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  • Notes on Contributors

    Jens Andermann teaches at NYU and is an editor of the Journal of Latin American Cultural Studies. He is the author of Tierras en trance: arte y naturaleza después del paisaje (2018, forthcoming in English from Northwestern), New Argentine Cinema (2011), The Optic of the State. Visuality and Power in Argentina and Brazil (2007), and Mapas de poder: una arqueología literaria del espacio argentino (2000). His current work explores unspecific aesthetics as modes of survival in the inmundo, or earthwide precarity.

    Joy Lehuanani Enomoto is a community organizer, visual artist and lecturer at the University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa in Pacific Islands Studies. Her work on climate justice, embodied archives and demilitarization in the Pacific is featured in Frontiers Journal, The Contemporary Pacific: Experiencing Pacific Environments: Pasts, Presents, Futures, Detours: A Decolonial Guide to Hawaiʻi, Routledge Postcolonial Handbook, and Amerasia Journal. Her current work focuses on anti-Blackness in Oceania/Solwara.

    Sarah E.K. Fong is an Assistant Professor of Studies in Race, Colonialism, and Diaspora at Tufts University. Her research examines the entanglements of schooling, self-making, and racial-settler capitalism in the late-nineteenth century. Dr. Fong has published work in American Indian Culture and Research Journal as well as Amerasia Journal.

    Sandra Harvey is Assistant Professor of African American Studies at the University of California, Irvine.

    Chad B. Infante is a post-doctoral fellow and assistant professor of African American and Native American literature in the English department at the University of Maryland, College Park. Chad earned his doctorate in English from Northwestern University in 2018. Originally from Jamaica, his research focuses on black and indigenous US and Caribbean literatures, gender, sexuality, critical theory, and political philosophy.

    Alírio Karina is a Postdoctoral Fellow in the Archive and Public Culture Research Initiative at the University of Cape Town, and Associate Faculty at the Brooklyn Institute for Social Research. Their research examines how the idea of Africa is the product of the legacies of anthropology, and what it might mean to do African studies—and to think Africa—in ways autonomous of anthropology.

    Tiffany King is an Associate Professor of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at Georgia State University. She is the author of The Black Shoals: Offshore Formations of Black and Native Studies, Duke University Press, 2019.

    Kelly Limes Taylor does many things, including think, mother, teach, and write. She lives in the upper left corner of Georgia, U.S., with her family.

    Paul Joseph López Oro is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Africana Studies at Smith College. His research and teaching interests are on Black Latin American and U.S. Black Latinx social movements, Black Feminist & LGBTQ activism, and Black Queer Feminist ethnographies in the Américas. His in-progress manuscript, Indigenous Blackness in the Americas: The Queer Politics of Self-Making Garifuna New York is a transdisciplinary ethnography on how gender and sexuality shapes the ways in which transgenerational Garifuna New Yorkers of Central American descent negotiate, perform, and articulate their multiple subjectivities as Black, Indigenous, and AfroLatinx.

    Keguro Macharia is from Nairobi, Kenya. Author of Frottage: Frictions of Intimacy across the Black Diaspora, Keguro blogs at gukira.wordpress.com.

    Zoé Samudzi has a PhD in Medical Sociology from the University of California, San Francisco where her dissertation research engaged German imperialism, colonial biomedicine, and the Ovaherero and Nama genocide. She is currently a Postdoctoral Fellow at the ACTIONS Program in the UCSF School of Nursing where she is working on research around transgender health, reproductive justice and autonomy, and material-epistemic violences.

    Tyler T. Schmidt is Associate Professor of English at Lehman College, City University of New York (CUNY) where he co-directed the Writing Across the Curriculum for nearly a decade. His essay “Lessons in Light: Beauford Delaney’s and James Baldwin’s ‘Unnameable Objects’” was published in the collection Of Latitudes Unknown: James Baldwin’s Radical Imagination (2019). The author of Desegregating Desire: Race and Sexuality in Cold War American Literature (2013), he is currently at work on a book about a group of Midwestern writers and visual artists who collectively reimagined queer portraiture in the 1940s and 1950s.

    Dr. SA Smythe is a poet, translator, and assistant professor of Black European Cultural Studies and Black Trans Poetics at UCLA, where they are primarily invested in Black belonging beyond borders. They are the guest editor of Troubling the Grounds: Global Configurations of Blackness, Nativism, and Indigeneity in Postmodern Culture, the forthcoming monograph Where Blackness Meets the Sea: On Crisis, Culture, and the Black Mediterranean, and the full poetry collection titled proclivity, which takes up a familial history of Black migration (between Britain, Costa Rica, Jamaica, and Italy), trans embodiment, and Black liberation. Smythe is a statewide coordinating committee member of the faculty wing of California Cops Off Campus (UCFTP) and organizes with students and other comrades in the broader Cops Off Campus Coalition and other abolitionist/anti-carceral groups across Turtle Island and in Europe. Winner of the 2021 Rome Prize, Smythe is currently based between Rome, Italy and Tongva Land.

  • Radical Friends: Botany and Us

    Erin Obodiac (bio)

    A review of Meeker, Natania and Antónia Szabari. Radical Botany: Plants and Speculative Fiction. Fordham UP, 2020.

    In The Groves of Academe (1952), Mary McCarthy begins her campus novel with a Latin epigraph from Horace: Atque inter silvas academi quaerere verum (and seek for truth in the garden of Academe, Epistle II, ii, 45). From its beginning, academia—the grove of sycamore and olive trees in Attica named after its original landowner Academus where Plato later conducted his lectures—thus fuses figures of man, plant, and philosophy. Yet Epistle II, ii, addressed to Julius Florus, is perhaps no less satirical about academia than McCarthy’s novel: having failed, amidst “so great noise both by night and day,” to deliver some florid verses to Julius, Horace observes dismissively that “poets love the grove, and avoid cities.” Apparently, the garden of academe, as well as the truth, is already beside the point in the first century BCE. At this late hour, nonetheless, professors Natania Meeker and Antónia Szabari of USC speculate on the silvas itself, and wager that the classical monoculture of arborescent man and arborescent philosophy has been uprooted by modernity’s radical botany, which engenders both rhizomatic posthumans and rhizomatic philosophies. Bursting through the centuries-tilled exceptionalism of human life and logos, the strange vitality of vegetality—one that is peculiarly inorganic—animates the speculative fruits of modernity’s science, fiction, technology, and art, according to Meeker and Szabari. Radical Botany: Plants and Speculative Fiction is therefore not merely a new academic book,1 but a rear-guard action that mobilizes critical plant studies to re-imagine the cosmos and cosmotechnics of modern life.

    Perhaps more modestly, Meeker and Szabari also envision radical botany as a practice that cultivates new modalities of research and collaboration within academia itself:

    With our book, we affirm that there is a vegetal dimension to the practice of collaboration. While experimenting concretely with that practice, we were forced to accept that our work process and its outcome were no longer tied to an individual sense of self, nor did they affirm our limits or boundaries as individual scholars. (vii)

    Taking up Deleuze and Guattari’s precepts of “becoming-plant,” “rhizome,” and “follow the plants,” Meeker and Szabari pledge their allegiance to vegetal allies whose mode of being is “neither individuated nor autonomous but collective, swarming, multiple” (xi). This distributive, emergent, non-hierarchical assemblage (whether plant, insect, or technology) has become the familiar of many new materialist discourses in their attempt to invoke a mode of being and relation that deprivileges human subjectivity while expanding the confluence of actants. Is this philosophical shift from Academus the man to Academe the grove—which, according to Radical Botany, emerges in (specifically French) seventeenth-century early modernity—simply a celebratory “turn,” or, more soberly, a “catastrophe”?

    The question can be reframed by taking a quick look at this “radical” of botany whereby plants are our allies and collaboration is itself vegetal. The Online Etymology Dictionary tells us that radical is already and originally a botanical term: “Late 14c., in a medieval philosophical sense, from Late Latin radicalis ‘of or having roots,’ from Latin radix (genitive radicis) ‘root’ (from PIE root wrad ‘branch, root’). Meaning ‘going to the origin, essential’ is from 1650s.” We see that the word radical concerns the root, the chthonic origin, the essence; indeed, the radical concerns the essence of the word, “the root part of a word.” Radical botany is therefore botanical to the roots: there are no Persons, only Plants, in the silvas academi. This confluence of speculative substitutions and supplements is already reflected upon by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in 1782. In the Dialogues, he finds himself foregoing human friends for botanical ones, and laments that “he would have left the supplement for the thing, if he had had the choice, and he was reduced to converse with plants only after vain efforts to converse with human beings” (qtd. in Derrida 148). Suspecting the implications of this predicament over the supplement and the thing for Rousseau’s philosophy and philosophy in general—whether writing in lieu of speech or plant in lieu of human being—in Of Grammatology, Derrida writes: “that botany becomes the supplement of society is more than a catastrophe. It is the catastrophe of the catastrophe.” (148). The irrecoverability of the logos is radical; there is always already only supplement. In Derrida’s landmark reading of Rousseau, “writing will appear to us more and more as another name for this structure of supplementarity” (245) and any gesture to “separate originarity from supplementarity” (243 points to an “originary supplement.” That Rousseau has no choice but to supplement the human being with the plant suggests that the plant is an “originary supplement” or a “radical friend,” if we heed the botanical meaning of the word “radical.”2 Although Meeker and Szabari follow Deleuze rather than being led down Derrida’s phyto-deconstructive garden path, they give to the plant a kind of radical priority that retrieves its peculiar vitality and animation from the margins (no longer mere Aristotelian threptikon or nutritive capacity of the vegetal soul) and dislodges the humanistic imperative from its lofty bell tower (the perpetual echo chamber of reason’s sovereignty). Going further, Radical Botany suggests that the “plant turn” is a companion vibrant materialism, one that signals an emergent phytocene in the wake of the anthropocene: “In its approach to the plant as a figure for the animation of matter in general, radical botany allows us to think the calamity (for us) of human insignificance together with the intensity of our desire for recognition and the dream of multispecies attachments and solidarities” (6). Despite the cosmic dimensions of the Plant Turn, Meeker and Szabari remain close to their disciplinary field and begin their account of radical botany thus “in seventeenth-century France with the gradual development of a botanically oriented thought that accords power and vitality to vegetal life in ways that trouble orthodox modes of classification” (1).

    From Aristotle’s de Anima onward, plant life has often been classified as poor in (or entirely without) intelligence compared to human life, and poor in (or entirely without) perception compared to animal life. Even so, this apparent catatonia and anesthesia have incited speculation that plants point to the limits of understanding life in anthropomorphic and zoomorphic terms. Vegetal lives, write Meeker and Szabari, “compel us to imagine an ingeniously animated and animating matter that we are never able to observe in all its operations. Within this framework, the plant becomes capable of unleashing speculative energies for envisioning and indeed participating in the world as other than it may appear to us” (3). The poverty of vegetal life incites our imagination to envision other worlds, or rather, becomes a nonhuman speculum that supplements human imagination. Meeker and Szabari observe both the “tradition that conceives of vegetal life as resisting representability” and the insight that plant life “participates in the production of new representational modes, including the novel, early cinema, and contemporary virtual reality, and new affects, including queer desires, feminist affinities, and ecological solidarities” (2). The birth of a “vegetal subject” hence occurs in arabesque tandem with a vegetal modernity that models a new representational framework for animated matter.

    For seventeenth-century (French) materialist thought, plants offer “a mode of life that is entirely immanent,” that is to say, “without a hidden or transcendent animating principle” (16). Taking as their example satirical narratives (from libertins eŕudits such as Cyrano de Bergerac) that carnivalize the dignity of the human person via plant figures that are both scandalously libidinal and indifferent, Meeker and Szabari see these works as a kind of Copernican turn for the order of life, whereby the plant is the exemplar of an entity “both vibrantly alive and fully material” (16) that “not only works as a tool with which to undermine anthropocentric narratives but as a key figure for the material life of the universe” (29). Yet, in an ambivalent gesture that becomes a strategy for their book as a whole, Meeker and Szabari begin the early chapter “Libertine Botany and Vegetal Modernity” with the works of Guy de La Brosse, who founded the Jardin de Roi, a kind of research garden expanding the (human) knowledge of plant chemistry for philanthropic purposes (botanical remedies for the poor). We see that this garden of the king is not only tethered to the scientific, social, and economic order of its time, but that La Brosse “retains the notion of the soul as an animating force” (ascribed to each individual plant), which leads Meeker and Szabari to the half-hearted concession that his “position is not a materialist one” (34). Attempting to recuperate the botanist’s exuberant assertion that plants, “the daughters of the earth,” are the first living things to receive the cosmic shower of “divine benediction,” Meeker and Szabari insist that “[i]f La Brosse invokes a divine rationality for being, he does so in order to give plants priority over all other forms of life” (36). This priority not only concerns the plant as an animated (ensouled) being but an animating being: the incorruptibility and immortality of the plant soul is made manifest, claims La Brosse, in experiments with palingenesis. The spectral scene of the ghost plant resurrecting itself from the ashes is deftly interpreted and linked by Meeker and Szabari to future technologies of visual materialization: “if this scene looks back to a tradition originating in alchemy, it also looks forward to techniques of animation three hundred years in the making—the time-lapse films of late nineteenth-century science and early cinema that animate the plant in an electric form” (39). Although perhaps no twenty-first century observer would see experiments in pallingenesis as an exhibition of the immortal, incorruptible soul of plants, making them a precursor to cinematic animation poses some questions: does not a (revisionist/retroactive) reading that turns something into a precursor suggest a teleological conception of history (Hegelian unfolding of spirit, etc.)? Does not any regime of visual representation—whether ghost plant rising up from the ashes in a glass vial or electric plant blossoming forth in time-based media—rely on a transcendental signified?

    In order to manage the complications that arise in a materialist reading of the plant as a vegetal subject and the emergence of a vegetal modernity, Meeker and Szabari mobilize speculative fiction as a genre and methodology. They designate “speculative fiction—narratives of life and sociability that go beyond anthropocentric and anthropomorphic limits” (48)—as vital materiality’s genre and the plant “as a key figure for the material life of the universe” (29). Yet Cyrano de Bergerac’s fantastic tale of the talking cabbage, for instance, though it might mock the dignities and illusions of the human person, does not make the “truth” of matter or vital materiality accessible.3 We might also see the peculiar vitality accorded to plants as more properly linguistic: according to Barbara Johnson’s Persons and Things, talking cabbages serve better to demonstrate the way rhetorical strategies like apostrophe, prosopopeia, anthropomorphism, and personification turn things into persons (and constitute human persons, in the first place). Radical Botany‘s chapter 3 sub-section “Plant-Human Analogies in the Eighteenth Century” directly addresses rhetoric by observing that eighteenth-century botany tends to anthropomorphize plants in order to put into question the hierarchies and categorization of various orders of life. The physiology and function of plant parts are likened to those of animals, suggesting “the development of a radical materialism that attacks ontological distinctions among life-forms as contested matters of belief rather than accepted truth” (58). And yet, in order to do so, botanists of this period had to give to the plant what belongs to the animal, particularly movement. This recuperative gesture did not go ignored by eighteenth-century materialists like Denis Diderot. Meeker and Szabari remark that the “tendency to privilege free will and autonomy of movement as sources of superiority is reconfigured by Diderot as a symptom of our inability to ascribe value to life-forms that do not resemble us” (59). In signature fashion, the structural arc of Radical Botany redoubles its own analysis: as early modern (French) speculative fictions turn to plants to explore the material life of the cosmos, they institute, on the one hand, a trajectory that includes cinematic animation as a form of life, and reinstitute on the other the manifest behaviors (primarily movement) of animal life as that which makes plants “alive.” This ambivalent framework helps to account for the disciplinary fractures and sutures of Radical Botany: for Meeker and Szabari, the early modern libertins eŕudits premediate early 20th century avant-garde cinema even as their materialist fictions remediate the philosophical terms and principles of classical philosophy (distinctions between plants and animals, materiality and immateriality, organic matter and inorganic matter).

    What mediates this double premediation and remediation? The chapter on “The Inorganic Plant in the Romantic Garden” tells us, unsurprisingly, that Romanticism provides the mediation, configured as mutuality. The Romantic botanist imagines a “plant life that is vibrant on its own terms yet exquisitely responsive to human interests and preoccupations” (88). Taking Percy Bysshe Shelley’s poem “The Sensitive-Plant” as exemplary, however, Meeker and Szabari suspect that the Romantic plant’s sensitivity may be more of the order of photosensitivity than affective affinity for the human being: the wild and indifferent vitality of weeds runs amuck after the tandem expirations of gentle Lady Gardener and her cultivated garden companions. Vegetal life cares naught for the human person, but shares proximity with “modes of animation and vitality unrelated to and undefined by organisms and the life that they embody” (86). The photon-sensitive-plant will, by the twentieth century, find its true soul mate in the techno-photosynthesis of the cinema. Meeker and Szabari trace this alliance by way of a “detour through a North American tradition of speculative botany. … [Edgar Allan] Poe’s texts in particular will be of inspiration to French symbolism (including the poetic arabesques of Charles Baudelaire) and, through this line of transmission, early avant-garde French cinema” (87). In The House of Usher, Poe takes heed of the dark side of the plant—its creeping excess, its slimy vitality, its evil flowers, its horrifying indifference—which casts an alien shadow on any sense of human temporality, achievement, or society. The crowning glory of human reason is no match for “the sentience of all vegetal things” (Poe, qtd. 98), which invades the human kingdom, penetrating even its inanimate structures and artifacts, engendering a vital mineralogy. In Poe’s macabre view, plants represent not only an inhuman vitality, but an undead or inanimate one as well. The uncannily green luminosity of the swamp bespeaks the electric glow of the emergent cinema and shares in its phantasmatic animations. As the “inorganic life” of the vegetal overtakes the house of Usher, Meeker and Szabari observe that, “[un]like much Gothic fiction,” this villain does not represent a “paternal authority turned cruel and terrifying but a force or mode of life that dissolves this authority altogether. In the process, vegetality is revealed as the agent of the disintegration of genealogies that should otherwise preserve distinctions according to a familial logic” (109). Meeker and Szabari see the fall of the house, the oikos, as ushering in a potential phyto-politics, one with feminist possibilities.

    Like other gestures in Radical Botany, grounding a feminist politics upon the vibrant materiality of the vegetal is pursued with speculative ambivalence. Taking up a short story influenced by Poe—Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s “The Giant Wistaria” (1891)—Meeker and Szabari propose that

    continuities between Poe’s and Gilman’s writings suggest that the materiality of the vegetal can contribute to the speculative invention of feminist topographies that do not necessarily have recourse to the privileging of female or feminine identity. Within the limits of a critique shot through with white supremacism, Gilman nonetheless suggests some of the promise Poe’s vision of vegetal contamination could hold for feminism. (111)

    Attention must be given to this word “nonetheless,” which occurs in Radical Botany 171 times, most tellingly in the title of the final chapter, “Becoming Plant Nonetheless.” The term habituates a recuperative strategy that is rhetorically innocuous in some cases—serving to uncover the compatibility of apparently incompatible alternatives—and politically charged in others. In the above example (the term’s twentieth deployment in the book), “nonetheless” allows for a problematic salvaging. Many readers have learned that phrases like nonetheless, in spite of, or nevertheless mask a more consequential “because of.” We may wonder why Meeker and Szabari’s analysis doesn’t take a different path—perhaps mapping out any link between the materiality of the vegetal and racism—or worry that only a white feminism could ever salvage a critique enmeshed with white supremacy. The “promise” of the transfer of vegetal vitality from the non-human to the human in new materialist discourses is a speculative performance that we should keep both our eyes on. Meeker and Szabari appear to have one eye on the situation when they write:

    The figure of the horrific plant, both supporting and dismantling the house, suggests a feminist rewriting of Poe’s “Usher,” but it is important in this context to acknowledge the racist and classist aspects of Gilman’s corpus, including the fact that her public critique of patriarchy remains imbued with xenophobia. (111)

    If the promise of radical botany has fraught political limits, it (nonetheless?) retains speculative and critical energies with regard to “scientific, technological, and mediatic engagement with vegetal life” (113). Meeker and Szabari regain a note of hope when the final chapters of their book turn to early twentieth-century experimental French cinema (Jean Comandon, Jean Epstein, and Germaine Dulac), which “takes the possibility of a vegetal sentience and transfigures it, suffusing it with transformative affect, to make it once again a joyous and galvanizing object” (113). The sign of this vegetal sentience is plant movement made visible with such techniques as time-lapse cinematography. The cinema not only animates the plant in this fashion, but also shares with it a kind of inorganic life: “[t]he ‘electric plant’ brings to fruition the concept of cinema as a form of pure movement” (115) and “the movement of the plant comes to stand for cinema’s ability to show (and transmit) the liveliness of the universe” (116). The cinema is itself a form of vegetal life, which is paradigmatic of vital materiality for Meeker and Szabari. As we have seen, however, the indifferent vitality of vegetal life can easily take root in politically problematic narratives: indifference is not a condition or consequence of equality. So when Meeker and Szabari deploy another “nonetheless”—this time with a chapter that begins its exploration of “the vegetal moment” in cinema with Abel Gance’s critical and commercial failure La Fin du monde, a film about the Earth’s collision course with a comet that “only features plants tangentially” (115) but is “nonetheless a spectacular exploration of the social repercussions of the impending cataclysm” (114)—readers might be keen on understanding which disavowed narrative or framework embeds this recuperative nonetheless.

    In a strangely passing remark, Meeker and Szabari mention the “deeply eurocentric idealism” (114) of the film “even as” it “harkens back to an Enlightenment universalism” (114). It appears that the void carved out by the cataclysmic impact of the comet enables a “newly universalist political order” that leaves “an Edenic earth from which most human life has been erased” (115) and is, in effect, a eurocentric void. As Meeker and Szabari proceed to their presentation of the vegetal moment in interwar French cinema, they intend “both to embrace and to rethink the social project with which cinema is so clearly invested in La Fin du monde,” stating that “vegetal life often does the work that the comet is meant to undertake in La Fin du monde: bringing about momentous social transformation” (115). Readers may wonder: does the opening up of the vegetal world by early (French) cinema with its delightful time-lapse photography (etc.) happen by way of a racialized excavation? In the case of the electric-plant, the carving out of its life-world might not happen “in spite of” a framing narrative of white supremacy or eurocentrism—more likely it happens as a technological determination of the cinematic apparatus—yet we may recall Walter Benjamin’s observation that cinema prepares the human being for cybernetic relations of all sorts.4 A machinic mode of animation informs the inorganic life of the cinema as well as the plant. For instance, Meeker and Szabari poetically express the way time-lapse techniques “create an ‘electric vegetable,’ a filmic ghost that moves and gesticulates in uncanny but compelling ways. A phantom of the cinematic apparatus is thus born, a stunning animated plant” (120). Making visible the slow movements and temporalities of the vegetal, the cinema does not turn the plant into an animetaphor, but unveils the machinic animism of the cosmos. If the heliotropic opening of daisies, the dandelion blooming, and the germinating grain of wheat—movements performed without volition, perception, or consciousness—share an affinity with the animating movements of the cinematic apparatus, they also signal “the dramatic loss of the world of human experience” (144).

    The penultimate chapter, “Plant Horror: Love Your Own Pod,” attends to the anxieties concerning this plant takeover and a planet absent of the human being. Shifting their focus from interwar French cinema to post-WWII American horror movies set in Southern California (in particular, the Invasion of the Body Snatchers franchise), Meeker and Szabari up the ante with their strategy of the nonetheless: in a world of vegetal and flat ontologies, what does it matter if you are a human being or a pod-person? Bypassing a possible racial allegory in the takeover of suburbia by alien pods, the authors set forth a materialist valuation of the merits of becoming-pod. In a world that is always already capitalist, neoliberal, and global,

    the world of the replicas, or bad copies, is not just alienating or melancholic—a zone of nostalgia for an absent original—but is a fully material world capable of transforming, producing, and reproducing itself. The pods are thus not only representatives of the workings of an increasingly rhizomatic capitalism. The film preserves a materialist aspect, in which matter is not only instrumentalized but also world-making in its own right. (165)

    This vibrant matter releases human inhabitants and

    redeems them from a drab existence. It is the latter experience that our materialist reading of the film underscores. Gradually, the images of flaccid, plantlike humans are reinjected with an excess of life, thanks to the invasion; the alien beings bring with them the promise of not only biological vitality but a vigorous efflorescence that can be substituted for the failed utopia represented by the multiethnic and multicultural but well-policed and ultimately fairly homogenous San Francisco. (165)

    This failed utopia concerns the university as well as the city: in the silvas academi, posthuman and nonhuman materialisms like radical botany promise to reinvigorate dialectical, historical, and other “outdated” humanistic materialisms. Yet if “coanaesthesis” (124) is the modality of collaboration modeled by vegetal life, do we really want to be anaesthetized together, living in synaesthetic oblivion like peas in a pod, Body Snatcher style? Is not this Green Coma or Green Catatonia just as disturbing as the eco-fascist human-plant symbiosis exhibited in the recent Swedish film Midsommar or in the 1973 American film Soylent Green? Doubling down on its speculative optimism, Radical Botany leaves us with the chapter “Becoming Plants Nonetheless,” and one can’t help but wonder from where it derives its amiable buoyancy: as long as it is plant-based, I may want to try some myself.

    Erin Obodiac Erin Obodiac received her Ph.D. in Comparative Literature from the University of California, Irvine and has held teaching and research appointments at the University of Leeds, SUNY Albany, Cornell University, and SUNY Cortland. She currently lectures in the UC Irvine-Dalian University of Technology joint program. Her writings assemble residual questions from the deconstructive “legacy” with emergent discourses in technics and animality, media ecology, and machinic subjectivity. She is completing a book called Husserl’s Comet: Cinema and the Trace, which repositions deconstruction within the history of cybernetics and machinic life.

    Footnotes

    1. As scholars of French literature, Meeker and Szabari don’t mention that the German word Buch comes from the word for beechwood trees.

    2. In The Politics of Friendship, Derrida follows this predicament of the “o my friends, there is no friend” (2).

    3. Catherine Malabou’s recent critique of speculative materialism and new materialism notices that matter is the new transcendental signified.

    4. Benjamin writes: “Film serves to train human beings in apperceptions and reactions caused by the interaction with technology [Apparatur] whose importance in their lives grows almost daily” (qt. in Hansen 314).

    Works Cited

    • Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology. Edited by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Johns Hopkins UP, Fortieth Anniversary Edition, 2016.
    • —. The Politics of Friendship. Translated by George Collins, Verso, 1995.
    • Hansen, Miriam. “Benjamin and Cinema: Not a One-Way Street.” Critical Inquiry, vol. 25, no. 2, Winter 1999.
  • “This book … of traces and tremors, if book it be”

    Cory Austin Knudson (bio)

    Taussig, Michael. Mastery of Non-Mastery in the Age of Meltdown. U Chicago P, 2020.

    In Mastery of Non-Mastery in the Age of Meltdown, anthropologist and ethnographer Michael Taussig confronts the reciprocal problems of theorizing and representing climate change. In this, he joins a popular strain of contemporary environmental humanities literature that examines how modeling the environment analytically or artistically limits or expands the ways we can think about, and perhaps mitigate, climatic catastrophe. Much of the work in this tradition tends to keep its models at arm’s length, using sober, scholarly analysis to master the myriad representational forms of climate change. It straightens out—in theory—the disorder of a world on the brink without letting theory itself become infected by such disorder. Taussig, by comparison, seeks to meld analysis with its object, making his text both product and agent of epistemic meltdown. Mastery of Non-Mastery in the Age of Meltdown (hereafter Mastery of Non-Mastery) in this way combines ecocritical and ecopoetic practices; it attempts to reshape, mutate, and parody the scholarly monograph in a bid to derive a form of expression commensurate with this surreal, volatile age of meltdown.

    Taussig’s correspondingly surreal and volatile text might at first appear a gimmick, where writing erratically mimics erratic weather patterns, as it were. But Taussig insists elsewhere that “while it is hazardous to maintain a mimetic theory of language and writing, it is no less hazardous not to have such a theory” (“Corn-Wolf” 33). For him, the distance assumed between the subject and object of scholarly analysis together with a presumed epistemic stability form the foundations of much traditional academic writing. As such, academic criticism often mirrors and reinforces the ideology of Man’s mastery of nature—or, more academically, of subject matter—while concealing the role of narrative (or what Taussig more approachably terms “storytelling”) in the perpetuation of such a disastrous pretense. Taussig has thus cast his “apotropaic writing” as a “countermagic” to this hegemonic mode of thought and language (“Corn-Wolf” 32–33).1 Mastery of Non-Mastery presents his latest attempt to tap into the meeting point between reality and representation, where the “meltdown of the language of nature swamps the nature of language” (174).

    Thus opposed to what he calls the “crabby and secular language” (56) of much contemporary environmental literature, Taussig variously situates Mastery of Non-Mastery as “somewhere between science fiction, high theory, and the weather” (3), a “book … of traces and tremors” (20), “a firefly moment navigating between light and dark” (57), “a too-late experimental ethnography” (120), and “a threshold between a theater and a book” (180). Nowhere does he employ the language of structuration and utility so normalized in works of theory. This “book that is not a book” (180) does not build anything. Nor does it seek to furnish its reader any theoretical tools. Rather, Taussig’s preferred models are dancing (16) and the meandering flight of a firefly (95). The salience of such images is apparent immediately on opening Mastery of Non-Mastery in the Age of Meltdown, which spans nineteen brief chapters laid out in discrete blocks of text that recall a collection of vignettes composed of aphorisms. The staccato rhythm of its format mirrors the way that ideas and intertexts are made to waltz and flit through the book’s pages, often disappearing suddenly only to reemerge in new combinations ten or fifty pages later. Lines of argument meanwhile cross and re-cross such that the author’s central concepts are gradually fleshed out more through creative patterning—or the layering of textures, or the thickening of an atmosphere—than by way of the gradual construction of a theoretical edifice. How else, he asks, should one write about a planetary condition where “nature turns more surreal each day with ominous green-yellow vistas and bluer-than-blue skies while the snow falls one day, rising the next as mist, stripping us naked as pixies as the cosmos draws close” (19)? Taussig here sets himself the task of philosophizing with the Nietzschean hammer, which resonates with its object so as to first match and then shatter its spell. This form of writing necessitates a way of reading that departs from what one might expect of an academic text. Like the figure on its cover, Taussig’s audience is meant to juggle rather than grasp his many tongue-in-cheek coinages—what he calls “‘shamanic tropes,’ such as ‘knowing what not to know,’ ‘the re-enchantment of nature,’ ‘the skilled revelation of skilled concealment,’ ‘the bodily unconscious,’ and of course the lead dancer itself, ‘mastery of non-mastery’” (34).

    A book devised to put its reader off-kilter leaves the reviewer in a predicament. On the one hand, I can give myself over to Taussig’s circuitous, often baroque style and attempt to do justice to the experience of reading his latest work by recreating it in miniature. On the other, I can set the juggling balls down and soberly attempt to taxonomize the performance at the expense of the intoxicating movement that gives it meaning in the first place. While the reader of this review need not fear (much) indulgence in theatrics, the temptation toward mimicry in this case is hard to resist. This impulse arises in part from Taussig’s compelling case against the ideology of Man’s exception from and dominance over nature and the scholarly mode of analysis that often ends up mirroring and reinforcing it, even for the most eco-conscious of critics. But mostly it comes from how powerfully the text conveys its central thesis on the contagious power of mimesis, which becomes the most enchanting of Taussig’s “shamanic tropes” and forms the gravitational center of his intellectual galaxy in general.

    Mimesis emerged as a theoretical and methodological point of departure early in Taussig’s career by way of his ethnographic studies of the indigenous peoples of the Putumayo River Basin in Colombia. Starting in 1969, the Guna and others whom he lived among during his fieldwork—and to whom he has returned every year since—challenged Taussig’s self-described “western, middle-class life” and destabilized the “moorings that, up to that time, I thought I required for sociological reckoning” (37). Taussig’s life’s work became to understand and convey to those beyond the Putumayo Basin how sympathetic magic formed the foundation for thinking about and managing social, political, ecological, and even cosmic entanglements. Since the early 1980s, he has consistently figured shamanic practices of ritual contagion and duplication in terms of mimesis. Through the metonymic process of taking a part for the whole (e.g., taking blood or hair to represent the person whom a ritual is to affect), or the metaphoric process of fabricating or conjuring a ritual copy (e.g., crafting a likeness of the person whom a ritual is to affect, or taking on that person’s identity via performance or possession), sympathetic magic draws on a deep-seated mimetic faculty that Nidesh Lawtoo described in this journal as an “unconscious that responds viscerally to fluxes of affective contagion that operate on bodies and minds.” Taussig similarly terms this simultaneously intellectual and physical conatus the “bodily unconscious” (11–12, 73). Following the Guna, Taussig casts the bodily unconscious and the mimetic fluxes of affective contagion that operate on and through it as foundational to the very fabric of reality itself.

    Mimesis thus represents for Taussig not only an atomic element of human sociality but also the metaphysical axis of art, technology, religion, language, politics, and nature itself. Its centrality to Taussig’s thought and methodology helps us to understand why his works present themselves as forms of mimetic ritual. Mastery of Non-Mastery is no exception in this regard. However tiresome the reader may sometimes find this cultivated grandiosity—showmanship and shaman-ship for Taussig are, if not identical, then at least inextricably intertwined—Taussig’s perspicacity and style attest to the pervasiveness and self-perpetuating momentum of the mimetic faculty. In reading his work, one can feel that mimesis designates the impulse to copy as well as the impulse to generate copies. Such generative processes naturally “lead to snowballing metamorphoses” (44), including the metamorphosis of his text’s readers (and its reviewer, and the reader of that reviewer, and …) into participants in the ritual.

    “In other words,” Taussig writes, “mimesis has an inbuilt propensity to provoke a chain reaction in which things become other things in a process of mimetic fission … This I call the ‘metamorphic sublime’” (44). Via this “metamorphic sublime,” Mastery of Non-Mastery deftly synthesizes the affective flux of the bodily unconscious with the principle of generalized planetary interconnection now largely taken for granted among environmental scholars, while at the same time literalizing what Taussig elsewhere terms the “re-enchantment of nature” that the recent ontological and nonhuman “turns” in the humanities have called up (40, 42, 144, 176). “Global meltdown amplifies mimetic and animistic impulses as never before,” he declares (5). As such, it becomes reasonable to ask whether “we are now becoming like the soothsayers of old”:

    Are we now becoming like ancient stargazers each night asking the heavens whys and wherefores? Do we not sense our animal selves, our plant selves, our insect selves, all of that and more as an angry sky beats down, our bodies resonant with hitherto unknown liaisons as foreign beings skid in from the unknown? Suddenly we are alive in our bodies as to stellar influence and solar wind when all goes dark once more but for fireflies, epitome of the newly animate world, reminders of chances missed, others to catch, roadside flares of pixilated consciousness.(61)

    In this way, Mastery of Non-Mastery implicitly mobilizes a common criticism in environmental humanities discourse, especially vis-à-vis the colonial trappings of the Anthropocene and the principle of all-pervading planetary interconnection that heuristic has popularized. Bluntly: indigenous people have theorized these kinds of things long before Paul Crutzen and Eugene Stoermer came along. And they have worked out elaborate ways of channeling the mimetic relays that form the warp and woof of human-nonhuman entanglement. “Weather magic,” Taussig reminds us, “is as old as the hills” (125).

