Month: September 2021

  • Coming Down

    Tyler T. Schmidt (bio)

    A review of Montez, Ricardo. Keith Haring’s Line: Race and the Performance of Desire. Duke UP, 2020.

    I keep thinking about Juan Dubose crashing in the hallway while his boyfriend, artist Keith Haring, soldiers through a dinner at the poet John Giorno’s house in January 1985. The event, peopled with gay stars of the art world, was in honor of William Burroughs. The couple had been partying the night before at the Paradise Garage, the iconic club at 84 King Street in SoHo. Dubose spent the evening at Giorno’s on the hallway stairs, reportedly with his head in his hands. For all their interest in queer nightlife as utopian possibility and the sexy hedonism of Paradise Garage, where legendary DJ Larry Levan turned vinyl into magic, students of queer culture have paid little attention to the “come down”—that treacherous, often shameful journey when the drugs wear off. “Shattered,” as I’ve heard some Brits describe these states of extreme fatigue or excessive partying, always strikes me as a perfect encapsulation of that fragile, queasy undoing. In his revelatory Keith Haring’s Line: Race and the Performance of Desire, Ricardo Montez keeps company with Dubose in the hall. Quiet companionship, in fact, is often what we need when we’re coming down from the party. Montez is the sort of thoughtful critic who gives theoretical weight and respect to those too undone from the night before to endure the dinner party banter. Returning to Giorno’s self-satisfying account of sex with Haring in the Prince Street toilets in his collection You Got to Burn to Shine (1994), Montez questions the way Dubose is both hailed and marginalized in most accounts of Haring’s cross-race desires, energies that profoundly shape both his life and art:

    Giorno’s deployment and disregard of Dubose echo many of the ways in which Dubose exists as a defining and necessary figure in the romantic view of Haring as transcendent interracial lover, while being ignored and somewhat disposable in the setting of valued exchange between those in an esteemed gay artistic circle. (52)

    As Montez demonstrates persuasively in Keith Haring’s Line, the “deployment and disregard” of racial difference are central features of Haring’s creative practice. His relationships and artistic collaborations are marked by both a still-rare self-critique of whiteness, and an obliviousness to—if not a downright dismissal of—the exploitative power dynamics within these cross-racial encounters.

    My own return to Dubose in the hall admittedly risks sliding into the sentimental mythmaking and sloppy identification with blackness by white gay men that Montez interrogates. Dubose has become “a brown and black sign that is an amalgamation of projections” (16), not only in Giorno’s account of the dinner party, but in much of the scholarship on Haring’s art. A DJ and car-radio installer, Dubose was the first of several Black and Latino men with whom Haring was romantically and artistically involved. The thorniness of these relationships, in all their ethical and aesthetic complexity, is central to Montez’s book. Some will recognize Dubose from Polaroids taken by Andy Warhol in 1983—the source material for the ghostly silkscreens of varying hues that he made of Dubose and Haring. Montez confronts the material complexity of these images in the archive to see them differently. Now alight with intimacy, the images of Haring and Dubose intertwined refuse “narrative coherence” (18); they are what Montez calls “temporal freezes that index Haring’s notion of becoming other,” a fantasy of racial erasure that Haring believes interracial relationships might make possible (16). In returning to the archives to see what’s been missed or misread, Montez is not interested in historical rescue or corrective. In fact, he says such a project would be impossible in the case of Dubose, for whom no self-composed counternarrative exists. Rather, the book interrogates the ways in which narratives—particularly heteroheroic accounts of Haring’s life—invoke cross-racial desires but avoid any meaningful discussion of the very real humans hailed within these gestures and then fetishized, marginalized, and cast aside.

    Montez’s book is a welcome addition to a constellation of projects—some foundational, others newer—that pay fuller, much-needed attention to the exchanges between race and queer desire in New York City’s “Downtown scene” of the early 1980s: for example, José Esteban Muñoz’s “Famous and Dandy like B. ‘n’ Andy: Race, Pop, and Basquiat” in Disidentifications (1999); Arnaldo Cruz-Malavé’s Queer Latino Testimonio, Keith Haring, and Juanito Xtravanganza (2007); Dagmawi Woubshet’s treatment of Haring in The Calendar of Loss (2015); Joshua Chambers-Letson’s recent work on Tseng Kwong Chi in After The Party (2018); and W. Ian Bourland’s Bloodflowers (2019), a brilliant study of photographer Rotimi Fani-Kayode. While Haring’s sexual and artistic interest in Black and Latino men is well-documented, Montez is up to something deeper; he interrogates Haring’s desire for these men as part of a creative practice often animated by racial fantasies, including an “unfulfilled desire to have and be something other than white” (5). Drawing from the worlds of graffiti and the dance culture of the city’s B-Boys, Haring believes he can access “a nonwhite interiority” through his art (14). “I’m sure inside I’m not white,” the artist writes in his journal. This “remarkable claim,” as Montez describes it, is one of the theoretically rich spaces he explores in the book (119). Haring’s fantasy of racial transcendence remains relevant to our current moment when many white Americans are eager to distance themselves from whiteness, arriving late to the idea that racism is systemic.

    Montez’s deep dive into the meanings of Haring’s line, his signature strokes, seeks to disrupt restrictive narratives about racialized desire. Chapter One, which includes the critique of Giorno’s questionable commentary on Haring’s erotic life, begins with a discussion of the ways in which Haring’s bold, carved lines are problematically described as “primitive,” a discourse always burdened with Western supremacist ideology that seeks to contain “the Other.” In a moment of jargon-studded prose, Montez explains: “Haring’s citational line embodies the condition of the Western self that can only be recognized through a dialectical relationship with a premodern tribal other” (37). He links this re-evaluation of Haring’s primitivism to narratives of queer alterity, including Giorno’s. Placing Haring’s journals within a tradition of urban writing rooted in the “dark places of ordinary men” (50), Montez resituates Haring’s lines (on paper and concrete) within “a legacy of queer performative writing experiments” that are almost always marked by a romance with the “other” (34). Haring’s writing about encounters in the bathhouse documents feelings of “isolation and rejection” that also define these spaces of sexual promise (57).

    Haring’s collaborations with graffiti artists and hip-hop dancers strengthen his street credibility while his whiteness neutralizes the rhetoric of criminality associated with these subcultures. Chapter Two begins with the work of Angel Ortiz, the graffiti artist known as LA II. Like Dubose, Ortiz is relegated to “a secondary timeline” in Haring’s biography (15). LA II, it becomes clear, had to be strategic in order to prevent his art from being eclipsed by the celebrity artist he worked alongside. He had to reclaim his lines repeatedly.

    Montez scrutinizes Ortiz’s collaborations with Haring—which include a golden, graffitied sarcophagus—through an original analysis of power negotiations and aesthetics within a “queer economy of exchange” (63). Their relationship is read through discourses on public sex and rethinks the ethical complexities between gay men and “trade.” Montez is careful to draw out the nuances of the term, whose meanings include straight men who have sex with gay men, often for money. The chapter explores “narratives of queer urban contact” (67)—including those by John Rechy and Samuel Delany—in order to offer “trade aesthetics” as “a framework for thinking through the visual discursive field that both artists [Haring and LA II] come to occupy in the press and the reception of the work they created together” (72). This instructive analysis illuminates the ways an economy of desire also marks Haring’s lines, emerging in “friction of complicity, desire, and inequality” (82).

    In a discussion of some of the more troublesome moments in Samuel Delany’s now canonical treatise on sex and public space (Times Square Red, Times Square Blue), Montez asks us to think more fully about the racial and class dynamics that shape these encounters, and the ethical questions that are often missing or glossed over in cultural studies of public sex. For example, he uses Delany’s account of stymying a pickpocket at the theaters to explore ways in which this murky “moral imperative” (70) has more in common with the policing of queer and Black bodies than many would care to realize. This instructive re-reading describes and questions a “john subjectivity,” one that celebrates interclass contact but prefers that it “remain unsullied by the money he [Delany] pointedly wants to protect.” And Delany evidently doesn’t like to tip a go-go boy. Montez argues that such moments reveal the way “trade as an object of desire is often denied care through the very operations of desire” (71). While acknowledging that none of us can exist outside of these economies of desire (this too is a racial fantasy), Montez’s reflections on LA II and Delany urge us to think more deeply about the incidents of mistreatment and stances of moral superiority behind these supposedly liberatory encounters and sites. Montez’s discussion of cruising culture demonstrates the sort of nuanced critique often absent in scholarship on public sex, despite increasing interest in pre-AIDS sexual practices that animated sites like New York City’s West Side piers, bathhouses and discotheques.1 Given the longing within a younger generation of queers for the “good ol’ days,” queer scholars should continue to interrogate the limits of the utopic, liberatory possibilities that these forms of public sex and communal eroticism are said to offer (and sometimes do).

    Chapter Three, “Theory Made Flesh,” makes a satisfying pivot to consider Haring’s collaborations with the singular artist Grace Jones. With her hula-hoop antics and much-cited androgyny, Ms. Grace has become a patron saint of queer performance studies, and is deservedly fawned over by queer radicals. Montez’s reading highlights the way acts of “white male authorship” turn to Jones’s body “for the production of truth,” to realize creative plans rooted in an aestheticization of blackness (104–5). Critical of photographer Jean-Paul Goude for his manipulation of Jones’s physical form and personas to suit his own primitivist vision, Montez shifts our attention to the singer’s independent projects. Jones’s self-directed video “I’m Not Perfect (But I’m Perfect for You)” (1986) is dissected as a narrative of excess, an unraveling (or perhaps redirecting) of the pop primitivism foisted upon her by Haring, Goude, and other male collaborators. Ever-attentive to the nuances of creative collaboration, Montez does not position Jones as a victim of simplistic objectification or as a radical warrior dismantling the racial imaginary. He claims, rather, that Jones’s comments in her memoir about her decades of image (re)making express an “awareness of the impossibility of rescuing a prediscursive truth of black flesh” but also “her excited sense of complicity in the making of the Grace Jones myth,” working with and through the racist fantasies that animate many of her collaborations (87). This analytical move to recognize and value complicity as a form of artistic agency counters the eagerness of queer scholars to find a radicalism, a promise of subversion, an unsullied agency or just some redemptive breathing space for the artists we admire, even adore, but whose political and aesthetic flaws make unqualified reverence impossible. Jones approaches her performances—including one at the Paradise Garage in which she dresses in Haring’s lines—as “a space of constant uncertainty” (90). Rather than evade white male authorship, Jones conspires with it as part of a “continual attempt at rewriting the possibilities of her flesh” (105). In our now, students of queer studies should welcome a similar critical and political uncertainty into their work; otherwise, the field’s fixed attention on the “transformative” and “disruptive” reduces the expansive ways radical politics and progressive artmaking engage both dissent and complicity.

    The book’s final chapter shifts in structure and approach. Describing the chapter as a “subjective journey” into a cluster of Haring ephemera (112), Montez pushes against the confines of more traditional, chronologically bound artist monographs and the “heteroheroics” that often animate them. Placing himself within a lineage of queer critical writing, Montez uses “alternative modes of historical imagining” (111) to disrupt simplistic claims about Haring’s racial aesthetics as well as the staid forms often used to write about queer art. The chapter moves briskly and poetically through a range of objects, from Haring’s mural in the former men’s room of New York’s LGBT Community Center to his triptych at St. John the Divine to Rosson Crow’s radiant, drip-filled painting, a reinhabiting of the Pop Shop. While I am a fan of the collage format with its quick turns of poetic insight (haven’t we all spent more time than we wanted with an artifact in a monograph as a scholar’s close reading becomes microscopic?), these objects call for greater attention. Even as a “performance of ambivalence” (112), Montez’s fragments, observations, and refusals to make authoritative claims are too rapid, associative, and less satisfying than the careful, needed, and often surprising insights about Haring and his interlocutors offered in the previous chapters. However fleeting these object studies, I must admit that reading Keith Haring’s Line during this stay-at-home season made the textual visits around New York extra sweet, from the St. Marks Baths to the Whitney Museum of American Art to the LGBT Center to St. John the Divine. Despite the staggering amount of international travel that Haring did as his celebrity and commissions exploded, New York City was his home.

    Like Haring’s line, Montez’s prose is crisp and decisive. In this final chapter and throughout his readings, his beautiful writing invites readers to rethink our scholarly machines, to reimagine what critical writing and our theory-laden prose can do. Keith Haring’s Line places its author’s affective investments on full display. Reading (which is to say feeling) a set of photographs of Haring and Dubose at a beach in Brazil, Montez admits that one photo, lovingly dissected, “forces me to a state of intimacy that is more turbulent than a general ‘research’ interest” (128). I admire such projects for their permission to write differently, to feel “our” art differently, to imagine an embodied, affective criticism that takes seriously the feelings we have for the subjects we write about. So much critical writing is after all a gussied-up version of our admiration and irritations, and this work attempts to square deep affection and thorny ambivalence. In writing differently, Montez also encourages us to read differently: outside of standard conceptions of time, outside of rote narratives about Haring or any queer, canonical artist (from Basquiat to Mapplethorpe to Baldwin), and outside of the “celebrity artist” industry with its tote bags and lapel pins.

    This thoughtful journey into the thicket of Haring’s racialized desire got me wondering about his broader responses and commitments to racial justice and social change. I knew about his Free South Africa poster (1985) and Michael Stewart–USA for Africa (1985), his response (one can’t call it a portrait) to the graffiti artist’s murder. The latter was recently on display as part of a Jean-Michel Basquiat exhibition at the Guggenheim.2 His journals make few references to politics in general and even fewer comments on current events related to race, racial justice, or activism; the murder of Michael Stewart and the acquittal of the officers who killed him are the exception. He writes of giving Stevie Wonder, whom he met backstage at a concert in Rome in June 1989, some Free South Africa buttons and a T-shirt (Journals 356). The year before he asks: “How can it be possible that apartheid still exists? Dr. King was speaking against it 20 years ago. The world knows it’s wrong: journalists, protests, books, songs, movies–no matter how many oppose it, it exists now in 1988 and it is as strong as ever” (289). This rare comment on the historical sweep and structures of racism is part of a larger reflection on elitism and “manipulation” in the art world in which Haring draws connections between art, race, and “Big Control”: “The art world is just a small model or metaphor of the Big Control.” He goes on to say that “things are changing faster and faster.” And at the end of the journal entry, he quotes (and I cringe) Fanon’s rallying cry: “By any means necessary” (Journals 289–90).

    Montez’s project, in contrast, urges us to look at “Little” control: the daily workings of power that include the quotidian, interpersonal forms wielded by white gay men, and that Haring isn’t quite able or willing to engage. One of the great strengths of Keith Haring’s Line is its nuanced attention to the “various ways in which race is reified through often contradictory narratives” (5). The complexities of racialized desire are scrutinized in Haring’s art and journal writing, but Montez also composes a critical narrative that welcomes similar contradictions, neither condemnatory nor effusive about Haring’s creative engagement with racial difference. Haring’s fetishistic practices are laid bare, as are the murky violations of intimacies across race, but readers are also shown the ways Haring’s queer sensibility changed over time, though it can never be cleaved from racial eroticism and racial aesthetics. This sensibility was both (over)crafted and, most importantly, collective and collaborative. Montez insists that we pay attention to those collaborators and wrangle with the dubious ethics and problematic racial fantasies that emerge in our collaborations, both artistic and sexual.

    Whether in Juan Dubose’s mixtape or the blurred lines Haring painted on Grace Jones’s performatively defiant body, Keith Haring’s Line: Race and the Performance of Desire engages both loss and excess to imagine a history always slightly out of reach. At one point, in his reading of Haring’s journal entry about a snub at the bathhouse, Montez suggests poignantly that love is a kind of “waiting to possess” (56). Juan Dubose is crashing in the hall, but he is also waiting for Haring. A history of intimacy is made in such minor moments. But a waiting love can be agonizing and undoubtedly exacerbated by the come down, that woozy space that remains when earlier joys take leave.

    Tyler T. Schmidt is Associate Professor of English at Lehman College, City University of New York (CUNY) where he co-directed the Writing Across the Curriculum for nearly a decade. His essay “Lessons in Light: Beauford Delaney’s and James Baldwin’s ‘Unnameable Objects’” was published in the collection Of Latitudes Unknown: James Baldwin’s Radical Imagination (2019). The author of Desegregating Desire: Race and Sexuality in Cold War American Literature (2013), he is currently at work on a book about a group of Midwestern writers and visual artists who collectively reimagined queer portraiture in the 1940s and 1950s.

    Footnotes

    1. Examples of recent engagements with New York City’s architectures of public sex include: The Life and Times of Alvin Baltrop exhibition (2019) at the Bronx Museum of Art; W. Ian Bourland’s brilliant Bloodflowers (2019); Jonathan Weinberg’s Pier Groups (2019); The Queer Space Studies Initiative; Jack Halberstam’s “Unbuilding Gender: Trans* Anarchitectures In and Beyond the Work of Gordon Matta-Clark” (2018); and Fred Moten’s “Amuse-bouche” (2017).

    2. The exhibition, Basquiat’s “Defacement”: The Untold Story, at the Guggenheim from June 2019 to November 2019, centered on Basquiat’s visual protest, initially rendered on the walls of Haring’s studio, of Stewart’s death.

    Works Cited

    Haring, Keith. Keith Haring Journals. Viking, 2010.

  • Self-Reflexivity as Infra-Structure

    Jens Andermann (bio)

    A review of Benezra, Karen. Dematerialization: Art and Design in Latin America. U of California P, 2020.

    Over the course of little more than a decade, from the late 1950s to the early 1970s, Latin American art experienced a wholesale transformation. As evidenced by the diverse group invited to participate in the Museum of Modern Art’s landmark 1970 survey exhibition Information (Marta Minujin, Carlos D’Alessio, Cildo Meirelles, Hélio Oiticia, and Artur Barrio, among others), Latin American artists increasingly challenged earlier neo-avant-gardist references such as Concrete, Informal, or Minimalist art, embarking instead on a process of homegrown conceptual and political radicalization. Argentine artist Roberto Jacoby—then a leading proponent of arte de los medios (media art) with Raúl Escari—succinctly describes the sentiment at the time, reflecting on how he and his fellow artists around Buenos Aires’s trend-setting Instituto Di Tella art school

    entered a crazy race which, in just a few years, brought plastic artists to move from the bidimensional space of the painting to the object, in its multiple variants, and from there to concept-based works, to messages that reflect on themselves, and on to the dissolution of the very idea of work and its extension to the transformations operated by the mass communication media as well as to the framings of their context and to signposting social life, etc. All these approaches removed painters from their relationships with traditional materials, and brought them to reflect on their positions vis-à-vis the cultural institutions of the bourgeoisie, on the possibilities of carrying out a transformative practice, and on the best ways of taking it forward: the avant-garde became politicized.(qtd. in Longoni and Mestman 58; my translation)

    Writing in 1966 on Hélio Oiticica’s early “ambientations,” Brazilian critic Mário Pedrosa notes that this new cycle is “no longer purely artistic but cultural”; instead of the isolated, self-referential work, “what is dominant is the perceptive-sensory ensemble.” He speculates that this shift might also herald a broader turn towards an altogether new social and political role for the aesthetic, one he tentatively proposes to call “postmodern art” (Pedrosa 205).

    Recent art-historical scholarship and curatorial proposals reflect a re-ignited interest in Latin American late modernism, exemplified by recent shows such as the Hammer Museum’s 2019 Radical Women: Latin American Art, 1960–1985 and the Migros Museum’s 2016–2017 Resistance Performed: Aesthetic Strategies Under Repressive Regimes in Latin America. In her in-depth study of the period, Karen Benezra argues that scholars and curators have too rapidly glossed over the years separating the conceptualist moment from a fully-fledged “political art” that began with the landmark 1968 Tucumán Arde (Tucumán Is Burning) in Argentina or the ground-breaking 1970 Brazilian show Do Corpo à Terra (From Body to Ground, curated by Frederico Morais, who coined the concept of guerrilla art in the same year). On today’s global museum circuit, Benezra suggests, “Latin American modernism” is coded as always already incipient political intervention, something other than purely art in a way that “implies its fusion with life within the closed historical horizon of the short twentieth century” (166). By contrast, Benezra refuses to take the dissolution of the work-as-object—and its gradual replacement by self-reflexive stagings of artistic practice (in its double relationship with the art system and everyday social life)—as an interstitial moment en route to an avowedly political art practice. Instead, her book zeroes in on the moment of dematerialization itself. Rather than using the term in a descriptive and historicizing sense, Benezra endows dematerialization with conceptual and analytical valences, allowing us “to reconsider the relationship between antiformalist art and sociopolitical transformation” (2). She argues that, insofar as “the ‘material’ at stake in art and design’s dematerialization is not only that of the physical, tangible object, but also the objective, historical specificity of the intertwined logic and ideology that produce and reproduce social relations” (4), dematerialization can serve as “a certain kind of operational self-reflexivity” (167) present both in artistic practice and in the critical reflection that responds to it (and which becomes increasingly enmeshed with and indistinguishable from that artistic practice as it becomes more “dematerialized”). In current American artistic and art-historical circles, dematerialization is deployed as a means to an end, a way of naming the move away from the self-enclosed “work” and towards open-ended, propositional “practices”; Benezra cites Lucy Lippard’s landmark 1968 essay “The Dematerialization of Art” as a key example. But in the usage of Latin American artist-intellectuals—such as the Argentine psychoanalyst and semiotician Oscar Masotta or his compatriot, the designer, painter, and theoretician Tomás Maldonado (the subjects of chapters 1 and 4, respectively)—the term comes to stand for art’s problematic relation to social totality. Art can neither claim autonomy (in terms of its regime of production and circulation) from this whole, nor can it blend immediately into it as yet another instance of “resistance performed” (to quote the title of the Migros Museum’s recent retrospective).

    Her book’s subtitle is something of a misnomer; in truth, and contrary to what we might expect, Benezra’s study is not a survey of art and design in Latin America, or even of the relations between the two. Rather, it offers a series of punctual engagements with key instances of critical self-reflexivity on the part of selected artists and writers, all of whom are situated on the uncertain boundary between artistic practice, politics, and theory. Chapter 1 charts the work of Oscar Masotta, in particular his book-length essay El “pop-art” (1967) and its shorter sequel, “Después del pop: nosotros desmaterializamos” (“After Pop: We Dematerialize”), collected in Conciencia y estructura (Consciousness and Structure, 1968). Benezra discusses Masotta’s production of “anti-happenings,” including El helicóptero (The Helicopter, 1966), a parallel staging of different events under the same name that drew attention to the regime of producing representations and its structuring ideological matrices as audience members discussed and disputed their experiences. She also considers El mensaje fantasma (Phantom Message, 1966), which set up a feedback loop between a street poster and a TV ad in a kind of mass-medial Moebius strip. Both actions resonate strongly with Grupo Arte de los Medios’s conceptualization of media art, particularly their seminal non-event Happening para un jabalí difunto (Happening for a Dead Boar), produced the same year.

    Chapter 2 leaps to the opposite end of the subcontinent and Mexican poet-philosopher Octavio Paz’s series of engagements with the work of Marcel Duchamp. Benezra asserts that Paz’s engagements “articulate a theory of art after modernism and a theory of communality or social being after modernity” as well as offering “a theory of art’s dematerialization” (65). Rather than as shock-like ruptures of medial circuits that could produce critical and consciousness-raising effects, as for Masotta and the Arte de los Medios group, Paz

    tends to view non-object-based works like happenings as immediately ritualistic and communitarian in nature in that they have left behind both the modernist emphasis on the hand of the artist and the self-critical mythological symbolism that he imputes to [Duchamp’s] The Bride. (97)

    “Dematerialization,” in the Mexican poet’s hands, comes to underwrite a “peculiarly postmodern Romanticism” (79). In Chapter 3, we are taken to the opposite end of the Mexican cultural spectrum for a discussion of the loosely interconnected artistic collectives known as Los Grupos (The Groups). Through the 1960s and 1970s, they advanced “the collectivization of artistic practice” as a way of making “the crisis of art’s social authority” conversant with “the social form of labor” and its transformations in the advent of neoliberal modernization (104–5). Benezra references the work of artist-theoreticians Alberto Híjar Serrano and Felipe Ehrenberg, specifically the latter’s 1970 London show Seventh Day Chicken.

    Chapter 4 pivots from artistic practices to industrial design, focusing on Gui Bonsiepe, German designer and disciple of Maldonado at the Ulm School of Design (Hochschule für Gestaltung, HfG). Benezra considers his role in the short-lived Chilean Cybersyn project: the computational planning of socialized industrial production under Salvador Allende’s Unión Popular government. Bonsiepe’s retro-futuristic Operations Room—with its Star Trek-like swirling chairs and datafeed screens—provides the central nexus for a sweeping reading of the HfG Ulm’s controversies on functionalism, of the politics of cybermanagement in its complex and ambivalent relation to Chilean domestic politics, and of global political and socio-economic constellations during the final years of crisis of the post-WWII welfare state.

    Benezra’s criteria for selecting this corpus over others are not always clear, and the absence of any substantial discussion of Brazilian post-Concretist art is somewhat mystifying. Yet her in-depth engagement with Masotta, Paz, Híjar, Ehrenberg and Bonsiepe—not just as producers of artworks but as authors of art and design theory and criticism—offers an important corrective to art history’s common approach to the Global South as a provider of aesthetic “raw material” to be processed and refined by Northern metropolitan curation. The downside of giving over large parts of the book to the artists’ and theorists’ critical writings on dematerialization (as opposed to the artworks themselves) is that the feedback loops between ‘art theory’ and ‘practice’ they set in motion remain at times more abstractly implied than concretely illustrated. The chapter on Masotta, for instance, would have benefited from a more extensive discussion of the Grupo Arte de los Medios and of the trajectory of Jacoby in particular; Jacoby’s subsequent interaction with the Rosario-based group around Graciela Carnevale and Juan Pablo Renzi produced the legendary Ciclo de Arte Experimental and ultimately the counter-informational circuit of Tucumán Arde. This context would have added depth to the discussion of Masotta’s work.

    Benezra argues that Masotta’s writings on art occupy a crossroads where “the theoretical and practical imply each other and become legible together” (36). This claim could be extended to the other authors under study, and in fact constitutes one of the main tenets of her analysis as a whole. For Masotta, the artwork itself is already conceptually productive in its own right “at the disjunctive point between consciousness and structure” (31). In a detailed archaeology of its successive iterations, Benezra shows that Masotta’s notion of dematerialization—“as an interrogation into the logic or structuration of structure as such” (36)—comes into being in response to the controversy around the 1964 Di Tella prize. International jurors Clement Greenberg and Pierre Restany presented rival accounts of modernist art, the former praising abstract expressionism and the latter advocating for an object-based new materialism. In contrast, Masotta’s preference for pop must be read as “a metacritical polemic” (40) that seeks out the real as a structuring absence in the symbolic codes of mass culture that pop art brings into relief. Pop art “both describes and performs the experience of apperception” of the code (47), which the ideological work of mass-cultural apparatuses renders otherwise inaccessible. Thus, Benezra concludes,

    Masotta’s proposal for art’s dematerialization addresses the genesis of structure on two levels: both as a philosophical problem for materialism and as practical artistic response to the historical novelty of a society formally subsumed under the mass media. (47)

    Conversely, for Tomás Maldonado (in his almost simultaneous polemic with Max Bill over the transformative properties of functionalist design), dematerialization names a critical inflection; the earlier trust in design’s capacity to supersede the consumer object’s (mis)appropriation of use value gives way to an idea that style exceeds (social) function, at the same time pointing to the transformative potential latent in the design object’s own formal excess. During Maldonado’s time at the Ulm School of Design, and prior to its closure in 1968, the school’s focus gradually passed from the material object to the machinic patterns and cybernetic management of its production, into which “design planning” would intervene in an attempt at “expanding the field of applications for industrial design from household consumer objects to technological and information systems” (140). Bonsiepe attempted to bring this notion of design planning to the project of rationalized industrial production (itself cybernetic) under the umbrella of the Chilean Social Property Area, aiming to “find a new social outlet for the spiritual significance of form”: “the implementation of design planning in the Third World would transcend the rationalist impetus for modernization that had motivated the previous generation and transform it into a tool of social emancipation” (142). Benezra reads the ambivalent role of “stylistic excess” (147) in Bonsiepe’s Operations Room as at once standing in for and exposing the absence of technological infrastructure that would have enabled the project to make good on its promises. The example is fascinating insofar as she is able to show, through close analysis of its design operations, how “Cybersyn reveals the historical context and limitations of both the Popular Unity’s accelerationism and the utopian underpinnings of the HfG Ulm’s embrace of technique” (148). On Benezra’s reading, dematerialization becomes a methodology for investigating late-modernist Latin American art and design’s proleptic or anticipatory capacity: the ways in which it exposed and forecast an epochal transformation in social regimes of production that were only beginning to take hold at the time.

    Jens Andermann teaches at NYU and is an editor of the Journal of Latin American Cultural Studies. He is the author of Tierras en trance: arte y naturaleza después del paisaje (2018, forthcoming in English from Northwestern), New Argentine Cinema (2011), The Optic of the State. Visuality and Power in Argentina and Brazil (2007), and Mapas de poder: una arqueología literaria del espacio argentino (2000). His current work explores unspecific aesthetics as modes of survival in the inmundo, or earthwide precarity.

    Works Cited

    • Longoni, Ana and Mariano Mestman, eds. Del Di Tella a “Tucumán Arde”: Vanguardia artística y política en el 68 argentino. Eudeba, 2008.
    • Pedrosa, Mário. “Arte ambiental, arte pós-moderna, Hélio Oiticia.” (1966) Dos Murais de Portinari aos Espaços de Brasília. Perspectiva, 1980.
  • Afterword: Across Difference, Toward Freedom

    Keguro Macharia (bio)

    Invitation

    I was delighted when SA Smythe invited me to write this Afterword. It extended an earlier invitation issued in 2018 to participate in a symposium, “Troubling the Grounds: Global Figurations of Blackness, Nativism, and Indigeneity,” held in May 2019. My response to Dr. Smythe was short: “My mother has cancer—not a secret—and I’m her primary caregiver. I’m unable to travel out of the country.” It was more curt than I’d have liked; the schedule of doctor’s visits and regular tests and intermittent hospitalizations and homecare left me too exhausted to think with others, even too exhausted to write more elegant emails. Some tethers are more weighted than others. I am so grateful that the invitation remained open, and returned, and that I could accept it this time.

    This invitation arrived during a global pandemic, at a time of unrelenting grief and exhausting carework, a time of compounding losses and inventive mutual aid. A time when those vulnerable to premature death have been made even more vulnerable, while others have been made newly vulnerable. A time when thinking and writing have felt clotted: urgent in the face of ongoing devastation and impeded by the halting rhythms of fear and mourning. Time has felt interrupted and unending, labyrinthine and borrowed. We—I?—have struggled to document what it feels like to try to live now, and wondered what forms of analyses and invention can suffice to name our present.1 We—I?—have wondered if all writing is useless unless eulogy and obituary, and know that, in some way, every piece of writing is infused with the sound and feeling of loss.

    Interruption and truncation have become rhythms of living and thinking, ways of marking the impossibility of time. Rest in Peace (RIP) and pole saturate the air:2 grief thickens, as does rage. And these mark the sayable—often choked out, always necessary, especially when survival and freedom are at stake, and especially when survival and freedom are framed as antagonists by those who want our survival, but not our freedom. I am not trying to be abstract—it is simply that geohistories stack against each other, and over and over we tell each other that India feels like Kenya feels like South Africa feels like Canada feels like England feels like the U.S. feels like Uganda feels like . . . : minoritized lives are at stake; minoritized lives are considered disposable; and minoritized lives are further minoritized by state neglect and abandonment. Everything is not everything—sometimes, it feels like it is.

    And still, there is invitation: to think with and along, to imagine from where we are toward freedom, to see with clarity all the ways we are assembled as the undone and the unmade and to know with certainty all the ways we make ourselves possible as we pursue freedom. I can do no better than to echo and amplify the invitation that was extended to me. I invite you to read and reread the assembled writing, as I have also been invited to read and reread, to learn and to imagine toward freedom.

    Geohistories

    I am writing from Nairobi, Kenya. The name Nairobi is derived from the Maasai phrase Enkare Nyrobi—place of the cool waters. A wandering nation, a nation of people who pursue life on the move—contact, pleasure, trade, food, adventure—the Maasai model ways to think about ancestral naming that do not privilege ownership. Not “I name this and so it belongs to me,” but “I passed here, noticed my experience of it, named that experience, and in that naming created dreams that might shape how others experience it.” Against the press of dangerous, ongoing ethnonationalisms in Kenya, where certain ethnic groups claim specific lands and attempt to expel others from those lands, I have been trying to imagine relations to place and space that are not based on exclusionary ownership. It might be that some names invite us to share experiences—a club named bliss, a bar named happy, a mountain named cold, a food named delicious—and that place is an invitation, not a boundary.

    Geohistories: Where we call from and are called to assemble so that we may think together, dream together, imagine freedom together, practice freedom together.

    From this particular geohistory, the term “indigenous” resonates differently. The history of what was first named part of British East Africa in the 1890s and then Kenya in 1920 is often taught as a history of migration by diverse people into this region. When they arrived—from western Africa or northern Africa or central Africa or southern Africa or from the Indian Ocean coast—they mixed in a range of ways, sharing some resources and fighting over others, trading with and raiding from each other. They borrowed names and rituals, ways of living and loving, forms of being legible and gendered. Perhaps I am being romantic about this. Yet Kenya’s historians teach us that what we now know as fixed ethnic groups with discrete characteristics took shape during colonialism: laws restricted movement, insisting that particular people came from and inhabited certain areas. Groups were described as “agricultural” or “martial,” as “traders” or “nomads,” as “sedentary” or “mobile.” Colonial laws insisted on genealogy and identity: colonized Africans needed to carry identity cards that named an ethnicity, a bounded region named “origin,” a white employer’s name, and an African father’s name.3

    I am burying a story.

    Those who migrated to what became Kenya found other people living here: the Ogiek and the Sengwer, among others. The Maasai described some of these people as “Dorobo,” which means people without cattle, poor people. In the Coastal areas, the Somali named them “Boni,” which means people without possessions (Schmidt-Soltau 15).4 Difference precedes colonial naming, even as colonialism shadows what we know as knowledge, and it’s difficult to know how the Maasai and Somali intended these terms. It’s easy to hear contempt in what might simply be a way to describe difference. In the colonial languages we have inherited, members of these groups were called “hunters-gatherers”; contemporary official documents still use the term. This designation erases the ways in which these groups tended to and were tended by the lands they traversed, how they named place and space, formed maps of experience and intimacy.

    Those who moved to Kenya interacted with these indigenous groups. At a benign level, they exchanged goods and practices, and were intimate in a range of ways. Less benignly, some migrating groups dispossessed indigenous groups, snatching lands and other resources. There might have been attempts at ethnocide. During the colonial period (1895–1963) and post-independence (1963 to the present), successive governments continued to dispossess indigenous groups, primarily by evicting them from traditional forests they inhabited and tended. As elsewhere around the world, indigenous people in Kenya—and Africa—are subject to state violence.

    Per the 2005 Report of the African Commission’s Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities, the term “indigenous” is contested.5 All African people are indigenous to the continent, the Report specifies, but “African people have for centuries been migrating from various parts of the continent and there have been wars of conquest, which shaped the character of nationalities” (12). I appreciate the report’s attention to movement and experience, to an Africa of migrating people who lived with difference and conflict, war and conquest. Yet as the Report notes, those who moved found other people living where they settled, people who had relations to their spaces, including the Hadzabe in what is now northern Tanzania; the Batwa who live in the equatorial forests of Central Africa and the Great Lakes region; and the San of Southern Africa. I find useful this general description from the Report:

    To summarize briefly the overall characteristics of the groups identifying themselves as indigenous peoples: their cultures and ways of life differ considerably from the dominant society and their cultures are under threat, in some cases to the extent of extinction. A key characteristic for most of them is that the survival of their particular way of life depends on access and rights to their traditional land and the natural resources thereon. They suffer from discrimination as they are being regarded as less developed and less advanced than other more dominant sectors of society. They often live in inaccessible regions, often geographically isolated and suffer from various forms of marginalisation, both politically and socially. They are subject to domination and exploitation within national political and economic structures that are commonly designed to reflect the interests and activities of the national majority. This discrimination, domination and marginalisation violates their human rights as peoples/communities, threatens the continuation of their cultures and ways of life and prevents them from being able to genuinely participate in deciding on their own future and forms of development. (89)

    As might be expected in an official document from the African Union, terms such as “dominant society” and “national majority” obscure the role of the state in harming indigenous groups. Moreover, the human rights frame used to address ways in which these groups are minoritized relies on definitions of the human that must exclude these groups, given that rights discourses and practices are subtended by white supremacist definitions of those humans who are eligible for rights. And let me emphasize one final point: these groups have been victimized by extractive practices that steal and poison their lands, on the one hand, and by conservation practices that purport to save forests and other natural resources on the other.

    I am still trying to work the seam between indigenous and African, to trouble the idea of indigenous African by pointing out that it must hold at least two meanings: to name the rupture of colonial modernity that deracinates through slavery across all African oceans—the Atlantic, the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean—and to name various groups whose practices of living and tending to the earth are disrupted by European colonialism and the extractive practices it bequeaths to Africa’s nation-states. Indigenous African sounds and means differently depending on who says it and where they say it from and what forms of relation they want to name and foster.

    In a remarkable conversation with Dionne Brand, Michi Saagiig Nishnaabeg writer, artist, and scholar Leanne Betasamosake Simpson provides a way to think about indigenous relations to land and the ongoing work of dispossession by the Canadian state. She states:

    Land is very important to Indigenous Peoples, but we think of land quite differently from the colonizers. For us, land is not an enclosure that is protected by a border. Land is not a natural resource to exploit. Land is not a commodity. It is a particular space full of relationality to which we form very deep attachments over very long periods of time. Nation-states need to remove Indigenous bodies from land in order to commodify land and exploit natural resources.

    Simpson’s thinking gives flesh to a common understanding in Kenya: indigenous communities tend forests and waterways, as they are also tended by those forests and waterways. Despite knowing this, the Kenyan state is determined to dispossess these communities. And it might be that the very idea of Kenya depends on dispossessing indigenous communities, repeating and extending the violence of dispossession through which Kenya came into being.

    Listening

    I am listening to and listening for.

    Listening to attempts to suspend those habits of interruption that would demand context and theory and justifications and persuasion and evaluation. It is difficult and necessary. Listening for attempts to catch those difficult registers, barely audible in the noise of the quotidian. It is ongoing training in working across difference. Listening for has no interest in mastering what is heard, nor in deferring ethical and moral questions. It knows that much is missed, but hopes that what is caught enables the shared work of pursuing freedom.

    Listening to and for.

    Drawing on the practices and histories of our ancestors and our interactions with the indigenous peoples of these lands, scholars within western hemispheric Black Studies continue to ask ourselves, how does black life fit into (or not) the histories and ongoing conquest and colonization of peoples and their homelands? (Sandra Harvey)

    Listening to and for.

    We cannot want witchcraft—even as we might want its heresy—and yet it remains, producing spectacular violence and spectacular objects that unsettle the social. And yet, there is something seductive about witchcraft, about the power it possesses and can transmit. This power is not just a discursive referent to things that have actual power. In this sense, witchcraft is not merely a critique of capitalism or of the particular workings of any given African nation state, but of sovereign power and those who wield it. (Alírio Karina)

    Listening to and for.

    What does it mean for African-descended and Indigenous communities to farm alongside one another in the urban Bay Area?

    . . .

    The vegetable beds tended by Sogorea Te’ Land Trust and Black Earth Farms offer an existing model of co-constituted, land-oriented care between Black and Native communities. This site of growth and abundance – fed by and illustrative of Black and Indigenous political imaginaries that diverge from the model of nation-making predicated on exploitation, dehumanization, and dispossession – pushes against prevailing white settler geographies that imagine African-descended and Indigenous peoples as placeless. (Sarah Fong)

    Listening to and for.

    Sonja Larson, Camari Serau, and Mere Tuilau are all born out of a Blackness whose lineages of resistance and liberation anchor and overlap in Papua. . . . This essay bears witness to the clarity and courage of Melanesian women and gender nonconforming people.

    Black is the color of solidarity. (Joy Enomoto)

    Listening to and for.

    My Central America is Caribbean. My Central America is a Caribbean Coast whose natural resources and peoples have and continue to be exploited by US imperialism. My Central America is Black, Black Indigenous to be exact, whose descendant’s survivors of the transatlantic slave trade and Carib-Arawak indigeneity on the Antillean island of St. Vincent and whose marronage and exile call Central America’s Caribbean Coast: home. To be Garifuna is to be Caribbean and Central American simultaneously. I am the grandchild of banana workers from Tela and Balfate, Honduras whose transmigrations to Harlem, New York, in 1964 was made possible by the political mobilization of Garveyism and whose parents met in Bedford-Stuyvesant, Brooklyn in 1982. My Black Central America is also New York City. (Paul Joseph Lopéz Oro)

    Listening to and for.

    In 2015, we began assembling a dialogue among Black identified scholars committed to research focusing on Black diasporan people about how Black Studies might approach Native and Indigenous Studies. (Chad Infante, Sandra Harvey, Kelly Limes Taylor, Tiffany King)

    Listening to and for.

    The recognition of genocide is caught in a double bind. Where acknowledgement of an ongoing genocidal process unfolds before a spectatorial international community, or where retrospective recognition is circumvented because of its political inconvenience and unsettling potential, inaction is tantamount to denial. But limiting our understanding of victimization by framing it according to the western episteme is also a kind of a denial. It renders and interprets history solely as an attempt to reassert the primacy of imperial humanity: the reinscription of the power to demarcate the killable from those who must not and should not be killed (and the mutable boundary between these non-discrete categories). Whether this is a product of our limited socio-political imagination or of the legal structure’s limited capacity for redress (and the destabilizing potential of reparations, particularly if recompense were to be defined by the harmed parties in question), it is certainly reflective of the pitfalls of endeavoring towards “the human.” (Zoé Samudzi)

    (At this point, every single part of me that has ever taught is telling me I have over-quoted and I need to summarize and synthesize so the reader can grasp my main point. I am still listening to and listening for.)

    For several years, Christina Sharpe has posted two or more images simultaneously with the tag, “Thinking Juxtapositionally.”6 From this practice, I have learned to ask what kind of thinking happens when synthesis is not the goal, when there is no single position to stage or oppose, when we are told to hold multiple things together. To be against synthesis? Yes, when such synthesis overlooks the textures of difference, misses the accents and demands of geohistories. Placed alongside, some things may desire contact, inch toward a seam, perhaps tight, perhaps gaping. Other things may desire touch but know that it cannot be sustained, and so they approach each other carefully. Longing is the name of the gap. And yet others fold into each other, forming a sharp crease—the join is visible, and difference remains. Freedom is a practice of and across difference. I will return to this.

    Difference & Freedom

    Freedom is a practice of difference.

    Increasingly, I am convinced that difference must subtend and sustain freedom dreams and practices, and that in starting with and staying with difference, those of us interested in pursuing and practicing freedom might avoid the disappointments that come with demands for unity. I am guided in this by Audre Lorde:

    Within the interdependence of mutual (nondominant) differences lies that security which enables us to descend into the chaos of knowledge and return with true visions of our future, along with the concomitant power to effect those changes which can bring that future into being. Difference is that raw and powerful connection from which our personal power is forged. (111–112)

    By way of closing, and by closing I mean to extend the invitation with which I started, let me return to thinking in this issue. Chad Infante writes, “The Black diaspora in the Americas need not claim indigenousness or nativeness to the Americas—or even to Africa for that matter—to make political and long-lasting connections with the Indigenous peoples of Africa or the Americas.” And I nod: freedom is a practice of difference. Tiffany Lethabo King writes, “I tend to find that much of the literature and critical theory in Black diasporan studies that addresses the Middle Passage and the enslavement of Black people lacks a robust grammar for talking about land. I think it is very difficult for descendants of the middle passage to have a discussion with Indigenous people in the Americas, Africa and across the globe about land.” And I nod, and I wonder what relations to earthliness might sustain engagement across difference. And perhaps the experience of space to which I gesture in the brief discussion of Maasai cosmologies is useful: not ownership, but an experience of place, an expectation of place. I garden—badly, amateurishly—and so I was drawn to Sarah Fong’s writing about how Black and Native communities farm alongside each other, tending the earth as it, in turn, tends them. What might it mean not simply to attend to each other, as is now common to say in an academic vernacular, but to tend to each other? To tend to each other in how we tend to the earth? How might grammars and practices of care and repair be central to inhabiting the seam of difference between and across Black and Native in shared quests for freedom?

    I am listening to and listening for the registers in which freedom is sought and practiced, across difference. And I am grateful for the care with which the contributors to this issue have listened to and listened for each other, across geohistories, daring to imagine that the difficult is not the impossible, and that we can imagine and tend a more shareable earth. We dream freedom as we practice it every day.

    Keguro Macharia

    Nairobi

    January 2021

    Keguro Macharia is from Nairobi, Kenya. Author of Frottage: Frictions of Intimacy across the Black Diaspora, Keguro blogs at gukira.wordpress.com.

    Footnotes

    1. Repetition has become one of those forms. I repeat myself constantly in this writing. It mirrors how often we now express condolences. It is deliberate.

    2. Pole is a Kenyan term to share grief. See Macharia, “Pole.”

    3. For more, see foundational works by Bethwell A. Ogot, A History of the Southern Luo (East African Publishing House, 1967) and Godfrey Muriuki, A History of the Kikuyu: 1500–1900 (Oxford UP, 1974).

    4. Also see http://www.ogiek.org.

    5. I dislike reading and citing from such reports very much—I use them to track official narratives by state and extra-state bodies.

    6. Much of this practice is archived on a tumblr space https://hystericalblackness.tumblr.com

    Works Cited

    • African Commission on Human and People’s Rights. Report of the African Commission’s Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities. Banjul, 2005.
    • Lorde, Audre. “The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House.” Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches, Crossing P, 2007, pp. 110–114.
    • Macharia, Keguro. “Pole.” Popula, 20 Dec. 2018. https://popula.com/2018/12/20/pole/. Accessed 9 Jun. 2021.
    • Schmidt-Soltau, Kai. Indigenous Peoples Planning Framework for the Western Kenya Community Driven Development and Flood Mitigation Project and the Natural Resource Management Project.
    • Final Report, Republic of Kenya, Office of the President & Ministry of Water and Irrigation & Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, Dec. 2006. https://documents1-worldbank-org.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/curated/en/117131468091477136/pdf/IPP199.pdf. Accessed 9 Jun. 2021.
    • Simpson, Leanne Betasamosake and Dionne Brand. “Temporary Spaces of Joy and Freedom: Leanne Betasamosake Simpson in conversation with Dionne Brand.” Literary Review of Canada, Jun. 2018. https://reviewcanada.ca/magazine/2018/06/temporary-spaces-of-joy-and-freedom/. Accessed 3 Jun. 2021.
  • Paradox of Recognition: Genocide and Colonialism

    Zoé Samudzi (bio)

    Abstract

    The recognition of and desire to prevent genocide are unquestionable social and political necessities. But despite genocide’s standardization and codification in international law, understandings and applications of its meaning are still contested. Using Germany’s response to the 1904–1908 Ovaherero and Nama genocide and Raphael Lemkin’s response to the Civil Rights Congress’s 1951 “We Charge Genocide” petition to the United Nations, this paper argues the necessary existence of an anti-Black exception to acknowledgements of genocide, yielding a paradox in our understandings of recognizing genocide that renders Black death necessary.

    I

    Paul Gilroy offers “paralyzing guilt” and “productive shame” as two approaches to state and community engagement after genocide (99). He confers upon shame positive political and psychological qualities, including the collective impulse to repair historical harm. Yet it is paralyzing guilt that compels Germany to commemorate in perpetuity the genocidal wrongdoings it perpetrated against German and European Jews in the Second World War to the preclusion of proper recognition of and restitution for other genocidal crimes for which it is responsible. The specter of the Nazism rightfully drives both national and continental commemorations of lives taken so that such horrors might not be repeated: “Never again, goes the maxim. The Nazi Holocaust provides the framework for the definition of genocide under international law. The 1951 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide formalizes Raphael Lemkin’s definition of mass eliminatory murder first published in his 1944 landmark text, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. The term combines the Greek génos (meaning “race” and denoting a group of people with a common origin or descent) with the Latin suffix –cide (meaning “killing”). Lemkin’s definition revolves fundamentally around colonialism, emerging from his study of the collective annihilation of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and colonial projects in the Americas. The Convention posits a standard definition for prosecuting “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,” and its passage in 1951 formally criminalizes genocide while implicitly codifying who can and cannot be killed.

    In a recent iteration of the enduring debate about historiographic considerations of German genocide (i.e. whether Nazi genocide was a singular phenomenon as opposed to part of a historical arc or relational framework of German racial statecraft), historian Dirk Moses offers a provocation that analogizes dominant German memory culture as religious orthodoxy. This political catechism is governed, most critically, by the twinned ideas that, first, the uniqueness of the Nazi Holocaust arises from the hate-motivated desire to eliminate European Jewry: that “it was the unlimited Vernichtung der Juden (extermination of Jews),” which is distinct from the “limited and pragmatic aims of other genocides.”1 Second, the attempted racial annihilation driven purely by this antisemitic ideology thus represents a politically foundational “Zivilisationsbruch (civilizational rupture)” for which Germany has a responsibility to atone (Moses).

    In the case of the Ovaherero and Nama genocide during and after the 1904–1908 Herero Wars in German South West Africa (present-day Namibia), inertia has forestalled productive shame or even the complete acknowledgement of violence. We may understand the roots of this denialism—the relative lack of public recognition and acknowledgement in Germany and around the world—as a coupling of anti-blackness with a hesitation to frame the processual and destructive violence of coloniality as genocidal. To recognize it as such would negate the dominant idea that collectivized punishment and community destruction are rare and preventable as opposed to a common aspect of colonial projects. Instead, genocide is understood as singularly event-based per jurisprudential precedents set by post-war prosecutions of Nazi perpetrators at Nuremberg. Culpability for genocide is also informed by the ideological genesis of property rights: a legal subjecthood centered on the singular citizen-subject. It is, therefore, part of the Eurocentric framing of genocide that responsibility for perpetrating acts of mass atrocity resides with guilty individuals and political regimes rather than with entire nation-states and the logics that animate and sustain them. The precedent set by Nuremberg adjudicates that “crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, [and] ‘only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced’” (Nollkaemper 621). But in the wake of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, and in a jurisprudential moment shaped by subsequent ad hoc tribunals (e.g. the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda) and the creation of the International Criminal Court, new legal attention has been paid to hybridized individual-structural notion of responsibility where acknowledging state responsibility does not preclude that of the individual (Milanović 554; Gaeta 643). In asking about complicity, international law grapples with the question of whether the real agent of genocide is the state itself or those working on its behalf:

    What is the role of each? . . . There is no question that the state can act only through its agents. On the other hand, the agents, if acting within their powers, are acting only for and on behalf of the state. When genocide is committed, upon whom then must the curtain fall? Is the responsibility of one dependent on the other? (Asuncion 1218)

    Many of the machinations of the Nazi Holocaust were founded in Germany’s colonizing of South West Africa (Madley 430). Where genocidal antisemitism is an attempted extermination of European Jews following the molecularized distillation of Jewishness to an essential racial quality, Germany’s genocidal practices were first enacted outside of the European continent; necropolitical organizing forms in the metropole were first attempted in the colony, the “site where sovereignty consists fundamentally in the exercise of a power outside the law” (Mbembe 23). After all, Hitler “applied to Europe colonialist procedures which until then [had] been reserved exclusively for the Arabs of Algeria, the ‘coolies’ of India and the ‘niggers’ of Africa” (Césaire 36). Before the Nazi campaign embarked on its “struggle for space,” imperial Germany materialized its conquest of German South West Africa in similar ideological terms (Giaccaria and Minca 20). It strove to create an outpost in its southern African colony “that did not have to shy away from a comparison with the German homeland,” exporting the notion of Lebensraum that had captured the German geopolitical imagination to actualize it via a careful “‘scientific method’ in ‘indigenous policy’” (Zimmerer, “In Service of Empire” 69). While “scientific method” may be a metaphor for methodically crafted bureaucracy and policy directed toward the native inhabitants of this conquerable African land, it can also allude to the methodological crafting of spatial management administration: a part of what Bench Ansfield describes as “the spatial and bodily purification of blackness and the environmental conditions associated with this racial classification” (127). The logics for racial management in both German genocides are rooted in colonial claims to land-based sovereignty defined by bounded territorializations of identity. In considering these two genocides the results of that racial policy, it becomes unnecessary to assert singular causality (i.e. the Nazi Holocaust was motivated solely by antisemitic animus, though it was an overwhelming and significant motivation) or exceptionalism of either event (i.e. the unprecedentedness of Nazi antisemitism, German genocide, or Nazi race science). The varying contexts of genocidal crimes make all genocides unique, but the layered and processual governing logics of race-making co-constitute anti-Black and antisemitic racialization. The horrors enacted in German South West Africa provided the ideological and material scaffolding through which German statecraft unfolded itself in Europe in its management of populations perceived to present existential threats to German sovereignty. Rather than competition for primacy in historical memory, we can recognize how the genocide of the Ovaherero and Nama brought race war and mass extermination into the arsenal of future German necropolitical possibility and the state’s brutal attempt to resolve the ongoing “Jewish question” once and for all.2

    The social Darwinist paradigm of the time informed an organismic view of community interactions within nation-states rooted in the concept of purity. These ideas underpin Lebensraum, in which Raum (“room”) contours oppositional definitions of the self and the other within a regime of biologized state-making that is always already racialized (Heffernan 45). Skirmishes over land and resources were formalized into military strategies like the Herero Wars. General Lothar von Trotha’s declaration in October 1904 was decidedly genocidal; in threatening all Ovaherero peoples who did not cede their land with certain death, all indigenous people were transformed into enemy combatants by the mere nature of a blackness that presented an obstacle to German claims to land. War extracted indigenous Namibians, now enemies of the state, from German subjecthood and from any proximity to the realm of the human; “savage life [was] just another form of animal life,” and this animalization of native Africans through eugenicist racial science further nullified African land claims and social orders and enabled Europeans to impose their own notions of ownership and personhood/subjecthood (Mbembe 24; Nhemachena and Dhakwa 73–6).

    Von Trotha’s “race war” produced racialized and gendered geographies by coupling premeditated extermination with “cleansing” space through internment and labor/prison camp structures (Zimmerer, “The Model Colony” 51). The notion of Lebensraum (“living space”) is incomplete without a corresponding Entfernung (“removal”) in whatever manner the specific racialized nation-state project dictates. The shared logics of German racial production within both imperial and Nazi moments are striking. Rather than being unique to the Nazi regime, biologizations of citizenship and territorializations of a racialized nation-state identity are fundamental to the European liberal project that contoured relationships between the [unenslaveable] white European and the racialized and enslaveable non-European “Other.” The racial “Other” exists, foundationally, in a subjugated master/slave symbiosis with the dominating force of whiteness grounded in the social death of an African native recognized solely through its subordination by European coloniality. The natives were alienated and socially-dead persons whose own social orders were delegitimized (and eventually destabilized and destroyed), and so had “no socially recognized existence” outside of European subjecthood. This social death of the native—one rooted in eugenicist explanations of inferiority—justified segregation and a ban on racial mixing. The socially-dead person is a polluting person, and mixing would compromise racial purity (Patterson 322).

    Since Namibian independence in 1990, the question of reparations has been actively engaged by survivor communities, complicated by the fact that all the perpetrators have long since passed away (Sprenger et al. 132). In 2017, an American federal court heard the first arguments of the descendants of surviving Ovaherero and Nama peoples in a class action lawsuit brought against the German government. A previous suit was filed in 2001; the Herero People’s Reparations Corporation made an unsuccessful legal claim, which nevertheless widened the forum of public debate about Germany’s obligations for victims of its colonial past. Though the Minister for Economic Development and Cooperation stated in 2004 that the nation accepted its “historical and moral responsibility,” Germany has also stated publicly that any court settlement would not include reparations to the communities of survivors even if Namibians were successful in their legal claims. The longstanding line taken by the German state is that only historical events committed after 1951—when the convention went into effect—can be classified as genocide. Yet in 2016 the German Bundestag passed a resolution describing the Ottoman massacre of Armenians (in which Germany was complicit) as a genocide, even jeopardizing diplomatic relations with Turkey in doing so. In May 2021, the German government announced it would officially recognize the atrocities committed in Namibia as genocide. The German government additionally but separately pledged €1.1 billion (USD $1.3 million) towards existing Namibian development programs to be disbursed over the next thirty years, but has been adamant that this payment should not be understood as reparations for fear that a successful reparations claim would set a precedent for similar demands by other formerly colonized peoples (Oltermann “Germany Agrees to Pay”). Ovaherero and Nama communities and leaders were insulted by the diplomatic gesture: not only were negotiations conducted in their absence (the deal is a bilateral agreement between the German and Namibian governments), but it is unclear whether any of the pledged aid will be allocated to them. Part of Germany’s justification for refusing reparations is the unprecedentedness of restitution being paid more than a century after the event, yet how is it possible to atone for a genocide without pointedly addressing the demands and/or material conditions of affected communities?

    The 2017 lawsuit involved Germany’s claim to sovereign immunity, which the Ovaherero and Nama delegation contested (as plaintiffs). In appellate court following the original filing, the delegation argued that the human remains included in the sale of Felix von Luschann’s teaching collection to the American Museum of Natural History (AMNH) constituted commercial rather than sovereign activity, because “Germany packaged, shipped, traded, and trafficked its genocide victims to New York in 1924, within a ‘[p]urchase’” and that “the skulls were ‘[r]eceived [f]rom’: the ‘Museum für Völkerkunde, Berlin, Germany,’ the Museum of Ethnology, a German agency and instrumentality” (Plaintiffs-Appellants’, Rukoro). The international nature of the acquisition, transfer, and sale of the remains underscores the internationalism of geographies of domination, which are “conceptually and materially bound up with racial . . . displacement and the knowledge-power of a unitary vantage point” (McKittrick xvi). Despite having previously acknowledged responsibility for these colonial acts of violence, Germany’s legal rebuttal describes the “alleged. . . genocide of Ovaherero and Nama civilians and unlawful taking of their property in violation of international law in 1884–1915 in Hereroland and Great Namaqualand, sovereign polities now part of the Republic of Namibia” (Brief for Defendant, Rukoro; emphasis added). But while genocide was not specifically a crime until its formalization in the Convention, international customary law nevertheless criminalized “wars of extermination and annihilation against peoples and tribes capable of life and culture” (Plaintiffs-Appellants’, Rukoro). The plaintiff brief goes on to state:

    Germany’s logic was that, as the Ovaherero and Nama faced extinction by genocide, samples of these two peoples must be preserved for science and posterity. These takings were thus the souveniring of genocide and so a continuation of the same, which makes the AMNH as much a locus of Germany’s crime as [the] Shark Island [concentration camp] itself.3 [The nature of the taking of human remains] is also reflected by its methods; here, for example, forcing women prisoners to remove the flesh from boiled heads of their own kin. . . . Germany sought to cause maximal loss, extract all profit from its slaves (down to their skulls), and reinforce white supremacy through dehumanization. By taking these skulls, Germany’s message was not only that Herero and Nama lives did not matter, but that they were not really human lives at all. (Plaintiffs-Appellants’, Rukoro; emphasis added)

    The lawsuit came to a close in 2020 when the United States Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit dismissed the Ovaherero and Nama delegation’s appeal, affirming the reality and legitimacy of claims of genocide but finding the “plaintiffs’ allegations insufficient to trace the proceeds from property expropriated more than a century ago to present‐day property owned by Germany in New York” (Ruling on Appeal, Rukoro).

    In returning to the idea that the definition of “genocide” effectively codifies who can and who cannot be killed, it is imperative to understand that the application of this international law is constrained by the ideology of the global political system that constructs it. Central to European subjecthood is the idea of property rights and individualism: a racialized regime of ownership that renders some citizens, and others property (Bhandar 3–7). Per Walter D. Mignolo, “the concepts of ‘man’ and ‘human’ went hand in hand with the emergence of the concept of ‘rights,’” imagined in service of the construction of a colonial world, and so were inextricably linked to state/nationhood (“Who” 7–8). “Human rights law . . . aspires to name, define, call into being, [and] redeem the human” through the transformation of what should be some innate or inalienable condition to a legally informed social-political status, or what Esmeir names “juridical humanity” (1544). The codification of humanity established by human rights conventions is an institutionalization of racial hierarchies and a “narrative privileging of white life/death as the instance through which other peoples’ encounters with Western modernity’s logics of racial extermination/terror…are to be apprehended, calibrated, and conceptually qualified” (Rodriguez 20). Discussions of African genocide in relation to colonial violence become paradoxical because “the African anthropos who exist (not live) in the zone of nonbeing cannot suffer human rights abuses when they are in fact regarded as ‘non humans’. Non-humans cannot suffer human rights abuses” (Benyera et al. 190). Foucault usefully shows that the emergent biopolitical regime equates corporal punishment with a political anatomy: the body is understood as a malleable and manipulatable “docile body” that can be maximized and transformed and treated as a means of social and economic production through racial capitalist systems of enslavement (135). He also describes a modern disciplinary regime inextricably linked to medicalization, demonstrating the emergence of the panopticon from strategies of medical containment during the bubonic plague (195). But he notably fails to account for the centrality of colonization and racialization in this genealogy of Man4: he does not connect racial production in the colonial elsewhere to the violence within and by the modern European state, yet this violence animates what Frantz Fanon describes as the “epidermalization of inferiority” (xv), and inscribes the schema of anti-Blackness upon the bodies of people racialized as Black. Race-making is a part of a sociogenic5 process through which racialization acts as a “biocultural stigmatic apparatus,” where desires for dominance are justified through scientific articulations and “assemblages of human flesh that invest human phenomenology with an aura of extrahuman physiology” (Weheliye 51). The scientific logics that justify race, equivalent to biological life itself, become “a master code within the genre of the human represented by western Man,” yoked to “species-sustaining physiological mechanisms in the form of a global color line” (Weheliye 27). There is no a priori or autopoietic6 existence for blackness within the realm of humanity: the “human” emerges only through material articulations constructed and propagated by sovereign and other powerful entities able to project their own notion of the “human” and of the “self.”

    In considering these non-recognitions or even articulated recognitions that attempt to minimize or circumvent responsibility for harm,7 we find that denial acts not simply as a refusal to acknowledge an event, but also in the truncation of the event’s historicization (Moses, “Conceptual Blockages” 9, 12). This form of denial coheres around discursive attempts to put forth a particular kind of legitimate claim to victimhood ultimately rooted in anti-blackness. The Nazi Holocaust was not simply an event carried out by a fascist regime whose genocidal actions were mobilized solely by a contempt for European Jews.8 The exterminatory process, rather, was part of a trajectory of German coloniality multiply marked by social Darwinist attempts to “purify” its population and its claimed territory.9 Germany’s failure to confront its colonial conquests in Africa, and therefore to contextualize the Holocaust and German antisemitism within this trajectory of racial citizenship, amounts to a kind of genocide denialism.

    II

    What exactly does it mean to attempt to recognize a genocide? Is recognition the ultimate practice of empathy, of seeing the humanity of an oppressed and long-suffering people and responding in kind? In a world where our own subjectivity is defined by hierarchal relations—a defining of the self through “Others”—we are individually and collectively able to overcome urgent self-fashioning as dominant in order to truly feel with others. The actualization of empathy demands an equal capacity to humanize, and our performances of empathy through imagined embodiment deny the reality of a moral-material world defined and ordered by those understood to be “fully” human against those for whom full humanity is foreclosed. This reality produces legibility, using testimony via the model of recognition to produce a subject deserving of acknowledgement and maybe even restitution. Ultimately, this so-called empathy demands assimilation into a framework of sameness: one that enables a relation through similarity (or hypothetical similarity) to some fully humanized self. It is a perverse ubuntu, a colonial seeing/locating/understanding of the self through others. Recognition by the western episteme is positioned as universal because western-ness is exported as universal. The “human” emerges only through articulations and “enunciations” of humanness constructed and propagated by those with the power to project and impose their own selves onto a universally accepted notion of what is human (Mignolo, “Sylvia Wynter” 108–9).

    The commonly-held framework for defining and understanding genocide—both popularly and within international law—describes the act as a “predictable but not inexorable” singular event. But rarely does the idea of culpability or prosecutability for the act of genocide intersect with the fact that the destruction of an indigenous population (whether through forcible assimilation, ethnic cleansing, violent depopulation and killing, or some combination of acts) is by definition part of establishing and maintaining settler states (Wolfe 388). The understanding of genocide as an anomalous, aberrational, and avoidable act forecloses understandings of the ways in which coloniality and state domination require the management and/or destruction of populations (whether through killings or forced assimilation) as a part of the articulation of a state apparatus and its (biologized) definitions of citizenship and belonging. To recognize is to acknowledge the validity, legitimacy, and legibility of a thing; to bring it into the fold of experience and understanding so that it too can become universal (no matter the particular trajectory or consequences of the event). Inherent in the politics of genocide recognition is some ushering into whiteness: the affirmation of genocide is, functionally, an extension of and assimilation into humanity through a frame of uniqueness. The existent discourse of recognition as legibility—as making genocidal process clear enough to morally and ethically grasp and enclose —is antithetical to a Glissantian embrace of difference, which engenders solidarity in opacity as opposed to translation, transmutation, and ordering into hierarchy (Glissant 191, 193–94). To recognize a genocide is not to humanize in any altruistic sense, but to dictate that the goal of any indigenous community is to become assimilated into the anthropocentric project of Man as “human,” as opposed to attaining a recognition that strengthens their own sovereign claims and/or begins to attempt to offer whatever kind of restitution might compensate for the human capital lost to genocide.

    The Ovaherero and Nama genocide is unique in its firstness: historians largely agree it is the first genocide of the 20th century. But even this uniqueness or firstness is insufficient to unsettle the foundational nature of indigenous African genocide on the continent (including the transatlantic trafficking and trade in enslaved indigenous African peoples foundational to modernity itself). How can a necessary death constitute an acute crisis of recognition? The Black/Afro-diasporic/African subject suffers the “ontological ‘flaw’” of non-being that bars entry into any dialectic in which it could be recognized as “human” (Ciccariello-Maher 55). The Hegelian dialectic presumes a reciprocity and universality in recognition, and only nurtures the ontological inferiority of the Black/African subject by continually forcing them to self-define through a discursive framework of domination within which it has no epistemic authority. Blackness exists within the sub-ontological realm where being human is impossible to claim. Attempting to recognize the subject—and to understand the trajectory from full indigenous personhood and sovereignty to “native” colonial subject to post-genocide indigenous subject within a postcolonial “native”-ruled nation-state—means we must refuse this presumed universality and an Africanness (as opposed to blackness) that exists solely in its relationship to European coloniality.10

    It’s useful here to examine the response to the Civil Rights Congress (CRC) petition presented to the United Nations meeting in Paris at the end of 1951. In We Charge Genocide: The Crime of Government Against the Negro People, the CRC and its signatories “charge their own government with mass murder of its own nationals, with institutionalized oppression and persistent slaughter of Negro people in the United States on a basis of ‘race,’ a crime abhorred by mankind and prohibited by the conscience of the world” and indeed criminalized by the Genocide Convention (3). There are two main arguments for this charge of genocide. The first is “killing members of the group,” a violation of Article II of the Genocide Convention. As evidence, the CRC offers “killings by police, killings by incited gangs, killings at night by masked men, killings always on the basis of ‘race,’ [and] killings by the Ku Klux Klan,” despite the universal citizenship that ought to have been afforded by the constitution (4). The second is economic genocide or, per the Genocide Convention’s language, “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its destruction in whole or in part.” The petition outlined the creation and maintenance of conditions so egregious that the “American Negro is deprived, when compared with the remainder of the population of the United States, of eight years of life on the average.” It described how the violence of the transatlantic slave trade and the indignity of the Southern planation system begot exploitative sharecropping, while Jim Crow segregation forced Black Americans into “city ghettos or their rural equivalents” and “filthy, disease-bearing housing, and deprived [them] by law of adequate medical care and education.” These combined acts of violence are made possible by the “emasculation of democracy,” the structural prevention of Black Americans from voting and organizing, and by “dividing [of] the whole American people, emasculating mass movements for democracy and securing the grip of predatory reaction on the federal, state, county and city governments” (CRC 4–6).

    The CRC’s petition was a seminal articulation of the Black freedom movement’s use of the then-new anti-genocide norm,11 and serves as a useful example of the ontological and analytical limitations of the international definition of genocide (Solomon 130–31). Crucially, the petition used the criminalization of genocide—a crime targeting individuals and communities explicitly because of their group membership—to contest the maintenance of racial hierarchies: “accusations of genocide reprised a vocabulary designed to challenge the suppression and destruction of minority life,” which of course presented the particular concern “that an international law against genocide would challenge existing state and nonstate practices designed to maintain white supremacy” (Meiches 23). The petition also had disconcerting international implications (disconcerting to hegemonic powers, at least) because it offered the possibility that the Genocide Convention could contest racial discrimination internationally, a frame articulated by the petition’s “solemn warn[ing] that a nation which practices genocide against its own nationals may not long be deterred, it has the power, from genocide elsewhere” (CRC 7). The invoked Du Boisian “problem of the color line” was politicized in such a way that it “link[ed] the racial terror of the lynch mob directly to more organized campaigns of colonial warfare”; a critique of imperialism is conspicuously absent from the United Nations’ 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Meiches 24).12

    Unsurprisingly, the petition was poorly received in the United States, but the most notable rejection of its legitimacy came from Lemkin himself. In a 1953 letter to the editor of the New York Times, Lemkin re-emphasized the rarity and socio-political magnitude of genocide, describing not only the tens of millions of lives lost in the 20th century, but also the gravity and necessity of the “serious mental harm” provisions of the Genocide Convention. Characterizing the petitioners as “opponents of the Genocide Convention” (rather than individuals seeking to broaden its scope beyond its original intent), Lemkin questioned whether “one can be guilty of genocide when one frightens a Negro”; “fear alone cannot be considered as serious mental harm,” and the acts of intimidation are not “directed against the [entire] Negro population of the country” (“Nature of Genocide”). In response to Lemkin’s op-ed, Oakley C. Johnson, social activist and member of the Communist Party of America, wrote that his characterization of “fright” is insufficient to describe actions intended to incite race hate, terrorize an entire racial group, and maintain the existence of anti-Black racial hierarchies (Elder 42). Lemkin concluded that the conflation of genocide with the injustice of discrimination besmirches “the good name of some democratic societies which might be unjustly slandered for genocide” (“Nature of Genocide”).

    We can understand Lemkin’s trivializing response to the petition primarily through a prevailing anti-blackness, consistent with his writings about the Ovaherero and Nama genocide. While colonialism was foundational to his theorizations of genocide, his writings on African colonization contain substantial contradictions that undermine his ideas. Writing about the genocidal violence against the Ovaherero, Lemkin attributed state cruelty to Germany’s improper practice of colonial rule; the British system of “indirect rule,” which allowed for indigenous cultural maintenance and complementary administration, would have been more suitable and humane. In line with other historiographic theses that emphasize exceptional German cruelty, brutal suppressions of Ovaherero rebellions were understood as a result of “Prussian militarism,” which actually overstates the function and efficiency of the imperial German administration prior to the 1904 war (Schaller 89). While Lemkin does not retroactively apply his neologism “genocide” to the Ovaherero context, his description of the Herero Wars would undoubtedly have fit his own criteria.13 Yet his analysis of the violence does not hold European colonialism sufficiently responsible for the production of genocide-making/justifying epistemes and practices. Further, he perpetuated the racist myth that the Ovaherero were committing “race suicide,” a popular theory promoted by Willem Petrus Steenkamp who claimed the Ovaherero “could not reconcile themselves to the idea of subjection to Germany and thus loss of independence” and so, “having nothing left to exist for as a nation,” proceeded to commit “national suicide” (qtd. in Schaller 90). Lemkin believed (and wrote) that Ovaherero women and men alike consumed a particularly strong beer called Kari —“the drink of death” —that “had a most weakening and exhausting effect on their [re]productive powers” (qtd. in Schaller 90). This theory was forwarded to hold the Ovaherero people, especially women, responsible for their declining birthrates rather than the genocidal conditions imposed by imperial Germany. With regards to the petition, Cold War-era McCarthyism was also a means of discrediting the CRC’s claims. Lemkin often discussed the “Russian practice of genocide” saying that antisemitic propaganda under Stalin “matched the efforts of Streicher and Goebbels”; he asserted that Paul Robeson and William L. Patterson, prominent African-American communists and signatories of the petition, were “falsely accusing the United States of genocide to divert UN attention from true genocidal crimes being committed against Soviet-dominated people” (“UN Asked”; Weiss-Wendt 108–9). Lemkin’s understanding of genocide complemented the Nuremberg precedent, set just a few years before: genocide was not to be understood as a long-existing structural phenomenon, but rather as an acute flare-up of violence perpetrated by a prosecutable group of people.

    The recognition of genocide is caught in a double bind. Where acknowledgement of an ongoing genocidal process unfolds before a spectatorial international community, or where retrospective recognition is circumvented because of its political inconvenience and unsettling potential, inaction is tantamount to denial. But limiting our understanding of victimization by framing it according to the western episteme is also a kind of a denial. It renders and interprets history solely as an attempt to reassert the primacy of imperial humanity: the reinscription of the power to demarcate the killable from those who must not and should not be killed (and the mutable boundary between these non-discrete categories). Whether this is a product of our limited socio-political imagination or of the legal structure’s limited capacity for redress (and the destabilizing potential of reparations, particularly if recompense were to be defined by the harmed parties in question), it is certainly reflective of the pitfalls of endeavoring towards “the human.”

    Zoé Samudzi has a PhD in Medical Sociology from the University of California, San Francisco where her dissertation research engaged German imperialism, colonial biomedicine, and the Ovaherero and Nama genocide. She is currently a Postdoctoral Fellow at the ACTIONS Program in the UCSF School of Nursing where she is working on research around transgender health, reproductive justice and autonomy, and material-epistemic violences.

    Footnotes

    1. On the relationships between genocide and permanent security, see Moses’s The Problems of Genocide: Permanent Security and the Language of Transgression, Cambridge UP, 2021.

    2. With regards to “the tendency of racializing logics to change scales in an effort to resolve contradictions internal to the logics themselves,” see Dorian Bell’s Globalizing Race: Antisemitism and Empire in French and European Culture, Northwestern UP, 2018.

    3. On the militarized science produced in/by concentration camps and the exploitation of the war as an opportunity to access human remains for ethnological and anatomical study, see Reinhart Kößler’s “Imperial Skullduggery, Science and the Issue of Provenance and Restitution: The Fate of Namibian Skulls in the Alexander Ecker Collection in Freiburg,”Human Remains and Violence, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 27–44.

    4. Mbembe’s “Necropolitics” is instructive as a rebuttal to this end as he notes that the social death to which the colonized and enslaved were subjected and that configured hierarchal racial relations “could be considered one of the first instances of biopolitical experimentation.” With the plantation at the core of necropolitical formations, the tripled losses of “domination, natal alienation, and social death” comprise the logics of imperial world-making (21).

    5. Sociogeny refers to a Fanonian understanding of socio-historical development. Fanon demands that any naturalization of racial formations as biological reality be grounded in an understanding of social orderings that cast the Black “other” into subjugated relation with the white standard of humanity—this is a central analytical feature of Black Skin, White Masks (1952).

    6. The term “autopoiesis” refers to a system able to create, reproduce, and maintain itself. The term was introduced in 1972 by biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, who used it to describe the self-maintaining capability of living cells.

    7. An example of this is the language utilized by state officials. In its motion to dismiss the eventually dismissed legal case, the German state asserted that the “legal concept of genocide does not apply in this case.” Despite acknowledging that such violence constitutes genocide over the past several years, the state nevertheless refuses to entertain any legal rebuttals to Ovaherero and Nama accusations because the alleged genocide occurred before the passage of the 1951 Genocide Convention.

    8. There is a necessity to use the phrase “racialized as white” as opposed to “white” because of a contemporary conditionality of whiteness (as opposed to unequivocal absorption of white Jewish people) into the category of whiteness. Despite many Jews’ phenotypical presentation as “white,” the racial logics of whiteness have constructed Jewishness as an essential racial identity. This is the enduring nature and function of antisemitism it is the desire to legitimize centuries of hegemonic Christian Judenhass (“hatred of Jews”) by using the racist pseudoscientific convention of the mid- to late-19th centuries and designating/derogating Jewish people as a unique and inferior discrete Semitic race (in contrast to the allegedly superior Aryan race). See David Nirenberg’s “Mass Conversion and Genealogical Mentalities: Jews and Christians in Fifteenth-Century Spain,” Past and Present, no. 174, pp. 3–41.

    9. Michael Rothberg offers “multidirectionality” as a syncretic framework for understanding “the significance of both genocidal imperialism and the totalitarian Holocaust,” which transcends the analytical debate pitting exceptionalism/uniqueness against the idea of genocide continuity; see Rothberg’s Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization, Stanford UP, 2009.

    10. About the limitedness of this binary, Édouard Glissant writes that where “the Western nation is first of all an ‘opposite,’ for colonized peoples identity will be primary ‘opposed to’—that is, a limitation from the beginning. Decolonization will have done its real work when it goes beyond this limit” (17). Wilderson writes, about the Middle Passage’s ontological transformation of the racialized figure of “the African,” that “Jews went into Auschwitz and came out as Jews. Africans went into the ships and came out as Blacks. The former is a Human holocaust; the latter is a Human and a metaphysical holocaust. That is why it makes little sense to attempt analogy: the Jews have the Dead (the Muselmann) among them; the Dead have the Blacks among them” (38).

    11. Solomon describes the anti-genocide norm as “an individual or organization’s explicit or implicit expressions of opposition to the past, present, or future occurrence of genocide” where “implicit expressions consist of analogies between instances of violence or repression and canonical genocidal events, in particular the Nazi Holocaust” (131).

    12. Keguro Macharia, (2019) in contrasting the 1945 Pan-African Congress’s Declaration to Colonial Workers, Farmers, and Intellectuals with the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, describes how the latter “refused to acknowledge (or contradict) the contemporary distinction between colonizer and colonized,” a history of domination that was central to the former. The United Nations and the structure of international [criminal] law was not only “understood to be compatible with imperial ventures,” but the anti-Black regime of racialized humanity is an enshrining of racial hierarchies within and through the very structure of human rights. See Macharia’s “1945 & 1948,” as well as Mignolo’s “Who Speaks for the ‘Human ’in Human Rights?” and Esmeir’s “On Making Dehumanization Possible.”

    13. In his unpublished and uncompleted manuscript, Lemkin writes about the Ovaherero: “After the rebellion and von Trotha’s proclamation, the decimation of the Hereros by gunfire, hanging, starvation, forced labour and flogging was augmented by prostitution and the separation of families, with a consequent lowering of the birthrate” (qtd. in Schaller 90).

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  • Black is the Color of Solidarity: Art as Resistance in Melanesia

    Joy Enomoto (bio)

    Abstract

    This essay centers on three Melanesian women artist activists who use art as a tool for social justice and as visual archive: Camari Serau and Mere Tuilau both of iTaukei descent living on the island of Viti Levu, Fiji, and Sonja Larson of Papuan Tolai descent living in New Mexico. This essay adds to Black/Indigenous Studies in conveying a more nuanced understanding of Blackness from within the Pacific. In this context, Black Oceania is not merely a conceptual counterpoint to the Black Atlantic but a center point of political and artistic solidarity that recognizes the sacredness of Black lives in unexpected and unpredictable ways. Drawing upon the activism and mentorship of the late Dr. Teresia Teaiwa, this essay also illustrates the necessity of highlighting and acknowledging the work of Black/Pacific women artists engaged in West Papua’s struggle for self-determination and collective liberation.

    The first people to settle the Pacific were Black.
    —Teresia Teaiwa, “Mela/Nesian Histories, Micro/Nesian Poetics”

    The late I-Kiribati, African American scholar and poet Dr. Teresia Teaiwa poetically reminds us that Blackness not only exists within but is rooted in the Pacific. Black women of Oceania are often left out of the frame in discussions about global Black liberation struggles, and ironically they are left out of many conversations of Black indigeneity, even though they remain central players in movements for Black self-determination. Perhaps this is because indigeneity in the South Pacific takes precedence over Blackness, or because the Atlantic and the Caribbean have stood for the entirety of the Middle Passage and the motion of Black bodies. Whatever the reason, beyond the South Pacific, Melanesia—and particularly the activism of Melanesian women—remains largely ignored in Black, Indigenous, and diaspora studies. In recent years, several contemporary scholars have developed significant scholarship on the so-called Black Pacific. The work of Quito Swan situates Melanesia in relation to the Pan-Africanist movement and draws out the rich complexities of the rise of Pacific Feminism, particularly in Melanesia during the 1975 Pacific Women’s Conference in Suva, Fiji. Historian Gerald Horne delves deeply into the impacts of the slaving practice of blackbirding in the South Pacific following the US Civil War. Post-colonial scholar Robbie Shilliam examines the conceptual space of diasporic kinship across space and time shared by the African Diaspora and the Maori. Other scholars, such as Joyce Pualani Warren, Maile Arvin, and Nitasha Sharma, interrogate how conceptions of white supremacy and eugenics leeched into the Pacific, effectively ranking its inhabitants according to their “proximity to whiteness,” and also examine the ways that Pacific peoples view themselves (Arvin 4). While the contributions of Shilliam, Warren, Arvin, and Sharma are important, they focus primarily on Hawaiʻi and Polynesia, hence their writings are not considered in this essay.

    This essay is part of a continuing dialogue regarding the interventions into Blackness and anti-Blackness in Oceania that began at a performative roundtable entitled “Afro-Diasporic Women Artists on History and Blackness in the Pacific” at the Pacific Histories Association (PHA) Conference in 2016 (“Afro-Pacific Women”). During the first iterations of the Black Lives Matter movement, Pacific scholar Dr. Teresia Teaiwa felt compelled to bring together a small collective of women artists and scholars of Black and Pacific Islander descent to address the rarely-discussed but deeply-felt issue of anti-Blackness among Pacific Islanders. I take my title, “Black Is the Color of Solidarity,” from Teresia Teaiwa’s poem “Mela/Nesian Histories, Micro/Nesian Poetics” (171), in memory of Teaiwa as an artist and to honor her unwavering commitment to placing Black Indigenous and Pacific feminism at the center of her work toward our collective liberation. The roundtable participants included Dr. Teaiwa, Samoan ethnomusicologist and musician Dr. Courtney Savali-Andrews, CHamoru performance artist Ojeya Cruz Banks, and me, a Kanaka Maoli visual artist. Our discussant was ethnomusicologist and assistant professor Dr. Alisha Lola Jones. The design of the roundtable, which combined performance, visual art, poetry, and music alongside presented papers, was unique for a conference, and especially for a history conference traditionally dominated by white male scholars. We opened the space by building an altar and singing a collective song. Each of us in turn shared both art and scholarship on what it means to live as “Afro-diasporic children of the Pacific” (Teaiwa, “Introduction” 145). The forum raised the question, “how have we addressed these culturally and historically complex conditions in our work as artists?” (Teaiwa, “Introduction” 145). Although our experiences have been vastly different, we share the particular experience of being both Black and Pacific Islander but not Melanesian. Our Blackness has remained somehow outside of Oceania. Even though Teaiwa and her sisters were raised in Fiji, their Blackness was still somehow set apart from that of the iTaukei (indigenous) Fijians. What has become clear since the PHA is that there are solidarities that exist within Melanesia that are in alignment with the liberation struggles of the African Diaspora, yet those solidarities remain distinct. As a Black and Kanaka Maoli artist and organizer committed to international liberation, part of my intention in this essay is to honor and center the contributions of Black / Indigenous liberation struggles within Melanesia. This remapping, I argue, has the potential to reorient how we understand Blackness, Indigeneity, and the intersection of the two.

    For several scholars writing outside of Oceania, the Black Pacific is a “sort of imagined community” (Taketani) that must somehow be in relationship with Paul Gilroy’s “Black Atlantic” in order to be considered a valid Black space, and its Blackness one that does nothing more than expand African American or Afro-Caribbean geographies. It is difficult for scholars outside of Oceania to disentangle a Blackness rooted in Africa from a Blackness rooted in the Pacific because of its long entanglement with the violence of European colonization and the mid-nineteenth century enslaving practices of South Pacific Islanders by Australians, Europeans, and Americans known as blackbirding (Horne). Yet it is important to acknowledge the very real Black Indigenous geographies, complexities, and lived experiences that exist within Oceania. There are more than ten million people living throughout Kanaky (New Caledonia), Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Fiji, the Solomon Islands, the Torres Straits, and Aboriginal Australia who speak over 1,300 languages and who were the first to navigate and settle the Pacific nearly fifty thousand years ago. Engaging with the Black Pacific and Black solidarity requires a deeper interrogation into the ways in which conceptions of Blackness in the Pacific overlap with the struggles of the African Diaspora and Black Power movements as well as examinations of those ways in which they remain independent from each other.

