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  • Talking and Thinking: David Antin in Conversation with Hazel Smith and Roger Dean

    Hazel Smith and Roger Dean

    H.Smith@unsw.edu.au

     

    David Antin is a “talk poet” who gives provocative talks which combine the genres of lecture, stand up comedy, story-telling and poetry. They juxtapose anecdote with poetic metaphor, philosophical and political debate with satirical comment. The talks are improvised, that is they are created during the performance and no two performances are the same. In his talk piece Gambling (Tuning 148), performed in the seventies, Antin refers to the recreativeness which dominates many poetry readings and which he is reacting against; simply reading a poem is like “returning to the scene of the crime/you try to reenact it and the more you try to bring it back to life the deader it becomes.” The medium of the talk restores to poetry its lost oral dimension; the opportunity to bridge the gulf between creative process and product and the opportunity to create in a public forum. Although there is no written record of many of Antin’s talks, some of them have been published in two volumes Talking at the Boundaries and Tuning.

     

    David Antin was born in New York City in 1932 and graduated from New York City College and New York University. He is currently Professor of Art at the University of California at San Diego. He is married to the performance and video artist and film-maker Eleanor Antin. He is also a distinguished critic who has written on the visual arts, postmodernism, television and video art, and the role of art in technology.

     

    The context of the conversation was our forthcoming book Discovering the Discourse: improvisation in the arts after 1945 in which we are investigating the importance of improvisatory techniques and approaches in art, film, literature and theatre. In this book we will rebut the naive conception of improvisation as a purely spontaneous and intuitive process and demonstrate how improvisation has been a complex creative procedure used by many artists since 1945. We were particularly interested in David Antin’s work because it is one of the few examples of improvised poetry. We wanted in the interview to ascertain how David went about his improvisations, what his technique for improvising was and how this related to the effect of the improvisations.

     

    The interview took place in San Diego in February 1992 shortly after David Antin’s talk at Carroll’s Bookshop in San Franscisco on the subject of the other. Although David’s work over the years was the main focus of the interview, we also alluded from time to time to that specific talk.

     


     

         HS:  In what sense do you think your talks are
              improvisations?
    
         DA:  Probably in the same sense that most people's
              improvisations are improvisations.  One person I could
              imagine myself in a relationship to, though I've never
              said it before, is Coltrane.  Coltrane was constantly
              working over scales and examining other musical
              manoeuvres, to keep his hands on a lot of things that
              he could do; he was listening to timbres of different
              mouthpieces and playing with different ways of making
              music, so it is not as if he went in as a blank slate.
                   Jazz improvisation is work that in some ways I
              feel very close to, because the language offers you a
              well-formed grammar.  I am not interested in
              transforming English grammar, but I am interested in
              the full range of English and its varieties of speech-
              registers and its ways of movement from here to there.
              It allows you much more freedom than anybody really
              knows.  I mean we know very little about the full range
              of colloquial English.  In fact most grammar that is
              being used in the schools of the high levels of
              linguistics, which I did doctoral work in, I regard as
              highly idealized.  There are so many things that it
              doesn't explain, although it's a very eloquent family
              of explanations for the things it does explain.
                    But it seems to me that language is a reservoir
              of ways of thinking, because what I am really
              interested in, at least as much as language, is
              thinking: not thought but thinking.  And the closest I
              can get to thinking is talking.  When I started doing
              this I wanted to get close to the sound of thought, and
              then I realised the only way you can get the sound of
              thought is to think, to do a lot of thinking.  Not all
              thinking is verbal, and you can get close to some of
              the things that are not generally thought to be
              linguistic by approaching things in a way that seems
              less discursive.  That is, in some ways narrative and
              images seem less discursive so that you can reach
              towards images or towards semantics that are more
              governed by other ways of arranging things in your mind
              than merely what is taught to people as linguistics.
              So the goal is to articulate through thinking, to find
              my way and open up and explore the range of thinking,
              but to think about things in the course of it.  So in
              this sense I have a lot of practice because I do it all
              the time, but Coltrane also played music all the time.
              It seems to me that Monk had a variably finite
              repertory of ways of moving, part of which may have
              been characteristic and part invented from time to time
              and carried from performance to performance.  In that
              sense I am not any more original than Monk or Coltrane
              but very much like them.
    
         HS:  I understand that.  It is very important that
              improvisation shouldn't just be confused with
              spontaneity.  Nevertheless, if you are going to give a
              talk, is there any degree of preparation beyond previous
              experience?
    
         DA:  Sometimes there is but the preparation is not
              formalized.  In other words when Peter Cole asked me to
              think about the idea of the other I started thinking
              about a variety of things.  I started thinking about
              the way the idea is used.  Not systematically, but as I
              was driving to school or doing something else like
              making coffee in the morning.  And I took out books
              from the library to read, but not on the subject of
              the other.  It struck me that I wanted to look at
              Marco Polo's travels.  I did and it turned out to be a
              bad translation and I thought that maybe Mandeville's
              travels would even be more useful because they were
              more fanciful.  So I took out several volumes and was
              browsing Mandeville before falling asleep at night.  I
              also browsed through an older history of ethnology that
              I wanted to look at again and I re-read some of Levi
              Strauss's Tristes Tropiques, none of which I found
              specially important.  It was just that I was preparing
              my mind and it wasn't that I needed, or was necessarily
              going to use any of this material: I thought it might
              have some edge-like relationship to what I was doing.
              I also looked at several old articles where the term
              got recycled but again not very seriously.  I made a
              very light play with the material just to make myself
              cycle the information in my head very loosely.
                   By the time I arrived for the talk I had no fixed
              idea of how I would begin and I had no fixed idea of
              structure.  The structure normally is provided by the
              finite length of the tape, sometimes I will stop long
              before the tape runs out.  So I talk for about an hour
              or 45 minutes: if I'm told that I have to go shorter I
              will run around half an hour.  I can do very short ones
              if necessary, but then it is different, you don't have
              the luxury of manoeuvering in the same way.  There are
              dictates which are purely practical, such as how much
              you can get on a side and there are the dictates of the
              range and type of audience which has a lot to do with
              social interplay and making things intelligible.
              Because it is not only thinking out loud, it's thinking
              out loud where you are sharing the thinking in some way
              with other people.
    
         HS:  But how can you tell what the audience is like if you
              are not very directly interacting with them?  How can
              you tell what the range of intelligence is?  I was
              wondering all the time during the performance what kind
              of audience you were pitching it at.
    
         DA:  You don't know what it is but you feel it out--at the
              beginning of a piece I have a tendency to be fairly
              exploratory, it doesn't start taking shape right away.
              There is a kind of prelude, you run a few scales to see
              how they work for you but also whether people find them
              intelligible, which may not mean that you will abandon
              them.  But you get a sense from body language whether
              people are with you or not with you and there are ways
              of playing it that are so completely intuitive I don't
              even know how I do it.  That is I spend a fair amount
              of time circling the material before plunging in, to
              achieve a readiness of mind and also a kind of tuning
              relationship--it's like tuning an instrument as a
              prologue.  In other words in standard orchestral
              situations they tune because they have got to reach a
              particular pitch, but I have freedom of tuning because
              no one tells me whether I need just tempered or equal
              tuning.
    
         HS:  One possibility improvisation provides is
              collaboration with other people, for example to
              collaborate much more with the audience.  I have read
              about the incident at 80 Langton Place where the
              audience, made up largely of poets, made you interact
              with them.
    
         DA:  I was actually interacting with them rather maliciously
              I thought.
    
         HS:  During your talk I wondered whether it would end with a
              discussion and in some ways I was quite relieved that
              it didn't.
    
         DA:  Most people are.  I don't have a set feeling about it.
              My sense is that people are there of their own free
              will and I offer a kind of human engagement with them.
              In other words I don't deal with material that is
              impossible for them to deal with.  I deal in a space
              that I presume this intelligent audience can arrive at
              in some manner.  The length of the piece has something
              to do with the audience's interest, and sometimes the
              question is how much I can push the material and keep
              the audience still with it.  I think that I can also
              tell whether people are dialoging with the piece.
                   When I am talking what I say is never quite what I
              intend to say.  There is a kind of relationship between
              the sense of one's own intentionality and what one
              does, because if one had a complete match between what
              one intended and what one said, one wouldn't have to go
              any further, one would never have to reformulate.  So
              there is a kind of slippage and sometimes what you say
              is better than your intention and sometimes worse or
              sometimes merely to the left or right of it.  And so I
              am always conducting a kind of dialogue with myself, as
              well as a dialogue with the audience, and the audience
              is always conducting a kind of dialogue with me, but
              also spinning off.  I feel that's good.  One of the
              reasons I use a less tight presentation mode is that I
              want the audience to have room to pursue its own
              interest and loop away and loop back, which I think
              they do.  I think people associate off into things that
              are like my experience but different, and that they
              might have said in a different way.  So they pursue
              their agreements and disagreements with me through
              parallels of support, this allows them a full-scale
              dialogue.  And to the extent to which they are involved
              in it, they are interested in the piece and they have
              this kind of intense but intermittent attention.
    
         HS:  It's still different from a direct dialogue with the
              audience.  Have there been some instances (apart from
              the incident at 80 Langton Place) where people have
              spoken from the audience or you have actively
              encouraged that?
    
         DA:  Sometimes but not a great deal, unless it happens, in
              which case sometimes I will respond to it in a way,
              loop it in and continue, but my performance is not
              aimed at that.  Usually the audience doesn't feel
              inclined to do this, anymore than they would normally
              feel inclined to do it.  Imagine an audience of
              musicians at a jazz performance.  They might feel very
              responsive, someone might say, yeah, but they are not
              likely to start playing.  There is a feeling that the
              audience generally has at an artwork that they interact
              with it by thinking about it, rather than that they
              immediately interact discursively with it.  Although
              once in a while I'll say something that gets close and
              somebody will say something, usually not much, and I
              acknowledge it and bring it in a bit and that is fine.
    
         HS:  As audience we're very conservative, I think: we're not
              used to participating and so I suppose we would have
              to be actively encouraged.
    
         DA:  You have to be not only encouraged but also feel
              sufficiently ready.  It is more than that, you have to
              feel a readiness with respect to a common range of the
              material and I think the lack of feeling ready is
              partly a sense that the material is not quite so common
              to them.  In fact that was one of the complaints that
              the Langton Place people had which I was toying with,
              it was essentially that they knew very little about the
              material.  I was dealing with a relationship between
              the figures of rhetoric and figures of mind and I was
              trying to retrieve the values of certain Greek terms
              because I thought they were useful.  But when I got to
              a story in an area they felt they knew a great deal
              about or thought they knew something about, (they felt
              inclined to have an opinion about anorexia say, or what
              was called anorexia) it was funny because they hadn't
              really thought about that either.  Which was of course
              one of the great difficulties for them, that is, they
              were thinking about it now for the first time in any
              significant way.  And I think even they were tepid in
              their interventions because they really hadn't thought
              about it that much, and they figured I had thought
              about it more which was probably true.
    
         RD:  Have you ever tried to set up a situation where you
              have a discourse between several people who are
              simultaneously thinking?
    
         DA:  I've never tried to set it up because it is hard to do.
              Though I would certainly find it interesting.
    
         RD:  Because that would be the analogy to the jazz
              performance.
    
         DA:  It certainly would, it's just that you have to organise
              it and find people and find a terrain that you all feel
              you are willing to do it in relationship to.  I did a
              thing in France at the Beauborg with several French
              poets a couple of years ago but I think they saw
              themselves as more supportive of what I was doing than
              I would have liked.  It was fun talking with them but I
              found it hard to draw them out.  I tried but it was
              harder for me to draw them out in those circumstances.
    
         HS:  Could you give me any idea of the process by which you
              generate the talks, how you get from one item in them
              to another?
    
         DA:  Well I look for a promising tangle, some kind of snarl
              of threads so to speak.  I may not see all of them at
              once, I may see the end of a thread, the end of a
              couple of threads and I try to pick it apart, and find
              out what it consists of.
    
         HS:  So you are holding all those threads together
              simultaneously in your mind?
    
         DA:  I follow one of them and it either leads to another
              knot or I go back up to find another one and I might
              move into what seems like an end that I can't get out
              of and then instead of backtracking I will leap to one
              that was next to it.  I will make a transition to the
              one that was further away but which I had left over
              there.  So there is a way of dealing with it, as a
              problematic: it is a sort of playfulness, it is as if I
              took the notion of problem solving and thinking away
              from its seriousness into a kind of sheer pleasure, the
              idea of solving knots.  You look for the great knot and
              then you try to solve it like the Gordian knot.  To me
              the world is filled with some things that are knots and
              some things that are snarls and some things that are
              pleasant tangles and I try to find a way to open them
              up and see what they are made out of and this sometimes
              lead to new forms of ravelling.  I knot and unknot and
              I am looking for an ultimately elegant knot structure
              which I will eventually work out of the remaining
              material.
    
         HS:  That is actually what it feels like.
    
         RD:  It feels like several successive modules in some cases
              doesn't it, particularly in the other.  Did you have
              an awareness that it was likely that there would be
              five modules and that "Guattari" and "Saddam" and
              "molecular structure" would be amongst them, or were
              those things that mostly came to mind as it happened?
    
         DA:  I think they come from a kind of experience and a set
              of attitudes and what sometimes happens is that you
              have clear cut modules but the number of them may
              differ and also they turn out not to be situated
              precisely in the same plane.  In other words there are
              discrete concentrations usually, something leads to a
              concentrated module and somewhere another one may
              develop, but it generally turns out not to be module
              module module in total contiguity.  I try to construct
              in a kind of cognitive space in such a way that the
              distances between the modules create openings for the
              mind and also begin to throw light on a space that
              seems like a meaningful quasi container, but a
              container filled with holes.  In other words my
              relationship to a system is--the problem of systems
              is--that they don't have enough holes.  So that they
              become fanciful and unreal: the trap of systematic
              thinking is that it is falsified through closure.  I
              like systems, I find them illuminating, but what I find
              illuminating is the notion of systems that articulate
              and are elegant and in some way incomplete and clearly
              so.  And it is a relationship between the one
              incomplete system and the other one which creates a
              kind of hyperspace, because the spaces between them
              become interesting.  The principle of complementarity
              in physics is an example of concentration, on the non-
              fit between two situations, and it takes head on the
              difficulty of wave and particle and puts it right up
              front in physics.  Well I don't want to necessarily
              argue that what I do puts it right up front like that
              but I have treated it with casual obviousness.  That is
              I allow this complementarity situation to develop where
              one story doesn't fit over the other story in such a
              way that one completely clarifies the other (I don't
              believe in total clarification) but on the other hand
              it throws light onto it.
    
         RD:  But it is a logical necessity that thinking could not
              have a complete closure really isn't it?
    
         DA:  It can't have complete closure.
    
         RD:  So what I was going to ask was,why so much emphasis on
              making that necessary failure overt?  I can see the
              attraction but why is it attractive to you?
    
         DA:  Well it doesn't turn out to be a failure, because what
              I really am doing is partly making a polemical case for
              what I believe is real thought, real thinking, as
              opposed to what has come to stand for rationalism in
              the history of Western thought, which is a straw man:
              the notion of the totally closed logical system which
              has only one little hole in it that is unfortunate
              because there is a paradox lurking in the corner.  This
              particular form, has dominated rational and
              irrationalist thought in Western European discourse to
              the point of annoyance finally, but what you actually
              find is that structures, because they have holes in
              them, don't become useless.  On the other hand rational
              thought is different from what people think it is, and
              rationality is an exaggeration of the kind of clarity
              of mind and the possible mental tactics that can be
              deployed to think usefully, meaningfully and
              creatively, and it seems to me these are very poorly
              understood.  So part of the purpose of my work is to
              illuminate, by example, the nature of real thinking, in
              which art-thinking shares a great deal with scientific-
              thinking, and we have a lot in common although we will
              do things that may be done differently we may not do
              some of the things that scientists may do and we may do
              a great number that they do.  And even if you do what
              they do, what they do doesn't look like what they say
              it is, because when they write the article they always
              do it backwards.  The article is not the thinking.
    
         RD:  We art thinkers would not have such a tendency to
              prioritise as scientists would have would we?
    
         DA:  No, and my work is about the unity of thinking and the
              absolute absence of the dichotomy between what we call
              irrational artistic thought and rational thought.  It
              basically engages with the idea of raiding across the
              two terrains to insist on the unity of the terrain.
              Logic is a function of human character, people are
              basically in some sense logical when they think at all.
              But logic is broader than that.  The truth-table fable
              is a fantasy but if you could lock down the categories
              in such a way and you could position them rigidly
              between here and there, you could quantise between the
              true and the false in a particular curious way.  But
              usually the categories are too slippery for anything
              significant to be put into this position for very long.
              What happens is that the slippage in anything you use
              generally causes you to have to approach it in a number
              of different ways, "as long as this holds to be true"
              and "as long as this is like that then it follows from
              that that this is this."
    
         HS:  Do you feel there is a sense in which you adopt a
              persona in your talks?  Reading through the talks I
              sometimes felt there was a persona of a kind of naive
              person struggling to understand certain things, for
              example in the talk where you speak about the third
              world and what the third world actually is.
    
         DA:  There is in a sense a persona but the persona develops,
              because as soon as you begin representing yourself at
              all, anything you represent has a fictional property.
              As soon as a representation occurs it's partly untrue,
              it's partly fiction, but it develops its own inertial
              moment, its own commitments and a lot of these things
              derive essentially from a kind of philosophical
              positioning.  In other words you can approach it in a
              different way: "what if we didn't start by accepting
              belief in all these things that everybody always knows,
              what if we didn't know this, how could we examine this
              belief."  So the naivety is ultimately based on the
              belief that we know too much and that it is founded on
              too little.  We are standing on a swamp or a cloud and
              we rely on these well known things, that are well known
              to be true, but how true are they?  So in a way you
              take things everybody knows so it sounds naive to say
              them, but if you say "third world" by now everybody
              seems to have forgotten what the first and second
              worlds were.  I mean is there a second world?  What do
              you mean by a world?  Are there more than that?  In
              other words if the third is invented largely as a
              function of a quarrel between one and two and you
              develop a kind of economic theory on the basis of this,
              the third gets to be built up largely on not belonging
              to one or two.  And then you call it unified, but the
              relations that either the one or two might have can be
              extremely bizarre, and furthermore you can imagine a
              unity of victimization but the victims might not like
              each other if they were unified.  For example, it is
              not obvious that the Jehovah's Witnesses, the gypsies,
              the Jews, and the communists in the concentration camps
              of the Nazis really were very friendly with each other,
              or they were only as long as you had the barbed wire
              around the camp, and they were often treated in
              different ways.  So it seems to me, without being
              naive, you can't ask the right questions.
    
         HS:  But can I go back to the issue of the relationship
              between the first person and yourself, because that has
              been worked out in so many different ways in post-
              modern poetry and yours seems to be very interestingly
              situated with regard to that.  Do you feel you have a
              strong sense of talking about your own experience, or
              do you sometimes tell lies about your own experience?
    
         DA:  Very often.  No, it is all mixed!  I basically feel
              that my talks should be no more reliable than
              conversation in general as absolute fact!  You see what
              one depicts as true is a function of one's feeling and
              experience and all of it has its origins in things that
              are factual as far as I remember, but some of them are
              fantasies.  And some of them are fantasies
              involuntarily, sometimes you remember things that are
              not true simply because your desire has already
              produced the representation.  So that I have never gone
              out and notarised my statements, and my self-position
              is that people will take it as credibly as
              conversation.  Now much of the experience is true or at
              least partially true and some of it is very true and
              some of it is fiction, but it is fiction that is true,
              in other words it is serious fiction, it's not fantasy.
              It is serious fiction in that it derives from a kind of
              experiential engagement with it.
    
         HS:  How do you think the talks relate to your normal talk
              or your normal speech?
    
         DA:  They are close but the situation creates a greater
              intensification of the characteristics.  In a
              conversation with other people, in a social situation,
              you tend to encourage other people and allow other
              people to play and you may not have the space to take
              on one of these things.
    
         HS:  The knotting and the unknotting you talk about wouldn't
              be so prevalent in a conversation would it?
    
         DA:  No.  But it has a relationship with some of the
              teaching that I do.
    
         HS:  That was another thing that struck me when I saw the
              talk; it reminded me of the lecture situation in some
              respects.
    
         DA:  Yes, well it draws on the lecture and on stand-up
              comedy.  It is not really stand up comedy in that I
              really don't play gag after gag, I don't theatricalize
              myself like Spalding Gray.  Spalding Gray, of course,
              is characterized as a performer who also does
              improvisation although his improvisations become
              somewhat memorized by the time he does the work.  At
              least I think he said this and on another occasion he
              said he didn't, so I am not sure, he may work more like
              me than he indicated first time around.  He comes from
              acting and so what he generates essentially is very
              markedly a persona of Spalding Gray.  He theatricalises
              himself so he is his main actor and he positions
              Spalding Gray as bewildered and as a major victim of
              his own inadequacies and it is very charming.
                   And what happens is that though he is his main
              actor, things befall him, whereas I tend to be
              sometimes an actor and often merely only an observer or
              sometimes an actor who is in there involuntarily but
              the action is the other people.  I am not my main actor
              so my persona doesn't develop beyond necessity.  It
              seems to me as long as you start saying "I" you have
              got a persona, especially if you say it three times in
              a row because the "I" begins to develop a configuration
              from its continuity.  And you see Gray concentrates so
              much on the behaviour and the bewilderment of his "I"
              because he is his main actor, he produces not exactly a
              Chaplinesque figure but a certain kind of bewildered
              central figure.  It is a more artefactually complete
              version of the naivety you say that you pick up in
              some of my pieces but my pieces are merely an attitude
              that enters into a discussion of something else,
              whereas in his case he then intrudes into and stumbles
              over it and falls into a trap deliberately and picks
              himself up out of the trap.
    
         HS:  Well that is a very important distinction isn't it?
    
         DA:  And so I don't build up the character and occasionally
              I get sucked into a case where I am a considerable
              figure but usually I am interested in something outside
              of the "I."  The subject in my case becomes the vantage
              point from which to look.
    
         HS:  How do the talks relate to the written transcripts of
              them, how do you actually notate them and what makes
              you decide where to notate the gaps?
    
         DA:  It is very impressionistic.  You see the media are
              really quite different so what I am doing with the
              talks is trying to create an experience for the reader
              which is an analogue structure of the performance.  The
              media are really so different, that is performance has
              all these unknown things that are happening between
              you.  The audience is there and they pick up a great
              number of things from the way you look, from what you
              are saying, the inclination of your head movement, they
              have many more contextual clues than is on the tape
              recording.  The tape recording is in some ways totally
              bewildering for most people, because it contains stuff
              that people don't hear and it doesn't contain things
              they do pick up.  Whatever is said they ignore certain
              things and slips at the time which they don't pay
              attention to.  It is perfectly clear when an audience
              listens they hear the right thing.  They hear what you
              intend to a very great degree, and a tape recorder
              records only what is acoustically available to it
              within certain filters, so the tape recording is the
              most bizarre mode of dealing with this material.
                   The transcript then is an attempt to construct.  I
              used to do it myself but now I get somebody just to
              type it up altogether with no pauses, or to pause
              wherever they think a sentence ends or not to worry
              about it.  If I decide to listen to the tape, which I
              sometimes do, I listen all the way through and then I
              take the transcript and put it down over there.  And
              then I look at the beginning and I read through it once
              and then I start typing and then I might look at it
              four pages later, six pages later, 12 pages later, I
              may look at it very closely in spots.  So what happens
              is that I am typing, I am writing something with my own
              habits of verbal composition and in my head the image
              of what I have done, and I am recreating its image, I
              am not transcribing line for line.  Often without doing
              anything of the sort it comes out almost as if it has
              been memorized, which is very startling.  But sometimes
              what will happen is that I will come to a place where I
              didn't have room to do something at the time, the piece
              had a moment where I wanted to go on and for some
              reason I couldn't do it as fully as I would have liked
              and I think it should be made more articulate.  Some
              transcripts are twice as long as the talks originally
              were.  Some pieces are very close to the literal form:
              the phrasing system seems to be very similar in both of
              them and you could hardly tell the difference between
              them.
                   I remember a piece called dialogue in my book
              tuning.  I did this piece in Santa Barbara and they
              sent it back to me and I transcribed it and I added a
              whole story that I cite in the performance but didn't
              have room to tell it.  But a reading audience doesn't
              suffer from the same psycho-dynamic as a listening one,
              you are in a different space, you are holding a book in
              your hand and so I simply told the whole story that I
              couldn't have told there given the difficulties of
              timing.  So the version that I sent back to them was
              one and a half to two times the length of the other
              piece.  I met the editor about a week later and she
              said she really liked it a lot and what she really
              liked was how completely identical my original version
              was with the performance!  And so I have to say that
              there is a phenomonological issue at stake.
                   It does vary from occasion to occasion depending
              on the commitments I have.  I have a commitment to the
              performance, to the psycho-dynamics of improvisation,
              to doing the best I can, which always involves an
              engagement with an audience, and a commitment to
              material.  And sometimes one has to be traded off
              against the other, you can't let the audience down.  I
              have a responsibility to an audience to do it as well
              as I can in a way that allows them to be participants
              to the end, and so my sense of timing is partly related
              to that.  I can stretch it, I can negotiate it but I
              am not a performer who is interested in violating
              audiences.  My interest is essentially in engaging an
              audience, discoursing with an audience perhaps pushing
              it, but in some kind of social relationship that I find
              is humanly responsible.  Now the problem is I don't
              always feel that I was responsible enough to some of
              the articulations I should have undertaken in relation
              to my loyalty to the material and then the question is
              how do I do it in the text in such a way that it
              doesn't violate the spirit of the performance?  And
              there will be times when I will take up in the text a
              greater articulation of some of the material that I was
              handling in a performance, and then I have to construct
              a way of getting back from it into where I was before.
              It is as if a cadenza went wild and I take the cadenza
              way out and then I've got to come back in some way and
              I create an artifice for getting back to where I was
              before.
    
         HS:  I think, actually, the transcripts are very successful
              because one of the things that struck me when I saw you
              talk was...
    
         DA:  They sound like me.
    
         HS:  Yes that it was very much what I had conjured up from
              the text.
    
         DA:  Well that is the intention.
    
         RD:  On the other hand another way of looking at that
              process of transcribing is that you are using the
              process of thinking but then you are also superimposing
              thought.
    
         DA:  Well actually no.  Just superimposing more thinking.
    
         RD:  Except that you are presumably doing that over a much
              longer time-span and you are also thinking
              retrospectively about what you thought in the process
              of thinking when you performed--i.e., by now, thought.
              It is kind of a combination of the two, isn't it?
    
         DA:  Well it is interesting--it is true in a way although I
              don't see it that way.  I see it as thinking and
              rethinking, because it seems to me I don't write slowly
              either.  I write almost as fast as I speak.  I use a
              computer and I used to use a typewriter and I am an
              extraordinarily fast typist and the computer has made
              me even faster.  So I don't use the system that many
              people use to write, which is built on endless
              revision; not because I don't want to do it, I just
              don't feel that way.  I write almost the way I talk so
              I go pusssssh you know and I catapult myself along
              almost at the pace of my speaking.
    
         RD:  That raises the other question which comes from the
              realization of the two stages.  Why do you really need
              to do the performance verbally in public?  Why can't
              you do the thinking at the computer.
    
         DA:  I like the engagement.  Somewhere in Levi Strauss' work
              he talks about the one thing that is so marked in all
              primitive art and that is almost lost completely in
              Western traditional art as we know it.  And he says
              what isn't there is a sense of occasion, whereas
              occasion so dominates the art that he was talking
              about.  For me the sense of occasion, of art being
              rooted in an occasion, is one of the central issues of
              its motivation.
    
         RD:  Yes, well as an improviser I sympathise with that.
              Stemming from what you said at the beginning of the
              conversation and the comparison with Coltrane there is
              one major difference, it seems to me, between what you
              are doing in your talks and what they are doing.  You
              are saying that you don't really want to transform
              grammar but I think that they did eventually transform
              the grammar of music and by the heyday of free jazz it
              became a primary objective almost.  I don't think it
              was ever a prime objective of Coltrane's but it
              probably was of Cecil or Ornette.  Do you not feel any
              temptation in that direction in spite of that?
    
         DA:  Well grammar plays a different role historically in
              music.  And in a certain sense the grammar of music is
              much more constraining and in some sense fairly
              trivial.  As someone reasonably grounded in music my
              sense is that grammar in music is more of a
              straightjacket than grammar in language.  So they
              really had to break with a lot, although they didn't
              really break with grammar if you take grammar to be a
              universal grammar.  Supposing we take the notion of the
              universal grammar of music, a very loosely
              understandable psycho-grammar in a sense of what you
              can distinguish, that is based on the
              distinguishability of timbres, the limit and thresholds
              of what perception can in fact articulate in sound.  It
              seems to me we don't know the universal grammar of
              music.  The grammar of language has just begun to be
              discovered with the appearance of people like Chomsky
              and the Russian formalists, and we hardly know what the
              real grammar of language is.
    
         RD:  Nevertheless quite a few of our literary peers have
              felt inclined to attack it haven't they?
    
         DA:  Yes though they usually do so on the basis of very
              insufficient understanding.
    
         RD:  But as you have said in various ways already that
              doesn't necessarily undermine the validity of the
              enterprise does it, quite the opposite.
    
         DA:  No, not at all, I'm perfectly happy with them doing it.
              If they start out from false premises and do terrific
              things.  I've got nothing against it!  It is the theory
              that I sometimes find foolish but the outcome of the
              work is often terrific.  So in a sense if Coltrane or
              Ornette do things that are breaking up a grammar it is
              only when you take grammar in the narrow sense of the
              grammar of music, because if, for example, you suppose
              that the deep grammar of music is different from the
              grammar that was imposed on it, in my sense they look
              for the deep grammar.  I would say they are looking for
              the deep grammar in music and that was the greatness of
              free jazz, the fact that it was so coherent.  I taught
              one entire 3 hour course with a group of people where
              we tried simply to take one whole performance of the
              Coltrane group in 65 and we were listening to it and we
              tried to find a way to talk about it that made
              intelligent sense about the articulations and the moods
              that were made.  And we needed a kind of theatrical
              vocabulary to discuss it and we were trying to re-
              formulate, and it seemed to us that the work was
              extraordinarily coherent and in some sense humanly
              grammatical because it was intelligible.
    
         RD:  Do you recognise a group of improvising talk-givers in
              whatever country that are your peers, and if so have
              you considered trying to set up a condition in which
              you could collaborate with any of them specifically?
    
         DA:  Well I don't know of any peers in the sense of having
              close relations although I know other people who work
              in the domain.
    
         RD:  Yes I mean in the latter sense, a peer, somebody with
              an equivalent level of interest.
    
         DA:  Yes they do but they are in a semi-commercial zone
              overlapping mine and have different aims.  For example
              Garrison Keillor is an improvisor in certain ways.  I
              am not sure whether he memorizes his stuff and maybe it
              is in story-telling that we overlap more than in
              improvisation, although I have a feeling he may
              improvise his stories.  And there is a kind of
              connection, although not a connection of sensibility
              with Spalding Gray, though he is theatrical.  And
              whereas my talks have a kind of philosophical
              linguistic commitment, in his there is a kind of
              theatrical but also psychological set of concerns.  I
              don't know anyone who basically works that way that it
              would be easy to imagine working in relationship to.
    
         RD:  So the idea of a collaboration with say a person who
              might use phonemic improvising, let's say a Bob Cobbing
              wouldn't really appeal because there isn't that
              cohesion between the two approaches?
    
         DA:  No, although I am very inclined to the possibility of
              working with a musician because I could imagine working
              with some really contemporary musician, doing a piece
              for example with George Lewis.  I could imagine doing
              things with him because the space that he operates in
              seems to me not unreasonably playful.  It is both
              different enough and at the same time capable of being
              rhetorically innovative and I could see myself playing
              with it.
    
         RD:  We have used musical and verbal improvising.  It can be
              very interesting, you can make the relationship in lots
              of ways.
    
         DA:  Yes, as long as you can figure out how to work together
              in a physical sense and a team-like sense.  It seems to
              me that we could do it in ways that are not the most
              obvious ways.
    
         HS:  And have you thought of doing anything, setting
              yourself up technologically in any way?  Having for
              example a tape of yourself talking and then talking
              with that or something like that.
    
         DA:  Well I did use the intervention of taped conversations
              for the Archeology at Home and I was not enormously
              thrilled by that.  And I did another piece, Scenario for Beginning Meditation, that was published in one of
              my books of poems.  It has a set of questions with wide
              spaces between them and some responses to them.  There
              were questions such as "is this the right time to
              begin" and I left spaces between them on the tape
              recording long enough so that I could answer the tape
              recording.  And I went back the next day and I ran down
              the batteries of the tape recording so that I knew that
              it would be fairly weak and that it would get weaker
              and weaker.  The sentences were philosophical
              reflections on the problem of beginning.  The tape
              recording would talk and then I would try to answer the
              recording in a dialogue.  I tried to respond because it
              was asking questions and I tried to answer it.  The
              students were in the middle and as the tape recorder
              got lower and lower because I had deliberately run down
              the battery very low, I had to push through the
              students to hear the tape recording and be able to
              respond to it.  So the piece was a sculptural piece
              because basically it forced the re-articulation of the
              space.  The piece took a while to do and at the end I
              frantically leant against the tape-recording trying to
              hear what it said in order to answer it.  So the piece
              was sort of funny but it was designed as a piece of
              sculpture but later I just published the questions.
    
         HS:  Reading through Talking at the Boundaries and
              Tuning there didn't seem to be a major change in the
              way that you actually approached giving talks.  When
              did you start the talks?
    
          D:  Early 70's, about 71.
    
         HS:  Do you feel that the talks you give now are very
              different in certain ways?
    
         DA:  I think they vary enormously.  Obviously there were
              changes because I am much more experienced at doing
              them.  But on the other hand if you look at the two
              books, there are 16 talk pieces published in the two
              books and yet in the 21 years that I have done this I
              may have done 160 talks.
                   And this is a very small subset of what I have
              done and in it is hard to have an idea of the range of
              the talks from the 16.  I could publish more but in a
              way I am an oral poet who has book capability, and to
              be an oral poet you have to do 7 or 8 performances a
              year or you are not performing.  It's important to be
              an ongoing performer.  I will do about 5 or 6 this
              year; if you don't do it you can't keep your hand in
              it.  There have been changes and I've got a book coming
              out with New Directions which will be out in Spring of
              93.  It is called What It Means to be Avant Garde.
    
         HS:  Do you think there are certain topics that you are
              really obsessed with, which keep coming up time and
              time again in your talks?  I am sure if I went through
              I could find certain recurring themes.
    
         DA:  Probably some that come up more than others and new
              things show up once in a while.  I like to think that I
              am not so completely closed that I always talk about
              the same things.  On the other hand we have our habits
              and concerns and things that are not resolved.  What is
              resolved I don't bother dealing with.  For example in
              the other certain things familiarly fit into it.  On
              the other hand it was not a subject I had thought about
              in any significant way before and if you take it at the
              micro-level, some of the concerns are the same, but you
              are looking at them from different points of view.  So
              my sense is that there is a mixture.  I am sure if I
              went through the talks I would find things that were
              familiar, but then one isn't infinite in one's
              capabilities.
    
    

     


     

    The Interviewers:

     

    Hazel Smith, who lived in England until 1989, was an undergraduate at Cambridge University, has a PhD from the Department of American Studies at the University of Nottingham in contemporary American poetry and is currently a lecturer in the School of English at the University of New South Wales, Australia. She has a particular interest in the contemporary avant-garde and in the creative process, and her current research interests include performance- orientated and technologically manipulated poetry, and improvisatory techniques and real time manipulation in the contemporary arts. She has published articles in many journals and is currently writing a book collaboratively with Roger Dean on improvisation in the arts after 1945 for the publishers Gordon and Breach.

     

    Hazel Smith is also a poet and sound artist working in the area of experimental poetry and performance and has published in numerous international poetry magazines. She has also published three volumes Threely (Spectacular Diseases Imprint 1986), Abstractly Represented: Poems and Performance Texts 1982-90 (Butterfly Books 1991) and TranceFIGUREd Spirit (Soma 1990). Some of her work was included in the 1991 Anthology Floating Capital: new poets from London, Potes and Poets Press, U.S.A..

     

    Hazel Smith has given poetry and text performances in many different countries including Australia, Great Britain, USA, Belgium and New Zealand, and also on the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), BBC and US radio. She has collaborated several times with artist Sieglinde Karl and musician Roger Dean and her performance work has been featured on several ABC programmes, and internationally, for example on France Culture. She is currently making a CD of her poetry and performance pieces and one is being released on CD by the US journal in sound, Aerial.

     

    Hazel is also a violinist. She is leader of the contemporary music group austraLYSIS and has performed solo and chamber music in many parts of the world including Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Great Britain, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, New Zealand, Norway and the Philippines. She has featured as soloist on several gramophone records.

     

    Roger Dean is an improviser, instrumentalist (playing double bass, piano and electronics), composer and musicologist. He has worked widely in Europe, Asia, Australasia, and the U.S.. He formed the European group Lysis in 1975, and its Australian counterpart, austraLYSIS, in 1989. He has made more than twenty five lp and cd recordings. Amongst his recent recordings are The Wings of the Whale (with Lysis; Soma 783), Something British (with Graham Collier Music; Mosaic GCM 871), Moving the Landscapes (austraLYSIS, Tall Poppies 007) and Xenakis Epei on the Wergo label.

     

    He has written more than 60 works, both completely notated pieces and also works for improvisers. He has used a range of compositional techniques, from serial, and freely atonal, to neotonal and other post-modern approaches; and composed for digital electronics also. Several scores have been widely distributed in his books (mentioned below); and in publications of Sounds Australian, The Australian Music Centre, Sydney, and Red House Press, Melbourne. Many are on commercial record releases on Soma, Mosaic, and recently Tall Poppies.

     

    Amongst his recent works are TimeDancesPeace, in which dancers and musicians work interpretively and improvisatorily with shared materials and methods of development. He has also collaborated with Hazel Smith in two large text-sound works, Poet Without Language, and Silent Waves, both written for the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC).

     

    He is active in musicology, with many articles and reviews published. His practical book Creative Improvisation was published by Open University Press (UK/US) in 1989. It was followed by New Structures in Jazz and Improvised Music since 1960 (Open University Press; 1991). He has received bursaries and commissions from the Arts Council of Great Britain, the Australia Council, ABC, and Rikskonserter (Sweden).

     

    He also has a career in scientific research, and is the Director of The Heart Research Institute, Sydney, Australia.
     

  • “It Meant I Loved”: Louise Gluck’s Ararat

    Eric Selinger

    Dept. of English
    University of California at Los Angeles

    eselinger@aol.com

     

    Thanatos undercuts, overrides Eros, his sweet, belated sibling–so says Freud.1 And in Revolution in Poetic Language, her closely argued brief against paranoid Unity and culture as theology, Julia Kristeva more than agrees. Like the Accusing Angel that she calls “the text,” Kristeva puts the writing subject, in her now famous phrase, en proces–in process and on trial–charged with denying the very spark that drives him: the “jouissance of destruction (or, if you will, of the ‘death drive’)” (150). This drive lies below language, she argues; it underwrites or even is desire (49, 131). Even oral pleasure, that link between infantile suckling and the poet’s honeyed words which at one moment in her account “restrains the aggressivity of rejection,” thus holding the death drive in check, amounts in the end to “a devouring fusion,” “borne” and “determined” by the very rejection one hoped it would restrain (153, 154). Avant-garde social and textual “practice,” along with the critic’s own, must on account of this be strict, undeceived, and unsentimental. There’s no entry for “love” in the index to Revolution. No Eros peeks out from Psyche’s cupola, offering readers shelter from the storm.

     

    At moments Louise Gluck’s Ararat calls to mind such passionate strictness. “The soul’s like all matter,” the poet observes. “Why would it stay intact, stay faithful to its one form,” when it could fly apart into “particles” and “atoms,” disintegrate, “be free?” (“Lullaby” 28-29). The Kristeva I’ve cited so far would take this as a rhetorical question; and indeed, on first reading, so it seems. But these lines, like the rest of the volume, are spoken by a self-professed “Untrustworthy Speaker” (34). Suppose we read deeper, then, and hazard an answer? Recall another myth of rejection, the sentence passed on another subject on trial: Job, who refused to curse God and die (the biblical version of Kristevan “practice”). He survives to see an erotic restitution, his second crop of daughters, Dove, Cinnamon, and Eye-shadow, married with children and grandchildren of their own (Mitchell xxx, 91). A taste of fairy-tale closure, this end equally hints at that love “fierce as death” we read of in the Song of Songs (8:6), the book which follows Job in the Hebrew Bible as its countersong, a promise and a kiss.

     

    The effort to unlock a love like that, a fierce erotic drive to hold life together, propels Gluck’s sequence from scene to stark, lyric scene. And the etiology of the affections we find in Kristeva’s more recent volumes can illuminate both the particulars and quiet formal imperative of the poet’s mourning work and self-analysis. “Beyond the often fierce but artificial and incredible tyranny of the Law and the Superego,” she writes in Tales of Love, postmodern love has been undermined by an “erosion of the loving father”: the one that Freud called the imaginary Father in Individual Prehistory, whose love for us ushers us out of melancholy longing for a lost maternal presence and into speaking subjectivity (378). Two musings from this book might serve as epigraphs to Ararat, highlighting the questions the poet sets herself as she attempts to reconstitute a vision of such paternity. “Love as unacknowledged lament?” Kristeva asks. “Lament as unsuspected love?” Tales 88).

     

    It’s easy to read Ararat as a book about death, a fatalistic “family tragedy” (Cramer 102). The passing of the speaker’s father precipitates portraits of earlier losses, of a distance and coolness in the family’s past, and of the uneasy relations that remain. “Long ago, I was wounded,” the first poem begins (15); the last poem echoes the phrase, suggesting that no cure has been effected in between. “I thought / that pain meant / I was not loved,” the volume all-but ends, and no sunburst of metaphor, rhythm, or rhetoric amplifies the retraction of the line that follows to close out the book: “It meant I loved” (68). And yet, for all Gluck’s restraint–she’s no Mahler, massing brass fanfares to signal the shift–this quick modulation from minor to major ripples back to revise our sense of everything we’ve read before. Thus while “Ararat” is the name of a Jewish cemetery in the text, as a title for the book it also suggests something rather more hopeful, a place to settle, a mountain that peeks into view as the high waters ebb. Somewhere to speak from, perhaps, for in Kristeva’s tale “our gift of speech, of situating ourselves in time for another, could exist nowhere except beyond an abyss” Black Sun 42). We might paraphrase that as “after a flood,” with Matthew Arnold’s “salt, estranging sea” filling the developmental gulf between child and mother that the theorist has in mind. And if we took this as a book about Thanatos, did we brush past its actual epigraph on the way? “Human nature was originally one and we were a whole,” Gluck quotes from Plato’s Symposium, “and the desire and pursuit of the whole is called love” (11).

     

    The androgynes split up by Zeus have long since lost their cartwheeling brio, their mocking, comic tone as a myth for the origin of sexual lack and desire. Gluck herself sets them aside, turning instead to the two visions of union that our modern myths allow: that between mother and infant, and the “coagulation of the mother and her desire” that intervenes in the mother/infant dyad as a third term, and that reveals to the child that “mother is not complete… she wants…who? what? … ‘At any rate, not I’” Tales 41). Through a “primary identification” with this third, whom Kristeva, following Freud, names the “father in individual prehistory,” we may be reconciled to the loss of primal symbiotic bliss (see Tales 21-56; Black Sun 6, 13). He, or he-and-she (since the Third “possesses the sexual attributes of both parents” [“Joyce” 172]) is the seed of the Ego Ideal, our original constitutive metaphor: “I’m like that.” Split off from mother, taking ourselves for, or becoming like, this other object of her affection, we thus inaugurate, all at once, subjectivity, metaphor, identification, idealization, symbolicity, and love. “The speaking being is a wounded being,” Kristeva explains; “his speech wells up out of an aching for love” Tales 372). Primary identification cannot heal the wound, but it sutures, salves, and compensates the pain. When it fails or is too fragile I lapse melancholic, have only the sense “of having been deprived of an unnameable, supreme good” as I run my thoughts over, in numbed, dumb repetition, the “unnameable” loss Black Sun 13, 12).

     

    In Ararat this “father of imaginary prehistory” appears in several incarnations: the father as object of the mother’s love; other children, sisters, in the same position; the “family unit,” as we blithely say, in its full domestic happiness. Or, I should say, he fails to appear. For all these unities lie shattered, unrecognized, unimagined, or forgotten as the volume begins. “Long ago, I was wounded,” the first poem opens:

     

    I learned
    to exist, in reaction,
    out of touch with the world: I'll tell you
    what I meant to be--
    a device that listened.
    Not inert: still.
    A piece of wood. A stone.(15)

     

    The near-toneless abstraction, the muted affect here, is that of a poet cut off from the pleasures of language as tactile, material, rhythmic, “the world.” The register Kristeva calls “the semiotic,” words surging with instinctual energy, seems repressed or abandoned. “Why should I tire myself, debating, arguing?” the speaker demands, as though such efforts of control were the only language games she knew, or thought to play–at least with those near her, “those people [sisters? the rest of her family?] breathing in the other beds.” If she “meant” in the past to be silent, mechanical or symbolic (a “device”), she hardly escapes that condition in the present tense of the lines.

     

    A slumber does her spirit seal, we might say, for surely the last line of this stanza distantly echoes Wordsworth’s “rocks, and stones, and trees.” Her words, arhythmic, breaking off in dashes, suggest the melancholy speech Kristeva describes as “elaborated with the help of much knowledge and will to mastery, but . . . secondary, frozen, somewhat removed from the head and body of the person who is speaking” Black Sun 43). But hers is a sleepless slumber, a restless depression, stirred by a turbulence instantly put down. “Those people” are “uncontrollable / like any dream–” the poet observes, then at the word “dream” breaks off to watch “the moon in the night sky, shrinking and swelling.” Perhaps phallic in its alternate tumescence, or like a mother’s heartbeat, throbbing in the dark, this moon supplies an image for that archaic force the poet calls “the dark nature,” to which birth and death itself “are proofs, not / mysteries.” Ominous, the moon still seems attractive, a source of the dynamism the poet lacks. As we move through the stasis of the next few poems, its changes will be missed.

     

    The opening poem I’ve been discussing stands in a double relation to the rest of the book. Its title, “Parados,” names the choral ode sung at the start of a Greek tragedy, a dramatic form that Nietzsche reads as teaching that “the state of individuation” is “the origin and primal cause of all suffering . . . objectionable in itself” (73).2 If we take the poem as a distinct dramatic invocation, thirty-one verses remain–and exactly halfway through the book, in “Brown Circle,” we find the pivot of confrontation and forgiveness on which its progress hinges. Gluck doubles up on organization, however, supplying a second structural logic I will follow from now on. After “Parados” we find five poems that move the sequence along, introduce characters, fill out the plot. Then we have “Confession,” which comments both on the speaker and, obliquely, on what we’ve seen so far. Five more poems, then another address from and about “The Untrustworthy Speaker.” Five poems later, after the halfway pivot, we find “Animals,” which treats the speaker and her sister together, and for the first time hints at the true bonds between them. Five poems, and we find a deus ex machina of sorts, a vertical turn to hear “Celestial Music,” followed by the coda, “First Memory,” which echoes and revises the opening ode: “Long ago, I was wounded. I lived / to revenge myself / against my father” (68). I don’t mean by spelling out these structures to suggest that the book is primarily organized by differences and distinctions, other than of course its division into separate poems. The sections I propose are nowhere marked. But by reading this way, against the grain, we can get below the speaker’s evident emotional stasis, and tune in to deeper, subtler, curative shifts.

     

    “A Fantasy” To “Confession”

     

    At the end of “Parados” we learn that birth and death “are proofs,” not the mysteries the poet must bear witness to. Proofs of the power of Thanatos, or so it seems as this section opens in “A Fantasy.” Here, though no familial relationship has yet been described between her and her subjects, the speaker watches birth and death lamentably converge as “every day, in funeral homes, new widows are born, / new orphans” (16). In the “new life” of each widow and orphan time flashes in jarring, paratactic fragments: “Then they’re in the cemetery”; “And after that, everyone goes back to the house / which is suddenly full of visitors.” The only force that counteracts this fragmentation and dispersal is the mourner’s memory: the imagination of “the widow” our attention has lighted on and entered into as the poem progresses:

     

    In her heart, she wants them to go away.
    She wants to be back in the cemetery,
    back in the sickroom, the hospital. She knows
    it isn't possible. But it's her only hope,
    the wish to move backward. And just a little,
    not so far as the marriage, the first kiss.(16-17)

     

    The poet, we note, presses back a bit farther in the continuity than the widow allows herself. She lingers as the last line ends on the vision of a woman–the mother, we will learn–achieving her desire. And yet, as the focus widens again in the next poem to include the whole of “this family,” still unnamed as the speaker’s own, nostalgia withers and a harsher tone sets in. “No one could write a novel about this family,” this voice announces: “too many similar characters. Besides, they’re all women; / there was only one hero. / / Now the hero’s dead” (18).

     

    Why this sudden shift in tone? It takes no particular psychological insight to see something defensive at work, signalling the importance of “the hero” when alive. The women may be “determined to suppress / criticism” of him, but in the speaker’s case, at least, they don’t succeed. His death “wasn’t moving,” the speaker insists; he was a “figurehead” alive, evidently narcissistic (the women are “like echoes”); “he’s weak,” she notes, “his scenes specify / his function but not his nature.” That function has something to do with narrative, with the making of sense and sentences through time. If at the gravesite a nameless someone instructed the mourners on “what to do next,” even that desiccated remnant of paternal function has now evaporated. “From this point on, nothing changes,” we are told. Not only is there “no plot without a hero,” but his absence rules out change as erotic development, new first kisses, escape. “In this house,” the speaker explains, “when you say plot what you mean is love story.” For Kristeva, love rests on a foundation of primary identification with the “imaginary father”: “a warm but dazzling, domesticated paternity” Tales 46). The recovery of such an imaginary father–the reconstruction of “the hero”–will be the poet’s task. As imagined here, he can only hurt and divide: in a brief flash of metaphor that perhaps signals his continued power, each woman’s heart is “pierced through with a sword” (19). But since the imaginary father does not simply equal the biological father, but incorporates whatever “not I” the child discovers its mother to desire, the poet must equally reconstruct the rest of her family. Her sympathetic imagination cannot jump past or exclude “these women, the wife and two daughters” and their children. These paired efforts will shape the first three sections of the book, starting with an admission that, indeed, this family is the speaker’s own.

     

    With the next poem, “Labor Day,” her mourning work begins. “It’s a year exactly since my father died,” she begins; everything snaps into focus with the first- person pronoun: the heat last year, a coldness now; a niece riding her bicycle out front. “There’s just us now,” the poet remarks, “the immediate family.” Immediate, since no longer mediated by a paternal third term, the family also seems trapped in an unhappy immediacy, a static present. Between the father as “a blond boy” and his appearance as “an old man gasping for air” we see nothing, no development, no life but “a breath, a caesura” (20); likewise, in the poem that follows, “Lover of Flowers,” we find references to “every spring” and “every autumn” as though years of seasons were compressed in the year that’s passed. Certainly immediacy does not equal closeness, for the speaker seems determined to mark off borders, to differentiate, particularly between her sister and herself. “In our family, everyone loves flowers,” she begins (21). But “with my sister, it’s different, / it’s an obsession.” When a set of poppies that the sister plants is beaten down by rain, we can glimpse the poet’s unacknowledged self-portrait in her mother’s words:

     

    My mother's tense, upset about my sister:
    now she'll never know how beautiful they were,
    pure pink, with no dark spots. That means
    she's going to feel deprived again.
    But for my sister, that's the condition of love.
    She was my father's daughter:
    the face of love, to her,
    is the face turning away.(21-22)

     

    The sister, too, was “wounded” it seems, perhaps by the father’s distancing love. Such separation marks “the face of love, to her,” the poet insists, as though this deprivation were not her own case, her condition as well. That acknowledgement would require more identification with the sister, and a stronger ability to idealize, to see the father or the parents’ love without dark spots, than she can summon up so early in the text.

     

    If we’ve had a first sketch of the poet’s response to her sister, the next poem fills out the background, shifts our perspective back two generations. What we find bears little resemblance to the ease of partial differentiation, the reassuring presence of reproduced motherhood that critics of the Freudian scheme discover between women and their daughters.3 Gluck’s sibling mysteries play themselves out in a difficult key. Mother and aunt play cards, “Spite and Malice, the family pastime, the game / my grandmother taught all her daughters” (23). The immediate, all-female world we see at the start and close of this poem, where the mother and aunt “have cards; they have each other” and therefore “don’t need any more companionship”–this world and its games may be “better than solitaire,” but they ring a little hollow nonetheless. “In the end,” in their game, “the one who has nothing wins”; and the next poem, the first address-lyric or echo of “Parados,” picks up and deepens that conclusion. Not Carol Gilligan’s “ethic of care” but bracing competition motivates the women of this world, or at least their representative speaker. “You show respect by fighting,” she observes; that’s how her mother and aunt were raised. And something of that sororial strife has worked its way into the myths of the next generation. “Fulfillment” and “happiness,” the poet confesses, serve only to draw down the anger of the Fates: “sisters, savages–” who “in the end . . . have / no emotion but envy” (“Confession” 25).

     

    Why does the speaker thus overstate the case against these women, evidently downplaying the affections of the scene? Why has she “learned to hide” her dreams, in other words, and what would those dreams contain? In her uncertainty we find a trace of resistance to that “sine-qua- non condition of our individuation” that Kristeva melodramatically calls “matricide” Black Sun 27-8). “Matricide is our vital necessity,” the theorist proclaims, for we must all extricate ourselves from undifferentiated infant bliss.4 But for women the violence of this process is harder to focus entirely outward. “Locked up within myself” it turns to “an implosive mood that walls itself in and kills me secretly, very slowly, through permanent bitterness, bouts of sadness” (29). The poet is trapped in this sort of bitterness, unable to blur her own borders, to metaphorize, to reach out in amorous idealizing identification to mother or sister, let alone to the dead hero or imaginary “loving father” she needs Tales 378). This family is indeed hers, but she stands outside it, at once unsympathetic and unable to acknowledge the roots of her pain.

     

    “A Precedent” To “The Untrustworthy Speaker”

     

    The five poems that come before “The Untrustworthy Speaker” hazard, if indirectly, one such identification. We learn of a death before the father’s loss–a sister to the speaker, one who died in infancy–and, more important, we find a new imaginative sympathy with the mother. As the poet details preparations for “the child that died,” a new delicacy of tone and loving accuracy of description breathes life into her voice. “Bureaus of soft clothes. / Little jackets neatly folded. / Each one almost fit in the palm of a hand” (“A Precedent” 26). We saw the mother’s capacity for care unfold in “Widows,” where she slept on the floor to be near her dying husband. But while the focus there was on her inability to get used to his absence after death, here we see her affections in full flower, as yet unthreatened, unhurt. When the hurt does come, when her daughter is lost, we see transformations in both the mother and the poet left behind:

     

        . . . when my sister died,
    my mother's heart became
    very cold, very rigid,
    like a tiny pendant of iron.
    Then it seemed to me my sister's body
    was a magnet. I could feel it draw
    my mother's heart into the earth,
    so it would grow.("Lost Love" 29)

     

    This poem and “A Precedent” are more tender, more compassionate, more fluent in their sympathetic identification than anything we’ve seen so far. But if the poet can sense her way into her mother’s skin, she equally seems inclined to be the dead sister, to cure the mother’s wound, to offer herself in a risky but attractive sacrifice.

     

    Perhaps we do not press too far to see a crucial early identification with the dead sister as, in effect, a dead “imaginary father”–recalling that the father was defined as such, in part, simply for being what Mama valued other than me. Stillness thus seems a virtue to the poet-child, one learned from the sister who died. As she wanted in “Parados” to be “Not inert: still” (15), in the final poem of this section, “Appearances,” we see her hazard an analysis of that longing, recall her childhood pride in its accomplishment: “It was something I was good at: sitting still, not moving. / I did it to be good, to please my mother, to distract her from the child that died. / I wanted to be child enough” (32). But this is too close for comfort to the stillness of the stillborn, of “the dying” who “spin so rapidly they seem to be still” (“Lullaby” 28) and to the inertia of the women who “can’t get moving” after the father-hero’s death, which itself “wasn’t moving” (18). If those who fall asleep “grow slowly calm,” soothed by a mother’s heartbeat–one thinks of the moon of “Parados,” and of the curative regressions in Whitman’s “The Sleepers”– those who fall apart in death refuse, or fail, to be comforted. The speaker, we sense, would gladly identify with the infant her mother holds, feeds, attempts to keep alive, in order to prove that she’d accept. On her the effort would be efficacious; loved, she’d stay alive.

     

    There is of course more to say about the middle poems in this bundle of five, and I will return to examine the father’s role in them shortly. But I want to focus on “Appearances,” the last of them, especially on its description of the living sisters’ relations to one another and their mother, and its invocation of a new character from outside the family, an artist. For if “forgiveness emerges first as the setting up of a form . . . [and] has the effect of an acting out, a doing, a poiesis,” Black Sun 206), the progress of the book requires this new intercessory term: a figure at once for the poet and for the loving father she lacks.5

     

    What, first off, needs to be forgiven? In poems of this section we’ve seen the mother’s love in action: folding baby clothes, holding a child that doesn’t want to be fed, lulling husband and infant to sleep, and into death. (“I can’t say / what she did for my father,” the poet reassures us, and herself; still, “whatever it was, I’m sure it was right” [28].) And yet, when the speaker considers the portraits her parents commissioned, looking with the eyes of an adult, one who’s “been analyzed,” who can “understand our [her and her sister’s] expressions” (31), she sees something more painful and troubling:

     

    My mother tried to love us equally,
    dressed us in the same dresses; she wanted us
    perceived as sisters.
    That's what she wanted from the portraits:
    you need to see them hanging together, facing one another--
    separated, they don't make the same statement.
    ...........................................
    She likes to sit there, on the blue couch, looking up at her daughters,
    at the two that lived. She can't remember how it really was,
    how anytime she ministered to one child, loved that child,
    she damaged the other. You could say
    she's like an artist with a dream, a vision.
    Without that, she'd have been torn apart.(31-32)

     

    The mother’s ministration to the living, unlike her care for the dying, calls pain to the poet’s mind in a new, post- analytic specificity. As usual, though, we see more than the words acknowledge. The mother’s desire to have her daughters “hanging together,” eyes fixed on one another, counters the potential dispersal by death of two generations. It works at once between the sisters (they won’t be torn away from each other) and in the mother’s heart (I won’t be torn apart by another loss), calling to mind and helping justify the grandmother’s attempt to make mother and aunt a sufficient pair: the attempt we read about in “Widows.”

     

    And yet the poet withdraws from the potential identification I am, like my mother, an artist. She doesn’t reject it, I hasten to add, since we find none of the dismissive force she mustered in “A Novel.” She merely steps back to the solid ground of her painful individuation. She still wants, first off, to be set off from her sister: to be either the loved child or the damaged one. “You had to shut out / one child to see the other,” she recalls, clearly hungering for that specific attention (33). She gets it from the most successful imaginary father so far, the portrait painter, “Monsieur Davanzo.” He, like the poet herself, insists on distinctions and accuracies. He notices the difference between flesh tones, for example, against the identical green cotton dresses the two sisters wear: the sister, who’s been linked with reds and pinks, is “ruddy”; the poet’s “faintly bluish,” recalling the daughter who died. We have seen no play so far in the poem, whether in the language or by children or with parents; but here, “to amuse us, Madame Davanzo hung cherries over our ears,” reminding us that the imaginary loving father, the critical third term the poet lacks, is in fact a “father-mother conglomerate” Tales 40), pictured here, if briefly, as an actual couple. But the poem ends with “the painter” himself marking in his portrait what is at least the child’s interpretation of her mother’s wish that her children always be bound up together. Does she want me to stay with her, with women, forever? Never turn to a sexual Other, fall in love with a man? “Every morning, we went to the convent,” we read of her summer schedule. “Every afternoon, we sat still, having the portraits painted”; and the artist Monsieur (“my lord”) Davanzo understands her expression. “A face already so controlled, so withdrawn, / and too obedient, the clear eyes saying / If you want me to be a nun, I’ll be a nun” (33).

     

    Does the mother really want this? Again, as after “Widows,” we sense an unfair accusation, and again we find a confession: the third of the “Parados” poems, “The Untrustworthy Speaker.”

     

    Don't listen to me; my heart's been broken.
    I don't see anything objectively.
    I know myself; I've learned to hear like a psychiatrist.
    When I speak passionately,
    that's when I'm least to be trusted.

    It's very sad, really: all my life, I've been praised
    for my intelligence, my powers of language, of insight.
    In the end, they're wasted--(34)

     

    This poem marks the speaker’s first acknowledgement that she has cut herself off from something, someone; that the analysis she’s brought to bear so far has failed. We note the self-criticism as a flicker of Eros, a latent desire to “see myself, / standing on the front steps, holding my sister’s hand,” even if that means having to call herself to account for love’s sadisms and failures, “the bruises on her arm, where the sleeve ends” (34). This would entail, in part, an observation of her own masochism, of the degree to which the “wound” or loss she mourns is self-inflicted, a condition of her speech. An exculpation of the mother indeed soon follows, set in motion by the “criticism of the hero” (18) suppressed earlier. This combination will bring the book to its pivotal moment of confrontation and crisis.

     

    “A Fable” To “Animals”

     

    This central section of the book begins with its first extended metaphor for the poet’s situation: “A Fable.” “Suppose / you saw your mother / torn between two daughters,” she demands, the daughters identified with those competing self-proclaimed mothers who fought over a single baby before Solomon (36).

     

    What could you do
    to save her but be
    willing to destroy
    yourself--she would know
    who was the rightful child,
    the one who couldn't bear
    to divide the mother.

     

    Setting aside the admission of masochism here–itself a step beyond the mere victimhood of “Appearances”–we find a curious blur of familial roles. The mother plays at once the parts of a “wise king” who judges and a child under threat; the poet too is at once mother (the one who can’t bear to divide) and child. Not her own but the mother’s pain attracts the poet’s attention: an unsettling shift, apparently, as the short lines and shivering enjambments suggest. If indeed “the transfer of meaning” in metaphor “sums up the transference of the subject to the place of the other” Tales91), we can understand the fragility of the poem’s presentation, as it ferries the poet oh-so-nervously across the flood waters, the gulf or “abyss” of individuation.

     

    Who, though, is the other daughter in this scene? The living sister, or the dead? Both sisters have divided their mother’s affections; and if we keep our eyes on the function of each sister, to borrow a term from the sequence itself (see “A Novel” and “The Untrustworthy Speaker”), we note that each acts for the other, in this emotional division, like the “imaginary father” Kristeva describes. As though to reinforce this connection the following poem, “New World,” turns from the sisters’ relations to those of the husband and wife. What role, the poet asks, did that Ur-Other play, and how did I imagine it at the time?

     

    As I saw it,
    all my mother's life, my father
    held her down, like
    lead strapped to her ankles.
    She was
    buoyant by nature;
    she wanted to travel,
    go to theater, go to museums.
    What he wanted
    was to lie on the couch
    with the Times
    over his face,
    so that death, when it came
    wouldn't seem a significant change.

     

    This life study, our first glimpse of the father in life, not death, treats him with imagistic specificity, as though to flesh out his “nature” in the way obscured at the start of the book. If he still seems the “someone remote” he was named in “Mount Ararat,” doing nothing but preparing to die, his association here with time and a certain style of language, the restrained clarity of “the Times,” is now insisted on through a new flair of metaphor. (So that’swhere the poet learned her style, we note in the margin.)

     

    This subtle change of style marks a quiet change of heart. “I thought my father’s death / would free my mother,” the poet observes; and while “in a sense, it has”– she can travel, go to her museums at last–something valuable’s been lost as well. The mother “isn’t held” anymore; “she’s free . . . / Without relation to earth” (39) –a phrase that echoes the speaker’s own original condition: “out of touch / with the world” (15). It’s not that being earth-bound was so good, but the inverse seems equally unfortunate. For the first time the father seems a figure of curative attraction–like the dead sister’s body in “Lost Love,” he draws, or drew, the mother down to earth. But the speaker seems loathe to articulate this attractive quality, her focus on the mother occluding the father as an object of desire, whether her mother’s or her own. Thus in “Birthday,” the next poem, we find a stand-in for him: an “old admirer” who, even after death, continues to send roses on the mother’s birthday, “his way of saying that the legend of my mother’s beauty / had simply gone underground” (40). A figure for the loving, living father–an alternative to that morbid silence below the Times–he’s both Persephone to the mother’s Demeter and, in his “ministering,” a mother too.6 “I thought / the dead could minister to the living,” the poet remembers. “I didn’t realize / this was the anomaly; that for the most part / the dead were like my father.” Hard words, if she means “like my father when alive.” And even if she means like the father after death, a certain harshness comes through the allegation, for if “my mother doesn’t mind, . . . doesn’t need / displays from my father,” surely his daughter suffers as the mother spends her birthday “sitting by a grave,” “showing him she understands, / that she accepts his silence / . . . she doesn’t want him making / signs of affection when he can’t feel” (40-41). “Hates deception”; “can’t feel”–the present indicative tense sweeps together the obvious lack of response from the dead with a vision of the father as there, watching without response or turning his face away. Did he not feel before his death, not live up even then to the “standard of courtesy, of generosity” the old admirer set? One might read the lines that way, written by a daughter who prefers to rest, like her father, undeceived.

     

    We have reached the hinge of the book, “Brown Circle.” Whatever objections we might have had to the speaker’s unforgiving stance toward her mother and sister, to the tone she’s taken toward her father until now, are suddenly voiced as this poem starts with a question from one who’s been silent so far. “My mother wants to know,” it begins, “why, if I hate / family so much, / I went ahead and / had one” (42). Why indeed? Freudian theory no less than the Bible finds the sins of the fathers visited on sons, and daughters here seem no exception. The cutting lineation of her response suggests the speaker’s uneasiness, the way she halts and stammers her way through to an unspoken answer.

     

            I don't
    answer my mother.
    What I hated
    was being a child,
    having no choice about
    what people I loved.
    I don't love my son
    the way I meant to love him.(42)

     

    How close she comes to simply saying “I don’t love my son”! Or, as we might expect from the end of the first stanza, “I don’t love him / because I must, but because I choose to.” In fact, of course, we find something quite different: a recognition that choice and love are uneasy bedfellows; that while we may choose to have our children we can’t choose who they are or even, often enough, what they do. Their ways are beyond us, have their way with us. How culpable, then, can we find each other and ourselves? If the poet loves like a scientist, unwilling to set down her magnifying glass and leave off her scrutiny “though / the sun burns a brown / circle of grass around / the flower”– and we think of her unyielding observation of the older generation so far–was she herself not similarly burned? Such scrutiny is “more or less the way / my mother loved me,” she admits, and the stanza ends on that line, backing up the recognition: my mother loved me, not just, as in “Appearances,” “one child . . . that child” or “the other.” “I must learn / to forgive my mother,” the poet admonishes herself, as the play of mother-daughter identifications we saw in “A Fable” becomes literal. It’s the only way to forgive herself, “now that I’m helpless / to spare my son” (43).

     

    Ararat revolves around “Brown Circle” in two ways. First, and most obviously, the book now focuses on the poet’s sister and her daughter, the poet and her son, and on the father himself, with the mother largely absent. But behind this lies the more crucial shift from a poetry of hazarded, uneasy identifications, verse searching for its sponsoring imaginary Other, to a poetry of calm, practiced distance, observation, and compassion. “It is by making his words suitable to his commiseration and, in that sense, accurate,” Kristeva explains, “that the subject’s adherence to the forgiving ideal is accomplished and effective forgiveness for others as well as for oneself becomes possible” Black Sun 217). None of this is entirely new to the volume: we saw such accuracies at work in “A Precedent” and at moments elsewhere. But by bringing a new generation into focus the poet lets go of certain earlier obsessions, and clears a path for forgiveness in substance as well as in style. No longer, for example, does she insist on distinctions between herself and her sister. Both have children itching for independence: the sister’s daughter in the first panel of the triptych “Children Coming Home From School,” the poet’s son sulking in her driveway in the second, “accus[ing] me / of his unhappiness.” In the third panel the poet and her niece, both of whom can be said to be “growing up with my sister,” equally learn “to wait, to listen,” to grapple for verbal advantage. And in the poem that stands where we’ve come to expect a version of “Parados,” some confession of the speaker’s untrustworthiness, we find the unsentimental sororial accord of “Animals” instead:

     

    My sister and I reached
    the same conclusion:
    the best way
    to love us was to not
    spend time with us.
    ...................

    My sister and I
    never became allies,
    never turned on our parents.
    We had
    other obsessions: for example,
    we both felt there were
    too many of us
    to survive.

    We were like animals
    trying to share a dry pasture.
    Between us, one tree, barely
    strong enough to sustain
    a single life.(47-48)

     

    The poet’s growing ease with metaphor allows her, for the first time in the sequence, to unite the parents in either a phrase (“the” or “our parents”) or a figure (the “one tree”). Where once the sisters tugged at and split up their mother’s love, here they stand off warily from parents who cannot “bring themselves / to inflict pain” on either. (“You should only hurt / something you can give / your whole heart to,” the speaker mordantly observes.) The chosen metaphor of “Animals” would seem to suggest an inevitable competition or natural selection between the two; and we’ve been led to expect something rather like this through the first half of the book. An unspoken pact emerges in its place, however, marking our transition to the fourth group of poems, focused for the first time on connections. Neither girl, each staring the other one down, will move to “touch / one thing that could / feed her sister” (49). What comes between them now, if only it were a little bit stronger, could keep them both alive.

     

    “Saints” to “Snow”

     

    Two paragraphs ago I quoted Kristeva as saying that the forgiver’s commitment to accuracy demonstrates an “adherence to the forgiving ideal.” The nature of that ideal should by now be clear–the Third, the imaginary father–and, in fact, Black Sun names it as such elsewhere. “Whoever is in the realm of forgiveness–who forgives and who accepts forgiveness–is capable of identifying with a loving father, an imaginary father,” Kristeva propounds, “with whom, consequently, he is ready to be reconciled, with a new symbolic law in mind” (207). That new law–a covenant after the flood–will remain unspoken until the penultimate poem of Ararat, but already we can see the reconciliation proceed. At first the imaginary father appears as female, and as a familial ideal. “In our family, there were two saints,” she startles us by writing: “my aunt and my grandmother” (50). Generations flicker, linked by metaphor: of these the grandmother seems to stand in for the speaker’s own mother, “cautious, conservative,” the aunt for the speaker, suffering repeated losses and haunted by jealous Fates familiar from “Confession.” (The mother suffers and loses too, you say? Ah, but these are ideals, desires, imaginings…). The aunt’s marked as a saint by her refusal to “experience / the sea” that steals away her loved ones “as evil. To her, it is what it is: / where it touches land, it must turn to violence” (50). This stoic acceptance, a model for the poet’s own work, prompts her into accepting complementary opposites that must also remain “what they are” in the pair of poems that follow: herself and her sister, her niece and son, as treated in “Yellow Dahlia” and “Cousins.”

     

    In the interest of space I will set these poems aside– suffice it to say that, despite Kristeva’s allegation that art forgives by giving shape “without exegesis, without explanation, without understanding” Black Sun 207), Gluck here demonstrates ample talent at all three. Let me rather turn to the central stanzas of “Paradise” and the final poems of the section, “Child Crying Out” and “Snow,” for here we see the slow introduction of the father as a loving Other in his own right. Once “remote,” a hero in disgrace, he approaches; and the poet admits an identification:

     

    In some ways, my father's
    close too; we call
    a stone by his name.
    .....................
    They always said
    I was like my father, the way he showed
    contempt for emotion.
    They're the emotional ones,
    my sister and my mother.(54-55)

     

    We have, perhaps, suspected this deep congruence all along. The poet’s distance, her sense of deprivation, made her seem her father’s daughter as much as or more than the sister named as such back in “Lover of Flowers.”

     

    But is “contempt” quite the right word here? “Child Crying Out” suggests that something else is at stake, a basic resistance to the claims of emotion to overwhelm the distance between individuals, to offer immediate access to the soul. This poem, an answer to Adrienne Rich’s “Night Pieces: For a Child,” refuses to assume a mother’s fundamental maternal connection with and insight into her child. Rich mourns her son’s slipping away into patriarchical terrors; here, the son has never been close enough to keep:

     

    The night's cold;
    you've pushed the covers away.
    As for your thoughts, your dreams--
    I'll never understand
    the claim of a mother
    on a child's soul.

     

    Does she mean the “claim” on his imagination, the way one’s mother slips into dreams as abject “death’s head, sphinx, medusa” (Rich 67)? Or, conversely, the claim to understand (a mother knows)? Though the former sticks in the back of our minds, the latter seems Gluck’s explicit quarrel:

     

    So many times
    I made that mistake
    in love, taking
    some wild sound to be
    the soul exposing itself--
    But not with you,
    even when I held you constantly.
    You were born, you were far away.

    Whatever those cries meant,
    they came and went
    whether I held you or not,
    whether I was there or not.(56-57)

     

    The son’s sleep, like the father’s face turned away, stands for a certain “condition of love” (22), of accepted alterity, “a basic separation that nonetheless unites” (Kristeva, Tales 90).7 It hints that the absence of “signs of affection” on either side of the grave won’t necessarily mean that the loved one, unlike the old admirer, “can’t feel” (41). Did the father, though we’ve never seen it, therefore love? And how would we, or the poet know?

     

    “If [the soul] speaks at all,” “Child Crying Out” ends, “it speaks in dreams.” Fair enough: and in “Snow,” the last poem of this fourth group, we get our first dream-vision (though it’s phrased as a memory) since the moon in “Parados.” Poet and father are on their way to New York, waiting for a train.8 “My father liked / to stand like this,” the poet recalls, “to hold me / so he couldn’t see me,” but so that she can stare into the world he sees, “learning / to absorb its emptiness” (58). A father, then, of both connection and withdrawal, he stands implicated in the narcissistic emptiness of the subject split off from maternal plentitude, the disjunction from the earth we’ve watched the poet suffer. (The snow’s not falling but whirling, we notice, borne up against gravity.) Their love, for we edge into calling it that, rests on the same disengaged commonality we saw between mother and son, the sort Frank Bidart calls “the love of / two people staring / / not at each other, but in the same direction” (“To the Dead”). A love, it happens, closer to that shared gaze on the Good that Socrates offers than to Aristophanes’s erotic myth–though here the good stays elusive, out of sight, lost in the empty white-out of the flurries.

     

    “Terminal Resemblance” to “Celestial Music”

     

    The final sequence of Ararat, these five poems hover and turn from portrait to portrait without anxiety, with the sense of at last accomplishing that “promise, project, artifice” Kristeva sees as integral to writing as love, mercy, transformation, forgiveness Black Sun 216-17). We get a last clear look at father and mother, father and daughter, daughters and mother, sisters and children, along with two poems that stand out from the rest: a nod to aesthetic religion in “Lament,” and the turn to religious aesthetics of “Celestial Music.” Rather than treat each poem individually, as I’ve done so far, I will first explore the way these as a group echo and revise the themes and images of the book. “Celestial Music” deserves to be looked at alone, since it stands out from the rest as a deus ex machina, a tribute to love, to the Third, as quite literally “a godsend” Tales 40).

     

    Since the start of the book the father has been linked to time, the Times–or, to be more accurate, the father’s absence has marked time’s failure to pass. In “Terminal Resemblance,” a poem about the poet’s last meeting with her father, we learn “he wasn’t . . . pointing to his watch” as he waited for her, signalling not only that “he wanted to talk,” but also certain relief from the earlier deathly, encompassing stasis. Gluck hints at this return to mutability at the close of the poem as well. “For a change, my father didn’t just stand there,” she writes; “this time, he waved” (60, my emphasis). Even the idea of immediacy is transformed in these last poems, appearing now in the mode of aesthetic appreciation, and not of numb, paratactic sequence:

     

    Your friends the living embrace one another,
    gossip a little on the sidewalk
    as the sun sinks, and the evening breeze
    ruffles the women's shawls--
    this, this, is the meaning of
    "a fortunate life": it means
    to exist in the present.("Lament" 61-6)

     

    Words and phrases culled from earlier poems make these last five seem a final tally, a summing up. In the first section we read about gardens and flowers; here we see a “gardener’s truck” (59). The grandmother-saint escaped suffering; so does the dying father (60). “It frightens” the mother, we read, “when a hand isn’t being used” (60); the poet’s sister wouldn’t let her daughter walk with both hands “totally free” in “Children Coming Home From School,” a poem whose title is given to a second poem, the fourth of this group, where the “children” are again the poet and her sister. The poet’s sadness over losing the mother’s complete, swaddling attention has been visible between the lines from the first. At last it is named outright: “I continued, in pathetic ways, / to covet the stroller. Meaning / all my life” (64). “Amazons” plucks the word “end” from the all-woman scenes of “Widows” and “Confession” and runs it through revelatory changes:

     

    End of summer: the spruces put out a few green shoots.
    Everything else is gold--that's how you know the end of the growing season.
    ..................................
    My sister and I, we're the end of something.
    ...................................
    I can see the end: it's the name that's going.
    When we're done with it, it's finished, it's a dead language.
    That's how language dies, because it doesn't need to be spoken.
    My sister and I, we're like amazons,
    a tribe without a future.
    I watch the children draw: my son, her daughter.(65)

     

    The father’s name will be lost; the maternal tradition of sufficient, respectfully fighting pairs of daughters, too, will soon die out, written as it was in “soft chalk, the disappearing medium.”

     

    In such recapitulations Ararat comes to terms with its own ending, with the way that writing finishes, so unlike life. Do we see here that “unease over the final, masterful accomplishment” Kristeva sees as returning the writer to the need for forgiveness once again Black Sun 217)? That would perhaps explain the sudden entry of a “friend who still believes in heaven,” one who “literally talks to god” in “Celestial Music.” This poem, which in its sustained long lines and metaphorical resonance stands dramatically apart from the rest of the volume, snaps us back to the grander dimensions of the book’s long quest to imagine a loving father, a Third. For if the love of “primary identification” founds and figures both “Greek Eros–violent, destructive, but also platonically ascending towards the Ideal,” and “the Christian Agape which, emanating from the Other, descends upon me” (“Joyce” 168), why not identify with a father in heaven, that God who is, or so we’re told, Love?9

     

    Such a turn seems at first promised by the poet’s praise of her friend, and the effects of her faith. “On earth, she’s unusually competent,” we learn. “Brave, too, able to face unpleasantness” (66). She’s like a mother, an “adult”; in the poet’s dreams she’s a lecturer on love. (“When you love the world,” she admonishes, “you hear celestial music.”) But a turn to on-high would belie, not enrich, the poet we’ve come to know; and, indeed, identification is extended only horizontally, on the human axis of friendship. If she starts by asserting her differences from the friend, as with her sister, similarities follow:

     

    It's this moment we're both trying to explain, the fact
    that we're at ease with death, with solitude.
    My friend draws a circle in the dirt....
    She's always trying to make something whole, something beautiful, an image
    capable of life apart from her.
    We're very quiet. It's peaceful sitting here, not speaking, the composition
    fixed, the road turning suddenly dark, the air
    going cool, here and there the rocks shining and glittering--
    it's this stillness we both love.(67)

     

    The success of the volume, not simply as a group of poems, but as a progress from loss, depression, the narcissistic wound, through “the narrow pass of identification with flawless ideality, loving fatherhood” Black Sun 216), into the formal aesthetic accomplishment of an ending, can be measured in the believability of these lines. Though different from the rest of the volume they must not seem out of place or make us frown in vexation at the poet’s claim to be “at ease” at last. For them to work we must have been prepared to see a metaphor for the poet’s own structures and symmetries in the friend’s dirt circle, that “composition” that surrounds a torn and dying (read: “wounded”) caterpillar. “The composition / fixed,” she writes; and the heavy stress of an enjambment forces us to pause, to read “fixed” as healed, made “whole” and “beautiful.” Fixed means “still” as well, and in “the stillness we both love” the twinborn but separated longings for stillness and new life of earlier poems are rejoined. Where it once implied a stunned fixity in the present, or a desperate identification with the dead in order to restore a mother’s love, stillness here suggests the reassurance of completion, the satisfactions of order and limit, an artist’s “it is finished” (if not Christ’s). A stillness bound up in the accomplishment of love, she suggests, telling over the word three times in the last two lines. “It’s this stillness that we both love. / The love of form is a love of endings” (67).

     

    Though it brings Ararat to conclusion, “Celestial Music” is not the last poem we read. That place belongs to “First Memory”: a reprise of “Parados,” a piece whose title suggests both that this memory delves as far back as the poet can and that she can now truly remember for the first time. On a first read through the book we come upon “First Memory,” not with a shock (as with “Celestial Music”) but with a shiver at its spare, discursive, chilly, familiar style. The poem is short enough to quote in its entirety:

     

    Long ago, I was wounded. I lived
    to revenge myself
    against my father, not
    for what he was--
    for what I was: from the beginning of time,
    in childhood, I thought
    that pain meant
    I was not loved.
    It meant I loved.(68)

     

    We can at last gloss those critical, open-ended phrases on which the poem ends and folds back on itself. “For what he was”: quiet, affectionate only at a distance, too hard to idealize, to imagine as the object of mother’s desire. “For what I was”: quiet, distant, longing to picture myself once again the sole focus of care, more like my father than I could bear to admit. But why does the poem not end with a perfect reversal, with “It meant I was loved,” which is equally true? Why does the pain mean she was a lover, too?

     

    In part, and on the book’s own terms, this ending includes and implies my suggested alternative. If pain meant I loved, then I loved my family; which means I wasn’t incapable of love, as I thought my father was; which means, since I’m like him, that he wasn’t incapable of love either; which means that he loved mother and me, and so was in pain, was wounded too; which means that under all the relations in the book, painful or strained, we might find love, denied or distorted, as well. And, indeed, if we look beyond Ararat, place it in a broader context, we find a further sanction for this reading. In the final chapter of Tales of Love, Kristeva records her sense of the narcissistic crisis in which we find ourselves. We are, as a chapter title claims, “Extraterrestrials Suffering for Want of Love”: as cut off from the earth as the poet of “Parados,” lacking “the secular variant of the loving father” to ensure our identifications, our ability to “elaborate primary narcissism,” to love and be loved in return (374). (“The unsure narcissist,” we might paraphrase Robert Creeley, “is not good for himself.”10) “Because today we lack being particular,” she writes, “covered as we are with so much abjection, because the guideposts that insured our ascent toward the good have been proven questionable, we have crises of love. Let’s admit it: lacks of love” (7).

     

    In answer to this crisis Kristeva offers an aesthetic antidote: “the imagination” (381), which can “turn the crisis into a work in progress” (380), with no pretension to finality or ultimate satisfaction. “Let it [the self] remain floating, empty at times, inauthentic, obviously lying,” she proclaims near the end of Tales of Love. “Let it pretend, let the seeming take itself seriously, let sex be as unessential because as important as a mask or a written sign–dazzling outside, nothing inside” (380). But this is James Merrill’s solution, not that of Gluck, who may stun but rarely dazzles. The love elaborated in Ararat weathers the postmodern condition, with its lack of faith in the old codes of romance, less by insisting on the open- endedness of Kristeva’s “work in progress” than by reaching out to affiliate itself with a stern, more potentially moralistic tradition of love-theory: one in which love is defined (against desire) as that which “embraces the other’s limited and imperfect reality, and invites and accepts the binding and defining embrace offered by the other” (McWhirter 6). Such love, which “accepts, in other words, its own finitude” and resigns the Platonic quest for wholeness and reunion in favor of the bittersweetness of “the attainable” (7, 197), accords with Gluck’s undeceived stance, and it sponsors the collection’s final lines. The speaker, after all, has been “wounded” not only by the loss of the mother in her individuation, but by a series of more quotidian disappointments. She wasn’t “child enough,” and no one else was quite mother or father or sister enough either. That such disappointment is the inevitable “break- up” of any idealizing relationship, Freud and Kristeva and popular culture will all testify, since at heart we are all men and women who love too much.

     

    Gluck’s poetic success lies in the way she turns the plot of a Donahue confession or an Oprah Winfrey show into memorable and particular verse, pressing her language to an antipoetic limit that marks, in some sense, her postmodernism as well. “Compared to the media,” as Kristeva explains,

     

    whose function it is to collectivize all systems of signs, even those which are unconscious, writing-as -experience-of-limits individuates. This individuation extends deep within the constituent mechanisms of human experience as an experience of meaning; it extends as far as the very obscure and primary narcissism wherein the subject constitutes itself in order to oppose itself to another.("Postmodernism?" 137-8)

     

    If we want to write love poems, Gluck’s book suggests, we have to start by pressing back into the depths behind our affections–not just to the power dynamics of a particular relationship, the culture it plays itself out in, or of the family romances that provide its local habitation and its names, but to what is at once our most and least private aspect: the way these construct the writing subject itself. Ararat takes us down to rock-bottom; it is a foundational text more than a therapeutic one. “Long ago I was wounded,” the poet’s choral ode begins, and she dares us as readers not to join in. This is not, I suppose, such a bleak rock song. “There is no imagination,” writes Kristeva, “that is not, overtly or secretly, melancholy” Black Sun 6). Yet “if it lives,” as she adds elsewhere, “your psyche is in love” Tales 15).

     

    Notes

     

    1. See Freud, 139; see also chapter four of The Ego and the Id, passim, and the final passages and footnote to Beyond the Pleasure Principle.

     

    2. My thanks to my UCLA colleague Brenda Kwon for pointing out this connection.

     

    3. I think here less of the work of Nancy Chodorow herself than the use of it made in Homans, for example, 1-39 passim.

     

    4. For a dissenting view, at least so far as daughters are concerned, see Homans 11-15. For a persuasive argument that we are always already differentiated, and that mother-child union is a nostalgic fantasy not borne out by studies of child development since the 1980s, see Benjamin 16-21.

     

    5. “The artist takes himself,” Kristeva writes, “not for the maternal phallus but for that ghostly third party to which the mother aspires, for the loving version of the Third, for the preoedipal father.” (“Joyce” 174).

     

    6. I make this maternal connection because the mother in “Appearances” “ministered” to her children, though with unforseen and divisive consequences.

     

    7. Kristeva likewise speaks of “the abyss between the mother and the child” in the lefthand column of the split essay, “Stabat Mater.” “What connection is there between myself, or even more unassumingly between my body and this internal graft and fold, which, once the umbilical cord has been severed, is an inaccessible other? My body and…him. No connection. Nothing to do with it. And this, as early as the first gestures, cries, steps, long before its personality has become my opponent. The child, whether he or she, is irremediably an other” Tales 254-55).

     

    8. Or so I now normalize the scene. On first reading, I saw them walking along the tracks, watching “scraps of white paper / blow over the railroad ties” in a way that calls to mind the opening of Elizabeth Bishop’s “Chemin de Fer.” “Alone on the railroad track / I walked with pounding heart. / The ties were too close together / or maybe too far apart” (Bishop 8).

     

    9. Such a heavenly identification may be implicit in forgiveness, which, Kristeva writes in Black Sun, “assumes a potential identification with that effective and efficient merciful divinity of which the theologian speaks” (216).

     

    10. I misquote Creeley’s “The Immoral Proposition” (Creeley 125).

    Works Cited

     

    • Benjamin, Jessica. The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the Problem of Domination. New York: Pantheon, 1988.
    • Bidart, Frank. In the Western Night: Collected Poems: 1965-1990. New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1990.
    • Bishop, Elizabeth. The Complete Poems 1927-1979. New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1983.
    • Cramer, Steven. Review of Ararat. Poetry (Nov. 1990): 101-106.
    • Creeley, Robert. The Collected Poems of Robert Creeley: 1945-75. Berkeley and Los Angeles: U of California P, 1982.
    • Emerson, Ralph Waldo. Essays and Lectures. New York: Library of America, 1983.
    • Freud, Sigmund. “Instincts and Their Vicissitudes.” Papers on Metapsychology: the Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works, Vol. XIV. Ed. and trans. James Strachey. London: Hogarth Press, 1953.
    • Gluck, Louise. Ararat. New York: Ecco, 1990.
    • Homans, Margaret. Bearing the Word: Language and Female Experience in Nineteenth Century Women’s Writing. U of Chicago P, 1986.
    • Kristeva, Julia. Black Sun. Trans. Leon S. Roudiez. New York: Columbia UP, 1989.
    • —. “Joyce ‘The Gracehoper’ or the Return of Orpheus.” James Joyce: The Augmented Ninth. Ed. Bernard Benstock. New York: Syracuse UP, 1988.
    • —. “Postmodernism?” Bucknell Review: Romanticism, Modernism, Postmodernism. Ed. Harry Garvin. Lewisburg: Bucknell UP: 136-141.
    • —. Revolution in Poetic Language. Trans. Margaret Waller. New York: Columbia UP, 1984.
    • —. Tales of Love. Trans. Leon S. Roudiez. New York: Columbia UP, 1987.
    • McWhirter, David. Desire and Love in Henry James: A Study of the Late Novels. Cambridge UP, 1989.
    • Mitchell, Stephen. The Book of Job. San Francisco: North Point Press, 1987.
    • Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Birth of Tragedy and The Case of Wagner. Trans. Walter Kaufman. New York: Vintage, 1967.
    • Rich, Adrienne. The Fact of a Doorframe: Poems Selected and New, 1950-84. New York: Norton, 1984.

     

  • Marxist Pleasure: Jameson and Eagleton

    Steven Helmling

    Department of English
    University of Delaware

     

    As reading matter, contemporary Marxist criticism is pretty heavy going. First and most obviously because it inherits a long, rich and adventurous tradition not only of political and sociological but also of philosophical argument–the breadth of Marx’s own interests insured that: he aimed, and so have all Marxisms after him, to synthesize all sciences, to make Marxism the key to all mythologies, or (in Fredric Jameson’s now-famous phrase) the “untranscendable horizon” of all cultural, political, and social inquiry. (Marxism obliges itself to reckon with, say, deconstruction; whereas deconstruction regards dealing with Marxism as discretionary.) But Marxism takes on other difficulties, other burdens besides the intellectual ones; it carries the torch of a moral tradition as well, of concern, even anguish about the plight of the oppressed. And its burdens are “moral” in another sense, too, the sense that connects less with “morality” than with “morale”; for it is the very rare Marxist text that is without some sort of hortatory subtext–though usually, it is true, expressed polemically (often most fiercely against other Marxists). And here, too, Marx himself is the great original: he asks to be read as a scientist, not a moralist, but we do not readily credit any Marxism that is deaf to the moralist (and ironist) in Marx’s potent rhetoric.

     

    So “doing Marxism” is not easy. To join in the Marxist conversation, even just as a reader, requires an askesis that cannot be casual, an experience of initiation that involves extraordinary “difficulty” of every possible kind: difficult texts, difficult issues, difficult problems, a (very) difficult history, difficult political conditions. Yet the initiation into Marxism is not without its pleasures, too: pleasures, indeed, not punctually marked off from, but rather continuous with, the satisfactions of the adept–and even more conflictedly, pleasures somehow deriving from, even constituted precisely by, the very “difficulties,” both moral and intellectual, that Marxism obliges its initiates to shoulder.

     

    I want in this essay to consider Fredric Jameson and Terry Eagleton, the two leading Marxists writing in English, with an eye to the contrasting ways each negotiates the contradictions of this mix of intellectual pleasure with intellectual-moral difficulty. (A salient topos will be “Left puritanism,” with some sidelights from Roland Barthes.) The eminence of Jameson and Eagleton makes them the obvious choices for such an essay in contrasts. Their substantive differences are as well known as the warmth with which they avow common cause, but in what follows I want to shift the emphasis from their “positions” to the ground where the contrasts between them are the sharpest, namely to their prose styles. That a subculture so devout as the academic about splitting fine ideological hairs nevertheless seems agreed on accepting as indispensable two writers so different–Jameson with his aloof hauteur warmed occasionally by erudite despair, Eagleton with his impetuous, energetic hope–attests that their manifest differences as stylists, and in their stances as writers, make them virtually polar terms, “representative,” between them, of the limits, the possibilities and the predicaments, of the rhetorical or libidinal resources available to Marxist criticism in our historical moment. It should go without saying that my focus on “textual” effects intends no renunciation of more substantively “thetic” interests: rather, I hope to stage the contrasts between these two very different prose styles to see how each writer handles “pleasure” as an issue, a problem, desire, or object of critique–to see how (or whether) what each says about “pleasure” squares with the pleasures (or whatever else we are to name the satisfactions) of their writing.

     

    A convenient place to begin, as it happens, is with Eagleton’s essay, “Fredric Jameson: The Politics of Style” (1982), in which Eagleton avows the “profound pleasure” he experiences reading Jameson. Tactically, consider what a very strange move Eagleton makes in speaking this way. Though I no longer find Jameson as vexing to read as I once did, “pleasure” seems a calculatedly provocative word for whatever it is that keeps me reading him–and lest we miss the point, Eagleton even takes care to remind us that “‘pleasure’ is not the kind of word we are accustomed to encountering in Jameson’s texts” Against the Grain 66). Indeed, not. Quite apart from its notorious difficulty, Jameson’s writing is fastidiously pained, “stoic,” even “tragic,” in its evocation of the ordeals Utopian desire must suffer through what he calls “the nightmare of history as blood guilt.”1 Most readers sense from the tone and sound of Jameson’s work, long before they get a grip on the complexities of its content, that the best motto it supplies for itself is the famous “History is what hurts” passage, the often quoted peroration to the opening chapter of The Political Unconscious. The passage begins in reflection on the genre of “dialectical” analysis to which Jameson obviously aspires to contribute:

     

    the most powerful realizations of Marxist historiography . . . remain visions of historical Necessity . . . [and of] the inexorable logic involved in the determinate failure of all the revolutions that have taken place in human history . . . [they adopt] the perspective in which the failure or the blockage, the contradictory reversal or functional inversion, of this or that local revolutionary process is grasped as "inevitable," and as the operation of objective limits.(The Political Unconscious 101-102)

     

    As visions go (and “visions” is Jameson’s own word here), this one–the failure of all revolutionary action as “inevitable” after the fact–is about as bleak as any vision (Marxist or otherwise) could possibly be. (In other Marxist writers, Jameson warns, such a vision risks “post-Marxism,” and this is obviously an anxiety close to the quick for Jameson himself.2) This bleak vision bears a patent family resemblance to many other critically powerful pessimisms–Michel Foucault’s “total system,” Paul de Man’s “aporia,” and Harold Bloom’s “Gnosticism,” to name three whose “defeatism” Eagleton has particularly vilified.

     

    Contempt for “defeatism” is a constant in Eagleton’s work, a gesture (symptomatically) much against the grain not only of Marxist “critique” but of culture criticism generally. So in testifying to the “profound pleasure” of reading Jameson, Eagleton is playing a deep game, seeming to praise Jameson but also, with typically British (not to say Marxist British) puritanism, subtly indicting Jameson in terms that echo Eagleton’s repudiation of the “frivolous” counter-culture (and French!) hedonism of Barthes and the Tel Quel group. Eagleton means it as a sign in Jameson’s favor when he specifies that he derives “pleasure” from Jameson’s work, but notjouissance.”3 Evidently, “pleasure” may be tolerable in contexts of righteous revolutionary effort, but “jouissance” would be going too far. (Insofar as Eagleton’s own pugilistic wit invites us to pleasures that feel distinctly masculine, his aversion to Barthesian “jouissance” might seem almost a residual, unwitting homophobia: the revolutionary band of brothers, apparently, is to enjoy collective pleasures, but not collective ecstasies.)

     

    Perhaps Eagleton’s double-edged praises of the “pleasure” of reading Jameson express the embarrassments of meeting so potent a version of the “defeatist” vision under the Marxist banner. But my point is that Jameson’s peculiar eloquence has been of that ascetic, despairing, facing-the- worst type familiar, and according to some (Leo Bersani and Richard Rorty, as well as Eagleton, and Barthes), over- familiar, in nineteenth- and twentieth-century culture- criticism. It is a rhetoric that cuts across the ideological spectrum: beside Foucault, de Man, and Bloom, whom I have already named, one might place Adorno, one of Jameson’s particular culture-heroes, and T.S. Eliot, one of his particular betes noirs. But what Jameson especially admires in a writer like Adorno, he has said repeatedly, is a “dialectical” quality in the writing: a power to render unflinchingly the awfulness of our present condition, but also to sustain some impulse toward utopian hope.

     

    But this utopian impulse must not offer any solace; to do so would make it liable to a post-Althusserian, Levi-Straussian definition of “ideology”: “an imaginary solution to a real contradiction,” i.e., a kind of “false consciousness”–and the more so in that it here appears as a textual effect, an achievement of style. Yet just this, but (ironically?) as “praise” rather than indictment, is the implication of Eagleton’s judgment that “Style in Jameson . . . both compensates for and adumbrates pleasures historically postponed” Against the Grain 69). Such “compensation,” such “adumbration” of how things will be after the revolution, is for Jameson sheer “ideological” indulgence in “the Imaginary,” and as such a particular pitfall or temptation that Marxist writing must avoid.

     

    On the contrary, what Jameson calls “the dialectic of ideology [the capitalist present] and utopia [the socialist future]” should aggravate, rather than soothe, our discontent with the way we live now.4 Jameson is trying for a rhetoric, a tone, that will not be a profanation of its subject matter, an eloquence appropriate to the plight of capitalism’s victims, and to Marxism’s hour on the cross. In a time (ours) of near-total “commodification” or “reification,” this task gets harder and harder, as you can hear in Jameson’s grim joke that Adorno’s question about whether you can write poetry after Auschwitz “has been replaced with that of whether you could bear to read Adorno . . . next to the pool” Late Marxism 248). The point of such a joke is not “pleasure,” but laceration; you might even call it a moral-intellectual masochism.5

     

    And this seems a model for Jameson’s effect generally. As a writer, as a stylist, Jameson is committed to a bleak “vision” of near-total desperation, and to praise the effects of his prose, as Eagleton does, in terms of “profound pleasure” seems a shrewdly pointed missing of the point. True, Jameson himself earlier commended the “purely formal pleasures” of Adorno’s prose, but Jameson’s language sounds sober–even “purely formal”?–whereas Eagleton’s praise of the “intense libidinal charge” of Jameson’s prose sounds like transport, not to say (the word Eagleton specifically rules out) jouissance.6 And Eagleton’s “defense” (or mock-defense?) of Jameson’s style is couched not only in terms of pleasure, but of Jameson’s own pleasure: “weighed down” as he is with the “grave burdens” and “historical responsibilities” he has assumed, writes Eagleton,

     

    [Jameson] must be allowed a little for himself, and that precisely, is style. Style in Jameson is the excess or self-delight which escapes even his own most strenuously analytical habits. . . . (Against the Grain 66)

     

    I lack the space here to rehearse Jameson’s aversion to all discussion of literary, cultural, social, political, or even psychological issues in terms of “self”; any reader of Jameson will have noticed that after his 1961 book on Sartre, hostility to the category of “the subject” is the most consistent of his presuppositions. So Eagleton’s reinscription of “pleasure” here in terms of a stylistic self-consciousness, and a “self-delight” that is Jameson’s due as a sort of allowance or indulgence (like Lenin’s penchant for Beethoven, or Freud’s cigars) compounds Eagleton’s sly “mis-taking” of Jameson’s point.7 Eagleton is raising issues as ancient as Aristotle on tragedy: how do we derive pleasure (if it is pleasure) from works that visit unpleasure upon us? Eagleton seems “materialist” in the British tradition of Hobbes and Bentham rather than Marx when he unmasks the “pleasure” of reading Jameson in this way.

     

    Eagleton’s remarks originally appeared in a 1982 issue of Diacritics devoted to Jameson. It was in the following year (1983) that Jameson published an essay that not only mentioned the word “pleasure,” but took it as its title, “Pleasure: A Political Issue.” I do not argue that Eagleton’s remarks prompted Jameson’s essay, but reading it “as if” it did makes its centerpiece, Jameson’s elaboration of Barthes’s plaisirjouissance distinction, seem a kind of defense against, correction of, or better, a dialectical out-leaping of, Eagleton’s implied strictures, as well as a tacit program or apologia for Jameson’s own writing as far as its literary “effects” are concerned.

     

    “Pleasure: A Political Issue” argues against what Jameson calls “Left puritanism” of just the sort that I have identified with Eagleton IT2 66-7); and its vehicle is a reconsideration of Barthes, a much more positive one than Jameson had offered, for example, in “The Ideology of the Text” (1976). The treatment of Barthes is, as usual in Jameson, quite unstable; he passes over, for example, Barthes’s wobble over the relation of “jouissance” to “significance” (“bliss” as liberation from the tyranny of “meaning,” versus “bliss” as restoration of a “meaning” utopia); and one of the most simply pleasurable parts of the essay, the opening jeremiad against the commodification of “pleasure” in our mass culture, ascribes this theme to The Pleasure of the Text, where it nowhere appears. (Jameson is conflating plaisir/jouissance with S/Z‘s lisible/scriptible.)8 Eagleton took care to absolve Jameson of any taint of Barthes’s “perversity”; but Jameson mounts a defense of the Barthesian “perverse” that resonates with his homage to Lacan.9 And where Eagleton reviles Barthesian jouissance as a flight from politics into a cerebral-sensual wet dream, Jameson avers that

     

    the immense merit of Barthes's essay The Pleasure of the Text] is to restore a certain politically symbolic value to the experience of jouissance, making it impossible to read the latter except as a response to a political and historical dilemma. . . . (IT2 69)

     

    “Impossible”? As usual when Jameson offers a judgment for or against a writer’s politics, this seems an eye-of- the-beholder situation, Jameson’s construction of a “political” Barthes attesting Jameson’s ingenuity more than Barthes’s politics; but I want to pass to the next, most interesting phase of Jameson’s argument, in which Jameson reads Barthes’s binary of “pleasure” and “jouissance” as a contemporary avatar of Edmund Burke’s “beautiful” and “sublime.” It seems a master stroke, until you reread Barthes. Jameson invokes Barthes’s epigraph from Hobbes about “fear,” and quotes Barthes quoting Hobbes in the section of The Pleasure of the Text called “Fear.” My own reading of Barthes is that by “fear” he means something like “shame”:

     

    Proximity (identity?) of bliss and fear. What is repugnant in such nearness is obviously not the notion that fear is a disagreeable feeling--a banal notion-- but that it is not a very worthy feeling. . . .(Barthes's emphasis; Pleasure of the Text 48)

     

    This unworthiness is a particular in which “fear” resembles “pleasure”; only two pages earlier Barthes protests the “political alienation” enforced by

     

    the foreclosure of pleasure (and even more of bliss) in a society ridden by two moralities: the prevailing one, of platitude; the minority one, of rigor (political and/or scientific). As if the notion of pleasure no longer pleases anyone. Our society appears to be both staid and violent: in any event: frigid.10

     

    But Jameson tilts Barthes’s invocation of “fear” away from the disquiets of prudery and the miseries of a closeted Eros in a very different direction: towards a Burkean sublime of terror, an effect that “threatens, diminishes, rebukes individual human life” IT2 72). Jameson initially treats this as an effect merely aesthetic, and therefore “ideological,” a mystification (Burke, he notes, makes the end-term of the sublime God Himself), and he jeers the hunger for such an effect–“choose what crushes you!” IT2 72)–but the valence changes when he goes on to posit an end-term of his own, namely that “unfigurable and unimaginable thing, the multinational apparatus” of late capitalism itself. Jameson alludes to the work of “the capital-logicians,” who invert Hegel’s providential world-historical metanarrative so that “what Hegel called ‘Absolute Spirit’ was simply to be read as the transpersonal, unifying, supreme force of emergent Capitalism itself”; it is “beyond any question,” he continues, that some such apprehension attaches to “the Barthesian sublime” IT2 72-73). Granted Barthes’s good-leftish politics, an ecriture(“sublime” or not) that “threatens, diminishes, rebukes individual human life” is not only very un-Barthes-like, but actually valorizes Barthes in terms of that very “Left puritanism” Jameson affects to defend Barthes against.

     

    Jameson has remade Barthes’s jouissance, in short, in the image of his own “sublime,” a passion of “fear” prompted by “History,” by “what hurts”: it is not Barthes who has chosen what crushes him; Barthes is willing to confess (or boast) that at least parts of him are not crushed; it is Jameson who insists on being crushed, by a “sublime” villain, late capitalism. The measure of that “crush” is of course the effect of the prose in which Jameson projects his “vision of Necessity” and its inverted Hegelian-Marxist metanarrative in which “the subject of History” proves to be not the proletariat but capitalism. “Pleasure: A Political Issue” invites a redescription of what Eagleton named the “pleasure” of Jameson’s prose as, on the contrary, a type of “the sublime.”

     

    “The sublime” is a theme that has much preoccupied Jameson in the ’80s, a decade in which, it seems to me, his prose has undergone a change. It is as allusive and inward as ever, but its emotional charge is much larger and more accessible than before. Eagleton in 1982 chided Jameson’s “regular, curiously unimpassioned style” Against the Grain 74), and here his judgment is avowedly adverse: he is calling in fact for a more “impassioned” Jameson. But the formula of 1982 no longer fits the Jameson of 1992, as even a cursory reading of, for example, the short meditations on diverse topics gathered as the “Conclusion” to Postmodernism will show. Moreover, “the sublime” is a frequent theme in this writing, and Jameson unfailingly characterizes it (as in the passage quoted above) in terms of unrepresentability, unfigurability, unsymbolizability. To evoke the nightmare of history as beyond the intellect’s grasp is to present a vision of “fear.” But another frequent theme in Jameson is the ambition to write a “dialectical prose,” like Adorno’s, that resists or escapes what Jameson calls “thematization.” Jameson nowhere speaks of this condition “beyond thematization” as a “jouissance,” but insofar as it, too, involves a transit beyond a linguistic-semantic entrapment, this ambition of Jameson’s rewrites the fear of the sublime as a kind of desire, and thus projects the terror of the sublime as a kind of utopia.

     

    I want to mention one more portent in the later Jameson’s evocation of “the sublime”: if “the sublime” is the unfigurable, it must necessarily defeat any project of interpretation. From long before his 1971 essay “Metacommentary,” through The Political Unconscious (1981), with its programmatic opening chapter, “On Interpretation,” Jameson presented his effort as a hermeneutic project, opposed to that of “anti-hermeneuts” from Susan Sontag to Foucault, Barthes and Derrida. In his work since then, “postmodernism” itself figures as the unfigurable, insofar as it is (to use a paleoMarxist shorthand whose terms Jameson disapproves) the “superstructural” concomitant of changes in the “base” wrought by a “late” or (in Ernest Mandel’s terms) “third-stage” capitalism whose modes of production have undergone a decisive world-historical alteration since, roughly, the ’60s. Hence Jameson’s more recent rhetoric in which, ominously, the center does not hold: as if, to use the terms of the eleventh thesis on Feuerbach, our impotence to “change” the world must be expressed as an impotence also to “understand” it, in accordance with (“Left puritanism” indeed) the “vision of Necessity” in which the “failure” of revolution appears as “inevitable after the fact”–and must further entail the “vision” of the “inevitable failure” of “dialectical historiography” itself, along with any hermeneutic labor tributary to it. Hence the agitation of Jameson’s recent prose, particularly the later pieces in Postmodernism, in which “the sublime” is not only a prominent theme, but also a frequent effect.11

     

    I have suggested that “Pleasure: A Political Issue” be read “as if” it responds directly to Eagleton’s ambiguous praise of the “pleasure” of reading Jameson, “as if” it aims to propose another ethos, a literary “effect” (“the sublime”) more creditable than “pleasure” for culture-criticism generally, and for Jameson’s own work in particular. I want now to turn to Eagleton’s writing, which, beyond ideological affinities, seems diametrically opposed to Jameson’s rhetorically, in its effects as writing. Where Jameson enlarges every problem, problematizes every solution, insists on “inevitable failure,” and proposes both for his prose and for his readers an askesis of facing the worst (what Geoffrey Galt Harpham has called “the ascetic imperative”), Eagleton writes a prose full of jokes and irreverences, Bronx cheers and razzberries, polemical piss and ideological vinegar, every clause lighting a ladyfinger of wit, almost as if under the compulsion of a kind of high-theory Tourette’s syndrome. It is a style with affinities to “counter-culture” journalism, as if James Wolcott had gone to graduate school instead of to The Village Voice. With obvious and naughty relish, Eagleton transgresses the decorums of academic prose, setting (for example) a clever bit of baby-talk on Derrida’s name (labelled “Oedipal Fragment”) as epigraph to a chapter on “Marxism and Deconstruction,” or concluding a book of essays with a doggerel busker-ballad in the broadside style (“Chaucer was a class traitor,/ Shakespeare hated the mob,” etc., to be sung to the tune of “Land of Hope and Glory”), or launching his essay on Jameson’s style with a parody of Jameson, or indulging a parody of Empson in his essay on Empson, “The Critic as Clown,” or sending up everything academic-critical in a parody of the academic handbook manner in “The Revolt of the Reader.” (Equally un- or anti-academic, but in the other direction, is the poem at the end of Eagleton’s book on Benjamin; compare the poem dedicating Criticism and Ideology [1976] to his father.12)

     

    As for the pained, mournful, obligatory pessimism of “the ascetic imperative,” Eagleton consistently jeers it as a kind of false consciousness. Here, for example, he is setting the stage for a recuperation of Walter Benjamin (whose “melancholy” he readily concedes) under the sign of “carnival”; and with characteristic brass, he makes the very implausibility of such a move his opening gambit:

     

    the suffering, Saturnine aspects of Benjamin, the wreckage of ironic debacles and disasters that was his life, have been seized upon with suspicious alacrity by those commentators anxious to detach him from the vulgar cheerfulness of social hope. Since political pessimism is a sign of spiritual maturity . . . Benjamin offers a consolingly familiar image to disinherited intellectuals everywhere, downcast as they are by the cultural dreariness of a bourgeoisie whose property rights they would doubtless defend to the death.(Walter Benjamin 143)

     

    Two pages later, enter Bakhtin, and the theme of “carnival,” which the prose not only describes but enacts:

     

    In a riot of semiosis, carnival unhinges all transcendental signifiers and submits them to ridicule and relativism . . . power structures are estranged through grotesque parody, 'necessity' thrown into satirical question and objects displaced or negated into their opposites. A ceaseless practice of travesty and inversion (nose/phallus, face/buttocks, sacred/profane) rampages throughout social life, deconstructing images, misreading texts and collapsing binary oppositions into a mounting groundswell of ambiguity into which all discourse finally stutters and slides. Birth and death, high and low, destruction and renewal are sent packing with their tails in each other's mouths . . . A vulgar, shameless, materialism of the body--belly, buttocks, anus, genitals--rides rampant over ruling-class civilities; and the return of discourse to this sensuous root is nowhere more evident than in laughter itself, an enunciation that springs straight from the body's libidinal depths.(Walter Benjamin 145, 150)

     

    These passages are from the chapter of Walter Benjamin called “Carnival and Comedy: Bakhtin and Brecht,” and I want to consider this essay at length here: it provides the program projected in the book’s subtitle (“Towards a Revolutionary Criticism”), and the place of “pleasure” in this program is large and important–both as an aim proposed by the argument and, more immediately, as an effect of the writing. The energy of these passages is not the only kind of energy to be found in Eagleton–space forbids sampling the rabble-rousing wisecracks, the downright, matey metaphors, the sheer gusto for combat and polemical hurly-burly, the insouciantly highbrow laying about amid Heidegger, Althusser, Hegel, or whomever. But the fluency of Eagleton’s rant makes a sharp contrast with Jameson: while Jameson’s notoriously “difficult” prose enacts the difficult (indeed impossible) position of Marxism today, the sheer brio of Eagleton’s prose in all its guises, its “riot of semiosis,” seems to address a political situation whose solution ought to be as simple as getting everyone to admit what they already know, if only by springing jokes so cunningly as to enable us to catch them laughing despite themselves. “A vulgar, shameless materialism of the body– belly, buttocks, anus, genitals–rides rampant over ruling-class civilities”: is there a straight face to be seen? The transgressions seem a test to see who will laugh and who will scowl–good fun, and pointed, of course, at the latter.

     

    Surely this is Eagleton’s dominant effect: it is why graduate students idolize him, and part of why he is recommended for anyone wanting an introduction to “theory.” He can, quite simply, be fun to read, and in that regard, more than any other contemporary highbrow Marxist, he can remind you of some passages in Marx himself. You can, indeed, almost imagine a coal miner or a factory worker reading him, as, in labor movement myth, some of them used to read Marx. I highlight this effect of Eagleton’s prose because it is an effect of pleasure. Even Eagleton’s darker notes, the moments of righteous anger, generally assume or imply (indeed, they aspire to create) a political situation in which righteous anger can readily find its proper effectivity–a situation, to put it another way, in which righteous political anger is felt as a pleasure in its own right. Eagleton’s prose means to yield such pleasure as an effect, as well as proposing it as a theme or program.

     

    Over the course of Eagleton’s career, indeed, the effect of pleasure is far more consistent than the theme; about the theme, Eagleton has often, especially when younger, expressed doubts–as in the caveat above about Jameson, for example: “pleasure,” yes; “jouissance,” no. Jouissance is a Barthesian word, and although Eagleton does on occasion resort to it as a positive term, his reservations about Barthes remain everywhere in force. Pace Jameson, Eagleton regards Barthes’s plaisir and jouissance as privatistic, apolitical, and corrupted with the (to Eagleton) irredeemably contemptible bourgeois pathology of guilt-as-added-thrill; Barthesian pleasure is “guilty pleasure,” enacted behind closed doors in controlled environments, whereas Eagleton’s rabble-rousing implies gleeful sacrilege in public places, and not with guilt, but with whoops of righteous laughter.

     

    “Carnival and Comedy” proposes such effects, such styles of revolutionary laughter and humor, not only in its practice (in the style of its prose), but also as a program for a “Marxist theory of comedy” Walter Benjamin, 159), which Eagleton sketches out, with Brecht’s help, as properly answering to something like the movement of history itself. For Brecht, the Marxist “dialectic of history” is “comic in principle”: “a source”–quoting Brecht now–“of enjoyment” heightening “both our capacity for life and our pleasure in it.”13 Hence, explains Eagleton, the redemptive move from pessimism to “the vulgar cheerfulness of social hope”: “What for Walter Benjamin is potentially tragic . . . is for Brecht the stuff of comedy.” But what of history’s horrors? Eagleton seemingly bids defiance to all obligatory handwringing on that score: “Hitler as housepainter yesterday and Chancellor today is thus a sign of the comic, because that resistible rise foreshadows the unstable process whereby he may be dead in a bunker tomorrow” Walter Benjamin 161). (Note the verb tenses, and especially the “may” in that last clause: even in this “comic” moment, Eagleton is conjuring with the prospect of future Hitlers, warning that we must not be complacent because the last one was vanquished.)

     

    But against Auschwitz, a paragraph later, Eagleton knows that his comic bravura will not stand, and he acknowledges that there is “always something that escapes comic emplotment . . . that is non-dialectizable” Walter Benjamin 162). This last nonce-word seems a little too impromptu; it would be a mistake to hold Eagleton to all its implications against “dialectic” itself. It is better taken as a symptom of how Eagleton’s improvisational afflatus can tread Marxist toes as readily as bourgeois ones. But Eagleton means the word to acknowledge that the “comic” critique he projects here has its limit, comes up against things in history that can not be “emplotted” in a “comic” mode. If “comedy” can mean Dante, or the Easter Passion, it may seem that Eagleton has confused the “comic” with the “funny”; immemorially august Western conceptions of “the comic” have claimed to encompass brutality, suffering, injustice. Perhaps Eagleton regards these as in bad taste, or perhaps he wants to avoid the assimilation once again of Marxism to religion.

     

    However that may be, what happens next in “Carnival and Comedy” provides a far more surprising tack away from revolutionary laughter toward something like the “melancholy” the essay began by protesting. And it does so, more remarkably still, by way of a reading of a passage from The Eighteenth Brumaire, perhaps the first among Marx’s texts one might have cited as exhibiting just the sort of “carnivalesque” angers and “comic” pleasures (ridicule and mockery) Eagleton had seemed to project. But Jeffrey Mehlman reads the passage this way, and it is as a refutation of Mehlman’s reading that Eagleton stages his own Revolution and Repetition). What apparently prompts Eagleton’s ire is Mehlman’s reference to the “anarchism” of Marx’s prose, which Eagleton finds complicit with “those ruling ideologies that have an interest in abolishing dialectics and rewriting Marxism as textual productivity” Walter Benjamin 162). Mehlman argues that Marx’s rhetorical excesses overflow his supposed thesis; Eagleton scorns such a notion, but goes on to make an argument not much different.

     

    Eagleton’s fulcrum is the first-time-as-tragedy- second-time-as-farce motif, for Marx specifies “Caussidiere for Danton, Louis Blanc for Robespierre . . . the Nephew for the Uncle,” quite as if the Revolution’s giants were first-timers, and did not themselves dress up in Roman togas (conveniently requiring little restyling when the signified changed from “Republic” to “Empire”). Yet precisely this revolutionary repetition–both heroic and farcical– quickly becomes Marx’s main theme. Eagleton interrogates the resulting “semiotic disturbance” (inconsistent metaphors, etc.) over several pages of “close reading,” much too lengthily to quote here; but its surprising premise is that “Marx’s text is symptomatically incoherent” Walter Benjamin 163). But where Mehlman found this carnivalesque, and thus a strength and an interest, Eagleton, avowedly promoting “carnival and comedy,” is pained at Marx’s “unwitting” loss of control over his language, and finds himself talking back to Marx, correcting him, unmixing his metaphors for him. He recovers himself at last by the threadbare critical move of transferring the “symptomatic incoherence” from Marx to his object (bourgeois revolution), thus at the final bell transforming what had been Marx’s unwitting “symptom” into his masterful critical “negation.” But the passage ends weakly, and the essay moves to a coda lamenting Western Marxism’s loss of Marx’s comic strength (as if forgetting Brecht, Eagleton’s initial sponsor). There is irony here, insofar as Eagleton has just (by imposing a monologic of his own on Marx’s figurally dialogic text) sapped the very strength he now professes to mourn; and there is pathos in this wistful statement of irrecoverable loss, since recovering a comic possibility for Marxist critique had been, just a few pages earlier, Eagleton’s boldly stated ambition. The essay ends this way:

     

    Benjamin, like Gramsci, admired the slogan "Pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will," and in what Brecht called "the new ice age" of fascism one can see its point. But Marxism holds out other strategic slogans too. Having taken the point of the first, it might then be possible to say, without voluntarist or Kautskyist triumphalism: "Given the strength of the masses, how can we be defeated?"(Walter Benjamin 172)

     

    Tentative (“it might then be possible to say”), and with the taunts of the shibboleth-meisters (“Voluntarist!” “Kautskyist!”) rising in his inner ear, Eagleton’s final flourish cannot, for once, deliver the pleasurable Eagletonian “triumphalism” that is his usual stock in trade. The final “slogan,” indeed, ending on a question mark, sounds more like a real question than a rhetorical one. Here the “optimism of the will” is too willful to convince, the “pessimism of the intellect” too much more than merely intellectual not to. For once, “pessimism of the intellect” really seems to win the agon in the arena of Eagleton’s prose.

     

    So a guerilla foray into a “Marxist theory of comedy,” driven by “carnival” energies, loses momentum at the name of the eponymous master. This failure tempts the sort of lit-crit “psychoanalysis” indicated when, say, the word “balls” sends Stephen Dedalus’s chastely passionate villanelle off the rails: a gallant defense of Marx turns into a subtle assault on Marx–“anxiety of influence”?–and suddenly all Eagleton’s fight (and fun) have gone out of him. But of course we had better push in the direction of that transindividual “libidinal apparatus” that assigns the “objective limits” (Jameson’s phrase) determining such failures–and in fact to “allegorize” the trajectory of Eagleton’s essay as enacting the fate of pleasure in our present “conjuncture” is to assimilate Eagleton to Jameson. Jameson, as we have seen, makes a “vision” of “necessary failure” an imperative for Marxist criticism, and Eagleton, despite his bravely avowed aim of rebutting all such “pessimism” here ends by bowing to it. Jameson, inscribing a failure imperative, compels from it his tortured, ambivalent, “difficult” success; Eagleton, in brash defiance of all pessimisms and confident of Marxism’s inevitable, eventual success, here “enacts” the Jamesonian “vision” of “necessary failure” the more movingly for all his “optimism of the will” against it. This may sound like scoring points against both of them, especially against Eagleton–but if pressed to admit that Eagleton’s failure, at least, does seem a “symptom” rather than a “negation,” I would want to add that both writers, by putting their expository “mastery” at risk, challenge the whole ethos of “critique” that gives the “symptom”/”negation” binary its significance. The ensuing gain is that we can see how two writers so different, enacting differing consequences of the same “contradiction,” must probe and come up against different reaches of the same “objective limits.”

     

    As for the question how to name the complex satisfaction of reading such writers as Eagleton and Jameson, the very difficulty of calling it “pleasure” raises problems whose force is worth looking into in its own right. What Jameson’s discomfort with “pleasure,” his need to sublimate it into “the sublime,” tells us about the fate of pleasure in our historical moment converges with Eagleton’s seemingly opposed embrace of pleasure (with, nevertheless, his reservations about “bliss” on the one hand and the more obscurely motivated “failure” enacted at the close of “Carnival and Comedy” on the other).

     

    Which returns us to the question of “Left puritanism.” Both Eagleton and Jameson seem shadowed by the “minority (political) rigor” whose affinities with the more majoritarian moralisms we saw Barthes uncovering. Each seems to find some sorts of enjoyment (however they differ on which ones) tainted by (Barthes again) “unworthy [bourgeois] feelings.” Neither, of course, wants to be tarred as a “Left puritan”; Jameson’s embrace of Barthes (and Lacan) bespeaks his desire to escape that label, and Bakhtin serves as a similar alibi for Eagleton. As I have argued above, though, Jameson’s construction of Barthes seems motivated by a very un-Barthes-like, and very “Left puritan,” distrust of “plaisir,” and his reinscription of “jouissance” into “the sublime” sublimates it into something very far from enjoyment (in anything other than, say, the Zizekian sense).14 As for Eagleton’s appropriation of Bakhtin, it is to be read in opposition to, not as a version of, Barthesian “jouissance.” It constructs “carnival” as social, and thus an affair less of Eros than of its collective sublimate, Agape. Sex, in Eagleton’s “carnival,” is comically deflationary–“A ceaseless practice of travesty and inversion (nose/phallus, face/buttocks)” Walter Benjamin 145)–rather than a unique, privileged, grand (or grandiose) access to the transport and exaltation of “the sublime.”

     

    Barthes, I suspect, would see in both of these writers more than a few symptoms of that “frigidity” he protests, “As if the notion of pleasure no longer pleases anyone” Pleasure of the Text 46-7). Barthes writes as one for whom the “promesse de bonheur” that Marxists so frequently denounce as “ideological” has already been in some measure cashed; his superego has apparently fought free of that “categorical imperative” that would have him deny his own pleasure in the name of the possibly counter-revolutionary effects of corrupt ideas of “pleasure” on others. But insofar as the resistance to “pleasure” involves the worry of “false consciousness,” the fear of being falsely consoled by “an imaginary solution to a real contradiction,” it will doubtless remain a potent source of moral trouble for Marxists and others who would direct the energies of “critique” to the tasks of making a more just society. The example, though, of Eagleton’s “optimism of the will” (and, most of the time, of his optimism of the intellect, too) prompts me at least to the pleasurable speculation whether “false consciousness” might not equally involve the temptation of responding to real contradictions with imaginary aggravations.

     

    Notes

     

    1. “Stoic” and “tragic” are terms of praise in Jameson’s essay “Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan” (1978), in The Ideologies of Theory, Volume 1 (hereinafter IT1), 98, 112; and it is manifest that part of Lacan’s fascination for Jameson is Lacan’s achievement of an ethos at once (“dialectically”) Hegelian and pessimistic, and to that extent a model for Jameson’s own. For “the nightmare of history as blood guilt,” see “Architecture and the Critique of Ideology” (1985), in The Ideologies of Theory, Volume 2 (hereinafter IT2), 43, and “Pleasure: A Political Issue” (1983), ibid, 68.

     

    2. See, for example, Jameson’s account of the Italian architectural historian Manfredo Tafuri in “Architecture and the Critique of Ideology” (1985), in IT2, 35-60; the caution about “post-Marxism” is on 38. See also remarks on Tafuri in Postmodernism, 61. Jameson scorns any suggestion of his own putative “post-Marxism” in the opening pages of the “Conclusion” to Postmodernism.

     

    3. Against the Grain, 68. Eagleton similarly praises Jameson in “The Idealism of American Criticism,” ibid, 49-64.

     

    4. “The Dialectic of Ideology and Utopia” is the title of the last chapter of The Political Unconscious (281-99), but the motif recurs throughout Jameson’s work, from the chapters on Marcuse (83-115) and Ernst Bloch (116-59) in Marxism and Form to the section of the “Conclusion” of Postmodernism called “The Anxiety of Utopia” (331-40).

     

    5. Cf. Jameson’s most unequivocal praise for Paul de Man: that no one has been more “self-punishing” in pursuit of a moral-intellectual askesis Postmodernism 239).

     

    6. Eagleton quotes Jameson on Adorno (from Marxism and Form xiii) in “The Politics of Style” Against the Grain 66); on the same page he quotes himself, on Jameson’s “intense libidinal charge,” from “The Idealism of American Criticism” Against the Grain 57).

     

    7. Compare this move of Eagleton’s with Jameson’s judgment that de Man’s project, despite its avowed ambition to deconstruct “the subject,” is “fatally menaced at every point by a resurgence of some notion of self-consciousness” Postmodernism 245, cf. 258-9).

     

    8. “Commodification” is a frequent topos in both Eagleton and Jameson, as well as in many other Marxist (and not-so-Marxist) writers. (Eagleton even images Jameson’s encyclopedic range of reference as a shopping cart wheeling through “some great California supermarket of the mind” collecting Hegel, Deleuze, Croce, et al., like so many designer-products Against the Grain 70].) Indeed, anxiety about the commodification of highbrow “theory” like his own–Barthes, Lukacs, Macherey, and whoever else as status-acquisitions in some flash-card degradation of intellectual life–frequently appear in Jameson himself, and in just such consumerist terms–as, for example, when he deplores hearing figures like Althusser, Gramsci, et al. turned into “brand-names for autonomous philosophical systems” (“Interview” 78).

     

    9. For Eagleton’s exempting Jameson from Barthesian “perversity,” see Against the Grain, 66; for Jameson on Barthes and Lacan, compare “Pleasure: A Political Issue” IT2 69) with the closing paragraph of “Imaginary and Symbolic in Lacan” IT1 115).

     

    10. Pleasure of the Text, 46-7. One of Jameson’s more dazzling asides is the linkage of Barthes with Lionel Trilling’s Sincerity and Authenticity on the grounds that both associate what they despise with the left–student radicals for Trilling, “Left puritanism,” as in the quoted passage, for Barthes IT2 65).

     

    11. This hermeneutic despair, surprisingly, lightens in work Jameson has published since Postmodernism. See the (previously unpublished, and presumably recent) essay, “The Existence of Italy,” in Signatures of the Visible, 155-248, where hermeneutic satisfactions again compensate for the reifications accounted for; and The Geopolitical Aesthetic: Cinema and Space in the World System, in which third world cinema’s reinvention of narrative and realism and its sense of “totality as conspiracy” offer a prospect of the world system once again rendered intelligible to the terms of a politically committed (mass) art form. See my review of these two books in Kritikon Litterarum (forthcoming).