    Taussig’s point that we must now come to terms with a broad-based re-enchantment of nature in all its marvels and horrors begs the question: what is to be done? This is where his central thesis on the contagious power of mimesis, its tendency to compound its own momentum, and its entanglement with the bodily unconscious at the intersection of “my body, your body, and the body of the world” really begins to throw sparks (11). With due reference to Nietzsche’s hammer become tuning fork—which, “touching the idols of culture, echoes their hollowness, thereby destroying them” (13)—Taussig gradually fleshes out the notion of “mimetic excess,” that tendency whereby any copy always generates some volatile residue or remainder. This is the true potency of sympathetic magic: the shaman not only mirrors something or someone, but engenders a creative refiguration thereof. Because magic ritual resembles a sort of cybernetic relay where output retroactively affects input, this creative refiguration has the capacity to turn back and affect its original. He explains this process via the 1955 short, quasi-ethnographic film, Les maîtres fous:

    The film concerns migrants of the French colony of Niger enacting in trance the spirits of French officials, seen now in black bodies gesticulating wildly and disjointedly, eyes rolling, spume frothing from their mouths. They enact mini-dramas of transgression and of military discipline. … They eat dog and they carry (toy) rifles. They exult in the exercise of mastery over craven subjects crawling on the ground. The crucial point is that the bodies in trance are and manifestly are not the French officials. The bodies mimic, yet the result is not without parody, and parody (as Steve Feld once pointed out) is mimesis with one aspect accentuated, which is all you need for mimetic excess. Yet even without accentuation, to be mimed is disconcerting. These men and women from Niger, part of the Hauka cult, thus bring out the wildness, the spirituality, and—most important—the sheer bluff their masters enact in the colonial theatricalization of mastery in general. … To mime is to get the power of what is mimed and power over it. (8)

    Les maîtres fous was banned in Niger and then in British-controlled African colonies for its perceived insult to colonial governorship. Taussig’s reading exposes the powerful transgression in this “insult.” The Hauka cult’s performances reveal an uncomfortable truth about the performative nature of colonial governorship itself, namely that it “is a matter of guile, of foxes as well as of lions, [of] what Hubert Murray, a colonial governor in Papua in the early twentieth century called ‘administration by bluff’” (13). This is the showman-shaman magic of political power in general, the magic trick of political power. And yet, because “mimesis exists no less in the actual events than in their depiction, in the reality as much as in its representation” (131), the mimicry of the Hauka practitioners as captured in Les maîtres fous retroactively reshaped the reality it both copied and parodied. It revealed the magic (trick) of colonial governance precisely through the creative refiguration thereof. This, according to Taussig, is the “trick whereby tuning forks become hammers” (15).

    Of course, mimetic excess has both a liberatory and a repressive side. The viral power of those mimetic relays operating in and through the bodily unconscious are just as likely to generate fascistic formations as subvert them. This is all too obvious today, Taussig argues, in the way that Donald Trump has been able to feed off of the visceral, affective power of racial resentment and patriarchal bluff, conjuring a following that would have been close to unthinkable in mainstream American thought even half a decade ago. “Trumpism [is] a shorthand for the sleight-of-hand theatricality of today’s politics” (35) he says, a condensation of “what I have shamanically in mind regarding dodge and feint and a larger-than-large theatrical presence verging on the grotesque that is magical if not sacred” (37), and “all the more impressive for being semi-conscious, at best” (39). Donald Trump indeed looms large over Mastery of Non-Mastery as the fascist showman-shaman par excellence. The nexus of the presidential Twitter account, the right-wing media echo chamber, and the ever more deranged following all feed on one another and give credence to Taussig’s thesis concerning the particular “magic of the presidency” (36) and the dark metamorphic sublimity it has called into being. Taussig here affirms Lawtoo’s point that

    mimetic behavior, just like the mythic tales that incite it, cuts both ways, depending on the model we mirror: if it can potentially turn a specific citizen into a model of resistance at a distance from power, it can also turn a democratic assemblage into a neofascist crowd under the hypnotic power of a leader’s pathos.

    Similarly, David Joselit’s more recent argument in October shows how the viral structure common to both the current pandemic and to the spreading and attribution of fake news (habitually mobilized by Trump) is cancerously mimetic, making COVID-19 so catastrophic in the US. But where Lawtoo gestures toward “what Nietzsche called a ‘pathos of distance‘ to diagnose the spiraling loops generated by the swarming of mimesis” and Joselit calls for a move to “re-authorize information … in the face of our world gone viral” (161), Taussig suggests no such stepping back. The task instead is to “mimetically match the magic sustaining fascism, which, like the fortress, is best tackled not from outside but from within” (16).

    This is a gutsy move that will likely earn him critics, sounding as it does like a call to stem the rising tide of fascism by, in a sense, jumping in and swimming with the current. It therefore doesn’t surprise me that Taussig, an avid student of the works of Georges Bataille, does not explicitly cite that thinker’s attempt to conjure up an antifascism based around the very same sort of détournement of fascist mimesis via the infamous Acéphale secret society and its eponymous, short-lived publication. Bataille’s invocation of a surfascisme that would ritualistically tap into and redirect the affective pull of reactionary forces earned him some of his most resounding denunciations, and remains a source of continuing confusion and misrepresentation today. Turning from politics proper, Taussig’s project makes a more modest proposal. He calls it “art versus art”:

    What sort of art is that, you ask? Well, not to put too fine a point on it, it is certainly not ideology versus truth, nor discourse versus counterdiscourse, but an art of sorcery-speak in a world gone rogue, piling on the negative sacred in which nature speaks through animate impulse and mimetic relays. Whatever the terms, paramount will be the pulse between bodies as America is made again. (144)

    Not putting too fine a point on it, indeed. In any case, there is no direct invitation to congregate in a secret grove around a dead tree struck by lightning to work out the terms of a human sacrifice (though Taussig does enigmatically refer to that acéphalic, lightning-struck tree of legend in chapter thirteen). Rather, a renewed art of “sorcery-speak” takes center stage, exemplified in certain works of Walter Benjamin and the “tremor-writing” that “draws upon and enacts corporeal tumult” (152) embodied in Marcel Proust’s In Search of Lost Time.

    In laying out how these authors are able to generate their characteristic, almost proprioceptive affect—which Taussig argues is crafted to operate on and through the bodily unconscious—Taussig demonstrates his powers as a reader of literature. Some of the best pages in the book engage his own hypnotic strain of ecocritical textual interpretation. Moving through the final paragraphs of Benjamin’s “On the Mimetic Faculty” or some passage from “Combray” with Taussig as guide is both pleasant and enlightening. Taussig’s language on occasion makes the book live up to its claim of being “a book of traces and tremors.” His prose, however, occasionally becomes as obfuscating as it is illuminating, and is sometimes overblown and clunky. He uses the phrase “they be” and variations thereof—”Shadows of life, they be” (100), “Those eyes, great black holes they be” (173), “Soul mates they be” (116)—with maddening frequency throughout the book. Far from lending the language a kind of sacred weight, this and similar idiosyncrasies end up distracting and frustrating this reader.2 Additionally, and at a less granular scale, Taussig’s rapid shifts in focus and tendency toward digression make even his most profound analyses less effective than they could be. While I understand what he is trying to do with his Nietzschean hammer and apotropaic countermagic, I still wonder what insights a more sustained engagement with his interlocutors would yield. This is exacerbated by the fact that his two favored exemplars of the kind of tremor-writing necessary for “art versus art” are writers who spend hundreds of pages elaborating a single idea or image.

    Then there are the interlocutors themselves. Taussig’s reviewers tend to point out that he appears to refuse, on principle, any sustained engagement with contemporary scholarship, preferring instead to stick with the tried-and-true cast of Benjamin, Proust, Bataille, and select others who, by and large, belong to the intellectual and literary canon of the Global North. He manages to avoid criticism for this pantheon not only because of his almost preternatural ability to generate fresh and audacious readings out of otherwise well-worn texts, but also because his profound investment in the ideas and practices of the indigenous cultures he studies allows him to unsettle the intellectual purview of dead-white-European-dom that often characterizes works of high theory. Mastery of Non-Mastery, though, largely leaves aside the second half of this formula. This is the work’s most significant shortcoming. Taussig makes frequent reference to the people, ideas, and experiences that populate the sub-equatorial half of his life and work, and he conveys a cutting if largely implicit criticism of the often parochial “flood of green books, freshly minted journals, essays, research grants, talk shows, films, fellowships, political campaigns, and endless conferences on the Anthropocene” (56). But Mastery of Non-Mastery itself features no truly sustained engagement with non-Western thinkers or texts, no first-hand testimonies, and not even any direct quotations from those among whom he lives when not in New York City. Walks around New York, in fact, take the place of journeys through the Amazon rainforest, and conversations with East Coast friends take the place of, for example, the conversations with the shaman Santiago Mutumbajoy around which Taussig built his watershed work, Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man (1987).

    One additional absence bears noting: the reader of this review has likely noticed my disappointment at the sudden, precipitous turn from the political point about occupying and redirecting the affective forces driving the current fascist resurgence to the more aesthetic project of crafting a kind of “tremor-writing” à la Benjamin and Proust. Given Taussig’s strident and often crushingly incisive comments on the current political landscape, a more directly political articulation of what is to be done in this “age of meltdown” seems called for. All the more so because Mastery of Non-Mastery is dedicated to “a Green New Deal,” and its first quotation is from the democratic socialist New York congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. Taussig seems to indicate—albeit under his breath—that the current fitful growth of a mass politics to the left of the Democratic Party might well be the political embodiment to match—and undo—the magic sustaining fascism. This would be a fascinating, bold, and productive argument against the dominant left-conservatism that sneers at “left populism” and pines for a return to “normal,” that asks us to step back from the flux of the metamorphic sublime and reinvest ourselves in traditional institutions of knowledge and power while fascism gains an ever-tighter grip on the bodily unconscious of the American socius. But alas, all this is only a trace, only a tremor, in Mastery of Non-Mastery in the Age of Meltdown. To its credit, that is precisely what the book claims to offer in the first place.

    Cory Austin Knudson Cory Austin Knudson is a doctoral student in Comparative Literature and Literary Theory at the University of Pennsylvania. His work focuses broadly on modernism and the environmental humanities, with emphasis on the function of decomposition in both literature and ecology. His essay, “Seeing the World: Visions of Being in the Anthropocene,” has been recently published in Environment, Space, Place. With Tomas Elliott, he is currently translating Georges Bataille’s The Limit of the Useful, a preliminary manuscript to The Accursed Share, for MIT Press.

    Footnotes

    1. Taussig writes, “I have long felt that agribusiness writing is more magical than magic ever could be and that what is required is to counter the purported realism of agribusiness writing with apotropaic writing as countermagic, apotropaic from the ancient Greek meaning the use of magic to protect one from harmful magic” (“Corn-Wolf” 32–33).

    2. To be clear, I am aware that this kind of pirate- and/or Yoda-speak is a stylistic quirk that, in general, reviews of scholarly works might gloss over or outright ignore—but in order to take seriously Taussig’s own wish for his language to be “not a tool of representation but a way of being what the writing is about” (170), I feel obliged to make mention of it.

    Works Cited

    • Joselit, David. “Virus as Metaphor.” October, no. 172, 2020, pp. 159–62.
    • Lawtoo, Nidesh. “The Swarming of Mimesis: A review of William Connolly, Facing the Planetary: Entangled Humanism and the Politics of Swarming.” Postmodern Culture, vol. 28, no. 1, 2017.
    • Taussig, Michael. “The Corn-Wolf: Writing Apotropaic Texts.” Critical Inquiry, vol. 37, no. 1, 2010, pp. 26–33.
  • Reasons for Self-Dislocating

    Miriam Jerade (bio)

    A review of Cadahia, Luciana, and Ana Carrasco-Conde, editors. Fuera de sí mismas. Motivos para dislocarse. Herder, 2020.

    This edited collection features contributions by Spanish-speaking women scholars who share the same motif—self-dislocation. The eleven authors seek to question the locus of philosophy and the discourses that frame it. The book is founded on the idea that philosophy has been historically enunciated by a male voice located in an Anglo-American geography. As the editors claim in the introduction, the self-dislocating logos is a loxos, a “taking away,” being mis-placed. This is reflected in the title of the volume, Fuera de sí mismas (Out of Their Minds), a play on words that echoes the language of mania but seeks to redress it as contrary to nonsense. Editors Cadahia and Carrasco-Conde propose that this form of collaboration allows women philosophers to claim back for themselves a voice of their own. The play between title and subtitle is also worth noticing. The title phrase “fuera de sí mismas” leads the reader to think of a judgment from outside—a female “they” who is “out of their mind” or even more literally “out of themselves.” The subtitle can be read as a response. There are indeed “reasons for dislocating” (“motivos para dislocarse”) the self, for making themselves uncomfortable, or self-dislocating. The contributors find themselves in a place where the voices of Spanish-speaking women philosophers are not heard. In response, the authors collectively claim the need to be creative and to dislocate the discourse. As Cadahia and Carrasco-Conde state in the introduction, “Only by being out of our minds/ourselves can we dislocate imposed places of enunciation that have turned aside our way of making philosophy, so we can open up new paths for a new logic” (“Solo estando fuera de sí mismas podemos desquiciar lugares de enunciación impuestos que han relegado nuestra forma de hacer filosofía y encontrar los caminos de una nueva lógica”; 18).1 It is not enough to publish philosophical research conducted by women in Spanish; more significantly, the collection explores a new logic of philosophical discourse through their interventions.

    The volume was not originally conceived as a collection of chapters focusing on feminism or on Latin American philosophy. The editors asked eleven renowned Latin American women scholars to send them texts about their current work. While the volume is not organized thematically, common topics arise in the essays. Anna Maria Brigante and Emma Ingala Gómez explore the image. Laura Quintana and Amanda Núñez García examine the possibility of political thought through aesthetics. María del Rosario Acosta and Rosaura Martínez Ruiz share a concern with the performativity of listening. Rocío Zambrana, Nuria Sánchez Madrid, and Macarena Marey critique liberal and neoliberal policies. In their respective essays, Ana Carrasco-Conde and Luciana Cadahia write about evil and desire.

    The originality of the book lies in the way all the contributors read canonical—and mostly male—philosophers and theorists from a situated standpoint. Zambrana interprets the debt crisis and the resistance of students in Puerto Rico through the lens of Walter Benjamin’s divine violence. Acosta reads political violence as an erasure of voice in Adriana Cavarero and in Ariel Dorfman’s novel La muerte y la doncella, which deals with torture in the Chilean dictatorship. Quintana writes about unburied corpses in Colombia, using Rancière and Mbembe as interlocutors. The contributors do not merely apply male theorists’ ideas to a particular question but take up a particular lens to read theory otherwise. Taken together, the various situations they bring into play question the locus of philosophy. For example, the subversive resistance of students in Puerto Rico allows us to better understand why divine violence is a destruction of history and how it is conceived as an expiation of debt in mythical violence. A character in the work of a Chilean author writing about the country’s dictatorship who has experienced torture in relation to their voice can shed light on the political dimension of listening, the acoustic dimension of violence, the horror produced by silencing, and even the effect of drowning out the voice.

    Fuera de sí mismas is based on modern philosophical-theoretical assumptions that pair with political concerns as a response to injustice. Cadahia reads desire in Antigone as a transgression of normativity. Her reading questions Hegel’s and Žižek’s interpretations of Antigone as well as feminist interpretations by Butler, Honig, and Copjec, which are situated in an Anglo-American context. Cadahia shows the difficulty of thinking about the feminine, taking into account the norms and hierarchy instituted by sexual difference. Cadahia writes:

    If there is something really revolutionary in the feminine, if there is something that capitalism cannot capture, it is precisely the feminine’s place in sexual difference as the discourse of Not-All, a discourse that detotalizes the place of feminine desire when it assumes its own right to materialize in public life. [Si hay algo realmente revolucionario en lo femenino, si hay algo que el capitalismo no logra capturar es justamente su lugar en la diferencia sexual como discurso del No-todo, un discurso que destotaliza el lugar del deseo femenino cuando asume sus propios derechos a materializarse en la vida pública.] (211)

    Sánchez Madrid explores suffering caused by capitalism in the work world. Taking as her starting point a sense of time that tends to a commodification of an “exhausted mind and crushed body” (“mente exhausta y cuerpo molido”; 342), her exploration leads her to question Adorno and critical theory. Marey explores consensus and consent as vehicles of normativity in Kant’s theory of the social contract, and shows, against Rawls, that the social contract is not a covenant made by self-interested pre-political individuals but by political communities with a legal normativity. The social contract is not founded in the individual categorical imperative of an idealized rational agent but in the formation of agency and collective will in the doctrine of law that founds political community. Discussing O’Neill and Darwall, she concludes that theories of social contract become exclusionary structural systems because of their ambition to universality as an ideal consensus.

    Writing from Colombia, Quintana focuses on the topic of corpses. Finding inspiration in the artistic installation “Cadáveres indisciplinados” (“Undisciplined Corpses”) by Colombian artist José Alejandro Restrepo and also in Mbembe’s theory of necropolitics, she assumes that politics masks the corpse because the life of the political body depends on the production of dead bodies. Images play a major role in the way bodies—and corpses—are made visible or invisible. Corpses distress us but they can also help us to think emancipation anew because of their ability to persist, to affect us, to make their testimony audible. In contrast to the virtual or theoretical, corpses possess a very real existence in a country such as Colombia, where missing persons number in the tens of thousands. As Quintana writes, one should “expose oneself to the call of so many defeated bodies, deprived of their possibilities; of so many deaths and lives forgotten here and now, again and again, in Colombia.” (“Exponerse al llamado de tantos cuerpos derrotados, desposeídos de sus posibilidades; de tantas muertes y vidas olvidadas aquí y ahora, una y otra vez, en Colombia” [103].)

    The reader should not look for a single answer to the problem of violence in this book, but a series of responses emerges throughout the chapters. Violence is understood not only as the legitimate or illegitimate use of force by the state but as a force against political, economic, and social injustices, including the structural epistemic injustice in mainstream philosophy that has silenced conversation conducted in Spanish. Writing in Latin America, some authors in the book link the inaudible nature of horror to this epistemological silencing, relating it to silencing that appears as a drowning out of the victims’ voices, their witnessing. Martínez Ruiz, writing from a psychoanalytical point of view, exposes the political dimension of listening and describes how listening to someone who has experienced trauma can subvert or provide healing from that trauma. This form of listening can become a counterpart to the experience of being silenced. As Acosta points out in her commentary on Ingala Gómez’s text, one possibility is “to subvert and question the criteria for visibility and intelligibility through which things (bodies, senses, modes of existence and articulation) appear to us.” (“Subvertir y cuestionar los criterios de visibilidad e inteligibilidad mediante los cuales las cosas (los cuerpos, los sentidos, los modos de existencia y articulación) se nos aparecen” [84].) Acosta’s philosophical point raises the question of whether the conversation, and further publications related to it, should be broadened to include other groups that have been marginalized in these discourses—Black and indigenous women, for example. These voices are badly needed; their absence in academic philosophy is poignant.

    This reviewer is a Latin American woman academic writing from Latin America. Racial and class structures inherent to the region’s research and university system become even more obvious when reading this volume. Fuera de sí mismas fits into the practice of academic writing while questioning the nature of academic structures in our region. Academic culture in Latin America does not expect an explicit, genuine critical exchange; the full weight of the notion of “intellectual authority” falls on the noun rather than on the adjective. Cultural ideas about critique consider it almost akin to a personal insult. Additionally, the expectation is that scholarly work in male-dominated research institutions in Latin America—and elsewhere—will be carried out by an individual, especially in the field of philosophy. This volume goes against those assumptions. Each text comes with a commentary by another woman scholar, and their commentaries take a somewhat careful tone, demonstrating a refusal to engage either in praise or in disdain. The exchanges generally read as a conversation between friends, although a few of the commentaries question or criticize the argument of the chapter they are assigned. The reader is left to wonder whether this reflects academic cultures in which a debate between peers is not expected. The chapters by Zambrana and Acosta, who work in the United States, are distinct in this respect. They seem to reflect a process of extended discussion and rewriting, which may be found in their work environment but is not as characteristic of Spanish- speaking academia. This is a salient feature in other chapters in the book, where the overall argument is not explicit. A different tradition of academic discourse may be at play here. This may also be shown in the use of language in Carrasco-Conde’s chapter, which presents an array of the polysemic and grammatical possibilities that Spanish carries with it.

    Fuera de sí mismas. Razones para dislocarse allows a first encounter with important voices from Latin American and Spanish language philosophy. The approach is explicitly feminist but the standpoint is nuanced. A voice of their own does not result from the space women have won in academic structures but rather from the hard work of questioning frames of intelligibility. As the editors state in the preface,

    The fact that women have broken into the discipline of philosophy gives no assurance on its own that women will develop a voice of their own. This is due, in great part, to the fact that the feminine is not tied to a biologization of our bodies. This is why developing a women’s voice requires a patient labor of thought and language, a labor that consciously makes possible a place of enunciation of our own. [La irrupción de las mujeres en el ámbito de la filosofía tampoco garantiza, de manera automática, la consolidación de una voz propia. En gran medida esto se debe a que lo femenino no está atado a una biologización de nuestros cuerpos. Por eso nos parece que la voz de la mujer es algo que exige un trabajo paciente desde el pensamiento y la lengua, un trabajo que de manera consciente posibilite un lugar de enunciación propio.](18)

    The creation of this discourse requires a new place of enunciation that will let “those historically silenced voices” (18) into academic discourse and thought, and will allow the witnessing of other lives—those marked by suffering, loss, grief, erasure of memory, debt, precarity, and exclusion.

    Miriam Jerade Miriam Jerade is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the Faculty of Liberal Arts, Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez, in Santiago de Chile. Previously, she was an assistant professor at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México and the Ivan and Nina Ross Fellow at the Katz Center for Advanced Judaic Studies in the University of Pennsylvania. Recent works include articles on political readings of speech act theory, Derrida’s reading of the death penalty, and representation and sovereignty in Franz Rosenzweig and Jacques Derrida. Her first book is Violencia. Una lectura desde la deconstrucción de Jacques Derrida (Metales Pesados, 2018).

    Footnotes

    1. All translations from Fuera de sí mismas. Razones para dislocarse are the author’s.

  • Idyllic Visions of the Past and/or the Death Drive? Right-Wing Responses to a Crisis of Futurity

    Adam Dylan Hefty (bio)

    A review of Nilges, Mathias. Right-Wing Culture in Contemporary Capitalism: Regression and Hope in a Time Without Future. EPUB, Bloomsbury Academic, 2019.

    Something is different about time in late capitalism. Whatever this something is, it has intensified with the fall of 20th century communism, the increasing financialization of capital, and the return of anti-systemic, sometimes anti-capitalist social movements. In the pauses between the flashes of these movements, cynicism and hopelessness abound in the intellectual space where a left should be. The canard, “It is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism,” has become a common sense, world-weary truism, while environmental, health, political, and economic stability melt away into a series of crises that render something that feels like an end of the world ever easier to imagine. The last two decades have seen a rising tide of right-wing forces ranging from nationalist governments, fascist street movements, militias and stochastic terrorism to decentralized conspiracy theories. Our moment in history feels all at once sped up, wrung out, in a series of real and spectacular crises, rapidly changing, profoundly stuck.

    In the last several years, a lively discussion has been taking place about the temporality of late capitalism in critical theory and radical political circles, beginning perhaps with Jonathan Crary’s 24/7: Late Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep and Massimiliano Tomba’s Marx’s Temporalities. Some of this work, like Sami Khatib’s The Time of Capital and the Messianicity of Time, has also turned to the Frankfurt School, particularly Benjamin and Bloch. This problem of the temporality of capital is an ongoing theme of Mathias Nilges’s work in essays and in an edited volume, The Contemporaneity of Modernism. His 2019 book, Right-Wing Culture in Contemporary Capitalism: Regression and Hope in a Time without Future is a compelling contribution to this literature. Nilges straddles academic literary theory and a more popular engagement with the contemporary moment, theorizing the way our ability to imagine historical progress (or even a resolution of various quickening catastrophes) seems to be blocked.

    Nilges’s work crosses disciplinary boundaries to engage discussions that have otherwise developed separately. The argument here crosses through Crary’s expansive notion of the drives of capitalism that seem to speed up and compress the experience of time, left debates about the “end of history” following on and in opposition to Fukuyama, the question of imagining an end of capitalism, and debates about the politics of nostalgia. This poses a framework that brings together seemingly disparate aspects of the experience and politics of time in late capitalism. Nilges’s conceptual map of late capitalist time and his unpacking of a Blochian mode of engagement with this moment are vital contributions of Right-Wing Culture.

    Bloch and nonsynchronism

    Nilges mobilizes Bloch to argue for an engagement with contemporary culture that understands fascist tendencies as coopting romantic, anti-capitalist instincts for a program that safeguards capitalism. Under different historical circumstances, these instincts could possibly turn in a different direction. Bloch is a somewhat underappreciated associate of the Frankfurt School; his work has seen neither the steady readership of Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse, nor a Benjamin-type “moment” – though interest has quickened enough that perhaps, the Bloch moment is happening now. Several of Bloch’s works have not been translated into English, and common glosses emphasize his intellectual distance from other Frankfurt School thinkers. Nilges emphasizes Bloch’s influence on and relationship with key aspects of Adorno’s thought, especially the critical nature of Bloch’s concept of utopia.

    One of Nilges’s primary conceptual tools, unpacked in chapter 2, is Bloch’s concept of nonsynchronism. Bloch uses nonsynchronism to analyze a “temporal plurality of the present” in which people in different social locations can have radically different experiences of the same moment. Subjects rendered as consumers in the information age may feel that we are lagging behind a rapidly advancing now that somehow involves endless innovation without any possibility of structural change – the long now of late capitalism. Liberal intellectuals may feel a sense of crisis in futurity itself, in the ability to feel a sense of hope. Others, feeling left behind, may revive a “reactionary attachment to previous moments in history, either by way of nostalgic idealization or by turning toward remnants of prior social, economic, and political structures that continue to exist in the present.” Nilges understands this turning towards the past as the fundamental drive of right-wing thought. Workers whose skills have been rendered obsolete may experience an “objective nonsynchronism,” while personal refusal of the now, in various forms, would constitute “subjective nonsynchronism.” A dialectical understanding of nonsynchronism can also lead us to pay attention to “latent possibilities that lie dormant in the now,” seeing the past not as a time of loss to be redeemed but as a time of “the incomplete, the foreshortened, and the unfulfilled.” This last sense of nonsynchronism provides a critical space for hope in the midst of threats of fascism: the “not yet” (ch. 2).

    The Long Now

    Nilges frames nonsynchronism and shows some instances of it in the introduction / chapter 1, “All We Have is Now,” which uses the story of the 10,000 Year Clock, also called The Clock of the Long Now, to explain this peculiar working of late capitalist time. The Clock is a project, with several prototypes already in existence, to build a huge clock in west Texas designed to keep working for 10,000 years. The makers explain the concept in terms of the common worry, in business and political circles, that short-term thinking has become dominant in our culture; they want to prompt us to consider what it would mean to think long-term about the future, on the scale of a civilization. On the face of it, this may seem like an optimistic, well-intentioned ambition, but the project’s funders, such as Jeff Bezos (who also owns the land designated for the clock), are titans of late capitalism with a clear agenda for the future. Their vision, Nilges argues, is not really a future at all, but a long now stretching ahead indefinitely. It is full of technological innovation and maybe some tweaks to promote sustainability, but it is of a piece with the basic power structures of late capitalism; it is a way of thinking about the future that forecloses fundamental change.

    Another example of this foreshortened futurism is an exhibition that appeared at several North American museums, “Massive Change.”

    Massive Change markets a revolution, yet it is neither a revolution that will take place in the future nor one that requires our participation in order to be actualized. As it turns out, the revolutionary change that the exhibition showcases is not a matter of future possibility. Rather, it has already happened—and we somehow missed it. … We seem to be lagging behind our own now.(ch. 1)

    We just have to get better at interacting with this changed present as consumers and participants in global civil society.

    [T]he present is the time of a long now of free markets and of technological innovation, of a designed world that already contains all of the answers that we need to solve the world’s problems and that is ready to empower us. In such a time, we do not need to look ahead. We just need to catch up. (ch. 1)

    Our recent generations have all experienced this crisis of futurity. Francis Fukuyama’s 1989 gloss of “the end of history” was optimistic about a post-historical, democratic, capitalist now; but the real pivotal moment since then was 2008, which wiped away neoliberal optimism but couldn’t find anything to replace it, placing us in what Peter Thompson identifies as a “Gramscian interregnum.” Another contributing factor here is a financialization of the economy in which risk, and the future itself, are rendered as commodities to be traded in the present, closing spaces for critical analysis and inquiry. Everything in our lives has the potential to be abstracted and monetized, including “leisure time” and intellectual and emotional aspects of our lives (ch. 2).

    Nilges’s readings of cultural trends are often sharp, such as his interpretation of “metime” as a capitalist phenomenon that only seemingly contradicts late capitalism’s valorization of everything. Commentators have recently discovered the value of letting one’s mind wander freely – within certain confines. But “me-time” “is not the opposite of work time. It is the extension of it” (ch. 2) that allows the human participant in the system to recharge, do some rudimentary self-care and self-maintenance, and stay plugged in to techno-capitalism. Taking time for oneself in this fashion turns out to be something like corporate wellness trends – a way of making the social crises of intensified forms of exploitation, insecurity, and the valorization of everything into problems fit for privatized, individualized coping mechanisms.

    Why the right, now? Romantic anti-capitalism

    Nilges develops a Blochian reading of a central paradox of our times in chapter 4, asking “how we can make sense of the fact that a large-scale economic crisis that lays bare the inequality and exploitation on which capitalism rests gives rise more readily to a right-wing turn than to Left critique” (ch. 4). Central to the answer is the right’s ability to grip and exercise the politics of representation. Centrist liberalism (represented here by Francis Fukuyama’s recent work and by Justin Trudeau) takes its own identitarian turn in response, developing an ethos of “larger collectivities” as an answer to the ethno-state nationalism of the right; but this answer is unconvincing. Fascism, while superficially anti-capitalist, is developed as “a crucial aspect of the Right’s function as a safeguard for capitalism,” forming an alternative to a neoliberalism which has clearly lost much of its hegemonic force. Meanwhile, young people turn to fascism instead of Marxism, according to this account, because fascism represents them, even if its anti-capitalism is a cruel lie (ch. 4).

    The right’s ability to dominate these representational debates despite the limited appeal of openly fascist politics is wrapped up in a broader “romantic anti-capitalism” which “rejects aspects of the capitalist present and advocates for the return to an idealized, better past” (ch. 4). (Perhaps we should add “romantic anti-neoliberalism and anti-globalism” as well, since many critiques of capitalism both on the right and on the liberal left criticize its neoliberal form, implying that we might turn or return to a more humane variant.) Bloch describes a program of “backward rejuvenation” floating around, which Nilges sees today in doomsday prepping and off-the-grid living narratives. These notions may seem barely political and mostly benign, but they often stir up notions of racial purity and male primacy. A later section develops the idea that the rise of finance capital has resulted in the full abstraction of (potentially) every sphere of life; nostalgic idealizations of a life that is concrete, in touch with nature, provide a counterpoint. The myths that accompany romantic anti-capitalism frequently provide the grist for reactionary nostalgia and fascist impulses. However, we should not reject myth altogether, for Bloch. Myths also contain what Bloch calls “the utopian light of comprehended futurity” (qtd. in Nilges, ch. 4) – a potentially subversive core that can be recovered.

    Revitalizing the past and/or the death drive

    Nilges develops his most detailed engagement with right-wing thought in chapter 3: the “new paternalism” of Jordan Peterson. Peterson is a good example for this kind of right-wing thought that looks to the past, whether to concrete norms of traditional masculinity or in more vague appeals to ancient wisdom and religious allegories (ch. 3). Nilges offers a persuasive interpretation of Peterson’s attack on postmodernism. Completely uninterested in the history of the concept, he instead “reduced it to ideas of pure relativism,” taking ideas like “pluralism, diversity, and play [as] mere code words for chaos and disorder.” Through a reading of postmodern literature, Nilges shows that what Peterson probably gets about postmodernism, at least intuitively, is that anti-paternalism and an abolition of the father narrative were central aspects of its project. Peterson’s central thrust, on the other hand, is to be a strong daddy figure for a generation of young men who feel lost and adrift. Peterson analyzes this loss and drift as a kind of temporal homelessness, encouraging nonsynchronism via a critique of the chaotic present. Nilges reads novels from the 1980s onward to ground this analysis of the new paternalism in a longstanding cultural narrative about a crisis of fathers and fatherhood.

    This is a compelling reading of Peterson and of one strand of the new right. Nilges’s reading tends to sidestep current left debates over whether current far right forces should count as fascist; he is interested instead in some of the common reactionary moves in “mainstream” right-wing nationalist politicians, right-wing thinkers, and receptions of novels and cultural moves. His use of Bloch suggests that these moves do share something with historical fascism, though Nilges is careful not to overextend the parallel. However, because Nilges engages closely with Peterson and not with other right-wing thinkers, there’s an odd way in which Peterson seems to stand in for the entire cultural project of the right here. As I write this in late 2020, Peterson has been mostly missing for several months, after dealing with months of health problems involving extreme diet, prescription drug addiction, double pneumonia, and COVID-19; he is apparently under the supervision of his daughter in Serbia. Daddy’s not doing so well these days. His erstwhile spiritual sons continue bumbling off in different directions.

    A gesture of recovering the past is common to most forms of right-wing thought; however, that aspect is in tension with others. For example, if we were to look at contemporary eco-fascism, we would find a strand of the right that sees the past as unrecoverable in the present – at least until we have gotten to the other side of a large-scale, in their view historically necessary genocide. This is, of course, an extreme example, but many forms of revanchism understand their own object as a “lost cause.” Many parts of the contemporary right are obsessed with death and destruction – the flip side, perhaps, of educated, liberal cynicism and “doomscrolling.” A current of Trump supporters know that Trump won’t be able to achieve his promises, whether they blame it on capitalism or on a deep state conspiracy; they just want to see him own the libs and fight for them. The emergence of stochastic terrorism has included lone incel-type shootings and the Boogaloo movement’s attempts to accelerate a civil war. There are many variations, but all these figures have to one extent or another given up on Jordan Peterson or at least on the hope of a conservative restoration that he represents. They’ve given up on the idea that straightening their room is going to lead to a more ordered life, or they’ve given up on getting a girlfriend, or they’ve given up on getting policy “wins”; to generalize, there is a desire to see the other suffer before it all ends.

    Nilges perhaps missed an opportunity to discuss this aspect of the right in his discussion, at the end of chapter 4, of right-wing takes on Chuck Palahniuk’s novel Fight Club. The move to lionize traditional masculinity and some images of pre-industrial labor is certainly part of what is going on here – but this is something of a secondary gesture compared to the well-developed practices of blowing stuff up and fighting. Nilges says that fascists have misread Palahniuk’s novel as a celebration, as “frequent references to the making of soap out of the parts of the human body … should be easy giveaways of its critique” (ch. 4). I’m pretty sure the fascist guys who lionize Fight Club noticed the soap and thought it was cool. The smarter ones probably noticed that it might have been meant as a critique and didn’t care. The author is dead, after all, and daddy’s in a coma somewhere in Serbia.

    These variations of the right that are more obsessed with death and destruction than they are with the past pose a problem for Nilges’s argument. There are ways that he could deal with it, and he mentions a couple of them in short asides. However, the general Blochian trajectory of his argument in almost every chapter is that fascism is obsessed with recovering an imaginary past that can’t be recovered; instead, we need to look at what is missing in the present, so that we can find these other incomplete hopes in the past. One can imagine how that might work with reference to a misty-eyed, mythical form of right wing thought that is obsessed with recovering the magical, paternalist past and that believes it is more or less possible. Meanwhile, sections of the right know that the paternalist past isn’t directly recoverable, at least on this side of some apocalyptic event, and some of them are gearing up for a Mad Max death drive, complete with the guns and muscle cars. Of course, this destructiveness can hardly be separated from the paternalism, because the vision of life for the few on the other side of the apocalypse is usually some kind of a small, paternalistic ethno-state with lots of old-timey labor, just as Nilges suggests. One could add a section that would analyze the parallels and differences between right-wing fascination with the apocalypse and the cynical liberal who takes pleasure in the horror of watching it unfold. Still, to the extent that parts of right-wing thought are animated by the death drive more than by hopes of redeeming their culture and manhood in the present, the Blochian move of salvaging something from the wreckage becomes trickier to imagine.

    In addition to the death / destructive drive and the urge to recover the past, we should also consider the basic motivations of conspiracy theory, as QAnon and related formations have become an integral part of the right. Here again, the feeling seems to be that something has gone wrong in the present compared to a simpler, better past. But the drive is less to recover the past or dominate the future with destruction and accumulation by dispossession, more to investigate endlessly “what is really happening” in the present. A rationalist practice of uncovering truths might assume, rightly or wrongly, something about the character of a political change that would follow from knowing those truths. Some critics see QAnon as more akin to an immersive alternate reality game, the purpose of which is not to create change external to itself, but to propagate itself as a mode of living and thinking that uses pseudo-scientific “research” to divorce itself from testable reality. Again, while idyllic images of the past are present in this structure of feeling, they do not necessarily constitute its dominant drive.