    Like the term “Black,” “Melanesian” is a complex term rooted in European colonialism and anti-Black racism. During the rise of the Black power movement in the 1970s, embraced as a term of empowerment, referred to as Melanesianism (Kabutaulaka 134). However, the term “Wantok”—a linguistically unifying term referring to a common pidgin spoken across the region (Kabutaulaka 131)—is more commonly used. In 1832, Jules Dumont dʻUrville labeled the islands of so-called Melanesia based on the darkness of the islanders’ black skin and the wooliness of their hair, labelling the men savages and the women undesirable (Tcherkézoff). This description essentially erased the millennia it took Wantok countries to learn the winds and rains, birdsong and plants of two thousand islands, erased the time it took to develop trade relationships, forms of governance, epistemologies, cosmographies, and ontologies that were centered in the Pacific. Although, the identities and cultures of ni-Vanuatu, Kanaky, Papuans, iTaukei, and Solomon Islanders developed completely disconnected from an African homeland and they are not a part of the African Diaspora, Wantoks are bound to the diaspora through shared subjugation, but more importantly through solidarity .

    While not African, Melanesians were also enslaved by Europeans, sometimes on their own land, other times kidnapped and displaced permanently. Between 1863 and 1904, 62,000 Pacific Islanders were kidnapped, tricked into servitude, or “blackbirded” from 80 Melanesian Islands, primarily within the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji, New Caledonia, New Ireland, and Milne Bay Provinces in Papua New Guinea, but also Tuvalu and Kiribati, to work in the sugar and cotton plantations of Queensland, Australia, Fiji, and Sāmoa (“Plantation Voices”). Thousands of men, women, and children died in the plantations, while their homelands were depleted. By 1908, these same people faced compulsory “repatriation” to the islands under the White Australia Policy and the Pacific Island Labourers Act of 1901. Those who remained often suffered harsh treatment and discrimination. Their descendants, known as Australian South Sea Islanders, are now considered “not indigenous to any one place or land” (“Plantation Voices”). They became a diasporic identity unto themselves, and as fourth generation South Sea Islander artist Jasmine Togo-Brisby explains, “it is still so hard for our people to identify, that sometimes our people choose not to identify, because it is such a struggle. You can’t just say, ‘I’m Australian South Sea Islander’ and expect that the person on the receiving end knows what you’re talking about” (“Unfurling Tākiri”). The failure to honor the trauma of blackbirding is not unique to white Australians. Here in Hawaiʻi, we are only beginning to recover and collect blackbirding stories through scholarship, activism, and art. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Black women artists like Togo-Brisby are taking leadership in bringing these stories to light.

    Blackbirding is a painful memory specifically held in the bodies and memories of the peoples across Oceania. The rise of blackbirding throughout Oceania coincided with the rising demand for new sources of sugar, cotton, and guano as slavery was coming to an end in the US and the Caribbean. Between 1862 and the 1870s, other Pacific Islanders, such as the Rapa Nui, Tokelauans, Tuvaluans, Niueans, Tongarevans, and Marquesans were blackbirded to the Chincha Island guano mines of Peru (Maude). Because these populations were considerably smaller and easier to kidnap, they were devastated both through the extraction of laborers but also by infectious diseases brought back by those very few who were repatriated. It is clear that American and European enslavers were not content with the trans-Atlantic slave trade but pillaged further into the Pacific. Their voracious greed subjected Melanesians and other Pacific Islanders into the violence of plantation slavery, displacement, depletion, and disease, all predicated upon a notion of Black bodies, Pacific bodies, and especially Melanesian bodies, as enslavable. Confederates left the American south and started new chapters of the KKK in Fiji and Queensland, Australia, joining British settlers to form “a kind of White Pacific/White Atlantic of planters” (Horne 5) to expand slavery into the Pacific just as the trans-Atlantic Slave trade was ending. The legacy of blackbirding is therefore one of the points of entry when considering the solidarity of Black Oceania with the African Diaspora.

    During a panel discussion at the Sundance Film Festival 2021, entitled “Black Visuality and Solidarity in Oceania,” iTaukei scholar Dr. Ponipate Rokolekutu stated:

    When I talk about blackness, as an iTaukei and as a Melanesian, my notion of blackness is intertwined with my identity as an indigenous Fijian. And as an iTaukei, I come from the clan of the Mata ni Vanua . . . So when I think of blackness, It is not only former slaves through the trans-Atlantic slave trade or blackbirding, but someone who is also dispossessed of their lands. So my notion of blackness is complicated, because of the complexity of where I am situated as an indigenous Fijian and as a Melanesian. (“SFF21”)

    Rokolekutu conveys that Oceania enters the conversation on Black solidarity not just via blackbirding, but through the dispossession from our ancestral lands. Here the Pacific Diaspora and the African Diaspora flow into each other.

    The use of the term “Black” as it relates to Black Power and solidarity was not taken up until the mid-twentieth century, when it became a “rallying cry of Pacific Islanders under European occupation” (Elnaiem), appealing not only to Melanesians and Australian aboriginals, but also to other Pacific Islanders across the region, either because of their historical relationship to blackbirding or because they were often called black and treated in derogatory ways by white settlers. In this context, to identify as Black is politically strategic, aligning Oceania with what Rokolekutu calls the “collective Black experience of marginalization, exploitation, slavery and denigration” (“SFF21”) and the global struggle for decolonization, self-determination, and liberation. However, this type of expansion of Black identity can and does continue to render invisible the anti-blackness that is particular to Melanesians, Australian Aboriginals, and Torres Strait Islanders. Blackness is not only a tool with which to fight white supremacy, but also to fight the anti-blackness that comes from other Pacific Islanders. Dr. Tarcisius Kabutaulaka reminds us that because Western discourse has produced over two centuries of negative representations of Melanesia and its peoples, these perceptions have become internalized by Pacific Islanders, including Melanesians themselves, and used to “perpetuate relationships with Melanesia that have racist, essentialist, and social evolutionary elements” (110). Hence by taking up the call for Black Power, Pacific Islanders did not necessarily undo anti-blackness toward Melanesians.

    It is perhaps because of all of these complex positionings and embodied relationships to Blackness that Melanesians and Australian Aboriginals were among the first to rise up when cries for Black Power echoed across the world in the late 1960s. They began to reclaim the term Melanesian and to develop the ever-evolving process of Melanesianism, as described by Kabutaulaka: “Melanesianism is rooted in and draws strength from the past but is not confined by it. It exists and is ‘real’ because it is talked about, lived, and experienced, not because it is defined” (127). By asserting the “Melanesian Way” (111), Melanesians determine for themselves with whom and where their solidarities lie. Even today, when they lift their voices for Black Lives Matter, it is not for a Blackness in the US, but to uplift the peoples of West Papua, the Kanaky of New Caledonia, the Aboriginals of Australia, the Torres Strait Islanders, and to support all other powerful Black struggles of the Pacific by people who remain under the yoke of white settler repression. It is on this multi-layered foundation that Black lives matter in Oceania.

    To interrogate these complexities even further involves centering Black women and Black gender nonconforming people at the heart of both historical and contemporary black international solidarities. The works of Camari Serau, Mere Tuilau, and Sonja Larson are among the many important interventions that I have had the good fortune to witness. Each uses art as a tool for resistance, storytelling, and solidarity in relation to what Katherine McKittrick calls “geographies of domination” across the solwara.1 Through the use of photography, poetry, stitching, cowrie shells, and their presence in unexpected spaces, these women push the limits of Black women’s geographies and open up new imaginings for Black diasporas.

    Fig. 1.
    Camari Serau with Morning Star flag at Melanesian Arts Festival 2018. Photograph courtesy of the author.

    We Bleed Black and Red

    The first people to settle the Pacific were Papuan.
    —Teresia Teaiwa, “Mela/Nesian Histories, Micro/Nesian Poetics”

    To understand how anti-Blackness works in Melanesia, a critical understanding of the history and presence of the West Papua freedom struggle is imperative. On December 1, 1961, the people of West Papua raised the Morning Star flag as a symbol of their independence from the Dutch. But Indonesia, which had gained its independence from the Dutch in 1949, desired all of the former Dutch colonial holdings and invaded West Papua in 1963. Unable to secure support for its invasion, Indonesia turned to the Soviet Union for help. US president John F. Kennedy wrote to the Dutch prime minister, urging him to support Indonesian occupation over West Papuan plans for independence. The US orchestrated a meeting between Indonesia and the Dutch, known as the 1962 New York Agreement, which “effectively signed West Papua over to Indonesia (West Papuans were completely excluded from the agreement negotiations)” (Webb-Gannon 354). In 1967, West Papua was transferred to Indonesia, and the American-owned mining company Freeport McMoRan was given consent to begin open-pit mining for gold in the formerly Dutch owned Grasberg gold and copper mine. White supremacy colluded with the postcolonial Indonesian state to advance capitalist mining interests, a devastating blow to West Papuans.2 Two years later, in 1969, under the guise of democracy, 1,026 Indigenous West Papuans were held at gunpoint and forced to vote for Indonesian rule. This so-called “Act of Free Choice” was rubber-stamped by the United Nations and the United States. Grasberg is now the largest open-pit gold mine and the second largest copper mine in the world.

    As West Papuans try to protect their land from this colonial and corporate violence, they face genocidal tactics, media censorship, and near silence from the international community. The Amungme people of West Papua refer to Grasberg as Nemangkawi or “the womb” (“Nemangkawi”). They believe that Nemangkawi is the place of their creation and that when their spirit dies it goes to Nemangkawi to dwell with their ancestors and other supernatural beings. For this reason, the tops of their mountains are considered sacred (“Amungme”). If we consider Nemangkawi a symbol of the Amungme mother, then its carving out through open-pit mining is akin to the desecration of the Amungme woman. Today the Grasberg mine produces 700,000 tons of toxic tailings per day, which wash into the Aikwa River system and the Arafua Sea, killing nearly all aquatic life. It is also estimated it will generate about 6 billion tons of waste in the course of its existence (Perlez and Bonner). Acid mine drainage is leeching into groundwater and surrounding farmland. If, as Teaiwa claims, the first people of the Pacific were Papuan, then Indonesia, the US, Australia and other foreign interests are imposing complete control over the lives of peoples of West Papua and attempting a total annihilation of Black lives at the very center of where Blackness originates in the Solwara.

    Given the significance of Nemangkawi to the Amungme and the peoples of the Papua highlands, it comes as no surprise that the Indonesian government faced strong resistance when, funded by Freeport McMoRan, it chose to militarize the mine in 1977. Members of the Free West Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka or “OPM”) attacked the mine, and Indonesia responded with several military operations near Wamena, resulting in anywhere from 5,000 to 10,000 deaths between 1977 and 1978 (International Coalition). Deaths caused by the Indonesian military have continued to mount since the 1970s. Today, the 250 indigenous tribes of West Papua are still subject to systematic torture, rape, and genocide by the Indonesian military, but they continue to fight for self-determination. Having no legal protection, women feel the violence of this constant military occupation most severely. The widows and children of former OPM members are consistently discriminated against. They are denied access to support services, education, and employment (International Coalition). Their husbands, brothers, and sons are often imprisoned or killed, so that women must carry on the struggle for liberation and the care of the family. Their resilience is the inspiration for pan-Melanesian solidarity and solidarity throughout Oceania.

    Indonesia’s aggressive censorship of the media regarding its human rights violations means that the people of West Papua must often rely on its allies to tell their story. Activists, artists, performers, poets, and musicians must constantly find new and creative ways to outsmart Indonesia’s attempts to silence the demands to end the genocide. I have found the courage of developing young women and gender non-conforming Melanesian activists to be particularly inspiring. From marches to social media campaigns to concerts and live paintings, they use whatever is available to them to stand up for West Papua. These activists know that they will not be free until West Papua is free. The murdered West Papuans are the Black lives they will not let us forget. They are teaching us what it means to defend Black life and land in the solwara.

    West Papuan solidarity among young Melanesian activists is not surprising given the strong Pacific feminist tradition that is particular to the women of Fiji, Kanaky, Vanuatu, and Papua New Guinea. In the mid-1970s, scholars and activists such as Claire Slatter, Vanessa Griffen, Amelia Rokotuivuna out of USP, Fiji, and Kanaky activist Dewey Gorodey, situated mainstream feminism’s engagement with issues of gender and culture in the “context of imperialism, colonialism, and liberation” (Swan). The radical stance of Melanesian women stood out among Pacific feminists, because they often looked beyond the customary and familial roles of women toward internationalist issues (George 63). These feminists directly informed the work of Teresia Teaiwa, who went on to mentor the iTaukei organizers Camari Serau and Mere Tuilau, who are continuing the anti-colonial Pacific Feminist tradition developed over the past forty years in Fiji.

    In 2014 in Madang, Papua New Guinea, a youth activist organization called Youngsolwara Pacific was developed out of a workshop called the “Madang Wansolwara Dance.” Wansolwara (“one salt water”) means “one ocean, one people.” The gathering brought together community-based organizations, activists, artists, academics, and theologians in order to re-ignite a movement of solidarity across the Pacific with the motto Teaiwa, “One Ocean, One People.” The following year, Youngsolwara Pacific organized its first campaign to build regional awareness about West Papua. The “We Bleed Black and Red” campaign included several marches and events that gained attention on social media, despite the violent threats and intimidation of the Indonesian government. But there is one event I witnessed that I must recount in its entirety in order to communicate its significance.

    Between July 1 and 10, 2018, the Solomon Islands hosted the 26th Melanesian Arts and Cultural Festival (MACFest) in Honiara, Guadalcanal. MACFest is held every two years and brings together over 2,000 participants from throughout the region. The purpose of the festival to celebrate the dance, song, and arts of Melanesian countries. Although the Festival of the Pacific Arts began in Suva, Fiji it quickly became a more Polynesian dominated event, making it difficult for several Wantok delegates to attend. MACFest, was created in direct response to this and while open to delegates from other Pacific countries, remains governed by Wantok delegates, centering Melanesia. When Solomon Islands Prime Minister Rick Houenipwela allowed Indonesia to participate in the festival, he departed from the longstanding pro-West Papuan independence position of previous governments. This decision was considered an insult by many of the festival participants, most especially Solomon Islanders. Houenipwela demonstrated a blatant complicity with genocide and willingness to provide a venue for Indonesia’s self-serving narrative of colonial innocence.

    On July 5, 2018, without announcement or performance, gender non-conforming iTaukei poet Camari Serau quietly stood in front of the “Melanesian Provinces of Indonesia” pavilion on the Panatina Grounds in the middle of the festival and unfurled the Morning Star flag of West Papua (see fig. 1). It is illegal to fly this flag in West Papua, and anyone who does so risks arrest. Even into the fifth day of the festival, the “Melanesian Provinces of Indonesia” pavilion had no crafts or food for sale, no information to hand out, no adornments, no symbols of national pride, nothing and no one to represent it, unlike every other country’s pavilion in the festival. A sign above the pavilion served as a political signifier of power, to assert Melanesia’s place in the region. The barren pavilion stood out as a space uninvested in and unconcerned with its presence as a participant in the festival. Serau’s decision to unfurl that flag was a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the Indonesian government’s presence at the festival and an assertion of West Papuan sovereignty. This courageous act transformed an otherwise predicatable arts festival into a tinderbox of political tension by provoking an unexpected display of Melanesian solidarity for West Papuan Independence throughout the festival, thus denying Indonesia validation on Melanesian soil.

    Serau was joined by fellow poet and media specialist, Mere Tuilau, who photographed her. Serau and Tuilau are both members of Youngsolwara Pacific and two of the founding members of the We Bleed Black and Red Campaign. Together they reclaimed the Indonesian Pavillion for West Papua. At first, a delegate from Vanuatu and Kanaky arrived with their countries’ flags and joined Serau. More people approached the pavilion, and ultimately entire families and children from other island provinces in the Solomons, as well as Australian tourists, Fijians, Maori, Samoans, Tongans, Taiwanese, ni-Vanuatu, and many more joined the crowd, seeking a photograph with the Morning Star flag. Tuilau transformed the moment into a social media campaign. A small crowd of community members and members of the local Free West Papua Campaign Solomon Islands Youth movement also gathered. One man from an outer province of Guadalcanal stated: “I want to fly a big flag over my village for my brothers and sisters in West Papua. The Solomons have a deep love for West Papua.” It was quite an amazing action to witness: this was a moment to protect Black lives in the Pacific, with Black women artists leading the charge. On the surface, their action may not seem particularly extraordinary, but the choice for a young woman and gender non-conforming iTaukei to provoke the Indonesian government and festival officials in the middle of festival grounds is quite radical. The Indonesian government is notorious for harassing and threatening anyone willing to challenge their validity in the region. The Honiara government wants the income generated by tourists and are denying the political implications of Indonesia’s presence at the festival. By instigating an impromptu protest without any consultation or plan for their own protection, Serau and Tuilau were actively putting themselves in harm’s way. Even the local Free West Papua Campaign members were very hesistant and remained on the edges of this action, tentatively waiting to see the end result.

    About a half an hour later, well-known Papuan artist Jeffry Feeger arrived at the pavilion with a painting he had created just minutes before on the main music stage alongside a band from Papua New Guinea (PNG). He painted a portrait of a West Papuan with a Morning Star flag across his forehead. More than aware that his painting may be considered controversial by festival officials, he had received permission from the PNG delegation to show it. The arrival of the painting along with the pop-up photo action created a small frenzy of curiosity and an overwhelming outpouring of solidarity. Over one hundred people waited to have their picture taken with the Morning Star flag, and an announcer for the festival addressed the crowd: “If you would like to show your solidarity with West Papua and take a picture with the Morning Star flag, please go to the West Papua pavilion.” We were there for nearly two hours, and throughout that time the air was filled with beautiful conversations of solidarity. The crowd was made of residents from the islands of Taumotu, Rennel Island, Kanaky, Fiji, PNG, Australia, and Aotearoa.

    Then Indonesian government vehicles arrived. Two military vehicles pulled up beside the pavilion. The Indonesian officials stood by, quietly but visibly angry, taking out their phones to photograph the scene and the crowd. The pleasant atmosphere that had existed for hours before shifted in seconds. The tension was palpable. The lone woman among the military personnel was the designated speaker for the delegation. She asked about those who were in attendance and whether we would be returning to the pavilion the next day, because that is when the West Papuan delegation was expected to arrive. The sudden reclamation of the pavilion as belonging to West Papua and not to Indonesia clearly incensed them. The Indonesian and festival officials let the afternoon pass, but this action would not be the end of it.

    That night, Youngsolwara Pacific members and the Solomon Islands Free West Papua Campaign members danced together waving multiple Morning Star flags and singing songs dedicated to West Papuan self-determination. In a multitude of ways, this moment revealed “the indestructible character of the cultural resistance of the people—the popular masses—in the face of foreign domination” (Cabral and Vale 22). In this case, the masses were the people of Melanesia present on that day, who used the platform of MacFEST – a space for both art and political expression – to protest colonial occupation and genocide. The protest began with the unfurling of a flag, photographs, and a painting. This was all it took to subvert the presence of the Indonesian government.

    The next day, Serau, Tuilau, Feeger, and I were invited to speak at a community roundtable at the Leaf Haus Kava Bar along the coast of Honiara addressing the role of art in social justice movements. The moderator was Joey Tau, co-director of Pacific Network on Globalisation. As the panel opened, Serau and Tuilau each shared a poem of solidarity for West Papua. Participants were local West Papua activists from the Solomon Islands, students from the University of the South Pacific, and young writers, poets, photographers, and singers. The conversation covered many topics, most importantly the role that artists must play in struggles for social justice. It was clear to all those in attendance that art consists not only in artifacts, but also in using artistic skills to actively resist oppression. It was a truly “Wantok” (one talk) (Kabutaulaka 131) conversation: we did not share the same language, but linguistic differences did not prevent anyone from understanding each other. Rather, they worked to deepen the collective understanding that spaces like these are necessary. While this artist dialogue was taking place, the Indonesian delegation staff spent the day painting the Indonesian flag on the exterior walls of the pavilion with no West Papuan delegate in sight. The purpose of our gathering was ostensibly to celebrate art and the beauty of Melanesian culture, but the presence of the soldiers was a reminder of the bitter ugliness of colonial occupation.

    Saturday, July 7, 2018, marked the fortieth anniversary of the Solomon Islands’ Independence from the British. It was on this day that Serau and Tuilau returned to the newly painted, Indonesian flag-draped pavilion. However, this time they returned with members of the Solomon Islands Free West Papua Campaign. Serau did not hold the Morning Star flag, but handed it to West Papuan activist Ben Didiomea. They stood just outside of the pebble-lined border that demarcated the edges of the pavilion from the rest of the festival grounds. Tuilau once again began filming. Didiomea held the flag and began to speak, and almost immediately an Indonesian official tried to take the flag from him. But before the official could do anything, Tuilau ran toward him, camera in hand, and shouted, “Hey, hey, hey! This is your line! This is your fucking line!” Pointing to the rock-lined border on the ground, he shouted, “this is our soil! Melanesian soil! Shut up!” (Tuilau). Somewhat shocked, the Indonesian official took a step back. By this time, a crowd of bystanders had gathered. Didiomea began to shout, “This is Melanesia! What is Indonesia hiding in West Papua? Why are they not letting international media enter West Papua? I am a freedom fighter… International media no enter West Papua.” Meanwhile Serau stood behind him with a handmade sign that read “West Papua Merdeka” (Free West Papua). Once again, she stood in silent protest. Ben Didiomea had been present on that first day when Camari Serau brought out the flag at the empty pavilion, but he did not speak on that day, nor did he lead any actions on the day that the Indonesian officials painted their pavilion the colors of the Indonesian flag. Every action on the festival grounds for West Papua was initiated by Serau and Tuilau. In solidarity and with respect for their Solomon brothers and sisters living in Honiara, they did what they could to carve out a space that allowed the local organizers to speak and be heard. In fairness, Didiomea had more to lose for speaking out in Honiara, because men are often at higher risk for arrest or detention. There remained a high likelihood of arrest for Serau and Tuilau, but they were not afraid. When the Honiara Police department arrived, they stood and challenged the police (Toito‘ona). They did not hesitate to defend Didiomea. But neither the Indonesian officials nor the police wanted to interact with Tuilau or Serau. They only wanted to speak to the men in the movement, and it was the men who were targeted for arrest. Consequently, Didiomea and another Free West Papua campaign member, Maverick Seda, were later temporarily detained by the Honiara police and their Morning Star flag was confiscated. Honiara Police “issued a statement saying the flag was removed to prevent provocation of the Indonesians, reminding the demonstrators that it was not a political event” (RNZ Pacific).

    Serau and Tuilau’s protest at the festival did not go unnoticed by Fiji authorities. When Serau and Tuilau returned to Fiji from Honiara, “[they] were taken in for questioning by the Fiji Border Control Police. [They] were asked questions relating to pro-independence advocacy for Papua and West Papua province” (“Portrait”). Serau and Tuilau have since been told by Fijian police to stop “wearing Papuan activism t-shirts or carrying out any form of protest at public events” (“Portrait”). Serau and Tuilau’s social media accounts and activities concerned with West Papua have come under surveillance, yet they continue to fight. The detention and questioning of Didiomea, Seda, Serau and Tuilau reflects a shifting and regressive landscape in relation to Indonesia among regional governments.

    The political and economic power that Indonesia wields in the region cannot be underestimated. Because Indonesia controls the mineral wealth of West Papua, they are backed by international corporate mining interests and have developed strong military relationships with Australia and the US. Indonesia will often threaten to cut off trade with or other assistance to Melanesian countries that take a strong position against their occupation of West Papua, pressuring governments to take punitive steps toward openly pro-West Papuan Independence activists. Therefore, the acts of Camari Serau and Mere Tuilau should not be taken lightly. It is important to recognize their solidarity with those on the ground in Honiara, to honor their creative and fearless demands for justice, and to mark their intervention against Indonesia’s violence, which otherwise might go unnoticed. Tuilau and Serau use art as a tool for liberation and incorporate multiple genders into Black liberation, expanding the scope of previous conceptions of Black feminism in Melanesia. They may not declare themselves feminist in the same ways as their predecessors, but their relentless demands for West Papuan self-determination and their willingness to directly challenge Indonesian harassment places them in the continuum of radical Black Pacific feminist solidarity. Following their example, I include the people of the Melanesia and their urgent cry for freedom when I say “Black Lives Matter.” The West Papuan freedom struggle has much to teach the rest of us about what it means to demand liberation under militarized occupation, and what it means to push back against corporations that are protected by a government seeking to extinguish the beauty of Black life, land, and self- determination.

    Mourning and Solidarity in the time of COVID-19

    the salt in our veins, the who we are and the who we are not. we have not yet seen the bottom of it, the depth of mourning that birthed us here.
    Alexis Pauline Gumbs, M Archive: After the End of the World

    These words by Alexis Pauline Gumbs’s M Archive capture the deep mourning generated by the loss of so many Black lives due to state violence and now COVID-19. In the spring of 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic sent the world into quarantine as people around the globe began dying at alarming rates. The quarantine revealed cracks in the facade of the health care system worldwide: disparities in wealth, wage protections, and access to healthcare. Reactionary, slow-to-respond governments, particularly in the US, caused many deaths. As of June 23, 2021, 3.88 million people have contracted COVID-19 (World Health Organization). On May 25, 2020, a Black man named George Floyd was murdered by Minneapolis Police officer, Derek Chauvin, who was filmed forcefully kneeling on Floyd’s neck, preventing him from breathing. Floyd’s dying words were “I can’t breathe” (Hill et al.). This recorded murder set the world ablaze overnight. The unbearable sense of rage, pain, and devastation in witnessing in real time the state-sanctioned murder of yet another Black man could not be contained. The murders of Trayvon Martin, Eric Garner, Michael Brown, Philando Castille, Tamir Rice, Sandra Bland, and so many others were still fresh in our collective memory. Uprisings and protest erupted across the US and around the globe. Freeways were shut down and police stations and police cars were set on fire. There were also marches to protest the recent murders of Ahmaud Arbery, Toni McDade, and Breonna Taylor. All of these murders intensified the demands for state accountability and structural change. Organizers such as Patrice Cullors, co-founder of Black Lives Matter, and M Adams of the Movement for Black Lives began shifting the narrative beyond prosecuting the police to defunding the police, moving toward a Black feminist abolitionist praxis that promotes moving funds away from institutions that have historically brought harm to Black communities and toward an economy that could lead to transformative healing and growth.

    Many people in Oceania rose up in solidarity with the movement for Black lives. On June 6, 2020, designated as an international day for marches of solidarity, a march in Honolulu, Hawai‘i led by twelve high school organizers suprisingly drew a crowd of over 10,000 people. The march included many Pacific Islanders and Kanaka Maoli who were kiaʻi o Mauna Kea (protectors of Mauna Kea). Thousands of kia‘i had spent the previous summer on the summit road effectively preventing the multinational Thirty Meter Telescope (TMT) corporation from any further desecration of the summit of Mauna Kea on Hawaiʻi island, which already has thirteen telescopes and is considered to be one of the most sacred mountains in the Hawaiian archipelago. The momentum of this movement, which recognized the value of international solidarity, spilled over into the Hawaiʻi movement for Black Lives march, effectively making it one of the largest marches in Hawaiian history.

    There were also numerous large-scale solidarity marches throughout the Pacific, particularly in Wellington and Auckland in Aotearoa, and in cities throughout Australia. USP students in Vanuatu waved signs, and a group of eighteen Fijians placed flowers in front of the US embassy in Tamavua to draw attention to police violence both abroad and in Fiji. They stood in quiet protest for 8 minutes and 46 seconds, the time it took for George Floyd to pass away from asphyxiation. Fijian police removed the flowers as soon as they left (Boyle), a reminder that threats to freedom of speech exist there also.

    Pacific student organizing has been critical in combating anti-Black racism, and the 2020 global protests strengthened movements calling for global solidarity. A group of anti-racist Papuan students, known as the “Balikpapan 7,” was arrested in 2019 for leading protests in Jakarta that called for an end to racism and to violence against West Papuans (Piersen). Student protestors were called “monkeys” and taunted with racist epithets. The protests calling for the release of the Balikpapan 7 were clearly informed by the resurgence of international support for the Black Lives Matter movement, as can be seen from the social media tag #PapuanLivesMatter. Papuan activist Buchtar Tabuni told the Los Angeles Times that “The government was afraid. Black Lives Matter has triggered support for oppressed Papuans” (Piersen). The Balikpapan 7 all faced the possibility of being sent to prison for up to seventeen years on the charge of treason. As a result of BLM protests, the group was only sentenced to serve eleven months. Tabuni continued: “I extend my sympathies for the passing of George Floyd. We know exactly how it feels. But we also ask Americans for their solidarity; to help us stand on our own two feet as an independent West Papua” (Piersen). Tabuni, while extending sympathies to Floyd’s family, reiterates the need for solidarity with the peoples of West Papua. This solidarity is long overdue.

    I now turn to the important work of diasporic Papuan artist Sonja Larson. Unlike Camari Serau and Mere Tuilau, Larson did not identify as an activist before the summer of 2020. However, it would be a mistake to underestimate the importance of her intervention, entitled BLM Meri Blouse 2020 (see fig. 2). The piece of clothing in the pictures is a handstitched dress known as a Meri blouse, which is worn in PNG. The blouse is covered in both historic and contemporary photographs commemorating Black liberation struggles, social justice activists and those murdered by the state from the United States to West Papua, with delicately placed, sewnin red beads and cowrie shells. This work provides a powerful visual mapping of intersections of Blackness as seen by a Black Pacific woman living in the diaspora in the time of COVID-19.

    Fig. 2.
    BLM Meri Blouse 2020 by Sonja Larson. Photograph courtesy of Sonja Larson.

    Larson descends from the Tolai people of the Gazelle Peninsula of East New Britain in Papua New Guinea, but she has never known these lands. Her only connection to these lands and waters comes from listening to her mother and aunts speaking in Tok Pisin, a language neither she nor her sister speaks. Like many diasporic peoples, Larson has found it difficult to develop a deep connection with her mother’s homeland. Larson was born and raised in Albuquerque, New Mexico, where, she stresses, she is “always read as African American” (S. Larson, Interview). Larson was a student in a Pacific Islands Studies course, “Art, Ritual, and Performance,” that I was teaching at the University of Hawai‘i. Larson was longing to see a reflection of herself at the university, so the opportunity to engage with Melanesian artists opened up new possibilities for her creative expression.

    I introduced Sonja to the work of Australian-based Tolai artist Lisa Hilli, which addresses Black identity and colonial encounters. Hilli curated an exhibition of her work called Trade and Transformation. The purpose of the exhibition was to draw out narratives of the Tolai people and “non-indigenous people to that land—Europeans, missionaries, and colonists” (Hilli, “Trade and Transformation”). Hilli’s exhibition focuses on the small red beads that were ordered by the pound from Europe, which missionaries would hand out to the Tolai inhabitants, initially as a tool to convert them to Christianity but eventually as material with which to acquire land and to extract labor. Hilli ordered twenty pounds of red beads, based on a passage she read in the journal of a reverend who engaged in this trade. She then strung them into rows and hung them from ceiling to floor in multiple strands of varying lengths to display what this payment for labor looks like. At the end of each strand, she added small colonial coins, crosses, or photographs of her ancestors in lockets to represent the unknown history of the Tolai people (Hilli, “Trade and Transformation”). In this same exhibition, Hilli shares a video of green beads being poured into thimbles, invoking workers being paid by German plantation owners “four thimblefuls of beads for every pound of coconut or copra in a coconut pound bag… I wanted to see what that looked like in Black hands” (Hilli, “Trade and Transformation”).

    Inspired by Hilli, Larson stitched in a few small red and green beads at the neck, hem, and sleeves of the blouse, thereby putting Larson into conversation with ancestors she had never known. According to Larson’s mother, Diane Mali Larson, Meri blouses were first given out on the Islands of New Ireland, New Britain, Manus, Louisiade Archipelago, and the Northern Solomons by missionaries in the 1870s to promote humility in bare-breasted Black women. Over time, however, the blouses became a marker of Papuan women’s identity. Women individualized their blouses by embroidering designs or adding different textures or prints. Larson chose to hand-stitch a blouse made of cotton with a faint floral print. Her choice of white cotton was, in part, a practical one, as it is easier to transfer black-and-white photographs onto white cloth, but she chose white cotton also because it was a primary commodity of colonial plantations. It then becomes a material in conversation with the plantations of Fiji and Queensland and the Americas, which are key sites of blackbirding, as Gerald Horne’s work has shown. By hand-sewing the blouse, a craft taught Larson by her mother, she joined a diaspora of Black women artists–from the outer islands of Papua New Guinea to Gee’s Bend–who use cloth and thread to reclaim their identities.

    The materials that Larson chooses transport the viewer across spatial-temporal realms of Black resistance and survival. The cowrie shells stitched into the sleeves of the blouse are particularly relevant from a Black historical perspective. The shells were collected by Larson’s mother from the shores of her home in New Ireland. Larson shared, “By hand-stitching these specific Cowrie shells onto my blouse, it is as though I am bringing a piece of New Ireland closer to me” (“Meri Blouse 2020”). But the cowrie shells are much more than just reminders of her homeland. Cowrie shells or “blood cowries” were ballast on slave ships and a currency for Black bodies (Hartman 205). In this way, Lawson notes that cowries can be both Pacific and Atlantic, both beautiful and bloodstained, gesturing toward an inclusive vision of global Black liberation. As Tolai artists living in the diaspora, Larson and Hilli navigate centuries of anti-blackness and colonialism across oceans. By creating the BLM Meri blouse, Larson hoped to “illustrate the complexity of Black-Pacific identity within the diaspora” (S. Larson). But her decision to incorporate iconic Civil Rights photographs, contemporary photographs of the protests for West Papua, and images of the protests for George Floyd also visually brings to the forefront those intersections and distinctions that define Black Pacific women in the diaspora.

    On the last day of the course, I invited Black Pacific scholars Courtney Savali Andrews, Joyce Pua Warren and Black Maori artist Poata Alvie McKree to critique the students’ final projects. While all of the students in the class shared powerful and moving work, Sonja Larson’s BLM Meri Blouse 2020 produced a collective silence. Larson’s work had marked and made visible the collective pain that we were all holding. This one small garment conveyed colonial violence, our being severed from our ancestors, and the cries for liberation we could not name. In its shells it held the sea and the whispers of those unnamed, carrying all of us to the shores Larson hopes to touch one day.

    Sonja Larson, Camari Serau, and Mere Tuilau are all born out of a Blackness whose lineages of resistance and liberation anchor and overlap in Papua. Their actions and art explore the ways in which Blackness ebbs and flows within the same salt water as the African Diaspora but is grounded in their experience as Pacific peoples. Their work creates a new locus from which to understand Blackness not as an imagined, distant place but instead as a vitally important multi-faceted region that “becomes ‘real’ through pan-Melanesian connections that are manifested in the idea of ‘Melanesia’” (Kabutaulaka 127). From this pan-Melanesian center they build international solidarity. This essay bears witness to the clarity and courage of Melanesian women and gender nonconforming people. Their longings, their suffering, their imagination, and their struggles for liberation provide visionary leadership for Black futures that is so urgently needed.

    Black is the color of solidarity.

    Joy Lehuanani Enomoto is a community organizer, visual artist and lecturer at the University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa in Pacific Islands Studies. Her work on climate justice, embodied archives and demilitarization in the Pacific is featured in Frontiers Journal, The Contemporary Pacific: Experiencing Pacific Environments: Pasts, Presents, Futures, Detours: A Decolonial Guide to Hawaiʻi, Routledge Postcolonial Handbook, and Amerasia Journal. Her current work focuses on anti-Blackness in Oceania/Solwara.

    Footnotes

    1. The term “solwara” is Tok-Pisin word for “salt-water” or “ocean.”

    2. This history stands in contrast to rosy accounts of Indonesia as the host of the infamous 195 Bandung conference, still imagined by scholars an activists as the apex of Third World solidarity.

    Works Cited

    • “Afro-Pacific Women in the Diaspora, Pacific History Association #SayHerName.” YouTube, uploaded by Alisha Lola Jones, 11 Aug. 2016, youtu.be/iAShZYjqSlw. “Amungme: Mountain Papuans Deprived of Their Land.”
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    • Hill, Evan, et al. “How George Floyd was Killed in Police Custody.” New York Times, 31 May 2020, www.nytimes.com/video/us/100000007159353/george-floyd-arrest-death-video.html.
    • Hilli, Lisa. “Trade and Transformation.” Vimeo, uploaded by Blak Dot Gallery, 20 June 2018, www.vimeo.com/276158481. Accessed 12 Oct. 2020.
    • ———. “Trade and Transformation: Blak Dot Gallery Solo Exhibition.” Lisa Hilli, lisahilli.com/papalum-na-lima-practice/trade-transformation/. Accessed 1 Oct. 2020.
    • Horne, Gerald. The White Pacific: U.S. Imperialism and Black Slavery in the South Seas after the Civil War. U of Hawaiʻi P, 2007.
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    • Kabutaulaka, Tarcisius. “Re-Presenting Melanesia: Ignoble Savages and Melanesian Alter-Natives.” The Contemporary Pacific, vol. 27, no.1, 2015, pp. 110–145. Project MUSE, doi:10.1353/cp.2015.0027.
    • Larson, Diane Mali. “History of Meri Blouse.” Interview by Sonja Larson. 28 July 2020 and 20 Aug. 2020. ———. “Meri Blouse 2020.” University of Hawai’i, 2020. Project proposal.
    • Maude, Henry Evans. Slavers in Paradise: The Peruvian Labour Trade in Polynesia, 1862–1864. Australian National UP, 1981.
    • McKittrick, Katherine. Demonic Grounds: Black Women and the Cartographies of Struggle. U of Minnesota P, 2006.
    • MTG Project Banaba. “Project Banaba: Katerina Teaiwa.” YouTube, uploaded by MTGHawke’s Bay, 6 July 2019, youtu.be/hvXe0OabqRg.
    • “Nemangkawi.” Freedom Flotilla, 10. Feb. 2014, freedomflotillawestpapua.org/2014/02/10/nemangkawi/. Accessed 10 July 2020.
    • Perlez, Jane, and Raymond Bonner. “Below a Mountain of Wealth, a River of Waste.” The New York Times, 27 Dec. 2005, www.nytimes.com/2005/12/27/world/asia/below-a-mountain-of-wealth-a-river-of-waste.html. Accessed 9 Oct. 2020.
    • Piersen, David. “George Floyd’s Death Inspires an Unlikely Movement in Indonesia: Papuan Lives Matter.” Los Angeles Times, 2 July 2020, www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-07-02/papuan-lives-matter.
    • “Plantation Voices: Contemporary Conversations with Australian South Sea Islanders.” State Library of Queensland, 16 Feb. 2019, www.slq.qld.gov.au/discover/exhibitions/plantation-voices-contemporary-conversations-australian-south-sea-islanders. Exhibition.
    • “Portrait of an Activist: Camari Serau.” Amnesty International, 30 May 2019, www.amnesty.org/en/latest/education/2019/05/camari-serau/. Accessed 10 Oct. 2020.
    • “West Papua Activists Stopped by Solomons Police.” RNZ Pacific, 9 July, 2018 https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/361417/west-papua-activists-stopped-by-solomons-police
    • “SFF21: Black Visuality and Solidarity in Oceania.” YouTube, uploaded by Honolulu Museum of Art, 3 Feb. 2021, youtu.be/nJTJv4TpSnc.
    • Swan, Quito. “Giving Berth: Fiji, Black Women’s Internationalism, and the Pacific Women’s Conference of 1975.” Journal of Civil and Human Rights, vol. 4, no. 1, 2018, pp. 37–63. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/10.5406/jcivihumarigh.4.1.0037.
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    • ———. “Mela/Nesian Histories, Micro/Nesian Poetics.” Amerasia Journal, vol. 43, no. 1, 2017, pp. 169–178. Taylor & Francis, doi:10.17953/aj.43.1.169-178.
    • ———. “One Ocean, One People: Interview with Teresia Teaiwa on Self-Determination Struggles in the Pacific.” Fightback, 29 Oct. 2014, fightback.org.nz/2014/10/29/one-ocean-one-people-interview-with-teresia-teaiwa-on-self-determination-struggles-in-the-pacific/.
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  • Unsettling Diasporas: Blackness and the Specter of Indigeneity

    Sandra Harvey (bio)

    [T]he wake has positioned us as no-citizen … with no state or nation to protect us, with no citizenship bound to be respected.

    Christina Sharpe, In the Wake

    In her much-celebrated The Transit of Empire, Chickasaw critical theorist Jodi Byrd begins a chapter on colonial multiculturalism with a story about land desecration and grave robbing that has stuck with me for years. As she writes, around the turn of the 20th century, archeologist Charles Peabody hired black workers to excavate mounds within the Mississippian Ceremonial Complex. These were burial sites, sacred land that the Choctaw and Chickasaw tend. The Mother Mound, Ninih Waiya, is the site of creation for the Choctaw who are called to be its stewards (Osburn). The 1830 forced removal of the Choctaw to what is currently called Oklahoma was disastrous not only for the violence enacted on their living bodies but for the violent attempt to sever care between the Choctaw, the land, and their deceased relatives dwelling within the land. One elder described the nightmare of removal in the following way: “We were to cast away the bones of our fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, for the wild dogs to gnaw in the wilderness, our hunters could kill no more meat; hunger and disease would follow; then confusion and death would come … The vengeance of the offended spirits would be poured out upon this foolish nation” (Akers, “Removing” 133). When a Choctaw dies, one spirit holds vigil over their remains to ensure proper care. The other spirit, the shilup, travels west to the “Land of Death.” For the Choctaws, forced removal to the west literally meant being relegated to the land of the dead where they would potentially be unable to reach the afterworld (Akers, “Living”).

    Peabody’s anthropological craft emerged from the American settler colonial and slave owning project and perpetrated this project’s violence simultaneously upon three peoples: he instigated and oversaw the removal of Choctaw and Chickasaw ancestors from their mounds, and he also recorded exploited black workers in song as they carried out the bulk of the grueling physical labor.1 What struck me and continues to weigh on me in this story is the ethical/political relationship of black peoples and, in a more abstract sense, blackness, to the mounds, to the sanctity of the land which we inhabit, and its relatives in this so-called “New World.” This essay represents an attempt at contributing to the many traditions and conversations that try to better understand and enact this relationship, its nuances, and the ethical/political possibilities, both those opened up and foreclosed within its contexts. Drawing on the practices and histories of our ancestors and our interactions with the indigenous peoples of these lands, scholars within western hemispheric Black Studies continue to ask ourselves, how does black life fit into (or not) the histories and ongoing conquest and colonization of peoples and their homelands?2

    The question is salient, in part, because of how foundational ideas of diaspora have come to be for both black intellectual history and black politics. The term often conjures up an existential pull or directionality, a persistent elsewhere that renders black existence, especially but not solely outside of Africa, permanently and always already “unrooted.” In one sense, this has been reduced to a deleterious trope within certain diasporic black political circles that engage a projection of Africa rather than Africa itself as an actual, present constellation of geographies, global capital, colonial ties, and post-colonial struggles. In these balancing moves, an uninterrogated or a carelessly interrogated loss or alienation and desire for or recovering of Africa, mirroring the trope of black colonial “unrootedness,” is paradoxically ingrained in the episteme of what Congolese philosopher and cultural anthropologist V.Y. Mudimbe calls the European project of “Africanism.” Here, Africa as image or object arises only as either completely inaccessible to the descendants of transatlantic enslavement and other black diasporic subjects, or romantically awaiting rediscovery or historical recovery.

    Yet, diaspora has also been the organizing force of Pan African politics, black internationalism, and other black transnational solidarity efforts. It has come to strengthen lateral socio-cultural exchanges between black peoples across Europe, Canada, the United States, the Caribbean, and parts of Central and South America. As Paul Gilroy argues of the Black Atlantic, such ties are manifestations of the “desire to transcend both the structures of the nation state and the constraints of ethnic and national particularity” (19). Despite this productive cross-oceanic pull, Gilroy insists that black existence (outside of one’s so-called original or ancestral homeland) demands a connection to place in its immediate locality. Such a claim frames diaspora in terms of “multi-rootedness” rather than “unrootedness.” He notes, for example, that black Britons are “linked into the social relations” of the UK such that “[b]oth dimensions [the diaspora as transnational and its ties to the nation] have to be examined and the contradictions and continuities which exist between them must be brought out” (156). Gilroy teases out the tensions within the binaristic pull between “home” and colonial metropole that constitutes black life in diaspora.

    Yet, what if we understood diaspora as one point of a definitional web that does not rely on rootedness, however complicated, in the Western nation-state as its counter point? What if we, in addition to diaspora, turn our attention to the condition of indigeneity, which remains undertheorized in most renditions of diasporic Black Studies? How might considering indigeneity and our relationship to it offer insight into who “we” are and what “our futures” can be? I’d like to stage a conversation about the ways in which diaspora has been positioned in opposition to indigeneity, the two reflected as geopolitical poles. I venture that the work of bringing into view the constitutive binary of diaspora and what I argue is its specter, indigeneity, allows us to interrogate the political and cosmological force of its structure as such and the implications for how we might understand our world otherwise. The goal is to pay attention to the multiplicity of ways blackness is coded and recoded in various colonial, post-colonial, and settler colonial geopolitical intersections.

    One of the challenges to posing a conversation between Africanists, post-colonial theorists, migration scholars, Latin Americanists, Black Studies scholars, and Indigenous Studies (including Two Spirit) scholars is not just that each approaches (or dismisses) the idea of “indigeneity” through different conceptual frameworks, different collections of knowledge, and different histories. As scholars, even if we are aware of the work of “other” communities, we have not always taken in their various logics to consider their implications for our own communities. No doubt this article is subject to the same mistakes. However, this failure should not precipitate abandoning the effort. On the contrary, it is indicative of the need for the project itself, given that we are often, as Saidiya Hartman notes, “intellectual strangers” and also—I might add—politically, culturally, epistemically, and genealogically estranged. This article makes an attempt to put into conversation some of these disparate scholarly and political habitus that, while at the level of institution remain siloed, are not so neatly separate in lived experience. I hope it offers additional entryways into thinking about the meanings and relationships between “indigeneity,” “blackness,” and “diaspora.”

    Who “We” Is

    This call also necessarily turns anew to the question of who “we” are, in hopes not of shoring up boundaries but rather of sitting with their necessary and productive porosity and friction.3 The consideration requires attention to the multiple iterations, fault lines, and convivialities within both the “we” of black people (including Indigenous black people) and Black Studies as a field formation that traverses multiple disciplines, area studies, and imperial/colonial institutional power relations.4 In the Western Hemisphere, it is critical to be intentional about these questions, specifically because of the ways that the diasporic / indigenous binary in the Americas has been mapped onto the categories of “black” and “Native” and racialized as such. Tiya Miles, Sharon Holland, and Circe Sturm have contested this reductive demarcation through their work on the history and culture of black members of the so-called Five Civilized Tribes who participated in the chattel slave market, had slaves themselves, and also made kin with Africans and Afro-descendant people. Black peoples (including those enslaved by Indigenous families) engaged in the cultural and kinship practices of the Five Civilized Tribes and many times identified and were recognized as Native peoples. In the United States and Canada, these histories are often understood as exceptional; anti-racist scholars and activists alike in the West often commit the mistake of considering that while black people in these particular cases are Native (“by blood” or “by treaty”), most Natives are not black and most blacks are not Native.5 The consequences of this assumption are severe at the conceptual and thus political levels. The presumption reifies the boundary between blackness and indigeneity such that at present, academic conferences and activist spaces generally take on the interrelations between black and Indigenous peoples and consider these identities as mutually exclusive in attempts to parcel out what solidarity between peoples might look like. In this way, the intra-relationality of black indigeneity becomes unthinkable in a Trouillotian sense (Trouillot).

    I would like to push back on this generalized assumption, and instead to hail as interlocutors black peoples who have no legible (political or cultural) claim to a position of indigeneity. That is, I seek to open up the conversation as a matter of concern amongst black people who are generally identified through the narrative of diaspora. In one sense, this call is anchored in what Tiffany King describes as our conditions as black people “living under relations of conquest” (King, Black Shoals xiii). King prioritizes a conversation amongst black people because, in her words, “I care about Native people’s survival. And I do not care because I have a Native grandmother or ancestor. I care because the Black radical politics that I have inherited cares about Native people … This ethics that eschews and actively resists genocide as an order of modernity and making of the human subject proper is an ethics of Black radical struggle, period” (King, Black Shoals xiii). King attributes this ethics of care not to an identity claim or a claim for political inclusion but to a recognition that the black radical tradition requires a future that wholly ruptures the foundations of conquistador modernity (the modern, Eurocentric and patriarchal idea of the human, the propertization of land, the invention of race and, in particular, blackness as antithetical to freedom) that make black and indigenous life impossible. King hails a black “we” based in a black radical care for the “other” (but not necessarily the other as stranger and even maybe the other as “we”) made possible by her trust in black people and the righteousness of our freedom dreams in as much as they must and do “consider Native freedom” (xiii). One of the most important contributions of this discussion of “we” is that it moves the expectation of concern about colonialism and for indigenous futures beyond the focus on a so-imagined smaller group of black people on Turtle Island who are legally and culturally recognized as also Indigenous. King returns to the Black Studies’ tradition of considering the violence of colonialism as a core component to black freedom and a charge that must be taken up by black scholars and activists in the present.

    This tradition, however, is complicated. Even with trust in (or in other cases, desire for) a black peoples—and not simply those living but our ancestors, if one considers them—“we” are often strangers. I do not mean this only metaphorically or ideologically. Alzheimer’s runs in my family. Many of us are obligated to forget. I am haunted by these doubts: Would my grandmother—as ancestor—recognize me now? Do I or how do I want her to recognize me? Do I have a choice? Here, I invoke recognition in the sense that Fanon through Hegel, Audra Simpson, and Glen Coulthard discuss the term. Yet I also emphasize that recognition is both a political process and an actual material question, whether that be limited by the brain’s grey matter or the emptiness of the National Archives. “Making generations,” as Gayle Jones reminds us in Corregidora, or belonging to generations, is risky and often outside of our control (and perhaps desires). Moreover, alienation is different from unrootedness. One lives estranged within relations of subjection, an almost unbearable circumstance for certain. Yet, almost always, it is that sort of alienation that “we” have in common, even if differently. In mediating on purposefully building relations, Keguro Macharia notes, “Queer studies teaches me to distrust community. From here, (Kenya, personal history, Gikuyu supremacy, heteronormative ethnopatriarchy), family is too toxic to be useful” (“Mbiti & Glissant”). Macharia moves away from the filial as heteronormative and towards what he calls we-formations, and the risky, chaotic, erotic work of relating to one another. To the extent that one desires a “there, there” for blackness, for a black “we,” and for the stability that this might afford particularly in the context of the present task of considering indigeneity alongside, within, rubbing up against blackness, I attempt to take up the opportunity to reckon with these conditions of alienation, to remain open or vulnerable to multiple openings and configurations. To expose oneself to these opportunities and risks is to call for a “we” in which the possibilities of ancestry, in all its queerness and estrangement, confront us. Black Studies is an institutionalized reflection of these silos, investments, desires—one that is beholden to the political economic constraints of an ever more privatized, and US-centric academe. Yet it is also one of the fraught places in which “we” struggle for such formations.

    The Ungeographic

    Black diaspora studies has focused on the Atlantic and its coasts as the points of reference for understanding both black life and black death. Whether it be, for example, through Paul Gilroy’s Black Atlantic, Stephanie Smallwood’s littoral, Saidiya Hartman or Dione Brand’s Door of No Return, Christina Sharpe’s wakes, or Tiffany King’s shoals, these geographical locations, the writers insist, are more than mere positions on a map. They are epistemological and ontological thresholds. That is, the Atlantic and its coasts are not simply borders or boundaries through which subjects of history have passed. Rather, they are people-making (or object-making) geographical constructs that have given form to a key paradox for subjectivity in the soon-to-be-called “New World.” The Middle Passage establishes captive Africans as both objects of commerce and as subjects, but only as pertains to their capacity—if not propensity—for legal or social perversion. The slave trade arranges space and gives meaning by transmogrifying people into commodities.6 Indeed, in Saltwater Slavery, historian Stephanie Smallwood describes the littoral as that place where “a human being could fail to be a person” (63).

    The logic of the market produces place—the littoral—and subject/object together. This was so much the case that within the littoral, even as the enslaved were commonly able to flee particular slavers, they were rarely able to escape enslavement more permanently. Prices for captives were higher closer to the coast, and as such, there was a strong incentive for others to recapture fugitive slaves quickly and sell them back. As Smallwood notes, “sooner rather than later the commercial tide inexorably returned to the water’s edge most of those who had escaped from European captivity” (55). Identified by their emaciated bodies and estrangement from any local kinship ties, they could escape a particular fort or ship but could rarely escape their status as chattel. Thus, the trade altered geographic points of reference for Europeans and Africans (both captive and those who remain on the continent). If prior to the Atlantic slave market the trading centers of west Sudan were a major focal point, once the slave trade increased, the west coast and its logic became a central organizing space (Smallwood). Belying the very definition of the littoral as marginal, slave trafficking rendered the coast a center of West African life.

    The illogic of the periphery-as-center matters for Europe’s projected framing of black and African peoples’ existence in the world as always already detached from origin, and particularly from land as origin. Scholars of the Atlantic, the littoral, and the wake historicize this predicament and yet make sure not to re-claim these geographic configurations as stable ground. On the contrary, it is just this instability, this not fitting into appropriate normative geographies of groundedness, that may serve as a productive force. Leaning into black as ungrounded, as either a geographic non-presence or at least a not fully visible presence, acts as a foil for colonial fantasies of stability, or mastery of space—as do the shoals that disrupt the currents of the Atlantic (King, Black Shoals). Tending to these shoals or the wakes and the understandings of space that they open up is a critical component for a black ethical relationship to land.

    The Atlantic as a point of reference focuses diaspora as a central framing of Black Studies. We have seen, as Stuart Hall insists, “the black experience as a diaspora experience” (253). Yet it is worthwhile to ask whether our existence might be more than “diaspora” as such, or rather if our current understandings of the idea of diaspora obscure various modes of black relating to land. Thus far, our nuanced theorizing of diaspora’s transnationality, uprootedness, and multi-rootedness has often referred back to the colonial or postcolonial nation, even when we believe we are undermining it. This idea of diaspora responds to the ways colonial geography has authorized spatial meaning in the world. The black subject emerges as socially and politically legible as a modern subject in the West through this notion of diaspora and uprootedness. However, despite the complex understanding we have of diaspora, we have generally not paid enough careful attention to whether (or how) this experience is exclusive of indigeneity, which hovers closely by as a specter of black life. For certain, terms such as “indigenous,” “native,” “aboriginal,” and “original peoples” emerge through the making of colonial empire and anthropology as institutions of colonial knowledge production.7 In its attempts to identify and regulate difference, anthropology employs the idea of indigeneity as a place marker of modernity’s boundaries. Many colonized peoples have taken these terms up for resignification. They refer both to various hegemonic colonial designations and to their beyond.8 With this in mind, it is important to look anew at the term and ask after its political (political economic) and ethical and cosmological (or worlding) force. To take indigeneity in relation to diaspora seriously requires rethinking the “point of departure” or “origin” as, instead, multiple points of departure, nodes of movement that of course travel the transits of empire (the Atlantic and the Pacific), but that also exist and make place in excess of colonial logic.9 To exist in such an anarchic way with regard to place, creatively and carefully, isn’t an abstract political choice but the condition of existence (worldly and otherwise) for those of us collectively known as black.

    Part of the reason Black Studies in the West often undertheorizes indigeneity is the prominence of the notion that captive Africans and their black descendants lost all native ties, having passed through the “Door of No Return.”10 Our scholarship recites Orlando Patterson’s observation that natal alienation, or the severing of kinship ties, is a central characteristic of the enslaved. We have given less attention, however, to Patterson’s argument that enslavement also involves a loss of one’s nativeness. He explains that natal alienation has “the important nuance of a loss of native status, of deracination” (7). For Patterson, the idea of the “native” is almost entirely folded into questions of kinship and specifically of lineage. Yet he alludes to the fact that it involves more than genealogy. A loss of native status included severing “attachment to groups or localities other than those chosen for him by the master” (7, emphasis added). Here we see again how kinship and place are related. Note that these violent forms of intertwined alienation seem to be true not just of the transatlantic trade but also more broadly in African and transaharan slave trading societies. For example, Saidiya Hartman offers as a cultural fact that “The most universal definition of the slave is a stranger” (Lose Your Mother 5). In Hartman’s account, with regard to estrangement, place is just as critical as kin. She goes on: “Contrary to popular belief, Africans did not sell their brothers and sisters into slavery. They sold strangers: those outside the web of kin and clan relationships” (5). The stranger was found to be out of their element: their kinship circle and their homeland.

    Hartman’s reflection picks up on a critical point made earlier by Sylvia Wynter regarding the importance of kinship as a logic that protects one from the possibility of enslavement. According to Wynter’s rendition of the “Congolese symbolic-representational system,” men and women who had “fallen out of the protection of their own lineages (in which metaphysically normal being was alone possible)” came to be understood as vulnerable to enslavement (33). Here again, lineage or kinship offers actual existence, and dispossession—or the estrangement of one’s familial relationship to place—engenders an ethics of enslavability. Opposed to “slave,” “native” as an anthropological term holds within it metaphysical consequences. Its designation opens up the possibility of inhabiting the status of personhood or “normal being.” The opposite is also true: to enslave is to sever the captive’s native ties.

    Deracination, at the level of representation and ontology, is intricately tied to colonial geography, and thus comes to describe the condition of blackness after its passage through the so-called Door of No Return or on the shores of Turtle Island. Yet this is not the product of an automatic alchemy that converted captive Africans and Afro-descendants into a complete objecthood. Rather, in the West, it occurs via the logics of trafficking and processes of law making, Christian messianic theologies, and scientific knowledge production, and via the ways each interacts with the others. For example, in seventeenth-century Virginia, the colonial Assembly sought to repress Powhatan-led resistance after Nathaniel Bacon’s rebellion by making a legal equivalence between captured Africans and Powhatans with regard to enslavement. The legislation insisted that “all servants ‘whether Negroes, Moors, Mollattoes and Indians’ were to be considered slaves if their parents and native country were not Christian at the time of their first purchase” (Brown 180). This early legislation is indicative of a series of colonial projections and preclusions. First, by rendering individual Powhatans enslaveable, the Assembly reduced these individuals to the status of captive Africans. In this case, white settler/slave owners surreptitiously projected blackness onto Native peoples as a means of both materially and discursively obviating their threat to settler sovereignty. I say they projected “blackness” because this legislation occurred at the same time that blackness became legally fixed to the position of the slave through the recently passed partus law. This law rendered the black womb as that which produced slaves and not legally recognized and protected kin.11

    I argue that blackness, rather than black people, becomes the signifier of enslavement in order to be precise about the structure of the developing symbolic representational system. Blackness, or what Hartman calls the “figurative capacities of blackness,” becomes an abstract signifier of the slave, the non-being or the oxymoronic being-who-lacks-will (Scenes 22). It refers to the black body and black geographies but also to abstract or projected representations. That is, there is nothing (biologically) essential about the black body that renders it or its person vulnerable to enslavement. Rather colonial imaginaries suture blackness to bodies as an effect of exercising sovereignty over oneself as master/property owner (of people and land). One may read the legislation as projecting blackness onto Native peoples, an ultimate affront to Native sovereign claims.

    Second, and paradoxically, in locating the justification for enslavement in the captives’ non-Christian parents and “native country,” the legislation momentarily recognized a parallel between African and Powhatan experiences of colonialism. The law references both African and Powhatan ties to kinship and place of origin, a place to which they were indigenous, and (at least at one point) a native status. Not yet can these Anglo colonists easily make the argument that enslaved Africans came from nothing, that they had no history. Moreover, the law conceives of a constitutive likeness between relations and place, if not land. These two conceptual nodes point to a slip in the doctrine of the “colonialism that never happened” (Smith), or the disavowal of the colonialism that occurred in West Africa beginning in the fifteenth century and through the transatlantic slave trade and its afterlife. This particular and short-lived law attempted to exclude both Africans and Powhatans from the status of free human based on the argument that they were not of a Christian country. According to this law, we might infer that Africans actually brought with them a specter of their one-time indigenous relationship to place or land and, thus, origin. Africa stubbornly materialized on the shores of what came to be called Virginia. That is, this legal doctrine superimposed lineage and land onto each other; the entanglement of the two determined one’s enslavability.

    The example of colonial Virginia’s attempts to contain both African and Powhatan life exemplifies the ways geography, as a technology of colonial nation-building, works as a practice of subjection with consequences for what is or is not intelligible. Indeed, Katherine McKittrick underscores the importance of this arrangement for the stability of the Western world as we know it. She writes, “Geography’s discursive attachment to stasis and physicality, the idea that space, ‘just is’ . . . not only anchors our selfhood and feet to the ground, it seemingly calibrates and normalizes where, and therefore who, we are” (xi). Yet this sort of “transparent geography,” as McKittrick calls the discipline’s rootedness in positivism, belies the ways conquest and ongoing colonialism as epistemological and material forces shape space. The claim to transparency, then, is a farce that renders illegible or illogical those black relationships to place that challenge the ontological claims of colonial geography and world-mapping. McKittrick argues, thus, that black peoples themselves come to be understood as “ungeographic.” This is because the logic refuses to see the complexities of black relationality or sociality as committed to place in nuanced ways. This nearsighted perspective refuses Africa’s specter on the shores of Virginia.. I am not interested in rendering black life and relationship to space or land legible in any transparent way. Instead, I view transparency’s oversight as a provocation in itself. In other words, what interests me is what it means to be ungeographic. What are the illogical and thus radical possibilities that are opened up for black and African peoples’ relationship to place/space/the world, given our ungeographic rendering? This includes a necessary care for other Indigenous people’s relationships to land (in particular, land as familial relations) and to a worlding that is not loyal to the fantasy of mastery that undergirds the project of positivist geography.

    Indigeneity, Race, and the Secular State

    If early modern colonial legislation located black and Native difference in their non-Christian “souls,” a product of their intertwined country and kinship ties, modern legal-rational knowledge regimes reduced this difference to the body through the idea of “race.” This understanding of the human and its other becomes a building block that makes possible the rational administration of peoples within the bounds of the nation-state and its political economy. The process of racialization is important not simply because it instantiates a hierarchy, but because it summons subjects (or objects) to serve as beings-for-the-nation, as markers of its sovereign, life enforcing and death making boundaries. Western political theorists have observed this dynamic in Europe’s metropoles regarding citizenship and the so-called “Jewish Question.” As part of the formation of the modern state, the anti-Semitic debate across Europe questioned whether Jewish people could be proper citizens. At the center of the debate were the supposedly competing interests for Jewish people between the will of the rational state and the divine law of G-d. Western statists considered secularism and Judaism as two universal claims about the world that necessarily challenged each other’s sovereignty. Wendy Brown writes that by the late nineteenth century racial liberalism attempted to resolve the issue on (at least) a discursive level by privatizing Jewish difference as race and reducing divine law to a religious choice, or the product of (humanist) belief. Liberalism allows for “religion” to be practiced at home or in a temple as private space, and for nationalism to be practiced in the public sphere. As a result, the sovereign conflict between cosmological difference is reduced or privatized to a notion of race and “identity” attached to the body (Brown). This liberal secularist logic is at least in part where the concept of Jewishness as a physiological race emerges.12 In this sense, perhaps the most important component of national racialization processes is the calling into being of the secular human. In the metropole, as Talal Asad explains, secularism “is an enactment by which a political medium (representation of citizenship) redefines and transcends particular and differentiating practices of the self that are articulated through class, gender, and religion” (5). Liberal secularism is a universalist political and epistemological claim that reduces difference to a notion of “identity,” of which race is a part, and relegates this to the private sphere for good political subjects to transcend. It thus splits the subject in two: public citizen and private ethnic, racial, and religious individual.

    What Brown makes less clear is what relationship these processes of liberal secularism and racialization might have with Europe’s own concurrent colonial and slave management projects. To return to these regimes, we can trace the ways racialization is a core component of the Western nation-state’s sovereignty, which depends on a civilizing mission to create new colonial subjects or tributes. We cannot say that the sixteenth or seventeenth-century captive Africans or their European traffickers inhabited the world through a liberal secular subjectivity. Instead, as argued above, subjection occurred through the enslaved’s loss of native status, natal alienation, and the removal of Africans across the Atlantic. Stephanie Smallwood describes the way some made sense of this commodification and removal: “In some Atlantic African communities it was believed that persons who departed in this way did in fact return but traveled not on the metaphysical plane of the ancestors but rather, transmuted as wine and gunpowder, on the material plane of commodities” (61). This is not simply “social death” as understood in various indigenous cosmologies, but a “kind of total annihilation of the human subject” (61). Emancipation in theory, then, required not simply the removal of chains but a further alchemy of the commodity/subject to a sort of liberal, secular individual able to take up citizenship.13 A bad faith liberal order discursively incorporates the black subject as citizen to the extent that blackness as difference is reduced to and contained within the body, and cosmology is reduced to the private realm of culture. It further disavows any ontoepistemic consequences of slavery’s afterlife for Afrodescendents. Within such a logic, to move blackness from the private sphere to the public is to introduce the unwieldy specter of non-sovereignty into the heart of the sovereign national body politic.

    This is understandably one reason Indigenous peoples have argued against a designation that reduces them to “an additional special (ethnic) group or class” within the multicultural state, as Eve Tuck and Wang Yang write (2). Yet, herein lies an assumption that has not been scrutinized sufficiently by those making such an argument against the violence of inclusion. This assumption, which pushes back against racialization for those recognized as Indigenous, takes for granted and shores up the racialization of Afrodescendents. This may be the gravest of epistemological violences for the colonized: the invisibilized work of deracination. It isn’t about a loss of identity. On the contrary, it is the creation of the very idea of identity and one’s access to it. Being called into “being” as black within the modern secular liberal world is 1) to maintain a loss of native status, including access to a possible multiplicity of West African cosmological differences with regard to land and kin; and 2) to re-emerge as a subject whose difference is only legible through the language of privatized and minoritized racial identification.

    I wonder, too, if this is what is at stake for the white settler state in the marking of “indigeneity.” It is not simply an indicator of time and space—one’s presence in one’s homeland prior to European colonization—but the sovereign threat of a competing universal claim about the very way time and space (place) work together. The onto-epistemological violence that liberal secularism authorizes involves viewing any other cosmology or way of being in the world as a threat to the sovereignty of the nation-state and, therefore, relegating it to the status of nonsense. The making of the liberal, secular state is rooted in the business of colonization and chattel slave ownership, in large part through racialization. Indigeneity as a concept, then, is partly a marker of the way colonized peoples have of inhabiting the world (and beyond) that otherwise is not able to be fully incorporated into the modern, liberal, secular state. This, at its very core, is necessarily in competition with state sovereignty. For Afrodescendants, the stakes of experiencing a loss of native status, then, must be understood in this way—as a forced cosmological transformation that demands the new modern subject’s total fidelity to the secular New World.

    The term ontoepistemic signals the conceptual level upon which indigeneity is made to disappear. Shona Jackson uses the term to describe a similar dynamic in post-colonial Guyana. She highlights the bad faith manner in which black nationalist belonging uses indigeneity to make a claim to power through the state. She clarifies that

    the term ontoepistemic is used to signal the link between Creole being and the production of discourses that support social being by narratively instituting Creole subjectivity as indigenous. In these discourses, the repetition of indigenous disappearance emerges as a significant epistemological component. (28)

    For Jackson, the legibility of post-colonial Creole nationalism depends on the trope of Amerindian disappearance. Particularly problematic is the claim that black Guyanese are the rightful inheritors of the state because they and their ancestors built the state up through their forced labor on plantations. According to Jackson, this claim depends upon a relationship to land through labor that is made legible within a modern capitalist episteme. The claim “makes sense,” as she argues, because black labor produced commodities bought and sold on the market, and its profits contributed to the development of the colonial and post-colonial state. In contrast, Amerindian relations to land are rendered illegible precisely because they do not register within modern labor and commodity market representational systems. Black Creole claims to the state traffic in settler discourse, she argues, as it disappears Amerindians while simultaneously making its own indigenous claims.14

    My interests in this important critique are twofold. First, Jackson raises the critical question of whether the post-colonial state—even when taken over by black people—is capable of being exorcised from colonial relations. The question is critical because the state’s claim to sovereignty renders any other claim, including others’ sovereign relations with land, dependent or disappeared. This move has real and violent ontoepistemic and political-economic consequences for the disappeared. Thus, one must ask how we can act ethically within the so-called post-colonial space/time in a way that does not reify colonial or slave trafficking geographies and claims to humanity. That includes narratives that commit colonized peoples to a hinterland or, I might add to a permanent status as stranger. Second is Jackson’s reading of blackness as the racial identity vulnerable to creolization.15 It raises the question, not only of the possibilities for subjectivity for black peoples in the post-colony and/or post-emancipation moment, but also for those recognized as Indigenous. Ugandan theorist Mahmoud Mamdani reads each of these positions as political identities in particular because of the ways colonial governance identified and categorized indigenous “ethnic groups” as part of a colonial structure of governance (658). Yet he does not duly consider the ways in which identity, as a form that a subject must inhabit, has been itself the product of a violent transformation. We find ourselves in the post-colonial conundrum, that we are both rightly suspicious of ideas of “primordial” culture or static “tradition” and compelled to tend to the real consequences of ontological and cosmological difference and their consequences.

    We the Estranged

    We are thus confronted with an impasse that is anchored in the epistemological demand for the modern and its outliers, which have been made possible through blackness’s loss of native status as a condition of both colonialism and enslavement. After the archival turn in particular, many black scholars decried our “stuckness” in a dichotomy of existential and epistemological loss and recovery. Once again, questions emerge about who “we” are, how we might know us, and also what sort of ethics guides our orientation to and amongst each other.

    In contrast to this consolidation of Black Studies under the metaphor of the trans-Atlantic, or of proximity to the Atlantic and the abandonment of the need to claim a native life, some Afrodecendents in Abya Yala, or what is currently called Latin America, have been forging a different sort of relationship to the place that they inhabit and the peoples to whom they belong. This is true, for example, for black peoples of the Costa Chica in Guerrero and Oaxaca, México. Here I raise this example because in considering it seriously, I believe their interaction with conditions of indigeneity in Mexico might allow us to think the relationship of indigeneity to diaspora and the Atlantic differently. Black people from the Costa Chica have much less access to the cosmopolitan worlds of Paul Gilroy’s Black Atlantic, which, as several scholars have pointed out, almost exclusively focuses on the Global North and the Caribbean.16 Instead, black people in Costa Chica have moved with rather than away from indigeneity in a way that cannot and should not be reduced to “recovery” or fully explained through the language of citizenship. According to the 2015 Intercensal Survey, 64.9 percent of Afrodescendent respondents self-identified as “indigenous.”17 Their claims challenge long-standing ideas about what the term means, and what politics are made possible by inhabiting the position. First, they challenge the de jure racialization of the category in the Western Hemisphere. They betray any claim to a local homeland on Costa Chica prior to colonization, and they demand that we consider a different temporal organization. Second, the newness of being considered “original peoples” pushes back on the relationship that modernity has with indigeneity as a prologue to the Western State.

    Black mobilization in Costa Chica has not been organized around the idea of indigeneity. Instead it initially responded to the consequences of broad erasure of black existence in the modern nation. Anti-black, post-colonial Mexican nationalism celebrates the Indigenous nations in its territory (even if condescendingly) and the mestizo (as a modern resolution of a colonial past settled through a white supremacist best-case scenario of the Casta racial framework). Critical theorist Ricardo Wilson characterizes Mexican post-colonial nationalism as dependent on a “psychic vanishing of blackness,” in which national consciousness seeks to contain a secret of black existence within a psychic crypt or “gap,” denying its presence within the country’s contemporary borders. Blackness itself, in México, is either relegated to a past and forgettable slave economy or externalized as emanating from Central America or the Caribbean. Black Mexicans, as a result, exist in a paradoxical situation of active state neglect and surveillance, that is, of both invisibility and hypervisibility. While their movement cannot be reduced to a call for state recognition—in fact, the rallying demand was for an end to the anti-black violence and erasure they face daily—the push for recognition became in large part a strategy for securing state resources (Hernández-Díaz).

    In this instance, it was perhaps at least in part because of the cultural and institutional erasure of blackness in México that the state ultimately recognized black people of the Costa Chica as “original peoples.” The states of Guerrero and Oaxaca responded to black mobilizations through what was available to them: existing legal statutes or dominant discourses aimed at tending to the relationship between the state and conventionally recognized Indigenous nations. For example, to Oaxaca’s preexisting Law for the Rights of Indigenous Communities and Peoples (Ley de Derechos de los Pueblos y Comunidades Indígenas), officials added a clause recognizing “Afromexicans” and “Indigenous peoples belonging to any other community of another state in the republic” (Secretaría de Asuntos Indígenas de Oaxaca 2005; qtd. in Quecha Reyna 163; my translation and emphasis added). Following suit, officials from the Secretary of Indigenous Affairs in Guerrero changed the state’s constitution to include the following language: “This constitution recognizes and protects the ‘Original Peoples’ of the state” including “the Indigenous nations of Naua, Nuu savi, Me’phaa and N’ancue N’omdaa, the communities belonging to them and the Afromexican peoples” (Quecha Reyna 162; my translation). While the dominant narrative celebrates this “multicultural” nationalist move to recover and recognize black Mexicans as the nation’s tercera raiz (the other two are Eurodescendents and Indigenous peoples), it is clear from the state’s response that understanding black difference at the level of a “peoples” or pueblo emerges from the same conceptual and institutional framework it uses in response to Indigenous peoples writ large.

    The words indigenous and original are provocative. There is a slippage between the two, which otherwise are used as synonyms in México and in Spanish in general. It is not clear how or if these denominations imply different relationships to land. For example, indigenous has almost always referred to a peoples’ particular relationship to homeland, while original might leave its object open for interpretation. This ambiguity allows for the state to claim “original peoples” as part of the cultural and political project of the nation state. However, the word also connotes a relationship to authenticity, stasis, or that which has not or never will change. This sort of existence, tied to prologue, is legible to the state, particularly in its multicultural formulation (Povinelli). For black peoples, who in their existence in the “New World” become the symbol of the modern and new subject, claiming original status within that so-called New World might come off as illogical or illegible. I want to entertain this illogic as a possible example of the ungeographic nature of what McKittrick has called “demonic grounds.” The term demonic, borrowed from Sylvia Wynter, denotes evil but also describes those troubling locations “outside the space-time orientation of the humunucular observer” (Wynter qtd. in McKittrick, xxv). This consideration also follows Wilson’s question about how “what emanates or escapes from” the racial psychic gap of the Mexican nation can be made “visible in order to activate anxieties that give a slight sense of the contours of the unthinkable intrapsychic gap” (31). To consider a black claim to indigeneity in this way opens up the possibilities of a relationship to place that troubles the stagnation of the label “arrivant,” which Settler Colonial Studies and some Native Studies scholarship demand of black people on Turtle Island. In one sense, it is true that black mobilization in the Costa Chica can be read as falling into the relationship that Gilroy describes as characteristic of the black diaspora: a simultaneous relationship and political/identitarian commitment to México and to Africa; after all, many black people on the Costa Chica refer to themselves as “afromexicano.” However, the community’s designation as “original,” which places them alongside other Indigenous peoples, exists in an ungeographical sense, and perhaps in its reference to Mexico’s black psychic gap, in excess of the state.

    Additionally, the origin story black peoples of Costa Chica hold onto contests the accepted narrative produced by Mexican anthropologists, who attribute their beginnings largely to what was made possible through state-sponsored emancipation of slaves and small-scale instances of fugitivity. In an article on “afro-descendant ethno-political mobilization” in the Costa Chica, Mexican anthropologist Citali Quecha Reyna quotes an elder interlocutor who recounted: “Well, there are lots of stories, but one that the oldest elders told me was that there, in front of Port Minizo, there was a shipwreck. They said it was huge and all of the broken pieces of the ship remained there and that a lot of black peoples came down from there. That’s what they told me about how we got here. And it might be why we, here, love life by the sea” (Quecha Reyna 163; my translation). The anthropologist highlights their insistence in telling their children they “come from ships” even as she scrutinizes them, noting that “their origins are diverse, and certainly shipwrecks existed, but they were uncommon” (Quecha Reyna 164; my translation).

    We are presented with two questions. First, within the context of blackness and indigeneity in the “New World,” how might we understand the elders’ insistence that they originate from a shipwreck? Second, how must we read the anthropologist’s explanation of this insistence? One aspect that jumps out is the elder’s description of her people’s relationship to place, and in particular, to the littoral instantiated not by a “Door of No Return” but by a shipwreck, ostensibly a mutiny of captives. The origin story speaks of refusal and destruction as a celebratory source of pleasure for its people. It is why they “love life by the sea.” It is also a moment that troubles the sovereignty (or mastery) of the slave owning colonizers. On the one hand, the origin story indicates a living relationship between a people and the ground upon which they emerged as defeating the power of the sovereign. On the other hand, it is questionable whether this new relationship claims sovereignty itself in as much as sovereignty seeks to police and is successful at policing the boundaries of such a stable ground.

    The anthropologist explains her interlocutor’s story within the discourse of social construction. She attributes the creation of the “myth” to the group’s needs given the experience of the “first slaves” of the “violent,” “cultural and geographic” “transformation” of the transatlantic slave trade. On the one hand, social construction as a concept indeed counters the multicultural desire for “authenticity” and “timelessness.” For example, Quecha Reyna cites anthropologist Ana Rosas Mantecón who explains, “The construction of heritage is a dynamic operation, rooted in the present, from which the past is reconstructed, selected, and interpreted. It’s not about preserving an immobile past, but inventing a posteriori, social continuity, in which tradition has a central role” (qtd. in Quecha Reyna 164). This is a valuable intervention in that it pushes back on the dichotomy of loss and recovery. Yet it is also a secular humanist reading of the origin story, which otherwise might not be legible within the bounds of transparent geography or linear history. This is to say, what if we did not insist on the exclusivity of the power of humans to shape their own relationships to land (or moments) as inanimate objects or events on a linear timeline? What if we took the origin story at face value?

    This does not mean reading the elders as completely outside modernity’s episteme, but it does mean becoming open to the possibility that this grid of intelligibility is not all-encompassing or totalizing. That is, black peoples’ existence straddles both Western modernity and the undoing of its hegemony. The demonic grounds that condition black existence, as McKittrick has argued, are unpredictable, animate, and unstable. Here then, rather than understanding black existence as having “no ground” upon which to stand, we might understand it as an orientation that emerges through ungeographic grounds upon which modern conceits of sovereignty are unsustainable. To insist on the primacy of anthropology or geography’s reading of social construction, as Native feminist Mishuana Goeman charges, “obfuscates the power of land to possess us” (27). Goeman recounts that Indigenous scholar Leslie Silko “reminded us that the earth pushes through the pavement … where no sacred sites are thought to exist, and a sacred stream may still trickle waiting to heal again” (27). Indeed, we may not be the only agential creatures in this world or its otherwise.

    Some Opening Remarks

    By way of participating in this conversation, I’d like to submit that considering head-on black relationship to, desires for, existence in, and alienation from indigeneity provides us with an opportunity to better articulate both the epistemological force of colonialism, chattel slavery, and post-coloniality, and our desires for a “we” in their eventual destruction. Saba Mahmood clarifies: “Indeed, if the religious [or, I might add, other cosmologies] and the secular are indelibly intertwined in the modern period, each conditioning the other, then the question is not so much how modern society can expunge religion from social life (as Marx envisioned) but how to account for its ongoing power and productivity in material and discursive terms” (15). Likewise, we would do well to account for the power and productivity of the colonial episteme’s dichotomous logic of diaspora and indigeneity and the ways race (and blackness in particular) is mapped onto each.

    To push back or decenter a secularism as a total logic regime also has implications for who we are and how we relate to our various origin stories, space/place, time, our ancestors, and each other. Romanticizing this relationship is unproductive, at best, and an act of violence in bad faith, at worst. To take seriously the years of critique from feminist, queer, and trans scholars as well as those coming from critiques of class and multiple geopolitical positionalities, our relations are not always benevolent; they do not always have “our” best interests at heart. In an anecdote she presents in The Transit of Empire about black workers, the colonial anthropologist Charles Peabody, and the Choctaw and Chickasaw peoples and their mounds, Jodi Byrd speculates that black workers understood and took seriously the metaphysical consequences that grave robbing would incite and for which Peabody himself was responsible. She writes,

    There is evidence within the evocations [the workers sang] of corn and fire on the one hand, and a critique of the preachers in the cornfield digging up “taters row by row” on the other, that those laborers and their songs provide resistant traces that acknowledge the desecration that is occurring—and a positioning of themselves as tied to the people buried in the mounds. The corn and potatoes reveal the bundles of bodies and skulls of those Choctaws buried at the site. As Peabody forced the laborers to disinter the mounds through terraced rows, each blow of the shovel exposed the dirt-encrusted whiteness of human bones that are evoked so provocatively by these singers as the white flesh of shovel-scored potatoes in the ground. (121)

    Such a laborers’ song certainly evokes an ethics of care concerned with the Choctaw and Chickasaw responsibility towards both the land and its inhabitants. This ethics also calls the workers to support the land’s caretakers in their duties. This is a relationship to land, not as visitors, not as always elsewhere, but one that questions and wrestles with the designation of black totalizing rootlessness. It asks, how might we turn our attention to the animacy of alienation in a way that straddles Western modernity and its other, such that being beholden to our relations includes contending with their force and refusing (our or their) possession?

    Sandra Harvey is Assistant Professor of African American Studies at the University of California, Irvine.

    Footnotes

    1. In this essay I purposely do not capitalize “black” or “native” as a reminder that the ideas of blackness and nativeness are contested and refigured grounds. In contrast, I capitalize “Indigenous” or “Native” at times to differentiate between ideas of nativeness or native peoples and Native people as recognized by the U.S. federal government.

    2. These conversations have also drawn on moments of academic work and histories of political organizing. Regarding activism, for example, the American Indian Movement (AIM), the Brown Berets, and the Red Guard of the late 1960s and 1970s modeled police patrols after those of the Black Panther Party (BPP), and like the BPP implemented social support actions including food programs, legal support, and health clinics. Activists formed coalitions to demand a Third World College at San Francisco State and University of California, Berkeley. These efforts brought forth Ethnic Studies programs in California and across the United States. The Third World alliances emerging during a time of colonial resistance in Africa and Asia focused attention on the importance of a critique of colonialism even within the metropole. Also, black historians and literary scholars have documented the experiences of black Indigenous peoples in the United States. See for example Tiya Miles, Ties That Bind; Sharon Holland and Tia Miles, Crossing Waters, Crossing Worlds; and Andrew Jolivette, Louisiana Creoles. More informally, the open access journal Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society frequently showcases scholarship focused on the intersections of anti-blackness and settler colonialism. This scholarship seldom has drawn on black and indigenous scholarship focused on Latin America.

    3. I am prompted to think through the term “porous” in Tiffany King, The Black Shoals; the idea of “fault lines” in SA Smythe, “Can I Get a Witness?”; and the term “frottage” in Keguro Macharia, Frottage.

    4. I use the term “fault lines” following SA Smythe. I also thank them for the multiple conversations we have had about the need for this article to consider, once again, the “we” of both black peoples and Black Studies.

    5. Even this argument is called into question by those who assert that the descendents of Indigenous people’s black slaves should not be considered citizens of their nations and that they should not benefit from rights and privileges of citizens. Their very inclusion, so goes the argument, is the result of colonial treaties that undermine the sovereignty of Indigenous nations.

    6. In using this term, I call attention to the various dimensions embedded within it, as explored by Saidiya Hartman. First, the insistence on the word scene refers to a spatialized representation of a moment of subjection. Second, the subjection of the slave involves a calling into being as subjected to the terror of the master’s violence at the master’s will. Hartman describes such scenes as “inaugural moments” and the “primal scene,” by which she means “that the terrible spectacle dramatizes the origin of the subject and demonstrates that to be a slave is to be under the brutal power and authority of another” (Scenes 3).

    7. See Braun and Hammond (Race, Populations, and Genomics) on anthropological and linguistic practices that give rise to the idea of “native” or “indigenous” as indicating exclusive “ethnic” groups. The practices upheld Western science as the authoritative system of knowledge production and led to understandings of ethnic groups as populations and later distinct races.

    8. Here I am not referring to a beyond that transcends the colonial but to a beyond in the sense that the colonial is not successful in its totalizing attempts at mastery. One engages in ways of being that exceed colonial containment. These include otherwise cosmologies but also those ways of being that are produced and yet disavowed through colonial symbolic orders.

    9. I draw on Jodi Byrd’s term “transit of empire.” She argues that “Indianness” constitutes a transit of empire, “a site through which US empire orients and replicates itself by transforming those to be colonized into ‘Indians’ through continual reiterations of pioneer logics, whether in the Pacific, the Caribbean, or the Middle East” (xiii).

    10. There are two bodies of literature that focus more directly on the idea of black indigeneity. They include scholarship of Africa and the politics of autochthony and Caribbean creole culture. In the interest of space and due to the author’s limited expertise, this article does not address the latter form. I do, however, welcome conversations about its intersections with the fields of Black and Native Studies in the Americas. The article briefly engages the latter work on creole ways of being but recognizes further attention is needed.

    11. This is interesting to think about given the ways settler and slave owning political thinkers continued to project blackness onto Native peoples in Virginia. See Thomas Jefferson’s differentiation between the “noble” natives beyond the borders of the United States and those within the sovereign borders of Virginia who, he argues, are mostly black.

    12. Even the socialist critique of liberal secularism, which calls for the abolition of even privatized “religion,” emerges within the metaphor of skin. In “On the Jewish Question,” Marx calls for the birth of the truly free “man” by shedding religion “as snake-skins cast off by history” (Marx 213).

    13. Saidiya Hartman writes, “The transformation of black subjectivity effected by emancipation is described as nascent individualism not simply because blacks were considered less than human and a hybrid of property and person prior to emancipation but because the abolition of slavery conferred on them the inalienable rights of man and brought them into the fold of liberal individualism” (Scenes 117). Given this legal legibility, it was the civilizing mission of certain abolitionists and the Freedmen’s Bureau to make proper subjects out of the emancipated.