     

    12. “Oedipal Fragment,” Walter Benjamin, Or, Towards a Revolutionary Criticism, 131; “The Ballad of English Literature,” Against the Grain, 185; the parody of Jameson, ibid, 65; of Empson, ibid, 151; “The Revolt of the Reader, ibid, 181-4. For the homage to Benjamin, see Walter Benjamin, 185. This is also the place to mention Eagleton’s play, Brecht and Company (1979) and his novel, Saints and Scholars (1987).

     

    13. Brecht on Theatre, 277; qtd. in Walter Benjamin, 160.

     

    14. I am thinking, of course, of Slavoj Zizek’s Enjoy Your Symptom: Jacques Lacan In Hollywood and Out, but readers of Zizek know that they will find this and Zizek’s other central themes rehearsed in virtually any of his books.

    Works Cited

     

    • Barthes, Roland. The Pleasure of the Text. 1973. Trans. Richard Miller. New York: Hill and Wang, 1975.
    • Eagleton, Terry. Against the Grain: Selected Essays. New York and London: Verso, 1986.
    • Eagleton, Terry. Walter Benjamin, Or, Towards a Revolutionary Criticism. New York and London: Verso, 1981.
    • Jameson, Fredric. The Geopolitical Aesthetic: Cinema and Space in the World System. Indiana UP/British Film Institute: Verso, 1992.
    • —. The Ideologies of Theory, Volume 1: Situations of Theory. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1988.
    • —. The Ideologies of Theory, Volume 2: The Syntax of History. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1988.
    • —. “Interview.” Diacritics 12.3 (Fall 1982): 72-91.
    • —. Late Marxism, Or, Adorno: The Persistence of the Dialectic. New York and London: Verso, 1990.
    • —. Marxism and Form. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1971.
    • —. The Political Unconscious. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1981.
    • —. Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1991.
    • —. Signatures of the Visible. Routledge: New York and London, 1992.
    • Mehlman, Jeffrey. Revolution and Repetition. Berkeley: U of California P, 1977.
    • Zizek, Slavoj. Enjoy Your Symptom: Jacques Lacan In Hollywood and Out. New York and London: Routledge, 1992.

     

  • The Excremental Sublime: The Postmodern Literature of Blockage and Release

    Roberto Maria Dainotto

    Dept. of Comparative Literature
    New York University

    DAINOTTR@acfcluster.nyu.edu

     

     

    Once a famous Hellenic philosopher, [Aesop’s] master in the dark days of his enslaved youth, had asked him why it was, when we shat, we so often turned around to examine our own turds, and he’d told that great sage the story of the king’s loose-living son who one day, purging his belly, passed his own wits, inducing a like fear in all men since. “But you don’t have to worry, sire,” he added, “you’ve no wit to shit.” Well, cost him a beating, but it was worth it, even if it was all a lie. For the real reason we look back of course is to gaze for a moment in awe and wonder at what we’ve made–it’s the closest we ever come to being at one with the gods.
     
    Now what he reads in this analecta of turds is rampant disharmony and anxiety: it’s almost suffocating. Boundaries are breaking down: eagles are shitting with serpents, monkeys with dolphins, kites with horses, fleas with crayfish, it’s as though there were some mad violent effort here to link the unlinkable, cross impossible abysses. And there’s some dejecta he’s not sure he even recognizes. That foul mound could be the movement of a hippogriff, for example, this slime that of a basilisk or a harpy. His own bowels, convulsed by all this ripe disorder, feel suddenly with a plunging weight, as though heart, hump, and all might have just descended there: he squats hastily, breeches down (well, Zeus sent Modesty in through the asshole, so may she exit there as well), to leave his own urgent message on the forest floor.
     

    –Robert Coover, “Aesop’s Forest”

     

    For this relief much thanks…

     

    Hamlet, I: i, 8

     

    Dedicatory Epistle to the Reader

     

    The paper hereby presented is, properly speaking, a treatise on evacuation. As such, its ideal location would be between Dominique Laporte’s Histoire de la merde and Pietro Manzoni’s Merde d’artista–works, in other words, secretly dedicated to friendly souls, or, as in this case, to the logorrheic interpreter of postmodernity. The author, but a humble hack, aims at the scholastic fame of having been able, if not to tap, at least to indicate a peculiar gap in postmodern criticism: for it appeared astounding to him that, among so many postmodernisms–“John Barth’s postmodernism, the literature of replenishment; Charles Newman’s postmodernism, the literature of inflationary economy; Jean-Francois Lyotard’s postmodernism, a general condition of knowledge in the contemporary informational regime; Ihab Hassan’s postmodernism, a stage on the road to the spiritual unification of humankind…” (McHale 4)–the one concerned with the sublimity of evacuation had been so absolutely neglected.

     

    To single out a certain sense of the sublime in contemporary literature, it is mandatory to impose severe limitations on and some critical selecting of the otherwise too heterogeneous material at hand. First, this research will be limited to North American fiction. Second, the investigation will focus on one particular theme that seems to have grieved American literature since the fifties–a theme that goes under the name of “the crisis of consciousness.”1 What is intended here by “critical selecting” is that pre-Kantian form of judgement that constitutes the essence and very nature of the author’s critical method: “I like it, or I don’t.” On this basis, I have not the least intention to encompass within this reading the “fast-food fictions” (Pfeil 2) and minimalist melancholies of Jay McInerney or Susan Minot. They do not “fit,” and, moreover, they get on my nerves.

     

    Of this critical scheme, the author is ready to admit that it is what nowadays seems to be the object of ridicule and scorn: it is, no doubt, a dogmatic scheme. It begins with an assumption about what contemporary American literature might be, and therefore it handles exclusively those works which “fit” into the scheme. In defense of this method, the author can only mention the innocence with which he is trying not to impose his assumption on any work.

     

    If the reader finds this preamble to be redundant, or the following to be repugnant, let us make clear that these notes, “neither a defense nor yet another denigration of the cultural enterprise we seem determined to call postmodernism” (Hutcheon, Poetics ix), should be intended as an attempt to single out some strategies of aesthetic, and maybe also moral and political, survival within the limits of what Jameson has so grimly called “logic of late capitalism”–or, in Baudrillard’s more pertinent formulation, the logic of fast-food, anorexia, bulimia, and obesity. Henceforth, dear reader, consider the following as yet one more exercise in survival and digestion–an exercise morally and socially relevant of which the author professes himself to be a persevering practitioner.

     

    Fables of Digestion

     

    The term digestion itself is one of the interfaces between ideas of bodily and mental process. Latin digero meant properly to force apart, to separate…

     

    –R.M. Durling, “Deceit and Digestion in the Belly of Hell”

     

    Inclusion and exclusion, symbolic and material exchange, body boundaries, gender, and other identity factors are systematically and most deeply inscribed in the members of a given group through eating practices.

     

    –George Yudice, “Feeding the Transcendent Body”

     

     

    In this paper, the term “sublime” refers not only to a set of aesthetic practices and transcendental ideals that have manifested themselves in contemporary American literature, but also to certain features of our own life and culture, features that, to paraphrase Geoffrey Harpham, “have survived the loss of the ideological structures within which they emerged” (xi). Loss and survival are two of the most remarkable traits of the sublime: since Longinus, they mark the stages of the individual’s confrontation with a superior force that momentarily marks the disruption of the subject, which is first “scattered,” and then joyfully reconstituted, “uplifted with a sense of proud possession…filled with joyful pride, as if we had ourselves produced the very thing we felt” (Longinus On the Sublime VII, translation mine).

     

    There seems to be general agreement today about the fact that the first epochal horizon within which one can speak of postmodernity coincides with the alleged death of the subject–or, at least, with an “attenuation of the self,” as Lionel Trilling puts it in Sincerity and Authenticity. From the “loss of the self” of Wylie Sypher, through the “divided self” of Ronald Laing, to the “deconstructed self” of Leo Bersani, the identity of the “I” is dramatically scattered.

     

    One can locate the first symptoms of the vanishing Emersonian self in the schlemiel of the literature of the fifties.2 Undoubtedly, there are specific historical reasons that generate this sense of pessimism and loss. The crisis of consciousness in the literature of the fifties may well witness, in Edmund Wilson’s words, the “homicidal and menacing schemes” of McCarthyan policy (Wilson 128). At the turn of the new decade, Ken Kesey’s One Flew over the Cuckoo’s Nest warns against the clinical suppression of the subject in the political style of Kubrick: “[they] try to make you weak so they can get you to toe the line, to follow their rules, to live like they want to” (Kesey 57). As Hendin puts it, society, as symbolized in Kesey’s asylum, “controls and infantilizes [the subject] in the name of the best interests of the inmates” (Hendin 132).

     

    And yet, the fiction of the sixties muses, with Kesey’s McMurphy, an outside space (“We want to live out of this society,” the king of the Merry Pranksters avows), the revival of the American dream, the fantasy of an ultimate frontier that, once crossed, will open onto the uncontaminated plains of ultimate innocence and freedom. Although the themes of power and suppression undergo some variations, say, from Kesey’s dystopic vision to Kerouac’s beatnik quest, the literature of the sixties traces a neat line between a power reduced to mere symbol of evil and an Adamic individual consciousness outside power and innocently extraneous to it. Curiously enough, the writer of the sixties uses the themes of power and consciousness in a way that resembles Thoreau’s, Whitman’s, and Hawthorne’s more than it resembles any postmodern writer’s: the Walden of literature is still a sacred wood in which I sing myself far from the evil of civilization and far from its scarlet symbols of doom. But is there any such a space of innocence in the coming society of the spectacle?

     

    Postmodern statements on politics and society, from Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow to Coover’s The Public Burning, persistently echo the gloomy tones of Kesey’s Foucauldian clinic–but where is the ultimate frontier of innocence and freedom?

     

    America was the edge of the World. A message from Europe, continent-seized, inescapable. Europe had found the site for its kingdom of Death, the special Death the West has invented. . . . Now we are in the last phase. American Death has come to occupy Europe. It has learned empire from its old metropolis. . . . Is the cycle over now and a new one ready to begin? Will our new Edge, our new Deathkingdom, be the Moon? . . . Gravity rules all the way out to the cold sphere, there is always the danger of falling.(Pynchon 722-23)

     

    Or, as Richard Nixon admits in The Public Burning, some pages before being sodomized by Uncle Sam, “we cannot escape” (Coover 8).

     

    Yet, the theory and practice of postmodernity may recast the question of “the crisis of consciousness,” raised in the fifties and brought to its final “paranoid” conclusions in the sixties, in “a more positive mode of confrontation between subject and power” (Olderman 124); the postmodern answer to this question attempts at producing new and different structures of survival–“new mutants,” to say it with Leslie Fiedler. The argument I want to support with this paper can be summarized as follows: the claim of a death of the subject in postmodern discourse must be understood, pace all those critics who take the “death-theme” in absolute earnestness, as a “radical irony” (Ihab Hassan) which aims at reconstituting what one can call–faute de mieux–the “radical subject”: a subject which stands to represent “the community of disappointed . . . literary intellectuals–and how many of us really stand outside this class?–whose basic need is to believe in the autonomy of self-fashioning.”3 Escape is impossible, since Kesey’s clinic is virtually everywhere, in “the crime labs . . . the records . . . the radios and the alarm system and the TV over the teller’s cages . . . the cells and the jails and the schools and institutions . . . the traffic signals and the alternate-side-of-the-street parking regulation . . . the magnified maps of the city . . . the beats and patrols,” as Elkin’s Bad Man witnesses (70); and yet, the repressive project of society reveals itself inefficient to discipline the postmodern self-fashioning individual.

     

    “I say all this to assure you that it is incorrect to assume that, because I am invisible and live in a hole, I am dead. I am neither dead nor in a state of suspended animation. Call me Jack-the-Bear, for I am in a state of hibernation.” But what can Ellison’s Bear do in the society of spectacle? How can Trilling’s “liberal imagination” survive the mystifications of mass-culture? And how can individual consciousness confront and survive a power disseminated in the most appealing forms of advertising, a power so forcefully obliterating reality with fictive simulacra? If “my life is a kind of simulation,” as the protagonist of DeLillo’s Mao II believes (97), how can the subject reposition itself within a society that transforms everything into simulation, in which even the individual, as Teresa de Lauretis warns, is “continually engaged, represented, and inscribed” (“Alice Doesn’t” 37)? In the last analysis, power is not framed within an inside that allows an outside innocence: power resides in the pre- fabricated notions of “reality” that the subject lives, “a series of overlapping fictions [that] cohere into a convincing semblance of historical continuity and logical truth” (Coover, Burning 122). Power is the ability of mass-media to create “static tableau–The New York Times’s finest creation–within which a reasonable and orderly picture of life can unfold” (Coover, Burning 192).

     

    Once reality and life have lost any ontological arche, and have become the result of a fictive construction, the radical subject, as Coover puts it, must become “cynical about it…learn the rules and strategies . . . [and become] a manipulator” (“Interview” 72); or, as Jerome Klinkowitz suggests, the radical subject must recuperate some sort of “transformative imagination” Disruptions 16) to be able to change plots and life, drive force beyond exhaustion, and transform indifference and its simulacra.

     

    Indeed, the publication of Berger and Luckmann’s The Social Construction of Reality (1967) had to convince a group of American authors, now labelled as “post-modernists,” that the first step towards the Bildung–or rather, a re-membering–of the radical subject was “to destroy the hold which these artificial constructions have on men, typically by forcing the very patterns and mythic structures to undermine themselves” (McCaffery, “Checklists” 112). Robert Coover declares:

     

    Men live by fiction. They have to. Life's too complicated, we just can't handle all the input . . . All of them [fictions], though, are merely artifices-- that is, they are always in some ways false, or at best incomplete. There are always other plots, other settings, other interpretations. So if some stories start throwing their weight around, I like to undermine their authority a bit, work variations, call attention to their fictional nature.4

     

    Thus, the dead “I” opens a breach in the institutionalized mythic structures, a breach in which s/he will find space enough for inventing new plots and new fables of identity: the radical subject survives the attempt of annihilation by virtue of his/her ability to transform social plots, “work variations, call attention to their fictional nature.”

     

    Why, then, does postmodernism insistently repeat the litany of the dead at the same moment in which death is to turn into survival? One reason may be that postmodernism tries to re-enact a drama that takes place in daily life– the risk that the subject could be actually annihilated by his/her inability to confront overpowering social myths. Most important, this dramaturgy allows postmodernism to celebrate an ironically initiatory rite, or “mythotherapy,” as Campbell Tatham suggests (“Mythotherapy” 155), that enacts the drama of a temporary collapse in order to subsequently reconstitute a new subject in a stage of sublime ecstasy: as a ritual, the death of the subject initiates the reader to confront overpowering structures and destroy their hold. “The process is part of our daily life,” Richard Poirier tells us, “and no other novelist predicts and records it with Pynchon’s imaginative and stylistic grasp” V. 5). Indeed, Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow might be the best example to illustrate this kind of ritualistic sublimation of the self. If “They” have transformed the self into a “poor cripple, [a] deformed and doomed thing” GR 720), living in the “master plan” of a continuous alienation; if the self has been ensnared in a plot that is trying to subject both humanity and the Earth to the principle of economic exploitation–then it is “our mission to promote death,” and to become, like Katje and Gottfried, “children who are learning to die” GR 175). As the narrator says, “We must also look to the untold,” to a story different from the “master plan” that has constructed our very idea of identity GR 720). Like Slothrop’s, the human self must first be “broken down” and “scattered” in order to overcome alienation and return as the Benjaminian “bright angel of death” GR 738 ff.). In Pynchon’s novel, Slothrop’s “death” serves the purpose of recognizing fictions and social “master-plans” for what they are, thus liberating the subject from his/her dependency on artificial constructs. As Ihab Hassan argues, “revulsion against the self serves [postmodernism] as a link between the destructive and visionary impulses of modern apocalypse; it prepares for rebirth” Postmodern Turn 5). It administers last rites to all of human life.

     

    Coover’s fictions are no less rich of ritualistic sublimations. Coover, with his proclaimed interest in Roger Caillois’ Eucharistic rites (“Interview” 74), repeatedly stages sacrificial public burnings, regicides, and other executions. In “Aesop’s Forest” the artist/Aesop, who has sinned against Apollo, is, like Orpheus, dismembered by the angry Delphians–“one eye is gone, the other clouded, an ear is clogged with bees, his hide’s in tatters.”5 Aesop’s sacrilege consists in having denounced Apollo’s Truth as a fable.

     

    As Aesop remarks, with a sense of tragic irony, “I told them the truth, they called it sacrilege.” Like the postmodern demiurge, Aesop has de-mystified an absolute Truth, but, in so doing, he has hypostatized his own construction as a new truth, allegedly free from any Dionysian construction. Men live by fictions, they have to. But some fictions, like Aesop’s “deconstruction” of Apollonian Truth, start throwing their weight around. When this happens, fictions can turn against their creator, and Aesop’s moralized animals join the Delphians in the lynching of the author:

     

    they are on him: wolves, boars, apes, moles, toads, dancing camels, plucked daws, serpents, spiders, snails, incestuous cocks and shamming cats, hares, asses, bats, bears, swarms of tongueless gnats, fleas, flies and murderous wasps, bears, beavers, doves, martins, lice and dungbeetles, mice and weasels, owls, crabs, and goats, hedgehogs and ticks, kites, frogs, peacocks and locusts, all the fabled denizens of the forest, all intent in electing him into the great democracy of the dead.("Aesop's Forest" 82)

     

    At once, Coover’s story gives the idea of Aesop-the-fabler’s “radical” (anti-Apollonian) activity, and of Aesop-the-man’s entrapment in his own “eloquent text of the forest.” It is not less amazing to notice how Aesop is dismembered by his own “fabled denizens” than to notice how the Rosenbergs are sacrificed to the fable of American democracy in The Public Burning. To give credit to fictions is to put lives at stake. It is not surprising, in this context, that Coover’s narrative technique continuously aims at constructing “exemplary fictions”–fictions that, in Robert Alter’s formulation, “flaunt their own condition of artifice” Partial Magic x) and that, by so doing, escape any hypostasis onto the plane of myth and absolute Truth:

     

    Ejemplares you [Cervantes] called your tales, because "si bien lo miras, no hay ninguna de quien no se pueda sacar un ejemplo provechoso," and I hope in ascribing to my fictions the same property, I haven't strayed from your purposes, which I take to be manyfold. For they are ejemplares, too, because your intention was "poner en la plaza de nuestra republica una mesa de trucos, donde cada uno pueda llegar a entratenerse sin dao del alma ni del cuerpo, porque los ejercicios honestos y agradables antes aprovechan que daan"-- splendid, don Miguel! for as our mutual friend don Roberto S. [Robert Scholes, in The Fabulators] has told us, fiction "must provide us with an imaginative experience which is necessary to our imaginative well being . . . We need all the imagination we have, and we need it exercised and in good condition"--and thus your novelas stand as exemplars of responsibility to that most solemn and pious charge placed upon this vocation. . .(Coover Pricksongs, 77)

     

    Coover’s self-denouncing fictions, differently from Aesop’s moralities, do not permit “to have their miserable excrement read so explicitly”6–they do not establish any interpretive order. Because, if Aesop was the victim of an Apollonian social order, he has become, quite paradoxically, the grantee for a classical order–think of La Fontaine– which sees in Aesop’s fables the explicit moralities of “avarice, panic, vanity, distrust, lust for glory and for flesh, hatred, hope, all the fabled terrors and appetites of the mortal condition, drawn together here now for one last demented frolic.” Eventually, whether they were guilty or not of a radical and anti-Apollonian statement, Aesop’s fables serviced another artificial but stable moral order. Establishing the tradition of the Aesopian genre tells enough about the institutionalization of fable and the fetishization of narrative constructs, as Chenetier argues: “Aesop[‘s] . . . transformations, a founding gesture for his particular world-view, [have become] a-dynamic and irreversible” (“Ideas” 101). Hence, Coover’s exemplary tale, in order to exercise “all the imagination we have . . . in good conditions,” must dismantle the whole of Aesop’s mythologized apparatus. For reasons antithetical to those of the Delphians, Coover himself must sacrifice Aesop–or his now overpowering plot–on the altar of the postmodern transformative imagination, in the “Temple of the Muses” (“Aesop’s Forest” 81).

     

    Whatever happens to Aesop, and whoever kills him, we know that his is a tragic end. But what happened to the postmodern subject, or, to a lesser extent, whatever happened to Coover in Aesop’s forest? Does the death of Aesop stands to signify the death of the author tout court? Does this coincide with Lyotard’s claimed death of grand narratives? Coover’s allegory is very careful about this: the felicitous announcement of the death of the author can well serve the political agenda of the fox, “that treacherous foul-mouth.” Should we give absolute credit to the wide-spread announcement of the death of narrative (another myth, indeed), the fox may engineer a subtle takeover and make us believe that its realpolitik is the ultimate demystification–we may find ourselves entrapped into Peter Sloterdijk’s “cynical reason,” the belief that, since ideologies are all equally false, one’s behavior should then be absolutely determined by “particular interests.” The problem with Sloterdijk, as with our fox, is that they do not see in their “cynicism” a new fiction, a novel artificial construction: the “particular interest” is not more “real” than what has so far been deconstructed. Interests, to paraphrase Baudrillard, are never “free” from ideological determinations: “there is no basis on which to define what is ‘artificial’ and what is not. . . . No one experiences this [particular interest] as alienation” (“Consumer Society” 40). The grand narratives that have a hold on our life may be easily condemned and unmasked on the assumption that, much like the Socratic “enlightened” rationalism according to Nietzsche, they aspire to Apollonian truth, forgetting that they are bound to the deceptive nature of the Dionysian. However, what is striking is precisely the degree of forgetfulness that accompanies many annunciations of death and unmaskings of grand narratives: the authoritative announcement of the disappearance of authority, and the articulation of a total and comprehensive narrative of a postmodern condition in which it would be impossible to articulate any narration, surreptitiously establish, as Coover suggests, a “foxy” and fraudulent totalizing order. If there is any difference between Aesop’s and Coover’s postmodernism, it is this: the “suspicion” Aesop casts on Apollonian order is recast by Coover on the suspicion itself, with the result that the denunciation of myths does not acquire the status of an Aufklarung, but rather, in Bentham’s formulation, of a “necessary fiction.”7 In other words, the de- mythification itself is the result of another fictive construction that can acquire “exemplarity” only if it recognizes itself as “fictive,” thus avoiding any hypostasis onto the plane of absolute truth and enlightenment. Whoever would execute the myth-maker and fight an order of reality must be fully aware that the logics on which s/he would perform the “de-mythification” are not devoid of a necessary fictional nature–or, in Coover’s own words, “It’s all shit anyway” (“Aesop’s Forest” 83).

     

    More precisely, the death of the author/Aesop prepares for a rebirth: once Aesop’s moralized forest “extinguishes itself around him,” a new, exemplary forest can be created, and a new “self-conscious” author can take Aesop’s place. The execution of the author participates of a tribal ritual of initiation in which “killing the author,” as Frazer would say, “assumes, or at least is readily combined with, the idea that the soul of the slain author is transmitted to his successor.” As in Freud’s “totemic meal,” oral incorporation and its correlates–instalment and digestion of authority within the self–consume a patricidal act that sublimates the subject’s desire for strength, authority, and life. The Gerontion-like loss of sight, smell, hearing, taste, and touch that characterizes the narrator of “Aesop’s Forest” must be counterbalanced by a will to eat: “even in such decline, the familiar hungers stir in him still… his appetite for power outlasting his power to move” (“Aesop’s Forest,” 68).

     

    It is the same hunger that saves the characters of Maxine Hong Kingston’s The Woman Warrior in their endless combat against the ghosts of patriarchal culture: “my mother won in ghost battle because she can eat anything…. All heroes are bold toward food…. Big eaters win.”8 In Kingston’s and Coover’s vocabulary, one must introject the myth for reasons of survival; only by following the drive of this appetite can the postmodern subject “learn the rules,” and find alternative plots, “more pathways, more gardens, and more doors” (Coover Pricksongs, 19). In other words, if eating practices and “disorders,” as Julia Kristeva suggests, may be the product of a hysterical resistance to (patriarchal) authority (“Stabat Mater”), it must be noticed that the postmodern resistance is not on the part of the anorexic, but, rather, of the bulimic. As the title (if not the argument) of Sohnya Sayres’s article on “Food and the Agon of Excess” suggests, postmodernism is a tale of bulimic excess, or, as George Yudice puts it, the promise of “transcendence in an age of fake fat and microwavable synthetic meals” (“Transcendent Body” par. 3). As Susie Orbach’s The Anorectic’s Struggle as a Metaphor implies, even the anorectic’s “hunger strike,” a loss at the level of the physical, “replenishes” the body with the metaphors of an excess in respect to social codes.

     

    But is “appetite” enough for the individual’s survival? Cannot eating rather be, as Baudrillard’s discussion on “The Obese” insinuates, a “fatal strategy,”9 or simply produce a blockage? “As a child,” Kingston tells us, “I pictured a naked child sitting on a modern toilet desperately trying to perform until it died of congestion” (86). Cannot the introjection of social structures, literary traditions, and Aesop’s moralities, actually paralyze the childlike postmodern imagination in some sort of congestion? Or into a compulsion to repeat? Indeed, the rather heavy meal can create a digestive disorder, a rampant dyspepsia, and a metabolic chaos. The “urgent message” of the postmodern author is hindered. The author “squats hastily, breeches down. Ah!, what a plunging weight.” Can postmodernism overcome this moment of blockage, this compulsion to cite and repeat–this compulsion to death? One has reason for worrying: the signs shed in Coover’s forest seem to be Aesop’s and La Fontaine’s, rather than Coover’s own– “there’s some dejecta he’s not sure he even recognizes”! For the voracious postmodern individual, blockage is the real threat, and survival coincides with some sort of “digestive capability”–the power to actively transform authorities and traditions into fecal signs, into wastes from which the subject has to separate in order to constitute itself as a subject. It is the ability of forcing apart, separating one’s individuality from that of the slain king. In the next section, I will try to associate the possibility of survival for the postmodern individual with a sublime ability to evacuate. This–it goes without saying–is a topic that the author, who is not free from certain academic scruples, has not the power to censor nor the happiness to approve. It is a topic that has been forced upon me by Robert Coover, for whom evacuation is “the closest we ever come to the gods.”

     

    And so, with a timid “Can I?,” I’d like to move to the second section.

     

    From Citation to Sublimation: Metaphors Of Evacuation

     

    As if it were a game played by the sphincter muscle . . .

     

    –Richard Brautigan, Trout Fishing in America

     

    Although several critics have commented on the subject, the key document in defining postmodern American literature remains John Barth’s “The Literature of Exhaustion” (1967). Barth’s radical announcement was that writers were facing “the used-upness of certain forms of exhaustion of certain possibilities” (29). From then on, the author could only cite and repeat old stories and earlier forms. It is evident that postmodern literature seemingly endorses Barth’s aesthetics of exhaustion: Coover’s repetition of Aesop’s fables, Barthelme’s rewriting of Snow White, Kathy Acker’s Borgesian Don Quixote, equivocally suggest a compulsion to cite, quote, and repeat a whole literary tradition that disturbingly crops up in the postmodern literary body. “Nobody had enough imagination,” Barth’s Ambrose muses at the end of Lost in the Funhouse (97). The postmodern author is condemned to cite and repeat old stories, given forms and structures. Or so it seems. Because some questions can still be asked: Is it possible to turn Barth’s aesthetic ultimacy, his entropic compulsion to cite, into a sublime strategy for the survival of the subject? Can the citing subject be “uplifted with a sense of proud possession” above the cited material? And, if so: According to which paradigm can we define this “uplifting” as “sublimation,” and in what terms?

     

    Suzanne Guerlac, in her study on “Longinus and the Subject of the Sublime,” locates the force of the sublime in the humble practice of citation, in which the author takes “proud possession” of the given message (275). Frances Ferguson replies to Guerlac by suggesting that citation rather promotes, to be fair to Longinus, a “suppression of the author” (295; emphasis mine). Despite the different conclusions they reach, both Guerlac’s and Ferguson’s arguments, as Geoffrey Harpham argues (198-199), are essentially correct, since the Longinian sublime, in the last analysis, does not aim to promote auctorial individuality, but instead the unification of the author with a transcendent totality, or with a past re-presented by and in the citation. The author is thus “promoted” (Guerlac) by dispersing him/her self within a “totality” (Ferguson). When the Longinian author recognizes the citation “as something he had himself produced,” s/he is caught in the sublime experience because s/he feels as part of a transcendental creative energy.

     

    From its very outset, postmodernism seems to tell a rather different story: postmodern citation can be more correctly imagined as a moment of blockage, in which the author is compelled to cite, to repeat,10 because a given totality–a literary tradition, a social given to which the author feels belated, or, as Kathy Acker puts it, some “great expectations”–already comprehends him/her. The problem for the postmodern author is that s/he, unlike Longinus, tries to escape that totality, whose overpowering force blocks and paralyzes. Donald Barthelme’s Snow White, trying to narrate her own story, finds herself captured in a plot–Grimm’s Snow White–from which she cannot escape: “Oh I wish there were some words in the world that were not the words I always hear!” (6). Whereas the Longinian sublime contents the subject with a syntactical “sympathy” (the term is Burke’s) between subjective expression and absolute logos, postmodern technique tries to free the subject from the hierarchy of syntax, and hinges, as Hayden White comments, on “a paratactical consciousness: a language of linear disjunction rather than narrative sequence” (“Culture” 69). To put it in rhetorical terms, the organizing principle of postmodern narrative would be metonymy–the succession of unconnected elements –rather than metaphor–the link between the parts. Accordingly, Donald Barthelme breaks syntactic hierarchy to introduce an element of error, a metonymic uncodifiable fragment, in the ordered space of social information:

     

    I have a number of error messages I'd like to introduce here and I'd like you to study them carefully . . . they're numbered. I'll go over them with you: undefined variable . . . improper use of hierarchy . . . missing operator . . . mixed mode, that one's particular grave . . . invalid character transmitted in sub-program statement, that's a bitch . . . no END statement.("Explanation" 79)

     

    The Guerlac-Ferguson debate suggests that Longinus’s holistic sublime may lose its usefulness to describe a postmodern strategy. The ironic tone of postmodern citation implies a different movement, namely, in Paul Bove’s terms, “a radical break or rupture in the genetic pattern,” in which the subject inter-relates dialectically with his/her genetic/historical predecessor, thus instituting “discontinuities” rather than syntheses.11

     

    If Longinus’s sublime and Burke’s “sympathy” do not “fit” postmodernism, Neil Hertz’s “The Notion of Blockage in the Literature of the Sublime” tries to define the postmodern practice of citation in terms of Kantian sublime. The enormous “accumulation of secondary discussion,” the “proliferation of secondary comments,” Hertz argues, brings the postmodern author to face “a point of blockage: he [writes] of the threat of being overwhelmed by too much writing, and it may not be possible to go beyond that” (62 ff.) This “accumulation,” an enormous difficulty to ex-press (etymologically: ex premere, to push out) new signs under “the pressure of the super ego,” produces on the author/subject what Hertz calls a “blockage,” something emotionally similar to Kant’s fear and amazement in facing an overwhelming, “limitless” force. The subject/author feels impotent, constipated, quite dead. Yet, Hertz suggests, after the postmodern author posits this impossibility, after s/he installs such a monstrous accumulation impeding writing–after blockage is posited, writing flows out: a logorrhea, indeed, about the “impossibility” of writing. This process constitutes, according to Hertz, the liberating experience of contemporary sublime–an experience organized on the double “mind’s movement [of] blockage, and release.”

     

    Let us consider, as an example of this mechanism of sublimation, Linda Hutcheon’s The Politics of Postmodernism. The first chapter of this text is entitled “Representing the Postmodern,” and it begins with a subchapter devoted to the discussion of “What is Postmodernism?” That is to say: Can post-modernism have any identity? Hutcheon astutely plays on the oxymoron opened between the notions of “representation of postmodernism” and that of “postmodern impossibility of representation.” How can we possibly represent, in fact, a phenomenon whose first given is that of unpresentability? Impossibility rules the program of Hutcheon’s text, which is to represent the unpresentable. The Politics of Postmodernism may be seen as some kind of allegory–quite literally an anagogic attempt–of postmodernism itself. The entire postmodernist project is re-enacted here as the desire to “project,” and create, that which cannot be pinned down or mastered by representation. The transcendent object of desire is that which, according to Lyotard, moves postmodernism toward the sublime:

     

    The postmodern would be that which, in the modern, puts forward the unpresentable in presentation itself, that which denies itself the solace of good forms, the consensus of a taste which would make it possible to share collectively the nostalgia for the unattainable; that which searches for new presentations.(Postmodern Condition 81)

     

    The entire postmodern “representation” (or “postmodernism represented”) is in it–the “post-modernist project,” or, in other words, that ephemeral, brilliant moment of writing the impossibility of writing that by itself represents an entire era, and transcends the logical and stylistic possibilities of representation in the moment the unpresentable is finally presented:

     

    it seems reasonable to say that the postmodern's initial concern is to de-naturalize some of the dominant features of our way of life; to point out that those entities that we unthinkingly experience as 'natural' . . . are in fact 'cultural'; made by us, not given to us. Even nature, postmodernism might point out, doesn't grow on trees.(Hutcheon, Poetics 2)

     

    The “indeterminate,” the “unpresentable,” is thus transcended, as Kant puts it, in the “representation of the limitlessness.” The question “What is postmodernism?” poses to the reader an apparently unrecoverable “momentary check” (Kant) to the possibilities of representing “an indeterminate reference”12; the feeling of impotence is then “followed at once by a discharge all the more powerful” (Kant) in the moment the unpresentable is finally “connected with the mere presentation or faculty of representation, and is thus taken to express the accord, in a given intuition, of the faculty of presentation, or the imagination, with the faculty of concepts” (Kant). The identity of postmodernism is given, albeit in a negative way, as discrepant from representation itself; or, rather, as ironic (negative) representation, as a representation that takes traditional (positive) representation ironically.

     

    However, we have come a long way from Kant’s sublime. Kant’s was the attempt, once again, to reconstitute the excess of feeling within the notions of “unity,” “integrity,” and “coherence” sanctioned by the “ethical man.” As Hayden White has noticed, Kant’s sublime is some sort of disguised ideology which disciplines the suprasensible by reconciling it with the re-cognition of a social meaning in it. The individual, rather than freeing him/herself from overwhelming totalities, is eventually subjected to the overpowering force–a force of representation, or “faculty of concepts”–of the ethical man.13 By advocating the need for rupture, disjunction, and differance, the postmodern “improper use of hierarchy” might well fall out from any Kantian categorization. In his insightful “Sublime Politics,” Donald Pease implicitly maintains the necessity, for postmodernist poetics, of dropping out any argument about, and tendency toward, the sublime:

     

    Despite all the revolutionary rhetoric invested in the term, the sublime has, in what we could call the politics of historical formation, always served conservative purposes . . . the sublime, instead of disclosing a revolutionary way of being that is other than the ethical, in Kant's rendition, is reduced to strictly ethical duties. Or, put differently, the sublime makes the formation of an ethical character sound as if it is a rebellious task.(275-276; Pease's emphasis.)

     

    Published in boundary 2 in 1984, Pease’s might be seen as a declaration of postmodernist intents. However, Pease’s refusal of the sublime may be contradictorily sublime in itself. What Pease claims, in his elaborate discussion and description of so many theories of the sublime, is the necessity of dropping out, releasing a certain political embarrassment which seems to be the given of the sublime. By first citing an impressive mass of material on the sublime, and then proclaiming a repudiation of all these structures, Pease’s article offers a clear example of what I intend as the postmodern sublime, organized, indeed, on Hertz’s paradigm of blockage and release. Not only does Pease confront something as overwhelming as the sublime, but he also exceeds it, thus “uplifting” postmodernism beyond the possibilities of what is usually known as “the sublime.” In Pease’s epistemological displacement, the “sublime” reaches what Kant’s conservatism represses: namely, the discontinuity between the given structures and the individual effort to transcend that given; Pease’s sublime results in the differance between self and world, present and past, referent (the “sublime politics”) and sign (a discourse exceeding that referent).

     

    Dick Hebdige, in “The Impossible Object: Towards a Sociology of the Sublime,” is more explicit than Pease in affirming the existence of a postmodern sublime based on the ironic rejection of previous theories of the sublime and on the disruption of totalities. Hebdige singles out what he calls “the pull towards the asocial sublime” in contemporary discourse: for Hebdige, the mode of the “asocial sublime” is a celebration of the “camp vision,” the vision of waste, trash, and excrement–an indirect citation of Barthelme’s “digging on the leading edge of the trash phenomenon.” The ironic inversion of the sublime from Kant and Lyotard’s totalizing aestheticizations (a re-engagement of the excess as aesthetic work), to the new “camp vision,” explicitly aims at both resisting unity and locating the force of postmodern sublime within the realm of an anti-aesthetic differance. For Hebdige, one of the most remarkable strategies of the postmodern sublime consists in the simultaneous citation and combination (“double coding,” in Umberto Eco’s or Linda Hutcheon’s terminologies) of texts belonging to high and camp culture. The result of this peculiar citational practice is complexly disruptive and constructive at once: at the same moment in which hierarchy (high vs. low culture) is disrupted, the post-modern subject is “uplifted” with a sense of complete mastery of both fields:

     

    Rather than surrender mastery of the fields, the critics who promulgate the line that we are living at the end of everything (and are all these critics men [sic]?) make one last leap and resolve to take it all-- judgement, history, politics, aesthetics, value--out of the window. . . . The implication seems to be that if they cannot sit at the top of Plato's pyramid, then there shall not be any pyramid at all.(Hebdige 70)

     

    As Fred Pfeil maintains, manipulation and digestion of culture in its entirety, from high to low, coincides with some sort of jouissance, of a pleasure that is, in the last analysis, the constitutive nature of postmodern subjectivity:

     

    [the postmodern subject] finds him/herself an extraordinarily well-rounded, complete cultural consumer and connoisseur, eminently capable of taking pleasure in a spectrum of choices . . . ranging from just a step ahead of mass culture . . . to just a foot short of high.(108)

     

    At this point, we can start defining the specific features of a postmodern strategy of the sublime, which is —on le sait!–an anti-theory, a virtual subversion of all totalizing theories. Hebdige’s sense of metaphoric inversion from art to anti-art, from aesthetics to anti-aesthetics, from the “beautiful” to the sublime “camp vision,” and from “exhaustion” to “mastery,” no longer stresses the drama of “ultimacies,” or the disintegration of identity; instead, it shifts into the strategy for the Bildung of a new subject. This new subject confronts given structures to master them with some kind of Keatsean negative capability.14 In his book on The Art of Excess: Mastery in Contemporary American Fiction, Tom Le Clair argues:

     

    Recognizing their dependence on their culture's system of dissemination . . . novelists have two strategies to counter the homogeneity of mass-produced and institutionally controlled information. One strategy is to collect to excess and thus use against the dominant culture its own information. The other...(16)

     

    . . . But let us stay with the first of Le Clair’s strategies of mastery: the postmodern sublime, to start with, is a strategy of “collection” and ex-cess (etymologically: ex cedere, to give out), in which the givens of an “accumulation of writing” (Hertz), of a political embarrassment (Pease), or of “mass-produced and institutionally controlled information” (Le Clair), lead not so much to a rejection, but rather to an introjection (admission of the problem, commentary, citation, allusion), which poses a blockage suddenly overcome by a release, an ironic “excess” which turns the manipulator against cultural givens. This sublime strategy of ingestion, ironic blockage, and final release, has been defined by Arthur Kroker and David Cook as the privileged strategy of an “excremental culture”: such a culture nourishes itself of the “pestilential spirit” of social and cultural entropic systems, to finally digest and drop out a fairly new message of disruption whose “psychological signs are those of . . . disaccumulation”: “[postmodern art] exists at the edge of ecstasy and decay where the consumer culture of the passive nihilists does a reversal and in a catastrophic implosion flips into its opposite number” (10 ff.). Not altogether differently, John Barth’s metaphor of disaccumulation in Lost in the Funhouse suggests that “The final possibility is to turn ultimacy, exhaustion, paralyzing self- consciousness and the adjective weight of accumulated history … Go on. Go on. To turn ultimacy against itself to make something new and valid” (109).

     

    Ihab Hassan, as far as I know, is the first critic who has defined the postmodern sublime as ironic discharge of the “infinite powers” that impede expression. Hassan’s metaphor is that of defecation overcoming the nausea brought about by constipation:

     

    Nathaniel West, writing at the edge of our contemporaneity, first comes to mind . . . The Dream Life of Balso Snell, mock artist, proves to be a wet dream. More precisely, Snell imagines that he ascends into the bowels of the Trojan horse. This accords with his view of art as "sublime excrement." West seems to endorse this bilious irony: his own repugnance of life touches even his craft. His nausea, which no social dependency of the thirties can entirely explain, conceals itself in black comedy. A world of ugly doorknobs, dead dreams, and distressed loves, burns into the ash of parodic apocalypse. Thus West, turning violence into dubious merriment, is the new satirist laughing at the wound within his laugh. Thirty years after, William Burroughs carries the excremental vision even farther. A devilish mimic, he transposes a world ruled by entropy, waste, and disease into a film of metallic laughter.(Dismemberment 249)

     

    The vision of excremental sublime, as “parodic apocalypse” of a subject opposing “a world ruled by entropy,” certainly emerges in many postmodern works. We might think of Pynchon’s “defecation rites,” or of the narrator of Gass’s The Heart of the Heart of the Country who asserts that “I want to rise so high that when I shit I won’t miss anybody.” Federman’s The Voice in the Closet provides the (autobiographical) example of a thirteen-year- old boy hidden in a closet to escape the Nazis: “I was scared. And on top of that, in the middle of the afternoon I had to take a crap. And why not? So I unfolded one of the newspapers and took a shit on it” (47). After defecation, fear is overcome; the boy finds courage to leave the closet, and embarks to America. Federman charges the scene with almost obvious allegorical implications: the closet becomes the tomb and the womb for the coming-into- life of a new subject; defecation is the ironic release of the fear of death and annihilation. The same allegorical structure is at work in Coover’s Spanking the Maid. The “teacher” of Coover’s story has to realize that his Victorian ideal of Bildung–“feeding with spanking . . . that broad part preferred by him and Mother Nature for the invention of the souls”–is absolutely incorrect. For “that broad part” of the human body “seems more like a place for letting things out than putting things in.” After a moment of apparent death, which is, in truth, only a digestive pause, the “invention of souls,” the epiphany of the subject, happens in a water-closet, in a last heraldic effort to produce “spiritual” signs: “twitching amicably yet authoritatively like a damp towel, down a bottomless hole, relieving himself noisily” (102). Even more explicitly, Vonnegut’s Slaughterhouse Five offers fecal signs as allegorical signs of authorial consciousness and as the epiphany of the radical writer opposing war and its horrors:

     

    Billy looked inside the latrine. The wailing was coming from there. The place was crammed with Americans who had taken their pants down. The welcome feast had made them as sick as volcanoes. The buckets were full or had been kicked over. An American near Billy wailed that he had excreted everything but his brains. Moments later he said, "There they go, there they go." He meant his brains. That was I. That was me. That was the author of this book.(125)

     

    This is the price that the subject has to pay for its survival. Giving up any metaphysical consistency, this sort of subject becomes, quite literally, an excrement, a surplus that cannot be codified and inscribed in the fabricated notions of “reality.” Its “resistance” to codification institutes at the same time its absolute superfluity in relation to the symbolic order. Its manipulation of codes and structures, in other words, cannot have any effectual consistency if not in establishing a topos in which subjectivity may exist, as a digestive process, in a sublime manipulation of pre-existing categories.

     

    Examples of excremental sublime in postmodern American fiction could multiply almost endlessly. However, I should discourage my reader from thinking that the excremental sublime is limited to the (many) cases in which fecal signs explicitly appear in the literary space; rather, excremental sublimity consists of a narrative practice which I have defined as a movement from blockage to release, and from Longinian citation or Kantian re-presentation to sublime digestive transformation. As such, it encompasses a more general postmodern trend: it includes any strategy of incorporating social myths and given plots–we might say: history and/as literary tradition–to finally release new stories and new modes of being. This new mode of being is the postmodern radical subject, who has survived the menaces of death and has “uplifted” him/herself with “joyful pride” in an act of ultimate poiein. In this sense, we might well conceive of the postmodern subject as a sphincter muscle performing its daily activity of retention, manipulation, and ex-pression; Altieri seems to endorse this idea when he argues, rather aphoristically, that “as organ, the [postmodern] ego has its own rhythms of expansion and contraction . . . it is not a place to store experience, but a way of experiencing” (627; Altieri’s emphasis).

     

    However, some mysteries are still unsolved: how can postmodern irony overcome the moment of blockage? And how can a subject be reconstituted–in his/her “way of being”– in spite of a power aggressively trying to “objectify” him/her? The postmodern answer to both questions is that the blockage–the “impossibility”–is not “real”; power is only a fiction. Put like this, the answer may seem too blunt, and it certainly exacts sharpening in order to prevent excessive optimism. It is my assumption that the achievements of Marcuse’s Eros and Civilization (1962) and Norman O’Brown’s Life against Death (1964) must be taken as defining features of the American postmodern sublime. For it is in these works that, through an alliance of Marx and Freud, the inevitable confrontation of subject and power takes place in a radically new fashion. Exemplified (maybe at the excess) by Theodore Roszack’s “The Dialectics of Liberation,” the problem of “making a counter culture” during the sixties could be put like this:

     

    While both Marx and Freud held that man is the victim of a false consciousness from which he must be freed to achieve fulfillment, their diagnoses were built on very different principles. For Marx, that which is hidden from reason is the exploitive reality of the social system. Culture--"ideology" [. . .]--intervenes between reason and reality to mask the operation of invidious class interest. . . . For Freud, that which is hidden from reason is the content of the unconscious mind. Culture plays its part in the deception not as a mask concealing social reality, but rather as a screen on which the psyche projects itself in a grand repertory of "sublimations." [. . .] There we have the issue. Is the psyche, as Marx would have it, a reflection of "the mode of production of material life"? Or is the social structure, as Freud argued, a reflection of our psychic contents?(84-85)

     

    What is power, then? Social super structure, or father figure projected by the unconscious? Philosophically, the issue raises the question of the locus of reality; politically, it poses the question of how liberation is to be achieved: by social or psychic revolution? Marcuse’s answer to these questions is that power is both a reality and a fiction: accordingly, he tries to develop a radical social critique out of the psychoanalytic assumption that power may be, after all, a projection, a myth. Significantly enough, this Freudian turn moves American radicalism away from Marxist de-subjectification and, in a very Emersonian way, puts the accent upon those “tendencies that have been attenuated in the post-Marxian development of his critique of society [Marx’s, in his first writings], namely, the elements of communistic individualism.”15

     

    Marcuse’s social critique hinges on the notion of “alienation.” For Marcuse, “alienation” does not have any of Marx’s (or Hegel’s) connotations. Alienation is no longer a locus between labor and exploitation, but rather a disease that is rooted inside human beings. What the psychiatrist knows is that alienation results from acts of repression: the patient “forgets” his/her own construction of symbolic structures that the analytic anamnesis should re-present. Marcuse emphasizes the primacy of consciousness in social changes: the subject must be conscious of his/her own projections; s/he must recognize, in other words, that “power” is nothing else than the re-presentation of an Oedipal complex Eros viii ff.). The impossibility, or blockage, is only a psychic construction, a story.

     

    I will discuss the Oedipal strategy of postmodern sublime, based on Freud’s notion of “anal character,” in the next section. To bring the current section to a conclusion, let me notice how Marcuse’s social critique bears powerfully on postmodern narrative. Larry McCaffery’s The Metafictional Muse provides a neat summary of how postmodern narrative can produce an anamnesis of the artificial construction of overpowering structures of “reality”:

     

    In examining the concept of man-as-fiction-maker, [postmodern works] deal with characters busily constructing systems to play with or to help them deal with their chaotic lives. Some of these systems are clearly fictional in nature: we observe writers trying to create stories, men struggling to break the hold of mythic patterns, desperate people inventing religious explanations for a terrible catastrophe. . . . Yet, [postmodern narrative] is filled with hints that other, less obviously artificial systems--such as mathematics, science, religion, myth, and the perspectives of history and politics--are also fictional at their core. . . . [T]here exists a tension between the process of man creating his fictions and his desire to assert that his systems have an independent existence of their own. . . . [T]his tension typically results in man losing sight of the fictional basis of his systems and eventually becoming trapped within them.(25-26)

     

    The postmodern subject is thus the locus (maybe all-too literally a rhetorical topos) of consciousness; consciousness of the fictional nature of overpowering structures will finally allow the subject to imagine new plots, new stories, new lives to be told. Let us think, in this context, of Coover’s maneuver in “Aesop’s Forest”: the imaginative power of the narrator is here absolutely impaired by the presence of his grand precursor–Aesop. Facing such an overpowering presence, the narrator can only cite the stories already told by the genius–Aesop. But, as the scholar well knows, “Aesop” is only “a fictional construct . . . [a] biography . . . reconstructed to satisfy the Greek requirement, according to which all genres should have an inventor” (Chenetier 97). The overpowering presence that impairs the subject turns out to be a mere fiction! As Borges would put it, “[t]he fact is that every writer creates his own precursor.”16 The blockage–the death–may be overcome by consciousness, thus uplifting the subject as the true crafter of his/her own narration. In this moment of sublime release, the dejecta membra are re-composed into subjective expression: “Orpheus, dismembered, continues to sing” (Hassan, Dismemberment 45).

     

    …You see, dear reader, how, step by step, singing along, citing, arguing, implying, yawning, digesting what has been already said, apologizing, we go on together from section to section! We are already at the end of the second section, and one hour ago the first one did not even exist yet. You see, this is the mystery and joy of the excremental sublime. There was a great silence, nothing that we could say to each other, no new story we could entertain each other with. In truth, you did not even exist, and neither did I. There was nothing, not even the excremental sublime. Maybe only the embarrassing feeling of something that we wanted to say. And then, in this silence, a voice is heard, a voice that I want to compare to the growling of the bowels after a meal long retained, and the voice becomes stronger, and the story bigger, and nothingness a logorrhea…. Maybe it was in this way that the world we live in was created–from the unintentional digestion of an apple….

     

    … Well, I was happy to find ourselves at the end of the second section, but now I am losing myself in superfluous details. And so, let us jump into our third section….

     

    The Postmodern Subject: An Epiphany Of Sorts

     

    I think of myself as a lyrical socialist,which makes about as much sense, given the world we live in, as being an anal-retentive anarchist with a bomb in his hand.

     

    –Robert Coover, Whatever Happened to Gloomy Gus of the Chicago Bears?

     

    “All aesthetics has its root in repressed anal erotism,” the psychoanalyst says (Ferenczi 325). All writing, on le sait!, engages in some sort of coprophiliac activity. Yet the paradigm of blockage and release that we have followed so far seems to suggest that the process —the movement from retention to release–is far more important, for the postmodern Muse, than the final excremental result. It is this process, after all, that structures the intensity of postmodern narrative–a process of digestion of old and mythical structures that will indefinitely defer the production of an ultimate (fecal) meaning. In this sense, even the postmodern subject will be, as Altieri has already told us, a “process,” rather than a simple excremental left-over of our times.17 It is a subject, as Kathy Acker’s Don Quixote has it, that resists “capitulation to social control. . . . [t]o letting our political leaders locate our identities in the social” (18), and that continually refuses to end its manipulations and digestion into visible social signs. It is a subject, in other words, that finds in the process defined above as excremental sublime its locus and only raison d’etre.

     

    Another way to define this process, and thus identify our subject, is of course through Freud’s notions of “anal retentiveness” and “anal character”:

     

    they [anal characters] seem to have been among those who refuse to empty the bowel when placed on the chamber, because they derive an incidental pleasure from the act of defecation.("Character" 28; emphasis mine)

     

    Anal retention aims at finding “an incidental pleasure” in the moment of eventual defecation. Pleasure is “incidental” to actual defecation, since it belongs more properly to the process of retention and release. Such process is also, as the quoted passage suggests, an Oedipal strategy, that is, a refusal of the Law imposed by authority. If defecation is a pleasure, this pleasure cannot accept any external imposition or constraint: the subject must decide when, where, and how, this pleasurable activity shall take place. Freud supplements the passage quoted above with a footnote which better highlights the Oedipal refusal of a super-imposed Law (i.e., the wish of the nurse) which tries to regulate defecation according to social (i.e., non-pleasurable) norms; the footnote runs like this:

     

    It is one of the best signs of later eccentricity or nervousness if an infant obstinately refuses to empty his bowel when placed on the chamber, that is, when the nurse wishes, but withholds this function at his own pleasure. Naturally it does not matter to the child if he soils his bed; his only concern is not to lose the pleasure incidental to the act of defecation.("Character" 29; emphasis mine)

     

    The fact that Freud confers on the anal character the quality of an “obstinacy [which] may amount to defiance, [and] with which irascibility and vindictiveness may easily be associated” (“Character” 28) should not pass unnoticed. The most distinctive traits of the anal character seem therefore to be those of a rebellious, almost anarchic energy; its main qualities, much more than “parsimony” and “order,” seem to be, as Freud’s essay on “Character and Anal Erotism” has it, “obstinacy,” “vindictiveness,” and “eccentricity.” Dispositions, in other words, which defiantly refuse social order. It is worth noting that Freud, in Civilization and its Discontents, singles out in anal retention a “most remarkable” strategy for the “sublimation” of a particular kind of subjectivity, that is, an “original personality, which is still untamed by civilization and may thus become the basis . . . of hostility to civilization” (43). Thus, an “anal character” is the sublimation of an anti-social impulse, and the anal-retentive character might well be identified with Coover’s “anal-retentive anarchist with a bomb in his hand”: s/he who survives a repressive society by disrupting its order, and by transforming its Law into pleasurable fecal signs.

     

    In this ironic negativity, in this reduction to a metabolic process, Lentricchia’s “radical subject” and “disappointed intellectual” seems to have been re-membered and brought back to life after a digestive nap; social reality has been redeemed from Debord’s consumer conformism, Jameson’s schizophrenia, and Habermas’s indifference.

     

    “But,” the fairy-tale reads, “there’s always a ‘but’”. . . . Like Barthelme’s “angel,” my reader might be overtaken, at this point, by some fundamental questions (the question of angels in postmodern discourse has a considerable history, from Barthelme to Wim Wenders): Is redemption a mere narrative practice? Is the sublimation of the subject a mere narrative freedom resulting from the disruption of notions such as “essence,” arche, and “representation”? Furthermore: what kind of hopes can we draw from a narrative that resolves any signification to excrementality? Will digestion resist the inevitable commodification of our lives? Will we prevent society from reducing our selves to excremental left-overs? Henry Kariel, in The Desperate Politics of Postmodernism, woefully remarks that “we resist . . . by telling a story, by producing narratives that elaborately depict the drift of events as the sublime unfolding of the inevitable” (117). But what besides these stories and ephemeral resistance? What changes in “real life,” or in the real life of our postmodern subjectivities–those wonderful entelechies of creation? However puzzling the term “real” may sound in the context of a postmodern condition, the doubt cannot be repressed; the angel, unaccustomed to doubt, falls into despair: “Redemption is a fucking fiction anyway,” Gravity’s Rainbow admonishes us; “It’s all shit anyway,” Coover’s forest resounds. Maybe Cornelius Castoriadis is right in his jeremiad on “Post-Modernism as Generalized Conformism”: even this allegory of the postmodern subject as excremental practice may be the, albeit sublime, manifestation of “the pathetic inability of the epoch to conceive of itself as something positive” (14). Moreover, as Yudice admonishes, it is difficult to discern any political relevance–if not Coover’s anal-retentive “anarchism”–in these narratives of subjective redemption:

     

    The aesthetics accompanying current analyses of eating disorders tend to celebrate the individual body, thus not posing any challenge to the Right or Liberalism. We need an aesthetics that instills the values of the social body.("Transcendent Body" par. 36)

     

    Undoubtedly, angels should start looking forward for a more “concrete” strategy of survival, a radical praxis that does not act only in the sacred wood of literary theory and in the groves of subjectivity, but also in the doomed world of production. Until then, postmodern theory and narrative will play the role of praxis while praxis has no more role to play.

     

    Today that postmodernism, as Hassan pontificates (in Selves At Risk) is at its dusk–or is it an ironic dusk preparing for another rebirth? Today that postmodernism seems on the verge of its ultimate exhaustion, it is likely that we should surrender to the ultimate impossibility of reconstituting radical politics according to excremental practices. Probably, the postmodern sublime is today an untenable strategy even for real subjects’s survival. Linda Hutcheon, among many, advocates the necessity of going beyond postmodernism, of “using” it to “exceed” it: “Postmodernism manipulates, but does not . . . (re)construct the structures of subjectivity . . . [we] may use postmodern strategies of parodic inscription and subversion in order to initiate the deconstructive first step, but [we] do not stop therePolitics 168; emphasis mine). Postmodernism is dead! Long live postmodernism! (But isn’t there a sense of deja vu in Hutcheon’s forest? What is this initiation about?). Today, failure faced, one feels that new doors must be open, new strategies found, new steps taken, new paths trodden. Let us finally digest postmodernism!

     

    . . . With a sense of deep elegy, a feeling of nausea and an unbearable burden in my constipated stomach, I conclude this paper with Robert Coover, postmodern Virgil, with whom my own quest begun:

     

    THIS ACT IS CONCLUDED
    THE MANAGEMENT REGRETS THERE WILL
    BE NO REFUND.(Pricksongs 256)

    Notes

     

    1. See Max F. Schulz, Radical Sophistication, esp. 198 ff.

     

    2. See Franco La Polla, Un posto nella mente: il nuovo romanzo americano.

     

    3. Frank Lentricchia, Ariel and the Police: Michel Foucault, William James, Wallace Stevens (Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1988), 96-97; on the notion of postmodernism as “aesthetic of self-formation” see also George Yudice, “Marginality and the Ethics of Survival.”

     

    4. Robert Coover, “Interview with Larry McCaffery,” 68. In a slip of the tongue Coover seems to echo Sigmund Freud: Life, as we find it, is too hard for us; it brings to us too many pains, disappointments, and impossible tasks. In order to bear it we cannot dispense with palliative measures. “We cannot do with auxiliary constructions,” Theodor Fontane tells us. . . . But one can do more than that; one can try to re-create the world, to build up in its stead another world in which its most unbearable features are eliminated and replaced by others…. (Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents 22 and 28)

     

    5. Robert Coover, “Aesop’s Forest” 82; see also Hassan’s metaphorization of postmodernism in the terms of the Orpheus’s myth, in The Dismemberment of Orpheus.

     

    6. Coover’s active participation in Aesop’s lynching cannot pass unnoticed in the shift from “They’ll be here soon,” (75), referring to the Delphians, to the final “We set him [Aesop] on his bendy legs and stepped back, blocking any possible escape” (81).

     

    7. On the centrality of Bentham’s notion of “necessary fiction” in American narrative, see Guido Carboni, La finzione necessaria; see also Fred Pfeil, Another Tale to Tell.

     

    8. Maxine Hong Kingston, The Woman Warrior: Memories of a Girlhood among Ghosts (New York: Vintage, 1989), 88 and 90. For the symbology of the ghosts as essence of patriarchy, see Sidonie Smith, “Maxine Hong Kingston’s Woman Warrior: Filiality and Woman’s Autobiographical Storytelling.” Notably within feminism, “big eating” seems to counteract what Kim Chernin has called “the tyranny of slenderness” imposed on women by patriarchy; on this issue, see Kim Chernin, The Obsession. Reflections on the Tyranny of Slenderness, and Susan Bordo, “Reading the Slender Body.”

     

    9. Jean Baudrillard, “The Obese,” Fatal Strategies; on the way food industry may re-code gastronomic excess into consumerism, see Warren Belasaco, Appetite for Change: How the Counterculture Took On the Food Industry. 1966-1988.

     

    10. In postmodern narrative, “[c]haracters become the passive receptors of phenomena from outside; they become all ears, listening to the sounds of voices, noises from the street, literary parodies and emulations, music . . . compulsion to repeat” (Poirier 9); anticipating for a moment, I would like to paraphrase Lacan, in order to individuate in the “repetition compulsion” an ironic (“reversal”) mode of affirmation of the subject in history but as difference from history: [the repetition compulsion] has in view nothing less than the historizing temporality of the experience of transference, so does the death instinct essentially express the limit of the historical function of the subject. This limit is death–not as an eventual coming-to-term of the life of the individual, nor as the empirical certainty of the subject, but, as Heidegger’s formula puts it, as that “possibility which is one’s ownmost, unconditional, unsupersedable, certain and as such indeterminable (unberholbare)” . . . This limit represents the past in its real form, that is to say, not the physical past whose existence is abolished, nor the epic past as it has become perfected in the work of memory, nor the historic past in which man finds the guarantor of his future, but the past which reveals itself reversed in repetition. (“The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis” in Ecrits 103; emphasis mine).

     

    11. Bove, Destructive Poetics 37. Examples of this break with genealogy: the abortion at the beginning of Kathy Acker’s Don Quixote; the illegitimate child at the beginning of Maxine Hong Kingston’s The Woman Warrior.

     

    12. References are to Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgement 90-94.

     

    13. See Hayden White, “The Politics of Historical Interpretation: Discipline and Desublimation.”

     

    14. Charles Altieri, in “From Symbolist Thought to Immanence,” stresses the importance of Keats’s notion of “negative capability” in the context of American postmodern poetics; he traces a genealogy from Keats to Olson.

     

    15. Herbert Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, 294-295; another exemplary case of the psychoanalytic turn of Marxism into “Marxist Humanism” is certainly Erich Fromm, Marx’s concept of Man.

     

    16. Jorge Luis Borges, “Kafka and his Precursors,” 201; Borges’s own emphasis. Also Tony Tanner: “[postmodern writers suggest that] the plots men see may be their own inventions” City of Words 156).

     

    17. Charles Altieri, “From Symbolist Thought to Immanence”; but is this idea of self-as-process a novelty of postmodernism? Identity as a process of self-creation is, after all, a Jungian idea. James Olney confirms: “Like the elements, individual man never is but is always becoming: his self, as C.J. Jung will say some twenty-five hundred years after Heraclitus–nor did man change much in the interim–is a process rather than a settled state of being” (James Olney, Metaphors of Self 27). And so, postmodernism is once again repeating the old, isn’t it? And yet, John Paul Russo comments on Olney’s passage, “[i]t is hard to reconcile the two sides of this sentence: on one hand man is ‘always becoming.’ On the other, man has not changed ‘much’ in two and a half millennia” (John Paul Russo, “The Disappearance of the Self” 22).

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    • Lentricchia, Frank. Ariel and the Police: Michel Foucault, William James, Wallace Stevens. Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1988.
    • Lyotard, Jean-Francois. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi. Manchester: Manchester UP, 1984.
    • Marcuse, Herbert. Eros and Civilization. New York: Vintage Books, 1962.
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    • McCaffery, Larry. The Metafictional Muse: The Works of Robert Coover, Donald Barthelme, and William H. Gass. Pittsburgh: U of Pittsburgh P, 1982.
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    • Olney, James. Metaphors of Self: The Meaning of Autobiography. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1972.
    • Orbach, Susie. Hunger Strike: The Anorectic’s Struggle as a Metaphor for our Age. New York: Norton, 1987.
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    • Pfeil, Fred. Another Tale to Tell: Politics & Narrative in Postmodern Culture. London: Verso, 1990.
    • Poirier, Richard. The Performing Self. New York: Oxford UP, 1971.
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    • Polla, Franco La. Un posto nella mente: il nuovo romanzo americano (1962-1982). Ravenna: Longo, 1983.
    • Pynchon, Thomas. Gravity’s Rainbow. Harmandsworth: Penguin, 1987.
    • Roszack, Theodor. “The Dialectics of Liberation: Herbert Marcuse and Norman Brown.” The Making of a Counter Culture: Reflections on the Technocratic Society and its Youthful Opposition. New York: Doubleday, 1969.
    • Russo, John Paul. “The Disappearance of the Self: Some Theories of Autobiography in the United States, 1964-1987.” Tuttamerica 29-30-31 (1986-87).
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    • Schulz, Max F. Radical Sophistication: Status in Contemporary Jewish-American Novelists. Athens: Ohio UP, 1969.
    • Sloterdijk, Peter. Critique of Cynical Reason. Trans. Michael Eldred. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1987.
    • Smith, Sidonie. “Maxine Hong Kingston’s Woman Warrior: Filiality and Woman’s Autobiographical Storytelling.” A Poetics of Women’s Autobiography. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1987.
    • Sypher, Wylie. Loss of the Self in Modern Literature and Art. New York: Random House, 1962.
    • Tanner, Tony. City of Words: American Fiction (1950-1970). New York: Harper & Row, 1971.
    • Tatham, Campbell. “Mythotherapy and Postmodern Fiction.” Performance in Postmodern Culture. Eds. Michel Benamou & Charles Caramello. Madison: Coda Press, 1977
    • Trilling, Lionel. Sincerity and Authenticity. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1972.
    • Vonnegut, Kurt, Jr. Slaughterhouse Five. New York: Dell, 1969
    • White, Hayden. “The Culture of Criticism.” Liberations: New Essays on the Humanities in Revolution. Ed. Ihab Hassan. Middletown: Wesleyan UP, 1971.
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    • Wilson, Edmund. The Cold War and the Income Tax. New York: Signet, 1964.
    • Yudice, George. “Feeding the Transcendent Body.” Postmodern Culture 1.1 (Sep. 1990).
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    Forthcoming in 1993:
    
    The Violence of Light in the Land of Desire; or How William Jones
    Discovered India / Jenny Sharp
    
    Veiled Woman and Veiled Narrative in Tahar Ben Jelloun's _The
    Sandchild_ / John. D. Erickson
    
    The Ideologies and Semiotics of Fascism: Analyzing Pound's
    _Cantos 12-15_ / Stephen Hartnett
    
    Lionel Trilling, _The Liberal Imagination_, and the Emergence of
    the Cultural Discourse of Anti-Stalinism / Russell J. Reising
    
    Divine Politics: Virginia Woolf's Journey toward Eleusis in _To
    the Lighthouse_ / Tina Barr
    
    %Saxa loquuntur%: Freud's Archaeology of the Text / Sabine Hake
    
    Deleuze's Nietzsche / Petra Perry
    
    A Tyranny of Justice: The Ethics of Lyotard's Differend / Allen
    Dunn
    
    Thinking\Writing the Postmodern: Representation, End, Ground,
    Sending / Jeffrey T. Nealon
    
    Three issues annually
    Subscription prices: $48 institutions, $24 individuals, $16
    single issues.  Please add $6 for postage outside the U.S..
    
    Duke University Press/ Box 90660 /Durham NC  27708
    
    5) --------------------------------------------------------------
    
    _The Centennial Review_
    
    Edited by R.K. Meiners
    
    _The Centennial Review_ is committed to reflection on
    intellectual work, particularly as set in the University and its
    environment.  We are interested in work that examines models of
    theory and communication in the physical, biological, and human
    sciences; that re-reads major texts and authoritative documents
    in different disciplines or explores interpretive procedures;
    that questions the cultural and social implications of research
    in a variety of disciplines.
    
    **SPECIAL ISSUE**
    
    POLAND: FROM REAL SOCIALISM TO DEMOCRACY
    Winter 1993
    
    Guest Editor: Stephen Esquith
    Essays on events and ideas in recent Polish history, culture, and
    politics.
    
    Adam Michnik:
    _An Interview with Leszek Kolakowski_
    
    Marek Ziolkowski:
    _The Case of the Polish Intelligentsia_
    
    Marian Kempny:
    _On the Relevance of Social Anthropology
    
    to the Study of Post-Communist Culture_
    
    Plus: Lagowski, Narojek, Szszkowska, Buchowski, and others.
    
    Please begin my _CR_ subscription:
    
    ___ $12/year (3 issues)
    
    ___ $18/two years (6 issues)
    
    (Add $4.50 per year for mailing outside the US)
    
    Please send me the special issue:
    
    ___ _Poland: From Real Socialism to Democracy_
    
    Name____________________________________________
    
    Address_________________________________________
    
    City____________________________________________
    
    State/County____________________________________
    
    Zip_____________________________________________
    
    Please make your check payable to _The Centennial Review_.  Mail
    to:
    
    _The Centennial Review_
    312 Linton Hall
    Michigan State University
    East Lansing MI  48824-1044
    
    6) --------------------------------------------------------------
    
    _College Literature_
    A Triannual Literary Journal for the Classroom
    
    Edited by Kostas Myrsiades
    
    A triannual journal of scholarly criticism dedicated to serving
    the needs of College/University teachers by providing them with
    access to innovative ways of studying and teaching new bodies of
    literature and experiencing old literature in new ways.
    
    "_College Literature_ has made itself in a short time one of the
    leading journals in the field, important reading for anyone
    teaching literature to college students."
         J. Hillis Miller
         University of CA, Irvine
    
    "Congratulations on some extremely important work; you certainly
    seem attuned to what is both valuable and relevant."
         Terry Eagleton
         Oxford University
    
    "In one bold stroke you seem to have turned _College Literature_
    into one of the things everyone will want to read."
         Cary Nelson
    
    "My sense is that _College Literature_ will have substantial
    influence in the field of literacy and cultural studies."
         Henry A. Giroux
    
    "A journal one must consult to keep tabs on cultural theory and
    contemporary discourse, particularly in relation to pedagogy."
         Robert Con Davis
    
    Forthcoming issues:
    
         Third World Women's Literature
         African American Writing
         Cross-Cultural Poetics
    
    Subscription Rates:      US                  Foreign
             Individual      $24.00/year         $29.00/year
             Institutional:  $48.00/year         $53.00/year
    
    Send prepaid orders to:
    
    _College Literature_
    Main 544
    West Chester University
    West Chester, PA 19383
    (215)436-2901 / (fax) (215)436-3150
    
    7) --------------------------------------------------------------
    
    _CONTENTION_
    Debates in Society, Culture, and Science
    
    _Contention_ is:
    
    "...simply a triumph from cover to cover."
                                       Fredrick Crews
    
    "...extremely important."
                                       Alberta Arthurs
    
    "...the most exciting new journal 
        that I have ever read."
                                       Lynn Hunt
    
    "...superb."
                                       Janet Abu-Lughod
    
    "...an important, exciting, and 
        very timely project."
                                       Theda Skocpol
    "...an idea whose time has come."
                                       Robert Brenner
    
    "...serious and accessible."
                                       Louise Tilly
    
    Subscriptions (3 issues) are available to individuals at $25.00
    and to institutions at $50.00 (plus $10.00 for foreign surface
    postage) from:
    
    Journals Division
    Indiana University Press
    601 N. Morton
    Bloomington IN  47104
     ph: (812) 855-9449
    fax: (812) 855-7931
    
    8) --------------------------------------------------------------
    
    _Differences_
    A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies
    
    QUEER THEORY: LESBIAN AND GAY SEXUALITIES
    (Volume 3, Number 2)
    Edited by Teresa de Lauretis
    
    Teresa de Lauretis: _Queer Theory: Lesbian and Gay Sexualities
                         An Introduction_
    Sue Ellen Case:     _Tracking the Vampire_
    Samuel R. Delany:   _Street Talk/Straight Talk_
    Elizabeth A. Grosz: _Lesbian Fetishism?_
    Jeniffer Terry:     _Theorizing Deviant Historiography_
    Thomas Almaguer:    _Chicano Men: A Cartography of Homosexual
                         Identity and Behavior_
    Ekua Omosupe:  _Black/Lesbian/Bulldagger_
    Earl Jackson, Jr.: _Scandalous Subjects: Robert Gluck's
                         Embodied Narratives_
    Julia Creet:        _Daughter of the Movement: The
                         Psychodynamics of Lesbian S/M Fantasy_
    
    THE PHALLUS ISSUE
    (Volume 4, Number 1)
    Edited by Naomi Schor and Elizabeth Weed
    
    Maria Torok:        _The Meaning of "Penis Envy" in Women (1963)_
    Jean-Joseph Goux:   _The Phallus: Masculine Identity and the
                         "Exchange of Women"_
    Parveen Adams:      _Waiving the Phallus_
    Kaja Silverman:     _The Lacanian Phallus_
    Charles Bernheimer: _Penile Reference in Phallic Theory_
    Judith Butler:      _The Lesbian Phallus and the Morphological
                         Imaginary_
    Jonathan Goldberg: _Recalling Totalities: The Mirrored Stages
                         of Arnold Schwarzenegger_
    
    Emily Apter:        _Female Trouble in the Colonial Harem_
    
    Single Issues: $12.95 individuals
                    $25.00 institutions
                    ($1.75 each postage)
    
    Subscriptions (3 issues): $28.00 individuals
                               $48.00 institutions
                               ($10.00 foreign surface postage)
    
    Send orders to:
    
    Journals Division
    Indiana University Press
    601 N Morton
    Bloomington IN  47404
     ph: (812) 855-9449
    fax: (812) 855-7931
    
    9) --------------------------------------------------------------
    
    _DISCOURSE_
    
    Volume 15, Number 1
    
    SPECIAL ISSUE
    
    FLAUNTING IT: LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES
    
    Kathryn Baker:  Delinquent Desire: Race, Sex, and Ritual in
                    Reform Schools for Girls
    
    Terralee Bensinger: Lesbian Pornography: The Re-Making of (a)
                        Community
    
    Scott Bravmann: Investigating Queer Fictions of the Past:        
           Identities, Differences, and Lesbian and Gay 
           Historical Self-Representations
    
    Sarah Chinn and Kris Franklin: "I am What I Am" (Or Am I?):
          Making and Unmaking of Lesbian and Gay Identity in _High
          Tech Boys
    
    Greg Mullins:  Nudes, Prudes, and Pigmies: The Desirability of
                   Disavowal in _Physical Culture Magazine_
    
    JoAnn Pavletich:  Muscling the Mainstream: Lesbian Murder
                      Mysteries and Fantasies of Justice
    
    David Pendelton:  Obscene Allegories: Narrative Structures in
                      Gay Male Porn
    
    Thomas Piontek:  Applied Metaphors: AIDS and Literature
    
    June L. Reich:  The Traffic in Dildoes: The Phallus as Camp and
                    the Revenge of the Genderfuck
    
    Single Issues: $12.95 individuals
                   $25.00 institutions
                   ($1.75 each postage)
    
    Subscriptions (3 issues): $25.00 individuals
                              $50.00 institutions
                              ($10.00 foreign surface postage)
    
    Send orders to:
    
    Journals Division
    Indiana University Press
    601 N Morton
    Bloomington IN  47404
     ph: (812) 855-9449
    fax: (812) 855-7931
    
    10) ------------------------------------------------------------
    
    _The Electronic Journal on Virtual Culture_
    
    We are very pleased by the great interest in the _Electronic
    Journal on Virtual Culture_.  There are already more than 1,280
    people subscribed.
    
    Our first issue was distributed in March 1993.  The future looks
    very interesting.  Editors are working on Special Issues on
    education, law, qualitative research, and dynamics in virtual
    culture.
    
    The _Electronic Journal on Virtual Culture_  (EJVC) is a refereed
    scholarly journal that fosters, encourages, advances and
    communicates scholarly thought on virtual culture.  Virtual
    culture is computer-mediated experience, behavior, action,
    interaction and thought, including electronic conferences,
    electronic journals, networked information systems, the
    construction and visualization of models of reality, and global
    connectivity.
    
    EJVC is published monthly.  Some parts may be distributed at
    different times during the month or published only occasionally
    (e.g. CyberSpace Monitor).  If you would be interested in writing
    a column on some general topic area in the Virtual Culture (e.g.
    an advice column for questions about etiquette, technology, etc.
    ?) or have an article to submit or would be interested in editing
    a special issue contact Ermel Stepp Editor-in-Chief of Diane
    Kovacs Co-Editor at the e-mail addresses listed below. You can
    retrieve the file EJVC AUTHORS via anonymous ftp to
    byrd.mu.wvnet.edu (pub/ejvc) or via e-mail to listserv@kentvm or
    listserv@kentvm.kent.edu
    
    Cordially,
    
    Ermel Stepp, Marshall University, Editor-in-Chief
    MO34050@Marshall.wvnet.edu
    Diane (Di) Kovacs, Kent State University, Co-Editor
    DKOVACS@Kentvm.Kent.edu
    
    11) -------------------------------------------------------------
    
    _GENDERS_
    
    Ann Kibbey, Editor
    University of Colorado, Boulder
    
    Since 1988, _GENDERS_ has presented innovative theories of gender
    and sexuality in art, literature, history, music, photography,
    TV, and film.  Today, _GENDERS_ continues to publish both new and
    known authors whose work reflects an international movement to
    redefine the boundaries of traditional doctrines and disciplines.
    
                       ------------------------------
    
       _GENDERS_ is published triannually in Spring, Fall, Winter
            Single Copy rates: Individual $9, Institution $14
                      Foreign postage, add $2/copy
           Subscription rates: Individual $24, Institution $40
                 Foreign postage, add $5.50/subscription
    
    Send orders to:
    
    University of Texas
    Box 7819
    Austin TX  78713
    
    12) -------------------------------------------------------------
    
    M/E/A/N/I/N/G
    
    A Journal of Contemporary Art Issues
    
    M/E/A/N/I/N/G, an artist-run journal of contemporary art, is a
    fresh, lively, contentious, and provocative forum for new ideas
    in the arts.
    
    M/E/A/N/I/N/G is published twice a year in the fall and spring.
    It is edited by Susan Bee and Mira Schor.
    
    M/E/A/N/I/N/G #13 is a vivid mix of writings by artists and art
    historians.  Curtis Mitchell's "Working the Park" considers the
    sublime and the abject through the travails of an installation
    artist's efforts at public sculpture; Jordan Crandall's
    "Transactional Space" speaks of new systems of art communication
    and production at the limits of information technology; Jo Anna
    Isaak sheds new light on colonialist discourse in Matisse's "The
    Comfy Chair"; painting illiteracy is considered in Mira Schor's
    "Course Proposal;" Daryl Chin's "Those Little White Lies"
    critiques art history as an instrument of capitalism; an artist's
    spiritual sources are explored in David Reed's "Media Baptisms."
    
    Also in this issue: Definitions of "Art" by Stewart Buettner;
    Book and video reviews by Barry Schwabsky, Susan Bee, Johanna
    Drucker, Stephen O'Leary Harvey, and Robert C. Morgan.
    
    >From issue #13, Spring 1993
    
    "The sublime consists of a major dose of entropy, with the
    picturesque as only a condiment."
                                                 -- Curtis Mitchell
    
    "In all likelihood, what Matisse actually saw of a harem was what
    any tourist would see -- the high outer walls of the compound."
                                                 -- Jo Anna Isaak
    
    "If 'good' painting is suspect and unseen, then it might help to
    look at some bad painting just as closely."
                                                 -- Mira Schor
    
    "The artwork becomes a Marxist Christmas tree on which are hung
    gaudy baubles of 'late capitalism.'"
                                                 -- Daryl Chin
    
    "Rationality or belief don't work well now for painting.
    Suspension--doubt, works best."
                                                 -- David Reed
    
    Subscriptions for
    
    2 ISSUES (1 YEAR):
    $12 for individuals:
    $20 for institutions
    
    4 ISSUES (2 YEARS):
    $24 for individuals;
    $40 for institutions
    
    * Foreign subscribers please add $10 per year for shipping abroad
    and to Canada: $5
    
    * Foreign subscribers please pay by international money order in
    U.S. dollars.
    
    All checks should be made payable to Mira Schor
    
    Send all subscriptions to:
    
    Mira Schor
    60 Lispenard Street
    New York, NY 10013
    
    Limited supply of back issues available at $6 each, contact Mira
    Schor for information.
    
    Distributed with the Segue Foundation and the Solo Foundation
    
    13) -------------------------------------------------------------
    
    _Minnesota Review_
    
    Tell your friends!  Tell your librarians!
    The new _Minnesota Review_'s coming to town!
    
    **now under new management**
    
    Fall 1992 issue (n.s. 39): "PC WARS"
    
    includes essays by:
    
    * Richard Ohmann              "On PC and related matters"
    * Michael Berube              "Exigencies of Value"
    * Barry Sarchett              "Russell Jacoby, Anti-
                                   Professionalism, and the Politics
                                   of Cultural Nostalgia"
    * Michael Sprinkler           "The War Against Theory"
    * Balance Chow                "Liberal Education Left and Right"
    
    Spring 1993 issue (n.s. 40): "THE POLITICS OF AIDS"
    Poetry, Fiction, Interviews, Essays.
    
    topics include: 
    
    * Queer Theory and activism.
    * Public image of AIDS.
    * Politics of medical research.
    * Health care policies.
    
    Subscriptions are $10 a year (two issues), $20
    institutions/overseas.  The new _Minnesota Review_ is published
    biannually and originates from East Carolina University beginning
    with the Fall 1992 special issue.
    
    Send all queries, comments, suggestions, submissions, and
    subscriptions to: 
    
    Jeffrey Williams, Editor 
    _Minnesota Review_ 
    Department of English
    East Carolina University 
    Greenville, NC  27858-4353
    
    14) ------------------------------------------------------------
    
    NOMAD
          An Interdisciplinary Journal of
                           The Humanities,
                                     Arts,
                             And Sciences
    
    **************************************************************
    Manuscript submissions wanted in all interdisciplinary fields!
    
    Nomad is a forum for those texts that explore or examine the
    undefined regions among critical theory, visual arts, and
    writing.  It is a bi-annual, not-for-profit, independent
    publication for provocative cross-disciplinary work of all
    cultural types, such as intermedia artwork, metatheory, and
    experimental writing, as well as literary, theoretical,
    political, and popular writing.  While our editorial staff
    is comprized of artists and academics in a variety of
    disciplines, NOMAD strives to operate in a space outside of
    mainstream academic discourse and without institutional
    funding or controls.
    
    Manuscripts should not exceed fifteen pages (exclusive of
    references); any form is acceptable.  If possible, please
    submit manuscripts on 3.5" Macintosh disks, in either
    MicroSoft Word or MacWrite II format, or by E-mail.  Each
    manuscript submitted on disk must be accompanied by a paper
    copy. Otherwise, please send two copies of each manuscript.
    Artwork submitted must be no larger than 8 1/2" x 11", and
    in black and white.  PICT, TIFF, GIF, and JPEG files on
    3.5" Macintosh disks are acceptable, if accompanied by a
    paper copy (or via E-mail, bin-hexed or uuencoded).  All
    artwork must be camera-ready.  Submissions by regular mail
    should include a SASE with sufficient postage attached if
    return is desired.  Diskettes should be shipped in standard
    diskette mailing packages.
    
      Subscriptions: $9 per year (2 issues)
      Send Manuscripts and Inquiries to:
      NOMAD, c/o
      Mike Smith
      406 Williams Hall
      Florida State University
      Tallahassee, Florida, 32306
      (msmith@garnet.acns.fsu.edu)
    
    *****************************************************************
     "In NOMAD, the rarest combinations of interests are treated with
      respect and exposed to the eyes of those who can most
      appreciate them."
    *****************************************************************
    
    15) -------------------------------------------------------------
    
    _October_
    Art | Theory | Criticism | Politics
    
    The MIT Press
    
    Edited by: Rosalind Kraus
                Annette Michelson
                Yve-Alain Bois
                Benjamin H.D. Buchloh
                Hal Foster
                Denis Hollier
                John Rajchman
    
                                  "OCTOBER, the 15-year old
                                  quarterly of social and cultural
                                  theory, has always seemed special.
                                  Its nonprofit status, its cross-
                                  disciplinary forays into film 
                                  and psychoanalytic thinking, and
                                  its unyielding commitment to 
                                  history set it apart from the
                                  glossy art magazines."
                                            --Village Voice
    
    As the leading edge of arts criticism and theory today, _OCTOBER_
    focuses on the contemporary arts and their various contexts of
    interpretation.  Original, innovative, provocative, each issue
    examines interrelationships between the arts and their critical
    and social contexts.
    
    Come join _OCTOBER_'s exploration of the most important issues in
    contemporary culture.
    Subscribe Today!
    
    Published Quarterly ISSN 0162-2870.  Yearly Rates: Individual
    $32.00; Institution $80.00; Student (copy of current ID required)
    and Retired: $22.00.  Outside USA add $14.00 postage and
    handling.  Canadians add additional 7% GST.  Prepayment is
    required.  Send check payable to _OCTOBER_ drawn against a US
    bank, MasterCard or VISA number to: MIT Press Journal / 55
    Hayward Street / Cambridge, MA 02142-1399 / TEL: (617) 233-2889 /
    FAX: (617) 258-6779 / E-Mail: journals-orders@mit.edu
    
    16) -------------------------------------------------------------
    
    _RIF/T_
    E-Poetry Literary Journal
    
                                  In all arts there is a physical
                                  component . . .  We must expect
                                  great innovations to transform the
                                  entire technique of the arts.
                                                      --Paul Valery
    
    This list was formed to serve as a vehicle for (1) distribution
    of an interactive literary journal: _RIF/T_ and related exchange,
    and (2) collection of any information related to contemporary
    poetics.
    
    _RIF/T provides a forum for poets that are conversant with the
    media to explore the full potential of a true electronic journal.
    
    Dynamic--not static, _RIF/T_ shifts and riffs with the diction of
    "trad" poetry investigating a new, flexible, fluid poetry of
    exchange.
    
    Archives of e-poetry and related files are stored in the e-poetry
    FILELIST.
    
    To receive a list of files send the command 
    
    INDEX e-poetry 
    
    to: LISTSERV@UBVM or LISTSERV@UBVM.CC.BUFFALO.EDU as the first
    line in the body of your mail message (not your Subject: line).
    
    To subscribe to e-poetry, send the command
    
    SUB e-poetry your name
    
    to: LISTSERV@UBVM or LISTSERV@UBVM.CC.BUFFALO.EDU via mail
    message (again, as the first line in the body of the mail, not
    the Subject: line).  For example: SUB e-poetry John Doe
    
    Owner: Ken Sherwood
    v001pxfu@ubvms.cc.buffalo.edu
    
    17) -------------------------------------------------------------
    
    _SSCORE_
    Social Science Computer Review
    
    G. David Garson, Editor
    Ronald Anderson, Co-editor
    
    The official journal of the Social Science Computing Association,
    _SSCORE_ provides a unique forum for social scientists to acquire
    and share information on the research and teaching applications
    of microcomputing.  Now, when you subscribe to _Social Science
    Computer Review_, you automatically become a member of the Social
    Science Computing Association.
    
    Recent articles:
    
    Social Impacts of Computing: Codes of Professional Ethics
    Ronald Anderson
    
    Teledemocracy and Political Science
    William H. Dutton
    
    Trends in the Use of Computers in Economics Teaching in the
    United Kingdom
    Guy Judge and Phil Hobbs
    
    The Essentials of Scientific Visualization: Basic Techniques and
    Common Problems
    Steve E. Follin
    
    Psychology: Keeping up with the State of the Art in Computing
    Charles Huff
    
    Computer Assistance in Qualitative Sociology
    David R. Heise
    
    Automating Analysis, Visualization, and Other Social Science
    Research Tasks
    Edwin H. Carpenter
    
    From Mainframes to Micros: Computer Applications for
    Anthropologists
    Robert V. Kemper, Ronald K. Wetherington, and Michael Adler
    
    Quarterly
    Subscription prices: $48 individual, $80 institutions
    Single Issue: $20
    Please add $8 for postage outside the U.S.
    Canadian residents add 7% GST
    
    Duke University Press/ Journals Division / Box 90660 /Durham NC
    27708
    
    18) -------------------------------------------------------------
    
    _Studies in Popular Culture_
    Dennis Hall, editor.
    
    _Studies in Popular Culture_, the journal of the Popular Culture
    Association in the South and the American Culture Association in
    the South, publishes articles on popular culture and American
    culture however mediated: through film, literature, radio,
    television, music, graphics, print, practices, associations,
    events--any of the material or conceptual conditions of life. 
    The journal enjoys a wide range of contributors from the United
    States, Canada, France, Israel, and Australia, which include
    distinguished anthropologists, sociologists, cultural
    geographers, ethnomusicologists, historians, and scholars in mass
    communications, philosophy, literature, and religion.
    
    Please direct editorial queries to the editor: 
    Dennis Hall 
    Department of English 
    University of Louisville
    Louisville KY  40292
    tel: (502) 588-6896/0509
    Fax: (502) 588-5055
    Bitnet: DRHALL01@ULKYVM
    Internet: drhall01@ulkvm.louisville.edu
    
    All manuscripts should be sent to the editor care of the English
    Department, University of Louisville, Louisville, KY 40292. 
    Please enclose two, double-spaced copies and a self-addressed
    stamped envelope.  Black and White illustrations may accompany
    the text.  Our preference is for essays that total, with notes
    and bibliography, no more than twenty pages.  Documentation may
    take the form appropriate for the discipline of the writer; the
    current MLA stylesheet is a useful model.  Please indicate if the
    work is available on computer disk.  The editor reserves the
    right to make stylistic changes on accepted manuscripts.
    
    _Studies in Popular Culture_, is published semiannually and is
    indexed in the _PMLA Annual Bibliography_.  All members of the
    Association receive _Studies in Popular Culture_.  Yearly
    membership is $15.00 (International: $20.00).  Write to the
    Executive Secretary, Diane Calhoun-French, Academic Dean,
    Jefferson Community College-SW, Louisville, KY 40272, for
    membership, individual issues, back copies, or sets.  Volumes I-
    XV are available for $225.00. 
    
    19) ------------------------------------------------------------
    
    _VIRUS 23_
    
    For those brave souls looking to explore the Secret of Eris, you
    may wish to check out _VIRUS 23_.
    
    2 and 3 are even and odd,
    2 and 3 are 5,
    therefore 5 is even and odd.
    
    _VIRUS 23_ is a codename for all Erisian literature
    
    Don Webb
    6304 Laird Dr.
    Austin TX 78757
    0004200716@mcimail.com
    
    _VIRUS 23_ is the annual harcopy publication of A.D.o.S.A, the
    Alberta Department of Spiritual Affairs.  
    
    All issues are available at $7.00 ppd from:
    
    _VIRUS 23_
    Box 46
    Red Deer, Alberta
    Canada
    T4N 5E7
    
    Various chunks of _VIRUS 23_ can be found at Tim Oerting's
    alt.cyberpunk ftp site (u.washington.edu, in
    /public/alt.cyberpunk.  Check it out).
    
    For more information online contact Darren Wershler-Henry:
    grad3057@writer.yorku.ca
    
    20)------------------------------------------------------------
    
    ViViD Magazine
    
    The first issue of ViViD Magazine is now available. ViViD is a 
    hypertext magazine about experimental writing and creativity
    in cyberspace. We are actively seeking contributions for
    the next issue.
    
    The magazine is presented in the colorful, graphics environment
    of a Windows 3.1 Help File. You will need Windows 3.1 to read the
    magazine.
    
    The magazine will also be available via anonymous FTP at 
    "ftp.gmu.edu", to obtain it:
    
                             ftp ftp.gmu.edu
    username: anonymous
         password: (your email address)
         cd pub/library
         binary
         get VIVID1.ZIP
    
    -----------------------------------------------------------------
    For more information on ViViD, contact the editor, Justin McHale.
    Internet address: jmchale@gmuvax.gmu.edu
    -----------------------------------------------------------------
    
    Issue 1 Features:
    
    Articles:
           What is Cyberspace?
           What is Hypertext?
           Multiple Fiction and Multiple Worlds.
    
    News items:
           "Matrix News," a section featuring news items, notices
            and reviews concerning cyberspace. 
    
           "Treasure of the Internet," a section which details       
    
            interesting sites and services on the Internet.
    
    Experimental writing:
                        Poemtexts
                        Explodedview Texts
    
    21) -------------------------------------------------------------
    
    _Zines-L_
    
    announcing a new list available from: listserv@uriacc
    
    To subscribe to _Zines-L_ send a message to:
    listserv@uriacc.uri.edu
    
    on one line type:
    SUBSCRIBE ZINES-L first name last name
    
    22) -------------------------------------------------------------
    
                 _Postmodern Culture_ announces PMC-MOO
    
    PMC-MOO is a new service offered (free of charge) by _Postmodern
    Culture_.  PMC-MOO is a real-time, text-based, virtual reality
    environment in which you can interact with other subscribers of
    the journal and participate in live conferences.  PMC-MOO will
    also provide access to texts generated by _Postmodern Culture_
    and by PMC-TALK, and it will provide the opportunity to
    experience (or help to design) programs which simulate object-
    lessons in postmodern theory.  PMC-MOO is based on the LambdaMOO
    program, freeware by Pavel Curtis.
    
    To connect to PMC-MOO, you *must* be on the internet.  If you
    have an internet account, you can make a direct connection by
    typing the command
    
    telnet dewey.lib.ncsu.edu 7777
    
    at your command prompt.  Once you've connected to the server, you
    should receive onscreen instructions on how to log in to PMC-MOO.
    
    If you do not receive these onscreen instructions, but instead
    find yourself with a straight login: and password: prompt, it
    means that your telnet program or interface is ignoring the 7777
    at the end of the command given above, and you will need to ask
    your local user-support people how to telnet to a specific port
    number.  If you have the Emacs program on your system and would
    like information about a customized program for PMC-MOO that uses
    Emacs, contact pmc@unity.ncsu.edu by e-mail.
    
    23) -------------------------------------------------------------
    
    ******************************************************
    CALL FOR PAPERS
    for
    
    "RAIDS ON THE CONSCIOUS:
    New Essays on Don DeLillo"
    
    A special cluster for _Postmodern Culture_, Jan. 1994
    ******************************************************
    
       Since the early Seventies, Don DeLillo's work (fiction, 
    drama, and journalism) has played an important role in the 
    literature of what has gradually become known as the 
    "postmodern condition."  DeLillo's novels and plays 
    investigate the problem of subjectivity in an environment 
    increasingly governed by, perhaps even constructed purely of 
    information and its various modes of transmission.  Identity 
    in DeLillo is dominated by a sense of anxiety concerning the 
    formation of "self" from this patchwork of postmodern 
    discourses, and is often further problematized by the 
    lurking suspicion that there is no longer any stable 
    referential framework behind the blizzard of signifiers; a 
    suspicion that ideals, goals, and even individuality are 
    categories as "empty" as poststructuralist theory tells us 
    are the images, words, and digits with which we are 
    surrounded; that identity is as arbitrary, illusory, and 
    transient as the "sign."
    
       The breakdown of various Western master narratives 
    which is often at the heart of DeLillo's novels--a 
    breakdown discussed by, among others, Lyotard--contributes 
    to this "vacuuming out" of substance.  The result is a 
    "postnarrative" world where the acontextual, the enigmatic, 
    the arbitrary and fundamentally anti-rational continually 
    threaten to become the sole reality--as in Jorge Luis 
    Borges' "Tlon, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius."
    
       Furthermore, in DeLillo's works this cultural 
    identity crisis often "bleeds" into the characters' private 
    anxieties; in fact, the boundary between public and private 
    is the barrier which DeLillo seems to believe the postmodern 
    condition threatens to breach.  Some line has been crossed, 
    and in DeLillo's work identity is now formed from the 
    outside in, the product of a ceaseless anti-Cartesian 
    barrage of decontextualized messages and undifferentiated 
    signals from without.  The governance of this situation has 
    devolved from powerful but recognizable individuals onto 
    shadowy larger "bodies": corporations, intelligence 
    agencies, the academy and, perhaps most importantly, 
    terrorist organizations.  Beyond such barely tangible agents 
    DeLillo posits a postmodern sublime, the force described in 
    Libra as the "world inside the world."
    
       Papers are solicited which respond to these issues in 
    DeLillo's work (fiction, drama, and journalism) for possible 
    inclusion in a special issue (January, 1994) of the 
    electronic journal Postmodern Culture, and in a hard cover 
    edition to be published later in 1994 or in early 1995.  
    Papers should address the problems of how literature and 
    other forms of public language support and/or resist the 
    construction of the postmodern relationship of author, text, 
    and reader; how these identities and their relationships are 
    maintained, thwarted, or altered through a concatenation of 
    public spectacle, random violence, and decontextualized 
    language; and how the control of a massively disoriented 
    narrative (or former narrative) of and about these 
    identities increasingly depends upon a variety of ill-
    defined and vaguely sinister "postindividual" agencies.  
    Comparative essays utilizing other authors, films, music and 
    other forms of popular culture are welcomed.
       Abstracts (250-500 words) should arrive no later than 
    Oct. 15th, and the *first* drafts of papers (15-30 pages) 
    will be due no later than December 15th.  Inquiries, 
    abstracts and rough drafts may be sent electronically to: 
    
    Glen Scott Allen at e7e4all@toe.towson.edu, or
    Stephen J. Bernstein at bernstein_s@crob.flint.umich.edu
    
    or by regular mail to
    
    Prof. Glen Scott Allen   or   Prof. Stephen J. Bernstein
    English Dept.                 Dept. of English
    Towson State University       University of Michigan-Flint
    Towson, MD  21204             Flint, MI  48502
    
    24) ------------------------------------------------------------
    
    ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
    CALL FOR ARTICLES
    
    EJVC: Electronic Journal of Virtual Culture
    
    ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
    
    Special Issue: Gender Issues in Computer Networking
    
    Issue Editor: Leslie Reagan Shade
                   McGill University
                   Graduate Program in Communications
                   czsl@musica.mcgill.ca; shade@well.sf.ca.us
    
    EJVC is a new peer-reviewed electronic journal dedicated to
    scholarly research and discussion of all aspects of computer-
    mediated human experience, behavior, action, and interaction.
    
    This special issue of the EJVC will be devoted to gender issues
    in networking.  Despite the abundance of various private networks
    and the meteoric growth of the Internet, this rapidly expanding
    user base does not include an equal proportion of men and women. 
    How can women become equally represented in the new "electronic
    frontier" of cyberspace?  Issues to be discussed can include, but
    are not limited to, the following: 
    
    * Access issues--to hardware, software, and training.  What
         barriers do women face?  What are some success stories.
    
    * How can women be given the technical expertise to become
         comfortable and versatile with computer networking?
    
    * Interface design: can there be a feminist design?
    
    * How can networking realize its potential as a feminist tool?
    
    * How can women scholars exploit networking's technology?
    
    * What information technology policies could be developed to
         ensure computer networking equity for women, as well as
         minorities?
    
    * How does one define computer pornography and "offensive"
         material on the net?  Should it be allowed?
    
    * How should sexual harassment on the net be treated?
    
    * Are women-only groups necessary?
    
    * How do women interact on MUDS and MOOs?
    
    * What net resources exist for women?
    
    Deadlines:     December 1, 1993 (submission of abstracts)
                   April 1, 1994 (submission of contributions)
    
    Abstracts will be reviewed by the issue editor for
    appropriateness of content and overall balance of the issue as a
    whole.  In turn, authors will then be invited to submit full-
    length contributions, which will be peer-reviewed by the
    journal's normal editorial process before final acceptance for
    publication.  The issue editor encourages correspondence about
    proposed contributions even before submission of an abstract.
    
    Potential contributors may obtain a more detailed statement about
    the focus and range of this special issue by sending email to the
    issue editor with the subject line: EJVC Issue or by anonymous
    ftp to byrd.mu.wvnet.edu, directory/pub/ejvc, get
    ejvc.shade.call.
    
    Further information about EJVC may be obtained by sending e-mail
    to LISTSERV@KENTVM.BITNET or LISTSERV@KENTVM.KENT.EDU with one or
    more of the following lines in the text:
    SUBSCRIBE EJVC-L YourFirstname YourLastName
    GET EJVC WELCOME
    INDEX EJVC-L
    Also, the file is available by anonymous ftp to byrd.mu.wvnet.edu
    in the pub/ejvc directory.
    
    25) ------------------------------------------------------------
    
    *********************
    Call for Submissions
    *********************
    
    _Hypertext Fiction and the Literary Artist_ is a research project
    investigating the use of hypertext technology by creative
    writers.
    
    The project consists of evaluations of software and hardware,
    critiques of traditional and computerized works, and a guide to
    sites of publication.
    
    We would like to request writers to submit their works for
    review.  Publishers are requested to send descriptions of their
    publications with subscription fees and submission formats.  We
    are especially interested to hear from institutions which teach
    creative writing for the hypertext format.
    
    To avoid swamping our e-mail account, please limit messages to a
    page or two in length.  Send works on disk (IBM or Mac) or
    hardcopy to:
    
    _Hypertext Fiction and the Literary Artist_
    3 Westcott Upper
    London, Ontario
    N6C 3G6
    E-mail: KEEPC@QUCD>QUEENSU.CA
    
    26)------------------------------------------------------------
    
              THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND POPULAR CULTURE
    
                             CALL FOR PAPERS
    
    Scholars are invited to submit manuscripts/reviews that
    meet the following criteria:
    
    ISSUES:  The Journal invites critical reviews of films,
              documentaries, plays, lyrics, and other related visual
              and performing arts.  The Journal also invites original
              manuscripts from all social scientific fields on the
              topic of popular culture and criminal justice.
    
    SUBMISSION PROCEDURES: To submit material for the Journal,
              please subscribe to CJMOVIES through the listserv and a
              detailed guidelines statement will automatically
              follow.
    
    To subscribe, send a message with the following command to
    
                           LISTSERV@ALBNYVM1:
              SUBSCRIBE CJMOVIES YourFirstName YourLastName
    
    Manuscripts and inquiries should be addressed to: 
    The Editors, 
    Journal of Criminal Justice and Popular Culture
    SUNYCRJ@ALBNYVM1.BITNET
    or SUNYCRJ@UACSC2.ALBANY.EDU
    
    MANAGING EDITORS:
    Sean Anderson and Greg Ungar 
    Editors 
    Journal of CriminalJustice and Popular Culture, 
    School of Criminal Justice, SUNYA 135
    Western Avenue Albany, NY 12222 
    
    INTERNET:
    SA1171@ALBNYVM1.BITNET or GU8810@uacsc1.albany.edu
    
    LIST ADMINISTRATOR
    Seth Rosner 
    School of Criminal Justice, SUNYA
    SR2602@uacsc1.albany.edu or SR2602@thor.albany.edu
    
    27) -------------------------------------------------------------
    
    +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
    Call for Papers
    _PSYCHE: an interdisciplinary
    journal of research on consciousness_
    +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
    
    You are invited to submit papers for publication in the inaugural
    issue of _PSYCHE: an interdisciplinary journal of research on
    consciousness_ (ISSN: 1039-723X).
    
    _PSYCHE_ is a refereed electronic journal dedicated to supporting
    the interdisciplinary exploration of the nature of consciousness
    and its relation to the brain.  _PSYCHE_ publishes material
    relevant to that exploration form the perspectives afforded by
    the disciplines of Cognitive Science, Philosophy, Psychology,
    Neuroscience, Artificial Intelligence, and Anthropology. 
    Interdisciplinary discussions are particularly encouraged. 
    _PSYCHE_ publishes a large variety of articles and reports for a
    diverse academic audience four times per year.  As an electronic
    journal, the usual space limitations of print journals do not
    apply; however, the editors request that potential authors do not
    attempt to abuse the medium.  _PSYCHE_ also publishes a hardcopy
    version simultaneously with the electronic version.  Long
    articles published in the electronic format may be abbreviated,
    synopsized, or eliminated form the hardcopy version.
    
    Types of Articles:
    
    The journal publishes from time to time all of the following
    varieties of articles.  Many of these (as indicated below) are
    peer reviewed; all articles are reviewed by editorial staff.
    
    Research Articles reporting original research by author(s).
    Articles may be either purely theoretical or experimental or some
    combination of the two.  Articles of special interest
    occasionally will be followed by a selection of peer
    commentaries.  Peer Reviewed.
    
    Survey Articles reporting on the state of the art research in
    particular areas.  These may be done in the form of a literature
    review or annotated bibliography.  More ambitious surveys will be
    peer reviewed.  
    
    Discussion Notes critiques of previous research.  Peer Reviewed.
    
    Tutorials introducing a subject area relevant to the study of
    consciousness to non-specialists.
    
    Letters providing and informal forum for expressing opinions on
    editorial policy or upon material previously published in
    _PSYCHE_.  Screened by editorial staff.
    
    Abstracts summarizing the contents of recently published journal
    articles, books, and conference proceedings.
    
    Book Reviews which indicate the contents of recent books and
    evaluate their merits as contributions to research and/or as
    textbooks.
    
    Announcements of forthcoming conferences, paper submission
    deadlines, etc.
    
    Advertisements of immediate interest to our audience will be
    published: available grants; positions; journal contents;
    proposals for joint research; etc.
    
    Notes for Authors
    
    Unsolicited submissions of original works within any of the above
    categories are welcome.  Prospective authors should send articles
    directly to the executive editor.  Submissions should be in a
    single copy if submitted electronically of four (4) copies if
    submitted by mail.
    
    Submitted matter should be preceded by: the author's name;
    address; affiliation; telephone number; electronic mail address. 
    Any submission to be peer reviewed should be preceded by a 100-
    200 word abstract as well.  Note that peer review will be blind,
    meaning that the prefatory material will not be made available to
    the referees.  In the event that an article needs to be shortened
    for publication in the print version of _PSYCHE_, the author will
    be responsible for making any alterations requested by the
    editors.
    
    Any figures required should be designed in screen-readable ASCII.
    
    If that cannot be arranged, figures should be submitted as
    separate postscript files so that they can be printed out by
    readers locally.
    
    Authors of accepted articles assign to _PSYCHE_ the right to
    publish the text both electronically and as printed matter and to
    make it available permanently in an electronic archive.  Authors
    will, however, retain copyright to their articles and may
    republish them in any forum so long as they clearly acknowledge
    _PSYCHE_ as the original source of publication.
    
    Subscriptions
    
    Subscriptions to the electronic version of _PSYCHE_ may be
    initiated by sending the one-line command, SUBSCRIBE PSYCHE-L
    Firstname Lastname, in the body on an electronic mail message to:
    
    LISTSERV@NKI.BITNET
    
    28) -------------------------------------------------------------
    
    *************************************
    Announcement and Call for Submissions
    _Postmodern Culture_
    *************************************
    
    _Postmodern Culture_
    A SUNY Press Series
    
    Series Editor: Joseph Natoli
    Editor:         Carola Sautter
    
    Center for Integrative Studies, Arts and Humanities
    Michigan State University
    
    We invite submissions of short book manuscripts that present a
    postmodern crosscutting of contemporary headlines--green politics
    to Jeffrey Dahmer, Rap Music to Columbus, the Presidential
    campaign to Rodney King--and academic discourses from art and
    literature to politics and history, sociology and science to
    women's studies, form computer studies to cultural studies.
    
    This series is designed to detour us off modernity's yet-to-be-
    completed North-South Superhighway to Truth and onto
    postmodernism's "forking paths" crisscrossing high and low
    culture, texts and life-worlds, selves and sign systems, business
    and academy, page and screen, "our" narrative and "theirs,"
    formula and contingency, present and past, art and discourse,
    analysis and activism, grand narratives and dissident narratives,
    truths and parodies of truths.
    
    By developing a postmodern conversation about a world that has
    overspilled its modernist framing, this series intends to link
    our present ungraspable "balkanization" of all thoughts and
    events with the means to narrate and then re-narrate them. 
    Modernity's "puzzle world" to be "unified" and "solved" becomes
    postmodernism's multiple worlds to be represented within the
    difficult and diverse wholeness that their own multiplicity and
    diversity shapes and then re-shapes.
    
    Accordingly, manuscripts should display a "postmodernist style"
    that moves easily and laterally across public as well as academic
    spheres, "inscribes" within as well as "scribes" against realist
    and modernist modes, and strives to be readable-across-multiple-
    narratives and "culturally relative" rather than "foundational."
    
    Inquiries, proposals, and manuscripts should be addressed to:
    
    Joseph Natoli
    Series Editor
    20676jpn@msu.edu
    
    or 
    
    Carola Sautter
    Editor
    SUNY Press
    SUNY Plaza
    Albany, NY 12246-0001
    
    29) -------------------------------------------------------------
    
                                 NSC'93
    
                  The Network Services Conference 1993
                   Warsaw, Poland, 12-14 October 1993
    
    Invitation
    
    Networking in the academic and research environment has evolved
    into an important tool for researchers in all disciplines.  High
    quality network services and tools are essential parts of the
    research infrastructure.
    
    Building on the success of the first Network Services Conference
    in Pisa, Italy, NSC'93 will focus on the issue of providing
    services  to customers, with special attention paid to the 
    actual usage of the various tools available.  We will address the
    impact of today's global tools on service development and
    support, the changing function of traditional tools and services
    (such as archives), new services (such as multi-media 
    communications), the future role of the library and the
    effects of commercialization of networks and network services.
    Customer support at the institutional and campus level, and the 
    role of support in accessing global services, will also be
    covered.
    
    Talks, tutorials, demonstrations and other conference activities
    will address the needs of the research, academic, educational,
    governmental, industrial, and commercial network communities.
    
    Tutorial sessions on specific network services have been
    integrated into the regular conference program.  Practical issues
    in the use of these services and tools will be covered in detail
    by experts.  Throughout the conference, participants will be able
    
    to get hands-on experience in the well-equipped demonstration
    area.
    
    NSC'93 is being organized by EARN in conjunction with EUnet,
    NORDUnet, RARE, and RIPE.
    
    To get a preliminary program and registration form, send e-mail
    to:
    
       LISTSERV@FRORS12.BITNET     (or LISTSERV@FRORS12.CIRCE.FR)
    
    In the body of the message, write:  GET NSC93 ANN2
    
    David Sitman
    EARN
    
    30) ----------------------------------------------------------   
    
    _FEMISA_
    
    FEMISA@mach1.wlu.ca
    
    _FEMISA_ is conceived as a list where those who work on or think
    about feminism, gender, women and international relations, world
    politics, international political economy, or global politics,
    can communicate.  
    
    Formally, _FEMISA_ was established to help those members of the
    Feminist Theory and Gender Studies Section of the _International
    Studies Association_ keep in touch.  More generally, I hope that
    _FEMISA_ can be a network where we share information in the area
    of feminism or gender and international studies about
    publications or articles, course outlines, questions about
    sources or job opportunities, information about conferences or
    upcoming events, or proposed panels and information related to
    the _International Studies Association_.
    
    To subscribe: send one line message in the BODY of mail-message
    
                          sub femisa your name
    
    to: listserv@mach1.wlu.ca
    
    To unsub send the one line message
    
                              unsub femisa
    
    to: listserv@mach1.wlu.ca
    
    I look forward to hearing suggestions and comments from you.
    
    Owner: Deborah Stienstra  stienstr@uwpg02.uwinnipeg.ca
            Department of Political Science
            University of Winnipeg
    
    31)-------------------------------------------------------------
    
    _HOLOCAUS: Holocaust list_
    
    HOLOCAUS on LISTSERV@UICVM.BITNET
             or LISTSERV@UICVM.UIC.EDU
    
    HOLOCAUS@uicvm has become part of the stable of electronic mail
    discussion groups ("lists") at the University of Illinois,
    Chicago.  It is sponsored by the University's History Department
    and its Jewish Studies Program.
    
    To subscribe to HOLOCAUS, you need and Internet or Bitnet
    computer account.  From that account, send this message to
    LISTSERV@UICVM.BITNET or LISTSERV@uicvm.uic.edu:
    
                     SUB HOLOCAUS Firstname Surname
    
    Use your own Firstname and Lastname.  You will be automatically
    added.  You can read all the mail, and send your own postings to
    everyone on the list (We have about 100 subscribers around the
    world right now).
    
    Owner: JimMott@spss.com
    
    The HOLOCAUS policies are:
    
    1.   The coverage of the list will include the Holocaust itself,
         and closely related topics like anti-Semitism, and Jewish
         history in the 1930's and 1940's, as well as related themes
         in the history of WW2, Germany, and international diplomacy.
    
    2.   We are especially interested in reaching college teachers of
         history who already have, or plan to teach courses on the
         Holocaust.  In 1991-92, there were 265 college faculty in
         the US and Canada teaching courses on the Holocaust (154 in
         History departments, 67 in Religion, and 46 in Literature). 
         An even larger number of professors teach units on the
         Holocaust in courses on Jewish history (taught by 273
         faculty) and World War II (taught by 373), not to mention
         many other possible courses.  Most of these professors own
         PC's, but do not use them for e-mail.  We hope our list will
         be one inducement to go on line.  _HOLOCAUS_ will therefore
         actively solicit syllabi, reading lists, termpaper guides,
         ideas on films and slides, and tips and comments that will
         be of use to the teacher who wants to add a single lecture,
         or an entire course.  
    
    3.   H-Net is now setting up an international board of editors to
         guide _HOLOCAUS_ policy and to help stimulate contributions.
    
    4.   _HOLOCAUS_ is moderated by Jim Mott (JimMott@spss.com), a
         PhD in History.  The moderator will solicit postings (by e-
         mail, phone and even by US mail), will assist people in
         subscribing and setting up options, will handle routine
         inquiries, and will consolidate some postings.  The
         moderator will also solicit and post newsletter type
         information (calls for conferences, for example, or listings
         of sessions at conventions).  It may prove feasible to
         commission book and article reviews, and to post book
         announcements from publishers.  Anyone with suggestions
         about what _HOLOCAUS_ can and might do is invited to send in
         the ideas.
    
    5.   The tone and target audience will be scholarly, and academic
         standards and styles will prevail.  _HOLOCAUS_ is affiliated
         with the _International History Network_.
    
    6.   _HOLOCAUS_ is a part of H-Net, a project run by computer-
         oriented historians at the U of Illinois.  We see moderated
         e-mail lists as a new mode of scholarly communication; they
         have enormous potential for putting in touch historians from
         across the world.  Our first list on urban history, _H-
         URBAN@UICVM_, recently started up with Wendy Plotkin as
         moderator.  _H-WOMEN_ is in the works, with discussions
         underway about other possibilities like Ethnic, Labor, and
         US South.  We are helping our campus Jewish Studies program
         set up _JSTUDY_ (restricted to the U of Illinois Chicago
         campus, for now), and are considering the creation of _H-
         JEWISH_, also aimed at academics, but covering the full     
         range of scholarship on Jewish history.  If you are
         interested in any of these projects, please e-write Richard
         Jensen, for we are now (as of late April) in a critical
         planning stage.
    
    7.   H-Net has an ambitious plan for training historians across
         the country in more effective use of electronic
         communications.  Details of the H-Net plan are available on
         request from Richard Jensen, the director, at:
    
                             campbelld@apsu  
    
    or
    
                          u08946@uicvm.uic.edu
    
    32) -------------------------------------------------------------
    
    NewJour-L@e-math.ams.org
    
    NewJour-L aims to accomplish two objectives; it is both a list
    and a project.
    
       FIRST:
    
       NewJour-L is the place to *announce* your own (or to forward
    information about others') newly planned, newly issued, or
    revised *ELECTRONIC NETWORKED* journal or newsletter.  It is
    specially dedicated for those who wish to share information in
    the planning, gleam-in-the-eye stage or at a more mature stage of
    publication development and availability.
    
       It is also the place to announce availability of paper
    journals and newsletters as they become available on electronic
    networks.  Scholarly discussion lists *which regularly and
    continuously maintain supporting files of substantive articles or
    preprints* may also be reported, for those journal-like sections.
    
       We hope that those who see announcements on Bitnet, Internet,
    Usenet or other media will forward them to NewJour-L, but this
    does run a significant risk of boring subscribers with a number
    of duplicate messages.  Therefore, NewJour-L IS filtered through
    a moderator to eliminate this type of duplication.
    
       It does not attempt to cover areas that are already covered by
    other lists.  For example, sources like NEW-LIST describe new
    discussion lists;  ARACHNET deals with social and cultural issues
    of e-publishing;  VPIEJ-L handles many matters related to
    electronic publishing of journals.  SERIALST discusses the
    technical aspects of all kinds of serials.  You should continue
    to subscribe to these as you have done before, and contribute to
    them.
    
       SECOND:
    
       NewJour-L represents an identification and road-mapping
    project for electronic journals and newsletters, begun by Michael
    Strangelove, University of Ottawa.  NewJour-L will expand and
    continue that work.
    
       As new publications are reported, a NewJour-L support group
    will develop the following services -- planning is underway & we
    ask that anyone who would like to participate as below, let us
    know:
    
       -A worksheet will be sent to the editors of the new
         e-publication for completion.  This will provide detailed
         descriptions about bibliographic, content, and access
         characteristics.
    
       -An original cataloguing record will be created.
    
       -The fully catalogued title will be reported to national
         utilities and other appropriate sites so that there is a
         bibliographic record available for subsequent subscribers or
         searchers.
    
       -The records will feed a directory and database of these
         titles.
    
      Not all the of the implementation is developed, and the work
    will expand over the next year.  We thank you for your
    contributions, assistance, and advice, which will be invaluable.
    
       SUBSCRIBING:
    
         To subscribe, send a message to: LISTSERV@e-math.ams.org
    
         Leave the subject line blank.
    
         In the body, type: SUBSCRIBE NewJour-L  FirstName LastName
    
         You will have to subscribe in order to post messages to this
         list.
    
         To drop out or postpone, use the standard LISTSERV
         (Internet) directions.
    
       ACKNOWLEDGMENT:
    
       For their work in defining the elements of this project and
         for their support to date, we thank:
    
          Michael Strangelove, University of Ottawa, Advisor
          David Rodgers, American Mathematical Society, Systems &
              Network Support
          Edward Gaynor, University of Virginia Library, Original
              Cataloguing Development
          John Price-Wilkin, University of Virginia Library, Systems
              & Network Support
          Birdie MacLennan, University of Vermont Library,
              Cataloguing and Indexing Development
          Diane Kovacs, Kent State University Library, Advisor
    
    We anticipate this will become a wider effort as time passes, and
    we welcome your interest in it.  This project is co-ordinated
    through:
    
    The Association of Research Libraries
    Office of Scientific & Academic Publishing
    21 Dupont Circle, Suite 800
    Washington, DC  20036
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    ************************************************************
                        John W. Hartman Center
              for Sales, Advertising, and Marketing History
                     Special Collections Library
                           Duke University
    
              TRAVEL-TO-COLLECTIONS GRANTS 1993-94
    
              Three or more grants of up to $1000 are available to
              (1) graduate students in any academic field who wish to
              use the resources of the Center for research toward
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              The major collection available at the Hartman Center at
              the current time is the extensive Archives of the J.
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              since the 1920's.  It is anticipated that the
              advertisements (1932+) and a moderate amount of agency
              documentation from D'Arcy, Masius, Benton & Bowles
              (DMB&B) will be available for research by autumn 1993. 
              The Center holds several other smaller collections
              relating to 19th and 20th century advertising and
              marketing.
    
              REQUIREMENTS: Awards may be used between November 15,
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              student's advisor or project director.  Please address
              questions and requests for application forms to:
    
                   Ms. Ellen Gartrell, Director
                   John W. Hartman Center for Sales, Advertising, and
                   Marketing History
                   Special Collections Library
                   Duke University
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                   Durham NC  27708-0185
    
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  • Selected Letters From Readers

    Paul Miers
    Department of English
    Towson State University
    e7e4mie@toe.towson.edu

     

    RE: Kip Canfield’s essay, “ The Microstructure of Logocentricism: Sign Models in Derrida and Smolensky,” in PMC v.3 n.3. A reply by Paul Miers, Department of English, Towson State University.

     

    Connectionism and Its Consequences

     

    Kip Canfield’s article in the last issue of Postmodern Culture is one of the first pieces of critical theory to discuss the implications of the revolutionary paradigm shift now taking place in the cognitive sciences. The movement inspiring that shift, generally called connectionism, offers a powerful and still controversial alternative to the standard model of mental representation which has more or less dominated western philosophy at least since the Enlightenment (Bechtel). As Canfield notes in his comparison of Paul Smolensky, one of the leading connectionists, with Jacques Derrida, the connectionist critique parallels in many ways the deconstruction of traditional semiotics and structuralism. But, as Canfield also notes, connectionist theory does more than deconstruct the old paradigm: it also purports to offer an alternative account of representation, a genuine Copernican revolution which changes our view of mental life from a symbol centered token/type model to a network based vector/matrix account (Churchland).

     

    Since Canfield focuses almost exclusively on Smolensky and Derrida, however, readers of his essay not already familiar with the paradigm wars in cognitive science may not see just how profound the connectionist revolution could be. For that reason, I want to offer here a brief note on the consequences of connectionism which follows up on a point I have made elsewhere regarding the implications of connectionism for critical theory (Miers).

     

    The attraction of connectionism for cognitive science is its potential for providing a “natural” theory of information processing in the brain. All the evidence indicates that the brain itself is organized as a massively distributed parallel processor (Edelman); what the great debate is about is how to reconcile the neural evidence with the standard, classical theory of mental representation. Classical theory claims that mental representations are the product of arbitrary atomic symbols (i.e., signs rather than symbols in the Coleridgean sense) operated on by formal syntactic rules. Connectionist theory, on the other hand, focuses on the fact that neural networks have no one- to-one mappings, and that they respond to input vectors not by invoking rules, but by dynamic transformations of the network (Churchland). The real issue then is not a simplistic opposition between atomic and distributed elements or between arbitrary and motivated symbols; it is, rather, the problem of explaining how the brain produces the apparent formalism of symbolic representation from the non- classical structure of neural networks.

     

    In broad terms, there are two explanations for this puzzle, the first of which I call weak connectionism or neo- symbolism and the other I term strong or pan-connectionism (Miers; see also Bechtel). In the weak version, the logic of neural networks serves simply to implement some version of the traditional token/type symbol processing which the classical cognitivists like Fodor see as essential for mental representation (Fodor, “Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture”). In the weak case, the classical cognitivists can, with some modifications, “save the appearance” of the symbolic paradigm. Even though connectionist processes may infiltrate and shape whole aspects of mental life, there remains a unique domain of rational or propositional thought governed by the formalisms of symbolic structures. As Fodor has consistently argued for years, not all of the messy flux of what passes through our heads needs be structured like a formal language, and Fodor is quite willing to concede much of mental life to Freudian and even Skinnerian accounts (The Language of Thought 200).

     

    Strong connectionism, on the other hand, is much more radical and leads to a rather uncanny picture of the apparent symbol processing capabilities of the mind. Strong connectionism claims that symbolic representation is, in fact, a rather shallow illusion which is being approximated or mimed by a wholly connectionist strategy that evolved in the brains of mammals long before the appearance of humans. In this account, our sense that there are atomic tokens is being created by a series of vector/matrix interactions, and our notion that tokens belong to some double system of message and code or object language/meta-language is a belated allegory. There are only vectors operating within matrices, and the language of thought is in reality the algebra for convolving vectors and matrices (Churchland). Our received notions of deep structure, symbolic orders, even the Unconscious, are therefore historical constructs, reinforced by external contingencies and controls. The language of thought is not structured like a language; indeed language cannot be structured like a language since language itself is fabricated by a non-classical strategy for representation.

     

    I have argued in favor of strong connectionism (Miers), but which, if any, of these two versions turns out to be the case is still an open question. The symbolists argue that connectionist models fail to meet the formal requirement for symbolic representation (requirements, it should be noted, which must be taken seriously) (Fodor “Connectionism”), while the connectionists point to increasingly sophisticated programs which have begun to meet (or more accurately approximate) these requirements (Bechtel). The point I want to make here, however, is that both the strong and the weak version of connectionism have significant consequences for a certain kind of ironic postmodernism most often identified with Lyotard and Baudrillard. It might appear at first glance that this postmodernism would be vindicated by the triumph of strong connectionism since strong connectionism undercuts classical representation. My claim is that ironic postmodernism loses either way, because it is wedded to a particular account of representation still tied to the symbol-centered token/type account–albeit a deconstructed, paradoxical version–of the classical system. In short, ironic postmodern can only think itself within the paradigm of the sign and is highly dependent on that paradigm remaining in place as a failed system.

     

    If weak connectionism proves to be the proper model for representation, then what we will see is a return to classical theory and a demonstration that at least in some realm it is possible to defend the classical account of reason, indeed that the classical account of reason is rooted in natural evolution. In this case, the postmodern ironists will have bet on the wrong reading of the symbolic order, and their arcane jargon will rapidly look as out of date as the discourse of Ptolemaic astronomy. But if strong connectionism proves true, that is, if representation is driven by the logic of vector/matrix interactions, then ironic postmodernism also fails because of its dependency on the deconstructed sign. The triumph of strong connectionism would support the claim that ironic postmodernism is simply a very late, very belated and desperate version of modernism (Cascardi). The true end of modernism then would come not with the deconstruction of the classical system, a deconstruction which leaves in place and cultivates the ruins of the system. Modernism would end, rather, when the recipe for making the illusion of signs is finally revealed.

     

    What is most radical about strong connectionism is its claim that such a recipe exists and that it can be formulated. This recipe for thought is going to include both sensory and propositional modes in a single model of figural forms. Ironic postmodernism tells us that we live in an economy of undecipherable hieroglyphs, condemned to know but unable to change their fictive, arbitrary status. Strong connectionism suggest that we might be able to refigure this notion and see ourselves as living in the first post-symbolic culture, a culture where we know how to make and unmake signs, a culture where it is possible to limit and resist the sublime allure of unlimited semiosis, a culture which knows itself to be a natural and necessary illusion.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Bechtel, William and Abrahamsen, Adele. Connectionism and the Mind: An Introduction to Parallel Processing in Networks. Oxford: Blackwell, 1991.
    • Canfield, Kip. “The Microstructure of Logocentricism: Sign Models in Derrida and Smolensky.” Postmodern Culture May (1993).
    • Cascardi, Anthony J. The Subject of Modernity. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1992.
    • Churchland, Patricia S. and Sejnowski, Terrence. The Computational Brain. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992.
    • Edelman, Gerald. Neural Darwinism: The Theory of Neuronal Group Selection. New York: Basic Books, 1987.
    • Fodor, Jerry. The Language of Thought. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1975.
    • —, and Pylyshlyn, Zenon. “Connectionism and Cognitive Architecture.” Cognition 28 (1988): 3-71.
    • Miers, Paul. “The Other Side of Representation: Critical Theory and the New Cognitivism.” MLN 107 (1992): 950-975.

     

  • The Sound of the Avant-Garde

    Timothy D. Taylor

    Music Department
    Denison University

    taylort@cc.denison.edu

     

    Kahn, Douglas, and Gregory Whitehead, eds. The Wireless Imagination: Sound, Radio, and the Avant-Garde. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992.

     

    Co-editors Kahn and White describe their purpose in The Wireless Imagination as an attempt to compile a collection of “first utterances” rather than a Last Word on the subject of abstract sound. But these utterances are so disparate, so dispersed, that the reader may be more frustrated than enlightened, perhaps wishing instead for something a little less pomo and a little more old-fashioned: coherence. Kahn and Whitehead write, “Rather than simply starting to pull theories of aurality out of a hat, we have chosen to ground Wireless Imagination in the more modest intent of documenting and charting sonographic resonances among the above existing histories, strangely dissonant and cacophonous as they may strike the naked ear” (x).

     

    Fair enough. Some of the essays are indeed historical and useful (Mel Gordon’s “Songs from the Museum of the Future: Russian Sound Creation (1910-1930)”; Mark E. Cory’s “Soundplay: The Polyphonous Tradition of German Radio Art”; Christopher Schiff’s “Banging on the Windowpane: Sound in Early Surrealism”). But what’s wrong with theorizing? Perhaps the fault of the volume is that it suffers from sprawling theory: there’s theory all over the place, and some of it makes little sense. A few essays indulge in the kind of critspeak that would turn off all but the most ardent theory fetishist (Charles Grivel’s “The Phonograph’s Horned Mouth”; Gregory Whitehead’s “Out of the Dark: Notes on the Nobodies of Radio Art”; Allen S. Weiss’s “Radio, Death, and the Devil: Artaud’s Pour en Finir avec le Jugement de Dieu“). I do not mean to make a blanket attack against theoretical work. The problem with these essays is not that they deploy theory, but that they do so in a way that makes them appear both elitist and every bit as non-significant as the abstract sounds they’re ostensibly about.