    Undoing right-wing thought from within

    Nilges develops the utopian suggestion in Blochian thought in chapter 5, which considers how we might look at the past without nostalgia. His critique of intellectual cynicism was compelling, and I find myself quite sympathetic to the main idea. I wish that he would sketch out more examples of what it would look like to make these moves, not only in novels but in other cultural contexts or political movements. Conceptually, Nilges’s argument seems open to a couple of different interpretations. It might be that romantic anti-capitalism constitutes a broad form of cultural reaction to capitalism. Given certain conditions and stances, romantic anti-capitalism could develop in the direction of nostalgia, paternalism and fascism. A critical, utopian radical might be able to look at the past and find – within some of the same common resources of romantic anti-capitalism but also in different, suppressed sources – stories of resistance and lost dreams that could be revitalized, to different effect, in the now.

    At times, Nilges suggests that Bloch would go a lot further. “There lies positive potential even in fascism [that] may be rescued and turned into a basis for progressive politics. … Blochian thought … seeks to undo fascist thought from within while simultaneously engaging in an examination of the limits and possibilities of Marxist thought and politics” (ch. 5). Nilges doesn’t really unpack what Bloch might have meant by this with respect to historical fascism. Most of his examples of engagement with the common, romantic anti-capitalist source material do not engage directly with right wing thought. Right-Wing Culture approaches the debate over whether we should “listen to Trump / Brexit voters” (and be empathetic towards those voters’ economic grievances rather than understanding these voters and racists and semi-fascists to be isolated and defeated) from something of a meta standpoint. Nilges’s general stance seems to be that we should understand the emotive core and historical resonance of the right-wing move. We should consider the economic grievances that constitute the core of objective nonsynchronism, while understanding the mythology of the right as an enveloping mode of thinking that is very seductive but that is also not historically necessary; it can be resisted culturally as well as politically. While many supporters of the right might be racists and semi-fascists, we need to understand the thinking that is pulling so many people into romantic anti-systemic thought that ultimately shores up capitalism, since racism and fascism are not so easily defeated by logic or electoral numbers.

    This meta-take makes a real contribution to the discussion. However, there are a few places in the text where the argument tends in the direction of a first-order “listen to the economic grievances of Trump and Brexit voters” approach:

    it is precisely because the Right knows to use the widespread rejection of the long now to its advantage that it is able to successfully poach disillusioned voters, including potentially Left-leaning voters who demand a politics that addresses the contradictions of contemporary capitalism and who believe to have been politically abandoned.(ch. 2)

    These passing, foreshortened suggestions of first-order engagements with right-wing grievances feel underdeveloped, especially given the extensive literature criticizing left discourses that start with “listening” and end up taking right-wing starting points for granted. There are other things that “undoing fascist thought from within” might look like, but I am left wondering what they might be.

    Indigenous speculative futurity and thinking with Nilges

    One of the final sections of the book finds resonance for the Blochian, critical utopia in recent indigenous speculative fiction that makes use of non-linear temporalities; this is to me the most compelling of Nilges’s sections of literary analysis. As I write this in late 2020, much of California has been burning, for weeks, in a fire season that seems to have stretched out by several months. Indigenous land management techniques of learning how to live with fire and the forests, long subsumed or forgotten, are becoming lively subjects of inquiry with an eye to something like utopia or at least survival. This seems like an instance where the Blochian move feels promising – reaching into the past, to a way of living with the land that was not allowed to be, to learn what it has to say to the now about creating a future where we could live together.

    Right-Wing Culture offers a conceptual map of temporality and political culture in late capitalism that invites the reader to think with it and consider additional factors beyond those Nilges analyzes. The post-2008 anti-capitalist left and anti-racist upsurges are largely absent from Nilges’s account. Nilges offers good critiques of centrist, liberal discourse. The animating spirit of the book is of course well left of that, and the Occupy movement gets a shout out in a section title, but radical left movements do not appear concretely. As a broad generality, the twenty-first century left has not generated many ambitious, utopian projects comparable to those of nineteenth and early twentieth century lefts; the left is still, now, like the left Bloch analyzes, better at offering a rational critique of society than at engaging with dreams of a better world. Nevertheless, recent social movements have used practices of demandlessness (Occupy) and have generated broad visions that are far beyond next-step proposals—movements, arguably, including Black Lives Matter, the Standing Rock community defense movement, and even Democratic Socialists of America. It would be interesting to examine how these movements engage with visionary, dream-like, immediately unachievable possibilities, and how new left visions of a future relate to defensive battles and piecemeal gains that often seem to be the immediate horizons of possibility.

    Nilges says that the time of the long now of late capitalism generates a feeling that we are behind our own now and must catch up. How it does so may be very uneven, and this is a rich area for further analysis. Particularly, colonialism and post-colonialism have long generated feelings in their subject populations that they are behind and must catch up (or, in some instances, that they are behind and can never catch up). This dynamic can be found in the whole of modern colonialism, long predating finance capital and the speed-up of a technological innovation. It has taken on new dynamics in this era, as some postcolonial elites embrace the idea that a long now of innovation and capitalism potentially levels the geographic playing field while other populations seem more resolutely excluded than ever.

    The conceptual map of Right-Wing Culture contains some coordinates that remain fuzzy and invite debate, but these do not detract from the rich and suggestive nature of the project. Nilges’s efforts to sketch out the moves of a Blochian critique for the current moment and his way of schematizing late capitalist temporality in relation to political and cultural practices are well worth thinking with. His call to recognize the “end times” feelings of our moment as perhaps in fact the death throes of capitalism and to find the lost threads of hope in the midst of reaction and the sense of being stuck are worth heeding.

    Adam Dylan Hefty Adam Dylan Hefty is an Assistant Professor in the Core Curriculum program at Prince Mohammad Bin Fahd University (Al Khobar, Saudi Arabia). He holds a Ph.D. in History of Consciousness from the University of California, Santa Cruz. Recent works include essays on right-wing responses to climate change and on the history of mood disorders. He is working on a manuscript that traces a genealogy of the connection between practices of managing work and mental health.

  • Fictionalizing Marx, or Towards Non-Dialectics: Baudrillard and Laruelle

    Jonathan Fardy (bio)

    Abstract

    This essay offers a comparative reading of the post-Marxian work of Jean Baudrillard and François Laruelle, arguing that both thinkers seek to establish a way forward for theory that remains faithful to the spirit of Marxism without reaffirming dialectics. In order to do so, both turn to the concept and strategy of “fiction.” Their fictionalized Marxian theory intervenes in reality in the form of writing without reaffirming the dialectical presumption that the Real and concept can be exchanged. To fictionalize Marxism in non-dialectical terms repudiates the logic of exchange, enabling us to think against capital in non-capitalist terms.

    This essay offers a comparative reading of the post-Marxian work of Jean Baudrillard and François Laruelle to argue that these thinkers are linked by two elective affinities. First, both seek to establish a way forward for theory that remains faithful to the spirit of Marxism without reaffirming dialectics. Second, both turn to the concept and strategy of “fiction” in order to accomplish this task; Baudrillard names his work “theory-fiction,” and Laruelle names his “non-philosophical” approach to theory “philo-fiction” (short for “philosophical fiction”). I argue that their turn to fiction grows out of a shared conviction that theory must forge ahead without reference to the Real. I capitalize the Real, as does Laruelle, because it names what both thinkers conceive (in different ways) as the transcendental horizon that can never be encompassed by the signs and simulacra of theoretical concepts. This axiomatic starting point organizes Baudrillard’s and Laruelle’s approach to non-dialectical theory. For them, no dialectical exchange between concept and the Real ought to be assumed and enacted in the space of theoretical writing. The model of “fiction” does not make claims on the Real or the essence of reality, but takes place as an event in reality itself. The aim of their fictionalized Marxian theory is to intervene in reality without reaffirming the dialectical presumption that the Real and concept can be exchanged. Rather than leading either thinker to despair or to turn away from Marxism, fictionalization enables both to rethink the practice of Marxian theory in non-exchange-based terms or the terms of capitalist logic. To assume that the Real can be exchanged for concepts—which, for Laruelle, is the fundamental presupposition of all philosophies—affirms the primacy of the principle of exchange that underwrites capitalist abstraction. To fictionalize Marxism in non-dialectical terms repudiates the logic of exchange in order to think against capital in non-capitalist terms.

    I want to first begin by very briefly opening up the concept of dialectics as it has been historically understood. Fredric Jameson argues in Valences of the Dialectic that the term “dialectics” historically has had two distinct but interrelated meanings. “Traditional presentations have tended to stage the dialectic,” writes Jameson, “either as a system on the one hand, or as a method on the other—a division that faintly recalls the shift from Hegel to Marx” (3). He suggests that both presentations are increasingly untenable today because the idea (or ideal) of philosophical systematicity has been dethroned. Marxist dialectics—dialectic as method—is beset by debate and division over the philosophical question of Marxism’s applicability, which inevitably leads back to affirmations or repudiations of the idea that Marxism is a system. Whether taken as method or as system, dialectical philosophy attempts to temporalize philosophical concepts: to think in time. A properly dialectical concept is self-reflexively defined by the contradictory conditions that establish the possibility of its own conceptualization. Dialectics repudiates the idea that timeless concepts make reality thinkable. For the dialectician, reality itself is an historically contingent (if not determined) concept. However, as Jameson shows, the argument over whether dialectics is a method or a philosophy presupposes a thoroughly “undialectical” conception of method and philosophy (49). At the same time, if one does not in some way lend the concept of dialectics “structure,” it cannot be conceptualized apart from the visisitudes of its history. One is then faced with the problem or the tension – perhaps a dialectical tension – between structure and event.

    Dialectically speaking, there cannot in principle be something called “the dialectic,” which assumes a singular mode of thought that isn’t subject to history. But if there is no such thing as “the dialectic,” then there are only competing dialectical methods. While one could compile a list of examples of dialectical methods, the list would itself imply some structural invariance that binds the examples to one another: a law that would be the dialectical other of contingency. “Examples are the arbitrary cases that rattle around inside the impossible abstraction called a law,” writes Jameson, and this “law” of the same that identifies examples of thought as truly dialectical would be but the displaced name for “the concrete universal” (50). For Jameson, pluralizing and temporalizing the concept of the dialectic will not enable us to escape the binding claim of universality that conditions the possibility of the concept of “the dialectic” as the foundation of dialectics. Dialectics is either the method for gaining access to the Real movement of history or the unsurpassable philosophy of history itself. Either way, it appears to many contemporary thinkers as a dangerously totalizing mode of thinking.

    Defenders of the dialectic maintain that it offers a means (if not a system) for reconciling thought and history – idea and time – and that this reconciliation to reality tempers theory by subordinating it to the historical conditions of its own possibility. The ideal dialectical reconciliation for Marxism is the ultimate unity of theory and practice, whereby the Real of history will at last be changed forever through a theory that correctly captures the Real and by a practice that transforms the Real by dissolving the necessity for theory itself though its very realization. As Lenin once put it: “Philosophy cannot be abolished without being realized” (Korsch 97). This drive to go beyond theory and transform reality marks the Marxian dialectical tendency to “distinguish itself from purely philosophical systems … by positing itself as a ‘unity of theory and practice’” (Jameson 321). But in order to realize itself in practice, Marxism (as philosophy or method) must first capture the Real of history in dialectical concepts using the dialectic itself. Baudrillard and Laruelle intervene on this question of the capture of the Real. Hence, their non-dialectical modes of fictionalized theory turn on the problem of the Real itself to which we now turn.

    In Principles of Non-Philosophy, Laruelle spells out his axiom of the Real. The Real is nothing less than the radicality of immanence prior to any concept of the Real, or what Laruelle calls “Philosophical Decision” on the Real. The Real is always already the prior condition for the possibility of philosophy and all its decisions. Laruelle writes:

    Immanence of the Real, … without a single morsel of transcendence (of the World, language, movement, topology, set theory, etc.)—of philosophy. It is what it names, … an autonomy through radicality in relation to every form of transcendence. Phenomenally, it is a “Given-without givenness.”(18)

    Laruelle’s point here is relatively simple. The Real is not a philosophical concept. The Real transcends philosophical reason only by reason of its immanence. As Ian James notes in The New French Philosophy:

    [T]he real is transcendental … insofar as it is its own condition. The real does not need anything other than itself and its own indivisibility in order to be what it is: this is its absolute autonomy and self-sufficiency. Yet since the real is real (a lived, “unreflective” experience), it is also the condition of all being, existence, thought, consciousness, transcendence, and so on since all these are (in) the real, or put differently, the real is always immanent to them. (169)

    Laruelle criticizes “standard philosophy” for presuming itself sufficient to determine or decide the Real. In Laruelle’s view, the Real is decisive and determinant for all thought in the last instance. Non-philosophy opts inventively to resign the authority of “standard philosophy” to decide the Real. It reworks philosophical concepts via aesthetic strategies of fictionalization in order to think through philosophy without presuming to know or decide what is decisive (the Real). Laruelle writes, again, in Principles of Non-Philosophy:

    non-philosophy holds to: 1) the destitution of [philosophy’s] sufficiency and its authority (of the “Principle of Sufficient Philosophy”); b) the affirmation of the equivalence of every philosophical position before the Real; c) a reevaluation of the identity (if not the “whole”) of philosophy as simple … “field of phenomena” or objects for the new discipline [of non-philosophy]. (19)

    The objects of non-philosophy consist of what Laruelle calls “clones,” which look like standard concepts but are used in non-decisionist ways. Laruelle assembles these clones into fictional texts or “philo-fictions.” Fiction should be understood here in Laruelle’s special sense. As he explains in Philosophy and Non-Philosophy, philo-fictions have two “surfaces.” “On one of their surfaces,” writes Laruelle, “they [philo-fictions] will be scientific representations … that utilize philosophical elements,” which is to say philo-fictions represent a certain open-minded, experimental approach to the raw materials of philosophy; but, “on the other surface, they will be philosophical fictions, fictions ‘for’ philosophy” (239). Philo-fiction uses the raw materials of philosophy experimentally precisely by taking them as raw materials rather than as elements of a systematic set of coordinated decisions on the Real. This experimental or “scientific” approach yields a fictionalization of philosophical systems.

    Philo-fiction thus occupies a parallel space to that of standard philosophy. As Anthony Paul Smith observes in Laruelle: A Stranger Thought, “the purpose of [Laruelle’s] fiction is a kind of counter-creation to that of the world” (119). By refusing to legitimize the gesture of philosophical decisionism, philo-fiction effects an auto-critique of philosophy’s a priori assumption that it is sufficient to know the Real and decide the question of its essence. “The act of creating fiction or ‘fabulating’ is the goal of a non-philosophy,” writes Smith, “in order to relativize and disempower what presents itself as sufficient and absolute,” namely philosophy itself (119–120). Philosophy valorizes itself by establishing a sovereign discourse over the Real. This presumption to mastery over the Real takes the form of a discourse on the world in most materialist philosophies, where the aim is not to seek a metaphysical truth, but to lay claim to the truth of the world as it is. But this too Laruelle rejects. This is why he always capitalizes “world,” because, like the Real, world is a transcendental signified invented and operationalized by philosophical reason.

    In his critique of the concept of “world” Laruelle aligns himself with others of his generation, especially Alain Badiou. Familiar concepts of world tend to function as alibis for pragmatism and reformism. “Be practical!” “Get real!” “This is the real world.” For Badiou, these are colloquial versions of a philosophy of subjugation that prizes reconciliation with a hollow and hopeless concept of the world. But the world operative in such instances is not the Real. The Real is what can always be punctured and broken in two by the “event.” Badiou polemically and critically refuses what Peter Hallward calls “the worldly condition” (25). Badiou will not accommodate his thought to a concept of world that refuses to recognize its potential for eventual ruptures. “Badiou’s philosophy,” writes Hallward, “is infused with that same contempt for worldliness characteristic of the great antiphilosophers, most obviously Saint Paul and Pascal. The world, as such, is defined for Badiou by imperatives of communication and interest” (25). The concept of the world (or World, in Laruelle’s language) is an alibi for conformist thought that disavows eventual possibility. However, despite a degree of convergence between Laruelle’s and Badiou’s critiques of the commonsense concept of world, their projects are in detail entirely opposed. Badiou remains committed to concepts like Being and Truth, whereas Laruelle suspends these concepts—in a kind of radicalization of the Husserlian epoché—in order to treat philosophical texts as raw material for thinking otherwise than that demanded by the decisionist imperative. Laruelle’s inventive skill at disempowering and defetishizing philosophy comes to the fore in his book-length critique of Badiou. In Anti-Badiou, Laruelle clones Badiou’s concepts in order to produce a parodic representation of Badiou’s political philosophy that challenges what Laruelle sees as the authoritarian dimension of his thought. Laruelle zeroes in on Badiou’s axiom that mathematics equals ontology: Badiou “manages to divest us of all our predicates and reduce us,” writes Laruelle, “to the state of a proletariat at the service of a mathematico-philosophical dictatorship” (xxxvi). Laruelle resits, however, any overt “philosophical” challenge to Badiou’s philosophy on the grounds that this would merely aggrandize philosophy itself. Laruelle writes that his aim is

    not a dialogue, it is … an ultimatum, but emitted this time from an acknowledged position of weakness, in an encounter with a position of acknowledged force. … An ultimatum signifies that we are not the mirror of the other. Very precisely, Badiou is a means for non-philosophy … [thus] this book is, above all, finally … a book in which non-philosophy explains itself to itself, but with the aid of a counter-model that it falls to us to transform. (xxxix)

    Laruelle’s text on Badiou is a model of fictionalized Marxian theory. Laruelle voids Badiou’s “system” of its imperatives and decisionist valences. He reweaves, reworks, and re-produces Badiou’s terms into a “clone” of Badiou’s system. He treats Badiou’s concepts as “raw materials” to critique his mathematico-political “dictatorship.” Laruelle’s critique of his system via fictional strategies of parody, exaggeration, and juxtaposition constructs a counter-theory that implicitly calls for the “liberation” of theory from philosophical claims on the Real. He thereby indicates a path forward for theory that neither reifies nor aggrandizes philosophy’s stature. Laruelle’s fictionalization rebels against the authority (and authoritarianism) of philosophy. The fiction that interests Laruelle cannot be constrained by any theory or philosophy of fiction or tied to any conceptual apparatus that would decide its epistemic status in advance. As John O’ Maoilearca astutely observes in All Thoughts Are Equal:

    If the Real is experienced as “nothing-but-real,” then fiction, commensurately, must no longer belong to the “order of the false”. … such a reconfiguration of fiction requires a rebellion against “philosophy’s authority” over it: fiction must no longer be subordinated to the judgments of philosophy. Instead, philosophy will be made to “reenter” through fiction and be conceived as a mode of fabulation. … an avowedly utopian form of thought. (99)

    One does not “apply” non-philosophy any more than one would “apply” fiction. Rather, one non-philosophizes philosophy in the name of liberating thought from its addiction to dominate and decide the Real. Such liberation aims to repurpose philosophemes (voided of their decisionist character) within a fictional ensemble that maps out a theoretically utopic position free from the closed dialectic of the Real.

    Here Laruelle’s position intersects with Baudrillard’s. Although their concepts of the Real are by no means identical, Baudrillard’s axiomatic starting point yields a similar mode of utopic theorizing that he calls “theory-fiction.” The central axiom of Baudrillard’s best-known work is the disappearance of the Real. “On the horizon of simulation,” writes Baudrillard, “not only has the world [or the Real] disappeared but the very question of its existence can no longer be posed” (Crime 5). For Baudrillard, this disappearance “defines the irresolvable relationship between thought and reality,” inasmuch as “a certain form of thought is bound to the real” (96). That “certain form of thought” is none other than dialectics, which “starts out from the hypothesis that ideas have referents and that there is a possible ideation of reality. A comforting polarity, which is that of tailor-made dialectical and philosophical solutions” (96). Opposing dialectical thought, which presumes a critical interface with a preexistent concept of the Real, Baudrillard advocates for the writing of “theory-fiction.” As he notes in an interview with Salvatore Mele and Mark Titmarsh:

    My way of reflecting on things is not dialectic. Rather it’s provocative, reversible, it’s a way of raising things up to their ‘N’th power, rather than a way of dialectizing them. It’s a way of following through the extremes to see what happens. It’s a bit like a theory-fiction.(82)

    For good reason, Baudrillard never spells out exactly the form that fictionalized theory is supposed to take; theory-fiction is not a systematic theory, but a process of invention that “challenges” the Real as well as the style and substance of dialectical theory. One may say that theory-fiction represents what Laruelle would call a mode of “non-analysis,” which parodically deflates and defetishizes the typical subjects of critical theory: power, domination, political economy. His search for a theoretical topos unencumbered by a concern for the Real marks the late Baudrillard as a thinker of utopia in theory, which also links his project with Laruelle’s non-philosophy. As Mike Gane notes in Baudrillard’s Bestiary, Baudrillard’s later work evinces an “undeniable vitality and creativity coupled with an undying fidelity not to a utopian vison in a passive sense, but to a passionate utopian practice in theory” (157). In Baudrillard’s earlier Marxian phase and in his later writings, theory-fiction is a means of theorizing that maintains an analytic indifference from the Real.

    With the publication of For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign in 1972, Baudrillard seeks to augment and critique bourgeois and Marxian political economy alike. He argues that both traditions err by theorizing a restricted conceptual economy or closed conceptual system in which production, exploitation, and consumption cycle predictably through the matrix of “use value” and “exchange value.” He shows that under late capital, exchange value is complexified by the exchange and circulation of signs and offers the art auction as an example; wealthy people buy blue-chip art at the auction not merely to purchase art, but also to show that they have the financial power to do so. Baudrillard acknowledges that his reading builds on the work of the late nineteenth-century economist Thorstein Veblen. In Theory of the Leisure Class, Veblen argues that the principal labor of the wealthy or “leisure” class consists of social acts of “conspicuous consumption.” The “process of consumption considered as a system of sign exchange value,” writes Baudrillard, is “not consumption as traditional political economy defines it … but consumption considered as the conversion of economic exchange value into sign exchange value” (For 107). Bidding at the art auction is not simply an economic transaction; it is a system through which the bidders exchange social signs of wealth and leisure. Baudrillard contextualizes his project in For a Critique as part of an “exiled” and marginalized tradition of political economy:

    Critical theorists of the political economy of the sign are rare. They are exiled, buried under Marxist (or neo-Marxist) terrorist analysis. Veblen and Goblot are the great precursors of a cultural analysis of class which, beyond the “dialectical materialism” of productive forces, examines the logic of sumptuary values which assures and perpetuates through its code the hegemony of the dominant class.(109)

    Baudrillard argues for the analysis of, and critical resistance to, not only the cycle of economic production and exploitation, but the social “code” that valorizes and thereby perpetuates the perceived power of the dominant class. Traditional political economy does not account for the process of sign production and thus cannot resist it. A critical theory of consumer society must then begin by integrating the analysis of sign exchange “into the very structures of political economy” (108). But as he notes, this is strongly resisted by bourgeois and Marxian theorists alike:

    [T]he traditional boundaries of political economy, canonized by bourgeois economic science as well as by Marxist analysis, should be disregarded. And the resistances to this are strong, for they are of all orders theoretical, political, phantasmagorical. Yet today only a generalized political economy can define a revolutionary theory and practice.(108)

    Part of the resistance to integrating sign analysis into theories of political economy is that sign systems produce open and contingent meanings (or values) rather than fixed and predictable ones. Bourgeois and Marxian political economy alike traditionally relied on models of economic production that cycle through logically fixed circuits. But the meaning or value of a sign is contingent and mutable. Baudrillard thus challenges traditional semiotic theory (Saussure) because he rejects the anchoring force of the “signified” as a metaphysical mechanism designed to restrict the contingent economy of meaning. He also rejects Marx’s anchoring concept of “use-value,” which he sees as incompatible with the social labor of conspicuous consumption. For a Critique articulates a “general” conceptual economy in Georges Bataille’s sense. In The Accursed Share, Bataille famously distinguished between “general” and “restricted” economies. The former names economies in which some expenditure remains expended and does not return in another form; the latter names economic systems, like capitalism, premised on the belief that everything can be exchanged for its equivalent in another form. Baudrillard’s “critique” is in this sense a general economy in theory inasmuch as it is organized around “general principles” of sign exchange anchored neither in the Real of classical exchange, nor in the transcendental signified of classical semiotics. The theoretical economy of For a Critique is open and general in Bataille’s sense because it turns on the contingency of economic and sign-exchange.

    Baudrillard’s insistence on the difference and distance between theory and its supposed referent—the Real in the last instance—also links him to Althusserian Marxism. Althusser’s work of the 1960s stresses the non-equivalence between theoretical concepts and the Real via the Spinozist distinction between the “real object” and the “object of knowledge”: “Spinoza warned us that the object of knowledge or essence was absolutely distinct and different from the real object” (Reading 40). Althusser claims that objects of knowledge (like the concepts that comprise Marx’s Capital) must be distinguished from “real objects” (like actually existing capitalism). He sharpens his point in “Theory, Theoretical Practice and Theoretical Formation” (1974):

    [T]heoretical work is not an abstraction in the sense of empiricist ideology. To know is not to extract from the impurities and diversity of the real the pure essence contained in the real, as gold is extracted from the dross of sand and dirt in which it is contained. To know is to produce the adequate concept of the [real] object by putting to work means of theoretical production.(15)

    “Theory” for Althusser is a relatively autonomous practice that does not “reflect” the Real, but is rather a concept production process through which economy, society, politics and so on are made conceptualizable. On this account, one does not think the “real object.” Instead, one is tasked with producing concepts that make the Real thinkable as a model. Baudrillard further radicalizes the Althusserian split between concept and Real by theoretically letting go of the entire concept of the Real (and with it the reality-principle).

    Here too Laruelle’s perspective is clearly aligned with Baudrillard’s inasmuch as both thinkers reject any prior decision on the relation between Real and concept. Both refuse to enact what Laruelle has named the Philosophical Decision, which he defines concisely (if elliptically) thus:

    Philosophical Decision is an operation of transcendence that believes (in a naïve and hallucinatory way) in the possibility of a unitary discourse on the Real. … To philosophize is to decide on the Real and on thought, which ensues from it, i.e. to believe to be able to align them with the universal order of the Principle of Reason (the Logos), but also more generally in accordance with the “total” or unitary order of the Principle of sufficient philosophy. (Dictionary 117)

    Philosophical Decision encloses the Real within a restricted theoretical economy dialectically hinged on a hallucinatory concept of the Real. Dialectics then presupposes a principle of exchangeability of concept and Real, which formally aligns dialectical philosophy with the logic of capitalist abstraction. As Katerina Kolozova notes in her study of Laruelle’s “non-Marxism,” philosophy “is constituted in a fashion perfectly analogous to the one which grounds capitalism” because it “establishes an amphibology with the real (acts in its stead, posturing as ‘more real than the real’)” (2). Kolozova does not cite the phrase “more real than the real,” but this is, of course, Baudrillard’s master formula for “hyperreality.” Kolozova (perhaps unwittingly) suggests a common conceptual space between Laruelle and Baudrillard. For Laruelle, philosophy proposes to be “more real than the real” inasmuch as it claims to have the key to the Real, but Kolozova (via Laruelle) sees this as a simulation of the Real. To put the matter in Baudrillard’s terms, philosophies of the Real are conceptual and analytical instances of the hyperreal. Just as capitalism is grounded on the fetish character of value abstracted from the social sphere, so too is philosophy constituted through a fetishization and reification of thought itself empowered by the hallucinatory force of Philosophical Decision. The image of the Real captured in philosophical “reflection” is never the Real for Baudrillard or Laruelle. Rather, what appears in the mirror of philosophy is a hyperreal phantasm of philosophy itself.

    By the late 1970s, Baudrillard and Laruelle come to see that the problem is how to escape the auto-valorizing force of dialectical philosophy and to open anew the problematic of the politics of theoretical critique itself. Neither thinker seeks to overthrow or overcome dialectics, which would only reaffirm it. Instead, each seeks to invent strategies and aesthetics of theoretical writing that intensify the potential for emancipatory thought immanent to the ethics of Marxism without getting ensnared in the dialectic of exchange (or the rhetoric of production, as we will see). This project shares some affinity with Lyotard’s post-Marxist work of the same decade; Lyotard’s Libidinal Economy of 1974 taps into and exploits what he calls the “intensities lodged in theoretical signs” (102). However, in the same text he rebukes Baudrillard for his conceptual privileging of symbolic exchange. A brief detour though Lyotard’s critique of Baudrillard will spell out the difference between the fictionalized Marxism of Baudrillard and Laruelle and the libidinalized writing of Lyotard’s post-Marxism: a theoretical indifference to the Real (Baudrillard and Laruelle) versus the continuation of dialectics in a new way (Lyotard).

    Lyotard’s major statement of post-Marxism is Libidinal Economy. The text stems from the tradition of Freudo-Marxism, albeit in a form that challenges that tradition. Lyotard argues that Marxian political economy is torn between two warring poles, which he names (somewhat regrettably) the “prosecutor Marx” and the “little girl Marx.” The “prosecutor Marx” names the Marx who sat in the British Museum day after day toiling away at Capital but never completed it; the “little girl Marx” names the one who did not complete his master text because he was too attracted to, and fascinated by, the polymorphous perversities of capital. Lyotard sees Marx as trying to engineer a theory to close and contain industrial society’s “erotic” fascination with the object (capital) he was trying to prosecute theoretically. Lyotard’s corrective is to explode political economy via a libidinalized textualism:

    we are not going to do a critique of Marx, we are not, that is to say, going to produce the theory of his theory: which is just to remain within the theoretical. No, one must show what intensities are lodged in theoretical signs, what affects within serious discourse; we must steal his affects from him. Its force is not at all in the power of its discourse, not even in inverse proportion to it, this would still be a little too dialectical an arrangement.(102)

    Lyotard explicitly targets Baudrillard’s work for continuing the tradition of prosecuting a critical theory of political economy and for its apparent valorization of what Lyotard sees as a thinly disguised figure of pre-lapsarian time: the time of “symbolic exchange,” before contact with the Real disappeared into the play of signs. Moreover, he points out what he sees as the racist and imperialistic legacies lurking in Baudrillard’s conceptual privileging of “primitive societies”:

    When Baudrillard says: “There is neither a mode of production nor production in primitive societies. There is no dialectic and no unconscious in primitive societies,” we say: there are no primitive societies. First of all, methodologically… this society of the gift and counter-gift plays, in Baudrillard’s thought, the role of a reference (lost, of course), of an alibi (which cannot be found), in his critique of capital. … How is that he does not see that the whole problematic of the gift, of symbolic exchange … belongs in its entirety to Western racism and imperialism—that it is still ethnology’s good savage, slightly libidinalized, which he inherits with the concept? (106)

    Lyotard believes his approach evades the traps of dialectical Marxism and the imperialistic fantasies of Baudrillard’s theoretical alternative by exiting the discourse of standard political economy via a libidinalized mode of writing that aims not to diagnose, but to actualize “intensities lodged in theory” or what Geoff Bennington interestingly calls “writing the event.” Lyotard’s writing aims not to theorize capital, but to write the dissolution of political economy (and of theory more broadly) and to actualize this event of dissolution through what might be called the jouissance of the signifiers of theory. Lyotard seeks to “demonstrate that the cold serious discourse of political theory is also a set-up of libidinal economy” (Bennington 34–35). He damns Baudrillard’s concept of “symbolic exchange” qua a lost form of “primitive” exchange as the symptomatic sign that Baudrillard cannot relinquish his own desire for the Real, if only as a lost sign or lost time. Baudrillard remains committed to political theory dialectically hinged on the (lost) Real prior to capital. In short, he is still much more concerned with the Real and with the critique of capital than his prose suggests. But one could say nearly the same of Lyotard’s post-Marxist work. Lyotard’s desire to escape theory via a libidinalized textual free-play is itself a highly speculative if not “theoretical” project. In working through the tensions between theoretical analysis and an inscriptive desire to exceed analytic limits, Lyotard reproduces dialectics as he shuttles between what one is tempted to call a prosecutorial Freudo-Marxism and a polymorphous and perversely polysemic excess of writing. Without this background tension, the book would hardly have the charge it does. Lyotard can make the apparent dissolution of these theories an exciting literary event precisely because he is working against the backdrop of Marxism and psychoanalysis. Libidinal Economy is squarely situated within the dialectics of theory and practice: the practice of theorizing the end of theory.

    Contra Lyotard, I want to suggest that the escape from dialectics lies not in the direction of a libidinalized writing, but in a form of thought structured by a radical indifference to the Real. Baudrillard’s indifference to the Real—although far more pronounced in his later “theory-fictions”—is already forming in For a Critique, which is organized around the thesis that a culture of sign-exchange is symptomatic of the loss of contact with the Real. Baudrillard further radicalizes his theoretical indifference to the Real in The Mirror of Production. In his landmark statement on Marxism, Baudrillard suggests that the concept of “production” has morphed into a “strange contagion” in post-1960s Left theorizing (17). Baudrillard detects symptoms of this “strange contagion” in everything from the “unlimited ‘textual productivity’ of Tel Quel to Deleuze’s factory-machine productivity of the unconscious” to Lyotard’s libidinalized writing; “no revolution,” he writes, “can place itself under any other sign” (17). He traces the problematical theoretical valorization of production back to Marx:

    Marx did not subject the form of production to a radical analysis any more than he did the form of representation. These are the two great unanalyzed forms of the imaginary of political economy that imposed their limits on him. The discourse of production and the discourse of representation are the mirror by which the system of political economy comes to be reflected in the imaginary and reproduced there as the determinant instance.(20)

    Marx’s axiomatic decision on the nature of “man” as “productive animal” was never submitted to a radical analysis, according to Baudrillard. As Mike Gane notes in Baudrillard: Critical and Fatal Theory, Baudrillard argues that “Marx never gets to the position where he can challenge the thesis that the human is characterised by the capacity to produce” (98–99).

    Marx adopts his concept of the human as productive animal from the classical texts of political economy as truth, which for Baudrillard determines and limits Marx’s thought. As Gane puts it, “What is necessary, Baudrillard reiterates, is to see that a generic definition of man as productive animal, homo faber, is actually caught within the effects of [the] rationality of capital itself” (Baudrillard: Critical 97). Production, and its human correlate of labor power, constitutes a closed circuit of philosophical decisionism that reproduces the image of the human qua producer in the mirror of bourgeois and Marxian political economy alike. Baudrillard sees Marx as having established a set of concepts—use-value, exchange-value, commodity-fetishism and so forth—whose analytic value is pegged to a concept of the Real given under the sign of “production.” Marxism never escaped this dialectical economy of knowledge qua production organized by the theses and assumptions of classical political economy. “Marxism was not the revolutionary breakthrough that had been hoped for,” writes Gane, “but catastrophically, it was a particular elaboration of capitalism’s own principles” (Baudrillard: Critical 94). As Baudrillard argues in Mirror, the system of political economy “rooted in the identification of the individual with his labor power” is naturalized in the theoretical mirror of classical political economy (31). “Between the theory [of capitalism] and the object [of capitalism],” writes Baudrillard, “there is in effect, a dialectical relation, in the bad sense: they are locked into a speculative dead end” (29). He thus concludes that Marx’s concepts of labor and production “must be submitted to a radical critique as an ideological concept” (Mirror 43). This is a clear shot across the bow of Althusserian theory. Althusser aims to save the “science of history” by distinguishing “science” from humanist (and Marxist) ideology. For Baudrillard to claim that the “science of history”—the science of the history of modes of production—is an ideological concept inherited from classical political economy is to say that Althusserian Marxism must be liberated from its symptomatically self-imposed ideological limits. In Gane’s description, “The analysis, in Althusser, of theory as a productive process … becomes modelled on capitalist processes, and, as a system of thought, only reduplicates its object as separated and alienated: theory and revolutionary practice are neutralized by this failure” (Baudrillard: Critical 98).