    14. Tiffany King critiques the centrality of labor for understanding black life during formal slavery and post-emancipation. See “Labor’s Aphasia.”

    15. Jackson also describes East Indian claims to state power through creole identity. Yet, she argues, in this case, creole is almost always used as adjective rather than noun. Further, the Caribbean cultural archives Jackson reviews contain predominantly black authors.

    16. See Feldman Black Rhythms of Peru; Walsh “Shifting the Geopolitics”; Greene, “Entre lo indio”; and Anderson, Black and Indigenous.

    17. 2015 Encuesta Intercensal (Intercensal Survey) cited in Wilson II, The Nigrescent Beyond.

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  • Garifunizando Ambas Américas: Hemispheric Entanglements of Blackness/Indigeneity/AfroLatinidad

    Paul Joseph López Oro (bio)

    Abstract

    Central Americans of African descent are in the margins on the histories of transmigrations and political movements in the isthmus and their diasporas. The absence of Black Central Americans in Latinx Studies and Central American Studies is an epistemological violence inherited from Latin American mestizaje. The insurgence of Afro-Latinx Studies is an intellectual and political response to the erasure and negation of Black people and Blackness in the field of Latinx Studies. In this essay, I map out the political urgency to call for a refashioning of Afrolatinidad that dismantles the dangerous allure of ethno-racial nationalism (i.e., Afro-[insert nation-state]) and mappability of Blackness into exclusionary geographies of Spanish-speaking Americas (i.e., “you must be Dominican, because you don’t look Guatemalan”). Drawing on oral history interviews, visual cultures, and social media analysis, I demonstrate how transgenerational Garifuna New Yorkers of Central American descent histories and politics of self-making, beginning in the late 1950s to the present, highlight their negotiations and contradictions as they perform their multiple subjectivities as Black, Indigenous, and AfroLatinx.

    When I am challenged or questioned about my identity, I respond by saying that Black people exist in Central America. Some are descendants of enslaved peoples; some are not. Some speak Spanish; some do not. Some are Catholic; some are Rastas; some are Garveyites. Some are immersed in hybridized identities that include native, Asian, and African nations. And when these Black people come to the United States, they continue to be Black people from Central America, negotiating among invisibilities.—Vielka Cecilia Hoy, “Negotiating among Invisibilities”

    In the United States, the invocation of Central America conjures a set of racial and political imaginaries that centers mestizos, Indigenous cultures, revolutionary movements, civil wars, and US occupations, eclipsing a discussion of race and racism in the region and its diasporas. Within Central American mestizaje, Blackness is relegated and ascribed to the Caribbean Coast, erasing centuries of Black folks in the interior and Pacific Coasts. By ascribing Blackness and Black people to Central America’s Caribbean Coasts, mestizaje constructs its imaginary in opposition to and as a negation of Blackness, especially when the Caribbean Coast is understood to be removed from the national public spaces of mestizo governance, for example with Managua or Tegucigalpa. Moreover, this imaginary renders Central American Blackness as Caribbean, as coming from elsewhere and not always already present prior to the formation of the Republic. More recently, Central American neoliberal multiculturalism (Hale) constructs Blackness as a folkloric caricature for tourist and popular culture consumption (Loperena). Black Central Americans doubly negotiate their invisibilities on the isthmus and in their diasporas in the United States. Despite the extensive and rich history of Africans and their descendants in the isthmus, especially their presence and contributions centuries prior to the 1821 Wars of Independence, Black history and Blackness remain alien to Central American nationhood in and outside of the isthmus (Gudmundson and Wolfe 5). This negation and erasure of Black Central Americans is produced and preserved by the dominant nationalist racial project of racial mixture or mestizaje. Black Central Americans transgenerationally carry with them when they migrate to the United States centuries of embodied histories of anti-black racism and violence.1

    Vielka Cecilia Hoy’s essay “Negotiating among Invisibilities: Tales of Afro-Latinidades in the United States” appeared in the trailblazing volume The Afro-Latin@ Reader: History and Culture in the United States. Vielka’s essay is one of three essays in the 584-page volume that is written from and about a Black Central American worldview. Born in Brooklyn, New York, Vielka Cecilia Hoy was raised in Oakland, California, by immigrant parents. Her mother is a Creole Nicaraguan woman from Bluefields and her father is an Afro-Panamanian man from Colón and a descendant of West Indian migrant workers. Her essay powerfully illustrates the nuances and complex ways her Black Latinidad is in perpetual conflict in a space like the West Coast, where the dominance of mestizo Mexican identities and cultures shapes the Californian imaginary as a Mexican/Chicanx/Mexican-American space of Latinidad. In similar ways on the East Coast, specifically in New York City as a Caribbean Latinx city, AfroLatinx peoples are often assumed to be Dominican, whereas Black Central Americans tend to be racialized as African Americans or West Indians. Hoy’s essay is striking because of the multiplicity of invisibilities and contradictions it engages. It is here, in the space of negotiations, contradictions, and articulations that I consider the ways transgenerational Garifuna New Yorkers exist, live, and articulate their multiple Black, Indigenous, and Latinidad subjectivities.

    Garifuna are Black Indigenous peoples who are descendants of shipwrecked enslaved West Africans and autochthonous Carib-Arawak on the Caribbean island of St. Vincent. Their exile by British colonial powers in 1797 to the Bay Islands of Honduras and their subsequent migrations to Belize, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and mainland Honduras script their ethnogenesis in the lesser Antillean Caribbean and mark their multiple diasporas: African, Caribbean, and Central American (England). With the economic collapse of the United Fruit Company in the mid-twentieth century, Garifuna Central Americans commenced multiple waves of transgenerational migration to major US port cities such as New York City, New Orleans, Miami, Chicago, Boston, and San Francisco. This migration continues today, as gang violence, government corruption, and economic instability dominate the Central American region. A diasporic multiplicity informs the complex ways in which Garifuna negotiate their multiple subjectivities in Central America and in the United States, as Central America’s Caribbean Coasts become nostalgic sites of home whose Black Indigeneity imagines St. Vincent as homeland.2 Garifuna Black Indigeneity unsettles racial formations in the Americas that understand Blackness, Indigeneity, and Latinidad as mutually exclusive.

    In the context of Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, where Garifuna and Creole communities have lived prior to 1821, mestizaje discursively emerges as an ideological project of nation-building, violently negating Blackness and the existence and contributions of peoples of African descent in its construction of a racially mixed harmonious mestizo subject. The absence of Black Central Americans3 in Latinx Studies and Central American Studies reflects an epistemic violence inherited from Latin American mestizaje. The insurgence of Afro-Latinx Studies is an intellectual and political response to the erasure and negation of Latinxs of African descent in the field of Latinx Studies. I call for a refashioning of AfroLatinidad that dismantles the dangerous allure of ethno-racial nationalism (e.g., Afro-[insert nation-state]) and that refuses cartographies of Blackness that map exclusionary geographies of Spanish-speaking Americas (“you must be Dominican, because you don’t look Guatemalan”). Drawing on oral history interviews, visual cultures, and social media, I demonstrate how, from the late 1950s to the present, transgenerational Garifuna New Yorkers’ histories and politics of self-making highlight their struggles to negotiate, perform, and articulate their multiple subjectivities as Black, Indigenous, and Latinx. In the following section, I begin with a mid-19th century and early 20th century history of anti-Black racism on Central America’s Caribbean Coasts to argue that hemispheric travel from South (Central America) to North (United States) shapes how Garifuna New Yorkers negotiate and articulate their Blackness, Indigeneity, and Latinidad in the United States.

    Central America’s Caribbean Coasts: Racialized Geographies of Anti-Blackness

    In Central America, Blackness and geography are intrinsically entangled with histories of Spanish colonialism, mestizo governance, and the alienation of Blackness to the Atlantic Coast (Gordon 133). Mestizaje as a racial discourse emerged in the early twentieth century in response to a larger hemispheric critique of US imperialism, which grounded Latin American’s myth of racial democracy as a distinct marker of racial egalitarianism in the face of Jim Crow apartheid in the US (Hooker, Theorizing Race 158). Central American ideologies of mestizaje emerge in distinct geographies and historical moments. I turn to Honduras and Nicaragua in particular because the Caribbean Coasts become an explicit demarcation of Black geography’s detachment from the mestizo nation-state both discursively and geographically. In “‘Beloved Enemies’: Race and Official Mestizo Nationalism in Nicaragua,” political theorist Juliet Hooker charts the absence of costeños (Creole/Afro-Caribbean and Indigenous Nicaraguans) in Nicaragua’s formulation of mestizaje. She coins the term “mestizo multiculturalism” to highlight the contradictions of Nicaragua’s 1987 move to become one of the first Latin American countries to adopt multicultural citizenship reforms. These reforms assigned special collective rights to Black and Indigenous communities on its Atlantic Coast, while maintaining mestizo culture as the hallmark of national identity in the company of racial and cultural diversity.

    The Atlantic coast of Nicaragua is marked as geographically distinct in the landscape of Nicaraguan mestizo nationalism. British colonialism on Nicaragua’s Caribbean Coast produces an alterity that marks a religious, linguistic, and racialized culture different from the afterlife of Spanish colonialism in Nicaragua’s mestizo nationalism. Following independence from Spain in 1821, Nicaragua underwent a wave of domestic civil wars and governmental regimes that aimed to bring forth national unity and state formation. One of the best-remembered state-building efforts was the forcible “reincorporation” of the Atlantic Coast in 1894, an act of internal colonization on Black and Indigenous communities to assimilate into mestizo culture. 1894’s forcible annexation made Spanish the official language and Catholicism the official religion on the Atlantic Coast. This legacy informs the vexed relationship Creole and Indigenous communities have with the mestizo nation-state; therefore, the shift to multiculturalism has been greeted with much-deserved skepticism. Despite the constitutional shift toward a multicultural paradigm, peoples of African descent remain geographically and politically marked as alien and foreign, and only exist on the Caribbean Coasts removed from the interior (Pacific Coast) of mestizo political power.

    Historian Darío A. Euraque argues that the Honduran Congressional Act of 1926, which officially titled the national currency the Lempira, was an explicit response to the threat of Blackness by the growing banana economy on Honduras’s Caribbean Coast. Euraque argues:

    In the 1920s the notion of an Indo-Hispanic mestizaje represented only an emerging elite discourse. However, the 1920s effort to officially designate Lempira as the “representative” of the “other race” in “our mestizaje” involved a local racism that drew on a postindependence rejection of blackness, and especially a rejection of Garifuna blackness as a more local and immediate racial threat. (243)

    Black Hondurans were a great source of anxiety at a time when the Caribbean Coast was gaining financial and political independence from the capital city of Tegucigalpa through the presence of US-owned banana companies. This anxiety also fueled the deportation of thousands of West Indian migrant laborers, mostly from British Honduras (present-day Belize) and Jamaica. Honduran anti-Blackness made Garifuna and Creole communities on the Caribbean Coast vulnerable to border patrol harassment and increased their risk of deportation (Chambers 74). At distinct moments of nation-building in Nicaragua, Honduras, and the rest of the isthmus, Blackness was a great source of discursive and economic anxiety.4 This continues to be the case to this day.

    Anti-black racism in Central America informs the political mobilization and self-making processes of Garifuna New Yorkers. Anti-black racist histories are embodied memories that are transmitted generationally through oral histories. Garifuna New Yorkers negotiate and contradict their Blackness, Indigeneity, and Central Americanness based on that historical legacy, which shapes contemporary racial and racist discourse on the isthmus and in its diasporas. The political and cultural histories of Central America’s Caribbean Coasts are present in New York City and throughout the rest of the Garifuna diaspora in the United States, directly shaping how US Garinagu engage and mobilize alongside other Black Caribbean, African American, and Latinx communities.5 In the following section, I turn my attention to Garifuna of mostly Honduran and Guatemalan descent born and raised in New York City (Eastern Brooklyn and the South Bronx) and analyze their diasporic processes of self-making Garifunaness in the company of African Americans, Dominicans, Jamaicans, Puerto Ricans, and Ghanaians. Afro-Latinx Studies is a political project whose origins stand outside of the disciplinary boundaries of the academy and whose intellectual impulse is to disrupt the absence of Latinxs of African descent in the field of Latinx Studies.6 I therefore ask how transgenerational Garifuna New Yorkers negotiate and articulate their Central Americanness and Garifunaness simultaneously. How does an explicit politics of rejecting AfroLatinidad for Garifunaness reinscribe Garifuna exceptionalism and ethno-racial nationalism?

    Before turning to these questions, a brief note on Garinagu Indigenous Blackness is necessary to establish a conceptual framework. Blackness and Indigeneity remain codified and ascribed as mutually exclusive racial categories and identities in the Americas. Garifuna folks are persistently constructed as an anthropological puzzle because their contradictory and choreographed negotiations as simultaneously Black Indigenous peoples present a richly compelling conundrum (see Anderson). However, as we deepen our historical and contemporary understanding of Black and Indigenous peoples throughout the Americas, we can begin to dismember these colonial logics of racial compartmentalization and excavate multiple Black Indigenous histories, cultures, and politics. Garinagu articulations and self-makings of Indigenous Blackness are not unique to Garifuna, as there are several communities of African descent throughout the Americas whose Indigenous ancestry and lineage shape their political consciousness as Black Indigenous, such as Gullah/Geechee, quilombos in Brazil, Jamaican maroons, palenques in Colombia, and Seminoles, among others. Furthermore, it is important to note that my interlocutors—who mostly find themselves living or having lived in New York City—understand their Garinagu Black Indigeneity as rooted in the Caribbean, Central America’s Caribbean Coasts, and the United States. The terms used are multiple, and include: negro indígena [Indigenous Black], afroindígena [Afroindigenous], Black Indigenous/Afro-Indigenous, and Black Carib. These variations point to the multiplicity of geographies, spaces/places, and racial identity formations that Garinagu engage. In the context of Honduras and the rest of Central America’s Caribbean Coast, for example, Garinagu articulations and self-makings of Black Indigeneity are performed, negotiated, and lived in distinct ways from U.S.-based Garifuna folks. In Central America, Garinagu notions of (Black) Indigeneity are bound to land and cultural traditions: claiming indigeneity is a political move to claim land rights, tenure, and titles. In the United States, and more specifically in New York City, Garifuna folks use Indigeneity (read: Carib Arawak lineage) as a marker of cultural alterity within Blackness. To claim Indigeneity is thus to perform different political subjectivity labor in these different geographical racialized spaces.

    My framing of hemispheric Indigenous Blackness thus comes directly from my interlocutors. In the context of Central America’s Caribbean Coasts, Garinagu communities articulate their Caribbean Indigeneity as one bound to land rights; this is why Garifuna Settlement Day originates on the Atlantic Coast of Central America (Belize to be precise) as an Indigenous articulation of land tenure and rights. Garifuna Indigeneity in Central America is used to gain discursive, ontological, and material land/territory vis-à-vis an articulation of indigeneity as an ancestral heritage and a contemporary identity. Ancestral land/territory is the epicenter of the way in which Garifuna Indigeneity is articulated materially on Central America’s Caribbean Coasts. However, in the United States there is a shift in how Garinagu articulate and invoke their Indigeneity, which is rooted in St. Vincent. In the United States, Garifuna Indigeneity is articulated, invoked, and performed as an Othered formation of Blackness. Garifuna Indigeneity in the United States is constructed and performed as a signifier of Caribbeanness, of exceptional marronage, and locates a Caribbean geographical site of Garifuna ethnogenesis: St. Vincent. Therefore, in the United States Garifuna Indigeneity finds an imaginary homeland in St. Vincent as not solely a site of ethnogenesis but of nostalgia for marronage and Black Indigeneity. Garinagu articulations and performances of Black Indigeneity are not universal. They are distinct based on the specific geographies in which Garinagu folks find themselves. Garifuna communities in Los Angeles, Houston, Chicago, and New York City have different expressions of and relationship to their Indigeneity based on the racialized geographies of those spaces, while retaining commonalities. Black Queer Feminist theorist Tiffany Lethabo King notes that:

    genocide and slavery do not have an edge. While the force of their haunt has distinct feelings at the stress points and instantiations of Black fungibility and Native genocide, the violence moves as one. To perceive this distinct yet edgeless violence and its haunting requires a way of sensing that allows moving in and out of blurred and sharpened vision, acute, and dulled senses of smell. It requires that taste buds at the back of the throat and the pinch of the acidic in the nerves of the jawline. Edgeless distinction is a haptic moment, shared, and a ceremonial Black and Indigenous ritual.

    King’s provocation to pay attention to the edgeless colonial hauntings of Blackness and Indigeneity is generative as we think about the ways in which Garifuna folks negotiate and contradict their articulations and self-makings of Black Indigeneity. The Black Indigeneity of Garifuna folks is a significant marker of distinction on Central America’s Caribbean Coast (and in the United States). In the context of Honduras, Garifuna have politically mobilized with the nation-state to gain constitutional rights to ancestral lands and inclusion into the polity through a politics of Afro-Indigeneity, pointing to a political subjectivity of Black Indigeneity tied to land rights and cultural heritage.

    The Insurgency of Black Latinidad: Unsettling Hemispheric Mestizaje

    “No matter your race because you know you’re Latino” N.O.R.E. (October 2004) “Si tú eres Latino, saca tu bandera.” Gente de Zona(April 2015)

    Latinidad in the United States is built on, travels, and performs the ideological legacies of Latin American mestizaje as a political project of racial mixture that seeks to distance itself from its northern imperial neighbor: Jim Crow apartheid (Hooker, Theorizing Race). Mestizaje also romanticizes Spanish colonialism and the caste system in its national memory of a past Indigenous culture and civilized Spanish conquest, omitting the gendered and sexualized violence of Spanish colonialism in the Americas from this historical memory (Mendoza). The negation of Blackness within the project of mestizaje or the recovery of it, as in the example of Mexico’s Third Root, problematizes mestizaje as a racial project that imagines racial mixture as the solution to racism and racial inequalities. It is precisely in the struggle with the negation and erasure and for the recovery of Blackness in Latin America and US Latinidad that Afro-Latinx Studies insurgency becomes a necessary political and intellectual project of Black political mobilization.

    In her New York Times article “For Many Latinos, Racial Identity Is More Culture Than Color,” Mireya Navarro writes that, in the context of the United States,

    the census categorizes people by race, which typically refers to a set of common physical traits. But Latinos, as a group in this country, tend to identify themselves more by their ethnicity, meaning a shared set of cultural traits, like language or customs. So when they encounter the census, they see one question that asks them whether they identify themselves as having Hispanic ethnic origins and many answer it as their main identifier.

    Here we see a persistent dilemma within hemispheric constructions of Latinidad: its “ongoing production” (to borrow from Stuart Hall) is rooted in ethnic signifiers in hopes of evading racial discourse for a raceless imaginary of ethnicities. The problematic news story argues that Latinos are so racially mixed that their ethnic differences mark them much more deeply than race in the United States. This is a narrative supported by the general notion that racial discourse and racism do not exist in Latin America and the Caribbean the way they do in the United States, and that any inequalities that do exist result from class and ethnic differences. This trope of Latinx racial exceptionalism as simply not fitting into US racial categories is based in a hemispheric project of mestizaje that is haunted by the mythical illusion of racial democracy (read: racial paradise) in the shadow of Jim Crow’s black/white binary. In the United States, non-Black Latinx peoples mobilize for a census category that transcends US racial categories, distancing themselves from and opposing the histories of racial formation by aspiring to racialized sameness (read: Hispanic/Latino) vis-à-vis ethno-racial nationalist identities (read: Puerto Rican, Mexican-American, etc.) in a continued negation of Black and Indigenous Latinx peoples.

    While scholarly production on Black Latin America has enjoyed a long tradition since the nineteenth century, equivalent scholarship on Black Latin Latinxs in the United States and their descendants remains absent. It is this absence that highlights the political and intellectual necessity of Afro-Latinx Studies, which involves the lived experiences of Latinxs of African descent whose transgenerational migrations, routes, and lineages are located south of the US border, as a means to disrupt homogenized Latino racial exceptionalism. Afro-Latinx Studies opens a space to analyze how Black Latinxs born and raised in the United States can potentially unsettle the media-infused narrative of African American and Latinx conflict, which foments a divisive majority-minority dichotomy.

    In their groundbreaking edited volume The Afro-Latin@ Reader: History and Culture in the United States, Miriam Jiménez Román and Juan Flores give us a useful introductory definition of Afro-Latin@s as “people of African descent in Mexico, Central and South America, and the Spanish-speaking Caribbean, and by extension those of African descent in the United States whose origins are in Latin America and the Caribbean” (1). Building upon this definition, AfroLatinidad emerges as an insurgent analytic that dismantles centuries of discursive and scholarly erasure and negation of Blacks and Blackness in Latin America and unsettles US Latinidades’ investment in an imagined racially harmonious project that reinscribes ethnonationalism as exceptional transcendence of US racial formations (López Oro 62). AfroLatinidad complicates Blackness as a site of rupture in the United States by taking a hemispheric turn to deepen our understanding of the histories, politics, and transmigrations of Blackness in the Americas.

    I now turn to three moments in which transgenerational Garifuna New Yorkers negotiate and articulate their multiple subjectivities as an act of refashioning AfroLatinidad.

    Garifunizando AfroLatinidad: The Politics of Self-Making Garifuna New Yorkers

    Many of the terms, including Latino/a, we use today were created (or influenced) by those who’ve colonized us. In using the term negra, or afrodescendiente, I’m choosing to without a doubt center Blackness. Identity isn’t clear cut. It’s complex and multilayered. As I journey through life, just as my current experiences influence how I identify, new encounters and knowledge will further shape it. No matter which term I use, my pride in my African roots will forever be a constant. Let there be no confusion as to who I am: a Black woman. In the eternal words of Victoria Santa Cruz, “Sí, soy negra. Negra soy.”—Janel Martínez, “‘Negra Soy’: Why I’ve Moved Away from the Term Afro-Latina”

    New York City is home to the largest Garifuna community outside of Central America’s Caribbean Coast. This geographic and demographic distinction matters for many historical and political motivations. It highlights an understudied history of Garifuna Central American transmigrations to New York City that begins in the late 1950s with the economic collapse of the US-owned Fruit Companies, which ignited a Great Migration of Black Central Americans from South of the US South.7 In other words, Garifuna folks are US imperial subjects before arriving at the shores of the United States. Within the broader racialized geographies of US Central Americanness, New York City is not imagined as a US Central American space due to the dominance there of Caribbean Latinx communities.

    On February 23, 2014, the image below was posted on the popular Facebook page “Garifuna TV Page,” where news on gatherings and community events in the US (New York City, Chicago, Houston, New Orleans, Miami, and Los Angeles) as well as in Central America are shared. The Facebook page also promotes Garifuna culture and music, giving publicity to local Garifuna musicians, artists, and activists.

    Fig. 1.
    Facebook post on Garifuna TV page, February 23, 2014.

    The posting was in response to an ongoing debate in Garifuna social media spaces about Afrolatinidad. The statement, “Do not call me Afro Latino!! & Do not call me an Afro-Descendant because I am a Proud Garifuna,” is accompanied by visuals of Garifuna culture and traditions, including the symbolic Garifuna flag and its colors (yellow, white, and black) and activities such as mashing plantains for a plate of machuca (hudutu), rasping coconut on a board to make either bread or stew, and carrying baskets. These are all images of labor done by Garifuna women; the only male presence in the image is the young boy being carried on his mother’s back. The Garifuna tropes invoke nostalgia for Central America’s Caribbean Coast and bestow historical weight onto diasporic Garifunaness.

    The image was created by Ana Castillo, a US-based Garifuna poet from Honduras. The loss of Garifuna culture and language to American culture, specifically African American culture, has been an ongoing concern of the generation of Garifuna Central American immigrants of the 1960s. The clear rejection of AfroLatinidad and Afrodescendants in this image is a deeply significant assertion that points to the centuries of anti-black racism and violence experienced by Garifuna Central Americans in the isthmus. The assertion of an exclusively Garifuna epistemology matters here as a point of disruption into a category that does not capture Garifuna Black Indigeneity, and it also reveals the political mobilization of Garifuna communities in Central America and in the United States in the effort to preserve their culture, language, and history. There is a generational concern here that something is lost in the United States, that values, customs, language, traditions, and music are slowly being erased because of American assimilation and because families are no longer living in their hometowns on the Caribbean Coasts. It is interesting that the categories of Afro-Latino and Afro-descendant are presented together; their conjunction conveys a reinscription of Garifuna pride throughout the Americas. “Afro-Latino,” a term mostly used in the United States, and “Afro-descendant,” which is mostly used in Latin America, have parallel political projects of insurgency that respond to the erasure and absence of Blacks and Blackness in Latin America and US Latinidad. However, here Garifuna folks are not interested in investing into a project that from its inception has erased, excluded, and voided their existence. The phrasing “Do not call me Afro Latino and Do not call me Afro-descendant, I am a Proud Garifuna” is an effective political affirmation of visibility and recognition at a moment when AfroLatinidad and Afrodescendant have taken center stage as all-encompassing umbrella terms. Garifuna folks are uneasy about the way both terms erase/silence/footnote the specific histories of Blackness in Latinx Americas. More importantly, the phrase “I am a Proud Garifuna” builds on the political genealogies of the US Black Power Movement of the 1960s and 1970s, echoing James Brown’s iconic vocals in “Say It Loud, I’m Black and I’m Proud.” “I am a Proud Garifuna” is an explicit response to the historical and contemporary manifestations of mestizo supremacy and anti-Black racism in Central America, which remains present today in spite of a multicultural shift. The echo of the US Black Power Movement here unearths the hemispheric influences of African American political thought and formations. It also exemplifies how Garifuna New Yorkers and those throughout the rest of their diaspora in the United States engage directly with US Black history, culture, and politics.

    Janel Martínez’s invocation of her Blackness quoted in the epigraph of this section is of great transgenerational diasporic importance. Her rejection of the term “AfroLatinx,” especially at a moment of hyperawareness, points to her desire to center her Blackness as something other than a racial fetish. It speaks to the broader politics of the way Garinagu New Yorkers and those in Central America negotiate and articulate their Blackness as a political project of membership to the larger African diaspora, rooted in the racialized lived experiences of being Black. Indigeneity, although it is a simultaneous Garifuna identity in these instances, takes a back seat to a politics of Blackness that highlights an interpellation as always already Black.

    “Ain’t I Latina?”: Negotiating Central Americanness vis-à-vis AfroLatinidad

    Aida Lambert, a Garifuna woman born and raised in Honduras, came to New York City in 1964 at a time when Central Americans, especially Garifuna folks, did not have much visibility in the ethnic pantheon of New York City’s Latinidad. Aida Lambert forms part of the second largest wave of Garifuna New Yorker transmigrants who arrived a few years prior to the economic collapse of the United Fruit Company. She first lived in Eastern Brooklyn and later, when she married, moved to East Harlem with her husband and children. In her autobiographical essay “We Are Black Too: Experiences of a Honduran Garífuna,” Lambert illustrates the nuanced relations between African Americans and Spanish-speaking immigrants. Lambert was a founding committee member of Desfile de la Hispanidad [Hispanic Parade]. The Annual Hispanic Parade in October emerged mid-1980s when NuyoRicans and recent migrants from Puerto Rico wanted to exhibit their culture, work ethic, and racial differences from their African American neighbors. Lambert’s involvement developed out of her language barriers with other English-speaking Blacks and her cultural and linguistic bond with Puerto Ricans and Dominicans:

    I have found that even though you are Black, the fact that you are Latina means to them [African-Americans] that you are of another race … even at home, in Honduras, our Garífuna culture, and our language, is losing ground and becoming less and less familiar. And here it is even more so.

    My own children, as much as I try to keep the culture alive, they have their own lives and often forget whatever they learn. Not to mention my grandchildren, who were born here. I warn them about my experiences with African Americans, but they play with them, are influenced by them, and join them. They make friends with them, they identify with them, in the way they dress, and talk, and the music they listen to. And what can I do, I have to let them choose their own cultural preferences. (433)

    Lambert’s testimonio is telling of her generation of Garifuna Central American immigrants and their engagement and inclusion with Puerto Rican and Dominican aspirations of social mobility. The generations of Garifuna New Yorkers following Lambert’s arrival to Brooklyn and Harlem negotiate Latinidad in multiple ways that simultaneously reject and interject into Latinidad as a marker that makes Garifuna Blackness distinct from the Blackness of African Americans, while simultaneously using Garifunaness as a means of distancing from mestizo Latinidad and AfroLatinidad. Her feeling of being rejected by Black Americans and accepted by Puerto Ricans is a significant act of remembrance for a number of reasons, particularly because Garifuna Central Americans migrate to the United States at the intersections of anti-Black racism, non-democratic governments, and economic instability. Lambert’s remembering of solidarity and support from Puerto Ricans is not a universal narrative according to Spanish-speaking Black immigrants, who continued to experience anti-Black racism from their own countrymates in the United States. The best-known example is Arturo Alfonso Schomburg, a Black Puerto Rican who migrated to Harlem in 1891 but, in contrast to Lambert, felt rejected by other Spanish-speaking immigrants and embraced by African Americans and Afro-Caribbeans (Hoffnung-Garskof). Aida’s generation resisted being labeled African American and maintained the household mantra, “somos negros pero no como aquellos” (we are Black but not like them), “them” being African Americans. This narrative does not remain true for second and especially third generation Garínagu, as their interpellation as Black Americans creates interstitial spaces between their Blackness, Garifunaness, and Latinidad. They never fully belong in any of these categories because the United States is a dislocation of birthplace, citizenship, and a fragmented home.

    Fig. 2.
    Aida Lambert in the center being honored in the 2014 Central American Parade & Festival in Crotona Park, Bronx as Madrina de Festival Centroaméricana. Photo courtesy of the author.

    Janel Martínez is a Garifuna woman of Honduran descent, born and raised in the Bronx, and daughter of Garifuna Honduran immigrants from the 1970s generation. She is the creator of “Ain’t I Latina?” an online destination created by an Afro-Latina for Afro-Latinas, inspired by the lack of representation in both mainstream and Spanish-language media. Martínez is a multimedia journalist whose work has been featured in both African American media sites, such as The Root, Black Enterprise, Madame Noire, and in Latinx media sites, such as Cosmopolitan for Latinas, Remezcla, and NPR’s Latino USA. The very question that inspires Martínez’s online site, and which provocatively connects her to Sojourner Truth’s “Ain’t I a Woman?” shows the importance of disrupting mestizo Latinidades which erase peoples of African descent. Martínez’s Black Latinidad is articulated not as separate from the Black identity of African Americans but very much in the company of African American and other non-US Black lived experiences in the United States. Her travels to her parents’ hometown communities on the Caribbean Coast of Honduras in Ciriboya and Irionia deepened her Garifuna political identity. She notes, “Garifuna was never an identity I had to unearth; it was a culture and way of being I experienced within and all around me” (Martínez, “This is What it’s Like”). Martínez points to her home life as a site of Garifuna self-fashioning where food, language, and traditions are preserved in the intimacies of her mother’s kitchen and in family gatherings in her parents’ living room. After her grandmother’s passing and the ensuing beluria, a Garifuna spiritual tradition to celebrate life in and after ancestral deaths, Martínez’s interest in learning about Garifuna life and history continues.

    Martínez’s journalistic work has examined the complexities of being raised Garinagu in the United States, where one’s identity is frequently demeaned or marginalized. Grounded in her identities as Garifuna and Black Latina, Martínez explores the complexities and multiplicities of diasporic linkages with other Black Latinxs and the intersectionality of race, ethnicity, country of birth, and nationality. While Martínez acknowledges that presuming a common AfroLatinidad, especially one that does not center Blackness (Martínez, “‘Negra Soy’”), runs the risk of homogenizing Latinxs of African descent, her work still notes that refashioning AfroLatinidad calls for an expansive and hemispheric Blackness in the Americas instead of simply relying on a politics of inclusion into Latinidad.

    Fig. 3.
    Janel Martínez on April 12, 2018 being awarded a Proclamation by New York City Council Member Vanessa L. Gibson for her activism and cultural work in preserving Garifuna history and culture in New York City. Photo courtesy of the author.

    Hemispheric Black Latinidades: Garinagu New Yorkers Presente

    On July 13, 2018, I was invited to participate in a Presidential Plenary titled “US Central Americans, Invisible, and Silent No More” for the Latina/o Studies Association biannual meeting. I began my comments with the following provocation to problematize the absence of Black Central Americans in the scholarship on US Central Americans:

    My Central America is Caribbean. My Central America is a Caribbean Coast whose natural resources and peoples have and continue to be exploited by US imperialism. My Central America is Black, Black Indigenous to be exact, whose descendant’s survivors of the transatlantic slave trade and Carib-Arawak indigeneity on the Antillean island of St. Vincent and whose marronage and exile call Central America’s Caribbean Coast: home. To be Garifuna is to be Caribbean and Central American simultaneously. I am the grandchild of banana workers from Tela and Balfate, Honduras whose transmigrations to Harlem, New York, in 1964 was made possible by the political mobilization of Garveyism and whose parents met in Bedford-Stuyvesant, Brooklyn in 1982. My Black Central America is also New York City.

    My articulations of Black Central America on the isthmus and in its diasporas builds on centuries of anti-Black racism and erasure of our existence. Aida Lambert, Janel Martínez, and Vielka Cecilia Hoy all articulate a politics of Black Central Americanness that is made and remains invisible in the face of a mythical all-inclusive Latinidad. Lambert’s political mobilization alongside Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, and other mestizo Latinx New Yorkers animates her desires to negotiate her Black Honduranness in the Desfile de la Hispanidad, where her activism allowed a Garifuna Honduran woman to win the beauty pageant contest in 1994. Martínez’s negotiation and articulation of her Black Latinidad engages a hemispheric project that centers Blackness in the Americas with an inclusionary praxis into Latinidad. Garifuna New Yorkers of Central American descent are marked by their transgenerational differences and bounded by a Garifunaness that disrupts hegemonic racial and ethnic subjectivities.

    Paul Joseph López Oro is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Africana Studies at Smith College. His research and teaching interests are on Black Latin American and U.S. Black Latinx social movements, Black Feminist & LGBTQ activism, and Black Queer Feminist ethnographies in the Américas. His in-progress manuscript, Indigenous Blackness in the Americas: The Queer Politics of Self-Making Garifuna New York is a transdisciplinary ethnography on how gender and sexuality shapes the ways in which transgenerational Garifuna New Yorkers of Central American descent negotiate, perform, and articulate their multiple subjectivities as Black, Indigenous, and AfroLatinx.

    Footnotes

    1. I refer to a violence that is both physical and epistemic, pointing to the centuries of land dispossession, US imperialism, and erasure from national subjecthood. Central Americans of African descent are in the margins of the histories of transmigrations and political movements in the isthmus and their diasporas.

    2. Garifuna epistemology is rooted in Black Indigeneity, where Blackness is marooned in the Americas, as the collective memory of ethnogenesis on St. Vincent: being descendants of shipwrecked slaves, an important marker of alterity and problematic divorcing of plantation slavery in the Americas. The Garifuna notion of maroonage is foundational to Garifuna Black Indigeneity as it invokes an act of shipwreckedness and eventual hybridity with Carib Arawak Indigenous peoples on St. Vincent in the 15th century.

    3. I reference the homogenized term Black Central Americans or Central Americans of African descent, which does not detail the multiplicity of Black Central American communities. I do this with the political intent of affirming Blackness in a region of the Americas that is racialized as a non-Black space.

    4. This is the case even during the multicultural era, especially as Creole, Garifuna, and West Indian communities continue to fight for autonomy and inclusion.

    5. Garinagu refers to the collective and diasporic identity of Garifuna peoples that extends beyond Central American nationalism or regional specificity. It is in use particularly in Garifuna linguistic spaces.

    6. I only use the hyphen when referring to the field of study of Afro-Latinx Studies. I explicitly use Afrolatinidad and AfroLatinx to refer to peoples, histories, and cultures, because the hyphenation of Afro-Latinidad/Afro-Latinx is a continued violence of erasure. A hyphen reinscribes the notion that “Black” and “Latinx” are mutually exclusive to each other. Here I build on conversations with Omaris Z. Zamora and Yomaira C. Figueroa about the idea that Blackness is always already present in our Latinidad. Hyphenation is a dislocation of Blackness in distancing from Latinidad and in this context more specifically from US Central Americanness.

    7. I refer to this understudied transmigration of Garifuna and Creole folks to the United States as a “Great Migration of Black Central Americans from South of the US South” to point to the various hemispheric Black migrations and to disrupt the grand narrative of a US-centered Great Migration. Throughout the Americas, there have been and continue to be “Great Migrations” of Black communities fleeing anti-black racism.

    Works Cited

    • Anderson, Mark. Black and Indigenous: Garifuna Activism and Consumer Culture in Honduras. U of Minnesota P, 2009.
    • Chambers, Glenn A. Race, Nation, and West Indian Immigration to Honduras, 1890–1940. Louisiana State UP, 2010.
    • England, Sarah. Afro-Central Americans in New York City: Garifuna Tales of Transnational Movements in Racialized Space. UP of Florida, 2006.
    • Euraque, Darío A. “The Threat of Blackness to the Mestizo Nation: Race and Ethnicity in the Honduran Banana Economy, 1920s and 1930s.” Banana Wars: Power, Production, and History in the Americas, edited by Steve Striffler and Mark Moberg, Duke UP, 2003, pp. 229–250.
    • Figueroa, Yomaira C. Decolonizing Diasporas: Radical Mappings of Afro-Atlantic Literature. Northwestern UP, 2020.
    • Gordon, Edmund T. Disparate Diasporas: Identity and Politics in an African-Nicaraguan Community. The U of Texas P, 1998.
    • Gudmundson, Lowell, and Justin Wolfe. Introduction. Blacks and Blackness in Central America: Between Race and Place, edited by Lowell Gudmundson and Justin Wolfe. Duke UP, 2010, pp. 1–23.
    • Hale, Charles R. “Neoliberal Multiculturalism: The Remaking of Cultural Rights and Racial Dominance in Central America.” PoLAR, vol. 28, no. 1, 2005, pp. 10–28. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/24497680.
    • Hoffnung-Garskof, Jesse. “The Migrations of Arturo Schomburg: On Being Antillano, Negro, and Puerto Rican in New York, 1891–1938.” Journal of American Ethnic History, vol. 21, no. 1, Fall 2001, pp. 3–49. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/27502778.
    • Hooker, Juliet. “‘Beloved Enemies’: Race and Official Mestizo Nationalism in Nicaragua.” Latin American Research Review, vol. 40, no. 3, 2005, pp. 14–39. Project Muse, doi:10.1353/lar.2005.0051.
    • Hooker, Juliet. Theorizing Race in the Americas: Douglass, Sarmiento, Du Bois, and Vasconcelos. Oxford UP, 2017.
    • Hoy, Vielka Cecilia. “Negotiating among Invisibilities: Tales of Afro-Latinidades in the United States.” Jiménez Román and Flores, pp. 426–430. Jiménez Román, Miriam, and Juan Flores, editors. The Afro-Latin@ Reader: History and Culture in the United States. Duke UP, 2010.
    • King, Tiffany Lethabo. The Black Shoals: Offshore Formations of Black and Native Studies. Duke UP, 2019.
    • Lambert, Aida. “We Are Black Too: Experiences of a Honduran Garifuna.” Jiménez Román and Flores, pp. 431–433.
    • Loperena, Christopher. “Radicalize Multiculturalism? Garifuna Activism and the Double-Bind of Participation in Postcoup Honduras.” The Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Anthropology, vol. 21, no. 3, 2016, pp. 521–522. Wiley, doi:10.1111/jlca.12222.
    • López Oro, Paul Joseph. “Ni de aquí, ni de allá: Garifuna Subjectivities and the Politics of Diasporic Belonging.” Afro-Latin@s in Movement: Critical Approaches to Blackness and Transnationalism in the Americas, edited by Petra R. Rivera-Rideau, Jennifer A. Jones, and Tianna S. Paschel, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, pp. 61–84.
    • Martínez, Janel. “‘Negra Soy’: Why I’ve Moved Away from the Term Afro-Latina.” Remezcla, 17 Sept. 2018, remezcla.com/features/culture/negra-vs-afro-latina/.
    • Martínez, Janel. “This is What It’s Like to Grow Up Garifuna.” 12 Apr. 2018, Mitú, fierce.wearemitu.com/identities/as-garifuna-woman-come-from-lineage-black-female-fighters-but-didnt-always-know/.
    • Mendoza, Breny. “De-Mythologizing Mestizaje in Honduras: A Critique of Recent Contributions.” Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Ethnic Studies, vol. 1, no. 2, 2006, pp. 185–201. Taylor & Francis, doi:10.1080/17442220600859361.
    • Navarro, Mireya. “For Many Latinos, Racial Identity Is More Culture Than Color.” The New York Times. 14 Jan. 2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/01/14/us/for-many-latinos-race-is-more-culture-than-color.html.
    • Zamora, Omaris Z. “(Trance)forming AfroLatina Embodied Knowledges in Nelly Rosario’s Song of the Water Saints,” Label Me Latina/o, Special Issue: Afro-Latina/o Literature and Performance, Vol. VII, (Summer 2017): pp. 1–16.

  • The Politics of Witchcraft and the Politics of Blood: Reading Sovereignty and Sociality in the Livingstone Museum

    Alírio Karina (bio)

    Abstract

    Thoroughly entangled in the legacies of colonial anthropology, witchcraft is often presented as evidence of primitiveness or superstition, or as a metaphor for reality. This paper examines a set of witchcraft objects held at the Livingstone Museum in Zambia, reading them against anthropological and political-theoretical efforts to treat witchcraft as a metaphor—for the African nation-state, capitalism, and ethnic violence, or for African ingenuity, modernity, and liberation. It argues instead that the materiality of witchcraft invites a reconceptualization of ideas of postcolonial agency and points to the limitations of liberatory politics organized around the pursuit of sovereignty.

    There looms, within abjection, one of those violent, dark revolts of being, directed against a threat that seems to emanate from an exorbitant outside or inside, ejected beyond the scope of the possible, the tolerable, the thinkable. It lies there, quite close, but it cannot be assimilated.—Julia Kristeva, The Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection

    In her 1975 review of Keith Thomas’s Religion and the Decline of Magic, Hildred Geertz identifies a problem with Thomas’s sweeping history of ideas: he fails to define “magic” outside of the terms his other ideological protagonists use to criticize it. The borders of the magical come to be delineated by that which should be, but is not, there—reason, practicality, religion.

    According to Geertz, Thomas reduces all systems of magical belief to wholly psychological phenomena, which cease to be important in the 17th century as Thomas identifies a reduction in need for supernatural aid and an increase in practical self-reliance. But, for any such psychological effect to exist, magic must be reasonable, and must too be something exceeding negative definition—so under what terms does it make itself such? What, actually, is magic? I am not interested in fleshing out Thomas’s psychological account of magic, though I will explore a related psychological-rationalist reductionism in contemporary and classical anthropological accounts. Instead, I contest Geertz’s challenge. What if there was a form of “magic” that was not framed as existing on the outside of normative knowing and being, but that sought to be the frame of that outside, to become that outside? To exist willfully outside of juridical and ecclesiastical law and logic, of scientific rationality—to exist, perhaps, against it, as a sovereign without obligations?

    Such a form of magic would present a radical threat to the knowable and governable and livable world. It is such a form that we find in the news reports and rumors of witchcraft that seem to orbit the African and Afro-diasporic world. This witchcraft kills, maims, and terrorizes innocent and marginal Africans.1 It remains a threat even after more than a century of colonization brought about its criminalization, after the refusal of the traditional and a new Christian antagonism to (non-ecclesiastical) magic, and after post-colonial African governments sought to unite despite the traditionalisms of tribe. In the process, it became overwhelmed by racial and ethnographic phantasm, a sign of the most shamefully savage, of the threat of an at-once racial and ethnographic Blackness, of the utmost impossibility of desiring the non-colonial, and thus it became a site of crisis for a reimagined African Studies. While in some ways specific to African Studies, this problematic has broader ramifications, as it is the result of the naturalization of ethnographic habits in the discipline that cast African witchcraft as a peculiarly and perniciously Black and indigenous practice. This paper does not seek to “apply” Black Studies or Indigenous Studies to consider this question. Instead, it thinks through the figure of witchcraft—at once burdened by the representational weight of both fields, by the weight of aspiration—in order to explore how both contribute to its understanding as a sign of sovereignty rather than as merely a nativist symbol of the return to a pure past or a liberal symbol of an always-already modernity.

    Fig. 1.
    Witchcraft display in the ethnographic gallery of the Livingstone Museum. All photographs were taken by the author and are used by permission.

    The contours of this story are drawn out in the galleries and collections of the Livingstone Museum, in Livingstone, Zambia (see fig. 1).2 In the ethnographic gallery,3 at the very beginning of a series of displays that travel from TRADITIONAL MEDICINE, through WITCHCRAFT, to DEATH (and BEYOND…), a small label informs the viewer that there are three kinds of traditional medicine items: herbs, which are prepared ointments and oral medicines of predominantly plant origin meant to cure various ailments; stimulants and depressants, which amplify or diminish a person’s (sexual, reproductive, psychological) capacities; and charms and talismans, which confer power to the wearer. Following in the footsteps of foundational English anthropologist E. Evans-Pritchard’s work on magic, the museum builds a careful distinction between objects that belong to the realm of the “magical” and those that pertain to “witchcraft.” This distinction marks not only a difference in what these objects are capable of, but—perhaps more importantly—a difference in how these objects should be related to.

    In this paper, I examine these objects as material things critically embedded in modes of ethnographic interpretation that are signaled by both the museum’s taxonomy and the writing of anthropological monographs that seek to understand “belief” and its associated material culture. These objects are caught up in an ethnographically entangled process of missionary evangelism on the African continent and in other legal and political moments of the colonial encounter. Reading these moments together with the sociopolitical threat posed by witchcraft and its associated material, I argue that the museum’s framing of these materials works (symbolically) to mediate their sovereignty, while nevertheless ceding to their power. When read against theories of postcolonial politics that rely upon an analogy to witchcraftness, these violently heretical objects demonstrate the necessity of thinking witchcraft not merely via circulated objects of belief or superstition, but as a practice that poses real challenges to the authority of postcolonial African states. This paper develops ideas about the sovereignty of witchcraft in relation to Achille Mbembe’s “Provisional Notes on the Postcolony” and considers the questions witchcraft poses for scholars concerned with valorizing African practices that exceed the command of the colonial.

    The witchcraft objects held by the Livingstone Museum were accessioned between the 1940s and 1960s, primarily following witch-trials, and were studied by Barrie Reynolds, then the Keeper of Ethnology at the Livingstone Museum.4 The objects fall into a few categories. Many are power sources in the form of containers; others are kaliloze guns used both by witches to kill their enemies and for witch-hunting (see fig. 2); a few are large ceremonial brushes; several are ilomba, snake familiars whose form the witch would adopt on night missions; others are various kinds of familiars, divining baskets, and associated objects. Among the objects is a magical telephone for communing with the otherworld and at least one magical aeroplane for traveling large distances and conducting night missions. Many are made from common materials that signal they were likely made by the same person. But many of them share other material traits. Several objects use seeds of the Lucky Bean Creeper (poisonous shiny red seeds that are black when dried), which are embedded in the object using dark resinous wax (another feature of many of the objects, across makers), while others featuring strings of small beads embedded in the same way. Many are shrouded in layers of fabric (at times signaling that the object was a snake, at times to hold a precarious object together, at times both) that have clearly been darkened on the surface by burial. Many combine parts of animal bodies—hooves, hides, tails, turtle shells, feathers—with wooden and other natural and crafted materials. Several too—especially the kaliloze guns, but also a skull-shaped object and a necklace of teeth—involve human remains, either teeth or large pieces of bone.

    Fig. 2.
    A kaliloze gun, made to look like a rifle. Its barrel is one end of a hollowed human femur, partially filled with soil. This is attached to a wooden stock and wrapped with leaves. Aimed through a hole in a wall, or at the sun, it can kill its target at any distance. Acc. 6580.

    These objects are composites, crafted from a variety of different (primarily natural) materials that do not seem to fit, usually held together with dark resin that appears equally unsuited to the object’s components. A significant subset of the objects seem to employ impossible taxidermy. The most striking is crafted to look like a zebra’s leg filled with a zebra’s tail, made from a zebra hide, a hoof (likely equine), a combination of multiple animal tails for the tail, and wood and thread. Even non-taxidermic objects combine these forms in similar ways. While most of the kaliloze guns are made simply of wood, a sawed-off human bone, fabrics wrapped around them, and beads attached with wax (already an extraordinary and unsettling combination), some are more extravagant. One has a purple glass or semi-precious stone attached, with an inverted pound coin beneath it; the handle of another is formed from a warthog tusk and a claw. The magical telephone is a small animal horn with thick, soft fur stitched all around it and a jar lid with sticks, wax, and lucky beans that forms the “earpiece.” The “receiver” is a painted plastic cylinder filled with things that rattle (see fig. 3). In many of these cases, the objects come to look magical through the internal consistency of a mode that relates disparate forms, objects, and components, whose combination undermines any norm by which the viewer might expect to relate to it.

    Fig. 3.
    A witch’s telephone. The earpiece comprises animal horn, hide, metal, wood, seeds, and a shell. The receiver is metallic (possibly a jar lid) and coated in dark wax; Lucky Seeds dot the perimeter, with a cowrie shell on the top. The mouthpiece is a plastic canister filled with black powder, covered in fabric, resin, and strings of beads. Acc. 064 A/B.

    Even objects with aesthetic value—well-crafted, referential of the familiar, or intricate in their form and decoration—are jarring. The intricate ilomba—whose carved faces recall the more mundane carvings found in the tourist market a few minutes from the museum—are deliberately frightening to look at. Their wooden heads, carved in the likeness of the witch whose snake form they would become, have exaggerated facial features that bulge out and are often decorated with materials that augment both their power and their visual menace. One such object has both seeds of the Lucky Bean Creeper affixed to the center of each eye and human hair (likely from the head of the witch himself). The heads form the tops of otherwise uncarved slabs of wood. The “bodies” are wrapped with a tremendous amount of murky-colored fabric, often with other objects (like scissors and animal claws) slipped inside and around these layers. This wrapping recalls a straitjacket and a snake at once, while the tone of the fabric indicates the ilomba’s hiding by burial. Another object is a necklace made entirely of human maxillary incisors, attached by coils of wire to a copper choker. This necklace, containing at least ten sets of front teeth, seems to come alive when moved (see fig. 4). The teeth, loosely connected to the copper core, shift very slightly. All of these objects are crafted with a great deal of attention to their form and aesthetics, echoing the familiar while using materials that render this reference to the beautiful quite frightening.

    Fig. 4.
    An item of witch regalia, worn around the neck. It comprises 43 adult maxillary incisors affixed to a loop of copper wire. The teeth move slightly when the piece is held. Acc. 10699.

    The necklace, the kaliloze guns, and the ilomba are especially unsettling because of the way they inhabit death. Objects involving human body parts and remains become inescapably entangled with questions of how they were obtained (the morbid hope that they were stolen from graves) and, in the case of the guns, an awareness that the death that was necessary to build the object is a death that comes to generate death. Each of the objects with Lucky Bean seeds signals a relationship to the world of the dead—as well as the dangers of crossing the witch who has that relationship and the dangers of an object decorated with poison, a death-bringer. The shrouding and burial of the guns and the ilomba are reminders of precisely what these objects have the power and intention to do.5

    Despite the ways in which these objects invoke and inhabit death, the ordinariness of Zambian belief in and fear of witchcraft is often treated as puzzling. Zambia—seen as modern, urban, educated, distant from “tradition”—would not then make sense as a home for indefensible superstitions from a forgotten past, while its predominant Christianity allows visitors to assume magic belief would have been replaced, as in Europe, by religious faith (Thomas). But that is not what witchcraft is. Witchcraft is a thoroughly modern practice and it has adapted in turn to the conditions of colonial and postcolonial Africa and assisted African subjects in adapting to these changes themselves.6 Zambian witchcraft is also invariably colored by colonial influence. Distinctly European magical fears—of black cats or walking under ladders—came to form the language for talking about a local “witchcraft” (which itself earned its name through the colonial encounter) and became the basis of a reckoning with this form as equivalent to what was historically present in Europe. This connection may have been tenuous in the early encounter—indeed, it was still complicated in 1930s Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, where Evans-Pritchard used the terms “witchcraft,” “magic,” and “oracles,” which he recognized as inadequate to the task of describing the capacious modes of the social theory he was capturing. However, the question of “mistranslation” becomes murkier when we return to postcolonial Livingstone, a place where European missions and their postcolonial American counterparts have been entrenched for centuries. Zambian witchcraft was changed by its framing with European logics. Some of this involved the appropriation of European symbolism, as both Barrie Reynolds and Friday Mufuzi argue. The kaliloze guns again provide an immediate reference here, both in their form (referencing guns, with some quite distinct references to revolvers and rifles) and in the materials that decorate them.

    But this shift is perhaps most clear when we consider the medicinal objects in the Livingstone Museum collections. Unlike the objects considered witchcraft objects, which traffic in and produce death, the objects that the Livingstone Museum frames as medicinal were built around magically or medically refusing the death that the witchcraft objects created, refusing the decay of the body and healing it instead. The herbal materials are catalogued as botanical clippings, occasionally with notes indicating the appropriate methods for usage and the illnesses these materials would aim to heal. This pharmacological collection strategy grants these materials a scientificity that allows them to be read as a valued form of “indigenous knowledge.” But what brings these herbal materials and charms together is the peculiar way in which the museum comes to define the category they do not form a part of: witchcraft. Where the magic of protective charms is a magic that heals or does no harm—and a magic that, perhaps as a result, needs little justification for even a very Christian Zambian to recognize—witchcraft is the magic that is about doing violence. In the case of the needle charms that protect against kaliloze gun attacks, witchcraft is also about surviving the reflection of violence you have attempted. This distinction seems solid enough until one remembers that the most common supernatural-related violence that the region sees takes the form of the killing of marginal subjects for body parts, which can then, medicinally, assist in the production and sustenance of power. These medicinal killings and maimings continue to be a problem in the region, with the market for body parts thriving especially in electoral periods. By delimiting violence of this kind to the world of witchcraft, the museum creates a neater division between different modes of vernacular practice than seems to really exist; this move may reflect a deliberate attempt to cleanse the “medicinal” of its more horrific components, such that “medicine” as a whole—not only in its pharmacological form—can remain an indigenous form immune to moral critique.

    Due to the museum’s taxonomy and the way it is reproduced by Christian responses to witchcraft and medicine materials, these objects come to be inscribed by a very European binary: they are either white or black magic. This idea is now hard to unravel from these materials. The white magic, which is beneficial and socially acceptable, becomes “medicine” or “divination”; the black magic, which is anti-social and violent, is “witchcraft” (Mufuzi, “Practice of Witchcraft”). This distinction between social benefit and anti-social violence mirrors the origin mythology that animates tourist life in Livingstone. Livingstone the town is named after Livingstone the man, who is memorialized as the uniquely goodhearted missionary who brought both salvation and abolition to the region. The ultimate anti-social black magic would then be the violence of slavery, and its abolition is understood to be of material and moral concern—a concern both with the end of raids that brought upheaval to the north of what is now Zambia (and the danger of being abducted into slavery through these raids) and with the wrongness of the enslavement of African kin. Its counterpart is the healing force of Christianity spread by Livingstone. Indeed, contemporary Christianity in Zambia—even after excluding the more willfully syncretic African Independent Churches—is a thoroughly magical phenomenon. Ordinary and spiritual life is expected to be structured in profoundly supernatural ways, from the transubstantiation in Catholicism and consubstantiation in Anglicanism to the more recently imported Pentecostal and Charismatic churches, where locals find themselves possessed, speaking in tongues, gaining special powers, and being healed by the word of God and the hands of their preachers. More, these supernatural modes are amenable to those governing local ideas of magic, and the commensurability of religion and witchcraft in Zambia produces local witchcraft practices not as impossibilities but as evil presences in the world. It follows that the fear of witchcraft and of its objects comes to be central to conversion in the region.

    To Western audiences, these witchcraft objects appear to manifest their power and intention through supernatural means,7 a fact that presents a scholarly problem. In the most notable early attempt to resolve this problem, Evans-Pritchard’s Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande (1937) works to find a way to rationalize witchcraft’s excess from the natural. In the text, Evans-Pritchard argues that Zande cosmology seeks to explain and respond to that which is left out of Western analyses of cause and effect—instead of the how questions, the why questions: why then, why there, why them. These beliefs in turn produce practices that help the Zande social structure retain stability in light of potentially destabilizing accidents and deaths.8 Evans-Pritchard produces a psychological account of witchcraft, describing it as a way of dealing with the inexplicable misfortunes of everyday life. In its effort to be sympathetic to magic, this mode imagines magic as the exceedingly rationalist counterpart to Western naturalist modes of inquiry (Mills). This witchcraft is not truly agential; not only does it not actually harm anyone, but it doesnt’ actually act. Instead, for Evans-Pritchard, witchcraft is a discourse applied after the fact and it produces the sense that the world it describes can be correctly understood through Western science.

    In postcolonial scholarship on witchcraft, this problematic is often addressed by studying experiences of witchcraft or witchcraft accusations through a set of concrete harms that witchcraft is understood to provide psychic or critical commentary upon. Many scholars extend Evans-Pritchard’s “misfortune” to its structural conclusion that witchcraft is the manifestation of the lived social violence of capitalism. This mode of thinking witchcraft as part of an “occult economy” hopes to take seriously the modernity of practices that are otherwise situated in the traditional past in an uncomplicated way. In Modernity and its Malcontents, Jean and John Comaroff attempt to rethink all ritual on the African continent as forming the “efforts of people to empower themselves, [and] thus to assert a measure of control over worlds often perceived to be rapidly changing” (xiv) and assert the importance of thinking ritual as symbolic action. Thus, they replicate Evans-Pritchard’s psychological dismissal of the occult. However, where for Evans-Pritchard magical practices have a stabilizing function, for the Comaroffs, they figure “in a moral economy capable of addressing the raw realities of misfortune and inequity” (xvii). The occult here is transmuted into a form of ritualized social criticism, which may come to have tangible effects. This speaks to an idealized occult world, in which the eminent adaptability of witchcraft (Geschiere) uniquely positions it as a resistant force to those geopolitical changes that affect everyday life in harmful ways (Moore and Sanders 11). But the practice of witchcraft that the Comaroffs identify routinely becomes subordinate to the moral critique that witchcraft is seen to enable. They write:

    African witches have a long legacy. Their signifying potential, moreover, has proven to be unusually dynamic and versatile. They travel across broad horizons, take up residence in towns, become mistresses of money, markets, and motorized transport, wear makeup and modish attire. They also become the personification of capricious commodities, the sirens of selfish desire. Thus Schmoll shows that Hausa “soul-eaters” in rural Niger consume the life essence of their fellows out of insatiable, uncontrolled craving. Theirs is an antisocial lust that finds its “meat” in the bodies of children, and hence subverts the process of social reproduction itself—this, Austen reminds us, being a very general motif in African witchcraft. (xxv)

    This brief historic analysis of the doings of witches is subsumed into an account of the soul-eater as a commodity that comes to threaten Hausa heritage, revealing the shifting moral margins of society. The Hausa witchcraft accusation is a quasi-Marxist critique from which we might better come to understand the economic violence of African modernity. It should come as little surprise that the discussions of magic in Modernity and Its Malcontents are animated by the idea of the fetish. This is a layered reference. The feitiço gives “fetish” its name—the enchantment, the magical object, the product of sorcery, the supernaturally animate—just as the Marxian commodity fetish describes the magic whereby circulation hides the social, becoming a veil that masks what is real. This is not just a rhetorical parallel; for the Comaroffs, much of what witchcraft appears to veil is capitalism. Despite their stated concern with taking non-Western forms seriously in their own right instead of as reflections of the West, Comaroff and Comaroff present an unveiling of the occult that is “truly” a criticism of newly entrenched forms of accumulation (xiii). Witchcraft becomes simply a metaphor for capitalism.

    For Sean Redding, witchcraft is the sign of colonial power in Union-era South Africa. Redding quotes a passage from Monica Hunter (Wilson)’s 1936 Reaction to Conquest, in which she presents an argument about the witchcraft done to the Pondo by Europeans:

    Quoting an unnamed informant, [Hunter] elaborated: “All ubuthi [material for sorcery] comes from Europeans. They are the real amagqwira (witches or sorcerers).” . . . Informants, when asked, replied that store-keepers and individual Europeans in Pondoland did not kill Pondo by witchcraft or sorcery, but “It is that European, the Government, who ukuthakatha [does harm by witchcraft or sorcery].”(10)

    For Hunter’s Pondo informant, the Union of South Africa is a witch, and colonial rule takes place by means of witchcraft. As Redding elaborates, the most frequent target of this mode of witchcraft accusation was the colonial tax, which demanded a fundamental and immediate restructuring of local forms of life, and whose authority (however illegitimate) could not be ignored. For Redding, this reading of white power as witchly is entangled with early evangelism. Christian missions and their associated civilizing projects—training grounds for appropriately proletarian, though at least initially elite, African subjectivities—were aligned with the colonial administration and colored local understandings of what the supernatural could do and for whom. The social disruption and violence of the sorcerer—the colonial administration, broadly construed—operated through the fetish of British currency, entrenching and facilitating the colonial government’s power at the cost of indigenous lives and life. Redding is concerned less with witchcraft, however, than with the witchcraft accusation. As a result, witchcraft is a metaphor and witchcraft accusations are indices of social anxiety, and thus critiques of the decidedly not supernatural operations of the colonial and postcolonial market and state.

    Henrietta Moore and Todd Sanders offer a rejoinder:

    Is witchcraft, or the occult more generally, offering a critique of globalization and modernity? Must it do so? Is witchcraft really about symbolic politics? Could it be that anthropologists are telling a popular liberal tale through “others” and, in the process, inadvertently reinscribing the very “us”-“them” dichotomies we seek to dismantle? It seems most unlikely that, in all cases and places, people are resisting or critiquing the technologies and conveniences of modernization, and they are certainly not shy of the capitalist relations needed to acquire them. (13)

    Why should allegations about occult harm so neatly mirror a left-centrist critique of capital and the modern world? Why should witchcraft be fundamentally about any such critique—why should it be reduced to discourse? By failing to think witchcraft as a practice with a social life, this scholarship cannot account for the way that the language of witchcraft in particular works to track changes in processes of “consumption, production and political control” (Moore and Sanders 9) on the African continent. This trajectory of witchcraft scholarship is well-meaning, reflecting the desire to dismiss concoctions of racist imagination, to valorize African social practices, and to retain a sense of (radical, or even revolutionary) political optimism about a continent that is often refused it. But witchcraft is not only a discourse; it is a living practice. To understand it, one must first be willing to take witchcraft as real. On one level, this might mean taking a more “rounded picture of reality, one that provides for both the visible and invisible dimensions of our world” (Nyamnjoh 47). But even if one is unwilling to countenance the agency of an invisible world, witchcraft is nonetheless agential and real. The ilomba of the Reynolds collection are especially suggestive here. These objects are crafted in ways that emphasize their identification with ethnographic Blackness, using racialized caricature to heighten the work of fear, and they are understood to be fundamentally entangled with the life of the witch. The ilomba must eat just as the witch must eat, and blood must flow through the ilomba just as blood must flow through the witch, or the ilomba and the witch will both die. This materiality does not so obviously reflect a structure of anti-social violence. But such a violence characterizes the evidently material practices that come to be excluded from the realm of the medicinal—the medicine murders and maimings of children, the elderly, and people with albinism. By failing to reckon with these, and with the convenience mapping of witchcraft accusations onto critiques of capitalist modernity, witchcraft is wholly excised from the material and social world.

    Francis Nyamnjoh’s analysis of magic in the Bamenda Grassfields of Cameroon offers a direction for resolution. Here, sorcerers are at once estranged from social life and possessed of an “undomesticated agency” (Nyamnjoh 44). This “undomesticated agency” is not only the malevolent power of sorcery, it corresponds too to the greed and pride of the economic and political climber, as part of a world in which everything—all resources, including life itself—is understood to be finite and in need of balancing. In both cases, close and distant kin are sacrificed—their lives traded at the market of a shadow world, Msa—to attain position and power. While this certainly appears to be a vernacular criticism of capitalist accumulation, it also seems to make a broader claim: witchcraft has a wild power and this power is absolute, free of the influence of any but the witch, and if left undomesticated—or at least unchallenged—it will continue to consume its kin until there are no spirits left.

    What does it mean to consume one’s kin? This is an expression of the most antisocial of violences—not only the cannibal consumption of other persons, but the literal eating of the family that grounds one’s presence in the social world. This consumption corresponds to the use of body parts in medicines that aid inattaining power and wealth. But it speaks more broadly to witchcraft as a socially disassembling force. The materials in the Reynolds collection—their aesthetics, materiality, social importance, and magical power—unmoor us and their contemporaries alike from the bounds of the social world as we have been brought to understand it. The witch’s otherworldly knowledge, signaled by the material and aesthetic mismatches in the construction of these composite objects, violently unmakes the boundaries of our worldly knowledge. In other words, witchcraft is abject. This is not as the overdetermined signifier of the horrors of the African primitivity, although an awareness of this may well be incorporated into witchcraft practice. Instead, witchcraft is the deliberate crafting and embodiment of abjection, occupying a position that is both marginal and threatening. This abjection can be seen even in the materiality of the Reynolds objects, with their malevolent superimposition of human remains with craft materials, natural dangers, and animal parts. Instead of merely surviving from a shameful traditional past, witchcraft continues to disassemble the boundaries of social meaning in ways capacious enough to incorporate the iconography and logic of colonialism.

    Whether we are concerned with the witchcraft of the medicine murder or with the way that killing itself operates through more occult means, we find in witchcraft a problem of relation. We cannot want witchcraft—even as we might want its heresy—and yet it remains, producing spectacular violence and spectacular objects that unsettle the social. And yet, there is something seductive about witchcraft, about the power it possesses and can transmit. This power is not just a discursive referent to things that have actual power. In this sense, witchcraft is not merely a critique of capitalism or of the particular workings of any given African nation state, but of sovereign power and those who wield it.

    Indeed, witchcraft is a form that challenges the sovereignty of African states. This challenge is regularly expressed in ordinary life. In one version, witchcraft is an evil obstacle to the salvation of the continent, to be overcome through novel ecclesiastical practices (Asamoah-Gyadu). This point is especially salient in Zambia, whose official Christianity has resulted in explicitly non-secular forms of governance following the 1991 presidential election of Frederick Chiluba, a Pentecostal Christian. This general Christian consensus on witchcraft in Zambia results in the idea that witchcraft is heretical, but not as discourse or representation. Instead, witches are actual combatants in a cosmological war,9 one that Christianity must win (Asamoah-Gyadu). In a somewhat parallel story, witchcraft is a superstitious practice that burdens governance and its potential to provide liberated futures (Okeja). This line of criticism reduces magical beliefs and practices to a backwards misreading of the real that produces frustrating noncompliance with the paternal authority of the state. Here the Zambian state’s position offers a useful conclusion. In the Lusaka National Museum—a fairly empty museum colored by state politics and situated next to a government office building that houses several ministries—the International Museums Day exhibit for 2017 (“Museums and Contested Histories: Saying the Unspeakable in Zambia”) featured panels on witchcraft and albinism, among other topics. The witchcraft panel, while in principle standing alone, provided the context through which to understand the other. Witchcraft and magic—including their medicinal and defensive forms, and especially the forms that enable the accumulation of wealth—are the necessary conditions for the maiming and murdering of albino Zambian adults and children. Tremendous and pervasive violence is incorporated into an illicit economy of supernatural power; superstition, if not evil itself, produces evil. And this violence is of urgent concern not only because it is horrific, but because it persists, spiting national attempts to manage it.10 Its occurrence compels international observers to call for intervention, thus reminding African governments of the subordinate position of their own “sovereignty.”

    In contrast, the heretical violence of and for witchcraft is not trapped by any obligations to appease others—any such death or maiming serves only the witch and perhaps a series of hired hands who willfully do violence to others in order to bring about or maintain the wealth or power of the witch in question. There is no decorum to maintain—no acts of violence that might (need to) be justified—nor anyone to be accountable to. There is opposition from the colonial and postcolonial state, as well as from Christian churches, and the entanglement of their challenge to witchcraft—or rather, of witchcraft’s challenge to both—signals that witchcraft’s heretical position may also be a sovereign one, as Fasolt argues in “Sovereignty and Heresy.” The attempts to criminalize witchcraft and the evangelical framing of witchcraft as an enemy force signal that witchcraft presents a critical disruption of the sovereignty of the Zambian state that, in the transit of the neocolony (cf. Byrd), must somehow be restructured from crisis into a difference that is either internal or external to the workings of the state11.

    Such an attempt was hinted at upon the election of Frederick Chiluba. On the first of November 1991, the results of the Zambian presidential election were announced. Following a staggering defeat, Kenneth Kaunda telephoned Chiluba to concede defeat and congratulate the new president. The Washington Post reported that shortly after this concession in a press conference,

    Chiluba called on Kaunda to remain in the country and help rebuild it. “I want the fears to vanish, to disappear from his mind,” he said. “There will be no witch hunting. Kenneth Kaunda is the father of this country, so we must show him respect.”12

    Chiluba’s declaration that “There will be no witch hunting” is a loaded play on words. More than just referencing the fact that Kaunda was the subject of myriad accusations of witchcraft, it nods to the legitimacy of the accusations against Kaunda. The pronouncement recognizes the growing popular frustration with Kaunda’s singular power, which, together with international pressure, produced the multiparty election in which he was unseated and through which his late autocratic rule became tantamount to witchcraft. Beyond that, Chiluba is declaring his own authority and capacity to control the world of witchcraft and dissuade it from action, perhaps by virtue of this democratic election. These two figures—Kaunda the witch, Chiluba the vanquisher—together tell a story of the success of Zambian sovereignty. The witch’s undomesticated agency is domesticated (subordinated) to the newly Christian state by means of a democratic election. But there is more than one threat of witchcraft in this account; also present are the multitudes desiring occult retribution, the witch-hunters-in-waiting (the rioters who had unsettled Kaunda’s Zambia and led to the election). And where Kaunda’s witchcraft-of-sovereignty is overcome by Chiluba’s electoral victory, this latter witchcraft—which threatened to compete with Chiluba’s role of authorizing violence for the state—is instead comfortably incorporated into Zambian statecraft, becoming part of what confirms Chiluba’s own legitimacy. The witch is dead! Long live the witches!—or so Chiluba, victorious, will tell us.

    Perhaps this signals the incorporation of witchcraft proper into Zambian nation-building. The use of witchcraft by politicians to establish their power certainly suggests as much. Perhaps witchcraft then takes the form of a commodity whose circulation is attuned to the whims of the state or its capitalist corollaries. Or perhaps instead of witchcraft being incorporated into the workings of the Zambian nation, it remains independent of and coextensive with Zambian sovereignty, a font of illicit power engaged by those who desire its legitimate corollary. The idea that witchcraft could be incorporated into governance belies both the utter social disruption it produces and the fact that, even as politicians attempt to access power by means of witchcraft, they can never acknowledge (to locals) that they are witches or (to international observers of multiple kinds) that they are primitive, superstitious, and willing to corrupt social life to attain power. Instead, it seems that witchcraft holds its own. It has become the immediate point of reference when discussing ascension to the kinds of wealth and position whose power is progressively less constrained. This does not seem to signal that witchcraft is equivalent to the tropic, populist witchcraft accusations that follow those who have attained some form of power (not least because they also follow those who have not). Instead, it seems to indicate that witchcraft, as a distinct, independent, unsubordinated sovereign form, is the sign through which power is understood.

    Thinking with Achille Mbembe, we might then be tempted to understand witchcraft as a necropolitical form, characterized by the production of lawless and excessive “death-worlds” (Mbembe, “Necropolitics” 40). In this reading, and in light of the challenges witchcraft poses to the postcolonial state (which it shadows with myth, rumor, and spectacular violence), witchcraft appears to correspond to an expression of sovereign power peculiar to the colony and its postcolonial successor. This is the logic that animates Mbembe’s “Provisional Notes on the Postcolony” (1992), which employs an extended metaphor of the fetish in its reading of postcolonial commandement. In this text, the fetish is the ideal form through which illegitimate authoritarian colonial power operates, as well as the power of its postcolonial successor.

    This fetish appears primarily to be the fetish-as-veil, although Mbembe makes use of the more occult origin of the term. But the fetish is also what structures our relations to the obscene, vulgar, sexual, phallic. Thus this contemporary-politics-as-fetish is not only a veil but a carnival masquerade (and, crucially, one known as such). This reading forces us to reckon with the permeation of political discourse with reactive and chaotic performances that undermine the recognition of political relations. Mbembe offers an account of how the grotesque, excessive, and obscene come to be incorporated into the workings of political power. What initially exceeds the capacities and domains of postcolonial governance comes to form part of what ratifies and enables the workings of the state. These changes can be read as the workings of a state aspiring to the modernity that seems to be otherwise unique to witchcraft, which is possessed of an infinite adaptability and responsiveness to change and external interpretation. As a result, Mbembe’s power-as-fetish—or perhaps, power-as-witchcraft—is capable of internalizing any obscenity or excess that should disrupt it.

    Mbembe writes this power-as-fetish as at once establishing and legitimating the authority of the state. But neither mechanism seems convincing, even within his own reading. Postcolonial potentates do not institute themselves by radical incorporation or any other means—in On the Postcolony (2001), they are instituted by a mere handover of power from a colonial commandement established by routine violence.13 Even considering only the contemporary African nations for which this claim might be held as true, the terms of this transition violently constrain African government policy. What remains relatively unconstrained is a discursive terrain through which power might be legitimated. However, Mbembe goes on to argue forcefully for an African postcolonial drama in which all parties have been radically disempowered, and both the state and the subjects of its regime are locked in a violent powerlessness due to their intimate, unwilling “conviviality” (“Provisional Notes” 10).14 In light of this, it seems odd that a mechanism for legitimation should even be necessary in the postcolony. Regardless of how political discourse might be performed here—with or without the fetish—we are left without a material account of the kind of sovereign power actually possessed by African states and the terms through which that sovereignty might be challenged or dissembled, and are instead offered something very close to an account of total domination. Mbembe reads power-as-witchcraft as a peculiarly African form characterized by excessively and arbitrarily violent state power. This peculiarity seems to be grounded in the seamlessness that Mbembe ascribes to the transfer of power from colonial administration to African government at independence, which appears as the key feature of the continent’s politics after colonialism, and through which theorization post-independence African states are assigned the full power of the colonial administrations that preceded them.

    Reading “Provisional Notes” with his essay, “Afropolitanism” (2007), a further problem emerges with the thesis of a postcolonial citizenry radically disempowered of democratic possibility. In “Afropolitanism,” Mbembe rhapsodizes about the value of an African political-aesthetic practice untethered to Africanism or Blackness (as racial, cultural, or kin-making forms). These latter forms reflect a nativism that Mbembe reads to be the problem at the heart of power-as-witchcraft.

    Partly through the indigenizing character of the African occult, Mbembe reads political claims to lineage and kinship—which he elsewhere equates to a “politics of blood,” both the blood of kin and of bloodshed (“If We Don’t”)—as commensurable with witchcraft-as-power. But, just as African states do not operate through witchcraft-as-power, violence in excess of that required to produce a nation-state can never gain hegemony across the Postcolony due to the quasi-condition of African sovereignty. Moreover, this commensuration misreads witchcraft, imagining it as a politics of kinship instead of a practice that arbitrarily and systemically brings the possibility of kinship into question. Further, and perhaps most troublingly for Mbembe’s project of reclaiming African subjectivity after colonialism, this gesture also forecloses the the affiliative models of political practice that might figure a new politics of solidarity and a new African political horizon.

    Mbembe’s criticism of the politics of custom operates within an academic conversation that commonly disparages resurgent African indigenous-coded political claims as nativist. Claims to land and lineage are seen as mired in an attachment to a past that is beyond reasonable access, and thus that is produced in the shape of existing desires, in which the customary comes to exist primarily as a legitimating force. Taking this to reflect truth, the question that follows is then, for what? The seeming answer is that claims to lineage threaten to produce ethnic division, hierarchy, and violence. This threat is in many ways evidenced by aspects of ethnic politics on the continent. But this sense of threat also reflects how the customary exists as a site of anxiety in advance of any actual violence, in ways that elide the banality of its everyday life—and indeed, the banality of the suggestion that an ethnicized context should deal with ethnicity instead of seeking to sweep it away. After all, fictive and affiliative claims to culture, kinship, and the past do not reflect politically convenient artifice, nor—much like witchcraft—are they a holdover from the precolonial. Instead, they articulate experiences with and attachments to non-Western practices, and reflect the vitality and urgency of such practices for the present day.

    The problem of wrestling with the agency and power of kinship—both in its banal and its pernicious forms—is one that the Livingstone Museum takes seriously. Its witchcraft objects are possessed of a deathly power, which is resolved by their deactivation by a witchdoctor prior to their placement on open shelves, and the restriction of access to any active objects accessioned after the last deactivation event. In the process, the museum both builds an archive of materials that can no longer threaten15 and recognizes their threat as real. The structure of its galleries offers another set of remarks; the ethnographic gallery is set up so as to critique colonialism and its effects on Zambian lives. Its entrance is marked by a curved reed fence, with sand on the ground; on the other side of this fence, a sign reads “Our Village.” The next room has several thatch-roofed buildings, sandy floors, and many traditional items meant to communicate how Zambians would have been living in the villages. Many objects, like jerricans and bicycles, signal that this is life under colonial rule. Three-dimensional sculptures of people are living their lives in this environment with these objects. The paintings on the walls continue the scene into the distance. In the next room, labelled “Their Town,” the floor ceases to be sandy, and is instead structured like a street, with pavement along the sides where the visitor walks in the road. Right in front of the entrance is a huge building with a sign labeled “Mirage House” and other signs that identify it as a government office and people’s bank. The story of this transition is clear; the urban promises of colonialism and postcolonial modernity proved mere mirages, and life in the cities and towns of Zambia is no easier than “traditional” life in the villages. Next to the building, there is a pay phone and a street light. Along the wall, extending to the right side of the entrance, a scene shows an industrial project helmed by a complaining European man, people struggling for work, and people debating whether the work—and, by extension, the colonial project—is worth it. Unlike in the scene of “Our Village,” all of the figures are two-dimensional wood cut-outs (or part of the murals). On the right side, we see a church, children walking to school, and a small shop set up in a tin shack complete with dry goods. Walking around the building, a car with wooden cut-out figures inside is being stopped by police and another person is sitting on the corner, begging.

    Fig. 5.
    Entrance to the conventional ethnographic exhibition hall following “Their Town.”

    A sign on the arched wall reading “Museum” marks the end of the installation space and the beginning of the conventional ethnographic exhibits, while also chronologically and critically situating museological knowledge in and after the destabilizing colonial encounter (see fig. 5). Thus, the structure of the ethnographic gallery suggests that the indigenous cosmologies reflected by the witchcraft objects (as opposed to by the museum, or the anthropologists that read the museum, or the colonial administrators who seek to reorganize social meaning for political and economic gain) are an inheritance Zambians cannot abandon. In making this move, the Livingstone Museum both invests in the scientificity of the research museum and challenges the singularity of its authority. The museum, we should understand, does have some (curated, colonial) relationship to truth, and as such is a resource in coming to comprehend anew the Village in the midst of (and after) the Town. Between the affirmations of and attempts to manage the threat of witchcraft and the exalting of forms of life that resist the logics of Zambian modernity without excluding its trappings, the Livingstone Museum does not make any optimistic claims about the potentiality of the future. Instead, it reckons with the problem that these witchcraft objects pose, as potently agential materials fundamentally entangled in indigenous ways of knowing. These objects also become overdetermined signs of primitive savagery and come to take newly harmful forms after colonialism and into the present.

    In its refusal of easy optimism—and even as it asserts the urgency and reality of indigenous knowledges and cosmologies—the museum also refuses a nativist appeal to origin or to a neatly defined sense of the precolonial. But it does so in ways that reflect the absence of anxiety around the power of custom, ethnicity, and the past, in sharp contrast to the scholarly discourses that concern and surround materials of the kind held in the Livingstone Museum’s collections. In the process, the museum is able to treat even the most violently overdetermined signs of cultural life as things possessing a life of their own, even the ones that have been out of circulation for half a century. It presents the idea that regardless of the impulse to authenticate indigenous practices, anthropologized African forms are not paths to the precolonial, nor do they reflect correct modes of timeless relation to the contemporary world. Instead, the Livingstone Museum’s treatment of these witchcraft objects underscores the necessity of simultaneously asking what politics are desired and what forms must be enlivened or reformed in order to ensure the possibility of these politics.

    Asking these questions means emphasizing the kinds of constraints to the quasi-sovereignty of post-independence African states posed by the economically, epistemically, and politically intrusive actions of imperial powers, and acknowledging too that life is made and remade in the midst of this. By taking witchcraft seriously—as practice and rumour and myth, as repulsion and seduction, as an antisocial violence and being-without obligation—we might gain grounds from which to understand the aspiration to sovereignty in African political life. And we might understand its fatal absence even where it is present and, more urgently, its inadequacy as a site of political aspiration whose violence—of jurisdiction, or of recognition—is not society-making but society-breaking. Crucially, witchcraft suggests too a productive inverse: sociality. Perhaps, following Mudimbe, one might instead trace the ordinary—the cultural products, the habits of life, the discourses that needn’t be spoken—and through it find a politics of kin-making that need not also be a politics of blood.

    Alírio Karina is a Postdoctoral Fellow in the Archive and Public Culture Research Initiative at the University of Cape Town, and Associate Faculty at the Brooklyn Institute for Social Research. Their research examines how the idea of Africa is the product of the legacies of anthropology, and what it might mean to do African studies—and to think Africa—in ways autonomous of anthropology.

    Footnotes

    1. Following the Livingstone Museum’s nomenclature, I use the term witchcraft here. The term is itself coherent with a lineage of writing from Barrie Reynolds to Evans-Pritchard, and with the popular terms that typically describe these practices in Zambia and beyond. Accordingly, I refer to the practitioners of witchcraft as witches, whereas practitioners of other kinds of magic might be diviners or witch-doctors. In some scholarship, my use of witchcraft is congruent with sorcery; in other scholarship and social contexts, witchcraft and sorcery are used interchangeably. In doing so, I also am responding to a set of arguments about nomenclature that would avoid the use of witchcraft or sorcery altogether, in favor of terms that speak to indigenous meaning rather than colonial assumption, and that avoid the pernicious connotations that come with witchcraft, sorcery, or witch-doctor. However, this logic falls flat in contemporary Zambia, where witchcraft is called witchcraft and bears the traces of the colonial encounter. Moreover, the attempt to avoid the negative connotations of these terms ultimately reflects a misunderstanding of (or unwillingness to understand) the extent to which these practices produce social violence. Further, in the Zambian case, the term witch, and thus the term witchcraft, is gendered in complex ways. While it is assumed that men and women are equally capable of being witches, male witches are understood to be more powerful (Mufuzi) and witch-hunts predominantly target women (and the elderly).

    2. This museum was founded as the Rhodes-Livingstone Museum, after both David Livingstone and Cecil John Rhodes, the mining magnate who conquered what is now Zambia as part of his personal colony of Rhodesia. It was affiliated with the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute (RLI) and would occasionally accession items collected by anthropologists working under the latter’s auspices. The RLI has since been renamed the Institute for Economic and Social Research (INESOR).

    3. Specifically, this display is in the part of the ethnographic gallery labelled MUSEUM and arranged with conventional museum displays, and not in the preceding part of the ethnographic gallery, a two-room installation work (“Our Village”; “Their Town”) that depicts the subtler violences of colonialism.

    4. The objects are deeply associated with Reynolds, and this collection is generally referred to within the museum as the “Reynolds Collection,” despite the fact that Reynolds is not listed as the collector for any of these materials. I will use this nomenclature in this paper.

    5. As a counterpoint to this now faded (deactivated) power, we see the present material condition of the objects. As many are made of natural materials (especially hide, hair, or dense patches of fiber), almost all of the objects are decaying, with small insect infestations resulting in dramatic shedding.

    6. See Geschiere, The Modernity of Witchcraft; Moore and Sanders, “Magical Interpretations”; Comaroff and Comaroff, Modernity and Its Malcontents; and Mufuzi, “Practice of Witchcraft.”

    7. In Zambia, the operation of witchcraft objects does not exceed the natural, nor do broader witchcraft and traditional medicinal practices.

    8. Evans-Pritchard already recognizes that this does not take the form of the “traditional,” as Anglo-Egyptian intervention had already forced the relocation of the community he studied and would do so again shortly thereafter. In some ways, these moves disabled “traditional” ways of living.

    9. This tale of the war of Christianity versus Witchcraft further complicates the idea of the “occult economy,” which serves as a mode of criticizing capitalist value structures. This is due to the Christian evangelical churches, whose leaders are conspicuous in their consumption and almost as rich in moral authority, and whose members tithe heavily, whose work entangles the capitalist and the moral and supernatural, whose adverts litter notice boards and the walls of buildings, and whose churches can be found on every block.

    10. The most obvious of these are the attempts to criminalize witchcraft, primarily under British rule, efforts that actually served to criminalize witchcraft accusations (see Redding, Sorcery and Sovereignty). But other anti-witchcraft (and anti-magic) sentiments animate African government, most clearly where public health and internal security seem to be at risk. These sentiments share a mixed lineage from both European attempts to produce modern colonies and modes of anticolonial anti-tribalism that were the result of wariness of the threats posed by attachments to ethnicity and to the making of new nationalisms, but that also took the form of a wariness with practices under sign of the traditional past instead of the modern (and in the case of Zambia, socialist) future.