     

    Probably the most interesting portions of The Wireless Imagination are those that detail someone’s response to sound. Alexander Graham Bell worked with his father to try to find a written language for non-language sounds; the young Bell and his brother tried to get their dog to speak by moving its jaws, eventually getting it to “say,” “How are you, grandmamma?”; Thomas Edison believed that each person has small, noise-producing beings within them, and devised a machine to record these “life units” exiting dead bodies as they lay in their coffins.

     

    Nearly as interesting are the fictions, or prose inventions. Velimir Khlebnikov, in “The Radio of the Future,” presages Muzak: “During periods of intense hard work like summer harvests orduring the construction of great buildings, these sounds [“la” and “ti,” or the pitches A and B] can be broadcast by Radio over the entire country, increasing its collective strength enormously” (21). Khlebnikov resurfaces in a detailed essay by Mel Gordon on Russian sound creation from 1910-1930 as a proponent of zaum, Alexei Kruchenykh’s “language” that incorporated all kinds of random sounds, from baby talk to the speech of schizophrenics. Khlebnikov’s zaum was meant to transcend all cultural barriers. Additionally, Khlebnikov invented a “universal alphabet,” in which each phoneme (just 25 in all) causes a certain emotional response, and is linked synesthetically with a color. So the phoneme “P,” for example, causes “explosion, release of pressure,” and is related to the color black outlined in red. Raymond Roussel’s Locus Solus (1914) tells of a deboned head stored in a liquid called aqua micans. This head can be reanimated through the efforts of a hairless cat, who, upon taking a red pill which turns it temporarily into an electric battery, swims to a metal cone and completes a connection with the head through the cone.

     

    It seemed as though life once more inhabited this recently immobile remnant of faces. Certain muscles appeared to make the absent eyes turn in all directions, while others periodically went into action as if to raise,lower, screw up or relax the area of the eyebrows and forehead; but those of the lips in particular moved with wild agility.(80)

     

    Still, the many attempts, fictional and actual, to record sound make fascinating reading, even if the contributors’ discussions of these attempts aren’t always satisfying. Alexander Graham Bell seemed to be fixated on the subject of sound recording, devoting years of his life to working with his father on an attempt to notate in written symbols all kinds of sounds. Co-editor Douglas Kahn offers an unbelievable story from a 1922 article by Bell, describing his near-vaudevillian demonstrations of this “language”:

     

    The members of the audience were invited to make any sorts of sound they desired, to be symbolized by my father. It was just as easy for him to spell the sound of a cough, or a sneeze, or a click to a horse as a sound that formed an element of human speech. Volunteers were called to the platform, where they uttered the most weird and uncanny noises, while my father studied their mouths and attempted to express in symbols the actions of the vocal organs he had observed. I was then called in, and the symbols were presented to me to interpret; and I could read in each symbol a direction to do something with my mouth. I remember on one occasion the attempt to follow directions resulted in a curious rasping noise that was utterly unintelligible to me. The audience, however, at once responded with loud applause. They recognized it as an imitation of the noise of sawing wood, which had been given by an amateur ventriloquist as a test.(86)

     

    Bell writes that he was close to inventing the phonograph but that Edison beat him to it. If Bell hadn’t invented the telephone, this claim might sound far-fetched given the foregoing excerpt.

     

    There are some lacunae. The aestheticization of abstract sounds seems to have led the creators of these sounds, and their chroniclers in this volume, to overlook politics, or real people “on the ground.” For example, co-editor Kahn quotes in his introduction a passage from Apollinaire’s 1916 “The Moon King” which is redolent of the kinds of surveillance that sound recording and broadcasting devices have facilitated (as Jacques Attali potently observes in his 1985 Noise):

     

    The flawless microphones of the king's device were set so as to bring in to this underground the most distant sounds of terrestrial life. Each key activated a microphone set for such-and-such a distance. Now we were hearing a Japanese countryside. The wind soughed in the trees--a village was probably there, because I heard servants' laughter, a carpenter's plane, and the spray of an icy waterfall. Then another key pressed down, we were taken straight into morning, the king greeting the socialist labor of New Zealand, and I heard geysers spewing hot water. Then this wonderful morning continued in sweet Tahiti. Here we are at the market in Papeete, with the lascivious wahinees of New Cytheria wandering through it--you could hear their lovely guttural language, very much like ancient Greek. You could also hear the Chinese selling tea, coffee, butter, and cakes. The sound of accordions and Jew's harps.(23)

     

    The authors offer this excerpt as an example of Apollinaire’s “wirelessness,” his interest in abstracted sound, but don’t examine the issues of power and surveillance pervading the passage, or, for that matter, the proto-pomo implications of juxtapositions of disparate sounds from all over the world.

     

    But the most disturbing omissions concern gender. Some of the material presented is so outrageous that it would seem to demand some kind of interrogation involving considerations of gender. For example, the first essay, Charles Grivel’s “The Phonograph’s Horned Mouth,” avoids inclusive language, and at one point adds “the other” gender as an afterthought, as though Grivel at the last minute imagines a feminist reader looking over his shoulder. Like so much French theory, Grivel’s essay is quote proof: “Symbol ‘become life,’ that is, substance, of a being articulated like a sex (or rather like two!) and violently applied upon the listener” (33). Grivel describes Villiers del l’Isle-Adam’s L’Eve Future (1886), which features a “fictitious” Edison who constructs a woman with two phonographs instead of lungs, beneath her breasts. (An excerpt from del l’Isle-Adam’s story follows Grivel’s essay.) Grivel’s consideration of Marcel Schwob’s “La Machine parler” of 1892 likewise skirts gender considerations. Schwob’s story tells of a frightening device that makes horrific sounds, which, it seems, are played by a woman, who is, in Grivel’s words, “servant to the ingenious inventor and slave to the monstrous ‘mechanical mouth’.” Another example is Allen S. Weiss’s discussion of Antonin Artaud in his essay, “Radio, Death, and the Devil.” Weiss, like most of the contributors to this volume, notes the invention of a sound-producing vehicle–evidence of the “wireless imagination”–but does little more. His discussion of Artaud’sIl n’y a plus de firmament (c. 1932) describes “an archetypically Artaudian figure . . . the human body transformed into a musical instrument”:

     

    Then the noise of a bizarre drum envelops everything, a nearly human noise which begins sharply and ends dully, always the same noise; and then we see enter a woman with an enormous belly, upon which two men alternately strike with drumbeats.(297)

     

    So, what is the relationship between sound and gender in such passages? Sound, it seems, can stand in for heterosexual sex, something that women “possess” and can “give” to men, or something that men violently take from, or beat out of, women.

     

    All of the book’s discussions of gender serve as yet another example of the ways in which Western culture has mapped binary oppositions on top of each other; in this case “abstract” sound/non-abstract sound is made to coexist with male/female, so that the violence often voiced in abstract sounds comes to reflect deferred, actual violence perpetrated against women. Or ethnic minorities, or whatever oppressed group the dominant culture chooses to attack. This flexible binarism of violence has worked all too well throughout Western history, whether the target of the drumsticks was a woman’s belly or Rodney King’s head. But it goes without comment in all of these essays.

     

    More satisfying considerations of the gendered nature of sound as it appears in these pages might have been possible if any of the authors had examined the ways that sound, including musical sound, signifies: here’s where the subject of the book is most notably undertheorized. Hardly any musicologist deals with this issue (and most contemporary discussions of music aesthetics by philosophers are hopeless–unmusical, unmusicological, and unconcerned with social and performance issues), so it would seem that the range of professions practiced by the authors of these ten essays would include someone who would tackle the problem. All of the writers and thinkers whose work is chronicled in the pages of The Wireless Imagination attempt to deal with sound as a means of expression. But what does it “express,” if anything? Some of the primary texts under consideration address the issue. Surrealist Giorgio de Chirico’s No Music (1913), for example, begins, “Music cannot express the essence of sensation. One never knows what music is about . . .” (162). De Chirico and the other Surrealists turned against music because of their disaffection with first Erik Satie (1866-1925) and then Georges Auric (1899-1983, a Parisian composer of “Les Six”), and Christopher Schiff writes that the Surrealist movement eventually attempted to do without music altogether. But de Chirico’s writings on musical signification go without close examination. Arseni Avraamov’s The Symphony of Sirens (1923) begins at the opposite end of the spectrum: “Of all the arts, music possesses the greatest power for social organization” (245). Perhaps. The authors of these essays fail to examine this central problematic, and thus miss opportunities to track the related issues, mainly the relationship of the abstraction of music and sound to larger cultural and political concerns and to the other arts. Frances Dyson’s insightful essay–perhaps the most valuable chapter in the book–on John Cage comes closest to such a discussion, and makes a crucial assertion (which he unfortunately discounts): that Cage, in his emancipation of sounds and noises, perpetuates the object-status of music in Western bourgeois culture, despite Cage’s systematic critique of the aesthetic premises of that culture.

     

    The translations of historic texts that aren’t often available are welcome; many of these form an important companion to Umbro Apollonio’s Futurist Manifestos (1973). Included are de l’Isle-Adam’s “The Lamentations of Edison,” from L’Eve Future (1886); Alberto Savinio’s “Give me the Anathema, Lascivious Thing” (1915); Avraamov’s The Symphony of Sirens (1923); F.T. Marinetti and Pino Masnata’s La Radia (1933); and Artaud’s To have done with the Judgment of God (1947). These are important to have in recent translations, for they are texts that we readers can examine further in explicating the myriad ways Western culture has attempted to deal with sound as sound.

     

    In sum, it’s about time somebody looked at the role of abstract sound and radio in the “avant-garde.” But as a starting point or “first word” on the subject, we might have done better with a volume more firmly grounded in the everyday world, a world where wireless sound has served not merely as a conceptual and aesthetic challenge but as a concrete reality on the social field and, at times, as an effective weapon of political domination.

     

  • Idioculture: De-Massifying the Popular Music Audience

    Marc Perlman

    Department of Music
    Tufts University

    perlman@pearl.tufts.edu

     

    Crafts, Susan D., Daniel Cavicchi, Charles Keil and the Music in Daily Life Project. My Music. Foreword by George Lipsitz. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England for Wesleyan University Press, 1993.

     

    Cultural Studies frequently constructs popular music as a particularly disruptive sort of object, a form of resistance (Frith: 179). Part of the resistance displayed by consumers of popular culture has been seen in their reinterpretation and creative appropriation of mass-marketed products. Though the best-known examples of this process have been literary (e.g. Radway on the romance, or Penley on K/S zines), Frith sees popular music consumption “becoming the model for ‘active’ popular cultural consumption in general” (Frith: 180).

     

    The book under review features ‘active’ consumption as resistance, though in a way not limited to popular music. In this book the disruptive moment of consumption is generalized beyond pop: here it is the moment of listening across genre borders. In a world where the music market and musical institutions impose strict boundaries between styles, people resist by having eclectic tastes. The “most important message” of this book is that there is “far more complexity and far more self-directed searching, testing, and experimenting than either music schools or commercial market categories can account for.” People find their way to “an astonishing range of musical choices, despite the inhibiting constrictions of the music industry” (Lipsitz: xiii). Their tastes are broader than the “confines imposed upon them by marketing specialists” (xiv).

     

    That is the book’s message; but My Music is much more than an illustration of a thesis. Whatever the plausibility of this view of eclectic listening–and I shall add my reflections on this subject below–the book presents a lively cross-section of lay commentary on music. My Music is an edited selection of 41 interviews out of 150 conducted in Buffalo, NY. The interviewees range in age from 4 to 83. Most are white Americans, though five African-Americans, one Hispanic, and one Asian-American are included, as well as one Bolivian and one Ethiopian.

     

    The Music in Daily Life Project started in 1984, when Carol Hadley, a student at SUNY Buffalo pursuing an independent study project, asked a few people about the role of music in their lives. She found people with unsuspected combinations of tastes (for example, one woman’s listening revolved around a Bette Midler/Allman Brothers/Joni Mitchell configuration) or striking trajectories (a woman who moved from classical music to Neil Diamond). That was the stimulus. Two undergraduate classes carried out further interviews, and three graduate seminars edited and organized the results. The result is this kaleidoscope of individual voices, too diverse and specific to be easily grouped into subcultures.

     

    My Music is a portrait of particularity. As Keil puts it in his Introduction, “Like your fingerprints, your signature, and your voice, your choices of music and the ways you relate to music are plural and interconnected in a pattern that is all yours, an ‘idioculture’ or idiosyncratic culture in sound” (2).

     

    The interviews illustrate Keil’s notion of musical idioculture. A few seem to fit common stereotypes, but just as many defy such caricatures. May, for example, is an overachieving high school violinist who attends Julliard on weekends. Her favorite listening music is Italian opera, but she grew up on the Rolling Stones and the Who, has tapes of Talking Heads, and can play Grateful Dead tunes on request.

     

    The editorial choice to present whole (edited) interviews was made to spotlight the interviewees, many of whom prove to be trenchant observers and witty conversationalists. Molly (age 11) comments on how music videos interfere with individual visualizations, “because you just think of what you saw on TV and not what your mind sees” when you listen (31). The insufferably cute Lisa (age 12) listens to the radio while studying for a test: “when it comes to the test, I remember the song, I remember the question, and I remember the answer” (40). Ralph, the polymath truckdriver (113-16), notices the “Ride of the Valkyries” in an Elmer Fudd cartoon, holds forth on the connection between the Jewish diaspora and polka music, likes the Beach Boys (“all a rip-off of black music … but white fun”) as well as the Mahavishnu Orchestra, but draws the line at opera (“Well, ‘Madam Butterfly’ is okay, but that’s the only one I really appreciate”). Stella, who emigrated from Greece thirty years ago, doesn’t consider Greek music to be her music: “It’s not mine, it’s a couple million other people’s” (159). She thinks country and western is the only adult music–not the “male bonding party songs,” but the ones where “the cliches are given reasons as to why they became cliches” (161).

     

    In short, the interviews are very rich, and not only for their musical content. There are miniature psychodramas, and some clouded glimpses into private lives. Betty, for example, converted from classical music to Neil Diamond. The reader involuntarily wonders about the significance of this conversion when Betty tells us it accompanied her divorce from a classical-music-loving husband. There are also bits of intergenerational sitcom. Nineteen-year-old Abby, interviewed by her father, mentions Grace Jones. Her father, in a follow-up question, mistakenly refers to the singer as Grace Slick, which elicits this putdown: “Grace Jones, honey. Grace Slick? For-give me. Never in a million years” (87).

     

    Nevertheless, while I applaud Crafts et al.’s decision to focus on people’s own words, I wonder if it was perhaps too zealously implemented. My Music is half of the book the authors originally envisioned; it lacks the planned set of essays reflecting on the interviews. In the end they chose to include more voices rather than reserve space for their own pronouncements. As one of the student members of the Project put it, “Isn’t the main point to hear from more people rather than from the critic and expert types again?” (xxii).

     

    It is indeed good to hear from so many people, but there is much we would like to know about them that they do not tell us. We know their age, sex, and (sometimes) ethnic identification. We are given their occupation in a few words: “pastor”; “student”; “music teacher”; “heavy truck salesman”; “works in her husband’s office”; “works at Allstate.” Some seem to be housewives. We know little else about their lives except what they choose to tell the interviewers. Crafts et al. refrain from fleshing out the picture, even when extra information would significantly alter our reading of the interview.

     

    For example, Beth does not tell us that she plays music. We only learn this from Keil, who mentions it in order to make a point about the possible negative effects of the dominance of mediated music in our lives (2). We are told that Charles is a music teacher and composer; he is obviously also a performer, probably a pianist. But it would help us to interpret his diatribes against commercialism, his admiration for Beethoven and Jimi Hendrix, and his quotations from Plotinus, if we knew a bit more about him. Is he a classically-trained pianist performing in a general business band? An aspiring Frank Zappa–or Glenn Branca?

     

    Crafts et al. minimize contextualization and all but abstain from comment. Keil invites us to make our own correlations and interpretations (3), but we can hardly do so without knowing more about these people. Their voices remain only voices, and we remain eavesdroppers on invisible conversations. (Other sorts of contextualization would be helpful, too. For example, some readers will be unable to understand some of the references to specific performers–Rick James, David Sylvian, etc.)

     

    It is instructive to compare this collection of ordinary people’s voices with the results of a somewhat similar project, another book organized around quotations from listeners: Music and Its Lovers, by Vernon Lee (pseudonym of Violet Paget). Whether or not it is a unique precursor of My Music, it is surely the first such study to appear in America: published in 1933, it is based on research conducted before World War I. The two books draw on samples of similar size, but apart from that the differences are striking. Lee used a questionnaire, and usually collected written responses. She worked in French and German as well as English, and reached many of her respondents through a periodical. Her sample seems to have included a disproportionate number of musicians, poets, essayists, critics, and PhDs. She seems to have asked only about ‘high art’ music. In her presentation, too, she kept a firm authorial grip on the material: her respondents’ voices are dispersed throughout her text, surfacing as a sentence here, a paragraph there. Though she was interested in individual responses to music, her questions were narrowly focused: she wanted to know if people listened to music for “a meaning which seems beyond itself, a message,” or if they heard it as “ just music” (Lee: 25).

     

    In other words, Lee was preoccupied with the aesthetic problems of her time: the question whether music was an “absolute” art, inhabiting a realm of its own, independent of programmatic content. As a result, her book has a fairly strict psychological focus. We learn about the inner worlds of her respondents, but hardly anything about their external, practical concerns. (Except in the case of an unnamed suffragette, who disliked Brahms because of the masculine self-satisfaction she heard in his music [211, 531].)

     

    The interview format of My Music insures that it escapes Lee’s overriding tendentiousness. However, it too is clearly a child of its time, and its framing essays show its relationship to some recent themes in the study of popular music.

     

    I have already mentioned the idea that eclectic, exploratory listening represents resistance to the market-imposed pigeonholing of musical styles, the “inhibiting constrictions of the music industry” (xiii). This notion is the main source of celebratory energy in the book. (Though Keil dampens the parade with a light drizzle of cultural criticism: “Aren’t all these headphoned people alienated, enjoying mediated ‘my music’ at the expense of a live and more spontaneous ‘our music’?” [3].)

     

    My Music seems to show that musical tastes cannot be predicted by the usual demographic categories: as Keil puts it, the “Billboard Charts view” of people’s musical worlds is a tremendous oversimplification (2). But is Keil’s notion of “idioculture” the only alternative to the Billboard Charts view? [18] The entire question of cross-genre listening as musical resistance surely needs to be discussed in a larger socio-economic and historical context. The marketplace does not inherently solidify genre or style categories. Under certain circumstances it can collocate diverse styles as well as differentiate them. Indeed, Max Weber argued that the market declassifies culture: presenters seeking large audiences try to provide something for everybody. This does seem to explain the behavior of for-profit, privately owned firms in some circumstances (DiMaggio: 36). Under other conditions (demand uncertainty, high competition, etc.) firms prefer to target narrowly-defined taste bands. This is evident (for example) in the fragmentation of radio formats.

     

    We should recall that the decline of eclectic music programming on commercial radio is a relatively recent phenomenon, hastened by the migration of the radio audience to television in the early 1950s, the proliferation of stations in major markets, etc. (Peterson and Davis: 169-71). With increased competition, stations had more incentive to narrow their appeal to specific demographic groups–those attractive to advertisers.

     

    The fractionalization of radio was noted at the time, and even greeted as evidence that the prophets of massification were wrong: the mass media could be “a vigorous force working for cultural diversity” (Honan: 76). In retrospect, it is clear that radio’s commitment to cultural diversity was contingent on changes in industry structure and market conditions that made it more profitable to differentiate tastes than to agglomerate them.

     

    Finally, it is true that the interviews in My Music show the subtlety, variety, and depth of meaning music has in the lives of 41 individuals. This book represents a welcome complement to the macro-results of survey-based research; as such, it justifiably emphasizes the moment of autonomy in musical reception. Unfortunately, it could easily be read as a romanticized portrait of musical individualism. Aside from a brief mention of the “constraints” and “broader systemic practices” (xiv-xvi) within which listeners operate, My Music does little to avert such a reading. Its micro-vision needs to be articulated with a macro-vision. Recent developments in the sociology of cultural choice should make this articulation especially fruitful.

     

    The past few decades have been marked by two paradigm shifts in the study of popular culture: first, by a drift away from the Adornoesque view of musical massification to an acknowledgement of plural “taste cultures” defined by demographic parameters (class, race, age, geography, etc.); and second, to a view of “culture classes” less tightly bound to social class, defined instead by consumption patterns (Lewis 1975; Peterson and DiMaggio 1975; Peterson 1983; DiMaggio 1987). Turning away from Bourdieu’s Durkheimian correlations of musical taste with position in social space (1984), recent writers reject earlier assumptions of isomorphism between taste and class.

     

    The insistence of Crafts et al. on individuals’ unique configurations of musical taste, it seems to me, is consistent with these sociological results, and could even enrich them. But My Music‘s resolutely idiographic stance seems to forclose the possibility of a sociological account of eclecticism.

     

    In fact, we already have at least one such account. DiMaggio (1987) suggests that broad tastes correlate with high socio-economic status, assuming that those in high positions have wider social networks and hence need to be familiar with a wide range of artistic styles. Might the patterns of musical choice revealed in My Music be explicable in these terms?

     

    We badly need a study of musical taste that combines My Music‘s attention to detail with panoramic views of the social, economic, and historical context. Until one appears, however, we do well to appreciate this book for what it is. It is unique in its use of open-ended, more-or-less nondirective interviews, and its focus on the voices of ordinary people. I don’t know if this book is part of an “emancipatory cultural project” (xvii), but it is valuable in its own right. And I suspect it will prove especially useful in the classroom.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Bourdieu, Pierre. Distinction: A Sociological Critique of the Judgment of Taste. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984.
    • DiMaggio, Paul. “Cultural Entrepreneurship in Nineteenth-Century Boston: The Creation of an Organizational Base for High Culture in America.” Media, Culture and Society 4 (1982): 33-50.
    • “Classification in Art.” American Sociological Review 52 (1987): 440-55.
    • Frith, Simon. “The Cultural Study of Popular Music.” Cultural Studies. Ed. L. Grossberg, C. Nelson and P. Treichler. New York: Routledge, 1992.
    • Honan, William H. “The New Sound of Radio.” New York Times Magazine 3 Dec. 1967.
    • Lee, Vernon. Music and Its Lovers: An Empirical Study of Emotional and Imaginative Responses to Music. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1933.
    • Lewis, George H. “Cultural Socialization and the Development of Taste Cultures and Culture Classes in American Popular Music: Existing Evidence and Proposed Research Directions.” Popular Music and Society 4 (1975): 226-41.
    • Peterson, Richard A. “Patterns of Cultural Choice.” American Behavior Scientist 26 (1983): 422-38.
    • Peterson, Richard A., and Russell B. Davis, Jr. “The Contemporary American Radio Audience.” Popular Music and Society 6 (1978): 169-83.
    • Peterson, Richard A., and Paul DiMaggio. “From Region to Class, The Changing Locus of Country Music: A Test of the Massification Hypothesis.” Social Forces 53 (1975): 497-506.

     

  • Fear Of Music

    Andrew Herman

    Department of Sociology
    Drake University

    ah7301r@acad.drake.edu

     

    Goodwin, Andrew. Dancing in the Distraction Factory: Music Televison and Popular Culture. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992.

     

    I. Fear of Music: Postmodernism and Music Television

     

    The first time I heard the terms “postmodernism” and “the postmodern” was at the “Marxism and Interpretation of Culture Conference” at the University of Illinois during the torpid summer of 1983. Like the inhuman heat and humidity of the Midwestern July, the terms hung heavily in the conference atmosphere, a prominent feature of almost every presentation, debate, and discussion. The omnipresence of the terms was particularly frustrating as almost nobody had anything close to resembling a straight explanation of them. Clearly, I thought, these terms must have some shared intersubjective meaning, otherwise all these people wouldn’t be enunciating them with such zest and enthusiasm. Finally, in desperation, I nearly assaulted a fellow conference participant during an incredibly hot and hazy dance party, determined to extract at least a basic definition of this hot and hazy chimera, “the postmodern.”

     

    This individual did her best to satisfy my inquisitorial hunger by telling me of “the crisis in representation,” the “death of the author,” the “collapse of master narratives,” “pastiche and parody,” the “waning of affect,” and so on. Unfortunately, none of these characterizations of “postmodernism” or “the postmodern” made much sense to me. And so I just stood there nodding and grinning, hoping to convey vague understanding. Sensing a lack of comprehension on my part, and desperate to extricate herself from what was rapidly becoming a dead-end conversation, my reluctant interlocutor directed my attention to the spectral glow of a television monitor that hung in the corner of the room. “Look,” she said triumphantly, “the postmodern is in this very room. If you want to understand the postmodern, watch music television.” She then slipped away, leaving me to ponder the connection between music video, MTV, and postmodernism.

     

    My companion that evening was probably not the first, and most certainly not the last, to note that there was an intimate connection between the postmodern, music video in general, and MTV: Music Television in particular. Indeed, the argument that music video as cultural form and MTV as televisual apparatus were quintessential exemplars of postmodern culture has become the dominant interpretation of music television within cultural studies. For example, John Fiske (1986, 1989) argues that music video as textual form is postmodern because of its fragmentary and disjointed nature. In its privileging of signifier over signified, contends Fiske, music video produces the distinctively postmodern experience of decentered subjectivity. Similarly, E. Ann Kaplan (1987) and David Tetzlaff (1986) maintain that MTV, as a regime of televisual experience, is postmodern because of the atemporal, ahistorical and dreamlike quality of its programming flow. Although they draw widely different political conclusions from their analyses, Kaplan, Kim Chen (1986), and Will Straw (1988) locate the postmodern nature of music video in its palimpsistic intertextuality and representational practices of pastiche and parody. Finally, Larry Grossberg (1988, 1989, 1992) argues that MTV evinces a cultural logic of “authentic inauthenticity,” a peculiarly postmodern form of identity politics that self-consciously celebrates the temporary affective commitments of style and pose. As an expression of the logic of postmodern culture, Grossberg maintains that music television locates identity and difference in the surface appearances of mood and attitude rather than in the meaningful modernist depths of ideology. What makes this superficial, “inauthentic” politics of style “authentic” (and therefore postmodern), according to Grossberg, is that performers, programmers, and audiences all know that there is nothing beyond the pose. In the cynical postmodern sensibility of MTV (and, for Grossberg, popular culture as a whole), there is no pretension to making a difference in the structure or fabric of everyday life beyond the differences of image and appearance.

     

    It would be an understatement to say that Andrew Goodwin finds the predominance of such accounts within cultural studies a bit troublesome. Indeed, much of Dancing in the Distraction Factory is a sustained, if uneven and somewhat contradictory, polemic against the understanding of music television as distinctively postmodern. For Goodwin, the aforementioned authors and their analyses (with the partial exception of Grossberg) represent a theoretical arrogance and political naivete of egregious proportions. They are part of a “current fashion for conflating the specificities of different media and genre into a ragbag category of ‘postmodernism’ that does injustice in equal measure to both the conceptual field [i.e., postmodernism] and the object of study [i.e., music television]” (17). Although Goodwin grudgingly admits that there are certain features of contemporary society and popular culture that might be accurately and fruitfully understood as “postmodern,” music television is not one of them.

     

    According to Goodwin, the fundamental problem of the postmodernist take on music television is that it fails to take into account that music television is, quite simply, music television. Although there has been some work done in media studies on the aural dimension of television (e.g. Williams, 1974; Altman, 1987), according to Goodwin, “very few analyses of music television have thought to consider that it might be music” (5). Goodwin devotes much of the first part of the book to detailing the deleterious results of the bias in studies of music television towards the visual.

     

    For example, Goodwin takes issue with two widely held positions that represent polar extremes of the postmodern assessment of the politics of music television. The first is the pessimistic argument that music video has had a detrimental impact on the interpretative imagination of the audience because its visual images tyrannically fix the lyrical and musical meaning of a song. The second is the more optimistic, “avant-garde” argument that music videos represent a radical, subversive break with “classic realist” modes of representation and subjectivity because of their temporally fractured narrative and distinctive mode of address. Due to their narrow emphasis on the visual text of music video, both arguments ignore two con-textual dimensions of music television that are central to Goodwin’s own analysis.

     

    The first dimension is the interdiscursive polysemy of music television. Goodwin argues that there are a multiplicity of extratextual discourses beyond the visual image which help constitute any particular song’s meaning. These include discourses of performance, promotion, and stardom that are crucial to understanding the institutional context of music television. Secondly, the hermeneutical valences of music video can be understood only by taking into account the phenomenology of synaesthesia, or the complex relationship between sound and image that was central to the production of the pleasure and meaning of songs long before music television.

     

    When both dimensions are foregrounded in the analysis of music television, Goodwin maintains, the aforementioned arguments make little sense. In the case of the “meaning-fixing” dominance of video-text images, because of the array of discourses that are both inscribed in a music video as well as brought to the video by an audience, there is a multiplicity of visual associations that are conjured by the audience, many of which have little to do with a particular video’s images. Rereading the avant-garde argument about the anti-realist nature of music video, Goodwin points out that if one understands the institutional history of pop music discourses and the aesthetics of performance, the supposedly radical mode of address of music video (where the performer often directly addresses the audience) is, in fact, revealed to be “entirely conventional and thoroughly ordinary” (76). Further, if one considers the ways sound and image are linked through the process of synaesthesia, the fractured narratives and other “instabilities” in the music-video text (which are supposedly indicative of its postmodern character) can be understood as visual analogs of the musical structure of a song in terms of voice, rhythm, tempo, timbre, harmonic development and, of course, lyrics. Thus, according to Goodwin, much of what makes “no sense” to postmodernists (c.f. Chen, 1986; Fiske, 1989) makes a great deal of sense in terms of what he calls a “musicology of the image.” Indeed, from this perspective, music television represents “the making musical of television” through the subordination of vision to sound as much as it does the triumph of the visual over the musical (70). Consequently, as Goodwin concludes with a nice rhetorical flourish,

     

    music television does not, generally speaking, indulge in a rapture with the Symbolic; nor does it defy our understanding or attempt to elude logic and rationality through its refusal to make sense. Far from constituting a radical break with the social processes of meaning production, music television constantly reworks themes (work, school, authority, romance, poverty, and so on) that are deeply implicated in the question of how meaning serves power.(180)

     

    II. Meaning, Power and the “Scandal” of “New Populism”

     

    It is this issue of “how meaning serves power”, and how it’s currently being addressed within contemporary cultural studies, that is Goodwin’s ultimate concern in the book. As should be clear by now, he believes that the postmodern perspective is ill-equipped to explore the “social process of meaning production” in music television because of its fascination with the surfaces of visual imagery. However, Goodwin is equally critical of what he terms the “new populism” of cultural studies. Although he never specifies precisely to what work the epithet refers, one gathers that this new populism is characterized by an ethnographic focus on the processes of reception and a concomitant privileging of the audience’s power in terms of interpretation and pleasure (e.g. Ang, 1985; Lewis, 1990). For Goodwin, this so-called new populism accords “too much autonomy” to audiences because it implies that they “could construct meaning from media texts at will,” thus denying the salience of hegemonic or preferred meanings that emanate from cultural institutions and are inscribed in cultural artifacts and texts (14). This valorization of the audience in cultural studies, Goodwin insists, has entailed an abandonment of the project of ideology critique and its concern with the relationship between meaning and power. To my knowledge, even the most optimistic of those who might fall under the Goodwin’s rubric of new populism, such as John Fiske (1989, 1992), do not in any way maintain that power or preferred meanings are inoperative in the process of reception. Nonetheless, Goodwin dramatically asserts that the new populism’s supposed abandonment of concern with ideology as power constitutes “the ‘scandal’” of cultural studies (158).

     

    How, then, is this “scandal” to be stopped? In order to have an adequate grasp of the social processes of meaning and ideology involved in music television in particular and popular culture as a whole, Goodwin maintains that cultural studies must adopt a mode of analysis that is “more adequate to the real.” The “real” for Goodwin is constituted by “actual, historical relations of power” and production (158, 167). In other words, the scandalous state of cultural studies can be rectified by its reorientation within a framework of Marxist political economy. Of course, Goodwin is quick to point out that he is not advocating a return to the good old days of crude base/superstructure certitude where the masses were manipulated into false consciousness by the products of the culture industry, products whose ideological content could be explained solely in terms of the imperatives of capital accumulation. Rather, Goodwin’s political economic approach is meant to be a “non-reductionist” examination of the institution/text and text/audience nexi of popular culture that situates textual aesthetics and ideology, as well as audience reception, squarely within the conditions of cultural production in a capitalist society.

     

    Accordingly, from his perspective, a materialist analysis of music television that is “more adequate to real” adheres to the following logic. First, one must examine the historical development and contemporary dynamics of the institutional politics of production in the music and television industries. This institutional analysis establishes a contextual framework for understanding the aesthetics and ideology of music videos as texts. Although Goodwin claims he is not suggesting that textual content is determined by conditions of cultural production, he does want to emphasize that such conditions have a constraining effect upon texts. Finally, having examined the nexus of institution and text, one can proceed to the final step of analysis wherein one examines the nexus of text and audience, or the relationship between the politics of production and the politics of consumption.

     

    Again, while not claiming that the meaning and pleasures of music video are predetermined and fixed by the institutional imperatives of production, Goodwin clearly argues that there are limits to the polysemy of music television which are set by its political economy. Accordingly, he insists that the first and second levels of analysis can produce an understanding of the third by illuminating what he suggestively terms (but, unfortunately, never explicitly defines) “reading formations.” Such reading formations are multidiscursive regimes of representation and pleasure that privilege certain subject positions in terms of ideology and affect. One example of a “reading formation” is what Goodwin terms a “star-text.” The star-text is composed of the repertoire of images and discourses which constitute a musician’s or band’s persona and is central to the meaning of music videos. Such star-texts operate as a “metanarrative” that structure a musician’s or band’s identity. Thus, even before audiences have seen a particular video clip of, say, the band U2, they are probably familiar with the band’s metanarrative or star-text as the spiritual and political “conscience of rock and roll.” Further, argues Goodwin, such star-texts are inextricably linked to the imperatives of the music industry as they are an essential component of the effort to package and sell musicians as commodities. After all, it was the promotions department at Island Records that came up with the “conscience of rock and roll” moniker for U2 in order to sell The Joshua Tree album. Thus, even though at the book’s beginning Goodwin hedges his bets by disavowing any “claim to provide a definitive account of textual reception” (xxiii), by its end he feels entitled to state unequivocally that “while different parts of the audience will be positioned differently, music television viewers are nonetheless still positioned” (180). It is this claim about the audience which, I would argue, represents the major flaw in the logic of cultural analysis followed by Goodwin and ultimately undermines his claim to provide a coherent alternative to both postmodernism and the “new populism.” [13] When it comes to the first moment of Goodwin’s preferred mode of analysis, exploring the trends in the music and television industries that fostered the development of music video and music television, Dancing in the Distraction Factory is superb. Building upon Wolfgang Haug’s work on advertising and commodity aesthetics (1986), Goodwin offers a compelling argument that it is impossible to comprehend the pleasure and meaning of music video texts without considering their status as unique promotional commodities. Goodwin is certainly not the first to examine the emergence of music television in terms of pressures of market demographics, programming needs, and promotional imperatives of the music and television industries (c.f., in particular, Denisoff, 1988). However, his argument concerning the confluence of industrial marketing and programming imperatives with the emergence of new aesthetics and ideologies of performance and musicianship which privileged the artifice of the visual image (e.g. as articulated by the “New Romantics” such as the Pet Shop Boys), is startlingly original and convincing.

     

    Similarly, Goodwin’s analysis of how the institutional discourses and practices of promotion, performance, and stardom become encoded into the sounds, images, and iconography of music video texts is nuanced and sophisticated. Indeed, the chapter on what Goodwin terms the “musicology of the image” should be required reading for all students of music television and music in general. Yet in spite of the complex relationship between sound, visual image, and narrative structure that engenders the ideology and aesthetics of music video, Goodwin maintains one cannot escape the political economic fact that all video clips are, first and foremost, promotional devices meant to entice consumers to purchase other commodities. Further, both music videos and the programming flow of networks such as MTV operate as a “super-text” which constantly directs the attention and desire of the audience towards commodities that promise solutions to individual and social problems. Accordingly, Goodwin argues, the polysemy of music video is limited by a hegemonic reading formation of commercialism which “attempts to restructure the subject-as-citizen . . . along the lines of subject as consumer” (169). Therefore, the central way in which in which Goodwin’s political economic approach is able to show how meaning serves power in music television is to demonstrate how text, programming, and audience are, to use an old Althusserian chestnut, structured in dominance by the ideology of the marketplace.

     

    Naturally, when one makes such strong claims regarding the hegemonic structuring of the reading formations of music television one runs the risk of creeping (if not galloping) reductionism. That is, there is a danger of assuming that the politics of consumption in terms of use, meaning, and pleasure can be read off the politics of production like elephant tracks. Goodwin is well aware of this danger and, to pre-empt such criticisms, says:

     

    The objection to such arguments is that they tell us too little about what particular television programs mean, what use-values are obtained in the consumption of popular culture and so on. . . . However, to argue that diverse audience readings and real use-values must also be taken into account is not to argue that a politics of individual consumption, based around the promotion of market relations, does not also operate. Indeed, to suggest that the former actually cancels out the latter is every bit as reductionist and simplistic as the most brazen economism.(174)

     

    [16] And, indeed it is. Yet what vitiates Goodwin’s otherwise reasonable argument here is the contradictory way in which he deploys the audience in his analysis elsewhere. On the one hand, he frequently appeals to an audience of “music fans” to validate his hermeneutic analysis of the multi-discursivity of music video texts. For example, when discussing the visual iconography of performance, Goodwin forthrightly claims that he is simply “describing the process by which video clips make sense to the audience” (90). On the other hand, while this may indeed be true, Goodwin has absolutely no evidence to support his conclusions (and admits as much, 95). Further, although he concedes that his analysis “needs to be related to audience interpretation and reader competence” (130), he does not attempt to do so and dismisses almost out of hand other attempts along these lines (e.g. Lewis, 1990). The “audience” seems to exist for Goodwin only as a convenient rhetorical device that enables him to claim a face validity for his textual analysis and thus obviates the need for engaging in or with ethnographies of the music television audience. Doggedly sticking to his Marxist guns against the new populists, whom he condescendingly terms the “bright young things of cultural studies” (xxiii), Goodwin refuses to believe that the audience might tell him something about the politics of consumption that he doesn’t already know.

     

    In the end, Goodwin’s cavalier attitude towards the audience and ethnographic study of the politics of consumption both blinds and deafens him to the salience of the concept of postmodernism for understanding the cultural politics of music television. At this point in the debate around postmodernism within cultural studies, it should be clear that the concept entails much more than simply textual aesthetics. The postmodern is not simply a style, attitude, or pose, but a fundamental mutation in the fabric of everyday life from the political economy of production to the rituals of consumption. In order to understand the politics of music television, to assess how meaning serves power, it would seem to me that it is imperative to examine how the postmodern is evinced in the everyday life of the audience. Goodwin seems to suspect that this might be the case when he notes in passing that “work on postmodernism as a condition of reception might be extremely fruitful” (153). Yes it would, but only if one is less dismissive of ethnographic dialogue with the audience. And, in spite of the many virtues of Dancing in the Distraction Factory, it is this refusal to take the postmodern seriously that is truly a scandal.

    Works Cited

     

    • Altman, R. “Television/Sound.” Television: The Critical View. Ed. H. Newcomb. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.
    • Ang, I. Watching Dallas: Soap Opera and the Melodramatic Imagination. New York: Methuen, 1985
    • Chen, K. “MTV: The (Dis)Appearance of Postmodern Semiosis, or the Cultural Politics of Resistance.” Journal of Communication Inquiry 10.1 (1986).
    • Denisoff, R. S. Inside MTV. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1988.
    • Fiske, J. “MTV: Post structural Post modern.” Journal of Communication Inquiry 10.1 (1986).
    • Fiske, J. Reading Popular Culture. Winchester, MA: Unwin Hyman, 1989.
    • Fiske, J. “Cultural Studies and the Culture of Everyday Life.” Cultural Studies. Ed. L. Grossberg, C. Nelson, and P. Treichler. New York: Routledge, 1992.
    • Grossberg, L. “‘You Still Have to Fight For Your Right to Party’: Music Television as Billboards of Post-Modern Difference.” Popular Music 7.3 (1988).
    • Grossberg, L. “MTV: Swinging On A (Postmodern) Star,” Cultural Politics in Contemporary America. Ed. I. Angus and S. Jhally. New York: Routledge, 1989.
    • Grossberg, L. We Gotta Get Outta This Place: Popular Conservatism and Postmodern Culture. New York: Routledge, 1992.
    • Haug, W. Critique of Commodity Aesthetics: Appearance, Sexuality and Advertising in Capitalist Society. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986.
    • Kaplan, E.A. Rocking Around the Clock: Music Television, Postmodernism and Consumer Culture. New York: Methuen, 1987.
    • Lewis, L. Gender Politics and MTV: Voicing the Difference. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990.
    • Straw, W. “Music Video in Its Contexts: Popular Music and Post-Modernism in the 1980’s.” Popular Music 7.3 (1988).
    • Williams, R. Television: Technology and Cultural Form. London: Fontana, 1974.

     

  • Postmodernist Purity

    John McGowan

    Department of English
    University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

    jpm@unc.bitnet

     

    Owens, Craig. Beyond Recognition: Representation, Power, and Culture. Ed. Scott Bryson, Barbara Kruger, Lynne Tillman, and Jane Weinstock. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992.

     

    Craig Owens was a critic/theorist of contemporary art, best known for his essays in October and Art in America, who died of complications stemming from AIDS in 1990. Just about everything he ever published–plus the syllabi and bibliographies for courses he taught on postmodern art, on critical theory, and on visualizing AIDS–has been collected in the volume under review. It makes for sad reading, not just because Owens should still be among us, but also because the shifting yet intractable aporias of a certain postmodernist discourse haunt this work. Owens’s intellectual trajectory–from Derrida to Foucault to Lacan as the major influence on his work–follows that of much of his (and my) generation in this country. From an aestheticist, textual rejection of modernist pieties inspired by Derrida, Owens moved to a political analysis of modernism that focused on relations of power and from there to a cultural critique of the construction of gender identities and of desire (sexual and social) itself. In the process, Derrida and Foucault do not completely disappear, but the prevalence of psychoanalysis in much feminist thought had shaped Owens’s discourse in a particularly distinctive way by the mid-eighties.

     

    The thread that runs through these various sub-periods in Owens’s work is the problematic of representation. An early (1979) essay on Derrida’s critique of classical aesthetics ends with the enigmatic statement from which the editors of this volume take its title:

     

    If in 'The Parergon' Derrida offers us no alternative theory of art, it is because the theoretical investigation of works of art according to philosophical principles is what is deconstructed. Still, 'The Parergon" signals a necessity: not of a renovated aesthetics, but of transforming the object, the work of art, beyond recognition."(38)

     

    What is the nature of the “necessity” here? Necessary for what and to whom? And how would we know (if) something (was) beyond recognition? A few years later (1982), Foucault has led Owens to be more willing to name names, to suggest why an escape from representation, from recognition, might be desirable. He calls our attention to “the ways in which domination and subjugation are inscribed within the representational systems of the West. Representation, then, is not–nor can it be–neutral; it is an act–indeed, the founding act–of power in our culture” (91). The wholesale condemnation of the West’s representational systems is retained in this shift from Derrida to Foucault, but now Owens can at least specify particular harmful effects of powerful representations and the groups most likely to suffer those harms.

     

    Three years later (1985) Owens criticizes Foucault for only telling “half the story”; what “Foucault would excise” is the half “that concerned desire and representation” (204). Here we need Lacan, who teaches us to “regard all human sexuality as masquerade” (214), as a representation of presence/plenitude/identity over the absence/lack that is castration. Appropriately enough, the Lacanian essay on “Posing” brings Owens full circle. He ends with a quote from Derrida. “If the alterity of the other is posed, that is simply posed, doesn’t it amount to the same . . . . From this point of view I would even go so far as to say that the alterity of the other inscribes something on the relation which can in no way be posed” (215).

     

    The critique of representation, then, keeps coming back to the desire for that which exceeds representation, which cannot be represented. I use the word “desire” deliberately here because, while fascinated by the inscription, formation, and constraints of conventional desire, Owens follows his models in never thinking through his own desire to question and disrupt the conventional. This postmodern discourse adopts without question a certain oppositional posture traditionally associated with the avant-garde. This blind spot is particularly irritating because Owens recognizes that the avant-garde was never the revolutionary force it set itself up as and that contemporary re-runs of avant-garde movements are the farcical versions that follow tragedy in Marx’s version of historical repetition. “Honor, Power, and the Love of Women” offers a wonderful send-up of neoexpressionism, while “The Problem with Puerilism” argues convincingly that “what has been constructed in the East Village is a simulacrum of the social formation from which the modernist avant-garde first emerged” (263). But, lest we allow this talk of simulacrum to entice us into nostalgia for the original modernist avant-garde, Owens is quick to sketch for us the role that avant-garde played in making “difference . . . become an object of consumption”:

     

    The fact that avant-garde artists had only partially withdrawn from the middle-class elite--which also constitutes the primary, if not the only, audience for avant-garde production--placed them in a contradictory position; but this position also equipped them for the economic function they would eventually be called upon to perform--that of broker between the culture industry and subcultures.(264)

     

    [5] Armed with this awareness of the modernist avant-garde’s failure, Owens offers nothing beyond calls for a purity more stringent than the modernists could achieve. Writing during the boom art market years of the 80s (which, again, he wonderfully satirizes when discussing enemies like Robert Hughes in “The Yen for Art”), Owens is reduced to denial when asked to contemplate the relation of the artists he champions to that market. Andars Stephanson asks: “But isn’t it true that oppositional artists themselves became marketable, say, after 1980?”–to which Owens replies: “This is seriously overplayed. Hans Haacke does not sell much work, and he has not had a show in an American museum until now. Kruger’s work is also interesting because it costs far more to produce in terms of photomechanical work, labs and so forth, than it costs to produce a painting, yet it sells for one-tenth of the latter’s price” (307). What’s significant here is not the fact of the matter, but the form that the defense of oppositional artists takes. Owens has not gotten past the association of purity and integrity with poverty, with producing the art work which does not become a commodity. He is setting himself up to reach the same dead end that avant-garde art has been reaching for seventy-five years: the dead end of silence as the only pure act and the dead end of isolation from every audience because to appeal to anyone outside the self (or, in some cases, outside a small coterie) is to become implicated in social forms of exchange that are repudiated.

     

    In this context, the poststructuralist critique of representation comes across as a new variant on this long-standing modernist obsession with purity. To even engage in debate with the culture, it seems, would be to succumb to its terms.

     

    It is not the ideological content of representation of these Others that is at issue. Nor do contemporary artists oppose their own representations to existing ones; they do not subscribe to the phallacy of the positive image. (To do so would be to oppose some 'true' representivity to a 'false' one.) Rather, these artists challenge the activity of representation itself which, by denying them speech, consciousness, the ability to represent themselves, stands indicted as the primary agent of their domination."(262)

     

    What would it mean to “indict” the “activity of representation itself” in the name of “the ability to represent themselves”? By rejecting a conflict within the social over different representations with the assertion that every positive image is a phallacy, Owens places the artist on the path of pure negation that has been a modernist treadmill since at least Flaubert’s desire to write a novel about nothing.

     

    The critic is left in even a worse position than the artist.

     

    "What you are saying, then, is that to represent is to subjugate?" "Precisely. There is a remarkable statement by Gilles Deleuze . . . that encapsulates the political ramifications of the contemporary critique of representation: 'you [Deleuze says to Foucault] were the first . . . to teach us something absolutely fundamental: the indignity of speaking for others.'"(261-2)

     

    Owens as critic does nothing else but speak for others. He wrote only one essay–“Outlaws: Gay Men in Feminism”–that is even remotely self-referential, and he is still speaking for gay men, not of this particular gay man. Everything he writes performs the traditional critical task of mediating between audience and work (of art, of theory). A sometime academic who wrote academic prose to introduce academic theory to a nonacademic audience (the New York art world), Owens was primarily a translator, re-representing representations to facilitate their entry into different contexts. His success is attested to by the fact that his work was widely read and highly influential. Through his efforts and those of some collaborators, Art in America became a conduit point between the academy and the art world. Owens was a mediator whose work keeps circling around his distrust of the means of mediation. By adopting a simple-minded and wholesale condemnation of representation, Owens boxed himself into a corner where he had to suspect anything he would write of bad faith. He wrote only three essays the last four years of his life; he did not write about AIDS. I know nothing about Owens personally; his health as well as other commitments could easily explain this relative silence. But his own theoretical views had, by that time, left him very little space to work in.

     

    No doubt Owens would have struck out in new directions. What is fascinating and rewarding about these collected essays is the combination of Owens’s sharp eye (this is someone whose representations of others’ art I came to trust) with his continued fascination with and ability to learn from theoretical arguments. If I focus on the theoretical impasse at which his work ends, it is because I find it sad that one version of postmodernism is currently stuck right there, unable (apparently) to apply its own strictures against universals to this universal condemnation of representation, unable to think its own retrograde (modernist) desire for purity within its critique of discourses that aim for homogeneity. Not surprisingly, the specifics of Owen’s wonderful essays on William Wegman, Barbara Kruger, and Lothar Baumgarten already suggest some ways to move beyond a vague and unsatisfiable desire for absolute alterity. The conclusion to the essay on Wegman talks of “necessity” again, but this time it is the necessity of recognition, not of getting beyond it:

     

    When we laugh at Man Ray's foiling of Wegman's designs, we are also acknowledging the possibility, indeed the necessity, of another, nonnarcissistic mode of relating to the Other--one based not on the denial of difference, but upon its recognition. Thus, inscribed within the social space in which both Bakhtin and Freud situate laughter, Wegman's refusal of mastery is ultimately political in its implications.(163-4)

     

    Postmodern thought needs to turn to the question of the social space which would enable this recognition of difference; it is the absence of the social and its myriad forms of interaction between self and other that constitutes both the purity and the peculiar emptiness of so much postmodernist cultural critique. For what could be more narcissistic than a total repudiation of all the forms of representation by which the other might try to make contact?

     

  • Practice, Politique, Postmodernism

    J.L. Lemke

    Sociology Department
    City University of New York

    jllbc@cunyvm.cuny.edu

     

    Bourdieu, Pierre and Lois J.D. Wacquant. An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.

     

    I. The Text

     

    Invitation to Reflexive Sociology is a book that is not quite a text. Tiles in a genre mosaic abut one another: Fantasy Interview with the Great Man (Part Deux, a construction not a transcript), Fatherly Advice on Becoming a Sociologist (Part 3, from a seminar for Bourdieu’s students), several essays at a “How to Read Bourdieu” (Part 1, Appendices, Notes, from Wacquant). The unbounded border mosaic of intertexts, present and absent, draws down readers’ accumulated cultural capital toward indebtedness.

     

    If you have read Bourdieu’s The Logic of Practice (1990), whose first half sets forth his most original theoretical ideas (elaborating and superseding the older Outline of a Theory of Practice, 1977), and at least one of his major sociological studies Distinction, 1984; Homo Academicus, 1988; La Noblesse d’Etat, 1989), then Invitation may help you decide whether to read more from Bourdieu, and what. If you have only a vague sense that Bourdieu is a leading social theorist who engages the telling intellectual issues of the day, Invitation may convince you that, along with his near neighbors in social space (as he himself defines them in Homo Academicus, 276), Foucault and Derrida, Bourdieu sets the stage for our postmodernist play.

     

    And if you have ever wondered what Bourdieu thinks of his actual and potential rivals: sociological, intellectual, and philosophical (except Derrida and Foucault), or simply enjoy stockpiling ammunition for use in future intellectual battles of your own, Invitation is a fully-stocked armamentarium.

     

    But Invitation is also a voice, one that resonates with our own, speaking as we would like to speak (if not necessarily saying what we would like to say), about the construction of reality and society, experience and meaning, language and power, the social and the personal, time and the body, gender and domination, science and politics, academics and intellectuals. Perhaps it is only an illusion, but in this text as nowhere else, we seem to hear Bourdieu speaking, rather than writing. Bourdieu writes himself out of his writing in too many ways. However written his speaking may be here, however defensive, didactic, or undialogical, to a small degree at least it allows us to write him back in.

     

    And if you are a student, or any sort of newcomer, to academic and intellectual discourse in what was once humanistic and social studies, I advise you to read and challenge this book.

     

    II. Postmodernism, Si or No?

     

    So, is he or isn’t he? The short answer, I think, is that Bourdieu writes as a chastened defender of the great modernist projects, a modernist for postmodern times. But while his desire is with the best of modernism, his method is shaped by the same rebellion against modernism and structuralism that characterizes his close contemporaries Foucault and Derrida.

     

    Here, taken from Invitation, is my reading of Bourdieu’s project and consequent overt stance against postmodernism, to be followed by a counter-construction of Bourdieu as postmodern in spite of himself.

     

    The project of Bourdieu’s desire is a grand sociology which realizes in part the modernist dream of a scientific objectivity hard won through its own reflexivity: “Sociology can escape to a degree [from its necessarily socially determined point of view on the social world] by drawing on its knowledge of the social universe in which social science is produced to control the effects of the determinisms that operate in this universe and, at the same time, bear on sociologists themselves” (67).

     

    This is the motivation for Bourdieu’s many studies of the academic and educational systems of his native France, and generally for his studies of how the social system shapes our perceptions and desires. He constructs his notion of what scientific objectivity about such matters means following Marx’s criterion that social facts exist “independently of individual consciousness and will.” But what exist objectively for Bourdieu in the social world are pre-eminently relations, not positive entities, and with this he has already taken the first, structuralist step into postmodernism.

     

    Still, he wants to draw a line against critiques of social science that see its/his writings as merely “poetics and politics,” opening the door to “nihilistic relativism” of the same sort found in the “strong program of the sociology of science” (Feyerabend? Bruno Latour?). He opposes “the false radicalism of the questioning of science” and “those who would reduce scientific discourse to rhetorical strategies about a world reduced to the state of a text” (246-7). How can I hope to rehabilitate the author of such reactionary sentiments?

     

    By better understanding the terms of the debate as Bourdieu constructs it. When, just following this last point, he characterizes the goal of his own project as “to wrench scientific reason from the embrace of practical reason, to prevent the latter from contaminating the former,” we need to understand his critical distinction of the practical from the scientific, and his own critique of positivistic objectivity:

     

    Against positivistic materialism, the theory of practice posits that objects of knowledge are constructed, and not passively recorded; against intellectual idealism, it reminds us that the principle of this construction is found in the socially constituted system of structured and struc- turing dispositions acquired in practice . . . and that all knowledge . . . presupposes a work of construction . . . that consists of an activity of practical construction, even of practical reflection, that ordinary notions of thought, consciousness, knowledge prevent us from thinking . . . . [This view aims] to escape from under the philosophy of the subject without doing away with the agent, as well as from the philosophy of the [social, semiotic] structure, but without forgetting to take into account the effects it wields upon and through the agent.(121)

     

    III. Practice, Temporality, Embodiedness

     

    For a systematic account of this Logic of Practice, we have to turn to that text. Its tour-de-force Introduction is mainly a critique of every form of objectivism, and more profoundly of the conditions of possibility of theoretical and scientific perspectives:

     

    Social science must not only, as objectivism [vs. phenomenological subjectivisms] would have it, break with native experience and the native representation of that experience, but also, by a second break, call into question the presuppositions inherent in the position of the "objective" observer who, seeking to interpret practices, tends to bring into the object the principles of his relation to the object.... Knowledge does not only depend, as an elementary relativism would have it, on the particular viewpoint that at "situated and dated" observer takes us via-a-vis the object. A much more fundamental alteration ... is performed on practice by the sheer fact of taking up a "viewpoint" on it and so constituting it as an object ... this sovereign viewpoint is most easily adopted from elevated positions in the social space, where the social world presents itself as a spectacle seen from afar and from above, as a representation.(Logic of Practice, 27)

     

    In The Logic of Practice Bourdieu inquires into those aspects of experience and social reality which look different precisely because we are in the midst of action and not theoretically and scientifically distancing ourselves from it: the contingency and anticipatability of events when they have yet to happen, the absence of synoptic order and structure from the logic of action, the construction of dynamic vs synoptic time, the role of the body in action without reflection (and in reflection itself), the importance of tempo, rhythm, pacing, duration, delay, and haste in the meaning of events-in-flow. This is the perspective from which Bourdieu originally criticized Levi-Straussian structuralism for its theoreticist blindness to whatever is elided from synoptic representations made from the sovereign viewpoint of a science outside of event-time and the pressures of the moment.

     

    It also provides a counterpoint against which to examine both the conditions of possibility and the otherwise unthinkable biases of all theoretical and scientific discourses and perspectives, as such. Dialectically, it allows us to interrogate the practices of science as practice, and to see in them the role of the practical, embodied logics, the famous dispositions toward practice that Bourdieu calls “habitus”, and which derive from the trajectories of practice of individual social agents as they take up the lives available to them.

     

    I have found this dynamic perspective on social practice, and its dialectical relations with the synoptic perspectives of theoretical representation, extremely useful in my own work on social semiotics, discourse analysis, and text semantics (Lemke 1984, 1990, 1991) and so have many others (e.g. Martin 1985, Thibault 1991) in these fields whose underlying disciplines and methods are quite distant from Bourdieu’s. The re-centering of the body in alternatives to mentalist accounts of subjectivity, cognition, and action; in deconstructing the idealist cheats of a natural science self-disembodied from its own practice; and in theorizing gender issues, domination relations, and the repressed role of bodily violence in constituting the social order are but some of the postmodernist projects that will eventually build on Bourdieu’s theory of practice.

     

    IV. Gender, Habitus, and Us

     

    For all that Bourdieu lays the foundations of a productive critical dialectic between the logics of theory and practice, of semiotic structures and bodies in action, social structures and personal trajectories, and for all the centrality of reflexivity in his notion of social science, there seems to be more preparing-the-way than radical self-critique in his work. There is no profound self-examination, for example, of masculinism, Eurocentrism, or even the essentially bourgeois perspectives in his own theoretical metaphors and paradigms.

     

    Homo Academicus comes closest to being a self- analysis “by proxy,” as he says in the Preface. But it is a micro-analysis, situating Bourdieu in his generation, and in the academy, but not in his gender, social class (bourgeois, as such), or culture (European, as such). By proxy and indirection it suggests that various elements of his scientific and career trajectory are shaped, as his theory requires, by his own initial social position and the effects of the dispostions it engendered in him on his encounters with later opportunities. In Invitation he argues that he keeps the personal Bourdieu on the margins so as not to make facile argumenta ad hominem too easy for his rivals. In doing so, however, he may have kept himself from deploying the full power of sociological reflexivity toward his own theorizing. Enabling such self-critique is, after all, the point of his scientific project and the absence of such self-analysis the very point on which, in the Postscript to Distinction, he criticizes Derrida.

     

    Who, Bourdieu included, can read his texts and not see that he models the whole social universe as a struggle and competition among agents for status, domination, profit, and accumulation in one guise or another? In every field of social action, whatever their habitus, agents deploy and convert their capital (economic, cultural, and social) in an effort to win the game as defined in that field. If the game, and especially the competitive game of sport, is Bourdieu’s favorite simile, his master trope is the agon, the struggle for dominance.

     

    The field of fields, the master field, for Bourdieu is the field of power, in relation to which all others are defined, and power for Bourdieu is the power to win the game, to maximize one’s capital position, to overcome adversaries. Any such summary is caricature, of course, but with the truth of caricature, as well. When Bourdieu speaks, rarely, of what happens “in the family and in other relations of philia,” what he sees is “violence suspended in a kind of pact of symbolic non-aggression,” the pervasive potentiality of every utterance to function as an act of power “bracketed” (145).

     

    The social relations of philia are defined as exceptions to the underlying principle of the agon. The institutions of philia are marginalized, those of the agon made central. Economic competition, cultural competition, personal competition, metaphoric competition among abstracted social positions and roles. This is a view of social reality constructed with the dispositions of masculinism. It survives as doxa for Bourdieu precisely for the reasons his theory offers: because the world as he sees it and lives it fits perfectly with the masculinist dispositions it has produced in him.

     

    Power for Bourdieu is the power to dominate, to control, to win. It is not also the power to nurture, to befriend, to console, to inspire, to share, to yield, to cooperate. It is not the power, in general, to engage in, and so to engage with others in, every social practice that comprises the social reality of every agent–a social reality, therefore, remade from every perspective of practice, and not only from that of the specialized practice of the straight, male, bourgeois academic theorist.

     

    Bourdieu began his career as an anthropologist, and all his theoretical work, and most of his insights, arise from and are illustrated by examples from his fieldwork among the berber Kabyle of Algeria. The view he offers is not meant to be restricted to European culture or to the social reality of the bourgeoisie. He offers brilliant analyses (in the Logic) of the differences between barter and monetary economies and the cultures that support them, but still he models all of social reality as an economics, he takes economic capital and the relations of the economic field to be primus inter pares among all forms of capital and all dimensions of the field of power. This is a view of social reality constructed with the dispositions of the bourgeoisie.

     

    And what does Bourdieu add to economism, even as he transforms simplistic models of base and superstructure into something more dialectical and flexible? Cultural capital and social capital, the capital par excellence of the intellectual, the academic, and the cosmopolite. Know-what and Know-who compete with Have-bucks for power in every field of social practice for Bourdieu. This, too, is a view of social reality constructed with the dispositions of a successful academic and intellectual.

     

    All of these dispositions and their theoretical effects are in need of correction according to Bourdieu’s desire for scientific objectivity. Or they are all in need of diversification and multiplication by the perspectives of feminist and gay alternatives to masculinism, working class and other non-bourgeois viewpoints about social reality, and cultural models of the social world that do not privilege agon over philia, or imagine the social world out of an experience of economism, according to we Others’ desire to make meanings troubling to us and ours.

     

    V. Present and Absent Others

     

    I have probably said too much already about some of the absent Others at Bourdieu’s banquet. I should say a little more about some of the theoretical absences here. Bourdieu is a marvelous describer of how things are. He announces, but does not labor at, a “genetic sociology,” an understanding of the historical trajectories by which not just individuals, but institutions and theoretical objects, came to be made as they are. This he seems to have left largely to the most present absence in his work, Michel Foucault. He does not deal well with matters of social and cultural change.

     

    Invitation points to the final chapter of Homo Academicus for the kernel of a theory of change and revolution, but what we find there is much less, mainly a scheme for describing moments of crisis, turning points, the visible tips of the icebergs of long-term social dynamics. Bourdieu seems to have too profound an awe of the stability of social systems to be willing to see on what chaotic foundations of contingent self-organization they rest (cf. Lemke, in press). His emphasis on embodied habitus should point Bourdieu, and all of us, toward the potential of bodies in (inter-) action to find themselves acting as they should not, acted upon in ways their habitus cannot make canonical sense of, because the material relations into which bodies can enter cannot be exhausted by the semiotic relations of any culture, even an embodied one.

     

    Among the present Others, there are many who help orient our reading of Bourdieu. There are the German philosophers, the first intellectual love of the younger Bourdieu, abandoned by him for social science in order to challenge the stranglehold of philosophy on the academic field of Bourdieu’s youth. There are the sociological and philosophical rivals of the phenomenological-hermeneutic school (especially Geertz and the ethnomethodologists) against whom he argues passsionately (and at least in the case of ethnomethodology, for me, rather persuasively). There are the methodological rivals, especially discourse analysis, which he quite properly resituates back in the sociological context (as do Bakhtin and the social functionalists). There are Sartre and Levi-Strauss, whose debate shaped Bourdieu’s choice between philosophy and social science, and the Algerian war, which defined the more difficult choice between politics and the meta-politics.

     

    And always there is this presence-by-absence, Michel Foucault (and to a lesser degree Jacques Derrida), not simply as individual, but as proximate proxy in the academic social space Bourdieu himself defines Homo Academicus, 276). These three followed closely similar academic and social trajectories, and in Bourdieu’s rather convincing view, we should expect them to be critical keys to reading one another. But Bourdieu scrupulously avoids reading Foucault for us, almost as if he would be reading his mirror-self. The parallels of their projects are evident, and Bourdieu notes this himself, but only notes it, and no more. Perhaps self-reflexivity, like agon, meets its limit in philia.

     

    Note

     

    I have said next to nothing about Bourdieu’s discussions of education, particularly higher education, language and symbolic power, or the nature of science. I plan to address at least some of these areas, in which I have considerable personal interest, first in a separate review (of Bourdieu’s Language and Symbolic Power for the journal Linguistics and Education) and then in a book in preparation Textual Politics: Discourse and Social Theory).

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Bourdieu, Pierre. Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cam- bridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
    • Bourdieu, Pierre. Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984.
    • Bourdieu, Pierre. La Noblesse d’Etat: Grands Corps et Grandes Ecoles. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1989.
    • Bourdieu, Pierre. Homo Academicus. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990.
    • Bourdieu, Pierre. The Logic of Practice. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990.
    • Bourdieu, Pierre. Language and Symbolic Power. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991.
    • Lemke, J.L. Semiotics and Education. Monograph in Toronto Semiotic Circle Monographs Series, Victoria University, Toronto, 1984.
    • Lemke, J.L. Talking Science: Language, Learning, and Values. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing, 1990.
    • Lemke, J.L. “Text Production and Dynamic Text Semantics.” Functional and Systemic Linguistics: Approaches and Uses. Ed. E. Ventola. Berlin: Mouton/deGruyter (Trends in Linguistics: Studies and Monographs 55), 1991.
    • Lemke, J.L. “Discourse, Dynamics, and Social Change.” Language as Cultural Dynamic [Focus issue of Cultural Dynamics (Leiden: Brill), in press].
    • Martin, James R. “Process and Text: Two Aspects of Human Semiosis.” Systemic Perspectives on Discourse. Ed. J.D. Benson and W.S. Greaves. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing, 1985.
    • Thibault, Paul. Social Semiotics as Praxis. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991.

     

  • Postmodern Communities: The Politics of Oscillation

    Heesok Chang

    Department of English
    Vassar College

    hechang@vaxsar.vassar.edu

     

    Vattimo, Gianni. The Transparent Society. Trans. David Webb. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992.

     

    Agamben, Giorgio. The Coming Community. Trans. Michael Hardt. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993.

     

    I. Philosophical Homelessness

     

    Readers of the young Georg Lukacs may recall this memorable citation from The Theory of the Novel: “‘Philosophy is really homesickness,’ says Novalis: ‘it is the urge to be at home everywhere.’”

     

    According to Lukacs that is why “integrated civilizations”–where the soul feels at home everywhere, both in the self and in the world–have no philosophy. Or “why (it comes to the same thing) all men in such ages are philosophers, sharing the utopian aim of every philosophy. For what is the task of true philosophy if not to draw that archetypal map?”1

     

    Needless to say (especially in the [virtual] pages of the present journal) this endorsement of philosophy’s “utopian aim” would not find many adherents today. If anything, the “task” of contemporary philosophy would be to debunk the notion of its universalizing, “archetypal” vocation. The subsumptive mapping of the world by reason is no longer an unquestioned telos of occidental thought.

     

    Today, especially in France, philosophy has addressed itself to a nonappropriative understanding of exteriority, a “thought from the outside.”2 Modern thought has deterritorialized its claims to dialectical resolution; it has become homeless, so to speak, once and for all. Against the grain of philosophy’s utopian memory–its nostalgic stance in being, its nostalgia for Being–the philosophers of our moment urge a “nomadic” thinking.

     

    This sort of generalization about “postmodern” philosophy (such as it is) is well known. Like journalism, it is useful up to a certain point–let’s say until the end of the day. But like all more or less accurate journalistic descriptions it tries to say too much in one breath. Decisive opinions about “postmodern” or “poststructuralist” thought “today” leave the philosophical terrain largely undifferentiated. For example, we might be overly hasty to isolate “poststructuralism” from a certain “homesickness.” This philosophical “malady” (maladie du pays) need not be grounded in a Judaeo-Christian or Romantic nostalgia for lost origins; it might point to a more urgent need to rethink the social constitution of our being. I am thinking here not only of Richard Rorty’s recent attempts to imagine a “contingent” community (a sense of human solidarity not founded on an essentialist understanding of the human, but on an expanding recognition of human sufferance).3

     

    I am thinking particularly of those thinkers (again, largely French) who write explicitly “within” a Heideggerean idiom–or rather, those writers who continue to stage a critical confrontation, an Auseinandersetzung, with Heidegger’s thought. I am thinking, for example, of Jacques Derrida’s recent meditations on spirit, friendship, and today’s Europe; or Phillipe Lacoue-Labarthe’s exemplary work on the aesthetic assumptions informing modern national identity formation (National Socialism). And I am thinking of Jean-Luc Nancy’s extended research on the finitude of our daily, nightly existence–our “being-in-common”–which has given new rigor and new impetus to thinking about what community actually means.

     

    Nancy’s appeal to rethink community could not really be characterized as nostalgic (quite the contrary). Nevertheless, something of the philosopher’s “transcendental homelessness,” the registration of a shared pain or loss, and therefore of a desire, is distinctly audible in these words: “The gravest and most painful testimony of the modern world, the one that possibly involves all other testimonies to which this epoch must answer . . . is the testimony of the dissolution, the dislocation, or the conflagration of community.”4

     

    This sentence could stand as a more or less appropriate epigraph for both the texts under review (more so for The Coming Community, less so for The Transparent Society). Like Nancy, both Gianni Vattimo and Giorgio Agamben address questions of our contemporaneity on a very broad scale. They too write in response to this epochal demand: not to “be at home everywhere,” but to free the very idea of “home,” of a certain belonging, from the planetary administration of techno-economic forces. And like Nancy, both authors draw considerably on Heidegger to articulate not only their diagnoses of our (post)modernity, but also their prescriptions for rethinking our being-in-the-world.

     

    Despite marked differences in tone, style, content, and indeed, quality, The Transparent Society and The Coming Community contribute to our political imagination, to our ideas about “freedom” and “singularity,” “heterotopia” and “community.” With varying success, they outline new ways of being at home in a world that is increasingly no longer, quite simply, “ours.”

     

    II. Hermeneutic Oscillations

     

    English readers of Gianni Vattimo’s previously translated work–particularly the later essays collected in The End of Modernity–will not discover much that is radically new in The Transparent Society (but given Vattimo’s thesis about the impossibility of a definitive overcoming, an Uberwindung, this should certainly come as no surprise). Those who are unfamiliar with his writing, or who have only heard his name in association with the miserable label “weak thought” (pensiero diebole), will find this book a lucid and economical (120 pages of largish type) summary of his latest views on “the postmodern question.”5

     

    The brevity of his text does not inhibit Vattimo from fielding a wide range of academic topoi: the evolution of the human sciences, the modern resurgence of myth, the privilege of “shock” in aesthetic experience, the disappearance of utopian models, the centrality of interpretation in a radically plural society. These discussions do not dwell on example and illustration (with the exception of a brief and unexceptional look at Blade Runner). Rather, Vattimo engages his interlocuters–Nietzsche, Heidegger, Benjamin, Adorno, Apel, Habermas, Gadamer–at a pace of brisk generality we might as well call journalistic.

     

    Despite the liberal scope of the contents, however, the book’s eight chapters elaborate a consistent politico-philosophical vision. At the risk of oversimplifying, I believe Vattimo’s essential argument is encapsulated in this sentence from the opening chapter: “To live in this pluralistic world means to experience freedom as a continual oscillation between belonging and disorientation” (10). I will direct my review of the book towards a critical gloss on this sentence.

     

    The Transparent Society takes up where the last book left off–namely, at “the end of modernity.” Vattimo elegantly defines modernity as “the epoch in which simply being modern became a decisive value in itself” (1). This cultural capitalization of the new, which emerges in art with the cult of genius, is eventually incorporated into a greater narrative of human progress and emancipation. Within a unilinear, Enlightenment conception of history the intrinsic value of anything modern consists in its being simply the latest, the most advanced, the nearest to the ends of man.

     

    In a hypothesis which clearly resonates with Jean-Francois Lyotard’s, Vattimo states: “modernity ends when–for a number of reasons–it no longer seems possible to regard history as unilinear” (2). In The End of Modernity the “reasons” he gives are confined principally to philosophical ones–in particular, the forceful anti-foundationalist thinking of Nietzsche and Heidegger. In the present work, however, the advent of postmodernity is no longer an emphatically “theoretical” event. Vattimo foregrounds two major sociological causes for the dissolution of unilinear history.

     

    First, decolonization. The global rebellion against European colonialism and imperialism renders the very notion of a single, centralized story of human progress “de facto problematic”; “The European ideal of humanity has been revealed as one ideal amongst others, not necessarily worse, but unable, without violence, to obtain as the true essence of man, of all men” (4).

     

    Second, planetary mass media. Vattimo seems to regard this factor to be more decisive in ending modernity than the emergence of post-colonial voices because (although he does not say this explicitly) the former is the technological condition of possibility for the latter. A “society of generalized communication” must be in place for multiculturalism to get on the map. The relentless expansion of informational media enables “Cultures and subcultures of all sorts [to step] into the limelight of public opinion” (5).

     

    According to Vattimo, this “giddy proliferation of communication” seems to equip the world for actualizing a fully “transparent society.” We should note, however, that the book is misleadingly, or at least provocatively, titled. For “the transparent society” does not name Vattimo’s vision of a utopian postmodernity. Rather, it describes the belated, modernist ideal of our socius championed by every postmodernist’s favourite straw men: Karl Otto Apel and Jurgen Habermas.

     

    Vattimo argues that Apel’s community of “unrestricted communication” and Habermas’ universe of “communicative action” are informed by the old dream of a self-transparent society. More specifically, their normative ideals of communicative rationality are modelled on the communal drive for self-knowledge exemplified by the human sciences. “But,” Vattimo objects, “can one legitimately model the emancipated human subject, and ultimately society, on the ideal of the scientist in her laboratory, whose objectivity and disinterest are demanded by what is at bottom a technological interest and who conceives of nature as an object only to the extent that it is marked out as a place for potential domination . . . ?” (24).

     

    Here Vattimo sides with the Frankfurt School (and Heideggerean) critique of instrumental reason. The Enlightenment ideal of a perfectly self-transparent society–in which the subject (the Subject) seamlessly enframes the world as an object of reflexive knowledge–does not augur human liberation. Instead, it installs a logic of domination. Man is not emancipated from his social labour, but dehumanized by technology. The transparent society is the totally administered and regulated society.

     

    Now does the ungovernable or “giddy” expansion of information technology today mean we are on the verge of realizing such a transparent society?

     

    According to Vattimo, no.

     

    Adorno’s pessimistic vision of an increasingly instrumentalized modernity is well taken. But “–and this is what Adorno missed–within the communication system itself, mechanisms develop (the ‘rise of new centres of history’) that make the realization of self-transparency in principle impossible” (23). Vattimo does not specify what these “mechanisms” might be. Instead, he testifies repeatedly that the generalization of communication guarantees the dissolution of a monolithic history of human knowledge; “the freedom given by the mass media to so many cultures and Weltanschauungen has belied the very ideal of a transparent society” (6). In postmodernity, it seems everyone gets to step up to the mike.

     

    We should object here that the “liberation of differences” Vattimo has in mind–a sort of “giddy” multicultural polylogue–does not necessarily entail a radical challenge to the existing order.6 The fact that everybody now can have their “say” does not automatically disrupt the present constitution of our public sphere. Perhaps real political differences, differences that won’t make a difference by their mere “say” are everywhere today, to borrow Claude Lefort’s phrase, “dissolved into the ceremony of communication.”7

     

    Vattimo acknowledges this objection, but hastens to emphasize the “irreducible pluralization” (6) accompanying the veritable explosion of mass media in our daily lives. Moreover–and here we return to his central argument–emancipation today should not, he urges, be thought on the model of self-authentication (this would return us to the dream of self-transparency). What is liberating about postmodernism is not the parading of different identities per se.

     

    Rather, “The emancipatory significance of the liberation of differences and dialects consists . . . in the general disorientation accompanying their initial identification. If, in a world of dialects, I speak my own dialect, I shall be conscious that it is not the only ‘language,’ but that it is precisely one amongst many” (9). In this irreducibly multicultural and heterotopian world I carry around a “weakened” sense of my “reality.” Freedom here does not come from asserting the particularity of my (linguistic) being. Rather, I experience freedom in a totally new way: by “oscillating” continually between feeling at home in my language and sensing how thoroughly finite, transient, and contingent it actually is.

     

    Without commenting on the viability of this weird notion of “freedom” (how could such a thing be judged in all rigour?), I would like to close out this discussion by dwelling a bit on the key word “oscillation.”

     

    The figurative movement of vibrating or fluctuating is certainly not new to Vattimo’s thinking. Indeed, oscillation in the present work may well be read as a spatial translation of the temporal or (post)historical notion of Verwindung which is described in the last essay of The End of Modernity. Readers of that work may recall this Heideggerean word signifies a going-beyond of metaphysics which is not a complete overcoming of metaphysics (the modernist myth), but rather a sort of deepening, healing resignation to its tracelike survival. Amongst Verwindung’s other lexical meanings Vattimo points out “twisting” and “distortion.” We experience Being in postmodernity not as an emancipated presence, but as an ironic twist or distortion. Being is only approachable in its estrangement from our nostalgic grasp–as a constant oscillation between revelation and concealment.

     

    In The Transparent Society Vattimo fleshes out this meaning of oscillation as ongoing estrangement by referring us to the realm of the aesthetic. The fluid play of differences we find in postmodernity is likened to the disorienting encounter with the artwork–the blow (Stoss) or “shock”–described by Heidegger and Benjamin. Vattimo explicitly gives ontology and aesthetic theory a defining role in conceptualizing the oscillation and disorientation peculiar to postmodern being.

     

    But I would suggest the metaphor of oscillation in Vattimo’s argument does not only derive from his interpretations of philosophy and postmodernity. Oscillation is a crucial feature of his interpretive methodology itself.

     

    An implicit aim of The Transparent Society (but made explicit in the final chapter) is to defend a ramified understanding of Gadamerian hermeneutics. To move very quickly here, Vattimo wants to rescue hermeneutics from unacceptable axioms like this one: “To recognize oneself (or one’s own) in the other and find a home abroad–this is the basic movement of spirit whose being consists in this return to itself from otherness.”8 Hermeneutics’ universalizing appropriation of other worlds can only be corrected by breaking its circular understanding. Thus, the hermeneutic circle gives way to a trembling arc of interpretation. The figure of swaying between the poles of belonging and disorientation, home and away, assure Vattimo’s hermeneutic procedure “cannot appear . . .[under the] logics of subsumption.”9

     

    But this metaphor of oscillation is hardly a postmodern twist on interpretation. The methodological notion of oscillation appears at the pre-Gadamerian beginnings of hermeneutics. As Werner Hamacher has noted: “Schleiermacher’s concept for the delicate relationship between the general and the individual, within which all verbal and language-generative acts manifest themselves, is called the ‘schema of oscillation between the general and the particular.’”10

     

    Vattimo’s hermeneutic oscillation guarantees his understanding of postmodern alterity will remain disoriented. But this does not allow other “dialects” to appear outside the sway of hermeneutic understanding (no matter how “weakened”) itself. In this oscillation differences can only appear as trembling versions of themselves–as different or “contaminated” identities11 –and not as differences indifferent to identity. To borrow a term from Agamben, nothing singular may appear.

     

    It does not occur to Vattimo that the postmodern experience of freedom may be post-hermeneutic as well.

     

    III. Whatever Being

     

    “Marginality and homelessness are not, in my opinion, to be gloried in; they are to be brought to an end, so that more, not fewer, people can enjoy the benefits of what has for centuries been denied the victims of race, class, or gender.”12

     

    Edward Said’s words testify, in their own way, to what Nancy calls “the dissolution, the dislocation, or the conflagration of community.” Said here is criticizing the politics of identity–the “unreconstructed nationalism”–that grips not only the academy, but the postcolonial world at large. Reclamations of cultural identity were useful and necessary for asserting independence from colonial rule. But, today, nationalist affirmations of identity for their own sake act only in the interests of a clamorous separatism. Nancy concurs with this diagnosis when he remarks that “the emergence . . . of decolonized communities has not . . . triggered any genuine renewal of the question of community.”13

     

    Unlike Said, however, Nancy does not presuppose the question of community to be a question about reclaiming our humanity. He does not think community on the traditional humanist model of a lost or broken immanence (“what has for centuries been denied”) which must be restored. Like Vattimo, he does not imagine our future in the direction of a “transparent society.”

     

    But what other than a local or universal affiliation–a sense of belonging to this tribe, this nation, this race, or to the human race as a whole–could form the basis for any meaningful community? This is where Agamben’s latest book makes, I think, a fundamental contribution to our political thought. The Coming Community delineates the topos of belonging without mobilizing identity politics and without falling back on the idees fixes of humanist discourse.

     

    It is impossible, in the space that remains, to give the reader an adequate sense of the immense scope of Agamben’s philosophical and philological learning. The expected readings of Kant and Heidegger, Benjamin and Kafka, are supplemented at every turn with astonishing examples drawn from medieval logic and analytic philosophy, Talmudic tales and Provencal poetry.

     

    Dense though it is, Agamben’s writing is never turgid or pedantic. Rather, his terse, fluid style is reminiscent (the likeness has been drawn before and will be drawn again) of Walter Benjamin’s.

     

    And like Benjamin (at least in this latest book), Agamben probes contemporary social phenomena–technology and media, the society of the spectacle and the modern fate of social classes, a stocking commercial and Tiananmen Square–in the light of his theoretical expositions.

     

    A lengthier discussion would need to sample some of these exemplary readings (and this entire text proceeds through the by-play, the Bei-spiel, of examples). It might be more useful here, however, to summarize for the reader, against the grain of the text’s singular movement, the gist of the argument. To enhance the critical significance of such a reductive reading, I will place Agamben’s conception of “the coming being” in relation to Nancy’s groundbreaking ideas about community.

     

    In order to rescue community from its nostalgic (and finally Christian) assumptions we must, Nancy thinks, return to ontology (first philosophy). A serious reflection on community requires we answer the call to rethink–at the most mundane level–what it means to be-in-common.

     

    For Nancy this call does not arise from a utopian or humanist appeal for a reorganization of social relations in which community is posited as the end result, the work, of a subject labouring on itself. The obscure exigency of community comes from the existential position of our being-there, thrown into the world. This being-there is not a punctual self-presence, a being-oneself. Community or being-in-common is not a predicate of an essentially solitary entity. Rather, being-there (Dasein) is none other than a being-with (Mitsein). The very possibility of my being alone depends on my ontological potential to share my existence.

     

    Emphasizing Heidegger’s differential and relational definition of Dasein in order to underline our constitutive being-in-common may be easy enough to follow. What is much more difficult to grasp is that for Nancy, our strange built-in sociality does not provide any groundwork for building a community in any identifiable sense. On the contrary, the fact that we are (ontologically) only in relation to one another thwarts–or resists (a key word for Nancy)–in advance any self- or communitarian identification with this or that identity trait (being red, being Italian, being communist–to cite Agamben’s examples). Our being-in-common is a limit-experience, a feeling for our finitude. What we share at the end of ourselves, ecstatically (so to speak), is not our shared individuality, but our uncommon singularity.

     

    The experience of this sharing should not be understood as a selfless fusion into a group (both Nancy and Agamben write continuously against the unsurpassed danger of our political modernity: fascism, Nazism). Rather, our shared singularity takes the form of an exposure. We are exposed to the absence of any substantial identity to which we could belong. Exposure to singularity: that means to be scattered together, like strangers on a train, not quite face-to-face, oscillating between the poles of communion and disaggregation.14 It is this banal relation without relation that exposes our pre-identical singularity, our being-in-common.

     

    Coming now to Agamben, I believe his work helps us to approach this renewed question of community from another angle. Specifically, he gives positive content to what Nancy is inclined, I think, to describe negatively: namely, the concept of singularity.

     

    The Coming Community opens like this: “The coming being is whatever being. In the Scholastic enumeration of transcendentals (quodlibet ens est unum, verum, bonum seu perfectum–whatever entity is one, true, good, or perfect), the term that, remaining unthought in each, conditions the meaning of all the others is the adjective quodlibet. The common translation of this term as ‘whatever’ in the sense of ‘it does not matter which, indifferently’ is certainly correct, but in its form the Latin says exactly the opposite: Quodlibet ens is not ‘being, it does not matter which,’ but rather ‘being such that it always matters.’ The Latin always already contains, that is, a reference to the will (libet). Whatever being has an original relation to desire” (1).

     

    The basis of the coming community, the singular being, is whatever being–not in the sense of “I don’t care what you are,” but rather, “I care for you such as you are.” As such you are freed from belonging either to the emptiness of the universal or the ineffability of the individual.

     

    In Agamben’s elaboration of singularity, human identity is not mediated by its belonging to some set or class (being old, being American, being gay). Nor does it consist in the simple negation of all belonging (here Agamben parts company with Bataille’s notion of the “negative community,” the community of those who have no community). Rather, whatever names a sort of radical generosity with respect to belonging. The singular being is not the being who belongs only here or there, but nor is it the being who belongs everywhere and nowhere (flipsides of the same empty generality). This other being always matters to me not because I am drawn to this or that trait, nor because I identify him or her with a favoured race, class, or gender. And certainly not because he or she belongs to a putatively universal set like humanity or the human race.

     

    The other always matters to me only when I am taken with all of his/her traits, such as they are. This defining generosity of the singular means that quodlibet ens is not determined by this or that belonging, but by the condition of belonging itself. It belongs to belonging. The singularity of being resides in its exposure to an unconditional belonging. [51] Such a singularly exposed being wants to belong–which is to say, it belongs to want, or, for lack of a less semantically burdened and empty word, to love: “The singularity exposed as such is whatever you want, that is, lovable” (2).

     

    We must be careful here not to conflate Agamben’s exposition of whatever being with a more familiar discourse on love: “Love is never directed toward this or that property of the loved one (being blond, being small, being tender, being lame), but neither does it neglect the properties in favor of an insipid generality (universal love): The lover wants the loved one with all of its predicates, its being such as it is. The lover desires the as only insofar as it is such–this is the lover’s particular fetishism” (2).

     

    But what could a thing with all of its predicates look like? Agamben gives us the example of the human face. Every face is singular. This does not mean a face individuates a pre-existing form or universalizes individual features. The face as such is utterly indifferent to what makes it different and yet similar. It is impossible to determine from which sphere–the common or the proper–the face derives its singular expressivity.

     

    In this the face is not unlike handwriting in which it is impossible to draw the line between what makes this signature at the same time common and proper, legible and unique. We cannot say for certain whether this hand and this face actualize a universal form, or whether the universal form is engendered by these million different scripts and faces.

     

    Whatever being emerges, like handwriting, like the face, on “a line of sparkling alternation” (20) between language and word, form and expression, potentiality and act. “This is how we must read the theory of those medieval philosophers,” Agamben writes, “who held that the passage from potentiality to act, from common form to singularity, is not an event accomplished once and for all, but an infinite series of modal oscillations” (19).15 The coming community is founded on the imperceptible oscillations of whatever being.

     

    But what, finally, might the politics of whatever belonging be?

     

    Agamben envisions the coming politics not as a hegemonic struggle between classes for control of the State, but as an inexorable agon between whatever singularity and state organization. What the State cannot digest is not the political affirmations of identity (on the contrary), but the formation of a community not grounded in any belonging except for the human co-belonging to whatever being.

     

    “What was most striking about the demonstrations of the Chinese May,” Agamben points out, “was the relative absence of determinate contents in their demands” (85).

     

    Here Agamben surely also has in mind the singular example of May 68. I would even say The Coming Community is (not unlike Vattimo’s book) a belated response to the radical promise–let’s say (using the wrong idiom perhaps), the promise of human happiness–exposed in that event.

     

    In these works by two important Italian thinkers, philosophy becomes once again, perhaps, a kind of homesickness, a longing to belong. To a permanent disorientation. To oscillation. To whatever.

     

     Notes

     

    1. The Theory of the Novel, trans. Anna Bostock (Cambridge: MIT UP, 1971), 29.

     

    2. This phrase, “La pensee du dehors,” is the title of Michel Foucault’s important essay on Maurice Blanchot (first published in Critique 229, 1966). Gilles Deleuze elaborates on the theme of exteriority in his excellent book on Foucault Foucault, trans. Sean Hand [Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1988]). See especially the chapter entitled “Strategies or the Non-stratified: the Thought of the Outside (Power)” where he links up this early essay with Foucault’s later and better known piece on Nietzschean genealogy.

     

    3. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989.

     

    4. This is the opening sentence of “The Inoperative Community” (trans. Peter Connor, in The Inoperative Community, ed. Peter Connor [Minneapolis and Oxford: U of Minnesota P, 1991], 1).

     

    5. I take this phrase from a blurb on the back jacket of the book: “‘This book is of major importance to the debate on the postmodern question.’–Jean-Francois Lyotard.”

     

    6. For a recent–and typical (that is, typically anti-academic)–articulation of this objection see David Rieff’s piece “Multiculturalism’s Silent Partner: It’s the newly globalized economy, stupid,” Harper’s 287 August 1993: 17-19.

     

    7. The Political Forms of Modern Society: Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986), 226.

     

    8. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, ed. Garrett Barden and John Cumming (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), 15.

     

    9. This quote, not to mention my understanding of the role of oscillation in hermeneutics, comes from Werner Hamacher’s essay “Hermeneutic Ellipses: Writing the Hermeneutical Circle in Schleiermacher,” trans. Timothy Bahti, in Transforming the Hermeneutic Context: From Nietzsche to Nancy, ed. Gayle L. Ormiston and Alan D. Schrift (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990), 190.

     

    10. Ibid. 190.

     

    11. In an essay entitled “Hermeneutics and Anthropology” Vattimo is careful to underscore the ideological nature of ethnographic otherness. Anticipating the theme of generalized communication he writes: “The hermeneutic–but also anthropological–illusion of encountering the other, with all its theoretical grandiosity, finds itself faced with a mixed reality in which alterity is entirely exhausted. The disappearance of alterity does not occur as a part of the dreamed-for total organization of the world, but rather as a condition of widespread contamination” The End of Modernity 159). This sobering reminder about the Westernization of third world cultures seems to drop out of Vattimo’s discussion in The Transparent Society where the emphasis falls on heterogeneity not homologation.

     

    12. Edward Said, “The Politics of Knowledge,” Raritan 11 (Summer 1991): 31.

     

    13. Nancy 22.

     

    14. “Passengers in the same train compartment are simply seated next to each other in an accidental, arbitrary, and completely exterior manner. They are not linked. But they are also quite together inasmuch as they are travelers on this train, in this same space and for this same period of time. They are between the disintegration of the ‘crowd’ and the aggregation of the group, both extremes remaining possible, virtual, and near at every moment. This suspension is what makes ‘being-with’: a relation without relation, or rather, being exposed simultaneously to relationship and absence of relationship” (Nancy, “Of Being-in-Common,” trans. James Creech, Community at Loose Ends, ed. Miami Theory Collective [Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1991] 7).

     

    15. “Oscillation” is an entirely appropriate word to use in this context for, as Hamacher points out, “oscillum is in fact a derivation of os, mouth, face, and thus means little mouth, little face and mask. Oscillation, understood in its etymological context, would indicate that ‘originary’ movement of language in which it is allotted to something or someone, which has neither language nor face, is neither intuition or concept” (190).

     

    16. This sentence concludes, in parentheses: “(democracy and freedom are notions too generic and broadly defined to constitute the real object of a conflict, and the only concrete demand, the rehabilitation of Hu Yao–Bang, was immediately granted)” (85).

     

  • ‘Imagining The Unimaginable’: J.M. Coetzee, History, and Autobiography

    Rita Barnard

    English Department
    University of Pennsylvania

    rbarnard@mail.sas.upenn.edu

     

    Attwell, David. J.M. Coetzee: South Africa and the Politics of Writing. Perspectives on South Africa 48. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1993.

     

    Coetzee, J.M. Doubling the Point: Essays and Interviews. Ed. David Attwell. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992.

     

    David Attwell’s important new critical account of J.M. Coetzee’s work takes as its epigraph a statement from one of his interviews with Coetzee, recently collected in Doubling the Point:

     

    I am not a herald of community or anything else, as you correctly recognize. I am someone who has intimations of freedom (as every chained prisoner has) and constructs representations--which are shadows themselves--of people slipping their chains and turning their faces to the light.(341)

     

    The remark is in many ways characteristic of Coetzee: it does not refer in a direct and unproblematic way to any one of his novels; and yet it captures their rigorous sense of their own limitations, as well as their muted utopian dimension. The allusiveness of the statement is also characteristic, in that it rewrites, rather than merely echoes, Plato’s allegory of the cave. Deeply conscious, as always, of our inevitably mediated and tenuous sense of reality (perhaps, in this context, we might call it “History”), Coetzee shares something of Plato’s skepticism about what the poet might do in the world: a body still chained in darkness can scarcely be an “unacknowledged legislator,” nor a herald, nor even a truthful witness. (South African literature, Coetzee once remarked, is “exactly the kind of literature you would expect people to write in a prison” [Doubling, 98]). Yet the shadow-play he evokes here–and, he feels, in his fiction–is not quite the trivial passage of objects before the firelight which Plato has us conceive. It is a shadowy premonition of the impossible, of a different way of seeing: one that can only begin at that moment when, first, the body is unshackled, and then the eyes turn to a new order.

     

    This statement, though far more personal, is reminiscent of a moment in Coetzee’s 1986 essay, “Into the Dark Chamber.” The piece recalls how Rosa Burger, the protagonist of Gordimer’s Burger’s Daughter, is thrown into utter confusion as she watches a “black, poor, brutalized” man cruelly whip his donkey in a drunken fury. The act brings to Rosa’s mind, in the rush of an instant, a vision of the entirety of human suffering and torture, especially politically motivated cruelty: “solitary confinement … the Siberias of snow or sun, the lives of Mandela, Sisulu, Mbeki, Kathrada, Kgosana, gull-picked on the Island” (Doubling 367). But it does so in such a way as to render moral judgement impossible: here is “torture without the torturer,” victim hurting victim. How does one proceed beyond this vision? Coetzee asks. He ends his essay with an expression of his longing, with Rosa, for a restoration of ethics, for a “time when all human acts … will be returned to the ambit of moral judgment,” for a society in which it will “once again be meaningful for the gaze of the author, the gaze of authority and authoritative judgement”–the gaze of one who has faced the light outside the prison-cave–“to be turned upon scenes of torture” (Doubling, 368).

     

    The imperative to proceed “beyond” is, of course not one that is often indulged in Coetzee’s novels, nor is it clear, from a strictly logical or materialist point of view, that such a move is really possible. What is at stake, when Coetzee, and his critic/interlocutor, ponder this question, is the relationship between the imagination and the real, or, if you will, between textuality and history. This relationship is the main concern of David Attwell’s book. The project of J.M. Coetzee: South Africa and the Politics of Writing could be understood as an attempt to negotiate the distance between two contradictory attitudes towards history on the novelist’s part. The first position, discussed in Attwell’s opening chapter, finds its most forceful expression in Coetzee’s controversial address (“The Novel Today”) to the Weekly Mail Book Week in 1987. Coetzee here insists on the discursive nature of history, and its difference from–and even its enmity to–the discourse of the novel. He describes the position of the South African novelist as follows:

     

    In times of intense ideological pressure like the present, when the space in which the novel and history normally coexist like two cows on the same pasture, each minding its own business, is squeezed to almost nothing, the novel, it seems to me, has only two options: supplementarity or rivalry.... (15)

     

    In the face of what we might call the dominant counter- hegemonic discourse of the mass democratic movement, in which literature must become a weapon in “the struggle,” Coetzee resolutely refuses the “correct” position of supplementarity, and claims the separate discourse of the novel, of the story, as his own–beleaguered–terrain.

     

    The second position, discussed in Attwell’s final chapter, emerges from Coetzee’s 1990 interview with the Washington Post, in which “real history” seems to be reaffirmed. A propos of Francis Fukiyama’s (premature) post-Cold War declarations about the global achievement of liberal democracy, the novelist observes:

     

    There is a certain controversy, isn't there, going on right at the moment in the United States about "the end of history"?... The position, expressed in a very crude way, is that the Western democracies have reached a stage in their historical development in which development ceases because there is no stage beyond it.... That very way of seeing the history of mankind is a symptom of the First World ... moving to a plateau of inconsequentiality or irrelevance. It's actually the Third World where history, real history is happening. And the First World has played itself out of the game.(Attwell, 124)

     

    This observation, with which Attwell brings his study to its close, is read as a return to the site of history, “real history,” as a place of privilege.

     

    For Attwell, whose approach to literature is theoretically eclectic but fundamentally historicist, and whose declared purpose is not only to explicate, but to offer a “tribute” to Coetzee’s oeuvre (7), Coetzee’s insistence on novelistic autonomy in “The Novel Today” essay presents something of a political and a methodological problem. As a South African academic, he is only too aware of the critical protest which this kind of position could– and did–elicit; namely, that Coetzee is guilty of a decadent, elitist aestheticism.1 He seems somewhat embarrassed by the “chilly political choice” and the “exclusively and unhappily Manichean” terms in which it is offered (16-17; Trump 107). It is tempting, therefore, to speculate that this might be the reason why “The Novel Today”–surely one of Coetzee’s most provocative and least circulated pieces–is not included in Doubling the Point.

     

    In fact, however, the main impulse in J.M. Coetzee: Politics and Writing in South Africa is not to evade, but to challenge and complicate such a polarization of history and fictionality, by exploring the ways in which Coetzee’s novels are themselves contextualized. Attwell offers the term “situational metafiction” as a way of suggesting that the tension between the two contradictory positions is both irresolvable and productive. The term, as he argues, is by no means paradoxical: “Coetzee’s figuring of the tension between text and history is itself a historical act, one that must be read back into the discourses of South Africa where on can discern its illuminating power” (3).2 Whether or not Coetzee chooses to represent South African history is then far less important, in this study, than the fact that his work consistently registers, even when it tries to escape, the political pressures that shape the act of writing. The historical contextualization we see in Attwell’s text is not the kind Coetzee excoriates in “The Novel Today”: the kind that treats the novels’ conclusions as checkable by history “as a child’s schoolwork is checked by a school mistress” [3].3 Attwell suggests that for Coetzee, as for Jameson, “History” per se is unrepresentable, but, as a political unconscious, leaves its mark on all forms of expression. The position is formulated as follows in Doubling the Point: “it is rare that history should emerge … as Necessity, as an absolute limit to consciousness. History, in [Coetzee’s] work, seems less a process that can be represented than a force acting on representation …” (66).

     

    Compared to the other three full-length studies of Coetzee’s work (by Penner, Dovey, and Gallagher) Attwell’s is by far the most knowledgeable and sophisticated in its treatment of the South African context–historical, political, and literary. Indeed, it is fair to say that only Susan Van Zanten Gallagher’s A Story of South Africa: J.M. Coetzee’s Fiction in Context, makes much of an attempt to offer a historicist reading.4 Attwell’s book situates the novels not only in terms of political events–the Soweto uprisings, the death in detention of Steve Biko, etc.–the kind of thing that Gallagher, at her greater remove from South Africa, also provides–but in terms of both the academic and political discourses prevalent in South Africa at a given moment.

     

    Attwell is able, for instance, to relate the political stance of Dusklands (1974) to the emergence of a post- liberal discourse in South Africa during the seventies: a phenomenon shaped, in various ways, by the Black Consciousness movement, by Beyers Naude’s Study Project on Christianity in Apartheid Society (SPRO-CAS), by the first contributions of a South African Marxist historiography, and by the first challenges to the comfortable Leavisite humanism that had dominated South African English departments up to that point. Or, in the case of Waiting for the Barbarians (1981), he is able to demonstrate that the novel, despite its fictional location and indeterminate time–and despite its stated theme of resistance to “the time of History” as the imposition of a vicious Empire– responds rather specifically to the discourse and practice of the state at a particularly paranoid moment. In the wake of the Soweto uprising, and the fall of colonial regimes to the north, the Apartheid regime developed a “total strategy” to counter the “total onslaught” of terrorists, communists, and agitators at the border (not to mention those in the backyard, under the bed, and behind every bush). The novel’s challenge to “Empire’s” cruel certainties in its quest for self-preservation and its elimination of the “Other,” clearly responds to this time of detentions, bannings, torture, and rumors of torture in South Africa. Moreover, as Attwell argues, the very phantasmagoric remoteness of the novel’s mise-en-scene, has the paradoxically representational dimension of mimicking the phantasmagoric character of the state’s paranoid projections. As one who was subjected at school to classes in “Youth Resistance,” who joked that the Communists invented sex to seduce the Afrikaner teenager, and who listened in astonishment to the callous excuses given for the deaths in detention in the years just before the novel’s publication, I can only confirm the aptness of this contextualization: it is impossible for someone who lived through the late seventies in South Africa to read the novel only as “being about” a fictive never-never land.

     

    But to say this is to minimize the caution with which both Attwell, and Coetzee in Doubling the Point, approach the question of relevant “facts” and “contexts.” (At the beginning of the latter book, for instance, we find Coetzee pondering the problem of writing the history of his intellectual career: “But which facts? All the facts? No. All the facts are too many facts. You choose the facts insofar as they fall with your evolving purpose. What is the purpose in the present case?” [Doubling 18].) Attwell’s introduction, significantly, offers a kind of apology for his own historicizing efforts: he recognizes that these might go against Coetzee’s “evolving purpose” (which Attwell admits seems to be shifting, in the later novels, in the direction of a kind of self-exploding textuality that opposes the fixed structures of historical consciousness).

     

    The reason for this deference lies in Attwell’s realization that Coetzee’s resistance to history is based on what the novelist sees as an ethical and liberatory imperative. In the interview I referred to at the beginning of this essay, Coetzee reminds Attwell–and all of us–that not just history and necessity, but also freedom, stands beyond representation (freedom is, as Kant argued “the unimaginable”); and insists that (paradoxically) because of the way the overwhelmingly brutal facts of South African history tend to short-circuit the imagination, “the task becomes imagining [the] unimaginable, imagining a form of address that permits the play of the imagination to start taking place” (66-8). Coetzee, in short, does not deny his own status as a prisoner of history–but insists on the importance of those shadowy projections: the need to also think of “people slipping off their chains.” Attwell’s historicist study therefore remains constantly, and self- critically aware of Coetzee’s urgent insistence on the qualified freedom of fiction. The result is the first reading of Coetzee’s work that contextualizes and politicizes Coetzee’s novels, even as it articulates the theoretical problem of “history” and recognizes the possible limitations of historically demystifying criticism.5

     

    The value and character of Doubling the Point is rather more difficult to pinpoint. It is, as the subtitle announces, a collection of critical essays and interviews. But it is perhaps primarily an autobiography of sorts; and while, as I suggested above, the collection frequently reveals Coetzee’s connections to the modernist tradition, it has to be seen as a rather postmodern autobiography. It offers only a few moments of conventional first person recollection (notably in the essay “Remembering Texas”), as is consistent with Coetzee’s suspicions about any claim to self-presence–a suspicion that makes him favor the mode of the interview, “as a way of getting around the impasse of my own monologue” (19). What we end up with is, therefore, fragmentary and dialogic; and, while the collection does conclude with a very revealing retrospective statement in the final interview, this too is rather self-deconstructive. Written in the third person, it identifies, as the pivotal moment of the intellectual life we have just reviewed, the essay on “Confession and Double Thoughts”: a skeptical exploration of the infinite nature of confession, of the impossibility to ever tell the truth in autobiography.

     

    All this is not to say that many interesting “facts” about Coetzee’s life and thinking do not emerge from Doubling the Point; but that, as I have already suggested, the idea of a personal “history” is from the start problematic. As the final essay states, there is little distinction to be made between the writing of fiction, of criticism, and of autobiography: all of these are modes of storytelling–and in Coetzee’s hand stories are always fictions that will claim no final closure, that are skeptical even of skepticism. Doubling the Point is thus an intriguingly contradictory text: authoritative (the rigor and range of Coetzee’s intellect inevitably give it that austere quality) and anti-authoritarian.

     

    It is perhaps fair to say that none of the critical essays here–to turn to another aspect of Doubling the Point–are as good as, for instance, the introduction and the first chapter of White Writing; nor (inevitably) does the collection, selected for the sake of a more or less chronological intellectual biography, have the thematic coherence of that earlier book. The essays do reveal an impressive range of intellectual work: in addition to the pieces on Beckett, Kafka, Gordimer, and Achterberg, already mentioned, Doubling the Point includes discussions of Tolstoy, Dosteyevsky, Gibbon, Newton, Rousseau, Nabokov, Musil, Barthes, Godard, Girard, Derrida, Lacan, Fugard, La Guma, and also of advertising, censorship, and even rugby. I can live without some of the essays included here, especially those in the “Popular Culture” and the “Syntax” subsections of the book (though Attwell’s attempts to relate them to the fiction are consistently interesting). But at least two of essays in the collection, the Jerusalem Prize acceptance speech and the essay on torture (“Into the Dark Chamber: The Writer and the South African State”), have always seemed to me essential to an understanding of Coetzee’s political vision. I am also delighted that the sardonic Barthesian essay “The Burden of Consciousness in Africa” (on the Fugard/Devenish film The Guest [1977]) will now be available to a wider audience. On the whole, it seems to me that Coetzee is revealed in these essays as something quite rare, if not paradoxical: a very academic, very sophisticated autodidact. I don’t think this assessment would strike him as out of line: Coetzee observes at one point that he has no “field” as a literary scholar, and therefore frequently finds himself in the position of “reinventing philosophical wheels” (243). The results are sometimes extremely rewarding for the reader, and sometimes less so. 14] But the essays per se, do not make Doubling the Point: the book’s extraordinary interest lies in the interviews, which are by far the most engaged, the most revealing, and the most suggestive for readings of Coetzee’s fiction yet to appear. One interview even offers a disarmingly candid assessment (or would the essay on confession rule out my use of the word “candid”?) of the reason why so many of Coetzee’s previous interviews seem so terse and unrevealing. Coetzee quite frankly acknowledges his reputation for being “evasive, arrogant, generally unpleasant” to journalistic interviewers (65), but suggests that his difficulty with the ordinary interview ultimately comes from a profound philosophical disagreement with their basic assumptions. On some level, he argues, they believe in the confession, whether as something that comes out of a legal interrogation, or (in a more Rousseauvian mode) from the “transports of unrehearsed speech”; while for Coetzee truth is in silence, and in the dialogic possibilities of writing–in the war between the counter-voices which the act of writing evokes within the writer. (The questions and answers here collected were written, not taped.)

     

    Comments like these illustrate perfectly what we may find in the best moments of Doubling the Point: observations that are both personally revealing, and that suggest, rather than dictate, ways in which we might read Coetzee’s novels. The remarks on the interview, for instance, present us with an extremely important caveat against reading Coetzee too monologically, or against any simplistic identification of Coetzee’s position with a single character. Let us apply this suggestion to a controversial example: in the case of Life and Times of Michael K. we are not necessarily called upon to read the humble gardener as a figure for Coetzee’s putative political, or more exactly, a-political, position. The novel does not straightforwardly tell us (as such commentators as Gordimer and Steven Clingman seem to have thought) to “cultivate our own garden” as Michael K. does. (That position would seem to reach its limit after all when the garden is mined.) Rather, the novel sets in motion a struggle (a “war” in the novel’s terminology) between certain principles, possibilities, readings, and stories.

     

    Another revealing moment in Doubling the Point can be discovered in Coetzee’s moving comments on suffering and the body in the interview preceding the section on “Autobiography and Confession.” I cite his confession at some length:

     

    If I look back over my own fiction, I see a simple (simple-minded?) standard erected. That standard is the body. Whatever else, the body is not "that which is not," and the proof that it is is the pain it feels. The body with its pain becomes the counter to the endless trials of doubt. (One can get away with such crudeness in fiction; one can't in philosophy, I'm sure.) ... Let me put it baldly, in South Africa it is not possible to deny the authority of suffering and therefore of the body. It is not possible, not for logical reasons, not for ethical reasons (I would not assert the ethical superiority of pain over pleasure), but for political reasons, for reasons of power. And let me again be unambiguous: it is not that one grants the authority of the suffering body: the suffering body takes this authority: that is its power. To use other words: its power is undeniable. (Let me add, entirely parenthetically, that I as a person, as a personality, am overwhelmed, that my thinking is thrown into confusion and helplessness, by the fact of suffering in the world, and not only human suffering. These fictional constructions of mine are paltry, ludicrous defenses against that being- overwhelmed, and, to me, transparently so.)(248)

     

    These comments are offered to account for the curious authority of Friday, the mute, mutilated, unassimilable figure from Foe, whom we are finally called upon to think of as standing outside language. (His home, we are told at the novel’s end, is “a place where bodies are their own signs” [157].) But they remind us, more generally, of the importance of the body in all of Coetzee’s novels: the bitten ear of the Hottentot child and the (unforgettable!) anal carbuncle of the explorer in Dusklands, the broken feet and bloodied backs of the prisoners in Waiting for the Barbarians, the harelip and bony frame of the starved Michael K., and the cancer that is slowly destroying Elizabeth Curren in Age of Iron. These remarks explain, moreover, why Coetzee identifies so strongly with the moment in Burger’s Daughter I discussed above: that short- circuiting of moral understanding in the face of human brutality is something that he shares, and tries to repair in his fiction.

     

    At the conclusion of Doubling the Point, Coetzee returns us again, surprisingly, to Plato, with a simple insistence that we are somehow born with an idea of justice and truth. This is, as Coetzee is all too aware, a vulnerable and perhaps a naive position, but it is the only way he finds himself able to explain his own marginal position–the paradox of the “colonial postcoloniality” of his texts; the fact that like the Magistrate in Waiting for the Barbarians he seems compelled to “choose the side of justice when it is not in one’s material interests to do so” (394-5). The reconstruction of an ethical vision, against the odds of an unbearably violent history, is the imperative with which both these texts finally leave us: Coetzee’s writings, as Attwell concludes, do project beyond their situation, “alerting us to the as yet unrealized promise of freedom” (125).

     

    Notes

     

    1. See for instance Michael Chapman’s comments on Foe as a “kind of masturbatory release, in this country, of the Europeanizing dreams of an intellectual coterie” (335). Cited in Attwell 127-8 fn.

     

    2. In his essay “The Problem of History in the Fiction of J.M. Coetzee,” Attwell elaborates on the theoretical position underpinning his book (Trump, 128).

     

    3. For a discussion of such readings, see Teresa Dovey, “Coetzee and his Critics: The Case of Dusklands,” English in Africa 14 (1987): 15-30.

     

    4. The title of Dick Penner’s book, Countries of the Mind, declares candidly that his interest lies elsewhere; and Teresa Dovey, while deploying an extremely limited notion of South African discursive codes which Coetzee subverts, has even less interest in any kind of historical specificity. (Schreiner seems to be the only other South African writer she has actually read.) As Attwell so neatly puts it, Dovey challenges those naive critics who would turn Coetzee’s work into a supplement to history, but then turns it into a supplement to Lacan (2).

     

    5. There is an interesting discussion in Doubling the Point of Coetzee’s increasing resistance to symptomatic readings in his own criticism: “Why am I now suspicious of such suspiciousness?” Coetzee asks himself (106). The answer he ventures is that demystificatory criticism tends to privilege mystification. Attwell’s criticism seems to me to be influenced by this discussion. (See, for instance, 118-19.)

    Works Cited

     

    • Attwell, David. “J.M. Coetzee and the Problem of History.” Trump 94-133. Rpt. Poetics Today 11 (Fall 1990): 579-615.
    • Chapman, Michael. “The Writing of Politics and the Writing of Writing: On Reading Dovey on Reading Lacan on Reading Coetzee on Reading … (?)” Rev. of Dovey. Journal of Literary Studies 4 (1988): 327-41.
    • Clingman, Stephen. “Revolution and Reality: South African Fiction in the 1980s.” Trump 41-60.
    • Coetzee, J.M. “Author on History’s Cutting Edge. South Africa’s J.M. Coetzee: Visions of Doomed Heroics.” Interview. Washington Post 27 Nov, 1990: C1, C4.
    • —. Foe. New York: Penguin, 1987.
    • —. “The Novel Today.” Upstream 6 (1988): 2-5.
    • Dovey, Teresa. The Novels of J.M. Coetzee: Lacanian Allegories. Johannesburg: Ad. Donker, 1988.
    • Fukiyama, Francis. “The End of History?” National Interest 16 (Summer 1989): 3-18.
    • Gallagher, Susan Van Zanten. A Story of South Africa: J.M. Coetzee’s Fiction in Context. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991.
    • Gordimer, Nadine. “The Idea of Gardening.” Rev. of Life and Times of Michael K. New York Review of Books 2 Feb. 1984: 3,6.
    • Penner, Dick. Countries of the Mind: The Fiction of J.M. Coetzee. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1989.
    • Trump, Martin. Rendering Things Visible: Essays on South African Literary Culture. Athens: Ohio UP, 1990): 94-133.

     

  • Authorizing Memory, Remembering Authority

    Mark Fenster

    Department of Telecommunications
    Indiana University

    fenster@silver.ucs.indiana.edu

     

    Schudson, Michael. Watergate in American Memory: How We Remember, Forget, and Reconstruct the Past. New York: Basic Books, 1992.

     

    Zelizer, Barbie. Covering the Body: The Kennedy Assassination, the Media, and the Shaping of Collective Memory. Chicago: U of Chicago Press, 1992.

     

    Best Evidence is the story of my journey in search of the truth about the autopsy [of John F. Kennedy]. When my literary agent first read this manuscript, he said, ‘You have written a book about authority.’ No, I said, I’ve written a book about the assassination. I didn’t understand, but he did. This is a book about authority because it delves into the process by which we–as individuals and as a society–decide what is true and what is false; what is to be believed and what is not” (Lifton 1992, xviii).

     

    Michael Schudson’s Watergate in American Memory and Barbie Zelizer’s Covering the Body are quite removed from the often heady world of Kennedy assassination researchers, a world in which David Lifton is a lofty, though somewhat controversial figure. Schudson is a sociologist, Zelizer is in a rhetoric and communication department, and neither is interested in the minutiae of medical evidence and the geopolitical speculation that are at the heart of Warren Commission critics. However, they would both agree with Lifton that the debates around such “critical incidents” as the Kennedy assassination(s) and Watergate are indeed as much about authority as they are about “truth” and the never ending and seemingly impossible search for it. While Schudson and Zelizer have written very different books on these events and their implications in their own time and in the present, their projects are quite similar and are worthy of comparison for the study of social memory and contemporary culture.

     

    Specifically, they share the purpose of attempting to use the very problematic events that they discuss in order to make arguments about contemporary American culture. Schudson is interested in “collective memory,” and how societies institutionalize memories, and particularly historical memories, in cultural forms and social practices. Zelizer traces the establishment of journalistic authority in and over the Kennedy assassination–the title phrase, “covering the body,” refers to the actual media “coverage” of Kennedy and his death (ironically, the term was used before the assassination to refer to those whose beat was following the President to Dallas or wherever he went). Both authors, then, are using these events as case studies for projects that seek to move beyond mere historical chronicles, and this movement beyond history and into memory and authority are among the main strengths and weaknesses of these books. These were and remain, as both authors document, important events in recent American history and memory, and their reverberations throughout politics and culture are still felt; in the past year, for example, the twentieth anniversary of the Watergate break-in was commemorated by a CBS documentary, while a “Director’s Cut” of Oliver Stone’s controversial JFK has just been released on video, with a number of scenes “restored” from the shorter version that met the time constraints imposed by Time-Warner. As powerful historical events that took place at crucial conjunctures in recent American history, Watergate and the Kennedy assassination can tell us much about such diverse topics as the function of memory and the practice of journalism; however, as such, these events can and often do exceed such attempts to “use” them. In other words, because there is far more to Watergate and JFK’s assassination than the rather specific theoretical and political interests with which these authors come to these events, their attempts to somewhat sharply focus, or to cut off a discursive slice of an “event” in order to examine “American Culture,” at times yields frustrating results.

     

    * * * * *

     

    Zelizer is most interested in the “interpretive community” of journalists, and how the “cultural authority” of (certain) journalists is asserted and maintained. “Journalism,” in this sense, refers to more than merely the printed page or the broadcast; it comprises the discursive practices authorized and legitimated in professional meetings of journalists, journalism textbooks, codes of professionalism, journalists’ folklore, memoirs, historical accounts, etc. Zelizer argues that the overarching narrative of journalism and the journalist is a structuring principle of journalistic discourse; the journalistic community constitutes itself, she argues, via the stories it tells about itself in order to legitimate itself and what it does.

     

    Within this interpretive community and American culture in general, the Kennedy assassination serves as a “critical incident” (a moment ‘by means of which people air, challenge, and negotiate their own standards of action'[4]) in its historical position within the emergence of television news as a primary form of journalism, the chaotic circumstances of the assassination and the ability of the media to narrate and explain seemingly inexplicable information, and the close ties between the Kennedy administration and many members of the press. This was a story that was clearly “told” first and foremost by journalists–the trickling out of facts, the live coverage of the Oswald murder and the Kennedy funeral, and the early legitimation of the Warren Commission report were all dependent upon the reporting of the news media. And a number of prominent journalists, among them current CBS news anchor Dan Rather and Washington Post pundit David Broder, established themselves as important news figures while covering this event, and continue to keep the event alive within their own work and autobiographies (none more so than Rather, who seems to obsessively cover the story whenever it seems necessary for CBS to give it further prime time coverage). Zelizer is at her best when documenting and describing this obsessive use of the coverage by news organizations and journalists, and persuasively documents how journalists established themselves as “preferred spokespersons of the assassination story” (137).

     

    In addition, her discussion of the struggles over journalism’s association with this story provides a good framework for understanding both the conflicts between journalistic and historical discourse, and those between “legitimate” explanations of the assassination and the explanations offered by Warren Commission critics, as exemplified by Stone and JFK. By asserting themselves as main spokespersons of the assassination story, journalists and news organizations were, and remain, poachers on the territory of historians; this was, after all, a presidential assassination, and can only be understood, so historians argue, within its proper historical context and with the “disinterested” and distanced care of the historian. Yet the assassination remains in the realm of the popular; the “explanations” of the event provided by Dan Rather or James Reston are more widely circulated and have greater purchase on social memories of the event than those of prominent historians (the recent “forum” in the American Historical Review on JFK [1992] was itself a rather problematic attempt to enable historians to engage in the popular debate about the popular film).

     

    If historians represent one challenge to journalistic authority (or, more precisely, if journalists represent one challenge to the authority of historians), then Warren Commission critics represent a similar, though quite different struggle over the meaning of the event. Indeed, no group is more willing to provide an extended critique of the mass media and news organizations as instruments of propaganda than these “independent researchers,” who often come across as a poor person’s Noam Chomsky (this is intended as a compliment to the researchers). At the same time, the mainstream media view the work of these researchers with disdain, if indeed they view it at all. The incredible backlash against Stone and his film, which began before the film was even released, was, as Zelizer argues, as much an attempt to re-assert journalistic authority as it was an attempt to review a film; after all, if Stone was in any way correct, then journalistic accounts are willing or unwilling accomplices to a great cover-up. Thus the debate over the ethics of cinematic representation (i.e., which sequences and images were “real” and which were “fiction”?) was often a displacement of journalistic and mainstream political anxiety over who was telling the tale of the assassination and how it was being told. In this sense, this debate over the Kennedy assassination as a public event, no matter whether Stone is right, is very much about authority.

     

    Yet a central problem of the book lies precisely in questions that arise in Zelizer’s definition of “authority,” as she seems reluctant to explain fully how she would define journalistic (and media) authority. On the one hand, she wants to emphasize what she sees as a “collective” set of knowledge and practices, and she seems to reject or at least to modify the classic left association of the media with the protection of and assistance to power and influence in the transmission of ideologically limited and distorted information (6-7). And yet she closes her book with a discussion of the importance of an “acquiescent,” “relatively uncritical and inattentive” American public in the crafting of journalistic authority. How “collective” is a media complex so removed from an invisible and seemingly powerless public and dependent upon electronic media and stars, and how does journalistic authority survive if not via the transmission of certain types of narratives and not others?

     

    Despite these lingering political and theoretical questions, the book admirably meets its central objective of chronicling and critiquing journalistic discourses of authority. Yet it leaves me dissatisfied because of its inadequate recognition of what I would call the “excesses” of popular political/cultural events like the Kennedy assassination and Watergate. I’m referring here to both disciplinary and phenomenological excess: the assassination was “experienced” and continues to be remembered and “experienced” on a seemingly infinite number of personal, cultural and political levels, and can and has been argued over and “explained” by as many disciplinary authorities as have looked into it. This is why, in some ways, Don Delillo’s Libra can represent the event more powerfully than sociology of journalism can (or should be expected to); it is also why the vast and polymorphous corpus of pro- and anti-Warren Commission authors provides a fascinating, Joycean vision of virtually all aspects of the event.

     

    This is not to say that Zelizer’s project is inherently flawed or that it tells us nothing; rather, it represents a good starting point for understanding the workings of discursive practices of authority in popular historical events such as this. It does, however, mean that in so tightly focusing her study on an event that needs a very wide screen, her argument at times becomes diffused within the broader implications of the murder of a president. Her very controlled academic prose and her staid sociological approach can explain the workings of journalists quite well; yet they can only describe one aspect of the event and the discourse that surrounded and still surrounds it. And at times, this excess seems to overwhelm the book’s premise–after all, if, as polls indicate, the American public disbelieves the findings of the Warren Commission and distrusts the media, then what exactly does “journalistic authority” over the event amount to? What is an authority that has a virtual monopoly on the circulation of information and the construction of historical narratives, and yet is so ineffectual that after thirty years of reiterating its official story of the Kennedy assassination almost nobody appears to believe what it tells them? Sociology of journalism such as Zelizer’s can help us to understand the attempt to control the excess of events like the Kennedy assassination. It remains for further work to explain the institutional and popular practices that attempt, sometimes successfully, to exceed this control.

     

    * * * * *

     

    Schudson’s book is more directly concerned with issues that are central to theorizing the practices of postmodernity: the construction, circulation and institutionalization of memory. Like Zelizer, Schudson is interested in authority, although his emphasis is less on the interests of any one specific group than on the use of and struggle over the events and meanings of Watergate. The book is written in engaging and, compared with Covering the Body, relatively informal and enjoyable prose; it is also neat and tightly constructed, beginning with a concise discussion of theories of social memory, a review of the central political elements of Watergate, and a series of case studies of the use of memory in post-Watergate reform politics, journalistic practice, and historical accounts, as well as in popular culture, language, autobiographies of Watergate participants, and in the self-serving Richard Nixon Library. Among other uses Schudson describes, memories of Watergate have been “mobilized” for the sake of political careers, “contested” in political practice, “ignited” in the discourse surrounding the revelations of and responses to the Iran-Contra scandal, and “besieged” in Nixon’s campaign to restore his personal reputation. In addition, Schudson argues that the revelations of Watergate were easily articulated with growing suspicions and distrust of government (which, as he cogently asserts, had begun prior to Nixon’s fall) as well as with the release of information about the sins of the American security apparatus at home and abroad. At the same time, he demonstrates how the discourse concerning Watergate generally ignores a central source for the conflict between Nixon, the Congress, and popular protest–the Vietnam War and the secret bombing of Cambodia.

     

    Watergate in American Memory is particularly effective in its mapping out of the various reactions to Watergate by different political groups. Schudson divides and sub-divides such responses: first, in terms of whether the event was understood as a constitutional crisis (generally by liberal and conservative centrists) or a scandal (i.e., as a superficial “show” that covered up greater manipulation by elite groups, generally believed by what he terms “ultraconservatives” and the “radical left”), and then by virtue of whether the problem that Watergate represented was caused by systemic shortcomings within the American political system (liberals and leftists) or was peculiar to the Nixon presidency (centrists and conservatives of all stripes). Clearly, these differing reactions concern the construction of larger historical narratives and the placement of Watergate within these narratives; as Schudson argues, understanding and remembering Watergate is an ongoing process and struggle over identifying actors, motives and context.

     

    In this sense, Watergate represents the process of contemporary historical knowledge and memory; it was, at once, a Historical Event, an object of intense media scrutiny, and a site of popular knowledge and debate. Against the tirades of academics and intellectuals on the right and left which posit an American culture that lacks any memory of itself and others, Schudson conceives of a United States that immerses itself in certain texts and practices of popular history, such as the memory of the historical in relation to the personal remembrance, “amateur” historical research, and the popular political discourse of the mass media and everyday life. Like the Kennedy Assassination, Watergate is both popularly “forgotten” (in the “properly” historical sense of the knowledge of specific facts and human agents) and obsessed over in the struggle to understand and define the implications of these events and their relationship to the present. To remember Watergate is to remember Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, the Ervin committee hearings, and Robert Redford and Dustin Hoffman–thus illustrating the continuing importance of popular narratives and memories in understanding contemporary political events and crises. For the study of contemporary culture, this emergent notion of memory as popular and (mass) mediated rather than as authoritative and mediated through “proper” historical channels is of considerable value.

     

    My frustration with Schudson’s book is his tendency to set up a continuum of political and theoretical positions and to attempt to occupy what he constructs as a reasonable, yet transcendent, middle ground. This appears first in his validation and appropriation of virtually every political response to Watergate; he agrees, yet limits his own agreement, with those who see it as scandal and constitutional crisis, as peculiar to Nixon and as part of systemic problems with the Presidency. Unwilling to assume any one of these positions, he seems ready to occupy all at once. Yet taken to their logical conclusions, these positions are mutually exclusive: if Watergate was the successful resolution of a crisis through the removal of the constitutional threat and the reform of legislation and policy, then it could not have been a scandal constructed by the power or media elite to retain legitimacy for a corrupted system or to depose a conservative president. Similarly, while one might agree that Nixon’s was a singular presidency, the reign of Reagan was competitive in the breadth and fury of its domestic and foreign covert operations–and thus, clearly, Nixon’s singularity is far less significant than the systemic structures that allow for two such imperial presidencies in successive decades. While Schudson notes this, his apparent desire to remain above such “partisan” politics demonstrates an unwillingness to confront the issues of power that (what he might term) the “radical left” position would require of him. Because he chose Watergate as a case study of social memory, Schudson is obliged, it seems to me, to express a good deal more righteous indignation at the politics of the era and the treachery of the Nixon regime; this is neither a question of “objectivity” nor correct politics, but part of the terrain that comes with choosing such a controversial event for a case study of social memory.

     

    This becomes more apparent in his lack of a satisfactory theory of memory. He provides worthy critiques of some of the problems with “interest” theories (i.e., critical theories of the ideological uses of memory), “cultural” theories (the symbolic logic of remembrance within specific cultures) and social constructionist theories (the construction of the past in the memory of present observers), yet seems to argue neither for a singular different theory nor for one that appropriates the best aspects of all of them. While he posits memory as a “scarce resource” that is “handed down through particular cultural forms and transmitted in particular cultural vehicles” (207, 5), he seems unwilling to note the degree to which, in his case studies, it is the power and media elite who construct the dominant, though not unchallenged, narratives of Watergate. While one would certainly want to qualify simplistic notions of ideology that would claim such discourse as all-powerful, the sheer dominance of certain ways of understanding and using Watergate for political ends demonstrates the viability of radical critiques of dominant discourse. Clearly, “American memory” is a site of struggle, but one in which certain groups and interests enjoy greater ability than others to manage what is remembered and how it is remembered.

     

    If, as I would argue, an important dimension of postmodernity is the increasingly sophisticated array of strategies and technologies by means of which certain groups attempt to “manage” the construction and reconstruction of historical knowledge, then Watergate, as a text that was at its very core covert and opaque, seems a seminal example of the relationship between power, the realm of the political, and memory in contemporary American culture. As with the Kennedy assassination, memories of Watergate are aspects of the cultural struggle to construct and authorize certain narratives and explanations of the past. Zelizer and Schudson successfully document aspects of this process; the challenge for theories of postmodernity is to further map social memory within matrices of knowledge, power, and domination.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • “AHR Forum: JFK.” American Historical Review Apr. 1992: 486-511.
    • Lifton, David. Best Evidence. New York: Signet, 1992.
    • Stone, Oliver and Zachary Sklar. JFK: The Book of the Film. New York: Applause Books, 1992.