    The Mirror of Production marks Baudrillard’s break with ideologically rigid Marxism (if not with Marx) and with critique and all critical theories of the Real. His break with Marxism specifically marks a turn from critical to fictive theory: a break not only with Marxist productivism, but with a theoretical mode of production that produces the Real in its “mirror” of critical reflection. This break links his dual “provocations” (as Kellner calls them) against Marx and Foucault. Two years after Mirror, in 1977, Baudrillard publishes his “broadside attack, Forget Foucault, at the time when Foucault was becoming a major figure in the pantheon of French theory” (Kellner 132):

    In many ways Forget Foucault marks a turning point and point of no return in Baudrillard’s theoretical trajectory. In this text he turned away from his previous apotheosis of a politics of the symbolic, and moved into a more nihilistic, cynical and apolitical theoretical field.(132)

    While Baudrillard’s later work does not often engage political questions directly, it does engage inventively and critically with the politics of theoretical critique itself. Forget Foucault is an indictment of the valorization of power by Foucault and of desire by Deleuze and Lyotard. For Baudrillard, “Foucault,” “Deleuze,” and “Lyotard” name patterns of theory that reify the desire of power and the power of desire. This he sees as theoretically complicit with the values of consumer capital:

    This compulsion towards liquidity, flow, and an accelerated circulation of what is psychic, sexual, or pertaining to the body is the exact replica of the force which rules market value: capital must circulate; gravity and any fixed point must disappear; the chain of investments and reinvestments must never stop; value must radiate endlessly and in every direction. (Forget 25)

    Baudrillard damns the libidinal turn in theory as simply the reflection and reification of what might be called (in Deleuzian terms) the desiring machine of capital itself.

    The question for Baudrillard is: how to escape the “spiral” of critical theory whose models turn into alibis for the domination of bodies, desire, and libido by consumer society? What then is theory to do? In what form might anti-capitalist theory continue? Fiction is Baudrillard’s answer. In a brief essay titled “Why Theory?” he writes:

    To be the reflection of the real, or to enter into a relation of critical negativity with the real, cannot be theory’s goal. … What good is theory? If the world is hardly compatible with the concept of the real which we impose upon it, the function of theory is certainly not to reconcile, but on the contrary, to seduce, to wrest things from their condition, to force them into an over-existence which is incompatible with the real.(129)

    Strategies of fiction—such as exaggeration (forced over-existence), seduction, and wresting things from their conditions—are ultimately aesthetic solutions to the problem of theory’s relation to the Real in the age of its disappearance. Now it is no longer “enough for theory to describe and analyze, it must itself be an event in the universe it describes” (129). “Theory pays dearly” for this fictional transformation, because theory as fiction can no longer innocently critique its object as if that object exists in a certifiably distanced space designated as the Real (129). This is, however, not a mode of theory that merely ratifies defeatism, as Baudrillard’s critics often suggest; theory-fiction can still “challenge” the economic, the social, the political, the aesthetic.1 But as Baudrillard notes:

    Even if it speaks of surpassing the economic, theory itself cannot be an economy of discourse. To speak about excess and sacrifice, it must become excessive and sacrificial. It must become simulation if it speaks about simulation, and deploy the same strategy as its object. … If it no longer aspires to a discourse of truth, theory must assume the form of a world from which truth has withdrawn.(“Why” 129)

    Just as literature creates a world, and that creation is an event in the world, so too does theory-fiction create a world of its own with the capacity to think in ways unconstrained by any pre-given concept of the Real. Baudrillard’s post-Marxist theory-fiction, styled in a self-consciously avant-gardist manner, strategically reanimates utopian thought. Theory “must tear itself from all referents and take pride only in the future” (“Why” 130). Baudrillard’s theoretical posture post-Mirror is to regard the Real with the same indifference with which the Real regards theory.

    Here too Baudrillard’s project intersects theoretically with Laruelle’s non-philosophical project. Non-philosophy is founded on two axioms: 1) Standard philosophy is defined by the decisions it makes about the Real; 2) The Real is foreclosed to the philosophical grasp. Yet all thought (philosophical and non-philosophical) is immanent to the Real, which is determinant and decisive in the last instance. Laruelle identifies standard philosophy with what he terms the Principle of Sufficient Philosophy: to decide on the Real rests on the presupposition that philosophy has sufficient resources to decide it. Philosophical Decision creates a conceptual “world” in its own image. What philosophy “sees” as the world of the Real is a projection of what philosophy decides concerning the Real. And because this image is always partial, it is also always false, for the Real is not partial. Rather than produce a false image of the Real that denies its falsity, Laruelle turns philosophy into fiction because fiction knows itself to be other than true. The non-philosophical practice of Marxism (non-Marxism) is a form of philo-fiction composed of the “raw materials” of Marxism in a non-dialectical and non-exchange-based mode of theorization. The “non” of “non-Marxism” is thus not a negation of Marxism as a whole, but only a negation of its dialectical pretense to exchange the Real for concepts. As Laruelle notes in Introduction to Non-Marxism:

    The non– cannot have any other “content” except that of the radical immanence of the Real or strictly following from it, without being a relation of negation to philosophy itself. … We will invert—at least—the usual approach of a philosophical appropriation of Marxism. Rather than completing Marxism through axioms drawn from the tradition … from thought-as- capital, we will instead disappropriate every constitutive relation to philosophy (but not its materials, symptoms, and models), i.e., every relation to it that is itself philosophical.(36)

    Introduction to Non-Marxism is a fiction or a fictionalization of Marx and the Marxist heritage, less in the avant-gardist style of late Baudrillard and more the cold and anti-humanist rationality of the early Althusser. But whereas Althusser sought to save Marx’s science of history via philosophy, Laruelle seeks a “scientific” examination of standard philosophy.

    Laruelle’s sense of “science” is as an attitude open to experimenting with the raw materials of a philosophical text or tradition. This experimental attitude is registered in syntactical and rhetorical constructions “cloned” from dominant philosophemes. Laruelle sees the fictionalization of Marxian theory as a means of rescuing or even redeeming it: “Rescuing Marxism from metaphysics is effectively an illusion as long as it is not rescued from philosophical sufficiency itself, belief in the Real and desire for the Real” (Non-Marxism 34). This is the first meaning of “fiction” for Laruelle: escape from belief in, and desire for, the Real. He defines his approach to writing (and reading) non-philosophical fiction thus:

    To under-practice [sous-pratiquer] philosophical language, indeed to under-understand it … is to think in a more generic manner without exceptions. All this can appear too moral, but this would be forgetting that thought is not uniquely subtractive, it is insurrection. (Photo-Fiction 62)

    This passage performs what it describes, rendering philosophical language in a style that subtracts the value of immediate understanding for an “under-understanding.” At issue (and in the “generic” practice of non-philosophy) is the disruption of the standard philosophical economy whose master formula is thought-for-the-Real. Non-philosophy aims to take philosophy out of circulation with any dialectically-conceived concept of the Real. This subtractive gesture ethically refuses to participate in the reification of the principles of exchange and equivalence that regulate standard philosophy or “thought-as-capital.” As Alexander Galloway notes, “exchange is not simply a philosophical paradigm for Laruelle, but the philosophical paradigm. There is no philosophy that is not too a philosophy of exchange” (117). Standard philosophy, insofar as it presupposes an operative principle of equivalence or exchange with the Real, is formally identical to the logic of capital according to Laruelle.

    His work attempts to break this bond between theory and the Real through an insurrectionary use of language that scrambles the codes and coordinates of standard philosophy: “No synthetic portmanteau, but non-localizable indeterminations in the philosophical sense, a language brought to its simplest status and sufficiently disrupted in order for the superior form of expression certain of itself in the concept to be rendered impossible” (Photo-Fiction 62–63). Philo-fiction disrupts the syntax and operativity of standard philosophical prose to render the equivalence and exchange principle (or the capitalist principle) of standard philosophy inoperative. Laruelle continues:

    Philo-fiction is a gushing [jaillissant] and subtractive usage of the means of thinking, of philosophemes-without-philosophy, of mathemes-without-mathematics, and from here, all of the dimensions of philosophy [are] rid of their proper all-encompassing finality, an insurrection against the all-too great superior finalities. (Photo-Fiction 63)

    Laruelle’s fictional approach to Marxian theory uses insurrectionary language—an insurrection within and against philosophy—that operates on the immanent terrain of thought. “There is, for Laruelle, a way of valorizing fiction,” writes Anthony Paul Smith, “as a force of insurrection that disempowers the world and operates without concern for its parameters” (120). This disempowerment of the philosophy-Real dialectic radically defetishizes philosophy and devalues the whole schema by which the Real is reified and reproduced in the cultural capital of critique.

    To conclude, in their fictionalizations of Marxian theory, Baudrillard and Laruelle attempt to “disempower” the concept of the Real. They answer the implacableness of the Real with a non-exchange-based form of thought, or what I would hazard to call “non-dialectics.” For theory to remain relevant, they posit that it has to become fiction (but not unreal). By an insurrectionary and non-dialectical mode of writing and thinking, they open places within the Real unbounded by standard philosophical thought monopolies. My task here has been merely to indicate the path they suggest for non-dialectical thought. In good non-philosophical fashion, I have attempted to avoid Laruelle’s and Baudrillard’s supposed “philosophical” differences and recast both thinkers as raw materials for a non-dialectical and non-capitalist mode of thought. By way of their fictionalized forms of theorizing, Baudrillard and Laruelle attempt to create the conditions of possibility for a non-Marxist mode of theorizing in a non-dialectical framework. This framework contains a meta-theoretical recitation of utopian thought. It creates a space—a no-place—outside the dialectical bounds of capitalist critique and the reproduction of capitalist logic as theory (or “thought-capital”). We need a non-dialectical theoretical countermeasure to the persistent illusion of the Real as a “world” where everything is subject to exchange under the rule of general equivalence and which justifies the continued destruction of all that is humane in human life.

  • Negative Ecology: Robert Smithson’s Spiral Jetty at 50

    John Culbert (bio)

    Abstract

    This essay reassesses the significance of Robert Smithson’s land art for environmental politics in a time of climate crisis. Drawing on analyses of fossil capital and petrocultures, it argues that Smithson’s aesthetics of entropy—particularly as conveyed in the 1970 earthwork Spiral Jetty—provide a valuable dialectical methodology for critical theory in the Capitalocene. The essay proposes a “negative ecology” that can challenge logics of resilience and survival shared by ecologists and extractivists alike.

    Contretemps (n.): a minor dispute or mischance; from the French contre-temps, “against time.”

    Against the Ages

    Robert Smithson broke ground on his visionary sculpture Spiral Jetty in April 1970, the month of the first Earth Day demonstrations. A petroglyph in rubble, a gnomic symbol in a desert sea, Smithson’s most celebrated artwork is indelibly linked by that shared date to a formative moment in modern environmentalism. The historical convergence is significant, if somewhat ironic. Like the broader Land Art movement of the 1960s, Smithson’s sculptural work reflects the social ferment and ecological consciousness that would lead, within a few months of the inaugural Earth Day, to the founding of the US Environmental Protection Agency. And yet Smithson’s aesthetic vision was largely at odds with environmentalist discourse. To ecology Smithson opposed the dispiriting concept of entropy; to political activism he advised suspending the will; and, to Earth Day protesters who seized the occasion, Smithson might have suggested dwelling in the “arrested moment” of geological time (“Four” 228). Fifty years after the building of Spiral Jetty, the significance of Smithson’s contretemps with environmentalism has come into focus. At stake, precisely, is the question of time in ecological consciousness.

    Like a turn in Smithson’s diminishing, self-consuming spiral in Utah’s Great Salt Lake, the returning date of this half centenary brings stark new threats and a powerful urgency to environmentalism. New and newly energized movements in ecology and climate justice (such as the climate strike movement and Extinction Rebellion) have significantly broadened public awareness of global heating even as local policies and international accords fail to stem the frightening growth of so-called “negative externalities,” from rising sea levels and ocean acidification to secular drought and mass extinctions. In the midst of a cataclysmic wildfire season in Australia, a firefighter suggested that the start of the new decade could mark “year zero” for environmental politics (Goldrick). The equivocal phrase neatly captures a paradox of this historical conjuncture, its odd combination of terminal and inaugural time, when public consciousness reaches a peak at the same moment that climate fatalism begins to take hold in liberal and progressive discourse.1

    The grand, purposeless spiral of Smithson’s self-defeating Jetty evokes the contradictions of his time, its heady ambitions and wicked defeats. Yet the sculpture is perhaps an even more apt reflection of today’s calamitous political-ecological moment. Its coiling form conveys no stable system or desirable order but instead a threatening vision of tumult and disintegration, a destructive “whirlpool,” as Smithson suggests (“Four” 227). Importantly, Spiral Jetty inverts a drain’s natural flow, its counterclockwise spin opposing natural order and historical progress alike. Smithson’s earthworks wager with time, though the artist refused any claim to posterity or monumental ideality of form—a vision of destructive temporality best conveyed as retrogression. Like the sculptures he describes in “Entropy and the New Monuments,” Spiral Jetty is a monument “against the ages” (11). Environmentalism would seem to gain little from this negative ecological vision. Smithson’s essay on the Jetty suggests as much: “These fragments of a timeless geology laugh without mirth at the time-filled hopes of ecology,” Smithson mockingly says (“The Spiral Jetty” 13). And yet Smithson’s aesthetic vision of entropic time has a great deal to offer to the challenges we confront in an overheating world, provided we amend the artist’s framing of ecology.

    “An epic case of bad timing” is how Naomi Klein describes the fateful irony that the scientific consensus on climate change emerged at the same time as globalized, deregulated capitalism (This 73). The current breakdown of liberal democratic systems and interstate governance adds daunting hurdles to these challenges precisely when a swift and decisive collective intervention in the world economy appears necessary to avert climate collapse and social chaos. On this front, the “economy-killing measures” imposed at the start of the coronavirus pandemic—to quote Bloomberg Businessweek—hardly provide environmentalists reasons for cheer (Robison et al.). To climate activists who have long called for a halt to “business as usual,” the COVID-19 crisis serves as a bitter reminder that governing bodies only act with urgency—however briefly or ineffectually—in the face of immediate, not future, threats. Even the alarming phenomenon of government-sanctioned medical disinformation follows a pattern familiar to environmentalists; top-down science denialism was normalized by energy lobbyists long before the politicization of the new coronavirus. And as the pandemic wreaks disproportionate damage along the fault lines of race, gender, age, and class, current investments in health care and social support continue to widen a morbid generational divide between today’s populations and their unlucky inheritors, rehearsing the “temporal antagonism” we can expect to play out in an overheated future (Taylor).

    Many will likely remember the clear skies and birdsong that accompanied the outbreak of COVID-19 as pollution and traffic were swiftly curtailed. But early in the crisis, ostensibly positive reports of declining greenhouse gas emissions were already outweighed by larger trends: a projected seven percent annual drop in CO2 emissions in 2020—a high estimate, and bought at the cost of extraordinary human suffering—would barely match the amount the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) says is needed every year of this decade in order to keep global warming within the catastrophic threshold of 1.5 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels (Le Quéré et al. 647). Earth Day’s fiftieth year was celebrated under the threat of this fast-approaching limit, a mere ten years away. Meanwhile, as the anniversary was marked under lockdown, fossil fuel interests can celebrate a milestone in what Naomi Klein calls a “half-century long ideological project” of deregulation; citing the challenge of COVID-19 to the economy, the EPA bowed to industry lobbyists and waived environmental rules for major polluters during the crisis, effectively suspending its role as a regulatory agency (“Care” 99).

    “Bad timing” indeed. However, Klein’s observation reflects another fateful contretemps, more fundamental and historically consequential. “Fossil capital,” to adopt Andreas Malm’s expression, is more than a source of increasing power and mobility, the well-known “time-space compression” of industrialized economies; it cleaves modern history with a profound temporal disjunction (240). Climate change is nothing if not the intrusion of another temporality into the timeline of history. The vitality of industrial modernity would be unthinkable without the mute compact energy of past photosynthesis, the unearthed daylight of numberless dead noons. Whence the inordinate force of fossil capital, so too its terrible cost. To the English capitalists who struck upon the notion of exploiting the coal of the smiths for large-scale industry, fossil capital offered a power source that was unbound from the seasons and so appeared to stand “outside of time,” Malm says (42). Likewise, as distinct from energy sources growing on the land, coal’s stored energy was independent of the lived world and existed seemingly “outside of the landscape.” The latter proved a crucial strategic advantage of mobile capital over the laboring class, as Malm’s meticulous history demonstrates (41). Climate change can be seen as the delayed effect of the fundamental disjunctions installed by fossil capital into the historical present, “a now that is non-contemporaneous with itself” (8).

    Carbon economies, as a result, inhabit a spatiotemporal conundrum. Timothy Mitchell argues that the energy unlocked from prehistoric petrocarbon has lent modern societies “a peculiar orientation towards the future,” conceived as “a limitless horizon of growth” (142). “Petroknowledge” arises from these circumstances as a phantasmatic political-economic discourse that seemingly triumphs over metabolic space-time; whereas previous ideas of wealth and property “were based upon physical processes that suggested limits to growth,” petro-fueled GDP “could grow without any problem of physical or territorial limits,” Mitchell observes (139). The impression of limitlessness yields a paradoxical object—the “economy”—that “could expand without getting physically bigger.” The current pace and scope of virtual experience, internet connectivity, and electronic stock market trading may have accustomed us to the notion that “practically infinite values are reached in finite time” (129), though this economic condition remains fundamentally disparate from the lived circumstances inhabited by a biophysical organism. This predicament highlights the stakes of environmental art, because the figuration of natural processes must be reclaimed from fundamentally distorting spatiotemporal representations of the given world.

    If fossil fuels are the sine qua non of capital accumulation, fossil capital appears not only incompatible with a sustainable biosphere, but radically asynchronous with life. As Rob Nixon argues in Slow Violence, the delayed, microscopic, and incremental nature of much ecological damage eludes the conventions of narrative and representation, based as they are in the parameters of lived experience and the affective gratifications of a sensationalistic mediascape. The discrepancies between lived time and temporalities of ecological disruption increase the need for climate science communication even as the resources of rhetoric, narrative, and the arts are sorely tested by atmospheric data measured in parts per million, temperature variations logged in tenths of a degree, and radioactive half-lives calculated in billions of years. In spite of the increasingly sensational and spectacular evidence of human impact on Earth systems—evidence that would appear to challenge Nixon’s thesis—climate change reflects causal processes occurring at scales that defy conceptual framing and whose delayed or incremental effects pose an ongoing challenge to representation.

    During the Cold War, questions of communication on ungraspable time scales were posed in terms of the challenge of relaying threats of nuclear contamination to future generations. “Nuclear semiotics” was born with a Reagan-era task force that drew up guidelines for an information system that could deliver messages to recipients unknown up to 10,000 years in the future. Linguist Thomas Sebeok’s account of this project stands as a cautionary example of the co-optation of scholarship by a military-industrial state apparatus. Working with the construction and engineering behemoth Bechtel Corporation and under the authority of the National Waste Terminal Storage Program, Sebeok proposed a symbolic system that could survive all foreseeable circumstances in order to keep the US’s vast and growing store of radioactive waste safe from tampering yet still available for potential future employ. The fearsome extent of power and authority involved in this project is perhaps no more audacious than the linguist’s reasoned effort to account for all possible future eventualities. Indeed, nuclear power is rivaled by the breathtaking “all” of Sebeok’s totalizing formulations; he excludes all exteriority with the idea of a fully encompassing “context” according to which signification is boxed by a container, much as waste is supposedly confined to storage—”semiosis,” the linguist ingenuously says, “takes place within a context” (452)—, and he summarily discounts the role of difference by confining it to the category of noise. “Differences between input and output,” he asserts, “are due to ‘noise.’” Far from troubling any concept of system, “difference” in this account amounts to a mere variation on self-identity and presence—a metaphysical claim that makes common cause with larger systems of order and control. Like structuralist linguistics, then, Sebeok’s notion of signification “compels a neutralization of time and history,” as Derrida puts it (“Structure” 291). Through his reductive framing, Sebeok feels authorized to invoke the idea of a permanent “natural message” of warning that has “the power to signify the same things at all times and in all places” (453).

    Rather than encompassing all of space and time, as Sebeok claims to do, we might instead propose that his work for the National Waste Terminal Storage Program reflects a specific rationale standard in late capitalism. As defined by Eric Cazdyn, the “new chronic” of our present political-economic order is characterized by a stagnant maintenance of ongoing damage and a corresponding recoil from terminality, whether in the management of incurable disease or the perpetuation of broader conditions of economic crisis (6). By placing terminality under embargo, the new chronic disables the transformative prospects of political endings and existential exits. As such, like Sebeok’s plans for “Terminal Storage,” the new chronic mode of symptom management “effectively colonizes the future by naturalizing and eternalizing the brutal logic of the present” (6). The perpetual “meantime” of Cazdyn’s “new chronic” is akin to the delusory futurity of Mitchell’s “petroknowledge”: both extend themselves into the time made available by their own powerful destructiveness. Here, for all its supposed concerns about the welfare of distant generations, Sebeok’s linguistics of “Terminal Storage” appears both deeply ironic and sadly misguided. In working with military contractor Bechtel, Sebeok projects the maintenance of some of capitalism’s deadliest by-products into a near-infinite future even as his collaborators deepen the ruts of petroculture. Notably, Bechtel is the largest US construction company and provides key infrastructure for worldwide petroleum interests. In contrast to the horizonless engineering mentality of Bechtel and Sebeok’s interminable storage, one especially urgent task of a critique of petroknowledge is to foster a sense of desirable terminality, as Cazdyn suggests, while understanding how phenomena on a geologic scale are imbricated in the ordinary maintenance of our fossil-fueled “meantime.” But if petroknowledge articulates a dominant spatiotemporal condition of illimitude, critical ecological theory must confront that horizonlessness as a conceptual and aesthetic obstacle that inhibits viable endings. In the argument that follows, I propose “negative ecology” as a challenge to the reifying conditions of fossil capital by critiquing the spatiotemporal confines of petroknowledge on the near side of its terminal illimitude.

    In retrospect, Robert Smithson seems the artist most attuned to these political-ecological predicaments and their emerging threats. With his insistent focus on prehistory, paleontology, and long-term natural processes, Smithson locates cultural production in timeframes and spatial scales indispensable to our understanding of climate change. The artist’s late unrealized projects for art reclamation in large-scale mining sites appear ever more pertinent to ecology conceived on such scales. And in light of the urgency of climate disruption and the merging of aesthetics and activism in environmental art, it seems increasingly fitting that Spiral Jetty should stand as an emblem of Smithson’s work and indeed of Earth art in general. More than any other piece in his body of work, Spiral Jetty is strongly suggestive of a symbol, glyph, or pictograph. Granted, the sculpture’s coiling form hardly presumes to be a “natural message” that could “signify the same things at all times and in all places,” as Sebeok puts it (453), or even aspire to leave “some faint, enduring mark on the universe,” in Alan Weisman’s ambiguous phrase (4). And yet Spiral Jetty belongs as much to the domain of semiotics as it does to sculpture.

    This semiotic dimension is underscored by the original reception of Spiral Jetty; photographs of Smithson’s sculpture were first mounted in the summer of 1970 at the Museum of Modern Art’s (MoMA) conceptual art exhibition, titled “Information.” The show emphasized data, documentation, installations, instructions, protocols, mathematical permutations, and audience-response performance. Like the black asphalt poured down a Roman quarry slope in his 1969 Asphalt Rundown—also mounted at MoMA—Spiral Jetty presents itself as a high-contrast graphical sign in the landscape. Arguably, however, the most enduring piece of graphical “information” from the time of MoMA’s exhibition is the now ubiquitous international recycling symbol. Like Spiral Jetty, the symbol was designed on the occasion of the original Earth Day, and the parallels between these two iconic graphical forms are as illuminating as their differences. Each conveys a vision of natural cycles while deliberately exploiting a sense of paradox. In the case of the recycling symbol, however, this enigmatic dimension has had some inadvertent effects. By evoking a Möbius strip, the recycling emblem implicitly links eco-conscious consumer behavior to a strange topology without real pertinence to actual space, an illogic confirmed by the political-economic reality of post-consumer recycling. A recent Greenpeace investigation of the “recycling exports system”—an expression itself rich in irony—reveals that much waste supposedly recycled by first world consumers instead ends up burned or simply discarded in vulnerable zones of the Global South (Ross). Smithson can hardly be credited with anticipating the flaws of post-consumer waste treatment, of course. And yet the artist’s entropic vision of spiraling disorder proves a vital corrective to any pretense of sustainability under fossil capitalism. There is no viable return in Smithson’s spinning Jetty beyond the troping of entropic recurrence. Smithson’s negative ecological vision—his “geopolitics of primordial return,” as he put it (“The Spiral Jetty” 12)—is based instead on an abiding sense of the untimeliness of petrocultural space-time. This aesthetic sense of geological time impelled the artist to map a “double world” that, he said, could “show the prehistoric world as coextensive with the world I existed in” (11).

    Smithson’s “double world” is more than an attempt to add new material to art history’s stock of subjects or even to present an innovation in artistic form. It suggests nothing less than the “collapse of the age-old humanist distinction between natural history and human history,” as Dipesh Chakrabarty puts it (201). Indeed, Smithson strikingly anticipates the onset of the Anthropocene in speaking of “the artist as a geologic agent” (“Four” 217). The phrase is uncannily apt; while the Anthropocene encompasses all human effects on Earth systems, its definition lies specifically in our measurable impact on rock strata (Walters et al. 317), the lasting trace of “man as a geological agent” (Fernàndez-Lozano et al. 2). Such expressions may seem grandiose, and indeed critics have faulted Smithson for a supposed machismo out of keeping with sustainable ecological stewardship. But to make such a critique is to commit an error of scale. If anything, the idea of a “geologic agent” dwarfs any particular human action by framing it within a dissipating process beyond all reckoning. This confounding mismatch between individual acts and their general effects is a central conundrum of environmental politics in an age of global warming. The building of Spiral Jetty is just such a vain act, its momentous gesture less heroic than ironic.

    Most importantly, perhaps, Smithson’s site/nonsite dialectic makes Malm’s dual “outsides”—disjunct time and distant space—the essential coordinates of aesthetic experience. While insisting on a given artwork’s site-specificity, Smithson always emphasizes its spatial and temporal dislocation; the gallery object, in Smithson’s terminology, is demoted to a negative “nonsite,” the mere index of an absent site. This dialectic involves no mere exercise in aesthetic estrangement, that familiar topos of twentieth-century art; the primary materials of Smithson’s sculptural nonsites—coal, tar, and asphalt, for instance—confront the viewer with an unassimilable, deeply alien prehistoric substance. If the nonsite’s reference to waste zones and industrial extraction sites seems to illustrate the general “centrifugal movement” of industrial modernity, as Nicolas Bourriaud would have it (ix), Smithson’s dialectics speak to a violent expulsion of art that defies any recuperation.2 Fossil capital makes this dislocation the fundamental dialectic of our disrupted present. Accordingly, progressive political ecology in an age of climate change can only be realized by confronting the spatiotemporal conundrums generated by fossil capital. This in turn requires a critical shift from the fuzzy humanist causality of the Anthropocene to the Capitalocene, understood as an epoch of climate disruption midwifed by capital accumulation.

    Smithson’s focus on prehistory provides a temporal framework that dwarfs cultural chronologies and undermines the dominion of the present, from capitalist clock time to the latest breathless avant-garde. The disjunctive unmodernity he discerned in modern fossil economies provides a way to visualize other temporalities hidden by the “homogeneous, empty time” of capitalism (Benjamin, “On the Concept of History” 395). Indeed, if capitalism’s greatest triumph lies in its seeming homology with the remorseless, unstoppable advance of linear clock time, Smithson’s work testifies instead to fossil capital’s disruptive, entropic temporality. This in turn exposes built-in contradictions and prospects for resistance that can make common cause with sustainable social formations and supposedly atavistic life-rhythms branded “pre-modern” and “archaic” (Chatterjee 4–5). The fiftieth anniversary of Spiral Jetty is an opportunity to consider the environmental promise of Smithson’s aesthetics, its implicit “revolution against history” (Malm 10).

    Against Survival

    For thirty years Spiral Jetty was largely invisible, the Great Salt Lake’s rising water levels having unexpectedly swallowed the sculpture soon after it was built. Arguably, the Jetty‘s increased remoteness in an already remote place accentuated its dialectical relationship with Smithson’s accompanying film and essay. But if this mediation in text and image reinforced the Jetty‘s conceptual aspect—”dematerializing” the artwork, as Lucy Lippard puts it—the sculpture’s disappearance also added to its mystique (xxi). Biography laid claim to the Jetty. In Gianfranco Gorgoni’s monumental photographs of 1970, the Jetty already seems an artifact frozen in time, a stark, graphic emblem planted in weatherless still waters. Following Smithson’s death in 1973, Gorgoni’s portraits of the artist at the site reinforce a pathos-laden identification of the lone creator with his signature work, an enduring ideal of the Jetty as “the individual vision of a single artist” (Flam, “Biographical” xxvi). Ironically, every look back at Spiral Jetty becomes a memorial to this “individual vision.” At the turn of the millennium the reemergence of the Jetty from the Great Salt Lake prompted the Dia Art Foundation’s publication of a volume on Spiral Jetty. Somewhat misleadingly, photographs by Gorgoni, Nancy Holt, and Smithson, along with more recent images, largely confirm the sculpture’s appearance during the artist’s lifetime. In recent years, however, the Jetty has become fully stranded on the shore. This entropic, wholly useless aspect of the Jetty encourages a renewed view of the sculpture as subject to the impersonal forces of time, weather, and seasonal variation—and the historical processes behind climate change.

    James Benning’s 2007 film Casting a Glance highlights the challenges and pitfalls of a retrospective look at Smithson’s work. The feature-length documentary evokes Spiral Jetty‘s history in long, static shots that portray the sculpture in different seasons. Fifteen chapters, each named with a date, span the sculpture’s completion on April 30, 1970 to May 15, 2007. By the film’s fifth chapter, dated March 5, 1971, the viewer sees the Jetty begin to sink. The sculpture’s black basalt rocks stand half submerged in the flat, mirroring waters of the lake under an imposing background of snow-covered mountains. In the chapters dated 1984 and 1988, the jetty has fully disappeared. Likewise for the entire span of the 1990s, as the next chapter jumps another fourteen years to 2002, at which time the first rocks of the jetty have just begun to reemerge from the lake.

    Benning’s framing and editing foreground the anonymous natural processes of the vast desert landscape and promote an immersive sense of duration, an insistent feature of the filmmaker’s work. And yet in a film that cedes the initiative to nature, significant narrative features still obtain. On May 24, 1973, as the lake’s waters are swallowing the jetty, only a dotted outline of rocks can be seen; stormy surf beats the stones, and waves race across the sculpture’s concentric bands. An intrepid visitor is seen standing far out at the first bend of the jetty, and a dog tries to join him but the man calls it to go back. The lone man and his companion’s exit from the scene take on meaningful resonance when we realize that the following black frames skip over the year of Smithson’s death, as signaled by the next chapter’s intertitle: July 20, 1984, the eleventh anniversary of the artist’s passing. This gesture is underscored by the film’s concluding shot; before the film cuts to black, we hear the faint ambient noise of a single-engine plane, evocative of the crash that ended Smithson’s life in Amarillo, Texas at the site of his final earthwork.

    These narrative elements lend Benning’s film a hagiographic tone not uncommon among Smithson’s commentators. Lynne Cooke goes so far as to guess what Smithson “must have” felt upon completing the Jetty, conflating her own admiring hindsight with a nostalgia she imputes to the artist. “In retrospect,” Cooke proposes, “the moment of the Jetty‘s completion must have seemed golden; it must have been tinged with nostalgia” (64). While anniversaries always involve some retroactive fabrication, the Spiral Jetty, a monument in time, raises the stakes of such historical returns. In celebrating Smithson’s work and commemorating his untimely end, we risk giving narrative meaning and thereby a redemptive significance to a body of work that radically challenges our frameworks for understanding the natural processes in which our lived lives are embedded. Benning’s film is especially interesting in this regard, because the overarching story of the Jetty‘s submergence and reappearance is, in fact, the director’s willful fabrication. Having filmed during a span of time when the Jetty began to reappear, Benning used his footage of this more recent time period to reconstruct the Jetty‘s earlier history, matching the water surface levels from his film footage to the lake’s recorded levels at corresponding months in the past. The chapters relaying the Jetty‘s submergence have thus inverted the arrow of time, for Benning filmed during a period when the opposite process was underway. Accordingly, the chapter dated 1970 corresponds not to the earliest but instead to Benning’s most recent footage of the Jetty.

    In this regard, perhaps the most telling narrative moment of Casting a Glance involves no human agent or ambient sound. In the chapter that briefly shows the man and his dog, the Jetty‘s impending submergence is portrayed with images of stormy waves that render the incremental process of slowly rising water as a dramatic event: a flood, perhaps, or even a deluge of biblical scale—an impression reinforced by the film’s long middle sequences of horizonless waters under infinite skies. The return of the Jetty thus carries connotations of supernatural creation and divine redemption, motifs quite alien to Smithson’s aesthetics. Benning’s film ends up an all-too-human homage, ironically confirming Smithson’s damning judgment that “cinema offers an illusive or temporary escape from physical dissolution” (“A Tour” 74).

    As we have noted, Rob Nixon argues that one of the most pressing tasks of environmental justice is to represent dilatory social and ecological catastrophes whose delayed effects defy conventions of narrative and representation. If this is so, slowness and violence themselves would seem to call for critical reassessment. Gayatri Spivak provides the means for such a critique, arguing that to access “the rhythm of the eco-biome” requires that we not only focus on violations that are “pervasive rather than singular and spectacular” but also question and reevaluate the metaphysical grounding of the notion of violence itself (529, 533). The transcendental and humanist aspects of Benning’s film can be faulted on these counts. Even more significant, however, is the story arc that relates the Jetty‘s long process of submersion and reappearance. While the filmmaker’s recreation of that history is a deliberate artifice, his filmic construct is itself premised on an erroneous perception of natural rhythms. Climate science suggests that from the early twentieth century to the present, the surface level of the Great Salt Lake has been in general decline (Meng 7, 9). If, viewed on this timeline, the average surface level tends progressively lower, this poses a baffling conceptual challenge: we must be able to picture the lake constantly diminishing, its surface level perpetually dropping, even during the decades-long period when rising waters submerged the Jetty.

    This kind of long view is characteristic of Smithson’s aesthetic vision, and the artist was well aware that the Great Salt Lake is the remnant of a much larger inland sea that would likely shrink further. Smithson fully anticipated his sculpture’s eventual dissolution, its inevitable “dedifferentiation” (“Four” 207). But today the Jetty‘s fast-shifting elevation cannot help but evoke two related ecological threats quite specific to our age of global heating: sea level rise and the desiccation of desert lakes. As Elizabeth Rush documents in Rising: Dispatches from the New American Shore, the United States is poorly prepared for the drastic changes already being felt on shrinking shorelines everywhere. Perhaps the most valuable aspect of Rush’s book is its challenge to climate-change adaptation, an emerging political and economic dogma that takes the logic of “creative destruction” beyond its terminal limit by capitalizing on future unlivability. In contrast to technocratic plans for the profitable management of catastrophe, Rush suggests avowing “defeat” in the face of indomitable natural forces; she advocates an organized retreat from the shoreline and a shared embrace of “vulnerability” as a lived practice of egalitarian, intersectional, coalition-building politics (249). As with Benning’s film, however, Rising ultimately offers a redemptive vision that undermines Rush’s most important claims. The book closes with descriptions of landscapes in states of decay that evoke Smithson’s entropic art: a “crosshatch of levees,” a disintegrating berm, and walkways leading out into salt ponds, where an art installation of ambiguous purpose leaves Rush baffled (250). But this bafflement does not last; inspired by signs of persistent life in the tidal zone, she settles on an ecological vision of “a living system so complex the sole word to describe it is divine” (251). The author’s metaphysical flourish is worth noting, as her conclusion betrays a number of recuperative moves that allay her message of vulnerability with an implied claim to all-encompassing immunity from physical decay. This could explain why her language swerves from an avowal of “defeat” to a claim of “resiliency” and ultimate “survival” (249)—ideas that arguably undergird all the World Bank’s ominous investments in so-called adaptation. Tellingly, Rush conscripts art too into this project of survival: she appeals to the art installation in the marshland as a supposed conduit of stable “meaning” and clear “purpose” (250), where the cultivation of Smithsonesque irony might serve better.