    11. Together with Jodi Byrd, Sylvia Federici’s work is instructive on this point. Though the “witches” in question are altogether different, the “witch” appears as abject, against which—and in whose idealized answer—the maintenance of the Rhodesian and Zambian state as (neo)colonial forms is made possible. Indeed, even as the sovereignty of Zambian witchcraft is grounded in material violences, and responded to with equal materiality, its power is also grounded in its role as political and cultural counter-symbol to the state.

    12. This statement is complicated, as it becomes clear prior to the 1996 presidential election—for which new laws were passed barring non-Zambian born people from candidacy—that Kaunda was not welcome except as a subordinate figure to Chiluba and his political party, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). In the following year, Kaunda was stripped of his Zambian citizenship altogether..

    13. This argument is central to the first two chapters of On the Postcolony.

    14. In “Provisional Notes,” Mbembe offers this as an analytic on the grounds of its superior complexity to the binarism of “resistance v. passivity, autonomy v. subjection, state v. civil society, hegemony v. counter-hegemony, totalisation v. detotalisation” (1).

    15. The absence of threat is limited to when these objects remain deactivated; the object that ceases to be an archival or curatorial object is one that might be reactivated by another witch and used again to cause harm. For this reason, witchcraft objects on open display are sometimes stolen.

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    • Mills, Martin A. “The Opposite of Witchcraft: Evans-Pritchard and the Problem of the Person.” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, no. 19, 2013, pp. 18–33.
    • Moore, Henrietta L., and Todd Sanders. “Magical Interpretations and Mterial Realities: An Introduction.” Moore and Sanders, pp. 1–27.
    • ———, editors. Magical Interpretations, Material Realities: Modernity, Witchcraft and the Occult in Postcolonial Africa. Routledge, 2001.
    • Mudimbe, V.Y. The Idea of Africa. Indiana UP, 1994.
    • Mufuzi, Friday. “The Practice of Witchcraft and the Changing Patterns of its Paraphernalia in the Light of Technologically Produced Goods as Presented by Livingstone Museum, 1930s–1973.” Zambia Social Science Journal vol. 5, no. 1, 2014, pp. 50–71.
    • Nyamnjoh, Francis B. “Delusions of Development and the Enrichment of Witchcraft Discourses in Cameroon.” Moore and Sanders, pp. 28–49. Okeja, Uchenna B. “Magic In African Context.” Magic and the Supernatural, edited by Scott E. Hendrix and Timothy J. Shannon, Leiden, Brill, 2012, pp. 101–106.
    • Redding, Sean. Sorcery and Sovereignty: Taxation, Power and Rebellion in South Africa, 1880–1963. Ohio UP, 2006.
    • Reynolds, Barrie. Magic, Divination and Witchcraft Among the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia. U of California P, 1963.
    • Thomas, Keith. Religion and the Decline of Magic. Scribner, 1971.
  • The Grounds of Encounter: Racial and Colonial Discourses of Place

    Sarah E.K. Fong (bio)

    Abstract

    Bridging Black and Native Studies, this essay juxtaposes the speeches of late-nineteenth century social reformers with Black and Indigenous place-making practices to show that white settler spatial imaginaries depict both Black and Indigenous peoples as placeless within the lands currently called the United States. Moving beyond an analytical separation of Black and Native Studies, it employs a relational approach that reveals how racial and colonial discourses of place are co-constitutive in historical practice. The association of past and present in this essay is an invitation to consider the recursive and repetitive production of white settler spatial practices and imaginaries as ongoing sites of struggle.

    My first introduction to Sogorea Te’ Land Trust came in August 2017 when I attended a panel discussion titled “Living on Ohlone Land.” I had recently been wondering how I, as a non-Native person, could support the work of Indigenous communities in the Bay Area where I live. Sogorea Te’ Land Trust is “an urban Indigenous women-led land trust … that facilitates the return of Indigenous land to Indigenous people” (Sogorea Te’ Land Trust, “Purpose and Vision”). In order to “reclaim parcels [of land] in the midst of an urban setting,” Sogorea Te’ encourages residents and businesses to pay a land tax to the Ohlone people. The organization describes this voluntary financial contribution to the rematriation of Ohlone land as “a small step towards acknowledging the history of genocide on this land and contributing to its healing” (Sogorea Te’). Sogorea Te’ defines rematriation as the restoration of “a people ot their rightful place in sacred relationship with their ancestral land” (Sogorea Te’). Beyond purchasing and placing parcels of land in a trust, Sogorea Te’ engages in a range of place-making practices such as building ceremonial arbors, re-interring ancestral remains in sacred funerary Shellmounds, and growing food and traditional medicines in urban community farms. Through various projects, this intertribal collective aims to “restore reciprocal relationships with the sacred land we live on, and with the plants, animals and other human beings who we share this land with” (“Purpose and Vision”).

    In the summer of 2019, after paying my Shuumi land tax for two years, I began to support Sogorea Te’s work by volunteering at one of their community farms.1 I met Loa on the farm located at the intersection of two major urban thoroughfares. Walking through the lush, green grounds, I could hear the hum of cars, busses, and bikers passing on the street just beyond the fence. As Loa pointed out the tomatoes, kale, lettuce, and marigolds they were raising, she gestured to the neighboring beds. Those, she explained, were tended by Black Earth Farms, an agroecology collective that works to “train community members to build collectivized, autonomous, and chemical free food systems in urban and peri-urban environments” (Black Earth Farms). Black Earth Farms supports food sovereignty through the distribution of community-supported agroecology (CSA) food boxes to communities that face food insecurity. The long and narrow vegetable beds that make up this community farm, separated by a walking path no more than a foot wide, are stewarded by two different organizations – one identified with Ohlone women and another with African-diasporic and Indigenous people. And yet, Loa told me, members of the two communities will, at times, weed and water one another’s beds as seems necessary or prudent.

    Sogorea Te’ Land Trust and Black Earth Farms engage in place-based practices meant to sustain the physical bodies, community relations, and epistemological frameworks of Black and Indigenous peoples in the twenty first century. These embodied place-making practices push against dominant geographies that seek to limit and obscure Black and Indigenous peoples’ relationships to the lands currently called the United States, and to one another. This site of encounter between Black and Indigenous communities raises questions about the significance of the land- and place-based practices that emerge in the wake of slavery and amidst the ongoing conditions of colonization that shape contemporary social and political life in the United States. What does it mean for African-descended and Indigenous communities to farm alongside one another in the urban Bay Area? In what ways do their relationships to land align and diverge? How have dominant settler spatial imaginaries positioned Indigenous peoples and African-descended people in relationship to land and to one another in the Americas? How do Indigenous and African-descended people engage one another and remake these relationships today? I am new to this farm and to the communities that tend to it. I do not presume to grasp fully the philosophies or political imaginaries that animate Sogorea Te’ Land Trust and Black Earth Farms. This essay will not, therefore, undertake an analysis of the relationships between these particular organizations or their respective relationships to the land they farm. Instead, I use the parallel and shared beds of these two communities to open a window into the dynamics of place that preoccupy settler spatial imaginaries as well as the fields of Black Studies and Native Studies.

    US scholars of race and colonization commonly describe the relationship between Black Studies and Native Studies, or between histories of enslavement and colonization, as incommensurable. Frequently, the two fields are positioned at an impasse whereby the body and the land appear as the two poles around which race and colonization orbit. Within Black Studies, the racialized body is often approached as the crux of racialization, marking the limits of citizenship and Western conceptions of the human. Within Native Studies, land is frequently positioned as a primary site of conflict between colonial powers and Indigenous peoples. Native Studies scholar Mark Rifkin summarizes these constructions: “we might quite roughly schematize the distinction between Black and Indigenous political imaginaries as that of flesh and of land, a contrast between a focus on the violence of dehumanization through fungibility and occupation through domestication” (4). Yet as scholars such as Mishuana Goeman and Katherine McKittrick demonstrate, the study of racialized and gendered bodies cannot be so easily separated from considerations of land and place. At the same time, land need not act as an impassable analytical boundary between the intellectual and political projects of Black and Native Studies. Instead, we can approach prevailing discourses of place, which frequently (mis)characterize Black and Indigenous relationships to physical geographies, as the ground upon which to consider overlapping histories of struggle.

    In the twenty-first century United States, Black and Indigenous communities engage in ongoing struggles against the violent enforcement of racial and colonial spatial orders. For instance, federal and state officials have mounted new challenges to the sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction of Native nations. In addition to executive branch challenges to the Mashpee Wampanoag reservation, three recent Supreme Court cases – Herrera v. Wyoming, Carpenter v. Murphy, and McGirt v. Oklahoma – have questioned whether or not reservation lands and treaty rights remain valid from the vantage point of state and federal governments. In Herrera v. Wyoming, the State of Wyoming sought to constrain the Crow Mountain tribe’s treaty-protected hunting rights by arguing that the Fort Laramie Treaty (1868) was invalidated when Wyoming became a state in 1890.2 The state’s argument positioned the Crow Mountain peoples’ movement and its relationships to land as criminal. In both Carpenter v. Murphy and McGirt v. Oklahoma, the State of Oklahoma argued that the Muscogee Creek reservation had been disestablished not through an act of Congress but through allotment, legal precedent, and decades of state administration.3 Although the case specifically addressed whether or not the state of Oklahoma had jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed on Indian land, its ramifications extend far beyond the prosecution of crimes to ask whether or not the Muscogee Creek Reservation retains any legal validity in the present day. In the case of the Mashpee Wampanoag, the Secretary of the Interior unilaterally moved to take the tribe’s 321 acres of land out of federal trust, thereby dispossessing the Mashpee Wampanoag of their homelands. By taking the land out of trust, the Secretary of the Interior put at risk the tribe’s ability to sustain its own governing and cultural institutions, such as a police force, a language academy, a low-income housing development, and a resource management program.4 These examples demonstrate that state and federal governments continue their assault on Indigenous peoples’ sovereignty and land-based relationships through administrative and judicial maneuvers premised on the enduring notion that Native nations and their citizens, as such, have no rightful or recognizable claims to the lands occupied by the United States.

    At the same time, the police-related deaths of Black citizens of the United States – such as Oscar Grant, Michael Brown, Sandra Bland, Breonna Taylor, and George Floyd, to name but a few – point to persistent conceptions of Black people as out of place within the social and physical geographies of the nation. Oscar Grant was returning home from a New Year’s Eve Party when a public transportation police officer killed him on a train platform in Oakland, California. Michael Brown was killed by a police officer as he walked home from the store in Ferguson, Missouri. Sandra Bland died in police custody in Waller County, Texas after a minor traffic stop resulted in her arrest. Breonna Taylor was killed by Louisville Metro Police officers when they entered her home on a no-knock warrant in the middle of the night. George Floyd was killed by a police officer who kneeled on his neck, holding him down on the pavement outside of a Minneapolis grocery store. These killings, and the countless others not listed here, remind us that the mundane geographies of cities and towns across the US can become sites of racialized state violence. That Black citizens can be killed with impunity in locations of everyday life repeats and enforces the idea that there is no place within the nation that guarantees the integrity, dignity, and futurity of Black lives. Police killings mark train stations, public roads, and private homes as sites that divide lives that are valued from those that are not. They remind all residents of the United States that Black people are disallowed from moving through space without risk of fatal harm.

    The narratives of place and belonging that shape and undergird these flashpoints are not, however, uniquely characteristic of the present moment. Instead, the contested spatial imaginaries that shape these events have persisted over centuries of struggle following the colonization of the Americas and the enslavement of African-descended people. The geographic discourses that explain and authorize these contemporary sites of struggle are part of a recursive spatial imaginary and a set of material geographies premised on the notion that Black and Indigenous people have no place in the lands currently called the United States. In this essay, I argue that white settler spatial imaginaries depict both Black and Indigenous peoples as placeless, making questions of land, place, and space relevant to the study of both race and settler colonization. Moving beyond an analytical separation of Black and Native Studies, a relational approach reveals that racial and colonial discourses of place are co-constitutive in historical practice. Drawing on speeches made by late-nineteenth century social reformers, I examine the narrative and rhetorical moves that position Black and Native people in relation to one another through the language of placelessness. I show how discourse couples placelessness with normative modes of emplacement that work to uphold white settler control over peoples and lands. I gesture to Sogorea Te’ Land Trust and Black Earth Farms as well as to historical examples of Black and Native place-making to point out the lines of flight that necessarily rupture and exceed white settler spatial imaginaries. By juxtaposing archival materials with present-day place-making practices, I do not aim to produce a teleological account of nineteenth- and twenty-first century struggles over place, nor do I mean to suggest that the impact of nineteenth-century discourses on twenty-first century spatial struggles can be clearly or easily discerned. Instead, I aim to illuminate enduring patterns of spatial thought. The association of past and present in this essay is an invitation to consider the recursive and repetitive production of white settler spatial practices and imaginaries as ongoing sites of struggle.

    While I argue that spatial imaginaries and geographic stories are relevant to the study of racialization and colonization alike, I also want to make clear that I do not aim to question or diminish the fact of Indigenous sovereignty over the lands currently called the United States. Indigenous peoples have long stewarded the lands of North America and maintain meaningful relationships to their ancestral homelands in the face of genocide, removal, and war. These relationships must be taken seriously as the basis for ethical relationships between all non-Indigenous peoples and Indigenous peoples living in North America. My point is not that place and space function identically for Indigenous peoples, African-descended people, and other racialized subjects, but rather that examining discourses of place as a site of encounter between racial formations and settler colonialism can produce new insights about how these different processes have unfolded alongside and through one another.

    The Spatial Imaginaries of Mohonk Conferences

    Like the present day, the nineteenth century was characterized by violent conflict over the material and conceptual boundaries of the nation. Legal and extra-legal forms of violence such as lynching and segregation policed the social and geographic boundaries of Black life in the United States. Alongside wars of removal and containment, the US government sought to open Indigenous lands to settlement and commercial use through land policy, boarding schools, and other forms of government administration. These racial and colonial conflicts reveal how the language and practice of displacement are mobilized to assert territorial and political control over peoples and lands.

    Black and Native feminist geographers argue that spatial analysis is critical to understanding the construction and experience of racial-sexual hierarchy and colonial relationships. Rather than analytically separating body, land, and place, feminist approaches to space illuminate how racialized and colonized bodies move through physical spaces that are themselves organized through registers of racial-sexual and colonial difference. Black feminist geographies expand prevailing conceptions and critiques of racial difference as a corporeal phenomenon by considering how racism and sexism are constituted by “spatial acts” (McKittrick, Demonic Grounds, xviii). Since the Enlightenment, the discipline of geography has contributed to the elaboration of racial difference by crafting “racial essentialisms based on place” (Hawthorne 3). Such racialized geographic imaginaries “bound individuals and groups in place, classify them according to their geographical locations, and arrange them in spatio-temporal hierarchy” (3). By designating the where and who of humanity’s apex, as Alexander Weheliye observes, Enlightenment thinking arranges the world through racial, sexual, and economic hierarchy such that some peoples and places are marked as less-than-human and non-human. Thus, the racial and sexual ordering of physical and imaginative geographies shape how racial-sexual bodies move through space. Those bodies marked as racial others are frequently denied access to, segregated from, and policed within the spaces designated as the domain of proper citizens and human subjects.

    By considering physical and imaginative landscapes, Black geographies offer a site of overlap with those elements of Native studies that focus on land and place. Native feminist geographies too explore how land, space, and place are ordered through colonial categories and practices. Mapping and cartography emerge in these approaches as critical practices in the colonial project of accumulating and controlling territory. According to Goeman, cartography is a technology from which conquest flows, allowing colonial powers to rename and reorganize Indigenous lands according to colonial conceptions of gender, nation, and indigeneity. By renaming and reconfiguring Native spaces, imaginative and material settler geographies demarcate between Native and non-Native (or national and non-national) spaces. Importantly, such mapping practices do more than reorder the physical spaces of North America. They also establish “gendered colonial structures” that organize, categorize, and surveil Native bodies such that they are “readable to the state” and appointed to “appropriate” spaces (Goeman 36). When Native people move outside of the spaces designated to them by settler spatial imaginaries, they are criminalized and made vulnerable to violence. In this way, Goeman observes, “colonialism is not just about conquering Native lands … it is also about the conquest of bodies” (33). Considered together, Black and Native feminist geographies reveal the overlapping ways that racial-sexual difference and colonial relations structure white settler spatial imaginaries and geographic practices.

    Black and Native feminist geographies reveal space and place to be simultaneously material (manifested in physical landscapes and infrastructures) and imaginary (rendered through discourse and language). Rather than a static background upon which human social life occurs, geography is a contested site of meaning and a field of encounter between different histories and worldviews. When we take “the language and physicality of geography seriously,” as McKittrick does, we are better able to see place as a site of struggle over racial and colonial power relations (Demonic xiii). Goeman too, in her study of Native women’s literatures and geographies, shows that the geographic structures of colonial governance “rely on tales to lend meaning to nature and ordered space” (35). For example, colonial cartographies seek to overwrite Native peoples’ understandings of and relationships to place through narratives of property law, environment, and nature. I take up Goeman and McKittrick’s focus on spatial imaginaries and geographic stories to explore how discourses of place and placelessness contribute to relational racial formations and settler colonial practices. Below, I explore how the spatial imaginaries of the Mohonk Conferences crafted racial and colonial categories as well as policies that aimed to resolve the so-called Negro and Indian Problems. The records of the Mohonk Conferences provide an opportunity to approach discourses of place as a site of encounter where histories of racialization and colonization meet. This article does not aim to offer a definitive theory of place in relationship to racialization and settler colonization, but rather to point to new avenues of relational analysis that neither collapse colonization into racialization nor hold these sociohistorical processes apart as discrete and separable.

    The Lake Mohonk Conferences—founded in the years preceding the passage of allotment legislation and amidst the solidification of Jim Crow segregation—provide a rich archive from which to discern the spatial imaginaries that narrate and justify Black and Indigenous displacement. Taking place during the post-Civil War era as the nation expanded westward, the Mohonk Conference of the Friends of the Indian (1883–1916) and the Mohonk Conference on the Negro Question (1890–1891) brought together policy-makers, philanthropists, educators, and business leaders who hoped to resolve the so-called Negro Problem and Indian Problem through humanitarian social reforms. Hotelier and social reformer Albert K. Smiley established the Mohonk Conference of the Friends of the Indian in 1883 to call national attention to the policy reforms needed “before a solution of the [Indian] problem [would] be possible” (Lake Mohonk Conference, “Address” 14). By debating the causes of and solutions to the so-called Indian Problem, conference participants hoped to sway public opinion and federal law towards policies such as residential schooling and allotment. Energized by the first conference, in 1890 Smiley founded a second forum to address the conditions of African-descended people. The Mohonk Conference on the Negro Question drew attention to the conditions of Black life in the post-Reconstruction era, focusing on questions of poverty, schooling, and citizenship. Although most conference attendees stopped short of openly advocating for legal segregation, many were careful to explain that they did not support immediate and complete equality for Africa-descended people while making apologies for deepening physical and social segregation. Similarly, many argued that Native people could eventually be woven into mainstream US society, but only after they adopted normative models of domesticity, gender, and property. Thus, although Mohonk delegates largely agreed that Black and Native people would inevitably remain or become part of the US body politic, their imagined and material place within the nation remained open to debate. In line with these material forms of sociospatial control, Mohonk reformers gave voice to spatial imaginaries that denied Black and Native peoples any valid or recognizable place in the lands claimed by the United States. The remarks and speeches made by attendees of both Mohonk Conferences reveal an underlying spatial imaginary that sought to determine where Black and Indigenous people fit into the emerging geographic and social landscapes of the post-Civil War United States. To what physical locations and social positions could or should Black and Indigenous people be assigned? How were these two populations positioned in relation to one another? And to what spaces could white settlers rightfully lay claim? Rather than explore the material impact of the Mohonk Conferences on legislative and juridical realities, I am interested here in the discursive patterns revealed by the records of these conferences.

    In the eyes of many Mohonk Conference speakers, Black and Native people appear to lack any legible or meaningful relationships to the spaces of the United States. Speakers draw on dominant spatial imaginaries that envision African-descended people as ungeographic—a perception that, according to McKittrick, connotes an inability to establish geographic relationships or valid geographic knowledge. By describing African-descended people as out-of-place within the social and material geographies of the nation, Mohonk speakers draw on and extend dominant geographic narratives that “require black displacement, black placelessness, black labor, and a black population that submissively stays ‘in place’” (Demonic 9). According to McKittrick, such depictions are rooted in the spatial imaginaries and practices of chattel slavery and are thus key to the dehumanization of African-descended people in the Americas. Goeman demonstrates how settler spatial imaginaries similarly disavow Native peoples’ geographic knowledges and practices. By attempting to overwrite Native geographies, settler spatial practices and imaginaries contribute to “the violent erasure of alternative modes of mapping and geographic understandings” (Goeman 2). The mischaracterization of Native nations’ relationships to place as non-relationships contributes to dominant spatial imaginaries perception of white settlers as the rightful owners and occupants of the land.

    The remarks of Mohonk Conference attendees link Black and Native people to one another through their mutual dislocation in ways that suit the needs of the racial settler-state, depicting African-descended people as doubly-displaced and Indigenous peoples as improperly in place. In the eyes of late-nineteenth century social reformers, African-descended people in the Americas appear to have no lasting ties to the lands of Africa and no valid claims to the territories of the United States. They craft a category of placelessness that imagines enslaved and, later, freed people as lacking any rightful or recognizable relationships to the physical and social geographies on either side of the Atlantic. By contrast, conference attendees cast Indigenous peoples as improperly in place. Having encountered Native nations on their traditional homelands, settler spatial imaginaries cannot so easily craft a totalizing narrative of rootlessness. Instead, Mohonk Conference attendees suggest that Native peoples exist improperly in place as they do not appear to cultivate or improve land according to the capitalist logics of production and extraction. Narrating multiple forms and histories of displacement, Mohonk Conference attendees contribute to the geographic stories that seek to locate and contain Black and Indigenous bodies and relationships to land. Such spatial imaginaries endure today, as evidenced by ongoing patterns of residential segregation, racialized policing, and the continued erasure of Indigenous peoples’ presence on and relationships to land.

    African-Descended People as Doubly-Displaced

    By arguing that the Middle Passage and generations of enslavement catalyzed a fundamental subjective transformation, Mohonk Conference delegates represent enslaved people and their descendants as placeless in relation to both Africa and the Americas. Their discursive construction of double-displacement relies on a pair of rhetorical moves. First, they sever enslaved peoples’ ties to the places and people of Africa. Second, they describe the captivity of chattel slavery as a benevolent form of emplacement that locates African-descended people in proximity to, yet always apart from, civilized modernity. To men like former US President Rutherford B. Hayes and Reverend A.D. Mayo, the geographies of slavery appear benevolent and humanizing. Narrating what he perceives as racial progress, Hayes describes the ancestors of freed people as “African barbarians and pagans of the lowest type” (Lake Mohonk Conference on the Negro Question, “First Mohonk Conference” 10). They had, he claims, “no moral code,” “no skills of any kind,” and “knew nothing of any printed or written language” (10). Hayes suggests, however, that when these “heathen people” were “brought from the Dark Continent” and subjected to “several generations of bondage,” they began to adopt the habits of civilized people (10). Reverend Mayo adds to this conception of enslavement as a civilizing experience, describing generations of chattel slavery as a “brief period of tutelage” through which African-descended people were “brought into contact with the upper strata of the most powerful and civilized peoples” (38). He celebrates the “prodigious change” resulting from bondage, arguing that as a result of slavery, the Black subject was at the time of emancipation “further ‘out of the woods’ of barbarism than any other people after a thousand years” (38, 39). Hayes and Mayo share a perception of the geographies of slavery as transformative and humanizing. From their perspective, traversing slavery’s geographies produces an irreversible separation between African-descended people in the Americas and their ancestral homelands.

    Hayes’s and Mayo’s remarks articulate a spatial imaginary that designates the “where” of civilized modernity, differentiating “the woods of barbarism” and the “Dark Continent” from the civilizing spaces of bondage. The slave ship and the plantation appear as geographies of transit that move African-descended people across space and time to arrive in physical proximity to the civilized spaces and people of the Americas. Hayes and Mayo emphasize the same material geographies identified by McKittrick as dehumanizing “locations of captivity”: the slave ship, the Middle Passage, and the plantation (Demonic xvi). McKittrick understands these as the sites that underwrite the violences of chattel slavery by claiming to transform people into property. Hayes and Mayo invert the dehumanizing effects of slavery’s geographies to envision them as sites rich with transformative and human-making potential, proposing that slavery’s geographies are essential to the production of modern, civilized human subjects. From another perspective, however, the logics of slavery and the space of the plantation mark African-descended people as existing apart from the peoples and places of the United States. Plantations serve as spatial reminders of the supposed distance between African-descended people and white Americans (construed as the apex of modern human subjectivity). As a material geography, the plantation contributes to dominant racial imaginaries that construe black working bodies as “without land or home” and “without ownership of self” (McKittrick, “On Plantations” 948). According to McKittrick, the plantation not only “legalized black servitude” but also sanctioned “black placelessness and constraint” (948). The spaces, practices, and imaginaries of the plantation underwrite the representation of African-descended people as enslaveable and thus homeless within a nation of ostensibly free-willed and autonomous white subjects. Even after the abolition of slavery, the plantation “provided the blueprint for future sites of racial entanglement” (949), continuing to mark African-descended people as apart from and placeless within the material and social geographies of the United States.

    Reverend A.W. Pitzer articulates this racial placelessness when he insists that, despite their contact with European and American cultures, freed people remain apart from the white societies in which they live and labor. Even as he describes himself as a man who “did not like slavery,” Pitzer perpetuates these racializing and dehumanization logics, remarking “how great the gulf between the Anglo-Saxon and the Negro” (Lake Mohonk Conference on the Negro Questions, “First Mohonk Conference” 70). He calls on the gathered audience to recall that “the wild, naked, man eating savages of equatorial Africa are of the same blood and race as the Negro of this republic” (70). “We must remember,” he continues, “the darkness out of which he comes” and “the fact that he does not belong to our historic race” (70). Through his rearticulation of inherited racial difference, Pitzer casts African-descended people out of the networks of social relations under negotiation at the end of the Civil War. He stages a narrative of racial non-belonging that moves between conceptions of placelessness and efforts to emplace restrictively. The supposedly irreconcilable racial difference Pitzer describes authorized lynching and segregation in the years following Reconstruction. These forms of corporeal violence and geographic constraint send the message that the place of Black citizens is restricted by white Americans. For example, lynching and Jim Crow restrictions sought to emplace Black people in narrowly defined and violently policed spaces. And yet, according to Reverend Mayo, the forms of segregation authorized by these narratives of placelessness have had a beneficial effect on African-descended people. He argues that “the temporary isolation of the Negro in the Southern church, school, and society” is not “an evil” but rather a “providential aid in gaining the self-respect and habit of self-help absolutely essential to good citizenship” (44). He thus holds that the spatial dynamics of slavery (removal) and segregation (confinement) contribute to the progress of the race. Again, the placelessness of African-descended people appears as a path to developmental and evolutionary progress, this time in relation to the dominant geographies of the Americas.

    Despite such narratives of double-displacement, however, Black people have and continue to enact and narrate a “different sense of place” that moves against and across dominant geographic imaginaries. McKittrick offers the story of Harriet Jacobs, an enslaved woman, as an example of the geographies crafted by Black women within and against the dominant geographies that aim to constrain and dehumanize. Jacobs crafted a complex and fraught plan to free her children from slavery and shield herself from ongoing physical and sexual assault, hiding in a narrow attic above her grandmother’s home for seven years. Although this space was too small for Jacobs to stand or even sit comfortably, McKittrick nonetheless characterizes the crawlspace as a “loophole of retreat” (Demonic 41) that allows Jacobs to remake the violent geographies of slavery. McKittrick interprets Jacobs’s spatial imaginaries as evidence of her ability to shape a “different sense of place,” allowing her to “explore the possibilities in the existing landscape.” Although she could not escape or operate entirely outside of slavery’s geographies, Jacobs was able to create a geography that “makes available a place for [her] to articulate her lived experiences and emancipatory desires” (41). Jacobs’s geographic strategies provide an example of Black place-making practices that subvert dominant geographies and create more room for liberation.

    Today, in contrast to the dominant geographic imaginaries that narrate and seek to produce Black placelessness, Black Earth Farms centers Black and Indigenous peoples’ relationships to land as an essential element of Black liberation and decolonization. Growing, harvesting, and delivering “nutrient dense and chemical free food to low-income communities experiencing food apartheid,” this collective works to regenerate Black and Indigenous communities’ “connection to and reverence for land and agriculture” (Black Earth Farms). Arguing that “relationships with soil, plants, food, and medicine are direct lines of communication and connection with our ancestors,” Black Earth Farms engages in a place-making practice not bound by commercial food systems, urban segregation, or racialized violence (Black Earth Farms). By building and sustaining communities of care through sustainable farming practices, Black Earth Farms emphasizes the centrality of place-based practices to liberated futures.

    Indigenous Peoples and Improper Relationships to Land

    The assertion that Indigenous peoples in North America failed to establish valid or recognizable relationships to land was central to social reformers’ discursive construction of Indigenous placelessness. Rather than as doubly-displaced, Mohonk delegates depict Indigenous peoples as improperly in place based on the perception that they do not relate to land through the capitalist logics of acquisition, extraction, and production. Lyman Abbott, a theologian and author, stages this narrative at the 1885 Mohonk Conference of the Friends of the Indian when he argues that “a people do not occupy a country simply because they roam over it.” Abbott holds that Native peoples do not “occupy the coal mines, nor the gold mines, into which they never struck a pick; nor the rivers which flow to the sea, and on which the music of a mill was never heard.” Given their apparent non-use of the land and its resources, he insists that “the Indians can scarcely be said to have occupied this country more than the bisons and buffalo they hunted” (Lake Mohonk Conference on the Friends of the Indian, “Proceedings” 51). Although Abbott tacitly acknowledges the prior relationships of Native people to the lands of North America, he moves immediately to deny their validity. He imposes a colonial geographic imaginary that erases Native peoples’ complex, enduring, and evolving relationships to place. Given their apparent failure or refusal to approach land through capitalist logics, Abbott reduces the status of Native people to that of the buffalo and bison. As Goeman argues, this type of “unjust spatial imaginary” distorts Native peoples’ social worlds such that they “become part of the flora and fauna open to settlement” (18). By re-writing Native peoples’ relationships to place as non-relationships, Abbott depicts the land as open to settlement by those who would use it for production and extraction.

    Such narratives of placelessness have long authorized genocide, forced removal, and other forms of dispossession at the hands of colonial and national governments. In the late 1880s, social reformers used this enduring colonial imaginary to argue for allotment in the 1887 Dawes General Allotment Act. The Act legislated the allotment of tribal lands by individual title rather than as collective holdings, and reformers hoped the policy would facilitate the dissolution of tribal governments and the incorporation of Indigenous lands into US markets. Abbot and his contemporaries perceived the reservation system as a spatial order that allowed Native people to continue living on the land improperly and, by extension, to continue living according to traditional lifeways that were not easily assimilable into settler state politics or capitalist economies. Viewing reservations as vast areas of land “set apart to barbarism,” Abbott argues that the reservation system cannot be reformed (Lake Mohonk, “Proceedings” 52), and must instead be “uprooted, root, truck, branch, and leaf, and a new system put in its place” (53). For Abbott and his fellow reformers, the “new system” would transform Native peoples’ supposedly improper relationships to land into proper and recognizable forms of individual land ownership, and protect Native peoples from being further removed and dispossessed. Abbott maintains that allotment would secure every Indian “in his right to his home, and in his right to free intercourse and free trade, whether the rest of the tribe wish him so protected or not” (53). Individual land ownership and independent economic activity are, he suggests, rights “which no tribe has the right to take from him, and no nation the right to sanction the robbery of” (53). In Abbott’s view, then, properly emplacing Native people on the land through private property ownership would produce them as differentiated and independent individuals, transforming their improper relationships to land, protecting them from further dispossession by settlers, and preventing what he perceived as the violation of individual economic and ownership rights by tribal governments.

    The rhetorical underpinnings and material results of the Dawes Act produced a contradictory cluster of spatial discourses and dynamics. On the one hand, reformers claimed that allotment would protect Native peoples’ connections to land by formally and properly placing them on the land; their supposedly improper placement on the land would become legible through individual land title as a mode of civilizing emplacement. Yet in historical fact, allotment facilitated a new era of dislocation through land sales, land speculation, and tax forfeiture (108). Despite reformers’ claims that the Dawes Act would secure Native people on their land, Native landholdings decreased from 138 million to 53 million acres between 1887 and 1934 (Chang, “Encolsures” 108). By narrating shifting conditions of displacement and emplacement, reformers worked to incorporate Native peoples and lands into US political and economic structures. In the minds of social reformers, the incorporation of Indigenous peoples and lands into the nation state required the dissolution of tribal governments and the disappearance of Indigenous subjects and socialities as Indigenous. These settler spatial imaginaries seek to “incorporate Native people through their disappearance or social death” (Goeman 4). The contradictory discourses and shifting practices of displacement and emplacement surrounding allotment are essential to explaining and justifying this mode of incorporation and/as disappearance.

    Despite reformers’ persistent efforts to narrate and make placelessness a reality, Indigenous peoples continued to enact place-making relationships to land that exceeded the terms set by policy-makers. For example, in the face of forced removal from the regions now known as Georgia and Alabama, town leaders of the Creek Nation strove to establish continuities between their ancestral homelands and Indian Territory. According to David Chang, Hotulke Emarthla, micco of Okichye, “planted the ashes of his town fire in the earth” 600 miles from the Creek homelands (The Color of the Land 26). Rekindling the town fire on the other end of removal, Hotulke Emarthla insisted that this new place, too, was Okichye. In the allotment era, Creek people continued to craft and enact their own relationships to place despite the expectations of US authorities. Although allotment policy re-envisioned land as private property, Chang argues that “Creek people continued to use their land to work toward their own goals” (112). Rather than approaching allotment as the foundation of a new subjecthood as yeoman farmers (as policy-makers had anticipated), Creek people used the new land system to sustain kinship and community ties by selecting plots alongside members of their kin group (144).

    The ceremonial arbors, funerary sites, and urban farms built and stewarded by Sogorea Te’ Land Trust remind us that today, as in the past, Indigenous peoples sustain relationships to place that operate within, but not always in alignment with, the terms set by white settler spatial imaginaries, political systems, and economies. The Ohlone people are not a federally recognized tribe, and so remain landless within settler imaginaries and material arrangements of space: “the lack of access to traditional ceremonial grounds and to land appropriate for multi-day ceremonies is a serious challenge faced by Lisjan people today” (Sogorea Te’ Land Trust, “Lisjan”). However, through the rematriation and stewardship of urban land, the women-led intertribal collective creates pathways for Native and non-Native people alike to affirm Indigenous geographies and establish relationships to land not grounded in settler spatial arrangements. Sogorea Te’ Land Trust has built a traditional Lisjan roundhouse on rematriated land where ceremonies can be held; formed a Himmetka, “a culturally based emergency response hub” (“Himmetka”); and established three urban farms where community members grow traditional plants, medicines, as well as fruits and vegetables.1 In these ways, Sogorea Te’ Land Trust has facilitated Indigenous peoples’ ability to affirm their enduring and evolving relationships to unceded and occupied Ohlone lands. Sogorea Te’ Land Trust invites non-Native peoples too to see and relate to the land outside of settler spatial orders. Paying the Shuumi land tax and volunteering to support the organization’s daily operations rupture settler spatial imaginaries by affirming that before these lands were known as Berkeley, Oakland, or Richmond, they were Lisjan Ohlone land, and remain so to this day.

    Relational Discourses of Place

    Reading the records of the two Mohonk Conferences alongside one another reveals that narratives of Black and Native placelessness are not simply parallel or similar discourses but are relational and co-constitutive. Beyond comparing the perceived placelessness of Black and Native people, conference attendees mobilized the narrative of humanizing Black dis/emplacement as a conceptual resource to justify allotment as a civilizing mode of dis/emplacement for Native people. This relational exchange is evident in both the founding of the two conferences and in the published statements of attendees. The formation of two conferences registers the construction of Blackness and Indigeneity as separate yet related problems in the minds of late-nineteenth century social reformers. As they sought to describe and respond to the problems of racial and colonial difference, the attendees of the conferences presumed that African-descended and Indigenous people are separate groups of people that can be managed and incorporated into the nation by similar means. Buoyed by the apparent success of the Mohonk Conference of the Friends of the Indian in swaying public opinion in favor of allotment and a federal boarding school system, Mohonk delegates mobilized to form a corollary conference to address matters related to Black citizens. The conferences’ founder and host Albert K. Smiley recalled that years prior, President Hayes indicated that he was “so gratified” with the methods and spirit of the Mohonk Conference of the Friends of the Indian that he could not help but hope that someday “that other weaker race” would “have some annual assembly such as this to consider its condition and to aid it to rise to the stature of true American citizenship” (Lake Mohonk Conference on the Negro Question, “First Mohonk Conference” 7). This hope, according to Smiley, was the impetus for the formation of the Mohonk Conference on the Negro Question. Crafting an origin story for the new conference, Smiley recounts the duplication of an institutional model first devised to address the problems associated with settler expansion (the Mohonk Conference of the Friends of the Indian) to craft a corollary institution to address the problems arising from enslavement and its afterlives (the Mohonk Conference on the Negro Question). In this narrative, Smiley alludes to a relational form of thinking that borrowed institutional forms and civic practices oriented towards settler expansion to envision a response to the problem of racial difference.

    Smiley’s duplication of institutional forms – and the exchange of ideas about Blackness and Indigeneity that it facilitates – positions Black and Native communities as comparable problems that might be resolved through similar means. This viewpoint was made explicit in speeches at the Mohonk Conference on the Negro Question, as delegates drew on discourses of Black placelessness to express their support for allotment policy. After the Dawes Act passed, the actual allotment of land proceeded unevenly across various reservations; some – including the Cherokee, Seminole, Choctaw, Chickasaw, and Creek nations – were exempted from the terms of the act entirely. But whether subject to the Dawes Act or not, Native nations persistently resisted the division of tribal lands and thus, reformers and policy-makers had to fight continually for the implementation of the policy. So strong was the resistance to allotment amongst the Five Civilized tribes, for example, that the federal government had to appoint the Dawes Commission in 1893 and pass the Curtis Act in 1897 before their lands were divided (Carlson 15).5 Thus, it is not surprising that in 1890, Mohonk Conference attendees continued to argue for the effectiveness of and need for allotment.

    The ideological underpinnings and material effects of allotment policy have been studied within the frameworks of Native American studies as an extension of earlier practices of removal and dislocation.6 However, examining the arguments made in favor of allotment at the Mohonk Conferences produces new insights into the discursive relationship between Indian removal and chattel slavery. Reformers’ discourse of placelessness and efforts to emplace Indigenous peoples properly on the lands desired and/or claimed by the United States depend on a metaphorical relationship to discourses of Black placelessness. Casting enslavement as a “brief period of tutelage,” this group of reformers argued that increased proximity to white, western society catalyzed racial advancement for African-descended people. In turn, Mohonk attendees suggested that allotment will bring Native peoples into intimate contact with white Americans and thus drive their progress towards modernity.

    Drawing a comparison between the history of enslavement and of the reservation system, Mohonk attendees mobilize the material and discursive construction of Black placelessness as a model for how to incorporate Native peoples and lands into the structures of racial-settler capitalism. Where enslavement appears as a civilizing force, attendees of the Mohonk Conference on the Negro Question perceive the reservation system – which enabled Native peoples to maintain collective land holdings, even if limited in scope – as a hindrance to progress. For instance, Reverend A.D. Mayo perceives the reservation system as a spatial arrangement that allows Native people to live in “proud isolation” from civilized society, thus making it possible to repel all the “beneficent changes” experienced by enslaved people living in close proximity to white society (39). He argues that as a result of the ongoing spatial separation facilitated by reservations, “the entire philanthropy, religion, and statesmanship of the republic are now wrestling with the problem of saving [Native peoples] from the fate of the buffalo” (38). Unlike the supposedly humanizing emplacement wrought by enslavement, Mayo construes the reservation system as a mode of spatial organization that renders Native people akin to the buffalo and similarly threatened with extinction. From Mayo’s perspective, the preservation of Native life requires a form a dis/emplacement modeled on that which animated enslavement and its afterlives. Samuel J. Barrows, too, stages this relational spatial imaginary when he contrasts enslavement as a mode of incorporation that draws African-descended people into the sphere of civilized modernity with the reservation system as a spatial order that holds Native peoples apart from the civilizing spaces of the United States. He explains in 1891 that, whereas slavery and its afterlives have “drawn [the Negro] away from his traditions, and absorbed him into the body of our civilization,” federal Indian policy pushed the Indian “outside of our civilization, forcing him back upon his tribal traditions, leaving him free to speak his own language” (Lake Mohonk Conference on the Negro Question, “Second Mohonk Conference” 8). Laying claim to the role of benevolent humanitarian, Mayo and Barrows applaud reformers and policy-makers for working to ensure the continuation of Native life by properly emplacing them on the land via allotment. In this comparative discourse, enslavement is first recast as a civilizing force and subsequently converted into a model for reshaping Indigenous relationships to land and making land available for settler use.

    The remarks of Hayes, Pitzer, Mayo, Abbott, and Barrows illuminate the shifting narratives of placelessness that animate late-nineteenth century social reform. In addition to leveraging displacement to seat themselves at the top of a racial/colonial spatial and social order, late-nineteenth century social reformers sought to delineate the relationship between Black and Indigenous peoples by using slavery as a metaphor for allotment. In actuality, the geographies of slavery attempted to convert Black life into a labor resource and to demarcate the limits of humanity. Similarly, the material effect of allotment was not the “civilization” of Native peoples but rather the capturing of Indigenous lands within the mechanisms of racial-settler capitalism.7 Analyzing the spatial narratives of Mohonk Conference speakers reveals the centrality of Black and Native placelessness to a white settler imaginary that envisions “modern” and “civilized” white subjects as the rightful owners, occupants, and masters of Black and Native peoples and lands. Their discursive acts recall how the conquistador-settler, to borrow Tiffany Lethabo King’s terminology, seeks to determine “the violent terms of … social relations” in order to ascend to whiteness and mastery over peoples and lands (xi). Mohonk delegates exemplify how the self-actualization of the conquistador-settler requires the mediation of Black and Indigenous relationships as well as the death and displacement of racial and colonial others (xi). Through the language of double-displacement and improper placement, social reformers justify the dehumanization of Black and Native people as well as the dispossession of Native nations. Their remarks register an anxiety about the place of Euro-American settlers in the Americas. Asserting their right to live on and govern in the lands called the United States requires the disavowal of longstanding and newly emerging Black and Indigenous geographies.

    Today, the geographic, social, and political dominance of those people racially coded as white continues to rely upon similar representations of Black and Native peoples as placeless. However, the embodied and place-based practices of Sogorea Te’ Land Trust and Black Earth Farms point to fissures in this white settler spatial imaginary. They challenge or operate outside of this framework by asserting ongoing relationships to land despite centuries of thought and action meant to transform or dissolve these relations, and by opening up possibilities for mutual relations between Black and Native people grounded in land and place rather than displacement and dispossession. By enacting and nurturing relationships to land on terms set by their own communities, and by building relationships with one another, these organizations produce other ways of knowing and experiencing place.

    Black and Native Studies: Beyond the Impasse

    Emphasizing the distinctions between processes of racial dehumanization and settler colonial violence is a critical intervention into the tendency to collapse histories of genocide, removal, and territorial dispossession into frameworks of racial difference. However, too neat a division between the signs of “body” and “land” frequently results in positioning Black and Native Studies, or the experiences of Black and Indigenous peoples, as oppositions where entanglements, overlaps, and sites of mutual constitution are obscured. Such occlusion raises questions about methodology and how best to account for the complex interchanges between racialization and colonization in the US. Can we approach Black and Indigenous place-making practices without placing them in opposition to one another? Can we explore how land-oriented practices fit into divergent and overlapping liberatory and decolonizing political imaginaries without establishing hierarchies between them? Can we construct methodological or theoretical approaches that allow for Black and Indigenous relationships to land to emerge as a site of encounter rather than impasse? Can we account for simultaneity and difference? Can we account for vegetable beds tended by Black and Indigenous communities, driven by different political imaginaries, and yet at times tended and watered together?

    In addition to studying the unique histories of African-descended and Indigenous peoples, scholars have increasingly taken up relational analyses that consider enslavement, colonization, and other dehumanizing forms of power alongside one another.8 Building on these methods, I approach land and place as a site of encounter between Black and Native Studies, rather than as concepts that sever these fields. Enslavement and genocide cannot be collapsed as equivalent historical processes, yet both are foundational to the formation of the United States (and Western modernity more generally); Lethabo King describes them as “distinct yet edgeless forms of violence.” Black fungibility and Native genocide proceed along divergent trajectories and yet “the violence moves as one” (x). Ethical analysis of the violences experienced by Black and Native peoples in the Americas thus requires a form of relational analysis capacious enough to account for simultaneity and difference. Troubling the analytical separation of Black and Native Studies via land and body, the proceedings of the Mohonk Conferences demonstrate that, historically, discourses of place structure both racial and colonial imaginaries by producing narratives about how Black and Indigenous people do (or do not) relate to material geographies and the social landscapes of modernity.

    Using this historical instance as an example, we can ask how settler spatial imaginaries continue to occlude and disturb Black and Indigenous relations to self, land, and other. As place continues to be a site of struggle, attending to the ways Black and Indigenous people have been simultaneously yet differently rendered placeless is an important element of liberatory intellectual and political pursuits. Rather than allow the notion of incommensurability to produce seductive notions of irreconcilable difference, attending to simultaneity and difference brings into view the mutual constitution of racial dehumanization and settler colonial relations. This suggests that Black liberation and decolonization require attention to the ways that both Black and Indigenous peoples have engaged in struggle with white settler spatial imaginaries. However, if “many histories and ways of seeing and mapping the world can occur at the same time,” as Goeman argues, we cannot presume that dominant geographies overdetermine the nature of Black and Indigenous relations to place nor their relations to one another. In the face of displacement and dispossession, Black and Native peoples have sustained material geographies and spatial imaginaries that exceed the terms of placelessness. Today, the embodied and land-oriented work of Sogorea Te’ Land Trust and Black Earth Farms point towards “alternate geographic formations” that might “incite new, or different, and perhaps more just, geographic stories” (McKittrick, Demonic xix). These two organizations provide spaces that nurture embodied relations to the land, cultivating a grounds of encounter where Black and Indigenous communities might remake the spatial relations that white settler imaginaries would establish for them. Their subaltern geographies might incite alternative mapping practices that open up “a conceptual arena through which more humanly workable geographies can be and are imagined” (xii). The vegetable beds tended by Sogorea Te’ Land Trust and Black Earth Farms offer an existing model of co-constituted, land-oriented care between Black and Native communities. This site of growth and abundance – fed by and illustrative of Black and Indigenous political imaginaries that diverge from the model of nation-making predicated on exploitation, dehumanization, and dispossession – pushes against prevailing white settler geographies that imagine African-descended and Indigenous peoples as placeless. The collective care shown to the soil, the carrots, the bugs, and the other beings that make place on this farm reveal Black and Native placelessness to be a settler fiction. Within the limits set by racial-settler capitalism, the embodied and narrative practices of Sogorea Te’ Land Trust and Black Earth Farms are a reminder that Black and Native peoples have persistently and powerfully challenged the dehumanization of racialized life and the exhaustive extraction of land.

    Sarah E.K. Fong is an Assistant Professor of Studies in Race, Colonialism, and Diaspora at Tufts University. Her research examines the entanglements of schooling, self-making, and racial-settler capitalism in the late-nineteenth century. Dr. Fong has published work in American Indian Culture and Research Journal as well as Amerasia Journal.

    I would like to express my thanks to the editors and staff of Postmodern Culture for making this volume possible. I am thankful to the organizers and participants of the “Troubling the Grounds Conference” for creating a space in which to develop these ideas. I am grateful, also, to Dr. Rosanne Sia for thinking with me over many months and reading countless drafts of this article. Finally, my deepest gratitude goes to Dr. SA Smythe, for their steady encouragement from the earliest iteration of this piece to its final form.

    Footnotes

    1. See descriptions of all Sogorea Te’ Land Trust’s projects at sogoreate-landtrust.org..

    2. Sogorea Te’ Land Trust defines Shuumi as “a gift.” According to their website, it is a way for “non-Indigenous people who live in traditional Chochenyo and Karkin Ohlone territory to make a voluntary annual financial contribution to this critical community work. If you live on Chochenyo and Karkin Ohlone land, you are inadvertently benefitting from the genocide waged against the Ohlone people and the theft of their land. Whether you know it or not, however you feel about it, this is an inescapable fact. The civic infrastructure, the economic system, the private development and the consumption of natural resources in our society are all connected to and in different ways built upon the colonial occupation of this land and the violent displacement of the Ohlone. Paying the Shuumi Land Tax is a small way to acknowledge this legacy and contribute to its healing.”

    3. See “Herrera v. Wyoming,” Harvard Law Review, 8 Nov. 2019, harvardlawreview.org/2019/11/herrera-v-wyoming/. Accessed 24 Aug. 2020; Olivia B. Waxman, “This Supreme Court Case on Hunting Is Really About a 150-Year-Old Treaty and Wyoming’s Existence as a State,” Time, 8 Jan. 2019, time.com/5494458/treaty-wyoming-herrera-history/. Accessed 24 Aug. 2020.

    4. See Albert Bender, “Supreme Court’s earthshaking decision: Eastern Oklahoma is still Indian Country,” Indianz.Com, 15 Jul. 2020, www.indianz.com/News/2020/07/15/supreme-courts-earthshaking-decision-eas.asp. Accessed 24 Aug. 2020; David K. TeSelle, “Review of McGirt v. Oklahoma – How the Supreme Court and Justice Gorsuch’s Revolutionary Textualism Brought America’s ‘Trail of Tears’ Promise to the Creek Nation Back From the Dead,” The National Law Review, 5 Aug. 2020, www.natlawreview.com/article/review-mcgirt-v-oklahoma-how-supreme-court-and-justice-gorsuch-s-revolutionary. Accessed August 24, 2020.

    5. See Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe, “Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe Threatened with Land Disestablishment, Tribal Leaders Step in to Address Ongoing Land Issues and Threats to Sovereignty,” 30 Mar. 2020, mashpeewampanoagtribe-nsn.gov/news/2020/3/30/mashpee-wampanoag-tribe-threatened-with-land-disestablishment-tribal-leaders-step-in-to-address-ongoing-land-issues-and-threats-to-sovereignty. Accessed 24 Aug. 2020; Carrie Jung, “What’s At Stake In The Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Land Bill.” WBUR, 13 May 2019, www.wbur.org/news/2019/05/13/edited-whats-at-stake-in-the-mashpee-wampanoag-tribal-land-bill. Accessed 24 Aug. 2020.

    6. In 1893, the Dawes Commission was appointed to negotiate with these five tribes to get them to accept allotment or, if they would not, to force it upon them. In 1897, Congress passed the Curtis Act which dissolved tribal governments and enforced allotment where voluntary agreements could not be reached.

    7. See Emily Greenwald, Reconfiguring the Reservation: The Nez Perces, Jicarilla Apaches, and the Dawes Act, U of New Mexico P, 2002; Frederick Hoxie, A Final Promise: The Campaign to Assimilate the Indians, 1880–1920, U of Nebraska P, 2001; D.S. Otis, The Dawes Act and the Allotment of Indian Lands, U of Oklahoma P, 1973.

    8. See Sarah Fong, “Racial-Settler Capitalism: Character Building and the Accumulation of Land and Labor in the Late Nineteenth Century,” American Indian Culture and Research Journal, vol. 43, no. 2, 2019, pp. 25–48.

    9. See Jodi A. Byrd, Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism, U of Minnesota P, 2011; Quynh Nhu Le, Unsettled Solidarities: Asian and Indigenous Cross-Representations in the Americas, Temple UP, 2019; Nada Elia, David M. Hernández, Jodi Kim, Shana L. Redmond, Dylan Rodriguez, Sarita Echavez See, editors, Critical Ethnic Studies: A Reader, Duke UP, 2016; J. Kēhaulani Kauanui, “Tracing Historical Specificity: Race and the Colonial Politics of (In)Capacity,” American Quarterly, vol. 69, no. 2, 2017; Lisa Lowe, Intimacies of Four Continents, Duke UP, 2015.

    Works Cited

    • Black Earth Farm Collective. “Organizational Principles and Manifesto.” Black Earth Farms, blackearthfarms.com/. Accessed 24 Aug. 2020. Carlson, Leonard A. Indians, Bureaucrats, and Land. Praeger, 1981.
    • Chang, David. The Color of the Land: Race, Nation, and the Politics of Land Ownership in Oklahoma, 1832–1929. U of North Carolina P, 2010.
    • ———. “Enclosures of Land and Sovereignty: The Allotment of American Indian Land.” Radical History Review, no. 109, 2011, pp. 108–120.
    • Goeman, Mishuana. Mark My Words: Native Women Mapping Our Nations. U of Minnesota P, 2013.
    • Hawthorne, Camilla. “Black Matters are Spatial Matters.” Geography Compass, vol. 13, no. 11, 2019.
    • King, Tiffany Lethabo. The Black Shoals: Offshore Formations of Black and Native Studies. Duke UP, 2019.
    • Lake Mohonk Conference of the Friends of the Indian. “Address to the Public of the Lake Mohonk Conference.” Report of the Annual Lake Mohonk Conference on the Indian and Other Dependent Peoples, no. 1, 1883, pp. 3–16. HeinOnline, https://heinonline-org.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/HOL/P?h=hein.hoil/ramhonk0001&i=12. Accessed 24 Aug. 2020.
    • ———. “Proceedings of the Third Annual Meeting of the Lake Mohonk Conference of Friends of the Indian.” Report of the Annual Lake Mohonk Conference on the Indian and Other Dependent Peoples, no. 3, 1885, pp. 3–80. HeinOnline, https://heinonline-org.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/HOL/P?h=hein.hoil/ramhonk0003&i=48. Accessed 24 Aug. 2020.
    • Lake Mohonk Conference on the Negro Question. “First Mohonk Conference on the Negro Question.” 1890. Mohonk Conference on the Negro Question, edited by Isabel C. Barrows, Negro Universities P, 1969. HathiTrust, https://hdl-handle-net.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/2027/uc1.b4016739. Accessed 24 Aug. 2020.
    • ———. “Second Mohonk Conference on the Negro Question.” 1891. Mohonk Conference on the Negro Question, edited by Isabel C. Barrows, Negro Universities P, 1969. HathiTrust, https://hdl-handle-net.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/2027/uc1.b4016739. Accessed 24 Aug. 2020.
    • McKittrick, Katherine. Demonic Grounds: Black Women and the Cartographies of Struggle. U of Minnesota P, 2006.
    • ———. “On Plantations, Prisons, and a Black Sense of Place.” Social & Cultural Geography, vol. 12, no. 8, 2011, pp. 947–63.
    • Rifkin, Mark. Fictions of Land and Flesh: Blackness, Indigeneity, and Speculation. Duke UP, 2019.
    • Sogorea Te’ Land Trust. sogoreate-landtrust.com/. Accessed 24 Aug. 2020.
    • ———. “Himmetka: In One Place, Together.” Sogorea Te’ Land Trust, sogoreatelandtrust.org/himmetka/. Accessed 24 Aug. 2020.
    • ———. “Lisjan (Ohlone) History & Territory.” Sogorea Te’ Land Trust, sogoreatelandtrust.org/lisjan-history-and-territory/. Accessed 24 Aug. 2020.
    • ———. “Purpose and Vision.” Sogorea Te’ Land Trust, sogoreate-landtrust.org/purpose-and-vision/. Accessed 24 Aug. 2020.
    • Weheliye, Alexander. Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human. Duke UP, 2014.
  • Other Intimacies: Black Studies Notes on Native/Indigenous Studies

    Chad Infante, Sandra Harvey, Kelly Limes Taylor, and Tiffany King (bios)

    In 2015, we began assembling a dialogue among Black identified scholars committed to research focusing on Black diasporan people about how Black Studies might approach Native and Indigenous Studies. Tiffany Lethabo King reached out to Shona Jackson, Melanie Newton, Faye Yarborough, Tiya Miles, Chad Infante, Shanya Cordis, Sandra Harvey, and Kelly Limes Taylor to think about how to have this conversation.1 A few of us were able to sustain conversations over email about convening at the American Studies Association (ASA) and Native American and Indigenous Studies Association (NAISA) conferences. Over email and in digital space, we made suggestions about scholars to include, thought about questions that needed to be posed, and set goals for how to sustain a long-term conversation and build a community of scholars.

    In 2019, Shanya Cordis, Sandra Harvey, Chad Infante, Shona Jackson, Tiffany King, and Kelly Limes-Taylor submitted a panel to ASA’s 2019 conference in Hawaii. After a series of emails, we named our roundtable “Other Intimacies: Black Studies Notes on Native/Indigenous Studies.” We thank Sandra Harvey for framing our thinking about the kinds of relationships and conversations we desired to have with Native and Indigenous studies as a kind of “other intimacy.” After careful drafting and redrafting (we are so grateful to Shona Jackson) we submitted the following proposal:

    Recent attention to the ways that anti-Blackness, Indigenous genocide, and settler colonialism shape and inform one another have given rise to generative scholarship, conversations, and political work at the critical juncture of Black and Native/Indigenous Studies. This robust exchange has happened at the same time that settler colonial studies, as a discourse and field, has become the lingua franca in the academy for talking about social relations under the violent conditions of extermination, settlement, displacement, and migration. In reflecting on the unique ways that Black Studies has historically grappled with and continues to engage questions of Indigeneity, sovereignty, settlement, and nation alongside its sustained attention to diaspora, the roundtable participants address the ways in which settler colonial studies has opened up and closed off avenues between Indigenous and Black Studies, both of which have “grammars” that are often overshadowed by it. The participants on this panel discuss ‘what can be learned’ if the specific ways that Black Studies—a geographically, theoretically and politically diverse practice—has engaged and is engaging Native/Indigenous Studies is taken seriously. The panelists seek to engage Black Studies at both its points of entanglement with Native/Indigenous studies, and its points of closure.2

    During the roundtable, the panel sought to reflect on the following questions:

    1. What particular genealogies, methodologies, traditions/practices, and scholars within Black Studies have been generative for engaging theoretical and conceptual concerns within Native/Indigenous Studies?
    2. What are some limitations to the aforementioned approaches?
    3. How has settler colonialism as a theoretical framework shaped discussion between Black Studies and Native/Indigenous Studies? What are the possibilities and limitations of this point of departure?
    4. What can theories of sovereignty that have emerged in Black Studies contribute to a mutual conversation/movement for decolonization and abolition?
    5. How have Black Studies’ conceptualizations and critiques of the “nation” and the “state” been in conversation with Native/Indigenous theorists’?
    6. What might be opened up in Black Studies when we focus attention on the notion and histories of indigeneity as much as we do or in conjunction with the theme of diaspora?
    7. How do Black Studies and Native Studies attend to each other with care? For example, how do we honor Black and Indigenous people particularly when focusing on violence and Black and Indigenous people’s bodies?
    8. How do we move forward/keep momentum?

    We proposed, adjusted, and revised questions as a group. Some of the questions emerged from the intellectual labor and scholarly investments of specific participants. For instance, questions four and six, which inquire about Black theories of sovereignty and a refocus of attention from diaspora to indigeneity, were posed by Sandra Harvey. Harvey responds to these questions in elegant and prodding ways that require deep contemplation. Questions three, five, and seven were offered by Shanya Cordis, and ask the participants to think about what settler colonial studies as a discourse and field has offered and foreclosed, how Black Studies’ critiques of the “nation” and “state” interface with Indigenous theories of the nation, and finally how Black and Indigenous people might attend to one another with care. While not reproduced in the roundtable discussion or in this essay, Cordis’s contributions to this conversation were essential to the groundwork we did as a group. Kelly Limes-Taylor offers thoughtful and eloquent responses to Cordis’s questions in ways that ground readers in the everyday practice of decolonial struggle and of moving toward more promising horizons. Four of us (Harvey, Infante, Jackson, and King) were able to travel to the ancestral homelands and waters of the Kanaka Maoli in November 2019 for the ASA. The four of us hosted a vibrant exchange and discussion with those in attendance. We have tried to reproduce the conversation that took place during the roundtable between Harvey, Infante, Jackson, and King, which also continued in later weeks over email with Kelly Limes-Taylor. This essay will proceed with the edited written responses of the remarks offered at the ASA by Sandra Harvey, Chad Infante, and Tiffany Lethabo King. While Shona Jackson offered remarks during the roundtable, we were not able to include her written comments here due to time constraints and other demands. However, some of the answers below respond to Jackson’s offerings and insights at the roundtable.

    The following are introductory remarks delivered by Tiffany Lethabo King on November 8, 2019 at the 2019 convening of the ASA in Honolulu, Hawaii, titled “Build As We Fight.”

    Welcome to “Other Intimacies: Black Studies Notes on Native/Indigenous Studies.” This afternoon, I have the pleasure of keeping company and engaging three of the six scholars who continue to inform and transform my thinking after every encounter with them. I have been trying to bring us together to have this conversation for the last five years. While we are here on the ancestral lands and waters of the Kanaka Maoli this afternoon, my colleagues and I hope to attend to the ways that multiple Black Studies projects have engaged Indigeneity and Indigenous peoples across the African diaspora.

    As scholars engaged in the practice of Black study, we want to consider “what we can learn” if Black Studies is used as a point of departure for engaging Native/Indigenous Studies. This conversation is not an effort aimed at critique, displacement, or the takeover of more recognized theoretical and disciplinary frames. However, the question “what can be learned if Black Studies is a point of departure?” introduces important theoretical, political, pedagogical, and ethical concerns. As panelists, we seek to engage Black Studies at both its points of entanglement with Native/Indigenous Studies and its points of closure. Black diasporan scholarship, with its attention to African descended people “on the move” as well as indigeneity in Africa, reorients how we think through the field of Native and Indigenous Studies. I have had the privilege of thinking with my colleagues Shona Jackson, Sandra Harvey, Shanya Cordis, Chad Infante, and Kelly Limes-Taylor about this provocation since the winter. In preparation for this much anticipated conversation, I have thought about the following things when I consider what it means to approach Native and Indigenous Studies from shifting and dynamic spaces of Black Studies:

    What new questions and concerns rise to the surface?

    What kinds of texts, objects, artifacts, and encounters do we need to consider?

    Are new periodizations and temporalities in play?

    What are the “unthought” geographies and ecologies that need to be surfaced?

    Should we consider Black diasporan healing practices and modalities as a space to look for deep and or fleeting knowledge of Indigenous peoples and cosmologies?

    Might we consider that some intimate, ceremonial, healing, and erotic work is off limits or considered sacred in Black Studies or by some scholars within Black Studies?

    Instead of imagining that Black Studies is a space of lack and ignorance about Indigeneity, might we consider the silence a site of refusal or a critique of academic knowledge production?

    In line with this posture of refusal, might there be a reticence on the part of Black scholars, due to a shared experience with Indigenous people of being objectified, to “study” Indigenous people?

    Is there an unmappable practice of Black study and ethics that pursues being in relationship with Indigeneity rather than “knowing” it?

    Q1: What particular genealogies, methodologies, traditions/practices, and scholars within Black Studies have been generative for engaging theoretical and conceptual concerns within Native/Indigenous Studies?

    Chad B. Infante:
    My first teacher of Native American Studies is my mother, Lynda Angela Duhaney. Like Sylvia Wynter, she is a teacher of Spanish. For this reason, she has always emphasized the Spanish possession of the island of Jamaica and their colonization of the Indigenous Taino people. To combat the convenient use of the “Black Legend” by the British and the claims that the Taino population on Jamaica was small—estimated at 15,000–20,000—because of its relative distance from the chain of Greater Antillean islands, she constantly reminded me that Jamaica, the Americas, and Africa were colonized and enslaved not only by the Spanish and British but by that minuscule and cold corner of the world called Europe.

    It was only at the end of my graduate career that I realized her significant influence on my scholarship. In those restless dreams before and after submitting the dissertation, I could see the slim white bookcase that held her copies of Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth, De Beauvoir’s The Second Sex, and Van Sertima’s They Came Before Columbus. Her influence and these works propelled me into a love of literature and scholarly inquiry. Her focus on the importance of performance, the spoken word, folklore, and global indigenous practices of storytelling led me to read and appreciate Native American literature. This, in turn, brought me to the work of Sylvia Wynter, Frank B. Wilderson, the debate between Afro-Pessimism and Black Optimism, and to the important work of Sharon P. Holland and Tiya Miles.

    Sandra Harvey:
    Some of the most profound intellectual and political spaces in Black Studies are rooted in radical black feminist approaches to slavery studies. In particular I’m thinking about Toni Morrison, Hortense Spillers, and Saidiya Hartman’s work with the archives of slavery, whether they be the slave ledger, runaway slave advertisements, slave narratives and newspaper articles, or bodies and flesh. What stands out to me in these works is the ethical commitment that, I’d argue, represents Black feminist work at its best. For Hartman, the question has been, “What sort of ethics of care must I sustain with those enslaved Africans whom official archives are necessarily unable to represent?” For Morrison, it is to hold space for the interiority of enslaved black people, to combat a politics of respectability in representing ancestors, and in so doing, she asserts, her “single gravest responsibility,” despite a sort of magic that might guide events in their lives, “is not to lie” (93). In the name of this collective and personal responsibility to the dead and not-so-dead, Morrison’s “literary archeology,” Spillers’s “semiotics of the flesh,” and Hartman’s “critical fabulations” are methods that seek to tell “truth” as opposed to “fact,” or that which undergirds modern science and history’s positivism. I recognize a similar ethical, affective response to the archive (people’s prior lives/practices/cosmologies) in Native Studies.

    Saidiya Hartman’s work is not generally considered to be in conversation with Indigenous Studies and studies of colonialism more broadly. Yet in Lose Your Mother, Hartman’s reflection on her research trip to Salaga and Gwolu, Ghana—places where people fleeing slave raiders and traders attempted to build and defend communities made from new kin—has many parallels with stories Native scholars and elders have told in what is currently called the United States. One of the greatest contributions of Lose Your Mother is the way it calls on Black Americans to consider a fuller picture of the transatlantic slave trade and its place within a larger colonial context shaping West Africa well into the present. Hartman has us consider the experiences of dispossession within Africa. It is a sort of dispossession that encompasses displacement from homelands, from kinship structures, and from one’s own self-determination. She writes of one now disappeared village of fugitives from raiders where

    Newcomers were welcome. It didn’t matter that they weren’t kin or that they spoke a different language, because genealogy didn’t matter (most of them couldn’t go back more than three or four generations, anyway), building a community did. If the willingness to receive new arrivals and foreigners was what it took to make a world different from the one they had left, then so be it. So they put down their roots in foreign soil and adopted strangers as their kin and intermarried with other migrants and runaways, and shared their gods and totems, and blended their histories. “We” was the collectivity they built from the ground up, not one they had inherited, not one that others had imposed.(225)

    Hartman relays the way these ancestors (if we are to call them so) responded to dispossession—not with a melancholic attempt at recuperation but as creative agents of dynamic culture and kin, even through the pain and threat of death.

    Tiffany Lethabo King:
    I value and hold dear so many of the texts and scholars that my colleagues have mentioned. Shona Jackson acknowledged [referring to Jackson’s oral remarks on November 8, 2019] the work of Frank Wilderson and what it made possible in her own work. I agree with Jackson that I don’t think I would have been able to do the work that I have done without Wilderson’s Red, White & Black (2010). While Wilderson and I are headed in different directions with our intellectual and political commitments (he is increasingly unconvinced that Black and Indigenous ontological positions and political commitments are compatible), in my own relentless efforts to make connections with Indigenous communities, Wilderson’s exploration of the ontological positions of the settler, slave, and savage is essential for my intellectual development. Wilderson creates a relational framework from which to think about how the ontological positionings of the settler, slave, and savage are produced in relation to violence and the figure of the White human. While Wilderson gives up on the project called the human and finds no contemporaries for Black people whose existence is overdetermined by slavery and death, Wynter, whose work I also find invaluable, views the praxis of being human an unfinished and revisable project that exists on the horizon. Like Wilderson, Wynter argues that overrepresentations of Man (versions 1 and 2) are formed and shaped through producing Blackness and Indigeneity as external to Man and making Black and Indigenous people “Human Others” (Wynter, “Unsettling” 283). Wynter’s schematic overview of the history of Western Humanism allowed me to think about Black and Indigenous existence simultaneously because she positions Indios/Natives and Negroes/Niggers at the bottom of the hierarchy of being even as Man becomes more expansive (Man1 evolves into Man2) over time. Finally, I would be remiss to fail to mention the Black and Indigenous women who made up the Toronto Chapter of INCITE. INCITE Toronto had such a deep impact on my spiritual and political development from 2006 to 2008. The Black and Indigenous women who were a part of this formation compelled me to confront the work of creating more ethical relations with myself, other Black folks, and Indigenous people as I navigated two settler nation-states that perpetuate genocide, conquest, colonialism and anti-blackness. In 2006 and 2007, professor M. Jacqui Alexander accompanied a few of us in some of this work, and I am so grateful for her legacy as a thinker and person led by spirit.

    Q2: What are some limitations to the aforementioned Black Studies approaches?

    CBI:
    While I find Wynter’s and Van Sertima’s work useful for thinking the connection between Blackness and Indianness, both of their theories rest on flawed and recursive European logics. Van Sertima attempts to found a Black and Native American cultural and political connection by finding a moment of contact before the European colonial context. However, in this attempt, he supplants Native American conceptual worlds with African ones, and takes the European emphasis on phenotype as given. In addition, his work has emboldened unethical “hotep” and vernacular theories that argue that (dark-skinned) Native Americans are really Africans, and that this misrecognition is part and parcel of a colonial subterfuge against Africa. This claim leaves the American Native behind.

    Wynter’s theory of the African in Jamaica as the “New Native of a New World “ has a similar outcome, and leaves Native Americans, once again, unthought. Wynter argues in her unpublished nine-hundred-page tome Black Metamorphosis that the African replaces the disappeared Tainos as the “New Natives of a New World.” The argument too smoothly supposes the colonial narrative of Native extermination and argues too strongly that Blackness is indigenous to the New World and not to Africa. In addition, works that emphasize the figure of the “Black-Indian” rely too heavily on the European hetero-patriarchal matrix of mixture and reproductive sex. Particularly, this narrative indicates that for Black people to have a connection to Native America, that connection must be biological, cultural, or genealogical, leaving politics as a source of connection far, far behind.

    My most significant difficulty with Black engagements with Native America is with the desire to be indigenous to the New World. This is compounded by the ability of Indigenous people in the Americas to name the specific cultural lineage from which they hail, however fraught, and the relative difficulty of such a task for enslaved Africans brought to the Americas. The Black diaspora in the Americas need not claim indigenousness or nativeness to the Americas—or even to Africa for that matter—to make political and long-lasting connections with the Indigenous peoples of Africa or the Americas. Nor do they need to center the heterosexual and reproductively framed figure of the Black-Indian to make this connection. The only ground necessary for Black and Native connection is an unwavering and stern anti-colonial, anti-white, and anti-European politics.

    SH:
    One of the challenges we face in Black Studies in the US is that, institutionally and imaginatively, we are often too North American or even US-centric in our approach to studying black life. Returning to Lose Your Mother, this is exactly what confronts Saidiya Hartman. Her colleagues challenge her with this as she centers her own pain on the past. The South African scholar charges, “You think that the story of those in the Americas is the most important” (218). We must be careful in our approaches to Black Studies such that the transatlantic and “Black Atlantic” don’t become metanarratives that prevent us from engaging black life globally.

    In Lose Your Mother, one woman at the market by the Elmina dungeon, the last place where many captive Africans were held before being shipped off to the so-called New World, offers us a reading of Hartman’s venture, but it could easily be directed at a certain sort of navel-gazing scholarship in the United States: “[Black] Americans come here to cry but they don’t leave their money behind” (Hartman 56). These comments call out the geopolitical position of middle-class Black Americans vis-à-vis global capital in a present where, as some have argued, memories themselves are commodities. The livelihood of Ghanaians through slavery tourism and the preservation of artifacts of the transatlantic slave trade depend on the erasure of their own dispossession.

    At Troubling the Grounds, a conference at UC Irvine in 2019, SA Smythe and I asked attendees to consider the intersections of blackness and nativeness in a global context in order to think through colonial, imperial, and capitalist forces that have interacted with and shaped what blackness and nativeness have come to mean. What was clear is that we—those of us studying Black life in the US, in Europe, in the Pacific, in Africana Studies—are not used to talking to each other. We aren’t necessarily reading each other’s work and so when we want to engage each other we aren’t really prepared. If in the US and Canada we so often speak of Black and Indigenous experiences as mutually exclusive (barring some exceptions), scholars from the Pacific or from South Africa confront these issues as necessarily intertwined. Indigeneity is often but a specter in much of US Black Studies, and likewise we might find that diaspora haunts Native Studies on this hemisphere.

    TLK:
    I tend to find that much of the literature and critical theory in Black diasporan studies that addresses the Middle Passage and the enslavement of Black people lacks a robust grammar for talking about land. I think it is very difficult for descendants of the Middle Passage to have a discussion about land with Indigenous people in the Americas, Africa, and across the globe. Notions of land as a relation/relative, cosmology, sensation, language system, or aesthetic are not as discursively available within much of the theory, literature, and aesthetic practices of Black Studies. To be clear, I do not consider this particular privation a deficiency or failure on the part of Black diasporan people. Land often emerges as something that Black people who survived the Middle Passage are estranged from. They are brutalized by it, and long after, they have to come to terms with it and are forced to relate to it through colonial and nationalist notions of property. The violent rupture of the Middle Passage separated Black diasporan people who would “land in” the Americas from a relationship to other-than-human life forms like “land.”

    I’m so grateful that Sandra Harvey mentioned Saidiya Hartman’s work in Lose Your Mother. In Lose Your Mother, Hartman details the trek from the Northern interior of Ghana through the savannah to the coast. What became clear for me while reading this portion of the book was that the slave route also became a place where African kinship and indigeneity were stripped from the captive. In the chapter “Lose Your Mother,” Hartman describes the way kinship was meticulously stripped from people. Hartman’s evocative retelling of the ways that captors used the land against the captive to produce a “landscape of forgetting” is heart-wrenching (156). Hartman reveals throughout the chapter a longing that is refused writing: “But as I traveled along the slave route, I soon found out about all the elaborate methods that had been employed to make slaves forget their country. In every slave society, slave owners attempted to eradicate the slave’s memory, that is, to erase all the evidence of an existence before slavery. This was true in Africa as in the Americas” (155). Later, Hartman pens, “in Ouidah, a town that had been a significant port on the Slave Coast, a university student told me that slaves were marched through a grove that induced forgetting, or that they encircled a tree of forgetfulness. Women had to circle the tree seven times, and men had to circle it nine times in order to forget their origins and accept their slave status” (156). What Hartman details for the reader is the deployment of land as a weapon against the captive. Continuing to detail the process of forgetting Hartman writes, “Every part of West Africa that trafficked in slaves possessed its own Lethe, rivers and streams whose water made the slaves forget their pasts, dense groves that trapped old memories in the web of leaves, rocks that obstructed entrance to the past, amulets that deafened a man to his mother tongue, and shrines that pared and pruned time so that only today was left” (156). Even sacred parts of the earth, like the leguminous undershrub manta uwa, “which means ‘forget mother’ in Hausa,” were given to the captives to ingest (156). Manta uwa “expunged all memories of a natal land, and it robbed the slave of spiritual protection” (156). Mother Earth itself was used against the captives to make them forget their emergence from it.

    As processes of dispossession and alienation continue in the Americas, so do rituals and processes of resistance and recuperation. I am thankful for my colleague Xhercis Mendez’s question during the roundtable, which posed the possibility—or rather asserted the probability—that Afrodiasporic spiritual practices like Santeria elaborate embodied practices (dances and rituals for Yemeya), and ceremonial song and prayer produce vernaculars of terra and ocean and that are not always legible in academic Black Studies. Diasporan Black people must continue to recuperate and refashion relations, tongues, and embodied grammars for land.

    Q3: How has settler colonialism, as a theoretical framework, shaped discussions between Black Studies and Native/Indigenous Studies? What are the possibilities and limitations of this point of departure?

    CBI:
    I am very, very grateful for the work of Tiffany King because my engagement with settler colonial studies is significantly influenced by her work. I had already read Wolfe’s staple work and that of others in graduate school when I encountered King’s stellar dissertation, In the Clearing. This work presented the white Australian genealogy of the field. More importantly, it challenged the primacy of settler colonial studies over Native Studies (particularly Native feminism) and the idea that settler colonial studies is a mediating force between Black and Native theories and peoples. I am indebted to King because her work taught me how to read settler colonial studies as a white formulation that downplays both Native American and African experiences of conquest and slavery by replacing them with the concept of settlement. She rerouted me away from settler colonial studies squarely into the wide world of Indigenous feminisms. This correction has been foundational to my current work.

    SH:
    Settler colonialism has provided a framework for centering both the structure and temporality of a certain sort of white colonial project. It confronts various resistance discourses—leftist, multiculturalist, and even homonationalist—to take seriously the present and ongoing colonial context in which we work. A critique of settler colonialism confronts the myth that the colonialism of what is currently called the United States has already been settled. This particular colonial project reorganizes our understanding of time and space such that the violence of the initial encounter becomes understood as prologue to the linear timeline of the nation-state. Moreover, we can understand the figure of the settler as another dimension of the figure of the slave owner and vice versa. Black Studies scholars have theorized the project of mastery as one that seeks to stabilize a white subject’s consumption and enjoyment of Black people—and in particular our bodies. Likewise, the figure of the settler allows us to understand the project of mastery in spatial terms, and thus how bodies and land become reorganized. Both Tiffany King and Shona Jackson relate how white settler-slave owners use black bodies within the plantation economy to clear and settle the homelands of peoples indigenous to Turtle Island and Abya Yala. Likewise, Native feminist scholar Audra Simpson explains that “An Indian woman’s body in settler regimes such as the US and Canada is loaded with meaning—signifying other political orders, land itself, the dangerous possibility of reproducing Indian life, and most dangerously, other political orders.… Indian women … transmit the clan, and with that: family, responsibility, and relatedness to territory” (15). There is a libidinal economy to the settler’s project through which the possession of Black and Native women secures sovereignty, or what we most often refer to in Black Studies as mastery.

    Nevertheless, I think we have come up against major limitations with regard to the structural understanding emerging from settler colonial studies. That is, the triad structure comes up short in theorizing Black peoples’ experiences and positionalities in a nuanced manner—especially the way the afterlife of slavery, and anti-blackness in general, give shape to black subjectivity within the settler-slave owning project. It maps colonial racial categories onto various orientations such that, at least on Turtle Island, black must always signify “arrivant,” or in other renditions, “guest.” This category represents captive Africans as either existing in parallel to colonialism or as the bodies that enable colonialism, but never as colonized subjects themselves. The category also runs the risk of containing the descendants of enslaved Africans in an alienated relationship to place and homeland, perpetually tethered to a prior moment of arrival. What is the future that the category “arrivant” makes possible outside of the presumption of “departure”? I think new scholarship at this intersection would do well to explore what is enabled and foreclosed within this structural analysis for Black and Indigenous life. Can we tend to the ways we (in our multiple, varied, and changing forms) have developed or received relationships to land and kin, even in alienation?

    TLK:
    Settler colonial studies has given us a great deal to work with. The discourse, and now field, has grappled in good faith with the ongoing violence of settlement and the colonization of Native/Indigenous peoples and land. I think that the field does some things really, really well, particularly as it concerns forcing nationalist narratives, continental theory, and post-colonial theory to grapple with settler colonial relations. However, remembering my own struggles as a graduate student to square settler colonial relations with Black life, I maintain that white settler colonial studies is limited and to a large extent inhibits or frustrates attempts to bring black presence into view in the Americas. This failure is due in part to some of its conceptual and constituent elements. For example, the ontological premise or dialectic that grounds the antagonism of settler colonial relations is predicated on a settler/native dyad. This binary makes it difficult (damn near impossible) to incorporate enslaved and fungible chattel. Even the rubric of labor used to think about forced and coerced labor fails to fully register the position of Black enslaved people. Adding Black enslaved people into the native/settler dyad after the fact is a cosmetic change that does not address the limits of settler colonialism’s ontological universe, or account for the way that, in Hartman and Wilderson’s terms, Blackness remains a space of the “unthought.” Additionally, settler colonial studies cannot or will not address the ways in which the academy authorizes its displacement of Native scholars and of Native/Indigenous Studies. I tend to make a distinction between white settler colonial studies and Native feminist theorizations of settler colonialism, for example the Native feminist theory of Huanani-Kay Trask, which was introduced before white settler colonial studies gained so much prominence.

    Q4: What may be opened up in Black Studies when we focus attention on the notion and histories of indigeneity as much as we do on or in conjunction with the theme of diaspora?

    CBI:
    While I am sometimes frustrated by the etiological debate between Black and Native Studies about which came first—New World conquest or African enslavement—I appreciate that this debate has produced a greater interest in the long history of antiblackness on the African continent itself and in Africa’s encounter with Europe and the Middle East.

    As we excavate and uncover the history of racism, slavery, and conquest, we come to realize that these concepts are germane to European ideals and forms generally; we learn that they are not unique to the moments following African and New World “discovery” but to the full history of what is called Europe. When Black Studies focuses on indigeneity, we grasp that Black Studies and Native Studies have left African Studies to white anthropologists, and that all these fields in general, Black Studies included, are dominated, if not by white theorists and anthropologists, then by colonial frames, languages, conceptions, and intimacies. The process of reclaiming these fields—along with Early Modern Studies, Medieval Studies, and the Classics—from their white gatekeepers illuminates the long, long history of Greek, Roman, Medieval Western European, and Arabic-Muslim contact with and enslavement of dark-skinned sub-Saharan Africans (Hamel 75). This long and understudied history demonstrates that Black Africa has always been discussed from the outside.

    In his important study Black Morocco: A History of Slavery, Race, and Islam, Chouki El Hamel dexterously explains that, in part, the civilization clash between Christian Europe and the Muslim Middle East facilitated the trade and transfer of concepts of dominance and power between these powers. Although conceptions of antiblackness existed in the European Middle Ages and earlier, the combination of local European and Arabic-Muslim antiblackness helps to create the European global form of African chattel slavery. (It is important to add that the exportation of these local European and Arabic-Muslim conceptions of Blackness to the Native inhabited territories of the Americas creates both Blackness and Indianness as truly global forms.) In the moment of the Moorish occupation of Iberia, Europe takes up particular conceptions of Black slavery developed by Muslim legal scholars in the first and second caliphates (El Hamel 76–77: Spillers 69–70). These Muslim scholars incorporate earlier Bedouin practices of holding dark-skinned Africans as slaves and install these practices into Muslim law despite the absence of any justification of slavery in the text of the Quran itself (El Hamel 18–19). If we focus on moments of contact and conflict between these two theological formulas of conquest around the Mediterranean Sea and on their pre-history, we see that along with certain aspects of Black slavery, the Muslim world transfers the concept of sovereignty and the numeral zero—all of which, to me, are related to indigenous Africanness and Blackness as the nothingness, the zero point, against which theology structures itself.

    In Gomes Eanes De Zurara’s 1441 text The Chronicle of the Discovery and Conquest of Guinea, the historian augments Portuguese Christian conceptions along with Arabic ethnic distinctions from an Arabic nobleman named Adahu who is captured as a slave (48). In order to save and ransom himself, the nobleman offers ten Black Moors in exchange for his own person and two other boys. He informs the Portuguese lords that Black Africans, though Muslim, are converts and “were not of the lineage of the Moors (Mohammedans proper)” (55). They were not People of the Book; they “were Gentiles,” ergo slavable, “the better to bring into the path of salvation” (55). In addition to Adahu’s distinctions, De Zurara presents and combines the Curse of Cain and the Hamitic myth (55). He also cites the work of Jewish historians and other texts such as “the Archbishop Don Roderic of Toledo, and Josephus in his book of Antiquities of the Jews and Walter with other authors” (55). In the progression of the text, De Zurara’s ethnic, racial and theological terms of distinction become more precise, indicating that he learns the European term “Moor” at best describes the Muslim world as an empire but does not account for the conquered peoples of differing ethnic, religious, and racial origins that fall under the rule of Islam. He then begins to use the term “Black Moor” and “blackamoor” (105) to distinguish between captured Arab and Black Muslim slaves.

    When we focus on the history of the circum-Mediterranean we get a broader and earlier context for the relationship between Blackness, sovereignty, and the number zero. This is not to suggest that Europeans simply learn Black slavery from the Arab-Muslim world—especially considering earlier Classical and Roman conceptions of Ethiopian Blackness and dark-skinned Africans as aesthetically unpleasing (Snowden 7–8) and Jewish conceptions of the Curse of Cain and the Hamitic Myth (El Hamel 60)—but to suggest that the Mediterranean world traded in conceptions about sub-Saharan Africa and dark-skinned Africans as slavable long before the advent of the “Age of Discovery.” Rather than suggest that either Europeans or Arab-Muslims created Black slavery in isolation, I contend that their collective descriptions and ideas about sub-Saharan dark-skinned Africanness are key to Blackness as we come to know it today, as an ontological and external description grafted onto the history of Africans and their descendants.