     

  • If I Only Had a Brain

    Steven Shaviro

    Department of English
    University of Washington
    shaviro@u.washington.edu

     

    Burroughs writes: “in this life we have to take things as we find them as the torso murderer said when he discovered his victim was a quadruple amputee.” Good advice for the anatomically deranged, like Cliff Steele. He’s a character in the DC/Vertigo comic book DOOM PATROL; I refer in particular to the issues written by Grant Morrison and illustrated by Richard Case, between 1989 and 1992 (#s 19-63). Cliff has a problem with his body, you see. It happened like this. He used to be a daredevil racing car driver; he had a horrible wreck. Nearly all of him was burned to ashes, but they snatched his brain from the flames. And then they implanted that brain in a new prosthetic body, all shiny metal, ultra high tech, a veritable fighting machine. Now Cliff is the muscle of the DOOM PATROL, a brain turned into brawn. They expect him to be a macho bruiser, when actually he’s quite sensitive underneath. And to add insult to injury, they call him Robotman–a name he violently hates. What would that do for your sense of self-esteem? The life of a superhero these days! Cliff thinks of himself as just a regular guy; Robocop fantasies are the last thing on his mind. But with a metallic casing like this, he can’t exactly blend into the crowd. It’s what Baudrillard calls hyper-visibility, the postmodern condition par excellence. No chance of chilling out with a secret identity, like old Clark Kent used to do. All this metal is a clunky encumbrance, no matter how great its tensile strength. You know you’re in bad shape when you bang your head against a wall, and you still don’t feel a thing. At this point, Cliff doesn’t even really know what his body can do. How good is all this cyber-tech stuff anyway? How accurate and detailed is sensory input? How fast is motor response? What unaccustomed relays and connections now trigger the pain and pleasure centers in Cliff’s brain? Will he ever be able to taste and smell? Can he ever have sex again? What about getting drunk or stoned? “The only good thing about having a human brain in a robot body,” Cliff remarks sardonically at one point, “is that it’s easier to control brain chemistry.” Just the touch of a button, and anxiety is dissipated, alertness is heightened, or memory is enhanced. But alas, this techno-manipulation seems to work only for utilitarian ends, and not for hedonistic ones. “Our machines are disturbingly lively,” Donna Haraway writes, “and we ourselves frighteningly inert.” It might not be so bad, if only you could get used to the situation. After all, Descartes argued long ago that the body is a machine. It shouldn’t matter all that much whether metal or flesh is the medium. In either case, it’s simply a matter of mastering the electrochemical interface: regularizing chains of association, facilitating neural feedback patterns, reinforcing the appropriate re-entrant connections. In short, a question of recognition and memory, of cultivating habits over the course of time. The problem is that Cliff’s mechanical body never stays the same. He’s continually being sent back to the shop for upgrades and repairs. Transistors burn out; programming errors and faulty couplings throw him off stride. He gets into fights, and enemies regularly mangle his metal to bits. As if that weren’t bad enough, Doc Magnus (who built and programmed his body in the first place) and Niles Caulder (the Chief of the DOOM PATROL) tend to use Cliff as a pawn in their ongoing professional rivalry. Neither of them is content to let well enough alone; they are both all too eager to retool him in order to try out their latest cybernetic design ideas. And let’s not even think about those insectoid aliens who at one point fit Cliff out in a new metal carapace with six legs. Life in a robot body, even if you’re strong, is just one humiliation after another. The persistence of memory in the brain only makes things worse. Amputees typically feel phantom sensations in their lost limbs; poor Cliff has this problem multiplied many times over. He must endlessly relive numerous episodes of mutilation and dismemberment. Neither Clint Eastwood nor Woody Allen–our two best-known icons of hetero-male angst–ever had to go through anything remotely like this.

     

    The worst part, though, is the waiting. All these body modifications take time, just as it takes time to alter a dress or a pair of pants. Cliff’s brain is disconnected meanwhile, and left in a vat of nutrient fluids. The experience isn’t exactly like returning to the womb. You don’t get some soothing “oceanic feeling”; rather, you freak out from sensory deprivation. The first stage is “boredom: hearing nothing, seeing nothing, experiencing nothing. Boredom and irritation and then panic.” Panic, because the brain (like nature) abhors a vacuum. So that’s when the hallucinations begin: “nightmares of sound and vision, grotesque sensory distortions.” Cliff is overwhelmed by paranoid delusions of a world controlled by malevolent insects and soulless infernal machines. “The body becomes remote, robotic, disconnected,” a symptom of the schizophrenic’s “sense of being abstracted from the day-to-day physical world.” But if this is the case with me, then what about other people? “Maybe I’m not the robot, and everyone else is.” It doesn’t help to realize that this is just a virtual world, and that your own brain is generating all these visions. If anything, such an awareness only makes things worse: your ontological insecurity is heightened, while the horrors you confront don’t for all that become any less vivid and intense. If only I could attribute these appearances to a malevolent programmer, to somebody like Descartes’ evil demon! Then at least I’d have the comfort of knowing that somebody else is out there, that I’m not absolutely alone. True hell for Cliff is the solipsistic universe of Bishop Berkeley, in which nothing exists except one’s own inner perceptions: a closed circle from which there is no escape.

     

    But fortunately this idealist delirium doesn’t last forever; eventually the hallucinations subside. Virtual reality is a great leveller: “nothing can pass through without being broken down, disintegrated.” And so Cliff finally reaches a sort of nirvana, “something I can’t describe: the center of the cyclone, the room without doors.” Now becoming grinds to a halt; time no longer passes, you have all the time in the world. Plenty of time to meditate upon the Smiths lyric that opens and closes one episode of DOOM PATROL: “Does the body rule the mind or does the mind rule the body?” The question resonates in the emptiness like a Zen koan: ironic, unanswerable, absurd. Meditate long enough, and the inner self, the first person of the Cartesian cogito, drops out of the picture. You’re left with the great postmodern discovery, anticipated alike by Hume and by the Buddhists: that personal identity is a fiction. The Cartesian subject disappears, together with all that it created. When I introspect deeply, I may come across all sorts of experiential contents and structures: feelings, desires, perceptions, memories, multiple personalities, and so on. But the one thing I am absolutely unable to find is myself.

     

    The conundrum of the brain in a vat is an old philosophical slapstick routine, our updated postmodern version of Descartes’ original Meditations. The question is always the same: how can I know for sure that these inner representations correspond to something out there, that what I experience is real? How can I be absolutely certain that I’m not just a disembodied mind dreaming the external world, or that it isn’t all a computer simulation fed into my brain through direct innervation of the neuronal fibers? The comedy lies in this: that it’s only my hysterical demand for certainty that first introduces the element of doubt. It’s only by subjecting myself to the horrors of sensory deprivation that I approach the delirious limit at which the senses become questionable. Descartes does just that in his Third Meditation: “I will now shut my eyes, stop my ears, and withdraw all my senses . . . .” Descartes “proves God,” as Samuel Beckett puts it, “by exhaustion.” As metaphysics goes, it’s the oldest trick in the book: first you take something away, then you complain that it isn’t there, and then you invent a theory grounded in–and compensating for–its very absence. Deleuze and Guattari call it the Theology of Lack. A seductive ruse, to be sure: once you accept the premises, you’ve already been suckered into the conclusions.

     

    “If I only had a brain . . . .” For as one character in DOOM PATROL remarks, “Descartes was nothing but a miserable git who never had a good time in his entire life!” Postmodern philosophers rightly reject the very logic that gets us into the dualist impasse. Descartes’ methodical doubt is ultimately a distinction without a difference, since it has no pragmatic consequences whatsoever. For consider the alternatives. Either there’s some telltale sign, which allows us empirically to determine whether or not we’re just brains kept in vats: in which case the whole sorry mess is merely a question of fact, without any deeper epistemological import. Or else, there’s no way of telling: but in this case, we have nothing to worry about, since experience remains the same one way or the other. “The mystery, as Cormac McCarthy’s Judge Holden says, “is that there is no mystery.” Perhaps the evil demon posited by Descartes gets some private, masturbatory delectation out of fooling us like this; but that needn’t be any concern of ours. For the evil demon can’t do anything to us, can’t harm us or change us or otherwise affect us, without thereby tipping his hand and revealing his existence. Descartes’ dilemma is resolved without dualism, then, and without positing a transcendent self, simply by noting that appearances and simulacra are themselves perfectly real. The cogito is reduced to a third-person tautology: things are exactly as they are, “everything is what it seems.” In this postmodern life, “we have to take things as we find them.”

     

    But such logic and such consolations are of little help to Cliff Steele, trapped as he is in all that heavy metal–except for the even worse times when his naked brain is actually left to stew and hallucinate in a vat. If modern Western rationality begins with Descartes’ self-mutilating gesture, perhaps it culminates in Cliff’s absurd disembodiment. For Cliff is the final, helpless, involuntary victim of a whole history of amputations. He iss compelled literally to live out the disabling paradoxes of Cartesian dualism. He suffers every day from schizophrenic disjunctions between the real and the imaginary, between self and other, between vitalism and mechanism, between mind and body. The problem may be a false one philosophically, but it’s still inscribed in our technology. Descartes’ idle speculations are now as it were incised in Cliff’s very flesh. Doc Magnus and the Chief mess with Cliff’s head more insidiously than the evil demon ever could. Their operations give dualism a delirious new twist: for now it’s Cliff’s mind that is materially incarnated, while his corporeality is entirely notional, virtual, simulacral. Such is our postmodern refinement of those old metaphysical endeavors to find the ultimate reality, to separate essence from accident. Descartes’ cogito and Husserl’s epoche were merely thought experiments; but now we can realize their equivalents in actual surgical procedures. Strip everything away that is not indubitably “Cliff Steele,” that is not necessarily contained in the very notion of his essence; and what’s left is precisely these three pounds of neuronal tissue, a fleshy lump “so full of water that it tends to slump like a blancmange if placed without support on a firm surface” (Anthony Smith, The Body). Since Cliff’s only ‘identity’ is that of this actual, physical brain, you might say that his sole grounding certitude is that he is an extended thing–as against Descartes’ claim to be a thinking thing. Just as you can’t make an omelette without breaking eggs, so you can’t get amputated unless you have a body.

     

    The Chief claims that the operation was a success, that it’s all turned out for Cliff’s own greater good. The old Cliff Steele, he says, was “selfish, arrogant, overconfident, ill-educated . . . a loudmouthed, misogynistic boor”; it’s only through the traumas of amputation and cyborgization that the new Cliff has “learned kindness and compassion and a selfless heroism.” DOOM PATROL is quite different from the revisionist superhero comics that made a big splash in the mid to late 80s: Alan Moore’s Watchmen (with Dave Gibbons), Frank Miller’s Batman: The Dark Knight Returns (with Klaus Janson and Lynn Varley), and Grant Morrison’s own Batman: Arkham Asylum (with Dave McKean). All these works “deconstruct” our familiar images of comic book superheroes. They go behind the scenes to reveal what we should’ve suspected all along: that Batman and all those other patriotic, costumed crime-fighters are really violent sociopaths with fascist-cum-messianic leanings and a kinky underwear fetish. Everything gets played out for these sordid characters in the registers of secrecy, disguise, and paranoia: literally in the form of their jealous anxieties about maintaining a “secret identity,” and more figuratively in terms of those notorious paradoxes of destroying the world in order to save it, or stepping outside of the law in order to enforce the law. As old Mayor Daley of Chicago once said, “the police are not there to create disorder; the police are there to preserve disorder.” Miller’s Batman and Moore’s tormented anti-heroes owe much to the creepy affectlessness and suppressed fury of Clint Eastwood’s Dirty Harry. Indeed, their hoods and masks go Clint one better, when it comes to maintaining an unreadable, deadpan exterior. The crimefighter’s costume is a literal “character armor,” rigidly neutralizing whatever may rage beneath–and thereby perpetuating the modernist fantasy that there is a “beneath,” something like manhood or interiority or selfhood. Most of these psychotic superheroes are still organically human; but it’s only one more step to outright cyborgs like Arnold Schwarzenegger’s Terminator and Peter Weller’s Robocop (in fact, Frank Miller wrote the scripts for Robocop II and III). And hasn’t there always been something cyborg-like about Clint? In these cyborg fantasy films, in any case, the superhero’s costume–I include Arnold’s muscles in this category–no longer works as a disguise. Now it’s a prosthetic organ of strength, a kind of supplemental, rebuilt manhood. Todd McFarlane’s comic book Spawn (a series to which Alan Moore and Grant Morrison have both contributed) presents an even more fascinating case. Here, the protagonist’s costume is not just an article of clothing, nor even a mechanical interface, but a living inhuman being in its own right: a sexually voracious, “constantly-evolving neural parasite” from Hell that brings Al Simmons back from the dead, heightens his metabolism, encases him in an unbreachable protective carapace, and takes command of his central nervous system. The image is definitely arthropodal: hard armor on the outside, guarding some soft squishy stuff within. Al’s body is nearly invulnerable; but this security only intensifies his hidden anguish. He wallows in the misery of living in back alleys with the homeless, and mourns the loss of his wife and child. And so Al gets to display his macho prowess, while at the same time laying claim to a deep inner sensitivity, a self-righteous feeling of vulnerability and victimization. Can Robert Bly and his “men’s movement” be far behind? Again and again it’s the same old story: a near-catatonic rigidity that can be breached only in outbursts of extreme cathartic violence, whether by banging drums in the woods, or by blowing away the slavering hordes of sickos and scumbags with your .357 Magnum. At least Clint has a keen sense of irony about it all–which is more than you can say for Bly or for Woody Allen. Some guys’ll do anything to redeem their lonely, frustrated lives. And so they endow their experience with a certain self-aggrandizing pathos, by entertaining reactive, resentful fantasies of masculinity under siege. It feels so good to be a victim, ’cause then you’ve got the perfect excuse to demand recompense, to make others pay like you’ve had to pay, to lash out at the bitch who started it all.

     

    A man’s gotta do what a man’s gotta do. You imagine your ‘manhood’ as something both strong and fragile, hard and tough and yet continually in peril. Like a penis that might go limp, or a mind weighted down with a body. But why even bother, why hold back? Why not just let yourself go? Why cling to this rigid exterior armor, why nurture this aggrieved inner self? Can Cartesian dignity mean that much to you? OK, OK, you’ll say–together with Descartes and with Arnold–this body is only a machine, but there’s still something inside that’s really me. I had to destroy my cock in order to save it: I tore it apart and had it recast in hard, cutting metal–a strategy implicit in many of these films, and savagely literalized in Shinya Tsukamoto’s Iron Man. McLuhan describes such techno-hysteria as an inevitable defensive reaction to change, “a desperate and suicidal autoamputation, as if the central nervous system could no longer depend on the physical organs to be protective buffers against the slings and arrows of outrageous mechanism.” But McLuhan also insists that there’s no backing away from the dilemma: “there is, for example, no way of refusing to comply with the new sense ratios or sense ‘closure’ evoked by the TV image.” It isn’t a question of adapting ourselves to the new technological environment, but of realizing that this technology already is our adaptation. We must cultivate the new sensations offered to us by our new organs. And if masculinity can’t keep up with the changes, then so much the worse for masculinity.

     

    Grant Morrison understands these dynamics better than anybody. His Batman: Arkham Asylum pushes the revisionist superhero comic to a parodic point of no return. Batman’s old enemies, now inmates of this asylum for the criminally insane, tauntingly invite him to join them. For isn’t the ‘virtual’ freedom of madness more appealing than the tedium of life in the ‘real’ world, “confined to the Euclidean prison that is sanity”? Batman is all too receptive to this seduction. He knows he’s as crazy as any of them, what with his bizarre fixations and his hysterical rage for order. He senses that walking through the doors of Arkham Asylum will be “just like coming home.” And indeed, once he arrives, the blood of self-mutilation flows unchecked. Virility crumbles in an onslaught of psychedelic dislocation. The Cartesian fiction of the mind as a faithful “mirror of nature” (Rorty) is shattered and scattered into the multiple grotesque reflections of the Asylum’s funhouse mirrors. The Joker captures Batman, but declines to unmask him and reveal his secret identity; for he knows that the Caped Crusader’s mask already “is his real face.” I’ve loved the Joker ever since I was a child, so I was thrilled by Morrison’s reinvention of his character. The Joker may well be a gleefully sadistic mass murderer, but he’s also an exemplary postmodern subject. For he “has no real personality; he creates himself each day. He sees himself as the Lord of Misrule, and the world as a theatre of the absurd.” The Joker responds to the “chaotic barrage” of his overloaded senses–the postmodern information glut–in a radically new manner. Not by choosing and discriminating among his perceptions; and not by striving to maintain a fixed ego structure. But simply by “going with the flow”; he immerses himself in the postmodern flux and just lets it all happen. Unlike Batman, the Joker no longer needs the “protective buffers” that McLuhan feared were numbing us to change. He knows that the only way out is first of all a way in and through. His great adaptive innovation is to hold nothing back; he lives and enjoys the postmodern condition, this mutation of our sensibility into non-linear, non-Euclidean forms. Far from being mad, the Joker may in fact represent “some kind of super-sanity . . . . a brilliant new modification of human perception, more suited to urban life at the end of the twentieth century.”

     

    The Joker’s difference from Batman parallels McLuhan’s distinction between hot and cool media. “A hot medium,” McLuhan says, “is one that extends one single sense in ‘high definition.’” Its chief characteristics are “homogeneity, uniformity, and linear continuity.” Hot media are imperious, unidirectional, even terroristic. They demand rapt contemplation or close, obsessive attentiveness. Your life at every second depends upon their dictates, and yet they leave you feeling strangely uninvolved. They keep you at a proper, ‘alienated’ distance, drawing you into a paranoid frenzy of endless interpretation. This is the culture of the Book: of fundamentalist Christians scrutinizing their Bibles, and of academic Marxists “reading” the insidious ideologies embedded in the seemingly innocuous practices of everyday life. Batman is a quintessentially hot figure, ever on the lookout for miniscule clues that will confirm his Manichean sense of the world’s depravity. Cool media, to the contrary, are ‘low-definition,’ and for that very reason “high in participation or completion by the audience.” Their sparse spaces welcome and envelop us. They are characterized by “pluralism, uniqueness, and discontinuity,” and they solicit high levels of feedback and involvement. A cool medium, McLuhan says in a famous pun, offers you a massage rather than a message: a multi-textured, tactile and sensual experience, rather than the rational finality of a meaning to be decoded. There is nothing to interpret. Instead, cool media invite the kind of open reception that Michael Taussig, elaborating on Walter Benjamin, calls distraction: “a very different apperceptive mode, a type of flitting and barely conscious peripheral visual perception.” This is the Joker’s random drift, a delirious passivity brilliantly adapted to our state of continual technological shock. With innovation running at so fast a pace, alienation is out of date. It’s no longer a case of me against the world. Contrary to the overwrought claims of Neil Postman, Jerry Mander, and other such high-minded media pundits, nobody’s ever been brainwashed by watching TV. In fact, most people talk back to their sets. As Clark Humphrey puts it, “people who consume lots of media are very cynical about what they’re consuming . . . . A typical nonviewer may believe almost anything, [but] a typical TV viewer treats everything with (excess?) skepticism.” Our cheerful postmodern skepticism–reacting as if everything were just “on TV,” or always already in quotation marks–is poles apart from modernist angst or from Cartesian methodical doubt. You can’t ever defeat the evil demon in open battle, but you can put him in his place once you realize that he has more in common with Chuck Barris and Maury Povich than he does with Satan or with God.

     

    You might say that when Cliff Steele lost everything except for his brain, he was thrust willy-nilly into this cool new postmodern world. With all his “protective buffers” gone, he was preadapted to change. He had no choice but to be plugged directly into the “extension of the central nervous system” that electronic media have made of our planet. The Chief is right: something inside Cliff has been altered forever, so there’s no point in even trying to recover what was lost. “We have to take things as we find them,” amputations and all. This is “what it’s like” to be a postmodern cyborg. Prosthetic surgery is painful, but it can powerfully renew our sense of involvement in the world. It’s all a question of where you locate the information interface: how much you can stand to lop off, or just how far back you’re willing to go. Daniel Dennett notes that the question of the interface is the fatal weak point of every mind/body dualism: how can something be wholly immaterial, and yet still have material effects? Descartes placed the transfer point in the pineal gland; phenomenologists extend it to the surface of the skin; spiritualists push it even further out, to the ectoplasmic aura that surrounds us like a crustacean carapace or a superhero’s sheath. But for Cliff it no longer makes sense even to draw the line. Neurons and wires are much the same stuff. The electro-chemical feedback loops that constitute Cliff’s brain are of the same nature as those that are wired into his prosthetic body, or that course across the entirety of the postmodern “global village.” Cliff’s feelings, like the ashes of his former body, are scattered more or less everywhere. But there’s no one single point at which the experiences become “his own.”

     

    So in this strange way, Cliff is the postmodern Everyman. He hasn’t quite become feminized, but at least he’s no “misogynistic boor.” It’s true that he suffers from a certain baffled frustration, from a perpetual sense of unfulfilled duty, from frequent bouts of self-pity, and from a chronic inability to relax. It’s true also that his lovely thirst for the concrete can’t be quenched by any number of virtual or psychedelic wonders. Nothing seems vital to Cliff any more; as his psychiatrist asks him at one point, “how must it feel to have saved a world you don’t really believe is worth saving?” But unlike the old superheroes, Cliff doesn’t feel any differently about the world than he does about himself. The distinction of inner and outer simply isn’t relevant any more. That’s why Cliff’s pathos has nothing vengeful about it; it can’t be seen as the reaction of a resentful masculine ego. This pathos is rather the very affect or quality of that ego’s having been dispersed. It’s the expression, not of Cliff’s subjectivity, but precisely of his no longer being a “subject” in the old Cartesian/Freudian sense. It’s the feeling of not having a center–but also of not even lacking one. A cool, prosthetic pathos, perfect for an age of television and computers. What is the ontological status of this “soul of a new machine” (as one episode of DOOM PATROL calls it), this deeply intimate, yet strangely unlocalizable, affect? Call it a secondary, sympathetic resonance; or an uneliminable redundancy; or an effect of multiple interference patterns; or an emergent property of information flows accelerated beyond a certain threshold. As Deleuze suggests, we need to replace the old phenomenological slogan (“all consciousness is consciousness of something”) with a new, radically decentered one: “all consciousness is something.” For this is what happens when your brain is plugged directly into the ‘real’ world’s “mixing board”; but also when it’s isolated in a vat, or when its contents are downloaded into the virtual-reality matrix of a supercomputer. Round and round and round it goes; where it stops, nobody knows. “Does the body rule the mind or does the mind rule the body? I don’t know.” No cogito, then; no ergo, and no sum. “I don’t know if the world is better or worse than it has been”–as Kathy Acker writes in a different context–“I know the only anguish comes from running away.”

     

  • Dynamic and Thermodynamic Tropes of the Subject in Freud and in Deleuze and Guattari

    Martin Rosenberg

    Visiting Assistant Professor
    Department of English
    Texas A&M University

    mer1911@tamvm1.tamu.edu

     

    [O]rators and others who are in variance are mutually experiencing something that is bound to befall those who engage in senseless rivalry: believing that they are expressing opposite views, they fail to perceive that the theory of the opposite party is inherent in their own theory.

     

    –Thrasymachus of Chalcedon

     

    Introduction

     

    In their recent work Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? (1991), Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari make explicit the role that the concept of chaos plays in their representations of subjectivity, with respect to philosophy, science and the arts.1 I wish to exfoliate the chaotic in Deleuze and Guattari’s works, for their analysis of the ways in which chaos may be used referentially in philosophy, science and the arts in this later work may interfere with readers’ attempts to grapple with manifestations of chaos as a referent in their earlier collaboration, the two volumes subtitled Captialism and Schizophrenia: Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus. One way to make visible Deleuze and Guattari’s recourse to the chaotic in these two works is to examine the role that particular physics tropes play in their representation of subjectivity, especially since the tropes that model the subject in these two works engage agonistically with those that model subjectivity in the works of Sigmund Freud.2

     

    The descriptions of human consciousness in Freud and in Deleuze and Guattari are problematic precisely in their inverse, mirrored opposition, and we may discover the “ground” for that opposition by examining the role played by tropes from the discipline of physics in these theorists’ representations of subjectivity. We will need to notice particularly the historical differences in the ideological use of these tropes–at the end of the nineteenth century, and since the mid-twentieth century. As we will see, these two periods are interesting because they represent moments when the term entropy, a concept describing the amount of disorder in a physical system, has very different meanings– in physics, and in the cultural matrix as well. In the mid- to-late nineteenth century, entropy (in the context of equilibrium thermodynamics) refers largely to terminal processes of disorder for a physical system; since the nineteen-sixties, however, entropy (in the context of non- equilibrium thermodynamics) came to be understood as an initial condition enabling greater order and complexity in a physical system. Since Freud draws on the first version of entropy as referent, and Deleuze and Guattari draw on the second version of entropy as referent, two questions emerge: Can we say that Freud and Deleuze and Guattari are making the same claims for tropes of chaos (or entropy, or disorder) as grounds for their contending representations of subjectivity? If so, what can we then say about the stability of such claims for a correspondence between laws of physics and the forces and processes of human consciousness? In order to confront these questions, we should first examine trope theories that might illuminate the problematic construction of correspondences.

     

    Physics and Tropes

     

    The problematic of the subject becomes the problem of representation when the particular forms of representation of the subject, such as tropes, come into question. This problem of representation then requires a rhetoric of the tropes of subjectivity that will discover the relationships among particular tropes representing specific functions of consciousness, such as the dreamwork, or the Oedipal scenario.

     

    By the term trope, we may refer to what Hayden White calls the irreducible nature of metaphor in imaginative and realistic discourses. A trope is a turn of phrase that links an abstract concept to the physical world, and as such, establishes a correspondence between the physical world and human ideation. According to White, tropes are “inexpungeable from discourse in the human sciences” (White 1-2). In other words, for White, every trope is a fiction, the authorship of which all writers must deny, in order to preserve their claim for the truth-content of their discourse. But even contemporary theories of tropes have had recourse to the discipline of physics in order to model how tropes work. Thus, for the sake of this inquiry, we must first question the motives for such recourse, not only in psychology, but in theories of the trope as well.

     

    Jacques Derrida argues that tropes (or one particular form, metaphors) function explicitly as the onto-theological manifestation of a “White Mythology” that tolerates a “provisional loss of meaning” to arrive at “what is proper” (Derrida 45). Tropes demonstrate their truth-content by grounding discourse in the phenomenal world, with the given that there must be some essential connection posited between word and thing:

     

    Like mimesis, metaphor comes back to physis, to its own truth and its presence. Nature always finds in it its own analogy, its own resemblance to itself, and finds increase there only of itself.(Derrida 45)

     
    Yet Derrida argues that metaphors serve both to “menace” and to function as “accomplices.” They menace by the way that the connection between name and thing is subject to “wear and tear” (13): by the tendency of tropes to wear themselves out like coins through the “repetition” of use; and by tearing that precise link between name and thing through deviation, or tropical “divergence” (71).

     

    Derrida associates this precise link with “Physis,” or the claim for natural law, a law that apparently must decay, “wear and tear” through time–as implied by the nineteenth-century conventional understanding of the thermodynamic term entropy as a kind of end-game. Both Jacques Derrida and Harold Bloom have noticed that interest in tropes and in entropy coincided in the middle of the nineteenth century (Derrida 60-74; Bloom 83-105). Yet, according to Derrida, tropes are also accomplices, allowing for “an inevitable detour,” in order to maintain “a horizon of circular reappropriation of the proper sense” (Derrida 73). That sense, of course, remains dependent upon the fiction that there lies an essential connection between word and thing: these tropes imply a correspondence between a pull or force among planets in a solar system, and with the sun; or, among electrons swarming around a nucleus and the energized link among the tropes in a system of signification, with the significance that it surrounds. As opposed to the borrowing of thermodynamic tropes to describe the irreversible decay of an individual sign, here systems of signification are described with reference to the reversible laws of dynamics–Newtonian mechanics and quantum mechanics. Here one finds the conceit that the irreversible “decay” of individual signs can be arrested by situating signs in a system governed by stasis, or inertia. After all, it was Friedrich Nietzsche who said: “What is Truth? Inertia; that hypothesis which gives rise to contentment; smallest expenditure of physical force, etc.” Will to Power 291).

     

    Derrida’s deconstructive agenda involves demonstrating both the instability of individual signs, and the contradictory traces always present within the inertia of a system of signification. William R. Paulson has argued that Derrida draws on information theory, on the relationship between entropy as formulated in physics, and “noise” in the channel between sender and receiver as a problematic (1988, 26-28, 92-99). In this view, Derrida seeks therefore to subvert philosophical discourse by foregrounding the noise present in every possible message. More recently, Alex Argyrous explores Derridean discourse by formulating a theory of order which emerges out of the noise generated by his tactics, thus presenting a positive gloss on what Derrida’s critics have argued constitutes a nihilistic agenda (1991, 57-85). Yet Hans Kellner identifies the agenda of all tropical relations metaphorically (!) with catastrophe theory, particularly with the relations established in the shift from one master trope to another, as suggested by Vico’s notion of “ricorso” (1981, 24-28).

     

    Within the field of trope theory, we can demonstrate the instability of a tropical system, based as it is on “circular reappropriation,” by observing trans-disciplinary borrowings. In recent theories of rhetoric, there has been a return to the four master tropes discussed by Aristotle– metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche and irony–in order to ground trans-disciplinary borrowings.3

     

    Both Hayden White and Frank D’Angelo have asserted the primacy of the four master tropes from Aristotle’s Rhetoric to demonstrate the stability of certain cognitive structures beneath specific disciplinary formations, history and psychology. They argue that Freud’s mechanisms of the dreamwork–which would be useful to review here: condensation, displacement, representation and secondary revision–are their psychological equivalents. Condensation, the process of fusing several elements or images into one, is equivalent to metaphorical identification; displacement, by which one idea, image or element “surrenders to another, signaling a shift in meaning and emotional intensity,” is equivalent to metonymic displacement; representation, the “process of transposing ideas, feelings into symbols,” is equivalent to synecdoche; secondary revision, which with the help of an analyst converts dream elements into comprehensive form through the intrusion of self-conscious distance, is equivalent to irony.4

     

    We may accept or reject D’Angelo’s more pointed defense of the continued study of classical rhetoric by positing (in cognitive psychology) an ontological ground for the four master tropes. Still, and this is crucial, that rhetoric may supply tropes for clinical psychology, and that developmental psychology may provide tropes for rhetoric, indicates the potential circularity inherent in any attempt to ground tropes by recourse to other disciplines. For example, White becomes quite dependent upon a cultural application of Freud’s psycho-analytic approach when he claims that within a cultural field, schemes of tropes function “unconsciously” (White 13-20), thus circulating the grounds of his discourse between psychoanalysis and linguistics, with reference to the work of Jacques Lacan. White’s key word for describing tropical function here is defense, and I am most directly interested in exploring the defensive posture implicit in the recourse to tropes from other disciplines.

     

    As Hayden White points out, Harold Bloom has taken the further, Freudian step in pronouncing tropes “the linguistic equivalent of a psychological mechanism of defense” that, while directed “against literal meaning in discourse,” must always assume that literal meaning is something possible (Bloom 88). For Bloom, however, literal meaning is “death,” what would occur if electrons spun into the nucleus, or planets spiraled into the sun. Bloom refers here, of course, to Freud’s Life and Death drives. Thus, out of “survival,” tropes form a reversible system of false signification that he compares to Newtonian mechanics (93), or even to a chess game (96), both of which are premised on reversible laws. This suggests that even what Bloom calls the romantic undoing [kenosis] of an existing tropical system marks merely the commitment to a “personalized countersublime” that itself then systematizes suddenly freed tropical patterns in order to avoid the “threat” of the literal meaning that is death (Bloom 89). We have here a physics of romantic revolution, of private epistemic shifts, a physis of deterritorializations and reterritorializations of the tropical approximations that constitute the limits of representation.

     

    Yet we must force Bloom’s influence theory into a further step that he would resist, by insisting that tropes “defend” an ideological as well as a psychological state, and thus that the disintegration of an accepted tropical field constitutes a public as well as a private event. Scientists resort to tropes of cultural phenomena to make their explanations of physical forces and processes accessible; social philosophers, artists and psychologists resort to tropes from physical forces and processes in order to similarly explain cultural, aesthetic and psychological phenomena. This borrowing from other disciplines reveals, first, a consensual dependence upon a given set of assumptions about the laws governing physical or human phenomena to which these tropes refer; and second, a mutual complicity in suppressing the fictive nature of the tropes that are used. Thus, physicists, philosophers, artists and psychologists betray their dependence on the fictive correspondence between the laws governing nature and the laws governing culture because it makes their thoughts intelligible. Furthermore, this dependence points ultimately to an essentialist perspective underlying even the thoughts of those whose project is to demystify, to deterritorialize old systems of tropical approximations. We address, therefore, how the institution of the avant-garde functions in complicity with the dominant systems it seeks to destabilize. But, before discussing historical examples of this complicity in two avant-garde moments in the history of theories of the subject, Freud’s, and Deleuze and Guattari’s, we should address motive more directly.

     

    The problem of cross-disciplinary borrowing becomes complicated further by the relative status of each discipline in the cultural field. By this I mean that the borrowing of physical tropes by the arts, philosophy and psychology marks their marginalized position more than their cosmological reach. In contrast, the borrowing of cultural tropes (Richard Feynman’s use of the chessboard to describe the laws governing the interactions of sub-atomic particles, for example) to illustrate physical laws extends mastery, which in turn reflects the domination of the sciences across the spectrum of social discourses. As Michel Serres writes of the poverty of literature:

     

    Science is on the side of power, on the side of effectiveness; it has and will have more and more credit, more intellectual and social legitimacy, and the best positions in government; it will attract strong minds--strong in reason and ambition; it will take up space.(1990, 4)

     
    Here, Serres emphasizes the legitimating power as well as the fictiveness of tropes from physics, and we must recognize, when examining the internally contradictory use of these tropes, that the motive for constructing such correspondences lies with the will to power. The source of internal contradiction generated by the tropes themselves comes from an ideological difference, a struggle from within the discipline of physics itself. This struggle arises out of the difference between the precision possible with the time-reversible geometrical perspective usually associated with dynamics, and the statistically-approached contingencies of the time-irreversible perspective normally associated with equilibrium and non-equilibrium thermodynamics.

     

    Here I am drawing on the works of Ilya Prigogine, particularly on his work to make visible an ideological war within the physical sciences, a war of what he calls “Clashing Doctrines,” between time-reversible and time-bound models of physical processes. In this “war,” time-bound theories are marginalized by time-reversible theories. Prigogine’s work in the physics of turbulent systems far- from-equilibrium brought him the Nobel Prize in Chemistry (1977), not Physics. A further illustration of the marginal status of Prigogine’s own work comes from chaos theory, which was introduced to the public through James Gleick’s popular work, Chaos. This work emphasizes the geometry of fractals without once mentioning Ilya Prigogine’s works on self-organizing systems (Gleick, 1990; 1984, 1-26 and 79-102). Yet Prigogine’s work may provide the most help in confronting problems created by the ideological appropriation of tropes from physics by other disciplines.5

     

    We can situate the historical determinants of the construction of theories of subjectivity by identifying tropes from the very different conceptions of physical laws, identified here simplistically by the familiar terms dynamics and thermodynamics, as they are found in the works of Freud and in the works of Deleuze and Guattari.

     

    After discussing dynamics and thermodynamics, particularly with reference to the internal combustion engine, we will then limit discussion to the allusions to machinery in Freud’s description of dreamwork and of the unconscious; and to Deleuze and Guattari’s description of human consciousness as an aleatory subject embedded in the schizo-fluxes of cultural machinery as a means of resistance to these machines of cultural signification. Finally, we will address Deleuze and Guattari’s transgressive yet fundamentally complicitous relationship with the Freudian hegemony of the subject’s representation.

     

    Dynamics and Thermodynamics

     

    The mechanistic world-view of dynamics involves the study of matter and its interactions; that is, the dynamic view reduces natural events to simple laws that can explain the motion of planets, cannon ball trajectories, the movement of molecules and atoms, the interactions of sub- atomic particles, even the time-lines of Einstein’s Twins. Crucial to the success of this view is the search for absolute precision in the description of these forces, in accounting for the history of, and in predicting the future of the systems upon which these forces work. This precision becomes actualized by the capacity of calculus to determine mathematically the time-line of any dynamic system by freezing time itself into an infinite series of still frames, thus tracing that system into the past or into the future at will.

     

    This assumption of absolute certainty as the criterion for the success of physical investigations was challenged for the first time in the mid-ninetenth century by the Second Law of Thermodynamics, equilibrium thermodynamics, or entropy: given any isolated system, that system moves in the direction of greater entropy or disorder. Articulated further by Boltzmann’s Order Principle (given a closed system, that system will always choose the direction of greatest probability), this Second Law forces observers to recognize the roles that randomness and the irreversibility of time play in physical processes: a Mazda Miata is more likely to turn into a pile of rust then a pile of rust will turn into a Mazda Miata. Most important, however, the state of any system is perpetually contingent until it arrives at its rest state or equilibrium. The precise predictions possible in charting a planetary system, or in plotting the recursive trajectories of comets, are impossible in the investigation of processes governed by thermodynamic laws.

     

    In dynamics, therefore, we have precision and certainty in the prediction of the behavior of any system; in thermodynamics, we have only statistical probabilities that remain contingent until equilibrium or, in the case of non-equilibrium thermodynamics, a steady-state is achieved.

     

    In the design of the internal combustion engine, we have a relationship between dynamics and thermodynamics that illustrates through metaphor, first, the hegemonic domination of dynamics within physics, and second, Freud’s agonistic model of the subject as a dynamic equilibrium of (dynamic) drives forcefully modulating unconscious (thermodynamic) processes.

     

    Prigogine argues that as engineering became the context for the question of thermodynamic processes (mechanical, thermal or chemical), two constraints on the observation of those processes emerged. First, the classical method for accounting for every element in a system became replaced by statistical approximations called “macroscopic parameters.” Second, “boundary conditions” needed definition to account for the relationship between the system and its surroundings (1984, xxx). In engines, these referred, first, to the need for statistical analysis in order to predict the behavior of the energy utilized by the engine; and second, to the need to account for the active movement of that energy from one part of an engine to another, as well as the loss of energy from the engine altogether.

     

    Internal combustion engines require two systems, each with a different energy level, to accomplish work. If both systems can be the source of heat flow from hot to cold, then any engine is reversible in the dynamic sense. Yet the Second Law also describes a universal tendency to erase thermal difference through diffusion, resulting in a limit to the utility of controlling heat to produce work. If engines depend upon the Second Law to do work, and yet have to fight the Second Law to do work, then two constraints occur: engines function inefficiently, and there is a limit to the amount of energy available. This does not mention the threat to the integrity of the mechanical system that friction produces, as well as threats created by imperfections in the dynamic system itself: there are limits to precision even in the manufacturing of the parts for the engine.

     

    Thus, the industrial revolution brought about a war of domination by applying the principles of dynamics to mechanical dissipative structures against the inefficiencies that plague those systems. These inefficiencies are due, in turn, to processes governed by the same law of thermodynamics that enable work to be generated by dynamic machines in the first place. In the nineteenth century, the contradictions inherent in the application of dynamic systems and thermodyanmic processes culminates in a world- view, best described by Lord Kelvin, that the universe itself tends toward the degradation of mechanical energy. As Prigogine notes:

     

    This world is described as an engine in which heat is converted into motion only at the price of some irreversible waste and useless dissipation. Effect-producing differences in nature progressively diminish. The world uses up its differences as it goes from one conversion to another and tends toward a final state of thermal equilibrium, "heat death." (1984, 115-116)

     
    The philosophical implications for this irreversible process were not lost on the nineteenth-century mind. Aside from the shift from a fascination with system and classification in the eighteenth century to the seeming domination of time over the imaginations of all the disciplines in the nineteenth century, the association of time with disorder, decay and death shaped the imaginations of social philosophers such as Henry Adams and Oswald Spengler well into the twentieth century. Here we may situate Freud’s recourse to the discipline of physics in modeling the unconscious and the dreamwork, while anticipating the cultural as well as clinical implications of Deleuze and Guattari’s polemical statement that “Everything is a machine” Anti-Oedipus 2, 8).

     

    Physics, Hegemony and the Freudian Subject

     

    If we examine the stages of the dreamwork– condensation, displacement, representation and secondary revision–these stages seem similar to the stages of the function of a steam engine as it does work. Condensation, or the mixing and fusing of disparate elements into one, corresponds to the initial activity of the chamber, the function of which is to mix coal or other fuel and oxygen before ignition produces heat. Displacement, or the surrender of meaning and emotion as it is transferred from one image to another, corresponds to the generating of heat in the chamber after ignition, that is then channelled to the steam engine used to drive the machinery being worked.

     

    Representation, or the translation of those elementary ideas and feelings into symbols, corresponds to the commodity that can be manufactured by harnessing the process of conversion taking place in the secondary chamber of the machine. Secondary revision, or the conversion of the elements of the dream into coherent form with the aid of a therapist, corresponds to the attachment of public value to the commodity created by this dream machine. The dreamwork, then, modulates the flow of desire through a process that transforms that desire into a system of valuation cultured, even manufactured (in process), with the aid of the therapist.

     

    Psycho-analysis, in this sense, becomes one of many cultural machines that control desire. Furthermore, Freud describes thought itself as the fundamental transformation: the sublimation of effulgent desire becomes by itself a threat to the health of the system that generates the desire in the first place. The purpose of thought itself, of which the dreamwork is only one manifestation, is to channel the libido, defined thus in thermodynamic terms, into acceptable behavior. As Freud writes in The Ego and the Id:

     

    If this displaceable energy is desexualized libido, it may also be described as sublimated energy . . . . If thought processes in the wider sense are to be included among these displacements, then the activity of thinking is also supplied from the sublimation of erotic motive drives.(45)

     
    In other words, the entire subject-system, expressed in terms of the Id, Ego and Superego, can be made to correpond to a mechanical dissipative structure, in which desire, as heat or entropy, motivates the system, and is modulated through drives for the purposes of psychological survival.

     

    LaPlanche and Pontalis have identified two different subject-systems in Freud’s works: the narcissistic ego/ideal-ego system; and the superego/ego-ideal system (1973, 144-5, 201-2). Both systems modulate flows of sublimated energy-desire to different ends. One may inquire (as LaPlanche does, for example) into how these differing structures function in terms of the life and death drives respectively (1976, 8-24), especially if we remember Bloom’s conceit that the literalization of tropes brings “death” to the system-subject. What most concerns us, though, is that the function of the subject appears to be the control of energy-as-desire, to limit the representations of motivated thought by modulating motivated thought through systems that drive thought into acceptable forms. If forms are unacceptable, as in the case of disturbing dreams, the function of psychoanalysis, with reference to dreamwork, is to remodulate desire through a symbolic system navigated, and therefore mapped, in the dynamic, geometrical sense, by the therapist. To undertand how this system might work at the level of culture-dynamics, we should digress briefly to the work of Peter Stallybrass and Allon White.

     

    In The Politics and Poetics of Transgression, Stallybrass and White demonstrate, first, the disappearance of carnival forms in Northern European (British) society, and second, the reconfiguration of the carnivalesque into the lowest and basest of social interactions, that become a threat to emerging middle-class values (1986, 1-26). In two chapters on Freud, these authors demonstrate the function of the unconscious as the seat of the carnivalesque in the discourse of the bourgeoisie, the seat of dissolved hierarchies and vital turbulence that threatens the carefully modulated orderings of the European middle-class. They also demonstrate the institutions of control, associated with the Family Romance, that enforce the control of desire, seated in the Id, through the triangulation of the Oedipal scenario (149-91). As we have seen, the dynamic forces modulating the thermodynamics of desire for the individual, as a synecdoche, are now applied to the dynamic control of entropic forces throughout culture as a whole.

     

    It will now be useful to negotiate a transition from Freud’s Oedipus to the anti-oedipal strategies of Deleuze and Guattari by situating the public mechanisms at work at the level of individual neurosis and psychosis.

     

    In Deleuze and Guattari’s collaborative volumes, Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus, lies a Nietzschean synthesis of the Marxist theory of production (dominated, as it is, by the dynamics and thermodynamics of the Industrial Revolution), and by Freud’s theory of the libido. They do so through the conflated term “desiring-production.” They state that the Oedipal scenario structures desire in capitalist countries, and that psychoanalysis helps to enforce the restrictions imposed by that structure. Also, they agree with the Marxist formulation that capitalism reduces all human interactions to “commodity-relations of universal equivalency.” As Ronald Bogue points out, capitalism therefore “deterritorializes” desire by exploding not only the limits created by the Oedipal scenario, but the limits created by other traditional structures as well (1989, 88-92). Yet capitalism also “reterritorializes” desire by forcing it to manifest itself through the network of commodity relations. While Oedipus helps to focus human desire through the family, leaving its residue to wander the leveled field of “universal equivalency,” capitalism also generates “schzophrenic fluxes,” a mixing up of material and human refuse in the diffused heat of undifferentiated desire which, if all goes well, is redirected through the Oedipal machinery. As trope, the “residue” of desire– “schizophrenic fluxes” of human and material refuse–makes sense when we recognize its thermodynamic origin, while tropes for capitalism and psychoanalysis take on the dynamic properties of machines modulating “fluxes.”

     

    Deleuze and Guattari then define clinical schizophrenia as the psychological equivalent of a thermodynamic state of equilibrium, the human refuse (institutionalized or not) in which the machinery of Oedipus, and even the more primal subject-structures, have been overthrown. Their project is to build a psychoanalysis, aesthetics and politics that valorizes the schizo-flux. They provide a schizo-analysis of the multiple cultural machines of desiring-production, and a program for resistance to those machines.

     

    Deleuze and Guattari’s program for resistance lies in two related tropes for thought and action: the nomad and the rhizome. Representing subjective and cultural contingency on the one hand, and spontaneous aggregation of contingent subjective and cultural formations on the other, these terms constitute a theory of self-organization: the nomad and the rhizome have explanatory power across the human sciences: the writings of Kafka, the contingencies and collectivity of jazz performance, Pynchon’s Tristero postal subculture, the multiple human formations of the dance troop Pilobolus (itself a name for a rhizome), the “cells” of the Kuwaiti resistance.

     

    Physis, Nomos and the “Grounds” for Subjectivity in Deleuze and Guattari

     

    First of all, it should be clear that Deleuze and Guattari merely valorize the heat-energy fluxes (limited by Freud to the chamber of the subject-machine as dissipative structure) over the machine itself: they argue for the sustained play of entropic thought and action, as that play may exist independent of the machinery that depends upon entropy to produce work and controls the chaos that seems necessarily to pose a threat to the system itself. Up until this point we have been discussing entropy as an end-game phenomenon, but it is precisely Prigogine’s work, over the last thirty years, on processes of self-organization possible in chaos or turbulence, that may provide a model for how Deleuze and Guattari’s answer to Freud is not merely destructive, but nihilistic in the affirmative sense. We will then need to confront how their response to Freud also remains complicitous in the rhetorical sense.6

     

    Yet Deleuze and Guattari are sly, and they do not wish to seem invested in an essentialist correspondence between the laws of physics and the laws that may govern consciousness and culture. In the chapter from A Thousand Plateaus, entitled “1227: Treatise on Nomadology–The War Machine,” Deleuze and Guattari analize war by opposing chess and Go as opposing game theories: “from the standpoint of the game pieces, the relations between the pieces and the space involved” (1987, 34-52-3). Yet this concept of war involves processes within the subject as well as the most violent manifestations of social dynamics. While Deleuze and Guattari state that “Chess is a game of State, or of the court; the emperor of China played it” (352), we must also remember that chess tropes signifying systems that determine the socially-constituted subject, with rigid rules governing identity. Go pieces, on the other hand, “have only an anonymous, collective or third-person function,” with “only a milieu of exteriority, or extrinsic relations” (353). The properties of Go involve not semiotic precision but strategic flows that obey not cause and effect, as with chess, but dissemination that is contingent upon situation. They write, “it is a question of arraying oneself in an open space, of holding space, of maintaining the possibility of springing up at any point: the movement is not from one point to another, but becomes perpetual, without aim or destination, without departure or arrival” (353).

     

    The oppositions in the tropes generated by their analysis of these two games are useful for our purposes: a closed system against an open system; precise identity against the anonymity of numbers; determined trajectory of the pieces against contingent dissemination; fixed function against virtual potential. Clearly, these tropes from chess and Go draw respectively on the opposing models of pysical forces and processes, the dynamic and the thermodynmic.

     

    We should note that by opposing the “‘smooth’ space of Go against the ‘striated’ space of chess,” Deleuze and Guattari make the distinction between the “Nomos of Go against the State of chess, nomos against polis” (353). By opposing polis to nomos, they imply that chess is premised upon physis, or natural law, while Go is premised upon nomos, or law agreed upon by convention. In their discourse, Go is valorized over chess in order to valorize nomos over the State’s claims for physis. Deleuze and Guattari assault the assumptions of natural law, proposing their avant-garde social philosophy in order to demystify the State. They do so by denying the correspondence between the laws of nature and the laws describing forces governing culture (physis). In their discourse, the laws of nature refer specifically to classical mechanics, and especially to the chess tropes used by Richard Feynman to describe the dynamics of quantum electrodynamics and by Saussure to describe the laws governing signification.7

     

    But in using the game of Go as a source of tropes, Deleuze and Guattari must make recourse to physis themselves by valorizing contingency and aggregation as an essential condition of nomadic and rhizomatic thought and action. These concepts refer respectively to the initial conditions necessary for thermodynamic processes (contingency as a condition of freedom), and to one possible behavior for physical systems governed by those processes (prairie grassroots as a collectivity of blades of grass; slime mold as an aggregation of unicellular nomads).

     

    We can trace fairly precisely a genealogy of concepts related to equilibrium and non-equilibrium thermodynamics in Gilles Deleuze’s earlier works, indicating his debt to nineteenth and twentieth-century theories of chaos or disorder that provide the tropical grounds for his theory of subjective and collective resistance to cultural machinery. In Nietzsche and Philosophy (1962, 83), Deleuze describes Nietzsche’s Eternal Return as the return to difference, not sameness, an analysis of the contingent dimension of cultural systems and human consciousness affirming for any physical system, and, by implication, any human subjective or cultural system, the always-already contingency of past and future as it is reformulated in every present moment. This seems, in turn, to indicate a reformulation of Boltzmann’s Order Principle, first defined in Deleuze’s earlier Bergsonism (1966, 1988). In this work, Deleuze defines Bergson’s theory of creative evolution as a dialectic between contingent duration as “pure becoming” and the memory of a system engaged by elan vital or a physical/metaphysical principle of desire, a dialectic explored with remarkable subtlety in his recently translated Difference and Repetition (1968; 1993, forthcoming), particularly when repetition becomes a referent for pathology applicable both to the individual isolate and to the cultural field. The specific applications of these concepts–of the Eternal Return and of contingent duration as Becoming to human subjectivity and to the forces and processes of culture–lead to the nomad, and to nomad thought (“Nomad Thought” 1973, 1985). This is true as well of the passages on becoming as an initial condition for schizophrenia in The Logic of Sense (1969; 1990). This genealogy, in turn, helps to locate in Deleuze’s corpus, as well as in his collaboration, a continuous commitment to the concept of an intense, irreversible and irresistible impetus underlying the relational grids superimposed upon the subject by various visible and invisible cultural machines, machinery that produces aesthetic objects such as cinema (see Cinema I [1983, 1986] and Cinema II [1985, 1989]), or fiction Proust and Signs [1964, 72]; Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature [1975, 1986]). And it is in The Logic of Sense that Deleuze first comes to terms with the cultural as well as clinical implication of schizophrenia as a theory of subjective and cultural chaos (1-3, 82-93). With the help of Felix Guattari, Deleuze offers in A Thousand Plateaus an extended meditation on the role of Becoming as a form of resistance (232-309), a role recognized in Brian Massumi’s recent reading of the two-volume Capitalism and Schizophrenia.8

     

    But what interests us further in this passage on game theories of war are the attempts to disguise the nature and function of the system of tropical oppositions that I have demonstrated are crucial to Deleuze and Guattari’s representations of subjectivity. We can find other examples of oppositions disguising a recourse to physis.

     

    Deleuze and Guattari’s recourse to the thermodynamics of open systems far-from-equilibrium, systems grounded in contingency and multiplicity, permeable membranes instead of rigid lines, enables them to articulate their program against the laws of dynamics as applied to human affairs, while hiding their own affiliations with the claim for physis:

     

    A rhizome has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between things, interbeing, intermezzo. The tree is filiation, but the rhizome is alliance, uniquely alliance. The tree imposes the verb "to be," but the fabric of the rhizome is the conjunction "and...and...and...." (A Thousand Plateaus 25)

     
    Here we may find, hidden in this parable of two opposing “organic” tropes (the arboreal against the rhizomatic), the implicit reference to the structures of dynamics against the processes of thermodynamics–the definitive static, vertical structure of the tree versus the open conjunction of the spontaneous aggregation of wandering cells into a weaving of roots constructed by simple addition. Chess and Go, tree and grass–sedentary structure and flows of openness: at the center of Deleuze and Guattari’s writing machine lies a programmatic commitment to one side of the ideological opposition between dynamics and thermodynamics, as well as a complicitous commitment to ground their discourses in natural laws of a different sort than those justifying the dominance of our machine age.

     

    Notes

     

    1. I’d like to thank Ronald Bogue for pointing out the crucial role of chaos theory in this work and its relevance to this essay. An extension of the lines of inquiry pursued in this essay will serve as the springboard for a panel on chaos theory and subjectivity in the works of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari at the 1993 Modern Language Association, with the following essays: my “Chess and Go: The Physis/Nomos Debate in Deleuze and Guattari’s Game Theory of War”; William R. Paulson, “Self-Organization and Figures of Resistance”; and Ronald Bogue, “The Micropolitics of the Fractal Fold.”

     

    2. This requires an extension of the concept of chaos, as it is currently employed, to include an earlier theory of disorder associated with nineteenth-century entropy theory. We can suggest such a connection through the works of the contemporary physicist Ilya Prigogine, whose particular approach to chaos theory draws on a genealogy that begins with those nineteenth-century physicists working in thermodynamics, and whose work is central to my argument.

     

    3. One exception has been George Lakoff, who, by drawing on generational grammar as well as on cognitive psychology, argues not only that all conceptual systems are metaphorical, but that the systems of human knowledge that depend upon these metaphors are grounded in the biology of cognition. Expanding beyond the four tropes, he argues that even the most abstract systems from any discipline are dependent upon spatio-temporal metaphors. Lakoff claims that these spatio-temporal metaphors are not arbitrary constructions, but function systematically and have universal status, precisely because they are rooted essentially in the biological fact of a complex organic orientation determined by gravity, by the perception of up and down, of inside and outside, of near and far (Lakoff 3- 24, 56-68). But Lakoff’s tactical representation of those grounded categories of metaphors in terms of maps remains problematic because using maps implies a structuralist methodology. In other words, despite Lakoff’s claims that there may be a “natural” order to metaphors, his use of maps involves the embrace of a conflicting assumption, which of course can be traced to Saussure’s argument that signs are, for the most part, constructed arbitrarily.

     

    4. D’Angelo’s brilliant demonstration of the seemingly arbitrary correspondence between dreamwork and the master tropes of classical rhetoric requires a further negotiation. Specifically, D’Angelo shifts his fascination with the function of tropes in Freud’s account of the process of dreaming toward the discipline of developmental psychology by demonstrating that these tropes also correspond to the four stages of cognitive development as described by Piaget (1987, 37, 36). In fact he argues elsewhere, as Lakoff does, that the master tropes of Aristotle are similarly grounded in human cognition; that is, rhetoric itself, as the science of inquiring into the available means of persuasion, has ontological status in the deep structures of human cognition, structures that can be understood developmentally (1982, 105-117) and in fact may be described with reference to theories of evolution such as that of Pierre de Chardin. Another source for this kind of grounding comes from Gerald Edelman, whose Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of the Mind grounds the work not only of George Lakoff, but of Mark Turner and Mark Johnson as well. Another example of the dangers inherent in cross-disciplinary borrowings comes from Mark Turner’s Reading Minds: The Study of English in the Age of Cognitive Science. Turner suggests that contemporary theory has led to a dead end in English studies; he considers their discourses suspect because of their complexity and inaccessibility. Calling contemporary theory “ungrounded bootstrapping” and “fragmented,” Turner argues that “contemporary theory fails to connect with the full human world to the extent that it treats objects in literature that can be seen only by means of the theory: in that case, if the theory vanishes, its objects vanish” (4). Turner argues for humanistic studies grounded in schemes and tropes that are working metaphors in the physical world. He grounds his systematic exploration of the matrix of schemes and tropes by resurrecting classical stasis theory: “image schemas to structure our understanding of forces,” in other words, through ordered forms or geometric structures. What makes Turner’s polemic so astonishing is its deliberate ignoring of a new paradigm in cognitive science that bears some relationship to the chaos theory discussed in this essay: emergence. Instead of connecting cognitive science and English studies through reference to geometric schemes and tropes organized by an implied and unified subjectivity, one could pursue such an interdisciplinary connection by postulating a human cognizing subject that has no unity but the unity that it perceives in itself is a fiction constructed to encompass all the heterogeneity of cognitions occurring. “Emergence” is a theory of self-organization that shares certain characteristics with Prigogine’s formulation of self-organizing systems theory. What Turner misses so egregiously in his attack on contemporary critical theory is that Maurice Merleau-Ponty, the crucial developer of this connectionist/emergence paradigm (dormant though it was for some twenty years after he first conceived of the possibility of human perception without autonomous consciousness), is responsible for certain grounding concepts that led to Barthes’, Foucault’s and others’ assaults on naive concepts of authorships. Turner therefore attempts to ground his assault on contemporary critical theory in one paradigm of cognitive science, ignoring (or ignorant of) how another, competing paradigm within cognitive science grounds the very theories he attempts to refute.

     

    5. One must say at this point that not all physicists have been drafted into this war, only those that are interested in the ideological dimension of the formations of their discipline. Prigogine’s reputation within the human sciences also lacks unanimous support. For example, take N. Katherine Hayle’s account of Prigogine’s position within the field of chaos studies, Chaos Bound: Orderly Disorder in Contemporary Literature and Science (91-114). Yet if we apply Prigogine’s ideological categories to her own account, Hayles demonstrates a clear bias toward a time-reversible, geometrical perspective on chaos, something she shares with James Gleick. This becomes visible in her chapter on physics concepts in the fiction of Thomas Pynchon from her earlier The Cosmic Web: Scientific Field Theories and Literary Strategies in the Twentieth Century (168-198). In addressing the concept of the “field” in physics, she ignores physics tropes that have to do with time irreversiblity and with self-organization. These tropes play a crucial role in the representation of subjectivity and cultural processes in that novel. See my “Invisibility, the War Machine and Prigogine: Dissipative Structures and Aggregation Processes in the Zone of Gravity’s Rainbow,” forthcoming in Pynchon Notes 21. See also David Porush’s response to Gleick’s account of chaos, “Making Chaos: Two Views of a New Science,” in New England Review and Breadloaf Quarterly (“On Science” Volume XII, 4, Summer, 1990, 427-442), which may also serve as a useful critique of Hayles’ own methodology.

     

    6. By the term “complicity,” I refer to the implied “contract” embraced by contending opponents to perpetuate the struggle indefinitely. I consider the opening quotation from Thrasymachus a useful arche for this implication. Baudrillard calls this seduction. See “On Seduction,” in Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings, edited with an Introduction by Mark Poster, 149-165.

     

    7. Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, 22; 88; 110; Richard Feynman, The Character of Physical Law. For the most sustained treatment by an avant-gardist of the cultural implications of the game of chess, see Marcel Duchamp and H. Halberstadt, Opposition et les cases congugee sont reconciliees (Brussels: l’Echiquier/Edmund Lancel, 1932). The opposition of the Kings at endgame is described in terms of the dynamics of the reversible movement of the pieces, and of the thermodymamics of equilibrium, preserving the opposition and breach of equilibrium which precipitate the end of the endgame. At this stage, the kings remain complicitous in attempting to preserve the endgame for as long as possible by seeking only to avoid making a mistake.

     

    8. See Brian Massumi, A User’s Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations from Deleuze and Guattari; citations with secondary references too numerous to count here. For a different reading of the significance of the concept becoming, as it indicates continuity between Deleuze’s work on Bergson and his work on Nietzsche, see Michael Hardt, Gilles Deleuze: An Apprenticeship in Philosophy, especially 19-25, 47-55.

    Works Cited

     

    • Allison, David, ed. The New Nietzsche. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985.
    • Argyrous, Alex. A Blessed Rage for Order: Deconstruction, Evolution and Chaos. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991.
    • Baudrillard, Jean. Jean Baudrillard: Selected Writings. Ed. Mark Poster. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988.
    • Bloom, Harold. A Map of Misreading. New York: Oxford, 1975.
    • Bogue, Ronald. Deleuze and Guattari. London and New York: Routledge, 1989.
    • D’Angelo, Frank. “Rhetoric and Cognition: Toward a Metatheory of Discourse.” Pre/Text 3, Summer 1982, 105-119.
    • —. “Prolegomena to a Rhetoric of Tropes.” Rhetoric Review 6.l, 1978, 32-40.
    • Deleuze, Gilles, and Felix Guattari. Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1991.
    • —. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Trans. Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987.
    • —. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen Lane. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983.
    • —. The Logic of Sense. Trans. Mark Lester, Charles Stivale. Ed. Constantin V. Boundas. New York: Columbia, 1990.
    • —. Bergsonism. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. New York: Zone Books, 1988.
    • —. Difference et repetition. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968.
    • —“Nomad Thought.” In The New Nietzsche. Ed. David B. Allison. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985, 142-149.
    • Derrida, Jacques. “White Mythology: Metaphor in the Text of Philosophy.” New Literary History VI, 1, Autumn, 1974, 5-75.
    • Edelman, Gerald M. Bright Air, Brilliant Fire: On the Matter of the Mind. New York: Basic Books, 1992.
    • Feynman, Richard. The Character of Physical Law. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1967.
    • Freud, Sigmund. The Ego and the Id. Trans. James Strachey. New York: W.W. Norton.
    • —. The Interpretation of Dreams. Trans. James Strachey. New York: Avon Books, 1965.
    • —. Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis. Trans. James Strachey. New York: W.W. Norton, 1966.
    • Hardt, Michael. Gilles Deleuze: Apprenticeship in Philosophy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993.
    • Hayles, N. Katherine. Chaos Bound: Orderly Disorder in Contemporary Literature and Science. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990.
    • —. Chaos and Order: Complex Dynamics in Literature and Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
    • —. The Cosmic Web: Scientific Field Theories and Literary Strategies in the 20th Century. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984.
    • Kellner, Hans. “The Inflatable Trope as Narrative Theory: Structure or Allegory?” Diacritics Vol. 11, March, 1981, 14-28.
    • Laplanche, Jean. Life and Death in Psychoanalysis. Trans. Jeffrey Mehlman. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976.
    • Laplanche, Jean, and J.B. Pontalis. The Language of Psycho-Analysis. Trans. Donald Nicholson Smith. New York: Norton, 1973.
    • Massumi, Brian. A User’s Guide to Capitalism and Schizophrenia: Deviations From Deleuze and Guattari. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992.
    • Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Will To Power. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage, 1967.
    • Paulson, William R. The Noise of Culture: Literary Texts in a World of Information. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988.
    • Porush, David. “Making Chaos: Two Views of a New Science.” New England Review and Breadloaf Quarterly, “On Science,” Volume XII, 4, Summer, 1990, 427-442.
    • Prigogine, Ilya. From Being to Becoming: Time and Complexity in the Physical Sciences. New York: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1980.
    • Prigogine, Ilya, and Isabelle Stengers. Order Out of Chaos: Man’s New Dialogue With Nature. New York: Bantam, 1984.
    • Saussure, Ferdinand de. Course in General Linguistics. Ed. Charles Bally, Albert Sechehay. Trans. Wade Baskin. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976.
    • Serres, Michel. “Literature and the Exact Sciences.” SubStance: A Review of Theory and Literary Criticism 59, xviii, #2, 1989, 4.
    • Stallybrass, Peter, and Allon White. The Politics and Poetics of Transgression. New York: Cornell University Press, 1986.
    • Turner, Mark. Reading Minds: The Study of English in the Age of Cognitive Science. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991.
    • White, Hayden. Metahistory. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973.
    • —. Tropics of Discourse. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.

     

  • That Was Then: This Is Now: Ex-Changing the Phallus

    Lynda Hart

    Department of English
    The University of Pennsylvania

     

    In A Taste for Pain, Maria Marcus recounts an anecdote about a women’s studies conference in 1972. Germaine Greer, the keynote speaker, was interrupted by a young woman from the audience who suddenly cried out: “But how can we start a women’s movement when I bet three-quarters of us sitting in this room are masochists?” Greer replied: “Yes, we know women are masochists–that’s what it’s all about!”1

     

    Twenty years later, I am more likely to hear the complaint that all women are masochists in the context of lesbians lamenting the scarcity of tops in the community. Whether they are “real” butches, or the newly popular femme- tops, a good top is hard to find; most lesbians prefer being bottoms.

     

    While feminists continue to debate the pros and cons of lesbian sexual practices, “masochism,” the term that has become synonomous for some feminists with internalized oppression, has undergone a theoretical renaissance in which the erotics of submission have been reclaimed by a diverse group of scholars as an emancipatory sexuality for men. Indeed if we are to follow Leo Bersani’s argument, which strikingly concludes that “sexuality–at least in the mode in which it is constituted–could be thought of as a tautology for masochism,” anti-s/m feminist arguments would be tantamount to barring women from sex altogether.2

     

    For feminists who are struggling to articulate a sexual subjectivity that does not submit to the psychoanalytic imperative of an exclusively masculine libido, which ineluctably consigns femininity to a masculinized fetish, Bersani’s theory might be welcomed since it takes us out of the discourse of the symptom into a “nonreferential version of sexual thought.” Parental identifications, which inevitably reify Oedipus, are no longer constitutive; and the “lost object,” which is relentlessly relegated to a feminized fetish, is diffused so that any object and any part of the body can become an erotogenic zone.3 This theory does not of course undo the historical/social attribution of masochism to women, but it does suggest a psychic model in which the sexual positions one takes up are not necessarily gendered. Nevertheless, Bersani implicitly assumes the now privileged masochistic position as a male preogative, and hence claims sexuality itself for men. This presumption is clearer in his essay, “Is the Rectum a Grave?” when he describes the dominant culture’s revulsion at the sight of a man seductively and intolerably imaged with “legs high in the air, unable to refuse the suicidal ecstasy of being a woman.”4

     

    This is a graphic enactment of Freud’s third form of masochism, “feminine masochism,” which he also presumes to be occupied by a male subject in a feminine situation. The male subject in this space signifies “being castrated, or copulated with, or giving birth to a baby.”5 Since women presumably already experience one or more of the above, the notion of a feminine “feminine masochism” is redundant at best, if not impossible. In short, linguistically masculine feminine masochism is performative; feminine feminine masochism is constative. The latter merely reports an adequation; it corresponds with the “facts.” The feminist campaign to free women from their masochism was never then about giving up something that they had, but extricating women from something that they were.

     

    Although Kaja Silverman acknowledges that psychoanalytic sexual difference relegates female masochism to a virtually ontological condition when she defends her focus on male subjectivity by explaining that the female subject’s masochism is difficult to conceptualize as perverse because it represents “such a logical extension of those desires which are assumed to be ‘natural’ for the female subject,” she nonetheless accepts and repeats the terms of a psychoanalytic symbolic in which there is only one libido and it is masculine.6 Women are denied sexual agency because they are incapable of mimesis. Their options are to take up the position of passive “normal femininity,” or to reverse the position and appropriate masculine subjectivity and its desires, in which case they can “perform” sexuality, but only through their “masculinity complex.” Bersani’s desire is aimed at the pleasures gay men might experience from an alignment with femininity, as is Silverman’s, though her project is to produce a revolutionary subject in a “feminine” yet heterosexual man. Both of these analyses add weight to feminist arguments against sadomasochism, for following their logic the lesbian masochist is either enacting the dominant culture’s degradation of women or she is playing out the desire to be a man. Even if she psychically occupies the position of a man with another man, she is still only a “fag hag” within the terms of sexual difference. These theories that posit male masochism as emancipatory thus continue to depend on the impossibility of desire between women. In this context, truth claims about lesbian sexuality such as this one made by Jan Brown,

     

    We practice the kind of sex in which cruelty has value, where mercy does not. What keeps those of us who refused to abandon our "unacceptable" fantasies sane is the knowledge that there are others like us who would not leave because we scream "Kill me," at the moment we orgasm. . . . We lied to you about controlling the fantasy. It is the lack of control that makes us come, that has the only power to move us . . . . 7

     

    would easily fall prey to the argument that lesbian sadomasochists are merely reproducing heterosexist models, or at best, male homosocial ones. The referent for Brown’s “lies” can be located in earlier rhetoric by s/m practitioners who justified the acting out of their fantasies by claiming they were means of exorcising their real hold on the individual. Tacitly accepting the feminist contention that s/m lesbians had internalized cultural misogyny, these defenses asked for a tolerant reprieve, a period of playing through the fantasies in order to transcend them. S/M then, ironically, became therapeutic, like a homeopathic cure.

     

    Theatrical metaphors were central to this defense. Susan Farr, for example, described s/m as “pure theatre,” “a drama [in which] two principals . . . act at being master and slave, play at being fearsome and fearful.” She cites the clues to the drama in the interchangeability of the roles and the repetitive, scripted dialogue. Even though, she acknowledges, much of the scene may be “pure improvisation,” it is still “theater.”8 This dialectic between the scriptural and the spontaneous is prevalent in early pro s/m accounts. On the one hand, there is the insistence that the scene is rigidly controlled, with a decided emphasis on the bottom’s mastery of the limits. On the other hand, the eroticism depends on the anticipation that the limits will be pushed to the breaking point, that the “scene” will cross over into the “real.”

     

    To a certain extent, the controversy about whether s/m is “real” or performed is naive, since we are always already in representation even when we are enacting our seemingly most private fantasies. The extent to which we recognize the presence of the edge of the stage may determine what kind of performance we are enacting, but willing ourselves to forget the stage altogether is not to return to the real, as s/m opponents would have it; rather, this will to forget is classical mimesis, which, as Derrida points out, is “the most naive form of representation.”9 Nevertheless, it is precisely this most naive form of representation that would seem to be the most desirable of sexual performances. Bersani’s objections to the frequent theorization of such things as “the gay-macho style, the butch-fem lesbian couple, and gay and lesbian sado-masochism” as . . . “subversive parodies of the very formations and behaviours they appear to ape,” rather than, “unqualified and uncontrollable complicities with, correlatively, “a brutal and misogynous ideal of masculinity” [gay macho], . . . “the heterosexual couple permanently locked into a power structure of male sexual and social mastery over female sexual and social passivity” [butch-fem], or “fascism” [s/m], are clearly based on his contention that these sexual practices are not performative. Parody, Bersani states emphatically, “is an erotic turn-off, and all gay men know this.”10 Although Bersani audaciously speaks for all gay men, I would have to agree with him and add that many lesbians know this too. Self-conscious mimicry of heterosexuality is a side show; when the main act comes to town, we all want the “real thing,” or, more precisely, we all want the Real thing. That is, sexuality is always, I think, about our desire for the impossible-real, not the real of the illusion that passes for reality, but the Real that eludes symbolization.

     

    Lesbian s/m erotica has become increasingly assertive about claiming dildoes as the “real thing.” Although strap- ons are advertised as “toys,” inside the narratives and testimonials of lesbian s/m practitioners references to an outside or a “model” are most often discarded in favor of descriptions that simply occupy the status of the real. So, for example, it has become common to speak of “watching her play with her dick,” or “sucking her off,” or “your dick find[ing] its way inside of me.”11 As one contributor to Quim puts it: “When I put on a strap on I feel male. I feel my dick as real otherwise I can’t use it well.”12 Rarely if ever does one find lesbian erotica that refers to the dildo as a joke, an imitation, or a substitute, whether these narratives are explicitly in an s/m context or in the more prevalent accounts of butch/femme vanilla erotica. On the contrary, the erotic charge of these narratives depends on both tops and bottoms, butches and femmes exhibiting nothing less than respect for the “phallic” instrument.

     

    Bersani’s argument about gay macho depends on this notion of respect for masculinity as a model. But the slide from gay macho to lesbian butch-fem and s/m is too facilely made. Whereas gay macho’s “mad identifications” are between gay and straight men, which he argues is a “direct line (not so heavily mediated) from excitement to sexuality,”13 the identifications made by b/f and s/m lesbians follow a more circuitous route in which the condensations and displacements are more complex. Most obviously, gay macho’s relationship to straight masculinity remains a homo-sexual affair; whereas lesbian b/f and s/m, as long as we are caught within the logic of this binary, would be hetero- sexual. In both cases, however, the erotic charge can only be articulated within the terms of a symbolic order that depends for its coherency on maintaining the distinction between homosexuality and heterosexuality. Nonetheless, even within the terms of this symbolic order, which I presume is what Bersani refers to when he speaks of sex “as we know it,” there is already dissidence, rather than resemblence, in the image of a woman penetrating another woman with a dildo. Although both might be interpreted as a yearning toward “masculinity,” in the gay man’s case it is a masculinity that the dominant culture at least marginally assigns to him and that he thus might willingly surrender. In the lesbian top’s case, it is a “masculinity” that she aggressively appropriates without any prior cultural ownership only then to give it up. If we look at it from the bottom’s perspective, there is quite a difference between the gay man who cannot “refuse the suicidal ecstasy of being a woman,” and the lesbian who is presumed by the dominant sexual order already to be a woman.

     

    Over a decade ago, Monique Wittig implicitly enjoined us to write The Symbolic Order with a slash through the article, just as Lacan writes The Woman, when she made her then startling announcment that “Lesbians are not women.”14 The straight mind, she pointed out, “speaks of the difference between the sexes, the symbolic order, the Unconsious . . . giving an absolute meaning to these concepts when they are only categories founded upon heterosexuality . . . .”15 Returning to this article, it is interesting to remember that the example Wittig chooses to demonstrate the material oppression effected through discourses is pornography. Pornography, she argues, signifies simply that “women are dominated.”16 Thus Wittig might be aligned with Mackinnon when she argues that pornography “institutionalizes the sexuality of male supremacy, fusing the eroticization of dominance and submission with the social construction of male and female.”17 It is this position that Bersani perversely asks us to reconsider when he temporarilly allies himself with Mackinnon and Dworkin only in order to argue for the necessity of proliferating pornography rather than banning it. However, if the ultimate logic of the radical feminist argument for the realism of porn is “the criminalization of sex itself until it has been reinvented,”18 whether one takes up a position for or against pornography on this basis, are we not then already acceding to the “straight mind” that can only think homosexuality as “nothing but heterosexuality”?19

     

    What has fallen out of these discussions is heterosexuality as a social contract, one that as Wittig argues can not only be but already is broken by practicing lesbians. For when we hear of “sex as we know it” or the ultimate logic of anti-porn feminists as the “criminalization of sex,” this “sex” is always already heterosexuality, and implicitly, a relationship of identity between the phallus and the penis. Lacan seems to free us from this difficulty when he argues that the Phallus is a signifier (without a signified), not a body part, nor a partial object, nor an imaginary construct.20 However, in her recent reading of Lacan’s “The Meaning of the Phallus,” back through “The Mirror Stage,” Judith Butler shows that Lacan’s denial of the Phallus as an imaginary effect is “constitutive of the Phallus as a privileged signifier.”21 At the risk of reductively summarizing her nuanced argument, what Butler’s essay seems to conclude is that the Symbolic is always only a masculine imaginary that produces the Phallus as its privileged signifier by denying the mechanisms of its own production.

     

    Lacan’s move to locate the Phallus within the Symbolic presumably breaks its relation of identity with the penis since symbolization “depletes that which is symbolized of its ontological connection with the symbol itself.”22 Just as Magritte’s painting of a pipe is not a/the pipe, so the penis and phallus are not equivalent.23 But, as Butler points out, they do retain a priveleged relationship to one another through “determinate negation.”24 If symbolization is what effects ontological disconnection, we might ask what happens to those “pipes” that are excessive to representation. Would not those things that cannot take place within any given symbolic end up accorded a radically negative ontological status? Would they not, in other words, become that which is real, and therefore impossible?25

     

    When Wittig argues that rejecting heterosexuality and its institutions is, from the straight mind’s perspective, “simply an impossibility” since to do so would mean rejecting the “symbolic order” and therefore the constitution of meaning “without which no one can maintain an internal coherence,”26 she seems to suggest that the straight mind simply denies the possibility of lesbianism. But phallocentrism/heterosexism does not merely secure its dominance through a simple negation. Rather, it needs lesbianism as a negative ontology. It needs its status as both radically real and impossible.

     

    That this is the case can be seen in Silverman’s reconceptualization of the borders of male subjectivity in which her analysis at once ignores lesbian sexuality and persistently depends on it as yet another instance of a constitutive outside. Determined to undo the tenacious assumption that there are only two possible sexual subject positions, Silverman ends by positing three possible “same- sex” combinations: 1. two morphological men 2. a gay man and a lesbian [both occupying psychically masculine positions] 3. a lesbian and a gay man [both occupying psychically feminine positions].27 Given Silverman’s sophisticated psychoanalytic rendering of the body’s imaginary production, it might sound naive to suggest that the latter two positions are morphologically heterosexual, i.e., one of each. Yet she retains the category of two morphological men, so there is obviously still some recourse to a materiality of the body outside its imaginary formations.

     

    Silverman concludes her book by asserting that her third paradigm for male homosexuality has the “most resonance for feminism,” which she claims to represent politically.28 But what is striking is that this is the only place in her analysis where lesbianism is represented. For it is in this most politically productive model of male homosexuality that the “authorial subjectivity” can be accessed “only through lesbianism.”29 What could this “lesbianism” be if not two morphologically female bodies, which oddly do not appear in her liberating models for “same-sex” desire? The feminism that Silverman speaks for politically is once again a heterosexual feminism; for her ability to make cases for imaginary gay sexualities is only intelligible through the assumption of a lesbian sexuality that remains stable and constitutively outside her recombinations of the relationships between psychic identifications and imaginary morphologies. Thus she depends on the orthodoxy of the impossibility of lesbian desire in order to challenge and break with the other orthodoxies that limit sexual choices for (heterosexual) women.

     

    The model that proposes the impossiblity of lesbian desire, constructed as two morphological females with psychic feminine identities, is impossible within psychoanalytic terms precisely because there is no desire without a phallic signifier. In order for lesbianism to escape from its stabilizing function as the place-holder of a lack, Butler’s fictive lesbian phallus would seem to be indispensable. Yet there is still in this formulation a submission to psychoanalytic orthodoxy; and lesbian sado- masochists have thought of much more interesting ways to practice dominance and submission.

     

    Suppose we agree with Bersani’s argument that phallocentrism is “above all the denial of the value of powerlessness in both men and women,”30 and consider what value women might find in powerlessness. I would agree with Tania Modleski that from a heterosexual woman’s perspective there might not be much to value in powerlessness.31 But from a lesbian perspective things look different. Powerlessness, in Bersani’s argument, seems to mean little more than submitting to penetration. When he takes anatomical considerations into account, he refers to the “real” of bodies which are constructed in such a way that “it’s almost impossible not to associate mastery and subordination with intense pleasures.”32 If the value of powerlessness is equivalent to being penetrated, note that the “woman” in Bersani’s imaginary must be either a heterosexual female or a gay man. Not only does Bersani then retain an equivalency between the phallus and the penis, but he also reinforces a morphological conflation of the vagina and the anus. At the same time, he insists upon a fantasmatic gender distinction that depends on these anatomical parts as referents. Bersani’s argument, then, surely exceeds his intentions. For while he means to value the powerlessness of both men and women, it is paradoxically between these two penetrable orifices, which are at once the same and different, that on their front/to/back axis the illusion of an impermeable male body is sustained. As D.A. Miller puts it: “only between the woman and the homosexual together may the normal male subject imagine himself covered front and back.”33

     

    If, as Butler argues, Lacan retains a relationship of identity between the phallus and the penis through “determinate negation,” it is also possible to understand the valorization of a masochism that is explicitly male as further consolidation of this relation of equivalence. For male masochism, which presumably relinquishes the phallus by occupying the being of woman, would necessarily assume that she is the one who does not “have it.” In other words, it is only by giving it up that one gets it. Hence the continuing postulation that female masochism is impossible depends on the assurance that she has nothing to give up. The female masochist would have to give up something that she does not have; and if she were represented as giving it up, then it would have to be admittted that the phallus is nothing more than an imaginary construct. According to Freud’s narrative, women are presumed to have once “had” the penis. The phallus/penis as “lost object” always refers us to the past of a woman’s body and the dreaded future of a man’s body. Hence the cultural horror associated with “becoming a woman.”

     

    Lesbians who regard their strap-ons as the “real thing” instigate a representational crisis by producing an imaginary in which the fetishistic/hallucinatory “return” of the penis onto a woman’s body goes beyond the “transferable or plastic property”34 of the phallus to other body parts by depicting a phallus that has no reference to the “real” of the penis. The lesbian-dick is the phallus as floating signifier that has no ground on which to rest. It neither returns to the male body, originates from it, nor refers to it. Lesbian-dicks are the ultimate simulacra. They occupy the ontological status of the model, appropriate the privilege, and refuse to acknowledge an origin outside their own self-reflexivity. They make claims to the real without submitting to “truth.” If the phallus was banned from feminist orthodoxy because it was presumed to signify the persistence of a masculine or heterosexual identification, and butch lesbians or s/m tops who wore strap-ons were thus represented, as Butler points out, as “vain and/or pathetic effort[s] to mime the real thing,”35 this “real thing” was at least two real things, which were only each other’s opposites. There was not much difference between the straight “real thing,” and the lesbian “real thing,” since the latter was only the absence of the former. Both these prohibitions converged on the assumption of an identity between the phallus and the penis. Without that identification, the top who wears the strap-on is not the one who “has” the phallus; rather it is always already the bottom who “has it” by giving up what no one can have. In the lesbian imaginary, the phallus is not where it appears. That’s why so many butches, as most lesbians know, are bottoms.

     

    Notes

     

    1. Maria Marcus, A Taste for Pain: on Masochism and Female Sexuality, trans. Joan Tate (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1981), 181.

     

    2. Leo Bersani, The Freudian Body: Psychoanalysis and Art (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 39.

     

    3. Ibid, 45.

     

    4. Leo Bersani, “Is the Rectum a Grave?” in AIDS: Cultural Analysis, Cultural Activism, ed. Douglas Crimp (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988), 212.

     

    5. Sigmund Freud, “The Economic Problem in Masochism,” The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works, trans. James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1966) vol. 19, 162.

     

    6. Kaja Silverman, “Masochism and Male Subjectivity” Camera Obscura, 17 (1988), 52.

     

    7. Jan Brown, “Sex, lies, and penetration: A Butch finally ‘fesses up,” The Persistent Desire: A Femme-Butch Reader, ed. Joan Nestle (Boston: Alyson Publications, 1992), 412.

     

    8. Susan Farr, “The Art of Discipline: Creating Erotic Dramas of Play and Power,” Coming to Power: Writings and Graphics on Lesbian S/M (Boston: Alyson, 1981) 185.

     

    9. Jacques Derrida, “The Theater of Cruelty and the Closure of Representation,” Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), 234.

     

    10. Bersani, “Rectum,” 208.

     

    11. Quim, Issue 3 (Winter 1991), 10 and 13. Similar language can be found in almost any issue of On Our Backs or Bad Attitude. And, in fact, in periodicals such as the now defunct Outrageous Women (which was published during the 80’s) one also finds such references to “lesbian dicks,” sometimes without the qualifier. What is apparent is that s/m dykes have always considered their dildoes to be the “real thing.”

     

    12. Anonymous, Quim Issue 3 (Winter 1991), 36.

     

    13. Bersani, “Rectum,” 208.

     

    14. Monique Wittig, “The Straight Mind,” The Straight Mind and Other Essays (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992) 32.

     

    15. Wittig, 27-28.

     

    16. Ibid, 25.

     

    17. Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1987), 3 and 172.

     

    18. Bersani, “Rectum,” 214.

     

    19. Wittig, “The Straight Mind,” 28.

     

    20. Jacques Lacan, “The Meaning of the Phallus,” Feminine Sexuality: Jacques Lacan and the ecole freudienne, trans. Jacqueline Rose (New York: W.W. Norton, 1985), 74-85.

     

    21. Judith Butler, “The Lesbian Phallus and the Morphological Imaginary,” differences, “The Phallus Issue,” 4, no.1 (Spring 1992), 156.

     

    22. Ibid, 157.

     

    23. Michel Foucault, This is Not a Pipe, trans. and ed. James Harkness (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).

     

    24. Butler, 157.

     

    25. If the “realesbian” of lesbian-feminism was a socially impossible identity, so in the psychoanalytic symbolic are lesbians only possible in/as the “Real,” since they are foreclosed from the Symbolic order–they drop out of symbolization. If they can be signified at all it is only as an algebraic x. Given that the “Real” is, in part, the brute, inscrutable core of existence, the “Real” lesbian is in this sense coincident with the “realesbian.” Hence as both real/Real, these figures make her “identical with [her] existence–self-identical–raw, sudden, and unfettered,” but impossible to “see, speak or to hear, since in any case [she] is always already there.” See Catherine Clement’s illuminating discussion of the Lacanian “real-impossible” in The Lives and Legends of Jacques Lacan, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 168-169.

     

    26. Wittig, “The Straight Mind,” 26.

     

    27. Kaja Silverman, Male Subjectivity at the Margins (New York: Routledge, 1992), 381.

     

    28. Ibid, p.387.

     

    29. Ibid, p.383.

     

    30. Bersani, “Rectum,” 217.

     

    31. Tania Modleski, Feminism Without Women: Culture and Criticism in a ‘Postfeminist’ Age (New York: Routledge, 1991), 145-158. I agree with Modleski that Bersani loses the sympathy of a feminist reader when he “declines to factor in the ‘history of male power’” (148). However, though she acknowledges that lesbian sadomasochists’ arguments must be taken seriously and points to the unresolvable contradiction between the acting out of power and the presumption of consensuality, I take exception to her assertion that the “defining feature of s/m [is] the infliction of pain and humiliation by one individual on another” (154). As her own discussion indicates, the s/m relationship resists that definition. I have taken up these questions at length elsewhere. What is important to point out here is that Modleski subtly posits the same distinction between “the feminist” reader and the “lesbian” that Silverman holds. The former is a heterosexually-gendered subject, the latter is something like an “exception” to the feminist “rule.” Thus, once again, the “lesbian” becomes that (constitutive) “outside” that facilitates “the feminist” argument.

     

    32. Bersani, “Rectum,” p. 216.

     

    33. D.A. Miller, “Anal Rope,” Inside/Out: Lesbian Theories, Gay Theories, ed. Diana Fuss (New York and London: Routledge, 1991), 135.

     

    34. Butler, p. 138.

     

    35. Ibid, p. 159.

     

  • “Another Autumn Refrain” and “Two Thirds of a Second at the Center of the Universe”

    George Bradley

     
     

    Another Autumn Refrain

     

    He kept trying to get it right, trying to catch
    That wisp of melody, that snatch of sound, listening
    And trying, like a man playing music, practicing scales;

     

    He kept trying to remember, though it would not come,
    About the leaves and the ghosts hung in the trees,
    Trying to recall the closing cadences of a song

     

    That started in his head again, again, again,
    About the light that came to him on autumn afternoons,
    About the weak sun that peeked around the branches;

     

    He kept trying to remember or trying to forget,
    Though that insistent tune returned when he would
    That it would not, revolved, rephrased, a sibilance

     

    Like the heavy wash of seashores in the distance,
    Like blood that rushes in the inner ear all night;
    He kept trying to get it right, though there was no right,

     

    About the wind that whistled through the dry dead grass,
    The sap that sank below a brittle crust of frost,
    About the earth that spun and came again undone.

     
     

    Two Thirds of a Second at the Center of the Universe

     

    Still waiting, with less than no time to decide,

    You think almost nothing, you thought become a sense,

    Become an activity, a woman dancing, a sun rising,

    Become persistent voices washing over you once more

    As sea air might and with it the sound of waves;

    Still waiting, waiting, the tiny object unseen,

    The elusive blur that covers your whole ambition,

    As it has each day since you first conceived your task,

    First elected this improbable pursuit, with its boredom,

    Its mundane rehearsals and childish superstitions;

    Still waiting, one man at the center of the universe,

    Preparing a moment that can never be yours alone,

    The issue shared instead with ones who gather watching,

    Their faces drawn in distance to form a sort of landscape,

    Flames, say, licking the ridgeline of encircling hills;

    Still waiting, and they wait also, await the spectacle

    Of your deepest satisfaction, your most intimate defeat,

    Watching and waiting as you put them from your mind,

    As you hold or try to only the image of your attempt,

    Of what will be your substitute for every human act,

    A motion tinged with memory and its fond mutation;

    Waiting, and surely it will soon be taking place again,

    The instant out of time which you feel most yourself,

    In which hands clutch and hearts gorge with blood

    And sweat bursts out like condensation on ripe fruit,

    A fraction of a second happening once and forever,

    A stream descending, a horse running, a man striding,

    Now.

    You imagined the triumphant cries far away in your head

    Before you gasped, as in pain, betrayed, betrayed.

    Strike three, the umpire said.
     

  • Mapplethorpe’s Art: Playing with the Byronic Postmodern

    Elizabeth Fay

    Department of English
    University of Massachusetts at Boston

    EFAY@UMBSKY.CC.UMB.EDU

     

    The term “the Byronic postmodern” is coined here specifically for the purpose of uncovering and exploring a congruency in the works of those artists invested in some aspect of the Byronic hero. The Byronic, which was both encoded by Byron and beyond his control, exudes a transgressive, dark, and seductive appeal that speaks to any artist interested in crossing boundaries. The Byronic postmodern, then, implicates a romanticism within postmodernism and a postmodernism within romanticism that is at odds with more general assessments of the postmodern as a self-romanticizing and self-conflicted phase in the modern era (see Kaplan and Elam), or as a counter-enlightenment and irrationalist philosophical and aesthetic movement whose “post” positionality precludes or throws over prior systems of knowledge.1

     

    The Byronic postmodern as defined here is not the ironizing superficial and self-aware contemplation that is usually considered to be the link between romantic irony and the postmodern aesthetic; nor do I rest easy in a Lyotardian alternation of modernist and postmodernist impulses. Rather, the Byronic postmodern redefines the historical and social formations called romanticism and postmodernism, and offers them instead as aesthetic impulses that appeal congruously to those artists whose sexual aesthetics overwhelm their perception of the art form. That is, in seeing the world bisexually or homosexually, the Byronic artist understands the nature of mask and the exchangeable subjectivity more clearly than does the artist confirmed in his/her normative sexuality. The relation between Byron and Mapplethorpe as Byronic artists cannot be confined to them alone, but they provide powerful parameters for artists of similar amplitude such as Baudelaire, Emily Bronte, Oscar Wilde, Andy Warhol.

     

    What Mapplethorpe’s photography has to do with Byron’s poetry, or Byron’s art with Mapplethorpe’s, is an argument these two artists initiate themselves: Byron through his postmodernist self-display and questioning of frames, and Mapplethorpe through his critical reassessment of romantic self-presentation. Mapplethorpe’s romantic rereading is most overt in pieces such as “James Ford, 1979,” where the subject is depicted lying in a deep, tiled bathtub in a pose that cannot but recall David’s “Death of Marat” (1793); less obvious are his photographs of classical marble statuary. The clearest example of his romantic revisionism, however, is Mapplethorpe’s “Manfred, 1974,” a four-frame sequence that comprehends Byron’s 1816 poem Manfred more succinctly than literary criticism has been able to do. The significance of Mapplethorpe’s title is pointed; of all the Faustian texts available, including the extreme romanticism offered by Goethe’s version, the twentieth-century photographer fixes on the Byronic Manfred. In the agency of his revisionism, Mapplethorpe has captured the postmodern impetus that drives Byron’s powerful drama, and at the same time reveals the deep romanticism of his own art.

     

    The role of sexual repositioning in Byronic postmodernism is crucial to the Byronist’s ability to reduce experience to a “staged” effect. This sense of staging is the outcome of a knowing difference, and a self-presentation that is at once the aestheticized self and serious art. Mapplethorpe’s choice of artistic medium makes his awareness of staging an open acknowledgement, as does his frequent use of dramatically posed portraiture and tableaux. But Byron’s self-staging required a sequence of transgressive events before he knew himself to be onstage.

     

    At age eight Byron became heir to his great uncle’s title, inheriting it at age ten. He is seduced by his nurse, Mary Gray, at age nine, and probably by Lord Grey de Ruthyn (who was renting the Byron home) during a holiday from Harrow at age fifteen. In between these two events he fell passionately in love with his cousin, Mary Chaworth, when he was fifteen, and Lord Delawarr at sixteen. However, the first to return his love and thus capture his imagination was the younger John Edlestone. The precocity of Byron’s peership coincides with the precocity of his sexual initiations, and his response to the demands of adult experience was accompanied by confusion and guilt. He characterizes this period of his life with the secrecy and ambivalence that becomes typical of his later responses to his double sexual identity. To his step-sister Augusta he writes of Grey, “My reasons for ceasing that Friendship are such as I cannot explain, not even to you my Dear Sister . . . but they will even remain hidden in my own breast” (March 26, 1804); the next year he hints at his affection for Edlestone by writing, “My melancholy proceeds from a very different cause to that which you assign,” one which “you could not alleviate, and might possibly be painful (January 7, 1805; both quoted in Crompton, pp. 100-101). Melancholy, the term literary reviewers associated both with Byron and his poetic heroes, becomes a code word much earlier in his own mind for his `dark’ passions. For Augusta, this melancholy so changed Byron from his boyish disposition that she thought him transformed, almost unrecognizable. His beloved, Edlestone, thought the same when Byron lost more than fifty pounds of bodyweight by vigorous dieting and exercise. Both transformations–from joy to melancholy, from chubby to sleek–are bodily changes that correspond with a new bodily awareness. And this new awareness signifies an understanding that the body now has two kinds of admirers that desire it, and two kinds of passions itself. Yet these must be secreted, coded, costumed, and playacted in order to be legitimated at all: the one must be made to signify the other, or to cover it up, or to displace it momentarily.

     

    In comparison to Byron, the most Byronic of modern artists found an equally Grecian, equally bodily way to express the differences in his taste. Mapplethorpe’s sexual tastes may not have been bipolar, but his artistry was. His black gay friends and lovers are translated into hellenized athletes and gods, with a special emphasis on the textures made possible by photographing black skin in black and white, or countering it with white skin as a way to emphasize not sex but bipolarity as form and mode. Yet when he also photographed his women friends with exquisite sensitivity and sexual daring, his work resonates less to the bipolarized schemata of his male photographs than to Byron’s daring exploits with married and thus inaccessible women: safe and yet satisfyingly seductive adventures. Byron’s seduction of the strong-minded Lady Frances Webster, for instance, resonates to Mapplethorpe’s photography of Lisa Lyon, a woman bodybuilder whose very name suggests gender play.

     

    Serious play becomes the byword for both Byron and Mapplethorpe as artists. The myth of the postmodern is that a series of tableaux produces a pastiche that is seamless truth. The tableaux by which Byron presents himself in his poetry and in society are also stitched together into a fated and apparently seamless narrative, marking him as postmodern and puzzling his romantic interpreters. Mappelthorpe’s work makes the tableau a dramatically postmodern image, imposing on the setpiece a dark, fated quality that signals his transgressive play in much the same way that Byron’s narrative poems do. Like Byron, Mapplethorpe’s apparent seeming comes from a literal seaming, a putting together to produce a new costume and new self. Dancing across the stage or camera’s eye focuses attention on the costume and bodily surface as a semiotic display of sign systems at war. Byron puts on Albanian dress, Mapplethorpe dons that of the Nazi secret police; both bespeak a sign system associated with homosocial fantasy life and self. The Byronic hero of either historical period is concerned in particular with harnessing sexuality, the display of identity, and the sheer play of a textual erotics. For textual erotics must be seen as sheer play, or it loses all signification; however, this is a specifically Byronic gesture which cannot be read into all postmodern texts. Within Byronic aesthetics, play is both a dance on the edge of the allowable/foreseeable/conditional, and a violence done to the sutures that hold–however tenuously–meaning, syntax, consent together.

     

    Certainly desire is part of this behavior, but it is not the only mechanism at work. Dalliance with comprehension and violation are both attributes of depressive melancholy. The bi-polarity of manic depression becomes in the postmodern period hyperactivity, mania as frenzy. Romantic mania, however, is a slow, deliberately tasted dying into, a depressive move into a psychology without faith. Byron laughs at this debilitating gesture even as he exploits its charm. And the charm itself is seductively duplicitous, doubling back with an ironic laugh: “Postmodernism’s distinctive character lies in [a] kind of wholesale `nudging’ commitment to doubleness, or duplicity,” Linda Hutcheon notes (1). The duplicity amounts not to a loss of faith, but to a cynicism thrust at the very heart of belief: both Byron and Mapplethorpe exhibit this awareness of disrupted yet retained foundations via seductive posturing.

     

    The allure that draws in the viewer is born of the wholesale nudge that allots both the one and the other a place onstage. The spectator who feels the safety of familiar principles is seduced and caught before feeling the shifting ground. The seduction for both Byron and Mapplethorpe begins by viewing the viewer as an initially antagonistic eye which must be converted, or mocked, or both. Two of Mapplethorpe’s works especially distill this gendered antagonism and recall earlier heroes of melancholy, metaphor, and misogyny.

     

    “Manfred” (1974) provocatively speaks to Byron’s closet drama, as well as his closeted drama of self, presenting the Faustian man as a multiply-framed modernist who assumes his capacity to redesign the architecture that contains him. The first of the sequenced four frames in “Manfred” is stark white, its blankness signifying not only original purity but also the absence of myth, and therefore of identity. In the second frame, the youth’s pose allows him to fill the arch which is the central of three framings or sculptings of the space around him. He is classically nude and relaxed, a lover not an athlete, yet his frontal revelation mocks classical aesthetics, the contrapposto which makes the figure “a true acting unit,” according to Gardner (132).

     

    In the third frame, the youth has assumed clothing, jewelry, and thus identity; he is poised to step out of the arch or closet, at the same time putting on a dark and melancholic expression that reestablishes the closet as protective and chosen, the space from which he will emerge. He is the `angry young man,’ the rebel and dreamer: Manfred himself. The final frame again finds the youth nude, but this time in full erection yet equal relaxation. He asserts his self upon the frame by placing his arms on its edge, again stepping precisely on its boundary, half-in, half-out.

     

    Outage, whether accomplished in emotional projection or physical projection, places dangerous demands on the dancer, as Byron’s Faustian hero discovered. The power of abstraction, of multiple identities beyond the socially condoned, leads both to love and to the leap of death, two modes of action that Bataille contends are reflexively identificatory. Mapplethorpe’s Manfred declines to indicate who has conjured whom, but the urge to death remains.

     

    In his Hamlet-like “Self-Portrait, 1988,” Mapplethorpe examines himself in light of death, as a death mask, and as a dying Hamlet. In his journal for Feb. 19, 1814 Byron notes that “Kemble’s Hamlet is perfect; but Hamlet is not Nature. Richard is a man; and Kean is Richard.” Mapplethorpe also understands Hamlet as more than nature, more than man. The photograph’s subject transmits his pain and mortal angst as he stares directly at the viewer; his stare is all the eerier for being disembodied and slightly out of focus, as if already fading from this particular world. At the same time, his severed hand floats clearly in the foreground, grasping a death-head cane with intense strength. Hamlet’s existential worry over whether to be, as well as his graveside meditation, is troped here both melancholically and whimsically. And it is but intertextual play that the epigram Byron chooses for his “Manfred” is from Hamlet I.v: “There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,/ Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.” Mapplethorpe’s Hamlet intimates this about death too.

     

    Hamlet knew that death defined love, and that the love of a woman is defiling if it is unaccompanied by the proper view and frame. Improper women for Byron are “strumpets,” of whom he requests one friend to “never . . . even allude to the existence of the sex.” Unlike Greek verbs of amorous frenzy, Byron announces “I won’t even read a word of the feminine gender” (16 Feb, 1812). Mapplethorpe would read such words, but would code and frame them to redefine gender itself into the fascination created by the tease of the camera’s eye. This is the posture of Byron’s romanticism and of Mapplethorpe’s postmodernism, and of the improper artist who is poised to leap both because he is willing and because the leap defines and sexes him.

     

    The Byronist’s internalizing of the specular takes place both between men, as well as within the dresser who must then seek other ways to display it. As such, it is an aspect of modernism Mapplethorpe will more fully exploit through the closely controlled space of photographic interiors, and through a cross-dressing which requires no clothes because it is written on the body. This is best incurred through a gender play that is both a natural outcome of specularization and an unnatural doubleness that is doubly enticing. Byron’s self-representations as the Byronic hero and Mapplethorpe’s self-portraits show the face as effeminate because it is seductive, the costuming as gender-play because it is teasing, and both offering relations between men. However, one important qualification must be made here: male costuming is not fashion in the sense of fashion photography because it does not pretend to be for a specifically women’s venue; its focus is the overt disruption of gender binaries rather than the covert exploitation of them. Thus, if women are seduced into buying Byron’s poems or making love to him, he can claim to have no agency in their desire since his overt offer seeks another comer: Women “ought to mind home . . . [and] to read neither poetry nor politics–nothing but books of piety and cookery. Music–drawing–dancing–also a little gardening and ploughing now and then” (Jan. 6, 1821, 1821 Journal). This difference in the visual contract specific to the Byronic postmodern allows for the incorporation of women’s bodies into men’s, and even women’s into men’s, as a statement of excess. Put another way: fashion photography, which can be seen as the extreme version of visual art, implies an absence (of the artist) predicated on the metaphorical use of the model’s body, as well as a covert expenditure of sexual energy between men. Male costuming in the Byronic postmodern posits presence rather than absence because the clothing literally (rather than metaphorically) implicates the artist, and it does so overtly. The clothing is so explicit in its homosexual seduction that it spells out what the fashion model suggestively hides: the clothes become the man. The model’s wardrobe fabricates sexuality, makes it up, while the transvestite poseur or dandy wears seduction as one aspect of his sexual identity.

     

    Thus the artistry that finds itself to be Byronic marginalizes itself from normative aesthetic practices or exaggerates them. It expresses its uncentered status by seeking revenge on its audience through expressive violence contained within a visual stillness. The artist uses this containment beyond the cultural center to artifice alternative worlds of seductive exile; but because the staging is transient rather than verifiable, it threatens the viewer with the possibility of transgressed boundaries and frames. And because the revenge is as much self-annihilating as it is viewer-threatening in its excess, its seductive posture invokes a pathos and an invitation difficult to ignore.

     

    The invitation is necessarily sexual, devastating in its promise to break through the frames of its staging; the Byronic postmodern is always a sexual or sexed violence, an exile caused by sexual transgression, a transvestism. Through this disruptive sexuality, the Byronic artist redistributes the contractual code between producer and consumer, forcing the viewer to make love to him by initiating and teasing out an active reciprocity and transgression.2 This contractual aberration is not present in all postmodernisms; nor is it a generally accepted view of the most Byronic of artists, Byron himself. If we accept this precept, however, we accept that postmodernism is not a single current of artistic and intellectual conflux. We also accept that the Byronic artist is not a single manifestation of a single current, but a self-creator who is most himself when playing out the flux and its staging possibilities.

     

    Closet drama may dispense with the need for visible costuming, but the multiple masks it allows the authorizing persona provide an arena for symbolic codes that costume disparate versions of the poetical self. The sexualities, genders, and temperaments that clothe closet characters virtually play out the alternative identities that transvestism frees up to the experiencing subject: closet dramas, at least for Byron, are in drag. Critics interested in Byron’s self-romanticism usually cite this aspect of Byron’s selfhood, finding the poet speaking not only as Sardanapalus but as each of the other main characters, not only as Don Juan but also as the poem’s narrator.3 They do so, however, to prove the biographical nature of Byron’s dramas, locating multiple Byrons (rather than multiple distributions of self) in order to sort out the more important family relations portrayed in the other characters; they do so most often in order to prove the Freudian nature of Byron’s self-obsessive narratives (see also Wolfson). But some critics go further; for instance, Jerome J. McGann argues that Byron exploited the self-identificatory possibilities of costuming from the very first. “Byron was operating en masque from his first appearances in print . . . Childe Harold, evolving from [his] earlier fictional selves, mutates quickly and repeatedly: the Giaour, the Corsair, Lara, Manfred, are all masks of Byron.” Similarly, Sardanapalus is “an autobiographical work . . . carried out in masquerade” (295-96). McGann reads Byron’s texts/masks as double-directed, but not in the contractual sense of artist-viewer; rather, McGann finds a doubled seeing which is, on the one hand, directed “`referentially’ toward certain socio-historical frameworks, and `reflexively’ toward the poetical environments within which they are aesthetically active” (296-97). In other words, the masks provide a way to deliteralize transvestite seeing without seeming to do so through a reflexive vision; at the same time, they reinstitute the metaphorical or referential nature of the homosocial visual contract. Doing so, McGann argues, allows the movement from theatrical to closet drama and thus into temptation: “Byron’s masquerades are requests (or perhaps temptations) for someone to play a correspondent part in the imagined scene,” but they are also “wicked and seductive invitations” (302). These invitations in the end “become the principal subject of his own fictions” because the move into private space allows the mask a literalizing power as well as a metaphorizing one, and thus a wicked dalliance with sincerity.

     

    The wickedness, the temptation, is that of the homosexual openly beckoning within the privacy of the closet: this referential, and paradoxically socio-historical move (Childe Harold amid the battlegrounds of Europe) authorizes that wicked privacy toward the open and public market of the visual contract. The double-edge term which allows this conflation of the opposed ways of seeing (homosexual and homosocial) is “mask.” Mask is not the trickier “masquerade,” in which costumes allow one to put one’s face, person, and morals aside in order to allow the libido and the uncanny full rein; instead, masks are veritable faces, costumes that cannot so readily be put aside. The mask effectively makes the other a self–without making it the self, thus reserving the possibility of a `true’ or recuperable self. The mask also allows for a certain amount of controlled outage within the purview of the closet(ed) drama.

     

    Masking locates this other-self in the face, the doubled site of vision and visage. But the face is itself the site of cupola and thus of excess; the multiplicitous connections it makes possible are different for each viewer, and not precisely controllable by the performer himself. The imprecise nature of the mask/face makes the performer a discourse facilitator through the visage/vision cupola by which he is seen by seeing. When the face is mask, as it forcefully is in the literal faces Mapplethorpe puts forth in his self-portraits, and as it figuratively is in Byron’s narrative voices, it acts as the focal point of the costume, of the other self, and thereby of sexualized difference. As the site of excessive sex, of the doubly male, it thus alters the visual contract in order to force the diffident artist on the viewer: he confronts us face-to-face.

     

    One of the best texts in which to explore Byron’s use of masks, according to McGann, is Manfred:

     

    Byron, like Manfred, ceases to justify himself or his romantic imaginations only when he makes those imaginations the self-conscious subject of his work. There is a power working upon Byron forcing him to display those aspects of the imagination that are seldom exposed to view.(303)

     
    The power working on Byron or his mask, Manfred, is the power of the mask-face in a place of contained excess, the closet. Closet space internalizes the play, making the literal quality of dress, like Mapplethorpe’s Bondage and Discipline leather, unnecessary. Costume refutes metaphor and the need for a covert visual contract and installs a literalized invitation on the body surface; mask reinstates metaphor without refuting costume, and the conflation of the two at once–like the conflation of transvestism with homosexuality–provides a double being, a reference and a reflex, a writing on the body.

     

    That is to say, Byron’s textual masks mark out the space of the Byronic postmodern as a closet space in which the relation between artist and viewer is specifically contracted through bodily inscription. The Byronic hero’s scowl and the feminine makeup and pseudo-Hamlet of Mapplethorpe’s self-portraits all point to the same conceit: that once the wicked invitation is inscribed on the body of the artist, he must then step in front of the artistic/photographic eye to become the feminized body over which contracts get made and invitations exchanged. For this reason Mapplethorpe’s subject-selves stare straight into the camera’s eye: they do not need the fashion model’s flirtatious glance because they know their eye (as artist and poseur) reciprocates the viewer’s gaze–they know because it is written on their face.

     

    Byron’s eye, if not in his portraits then certainly in his poetry, also stares straight into the viewer’s eye, looking for internalized relations and closeted desires. Contemporaneous reviewers were made uncomfortable by the game Byron played, that was playing on himself, and their discomfort may have come in part from the Byronic artist’s self-conscious play with identity and agency. The reviewers as a body, in fact, see Byron as performing the opposite operation from an exchange of masks and identity switches; they read him as inhabiting each Byronic character as himself, without permutation. How the reader is led to see in a particular way becomes a critical question: How has Byron seduced us into this understanding of his person? And the danger of this wicked invitation is that both the viewer and the artist himself are seduced: “the text becomes a kind of precipice that draws one in–like Manfred, like Byron–either to the self or to the destruction of the self” (McGann, 311). Yet the precipice is not as sincere as the critics believe nor as sensual as Byron would have it: within the erotics of a self-constituting dance there is also the artist’s awareness of how that self is not making, is merely a dressing without the deep center so alluringly promised. As David Joselit writes of Mapplethorpe, his popularity “is often explained (or explained away) as a form of sophisticated naughtiness. . . . It is Mapplethorpe’s broader relevance that is typically denied to him–typically obscured by labeling him a subcultural fetishist–by ignoring the hauntingly unstable vision of masculinity and femininity his art proposes” (19).

     

    What Byron and Mapplethorpe share is not merely in their transgressive sexual curiosity; it is also in their transgression into the exotic. Both artists construct travelogues into a fantasy land where costumes signify otherly selves against which the self must struggle or be seduced. And if Byron stepped further out, acting out the travelogue as well as imagining its space in fantastic verses, Mapplethorpe maintained an interior space that contained and transmuted his experience to an equally devastating and self-seducing degree.

     

    Don Juan’s travels necessarily lead eastward, for the Spain of his birth is a Moorish land, and the Moors’ power originates in their hoarding of classical knowledge.4 Thus, underneath the oriental tales of Romantic imagination is a love of the Grecian. It was widely known that Araby had absorbed Hellenic culture and preserved it through the middle ages. But what Byron understands, perhaps most from donning his Albanian dress and Turkish masks, is how much this is like boys looking like girls. Pederasty, or Greek love, is the love of nubile boys who looked like girls, boys who are girls underneath just as Arabs are Grecian underneath. When Byron was seen leading young women in his madly promiscuous London period, he was assumed to have been closeted with young women dressed as boys. Don Juan reverses and replays this moment several times as Juan himself dresses in female costume, replaying the London escapades in which Byron was simply closeted with nubile boys who could seem either gender or both.5

     

    The fascination Byron exhibits, no less than Mapplethorpe, is with that play between polarized positions, a play Araby exhibits even more than does Greece. Thus in his eastern tales Byron professes his desire for the Grecian costumed as its polarized contrary, the Turkish-Moorish-Arabian, and in doing so recasts his desire for cross-dressed or interstitial gendering. It cannot be surprising, then, to read art critic David Joselit assessing Mapplethorpe’s photographs as producing a “hauntingly unstable vision of masculinity and femininity . . . Mapplethorpe’s sexual aggression and submission–in men and women, heterosexual and homosexual–is clearly evident in the relationship he establishes between his own self-portraits and the photographs of his models.” Indeed, he “has envisioned a world in which masculinity is not stable but a constantly shifting terrain between hyperaggressiveness and submission” (Kardon, 19). Another way of saying this is that the Byronist understands sexuality as an unstable producer of identity. When Byron moves from self to self, and reproduces those shifts in variable dramatic masks, he understands sexuality as self in the moment of sex–not in the moment of self. And these shifts are always restricted by the calculable and incalculable audience response which is itself a thing of contingency and flux. If Mapplethorpe conceives the stillpoint of an erratic world through the classical moment of fixity–fixing the subject with a single frame of its dance across the stage, Byron embraces the fluidity of the shifting self as well as the return upon itself of each mask–and yet in doing so, he fixes his poetical character even more surely than does Mapplethorpe. The fix–the addiction to a dramatic moment of selfhood that one puts on in order to put over–is a mechanism of absolute charisma. And charisma, both in verse and on paper, demands a specular fixation.

     

    Walter Benjamin (in many ways a postmodern romantic himself6) reconstructs the nature of that which is “hauntingly unstable” that we locate in both Mapplethorpe’s and Byron’s postmodern romanticism, as a problem of two other Byronists: Baudelaire and Proust. In his essay, “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” Benjamin recasts Proust–a spiritual Orientalist–by saying that, “[t]o perceive the aura of an object we look at means to invest it with the ability to look at us in return” (188). This point is specific to photography: whereas painting feeds imaginative appetites (“that of which our eyes will never have their fill”), photography operates within a different paradigm of perception (the mechanical reproduction of images). Painting portrays the living quality of being; photography records it but cannot imbue its images with life, or what Benjamin calls “aura.” Susan Sontag confirms this perception when she writes of Mapplethorpe that his works do not reveal truth, but rather “the strongest version of it”; this is a claim about the mystical ability of art to reveal truth, but it is a postmodern version in that it ironizes art’s attempt to provide a truth where there can be none.

     

    What Sontag knows is that Mapplethorpe’s art gives life back to the viewer through the imbued object–through its aura. This gift, this truth, crosses transcendent boundaries so that the viewer is pulled into, or contracted into, the experience. In contrast, the romantic poet experiences and expresses epiphany while the reader vicariously witnesses its effect but does not participate. The Byronist achieves what we might describe as a sideways transcendence, a boundary crossing of epic proportions which nevertheless laughs at its own indecency.7 Benjamin’s “aura,” on the other hand, is meant to refer to a romanticized notion of the visionary’s artistry, the poet’s ability to capture `beauty in truth and truth in beauty,’ to paraphrase Keats. Yet that he comes to the notion of aura through Baudelaire with overtones of Proust means that the vision is available from both the sincere and the sardonic poet, that both assist the provision of what Kardon, after Sontag, calls the “aura of veracity” (12).

     

    It is this aura, according to Benjamin, in which objects hoard the life we lend them through our active looking, and by it they mystically return our gaze from a distance determined by their inscrutability that is somehow yet recognizable. The subject who looks in the camera eye sees nothing, and thus loses his own gaze; at the same time, when he looks at the photograph of himself the lost gaze cannot be met or recaptured because there is no room for aura. The photographer, on the other hand, sees a different picture, or to put it another way, becomes the camera eye and–to rephrase–exchanges glances with the subject, which he can then recall and cast into his own aural perception of each photograph as the authentic aspect of the subject no longer present. These arguments permit us to reconstruct the magnetism of Mapplethorpe’s photographs as visual renditions of that intensely magnetic glance Byron had mastered both in his life and his art–a glance that so captured the passions of both women and men. When Joselit explains that “Mapplethorpe’s presence, in front of the camera as well as behind it, brackets every representation” (19), he is attributing to the photographer’s doubled glance a doubled presence and a double aura. Like the doubled sex of the girlish boy dressed as a boy and so taken for a girl in boy’s costume, as in Byron’s premarital flings, or like the doubly enticing bisexual Byron himself, the double aura works like a double penis, a twice present and twice authenticated contractual power. Bracketing a representation does not fix it within a historical moment, but releases it into the flux of the auteur’s own cross-historical and defiantly untranscendent staging.

     

    Mapplethorpe has been called a classicist because of his painterly approach to photography, but he also deserves the term for his deliberate fostering of aura in both his human and inanimate subjects. It is this relation to the living that both Mapplethorpe and Byron share, for where Mapplethorpe produces works that return one’s gaze, Byron’s works are so aurally replete with his own identifiable persona that they vibrate with his seductive or scorning glance. Annabella Milbanke recalls Byron’s haughty, disdainful posturing at salons she attended before his first marriage proposal; his careful poses and distancing survey of the room both converted his shyness into a powerful tool, and increased his charismatic appeal.

     

    Mapplethorpe’s calm yet distancing stare into the camera in his self-portraits exude a similar aural fascination; significantly, the portraits that convey the same defiance and yet appealing plasticity are those of the two women friends he photographed numerous times: Patti Smith and Lisa Lyon. In two years Mapplethorpe produced more than a hundred photographs of Lyon, works which Kardon notes, reveal “his talents as an impresario, his ability to create images . . . . He discovered some of her latent personas and probably invented others” (11). The “probably” that qualifies Kardon’s insight is also the cupola on which Mapplethorpe provokes Lyon and Smith to become alternative masks for his own continual self-exploration.8 For it is through photography that Mapplethorpe “could touch `forbidden’ acts and states of consciousness, using the camera as an instrument of provocation,” according to Kay Larson. Using sexual positioning instead of mystical auras, Larson identifies the Byronic attitude as postmodern: “There is a kind of sexuality–the kind we think of as modern–that pursues self-interest to its limits, and sublimation be damned” (15). The transgression Mapplethorpe pursues in his art–across the bounds between classicism and eroticism, homo and hetero, male and female, pleasure and pain–are precisely the terms of Byron’s journey east, across the transcendental alps to the transnationalism of the Byronically Grecian aesthetic.

     

    In his last years Mapplethorpe begins to photograph Greek statuary, but by evading the cracks and missing limbs in order to imply a perfect whole, he nonetheless conveys the fragmentary nature of existence. The statement produced is that of death in life and life in death, a doubled concept that recalls the Grecian underdressing of Araby, the girl under the boy and boy under the girl, the transvestism of erotic spectacle. For both Byron and Mapplethorpe, classical culture provides a Rosetta Stone for a homoerotic aesthetic. “The Greeks, of course, were the first in Western civilization to erect a culture–a literature, an art, a philosophy–around the homoerotic . . . . Homoeroticism, Mapplethorpe suggests, has been around since the beginning of the world” (Larson, 17). And if Byron learned to write of his wrong-sexed, illicit adventures in the code of Greek phrases and oblique references to fellow sodomists, Mapplethorpe also learned the lexical value of classicism. The Byronist both voices and obscures the homoerotic aesthetic when he turns the classicism of a marble statue or a perfect flower inside out to produce the eroticism already inherent in it. The societies that contextualize both artists also knew and did not know this: Byron’s publisher and closest friends burned his memoirs and altered his letters to hide the first term of the Byronic aesthetic, while the intent of the prosecution of Dennis Barrie, the Cincinnati museum director who exhibited Mapplethorpe’s photographs, was to figuratively burn those photographs that leave no room for sentimental misreadings. Charged with pandering and obscenity charges, Barrie had to defend his “exhibition” of the very sexuality Mapplethorpe intentionally provokes us by: Barrie is indeed a panderer, but of the spirit and not the flesh, for it is the aura Mapplethorpe imparts to his work that so threatens and unsexes us.

     

    Certainly it is part of any Byronist’s threat to the viewer that the artist’s own aura is retained in his endless self-portraiture through sequences of masks and counter-masks. Photography “is a process of two-way looking: looking at, and being looked at,” as Larson notes. Each artist continues to entice the viewer into a witting and unwitting appreciation for a titillating aesthetics. Mapplethorpe is both a “voyeur” and a “provocateur,” writes Larson, and as such “he is not averse to running guns into forbidden territory” (16). The reference is to Mapplethorpe’s excursions into the nightworld of Bondage and Discipline, but it is a wonderful comment on Byron’s own particular form of gun running. He is still remembered in Greece today for his liberatory endeavors there before dying of disease. Like Byron, Mapplethorpe also died young by disease, and his Hamlet-like self-portrait of full-blown AIDS concurs that both artists associate themselves with self-annihilating heroes. As such, both might say with Manfred when the summoning Spirit pronounces, “But thy crimes/ Have made thee–“: “I have not been thy dupe, nor am thy prey–/ But was my own destroyer.” There is a sanctity in this statement that is leveled in the aura, the gaze returned–precisely the seductive threat of both Byronists’ postmodern works.

    Notes

     

    1. Christopher Norris takes to task those critics who essentialize postmodern thought in this manner, including Habermas, Rorty and Gasche. Although Norris supports Habermas’ critique in such works as The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (1987), he asserts that Habermas misunderstands Derrida’s self-positioning within philosophical traditions as “a species of latter-day Nietzschean irrationalism . . . that rejects the whole legacy of post-Kantian enlightened thought.” See Norris, What’s Wrong with Postmodernism: Critical Theory and the Ends of Philosophy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1990), esp. pp. 49-76.

     

    2. The contract itself has recently been revitalized as a romantic term, however with tonalities other than the visual, by scholars such as Jerome Christensen and Barbara Charlesworth Gelpi influenced by Carole Pateman’s The Problem of Political Obligation (1979; Berkeley, 1985) and The Sexual Contract (Stanford, 1988). The conceptual contract as I understand it here, however, is itself artwork, and as such is specifically set in visual terms. I borrow these terms from de Lauretis, esp. p. 105, and Fuss.

     

    3. Byron’s journals, written with at least an intimate audience in mind, if not simply to the audience of himself, exemplifies the rapidity of his mood and voice shifts. Commenting on a journal passage regarding Napoleon’s abdication, Peter Manning writes: “Byron confessed that he was `utterly bewildered and confounded,’ and the threat to his own identity produced a dispersal of voices notable even in his habitually echoing prose” Reading Romantics, 146).

     

    4. Dorothee Metlitzki provides an important overview of the relation between Orientalism and romanticism in The Matter of Araby in Medieval England (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1977); the final chapter, “The Matter of Araby and the Making of Romance,” is especially helpful (pp. 240-250).

     

    5. Louis Crompton notes that “[t]hough his involvements were overwhelmingly heterosexual, various stories circulated, all at second hand, about how he disguised his inamoratas as boys to deceive his mother or others . . . Since Byron was often attracted by boys with girlish looks, Marchand suggests that some of the boys in his company were in fact mistaken for girls in disguise” (110).

     

    6. Benjamin’s elusive prose, and the `open-sided’ character of his individual phrases, evinces his particular kind of Byronic dancing. That he partakes of the romantic is evident in his mystical claims about art as being behind history; that he is romantically postmodern is productive of his interest in fragmentation and the occasional essay form.

     

    7. When Karl Kroeber describes the improvisational methodology of Don Juan as “open-sided,” he provides an apt term for the whole of Byronic aesthetics, an idea which Peter Manning underscores in introducing his Reading Romantics (4).

     

    8. Bataille states in “The Solar Anus” that, “It is clear that the world is purely parodic, in other words, that each thing seen is the parody of another, or is the same thing in a deceptive form . . . because with the aid of a copula each sentence ties one thing to another . . . . But the copula of terms is no less irritating than the copulation of bodiesVisions, 5).

    Works Cited

     

    • Bataille, G. “The Solar Anus.” In Visions of Excess: Selected Writings, 1927-1939. Ed. and trans. Allan Stoekl. Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1985.
    • Benjamin, Walter. Illuminations. New York: Schocken, 1969.
    • Christensen, J. “Setting Byron Straight: Class, Sexuality, and the Poet,” in Literature and the Body: Essays on Populations and Persons. Ed. Elaine Scarry. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins UP, 1988.
    • de Lauretis, Theresa. Technologies of Gender: Essays on Theory, Film, and Fiction . Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1987.
    • Elam, D. Romancing the Postmodern. London and New York: Routledge, 1992.
    • Fuss, Diana. “Fashion and the Homospectatorial Look.” Critical Inquiry 18 (Summer 1992): 713-37.
    • Gardner, Helen. Art Through the Ages. Sixth Ed. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975.
    • Hutcheon, Linda. The Politics of Postmodernism. London and New York: Routledge, 1989.
    • Joselit, D. “Robert Mapplethorpe’s Poses.” In Janet Kardon, 19-21.
    • Kardon, J. Robert Mapplethorpe: The Perfect Moment. Ed. Janet Kardon. Philladelphia: Institute of Contemporary Art/ Univ. of Pennsylvania, 1988.
    • Kaplan, E.A. “Introduction.” Postmodernism and its Discontents: Theories, Practices. Ed. E. Ann Kaplan. London and New York: Verso, 1988.
    • McGann, J. “Hero with a Thousand Faces: The Rhetoric of Byronism.” SiR 31 (Fall 1992): 295-313.
    • Manning, P. Byron and His Fictions. Detroit: Wayne State UP, 1978.
    • Marchand, L., ed. Byron’s Letters and Journals, 6 vols. London: John Murray, 1973.
    • Sontag, Susan. Preface to Robert Mapplethorpe’s Certain People: A Book of Portraits. Pasadena, CA: Twelvetrees Press, 1985.
    • Thorslev, Jr., P. The Byronic Hero: Types and Prototypes. Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1962.
    • Wolfson, S. “`A Problem Few Dare Imitate’: Sardanapalus and `Effeminate Character.’” ELH 58 (1991): 867-902.

     

  • A Schizoanalytic Reading of Baudelaire: The Modernist as Postmodernist

    Eugene W. Holland

    Department of French Language and Literature
    The Ohio State University

    eugeneh@humanities1.cohums.ohio-state.edu

     

    Whether Deleuze and Guattari were actually “doing philosophy” in the Anti-Oedipus or not, their last collaborative work Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?) may shed some light on the status of the concepts operating in that early work.1 Unlike scientific concepts, which aim to stabilize and identify specific domains within the real, philosophical concepts operate according to Deleuze and Guattari as what we might call “transformers”: they intervene in established philosophical problematics in order to de-stabilize them, reworking old concepts and forging new connections among the distinctive features composing them.2 What is distinctive about the Anti-Oedipus, in this light (and perhaps this is what makes its mode of intervention seem more than just philosophical), is that its de-stabilization of established problematics involves making new connections with historical context, as well as re- aligning concepts into new constellations.3 A term such as “de-coding,” then, will best be understood not in terms of any content of its own, but in relation to the concepts it transforms in the course of producing schizoanalysis out of the problematics of historical materialism and psychoanalysis in the wake of the events of 1968 in France, and–for the purposes of this essay–how it illuminates the transformative force of the works of that great 19th- century figure of transition, Charles Baudelaire.4 My aim here will thus be not so much to explain what de-coding means as to show how it works and what it can do in the way of textual and socio-historical analysis of Baudelaire.

     

    Since concepts as transformers intervene in other contexts instead of governing domains of their own, they have no independent, autonomous content, and depend instead on their use for whatever content we can ascribe to them. In other words, what makes philosophical concepts “user- friendly” for Deleuze and Guattari is also what makes them so challenging: they are strategically underdetermined, and thus only take shape–to borrow one of Deleuze’s favorite polyvocal expressions–“au milieu”: in context and in between their point of departure and a point of arrival or connection with some other phenomenon or event.5 Connecting schizoanalysis with Baudelaire for one thing endows the notion of de-coding with features– notably the linguistic or rhetorical tools of metaphor and metonymy for close analysis of poetic texts–it does not obviously possess in the Anti-Oedipus itself; and at the same time it in turn situates the evolution of Baudelairean poetics in the broader cultural and historical context of the emergence of market society, which is ultimately responsible for de-coding in the first place. The de-coding of modernism in Baudelaire will, in this context, turn out to be not only what happens to an earlier romanticism he puts behind him with the invention of modernism, but also what happens to that modernism itself, especially in the late prose poems. By repositioning Baudelaire in relation to and somehow already beyond the very modernism he contributed so much to inventing, a schizoanalytic reading can help situate Baudelaire in postmodern context. But first, a few words about de-coding.