    If the continued use of fossil fuels condemns the world to unlivability, a transition to a post-carbon future is crucial to the world’s survival. But this task would involve extricating “survival” from the extractive economies that have defined the terms of livability. Building on Timothy Mitchell’s influential work, a collective of activist petrocultures scholars offers tools for such a critique by asserting that the influence of fossil fuels extends even into the immaterial realms of our values, affects, and desires. Accordingly, they argue that art can dismantle those deeply embedded traces of the carbon economy and help to envision alternative futures “after oil” (Petrocultures). But in observing that “art can be put to purposes other than corporate interests,” the scholars take art’s purposefulness as a given—a construal of artistic practice that aligns broadly with carbon economy’s instrumental rationality (Petrocultures 47). This framing of art practice suggests that art’s purposeful aims may be complicit in petroculture even in works that engage in ostensible critique, which would ironically confirm the scholars’ own sobering dictum that “life has been limited to life within a petroculture” (47). Here it may be worth recalling Adorno’s evocation of the “purposeless activity” of play, which allows children to defeat the usefulness of things and forestall their capture by market logic (228). In his description of child’s play Adorno evokes trucks, those stalwarts of petroculture, deprived of any practical function by the child’s creative improvisation: “the little trucks travel nowhere,” Adorno says, “and the tiny barrels on them are empty” (228). Smithson employed dump trucks and earth-moving equipment in his major late works, including Asphalt Rundown, Concrete Rundown, and Spiral Jetty. A barrel of viscous glue served as Smithson’s art medium in his Glue Pour of 1970. Childhood play as described by Adorno allows us to glimpse how these seemingly grand gestures of Smithson’s are belittled by the ludic purposelessness of the artist’s entropic sensibility. At stake in each is not simply a difference in size but in disparities of scale; in other words, artistic practice, like play, involves the creative engagement with another order of measurement and correspondingly disparate values. “Size determines an object,” Smithson pointedly observes, “but scale determines art” (“The Spiral Jetty” 9).

    This suggests that ecological aesthetics requires a critique of art’s complicity not only in dominant values and interests but in its representational and communicative functions. Far from merely espousing political aims and expressing social engagement, art’s political promise lies in materializing what lies at the bounds of aesthetic and political representation alike. After Oil‘s own examples of activist art, while laudably committed to social justice, tend to reinforce positivist ideals of mimetic representation and full disclosure. In a particularly bald assertion of reductively instrumental logic, artists are enjoined to “make the unconscious conscious” (Petrocultures 48). In a similar way, Adrian Parr’s Hijacking Sustainability calls on an inspiring, if didactic, example of art to illustrate the stakes of anti-capitalist ecology: Spencer Tunick’s photograph of a mass of vulnerable naked people lying huddled on a receding Swiss glacier (162). For all their radical commitments, Parr’s theory of sustainability and the petrocultures scholars’ bid for survival “after oil” largely depend on an idea of art grounded quite safely in a metaphysics of denotative representation.

    To argue for Smithson’s relevance to contemporary political ecology is to read against the grain of his pronouncements on environmentalism. Smithson was openly critical of ecologists and considered their vision of natural processes moralizing and sentimental. But the artist’s impatience with environmentalists goes to the heart of ecological illusions of survival. Crucially, this critique implies an entropic theory of language and representation; as a wholly material activity outmatched by processes of erosion and dissolution, signification is inherently self-undermining for Smithson, its claims of enduring presence delusory.3 Ecology, then, cannot evade the question of entropic signification without falsifying the nature it purports to represent. He makes this point quite strikingly in the short and acerbic piece titled “Can Man Survive?” Smithson’s essay savages an exhibit by that name at the American Museum of Natural History, scorning the “superstition” and “religiosity” of the show’s portrayals of nature (367). The show’s all too wondrous visions of calamity betray aesthetic raptures that ultimately fall prey to the familiar recuperative sleight of mind of sublime experience: images of “pretty filth and elegant destruction,” Smithson says, imply “a transcendental state of matter, that is uncanny, grotesque, and terribly attractive” (368). The artist concludes that “Ecology arises from a need for deliverance and a deep distrust of science,” and as such, its “weird faith” (367) offers no viable alternatives to its grim visions of the “apocalypse of ecology.”

    The threat of a population explosion looms large in the exhibit “Can Man Survive?” A photograph showing “piles of birth control devices rotting in India” (368) alludes to Paul R. Ehrlich’s alarming prediction in The Population Bomb (1968) that overpopulation would soon lead to global mass starvation events, notably on the Indian subcontinent. One might wish that Smithson had given more than a passing attention to the topic. His scorn at least cuts through the discourse of population control, whose pieties have long given cover to colonial dispossession and free-market rationality, from the Irish Famine to NGO interventionism. This discourse has lately emerged in posthuman environmentalism, where a prominent strand of first-world eco-feminism endorses population control in language that revives the eugenicist strain of ecological demography.4 Needless to say, Ehrlich’s predictions ultimately proved wrong, though not for reasons that economists can adequately explain even today. To self-avowed economic “optimist” David Lam, for instance, a look back at fifty years of recent demographic history prompts the cheerfully incurious question “how did we survive?” (10). Citing Ehrlich’s warning of 1968 that “the battle to feed humanity is already lost” (6), the economist points to global statistics that seem to imply the opposite: at the very same time that the world population doubled, per-capita food production increased, commodity prices remained stable, and poverty declined—feats “surely worth marveling at” (10), Lam says. Notably, however, Lam minimizes the role of Cold War geopolitics in these equations; during the period in question, US-funded aid programs promoted large-scale industrialized agribusiness which, touting the virtues of self-sufficiency in developing countries, in fact aimed to undermine local autonomy and stem the tide of socialism. Likewise, ecology gets short shrift in Lam’s account of this history. A more holistic view of agriculture plainly shows that the so-called green revolution has had long-term deleterious effects, chaining emerging economies to the corporate monopolies that provided machinery, petrochemical fertilizers, pesticides, and new strains of seeds for large-scale monoculture farming, with well-known negative consequences for food security, sustainability, and biodiversity. This long-term damage is now taking its toll; indeed, even before the global pandemic, the IPCC issued a grim warning that famine is making a comeback, its threats magnified by the multifarious effects of climate change.5

    The apparent “marvel” of our survival is contradicted by the economist’s own sunny data. In a graph plotting commodity prices from 1960–2010, two major price increases stand out. The first, in 1974, corresponds to the OPEC oil embargo, and the second, in 2008, to the global financial crisis. The parallel is enlightening. We may consider the OPEC embargo as a “true cost” experiment conducted on US Cold War geopolitics and the consumer economy it sustains; oil shortages and general unaffordability provide a rough idea of fossil fuels’ prohibitive price tag once their damage is factored in. As for the second spike in affordability, we might have only survived that crisis in a state of “non-death,” as Colin Crouch puts it, neoliberal dogma having paradoxically outlived the crisis that should by all rights have fully discredited it. Expanding on Crouch’s analysis of the 2008 crisis, we can posit that the OPEC crisis similarly discredited the fundamentals of the fossil economy by exposing its hidden costs. If this is so, a “non-dead” fossil economy renders retrospectively implausible our survival of the population explosion. Like apocalypse, the “extraordinary resilience”6 of zombie capitalism seems anchored in an unbudgeable metaphysics of enduring life, though a materialist analysis can trace that delusory claim of survival back to the fossil infrastructures that removed the “natural limits to growth” (Mitchell 141). If we include the delayed consequences of carbon emissions and synthetic pollutants in the green revolution’s cost ledger, we will only have survived the population bomb in a state of fossil-fueled “non-death.”

    This predicament implies a temporal paradox: “the new chronic,” as Eric Cazdyn puts it (5), is characterized by the stubborn persistence of late capitalism in a sick ongoingness of constant crisis management. Cazdyn argues that the perpetual denial of capitalism’s end-time converts terminal states into an uncanny suspension of history, a borrowed time in which we are “already dead.” Taken together, Crouch’s and Cazdyn’s analyses suggest a highly paradoxical historical moment in which the not-yet and the already coincide or overlap: a time without the present. As such, fossil capital’s uncanny temporality seems to offer a chance to deconstruct survival’s unhealthy grip on ecological consciousness. Here, Cazdyn with his sense of the “already dead” has perhaps an advantage over Crouch, who frames his sobering analysis of our contemporary “non-death” as an implicit survival guide for “coping,” as he puts it, with the impending end of democracy (2). In contrast, Cazdyn’s critical optic disallows any crisis management that would fudge accounts with negativity, not only in the economic realm—Crouch’s field of study—but in a symbolic general economy. This meshes with a deconstructive theory of representation congruent with Smithson’s materialist aesthetics of “dedifferentiation”: the “always already” of différance requires that we understand survival as inherently self-defeating, life’s persistence in “auto-immunity” being indistinguishable from the material supports that negate it.7

    Because the “new chronic” perpetuates capitalism in a state of crisis, ordinary activities of coping and triage can be judged as largely complicit in its maintenance. A critique of this low-grade complicity in survival has radical implications for environmentalism, whose primary focus in all areas of conservation involves “saving” species and ecosystems from economic overexploitation, even when they presume nature functions as a “natural resource” or “ecosystem service.” Elizabeth Kolbert’s The Sixth Extinction provides a subtle critique of the implicit eschatology of such ark-like preservation efforts, suggesting a need to save ecology from the logic of salvation (10). To cite only one example from the catalogue of failed preservation efforts, a recent study found that insect populations have declined twenty-five percent in the past thirty years (Klink et al.), confirming an earlier report that warned of “catastrophic consequences for the survival of mankind” should those trends continue (Carrington). Notably, insects in nature reserves were not found to be significantly more abundant than in farmland and urbanized areas. The “new chronic” appears here as ecology’s managed diminishment of existence under a general condition of perpetual decline. With such failures in mind, an exit from the “new chronic” might entail a reassertion of history by revolting from the merely endurable and confronting our political-ecological reality as “already dead.” Environmental politics would be converted into negative ecology; to conceive of the environment as “already dead” is to depart from the radical position of having nothing to save, as saving can only preserve within the terms of capitalism’s death-dealing survival.

    Survival is to climate change as resilience is to precarity. In the one we may already glimpse the incalculably worse implications of our gradual slide into the other. After all, plans for adaptation to climate change are unfolding in a context that already demands continuous adaptation to ever more precaritizing social and economic conditions—in which an enforced condition of maximal insecurity requires self-maintenance through a paradoxical “self-precaritization” (Lorey 70). Frantz Fanon speaks compellingly of the way colonized populations are subjected to a “continued agony” that degrades and diminishes their culture without definitively ending it (34). Colonialism casts the shadow of this “continued agony” well beyond the present. A preview of general militarized survival under climate collapse may be seen in the colonial security apparatus in occupied Palestine, a uniquely brutal system of “necrocide” in which “unauthorized death is banned,” as China Miéville aptly puts it (302). In this light, one of the major political ramifications of the 2020 protests against racism and police brutality in the United States is the growing recognition of the militarization of policing. Occurring as it did amidst economic calamity and social upheaval, the mass movement to defund the police speaks as much to the urgency of the present as to the prospects of social and environmental justice in an unlivable future. As a resistance movement against enforced survival, negative ecology can help sustain critical focus on the brutalizing control systems that foreclose “unauthorized death.”

    At the same time, such a negative ecology would simply reconnect with the scope of environmentalism as defined by Rachel Carson. In Silent Spring, her excoriating critique of synthetic pesticides, Carson insists that ecology involved grasping time measured “not in years but in millennia,” and events “totally outside the limits of biologic experience” (7). Carson strikes an entropic, Smithsonesque tone in saying that damage from pollution already appeared “irrecoverable” and “irreversible” in 1962. Significantly, Carson finished writing her book under the shadow of her own impending death from cancer, though environmentalism has not fully embraced the negative ecological implications of her judgment that “there is no time” in the modern world for ecology (6). From an aesthetic standpoint, neither does Carson herself; the author’s empathic lyricism, so important for the book’s popular reception, nonetheless reinscribes geological time within the familiar biological patter of iambic and dactylic meter, as when she evokes “the heedless pace of man” and “time on the scale that is nature’s” (7). Challenging the dominance of the lyric mode in environmental humanities has emerged as a significant front in recent scholarship as ecocritics turn to experimental poetry to grasp the contours of the climate crisis in subjective apprehensions of the non-human temporalities of the Capitalocene.8 Smithson’s work speaks to this challenge to lyrical subjectivity in his deliberately impersonal, paratactic prose style, which eliminates the speaking “I” and renders actions in the passive voice in order to convey the ecological temporality of the “already dead.”9

    Silent Spring is often credited with galvanizing the movement that led to the founding of the EPA, which in its first year was tasked with setting regulatory standards for pollution under the 1970 Clean Air Act. With its focus on human respiratory health, however, the history of the Clean Air Act’s piecemeal regulations (and their subsequent dismantling) might be seen as fatefully confined within Carson’s “limits of biologic experience.” Fossil capital’s deep imbrication with extractive and despoiling processes imposes the recognition that the necessary objective of climate ecology is not pollution, narrowly defined, but carbon emissions. Accordingly, if the target of climate activism is the fossil economy, then the field of political action requires the kind of leap in scale we see in Smithson’s aesthetics. Such a scalar leap is memorably captured in the poster for Al Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth, arguably the most culturally influential ecological statement since Silent Spring. The image shows smoke spewing from smokestacks and curling into the threatening shape of a hurricane’s gargantuan spiral—an “immobile cyclone,” as Smithson might put it (“The Spiral Jetty” 8).

    Terminal Dialectics

    In times of crisis, spirals are often invoked as emblems of catastrophe, of things spinning downward and out of control; we speak colloquially of death spirals and of spiraling crises and inequality. Symbolically resonant as it may be, particularly in a year of manifold calamities, Spiral Jetty is perhaps above all a formal achievement. The absurd “pointlessness” of an art pilgrim’s trek into the Great Salt Lake is no metaphysical voyage or journey into an allegorical labyrinth.10 Rather, we should see it as Smithson’s full-scale demonstration of the optical vanity of linear perspective, his “terminal view” of art, as Ann Reynolds puts it (134). The Jetty‘s sinuous curl may be suggestively organic, but Smithson modeled its shape on the geometric spiral formations of inanimate crystalline structures. Likewise, the spiral’s dynamic spin should be considered a “gyrostatic” form, no less threatening for being immobile.11 Viewed this way, the Jetty evokes the formal language of Smithson’s nonsites, which set up a play of dialectical tensions between container and contained, presence and absence, visibility and invisibility, proximity and distance. This formal correspondence is brought out most strikingly in comparing the Jetty to Smithson’s crate-shaped sculptural installations: the nonsites’ horizontal slats are mirrored in his Great Salt Lake sculpture’s alternating bands. In the 1968 Non-site (Palisades-Edgewater, N.J.), for instance, a slatted steel box displays a jumble of rocks from a disused trolley line, with an accompanying text that seems to anticipate the Jetty‘s winding itinerary: “what was once a straight track has become a path of rocky crags—the site has lost its system” (Hobbs 110).

    In their conceptualist aspect, Smithson’s nonsites undermine the art object by emphasizing distance and disintegration, their displacement in “networks of interconnection” (Baker 107). As non-representational interventions in the pictorial tradition of landscape art, they challenge perspectival vision by undermining the characteristic “fantasizing distance” of the appropriative viewer who claims the admirable scene of nature without belonging to it ecologically (Kelsey 209). Such a distant claiming has an underlying economic rationale: the conventions of modern landscape art, including mapping and optical perspective, arguably came into dominance with a fourteenth-century need to rationalize a world picture for long-distance trade (Baridon 283). In contrast, Smithson’s nonsites are neither here nor visible, as their name implies, and thereby evade the conventional features of landscape art and more broadly of the art object as commodity. In so doing, however, the nonsite captures a crucial aspect of the commodity fetish: its profitable removal from the occluded site of production. The site from which Smithson draws his raw material is typically a postindustrial landscape. By insisting on that place’s connection to the nonsite, Smithson makes its dirty history cling to the gallery object. The nonsite, we might say, becomes the site’s impossible alibi. As such, we can think of the nonsite’s distant reference point as either source or destination in a cycle of economic production: the scene of exploitation, tainted provenance of the gallery object, or site of violent expulsion, a place where the commodity’s cost is measured in waste, ravage, and abandonment.12 By favoring the remote site over the humble gallery object, Smithson’s spatial dialectics implicitly challenge what Bruce Robbins calls “the tyranny of the close over the distant” (97).

    The dialectic of site and nonsite thus resonates significantly with environmental justice work that targets the invisible and distant sites of offloaded waste, outsourced labor, and offshored profits. Indeed, as Nixon frames it in Slow Violence, environmental justice hinges on a Smithsonesque politics of the ecologically distant and unseen; a critique of the “unsightly,” the “out-of-sight,” and the “remote” requires a practice of environmental justice as much aesthetic and representational as it is political (2). Presumably, then, a politics of environmental justice would bring closer what is remote and render visible what is out of sight. Like a nonsite, the first-world consumer’s home should become unsightly and uncanny; to recognize the taintedness of products sourced in places of unregulated exploitation would be to “de-alienate” them and realize their ubiquity in our domestic space.13 As with ivory in the days of the Belgian Congo, these commodities are “everywhere at home” (McCarthy 621). Smithson’s nonsites deliberately challenge such a politics of corrective vision. As Smithson insists, the seemingly indexical referentiality of the site/nonsite dialectic is fraught with hazards.14 The site may be a real referent, but it is prone to disturbance; it endures, but only as a mock eternity. This temporal dimension ultimately undermines the nonsites themselves; as Smithson explains, one of his final nonsites points to no definite place, the referent being lost in measureless time and therefore invisible and unlocatable. Significantly, the contents of Nonsite, Site Uncertain (1968) are fossil fuel: chunks of black cannel coal.15

    This shift from the relatively bipolar and spatially organized structure of the nonsites to Smithson’s later work fulfills the entropic orientation of the artist’s vision. At the extreme point of Smithson’s site/nonsite dialectics, the demise of the nonsite also relates in a concrete way to the impasse of environmentalist consumer ethics in an age of climate crisis. While the discourse of consumer responsibility often invokes simple polarities of source and destination, such an “individuation of responsibility” can only misrepresent the scale and complexity of global production and consumption networks (Monbiot). As outsourcing and subcontracting often involve multiple sites of production, any attempt at pointing to the commodity’s many extraction points would imply innumerable referents—seemingly “faraway sites” that keep exerting their influence on the local object, as Bruno Latour keenly demonstrates (200). Patrick Bond puts the problem succinctly: “capitalism intrinsically externalizes costs” (65). Consumer-choice ethics can be seen, then, as corporate capitalism’s ultimate alibi; customer behavior hardly affects the overriding motive of capital to seek cheaper and more exploitative sources of goods and labor and to hide profit’s collateral damage, its so-called externalities. David Harvey has persuasively shown how capitalism survives its crises by buying time and shifting ground: so many “spatial fixes” and “temporal fixes” to its intractable contradictions.16 Crucially, however, a political critique of capital’s shifting alibis must pursue the logic of extractivism to the “uncertain” sites where dialectics meet entropy.

    “An inferno rages in the soul of the commodity,” writes Walter Benjamin (Arcades 369). Brooding on the deceptive innocence of the commercial object, Benjamin considers its “price tag” akin to allegorical meaning: arbitrary and illusory, a significance far removed from its signifier. His “inferno” challenges such alibis by evoking the monstrous realm of cruelty, suffering, and exploitation hidden behind the commodity—by insisting, in other words, on “how it came into being” (Adorno qtd. in Arcades 669). As such, the metaphor evokes real sites of blazing heat, the blast furnace of a steel factory, perhaps, or the stifling “underground workshops” of coal miners described in Benjamin’s essay “The Storyteller” (95). Here as elsewhere Benjamin insists on framing labor history within the death cycles of what he called “natural history.” And yet, even as he broods over his “indiscriminate mass of dead lore” (Arcades 368), the allegorist likely did not mean his “inferno” to evoke fossilized biomass, the product of chthonic heat and pressure. Nor did he intend to describe that fuel’s profitable destruction in an internal combustion engine. This shift of focus, however, is precisely the target of a political ecology of fossil capital. But as with Smithson’s 1968 nonsite, that target is profoundly elusive; site and nonsite appear “intimately coupled yet strangely disconnected from each other,” as Malm puts it (4), or “widely separated both in space and time,” in Rachel Carson’s words (189), a distance that imposes an ever more imperative dialectics. The commodity as nonsite demands that we grasp it in relation to a site expanded to the dimensions of the globe, a dialectic that bridges the fossil-fueled fetish and its emissions’ incremental contribution to anthropogenic climate change. Crucially, Smithson’s dialectics trouble the commodity’s trajectory from raw material to fetish. In so doing they invert capitalism’s overall “transmutation of processes into entities” (Rose 18). In this sense we might understand the world-girdling implications of the commodity owner’s enmeshment in “the metabolic process of mankind,” as Marx puts it: by assuming the ecological cost of his infernal wares, “the commodity-owner becomes a cosmopolitan” (384).

    Benjamin’s infernal commodity aligns with Lukács’s theory of reification, which assumes its most stringent and unforgiving definition in Adorno’s negative dialectics. Reification for Adorno defines the all-encompassing and inescapable condition of a world wholly subjected to the rule of exchange-value. The infernal economy of fossil capital, to borrow Benjamin’s flash of insight, is perhaps the most persuasive confirmation of reification’s total dominion over life. What is hidden by each “price tag” on every commodity is the fossil economy that propels it into circulation and whose carbon emissions add to the atmosphere’s degradation. The contemporary subject is inextricably linked to that pervasive fossil economy, whose material network makes our local self a nonsite of that other, infrastructural body. As Daisy Hildyard puts it in The Second Body, “You are always all over the place” (8).

    Smithson’s death spiral in the Great Salt Lake might be seen, then, as an exploded nonsite that materializes the terminal dialectics of fossil capital. “My dialectics of site and nonsite whirled into an indeterminate state,” Smithson says of his first encounter with the inspiring location at Rozel Point (“The Spiral Jetty” 8). Site and nonsite swirl into oblivion; externalities overwhelm the landscape. To grasp the political implications of this predicament requires envisioning a totality more extensive than globalization and more materially specific than the all-too-human Anthropocene. On the model of Adorno’s unforgiving dialectics, negative ecology describes the grip of fossil capital on the entirety of the biosphere. Decarbonization surely requires “system change,” as many slogans demand, but ecology lies beyond a horizon turned dead end; as an alternative to capitalism it appears only in the negative, from within the scope of structure and system. A crucial advantage of viewing ecology from the perspective of Adorno’s “damaged life” is that it sustains focus on the obstacles we face. Petrocultures scholars are no doubt right in emphasizing that any transition to a post-carbon society is “stalked by the experience of impasse” (Petrocultures 16).17 Ironically, though, the war on nature waged by fossil capital materializes a collateral knowledge of the ecological in a way that consciousness-raising environmentalists have failed to achieve. Indeed, the all-encompassing condition of climate change may be the ultimate validation of nature as “environment,” even as this predicament indicates our entrapment in the negative ecology of fossil capital’s total reification of life.

    Environmental art often engages with this ecological predicament by connecting sensory experience in the here and now to the supersensible processes driving climate change. Olafur Eliasson’s Ice Watch is perhaps the paradigmatic recent effort to link tactile, visual, and auditory experience to phenomena occurring on geological scales. To coincide with the United Nation’s historic Climate Change Conference in Paris in December 2015, the artist installed twelve massive blocks of glacial ice on a street in the French capital. Evoking both a clock-face and a compass, as Eliasson notes, the circular installation allowed visitors to hear and feel the melting of ice dating back 15,000 years (Zarin). In contrast, Smithson’s approach to such challenges is to question the ability of the sensorium to encompass objects of any kind, and—inverting a hoary dictum of liberal politics—the artist implies that the impersonal is political.18 Literally uncontainable, Smithson’s museum nonsites evade both the grasp of the senses and the would-be comprehending mind, while his critique of optical perspective discredits the eye’s claim to attain the infinite. This challenge to “the illusion of infinite spaces” perhaps best allows us to gauge the dialectical significance of Smithson’s aesthetics for a politics of fossil capitalism (“Pointless” 358). Two main implications stand out: on the one hand, the illusory limitlessness of carbon democracy’s propulsive futurity must be pared back to its metabolic bounds; on the other, a sense of the illimited is needed to grasp fossil capital’s unaccountable inheritance from geology.

    Art historians understand Smithson to have debunked visual perspective as an anthropomorphic optical construct and demoted it to a useless, outdated artifact. In the sculptures Leaning Strata and Pointless Vanishing Point, for instance, Smithson renders what he calls perspective’s “mental artifice” as inert geometrical forms, their converging lines lopped off as if to castrate the scopic gaze (“Pointless” 358). Framed more broadly, we can understand this aesthetic intervention as a critique of masterful knowledge in general, especially with regard to its intimations of infinity. This has inherent political ramifications, given that the democratic notion of freedom itself is fully entangled in carbon democracy’s propulsive futurity. To put this in Jacques Rancière’s terms, a sense of limitlessness is part of what we have in common, and Smithson draws on this horizon to reinscribe finitude at that limit and foster a new aesthetic “distribution of the sensible” (12). Smithson’s critique of the would-be progressivism of the avant-garde then makes sense not merely as a contrarian’s cynicism but as a rigorous attention to what is shared and parceled out at its limits—at the territorial bounds of the horizon and on the vanishing line of fossil capitalism’s evanescent present. This is not to deny the vital role of pessimism to a critique of fossil capital, given that petroknowledge is characterized by its overweening “optimism” (Mitchell 141). Alarmingly enough, as Mitchell pointedly notes, the IPCC may be complicit in this affective posture; the likely impacts of negative feedback loops on the climate “make even the dire warnings from the IPCC look absurdly optimistic,” he says (7). In contrast to the sanguinity of climatologists and the rash positivity of petrocrats, Smithson sees the inheritance of prehistory as implying an insuperable limit to understanding, even as it impels the mind toward the infinite. Smithson only ever offers us visions of excess on the near side of infinity: “quasi-infinities,” as he puts it (“Quasi-Infinities” 34), or images of “infinite contraction,” in Robert Hobbs’s pithy phrase (98). Smithson’s is a claustral sublime, as rendered in his film on the Jetty, where the artist is seen running toward the sculpture’s center while his voiceover intones an identical view of “mud, salt crystals, rocks, water” from every compass-point (Spiral Jetty). This blocked view is a challenge to any claim of metaphysical survival or fossil-fueled inheritance. Rigorously materialist, the view from Spiral Jetty is at the same time a framing of infinitude, without which environmentalism can hardly foster a sense of the “double world” of the geological present.

    Contretemps

    It was in Vancouver, British Columbia, that Smithson spoke of “the artist as a geologic agent.” During the same three months he visited the area, he also had his most consequential dispute with ecologists. Public controversy over the environmental impact of Smithson’s proposed Island of Broken Glass forced the artist to abandon what would no doubt have been one of his major sculptural works. The inconclusive project for an Island of Broken Glass led Smithson to seek an alternate site at the Great Salt Lake. This episode is more than a detail of biography. As a project born of failure, Spiral Jetty can be seen as the sculptural enactment of a contretemps between environmentalism and negative ecology.

    In a particularly striking instance of Klein’s bad timing, Smithson’s stay in Vancouver coincided with the founding of one of the world’s most influential and enduring direct-action environmental organizations. Smithson visited Vancouver between November 1969 and February 1970 to develop the Island project on Miami Islet (a barren rock in the Strait of Georgia), and to participate in Lucy Lippard’s exhibition 955,000 at the Vancouver Art Gallery. After the Ministry of Lands, Forests and Water Resources denied the artist permission to build the Island of Broken Glass, gallerist Douglas Chrismas, Smithson’s local dealer, penned a letter making the case for a revised project at the site. Smithson’s idea for a new island earthwork made various concessions to public concerns and envisioned a welcoming “habitat” for sea birds, though his description of the Island of the Dismantled Building betrays the artist’s characteristic droll irony; as Chrismas says, quoting Smithson, the new work was intended as a “‘monument to ecology’” (Arnold 25). This second project met with a definitive rejection. Chrismas’s ill-fated missive to the Ministry is dated February 13, 1970. Two days later, in an article in the Vancouver Sun, the name Greenpeace appears for the first time in print (Weyler 68).

    One can hardly imagine a less propitious moment for Smithson to conceive his island project. The newly formed Vancouver chapter of the Sierra Club was instrumental in stopping the Island of Broken Glass; it was that group’s first environmental campaign. Meanwhile, as reported in the Vancouver Sun, a more radical faction was plotting to sail a boat dubbed Greenpeace to the Alaskan island Amchitka where the US was preparing a nuclear test. To activists fighting the “insane ecological vandalism” of the United States, Smithson’s island project appeared a similar American desecration of nature (Weyler 66). The opinion persists. In Rex Weyler’s account of this history thirty-four years later, the cofounder of Greenpeace still views the episode as an unalloyed triumph for environmentalism. His description of Smithson’s earthwork is shockingly garbled, if not defamatory: according to Weyler, Smithson’s intent was “to pave the islet with toffee-colored glue and shards of broken glass” (60). Aside from its inaccuracy—Weyler conflates Smithson’s seminal Glue Pour with the island project—the ecologist’s version of events betrays a glaring mismatch between environmentalism and geological consciousness. As Dennis Wheeler put it in his conversations with Smithson, the island project would be “making geologic time available” to the viewer with its heaped and jumbled plates of glass, evocations of earth strata shattered out of linear time and scattered into disorganized space (“Four Conversations” 226). The effect would be a “visual overload” that defies the viewer’s grasp (Grant 14), or, as Smithson suggests, a Bataillean “spiral” connoting “irreversible” expenditure (“Four” 230, 200).

    In spite of its apparent grandiosity, Smithson conceived the Island of Broken Glass as a highly bounded work concerned with issues of framing and containment, enclosing processes that occur on utterly different scales. As such, it exemplifies what Jack Flam calls “compressed hyperbole,” Smithson’s characteristic trope (“Introduction” xiv). This controlled rhetoric was sorely tested by Smithson’s disappointment in Vancouver. In a text penned after the final rejection of his island project, Smithson forcefully asserts that his vision of entropic loss is incompatible with any environmentalist logic of “salvation”: “The island is not meant to save anything or anybody but to reveal things as they are” (qtd. in Arnold 25). The artist casts himself as the “scapegoat” of environmentalist “cowards” and “hypocrites,” and concludes that “the phony ‘salvation’ put forth in so much ecological propaganda, has less to do with ‘saving the land’ than losing one’s mind” (qtd. in Arnold 25). Smithson may have misjudged the impression of “ecological vandalism” that his Island of Broken Glass would provoke, and his aesthetic intervention on Miami Islet could appear politically antithetical to a major protest action unfolding concurrently on another rocky island on the West Coast: the American Indian occupation of Alcatraz, a turning point for Indigenous rights in North America. Yet Smithson’s inexistent island remains strangely evocative for a negative ecology beyond the politics of “rich-nation environmentalists.”19 In E. Pauline Johnson’s short story “The Lost Island,” the author relates a tale told to her by Sahp-luk (Chief Joseph Capilano), in which a powerful medicine man, “the strongest man on all the North Pacific Coast,” is tormented by a dream that foretells the coming of White settlers to Vancouver and the resulting loss of his people’s lands and traditions (74). When the medicine man dies, he instructs his people to search for a mysterious island on which his powerful spirit will reside forever. In local Vancouver lore, then, an elusive island contains all the hopes of a return to the former lifeways of the Squamish and the restoration of a natural habitat “where the salmon thronged and the deer came down to drink of the mountain-streams” (75). One local author seems to have channeled Smithson’s “lost island” as the unwritten subtext for an insurgent Indigenous counter-history of art activism in Vancouver.20

    When Smithson visited the Great Salt Lake in March 1970 to scout locations for an earthwork, he initially pictured building an island in the lake (“The Spiral Jetty” 7). This echo of the Island of Broken Glass suggests that Smithson brought the bitter concept of a “monument to ecology” to Utah’s “dead sea.” By April, the site he chose at Rozel Point had inspired a different project. Intriguingly, the Jetty as originally constructed appears half-formed, as if caught midway between his Vancouver project and the Great Salt Lake: extant photos of his first Jetty show an arc terminating in a small bulbous form, like a tether linking an islet to the mainland.21 Smithson was unsatisfied with this solution. He returned the construction crew to the site a few days later to dismantle the island and give the Jetty its present shape.22

    Fifty years on, Miami Islet remains undisturbed. Though it is hard to judge the hypothetical impact of a planned forty tons of broken glass on the site, it would likely have had minimal effects on the surrounding ecosystem. Local preservation efforts, meanwhile, are outpaced by climate change. In the Strait of Georgia, salmon stocks are in steep decline and the resident orcas threaten to vanish. Dungeness crab, a local delicacy, can be found at Miami Islet, but as recently reported in the Vancouver Sun (Shore), their shells are showing developmental damage due to the global phenomenon of ocean acidification.

    John Culbert John Culbert is a Lecturer in the Department of English at the University of British Columbia. He is the author of Paralyses: Literature, Travel and Ethnography in French Modernity (Nebraska 2010). His article “The Well and the Web” appeared in Postmodern Culture 19.2.

    Footnotes

    I would like to thank Dina Al-Kassim, Dan Katz, Jaleh Mansoor, Kavita Philip, and Madeleine Reddon for reading earlier versions of this essay.

    1. See especially Nathaniel Rich, “Losing Earth”; David Wallace-Wells, The Uninhabitable Earth; Jonathan Franzen, “What If We Stopped Pretending?”; Catherine Ingram, “Facing Extinction.”

    2. In his treatise on the role of waste in modern aesthetics, Bourriaud performs a peculiar domestication of Bataille’s theory of excess, proposing instead a recuperative vision of the excluded remainder and casting the role of the modern artist as laboring “to bring those expelled by ideology, deported from symbolic power, back to the centre of life and culture” (172). In this account, nothing resists reassimilation – even if, confusingly enough, art itself reserves the right to “refuse” expulsion: “a realist mode of conceiving art,” Bourriaud asserts, “has refused the existence of the inassimilable.” In contrast, Smithson proposes that the artwork “evades our capacity to find its center,” and this decentering propels the viewer outward without prospect of return. “Where is the central point, axis, pole, dominant interest, fixed position, absolute structure, or decided goal? The mind is always being hurled towards the outer edge into intractable trajectories that lead to vertigo” (Smithson, “A Museum” 94).

    3. See especially Smithson, “A Museum of Language in the Vicinity of Art” and “A Sedimentation of the Mind.”

    4. See Sophie Lewis, “Cthulhu Plays no Role for Me.”

    5. See Natalie Sauer and Chloé Farand, “IPCC: Urgent action needed to tackle hunger alongside climate crisis.”

    6. I borrow the phrase from Frank Kermode. “Apocalypse can be disconfirmed without being discredited,” Kermode asserts. “This is part of its extraordinary resilience” (8). See The Sense of an Ending.

    7. For a uniquely personal treatment of this motif so crucial to his thought, see Derrida, Learning to Live Finally.

    8. See Lynn Keller, Recomposing Ecopoetics; Margaret Ronda, Remainders.

    9. See especially “Strata: A Photogeographic Fiction” and “Incidents of Mirror-Travel in the Yucatan.”

    10. We could say that Smithson “out-labyrinthed labyrinths,” as he remarks drolly of Frederick Law Olmsted (Smithson, “Frederick” 169).

    11. “Gyrostasis” is the name of Smithson’s triangulated spiral sculpture of 1968, which he subsequently described as a “map” to the Spiral Jetty. See Hobbs, editor, Robert Smithson: Sculpture, 95.

    12. See Saskia Sassen, Expulsions.

    13. On contemporary artistic strategies of “de-alienation,” see Heather Davis.

    14. The space between site and nonsite conveys a “new sense of metaphor,” Smithson says, that challenges expressive and realistic representation with a conceptual, analogic, and abstract dialectic (“A Provisional,” 364). Smithson specifies that because the nonsite directs the viewer into unbounded space, the indexicality of the metaphor opens onto no defined reference point: “Although there’s a correspondence, the equalizer is always in a sense the subverted or lost, so it’s a matter of losing your way rather than finding your way” (“Four” 218).

    15. As Smithson says, “The last nonsite [Nonsite, Site Uncertain, 1968] actually is one that involves coal and there the site belongs to the Carboniferous Period, so it no longer exists; the site becomes completely buried again. There’s no topographical reference. … That was the last nonsite; you know, that was the end of that. So I wasn’t dealing with the land surfaces at the end” (“Interview,” 296). Though Robert Hobbs points out that this nonsite was not, in fact, Smithson’s last, the artist’s account of his aesthetic trajectory reveals his sense of the nonsites’ conceptual evolution into geological time. See Hobbs 115 and Smithson, “Four,” 223.