    Most importantly, we learn that it is circulation of ideas about Africa between the European and Arabic-Muslim worlds, and then from Europe to the Americas, that transforms Blackness and Black slavery from its localized Mediterranean form into a global one—which is to say, into its ontological form. Put another way, the encounter between indigenous Africans and indigenous Americans allows for the creation of a global form of antiblackness and Native American genocide. Through their encounter and comparison, they are fashioned as global racial types, both with and against each other.

    SH:
    Native and Indigenous Studies has prompted me to think more thoroughly about the relationship of black people(s) to land and about our own meditative traditions. Here I want to thank Tiffany King for the beautiful recollection of this relationship as it emerges in Hartman’s Lose Your Mother. I want to come back to the “accessibility” of land, of thinking land. I think it is right to say that the question of the relation of black life to land in settler colonialism discourse is not a deficiency within Black Studies. Nevertheless, I do gather that a sustained reorientation towards our relations with land offers us a better understanding of our presence beyond positivist or transparent geography, as McKittrick calls it, and territory as it relates to the state. Land comes up in the stories we tell ourselves. Here I’m thinking about that Clearing where Baby Suggs gathered black folks for revival in Beloved. Morrison describes it as “a wide-open place cut deep in the woods nobody knew for what at the end of a path known only to deer and whoever cleared the land in the first place” (87). The use of the word “cleared” as a past-tense verb brings attention to the violence involved in the act of clearing the land. Yet, Suggs’s move from church buildings to the land becomes an invitation to return black people to their own bodies. Suggs tells the people gathered amongst the trees, “Here . . . in this here place, we flesh; flesh that weeps, laughs; flesh that dances on bare feet in the grass. Love it. Love it hard” (88). I imagine here in the Clearing, amongst the violence of its making, black people are able to relate to land in excess of what settler structures might allow, and in so doing, for at least a moment, find respite from the logic of fungibility.

    Kelly Limes-Taylor enters the post-ASA roundtable discussion via email to extend the conversation. Chad also re-enters the conversation to conclude our engagement.

    Q5: What can theories of sovereignty that have emerged in Black Studies contribute to a mutual conversation/movement for decolonization and abolition?

    Kelly Limes-Taylor:
    First, I want to say I am pleased to have my thoughts on these questions combined with the thoughts of such an amazing group of people. Some time ago, my work as an educational theorist and philosopher moved me from thinking about our world in terms of concrete, definable disciplines, identities, and experiences and into thinking about our world primarily in terms of the stories we tell ourselves for a time—and the stories that we don’t know (yet) and/or that were hidden/taken from us. When thinking about sovereignty, I tend to hover around the work of Sylvia Wynter because of her emphasis on the importance of language in shaping experience. As I note in a recent Curriculum Inquiry article, Wynter (1976, 2000) discusses the Word, a concept that includes not only the denotations of language but the “abstract thought and story systems” with which humans subordinates themselves; humanity, I argue, needs

    to again create a system of abstraction that represents the human being in a whole new way, something completely different from colonial constructions of humanity, and, thus, non-humanity, of which Blackness is the marker in this Western colonial era (as cited in Gagne, 2007, p. 259). In short, the representation would bear no relation to the Western definition of human and humanity that requires Indigenous genocide and Black enslavement/fungibility, two of the three elements Smith (2010) asserts are the foundations of US settler colonialism. (16–17)

    Per my reading of Wynter, we decide, in a shared conversation, what our world is or is not, what it is going to be. We define it, as such defining is the very work of being human. I believe that Wynter’s discussion of our ability to decide and define, and then act on those decisions and definitions—indeed, our ability to be truly human—represents the meaning of sovereignty.

    Shared conversations about decolonization and abolition likely require that we first establish which stories about ourselves, each other, and the world around us are true for us, and true for the world we want to see. Next, we identify the false stories about ourselves and each other that have been forced upon us and under which we still labor. Finally, we start doing our work and living our lives as if the true stories we’ve identified for ourselves are, indeed, true—defending/protecting ourselves against those who want to force false stories upon us, but otherwise not paying them much mind. It feels almost laughable to discuss everything-changing concepts like sovereignty, decolonization, and abolition in terms of a simple, three-part plan, but this is the only thing that has made sense to me thus far. And I’m clear about the difference between simple and easy here; while this is a simple plan, it’s not an easy one.

    TLK:
    I have not spent time tracking and thinking with the key term sovereignty in Black Studies, per se. However, I think that bodily autonomy and the right to self-defense are concepts that are taken seriously within Black social and political thought, spanning the ideologies of Black liberalism and the Black radical tradition. Black people take their lives and those of their loved ones seriously. Black life is sacred and this is the bedrock of Black liberation movements. Critical Black Studies, emerging from abolitionist traditions, troubles the idea of Black sovereignty, or autonomy, and even, in some cases, of a Black body to defend. I see this in the work of Jared Sexton and Frank Wilderson. They question the existence of sovereignty for a Blackness without personhood. In her recent book Becoming Human: Matter and Meaning in an Anti-Black World, Zakiyyah Jackson argues that the notion of sovereignty as absolute freedom is a dangerous idea that stands in opposition to relationality (146). I think that this kind of critique of the liberal human, sovereignty, and the attendant notion of an autonomous and unfettered self is productive and can be a space of resonance with some Indigenous critical theory. For instance, Indigenous feminist notions of native sovereignty in Maile Arvin, Angie Morrill, and Eve Tuck’s article “Decolonizing Feminism,” premised on relationality across species, align with the kinds of critical relationality that Zakiyyah Jackson gestures toward in her work.

    SH:
    What I find so generative in Black Studies—at least various genealogies within what we’ll call Black Studies—is its push to bring freedom into conversation with those calling for sovereignty. This presents a true dilemma for the idea of sovereignty. That is, what has emerged as “sovereignty” in Western traditions is shored up specifically through its juxtaposition with blackness, with Nativeness, and with queerness. Black Studies scholars have thought through the idea of sovereignty or mastery at the level of the subject and against the figure of the “slave,” and thus asked us to think through the meaning of self-determination or autonomy if we accept that the boundaries of the self are constantly in question. I’d say this is also true for nations or peoples.

    Tiffany’s descriptions of black porosity and of the Sycorax wire sculpture in The Black Shoals are perfect examples of this idea of autonomy. In the vulnerability, the gaps between boundaries, intimacy is possible and new ways of being emerge. Tiffany describes the wire sculpture as a co-presence: “The intertwined bends, curls, and unfurlings of the wire memorialize the Black and Native female in the Americas . . . Sycorax is a relational entity . . . In the wire sculpture, Lurch renders Indigeneity and Blackness indistinguishable as they are both represented by the color black or the dark feminine. The copper wire and black wires meld into one another like skin” (186). Tiffany, through Jackson and Arvin, Morrill, and Tuck, describes the sculpture as an instance of critical relationality, where the “self” of self-determination is both questioned (in its ability/desire to achieve full autonomy) and affirmed (in its movement vulnerable to the other that is in the self and without which the self could not be).

    These conversations have me thinking through various acts or actions via sovereignty rather than via bodies. Teaching about the master slave dialectic in our graduate courses, David Marriott would remind us, “There are plenty of slavish masters and masterful slaves.” In part, I take this as a push to think through orientations and/or acts as sovereign. In one sense, orientation or acting is the sort of sovereignty that does not depend on recognition from or against an Other. But it is also about the law-making actions that produce ruptures in the colonial and slave owning symbolic order. I understand Fanon’s reflections on violence in this vein, but I also consider that the way “speaking” (as Kelly has pointed out) and ceremonies, as Tiffany puts it in The Black Shoals, “carry potential for transformation” (199). Rather than foundational, institutional, or grounded sovereignty (nothing that Jared Sexton critiques a certain understanding of sovereignty with land as its basis), this notion of sovereignty is fleeting, emergent, and relational. It is found in Standing Rock, Alcatraz, the Dakota road blocks, and in the defiance of the uprising for Black lives.

    Q6: How have Black Studies’ conceptualizations and critiques of the “nation” and the “state” been in conversation with Native/Indigenous theorists?

    KLT:
    I’m particularly drawn to the concept of nationhood here, because it reminds me of when I first connected Daniel Heath Justice and Saidiya Hartman’s discussions of kinship. I was researching for my dissertation when I first came across Justice’s work. He relates kinship to nationhood in a way that was paradigm-shifting for me, as I’d only been acquainted with colonial notions of kin and nation. Justice defines kinship as the “recognition of some sort of relationship between and among peoples,” and asserts that, in the Indigenous context, nationhood is an understanding of a common social interdependence with the community, the tribal web of kinship rights, and responsibilities that link the People, the land, and the cosmos together in an ongoing and dynamic system of mutually affecting relationships (151).

    From this position, I learned that interdependence, relationship, responsibility, and mutuality define nation, not the dictates of people who couldn’t care less about whether you, your human kin, or the environment around you thrives or dies. Justice further extends the concept of kinship to connection with the living world around us, “from the plants and animals to the sun, moon, thunder, and other elemental forces” (151), and asserts that kinship is something we do (148). I want to also include Shawn Wilson here, who notes that “we are the relationships that we hold and are part of” (80). Both these thinkers helped me redefine what I understood as the concept of nation—namely that nation encompasses our understanding of the relationships we have with the living beings and environment around us.

    When I was brought to Hartman’s Lose Your Mother, I could see the overlap between Black and Indigenous conceptualizations of kinship and, thus, nationhood. More specifically, I was able to see more clearly the ways that Black folks in these lands—most of us descended from Indigenous peoples whose relationships with their environments were violently, devastatingly, and almost-permanently stripped from them—consistently worked to protect and maintain notions of kinship, beginning with their first abrupt removal (and with each subsequent removal). Indigenous peoples in these lands were fighting to maintain their kinship networks at the same time my people were. I believe we both have been struggling to get our nationhoods back to us—in our own ways, as best as we have been able to do over these centuries. This consideration of Black Diasporic restorative practice as response to the intentional and historical separation from indigenous roots can foster solidarity between Diasporic Black and Indigenous decolonization initiatives and movements, as the two histories account for two sides of the proverbial Western colonialist coin.

    Black American life in the US is, among other things, very much the result of Indigenous peoples’ being taken from their land; Indigenous American life in the US is, among other things, very much the result of Indigenous peoples’ land being taken from them. We’ve had our nationhoods taken from us and were then told that those doing the taking represented the real, true nation. But that simply isn’t true. Real nation is responsibility and connection, not dominance and exclusion.

    CBI:
    I think that the best work of Black and Native artists, academics, and activists offers a criticism of the nation-state even when the state is not named as the explicit target of critique. Even those works and actors that might seem to placate the state are attempting to balance the short- and long-term political needs of their communities. This is a difficult balance to strike, and in the face of violence, Black and Native people have often chosen political strategies based on pragmatism and life, and rightly so. The immediate political needs of a community in response to hunger and shelter are weighed and balanced over and against the long-term political goals that might be required for structural transformation. Many Black and Native actors try to balance these needs and goals in a world where they recognize that they have to engage the state to access certain resources in order to live, all the while offering strident critique and imagining new forms of community care. Despite the need for this engagement, both Black and Native theorists and writers continue to question the legitimacy of the nation-state.

    TLK:
    I will speak to the resonances between fields in my response. Like Kelly Limes-Taylor, I am struck by Daniel Heath Justice’s notion of peoplehood, which distinguishes tribal-based understandings of nation from colonial and state-based understandings of the nation. This revision rebukes the Cherokee nation model that requires Black enslavement and antiblackness as a condition of recognition. For Justice, Cherokee peoplehood is a “relational system that keeps the people in balance with one another, with other people and realities, and with the world” (Our 24). This invocation of peoplehood resonates with a notion of Blackhood articulated by Toni Cade Bambara in “On the Issue of Roles” in 1970. Bambara similarly tries to construct Blackness outside of the colonial constraints and violent strictures of gender. Bambara argues that “perhaps we need to let go of all notions of manhood and femininity and concentrate on Blackhood” (Black Woman 126). She calls for fashioning an identity and a self outside of the categories of manhood and womanhood, “perhaps an androgynous self via commitment to the struggle” (126). This revisioning and refashioning of categories forms the connective tissue that brings Black and Indigenous thought and worldmaking together beyond nation, gender, and the human.

    Q7: How do Black Studies and Native Studies attend to each other with care? For example, how do we honor Black and Indigenous people particularly when focusing on violence and Black and Indigenous people’s bodies?

    KLT:
    Unfortunately, those of us involved with the academy often find our writing and thinking bound by academia’s farcical mores of objectivity and emotional distance—even when we’re dealing with topics that negatively affect our everyday lives. This is doubly true when our research is focused on the experiences of marginalized groups; triply true when we researchers also identify as members of those groups. I think that we—marginalized researchers researching marginalized peoples/experiences—often feel obligated to play into this act of distancing so that we can sound reasonable and sober enough to have our work accepted by a White supremacist institution that isn’t really checking for us in the first place, since the academy’s first priority—as with all institutions in this White supremacist conceptualization of a nation—is to uphold the supremacy.

    I begin my answer to this question in this way because, though I’m offered the idea of violence and bodies to use as example here, I believe that the question itself is indicative of the foundational White supremacist violence that Black and Native studies often highlight, particularly in the US context. How do we attend to each other with care? We ask ourselves this question as if truly caring for each other (and, really, for ourselves) within a super violent national context is mysterious or complex, as if we haven’t been doing it all along.

    So, I respond with my own questions: how are we caring for our friends, our comrades (for those that choose that term), right now, in real time? How do we care for our family every day? How do we care for cousins we have not seen in a long time or for those who have long joined us in struggle, often just as nameless or unseen as we? The answers to these questions, I believe, also address how those of us in Black and Native studies can attend to each other with care. I also want to note that, in order to take this out of the realm of abstraction, I read the initial prompt as How do Black and Native people attend to each other with care? within the US context, as hypothesizing about doing something in academia isn’t worth much if we’re not talking about how we just do it in our everyday lives.

    I believe that we must be clear about the context in which we are trying to survive as people. Those of us in the US exist in a nation- and society-making context that is violence: forcing millions of people into ways of life other than those of their choosing for hundreds of years may be a lot of things, but it will always be violent. That means that the institutions emerging from this context will always be violent as well, each in its particular way; the violence, after all, must be multi-faceted and all-encompassing in order to continue. Supremacist academic violence has historically shown up in the forms of objectivity and distance, subsequently allowing for other violences (and justifications for supremacist violence outside the academy) to occur. I’m thinking of Linda Tuhiwai Smith’s groundbreaking discussion in Decolonizing Methodologies in particular here.

    Indigenous and Black folks who find ourselves in the academy may also feel like we have to play into that historically violent objectivity and distance. So, for the most part, we don’t get to be angry in the classroom (for fear of negative student evaluations) or rail as we write up our research (because the infamous reviewer #2 won’t go for that). The pride or passion we feel has to be subdued, contained. We quietly hold the extent of our love for our people behind office doors, or carefully launch it in direct messages to safe colleagues, or keep it safely tucked away during meetings with fellow faculty members who just don’t (or won’t) get it.

    In my opinion, we need to stop that shit. The Western academy isn’t anything holy; in fact, it’s the opposite of that. It is the knowledge-creating and -perpetuating institution established by people who, if alive today, wouldn’t even agree we are human like them. Objectivity and distance don’t serve us and don’t serve anyone. Neither do separations between the disciplines. The violences that Indigenous and Black folks face in the US aren’t separate from each other, but are part of the White supremacist social and economic campaign that began on these lands hundreds of years ago–a campaign that has never stopped. Showing care and honor, then, means that we never stop acknowledging the violence, and that we are loud and unapologetic about caring for ourselves and each other.

    We care for each other just like we normally show care for those we love, both near and far: openly, without shame or pretense of objectivity. We care for each other just like we normally show care for those we don’t know who are experiencing the same things we are: by learning more about their experiences and amplifying them, by reaching out and asking how we can be accomplices. We care for each other in ways that defy the barbarity of White supremacy: by acknowledging, holding, and healing our own pain while making space for the pain of others—including the pain we experience from hurting each other, due primarily to the mind-boggling violence perpetuated upon both of us on these lands.

    We mourn for ourselves and each other. We get loud for and about ourselves and each other. We fight for ourselves and each other. Without apology, without wavering.

    CBI:
    It is important that we read each other’s work and histories and that we show up for each other. Because the relationship between these two disciplines and communities is mediated by a third party, Black and Native people should speak to each other in order to have a more honest account of the relation between the two communities. It also is essential that we read, cite, and defend the work of Black and Native women who are often on the frontlines of activist, academic, and artistic work. From #Sayhername to #MMIW, Black and Native women provide the most important examples of how we can honor people and communities facing violence. Accordingly, I think that it is vital that we return to their work and example again and again and again. More than this, I think we should make a habit of pairing and reading Black and Native women’s work together.

    TLK:
    To some extent I attempted to speak to this issue of care in my 2019 introductory remarks for the ASA panel, which also open this essay’s roundtable discussion. I think that building relationships with each other both outside and inside the academy is essential. Building spaces of connection, healing, and dialogue that are not oriented toward producing a product/commodity can change the terms of our engagements with each other as Black and Indigenous people in the academy. We cease to be objects of study for one another. As I reflect on the rather late entry of the fields of Black Studies and Indigenous Studies in the academy in the late 1960s, I think that this belatedness and marginalization in the university could be a kind of gift. For example, being in a marginalized field means that we have not had the time nor have we developed a desire for the pay-off of developing epistemologies and approaches that objectify and pornotrope one another. While I’m not saying that this does not happen and cannot happen, our fields have not emerged from the violent epistemological formations of colonial projects. We have an advantage in this sense. Many of us come from communities that refuse to make some of our intimate, ceremonial, healing, and erotic work material for knowledge production. We come from communities with good boundaries who practice refusal (Simpson). Our ethics and our political commitments of care (Sharpe) can shape our fields in critically important ways.

    SH:
    I’m grateful already for the attention to care that I’ve received by so many Black and Native scholars and the care with which my colleagues and comrades have carried out this roundtable. Like Kelly, I have serious doubts about the sorts of care possible within our institutions. We are precarious workers (some more than others). Our departments are always the first to be cut. Our students often receive the least amount of institutional support and respect. I have been rereading Fred Moten and Stefano Harney’s Undercommons with my students, and we are constantly taken by the charge that “the only possible relationship to the university today is a criminal one” (26). I say this as multiple institutions are being pushed to account for their accumulation of wealth through slave trafficking. Most universities have not begun to reckon with the truth that their existence is made possible through land grants, which in turn were made possible only by dispossessing Indigenous peoples of their homelands. In the past, Indigenous peoples resisted colonial civilizing missions by burning down boarding schools that sought to separate children from families and peoples from their languages and cultures. We (Black, Indigenous, and other “Third World” students) have also made demands on the university for autonomy in creating departments and research programs that center our work and study. Black and Native scholarship share a tradition that recognizes the many ways we produce knowledge, which can include university settings, but also oral histories, music, dance, practices of care, ceremony, uprisings, and art. These are the stakes of our continued and collective care. That we tend to each other, Black, Indigenous, and Black and Indigenous peoples, that we tend to each other’s relations and each other’s homelands as if our very existence depends on it, because as we know, it has and it does. This includes learning from each other, mourning and celebrating with each other, convening and, when necessary, holding each other accountable and making amends.

    Q8: How do we move forward/keep momentum?

    CBI:
    We must constantly remind ourselves that precisely because the relationship between these two communities is mediated by whiteness and colonial concepts, moments of Black and Native American contact occur in a minor register. They reflect small moments that flit in the corner of the eye, only to disappear when you try to focus on them. These small, mutable, and fragile moments demand not that we walk on eggshells, but that we craft carefully, deliberately, and ethically. Black and Native people must wholeheartedly engage each other and this ethic in their art, music, and literature. And they must do this all while holding at bay those best intentioned “white allies”—if there are indeed such persons—until after Black and Native people have had enough time to commune with each other. Then and only then, if at all, might “white allies” be invited to participate in the conversation.

    KLT:
    Given the current social and political climate in the US, I think that the primary way we can move forward is to continue (or to begin, for some of us) to imagine what our society looks like beyond the mayhem we are seeing around us without getting distracted or dismayed by it. If we believe that we are watching the death throes of White supremacy (whether the beginning or the end throes—I, of course, have no idea about that), I think we can better orient ourselves to the work that is ahead of us, especially when it comes to imagining and thus creating a future in which those of us who have previously been so disastrously oppressed can love and center ourselves while making space safe for others to do the same. The current times may feel particularly heavy for Native and Black folks, especially when the backlash to taking the slightest step forward seems to resound so loudly. We can feel heartened when we remember that under White supremacy, we have never not experienced genocidal extraction, and that our continued existence evinces that we are stronger than it and can and will survive beyond it. As we come to understand that we have a shared struggle, as we continue to link and recognize each other’s struggles, and as we gain more and more confidence in the ways of knowing and being that have carried us through to this time, I believe that we can carry ourselves into a beautiful future. It is hard and can feel so defeating, but I believe we will win.

    TLK:
    Since 2016, the increased visibility of Black and Indigenous liberation movements in the US has created an opportunity to frame social justice issues necessarily as matters of Black abolition and Indigenous decolonization. Additionally, as we navigate our COVID pandemic reality, we have had to innovate and create new modes of connection and communication. As our communities continue to contract the virus and die at alarming and disproportionate rates, I have seen Black and Indigenous people use digital platforms to organize and promote necessary conversations taking place between Black and Indigenous people. I’m both devastated by the losses that we have experienced and also moved and energized by the desire and efforts to talk to one another. We need to continue talking to one another on terms and grounds that we create together.

    Chad B. Infante is a post-doctoral fellow and assistant professor of African American and Native American literature in the English department at the University of Maryland, College Park. Chad earned his doctorate in English from Northwestern University in 2018. Originally from Jamaica, his research focuses on black and indigenous US and Caribbean literatures, gender, sexuality, critical theory, and political philosophy.

    Sandra Harvey is Assistant Professor of African American Studies at the University of California, Irvine.

    Kelly Limes Taylor does many things, including think, mother, teach, and write. She lives in the upper left corner of Georgia, U.S., with her family.

    Tiffany King is an Associate Professor of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at Georgia State University. She is the author of The Black Shoals: Offshore Formations of Black and Native Studies, Duke University Press, 2019.

    Footnotes

    1. Between 2015 and 2019, we considered many other people including Kendra Fields, Robert Keith Collins, Alaina Roberts, Andrew Jolivette, Arica Coleman, and Arika Easley Houser, whose contributions we are deeply indebted to but we lacked time and organization to initiate the conversations. We hope to initiate conversations with these scholars and others in the near future.

    2. This text is copied from the proposal submitted to American Studies Association in January 2019 and appears in the 2019 American Studies Association conference program.

    Works Cited

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  • Introduction: Unsettle the Struggle, Trouble the Grounds

    SA Smythe (bio)

    The interrelated quest to map the unknown—the geographic unknown, the corporeal indigenous/black unknown—sets forth what Neil Smith calls “uneven development,” albeit from a very different analytical perspective: the systematic production of differential social hierarchies, which are inscribed in space and give a coherence to disproportionate geographies. —Katherine McKittrick, Demonic Grounds

    We, to paraphrase [Kamau Braithwaite], can make here, on these broken grounds . . . something torn and new . . . , a communal future of wholeness.—Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o, “Kamau Brathwaite: The Voice of African Presence”

    As Black feminist Barbara Smith notes in Marlon Riggs’s iconic film Black Is…Black Ain’t, “There are as many kinds of Black people as there are Black people to be. There are so many variations on this theme.” And for as many kinds of Black people as there are to be, there are also many kinds of relationships to place and to belonging. The study of the African diaspora—of the practices and experiences that teem across language, histories, and other attachments—points to an origin: to Africa or “the continent.” However, to those not committed to its study, this reference is often reduced and ideologically bound to enslavement and departure. This special issue is instigated and organized around this observation, and wonders: what to the African, Black, and Afro-descendant is indigeneity? What, to the Indigenous, is Black(ness)? We know well that the stakes of considering Blackness and Indigeneity together in epistemological relation are high, and certainly not singular. Nor are they discrete, despite the efforts (be they concerted or a result of ideological neglect) to make indigeneity cartographically and thus epistemologically implausible or unthinkable in a specifically Black African context.1

    This inability to trace landed attachment to places perpetuate the notion of Afro-descended people’s nonbelonging, and the question of sovereignty and self-possession becomes ephemeralized. In this settler imaginary, who owns the land (which is already a white supremacist conceit: many Native authors have argued over generations that relation to rather than possession of land is the deeper intention of land acknowledgments or even Land Back demands) is utilized as a coercive cudgel with which to determine who is made to labor on the land and who can form and maintain knowledge over the land and place writ large as well as let themselves be known/knowable.2 Here we see the connection between racial capitalism and settler colonialism, as epistemological-material projects of genocide, super exploitation, and dispossession are always already linked. The representation of Africans as un-landed in cartographic renderings like Native Land is one of the proliferating examples of how Indigenous belonging has been removed from Blackness and Black people. This informs the tenuous relationship of Africans in the diaspora to Indigenous claims (for example, of Afro-descended peoples in places like the colonial United States where Africans were considered enslaved people and not people with Indigenous identity and the policing of those lines continues to impact our present day perceptions of incommensurability).3 Continuing down the path of unsedimenting the relationship between Blackness and landedness and the delimiting relationship of Indigenous peoples to their lands as the only measure through which to understand and afford or experience sovereignty is to trouble the grounds—to disturb the tasks, the conditions, and the terrain—of understanding and knowledge production on which Blackness and Indigeneity can be thought in multiscale and dynamic relation.

    Situated as the contemporary vanguard of this settler structure of knowledge production, obstruction, and maintenance is the academic industrial complex in the United States in particular, which is founded on genocide, anti-Black racism, and other ongoing modes of dispossession. We see these formations in the land grant institutions built on stolen lands (such as the University of California) and in the fact that across Turtle Island, Black Studies and Native Studies programs and departments are forced to compete for the same scarce resources and encouraged to remain discrete units and bodies of knowledge, despite the realities on the ground and their shared relational histories. The matter of funding and employment also reveals the university’s commitment to racial capitalism, as it claims knowledge and control over Black life, mobility, and labor in multiple ways. As we wrote in “A Statement of Black Solidarity: Cops Off of Every Campus,” “[t]o these institutions, our truest value comes in times of crisis, when we are made to show up in the form of statistics, in the form of alibis, in the form of crisis managers. Diversity regimes and administrative bloat routinely serve as the veneer of Black value.”4

    This special issue is inspired into an ecology of thinking that seeks to dwell in deep relation with the scholars, artists, and visionaries proliferating conversations between Black and/or Indigenous peoples that show an abiding need for tuning into and across difference to name the possibilities for our collective liberation. This inspiration also points to the proliferation of conversations beyond the white settler colonial gaze. Troubling the Grounds: Global Configurations of Blackness, Nativism, and Indigeneity lingers over the perceived incommensurability of Black and Indigenous life, and has emerged as a result of many conversations, explorations, and indeed frustrations about the ways Black and Indigenous life wor(l)ds are taken up, buried, and mystified across various geographical contexts. It was the name of a conference held at the University of California, Irvine, in May 2019, that I co-organized with Dr. Sandra Harvey. The symposium was thus held on the homelands of the Tongva peoples who, in the face of ongoing settler colonialism, continue to act as stewards of their ancestral lands as they have for the past 8,000 years. As Black visitors to the land, we moved with curiosity about the possibilities for connection. The greater Los Angeles area is home to some of the largest Indigenous populations in the United States. It is the ancestral homeland of the Tongva, the Acjachemen, the Chumash, the Tataviam, the Cahuilla nations, the Chemehuevi, the Pipa Aha Macav, the Morongo, the Pechanga, the Yuhaaviatam, and the Soboba among many other peoples. It is also presently home to large communities of Indigenous peoples from the greater Turtle Island, the Pacific Islands, and Latin America, including Zapotec and Mixtec peoples.

    Black people, like Garífuna communities, or like the Miskito people, whether in diaspora or in Central America, continue to claim Indigeneity even when it is regarded as contentious or untenable. The questions of the physical, spatial (landed), and other articulations of sovereignty are interrelated. How can Africanness be thought not alongside Indigenous cultures, communities, and politics, but as itself Indigenous, with all of the rights, freedoms, and unsettling that this might engender? Ultimately, we sought to bring our attention to Black/African Indigeneity and Black/African decolonial solidarity as practiced in various regions of the globe.

    This convening was motivated by a curiosity about theories of sovereignty and Black/African political imaginaries: by shared cosmologies, solidarities, and coalitions across difference between Indigenous peoples and people of the African diaspora and on the continent. We wondered how we might problematize blood quantum or other biological/racial understandings of indigeneity historically and in the contemporary moment, and about the role of indigeneity in Black political struggle in various regions of Africa and Latin America. Panelists and discussants came together to consider how the “idea of Africa” circulates in Native American and Indigenous studies and communities, as well as how and where the continent occupies the Black American imaginary and its own intra-migration stories within its own borders.5 In this generative discursive space, we brought together the study of settler colonialism and postcoloniality to bear witness to trenchant critiques of citizenship and human rights, recognizing the political import of what “native” or “indigenous” might mean in specific geopolitical and geotemporal contexts, and grappling with the unyielding violence of settler colonial white supremacy, racial capitalism, and imperialism.

    The title of our special issue is drawn from the incisive thought of Katherine McKittrick’s Demonic Grounds: Black Women and the Cartographies of Struggle, in which McKittrick sets a foundational course for ways we might think about racialized geographies, temporalities, and modes of political opposition to colonialism. Her work prompted us to rethink the very ideological grounds on which our assumptions, ideologies, and claims to liberation rest. McKittrick urges us to think through how blackness and geography animate new ways of imagining the world; her book, she writes, “is, in its broadest sense, an interdisciplinary analysis of black women’s geographies in the black diaspora. It seeks to consider what kinds of possibilities emerge when black studies encounters human geography” (x). Troubling the Grounds: Global Figurations of Blackness, Indigeneity & Nativism considers what kinds of possibilities emerge when Black Studies, Native Studies, African Studies, and global Indigenous Studies meet. In this volume, writers across various disciplinary formations and geopolitical commitments build upon ongoing intellectual and activist conversations about racism, racial capitalism, and (settler) colonialisms in order to refigure our conversations through a global lens.

    As a point of departure, let us reconsider what happens on a material and epistemological level when we return to Africa rather than to the world of whiteness in these conversations and conflicts. How might centering Africa—with differing and non-syncretic ideas of the continent and its variegated colonial histories, contemporary political struggles, innovative joys—impact narratives of belonging, citizenship, nativism, migration, and indigeneity across Europe, Turtle Island, Oceania, and Abya Yala? Likewise, in what ways do questions around settler colonialism and anti-Black racism in the so-called West help or hinder our understanding of anticolonial or decolonial debates and struggles in various African contexts? Katherine McKittrick’s reading of Sylvia Wynter’s term “grounds” allows us to think critically of diasporic, Indigenous, and nomadic ways of living in the world not as mutually exclusive states of being but possibly as simultaneous spatial and temporal relationships. McKittrick offers us this provocation:

    If these conceptual and political differences are not simply cast as marginal, they do not have to replicate marginality. Demonic grounds are not, then, only reifying and politicizing marginality in itself (black women’s identities = margin/position = difference in/and feminism; or, our present form of life). Rather they are also a projection of what the biocentric human (genres of black womanhood) means in relation to “the normally inhabitable.” (135)

    The grounds have always been troubled, and we wade into the conversation in search of otherwise possibilities for understanding and place.

    Both at the “Troubling the Grounds” symposium and throughout this volume (which also contains essays from scholars who were not involved in those sessions), there is an abiding interest in the ways blackness travels, is mobilized, or is (re)coded within discourses of indigeneity, citizenship, and sovereignty, where recognizable relationships to the state are determined. Of course, overdetermined positionalities (including the triad of the arrivant/diasporic subject/migrant, the native, and the settler/colonizer) are rooted in ideologies that shape all of our political responses. Troubling the Grounds opens with the imperative that we develop and continue strategies of solidarity that carefully and critically tend to the ways our deeply held narratives of belonging are brought to bear on each other. Thus, these essays center Africa, the African diaspora, and Blackness in the collective conversation, while understanding these terms (especially “Blackness”) to be expansive and mutable depending on how they are geopolitically and historically situated. There is attention to the trouble, the tensions, and tautness of ideological and physical relations that we seek to tease out. The volume is an effort to draw out that set of relations and attachments but by no means to totalize the territory. There continues to be a growing body of scholarship about the relationship between Black Studies and/in/of Native Studies that this volume moves alongside and shifts away from, we hope in generative ways.6

    Put differently, this special issue of Postmodern Culture moves with the understanding that indigeneity, diaspora, and migration are racial-ethno-political categories emerging differently across geopolitical contexts. In Europe, for example, the Sámi people inhabiting parts of what is now Scandinavia are readily classified as Indigenous to those lands, whereas the Romani (including Roma and Sinti peoples) are often conflated with nomadic tribes. Rather than being understood as Indigenous, these groups often experience a process of what Alyosxa Tudor calls “migratization.”7 Likewise, “Indigenous” as a political identity is mobilized asymmetrically throughout the continent of Africa, Central America, and various other regions, despite various peoples’ historic claims to tribal or ancestral lands. Given these different geopolitical locations—what Keguro Macharia describes in the afterword to this issue as the attendant geohistories—from Turtle Island to the diasporic homes of the Garínagu to what is today known as Namibia and to Melanesia, the authors in this volume contribute to a discussion about the ways in which race, ethnicity, and history have informed our understandings of indigeneity, blackness, and mobility, as well as the political claims these categories make possible or foreclose in their respective contexts, and for Africa and its diaspora. Not featured here, but also deeply in conversation and present at that Spring 2019 conference were engagements with Palestine, the quilombos of Brazil, migrants and Roma across Europe, and Blackscapes across the Indian Ocean, Asian, and Arab worlds. The grounds of all of these spaces are demonic, and we owe a debt of gratitude to these thinkers and contributors for their offerings as we collectively sought a way out of epistemic and ontological barriers to our knowing one another and ourselves.

    Also not included in this issue is the way that whiteness positions itself as having access to indigeneity in places like Europe. The topic came up for vociferous debate during the conference, and is implicated in these conversations. In recent years, the deadly fever pitch of ultranationalist calls to greatness has taken up a frail form of sovereignty based on a nostalgic act of white return, which is tied to the supremacist narrative of “the great replacement” in France, in particular.8 Take, for example, Donald Trump’s slogan to “Make America Great Again,” which begat ideologically linked global campaigns like Jair Bolsonaro’s “Make Brazil Great Again,” and Matteo Salvini’s “Make Italy Great Again” and “Italians First,” and Boris Johnson’s promise to “make Britain great again” by forcing the United Kingdom out of the European Union. They share a desire to recuperate an originary colonial project of the nation as individualist imperial formation. The discourse retrenches white supremacist iterations of History and Time to harken back to nebulous and fictional moment of ethnoracial purity and coeval peace. When confronting the political and ethnoracial diversity of the present, this of course foments anti-immigrant, anti-Black, and anti-Indigenous movements, in great part because they promote a revisionist history that celebrates white cisheterosexual people as the rightful claimants to the land and therefore to the status of “native.” “Nativism” in this perverse context then refers to a return to whiteness, and thus, a return that renders impossible any other claims to sovereignty in favor of white ethnonationalist politics of recognition and of fantasies of belonging.

    The pieces in this volume should be read as rigorous engagements in their own right, and we are invited to “read as amateurs” to consider a relationship to knowledge and its production as divested from notions of mastery.9 We do this in order to look at our principles and orientations towards diaspora, to name who we are and how we fellowship with one another, foregrounding interrelatedness and our own stories. With this invocation of “we,” these works join Kānaka Maoli scholar Lisa Kahaleole Hall’s moratorium “on talking about ‘them,’ so we can talk about ‘we’s’” from her 2018 Critical Ethnic Studies essay “More than ‘Two Worlds,’” forged with Black feminist activism, scholarship, and poetry about relating across difference (77). She continues, “The violences that we can effectively stop are those that are employed within a “we.” The existence of that “we” is necessary but not sufficient for making change—it is the ground of possibility” (78).

    There was rousing poetry, theory, land blessings, and scholarship presented at the Troubling the Grounds conference and considered for this issue that addressed the relationship between indigenous South Africans and the geocosmogenic waywardness of their ancestry; Black African and Palestinians relations after the Second World War; insurgent knowledges of freedom-making from the quilombos of Brazil; spatial performances of the Indian Ocean Blackness of Ceylon Africans in Sri Lanka; the migratization of Eastern European in the interest of troubling attachments to nativism and whiteness, and so on. There are many limits of a special issue including the number of included essays. However, if we take up the spirit of curiosity and resist exclusionary readings as ones of bad faith and misrecognition, it will allow us to consider where we might deepen our study, stretch our political engagement, and peek beyond the horizon of our struggles, toward what Lisa Kahaleole Hall refers to as “the lateral sharing of difference within multiple consensually constructed ‘we’s’” (81). This work is ongoing. The struggle continues.

    This issue opens with “Other Intimacies: Black Studies Notes on Native/Indigenous Studies,” a grounding conversation between Chad Infante, Sandra Harvey, Kelly Limes Taylor, and Tiffany Lethabo King that stretches across multiple exchanges, continents, and itineraries between Black Studies and Native Studies. After these scholars push beyond the confines of multiple fields to extend our collective investment and to tarry with Blackness as more than an agon for thinking sovereignty, belonging, and indigeneity, Sarah Fong’s “The Grounds of Encounter: Racial and Colonial Discourses of Place” historicizes the ongoing struggle against colonial geographies of separation and extraction in the 19th century United States and 21st century solidarities between Native and Black peoples at the Sogorea Te’ Land Trust on traditionally Chochenyo and Karkin lands in the San Francisco Bay Area. By troubling the temporality of association, Fong resists the cleaving of Black Studies and Native Studies that fuels the settler imaginary and racial illogics to meditate on placelessness as co-constitutive of Black and Native experiences and renderings. In “The Politics of Witchcraft and the Politics of Blood: Reading Sovereignty and Sociality in the Livingstone Museum,” Alírio Karina presents witchcraft as an object and cosmology that troubles the colonial and anthropological tendencies of contemporary African Studies. Examining witchcraft objects held at the Livingstone Museum in Zambia, Karina reflects on indigenous-coded claims to territory, custom, and Africanity, and offers a critique of limited readings of witchcraft that move away from the materiality of its real cosmologies, readings that reflect a colonizing tendency, arguing instead for the agency of Indigenous Africans who exceed their postcolonial containers in pursuit of sovereignty. Where Karina engages Indigenous Africans as disruptive of colonial framings of African identity and belonging, Paul Joseph López Oro’s articulations of Black Central America on the isthmus and its diasporas build on centuries of anti-Black racism and genocidal erasure to argue that Garifuna New Yorkers of Honduran descent are marked by their transgenerational differences and bounded by a “Garifunaness” that seeks to disrupt hegemonic Latinidad and refashion Afro-Latinidad through indigeneity. Sandra Harvey offers another framing of the spatialization of Black and Native life through epistemological, phenomenological, and metaphysical turns. Like Fong’s “placelessness,” Harvey’s notion of unsettling moves us to think about the binary of Black displacement, which Katherine McKittrick refers to as “ungeographic,” in “Unsettling Diasporas: Blackness, Solidarity Ethics, and the Specter of Indigeneity.” As Fong does in her work on Black and Native solidarities and resistance, Joy Enomoto situates the work of Melanesian women artists and activists to push our thinking of material solidarity and political possibility. “Black is the Color of Solidarity: Art as Resistance in Melanesia” articulates Black Oceania and the Black Pacific as bounded sites of possibility that are thought materially, and not merely as conceptual containers for inter-community epistemologies and praxis. Zoé Samudzi’s incisive engagement, “A Paradox of Genocide Recognition,” thinks across solidarity and recognition with another refractive reading of history. Offering a comparatively political assessment of Germany’s legal response to the 1904–1908 genocide of the Nama and Herero indigenous Africans the Civil Rights Congress’s 1951 We Charge Genocide petition to the United Nations, Samudzi names anti-Blackness as the litmus case and limit of modern understandings and acknowledgements of colonial genocide, arguing that the result is a deep paradox of recognition that is not only commensurate with Black death, but renders it a pre-requisite. Concluding the volume is a generous afterword by Keguro Macharia, “Afterword: Across Difference, Toward Freedom,” that furthers the call to listen, to attend, and to dwell in and across these seemingly divergent contexts in order to pull together through-lines and repetitions toward a collective understanding of the anti-Blackness that structures this modern world, the Black livingness that exceeds categorization through independent containment away from “the Indigenous” or “the Native.”

    Engaging with the relational lived experiences and struggles of Black and African people in this way may yield a deepening of conversations in which Blackness and Indigeneity are thought about with a curiosity that is not merely transactional solidarity, is not antagonistic, and is not concerned with incommensurability, but rather pushes us to consider shared access to struggles against and experiences of ontological oppression, dispossession, and erasure. This special issue holds together approaches across and beyond the geopolitical, historiographical, or conjectural analysis, beyond literary criticism, visual art, and performance. It’s an ongoing conversation that resists the overdetermination of form and genre and the imposition of rigid forms. Deep gratitude to Postmodern Culture managing editor Annie Moore for her steadfastness in seeing this volume through to its culmination, delayed many times by racialized responses to COVID-19, American insurrections, demands of the neoliberal university, and ecological disaster that in many ways underscored the importance of attending to the matter of Indigenous and Black belonging deeply enough to forge a world that we can ultimately thrive in. Further gratitude to Postmodern Culture editor Eyal Amiran for supporting this effort since it was a burgeoning idea turned conference, and understanding that what might normatively be said to be “historical” work must be stretched when we think materially about what constitutes “history,” given the unfixed temporality and ongoing colonialisms (settler and otherwise) and ongoing catastrophe of racial capitalism and other racisms on Turtle Island, Abya Yala, Mzansi, Europe and other lands.

    Every iteration of “crisis” affords us the opportunity to reconfigure the grounds. Perhaps the time is nigh for us to ask: what, to young children Tree and Delisha Africa, or to the hundreds of precious Native children whose remains are routinely and tragically being discovered in mass graves around residential schools across Turtle Island, is an institutional land acknowledgment? May we continue to trouble the grounds of discipline/disciplinarity, of ontology, of capital, and of w(h)it(e)ness, by nurturing the shoals of transformation (of fields, of possibility) that refuse to settle. 10

    Dr. SA Smythe is a poet, translator, and assistant professor of Black European Cultural Studies and Black Trans Poetics at UCLA, where they are primarily invested in Black belonging beyond borders. They are the guest editor of Troubling the Grounds: Global Configurations of Blackness, Nativism, and Indigeneity in Postmodern Culture, the forthcoming monograph Where Blackness Meets the Sea: On Crisis, Culture, and the Black Mediterranean, and the full poetry collection titled proclivity, which takes up a familial history of Black migration (between Britain, Costa Rica, Jamaica, and Italy), trans embodiment, and Black liberation. Smythe is a statewide coordinating committee member of the faculty wing of California Cops Off Campus (UCFTP) and organizes with students and other comrades in the broader Cops Off Campus Coalition and other abolitionist/anti-carceral groups across Turtle Island and in Europe. Winner of the 2021 Rome Prize, Smythe is currently based between Rome, Italy and Tongva Land.

    Footnotes

    1. I am thinking here of the many recent projects originating in the West that set about to map indigenous territories with the expressed aim to inform “non-indigenous” people about the surrounding occupied lands and their original and ongoing stewards. At the time of this writing, the app and website Native Land (native-land.ca), founded by self-identified Canadian settler Victor Temprano, “strives to create and foster conversations about the history of colonialism, Indigenous ways of knowing, and settler-Indigenous relations, through educational resources such as our map and Territory Acknowledgement Guide.” The project, which features “indigenous and non-indigenous” people, also boasts an ardent community that crowdsources information across the Americas and Europe, and contains almost no Indigenous representation on the African continent. The site privileges “‘Indigenous way of knowing’ when it comes to the importance and sacredness of land,” which begs the question: what are we to understand about what the Indigenous African knows?

    2. On the Land Back Movement, see https://landback.org/manifesto/.

    3. For more on the history and legacy of racial purity and its impact on the relations between African Americans and Native Americans, see the work of Arica L. Coleman, in particular That the Blood Stay Pure: African Americans, Native Americans, and the Predicament of Race and Identity in Virginia.

    4. See Sarah Haley, Nick Mitchell, Shana Redmond, and SA Smythe, “A Statement of Black Solidarity: Cops Off of Every Campus,” written for the California Cops Off Campus Coalition.

    5. See Mudimbe, The Idea of Africa.

    6. The shift “away” is still ever in relation, and the privileging of “Indigenous” throughout this introduction is meant to indicate a set of entanglements including and beyond Turtle Island, that involve land and temporality, which Native Studies, peoples, and possibilities also attend to.

    7. See Tudor, “Cross-fadings of racialization and migratization.”

    8. The latter anti-Semitic and Islamophobic conspiracy developed by white nationalist writer Renaud Camus argues for the existence of an ongoing plot for “white genocide” that is being carried out by replacing the demographics and culture of white Europeans with non-white people, globalized culture, and transnational ideals.

    9. In “Beyond Incommensurability: Toward an Otherwise Stance on Black and Indigenous Relationality,” the introduction to Otherwise Worlds: Against Settler Colonialism and Anti-Blackness, Tiffany Lethabo King, Jenell Navarro, and Andrea Smith outline three typical articulations of the relations between “Black and Native peoples and, by extension, Black and Native politics” as being articulated “sometimes in terms of presumed solidarity or comparison,” sometimes “in terms of antagonism,” and “nowadays … in terms of incommensurability, which asserts a lack of commonality/relationality between Black and Native folks.” They go on to unpack the Glissantian notion of “relation” to move us beyond a binary formation rooted in a white supremacist settler imaginary that maintains the separation of Black and Indigenous communities from one another, by rendering the Native person knowable in a fixed and erstwhile positionality and the Black person unthought, excessive to the point of obscurity, or utterly present without any historical attachment to the land. The introduction goes on to set the intention for their volume, which is to resist the disavowal of this relation and instead to move toward an “approach that does not presume an ‘answer’ but instead seeks to ask question about the complexities of this relation and hence the political possibilities that emerge” (2). Shortly after the time of this writing (May 2021), ongoing controversy about the claims to Native identity finally punctuated mainstream academic consciousness due to the publication of a longform article on the Native claims of Andrea Smith. In many Native (feminist) spaces, this has been an object of vocal concern for over a decade. We cannot ethically ignore this reality, and the untold harms caused. However, I refuse a politics of public disposability for the Black, Indigenous, and Native scholarship present in that volume, which has been truly generative to my thinking, and whose total refutation would in certain instances compound harm and avoid the key contributions of its arguments. Independent of Otherwise Worlds, conversations about the global effects of settler colonialism and the global materialities forged from racism must continue to unfold and not be dismissed along with one individual’s pretend claims to Native identity. In fact, anti-Blackness fuels the untenability and incredulity plaguing Black/African claims to Indigenous belonging around the world, and as such propel the desire to corral scholarship like the work presented in this volume. Questions about embodied, geographic, and most other forms of sovereignty remain.

    10. See King, The Black Shoals.

    Works Cited

    • Coleman, Arica L. That the Blood Stay Pure: African Americans, Native Americans, and the Predicament of Race and Identity in Virginia. Indiana UP, 2013.
    • Haley, Sarah, Nick Mitchell, Shana Redmond, and SA Smythe. “A Statement of Black Solidarity: Cops Off of Every Campus.” Written for the California Cops Off Campus Coalition. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1YQC9I50KdrsK3tt5cQrWFIPossizQisDCisO57Bhoac/edit. Accessed 3 May 2021.
    • Hall, Lisa Kahaleole. “More than ‘Two Worlds’: Black Feminist Theories of Difference in Relation.” Critical Ethnic Studies Journal Special Issue: The Academy and What Can Be Done, vol. 4, no. 1, Spring 2018, 64–83.
    • King, Tiffany Lethabo. The Black Shoals: Offshore Formations of Black and Native Studies. Duke UP, 2019.
    • ———, Jenell Navarro, and Andrea Smith. “Beyond Incommensurability: Toward an Otherwise Stance on Black and Indigenous Relationality.” Introduction, Otherwise Worlds: Against Settler Colonialism and Anti-Blackness, Duke UP, 2020, pp.1–23.
    • McKittrick, Katherine. Demonic Grounds: Black Women and the Cartographies of Struggle. U of Minnesota P, 2006.
    • Mudimbe, V.Y. The Idea of Africa. Currey, 2005.
    • Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o. “Kamau Brathwaite: The Voice of African Presence.” World Literature Today, vol. 68, no. 4, 1994, pp. 677–682. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/40150609.
    • Tudor, Alyosxa. “Cross-fadings of racialisation and migratisation: the postcolonial turn in Western European gender and migration studies.” Gender, Place & Culture, vol. 25, no. 7, 2018, pp. 1057–1072. DOI: 10.1080/0966369X.2018.1441141

  • Notes on Contributors

    Jens Andermann teaches at NYU and is an editor of the Journal of Latin American Cultural Studies. He is the author of Tierras en trance: arte y naturaleza después del paisaje (2018, forthcoming in English from Northwestern), New Argentine Cinema (2011), The Optic of the State. Visuality and Power in Argentina and Brazil (2007), and Mapas de poder: una arqueología literaria del espacio argentino (2000). His current work explores unspecific aesthetics as modes of survival in the inmundo, or earthwide precarity.

    Joy Lehuanani Enomoto is a community organizer, visual artist and lecturer at the University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa in Pacific Islands Studies. Her work on climate justice, embodied archives and demilitarization in the Pacific is featured in Frontiers Journal, The Contemporary Pacific: Experiencing Pacific Environments: Pasts, Presents, Futures, Detours: A Decolonial Guide to Hawaiʻi, Routledge Postcolonial Handbook, and Amerasia Journal. Her current work focuses on anti-Blackness in Oceania/Solwara.

    Sarah E.K. Fong is an Assistant Professor of Studies in Race, Colonialism, and Diaspora at Tufts University. Her research examines the entanglements of schooling, self-making, and racial-settler capitalism in the late-nineteenth century. Dr. Fong has published work in American Indian Culture and Research Journal as well as Amerasia Journal.

    Sandra Harvey is Assistant Professor of African American Studies at the University of California, Irvine.

    Chad B. Infante is a post-doctoral fellow and assistant professor of African American and Native American literature in the English department at the University of Maryland, College Park. Chad earned his doctorate in English from Northwestern University in 2018. Originally from Jamaica, his research focuses on black and indigenous US and Caribbean literatures, gender, sexuality, critical theory, and political philosophy.

    Alírio Karina is a Postdoctoral Fellow in the Archive and Public Culture Research Initiative at the University of Cape Town, and Associate Faculty at the Brooklyn Institute for Social Research. Their research examines how the idea of Africa is the product of the legacies of anthropology, and what it might mean to do African studies—and to think Africa—in ways autonomous of anthropology.

    Tiffany King is an Associate Professor of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at Georgia State University. She is the author of The Black Shoals: Offshore Formations of Black and Native Studies, Duke University Press, 2019.

    Kelly Limes Taylor does many things, including think, mother, teach, and write. She lives in the upper left corner of Georgia, U.S., with her family.

    Paul Joseph López Oro is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Africana Studies at Smith College. His research and teaching interests are on Black Latin American and U.S. Black Latinx social movements, Black Feminist & LGBTQ activism, and Black Queer Feminist ethnographies in the Américas. His in-progress manuscript, Indigenous Blackness in the Americas: The Queer Politics of Self-Making Garifuna New York is a transdisciplinary ethnography on how gender and sexuality shapes the ways in which transgenerational Garifuna New Yorkers of Central American descent negotiate, perform, and articulate their multiple subjectivities as Black, Indigenous, and AfroLatinx.

    Keguro Macharia is from Nairobi, Kenya. Author of Frottage: Frictions of Intimacy across the Black Diaspora, Keguro blogs at gukira.wordpress.com.

    Zoé Samudzi has a PhD in Medical Sociology from the University of California, San Francisco where her dissertation research engaged German imperialism, colonial biomedicine, and the Ovaherero and Nama genocide. She is currently a Postdoctoral Fellow at the ACTIONS Program in the UCSF School of Nursing where she is working on research around transgender health, reproductive justice and autonomy, and material-epistemic violences.

    Tyler T. Schmidt is Associate Professor of English at Lehman College, City University of New York (CUNY) where he co-directed the Writing Across the Curriculum for nearly a decade. His essay “Lessons in Light: Beauford Delaney’s and James Baldwin’s ‘Unnameable Objects’” was published in the collection Of Latitudes Unknown: James Baldwin’s Radical Imagination (2019). The author of Desegregating Desire: Race and Sexuality in Cold War American Literature (2013), he is currently at work on a book about a group of Midwestern writers and visual artists who collectively reimagined queer portraiture in the 1940s and 1950s.

    Dr. SA Smythe is a poet, translator, and assistant professor of Black European Cultural Studies and Black Trans Poetics at UCLA, where they are primarily invested in Black belonging beyond borders. They are the guest editor of Troubling the Grounds: Global Configurations of Blackness, Nativism, and Indigeneity in Postmodern Culture, the forthcoming monograph Where Blackness Meets the Sea: On Crisis, Culture, and the Black Mediterranean, and the full poetry collection titled proclivity, which takes up a familial history of Black migration (between Britain, Costa Rica, Jamaica, and Italy), trans embodiment, and Black liberation. Smythe is a statewide coordinating committee member of the faculty wing of California Cops Off Campus (UCFTP) and organizes with students and other comrades in the broader Cops Off Campus Coalition and other abolitionist/anti-carceral groups across Turtle Island and in Europe. Winner of the 2021 Rome Prize, Smythe is currently based between Rome, Italy and Tongva Land.

  • Radical Friends: Botany and Us

    Erin Obodiac (bio)

    A review of Meeker, Natania and Antónia Szabari. Radical Botany: Plants and Speculative Fiction. Fordham UP, 2020.

    In The Groves of Academe (1952), Mary McCarthy begins her campus novel with a Latin epigraph from Horace: Atque inter silvas academi quaerere verum (and seek for truth in the garden of Academe, Epistle II, ii, 45). From its beginning, academia—the grove of sycamore and olive trees in Attica named after its original landowner Academus where Plato later conducted his lectures—thus fuses figures of man, plant, and philosophy. Yet Epistle II, ii, addressed to Julius Florus, is perhaps no less satirical about academia than McCarthy’s novel: having failed, amidst “so great noise both by night and day,” to deliver some florid verses to Julius, Horace observes dismissively that “poets love the grove, and avoid cities.” Apparently, the garden of academe, as well as the truth, is already beside the point in the first century BCE. At this late hour, nonetheless, professors Natania Meeker and Antónia Szabari of USC speculate on the silvas itself, and wager that the classical monoculture of arborescent man and arborescent philosophy has been uprooted by modernity’s radical botany, which engenders both rhizomatic posthumans and rhizomatic philosophies. Bursting through the centuries-tilled exceptionalism of human life and logos, the strange vitality of vegetality—one that is peculiarly inorganic—animates the speculative fruits of modernity’s science, fiction, technology, and art, according to Meeker and Szabari. Radical Botany: Plants and Speculative Fiction is therefore not merely a new academic book,1 but a rear-guard action that mobilizes critical plant studies to re-imagine the cosmos and cosmotechnics of modern life.

    Perhaps more modestly, Meeker and Szabari also envision radical botany as a practice that cultivates new modalities of research and collaboration within academia itself:

    With our book, we affirm that there is a vegetal dimension to the practice of collaboration. While experimenting concretely with that practice, we were forced to accept that our work process and its outcome were no longer tied to an individual sense of self, nor did they affirm our limits or boundaries as individual scholars. (vii)

    Taking up Deleuze and Guattari’s precepts of “becoming-plant,” “rhizome,” and “follow the plants,” Meeker and Szabari pledge their allegiance to vegetal allies whose mode of being is “neither individuated nor autonomous but collective, swarming, multiple” (xi). This distributive, emergent, non-hierarchical assemblage (whether plant, insect, or technology) has become the familiar of many new materialist discourses in their attempt to invoke a mode of being and relation that deprivileges human subjectivity while expanding the confluence of actants. Is this philosophical shift from Academus the man to Academe the grove—which, according to Radical Botany, emerges in (specifically French) seventeenth-century early modernity—simply a celebratory “turn,” or, more soberly, a “catastrophe”?

    The question can be reframed by taking a quick look at this “radical” of botany whereby plants are our allies and collaboration is itself vegetal. The Online Etymology Dictionary tells us that radical is already and originally a botanical term: “Late 14c., in a medieval philosophical sense, from Late Latin radicalis ‘of or having roots,’ from Latin radix (genitive radicis) ‘root’ (from PIE root wrad ‘branch, root’). Meaning ‘going to the origin, essential’ is from 1650s.” We see that the word radical concerns the root, the chthonic origin, the essence; indeed, the radical concerns the essence of the word, “the root part of a word.” Radical botany is therefore botanical to the roots: there are no Persons, only Plants, in the silvas academi. This confluence of speculative substitutions and supplements is already reflected upon by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in 1782. In the Dialogues, he finds himself foregoing human friends for botanical ones, and laments that “he would have left the supplement for the thing, if he had had the choice, and he was reduced to converse with plants only after vain efforts to converse with human beings” (qtd. in Derrida 148). Suspecting the implications of this predicament over the supplement and the thing for Rousseau’s philosophy and philosophy in general—whether writing in lieu of speech or plant in lieu of human being—in Of Grammatology, Derrida writes: “that botany becomes the supplement of society is more than a catastrophe. It is the catastrophe of the catastrophe.” (148). The irrecoverability of the logos is radical; there is always already only supplement. In Derrida’s landmark reading of Rousseau, “writing will appear to us more and more as another name for this structure of supplementarity” (245) and any gesture to “separate originarity from supplementarity” (243 points to an “originary supplement.” That Rousseau has no choice but to supplement the human being with the plant suggests that the plant is an “originary supplement” or a “radical friend,” if we heed the botanical meaning of the word “radical.”2 Although Meeker and Szabari follow Deleuze rather than being led down Derrida’s phyto-deconstructive garden path, they give to the plant a kind of radical priority that retrieves its peculiar vitality and animation from the margins (no longer mere Aristotelian threptikon or nutritive capacity of the vegetal soul) and dislodges the humanistic imperative from its lofty bell tower (the perpetual echo chamber of reason’s sovereignty). Going further, Radical Botany suggests that the “plant turn” is a companion vibrant materialism, one that signals an emergent phytocene in the wake of the anthropocene: “In its approach to the plant as a figure for the animation of matter in general, radical botany allows us to think the calamity (for us) of human insignificance together with the intensity of our desire for recognition and the dream of multispecies attachments and solidarities” (6). Despite the cosmic dimensions of the Plant Turn, Meeker and Szabari remain close to their disciplinary field and begin their account of radical botany thus “in seventeenth-century France with the gradual development of a botanically oriented thought that accords power and vitality to vegetal life in ways that trouble orthodox modes of classification” (1).

    From Aristotle’s de Anima onward, plant life has often been classified as poor in (or entirely without) intelligence compared to human life, and poor in (or entirely without) perception compared to animal life. Even so, this apparent catatonia and anesthesia have incited speculation that plants point to the limits of understanding life in anthropomorphic and zoomorphic terms. Vegetal lives, write Meeker and Szabari, “compel us to imagine an ingeniously animated and animating matter that we are never able to observe in all its operations. Within this framework, the plant becomes capable of unleashing speculative energies for envisioning and indeed participating in the world as other than it may appear to us” (3). The poverty of vegetal life incites our imagination to envision other worlds, or rather, becomes a nonhuman speculum that supplements human imagination. Meeker and Szabari observe both the “tradition that conceives of vegetal life as resisting representability” and the insight that plant life “participates in the production of new representational modes, including the novel, early cinema, and contemporary virtual reality, and new affects, including queer desires, feminist affinities, and ecological solidarities” (2). The birth of a “vegetal subject” hence occurs in arabesque tandem with a vegetal modernity that models a new representational framework for animated matter.

    For seventeenth-century (French) materialist thought, plants offer “a mode of life that is entirely immanent,” that is to say, “without a hidden or transcendent animating principle” (16). Taking as their example satirical narratives (from libertins eŕudits such as Cyrano de Bergerac) that carnivalize the dignity of the human person via plant figures that are both scandalously libidinal and indifferent, Meeker and Szabari see these works as a kind of Copernican turn for the order of life, whereby the plant is the exemplar of an entity “both vibrantly alive and fully material” (16) that “not only works as a tool with which to undermine anthropocentric narratives but as a key figure for the material life of the universe” (29). Yet, in an ambivalent gesture that becomes a strategy for their book as a whole, Meeker and Szabari begin the early chapter “Libertine Botany and Vegetal Modernity” with the works of Guy de La Brosse, who founded the Jardin de Roi, a kind of research garden expanding the (human) knowledge of plant chemistry for philanthropic purposes (botanical remedies for the poor). We see that this garden of the king is not only tethered to the scientific, social, and economic order of its time, but that La Brosse “retains the notion of the soul as an animating force” (ascribed to each individual plant), which leads Meeker and Szabari to the half-hearted concession that his “position is not a materialist one” (34). Attempting to recuperate the botanist’s exuberant assertion that plants, “the daughters of the earth,” are the first living things to receive the cosmic shower of “divine benediction,” Meeker and Szabari insist that “[i]f La Brosse invokes a divine rationality for being, he does so in order to give plants priority over all other forms of life” (36). This priority not only concerns the plant as an animated (ensouled) being but an animating being: the incorruptibility and immortality of the plant soul is made manifest, claims La Brosse, in experiments with palingenesis. The spectral scene of the ghost plant resurrecting itself from the ashes is deftly interpreted and linked by Meeker and Szabari to future technologies of visual materialization: “if this scene looks back to a tradition originating in alchemy, it also looks forward to techniques of animation three hundred years in the making—the time-lapse films of late nineteenth-century science and early cinema that animate the plant in an electric form” (39). Although perhaps no twenty-first century observer would see experiments in pallingenesis as an exhibition of the immortal, incorruptible soul of plants, making them a precursor to cinematic animation poses some questions: does not a (revisionist/retroactive) reading that turns something into a precursor suggest a teleological conception of history (Hegelian unfolding of spirit, etc.)? Does not any regime of visual representation—whether ghost plant rising up from the ashes in a glass vial or electric plant blossoming forth in time-based media—rely on a transcendental signified?

    In order to manage the complications that arise in a materialist reading of the plant as a vegetal subject and the emergence of a vegetal modernity, Meeker and Szabari mobilize speculative fiction as a genre and methodology. They designate “speculative fiction—narratives of life and sociability that go beyond anthropocentric and anthropomorphic limits” (48)—as vital materiality’s genre and the plant “as a key figure for the material life of the universe” (29). Yet Cyrano de Bergerac’s fantastic tale of the talking cabbage, for instance, though it might mock the dignities and illusions of the human person, does not make the “truth” of matter or vital materiality accessible.3 We might also see the peculiar vitality accorded to plants as more properly linguistic: according to Barbara Johnson’s Persons and Things, talking cabbages serve better to demonstrate the way rhetorical strategies like apostrophe, prosopopeia, anthropomorphism, and personification turn things into persons (and constitute human persons, in the first place). Radical Botany‘s chapter 3 sub-section “Plant-Human Analogies in the Eighteenth Century” directly addresses rhetoric by observing that eighteenth-century botany tends to anthropomorphize plants in order to put into question the hierarchies and categorization of various orders of life. The physiology and function of plant parts are likened to those of animals, suggesting “the development of a radical materialism that attacks ontological distinctions among life-forms as contested matters of belief rather than accepted truth” (58). And yet, in order to do so, botanists of this period had to give to the plant what belongs to the animal, particularly movement. This recuperative gesture did not go ignored by eighteenth-century materialists like Denis Diderot. Meeker and Szabari remark that the “tendency to privilege free will and autonomy of movement as sources of superiority is reconfigured by Diderot as a symptom of our inability to ascribe value to life-forms that do not resemble us” (59). In signature fashion, the structural arc of Radical Botany redoubles its own analysis: as early modern (French) speculative fictions turn to plants to explore the material life of the cosmos, they institute, on the one hand, a trajectory that includes cinematic animation as a form of life, and reinstitute on the other the manifest behaviors (primarily movement) of animal life as that which makes plants “alive.” This ambivalent framework helps to account for the disciplinary fractures and sutures of Radical Botany: for Meeker and Szabari, the early modern libertins eŕudits premediate early 20th century avant-garde cinema even as their materialist fictions remediate the philosophical terms and principles of classical philosophy (distinctions between plants and animals, materiality and immateriality, organic matter and inorganic matter).

    What mediates this double premediation and remediation? The chapter on “The Inorganic Plant in the Romantic Garden” tells us, unsurprisingly, that Romanticism provides the mediation, configured as mutuality. The Romantic botanist imagines a “plant life that is vibrant on its own terms yet exquisitely responsive to human interests and preoccupations” (88). Taking Percy Bysshe Shelley’s poem “The Sensitive-Plant” as exemplary, however, Meeker and Szabari suspect that the Romantic plant’s sensitivity may be more of the order of photosensitivity than affective affinity for the human being: the wild and indifferent vitality of weeds runs amuck after the tandem expirations of gentle Lady Gardener and her cultivated garden companions. Vegetal life cares naught for the human person, but shares proximity with “modes of animation and vitality unrelated to and undefined by organisms and the life that they embody” (86). The photon-sensitive-plant will, by the twentieth century, find its true soul mate in the techno-photosynthesis of the cinema. Meeker and Szabari trace this alliance by way of a “detour through a North American tradition of speculative botany. … [Edgar Allan] Poe’s texts in particular will be of inspiration to French symbolism (including the poetic arabesques of Charles Baudelaire) and, through this line of transmission, early avant-garde French cinema” (87). In The House of Usher, Poe takes heed of the dark side of the plant—its creeping excess, its slimy vitality, its evil flowers, its horrifying indifference—which casts an alien shadow on any sense of human temporality, achievement, or society. The crowning glory of human reason is no match for “the sentience of all vegetal things” (Poe, qtd. 98), which invades the human kingdom, penetrating even its inanimate structures and artifacts, engendering a vital mineralogy. In Poe’s macabre view, plants represent not only an inhuman vitality, but an undead or inanimate one as well. The uncannily green luminosity of the swamp bespeaks the electric glow of the emergent cinema and shares in its phantasmatic animations. As the “inorganic life” of the vegetal overtakes the house of Usher, Meeker and Szabari observe that, “[un]like much Gothic fiction,” this villain does not represent a “paternal authority turned cruel and terrifying but a force or mode of life that dissolves this authority altogether. In the process, vegetality is revealed as the agent of the disintegration of genealogies that should otherwise preserve distinctions according to a familial logic” (109). Meeker and Szabari see the fall of the house, the oikos, as ushering in a potential phyto-politics, one with feminist possibilities.

    Like other gestures in Radical Botany, grounding a feminist politics upon the vibrant materiality of the vegetal is pursued with speculative ambivalence. Taking up a short story influenced by Poe—Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s “The Giant Wistaria” (1891)—Meeker and Szabari propose that

    continuities between Poe’s and Gilman’s writings suggest that the materiality of the vegetal can contribute to the speculative invention of feminist topographies that do not necessarily have recourse to the privileging of female or feminine identity. Within the limits of a critique shot through with white supremacism, Gilman nonetheless suggests some of the promise Poe’s vision of vegetal contamination could hold for feminism. (111)

    Attention must be given to this word “nonetheless,” which occurs in Radical Botany 171 times, most tellingly in the title of the final chapter, “Becoming Plant Nonetheless.” The term habituates a recuperative strategy that is rhetorically innocuous in some cases—serving to uncover the compatibility of apparently incompatible alternatives—and politically charged in others. In the above example (the term’s twentieth deployment in the book), “nonetheless” allows for a problematic salvaging. Many readers have learned that phrases like nonetheless, in spite of, or nevertheless mask a more consequential “because of.” We may wonder why Meeker and Szabari’s analysis doesn’t take a different path—perhaps mapping out any link between the materiality of the vegetal and racism—or worry that only a white feminism could ever salvage a critique enmeshed with white supremacy. The “promise” of the transfer of vegetal vitality from the non-human to the human in new materialist discourses is a speculative performance that we should keep both our eyes on. Meeker and Szabari appear to have one eye on the situation when they write:

    The figure of the horrific plant, both supporting and dismantling the house, suggests a feminist rewriting of Poe’s “Usher,” but it is important in this context to acknowledge the racist and classist aspects of Gilman’s corpus, including the fact that her public critique of patriarchy remains imbued with xenophobia. (111)

    If the promise of radical botany has fraught political limits, it (nonetheless?) retains speculative and critical energies with regard to “scientific, technological, and mediatic engagement with vegetal life” (113). Meeker and Szabari regain a note of hope when the final chapters of their book turn to early twentieth-century experimental French cinema (Jean Comandon, Jean Epstein, and Germaine Dulac), which “takes the possibility of a vegetal sentience and transfigures it, suffusing it with transformative affect, to make it once again a joyous and galvanizing object” (113). The sign of this vegetal sentience is plant movement made visible with such techniques as time-lapse cinematography. The cinema not only animates the plant in this fashion, but also shares with it a kind of inorganic life: “[t]he ‘electric plant’ brings to fruition the concept of cinema as a form of pure movement” (115) and “the movement of the plant comes to stand for cinema’s ability to show (and transmit) the liveliness of the universe” (116). The cinema is itself a form of vegetal life, which is paradigmatic of vital materiality for Meeker and Szabari. As we have seen, however, the indifferent vitality of vegetal life can easily take root in politically problematic narratives: indifference is not a condition or consequence of equality. So when Meeker and Szabari deploy another “nonetheless”—this time with a chapter that begins its exploration of “the vegetal moment” in cinema with Abel Gance’s critical and commercial failure La Fin du monde, a film about the Earth’s collision course with a comet that “only features plants tangentially” (115) but is “nonetheless a spectacular exploration of the social repercussions of the impending cataclysm” (114)—readers might be keen on understanding which disavowed narrative or framework embeds this recuperative nonetheless.

    In a strangely passing remark, Meeker and Szabari mention the “deeply eurocentric idealism” (114) of the film “even as” it “harkens back to an Enlightenment universalism” (114). It appears that the void carved out by the cataclysmic impact of the comet enables a “newly universalist political order” that leaves “an Edenic earth from which most human life has been erased” (115) and is, in effect, a eurocentric void. As Meeker and Szabari proceed to their presentation of the vegetal moment in interwar French cinema, they intend “both to embrace and to rethink the social project with which cinema is so clearly invested in La Fin du monde,” stating that “vegetal life often does the work that the comet is meant to undertake in La Fin du monde: bringing about momentous social transformation” (115). Readers may wonder: does the opening up of the vegetal world by early (French) cinema with its delightful time-lapse photography (etc.) happen by way of a racialized excavation? In the case of the electric-plant, the carving out of its life-world might not happen “in spite of” a framing narrative of white supremacy or eurocentrism—more likely it happens as a technological determination of the cinematic apparatus—yet we may recall Walter Benjamin’s observation that cinema prepares the human being for cybernetic relations of all sorts.4 A machinic mode of animation informs the inorganic life of the cinema as well as the plant. For instance, Meeker and Szabari poetically express the way time-lapse techniques “create an ‘electric vegetable,’ a filmic ghost that moves and gesticulates in uncanny but compelling ways. A phantom of the cinematic apparatus is thus born, a stunning animated plant” (120). Making visible the slow movements and temporalities of the vegetal, the cinema does not turn the plant into an animetaphor, but unveils the machinic animism of the cosmos. If the heliotropic opening of daisies, the dandelion blooming, and the germinating grain of wheat—movements performed without volition, perception, or consciousness—share an affinity with the animating movements of the cinematic apparatus, they also signal “the dramatic loss of the world of human experience” (144).

    The penultimate chapter, “Plant Horror: Love Your Own Pod,” attends to the anxieties concerning this plant takeover and a planet absent of the human being. Shifting their focus from interwar French cinema to post-WWII American horror movies set in Southern California (in particular, the Invasion of the Body Snatchers franchise), Meeker and Szabari up the ante with their strategy of the nonetheless: in a world of vegetal and flat ontologies, what does it matter if you are a human being or a pod-person? Bypassing a possible racial allegory in the takeover of suburbia by alien pods, the authors set forth a materialist valuation of the merits of becoming-pod. In a world that is always already capitalist, neoliberal, and global,

    the world of the replicas, or bad copies, is not just alienating or melancholic—a zone of nostalgia for an absent original—but is a fully material world capable of transforming, producing, and reproducing itself. The pods are thus not only representatives of the workings of an increasingly rhizomatic capitalism. The film preserves a materialist aspect, in which matter is not only instrumentalized but also world-making in its own right. (165)

    This vibrant matter releases human inhabitants and

    redeems them from a drab existence. It is the latter experience that our materialist reading of the film underscores. Gradually, the images of flaccid, plantlike humans are reinjected with an excess of life, thanks to the invasion; the alien beings bring with them the promise of not only biological vitality but a vigorous efflorescence that can be substituted for the failed utopia represented by the multiethnic and multicultural but well-policed and ultimately fairly homogenous San Francisco. (165)

    This failed utopia concerns the university as well as the city: in the silvas academi, posthuman and nonhuman materialisms like radical botany promise to reinvigorate dialectical, historical, and other “outdated” humanistic materialisms. Yet if “coanaesthesis” (124) is the modality of collaboration modeled by vegetal life, do we really want to be anaesthetized together, living in synaesthetic oblivion like peas in a pod, Body Snatcher style? Is not this Green Coma or Green Catatonia just as disturbing as the eco-fascist human-plant symbiosis exhibited in the recent Swedish film Midsommar or in the 1973 American film Soylent Green? Doubling down on its speculative optimism, Radical Botany leaves us with the chapter “Becoming Plants Nonetheless,” and one can’t help but wonder from where it derives its amiable buoyancy: as long as it is plant-based, I may want to try some myself.

    Erin Obodiac Erin Obodiac received her Ph.D. in Comparative Literature from the University of California, Irvine and has held teaching and research appointments at the University of Leeds, SUNY Albany, Cornell University, and SUNY Cortland. She currently lectures in the UC Irvine-Dalian University of Technology joint program. Her writings assemble residual questions from the deconstructive “legacy” with emergent discourses in technics and animality, media ecology, and machinic subjectivity. She is completing a book called Husserl’s Comet: Cinema and the Trace, which repositions deconstruction within the history of cybernetics and machinic life.

    Footnotes

    1. As scholars of French literature, Meeker and Szabari don’t mention that the German word Buch comes from the word for beechwood trees.

    2. In The Politics of Friendship, Derrida follows this predicament of the “o my friends, there is no friend” (2).

    3. Catherine Malabou’s recent critique of speculative materialism and new materialism notices that matter is the new transcendental signified.

    4. Benjamin writes: “Film serves to train human beings in apperceptions and reactions caused by the interaction with technology [Apparatur] whose importance in their lives grows almost daily” (qt. in Hansen 314).

    Works Cited

    • Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology. Edited by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Johns Hopkins UP, Fortieth Anniversary Edition, 2016.
    • —. The Politics of Friendship. Translated by George Collins, Verso, 1995.
    • Hansen, Miriam. “Benjamin and Cinema: Not a One-Way Street.” Critical Inquiry, vol. 25, no. 2, Winter 1999.
  • “This book … of traces and tremors, if book it be”

    Cory Austin Knudson (bio)

    Taussig, Michael. Mastery of Non-Mastery in the Age of Meltdown. U Chicago P, 2020.

    In Mastery of Non-Mastery in the Age of Meltdown, anthropologist and ethnographer Michael Taussig confronts the reciprocal problems of theorizing and representing climate change. In this, he joins a popular strain of contemporary environmental humanities literature that examines how modeling the environment analytically or artistically limits or expands the ways we can think about, and perhaps mitigate, climatic catastrophe. Much of the work in this tradition tends to keep its models at arm’s length, using sober, scholarly analysis to master the myriad representational forms of climate change. It straightens out—in theory—the disorder of a world on the brink without letting theory itself become infected by such disorder. Taussig, by comparison, seeks to meld analysis with its object, making his text both product and agent of epistemic meltdown. Mastery of Non-Mastery in the Age of Meltdown (hereafter Mastery of Non-Mastery) in this way combines ecocritical and ecopoetic practices; it attempts to reshape, mutate, and parody the scholarly monograph in a bid to derive a form of expression commensurate with this surreal, volatile age of meltdown.

    Taussig’s correspondingly surreal and volatile text might at first appear a gimmick, where writing erratically mimics erratic weather patterns, as it were. But Taussig insists elsewhere that “while it is hazardous to maintain a mimetic theory of language and writing, it is no less hazardous not to have such a theory” (“Corn-Wolf” 33). For him, the distance assumed between the subject and object of scholarly analysis together with a presumed epistemic stability form the foundations of much traditional academic writing. As such, academic criticism often mirrors and reinforces the ideology of Man’s mastery of nature—or, more academically, of subject matter—while concealing the role of narrative (or what Taussig more approachably terms “storytelling”) in the perpetuation of such a disastrous pretense. Taussig has thus cast his “apotropaic writing” as a “countermagic” to this hegemonic mode of thought and language (“Corn-Wolf” 32–33).1 Mastery of Non-Mastery presents his latest attempt to tap into the meeting point between reality and representation, where the “meltdown of the language of nature swamps the nature of language” (174).

    Thus opposed to what he calls the “crabby and secular language” (56) of much contemporary environmental literature, Taussig variously situates Mastery of Non-Mastery as “somewhere between science fiction, high theory, and the weather” (3), a “book … of traces and tremors” (20), “a firefly moment navigating between light and dark” (57), “a too-late experimental ethnography” (120), and “a threshold between a theater and a book” (180). Nowhere does he employ the language of structuration and utility so normalized in works of theory. This “book that is not a book” (180) does not build anything. Nor does it seek to furnish its reader any theoretical tools. Rather, Taussig’s preferred models are dancing (16) and the meandering flight of a firefly (95). The salience of such images is apparent immediately on opening Mastery of Non-Mastery in the Age of Meltdown, which spans nineteen brief chapters laid out in discrete blocks of text that recall a collection of vignettes composed of aphorisms. The staccato rhythm of its format mirrors the way that ideas and intertexts are made to waltz and flit through the book’s pages, often disappearing suddenly only to reemerge in new combinations ten or fifty pages later. Lines of argument meanwhile cross and re-cross such that the author’s central concepts are gradually fleshed out more through creative patterning—or the layering of textures, or the thickening of an atmosphere—than by way of the gradual construction of a theoretical edifice. How else, he asks, should one write about a planetary condition where “nature turns more surreal each day with ominous green-yellow vistas and bluer-than-blue skies while the snow falls one day, rising the next as mist, stripping us naked as pixies as the cosmos draws close” (19)? Taussig here sets himself the task of philosophizing with the Nietzschean hammer, which resonates with its object so as to first match and then shatter its spell. This form of writing necessitates a way of reading that departs from what one might expect of an academic text. Like the figure on its cover, Taussig’s audience is meant to juggle rather than grasp his many tongue-in-cheek coinages—what he calls “‘shamanic tropes,’ such as ‘knowing what not to know,’ ‘the re-enchantment of nature,’ ‘the skilled revelation of skilled concealment,’ ‘the bodily unconscious,’ and of course the lead dancer itself, ‘mastery of non-mastery’” (34).

    A book devised to put its reader off-kilter leaves the reviewer in a predicament. On the one hand, I can give myself over to Taussig’s circuitous, often baroque style and attempt to do justice to the experience of reading his latest work by recreating it in miniature. On the other, I can set the juggling balls down and soberly attempt to taxonomize the performance at the expense of the intoxicating movement that gives it meaning in the first place. While the reader of this review need not fear (much) indulgence in theatrics, the temptation toward mimicry in this case is hard to resist. This impulse arises in part from Taussig’s compelling case against the ideology of Man’s exception from and dominance over nature and the scholarly mode of analysis that often ends up mirroring and reinforcing it, even for the most eco-conscious of critics. But mostly it comes from how powerfully the text conveys its central thesis on the contagious power of mimesis, which becomes the most enchanting of Taussig’s “shamanic tropes” and forms the gravitational center of his intellectual galaxy in general.

    Mimesis emerged as a theoretical and methodological point of departure early in Taussig’s career by way of his ethnographic studies of the indigenous peoples of the Putumayo River Basin in Colombia. Starting in 1969, the Guna and others whom he lived among during his fieldwork—and to whom he has returned every year since—challenged Taussig’s self-described “western, middle-class life” and destabilized the “moorings that, up to that time, I thought I required for sociological reckoning” (37). Taussig’s life’s work became to understand and convey to those beyond the Putumayo Basin how sympathetic magic formed the foundation for thinking about and managing social, political, ecological, and even cosmic entanglements. Since the early 1980s, he has consistently figured shamanic practices of ritual contagion and duplication in terms of mimesis. Through the metonymic process of taking a part for the whole (e.g., taking blood or hair to represent the person whom a ritual is to affect), or the metaphoric process of fabricating or conjuring a ritual copy (e.g., crafting a likeness of the person whom a ritual is to affect, or taking on that person’s identity via performance or possession), sympathetic magic draws on a deep-seated mimetic faculty that Nidesh Lawtoo described in this journal as an “unconscious that responds viscerally to fluxes of affective contagion that operate on bodies and minds.” Taussig similarly terms this simultaneously intellectual and physical conatus the “bodily unconscious” (11–12, 73). Following the Guna, Taussig casts the bodily unconscious and the mimetic fluxes of affective contagion that operate on and through it as foundational to the very fabric of reality itself.

    Mimesis thus represents for Taussig not only an atomic element of human sociality but also the metaphysical axis of art, technology, religion, language, politics, and nature itself. Its centrality to Taussig’s thought and methodology helps us to understand why his works present themselves as forms of mimetic ritual. Mastery of Non-Mastery is no exception in this regard. However tiresome the reader may sometimes find this cultivated grandiosity—showmanship and shaman-ship for Taussig are, if not identical, then at least inextricably intertwined—Taussig’s perspicacity and style attest to the pervasiveness and self-perpetuating momentum of the mimetic faculty. In reading his work, one can feel that mimesis designates the impulse to copy as well as the impulse to generate copies. Such generative processes naturally “lead to snowballing metamorphoses” (44), including the metamorphosis of his text’s readers (and its reviewer, and the reader of that reviewer, and …) into participants in the ritual.

    “In other words,” Taussig writes, “mimesis has an inbuilt propensity to provoke a chain reaction in which things become other things in a process of mimetic fission … This I call the ‘metamorphic sublime’” (44). Via this “metamorphic sublime,” Mastery of Non-Mastery deftly synthesizes the affective flux of the bodily unconscious with the principle of generalized planetary interconnection now largely taken for granted among environmental scholars, while at the same time literalizing what Taussig elsewhere terms the “re-enchantment of nature” that the recent ontological and nonhuman “turns” in the humanities have called up (40, 42, 144, 176). “Global meltdown amplifies mimetic and animistic impulses as never before,” he declares (5). As such, it becomes reasonable to ask whether “we are now becoming like the soothsayers of old”:

    Are we now becoming like ancient stargazers each night asking the heavens whys and wherefores? Do we not sense our animal selves, our plant selves, our insect selves, all of that and more as an angry sky beats down, our bodies resonant with hitherto unknown liaisons as foreign beings skid in from the unknown? Suddenly we are alive in our bodies as to stellar influence and solar wind when all goes dark once more but for fireflies, epitome of the newly animate world, reminders of chances missed, others to catch, roadside flares of pixilated consciousness.(61)

    In this way, Mastery of Non-Mastery implicitly mobilizes a common criticism in environmental humanities discourse, especially vis-à-vis the colonial trappings of the Anthropocene and the principle of all-pervading planetary interconnection that heuristic has popularized. Bluntly: indigenous people have theorized these kinds of things long before Paul Crutzen and Eugene Stoermer came along. And they have worked out elaborate ways of channeling the mimetic relays that form the warp and woof of human-nonhuman entanglement. “Weather magic,” Taussig reminds us, “is as old as the hills” (125).

    Taussig’s point that we must now come to terms with a broad-based re-enchantment of nature in all its marvels and horrors begs the question: what is to be done? This is where his central thesis on the contagious power of mimesis, its tendency to compound its own momentum, and its entanglement with the bodily unconscious at the intersection of “my body, your body, and the body of the world” really begins to throw sparks (11). With due reference to Nietzsche’s hammer become tuning fork—which, “touching the idols of culture, echoes their hollowness, thereby destroying them” (13)—Taussig gradually fleshes out the notion of “mimetic excess,” that tendency whereby any copy always generates some volatile residue or remainder. This is the true potency of sympathetic magic: the shaman not only mirrors something or someone, but engenders a creative refiguration thereof. Because magic ritual resembles a sort of cybernetic relay where output retroactively affects input, this creative refiguration has the capacity to turn back and affect its original. He explains this process via the 1955 short, quasi-ethnographic film, Les maîtres fous:

    The film concerns migrants of the French colony of Niger enacting in trance the spirits of French officials, seen now in black bodies gesticulating wildly and disjointedly, eyes rolling, spume frothing from their mouths. They enact mini-dramas of transgression and of military discipline. … They eat dog and they carry (toy) rifles. They exult in the exercise of mastery over craven subjects crawling on the ground. The crucial point is that the bodies in trance are and manifestly are not the French officials. The bodies mimic, yet the result is not without parody, and parody (as Steve Feld once pointed out) is mimesis with one aspect accentuated, which is all you need for mimetic excess. Yet even without accentuation, to be mimed is disconcerting. These men and women from Niger, part of the Hauka cult, thus bring out the wildness, the spirituality, and—most important—the sheer bluff their masters enact in the colonial theatricalization of mastery in general. … To mime is to get the power of what is mimed and power over it. (8)

    Les maîtres fous was banned in Niger and then in British-controlled African colonies for its perceived insult to colonial governorship. Taussig’s reading exposes the powerful transgression in this “insult.” The Hauka cult’s performances reveal an uncomfortable truth about the performative nature of colonial governorship itself, namely that it “is a matter of guile, of foxes as well as of lions, [of] what Hubert Murray, a colonial governor in Papua in the early twentieth century called ‘administration by bluff’” (13). This is the showman-shaman magic of political power in general, the magic trick of political power. And yet, because “mimesis exists no less in the actual events than in their depiction, in the reality as much as in its representation” (131), the mimicry of the Hauka practitioners as captured in Les maîtres fous retroactively reshaped the reality it both copied and parodied. It revealed the magic (trick) of colonial governance precisely through the creative refiguration thereof. This, according to Taussig, is the “trick whereby tuning forks become hammers” (15).