     

    De-coding is, in the first place, Deleuze and Guattari’s translation into semiotic terms of the concepts of rationalization and reification, by which Weber and Lukacs designated the historical replacement of meaning by abstract calculation as the basis of social order. More in agreement with Lukacs than with Weber, they explain this process as a function of the capitalist market and the predominance of exchange-value. To be more specific, de-coding is linked to axiomatization, the process central to capitalism whereby streams of quantified factors of production (such as raw materials, skills, and knowledges) are conjoined in order to extract a differential surplus; de-coding both supports and results from axiomatization, transforming meaningful qualities into calculable quantities. Deleuze and Guattari disagree radically with both Weber and Lukacs, however, in considering de-coding not as sterile disenchantment or hopeless fragmentation, but as the positive moment in the dialectic of capitalist development: as the potential for freedom and permanent revolution, opposed by the forces of re-coding and capitalist authoritarianism.

     

    At the same time, however, that de-coding transforms rationalization and reification into semiotic terms, it translates the semiotics of Lacanian psychoanalysis into historical terms. Of central importance here is the pair of concepts that parallel de-coding and re-coding in the Anti- Oedipus: de-territorialization and re-territorialization. Derived from Lacanian usage–where “territorialization” designates the mapping of the infant’s polymorphous erogenous zones by parental care-giving–these terms come to designate a crucial dynamic of the capitalist market: the disconnection and reconnection of bodies and environments (e.g. the disconnection of peasants from common land by the Enclosure Acts in England, and their re-territorialization as wage-labor onto textile looms in the nascent garment industry). The primary difference between these parallel conceptual pairs is that de-territorialization and re- territorialization operate on physical bodies and involve material investments of energy (as in production and consumption), while de-coding and re-coding operate on symbolic representations and involve investments of mental energy (as in cognition and fantasy). This dual transformation of concepts serves to hinge together labor- power and libido (called social and desiring production in the Anti-Oedipus), and produces a revolutionary historical-materialist-semiotic psychiatry: schizoanalysis. I should note that the distinction between material and symbolic investments virtually disappears in Deleuze and Guattari’s later works. But the benefits of retaining the term “de-coding”–for cultural and literary studies at least–are threefold: it designates semiotic processes that are legible as such in texts and cultural artifacts; it construes those semiotic processes in psychoanalytic or psychodynamic terms (following Lacan); and it at the same time connects both texts and psychodynamics with history and political economy–attributing them ultimately to the spread of the market and the rhythms of capitalist development.

     

    The translation of Lacanian psychoanalysis into historical materialist terms depends on an ambiguity inherited from Levi-Strauss as to the status of the Symbolic Order–an ambiguity crucial to Lacanian therapy: is the “Symbolic Order” a purely abstract, logical structure, or is it historical and concrete? For Deleuze and Guattari, the answer is clear: the Symbolic Order is historical; it is the actual ensemble of codes governing meaning and action in a given social formation. But for Lacanian therapy, the Symbolic Order entails the following paradox: On one hand, the Symbolic Order is the basis of human identity-formation: in saying “I” and accepting a proper name derived from the Name-of-the-Father, the organism becomes a human subject spoken by the language-system, forever alienated from his or her “true” pre-linguistic being and dependent for any sense of self on the Symbolic Other. On the other hand, the Symbolic Order is an illusion, and the Symbolic Other is not a person but a place: the place occupied by the “sujet- suppose-savoir” (the subject who is presumed to know, to possess authoritative knowledge)–and this is an empty place, occupied by the Lacanian therapist only in order to refuse the imputation and indeed deny the very possibility of such knowledge and authority. To put this paradox in other terms, the Symbolic Order is lived in two different registers: from the perspective of the Imaginary register, the Symbolic Order is centered on and governed by a Symbolic Other who possesses the phallus as sign of authority and from whom the individual derives his or her sense of fixed identity and meaning; from the perspective of the Symbolic register, the Symbolic Order is a realm of fluid rather than fixed identities, the phallus is a sign of infinite semiosis rather than of stable meaning, and the Other is a fictional persona in an empty place. Following Lacan, Deleuze and Guattari designate the Symbolic register’s radically fluid form of semiosis free from identity-fixations as “schizophrenia”–but they will ultimately locate and define it historically rather than clinically.

     

    For although they acknowledge the radical implications this paradox of the Symbolic perspective on the Symbolic Order entails for therapy, Deleuze and Guattari nonetheless insist that it has specific historical conditions of possibility. And insisting that the Symbolic Order is historical means exposing it irrevocably to difference, contingency, and change: by examining different social formations (in Part III of the Anti-Oedipus), they are able to show that the fiction of a centered Symbolic Order belongs to another, older social formation based on stable codes, and that capitalism by contrast thrives on and indeed fosters through de-coding the meaningless and identity-free “schizophrenic” semiosis characteristic of the Symbolic register; hence the subtitle of the Anti- Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. The intervention of de-coding in Lacanian psychoanalysis thus transforms a paradox lying at the heart of radical therapy into a recognition of historical difference, and produces the strong claim that the Lacanian perspective is made possible by market de-coding under capitalism.

     

    The crux of that historical difference is this: Social relations in a coded Symbolic Order are qualitative and significant: women in tribal societies, for example, are valued as the source of life and the very cornerstone of meta-familial social relations in a kinship system fully charged with symbolic meanings. The basic social relations in the de-coded Symbolic order of capitalism, by contrast, are quantitative and strictly meaningless: workers (of whatever gender) are equated as abstract, calculable amounts of labor-power within the cash nexus of the market. In this regard (though without using the term de-coding, of course), Marx had already discerned an illuminating parallel between Martin Luther and Adam Smith: for Luther, the essence of religion was not found in objects of religious devotion, but in subjective religiosity in general; and for Smith, the essence of wealth was not found in objects of economic value, but in abstract productive activity in general. And Smith’s insight, Marx argues, was made possible by the practice under capitalism of measuring value in terms of abstract labor-power.

     

    To this parallel, Deleuze and Guattari add a third term: Sigmund Freud, whom they call “the Luther and the Adam Smith of psychiatry.”6 For Freud, the essence of libidinal value is found not in the objects of desire, but in desire itself as an abstract subjective essence, as objectively-underdetermined, de-coded libido. Freud’s insight, too, Deleuze and Guattari argue, was made possible dialectically by the capitalist subsumption of all social relations under the market and exchange-value–except the relations of reproduction, which restrict desire to the abstract poles of the nuclear family. So between the extremes of Daddy as Oedipal agent of castration and object of identification and Mommy as forbidden object of desire, market de-coding makes “all that is solid melt into air,” as Marx put it: the market “mobilizes” desire, in other words, by freeing it from capture by any stable, all-embracing code–only to recapture it, it must be said, via the re-coding of advertising, for example, which re-territorializes it onto the objects of the latest administered consumer fad.7

     

    Within the framework of psychoanalysis, meanwhile, Lacan takes the de-coding of desire one important step further than Freud: it is not the actual persons of Mommy and Daddy that shape desire in the family, but rather the functions of the metonymic search for mother-substitutes as objects of desire and metaphoric identifications made in the father’s name. And when such metaphoric identifications break down or are refused (“foreclosed”), according to Lacan, the result is a predominantly metonymic form of desire no longer structured by the nuclear family or any other stable code, but mobilized by the infinite semiosis of language as a purely abstract signifying system devoid of meaning: schizophrenia. From the perspective of schizoanalysis, however, such a radically unstructured form of desire constitutes not a clinical case or exception to the norm, but the very historical rule or tendency of capitalism; schizophrenia becomes the absolute horizon (or “limit”) of social (dis)order and psychic functioning, produced by the de-coding processes of the market.8

     

    My claim is that Baudelaire can be added as a fourth term in the series of parallels linking Freud with Luther and Adam Smith: because for Baudelairean modernism, aesthetic value is found not in the objects of poetic appropriation, but in the activity of poetic appropriation itself–whence the oxymoron in the title of his major collection The Flowers of Evil) and his claim to be able to extract modernist poetry from absolutely anything–from Evil, from sheer boredom (spleen), or even from mud (as he says).9 Abandoning and indeed actively rejecting the fixed values imposed in the Symbolic Order, Baudelaire opts instead for a metonymic poetics that approaches the infinite semiosis of a completely de-coded Symbolic register. In the modernity that Baudelaire was among the first to diagnose, value–religious, economic, libidinal, poetic value– does not inhere in objects, but is subjectively (and even schizophrenically) bestowed. Baudelaire is thus in an important sense the Martin Luther-Adam Smith-Sigmund Freud of poetry, an early champion of de-coding within poetry and aesthetics, and one representative of a world-historical transformation in this field just as Luther, Smith, and Freud were in theirs. (There is another, less flattering sense in which Baudelaire represents the Luther-Smith-Freud of poetry, however, to which I will return below.)

     

    It is this figure of Baudelaire as epitomizing a crucial turning-point in the history of Western culture at the emergence of modernism that the notion of de-coding enables us to recover from the so-called “rhetorical” school of deconstructive criticism. Members of this school–I am thinking in particular of Barbara Johnson, and her ground- breaking readings of matched pairs of Baudelaire poems10— were among the first to see important epistemological or ideological implications in the Jakobsonian distinction between metaphor and metonymy, when one or the other aspect of discourse predominates in a given literary text. In comparing verse and prose versions of the same poem, Johnson argued that metaphoric discourse–predominating in the verse poems–represents delusory adherence to the metaphysics of identity, while metonymic discourse– predominating in the prose poems–entails heroic acknowledgment of uncertainty, contingency, and flux. But this seminal insight is then immediately recontained as an undecidable binary opposition–metaphor and metonymy are legible in both verse and prose, she insists–lest it open onto the historical conclusion that Baudelaire’s poetics evolved from predominantly metaphoric to predominantly metonymic, and that this evolution aligns with his rejection of romanticism and the turn to modernism.

     

    This strategy of containment is based on a misreading of Jakobson–who would surely have been very unhappy to hear the rigorous distinction he proposed between metaphor and metonymy considered “undecidable.” According to Jakobson, the metaphoric axis of discourse is based on the identity or equivalence among terms as defined by the storehouse of the language-system functioning “in absentia” (as Saussure put it) “outside” the linear time of utterance. The metonymic axis, by contrast, sustains the process of combining different terms contiguously to form a chain of signification “within” time–that is, in the duration of utterance. The metaphoric axis is thus a function of the language-system, and appears to exist as a given, outside of time, in contrast to the metonymic axis which is precisely the sequentiality of actual discourse as it is produced in context and through time. Jakobson thus concludes that every sign used in discourse has “two sets of interpretants . . . the code and the context.”11 And we may surmise that when one set of interpretants diminishes in strength or importance, the other set will come to the fore.

     

    This is precisely what happens in Baudelaire: metaphoric poetics predominates in the early poetry, but gives way to metonymic poetics in the later poetry. The single Baudelaire poem everyone is likely to be most familiar with–“Correspondences”–is, ironically enough, the very poem against which nearly everything he later wrote is directed; it sums up a metaphoric poetics of romanticism expressing the harmonies enveloping man in nature outside of society and time–and it is this romantic poetics that is virulently rejected by Baudelairean modernism, where metonymic reference to the present moment and context prevail, instead.

     

    “Correspondences” appears in an introductory group of poems that treat the relation between the misunderstood artist and his philistine society: the ungainly poet is cruelly taunted by uncomprehending humanity in “The Albatross,” while in “Elevation” he soars high above the mortifying world of earthly existence and “effortlessly understands/ The language of flowers and all silent things” (lines 19-20). Such inspired communion with nature becomes the subject of the well-known fourth poem of the cycle, “Correspondences,” whose title and first phrase (“Nature is a temple . . .”) depict nature as a realm of equivalences between the divine and the human, a realm where everything ultimately appears to be just like everything else. The poem’s insistent use of metaphor and simile promotes a poetic vision able to unite interior and exterior, essence and appearance into an organic whole.

     

    In the opening poem of the following cycle, “Beauty,” things are very different. Where “Correspondences” abounds in metaphorical figures of equivalence, transparency, and wholeness, “Beauty” insists instead on metonymical figures of exteriority, mechanical causality, and comparisons of degree. The temptations of metaphor and simile are proferred, but ultimately refused, as the poem dictates a very different form of poetic investigation. The simile of the poem’s first line (“I am beautiful, o mortals, like a dream of stone”) is a case in point: a resemblance is proposed, but in terms so bewildering as to obscure the comparison they are supposed to serve. For what is so beautiful about a dream made of stone, or a dream about stone? We may be tempted to posit statuary as an interpretant for this opening simile: but then why does Beauty-as-statue inspire in poets a love that is “eternally mute, like matter” (line 4), as the closing simile of the first stanza puts it? A poetically fruitful comparison would surely not silence poets, who of all people should be able to give it voice.

     

    The opening simile of the second stanza reinforces these perplexities, by comparing beauty with a sphinx that is “incomprehensible” (line 5). And the strange juxtaposition in the next line (“I combine a heart of snow with the whiteness of swans” line 6) demonstrates how misleading external appearances may be: the swans’ whiteness, suggesting innocence and purity, covers a snowy-white heart of coldness and cruelty. By the time we reach the third stanza, correspondences between inside and outside have become completely undeterminable and appearances evidently deceiving: the poets remain transfixed by what Beauty calls her “grand poses” (grandes attitudes, line 9), but are completely unable to determine their authenticity. She appears, she says (line 10), to have borrowed them from the proudest monuments: if she has borrowed them, are they really hers? And if she hasn’t borrowed them, then why is she pretending to? No wonder the poets’ love remains eternally mute: their metaphors prove unable to determine Beauty’s true inner nature.

     

    Yet it turns out that the inaccessibility of Beauty’s essence enables her actual effectivity in the last stanza of the poem:

     

    For I have, to fascinate those docile admirers, Pure mirrors that render everything more beautiful: My eyes, my immense eyes of eternal light!(12-14)

     
    Her identity lost in questionable comparisons of metaphorical equivalence, Beauty’s effects on things are henceforth measured in metonymical comparisons of degree: she renders things more beautiful. It is not through essences that Beauty reaches poets, but through things; not by relations of interiority and transparency, but of exteriority and mechanical causality. Denied access by the “pure mirrors [of] her eyes” to Beauty’s essence, the poets remain fascinated by proliferating images of the more and more beautiful things illuminated by them.12

     

    Defying metaphoric appropriation and totalizing expression, Beauty is henceforth to be appreciated through her incremental effects on the external world. And indeed, in the subsequent poems of the cycle (especially “The Mask” and “Hymne to Beauty,” which Baudelaire added to the second edition of the collection), Beauty appears only in fragments and random images, valued not for her (or as an essence), but for her contingent impact on the poet. This metonymic poetics intensifies in the “Spleen” poems at the end of the first section of the collection, and reaches its zenith in the “Parisian Tableaus” section, with its insistent reference to scenes of Second Empire Paris, despite the agonizing inability to confer meaning on those scenes. The de-coding of metaphor, meaning, and identity thus fosters not sheer meaninglessness, “undecidability,” or the abyss, but rather metonymic reference to context–even if such reference must at the limit forgo any claim to stable meaning.13

     

    The poetics of metaphor and metonymy in Baudelaire therefore do not represent the poles of an undecidable binary opposition, but terms in an historical evolution from romanticism to modernism. Moreover, Baudelaire’s poetry does not merely reflect the processes of de-coding characteristic of modern capitalist society, it actively participates in them. It is true, of course, that Baudelaire’s life-span corresponds to the take-off period of modern French capitalism, with the banking elite coming to power in 1830, followed by the influx of Californian and Australian gold in 1849, and the founding of the first investment banks and the unification of markets by the rail system under Napoleon III in the 1850s and 60s. But even more important was Baudelaire’s personal investment in romantic-socialist hopes for the Revolution of 1848, which was to crown the revolutionary tradition by finally bringing true workers’ democracy to France. For when the radical- democratic ideals of 1848 are crushed by the coup d’etat of Napoleon in 1851, Baudelaire (among many others) responds by actively repudiating his adherence to those ideals and adopting instead a stance of cynical disdain for modern culture and society. Baudelaire’s modernism emerges here, as defensive repudiation of the romantic enthusiasm he once shared for the figures of nature, woman, and the people. So in this literary-critical context, the introduction of the notion of de-coding transforms the deconstructive binary opposition metaphor/metonymy into a historical matrix for understanding the emergence of modernism in Baudelaire as the metonymic de-coding of romantic metaphoricity in revenge for the shattered hopes and ideals of 1848.

     

    Central to Baudelaire’s evolution from romanticism to modernism is his notorious masochism, about which so much has been written (mostly from various psychoanalytic perspectives).14 Schizoanalysis will insist upon transforming masochism from a psychological into a socio- historical category, situating it in the period following the failures of the 1848 revolutions, when the literary works and essays of the “original” masochist, Leopold von Sacher-Masoch, were so popular throughout Europe. Here I refer to Deleuze’s study of Masoch, although it predates schizoanalysis and uses the discipline-bound terms “de- sexualization” and “re-sexualization” in place of de-coding and re-coding.15 To derive the specificity of real masochism from Masoch’s own literary oeuvre, Deleuze draws on the Freud of Beyond the Pleasure Principle, which explores the relationship between pleasure and repetition: what lies “beyond” the pleasure principle is not so much exceptions to it, but rather its grounding in repetition and the death instinct. Under the influence of the death instinct, even the pleasure-principle becomes, as Freud put it, “innately conservative”: repetition grounds the stimulus-binding energy that links present perception with memory-traces of past gratification, thus enabling the pleasure-principle to operate and govern behavior. Usually, repetition and pleasure work hand-in-glove: we repeat what has previously been found pleasurable, which is to say that present perception is eroticized or “sexualized” and governed “conservatively” by memories of gratifications past.

     

    But the relation of pleasure and repetition can vary: less usually, as in the case of trauma dreams, for instance, repetition operates independently of the pleasure-principle, “de-sexualizing” perception and repeating something not pleasurable, but extremely displeasurable, something traumatic. Here repetition is severed from drive- gratification, and serves instead as an ego-defense to reduce anxiety, by developing ex post facto the stimulus- binding recognition-function whose absence occasioned the trauma in the first place. Still less usually, as in the case of perversion, the de-sexualization of perception is accompanied by the re-sexualization of repetition itself: instead of repeating what was initially found pleasurable, pleasure is derived from whatever is repeated. Now we might well expect desperate measures for reducing anxiety to proliferate in a de-coded Symbolic Order, which no longer protects the psyche from traumatic stimuli by binding them according to established codes of meaning. But the question remains: how can the repetition of pain, of all things– and especially one’s own pain–reduce anxiety and procure pleasure? Here, Deleuze invokes the conclusion of Reik’s clinical study of masochism: accepting punishment for the desired act before it occurs effectively resolves guilt and anxiety about the act, thereby sanctioning its consummation.16 But he then goes on to ask, why would preliminary punishment serve the end of obtaining pleasure? Under what conditions does this masochistic narrative-kernel (punishment-before -> pleasure-after) become effective? This is where analysis of Masoch’s fiction proves illuminating.

     

    Masoch’s hero typically arranges a mock contract according to which he willingly suffers regular and systematic domination and punishment at the hands of a beautiful woman. The functions of this fantasy-contract are several: first of all, it reduces anxiety about punishment by meticulously specifying when, where, and how such punishment is to be carried out; secondly, it explicitly excludes the Father, the usual authority-figure, and transfers his Symbolic authority to the woman; then, by actively soliciting punishment, the contract invalidates the Symbolic authority responsible for the suffering incurred: since the punishment is undeserved, blame falls on the figure meting it out, instead. With the Father-figure excluded and his authority denied, the masochist hero ends up enjoying relations with the woman which the Father normally prohibits. In the context of mid-19th century France, this fantasy-scenario presents an allegory of the anti-authoritarian ideals of 1848, with the de-coding of the Father-figure in Louis-Philippe accompanied by re-coding on the Mother-figure of Marianne and the Second Republic.

     

    Yet, in a way Deleuze does not fully appreciate, the masochistic scenario just described is in Masoch’s fiction embedded within a narrative that produces results very different from the utopian ideal projected by the contract. In Masoch’s stories, the Father-figure supposedly excluded from the fantasy-contract suddenly re-appears, and is in fact joined by the woman in administering new forms of torture that exceed and thus break the terms of the contract. So at the end of Masoch’s stories, the masochistic fantasy-scenario crumbles, leaving the hero with a galling sense of having been duped and a bitter desire for revenge. And the ex-masochist hero in Masoch’s stories indeed takes his revenge, with a ferocity bordering on sadism. The conclusion of Masochian narrative thus represents not the anti-authoritarian utopia of idealized relations with the ideal Mother-figure, as pictured in the masochistic scenario, but rather a vitriolic and often violent cynic who now despises anyone (even or most of all himself) foolish enough to have taken his ideals and desires for reality. Such is the story that Masoch told–and that his innumerable readers throughout late-19th century Europe read–over and over and over again: as in a trauma-dream, this compulsion to repeat represents defensive preparation for a cataclysmic event…that has already occurred. And for Baudelaire, as for so many of his French contemporaries, the real event that represents as it were the return of the Father ruining the Mother-and-son’s anti- authoritarian utopia, is the incredible rise to power and coup d’etat of Napoleon III, the founding of the authoritarian Second Empire on the ruins of the democratic Second Republic.

     

    What’s more, anyone familiar with biographies of Baudelaire will recognize this story of the return-of-the- Father destroying the Mother-and-son’s idyllic utopia as a repetition, from Baudelaire’s own childhood, of his mother’s remarriage to an ambitious young military officer several years after the death of Baudelaire’s real father: this uncanny “coincidence” is for schizoanalysis what made Baudelaire the lyric poet of his age, to paraphrase Walter Benjamin. In schizoanalytic terms, then, “masochism” is not the name of a psychological category, but a historical strategy for de-coding social authority while transforming romantic idealism into the disillusioned cynicism of modernism.

     

    This is not to say that the evolution from romanticism to modernism in Baudelaire can be understood as some kind of linear progression from metaphor to metonymy: metaphor doesn’t simply disappear, but reappears in Baudelairean modernism transformed by metonymization into a corrosive irony.17 Our account of the de-coding of modernism in Baudelaire, meanwhile, remains still too abstract as long as metonymy as a free form of desire induced by the market and metonymization as a formal development of Baudelairean poetics are linked by mere parallelism: Lacan’s and Johnson’s quite different transformations of Jakobson’s concept of metonymy must be completed and brought to bear on the evolution of Baudelairean poetics as a whole (not restricted to individual poems or pairs of poems, as in Johnson and in Jakobson himself). Here, Walter Benjamin’s own historicization of psychoanalysis via a reading of Baudelaire constitutes an invaluable point of departure. What Benjamin saw was that Baudelaire’s best poetry was formulated as a defense against the traumatic shocks typical of urban life in the de-coded Symbolic Order of nascent capitalism. Baudelaire’s shock-defense takes two forms, which correspond to the title of the well-known first section of The Flowers of Evil, “Spleen and Ideal.” “Ideal” designates a metaphoric defense that re-codes potentially traumatic experience in the nostalgic terms of a lost yet rememorable harmony with nature outside of time (as in “Former Life,” for example); “Spleen” designates a metonymic defense that defuses potential trauma simply by locating an experience as precisely as possible in time (see “The Clock”)–though at the cost, Benjamin suggests, of robbing it of any lyric content.18

     

    As invaluable as it is, Benjamin’s reading overlooks the importance of the prose poem collection and even of the “Tableaux Parisiens” section added after “Spleen and Ideal” to the second edition of The Flowers of Evil–where a very different form of poetics and response to market de- coding prevail. What Benjamin didn’t see is that cycles of protective re-coding alternate with cycles of exhilarated de-coding in the verse collection, as the poet alternately seeks out and then withdraws from contact with the Real. Nor was he able to appreciate the way in which the predominance of metonymic poetics transforms the cycles of de-coding and re-coding in the verse collection into simultaneous re-coding and de-coding in the individual poems of the prose collection, as the high-anxiety trauma and shock-defenses of earlier work give way in the later work to a very different defense based on psychic splitting.

     

    Historically speaking, once ambient de-coding reaches a certain threshold of intensity, whatever stability and coherence the ego may have possessed dis-integrate, and the unstable, split subjectivity of so-called borderline conditions replaces oedipal neurosis as the predominant form of psychological disturbance–as nearly all the post- Freudian psychoanalytic literature from Fenichel to Kristeva and Kernberg attests.19 But in the case of Baudelaire, who after all experienced de-coding at a considerably earlier stage of capitalist development, there had to have been a precipitating cause for severe splitting: it was, as I have suggested, his experience of Napoleon’s coup d’etat, which shook Baudelaire’s psychic structure to its foundations and propelled him from a relatively stable romanticism, through masochism, and into the supremely flexible, if not indeed self-contradictory, borderline condition characteristic of his modernism.20 Borderline conditions by themselves, however (and regardless of the degree to which Baudelaire “actually” lived or “merely” staged them in his poetry21), are not sufficient to account for Baudelairean modernism; there had to have been some figure to serve as ego-ideal around which a new, post- romantic personality could form, in order to sustain and sanction the enduring ambitions of Baudelaire the writer: this figure, it turns out, was Edgar Allan Poe. Identification with Poe as a fellow writer shunned by contemporary society fosters a narcissistic reaction to the underlying borderline condition, so that the extreme instability and psychic splitting characteristic of the latter become a new form of defense.

     

    This is the stance that emerges in the “Parisian Tableaus” section of the second edition of The Flowers of Evil; it is epitomized in “The Game” (“Le Jeu”), in which the poet sees himself in a dream sitting off in a corner at a gambling-house, silently watching the players and whores feverishly pursuing their ends, and is shocked that he actually envies them their “tenacious passion”:

     

    I saw myself, off in a corner of the grim gambling-den,
    Leaning on my elbows, silent, cold, and envious,
    Envying the gamblers their tenacious passion,
    The old whores their dismal gaiety.
    And all of them cheerfully selling, right in front of me,
    One, his long-held honor, the other her good looks!
     
    And my heart was alarmed at my envy of these poor souls
    Racing zealously toward the gaping abyss,
    Who, drunk with their own passion, in the end all liked
    Pain better than death and hell better than nothingness!(15-24)

     
    Not only is the poet only an observer within the dream (lines 15-16), but he then takes his distance from this dream-self, cynically demystifying in waking consciousness the very passions he envied in the dream (lines 21-24).

     

    Such splitting appears even more starkly in the figure of the prose poem narrator, for whom it serves to establish a more or less comfortable distance from scenes of former selves in degraded commercial context–former selves (romantic idealists, most notably) who have been split off from the observing narrator yet retain a certain fascination as objects of his rapt attention and of poetic depiction.22 This narrative stance is most clearly illustrated in “Loss of a halo,” where the de-coding of romantic views of the poet’s vocation, already accomplished on the level of poetics in “Beauty,” has become an explicit prose theme. In a brothel, the narrator runs into an acquaintance who expresses surprise at finding the illustrious poet in such a mauvais lieu. The poet immediately launches into a long explanation of why he is there: while dodging on-coming traffic on his way across the boulevard, his halo dropped in the mud; not having the courage to retrieve it, he decided it would be better to lose his insignia than to break his neck. Then, looking on the bright side, he realized he could now “stroll about incognito, do nasty things, and indulge in vulgar behavior just like ordinary mortals.” The acquaintance expects him to advertise to get his halo back, but the poet will have none of it: dignity bores him, and now he gets to enjoy himself. Besides, he imagines the fun he will have if some scribbler picks it up and dares to put it on: “What a pleasure to make someone happy!–especially someone who would make me laugh! Think of X, or Z! Wouldn’t that be droll!” Here we see the narrator exercising an invidious superiority over his interlocutor and other writers who still believe in the “aura” of an older, romantic version of the poet, one the narrator has left behind.

     

    But this sense of superiority, it turns out, was not a given but an achievement, and was in fact achieved at the expense of Baudelaire himself in an earlier incarnation. For the journal anecdote on which the poem is based reads very differently from the published version: here, the narrator does recover the halo, and still values it highly enough to consider even its momentary loss a bad omen.23 The lost halo, in this light, would be precisely the one awarded the romantic poet of “Benediction” for his suffering at the beginning of The Flowers of Evil. This idealistic self has in the final version completely disappeared beneath the narrator’s cynicism, having been projected onto X, Z, and the interlocutor, all of whom continue to value the outmoded ideal. Moreover, the loss of the halo is now not merely the subject of a story: it is an event recounted by a narrator to a listener within the poem; it has become an occasion for the narrator to attain a position of superiority over his fictional audience. And he is now at one remove from the experience: Baudelaire has transmuted the original account and the uneasy feeling it provoked into the snide banter of a world-weary and slightly sullied roue, and in the process utterly rejected the romantic ideal of the poet he himself once espoused, if not embodied. Such a position of serene indifference or actual disdain for cultural ideals characterizes Baudelairean modernism at its apogee. And yet…and yet….

     

    And yet there are at least two senses in which Baudelaire’s prose poem collection goes far beyond the split stance of the modernism adumbrated in the “Tableaux Parisiens”–far enough, perhaps, to attain a certain postmodernism. For one thing, although Baudelaire’s identification with Poe as martyr to a philistine society was supposed to elevate him above the crass world of commerce and mass-democratic society, the modernist poetics he developed turned out to be strictly complicitous with the capitalist market. By locating aesthetic value solely in the activity of poetic appropriation and distancing himself from the objects of that appropriation, Baudelaire comes to occupy the position of what Jacques Attali calls the “designer” or “programmer,” whose basic function within capitalism is to endow more or less worthless objects (such as “designer-jeans”) with semiotic surplus-value in order to enable the realization of economic surplus-value by promoting their purchase by consumers; the most familiar form of programming, in other words, is advertising.24 This is the second sense in which Baudelaire can be considered the Martin Luther/Adam Smith/Sigmund Freud of poetry, for each of these figures, too, re-imposed a moment of re-coding on the radical indeterminacy of de-coding, according to Deleuze and Guattari: Luther re-codes pure religiosity onto Scripture; Adam Smith re-codes abstract labor-power onto capital; Freud re-codes polymorphous libido onto the Oedipus complex. Baudelaire, similarly, re-codes an increasingly metonymic poetics onto the prose poem narrator-as-programmer.

     

    Inasmuch as Baudelaire’s mature poetics functions in this way to valorize from the re-coded perspective of the borderline-narcissist narrator various forms of de-coded experience that have been distanced or rendered virtually meaningless in themselves, it acts in complicity with and even as a prototype for the kinds of debased commercial activity modernism was to have rejected and risen above. And this is a complicity that Baudelaire himself acknowledges in the prose poem entitled “The Cake,” where inflated rhetoric endows a nearly worthless scrap of bread with so much semiotic surplus-value that it becomes the prized object of a fratricidal war.25 Such recognition of the ultimate inseparability of high and low culture, of aesthetics and marketing, has become a hallmark of what we today call the postmodern condition–in large part because modernist “defamiliarization” has indeed become the all too familiar marketing strategy Baudelaire “foresaw” it could, now used for selling everything from standard-brand beer to haute couture perfume.

     

    And yet it must be said at the same time that Baudelaire never whole-heartedly adopts the aloof and superior position of the modernist programmer: an abiding sympathy for his idealistic former selves remains a central feature of the prose poem collection, visible in the narrator’s recurring shock of recognition that the poor victims of commerce and philistinism he has been watching from a distance are none other than the poet himself. Nowhere in the prose poem collection is this more poignantly depicted than in “The Old Clown,” in which the narrator happens across an aged carnival clown sitting alone, ignored by the joyous throngs surrounding him. While observing him, the narrator suddenly “feels his throat wrung by the terrible hand of hysteria,” and when he tries to “analyze [his] sudden grief,” he realizes he has just seen an image of “the aging man of letters who has outlived the generation he had so brilliantly amused; [an image] of the old poet bereft of friends, family, children, worn out by poverty and the public’s ingratitude”–an image, that is to say, of his very self. Whereas the narrator of poems such as “Loss of a halo” (and “The Projects”) manages to retain or quickly regain his composure in the face of former selves, defensive splitting in many other poems (including “A Heroic Death” as well as “The Old Clown”) fails abruptly, putting the narrator back into agonzing contact with romantic ideals that are alive in memory despite their historical defeat (which is the theme of the prose poem entitled “Which one is the true one?”).26

     

    To be sure, there is a tendency in Baudelaire to repudiate the romantic narrative of French history as progress toward social democracy in the name of modernism, a tendency to transform erstwhile idealism into pure cynicism. What could be more cynical than to capitalize on the defeat of one’s ideals by adopting the position of programmer and contributing to the realization of surplus-value, including and especially one’s own? Such borderline-narcissist cynicism, incidentally, is precisely the stance of Baudelaire’s current-day, American avatar, Madonna, who acts out degraded split-off selves who she knows will shock and sell, but always from an ironic distance that leaves her integrity as programmer and her command of a share of the profits intact.27 But Baudelaire, it seems to me, never quite occupies such a position. And this is not just because (as Bataille reminds us28) he represents in material terms a colossal failure as the “lyric poet of high capitalism”–unlike Madonna. It is because, however much Baudelaire repudiates narrative and history, he never manages to completely hide his profound sympathy and lasting identification with the victims of the capitalist market: he never fully occupies the modernism he himself invented.

     

    Is such identification with the victims on Baudelaire’s part a mere vestige of his erstwhile romanticism? Biographically speaking, perhaps so. But I would argue that it becomes available or interesting to us under specifically postmodern conditions, when we become willing or able to see more in Baudelaire than the invention of modernism for which he has been canonized. Surely his recognition of the potential of modernist poetry for market programming has little enough to do with romanticism, and everything to do with postmodernism today. In any case, the anti- universalizing and anti-individualist principles of schizoanalysis suggest a version of literary reception theory (akin to Benjamin’s “redemptive” literary history) according to which a process of socio-historical rather than narrowly psychological transference will make certain features of a literary work become visible when changed circumstances bring one historical moment into unexpected alignment with another.29 In this light, as our postmodernism rejoins Baudelaire’s pre- and/or post- modernism by means of such historical transference, modernism appears in between as an attempt to capitalize on market reification itself, with its segregation of formal innovation in the restricted sphere of high culture from homogenizing repetition in the general cultural sphere, as a vehicle or opportunity for aesthetic development.30 And it would appear by now that this attempt has, if not failed in some simple and total way, then certainly run its course, accomplished all that it can–and is therefore being surpassed.

     

    Antonio Negri has, to my mind, proposed the most acute way to situate this historical reconstruction of the relation between the premodern, modern, and postmodern in a figure such as Baudelaire: in terms of the difference between merely formal subsumption and real subsumption of labor by capital.31 If, as Marx said, society sets itself only the tasks it is able to accomplish, then we may understand the kinds of formal freedom and equality associated with romanticism, the sovereign individual, and representative democracy, along with the kinds of formal innovation associated with modernism, as historically necessary and indeed fruitful stages in the development of modern culture, but stages which have by now been superceded, as the full socialization of production under conditions of real subsumption renders the individual romantic subject obsolete, and calls for new developments in collective freedom, substantive equality, and general cultural innovation alike. In this light, “The Voyage” (the concluding poem of the second edition of The Flowers of Evil) might be understood to prefigure, in its insistence on the value of unending travel for its own sake, the notion of permanent revolution as it appears on the historical horizon once capitalism has exhausted all of its positive potential–and more specifically to prefigure, in its strategic use of the anti-lyrical, plural personal pronoun “we” throughout, the kind of collective nomadism on a new earth that Deleuze and Guattari envisage in the Anti- Oedipus as the next stage of social development.32

     

    Notes

     

    1. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, The Anti-Oedipus (New York: Viking, 1977) and Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? (Paris: Minuit, 1991).

     

    2. On the differences between philosophical concepts and scientific “functives” (fonctifs), see Chapter 5 of Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?. While not Deleuze and Guattari’s own, I have found the term “transformers” useful for capturing the operational value of Deleuzo-Guattarian concepts; so has Reda Bensma, in “Les transformateurs- Deleuze ou le cinema comme automate spirituel,” forthcoming.

     

    3. This would be the “utopian” dimension of the philosophical concepts deployed in the Anti-Oedipus, according to Qu’est-ce que la philosophie? (95).

     

    4. On the relations of the Anti-Oedipus to May 68, see my “Schizoanalysis: the Postmodern Contextualization of Psychoanalysis” in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, Nelson and Grossberg, eds. (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 405-416, esp. 415. For a fuller treatment than is possible here of the evolution of Baudelairean poetics from the perspective of schizoanalysis, see my Baudelaire and Schizoanalysis: the Sociopoetics of Modernism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

     

    5. On the concept of friend and concepts as friends, see Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?, 8-10 and Chapter 3, “Les personnages conceptuels”. On “milieu,” see Gilles Deleuze and Claire Parnet, Dialogues (Paris: Flammarion, 1977), 69 and passim; and Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?, 94-96.

     

    6. The Anti-Oedipus, 271.

     

    7. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, “The Communist Manifesto” in Marx and Engels: Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, Lewis Feuer, ed. (Garden City: Doubleday, 1959) 6-41; the quotation is from p.10.

     

    8. The Anti-Oedipus, 176-77; for a similar discussion of the relation between philosophy and the limits of capitalism, see Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?, 92-97.

     

    9. “I have kneaded mud and made it into gold” (my translation), Oeuvres Completes (Paris: Seuil, 1968), 763.

     

    10. Barbara Johnson, Defigurations du langage poetique: la seconde revolution baudelairienne (Paris: Flammarion, 1979), 31-55; and The Critical Difference (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), 23-48.

     

    11. Roman Jakobson, “Two Aspects of Language and Two Types of Aphasic Disturbance” in Fundamentals of Language (with Morris Halle) (The Hague: Mouton, 1956), 67-96; the quotation is from page 75.

     

    12. For a more complete comparison of the poetics of “Correspondences” and “Beauty,” see Baudelaire and Schizoanalysis, Chapter 2.

     

    13. On the metonymic poetics of the “spleen” poems and the “Parisian Tableaus,” see Baudelaire and Schizoanalysis, Chapters 3 and 5. On metonymic or “indexical” reference to context in Baudelairean modernism, see Ross Chambers, Melancolie et opposition: les debuts du modernisme en France (Paris: Jose Corti, 1987).

     

    14. On Baudelaire’s masochism, see Rene Laforgue, The Defeat of Baudelaire (London: Hogarth, 1932); Jean-Paul Sartre, Baudelaire (Paris: Gallimard, 1947); and Leo Bersani, Baudelaire and Freud (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).

     

    15. Gilles Deleuze, Presentation de Sacher-Masoch (Paris: Minuit, 1967).

     

    16. Theodor Reik, Masochism in Modern Man (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1941).

     

    17. For another, quite different account of metaphor in modernism, see David Lodge, The Modes of Modern Writing: Metaphor, Metonymy, and the Typology of Modern Literature (London: Edward Arnold, 1977); Lodge draws exclusively on Jakobson for his understanding of metaphor and metonymy, and not at all on Lacan.

     

    18. Walter Benjamin, Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism (London: Verso/New Left Books, 1973).

     

    19. Otto Fenichel, “Ego-Disturbances and their Treatment,” in Collected Papers, 2 Vols. (New York: Norton, 1953-54), Vol. 2, 109-28; Otto Kernberg, Borderline Conditions and Pathological Narcissism (New York: Jason Aronson, 1975); Julia Kristeva, “Within the Microcosm of ‘The Talking Cure’,” in Interpreting Lacan, Smith and Kerrigan, eds., Psychiatry and the Humanities Vol. 6 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), 33-48.

     

    20. “With all the talk of rights these days, there’s one that everyone has forgotten about . . . the right to contradict oneself” (my translation) Oeuvres Completes, 291. On the contradictory nature of modernism, see Charles Bernheimer, Figures of Ill Repute: Representing Prostitution in Nineteenth-Century France (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989).

     

    21. As Leo Bersani put it, “I don’t mean that Baudelaire was psychotic when he wrote these poems; he does, however, seem to have represented in them a psychotic relation to the world.” Baudelaire and Freud (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 128.

     

    22. For a fuller discussion of narrative splitting in a broader range of prose poems, see Baudelaire and Schizoanalysis, Chapters 6 and 7.

     

    23. The anecdote is found in “Fusees” #11, Oeuvres Completes, 627.

     

    24. Jacques Attali, Noise: the Political Economy of Music (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), esp. 128-32.

     

    25. For a more complete reading of “The Cake,” see Baudelaire and Schizoanalysis, Chapter 7.

     

    26. For discussions of “Which one is the true one?” “A Heroic Death,” and “The Projects” along these lines, see Baudelaire and Schizoanalysis, Chapter 6.

     

    27. See David Tetzlaff, “Metatextual Girl: patriarchy -> postmodernism -> power -> money -> Madonna,” forthcoming; and my “Baudelaire’s Madonna and Ours,” forthcoming.

     

    28. See his essay on Baudelaire in Literature and Evil (London: Calder and Boyars, 1973).

     

    29. On “historical transference” of this kind, see Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” in Illuminations, Hannah Arendt, ed. (New York: Schocken, 1969), 253-64; Michel de Certeau, The Writing of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988); Dominick LaCapra, Soundings in Critical Theory (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); and the preface to Baudelaire and Schizoanalysis.

     

    30. On the general and restricted spheres of culture, see Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: a social critique of the judgment of taste (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984).

     

    31. See Antonio Negri, Marx Beyond Marx: Lessons on the Grundrisse (New York: Bergin and Garvey, 1984); and The Politics of Subversion: A Manifesto for the Twenty-First Century (London: Polity Press [Basil Blackwell], 1989), especially Chapter 3, “From the mass worker to the socialized worker–and beyond” and Chapter 13, “Postmodern.”

     

    32. On the “new earth,” see the Anti-Oedipus, 35, 131, 318-22, 367-82; and Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?, 95; on nomadism as permanent revolution, see my “Schizoanalysis: the Postmodern Contextualization of Psychoanalysis,” esp. 407.

     

  • On The Bull’s Horn with Peter Handke: Debates, Failures, Essays, and a Postmodern Livre de Moi

    Stephanie Hammer

    Department of Literature and Languages
    University of California, Riverside

    HAMM@ucrac2.ucr.edu

    The time is past when we can plant ourselves in front of a Vernet and sigh along with Diderot, “How beautiful, grand, varied, noble, wise, harmonious, rigorously colored this is!”

     

    (Lyotard, “Contribution to an Idea of Postmodernity”)

     

    What a wise and beautiful book . . . .

     

    (Erich Skwara’s review of the Essay on Fatigue)

     

    Today what subject would the great metaphysical narrative tell about? Would it be the odyssey and for what narratee?

     

    (Lyotard, “Contribution to an Idea of Postmodernity”)

     

    We are dealing with another one of those postmodern texts in which a funky object de pop-art serves as the pretext for self-reflexive excursions through the time and space of memory . . . .

     

    (Theodore Ziolkowski’s review of the Essay on the Jukebox)

     

    Autobiography is abject unless, in the words of Michel Leiris, it exposes itself to the “bull’s horn.”

     

    (Ihab Hassan, “Parabiography”)

     

    This essay obeys two imperatives;1 it is being torn in two directions: a critique of Handke’s critical reception as it pertains to the postmodern and a close read- ing of Handke’s recent Essay Versuch) series. I will allow my text to tear, and rather than suturing it together, I display, in advance, the wound that cannot–at least in this space–be closed. As a tribute to and as a critical apparatus for Handke, I will allow it to split, to be uncertain, to be ambivalent. This move will court failure and ensure insufficiency, but it might “correct” the flatness of most Handke criticism: the thematic studies, the stylistic studies, the countless influence studies on him, and more insidiously, the frequent, incestuous comparisons of him with himself. I will try to show that, for the most part, the articles and books on him cannot understand his work because they would master it (with all that such a term implies), and as Handke’s texts resist such hermeneutic sub- jugation, his critics have often descended either to righteous indignation or into summary and description2 –colorless repetitions of the objects which they want to comprehend but cannot fasten upon. Can one surrender without submitting to the writing of Peter Handke? Can one’s own writing on him allow itself to be gored by his textual challenges to authority and reconstitute itself through that (fatal? pleasurable?) blow to its own integrity? Perhaps.

     

    In his turning-point exercise of the mid 70’s, The Weight of the World Das Gewicht der Welt), Peter Handke exerted a renewed resistance to the narrative tyrannies of form, which he at once invoked and subverted in such novels as The Goalie’s Anxiety at the Penalty Kick and Short Letter, Long Farewell. In Weight he rehearsed the Russian Formalist view of contemporary society gone numb, but rather than just making language “strange”, he exploded the diaristic form (that humble, non-literary history of the every day that anyone can produce) into an elusive encyclopedia of linguistic snippets–autobiographical sound bytes which might contain information, citation, observation, opinion, dream, or memory. Indeed, as several critics have noted (among them Axel Gellhaus and Peter Putz) most of Handke’s output during that decade consisted of narrative forms made difficult by a perceptual loss of one kind or another which they simultaneously narrated and enacted. But The Weight of the World radicalized the problem of narrative; it documented the author’s hardening refusal to tell, and harnessed that refusal to both a utopian dream of a new mythology and an ironic critique of language practices, including and especially his own.

     

    Much critical energy has already been expended on Handke’s evolution during the 60’s and 70’s, so I will not retread that familiar territory here, although I will, inevitably, refer to it. Instead I would examine an apparent problem–namely the fact that, as difficult as Handke’s narrative forms have always been for even the most agile of critical readers, his prose works of the past decade seem, unbelievably enough, to pose even more daunting challenges. As examples of this new difficulty I will read the trilogy (at the time of writing) of slim volumes entitled Essays produced by Handke in the late 80’s and early 90’s against a variety of concerns, including the resonance of that father-essayist, Montaigne. But before doing this, I am compelled to dismantle the discussions of Handke’s “difficulty” during the past decade–a difficulty which has been discussed, increasingly, in terms of the author’s postmodern affiliations–hence the oppositional pairings of Lyotard and Hassan with recent reviews of Handke’s works by way of preface to my own problematic/problematized “essay.”

     

    What is the origin and history of this connection? Handke’s relation with the postmodern was first articulated by the Klinkowitz/Knowlton book Peter Handke and the Postmodern Transformation in 1983. In a brief opening chapter on postmodern art, that book aligned Handke’s work of the 60’s and 70’s with that of Jacques Derrida (assuming, by implication, a congruence between deconstruction and the postmodern [3-6]), and it argued for a view of Handke’s corpus from 1966 to 1981 along a trajectory which shifted from negative to positive poles of postmodern aesthetics (Klinkowitz and Knowlton, 128-9); the book’s conclusion also made a quick appeal to the category of “new Sensibility”– ostensibly as a corrective to Manfred Durzak’s deployment, a year earlier, of “neue Subjektivitat” in a hostile reading of Handke’s repeated usage of autobiographical material. Ten years later, the Klinkowitz/Knowlton perspective looks simplistic when compared to the complex theoretical dis- cussions of postmodernity offered by Hassan and Hutcheon, among others, but the book’s attempt to move Handke out of the prisonhouse of Austro-German literary traditions was brave and continues to be valuable. Yet, far from being settled, the question of Handke’s connections to postmodernism/ity has taken on an odd intensity and a kind of built-in futility in subsequent discussions. This is, for example, the essential non-dynamic which characterizes Norbert Gabriel’s 1991 essay on Handke’s recent prose work; tellingly, the essay raises and then defers the question of Handke’s place to an unwilling conclusion that the Austrian author’s works, unpleasant as they are to read, are in fact “not bad books.”

     

    The lofty tone of Gabriel’s pronouncements and the strategic use of the issue of postmodernity to damn Handke with faint praise are, I think, symptomatic of a theoretical tack which has proven at least as problematic as the problem it wants to solve; namely, the question of Handke and the postmodern has provided critics with an outlet for an anxiety-ridden false debate about his aesthetic worth, as though the question of his place, once settled, could somehow legitimize (or more likely invalidate) his writing practices once and for all. The gesture of invoking the postmodern works in paradoxical ways in assessments of Handke; sometimes it might imply a comforting, and curious understanding of postmodernism as part of an aesthetic/ethical/political duality wherein it must play the part of the good, the beautiful, the true, and the politically progressive to modernism’s shopworn aesthetic program–a duality which ringingly repeats the binarism of classic/romantic.3

     

    This is the agenda of Hans Joseph Ortheil, who uses an earlier, postmodern Handke to condemn the work of the later, reactionary Handke in Die Zeit Die Zeit 24.4, 1987). Such an outlook also indirectly informs the article of Eva- Maria Metcalf, who argues that Handke is an arrogant, impotent modernist: “in 1967 Peter Handke built himself an ivory tower, and he has resided in it ever since” (369). But elsewhere, as in Ziolkowski’s review, the “fact” of Handke’s postmodern aesthetic becomes a way to dismiss him as unoriginal, leaving Erich Skwara the uncomfortable task of defending Handke’s essay on fatigue through an appeal to neo-romantic accolades which would (while they seemingly challenge Lyotard’s contentions) rehabilitate the con- temporary author into a reincarnation of Hugo von Hofmannsthal, or worse, Goethe. Finally, there are those like Handke’s French apologist/translator G.-A. Goldschmidt, who insist on Handke’s essential realistic simplicity, all the while offering a “modest” commentary of 200 pages (supplemented by photographs and utterances of Handke) to assist in this easy enterprise.

     

    The only person who comes close to articulating the relationship between Handke and the postmodern is Diane Shooman, who boldly compares Handke’s work to Ulysses, Wordsworth, and contemporary painting, and then challenges the Handke/Derrida congruence proposed by Klinkowitz and Knowlton (Shooman 94). She does something else remarkable and controversial; she compares Handke’s work, primarily, to that of a female painter–highlighting, by implication, an aspect of his work which had heretofore gone unnoticed: the gender trouble at work in his writing, and its specifically “feminine” markers (when she presented this analysis at the Modern Austrian Literature Conference a few years ago, it was vociferously decried by practically everyone in the room).4

     

    For the most part, Handke’s critical reception veers between an angry dismissal which openly hates what he does and a swooning, predominantly masculine, denial which buries whatever the books might really up to.5 He is postmodern when he writes badly, and he is a bad writer because he is not postmodern. He is difficult, he is almost unreadable (Michael Hofmann TLS), he is arch (J.J. White TLS), he is in a literary cul-de-sac (Anthony Vivis TLS); or he writes books which are our “friends” (Skwara) and which are glowing and moving classics (Volker Hage, blurb on Versuch uber die Jukebox, on the last page of Versuch uber den gegluckten Tag, excerpted from Die Zeit). These discussions about Handke contrast so profoundly with the statements of both theoreticians and ex- plicators of the postmodern such as Ihab Hassan and Steven Connor (who simply include Handke on a list of postmodern writers [Hassan 85; Connor 123] without further comment), that I cannot help asking, as does Warren Montag in his angry indictment of the postmodern debate, what lies be- hind this vociferous, yet strangely off-kilter posturing. What is at stake in these critical (mis)readings of Peter Handke?6

     

    Much. First, Handke has succeeded too well in the formalist challenge which I invoked earlier; he makes the forms so difficult that we feel the difficulty, rather than the feeling, and get deflected by the perception rather than examining (or sharing) the mood which informs it. Second, Handke enrages German critics and American critics alike, because his recent writing repeatedly indicts Austro-German culture, while at the same time using an increasingly high- style literary language that represents, for Wim Wenders at least, “the most beautiful German written nowadays” (Kunzel 212)–as though Kafka were channeling the spirit of Goethe to write “In the Penal Colony.” Third, he plays a scary, threatening game with male subjectivity, and his recent works are disturbing and destabilizing in ways that his early plays and novels rarely were, for all their violent histrionics, and it is this aspect of his work that his defenders most want to deny.7 These threats against male subjectivity are important in another, more immediate way, for they are vocationally and practically, as well as psychically, troubling to literary professionals. By their very nature, Handke’s games with the male subject undermine any “penetrating” analysis which would get to the core of his writing, and so the greatest danger that Handke’s writing incurs on the critic is the almost certain invalidation of the literary-critical project itself, as it is usually constructed; there is throughout Handke’s recent work a questioning of the critical stance as such, and, more precisely, the form through which that stance attempts to legitimize itself and ensure its authority. That form is the essay, and it is no coincidence, both that the essay is the genre of choice for Handke in his work of the late 80’s and early 90’s, and that critical essays about him seem so often doomed to failure. More productive, clearly, would be to shift the ground for the discussion entirely, as Alice Kuzniar has already provisionally done in her powerful Lacanian reading of Across. Her analysis of Handke in terms of the Lacanian “gaze” and what she calls Handke’s “Antwortblick” (seeing oneself being seen [Kuzniar 357]) furthers the critical conversation’s migration out of Germanistik, toward a different realm of poststructuralist theory (psychoanalysis rather than deconstruction) as it pertains to the visual in general and the cinematic in par- ticular–concerns, which as she observes, are sources of continuing interest in Handke’s writing.

     

    But before sketching out the critical venue opened, not only by this shift into visual media, but more importantly, by her invocation of the word “desire” (the ramifications of which Kuzniar does not pursue in her essay), I want to address this difficulty of Handke’s place one more time. The problem is, the non-debate notwithstanding, a fertile one because it points both to the specialness of Handke’s project and to the impossibility of “defining” the postmodern. This impossibility becomes both clear and humorous when, we think of Handke’s aesthetic practices, not against a definition or in terms of a category, into which we must forcibly stuff his corpus, but rather, with the ponderings of Lyotard, who has discussed the postmodern within the following, very large parameters8:

     

    The powers of sensing and phrasing are being probed on the limits of what is possible . . . . Experiments are being made. This is our postmodernity's entire vocation . . . . Today's art consists in exploring things unsayable and things invisible. Strange machines are assembled, where what we didn't have the idea of saying or the mat- ter for feeling can make itself heard and experienced.("Contribution to an Idea of Postmodernity" 190)

     
    This non-definition might certainly adhere to Handke’s writing of the 80’s, where he writes repeatedly about the marginal (the threshold in Across), the invisible, the unsayable, and the downright absent, and this fascination with the presence of absence and with the limits/possibilities of repeatability (overtly marked by such titles as Absence and Repetition) expresses itself most typically in Handke’s Essay on the Jukebox Versuch uber die Jukebox), where the quest of the medieval romance is transmogrified into a writer’s futile meanderings in the Spanish countryside, as he looks repeatedly for a jukebox, and for a hotel room that he can be comfortable in.

     

    But listen to how Lyotard describes the postmodern’s adversary–classical aesthetics:

     

    an aesthetics stemming from Hegel, for whom what was at stake was indeed "experience" in the sense of a passion of the spirit traversing perceptible forms in order to arrive at the total expression of self in the discourse of the philosopher . . . . It can indeed be said that there is no longer any experience in this sense . . . . (191)

     
    Here again we find Handke, for this is precisely the challenge to which he returns over and over again–the challenge to create a new narrative and a new experience which will rectify and make good the very real loss of the feeling of experience; Handke’s writing elaborately and ironically mourns the irrecuperability of traditional, western subjectivity as he uses that grief-ritual to look beyond it (as in Nova’s speech at the end of Beyond the Villages Uber die Dorfer]).

     

    In short, can we not rethink Handke’s relation to the postmodern (both in terms of postmodernity, the moment, and postmodernism, the movement), and in so doing rethink the “use” of this term? Is this not one of the reasons why the Handke case is important insofar as it tests the notion of the “postmodern” even as it testifies to the miscalculated ways that it is being invoked? The postmodern is not, after all a category in an aesthetic periodic table (Hassan 33), it is not an either/or proposition, but a “cluster concept” to be explored, to be expanded (hence Lyotard’s title–a contribution to an idea).9 If the postmodern can be deployed in this manner, does not Handke’s very slipperiness –this ability to fit in everywhere and rest nowhere; to be at once classical, romantic, modernist and at the same time resolutely anti-classical, anti-romantic, and anti-modernist –suggest, in and of itself, not that Handke is postmodern in the way that Schlegel is Romantic or Joyce is modernist, but that Handke uses the postmodern, ably manoeuvering through the different layers of history–where Schlegel, Buddha, and Credence Clearwater Revival are all equally (non)present?10 And, if Handke uses the postmodern, he also uses just about every other possible cultural tool: the language and terminology of German idealist philosophy, the topoi of classical literature–both German and foreign, Western and Asian–as well as autobiography and mass media, and, I would argue, a strong awareness of the thematic/formal structures of psychoanalysis–an awareness which Kuzniar has already signalled.

     

    How might such a comprehension of the postmodern reforms and re-forms critical practice vis-a-vis Peter Handke? It tells us this: any reading of his work according to one thematic line, one theoretical approach, or one periodic “place,” or even one question is–as Michael Hays astutely notes in his reading of Handke’s plays–bound to founder; it must automatically invalidate the critical enterprise by its distortion of the text under critical scrutiny, for Handke’s most recent texts are, to misquote Luce Irigaray, not one. Handke’s recent work can, then, be approached only by circuitous navigation through a series of vectors, such as the ones I just suggested above (but not limited to them), which may or may not form a coherent grid and which may not possess a thematic destination–and this irregular flight-pattern might enable us to begin to appreciate the complexity, richness, and the density of his current project. And if this is so, then perhaps Peter Handke can be defended, after all.

     

    Handke’s defense is, I confess, the directive which orients this essay. But against what charge? Difficulty– insofar as his work refuses to be categorizable? Treason –insofar as his work refuses not to change? And here I sense that I am near the mark, for isn’t Handke the subject of so much argument because he will not compose repetitions of Kaspar for the rest of his life, will not cling to the chic malaise of Short Letter? But, even if I can defend Handke, how am I to defend the form which the present defense takes? If form is to be distrusted, including and especially the essay, then the problem of doing Handke “justice” must become potentially overwhelming, for won’t the (my) literary essay also founder in its attempt to analyze his work at all? Perhaps we should elect not to perform an analysis of Handke; instead, we should make him an instrument rather than an object of scrutiny, as Kathleen McHugh has argued in the case of a very different late 20th Century artist/phenomenon–Madonna. I shy away from this possibility, even as I feel obliged to marshall it, because the unlikely comparison interweaves yet another thread in this tangled grid of Handke-difficulties–namely, the degree to which Handke’s public “persona” shapes and predetermines understandings of his work. I would like to deny that Handke has anything in common with Madonna. He is not the pure object of consumerism, as she is; he is not altogether reducible to a media image; he is the creator of texts more than he is the subject of them. Indeed, the plethora of texts represents yet another one of Handke’s features that drives critics crazy; his productivity ensures that he can not be “kept up with”; he remains always ahead of the critical game and seems determined to hold on to his lead till the finish.

     

    But here the contrast falls back into comparison and further, into a near identity between the two “artists.” For Handke’s maneuvers–his melancholic, apolitical posturing, his deployment of various literary-theatrical media–are by no means dissimilar to Madonna’s–to her continual shift of “subversive” fashion affect and to her multiple appeals to different sorts of media expressions– videos, television interviews, magazine interviews, c.d.’s, books. Certainly, Handke wants to manipulate his own public “image” every bit as much as Madonna does–a fact which, like her, he does not conceal but rather foregrounds. There is a stunning example of this tactic in Goldschmidt’s book about Handke. The study is filled with emotionally charged photographs such as one of Handke as a baby in the arms of his young and beautiful mother (whom the critic will recognize as the heroine of A Sorrow beyond Dreams); near the end, however, appears a photograph of the author kneeling on a living room floor, sorting through a box of photographs. Goldschmidt’s caption explains that this is a picture of the author choosing the photographs for the present book. In this terse undermining of the operator/spectator/spectrum trinity proposed by Roland Barthes Camera Lucida 9), the “subject” Handke–the primary spectator of his own spectral image–ironically imposes his authorial (operational) presence on the work meant to objectify him (make him a spectrum)–signalling among other things, that he will brook no unmediated hermeneutic “mastery” of that cognitive object, the author Peter Handke. He will not, to use the parlance of photography, be captured; instead he will own and use all of photography’s image-repertoires in order not to be seen.11 Autobiographical material becomes, then, for both Madonna and Handke, the screen–the veil and the site of media image–that plays out and thwarts fantasies of control–ours and theirs. And if Madonna struts the stuff of self-conscious, parodistic phallic womanhood with a redundant physical presence, Handke’s mournful, aggressive passivity approaches a hysterical masculinity which would pillory itself in one grand performative gesture–a disappearing act.

     

    Thus, even as I attempt to contemplate the receding object of my inquiry–Peter Handke–even as I essay this essay, I must retain something of McHugh’s Madonna argument; I will have to try to read with him as well as about him. How might one read with as well as about Handke? What would such a reading look like? This is one, tentative, possible, version.

     

    And I can use this digression on Madonna and Handke to circle back to the question of desire raised by Kuzniar and to the constant interpretative reduction of Handke’s work to bloodless readings of one kind or another, which are stripped of any affect other than anger/adulation and inattentive to questions of emotionality and sexuality.12 While Handke’s own writing would appear to shore up such disembodied interpretations, do not readings of his emotionally understated, repressed texts, neglect the very real passion which infuses even his recent works? The question is begged first, by the sheer mass of emotions and violent passions which seethe and explode within the corpus, and second, by the critical oblivion to which they have, for the most part, been relegated. Professional readers of Handke have reflected very little upon the sexually motivated murder in The Goalie’s Anxiety, the conjugal rage between husband and wife in Short Letter, the resentful Oedipal longing to resurrect the dead mother in Sorrow beyond Dreams, and the complementary adulation of the girl-child as muse in Child’s Story. But what of the problematic patriarchal loves invoked in both Across (the father for the son) and Absence (the son’s elegiac adoration of the lost father)? I will speak more of the loves and pleasures of the Essay series in a moment. Finally, we should not forget that there is a profound adoration of the written word in Handke’s writing–an adulation which has become, visceral, desperate, sensual, and topographical.13 Throughout the work of the 80’s we wander the divergent landscapes of Europe: Austria, Slovenia, France, and Spain, and these wanderings are chocked full of literary, cultural evocations, providing a simultaneous geographical and archaeological pleasure–clearly announced as late 20th Century humanity’s only possible, imperfect consolation, at the end of Handke’s strange mock-pastoral, Beyond the Villages. Seen from this point of view, it seems no coincidence that, in the Wim Wenders film Wings of Desire Himmel uber Berlin–for which Handke helped compose the screenplay), Damiel chooses to enter the world of “History” (Geschichte)–at once his story and history through desire; though he is bearer of the divine Logos, the male angel recognizes that the word yields meaning when it is made female flesh–and he must descend from rather than transcend his male sterility by falling down to, not rising with the Goethean “eternal feminine.”14

     

    How then can we not speak of passion, desire, and pleasure when we speak of Peter Handke’s writing? The critical “We” haven’t until now, because to speak of those things in Handke’s writing is to truly expose both him and “us”; to speak about passion/desire/pleasure in his books is to speak about, among other things, misogyny, sado- masochism, womb-envy, paedophilia, passivity, impotence, and castration, and to speak of those things is to come face to face with the deeply problematized vision of male heterosexuality articulated there. Handke is, to paraphrase Woody Allen, polymorphously perverse, but in contrast to Woody Allen’s smugly neurotic eroticism, there is no self- congratulation of that fact in his work.

     

    Within and against this net of observations/questions about Handke, I circle back once more around the tear which originated this essay: Handke and the postmodern/Handke and his refusal to tell in the Essay series. In these pieces, rather than merely detonating logocentrism from the outside, as he had done before, Handke’s work has another exercise in mind. It seems to actively quest for the missing Logos, by looking for it in the “wrong” places. “Fantasy is my faith,” the first-person narrator/actor tells us in Essay on the successful [prosperous, auspicious] Day (55), and a page later proclaims:

     

    And what did this Nothing and again Nothing do? It meant . . . . And so it went here: as for the Nothing of our time, the main thing now is to let it ripen from morning till evening (or even to midnight?). And I repeat: the idea was light, the idea is light.

     

    [Und was tat dieses Nichts und wieder Nichts? Es bedeutete . . . Und darum ging es hier: das Nichts unsrer Tage, das galt es jetzt "fruchten" zu lassen, von Morgen bis Abend (oder auch Mit- ternacht?). Und ich wiederhole: die Idee war Licht. Die Idee ist Licht.](56)

     
    Yet, even as the possibility of Logos is erected, Handke whittles away at the authority of the traditional male subject in increasingly graphic ways as though performing a process of aesthetic self-castration in payment for a new, legitimized, subjectivity. Particularly because he is a male writer–and ostensibly a heterosexual one–it is impossible for me to contemplate the veritable parade of chaste, solitary, passive male speakers who inhabit his works and not see them as postmodern Abelards; nominally heterosexual, but mysteriously incapacitated, they repeatedly express their feelings of and distance from a sexual desire which seems connected to and yet severed from the desire to put the pen to paper. And are not Handke’s cloistered male porte-paroles markers of what Handke is “doing to” meaning, and to meaning’s traditional receiver/producer? To reparaphrase Hassan’s use of Leiris, Handke’s autobiographical doubles not only expose themselves to the bull’s horn, they allow themselves to be gored (they welcome the penetration); this reverse matadorian spectacle is at once the performance to which we are constantly invited to watch in the Handke texts of the 80’s and the radical cure which we might also enact upon ourselves.

     

    The Essays arguably take their cue from the work of Michel de Montaigne,15 whose work sought also to interweave a number of discursive threads and to create a complex junction where bellettristic (in the literal sense of beautiful writing), philosophy, politics, autobiography, psychology, epistemology and scientific experiment meet. Montaigne has been seen, recently with increasing enthusiasm, as the herald of modern narrative subjectivity in the West (Auerbach), and there are good reasons for this. Relentlessly anecdotal, understated, erudite, and often ironic, Montaigne’s essays bore curious titles which sometimes had only the slightest relevance to the matter at hand (as in “On Cannibals” [“Des Cannibales”]–where cannibalism is mentioned in a sentence), were peppered with epigraphs and textual references, while the arguments were typically roundabout, if they were in fact discernible, and closed with a lack of authoritative conclusiveness which can still be gleefully frustrating to readers. Montaigne was one of the first Western authors to choose to write about mundane subjects (in both senses–worldly things and unimportant things) in an ongoing project which–in his own resistance to narrative–he came to call, not the His- toire de moi, but the Livre de moi, the book of me. Not coincidentally, the essays derive from and return to a sense of physicality–to the limits of the body, its sicknesses, its death–for the “me” in question here is “matiere,” material, stuff, flesh and bones.16 There is no transcendental subject in Montaigne, but a quirky mind-body which thinks/feels his way through a writing enterprise that, Lawrence Kritzman writes, becomes both “self- generating” and “autoerogenous” (Kritzman 91), and where a neo-stoic masculine impermeability is repeatedly undercut –but not canceled out–by other subject-voices telling fragments of other stories.17

     

    Handke uses Montaigne–specifically, but not only, the elements mentioned above–and empties him: the eccentric, hidden relevance of the essay titles in Montaigne become non-topics in Handke–passive interim states (Lyotard’s “things unsayable”), useless, peripheral machinery (“things invisible”), and greeting-card cliches which take the place of such idealistic maxims as “to philosophize is to learn to die.” The jouissance which, as Kritzman notes, is appealed to in Montaigne, and which has characterized the modernist sensibility from Joyce to Barthes (and Barth), is excised and–its absence profoundly felt–the procedure leaves Montaigne’s autoerogenous text as a body with uncertain orientations–a masculine text without qualities, though it still desires. And the “subject”–the controlling ego that informs Montaigne– shudders and splits, becoming a series of impossible “selves,” flat subject speakers–at once solemn and droll, lugubrious and elegant–who posture their ways through language gestures in a spectral conversation. Handke’s radical surgery on Montaigne resembles in respects an autopsy performed by a vampire doctor; the postmodern essay drains the life from the modern and lives on, pumped up momentarily with the knowledge and blood of the dissected deceased–undead, glamorous, meticulous, analytical, thirsting. Montaigne’s cannibal text–the admiring com- mentary which devours classical literature whole and becomes itself a literary product–becomes simultaneously Dracula and Von Helsing–the kiss of death and the cure for modernism.

     

    Thus, Handke’s essays tear much further than ever Montaigne did into anecdotal fragmentation, and where Montaigne is smooth, Handke is jagged, jumpy, and pained. The Versuche function ostensibly as ludic reflections upon the interstices where–officially, as far as traditional Western narrative is concerned–nothing is happening,18 but these exercises are both playful and sad; they play with melancholy, they are melancholy games, and the game consists at once of formal experimentation and of a deadly serious self-practice–a practice which is in turns therapeutic, mutilating, and transformative; pleasurable, and painful. A somber I comments on the combination of comedy, mundanity, and death in Essay on the successful Day:

     

    Yes, it is as though a certain irony belonged here, in the face of my own self as day by day regularities and episodes--irony from in- clination--, and still, a kind of humor, which named itself after the gallows.

     

    [Ja, es ist, als gehorten dazu eine besondere Ironie, angesichts meiner selbst wie der tagtaglichen Gesetzlichkeiten und Zwischenfalle-- Ironie aus Zuneigung--, und noch, wenn schon eine Art von Humor, der nach dem Galgen benannte.](41)

     
    The first in the series, Essay on Fatigue (1989), furnishes the clearest intertextual response to Montaigne in so far as it may be read as a re-vision of the essays on idleness and sleep, but it frames its non-subject matter within a strange dialogue which unfolds between a writer (possibly, but not necessarily Handke) and another speaker. Although much of the discussion is aesthetic, there is a therapeutic thrust to the proceedings; the writer opens the discussion by manifesting an anxious connection between fatigue and fear, while his analytical interlocutor guides him with short, pointed questions, toward a recognition and articulation of his motivations for wanting to talk about fatigue.

     

    The recognition is both utopian and disappointed/ing, and the narrative circling, linking apparently unrelated personal memories and images, resonates with the trauma of a Freudian case-history, where, to quote Peter Brooks, “narr- ative discourse works intermittently in a dialogic manner (Brooks 57). But the psychoanalytic process is flattened even as it is pursued–its “significance,” its deep personal meaning, and claim to utter seriousness are simultaneously posited and erased. Typically, as in those histories, much is said about childhood, school, first feelings of difference from others, but the conversation glistens with artificiality, even as it assumes a predictably sexual character, focussing on the exhaustion that occurs between men and women and what that signifies in their relationship. These observations lead in turn to a revealing and ludicrous reworking of that masculine erotic icon, Don Juan:

     

    I imagine Don Juan . . . not as a seducer, but rather as a tired, always tired hero, into whose lap, at any given time, at the right moment, in the presence of a tired woman, every one of them will fall.

     

    [Den Don Juan stelle ich mir . . . nicht als einen Verfuhrer, sondern als einen jeweils zur richtigen Stunde, in Gegenwart einer muden Frau, muden, einen immer-muden Helden vor, dem so eine jede in den Schoss fallt. . . .](Uber die Mudigkeit 48)

     
    This image of a passively erotic, feminized (the German “Schoss” means both “lap” and “womb”) masculine exhaustion, that drastically revises a traditional Western image of energetic masculine prowess (providing an ironic gloss both on Mozart’s and on Camus’ Don Juan–the man driven by an excess of love/eros), opens the possibility of a new kind of narrative which would fuse poetry and prose as well as “high” and “low” artistic enunciations:

     

    The inspiration of fatigue says less, what there is to do, as than can be left to happen . . . . A certain tired one (masculine) as another Orpheus, in order to gather the wildest animals to himself and to finally be tired with them . . . . Phillip Marlowe--still a private detective--became better and better, more and more clear-sighted in the solutions of his cases, the more his sleepless nights added up.

     

    [Die Inspiration der Mudigkeit sagt weniger, was zu tun ist, als was gelassen werden kann . . . . Ein gewisser Mude als ein anderer Orpheus, um den sich die wildesten Tiere versammeln und endlich mitmude sein konnen . . . . Phillip Marlowe--noch ein Privatdetektiv--wurde im Losen seiner Falle, je mehr schlaflose Nachte sich reihten, immer besser und scharfsinniger.](74-75)

     
    And yet, the speaker cannot practice this art, he doesn’t know the recipe/prescription [Rezept], and the project of Fatigue reveals itself to be a failure on both culinary and medicinal fronts; it cannot nourish and it cannot cure. The speaker can only defer his failure to a future project, as he looks forward at the close of the discussion to another Essay, whose failure is also already pointed out as imminent, by his skeptical interlocutor:

     

    But in all of Spain there is no jukebox.

     

    [In ganz Spanien gibt es doch keine Jukebox.](78)

     
    The curious picture of Don Juan and the sexual problematic which it implies, the warning of failure, and the formal challenges of telling otherwise are progressively radicalized in the next two Essays. If Essay on Fatigue wants (and yet refuses) to be a therapeutic dialogic text which, to paraphrase Freud’s title–remembers, repeats and works through (Brooks 57)–the non-dialogic format of Essay on the Jukebox (1990) plays out a personal obsession; it is a neurotic monologic text which repeats instead of remembering the origin of its trouble. But here again, the “trauma” is trivialized (although it still hurts), for the loss/absence which motivates the text is situated within the boundaries of post-World-War 2 Western popular culture, and as such, it plays out as both a truncated travesty of a 60’s road movie–the meanderings of a disenfranchised, blocked, obsessed writer on a futile quest in the Spanish countryside for a jukebox (whose image only he glances in a B-movie)–and a stripped-down reverse of Proust’s self-reflexive narrative project19–the epic novel about the writer’s aesthetic education, which prepares him to compose that same epic novel, pares itself to an essay about an essay (by the same title) which cannot get written. Again, as in Fatigue, the crucial moment of the text concerns a heterosexual encounter, which is once again, viewed in terms of non-action. In the middle of the essay, the writer remembers a chance meeting with an Indian woman in Alaska (an intertextual reference to Slow Homecoming), and compares his refusal of her erotic invitation to Parzival’s failure to ask Anfortas the necessary questions to cure him of his terrible wound (a wound in the testicles). This odd simile suggests that what the chaste, frustrated protagonist of Jukebox may fail to admit, is that his impotence with the pen and with the woman links him not with Parzival but with the castrated Lord of the Grail. The connection with Parzival is not coincidental, for the goal of this essay is, unlike the other two, indeed the obtaining of an object, a feminine vessel which, grail-like, incorporates in its musical contents all of the memories, and well-being of the impotent, exiled protagonist (it is the thing that makes him feel safe, grounded, connected)–all of which suggests that this Versuch can be read, among other things, as an always-already failed quest for the eternal feminine, now recognized as a mere machine, and an outmoded one at that (which connects this work with the impossible quest for the mother’s lost history in A Sorrow Beyond Dreams).

     

    At once a companion piece to and a skeptical corrective of the earlier, more mock-impressionist Afternoon of a Writer, Essay on the Jukebox uses the futile pursuit of the feminine machine as a metaphor to talk about not just desire, and writing, but that other elusive feminine machine called “Geschichte” (the feminine German word for “history”). Writing at the time of the demolition of the Berlin wall, the impotent writer bears symbolic witness to the problem of defining historical moments in our time and questions the rhetoric with which the demise of communism is so celebrated, even as the “execution” of its leaders mimics the violence of the deposed regimes. I read the jukebox as the feminized, fetishized repository of ideological formation, and although the writer can neither vanquish his obsession with it nor replace it with something else, he can bear witness to his own discomfort–aesthetic, sexual, political, historical, physical–and, by transference, to ours. At once a critique of history and HIS STORY, Essay on the Jukebox suggests that any story that the masculine, European, and particularly German subject tells may be a dangerous falsification, but still he is driven to try and fail to write. Like Anfortas, the essayist can neither die nor recover and we, like Parzival, cannot choose but watch the ritual with wonder. “Write yourself free” said the priest to the war traumatized protagonist of Gunther Grass’ Cat and Mouse, but Grass believed in an alternative narrative coherence which might guarantee, if not salvation, then at least a cure to male, German guilt–a grace which Handke’s essayist/assayer both fantasizes about and pointedly denies himself in an act of interrupted metaphysical-political onanism.

     

    Essay on the successful Day (1991) is the most overtly ludic of the three texts. Formally indecisive, it plays compulsively with combinations–the dialogic with the monologic, third, with first and second persons, and verb tenses and moods with each other–toward the accomplishment of a key admission (which comes at the end of the “session”)–namely that the essayist/attempter has never experienced the very day of happiness, success, fulfillment which he repeatedly and unsuccessfully tries to describe. It is here that telling otherwise, pleasure, castration, failure, and writing “come” together in one strangely compelling scene. Telling the story of another person (probably himself) the essayist describes an attempt to saw through a log of wood. The description conveys for seven pages the rhythm and pleasure (“Vergnugen”) of the operation–

     

    but then something threatened, if not the overlooked fork in the bough, (which was about a finger's breadth away from the point, where, the already cut through wood fell anyway, of itself into the lap of the sawer), then that very small and hard layer, in which the steel struck on stone, on nail, on bone in one and so to speak, wrecked the undertaking in the last stroke... There it would have been so close to it, that the sawing for itself, the mere finding-itself- together and being-together with the wood there, its roundness, its fragrance, nothing as the traversal/dimension taking of the material there . . . incarnated for him an ideal from a time of disinterested satisfaction/pleasure. And just as the breaking pencil . . . .

     

    [dann drohte aber, wenn nicht die ubersehene Astgabel, so (meist gerade um eine Fingerbreite weg von dem Punkt, an dem das so weit durchschnittene Holzstuck ohnehin dem Sager von selbst in den Schoss fiel) jene sehr schmale und um so hartere Schicht, in der der Stahl auf Stein, Nagel, Knochen in einem traf und das Unternehmen sozusagen im letzten Takt scheiterte . . . . Dabei ware er doch so nah dran gewesen, dass das Sagen fur sich, das blosse Sich-Zusammenfinden und Zusam- mensein mit dem Holz da, seiner Rundung, seinem Duft, seinem Muster, nichts als das Durchmessen der Materie da . . . ihm ideal den Traum von einer Zeit des Interesselosen Wohlgefallens verkorperte. Und ebenso hatte der abbrechende Bleistift. . . ](48)

     
    This pleasure in pain, this union of the cutter with thing cut which in turn becomes imaginative flesh and bone, suggest that Handke is doing far more than just whittling away at Western literature. His autobiographical narratives, in the Essays at least, have become literally experimental operations–performative attempts (and here narrative becomes for Handke the newest of the new drama)–to enact a bloody refinement, to chop away at himself and at the marker of his writerly masculinity, the pencil and to make this aesthetic unmanning serve to create a new narrative. What is or can be the result? “Not nothing,” says Handke’s essayist–neither nothing nor something, which tells itself in past, present, future, and subjunctive, and which not fear its own demise, its own self-forgetting:

     

    And at the end of the day, this one (masculine) would have called for a book--more than just a chronicle: "the fairy-tale of the successful day." And at the very end the glorious forgetting would still have come, that the day had to succeed.

     

    [Und am Ende des Tags hatte dieser nach einem Buch gerufen--mehr als bloss eine Chronik: "Marchen des gegluckten Tags". Und ganz am Ende ware noch das glorreiche Vergessen gekommen, dass der Tag zu glucken habe . . . . (75)

     
    As the epistle of the imprisoned Paul urgently requests sustenance from Timothy in writing (this is how successful Day closes), so does Handke’s unfolding livre de moi– his postmodern odyssey turned gospel (not “truth,” but “godspell”–good spell, magical phrase, discourse, and tale) according to Peter (the shifting rock of an un- derstanding which must always already deny its ground)– supplicate his fellow-neurotic (the reader, us, me) to move beyond a castrated masculine history towards a feminized (?) narrativity which is by its very nature not one, not finished, which may always give birth to another Essay. “Through our own wounds we shall be healed,” observes the card-playing priest in Across (127), and the Essay series empowers us to reread that resonant line differently, and through that rereading to remap the contours of that gargantuan aesthetic anatomy which we name Handke’s. For is it not precisely within the borders of the wounded space carved out by Handke’s pencil upon the body of his own autobiographical text that we are summoned to perform our own flawed testaments and through that spectacle of failure be made, not whole, but perhaps wholly other and new?

     

    Notes

     

    1. Conversations with Robert Gross, Kathleen McHugh, and John Ganim made this essay “happen.”

     

    2. See for example, June Schleuter’s book.

     

    3. This is a repeat of what Ihab Hassan sees as Richard Porier’s problematic attempt to mediate between the two, The Postmodern Turn, 32.

     

    4. A certain “moral” disgust also permeates many of the recent conversations about Handke which I have been a party to. He was pilloried outright at a special section at the MLA in 1986, where he was accused both of selling out and of writing bad books, and in a more recent MLA session (1992), the post-presentation discussion veered strangely between an outright dismissal of his work as postmodern (which in this context, seemed to mean that it was formulaic and predictable) and a neo-conservative insistence that his art was now concerned purely with “aesthetic problems.” In less formal venues, friends of mine in Germanistik usually roll their eyes in annoyance when I tell them I work on the recent Peter Handke, while acquaintances more directly involved in the arts (in my case, a straight female sculptor from Germany and a gay American director) seem to value what he is doing now.

     

    5. This sexually charged denial has been beautifully evidenced in Peter Strasser’s introduction to his essays on the author in which he declares that he has literally “fallen in love” with the work of Peter Handke twice (the first time being a “naive fascination” in contrast to the second, mature alert understanding of the object), only to insist that such a feeling ensures critical objectivity (Strasser 5).

     

    6. That is not to say that Handke’s earlier work has not encountered negative reception. See Rolf Michaelis, “Ohrfeigen fur das Lieblingskind” in the Works Cited.

     

    7. Skwara is a case in point. He discusses the erotic tiredness in Fatigue without realizing the role it plays–not as a state following the act, but as a replacement for the act itself.

     

    8. I invoke Lyotard here, not because he is the ultimate “authority” on the postmodern, but because the tenor of his writing, his interest in language-games, and his gleeful flirtations with pessimism provide a productive ground on which to think about Peter Handke.

     

    9. Bernd Magnus calls postmodern philosophy a “complex, cluster concept” which includes at least ten elements, but probably more. See “postmodern,” Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (in production).

     

    10. This is a corollary to Stanley Fish’s suggestion that we ask, not what postmodernism means but what it does. See Connor on Fish, 10.

     

    11. In front of the lens, I am at the same time: the one I think I am, the one I want others to think I am, the one the photographer thinks I am, and the one he makes use of to exhibit his art. (Barthes 13)

     

    12. An important exception to this rule is Tilmann Moser’s smart, if anxious, discussion of A Moment of True Feeling and A Sorrow beyond Dreams in his general psychoanalytic reading of contemporary German fiction.

     

    13. Richard Arthur Firda is right when he links Handke and Barthes, but the connection has as much to do with erotics as with semiotics (a false dichotomy if ever there was one). See Firda, 51.

     

    14. This is not to say, however, that there are not real problems with this film as bell hooks has observed in her essay.

    15. I am not arguing for an interpretation of Handke in terms of “influence;” rather I am using Montaigne as a concrete example of the many occasions when Handke avails himself of the “common discursive ‘property’” of texts (Hutcheon, 124). Certainly, there are other important essayist-mediators, among them, Barthes, himself an admirer of Montaigne.

    16. See Jefferson Humphries’ discussion of “matiere” in “Montaigne’s Anti-Influential Model of Identity.” In Bloom.

     

    17. See Zhang Longxi’s intriguing reading of Montaigne in conjunction with representations of the Other in Western Literature.

     

    18. This narrative of the interstice is one of the possible answers which Handke explores in conjunction with Lyotard’s question about the odyssey.

     

    19. And also Thomas Wolfe’s You can’t go home again.

    Works Cited

     

    • Auerbach, Erich. “L’Humaine Condition.” In Bloom, 11-39 (originally published in Mimesis 1953).
    • Barthes, Roland. Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography. Trans. Richard Howard. New York: Hill and Wang, 1993.
    • Bloom, Harold, ed. Montaigne’s Essays. Modern critical interpretations. New York: Chelsea House, 1987.
    • Brooks, Peter. “Psychoanalytic constructions and narrative meanings.” Paragraph 7, 1986. 53-76.
    • Connor, Steven. Postmodernist Culture: An Introduction to Theories of the Contemporary. Basil Blackwell: Oxford and Cambridge, 1989.
    • Durzak, Manfred. Peter Handke und die Gegenwartsliterature: Narziss auf Abwegen. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1982.
    • Firda, Richard Arthur. Peter Handke. Twayne World Authors Series. New York: Twayne, 1993.
    • Gabriel, Norbert. “Neoklassizismus oder Postmoderne? Uberlegungen zu Form und Stil von Peter Handkes Werk seit der Langsamen Heimkehr. Modern Austrian Literature 24.3/4, 1991. 99-109.
    • Grass, Gunther. Cat and Mouse. Trans. Ralph Mannheim. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1963.
    • Handke, Peter. Across. Trans. Ralph Mannheim. New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 1986.
    • —-. Versuch uber den gegluckten Tag. Frankfurt a. Main: Suhrkamp, 1991.
    • —-. Versuch uber die Mudigkeit. Frankfurt a. Main: Suhrkamp, 1989.
    • —-. Versuch uber die Jukebox. Frankfurt a. Main: Suhrkamp, 1990.
    • Hassan, Ihab. The Postmodern Turn: Essays in Postmodern Theory and Culture. Ohio State, 1987.
    • Hofmann, Michael. “A superior reality” [a review of Absence]. TLS May 24, 1991, N4599:20.
    • Hays, Michael. “Peter Handke and the End of the Modern.” Modern Drama 23:4, 1981. 346-66.
    • hooks, bell. “Representing Whiteness: seeing wings of desire.” In Yearning: race, gender, and cultural politics. Boston: South End, 1990.
    • Humphries, Jefferson. “Montaigne’s Anti-Influential Model of Identity.” In Bloom, 133-44 (originally published in Losing the Text: Readings of Literary Desire, 1986).
    • Hutcheon, Linda. A Poetics of Postmodernism: History, Theory, Fiction. Routledge: New York and London, 1988.
    • Klinkowitz, Jerome and James Knowlton. Peter Handke and the Postmodern Transformation. Columbia: U of Missouri P, 1983.
    • Kritzman, Lawrence. “My Body, My Text: Montaigne and the Rhetoric of Sexuality.” In Bloom, 81-95 (originally published in the Journal of Medieval and Renaissance Studies 13.1 [1983]).
    • Kunzel, Uwe. Wim Wenders: ein Filmbuch. Freiburg: Dreisam, 1989. [contains an interview with Wenders concerning his collaboration with Handke for Himmel uber Berlin]
    • Kuzniar, Alice. “Desiring Eyes.” Modern Fiction Studies 36.3, 1990. 355-67.
    • Lyotard, Jean-Francois. “Philosophy and Painting in the Age of Their Experimentation: Contribution to an Idea of Postmodernity.” In The Lyotard Reader, Ed. Andrew Benjamin. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989.
    • Magnus, Bernd. “Postmodern.” Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy. In production.
    • McHugh, Kathleen. “Acrostics.” In Sex? Deconstructing Madonna, Ed. Fran Lloyd. London: Batsford Press (in production).
    • Metcalf, Eva-Maria. “Challenging the Arrogance of Power with the Arrogance of Impotence: Peter Handke’s somnambulistic energy.” Moder Fiction Studies 36.3 (1990).
    • Michaelis, Rolf, “Ohrfeigen fur das Lieblingskind. Peter Handke und seine Kritiker.” Text + Kritik, 24/24a (1976). 80-96.
    • Moser, Tilmann. Romane als Krankengeschichten. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1985.
    • Ortheil, Hans-Joseph. “Das Lesen–ein Spiel. Postmoderne Literatur? Die Literatur der Zukunft.” Die Zeit 24.4. 1987
    • Schlueter, June. The Plays and Novels of Peter Handke. Pittsburgh: U of Pittsrugh P, 1981.
    • Slovsky, Viktor. “Art as Technique.” In Russian Formalist Criticism, Ed. Lee T. Lemon and Marion Reis. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1965. 11-12.
    • Shooman, Diane. “From Episodic Space to Narrative Space: The Search for Unity in Peter Handke’s Fiction and the Paintings of Ursula Hubner.” MAL 23.3/4, 1990. 87-97.
    • Skwara, Erich Wolfgang. “Peter Handke, Versuch uber die Mudigkeit.” World Literature Today 64:3, Summer 1990. 460-1.
    • Strasser, Peter. Der Freudenstoff: Zu Handke eine Philosophie. Salzburg: Residenz, 1990.
    • Vivis, Anthony. “Own goal” [review of Handke’s Versuch uber die Jukebox]. TLS N4566:1073, Oct. 5, 1990.
    • White, J.J. “The elusive perfect day” [review of Handke’s Versuch uber den gegluckten Tag]. TLS N4618:34, Oct.4, 1991.
    • Zhang, Longxi. “The cannibals, the ancients, and cultural critique: reading Montaigne in postmodern perspective.” Human Studies 16.51-68, 1993. 51-68.
    • Ziolkowski, Theodore. “Peter Handke, Versuch uber die Jukebox.” World Literature Today 65:2, Spring 1991. 360.

     

  • “It Dread Inna Inglan”: Linton Kwesi Johnson, Dread, and Dub Identity

    Peter Hitchcock

    Department of English
    Baruch College, CUNY

     

    Postmodern Culture Version1

     

    it is noh mistri
    wi mekkin histri
    it is noh mistri
    wi winnin victri

     

    (“Mekkin Histri” LKJ)

     

    “The trouble with the English is that their history happened overseas, so they don’t know what it means”

     

    (The Satanic Verses, Salman Rushdie)

     

    In order to appreciate the achievement of Linton Kwesi Johnson (LKJ), the African/Caribbean/European dub poet, one must come to terms with the cultural specificity of the voice, and what the voice can do. Mekkin histri. Making history? What recidivism might this be at the end of the twentieth century? The double-displacement of an African- Caribbean Black living in England, diaspora upon diaspora, comes with a double-indemnity–making and history. What cultural logic obtains in the construction/reconstruction of subjectivity as subaltern, the articulation of the margin, the trace, the veve, that still allows a trenchant sense of history, of the need to make history? Can we still conceive of subjects that make history, have a history to make, remake at a cacophonous rendezvous of victory? To understand why this notion is not a mystery (the History, for instance, of imperialist certitude) but a problematic, one must understand what makes this history: one must come to terms with the history of the voice, what Kamau Brathwaite calls the “invitation and challenge,”2 or what Edouard Glissant defines as “literature” and “oraliture” (the fragmented and therefore shared histories and voices of peoples).3 One can read this history as an introduction in LKJ’s sonorous beat, and one can see this history in a dissidence of voice, in all its synesthesia and dislocation.

     

    The sounds of dislocation. Our trust in electricity makes the archive of the voice seem a recent technology: LKJ himself is “available in all three formats” (CD, cassette, and the fast disappearing LP). But the voice at issue has, shall we say, a much longer geneology, a history that “happened overseas.” Thanks to Columbus’s “discovery” (the kind of “surprise” common to colonialism), the Amerindians of the Caribbean were soon in short supply and so began one of the darkest chapters in forced relocation and labor in human history. Except, of course, that such a chapter remains largely unwritten, not just because of racist ideology, the loathsome lacuna of the “official story,” but because this history is an archaeology of voice, a history intoned more than inscribed. As such, it is a history articulated in the clash and fierce concatenation of colonial power and resistance characterized by the internecine struggles of languages and cultures, Ashanti, Yoruba, Congolese, French, English, Spanish, and Dutch. The word creole only begins to do justice to the range of this struggle even if its logic of hybridity suggests a new understanding of what constitutes “sound” evidence. Theory has trained us, and rightly so, to be suspicious of the voice and the ontology it confers. Yet, what I am calling dub identity is not about the presence of being, but being in between, the “Middle Passages” that Brathwaite (among others) has elaborated, or the “black atlantic” model that Paul Gilroy has proposed.4 The problem of dub is the sound of diaspora, and its doubling, its versions. Thus, if the following notes are read as an introduction to LKJ, they only begin to imagine the utterance he makes, in all its complexity, as testimony and travelogue: the subjective states of being, in between.

     

    Obviously, in his history of the voice Brathwaite is not claiming that dub poetry, Jamaican “sound” poetry, the righteous riddim of resistance, is purely a phenomenon of sound (who would want to fall into that Cartesian chasm of speech/writing made infamous by Derrida?). He is saying, however, that without an adequate theory of performativity and voice one cannot hope to fathom cultural expression under the mark of cultural erasure, the colonizer/ postcolonizer’s denial of voice, whether poetic, polemical, or political. For Brathwaite, language from the Anglophone Caribbean is “a process of using English,” not just in the well-documented sense of creolization (patois), but a particular socialization of the voice. Brathwaite’s specific concern has been for an anglophone hybridization bred of slavery and colonization with all the linguistic and cultural displacement that that has entailed. For Afro- Caribbean poetry this has meant not just an agonistic social function but a particular struggle over social forms of poetry. As Brathwaite pithily puts it, “the hurricane does not roar in pentameters.”5 Although on one level this means attempting to reproduce the sounds of specific natural experiences of the Caribbean peoples, Brathwaite also wants to emphasize the disruptive potential of these experiences and the resistance riddim they inculcate. So even when Brathwaite displays a particular respect for the poets who challenge English from within (his list includes a tradition from Chaucer to Eliot), they are not the poets of a “nation language,” the product and medium of this radically different purview.

     

    “Nation language” is an extremely problematic term used to register the “submerged” capacity of dialect, of African intonation and derivation. Brathwaite distinguishes nation language from dialect because of the negative connotations associated with the latter (“bad English” etc.) but the concept of nation itself does not arrive free from contaminants, particularly those associated with the identification processes that fueled imperialist subjugation (and in addition leads Cesaire to the abrupt but pertinent conclusion that “nation is a bourgeois phenomenon”). As Benedict Anderson’s oft-quoted analysis of nations and nationality has shown, a national identity may involve active forgetting, a lack of historicity precisely the obverse of Brathwaite’s cultural impetus.6 Yet we cannot simply dismiss the prescience of Brathwaite’s appeal based on the sordid histories of Western imperialism. That is to say, a nation looks considerably different through the perspective of an oppressed collectivity which, while not immune to the power abuses that national selfhood may confer, may produce a significant communal resistance in tracing such an identity. For our purposes the paradox of “nation” is appropriate, for what seems to reify “nation” in the Caribbean context can vilify it in the tortuous confines of Black Britain. LKJ’s deployment of “nation language” then, serves to undermine a particularly nefarious manifestation of the nation state. Before examining LKJ’s particular form of dissidence and dissonance, I want to consider how Glissant figures the nation in Caribbean discourse, for he too is deeply concerned with how the postcolonial Caribbean subject finds a voice, makes a history.

     

    As a Martinican, Glissant is less concerned with the hegemony of the English pentameter, but in his poetry, plays, fiction, and criticism he is keenly aware of the psychic disabilities that can accompany acculturation within imperial and colonial codes. Readers of Fanon will be familiar with this critique, but suprised perhaps to find that, forty years later, the dissociation of self endemic to the colonial moment still conditions to a great degree the formation of Martinican identity. For Glissant, the crisis is severe, for without measured attempts to articulate a collective memory, the break from the non-identity or “non- history” as French history, the prospects are indeed bleak, as he shows in a table imbricating economic and literary production.7 Within a range of contingent possibilities, Glissant sees “oblivion or organization of a Martinican economy,” “isolation as ‘French’ or integration in the Caribbean,” “sterilization or creative explosion,” and “disappearance of a community or birth of a nation.” The either/or rhetoric might seem uncompromising, but Glissant is attempting to ward off a cultural and political complacency that is eroding a viable Caribbean collectivity. But neither is he separatist: Glissant advocates a cross- cultural poetics, a creolization of cultures that celebrates the strategic value of revoicing the Caribbean’s ingrown diversity outwards. In this sense, creole can no longer subsist as a secret code: by opening to the world it changes itself and the world. But, more importantly, this gives the lie to the totalizing force of History, as a Hegelian construct, for this History is “fissured by histories” as Glissant notes, as Literature is fragmented by literatures, by “oraliture” as he calls it–the submerged voice of the collective.

     

    There is no neat equivalence or complementarity in the formulations of Brathwaite and Glissant, just as one would have to specify the discursive alterity of their African- American counterparts (“nation language” and “oraliture” bear comparison with what Henry Louis Gates Jr. in another context has studied as “signifyin’,” or what Houston Baker has pursued in the Blues as forceful variations of the vernacular8), but they both underline that there are conceptual as well as geographic or spatial links between the islands of the Caribbean. Among them, the voice is integral to the function of memory but does not answer the question “Who am I?” that existential staple common to the discourse of colonialist angst (Prospero’s perplexity or Kurtz’s confusion); it does, however, inflect the transcultural “Who are we?” in which the “we,” although radically particularized rather than an illusory unity, recalls a historical dialogue about the cause and course of fragmented community, the diasporic disjunction and displacement wrought by the arrogance of power and the will- to-silence of colonial history. Brathwaite and Glissant, then, speak differently, but they both know the tenor of resistance. And this is as important in LKJ’s Jamaica as it is in Barbados or Martinique–the roots which lead to Inglan.

     

    LKJ was born in Chapelton, Jamaica, 1952. When his mother left for England LKJ soon followed, at the age of 11. They lived on the outskirts of Brixton, well-known for its Afro-Caribbean community, where LKJ experienced not only a taste of home but a new perspective on the metropolitan centre. He recalls: “I [saw] a white man sweeping the streets. All the white people I saw in Jamaica drove fish- tail cars and smoked cigars. So when I saw someone, a white person, actually sweeping the streets it was a bit of a revelation.”9 So along with a profound consciousness of racism in London, the postcolonial heart of Inglan, LKJ quickly learned that the white man’s History was also “fissured” by the history of class, a constituent feature of the doubling of diaspora, and a significant mark of LKJ’s political perspicacity. In general, LKJ defies the assumptions that make poet and activist mutually exclusive terms. Not long after leaving school LKJ became involved with the Black Panthers and, although he had a full time job with the GLC (the now defunct Greater London Council) he spent as much time again organizing members, attending meetings, and distributing pamphlets. When the British government found ways to break up the Panther movement it did not stop LKJ’s involvement in Black community politics. By 1976 he was an official member of the Race Today Collective which, under the leadership of LKJ’s friend, Darcus Howe, has become a leading force in Black British struggle. Many of LKJ’s cultural initiatives, like “Creation for Liberation,” have developed under the aegis of Race Today. And, for much of his career, LKJ has maintained a gruelling schedule of readings in schools, universities, colleges, youth centres, community centres, and concert halls (which in part explains why his voice has remained defiantly public and sensitive to community issues). Among many other cultural activities LKJ has organized an international poetry reading (and produced the album of this event), presented a documentary on Carifesta for BBC television called “From Brixton to Barbados” and narrated a series on the history of Jamaican popular music for BBC radio called “From Mento to Lovers Rock.” LKJ is not interested in replacing the Ivory Tower with an Ebony one.

     

    But what are the salient characteristics of the voice that LKJ brings from Jamaica? The voice is set to a rhythm, a beat that enunciates a conundrum, what Glissant calls “inscrutability” as an expression of freedom of Caribbean peoples. If for Glissant, this rhythm is initially characterized by beguine and later by a vibrant hybrid of salsa, reggae, and jazz; and if for Brathwaite what shatters the pentameter is primarily calypso; then for LKJ the riddim is reggae, which invokes both his Jamaican home, and the specific realities of Britain’s Afro-Caribbean communities. Interestingly, the origin of the word “reggae” is largely unknown. In Jamaican English it may recall rege-rege, a quarrel or a row, but it also has been linked to the sound of the guitar in the rhythm and to “raggedy,” meaning everyday or from the people. One thing is certain, since Toots Hibbert, who is usually credited with coining the word, wrote “Do the Reggay” in 1968, reggae followed LKJ to London, rather than him taking it with him.10 This is important because Black Britons do not just remember the countries of their past, they continually reinvent them as a challenge to the nationhood they now confront. And, as Paul Gilroy has noted, the focus of the alternative public spheres they create is musical.11 Nation languages are sound systems.

     

    If LKJ’s poetry deploys Brathwaite’s sense of “nation language” it does so as an impasse, a knot that cannot simply be untied by more generally accepted definitions of national selfhood. The doubling of diaspora requires a supplementary (simultaneous rather than sequential) notion of such language to acknowledge both the geographic displacement and that, to borrow a popular phrase, “the empire strikes back.” This would be a “version” of “dissemiNation,” in Homi Bhabha’s terms, “the moment of the scattering of the people that in other times and other places, in the nations of others, becomes a time of gathering.”12 Again, the version is characterized by sound, the community is gathered in an aural mix which, because it is sound (and not whole) is in continual flux: there are versions of versions. The version supplements both the nation and dissemiNation because, although the latter is characterized by a theory of performativity, it elides the “inscription” of the voice in the other narration of nation. For once, the perquisites of deconstruction would seem to mitigate against the realities of a specific diasporic culture even as it aptly describes the decentering and irreducible processes at work. For the sake of argument, let us say (in a creolized version of Marx’s eleventh thesis) that philosophers have grafted the world, the point here is to dub it.

     

    Of course, the heritage of sound serves another national function. Indeed, LKJ’s voice is at once a critique of the imagined community of “Britishness” resplendent in the lamentable wave of authoritarian populism now known as Thatcherism13 (Thatcher herself is described by LKJ as the “wicked wan”14). That nation, despite its recalcitrant xenophobia, is all but dead. The problem, of course, is that this older paradigm of national purity (the little englander mentality) has, in its death throes, created a new culture of white anomie which, though assured of failure, seriously disables a more edifying vision of human community. And the African-Caribbean peoples of Britain, like their post-colonial Asian counterparts, are caught up in the manichean logic of exclusion/inclusion that drives the hegemonic ethnos and its attendant phantasms. From New Cross to Brixton, from Toxteth to Moss Side, from Southall to Notting Hill (a geography not of violence, but resistance and affirmation), this is what I want to critique as the culture and condition of dread. Dread, here, has several meanings that have to be thought simultaneously and in collision for LKJ’s voice and voicing to be understood. Dread has its roots (!) in Jamaican Rastafari, the religious cultural movement, and, in that declension, describes a communal realization: “the awesome, fearful confrontation of a people with a primordial but historically denied racial selfhood.”15 More generally, it connotes a sense of crisis (“Dread in a Babylon”), whether political or cultural, of apocalyptic nature in which social contradictions cannot be answered accept by an intense destabilization of the “order of things.” And, of course, there is dread as danger, because every stand against injustice invites retribution from those who see inequity as a niggling but necessary byproduct of their barbarism. Then there is dread as defiance:

     

    Maggi Tatcha on di go
    wid a racist show
    but a she haffi go
    kaw,
    rite now,
    African
    Asian
    West Indian
    an' Black British
    stan firm inna Inglan
    inna disya time yah.
    far noh mattah wat dey say,
    come wat may,
    we are here to stay
    inna Inglan,
    inn disya time yah....

     

    (LKJ “It Dread Inna Inglan”16)

     

    This marks a significant difference with LKJ’s Caribbean counterparts, for there is no ideology of return in LKJ’s view. Brathwaite, for one, went back to Africa, to Ghana, to rediscover his roots, then crossed the Atlantic once more to elaborate on his experiences. And, as is well known, Jamaican Rastafari includes a roots thematic specifically focused on Ethiopia as the domain of Haile Selassie, the reincarnation of Jah (and therefore Ethiopia is viewed as a promised land). Even when fronting Rasta Love, the band he named, LKJ never felt comfortable with this view: “I couldn’t identify with this Selassie thing. I just couldn’t identify with that at all.”17 So even though rasta provides an oppositional politics for LKJ (in its various challenges to ideologies of racial subordination and, indeed, capitalism), the deployment of dread is quite specific in his work, and is overdetermined by Inglan’s situation.

     

    dis is di age af reality
    but some a wi a deal wid mitalagy
    dis is di age of science an' teknalagy
    but some a wi a check fi antiquity
    w'en we can't face reality
    wi leggo wi clarity

     

    (“Reality Poem,” LKJ)18

     

    In a way, this is closer to Glissant’s notion of decentered Caribbeanness, a condition much more suspicious of prelapsarian origins as a solution to psychological dislocation. When Glissant left Martinique, it was for Paris on a scholarship. The relocation of Afro-Caribbeans to England after the Second World War was not primarily a function of educational opportunities (although these cannot be discounted), but an economic decision fostered by the machinations of a British government newly cognizant of its labor shortages. Dread manifests itself in many ways in LKJ’s poetry but in general it is used to describe the material conditions of Black Britain, or Inglan, an existence suppressed or marginalized in the consciousness of England, or White authority.

     

    Dread is underlined by dub. Dub sharpens the defiance by writing over the OED, by spelling the sounds of actual English usage in the anglophone African/Caribbean community. Dub itself describes the paradox of the poet’s voice, for dub means both the presence and the absence of Jamaican speech rhythms. Again, a confrontation with deconstruction’s primary reflex might seem in order (the word as the presence of an absent voice) but that only partially explains the paradox at issue. Dub is instrumental reggae, reggae with the lead vocal track removed and replaced (by a sound engineer) with various sound effects (echoes, reverberation, loops, vocal bites, etc.). Dub reggae’s very emphasis on production, on mixing, is itself a challenge to the ideology of the artist as performer or originator (and is sometimes snubbed by reggae artists precisely because it threatens or subverts their copy-rights). This feature emerges in many other forms of popular music (for instance, rap, techno-punk, and rave), which all sample each other with wild abandon, but often as much with the voice track as without. But if dub reggae mixes out the vocals, dub poetry lays down the voice as an instrument within the reggae beat; indeed, the voice is so closely allied with this beat that if you remove the reggae instrumentation you can still hear its sound in the voice of the poem. Dub means simultaneously instruments without voices and voices without instruments. This neat chiasmus is not a tribute to the wily signifier so much as a product of dread identity, subaltern subjectivity as sound, silence, and warning. Dub is underlined by dread.

     

    The paradox of dub as it signifies dread is a function of its multi-levelled etymology. Obviously, the lingo of the sound engineer is paramount, although this was formerly associated with the manipulation of sound and voice tracks in cinematic production or the copying of film onto film. Copying is important, both as a productive capacity and as a logic of repetition. Because of the question of property rights, dubbing is tantamount to repetition as sedition (dub has also meant “to forge keys” as well as “to lock up”; and “to invest with a dignity” as well as “to smear with grease” in two other instances of self-deconstruction). Coincidentally, perhaps, dub has an onomatopoeic function, specifically in “dub” and “dub-a-dub,” the sound of a beating drum. As LKJ recalls in “Reggae Sounds,” the drum is integral to the beat: “Thunda from a bass drum sounding/ lightning from a trumpet and a organ/ bass and rhythm and trumpet double-up/ team-up with drums for a deep doun searching.”19 I will say more about the bass in due course, but the point here is to emphasize dub’s undecidability and its technical associations which are both highly evocative of its cultural politics. The latter, ultimately, is what dread is all about.

     

    Although dub poetry is now associated with a number of poets (Oku Onuora, Mikey Smith, Mutubaruka, Brian Meeks, Breeze, Anita Stewart, etc.) it is almost synonymous with LKJ. Indeed, he claims to have coined the term in the early Seventies.20 For LKJ, dub poetry should be distinguished from dub lyricism, the latter being the process by which deejays lay down their own voice track over reggae (he has in mind Big Youth, U-Roy, I-Roy)–we know this more commonly as “talk-over” or “toasting.”21 Dub lyricism is the voice at its most spontaneous for (with the original voice track removed) the deejay can directly involve his or her audience through call and response methods, or by using current events to recontextualize the dread. Toasting, then, is a special skill tuned in to the tenor of the live event which in the Seventies and early Eighties was epitomized by the one thousand watt-plus sound system discos (either those of the clubs, or the more underground roving systems set up in abandoned houses or warehouses or sometimes just in the street until the police or authorities found a way to pull the plug). Obviously, there is some overlap in LKJ’s work: “It Dread Inna Inglan” on the album Dread Beat and Blood begins with call and response and features a crowd chanting “Free George Lindo” (the reference is to a wrongful arrest case in Bradford). Also, the fact that LKJ himself has released dub versions of his dub poetry (most conspicuously, the album LKJ in Dub) and thereby allows his music to be “talked over” would seem to make the practical separation of dub poetry from dub lyricism problematic. The main difference, however, is that dub poetry privileges the word over the music, or else incorporates the rhythm of the instruments into its enunciation. For LKJ in particular, the poetry should outlast its musical accompaniment or affiliation. This is an oddly purist and anti-populist stance but it has several explanations.

     

    The first is that LKJ considers himself a poet, and not a reggae artist. Clearly, he has learned much from reggae and the musical traditions on which it is based (like mento, ska, rude-boy, and rock-steady) but he does not believe that reggae can exhaust the possibilities of poetry in African/Caribbean cultural expression. Indeed, in a scathing review of Bob Marley in 1975 LKJ suggests that it is reggae music’s commercialization which underlines the danger in the poet becoming overly dependent on it. He cites the example of Marley being “found” by Island Records’ Chris Blackwell (referred to as the “descendant of slave masters”) and promoted as a “Rasta rebel” to boost lagging record sales. The irony is obvious:

     

    The "image" is derived from rastafarianism and rebellion, which are rooted in the historical experience of the oppressed of Jamaica. It then becomes an instrument of capital to sell Marley and his music, thereby negating the power which is the cultural manifestation of this historical experience. So though Marley is singing about "roots" and "natty," his fans know not. Neither do they understand the meaning or the feeling of dread. And there is really no dread in Marley's music. The dread has been replaced by the howling rock guitar and the funky rhythm and what we get is the enigma of "roots" and rock.22

     

    One wonders what LKJ would have to say about Shabba Ranks and other notables of Ragga (a hybridization of rap and reggae) or dancehall stylee? Dread, here, seems to contain its own fear, in this case connected to the rock industry’s economic and race relations: in short, the twin demons of sell-out and cross-over. For LKJ, commercial dread is either dreck or simply a contradiction in terms: it is reggae shorn of its sense of crisis, of its political edge. One could argue that Marley contradicts LKJ’s case, but LKJ’s musical career itself proves that the rock industry is not quite the monolothic capitalist entity that he makes it out to be. Indeed, LKJ’s break into pop occurred a couple of years later in his relationship with Virgin Records. Initially, he wrote biographies to accompany Virgin’s emerging list of reggae artists but eventually he got a chance to cut a record of his poems (drawn principally from the Dread Beat and Blood collection) with a reggae backing (LKJ had been doing this since 1973 with his band Rasta Love, but without a recording contract). While it was Mike Oldfield rather than reggae that catapulted Virgin towards multinational goliath status, LKJ’s point about capital remains pertinent: the corporate deployment of reggae directly supports those it putatively opposes. Taking poetry seriously simultaneously distances the white-dominated media conglomerates for which multiculturalism means capital diversity, while it also assures that the poetry itself can only have a local effect. With the market for printed poetry being so small, the dub poet must rely on live performance as the focus for the message, but for LKJ this means reading principally without the reggae band. Since his “farewell performance” in December, 1985 in Camden, LKJ has made less band-backed appearances, although the release of a new music collection Tings an Times in 1991 underlines that his concert farewell did not end his desire to produce reggae albums. Yet if economic exigency can be seen to compromise LKJ’s poetic principles the general rule remains that he is suspicious of reggae more because of the industry in which it is entwined than its tendency to demote the voice and the dread it embodies.

     

    Connecting this notion of voicing dread and making history suggests an important way of understanding the construction of the subaltern subject. Dub has its own code of othering which distances and/or alienates official discourse while addressing the real foundations of the Black community (the economic plight of postcolonialism, the racism of neo-colonialism, etc.). That the subaltern subject is an active political subject is crucial to LKJ’s history of/in the voice, which provides a significant documentary record of recent race relations in Britain. “New Cross Massakhah,” for instance, is not just a harrowing description of the arson murder of at least thirteen young Blacks attending a birthday party in South London in 1981, but also a story of community outrage, mobilisation, and protest. The Race Today Collective organized a mass demonstration to call attention both to the burgeoning violence against Blacks and to the woeful misrepresentation of the Massacre in the British press.23 For the poem, the point of crisis is also the point of memory. The narrator of the poem recalls the party as a celebration of community culture (“di dubbin/ an di rubbin/ an di rackin to di riddim”) and the violence and subsequent hypocrisy as an affront to the same, while constantly appealing to the community’s sense of this crisis (“yu noh remembah”). In particular, the poem draws a distinction between this community identity and the infamous “public” which is seen to be much too malleable before the police, the press, and the government’s “official story.” The rhythm of the story switches between the liveliness of the party and the heavier bass beat of the aftermath and this itself is a measure of dread. But the beat underscores the resistance polemic that is the content of the poem (“wi refuse fi surrendah/ to dem ugly inuendoh”). As with many of LKJ’s poems, the dread emerges in the difference between the “England” of the dominant public sphere and the “Inglan” of a historically specific English community. Although the outrage over New Cross was not the only cause, the riots across England in 1981 were a product of this glaring cultural, social, and political discrepancy. In this sense, the dub poet does not describe the crisis but articulates it as a function of contemporary community relations (in Jamaica dub serves a similar agonistic purpose). The aesthetics of dub poetry are not founded on description but praxis and the “wi” of its community appeal.

     

    “New Cross Massakhah,” (like LKJ’s “Di Great Insohreckshan” about the riots of ’81, and “Sonny’s Lettah” about the notorious “sus” law) evokes a poignant aesthetic of song and solidarity–the “Other” talks back, and dialogically. By this I mean to invoke Bakhtin’s sense of the utterance being authored by the other.24 Since the addressor anticipates audience response, the other voice is embedded in the speaker’s text. Each word is structured by the relationship between speaker and listener and the immediate conditions in which that “exchange” takes place. As we know, Bakhtin tended to hypostatize the novel as form, but there is good reason to dialogize dialogics through and beyond that domain. Thus, if the subaltern does not speak, as such, it is only within the restrictive logics and codes of the dominant discourse. This raises the paradox of dub once more, for there the subaltern is not represented but is heard. On the one hand, the social conditions dub critiques engage a particular community and context; on the other, the alienating English of dub distances the normative and normalizing tones of the linguistic orthodoxy (“Queen’s English” or “BBC English,” for instance).

     

    But the language of dub also calls attention to the racial differences that stratify Britain’s working classes. This, of course, has been the explicit subject of several reggae talk-over hits, the most famous of which is Smiley Culture’s “Cockney Translation.” Both Gilroy and Hebdige have provided cogent analyses of this brilliant paean to multiple voicing, but Smiley was not the first to highlight the differences within, in this case, working-class London. Cockney meets patois in LKJ’s 1979 poem “Fite Dem Back” which ventriloquizes London’s white working class as a harbinger of racist attitudes. The clash of language is also a struggle of race relations. The first verse of “Fite Dem back” begins with a “version” of Cockney: “we gonna smash their brains in/ cause they ain’t got nofink in ’em.”25 The second verse replies to this National Front mentality with “some a dem say dem a niggah haytah” and continues, “fashist an di attack/ noh baddah worry ’bout dat/ fashist an di attack/ wi wi’ fite dem back.” The simplified sociology of “us” and “them” (“wi” and “dem”) is, as I’ve argued elsewhere, not a function of crass dichotomous thinking, but a register of strategic opposition.26 Not all Cockneys are fascists, but “dem” who are must be challenged. The value of Bakhtin’s theory of the utterance and, indeed, Brathwaite’s notion of nation language, is that both provide models for understanding community address at the macro- and micro- social levels. And the artist, in both cases, must have a highly developed sense of public voice and responsibility, or what Bakhtin calls “answerability.”

     

    Dub emphasizes what constitutes a voice in social discourse.27 Mikey Smith, whose brutal murder in 1983 cut short the career of Jamaica’s premier dub poet, always wrote his poems, but the scripts do little justice to the instrumentation of his voice in live performance. Brathwaite comments that Smith “published” his poetry at public poetry readings, and notes that transcription of Smith’s voice is especially difficult when he includes noise, such as an imitation of a motorbike, to extend syllables at key moments (I will return to noise in due course). The word “woe” in his poem, “Me Cyaan Believe It” on the album version is a scream of almost four seconds in length, yet in his poetry collection, It A Come, it is rendered as “woeeeeeeee” which, while emphatic, does not convey the effect. Interestingly, at a recent conference in New York honoring Brathwaite, LKJ recited Smith’s poem from memory and followed the rhythm and stress of the album version almost exactly. Clearly, LKJ was dependent on Smith’s oraliture and his own experience of Smith recitations for his performance (the vocal clues are not sufficient in the written text). This underlines a paradoxical degree of unrepeatability and untranslatability in dub poetry that resists its reproduction as writing. The coding of dub is in tune with the live event and the community in which that event occurs.28 Bakhtin’s term “eventness” (sobytiinost’) describes this material specificity, a moment that constrains abstract transcription. Although Bakhtin has in mind an “act” rather than a speech act, he believes such activity should be linked to the process of art, art as an event of being rather than an object of “purely theoretical cognition.”29 Again, the key to the event is the co- authoring of the addressee, a sympathetic “co-experiencing” certainly more possible in an Afro-Caribbean community than, for instance, the halls of Westminster or Scotland Yard in their current forms. What makes for identification in one context might make for alienation and hostility in another. The dub poet is sensitive to the “eventness” of dub poetry and knows that one community’s dread is another community’s fear. LKJ, then, does not “give voice to the struggle” so much as explore how the voice is structured from within by struggle as a material context, both as social oppression and as linguistic violence.

     

    Thus, Bakhtin’s assertion that cultural voice always exceeds the personal, the individual, has a particular resonance in the dub poet’s community address–and for Black Britain at present, this voice is constructed at the margin where it (dialogically) confounds the centripetal logic of a “little englander” mentality. In addition to Bakhtin’s dialogism, such a reading picks up on Homi Bhabha’s notion of “dissemiNation” as a liminality of cultural identity, but double-voicing, in principle, is also highly evocative of dub’s doubling of English. This doubling forms a coda to Gates’s elaboration of the “talking book” in African vernacular traditions because here we have not just texts talking to one another in their revoicing of the history of black struggles but an emphasis on speech qua speech as a (dis)figuring of moribund nationalist ideology. Dub poetry would seem to be a rather obvious “speakerly text,” but it is my contention that it is better heard as a textualizing voice. The four beat bass rhythm of reggae (with its stress on beats two and four) might carry this voice, but what articulates it as such is the ambivalent subjectivity of dread. This is not a jargon of authenticity but an intimation of crisis in excess of its putative speaker. Voice, then, instantiates dread in two ways, the first of which is characterized by Kobena Mercer in his Bakhtinian model of Black British aesthetics: At a micro-level, the textual work of creolizing appropriation activated in new forms of black cultural practice awakens the thought that such strategies of disarticulation and rearticulation may be capable of transforming the ‘democratic imaginary’ at a macro- level by ‘othering’ inherited discourses of English identity.30

     

    The second instantiation, which is not presence but present danger, is (like Mikey Smith’s “woe”) to make the voice noisy; that is, to employ sound as syntax, as syncopation, as “sonority contrasts” (Brathwaite), and as instrumentation. This is the measure of dread beat, for it picks away at authority’s rationalism (Thatcher’s and now Major’s monotonous “common sense”). Dread beat interrogates and interpolates this often harmful status quo by not being quiet. As LKJ notes, “To us, who were of necessary birth, for the earth’s hard and thankless toil, silence ‘as no meaning” (“Two Sides of Silence”). While African American rap has provided an exhortation to “bring the noise,” dub poetry has been doing this for quite some time and belongs to the same tradition of affective sound. But LKJ’s move beyond silence suggests a doubling or troubling of identity for, as Jacques Attali has pointed out, what noise is to chaos, music is to community. Dub fashions both: the noise destabilizes the false ontology of Britishness (an oxymoronic discordant harmony) while the dread riddim provides a musical gloss on the fractured and tenuous realities of the diasporic subject.

     

    I have been trying to suggest how the voice of dub poetry instantiates a version of making history: the voice, here, as an active component of community identity. In the main, reggae has provided dub with its dread riddim but, as we have noted, LKJ believes that dub is not reducible to reggae even if it owes it a rhythmic allegiance. As with most “sound” protest, dub’s doubling provides a subaltern community with a medium for resistance and active intervention in the political arena. While this might seem to confine dub poetry to the margins as subculture, this does not mean cultural subservience. In fact, I believe it is closer to what Deleuze and Guattari have examined as the deterritorializations of “minor literature,” but in this case as a textualizing voice.31 LKJ’s “Bass Culture” is typical of the (sub)cultural (sub)version of dub. Obviously, the title puns on bass as being both the instrument of the beat and as being somehow obnoxious or repulsive. Who finds the bass base goes to the heart of the politics of culture that dub foregrounds. On the face of it, “Bass Culture” exudes all the major features discussed so far: the thumping beat of bass is its subject matter, here tied to the beating of the heart but also to Brathwaite’s point about the rhythm of the storm; it is a poem about dread, both as threat and as cultural identity (“dread people”); the violence it registers has everything to do with the tropical storm it imitates and the history of oppression it records and from which it learns; the voice is both musical as it follows the bass line, and noisy, as it makes a thunder crack (“SCATTA-MATTA-SHATTA-SHACK”) a slogan of defiance; the voice is specific about its own musical moment (“an di beat will shiff/as di culture altah/when oppression scatta”) which will pass according to a particular historical situation; in acknowledging the power of the voice (partially indicated in the dedication to Mr.Talk-Over, “Big Yout”) it makes no claims as to its originality but instead emphasizes a shared sense of “latent powa” as a bloodline of history, a “muzik of blood”; and the dread is a threat because it challenges the norm (“the false fold”) in its language, its riddim, and, of course, in its title. But there is also an ambivalence of context in “Bass Culture” that allows dread to signify simultaneously in two moments of identity. The first is the colonial condition in which dread is the “latent powa” that eventually comes “burstin outta slave shackle/ look ya! boun fi harm di wicked.” The second moment, however, is the dread present where this same latency must be utilized to “scatta” oppression within postcoloniality. Dread keeps the “culture pulsin” with bass riddim as long as it is “BAD OUT DEY”–a situation that did not necessarily end with the independence of Jamaica or the migration of some of its population to Britain. Dread, then, becomes a conceptual as well as experiential link in the story of Afro-Caribbeans. Thus, when I suggest that dub identity is about being-in-between this does not mean that the community voiced by LKJ has not arrived in England (we have already noted that it “stan firm inna Inglan”) but that arrival in itself does not end the legacy of racism that structures England’s national selfhood. The dread beat still has that to beat.

     

    But we are left with a central question: does the voice make history or simply record it? The answer lies in the ambiguity of “telling history.” History is that which has disallowed the subaltern voice, and yet talking history permits a trenchant sense of both a subject without a voice and a voice without a subject. That which makes history telling depends upon the specific positions of speaker and listener which are in excess of individuality. LKJ is, therefore, a vessel of history–he carries the voice rather than being coterminous with it. What makes history telling is not the individuation of the voice, as the griots well know, but the process in which the story keeps getting told. If the little englander subject makes the voice self present with the speaker, then dub identity answers by making history a function of the voice. In this sense, you know when LKJ is making history, because the community voice is telling it. Aime Cesaire once pointed out a massive contradiction in European identity in just three words, “Colonization and civilization?” The questions are different now (for instance, racism and multiculturalism?) but LKJ gives voice to current crises in Black Britain by historicizing them. While I have only begun to detail the importance of this history I hope the version here at least underlines that there is a history at stake and a role for the poet in speaking it, in something other than pentameters, and somewhere other than overseas.

     

    Notes

     

    1. A shorter “version” of this essay was first given at the MLA conference in New York, December 1992. The talk was backed with dub reggae, and the intonation of each sentence picked up on that bass beat. The form of the presentation, therefore, attempted to demonstrate the instrumentation of voice in dub poetry. This, of course, included an example of LKJ’s performance–the poem I will discuss later, “Bass Culture.” The present “re-mix” pushes against the impossibility of reproducing that event even as it admits the importance of this form of irreducibility. It is itself a dub version, the voiceless B-side of a reggae record–toned down, of course! A longer version will follow. For more on versions, see Dick Hebdige, Cut ‘N’ Mix (London: Comedia, 1987). Hebdige’s book exemplifies the ability to hear and read the riddim crucial to dread.

     

    2. I refer here to Brathwaite’s provocative essay, “History of the Voice” first presented at Carifesta 76 in Jamaica and subsequently expanded and revised as a lecture given at Harvard University, August 1979. The full text with bibliography has been published as Edward Kamau Brathwaite, History of the Voice (London: New Beacon Books, 1984). My efforts here are strongly influenced by Brathwaite’s emphasis on orality in his essay (his talk, like mine, has an audio track), although I will also focus on the difficulties of representation in his concept of the “nation language.”

     

    3. See Edouard Glissant, Caribbean Discourse (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1992): 77. Both Glissant’s and Brathwaite’s notion of history challenge the totalizing paradigms of Western history (particularly the Hegelian model). The status of the voice in relation to writing, however, is perceived somewhat differently as we will see. Glissant has a deconstructor’s flair for writing that remains suspicious of speech even as he wants to instantiate a “scriptible” voice. Brathwaite, however, is much more sanguine about the scriptability of the voice in its a radical distancing of the colonial word. “Dread” emerges in the tension between these polemics.

     

    4. The dilemma of being in between, or crossing is explored in Kamau Brathwaite’s Middle Passages (Newcastle: Bloodaxe, 1992), a brilliant collection of poems that fracture English, the page, and any sense of Black diaspora as a unitary experience of dislocation. For more on the “black atlantic” model, see Paul Gilroy, “Cultural Studies and Ethnic Absolutism” in Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson, and Paula Treichler, eds., Cultural Studies (London: Routledge, 1992): 187-198.

     

    5. Brathwaite: 10.

     

    6. See Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1983). Anderson’s thesis is linked to a simultaneous temporality called “meanwhile” which gives the form of the nation its assumed integrity. As Bhabha has pointed out, this works very well for realist models of representation, but overlooks (or, for our purposes, stutters) the liminality of cultural identity: the “imperceptible” and the unutterable remains just that. LKJ, for one, has attempted to speak what he calls this “silent space.”

     

    7. See Glissant: 94-95. My point in this diversion is to suggest that without an adequate knowledge of the deformations of the Caribbean nation one cannot begin to understand the voice of dread in the metropolitan “center.”

     

    8. See Henry Louis Gates Jr. The Signifying Monkey (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988); and, Houston Baker Jr., Blues, Ideology, and Afro-American Literature (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).

     

    9. See Mervyn Morris, “Interview with Linton Kwesi Johnson” Jamaica Journal, 20:1 (Feb/April 1987): 17-26. Most of this interview was conducted in 1982, but it was subsequently updated in 1986. As such, it provides an important overview of LKJ’s upbringing and intellectual/political development.

     

    10. Hebdige points out that Toots might have had the term, but the rhythm had appeared on earlier recordings, principally, Lee “Scratch” Perry’s production, “People Funny Boy.” Perry would go on to produce a number of groups, including the Wailers and the Upsetters. See Hebdige: 75.

     

    11. Like many other writers (including Baker and Hebdige), Gilroy connects the black diaspora through the strong musical links between Africa and the Caribbean, North America, and Western Europe. Gilroy’s study breaks new ground in several ways, however, particularly in detailing the complex alliances and oppositions that develop in Black Britain. The nexus of race and class is vital in this regard, as is his analysis of the production and institutionalization of racism in and outside government.

     

    12. See Homi Bhabha, “DissemiNation: Time, Narrative, and the Margins of the Nation” in Homi Bhabha, ed., Nation and Narration (London: Routledge, 1990): 291-322. Interestingly, this concept describes a temporality that distances, so to speak, from within, the History of Western national identity. But, for LKJ, I would argue, this principle itself needs to be qualified in light of the double diaspora, in terms of spatiality and tonality (the focus, if not the function, of the Brathwaite/Glissant metacritiques).

     

    13. See Stuart Hall’s perceptive analysis of this phenomenon in his The Hard Road To Renewal (London: Verso, 1988). It is important to maintain the sense that, although Thatcher embodies Thatcherism, its political formation and deformation pre- and post-dates her terms as Prime Minister.

     

    14. See/hear, Linton Kwesi Johnson, “Di Great Insohreckshan” in Linton Kwesi Johnson, Tings an Times (Newcastle: Bloodaxe, 1991): 43-44; and “Di Great Insohreckshan” on Linton Kwesi Johnson, Making History (Mango: MLPS9770, 1984).