    16. See David Harvey, The Limits to Capital, and “Globalization and the ‘Spatial Fix.’” While “spatial fix” is a focal term in Harvey’s work, its temporal correlative has largely been elaborated by his commentators. See Jessop, “Spatial Fixes, Temporal Fixes, and Spatio-Temporal Fixes.”

    17. In specifying “what blocks us from transitioning to other forms of energy,” the petrocultures scholars seem to draw implicitly on Malm’s sobering analysis of the “obstacles to the transition” (367). “The only historical transition that gives us insight into what is on the horizon (i.e., the scale of infrastructural and social shift) is the transition into the energy and economic system we’re on the brink of exiting” (Petrocultures 15). I have been arguing that any insight into such a horizon would have to pass through the obstructive entropics of Smithson’s terminal sightlines.

    18. A signal failure of environmental dialectics is demonstrated by would-be liberal thought leader Robert Reich. “It’s one thing to understand climate change in the abstract,” Reich observes. “It’s another to live inside it.” According to Reich, this supposedly unbridgeable disparity requires that we regain a sense that “the personal is political” in the lived experience of climate-fueled disaster. Such advocacy for a personal, experiential rapport to climate change can only promote a politics of adaptation to changes, which, if large enough to be commonly observed, can hardly be prevented.

    19. World Bank president Lawrence Summers notoriously employed the phrase. See Nixon 1; see also Bond 55.

    20. Wayde Compton’s short story collection The Outer Harbour relates the unexpected emergence of a volcanic island in Vancouver harbor that is targeted by First Nations militants for native occupation but is subsequently turned into a migrant detention facility. Smithson’s unbuilt island appears to be the tacit intertext between “Pauline Johnson island” and the various insurgent and artistic movements described in Compton’s fictional Vancouver. Indeed, as imagined by Compton, radical political action extends Smithson’s vision for the Island of Broken Glass to all of urban space and no doubt beyond; evoking “the so-called City of Glass” littered with the shards of broken windows, one militant group proposes, “Let those who smash, smash,” urging local residents “to crack every last antiseptic condo tower window, coating the sidewalks with so much shining rime” (Compton 79–80).

    21. On the logistics of construction and Smithson’s change of design, see Bob Phillips.

    22. Interestingly, the final version of Spiral Jetty may itself bear the traces of Smithson’s failed Vancouver project. When Smithson visited Vancouver in 1969, he may well have seen the large advertising billboards mounted across the city that year by Ben Metcalfe, a founding member of Greenpeace. The billboards featured the word “Ecology” in large letters, and the suggestion: “Look it up! You’re involved.” Notably, the accompanying image was of two large spirals, each nested in the other. See “The Fight to Save Earth.”

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  • Choreographies of Consent: Clarice Lispector’s Epistemology of Ignorance

    Rocío Pichon-Rivière (bio)

    Abstract

    This essay argues that, after studying law, Clarice Lispector never abandoned her engagement with political theory, and shows that her fiction and chronicles were a continuation of her philosophy of law by other means. Lispector developed an epistemology of ignorance through the analysis of two key social practices: “choreographies of consent” and “orchestrated oblivion.” In light of a 1941 article published in a law school journal, the essay traces the development of Lispector’s increasingly complex conceptions of law and examines how she adapted them when historical events forced her to confront willful ignorance as a pervasive condition of possibility for the social reproduction of injustice.

    Introduction

    Scholars rarely mention that Lispector—one of Brazil’s most prominent modernist writers—was a lawyer. This frequent omission suggests that her relation to the law was external to her literary work. This essay argues the opposite: I claim that Lispector’s literature was a continuation of her philosophy of law by other means precisely because it allowed her to narrate the gestures and feelings that constitute the outside of legal discourse.1 In doing so, she enticed her readers to see what remains unspoken in the language of the law as its implicit historical conditions of possibility.2 Whether the law is sanctioned by a secular State or enforced in religious communities through moral consensus, her concern had to do with the legitimization of such law in social rituals of consent and approval. In an early essay published in 1941when she was a student in law school, titled “Observações sobre o fundamento do direito de punir” (“Observations on the foundation of the right to punish”3), Lispector explores the continuities between moral and secular law. She makes the case that historically one institution leads to the other and that moral law and positive law share a common genealogy in the invention of the right to punish (“Observações”). The essay exposes the lack of foundation of the right to punish and hoped to prove that punishment was a dubious ritual that served to conceal rather than heal injustice. With the exception of this essay on crime and punishment, which makes analytical arguments against the letter of modern philosophies of right, Lispector developed her philosophy of law mostly in her fiction. Literature provided her the freedom to describe and narrate the spaces of law rather than replicating the language of the law in its redundant abstraction. In the ambivalent spaces of law, silent yet efficient gestures can be grasped or imagined as an outside to its scripture, thereby challenging and subverting its (often) well-intended meaning. I argue that the underlying phenomenological analyses of affective moods in the spaces of law in Lispector’s writings articulate a progressive series of theses that together compose an epistemology of ignorance. Simply put, an epistemology of ignorance examines the structural mechanisms through which society lies to itself.4 Lispector’s fiction focuses not only on what is said and what remains unsaid, but also observes with an anthropological gaze the choreographies of heads bowed down in shame or denial. Lispector’s engagement with these and other performances of powerfully constitutive forms of ignorance delineate the social and material conditions of possibility for the criminal justice system as we know it.

    In what follows, I focus first on what I call “choreographies of consent”: the narration of the gestures that performatively organize the social practice of moral justification regarding a decision. Choreographies of consent are the link between Lispector’s philosophy of law and her epistemology of ignorance, and involve cognitive processes in a dance of agreements and omissions regarding the validity or applicability of a law. The short story “The Crime of the Mathematics Professor” (1960) serves as an example of this literary device that reappears in other texts as well. The second section examines Lispector’s critical phenomenology of ignorance as it is fleshed out in a chronicle about a case of police brutality titled “Mineirinho” (1962). In light of the epistemology of ignorance articulated there, this section proposes a reading of her novel, The Passion According to G.H. (1964), to introduce the concept of the entbildungsroman.5 The entbildungsroman is a literary genre that parodies the traditional bildungsroman and in doing so advances a theory of the place of ignorance within the processes of ideology reproduction.

    Choreography of Furtive Consent

    A study of the notion of injustice lies at the center of Lispector’s phenomenological descriptions of the spaces of law as they appear both in her fiction and in her non-fiction. Biographically, this concern goes back to her first political intuitions when she was a child living in Recife, a city in Brazil’s Northeast region—one of the poorest and most State-abandoned areas of the country. In contrast to Lispector’s glamorous public image as a sophisticated diva of literary modernism, her upbringing was quite humble. Her father—a Jewish student of the scriptures forced to migrate from a violently racist Russia, where his wife was unspeakably maimed—had to take manual work to feed his family upon arriving in Brazil. In a chronicle from 1968, Lispector recounts her first experiences of political rage that inspired her to become a lawyer. She visited the mocambos in Recife—the poor Black neighborhoods where the formerly enslaved lived—just a few decades after the abolition of slavery, where she had the opportunity to hear the inflamed speeches of social leaders calling out their unjust conditions. Lispector wrote that she “vibrated” as a child with the heat of those discourses and promised herself that when she grew up, she would become a defender of the rights of the most vulnerable.6 Yet after graduating from law school in 1943, she did not follow through on that promise. Instead, she followed her new husband on his diplomatic missions in North Africa, Europe, and finally Washington, D.C., where they spent seven years. In a letter to her sisters written in Paris in January 1947, Lispector confesses her disgust with the hypocrisy that had become her new way of life. She recognizes that the lies hidden in the excessive cordiality of diplomatic conversations are a type of drunkenness—one in which she can no longer see her best self.

    Com a vida assim parece que sou “outra pessoa” em Paris. É uma embriaguez que não tem nada de agradável. Tenho visto pessoas demais, falado demais, dito mentiras, tenho sido muito gentil. Quem está se divertindo é uma mulher que eu detesto, uma mulher que não é a irmã de vocês. É qualquer uma. (Correspondências 115)

    In such a life it seems as if I am “another person” in Paris. It is a drunkenness that brings no satisfaction. I have seen too many people, talked too much, told lies, have been too gentle. The one having fun is a woman that I hate, a woman who is not your sister. She is a nobody.

    The delicate drunkenness of diplomacy suggests sophisticated choreographies of politeness that worked as a sedative for the rage of her youth. In her letter, Lispector seems to have surrendered to this intoxication with the sweet shame of an addict. Her being muito gentil—excessively gentle and gentile—begins to describe the tone of the choreographies of social oblivion that eventually became the theme of her fiction as well as of some of her chronicles. All her writings explore insistently how it is cognitively possible to forget what one used to know well.

    In an autobiographical essay, “Literatura e justiça” (“Literature and Justice”), Lispector comments on the reason she never wrote under the guise of engaged literature, like so many of her contemporaries in the Latin American Boom. Her essay explains her intellectual motives to produce instead an epistemology of ignorance:

    Desde que me conheço o fato social teve em mim importância maior do que qualquer outro: em Recife os mocambos foram a primeira verdade para mim. Muito antes de sentir “arte”, senti a beleza profunda da luta. Mas é que tenho um modo simplório de me aproximar ao fato social: eu queria era “fazer” alguma coisa, como se escrever não fosse fazer. … O problema de justiça é em mim um sentimento tão óbvio e tão básico que não consigo me surpreender com ele—e, sem me surpreender, não consigo escrever. E também porque para mim escrever é procurar. O sentimento de justiça nunca foi procura em mim, nunca chegou a ser descoberta, e o que me espanta é que ele não seja igualmente óbvio em todos.(Para não esquecer 25)

    Ever since I knew myself the social fact had in me an importance more prominent than any other: in Recife the mocambos were for me the first truth. Long before feeling “art,” I felt the deep beauty of political struggle. But I have a simplistic way of approaching the social fact: I wanted to “do” something, as if writing was not doing. … The problem of justice is in me a feeling so obvious and so basic that I cannot manage to be surprised by it—and, without being surprised, I cannot write. And also because for me writing is seeking. I never had to seek for the feeling of justice within me, it was never a discovery, and the thing that terrifies me is that it is not equally obvious to others.

    This passage resembles the beginning of Aristotle’s Metaphysics: without surprise and a certain lack of understanding there can be no thinking, because thinking begins as a search with an unknown destination. That certain circumstances are unjust is so obvious for Lispector that injustice does not require redundant representation. What remains a mystery is the willingness of others to remain ignorant about injustice despite its obvious presence.

    Lispector best parodies redundancy as the structure of engaged literature in her posthumous novel, A hora da estrela (1977). There the narrator (a novelist whose words we read as he struggles to convey social facts) says he is interested in facts because they are “pedras duras” (hard rocks) and therefore inescapable (25). While some read in this a naturalization of poverty (Peixoto), the pleonasm in the expression “pedras duras” might rather be a reference to the redundancy inherent in the enterprise of representing the inescapable as such.7 If this is correct, the thesis is not that social injustice is itself inescapable, but that the truth about existing, contingent social injustice cannot be dissimulated effectively and should require no additional help to be visible unless something is cognitively off—something that I call here “ignorance.”

    Lispector’s fictional inquiries both ask and seek to answer this fundamental question: how do people escape the inescapable truth of social injustice? And yet I want to challenge the simplicity of this distinction between herself and others, between those who can see injustice and those who remain ignorant. I want to foreground the tense subject position that Lispector articulates elsewhere, when she represents those whose lives perform a drunken ignorance despite showing glimpses that they know better. As we shall see in the chronicle “Mineirinho,” Lispector eventually self-represents as a subject defined by this dynamic contradiction, blurring the line that separates ignorance and knowledge.

    After they left Europe, her husband took on a diplomatic position in Washington, D.C., where they stayed for seven years during the dawn of the civil rights movement in the late 1950s. One can only imagine the conversations among the white diplomats as the orchestrated oblivion of racial injustice was interrupted by an increasingly organized movement and its public cry for justice. Lispector’s epistemology focuses on the ways in which it is cognitively possible to ignore what everybody knows. The drunkenness of diplomatic hypocrisy would become the examined subject of a theory about the orchestrated oblivion of injustice that organizes society despite the occasional glimpses of just political anger.8 In 1959 Lispector divorced her husband, left Washington, D.C., and returned to Brazil with her two children. In the following years, she published two texts that develop the question of the oblivion of injustice: a short story, “O crime do professor de matemática” (“The Crime of the Mathematics Professor”) (1960) and a chronicle about a case of police brutality, “Mineirinho” (1962), titled after the nickname of a man murdered in cold blood by a pack of policemen. In what follows, I read these together, next to the essay from 1941. In these works, Lispector shows links between punishment and oblivion and thereby ties the philosophy of law to the epistemological inquiry of a social production of ignorance.

    The short story “The Crime of the Mathematics Professor” starts in medias res with the professor carrying a heavy bag of unknown contents, which represents an unspoken crime he has committed. He is trying to find redemption through a punishing ritual that he first has to design because “they hadn’t yet invented a punishment for the great crimes in disguise and for the profound betrayals.” (“Pois ainda não haviam inventado castigo para os grandes crimes disfarçados e para as profundas traições.” 83) If there is a crime in the story, the avowed crime of the mathematics professor was abandoning his dog, José. What this crime means as a metaphor is not fully revealed at first, except to the extent that it suggests an action (or inaction) not considered a crime or a sin in hegemonic culture that can still burden a conscience. The question of improving existent social norms, whether through mild reform or radical change, is ciphered here. To borrow Derrida’s expression, this story points to the problem of “a democracy to come.”9 What our current democracy tolerates can burden the conscience of someone who might dare to imagine a higher standard. Yet such a standard to come cannot be expressed in the idiom of present norms. Abandoning a dog is an inaction or oversight that can go unpunished, but some time after the fact, the professor begins to find this lack of punishment unbearable. Readers soon learn that there is a dead body of another dog in his bag that he wants to bury with full honors in order to redeem himself for the wrongdoing committed against his own dog. The moral release that he craves is a curious theatre of confession, punishment, and absolution: “tratava-se de tornar o fato ao máximo visível à superfície do mundo sob o céu. Tratava-se de expor-se e de expor um fato, e de não lhe permitir a forma íntima e impune de um pensamento” (80). (“It was a question of rendering the fact as visible as possible on the surface of the world beneath the heavens. It was a question of exposing himself and exposing a fact, and not allowing the intimate and unpunished form of a thought.”) The fact that not even the church—as his inner monologue states with mild desperation—would consider his behavior a sin leaves him without a ritual of punishment and divine grace that would allow him to forget that dog’s face.

    From the story’s first sentence, the narrator contrasts the orderly entrance of Catholics into the church down below with the mathematician’s improvised and erratic dance of absolution up on the hill: he swings his heavy burden in search of the geometrically logical spot to bury his crime. His stream of consciousness follows the impromptu choreography of his feet meandering in the desert. In the distance, he sees the last tiny Catholics walking hastily into the church as “joyful bells peal once more summoning the faithful to the solace of punishment” (“Os sinos alegres tocaram novamente chamando os fiéis para o consolo da punição“) (80). This choreography of punishment brings solace to the faithful, and the professor tries to invent a new amendment to this kind of liturgy, to acknowledge his presumed crime and, by way of a gentile alchemy, to allow himself to release his guilt at last and forget his dog’s eyes.

    The question of why he abandoned his dog vaguely haunts the professor’s stream of consciousness. Whether such a question could ever be answered, however, is not made clear in the story. At some point he remembers the excuses he had given himself when he made the decision. Trusting their validity no longer, he unveils the full scene of consent:

    Abandonou-te com uma desculpa que todos em casa aprovaram: porque como poderia eu fazer uma viagem de mudança com bagagem e família, e ainda mais um cão, com a adaptação ao novo colégio e à nova cidade, e ainda mais um cão? ‘Que não cabe em parte alguma’, disse Marta prática. ‘Que incomodará os passageiros’, explicou minha sogra sem saber que previamente me justificava, e as crianças choraram, e eu não olhava nem para elas nem para ti, José. (Laços 83)

    [I] abandoned you with an apology that everyone at home approved of: since how could I move to a new house with all that baggage and family, and on top of that a dog, while adjusting to a new high school and a new city, and on top of that a dog? “For whom there’s no room,” said Marta being practical. “Who’ll bother the other passengers,” reasoned my mother-in-law without being aware that she was preemptively justifying my plan, and the children cried, and I looked neither at them nor at you, José.

    The universal claim in the first line (“with an apology that everyone at home approved of”) is immediately contradicted when we learn that the children were crying and that he avoided their gaze as well as the dog’s. This is a classic choreography of consent: the dance of rhetorical cooperation among those whose opinions are admitted in the consensus while their eyes follow rehearsed movements to avert excluded gazes. This kind of consent, which I would call furtive, is tautological: it averts precisely those gazes that presumably express a dissent.

    As the professor directs his silent speech to the presumed victim of his crime, the verb in the second person singular points to another gesture, even if imaginary and belated: that of finally looking into the dog’s eyes, so to speak, acknowledging at last his formerly effaced interpellation. The universal predication at the beginning of the sentence contrasts with the direct address at the end: the first one legitimizes the act of abandonment, as hyperbolic (“everyone”) as it is false; the latter comes retrospectively and seems to open up the old wound of a truth that had been awkwardly averted. The falsity of the first is the truth of the second. The first follows the universality of the law; the second opens up the intimate interpellation of an ethics of the other.10 The first one soothes the angst of decision-making with the fantasy of final approval; the second haunts the decision-maker—from outside their discourse—with the uncanny temporality of an eternal recurrence that resists the attempted closure. This contrast between the linear temporality of erasure and the haunting, enduring truth of what happened is emphasized again when the professor realizes that he had done with the dog something that will last “forever,” with impunity evermore (“Só agora ele parecia compreender, em toda sua gélida plenitude, que fizera com o cão algo realmente impune e para sempre” 83).11 With this realization, the theater of punishment that he had been staging reveals its vanity. He notices, “more mathematical still,” that the logic of his redemption is no better than the logic of his previous excuses and so he dramatically unburies the dog, under the heavens:

    Olhou a cova coberta. Onde ele enterrara um cão desconhecido em tributo ao cão abandonado, procurando enfim pagar a dívida que inquietantemente ninguém lhe cobrava. Procurando punir-se com um ato de bondade e ficar livre de seu crime. Como alguém dá uma esmola para enfim poder comer o bolo por causa do qual o outro não comeu o pão.

    Mas como se José, o cão abandonado, exigisse dele muito mais que a mentira … agora, mais matemático ainda, procurava um meio de não se ter punido. Ele não devia ser consolado. … E assim o professor de matemática renovara o seu crime para sempre.(84)

    He looked at the covered grave. Where he had buried an unknown dog in tribute to the abandoned dog, attempting at last to repay the debt that distressingly no one was demanding. Attempting to punish himself with an act of kindness and be free of his crime. The way someone gives alms in order at last to eat the cake for which another went without bread.

    Now, more mathematically still, he sought a way not to have punished himself … as if José, the abandoned dog, demanded much more from him than a lie. He must not be consoled. … And so the mathematics professor renewed his crime forever.

    This final unearthing of the corpse of the anonymous dog that he no longer wants to bury coincides with the revelation of what his crime represents, as it bears the weight of a newly-introduced metaphor. The narrator compares the professor’s desire to be forgiven with the act of giving spare change as a way to seek absolution for being complicit with (and benefiting from) social inequity. Social injustice is also “the debt that distressingly no one was demanding.” As this passage suggests, the abandoned dog might represent those whose lives are treated as less than human with impunity, even if it might also evoke the position of non-human animals before the law.

    In the profound arbitrariness of the self-inflicted penalty of burying a “strange and objective” dog, in relation to the crime of abandoning a different dog, one can read Lispector’s take on the modern notion of punishment: too impersonal and abstract to be a debt paid to the actual victim or to offer restorative justice and, as a matter of general principle, completely useless insofar as it does nothing to prevent similar events from taking place. As the young Lispector argues regarding positive law in her 1941 essay, the concept of punishment implicit in the criminal justice system is scientifically invalid for similar reasons: it does nothing to address the root of the problem, hence nothing to prevent the repetition of such acts in new generations; and it does not heal the wounded parties (healing being the only real form of addressing the hurt at the root of such conflicts). There she compares punishment with morphine: a mere palliative, rather than a cure, for society’s condition.12 The 1941 essay states that there is no such thing as a right to punish, only a power to punish, and that the concept of a right to punish is the labor of “the first intelligent men.” (67) In her narrative, the genealogy of the right to punish goes back to “the first intelligent men” who lacked power individually (in a state of nature) and yet managed to build power by rhetorically claiming and physically executing a right to punish.

    Though this short story explores the trope of punishment from the perspective of self-examination and religion, the professor’s mathematical method of reasoning works as a parable of the role of intelligence in both the concept and the institution of punishment. The arbitrary and cruel nature of punishment is sanitized and presented as a scientific necessity and considered just by a too-intelligent rhetoric that ultimately serves to distract attention from the real issue: “the crimes in disguise” (Laços 83) that are not listed in the penal code precisely to protect the status quo. The mathematics of the professor speaks to the loop of tautological reasoning in an institution concerned with conserving rather than eliminating injustice. This form of ignoring a crime in disguise is a kind of “ignorance that presents itself unblushingly as knowledge,” to borrow Charles Mills’s words, and its most complex and non-appealable expression is positive law (13). In the sphere of self-examination, as represented in this story, ignorance takes the form of a too-pristine rationalization that seeks to avert feeling—hence its morphine-like sedative effects.13

    Immune to Knowledge: The Sonsos Essenciáis and the Entbildungsroman

    In Lispector’s last interview, the interviewer asks her about which text she is most proud. From among her numerous novels and pitch-perfect short fiction, she mentions a chronicle titled “Mineirinho” that denounces police brutality (1977). The choreographies of averted gazes reappear in this text, which explicitly addresses an assassination that shook Rio de Janeiro in 1962. José Miranda Rosa, a.k.a. “Mineirinho,” the man executed in cold blood by the police, was already famous for his robberies, had been sentenced for murder, and later managed to escape the psychiatric detention center where he was imprisoned. After a manhunt that lasted several days and involved dozens of policemen, he was gunned down by a group of police officers. The morning after his death, the newspapers enumerate in gory detail the limbs and organs where each of the thirteen bullets had entered, intensifying the spectacularized horror of an assassination that was also a message for inhabitants of the slums in Rio. The day of his murder, many gathered to honor his body, choreographing an impromptu ceremony that the police dispersed with violence.14 Mineirinho’s notoriety was not due to his lawlessness; paradoxically, he was famous for his generous heart. He had earned the reputation of being the Robin Hood of the favelas in Rio. The people from the favelas seemed to love him despite his violence because of the redistributive justice he enacted. He was no ordinary criminal: his work was a mise-enabîme of the concept of crime, for his crimes were exercises of justice. They expressed his dissent from the social system that had marginalized and racialized him and others. The obscenity of his public death seemed to aim at punishing his redistributive justice efforts more than his crimes. It was an authoritative statement about the police force and its unconstitutional yet very real power to kill at gunpoint—and more, to control any revolt of the poor. This was sheer expressive violence as a sovereign act (Segato), and the violence of that expression shocked the public more than its message.15 The newspaper A Noite observed that the police disposed of his body “as if he were an animal” (“Polícia”) and reported that, after being wounded by the first gunshots, José Miranda Rosa had the strength to murmur, “Estão matando um homem” (“You’re killing a man”).

    A month later, Lispector published a text about this execution in the cultural magazine Senhor at the request of the editor. It begins with an interpellation of its readers, as she claims to speak “como um dos representantes de nós” (“as a representative of us”):

    É, suponho que é em mim, como um dos representantes de nós, que devo procurar por que está doendo a morte de um facínora. E por que é que mais me adianta contar os treze tiros que mataram Mineirinho do que os seus crimes … não matarás … Esta é a lei. Mas há alguma coisa que, se me fez ouvir o primeiro e o segundo tiro com um alívio de segurança, no terceiro me deixa alerta, no quarto desassossegada, o quinto e o sexto me cobrem de vergonha, o sétimo e o oitavo eu ouço com o coração batendo de horror, no nono e no décimo minha boca está trêmula, no décimo primeiro digo em espanto o nome de Deus, no décimo segundo chamo meu irmão. O décimo terceiro tiro me assassina—porque eu sou o outro. Porque eu quero ser o outro.(“Mineirinho” 112)

    Yes, I suppose it is in myself, as one of the representatives of us, that I should seek the reasons for the pain felt after the death of a thug. And why does it make more sense to me to count the gunshots that killed Mineirinho rather than his crimes. … Thou shall not kill. … That is the law. But there is something that, if it makes me hear the first and the second gunshots with relief brought by a feeling of safety, at the third puts me on the alert, at the fourth unsettles me, the fifth and the sixth cover me in shame, the seventh and eighth I hear with my heart pounding in horror, at the ninth and tenth my mouth is trembling, at the eleventh I say God’s name in fright, at the twelfth I call my brother. The thirteenth shot murders me—because I am the other. Because I want to be the other.

    Lispector signals that the form rather than the content of his assassination seemed out of place, as she witnessed the first two gunshots with relief: safe at last from the threat of him. She explains in that last interview that this text is constructed around the excessive shots that were not necessary to kill him. If, in retrospect, after the last bullet was shot, the first one can be resignified as unjust, this does not erase the fact that the first impression was relief. This admission is essential to understanding who is speaking. The morphine of punishment in this case has to do with numbing the fear of insecurity. Two precise shots would have provided that without conflict, but this should not be mistaken for peace.

    Lispector’s chronicle finds its rhetorical power in its use of the first-person plural. Rather than accusing others in a blame game that could have implied her own innocence, the narrator does not disguise her complicity in a system that kills with predictable, unblushing regularity.16 Epistemologies of ignorance study the ways in which privileged social groups collaborate to assure that ignorance will prevail despite occasional encounters with knowledge of the perspectives and predicaments of the oppressed. Lispector’s inclusion of herself in the social group whose consciousness she condemns quite boldly implies that no amount of critical knowledge in and of itself will suffice to subtract her from that group.

    The question of who exactly belongs to “us” is structured as an anaphora in both senses of the term: an insistent repetition and a pronoun whose reference in this case is not antecedent but oddly postponed. The device itself replicates the initial interpellation of the ominous death and works almost as an invitation, too polite to be explicit; the readers are welcome to decide whether they identify with this “us.” Chantal Mouffe—reading Carl Schmitt—says that any “us” presupposes a “them” (43). Here, “us” could name the readership of the magazine Senhor, an elite publication dedicated to the dissemination of modernist art. If “us” names the social class this audience represents, the contrasting “them” would then be the favelados. And yet there is no mention of “them” in this text. Quite on the contrary, this problematic word is avoided with care, and “us” is only juxtaposed with “him.” “Us” then could name the living—such is its initial vagueness. Or, in light of the story about the mathematics professor, the “us” might connote the universality of the law (as it is often proclaimed in constitutions or declarations of independence) in contrast to “him.”17 As in Lispector’s short story, the echo of one absent gaze interpellates the narrator, haunting the universality of a furtive consent and showing it to be false.

    Later in the text—only after the last of the thirteen shots elicits an epiphany—a name for “us” is finally revealed. The chronicle defines “us” with a suggestive epithet: “os sonsos essenciais” (“the essential phonies”) (114).18 This translation is imprecise as the word “phony” does not fully capture the Portuguese “sonso,” a term that one would also use to translate the expression “playing dumb.” A sonso is someone who pretends to ignore something that he knows all too well. And yet it also connotes plain stupidity. The essential phonies, os sonsos essenciáis, are the political agents of a social charade. An intriguing question arises: why are these sonsos essential? They could be essential in the Aristotelian sense of being the principle of movement, just as in Hobbes’s Leviathan, where the sovereign State and its laws are the principles according to which the social body moves. The phonies would be essential, in this sense, as the political class with enough agency to decide what constitutes a crime and who gets to be executed while others stay safe. The term sonsos essenciais seems to imply as well that there are more sonsos, yet they are not essential: these would be the inessential, disposable sonsos.19

    Lispector ciphers the difference between “us” and “him” in a formula: “Tudo o que nele foi violência é em nós furtivo” (“Everything that was violence in him is furtive in us”) (113). The adjective furtivo (in English, furtive, secretive) means something surreptitious or clandestine, done in a quiet and secretive way (Dicionário; Merriam Webster). There is again something untranslatable in this formula because the root of this word is also at play in the word furto, which means theft in Portuguese. Furto in legal terms is emphatically different from latrocínio; the latter means robbery as opposed to theft precisely inasmuch as violence is involved, and the punishment for it is therefore much harsher. “Tudo o que nele foi violência é em nós furtivo” means that we are also thieves, but the kind of theft at stake is one without violence, or a violence with no visible author in the eyes of the law. A more untranslatable notion that exists only in Portuguese reverberates in this sentence as well: the verb furtar has a pronominal form, furtar-se, which means to avoid or to pretend to ignore, that is to say, to play dumb. For example, one can say: “V. Exa. Furtou-se a responder àquela que é a mais crucial das questões” or “É preciso que as pessoas deixem de furtar-se a responsabilidades.” (“Your majesty refused to respond to the most crucial question” or “People need to stop avoiding their responsibilities.”) The connections between the adjective furtivo (secretive), the verb furtar (to steal), and the pronominal verb furtarse (to play dumb) are not at all obvious in Portuguese, because these words evolved to mean discrete concepts. Yet Lispector’s full sentence brings the philological connection together:

    Tudo o que nele foi violência é em nós furtivo, e um evita o olhar do outro para não corrermos o risco de nos entendermos. Para que a casa não estremeça. (113)

    Everything that was violence in him is furtive in us, and we avoid each other’s gaze so as not to run the risk of understanding each other. So that the house doesn’t tremble.

    What began as theft is followed by a secret that becomes a form of self-evasion from responsibility. What begins as playing dumb can result in becoming dumb—or ignorant—if this active ignoring of each other’s gaze can indeed protect the subject from “the risk of understanding each other.” When the playing dumb is choreographed at a structural level, with the complicity of the most powerful subjects, it produces faked stupidity at the level of institutions, or, as she calls it, “a stupid justice” (justiça estupidificada) (114). This is the secret that lies at the foundation of the republic.

    From Lispector’s discussion of a furtive consent that forms around a justice filled with stupidity, the pair friend/enemy appears at last. Yet it appears in a way that defies Schmittian logic and the paradox of liberal democracy: the enemies are “us,” the essential phonies trying to justify a form of living with the blessing of “a god invented at the last minute”; the friends are those who interrupt the choreography of consent by refusing to find excuses:

    [Mineirinho] foi fuzilado na sua força desorientada, enquanto um deus fabricado no último instante abençoa às pressas a minha maldade organizada e a minha justiça estupidificada: o que sustenta as paredes de minha casa é a certeza de que sempre me justificarei, meus amigos não me justificarão, mas meus inimigos que são os meus cúmplices, esses me cumprimentarão; o que me sustenta é saber que sempre fabricarei um deus à imagem do que eu precisar para dormir tranqüila e que outros furtivamente fingirão que estamos todos certos e que nada há a fazer. Tudo isso, sim, pois somos os sonsos essenciais, baluartes de alguma coisa. E sobretudo procurar não entender. (114)

    [Mineirinho] was gunned down in his disoriented strength, while a god fabricated at the last second hastily blesses my organized cruelty and my justice filled with stupidity: what upholds the walls of my house is the certainty that I shall always justify myself, my friends won’t justify me, but my enemies who are my accomplices, they will praise me; what upholds me is knowing that I shall always fabricate a god in the image of whatever I need in order to sleep peacefully, and that others will furtively pretend that we are all righteous and that there is nothing to be done. All this, yes, for we are the essential phonies, bastions of something. And above all of trying to not understand.

    As the words furtar (theft), furtivo (secret), and furtar-se (playing dumb) branch out from their common root, they indicate the three stages of oblivion through which the epistemological labor of actively ignoring takes place. Social injustice—the furtive theft of the land that left Mineirinho in a state of nature fighting for survival in a hypocritical society marked by extreme inequities—suddenly becomes apparent, as a first truth previously averted. The chaos resulting from Mineirinho’s brutal and public execution ultimately reveals the secrets that surround injustice as well as the irresponsibility protected by such secrecy.

    Living a life of diplomatic dinner parties in Europe and Washington, D.C., after law school, must have been an invaluable source of inspiration for Lispector to think about white ignorance, hypocrisy, and the potential—though quite infrequent—interruption of choreographed oblivion. Lispector was in the U.S. when Emmett Till was murdered in 1955, and his mother’s decision to leave the coffin open for everyone to see was one of the triggers for the Civil Rights Movement. Perhaps this event was a first occasion for her to think about how an entire system of furtive violence can explode in the flesh of one man. The crime revealed in that coffin was not just a child’s horrific murder but an entire way of life that Jim Crow made possible. Likewise, the crime revealed in Mineirinho’s wrecked flesh was not the manhunt for one person but the violence against favelados altogether. In the Brazilian case, however, the murder did not fuel a social justice movement, and ultimately nothing changed. As much as Lispector’s dramatic rhetoric tried to turn the event into an earth-shattering revelation, the public’s indifference only confirmed one of the most cynical theses of her epistemology of ignorance, which she formulated in the years immediately following: the kind of ignorance discussed here cannot be simply overcome by knowledge. Having an epiphany—by way of finally looking into previously averted eyes—is not enough to change a thing.

    While the bildungsroman is a narrative of overcoming ignorance and so may seem suited to Lispector’s thinking on social justice, her fiction in fact often mocks this genre. In novels such as A Paixão segundo G.H. (1964), Lispector subverts the bildungsroman, developing instead what I call an entbildungsroman: a novel that shows how ignorant a character can remain in the face of blatant truth in order to avoid ethical or emotional consequences that might follow from acknowledging that truth. Much of Lispector’s fiction is populated by upper-class characters who one day encounter the eyes of their social other (a Black maid, a beggar, a young brown woman from the northeast, etc.) and suddenly have a disarming epiphany. Lucia Villares claims that Lispector used novels such as this to make visible racial inequality in Brazil. I would take that observation a step further and say that Lispector’s thesis is more subtle and less optimistic: she narrates the uselessness of “making visible” as a political strategy or as the politics of literature. The politics of making visible forgets that what needs to be “made visible” is already bluntly visible.

    The narrator of A Paixão segundo G.H. parodies the bildungsroman (and the modern project that it ciphers) by elevating the character of G.H. to the highest peaks of existential revelation, inviting the reader to follow her to the climax of so-called indescribable (yet passionately verbalized) epiphanies, only to let her fall comically and brutally back into her old, secure ignorance. Toward the end of the novel, the narrator describes this ignorance—so almighty that it can survive the event of knowledge untouched—as “sacred” (120). Like Christ’s resurrection after his gory series of punishments, G.H. punishes herself with the thought of racial injustice, only to be reborn again from the ashes of that revelation, as innocent and as ignorant as ever before. The first pages signal in advance that ignorance is the ending of the novel, as the narrator struggles to remember and put in writing the revelation that she just experienced in silence:

    Talvez me tenha acontecido uma compreensão tão total quanto uma ignorância, e dela eu venha a sair intocada e inocente como antes. … Pois ao mesmo tempo que luto por saber, a minha nova ignorância, que é o esquecimento, tornou-se sagrada. (8)

    Maybe what happened to me is an understanding as total as an ignorance, and I am going to come out of it untouched and innocent like before. … Because at the same time that I struggle to understand, my new ignorance, which is oblivion, has also become sacred.

    While the novel is structured around the event of an epiphany—as a classic bildungsroman—the ending sings the praise of an ignorance that challenges the Enlightenment project of modernity. G.H.’s stream of consciousness, like that of the narrator in Lispector’s posthumous novel A hora da estrela, can be read as a search for punishment and forgiveness. Her passion is precisely the experience of seeing at last, through her window, the lights of the favelas in the far distance and thinking that those precarious structures could have been palaces—echoing the realization of her former maid’s Black beauty and dignity, until then anxiously denied. The passion of G.H.—defined as a series of realizations hurting her fragility—ends up making her stronger, not because she reaches enlightenment but because she develops a sort of immunity to knowledge. Her ignorance becomes sacred. Read in light of Lispector’s philosophy of crime and punishment, this novel characterizes engaged literature as a ritual of moral punishment in the hands of those readers who are willing to face the painful truth but only to become invulnerable to it. Instead of being moved by truth toward restorative justice efforts, these imagined readers use the pain of truth as a ritual of performative remorse and furtive absolution, as they continue to uphold the status quo with their powerful ignorance and inaction.