    Of course, mimetic excess has both a liberatory and a repressive side. The viral power of those mimetic relays operating in and through the bodily unconscious are just as likely to generate fascistic formations as subvert them. This is all too obvious today, Taussig argues, in the way that Donald Trump has been able to feed off of the visceral, affective power of racial resentment and patriarchal bluff, conjuring a following that would have been close to unthinkable in mainstream American thought even half a decade ago. “Trumpism [is] a shorthand for the sleight-of-hand theatricality of today’s politics” (35) he says, a condensation of “what I have shamanically in mind regarding dodge and feint and a larger-than-large theatrical presence verging on the grotesque that is magical if not sacred” (37), and “all the more impressive for being semi-conscious, at best” (39). Donald Trump indeed looms large over Mastery of Non-Mastery as the fascist showman-shaman par excellence. The nexus of the presidential Twitter account, the right-wing media echo chamber, and the ever more deranged following all feed on one another and give credence to Taussig’s thesis concerning the particular “magic of the presidency” (36) and the dark metamorphic sublimity it has called into being. Taussig here affirms Lawtoo’s point that

    mimetic behavior, just like the mythic tales that incite it, cuts both ways, depending on the model we mirror: if it can potentially turn a specific citizen into a model of resistance at a distance from power, it can also turn a democratic assemblage into a neofascist crowd under the hypnotic power of a leader’s pathos.

    Similarly, David Joselit’s more recent argument in October shows how the viral structure common to both the current pandemic and to the spreading and attribution of fake news (habitually mobilized by Trump) is cancerously mimetic, making COVID-19 so catastrophic in the US. But where Lawtoo gestures toward “what Nietzsche called a ‘pathos of distance‘ to diagnose the spiraling loops generated by the swarming of mimesis” and Joselit calls for a move to “re-authorize information … in the face of our world gone viral” (161), Taussig suggests no such stepping back. The task instead is to “mimetically match the magic sustaining fascism, which, like the fortress, is best tackled not from outside but from within” (16).

    This is a gutsy move that will likely earn him critics, sounding as it does like a call to stem the rising tide of fascism by, in a sense, jumping in and swimming with the current. It therefore doesn’t surprise me that Taussig, an avid student of the works of Georges Bataille, does not explicitly cite that thinker’s attempt to conjure up an antifascism based around the very same sort of détournement of fascist mimesis via the infamous Acéphale secret society and its eponymous, short-lived publication. Bataille’s invocation of a surfascisme that would ritualistically tap into and redirect the affective pull of reactionary forces earned him some of his most resounding denunciations, and remains a source of continuing confusion and misrepresentation today. Turning from politics proper, Taussig’s project makes a more modest proposal. He calls it “art versus art”:

    What sort of art is that, you ask? Well, not to put too fine a point on it, it is certainly not ideology versus truth, nor discourse versus counterdiscourse, but an art of sorcery-speak in a world gone rogue, piling on the negative sacred in which nature speaks through animate impulse and mimetic relays. Whatever the terms, paramount will be the pulse between bodies as America is made again. (144)

    Not putting too fine a point on it, indeed. In any case, there is no direct invitation to congregate in a secret grove around a dead tree struck by lightning to work out the terms of a human sacrifice (though Taussig does enigmatically refer to that acéphalic, lightning-struck tree of legend in chapter thirteen). Rather, a renewed art of “sorcery-speak” takes center stage, exemplified in certain works of Walter Benjamin and the “tremor-writing” that “draws upon and enacts corporeal tumult” (152) embodied in Marcel Proust’s In Search of Lost Time.

    In laying out how these authors are able to generate their characteristic, almost proprioceptive affect—which Taussig argues is crafted to operate on and through the bodily unconscious—Taussig demonstrates his powers as a reader of literature. Some of the best pages in the book engage his own hypnotic strain of ecocritical textual interpretation. Moving through the final paragraphs of Benjamin’s “On the Mimetic Faculty” or some passage from “Combray” with Taussig as guide is both pleasant and enlightening. Taussig’s language on occasion makes the book live up to its claim of being “a book of traces and tremors.” His prose, however, occasionally becomes as obfuscating as it is illuminating, and is sometimes overblown and clunky. He uses the phrase “they be” and variations thereof—”Shadows of life, they be” (100), “Those eyes, great black holes they be” (173), “Soul mates they be” (116)—with maddening frequency throughout the book. Far from lending the language a kind of sacred weight, this and similar idiosyncrasies end up distracting and frustrating this reader.2 Additionally, and at a less granular scale, Taussig’s rapid shifts in focus and tendency toward digression make even his most profound analyses less effective than they could be. While I understand what he is trying to do with his Nietzschean hammer and apotropaic countermagic, I still wonder what insights a more sustained engagement with his interlocutors would yield. This is exacerbated by the fact that his two favored exemplars of the kind of tremor-writing necessary for “art versus art” are writers who spend hundreds of pages elaborating a single idea or image.

    Then there are the interlocutors themselves. Taussig’s reviewers tend to point out that he appears to refuse, on principle, any sustained engagement with contemporary scholarship, preferring instead to stick with the tried-and-true cast of Benjamin, Proust, Bataille, and select others who, by and large, belong to the intellectual and literary canon of the Global North. He manages to avoid criticism for this pantheon not only because of his almost preternatural ability to generate fresh and audacious readings out of otherwise well-worn texts, but also because his profound investment in the ideas and practices of the indigenous cultures he studies allows him to unsettle the intellectual purview of dead-white-European-dom that often characterizes works of high theory. Mastery of Non-Mastery, though, largely leaves aside the second half of this formula. This is the work’s most significant shortcoming. Taussig makes frequent reference to the people, ideas, and experiences that populate the sub-equatorial half of his life and work, and he conveys a cutting if largely implicit criticism of the often parochial “flood of green books, freshly minted journals, essays, research grants, talk shows, films, fellowships, political campaigns, and endless conferences on the Anthropocene” (56). But Mastery of Non-Mastery itself features no truly sustained engagement with non-Western thinkers or texts, no first-hand testimonies, and not even any direct quotations from those among whom he lives when not in New York City. Walks around New York, in fact, take the place of journeys through the Amazon rainforest, and conversations with East Coast friends take the place of, for example, the conversations with the shaman Santiago Mutumbajoy around which Taussig built his watershed work, Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man (1987).

    One additional absence bears noting: the reader of this review has likely noticed my disappointment at the sudden, precipitous turn from the political point about occupying and redirecting the affective forces driving the current fascist resurgence to the more aesthetic project of crafting a kind of “tremor-writing” à la Benjamin and Proust. Given Taussig’s strident and often crushingly incisive comments on the current political landscape, a more directly political articulation of what is to be done in this “age of meltdown” seems called for. All the more so because Mastery of Non-Mastery is dedicated to “a Green New Deal,” and its first quotation is from the democratic socialist New York congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. Taussig seems to indicate—albeit under his breath—that the current fitful growth of a mass politics to the left of the Democratic Party might well be the political embodiment to match—and undo—the magic sustaining fascism. This would be a fascinating, bold, and productive argument against the dominant left-conservatism that sneers at “left populism” and pines for a return to “normal,” that asks us to step back from the flux of the metamorphic sublime and reinvest ourselves in traditional institutions of knowledge and power while fascism gains an ever-tighter grip on the bodily unconscious of the American socius. But alas, all this is only a trace, only a tremor, in Mastery of Non-Mastery in the Age of Meltdown. To its credit, that is precisely what the book claims to offer in the first place.

    Cory Austin Knudson Cory Austin Knudson is a doctoral student in Comparative Literature and Literary Theory at the University of Pennsylvania. His work focuses broadly on modernism and the environmental humanities, with emphasis on the function of decomposition in both literature and ecology. His essay, “Seeing the World: Visions of Being in the Anthropocene,” has been recently published in Environment, Space, Place. With Tomas Elliott, he is currently translating Georges Bataille’s The Limit of the Useful, a preliminary manuscript to The Accursed Share, for MIT Press.

    Footnotes

    1. Taussig writes, “I have long felt that agribusiness writing is more magical than magic ever could be and that what is required is to counter the purported realism of agribusiness writing with apotropaic writing as countermagic, apotropaic from the ancient Greek meaning the use of magic to protect one from harmful magic” (“Corn-Wolf” 32–33).

    2. To be clear, I am aware that this kind of pirate- and/or Yoda-speak is a stylistic quirk that, in general, reviews of scholarly works might gloss over or outright ignore—but in order to take seriously Taussig’s own wish for his language to be “not a tool of representation but a way of being what the writing is about” (170), I feel obliged to make mention of it.

    Works Cited

    • Joselit, David. “Virus as Metaphor.” October, no. 172, 2020, pp. 159–62.
    • Lawtoo, Nidesh. “The Swarming of Mimesis: A review of William Connolly, Facing the Planetary: Entangled Humanism and the Politics of Swarming.” Postmodern Culture, vol. 28, no. 1, 2017.
    • Taussig, Michael. “The Corn-Wolf: Writing Apotropaic Texts.” Critical Inquiry, vol. 37, no. 1, 2010, pp. 26–33.
  • Reasons for Self-Dislocating

    Miriam Jerade (bio)

    A review of Cadahia, Luciana, and Ana Carrasco-Conde, editors. Fuera de sí mismas. Motivos para dislocarse. Herder, 2020.

    This edited collection features contributions by Spanish-speaking women scholars who share the same motif—self-dislocation. The eleven authors seek to question the locus of philosophy and the discourses that frame it. The book is founded on the idea that philosophy has been historically enunciated by a male voice located in an Anglo-American geography. As the editors claim in the introduction, the self-dislocating logos is a loxos, a “taking away,” being mis-placed. This is reflected in the title of the volume, Fuera de sí mismas (Out of Their Minds), a play on words that echoes the language of mania but seeks to redress it as contrary to nonsense. Editors Cadahia and Carrasco-Conde propose that this form of collaboration allows women philosophers to claim back for themselves a voice of their own. The play between title and subtitle is also worth noticing. The title phrase “fuera de sí mismas” leads the reader to think of a judgment from outside—a female “they” who is “out of their mind” or even more literally “out of themselves.” The subtitle can be read as a response. There are indeed “reasons for dislocating” (“motivos para dislocarse”) the self, for making themselves uncomfortable, or self-dislocating. The contributors find themselves in a place where the voices of Spanish-speaking women philosophers are not heard. In response, the authors collectively claim the need to be creative and to dislocate the discourse. As Cadahia and Carrasco-Conde state in the introduction, “Only by being out of our minds/ourselves can we dislocate imposed places of enunciation that have turned aside our way of making philosophy, so we can open up new paths for a new logic” (“Solo estando fuera de sí mismas podemos desquiciar lugares de enunciación impuestos que han relegado nuestra forma de hacer filosofía y encontrar los caminos de una nueva lógica”; 18).1 It is not enough to publish philosophical research conducted by women in Spanish; more significantly, the collection explores a new logic of philosophical discourse through their interventions.

    The volume was not originally conceived as a collection of chapters focusing on feminism or on Latin American philosophy. The editors asked eleven renowned Latin American women scholars to send them texts about their current work. While the volume is not organized thematically, common topics arise in the essays. Anna Maria Brigante and Emma Ingala Gómez explore the image. Laura Quintana and Amanda Núñez García examine the possibility of political thought through aesthetics. María del Rosario Acosta and Rosaura Martínez Ruiz share a concern with the performativity of listening. Rocío Zambrana, Nuria Sánchez Madrid, and Macarena Marey critique liberal and neoliberal policies. In their respective essays, Ana Carrasco-Conde and Luciana Cadahia write about evil and desire.

    The originality of the book lies in the way all the contributors read canonical—and mostly male—philosophers and theorists from a situated standpoint. Zambrana interprets the debt crisis and the resistance of students in Puerto Rico through the lens of Walter Benjamin’s divine violence. Acosta reads political violence as an erasure of voice in Adriana Cavarero and in Ariel Dorfman’s novel La muerte y la doncella, which deals with torture in the Chilean dictatorship. Quintana writes about unburied corpses in Colombia, using Rancière and Mbembe as interlocutors. The contributors do not merely apply male theorists’ ideas to a particular question but take up a particular lens to read theory otherwise. Taken together, the various situations they bring into play question the locus of philosophy. For example, the subversive resistance of students in Puerto Rico allows us to better understand why divine violence is a destruction of history and how it is conceived as an expiation of debt in mythical violence. A character in the work of a Chilean author writing about the country’s dictatorship who has experienced torture in relation to their voice can shed light on the political dimension of listening, the acoustic dimension of violence, the horror produced by silencing, and even the effect of drowning out the voice.

    Fuera de sí mismas is based on modern philosophical-theoretical assumptions that pair with political concerns as a response to injustice. Cadahia reads desire in Antigone as a transgression of normativity. Her reading questions Hegel’s and Žižek’s interpretations of Antigone as well as feminist interpretations by Butler, Honig, and Copjec, which are situated in an Anglo-American context. Cadahia shows the difficulty of thinking about the feminine, taking into account the norms and hierarchy instituted by sexual difference. Cadahia writes:

    If there is something really revolutionary in the feminine, if there is something that capitalism cannot capture, it is precisely the feminine’s place in sexual difference as the discourse of Not-All, a discourse that detotalizes the place of feminine desire when it assumes its own right to materialize in public life. [Si hay algo realmente revolucionario en lo femenino, si hay algo que el capitalismo no logra capturar es justamente su lugar en la diferencia sexual como discurso del No-todo, un discurso que destotaliza el lugar del deseo femenino cuando asume sus propios derechos a materializarse en la vida pública.] (211)

    Sánchez Madrid explores suffering caused by capitalism in the work world. Taking as her starting point a sense of time that tends to a commodification of an “exhausted mind and crushed body” (“mente exhausta y cuerpo molido”; 342), her exploration leads her to question Adorno and critical theory. Marey explores consensus and consent as vehicles of normativity in Kant’s theory of the social contract, and shows, against Rawls, that the social contract is not a covenant made by self-interested pre-political individuals but by political communities with a legal normativity. The social contract is not founded in the individual categorical imperative of an idealized rational agent but in the formation of agency and collective will in the doctrine of law that founds political community. Discussing O’Neill and Darwall, she concludes that theories of social contract become exclusionary structural systems because of their ambition to universality as an ideal consensus.

    Writing from Colombia, Quintana focuses on the topic of corpses. Finding inspiration in the artistic installation “Cadáveres indisciplinados” (“Undisciplined Corpses”) by Colombian artist José Alejandro Restrepo and also in Mbembe’s theory of necropolitics, she assumes that politics masks the corpse because the life of the political body depends on the production of dead bodies. Images play a major role in the way bodies—and corpses—are made visible or invisible. Corpses distress us but they can also help us to think emancipation anew because of their ability to persist, to affect us, to make their testimony audible. In contrast to the virtual or theoretical, corpses possess a very real existence in a country such as Colombia, where missing persons number in the tens of thousands. As Quintana writes, one should “expose oneself to the call of so many defeated bodies, deprived of their possibilities; of so many deaths and lives forgotten here and now, again and again, in Colombia.” (“Exponerse al llamado de tantos cuerpos derrotados, desposeídos de sus posibilidades; de tantas muertes y vidas olvidadas aquí y ahora, una y otra vez, en Colombia” [103].)

    The reader should not look for a single answer to the problem of violence in this book, but a series of responses emerges throughout the chapters. Violence is understood not only as the legitimate or illegitimate use of force by the state but as a force against political, economic, and social injustices, including the structural epistemic injustice in mainstream philosophy that has silenced conversation conducted in Spanish. Writing in Latin America, some authors in the book link the inaudible nature of horror to this epistemological silencing, relating it to silencing that appears as a drowning out of the victims’ voices, their witnessing. Martínez Ruiz, writing from a psychoanalytical point of view, exposes the political dimension of listening and describes how listening to someone who has experienced trauma can subvert or provide healing from that trauma. This form of listening can become a counterpart to the experience of being silenced. As Acosta points out in her commentary on Ingala Gómez’s text, one possibility is “to subvert and question the criteria for visibility and intelligibility through which things (bodies, senses, modes of existence and articulation) appear to us.” (“Subvertir y cuestionar los criterios de visibilidad e inteligibilidad mediante los cuales las cosas (los cuerpos, los sentidos, los modos de existencia y articulación) se nos aparecen” [84].) Acosta’s philosophical point raises the question of whether the conversation, and further publications related to it, should be broadened to include other groups that have been marginalized in these discourses—Black and indigenous women, for example. These voices are badly needed; their absence in academic philosophy is poignant.

    This reviewer is a Latin American woman academic writing from Latin America. Racial and class structures inherent to the region’s research and university system become even more obvious when reading this volume. Fuera de sí mismas fits into the practice of academic writing while questioning the nature of academic structures in our region. Academic culture in Latin America does not expect an explicit, genuine critical exchange; the full weight of the notion of “intellectual authority” falls on the noun rather than on the adjective. Cultural ideas about critique consider it almost akin to a personal insult. Additionally, the expectation is that scholarly work in male-dominated research institutions in Latin America—and elsewhere—will be carried out by an individual, especially in the field of philosophy. This volume goes against those assumptions. Each text comes with a commentary by another woman scholar, and their commentaries take a somewhat careful tone, demonstrating a refusal to engage either in praise or in disdain. The exchanges generally read as a conversation between friends, although a few of the commentaries question or criticize the argument of the chapter they are assigned. The reader is left to wonder whether this reflects academic cultures in which a debate between peers is not expected. The chapters by Zambrana and Acosta, who work in the United States, are distinct in this respect. They seem to reflect a process of extended discussion and rewriting, which may be found in their work environment but is not as characteristic of Spanish- speaking academia. This is a salient feature in other chapters in the book, where the overall argument is not explicit. A different tradition of academic discourse may be at play here. This may also be shown in the use of language in Carrasco-Conde’s chapter, which presents an array of the polysemic and grammatical possibilities that Spanish carries with it.

    Fuera de sí mismas. Razones para dislocarse allows a first encounter with important voices from Latin American and Spanish language philosophy. The approach is explicitly feminist but the standpoint is nuanced. A voice of their own does not result from the space women have won in academic structures but rather from the hard work of questioning frames of intelligibility. As the editors state in the preface,

    The fact that women have broken into the discipline of philosophy gives no assurance on its own that women will develop a voice of their own. This is due, in great part, to the fact that the feminine is not tied to a biologization of our bodies. This is why developing a women’s voice requires a patient labor of thought and language, a labor that consciously makes possible a place of enunciation of our own. [La irrupción de las mujeres en el ámbito de la filosofía tampoco garantiza, de manera automática, la consolidación de una voz propia. En gran medida esto se debe a que lo femenino no está atado a una biologización de nuestros cuerpos. Por eso nos parece que la voz de la mujer es algo que exige un trabajo paciente desde el pensamiento y la lengua, un trabajo que de manera consciente posibilite un lugar de enunciación propio.](18)

    The creation of this discourse requires a new place of enunciation that will let “those historically silenced voices” (18) into academic discourse and thought, and will allow the witnessing of other lives—those marked by suffering, loss, grief, erasure of memory, debt, precarity, and exclusion.

    Miriam Jerade Miriam Jerade is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the Faculty of Liberal Arts, Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez, in Santiago de Chile. Previously, she was an assistant professor at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México and the Ivan and Nina Ross Fellow at the Katz Center for Advanced Judaic Studies in the University of Pennsylvania. Recent works include articles on political readings of speech act theory, Derrida’s reading of the death penalty, and representation and sovereignty in Franz Rosenzweig and Jacques Derrida. Her first book is Violencia. Una lectura desde la deconstrucción de Jacques Derrida (Metales Pesados, 2018).

    Footnotes

    1. All translations from Fuera de sí mismas. Razones para dislocarse are the author’s.

  • Idyllic Visions of the Past and/or the Death Drive? Right-Wing Responses to a Crisis of Futurity

    Adam Dylan Hefty (bio)

    A review of Nilges, Mathias. Right-Wing Culture in Contemporary Capitalism: Regression and Hope in a Time Without Future. EPUB, Bloomsbury Academic, 2019.

    Something is different about time in late capitalism. Whatever this something is, it has intensified with the fall of 20th century communism, the increasing financialization of capital, and the return of anti-systemic, sometimes anti-capitalist social movements. In the pauses between the flashes of these movements, cynicism and hopelessness abound in the intellectual space where a left should be. The canard, “It is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism,” has become a common sense, world-weary truism, while environmental, health, political, and economic stability melt away into a series of crises that render something that feels like an end of the world ever easier to imagine. The last two decades have seen a rising tide of right-wing forces ranging from nationalist governments, fascist street movements, militias and stochastic terrorism to decentralized conspiracy theories. Our moment in history feels all at once sped up, wrung out, in a series of real and spectacular crises, rapidly changing, profoundly stuck.

    In the last several years, a lively discussion has been taking place about the temporality of late capitalism in critical theory and radical political circles, beginning perhaps with Jonathan Crary’s 24/7: Late Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep and Massimiliano Tomba’s Marx’s Temporalities. Some of this work, like Sami Khatib’s The Time of Capital and the Messianicity of Time, has also turned to the Frankfurt School, particularly Benjamin and Bloch. This problem of the temporality of capital is an ongoing theme of Mathias Nilges’s work in essays and in an edited volume, The Contemporaneity of Modernism. His 2019 book, Right-Wing Culture in Contemporary Capitalism: Regression and Hope in a Time without Future is a compelling contribution to this literature. Nilges straddles academic literary theory and a more popular engagement with the contemporary moment, theorizing the way our ability to imagine historical progress (or even a resolution of various quickening catastrophes) seems to be blocked.

    Nilges’s work crosses disciplinary boundaries to engage discussions that have otherwise developed separately. The argument here crosses through Crary’s expansive notion of the drives of capitalism that seem to speed up and compress the experience of time, left debates about the “end of history” following on and in opposition to Fukuyama, the question of imagining an end of capitalism, and debates about the politics of nostalgia. This poses a framework that brings together seemingly disparate aspects of the experience and politics of time in late capitalism. Nilges’s conceptual map of late capitalist time and his unpacking of a Blochian mode of engagement with this moment are vital contributions of Right-Wing Culture.

    Bloch and nonsynchronism

    Nilges mobilizes Bloch to argue for an engagement with contemporary culture that understands fascist tendencies as coopting romantic, anti-capitalist instincts for a program that safeguards capitalism. Under different historical circumstances, these instincts could possibly turn in a different direction. Bloch is a somewhat underappreciated associate of the Frankfurt School; his work has seen neither the steady readership of Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse, nor a Benjamin-type “moment” – though interest has quickened enough that perhaps, the Bloch moment is happening now. Several of Bloch’s works have not been translated into English, and common glosses emphasize his intellectual distance from other Frankfurt School thinkers. Nilges emphasizes Bloch’s influence on and relationship with key aspects of Adorno’s thought, especially the critical nature of Bloch’s concept of utopia.

    One of Nilges’s primary conceptual tools, unpacked in chapter 2, is Bloch’s concept of nonsynchronism. Bloch uses nonsynchronism to analyze a “temporal plurality of the present” in which people in different social locations can have radically different experiences of the same moment. Subjects rendered as consumers in the information age may feel that we are lagging behind a rapidly advancing now that somehow involves endless innovation without any possibility of structural change – the long now of late capitalism. Liberal intellectuals may feel a sense of crisis in futurity itself, in the ability to feel a sense of hope. Others, feeling left behind, may revive a “reactionary attachment to previous moments in history, either by way of nostalgic idealization or by turning toward remnants of prior social, economic, and political structures that continue to exist in the present.” Nilges understands this turning towards the past as the fundamental drive of right-wing thought. Workers whose skills have been rendered obsolete may experience an “objective nonsynchronism,” while personal refusal of the now, in various forms, would constitute “subjective nonsynchronism.” A dialectical understanding of nonsynchronism can also lead us to pay attention to “latent possibilities that lie dormant in the now,” seeing the past not as a time of loss to be redeemed but as a time of “the incomplete, the foreshortened, and the unfulfilled.” This last sense of nonsynchronism provides a critical space for hope in the midst of threats of fascism: the “not yet” (ch. 2).

    The Long Now

    Nilges frames nonsynchronism and shows some instances of it in the introduction / chapter 1, “All We Have is Now,” which uses the story of the 10,000 Year Clock, also called The Clock of the Long Now, to explain this peculiar working of late capitalist time. The Clock is a project, with several prototypes already in existence, to build a huge clock in west Texas designed to keep working for 10,000 years. The makers explain the concept in terms of the common worry, in business and political circles, that short-term thinking has become dominant in our culture; they want to prompt us to consider what it would mean to think long-term about the future, on the scale of a civilization. On the face of it, this may seem like an optimistic, well-intentioned ambition, but the project’s funders, such as Jeff Bezos (who also owns the land designated for the clock), are titans of late capitalism with a clear agenda for the future. Their vision, Nilges argues, is not really a future at all, but a long now stretching ahead indefinitely. It is full of technological innovation and maybe some tweaks to promote sustainability, but it is of a piece with the basic power structures of late capitalism; it is a way of thinking about the future that forecloses fundamental change.

    Another example of this foreshortened futurism is an exhibition that appeared at several North American museums, “Massive Change.”

    Massive Change markets a revolution, yet it is neither a revolution that will take place in the future nor one that requires our participation in order to be actualized. As it turns out, the revolutionary change that the exhibition showcases is not a matter of future possibility. Rather, it has already happened—and we somehow missed it. … We seem to be lagging behind our own now.(ch. 1)

    We just have to get better at interacting with this changed present as consumers and participants in global civil society.

    [T]he present is the time of a long now of free markets and of technological innovation, of a designed world that already contains all of the answers that we need to solve the world’s problems and that is ready to empower us. In such a time, we do not need to look ahead. We just need to catch up. (ch. 1)

    Our recent generations have all experienced this crisis of futurity. Francis Fukuyama’s 1989 gloss of “the end of history” was optimistic about a post-historical, democratic, capitalist now; but the real pivotal moment since then was 2008, which wiped away neoliberal optimism but couldn’t find anything to replace it, placing us in what Peter Thompson identifies as a “Gramscian interregnum.” Another contributing factor here is a financialization of the economy in which risk, and the future itself, are rendered as commodities to be traded in the present, closing spaces for critical analysis and inquiry. Everything in our lives has the potential to be abstracted and monetized, including “leisure time” and intellectual and emotional aspects of our lives (ch. 2).

    Nilges’s readings of cultural trends are often sharp, such as his interpretation of “metime” as a capitalist phenomenon that only seemingly contradicts late capitalism’s valorization of everything. Commentators have recently discovered the value of letting one’s mind wander freely – within certain confines. But “me-time” “is not the opposite of work time. It is the extension of it” (ch. 2) that allows the human participant in the system to recharge, do some rudimentary self-care and self-maintenance, and stay plugged in to techno-capitalism. Taking time for oneself in this fashion turns out to be something like corporate wellness trends – a way of making the social crises of intensified forms of exploitation, insecurity, and the valorization of everything into problems fit for privatized, individualized coping mechanisms.

    Why the right, now? Romantic anti-capitalism

    Nilges develops a Blochian reading of a central paradox of our times in chapter 4, asking “how we can make sense of the fact that a large-scale economic crisis that lays bare the inequality and exploitation on which capitalism rests gives rise more readily to a right-wing turn than to Left critique” (ch. 4). Central to the answer is the right’s ability to grip and exercise the politics of representation. Centrist liberalism (represented here by Francis Fukuyama’s recent work and by Justin Trudeau) takes its own identitarian turn in response, developing an ethos of “larger collectivities” as an answer to the ethno-state nationalism of the right; but this answer is unconvincing. Fascism, while superficially anti-capitalist, is developed as “a crucial aspect of the Right’s function as a safeguard for capitalism,” forming an alternative to a neoliberalism which has clearly lost much of its hegemonic force. Meanwhile, young people turn to fascism instead of Marxism, according to this account, because fascism represents them, even if its anti-capitalism is a cruel lie (ch. 4).

    The right’s ability to dominate these representational debates despite the limited appeal of openly fascist politics is wrapped up in a broader “romantic anti-capitalism” which “rejects aspects of the capitalist present and advocates for the return to an idealized, better past” (ch. 4). (Perhaps we should add “romantic anti-neoliberalism and anti-globalism” as well, since many critiques of capitalism both on the right and on the liberal left criticize its neoliberal form, implying that we might turn or return to a more humane variant.) Bloch describes a program of “backward rejuvenation” floating around, which Nilges sees today in doomsday prepping and off-the-grid living narratives. These notions may seem barely political and mostly benign, but they often stir up notions of racial purity and male primacy. A later section develops the idea that the rise of finance capital has resulted in the full abstraction of (potentially) every sphere of life; nostalgic idealizations of a life that is concrete, in touch with nature, provide a counterpoint. The myths that accompany romantic anti-capitalism frequently provide the grist for reactionary nostalgia and fascist impulses. However, we should not reject myth altogether, for Bloch. Myths also contain what Bloch calls “the utopian light of comprehended futurity” (qtd. in Nilges, ch. 4) – a potentially subversive core that can be recovered.

    Revitalizing the past and/or the death drive

    Nilges develops his most detailed engagement with right-wing thought in chapter 3: the “new paternalism” of Jordan Peterson. Peterson is a good example for this kind of right-wing thought that looks to the past, whether to concrete norms of traditional masculinity or in more vague appeals to ancient wisdom and religious allegories (ch. 3). Nilges offers a persuasive interpretation of Peterson’s attack on postmodernism. Completely uninterested in the history of the concept, he instead “reduced it to ideas of pure relativism,” taking ideas like “pluralism, diversity, and play [as] mere code words for chaos and disorder.” Through a reading of postmodern literature, Nilges shows that what Peterson probably gets about postmodernism, at least intuitively, is that anti-paternalism and an abolition of the father narrative were central aspects of its project. Peterson’s central thrust, on the other hand, is to be a strong daddy figure for a generation of young men who feel lost and adrift. Peterson analyzes this loss and drift as a kind of temporal homelessness, encouraging nonsynchronism via a critique of the chaotic present. Nilges reads novels from the 1980s onward to ground this analysis of the new paternalism in a longstanding cultural narrative about a crisis of fathers and fatherhood.

    This is a compelling reading of Peterson and of one strand of the new right. Nilges’s reading tends to sidestep current left debates over whether current far right forces should count as fascist; he is interested instead in some of the common reactionary moves in “mainstream” right-wing nationalist politicians, right-wing thinkers, and receptions of novels and cultural moves. His use of Bloch suggests that these moves do share something with historical fascism, though Nilges is careful not to overextend the parallel. However, because Nilges engages closely with Peterson and not with other right-wing thinkers, there’s an odd way in which Peterson seems to stand in for the entire cultural project of the right here. As I write this in late 2020, Peterson has been mostly missing for several months, after dealing with months of health problems involving extreme diet, prescription drug addiction, double pneumonia, and COVID-19; he is apparently under the supervision of his daughter in Serbia. Daddy’s not doing so well these days. His erstwhile spiritual sons continue bumbling off in different directions.

    A gesture of recovering the past is common to most forms of right-wing thought; however, that aspect is in tension with others. For example, if we were to look at contemporary eco-fascism, we would find a strand of the right that sees the past as unrecoverable in the present – at least until we have gotten to the other side of a large-scale, in their view historically necessary genocide. This is, of course, an extreme example, but many forms of revanchism understand their own object as a “lost cause.” Many parts of the contemporary right are obsessed with death and destruction – the flip side, perhaps, of educated, liberal cynicism and “doomscrolling.” A current of Trump supporters know that Trump won’t be able to achieve his promises, whether they blame it on capitalism or on a deep state conspiracy; they just want to see him own the libs and fight for them. The emergence of stochastic terrorism has included lone incel-type shootings and the Boogaloo movement’s attempts to accelerate a civil war. There are many variations, but all these figures have to one extent or another given up on Jordan Peterson or at least on the hope of a conservative restoration that he represents. They’ve given up on the idea that straightening their room is going to lead to a more ordered life, or they’ve given up on getting a girlfriend, or they’ve given up on getting policy “wins”; to generalize, there is a desire to see the other suffer before it all ends.

    Nilges perhaps missed an opportunity to discuss this aspect of the right in his discussion, at the end of chapter 4, of right-wing takes on Chuck Palahniuk’s novel Fight Club. The move to lionize traditional masculinity and some images of pre-industrial labor is certainly part of what is going on here – but this is something of a secondary gesture compared to the well-developed practices of blowing stuff up and fighting. Nilges says that fascists have misread Palahniuk’s novel as a celebration, as “frequent references to the making of soap out of the parts of the human body … should be easy giveaways of its critique” (ch. 4). I’m pretty sure the fascist guys who lionize Fight Club noticed the soap and thought it was cool. The smarter ones probably noticed that it might have been meant as a critique and didn’t care. The author is dead, after all, and daddy’s in a coma somewhere in Serbia.

    These variations of the right that are more obsessed with death and destruction than they are with the past pose a problem for Nilges’s argument. There are ways that he could deal with it, and he mentions a couple of them in short asides. However, the general Blochian trajectory of his argument in almost every chapter is that fascism is obsessed with recovering an imaginary past that can’t be recovered; instead, we need to look at what is missing in the present, so that we can find these other incomplete hopes in the past. One can imagine how that might work with reference to a misty-eyed, mythical form of right wing thought that is obsessed with recovering the magical, paternalist past and that believes it is more or less possible. Meanwhile, sections of the right know that the paternalist past isn’t directly recoverable, at least on this side of some apocalyptic event, and some of them are gearing up for a Mad Max death drive, complete with the guns and muscle cars. Of course, this destructiveness can hardly be separated from the paternalism, because the vision of life for the few on the other side of the apocalypse is usually some kind of a small, paternalistic ethno-state with lots of old-timey labor, just as Nilges suggests. One could add a section that would analyze the parallels and differences between right-wing fascination with the apocalypse and the cynical liberal who takes pleasure in the horror of watching it unfold. Still, to the extent that parts of right-wing thought are animated by the death drive more than by hopes of redeeming their culture and manhood in the present, the Blochian move of salvaging something from the wreckage becomes trickier to imagine.

    In addition to the death / destructive drive and the urge to recover the past, we should also consider the basic motivations of conspiracy theory, as QAnon and related formations have become an integral part of the right. Here again, the feeling seems to be that something has gone wrong in the present compared to a simpler, better past. But the drive is less to recover the past or dominate the future with destruction and accumulation by dispossession, more to investigate endlessly “what is really happening” in the present. A rationalist practice of uncovering truths might assume, rightly or wrongly, something about the character of a political change that would follow from knowing those truths. Some critics see QAnon as more akin to an immersive alternate reality game, the purpose of which is not to create change external to itself, but to propagate itself as a mode of living and thinking that uses pseudo-scientific “research” to divorce itself from testable reality. Again, while idyllic images of the past are present in this structure of feeling, they do not necessarily constitute its dominant drive.

    Undoing right-wing thought from within

    Nilges develops the utopian suggestion in Blochian thought in chapter 5, which considers how we might look at the past without nostalgia. His critique of intellectual cynicism was compelling, and I find myself quite sympathetic to the main idea. I wish that he would sketch out more examples of what it would look like to make these moves, not only in novels but in other cultural contexts or political movements. Conceptually, Nilges’s argument seems open to a couple of different interpretations. It might be that romantic anti-capitalism constitutes a broad form of cultural reaction to capitalism. Given certain conditions and stances, romantic anti-capitalism could develop in the direction of nostalgia, paternalism and fascism. A critical, utopian radical might be able to look at the past and find – within some of the same common resources of romantic anti-capitalism but also in different, suppressed sources – stories of resistance and lost dreams that could be revitalized, to different effect, in the now.

    At times, Nilges suggests that Bloch would go a lot further. “There lies positive potential even in fascism [that] may be rescued and turned into a basis for progressive politics. … Blochian thought … seeks to undo fascist thought from within while simultaneously engaging in an examination of the limits and possibilities of Marxist thought and politics” (ch. 5). Nilges doesn’t really unpack what Bloch might have meant by this with respect to historical fascism. Most of his examples of engagement with the common, romantic anti-capitalist source material do not engage directly with right wing thought. Right-Wing Culture approaches the debate over whether we should “listen to Trump / Brexit voters” (and be empathetic towards those voters’ economic grievances rather than understanding these voters and racists and semi-fascists to be isolated and defeated) from something of a meta standpoint. Nilges’s general stance seems to be that we should understand the emotive core and historical resonance of the right-wing move. We should consider the economic grievances that constitute the core of objective nonsynchronism, while understanding the mythology of the right as an enveloping mode of thinking that is very seductive but that is also not historically necessary; it can be resisted culturally as well as politically. While many supporters of the right might be racists and semi-fascists, we need to understand the thinking that is pulling so many people into romantic anti-systemic thought that ultimately shores up capitalism, since racism and fascism are not so easily defeated by logic or electoral numbers.

    This meta-take makes a real contribution to the discussion. However, there are a few places in the text where the argument tends in the direction of a first-order “listen to the economic grievances of Trump and Brexit voters” approach:

    it is precisely because the Right knows to use the widespread rejection of the long now to its advantage that it is able to successfully poach disillusioned voters, including potentially Left-leaning voters who demand a politics that addresses the contradictions of contemporary capitalism and who believe to have been politically abandoned.(ch. 2)

    These passing, foreshortened suggestions of first-order engagements with right-wing grievances feel underdeveloped, especially given the extensive literature criticizing left discourses that start with “listening” and end up taking right-wing starting points for granted. There are other things that “undoing fascist thought from within” might look like, but I am left wondering what they might be.

    Indigenous speculative futurity and thinking with Nilges

    One of the final sections of the book finds resonance for the Blochian, critical utopia in recent indigenous speculative fiction that makes use of non-linear temporalities; this is to me the most compelling of Nilges’s sections of literary analysis. As I write this in late 2020, much of California has been burning, for weeks, in a fire season that seems to have stretched out by several months. Indigenous land management techniques of learning how to live with fire and the forests, long subsumed or forgotten, are becoming lively subjects of inquiry with an eye to something like utopia or at least survival. This seems like an instance where the Blochian move feels promising – reaching into the past, to a way of living with the land that was not allowed to be, to learn what it has to say to the now about creating a future where we could live together.

    Right-Wing Culture offers a conceptual map of temporality and political culture in late capitalism that invites the reader to think with it and consider additional factors beyond those Nilges analyzes. The post-2008 anti-capitalist left and anti-racist upsurges are largely absent from Nilges’s account. Nilges offers good critiques of centrist, liberal discourse. The animating spirit of the book is of course well left of that, and the Occupy movement gets a shout out in a section title, but radical left movements do not appear concretely. As a broad generality, the twenty-first century left has not generated many ambitious, utopian projects comparable to those of nineteenth and early twentieth century lefts; the left is still, now, like the left Bloch analyzes, better at offering a rational critique of society than at engaging with dreams of a better world. Nevertheless, recent social movements have used practices of demandlessness (Occupy) and have generated broad visions that are far beyond next-step proposals—movements, arguably, including Black Lives Matter, the Standing Rock community defense movement, and even Democratic Socialists of America. It would be interesting to examine how these movements engage with visionary, dream-like, immediately unachievable possibilities, and how new left visions of a future relate to defensive battles and piecemeal gains that often seem to be the immediate horizons of possibility.

    Nilges says that the time of the long now of late capitalism generates a feeling that we are behind our own now and must catch up. How it does so may be very uneven, and this is a rich area for further analysis. Particularly, colonialism and post-colonialism have long generated feelings in their subject populations that they are behind and must catch up (or, in some instances, that they are behind and can never catch up). This dynamic can be found in the whole of modern colonialism, long predating finance capital and the speed-up of a technological innovation. It has taken on new dynamics in this era, as some postcolonial elites embrace the idea that a long now of innovation and capitalism potentially levels the geographic playing field while other populations seem more resolutely excluded than ever.

    The conceptual map of Right-Wing Culture contains some coordinates that remain fuzzy and invite debate, but these do not detract from the rich and suggestive nature of the project. Nilges’s efforts to sketch out the moves of a Blochian critique for the current moment and his way of schematizing late capitalist temporality in relation to political and cultural practices are well worth thinking with. His call to recognize the “end times” feelings of our moment as perhaps in fact the death throes of capitalism and to find the lost threads of hope in the midst of reaction and the sense of being stuck are worth heeding.

    Adam Dylan Hefty Adam Dylan Hefty is an Assistant Professor in the Core Curriculum program at Prince Mohammad Bin Fahd University (Al Khobar, Saudi Arabia). He holds a Ph.D. in History of Consciousness from the University of California, Santa Cruz. Recent works include essays on right-wing responses to climate change and on the history of mood disorders. He is working on a manuscript that traces a genealogy of the connection between practices of managing work and mental health.

  • Fictionalizing Marx, or Towards Non-Dialectics: Baudrillard and Laruelle

    Jonathan Fardy (bio)

    Abstract

    This essay offers a comparative reading of the post-Marxian work of Jean Baudrillard and François Laruelle, arguing that both thinkers seek to establish a way forward for theory that remains faithful to the spirit of Marxism without reaffirming dialectics. In order to do so, both turn to the concept and strategy of “fiction.” Their fictionalized Marxian theory intervenes in reality in the form of writing without reaffirming the dialectical presumption that the Real and concept can be exchanged. To fictionalize Marxism in non-dialectical terms repudiates the logic of exchange, enabling us to think against capital in non-capitalist terms.

    This essay offers a comparative reading of the post-Marxian work of Jean Baudrillard and François Laruelle to argue that these thinkers are linked by two elective affinities. First, both seek to establish a way forward for theory that remains faithful to the spirit of Marxism without reaffirming dialectics. Second, both turn to the concept and strategy of “fiction” in order to accomplish this task; Baudrillard names his work “theory-fiction,” and Laruelle names his “non-philosophical” approach to theory “philo-fiction” (short for “philosophical fiction”). I argue that their turn to fiction grows out of a shared conviction that theory must forge ahead without reference to the Real. I capitalize the Real, as does Laruelle, because it names what both thinkers conceive (in different ways) as the transcendental horizon that can never be encompassed by the signs and simulacra of theoretical concepts. This axiomatic starting point organizes Baudrillard’s and Laruelle’s approach to non-dialectical theory. For them, no dialectical exchange between concept and the Real ought to be assumed and enacted in the space of theoretical writing. The model of “fiction” does not make claims on the Real or the essence of reality, but takes place as an event in reality itself. The aim of their fictionalized Marxian theory is to intervene in reality without reaffirming the dialectical presumption that the Real and concept can be exchanged. Rather than leading either thinker to despair or to turn away from Marxism, fictionalization enables both to rethink the practice of Marxian theory in non-exchange-based terms or the terms of capitalist logic. To assume that the Real can be exchanged for concepts—which, for Laruelle, is the fundamental presupposition of all philosophies—affirms the primacy of the principle of exchange that underwrites capitalist abstraction. To fictionalize Marxism in non-dialectical terms repudiates the logic of exchange in order to think against capital in non-capitalist terms.

    I want to first begin by very briefly opening up the concept of dialectics as it has been historically understood. Fredric Jameson argues in Valences of the Dialectic that the term “dialectics” historically has had two distinct but interrelated meanings. “Traditional presentations have tended to stage the dialectic,” writes Jameson, “either as a system on the one hand, or as a method on the other—a division that faintly recalls the shift from Hegel to Marx” (3). He suggests that both presentations are increasingly untenable today because the idea (or ideal) of philosophical systematicity has been dethroned. Marxist dialectics—dialectic as method—is beset by debate and division over the philosophical question of Marxism’s applicability, which inevitably leads back to affirmations or repudiations of the idea that Marxism is a system. Whether taken as method or as system, dialectical philosophy attempts to temporalize philosophical concepts: to think in time. A properly dialectical concept is self-reflexively defined by the contradictory conditions that establish the possibility of its own conceptualization. Dialectics repudiates the idea that timeless concepts make reality thinkable. For the dialectician, reality itself is an historically contingent (if not determined) concept. However, as Jameson shows, the argument over whether dialectics is a method or a philosophy presupposes a thoroughly “undialectical” conception of method and philosophy (49). At the same time, if one does not in some way lend the concept of dialectics “structure,” it cannot be conceptualized apart from the visisitudes of its history. One is then faced with the problem or the tension – perhaps a dialectical tension – between structure and event.

    Dialectically speaking, there cannot in principle be something called “the dialectic,” which assumes a singular mode of thought that isn’t subject to history. But if there is no such thing as “the dialectic,” then there are only competing dialectical methods. While one could compile a list of examples of dialectical methods, the list would itself imply some structural invariance that binds the examples to one another: a law that would be the dialectical other of contingency. “Examples are the arbitrary cases that rattle around inside the impossible abstraction called a law,” writes Jameson, and this “law” of the same that identifies examples of thought as truly dialectical would be but the displaced name for “the concrete universal” (50). For Jameson, pluralizing and temporalizing the concept of the dialectic will not enable us to escape the binding claim of universality that conditions the possibility of the concept of “the dialectic” as the foundation of dialectics. Dialectics is either the method for gaining access to the Real movement of history or the unsurpassable philosophy of history itself. Either way, it appears to many contemporary thinkers as a dangerously totalizing mode of thinking.

    Defenders of the dialectic maintain that it offers a means (if not a system) for reconciling thought and history – idea and time – and that this reconciliation to reality tempers theory by subordinating it to the historical conditions of its own possibility. The ideal dialectical reconciliation for Marxism is the ultimate unity of theory and practice, whereby the Real of history will at last be changed forever through a theory that correctly captures the Real and by a practice that transforms the Real by dissolving the necessity for theory itself though its very realization. As Lenin once put it: “Philosophy cannot be abolished without being realized” (Korsch 97). This drive to go beyond theory and transform reality marks the Marxian dialectical tendency to “distinguish itself from purely philosophical systems … by positing itself as a ‘unity of theory and practice’” (Jameson 321). But in order to realize itself in practice, Marxism (as philosophy or method) must first capture the Real of history in dialectical concepts using the dialectic itself. Baudrillard and Laruelle intervene on this question of the capture of the Real. Hence, their non-dialectical modes of fictionalized theory turn on the problem of the Real itself to which we now turn.

    In Principles of Non-Philosophy, Laruelle spells out his axiom of the Real. The Real is nothing less than the radicality of immanence prior to any concept of the Real, or what Laruelle calls “Philosophical Decision” on the Real. The Real is always already the prior condition for the possibility of philosophy and all its decisions. Laruelle writes:

    Immanence of the Real, … without a single morsel of transcendence (of the World, language, movement, topology, set theory, etc.)—of philosophy. It is what it names, … an autonomy through radicality in relation to every form of transcendence. Phenomenally, it is a “Given-without givenness.”(18)

    Laruelle’s point here is relatively simple. The Real is not a philosophical concept. The Real transcends philosophical reason only by reason of its immanence. As Ian James notes in The New French Philosophy:

    [T]he real is transcendental … insofar as it is its own condition. The real does not need anything other than itself and its own indivisibility in order to be what it is: this is its absolute autonomy and self-sufficiency. Yet since the real is real (a lived, “unreflective” experience), it is also the condition of all being, existence, thought, consciousness, transcendence, and so on since all these are (in) the real, or put differently, the real is always immanent to them. (169)

    Laruelle criticizes “standard philosophy” for presuming itself sufficient to determine or decide the Real. In Laruelle’s view, the Real is decisive and determinant for all thought in the last instance. Non-philosophy opts inventively to resign the authority of “standard philosophy” to decide the Real. It reworks philosophical concepts via aesthetic strategies of fictionalization in order to think through philosophy without presuming to know or decide what is decisive (the Real). Laruelle writes, again, in Principles of Non-Philosophy:

    non-philosophy holds to: 1) the destitution of [philosophy’s] sufficiency and its authority (of the “Principle of Sufficient Philosophy”); b) the affirmation of the equivalence of every philosophical position before the Real; c) a reevaluation of the identity (if not the “whole”) of philosophy as simple … “field of phenomena” or objects for the new discipline [of non-philosophy]. (19)

    The objects of non-philosophy consist of what Laruelle calls “clones,” which look like standard concepts but are used in non-decisionist ways. Laruelle assembles these clones into fictional texts or “philo-fictions.” Fiction should be understood here in Laruelle’s special sense. As he explains in Philosophy and Non-Philosophy, philo-fictions have two “surfaces.” “On one of their surfaces,” writes Laruelle, “they [philo-fictions] will be scientific representations … that utilize philosophical elements,” which is to say philo-fictions represent a certain open-minded, experimental approach to the raw materials of philosophy; but, “on the other surface, they will be philosophical fictions, fictions ‘for’ philosophy” (239). Philo-fiction uses the raw materials of philosophy experimentally precisely by taking them as raw materials rather than as elements of a systematic set of coordinated decisions on the Real. This experimental or “scientific” approach yields a fictionalization of philosophical systems.

    Philo-fiction thus occupies a parallel space to that of standard philosophy. As Anthony Paul Smith observes in Laruelle: A Stranger Thought, “the purpose of [Laruelle’s] fiction is a kind of counter-creation to that of the world” (119). By refusing to legitimize the gesture of philosophical decisionism, philo-fiction effects an auto-critique of philosophy’s a priori assumption that it is sufficient to know the Real and decide the question of its essence. “The act of creating fiction or ‘fabulating’ is the goal of a non-philosophy,” writes Smith, “in order to relativize and disempower what presents itself as sufficient and absolute,” namely philosophy itself (119–120). Philosophy valorizes itself by establishing a sovereign discourse over the Real. This presumption to mastery over the Real takes the form of a discourse on the world in most materialist philosophies, where the aim is not to seek a metaphysical truth, but to lay claim to the truth of the world as it is. But this too Laruelle rejects. This is why he always capitalizes “world,” because, like the Real, world is a transcendental signified invented and operationalized by philosophical reason.

    In his critique of the concept of “world” Laruelle aligns himself with others of his generation, especially Alain Badiou. Familiar concepts of world tend to function as alibis for pragmatism and reformism. “Be practical!” “Get real!” “This is the real world.” For Badiou, these are colloquial versions of a philosophy of subjugation that prizes reconciliation with a hollow and hopeless concept of the world. But the world operative in such instances is not the Real. The Real is what can always be punctured and broken in two by the “event.” Badiou polemically and critically refuses what Peter Hallward calls “the worldly condition” (25). Badiou will not accommodate his thought to a concept of world that refuses to recognize its potential for eventual ruptures. “Badiou’s philosophy,” writes Hallward, “is infused with that same contempt for worldliness characteristic of the great antiphilosophers, most obviously Saint Paul and Pascal. The world, as such, is defined for Badiou by imperatives of communication and interest” (25). The concept of the world (or World, in Laruelle’s language) is an alibi for conformist thought that disavows eventual possibility. However, despite a degree of convergence between Laruelle’s and Badiou’s critiques of the commonsense concept of world, their projects are in detail entirely opposed. Badiou remains committed to concepts like Being and Truth, whereas Laruelle suspends these concepts—in a kind of radicalization of the Husserlian epoché—in order to treat philosophical texts as raw material for thinking otherwise than that demanded by the decisionist imperative. Laruelle’s inventive skill at disempowering and defetishizing philosophy comes to the fore in his book-length critique of Badiou. In Anti-Badiou, Laruelle clones Badiou’s concepts in order to produce a parodic representation of Badiou’s political philosophy that challenges what Laruelle sees as the authoritarian dimension of his thought. Laruelle zeroes in on Badiou’s axiom that mathematics equals ontology: Badiou “manages to divest us of all our predicates and reduce us,” writes Laruelle, “to the state of a proletariat at the service of a mathematico-philosophical dictatorship” (xxxvi). Laruelle resits, however, any overt “philosophical” challenge to Badiou’s philosophy on the grounds that this would merely aggrandize philosophy itself. Laruelle writes that his aim is

    not a dialogue, it is … an ultimatum, but emitted this time from an acknowledged position of weakness, in an encounter with a position of acknowledged force. … An ultimatum signifies that we are not the mirror of the other. Very precisely, Badiou is a means for non-philosophy … [thus] this book is, above all, finally … a book in which non-philosophy explains itself to itself, but with the aid of a counter-model that it falls to us to transform. (xxxix)

    Laruelle’s text on Badiou is a model of fictionalized Marxian theory. Laruelle voids Badiou’s “system” of its imperatives and decisionist valences. He reweaves, reworks, and re-produces Badiou’s terms into a “clone” of Badiou’s system. He treats Badiou’s concepts as “raw materials” to critique his mathematico-political “dictatorship.” Laruelle’s critique of his system via fictional strategies of parody, exaggeration, and juxtaposition constructs a counter-theory that implicitly calls for the “liberation” of theory from philosophical claims on the Real. He thereby indicates a path forward for theory that neither reifies nor aggrandizes philosophy’s stature. Laruelle’s fictionalization rebels against the authority (and authoritarianism) of philosophy. The fiction that interests Laruelle cannot be constrained by any theory or philosophy of fiction or tied to any conceptual apparatus that would decide its epistemic status in advance. As John O’ Maoilearca astutely observes in All Thoughts Are Equal:

    If the Real is experienced as “nothing-but-real,” then fiction, commensurately, must no longer belong to the “order of the false”. … such a reconfiguration of fiction requires a rebellion against “philosophy’s authority” over it: fiction must no longer be subordinated to the judgments of philosophy. Instead, philosophy will be made to “reenter” through fiction and be conceived as a mode of fabulation. … an avowedly utopian form of thought. (99)

    One does not “apply” non-philosophy any more than one would “apply” fiction. Rather, one non-philosophizes philosophy in the name of liberating thought from its addiction to dominate and decide the Real. Such liberation aims to repurpose philosophemes (voided of their decisionist character) within a fictional ensemble that maps out a theoretically utopic position free from the closed dialectic of the Real.

    Here Laruelle’s position intersects with Baudrillard’s. Although their concepts of the Real are by no means identical, Baudrillard’s axiomatic starting point yields a similar mode of utopic theorizing that he calls “theory-fiction.” The central axiom of Baudrillard’s best-known work is the disappearance of the Real. “On the horizon of simulation,” writes Baudrillard, “not only has the world [or the Real] disappeared but the very question of its existence can no longer be posed” (Crime 5). For Baudrillard, this disappearance “defines the irresolvable relationship between thought and reality,” inasmuch as “a certain form of thought is bound to the real” (96). That “certain form of thought” is none other than dialectics, which “starts out from the hypothesis that ideas have referents and that there is a possible ideation of reality. A comforting polarity, which is that of tailor-made dialectical and philosophical solutions” (96). Opposing dialectical thought, which presumes a critical interface with a preexistent concept of the Real, Baudrillard advocates for the writing of “theory-fiction.” As he notes in an interview with Salvatore Mele and Mark Titmarsh:

    My way of reflecting on things is not dialectic. Rather it’s provocative, reversible, it’s a way of raising things up to their ‘N’th power, rather than a way of dialectizing them. It’s a way of following through the extremes to see what happens. It’s a bit like a theory-fiction.(82)

    For good reason, Baudrillard never spells out exactly the form that fictionalized theory is supposed to take; theory-fiction is not a systematic theory, but a process of invention that “challenges” the Real as well as the style and substance of dialectical theory. One may say that theory-fiction represents what Laruelle would call a mode of “non-analysis,” which parodically deflates and defetishizes the typical subjects of critical theory: power, domination, political economy. His search for a theoretical topos unencumbered by a concern for the Real marks the late Baudrillard as a thinker of utopia in theory, which also links his project with Laruelle’s non-philosophy. As Mike Gane notes in Baudrillard’s Bestiary, Baudrillard’s later work evinces an “undeniable vitality and creativity coupled with an undying fidelity not to a utopian vison in a passive sense, but to a passionate utopian practice in theory” (157). In Baudrillard’s earlier Marxian phase and in his later writings, theory-fiction is a means of theorizing that maintains an analytic indifference from the Real.

    With the publication of For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign in 1972, Baudrillard seeks to augment and critique bourgeois and Marxian political economy alike. He argues that both traditions err by theorizing a restricted conceptual economy or closed conceptual system in which production, exploitation, and consumption cycle predictably through the matrix of “use value” and “exchange value.” He shows that under late capital, exchange value is complexified by the exchange and circulation of signs and offers the art auction as an example; wealthy people buy blue-chip art at the auction not merely to purchase art, but also to show that they have the financial power to do so. Baudrillard acknowledges that his reading builds on the work of the late nineteenth-century economist Thorstein Veblen. In Theory of the Leisure Class, Veblen argues that the principal labor of the wealthy or “leisure” class consists of social acts of “conspicuous consumption.” The “process of consumption considered as a system of sign exchange value,” writes Baudrillard, is “not consumption as traditional political economy defines it … but consumption considered as the conversion of economic exchange value into sign exchange value” (For 107). Bidding at the art auction is not simply an economic transaction; it is a system through which the bidders exchange social signs of wealth and leisure. Baudrillard contextualizes his project in For a Critique as part of an “exiled” and marginalized tradition of political economy:

    Critical theorists of the political economy of the sign are rare. They are exiled, buried under Marxist (or neo-Marxist) terrorist analysis. Veblen and Goblot are the great precursors of a cultural analysis of class which, beyond the “dialectical materialism” of productive forces, examines the logic of sumptuary values which assures and perpetuates through its code the hegemony of the dominant class.(109)

    Baudrillard argues for the analysis of, and critical resistance to, not only the cycle of economic production and exploitation, but the social “code” that valorizes and thereby perpetuates the perceived power of the dominant class. Traditional political economy does not account for the process of sign production and thus cannot resist it. A critical theory of consumer society must then begin by integrating the analysis of sign exchange “into the very structures of political economy” (108). But as he notes, this is strongly resisted by bourgeois and Marxian theorists alike:

    [T]he traditional boundaries of political economy, canonized by bourgeois economic science as well as by Marxist analysis, should be disregarded. And the resistances to this are strong, for they are of all orders theoretical, political, phantasmagorical. Yet today only a generalized political economy can define a revolutionary theory and practice.(108)

    Part of the resistance to integrating sign analysis into theories of political economy is that sign systems produce open and contingent meanings (or values) rather than fixed and predictable ones. Bourgeois and Marxian political economy alike traditionally relied on models of economic production that cycle through logically fixed circuits. But the meaning or value of a sign is contingent and mutable. Baudrillard thus challenges traditional semiotic theory (Saussure) because he rejects the anchoring force of the “signified” as a metaphysical mechanism designed to restrict the contingent economy of meaning. He also rejects Marx’s anchoring concept of “use-value,” which he sees as incompatible with the social labor of conspicuous consumption. For a Critique articulates a “general” conceptual economy in Georges Bataille’s sense. In The Accursed Share, Bataille famously distinguished between “general” and “restricted” economies. The former names economies in which some expenditure remains expended and does not return in another form; the latter names economic systems, like capitalism, premised on the belief that everything can be exchanged for its equivalent in another form. Baudrillard’s “critique” is in this sense a general economy in theory inasmuch as it is organized around “general principles” of sign exchange anchored neither in the Real of classical exchange, nor in the transcendental signified of classical semiotics. The theoretical economy of For a Critique is open and general in Bataille’s sense because it turns on the contingency of economic and sign-exchange.

    Baudrillard’s insistence on the difference and distance between theory and its supposed referent—the Real in the last instance—also links him to Althusserian Marxism. Althusser’s work of the 1960s stresses the non-equivalence between theoretical concepts and the Real via the Spinozist distinction between the “real object” and the “object of knowledge”: “Spinoza warned us that the object of knowledge or essence was absolutely distinct and different from the real object” (Reading 40). Althusser claims that objects of knowledge (like the concepts that comprise Marx’s Capital) must be distinguished from “real objects” (like actually existing capitalism). He sharpens his point in “Theory, Theoretical Practice and Theoretical Formation” (1974):

    [T]heoretical work is not an abstraction in the sense of empiricist ideology. To know is not to extract from the impurities and diversity of the real the pure essence contained in the real, as gold is extracted from the dross of sand and dirt in which it is contained. To know is to produce the adequate concept of the [real] object by putting to work means of theoretical production.(15)

    “Theory” for Althusser is a relatively autonomous practice that does not “reflect” the Real, but is rather a concept production process through which economy, society, politics and so on are made conceptualizable. On this account, one does not think the “real object.” Instead, one is tasked with producing concepts that make the Real thinkable as a model. Baudrillard further radicalizes the Althusserian split between concept and Real by theoretically letting go of the entire concept of the Real (and with it the reality-principle).

    Here too Laruelle’s perspective is clearly aligned with Baudrillard’s inasmuch as both thinkers reject any prior decision on the relation between Real and concept. Both refuse to enact what Laruelle has named the Philosophical Decision, which he defines concisely (if elliptically) thus:

    Philosophical Decision is an operation of transcendence that believes (in a naïve and hallucinatory way) in the possibility of a unitary discourse on the Real. … To philosophize is to decide on the Real and on thought, which ensues from it, i.e. to believe to be able to align them with the universal order of the Principle of Reason (the Logos), but also more generally in accordance with the “total” or unitary order of the Principle of sufficient philosophy. (Dictionary 117)

    Philosophical Decision encloses the Real within a restricted theoretical economy dialectically hinged on a hallucinatory concept of the Real. Dialectics then presupposes a principle of exchangeability of concept and Real, which formally aligns dialectical philosophy with the logic of capitalist abstraction. As Katerina Kolozova notes in her study of Laruelle’s “non-Marxism,” philosophy “is constituted in a fashion perfectly analogous to the one which grounds capitalism” because it “establishes an amphibology with the real (acts in its stead, posturing as ‘more real than the real’)” (2). Kolozova does not cite the phrase “more real than the real,” but this is, of course, Baudrillard’s master formula for “hyperreality.” Kolozova (perhaps unwittingly) suggests a common conceptual space between Laruelle and Baudrillard. For Laruelle, philosophy proposes to be “more real than the real” inasmuch as it claims to have the key to the Real, but Kolozova (via Laruelle) sees this as a simulation of the Real. To put the matter in Baudrillard’s terms, philosophies of the Real are conceptual and analytical instances of the hyperreal. Just as capitalism is grounded on the fetish character of value abstracted from the social sphere, so too is philosophy constituted through a fetishization and reification of thought itself empowered by the hallucinatory force of Philosophical Decision. The image of the Real captured in philosophical “reflection” is never the Real for Baudrillard or Laruelle. Rather, what appears in the mirror of philosophy is a hyperreal phantasm of philosophy itself.

    By the late 1970s, Baudrillard and Laruelle come to see that the problem is how to escape the auto-valorizing force of dialectical philosophy and to open anew the problematic of the politics of theoretical critique itself. Neither thinker seeks to overthrow or overcome dialectics, which would only reaffirm it. Instead, each seeks to invent strategies and aesthetics of theoretical writing that intensify the potential for emancipatory thought immanent to the ethics of Marxism without getting ensnared in the dialectic of exchange (or the rhetoric of production, as we will see). This project shares some affinity with Lyotard’s post-Marxist work of the same decade; Lyotard’s Libidinal Economy of 1974 taps into and exploits what he calls the “intensities lodged in theoretical signs” (102). However, in the same text he rebukes Baudrillard for his conceptual privileging of symbolic exchange. A brief detour though Lyotard’s critique of Baudrillard will spell out the difference between the fictionalized Marxism of Baudrillard and Laruelle and the libidinalized writing of Lyotard’s post-Marxism: a theoretical indifference to the Real (Baudrillard and Laruelle) versus the continuation of dialectics in a new way (Lyotard).

    Lyotard’s major statement of post-Marxism is Libidinal Economy. The text stems from the tradition of Freudo-Marxism, albeit in a form that challenges that tradition. Lyotard argues that Marxian political economy is torn between two warring poles, which he names (somewhat regrettably) the “prosecutor Marx” and the “little girl Marx.” The “prosecutor Marx” names the Marx who sat in the British Museum day after day toiling away at Capital but never completed it; the “little girl Marx” names the one who did not complete his master text because he was too attracted to, and fascinated by, the polymorphous perversities of capital. Lyotard sees Marx as trying to engineer a theory to close and contain industrial society’s “erotic” fascination with the object (capital) he was trying to prosecute theoretically. Lyotard’s corrective is to explode political economy via a libidinalized textualism:

    we are not going to do a critique of Marx, we are not, that is to say, going to produce the theory of his theory: which is just to remain within the theoretical. No, one must show what intensities are lodged in theoretical signs, what affects within serious discourse; we must steal his affects from him. Its force is not at all in the power of its discourse, not even in inverse proportion to it, this would still be a little too dialectical an arrangement.(102)

    Lyotard explicitly targets Baudrillard’s work for continuing the tradition of prosecuting a critical theory of political economy and for its apparent valorization of what Lyotard sees as a thinly disguised figure of pre-lapsarian time: the time of “symbolic exchange,” before contact with the Real disappeared into the play of signs. Moreover, he points out what he sees as the racist and imperialistic legacies lurking in Baudrillard’s conceptual privileging of “primitive societies”:

    When Baudrillard says: “There is neither a mode of production nor production in primitive societies. There is no dialectic and no unconscious in primitive societies,” we say: there are no primitive societies. First of all, methodologically… this society of the gift and counter-gift plays, in Baudrillard’s thought, the role of a reference (lost, of course), of an alibi (which cannot be found), in his critique of capital. … How is that he does not see that the whole problematic of the gift, of symbolic exchange … belongs in its entirety to Western racism and imperialism—that it is still ethnology’s good savage, slightly libidinalized, which he inherits with the concept? (106)

    Lyotard believes his approach evades the traps of dialectical Marxism and the imperialistic fantasies of Baudrillard’s theoretical alternative by exiting the discourse of standard political economy via a libidinalized mode of writing that aims not to diagnose, but to actualize “intensities lodged in theory” or what Geoff Bennington interestingly calls “writing the event.” Lyotard’s writing aims not to theorize capital, but to write the dissolution of political economy (and of theory more broadly) and to actualize this event of dissolution through what might be called the jouissance of the signifiers of theory. Lyotard seeks to “demonstrate that the cold serious discourse of political theory is also a set-up of libidinal economy” (Bennington 34–35). He damns Baudrillard’s concept of “symbolic exchange” qua a lost form of “primitive” exchange as the symptomatic sign that Baudrillard cannot relinquish his own desire for the Real, if only as a lost sign or lost time. Baudrillard remains committed to political theory dialectically hinged on the (lost) Real prior to capital. In short, he is still much more concerned with the Real and with the critique of capital than his prose suggests. But one could say nearly the same of Lyotard’s post-Marxist work. Lyotard’s desire to escape theory via a libidinalized textual free-play is itself a highly speculative if not “theoretical” project. In working through the tensions between theoretical analysis and an inscriptive desire to exceed analytic limits, Lyotard reproduces dialectics as he shuttles between what one is tempted to call a prosecutorial Freudo-Marxism and a polymorphous and perversely polysemic excess of writing. Without this background tension, the book would hardly have the charge it does. Lyotard can make the apparent dissolution of these theories an exciting literary event precisely because he is working against the backdrop of Marxism and psychoanalysis. Libidinal Economy is squarely situated within the dialectics of theory and practice: the practice of theorizing the end of theory.

    Contra Lyotard, I want to suggest that the escape from dialectics lies not in the direction of a libidinalized writing, but in a form of thought structured by a radical indifference to the Real. Baudrillard’s indifference to the Real—although far more pronounced in his later “theory-fictions”—is already forming in For a Critique, which is organized around the thesis that a culture of sign-exchange is symptomatic of the loss of contact with the Real. Baudrillard further radicalizes his theoretical indifference to the Real in The Mirror of Production. In his landmark statement on Marxism, Baudrillard suggests that the concept of “production” has morphed into a “strange contagion” in post-1960s Left theorizing (17). Baudrillard detects symptoms of this “strange contagion” in everything from the “unlimited ‘textual productivity’ of Tel Quel to Deleuze’s factory-machine productivity of the unconscious” to Lyotard’s libidinalized writing; “no revolution,” he writes, “can place itself under any other sign” (17). He traces the problematical theoretical valorization of production back to Marx:

    Marx did not subject the form of production to a radical analysis any more than he did the form of representation. These are the two great unanalyzed forms of the imaginary of political economy that imposed their limits on him. The discourse of production and the discourse of representation are the mirror by which the system of political economy comes to be reflected in the imaginary and reproduced there as the determinant instance.(20)

    Marx’s axiomatic decision on the nature of “man” as “productive animal” was never submitted to a radical analysis, according to Baudrillard. As Mike Gane notes in Baudrillard: Critical and Fatal Theory, Baudrillard argues that “Marx never gets to the position where he can challenge the thesis that the human is characterised by the capacity to produce” (98–99).

    Marx adopts his concept of the human as productive animal from the classical texts of political economy as truth, which for Baudrillard determines and limits Marx’s thought. As Gane puts it, “What is necessary, Baudrillard reiterates, is to see that a generic definition of man as productive animal, homo faber, is actually caught within the effects of [the] rationality of capital itself” (Baudrillard: Critical 97). Production, and its human correlate of labor power, constitutes a closed circuit of philosophical decisionism that reproduces the image of the human qua producer in the mirror of bourgeois and Marxian political economy alike. Baudrillard sees Marx as having established a set of concepts—use-value, exchange-value, commodity-fetishism and so forth—whose analytic value is pegged to a concept of the Real given under the sign of “production.” Marxism never escaped this dialectical economy of knowledge qua production organized by the theses and assumptions of classical political economy. “Marxism was not the revolutionary breakthrough that had been hoped for,” writes Gane, “but catastrophically, it was a particular elaboration of capitalism’s own principles” (Baudrillard: Critical 94). As Baudrillard argues in Mirror, the system of political economy “rooted in the identification of the individual with his labor power” is naturalized in the theoretical mirror of classical political economy (31). “Between the theory [of capitalism] and the object [of capitalism],” writes Baudrillard, “there is in effect, a dialectical relation, in the bad sense: they are locked into a speculative dead end” (29). He thus concludes that Marx’s concepts of labor and production “must be submitted to a radical critique as an ideological concept” (Mirror 43). This is a clear shot across the bow of Althusserian theory. Althusser aims to save the “science of history” by distinguishing “science” from humanist (and Marxist) ideology. For Baudrillard to claim that the “science of history”—the science of the history of modes of production—is an ideological concept inherited from classical political economy is to say that Althusserian Marxism must be liberated from its symptomatically self-imposed ideological limits. In Gane’s description, “The analysis, in Althusser, of theory as a productive process … becomes modelled on capitalist processes, and, as a system of thought, only reduplicates its object as separated and alienated: theory and revolutionary practice are neutralized by this failure” (Baudrillard: Critical 98).

    The Mirror of Production marks Baudrillard’s break with ideologically rigid Marxism (if not with Marx) and with critique and all critical theories of the Real. His break with Marxism specifically marks a turn from critical to fictive theory: a break not only with Marxist productivism, but with a theoretical mode of production that produces the Real in its “mirror” of critical reflection. This break links his dual “provocations” (as Kellner calls them) against Marx and Foucault. Two years after Mirror, in 1977, Baudrillard publishes his “broadside attack, Forget Foucault, at the time when Foucault was becoming a major figure in the pantheon of French theory” (Kellner 132):

    In many ways Forget Foucault marks a turning point and point of no return in Baudrillard’s theoretical trajectory. In this text he turned away from his previous apotheosis of a politics of the symbolic, and moved into a more nihilistic, cynical and apolitical theoretical field.(132)

    While Baudrillard’s later work does not often engage political questions directly, it does engage inventively and critically with the politics of theoretical critique itself. Forget Foucault is an indictment of the valorization of power by Foucault and of desire by Deleuze and Lyotard. For Baudrillard, “Foucault,” “Deleuze,” and “Lyotard” name patterns of theory that reify the desire of power and the power of desire. This he sees as theoretically complicit with the values of consumer capital:

    This compulsion towards liquidity, flow, and an accelerated circulation of what is psychic, sexual, or pertaining to the body is the exact replica of the force which rules market value: capital must circulate; gravity and any fixed point must disappear; the chain of investments and reinvestments must never stop; value must radiate endlessly and in every direction. (Forget 25)

    Baudrillard damns the libidinal turn in theory as simply the reflection and reification of what might be called (in Deleuzian terms) the desiring machine of capital itself.

    The question for Baudrillard is: how to escape the “spiral” of critical theory whose models turn into alibis for the domination of bodies, desire, and libido by consumer society? What then is theory to do? In what form might anti-capitalist theory continue? Fiction is Baudrillard’s answer. In a brief essay titled “Why Theory?” he writes:

    To be the reflection of the real, or to enter into a relation of critical negativity with the real, cannot be theory’s goal. … What good is theory? If the world is hardly compatible with the concept of the real which we impose upon it, the function of theory is certainly not to reconcile, but on the contrary, to seduce, to wrest things from their condition, to force them into an over-existence which is incompatible with the real.(129)

    Strategies of fiction—such as exaggeration (forced over-existence), seduction, and wresting things from their conditions—are ultimately aesthetic solutions to the problem of theory’s relation to the Real in the age of its disappearance. Now it is no longer “enough for theory to describe and analyze, it must itself be an event in the universe it describes” (129). “Theory pays dearly” for this fictional transformation, because theory as fiction can no longer innocently critique its object as if that object exists in a certifiably distanced space designated as the Real (129). This is, however, not a mode of theory that merely ratifies defeatism, as Baudrillard’s critics often suggest; theory-fiction can still “challenge” the economic, the social, the political, the aesthetic.1 But as Baudrillard notes:

    Even if it speaks of surpassing the economic, theory itself cannot be an economy of discourse. To speak about excess and sacrifice, it must become excessive and sacrificial. It must become simulation if it speaks about simulation, and deploy the same strategy as its object. … If it no longer aspires to a discourse of truth, theory must assume the form of a world from which truth has withdrawn.(“Why” 129)

    Just as literature creates a world, and that creation is an event in the world, so too does theory-fiction create a world of its own with the capacity to think in ways unconstrained by any pre-given concept of the Real. Baudrillard’s post-Marxist theory-fiction, styled in a self-consciously avant-gardist manner, strategically reanimates utopian thought. Theory “must tear itself from all referents and take pride only in the future” (“Why” 130). Baudrillard’s theoretical posture post-Mirror is to regard the Real with the same indifference with which the Real regards theory.

    Here too Baudrillard’s project intersects theoretically with Laruelle’s non-philosophical project. Non-philosophy is founded on two axioms: 1) Standard philosophy is defined by the decisions it makes about the Real; 2) The Real is foreclosed to the philosophical grasp. Yet all thought (philosophical and non-philosophical) is immanent to the Real, which is determinant and decisive in the last instance. Laruelle identifies standard philosophy with what he terms the Principle of Sufficient Philosophy: to decide on the Real rests on the presupposition that philosophy has sufficient resources to decide it. Philosophical Decision creates a conceptual “world” in its own image. What philosophy “sees” as the world of the Real is a projection of what philosophy decides concerning the Real. And because this image is always partial, it is also always false, for the Real is not partial. Rather than produce a false image of the Real that denies its falsity, Laruelle turns philosophy into fiction because fiction knows itself to be other than true. The non-philosophical practice of Marxism (non-Marxism) is a form of philo-fiction composed of the “raw materials” of Marxism in a non-dialectical and non-exchange-based mode of theorization. The “non” of “non-Marxism” is thus not a negation of Marxism as a whole, but only a negation of its dialectical pretense to exchange the Real for concepts. As Laruelle notes in Introduction to Non-Marxism:

    The non– cannot have any other “content” except that of the radical immanence of the Real or strictly following from it, without being a relation of negation to philosophy itself. … We will invert—at least—the usual approach of a philosophical appropriation of Marxism. Rather than completing Marxism through axioms drawn from the tradition … from thought-as- capital, we will instead disappropriate every constitutive relation to philosophy (but not its materials, symptoms, and models), i.e., every relation to it that is itself philosophical.(36)

    Introduction to Non-Marxism is a fiction or a fictionalization of Marx and the Marxist heritage, less in the avant-gardist style of late Baudrillard and more the cold and anti-humanist rationality of the early Althusser. But whereas Althusser sought to save Marx’s science of history via philosophy, Laruelle seeks a “scientific” examination of standard philosophy.

    Laruelle’s sense of “science” is as an attitude open to experimenting with the raw materials of a philosophical text or tradition. This experimental attitude is registered in syntactical and rhetorical constructions “cloned” from dominant philosophemes. Laruelle sees the fictionalization of Marxian theory as a means of rescuing or even redeeming it: “Rescuing Marxism from metaphysics is effectively an illusion as long as it is not rescued from philosophical sufficiency itself, belief in the Real and desire for the Real” (Non-Marxism 34). This is the first meaning of “fiction” for Laruelle: escape from belief in, and desire for, the Real. He defines his approach to writing (and reading) non-philosophical fiction thus:

    To under-practice [sous-pratiquer] philosophical language, indeed to under-understand it … is to think in a more generic manner without exceptions. All this can appear too moral, but this would be forgetting that thought is not uniquely subtractive, it is insurrection. (Photo-Fiction 62)

    This passage performs what it describes, rendering philosophical language in a style that subtracts the value of immediate understanding for an “under-understanding.” At issue (and in the “generic” practice of non-philosophy) is the disruption of the standard philosophical economy whose master formula is thought-for-the-Real. Non-philosophy aims to take philosophy out of circulation with any dialectically-conceived concept of the Real. This subtractive gesture ethically refuses to participate in the reification of the principles of exchange and equivalence that regulate standard philosophy or “thought-as-capital.” As Alexander Galloway notes, “exchange is not simply a philosophical paradigm for Laruelle, but the philosophical paradigm. There is no philosophy that is not too a philosophy of exchange” (117). Standard philosophy, insofar as it presupposes an operative principle of equivalence or exchange with the Real, is formally identical to the logic of capital according to Laruelle.

    His work attempts to break this bond between theory and the Real through an insurrectionary use of language that scrambles the codes and coordinates of standard philosophy: “No synthetic portmanteau, but non-localizable indeterminations in the philosophical sense, a language brought to its simplest status and sufficiently disrupted in order for the superior form of expression certain of itself in the concept to be rendered impossible” (Photo-Fiction 62–63). Philo-fiction disrupts the syntax and operativity of standard philosophical prose to render the equivalence and exchange principle (or the capitalist principle) of standard philosophy inoperative. Laruelle continues:

    Philo-fiction is a gushing [jaillissant] and subtractive usage of the means of thinking, of philosophemes-without-philosophy, of mathemes-without-mathematics, and from here, all of the dimensions of philosophy [are] rid of their proper all-encompassing finality, an insurrection against the all-too great superior finalities. (Photo-Fiction 63)

    Laruelle’s fictional approach to Marxian theory uses insurrectionary language—an insurrection within and against philosophy—that operates on the immanent terrain of thought. “There is, for Laruelle, a way of valorizing fiction,” writes Anthony Paul Smith, “as a force of insurrection that disempowers the world and operates without concern for its parameters” (120). This disempowerment of the philosophy-Real dialectic radically defetishizes philosophy and devalues the whole schema by which the Real is reified and reproduced in the cultural capital of critique.

    To conclude, in their fictionalizations of Marxian theory, Baudrillard and Laruelle attempt to “disempower” the concept of the Real. They answer the implacableness of the Real with a non-exchange-based form of thought, or what I would hazard to call “non-dialectics.” For theory to remain relevant, they posit that it has to become fiction (but not unreal). By an insurrectionary and non-dialectical mode of writing and thinking, they open places within the Real unbounded by standard philosophical thought monopolies. My task here has been merely to indicate the path they suggest for non-dialectical thought. In good non-philosophical fashion, I have attempted to avoid Laruelle’s and Baudrillard’s supposed “philosophical” differences and recast both thinkers as raw materials for a non-dialectical and non-capitalist mode of thought. By way of their fictionalized forms of theorizing, Baudrillard and Laruelle attempt to create the conditions of possibility for a non-Marxist mode of theorizing in a non-dialectical framework. This framework contains a meta-theoretical recitation of utopian thought. It creates a space—a no-place—outside the dialectical bounds of capitalist critique and the reproduction of capitalist logic as theory (or “thought-capital”). We need a non-dialectical theoretical countermeasure to the persistent illusion of the Real as a “world” where everything is subject to exchange under the rule of general equivalence and which justifies the continued destruction of all that is humane in human life.

  • Negative Ecology: Robert Smithson’s Spiral Jetty at 50

    John Culbert (bio)

    Abstract

    This essay reassesses the significance of Robert Smithson’s land art for environmental politics in a time of climate crisis. Drawing on analyses of fossil capital and petrocultures, it argues that Smithson’s aesthetics of entropy—particularly as conveyed in the 1970 earthwork Spiral Jetty—provide a valuable dialectical methodology for critical theory in the Capitalocene. The essay proposes a “negative ecology” that can challenge logics of resilience and survival shared by ecologists and extractivists alike.

    Contretemps (n.): a minor dispute or mischance; from the French contre-temps, “against time.”

    Against the Ages

    Robert Smithson broke ground on his visionary sculpture Spiral Jetty in April 1970, the month of the first Earth Day demonstrations. A petroglyph in rubble, a gnomic symbol in a desert sea, Smithson’s most celebrated artwork is indelibly linked by that shared date to a formative moment in modern environmentalism. The historical convergence is significant, if somewhat ironic. Like the broader Land Art movement of the 1960s, Smithson’s sculptural work reflects the social ferment and ecological consciousness that would lead, within a few months of the inaugural Earth Day, to the founding of the US Environmental Protection Agency. And yet Smithson’s aesthetic vision was largely at odds with environmentalist discourse. To ecology Smithson opposed the dispiriting concept of entropy; to political activism he advised suspending the will; and, to Earth Day protesters who seized the occasion, Smithson might have suggested dwelling in the “arrested moment” of geological time (“Four” 228). Fifty years after the building of Spiral Jetty, the significance of Smithson’s contretemps with environmentalism has come into focus. At stake, precisely, is the question of time in ecological consciousness.

    Like a turn in Smithson’s diminishing, self-consuming spiral in Utah’s Great Salt Lake, the returning date of this half centenary brings stark new threats and a powerful urgency to environmentalism. New and newly energized movements in ecology and climate justice (such as the climate strike movement and Extinction Rebellion) have significantly broadened public awareness of global heating even as local policies and international accords fail to stem the frightening growth of so-called “negative externalities,” from rising sea levels and ocean acidification to secular drought and mass extinctions. In the midst of a cataclysmic wildfire season in Australia, a firefighter suggested that the start of the new decade could mark “year zero” for environmental politics (Goldrick). The equivocal phrase neatly captures a paradox of this historical conjuncture, its odd combination of terminal and inaugural time, when public consciousness reaches a peak at the same moment that climate fatalism begins to take hold in liberal and progressive discourse.1

    The grand, purposeless spiral of Smithson’s self-defeating Jetty evokes the contradictions of his time, its heady ambitions and wicked defeats. Yet the sculpture is perhaps an even more apt reflection of today’s calamitous political-ecological moment. Its coiling form conveys no stable system or desirable order but instead a threatening vision of tumult and disintegration, a destructive “whirlpool,” as Smithson suggests (“Four” 227). Importantly, Spiral Jetty inverts a drain’s natural flow, its counterclockwise spin opposing natural order and historical progress alike. Smithson’s earthworks wager with time, though the artist refused any claim to posterity or monumental ideality of form—a vision of destructive temporality best conveyed as retrogression. Like the sculptures he describes in “Entropy and the New Monuments,” Spiral Jetty is a monument “against the ages” (11). Environmentalism would seem to gain little from this negative ecological vision. Smithson’s essay on the Jetty suggests as much: “These fragments of a timeless geology laugh without mirth at the time-filled hopes of ecology,” Smithson mockingly says (“The Spiral Jetty” 13). And yet Smithson’s aesthetic vision of entropic time has a great deal to offer to the challenges we confront in an overheating world, provided we amend the artist’s framing of ecology.

    “An epic case of bad timing” is how Naomi Klein describes the fateful irony that the scientific consensus on climate change emerged at the same time as globalized, deregulated capitalism (This 73). The current breakdown of liberal democratic systems and interstate governance adds daunting hurdles to these challenges precisely when a swift and decisive collective intervention in the world economy appears necessary to avert climate collapse and social chaos. On this front, the “economy-killing measures” imposed at the start of the coronavirus pandemic—to quote Bloomberg Businessweek—hardly provide environmentalists reasons for cheer (Robison et al.). To climate activists who have long called for a halt to “business as usual,” the COVID-19 crisis serves as a bitter reminder that governing bodies only act with urgency—however briefly or ineffectually—in the face of immediate, not future, threats. Even the alarming phenomenon of government-sanctioned medical disinformation follows a pattern familiar to environmentalists; top-down science denialism was normalized by energy lobbyists long before the politicization of the new coronavirus. And as the pandemic wreaks disproportionate damage along the fault lines of race, gender, age, and class, current investments in health care and social support continue to widen a morbid generational divide between today’s populations and their unlucky inheritors, rehearsing the “temporal antagonism” we can expect to play out in an overheated future (Taylor).