     

    15. See Joseph Owens, Dread: The Rastafarians of Jamaica (London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1982): 3.

     

    16. See/hear “It Dread Inna Inglan,” in Linton Kwesi Johnson, Inglan is a Bitch (London: Race Today, 1980): 14-15; and “It Dread Inna Inglan” on Linton Kwesi Johnson, Dread Beat An’ Blood (Virgin: FLC9009 [tape], 1990). The latter is a reissue of the 1977 album of the same name.

     

    17. See the Morris interview: 19.

     

    18. See hear “Reality Poem” in LKJ, Tings An Times (Newcastle: Bloodaxe Books, 1991): 30-31; and LKJ, Forces of Victory (Mango: MLPS9566, 1979).

     

    19. Linton Kwesi Johnson, Tings An Times: 18.

     

    20. The earliest reference in his work I can find is an essay from 1976. See “Jamaican Rebel Music,” Race and Class, 17:4 (1976): 397-412. Even so, this still contradicts Stewart Brown’s contention that the term was first used by Oku Onuora in 1979. See “Dub Poetry: Selling Out” Poetry Wales, 22:2 (1987): 51-54. There are references in the music press as early as 1974 but these are usually tied to “talk-over” rather than LKJ’s sense of dub as poetry.

     

    21. For more on talk-over and toasting see Hebdige, especially Chapters 10 and 11. Given LKJ’s distinction, it would seem rap is closer to dub-lyricism than dub-poetry because the latter can function as its own instrumentation.

     

    22. See Linton Kwesi Johnson, “Roots and Rock” Race Today, 7:10 (October 1975)): 237-238.

     

    23. Paul Gilroy provides a pertinent analysis of the Massacre and its aftermath in his “There Ain’t No Black in the Union Jack” (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), Chapter Three. See also, the Special Issue of Race and Class, “Rebellion and Repression,” 23:2/3 (Autumn/Winter 1981/82).

     

    24. The implications of Bakhtin’s theory of the utterance for subaltern studies are discussed in my Dialogics of the Oppressed (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), especially the preface and chapter one. The relevant Bakhtinian texts are: V.N.Volosinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of Language, trans. Ladislav Matejka and I.R.Titunik (New York: Seminar Press, 1973); Mikhail Bakhtin, Problems in Dostoevsky’s Poetics, trans. Caryl Emerson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press); The Dialogic Imagination, ed. Michael Holquist, trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981); Speech Genres, trans. Vern McGee, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1986); and Art and Answerability, ed. Michael Holquist and Vadim Liapunov, trans. Vadim Liapunov (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990). In many ways, dub is a “version” of Bakhtin’s discourse of the streets which he reads in the organized heteroglossia of the novel.

     

    25. See/hear “Fite Dem Back” in Inglan is a Bitch (London: Race Today, 1980): 20; and on Forces of Victory (Mango: MLPS 9566, 1979). The transliteration of the sound, on this occasion, does not do justice to the effect in the song: “nofink” is actually “nuffink” on the album and is far more evocative of an East End accent. As an Eastender, I appreciate this verisimilitude.

     

    26. See Peter Hitchcock, Working-Class Fiction in Theory and Practice (Ann Arbor: UMI, 1989).

     

    27. This is a constituent feature of what Brathwaite calls “sound poetry.” Legendary among these are Mighty Sparrow, Miss Lou, and Bongo Jerry. The latter’s poem, “Mabrak,” with its invocation of a “black electric storm” and its plea to “recall and recollect black speech” does not go unnoticed in LKJ’s poetry. See Brathwaite: 25-48.

     

    28. LKJ describes this function thus: The kind of thing that I write and the way I say it is as a result of the tension between Jamaican Creole and Jamaican English and between those and English English. And all that, really, is the consequence of having been brought up in a colonial society, and then coming over here to live and go to school in England, soon afterwards. The tension builds up. You can see it in the writing. You can hear it. And something else: my poems may look sort of flat on the page. Well, that is because they’re actually oral poems, as such. They were definitely written to be read aloud, in the community. [Quoted in Andrew Salkey’s introduction to Linton Kwesi Johnson, Dread Beat and Blood (London: Bogle-L’Ouverture, 1975): 8].

     

    29. See Mikhail Bakhtin, Art and Answerability, ed. Michael Holquist and Vadim Liapunov, trans. Vadim Liapunov (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990): 189. See also, the discussion of eventness in Bakhtin’s work by Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson in their introduction to Gary Saul Morson and Caryl Emerson, eds., Rethinking Bakhtin (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1989).

     

    30. See Kobena Mercer, “Diaspora Culture and the Dialogic Imagination: The Aesthetics of Black Independent Film” in Mbye B.Cham and Claire Andrade-Watkins, eds., Blackframes: Critical Perspectives on Black Independent Cinema (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988): 59. Mercer’s approach to Black British film, particularly in its creative use of the Volosinov/Bakhtin text on the “ideological sign,” complements my interest here in the dialogic voice of dub poetry. For an excellent analysis of contemporary British cultural politics see also, Kobena Mercer, “Welcome to the Jungle: Identity and Diversity in Postmodern Politics” in Jonathan Rutherford, ed., Identity (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1990): 43-71.

     

    31. See Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature, trans. Dana Polan (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986). This will be developed in a subsequent “version.” For an application of “minor literature” to postcolonial discourse see Paget Henry and Paul Buhle, “Caliban as Deconstructionist: C.L.R.James and Post-Colonial Discourse” in Paget Henry and Paul Buhle, eds. C.L.R.James’s Caribbean (Durham: Duke University Press, 1992): 111-142.

     

  • Anouncements & Advertisements

     

     

     

    Every issue of Postmodern Culture will carry notices of events, calls for papers, and other announcments, up to 250 words, free of charge. Advertisements will also be published on an exchange basis. Send anouncements and advertisements to: pmc@jefferson.village.virginia.edu

     


     

    Journal and Book Announcements:

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    4) The Centennial Review
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    6) College Literature
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    •      ESSAYS IN POSTMODERN CULTURE:

    . . . Now Cordless

     

     

    An anthology of essays from Postmodern Culture is available in print from Oxford University Press. The works collected here constitute practical engagements with the postmodern–from AIDS and the body to postmodern politics. Writing by George Yudice, Allison Fraiberg, David Porush, Stuart Moulthrop, Paul McCarthy, Roberto Dainotto, Audrey Ecstavasia, Elizabeth Wheeler, Bob Perelman, Steven Helmling, Neil Larsen, David Mikics, Barrett Watten. Book design by Richard Eckersley.

     

     

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    •      BLACK ICE BOOKS

     

    Black Ice Books is a new alternative trade paperback series that will introduce readers to the latest wave of dissident American writers. Breaking out of the bonds of mainstream writing, the voices published here are subversive, challenging and provocative. The first four books include:

     

    Avant-Pop: Fiction for a Daydream Nation

     

    Edited by Larry McCaffery, this book is an assemblage of innovative fiction, comic book art, unique graphics and various other unclassifiable texts by writers like Samuel Delany, Mark Leyner, William Vollmann, Kathy Acker, Eurdice, Stephen Wright, Derek Pell, Harold Jaffe, Tim Ferret, Ricardo Cortez Cruz and many others.

     

     

    “One of the least cautious, nerviest editors going, Larry McCaffery is the No-Care Bear of American Letters.”

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    “A clusterbomb of crazy fiction, from a generation too sane to repeat yesterday’s lies.”

    — Tom Robbins

     

    New Noir
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    John Shirley bases his stories on his personal experience of extreme people and extreme mental states, and on his struggle with the seduction of drugs, crime, prostitution and violence.

     

    “John Shirley is an adventurer, returning from dark and troubled regions with visionary tales to tell.”

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    The Kafka Chronicles
    a novel by Mark Amerika

     

    The Kafka Chronicles is an adventure into the psyche of an ultracontemporary twentysomething guerilla artist who is lost in an underworld of drugs and mental terrorism, where he encounters an unusual cast of angry yet sensual characters

     

    “Mr Amerika–if indeed that is his name–has achieved a unique beauty in his artful marriage of Blake’s lyricism and the iron- in-the-soul of Celine. Are we taking a new and hard-hitting Antonin Artaud? Absolutely. And much more.”

    –Terry Southern

     

    Revelation Countdown
    by Cris Mazza

     

    Stories that project onto the open road not the nirvana of personal freedom but rather a type of freedom more resembling loss of control.

     

    “Talent jumps off her like an overcharge of electricity.”

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    Fiction Collective Two
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    Normal, IL 61761
     

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    •      Black Sacred Music: A Journal of Theomusicology

     

    Presenting the proceedings of an important conference held in Blantyre, Malawi in November of 1992, this volume represents a significant step for the African Christian church toward incorporating indigenous African arts and culture into it liturgy. Recognizing that the African Christian church continues to define itself in distinctly Western terms, forty-nine participants from various denominations and all parts of Africa– Uganda, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Madagascar, Mauritius, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Sierra Leone, Cameroon–and the United States met to share ideas and experiences and to establish strategies for the indigenization of Christianity in African churches.

     

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    The William Grant Still Reader presents the collected writings of this respected American composer. Still offered a perspective on American music and society informed by a diversity of experience and associations that few others have enjoyed. His distinguished career spanned jazz, traditional African-American idioms, and the European avant-garde, and his compositions ranged from chamber music to opera.

     

    Sacred Music of the Secular City delves into the American religious imagination by examining the religious roots and historical circumstances of popular music. Includes essays on musicians Robert Johnson, Duke Ellington, Marvin Gaye, Madonna, and 2 Live Crew.

     

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    •      The Centennial Review
      Edited by R.K. Meiners

     

    The Centennial Review is committed to reflection on intellectual work, particularly as set in the University and its environment. We are interested in work that examines models of theory and communication in the physical, biological, and human sciences; that re-reads major texts and authoritative documents in different disciplines or explores interpretive procedures; that questions the cultural and social implications of research in a variety of disciplines.

     

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    ___ Poland: From Real Socialism to Democracy

     

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    312 Linton Hall
    Michigan State University
    East Lansing MI 48824-1044
     

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    •      Chicago Journal of Theoretical Computer Science

    Editors: Stuart Kurtz, Michael O’Donnell, and Janos Simon, University of Chicago

     

    “I want to commend both The MIT Press and the MIT Libraries for their vision in publishing the Chicago Journal of Theoretical Computer Science… the North Carolina State University Libraries will be subscribing to this ground-breaking electronic journal. I can assure you that we will do all that we can to make our faculty and students aware of this exciting new publication” –Susan K. Nutter, Director of Libraries, North Carolina State University

     

    Please Join in Our Vision of a New Relationship between Publishers and Libraries

     

    We have a vision that university presses and university libraries, working together, can publish and maintain electronic scholarly journals which provide:

     

    •      Peer-reviewed and high-quality papers
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    Our Vision Begins with . . .

     

    Chicago Journal of Theoretical Computer Science

     

    The MIT Press and the MIT Libraries are pleased to announce the publication of a ground-breaking electronic journal to begin publication in spring of 1994. Edited by Stuart Kurtz, Michael O’Donnell, and Janos Simon at the University of Chicago, the journal will publish high-quality, peer-reviewed articles in theoretical computer science and is designed to meet the following needs:

     

    •      The scholar’s desire for quicker peer review and dissemination of research results;
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    Ground-Breaking:

     

    •      Published by an established journals publisher, the MIT Press, working with the MIT Libraries to guarantee library concerns are addressed;
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    What a Subscriber Gets:

     

    •      Article-by-article publication, beginning with approximately 15 articles in 1994 (equivalent to a triannual standard paper journal) and including possible paper delivery if demanded by customers;
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    •      College Literature: A Triannual Literary Journal for the Classroom
      Edited by Kostas Myrsiades

     

    A triannual journal of scholarly criticism dedicated to serving the needs of College/University teachers by providing them with access to innovative ways of studying and teaching new bodies of literature and experiencing old literature in new ways.

     

    College Literature has made itself in a short time one of the leading journals in the field, important reading for anyone teaching literature to college students.”

     

    J. Hillis Miller
    University of CA, Irvine

     

    “Congratulations on some extremely important work; you certainly seem attuned to what is both valuable and relevant.”

     

    Terry Eagleton
    Oxford University

     

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    Cary Nelson

     

    “My sense is that College Literature will have substantial influence in the field of literacy and cultural studies.”

     

    Henry A. Giroux

     

    “A journal one must consult to keep tabs on cultural theory and contemporary discourse, particularly in relation to pedagogy.”

     

    Robert Con Davis

     

    Forthcoming issues:

     

    Third World Women’s Literature African American Writing Cross-Cultural Poetics

     

    Subscription Rates:      US                  Foreign
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    Main 544
    West Chester University
    West Chester, PA 19383
    (215)436-2901 / (fax) (215)436-3150
     

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    •      CONTENTION
      Debates in Society, Culture, and Science

     

    Contention is:

     

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    Alberta Arthurs

     

    “…the most exciting new journal that I have ever read.”

     

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    “…superb.”

     

    Janet Abu-Lughod

     

    “…an important, exciting, and very timely project.”

     

    Theda Skocpol

     

    “…an idea whose time has come.”

     

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    Subscriptions (3 issues) are available to individuals at $25.00 and to institutions at $50.00 (plus $10.00 for foreign surface postage) from:

     

    Journals Division
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    601 N. Morton
    Bloomington IN 47104
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    •      Differences
      A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies

     

    QUEER THEORY: LESBIAN AND GAY SEXUALITIES
    (Volume 3, Number 2)
    Edited by Teresa de Lauretis

     

    Teresa de Lauretis: Queer Theory: Lesbian and Gay Sexualities An Introduction
    Sue Ellen Case: Tracking the Vampire
    Samuel R. Delany: Street Talk/Straight Talk
    Elizabeth A. Grosz: Lesbian Fetishism?
    Jeniffer Terry: Theorizing Deviant Historiography
    Thomas Almaguer: Chicano Men: A Cartography of Homosexual Identity and Behavior
    Ekua Omosupe: Black/Lesbian/Bulldagger
    Earl Jackson, Jr.: Scandalous Subjects: Robert Gluck’s Embodied Narratives
    Julia Creet: Daughter of the Movement: The Psychodynamics of Lesbian S/M Fantasy

     

    THE PHALLUS ISSUE
    (Volume 4, Number 1)
    Edited by Naomi Schor and Elizabeth Weed

     

    Maria Torok: The Meaning of “Penis Envy” in Women (1963)
    Jean-Joseph Goux: The Phallus: Masculine Identity and the “Exchange of Women”
    Parveen Adams: Waiving the Phallus
    Kaja Silverman: The Lacanian Phallus
    Charles Bernheimer: Penile Reference in Phallic Theory
    Judith Butler: The Lesbian Phallus and the Morphological Imaginary
    Jonathan Goldberg: Recalling Totalities: The Mirrored Stages of Arnold Schwarzenegger
    Emily Apter: Female Trouble in the Colonial Harem

     

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    Journals Division Indiana University Press 601 N Morton Bloomington IN 47404 ph: (812) 855-9449 fax: (812) 855-7931

     

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    •      DISCOURSE
      Volume 15, Number 1

     

    SPECIAL ISSUE

    FLAUNTING IT: LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES

     

    Kathryn Baker: Delinquent Desire: Race, Sex, and Ritual in Reform Schools for Girls

    Terralee Bensinger: Lesbian Pornography: The Re-Making of (a) Community

    Scott Bravmann: Investigating Queer Fictions of the Past: Identities, Differences, and Lesbian and Gay Historical Self-Representations

    Sarah Chinn and Kris Franklin: “I am What I Am” (Or Am I?): Making and Unmaking of Lesbian and Gay Identity in High Tech Boys

    Greg Mullins: Nudes, Prudes, and Pigmies: The Desirability of Disavowal in Physical Culture Magazine

    JoAnn Pavletich: Muscling the Mainstream: Lesbian Murder Mysteries and Fantasies of Justice

    David Pendelton: Obscene Allegories: Narrative Structures in Gay Male Porn

    Thomas Piontek: Applied Metaphors: AIDS and Literature

    June L. Reich: The Traffic in Dildoes: The Phallus as Camp and the Revenge of the Genderfuck

     

     

    Single Issues: $12.95 individuals $25.00 institutions ($1.75 each postage)

     

    Subscriptions (3 issues): $25.00 individuals $50.00 institutions ($10.00 foreign surface postage)

     

     

    Send orders to:

     

    Journals Division Indiana University Press 601 N Morton Bloomington IN 47404 ph: (812) 855-9449 fax: (812) 855-7931

     

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    •      The Electronic Journal on Virtual Culture

     

    We are very pleased by the great interest in the Electronic Journal on Virtual Culture. There are already more than 1,280 people subscribed.

     

    Our first issue was distributed in March 1993. The future looks very interesting. Editors are working on Special Issues on education, law, qualitative research, and dynamics in virtual culture.

     

    The Electronic Journal on Virtual Culture (EJVC) is a refereed scholarly journal that fosters, encourages, advances and communicates scholarly thought on virtual culture. Virtual culture is computer-mediated experience, behavior, action, interaction and thought, including electronic conferences, electronic journals, networked information systems, the construction and visualization of models of reality, and global connectivity.

     

    EJVC is published monthly. Some parts may be distributed at different times during the month or published only occasionally (e.g. CyberSpace Monitor). If you would be interested in writing a column on some general topic area in the Virtual Culture (e.g. an advice column for questions about etiquette, technology, etc. ?) or have an article to submit or would be interested in editing a special issue contact Ermel Stepp Editor-in-Chief of Diane Kovacs Co-Editor at the e-mail addresses listed below. You can retrieve the file EJVC AUTHORS via anonymous ftp to

     

    byrd.mu.wvnet.edu

    (pub/ejvc) or via e-mail to

    listserv@kentvm
     

    or

     
    listserv@kentvm.kent.edu

     

    Cordially,

    Ermel Stepp, Marshall University, Editor-in-Chief

    MO34050@Marshall.wvnet.edu

    Diane (Di) Kovacs, Kent State University, Co-Editor

    DKOVACS@Kentvm.Kent.edu
     

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    •      Eternal Network: A Mail Art Anthology

     

    “Eternal Network: A Mail Art Anthology” by Chuck Welch is to be published in Fall 1994 by University of Calgary Press. The 42 chapter, 350 page text includes an index, 147 illustrations and six major appendices including the largest extensive listing of underground mail art zines in existence. A thorough listing of nearly 100 international private and institutional mail art archives appears in another important appendice.

     

    But what is mail art? Mail art is a paradox in the way it reverses traditional definitions of art; the mailbox and computer replace the museum, the address becomes the art, and the mailman brings home the avant-garde to mail artists in the form of correspondence art, e-mail art, artistamps, postcards, conceptual projects, and collaborations. “Eternal Network introduces readers to a lively exchange with international mail art networkers from five continents. The book include snail mail and e-mail addresses, fax, and telephone numbers for many active mail artists. Readers are invited to participate — to corresponDANCE with global village artists who quickstep beyond establishment boundaries of art.

     

    Among the forty-two distinguished contributors appearing in “Eternal Network” are New York City art critic Richard Kostelanetz; physicist, poet Bern Porter; Director of the Museum of Modern Art Library, Clive Phillpot; famed Fluxus artists Dick Higgins and Ken Friedman; University of Iowa art historian and archival director Estera Milman, and mail art patron Jean Brown who has collected the world’s largest assemblage of mail art material now undergoing documentation at the Getty Center for the History of Art and the Humanities.

     

    Many of the forty-two chapters appearing in “Eternal Network” are original, unpublished essays pertaining to the origin and history of mail art networking, collaborative aesthetics, new directions for mail art networking in the 1990’s, mail art projects exploring the interconnection of marginal on and off-line networks, mail art criticism and dialogue, and finally, parables, visions, dances, dreams, and poems that articulate the living mythology of mail art.

     

    Edited by Chuck Welch, an active mail artist since 1978, “Eternal Network” makes an important first step towards introducing mail art to non-artists, artists, and academic scholars. For more information send e-mail to

     

    Cathryn.L.Welch@dartmouth.edu
     
     

    or write to

     

    “Eternal Network” PO Box 978, Hanover, NH 03755
     

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    •      GENDERS
      Ann Kibbey, Editor University of Colorado, Boulder

     

    Since 1988, GENDERS has presented innovative theories of gender and sexuality in art, literature, history, music, photography, TV, and film. Today, GENDERS continues to publish both new and known authors whose work reflects an international movement to redefine the boundaries of traditional doctrines and disciplines.

     

    ——————————

     

    GENDERS is published triannually in Spring, Fall, Winter

     

           Single Copy rates: Individual $9, Institution $14
                      Foreign postage, add $2/copy
           Subscription rates: Individual $24, Institution $40
                 Foreign postage, add $5.50/subscription

     

    Send orders to:

     

    University of Texas Box 7819 Austin TX 78713
     

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    •      Hot Off the Tree

     

    HOTT — Hot Off The Tree — is a FREE monthly electronic newsletter featuring the latest advances in computer, communications, and electronics technologies. Each issue provides article summaries on new & emerging technologies, including VR (virtual reality), neural networks, PDAs (personal digital assistants), GUIs (graphical user interfaces), intelligent agents, ubiquitous computing, genetic & evolutionary programming, wireless networks, smart cards, video phones, set-top boxes, nanotechnology, and massively parallel processing.

     

    Summaries are provided from the following sources:

     

    Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Washington Post, San Jose Mercury News, Boston Globe, Financial Times (London) …

     

    Time, Newsweek, U.S. News & World Report …

     

    Business Week, Forbes, Fortune, The Economist (London), Nikkei Weekly (Tokyo), Asian Wall Street Journal (Hong Kong) …

     

    over 50 trade magazines, including Computerworld, InfoWorld, Datamation, Computer Retail Week, Dr. Dobb’s Journal, LAN Times, Communications Week, PC World, New Media, VAR Business, Midrange Systems, Byte …

     

    over 50 research journals, including ALL publications of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies, plus technical journals published by AT&T, IBM, Hewlett Packard, Fujitsu, Sharp, NTT, Siemens, Philips, GEC …

     

    over 100 Internet mailing lists & USENET discussion groups …

     

    plus …

     

    •      listings of forthcoming & recently published technical books;
    •      listings of forthcoming trade shows & technical conferences;
    •      company advertorials, including CEO perspectives, tips & techniques, and new product announcements.

     

    BONUS:

     

    Exclusive interviews with technology pioneers … the next two issues feature interviews with Mark Weiser (head of Xerox PARC’s Computer Science Lab) on ubiquitous computing, and Nobel laureate Joshua Lederberg on the information society

     

    TO REQUEST A FREE SUBSCRIPTION, CAREFULLY FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS BELOW

     

    Send subscription requests to:

     

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    Leave the “Subject” line blank

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    Note: Do not include first or last names following “SUBSCRIBE HOTT-LIST” or “UNSUBSCRIBE HOTT-LIST”

     

    The HOTT mailing list is automatically maintained by a computer located at the University of California at San Diego. The system automatically responds to the sender’s return path. Hence, it is necessary to send subscription requests and cancellations directly to the listserv at UCSD. (I cannot make modifications to the list … nor do I have access to the list.) For your privacy, please note that the list will not be rented. If you have problems and require human intervention, contact:

     

    hott@ucsd.edu
     

    The next issue of the reinvented HOTT e-newsletter is scheduled for transmission in late January/early February.

     

    Please forward this announcement to friends and colleagues, and post to your favorite bulletin boards. Our objective is to disseminate the highest quality and largest circulation compunications (computer & communications) industry newsletter.

     

    I look forward to serving you as HOTT’s new editor. Thank you.

     

    David Scott Lewis
    Editor-in-Chief and Book & Video Review Editor
    IEEE Engineering Management Review
    (the world’s largest circulation “high tech” management journal)

     

    Internet address:d.s.lewis@ieee.org
    Tel: +1 714 662 7037
    USPS mailing address: POB 18438
    IRVINE CA 92713-8438
    USA
     

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    •      Announcing a New Electronic Journal:INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND DISABILITIES

     

    Below is information about the journal, including the table of contents for Volume I, no. 1, as well as information on editorial staff and explicit instructions for subscribing or using the journal via gopher.

     

    IT&D V1N1 Table of Contents 230 lines

     

    INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND DISABILITIES

    ISSN 1073-5127

    Volume I, No. 1 January, 1994

     

    ARTICLES

     

    INTRODUCING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND DISABILITIES

    (itdV01N1 mcnulty)

    Tom McNulty, Editor

     

    BUILDING AN ACCESSIBLE CD-ROM REFERENCE STATION

    (itdV01N1 wyatt)

    Rochelle Wyatt and Charles Hamilton

     

    ABSTRACT: This case study describes the development of an accessible CD-ROM workstation at the Washington Library for the Blind and Physically Handicapped. Included are descriptions of hardware and software, as well as selected CD-ROM reference sources. Information is provided on compatibility of individual CD-ROM products with adaptive technology hardware and software.

     

    DEVELOPMENT OF AN ACCESSIBLE USER INTERFACE FOR PEOPLE WHO
    ARE BLIND OR VISION IMPAIRED AS PART OF THE RE-COMPUTERIZATION
    OF ROYAL BLIND SOCIETY (AUSTRALIA)

    (itdV01N1 noonan)

    Tim Noonan

     

    ABSTRACT: In 1991, Royal Blind Society (Australia) and Deen Systems, a Sydney-based software development company, undertook a major overhaul of RBS information systems intended to enhance access to RBS client services as well as employment opportunities for blind and vision impaired RBS staff. This case study outlines the steps taken and principles followed in the development of a computer user interface intended for efficient use by blind and vision impaired individuals.

     

    THE ELECTRONIC REHABILITATION RESOURCE CENTER AT
    ST. JOHN’S UNIVERSITY (NEW YORK)

    (itdV01N1 holtzman)

    Bob Zenhausern and Mike Holtzman

     

    ABSTRACT: St. John’s University in Jamaica, New York, is host to a number of disability-related network information sources and services. This article identifies and describes key sources and services, including Bitnet listservs, or discussion groups, the UNIBASE system which includes real-time online conferencing, and other valuable educational and rehabilitation-related network information sources.

     

    THE CLEARINGHOUSE ON COMPUTER ACCOMMODATION (COCA)

    (itdV01N1 brummel)

    Susan Brummel and Doug Wakefield

     

    ABSTRACT: Since 1985, COCA has been pioneering information policies and computer support practices that benefit Federal employees with disabilities and members of the public with disabilities. Today, COCA provides a variety of services to people within and outside Government employment. The ultimate goal of all COCA’s activities is to advance equitable information environments consistent with non-discriminatory employment and service delivery goals.

     

    DEPARTMENTS

     

    JOB ACCOMMODATIONS

    (itdV01N1 jobs)

    Editor: Joe Lazzaro

    lazzaro@bix.com
     
     

    K – 12 EDUCATION

    (itdV01N1 k12)

    Editor: Anne Pemberton

    apembert@vdoe386.vak12ed.edu
     
     

    LIBRARIES

    (itdV01N1 library)

    Editor: Ann Neville

    neville@emx.cc.utexas.edu
     
     

    ONLINE INFORMATION AND NETWORKING

    (itdV01N1 online)

    Editor: Steve Noble

    slnobl01@ulkyvm.louisville.edu
     
     

    CAMPUS COMPUTING

    (itdV01N1 campus)

    Editor: Daniel Hilton-Chalfen, Ph.D.

    hilton-chalfen@mic.ucla.edu

     

    Copyright (c 1994) by (IT&D) Information Technology and Disabilities. Authors of individual articles retain all copyrights to said articles, and their permission is needed to reproduce any individual article. The rights to the journal as a collection belong to (IT&D) Information Technology and Disabilities. IT&D encourages any and all electronic distribution of the journal and permission for such copying is expressly permitted here so long as it bears no charge beyond possible handling fees. To reproduce the journal in non-electronic format requires permission of its board of directors. To do this, contact the editor.

     

    EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

    Tom McNulty, New York University

    (mcnulty@acfcluster.nyu.edu)

     

    EDITORS

     

    Dick Banks, University of Wisconsin, Stout
    Carmela Castorina, UCLA
    Daniel Hilton-Chalfen, PhD, UCLA
    Norman Coombs, PhD, Rochester Institute of Technology
    Joe Lazzaro, Massachusetts Commission for the Blind
    Ann Neville, University of Texas, Austin
    Steve Noble, Recording for the Blind
    Anne L. Pemberton, Nottoway High School, Nottoway, VA
    Bob Zenhausern, PhD, St. John’s University

     

    EDITORIAL BOARD

     

    Dick Banks, University of Wisconsin, Stout
    Carmela Castorina, UCLA
    Danny Hilton-Chalfen, PhD, UCLA
    Norman Coombs, PhD, Rochester Institute of Technology
    Alistair D. N. Edwards, PhD, University of York, UK
    Joe Lazzaro, Massachusetts Commission for the Blind
    Ann Neville, University of Texas, Austin
    Steve Noble, Recording for the Blind
    Anne L. Pemberton, Nottoway High School, Nottoway, VA
    Lawrence A. Scadden, PhD, National Science Foundation
    Bob Zenhausern, PhD, St. John’s University

     

    ABOUT EASI (EQUAL ACCESS TO SOFTWARE AND INFORMATION)

     

    Since its founding in 1988 under the EDUCOM umbrella, EASI has worked to increase access to information technology by persons with disabilities. Volunteers from EASI have been instrumental in the establishment of Information Technology and Disabilities as still another step in this process. Our mission has been to serve as a resource primarily to the education community by providing information and guidance in the area of access to information technologies. We seek to spread this information to schools, colleges, universities and into the workplace. EASI makes extensive use of the internet to disseminate this information, including two discussion lists:

     
    EASI@SJUVM.STJOHNS.EDU
     

    (a general discussion on computer access) and

     

    AXSLIB-L@SJUVM.STJOHNS.EDU
     

    (a discussion on library access issues). To join either list, send a “subscribe” command to

     

    LISTSERV@SJUVM.STJOHNS.EDU
     

    including the name of the discussion you want to join plus your own first and last name. EASI also maintains several items on the St. Johns gopher under the menu heading “Disability and Rehabilitation Resources”.

     

    For further information, contact the EASI Chair:

     

    Norman Coombs, Ph.D.

    NRCGSH@RITVAX.ISC.RIT.EDU
     

    or the EASI office:
    EASI’s phone: (310) 640-3193
    EASI’s e-mail: EASI@EDUCOM.EDU

     

    Individual ITD articles and departments are archived on the St. John’s University gopher. To access the journal via gopher, locate the St. John’s University (New York) gopher. Select “Disability and Rehabilitation Resources,” and from the next menu, select “EASI: Equal Access to Software and Information.” Information Technology and Disabilities is an item on the EASI menu.

     

    To retrieve individual articles and departments by e-mail from the listserv: address an e-mail message to:

     

    listserv@sjuvm.stjohns.edu

     

    leave subject line blank

    the message text should include the word “get” followed by the two word file name; for example:

    get itdV01N1 contents

     

    Each article and department has a unique filename; that name is listed below the article or department in parentheses. Do NOT include the parentheses with the filename when sending the “get” command to listserv.

     

    NOTE: ONLY ONE ITEM MAY BE RETRIEVED PER MESSAGE; DO NOT SEND MULTIPLE GET COMMANDS IN A SINGLE E-MAIL MESSAGE TO LISTSERV.

     

    To receive the journal regularly, send e-mail to:

     

    listserv@sjuvm.stjohns.edu
     

    with no subject and either of the following lines of text:
    subscribe itd-toc “Firstname Lastname”
    subscribe idt-jnl “Firstname Lastname”

     

    (ITD-JNL is the entire journal in one e-mail message while ITD-TOC sends the contents with information on how to obtain specific articles.)

     

    To get a copy of the guidelines for authors, send e-mail to:

     

    listserv@sjuvm.stjohns.edu

     

    with no subject and the following single line of text:
    get author guidelin

     

    Back

     


     

    •      M/E/A/N/I/N/GA Journal of Contemporary Art Issues

     

    M/E/A/N/I/N/G, an artist-run journal of contemporary art, is a fresh, lively, contentious, and provocative forum for new ideas in the arts.

     

    M/E/A/N/I/N/G is published twice a year in the fall and spring.
    It is edited by Susan Bee and Mira Schor.

     

    Subscriptions for

     

    2 ISSUES (1 YEAR):
    $12 for individuals:
    $20 for institutions

     

    4 ISSUES (2 YEARS):
    $24 for individuals;
    $40 for institutions

     

    •      Foreign subscribers please add $10 per year for shipping abroad and to Canada: $5
    •      Foreign subscribers please pay by international money order in U.S. dollars.

     

    All checks should be made payable to Mira Schor

     

    Send all subscriptions to:

     

    Mira Schor
    60 Lispenard Street
    New York, NY 10013

     

    Limited supply of back issues available at $6 each, contact Mira Schor for information.

     

    Distributed with the Segue Foundation and the Solo Foundation

     

    Back

     


     

    •      Modern Fiction Studies

     

    MFS, a journal of modern and postmodern literature and culture, announces the following forthcoming special issues:

     

    February, 39.1: “Fiction of the Indian Subcontinent”

     

    May, 39.3: “Toni Morrison”

     

    November, 40.1: “The Cultural Politics of Displacement” Barbara Harlow, guest editor

     

    We also continue to accept submissions for forthcoming special issues on “Autobiography, Photography, Narrative,” Timothy Dow Adams, Guest Editor (deadline: April 1, 1994); “Postmodern Narratives (deadline: October 1 1994); “Sexuality and Narrative,” Guest Editor, Judith Roof (deadline: March 1, 1995).

     

    MFS is published quarterly at Purdue University and invites submissions of articles offering theoretical, historical, interdisciplinary, and cultural approaches to modern and contemporary narrative. Authors should submit essays for both special and general issues in triplicate paper copy or duplicate paper copy and IBM-compatible floppy; please include a self- addressed, stamped envelope for the return of submissions. Send submissions to:

     

    Patric O’Donnell
    Editor
    MFS
    Department of English
    Heavilon Hall
    Purdue University
    West Lafayette IN 47907-1389
     
     

    Address inquiries to the editor at this address or by e-mail at

     

    pod@purccvm (bitnet);
    pod@vm.cc.purdue.edu (Internet)

     

    Subscriptions to MFS are $20 for individuals and $35 for libraries. Back issues are $7 each. Address subscription inquiries to:

     

    Nel Fink
    Circulation Manager
    MFS
    Department of Englis
    h Heavilon Hall
    Purdue University
    West Lafayette IN 47907-1389
     

    Back

     


     

    •      Minnesota Review

     

    Tell your friends! Tell your librarians! The new Minnesota Review‘s coming to town!

     

    Subscriptions are $10 a year (two issues), $20 institutions/overseas. The new Minnesota Review is published biannually and originates from East Carolina University beginning with the Fall 1992 special issue.

     

    Send all queries, comments, suggestions, submissions, and subscriptions to:

     

    Jeffrey Williams, Editor
    Minnesota Review
    Department of English
    East Carolina University
    Greenville, NC 27858-4353
     

    Back

     


     

    •      NOMAD
      An Interdisciplinary Journal of The Humanities, Arts, And Sciences

     

    Manuscript submissions wanted in all interdisciplinary fields!

     

    Nomad is a forum for those texts that explore or examine the undefined regions among critical theory, visual arts, and writing. It is a bi-annual, not-for-profit, independent publication for provocative cross-disciplinary work of all cultural types, such as intermedia artwork, metatheory, and experimental writing, as well as literary, theoretical, political, and popular writing. While our editorial staff is comprised of artists and academics in a variety of disciplines, NOMAD strives to operate in a space outside of mainstream academic discourse and without institutional funding or controls.

     

    Manuscripts should not exceed fifteen pages (exclusive of references); any form is acceptable. If possible, please submit manuscripts on 3.5″ Macintosh disks, in either Microsoft Word or MacWrite II format, or by E-mail. Each manuscript submitted on disk must be accompanied by a paper copy. Otherwise, please send two copies of each manuscript. Artwork submitted must be no larger than 8 1/2″ x 11″, and in black and white. PICT, TIFF, GIF, and JPEG files on 3.5″ Macintosh disks are acceptable, if accompanied by a paper copy (or via E-mail, bin-hexed or uuencoded). All artwork must be camera-ready. Submissions by regular mail should include a SASE with sufficient postage attached if return is desired. Diskettes should be shipped in standard diskette mailing packages.

     

    Subscriptions: $9 per year (2 issues)
    Send Manuscripts and Inquiries to:

     

    NOMAD, c/o
    Mike Smith
    406 Williams Hall
    Florida State University
    Tallahassee, Florida, 32306
    msmith@garnet.acns.fsu.edu

     

    “In NOMAD, the rarest combinations of interests are treated with respect and exposed to the eyes of those who can most appreciate them.”

     

    Back

     


     

    •      OctoberArt | Theory | Criticism | Politics

     

    The MIT Press

     

    Edited by: Rosalind Kraus
                Annette Michelson
                Yve-Alain Bois
                Benjamin H.D. Buchloh
                Hal Foster
                Denis Hollier
                John Rajchman

     

    “OCTOBER, the 15-year-old quarterly of social and cultural theory, has always seemed special. Its nonprofit status, its cross- disciplinary forays into film and psychoanalytic thinking, and its unyielding commitment to history set it apart from the glossy art magazines.”

    --Village Voice

     

    As the leading edge of arts criticism and theory today, OCTOBERfocuses on the contemporary arts and their various contexts of interpretation. Original, innovative, provocative, each issue examines interrelationships between the arts and their critical and social contexts.

     

    Come join OCTOBER‘s exploration of the most important issues in contemporary culture. Subscribe Today!

     

    Published Quarterly ISSN 0162-2870. Yearly Rates: Individual $32.00; Institution $80.00; Student (copy of current ID required) and Retired: $22.00. Outside USA add $14.00 postage and handling. Canadians add additional 7% GST. Prepayment is required. Send check payable to OCTOBER drawn against a US bank, MasterCard or VISA number to:

     

    MIT Press Journal / 55 Hayward Street / Cambridge, MA 02142-1399 / TEL: (617) 233-2889 / FAX: (617) 258-6779 / E-Mail: journals-orders@mit.edu
     

    Back

     


     

    •      RIF/TE-Poetry Literary Journal

     

    In all arts there is a physical component . . . We must expect great innovations to transform the entire technique of the arts.

     

    –Paul Valery

     

    This list was formed to serve as a vehicle for (1) distribution of an interactive literary journal: RIF/T and related exchange, and (2) collection of any information related to contemporary poetics.

     

    RIF/T provides a forum for poets that are conversant with the media to explore the full potential of a true electronic journal.

     

    Dynamic–not static, RIF/T shifts and riffs with the diction of “trad” poetry investigating a new, flexible, fluid poetry of exchange.

     

    Archives of e-poetry and related files are stored in the e-poetry FILELIST.

     

    To receive a list of files send the command

     

    INDEX e-poetry

     

    to:

     

    LISTSERV@UBVM

    or

    LISTSERV@UBVM.CC.BUFFALO.EDU
     
     

    as the first line in the body of your mail message (not your Subject: line).

     

    To subscribe to e-poetry, send the command

     

    SUB e-poetry your name
    to:

     

    LISTSERV@UBVM

    or

    LISTSERV@UBVM.CC.BUFFALO.EDU
     
     

    via mail message (again, as the first line in the body of the mail, not the Subject: line). For example: SUB e-poetry John Doe

     

    Owner: Ken Sherwood

     

    v001pxfu@ubvms.cc.buffalo.edu
     

    Back

     


     

    •      SSCORESocial Science Computer Review

     

    G. David Garson, Editor
    Ronald Anderson, Co-editor

     

    The official journal of the Social Science Computing Association, SSCORE provides a unique forum for social scientists to acquire and share information on the research and teaching applications of microcomputing. Now, when you subscribe to Social Science Computer Review, you automatically become a member of the Social Science Computing Association.

     

    Quarterly Subscription prices: $48 individual, $80 institutions Single Issue: $20 Please add $8 for postage outside the U.S. Canadian residents add 7% GST

     

    Duke University Press/ Journals Division / Box 90660 /Durham NC 27708
     

    Back

     


     

    •      Studies in Popular Culture
      Dennis Hall, editor.

     

    Studies in Popular Culture, the journal of the Popular Culture Association in the South and the American Culture Association in the South, publishes articles on popular culture and American culture however mediated: through film, literature, radio, television, music, graphics, print, practices, associations, events–any of the material or conceptual conditions of life. The journal enjoys a wide range of contributors from the United States, Canada, France, Israel, and Australia, which include distinguished anthropologists, sociologists, cultural geographers, ethnomusicologists, historians, and scholars in mass communications, philosophy, literature, and religion.

     

    Please direct editorial queries to the editor:

     

    Dennis Hall
    Department of English
    University of Louisville
    Louisville KY 40292
    tel: (502) 588-6896/0509
    Fax: (502) 588-5055
    Bitnet: DRHALL01@ULKYVM
    Internet: drhall01@ulkvm.louisville.edu

     

    All manuscripts should be sent to the editor care of the

     
    English Department, University of Louisville, Louisville, KY 40292
     

    Please enclose two, double-spaced copies and a self-addressed stamped envelope. Black and White illustrations may accompany the text. Our preference is for essays that total, with notes and bibliography, no more than twenty pages. Documentation may take the form appropriate for the discipline of the writer; the current MLA stylesheet is a useful model. Please indicate if the work is available on computer disk. The editor reserves the right to make stylistic changes on accepted manuscripts.

     

    Studies in Popular Culture is published semiannually and is indexed in the PMLA Annual Bibliography. All members of the Association receive Studies in Popular Culture. Yearly membership is $15.00 (International: $20.00). Write to:

     

    the Executive Secretary
    Diane Calhoun-French
    Academic Dean
    Jefferson Community College-SW
    Louisville, KY 40272

     

    for membership, individual issues, back copies, or sets. Volumes I- XV are available for $225.00.

     

    Back

     


     

    •      VIRUS 23

     

    For those brave souls looking to explore the Secret of Eris, you may wish to check out VIRUS 23.

     

    2 and 3 are even and odd, 2 and 3 are 5, therefore 5 is even and odd.

     

    VIRUS 23 is a codename for all Erisian literature

     

    Don Webb
    6304 Laird Dr.
    Austin TX 78757
    0004200716@mcimail.com

     

    VIRUS 23 is the annual hardcopy publication of A.D.o.S.A, the Alberta Department of Spiritual Affairs.

     

    All issues are available at $7.00 ppd from:

     

    VIRUS 23
    Box 46
    Red Deer, Alberta
    Canada
    T4N 5E7

     

    Various chunks of VIRUS 23 can be found at Tim Oerting’s alt.cyberpunk ftp site (u.washington.edu, in /public/alt.cyberpunk. Check it out).

     

    For more information online contact:

     

    Darren Wershler-Henry
    grad3057@writer.yorku.ca
     

    Back

     


     

    •      ViViD Magazine

     

    The first issue of ViViD Magazine is now available. ViViD is a hypertext magazine about experimental writing and creativity in cyberspace. We are actively seeking contributions for the next issue.

     

    The magazine is presented in the colorful, graphics environment of a Windows 3.1 Help File. You will need Windows 3.1 to read the magazine.

     

    The magazine will also be available via anonymous FTP at “ftp.gmu.edu”, to obtain it:

     

    ftp ftp.gmu.edu

     

    username: anonymous
    password: (your email address)

     

    cd pub/library
    binary
    get VIVID1.ZIP

     

    For more information on ViViD, contact the editor, Justin McHale.

     

    Internet address:

    jmchale@gmuvax.gmu.edu
     

    Back

     


     

    •      Zines-L

     

    announcing a new list available from:

    listserv@uriacc

    To subscribe to Zines-L send a message to:

    listserv@uriacc.uri.edu
     

    on one line type:
    SUBSCRIBE ZINES-L first name last name

     

    Back

     


     

    •      Postmodern Culture announces the relocation of PMC-MOO

     

    PMC-MOO has moved. To connect to PMC-MOO, you must now:

     

    telnet

    hero.village.virginia.edu 7777

     

    Once you’ve connected to the server, you should receive onscreen instructions on how to log in to PMC-MOO.

     

    PMC-MOO is a real-time, text-based, virtual reality environment in which you can meet other subscribers of the journal, sponsor or participate in live conferences. PMC-MOO also provides a way to share and discuss, in real time across the internet, any texts accessible from a gopher server, including those generated by Postmodern Culture and by PMC-TALK. Finally, it provides an opportunity to experience (or help to design) simulated object-lessons in postmodern theory.

     

    Your experience of PMC-MOO will be considerably more enoyable with a client program: clients for Mac, DOS, and Unix are available via anonymous ftp from:

     

    parcftp.xerox.com
     

    Back

     


     

    •      AHC’94 — Hull Conference

     

    Association for History and Computing UK Branch Conference

     

    The Seventh Annual Conference of the Association for History and Computing (UK Branch) will be held at the University of Hull between 12 and 14 April 1994. As well as existing members of the Association, we are anxious to see those of our “mainstream” colleagues who have so far resisted the blandishments of Information Technology, but think they might now want to get involved — particularly with the impending arrival of courseware products coming out the Teaching and Learning Technology Program (TLTP).

     

    The “major” theme of the conference will be to explore what computerate historians have to learn from disciplines cognate with History, or those from which we have traditionally filched elements of our methodology. We hope to have sessions which focus on Anthropology, Art History, Economics, Geography, Sociology and Textual Studies, with reference to time-frames ranging from the medieval to the near-contemporary.

     

    The “minor” theme is to be the role of computing in the modern History Curriculum, broadly defined: from what’s going on in secondary schools and colleges post-National Curriculum; through the undergraduate program, with special reference to TLTP products; to the IT component of postgraduate training courses being developed under the 1+3 arrangements favored by ESRC and the British Academy.

     

    We shall, of course, be issuing invitations to a number of keynote speakers, but would be very grateful to receive offers of papers on any of the subjects identified above.

     

    Further particulars and booking forms can be obtained from:

     

    Steve Baskerville
    Dean of the School of Arts
    University of Hull
    Cottingham Road
    Hull, HU6 7RX
    Phone: 0482-465684
    (Secretary: Louise Danby)
    E-mail: s.w.baskerville@amstuds.hull.ac.uk

     

    Ten years ago, before the celebrated Westfield Conferences that gave life to the AHC, there was a select gathering of people interested in historical computing met at Hull to discuss their common interests. We would like to see as many of you as possible come here again in 1994 to discuss the agendas of the next decade!

     

    Steve Baskerville
    University of Hull

     

    Back

     


     

    •      4CYBERCONF:
      4th International Conference on Cyberspace
      May 1994

     

    In May of 1994, The Banff Centre is Virtually the Only Place to be

     

    The Banff Centre for the Arts, in Banff, Alberta, Canada will host two important conferences on cyberspace and virtual reality. The first conference, 4CYBERCONF, to be held May 20 through 22, is a prestigious annual event that brings together theoreticians and practitioners to discuss the implications of cyberspace.

     

    Immediately following is the ART AND VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENTS SYMPOSIUM to be held May 23 and 24. This event focuses on artistic approaches to virtual reality, providing an opportunity for critical inquiry of the political, practical and aesthetic concerns around new media and cultural practices.

     

    Over the course of the two conferences, the work of eight groups of artists who have completed virtual environments at the Banff Centre will be installed at various sites.

     

    Participants may register for either or both events.

     

    4CYBERCONF –
    THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CYBERSPACE
    MAY 20, 21, and 22, 1994
    THE BANFF CENTRE FOR THE ARTS

     

    INTRODUCTION

     

    4CYBERCONF deals with the issues of cyberspace on many different levels. The technologies of virtual reality, networking and digital media are investigated from a critical standpoint that examines their social and cultural impacts and meanings. This conference considers cross-cultural contributions to the space and time of cyberspace, embraces the challenge of design for virtual environments and cybersound and suggests a new perception of space that challenges conventional views. Cyberspace is a space in flux where shared identities collide with discussions of diversity and the most potent constructions are the discussions that define and delineate these new environments.

     

    In the matrices and the nets, there is a growing society that ranges from architects to aboriginal artists to anarchists, from cyborgs to Silicon Valley sophisticates to cyberpunks. 4CYBERCONF offers the opportunity for exchange within and between these confluent and diverse interests.

     

    CONFERENCE FORMAT

     

    The Fourth Conference on Cyberspace is scheduled to take place over three days, with regular sessions, demonstrations and a “birds of a feather” meeting space for conference participants to exchange ideas and information. In addition, there will be an evening Round Table Discussion on Friday, May 20th and a Dinner on Sunday, May 22nd.

     

    CALL FOR PANEL AND PAPER PROPOSALS

     

    This is a call for paper and panel proposals, approximately twenty of which will be selected by the Program Committee for development and presentation at the conference. Papers submitted by individuals will be grouped by the Program Committee by theme.

     

    The following is a list of the general topics of interest to the Program Committee.

     

    ECONOMICS OF CYBERSPACE

     

    Everyone talks about the information economy but few are willing to face up to its implications: A nation’s wealth will be based on the information it produces. Commercial services may become the primary focus of the Net. Our copyright laws will need to be totally re- written for cyberspace. Intellectual property will become the most valued commodity of this new economy. Who will determine what’s public domain and what’s privatized? This session will deal with those issues and will provide a forum for exploring a dramatically different approach to economic issues.

     

    THE SOUNDS OF CYBER

     

    Cyberspace will be an environment vibrant with sound. While much of the technical investigation of virtuality has concentrated on the image, some of the richest and most compelling results have been achieved with audio. This theme will focus on the aesthetics, theory and practice of creating sound in immersion environments, as well as the synergy of sound and image in virtual space.

     

    DIVERSITY, TECHNOLOGY AND CYBERSPACE

     

    It is tough out there on the planetary streets, but is cyberspace a territory with a better immigration policy? How do individuals and groups gain access to cyberspace? Are technologies culturally, linguistically and gender specific? Are questions of authenticity relevant in cyberspace? How can technology be created and applied to serve the needs of varied communities, such as aboriginal groups and those from the myriad of cultural diasporas? How are the social constructions of body, gender, desire, race, place, economy and language built in cyberspace? What is imported, what is modified and what is created in human interaction and meaning within cyberspace; how does it then affect other experiences?

     

    CYBER NARRATIVES

     

    How and to whom are stories being structured and told in cyberspace? What are the entertainment industry`s distribution outlets? What tools are available to create cyber tales – and do these permit creative expression? What are the structures of interactive texts? What is the relationship between reading and authoring, viewing and creating? Are there existing forms of criticism – for example, architectural, literary, film, media, art, cultural studies – relevant to describing cyber stories? What new critical tools do we need? Are there genres in cyberspace?

     

    THE POETICS OF CYBERSPACE: DESIGNING THE VIRTUAL

     

    Traditional concepts of design travel poorly in cyberspace. Papers are invited that investigate the new design issues that must be resolved if virtual environments are to become compelling, evocative and effective. New tools and new approaches and the role of the design profession in cyberspace are critical aspects of this investigation.

     

    SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

     

    Proposals for papers and panels should be presented in abstracts of approximately 1000 words. Panel proposals should include abstracts of papers. Copies of illustrations and photographs can be submitted at this time. Persons proposing a panel should contact potential panelists prior to submitting. All proposals are due in hard copy and on disk at the address below by February 15, 1994. Papers selected for presentation, either as part of a theme session or a panel, are due May 1, 1994, in hard copy and digital form. Selected presenters will be notified by March 15, 1994. The final papers should be between 3000 and 6000 words. Papers will be allotted a half hour for presentation. Panels should not exceed one hour.

     

    Videotapes, recordings and other forms of presentation will be considered as part of panels or as a component of sessions. Submitted material on videotape, optical disk, film, and other media, will be returned.

     

    Brief biographical information may accompany submissions on a separate page.

     

    Because all accepted abstracts will be published as the Collected Papers of the Fourth Conference on Cyberspace and available at the conference, we ask that you observe the following format guidelines:

     

    Proposals should be printed on one side of 8.5″ x 11″ paper, single spaced, with one inch margins and in 12- point Times-Roman, unless there is specific artistic purpose to breaking this convention. Do not number the pages. Provide six copies, and a floppy disk with both ASCII and Word versions.

     

    The first page should start with:

     

    TITLE
    (Proposed Session)
    Your Name
    Your Affiliation
    Body of paper or abstract

     

    DEADLINES

     

    FEBRUARY 15, 1994 Deadline for submission of papers, abstracts and proposals inclusion in 4Cyberconf.

    MARCH 15, 1994 Notification date of selection for presentation:

    APRIL 8, 1994 Deadline for registration for both conferences: (Late registration will be available as space permits and at an extra charge)

     

    NOTE: Submission of an abstract or proposal indicates your intention, obligation, and capability to write/present/demonstrate the corresponding, full- length work if chosen.

     

    All materials should be sent to:

     

    4CYBERCONF
    THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CYBERSPACE
    Submissions
    Media Arts
    The Banff Centre for the Arts
    box 1020-8
    Banff, Alberta, T0L 0C0
    Canada

     

    E-MAIL: 4cyber@acs.ucalgary.caPHONE: 403-762-6652
    FAX: 403-762-6665
     

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    •      The Art and Virtual Environments SymposiumMAY 23 and 24, 1994
      THE BANFF CENTRE FOR THE ARTS

     

    The ART AND VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENTS SYMPOSIUM will be held immediately following 4CYBERCONF and is intended to facilitate dialogue and debate among artists, presenters and participants.

     

    This is an invitation to attend this two-day event that will include presentations and discussions on art, culture and new media technologies in the 1990s. In addition, virtual environment artworks will be exhibited and discussed by the artists. Since many of these works will never be shown again, this symposium represents an opportunity to experience and analyze some of the worlds that are shaping developments in virtual reality.

     

    The eight groups of artists who participated in the Art and Virtual Environments Project, include: Will Bauer and Steve Gibson; Toni Dove and Michael Mackenzie; Diane Gromala, Marcos Novak and Yacov Sharir; Perry Hoberman; Ron Kuivila; Brenda Laurel and Rachel Strickland; Michael Naimark; Michael Scroggins and Stewart Dixon. Over the past three years, these artists have explored this innovative medium at Banff and in the process developed important advances in the field.

     

    Presentations on art and virtual environments will be made by writers and thinkers invited to investigate current cultural practices. Speakers may include Frances Dyson, N.Katherine Hayles, Michael Heim, Erkki Huhtamo, Rob Milthorp, Margaret Morse, Jeanne Randolph, Allucquere Rosanne Stone, Nell Tenhaaf, Gene Youngblood and others. Writings on art, culture and virtual environments have also been commissioned to stimulate discussion and analysis of culture and new technologies. The end result is one of the most important critical investigations in the short history of virtual reality.

     

    The Art and Virtual Environments Project, undertaken by the Computer Applications and Research Program at the Banff Centre for the Arts, has been funded by The Department of Canadian Heritage and CITI (Centre for Information Technologies Innovation). The Banff Centre gratefully acknowledges the generous contributions of the Art and Virtual Environments Project sponsors: Silicon Graphics Inc., Alias Research, The Computer Graphics Lab in the Department of Computing Science at the University of Alberta, Apple Canada, The Intel Corporation, and AutoDesk Inc.

     

    LOCATION

     

    Both conferences will be held at The Banff Centre, Banff, Alberta, Canada. The Centre provides a comfortable setting nestled in one of the most picturesque environments in North America. Founded in 1933, The Banff Centre has evolved into an exciting, multi- disciplinary entity that is an experience unto itself. Artists, academics, professionals, business leaders, administrators and scientists come here to learn in an efficient, service-oriented setting that happens to be surrounded by some of the most breathtaking mountain wilderness in the world.

     

    Banff is located 125 kilometers, or a scenic 1 1/2 hour drive, west of the city of Calgary. The Calgary International Airport services daily flights from most major centers in Canada, the United States, Europe and the Orient. Bus service is available directly from the airport or downtown Calgary.

     

    For Further Information Regarding Registration Please Contact:

     

    Virginia Campbell
    The Banff Centre for Conferences
    Box 1020 – Station 11
    Banff, Alberta
    Canada T0L 0C0
    Tel: (403) 762-6202
    Fax: (403) 762-6388
     

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    •      Chaos and Society ConferenceUNIVERSITE DU QUEBEC A HULL CHAOS AND SOCIETY CONFERENCE
      June 1-2, 1994

     

    This is a summary of the information that will shortly be available on the University of Quebec Gopher. Anybody who wants more information, or a hard copy of this information (plus a small ad to be posted on a physical bulletin board), should contact:

     

    Prof. Pierre Lemieux
    Pierre_Lemieux@uqah.uquebec.ca
     

    1. About the University

     

    The Universite du Quebec a Hull (UQAH) is a branch of the University of Quebec. It is located in Hull, in the Province of Quebec (Canada), just across Ottawa in the National Capital Region.

     

    2. The Chaos and Society Workshop at UQAH

     

    The June Conference is organized by the Chaos and Society Workshop, directed by Prof. Alain Albert et Prof. Pierre Lemieux. The objective of the Chaos and Society Workshop is to stimulate research on the relations between chaos theory, complexity and the study of society (especially the idea of a spontaneous or anarchistic order).

     

    One of the topics that has raised some interest recently at the Workshop were the ideas discussed by Prof. Albert and Lemieux on the possibilities of building models of Artificial Anarchy.

     

    3. The June 1-2, 1994, Chaos and Society International Conference

     

    3.1. General Description

     

    The objective of the Conference is to bring together an interdisciplinary group of academics and scholars interested in the interface between chaos and complex-system theory and the social sciences. This two-day conference is to be held on June 1 and 2, 1994, in the Hull-Ottawa region (Canada). Formal papers will be presented and discussed. Papers can be presented in either English or French. (Most will probably be in English.) We are exploring the possibility of simultaneous translation during some of the lectures and discussions.

     

    Examples of Topics of Interest:

     

    •      What is the significance of the chaos paradigm for the social and humane sciences (including economics, sociology, political science, ethnology, philosophy…)? To which extent can society be analyzed as a chaotic, complex or living system?
    •      What can nonlinear dynamic simulation techniques contribute to the study of society?
    •      What is the meaning of information, evolution, and spontaneous order in the social sciences as compared to the physical sciences?
    •      To which extent were these elements already present in some schools of social sciences (v.g., the Austrian School of Economics)?
    •      After Artificial Life, what is the future of Artificial Economics, Artificial Politics, Artificial Sociology, etc.?
    •      What is their relevance to contemporary problems?

     

    We expect a group of 50 to 75 participants, mainly academics, at the Conference.
    They will include:
    1) Authors of papers;
    2) Discussants who will comment on the papers and start the workshop-type discussion.
    3) Simple participants (academics, scholars, students, government officials and business executives) who will be able to attend the lectures and participate in discussions.

     

    Here is a tentative schedule as of December 15, 1993:

     

    Wednesday, June 1
    8:45-10:30      Opening, paper, comment and discussion
    10:30-11:00     Coffee break
    11:00-12:45     Paper, comment and discussion
    13:00-14:45     Lunch for all participants
    15:00-16:30     Workshops I, II, III
    16:30-17:00     Coffee break
    17:00-18:30     Workshops I, II, III
    19:00           Dinner for all participants
    
    
    Thursday, June 2
    8:45-10:30      Paper, comment and discussion
    10:30-11:00     Coffee break
    11:00-12:45     Paper, comment and discussion
    13:00-14:45     Lunch for all participants
    15:00-16:30     Workshops I, II, III
    16:30-17:00     Coffee break
    17:00-18:30     Workshops I, II, III
    18:30           End of Conference

     

    The Organizing Committee is made of

     

    •      Dr. Jacques Plamondon, Professor of Philosophy of Science and President of Universite du Quebec a Hull (UQAH)
    •      Prof. Paul Bourgine, Director of the Artificial Intelligence and Artificial Life Laboratory, CEMAGREF (Antony, France)
    •      Dr. Bernardo Huberman, Research Fellow, Xerox PARC
    •      Prof. Alain Albert, Professor of Economics, Business Administration Department, UQAH
    •      Prof. Pierre Lemieux (Conference Director), Visiting Professor of Economics, Business Administration Department, UQAH

     

    3.2. Call for Papers

     

    Any person interested in presenting a paper must E-mail a one page abstract to the Organizing Committee before January 31, 1994. Each submission must contain the author’s name, affiliation, address, telephone, fax and E-mail numbers. The Organizing Committee will reach a decision on accepted papers and notify the authors in February. Accepted authors will then be asked to send their papers (hard copy and electronic version) before April 30, 1994, so that they be made available to discussants in time. Papers may be in English or French. They will later be published in the conference proceedings.

     

    Please send abstracts to:

     

    Pierre_Lemieux@uqah.uquebec.ca
     

    3.3. Registration

     

    Registration fees (in Canadian dollars)
    Category        Before Feb. 28, 1994    from Feb. 28 to April 30
    Academics               150                             250
    Students                150                             150
    Others                  300                             500

     

    The registration fees include dinner on June 1 and lunches on June 1 and 2. Registration fees will be reimbursed if registration is canceled before April 30, 1994. All registration must be paid before April 30, 1994. Please make your check to the order of “Universite du Quebec a Hull.”

     

    ________________________________________________________

     

    Registration form

     

    First Name, Middle Initial, LAST NAME:
    Title:
    Name and title preferred on badge:
    Occupation:
    Organization/Company:
    Address:
    Telephone:
    Fax:
    E-mail:
    I would like to register as:

     

            author of paper
            discussant
            participant

     

    Please send check (to the order of “Universite du Quebec a Hull”) to Prof. Pierre Lemieux

     

    Date:
    Please note that all registrations must be paid by check before April 30, 1994. (Special rates apply before February 28; see above.) Please make your check to the order of “Universite du Quebec a Hull” and send to:

     

    Prof. Pierre Lemieux
    Universite du Quebec a Hull
    P.O. Box 1250, Station B
    Hull, Quebec J8X 3X7
    CANADA
    Fax: 1 (819) 595-3924
    E-mail: Pierre_Lemieux@uqah.uquebec.ca

     

    3.4. Hotel Accommodation, Information and Registration

     

    Forthcoming.

     

    3.5. Logistics Information

     

    Located on the Quebec side of the Ottawa river, Hull is only a few miles from the National Capital of Canada and 10 miles from the Ottawa International Airport.

     

    3.6. Important Deadlines To Remember

     

    January 31, 1994 Authors who want to submit papers must have sent a one-page abstract. See “Call for Papers”.

     

    February 27 Last date to register at reduced tariff. See “Registration”.

     

    February 28 Accepted authors will have been notified by Organizing Committee. See “Call for Papers”.

     

    April 29 Last date to cancel registration and get a reimbursement. See “Registration”.

     

    April 30 Authors must have sent their papers. See “Call for Papers”. Last date to register. Registration fees must be received at UQAH. See “Registration”

     

    4. Whom to Contact

     

    For any information on this Conference, please contact:

     

    Prof. Pierre Lemieux
    Universite du Quebec a Hull
    P.O. Box 1250, Station B
    Hull, Quebec
    Canada J8X 3X7
    Tel.: 1 (819) 595-3833
    Fax: 1 (819) 595-3924
    E-mail:Pierre_Lemieux@uqah.uquebec.ca
     

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    •      EJVC: Electronic Journal of Virtual Culture

     

    EJVC is a new peer-reviewed electronic journal dedicated to scholarly research and discussion of all aspects of computer- mediated human experience, behavior, action, and interaction.

     

    Information about EJVC may be obtained by sending e-mail to:

     

    LISTSERV@KENTVM.BITNET

    or

    LISTSERV@KENTVM.KENT.EDU
     

     

    with one or more of the following lines in the text:

     

    SUBSCRIBE EJVC-L YourFirstname YourLastName
    GET EJVC WELCOME
    INDEX EJVC-L
    Also, the file is available by anonymous ftp to:

     

    byrd.mu.wvnet.edu

    in the pub/ejvc directory.

     

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    •      Call for Submissions

     

    Hypertext Fiction and the Literary Artistis a research project investigating the use of hypertext technology by creative writers.

     

    The project consists of evaluations of software and hardware, critiques of traditional and computerized works, and a guide to sites of publication.

     

    We would like to request writers to submit their works for review. Publishers are requested to send descriptions of their publications with subscription fees and submission formats. We are especially interested to hear from institutions which teach creative writing for the hypertext format.

     

    To avoid swamping our e-mail account, please limit messages to a page or two in length. Send works on disk (IBM or Mac) or hardcopy to:

     

    Hypertext Fiction and the Literary Artist
    3 Westcott Upper
    London, Ontario
    N6C 3G6
    E-mail: KEEPC@QUCD>QUEENSU.CA

     

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    •      THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND POPULAR CULTURECALL FOR PAPERS

     

    Scholars are invited to submit manuscripts/reviews that meet the following criteria:

     

    ISSUES: The Journal invites critical reviews of films, documentaries, plays, lyrics, and other related visual and performing arts. The Journal also invites original manuscripts from all social scientific fields on the topic of popular culture and criminal justice.

     

    SUBMISSION PROCEDURES: To submit material for the Journal, please subscribe to CJMOVIES through the listserv and a detailed guidelines statement will automatically follow.

     

    To subscribe, send a message with the following command to:

     

    LISTSERV@ALBNYVM1:

    SUBSCRIBE CJMOVIES YourFirstName YourLastName

     

    Manuscripts and inquiries should be addressed to:

     

    The Editors
    Journal of Criminal Justice and Popular Culture
    SUNYCRJ@ALBNYVM1.BITNET
    or SUNYCRJ@UACSC2.ALBANY.EDU

     

    MANAGING EDITORS:

     
    Sean Anderson and Greg Ungar
    Editors
    Journal of CriminalJustice and Popular Culture
    School of Criminal Justice, SUNYA 135
    Western Avenue Albany, NY 12222

     

    INTERNET:

     
    SA1171@ALBNYVM1.BITNET or GU8810@uacsc1.albany.edu

     

    LIST ADMINISTRATOR:

     
    Seth Rosner
    School of Criminal Justice, SUNY
    SR2602@uacsc1.albany.edu or SR2602@thor.albany.edu

     

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    •      Call for papers: The Linguistics of Humor

     

    High quality papers are solicited for a symposium on the state of the art in the linguistic analysis of humor to be held at the forthcoming ISHS ’94, the Annual Meeting of the International Society of Humor Studies in Ithaca, NY (June 22-26, 1994).

     

    Papers in all areas of linguistics dealing with theoretical, empirical, and applied aspects of the study of humor, joking, laughter, etc., from the point of view of linguistics are invited for the first ever symposium on the linguistics of humor.

     

    Send three copies of a one page (250 words max) abstract to:

     

    Salvatore Attardo
    Youngstown State University
    Dept. of English
    Youngstown, OH, 44555-3415
    USA
    E-mail attardo@cc.ysu.edu

     

    E-mail submissions (ASCII text, TeX/LaTeX or binhexed Macintosh MSWord) are encouraged.

     

    Abstracts should state name, affiliation and address of the author(s) and state clearly the problem(s) addressed, the solution(s) provided, and the methodology adopted. An extra page for references, examples, etc. is allowed. References and citations should use the LSA or HUMOR style sheets.

     

    Deadline for abstracts: February 15, 1994. Submitters will be notified of acceptance by March 20, 1994. Authors should register for the ISHS conference with:

     

    M. A. Rishel
    Writing Program
    375 Roy H. Park School of Communications
    Ithaca College
    Ithaca, NY 14850
    Ph. (607) 274-3324
    Fax (607) 274-1664
    E-mail rishel@ithaca.bitnet

     

     

    If you have already submitted an abstract to M. A. Rishel and wish to be considered for the symposium, submit the abstract to S. Attardo with a cover letter clearly stating this fact.

     

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    •      Conference AnnouncementLITERARY TEXTS IN AN ELECTRONIC AGE:
      SCHOLARLY IMPLICATIONS AND LIBRARY SERVICES

     

    31st Annual Clinic on Library Applications of Data Processing

     

    April 10-12, 1994 Graduate School of Library and Information Science University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

     

    Electronic technologies are not replacing the book so much as they are changing its form and its role in scholarship. Rising interest in electronic texts is evident in the development of new computational approaches to the study of literature, the appearance of electronic text centers on university campuses, and an expanding publishing industry in electronic books. This conference will examine the role of electronic texts in the humanities and the implications of these technologies for libraries. Conference speakers will discuss this latest development in the human pursuit of the literary arts from a variety of perspectives, including the production and acquisition of electronic texts, strategies for storage and dissemination, software for the retrieval and analysis of electronic texts, problems of bibliographic control and intellectual property, and publishing trends.

     

    Offered in conjunction with the conference is an optional preconference workshop in the practical use of Standard Generalized Markup Language (SGML) in the organization of electronic texts for interchange and research. Conducting the workshop will be C.M. Sperberg-McQueen, an editor of the recently released Guidelines for Text Encoding and Interchange, a text- representation standard based on SGML syntax.

     

    Who should attend: This conference will be of interest to librarians, academic computing staff, publishers and distributors of electronic texts, and humanities scholars interested in the possibilities of electronic texts.

     

    PROGRAM

     

    Sunday, April 10

     

    11am-5pm Registration

     

    1-4:30pm Preconference Workshop on using Standard Generalized Markup Language (SGML) C. M. Sperberg-McQueen Editor, Text Encoding Initiative University of Illinois at Chicago

     

    5-6:30pm Reception

     

    6:30-7:30pm Dinner

     

    8pm Keynote Address (Lincoln Hall Theater) AUTHORS AND READERS IN AN AGE OF ELECTRONIC TEXTS Jay David Bolter Professor School of Literature, Communication, & Culture Georgia Institute of Technology

     

    Monday, April 11

     

    8-9:30am ELECTRONIC TEXTS IN THE HUMANITIES: A COMING OF AGE Susan Hockey Director Center for Electronic Texts in the Humanities Rutgers and Princeton Universities

     

    THE TEXT ENCODING INITIATIVE: ELECTRONIC TEXT MARKUP FOR RESEARCH C. M. Sperberg-McQueen Editor, Text Encoding Initiative University of Illinois at Chicago

    9:30-10am Break

     

    10-11:30am ELECTRONIC TEXTS AND MULTIMEDIA IN ACADEMIC LIBRARIES: A VIEW FROM THE FRONT LINE Anita Lowry Head, Information Arcade, Main Library University of Iowa

     

    HUMANIZING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: CULTURAL EVOLUTION AND THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ELECTRONIC TEXT PROCESSING Mark Tyler Day Associate Librarian Indiana University

     

    11:30am-1pm Lunch (on your own)

     

    1-2:30pm COHABITING WITH COPYRIGHT IN AN ELECTRONIC ENVIRONMENT Mary Brandt Jensen Director, Law Library Professor, School of Law University of South Dakota

     

    STANDARDS, INTERCONNECTIONS, AND THE NONPROFIT DOMAINS Michael Jensen Electronic Media Manager University of Nebraska Press

     

    3-5pm Software Demonstrations

     

    5-7pm Dinner (on your own)

     

    7-9pm Software Demonstrations

     

    Tuesday, April 12

     

    8-9:30am THE FEASIBILITY OF WIDE-AREA TEXTUAL ANALYSIS SYSTEMS IN LIBRARIES: A PRACTICAL ANALYSIS John Price-Wilkin Information Management Coordinator Alderman Library, University of Virginia

     

    THE SCHOLAR AND HIS LIBRARY IN THE COMPUTER AGE James W. Marchand Professor Department of Germanic Languages and Literature University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

     

    9:30-10am Break

     

    10-11:30am THE CHALLENGES OF ELECTRONIC TEXTS IN THE LIBRARY: BIBLIOGRAPHIC CONTROL AND ACCESS Rebecca Guenther Network Development and MARC Standards Office Library of Congress

     

    PROJECT GUTENBERG: TRYING TO GIVE AWAY A TRILLION ETEXTS BY THE END OF 2001 Michael S. Hart, Professor of Electronic Text Executive Director of Project Gutenberg Etext Illinois Benedictine College

     

    11:30am-1pm Lunch (on your own)

     

    1-2:30pm DURKHEIM’S IMPERATIVE: THE ROLE OF HUMANITIES FACULTY IN THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES REVOLUTION Robert A. Jones Professor, Department of Sociology University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

     

    THE MATERIALITY OF THE BOOK: ANOTHER TURN OF THE SCREW Terry Belanger University Professor, University of Virginia

     

    GENERAL INFORMATION

     

    Location: Except as noted, all conference events will take place in the Illini Union on the campus of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1401 W. Green St., Urbana, Illinois.

     

    Registration and Fees: The fee for the conference is $340 ($380 after March 11, 1994), which includes the Sunday night dinner, refreshments, and a copy of the Clinic proceedings. Registration for the optional SGML workshop is $40. Registration is limited, and early registration is recommended. A limited number of reduced-fee registrations are available for those who might otherwise be unable to attend; for consideration, submit a written request by March 11, 1994.

     

    Transportation: Champaign-Urbana is served by TWA, Midway Express, American Eagle, and Northwest Commuter. AMTRAK service is available from Chicago and points south. Champaign is located 135 miles south of Chicago on Interstate routes 72, 74, and 57.

     

    Accommodations: Rooms have been allocated for participants at the hotels listed below. Participants must make their own reservations, and should do so before March 9, 1994. Please indicate that you are attending the library data processing conference.

     

        Illini Union                  University Inn
        1401 W. Green St.             302 E. John St.
        Urbana, IL  61801             Champaign, IL  61820
        (217) 333-1241                (217) 352-8132
        Single: $54 + tax             Single: $54 + tax
        Double: $62 + tax             Double: $61 + tax

     

    Continuing Education Units: Participants will earn 1.1 CEU for attending this meeting.

     

    Refunds: Refunds will be made if you find that you cannot attend and you notify us in writing by March 16, 1994. You must cancel your own hotel reservations.

     

    IF YOU WOULD LIKE MORE INFORMATION ABOUT THE CLINIC, PLEASE CALL (800) 982-0914 OR (217) 333-2973, OR SEND YOUR QUESTION VIA ELECTRONIC MAIL TO:

     

    DPC@ALEXIA.LIS.UIUC.EDU
     

     

    REGISTRATION FORM

     

    Literary Texts in an Electronic Age:
    Scholarly Implications and Library Services

     

    31st Annual Clinic on Library Applications of Data Processing

     

    April 10-12, 1994
    Graduate School of Library and Information Science
    University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

     

    Registration Form

     

    Name
    ____________________________________________________________
    Title____________________________________________________________
    Organization Name________________________________________________
    Business Address_________________________________________________
    _________________________________________________________________
    _________________________________________________________________
    Phone Number (___)_______________________________________________
    Email
    address____________________________________________________

    Registration Fees: $340 ($380 after March 11) ________ $40 SGML workshop ________ TOTAL FEES ________

    Method of Payment: __Check enclosed (make payable to GSLIS/University of Illinois) __Charge to credit card __Visa __MasterCard Card #___________________________Exp. date_______ Signature________________________________________

    Any special needs (access, meals, etc.)?_________________________ _________________________________________________________________

    If there are issues you are especially interested in, or if you have particular questions about the topics that will be addressed at this conference, please write them below. We will pass them along to the speakers. _________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________

     

    You may register by mail by sending this form to the address below, by phone (217-333-2973 or 800-982-0914), by fax (217-244-3302), or by electronic mail:

     
    (dpc@alexia.lis.uiuc.edu)

     

    University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
    Graduate School of Library and Information Science
    Library and Information Science Building
    501 E. Daniel St.
    Champaign, Illinois 61820-6212

     

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    •      CALL FOR PAPERS, PANELS, AND PRESENTATIONS

     

    National Symposium on Proposed Arts and Humanities Policies for the National Information Infrastructure

     

    On October 14th, 15th and 16th, the Center for Art Research in Boston will sponsor a National Symposium on Proposed Arts and Humanities Policies for the National Information Infrastructure.

     

    Participants will explore the impact of the Clinton Administration’s AGENDA FOR ACTION and proposed NII legislation on the future of the arts and the humanities in 21st Century America.

     

    The symposium will bring together government officials, academics, artists, writers, representatives of arts and cultural institutions and organizations, and other concerned individuals from many disciplines and areas of interest to discuss specific issues of policy which will effect the cultural life of *all* Americans during the coming decades.

     

    To participate, submit a 250-word abstract of your proposal for a paper, panel-discussion or presentation, accompanied by a one-page vitae, by March 15, 1994.

     

    Special consideration will be given to those efforts that take a critical perspective of the issues, and are concerned with offering specific alternatives to current administration and congressional agendas.

     

    The proceedings of the symposium will be video-taped, and papers and panels will be published on CD-ROM. For further information, reply to:

     

    jaroslav@artdata.win.net
     

    via return e-mail.

     

    Thank you, Jay Jaroslav

     

     
    Jay Jaroslav, Director jaroslav@artdata.win.net CENTER FOR ART RESEARCH 241 A Street Boston, MA voice: (617) 451-8030 02210-1302 USA fax: (617) 451-1196
     

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    •      Announcement and Call for Submissions:
      Postmodern Culture

     

    Postmodern Culture
    A SUNY Press Series

     

    Series Editor: Joseph Natoli
    Editor: Carola Sautter

     

    Center for Integrative Studies, Arts and Humanities Michigan State University

     

    We invite submissions of short book manuscripts that present a postmodern crosscutting of contemporary headlines–green politics to Jeffrey Dahmer, Rap Music to Columbus, the Presidential campaign to Rodney King–and academic discourses from art and literature to politics and history, sociology and science to women’s studies, form computer studies to cultural studies.

     

    This series is designed to detour us off modernity’s yet-to-be- completed North-South Superhighway to Truth and onto postmodernism’s “forking paths” crisscrossing high and low culture, texts and life-worlds, selves and sign systems, business and academy, page and screen, “our” narrative and “theirs,” formula and contingency, present and past, art and discourse, analysis and activism, grand narratives and dissident narratives, truths and parodies of truths.

     

    By developing a postmodern conversation about a world that has overspilled its modernist framing, this series intends to link our present ungraspable “balkanization” of all thoughts and events with the means to narrate and then re-narrate them. Modernity’s “puzzle world” to be “unified” and “solved” becomes postmodernism’s multiple worlds to be represented within the difficult and diverse wholeness that their own multiplicity and diversity shapes and then re-shapes.

     

    Accordingly, manuscripts should display a “postmodernist style” that moves easily and laterally across public as well as academic spheres, “inscribes” within as well as “scribes” against realist and modernist modes, and strives to be readable-across-multiple- narratives and “culturally relative” rather than “foundational.”

     

    Inquiries, proposals, and manuscripts should be addressed to:

     

    Joseph Natoli
    Series Editor
    20676jpn@msu.edu
     
     

    or

     

    Carola Sautter
    Editor
    SUNY Press
    SUNY Plaza
    Albany, NY 12246-0001
     

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    •      Call for PapersPSYCHE: an interdisciplinary journal of research on consciousness

     

    You are invited to submit papers for publication in the inaugural issue of PSYCHE: an interdisciplinary journal of research on consciousness (ISSN: 1039-723X).

     

    PSYCHE is a refereed electronic journal dedicated to supporting the interdisciplinary exploration of the nature of consciousness and its relation to the brain. PSYCHE publishes material relevant to that exploration form the perspectives afforded by the disciplines of Cognitive Science, Philosophy, Psychology, Neuroscience, Artificial Intelligence, and Anthropology. Interdisciplinary discussions are particularly encouraged. PSYCHE publishes a large variety of articles and reports for a diverse academic audience four times per year. As an electronic journal, the usual space limitations of print journals do not apply; however, the editors request that potential authors do not attempt to abuse the medium. PSYCHE also publishes a hardcopy version simultaneously with the electronic version. Long articles published in the electronic format may be abbreviated, synopsized, or eliminated form the hardcopy version.

     

    Types of Articles:

     

    The journal publishes from time to time all of the following varieties of articles. Many of these (as indicated below) are peer reviewed; all articles are reviewed by editorial staff.

     

    Research Articles reporting original research by author(s). Articles may be either purely theoretical or experimental or some combination of the two. Articles of special interest occasionally will be followed by a selection of peer commentaries. Peer Reviewed.

     

    Survey Articles reporting on the state of the art research in particular areas. These may be done in the form of a literature review or annotated bibliography. More ambitious surveys will be peer reviewed.

     

    Discussion Notes critiques of previous research. Peer Reviewed.

     

    Tutorials introducing a subject area relevant to the study of consciousness to non-specialists.

     

    Letters providing and informal forum for expressing opinions on editorial policy or upon material previously published in PSYCHE. Screened by editorial staff.

     

    Abstracts summarizing the contents of recently published journal articles, books, and conference proceedings.

     

    Book Reviews which indicate the contents of recent books and evaluate their merits as contributions to research and/or as textbooks.

     

    Announcements of forthcoming conferences, paper submission deadlines, etc.

     

    Advertisements of immediate interest to our audience will be published: available grants; positions; journal contents; proposals for joint research; etc.

     

    Notes for Authors:

     

    Unsolicited submissions of original works within any of the above categories are welcome. Prospective authors should send articles directly to the executive editor. Submissions should be in a single copy if submitted electronically of four (4) copies if submitted by mail.

     

    Submitted matter should be preceded by: the author’s name; address; affiliation; telephone number; electronic mail address. Any submission to be peer reviewed should be preceded by a 100- 200 word abstract as well. Note that peer review will be blind, meaning that the prefatory material will not be made available to the referees. In the event that an article needs to be shortened for publication in the print version of PSYCHE, the author will be responsible for making any alterations requested by the editors.

     

    Any figures required should be designed in screen-readable ASCII.

     

    If that cannot be arranged, figures should be submitted as separate postscript files so that they can be printed out by readers locally.

     

    Authors of accepted articles assign to PSYCHE the right to publish the text both electronically and as printed matter and to make it available permanently in an electronic archive. Authors will, however, retain copyright to their articles and may republish them in any forum so long as they clearly acknowledge PSYCHE as the original source of publication.

     

    Subscriptions:

     

    Subscriptions to the electronic version of PSYCHE may be initiated by sending the one-line command, SUBSCRIBE PSYCHE-L Firstname Lastname, in the body on an electronic mail message to:

     

    LISTSERV@NKI.BITNET
     

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    •      RESEARCH ON VIRTUAL RELATIONSHIPS

     

    Have you had an interesting virtual relationship  
        on electronic networks? A research team wants    
        your story. Material acknowledged and terms     
          respected. Both research articles and a        
            general press (trade) book planned.          
    
                Mail to Either Address                   
              USA:                 CANADA:    
               
                         -or-
     
    VIRTUAL, PALABRAS P.O. Box 46, Box 175, Stn. E Boulder Creek, Toronto, Ontario California 95006 CANADA M6H 4E1 E-Mail (internet): yfak0073@vm1.yorku.ca Fax: (to Canada): (416) 736-5986
      
                  
      -> Please re-post to relevant network sites <-     
      ( A Distributed Knowledge Project Undertaking )
    
    

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    •      SCREENSITES 94

     

    April 22nd and 23rd, 1994
    The Graduate Program in Communications
    McGill University
    Montreal, Quebec, Canada

     

    CALL FOR ABSTRACTS

     

    SCREENSITES 94 is a conference organized by the students of the Graduate Program in Communications, McGill University. Papers, presentations, panel discussions, and informal gatherings will discuss the screen as sites of knowledge, control, culture, aesthetics, interaction, power and experience. This conference will give participants a chance to present their ongoing research to an audience from a wide variety of disciplines and fields.

     

    The “screen” occupies an increasingly significant position in 20th Century culture. New cultural sites and structuring metaphors inevitably accompany screen-dependent media such as film, television, virtual reality, and computers. These phenomena deserve continued critical attention. This conference seeks submissions that will enhance our understanding of the screen– its lure, its formal properties, its varied uses, its economy, and its ubiquity. Should metaphors of sight be the favored analytical preoccupation when describing the screen and the fixation of its viewers, or would metaphors of “site” hold greater promise? Do screens have distinct, cross-contextual implications or are “effects” more usefully understood as they are determined and/or discovered by users, producers, viewers or spectators? How might the contributions of Communication Studies, Film Theory, Cultural Studies, Queer Studies, and Performance Theory be helpful in elaborating the utility of screen- or non- screen-specific modes of analysis? Papers addressing issues of class, race, ethnicity, taste and proclivity, gender and orientation are encouraged along with interdisciplinary and multi-theoretical approaches.

     

    SCREENSITES 94 will be held at The Graduate Program in Communications building which is located on the main campus of McGill University in the centre of downtown Montreal. For more information please call 514/398-7667 or make contact by e-mail:

     

    CYWB@musicA.mcgill.ca
     
     

    Send abstract or paper submission on disk or hard copy, by mail or fax to:

     

    SCREENSITES 94
    Graduate Program in Communications
    McGill University
    3465, rue Peel
    Montreal, Quebec
    H3A 1W7
    tel.: 514/398-7667 or 514/398-4110
    fax.: 514/398-4934
    electronic mail: CYWB@musicA.mcgill.ca
     
     

    SUBMISSION DEADLINE: 28 FEBRUARY 1994

     

    – FIN –

     

    La meme-chose en francais (sans accents):

     

    A l’ecran 94- Invitation a soumettre des projects de conferences

     

    A l’ecran est un colloque organise par les etudiant-e- s du Program d’etudes superieures en communications de l’Universite McGill. Conferences, sessions plenieres, et rencontres informelles seront l’occasion de se concentrer sur l’ecran, et sur l’ecran en tant que source d’information, de controle, de culture, d’esthetique, de societe, de pouvoir et d’experience. Ce colloque donnera l’occcasion aux participant-e-s de presenter leurs recherches a un public provenant d’un grand nombre de disciplines au Program d’etudes superieures en communications.

     

    L’ecran occupe une position importante dans la culture du vingtieme siecle. De nouveaux sites culturels et de nouvelles metaphores accompagnent inevitablement les media qui dependent de l’ecran: le cinema, la television, la realite virtuelle et les ordinateurs. Ce colloque sollicite des soumissions que contribueront a notre comprehension de l’ecranQ sa predominance, son attrait, ses proprietes et ses divers usages. Les systemes d’echanges symboliques que determinent la valeur culturelle et economique sont aussi dignes d’interet. Par exemple, les metaphores visuelles devraient- elles etre au centre de nos preoccupations lorsqu’on s’interesse a l’ecran et a ses publics, ou devrait-on plutot utiliser a des metaphores de lieux? Les ecrans ont-ils des implications concretes qui persistent a travers les contextes, ou doit-on s’attarder aux effets qui sont determines et/ou decouvents per les utilisateurs, les productrices, ou les spectateurs? Quelles sont les contributions des domaines des communications, des etudes du cinema, des etudes culturelles, des points de vue “marginaux”, des theories de la performance face a ces questions? Les conferences traitant des questions de classe, de race, d’ethnicite, de genres et d’orientation sont encouragees, de meme que les approches interdisciplinaires et multi-theoriques.

     

    Le Program d’etudes superieures en communications est situe sur le campus de McGill, au centreville de Montreal. Pour plus d’information, veuillez composer le (514) 398.76.67 ou communiquer per courrier electronique a l’adresse suivante:

     

    CYWB@musicA.mcgill.ca
     

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    •      FEMISA

     

    FEMISA@mach1.wlu.ca

     

    FEMISA is conceived as a list where those who work on or think about feminism, gender, women and international relations, world politics, international political economy, or global politics, can communicate.

     

    Formally, FEMISA was established to help those members of the Feminist Theory and Gender Studies Section of the International Studies Association keep in touch. More generally, I hope that FEMISA can be a network where we share information in the area of feminism or gender and international studies about publications or articles, course outlines, questions about sources or job opportunities, information about conferences or upcoming events, or proposed panels and information related to the International Studies Association.

     

    To subscribe:
    send one line message in the BODY of mail-message

     

    sub femisa your name

    to:

    listserv@mach1.wlu.ca
     
     

    To unsub send the one line message

    unsub femisa

    to:

    listserv@mach1.wlu.ca

     

    I look forward to hearing suggestions and comments from you.

     

    Owner: Deborah Stienstra

     

    stienstr@uwpg02.uwinnipeg.ca
     

    Department of Political Science University of Winnipeg

     

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    •      HOLOCAUS: Holocaust list

     

    HOLOCAUS on

     

    LISTSERV@UICVM.BITNET

    or

    LISTSERV@UICVM.UIC.EDU

     

    HOLOCAUS@uicvm has become part of the stable of electronic mail discussion groups (“lists”) at the University of Illinois, Chicago. It is sponsored by the University’s History Department and its Jewish Studies Program.

     

    To subscribe to HOLOCAUS, you need and Internet or Bitnet computer account. From that account, send this message to:

     

    LISTSERV@UICVM.BITNET

    or

    LISTSERV@uicvm.uic.edu

    SUB HOLOCAUS Firstname Surname

     

    Use your own Firstname and Lastname. You will be automatically added. You can read all the mail, and send your own postings to everyone on the list (We have about 100 subscribers around the world right now).

     

    Owner:

    JimMott@spss.com

    The HOLOCAUS policies are:

     

    •      1. The coverage of the list will include the Holocaust itself, and closely related topics like anti-Semitism, and Jewish history in the 1930’s and 1940’s, as well as related themes in the history of WW2, Germany, and international diplomacy.
    •      2. We are especially interested in reaching college teachers of history who already have, or plan to teach courses on the Holocaust. In 1991-92, there were 265 college faculty in the US and Canada teaching courses on the Holocaust (154 in History departments, 67 in Religion, and 46 in Literature). An even larger number of professors teach units on the Holocaust in courses on Jewish history (taught by 273 faculty) and World War II (taught by 373), not to mention many other possible courses. Most of these professors own PC’s, but do not use them for e-mail. We hope our list will be one inducement to go on line. HOLOCAUS will therefore actively solicit syllabi, reading lists, termpaper guides, ideas on films and slides, and tips and comments that will be of use to the teacher who wants to add a single lecture, or an entire course.
    •      3. H-Net is now setting up an international board of editors to guide HOLOCAUS policy and to help stimulate contributions.
    •      4. HOLOCAUS is moderated by Jim Mott (JimMott@spss.com), a PhD in History. The moderator will solicit postings (by e- mail, phone and even by US mail), will assist people in subscribing and setting up options, will handle routine inquiries, and will consolidate some postings. The moderator will also solicit and post newsletter type information (calls for conferences, for example, or listings of sessions at conventions). It may prove feasible to commission book and article reviews, and to post book announcements from publishers. Anyone with suggestions about what HOLOCAUS can and might do is invited to send in the ideas.
    •      5. The tone and target audience will be scholarly, and academic standards and styles will prevail. HOLOCAUS is affiliated with the International History Network.
    •      6. HOLOCAUS is a part of H-Net, a project run by computer- oriented historians at the U of Illinois. We see moderated e-mail lists as a new mode of scholarly communication; they have enormous potential for putting in touch historians from across the world. Our first list on urban history, H- URBAN@UICVM, recently started up with Wendy Plotkin as moderator. H-WOMEN is in the works, with discussions underway about other possibilities like Ethnic, Labor, and US South. We are helping our campus Jewish Studies program set up JSTUDY (restricted to the U of Illinois Chicago campus, for now), and are considering the creation of H- JEWISH, also aimed at academics, but covering the full range of scholarship on Jewish history. If you are interested in any of these projects, please e-write Richard Jensen, for we are now (as of late April) in a critical planning stage.
    •      7. H-Net has an ambitious plan for training historians across the country in more effective use of electronic communications. Details of the H-Net plan are available on request from Richard Jensen, the director, at: 
      campbelld@apsu

      or

      u08946@uicvm.uic.edu

     

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    •      NewJour-L@e-math.ams.org

     

    NewJour-L aims to accomplish two objectives; it is both a list and a project.

     

    FIRST:

     

    NewJour-L is the place to announce your own (or to forward information about others’) newly planned, newly issued, or revised electronic networked journal or newsletter. It is specially dedicated for those who wish to share information in the planning, gleam-in-the-eye stage or at a more mature stage of publication development and availability.

     

    It is also the place to announce availability of paper journals and newsletters as they become available on electronic networks. Scholarly discussion lists which regularly and continuously maintain supporting files of substantive articles or preprints may also be reported, for those journal-like sections.

     

    We hope that those who see announcements on Bitnet, Internet, Usenet or other media will forward them to NewJour-L, but this does run a significant risk of boring subscribers with a number of duplicate messages. Therefore, NewJour-L IS filtered through a moderator to eliminate this type of duplication.

     

    It does not attempt to cover areas that are already covered by other lists. For example, sources like NEW-LIST describe new discussion lists; ARACHNET deals with social and cultural issues of e-publishing; VPIEJ-L handles many matters related to electronic publishing of journals. SERIALST discusses the technical aspects of all kinds of serials. You should continue to subscribe to these as you have done before, and contribute to them.

     

    SECOND:

     

    NewJour-L represents an identification and road-mapping project for electronic journals and newsletters, begun by Michael Strangelove, University of Ottawa. NewJour-L will expand and continue that work.

     

    As new publications are reported, a NewJour-L support group will develop the following services — planning is underway & we ask that anyone who would like to participate as below, let us know:

     

    •      A worksheet will be sent to the editors of the new e-publication for completion. This will provide detailed descriptions about bibliographic, content, and access characteristics.
    •      An original cataloguing record will be created.
    •      The fully catalogued title will be reported to national utilities and other appropriate sites so that there is a bibliographic record available for subsequent subscribers or searchers.
    •      The records will feed a directory and database of these titles.

     

    Not all the of the implementation is developed, and the work will expand over the next year. We thank you for your contributions, assistance, and advice, which will be invaluable.

     

    SUBSCRIBING:

     

    To subscribe, send a message to:

     

    LISTSERV@e-math.ams.org

     

    Leave the subject line blank.

     

    In the body, type: SUBSCRIBE NewJour-L FirstName LastName

     

    You will have to subscribe in order to post messages to this list.

     

    To drop out or postpone, use the standard LISTSERV (Internet) directions.

     

    ACKNOWLEDGMENT:

     

    For their work in defining the elements of this project and for their support to date, we thank:

     

    Michael Strangelove, University of Ottawa, Advisor
    David Rodgers, American Mathematical Society, Systems & Network Support
    Edward Gaynor, University of Virginia Library, Original Cataloguing Development
    John Price-Wilkin, University of Virginia Library, Systems & Network Support
    Birdie MacLennan, University of Vermont Library, Cataloguing and Indexing Development
    Diane Kovacs, Kent State University Library, Advisor

     

    We anticipate this will become a wider effort as time passes, and we welcome your interest in it. This project is co-ordinated through:

     

    The Association of Research Libraries
    Office of Scientific & Academic Publishing
    21 Dupont Circle, Suite 800
    Washington, DC 20036
    e-mail: osap@cni.org
     

    (Ann Okerson)

     

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    •      popcult@camosun.bc.ca Popular Culture

     

    The POPCULT list is now in place. It is open to analytical discussion of all aspects of popular culture. The list will not be moderated. Material relevant to building bridges between popular culture and traditional culture will be very strongly encouraged.

     

    To subscribe, unsubscribe, get help, etc, send a message to:

     

    mailserv@camosun.bc.ca

     

    There should not be anything in the ‘Subject:’ line and the body of the message should have the specific keyword on a line by itself.

    S

    ome keywords are:
    SUBSCRIBE POPCULT
    HELP
    LISTS
    SEND/LIST POPCULT
    UNSUBSCRIBE POPCULT

     

    It is possible to send multiple commands, each on a separate line. Do not include your name after SUBSCRIBE POPCULT. In some ways this server is a simplified version of the major servers, but it is also more streamlined. I recommend, to start, that you put SUBSCRIBE on one line, and HELP on the next line. That will give you a full listing of available commands.

     

    To send messages to the list for distribution to list members for exchange of ideas, etc, send messages to:

     

    popcult@camosun.bc.ca

     

    Owner:
     
    Peter Montgomery Montgomery@camosun.bc.ca Professor Dept of English ph (604) 370-3342 (o) Camosun College (fax) (604) 370-3346 3100 Foul Bay Road Victoria, BC Off. Paul Bldg 326 CANADA V8P 5J2
     

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    •      Humanities Consultant Job Posting

     

    Princeton University

     

    The position of humanities computing consultant at Princeton University is part of a dynamic and forward-looking team of instructional and media specialists whose mission is to support teaching and learning. Please submit resumes to the address below — e-mail submissions are particularly welcome. Apply promptly, as we would like to fill the position immediately. You may also send questions about the position directly to me:

     
    balestri@phoenix.princeton.edu.Diane Balestri
    Manager, Instructional and Media Services
    Princeton University

     

    SEARCH REOPENED

     

    Humanities Consultant

     

    Information Services within CIT at Princeton University seeks a consultant to support faculty members and students in humanities disciplines who use information technologies in teaching and research. The consultant will join the Instructional and Media Services group.

     

    Responsibilities include: proactive consulting with humanities departments and faculty about instructional and research needs; identifying, installing, testing, and documenting software tools and applications; supporting faculty and students in software use. In addition, the consultant will work closely with the language laboratory coordinator on acquisition, installation, and use of software and multimedia applications for language instruction. The consultant will provide expertise in text data bases and text analysis for faculty in all disciplines and expertise in word processing and printing with non-Roman characters and fonts.

     

    Qualifications: minimally, a Master’s degree in a humanities discipline. Excellent knowledge of one or more foreign languages required. Strong background (at least two years) supporting computer users in one or more of the humanities disciplines taught at Princeton. Knowledge of both instructional and research applications is required, as is the ability to work on multiple projects simultaneously and to move easily among a variety of hardware platforms, including Intel-based and Macintosh systems. Must enjoy outreach to faculty in humanities disciplines and must possess superior oral and written communications skills.

     

    Application deadline: February 10, 1994.

     

    Send resume and letter of application to:

     

    Bruce Finnie
    Computing and Information Technology
    87 Prospect Avenue
    Princeton University
    Princeton NJ 08544
    609-258-3943 (fax)
    finnie@pucc.princeton.edu (e-mail)
     

    Princeton University is an equal opportunity, affirmative action employer.

     

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    •      NEH DEADLINES

     

    Below is a full list of application deadlines for NEH programs, plus contact numbers for individual programs. All telephone numbers are in area code 202. To receive guidelines for any NEH program, contact the Office of Publications and Public Affairs at (202) 606-8438. Guidelines are normally available at least two months in advance of application deadlines.

     

    DIVISION OF EDUCATION PROGRAMS

    James C. Herbert, Director (606-8373)

     

    PROGRAM / CONTACT                         DEADLINE         
    PROJECTS BEGINNING

     

    Higher Education in the Humanities (Lyn Maxwell White; 606-8380) 1 April 1994 October 1994

    Institutes for College & University Faculty (Barbara Ashbrook; 606-8380) 1 April 1994 Summer 1995

    Science & Humanities Education (Susan Greenstein; 606-8380) 15 March 1994 October 1994

    Core Curriculum Projects (Fred Winter; 606-8380) 1 April 1994 October 1994

    Two-Year Colleges (Judith Jeffrey Howard; 606-8380) 1 April 1994 October 1994

    Challenge Grants (Thomas Adams; 606-8380) 1 May 1994 December 1994

    Elementary & Secondary Education in the Humanities (F. Bruce Robinson; 606-8377) 15 March 1994 December 1994

    Teacher-Scholar Program (Annette Palmer; 606-8377) 1 May 1994 September 1995

    Special Opportunity in Foreign Language Education Higher Education (Lyn Maxwell White; 606-8380) 15 March 1994 October 1994

    Elementary & Secondary Education (F. Bruce Robinson; 606-8377) 15 March 1994 October 1994

     

    DIVISION OF FELLOWSHIPS & SEMINARS

    Marjorie A. Berlincourt, Director (606-8458)

     

    PROGRAM / CONTACT                       DEADLINE          
    PROJECTS BEGINNING
    
    Fellowships for University Teachers
    (Maben D. Herring; 606-8466)            1 May 1994             
    1 January 1995
    
    Fellowships for College Teachers &
    Independent Scholars
    (Joseph B. Neville; 606-8466)           1 May 1994             
    1 January 1995
    
    Summer Stipends
    (Thomas O'Brien; 606-8466)              1 October 1994           
    1 May 1995
    
    Faculty Graduate Study Program for
    HBCUs (Maben D. Herring; 606-8466)      15 March 1994        
    1 September 1995
    
    Younger Scholars Program
    (Leon Bramson; 606-8463)                1 November 1994          
    1 May 1995
    
    Dissertation Grants
    (Kathleen Mitchell; 606-8463)           15 November 1994     
    1 September 1995
    
    Study Grants for College & University
    Teachers (Clayton Lewis; 606-8463)      15 August 1994           
    1 May 1995
    
    Summer Seminars for College Teachers
    (Joel Schwartz; 606-8463)
       Participants                          1 March 1994            
    Summer 1994
    
       Directors                             1 March 1994            
    Summer 1995
    
    Summer Seminars for School Teachers
    (Michael Hall; 606-8463)
       Participants                          1 March 1994            
    Summer 1994
    
       Directors                             1 April 1994            
    Summer 1995

     

     

    DIVISION OF PRESERVATION & ACCESS

    George F. Farr, Jr., Director (606-8570)

     

    PROGRAM / CONTACT                         DEADLINE         
    PROJECTS BEGINNING
    
    Library & Archival Research Projects
    (Vanessa Piala/Charles Kolb; 606-8570)  1 June 1994             
    January 1995
    
    Library & Archival Preservation/Access
    Projects (Karen Jefferson/Barbara
    Paulson; 606-8570)                      1 June 1994             
    January 1995
    
    National Heritage Preservation Program
    (Richard Rose/Laura Word; 606-8570)     1 November 1994          
    July 1995
    
    U. S. Newspaper Program
    (Jeffrey Field; 606-8570)               1 June 1994              
    July 1995

     

    DIVISION OF PUBLIC PROGRAMS

    Marsha Semmel, Acting Director (606-8267)

     

    PROGRAM / CONTACT                         DEADLINE         
    PROJECTS BEGINNING
    
      Humanities Projects in Media
    (James Dougherty; 606-8278)            11 March 1994           
    1 October 1994
    
      Humanities Projects in Museums &
    Historical Organizations
    (Fredric Miller; 606-8284)             3 June 1994             
    1 January 1995
    
      Public Humanities Projects
    (Wilsonia Cherry; 606-8271)            11 March 1994           
    1 October 1994
    
      Humanities Projects in Libraries
    (Thomas Phelps; 606-8271)

    Planning 4 February 1994 1 July 1994 Implementation 11 March 1994 1 October 1994 Challenge Grants (Abbie Cutter; 606-8361) 1 May 1994 December 1994

     

     

    DIVISION OF RESEARCH PROGRAMS

    Guinevere L. Griest, Director (606-8200)

     

    PROGRAM / CONTACT                         DEADLINE         
    PROJECTS BEGINNING
    
      Scholarly Publications
    (Margot Backas; 606-8207)
      Editions
    (Douglas Arnold; 606-8207)            1 June 1994              
    1 April 1995
    
      Translations
    (Helen Aguerra; 606-8207)             1 June 1994              
    1 April 1995
    
      Subventions (606-8207)              15 March 1994          
    1 October 1994
    
      Reference Materials
    (Jane Rosenberg; 606-8358)
      Tools
    (Martha B. Chomiak; 606-8358)         1 September 1994          
    1 July 1995
    
      Guides
    (Michael Poliakoff; 606-8358)         1 September 1994          
    1 July 1995
    
      Challenge Grants
    (Bonnie Gould; 606-8358)              1 May 1994             
    December 1994
    
      Interpretive Research Programs
    (George Lucas; 606-8210)
      Collaborative Projects
    (Donald C. Mell; 606-8210)            15 October 1994           
    1 July 1995
    
      Archaeology Projects
    (Bonnie Magness-Gardiner; 606-8210)   15 October 1994          
    1 April 1995
    
      Humanities, Science, and Technology
    (Daniel Jones; 606-8210)              15 October 1994           
    1 July 1995
    
      Conferences
    (David Coder; 606-8210)               15 January 1994        
    1 October 1994
    
      Centers & International Research
    Organizations (Christine Kalke; 606-8210)
      Centers for Advanced Study            1 October 1994           
    1 July 1995
    
      International Research                1 April 1994           
    1 January 1995

     

     

    DIVISION OF STATE PROGRAMS

    Carole Watson, Director (606-8254)

     

    Each state humanities council establishes its own grant guidelines and application deadlines. Addresses and telephone numbers of these state programs may be obtained from the NEH Division of State Programs.

     

    CHALLENGE GRANTS PROGRAM

     

    Applications are submitted through the Divisions of Education, Research, and Public Programs. Deadline is 1 May 1994 for projects beginning December 1994.

     

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    •      GOPHEUR LITTERATURES

     

    Announcing the “gopheur LITTERATURES” at the Universite de Montreal.

     

    Address:

     

    gopher.litteratures.Umontreal.ca 7070

    or through the University of Montreal Main Gopher:

     

    Address:

     

    gopher.Umontreal.ca

     

    Gopher servers are sprouting like mushrooms these days. Not only universities have gopher servers, but also departments now. They can be very useful tools to locate information and students here are very fond of them. They are also the first step towards much more sophisticated modes of accessing collections of research and bibliographic data, e-texts, etc…

     

    The “Gopheur LITTERATURES” at the Universite de Montreal (UdM) just happens to be the first gopher dedicated to teaching, research and publications on French Literature, Quebecois Literature and Francophone Literatures, and also the first gopher to do so in french, albeit without the accents for the moment. (In the future we will offer the choice between ASCII and ISO-LATIN, as is currently being done on others gophers in the province of Quebec).

     

    The “Gopheur LITTERATURES” is in construction. This means it will be evolving. Items on the main menu indicate a program of research conducted at the Department of etudes francaises. The goal of the gopher is to offer electronic documentation on the Departement d’etudes francaises, and to establish a resource center for information, tools, links, documents, local and international, to be used by the computing community of French scholars and students.

     

    All comments and suggestions of sites of interest to French Studies should be sent to:

     

    Gophlitt@ere.Umontreal.caChristian Allegre
    allegre@ere.umontreal.ca
    Universite de Montreal
    Departement d’etudes francaises
     
  • Malice: The New American Hero

    M. Daphne Kutzer

    Department of English
    State University of New York at Plattsburgh
    kutzerdm@splava.cc.plattsburgh.edu

     

    Malice, Directed by Harold Becker. Screenplay by Aaron Sorking and Scott Frank. Castlerock, 1993.

     

    The latest contender in the Woman as Evil Bitch Film Sweepstakes is Harold Becker’s Malice. The film is less interesting for its portrayal of the Bitch, Tracy (Nicole Kidman), than for its view of what makes a Real American Man. The character of Tracy–a beautiful fraud who pretends to love children and her husband while plotting with handsome Dr. Jed Hill (Alec Baldwin) to make herself sterile and thereby collect insurance money–doesn’t add much to the string of recent screen villainesses in Fatal Attraction, The Hand That Rocks The Cradle, Basic Instinct, and others. All share the central quality of denying their feminine and motherly sides and/or exploiting their sexuality to ensnare hapless men. However, the development of the character of Tracy’s husband Andy (Bill Pullman), along with the ultimate fate of handsome Jed Hill, shows us that something both old and new is happening to the men in these films. Dan Gallagher (Michael Douglas) in Fatal Attraction (1988) is guilty of bringing evil into his domestic Eden, and in the end his wounded wife must kill the bitch. The only man aware of the bitch’s true nature in The Hand That Rocks The Cradle (1993) is the mental handicapped black handyman, Solomon (Ernie Hudson): the scientist husband is blind to her true nature even once he knows her true identity. In both these films the male “heroes” are weak and ineffectual, if not emasculated. Nick Curran (Michael Douglas again) in Basic Instinct (1992) is made of sterner stuff, but despite his nickname of “Shooter,” the film hints that he, too, will be a victim in the end. Malice provides a step–forward?–in the development of the American film hero, at least in the genre of thrillers.

     

    The male leads of the film are Andy and Jed. Andy’s shortened name suggests his initial weakness, while Jed’s name suggests his hunkiness–it’s the sort of name you find attached to cleft-chinned romantic soap opera heroes. The names match the physical attributes of each character. Bill Pullman’s Andy is slightly built, has a non-descript face, and is always dressed in a corduroy or tweed jacket, button-down Oxford cloth shirt, and knitted tie–suitable if stereotypical garb for an Associate Dean of Students. Jed is the former high school running back, solid and athletic (we see him jogging energetically, for instance, while Andy drinks coffee), and the film allows him to doff his shirt frequently, so that the viewer may admire Alec Baldwin’s broad and hairy chest.

     

    The way each man handles his women is also instructive. Andy has married, according to the local campus newspaper, his “favorite student.” We aren’t meant to raise our post-Anita Hill eyebrows at this. The detail is provided so that we may understand that Andy is not man enough for a Real Woman: he needs a “student wife,” someone young enough to be malleable in his inexperienced hands.

     

    Of course, Tracy turns out to be anything but malleable. The film foreshadows this by way of a sex scene between Andy and Tracy. The happy couple are eating take-out Chinese in bed (perhaps a reference to the scene in Woody Allen’s Manhattan, which also concerns the power balance between an older man and a younger woman). Andy can’t handle the chopsticks, and says to his wife, “Would you think any the less of me if I used a fork?” Tracy coyly begins to feed him from her chopsticks, and before we know it she is straddling him and they are having sex. It is Tracy who is on top, both literally and figuratively. She is less prudish and more aggressive than her husband; she doesn’t mind the curtainless windows and he does. Andy remains passive throughout, and all we see of his naked body is a scrawny lower leg. You can tell he doesn’t jog.

     

    Jed, on the other hand, is a Real Man. When we see him having sex, Jed is energetically on top–so much so that he is keeping Tracy and Andy, who live a floor below, awake. We see his bulging biceps and naked torso, and when his partner asks him to slow down on the booze, he replies, “I am impervious to alcohol.” Hard drinking, hard working, and hard playing: an admirable example of the American male.

     

    But in the end it is Jed who is killed by Tracy the Bitch, and Andy the Wimp who ends up the hero. How does this happen?

     

    It happens improbably, of course. There has been a serial rapist loose on campus, and indeed the rapist’s actions lead to the initial meeting between Andy and Jed– Jed miraculously saves the life of one of the victims, Andy comes to thank him and discovers that Jed is his old high school running back hero. Before long Andy asks Jed to rent the upper floor of his run-down Victorian house. What Andy doesn’t know, of course, is that Tracy and Jed are hatching an evil medical plot right beneath his roof, and that one reason Tracy becomes upset with Jed’s energetic sex life is that she has been having an affair with him herself. Andy is not only cuckolded, but cuckolded under his own roof, by someone who is also “cuckolding” (as it were) his wife.

     

    No one counts on the rapist, however. One of Andy’s students fails to show up for an appointment, and the dedicated dean drives to her house to talk to her. We aren’t surprised when he discovers her raped body in the backyard. The local (female) detective asks Andy to give a sperm sample to clear him of suspicion. Furious, he says, “Am I a fucking suspect?” This is the first time he uses the “f” word, but not the last. Up to this point in the film he has been fucked over by the judicial system and by his friend and his wife, and he has not done any genuine fucking himself, although he will ultimately fuck up the insurance scheme. When he is asked to fuck himself, he finally rebels. I emphasize the word “fuck” because it is the biggest linguistic clue in the film as to Andy’s growing manhood. Jed has used it early on–when lambasting a medical colleague, he says, “Do that again and I’ll take out your lungs with a fucking ice cream scoop.” Tracy also uses the word–and the instant Andy starts to, we know his luck is changing.

     

    But first Tracy leaves him. Her ovary has burst, Jed performs emergency surgery, and with Andy’s permission removes both ovaries, even though one of them turns out to be viable. Tracy sues Jed (this is part of their scheme, of course) and leaves Andy. Disconsolate, Andy works late, goes to the basement for a lightbulb, realizes the janitor is the rapist, and socks him into unconsciousness after a battle that leaves Andy with a bloodied face.

     

    A lightbulb has literally gone off for Andy. Directly after his capture of the rapist, the police detective tells him that the sperm sample he gave showed that he is sterile –and Andy knows Tracy was pregnant when she had emergency surgery. Here is proof that he has been cuckolded and that Tracy is not what she seems. Andy goes off in a fury to Jed (whom he does not yet suspect); to Tracy’s lawyer, whom he assumes is also her lover; and to Tracy’s alcoholic mother (played wickedly well by Ann Bancroft) in search of clues. Everyone he sees says, “What happened to your face?” Of course, in one sense he has lost face completely, courtesy of Tracy, and he has also lost his manhood in that he knows he can’t father children. But in other ways he has re-cast his mild-mannered professor’s face in the shape of the hero’s. He tells the detective, “You want something done right, goddamn it, you call a teacher,” and when Jed asks what happened to his face he says, “I beat the shit out of a seriously disturbed serial rapist.”

     

    Andy gets final proof of what is going on when he sees Tracy and Jed together and when he finds a medical syringe in his house. He then confronts Tracy. Tracy doesn’t understand that Andy is on top now, however. She thinks she can seduce him into going along with her scheme. She, too, asks what happened to his face, and he says, “I tripped.” This is meant to be ironic–it plays to his old role as ineffectual academic, not his new one as manly hero. Tracy, once she realizes things aren’t going her way, gets up in a hug and Andy says, “Sit the fuck down.” Stunned by this verbal virility, she says, “What?” “I said, sit the fuck down. I’m running the show now.” “What do you want?” “What does any man want? I want the Red Sox to win the World Series.”

     

    This little scene, more so than the fight with the rapist, shows us that Andy is now a Real Man. He can take charge of a woman and make her do what he wants her to do; he can say “fuck”; he can toss around sports references just like Jed Hill. He ultimately asks for half the insurance money, although by now the viewer knows this is just one more step in Andy’s revenge plot.

     

    Just as Andy’s masculinity is on the rise, Jed’s is declining. He and Tracy have argued over what to do about Andy and the child witness Andy claims to have. Jed is for compromise–he says give Andy half and be done with it. They argue so heatedly that Jed finally hits Tracy to put her in her place. At first this appears to be in line with Jed’s he-man qualities–but then he makes the mistake of apologizing. In the ethos of the film, this shows him to be weak, despite all of his macho sex and surgery. He is willing to compromise; he is appalled at Tracy’s plan to kill an innocent child; and he apologizes for using physical violence against a woman. What is the proper fate for such a man? Why, death, of course. Tracy plugs him twice with a gun, then goes off to commit child murder solo.

     

    She is foiled in her plot–Andy knows what she is going to do and substitutes a dummy for the boy. Tracy ends up going to jail. Andy ends up with a sprained arm, and when we last see him, the female detective (whose only role in the denouement is to masquerade as a nurse and mother), says, “You’re supposed to put ice on that.” He replies, “Fine. I’ll have mine with some scotch on top.” And off they go. Now Andy is the hard-drinking, swearing, womanizing Real Man, and the film’s end hints that he will end up next with a (psuedo) nurse, just like Jed.

     

    Malice has links with its predecessors that go beyond the Evil Bitch stereotype. First of all, it shares with them a particular, strategic deployment of the word “fuck.” In all of these films we are given to understand that when a man uses the word, he is a Real Man: when a woman does, she is the incarnation of evil, no matter how beautiful she may be. Peyton (Rebecca deMornay) in The Hand That Rocks The Cradle provides a nice example of this. She twists the arm of a six-year-old schoolyard bully and says, “I’ve got a message for you. . . . Leave Emma alone. . . . If you don’t I’m going to rip your fucking head off.” A scene or two later, she says to Solomon, the wiser-than-he-seems handyman, “Don’t fuck with me, retard.” She not only says “fuck” but picks on children and the mentally handicapped– hard to get much bitchier than that.

     

    Second, all of these films portray men as for the most part weak and dim-witted, their wits especially dulled by the siren calls of evil women. Dan Gallagher in Fatal Attraction has the perfect life, until Alex seduces him into a one-night stand and all hell breaks loose. In the end, he is still so weakened by her that he cannot kill her. He misses one chance in Alex’s kitchen, when he nearly strangles her but then backs off–he’s a nice middle-class lawyer, after all–and botches another in his own bathroom when he thinks he has drowned her, but hasn’t. It’s up to his wife, battered and weak from a car accident, to find the gun and fire the fatal shot. Matt McCoy’s Michael in Hand That Rocks The Cradle has facial expressions blanker than those of the handicapped Solomon, and although other men salivate at the sight of Peyton, he seems oblivious to her charms until nearly the end of the film. Even when he knows who she really is, he is reluctant to call the police and forgets to ask for the house keys when he throws her out; his wife has to ask for them. And in the final confrontation, he is completely out of the action, left in the basement with broken legs while the quick wits of a child and Solomon give Claire the chance to send Peyton out the attic window to her death. Nick in Basic Instinct is apparently somewhat shrewder, but even he misses out on crucial clues, is incapable of saving his best buddy from death, and is obsessed beyond reason with the pantyless femme fatale played by Sharon Stone.

     

    Even more interesting is the attitude towards paternity in these films. The fathers in Fatal Attraction and The Hand That Rocks The Cradle appear on the surface to be loving and involved parents: Dan Gallagher buys his child a pet bunny rabbit; Michael sings operetta to his daughter and plays board games with her. But Dan’s bunny ends up boiled because he has put carnal desires before fatherly duty, and Michael should not be so willing to turn over so much of the family’s care to a nanny.

     

    Nick in Basic Instinct has the paternalistic job of policeman, but he also has the nickname “Shooter,” earned by his tendency to wound innocent bystanders. He is not a father, nor does he show any desire to sire children by Sharon Stone’s Catherine, but he is a symbolic and murderous father. In this he points the way to Malice and what may be the latest trend in cinematic visions of manhood.

     

    In Malice paternal behavior leads one first to marry the Evil Bitch, and then to discover raped bodies in the bushes. Finding out one is sterile, however, leads to the possibility of endless sexual play without consequences — unless you choose a Sharon Stone, that is. Malice‘s Andy is smarter than Basic Instinct‘s Nick: he figures out the entire scheme on his own, cancels the bitch out of his life, takes up with someone who will nurture him rather than the other way around, and is freed from having to worry about unanticipated pregnancies (one of Dan Gallagher’s problems) or from ever having to worry about evil nannies in his childless household. He’s smarter than scheming Dr. Jed Hill, who ultimately is killed not only for greed, but for his paternal feelings towards an unknown child. Paternity is lethal all the way around in these films.

     

    The New American Hero, at least in the genre of popular film, is no New Age Sensitive Guy or angst-ridden Iron John. He’s an updated John Wayne–he can swear and drink, but he doesn’t smoke; he has brains but knows how to use his muscles; and most importantly he can have guilt-free, child-free sexual relationships in which he, of course, is always on top.

     

  • Grown-Ups and Fanboys

    Kevin Harley

    Norwich, England
    P280@CPCMB.EAST-ANGLIA.AC.UK

     

    Sabin, Roger. Adult Comics: An Introduction. London and New York: Routledge, 1993.

     

    It’s a long and sordid tale, the history of adult comics. This particular hotbed of intrigue has everything for the perfect television mini-series; suspense, prejudice, passion, censorship, homophobia, Anglo-American cultural relations, exploitation of creative individuals by massive and all-powerful media industries–even, gasp, communism. One wonders why the TV version has yet to be made. In its absence, Roger Sabin’s Adult Comics sets itself the formidable task of presenting this largely untold tale.

     

    Sometime in the mid-1980s, the British media suddenly became aggitated over the phenomenon of so-called ‘adult comics.’ Many argued that comics were laying claim to a hitherto absent literary legitimacy, largely through the use of the term “graphic novel” to denote the departure these “new comics” made from the supposedly childish orientations of their predecessors. The media response to this ostensible trend was divided between approval and outrage, but nearly everyone adhered to a suitably comic-book language of wild hyperbole.

     

    Among enthusiasts, the general attitude was one of terrific excitement about comics that–wow!–used cats and mice to tell the story of the Holocaust, or–gasp!– looked closely at both the politics and psychoses of superheroes, when the industry was presumed to have hitherto kept its heroes’ reputations untarnished. What’s more, these things called “graphic novels” were full-color, fully painted works of art which–hey!–you did not need to feel ashamed to read in a public place, even if you did look as if you were scouring the porn shelf to get to them (Sabin 72). It was finally safe for comics’ fans to come out and admit to their unspoken love.

     

    Others, however, were more hostile. David Lister set the resurgence of comic book popularity in the context of The Novel’s imminent death.1 Given the supposedly three minute culture in which “we” live, a visually based narrative media (as if television weren’t bad enough!) could only signal a turn for the worse. Lister refused to allow comics to hide behind the cloak of the term “graphic novel,” since this was of course an attempt to disguise the fact that the things were still “merely . . . a diverting entertainment for children.”

     

    One can readily set this whole debate over adult comics during the mid-80s in the general context of a series of debates over what constitutes culture. As Sabin notes, the growing popularity of Cultural Studies within British universities, and the faddishness of applying the term “postmodern” to anything that might be seen as challenging high/low culture boundaries, provided a perfect context for the adult comics hype to generate both excitement and outrage amongst its many commentators. Add to this the widely circulating arguments about whether visual literacy could be considered equal to textual literacy, and it is easy to see why the spark over comics briefly became a fire.

     

    Stepping in before the embers get cold, Sabin offers Adult Comics primarily as a “primer-textbook” for university teachers who know little about the medium and its histories, but might consider including comics on their syllabi. After all, as a medium it lends itself to all manner of disciplines, perfect fodder for the interdisciplinary age. Media studies, popular culture studies, literature, art history, and even history itself, could all be suitable disciplinary venues for the teaching of comics. Many comics offer themselves as history texts, and many flaunt such a high level of aesthetic-theoretical sophistication that their gradual assimilation into the hallowed halls of academia should not really surprise anybody.

     

    In his effort to seize on the moment of comics’ potential legitimization, Sabin casts himself in the role of demythologiser, trampling all over the rubbish that the mainstream British press has been churning out ever since comics became an issue. The death of the novel? Well, popular novels still sell pretty well. The first adult comics? They’ve been going strong since the nineteenth-century, mate, and other countries accepted them long before the English and American press leapt on the bandwagon. The collapse of high/low culture boundaries? A story as old as culture itself. Graphic novels? Been around since the 1940s, and besides they’re called albums in Europe. Etc etc etc. . . .

     

    So why, according to Sabin, did the mid-80s see such an explosion of interest in adult comics? There were, he says, basically three groups whose interests converged to produce a dramatic, if short-lived comics boom. Firstly, publishers saw the opportunity for a period of more aggressive production and distribution. Secondly, the media sniffed out a suitably scandalous decline-of-civilization story and got terribly excited about it for a while. Thirdly, creators (as they are known) were able to push the comic book institutions they worked in for better deals than before, now that their names were on the covers and people were actually buying the damn things. All these groups sought to benefit from a public who, as Sabin argues, knew nothing about what they were being sold. “This void made it easy for those with a vested interest in rewriting history: for them, other peoples’ ignorance was bliss. Adult comics had no history, which is why an invented one was so powerful.”

     

    Which, of course, leaves a space for Sabin to step in and reveal the truth about the history of a medium much-maligned and under-studied. Appropriately, his demythologising begins with the title of his own book. What is meant by this rather ambiguous term, “adult comics”? It is a term that, as Sabin notes, teases at the ambivalence, in British society at least, over the fault-line that divides most people’s childhood from their adulthood. But is this really a very secure or stable boundary? Obviously many “adults” read comics that are marketed for children, and many children would probably not have too much difficulty getting their hands on so-called adult comics.

     

    Whilst Sabin usefully raises this as a problem, his book is not up to the challenge of dealing with it. Given the fact that he has such an enormous history to recover, it’s true that one really cannot expect a lengthy treatise on adult/child distinctions in British society. But it is galling when Sabin tries to tidy up the ambivalences by recasting the adult/child distinction in such terms as “mature” and “adolescent,” as though these were somehow more helpful. Discussing similarities and differences between various types of so-called adult comics, Sabin comments that the “only thing . . . all the comics had in common was their adult nature,” which, he says, distinguishes them from the “traditional adolescent fare.” To depend on such undefined terms for one’s evaluative criteria creates all manner of anomalies, and reinforces some unjustified prejudices. A comment on Tim Burton’s Batman movie is typical. According to Sabin, the film’s release with a “12” certificate rather than a “15” could rightly have been read as a disappointing signal by audiences hoping for something more sophisticated. But why should the age of the viewers at which a work is pitched be taken as an index of its sophistication?

     

    This is not the only example of a lack of terminological and conceptual clarity in Adult Comics. Similar instances arise from Sabin’s obvious contempt for ‘fandom’ and for superhero comics. In his view, the latter pander to the “adolescent,” “male-power fantasies” of the former; the entire genre of superhero comics is dismissed as juvenile fodder either for those in their early teens or for older men who don’t want to leave their early teens behind. All these “fanboys” are to Sabin suspect persons, “anal-retentive, adolescent, and emotionally arrested.” The whole account depends on our accepting “adolescent” as a pejorative term: superhero fans are largely adolescent, therefore superhero comics are bad and their adult readers must be stunted.

     

    Indeed, Sabin’s approach in general avoids an engagement with fandom, offering a narrative not so much of specific patterns of reception and appropriation as of sweeping “historical and cultural imperatives.” At the same time, however, his own chapter on “Fandom and Direct Sales” makes clear that it was to some considerable degree the strategic activities and choices of fans that drove the emergence of the graphic novel and opened doorways into the industry for new and more ambitious creators. In view of his own research, it seems odd that Sabin would resist viewing “fanboys” and their strategies of reception as anything less than imperative cultural and historical phenomena where the development of comics is concerned.

     

    This blind spot in Sabin’s analysis is particularly unfortunate given that fandom and fan cultures are areas that have generated much critical literature recently. The essayists in The Adoring Audience: Fan Culture and Popular Media2 seek to clear a cultural space for the respectful analysis of popular culture fans with many different generic interests. Jensen’s essay, for example, argues that media commentaries or critical writing on fans is frequently marred by a “them” and “us” mentality, in which critics regard themselves as intrinsically superior to fans. This is probably because the genre to which the fans in question attach themselves has been perceived as an inferior one anyway, and possibly because it is presumed that fan-affiliations are singular: one fan, one genre. Sabin makes exactly this assumption when he suggests that a fan of Daredevil is unlikely to get very excited about Raw! (a collection of avant-garde comic strip work, edited by Art Spiegelman and Francoise Mouly), or vice versa. Sabin quotes no ethnographic evidence for this, and I could cite myself and many others as contradictions to the supposed rule. The superhero fanboys are not, I suspect, as discrete or as homogeneously imbecilic a group as Sabin is determined to make them out.

     

    Nor, it seems to me, are the superhero comics deserving of such a cursory and dismissive analysis. Unless we accept Sabin’s view that all the adults who read these texts are dull-witted, then there must be something other than self- reflexivity and lots of violence that earned the 1980s superheroes the label “adult.” Until Sabin’s claim to have looked “in detail” at the big three sellers in Britain during this period (Watchmen, The Dark Knight Returns, and Maus) is lived up to–and his one paragraph on each hardly accomplishes that–then we won’t know.

     

    But what of the comics that don’t buy into the mainstream superhero agenda? On these, Sabin’s book is superb. The attention he devotes to the underground comics and the relationship between women and comics far exceeds his sweeping judgements on superhero texts. While showing that the comic book medium and the specialist shop culture generated around it has tended effectively to exclude women, Sabin makes it clear that there are women’s comics, even if they are not part of the perceived mainstream. Like most comics, they have of course suffered at the hands of somewhat over-zealous customs officials and censors, particularly if they are so bold as to deal with such a taboo subject matter as sex in a medium which everyone knows is really only a diversion for children. “So far as the British authorities generally were concerned, men dealing with sex in comics was bad enough: women dealing with sex was beyond the pale. The worst example of censorship occurred in 1985, when Melinda Gebbie’s solo comic Frezca Zisis was declared obscene by the courts and destroyed” (289). Even recently, an erotic graphic novel written by Alan Moore and illustrated by Gebbie (Lost Girls) had trouble getting through customs in its serialized format as part of the quarterly collection of comic strip material in graphic novel format titled Taboo.