    Rocío Pichon-Rivière Rocío Pichon-Rivière is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Hispanic Studies at the University of California, Riverside. Previously she was a postdoctoral fellow at New York University and a visiting scholar at the Pratt Institute. Recent works include essays on hemispheric trans theory, Latin American women’s political thinking, and phenomenologies of shame.

    Footnotes

    1. Foucault in “La pensée du dehors” (1966) defines a notion of an “outside” of discourse as the element around which much literature was already doing its work, pointing toward what exceeds its intentional representation. “The reason it is now so necessary to think through fiction—while in the past it was a matter of thinking the truth—is that ‘I speak’ runs counter to ‘I think.’ ‘I think’ led to the indubitable certainty of the ‘I’ and its existence; ‘I speak,’ on the other hand, distances, disperses, effaces that existence and lets only its empty emplacement appear” (page number needed). Taking Foucault’s argument a little further, one can say that the outside of the law points to the level of the performativity of language and the institutions in which such discourses circulate. The narrated “presence” of the speaker’s body and their actions in a literary scene shed light and cast a shade over the content of their speech, a shadow drawn with the direction and intensity determined by their positionality in broader power structures that become keys to understanding not just what the discourse intends to say but also what it performs in terms of such structures. By challenging the purity of the abstract ‘I’ or the ‘we’ that seems to enunciate the law, fiction begins to point outside of its interiority. This outside can be defined as the realm of the unspoken injustice that the law fails to name while silently becoming a vehicle for its reproduction.

    2. This essay is part of a larger project that studies the thought of Latin American women, who often wrote in minor genres, in the margins of professional philosophy. I take the risk of presenting ideas through storytelling around the figure of the author, knowing that in the field of literary studies many have been disciplined by formalist methods and might have a visceral reaction against this type of narrative: bear with me. Indeed, many thinkers have convincingly established that a text should be studied in and of itself, regardless of the presumed, unverifiable intentions of the human who penned it, for a text has a life of its own. While I agree with this argument, I claim that it is necessary to narrate rather than describe systems of thought. In the field of philosophy—where I was most disciplined—quite paradoxically storytelling is often more favored than mere conceptual analysis and the figure of the author often lives in ways that literary critics might struggle to accept. To think is to think otherwise. And precisely that movement of thought advancing against the grain of previous limiting ideas creates a moment that is irreducibly dramatic and demands to be narrated before conceptual analysis can begin. In other words, non-tautological thinking has a narrative arch. Where—if not in time—can contradictions play a more interesting game than the impossible? In What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari wrote that we would not be able to understand a philosophical system of thought if our imagination had not first drawn the figure of the philosophical character who thinks the ideas presented. Such character is needed to breathe the pauses of any thought that is not tautologically foreclosed to external examination. The character performs, so to speak, the clumsy possibility of change. Narration favors contingency over necessity.

    This essay studies the works of Clarice Lispector and observes her philosophical character as a changing rhetorical trope in her writings. This figure of the author—however evanescent and filled with contradictions—is a necessary logical step to address questions of epistemic injustice, the main theme of this article, for the social drama of knowledge production can only be fleshed out through the figure of the thinkers. Inasmuch as she was addressing her own epistemic privilege and limitations, such argument necessitates the figure of the author to be predicated upon. Historically, Lispector only began to include herself as an explicit subject of enunciation in the 1960s as she became an increasingly public figure. This article analyzes one of the first times in which she pointed at herself in the text that she was writing, “Mineirinho.” Additionally, this essay ends with a commentary on novels that seem to be parodies of the figure of the engaged writer, further advancing an argument about her characterization of this type of figure.

    3. All translations are the author’s unless noted otherwise.

    4. Linda Martín Alcoff writes in “Epistemologies of Ignorance: Three Types” that “in mainstream epistemology, the topic of ignorance as a species of bad epistemic practice is not new, but what is new is the idea of explaining ignorance not as a feature of neglectful epistemic practice but as a substantive epistemic practice in itself. The idea of an epistemology of ignorance attempts to explain and account for the fact that such substantive practices of ignorance—willful ignorance, for example, and socially acceptable but faulty justificatory practices—are structural. This is to say that there are identities and social locations and modes of belief formation, all produced by structural social conditions of a variety of sorts, that are in some cases epistemically disadvantaged or defective” (39–40).

    5. I alternatively use the terms epistemology of ignorance (Alcoff) and critical phenomenology of ignorance (Weiss) because both disciplinary frameworks study the same phenomena: the ways in which ignorance is actively produced in society. Epistemology and phenomenology are two traditions that address this question: the first with a historical concern for what constitutes knowledge and how knowledge is produced unevenly depending on social positionality, the second with a focus on the experience of such knowledge production or lack thereof. This later tradition is closer to Lispector’s use of stream of consciousness narratives to convey the messiness of the experience of denial. Yet the conversation between these different traditions is where the complexity of these phenomena can be articulated with most nuance.

    6. “Por que foi o destino me levando a escrever o que já escrevi, em vez de também desenvolver em mim a qualidade de lutadora que eu tinha? Em pequena, minha família por brincadeira chamava-me de ‘a protetora dos animais’. Porque bastava acusarem uma pessoa para eu imediatamente defendê-la. E eu sentia o drama social com tanta intensidade que vivia de coração perplexo diante das grandes injustiças a que são submetidas as chamadas classes menos privilegiadas. Em Recife eu ia aos domingos a visitar a casa de nossa empregada nos mocambos. E o que eu via me fazia como que me prometer que não deixaria aquilo continuar. Eu queria agir. Em Recife, onde morei até doze anos de idade, havia muitas vezes nas ruas um aglomerado de pessoas diante das quais alguém discursava ardorosamente sobre a tragédia social. E lembro-me de como eu vibrava e de como eu me prometia que um dia esta seria minha tarefa: a de defender os direitos dos outros” (Lispector, A descoberta 217).

    7. Since I here affectionately disagree with one of Marta Peixoto’s articles, I feel the need to mention that she read several versions of this essay and gave me invaluable feedback, criticism, and support for which I am in debt to her and deeply grateful.

    8. Audre Lorde in “The Uses of Anger: Women Responding to Racism” (1981) speaks of the political power of anger that stems from its double nature, both epistemic and physical: “Anger is loaded with information and energy.” Sedating it with any narcotic not only diminishes its physical power to elicit change but also obscures the clarity of its content rendering it devoid of its epistemological power to point at a truth that a group seeks to ignore. Lorde writes: “Every woman has a well-stocked arsenal of anger potentially useful against those oppressions, personal and institutional, which brought that anger into being. Focused with precision it can become a powerful source of energy serving progress and change. And when I speak of change, I do not mean a simple switch of positions or a temporary lessening of tensions, nor the ability to smile or feel good. I am speaking of a basic and radical alteration in those assumptions underlying our lives” (127). Marc Brackett, the director of the Yale Center for Emotional Intelligence, defines anger as the emotional response to injustice, while distinguishing it from mere frustration, as a response to unfulfilled expectations (Bracket). If anger points us toward injustice, then the mechanisms at work to sedate it can be seen as functional to the reproduction of injustice.

    9. See Derrida, Spectres de Marx (1993) and Politiques de l’amitié (1994). This note might sound anachronistic insofar as Lispector could not have read Derrida’s texts on a democracy to come, as they were yet to come, for he started publishing them in the 1990s. Incidentally, it is quite possible that Derrida read this story, given his closeness to Hélène Cixous, who introduced Lispector’s works in France. Questions of direct influence aside, these authors were discussing a philosophical problem that predated them both. The fact that this is a mathematics professor points to the calculus that defines the logic within established laws. The professor’s stream of consciousness can be read as a phenomenological exploration of the problem of the incalculability of justice and the experience of trying to think beyond current democratic practices and laws while still struggling to use their logic and idiom. The result is a bit ridiculous, and the story’s ending can be seen as a parody of such enterprise.

    10. See Levinas, Le temps et l´autre (1947) and Humanisme de l’autre homme (1972). Of course, when Levinas writes about the Other, he does not include dogs. The case has been made quite convincingly that he did not even include people of color. For a recent critique of the limited, racist scope of Levinas’s ethics of the other see Moten. Lispector’s implicit reference to the interpellation of the face of the other as an ethical calling was possibly mediated by the Latin American reception of Levinas, which often read the figure of the other through an anti-colonial lens, as was the case most famously with liberation theology.

    11. In the aforementioned chronicle, “Literature e justiça,” where she discusses the question of engaged literature, Lispector writes something that perfectly parallels the mathematics professor’s late logic, this time talking about herself:

    não estou me envergonhando totalmente de não contribuir para nada humano e social por meio de escrever. … Do que me envergonho, sim, é de não ‘fazer’, de não contribuir com ações. … Disso me envergonharei sempre. E nem sequer pretendo me penitenciar. Não quero, por meios indiretos e escusos, conseguir de mim a minha absolvição. Disso quero continuar envergonhada. (25)

    I am not totally ashamed of not contributing with my writing to something human or social. … What does provoke shame in me is not contributing with actions. … Of that fact I will be forever ashamed. I don’t even intend to punish myself. I don’t want, through indirect ways and excuses, to obtain from myself my absolution. Of that, I’d rather continue to be ashamed.

    The enduring temporality of this shame does not seem to capture the duration of actions or inactions as much as it reveals and is itself an epistemological relation to history: no amount of penitence or excuses can change the past. Such is the temporality of truth from a perspective “more divine,” sub specie aeternitatis.

    12. The trope of gazes averted was present in the 1941 essay as well. Though mostly written in the style of abstraction and deduction, as demanded by the academic nature of the journal where it was published, the article ended with a theatrical finale: a gesture—precise, meaningful—and a blackout:

    Só haverá ‘direito de punir’ quando punir significar o emprego daquela vacina de que fala Carnelucci, contra o gérmen do crime. Até então seria preferível abandonar a discussão filosófica dum ‘fundamento do direito de punir’, e, de cabeça baixa, continuar a ministrar morfina às dores da sociedade. (“Observações” 69)

    There will only be a ‘right to punish’ when the term punishment is used to signify the administration of that vaccine about which Carnelucci spoke, against the germ of crime. Until then it would be preferable to abandon the philosophical discussion of a ‘foundation of the right to punish’ and, with head down, continue to administer morphine to society’s pain.

    The suggestion that this excuse for a justice system should be administered “with the head down” might prescribe the gestuality of shame for a broken system or a choreography of consent to avoid the gaze of the victims of this system.

    13. Later on, in the late sixties, in one of her chronicles in the Jornal do Brasil, Lispector would correct someone who said that she was intelligent. Intelligence was not her “strength,” she humble-bragged as she clarified: she did not value pure intelligence as much as this other faculty that she could provisionally call “intelligent sensitivity” (“sensibilidade inteligente”) of which she had more. Though this notion is undertheorized, this provisional name seems to stand for a holistic perception where sensation, emotion, feeling, and the clarity of thought are intertwined in a way that they cannot be abstracted. This, she claimed, was more useful regarding personal relationships and understanding others. People who balance these two forms of clarity follow the guidance of “an intelligent heart” rather than just the blind abstraction of the mind (A descoberta 215–216). The story about the mathematics professor is a parody of the notion of pure intelligence, abstracted from feeling, whose calculations hyperbolically struggle to understand a law that does not yet exist, for it can only be born from feeling.

    14. “Dozens of poor people came to the place where Mineirinho’s body was found. No one could approach the body, since the police, as determined by the chief officer of the 23rd Precinct Agnaldo Amado, was violently pushing everybody aside. In general, the slum residents were upset about Mineirinho’s death, who they considered a Rio de Janeiro version of Robin Hood” (Diário Carioca, May 1st, 1962. Qtd. in Rosenbaun 170).

    15. Lispector herself asserts in the interview just mentioned (1977) that it was not the fact of his death that shocked her and the public, but the additional gunshots that were not necessary to end his life. The chronicle implies this as well. As for the press, even in an article that claims to be horrified by the assassination, they object that the police abandoned the body to avoid taking responsibility for the murder, not so much the murder itself (“Polícia”).

    16. To this day, police regularly kill young men and women in the favelas in Rio without losing their jobs—almost as if that was precisely their job. According to the Jovem Negro Vivo campaign, Brazil is the country with the highest murder rate in the world. Young people between ages 15 and 29 constitute more than half of the total lives lost to this violence; 77% of these murdered young people are Black. In 2015, 1 out of 5 murders were committed by the police. See “Jovem”. Marielle, presente. Agora e sempre.

    17. For the question of who says “we” in declarations of independence and by virtue of what authority, see Derrida, “Declarations of Independence.” In this essay, Derrida discusses the religious nature of a proclaimed authority to declare, in the first-person plural, the independence of a modern state, as it happened in the US and many other countries founded on colonized land. In this essay by Lispector, that “we” is echoed in the first-person plural that proclaims the universality of the law in ways that too often fail to be universal.

    18. “Essa justiça que vela meu sono, eu a repudio, humilhada por precisar dela. Enquanto isso durmo e falsamente me salvo. Nós, os sonsos essenciais. Para que minha casa funcione, exijo de mim como primeiro dever que eu seja sonsa, que eu não exerça a minha revolta e o meu amor, guardados” (112). (“That justice that watches over my sleep, I repudiate it, humiliated that I need it. Meanwhile I sleep and falsely save myself. We, the essential phonies. For my house to function, I demand of myself as my first duty that I be a phony, that I refrain from enacting my revolt and my love, both locked away.”)

    19. How interesting it is to read these passages in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, when the term “essential workers” names many subjects who might be deemed politically inessential, as is unambiguously the case with the undocumented people working in agriculture, care, and the food industry. When it comes to the “we” of the declaration of independence mentioned in the previous note, these undocumented workers are excluded from this State, even though their ancestors were often in the lands in question before colonization.

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    • Morrison, Toni. Playing in the Dark. Whiteness and the Literary Imagination. Random House, 1993.
    • Moten, Fred. The Universal Machine. Duke UP, 2018.
    • Mouffe, Chantal. “Carl Schmitt and the Paradox of Liberal Democracy.” The Challenge of Carl Schmitt, edited by Chantal Mouffe, Verso, 1999, 38–53.
    • Peixoto, Marta. “‘Fatos são pedras duras‘: Urban Poverty in Clarice Lispector.” Closer to the Wild Heart: Essays on Clarice Lispector, edited by Cláudia Pazos Alonso and Claire Williams, Legenda, 2002.
    • Rosenbaum, Yudith. “A ética na literatura: leitura de ‘Mineirinho’, de Clarice Lispector.” Estudos Avançados, vol. 24, no. 69, 2010, pp. 169–82.
    • Segato, Rita. La guerra contra las mujeres. Traficantes de Sueños, 2016.
    • Villares, Lucia. Examining Whiteness: Reading Clarice Lispector through Bessie Head and Toni Morrison. Modern Humanities Research Association and Routledge, 2011.
    • Weiss, Gail, Ann V. Murphy, and Gayle Salamon, editors. 50 Concepts of Critical Phenomenology. Northwestern UP, 2020.
  • So-Called Indigenous Slavery: West African Historiography and the Limits of Interpretation

    Sara-Maria Sorentino (bio)

    Abstract

    This essay explores the mobilization of so-called “indigenous slavery” in the historiography of slavery in West Africa in order to expose the limits of historiographical interpretation and the tensions between black studies and African studies, which are here constituted around a shared negativity. This discussion provides some context for the debates of historians Walter Rodney and J.D. Fage, while also bringing these concerns into explicit conversation with a line of thought in radical black studies, namely Afro-pessimism. Considering indigenous slavery through the critical analytic of Afro-pessimism exposes the role of the paradigm of racial slavery in determining how slavery comes to be understood in relation to nation building in Africa, with Ghana serving as a particular example.

    Had Rawlings asked, ‘Are we yet free?’ most Ghanaians would have answered with a resounding, ‘No.’ This ‘no’ resonated on both sides of the Atlantic. It was the reminder of what abolition and decolonization had failed to deliver. This ‘no’ was the language we shared, and within it resided a promise of affiliation better than that of brothers and sisters.(Hartman 172)

    In an early essay, W.E.B. Du Bois provides a useful chiasmic formulation for the rebounding effect of slavery: “Instead of man-hunting being an incident of tribal wars, war became the incident of man-hunting” (254). This formulation points to an unresolved difficulty in the historiography of slavery—that of its so-called “indigenous” precursors. Did slavery in Africa exist prior to its transatlantic iteration? If so, what was its character or essence? The answer to the first question has been a resounding yes, if by existence we mean something approximating human ownership. But what that ownership means, and what its implications are for the racialized form that has become slavery’s synonym, is less than clear. Of course, apologist assumptions, extending from the slave traders and theologians of early modernity to the historiographers and ideologues of the present, excavate a prior, nearly naturalized African slavery in order to rationalize (or at least causally explain) slavery’s global expansion. In the 1960s and 70s, Walter Rodney intervened in this circular logic, repurposing and vivifying dependency theory to argue that what had been pathologized as a pervasive domestic slave trade internal to West Africa—slaving figured as an indigenous African mode of being—can be better understood as amplified, if not directly produced in its character, by the methods and metaphysics of trans-Atlantic traffic: the international demand for slaves had long wrecked the coast, moving both inward and radiating out. For Rodney, slavery was “the first stage of the colonial domination of Africa by Europeans” (West Africa 21), and it marked the initiation of a world-system overwhelmingly violent in scope.

    My argument builds from and elaborates a critical black internationalist engagement with the centrality of racial slavery—an intellectual genealogy often lost to the historiography of slavery in Africa, which instead interprets Rodney’s interventions almost singularly in relation to British historian J.D. Fage. Fage is an appropriate enough foil, opposing Rodney by representing racial slavery as the continuation of an indigenous pattern of enslavement, one that, it might be added, did not radically alter the trajectory of African social-political systems. In these cross-hairs are compounded a series of assumptions pertaining to the political-economic function of slavery and the activity of its agents but that, when read with the longer theoretical-political commitments of black internationalism, trouble its general conditions of interpretation.

    In reconsidering how indigenous slavery brings the past to bear on the present, this essay engages an apparent aporia between black studies, African studies, and, in a minor refrain, indigenous studies. From one angle, slavery has been subject to a disappearing trick, hidden in the folds of the colonial, decolonial, neocolonial, and postcolonial. Instead of orchestrating slavery’s reappearance, I am interested in the impact of its absence and the difficulty of its thought—its pre-conditionality. Indigenous slavery, as a problem-field, continuously resurrects a minimal kernel of doubt concerning the form and function of slavery in the political imaginary—a problem exacerbated by the apparent difficulty with discussing slavery in African studies, on the one hand, and the supposedly lopsided over-proliferation of concern with slavery in black studies, on the other. Both perspectives, paradoxically, might be marred by “a global tendency to talk away from slavery and its afterlife in the historic instance” (Sexton, “Affirmation” 101). Indigenous slavery also marks the fault where blackness delinks from indigeneity or becomes affixed to it, as racial slavery represents both a break from pre-colonial African (slaving) cultural practices and the deculturation of diasporic blackness. The opposition between Rodney and Fage—between dependency and agency, between radical breaks and constitutive causes—continues to inform the ocean of disorientation that dictates the diaspora’s origin and the disciplining difference whose currents still constitute it.

    To elaborate this problematic, wherein slavery (and the political culture it supports and sustains) is rendered either ahistoric or so fundamentally new that any connection to a world before it dissolves, my reading of “indigenous slavery” is informed by Afro-pessimism, insofar as its critical analytic is interested in shoring up, from within the wake, as it were, how racial slavery produces radically new concepts of political-ontological organization: the antagonism between the human and the slave. Despite the heterodoxy of Afro-pessimist itineraries, the intervention of political ontology draws them together; slavery’s collision with race forms the passageway to the modern world and does so by generating this world’s ordering principles—its metaphysical orientation to space, time, and subjectivity. While indigenous slavery might offer itself as the prehistory of the human-slave antagonism, the (ever-receding) material that precipitated slavery as we now desire to know it, is also, I argue, a test case for the difficulty of returning to a past, mapping a geography, or unifying around a culture, especially when available methods of analysis and modes of approach are imbricated in (if not coterminous with) the trans-Atlantic trade. What P. Khalil Saucier writes of ethnography doubles for historiography: “The grammar of violence that goes unspoken in the description of ‘how’ race and racism works by ethnographers betrays its aim: to not expose the nature of race and racism, because its existence is testimony to that fact” (52–53). Afro-pessimism might be another name for the risk of exposure.

    This essay represents an overture toward such exposure, staging an encounter that considers the historiography of West African slavery, in its elisions and obsessions, as a genre that invests in anti-blackness and makes durable a dissemination of slavery’s ontological traffic. If racial slavery writes itself by wresting away the possibility of native status, indigenous slavery tethers Africanity and blackness to an immemorial form of violence in order to explain its impossible cause. The role of indigenous slavery in this reversal is catalytic; it reinscribes slaving both as originary and as the historical-logical precursor to the violence of colonialism and capitalism. As a catalyst, indigenous slavery works to organize time (the contextual and ahistoric), space (diaspora and dispersal), subjectivity (agency and collusion), and (international) memory. In refracting diaspora, abolition, and reparations through a political ontological intervention, I make a case for how 1) the debates over the relative significance of indigenous slavery (a repression of a wider web of black internationalism) have presaged the form of current conversations in black studies; 2) Afro-pessimism’s conceptual resources have been articulated, in part, in the distorted influence of these debates; and 3) Afro-pessimism, far from avoiding the scene of African historiography, provides a response syncretic to political and cultural negotiations of method and meaning-making. These moves are made with close attention to the historiography of slavery in West Africa, and in Ghana more centrally, where indirect rule superseded the logic of the settler colony.

    Ahistoric Time

    Like the Marxist distinction between formal and real subsumption, racial slavery’s revalorization of the world accesses local avenues of discrete meaning-making (culture, ethnicity, servitude, power) and cannibalizes them in service of an emergent system of being. The pages of historiography are dotted with the remnants of slavery’s transformation. Akosua Perbi, for instance, asserts that “The European presence on the coast definitely influenced the indigenous institution of slavery” (26), citing the proliferation of war and the sale of people as well as “greater brutality and harshness” (66), and Babacar M’Baye exposes the emergence of a “unique and rigid concept of bondage” not dependent on religious conversion (608). Such sea changes are immanent to historical descriptions of slavery in Africa, but these transformations are rarely themselves thematized. Instead, the frame of time-space is given as the ground upon which indigenous (or African) slave-systems can be compared and contextualized relative to racial (or trans-Atlantic) slavery.

    From this orientation, historiography charges the analytic of racial slavery with conceptual bleeding, making impossible a clear-eyed investigation of other times and spaces. Igor Kopytoff and Suzanne Miers open their influential volume Slavery in Africa with the claim that “Any discussion of African ‘slavery’ in English is necessarily bedeviled by the fact that the word conjures up definite images in the Western mind. Anglo-Americans visualize slavery as they believed it was practised on the plantations of the Southern U.S. and the British Caribbean” (3). This conflation is especially accented, argues Frederick Cooper, in the tradition of Africanists who “regard the social norms governing slaves’ roles as cultural givens rather than as part of historical processes” (111). If the slave role is falsely given, even abstracted into an “epiphenomenon—a universal tragedy oblivious, with the exception of its volume, to historical specificity” (Bennett 47), the labor of historical reconstruction should be akin to a procedure of re-phenomenalization: to access phenomena as part of ongoing historical processes, find the particular buried in the universal, and reintegrate these granular details in their proper contexts, such that slavery as universal form would find itself elaborated by different times and spaces. Historiography, however, does not have internal tools to address how the universal slave figure remains stubbornly fixed to Africa; instead, it conceptualizes indigenous slave practices as transplanted, modified, and perfected in Africa and only later manipulated by proto-capitalists in the Mediterranean and the Americas (insofar as the invention of race is supposed to extend the already existing practice). Indigenous slavery becomes the developmental and anagogical synecdoche of slavery writ large and not, as Kopytoff and Miers worry, the other way around.

    Both Rodney and Fage share the concern that the generic “slave” misleads. For Fage, indigenous slavery is bedeviled by “the indiscriminate use of the single word ‘slave’ to cover a number of social and economic conditions” (History 92). Rodney writes that early Africanist Captain R. S. Rattray himself “ended by referring to the ‘so-called “slaves,’” noting that “though perhaps the label ‘domestic slave’ is meant to express this idea, it carries with it the same associations with the Americas which the pro-slavery interests were at pains to evoke” (“African Slavery” 440). Indigenous slavery is always recovering from the charge of its “so-called” character—its actual life presumably obscured by the faulty transmission of oral histories and its retrieval limited to linguistic traces and the lingering possibility that contemporary forms of slavery are its remnant.1

    Rattray records ɔdɔnkɔ, the Akan term for “bought person,” as one of five operative categorizations of “slave” (the others being akoa “servant,” awowa “pawn,” domum “war captive,” and akyere “sacrificial person”). “Slave,” in this minor tradition in historiography, was not generalized, and chattel slavery indicated only one of a range of conditions. Although akoa “is now often somewhat loosely applied by interpreters to mean ‘slave’ in the degrading European sense,” Rattray writes, akoa “to the African mind meant originally nothing worse than that condition of voluntary and essential servitude in which every man and woman stood in relation to some other person or group” (34). In such a spectrum of dependency, the akoa had rights not unlike “the ordinary privileges of any Ashanti free man, with whom … his position did not seem to compare so unfavourably” (42). While this position, more proximate to limited servitude, has been used to excuse an originary African slavery, it also does rhetorical work to specify what, precisely, the upheaval of racial slavery represented, including inducing the conceptual generalization of slavery.

    Perbi draws from Rattray’s colonial-era reading to disarticulate further how chattel slavery was not essential to those long-standing Ghanain practices in which “the slave was regarded as a human being and was entitled to certain rights and privileges” (4). These rights and privileges included the right to food, clothing, and shelter; protection from discipline and execution; and integration into new societies through marriage, adoption, and naming (112–18). Contrary to colonial-inflected doxa that continues to conflate social status with political positionality, an available reading of West African historiography expresses much more flexibility between ascribed and acquired status. Indeed, in places like south-west Ghana, slaves’ ascension to political office means that “partially unfree origins are often a preferential condition in the politics of succession” (Valsecchi 42). These alternatives open a different narrative: indigenous slavery included practices of deculturation and depoliticization but became, through strategies of incorporation, a structure of re-indigenization and affirmation of degrees of political capacity.2 Racial slavery, meanwhile, indexed the total revocation of access to indigenous or political claims. How and why, then, has the generic slave been used to link practices that may be better thought as disparate?

    If indigenous slavery reveals the political crisis of its category, we can understand the “false” abstractions of the slave to be the project of the present. One of Rodney’s enduring lessons is that the exposure of “writing of the type which justifies the trade in slaves … as racist bourgeois propaganda” is not merely a task for history “but of present-day liberation struggle in Africa” (How Europe 103). Fage does recognize that the position that “both slavery and trading in slaves were already deeply rooted in West African society, was of course a view propagated by the European slave-traders, especially perhaps when the morality of their business was being questioned” and he even nods to ways spectacularizing deep-rooted slavery formed “a principal moral justification for European colonization” (“Slavery” 393). Despite these concessions, Fage insists that foreign trade “across the Sahara or over the seas” should be considered “no more than a stimulus to essentially indigenous processes” (“Slaves” 289). As such, the difficult question of “how much the categories used by the European observers correspond to an African reality, and how much they owe to preconceptions derived from a common European inheritance,” does not raise to the level of challenging the fantasy of indigeneity’s links to slaveness (295). When Fage is framed as the counterpoint to Rodney, the apparent onus confronting Fage and reverberating across historiographical perspectives becomes merely that of modulating cause and effect. Absent is consideration into how the ahistorical abstraction of “slave” relayed by racial slavery makes insight into past modes of slavery tenuous at best and might itself be inextricable from the production of racial slavery.

    Articulating this historiographical dilemma, Achille Mbembe argues that “the slave trade had ramifications that remain unknown to us” (On the Postcolony 13). Following Mbembe, we can discern how slavery produces the conditions of its unknowing and its reproduction. The indigeneity of slavery cultivates freedom as a geographical and racial flight from the determinations of Africa, such that “the slave trade and colonialism echoed one another with the lingering doubt of the very possibility of self-government” (13). When, for example, Ethiopia and Liberia were singled out in a 1925 memorandum from the International Labor Organization as the sole continued purveyors of slavery, the assertion was that “where European powers exercise control of the administration of the territory, the slave trade and large scale raids have diminished and have become practically impossible” (qtd. in Getachew 59). With slavery made indigenous to Africa, “black sovereignty” becomes a threat to freedom and continued domination is ideologically justified. In other words, “the charge of slavery became the idiom through which black self-government would be undermined” (Getachew 59). Blackness doesn’t just represent vulnerability to slaveness; it collides with slaveness insofar as Africa is posed as originally self-enslaving. Africa’s consignment to a negative capacity for self-determination indicates how critiques of colonialism continue to carry with them slavery’s material-symbolic mode of organization. Racial slavery realizes itself in the way it organizes the past, carrying slavery’s indigenous provenance with it to explain away its continued presence. Thinking through how indigeneity has been compressed into service of the generic slave and its attendant modes of domination (and indeed written out of Africanity altogether) opens at minimum the possibility for imagining indigeneity and freedom otherwise.

    The problematic of political subjectivity, of who has access to freedom and how this access shapes not only perceptions of space and time but the materialization of space and time, indents the legacy of the Rodney-Fage debate and radiates outward in a series of methodological imperatives for the historiography of slavery. The best historians recognize that categories are both constructed and relational. Paul Lovejoy, for instance, argues that indigenous slavery is “an analytical convenience that should not be construed as an indication that African slavery developed in isolation” (“Indigenous African Slavery” 25). Although sympathetic to Rodney, Lovejoy understands him to share with Fage the conceit that both indigenous and racial slavery are “static” (26). Wrapping this criticism of stasis into one of “ahistorical” representations, Lovejoy charges that “the gap that is created in this way is in fact wider than the ocean that separated the slave institutions in their American and African settings” (27). A similar criticism has been levelled against Afro-pessimism as a “totalizing interpretation of black experience,” “bound to this historically specific context, all the while disavowing that specificity” (Kauanui 262). This critical conceit—that ahistoricism is a problem of bad intellectual practice—fails to address the materiality of the ahistoric. Despite attempts to historicize the relationship between indigenous and racial slavery, “the dialectical relationship of masters and slaves, ruling classes and kinship groups, remains ‘frozen in time’” (Cooper 10). How can we account for the seeming inevitability of this freezing?

    I am not here talking of the standard story in which African historiography becomes mired in limitations of recognizable archival sources, most of which originate after the abolition of slavery. Interpretations of slavery routinely quibble over how to access and evaluate the past, but because these positions presuppose the past as metaphysical resource, even if barred or lost, they also implicitly introduce the problem that the past is not past at all, which is to say it continues into the present, as well as the more arresting insight that the past is all there is. If it is the case that enslavement in Africa is eternal, no account of history could be possible. With this auto-enslavement, African history, as such, is stalled, hypostasized. Its only value would be the use we make of it in our continued fascination with its failings. Let us not forget that this methodological problem corresponds to the racist Hegelian conceit that shapes Africa’s lack of historical movement.3 But while both traditional African historiography and Afro-pessimist theorizations have been accused of ahistoricism, this charge misses the injection of an element of ahistoricism by racial slavery into the wheels of history. Mudimbe argues that “the episteme of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries … invented the concept of a static and prehistoric tradition” (189). This episteme was preconditioned with ontological significance and sustained by political practice, effecting how Africa is thought and, partially, how its systems come to be organized and its ontologies sorted. With its violent dramas of scale and abstraction, racial slavery seems to put indigenous slavery into relief. It creates the frozen master-slave structure that Afro-pessimism calls the human-slave antagonism. This antagonism, when identified and unleashed into workings of intellectual-political practice, rearticulates the historiography of slavery—and its assumptions of time, scale, and being—into a problem that actively participates in what it seeks to undo.4 Afro-pessimism, I argue, maintains this problem as its horizon.

    The historiography of slavery’s larger frame can account for transformations in “the process of enslavement, the mechanism of slave distribution, and the role of slaves in the social formation” (Lovejoy, Transformations 281), but it cannot account for changes in methods and metaphysics and it cannot identify how racial slavery radicalizes the frame. What we will see critiqued in Afro-pessimism as “ontological absolutism” (Kauanui 263) could instead be conceived as a method of inquiry that has the advantage of recognizing the force of historical universals: the myth of slavery qua universality is one of slavery’s products. Slavery traffics in this myth; its capacity to circulate depends on it, draws its strength from it. Contending with Rodney’s assertion that “slavery as a mode of production was not present in any African society” requires an inversion of priorities: “One of the paradoxes in studying this early period of African history is that it cannot be fully comprehended without first deepening our knowledge of the world at large, and yet the true picture of the complexities of the development of man and society can only be drawn after intensive study of the long-neglected African continent” (How Europe 69). The next section tarries here—between “the world at large” and “the long-neglected continent.”

    Dispersed Space

    Afro-pessimism echoes Rodney’s emancipatory geography of blackness—”black struggle must be universalized wherever black people happen to be” (Rodney, “Black Scholar Interviews” 39)—insofar as it emancipates black struggle from geographical constraint without erasing geographical meaning and measure. From this perspective, black struggle engages blackness through negative space, not to be filled fully with cultural substance or transnational translations, but instead exposing the violent site where tradition breaks and culture is made to meld to being. As Frantz Fanon writes: “Wherever he goes, the Negro remains a Negro” (173). It is in the shadow of this Fanonian formulation that Frank B. Wilderson III argues, “The Black’s moment of recognition by the Other is always already ‘Blackness,’ upon which supplements are lavished—American, Caribbean, Xhosa, Zulu, etc. But the supplements are superfluous rather than substantive, they don’t unblacken” (“Biko” 98). Although the connection between Fanon and Wilderson has been well established,5 the lines that connect broader currents of black internationalism to this ostensibly newer articulation of black studies remain curiously untraced. We can consider, as a prelude to such a project, the overlap between Wilderson’s contention that “Africa has always been a big slave estate. That has been and still is the global consensus” (“‘Inside-Outside’” 9) and George Padmore’s claim that “In Africa, in America, in the West Indies, in South and Central America—to be Black is to be a slave. Despised, humiliated, denied justice and human rights in every walk of life” (qtd. in Edwards 279).6 What V.Y. Mudimbe has famously addressed as the “invention of Africa” is here illuminated as the abstraction of slaveness-as-blackness, indexing a meta-philosophical overlap of concerns long threading West African political consciousness with global freight.

    Though this essay may be a plea to the contrary, it is true that Afro-pessimism has not been taken up directly by the historiography of slavery or by scholars in West Africa (though it has made waves in South Africa and Zimbabwe). Afro-pessimism does, however, share a namesake with a tendency much derided by African social and political theory. This other Afropessimism is an umbrella used to designate non-reflective, defeatist theoretical temperaments and policies that recycle eternal Africa images into the deadlock of a “culture of poverty.”7 These are discourses that, as we will see, a burgeoning Ghanaian national memory sought to avoid, discourses into which indigenous slavery sneaks as a signal flare for African pathology. Doomed by inheritance, “condemned in social theory only as the sign of a lack” (Mbembe, On the Postcolony 8), Africa becomes a place-name barred from self-determination. Insofar as developmentalism thrives on positivism, this nominal gathering of propositions reproduces the problem it identifies: as an “invented ideology” (Momoh 34), its circular reasoning condemns Africa to the pure production of its own lack. Non-regressive movement would come only from those that recognize this circuit as an untenable ideological deadlock. The negative identification and appraisal of Afro-pessimist sensibilities is meant, by contrast, to jumpstart a decided movement beyond the aporetic African recidivism that would revert to centralizing slavery-as-cause.