    Many will likely remember the clear skies and birdsong that accompanied the outbreak of COVID-19 as pollution and traffic were swiftly curtailed. But early in the crisis, ostensibly positive reports of declining greenhouse gas emissions were already outweighed by larger trends: a projected seven percent annual drop in CO2 emissions in 2020—a high estimate, and bought at the cost of extraordinary human suffering—would barely match the amount the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) says is needed every year of this decade in order to keep global warming within the catastrophic threshold of 1.5 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels (Le Quéré et al. 647). Earth Day’s fiftieth year was celebrated under the threat of this fast-approaching limit, a mere ten years away. Meanwhile, as the anniversary was marked under lockdown, fossil fuel interests can celebrate a milestone in what Naomi Klein calls a “half-century long ideological project” of deregulation; citing the challenge of COVID-19 to the economy, the EPA bowed to industry lobbyists and waived environmental rules for major polluters during the crisis, effectively suspending its role as a regulatory agency (“Care” 99).

    “Bad timing” indeed. However, Klein’s observation reflects another fateful contretemps, more fundamental and historically consequential. “Fossil capital,” to adopt Andreas Malm’s expression, is more than a source of increasing power and mobility, the well-known “time-space compression” of industrialized economies; it cleaves modern history with a profound temporal disjunction (240). Climate change is nothing if not the intrusion of another temporality into the timeline of history. The vitality of industrial modernity would be unthinkable without the mute compact energy of past photosynthesis, the unearthed daylight of numberless dead noons. Whence the inordinate force of fossil capital, so too its terrible cost. To the English capitalists who struck upon the notion of exploiting the coal of the smiths for large-scale industry, fossil capital offered a power source that was unbound from the seasons and so appeared to stand “outside of time,” Malm says (42). Likewise, as distinct from energy sources growing on the land, coal’s stored energy was independent of the lived world and existed seemingly “outside of the landscape.” The latter proved a crucial strategic advantage of mobile capital over the laboring class, as Malm’s meticulous history demonstrates (41). Climate change can be seen as the delayed effect of the fundamental disjunctions installed by fossil capital into the historical present, “a now that is non-contemporaneous with itself” (8).

    Carbon economies, as a result, inhabit a spatiotemporal conundrum. Timothy Mitchell argues that the energy unlocked from prehistoric petrocarbon has lent modern societies “a peculiar orientation towards the future,” conceived as “a limitless horizon of growth” (142). “Petroknowledge” arises from these circumstances as a phantasmatic political-economic discourse that seemingly triumphs over metabolic space-time; whereas previous ideas of wealth and property “were based upon physical processes that suggested limits to growth,” petro-fueled GDP “could grow without any problem of physical or territorial limits,” Mitchell observes (139). The impression of limitlessness yields a paradoxical object—the “economy”—that “could expand without getting physically bigger.” The current pace and scope of virtual experience, internet connectivity, and electronic stock market trading may have accustomed us to the notion that “practically infinite values are reached in finite time” (129), though this economic condition remains fundamentally disparate from the lived circumstances inhabited by a biophysical organism. This predicament highlights the stakes of environmental art, because the figuration of natural processes must be reclaimed from fundamentally distorting spatiotemporal representations of the given world.

    If fossil fuels are the sine qua non of capital accumulation, fossil capital appears not only incompatible with a sustainable biosphere, but radically asynchronous with life. As Rob Nixon argues in Slow Violence, the delayed, microscopic, and incremental nature of much ecological damage eludes the conventions of narrative and representation, based as they are in the parameters of lived experience and the affective gratifications of a sensationalistic mediascape. The discrepancies between lived time and temporalities of ecological disruption increase the need for climate science communication even as the resources of rhetoric, narrative, and the arts are sorely tested by atmospheric data measured in parts per million, temperature variations logged in tenths of a degree, and radioactive half-lives calculated in billions of years. In spite of the increasingly sensational and spectacular evidence of human impact on Earth systems—evidence that would appear to challenge Nixon’s thesis—climate change reflects causal processes occurring at scales that defy conceptual framing and whose delayed or incremental effects pose an ongoing challenge to representation.

    During the Cold War, questions of communication on ungraspable time scales were posed in terms of the challenge of relaying threats of nuclear contamination to future generations. “Nuclear semiotics” was born with a Reagan-era task force that drew up guidelines for an information system that could deliver messages to recipients unknown up to 10,000 years in the future. Linguist Thomas Sebeok’s account of this project stands as a cautionary example of the co-optation of scholarship by a military-industrial state apparatus. Working with the construction and engineering behemoth Bechtel Corporation and under the authority of the National Waste Terminal Storage Program, Sebeok proposed a symbolic system that could survive all foreseeable circumstances in order to keep the US’s vast and growing store of radioactive waste safe from tampering yet still available for potential future employ. The fearsome extent of power and authority involved in this project is perhaps no more audacious than the linguist’s reasoned effort to account for all possible future eventualities. Indeed, nuclear power is rivaled by the breathtaking “all” of Sebeok’s totalizing formulations; he excludes all exteriority with the idea of a fully encompassing “context” according to which signification is boxed by a container, much as waste is supposedly confined to storage—”semiosis,” the linguist ingenuously says, “takes place within a context” (452)—, and he summarily discounts the role of difference by confining it to the category of noise. “Differences between input and output,” he asserts, “are due to ‘noise.’” Far from troubling any concept of system, “difference” in this account amounts to a mere variation on self-identity and presence—a metaphysical claim that makes common cause with larger systems of order and control. Like structuralist linguistics, then, Sebeok’s notion of signification “compels a neutralization of time and history,” as Derrida puts it (“Structure” 291). Through his reductive framing, Sebeok feels authorized to invoke the idea of a permanent “natural message” of warning that has “the power to signify the same things at all times and in all places” (453).

    Rather than encompassing all of space and time, as Sebeok claims to do, we might instead propose that his work for the National Waste Terminal Storage Program reflects a specific rationale standard in late capitalism. As defined by Eric Cazdyn, the “new chronic” of our present political-economic order is characterized by a stagnant maintenance of ongoing damage and a corresponding recoil from terminality, whether in the management of incurable disease or the perpetuation of broader conditions of economic crisis (6). By placing terminality under embargo, the new chronic disables the transformative prospects of political endings and existential exits. As such, like Sebeok’s plans for “Terminal Storage,” the new chronic mode of symptom management “effectively colonizes the future by naturalizing and eternalizing the brutal logic of the present” (6). The perpetual “meantime” of Cazdyn’s “new chronic” is akin to the delusory futurity of Mitchell’s “petroknowledge”: both extend themselves into the time made available by their own powerful destructiveness. Here, for all its supposed concerns about the welfare of distant generations, Sebeok’s linguistics of “Terminal Storage” appears both deeply ironic and sadly misguided. In working with military contractor Bechtel, Sebeok projects the maintenance of some of capitalism’s deadliest by-products into a near-infinite future even as his collaborators deepen the ruts of petroculture. Notably, Bechtel is the largest US construction company and provides key infrastructure for worldwide petroleum interests. In contrast to the horizonless engineering mentality of Bechtel and Sebeok’s interminable storage, one especially urgent task of a critique of petroknowledge is to foster a sense of desirable terminality, as Cazdyn suggests, while understanding how phenomena on a geologic scale are imbricated in the ordinary maintenance of our fossil-fueled “meantime.” But if petroknowledge articulates a dominant spatiotemporal condition of illimitude, critical ecological theory must confront that horizonlessness as a conceptual and aesthetic obstacle that inhibits viable endings. In the argument that follows, I propose “negative ecology” as a challenge to the reifying conditions of fossil capital by critiquing the spatiotemporal confines of petroknowledge on the near side of its terminal illimitude.

    In retrospect, Robert Smithson seems the artist most attuned to these political-ecological predicaments and their emerging threats. With his insistent focus on prehistory, paleontology, and long-term natural processes, Smithson locates cultural production in timeframes and spatial scales indispensable to our understanding of climate change. The artist’s late unrealized projects for art reclamation in large-scale mining sites appear ever more pertinent to ecology conceived on such scales. And in light of the urgency of climate disruption and the merging of aesthetics and activism in environmental art, it seems increasingly fitting that Spiral Jetty should stand as an emblem of Smithson’s work and indeed of Earth art in general. More than any other piece in his body of work, Spiral Jetty is strongly suggestive of a symbol, glyph, or pictograph. Granted, the sculpture’s coiling form hardly presumes to be a “natural message” that could “signify the same things at all times and in all places,” as Sebeok puts it (453), or even aspire to leave “some faint, enduring mark on the universe,” in Alan Weisman’s ambiguous phrase (4). And yet Spiral Jetty belongs as much to the domain of semiotics as it does to sculpture.

    This semiotic dimension is underscored by the original reception of Spiral Jetty; photographs of Smithson’s sculpture were first mounted in the summer of 1970 at the Museum of Modern Art’s (MoMA) conceptual art exhibition, titled “Information.” The show emphasized data, documentation, installations, instructions, protocols, mathematical permutations, and audience-response performance. Like the black asphalt poured down a Roman quarry slope in his 1969 Asphalt Rundown—also mounted at MoMA—Spiral Jetty presents itself as a high-contrast graphical sign in the landscape. Arguably, however, the most enduring piece of graphical “information” from the time of MoMA’s exhibition is the now ubiquitous international recycling symbol. Like Spiral Jetty, the symbol was designed on the occasion of the original Earth Day, and the parallels between these two iconic graphical forms are as illuminating as their differences. Each conveys a vision of natural cycles while deliberately exploiting a sense of paradox. In the case of the recycling symbol, however, this enigmatic dimension has had some inadvertent effects. By evoking a Möbius strip, the recycling emblem implicitly links eco-conscious consumer behavior to a strange topology without real pertinence to actual space, an illogic confirmed by the political-economic reality of post-consumer recycling. A recent Greenpeace investigation of the “recycling exports system”—an expression itself rich in irony—reveals that much waste supposedly recycled by first world consumers instead ends up burned or simply discarded in vulnerable zones of the Global South (Ross). Smithson can hardly be credited with anticipating the flaws of post-consumer waste treatment, of course. And yet the artist’s entropic vision of spiraling disorder proves a vital corrective to any pretense of sustainability under fossil capitalism. There is no viable return in Smithson’s spinning Jetty beyond the troping of entropic recurrence. Smithson’s negative ecological vision—his “geopolitics of primordial return,” as he put it (“The Spiral Jetty” 12)—is based instead on an abiding sense of the untimeliness of petrocultural space-time. This aesthetic sense of geological time impelled the artist to map a “double world” that, he said, could “show the prehistoric world as coextensive with the world I existed in” (11).

    Smithson’s “double world” is more than an attempt to add new material to art history’s stock of subjects or even to present an innovation in artistic form. It suggests nothing less than the “collapse of the age-old humanist distinction between natural history and human history,” as Dipesh Chakrabarty puts it (201). Indeed, Smithson strikingly anticipates the onset of the Anthropocene in speaking of “the artist as a geologic agent” (“Four” 217). The phrase is uncannily apt; while the Anthropocene encompasses all human effects on Earth systems, its definition lies specifically in our measurable impact on rock strata (Walters et al. 317), the lasting trace of “man as a geological agent” (Fernàndez-Lozano et al. 2). Such expressions may seem grandiose, and indeed critics have faulted Smithson for a supposed machismo out of keeping with sustainable ecological stewardship. But to make such a critique is to commit an error of scale. If anything, the idea of a “geologic agent” dwarfs any particular human action by framing it within a dissipating process beyond all reckoning. This confounding mismatch between individual acts and their general effects is a central conundrum of environmental politics in an age of global warming. The building of Spiral Jetty is just such a vain act, its momentous gesture less heroic than ironic.

    Most importantly, perhaps, Smithson’s site/nonsite dialectic makes Malm’s dual “outsides”—disjunct time and distant space—the essential coordinates of aesthetic experience. While insisting on a given artwork’s site-specificity, Smithson always emphasizes its spatial and temporal dislocation; the gallery object, in Smithson’s terminology, is demoted to a negative “nonsite,” the mere index of an absent site. This dialectic involves no mere exercise in aesthetic estrangement, that familiar topos of twentieth-century art; the primary materials of Smithson’s sculptural nonsites—coal, tar, and asphalt, for instance—confront the viewer with an unassimilable, deeply alien prehistoric substance. If the nonsite’s reference to waste zones and industrial extraction sites seems to illustrate the general “centrifugal movement” of industrial modernity, as Nicolas Bourriaud would have it (ix), Smithson’s dialectics speak to a violent expulsion of art that defies any recuperation.2 Fossil capital makes this dislocation the fundamental dialectic of our disrupted present. Accordingly, progressive political ecology in an age of climate change can only be realized by confronting the spatiotemporal conundrums generated by fossil capital. This in turn requires a critical shift from the fuzzy humanist causality of the Anthropocene to the Capitalocene, understood as an epoch of climate disruption midwifed by capital accumulation.

    Smithson’s focus on prehistory provides a temporal framework that dwarfs cultural chronologies and undermines the dominion of the present, from capitalist clock time to the latest breathless avant-garde. The disjunctive unmodernity he discerned in modern fossil economies provides a way to visualize other temporalities hidden by the “homogeneous, empty time” of capitalism (Benjamin, “On the Concept of History” 395). Indeed, if capitalism’s greatest triumph lies in its seeming homology with the remorseless, unstoppable advance of linear clock time, Smithson’s work testifies instead to fossil capital’s disruptive, entropic temporality. This in turn exposes built-in contradictions and prospects for resistance that can make common cause with sustainable social formations and supposedly atavistic life-rhythms branded “pre-modern” and “archaic” (Chatterjee 4–5). The fiftieth anniversary of Spiral Jetty is an opportunity to consider the environmental promise of Smithson’s aesthetics, its implicit “revolution against history” (Malm 10).

    Against Survival

    For thirty years Spiral Jetty was largely invisible, the Great Salt Lake’s rising water levels having unexpectedly swallowed the sculpture soon after it was built. Arguably, the Jetty‘s increased remoteness in an already remote place accentuated its dialectical relationship with Smithson’s accompanying film and essay. But if this mediation in text and image reinforced the Jetty‘s conceptual aspect—”dematerializing” the artwork, as Lucy Lippard puts it—the sculpture’s disappearance also added to its mystique (xxi). Biography laid claim to the Jetty. In Gianfranco Gorgoni’s monumental photographs of 1970, the Jetty already seems an artifact frozen in time, a stark, graphic emblem planted in weatherless still waters. Following Smithson’s death in 1973, Gorgoni’s portraits of the artist at the site reinforce a pathos-laden identification of the lone creator with his signature work, an enduring ideal of the Jetty as “the individual vision of a single artist” (Flam, “Biographical” xxvi). Ironically, every look back at Spiral Jetty becomes a memorial to this “individual vision.” At the turn of the millennium the reemergence of the Jetty from the Great Salt Lake prompted the Dia Art Foundation’s publication of a volume on Spiral Jetty. Somewhat misleadingly, photographs by Gorgoni, Nancy Holt, and Smithson, along with more recent images, largely confirm the sculpture’s appearance during the artist’s lifetime. In recent years, however, the Jetty has become fully stranded on the shore. This entropic, wholly useless aspect of the Jetty encourages a renewed view of the sculpture as subject to the impersonal forces of time, weather, and seasonal variation—and the historical processes behind climate change.

    James Benning’s 2007 film Casting a Glance highlights the challenges and pitfalls of a retrospective look at Smithson’s work. The feature-length documentary evokes Spiral Jetty‘s history in long, static shots that portray the sculpture in different seasons. Fifteen chapters, each named with a date, span the sculpture’s completion on April 30, 1970 to May 15, 2007. By the film’s fifth chapter, dated March 5, 1971, the viewer sees the Jetty begin to sink. The sculpture’s black basalt rocks stand half submerged in the flat, mirroring waters of the lake under an imposing background of snow-covered mountains. In the chapters dated 1984 and 1988, the jetty has fully disappeared. Likewise for the entire span of the 1990s, as the next chapter jumps another fourteen years to 2002, at which time the first rocks of the jetty have just begun to reemerge from the lake.

    Benning’s framing and editing foreground the anonymous natural processes of the vast desert landscape and promote an immersive sense of duration, an insistent feature of the filmmaker’s work. And yet in a film that cedes the initiative to nature, significant narrative features still obtain. On May 24, 1973, as the lake’s waters are swallowing the jetty, only a dotted outline of rocks can be seen; stormy surf beats the stones, and waves race across the sculpture’s concentric bands. An intrepid visitor is seen standing far out at the first bend of the jetty, and a dog tries to join him but the man calls it to go back. The lone man and his companion’s exit from the scene take on meaningful resonance when we realize that the following black frames skip over the year of Smithson’s death, as signaled by the next chapter’s intertitle: July 20, 1984, the eleventh anniversary of the artist’s passing. This gesture is underscored by the film’s concluding shot; before the film cuts to black, we hear the faint ambient noise of a single-engine plane, evocative of the crash that ended Smithson’s life in Amarillo, Texas at the site of his final earthwork.

    These narrative elements lend Benning’s film a hagiographic tone not uncommon among Smithson’s commentators. Lynne Cooke goes so far as to guess what Smithson “must have” felt upon completing the Jetty, conflating her own admiring hindsight with a nostalgia she imputes to the artist. “In retrospect,” Cooke proposes, “the moment of the Jetty‘s completion must have seemed golden; it must have been tinged with nostalgia” (64). While anniversaries always involve some retroactive fabrication, the Spiral Jetty, a monument in time, raises the stakes of such historical returns. In celebrating Smithson’s work and commemorating his untimely end, we risk giving narrative meaning and thereby a redemptive significance to a body of work that radically challenges our frameworks for understanding the natural processes in which our lived lives are embedded. Benning’s film is especially interesting in this regard, because the overarching story of the Jetty‘s submergence and reappearance is, in fact, the director’s willful fabrication. Having filmed during a span of time when the Jetty began to reappear, Benning used his footage of this more recent time period to reconstruct the Jetty‘s earlier history, matching the water surface levels from his film footage to the lake’s recorded levels at corresponding months in the past. The chapters relaying the Jetty‘s submergence have thus inverted the arrow of time, for Benning filmed during a period when the opposite process was underway. Accordingly, the chapter dated 1970 corresponds not to the earliest but instead to Benning’s most recent footage of the Jetty.

    In this regard, perhaps the most telling narrative moment of Casting a Glance involves no human agent or ambient sound. In the chapter that briefly shows the man and his dog, the Jetty‘s impending submergence is portrayed with images of stormy waves that render the incremental process of slowly rising water as a dramatic event: a flood, perhaps, or even a deluge of biblical scale—an impression reinforced by the film’s long middle sequences of horizonless waters under infinite skies. The return of the Jetty thus carries connotations of supernatural creation and divine redemption, motifs quite alien to Smithson’s aesthetics. Benning’s film ends up an all-too-human homage, ironically confirming Smithson’s damning judgment that “cinema offers an illusive or temporary escape from physical dissolution” (“A Tour” 74).

    As we have noted, Rob Nixon argues that one of the most pressing tasks of environmental justice is to represent dilatory social and ecological catastrophes whose delayed effects defy conventions of narrative and representation. If this is so, slowness and violence themselves would seem to call for critical reassessment. Gayatri Spivak provides the means for such a critique, arguing that to access “the rhythm of the eco-biome” requires that we not only focus on violations that are “pervasive rather than singular and spectacular” but also question and reevaluate the metaphysical grounding of the notion of violence itself (529, 533). The transcendental and humanist aspects of Benning’s film can be faulted on these counts. Even more significant, however, is the story arc that relates the Jetty‘s long process of submersion and reappearance. While the filmmaker’s recreation of that history is a deliberate artifice, his filmic construct is itself premised on an erroneous perception of natural rhythms. Climate science suggests that from the early twentieth century to the present, the surface level of the Great Salt Lake has been in general decline (Meng 7, 9). If, viewed on this timeline, the average surface level tends progressively lower, this poses a baffling conceptual challenge: we must be able to picture the lake constantly diminishing, its surface level perpetually dropping, even during the decades-long period when rising waters submerged the Jetty.

    This kind of long view is characteristic of Smithson’s aesthetic vision, and the artist was well aware that the Great Salt Lake is the remnant of a much larger inland sea that would likely shrink further. Smithson fully anticipated his sculpture’s eventual dissolution, its inevitable “dedifferentiation” (“Four” 207). But today the Jetty‘s fast-shifting elevation cannot help but evoke two related ecological threats quite specific to our age of global heating: sea level rise and the desiccation of desert lakes. As Elizabeth Rush documents in Rising: Dispatches from the New American Shore, the United States is poorly prepared for the drastic changes already being felt on shrinking shorelines everywhere. Perhaps the most valuable aspect of Rush’s book is its challenge to climate-change adaptation, an emerging political and economic dogma that takes the logic of “creative destruction” beyond its terminal limit by capitalizing on future unlivability. In contrast to technocratic plans for the profitable management of catastrophe, Rush suggests avowing “defeat” in the face of indomitable natural forces; she advocates an organized retreat from the shoreline and a shared embrace of “vulnerability” as a lived practice of egalitarian, intersectional, coalition-building politics (249). As with Benning’s film, however, Rising ultimately offers a redemptive vision that undermines Rush’s most important claims. The book closes with descriptions of landscapes in states of decay that evoke Smithson’s entropic art: a “crosshatch of levees,” a disintegrating berm, and walkways leading out into salt ponds, where an art installation of ambiguous purpose leaves Rush baffled (250). But this bafflement does not last; inspired by signs of persistent life in the tidal zone, she settles on an ecological vision of “a living system so complex the sole word to describe it is divine” (251). The author’s metaphysical flourish is worth noting, as her conclusion betrays a number of recuperative moves that allay her message of vulnerability with an implied claim to all-encompassing immunity from physical decay. This could explain why her language swerves from an avowal of “defeat” to a claim of “resiliency” and ultimate “survival” (249)—ideas that arguably undergird all the World Bank’s ominous investments in so-called adaptation. Tellingly, Rush conscripts art too into this project of survival: she appeals to the art installation in the marshland as a supposed conduit of stable “meaning” and clear “purpose” (250), where the cultivation of Smithsonesque irony might serve better.

    If the continued use of fossil fuels condemns the world to unlivability, a transition to a post-carbon future is crucial to the world’s survival. But this task would involve extricating “survival” from the extractive economies that have defined the terms of livability. Building on Timothy Mitchell’s influential work, a collective of activist petrocultures scholars offers tools for such a critique by asserting that the influence of fossil fuels extends even into the immaterial realms of our values, affects, and desires. Accordingly, they argue that art can dismantle those deeply embedded traces of the carbon economy and help to envision alternative futures “after oil” (Petrocultures). But in observing that “art can be put to purposes other than corporate interests,” the scholars take art’s purposefulness as a given—a construal of artistic practice that aligns broadly with carbon economy’s instrumental rationality (Petrocultures 47). This framing of art practice suggests that art’s purposeful aims may be complicit in petroculture even in works that engage in ostensible critique, which would ironically confirm the scholars’ own sobering dictum that “life has been limited to life within a petroculture” (47). Here it may be worth recalling Adorno’s evocation of the “purposeless activity” of play, which allows children to defeat the usefulness of things and forestall their capture by market logic (228). In his description of child’s play Adorno evokes trucks, those stalwarts of petroculture, deprived of any practical function by the child’s creative improvisation: “the little trucks travel nowhere,” Adorno says, “and the tiny barrels on them are empty” (228). Smithson employed dump trucks and earth-moving equipment in his major late works, including Asphalt Rundown, Concrete Rundown, and Spiral Jetty. A barrel of viscous glue served as Smithson’s art medium in his Glue Pour of 1970. Childhood play as described by Adorno allows us to glimpse how these seemingly grand gestures of Smithson’s are belittled by the ludic purposelessness of the artist’s entropic sensibility. At stake in each is not simply a difference in size but in disparities of scale; in other words, artistic practice, like play, involves the creative engagement with another order of measurement and correspondingly disparate values. “Size determines an object,” Smithson pointedly observes, “but scale determines art” (“The Spiral Jetty” 9).

    This suggests that ecological aesthetics requires a critique of art’s complicity not only in dominant values and interests but in its representational and communicative functions. Far from merely espousing political aims and expressing social engagement, art’s political promise lies in materializing what lies at the bounds of aesthetic and political representation alike. After Oil‘s own examples of activist art, while laudably committed to social justice, tend to reinforce positivist ideals of mimetic representation and full disclosure. In a particularly bald assertion of reductively instrumental logic, artists are enjoined to “make the unconscious conscious” (Petrocultures 48). In a similar way, Adrian Parr’s Hijacking Sustainability calls on an inspiring, if didactic, example of art to illustrate the stakes of anti-capitalist ecology: Spencer Tunick’s photograph of a mass of vulnerable naked people lying huddled on a receding Swiss glacier (162). For all their radical commitments, Parr’s theory of sustainability and the petrocultures scholars’ bid for survival “after oil” largely depend on an idea of art grounded quite safely in a metaphysics of denotative representation.

    To argue for Smithson’s relevance to contemporary political ecology is to read against the grain of his pronouncements on environmentalism. Smithson was openly critical of ecologists and considered their vision of natural processes moralizing and sentimental. But the artist’s impatience with environmentalists goes to the heart of ecological illusions of survival. Crucially, this critique implies an entropic theory of language and representation; as a wholly material activity outmatched by processes of erosion and dissolution, signification is inherently self-undermining for Smithson, its claims of enduring presence delusory.3 Ecology, then, cannot evade the question of entropic signification without falsifying the nature it purports to represent. He makes this point quite strikingly in the short and acerbic piece titled “Can Man Survive?” Smithson’s essay savages an exhibit by that name at the American Museum of Natural History, scorning the “superstition” and “religiosity” of the show’s portrayals of nature (367). The show’s all too wondrous visions of calamity betray aesthetic raptures that ultimately fall prey to the familiar recuperative sleight of mind of sublime experience: images of “pretty filth and elegant destruction,” Smithson says, imply “a transcendental state of matter, that is uncanny, grotesque, and terribly attractive” (368). The artist concludes that “Ecology arises from a need for deliverance and a deep distrust of science,” and as such, its “weird faith” (367) offers no viable alternatives to its grim visions of the “apocalypse of ecology.”

    The threat of a population explosion looms large in the exhibit “Can Man Survive?” A photograph showing “piles of birth control devices rotting in India” (368) alludes to Paul R. Ehrlich’s alarming prediction in The Population Bomb (1968) that overpopulation would soon lead to global mass starvation events, notably on the Indian subcontinent. One might wish that Smithson had given more than a passing attention to the topic. His scorn at least cuts through the discourse of population control, whose pieties have long given cover to colonial dispossession and free-market rationality, from the Irish Famine to NGO interventionism. This discourse has lately emerged in posthuman environmentalism, where a prominent strand of first-world eco-feminism endorses population control in language that revives the eugenicist strain of ecological demography.4 Needless to say, Ehrlich’s predictions ultimately proved wrong, though not for reasons that economists can adequately explain even today. To self-avowed economic “optimist” David Lam, for instance, a look back at fifty years of recent demographic history prompts the cheerfully incurious question “how did we survive?” (10). Citing Ehrlich’s warning of 1968 that “the battle to feed humanity is already lost” (6), the economist points to global statistics that seem to imply the opposite: at the very same time that the world population doubled, per-capita food production increased, commodity prices remained stable, and poverty declined—feats “surely worth marveling at” (10), Lam says. Notably, however, Lam minimizes the role of Cold War geopolitics in these equations; during the period in question, US-funded aid programs promoted large-scale industrialized agribusiness which, touting the virtues of self-sufficiency in developing countries, in fact aimed to undermine local autonomy and stem the tide of socialism. Likewise, ecology gets short shrift in Lam’s account of this history. A more holistic view of agriculture plainly shows that the so-called green revolution has had long-term deleterious effects, chaining emerging economies to the corporate monopolies that provided machinery, petrochemical fertilizers, pesticides, and new strains of seeds for large-scale monoculture farming, with well-known negative consequences for food security, sustainability, and biodiversity. This long-term damage is now taking its toll; indeed, even before the global pandemic, the IPCC issued a grim warning that famine is making a comeback, its threats magnified by the multifarious effects of climate change.5

    The apparent “marvel” of our survival is contradicted by the economist’s own sunny data. In a graph plotting commodity prices from 1960–2010, two major price increases stand out. The first, in 1974, corresponds to the OPEC oil embargo, and the second, in 2008, to the global financial crisis. The parallel is enlightening. We may consider the OPEC embargo as a “true cost” experiment conducted on US Cold War geopolitics and the consumer economy it sustains; oil shortages and general unaffordability provide a rough idea of fossil fuels’ prohibitive price tag once their damage is factored in. As for the second spike in affordability, we might have only survived that crisis in a state of “non-death,” as Colin Crouch puts it, neoliberal dogma having paradoxically outlived the crisis that should by all rights have fully discredited it. Expanding on Crouch’s analysis of the 2008 crisis, we can posit that the OPEC crisis similarly discredited the fundamentals of the fossil economy by exposing its hidden costs. If this is so, a “non-dead” fossil economy renders retrospectively implausible our survival of the population explosion. Like apocalypse, the “extraordinary resilience”6 of zombie capitalism seems anchored in an unbudgeable metaphysics of enduring life, though a materialist analysis can trace that delusory claim of survival back to the fossil infrastructures that removed the “natural limits to growth” (Mitchell 141). If we include the delayed consequences of carbon emissions and synthetic pollutants in the green revolution’s cost ledger, we will only have survived the population bomb in a state of fossil-fueled “non-death.”

    This predicament implies a temporal paradox: “the new chronic,” as Eric Cazdyn puts it (5), is characterized by the stubborn persistence of late capitalism in a sick ongoingness of constant crisis management. Cazdyn argues that the perpetual denial of capitalism’s end-time converts terminal states into an uncanny suspension of history, a borrowed time in which we are “already dead.” Taken together, Crouch’s and Cazdyn’s analyses suggest a highly paradoxical historical moment in which the not-yet and the already coincide or overlap: a time without the present. As such, fossil capital’s uncanny temporality seems to offer a chance to deconstruct survival’s unhealthy grip on ecological consciousness. Here, Cazdyn with his sense of the “already dead” has perhaps an advantage over Crouch, who frames his sobering analysis of our contemporary “non-death” as an implicit survival guide for “coping,” as he puts it, with the impending end of democracy (2). In contrast, Cazdyn’s critical optic disallows any crisis management that would fudge accounts with negativity, not only in the economic realm—Crouch’s field of study—but in a symbolic general economy. This meshes with a deconstructive theory of representation congruent with Smithson’s materialist aesthetics of “dedifferentiation”: the “always already” of différance requires that we understand survival as inherently self-defeating, life’s persistence in “auto-immunity” being indistinguishable from the material supports that negate it.7

    Because the “new chronic” perpetuates capitalism in a state of crisis, ordinary activities of coping and triage can be judged as largely complicit in its maintenance. A critique of this low-grade complicity in survival has radical implications for environmentalism, whose primary focus in all areas of conservation involves “saving” species and ecosystems from economic overexploitation, even when they presume nature functions as a “natural resource” or “ecosystem service.” Elizabeth Kolbert’s The Sixth Extinction provides a subtle critique of the implicit eschatology of such ark-like preservation efforts, suggesting a need to save ecology from the logic of salvation (10). To cite only one example from the catalogue of failed preservation efforts, a recent study found that insect populations have declined twenty-five percent in the past thirty years (Klink et al.), confirming an earlier report that warned of “catastrophic consequences for the survival of mankind” should those trends continue (Carrington). Notably, insects in nature reserves were not found to be significantly more abundant than in farmland and urbanized areas. The “new chronic” appears here as ecology’s managed diminishment of existence under a general condition of perpetual decline. With such failures in mind, an exit from the “new chronic” might entail a reassertion of history by revolting from the merely endurable and confronting our political-ecological reality as “already dead.” Environmental politics would be converted into negative ecology; to conceive of the environment as “already dead” is to depart from the radical position of having nothing to save, as saving can only preserve within the terms of capitalism’s death-dealing survival.

    Survival is to climate change as resilience is to precarity. In the one we may already glimpse the incalculably worse implications of our gradual slide into the other. After all, plans for adaptation to climate change are unfolding in a context that already demands continuous adaptation to ever more precaritizing social and economic conditions—in which an enforced condition of maximal insecurity requires self-maintenance through a paradoxical “self-precaritization” (Lorey 70). Frantz Fanon speaks compellingly of the way colonized populations are subjected to a “continued agony” that degrades and diminishes their culture without definitively ending it (34). Colonialism casts the shadow of this “continued agony” well beyond the present. A preview of general militarized survival under climate collapse may be seen in the colonial security apparatus in occupied Palestine, a uniquely brutal system of “necrocide” in which “unauthorized death is banned,” as China Miéville aptly puts it (302). In this light, one of the major political ramifications of the 2020 protests against racism and police brutality in the United States is the growing recognition of the militarization of policing. Occurring as it did amidst economic calamity and social upheaval, the mass movement to defund the police speaks as much to the urgency of the present as to the prospects of social and environmental justice in an unlivable future. As a resistance movement against enforced survival, negative ecology can help sustain critical focus on the brutalizing control systems that foreclose “unauthorized death.”

    At the same time, such a negative ecology would simply reconnect with the scope of environmentalism as defined by Rachel Carson. In Silent Spring, her excoriating critique of synthetic pesticides, Carson insists that ecology involved grasping time measured “not in years but in millennia,” and events “totally outside the limits of biologic experience” (7). Carson strikes an entropic, Smithsonesque tone in saying that damage from pollution already appeared “irrecoverable” and “irreversible” in 1962. Significantly, Carson finished writing her book under the shadow of her own impending death from cancer, though environmentalism has not fully embraced the negative ecological implications of her judgment that “there is no time” in the modern world for ecology (6). From an aesthetic standpoint, neither does Carson herself; the author’s empathic lyricism, so important for the book’s popular reception, nonetheless reinscribes geological time within the familiar biological patter of iambic and dactylic meter, as when she evokes “the heedless pace of man” and “time on the scale that is nature’s” (7). Challenging the dominance of the lyric mode in environmental humanities has emerged as a significant front in recent scholarship as ecocritics turn to experimental poetry to grasp the contours of the climate crisis in subjective apprehensions of the non-human temporalities of the Capitalocene.8 Smithson’s work speaks to this challenge to lyrical subjectivity in his deliberately impersonal, paratactic prose style, which eliminates the speaking “I” and renders actions in the passive voice in order to convey the ecological temporality of the “already dead.”9

    Silent Spring is often credited with galvanizing the movement that led to the founding of the EPA, which in its first year was tasked with setting regulatory standards for pollution under the 1970 Clean Air Act. With its focus on human respiratory health, however, the history of the Clean Air Act’s piecemeal regulations (and their subsequent dismantling) might be seen as fatefully confined within Carson’s “limits of biologic experience.” Fossil capital’s deep imbrication with extractive and despoiling processes imposes the recognition that the necessary objective of climate ecology is not pollution, narrowly defined, but carbon emissions. Accordingly, if the target of climate activism is the fossil economy, then the field of political action requires the kind of leap in scale we see in Smithson’s aesthetics. Such a scalar leap is memorably captured in the poster for Al Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth, arguably the most culturally influential ecological statement since Silent Spring. The image shows smoke spewing from smokestacks and curling into the threatening shape of a hurricane’s gargantuan spiral—an “immobile cyclone,” as Smithson might put it (“The Spiral Jetty” 8).

    Terminal Dialectics

    In times of crisis, spirals are often invoked as emblems of catastrophe, of things spinning downward and out of control; we speak colloquially of death spirals and of spiraling crises and inequality. Symbolically resonant as it may be, particularly in a year of manifold calamities, Spiral Jetty is perhaps above all a formal achievement. The absurd “pointlessness” of an art pilgrim’s trek into the Great Salt Lake is no metaphysical voyage or journey into an allegorical labyrinth.10 Rather, we should see it as Smithson’s full-scale demonstration of the optical vanity of linear perspective, his “terminal view” of art, as Ann Reynolds puts it (134). The Jetty‘s sinuous curl may be suggestively organic, but Smithson modeled its shape on the geometric spiral formations of inanimate crystalline structures. Likewise, the spiral’s dynamic spin should be considered a “gyrostatic” form, no less threatening for being immobile.11 Viewed this way, the Jetty evokes the formal language of Smithson’s nonsites, which set up a play of dialectical tensions between container and contained, presence and absence, visibility and invisibility, proximity and distance. This formal correspondence is brought out most strikingly in comparing the Jetty to Smithson’s crate-shaped sculptural installations: the nonsites’ horizontal slats are mirrored in his Great Salt Lake sculpture’s alternating bands. In the 1968 Non-site (Palisades-Edgewater, N.J.), for instance, a slatted steel box displays a jumble of rocks from a disused trolley line, with an accompanying text that seems to anticipate the Jetty‘s winding itinerary: “what was once a straight track has become a path of rocky crags—the site has lost its system” (Hobbs 110).

    In their conceptualist aspect, Smithson’s nonsites undermine the art object by emphasizing distance and disintegration, their displacement in “networks of interconnection” (Baker 107). As non-representational interventions in the pictorial tradition of landscape art, they challenge perspectival vision by undermining the characteristic “fantasizing distance” of the appropriative viewer who claims the admirable scene of nature without belonging to it ecologically (Kelsey 209). Such a distant claiming has an underlying economic rationale: the conventions of modern landscape art, including mapping and optical perspective, arguably came into dominance with a fourteenth-century need to rationalize a world picture for long-distance trade (Baridon 283). In contrast, Smithson’s nonsites are neither here nor visible, as their name implies, and thereby evade the conventional features of landscape art and more broadly of the art object as commodity. In so doing, however, the nonsite captures a crucial aspect of the commodity fetish: its profitable removal from the occluded site of production. The site from which Smithson draws his raw material is typically a postindustrial landscape. By insisting on that place’s connection to the nonsite, Smithson makes its dirty history cling to the gallery object. The nonsite, we might say, becomes the site’s impossible alibi. As such, we can think of the nonsite’s distant reference point as either source or destination in a cycle of economic production: the scene of exploitation, tainted provenance of the gallery object, or site of violent expulsion, a place where the commodity’s cost is measured in waste, ravage, and abandonment.12 By favoring the remote site over the humble gallery object, Smithson’s spatial dialectics implicitly challenge what Bruce Robbins calls “the tyranny of the close over the distant” (97).

    The dialectic of site and nonsite thus resonates significantly with environmental justice work that targets the invisible and distant sites of offloaded waste, outsourced labor, and offshored profits. Indeed, as Nixon frames it in Slow Violence, environmental justice hinges on a Smithsonesque politics of the ecologically distant and unseen; a critique of the “unsightly,” the “out-of-sight,” and the “remote” requires a practice of environmental justice as much aesthetic and representational as it is political (2). Presumably, then, a politics of environmental justice would bring closer what is remote and render visible what is out of sight. Like a nonsite, the first-world consumer’s home should become unsightly and uncanny; to recognize the taintedness of products sourced in places of unregulated exploitation would be to “de-alienate” them and realize their ubiquity in our domestic space.13 As with ivory in the days of the Belgian Congo, these commodities are “everywhere at home” (McCarthy 621). Smithson’s nonsites deliberately challenge such a politics of corrective vision. As Smithson insists, the seemingly indexical referentiality of the site/nonsite dialectic is fraught with hazards.14 The site may be a real referent, but it is prone to disturbance; it endures, but only as a mock eternity. This temporal dimension ultimately undermines the nonsites themselves; as Smithson explains, one of his final nonsites points to no definite place, the referent being lost in measureless time and therefore invisible and unlocatable. Significantly, the contents of Nonsite, Site Uncertain (1968) are fossil fuel: chunks of black cannel coal.15

    This shift from the relatively bipolar and spatially organized structure of the nonsites to Smithson’s later work fulfills the entropic orientation of the artist’s vision. At the extreme point of Smithson’s site/nonsite dialectics, the demise of the nonsite also relates in a concrete way to the impasse of environmentalist consumer ethics in an age of climate crisis. While the discourse of consumer responsibility often invokes simple polarities of source and destination, such an “individuation of responsibility” can only misrepresent the scale and complexity of global production and consumption networks (Monbiot). As outsourcing and subcontracting often involve multiple sites of production, any attempt at pointing to the commodity’s many extraction points would imply innumerable referents—seemingly “faraway sites” that keep exerting their influence on the local object, as Bruno Latour keenly demonstrates (200). Patrick Bond puts the problem succinctly: “capitalism intrinsically externalizes costs” (65). Consumer-choice ethics can be seen, then, as corporate capitalism’s ultimate alibi; customer behavior hardly affects the overriding motive of capital to seek cheaper and more exploitative sources of goods and labor and to hide profit’s collateral damage, its so-called externalities. David Harvey has persuasively shown how capitalism survives its crises by buying time and shifting ground: so many “spatial fixes” and “temporal fixes” to its intractable contradictions.16 Crucially, however, a political critique of capital’s shifting alibis must pursue the logic of extractivism to the “uncertain” sites where dialectics meet entropy.

    “An inferno rages in the soul of the commodity,” writes Walter Benjamin (Arcades 369). Brooding on the deceptive innocence of the commercial object, Benjamin considers its “price tag” akin to allegorical meaning: arbitrary and illusory, a significance far removed from its signifier. His “inferno” challenges such alibis by evoking the monstrous realm of cruelty, suffering, and exploitation hidden behind the commodity—by insisting, in other words, on “how it came into being” (Adorno qtd. in Arcades 669). As such, the metaphor evokes real sites of blazing heat, the blast furnace of a steel factory, perhaps, or the stifling “underground workshops” of coal miners described in Benjamin’s essay “The Storyteller” (95). Here as elsewhere Benjamin insists on framing labor history within the death cycles of what he called “natural history.” And yet, even as he broods over his “indiscriminate mass of dead lore” (Arcades 368), the allegorist likely did not mean his “inferno” to evoke fossilized biomass, the product of chthonic heat and pressure. Nor did he intend to describe that fuel’s profitable destruction in an internal combustion engine. This shift of focus, however, is precisely the target of a political ecology of fossil capital. But as with Smithson’s 1968 nonsite, that target is profoundly elusive; site and nonsite appear “intimately coupled yet strangely disconnected from each other,” as Malm puts it (4), or “widely separated both in space and time,” in Rachel Carson’s words (189), a distance that imposes an ever more imperative dialectics. The commodity as nonsite demands that we grasp it in relation to a site expanded to the dimensions of the globe, a dialectic that bridges the fossil-fueled fetish and its emissions’ incremental contribution to anthropogenic climate change. Crucially, Smithson’s dialectics trouble the commodity’s trajectory from raw material to fetish. In so doing they invert capitalism’s overall “transmutation of processes into entities” (Rose 18). In this sense we might understand the world-girdling implications of the commodity owner’s enmeshment in “the metabolic process of mankind,” as Marx puts it: by assuming the ecological cost of his infernal wares, “the commodity-owner becomes a cosmopolitan” (384).

    Benjamin’s infernal commodity aligns with Lukács’s theory of reification, which assumes its most stringent and unforgiving definition in Adorno’s negative dialectics. Reification for Adorno defines the all-encompassing and inescapable condition of a world wholly subjected to the rule of exchange-value. The infernal economy of fossil capital, to borrow Benjamin’s flash of insight, is perhaps the most persuasive confirmation of reification’s total dominion over life. What is hidden by each “price tag” on every commodity is the fossil economy that propels it into circulation and whose carbon emissions add to the atmosphere’s degradation. The contemporary subject is inextricably linked to that pervasive fossil economy, whose material network makes our local self a nonsite of that other, infrastructural body. As Daisy Hildyard puts it in The Second Body, “You are always all over the place” (8).

    Smithson’s death spiral in the Great Salt Lake might be seen, then, as an exploded nonsite that materializes the terminal dialectics of fossil capital. “My dialectics of site and nonsite whirled into an indeterminate state,” Smithson says of his first encounter with the inspiring location at Rozel Point (“The Spiral Jetty” 8). Site and nonsite swirl into oblivion; externalities overwhelm the landscape. To grasp the political implications of this predicament requires envisioning a totality more extensive than globalization and more materially specific than the all-too-human Anthropocene. On the model of Adorno’s unforgiving dialectics, negative ecology describes the grip of fossil capital on the entirety of the biosphere. Decarbonization surely requires “system change,” as many slogans demand, but ecology lies beyond a horizon turned dead end; as an alternative to capitalism it appears only in the negative, from within the scope of structure and system. A crucial advantage of viewing ecology from the perspective of Adorno’s “damaged life” is that it sustains focus on the obstacles we face. Petrocultures scholars are no doubt right in emphasizing that any transition to a post-carbon society is “stalked by the experience of impasse” (Petrocultures 16).17 Ironically, though, the war on nature waged by fossil capital materializes a collateral knowledge of the ecological in a way that consciousness-raising environmentalists have failed to achieve. Indeed, the all-encompassing condition of climate change may be the ultimate validation of nature as “environment,” even as this predicament indicates our entrapment in the negative ecology of fossil capital’s total reification of life.

    Environmental art often engages with this ecological predicament by connecting sensory experience in the here and now to the supersensible processes driving climate change. Olafur Eliasson’s Ice Watch is perhaps the paradigmatic recent effort to link tactile, visual, and auditory experience to phenomena occurring on geological scales. To coincide with the United Nation’s historic Climate Change Conference in Paris in December 2015, the artist installed twelve massive blocks of glacial ice on a street in the French capital. Evoking both a clock-face and a compass, as Eliasson notes, the circular installation allowed visitors to hear and feel the melting of ice dating back 15,000 years (Zarin). In contrast, Smithson’s approach to such challenges is to question the ability of the sensorium to encompass objects of any kind, and—inverting a hoary dictum of liberal politics—the artist implies that the impersonal is political.18 Literally uncontainable, Smithson’s museum nonsites evade both the grasp of the senses and the would-be comprehending mind, while his critique of optical perspective discredits the eye’s claim to attain the infinite. This challenge to “the illusion of infinite spaces” perhaps best allows us to gauge the dialectical significance of Smithson’s aesthetics for a politics of fossil capitalism (“Pointless” 358). Two main implications stand out: on the one hand, the illusory limitlessness of carbon democracy’s propulsive futurity must be pared back to its metabolic bounds; on the other, a sense of the illimited is needed to grasp fossil capital’s unaccountable inheritance from geology.

    Art historians understand Smithson to have debunked visual perspective as an anthropomorphic optical construct and demoted it to a useless, outdated artifact. In the sculptures Leaning Strata and Pointless Vanishing Point, for instance, Smithson renders what he calls perspective’s “mental artifice” as inert geometrical forms, their converging lines lopped off as if to castrate the scopic gaze (“Pointless” 358). Framed more broadly, we can understand this aesthetic intervention as a critique of masterful knowledge in general, especially with regard to its intimations of infinity. This has inherent political ramifications, given that the democratic notion of freedom itself is fully entangled in carbon democracy’s propulsive futurity. To put this in Jacques Rancière’s terms, a sense of limitlessness is part of what we have in common, and Smithson draws on this horizon to reinscribe finitude at that limit and foster a new aesthetic “distribution of the sensible” (12). Smithson’s critique of the would-be progressivism of the avant-garde then makes sense not merely as a contrarian’s cynicism but as a rigorous attention to what is shared and parceled out at its limits—at the territorial bounds of the horizon and on the vanishing line of fossil capitalism’s evanescent present. This is not to deny the vital role of pessimism to a critique of fossil capital, given that petroknowledge is characterized by its overweening “optimism” (Mitchell 141). Alarmingly enough, as Mitchell pointedly notes, the IPCC may be complicit in this affective posture; the likely impacts of negative feedback loops on the climate “make even the dire warnings from the IPCC look absurdly optimistic,” he says (7). In contrast to the sanguinity of climatologists and the rash positivity of petrocrats, Smithson sees the inheritance of prehistory as implying an insuperable limit to understanding, even as it impels the mind toward the infinite. Smithson only ever offers us visions of excess on the near side of infinity: “quasi-infinities,” as he puts it (“Quasi-Infinities” 34), or images of “infinite contraction,” in Robert Hobbs’s pithy phrase (98). Smithson’s is a claustral sublime, as rendered in his film on the Jetty, where the artist is seen running toward the sculpture’s center while his voiceover intones an identical view of “mud, salt crystals, rocks, water” from every compass-point (Spiral Jetty). This blocked view is a challenge to any claim of metaphysical survival or fossil-fueled inheritance. Rigorously materialist, the view from Spiral Jetty is at the same time a framing of infinitude, without which environmentalism can hardly foster a sense of the “double world” of the geological present.

    Contretemps

    It was in Vancouver, British Columbia, that Smithson spoke of “the artist as a geologic agent.” During the same three months he visited the area, he also had his most consequential dispute with ecologists. Public controversy over the environmental impact of Smithson’s proposed Island of Broken Glass forced the artist to abandon what would no doubt have been one of his major sculptural works. The inconclusive project for an Island of Broken Glass led Smithson to seek an alternate site at the Great Salt Lake. This episode is more than a detail of biography. As a project born of failure, Spiral Jetty can be seen as the sculptural enactment of a contretemps between environmentalism and negative ecology.

    In a particularly striking instance of Klein’s bad timing, Smithson’s stay in Vancouver coincided with the founding of one of the world’s most influential and enduring direct-action environmental organizations. Smithson visited Vancouver between November 1969 and February 1970 to develop the Island project on Miami Islet (a barren rock in the Strait of Georgia), and to participate in Lucy Lippard’s exhibition 955,000 at the Vancouver Art Gallery. After the Ministry of Lands, Forests and Water Resources denied the artist permission to build the Island of Broken Glass, gallerist Douglas Chrismas, Smithson’s local dealer, penned a letter making the case for a revised project at the site. Smithson’s idea for a new island earthwork made various concessions to public concerns and envisioned a welcoming “habitat” for sea birds, though his description of the Island of the Dismantled Building betrays the artist’s characteristic droll irony; as Chrismas says, quoting Smithson, the new work was intended as a “‘monument to ecology’” (Arnold 25). This second project met with a definitive rejection. Chrismas’s ill-fated missive to the Ministry is dated February 13, 1970. Two days later, in an article in the Vancouver Sun, the name Greenpeace appears for the first time in print (Weyler 68).

    One can hardly imagine a less propitious moment for Smithson to conceive his island project. The newly formed Vancouver chapter of the Sierra Club was instrumental in stopping the Island of Broken Glass; it was that group’s first environmental campaign. Meanwhile, as reported in the Vancouver Sun, a more radical faction was plotting to sail a boat dubbed Greenpeace to the Alaskan island Amchitka where the US was preparing a nuclear test. To activists fighting the “insane ecological vandalism” of the United States, Smithson’s island project appeared a similar American desecration of nature (Weyler 66). The opinion persists. In Rex Weyler’s account of this history thirty-four years later, the cofounder of Greenpeace still views the episode as an unalloyed triumph for environmentalism. His description of Smithson’s earthwork is shockingly garbled, if not defamatory: according to Weyler, Smithson’s intent was “to pave the islet with toffee-colored glue and shards of broken glass” (60). Aside from its inaccuracy—Weyler conflates Smithson’s seminal Glue Pour with the island project—the ecologist’s version of events betrays a glaring mismatch between environmentalism and geological consciousness. As Dennis Wheeler put it in his conversations with Smithson, the island project would be “making geologic time available” to the viewer with its heaped and jumbled plates of glass, evocations of earth strata shattered out of linear time and scattered into disorganized space (“Four Conversations” 226). The effect would be a “visual overload” that defies the viewer’s grasp (Grant 14), or, as Smithson suggests, a Bataillean “spiral” connoting “irreversible” expenditure (“Four” 230, 200).

    In spite of its apparent grandiosity, Smithson conceived the Island of Broken Glass as a highly bounded work concerned with issues of framing and containment, enclosing processes that occur on utterly different scales. As such, it exemplifies what Jack Flam calls “compressed hyperbole,” Smithson’s characteristic trope (“Introduction” xiv). This controlled rhetoric was sorely tested by Smithson’s disappointment in Vancouver. In a text penned after the final rejection of his island project, Smithson forcefully asserts that his vision of entropic loss is incompatible with any environmentalist logic of “salvation”: “The island is not meant to save anything or anybody but to reveal things as they are” (qtd. in Arnold 25). The artist casts himself as the “scapegoat” of environmentalist “cowards” and “hypocrites,” and concludes that “the phony ‘salvation’ put forth in so much ecological propaganda, has less to do with ‘saving the land’ than losing one’s mind” (qtd. in Arnold 25). Smithson may have misjudged the impression of “ecological vandalism” that his Island of Broken Glass would provoke, and his aesthetic intervention on Miami Islet could appear politically antithetical to a major protest action unfolding concurrently on another rocky island on the West Coast: the American Indian occupation of Alcatraz, a turning point for Indigenous rights in North America. Yet Smithson’s inexistent island remains strangely evocative for a negative ecology beyond the politics of “rich-nation environmentalists.”19 In E. Pauline Johnson’s short story “The Lost Island,” the author relates a tale told to her by Sahp-luk (Chief Joseph Capilano), in which a powerful medicine man, “the strongest man on all the North Pacific Coast,” is tormented by a dream that foretells the coming of White settlers to Vancouver and the resulting loss of his people’s lands and traditions (74). When the medicine man dies, he instructs his people to search for a mysterious island on which his powerful spirit will reside forever. In local Vancouver lore, then, an elusive island contains all the hopes of a return to the former lifeways of the Squamish and the restoration of a natural habitat “where the salmon thronged and the deer came down to drink of the mountain-streams” (75). One local author seems to have channeled Smithson’s “lost island” as the unwritten subtext for an insurgent Indigenous counter-history of art activism in Vancouver.20

    When Smithson visited the Great Salt Lake in March 1970 to scout locations for an earthwork, he initially pictured building an island in the lake (“The Spiral Jetty” 7). This echo of the Island of Broken Glass suggests that Smithson brought the bitter concept of a “monument to ecology” to Utah’s “dead sea.” By April, the site he chose at Rozel Point had inspired a different project. Intriguingly, the Jetty as originally constructed appears half-formed, as if caught midway between his Vancouver project and the Great Salt Lake: extant photos of his first Jetty show an arc terminating in a small bulbous form, like a tether linking an islet to the mainland.21 Smithson was unsatisfied with this solution. He returned the construction crew to the site a few days later to dismantle the island and give the Jetty its present shape.22

    Fifty years on, Miami Islet remains undisturbed. Though it is hard to judge the hypothetical impact of a planned forty tons of broken glass on the site, it would likely have had minimal effects on the surrounding ecosystem. Local preservation efforts, meanwhile, are outpaced by climate change. In the Strait of Georgia, salmon stocks are in steep decline and the resident orcas threaten to vanish. Dungeness crab, a local delicacy, can be found at Miami Islet, but as recently reported in the Vancouver Sun (Shore), their shells are showing developmental damage due to the global phenomenon of ocean acidification.

    John Culbert John Culbert is a Lecturer in the Department of English at the University of British Columbia. He is the author of Paralyses: Literature, Travel and Ethnography in French Modernity (Nebraska 2010). His article “The Well and the Web” appeared in Postmodern Culture 19.2.

    Footnotes

    I would like to thank Dina Al-Kassim, Dan Katz, Jaleh Mansoor, Kavita Philip, and Madeleine Reddon for reading earlier versions of this essay.

    1. See especially Nathaniel Rich, “Losing Earth”; David Wallace-Wells, The Uninhabitable Earth; Jonathan Franzen, “What If We Stopped Pretending?”; Catherine Ingram, “Facing Extinction.”

    2. In his treatise on the role of waste in modern aesthetics, Bourriaud performs a peculiar domestication of Bataille’s theory of excess, proposing instead a recuperative vision of the excluded remainder and casting the role of the modern artist as laboring “to bring those expelled by ideology, deported from symbolic power, back to the centre of life and culture” (172). In this account, nothing resists reassimilation – even if, confusingly enough, art itself reserves the right to “refuse” expulsion: “a realist mode of conceiving art,” Bourriaud asserts, “has refused the existence of the inassimilable.” In contrast, Smithson proposes that the artwork “evades our capacity to find its center,” and this decentering propels the viewer outward without prospect of return. “Where is the central point, axis, pole, dominant interest, fixed position, absolute structure, or decided goal? The mind is always being hurled towards the outer edge into intractable trajectories that lead to vertigo” (Smithson, “A Museum” 94).

    3. See especially Smithson, “A Museum of Language in the Vicinity of Art” and “A Sedimentation of the Mind.”

    4. See Sophie Lewis, “Cthulhu Plays no Role for Me.”

    5. See Natalie Sauer and Chloé Farand, “IPCC: Urgent action needed to tackle hunger alongside climate crisis.”

    6. I borrow the phrase from Frank Kermode. “Apocalypse can be disconfirmed without being discredited,” Kermode asserts. “This is part of its extraordinary resilience” (8). See The Sense of an Ending.

    7. For a uniquely personal treatment of this motif so crucial to his thought, see Derrida, Learning to Live Finally.

    8. See Lynn Keller, Recomposing Ecopoetics; Margaret Ronda, Remainders.

    9. See especially “Strata: A Photogeographic Fiction” and “Incidents of Mirror-Travel in the Yucatan.”

    10. We could say that Smithson “out-labyrinthed labyrinths,” as he remarks drolly of Frederick Law Olmsted (Smithson, “Frederick” 169).

    11. “Gyrostasis” is the name of Smithson’s triangulated spiral sculpture of 1968, which he subsequently described as a “map” to the Spiral Jetty. See Hobbs, editor, Robert Smithson: Sculpture, 95.

    12. See Saskia Sassen, Expulsions.

    13. On contemporary artistic strategies of “de-alienation,” see Heather Davis.

    14. The space between site and nonsite conveys a “new sense of metaphor,” Smithson says, that challenges expressive and realistic representation with a conceptual, analogic, and abstract dialectic (“A Provisional,” 364). Smithson specifies that because the nonsite directs the viewer into unbounded space, the indexicality of the metaphor opens onto no defined reference point: “Although there’s a correspondence, the equalizer is always in a sense the subverted or lost, so it’s a matter of losing your way rather than finding your way” (“Four” 218).

    15. As Smithson says, “The last nonsite [Nonsite, Site Uncertain, 1968] actually is one that involves coal and there the site belongs to the Carboniferous Period, so it no longer exists; the site becomes completely buried again. There’s no topographical reference. … That was the last nonsite; you know, that was the end of that. So I wasn’t dealing with the land surfaces at the end” (“Interview,” 296). Though Robert Hobbs points out that this nonsite was not, in fact, Smithson’s last, the artist’s account of his aesthetic trajectory reveals his sense of the nonsites’ conceptual evolution into geological time. See Hobbs 115 and Smithson, “Four,” 223.

    16. See David Harvey, The Limits to Capital, and “Globalization and the ‘Spatial Fix.’” While “spatial fix” is a focal term in Harvey’s work, its temporal correlative has largely been elaborated by his commentators. See Jessop, “Spatial Fixes, Temporal Fixes, and Spatio-Temporal Fixes.”

    17. In specifying “what blocks us from transitioning to other forms of energy,” the petrocultures scholars seem to draw implicitly on Malm’s sobering analysis of the “obstacles to the transition” (367). “The only historical transition that gives us insight into what is on the horizon (i.e., the scale of infrastructural and social shift) is the transition into the energy and economic system we’re on the brink of exiting” (Petrocultures 15). I have been arguing that any insight into such a horizon would have to pass through the obstructive entropics of Smithson’s terminal sightlines.

    18. A signal failure of environmental dialectics is demonstrated by would-be liberal thought leader Robert Reich. “It’s one thing to understand climate change in the abstract,” Reich observes. “It’s another to live inside it.” According to Reich, this supposedly unbridgeable disparity requires that we regain a sense that “the personal is political” in the lived experience of climate-fueled disaster. Such advocacy for a personal, experiential rapport to climate change can only promote a politics of adaptation to changes, which, if large enough to be commonly observed, can hardly be prevented.

    19. World Bank president Lawrence Summers notoriously employed the phrase. See Nixon 1; see also Bond 55.

    20. Wayde Compton’s short story collection The Outer Harbour relates the unexpected emergence of a volcanic island in Vancouver harbor that is targeted by First Nations militants for native occupation but is subsequently turned into a migrant detention facility. Smithson’s unbuilt island appears to be the tacit intertext between “Pauline Johnson island” and the various insurgent and artistic movements described in Compton’s fictional Vancouver. Indeed, as imagined by Compton, radical political action extends Smithson’s vision for the Island of Broken Glass to all of urban space and no doubt beyond; evoking “the so-called City of Glass” littered with the shards of broken windows, one militant group proposes, “Let those who smash, smash,” urging local residents “to crack every last antiseptic condo tower window, coating the sidewalks with so much shining rime” (Compton 79–80).

    21. On the logistics of construction and Smithson’s change of design, see Bob Phillips.

    22. Interestingly, the final version of Spiral Jetty may itself bear the traces of Smithson’s failed Vancouver project. When Smithson visited Vancouver in 1969, he may well have seen the large advertising billboards mounted across the city that year by Ben Metcalfe, a founding member of Greenpeace. The billboards featured the word “Ecology” in large letters, and the suggestion: “Look it up! You’re involved.” Notably, the accompanying image was of two large spirals, each nested in the other. See “The Fight to Save Earth.”

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    • Zarin, Cynthia. “The Artist Who Is Bringing Icebergs to Paris.” The New Yorker, 5 Dec. 2015, www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/the-artist-who-is-bringing-icebergs-to-paris. Accessed 3 October 2020.
  • Choreographies of Consent: Clarice Lispector’s Epistemology of Ignorance

    Rocío Pichon-Rivière (bio)

    Abstract

    This essay argues that, after studying law, Clarice Lispector never abandoned her engagement with political theory, and shows that her fiction and chronicles were a continuation of her philosophy of law by other means. Lispector developed an epistemology of ignorance through the analysis of two key social practices: “choreographies of consent” and “orchestrated oblivion.” In light of a 1941 article published in a law school journal, the essay traces the development of Lispector’s increasingly complex conceptions of law and examines how she adapted them when historical events forced her to confront willful ignorance as a pervasive condition of possibility for the social reproduction of injustice.

    Introduction

    Scholars rarely mention that Lispector—one of Brazil’s most prominent modernist writers—was a lawyer. This frequent omission suggests that her relation to the law was external to her literary work. This essay argues the opposite: I claim that Lispector’s literature was a continuation of her philosophy of law by other means precisely because it allowed her to narrate the gestures and feelings that constitute the outside of legal discourse.1 In doing so, she enticed her readers to see what remains unspoken in the language of the law as its implicit historical conditions of possibility.2 Whether the law is sanctioned by a secular State or enforced in religious communities through moral consensus, her concern had to do with the legitimization of such law in social rituals of consent and approval. In an early essay published in 1941when she was a student in law school, titled “Observações sobre o fundamento do direito de punir” (“Observations on the foundation of the right to punish”3), Lispector explores the continuities between moral and secular law. She makes the case that historically one institution leads to the other and that moral law and positive law share a common genealogy in the invention of the right to punish (“Observações”). The essay exposes the lack of foundation of the right to punish and hoped to prove that punishment was a dubious ritual that served to conceal rather than heal injustice. With the exception of this essay on crime and punishment, which makes analytical arguments against the letter of modern philosophies of right, Lispector developed her philosophy of law mostly in her fiction. Literature provided her the freedom to describe and narrate the spaces of law rather than replicating the language of the law in its redundant abstraction. In the ambivalent spaces of law, silent yet efficient gestures can be grasped or imagined as an outside to its scripture, thereby challenging and subverting its (often) well-intended meaning. I argue that the underlying phenomenological analyses of affective moods in the spaces of law in Lispector’s writings articulate a progressive series of theses that together compose an epistemology of ignorance. Simply put, an epistemology of ignorance examines the structural mechanisms through which society lies to itself.4 Lispector’s fiction focuses not only on what is said and what remains unsaid, but also observes with an anthropological gaze the choreographies of heads bowed down in shame or denial. Lispector’s engagement with these and other performances of powerfully constitutive forms of ignorance delineate the social and material conditions of possibility for the criminal justice system as we know it.

    In what follows, I focus first on what I call “choreographies of consent”: the narration of the gestures that performatively organize the social practice of moral justification regarding a decision. Choreographies of consent are the link between Lispector’s philosophy of law and her epistemology of ignorance, and involve cognitive processes in a dance of agreements and omissions regarding the validity or applicability of a law. The short story “The Crime of the Mathematics Professor” (1960) serves as an example of this literary device that reappears in other texts as well. The second section examines Lispector’s critical phenomenology of ignorance as it is fleshed out in a chronicle about a case of police brutality titled “Mineirinho” (1962). In light of the epistemology of ignorance articulated there, this section proposes a reading of her novel, The Passion According to G.H. (1964), to introduce the concept of the entbildungsroman.5 The entbildungsroman is a literary genre that parodies the traditional bildungsroman and in doing so advances a theory of the place of ignorance within the processes of ideology reproduction.

    Choreography of Furtive Consent

    A study of the notion of injustice lies at the center of Lispector’s phenomenological descriptions of the spaces of law as they appear both in her fiction and in her non-fiction. Biographically, this concern goes back to her first political intuitions when she was a child living in Recife, a city in Brazil’s Northeast region—one of the poorest and most State-abandoned areas of the country. In contrast to Lispector’s glamorous public image as a sophisticated diva of literary modernism, her upbringing was quite humble. Her father—a Jewish student of the scriptures forced to migrate from a violently racist Russia, where his wife was unspeakably maimed—had to take manual work to feed his family upon arriving in Brazil. In a chronicle from 1968, Lispector recounts her first experiences of political rage that inspired her to become a lawyer. She visited the mocambos in Recife—the poor Black neighborhoods where the formerly enslaved lived—just a few decades after the abolition of slavery, where she had the opportunity to hear the inflamed speeches of social leaders calling out their unjust conditions. Lispector wrote that she “vibrated” as a child with the heat of those discourses and promised herself that when she grew up, she would become a defender of the rights of the most vulnerable.6 Yet after graduating from law school in 1943, she did not follow through on that promise. Instead, she followed her new husband on his diplomatic missions in North Africa, Europe, and finally Washington, D.C., where they spent seven years. In a letter to her sisters written in Paris in January 1947, Lispector confesses her disgust with the hypocrisy that had become her new way of life. She recognizes that the lies hidden in the excessive cordiality of diplomatic conversations are a type of drunkenness—one in which she can no longer see her best self.

    Com a vida assim parece que sou “outra pessoa” em Paris. É uma embriaguez que não tem nada de agradável. Tenho visto pessoas demais, falado demais, dito mentiras, tenho sido muito gentil. Quem está se divertindo é uma mulher que eu detesto, uma mulher que não é a irmã de vocês. É qualquer uma. (Correspondências 115)

    In such a life it seems as if I am “another person” in Paris. It is a drunkenness that brings no satisfaction. I have seen too many people, talked too much, told lies, have been too gentle. The one having fun is a woman that I hate, a woman who is not your sister. She is a nobody.

    The delicate drunkenness of diplomacy suggests sophisticated choreographies of politeness that worked as a sedative for the rage of her youth. In her letter, Lispector seems to have surrendered to this intoxication with the sweet shame of an addict. Her being muito gentil—excessively gentle and gentile—begins to describe the tone of the choreographies of social oblivion that eventually became the theme of her fiction as well as of some of her chronicles. All her writings explore insistently how it is cognitively possible to forget what one used to know well.

    In an autobiographical essay, “Literatura e justiça” (“Literature and Justice”), Lispector comments on the reason she never wrote under the guise of engaged literature, like so many of her contemporaries in the Latin American Boom. Her essay explains her intellectual motives to produce instead an epistemology of ignorance:

    Desde que me conheço o fato social teve em mim importância maior do que qualquer outro: em Recife os mocambos foram a primeira verdade para mim. Muito antes de sentir “arte”, senti a beleza profunda da luta. Mas é que tenho um modo simplório de me aproximar ao fato social: eu queria era “fazer” alguma coisa, como se escrever não fosse fazer. … O problema de justiça é em mim um sentimento tão óbvio e tão básico que não consigo me surpreender com ele—e, sem me surpreender, não consigo escrever. E também porque para mim escrever é procurar. O sentimento de justiça nunca foi procura em mim, nunca chegou a ser descoberta, e o que me espanta é que ele não seja igualmente óbvio em todos.(Para não esquecer 25)

    Ever since I knew myself the social fact had in me an importance more prominent than any other: in Recife the mocambos were for me the first truth. Long before feeling “art,” I felt the deep beauty of political struggle. But I have a simplistic way of approaching the social fact: I wanted to “do” something, as if writing was not doing. … The problem of justice is in me a feeling so obvious and so basic that I cannot manage to be surprised by it—and, without being surprised, I cannot write. And also because for me writing is seeking. I never had to seek for the feeling of justice within me, it was never a discovery, and the thing that terrifies me is that it is not equally obvious to others.

    This passage resembles the beginning of Aristotle’s Metaphysics: without surprise and a certain lack of understanding there can be no thinking, because thinking begins as a search with an unknown destination. That certain circumstances are unjust is so obvious for Lispector that injustice does not require redundant representation. What remains a mystery is the willingness of others to remain ignorant about injustice despite its obvious presence.

    Lispector best parodies redundancy as the structure of engaged literature in her posthumous novel, A hora da estrela (1977). There the narrator (a novelist whose words we read as he struggles to convey social facts) says he is interested in facts because they are “pedras duras” (hard rocks) and therefore inescapable (25). While some read in this a naturalization of poverty (Peixoto), the pleonasm in the expression “pedras duras” might rather be a reference to the redundancy inherent in the enterprise of representing the inescapable as such.7 If this is correct, the thesis is not that social injustice is itself inescapable, but that the truth about existing, contingent social injustice cannot be dissimulated effectively and should require no additional help to be visible unless something is cognitively off—something that I call here “ignorance.”

    Lispector’s fictional inquiries both ask and seek to answer this fundamental question: how do people escape the inescapable truth of social injustice? And yet I want to challenge the simplicity of this distinction between herself and others, between those who can see injustice and those who remain ignorant. I want to foreground the tense subject position that Lispector articulates elsewhere, when she represents those whose lives perform a drunken ignorance despite showing glimpses that they know better. As we shall see in the chronicle “Mineirinho,” Lispector eventually self-represents as a subject defined by this dynamic contradiction, blurring the line that separates ignorance and knowledge.

    After they left Europe, her husband took on a diplomatic position in Washington, D.C., where they stayed for seven years during the dawn of the civil rights movement in the late 1950s. One can only imagine the conversations among the white diplomats as the orchestrated oblivion of racial injustice was interrupted by an increasingly organized movement and its public cry for justice. Lispector’s epistemology focuses on the ways in which it is cognitively possible to ignore what everybody knows. The drunkenness of diplomatic hypocrisy would become the examined subject of a theory about the orchestrated oblivion of injustice that organizes society despite the occasional glimpses of just political anger.8 In 1959 Lispector divorced her husband, left Washington, D.C., and returned to Brazil with her two children. In the following years, she published two texts that develop the question of the oblivion of injustice: a short story, “O crime do professor de matemática” (“The Crime of the Mathematics Professor”) (1960) and a chronicle about a case of police brutality, “Mineirinho” (1962), titled after the nickname of a man murdered in cold blood by a pack of policemen. In what follows, I read these together, next to the essay from 1941. In these works, Lispector shows links between punishment and oblivion and thereby ties the philosophy of law to the epistemological inquiry of a social production of ignorance.

    The short story “The Crime of the Mathematics Professor” starts in medias res with the professor carrying a heavy bag of unknown contents, which represents an unspoken crime he has committed. He is trying to find redemption through a punishing ritual that he first has to design because “they hadn’t yet invented a punishment for the great crimes in disguise and for the profound betrayals.” (“Pois ainda não haviam inventado castigo para os grandes crimes disfarçados e para as profundas traições.” 83) If there is a crime in the story, the avowed crime of the mathematics professor was abandoning his dog, José. What this crime means as a metaphor is not fully revealed at first, except to the extent that it suggests an action (or inaction) not considered a crime or a sin in hegemonic culture that can still burden a conscience. The question of improving existent social norms, whether through mild reform or radical change, is ciphered here. To borrow Derrida’s expression, this story points to the problem of “a democracy to come.”9 What our current democracy tolerates can burden the conscience of someone who might dare to imagine a higher standard. Yet such a standard to come cannot be expressed in the idiom of present norms. Abandoning a dog is an inaction or oversight that can go unpunished, but some time after the fact, the professor begins to find this lack of punishment unbearable. Readers soon learn that there is a dead body of another dog in his bag that he wants to bury with full honors in order to redeem himself for the wrongdoing committed against his own dog. The moral release that he craves is a curious theatre of confession, punishment, and absolution: “tratava-se de tornar o fato ao máximo visível à superfície do mundo sob o céu. Tratava-se de expor-se e de expor um fato, e de não lhe permitir a forma íntima e impune de um pensamento” (80). (“It was a question of rendering the fact as visible as possible on the surface of the world beneath the heavens. It was a question of exposing himself and exposing a fact, and not allowing the intimate and unpunished form of a thought.”) The fact that not even the church—as his inner monologue states with mild desperation—would consider his behavior a sin leaves him without a ritual of punishment and divine grace that would allow him to forget that dog’s face.

    From the story’s first sentence, the narrator contrasts the orderly entrance of Catholics into the church down below with the mathematician’s improvised and erratic dance of absolution up on the hill: he swings his heavy burden in search of the geometrically logical spot to bury his crime. His stream of consciousness follows the impromptu choreography of his feet meandering in the desert. In the distance, he sees the last tiny Catholics walking hastily into the church as “joyful bells peal once more summoning the faithful to the solace of punishment” (“Os sinos alegres tocaram novamente chamando os fiéis para o consolo da punição“) (80). This choreography of punishment brings solace to the faithful, and the professor tries to invent a new amendment to this kind of liturgy, to acknowledge his presumed crime and, by way of a gentile alchemy, to allow himself to release his guilt at last and forget his dog’s eyes.

    The question of why he abandoned his dog vaguely haunts the professor’s stream of consciousness. Whether such a question could ever be answered, however, is not made clear in the story. At some point he remembers the excuses he had given himself when he made the decision. Trusting their validity no longer, he unveils the full scene of consent:

    Abandonou-te com uma desculpa que todos em casa aprovaram: porque como poderia eu fazer uma viagem de mudança com bagagem e família, e ainda mais um cão, com a adaptação ao novo colégio e à nova cidade, e ainda mais um cão? ‘Que não cabe em parte alguma’, disse Marta prática. ‘Que incomodará os passageiros’, explicou minha sogra sem saber que previamente me justificava, e as crianças choraram, e eu não olhava nem para elas nem para ti, José. (Laços 83)

    [I] abandoned you with an apology that everyone at home approved of: since how could I move to a new house with all that baggage and family, and on top of that a dog, while adjusting to a new high school and a new city, and on top of that a dog? “For whom there’s no room,” said Marta being practical. “Who’ll bother the other passengers,” reasoned my mother-in-law without being aware that she was preemptively justifying my plan, and the children cried, and I looked neither at them nor at you, José.

    The universal claim in the first line (“with an apology that everyone at home approved of”) is immediately contradicted when we learn that the children were crying and that he avoided their gaze as well as the dog’s. This is a classic choreography of consent: the dance of rhetorical cooperation among those whose opinions are admitted in the consensus while their eyes follow rehearsed movements to avert excluded gazes. This kind of consent, which I would call furtive, is tautological: it averts precisely those gazes that presumably express a dissent.

    As the professor directs his silent speech to the presumed victim of his crime, the verb in the second person singular points to another gesture, even if imaginary and belated: that of finally looking into the dog’s eyes, so to speak, acknowledging at last his formerly effaced interpellation. The universal predication at the beginning of the sentence contrasts with the direct address at the end: the first one legitimizes the act of abandonment, as hyperbolic (“everyone”) as it is false; the latter comes retrospectively and seems to open up the old wound of a truth that had been awkwardly averted. The falsity of the first is the truth of the second. The first follows the universality of the law; the second opens up the intimate interpellation of an ethics of the other.10 The first one soothes the angst of decision-making with the fantasy of final approval; the second haunts the decision-maker—from outside their discourse—with the uncanny temporality of an eternal recurrence that resists the attempted closure. This contrast between the linear temporality of erasure and the haunting, enduring truth of what happened is emphasized again when the professor realizes that he had done with the dog something that will last “forever,” with impunity evermore (“Só agora ele parecia compreender, em toda sua gélida plenitude, que fizera com o cão algo realmente impune e para sempre” 83).11 With this realization, the theater of punishment that he had been staging reveals its vanity. He notices, “more mathematical still,” that the logic of his redemption is no better than the logic of his previous excuses and so he dramatically unburies the dog, under the heavens:

    Olhou a cova coberta. Onde ele enterrara um cão desconhecido em tributo ao cão abandonado, procurando enfim pagar a dívida que inquietantemente ninguém lhe cobrava. Procurando punir-se com um ato de bondade e ficar livre de seu crime. Como alguém dá uma esmola para enfim poder comer o bolo por causa do qual o outro não comeu o pão.

    Mas como se José, o cão abandonado, exigisse dele muito mais que a mentira … agora, mais matemático ainda, procurava um meio de não se ter punido. Ele não devia ser consolado. … E assim o professor de matemática renovara o seu crime para sempre.(84)

    He looked at the covered grave. Where he had buried an unknown dog in tribute to the abandoned dog, attempting at last to repay the debt that distressingly no one was demanding. Attempting to punish himself with an act of kindness and be free of his crime. The way someone gives alms in order at last to eat the cake for which another went without bread.

    Now, more mathematically still, he sought a way not to have punished himself … as if José, the abandoned dog, demanded much more from him than a lie. He must not be consoled. … And so the mathematics professor renewed his crime forever.

    This final unearthing of the corpse of the anonymous dog that he no longer wants to bury coincides with the revelation of what his crime represents, as it bears the weight of a newly-introduced metaphor. The narrator compares the professor’s desire to be forgiven with the act of giving spare change as a way to seek absolution for being complicit with (and benefiting from) social inequity. Social injustice is also “the debt that distressingly no one was demanding.” As this passage suggests, the abandoned dog might represent those whose lives are treated as less than human with impunity, even if it might also evoke the position of non-human animals before the law.

    In the profound arbitrariness of the self-inflicted penalty of burying a “strange and objective” dog, in relation to the crime of abandoning a different dog, one can read Lispector’s take on the modern notion of punishment: too impersonal and abstract to be a debt paid to the actual victim or to offer restorative justice and, as a matter of general principle, completely useless insofar as it does nothing to prevent similar events from taking place. As the young Lispector argues regarding positive law in her 1941 essay, the concept of punishment implicit in the criminal justice system is scientifically invalid for similar reasons: it does nothing to address the root of the problem, hence nothing to prevent the repetition of such acts in new generations; and it does not heal the wounded parties (healing being the only real form of addressing the hurt at the root of such conflicts). There she compares punishment with morphine: a mere palliative, rather than a cure, for society’s condition.12 The 1941 essay states that there is no such thing as a right to punish, only a power to punish, and that the concept of a right to punish is the labor of “the first intelligent men.” (67) In her narrative, the genealogy of the right to punish goes back to “the first intelligent men” who lacked power individually (in a state of nature) and yet managed to build power by rhetorically claiming and physically executing a right to punish.

    Though this short story explores the trope of punishment from the perspective of self-examination and religion, the professor’s mathematical method of reasoning works as a parable of the role of intelligence in both the concept and the institution of punishment. The arbitrary and cruel nature of punishment is sanitized and presented as a scientific necessity and considered just by a too-intelligent rhetoric that ultimately serves to distract attention from the real issue: “the crimes in disguise” (Laços 83) that are not listed in the penal code precisely to protect the status quo. The mathematics of the professor speaks to the loop of tautological reasoning in an institution concerned with conserving rather than eliminating injustice. This form of ignoring a crime in disguise is a kind of “ignorance that presents itself unblushingly as knowledge,” to borrow Charles Mills’s words, and its most complex and non-appealable expression is positive law (13). In the sphere of self-examination, as represented in this story, ignorance takes the form of a too-pristine rationalization that seeks to avert feeling—hence its morphine-like sedative effects.13

    Immune to Knowledge: The Sonsos Essenciáis and the Entbildungsroman

    In Lispector’s last interview, the interviewer asks her about which text she is most proud. From among her numerous novels and pitch-perfect short fiction, she mentions a chronicle titled “Mineirinho” that denounces police brutality (1977). The choreographies of averted gazes reappear in this text, which explicitly addresses an assassination that shook Rio de Janeiro in 1962. José Miranda Rosa, a.k.a. “Mineirinho,” the man executed in cold blood by the police, was already famous for his robberies, had been sentenced for murder, and later managed to escape the psychiatric detention center where he was imprisoned. After a manhunt that lasted several days and involved dozens of policemen, he was gunned down by a group of police officers. The morning after his death, the newspapers enumerate in gory detail the limbs and organs where each of the thirteen bullets had entered, intensifying the spectacularized horror of an assassination that was also a message for inhabitants of the slums in Rio. The day of his murder, many gathered to honor his body, choreographing an impromptu ceremony that the police dispersed with violence.14 Mineirinho’s notoriety was not due to his lawlessness; paradoxically, he was famous for his generous heart. He had earned the reputation of being the Robin Hood of the favelas in Rio. The people from the favelas seemed to love him despite his violence because of the redistributive justice he enacted. He was no ordinary criminal: his work was a mise-enabîme of the concept of crime, for his crimes were exercises of justice. They expressed his dissent from the social system that had marginalized and racialized him and others. The obscenity of his public death seemed to aim at punishing his redistributive justice efforts more than his crimes. It was an authoritative statement about the police force and its unconstitutional yet very real power to kill at gunpoint—and more, to control any revolt of the poor. This was sheer expressive violence as a sovereign act (Segato), and the violence of that expression shocked the public more than its message.15 The newspaper A Noite observed that the police disposed of his body “as if he were an animal” (“Polícia”) and reported that, after being wounded by the first gunshots, José Miranda Rosa had the strength to murmur, “Estão matando um homem” (“You’re killing a man”).

    A month later, Lispector published a text about this execution in the cultural magazine Senhor at the request of the editor. It begins with an interpellation of its readers, as she claims to speak “como um dos representantes de nós” (“as a representative of us”):

    É, suponho que é em mim, como um dos representantes de nós, que devo procurar por que está doendo a morte de um facínora. E por que é que mais me adianta contar os treze tiros que mataram Mineirinho do que os seus crimes … não matarás … Esta é a lei. Mas há alguma coisa que, se me fez ouvir o primeiro e o segundo tiro com um alívio de segurança, no terceiro me deixa alerta, no quarto desassossegada, o quinto e o sexto me cobrem de vergonha, o sétimo e o oitavo eu ouço com o coração batendo de horror, no nono e no décimo minha boca está trêmula, no décimo primeiro digo em espanto o nome de Deus, no décimo segundo chamo meu irmão. O décimo terceiro tiro me assassina—porque eu sou o outro. Porque eu quero ser o outro.(“Mineirinho” 112)

    Yes, I suppose it is in myself, as one of the representatives of us, that I should seek the reasons for the pain felt after the death of a thug. And why does it make more sense to me to count the gunshots that killed Mineirinho rather than his crimes. … Thou shall not kill. … That is the law. But there is something that, if it makes me hear the first and the second gunshots with relief brought by a feeling of safety, at the third puts me on the alert, at the fourth unsettles me, the fifth and the sixth cover me in shame, the seventh and eighth I hear with my heart pounding in horror, at the ninth and tenth my mouth is trembling, at the eleventh I say God’s name in fright, at the twelfth I call my brother. The thirteenth shot murders me—because I am the other. Because I want to be the other.

    Lispector signals that the form rather than the content of his assassination seemed out of place, as she witnessed the first two gunshots with relief: safe at last from the threat of him. She explains in that last interview that this text is constructed around the excessive shots that were not necessary to kill him. If, in retrospect, after the last bullet was shot, the first one can be resignified as unjust, this does not erase the fact that the first impression was relief. This admission is essential to understanding who is speaking. The morphine of punishment in this case has to do with numbing the fear of insecurity. Two precise shots would have provided that without conflict, but this should not be mistaken for peace.

    Lispector’s chronicle finds its rhetorical power in its use of the first-person plural. Rather than accusing others in a blame game that could have implied her own innocence, the narrator does not disguise her complicity in a system that kills with predictable, unblushing regularity.16 Epistemologies of ignorance study the ways in which privileged social groups collaborate to assure that ignorance will prevail despite occasional encounters with knowledge of the perspectives and predicaments of the oppressed. Lispector’s inclusion of herself in the social group whose consciousness she condemns quite boldly implies that no amount of critical knowledge in and of itself will suffice to subtract her from that group.

    The question of who exactly belongs to “us” is structured as an anaphora in both senses of the term: an insistent repetition and a pronoun whose reference in this case is not antecedent but oddly postponed. The device itself replicates the initial interpellation of the ominous death and works almost as an invitation, too polite to be explicit; the readers are welcome to decide whether they identify with this “us.” Chantal Mouffe—reading Carl Schmitt—says that any “us” presupposes a “them” (43). Here, “us” could name the readership of the magazine Senhor, an elite publication dedicated to the dissemination of modernist art. If “us” names the social class this audience represents, the contrasting “them” would then be the favelados. And yet there is no mention of “them” in this text. Quite on the contrary, this problematic word is avoided with care, and “us” is only juxtaposed with “him.” “Us” then could name the living—such is its initial vagueness. Or, in light of the story about the mathematics professor, the “us” might connote the universality of the law (as it is often proclaimed in constitutions or declarations of independence) in contrast to “him.”17 As in Lispector’s short story, the echo of one absent gaze interpellates the narrator, haunting the universality of a furtive consent and showing it to be false.