     

    It is obviously true, however, that where “women’s comics” are concerned censors probably have less to answer for than the comics industry itself. Sabin notes that when the underground comics went into decline with the rest of the counter culture in the early 1970s, women’s comics were considered expendable and were “the first to go.” The specialist shops that subsequently emerged in Britain conveyed, says Sabin, a “locker-room atmosphere” that, aside from being intimidating to anyone less literate in comics than the fanboys, was far from welcoming to women. And even if comics became in some sense more “adult” by the mid to late 1980s, this rarely translated into more progressive attitudes towards women on the part of male comics writers. Indeed, as Sabin sees it, “some of the worst cases of negative representations of women in the history of comics can be identified in this period.”

     

    Nevertheless, despite their marginalization by the “mainstream” writers and marketers, women’s comics make up an important part of the history of comics. And it is in recovering this and other marginalized histories that Sabin excels. He shows that whilst women have served as a primary satiric butt for comics at least since the late nineteenth century (in, for example, Ally Sloper’s Half Holiday), they were always “recognised as an audience” and, in fact, have always constituted at least a small fraction of the creators of adult comics. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, an “underground” women’s comics movement emerged in force as a critical reaction against the macho and misogynist work of creators like Robert Crumb and S. Clay Wilson. By the mid 1970s even the comics mainstream showed some signs of feeling the impact of the women’s movement, and a number of established male writers (including Alan Moore) took to writing pro-feminist narratives. Whilst women creators themselves still do not hold very prominent positions in this mainstream, Sabin lets us see their work as extending a crucial counter-tradition.

     

    Sabin is also quite good at tracing the concrete histories of comic book production and distribution. Take, for example, the characteristically “convoluted” history of Bryan Talbot’s The Adventures of Luther Arkwright. This comic first appeared in the 1972 underground comic Mixed Bunch, moving from there to Near Myths in 1978, then onto Pssst! in 1982. Soon thereafter it was published in its first collected-volume format by Never Ltd., and then in 1988 as a nine-issue comic book series by Valkyrie Press. Valkyrie then republished the second volume, while volumes one and three were reprinted by Proutt, and, in 1991, the whole lot was republished, with all new covers, by Dark Horse Comics. Sabin can be commended for the thoroughness with which he has retraced these sorts of strange trajectories, but at times the minutiae can be overwhelming. Moreover, such publishing-centered approach to comics history can have the effect of submerging the cultural specificity of a text under the mere facts of its publication. Sabin describes both Dark Knight and Watchmen as “American in origin,” which is true enough as concerns their publication histories. But while Frank Miller’s Dark Knight certainly derives from an American perspective on superheroes, Moore’s Watchmen seems just as certainly to derive from a British one. Something of the cultural and ideological resonance of both texts is lost when the origins of their production are understood entirely in terms of the sites of their initial publication.

     

    But even allowing for this and other shortcomings, Sabin’s book is a valuable one. Sabin has succeeded in mapping out an extensive cultural terrain on which new analysis and research might find room to develop. He has opened a host of avenues for inquiry, even if some of the most promising of these may lead readers away from his own positions. Hopefully, Adult Comics will be taken up as the “primer-textbook” of comics studies, and provide the point of departure for much future work.

     

    Notes

     

    1. David Lister, “Traditional novel ‘in danger’ as teenagers turn to comics”, The Independent, 9/9/1989, p. 3.

     

    2. Lisa A. Lewis, ed., The Adoring Audience: Fan Culture and Popular Media (London: Routledge, 1992).

     

  • Exaggerated History

    Susan Schultz

    Department of English
    University of Hawaii
    schultz@uhccvm

     

    Susan Howe, The Birth-Mark: Unsettling the Wilderness in American Literary History. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1993.

     

    Susan Howe, The Nonconformist’s Memorial. New York: New Directions, 1993.

     

     

    Somewhere Thoreau says that exaggerated history is poetry.

     

    — Susan Howe,

    “The Captivity And Restoration of Mrs. Mary Rowlandson”

    (Birth-mark 96)

     

     

    The recent publication of two books by Susan Howe marks a further climb in the upward curve of her reputation as one of the most serious, and important, poets of our time. The nearly simultaneous publication of her latest books of poems and essays displays her ambition to change not only our way of writing poetry, but also our reading of it–although one is at times hard pressed in reading Howe’s work to decide what is “poem,” what “essay.” Howe, more than most poets, combines and confuses genres; she also experiments with typography, writing books that have to be turned over and side-ways, in order that they be read both as pictures and as texts. Despite her distinctly avant-garde surfaces, however, Howe straddles the lines between modern and postmodern poetries; she may be postmodernist in her method, but her intentions often appear to be those of a last modernist. Her fragments are every bit as artful as Eliot’s, and her desire to make them cohere (in literary and religious terms) is equal to that of Eliot, Pound, or Hart Crane.

     

    Howe’s poems are puzzles, in other words, but they are puzzles with answers. The acts of nonconformity that form the substance of Howe’s books stretch our assumptions about what texts are, and how they operate. Yet the more I read and teach her work, the more forcefully I am struck by the essential conservatism of her poetics, evident again in these new books. Howe believes in history (what she terms in Singularities “narrative in non-narrative”) and furthermore she believes, unfashionably, in the possibility that history (and gender) can be transcended through art. Unlike her colleague Charles Bernstein, also on the faculty of SUNY-Buffalo, she has faith that poems exist in order to communicate meaning; the radical nature of her texts reflect nothing so much as the difficulty of communicating new meanings, new histories.

     

    Howe adopts the mask of an editor, reviser, or “redactor” (a fine word that combines “reading” with “acting,” in both its senses). That is, she takes as given that our histories and literature have already been written, and makes it her task to alter rather than reinvent the record. As editor, however, she does not seek to purify her source texts, but to recom- plicate them, implicate them in the “wilderness” that was overrun by European immigrants, as by white male editors. Like her fore-fathers, Howe writes a frankly backward-looking prophecy, revising texts by stripping them of their rhetorical histories, and so giving voice to women and others silenced by previous editors and historians. As she tells Edward Foster:

     

         There you have Charles Olson at his
    wisest.  "The 
              stutter is the plot."  It's the stutter in 
              American literature that interests me.  I hear the 
              stutter as a sounding of uncertainty.  What is 
              silence or not quite silenced [as in Billy Budd]. 
              . . . A return is necessary, a way for women to 
              go.  Because we are in the stutter.  We were 
              expelled from the Garden of the Mythology of the 
              American Frontier.  The  drama's done.  We are the 
              wilderness.  We have come on to the stage 
              stuttering. (181)

     

    Howe does not create a new meaning for “wilderness,” but adopts the old meaning (the wilderness as woman in Hart Crane’s The Bridge, for example) and translates it, feminizes it. She disrupts old narratives not because she has no faith in narratives, but because she means for the reader to see in her gaps and verbal impasses the opening for new narratives. The danger is that the new language is too close to the old; by using the old words, she threatens to reinscribe old forms. Howe makes of these risks both revelation and paradox–the oppositions that Howe so often attempts to transcend threaten to undermine her historical (and so untranscendental) project.

     

    One of the central paradoxes in Howe’s work involves the function of silence in poetry, especially poetry by and about women. Howe’s revision of literary history problematically reproduces women’s silences in the text even as it permits their voices to speak through the agency of the reader, who transforms Howe’s compressed “narrative in non-narrative” into story. (This is something that can happen to marvelous effect in the classroom.) Silence is at once a negative social fact for women and a positive religious state; silence, like so much in Howe’s work, straddles the line between history and transcendence, thereby calling both of them into question. As she states the problem in her brilliant book My Emily Dickinson, “Identity and memory are crucial for anyone writing poetry. For women the field is still dauntingly empty. How do I, choosing messages from the code of others in order to participate in the universal theme of Language, pull SHE from all the myriad symbols and sightings of HE” (17-18). That she does pull the “she” from the “he” by taking advantage of the language’s frequent material self-betrayal only makes her thinking more complex; in her previous book Singularities, for instance, she literally un-mans the Puritan Hope Atherton, whose wanderings in the wilderness become the history behind her poem “Articulation of Sound Forms in Time.” She does so by commenting that “Hope” is now considered a woman’s name. As if by fiat, she begins an American epic of reduction and reconstruction through a simple linguistic sex-change operation. “Hope” for the American poet (or, as she puts it, for “the artist in America”) becomes a feminine aspiration.

     

    Howe’s view of Dickinson’s silence is both enabling and disturbing because it values that silence over publication: “I think,” she tells Ed Foster, “she may have chosen to enter the space of silence, a space where power is no longer an issue, gender is no longer an issue, voice is no longer an issue, where the idea of a printed book appears as a trap” (170). The difficulty of Howe’s work may, in part, stem from the fact that she herself uses language to aspire to the condition of silence and the immateriality to which her books cannot aspire. As she writes in the “Silence Wager Stories” section of The Nonconformist’s Manual:

     

         Words are an illusion 
              are vibrations of air 
              Fabricating senselessness 
              He has shattered gates 
              thrown open to himself  (38)

     

    These are lines that no Language poet would set upon the page; given a more complete syntax, the passage might be claimed by that American metaphysician, Wallace Stevens. The illusions of words often work through Howe’s manipulation of puns, as in her use of the word “word” in the following lines: “Language a wood for thought / over the pantomime of thought / Words words night unto night” (39). So language can be considered a “word” for thought; or the word may pertain to the wilderness that engenders thinking like Howe’s own; or language may (in an older sense of the wood-word) participate in madness’ meaning. “Much madness is divinest sense,” we recall from Dickinson. Dickinson’s poem, too, sets the social against the visionary world; categories are human inventions, but the states that they circumscribe approximate the divine.

     

    The illusive word is purposely allusive; Howe depends on the aura of words more than most poets (the example of Hart Crane comes to mind again). Like Crane, and like St. John the Divine, and despite her own claim not to believe in origins, she tries to wend her way through words (or woods) back to the Word. The fields of words that cover pages of Singularities, for example, contain not just the European words that helped to tame the wilderness, but also native American words that can now be used to re-claim it. Prophecy, in Howe’s lexicon, is re-vision in the sense that it both reaches forward and back; her quotation from John Cotton in Singularities is appropriate: “Prophesie is Historie antedated; / and History is Postdated Prophesie” (4). Of the Word, she writes in a more direct address from poet to reader than she is usually wont to make, in a section of the “The Nonconformist’s Manual” that begins with the poet’s address to her reader as a “confessor” (23):

     

         Reader I do not wish to hide 
              in you to hide from you 
              It is the Word to whom she turns 
              True submission and subjection  (NCM 30)

     

    The “she” who is pulled from the “he” of tradition here refers to any and all women who have chosen not to conform–from the Puritans to Howe herself.

     

    That this operation is not necessarily “true” to history does not bother Howe, who rather cannily asserts in an interview with Edward Foster (editor of Talisman ) reprinted in the new Wesleyan book, that “Poets aren’t reliable. But poetry may be. I don’t think you can divorce poetry from history and culture. The photographs of children during the war in Europe . . . prevented me from ever being able to believe history is only a series of justifications or that tragedy and savagery can be theorized away” (163-4). But Howe, who here insists that poetry and culture cannot be divorced, elsewhere makes pronouncements to the contrary. In My Emily Dickinson, for example, while defending Dickinson’s “illogical” syntax against the normalizing force of the “two feminist scholars,” Gilbert and Gubar, Howe asserts that “there is a mystic separation between poetic vision and ordinary living. The conditions for poetry rest outside each life at a miraculous reach indifferent to worldly chronology” (13). I am reminded, perhaps in spite of myself, of the words of one of the members of Run DMC quoted recently in The New York Times; rap, he claimed, is poetry, and therefore has no effect on the world. Howe’s transcendent claim, along with another anti-worldly statement against the power of “Mammon,” where she (and/or Dickinson) asserts that she must “renounce attachment to friends and worldly accomplishment” (49), resemble similar polemics by Gertrude Stein. Yet Stein was no advocate of poems “including history,” as was another of Howe’s forerunners, Ezra Pound. Rather, Stein more resembles John Ashbery or Charles Bernstein, poets for whom history (in their poems, at least) is more immediately a sequence of syllables than of political events.

     

    Thus, even as she attempts to give voices to those who were silenced by official histories, she claims also to get to a point past gender and past politics. It seems to me that, while each of these goals is admirable in and of itself, her conflation of them undermines each ambition. Despite her brilliant operation on Hope Atherton, and her vociferous attempts to reclaim Dickinson from the clutches of what she sees as a male-dominated editorial conspiracy, Howe thinks of poetry as an art that breaks beyond the confines of gender politics. As she writes toward the end of her book on Dickinson: “Poetry leads past possession of self to transfiguration beyond gender. Poetry is redemption from pessimism. Poetry is affirmation in negation, ammunition in the yellow eye of a gun that an allegorical pilgrim will shoot straight into the quiet of Night’s frame” (138). In these amazing sentences Howe succeeds in troping no one so much as herself; where she had argued that Dickinson’s “gun” (from the poem that begins, “My Life it Had stood–a Loaded Gun”) rightly belonged in the history of the American frontier, a claim that historicizes Dickinson’s work in a valuable and provocative way, she now claims for the gun a part in the allegory of a pilgrimage into the capitalized “Night” that no longer seems especially American, or especially historical. The “allegorical pilgrim” is not history, but history’s idea of itself.

     

    For better or for worse, then, Howe is less a historical poet than a religious one; like the Puritans with whom she identifies, she sees American history running parallel to a religious text. The Puritans give Howe historical force, though one wonders if their metaphors haven’t lost some of their currency in our secular age. It seems telling that the best purveyors of these metaphors in the last decade have been Ronald Reagan and Mario Cuomo, hardly our finest spiritual guides. Howe is that curious combination, a deeply spiritual iconoclast, one who seeks to replace a set of icons not with a heap of broken images, but with a new set of icons, inaugurated through her use of the page of words as a visual artifact. Thus, writing of Mary Magdalene and the poet in “The Nonconformist’s Memorial”:

     

    I wander about as an exile 
              as a body does a shadow 
              A notion of split reference 
              if in silence hidden by darkness 
              there must be a Ghost 
              Iconic theory of metaphor 
              a sound and perfect voice 
              Its hiding is understood 
              Reader I do not wish to hide 
              in you to hide from you

     
    It is the Word to whom she turns True submission and subjection.
     
    Her vision of writing (and editing) is of a spiritual and loving act. “If history is a record of survivors,” she writes in “Incloser” (previously published in PMC), “Poetry [with a capital P] shelters other voices” (Birth-mark 47). Or, again allegorizing poetry as “Poetry”: “In the precinct of Poetry, a word, the space around a word, each letter, every mark, silence, or sound volatizes an inner law of form–moves on a rigorous line” (145). This sentence sounds suspiciously old formalist; the other sheltered voices may obey nothing more than “an inner law of form” that is purely poetic. Parts of words and phenomena of prosody “form a ladder to an outside state outside of States. Rungs between escape and enclosure are confusing and compelling” (46). Thus the work of an editor is to get past (or before) the words themselves, a task that one might see as dangerously close to the editorial farce featured so prominently in Thomas Pynchon’s The Crying of Lot 49. In her introduction to the second section of The Nonconformist’s Manual, “A Bibliography of the King’s Book or, Eikon Basilike,” she writes:

     

         A bibliography is "the history,
    identification or 
              analytical and systematic description or 
              classification of writings or publications 
              considered as material objects."  Can we ever 
              really discover the original text?  Was there ever 
              an original poem?  What is a pure text invented by 
              an author?  Is such a conception possible?  Only 
              by going back to the pre-scriptive level of 
              thought process can "authorial intention" finally 
              be located, and then the material object has 
              become immaterial.  (50)

     

    In this long poem, Howe obviates the issue by writing about–and off of–a text whose authenticity is in doubt: “The Eikon Basilike is a puzzle. It may be a collection of meditations written by a ghostly king; it may be a forged collection of meditations gathered by a ghostwriter who was a Presbyterian, a bishop, a plagiarizer, and a forger” (49). In other words, the answers to her seemingly rhetorical questions, above, are all pronounced in the negative. And yet, in a move typical of Howe and characteristic of her risk-taking as a writer, one senses the desire that there BE an original text, an original poem, and that she–as editor and reviser–be permitted access to “authorial intention,” hence the pre-scriptive level of thought, a level that precedes proscription. Her work on Dickinson is full testimony to this desire on her part; as she tells Foster, “That’s what I wanted to do in My Emily Dickinson. . . Not just to write a tribute but to meet her in the tribute. And that’s a kind of fusion.”

     

    Howe’s central figures in the new book of poems are not silenced women, as they were in Singularities, but male writers who have been either silenced or marginalized. In her newest essays and poems Howe attempts to rewrite the American renaissance by adapting marginal texts by male writers; Melville’s marginalia form an ironic centerpiece to her book. Melville is celebrated as the author of that most silent of American heroes, Bartleby the scrivener, who was himself something of an editor of texts, if only in his refusal to copy them. That this renovation is at once personal and historical becomes clear in Howe’s autobiographical introduction to the essays, and in the discussion with Foster that forms a kind of postlude to the book. The American renaissance, it seems, was a personal concern of Howe’s family, one of whose friends was F.O. Matthiesson–whose famous book might be retitled, following Howe, as My American Renaissance.

     

    Not only is she taking on her literary fathers in her ongoing poetic and editorial project, but also her own father, who was at once her scout and her “encloser.” Her father, who wrote a history of American law entitled The Garden and the Wilderness, “said it would be trespassing” if his daughter Susan entered the stacks of Widener Library (the name of which comes to resemble a Howe pun) at Harvard, where he was a professor. So books became her wilderness; “Thoreau said, in an essay called ‘Walking,’ that in literature it is only the wild that attracts us. What is forbidden is wild. The stacks of Widener Library and of all great libraries in the world are still the wild to me” (18). In becoming what she calls a “library cormorant,” she is at once her father’s imitator and his reviser. The texts that were for him authentic appear to her to be tissued with silences, gaps; Harvard was, in her view, a false community of scholars. “I don’t want to be so hard on it because these were honorable scholars, careful researchers, and this was their profession, and they felt it was a calling. But you see, it was false if you were a girl or a woman who was not content to be considered second-rate” (159). So she becomes her father’s mother, assumes like “Hope,” a formerly masculine role that has been rewritten in the “feminine” mode.

     

    The baroque complexities of her literary relationship to her father (and by extension her fathers) are reproduced in “Melville’s Marginalia,” a “poem” probably better described as a combination of criticism and poetry, one that covers almost 70 pages. In this work Howe attempts not just to make Melville more central to her project, by making him less central to the American Renaissance as it was understood by F.O. Matthiesson; she also juxtaposes the Melville material with a chronology of the life of the Irish writer James Clarence Mangan, only to reach a rather forced conclusion that Mangan was the source for Bartleby.

     

    Howe furthermore investigates Melville’s attitude toward women as shown through his marginalia, and its erasures. Her method resembles that found in her long work of criticism and poetry, My Emily Dickinson, where she argues by juxtaposing texts. This mode of argument, like her mode of writing poetry, trusts the reader to do the work of narrating connections; it also suggests as yet untapped links between American and British literature. (Howe’s sections on Bronte’s and George Eliot’s influences on Dickinson are especially fine.) Both the arguments and the ways of working them out strike me as less necessary and hence less effective in the work on Melville. Howe’s passion for Melville and for Mangan are less evident than her passion for Dickinson, perhaps because they seem so much more purely academic, despite the personal investment we learn about in her interview. And, where Howe carried her work on Dickinson over into her book Singularities, which is almost a work of poetic ventriloquism (Dickinson writing through Howe), her work on Melville has more the aura of exercise than passion. She writes of Melville without writing as Melville, in other words.

     

    Howe writes of her purpose and her method: “Names who are strangers out of bounds of the bound margin: I thought one way to write about a loved author would be to follow what trails he follows through words of others” (92). This she does, using Melville’s margins as she used Dickinson’s alternate words as a site for her own work. She may hope, with this new foray into American literature, to achieve the “genderlessness” that is at once a promise and a problem in her work. But if that is, indeed, what she does, she does it better in writing from a gendered perspective such as Dickinson’s. Gender, like place, is for Howe a strength; as she tells Foster: “Trust the place to form the voice,” as she remarks on the fact that the differences between Dickinson and Melville may spring from their origins on opposite sides of the Connecticut River. In this instance, she has not trusted the gender (as a placeless place) to form the voice. She has tried too hard to achieve the “transcendence” that is the problematic aim of her work; as a result, “Melville’s Marginalia” is a better example of Howe’s technique than of her vision.

     

    The strongest poem in the book, and the one that argues most passionately for the kind of poetry Howe writes, is “The Nonconformist’s Memorial,” part Biblical rewrite, part examination of the relationship between typology and typography, and partial autobiography. Here Howe takes on “The Gospel According to St. John,” arguing against its narrative cohesion and all that that means ideologically; hence the following quotation, which obliges the reader to perform manual labor:

     

           As if all history were a progress 
    
              She was coming to anoint him [this is written 
                   upside-down] 
    
                             A single thread of narrative 
    
              headstrong anarchy thoughts [again upside-down] 
    
                Actual world nothing ideal 
    
                In Peter she is nameless [upside-down] 
    
              The nets were not torn 
    
              The Gospel did not grasp    (7)

     

    Thus is the feminine rendered upside-down–as the threatening “headstrong anarchy thoughts”–as if to counter the “single” and coherent “thread of narrative” found in the Gospels. The poetic net is torn here, but the ensuing chaos is not an evil but a good, in the sense that informational entropy is good. That is, the woman’s voice, upside-down as it is, does appear, and shows up (quite literally) the masculine voice, for all its typographical certainty about itself. Woman is figured as an impasse to narrative, but this impasse does not create incoherence so much as re-coherence. Many of Howe’s most interesting pages mimic chaos, while achieving a rigorous coherence of their own. I do not entirely believe her assertion that “If it [The Bibliography of the King’s Book] was impossible to print, that didn’t matter. Because it’s about impossibility anyway. About the impossibility of putting in print what the mind really sees and the impossibility of finding the original in a bibliography” (175). A page like this one–hardly her most radical in this vein–forces an old impossibility, that of woman’s speech, into possibility. That she pushes her reading of this impossibility into metaphysics is, as I’ve been indicating, typical of her ambition. It may also undermine her historical claims by reinvesting the poem and the poet in an old metaphysics, one that keeps everyone–but especially women–silent. While I can envision a new history, as I read Howe, I cannot so easily see a new transcendence.

     

    But metaphysics or not, Howe incorporates the Puritan background that is her historical strength into the poem. As an example of the way she combines history and textuality, consider the following lines:

     

         The act of Uniformity 
              ejected her 
              and informers at her heels 
              Citations remain abbreviated 
              Often a shortcut 
              stands for Chapter.

     

    The Act of Uniformity, which forced “nonconformists” to leave England for America, was passed by the Church of England in 1662. In a manner reminiscent of Language poetry, Howe writes as if the act itself is actor, not those who wrote it. But her puns are nothing if not controlled, and hence unlike the spontaneous, manic puns of Charles Bernstein, for example. She plays on the double-meanings of “citation” and “chapter,” words that refer not simply to books, but also to legal and religious matters. (What appears in books, in other words, becomes our way of thinking, our syntax.) Thus politics and language are fused, and the nonconformist must choose exile not only in fact, but also in print–hence Howe’s nonconformist setting of type so that the visual shape of the page is as important as the words’ meaning. The lines, “Often a shortcut / stands for Chapter,” provide a micropoetics to Howe’s work, in which she provides the shortcut, the reader Chapter–and verse.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Howe, Susan. My Emily Dickinson. Berkeley: North Atlantic Books, 1985.
    • —. Singularities. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1990.

     

  • Virtual Light

    Lance Olsen

    English Department
    University of Idaho
    olsen@idui1.csrv.uidaho.edu

     

    Gibson, William. Virtual Light. New York: Bantam, 1993.

     

    I. Cyberpunk 101, or: The Luminous Flesh of Giants

     

    Until now, and for no particular reason, PMC hasn’t reviewed a novel. And it seems appropriate that the first novel to be reviewed in these electronic pages should be one by none other than the godfather of cyberpunk, William Gibson. A cultural impulse birthed in the mid-eighties, and disowned as a concerted movement by its creators fewer than four years later, cyberpunk is still very much a cultural phenomenon–as a quick skim through the hallucinatory and info-dense pages of the Berkeley-based magazine Mondo 2000, or its how-to book, A User’s Guide to the New Edge (1992), will tell you. The very name cyberpunk fuses and confuses the techno-sphere of cybernetics, cybernauts, and, most of all, computer hacking, with the countercultural socio-sphere of punk, the embodiment of anarchic violence, fringe mentality, and a sincere (even naive) attempt to return to the raw roots of rock n’roll. Cyberpunk was, and is, in some very spooky and some very exhilarating ways, a whole heck of a lot more than merely a short-lived trend, some simulacrous eighties echo of Poundian Imagism or Boccionian Futurism.

     

    For a whole bunch of people it’s a way of life–a phenomenon that far exceeds the discourse of its shrill self-proclaimed mouthpiece, Bruce Sterling (whose cyberpunk manifesto appeared in his 1986 cyberpunk anthology, Mirrorshades), as well as that of Marc Laidlaw, Pat Cadigan, John Shirley, K. W. Jeter, Lewis Shiner, and the other writers originally associated with the term.

     

    Just modem into a couple of underground bulletin boards around the country–The Temple of the Screaming Electron (510-935-5845) with Jeff Hunter’s BBS Review, a comprehensive listing of international fringe BBS’s; or maybe Private Idaho (208-338-9227) with its deep-seated information-wants-to-be-free message; or perhaps Burn This Flag (408-363-9766) with its cybersex scenarios involving, I kid you not, everything from nose fetishes to water sports–and you will find a lot of people who want, like Andy Warhol, to be a machine. The plethora of electronic subcultures, each with its own codes, languages, and styles, can make you feel old at twenty-five, already past the point of ever being able to keep up with it all.

     

    Little cults embrace Ridley Scott’s 1982 film Blade Runner, with its speedy surreal images, thickly textured information, and techno-sleaze ambiance. Sonic Youth dedicates a song called “The Sprawl” to Gibson on the 1988 album, Daydream Nation. Kathy Acker openly pla(y)giarizes whole parts of her 1988 novel, Empire of the Senseless, from Gibson’s 1984 Neuromancer. A cover story in Time (February 8, 1993, there goes the neighborhood) focusing on the cyberpunk moment is laid out like a series of pages from, what else, Mondo 2000. Billy Idol’s really bad 1993 album Cyberpunk comes replete with its video about the LA riots, “Shock to the System,” featuring a Terminator-esque Idol transmogrifying into a cyborg with a TV camera protruding from his eye-socket. Scott Bukatman’s fascinating Terminal Identity: The Virtual Subject in Postmodern Science Fiction, out just months ago from prestigious Duke University Press, nips hot at the heels of the excellent 1991 Storming the Reality Studio: A Casebook of Cyberpunk and Postmodern Fiction, edited by Larry McCaffery and containing pieces by everyone from J. G. Ballard and William S. Burroughs to Jean Baudrillard and Jacques Derrida.

     

    Idol’s, Bukatman’s, and McCaffery’s projects of course also suggest that appropriation and commodification– academic and otherwise–have set in. So what else is new? But in many ways, William Gibson continues to stand at the center of this cultural firestorm as the guy whose seminal Matrix Trilogy–composed of Neuromancer (1984), Count Zero (1986), and Mona Lisa Overdrive (1990), and foreshadowed by some of the stories collected in Burning Chrome (1986)–explored, among other things, computer-generated reality, information as the new power base, and a grungy near-future universe that looked way too much like our own present one for comfort. In these works Gibson did nothing less than help shape the way a large part of the population perceives the world. We now unselfconsciously use the words and concepts he gave us (cyberspace, jacking in, computer cowboys) almost as though they’d had no flesh-and-blood origin.

     

    II. A Piece of God Resides in Every Old Movie

     

    Gibson, meanwhile, has been forging ahead. His last work, Agrippa: A Book of the Dead (1992), was a $2000 sweet autobiographical prose poem on a disk created in collaboration with the abstract expressionist painter Dennis Ashbaugh, which was designed to self-destruct after a single reading. Virtual Light is more conventionally packaged. Nevertheless, it bears Gibson’s unmistakable signature.

     

    Much conventional science fiction is set in the distant future, peopled with aliens, and enacted on a galactic and heroic scale. Gibson’s SF, on the other hand, extrapolates an all-too-real near-future world set increasingly close to ours (Virtual Light takes place in 2005, more than fifty years before the events in his first three novels), peopled with those at the margins of society, and enacted on a (usually) global and (always) antiheroic scale. “It’s kind of a tragic artifact of science fiction that some people are naive enough to think that science fiction writers are predicting the future,” Gibson recently told the San Francisco Bay Guardian (18 August, 1993). Fredric Jameson put it more academically when he pointed out in his interview for Andrew Ross’s collection Universal Abandon? that SF achieves “a distinctive historical consciousness by way of the future rather than the past” and thus becomes “conscious of our present as the past of some unexpected future, rather than as the future of a heroic national past.” The plain point: SF isn’t about the future; it’s about the present. In SF, tomorrow is a metaphor for today.

     

    In Virtual Light the future-present has lost the mystical aspects of cyberspace which dominated Gibson’s earlier trilogy. In its place appears a universe almost completely rooted in the meat world. The effect doesn’t challenge our imagination so much as our sense of political realities, particularly West Coast political realities. Set in a dingy California divided into two states, NoCal and SoCal, Gibson’s novel explores a narrative space in which the manufacture of cigarettes has been declared illegal throughout the US, and the Surgeon General is trying to outlaw convertibles because their use contributes to the high incidence of skin-cancer. An African-American woman is president, there’s massive inflation, and a privatized law-enforcement company cruises LA in tanks designed by Ralph Lauren. Countries like Canada and Brazil have exploded into nation-states, and TV is everywhere, even at the center of a Christian fundamentalist sect whose followers believe that a piece of God resides in every old movie.

     

    It’s a radically dystopian vision–or at least it might seem that way to you if, as Gibson underscores in that Guardian interview, “you are a very comfortable middle-class citizen.” Otherwise, it goes without saying, things actually look pretty good in his world. After all, “there’s stuff happening to people, lots of people, right now, all over the planet, that’s incredibly worse and so much more depressing than anything I’ve ever written about.” At least through one optic, then, Virtual Light, a book of profound contradictions if ever there was one, can be read as an optimistic novel. Two key metaphors reinforce this. First is a San Francisco bike-messenger service, one of whose employees, Chevette Washington, steals a pair of virtual light glasses (which produce images in the brain by stimulating your optic nerves without employing photons) from a gross guy at a party on a pissed-off whim. Second is the Oakland Bay Bridge, abandoned by the city after a megalithic earthquake, slowly taken over by the homeless, and currently the topic of research by a young Japanese scholar named Yamasaki, who’s attempting to use the bridge to understand American culture.

     

    Through the course of the novel, the bikes and the bridge become important pomo icons. Gibson’s use of the former nods in a gesture of appreciation and appropriation toward the major means of transportation in his friend Lewis Shiner’s excellent 1991 novel, Slam, about the anarchistic world of skateboarding, underground economies, and computer networks. The bikes, like Shiner’s skateboards, are emblematic of environmentally conscious no-fuel freedom, intense energy, exhilarating speed, and sexy fashion. They are the embodiment of the techno-hip, an attitude to which almost all the amoral characters in Gibson’s text subscribe. Skirting society’s periphery, they are out for themselves in a posthuman cosmos that has moved beyond a sense of compassion–or even hope. What counts to these people is the next hit of money or designer drugs, or the next ingot of information.

     

    The patchwork dwellings on the brilliantly described broken bridge, from bars to tattoo parlors, sushi shops to rag-tag shelters, inhabited by those living on the edges of our culture, indicate something a little different. They “had occurred piecemeal, to no set plan, employing every imaginable technique and material. The result was something amorphous, startlingly organic. At night, illuminated by Christmas bulbs, by recycled neon, by torchlight, [the bridge] possessed a queer medieval energy.” Or, elsewhere: the dwellings “had just grown, it looked like, one thing patched into the next, until the whole span was wrapped in this formless mass of stuff, and no two pieces of it matched. There was a different material anywhere you looked, almost none of it being used for what it had originally been used for.”

     

    The streets find uses for things, Gibson’s narrator notes in Neuromancer, and the result in Virtual Light is an urban crazy-quilt, an emblem of contemporary America. The bridge is also an icon appropriate to the particular novelistic practice of Virtual Light. As in Count Zero, the novel’s chapters are mostly no more than five or ten pages long and, also like those in Count Zero, they form a structure of intersecting plots that moves inexorably toward a jazzy unifying climax. Both bridge and text, then, are examples of Termite Art, a term Gibson lifted from a 1962 essay (“White Elephant Art and Termite Art” in Negative Space) by the iconoclastic film critic Manny Farber. If White Elephant Art embraces the idea of a “well-regulated area, both logical and magical,” as in the films of Francois Truffaut, Farber argues, then Termite Art embraces freedom and multiplicity, as in the films of Laurel and Hardy, going “always forward eating [its] own boundaries, and, likely as not, leav[ing] nothing in [its] path other than the signs of eager, industrious, unkempt activity.” Rubin, the artist-protagonist of Gibson’s 1986 short story “The Wintermarket,” describes himself as a gomi no sensei, Japanese for a “master of junk.” The same is true of Gibson himself. A literary bricoleur, more techno-hickster than techno-hipster (not even on e-mail, he’s the first to admit just how little he really knows about the computers and other glitzy gadgets that surface in his texts), he shops for his ideas among the aisles of the late-twentieth-century cultural hypermart.

     

    Maybe the most surprising result of his latest shopping spree is the often matte-black humor that continually emerges. It’s the antithesis of the bleak flat tone of the books that comprise the Matrix Trilogy. If Neuromancer has all the comic hoopla of the dark prophet himself administering late rites to late capitalist culture, then Virtual Light, virtually light, frequently evinces the bright cartoonish mischief of Pynchon. Characters sport handles like Lucius Warbaby. A surveillance and command satellite is fondly nicknamed the Death Star by those it watches over. A wind-surfing boutique is called, dead-pan, Just Blow Me. There’s a pscyho-killer with the Last Supper tattooed on his chest, a guy who believes TV is the “Lord’s preferred means of communicating, the screen itself a kind of perpetually burning bush,” and a woman who’s in San Francisco to get her husband’s cryogenically frozen brain removed from a tank with a whole bunch of others so it doesn’t have to feel so crowded in the afterlife, such as it is. The complex and deeply spiritual exploration of cyberspace that pervaded the Matrix Trilogy here gives way to very funny, if perhaps too easy, parody.

     

    III. Miracle Mile, or: It Could be Anybody

     

    The presence of such parody flags the essential narrative problem Gibson, now forty-five and a pomo icon himself, has had to wrestle with since the publication of Neuromancer almost a decade ago. Is it possible to keep the news new, the action vigorous and mind-bogglingly hot without skidding off the novel novelistic road into the ditch of self-replication, the slough of self-parody? In part the answer is surely yes, and the way Gibson goes about it is by dosing his text with a powerful hit of comic vision that seems to take nothing (including itself) very seriously. The fresh infusion of humor into his writing takes down the seriousness of his own textuality and grim futurist ideas before someone else has a chance to, destabilizes them in a flourish typical of Termite Art.

     

    But in part the answer is also no. Mona Lisa Overdrive, Gibson’s last solo effort, is set in the Hollywoodish world of Sense/Net. It focuses on the manipulation of young stars by various financial concerns and is shot through with the theme of commercial sellout. Clearly when writing it Gibson was simultaneously beguiled by the glamour and goods associated with that dimension, and bent on satirizing its commodifying impulse. The consequence was a Janus-text that looks to accessibility and tameness on the one hand (its conclusion involves an idyllic after-death marriage of its protagonists in a kind of futuristic restaging of Wuthering Heights), and toward disruptive innovation on the other (the scene can be read as a sharp self-reflexive parody of traditional happy endings). It was a move that prompted Paul Kincaid, in his review of the novel for TLS (12 August 1988), to glance back nostalgically to Neuromancer and observe that “Gibson wrote one book of stunning originality which caught the mood of the time so successfully that he has been condemned to repeat it. By this third volume he is showing clear and dramatic improvement as a writer, but is doing nothing fresh with his talent.”

     

    Something along the same lines could be argued with respect to Virtual Light. For all its flash and burn, there’s nothing particularly trailblazing about it. Chevette Washington, the bike-messenger who stole the VL glasses (which provide only a pale simulacra of the cyberspace we find in the trilogy) from a guy who turns out to be a gopher for, what else, a major corporation with some fairly depressing plans for San Francisco’s skyline, as in rebuilding it from the ground up, thereby, in a tactic that’s the antithesis of what the bridge suggests, dispossessing the already dispossessed. Throw in one Berry Rydell, a good-cop-gone-(accidentally)-bad, attach him to Chevette, and you have a variation of the Molly-Case team from Neuromancer, the Angie-Turner one from Count Zero, and the Angie-Bobby one from Mona Lisa Overdrive. They are all edge-dwellers of one kind or another, all caught in the complex workings of megacorporations uninterested in the human or humane, and all situated in a hard-boiled slightly stereotypical naturalist narrative universe, a universe at least as indebted to Nelson Algren’s The Man With the Golden Arm and Raymond Chandler’s The Big Sleep as to Alfred Bester’s The Demolished Man or Anthony Burgess’s A Clockwork Orange–despite its being stacked with really rad techno-weapons, grubby urban landscapes, delightfully grotesque characters, and ultra-hip fashion statements. The break-in plot of Neuromancer devolves into a backwards break-in, or familiar heist plot. The scope shrinks from global to local. The computer shrinks from gateway to surreality into subversive instrument. And the structure tightens (many reviewers, you can bet, will tell you it “matures”), becoming more conventional and more predictable. The happy ending provides a literal deus ex machina to tidy up the loose narrative threads.

     

    And yet things aren’t as easy as that, either. After all, most people don’t read Gibson for plot. Most read him for those great gadgets (nanotech birth-control devices, fetal tissue injections that build muscle and make workouts obsolete), which shock you into reconceptualizing your present and reevaluating your future; for those hip fashion statements (Chevette’s bike is a piece of assemblage art), which, like MTV logos, are just pure plain guilty pleasure to view; and for his holographically detailed sentences, frequently more poetry than prose, with more information packed into each one of them than into whole chapters by less energetic writers: “The courier presses his forehead against layers of glass, argon, high-impact plastic,” Virtual Light launches. “He watches a gunship traverse the city’s middle distance like a hunting wasp, death slung beneath its thorax in a smooth black pod. Hours earlier, missiles have fallen in a northern suburb: seventy-three dead, the kill as yet unclaimed.” No one does action like Gibson. The pace of his sentences, his sheer speed of inventiveness, are astonishing. And finally, of course, we read Gibson for his engaged imagination, his breadth and intensity of vision, his ability to shift us onto and across a terrain of crucial cultural issues that most other contemporary fiction (and even some cyberpunk fiction) just doesn’t care about, let alone explore. Gibson’s vision takes in everything from the anarchist hacker underground networks to the rise of religious fundamentalism, from cryogenics to surveillance satellites, from genetic engineering to nanotechnology, from multinational control of information to techno-angst, from the Japanization of Western culture to the decentralization of governments around the world. This is what keeps us coming back to Gibson’s books, and this is why he remains one of the most significant and influential writers on the fin-de- millennium scene.

     

  • A Postmodern Foundation For Political Practice?

    Linda Ray Pratt

    Department of English
    University of Nebraska, Lincoln
    lpratt@unlinfo.unl.edu

     

    McGowan, John. Postmodernism and Its Critics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991.

     
    John McGowan’s “postliberal democracy” sometimes sounds just like the place we’d like to be, and sometimes more like the place we’ve already been. To get there, we must dispose of the negative freedom he assigns to most of the major postmodern theorists and abandon the fantasy of the autonomous self. McGowan’s starting point is that postmodernism’s goal of disrupting hierarchical totality by empowering suppressed components circles back politically to “an underlying commitment to democracy.” Our political and moral task is to construct a society in which a social consensus protects the egalitarian procedures through which a tolerant, humanist society can make decisions in the absence of truth. The problem for McGowan is that most contemporary theorists are unable to legitimate the social authority necessary to make democracy work or to use power positively.

     

    Describing his critique as “resolutely antifoundationalist,” McGowan also notes that his definition of postmodernism will not satisfy all readers. Later in the book he observes, rightly I suspect, that for disciples of Lyotard, “my discussion of postmodernism . . . will seem to have missed all the important points . . .” (181). McGowan does not miss the important points, but he redefines them into a positive postmodernism that may sound too much like a defense of Western liberal democratic values for many readers to be comfortable labeling it “postmodern.” With keen intelligence and unrelenting logic McGowan tells us what’s wrong with the postmodernism of three major schools: the poststructuralism of Derrida and Foucault; the contemporary Marxism of Jameson, Eagleton, and Said; and the neopragmatism of Lyotard and Rorty. But the most influential figure in the book is not under examination. That is Jurgen Habermas, to whom McGowan acknowledges his debt while distinguishing his own greater willingness to weave key postmodernist characteristics into the model for a postliberal democracy which he proposes at the end of his study.

     

    In order to legitimate a postliberal model that can produce democratic political decisions in a non-repressive consensual society without the guarantees of truth, McGowan must expose the trap of “negative freedom” that most postmodernist thought replicates. Most postmodern theorists allow too little freedom to choose and too little consciousness to define a positive social self. Their emphasis on the ways power operates within the Cerberean forces of language/history/capitalism provides too little “play” in the space allowed for thinking and acting. For the postmodernist, the community is associated with tyranny, not freedom, and the postmodernist strategy is to disrupt and diminish power, not legitimate its use as a positive force. McGowan argues that this kind of postmodernist thinking leaves us no foundation for political action because it makes the self incommensurable and autonomous in its social relations. For him the immersion of the self in the social is how we realize its integral social and thus “semiautonomous” nature.

     

    McGowan’s postmodernism embraces antifoundationalism and pluralistic democracy, but rejects in the critics under discussion the tragic sense of human life, the tyranny implicit in power, the limited space in which self or language can freely act, and the problematic nature of democracy itself within Western capitalism. One wonders if the postmodern baby has not been tossed out with the bath water. Instead of a positive postmodernism, are we not left instead with a refurbished modernism? Regardless of which label is more accurate, the real issue is the substance of the alternative model McGowan poses for a positive postmodernism.

     

    McGowan’s social vision is attractive, and it is hard to counter it with a political stance as hopeful or potentially effectual. The list of principles which constitutes his “summary and a final appeal” is as sound a set of assumptions as we are likely to find in anything resembling a rationale for the feasibility of social action. He notes, among other things, that “the principle of democratic egalitarianism” is culturally and historically specific, which means that civil liberties are an historical creation and not a transcendent right, but that the social consensus in Western democracies “has proved remarkably durable in the absence of fundamental guarantees” (264). The “existence of a social consensus by no means ends social conflicts” (265); on the contrary, agreement on the legitimate social norms “is precisely what makes conflict possible [i.e., comprehensible as conflict]” (266). The “procedures of decision making that currently embody the community’s sense of how best to ensure its norms” provide the “consensual grounds,” the “conditions” which “enable politics, which is understood as the negotiations, compromises, arguments, and procedural steps taken to reach and to implement collective decisions” (267). Such collective decisions, in which philosophy is submitted to the political through democratic procedures, “return us to positive power” which can combat the tyrannical exercise of power or the domination of decision making by elite groups (269). Reform of procedures within the norms safeguards a society from violence, and “freedom from violence” secures “the freedom of participation” (270). In a participatory democracy, politics calls on “the various semiautonomous spheres” to foster the “normative goods” of the social totality in which the self has its integral relation (271).

     

    In this “appeal” to accept a more positive social model in the name of postmodernism, McGowan has submitted postmodern theory to political practice. Or rather, to theoretical political practice. What is lacking is a history of political practice whose record would inspire the confidence that McGowan’s model can be trusted to work better than other hopeful visions of democracy. “Postmodernism” itself is borne out of the tragic skepticism that replaced the failed optimism of Modernism. The history of practice which embodied twentieth century political ideas–whether utopian or despotic–teaches postmodernism its distrust of the claims of power and idealistic possibility. Although I am moved by McGowan’s vision, I find myself reaching out to Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard, Said, and Rorty on just those points which McGowan wants to dispose of in their thought.

     

    Like Nietzsche’s, Derrida’s thought is “marked everywhere by the tragic revelation of irresolvable contradictions” (91) and his belief that language is too embedded in a repressive Western metaphysics to affirm differences. Derrida’s “perpetual uneasiness” with political action and theory leaves in doubt whether differance offers anything better than the violence or oppression of the existing hierarchies. Given his “proclivity for tragic impasse” (113), Derrida can only anchor his ethics and his politics in some “mystical” hope; his theory can only register “a protest against a certain order without being abe to effect the transformation of that order” (119).

     

    From McGowan’s perspective, Foucault’s limitation for a postmodern politics lies in his preoccupation with power as the dominant social bond and his anarchistic tendency to locate freedom in resistance. Edward Said seeks “a community of tolerance and interdependence” (172), but his insistence on keeping his distance opens him to “a residual and foundational individualism” (174) that can be a form of complicity. In short, McGowan’s dismissive “point” is “that the half-baked anarchism of the literary left is necessarily accompanied by a version of individualism that is . . . theoretically unsound and politically counterproductive” (176-77).

     

    The neopragmatists generally fare worse under McGowan’s critical eye than the deconstructionists and Marxists. McGowan finds Lyotard’s rejection of “any generalizing explanation or purpose (telos) to which local action must be answerable . . . a conclusion . . . scandalous to most humanistic intellectuals . . .” (183). Lyotard’s concept of language games, his rejection of metanarratives, and his valorizing of conflict in the differend are irresolvably hostile to dialectical syntheses and any potential discourse of a holistic society. Rorty is praised for acknowledging the question of ethics, but his division of self and actions into public and private spheres leads back to the social dead-end of the autonomous individual.

     

    One need not even quarrel with McGowan’s critique that postmodernism’s “inability” to endorse a positive model of society is its chief failing to be uncomfortable with the use he makes of it as prelude to his own proposed alternative. Indeed, it is just at the moment I accept his vision of how a consensual democratic procedure may legitimate authority so that power becomes a positive force that I want to recapture its negatives: the sense of tragedy and the limits of play in Derrida; the resistance to power in Foucault; the distrust of the metanarratives and the use of word games in Lyotard; and “the gentle virtue of tolerance needed to keep the conversation going” (200) espoused in Rorty. “Consensus,” “totality,” “positive power” and “normative goods” ring little alarm bells for those whom history has taught to be skeptical of political discourse. These words arrive bearing covert genealogies that need deconstructing, the specifics of which should unsettle and disrupt the ease with which we use them.

     

    McGowan is no naive optimist, but his discussion of power and democracy is insufficiently problematized. He illustrates the nature of a semiautonomous self which negotiates relations between its different social spheres with the hypothetical case of the American Catholic who participates in other economic, political, and cultural domains. His point is that relations between beliefs and activities in other spheres must be, and therefore can be, we must assume, negotiated at every turn. Negotiation as procedure does not guarantee accommodation, however, and authority confident of its legitimation is less inclined to negotiate than to exercise power. The American Catholic who wants to “negotiate” between her political self and her religious self may find her church unwilling to recognize her right to do so on grounds outside the absolutes of doctrine or even local interpreters of it. Like “negotiation,” “consensus” implies the negative that is not unanimity. Political consensus may properly refuse to negotiate with its fringes. It may be used to mask or repress dissent, just as tolerance may be used to contain rather than to embrace the other. McGowan observes that non-acknowledgement is power’s best threat, but he underestimates the extent to which democracy’s processes of negotiation and consensus are themselves complicit in the exercise of negative power.

     

    McGowan too readily accepts that Western democracy is basically a pluralistic tradition with great social durability. Is that Greek democracy he means? Jeffersonian democracy? Jacksonian? Paine’s or Marat’s? Clinton’s? Was it in place during Reconstruction? The Gilded Age, or World War I? All of these times embody some form of Western democracy. They are not all bad dreams with nothing to teach us; indeed, what they teach is that models are specific to history where they, too, are subject to corruption, to limits, to tragic error, to excesses of violence, to irrationality and mysticism, to rigidities and laxities of procedures for decision making. To say so is not to countenance the irresponsible withdrawal from these flawed systems or to deny that they are the ground on which the creation of an ethical society must nevertheless take place. My discomfort is that McGowan tacitly gives them more performative potential than most postmodern critics can readily accept, including those of us who lean in his direction.

     

    If not McGowan’s model, then what? Can one not balance the “cheerful acceptance” of Habermasian possibilities with the resistance to power of Foucault or the cautionary sense of the tragic in Derrida? Perhaps McGowan would answer that such a balancing act results in the violent frustration of impasse, or the disabling confusion of hopeless contradictions, or the irrational resorting to a mystical hope for the social good. Perhaps sometimes he would be right, but postmodernism and its critics level the playing field of history on which the best of players on both sides have already made so many fatal errors. Even on this democratic “site of possible political action” (280), postmodern citizens may need just those characteristics that McGowan thinks are in our way.


  • Queer Bodies of Knowledge: Constructing Lesbian and Gay Studies

    Lynda Goldstein

    Department of English
    Pennsylvania State University
    lrg4@psuvm.psu.edu

     

    Abelove, Henry, Michele Anna Barale, and David M. Halperin, eds. The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader. New York: Routledge, 1993.

     

    Gever, Martha, John Greyson, and Pratibha Parmar, eds. Queer Looks: Perspectives on Lesbian and Gay Film and Video. New York: Routledge, 1993.

     

    As the newest kid on the interdisciplinary block looking for legitimation (with not a little attitude), Lesbian/Gay or Queer Studies (depending upon one’s political affiliations) poses a number of obvious challenges to academia and publishers. One of these, of course, has to do with the strategic, if not essential, reliance of lesbian and gay studies on a particular kind of identity politics that parallels the institutional maneuvering of other “minority studies” programs. Indeed, lesbian and gay studies can be charted along much the same trajectory as Women’s, African-American, Asian-American or Latino/a Ethnic Studies, all of which were institutionalized (however tenuously in these times of “down-sizing” colleges) at historically specific moments at the conjuncture of their respective (and overlapping) political activism, cultural production, and scholarship. Indeed, lesbian/gay studies shares more with these other emergent subdisciplines than a certain path toward discursive legitimation within the academy (though this is not to suggest that the struggles of every field of study have all been identical). It also often shares theoretical frameworks, and even some specific objects of study. The Harlem Renaissance, for example, has been a recurring area of focus, as queer studies has sought to rethink cultural history in terms of the intersections of sexuality, class, gender, and race.

     

    Begun as an inclusion of queer contributions to history here, a special topics course on lesbian and gay “coming out” literature there, and a rigorous theoretical interrogation of sexuality as a constitutive category of subject formation elsewhere, queer studies has reached critical mass in the “gay nineties.” This is evident in the increasing number of gay and lesbian studies undergraduate programs in and across the various humanistic disciplines; the special collections at university and large public libraries from coast to coast; and the critical/theoretical work on the cultural inscriptions of sexuality, much of which would be far more difficult to assemble without the explosive production of identifiably, often “in your face,” queer culture, most especially in literature/comics, theater/performance, music, the visual arts, film/video, and popular style/fashion. My emphasis here on popular cultural productions should not indicate that queer studies traffics exclusively in the popular (though the intersection of queer and popular is an intriguing one), as any study of homoclassics or anthrodrag surely indicates.

     

    Perhaps nothing suggests the critical materiality of lesbian and gay studies more substantially than the queer line of critical and theoretical work coordinated by Routledge, cagey publisher to the stars of queer theory. Indeed, as hefty as Routledge’s two anthologies delineating the field of Cultural Studies, and with much the same cutting-edge rationale guiding its journey through the contestatory fields of academic discourse, the compendium anthology, The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader, establishes itself as an indispensable introduction to the field, at least as it is determined within the (inter)disciplinary boundaries of the arts and humanities. Published just two years after Inside/Out (a collection of essays theorizing lesbian and gay sexual politics and culture edited by Diana Fuss and published by Routledge in 1991), How Do I Look? (the conference proceedings from “How Do I Look? Queer Film and Video” organized and edited by Bad Object Choices) and the “Queer Theory: Lesbian and Gay Sexualities” issue of the journal differences (edited by Teresa de Lauretis), The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader collects forty-two contemporary essays from a variety of disciplines, many of them no doubt known to readers from their previously published incarnations in journals. I mention the earlier collections because they were all distinguished by a theoretical approach that might be broadly defined as that of “cultural studies,” an approach that The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader has not merely adopted but sought to extend by encompassing an even wider range of disciplines and sites of investigation.

     

    Indeed, The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader is in many ways a continuation of the work begun by Inside/Out. In her introduction, editor Diana Fuss asks, “how can we work [the hetero/homo opposition] to the point of critical exhaustion, and what effects–material, political, social –can such a sustained effort to erode and to reorganize the conceptual grounds of identity be expected to have on our sexual practices and politics?” (1). Certainly one might argue that The Reader represents one effect of working the binary opposition of sexuality, if not to exhaustion, then to a fatigue productive of a visibility of gay and lesbian sexualities. That is, it embodies an attempt to “reorganize” sexuality studies from an oppositional stance that comes dangerously close to solidifying the epistemology of polarity. For those who believe that Gay and Lesbian Studies may only exist, however visibly, in contestation with the (supposedly hetero) core curricula, The Reader proposes a more troubling and independent existence while acknowledging its relational positioning. If as Fuss writes, “any outside is formulated as a consequence of a lack internal to the system it supplements” (3), then we might suppose that the outside status of lesbian and gay studies has everything to do with the constitutive lack of sexuality studies within the academy. In bringing queer studies in from the cold outside, does The Reader make it all too easy for interrogations of sexuality to operate as a “queer thing”? Moreover, in its bid to legitimate an emergent field does it do so at the expense of the political leverage discursive marginalization can accord? These are most difficult negotiations, as both Fuss and the editors of The Reader acknowledge, though Abelove, Barale, and Halperin more decisively throw their lot in with legitimation. It is their intention, after all, that this collection serve as a primary textbook for courses in Gay/Lesbian Studies 101.

     

    The volume’s usefulness in the classroom is admirably indicated by its categorical grouping of contents, its Users’ Guide, its alternative organization by disciplines, its essay header notes establishing the authority of the essayist and summarizing the essay’s arguments, and its briefly annotated but extensive bibliography. What all of these together provide is a map with which to navigate the territory of gay and lesbian studies, not only for the undergraduate (though some of these essays may be too difficult for students who are not already conversant with the theoretical debates that animate recent battles over humanities curricula) but for the instructor as well, who may have a thorough knowledge of queer studies in her own field but a lesser acquaintance with work in related disciplines. Fortunately, The Reader collects essays that are theoretically and literally conversant, if not always in agreement, making for a coherent and provocative approach to delineating lesbian and gay studies as a discipline of knowledge. Further, in its organizational structure along lines of thematic interest (for instance, “Politics and Representation” and “The Evidence of Experience”), The Reader suggests the extent to which queer theorists are, indeed, reorganizing the ontological grounds of sexual identity within historically specific cultural contexts. (The editors of The Reader, by the way, choose “lesbian and gay” over “queer” for reasons of institutional efficacy given some already established programs. While suggesting “lesbian and gay” retains a queer reverberation, signalled by The Reader’s inclusion of activist concerns and transgendering phenomena, it is not one that includes bisexuality. This omission poses rather interesting questions to be left for a review of the several recently published anthologies on bisexuality.)

     

    Just what does one find in The Reader? Gayle Rubin’s still extraordinary (and revised) “Thinking Sex” initiates the volume, deftly moving feminist theory in the direction of queer theory, an expansive move that others, such as Barbara Smith in her feminist and African-Americanist grounded essay, “Homophobia: Why Bring It Up?,” similarly make in this first section on “Politics and Representation.” In part, essays such as Rubin’s and Smith’s address the limitations of theory that is singularly invested in an identity politics; they pose a kind of coalition politics of theory which would (re)present the problematics of representation of our selves (however that might be defined) within politicized and intersecting cultural fields. For Rubin, this means, in part, tracing the history of “sex panic[s]” in Anglo-American culture since the nineteenth century, a history that reveals moments of repressive police action against populations designated “deviant” or “obscene” within a hierarchized system of sexuality and sexual practices, especially around sado-masochistic images and pedophilia. To fully comprehend how these practices are policed by the state, Rubin argues “that it is essential to separate gender and sexuality analytically to reflect more accurately their separate social existence” (33). Such a move is not to be confused with separating feminism (whose primary concern is gender) from queer theory, however; each has much to contribute to the other. It does mean being very careful not to collapse terms so that differences of social life, and their attendant politicization, are elided. It also operates as a cautionary tale to assimilationist lesbians and gays whose “we’re just like you” liberal politics demonizes non-vanilla (in both the erotic and racial senses) sexual practices.

     

    Such a warning is also evident in Smith’s short essay, in which she explicitly works against the hierarchizing of oppression all too evident among some activists and theorists who are willing to further their own political or pedagogical agenda by sacrificing the queers to the oppressive actions of our culture. “What happened at Blues [a police raid against a working-class bar for gays and lesbians of color] perfectly illustrates the ways in which the major ‘isms’ including homophobia are intimately and violently intertwined” (100). What Smith’s and Rubin’s essays both demonstrate in their very different ways are the inextricability of theory and praxis, the necessity to carefully analyze the multitudinous forms of social and cultural oppression, and the responsibility of all activists and theorists (not that these are so easily separated) to work at the intersections and along the fluid boundaries of identity categories. These are concerns shared by a number of essays included in this anthology: Kobena Mercer’s investigation of race, sexuality, and eroticism in Mapplethorpe’s work (a site also privileged by Richard Meyer’s “Mapplethorpe/ The Discipline of Photography”), Yvonne Yarbro-Bejarano’s reading of Cherrie Moraga’s Loving in the War Years, and Deborah McDowell’s uncovering of Nella Larsen’s lesbian passing masquerading as racial passing under the burden of the morally upright Harlem Renaissance. And Phillip Brian Harper’s wonderfully rich analysis of the place of eloquence in African-American discourse–of the tensions between speech and silence, hetero and homosexualities, Black Nationalism and assimilation–in the face of newscaster Max Robinson’s death by AIDS, serves as a model for disentangling the complexities of cultural identity formation.

     

    Another major theoretical paradigm threading its way through the collection is initiated by the second essay, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s “Epistemology of the Closet.” Like Rubin, Sedgwick looks to the nineteenth century, firmly establishing it as the historical moment for the political and cultural parameters of modern lesbian and gay identity. Here she outlines the contradictory status of the closet, arguing that it “has given an overarching consistency to gay culture and identity throughout this century” by mapping a double-bound system of secrecy and disclosure onto identity formation such that “the impasse of gender definition must be seen first of all in the creation of a field of intractable, highly structured discursive incoherence at a crucial node of social organization, in this case the node at which any gender is discriminated” (59). What concerns Sedgwick is the systemic incoherence of thinking about sexuality and gender in Euro-American culture dating from the late nineteenth century, an incoherence that ought not to be stabilized by queer theorists but continuously and productively interrogated. In large part, this is precisely the project adopted by The Reader: each wrangles with the epistemological incoherences of identity, representation, and social practices, often with brilliant results.

     

    For example, Lee Edelman takes up the visibility/ invisibility nexus of gay male sexuality in “Tearooms and Sympathy, or, The Epistemology of the Water Closet.” Obviously punning on Sedgwick’s title, as well as on the stage play and film, Tea and Sympathy (a sense of humor also refreshingly evident in Marjorie Garber’s “Spare Parts,” excerpted from her book Vested Interests, in which she examines surgical transsexualism as a privileged site of the constitutional instabilities of gender and sexuality), Edelman considers Walter Jenkins’s arrest in 1964 for undisclosed sexual activity in the men’s washroom of a Washington, DC YMCA as “a signal moment in which to examine the shifting ideological frameworks within which homosexuality could be read in relation to American national identity” (555). The collision of public and private indicated by the police surveillance of this urinal tryst, like the closet/coming out oscillation of Sedgwick’s essay, raises questions about the stability of the homo/hetero binary, especially as the precise sexual act was unobservable from the vantage point of the police. The unresolvable tensions of sexual/gender border patrolling are further investigated by Stuart Hall in “Deviance, Politics, and the Media,” while the visibility/invisibility binary figures in Teresa de Lauretis’ “Sexual Indifference and Lesbian Representation,” as well as in Sasha Torres’ essay on prime time television and Danae Clark’s “Commodity Lesbianism,” all of which demonstrate that lesbians as social subjects are rigorously situated on the invisibility side of the fence.

     

    The Reader‘s reliance on cultural-studies paradigms is most evident in the several essays that foreground cultural/historical specificity, as well as the immediacy of political activism, to combat early lesbian and gay studies tendencies toward universalizing experience. To this end, John D’Emilio argues that lesbian and gay identities are the result of capitalist economies. Anthropologists Alonso and Koreck deconstruct the catch-all term “hispanics” and its debilitating effects upon AIDS education among various Latino/a populations whose sexual practices are not necessarily commensurate with Anglo-determined sexual identities, while Tomas Almaguer maps identity and behavior among Chicano men. Cindy Patton documents the imposition of idealized bourgeois family values onto a demonized “Africa” without borders that is read as having bred a peculiar and distinct strain of AIDS. In one of the few excursions out of the “modern” period of lesbian/gay identity (along with David Halperin’s and John Winkler’s respective work on the constructions of homosexuality in classical Greece and Sappho’s lyric poetry), Charlotte Furth considers the fluidity of gender boundaries in sixteenth- and seventeenth- century China. And Serena Nanda explores the indeterminacy of the Hijira in Hindu mythology and contemporary social practice, while Harriet Whitehead surveys the body of work on the Native American berdache to demonstrate the efficacy of a methodology of comparative cultural analysis, a kind of destablized theoretical crossing that works to carefully maintain differences of specific systems of gender meaning in each culture under investigation.

     

    Yet the experiences of populations within specific historical and cultural contexts ought not to be the project of gay and lesbian history, argues Joan Scott, in her rigorously explicated essay, “The Evidence of Experience.” Arguing that experience too often serves as the ontological foundation for identity, politics, and history, Scott recommends that we not focus on “the reproduction and transmission of knowledge said to be arrived at through experience, but [focus on] the analysis of the production of that knowledge itself” (412), the narratives of knowledge that constitute that which we call experience. Such a shift in focus has repercussions not only for considerations of autobiography (to which all coming-out literature is indebted) as Biddy Martin’s work on lesbian autobiography acknowledges, but for activist politics and production as well, a consideration which is less consistently realized in Queer Looks. Where The Reader works toward a theoretical and thematic coherence while maintaining a queer commitment to analyzing incoherences, Queer Looks works toward incoherence, a queering of the body of knowledge (re)produced by the more academically integrated Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader.

     

    Less interdisciplinary in its approach, concentrating on lesbian and gay film and video (all of which is “independent” in its production and distribution histories), Queer Looks expands upon the territory mapped by the aforementioned How Do I Look anthology. More playful in its collection of essays, screenplays/stills, and interactive lampshades (the latter a “Take Back the Light: Lesbian Visibility Lampshade” by Donna Evans and Jean Carlomusto which combines the rigor of theory with the pleasure of popular culture and activism in this year of lesbian chic: think of it as Teresa de Lauretis lite), Queer Looks has no aspirations for legitimacy in academe. Rather, its project is to give its intersecting activists, theorists, and film/video makers the space to work out the possibilities of representational practices by, for and about lesbian, gay, and queer subjects. To an academic, this anthology may seem terribly uneven. While many of the essays consider the ways that queerness is inextricably bound to other categories of identity, most notably race (those of Isaac Julien, Pratibha Parmar, Jackie Goldsby and Kobena Mercer are obvious examples), some of these (Goldsby) and several of the others (e.g. Barbara Hammer’s “The Politics of Abstraction”) rely upon “experience” in ways that Joan Smith warns are not as productive as thinking about how we structure that experience as identity. Yet the strengths of Queer Looks lies less in its rigorous analyses (though there are these, most especially John Greyson’s “Security Blankets”) than in its proliferation of contending viewpoints that provoke thought, agreement, and dissension for the reader. In their often brief formats these 38 contributors generate queer perspectives on work that remains unavailable to most audiences outside large gay/lesbian film festivals.

     

    Neither of these collections is exhaustive. Race continues to be a category most often examined in conjunction with queers of color, “lesbians” appear as theoretical specters or social subjects with narrowly defined experiences, pornography is distanced to the AIDS education category, and the work of a Sadie Benning (legit as her Whitney Biennial inclusion has made her) is overlooked for multiple analyses of Isaac Julien’s and Marlon Riggs’s works (fine as they are). What is obvious in both of these collections is the queer bent that cultural studies has so productively taken. Each provides a wealth of analytical material with which to engage the cultural productions of lesbians and gay men, thereby suggesting ways of thinking about other work not specifically approached within these volumes. For any instructor who has faced a colleague’s snide “but there’s no such thing as lesbian and gay studies,” or any budding film maker who just doesn’t see herself in Hollywood, The Reader and Queer Looks respectively and together provide just the kind of coherent critical and activist incoherence that is needed. These anthologies mark the moment when “queer”–both as a productive knowledge of bodies and as a set of (re)productive bodies of knowledge, is at last finding a place of rest and motion in an institution near you.

     

  • Anna Deveare Smith’s Voices at Twilight

    Gayle Wald

    Princeton University
    gwald@pucc.princeton.edu

     

    The Mark Taper Forum Production of “Twilight: Los Angeles, 1992,” a work-in-progress that is part of the “On the Road: A Search for American Character” series conceived, written and performed by Anna Deavere Smith. Directed by Emily Mann. Set design by Robert Brill. Costume design by Candice Donnelly. Lighting by Allen Lee Hughes. Original music by Lucia Hwong.

     

    I saw Anna Deavere Smith’s one-woman performance “Twilight: Los Angeles, 1992” on a cool November evening at McCarter Theatre in Princeton, New Jersey–more than three thousand miles and worlds away from the site of the first multiracial urban uprising in U.S. history. McCarter was home to the East Coast premiere of Smith’s performance, which had played to near-universal critical acclaim at the Mark Taper Forum in Los Angeles, and which was directed by McCarter’s Artistic Director, Emily Mann. Though the people in the theater that evening had each paid twenty-five dollars to see “Twilight,” I suspect that many of them had long forgotten (if they had ever acknowledged) the social and economic despair that gave rise to what urban theorist Mike Davis has called “the most violent American civil disturbance since the Irish poor burned Manhattan in 1863.” Indeed, by last November, the trial of the L.A. Four for the near-fatal beating of truck driver Reginald Denny–played in many press accounts as a racial counterbalance to the near-fatal beating of Rodney King–had taken center stage in the white public imagination.

     

    When Smith’s performance had ended and the audience had offered its respectful, though not impassioned, applause, a friend of mine overheard a white woman sitting in the row behind us. Turning to her companion, she said in a polite If-you-can’t-say-anything-good-don’t-say-anything-at-all tone of voice, “Well, I wouldn’t exactly call it entertaining, but…” The woman never completed the sentence, never said what she would have called “Twilight.” Nor did she explain to her companion what she meant by “entertaining,” though clearly the term carried political, as well as aesthetic, value. Her gloss on “Twilight” also contained an unintended irony: Entertainment, or the production of glossy self-representations, is, after all, the dominant business of Los Angeles. In one sense, I could understand how the woman’s expectations could have felt somewhat let down if by “entertaining” she also meant diversionary; though “Twilight” is at times highly amusing, its effect is to memorialize the voices of L.A. In another sense, “entertainment” is one of the many challenges posed by “Twilight,” a work which seeks to generate theatrical compassion through Smith’s hallmark technique of literal impersonation.

     

    The mood on Princeton University’s campus was unusually tense the morning after the verdicts were announced in the first trial of police officers Koon, Powell, Wind and Briseno. After a dreary night spent watching CNN’s live aerial television footage of fires that burned through a twenty-five-block area of central L.A., a group of Princeton’s African American and Latino students–joined by some Asian Americans and whites–staged a midday rally in front of Firestone Library (named after the rubber magnate). The students spoke of their rage at the verdicts and at the beating, their sorrow at the loss of life and the damage to neighborhoods, and of their alienation from some of their white friends, many of whom viewed the trial in Simi Valley as an anomalous miscarriage of justice. An Asian-American student implored the assembly to work together to combat racism and discrimination on campus. Some students voiced concern about friends and relatives living in Los Angeles; others spoke of their apprehension about family sixty miles away in New York, where the possibility of rioting still loomed large.

     

    Ironically, April 29, 1992 was also the date set for the New York premiere of Smith’s “Fires in the Mirror: Crown Heights, Brooklyn and Other Identities,” her award-winning one-woman show about the conflict between Hasidic Jews and African- and Caribbean-Americans spurred by the death of a seven-year-old black child, Gavin Cato. (When her opening was canceled, Smith joined demonstrators protesting the King verdict in Times Square.) “Fires,” a play which enacts the relatively clear-cut dispute between visibly distinct minority communities who share the same New York City neighborhood, is the spiritual and aesthetic forebear of “Twilight,” a work which takes on the considerably more complex task of documenting the multiracial, multilingual and geographically dispersed communities of Los Angeles. Both draw upon a rigorous performance technique that Smith has been developing for over a decade, in which she interviews people and then “performs” them verbatim.

     

    For Smith, who is also Associate Professor of Drama at Stanford, the performance of real people’s real words originally functioned as a theatrical exercise, a way of investigating how different characters embody or inhabit language differently. Smith used linguistic and performative “found objects”–clips from often baroque late-night talk shows, for example–to investigate the possibility of “entering” character through the meticulous repetition of that character’s language, including body language. In rehearsal for “Twilight,” Smith listened repeatedly to tapes of her interviewees, then practiced until she had incorporated the voices well enough to “wear” the characters’ words. The technique, she contends, entails both theft–the appropriation of others’ voices–and gift–a mode of re-presenting or returning others’ voices to them. (Sister Souljah once refused Smith an interview, claiming that Smith was “the sister who wants to take my words.”) As her work in “Fires” and “Twilight” demonstrates, such impersonation, or “re-iteration,” as Smith prefers to call it, lends itself particularly well to highly charged media spectacles such as the Crown Heights conflict and the L.A. uprisings, precisely because these are wars of image and voice. A crucial part of the public spectacle that was “L.A.” entailed the struggle of voices speaking on behalf of besieged communities to broadcast their beliefs over the steady din of talking heads reporting official estimates of property damage. In newspaper and television accounts, the rioting itself was often portrayed as what happens when words do not suffice.

     

    For the Mark Taper Forum production of “Twilight,” Smith interviewed more than 175 people, including movie stars (Angelica Houston) and politicians (Maxine Waters). With help from four dramaturges–one black, one Latino, one white and one Asian–she later selected twenty-odd characters to be included in the work. Smith’s performances are, by definition, always works-in-progress, since she adds or subtracts characters to suit the needs of particular audiences or her own evolving ideas. The twenty-one people that she performed at McCarter ranged from the well known (Reginald Denny and former L.A. Police Chief Daryl Gates) to the lesser known (Angela King, Rodney’s aunt, and Maria, Juror #7 in the federal King trial, whose character was added two weeks into the L.A. performance of “Twilight”). John Lahr’s review of “Twilight” in The New Yorker describes a performance in which Smith did her show for seven hundred L.A. high school students. In the middle of performing Julio Menjivar–a lumber salesman and driver who was arrested for no apparent reason as part of the police round-ups during the riots–Smith interrupted her description (in Spanish) of the police abuse. “I don’t think I should say what the police said,” she told the audience. “Your teachers will mind.” When the kids shouted back their encouragement, Smith continued: “Get up, motherfucker! Get up!”

     

    On stage Smith, a light-skinned African American woman, performs barefoot, wearing a plain white shirt and loose, dark pants; in addition to changes in voice, posture and affect, she signifies the “feel” of characters with simple costume changes: a hat taken on or off, the addition of earrings or a string of pearls, a cigarette hanging loosely from the side of the mouth, a man’s striped tie and blazer. Brief blackouts demarcate the shifts between characters, shifts which are left intentionally ragged so that Smith’s audience can witness the uneven process of metamorphosis between, for example, Mrs. Young-Soon Han, a Korean-American and former owner of a liquor store, and Twilight Bey, a young African American male and an organizer of the gang truce between the Cripps and the Bloods.

     

    Bey’s self-consciously oracular voice, distinct from the bureaucratese of some characters and the informal, conversational expression of others, literally has the last word in “Twilight.” Bey steals the show, but not in the conventional sense; though his is not the most arresting or profound voice of the performance, it is the one that lends “Twilight” its title and serves as its coda, a surrogate voice for Smith’s voice. In a brief essay about the development of “Twilight,” Smith explains that she was inspired both by Bey’s words and by the rich metaphorical potential of his name. Twilight is a time of danger, when objects ordinarily visible in broad daylight are obscured, and the time of day when much of the first rioting occurred. Twilight is also a time of liminality and, more importantly, creativity–a time, Smith writes, that “asks more of our vision.” Here are Bey’s words, spoken by and through Smith, as he analyzes the relation between “twilight” and the growth of a prophetic voice:

     

      
                   So twilight
                   is
                   that time
                   between night and day
                   limbo
                   I call it limbo
                   so a lot of times when I've brought up
                        ideas to my homeboys
                   they say
                   Twilight
                   that's before your time
                   that's something you can't do now
                   when I talked about the truce back in
                        1988
                   that was something they considered
                        before its time
                   yet
                   in 1992
                   we made it
                   realistic
                   so to me it's like I'm stuck in limbo
                   like the sun between night and day

     

    Shaman, prophet and intermediary (in the gang wars), ever attentive to the disruptive power of his language, Bey’s character is a stand-in for Smith’s own (absent) voice as performer. Watching her perform each of the twenty-one characters in “Twilight” with obvious care and generosity — even a bewildered Daryl Gates, who seems genuinely mystified at how he became a national symbol of police oppression following “the Rodney thing” (a telling slip)– I had the sense that Smith, too, wants to be a peacemaker of sorts, a multilingual interlocutor who constructs her own unique theatrical voice from the select fragments of others’ voices. Bey’s is the privileged voice of “Twilight” because, in his role as leader of the gang truce, he exemplifies an analogous spirit of Smith’s performance, which is communication across seemingly insurmountable lines of hierarchy and difference.

     

    Through Smith, who embodies in her performance the very tape recorder that she uses to conduct interviews, “Twilight” brings to audiences such as the one in Princeton voices that would not normally get a public hearing. People from South L.A. and Koreatown are magically transported to a stage in New Jersey–not through conventional media such as TV, but through “real” physical proximity and presence. With the effect of a verbal patchwork quilt, the pieces sewn together by her own constant bodily presence, Smith’s performance constructs an imaginary–and highly intimate –conversation among twenty-one people who will never share the same room together, then presents this conversation to an audience that has paid twenty-five dollars a piece to listen. In contrast to the “outside” social realities that furnish white voices their immediacy and authority, the defining power of the soundbite, in the safe space of the theater, Smith gives all the voices in “Twilight” equal representation. Everyone has his or her five minutes before the footlights, from the director of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front to the Korean storeowner whose brain was partially blown out by a stray bullet.

     

    Moreover, the voices Smith performs are not homogenized through journalistic “smoothing out” (a technique applied liberally to the frequent slips of tongue and verbal lapses committed by heads of state, for example); neither are they necessarily translated for their audience. In one remarkable sequence, Smith performs Chung Lee, president of the Korean America Victim’s Association, speaking in Korean as English subtitles are projected on screens at either side of the theater. While selecting performance material from the archives of her interviews, Smith says she generally looks for the “bumps” in the flow of a speaker’s words and phrases. Her interests lie, paradoxically, in the moments when language “fails” rather than when it succeeds too well, when she believes it speaks us most thoroughly. Her monologues communicate as often through stammering and hesitation, when speakers are tongue-tied, as through moments of linguistic and tonal clarity. Like the woman overheard by my friend during the Princeton performance of “Twilight,” Smith’s characters speak through ellipses, innuendo, intonation and accent.

     

    “Twilight” harbors an implicitly populist agenda of breaking down the conventional binary between the “high” — and obviously highly stylized–language of the stage and the “low,” and no less stylized, language of everyday speech. Smith does not construct a multicultural national literature merely by introducing “real” voices into a highly charged aesthetic arena (though in and of itself, this would perhaps constitute a progressive political act); rather, she subtly shifts the contours of this arena by finding the “poetry,” as she calls it, in ordinary language. “Everyone, in a given amount of time, will say something that is like poetry,” Smith writes in the introduction to the recently published book version of Fires in the Mirror. “The process of getting to that poetic moment is where character lives” (xxxi). Later in the same essay, she notes that “character” lives in the digressions, the ways (of universally “bad” grammar, of “ums” and “uhs”) through which we get to the “point.” By mimetically reproducing the details of various characters’ fissures in speech, Smith makes it possible for people to talk–not only to say the sorts of things that are sometimes forbidden or veiled in public discourse, but also to say things in ways that are not usually allowed in the theater.

     

    Yet it’s at the precarious line between mimicry and parody that Smith’s work potentially backfires, or at least loses its political potency. While parody promises pleasure for its audience, mimicry seems the more difficult–and possibly the more radical–of the two modes. Closely related to parody, satire depends upon a cultural community that speaks, to a greater or lesser degree, a common language. Mimicry, in contrast, requires that the subject “become” the object of her imitation. Unlike parody, which effects a distance from the thing being mocked in order to provoke a self-conscious laughter, mimicry diminishes critical detachment and compels one to a more direct — though not necessarily less discriminating–engagement with the “other.” Smith sees mimicry as a way of facilitating a radical empathy, of enabling a transformative slippage across socially produced identities of race, nation, gender, and class. “The spirit of acting,” she writes, “is the travel from the self to the other” (xxxvi).

     

    Perfect mimicry of the other is, of course, a utopian desire, an impossible fantasy exemplified by Madonna, who in “Vogue” sings that it doesn’t matter whether you’re black or white, a boy or a girl. As Homi Bhabha has written in the context of colonial subjects, the very precondition for mimicry is the residue of difference–the “almost the same, but not quite“–that distinguishes self from other. Mimicry has the potential to de-naturalize dominant voices, as when Smith’s performances (of an anonymous talent agent, the former president of the L.A. Police Commission, the legal counsel for Officer Briseno, or even Reginald Denny) dramatize, and thus unmask, the privilege of white speakers. The implicit challenge of Smith’s performance style lies in inhabiting these kinds of voices while keeping mimicry and parody in tension. Of the characters she performs, Smith writes: “I try to close the gap between us, but I applaud the gap between us. I am willing to display my own unlikeness” (xxxviii).

     

    It might seem strange, therefore, that “Anna Deavere Smith” is absent from “Twilight.” Or rather, she’s everywhere present, in the form of a desire which is the structuring absence of the performance. Moments in the performance when characters call attention to Smith’s (invisible) presence are disruptive in this regard, making explicit the ways in which “Smith” mediates our experience of them, as well as the ways in which their own self-representations are shaped by her presence. Elvira Evers, a Panamanian-American cashier whose life was saved when a stray bullet penetrated her back and lodged in the elbow of her unborn baby, speaks to an invisible Smith, asking her midway through the monologue whether it’s alright to bring out her little girl. It’s a crucial moment, not just for transforming monologue into dialogue, but for foregrounding the ways in which Smith’s own voice may have a legitimizing, or hindering, effect upon others’ expression.

     

    Ever since “Fires in the Mirror” catapulted her to the pages of People magazine and the couch on Arsenio Hall’s late-night talk show, Smith’s work has been almost universally acclaimed. (According to one account, now that Smith has become a commodity in her own right, she signs a waiver that guarantees that after a certain threshold she will share profits with her interviewees.) The obvious political merit of “Twilight”–appreciated equally by critics from both the “mainstream” and “alternative” presses –lies in its portrayal of the irreducibility of voices in the noisy public discourse of “L.A.” Whereas the television news pitted riotous “black rage” against indignant white propriety, or black rage against Korean-American cupidity (the role formerly assigned Jewish inner-city merchants), or black rage against Korean-American industriousness (the divisive “model minority” image), “Twilight” offers a more complex rendering. As Gloria Naylor writes in Mama Day, there’s not just two sides to the story in L.A.–my side and your side–but four sides, including “an outside, and an inside. All of it is truth” (230).

     

    “Twilight” is a great leveler, a fact which may be simultaneously its greatest strength and its greatest weakness. While Smith aspires to burst through the limitations of a narrow ethnocentrism, the democratic impulse that guides “Twilight” can tend to obscure the ways in which these voices are in violent struggle with one another. Like all of us, Smith herself is part of this process. When the Mark Taper Forum originally commissioned her to create “Twilight,” some local artists protested that the theater was importing a commercially and critically successful “outsider” to speak their voices. Crusades for cultural justice are often figured in such terms, as conflicts over the ownership of voices and representations. This is not to impugn Smith’s voice; indeed, one of the most appealing aspects of “Twilight” is Smith herself–in particular, the obvious respect and care she demonstrates for the voices entrusted to her. At its best, however, “Twilight” embodies a dialectic: not only does Smith speak for and as “others”; these others also infuse and speak for her.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Bhabha, Homi. “Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse.” October 28 (Spring 1984): 125-133.
    • Lahr, John. “Under the Skin.” The New Yorker 69, 19 (June 28, 1993): 90-94.
    • Naylor, Gloria. Mama Day. New York: Vintage, 1988.
    • Smith, Anna Deavere. Fires in the Mirror. New York: Anchor Books, 1993.

     

  • From: PMC-Talk THREAD: Silber, Strauss, and Post-Democratic Politics in the Academy (11/30/93 – 1/6/94)

     
     
     

    (Excerpted from the Discussion Group PMC-talk@ncsuvm, 7/92-8/92)

     

    PMC-TALK digest: postings for the period ending 11-30-93. PMC-TALK is the discussion group for the electronic journal _Postmodern Culture_ (PMC-LIST). Subscription to PMC-TALK is independent of subscription to PMC-LIST; if you are not subscribed to the journal itself, and would like to be, send your first and last name and a request for subscription to PMC@UNITY.NCSU.EDU (internet).

     

    Today’s Topics: Boston Univ.’s Pres. Silber

     


     

    Sender: “Joseph H. Hesse”

    Subject: Boston Univ.’s Pres. Silber

     

    Hello. I am new to this list (to e-mail as well) and I feel a responsibility to produce some text for this list, rather than just sit in my room consuming the text of others.

     

    Has anyone else been reading about Pres. Silber’s recent letter to the faculty of Boston University. There was an article today in THE BOSTON GLOBE. They quote his letter as saying:

     

    “Boston University has resisted the imposition of doctrines that would curtail intellectual and academic freedom. It is plain that some versions of critical theory, radical feminism and multiculturism, among other intellectual positions, are ideological in character and inhospitable to free intellectual inquiry.”

     

    “Marxism, structuralism, feminism, etc., do not, in and of themselves, threaten academic freedom, but each of these views is highly susceptible to being formulated as dogma, impervious to any arguments or evidence not already in conformance with the basic tenets of the dogma.”

     
    “Any university that takes academic and intellectual freedom seriously has an obligation to spot these epistemologies and head them off.”

     
    The Globe reports that areas of study that Silber mentioned in an earlier report to the trustees were:

     
    “Critical legal studies, revisionist history, Afro-centrism, radical feminism, multiculturalism, the Frankfurt school of Critical Theory, structuralism and deconstructionism, dance therapy, gay and lesbian liberation and animal liberation.”

     
    I found so much of this article troubling, on so many different points, that I hardly know where to begin with a commentary on Silber’s statements. And so, I will wait and see if anyone is interested in this subject before I clutter up this list with my text.

     
    Any Comments or additional information on Silber?

     
    Joseph Hesse

    jhhes.mvax.cc.conncoll.edu

     


     

    PMC-TALK digest: postings for the period ending 12-2-93.

     

    [ . . . . ]

     

    Today’s Topics: President Silber of Boston University’s reported remarks

    CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS TO NOBODADDIES

    CALL FOR PAPERS: Meeting of Society for Literature and Science

     


     

    Sender:

    Subject: Re: President Silber of Boston University’s reported remarks

     

    As someone who works with both deconstruction and structuralism, I am profoundly disturbed by President Silber’s reported remarks. Are we in for another round of McCarthyism in American academe? And in what ways is dance therapy a threat to the powers that be?

     


     

    PMC-TALK digest: postings for the period ending 12-4-93.

     

    [ . . . . ]

     

    Today’s Topics: Re: President Silber of Boston University’s reported remarks Re: Silber

     


     

    Subject: Re: President Silber of Boston University’s reported remarks

     

    >As someone who works with both deconstruction and structuralism, I am

    >profoundly disturbed by President Silber’s reported remarks. Are we in for

    >another round of McCarthyism in American academe? And in what ways is dance

    >therapy a threat to the powers that be?

     

    Don’t you know that dancing leads to sex?

     


    From: bssimon@helix.ucsd.edu (Bart Simon)
    Subject: Re: Silber
    Date: Fri, 3 Dec 93 8:40:58 PST
    
    Forwarded message:
    > From Michael.Lynch@brunel.ac.uk Thu Dec  2 11:40:10 1993
    > Date: Thu, 02 Dec 1993 19:39:20
    > From: Michael.Lynch@brunel.ac.uk (hsstmel)
    > To: bssimon@helix.ucsd.edu
    > Subject: Re: Silber file
    > Message-Id: 
    > In-Reply-To: 
    > 
    > 
    > 
    > I'm writing this in response to Joseph H. Hesse's message about
    > Boston Univ. President John Silber.  Hesse quotes from an article
    > in the Boston Globe, regarding Silber's response to a Faculty
    > Council inquiry about academic freedom.  Hesse states: "I found
    > so much of this article troubling, on so many different points,
    > that I hardly know where to begin with a commentary on Silber's
    > statements."  I too found this troubling.   I spent six years at
    > Boston University, and left two months ago after a very bitter
    > battle with the BU central administration over my tenure case.
    > I would be happy to discuss my case further with anyone who is
    > interested.  However, in this message, I would like to elaborate
    > on Hesse's message, and suggest that anyone who finds Silber's
    > remarks ominous (and believe me, he substantiates his words with
    > deeds) should write to Silber to give him a piece of your mind. 
    > I recommend it highly; it is a rare opportunity to engage a
    > genuine tyrant in dialogue:
    > 
    > John Silber, President
    > Boston University
    > 147 Bay State Road
    > Boston, MA 02215
    > 
    > Be sure to cc. the following parties:
    > 
    > James Iffland, Chair
    > Faculty Council
    > Department of Modern Foreign Languages
    > Boston University
    > 718 Commonwealth Ave.
    > Boston, MA 02215
    > 
     [ .... ]
    > 
    > Alice Dembner
    > Higher Education Correspondent
    > Boston Globe
    > 135 Morrissey Blvd.
    > P.O. Box 2378
    > Boston, MA 02107-2378
    > 
      [ .... ] 
    > There is a genuine chance that if the academic community
    > supports Iffland and Faculty Council against Silber, that we will
    > see the end to 23 years of demoralization at BU.  Among the
    > reasons for getting involved in this battle are that BU, in the
    > aftermath of a faculty strike in the late '70s offers a model of
    > a university with a weakened faculty and an administration that
    > micromanages the faculty's academic affairs.  Administrators at
    > other universities may get ideas from this model.  Silber is not
    > the only problem at BU.  His Provost, a fellow named Jon
    > Westling, is a particularly nasty piece of work, as is the Dean
    > of the College of Liberal Arts, Dennis Berkey.  Silber and his
    > gang oversee all appointments and promotions, and consequently
    > they have built a substantial base of support among faculty (and
    > especially department chairs).  Nevertheless, there are very many
    > faculty at BU who would rejoice if Silber's reign came to an end,
    > but they rarely speak up for fear of getting their salaries
    > frozen, suffering departmental budget cuts, or being denied
    > tenure.    
    > 
    > The following is a series of quotations from the Silber report
    > that gave rise to the current flap about academic freedom.  The
    > administration's response to a very mild Faculty Council request
    > gives some indication of the Orwellian atmosphere of the place.
    >
    
    

    > 
    > Excerpt from John Silber, President's Report to the Trustees,
    > Boston University, April 15, 1993, pp. 93-95.  (The Report was
    > delivered as a slide show, and then published for distribution
    > to parents and others at the time of Boston University's
    > graduation ceremonies.  It was not distributed to the faculty.)
      [though it was subsequently reprinted in the Boston Globe --ML].)
    
    

    > 
    > ". . . let me speak of another way in which the stewardship of
    > the Board [of Trustees] can be judged.  Beyond anything you've
    > seen so far, but just as important, this University has remained
    > unapologetically dedicated to the search for truth and highly
    > resistant to political correctness and to ideological fads.  In
    > my view, it is not too much to say that among this country's
    > major research universities we are one of the very few that still
    > deserve to be called a university in the true meaning of the
    > term. . . .
    >  
    >      We have resisted relativism as an official intellectual
    > dogma, believing that there is such a thing as truth, and if you
    > can't achieve it, at least you can approach it.  We have resisted
    > the fad toward critical legal studies, which I've mentioned
    > [earlier].  In the English Department and the departments of
    > literature, we have not allowed the structuralists or the
    > deconstructionists to take over.  We have refused to take on
    > dance therapy because we don't understand the theory of it.  We
    > have resisted revisionist history.  We've resisted the fad of
    > allowing every student to do his own thing by determining his own
    > curriculum, thereby turning the University into a buffet in which
    > the student has whatever kind of mis-education he, in the midst
    > of his ignorance, decides he wants.  In the Philosophy Department
    > we have resisted the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory.
    > 
    >      Across the board we have refused to accept hiring quotas,
    > either of females or of minorities believing that we should
    > recruit faculty on the basis of talent and accomplishment rather
    > than any other consideration.  We have resisted the official
    > dogmas of radical feminism.  We have done the same thing with
    > regard to gay and lesbian liberation, and animal liberation.  We
    > have refused to introduce condom machines into University
    > buildings and thereby compete with drugstores.  We refuse to
    > believe that students at Boston University need a college
    > education in how to perform the sex act.  We believe that
    > students in America who haven't figured that out before they get
    > to college are too dumb to come to college.  And we have no wish
    > to share any responsibility whatsoever for what they do with
    > their knowledge.  We will not serve as procurers or facilitators
    > of sexual liaisons.
    > 
    >      We have resisted the fad of Afro-centrism.  We have not
    > fallen into the clutches of the multi-culturists.  We recognize
    > that Western culture, so-called, is in fact a universal culture. 
    > Western mathematics is the mathematics of the world; Western
    > science is the science of the world; and the Western culture has
    > been philosophically oriented from the start toward finding the
    > truth, and starting to approach it as closely as possible.  It
    > was in the Western cultural tradition that people began to
    > develop courses in anthropology, in the history of foreign
    > countries and in comparative religions.  Buddhism, for example,
    > was brought into German Universities by Kant and by Hegel.  This
    > is a part of the very meaning of Western culture and
    > civilization~not to be parochial, but to be universal in one's
    > concern."
    >
    
    

     
    > The Boston University Faculty Council got hold of this report,
    > and in recent weeks the Council's Committee on Academic Freedom
    > requested of Silber that he "clarify" what he meant by "resisted"
    > in the above remarks.  Silber did not respond for a few weeks,
    > and Faculty Council Chairman James Iffland discussed Silber's
    > report in the BU student newspaper (The Daily Free Press).
    
      [....]
    
     [In response, Silber's Assistant General Council wrote a letter 
      to the student newspaper, in which he objected, incredibly, that
      Silber's academic freedom was violated by the Faculty
      Council's questioning of Silber's statement to the trustees. --ML]
    
    

    > Another BU official was quoted in the Boston Globe (November 25,
    > 1993:  'BU official denies curbs on academic freedom' by Alice
    > Dembner):
    > "'No credible claims of violations of academic freedom have ever
    > been made against the university administration,' Carol Hillman,
    > vice president for university relations said in a statement. 
    > 'Prof. iffland's reported statements are nothing more than a form
    > of acadmic McCarthyism:  innuendo based on secret 'evidence' that
    > does not in fact exist.'"
    
    

    > 
    > Silber finally did respond to the Faculty Council's request, but
    > as the quotations in Joseph Hesse's e-mail message indicate, he
    > dug in his heels.  I am told that during a recent Faculty
    > Assembly meeting Silber accused Prof. Iffland of being a liar and
    > a coward.  Clearly, the BU Administration believes that a vicious
    > offense is the best defense against criticism.  Iffland and the
    > Faculty Council are being pilloried by Silber's propaganda
    > machine.  They need support. 
    > 
     [The Faculty Council Committee on Academic Freedom
     and the AAUP are currently looking into questions about
     academic freedom at BU, including tenure and promotion
     cases, intrusive efforts by BU administrators to edit
     dissertations and dissertation abstracts, and numerous other
     complaints. --ML]
    
    

    PMC-TALK digest: postings for the period ending 12-7-93.
    
    [ . . . . ]
    
    Today's Topics:
         Re: [anti-ideology politics]
         [ .... ]
    
    

     
    Sender: Jay Lemke 
    Subject:      Re: Digest ending 11-30-94
    
    Regarding the anti-ideology politics of Dr. Silber:
    
    My deepest sympathy to the faculty of BU to find the intellectual
    leadership (*is* that what Presidents do in our universities?) of
    their institution entrusted to a political demagogue whose audience
    is clearly not the serious intellectuals of the BU faculty, but
    the media and the mass-market for fear-based, anti-intellectual
    politics.
    
    The specific targets mentioned by Dr Silber are exactly the intellectual
    movements of our time that challenge establishment orthodoxies and
    social and cultural privilege. His claim that they lend themselves
    to dogmatic formulations could be made about almost *any* belief
    system, including scientific rationalism (have a look at how science
    is taught at BU, or almost anywhere, for the evidence).
    
    The best defense of critical intellectual movements is their offense
    against established views. Use the tools of these perspectives to
    demonstrate the ideological character of modernism, patriarchy,
    science, rationalism, and all the historically specific and still
    politically dominant intellectual formations which had their origins
    in the interests and values of a very small segment of humanity, who
    continue to be privileged by them. Demonstrate exactly how these
    values, discourses, and practices do in fact favor the interests of
    one social caste over those of others. Demonstrate the fallacies of
    its claims to universal validity independent of history and culture.
    And take the demonstrations beyond the academy to the same media,
    and wider political constituencies to which Silber appeals.
    
    If he believes ideology has no place in the academy, convict him
    of his own ideology./
    
    I recently had occasion to reply strongly to an editorial in a
    professional journal warning of the "slippery slopes of postmodernism".
    I am now on the editorial board of that journal. And I received
    a lot of support reaction from other professionals in the field,
    especially younger, more vulnerable ones, who confirmed my claim
    that such statements are not just statements of editorial opinion,b
    but, because of existing power relations, create a chilling effect
    on intellectual freedom. Silber is apparently using his own position
    in a somewhat similarly irresponsible manner. It is actions like
    his which constitute the threat to academic freedom, not ideas that
    challenge the established wisdom.
    
    I think we have a responsibility to say so, publicly.
    
    JAY LEMKE.
    City University of New York.
    BITNET:    JLLBC@CUNYVM
    INTERNET:  JLLBC@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU
    
    

    PMC-TALK digest: postings for the period ending 12-14-93.
    
    [ . . . . ] 
    Today's Topics:
         [Re: BU demagoguery]
         leo strauss
    
    

     

    Sender: KESSLER

    Subject: Re: Digest ending 12-7-93

     

    I am working backwards, up the e-mail in my files, but re Lemke’s remarks about BU: What is a “political” demagogue, in distinction from a demagogue? 2) Who are the “serious intellectual faculty” at BU, as distinct from the mere faculty? 3) Name, please, the “social castes” we have in the USA, and I mean as “caste”? What journal is Lemke helping to edit? he doesnt say? and pardon me if the answers are to be found in previous emails that I will work up the list to look at? And, while I am clear about the note from Lemke, 4) how are faculty nowadays to be distinguished from the mass media, the politicos, etc.?

     

    They were not different in the Borking of Thomas, and the Borking of Bork, or the Borking of Guinier, etc. One cannot be a tenured mandarin and ride the rails of hardnosed politics to DC too, can one? ONe never know, nowadays, do one? as FW used to ask. Jascha Kessler, living in this post-Kantian, if not post-Cantian day of ours.

     


     

    Sender: kv10@cornell.edu (Kazys Varnelis)

    Subject: leo strauss

     

    The recent discussion of Boston University President John Silber on this list led me to wonder about his possible connection with the academic/political cult/conspiracy/movement around conservative academician Leo Strauss. While I didn’t find any connection, I would like to bring up the question of Leo Strauss, who is a fascinating – and terrifying – ((post) modern) figure for me and I would like to know what other members of the list think about him and his work.

     

    For anyone who doesn’t know who Leo Strauss is, the following article, ought to be a start. (I should mention that I have explicit permission from the Nation to reproduce this article on pmc-list).

     

    For further reading I would probably start with:

     

    Leo Strauss, Persecution and the Art of Writing, (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1952)

     

    and

     

    Shadia B. Drury, The Political Ideas of Leo Strauss, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988).

     

    Kazys Varnelis

    Ph.D candidate, History and Theory of Architecture

    Cornell University

     

    – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

     

    [Because the permission granted by _The Nation_ covered only one posting in PMC-Talk, most of the article has been deleted in this republication. Anyone wishing to retrieve the original logs from PMC-Talk can do so by anonymous ftp to ftp.ncsu.edu, cd pub/ncsu/pmc/pmc-talk, and get 9312. Or, of course, you could get the magazine… –Ed.]

     

    The Nation magazine,

    Copyright (c) 1992, The Nation Company Inc.

     

    November 2, 1992

     

    SECTION: Vol. 255 ; No. 14 ; Pg. 494

    Minority report; Leo Strauss Column

    by Christopher Hitchens,

     

    [ …. ]

     

    The votaries of Leo Strauss form a sort of cult movement that is crucially ambiguous about the idea of elitism. The core belief of Strauss himself, and the mantra of his many rather odd followers, most of them located in the academy and in the “think tank” culture, was:

     

    Liberal education is the necessary endeavor to found an aristocracy within mass society.

     

    The key word here is probably “within”; Strauss made a special study of the esoteric and the cabalistic, and believed that since ancient times authentic philosophers had occluded their true meaning so as to make it clear only to a class of adepts.

     

    [ ….. ]

     

    Subscriptions:

    The Nation, PO Box 10763, Des Moines IA 50340-0763. 1-800-333-8536.

     


    PMC-TALK digest: postings for the period ending 12-17-93.
    
    [ . . . . ]
    
    Today's Topics:
         Leo Strauss
         BU Demagoguery
         re: THE NATION piece
    
    

     
    Sender: Jay Lemke 
    Subject:      Leo Strauss
    
    The posting about Leo Strauss did indeed push me to think further
    about the relation of the academy to democratic ideals. One can
    read there an invitation to an elitism with the rather serious
    modernist weakness that it imagines that one caste, narrow in its
    experience and view of the world, should project its own perspec-
    tives as universal and itself as fit to lead the whole of
    society. Mistaking the part for the whole does not seem a very
    sound foundation for policy-making.
    
    But... Just how realistic is it to imagine instead that someday
    everyone is society will take the time, have the interest, ac-
    quire the skills, to relate their own perspectives on policy to
    *any* model of the social system as a whole? Some policies are
    purely local; for them a stakeholder model of participatory demo-
    cracy seems reasonable. But other policies necessarily must be
    grounded in overviews that encompass relations among many social
    groups, agendas, activities. Such overviews will always, in the
    division of labor, the specialization of perspective and inter-
    est, be the speciality of *some* groups in society. They need not
    be monolithically masculine, middle-aged, middle-class,
    heterosexual, Christian, Eurocentric, etc. But neither are they
    likely to encompass most members of a large, diverse society.
    They need not necessarily be allowed the power to impose their
    policy choices on the rest of us, but they will be in some sense
    in a better position to consider such matters. A lot of the time,
    a lot of us just won't care.
    
    And ... Plato, at least, often sounds the theme that people in
    general need to believe in certain values, or gods, (or
    ideologies) for a social order to operate at all, and that there
    is a considerable danger to the social order (*any* social order,
    not just the ones we are critical of) when intellectual start to
    undermine general confidence in established beliefs. Intellec-
    tuals are specialists in critique. We are not supposed to stop at
    anything (cf. Descartes, Nietzsche, Postmodernism) in our criti-
    cal inquiries. But there is a danger that we could (if we were
    listened to, which usually we are not) disturb the social order
    in ways that would lead to conditions far worse than those we are
    critical of. It seems very plausible to me that Plato wrote with
    such notions in mind, and that his works do somewhat cloak his
    most dangerous ideas (in the indirectness of the Socratic
    dialogues, in the famous allegories and "religious" passages,
    etc.). Given the conditions under which many scholars and philos-
    ophers have written, even in modern times, not only a moral con-
    cern for the danger of their ideas to society as a whole, but a
    defensive concern for the danger of repercussions on themselves,
    may have led to a certain intertextual "encoding" of their mes-
    sages.
    
    We are the intellectual descendants of an elitist tradition. We
    know that democratic ideals are the product of a bourgeois (and
    masculine, and middle-aged, and modernist, etc.) culture, which
    we pride ourselves on criticizing and deconstructing in every
    other way. So what exactly might a post-democratic politics be?
    
    JAY.
    
    JAY LEMKE.
    City University of New York.
    BITNET:    JLLBC@CUNYVM
    INTERNET:  JLLBC@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU
    
    

    Sender: Jay Lemke 
    Subject:      BU Demagoguery
    
    Jascha Kessler asks a few questions about my remarks in the Sil-
    ber discussion. The first two seem miss the distinction between
    qualifiers and classifiers in English semantics. Social "caste"
    is a rather useful idea for postmodernists, I think, since it al-
    lows us to refine the matrix of categorial social differences and
    name its smallest cells: class by gender by age by cultural back-
    ground by .... The term may be less familiar, but the notion is a
    useful one, as in the work of Pierre Bourdieu and many feminist
    theorists. Only one such caste has traditionally been politically
    dominant in our society. ... The journal I co-edit is
    _Linguistics and Education_ (thanks for the opportunity to ad-
    vertise).
    
    As for what really seems to be bothering our correspondent, I'd
    say it is the touchy relationship between the political and the
    academic. Personally, I'd be happy to see more intellectuals (and
    not many academics today are, I think) enter electoral politics,
    or even just the arenas of public opinion-making. What is being
    objected to in the case of Dr. Silber is an attempt, not within
    the context of civil politics but within that of an academic in-
    stitution, to control opinion rather than to lead it. And I take
    it some are suggesting that he is motivated as much or more by
    the approval of such a move by those outside his university than
    by his responsibilities to the university itself.
    
    I am not, I hope, naive about the inevitable political dimensions
    of all institutions and indeed of all intellectual inquiry. But
    direct politically motivated efforts to control what are or are
    not acceptable theoretical perspectives within the academy should
    be resisted. The result of such efforts tends to intellectual
    monoculture, and extinction.
    
    JAY.
    
    JAY LEMKE.
    City University of New York.
    BITNET:    JLLBC@CUNYVM
    INTERNET:  JLLBC@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU
    
    

     

    Sender: KESSLER

    Subject: Re: Digest ending 12-14-93

     

    re: THE NATION piece. Why, one may ask, the phrase “CYNICAL briefing”? Why the use of the term briefing, and why the adjective. If one must not put one’s trust in princes, neither should one put one’s trust in “Nations(s).” Let us not forget where that journal is coming from, and who is the cynical editor of it, an unreconstructed Stalinist, to say the best and the least of him, who assumes that his view of the world is a true one. Talk about simpletons in the PM parish. Str.is one thing; Quayle is another. And William Kristol is a lad with a rather superior education and IQ, as indeed is his father. Please don’t start conflating Strauss, Straussians, Kristol and Quayle. It would be rather shoddy argumentation, about anything. Thinking, it is not. Kessler

     


    PMC-TALK digest: postings for the period ending 12-19-93.
    
    [ . . . . ]
    
    Today's Topics:
         Re: Digest ending 12-17-93  [Plato's ideas]
         Re: Digest ending 12-17-93  [Avoiding bad faith]
         Re: Digest ending 12-17-93  [evil geniuses of poststructuralism]
    
    

     

    Sender: KESSLER

    Subject: Re: Digest ending 12-17-93

     

    One suggestion may be to ask, What is dangerous about Plato’s ideas? And to whom are they dangerous? And why are they dangerous? What is meant by “post-democratic”? Alpha Beta Delta Gamma, out of bottles? as Huxley suggested in BRAVENEW WORLD? What is a caste? Where are the intellectuals J Lemke speaks of? What makes them intellectuals? Professors are intellectuals? Intellectuals are professors? Such a glibness and fluency of talk is rather worrisome, as it assumes a complaisant audience, knowingness and agreement on categories as defining the world we live in according to this sort of academic argot. Sentimental, suicidal, canting, and bullying in the extreme. As if the folks quoting a Christopher Hitchens did not realize that he publishes in journals supported by megabucks in foundations that are based upon extraordinary wealth. IN Italy years ago, this talk emanated from the “mink coat Communists.” IN the States, today, it is the limousine liberals and their academic janissaries, who know not what they say or do. In a word, it is sheer bad faith. Pontificating bad faith. Kessler here, not even breathing hard, but waiting for a sign, give us a sign.

     


    Sender: CYWB000 
    Subject: Digest ending 12-17-93
    
    I was distressed but not shocked by Kazys
    Varnelis' message to pmc-talk about Strauss.
    The first two paragraphs of _The Nation_
    article seem to demonstrate well enough that
    the article is confusing, not very interesting,
    boring, probably easy to take apart. But who
    wants to comment? I was going to wait to
    hear other PMCers reactions, but would like to
    address this message by K. Varnelis as a show
    of some kind of dissatisfaction with the ideas
    of, what I see as the L. Strauss club, and show
    my support for those who counteract the LS
    club (perhaps by adding a "D" to the end of
    "LS").
    
    A question in my own mind seems to be, "If I
    only had the force of A.R. Stone or A. Kroker--
    featured in the most recent Mondo 2000-- I
    could clear up my own confusion, and perhaps
    push this issue over the edge?" What little
    force I have is the wish to see A.R. Stone,
    Kroker, H. Giroux, C. Penley, and D. Haraway
    (there are others) placed in the same room
    with these folks (the LS club). Perhaps other
    PMCers can tell me if this Leo Strauss crowd
    would be an easy target.
    
    My reaction is central to the problem of
    epistemological battles that go on in
    individuals' lives everyday. By
    epistemological battle I mean the frustrations
    of everyday life-- where proof and burden of
    proof are too overwhelming to accumulate
    against some wrong that is being committed
    to you or to anyone else. The aggression of
    silence is a good example. Silence does not
    seem to be a discourse, and as Marika Finley-
    de Monchy says, the "(silence of) death is not
    a discourse". An academic elite, or whatever is
    being referenced (I am not familiar with the
    texts being discussed; although I know that
    Henri Giroux has a major contention with
    Bloom, and I side with Giroux), seems to be a
    community of silence. It's hard to pin these
    kinds of opinions down, not simply because
    they are not available but because they are so
    unpleasurable. [It is obvious that they are
    available, K. Varnelis was given permission to
    distribute the article in question.]
    
    The discussion on PMC has been a difficult
    one. The reason people and individuals arm
    our/them/onesel(f)ve(s) with theories, words,
    texts, languages, codes, intellectual tools, etc.,
    is specifically so individuals and people can,
    as Bourdieu advocates, avoid bad faith, and
    get on with the business of creating. I suppose
    people and individuals might also arm
    our/them/onesel(f)ve(s) with good vocal
    skills, good writing skills, and a bit of time to
    address all these potential threats to the
    creations and creativities many would like to
    see and do-- not just an intellectual elite.
    
    I am dissatisfied with the issue at hand. It
    gets nasty but not nasty enough. Perhaps
    Alphonso Lingis is monitoring PMC-talk and
    could respond. Perhaps J. Bigras could
    respond from the grave. I feel lucky that
    Lemke is around; the BU situation is very
    gray. I hope we are living something post-
    Kantian. Lemke, as for ""post-Cantian"",
    well responded to.
    
    Brennan Murray Wauters,
    cywb@musica.mcgill.ca
    
    

    Sender: AYEAMAN@cudnvr.denver.colorado.edu
    Subject: Re: Digest ending 12-17-93
    
    Seems to me that there are some worthwhile points of view being
    discussed here beyond the slurs against what Spivak ironically calls
    the evil geniuses of poststructural and postmodern inquiry. (See
    Spivak's chapter in Reading & Writing Differently.)
    
    I wonder, with a smile, if President Silber took lessons in Resistqnce
    from Henry Giroux? 
    
            --Andrew
    Internet: ayeaman@cudnvr.denver.colorado.edu
    
    Dr. Andrew R. J. Yeaman
    7152 West Eightyfourth Way #707
    Arvada, CO 80003
    (303) 456-1592
    
    

    PMC-TALK digest: postings for the period ending 1-4-94.
    
    [ . . . . ]
    
    Today's Topics:
         RE: democratic developments at the end of the twentieth-century 
         Post-democratic politics
    
    

     

    Sender: Peter Stupples, University of Otago, New Zealand

    pstupples@gandalf.otago.ac.nz

     

    I was struck by the importance of the issues raised by Jay Lemke in response to the Leo Strauss exchanges. Is seems to me that the recent and current events in the former Soviet Union illustrate the problems involved in democratic developments at the end of the twentieth-century. The Communist system, as it had evolved under Lenin and Stalin, was clearly non-democratic and had also lost the support of the majority of Russian intellectuals. Communism, in the form it had genetically assumed, has been destroyed and replaced by a swiftly changing array of models that have the appearance of being democratic in the Western tradition. These changes have been accompanied by an almost complete economic collapse. Where stakeholders have had the opportunity to voice an opinion over the past few years they have tended to favour either 1. a return to a form of Communism (better the devil you know – we were better off under Brezhnev – there was a class system in operation in which everyone had a stake and knew the rules) or 2. an inchoate, archaic nationalism (Russia for the Russians, we need a slavonic solution to a slavonic problem, we are the only ones who know how to deal with our historical development). The academy, which was enthusiastically behind forms of socialism in 1917, no longer has a voice – certainly not a voice that is listened to. However I was impressed on a visit to the Russia provinces in May 1992 how well local governments were capable of running their own affairs, able to coordinate local groups of stakeholders into purposeful activity. There seems to be something that can be learnt from this, such as – you cannot interfere with the genetic development of historical processes – Russia is going back to 1916 and rerunning the issues that are pertinent to it – the power of *modern* central governments must be anti-democratic because of the distance from the stakeholders and the self-interests of a vast bureaucracy that is not answerable to those stakeholders. Centralised government is a *modern* idea, it is paternalistic, at best the state looking after the less privileged, who remain without privileges, hope, education, a stake, but are kept fed, clothed and housed to stop them being a social nuisance – post-modernist debates point to the break up of centralising tendencies in the interests of giving stakeholders and stakeholder groups a greater voice and giving room for a diversity of living-choices within communities.

     

    The Platonic idea that people in general need to subscribe to a set of beliefs for social order to be possible is one of those leaps of faith that we no longer need to make. When all *beliefs* are undermined then we can all start looking at the construction of the real world, at the hopes and aspirations of real people and try to find the obviously very complex mechanisms that will allow them to flourish. This is not *post*-democratic politics but, perhaps for the first time, real democracy, the voice of the people, all the people, not simply being listened to by the political-class-patriachy representatives. We do not need beliefs but knowledge. Beliefs distort any objective view of the world. Knowledge leads to respect for the views and aspirations of others. Government structures need to be deconstructed in a physical sense until they are responsive to local interests. Policy-making should be local policy-making with pacts between localities to cover equity issues such as the funding of health and education.

     

    Silber’s comments are part of the defensive response of the patriarchy concerned about critical ideas that break down belief and reveal a real world and real issues that might be uncomfortable for the elite. Leo Strauss gives such ideas an intellectual gloss but are promted, it seems to me by a disrepect for the views of others, a quest for modernist simplicity at the expense of real-life diversity.

     

    Sorry to go on at length and in such prolix randomness. But Jay Lemke posed a question on the nature of post-democratic politics and I thought it wortha response, even one hurriedly and badly put together.

     


    Sender: Jay Lemke 
    Subject:      Post-democratic politics
    
    Maybe PMC is more flame-proof than other lists, but KESSLER's ef-
    fort to foreground critical perspectives and lament complaisance
    seemed somewhere between negative and incendiary in its tone. I
    certainly think it unwise to reply in kind. I also suspect that
    his specific questions were rhetorical (What makes someone an in-
    tellectual? Why are/aren't professors intellectual? etc.) and his
    point that we should not take it so much for granted that the
    common wisdom of the moment on such matters is enough for our
    discussions. But we all know that every assumption, every few
    words of every discourse, presents an opportunity for endless
    critical re-examinations, none of which ever lead to definite
    conclusions, though they are certainly essential to the process
    of coming up with newer discourses that serve us in some practi-
    cal ways. On PMC I assume that we are not in search of "truth" or
    old Believers that somewhere there is one such true and flawless-
    ly reasoned discourse which must then prove to be, if not the
    only useful one, then the most useful one. All the practices of
    life are carried on, often quite well, with discourses in which
    any of us could "find" numberless flaws.
    
    I read in Kessler's message (Digest 12-17-93) a certain im-
    patience with political superficiality, suggesting someone who,
    like me much of time, is more satisfied by analyses of how power
    sustains privilege and wraps itself in pseudo-intellectual
    mystification and misdirection. But these are old discourses.
    They have been around and widely circulated in our communities
    for more than a couple of generations now. They feel old,
    modernist, not-ours. They seem wonderfully satisfying as critique
    and totally useless as a guide to constructive action. Their
    political heart, which I largely share, needs a new voice, and
    their theoretical assumptions need a good post-modernist updat-
    ing.
    
    What would a post-democratic politics be indeed? How can there be
    a democracy of equals when we have no idea how in practice to
    make a society of equals? when this ideal assumes a privileging
    of the isolated individual as the ultimate political unit, and we
    know that this assumption is itself a specifically bourgeois
    ideological creation? What is the context in which we pose the
    problem of politics but that of the bourgeois State, a creation,
    like many before it, for the imposition of control by some upon
    all. Is there a solution to the paradox of scale in politics that
    what works in small communities does not generalize to extremely
    large ones? Can an entity like a nation-state operate as a com-
    munity except by illusion and artificial manipulation? How can
    there be a single ideal of politics in the absence of a coercive-
    ly dominant ideology? If political ideals are inseparable from
    cultural systems as wholes, what other domains of cultural prac-
    tice and belief most influence them? If all political critique is
    situated and positioned, then how is the modernist critique of
    capitalism, and the subsequent critical obsession with coercive
    power relationships itself limited, itself a product of masculine
    perspectives, of middle-class perspectives, of middle-aged per-
    spectives, of European and Judaeo-Christian perspectives, and of
    their specific interests?
    
    I think that postmodernism has largely held back from critical
    confrontation with modernist political ideals (and I do not mean
    classical liberal representative democracy, I mean neo-Marxist
    post-revolutionary participatory democracy) because we would also
    indict the political status quo and have not had any alternative
    to offer. It may also be because p-m is just crossing over from
    the humanities to the social sciences (by dissolving the
    modernist boundary between them).
    
    JAY LEMKE.
    City University of New York.
    BITNET:    JLLBC@CUNYVM
    INTERNET:  JLLBC@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU
    
    

    PMC-TALK digest: postings for the period ending 1-6-94.
    
    [ . . . . ] 
    
    Today's Topics:
         Postmodern politics
    
    

     
    
    Sender: Jay Lemke 
    Subject:      Postmodern politics
    
    Most of the replies I have had, on and off the list, to my
    queries about postmodernist, if not post-democratic, politics,
    have been seriously thoughtful and I am grateful for their per-
    spectives. They all, as well as responses I have had to this
    question from others lately, point toward localism as the key.
    
    I am as much in favor of localism as anyone, for dealing with lo-
    cal issues, and in earlier posting I pointed out that the
    participatory democracy ideal seems workable locally, on the
    scale of relatively small human communities.
    
    Many people also noted that the idea of nationwide (much less
    worldwide) political ideals or systems is a modernist, centralist
    one. And at least one person believed that they were not neces-
    sary to large-scale communities.
    
    But I do not think that these answers are good enough. Even the
    premise of "Think globally, act locally" assumes that local ac-
    tions must take account of a larger view of needs and conse-
    quences. Local actions interact. They contribute to emergent ef-
    fects on higher scales of organization of self-organizing
    ecological-social systems. They produce conflicts which are not
    resolvable except by appeal to the interests of some larger sys-
    tem. Some forms of action require trans-local cooperation,
    whether on the scale of large cities, nation states, world
    regions, or globally.
    
    Our present political solution to these problems is an unstable
    compromise between the older nation-state system (treaties, EEC-
    like confederations, wars, economic power-leveraging, etc.) and
    the emerging global economic-communication order (multi-
    nationals, economic interdependence, global information
    networks). The older system was already shifting from an owners-
    decide model to an experts-and-managers-decide model as the scale
    and complexity of the systems to be controlled grew; that has now
    been accelerated by the transnational developments. This is not a
    system that entirely works; it is still biased by the dis-
    proportiate representation in it of elite caste interests, but it
    has the capacity in principle to take mass popular interests and
    perceptions into account, insofar as those trained to do so can
    in fact appreciate them. At least this is a model, however
    flawed, which has evolved naturally within the social system, and
    which faces up to the fact that many decisions require a degree
    of global knowledgeability that is not possessed locally.
    
    This basically technocratic political model is thoroughly
    modernist. It has a horrendous ideology that buries values issues
    under "expert-knowledge" issues. It regards its knowledge as ob-
    jective rather than viewpoint-limited. It is still an elite suc-
    cessor to the previous elite, making common cause with it against
    the rest of us at the same time that it is displacing it. Its
    worst failures result from the unrecognized subcultural bias of
    its perspectives. But at least it faces global issues realisti-
    cally. Localist politics seems to me to be romanticist and
    utopian by comparison.
    
    Postmodernism, I believe, is itself a consequence of the
    strengthening of global integration, the second stage following
    colonialist-imperialist domination, when the exchanges across
    cultures (and to some extent genders and classes) have started to
    become more reciprocal as power differentials have leveled out
    somewhat. It is in that climate that the voice of the Other could
    effectively challenge orthodoxies, even among the dominated. I do
    not really believe that localism is postmodernist. But neither do
    I believe in the modernist ideal of global homogenization to the
    culture of the presently dominant elite. Diversity is good, we
    want it, and no one could have succeeded in getting rid of it in
    a viable world social order anyway. Diversity implies a mosaic of
    differences, with coherence on local scales, and global integra-
    tion based on horizontal interdependence rather than vertically
    imposed control. It is the world social-political order as
    ecosystem rather than as organism-writ-large, or as the patriar-
    chal family-writ-large.
    
    How is this system going to deal with global issues? The very
    distinction between local and global is disappearing as the sys-
    tem becomes more integrated! It's getting harder and harder to
    find a strictly "local" issue, in terms of impact, means for ef-
    fective action, causes, stakeholders .... Granted that there are
    going to be many diverse local ways of coming to grips with these
    kinds of problems, each of those local communities will find it-
    self already embedded in something larger, and limited in per-
    spective within it.
    
    One can say, Let's just go local and see what happens -- let the
    system self-organize. Perhaps we CANNOT get the kind of global
    perspectives on these systems needed to make better local deci-
    sions. Certainly we cannot hope to control the systems from
    within them (or from the individual-level of organization), but
    we are still going to have to make decisions. Those decisions are
    part of the activity of the system. If they are made strictly lo-
    cally, I suspect the system will re-organize away from global in-
    tegration, back toward greater local autonomy, and back toward
    the kinds of ideologies and political practices characteristic of
    that kind of system (neo-feudalism, anyone?). Such a political
    alternative is not going to compete effectively with the present
    trend toward greater technocracy. What can? what should? (and if
    English had a plural interrogative pronoun, Whats, I would have
    used it!)  JAY.
    
    PS. Perhaps we have no choice but to evolve through technocracy
    to something else, something we couldn't envision until we're al-
    ready living in the new postmodern global system. Maybe that
    presumption releases us from moral responsibility for political
    vision. Somehow, though, I doubt it.
    
    JAY LEMKE.
    City University of New York.
    BITNET:    JLLBC@CUNYVM
    INTERNET:  JLLBC@CUNYVM.CUNY.EDU

     

  • “‘To He, I Am for Evva True’”: Krazy Kat’s Indeterminate Gender

    Elisabeth Crocker

    Department of English
    University of Virginia
    libby@virginia.edu

     

    (IMAGE)

     

    Like the landscape of Coconino County where he lives, the character Krazy Kat’s gender and race shift, sometimes at random, but more often as a result of his social situation. George Herriman couched his assertions about the socially constructed nature of categories like race and gender, in addition to categories like class, ethnicity, age, and occupation, so deeply in the sophisticated allegory of his comic strip, however, that few readers recognized them. Those who have written on Krazy Kat in the past have confined their comments to Herriman’s drawing style and literary allusions, and to the more poignant but less puzzling aspects of the love relationship between Krazy Kat and Ignatz Mouse.

     

    The situation of the characters remains unchanged over the course of the strip’s run from 1913 to 1944: Ignatz Mouse hates Krazy Kat with a violent obsession that causes him to throw bricks at Krazy’s head; Krazy loves Ignatz with a singleminded passion that causes him to interpret the projectiles as signs of Ignatz’ love; Offissa Bull Pupp loves Krazy Kat and hates Ignatz Mouse, and uses his lawful authority–as well as his billy club–to protect Krazy from the bricks. Ignatz detests the “Kop,” and Krazy does not return Bull Pupp’s affection, but he does not resent the intervention in his relationship with Ignatz. Krazy seems to understand that others cannot see the brick as a token of affection, and he ignores even Ignatz’ own protestations to the contrary, always utterly confident in his perception of the brick as a signifier of love.

     

    The love-triangle plot has allowed critics to dismiss the problem of Krazy’s largely indeterminate gender. In the introduction to a Krazy Kat collection assembled shortly after Herriman’s death, e. e. cummings enumerated a number of tropes for Krazy to figure, including free will, democracy, and romance heroine (vii). Because Krazy is so often caught between the hero Bull Pupp and the villain Ignatz Mouse, and is fairly passive as the object of the Pupp’s love and as the object of the Mouse’s hatred, cummings gendered the Kat female. Nearly all critics and comics historians have since referred to Krazy as “she”; even novelist Jay Cantor, who used the Krazy Kat cast and setting for a postmodern psychoanalytic novel of the same name, unequivocally identified the Kat as a Dora-like female. While cummings himself understood that it was Krazy’s role in the romance-plot that was feminine, and not anything inherent in the character, others have since followed cummings’ use of “she,” relying upon his authority to avoid examining a complex issue.

     

    When questioned about Krazy’s sex, however, even Herriman would respond that he did not know, and the Kat did not seem sure either (Capra, 40). “I don’t know if I should take a husband or a wife,” Krazy complains in an October, 1915 daily. “Take care,” Ignatz responds, hurling a brick. The narrator nearly always refers to Krazy as “he,” resolving awkward, ambiguous, or gender-neutral moments to the pronoun “him,” rather than to the pronoun “it.” Most of Krazy’s activity is not gender-specific, but in scenarios involving some complication of his normal relationship with Ignatz, Krazy adopts whichever gender role will restore the usual balance. Cases of disguise or mistaken identity in either Ignatz or Krazy, and of rivalry with a party outside of the Kat/Mouse/Pupp triangle, invariably produce gender-bending confusion in the strip.

     

    • Full page:
       

      Sunday, April 15, 1923

       

      This episode combines the classic chase scene with the love-triangle plot, further complicated by the intervention of an outside party, Pauline Pullet. Krazy’s behavior here seems to be governed by his innocence and his absent-mindedness, but he actually performs complex maneuvers in order to maintain the most options within the social structures at hand — love and the law.

     

    • Full page:
       

      Sunday, July 14, 1918

       

      Roles in love play do not define the only parameters of gender construction in Krazy Kat. Krazy is a black cat only in general, just as he is generally male. When the Kat’s fur changes color, however, his gender categorically changes with it. Krazy, upon emerging bleached white in Madame Kamouflage beauty parlor, ceases not only to be male but ceases even to be a Kat in the dazzled eyes of the Mouse. Ignatz cannot recognize Krazy when Krazy is white, because whiteness in itself is for Ignatz an appropriate object of erotic desire, which then in turn must be feminine.

     

     

    This Krazy Kat hypermedia project began as a ToolBook application compiled for a graduate course in computing and literary study, taught by Hoyt Duggan and Peter Baker. John Price-Wilkin encouraged me to seek platform-independence when expanding it into a dissertation, of which this article is a part. When the dissertation is finished, with the direction of Eric Lott and John Unsworth, and the technical support of the Institute for Advanced Technology in the Humanities, it will be published on the World Wide Web.

     

    Click an image to view a comic.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Capra, Frank. The Name Above the Title: An Autobiography. New York: MacMillan Co., 1971.
    • cummings, e.e. Introduction. Krazy Kat by George Herriman. By George Herriman. New York: H. Holt & Co., 1946.
    • Herriman, George. Sunday pages July 14, 1918, and April 15, 1923, from George Herriman’s Krazy & Ignatz, vols. 1-9, Bill Blackbeard, editor. Forestville, California: Eclipse Books/Turtle Island Foundation, 1989.

     

  • Four Poems: “Ode To Woody Strode”, “Removing The Obelisk”, “Parental Guidance”, and “The Permanence Of Whim To Providence”

    Michael Gizzi

     

    Ode to Woody Strode

     

    Veteran Actor Woody Strode will appear at the 8 p.m. Saturday screening of John Ford’s “Sergeant Rutledge” at the Gene Autry Western Heritage Museum’s Wells Fargo Theater.

     

    –Los Angeles Times

     

    Brother Ebon Noggin, Survival Bubba, persona non grata
    In the peckerwood’s head, a midden of bushwah shoe-tree’d
    Into a montage mob of Queeg fits. Can’t beat it
    For sheer eidetic distress of 30 shitkickers with 10 toothpicks recidivism
    A runaway braille trimming tremors to the quick
    Gimme some skulls, man! not these
    Chiropodists down with the croup, Jack, in Drumstick
    Gigging like locust on the corn, humming memory loves company
    Per Idaho beanfire with chili obligations as
    Bronco Nagurski makes the conversion with broken horns

     

    As at a theatre corpses calling curtain calls
    With their entire cast of improprieties, Errol Flynn
    Pinned if only for a second between a crumpet and a scone
    The peak of his powers at the end of his rope
    The one-eyed King Radio with a mumbling jag on –
    This is the chorus of the Caresser’s song
    Canoeer than Velveeta were her thighs
    I thought I was standing in a movie with a leg wound
    An open book of alluvial text approximating flesh
    A ceiling dispensary pulled down to reveal
    Halfmoons claire de luneing at the world

     

    No one has a straight job, wheat snobs rule the waves
    Waterbury sidles to his cardspout
    Tuberculosis got the camellias. Family trees
    May insert any name one chooses for the pedigree of love
    Let the foreign woman come ashore, what as the talkers say
    You’ll never see at home lost in the delicate rays of folklore
    Its minutes recorded with his feet by the Armless Wonder
    Thuggees with allergies film greenhouses, hold shining steam
    To treebuds, prehensile eyes out stalking vim as if vision
    Were a concubine, a rinse cycle lashed to the belly of a Raj
    With buckle of swash, Flora Danica waiting in the wings

     

    Professor Pretzel Wolf buttons the suit on his portrait
    Of trees, an ornamental hombre in a speculum of preen
    Asks, “Who’s the forest of them all?”
    Why – Woody Strode! spiked with summer drone
    His dome chapeau made of breeze, accent grave
    Over the trees tight as a coat of Gliddens
    Not without ribands or the great socko of Kilimanjaro

     

    All these yahoos headed West, have they got names to be blessed?
    Bring me the ho-hum, fly it up here verbatim
    An eggshell carbon 12 writ in a foreign tongue
    As though Johnny Vast had no idea where his howl came from
    And fetch us the cretin who et my heart
    That’s what makes it green, does it not?
    We live in a factory of the future on the edge of a lip
    With miniature cowboys banished forever
    The precision of faraway herbalists spilling the beans
    “Our desires expectorate dutifully” slobbers Crow Bob

     

    An ol’ Yakima stuntjockey son of Cannut uproots the tree
    Of reason roost, wraith of the treeshirt twinges
    Until and when courage is inflated to pressure sufficiently
    Pigeon balloon per square inch chest looking comical enough
    To glance, getting by the smoketrees you reckon it’s only Gene
    Our ofay Autry slit-eyed slimewinder triggering his getaway
    Lately ghosted into Christmas while all the leaves go blind

     

    Only the shine inside perception lights the street
    Yours the campfire that mocks the sun
    Never met anyone outside your head who didn’t shimmer fragile timber
    What I mean Woody is you look swell
    Like them Indian lakes in summer
    Air kisses on a nudist clipboard, offbeat green tops o’ trees
    Everything Ritz crackers in the polluted lake wrappers
    Blue Moon mobile homes for the executive cornhuskers shimmering a song
    Cigarette snorkel on fishlip puffing dawn

     

     

    Removing the Obelisk

     

    From immediate dictation
    and against my will

     

    “I”s the most embarrassing
    character in the world
    a deflector from antiquity
    pretending to be italic

     

    Just another mook on Hungry Hill

     

    “I wanna got to collage
    I want sun on the phone
    to talk me down from here
    Nice embalmer. Easy Boy!”