    Later in the text—only after the last of the thirteen shots elicits an epiphany—a name for “us” is finally revealed. The chronicle defines “us” with a suggestive epithet: “os sonsos essenciais” (“the essential phonies”) (114).18 This translation is imprecise as the word “phony” does not fully capture the Portuguese “sonso,” a term that one would also use to translate the expression “playing dumb.” A sonso is someone who pretends to ignore something that he knows all too well. And yet it also connotes plain stupidity. The essential phonies, os sonsos essenciáis, are the political agents of a social charade. An intriguing question arises: why are these sonsos essential? They could be essential in the Aristotelian sense of being the principle of movement, just as in Hobbes’s Leviathan, where the sovereign State and its laws are the principles according to which the social body moves. The phonies would be essential, in this sense, as the political class with enough agency to decide what constitutes a crime and who gets to be executed while others stay safe. The term sonsos essenciais seems to imply as well that there are more sonsos, yet they are not essential: these would be the inessential, disposable sonsos.19

    Lispector ciphers the difference between “us” and “him” in a formula: “Tudo o que nele foi violência é em nós furtivo” (“Everything that was violence in him is furtive in us”) (113). The adjective furtivo (in English, furtive, secretive) means something surreptitious or clandestine, done in a quiet and secretive way (Dicionário; Merriam Webster). There is again something untranslatable in this formula because the root of this word is also at play in the word furto, which means theft in Portuguese. Furto in legal terms is emphatically different from latrocínio; the latter means robbery as opposed to theft precisely inasmuch as violence is involved, and the punishment for it is therefore much harsher. “Tudo o que nele foi violência é em nós furtivo” means that we are also thieves, but the kind of theft at stake is one without violence, or a violence with no visible author in the eyes of the law. A more untranslatable notion that exists only in Portuguese reverberates in this sentence as well: the verb furtar has a pronominal form, furtar-se, which means to avoid or to pretend to ignore, that is to say, to play dumb. For example, one can say: “V. Exa. Furtou-se a responder àquela que é a mais crucial das questões” or “É preciso que as pessoas deixem de furtar-se a responsabilidades.” (“Your majesty refused to respond to the most crucial question” or “People need to stop avoiding their responsibilities.”) The connections between the adjective furtivo (secretive), the verb furtar (to steal), and the pronominal verb furtarse (to play dumb) are not at all obvious in Portuguese, because these words evolved to mean discrete concepts. Yet Lispector’s full sentence brings the philological connection together:

    Tudo o que nele foi violência é em nós furtivo, e um evita o olhar do outro para não corrermos o risco de nos entendermos. Para que a casa não estremeça. (113)

    Everything that was violence in him is furtive in us, and we avoid each other’s gaze so as not to run the risk of understanding each other. So that the house doesn’t tremble.

    What began as theft is followed by a secret that becomes a form of self-evasion from responsibility. What begins as playing dumb can result in becoming dumb—or ignorant—if this active ignoring of each other’s gaze can indeed protect the subject from “the risk of understanding each other.” When the playing dumb is choreographed at a structural level, with the complicity of the most powerful subjects, it produces faked stupidity at the level of institutions, or, as she calls it, “a stupid justice” (justiça estupidificada) (114). This is the secret that lies at the foundation of the republic.

    From Lispector’s discussion of a furtive consent that forms around a justice filled with stupidity, the pair friend/enemy appears at last. Yet it appears in a way that defies Schmittian logic and the paradox of liberal democracy: the enemies are “us,” the essential phonies trying to justify a form of living with the blessing of “a god invented at the last minute”; the friends are those who interrupt the choreography of consent by refusing to find excuses:

    [Mineirinho] foi fuzilado na sua força desorientada, enquanto um deus fabricado no último instante abençoa às pressas a minha maldade organizada e a minha justiça estupidificada: o que sustenta as paredes de minha casa é a certeza de que sempre me justificarei, meus amigos não me justificarão, mas meus inimigos que são os meus cúmplices, esses me cumprimentarão; o que me sustenta é saber que sempre fabricarei um deus à imagem do que eu precisar para dormir tranqüila e que outros furtivamente fingirão que estamos todos certos e que nada há a fazer. Tudo isso, sim, pois somos os sonsos essenciais, baluartes de alguma coisa. E sobretudo procurar não entender. (114)

    [Mineirinho] was gunned down in his disoriented strength, while a god fabricated at the last second hastily blesses my organized cruelty and my justice filled with stupidity: what upholds the walls of my house is the certainty that I shall always justify myself, my friends won’t justify me, but my enemies who are my accomplices, they will praise me; what upholds me is knowing that I shall always fabricate a god in the image of whatever I need in order to sleep peacefully, and that others will furtively pretend that we are all righteous and that there is nothing to be done. All this, yes, for we are the essential phonies, bastions of something. And above all of trying to not understand.

    As the words furtar (theft), furtivo (secret), and furtar-se (playing dumb) branch out from their common root, they indicate the three stages of oblivion through which the epistemological labor of actively ignoring takes place. Social injustice—the furtive theft of the land that left Mineirinho in a state of nature fighting for survival in a hypocritical society marked by extreme inequities—suddenly becomes apparent, as a first truth previously averted. The chaos resulting from Mineirinho’s brutal and public execution ultimately reveals the secrets that surround injustice as well as the irresponsibility protected by such secrecy.

    Living a life of diplomatic dinner parties in Europe and Washington, D.C., after law school, must have been an invaluable source of inspiration for Lispector to think about white ignorance, hypocrisy, and the potential—though quite infrequent—interruption of choreographed oblivion. Lispector was in the U.S. when Emmett Till was murdered in 1955, and his mother’s decision to leave the coffin open for everyone to see was one of the triggers for the Civil Rights Movement. Perhaps this event was a first occasion for her to think about how an entire system of furtive violence can explode in the flesh of one man. The crime revealed in that coffin was not just a child’s horrific murder but an entire way of life that Jim Crow made possible. Likewise, the crime revealed in Mineirinho’s wrecked flesh was not the manhunt for one person but the violence against favelados altogether. In the Brazilian case, however, the murder did not fuel a social justice movement, and ultimately nothing changed. As much as Lispector’s dramatic rhetoric tried to turn the event into an earth-shattering revelation, the public’s indifference only confirmed one of the most cynical theses of her epistemology of ignorance, which she formulated in the years immediately following: the kind of ignorance discussed here cannot be simply overcome by knowledge. Having an epiphany—by way of finally looking into previously averted eyes—is not enough to change a thing.

    While the bildungsroman is a narrative of overcoming ignorance and so may seem suited to Lispector’s thinking on social justice, her fiction in fact often mocks this genre. In novels such as A Paixão segundo G.H. (1964), Lispector subverts the bildungsroman, developing instead what I call an entbildungsroman: a novel that shows how ignorant a character can remain in the face of blatant truth in order to avoid ethical or emotional consequences that might follow from acknowledging that truth. Much of Lispector’s fiction is populated by upper-class characters who one day encounter the eyes of their social other (a Black maid, a beggar, a young brown woman from the northeast, etc.) and suddenly have a disarming epiphany. Lucia Villares claims that Lispector used novels such as this to make visible racial inequality in Brazil. I would take that observation a step further and say that Lispector’s thesis is more subtle and less optimistic: she narrates the uselessness of “making visible” as a political strategy or as the politics of literature. The politics of making visible forgets that what needs to be “made visible” is already bluntly visible.

    The narrator of A Paixão segundo G.H. parodies the bildungsroman (and the modern project that it ciphers) by elevating the character of G.H. to the highest peaks of existential revelation, inviting the reader to follow her to the climax of so-called indescribable (yet passionately verbalized) epiphanies, only to let her fall comically and brutally back into her old, secure ignorance. Toward the end of the novel, the narrator describes this ignorance—so almighty that it can survive the event of knowledge untouched—as “sacred” (120). Like Christ’s resurrection after his gory series of punishments, G.H. punishes herself with the thought of racial injustice, only to be reborn again from the ashes of that revelation, as innocent and as ignorant as ever before. The first pages signal in advance that ignorance is the ending of the novel, as the narrator struggles to remember and put in writing the revelation that she just experienced in silence:

    Talvez me tenha acontecido uma compreensão tão total quanto uma ignorância, e dela eu venha a sair intocada e inocente como antes. … Pois ao mesmo tempo que luto por saber, a minha nova ignorância, que é o esquecimento, tornou-se sagrada. (8)

    Maybe what happened to me is an understanding as total as an ignorance, and I am going to come out of it untouched and innocent like before. … Because at the same time that I struggle to understand, my new ignorance, which is oblivion, has also become sacred.

    While the novel is structured around the event of an epiphany—as a classic bildungsroman—the ending sings the praise of an ignorance that challenges the Enlightenment project of modernity. G.H.’s stream of consciousness, like that of the narrator in Lispector’s posthumous novel A hora da estrela, can be read as a search for punishment and forgiveness. Her passion is precisely the experience of seeing at last, through her window, the lights of the favelas in the far distance and thinking that those precarious structures could have been palaces—echoing the realization of her former maid’s Black beauty and dignity, until then anxiously denied. The passion of G.H.—defined as a series of realizations hurting her fragility—ends up making her stronger, not because she reaches enlightenment but because she develops a sort of immunity to knowledge. Her ignorance becomes sacred. Read in light of Lispector’s philosophy of crime and punishment, this novel characterizes engaged literature as a ritual of moral punishment in the hands of those readers who are willing to face the painful truth but only to become invulnerable to it. Instead of being moved by truth toward restorative justice efforts, these imagined readers use the pain of truth as a ritual of performative remorse and furtive absolution, as they continue to uphold the status quo with their powerful ignorance and inaction.

    Rocío Pichon-Rivière Rocío Pichon-Rivière is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Hispanic Studies at the University of California, Riverside. Previously she was a postdoctoral fellow at New York University and a visiting scholar at the Pratt Institute. Recent works include essays on hemispheric trans theory, Latin American women’s political thinking, and phenomenologies of shame.

    Footnotes

    1. Foucault in “La pensée du dehors” (1966) defines a notion of an “outside” of discourse as the element around which much literature was already doing its work, pointing toward what exceeds its intentional representation. “The reason it is now so necessary to think through fiction—while in the past it was a matter of thinking the truth—is that ‘I speak’ runs counter to ‘I think.’ ‘I think’ led to the indubitable certainty of the ‘I’ and its existence; ‘I speak,’ on the other hand, distances, disperses, effaces that existence and lets only its empty emplacement appear” (page number needed). Taking Foucault’s argument a little further, one can say that the outside of the law points to the level of the performativity of language and the institutions in which such discourses circulate. The narrated “presence” of the speaker’s body and their actions in a literary scene shed light and cast a shade over the content of their speech, a shadow drawn with the direction and intensity determined by their positionality in broader power structures that become keys to understanding not just what the discourse intends to say but also what it performs in terms of such structures. By challenging the purity of the abstract ‘I’ or the ‘we’ that seems to enunciate the law, fiction begins to point outside of its interiority. This outside can be defined as the realm of the unspoken injustice that the law fails to name while silently becoming a vehicle for its reproduction.

    2. This essay is part of a larger project that studies the thought of Latin American women, who often wrote in minor genres, in the margins of professional philosophy. I take the risk of presenting ideas through storytelling around the figure of the author, knowing that in the field of literary studies many have been disciplined by formalist methods and might have a visceral reaction against this type of narrative: bear with me. Indeed, many thinkers have convincingly established that a text should be studied in and of itself, regardless of the presumed, unverifiable intentions of the human who penned it, for a text has a life of its own. While I agree with this argument, I claim that it is necessary to narrate rather than describe systems of thought. In the field of philosophy—where I was most disciplined—quite paradoxically storytelling is often more favored than mere conceptual analysis and the figure of the author often lives in ways that literary critics might struggle to accept. To think is to think otherwise. And precisely that movement of thought advancing against the grain of previous limiting ideas creates a moment that is irreducibly dramatic and demands to be narrated before conceptual analysis can begin. In other words, non-tautological thinking has a narrative arch. Where—if not in time—can contradictions play a more interesting game than the impossible? In What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari wrote that we would not be able to understand a philosophical system of thought if our imagination had not first drawn the figure of the philosophical character who thinks the ideas presented. Such character is needed to breathe the pauses of any thought that is not tautologically foreclosed to external examination. The character performs, so to speak, the clumsy possibility of change. Narration favors contingency over necessity.

    This essay studies the works of Clarice Lispector and observes her philosophical character as a changing rhetorical trope in her writings. This figure of the author—however evanescent and filled with contradictions—is a necessary logical step to address questions of epistemic injustice, the main theme of this article, for the social drama of knowledge production can only be fleshed out through the figure of the thinkers. Inasmuch as she was addressing her own epistemic privilege and limitations, such argument necessitates the figure of the author to be predicated upon. Historically, Lispector only began to include herself as an explicit subject of enunciation in the 1960s as she became an increasingly public figure. This article analyzes one of the first times in which she pointed at herself in the text that she was writing, “Mineirinho.” Additionally, this essay ends with a commentary on novels that seem to be parodies of the figure of the engaged writer, further advancing an argument about her characterization of this type of figure.

    3. All translations are the author’s unless noted otherwise.

    4. Linda Martín Alcoff writes in “Epistemologies of Ignorance: Three Types” that “in mainstream epistemology, the topic of ignorance as a species of bad epistemic practice is not new, but what is new is the idea of explaining ignorance not as a feature of neglectful epistemic practice but as a substantive epistemic practice in itself. The idea of an epistemology of ignorance attempts to explain and account for the fact that such substantive practices of ignorance—willful ignorance, for example, and socially acceptable but faulty justificatory practices—are structural. This is to say that there are identities and social locations and modes of belief formation, all produced by structural social conditions of a variety of sorts, that are in some cases epistemically disadvantaged or defective” (39–40).

    5. I alternatively use the terms epistemology of ignorance (Alcoff) and critical phenomenology of ignorance (Weiss) because both disciplinary frameworks study the same phenomena: the ways in which ignorance is actively produced in society. Epistemology and phenomenology are two traditions that address this question: the first with a historical concern for what constitutes knowledge and how knowledge is produced unevenly depending on social positionality, the second with a focus on the experience of such knowledge production or lack thereof. This later tradition is closer to Lispector’s use of stream of consciousness narratives to convey the messiness of the experience of denial. Yet the conversation between these different traditions is where the complexity of these phenomena can be articulated with most nuance.

    6. “Por que foi o destino me levando a escrever o que já escrevi, em vez de também desenvolver em mim a qualidade de lutadora que eu tinha? Em pequena, minha família por brincadeira chamava-me de ‘a protetora dos animais’. Porque bastava acusarem uma pessoa para eu imediatamente defendê-la. E eu sentia o drama social com tanta intensidade que vivia de coração perplexo diante das grandes injustiças a que são submetidas as chamadas classes menos privilegiadas. Em Recife eu ia aos domingos a visitar a casa de nossa empregada nos mocambos. E o que eu via me fazia como que me prometer que não deixaria aquilo continuar. Eu queria agir. Em Recife, onde morei até doze anos de idade, havia muitas vezes nas ruas um aglomerado de pessoas diante das quais alguém discursava ardorosamente sobre a tragédia social. E lembro-me de como eu vibrava e de como eu me prometia que um dia esta seria minha tarefa: a de defender os direitos dos outros” (Lispector, A descoberta 217).

    7. Since I here affectionately disagree with one of Marta Peixoto’s articles, I feel the need to mention that she read several versions of this essay and gave me invaluable feedback, criticism, and support for which I am in debt to her and deeply grateful.

    8. Audre Lorde in “The Uses of Anger: Women Responding to Racism” (1981) speaks of the political power of anger that stems from its double nature, both epistemic and physical: “Anger is loaded with information and energy.” Sedating it with any narcotic not only diminishes its physical power to elicit change but also obscures the clarity of its content rendering it devoid of its epistemological power to point at a truth that a group seeks to ignore. Lorde writes: “Every woman has a well-stocked arsenal of anger potentially useful against those oppressions, personal and institutional, which brought that anger into being. Focused with precision it can become a powerful source of energy serving progress and change. And when I speak of change, I do not mean a simple switch of positions or a temporary lessening of tensions, nor the ability to smile or feel good. I am speaking of a basic and radical alteration in those assumptions underlying our lives” (127). Marc Brackett, the director of the Yale Center for Emotional Intelligence, defines anger as the emotional response to injustice, while distinguishing it from mere frustration, as a response to unfulfilled expectations (Bracket). If anger points us toward injustice, then the mechanisms at work to sedate it can be seen as functional to the reproduction of injustice.

    9. See Derrida, Spectres de Marx (1993) and Politiques de l’amitié (1994). This note might sound anachronistic insofar as Lispector could not have read Derrida’s texts on a democracy to come, as they were yet to come, for he started publishing them in the 1990s. Incidentally, it is quite possible that Derrida read this story, given his closeness to Hélène Cixous, who introduced Lispector’s works in France. Questions of direct influence aside, these authors were discussing a philosophical problem that predated them both. The fact that this is a mathematics professor points to the calculus that defines the logic within established laws. The professor’s stream of consciousness can be read as a phenomenological exploration of the problem of the incalculability of justice and the experience of trying to think beyond current democratic practices and laws while still struggling to use their logic and idiom. The result is a bit ridiculous, and the story’s ending can be seen as a parody of such enterprise.

    10. See Levinas, Le temps et l´autre (1947) and Humanisme de l’autre homme (1972). Of course, when Levinas writes about the Other, he does not include dogs. The case has been made quite convincingly that he did not even include people of color. For a recent critique of the limited, racist scope of Levinas’s ethics of the other see Moten. Lispector’s implicit reference to the interpellation of the face of the other as an ethical calling was possibly mediated by the Latin American reception of Levinas, which often read the figure of the other through an anti-colonial lens, as was the case most famously with liberation theology.

    11. In the aforementioned chronicle, “Literature e justiça,” where she discusses the question of engaged literature, Lispector writes something that perfectly parallels the mathematics professor’s late logic, this time talking about herself:

    não estou me envergonhando totalmente de não contribuir para nada humano e social por meio de escrever. … Do que me envergonho, sim, é de não ‘fazer’, de não contribuir com ações. … Disso me envergonharei sempre. E nem sequer pretendo me penitenciar. Não quero, por meios indiretos e escusos, conseguir de mim a minha absolvição. Disso quero continuar envergonhada. (25)

    I am not totally ashamed of not contributing with my writing to something human or social. … What does provoke shame in me is not contributing with actions. … Of that fact I will be forever ashamed. I don’t even intend to punish myself. I don’t want, through indirect ways and excuses, to obtain from myself my absolution. Of that, I’d rather continue to be ashamed.

    The enduring temporality of this shame does not seem to capture the duration of actions or inactions as much as it reveals and is itself an epistemological relation to history: no amount of penitence or excuses can change the past. Such is the temporality of truth from a perspective “more divine,” sub specie aeternitatis.

    12. The trope of gazes averted was present in the 1941 essay as well. Though mostly written in the style of abstraction and deduction, as demanded by the academic nature of the journal where it was published, the article ended with a theatrical finale: a gesture—precise, meaningful—and a blackout:

    Só haverá ‘direito de punir’ quando punir significar o emprego daquela vacina de que fala Carnelucci, contra o gérmen do crime. Até então seria preferível abandonar a discussão filosófica dum ‘fundamento do direito de punir’, e, de cabeça baixa, continuar a ministrar morfina às dores da sociedade. (“Observações” 69)

    There will only be a ‘right to punish’ when the term punishment is used to signify the administration of that vaccine about which Carnelucci spoke, against the germ of crime. Until then it would be preferable to abandon the philosophical discussion of a ‘foundation of the right to punish’ and, with head down, continue to administer morphine to society’s pain.

    The suggestion that this excuse for a justice system should be administered “with the head down” might prescribe the gestuality of shame for a broken system or a choreography of consent to avoid the gaze of the victims of this system.

    13. Later on, in the late sixties, in one of her chronicles in the Jornal do Brasil, Lispector would correct someone who said that she was intelligent. Intelligence was not her “strength,” she humble-bragged as she clarified: she did not value pure intelligence as much as this other faculty that she could provisionally call “intelligent sensitivity” (“sensibilidade inteligente”) of which she had more. Though this notion is undertheorized, this provisional name seems to stand for a holistic perception where sensation, emotion, feeling, and the clarity of thought are intertwined in a way that they cannot be abstracted. This, she claimed, was more useful regarding personal relationships and understanding others. People who balance these two forms of clarity follow the guidance of “an intelligent heart” rather than just the blind abstraction of the mind (A descoberta 215–216). The story about the mathematics professor is a parody of the notion of pure intelligence, abstracted from feeling, whose calculations hyperbolically struggle to understand a law that does not yet exist, for it can only be born from feeling.

    14. “Dozens of poor people came to the place where Mineirinho’s body was found. No one could approach the body, since the police, as determined by the chief officer of the 23rd Precinct Agnaldo Amado, was violently pushing everybody aside. In general, the slum residents were upset about Mineirinho’s death, who they considered a Rio de Janeiro version of Robin Hood” (Diário Carioca, May 1st, 1962. Qtd. in Rosenbaun 170).

    15. Lispector herself asserts in the interview just mentioned (1977) that it was not the fact of his death that shocked her and the public, but the additional gunshots that were not necessary to end his life. The chronicle implies this as well. As for the press, even in an article that claims to be horrified by the assassination, they object that the police abandoned the body to avoid taking responsibility for the murder, not so much the murder itself (“Polícia”).

    16. To this day, police regularly kill young men and women in the favelas in Rio without losing their jobs—almost as if that was precisely their job. According to the Jovem Negro Vivo campaign, Brazil is the country with the highest murder rate in the world. Young people between ages 15 and 29 constitute more than half of the total lives lost to this violence; 77% of these murdered young people are Black. In 2015, 1 out of 5 murders were committed by the police. See “Jovem”. Marielle, presente. Agora e sempre.

    17. For the question of who says “we” in declarations of independence and by virtue of what authority, see Derrida, “Declarations of Independence.” In this essay, Derrida discusses the religious nature of a proclaimed authority to declare, in the first-person plural, the independence of a modern state, as it happened in the US and many other countries founded on colonized land. In this essay by Lispector, that “we” is echoed in the first-person plural that proclaims the universality of the law in ways that too often fail to be universal.

    18. “Essa justiça que vela meu sono, eu a repudio, humilhada por precisar dela. Enquanto isso durmo e falsamente me salvo. Nós, os sonsos essenciais. Para que minha casa funcione, exijo de mim como primeiro dever que eu seja sonsa, que eu não exerça a minha revolta e o meu amor, guardados” (112). (“That justice that watches over my sleep, I repudiate it, humiliated that I need it. Meanwhile I sleep and falsely save myself. We, the essential phonies. For my house to function, I demand of myself as my first duty that I be a phony, that I refrain from enacting my revolt and my love, both locked away.”)

    19. How interesting it is to read these passages in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, when the term “essential workers” names many subjects who might be deemed politically inessential, as is unambiguously the case with the undocumented people working in agriculture, care, and the food industry. When it comes to the “we” of the declaration of independence mentioned in the previous note, these undocumented workers are excluded from this State, even though their ancestors were often in the lands in question before colonization.

    Works Cited

    • “Polícia fuzilou ‘Mineirinho’: De luto mangueira chora morte do bandoleiro.” A Noite [Rio de Janeiro], 2 May 1962, p. 8. http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/Hotpage/HotpageBN.aspx?bib=348970_06&pagfis=5363&url=http://memoria.bn.br/docreader# Accessed 1 Oct. 2019.
    • Alcoff, Linda Martín. “Epistemologies of Ignorance: Three Types.” Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance, edited by Shannon Sullivan and Nancy Tuana, SUNY Press, 2007, pp. 39–57.
    • Anistia Internacional. “Jovem negro vivo.” https://anistia-org-br.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/campanha/jovem-negro-vivo/
    • Brackett, Marc. Permission to Feel: Unlocking the Power of Emotions to Help Our Kids, Ourselves, and Our Society. Celadon Books, 2019.
    • Deleuze, Gilles. Foucault. Les Éditions de Minuit, 1986.
    • Derrida, Jacques. “Declarations of Independence.” New Political Science, vol. 7, no. 1, 1986, pp. 7–15.
    • —. Politiques de l’amitié. Éditions Galilée, 1994.
    • —. Spectres de Marx. Éditions Galilée, 1993.
    • Dicionário Priberam da Língua Portuguesa. https://dicionario.priberam.org/
    • Foucault, Michel. “La pensée du dehors.” Critique, no. 229, 1966, pp. 523–46.
    • —. “Nietzsche, la généalogie, l’histoire.” Hommage à Jean Hyppolite, edited by Suzanne Bachelard, Presses Universitaires de France (PUF), 1971, pp. 145–72.
    • Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan or The Matter, Forme and Power of A Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil. Penguin, 1985.
    • Levinas, Emmanuel. Humanisme de l’autre homme. Fata Morgana, 1972.
    • —. Le temps et l´autre. PUF, 1947.
    • Lispector, Clarice. A bela e a fera. Nova Fronteira, 1979.
    • —. Correspondências. Organização de Teresa Montero, Rocco, 2002.
    • —. A descoberta do mundo. Nova Fronteira, 1984.
    • —. Laços de família. Rocco, 1998.
    • —. “Mineirinho.” Clarice na cabeceira. Jornalismo. Rocco, 2012, pp. 111–115.
    • —. “Observações Sobre o fundamento do direito de punir.” Clarice na cabeceira. Jornalismo, Rocco, 2012, 66–70.
    • —. A Paixão segundo G.H. Rocco, 1964.
    • —. Para não esquecer. Ática, 1979.
    • —. Interview, TV Publica, 1977. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w1zwGLBpULs
    • Lorde, Audre. “Uses of Anger: Women Responding to Racism.” Sister Outsider: Essays &Speeches, Crossing Press, 2007.
    • Merriam Webster Online Dictionary. https://www.merriam-webster.com/
    • Mills, Charles W. “White Ignorance.” Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance, edited by Shannon Sullivan and Nancy Tuana, SUNY Press, 2007, pp 13–38.
    • Morrison, Toni. Playing in the Dark. Whiteness and the Literary Imagination. Random House, 1993.
    • Moten, Fred. The Universal Machine. Duke UP, 2018.
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  • So-Called Indigenous Slavery: West African Historiography and the Limits of Interpretation

    Sara-Maria Sorentino (bio)

    Abstract

    This essay explores the mobilization of so-called “indigenous slavery” in the historiography of slavery in West Africa in order to expose the limits of historiographical interpretation and the tensions between black studies and African studies, which are here constituted around a shared negativity. This discussion provides some context for the debates of historians Walter Rodney and J.D. Fage, while also bringing these concerns into explicit conversation with a line of thought in radical black studies, namely Afro-pessimism. Considering indigenous slavery through the critical analytic of Afro-pessimism exposes the role of the paradigm of racial slavery in determining how slavery comes to be understood in relation to nation building in Africa, with Ghana serving as a particular example.

    Had Rawlings asked, ‘Are we yet free?’ most Ghanaians would have answered with a resounding, ‘No.’ This ‘no’ resonated on both sides of the Atlantic. It was the reminder of what abolition and decolonization had failed to deliver. This ‘no’ was the language we shared, and within it resided a promise of affiliation better than that of brothers and sisters.(Hartman 172)

    In an early essay, W.E.B. Du Bois provides a useful chiasmic formulation for the rebounding effect of slavery: “Instead of man-hunting being an incident of tribal wars, war became the incident of man-hunting” (254). This formulation points to an unresolved difficulty in the historiography of slavery—that of its so-called “indigenous” precursors. Did slavery in Africa exist prior to its transatlantic iteration? If so, what was its character or essence? The answer to the first question has been a resounding yes, if by existence we mean something approximating human ownership. But what that ownership means, and what its implications are for the racialized form that has become slavery’s synonym, is less than clear. Of course, apologist assumptions, extending from the slave traders and theologians of early modernity to the historiographers and ideologues of the present, excavate a prior, nearly naturalized African slavery in order to rationalize (or at least causally explain) slavery’s global expansion. In the 1960s and 70s, Walter Rodney intervened in this circular logic, repurposing and vivifying dependency theory to argue that what had been pathologized as a pervasive domestic slave trade internal to West Africa—slaving figured as an indigenous African mode of being—can be better understood as amplified, if not directly produced in its character, by the methods and metaphysics of trans-Atlantic traffic: the international demand for slaves had long wrecked the coast, moving both inward and radiating out. For Rodney, slavery was “the first stage of the colonial domination of Africa by Europeans” (West Africa 21), and it marked the initiation of a world-system overwhelmingly violent in scope.

    My argument builds from and elaborates a critical black internationalist engagement with the centrality of racial slavery—an intellectual genealogy often lost to the historiography of slavery in Africa, which instead interprets Rodney’s interventions almost singularly in relation to British historian J.D. Fage. Fage is an appropriate enough foil, opposing Rodney by representing racial slavery as the continuation of an indigenous pattern of enslavement, one that, it might be added, did not radically alter the trajectory of African social-political systems. In these cross-hairs are compounded a series of assumptions pertaining to the political-economic function of slavery and the activity of its agents but that, when read with the longer theoretical-political commitments of black internationalism, trouble its general conditions of interpretation.

    In reconsidering how indigenous slavery brings the past to bear on the present, this essay engages an apparent aporia between black studies, African studies, and, in a minor refrain, indigenous studies. From one angle, slavery has been subject to a disappearing trick, hidden in the folds of the colonial, decolonial, neocolonial, and postcolonial. Instead of orchestrating slavery’s reappearance, I am interested in the impact of its absence and the difficulty of its thought—its pre-conditionality. Indigenous slavery, as a problem-field, continuously resurrects a minimal kernel of doubt concerning the form and function of slavery in the political imaginary—a problem exacerbated by the apparent difficulty with discussing slavery in African studies, on the one hand, and the supposedly lopsided over-proliferation of concern with slavery in black studies, on the other. Both perspectives, paradoxically, might be marred by “a global tendency to talk away from slavery and its afterlife in the historic instance” (Sexton, “Affirmation” 101). Indigenous slavery also marks the fault where blackness delinks from indigeneity or becomes affixed to it, as racial slavery represents both a break from pre-colonial African (slaving) cultural practices and the deculturation of diasporic blackness. The opposition between Rodney and Fage—between dependency and agency, between radical breaks and constitutive causes—continues to inform the ocean of disorientation that dictates the diaspora’s origin and the disciplining difference whose currents still constitute it.

    To elaborate this problematic, wherein slavery (and the political culture it supports and sustains) is rendered either ahistoric or so fundamentally new that any connection to a world before it dissolves, my reading of “indigenous slavery” is informed by Afro-pessimism, insofar as its critical analytic is interested in shoring up, from within the wake, as it were, how racial slavery produces radically new concepts of political-ontological organization: the antagonism between the human and the slave. Despite the heterodoxy of Afro-pessimist itineraries, the intervention of political ontology draws them together; slavery’s collision with race forms the passageway to the modern world and does so by generating this world’s ordering principles—its metaphysical orientation to space, time, and subjectivity. While indigenous slavery might offer itself as the prehistory of the human-slave antagonism, the (ever-receding) material that precipitated slavery as we now desire to know it, is also, I argue, a test case for the difficulty of returning to a past, mapping a geography, or unifying around a culture, especially when available methods of analysis and modes of approach are imbricated in (if not coterminous with) the trans-Atlantic trade. What P. Khalil Saucier writes of ethnography doubles for historiography: “The grammar of violence that goes unspoken in the description of ‘how’ race and racism works by ethnographers betrays its aim: to not expose the nature of race and racism, because its existence is testimony to that fact” (52–53). Afro-pessimism might be another name for the risk of exposure.

    This essay represents an overture toward such exposure, staging an encounter that considers the historiography of West African slavery, in its elisions and obsessions, as a genre that invests in anti-blackness and makes durable a dissemination of slavery’s ontological traffic. If racial slavery writes itself by wresting away the possibility of native status, indigenous slavery tethers Africanity and blackness to an immemorial form of violence in order to explain its impossible cause. The role of indigenous slavery in this reversal is catalytic; it reinscribes slaving both as originary and as the historical-logical precursor to the violence of colonialism and capitalism. As a catalyst, indigenous slavery works to organize time (the contextual and ahistoric), space (diaspora and dispersal), subjectivity (agency and collusion), and (international) memory. In refracting diaspora, abolition, and reparations through a political ontological intervention, I make a case for how 1) the debates over the relative significance of indigenous slavery (a repression of a wider web of black internationalism) have presaged the form of current conversations in black studies; 2) Afro-pessimism’s conceptual resources have been articulated, in part, in the distorted influence of these debates; and 3) Afro-pessimism, far from avoiding the scene of African historiography, provides a response syncretic to political and cultural negotiations of method and meaning-making. These moves are made with close attention to the historiography of slavery in West Africa, and in Ghana more centrally, where indirect rule superseded the logic of the settler colony.

    Ahistoric Time

    Like the Marxist distinction between formal and real subsumption, racial slavery’s revalorization of the world accesses local avenues of discrete meaning-making (culture, ethnicity, servitude, power) and cannibalizes them in service of an emergent system of being. The pages of historiography are dotted with the remnants of slavery’s transformation. Akosua Perbi, for instance, asserts that “The European presence on the coast definitely influenced the indigenous institution of slavery” (26), citing the proliferation of war and the sale of people as well as “greater brutality and harshness” (66), and Babacar M’Baye exposes the emergence of a “unique and rigid concept of bondage” not dependent on religious conversion (608). Such sea changes are immanent to historical descriptions of slavery in Africa, but these transformations are rarely themselves thematized. Instead, the frame of time-space is given as the ground upon which indigenous (or African) slave-systems can be compared and contextualized relative to racial (or trans-Atlantic) slavery.

    From this orientation, historiography charges the analytic of racial slavery with conceptual bleeding, making impossible a clear-eyed investigation of other times and spaces. Igor Kopytoff and Suzanne Miers open their influential volume Slavery in Africa with the claim that “Any discussion of African ‘slavery’ in English is necessarily bedeviled by the fact that the word conjures up definite images in the Western mind. Anglo-Americans visualize slavery as they believed it was practised on the plantations of the Southern U.S. and the British Caribbean” (3). This conflation is especially accented, argues Frederick Cooper, in the tradition of Africanists who “regard the social norms governing slaves’ roles as cultural givens rather than as part of historical processes” (111). If the slave role is falsely given, even abstracted into an “epiphenomenon—a universal tragedy oblivious, with the exception of its volume, to historical specificity” (Bennett 47), the labor of historical reconstruction should be akin to a procedure of re-phenomenalization: to access phenomena as part of ongoing historical processes, find the particular buried in the universal, and reintegrate these granular details in their proper contexts, such that slavery as universal form would find itself elaborated by different times and spaces. Historiography, however, does not have internal tools to address how the universal slave figure remains stubbornly fixed to Africa; instead, it conceptualizes indigenous slave practices as transplanted, modified, and perfected in Africa and only later manipulated by proto-capitalists in the Mediterranean and the Americas (insofar as the invention of race is supposed to extend the already existing practice). Indigenous slavery becomes the developmental and anagogical synecdoche of slavery writ large and not, as Kopytoff and Miers worry, the other way around.

    Both Rodney and Fage share the concern that the generic “slave” misleads. For Fage, indigenous slavery is bedeviled by “the indiscriminate use of the single word ‘slave’ to cover a number of social and economic conditions” (History 92). Rodney writes that early Africanist Captain R. S. Rattray himself “ended by referring to the ‘so-called “slaves,’” noting that “though perhaps the label ‘domestic slave’ is meant to express this idea, it carries with it the same associations with the Americas which the pro-slavery interests were at pains to evoke” (“African Slavery” 440). Indigenous slavery is always recovering from the charge of its “so-called” character—its actual life presumably obscured by the faulty transmission of oral histories and its retrieval limited to linguistic traces and the lingering possibility that contemporary forms of slavery are its remnant.1

    Rattray records ɔdɔnkɔ, the Akan term for “bought person,” as one of five operative categorizations of “slave” (the others being akoa “servant,” awowa “pawn,” domum “war captive,” and akyere “sacrificial person”). “Slave,” in this minor tradition in historiography, was not generalized, and chattel slavery indicated only one of a range of conditions. Although akoa “is now often somewhat loosely applied by interpreters to mean ‘slave’ in the degrading European sense,” Rattray writes, akoa “to the African mind meant originally nothing worse than that condition of voluntary and essential servitude in which every man and woman stood in relation to some other person or group” (34). In such a spectrum of dependency, the akoa had rights not unlike “the ordinary privileges of any Ashanti free man, with whom … his position did not seem to compare so unfavourably” (42). While this position, more proximate to limited servitude, has been used to excuse an originary African slavery, it also does rhetorical work to specify what, precisely, the upheaval of racial slavery represented, including inducing the conceptual generalization of slavery.

    Perbi draws from Rattray’s colonial-era reading to disarticulate further how chattel slavery was not essential to those long-standing Ghanain practices in which “the slave was regarded as a human being and was entitled to certain rights and privileges” (4). These rights and privileges included the right to food, clothing, and shelter; protection from discipline and execution; and integration into new societies through marriage, adoption, and naming (112–18). Contrary to colonial-inflected doxa that continues to conflate social status with political positionality, an available reading of West African historiography expresses much more flexibility between ascribed and acquired status. Indeed, in places like south-west Ghana, slaves’ ascension to political office means that “partially unfree origins are often a preferential condition in the politics of succession” (Valsecchi 42). These alternatives open a different narrative: indigenous slavery included practices of deculturation and depoliticization but became, through strategies of incorporation, a structure of re-indigenization and affirmation of degrees of political capacity.2 Racial slavery, meanwhile, indexed the total revocation of access to indigenous or political claims. How and why, then, has the generic slave been used to link practices that may be better thought as disparate?

    If indigenous slavery reveals the political crisis of its category, we can understand the “false” abstractions of the slave to be the project of the present. One of Rodney’s enduring lessons is that the exposure of “writing of the type which justifies the trade in slaves … as racist bourgeois propaganda” is not merely a task for history “but of present-day liberation struggle in Africa” (How Europe 103). Fage does recognize that the position that “both slavery and trading in slaves were already deeply rooted in West African society, was of course a view propagated by the European slave-traders, especially perhaps when the morality of their business was being questioned” and he even nods to ways spectacularizing deep-rooted slavery formed “a principal moral justification for European colonization” (“Slavery” 393). Despite these concessions, Fage insists that foreign trade “across the Sahara or over the seas” should be considered “no more than a stimulus to essentially indigenous processes” (“Slaves” 289). As such, the difficult question of “how much the categories used by the European observers correspond to an African reality, and how much they owe to preconceptions derived from a common European inheritance,” does not raise to the level of challenging the fantasy of indigeneity’s links to slaveness (295). When Fage is framed as the counterpoint to Rodney, the apparent onus confronting Fage and reverberating across historiographical perspectives becomes merely that of modulating cause and effect. Absent is consideration into how the ahistorical abstraction of “slave” relayed by racial slavery makes insight into past modes of slavery tenuous at best and might itself be inextricable from the production of racial slavery.

    Articulating this historiographical dilemma, Achille Mbembe argues that “the slave trade had ramifications that remain unknown to us” (On the Postcolony 13). Following Mbembe, we can discern how slavery produces the conditions of its unknowing and its reproduction. The indigeneity of slavery cultivates freedom as a geographical and racial flight from the determinations of Africa, such that “the slave trade and colonialism echoed one another with the lingering doubt of the very possibility of self-government” (13). When, for example, Ethiopia and Liberia were singled out in a 1925 memorandum from the International Labor Organization as the sole continued purveyors of slavery, the assertion was that “where European powers exercise control of the administration of the territory, the slave trade and large scale raids have diminished and have become practically impossible” (qtd. in Getachew 59). With slavery made indigenous to Africa, “black sovereignty” becomes a threat to freedom and continued domination is ideologically justified. In other words, “the charge of slavery became the idiom through which black self-government would be undermined” (Getachew 59). Blackness doesn’t just represent vulnerability to slaveness; it collides with slaveness insofar as Africa is posed as originally self-enslaving. Africa’s consignment to a negative capacity for self-determination indicates how critiques of colonialism continue to carry with them slavery’s material-symbolic mode of organization. Racial slavery realizes itself in the way it organizes the past, carrying slavery’s indigenous provenance with it to explain away its continued presence. Thinking through how indigeneity has been compressed into service of the generic slave and its attendant modes of domination (and indeed written out of Africanity altogether) opens at minimum the possibility for imagining indigeneity and freedom otherwise.

    The problematic of political subjectivity, of who has access to freedom and how this access shapes not only perceptions of space and time but the materialization of space and time, indents the legacy of the Rodney-Fage debate and radiates outward in a series of methodological imperatives for the historiography of slavery. The best historians recognize that categories are both constructed and relational. Paul Lovejoy, for instance, argues that indigenous slavery is “an analytical convenience that should not be construed as an indication that African slavery developed in isolation” (“Indigenous African Slavery” 25). Although sympathetic to Rodney, Lovejoy understands him to share with Fage the conceit that both indigenous and racial slavery are “static” (26). Wrapping this criticism of stasis into one of “ahistorical” representations, Lovejoy charges that “the gap that is created in this way is in fact wider than the ocean that separated the slave institutions in their American and African settings” (27). A similar criticism has been levelled against Afro-pessimism as a “totalizing interpretation of black experience,” “bound to this historically specific context, all the while disavowing that specificity” (Kauanui 262). This critical conceit—that ahistoricism is a problem of bad intellectual practice—fails to address the materiality of the ahistoric. Despite attempts to historicize the relationship between indigenous and racial slavery, “the dialectical relationship of masters and slaves, ruling classes and kinship groups, remains ‘frozen in time’” (Cooper 10). How can we account for the seeming inevitability of this freezing?

    I am not here talking of the standard story in which African historiography becomes mired in limitations of recognizable archival sources, most of which originate after the abolition of slavery. Interpretations of slavery routinely quibble over how to access and evaluate the past, but because these positions presuppose the past as metaphysical resource, even if barred or lost, they also implicitly introduce the problem that the past is not past at all, which is to say it continues into the present, as well as the more arresting insight that the past is all there is. If it is the case that enslavement in Africa is eternal, no account of history could be possible. With this auto-enslavement, African history, as such, is stalled, hypostasized. Its only value would be the use we make of it in our continued fascination with its failings. Let us not forget that this methodological problem corresponds to the racist Hegelian conceit that shapes Africa’s lack of historical movement.3 But while both traditional African historiography and Afro-pessimist theorizations have been accused of ahistoricism, this charge misses the injection of an element of ahistoricism by racial slavery into the wheels of history. Mudimbe argues that “the episteme of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries … invented the concept of a static and prehistoric tradition” (189). This episteme was preconditioned with ontological significance and sustained by political practice, effecting how Africa is thought and, partially, how its systems come to be organized and its ontologies sorted. With its violent dramas of scale and abstraction, racial slavery seems to put indigenous slavery into relief. It creates the frozen master-slave structure that Afro-pessimism calls the human-slave antagonism. This antagonism, when identified and unleashed into workings of intellectual-political practice, rearticulates the historiography of slavery—and its assumptions of time, scale, and being—into a problem that actively participates in what it seeks to undo.4 Afro-pessimism, I argue, maintains this problem as its horizon.

    The historiography of slavery’s larger frame can account for transformations in “the process of enslavement, the mechanism of slave distribution, and the role of slaves in the social formation” (Lovejoy, Transformations 281), but it cannot account for changes in methods and metaphysics and it cannot identify how racial slavery radicalizes the frame. What we will see critiqued in Afro-pessimism as “ontological absolutism” (Kauanui 263) could instead be conceived as a method of inquiry that has the advantage of recognizing the force of historical universals: the myth of slavery qua universality is one of slavery’s products. Slavery traffics in this myth; its capacity to circulate depends on it, draws its strength from it. Contending with Rodney’s assertion that “slavery as a mode of production was not present in any African society” requires an inversion of priorities: “One of the paradoxes in studying this early period of African history is that it cannot be fully comprehended without first deepening our knowledge of the world at large, and yet the true picture of the complexities of the development of man and society can only be drawn after intensive study of the long-neglected African continent” (How Europe 69). The next section tarries here—between “the world at large” and “the long-neglected continent.”

    Dispersed Space

    Afro-pessimism echoes Rodney’s emancipatory geography of blackness—”black struggle must be universalized wherever black people happen to be” (Rodney, “Black Scholar Interviews” 39)—insofar as it emancipates black struggle from geographical constraint without erasing geographical meaning and measure. From this perspective, black struggle engages blackness through negative space, not to be filled fully with cultural substance or transnational translations, but instead exposing the violent site where tradition breaks and culture is made to meld to being. As Frantz Fanon writes: “Wherever he goes, the Negro remains a Negro” (173). It is in the shadow of this Fanonian formulation that Frank B. Wilderson III argues, “The Black’s moment of recognition by the Other is always already ‘Blackness,’ upon which supplements are lavished—American, Caribbean, Xhosa, Zulu, etc. But the supplements are superfluous rather than substantive, they don’t unblacken” (“Biko” 98). Although the connection between Fanon and Wilderson has been well established,5 the lines that connect broader currents of black internationalism to this ostensibly newer articulation of black studies remain curiously untraced. We can consider, as a prelude to such a project, the overlap between Wilderson’s contention that “Africa has always been a big slave estate. That has been and still is the global consensus” (“‘Inside-Outside’” 9) and George Padmore’s claim that “In Africa, in America, in the West Indies, in South and Central America—to be Black is to be a slave. Despised, humiliated, denied justice and human rights in every walk of life” (qtd. in Edwards 279).6 What V.Y. Mudimbe has famously addressed as the “invention of Africa” is here illuminated as the abstraction of slaveness-as-blackness, indexing a meta-philosophical overlap of concerns long threading West African political consciousness with global freight.

    Though this essay may be a plea to the contrary, it is true that Afro-pessimism has not been taken up directly by the historiography of slavery or by scholars in West Africa (though it has made waves in South Africa and Zimbabwe). Afro-pessimism does, however, share a namesake with a tendency much derided by African social and political theory. This other Afropessimism is an umbrella used to designate non-reflective, defeatist theoretical temperaments and policies that recycle eternal Africa images into the deadlock of a “culture of poverty.”7 These are discourses that, as we will see, a burgeoning Ghanaian national memory sought to avoid, discourses into which indigenous slavery sneaks as a signal flare for African pathology. Doomed by inheritance, “condemned in social theory only as the sign of a lack” (Mbembe, On the Postcolony 8), Africa becomes a place-name barred from self-determination. Insofar as developmentalism thrives on positivism, this nominal gathering of propositions reproduces the problem it identifies: as an “invented ideology” (Momoh 34), its circular reasoning condemns Africa to the pure production of its own lack. Non-regressive movement would come only from those that recognize this circuit as an untenable ideological deadlock. The negative identification and appraisal of Afro-pessimist sensibilities is meant, by contrast, to jumpstart a decided movement beyond the aporetic African recidivism that would revert to centralizing slavery-as-cause.

    For Greg Thomas, contemporary Afro-pessimism is but “Afro-pessimism (2.0).” With the rebuttal that “Africa and Africans bear no naturally condemned status in this world” (284), this 2.0 is derided for its continued naturalization of African negativity. Both iterations of Afropessimism—the one named by its critics as a foreclosure at the register of policy and the other critically claimed as a political-philosophical opening—are, purportedly, invested in the same inertia. The emancipatory alternative to pessimistic reprieves would be to uncover (or simply stylize) positive performances with enough power to combat parasitic dark continent tropes. Other than mirrored names, however, the two Afro-pessimisms share no common body of literature and would be considered autonomous by most standards of disciplinary and discursive lineage. The contingency of their common denomination doesn’t mean they are wholly unrelated: both are compelled to return to lack and both ultimately have their roots in the ways Africa and enslavement are jointly apprehended, including the apprehension of an originary enslaving African culture. But unlike the policy-oriented caricatures of Africa, the Afropessimism of this focus has little interest in developmental futurity. It registers a different order of concern, which is 1) genealogical—how and why blackness became connected with lack; 2) methodological—how to approach the history of negativity; and 3) ethical-political—is negativity something to abhor or does it have its own resources? To these questions comes the speculative innovation of political ontology, in order to interrogate how blackness appears to have emerged, calcified, as negative capacity. In its most abstract terms, Wilderson writes, “slaveness is something that has consumed Blackness and Africanness, making it impossible to divide slavery from Blackness” (“‘We’re Trying to Destroy the World’”). Attentive to a consumptive global anti-blackness, Afro-pessimism the critical analytic shares more with the spirit that has problematized the obsession with African incapacity, insofar as it is interested in articulating the conditions of possibility for Africa’s invention. Instead of avoiding the negative, however, Afro-pessimism asks what is gained by employing it, excavating its history, sharpening its explosive and world-ending edge.

    Critics turn from this opening to craft Afro-pessimism as a culprit in a double sense, arguing that it not only traffics like its nominal twin in a negative Africa but also absents Africa, in citation and substance, from the conversation altogether. Its US-centered interest, detractors note, spuriously compels it to extrapolate “the particularity of the experiences of African peoples in North America to make a universal argument” (Kauanui 262).8 If it is true that certain Afropessimist reading lists do not substantively include African scholarship, as Thomas claims, this does not mean that its wider referential web isn’t concerned with African or Atlantic history. It also does not follow that “there is little if any Africa to this discourse at all, its nominal Afrohyphenation notwithstanding” (Thomas 284).9 Beyond resonance with Padmore or Rodney, we might gesture to how Wilderson’s writing is informed by his political practice in South Africa and how Afro-pessimism’s political horizon is invested in shaping alternatives to redemptive strains of Marxism and post-colonial theory embedded in African studies’ readings of decolonial movements (including Rodney’s insistence that African slaves were captured “for economic reasons, so that their labor power could be exploited” [How Europe 88]).

    Attentive to the attachments of decolonial struggle, Wilderson speculates that if “a political movement must be built and sustained on behalf of someone who has lost something,” then “necessity may have required Black Consciousness to monumentalize the ego of a dead relation” (“Biko” 106). This ego might be a political figurehead, a nation-state, or a pan-African sensibility that represses slavery’s memory, as its recovery tends to reduce Africans to passive victims or complicit agents. Because political movements are predicated on the restoration of loss, they sustain themselves through practices of filiation that engage “Garveyism, Negritude, Pan-Africanism, African Personality, African Socialism, African Humanism, Black Consciousness Movement, and African Renaissance … as imaginations of freedom and recapturing of lost ontologies” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 119). Africanist literary scholar Abiola Irele clarifies the imaginative stakes of Negritude, as it “arose out of a complex of mental images which fulfilled a felt need, and was developed into a systematic and self-sustaining ideology which is, in the last resort, an intellectual projection of this need” (The Negritude Moment 75). This “founding myth” (113) advances a past for the future; it is also at the precipice of such monumentalizing, the political exigencies of which Wilderson recognized, that a conversation toward other inventions might proceed. It might require returning, for example, to the intricate intellectual and nationalist projects Adom Getachew describes as “anticolonial worldmaking,” whose visions “drew on an anticolonial critique that began from the foundational role of New World slavery in the making of the modern world and traced the ways its legacies were constitutive of racial hierarchy in the international order” (5). Such visions remain prophetic because of the ways they exceed the scene of historiography and can rescript its restrictions on indigeneity and freedom.

    These obscured conversations are why, for gamEdze and gamedZe, although the Black radical tradition “has largely been formulated and theorized in and from America, and even as it often falls prey to American exceptionalisms in its quest for forms of Black Universalism,” it nonetheless “holds radical potential for us on the continent” (218). Wilderson might agree: awareness of the limitations of black studies does not preclude it from being “a discipline that seeks to offer the best historical and theoretical framework for questions confronting the Black diaspora. Even though it started in the United States, I consider this to be for all continents” (“‘Inside-Outside’” 4).10 Despite aligning on the potential for radical exchange across oceans, a gulf appears at the (ontological or cultural) register through which such offerings are made—for gamEdze and gamedZe, Afro-pessimism departs, dangerously, from the black radical tradition’s capacious emphasis on “African cultural practices” and the ways African indigeneity has formed “the basis of Black revolt across time and space” (218). Whether gamEdze and gamedZe recognize these cultural practices as political hypostatizations, as concerted myth-making, is not entirely clear. Afro-pessimist theorizations do not wholly object to the work of myth,11 but they wouldn’t suppose African cultural practices to be legible on their own without a shift in the economy of worldmaking of such force that Afro-pessimism designates it as world-ending. Towards this revolutionizing orientation, Afro-pessimism supports an inquiry into negativity, or an engagement with nothingness, to be part of the political potential of the subterranean workings of culture and an alternative articulation of indigeneity.12 Indeed, Afro-pessimism’s rejoinder to strategies that centralize myth-making, but not the conditions of possibility for such myths, should be considered immanent to conversations that spin their wheels in uncovering or refuting the apparent objectivity of a slave-owning African past in ways that don’t entirely foreclose the resignification of the past for positive political purposes.

    Other critical suspicions emanate from the fear of cultural loss: “The manner in which Africanness disappears into Blackness … distorts the conceptual space between the Negro and the African” (Olaloku-Teriba 111). Afro-pessimist analyses, however, represent an invitation to reckon with blackness as the form of this distortion. If writing of diaspora tends to centralize experience, culture, performance, and tradition, it also seems to obscure the workings of race, as when Jemima Pierre writes that “discussions of the ‘Black Experience’ often did not include contemporary Black African experience, even as it is clear that continental Africans have always been and continue to be racialized as ‘Black’ in a global racial order that denigrates Blackness and exploits and dehumanizes Black people” (xiii-xiv). In splitting the difference between modes of “Black Experience” and a global racial order, between performance and the paradigm, this formulation toggles the indecipherability of blackness; the opacity is constitutive of blackness under slavery’s sign. This is why, for Afro-pessimism, blackness seems infinitely fungible, and also why black resistance takes place in fugitive spaces, misrecognized and underground.

    As “abstraction and as anti-abstraction” (Edwards 12), diaspora can be thought to mark the reorganization of a negative space dictated by a global anti-blackness, the enigmatic before and after shared between Wilderson’s “Africa has always been a big slave estate” and Padmore’s “to be Black is to be a slave.” Instead of excavating an African conscience to refute a Western one, posing difference against difference or tradition against modernity, Afro-pessimism engages diaspora through the anxiety around (and inventive potential of) nothingness that is slavery’s precipitate. The concept of the African diaspora might, that is, find itself registered through what Wilderson calls “dispersal,” or the idea that the diaspora “does not rest upon some plenitude in the past” (Wilderson, “Inside-Outside”).13 The question of diasporic meaning, which may or may not be synonymous with diasporic belonging, takes place in the gap between experience and paradigm, but the way the gap is presented globally is through the elaboration of the paradigm itself.

    While the problem of paradigm is only alluded to by historiographical modes of meaning-making that themselves owe coherency to an anti-black order of things, it is often recognized by African scholars. Take Irele: “The colonial experience was not an interlude in our history, a storm that broke upon us, causing damage here and there but leaving us the possibility, after its passing, to pick up the pieces. It marked a sea-change of the historical process in Africa; it effected a qualitative re-ordering of life. It has rendered the traditional way of life no longer a viable option for our continued existence and apprehension of the world” (“In Praise” 207). Irele describes the colonial experience as a paradigm shift for both life and historical processes. The presumptive break between an exceptionalizing black studies and depoliticizing African studies can be examined through the generalized loss of what Irele defines as a “traditional way of life.” If the antinomy identified by Pierre is efficacious, that “where African diaspora studies generally concerns itself with articulations of race and Blackness but not directly with Africa, so African studies generally concerns itself with Africa but not directly with race and Blackness” (xvi), the horizon for a political solution would not be to press too soon for a better synthesis apart from the “no” encountered in the epigraph: the negative response that resounded, “on both sides of the Atlantic,” to the question, “are we free yet?”

    Colluding Freedom

    The most politically weighted expression of spatial-temporal attempts to secure slavery’s status is that of African collusion—the fantastical medium of exchange between innocent non-slaveholding Africans, on the one hand, and warring rapacious slaveholders, on the other. This image of collusion gives rise to questions of the littoral and inland, class and statehood, guilt and innocence, feudalism and capitalism, continuing to call into crisis what slavery actually is. The crisis is provisionally contained by the deflection of responsibility: that Africans have, in certain iterations of public memory, been constructed as willing accomplices seems to interfere with the relative power imputed to European enslavers, the relevance of an African diaspora, the demand for reparations, and the political pertinence of studying slavery at all. The historiographical trend towards contextualization and disaggregation, in its recent revalorization of resistance, has attempted to make African participants actors like any other.

    In a first-order leveling, European merchants, African chiefs, and middlemen are complicit in equal, complicated measure. Their ontologies are made commensurable. A characteristically sweeping statement would have it that “when guilt is apportioned, African chiefs and merchants deserve a large share” (Alpern 57). This share can be numerically measured, as when Philip Curtin disaggregates force to reveal wide-scale African participation: “Europeans bought, but Africans sold; and the number of Africans engaged in the slave trade at any moment was certainly larger than the number of Europeans” (“The Atlantic Slave Trade” 266). But guilt has also been appraised by the origin, quality, and scale of participation—how participants became involved, what they do with that participation, ways they benefit. Here, West African elites take center stage, harnessing power by selling out their supposed own and developing systems of exploitation Walter Hawthorne gathers under the heading of the “predatory state thesis” (9). The elite exploited commoners, the coast raided interiors, and Africa came to cannibalize itself.14

    Certainly, those who traffic in the language of guilt wield the past against the present, in order to amplify or quell the fallout from the mass displacement of peoples and resources. White people have a long history, in Rodney’s indictment, of attempting to “ease their guilty consciences” and throw “the major responsibility for the slave trade on to the Africans” (How Europe 81). The willing participant narrative also informs what Sylviane A. Diouf calls the “black betrayal model” (xiv), posed as a traumatic core for the diaspora. In a widely quoted passage, Henry Louis Gates Jr. narrates learning of African participation at the slave fortresses in Elmina, a narrative that continues to dominate tours today, and propounds on the difficulty of having “to confront the curious ease with which black Africans could sell Africans to the white man” (qtd. in Kaba 8).

    Slave historiography and Afro-pessimist criticism align in critiquing assumptions of filiation underlying the betrayal model. We can see this, for instance, in the correspondence between Lovejoy’s 1983 corrective that “it is inaccurate to think that Africans enslaved their brothers—although this sometimes happened. Rather, Africans enslaved their enemies” (Transformations 21) and Saidiya Hartman’s assertion that “contrary to popular belief, Africans did not sell their brothers and sisters into slavery. They sold strangers: those outside the web of kin and clan relationships, nonmembers of the polity, foreigners and barbarians at the outskirts of their country, and lawbreakers expelled from society” (5). Hartman continues, in a decidedly theoretical advance, to interrogate the problem of race-making: “In order to betray your race, you had first to imagine yourself as one. The language of race developed in the modern period and in the context of the slave trade.” Diouf likewise appears to indict calls of collusion as expressions of “anachronism”: “ethnic, political, and religious differences” were indeed leveraged in the past, but “nowhere in the Africans’ testimonies is there any indication that they felt betrayed by people ‘the color of their own skin’” (xiv).15 As Diouf writes, if it is the case that “concepts of Africa, Africans, blackness, whiteness, and race did not exist in Africa … they cannot be utilized today to assess people’s actions at a time when they were not operative” (xiv). What the historiographical terms of debate miss, however, is how the imaginary zoning of a time before race is nonetheless infiltrated by race in the very movement of apprehension—there is now little conceptual escape. Which is also to say anachronism can only be anachronistic absent a vanishing mediator. If anachronism is, instead, symptomatic of this vanishing mediator—the imperceptible shift from formal to real subsumption that appears after-the-fact, in the form of belatedness—then the collision of Africanness-blackness-slaveness informs interpretations of the past even in attempts to divest from them. Without a reckoning of this order, the conceit of indigenous blackness, excavated by ethnophilosophy in mythic pasts, too easily mystifies the ground of its own articulation.

    Historiography mediates Africanness-blackness-slaveness through tricks of subjectivity: by diffusing the insider-outsider status in order to amplify agency and expand the sphere of African action beyond a reduction to either “trading partners on the one hand and cargo on the other” (Diouf x). While Rodney identifies as structural critique the idea that “any European trader could arrive on the coast of West Africa and exploit the political differences which he found there … It was so easy to set one off against another that Europeans called it a ‘slave trader’s paradise’” (How Europe 79), the ever-widening scope of historiographical intervention metabolizes Rodney’s structural critique into a problem of passive individual subjects. These historiographic conversions have occasioned recalibrations of agency, as focus shifts from the black betrayer to practices of resistance as survival.

    If “agency” in the context of racial slavery “is itself a response to a totalizing and unequal system” (Green xxvii), what does agency mean? What happens to power? Herman Bennett asks in African Kings and Black Slaves, “does the gesture of granting agency not risk giving legitimacy to the very political-conceptual practice that exercised its existence among Africans in the first place?” (25). As African historiography proceeds by incorporating and reclaiming agency, debates over how much agency should be conferred end up stabilizing a subjectivity outside of space and time, inducing a post-racialism at the very emergence of racial thinking. These incorporative calls to agency imply a metaphysics of capacity that underwrites the historiographical state of the field and the political ramifications of its questions (extending to the belief that Africa can be developed, if only the right insight or initiative were deployed). This range of assumptions, as an outgrowth of the terms of slavery itself, works to contextualize the individual but comes at the expense of contextualizing the structure. On the one hand, Rodney’s structuralism seems to absolve everyone, including slave traders and catchers. The view that slavery “was simply ordered and imposed from outside, with the African part in it a purely negative and involuntary one … mirrors a familiar notion of African incapacity” (Davidson 201). On the other hand, historiographers in the tradition of Fage, who assert that African states had vested interests in war and enslavement, “could be accused of trying to shift the burden of guilt for the horrors of the trade from European to African heads” (Curtin, Economic Change 153–54). Celebrations of agency effect a reversal, where the proto-colonial perspective passes, almost imperceptibly, into an avowedly emancipatory one. This is contextualization run amok, the point at which it becomes indecipherable from decontextualization.

    The historiography of African slavery does attend to the ways the trade impacted West African systems—how what we think of as tradition and culture bear the weight of slavery. Of particular interest have been transformations to ritual practices: take the evolution of shrines like the Nananom Mpow from local sites to regional significance (Shumway 134–44); the expansion of asafo militia companies, which protected the Fante’s emergent decentralized coalition from the terror of slave raiding (144–52); and the shifting focus to gods who “crystallize historical processes associated with the Atlantic slave trade” (Shaw 51), from the war god Nyigbla in Anlo-Ewe cosmology (Greene 16–7) to the Talensi god Tongnaab (Allman and Parker 23–71). It is now doxa that African traditions are inventive—paradoxically “not entirely ‘traditional’ in the sense that indigeneity or ‘native’ usually implies”—but it is less well established that these traditions reflect the experience of having been “for nearly fifteen generations … consumers of a foreign culture destructive of pre-existing practices and patterns of thought” (Woods 50), and that these traditions are themselves poetic and political negotiations with destruction.

    This is what Afro-pessimism approaches—not a flashy new theory, but a breaking away from some of the fetters (positivism, Marxism, history, tradition) that have made agency and resistance, victimhood and culpability the restricted markers of slavery’s impact in the world. Afro-pessimist itineraries augment dependency theory, asking whether diffusion of participation removes West African culpability, putting responsibility into the hands of a select few, or whether diffusion in fact identifies a more intensive form of capture. Even along the coast, a Dutch director-general observed in 1714 that “the kidnapping of people is becoming so common that no Negro whether free or slave dares pass without assistance from one place to another” (qtd. in Shumway 60). In this sense, Afro-pessimism draws from Rodney’s political edge and the occasional lessons of historiography, lessons that expand how “all blacks—rulers, traders, and war captives alike—became victims or potential victims” (Kaba 8). Given the extension of captivity across geography and rank, what needs to be raised as a possibility for thematic attention is the way “captivity and social death” might be “essential dynamics which everyone in this place called Africa stands in relation to” (Wilderson, “‘Inside-Outside’” 8–9). Historical models can chart transformations and continued debates can encircle them, but the paradigm that would seek answers only in actions might hide as much as it reveals. If Africa as a place-name has been made to designate a zone of incoherence through which the puzzle of human desire compels itself to find violent answers, then the enduring legacy of slavery can never be decoded through the performance of agency alone (whether participation, refusal, or resistance) and instead needs to be approached through the apparatus by which performance is articulated and appraised. Such a task necessitates, it might be added, that reparations include a global reclamation of meaning.

    Missing Memories

    It is here that the problem of a Ghanaian memory of slavery can be delimited. As a postcolonial collective that marks one (conversely Pan-African, democratic, liberationist, and neoliberal) variant of Africanity, Ghanaian identity has been rendered discrete from the problem of slavery through a foreclosure that designates “slavery and race” as “issues of concern only for diaspora Blacks” (Pierre 3). While Mbembe contends (with some ambivalence) that “there is, properly speaking, no African memory of slavery” (“African Modes” 259), and Hartman writes that “slaves have no place in the myth of empires. There were no drum histories of the captives” (190),16 scholars with an anthropological bent like Rosalind Shaw insist that “there are other ways of remembering the past than by speaking about it” (2). Joachim Agamba calls this other form of knowledge “embedded memory”: his research in Ghana’s Northern region has found echoes of slavery in musical forms, with flute and drum rhythms marking rallying cries warning of incoming raiders. Recent critical ethnography by Emmanuel Saboro continues to excavate resistance to enslavement far before the slave ships ever left shore, recorded in oral histories and on occasions such as the Fiok festival among the Bulsa in Northern Ghana. Similar findings have been documented in Nigerian songs and proverbs.17 What accounts for this tension between unaddressed memory and its saturation (only recently accessed in scholarship) in mythos and culture?

    In one strand of analysis, slavery’s memory is concealed by the demands of a postcolonial present. Nation-building, on the eve of Ghanaian Independence, was caught between the need to retrieve a past positive identity, a “native” or indigenous history of emancipation, and the need to prioritize a certain forward-facing finesse, a finesse that would avoid making Ghanaians passive victims or active agents with respect to slavery. Both positions might, in their own compounding ways, preclude direct paths to either refute European superiority or foster Ghanaian identity. As Ella Keren argues, “It was not just difficult to reconcile slavery and the slave trade with the search for a usable past, which would offer the new nation historical roots, continuity, and unity, but perceived as dangerous insofar as they could be used to support colonial images from which Africans wished to distance themselves” (980). This danger emanates from the racist fascination that links Africa to violence, which is maintained by more overt colonial-era invocations of the “native,” but encrypted by slavery’s supposedly indigenous provenance. The pressure of the postcolonial present, in other words, a collective Ghanaian conversation “shaped by forms of surveillance under colonialism as well as present-day development discourses with its Africa-as-failure mantra and the endless instantiations of Western ideologies of antiblack racism” (Holsey, Routes 8–9), mediates the distinct ways that slavery continues to be repressed and recovered. Cosmopolitan African identities express the eclipse of slavery in Africa by cathecting a triumphant past of indigeneity with the future of independence, but also by potentially ceding to the animating conditions propelling an anti-black present.

    Kwame Nkrumah’s intellectual production engages important precipitates of this national cathexis, navigating a reinvigorated past and revolutionary present through gestures toward self-fashioning. Arguing that African pre-history cannot provide transparent access to a socialist utopia, that “what socialist thought in Africa must recapture is not the structure of the ‘traditional African society’ but its spirit,” Nkrumah unearths the tension that is repeated later in West African historiography, writing both that “slavery existed in Africa before European colonisation, although the earlier European contact gave slavery in Africa some of its most vicious characteristics” and that “before colonisation, which became widespread in Africa only in the nineteenth century, Africans were prepared to sell, often for no more than thirty pieces of silver, fellow tribesmen and even members of the same ‘extended family’ and clan” (“African Socialism Revisited”). Faced with the specter of enduring slavery, with an African preparedness to sell that enabled slavery’s “most vicious” iteration, Nkrumah’s turn to the spirit (not the content) of the past invoked indigenous principles without becoming mired in more insidious practices. Ultimately, this negotiation meant that speeches and political tracts rarely centralized slavery, except as metaphor or brief colonial prelude.18 Self-determination nonetheless become a leitmotif for Nkrumah and his internationalist vision of democracy (Getachew 73–4), a vision whose rhetorical spin indicated that enslavement was ongoing, particularly when leveraged against “neo-colonialist masters” (Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism 33).

    Nkrumah inaugurated the University of Ghana’s Institute of African Studies with explicit exhortation to facilitate “cross fertilisation between Africa and those who have their roots in the African past” (qtd. in Ampofo 11). However, Ghana’s early black internationalist spirit did not translate into scholarship: according to one metric, out of three hundred graduate-level social science dissertations produced at the University of Ghana from 1965 to 1990, only Akosua Perbi’s focused on slavery (Keren 981).19 Since the early 1990s, meanwhile, slave and heritage tourism has been central to the Ghanaian Ministry of Tourism and Diasporan Relations’ 1992 Panafest, the 2007 bicentennial, and now the 2019 Year of the Return. The national response markets shared “brotherhood” based on lost culture. Scholarship and public conversations, however, do not directly engage a continued structuring history that would require negotiating how slavery, racism, colonialism, and capitalism shape Ghana’s position in a global imaginary (a turn that would, perhaps, better reflect the spirit of Nkrumah and Rodney). For Bayo Holsey, this lack of engagement indicates the ongoing impact of the divided world slavery opened: the “distancing from slavery,” which can be seen in gaps in public school textbooks, “and the embrace of slave ancestry encouraged by the state are two sides of the same coin” (“Black Atlantic Visions” 506). Holsey argues that while “narratives about African state-building have exhausted their utility,” those concerning “the slave trade have found a renewed purpose,” including those that link Africa to primordial corruption (“Owning Up to the Past?” 82–83). From the perspective of an Afro-pessimist analytic, this renewed purpose translates into the continued saturation of slavery, not its eclipse. The national containment of slavery both relays global dynamics and mediates how slavery is interpreted.

    Ghana’s Northern regions help exemplify the slave state paradigm. The North first featured in official tourism itineraries in 2001, where a delegation from Panafest traveled to the historic slave-holding town of Paga. The region’s involvement in the slave trade has been represented through 1) the mid-eighteenth century’s Asante-Dagbamba war; 2) the abduction of Yaa Naa Abdallah Gariba leading to the forced payment of 2,000 slaves as tribute or ransom to the Asante; 3) the use of Zambarama peoples as raiders and mercenaries; and 4) the supposition that half a million Northerners were sold into slavery from the mid 1700s to 1897 (Der 29). While the impact of this demographic disruption has been disputed, the gulf dividing Ghana’s North and South remains.20 Indeed, accumulated legacies of slavery and colonialism have all but written the North out of the story of the nation, displacing a geospatial Northern imaginary into a timeless past. The nationalized denigration of the North is intimately tied to the “desires of coastal residents to embrace an ‘imagined cosmopolitanism,’” and the “negative characterizations of northerners, which are at times accompanied by explicit references to their past vulnerability to enslavement, provide an ethnographic illustration of the dreadful depth of African historical interactions with Europe” (Holsey, Routes 100–1). This regional zoning engendered “a spatial reconfiguration of power that eventually led to the emergence of new (breakaway) social formations whose very origins and cultural logic resided principally in the expanding Atlantic complex” (Bennett 35). Such zoning transformed into the now well-known colonial carving of rigid ethnic and tribal lines, reduplicating in the consolidation of coastal power and structuring “non-centralized societies as politically illegitimate and therefore tangential to the political structure of the Northern Territories” (Talton 207).21

    Differently put, Ghana’s Northern regions represent the failed attempt to spatially segregate slavery and its impact. While “During the first phase of the slave trade on the Gold Coast, one’s level of vulnerability to enslavement could be difficult to predict,” after the dawn of the eighteenth-century the North became a primary target for enslavement (Holsey, “Black Atlantic Visions” 510). The containment of slavery was never successful, as the North instead became the zone through which the generalization of slaveness emerged. The Akan term for “bought person,” ɔdɔnkɔ, eventually became synonymous with Northerner (Rattray 34),22 while the symbolic-political strategies that reduced the North to a backwards and stateless people were repurposed and expanded during formal British rule to include all Ghanaians as “native.” The language used by the Northern Territories governor in 1933 echoes that of colonial logic writ large: “When the Whiteman first came to your country you were backward and primitive, a prey to slave raiders from the north and south. You had no cohesion and in many cases no constitution to speak of which was really the root of your troubles” (qtd. in Allman and Parker 72). If slaveness was associated with territorial backwardness that would eventually be engulfed by more triumphant national narratives, then to raise questions about slavery and its legacy may involve, as Emmanuel Akyeampong has argued, a threat to “national integration in recently independent countries” (1). What Akyeampong exposes is the myth of integration, one whose political necessity the history of slavery calls into question and for which it provides new frames.

    An investigation into the phantasmatic construction of indigenous slavery can transform our understanding of 1980s neoliberal austerity measures, which map onto the intellectual-political turn away from critiques of structural underdevelopment and towards positive appraisals of African autonomy and agency. Holsey submits, for example, that “the African slave trader provides a leitmotif of structural adjustment reforms” (“Owning Up to the Past?” 83).23 When the instability represented by the North is both subsumed into the nation and written backwards, its effacement (continuing today in diminished access to resources, infrastructure, and mobility) means having no account of how “the disruption of Africa’s political structures and socio-economic potentials was part of the stagnation of Africa’s technological progress caused by the slave trade” (M’Baye 611). This also means having no longer genealogical route through which to reckon with the failure of development discourses vis-à-vis African political economy.

    Conclusion

    The “afterlife of slavery,” as described by Hartman (6), is usually taken up to interrogate abolition and Reconstruction in the Americas, but it was also written in an attempt to reckon with problems of emancipation in West Africa, and it extends the interrogative frame in this direction. Take the Gold Coast’s 1874 non-interventionist anti-slavery ordinances (coinciding with the colony’s annexation), which formally announced the emancipation of slaves but provided no mechanism for liberation except individual court appeals, permitting slavery’s post-proclamation continuation (Opare-Akurang). The afterlife of African slavery exposes a through-line from slavery to colonialism and post-colonialism, such that, in Rodney’s estimation, “the period of slave trading in West Africa should be regarded as protocolonial” (History 117–18).24 Lovejoy furthers Rodney’s charge to demonstrate that the anti-slave rhetoric accompanying the scramble for Africa employed the very same language and rationale of slavery. For Lovejoy, however, the collapse of slavery provides the key context, as “the imposition of colonialism terminated slavery as a mode of production” (287). This is where Afro-pessimism makes a crucial modification to historiographical orientation, by reframing slavery’s afterlife not as its subsumption into other more contemporary and comphrensive scenes of violence (such as capitalism or colonialism) but as its continuation, not what comes after slavery but how it lives on.

    Slavery isn’t just a past object to be remembered or not—its violent influence shapes how it can be thought. Indigenous slavery, in particular, polices where and when responsibility appears in national discourse and intellectual production; indigenous slavery becomes indigenous slavery because of the way racial slavery transforms the world and rewrites its past. Localizing African practices as slavery’s source interrupts the capacity for critique that would have the Atlantic plantation as the grounding system of modernity and that might reimagine indigeneity otherwise. Racial slavery can instead be demonized as a corrupt (and contingent) “inheritance of wealth and power” and indigenous slavery revalorized precisely as “the inheritance of tradition” (Holsey, “Owning Up to the Past?” 85). Indeed, racial slavery can be said to invest indigeneity with its peculiar anti-black meaning—indigenous not in relation to the land (indigenous studies’ near comprehensive silence on Africa bears this out), but in relation to slavery. In this respect, we need an account of the continuity of the “extraordinary prejudice” that “African and Africans are somehow historically predisposed to violence and savagery” other than mere bewilderment that “it remains still quite widespread one fifth of the way through the twenty-first century” (Green xvi). This is to say that a focus on slavery as the generative condition of modernity, a version of Du Bois’s and Rodney’s positions, refigures the rhetoric of indigenous slavery as a point de capiton for African historiography, national mythology, and global anti-blackness. The legacy of slavery subsists through the displacement of narrative impossibility—shaping spaces and traditions, propelling time forward, securing meaning. If the racial slave is the generation of worldly possibility, the indigenous slave is its impossible effluvia. Every attempt to redeem, reconstitute, or resurrect the proper form of this past object must reckon with the prism through which it appears to us today.

    Sara-Maria Sorentino Sara-Maria Sorentino is an Assistant Professor of Gender & Race Studies at the University of Alabama. Her research asks methodological questions that excavate connections between anti-black violence, philosophical abstraction, and material reproduction. She has work published or forthcoming in Rhizomes, Theory & Event International Labor and Working-Class History, Antipode, and Telos.

    Footnotes

    1. See Kankpeyeng’s summary that “The history of indigenous slavery in Ghana is sketchy, but the oral traditions of present-day Ghanaian ethno-linguistic groups point to the longevity of the institution of slavery” (211), and Perbi’s reiteration of the argument that the Atlantic slave trade “did not supersede the indigenous slave trade. The two systems existed side by side and sustained each other” (62). In many ways, this problem repeats (and could someday clarify) Marxist debates over alternative and resistant sites to primitive accumulation. See Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa 82–9.

    2. See also Du Bois on how domestic African slaves “could and did rise to freedom and preferment; they became parts of the new tribe. It was left to Christian slavery to improve on all this—to make slavery a rigid unending caste by adding to bondage the prejudice of race and color” (251).

    3. Nkrumah writes that of all the “malicious myths” presented by European historians, the most insidious was the denial that “we were a historical people. It was said that whereas other continents had shaped history, and determined its course, Africa has stood still, held down by inertia; that Africa was only propelled into history by the European contact” (Consciencism 61).

    4. On how Afro-pessimism re-scripts the historiography of generalized slavery leveraged by Orlando Patterson’s study Slavery and Social Death, see Sorentino, “The Sociogeny of Social Death.”

    5. Sexton reads Afro-pessimism as “a certain motivated reading or return to Fanon, an attention to Fanon the theorist of racial slavery and ‘negrophobia’ more so than Fanon the theorist of metropolitan colonialism.” See “Afro-Pessimism: The Unclear Word.”

    6. See also Wynter: “What has remained constant is the position of Africa. Although no longer militarily and politically colonised, Africa, nevertheless, as the projected continent of origin as the extreme form of the ‘native Other’ to Man, retains its position as the bottom-most world, the one plagued most extremely by the contradictions that are inseparable from Man’s bourgeois conception of being human” (35).

    7. de B’béri and Louw attend to “this phenomenon of Afropessimism” as “much more complex and its impact much deeper, not only in terms of how Africa is imagined and perceived, but also as regards the ways in which Africans view themselves” (337)

    8. Concern with American exceptionalism is warranted, echoing in the missionary designs of nineteenth-century black nationalists Martin Delany, Alexander Crummell, and Harry McNeil Turner, who grounded their return to Africa in correcting a presumed savage enslaving pre-history (Adeleke), and continuing in a series of diasporic initiatives structured and supported by U.S. Cold War policy. See Von Eschen 176–81.

    9. A parallel criticism is levelled against Paul Gilroy in Gikandi, 1–2.

    10. In Amalgamation Schemes, Sexton extends this argument by centralizing “the qualitative difference between sub-Saharan Africa vis-à-vis the other regions of the global South” as the primary image that is “reflected in the qualitative difference of black positionality in the U.S. racial formation vis-à-vis ‘the colors in the middle’ (not black, not white)” (40–41).

    11. See Wilderson’s support of a multivalent political strategy he calls “Two Trains Running (Side by Side)” in “‘The Inside-Outside of Civil Society’” 18.

    12. See Chernoff’s engagement with Dagbamba music as “perhaps best considered as arrangement of gaps where one may add a rhythm” (113–14).

    13. See also Gilroy’s interview with Tommy Lott on a diaspora “that can’t be reversed” (57).

    14. This internalized consumption narrative takes a politically radical edge, too, as when Rodney converts the well-worn display of “tribal conflict” into a take-down of the ruling class in A History of the Upper Guinea Coast: “When the line of demarcation is clearly drawn between the agents and the victims of slaving as it was carried on among the littoral peoples, that line coincides with the distinction between the privileged and the un-privileged in the society as a whole” (117–18). The class line bears the weight of the acquisitive origin of slaving and has been rendered commensurate with classic accounts of European feudalism. See Diouf: “Aware of these parallels, a king in Dahomey remarked to a British governor, ‘Are we to blame if we send our criminals to foreign lands? I was told you do the same’” (xvi).

    15. As testimony, we can take Cugoano’s confession that he “must own, to the shame of my countrymen, that I was first kidnapped and betrayed by some of my own complexion, who were the first cause of my exile and slavery.” Although referring to racial constructions of difference, Cugoano situates this in slavery’s transformation:

    if there were no buyers there would be no sellers. So far as I can remember, some of the Africans in my country keep slaves, which they take in war, or for debt; but those which they keep are well fed, and good care taken of them, and treated well; and, as to their clothing, they differ according to the custom of the country. But I may safely say, that all the poverty and misery that any of the inhabitants of Africa meet with among themselves, is far inferior to those inhospitable regions of misery which they meet with in the West-Indies, where their hard-hearted overseers have neither regard to the laws of God, nor the life of their fellow-men.(234)

    16. Hartman does record memory inscribed in naming practices (192–96)

    17. See Ojo and Opata for examples of oral history in the Nigerian context.

    18. More broadly, “preferred Africanist topics of engagement” remain “globalization, nationalism, ethnicity, ritual and folklore, the (failed) state” (Pierre xiv).

    19. A similar gap has been noted in black studies, as “the early concrete connections between the lives of Africans on the continent and in the U.S. in the study of the Black experience have all but disappeared” (Ampofo 14).

    20. Haas has recently used his research with Dagbamba drummers and warriors to contest broad swaths of widely received history on the Asante empire and its domination over Dagbon.

    21. Kankpeyeng identifies how Northern “present-day population and settlement patterns” are grounded in slavery (213).

    22. The Dagbamba, meanwhile, tend to avoid dabili (slave) but do sometimes use it as an insult for the “stateless” (MacGaffey 18–19).

    23. Such an analysis can also be extended to current anti-police activism in West Africa. On the colonial history of policing in Ghana in particular, see Tankebe.

    24. See M’Baye and Nunn for recent econometric demonstrations of slavery’s devastating effect on African populations.

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  • Notes on Contributors

    John Culbert John Culbert is a Lecturer in the Department of English at the University of British Columbia. He is the author of Paralyses: Literature, Travel and Ethnography in French Modernity (Nebraska 2010). His article “The Well and the Web” appeared in Postmodern Culture 19.2.

    Jonathan Fardy Jonathan Fardy is Assistant Professor of Art History and Director of Graduate Studies in Art at Idaho State University. His research examines the aesthetic strategies that underwrite the constitution and argumentative structure of contemporary theories of art and politics. He is the author of three books: Laruelle and Art: The Aesthetics of Non-Philosophy; Laruelle and Non-Photography; and Althusser and Art. His current book project, The Real is Radical: Marx after Laruelle, is due out next year.

    Adam Dylan Hefty Adam Dylan Hefty is an Assistant Professor in the Core Curriculum program at Prince Mohammad Bin Fahd University (Al Khobar, Saudi Arabia). He holds a Ph.D. in History of Consciousness from the University of California, Santa Cruz. Recent works include essays on right-wing responses to climate change and on the history of mood disorders. He is working on a manuscript that traces a genealogy of the connection between practices of managing work and mental health.

    Miriam Jerade Miriam Jerade is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the Faculty of Liberal Arts, Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez, in Santiago de Chile. Previously, she was an assistant professor at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México and the Ivan and Nina Ross Fellow at the Katz Center for Advanced Judaic Studies in the University of Pennsylvania. Recent works include articles on political readings of speech act theory, Derrida’s reading of the death penalty, and representation and sovereignty in Franz Rosenzweig and Jacques Derrida. Her first book is Violencia. Una lectura desde la deconstrucción de Jacques Derrida (Metales Pesados, 2018).

    Cory Austin Knudson Cory Austin Knudson is a doctoral student in Comparative Literature and Literary Theory at the University of Pennsylvania. His work focuses broadly on modernism and the environmental humanities, with emphasis on the function of decomposition in both literature and ecology. His essay, “Seeing the World: Visions of Being in the Anthropocene,” has been recently published in Environment, Space, Place. With Tomas Elliott, he is currently translating Georges Bataille’s The Limit of the Useful, a preliminary manuscript to The Accursed Share, for MIT Press.

    Erin Obodiac Erin Obodiac received her Ph.D. in Comparative Literature from the University of California, Irvine and has held teaching and research appointments at the University of Leeds, SUNY Albany, Cornell University, and SUNY Cortland. She currently lectures in the UC Irvine-Dalian University of Technology joint program. Her writings assemble residual questions from the deconstructive “legacy” with emergent discourses in technics and animality, media ecology, and machinic subjectivity. She is completing a book called Husserl’s Comet: Cinema and the Trace, which repositions deconstruction within the history of cybernetics and machinic life.

    Rocío Pichon-Rivière Rocío Pichon-Rivière is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Hispanic Studies at the University of California, Riverside. Previously she was a postdoctoral fellow at New York University and a visiting scholar at the Pratt Institute. Recent works include essays on hemispheric trans theory, Latin American women’s political thinking, and phenomenologies of shame.

    Sara-Maria Sorentino Sara-Maria Sorentino is an Assistant Professor of Gender & Race Studies at the University of Alabama. Her research asks methodological questions that excavate connections between anti-black violence, philosophical abstraction, and material reproduction. She has work published or forthcoming in Rhizomes, Theory & Event International Labor and Working-Class History, Antipode, and Telos.