     

    Fucks it have to do with me?
    This crown ain’t small enough
    for the both of us?
    Gets so downright overused jellyglass
    one has to laugh

     

    Another thing those bones do
    — make your bed

     

    Lump back in on the jungle chaise
    Apache horsefly
    — Hi little soon to be dead buzz!

     

    Later silence
    the only visitor from another

     

    Parental Guidance

     

    Amnesia sweat the emptiness

     

    composed of sponges Darryl
    Adam Ahab DeGroot
    petroglyphs of gringotude
    a near myth childhood hovercraft
    near a 16 foot insect

     
    Die Meistersingerpouts so

     

    stream of air might partly stroke
    goldfish theories of Cliquot

     
    Jugglers with a ducking movement

     

    limberdemain over fruit floors
    lip an osculation on the glass kisser
    from the suicidal kissery, a squeegee
    mops any loss of face

     
    Out bunkers in addition to the standard

     

    facilities provided for comfort have
    cuspidors for the use of psychiatrists
    strategically sick at heart, nowadays sick

     
    A boy’s own wax among his bees

     

    and shrapnell blowing salve
    on the conjured static, spangled
    auras clocked on the draw

     
    Out Padres of the dormitory

     

    contagion on the hour

     

    The Permanence of Whim to Providence

     

    Begin in Purgatory where Lamb rassles Chasm
    and faults shoot halter of their fanfaronade
    nixing any Vita Nuova dynamo nictate deal

     

    Then rent a capsicum and travel nonpareil
    through the Baboon Lancet
    the equipage of a whoop anticipating sinkers
    of a low-rent wagonette in a Dexter diluvium

     

    Cocoon-steaming the small tales of croupiers
    and piazzas yawned at the local salutation
    where Brad Bibbler sucks his Beggar’s Double
    quick as lily over the paddy in a strabismus off Pulp Space

     

    Young Orchards of heartburn licking the salt misogamist
    as you turn spangle and motor
    towards Sutton, sunburn and snail
    thievish as a gospel lottery heard on the racket outside Lack

     

    The low rider ruin of Chickasaw Chepachets
    turbo charging browsers through the ghetto streaks
    damsons lit up like hooves of despite in twaddle
    blue denim brooks across their chests

     

    Or right here in Blackstone your everlastings
    ignoring the dry bones of that stranded drench
    where rain actuaries begin their lament

     

  • “The Geographics: Step Five” and “The Geographics: Step Six”

    Albert Mobilio

     

    The Geographics: Step Five

     

    Antennae lie buried beneath the floor because the reception is better that way. The airwaves brought us crumbs & pocket change but nothing worth diving in for. We learned whoever pounds the rock makes fire, and whoever plows the flame grows their own flaw. Instinct rode us down, looted our conversation, kept us in our seats. That’s why we cannot listen to these unwrapped winds and murmurs.

     

    It’s dark now. It was dark when we started out. The moon is a crooked tooth buried in the sky’s smoke stained roof. Over time you changed my system and now I feel like something northern has happened to us.

     

    They’ve left me some taste of mental health. Up in the old hat factory a miniature horse circles a track. Final exams are held between laps; that’s when they test our spoiled grey faces for muscular decisions. We learn how to hold our ass in place, to shake nickels into dimes. A routine physical disclosed how I had been screwed up by savage cooking, the kind done with pencils and safety pins.

     

    I titled her the same way she authored me — with bitten facts dealt like marked cards. She raked back her hair so she could bend to her task, and that’s when I felt left out. The forecast called for black ice and dark coughs. An army of starlings broke ranks when some dust blew down from the hills. She was waving from the porch but I stayed clean in a rented van.

     

    The paper that cut me was white bond. The fair and chiseled marble remains visible in the way she conjugates her nerves like Henry James. Behind the gas tanks, underneath the carnival tent, or any place where temperature accumulates, a gorgeous pinch of cypress leaves can be hidden. I am summoned by their scent. Out there in the blood thick mist, a cicada drones. Or is it the arrival of my gift of mourning tongues?

     

    The Geographics: Step Six

     

    Where does the world leave its dying heat? On the Lido, in the stone and stucco courtyards? Does it create mechanic pressures among the city’s darkened swirls? One day the gifts we bought will remind us of arriving in an early morning rain, of that balcony, and of an argument we had behind its beveled glass doors. If we had acted like we belonged, no one would have asked us for our tickets.

     

    Some call it a station but he knows it’s a terminal. The train falters in another state, so he swallows and waits until the new pills are proved upon his pulse. He believes his watch is about to burst. The platform is crowded with petals, the tracks hum with a distant approach, and welding sparks lift a small awning of yellow light above two workmen in the tunnel’s gloom. He saw this and knew he had become the ticket-of-leave apostle.

     

    I unwrapped a new thesaurus and looked up a synonym for the word desicate but I ended up feeling sad because every word was chained to another. The toxin bled through the old school halls; neon stained snow fell forever in the streets outside.

     

    Meeting in rooms. Look at my sofa, listen to my lamp. I live here in an ice-age marriage to my open floor. No one prepares you for this. You get booklets, brochures, and hints from other tourists, but nothing helps. When I turned the dial to the left, there was a rumba; when I turned right, it was cha-cha-cha, but your purple-heart treason has worn my footwork down to a walk.

     

    Covered in smoke, buried beneath a painted cowboy-sky, the sun roars through your hair. You once lived a magazine life, then you entered the pedestrian crosswalk that stilled you. Come to me, speak through my microphone scars and soon we will be such lovers I will be able to hear you tanning on the roof. You will smuggle my complaint across your border and we will finally begin to burn where it counts.

     

  • Buffalo and Marshmallows

    John Yau

     

    Buffalo and Marshmallows

     

    It’s an old glory when a toenail crocodile
    named Greta Gabo

     

    boasts that any tall
    thumb tucking

     

    pimple popper
    still in touch

     

    with the bottom of his atavistic roots
    will soon be rented out

     

    to the King of pencil Toads
    and his last iron caravan

     

    Dairy wolves howl
    at empty spoon

     

    while I sleep in black mall
    lily padded trailer park

     

    answer the second
    second

     

    I’m stalled in a parallel stupor
    squeezed between

     

    red hurt of a fall potato
    and blue stones of a part-time seed shifter

     

    I’m one of the jilted
    eager to bite the crust

     

    I plead with what’s left of the steam engine
    because I know it’s soft pajamas

     

    being one of the flies
    A free sample sniffing around

     

    the tattered drums of the effluvial honey
    You get to count creamy blots and carpet burns

     

    transmit grains of junked passion
    to the weekend handwarmers

     

    west of Sandusky, Ohio
    adopted home of tormented petal pushers

     

    one charm boxers and retired log nuts
    the whole glad parking lot of idle fun seekers

     

    You even score the church fire
    and pray to the invisible camera

     

    You get down on your full grown knees
    and you begin to stay

     

    In better times, I lived on a bingo farm
    ate off a checkerboard

     

    Each morning, I baked out the stains
    and flicked drivel into the yard

     

  • “Hauntings,” “Temples and Follies,” and “A Reading”

    Virginia Hooper

     

    Hauntings

     

    The hauntings laced themselves into another year,
    Grew into miracles and fertilized the grass.
    Spinning absent-mindedly,

     

    A thump and a rattle intercepting my dream,
    I clutched in fury to my story,
    And, uncertain on which side of the glass I had landed,

     

    I turned the page to the first window and climbed through.
    A cord by which a weight is suspended
    To test the perpendicularity or depth of a thought.

     

    Anything resembling a plume or feather. To adorn, dress,
    Or furnish with plumes. The thread had vanished
    Through the maze lined with brilliant blue, an opulence

     

    Amazing as the strutting peacock crossing my path.
    The hauntings came more frequently,
    Settled across the lawn, warmed the eaves. Is this the lesson

     

    We were destined to create, tracing sweet edges onto everything,
    Legibly exchanging all the fettered excuses
    With a lovelier version dangling off into the clear deep pool?

     

    A division or boundary marked or conceived
    Between adjoining areas. The cord plumbed my ignorance.
    The plot stretched endlessly, they reported, endlessly

     

    Repeating what came to me one evening
    Persuading the windows to cloud,
    the stars to brighten, the moon to retreat demurely behind

     

    A dark sense of urgency. As though the mist itself were a mirth
    Yet grounded into body. Demanded in haste,
    Given under duress, a rattled mention remained for dinner

     

    Clearing the table until the chairs were neatly arranged
    For company. We invited only those missing
    All sense of propriety. All cleverness concealed. All desserts aflame

     

    With sweetened promises wrapped in tinsel foil
    Tucked under the waiting pillow. The room was elsewhere.
    The explanation unravelled beyond my understanding,

     

    Hedged the border with a wait and see attitude.
    Every applicant was scrutinized as a potential messenger.
    But me, that was the problem. Me. Trespasser

     

    Pressed into service by an aimless habit, a nagging
    Obsession drawing me back to the entrance. Relentlessly crippling
    My desire to move on. Relentlessly sending me on

     

    An errand that folded me back upon myself.
    Was this the curse of my preoccupation?
    Or merely my blessing. To mingle and combine

     

    So as to obscure or harmonize the varying components,
    The concerns, they called them, compulsions pushing through
    The soil until a garden emerged, organized

     

    And flowered new responsibilities — life, they said —
    Kept me awake all night. The river remained the same.
    But more and more, so did I. Looking the part,

     

    Aimless but energized by a new vision
    Acquired in darkness, stuffed into my pockets and taken home.
    A fortified watchtower, squinting against the light,

     

    Caught in the middle of the sacred chamber
    Whose floors were laid with marble,
    Whose walls held special insight into a vision

     

    Pared for comfort, shaved and scaled to match the era,
    Chimed the hours. Measured in the stone
    Of an old extravagance, a mystery reverberating the present

     

    Until lights sing, darkness speaks the spell
    Lingering in the confusion, as though the hauntings
    Were Enlightenment itself. The distance to be travelled

     

    At any cost, its systems and roads mapping vast
    Expanses of mind over matter — a mere restoration
    Supporting the vaulted roof. These copies

     

    And originals identical. Looking for some way in,
    Circling the distance to be travelled,
    I thumbed through these illustrations of the profound.

     

    The cord weighed heavily upon me, sunk deeper
    Than my memory allowed. Than my mother allowed.
    The cord pulled me back to the old intersection,

     

    Laid me bare to be dressed in the plumes of her intrigue.
    But was I the trespasser? Lured back again
    With the knowledge gleaned from experience, the old promise

     

    Made by us both. To encircle by winding or weaving,
    Endlessly revolving back to the place of origin.
    The logic and elegance of the interior carried me

     

    Through its argument, an alphabet building
    Its own structure to house an idea hidden
    In these secret vaults. I wandered aimlessly.

     

    Here was design trimmed to fit
    The particular niches of the puzzle, a maze of concentration
    Broken only by generations turning the soil.

     

    The thought stood perpendicular as a stave
    Beside me, a mechanism assigning me greater responsibility,
    A trick played well, posted as sentry.

     

    They say crusaders were killed endlessly flitting and filing away
    The various pieces of the puzzle, sited upon
    An inhospitable terrain, just inside the encircling logic

     

    Nature obeys. The temple had been filled with sand,
    A castle subject to erosion. These were visions
    We had to learn, to leave, to stand outside the threshold

     

    And peer through. A story half as old as time
    Traced back to a source, then broken off.
    As much for the onlooker as the maker.

     

    A buried circular staircase, circling toward the obscure
    But recorded section of a vision sketched into stone.
    The fortune lay scrolled inward toward the reader,

     

    Its clear message left as a last minute impulse
    To render clear the clouded window
    Parted for that breath of air, the first glimpse.

     

    Temples and Follies

     

    Small temples and follies in the woods,
    The feeling soon passes
    Into extinction, or was it merely the fact

     

    We reconsidered the labor of love — the rapture
    Of reaching journey’s end when respite
    Can’t be sought through an intricate network
    Of hedged corridors, or on summer nights it took us through,

     

    Sudden views of the vanished lake.
    Houses should be lived in again and the landscape
    Returned, which we discovered

     

    Had been designed to rival Hope’s End serene romance.
    The residents are always free to roam.
    The feeling soon passes,
    But respite can be sought as a labor of love

     

    As all rooms share a graded vista
    Restoring journey’s end when the guests arrive,
    The original owners of the house.

     

    A Reading

     

    You are impatient, says the oracle.
    The weather has arrived cloudy, another’s day’s conclusion
    Shot with unraveling paths set back

     

    From the shore. An ocean’s breeze reshuffles the cards
    Across the deck, disorder restored to pattern,
    A chance you pattern yourself toward.

     

    Prompted to rethink your question,
    Which might, with grace, lift you above the determined
    Arrangement currents have washed you against,

     

    You play another hand. A chance you pattern yourself
    Against lifts back through selves
    You have assumed, fools sprung from oracle

     

    Beginnings, framed inside the gold-leaf border
    Of the cards played in patience
    When it wasn’t in the cards to share the evening

     

    With another. And what of crossed destiny?
    Teased out of solitaire, prompted by impatience,
    You think you have been courted by the cards.

     

    Strange, how this pattern unravels
    Inside the tale arranged for the oracle’s pleasure,
    A link, after all, you think.

     

  • One or Two Ghosts for One or Two Lines

    tall blank zebras appear

     

                     A

    To care. The aerogramme made a lily of necessity,
    stumped box, redolence ribboned far off in the glass
    cities I opened and closed to the dandy
    drawers. A colt emerged on a clotted pansy. A pan
    required fanning. This repose a thread files.
    Inside the spitting rope sweeps
    like a foppish knot or lighthouse,
    a beam where the sun withers like snow
    in its box of jewels. Like a towel-like now.

     

    tiny broom zippers boxed

     

                     Z

    Light as a ruler, I knitted the whiffing train to coverlet.
    Dark, I had my lips. They travel apart when I kiss.
    Exonerated groove. The captioned stock box
    waved to the master’s bedroom.
    Clacked suds. All flaking tide and shout
    was music walking out a headlamp.
    Engined isthmus, emerged track of levels, it could be
    nice. The pubescent birdie sleeps
    in a closed head. So,
    it knows or it knows.
    A crumb held out a mighty
    citron in a beak, screwed backwards.
    But no ox sniffled to an owl
    or stockinged box strum through bedroom.

  • Two Poems

     

     

    One And where did the Dutch get their vocabulary?
    A “generation and transition” company make the
    water muddy. Transitional generation in company
    of a muddy mere formality: or was it going Dutch,
    in transmission to transition? A mere formality of Dutch,
    a merely formal vocabulary, to be used “in company”
    of Dutch transmissions. My mission was to dutch
    a trans-generation, to formulate transitions.
    Or was it going muddy in the company?
    I threw mud at mimesis, a mere Dutch formality.
    And where did the Dutch get their vocabulary?
    Formerly, the Dutch kept company without vocabulary.
    My former mission was a mere formality,
    but I doubled my Dutch on the company’s transmission.

     

     
    Two Primitive haze or composite rejection?
    Such training requires persistence–
    a fateful hour, a stupid wheel, praiseworthy
    annals–the main term “reaction” would be
    retained, though searching for innocuous
    phenomena. It was not enough to have
    a patternbook, a dictatorship, or to claw walls
    looking for paint. Returning to the decoding end:
    you make it more cryptic. I’ll pant effectively.
    Roughly, in the rough, we are roughing it.
    This happens when I forget to differentiate–
    a false proposition of the first order.
    Or say: “When you hate maps, you hate the future.”
    Our lines are at stake in the border.

  • Anouncements & Advertisements

     

     

     

    Every issue of Postmodern Culture will carry notices of events, calls for papers, and other announcments, up to 250 words, free of charge. Advertisements will also be published on an exchange basis. Send anouncements and advertisements to:

     

    pmc@jefferson.village.virginia.edu

     


    Journal and Book Announcements:

     

    1)Essays in Postmodern Culture
    2)Black Ice Books
    3)Black Sacred Music: A Journal of Theomusicology
    4)Centennial Review
    5)Chicago Journal of Theoretical Computer Science
    6)College Literature
    7)Contention
    8)Differences
    9)Discourse
    10)Electronic Journal on Virtual Culture
    11)Eternal Network: A Mail Art Anthology
    12)GENDERS
    13)Hot Off the Tree
    14)Information Technology and Disabilities
    15)Inter-Society for Electronic Arts
    16)M/E/A/N/I/N/G
    17)Minnesota Review
    18)Modern Fiction Studies
    19)MTV Killed Kurt Cobain
    20)Nomad
    21)October
    22)RHETNET: A Cyberjournal for Rhetoric and Writing
    23)RIF/T
    24)SSCORE
    25)Studies in Popular Culture
    26)TDR
    27)Tonguing the Zeitgeist
    28)Virus 23
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    32)Representations
    33)Human Computer Interaction Laboratory (University of Maryland, College Park), 11th annual symposium and open house
    34)Hypertext Fiction and the Literary Artist
    35)Journal of Criminal Justice and Popular Culture
    36)The Little Magazine: Work, Writing, Electronic Space, Cyborg Performance and Poetics
    37)National Symposium on Proposed Arts and Humanities Policies for the National Information Infrastructure
    38)Postmodern Culture: A SUNY Series
    39) PSYCHE
    40)Research on Virtual Relationships
    41)Sixties Generations: From Montgomery to Vietnam; an interdisciplinary meeting of Scholars, Artists, and Activists
    42)Splinter
    43)STYLE: Possible Worlds, Virtual Reality, and Postmodern Fiction
    44)Undercurrent

     

    Networked Discussion Groups:

     

    45)FEMISA: Feminism, Gender, International Relations_
    46)HOLOCAUS: Holocaust List
    47)NewJour-L
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    Research Programs:

     

    50)Deadlines for NEH Programs, Seminars, and Fellowships

     

    Resources:

     

    51)Gopheur Litteratures
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    Other:

     

    54)Spelunk with International Artist
    55) Mark Taylor and Esa Saarinen, Imagologies

     



         ESSAYS IN POSTMODERN CULTURE:

     

     . . . Now Cordless

     

    An anthology of essays from Postmodern Culture is available in print from Oxford University Press. The works collected here constitute practical engagements with the postmodern–from AIDS and the body to postmodern politics. Writing by George Yudice, Allison Fraiberg, David Porush, Stuart Moulthrop, Paul McCarthy, Roberto Dainotto, Audrey Ecstavasia, Elizabeth Wheeler, Bob Perelman, Steven Helmling, Neil Larsen, David Mikics, Barrett Watten. Book design by Richard Eckersley.

     

    ISBN: 0-19-508752-6 (hardbound)
    0-19-508753-4 (paper)

     

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         BLACK ICE BOOKS

     

    Black Ice Books is a new alternative trade paperback series that will introduce readers to the latest wave of dissident American writers. Breaking out of the bonds of mainstream writing, the voices published here are subversive, challenging and provocative. The first four books include:

     

    Avant-Pop: Fiction for a Daydream Nation
    Edited by Larry McCaffery, this book is an assemblage of innovative fiction, comic book art, unique graphics and various other unclassifiable texts by writers like Samuel Delany, Mark Leyner, William Vollmann, Kathy Acker, Eurdice, Stephen Wright, Derek Pell, Harold Jaffe, Tim Ferret, Ricardo Cortez Cruz and many others.

     

     

    “One of the least cautious, nerviest editors going, Larry McCaffery is the No-Care Bear of American Letters.”

    — William Gibson.

     

    “A clusterbomb of crazy fiction, from a generation too sane to repeat yesterday’s lies.”

    — Tom Robbins

     

    New Noir
    Stories by John Shirley

     

    John Shirley bases his stories on his personal experience of extreme people and extreme mental states, and on his struggle with the seduction of drugs, crime, prostitution and violence.

     

    “John Shirley is an adventurer, returning from dark and troubled regions with visionary tales to tell.”

    — Clive Barker

     

    The Kafka Chronicles
    a novel by Mark Amerika

     

    The Kafka Chronicles is an adventure into the psyche of an ultracontemporary twentysomething guerilla artist who is lost in an underworld of drugs and mental terrorism, where he encounters an unusual cast of angry yet sensual characters

     

    “Mr Amerika–if indeed that is his name–has achieved a unique beauty in his artful marriage of Blake’s lyricism and the iron- in-the-soul of Celine. Are we taking a new and hard-hitting Antonin Artaud? Absolutely. And much more.”

     

    –Terry Southern

     

    Revelation Countdown
    by Cris Mazza

     

    Stories that project onto the open road not the nirvana of personal freedom but rather a type of freedom more resembling loss of control.

     

    “Talent jumps off her like an overcharge of electricity.”

    –LA Times

     

    Discount Mail-Order Information:
    You can buy these books directly from the publisher at a discount. Buy one for $7, two for $13, three for $19 or all four for $25. We pay US postage! (Foreign orders add $2.50 per book.)

     

    ___ Avant-Pop

    ___ New Noir

    ___ The Kafka Chronicles

    ___ Revelation Countdown

     

    Please make all checks or money orders payable to:

     

    Fiction Collective Two
    Publications Unit
    Illinois State University
    Normal, IL 61761

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         Black Sacred Music: A Journal of Theomusicology

     

    Presenting the proceedings of an important conference held in Blantyre, Malawi in November of 1992, this volume represents a significant step for the African Christian church toward incorporating indigenous African arts and culture into it liturgy. Recognizing that the African Christian church continues to define itself in distinctly Western terms, forty-nine participants from various denominations and all parts of Africa– Uganda, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Madagascar, Mauritius, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Sierra Leone, Cameroon–and the United States met to share ideas and experiences and to establish strategies for the indigenization of Christianity in African churches.

     

    Other special issues by single copy:

     

    The William Grant Still Reader
    presents the collected writings of this respected American composer. Still offered a perspective on American music and society informed by a diversity of experience and associations that few others have enjoyed. His distinguished career spanned jazz, traditional African-American idioms, and the European avant-garde, and his compositions ranged from chamber music to opera.

     

    Sacred Music of the Secular City
    delves into the American religious imagination by examining the religious roots and historical circumstances of popular music. Includes essays on musicians Robert Johnson, Duke Ellington, Marvin Gaye, Madonna, and 2 Live Crew.

     

    Subscription prices: $30 institutions, $15 individuals. Single issues: $15. Please add $4 for subscription outside the U.S. Canadian residents, add 7% GST.

     

    Duke University Press/Box 90660/Durham NC 27708

     

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         The Centennial Review

     

    Edited by R.K. Meiners

     

    The Centennial Review is committed to reflection on intellectual work, particularly as set in the University and its environment. We are interested in work that examines models of theory and communication in the physical, biological, and human sciences; that re-reads major texts and authoritative documents in different disciplines or explores interpretive procedures; that questions the cultural and social implications of research in a variety of disciplines.

     

    $12/year (3 issues), $18/two years (6 issues)

     

    (Add $4.50 per year for mailing outside the US)

     

    Recent special issue:

     

    Poland: From Real Socialism to Democracy

     

    Please make your check payable to The Centennial Review. Mail to: The Centennial Review
    312 Linton Hall
    Michigan State University
    East Lansing MI 48824-1044

     

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         Chicago Journal of Theoretical Computer Science

     

    Editors: Stuart Kurtz, Michael O’Donnell, and Janos Simon, University of Chicago

     

    “I want to commend both The MIT Press and the MIT Libraries for their vision in publishing the Chicago Journal of Theoretical Computer Science… the North Carolina State University Libraries will be subscribing to this ground-breaking electronic journal. I can assure you that we will do all that we can to make our faculty and students aware of this exciting new publication”

     

    –Susan K. Nutter, Director of
    Libraries, North Carolina State University

     

    Please Join in Our Vision of a New Relationship between Publishers and Libraries

     

    We have a vision that university presses and university libraries, working together, can publish and maintain electronic scholarly journals which provide:

     

    •      Peer-reviewed and high-quality papers
    •      Continuity and name-recognition
    •      Quicker and wider dissemination of information
    •      Enhanced search and retrieval mechanisms
    •      Lower costs than print journals
    •      Guaranteed future access to the contents

     

    The journal will publish high-quality, peer-reviewed articles in theoretical computer science and is designed to meet the following needs:

     

    •      The scholar’s desire for quicker peer review and dissemination of research results; 
    •      The library’s need to develop systems and structures to deal with electronic journals and know to what degree electronic journals might relieve budget pressures; 
    •      The publisher’s need to develop an economic and a user model for electronic dissemination of scholarly journals.

     

    Ground-Breaking:

     

    •      Published by an established journals publisher, the MIT Press, working with the MIT Libraries to guarantee library concerns are addressed; 
    •      Committed to publishing a level of quality equivalent to standard print journals with the goal of increasing acceptance of electronic publication in the tenure review process; 
    •      Committed to fast turnaround in the peer review process in order to attract high-quality manuscripts and communicate research results more quickly to the scholarly community; 
    •      Sold on a subscription basis for fees comparable to standard print journals to both libraries and individuals in an effort to develop an economic model that will encourage publishers to develop electronic journals (initial subscription prices of $125/year for institutions and $30/year for individuals); 
    •      Published on the basis of trust in libraries and scholars to pay for what they use and to follow established copyright and fair use guidelines; 
    •      Archived at MIT Libraries and University of Chicago with commitment to keep text compatible with latest standards, and assurance of authoritative version of text.

     

    What a Subscriber Gets:

     

    •      Article-by-article publication, beginning with approximately 15 articles in 1994 (equivalent to a triannual standard paper journal) and including possible paper delivery if demanded by customers; 
    •      Notification by e-mail of article title, author, and abstract when articles are ready, and the ability to retrieve them from the Press’s WAIS server via FTP or gopher, in either LaTex source file or Postscript form; 
    •      Articles published with an associated file of forward pointers for referral to subsequent papers, results, and improvements that are relevant to the published article; 
    •      Advertisements and notices available upon request from file server at MIT; 
    •      Access to continually updated archive located at MIT.

     

    As a Library Subscriber you have permission to:

     

    •      Store the Journal on any file server under your control, and make it available online to the local community to print or download copies; 
    •      Print out individual articles and other items for inclusion in your periodical collection; 
    •      Place the Journal on the campus network for access by local users or post article listings and notices on the network to inform your users of what is available; 
    •      Print out individual articles and other items from the Journal for the personal scholarly use of readers; 
    •      Print out articles and other items for storage on reserve if requested by professor, student, or university staff; 
    •      Share print or electronic copy of the Journal with other libraries under standard inter-library loan procedures; 
    •      Convert material from the Journal to another medium (i.e. microfilm/fiche/CD) for storage.

    For subscription information please contact:

     

    journals-orders@mit.edu
     
     

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    •      College Literature
      A Triannual Literary Journal for the Classroom

     

    Edited by Kostas Myrsiades

     

    A triannual journal of scholarly criticism dedicated to serving the needs of College/University teachers by providing them with access to innovative ways of studying and teaching new bodies of literature and experiencing old literature in new ways.

     

    “Congratulations on some extremely important work; you certainly seem attuned to what is both valuable and relevant.”

     

    –Terry Eagleton
    –Oxford University

     

    “In one bold stroke you seem to have turned _College Literature_ into one of the things everyone will want to read.”

     

    –Cary Nelson

     

    “A journal one must consult to keep tabs on cultural theory and contemporary discourse, particularly in relation to pedagogy.”

     

    –Robert Con Davis

     

    Forthcoming issues:

     

    Third World Women’s Literature
    African American Writing
    Cross-Cultural Poetics

     

    Subscription Rates:      US                  Foreign
             Individual      $24.00/year         $29.00/year
             Institutional:  $48.00/year         $53.00/year
    
    

    Send prepaid orders to:College Literature
    Main 544
    West Chester University
    West Chester, PA 19383
    (215)436-2901 / (fax) (215)436-3150

     

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    •      CONTENTION: Debates in Society, Culture, and Science

     

    Contention is:

     

    “…simply a triumph from cover to cover.”
    Fredrick Crews

     

    “…the most exciting new journal that I have ever read.”
    Lynn Hunt

     

    “…an important, exciting, and very timely project.”
    Theda Skocpol

     

    “…an idea whose time has come.”
    Robert Brenner

     

    “…serious and accessible.”
    Louise Tilly

     

    Subscriptions (3 issues) are available to individuals at $25.00 and to institutions at $50.00 (plus $10.00 for foreign surface postage) from:

     

    Journals Division
    Indiana University Press
    601 N. Morton
    Bloomington IN 47104
    ph: (812) 855-9449
    fax: (812) 855-7931

     

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    •      Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies

     

    QUEER THEORY: LESBIAN AND GAY SEXUALITIES
    (Volume 3, Number 2)
    Edited by Teresa de Lauretis

     

    Teresa de Lauretis: Queer Theory: Lesbian and Gay Sexualities An Introduction

    Sue Ellen Case: Tracking the Vampire

    Samuel R. Delany: Street Talk/Straight Talk

    Elizabeth A. Grosz: Lesbian Fetishism?

    Jeniffer Terry: Theorizing Deviant Historiography

    Thomas Almaguer: Chicano Men: A Cartography of Homosexual Identity and Behavior

    Ekua Omosupe: Black/Lesbian/Bulldagger

    Earl Jackson, Jr.: Scandalous Subjects: Robert Gluck’s Embodied Narratives

    Julia Creet: Daughter of the Movement: The Psychodynamics of Lesbian S/M Fantasy

     

    THE PHALLUS ISSUE
    (Volume 4, Number 1)
    Edited by Naomi Schor and Elizabeth Weed

     

    Maria Torok: The Meaning of “Penis Envy” in Women (1963)

    Jean-Joseph Goux: The Phallus: Masculine Identity and the “Exchange of Women”

    Parveen Adams: Waiving the Phallus

    Kaja Silverman: The Lacanian Phallus

    Charles Bernheimer: Penile Reference in Phallic Theory

    Judith Butler: The Lesbian Phallus and the Morphological Imaginary

    Jonathan Goldberg: Recalling Totalities: The Mirrored Stages of Arnold Schwarzenegger

    Emily Apter: Female Trouble in the Colonial Harem

     

    Single Issues: $12.95 individuals
                   $25.00 institutions
                   ($1.75 each postage)

     

    Subscriptions (3 issues): $28.00 individuals
                              $48.00 institutions
                              ($10.00 foreign surface postage)

     

    Send orders to:

     

    Journals Division
    Indiana University Press
    601 N Morton
    Bloomington IN 47404
    ph: (812) 855-9449
    fax: (812) 855-7931

     

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    •      DISCOURSE
      Volume 15, Number 1

     

    SPECIAL ISSUE

     

    FLAUNTING IT: LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES

     

    Kathryn Baker:
    Delinquent Desire: Race, Sex, and Ritual in Reform Schools for Girls

     

    Terralee Bensinger:
    Lesbian Pornography: The Re-Making of (a) Community

     

    Scott Bravmann:
    Investigating Queer Fictions of the Past: Identities, Differences, and Lesbian and Gay Historical Self-Representations

     

    Sarah Chinn and Kris Franklin:
    “I am What I Am” (Or Am I?): Making and Unmaking of Lesbian and Gay Identity in High Tech Boys

     

    Greg Mullins:
    Nudes, Prudes, and Pigmies: The Desirability of Disavowal in Physical Culture Magazine

     

    JoAnn Pavletich:
    Muscling the Mainstream: Lesbian Murder Mysteries and Fantasies of Justice

     

    David Pendelton:
    Obscene Allegories: Narrative Structures in Gay Male Porn

     

    Thomas Piontek:
    Applied Metaphors: AIDS and Literature

     

    June L. Reich:
    The Traffic in Dildoes: The Phallus as Camp and the Revenge of the Genderfuck

     

     

    Single Issues: $12.95 individuals
                   $25.00 institutions
                   ($1.75 each postage)

     

    Subscriptions (3 issues): $25.00 individuals
                              $50.00 institutions
                              ($10.00 foreign surface postage)

    Send orders to:

     

    Journals Division
    Indiana University Press
    601 N Morton
    Bloomington IN 47404
    ph: (812) 855-9449
    fax: (812) 855-7931

     

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    •      The Electronic Journal on Virtual Culture

     

    We are very pleased by the great interest in the Electronic Journal on Virtual Culture. There are already more than 1,850 people subscribed.

     

    Our first issue was distributed in March 1993. The future looks very interesting. Editors are working on Special Issues on education, law, qualitative research, and dynamics in virtual culture.

     

    The Electronic Journal on Virtual Culture (EJVC) is a refereed scholarly journal that fosters, encourages, advances and communicates scholarly thought on virtual culture. Virtual culture is computer-mediated experience, behavior, action, interaction and thought, including electronic conferences, electronic journals, networked information systems, the construction and visualization of models of reality, and global connectivity.

     

    EJVC is published monthly. Some parts may be distributed at different times during the month or published only occasionally (e.g. CyberSpace Monitor). If you would be interested in writing a column on some general topic area in the Virtual Culture (e.g. an advice column for questions about etiquette, technology, etc. ?) or have an article to submit or would be interested in editing a special issue contact Ermel Stepp Editor-in-Chief of Diane Kovacs Co-Editor at the e-mail addresses listed below. You can retrieve the file EJVC AUTHORS via anonymous ftp to

     

    byrd.mu.wvnet.edu

    (pub/ejvc) or via e-mail to

    listserv@kentvm
     
     

    or

     

    listserv@kentvm.kent.edu
     

     

    Cordially,

     

    Ermel Stepp, Marshall University, Editor-in-Chief

     

    MO34050@Marshall.wvnet.edu
     
     

    Diane (Di) Kovacs, Kent State University, Co-Editor

     

    DKOVACS@Kentvm.Kent.edu
     
     

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    •      Eternal Network: A Mail Art Anthology

     

    “Eternal Network: A Mail Art Anthology” by Chuck Welch is to be published in Fall 1994 by University of Calgary Press. The 42 chapter, 350 page text includes an index, 147 illustrations and six major appendices including the largest extensive listing of underground mail art zines in existence. A thorough listing of nearly 100 international private and institutional mail art archives appears in another important appendice.

     

    But what is mail art? Mail art is a paradox in the way it reverses traditional definitions of art; the mailbox and computer replace the museum, the address becomes the art, and the mailman brings home the avant-garde to mail artists in the form of correspondence art, e-mail art, artistamps, postcards, conceptual projects, and collaborations. “Eternal Network introduces readers to a lively exchange with international mail art networkers from five continents. The book include snail mail and e-mail addresses, fax, and telephone numbers for many active mail artists. Readers are invited to participate — to corresponDANCE with global village artists who quickstep beyond establishment boundaries of art.

     

    Among the forty-two distinguished contributors appearing in “Eternal Network” are New York City art critic Richard Kostelanetz; physicist, poet Bern Porter; Director of the Museum of Modern Art Library, Clive Phillpot; famed Fluxus artists Dick Higgins and Ken Friedman; University of Iowa art historian and archival director Estera Milman, and mail art patron Jean Brown who has collected the world’s largest assemblage of mail art material now undergoing documentation at the Getty Center for the History of Art and the Humanities.

     

    Many of the forty-two chapters appearing in “Eternal Network” are original, unpublished essays pertaining to the origin and history of mail art networking, collaborative aesthetics, new directions for mail art networking in the 1990’s, mail art projects exploring the interconnection of marginal on and off-line networks, mail art criticism and dialogue, and finally, parables, visions, dances, dreams, and poems that articulate the living mythology of mail art.

     

    Edited by Chuck Welch, an active mail artist since 1978, “Eternal Network” makes an important first step towards introducing mail art to non-artists, artists, and academic scholars. For more information send e-mail to

     

    Cathryn.L.Welch@dartmouth.edu
     

    or write to

     

    “Eternal Network” PO Box 978, Hanover, NH 03755
     

    Back

     


    •      GENDERS
      Ann Kibbey, Editor University of Colorado, Boulder

     

    Since 1988, GENDERS has presented innovative theories of gender and sexuality in art, literature, history, music, photography, TV, and film. Today, GENDERS continues to publish both new and known authors whose work reflects an international movement to redefine the boundaries of traditional doctrines and disciplines.

     

    GENDERS is published triannually in Spring, Fall, Winter

     

           Single Copy rates: Individual $9, Institution $14
                      Foreign postage, add $2/copy
           Subscription rates: Individual $24, Institution $40
                 Foreign postage, add $5.50/subscription
    
    

    Send orders to:

     

    University of Texas Box 7819 Austin TX 78713
     

    Back

     


    •      Hot Off the Tree

     

    HOTT — Hot Off The Tree — is a FREE monthly electronic newsletter featuring the latest advances in computer, communications, and electronics technologies. Each issue provides article summaries on new & emerging technologies, including VR (virtual reality), neural networks, PDAs (personal digital assistants), GUIs (graphical user interfaces), intelligent agents, ubiquitous computing, genetic & evolutionary programming, wireless networks, smart cards, video phones, set-top boxes, nanotechnology, and massively parallel processing.

     

    Summaries are provided from the following sources:

     

    Wall Street Journal, New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Washington Post, San Jose Mercury News, Boston Globe, Financial Times (London) …

     

    Time, Newsweek, U.S. News & World Report …

     

    Business Week, Forbes, Fortune, The Economist (London), Nikkei Weekly (Tokyo), Asian Wall Street Journal (Hong Kong) …

     

    over 50 trade magazines, including Computerworld, InfoWorld, Datamation, Computer Retail Week, Dr. Dobb’s Journal, LAN Times, Communications Week, PC World, New Media, VAR Business, Midrange Systems, Byte …

     

    over 50 research journals, including ALL publications of the IEEE Computer and Communications Societies, plus technical journals published by AT&T, IBM, Hewlett Packard, Fujitsu, Sharp, NTT, Siemens, Philips, GEC …

     

    over 100 Internet mailing lists & USENET discussion groups …

     

    plus …

     

    •      listings of forthcoming & recently published technical books; 
    •      listings of forthcoming trade shows & technical conferences; 
    •      company advertorials, including CEO perspectives, tips & techniques, and new product announcements.

     

    BONUS:

     

    Exclusive interviews with technology pioneers … the next two issues feature interviews with Mark Weiser (head of Xerox PARC’s Computer Science Lab) on ubiquitous computing, and Nobel laureate Joshua Lederberg on the information society

     

    TO REQUEST A FREE SUBSCRIPTION, CAREFULLY FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS BELOW

     

    Send subscription requests to:

     

    listserv@ucsd.edu
     

    Leave the “Subject” line blank

     

    In the body of the message input: SUBSCRIBE HOTT-LIST

     

    If at any time you choose to cancel your subscription input: UNSUBSCRIBE HOTT-LIST

     

    Note: Do not include first or last names following “SUBSCRIBE HOTT-LIST” or “UNSUBSCRIBE HOTT-LIST”

     

    The HOTT mailing list is automatically maintained by a computer located at the University of California at San Diego. The system automatically responds to the sender’s return path. Hence, it is necessary to send subscription requests and cancellations directly to the listserv at UCSD. (I cannot make modifications to the list … nor do I have access to the list.) For your privacy, please note that the list will not be rented. If you have problems and require human intervention, contact:

     

    hott@ucsd.edu

     

    The next issue of the reinvented HOTT e-newsletter is scheduled for transmission in late January/early February.

     

    Please forward this announcement to friends and colleagues, and post to your favorite bulletin boards. Our objective is to disseminate the highest quality and largest circulation compunications (computer & communications) industry newsletter.

     

    I look forward to serving you as HOTT’s new editor. Thank you.

     

    David Scott Lewis
    Editor-in-Chief and Book & Video Review Editor
    IEEE Engineering Management Review
    (the world’s largest circulation “high tech” management journal)

     

    Internet address:d.s.lewis@ieee.org
    Tel: +1 714 662 7037
    USPS mailing address: POB 18438
    IRVINE CA 92713-8438
    USA
     

    Back

     


    •      Announcing a New Electronic Journal:INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND DISABILITIES

     

    Below is information about the journal, including the table of contents for Volume I, no. 1, as well as information on editorial staff and explicit instructions for subscribing or using the journal via gopher.

     

    IT&D V1N1 Table of Contents 230 lines

    INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND DISABILITIES

    ISSN 1073-5127

    Volume I, No. 1 January, 1994

     

    ARTICLES

     

    INTRODUCING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND DISABILITIES

    (itdV01N1 mcnulty)

    Tom McNulty, Editor

     

    BUILDING AN ACCESSIBLE CD-ROM REFERENCE STATION

    (itdV01N1 wyatt)

    Rochelle Wyatt and Charles Hamilton

     

    ABSTRACT: This case study describes the development of an accessible CD-ROM workstation at the Washington Library for the Blind and Physically Handicapped. Included are descriptions of hardware and software, as well as selected CD-ROM reference sources. Information is provided on compatibility of individual CD-ROM products with adaptive technology hardware and software.

     

    DEVELOPMENT OF AN ACCESSIBLE USER INTERFACE FOR PEOPLE WHO
    ARE BLIND OR VISION IMPAIRED AS PART OF THE RE-COMPUTERIZATION
    OF ROYAL BLIND SOCIETY (AUSTRALIA)

    (itdV01N1 noonan)

    Tim Noonan

     

    ABSTRACT: In 1991, Royal Blind Society (Australia) and Deen Systems, a Sydney-based software development company, undertook a major overhaul of RBS information systems intended to enhance access to RBS client services as well as employment opportunities for blind and vision impaired RBS staff. This case study outlines the steps taken and principles followed in the development of a computer user interface intended for efficient use by blind and vision impaired individuals.

     

    THE ELECTRONIC REHABILITATION RESOURCE CENTER AT
    ST. JOHN’S UNIVERSITY (NEW YORK)

    (itdV01N1 holtzman)

    Bob Zenhausern and Mike Holtzman

     

    ABSTRACT: St. John’s University in Jamaica, New York, is host to a number of disability-related network information sources and services. This article identifies and describes key sources and services, including Bitnet listservs, or discussion groups, the UNIBASE system which includes real-time online conferencing, and other valuable educational and rehabilitation-related network information sources.

     

    THE CLEARINGHOUSE ON COMPUTER ACCOMMODATION (COCA)

    (itdV01N1 brummel)

    Susan Brummel and Doug Wakefield

     

    ABSTRACT: Since 1985, COCA has been pioneering information policies and computer support practices that benefit Federal employees with disabilities and members of the public with disabilities. Today, COCA provides a variety of services to people within and outside Government employment. The ultimate goal of all COCA’s activities is to advance equitable information environments consistent with non-discriminatory employment and service delivery goals.

     

    DEPARTMENTS

     

    JOB ACCOMMODATIONS

     

    (itdV01N1 jobs)

    Editor: Joe Lazzaro

    lazzaro@bix.com
     
     

    K – 12 EDUCATION

     

    (itdV01N1 k12)

    Editor: Anne Pemberton

    apembert@vdoe386.vak12ed.edu

     

    LIBRARIES

     

    (itdV01N1 library)

    Editor: Ann Neville

    neville@emx.cc.utexas.edu

     

    ONLINE INFORMATION AND NETWORKING

     

    (itdV01N1 online)

    Editor: Steve Noble

    slnobl01@ulkyvm.louisville.edu

     

    CAMPUS COMPUTING

     

    (itdV01N1 campus)

    Editor: Daniel Hilton-Chalfen, Ph.D.

    hilton-chalfen@mic.ucla.edu

     

    Copyright (c 1994) by (IT&D) Information Technology and Disabilities. Authors of individual articles retain all copyrights to said articles, and their permission is needed to reproduce any individual article. The rights to the journal as a collection belong to (IT&D) Information Technology and Disabilities. IT&D encourages any and all electronic distribution of the journal and permission for such copying is expressly permitted here so long as it bears no charge beyond possible handling fees. To reproduce the journal in non-electronic format requires permission of its board of directors. To do this, contact the editor.

     

    EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

     

    Tom McNulty, New York University

    (mcnulty@acfcluster.nyu.edu)

     

    EDITORS

     

    Dick Banks, University of Wisconsin, Stout
    Carmela Castorina, UCLA
    Daniel Hilton-Chalfen, PhD, UCLA
    Norman Coombs, PhD, Rochester Institute of Technology
    Joe Lazzaro, Massachusetts Commission for the Blind
    Ann Neville, University of Texas, Austin
    Steve Noble, Recording for the Blind
    Anne L. Pemberton, Nottoway High School, Nottoway, VA
    Bob Zenhausern, PhD, St. John’s University

     

    EDITORIAL BOARD

     

    Dick Banks, University of Wisconsin, Stout
    Carmela Castorina, UCLA
    Danny Hilton-Chalfen, PhD, UCLA
    Norman Coombs, PhD, Rochester Institute of Technology
    Alistair D. N. Edwards, PhD, University of York, UK
    Joe Lazzaro, Massachusetts Commission for the Blind
    Ann Neville, University of Texas, Austin
    Steve Noble, Recording for the Blind
    Anne L. Pemberton, Nottoway High School, Nottoway, VA
    Lawrence A. Scadden, PhD, National Science Foundation
    Bob Zenhausern, PhD, St. John’s University

     

    ABOUT EASI (EQUAL ACCESS TO SOFTWARE AND INFORMATION)

     

    Since its founding in 1988 under the EDUCOM umbrella, EASI has worked to increase access to information technology by persons with disabilities. Volunteers from EASI have been instrumental in the establishment of Information Technology and Disabilities as still another step in this process. Our mission has been to serve as a resource primarily to the education community by providing information and guidance in the area of access to information technologies. We seek to spread this information to schools, colleges, universities and into the workplace. EASI makes extensive use of the internet to disseminate this information, including two discussion lists:

     
    EASI@SJUVM.STJOHNS.EDU

     

    (a general discussion on computer access) and

     
    AXSLIB-L@SJUVM.STJOHNS.EDU

     

    (a discussion on library access issues). To join either list, send a “subscribe” command to

     
    LISTSERV@SJUVM.STJOHNS.EDU

     

    including the name of the discussion you want to join plus your own first and last name. EASI also maintains several items on the St. Johns gopher under the menu heading “Disability and Rehabilitation Resources”.

     

    For further information, contact the EASI Chair:

     

    Norman Coombs, Ph.D.

     

    NRCGSH@RITVAX.ISC.RIT.EDU

     

    or the EASI office:
    EASI’s phone: (310) 640-3193
    EASI’s e-mail: EASI@EDUCOM.EDU

     

    Individual ITD articles and departments are archived on the St. John’s University gopher. To access the journal via gopher, locate the St. John’s University (New York) gopher. Select “Disability and Rehabilitation Resources,” and from the next menu, select “EASI: Equal Access to Software and Information.” Information Technology and Disabilities is an item on the EASI menu.

     

    To retrieve individual articles and departments by e-mail from the listserv: address an e-mail message to:

     

    listserv@sjuvm.stjohns.edu
     

    leave subject line blank

     

    the message text should include the word “get” followed by the two word file name; for example:

     

    get itdV01N1 contents

     

    Each article and department has a unique filename; that name is listed below the article or department in parentheses. Do NOT include the parentheses with the filename when sending the “get” command to listserv.

     

    NOTE: ONLY ONE ITEM MAY BE RETRIEVED PER MESSAGE; DO NOT SEND MULTIPLE GET COMMANDS IN A SINGLE E-MAIL MESSAGE TO LISTSERV.

     

    To receive the journal regularly, send e-mail to:

    listserv@sjuvm.stjohns.edu
     

    with no subject and either of the following lines of text:
    subscribe itd-toc “Firstname Lastname”
    subscribe idt-jnl “Firstname Lastname”

     

    (ITD-JNL is the entire journal in one e-mail message while ITD-TOC sends the contents with information on how to obtain specific articles.)

     

    To get a copy of the guidelines for authors, send e-mail to:

    listserv@sjuvm.stjohns.edu
     

    with no subject and the following single line of text:
    get author guidelin

    Back

     


    •      Inter-Society for the Electronic Arts

     

    ISEA is the Inter-Society for the Electronic Arts. ISEA coordinates the continued occurence of the International Symposia on Electronic Art (the ISEA Symposia).

     

    1988: Utrecht, Holland

    1990: Groningen, Holland

    1992: Sydney, Australia

    1993: Minneapolis, USA

    1994: Helsinki, Finland

    1995: Montreal, Canada

     

    ISEA publishes a monthly Newsletter, both electronically and as a hard copy. Associate membership is free of charge for one year.

     

    Anyone interrested in membership info, aims and a sample Newsletter, contact

     

    ISEA@SARA.NL

     

    Greetings,
    Wim van der Plas
    ISEA Board

    Back

     


    •      M/E/A/N/I/N/GA Journal of Contemporary Art Issues

     

    M/E/A/N/I/N/G, an artist-run journal of contemporary art, is a fresh, lively, contentious, and provocative forum for new ideas in the arts.

     

    M/E/A/N/I/N/G is published twice a year in the fall and spring.
    It is edited by Susan Bee and Mira Schor.

     

    Subscriptions for

     

    2 ISSUES (1 YEAR):
    $12 for individuals:
    $20 for institutions

     

    4 ISSUES (2 YEARS):
    $24 for individuals;
    $40 for institutions

     

    •      Foreign subscribers please add $10 per year for shipping abroad and to Canada: $5
    •      Foreign subscribers please pay by international money order in U.S. dollars.

     

    All checks should be made payable to Mira Schor

     

    Send all subscriptions to:

     

    Mira Schor
    60 Lispenard Street
    New York, NY 10013

     

    Limited supply of back issues available at $6 each, contact Mira Schor for information.

     

    Distributed with the Segue Foundation and the Solo Foundation

    Back

     


    •      Minnesota Review

     

    Tell your friends! Tell your librarians! The new Minnesota Review‘s coming to town!

     

    Subscriptions are $10 a year (two issues), $20 institutions/overseas. The new Minnesota Review is published biannually and originates from East Carolina University beginning with the Fall 1992 special issue.

     

    Send all queries, comments, suggestions, submissions, and subscriptions to:

     

    Jeffrey Williams, Editor
    Minnesota Review
    Department of English
    East Carolina University
    Greenville, NC 27858-4353

    Back

     


    •      Modern Fiction Studies

     

    MFS, a journal of modern and postmodern literature and culture, announces the following forthcoming special issues:

     

    February, 39.1: “Fiction of the Indian Subcontinent”

    May, 39.3: “Toni Morrison”

    November, 40.1: “The Cultural Politics of Displacement” Barbara Harlow, guest editor

     

    We also continue to accept submissions for forthcoming special issues on “Autobiography, Photography, Narrative,” Timothy Dow Adams, Guest Editor (deadline: April 1, 1994); “Postmodern Narratives (deadline: October 1 1994); “Sexuality and Narrative,” Guest Editor, Judith Roof (deadline: March 1, 1995).

     

    MFS is published quarterly at Purdue University and invites submissions of articles offering theoretical, historical, interdisciplinary, and cultural approaches to modern and contemporary narrative. Authors should submit essays for both special and general issues in triplicate paper copy or duplicate paper copy and IBM-compatible floppy; please include a self- addressed, stamped envelope for the return of submissions. Send submissions to:

     

    Patric O’Donnell
    Editor
    MFS
    Department of English
    Heavilon Hall
    Purdue University
    West Lafayette IN 47907-1389
     

    Address inquiries to the editor at this address or by e-mail at

     

    pod@purccvm (bitnet);
    pod@vm.cc.purdue.edu (Internet)
     

    Subscriptions to MFS are $20 for individuals and $35 for libraries. Back issues are $7 each. Address subscription inquiries to:

     

    Nel Fink
    Circulation Manager
    MFS
    Department of Englis
    h Heavilon Hall
    Purdue University
    West Lafayette IN 47907-1389

    Back

     


    •      MTV Killed Kurt Cobain

     

    Announcing the publication of a mini-multimedia ‘zine, MTV Killed Kurt Cobain, with text, graphic, and sound resource. MTV Killed KC was written and directed by Mark Amerika and produced by Bobby Rabyd for Alternative-X, an electronic publishing enterprise at marketplace.com as Alternative-X

     

    MTV Killed Kurt Cobain can be ftp’d from:

     

    ftp.brown.edu

    in the directory:

    /pub/bobby_rabyd

     

    It is in Storyspace Reader format, a standalone hypermedia template for the Macintosh.

     

    Send queries to

    st001747@brownvm.brown.edu

    Bobby Rabyd

     

    Back

     


    •      NOMAD
      An Interdisciplinary Journal of The Humanities, Arts, And Sciences

     

    Manuscript submissions wanted in all interdisciplinary fields!

     

    NOMAD is a forum for those texts that explore or examine the undefined regions among critical theory, visual arts, and writing. It is a bi-annual, not-for-profit, independent publication for provocative cross-disciplinary work of all cultural types, such as intermedia artwork, metatheory, and experimental writing, as well as literary, theoretical, political, and popular writing. While our editorial staff is comprised of artists and academics in a variety of disciplines, NOMAD strives to operate in a space outside of mainstream academic discourse and without institutional funding or controls.

     

    Manuscripts should not exceed fifteen pages (exclusive of references); any form is acceptable. If possible, please submit manuscripts on 3.5″ Macintosh disks, in either Microsoft Word or MacWrite II format, or by E-mail. Each manuscript submitted on disk must be accompanied by a paper copy. Otherwise, please send two copies of each manuscript. Artwork submitted must be no larger than 8 1/2″ x 11″, and in black and white. PICT, TIFF, GIF, and JPEG files on 3.5″ Macintosh disks are acceptable, if accompanied by a paper copy (or via E-mail, bin-hexed or uuencoded). All artwork must be camera-ready. Submissions by regular mail should include a SASE with sufficient postage attached if return is desired. Diskettes should be shipped in standard diskette mailing packages.

     

    Subscriptions: $9 per year (2 issues)
    Send Manuscripts and Inquiries to:

     

    NOMAD, c/o
    Mike Smith
    406 Williams Hall
    Florida State University
    Tallahassee, Florida, 32306
    msmith@garnet.acns.fsu.edu

     

    “In NOMAD, the rarest combinations of interests are treated with respect and exposed to the eyes of those who can most appreciate them.”

    Back

     


    •      OctoberArt | Theory | Criticism | Politics

     

    The MIT Press

     

    Edited by:  Rosalind Kraus
                Annette Michelson
                Yve-Alain Bois
                Benjamin H.D. Buchloh
                Hal Foster
                Denis Hollier
                John Rajchman

     

    “OCTOBER, the 15-year-old quarterly of social and cultural theory, has always seemed special. Its nonprofit status, its cross- disciplinary forays into film and psychoanalytic thinking, and its unyielding commitment to history set it apart from the glossy art magazines.”

    --Village Voice

     

    As the leading edge of arts criticism and theory today, OCTOBERfocuses on the contemporary arts and their various contexts of interpretation. Original, innovative, provocative, each issue examines interrelationships between the arts and their critical and social contexts.

     

    Come join OCTOBER‘s exploration of the most important issues in contemporary culture. Subscribe Today!

     

    Published Quarterly ISSN 0162-2870. Yearly Rates: Individual $32.00; Institution $80.00; Student (copy of current ID required) and Retired: $22.00. Outside USA add $14.00 postage and handling. Canadians add additional 7% GST. Prepayment is required. Send check payable to OCTOBER drawn against a US bank, MasterCard or VISA number to:

     

    MIT Press Journal / 55 Hayward Street / Cambridge, MA 02142-1399 / TEL: (617) 233-2889 / FAX: (617) 258-6779 / journals-orders@mit.edu

    Back

     


    •      R H E T N E T: A CyberJournal for Rhetoric and Writing

     

    RHETNET Philosophy:

     

    There are numerous places to talk on the Internet, and scholars in all fields are there (and there and there and there) pouring forth rivers of words. Amid the inevitable and voluptuous mundanity of those conversations reside moments of discovery, the fiery and spontaneous generation of knowledge, and even wisdom. These conversations, or parts of them, are worth saving and savoring. If we look at all of literature, including scholarly publication, as being one long, vast, intricate and diverse conversation, then the discussion online can be seen as part of the same discourse. The conversation is migrating to a new media, but the means of (attempting to) provide coherence are still developing.

     

    RHETNET is an effort to adapt the functions of academic print journals to the new environment. Journals simultaneously serve as the medium of conversation and the repository for knowledge. RHETNET serves those purposes, but takes the shape of its native environment: cyberspace.

     

    The project is both radical and conservative. RHETNET provides rhetoric and Internet students and scholars with the means of capturing, contextualizing, searching, and retrieving some of the intriguing and valuable conversations that occur on various parts of the Net, but which currently lie scattered and forgotten in dusty corners of the virtual world. It provides a repository of netscholarship on rhetoric and writing. We envision it as a decentered, organic repository for all the stuff of the Net that is of interest to the rhetoric and writing community, while also including space for various traditional types of scholarly discourse.

     

    RHETNET Purpose:

     

    1.      To act as an archive for Net conversations
            relating to rhetoric and writing.  Few existing
            places of discourse (mailing lists, newsgroups,
            chat systems, MU*s), make an effort to capture
            those conversations in a form that would allow
            them to be reviewed reflectively and commented
            upon in the future.  They lack the archival intent
            that RHETNET provides.
    
    2.      To offer a place for original publication of
            articles and essays.  We're interested in
            retaining some aspects of traditional scholarly
            publishing, or at least exploring the
            possibilities for the co-existence of network and
            print-oriented forms and sensibilities.
    
    3.      To create appropriate help sheets, conference
            tutorials, or workshops on accessing the journal
            and advice that will help new members of the Net.
    
    4.      To promote netscholarship and community.

    RHETNET Editorial Intent

     

    The editorial management group is responsible for coordinating regular publication of refereed articles on rhetoric and writing, particularly as they are constituted in the network environments of a developing cyberspace. As the journal evolves, this traditional structure may meld with the forms of scholarship more native to the Net, the forms that other aspects of the journal discover through exploratory approaches to network publication.

     

    Anyone who is interested in being actively involved in the editorial or technological aspects of the journal is invited to join the editorial management group. Like the various scholarly communities on the Net, the main qualification for joining this effort is interest in writing, rhetoric, poetics, composition and critical theory, pedagogy, and online publication. Institutional credentials are not relevant.

     

    A Listserv list, RHETNT-L@mizzou1.bitnet, has been created to serve this effort, initially as a place to conduct asynchronous discussions about the project. The list is managed by Eric Crump.

     

    To subscribe, send email to

     
    LISTSERV@mizzou1.bitnet
     

    or

     

    LISTSERV@mizzou1.missouri.edu
     

    Leave the subject line blank and in the first line of the note, put:
    sub RHETNT-L Your Name

     

    Anyone who has trouble subscribing should write to Eric at

     
    LCERIC@mizzou1.bitnet

    or

    LCERIC@mizzou1.missouri.edu

     

    Back

     


    •      RIF/T

     

    RIF/T, the electronic poetics journal, is interested in receiving proposals and/or submissions for a forthcoming special issue on Charles Olson.

     

    Inquiries may be sent to:

     

    E-POETRY@UBVM.CC.BUFFALO.EDU
     

    RIF/T is edited by Kenneth Sherwood and Loss Pequen~o Glazier

    Back

     


    •      SSCORESocial Science Computer Review

     

    G. David Garson, Editor
    Ronald Anderson, Co-editor

     

    The official journal of the Social Science Computing Association, SSCORE provides a unique forum for social scientists to acquire and share information on the research and teaching applications of microcomputing. Now, when you subscribe to Social Science Computer Review, you automatically become a member of the Social Science Computing Association.

     

    Quarterly Subscription prices: $48 individual, $80 institutions Single Issue: $20 Please add $8 for postage outside the U.S. Canadian residents add 7% GST

     

    Duke University Press/ Journals Division / Box 90660 /Durham NC 27708

     

    Back

     


    •      Studies in Popular Culture
      Dennis Hall, editor.

     

    Studies in Popular Culture, the journal of the Popular Culture Association in the South and the American Culture Association in the South, publishes articles on popular culture and American culture however mediated: through film, literature, radio, television, music, graphics, print, practices, associations, events–any of the material or conceptual conditions of life. The journal enjoys a wide range of contributors from the United States, Canada, France, Israel, and Australia, which include distinguished anthropologists, sociologists, cultural geographers, ethnomusicologists, historians, and scholars in mass communications, philosophy, literature, and religion.

     

    Please direct editorial queries to the editor:

     

    Dennis Hall
    Department of English
    University of Louisville
    Louisville KY 40292
    tel: (502) 588-6896/0509
    Fax: (502) 588-5055
    Bitnet: DRHALL01@ULKYVM
    Internet: drhall01@ulkvm.louisville.edu
     

    All manuscripts should be sent to the editor care of the

     

    English Department, University of Louisville, Louisville, KY 40292
     

    Please enclose two, double-spaced copies and a self-addressed stamped envelope. Black and White illustrations may accompany the text. Our preference is for essays that total, with notes and bibliography, no more than twenty pages. Documentation may take the form appropriate for the discipline of the writer; the current MLA stylesheet is a useful model. Please indicate if the work is available on computer disk. The editor reserves the right to make stylistic changes on accepted manuscripts.

     

    Studies in Popular Culture is published semiannually and is indexed in the PMLA Annual Bibliography. All members of the Association receive Studies in Popular Culture. Yearly membership is $15.00 (International: $20.00). Write to:

     

    the Executive Secretary
    Diane Calhoun-French
    Academic Dean
    Jefferson Community College-SW
    Louisville, KY 40272
     

    for membership, individual issues, back copies, or sets. Volumes I- XV are available for $225.00.

    Back

     


    •      The Journal of Performance Studies

     

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                 ##|    ##|__##/   ##|  ##\
    ____________ ##|    ######/    ##|  ##\___________

     

    The Journal of Performance StudiesT141 (Spring 1994)

     

    TDR is a journal that explores the diverse world of performance. How does this relate to you? The journal emphasizes the intercultural, and the inter-disciplinary and spans numerous geographical areas and historical periods. TDR addresses performance issues of every kind: theatre, music, dance, entertainment, media, sports, politics, aesthetics of everyday life, games, play, and ritual. TDR is for people in the performing arts, the social sciences, academics, activists and theorists–anyone interested thinking about the “performance” paradigm. The journal, is edited by Richard Schechner of the Department of Performance Studies, New York University, and is published quarterly by MIT Press.

     

    Although TDR is not yet an electronic journal, you can browse through sample articles online and subscribe via e-mail from the Electronic Newsstand or directly from MIT, the publisher (see directions below).

     

    Check out our table of contents:

     

    In This Issue (T141 Spring 1994)

     

    Comments
    TDR & NEA: The Continuing Saga – TDR Comment by Richard

     

    Schechner (editor)
    In Memory of Utpal Dutt – by Sudipto Chatterjee
    In Memory of Robert W. Corrigan – by Richard Schechner

     

    Letters
    Free Giveaway of His Plays – by Richard Foreman
    Marxism, Melodrama, and Theatre Historiography – Dan Gerould responds
    Eelka Lampe Responds to Masakuni Kitazawa
    Native Earth and Jennifer Preston – a letter from Alan Filewood
    Retiring or Recharging? – a letter from Richard E. Kramer

     

    Articles
    Muhammed and the Virgin: Folk Dramatization of Battles Between Moors and Christians – by Max Harris

     

    “A Radiant Smile from the Lovely Lady”: Overdetermined Femininity in “Ladies” Figure Skating – by Abigail M. Feder

     

    Tomas Schmit: A Fluxus Farewell to Perfection – interview by Gunther Berghaus

     

    Going Going Gone: Theatre and American Culture(s) – by Bradley Boney

     

    Whatever Happened to the Sleepy Mexican?: One Way to be a Contemporary Mexican in a Changing World Order – by Yareli Arizmendi

     

    The New World Border: Prophecies for the End of the Century – by Guillermo Gomez-Pena

     

    The Other History of Intercultural Performance – by Coco Fusco

     

    Book Reviews
    Women and Comedy: Rewriting the British Theatrical Tradition (by Susan Carlson) – reviewed by Lizbeth Goodman

     

    Gender in Performance: The Presentation of Difference in the Performing Arts (edited by Laurence Senelick) – reviewed by Kim Marra

     

    The National Stage: Theatre and Culture Legitimation in England, France and American (by Loren Kruger) – reviewed by Susan Manning

     

    Actors and Onlookers: Theater and Twentieth-Century Scientific Views of Nature (by Natalie Crohn Schmitt), The Actor’s Instrument: Body, Theory, State (by Hollis Huston), The End of Acting a Radical View (by Richard Hornby), Acting (by John Harrop) – all reviewed by Phillip B. Zarrilli

     

    Each TDR issue is filled with photographs, artwork, and scripts that illustrate every article. The journal, founded in 1955, is 7 x 10, and a 184 pages per issue.

     

    Come browse and subscribe

     

    1. MIT Press Online
    To access MIT Press Online Catalogs and subscription information:
    telnet techinfo.mit.edu /Around MIT/MIT Press/journals/arts/

     

    You can also access MIT via Gopher in USA/massachusetts/MIT/

     

    To subscribe to TDR through MIT Press, send e-mail to:
    journals-orders@mit.eduMIT Press Journals, 55 Hayward Street, Cambridge, MA
    02142-1399 USA.
    Tel: (617) 253-2889 Fax: (617)258-6779

     

    2. The Electronic Newsstand
    You can browse through an article from our latest issue and
    obtain subscription information on the Electronic
    Newsstand.On Gopher, go to: massachusetts/MIT/Interesting Sites to
    Explore/Electronic Newsstand/all titles/TDR:The Dram
    Review/

     

    To subscribe to TDR through the Electronic Newsstand, send your name and address to:

     

    tdr@enews.com. Or call: 1-800-40-ENEWS.

    Back

     


    •      TONGUING THE ZEITGEIST
      A NEW NOVEL BY LANCE OLSEN

     

    So you want to be a rock’n’roll star? In a tomorrow that isn’t distant enough, you’ll have to sell your soul to MTV to pick up a guitar. And then they’ll start carving you up, making you over in the mega-media image of glitter and bone….

     

    LANCE OLSEN’S many other books include the novel Live from Earth and the first full-length study of the godfather of cyberpunk, William Gibson. His work has appeared in more than 200 magazines and anthologies, among them Mondo 2000, VLS, and Fiction International.

     

    To Order:

     

    Permeable Press 4
    7 Noe Street, Suite 4
    San Francisco, CA 94114
    bcclark@igc.apc.org
     

    ISBN 1-882633-04-0, $11.95

     

    Back

     


    •      VIRUS 23

     

    For those brave souls looking to explore the Secret of Eris, you may wish to check out VIRUS 23.

     

    2 and 3 are even and odd, 2 and 3 are 5, therefore 5 is even and odd.

     

    VIRUS 23 is a codename for all Erisian literature

     

    Don Webb
    6304 Laird Dr.
    Austin TX 78757
    0004200716@mcimail.com
     

    VIRUS 23 is the annual hardcopy publication of A.D.o.S.A, the Alberta Department of Spiritual Affairs.

     

    All issues are available at $7.00 ppd from:

     

    VIRUS 23
    Box 46
    Red Deer, Alberta
    Canada
    T4N 5E7
     

    Various chunks of VIRUS 23 can be found at Tim Oerting’s alt.cyberpunk ftp site (u.washington.edu, in /public/alt.cyberpunk. Check it out).

     

    For more information online contact:

     

    Darren Wershler-Henry
    grad3057@writer.yorku.ca

    Back

     


    •      ViViD Magazine

     

    The first issue of ViViD Magazine is now available. ViViD is a hypertext magazine about experimental writing and creativity in cyberspace. We are actively seeking contributions for the next issue.

     

    The magazine is presented in the colorful, graphics environment of a Windows 3.1 Help File. You will need Windows 3.1 to read the magazine.

     

    The magazine will also be available via anonymous FTP at “ftp.gmu.edu”, to obtain it:

     

    ftp ftp.gmu.edu
     

    username: anonymous
    password: (your email address)

     
    cd pub/library
    binary
    get VIVID1.ZIP

     

    For more information on ViViD, contact the editor, Justin McHale.
    Internet address:

     

    jmchale@gmuvax.gmu.edu

    Back

     


    •      Zines-L

     

    announcing a new list available from:

    listserv@uriacc

     

    To subscribe to Zines-L send a message to:

    listserv@uriacc.uri.edu

     

    on one line type:
    SUBSCRIBE ZINES-L first name last name

    Back

     


    •      Postmodern Culture’s PMC-MOO

     

    PMC-MOO is a service offered (free of charge) by _Postmodern Culture_. PMC-MOO is a real-time, text-based, virtual reality environment in which you can interact with other subscribers of the journal and participate in live conferences. PMC-MOO will also provide access to texts generated by Postmodern Culture and by PMC-TALK, and it will provide the opportunity to experience (or help to design) programs which simulate object- lessons in postmodern theory. PMC-MOO has its own mailing lists on postmodern literature and theory. To connect to PMC-MOO, you must be on the internet. If you have an internet account, you can make a direct connection by typing the command

     

    telnet

     

    hero.village.virginia.edu 7777
     

    at your command prompt. Once you’ve connected to the server, you should receive onscreen instructions on how to log in to PMC-MOO.

     

    If you do not receive these onscreen instructions, but instead find yourself with a straight login: and password: prompt, it means that your telnet program or interface is ignoring the 7777 at the end of the command given above, and you will need to ask your local user-support people how to telnet to a specific port number. If you have the Emacs program on your system and would like information about a customized program for PMC-MOO that uses Emacs, contact pmc@unity.ncsu.edu by e-mail. PMC-MOO is based on the LambdaMOO program, freeware by Pavel Curtis.

     

    Back

     


    •      Representations

     

    New ventures in humanities scholarship

    Published by the University of California Press

     

    ". . . widely recognized as among the most innovative outlets for work
    in literary criticism, art history, and cultural history."
    --Ludmilla Jordanova, Social History of Medicine

    Representations is a quarterly interdisciplinary forum offering imaginative and challenging approaches to the study of culture. Since 1983, Representations has devoted its pages to ground-breaking critical thought.

     

    RECENT SPECIAL ISSUES:

     

    Number 29:  "Entertaining History: American Cinema and Popular
                 Culture," edited by Carol J. Clover and Michael Rogin
    
    Number 30:  "Law and the Order of Culture," edited by Rober Post
    
    Number 31:  "The Margins of Identity in Nineteenth-Century
                 England"
    
    Number 33:  "The New World," edited by Stephen Greenblatt
    
    Number 37: "Imperial Fantasies and Postcolonial Histories"
    
    Number 42:  "Future Libraries," edited by R. Howard Bloch and Carla
                 Hesse

    FORTHCOMING SPECIAL ISSUES IN 1994:

     

    Number 47: Eighteenth-Century Culture

     

    Number 48: New Understandings of Eastern Europe

     

    SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

     

    $33 Individuals
    $23 Students (with copy of ID)
    $62 Institutions
    (add $9.00 for foreign surface postage)

     

    Send orders to:
    Representations
    University of California Press
    2120 Berkeley Way, Berkeley
    CA 94720

     

    Order by Phone (510/642-4191)
    Fax (510/642-9917)

     

    journals@garnet.berkeley.edu
     

    Prices subject to change

     

    Back

     


    •      UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND, COLLEGE PARK
      HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION LABORATORY
      11th ANNUAL SYMPOSIUM & OPEN HOUSE

     

    June 13, 1994
        Laying the Foundation for the Information Super Highway:
        Human-Computer Interaction Research
    
    June 14, 1994
        Superteaching in the Electronic Classroom:
        Concepts, Design and Evaluation
    
    June 14, 1994
        Interfaces to Imagination:
        Art, Music, and Poetry in the Digital Village
    
    Sponsored by
        Center for Automation Research University of Maryland
    
    with additional support from
            Computer Science Center
            Institute for Advanced Computer Studies
            Institute for Systems Research
    
    Registration
    
    
    June 13, 1994
    
        Laying the Foundation for the Information Super Highway
        (   ) $150 Industry - Full fee includes videotape,       
        technical reports, handouts, demo disk and lunch buffet
    
        (   ) $110 Faculty/Staff - University faculty & staff fee
        includes videotape, technical reports, handouts, demo    
        disk and lunch buffet
    
        (   ) Student - Free registrations without materials or  
        lunch will be granted to full-time undergraduate and     
        graduate students space permitting
    
    June 14, 1994
        Superteaching in the Electronic Classroom
    
        (   ) $80 Industry
        (   ) $50 Faculty/Staff
        (   ) Student
    
    June 14, 1994
        Interfaces to Imagination
    
        (   ) $60 Industry
        (   ) $40 Educator/Art Practitioner
        (   ) Student
    
    Directions and Parking Info:

     

    Please enclose a self addressed stamped envelope with your registration by May 27, 1994 to receive ___ a map and/or ____ a parking permit (indicate what you need). After May 27, permits cannot be requested, so plan to bring lots of quarters for parking meters.

     

    There is a 10% reduction for group of 4 or more from the same organization and registering together. Contact Teresa Casey (see below) for details.

     

    Since we CANNOT accept charge cards or cash, please enclose with your registration your check made payable to The University of Maryland, or a purchase order with the reference CFAR/HCIL-OH94.

     

    Mail to:
            Teresa Casey
            HCIL
            AV Williams Building
            University of Maryland
            College Park, MD 20742-3255
            e-mail:  tcasey@cs.umd.edu

    Back


    •      Hypertext Fiction and the Literary Artist

     

    Hypertext Fiction and the Literary Artist is a research project investigating the use of hypertext technology by creative writers.

     

    The project consists of evaluations of software and hardware, critiques of traditional and computerized works, and a guide to sites of publication.

     

    We would like to request writers to submit their works for review. Publishers are requested to send descriptions of their publications with subscription fees and submission formats. We are especially interested to hear from institutions which teach creative writing for the hypertext format.

     

    To avoid swamping our e-mail account, please limit messages to a page or two in length. Send works on disk (IBM or Mac) or hardcopy to:

     

    Hypertext Fiction and the Literary Artist
    3 Westcott Upper
    London, Ontario
    N6C 3G6
    KEEPC@QUCD>QUEENSU.CA
     

    Back

     


    •      THE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND POPULAR CULTURECALL FOR PAPERS

     

    Scholars are invited to submit manuscripts/reviews that meet the following criteria:

     

    ISSUES: The Journal invites critical reviews of films, documentaries, plays, lyrics, and other related visual and performing arts. The Journal also invites original manuscripts from all social scientific fields on the topic of popular culture and criminal justice.

     

    SUBMISSION PROCEDURES: To submit material for the Journal, please subscribe to CJMOVIES through the listserv and a detailed guidelines statement will automatically follow.

     

    To subscribe, send a message with the following command to:

     

    LISTSERV@ALBNYVM1:
     
    SUBSCRIBE CJMOVIES YourFirstName
    YourLastName

     

    Manuscripts and inquiries should be addressed to:

     

    The Editors
    Journal of Criminal Justice and Popular Culture
    SUNYCRJ@ALBNYVM1.BITNET
    or SUNYCRJ@UACSC2.ALBANY.EDU

     

    MANAGING EDITORS:

     

    Sean Anderson and Greg Ungar
    Editors
    Journal of CriminalJustice and Popular Culture
    School of Criminal Justice, SUNYA 135
    Western Avenue Albany, NY 12222

     

    INTERNET:

     

    SA1171@ALBNYVM1.BITNET or GU8810@uacsc1.albany.edu

     

    LIST ADMINISTRATOR:

     

    Seth Rosner
    School of Criminal Justice, SUNY
    SR2602@uacsc1.albany.edu or SR2602@thor.albany.edu
     

    Back

     


    •      WRITING AND ELECTRONIC SPACE
      CYBORG PERFORMANCE AND POETICS

     

    THE LITTLE MAGAZINE is looking for writing and visual artwork which exists in the imagination of media still uncreated.

     

    For all of its power and fascination, electronic media are still limited by metaphors clumsily imported from print. James Joyce and Ezra Pound were making hypertexts sixty years before the appropriate technology was created. We are looking for work which can be reproduced in the pages of THE LITTLE MAGAZINE but will inspire the engineers of the third millennium.

     

    Although we are interested in adventuresome uses of the technology, it is not technology but vision which is lacking. We do not need virtual reality machines cranking out the same kind of misinformation that we get from television in even more addictive forms, but we are sick also of the polite, conventional thing literature has become. It is so comfortably contained in print. It is mediated and re-mediated (already); it is the subject of schools. We are not interested in work which exemplifies the theories of the past or even the hottest, most engaging theory of the present. We are interested in work which will call forth the media of the future.

     

    CYBERPUNK GROW UP!

     

    The deadline for the issue is December 15, 1994, but get in touch with us as soon as possible. We will try to find a way to publish important work even if it does not fit neatly into the usual literary magazine format. Tell us about your writing, visual art, sound pieces, videos, multimedia performances, network art, and investigations of genres still unnamed.

     

    The Editors
    THE LITTLE MAGAZINE
    Department of English
    State University of New York at Albany
    Albany, NY 12222

     

    DJB85@csc.albany.edu

     

    Back

     


    •      Call for Participation:
      National Symposium on Proposed Arts and Humanities Policies for the National Information Infrastructure

     

    On October 14th, 15th and 16th, the Center for Art Research in Boston will sponsor a National Symposium on Proposed Arts and Humanities Policies for the National Information Infrastructure.

     

    Participants will explore the impact of the Clinton Administration’s AGENDA FOR ACTION and proposed NII legislation on the future of the arts and the humanities in 21st Century America.

     

    The symposium will bring together government officials, academics, artists, writers, representatives of arts and cultural institutions and organizations, and other concerned individuals from many disciplines and areas of interest to discuss specific issues of policy which will effect the cultural life of all Americans during the coming decades.

     

    To participate, submit a 250-word abstract of your proposal for a paper, panel-discussion or presentation, accompanied by a one-page vitae, by March 15, 1994.

     

    Special consideration will be given to those efforts that take a critical perspective of the issues, and are concerned with offering specific alternatives to current administration and congressional agendas.

     

    The proceedings of the symposium will be video-taped, and papers and panels will be published on CD-ROM. For further information, reply to:

     

    jaroslav@artdata.win.net
     
    via return
    e-mail.

    Thank you, Jay Jaroslav

     

    Jay Jaroslav, Director jaroslav@artdata.win.net CENTER FOR ART RESEARCH 241 A Street Boston, MA voice: (617) 451-8030 02210-1302 USA fax: (617) 451-1196

    Back

     


    •      Announcement and Call for Submissions:
      Postmodern Culture
    
    Postmodern Culture
    A SUNY Press Series

    Series Editor: Joseph Natoli
    Editor: Carola Sautter

     

    Center for Integrative Studies, Arts and Humanities Michigan State University

     

    We invite submissions of short book manuscripts that present a postmodern crosscutting of contemporary headlines–green politics to Jeffrey Dahmer, Rap Music to Columbus, the Presidential campaign to Rodney King–and academic discourses from art and literature to politics and history, sociology and science to women’s studies, form computer studies to cultural studies.

     

    This series is designed to detour us off modernity’s yet-to-be- completed North-South Superhighway to Truth and onto postmodernism’s “forking paths” crisscrossing high and low culture, texts and life-worlds, selves and sign systems, business and academy, page and screen, “our” narrative and “theirs,” formula and contingency, present and past, art and discourse, analysis and activism, grand narratives and dissident narratives, truths and parodies of truths.

     

    By developing a postmodern conversation about a world that has overspilled its modernist framing, this series intends to link our present ungraspable “balkanization” of all thoughts and events with the means to narrate and then re-narrate them. Modernity’s “puzzle world” to be “unified” and “solved” becomes postmodernism’s multiple worlds to be represented within the difficult and diverse wholeness that their own multiplicity and diversity shapes and then re-shapes.

     

    Accordingly, manuscripts should display a “postmodernist style” that moves easily and laterally across public as well as academic spheres, “inscribes” within as well as “scribes” against realist and modernist modes, and strives to be readable-across-multiple- narratives and “culturally relative” rather than “foundational.”

     

    Inquiries, proposals, and manuscripts should be addressed to:

     

    Joseph Natoli
    Series Editor
    20676jpn@msu.edu
     

    or

     

    Carola Sautter
    Editor
    SUNY Press
    SUNY Plaza
    Albany, NY 12246-0001
     

    Back

     


    •      Call for PapersPSYCHE: an interdisciplinary journal of research on consciousness

     

    You are invited to submit papers for publication in the inaugural issue of PSYCHE: an interdisciplinary journal of research on consciousness (ISSN: 1039-723X).

     

    PSYCHE is a refereed electronic journal dedicated to supporting the interdisciplinary exploration of the nature of consciousness and its relation to the brain. PSYCHE publishes material relevant to that exploration form the perspectives afforded by the disciplines of Cognitive Science, Philosophy, Psychology, Neuroscience, Artificial Intelligence, and Anthropology. Interdisciplinary discussions are particularly encouraged. PSYCHE publishes a large variety of articles and reports for a diverse academic audience four times per year. As an electronic journal, the usual space limitations of print journals do not apply; however, the editors request that potential authors do not attempt to abuse the medium. PSYCHE also publishes a hardcopy version simultaneously with the electronic version. Long articles published in the electronic format may be abbreviated, synopsized, or eliminated form the hardcopy version.

     

    Types of Articles:

     

    The journal publishes from time to time all of the following varieties of articles. Many of these (as indicated below) are peer reviewed; all articles are reviewed by editorial staff.

     

    Research Articles reporting original research by author(s). Articles may be either purely theoretical or experimental or some combination of the two. Articles of special interest occasionally will be followed by a selection of peer commentaries. Peer Reviewed.

     

    Survey Articles reporting on the state of the art research in particular areas. These may be done in the form of a literature review or annotated bibliography. More ambitious surveys will be peer reviewed.

     

    Discussion Notes critiques of previous research. Peer Reviewed.

     

    Tutorials introducing a subject area relevant to the study of consciousness to non-specialists.

     

    Letters providing and informal forum for expressing opinions on editorial policy or upon material previously published in PSYCHE. Screened by editorial staff.

     

    Abstracts summarizing the contents of recently published journal articles, books, and conference proceedings.

     

    Book Reviews which indicate the contents of recent books and evaluate their merits as contributions to research and/or as textbooks.

     

    Announcements of forthcoming conferences, paper submission deadlines, etc.

     

    Advertisements of immediate interest to our audience will be published: available grants; positions; journal contents; proposals for joint research; etc.

     

    Notes for Authors:

     

    Unsolicited submissions of original works within any of the above categories are welcome. Prospective authors should send articles directly to the executive editor. Submissions should be in a single copy if submitted electronically of four (4) copies if submitted by mail.

     

    Submitted matter should be preceded by: the author’s name; address; affiliation; telephone number; electronic mail address. Any submission to be peer reviewed should be preceded by a 100- 200 word abstract as well. Note that peer review will be blind, meaning that the prefatory material will not be made available to the referees. In the event that an article needs to be shortened for publication in the print version of PSYCHE, the author will be responsible for making any alterations requested by the editors.

     

    Any figures required should be designed in screen-readable ASCII.

     

    If that cannot be arranged, figures should be submitted as separate postscript files so that they can be printed out by readers locally.

     

    Authors of accepted articles assign to PSYCHE the right to publish the text both electronically and as printed matter and to make it available permanently in an electronic archive. Authors will, however, retain copyright to their articles and may republish them in any forum so long as they clearly acknowledge PSYCHE as the original source of publication.

     

    Subscriptions:

     

    Subscriptions to the electronic version of PSYCHE may be initiated by sending the one-line command, SUBSCRIBE PSYCHE-L Firstname Lastname, in the body on an electronic mail message to:

     

    LISTSERV@NKI.BITNET

    Back

     


    •      RESEARCH ON VIRTUAL RELATIONSHIPS

     

    *******************************************************
    *                                                     *
    *        RESEARCH ON VIRTUAL RELATIONSHIPS            *
    *        - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -            *
    *   Have you had an interesting virtual relationship  *
    *    on electronic networks? A research team wants    *
    *     your story. Material acknowledged and terms     *
    *      respected. Both research articles and a        *
    *        general press (trade) book planned.          *
    *                                                     *
    *            Mail to Either Address                   *
    *          USA:                 CANADA:               *
    *                     -or-                            *
    *        VIRTUAL,             PALABRAS                *
    *        P.O. Box 46,         Box 175, Stn. E         *
    *        Boulder Creek,       Toronto, Ontario        *
    *        California 95006     CANADA  M6H 4E1         *
    *                                                     *
    *    E-Mail (internet): yfak0073@vm1.yorku.ca         *
    *    Fax:  (to Canada): (416) 736-5986                *
    *  -> Please re-post to relevant network sites <-     *
    *  ( A Distributed Knowledge Project Undertaking )    *
    *******************************************************

    Back

     


    •      Call for papers:SIXTIES GENERATIONS:
      FROM MONTGOMERY TO VIET NAM
      AN INTERDISCIPLINARY MEETING OF SCHOLARS, ARTISTS & ACTIVISTS

     

    Second Annual Conference

    November 4-6, 1994

     

    Sponsored by _Viet Nam Generation_ and hosted by Western Connecticut State University, Danbury, CT

     

    Call for papers, session proposals, readings, performance art pieces, and workshops.

     

    Deadline for proposals: July 15, 1994.

     

    The First Annual Sixties Generations conference was held March 4-6, 1993,in Fairfax, Virginia. It was sponsored by _Viet Nam Generation_ and the American Studies, Film Studies and African American Studies Programs of George Mason University. Sixty academic paper presentations, eight poetry and prose readings, one play reading and a concert filled three days. We also held a full-day roundtable discussion, “On the Sixties in the Nineties,” featuring participants who were activists in the Sixties and continue to be so today, including activists in SNCC, SDS, the Black Panther Party, the Yippies, various racial/ethnic formation, antiwar formations, political formations, women’s groups and cultural workers.

     

    The event was such a success that _Viet Nam Generation_ decided to do it again this year. [Last year’s program is appended to this Call for Papers.] We welcome submissions in all disciplines, in all topic areas related to the 1960s in the U.S. and internationally.

     

    SCHOLARLY PRESENTATIONS

     

    Please send abstracts (250-500 words) describing your individual presentations, or collections of abstracts describing your panel proposals.

     

    Panel sessions will be 90 minutes. Folks interested in putting together whole panels should limit the number of presenters to three, and hold the length of individual presentations down to 20 minutes each, so that sufficient time will be left for audience responses.

     

    We welcome individual paper submissions on any topic related to the 1960s. Individual presenters should also limit their presentations to 20 minutes. We will assemble individual presenters into panels.

     

    LITERARY READINGS, VIDEO, FILM, AND PERFORMANCE ART

     

    If you are interested in reading prose or poetry, submit samples of your work (and tapes of previous of readings, if available). Readings will be limited to 25 minutes per reader.

     

    We will consider videos, films, and performance art pieces of up to 45 minutes in length. Please send samples, tapes, video clips, or whatever documentation is most suitable for your medium.

     

    WORKSHOP PROPOSALS

     

    Activists interested in putting on workshops at the conference can propose either 40 minute or 90 minute sessions. Please send a description of the workshop and related materials or publications.

     

    We welcome innovative ideas, so if you have an idea that doesn’t seem to fit into one of the categories described above, write and tell us about it.

     

    Submit proposals either in hard-copy or over email to:

     

    Viet Nam Generation
    18 Center Road, Woodbridge, CT 06525
    Fax: 203/389-6104

     

    kalital@minerva.cis.yale.edu
     

    _______________________

     

    The morning session will focus on recollections and reflections on people’s involvement in movement work in the 60’s. The afternoon session will focus on the value of the lessons and the continuing agendas and methods of the 60’s movements as they affect the work of social justice in the 90’s.

     

    We encourage conference participants to drop in on the Roundtable and join the ongoing discussion. Roundtable participants are also urged to visit other conference events and to join us for a cash bar, reception, and concert at the conclusion of the discussion.

     

    Conference Panels

     

    9:00-10:30am

     

    Panel 9: Viet Nam War Film I
    “Viet Nam War Film,” Cynthia Fuchs; “The Heart of Darkness Motif in Vietnam War Texts,” David L. Erben, Univ of South Florida; “Warren Beatty and the Draft,” Katherine Kinney, UC Riverside

     

    10:45am-12:15pm

     

    Panel 10: Sixties Popular Culture
    “Folk Songs and Allusions to Folks Songs in the Repertoire of the Grateful Dead,” Josephine A. McQuail, Tennessee Tech Univ; “Beatles, Beach Boys, Leave It To Beaver, Mustangs, GTO’s Freedom Marches, a sexual revolution, a war and PTSD,” John Ketwig; “Talking about the Beatles,” Bernie Sanders

     

    1:30-3:00pm

     

    Panel 11: Performing Arts
    “Planet Shakespeare: The Bard in Cold War America” Susan Fox, Washington, DC; “Shakespeare, Kerouac & Hedrick,” Donald K. Hedrick, Kansas State Univ; “West African Dance and Race/Culture and Gender Identity in Los Angeles African American Communities,” Phylise Smith, UCLA

     

    Panel 12: Reinterpreting the Sixties V
    “Peace Through Law: John Seiberling’s Vision of World Order,” Miriam Jackson, Kent, OH; “Reverend Malcolm Boyd and Bishop Paul Moore, Jr.,” Michael B. Friedland, Boston College; Eros on the New Frontier: The Limits of Liberal Tolerance,” Louis J. Kern, Hofstra Univ

     

    3:15-4:45pm

     

    Panel 13: The Viet Nam War
    “The National Liberation Front in South Viet Nam,” Ton That Manh Tuong; “The Tet Offensive and Middletown: A Study in Contradiction,” Anthony O. Edmonds;”The Impact of the American Antiwar Movement on the South Vietnamese Urban Youth Struggle Movement,” Nguyen Huu Thai

     

    Panel 14: Viet Nam War Film/Drama II
    “Decentering Genre: Vietnam War Films and Portrayal of Reality,” Catherine E. Richardson, Chattanooga, TN; “The Death of the Sixties: Easy Rider & and Deliverance,” Margie Burns, Cheverly, MD;”Luis Valdez and Teatro Campesino,” Dave DeRose, Yale Univ

     

    5:00-6:30pm

     

    Panel 15: Music
    “Folkore of the Viet Nam War,” Lydia Fish, SUNY-Buffalo; “In Country Songs,” Chuck Rosenberg; “Pilot Songs of the Viet Nam War,” Chip Dockery

     

    7:30pm Concert & Reception
    O.V. Hirsch
    Chip Dockery
    Chuck Rosenberg

    Back

     


    •      splinter

     

    splinter is a new electronic publication that seeks texts in various states of unfinish prose poetry neither both your scraps your scrytch your fragments your language doodles unfinished stories unfinished scenes unfinished sentences experiments freewriting drafts of drafts outlines bits of dialogue directionless musings stanzas that never found their way into poems flashes that dead-ended scribbled down and never became

     

    no length guidelines / authors keep all rights

     

    rolling submission, no deadlines

     

    the contact address at this point is

     

    dave1@gibbs.oit.unc.edu
     

    send your submissions, subscription requests, questions, and comments (put SPLINTER somewhere in the subject line) e-mail subscriptions are free and encouraged

     

    thanks

     

    Back

     


    •      Special issue of Style on
      Possible Worlds, Virtual Reality, and Postmodern Fiction

     

    Deadline for submission: November 30, 1994.

     

    To be published in 1995

     

    Contributions are solicited on the following topics:

     

    1. The centrality of ontological questions in postmodernist fiction and the contribution of the theory of possibleworlds in capturing and formulating the ontological issue. Inparticular: the stacking/embedding of realities, the transgression of ontological boundaries, the uses of recursive structures and their ontological implications.

     

    2. Virtual reality (VR) as a technological implementation of the philosophical concept of possible world.

     

    3. Challenges to the notion of actual world and alternatives to the “modal structure” in narrative universes. Hypertext and the decentralization of semantic universes. The theme of the disappearance of reality in fiction and theory.

     

    4. Hyperrealism as parody of realism in postmodern culture. The philosophical basis of the concept of realism and its connection to virtual reality.

     

    5. The thematization (especially in science fiction) of the concepts of virtual reality, parallel universes, alternative possible worlds, immersion in game-worlds, and interplanetary travel as a metaphor for movement across possible worlds.

     

    6. Game-theory and the concept of immersion in virtual worlds–as either thematized or implemented in postmodernist fiction or popular fiction.

     

    7. The myth of virtual reality in contemporary culture and media.

     

    8. Virtual reality as a simulacrum. The role of simulacra (imitations, images, copies) in postmodern culture and fiction. The problematics of the relation between image and reality, sign and referent, original and copy and its implementation in postmodernist fiction.

     

    Papers must be original contributions and will be refereed. Length should be between 20 and 40 pages, double spaced. Before submitting a paper, please contact the guest editor:

     

    Marie-Laure Ryan
    6207 Red Ridge Trail
    Bellvue, Colorado 80512

     

    mmryan@vines.colostate.edu
     

    Back

     


    •      U N D E R C U R R E N T

     

    Call for Manuscripts

     

    UNDERCURRENT is a free journal available on the Internet through e-mail subscriptions. (See end of this message for how to subscribe for free.) We are seeking article submissions or queries with abstracts providing an analysis of the present in terms of discourses, events, representations, classes, or cultures. We seek to publish analysis of the present from diverse intellectual perspectives–feminist, historical, ethnological, sociological, literary, political, semiotic, philosophical, cultural studies, and so forth. We seek applied analysis rather than theory. Any theoretical orientation ought instead to be apparent and immanent in your particular focus on the present. We especially encourage interdisciplinary work. Article length varies according to your needs, anywhere from “short-takes” of 500-1000 words to “feature” of up to 7500 words.

     

    As its audience is potentially much broader than that of academic journals held only in university libraries, the style must account for an educated audience which is not necessarily familiar with either the jargon or the debates in a special field. UNDERCURRENT wishes to publish articles that address this broader audience while also conveying a vivid sense of how current academic scholarship can contribute to our understanding of the present. We are attempting to bridge the gulf between academia and the general reading public, a gulf which has allowed various misperceptions about academia to become politically overcharged in the popular media.

     

    All submissions will receive a reply, however no copies can be returned. Any major citation format is acceptable, although endnotes must be used rather than footnotes due to the contingencies of various platforms for viewing electronic text. Submissions and queries can be sent in any of the following ways, in order of preference:

     

    1.> e-mail to

     

    heroux@darkwing.uoregon.edu
     
     and note in the
    subject field that this is a submission to UNDERCURRENT

     

    2.> Mail a floppy diskette with your text in ASCII or WordPerfect (address below).

     

    3.> Mail two copies of your essay by traditional post to:

     

    UNDERCURRENT
    Erick Heroux
    Dept. of English
    University of Oregon
    Eugene, OR 97403

     

    ABOUT FREE SUBSCRIPTIONS: You can subscribe yourself to UNDERCURRENT by sending a one-line e-mail message:

     

    SUBSCRIBE UNDERCURRENT YOURNAME@DOMAIN.WHERE

     

    Address it to:

     

    mailserv@oregon.uoregon.edu

     

    Problems or questions can be e-mailed to

     

    heroux@darkwing.uoregon.edu
     

    Back

     


    •      FEMISA

     

    FEMISA@mach1.wlu.ca

     

    FEMISA is conceived as a list where those who work on or think about feminism, gender, women and international relations, world politics, international political economy, or global politics, can communicate.

     

    Formally, FEMISA was established to help those members of the Feminist Theory and Gender Studies Section of the International Studies Association keep in touch. More generally, I hope that FEMISA can be a network where we share information in the area of feminism or gender and international studies about publications or articles, course outlines, questions about sources or job opportunities, information about conferences or upcoming events, or proposed panels and information related to the International Studies Association.

     

    To subscribe:
    send one line message in the BODY of mail-message

     

    sub femisa your name

     

    to:

     

    listserv@mach1.wlu.ca
     

    To unsub send the one line message

     

    unsub femisa

     

    to:

     

    listserv@mach1.wlu.ca
     

    I look forward to hearing suggestions and comments from you.

     

    Owner: Deborah Stienstra

     

    stienstr@uwpg02.uwinnipeg.ca
     
    Department of Political Science
            University of Winnipeg

    Back

     


    •      HOLOCAUS: Holocaust list

     

    HOLOCAUS on

     

    LISTSERV@UICVM.BITNET
     
    or
    LISTSERV@UICVM.UIC.EDU
     

    HOLOCAUS@uicvm has become part of the stable of electronic mail discussion groups (“lists”) at the University of Illinois, Chicago. It is sponsored by the University’s History Department and its Jewish Studies Program.

     

    To subscribe to HOLOCAUS, you need and Internet or Bitnet computer account. From that account, send this message to:

     

    LISTSERV@UICVM.BITNET
     
    or
    LISTSERV@uicvm.uic.edu
     

    SUB HOLOCAUS Firstname Surname

     

    Use your own Firstname and Lastname. You will be automatically added. You can read all the mail, and send your own postings to everyone on the list (We have about 100 subscribers around the world right now).

     

    Owner:

     

    JimMott@spss.com
     

    The HOLOCAUS policies are:

     

    •      1. The coverage of the list will include the Holocaust itself, and closely related topics like anti-Semitism, and Jewish history in the 1930’s and 1940’s, as well as related themes in the history of WW2, Germany, and international diplomacy.
    •      2. We are especially interested in reaching college teachers of history who already have, or plan to teach courses on the Holocaust. In 1991-92, there were 265 college faculty in the US and Canada teaching courses on the Holocaust (154 in History departments, 67 in Religion, and 46 in Literature). An even larger number of professors teach units on the Holocaust in courses on Jewish history (taught by 273 faculty) and World War II (taught by 373), not to mention many other possible courses. Most of these professors own PC’s, but do not use them for e-mail. We hope our list will be one inducement to go on line. HOLOCAUS will therefore actively solicit syllabi, reading lists, termpaper guides, ideas on films and slides, and tips and comments that will be of use to the teacher who wants to add a single lecture, or an entire course.
    •      3. H-Net is now setting up an international board of editors to guide HOLOCAUS policy and to help stimulate contributions.
    •      4. HOLOCAUS is moderated by Jim Mott (JimMott@spss.com), a PhD in History. The moderator will solicit postings (by e- mail, phone and even by US mail), will assist people in subscribing and setting up options, will handle routine inquiries, and will consolidate some postings. The moderator will also solicit and post newsletter type information (calls for conferences, for example, or listings of sessions at conventions). It may prove feasible to commission book and article reviews, and to post book announcements from publishers. Anyone with suggestions about what HOLOCAUS can and might do is invited to send in the ideas.
    •      5. The tone and target audience will be scholarly, and academic standards and styles will prevail. HOLOCAUS is affiliated with the International History Network.
    •      6. HOLOCAUS is a part of H-Net, a project run by computer- oriented historians at the U of Illinois. We see moderated e-mail lists as a new mode of scholarly communication; they have enormous potential for putting in touch historians from across the world. Our first list on urban history, H- URBAN@UICVM, recently started up with Wendy Plotkin as moderator. H-WOMEN is in the works, with discussions underway about other possibilities like Ethnic, Labor, and US South. We are helping our campus Jewish Studies program set up JSTUDY (restricted to the U of Illinois Chicago campus, for now), and are considering the creation of H- JEWISH, also aimed at academics, but covering the full range of scholarship on Jewish history. If you are interested in any of these projects, please e-write Richard Jensen, for we are now (as of late April) in a critical planning stage.
    •      7. H-Net has an ambitious plan for training historians across the country in more effective use of electronic communications. Details of the H-Net plan are available on request from Richard Jensen, the director, at: campbelld@apsu or u08946@uicvm.uic.edu

     

    Back

     


    •      NewJour-L@e-math.ams.org

    NewJour-L aims to accomplish two objectives; it is both a list and a project.

     

    FIRST:

     

    NewJour-L is the place to announce your own (or to forward information about others’) newly planned, newly issued, or revised electronic networked journal or newsletter. It is specially dedicated for those who wish to share information in the planning, gleam-in-the-eye stage or at a more mature stage of publication development and availability.

     

    It is also the place to announce availability of paper journals and newsletters as they become available on electronic networks. Scholarly discussion lists which regularly and continuously maintain supporting files of substantive articles or preprints may also be reported, for those journal-like sections.

     

    We hope that those who see announcements on Bitnet, Internet, Usenet or other media will forward them to NewJour-L, but this does run a significant risk of boring subscribers with a number of duplicate messages. Therefore, NewJour-L IS filtered through a moderator to eliminate this type of duplication.

     

    It does not attempt to cover areas that are already covered by other lists. For example, sources like NEW-LIST describe new discussion lists; ARACHNET deals with social and cultural issues of e-publishing; VPIEJ-L handles many matters related to electronic publishing of journals. SERIALST discusses the technical aspects of all kinds of serials. You should continue to subscribe to these as you have done before, and contribute to them.

     

    SECOND:

     

    NewJour-L represents an identification and road-mapping project for electronic journals and newsletters, begun by Michael Strangelove, University of Ottawa. NewJour-L will expand and continue that work.

     

    As new publications are reported, a NewJour-L support group will develop the following services — planning is underway & we ask that anyone who would like to participate as below, let us know:

     

    •      A worksheet will be sent to the editors of the new e-publication for completion. This will provide detailed descriptions about bibliographic, content, and access characteristics.
    •      An original cataloguing record will be created.
    •      The fully catalogued title will be reported to national utilities and other appropriate sites so that there is a bibliographic record available for subsequent subscribers or searchers.
    •      The records will feed a directory and database of these titles.
    Not all the of the implementation is developed, and the work
    will expand over the next year.  We thank you for your
    contributions, assistance, and advice, which will be
    invaluable.

     

    SUBSCRIBING:

     

    To subscribe, send a message to:

    LISTSERV@e-math.ams.org

    Leave the subject line blank.

    In the body, type: SUBSCRIBE NewJour-L FirstName LastName

    You will have to subscribe in order to post messages to this list.

    To drop out or postpone, use the standard LISTSERV (Internet) directions.

     

    ACKNOWLEDGMENT:

     

    For their work in defining the elements of this project and for their support to date, we thank:

     

    Michael Strangelove, University of Ottawa, Advisor
    David Rodgers, American Mathematical Society, Systems & Network Support
    Edward Gaynor, University of Virginia Library, Original Cataloguing Development
    John Price-Wilkin, University of Virginia Library, Systems & Network Support
    Birdie MacLennan, University of Vermont Library, Cataloguing and Indexing Development
    Diane Kovacs, Kent State University Library, Advisor

     

    We anticipate this will become a wider effort as time passes, and we welcome your interest in it. This project is co-ordinated through:

     

    The Association of Research Libraries
    Office of Scientific & Academic Publishing
    21 Dupont Circle, Suite 800
    Washington, DC 20036
    e-mail: osap@cni.org
     
    (Ann Okerson)

     

    Back

     


    •      NII-TEACH

     

    Scholastic Network, Scholastic Inc. is pleased to announce a new list dedicated to the discussion of the National Information Infrastructure and its role in education.

     

    As you know, policy decisions made about the NII will affect how teachers and students use online services, how they will be accessed, how they will be paid for, and who will be able to get these services first.

     

    We are encouraging you to share your views on the NII and what it should offer teachers. Moderators of this list are Bonnie Bracey, the Arlington, VA classroom teacher appointed to the NII Advisory panel, Leni Donlan of CoSN (the Consortium for School Networking) and Jane Coffey, a teacher-member of the Scholastic Network.

     

    This unmoderated list will only be on-line from March through June 1994. All classroom teachers and others interested in sharing feedback about education for the NII advisory group are invited to participate.

     

    To subscribe to NII-TEACH, send email to:

     

    NII-Teach-request@scholastic.com
     

    Leave the subject line blank.

    The text of the message should say:

    subscribe NII-Teach yourfirstname yourlastname

     

    Back


    •      popcult@camosun.bc.ca Popular Culture

     

    The POPCULT list is now in place. It is open to analytical discussion of all aspects of popular culture. The list will not be moderated. Material relevant to building bridges between popular culture and traditional culture will be very strongly encouraged.

     

    To subscribe, unsubscribe, get help, etc, send a message to:

     

    mailserv@camosun.bc.ca

     

    There should not be anything in the ‘Subject:’ line and the body of the message should have the specific keyword on a line by itself.

     

    Some keywords are:
    SUBSCRIBE POPCULT
    HELP
    LISTS
    SEND/LIST POPCULT
    UNSUBSCRIBE POPCULT

     

    It is possible to send multiple commands, each on a separate line. Do not include your name after SUBSCRIBE POPCULT. In some ways this server is a simplified version of the major servers, but it is also more streamlined. I recommend, to start, that you put SUBSCRIBE on one line, and HELP on the next line. That will give you a full listing of available commands.

     

    To send messages to the list for distribution to list members for exchange of ideas, etc, send messages to:

     

    popcult@camosun.bc.ca

     

    Owner:
    Peter Montgomery Montgomery@camosun.bc.ca Professor Dept of English ph (604) 370-3342 (o) Camosun College (fax) (604) 370-3346 3100 Foul Bay Road Victoria, BC Off. Paul Bldg 326 CANADA V8P 5J2
     

    Back

     


    •      NEH DEADLINES

     

    Below is a full list of application deadlines for NEH programs, plus contact numbers for individual programs. All telephone numbers are in area code 202. To receive guidelines for any NEH program, contact the Office of Publications and Public Affairs at (202) 606-8438. Guidelines are normally available at least two months in advance of application deadlines.

     

    DIVISION OF EDUCATION PROGRAMS
    James C. Herbert, Director (606-8373)

     

    PROGRAM / CONTACT                         DEADLINE         
    PROJECTS BEGINNING

     

    Higher Education in the Humanities (Lyn Maxwell White; 606-8380) 1 April 1994 October 1994

     

    Institutes for College & University Faculty (Barbara Ashbrook; 606-8380) 1 April 1994 Summer 1995

     

    Science & Humanities Education (Susan Greenstein; 606-8380) 15 March 1994 October 1994

     

    Core Curriculum Projects (Fred Winter; 606-8380) 1 April 1994 October 1994

     

    Two-Year Colleges (Judith Jeffrey Howard; 606-8380) 1 April 1994 October 1994

     

    Challenge Grants (Thomas Adams; 606-8380) 1 May 1994 December 1994

     

    Elementary & Secondary Education in the Humanities (F. Bruce Robinson; 606-8377) 15 March 1994 December 1994

     

    Teacher-Scholar Program (Annette Palmer; 606-8377) 1 May 1994 September 1995

     

    Special Opportunity in Foreign Language Education Higher Education (Lyn Maxwell White; 606-8380) 15 March 1994 October 1994

     

    Elementary & Secondary Education (F. Bruce Robinson; 606-8377) 15 March 1994 October 1994

     

    DIVISION OF FELLOWSHIPS & SEMINARS
    Marjorie A. Berlincourt, Director (606-8458)

     

    PROGRAM / CONTACT                       DEADLINE          
    PROJECTS BEGINNING
    
    Fellowships for University Teachers
    (Maben D. Herring; 606-8466)            1 May 1994             
    1 January 1995
    
    Fellowships for College Teachers &
    Independent Scholars
    (Joseph B. Neville; 606-8466)           1 May 1994             
    1 January 1995
    
    Summer Stipends
    (Thomas O'Brien; 606-8466)              1 October 1994           
    1 May 1995
    
    Faculty Graduate Study Program for
    HBCUs (Maben D. Herring; 606-8466)      15 March 1994        
    1 September 1995
    
    Younger Scholars Program
    (Leon Bramson; 606-8463)                1 November 1994          
    1 May 1995
    
    Dissertation Grants
    (Kathleen Mitchell; 606-8463)           15 November 1994     
    1 September 1995
    
    Study Grants for College & University
    Teachers (Clayton Lewis; 606-8463)      15 August 1994           
    1 May 1995
    
    Summer Seminars for College Teachers
    (Joel Schwartz; 606-8463)
       Participants                          1 March 1994            
    Summer 1994
    
       Directors                             1 March 1994            
    Summer 1995
    
    Summer Seminars for School Teachers
    (Michael Hall; 606-8463)
       Participants                          1 March 1994            
    Summer 1994
    
       Directors                             1 April 1994            
    Summer 1995

    DIVISION OF PRESERVATION & ACCESS
    George F. Farr, Jr., Director (606-8570)

     

    PROGRAM / CONTACT                         DEADLINE         
    PROJECTS BEGINNING
    
    Library & Archival Research Projects
    (Vanessa Piala/Charles Kolb; 606-8570)  1 June 1994             
    January 1995
    
    Library & Archival Preservation/Access
    Projects (Karen Jefferson/Barbara
    Paulson; 606-8570)                      1 June 1994             
    January 1995
    
    National Heritage Preservation Program
    (Richard Rose/Laura Word; 606-8570)     1 November 1994          
    July 1995
    
    U. S. Newspaper Program
    (Jeffrey Field; 606-8570)               1 June 1994              
    July 1995

    DIVISION OF PUBLIC PROGRAMS
    Marsha Semmel, Acting Director (606-8267)

     

    PROGRAM / CONTACT                         DEADLINE         
    PROJECTS BEGINNING
    
      Humanities Projects in Media
    (James Dougherty; 606-8278)            11 March 1994           
    1 October 1994
    
      Humanities Projects in Museums &
    Historical Organizations
    (Fredric Miller; 606-8284)             3 June 1994             
    1 January 1995
    
      Public Humanities Projects
    (Wilsonia Cherry; 606-8271)            11 March 1994           
    1 October 1994
    
      Humanities Projects in Libraries
    (Thomas Phelps; 606-8271)

    Planning 4 February 1994 1 July 1994 Implementation 11 March 1994 1 October 1994 Challenge Grants (Abbie Cutter; 606-8361) 1 May 1994 December 1994

     

     

    DIVISION OF RESEARCH PROGRAMS
    Guinevere L. Griest, Director (606-8200)

     

    PROGRAM / CONTACT                         DEADLINE         
    PROJECTS BEGINNING
    
      Scholarly Publications
    (Margot Backas; 606-8207)
      Editions
    (Douglas Arnold; 606-8207)            1 June 1994              
    1 April 1995
    
      Translations
    (Helen Aguerra; 606-8207)             1 June 1994              
    1 April 1995
    
      Subventions (606-8207)              15 March 1994          
    1 October 1994
    
      Reference Materials
    (Jane Rosenberg; 606-8358)
      Tools
    (Martha B. Chomiak; 606-8358)         1 September 1994          
    1 July 1995
    
      Guides
    (Michael Poliakoff; 606-8358)         1 September 1994          
    1 July 1995
    
      Challenge Grants
    (Bonnie Gould; 606-8358)              1 May 1994             
    December 1994
    
      Interpretive Research Programs
    (George Lucas; 606-8210)
      Collaborative Projects
    (Donald C. Mell; 606-8210)            15 October 1994           
    1 July 1995
    
      Archaeology Projects
    (Bonnie Magness-Gardiner; 606-8210)   15 October 1994          
    1 April 1995
    
      Humanities, Science, and Technology
    (Daniel Jones; 606-8210)              15 October 1994           
    1 July 1995
    
      Conferences
    (David Coder; 606-8210)               15 January 1994        
    1 October 1994
    
      Centers & International Research
    Organizations (Christine Kalke; 606-8210)
      Centers for Advanced Study            1 October 1994           
    1 July 1995
    
      International Research                1 April 1994           
    1 January 1995

    DIVISION OF STATE PROGRAMS
    Carole Watson, Director (606-8254)

     

    Each state humanities council establishes its own grant guidelines and application deadlines. Addresses and telephone numbers of these state programs may be obtained from the NEH Division of State Programs.

     

    CHALLENGE GRANTS PROGRAM

    Applications are submitted through the Divisions of Education, Research, and Public Programs. Deadline is 1 May 1994 for projects beginning December 1994.

     

    Back

     


    •      GOPHEUR LITTERATURES

     

    Announcing the “gopheur LITTERATURES” at the Universite de Montreal.

     

    Address:

    gopher.litteratures.Umontreal.ca 7070

     

    or through the University of Montreal Main Gopher:

     

    Address:

    gopher.Umontreal.ca

     

    Gopher servers are sprouting like mushrooms these days. Not only universities have gopher servers, but also departments now. They can be very useful tools to locate information and students here are very fond of them. They are also the first step towards much more sophisticated modes of accessing collections of research and bibliographic data, e-texts, etc…

     

    The “Gopheur LITTERATURES” at the Universite de Montreal (UdM) just happens to be the first gopher dedicated to teaching, research and publications on French Literature, Quebecois Literature and Francophone Literatures, and also the first gopher to do so in french, albeit without the accents for the moment. (In the future we will offer the choice between ASCII and ISO-LATIN, as is currently being done on others gophers in the province of Quebec).

     

    The “Gopheur LITTERATURES” is in construction. This means it will be evolving. Items on the main menu indicate a program of research conducted at the Department of etudes francaises. The goal of the gopher is to offer electronic documentation on the Departement d’etudes francaises, and to establish a resource center for information, tools, links, documents, local and international, to be used by the computing community of French scholars and students.

     

    All comments and suggestions of sites of interest to French Studies should be sent to:

     

    Gophlitt@ere.Umontreal.ca
    or
    Christian Allegre
    allegre@ere.umontreal.ca
    Universite de Montreal
    Departement d’etudes francaises
     

    Back

     


    •      AMERICAN LITERATURE SUBLIST

     

    AMERICAN LIT ANTHOLOGY #1 (upgraded April 1994)
      one disk, 1.1 Mbyte
    Red Badge of Courage by Stephen Crane
    Chicago Poems by Carl Sandburg
    The Call of the Wild by Jack London
    Our Mr. Wrenn -- Romantic Adventures of a Gentle Man by
       Sinclair Lewis
    Renascence & other poems by Edna St. Vincent Millay
    
    LOUISA MAY ALCOTT
      one disk, 1.1 Mbytes
    Little Women
    
    HORATIO ALGER
      one disk, 900 Kbytes
    Cast Upon the Breakers
    Ragged Dick or Street Life in New York
    Struggling Upward
    
    AMBROSE BIERCE
      one disk, 800 Kbytes
    Can Such Things Be, The Devil's Dictionary
    
    WILLA CATHER
      two disks, $10 each, $20 for the set
    Disk #1 (1.2 Mbytes) -- O Pioneers! The Song of the Lark
    Disk #2 (200 Kbytes) -- Alexander's Bridge
    
    JAMES FENIMORE COOPER #1
      one disk, 1 Mbyte, SGML
    The Last of the Mohicans
    
    NATHANIEL HAWTHORNE
      one disk, 1.2 Mbytes
    House of the Seven Gables
    The Scarlet Letter
    
    HENRY JAMES
      two disks, both SGML, $10 each, $20 for the set
    Disk #1 (900 Kbytes) -- The Europeans, Confidence
    Disk #2 (1.2 Mbytes) -- Roderick Hudson, Watch and Ward
    
    JACK LONDON
      two disks, both SGML, $10 each, $20 for the set
    Disk #1 (1.2 Mbytes) -- Sea Wolf, Stories
    Disk #2 (900 Kbytes) -- Klondike, White Fang
    
    HERMAN MELVILLE
      two disks, SGML, $10 each, $20 for the set
    Disk #1 (800 Kbytes) -- Moby Dick #1
    Disk #2 (690 Kbytes) -- Moby Dick #2
    
    CHRISTOPHER MORLEY
      one disk, 300 Kbytes
    Parnassus on Wheels
    
    FRANK NORRIS #1
      one disk, 800 Kbytes
    The Pit
    
    EDGAR ALLAN POE
      28 tales on one disk, 1 Mbyte
    These include The Gold-Bug, The Murders in the Rue Morgue,
    The Fall of the House of Usher, etc.
    
    MARK TWAIN
      four disks, $10 each, $40 for the set
    Disk #1 (1 Mbyte) -- Tom Sawyer, Huckleberry Finn
    Disk #2 (1.1 Mbyte) -- A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's
      Court, Tom Sawyer Abroad, Tom Sawyer Detective, Extracts
      from Adam's Diary, The Great Revolution in Pitcairn, A
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    •      ENGLISH LITERATURE SUBLIST, April 2, 1994

     

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    •      Spelunk with International Artist

     

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    END OF NOTICES

     

  • Laurie Anderson and the Politics of Performance

    Woodrow B. Hood

    University of Missouri–Columbia
    c562611@mizzou1.missouri.edu

     

    Anderson, Laurie. Stories from the Nerve Bible: A Retrospective 1972-1992. Performed at the Lied Arts Center, Lawrence Kansas, March 29, 1994.

     

    Performance theorist Philip Auslander has argued that whatever theoretical or empirical value finally attaches to the term “postmodernism,” the contemporary performance artists that we call postmodern share a certain critical distance from modernism and are able to historicize the contemporary “in the Brechtian sense of getting some distance on the world we live in and thus gaining a better understanding of it.” 1 Gaining distance from the world of late capitalistic America seems indeed to be the focus of Laurie Anderson’s new performance piece currently touring the United States and Canada. The work is ostensibly to promote Anderson’s book Stories from the Nerve Bible: A Retrospective 1972-1992, but it more importantly offers a contextualization of Anderson’s art from the early 1970s up to current day. The event details the growth of Anderson as an artist from her rougher beginnings like the song “Walk the Dog” to her more polished performance pieces from Empty Places.

     

    The show is a work in progress and it may change from venue to venue as it tours the country over the next few months. This review is being based on the March 29th performance at the Lied Center in Lawrence, Kansas. Though Lawrence seems an unlikely venue for an Anderson performance (she generally sticks to larger, more urban areas), she frequents this small, Midwestern town for the sake of her friend and artistic mentor William S. Burroughs, a local resident who was in attendance at the Lawrence show.

     

    The evening is rather brief–a little over one hour. The performance consists of Anderson sitting in front of a keyboard with two microphones (one is processed and the other isn’t) and a large sound board to her right. Underneath the sound board lies a DAT machine which plays the underscoring of Anderson’s readings from a collection of pages in front of her.

     

    This is the most intimate Anderson to date. The mise-en-scene has been stripped to its bare technical bones. The videoscreens, lasers, techno-gadgetry, and spectacle wizardry are gone. Lighting effects consist mainly of gel changes and primarily only light her well enough to be seen. What one sees is Anderson reflecting back on her career with an eye towards her future. She even says that the show is a retrospective about the future; by looking at where you’ve come from, you see where you’re going.

     

    The stories and talk-songs that comprise the performance are arranged by the series of associations based upon the “Nerve Bible”–by which she means the body. 2 What the audience gets is an apparently free association of juxtaposed images and ideas; the responsibility of finding meaning in the juxtapositions is placed solely upon the audience. The arrangement of the pieces may vary from night to night as Anderson creates new material or deletes old, establishing a whole new arena in which meanings can be created.

     

    Anderson performs a sampling of performance pieces from all periods of her work. Several of the pieces come from her recent notes, and will presumably go onto her upcoming album, Bright Red (produced by Brian Eno), and eventually the album’s multi-media promotional tour next year. She begins with the end of the Nerve Bible book, by talking about the future in “My Grandmother’s Hats,” a story about her Bible-thumping grandmother who kept waiting for the end of the world to arrive:

     

    . . . I remember the day she died, she was very excited. She was sitting in her hospital room waiting to die and she was very excited. She was like a small bird perched on the edge of her bed near the window and she was wearing this pink nightgown and combing her hair so that she would look pretty when I came to get her. And she wasn’t afraid but then something happened that changed everything.

     

    After years of preaching and predicting the future, suddenly, she panicked. Because she couldn’t decide on whether or not to wear a hat.

     

    And so when she died she went into the future in a rush, in a panic, with no idea of what would come next.3

     

    From this point, Anderson meanders around in her book, retelling earlier songs and monologues like “White Lily,” bits of “Coolsville,” and other previously presented material. Other stories surface as Anderson wanders back to the front of the Nerve Bible book where she tells of being offered roasted dog by the chief of a tiny Pacific island, Panope, in 1980 and watching the cremation tapes of the father of the Prince of Ubud in 1984.

     

    The most pronounced through-line one discerns in these scattered materials is that of Anderson’s emergence as an explicitly political artist. Despite some marginal elements of political critique in her early periods, Anderson primarily focused on examining American identity and myths; her early work contained no discernible political positioning. But a shift began with the 1989 performance of Empty Places. By then, Anderson had come to feel that her work was too mainstream, part of the establishment; it had been institutionalized. As she told John Howell, “I was tired of being “Laurie Anderson.” I wanted to start over. 4 Using the same performance style and methodology she had mastered in the late 1970s and early 1980s, she began to place a new emphasis on socio-political commentary. By the late 1980s, she had shifted away from the exploration of form to a new, subversive attack directed at the American status quo.

     

    In this regard, Anderson’s career is consistent with the broader trajectory of American performance art from the 1970s to the present. Other well-known artists such as Diamanda Galas, Karen Finley, and Orlon have made Marxism and cultural feminism standard elements of contemporary performance art. As Auslander has remarked (here paraphrasing New York Times art critic Andy Grundberg):

     

    in place of the detached, often opaque ironies of postmodernism, young artists are displaying renewed interest in art that addresses spiritual values, on the one hand, and overtly polemical, political art addressed to the AIDS and censorship crises on the other.5

     

    Anderson herself is fully conscious of this turn or transition in her work. “Like many people,” she says, “I slept through the Reagan Era politically.”

     

    When I woke up, everything looked really different. Homeless men and women were living on the streets of New York, hundreds of thousands of Americans were dead or dying of AIDS, and the national mood was characterized by fear, intolerance, and straight-ahead greed. Suddenly everything seemed deeply unfamiliar. Was this really my country? I decided to write about this new place, not because I had any solutions, but because I needed to understand how and why things had changed.6

     

    In Empty Places Anderson continued to employ her usual artistic practice of juxtaposing disparate images and objects, but there was a decisive change in her mode of operation. If Anderson’s early performances could have been called subversive at all, it was only in the broadest sense of the term: they questioned the established framework of American identity in an abstract way. But beginning with Empty Places her work became subversive in the narrow sense: it mounted a direct and confrontational attack on the American political system. And in the five years since, Anderson’s work has become ever denser with political references and ever more aggressively counter-hegemonic. Her Voices from the Beyond tour, which resembled the current one in its lack of spectacle, was also read from notebooks and dealt with the contemporary political atmosphere of America as the events of the Gulf War unfolded. She also did a piece on the 1992 presidential election for National Public Radio and a “Rock the Vote” PSA for VH-1.

     

    Much of the newer work centers on more global political concerns. She describes an encounter with an Israeli explosives expert which teaches her of the seductive power of bombs: “Here I am, a citizen of the world’s largest arms supplier, setting bombs off with the world’s second largest arms customer, and I’m having a great time.” 7 The earlier Anderson might have simply capitulated to this pleasure, rather than calling it into question. The question for her now is no longer that of the beauty of the image, but that of the articulation between particular political stances and particular ideas of beauty. “Night in Baghdad,” for example, examines the implicit aesthetics of media coverage of the Gulf War, which enabled this hideous event to be represented as a sort of cross “between grand opera and the Superbowl.” 8

     

    I do not mean to suggest that all of Anderson’s pieces now thematize national and international politics. There are moments in Nerve Bible when she explores the relation between aesthetics and politics on more local or personal registers. She tells some interesting stories, for example, about her relationship with the early 1980s comedian Andy Kaufman. She recalls the confusions of art and life that Kaufman sought to effect through his strange performances, and her own confusion when she served as one of the staged “victims” of his wrestling act. Kaufman would dare women to come up on stage and wrestle him, and Anderson was one of the women he hired to take him up on the challenge. She was not eager to participate in this seemingly sophomoric routine, she says, and only agreed to do it after she had consumed a few whiskeys and Kaufman had goaded her with his offensive behavior. But once on stage she found that Kaufman’s aim was really to wrestle. He sought to unravel any distinction between the performance of violence and the reality, and this was a project with which Anderson was simply not comfortable.

     

    Yet Anderson was clearly drawn to Kaufman and his attempts to break down the boundaries between artistic practice and everyday life. She tells another story, about going to an amusement park with Kaufman and doing the ride on which people enter a large drum and lie against a wall. The drum spins and the bottom drops out after the people have been anchored to the wall by centrifugal force. Kaufman would wait until the ride was about to begin its spinning and the crew was checking the bindings to make sure everything was safe, and then he would start screaming, “We’re all going to die!” What struck me as most significant in this part of Anderson’s show is that in telling this story she broke with her familiar, carefully controlled speaking rhythm and began screaming in the manner of Kaufman himself. Here, for the first time that I am aware of, Anderson collapsed somewhat the always carefully judged distance between her performing and her personal life. The cool, controlled performance artist is perhaps giving way to a more personal, emotional storyteller.

     

    The more personal Anderson is on display after the performance as well, when, after leaving the stage for a few moments, she returns to take questions. Anderson moves out of the performance mode at this point and seems to speak directly and candidly to the audience–about her creative practices, the relation of her stories to her actual life, and so forth. On this particular night, her most interesting remarks concerned the place of her art in a market economy. She argues that she tries to make a performance that does not rely on pop-star identification, on the desire to emulate and consume. She wants to avoid becoming a product for sale and wants to create a more resistant and viable art, an art that is not simply subsumed within institutions of power.

     

    This kind of rhetoric comes somewhat uneasily from Anderson, who after all maintains contracts with Warner Brothers Records and Harper/Perennial Books, and is arguably the most successful individual–the closest thing to a pop star–in the performance art genre. But Anderson’s ambigous stance is consistent with that of other politicized performance artists today. As Auslander has remarked, postmodern political art has found that it “must position itself within postmodern culture, it must use the same representational means as all other cultural expression yet remain permanently suspicious of them.” 9 Such a stance leaves us with many paradoxes and problems still to be worked out. But we are fortunate to have Anderson among those who are performing such work.

     

    Notes

     

    1. Philip Auslander, Presence and Resistance: Postmodernism and Cultural Politics in Contemporary American Performance (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992), 6.

     

    2. Laurie Anderson, Stories from the Nerve Bible: A Retrospective 1972-1992 (New York: Harper Perennial, 1994), 6.

     

    3. Anderson, Nerve Bible, 281.

     

    4. John Howell, Laurie Anderson (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1992), 12.

     

    5. Auslander, 1.

     

    6. Laurie Anderson, Empty Places: A Performance (New York: Harper Perennial, 1991), back cover.

     

    7. Anderson, Nerve Bible, 273.

     

    8. Anderson, Nerve Bible, 276.

     

    9. Auslander, 23.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Anderson, Laurie. Empty Places: A Performance. New York: Harper Perennial, 1991.
    • —. Stories from the Nerve Bible: A Retrospective 1972-1992. New York: Harper Perennial, 1994.
    • Auslander, Philip. Presence and Resistance: Postmodernism and Cultural Politics in Contemporary American Performance. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992.
    • Howell, John. Laurie Anderson. New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1992.