    For Greg Thomas, contemporary Afro-pessimism is but “Afro-pessimism (2.0).” With the rebuttal that “Africa and Africans bear no naturally condemned status in this world” (284), this 2.0 is derided for its continued naturalization of African negativity. Both iterations of Afropessimism—the one named by its critics as a foreclosure at the register of policy and the other critically claimed as a political-philosophical opening—are, purportedly, invested in the same inertia. The emancipatory alternative to pessimistic reprieves would be to uncover (or simply stylize) positive performances with enough power to combat parasitic dark continent tropes. Other than mirrored names, however, the two Afro-pessimisms share no common body of literature and would be considered autonomous by most standards of disciplinary and discursive lineage. The contingency of their common denomination doesn’t mean they are wholly unrelated: both are compelled to return to lack and both ultimately have their roots in the ways Africa and enslavement are jointly apprehended, including the apprehension of an originary enslaving African culture. But unlike the policy-oriented caricatures of Africa, the Afropessimism of this focus has little interest in developmental futurity. It registers a different order of concern, which is 1) genealogical—how and why blackness became connected with lack; 2) methodological—how to approach the history of negativity; and 3) ethical-political—is negativity something to abhor or does it have its own resources? To these questions comes the speculative innovation of political ontology, in order to interrogate how blackness appears to have emerged, calcified, as negative capacity. In its most abstract terms, Wilderson writes, “slaveness is something that has consumed Blackness and Africanness, making it impossible to divide slavery from Blackness” (“‘We’re Trying to Destroy the World’”). Attentive to a consumptive global anti-blackness, Afro-pessimism the critical analytic shares more with the spirit that has problematized the obsession with African incapacity, insofar as it is interested in articulating the conditions of possibility for Africa’s invention. Instead of avoiding the negative, however, Afro-pessimism asks what is gained by employing it, excavating its history, sharpening its explosive and world-ending edge.

    Critics turn from this opening to craft Afro-pessimism as a culprit in a double sense, arguing that it not only traffics like its nominal twin in a negative Africa but also absents Africa, in citation and substance, from the conversation altogether. Its US-centered interest, detractors note, spuriously compels it to extrapolate “the particularity of the experiences of African peoples in North America to make a universal argument” (Kauanui 262).8 If it is true that certain Afropessimist reading lists do not substantively include African scholarship, as Thomas claims, this does not mean that its wider referential web isn’t concerned with African or Atlantic history. It also does not follow that “there is little if any Africa to this discourse at all, its nominal Afrohyphenation notwithstanding” (Thomas 284).9 Beyond resonance with Padmore or Rodney, we might gesture to how Wilderson’s writing is informed by his political practice in South Africa and how Afro-pessimism’s political horizon is invested in shaping alternatives to redemptive strains of Marxism and post-colonial theory embedded in African studies’ readings of decolonial movements (including Rodney’s insistence that African slaves were captured “for economic reasons, so that their labor power could be exploited” [How Europe 88]).

    Attentive to the attachments of decolonial struggle, Wilderson speculates that if “a political movement must be built and sustained on behalf of someone who has lost something,” then “necessity may have required Black Consciousness to monumentalize the ego of a dead relation” (“Biko” 106). This ego might be a political figurehead, a nation-state, or a pan-African sensibility that represses slavery’s memory, as its recovery tends to reduce Africans to passive victims or complicit agents. Because political movements are predicated on the restoration of loss, they sustain themselves through practices of filiation that engage “Garveyism, Negritude, Pan-Africanism, African Personality, African Socialism, African Humanism, Black Consciousness Movement, and African Renaissance … as imaginations of freedom and recapturing of lost ontologies” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 119). Africanist literary scholar Abiola Irele clarifies the imaginative stakes of Negritude, as it “arose out of a complex of mental images which fulfilled a felt need, and was developed into a systematic and self-sustaining ideology which is, in the last resort, an intellectual projection of this need” (The Negritude Moment 75). This “founding myth” (113) advances a past for the future; it is also at the precipice of such monumentalizing, the political exigencies of which Wilderson recognized, that a conversation toward other inventions might proceed. It might require returning, for example, to the intricate intellectual and nationalist projects Adom Getachew describes as “anticolonial worldmaking,” whose visions “drew on an anticolonial critique that began from the foundational role of New World slavery in the making of the modern world and traced the ways its legacies were constitutive of racial hierarchy in the international order” (5). Such visions remain prophetic because of the ways they exceed the scene of historiography and can rescript its restrictions on indigeneity and freedom.

    These obscured conversations are why, for gamEdze and gamedZe, although the Black radical tradition “has largely been formulated and theorized in and from America, and even as it often falls prey to American exceptionalisms in its quest for forms of Black Universalism,” it nonetheless “holds radical potential for us on the continent” (218). Wilderson might agree: awareness of the limitations of black studies does not preclude it from being “a discipline that seeks to offer the best historical and theoretical framework for questions confronting the Black diaspora. Even though it started in the United States, I consider this to be for all continents” (“‘Inside-Outside’” 4).10 Despite aligning on the potential for radical exchange across oceans, a gulf appears at the (ontological or cultural) register through which such offerings are made—for gamEdze and gamedZe, Afro-pessimism departs, dangerously, from the black radical tradition’s capacious emphasis on “African cultural practices” and the ways African indigeneity has formed “the basis of Black revolt across time and space” (218). Whether gamEdze and gamedZe recognize these cultural practices as political hypostatizations, as concerted myth-making, is not entirely clear. Afro-pessimist theorizations do not wholly object to the work of myth,11 but they wouldn’t suppose African cultural practices to be legible on their own without a shift in the economy of worldmaking of such force that Afro-pessimism designates it as world-ending. Towards this revolutionizing orientation, Afro-pessimism supports an inquiry into negativity, or an engagement with nothingness, to be part of the political potential of the subterranean workings of culture and an alternative articulation of indigeneity.12 Indeed, Afro-pessimism’s rejoinder to strategies that centralize myth-making, but not the conditions of possibility for such myths, should be considered immanent to conversations that spin their wheels in uncovering or refuting the apparent objectivity of a slave-owning African past in ways that don’t entirely foreclose the resignification of the past for positive political purposes.

    Other critical suspicions emanate from the fear of cultural loss: “The manner in which Africanness disappears into Blackness … distorts the conceptual space between the Negro and the African” (Olaloku-Teriba 111). Afro-pessimist analyses, however, represent an invitation to reckon with blackness as the form of this distortion. If writing of diaspora tends to centralize experience, culture, performance, and tradition, it also seems to obscure the workings of race, as when Jemima Pierre writes that “discussions of the ‘Black Experience’ often did not include contemporary Black African experience, even as it is clear that continental Africans have always been and continue to be racialized as ‘Black’ in a global racial order that denigrates Blackness and exploits and dehumanizes Black people” (xiii-xiv). In splitting the difference between modes of “Black Experience” and a global racial order, between performance and the paradigm, this formulation toggles the indecipherability of blackness; the opacity is constitutive of blackness under slavery’s sign. This is why, for Afro-pessimism, blackness seems infinitely fungible, and also why black resistance takes place in fugitive spaces, misrecognized and underground.

    As “abstraction and as anti-abstraction” (Edwards 12), diaspora can be thought to mark the reorganization of a negative space dictated by a global anti-blackness, the enigmatic before and after shared between Wilderson’s “Africa has always been a big slave estate” and Padmore’s “to be Black is to be a slave.” Instead of excavating an African conscience to refute a Western one, posing difference against difference or tradition against modernity, Afro-pessimism engages diaspora through the anxiety around (and inventive potential of) nothingness that is slavery’s precipitate. The concept of the African diaspora might, that is, find itself registered through what Wilderson calls “dispersal,” or the idea that the diaspora “does not rest upon some plenitude in the past” (Wilderson, “Inside-Outside”).13 The question of diasporic meaning, which may or may not be synonymous with diasporic belonging, takes place in the gap between experience and paradigm, but the way the gap is presented globally is through the elaboration of the paradigm itself.

    While the problem of paradigm is only alluded to by historiographical modes of meaning-making that themselves owe coherency to an anti-black order of things, it is often recognized by African scholars. Take Irele: “The colonial experience was not an interlude in our history, a storm that broke upon us, causing damage here and there but leaving us the possibility, after its passing, to pick up the pieces. It marked a sea-change of the historical process in Africa; it effected a qualitative re-ordering of life. It has rendered the traditional way of life no longer a viable option for our continued existence and apprehension of the world” (“In Praise” 207). Irele describes the colonial experience as a paradigm shift for both life and historical processes. The presumptive break between an exceptionalizing black studies and depoliticizing African studies can be examined through the generalized loss of what Irele defines as a “traditional way of life.” If the antinomy identified by Pierre is efficacious, that “where African diaspora studies generally concerns itself with articulations of race and Blackness but not directly with Africa, so African studies generally concerns itself with Africa but not directly with race and Blackness” (xvi), the horizon for a political solution would not be to press too soon for a better synthesis apart from the “no” encountered in the epigraph: the negative response that resounded, “on both sides of the Atlantic,” to the question, “are we free yet?”

    Colluding Freedom

    The most politically weighted expression of spatial-temporal attempts to secure slavery’s status is that of African collusion—the fantastical medium of exchange between innocent non-slaveholding Africans, on the one hand, and warring rapacious slaveholders, on the other. This image of collusion gives rise to questions of the littoral and inland, class and statehood, guilt and innocence, feudalism and capitalism, continuing to call into crisis what slavery actually is. The crisis is provisionally contained by the deflection of responsibility: that Africans have, in certain iterations of public memory, been constructed as willing accomplices seems to interfere with the relative power imputed to European enslavers, the relevance of an African diaspora, the demand for reparations, and the political pertinence of studying slavery at all. The historiographical trend towards contextualization and disaggregation, in its recent revalorization of resistance, has attempted to make African participants actors like any other.

    In a first-order leveling, European merchants, African chiefs, and middlemen are complicit in equal, complicated measure. Their ontologies are made commensurable. A characteristically sweeping statement would have it that “when guilt is apportioned, African chiefs and merchants deserve a large share” (Alpern 57). This share can be numerically measured, as when Philip Curtin disaggregates force to reveal wide-scale African participation: “Europeans bought, but Africans sold; and the number of Africans engaged in the slave trade at any moment was certainly larger than the number of Europeans” (“The Atlantic Slave Trade” 266). But guilt has also been appraised by the origin, quality, and scale of participation—how participants became involved, what they do with that participation, ways they benefit. Here, West African elites take center stage, harnessing power by selling out their supposed own and developing systems of exploitation Walter Hawthorne gathers under the heading of the “predatory state thesis” (9). The elite exploited commoners, the coast raided interiors, and Africa came to cannibalize itself.14

    Certainly, those who traffic in the language of guilt wield the past against the present, in order to amplify or quell the fallout from the mass displacement of peoples and resources. White people have a long history, in Rodney’s indictment, of attempting to “ease their guilty consciences” and throw “the major responsibility for the slave trade on to the Africans” (How Europe 81). The willing participant narrative also informs what Sylviane A. Diouf calls the “black betrayal model” (xiv), posed as a traumatic core for the diaspora. In a widely quoted passage, Henry Louis Gates Jr. narrates learning of African participation at the slave fortresses in Elmina, a narrative that continues to dominate tours today, and propounds on the difficulty of having “to confront the curious ease with which black Africans could sell Africans to the white man” (qtd. in Kaba 8).

    Slave historiography and Afro-pessimist criticism align in critiquing assumptions of filiation underlying the betrayal model. We can see this, for instance, in the correspondence between Lovejoy’s 1983 corrective that “it is inaccurate to think that Africans enslaved their brothers—although this sometimes happened. Rather, Africans enslaved their enemies” (Transformations 21) and Saidiya Hartman’s assertion that “contrary to popular belief, Africans did not sell their brothers and sisters into slavery. They sold strangers: those outside the web of kin and clan relationships, nonmembers of the polity, foreigners and barbarians at the outskirts of their country, and lawbreakers expelled from society” (5). Hartman continues, in a decidedly theoretical advance, to interrogate the problem of race-making: “In order to betray your race, you had first to imagine yourself as one. The language of race developed in the modern period and in the context of the slave trade.” Diouf likewise appears to indict calls of collusion as expressions of “anachronism”: “ethnic, political, and religious differences” were indeed leveraged in the past, but “nowhere in the Africans’ testimonies is there any indication that they felt betrayed by people ‘the color of their own skin’” (xiv).15 As Diouf writes, if it is the case that “concepts of Africa, Africans, blackness, whiteness, and race did not exist in Africa … they cannot be utilized today to assess people’s actions at a time when they were not operative” (xiv). What the historiographical terms of debate miss, however, is how the imaginary zoning of a time before race is nonetheless infiltrated by race in the very movement of apprehension—there is now little conceptual escape. Which is also to say anachronism can only be anachronistic absent a vanishing mediator. If anachronism is, instead, symptomatic of this vanishing mediator—the imperceptible shift from formal to real subsumption that appears after-the-fact, in the form of belatedness—then the collision of Africanness-blackness-slaveness informs interpretations of the past even in attempts to divest from them. Without a reckoning of this order, the conceit of indigenous blackness, excavated by ethnophilosophy in mythic pasts, too easily mystifies the ground of its own articulation.

    Historiography mediates Africanness-blackness-slaveness through tricks of subjectivity: by diffusing the insider-outsider status in order to amplify agency and expand the sphere of African action beyond a reduction to either “trading partners on the one hand and cargo on the other” (Diouf x). While Rodney identifies as structural critique the idea that “any European trader could arrive on the coast of West Africa and exploit the political differences which he found there … It was so easy to set one off against another that Europeans called it a ‘slave trader’s paradise’” (How Europe 79), the ever-widening scope of historiographical intervention metabolizes Rodney’s structural critique into a problem of passive individual subjects. These historiographic conversions have occasioned recalibrations of agency, as focus shifts from the black betrayer to practices of resistance as survival.

    If “agency” in the context of racial slavery “is itself a response to a totalizing and unequal system” (Green xxvii), what does agency mean? What happens to power? Herman Bennett asks in African Kings and Black Slaves, “does the gesture of granting agency not risk giving legitimacy to the very political-conceptual practice that exercised its existence among Africans in the first place?” (25). As African historiography proceeds by incorporating and reclaiming agency, debates over how much agency should be conferred end up stabilizing a subjectivity outside of space and time, inducing a post-racialism at the very emergence of racial thinking. These incorporative calls to agency imply a metaphysics of capacity that underwrites the historiographical state of the field and the political ramifications of its questions (extending to the belief that Africa can be developed, if only the right insight or initiative were deployed). This range of assumptions, as an outgrowth of the terms of slavery itself, works to contextualize the individual but comes at the expense of contextualizing the structure. On the one hand, Rodney’s structuralism seems to absolve everyone, including slave traders and catchers. The view that slavery “was simply ordered and imposed from outside, with the African part in it a purely negative and involuntary one … mirrors a familiar notion of African incapacity” (Davidson 201). On the other hand, historiographers in the tradition of Fage, who assert that African states had vested interests in war and enslavement, “could be accused of trying to shift the burden of guilt for the horrors of the trade from European to African heads” (Curtin, Economic Change 153–54). Celebrations of agency effect a reversal, where the proto-colonial perspective passes, almost imperceptibly, into an avowedly emancipatory one. This is contextualization run amok, the point at which it becomes indecipherable from decontextualization.

    The historiography of African slavery does attend to the ways the trade impacted West African systems—how what we think of as tradition and culture bear the weight of slavery. Of particular interest have been transformations to ritual practices: take the evolution of shrines like the Nananom Mpow from local sites to regional significance (Shumway 134–44); the expansion of asafo militia companies, which protected the Fante’s emergent decentralized coalition from the terror of slave raiding (144–52); and the shifting focus to gods who “crystallize historical processes associated with the Atlantic slave trade” (Shaw 51), from the war god Nyigbla in Anlo-Ewe cosmology (Greene 16–7) to the Talensi god Tongnaab (Allman and Parker 23–71). It is now doxa that African traditions are inventive—paradoxically “not entirely ‘traditional’ in the sense that indigeneity or ‘native’ usually implies”—but it is less well established that these traditions reflect the experience of having been “for nearly fifteen generations … consumers of a foreign culture destructive of pre-existing practices and patterns of thought” (Woods 50), and that these traditions are themselves poetic and political negotiations with destruction.

    This is what Afro-pessimism approaches—not a flashy new theory, but a breaking away from some of the fetters (positivism, Marxism, history, tradition) that have made agency and resistance, victimhood and culpability the restricted markers of slavery’s impact in the world. Afro-pessimist itineraries augment dependency theory, asking whether diffusion of participation removes West African culpability, putting responsibility into the hands of a select few, or whether diffusion in fact identifies a more intensive form of capture. Even along the coast, a Dutch director-general observed in 1714 that “the kidnapping of people is becoming so common that no Negro whether free or slave dares pass without assistance from one place to another” (qtd. in Shumway 60). In this sense, Afro-pessimism draws from Rodney’s political edge and the occasional lessons of historiography, lessons that expand how “all blacks—rulers, traders, and war captives alike—became victims or potential victims” (Kaba 8). Given the extension of captivity across geography and rank, what needs to be raised as a possibility for thematic attention is the way “captivity and social death” might be “essential dynamics which everyone in this place called Africa stands in relation to” (Wilderson, “‘Inside-Outside’” 8–9). Historical models can chart transformations and continued debates can encircle them, but the paradigm that would seek answers only in actions might hide as much as it reveals. If Africa as a place-name has been made to designate a zone of incoherence through which the puzzle of human desire compels itself to find violent answers, then the enduring legacy of slavery can never be decoded through the performance of agency alone (whether participation, refusal, or resistance) and instead needs to be approached through the apparatus by which performance is articulated and appraised. Such a task necessitates, it might be added, that reparations include a global reclamation of meaning.

    Missing Memories

    It is here that the problem of a Ghanaian memory of slavery can be delimited. As a postcolonial collective that marks one (conversely Pan-African, democratic, liberationist, and neoliberal) variant of Africanity, Ghanaian identity has been rendered discrete from the problem of slavery through a foreclosure that designates “slavery and race” as “issues of concern only for diaspora Blacks” (Pierre 3). While Mbembe contends (with some ambivalence) that “there is, properly speaking, no African memory of slavery” (“African Modes” 259), and Hartman writes that “slaves have no place in the myth of empires. There were no drum histories of the captives” (190),16 scholars with an anthropological bent like Rosalind Shaw insist that “there are other ways of remembering the past than by speaking about it” (2). Joachim Agamba calls this other form of knowledge “embedded memory”: his research in Ghana’s Northern region has found echoes of slavery in musical forms, with flute and drum rhythms marking rallying cries warning of incoming raiders. Recent critical ethnography by Emmanuel Saboro continues to excavate resistance to enslavement far before the slave ships ever left shore, recorded in oral histories and on occasions such as the Fiok festival among the Bulsa in Northern Ghana. Similar findings have been documented in Nigerian songs and proverbs.17 What accounts for this tension between unaddressed memory and its saturation (only recently accessed in scholarship) in mythos and culture?

    In one strand of analysis, slavery’s memory is concealed by the demands of a postcolonial present. Nation-building, on the eve of Ghanaian Independence, was caught between the need to retrieve a past positive identity, a “native” or indigenous history of emancipation, and the need to prioritize a certain forward-facing finesse, a finesse that would avoid making Ghanaians passive victims or active agents with respect to slavery. Both positions might, in their own compounding ways, preclude direct paths to either refute European superiority or foster Ghanaian identity. As Ella Keren argues, “It was not just difficult to reconcile slavery and the slave trade with the search for a usable past, which would offer the new nation historical roots, continuity, and unity, but perceived as dangerous insofar as they could be used to support colonial images from which Africans wished to distance themselves” (980). This danger emanates from the racist fascination that links Africa to violence, which is maintained by more overt colonial-era invocations of the “native,” but encrypted by slavery’s supposedly indigenous provenance. The pressure of the postcolonial present, in other words, a collective Ghanaian conversation “shaped by forms of surveillance under colonialism as well as present-day development discourses with its Africa-as-failure mantra and the endless instantiations of Western ideologies of antiblack racism” (Holsey, Routes 8–9), mediates the distinct ways that slavery continues to be repressed and recovered. Cosmopolitan African identities express the eclipse of slavery in Africa by cathecting a triumphant past of indigeneity with the future of independence, but also by potentially ceding to the animating conditions propelling an anti-black present.

    Kwame Nkrumah’s intellectual production engages important precipitates of this national cathexis, navigating a reinvigorated past and revolutionary present through gestures toward self-fashioning. Arguing that African pre-history cannot provide transparent access to a socialist utopia, that “what socialist thought in Africa must recapture is not the structure of the ‘traditional African society’ but its spirit,” Nkrumah unearths the tension that is repeated later in West African historiography, writing both that “slavery existed in Africa before European colonisation, although the earlier European contact gave slavery in Africa some of its most vicious characteristics” and that “before colonisation, which became widespread in Africa only in the nineteenth century, Africans were prepared to sell, often for no more than thirty pieces of silver, fellow tribesmen and even members of the same ‘extended family’ and clan” (“African Socialism Revisited”). Faced with the specter of enduring slavery, with an African preparedness to sell that enabled slavery’s “most vicious” iteration, Nkrumah’s turn to the spirit (not the content) of the past invoked indigenous principles without becoming mired in more insidious practices. Ultimately, this negotiation meant that speeches and political tracts rarely centralized slavery, except as metaphor or brief colonial prelude.18 Self-determination nonetheless become a leitmotif for Nkrumah and his internationalist vision of democracy (Getachew 73–4), a vision whose rhetorical spin indicated that enslavement was ongoing, particularly when leveraged against “neo-colonialist masters” (Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism 33).

    Nkrumah inaugurated the University of Ghana’s Institute of African Studies with explicit exhortation to facilitate “cross fertilisation between Africa and those who have their roots in the African past” (qtd. in Ampofo 11). However, Ghana’s early black internationalist spirit did not translate into scholarship: according to one metric, out of three hundred graduate-level social science dissertations produced at the University of Ghana from 1965 to 1990, only Akosua Perbi’s focused on slavery (Keren 981).19 Since the early 1990s, meanwhile, slave and heritage tourism has been central to the Ghanaian Ministry of Tourism and Diasporan Relations’ 1992 Panafest, the 2007 bicentennial, and now the 2019 Year of the Return. The national response markets shared “brotherhood” based on lost culture. Scholarship and public conversations, however, do not directly engage a continued structuring history that would require negotiating how slavery, racism, colonialism, and capitalism shape Ghana’s position in a global imaginary (a turn that would, perhaps, better reflect the spirit of Nkrumah and Rodney). For Bayo Holsey, this lack of engagement indicates the ongoing impact of the divided world slavery opened: the “distancing from slavery,” which can be seen in gaps in public school textbooks, “and the embrace of slave ancestry encouraged by the state are two sides of the same coin” (“Black Atlantic Visions” 506). Holsey argues that while “narratives about African state-building have exhausted their utility,” those concerning “the slave trade have found a renewed purpose,” including those that link Africa to primordial corruption (“Owning Up to the Past?” 82–83). From the perspective of an Afro-pessimist analytic, this renewed purpose translates into the continued saturation of slavery, not its eclipse. The national containment of slavery both relays global dynamics and mediates how slavery is interpreted.

    Ghana’s Northern regions help exemplify the slave state paradigm. The North first featured in official tourism itineraries in 2001, where a delegation from Panafest traveled to the historic slave-holding town of Paga. The region’s involvement in the slave trade has been represented through 1) the mid-eighteenth century’s Asante-Dagbamba war; 2) the abduction of Yaa Naa Abdallah Gariba leading to the forced payment of 2,000 slaves as tribute or ransom to the Asante; 3) the use of Zambarama peoples as raiders and mercenaries; and 4) the supposition that half a million Northerners were sold into slavery from the mid 1700s to 1897 (Der 29). While the impact of this demographic disruption has been disputed, the gulf dividing Ghana’s North and South remains.20 Indeed, accumulated legacies of slavery and colonialism have all but written the North out of the story of the nation, displacing a geospatial Northern imaginary into a timeless past. The nationalized denigration of the North is intimately tied to the “desires of coastal residents to embrace an ‘imagined cosmopolitanism,’” and the “negative characterizations of northerners, which are at times accompanied by explicit references to their past vulnerability to enslavement, provide an ethnographic illustration of the dreadful depth of African historical interactions with Europe” (Holsey, Routes 100–1). This regional zoning engendered “a spatial reconfiguration of power that eventually led to the emergence of new (breakaway) social formations whose very origins and cultural logic resided principally in the expanding Atlantic complex” (Bennett 35). Such zoning transformed into the now well-known colonial carving of rigid ethnic and tribal lines, reduplicating in the consolidation of coastal power and structuring “non-centralized societies as politically illegitimate and therefore tangential to the political structure of the Northern Territories” (Talton 207).21

    Differently put, Ghana’s Northern regions represent the failed attempt to spatially segregate slavery and its impact. While “During the first phase of the slave trade on the Gold Coast, one’s level of vulnerability to enslavement could be difficult to predict,” after the dawn of the eighteenth-century the North became a primary target for enslavement (Holsey, “Black Atlantic Visions” 510). The containment of slavery was never successful, as the North instead became the zone through which the generalization of slaveness emerged. The Akan term for “bought person,” ɔdɔnkɔ, eventually became synonymous with Northerner (Rattray 34),22 while the symbolic-political strategies that reduced the North to a backwards and stateless people were repurposed and expanded during formal British rule to include all Ghanaians as “native.” The language used by the Northern Territories governor in 1933 echoes that of colonial logic writ large: “When the Whiteman first came to your country you were backward and primitive, a prey to slave raiders from the north and south. You had no cohesion and in many cases no constitution to speak of which was really the root of your troubles” (qtd. in Allman and Parker 72). If slaveness was associated with territorial backwardness that would eventually be engulfed by more triumphant national narratives, then to raise questions about slavery and its legacy may involve, as Emmanuel Akyeampong has argued, a threat to “national integration in recently independent countries” (1). What Akyeampong exposes is the myth of integration, one whose political necessity the history of slavery calls into question and for which it provides new frames.

    An investigation into the phantasmatic construction of indigenous slavery can transform our understanding of 1980s neoliberal austerity measures, which map onto the intellectual-political turn away from critiques of structural underdevelopment and towards positive appraisals of African autonomy and agency. Holsey submits, for example, that “the African slave trader provides a leitmotif of structural adjustment reforms” (“Owning Up to the Past?” 83).23 When the instability represented by the North is both subsumed into the nation and written backwards, its effacement (continuing today in diminished access to resources, infrastructure, and mobility) means having no account of how “the disruption of Africa’s political structures and socio-economic potentials was part of the stagnation of Africa’s technological progress caused by the slave trade” (M’Baye 611). This also means having no longer genealogical route through which to reckon with the failure of development discourses vis-à-vis African political economy.

    Conclusion

    The “afterlife of slavery,” as described by Hartman (6), is usually taken up to interrogate abolition and Reconstruction in the Americas, but it was also written in an attempt to reckon with problems of emancipation in West Africa, and it extends the interrogative frame in this direction. Take the Gold Coast’s 1874 non-interventionist anti-slavery ordinances (coinciding with the colony’s annexation), which formally announced the emancipation of slaves but provided no mechanism for liberation except individual court appeals, permitting slavery’s post-proclamation continuation (Opare-Akurang). The afterlife of African slavery exposes a through-line from slavery to colonialism and post-colonialism, such that, in Rodney’s estimation, “the period of slave trading in West Africa should be regarded as protocolonial” (History 117–18).24 Lovejoy furthers Rodney’s charge to demonstrate that the anti-slave rhetoric accompanying the scramble for Africa employed the very same language and rationale of slavery. For Lovejoy, however, the collapse of slavery provides the key context, as “the imposition of colonialism terminated slavery as a mode of production” (287). This is where Afro-pessimism makes a crucial modification to historiographical orientation, by reframing slavery’s afterlife not as its subsumption into other more contemporary and comphrensive scenes of violence (such as capitalism or colonialism) but as its continuation, not what comes after slavery but how it lives on.

    Slavery isn’t just a past object to be remembered or not—its violent influence shapes how it can be thought. Indigenous slavery, in particular, polices where and when responsibility appears in national discourse and intellectual production; indigenous slavery becomes indigenous slavery because of the way racial slavery transforms the world and rewrites its past. Localizing African practices as slavery’s source interrupts the capacity for critique that would have the Atlantic plantation as the grounding system of modernity and that might reimagine indigeneity otherwise. Racial slavery can instead be demonized as a corrupt (and contingent) “inheritance of wealth and power” and indigenous slavery revalorized precisely as “the inheritance of tradition” (Holsey, “Owning Up to the Past?” 85). Indeed, racial slavery can be said to invest indigeneity with its peculiar anti-black meaning—indigenous not in relation to the land (indigenous studies’ near comprehensive silence on Africa bears this out), but in relation to slavery. In this respect, we need an account of the continuity of the “extraordinary prejudice” that “African and Africans are somehow historically predisposed to violence and savagery” other than mere bewilderment that “it remains still quite widespread one fifth of the way through the twenty-first century” (Green xvi). This is to say that a focus on slavery as the generative condition of modernity, a version of Du Bois’s and Rodney’s positions, refigures the rhetoric of indigenous slavery as a point de capiton for African historiography, national mythology, and global anti-blackness. The legacy of slavery subsists through the displacement of narrative impossibility—shaping spaces and traditions, propelling time forward, securing meaning. If the racial slave is the generation of worldly possibility, the indigenous slave is its impossible effluvia. Every attempt to redeem, reconstitute, or resurrect the proper form of this past object must reckon with the prism through which it appears to us today.

    Sara-Maria Sorentino Sara-Maria Sorentino is an Assistant Professor of Gender & Race Studies at the University of Alabama. Her research asks methodological questions that excavate connections between anti-black violence, philosophical abstraction, and material reproduction. She has work published or forthcoming in Rhizomes, Theory & Event International Labor and Working-Class History, Antipode, and Telos.

    Footnotes

    1. See Kankpeyeng’s summary that “The history of indigenous slavery in Ghana is sketchy, but the oral traditions of present-day Ghanaian ethno-linguistic groups point to the longevity of the institution of slavery” (211), and Perbi’s reiteration of the argument that the Atlantic slave trade “did not supersede the indigenous slave trade. The two systems existed side by side and sustained each other” (62). In many ways, this problem repeats (and could someday clarify) Marxist debates over alternative and resistant sites to primitive accumulation. See Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa 82–9.

    2. See also Du Bois on how domestic African slaves “could and did rise to freedom and preferment; they became parts of the new tribe. It was left to Christian slavery to improve on all this—to make slavery a rigid unending caste by adding to bondage the prejudice of race and color” (251).

    3. Nkrumah writes that of all the “malicious myths” presented by European historians, the most insidious was the denial that “we were a historical people. It was said that whereas other continents had shaped history, and determined its course, Africa has stood still, held down by inertia; that Africa was only propelled into history by the European contact” (Consciencism 61).

    4. On how Afro-pessimism re-scripts the historiography of generalized slavery leveraged by Orlando Patterson’s study Slavery and Social Death, see Sorentino, “The Sociogeny of Social Death.”

    5. Sexton reads Afro-pessimism as “a certain motivated reading or return to Fanon, an attention to Fanon the theorist of racial slavery and ‘negrophobia’ more so than Fanon the theorist of metropolitan colonialism.” See “Afro-Pessimism: The Unclear Word.”

    6. See also Wynter: “What has remained constant is the position of Africa. Although no longer militarily and politically colonised, Africa, nevertheless, as the projected continent of origin as the extreme form of the ‘native Other’ to Man, retains its position as the bottom-most world, the one plagued most extremely by the contradictions that are inseparable from Man’s bourgeois conception of being human” (35).

    7. de B’béri and Louw attend to “this phenomenon of Afropessimism” as “much more complex and its impact much deeper, not only in terms of how Africa is imagined and perceived, but also as regards the ways in which Africans view themselves” (337)

    8. Concern with American exceptionalism is warranted, echoing in the missionary designs of nineteenth-century black nationalists Martin Delany, Alexander Crummell, and Harry McNeil Turner, who grounded their return to Africa in correcting a presumed savage enslaving pre-history (Adeleke), and continuing in a series of diasporic initiatives structured and supported by U.S. Cold War policy. See Von Eschen 176–81.

    9. A parallel criticism is levelled against Paul Gilroy in Gikandi, 1–2.

    10. In Amalgamation Schemes, Sexton extends this argument by centralizing “the qualitative difference between sub-Saharan Africa vis-à-vis the other regions of the global South” as the primary image that is “reflected in the qualitative difference of black positionality in the U.S. racial formation vis-à-vis ‘the colors in the middle’ (not black, not white)” (40–41).

    11. See Wilderson’s support of a multivalent political strategy he calls “Two Trains Running (Side by Side)” in “‘The Inside-Outside of Civil Society’” 18.

    12. See Chernoff’s engagement with Dagbamba music as “perhaps best considered as arrangement of gaps where one may add a rhythm” (113–14).

    13. See also Gilroy’s interview with Tommy Lott on a diaspora “that can’t be reversed” (57).

    14. This internalized consumption narrative takes a politically radical edge, too, as when Rodney converts the well-worn display of “tribal conflict” into a take-down of the ruling class in A History of the Upper Guinea Coast: “When the line of demarcation is clearly drawn between the agents and the victims of slaving as it was carried on among the littoral peoples, that line coincides with the distinction between the privileged and the un-privileged in the society as a whole” (117–18). The class line bears the weight of the acquisitive origin of slaving and has been rendered commensurate with classic accounts of European feudalism. See Diouf: “Aware of these parallels, a king in Dahomey remarked to a British governor, ‘Are we to blame if we send our criminals to foreign lands? I was told you do the same’” (xvi).

    15. As testimony, we can take Cugoano’s confession that he “must own, to the shame of my countrymen, that I was first kidnapped and betrayed by some of my own complexion, who were the first cause of my exile and slavery.” Although referring to racial constructions of difference, Cugoano situates this in slavery’s transformation:

    if there were no buyers there would be no sellers. So far as I can remember, some of the Africans in my country keep slaves, which they take in war, or for debt; but those which they keep are well fed, and good care taken of them, and treated well; and, as to their clothing, they differ according to the custom of the country. But I may safely say, that all the poverty and misery that any of the inhabitants of Africa meet with among themselves, is far inferior to those inhospitable regions of misery which they meet with in the West-Indies, where their hard-hearted overseers have neither regard to the laws of God, nor the life of their fellow-men.(234)

    16. Hartman does record memory inscribed in naming practices (192–96)

    17. See Ojo and Opata for examples of oral history in the Nigerian context.

    18. More broadly, “preferred Africanist topics of engagement” remain “globalization, nationalism, ethnicity, ritual and folklore, the (failed) state” (Pierre xiv).

    19. A similar gap has been noted in black studies, as “the early concrete connections between the lives of Africans on the continent and in the U.S. in the study of the Black experience have all but disappeared” (Ampofo 14).

    20. Haas has recently used his research with Dagbamba drummers and warriors to contest broad swaths of widely received history on the Asante empire and its domination over Dagbon.

    21. Kankpeyeng identifies how Northern “present-day population and settlement patterns” are grounded in slavery (213).

    22. The Dagbamba, meanwhile, tend to avoid dabili (slave) but do sometimes use it as an insult for the “stateless” (MacGaffey 18–19).

    23. Such an analysis can also be extended to current anti-police activism in West Africa. On the colonial history of policing in Ghana in particular, see Tankebe.

    24. See M’Baye and Nunn for recent econometric demonstrations of slavery’s devastating effect on African populations.

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  • Notes on Contributors

    John Culbert John Culbert is a Lecturer in the Department of English at the University of British Columbia. He is the author of Paralyses: Literature, Travel and Ethnography in French Modernity (Nebraska 2010). His article “The Well and the Web” appeared in Postmodern Culture 19.2.

    Jonathan Fardy Jonathan Fardy is Assistant Professor of Art History and Director of Graduate Studies in Art at Idaho State University. His research examines the aesthetic strategies that underwrite the constitution and argumentative structure of contemporary theories of art and politics. He is the author of three books: Laruelle and Art: The Aesthetics of Non-Philosophy; Laruelle and Non-Photography; and Althusser and Art. His current book project, The Real is Radical: Marx after Laruelle, is due out next year.

    Adam Dylan Hefty Adam Dylan Hefty is an Assistant Professor in the Core Curriculum program at Prince Mohammad Bin Fahd University (Al Khobar, Saudi Arabia). He holds a Ph.D. in History of Consciousness from the University of California, Santa Cruz. Recent works include essays on right-wing responses to climate change and on the history of mood disorders. He is working on a manuscript that traces a genealogy of the connection between practices of managing work and mental health.

    Miriam Jerade Miriam Jerade is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the Faculty of Liberal Arts, Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez, in Santiago de Chile. Previously, she was an assistant professor at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México and the Ivan and Nina Ross Fellow at the Katz Center for Advanced Judaic Studies in the University of Pennsylvania. Recent works include articles on political readings of speech act theory, Derrida’s reading of the death penalty, and representation and sovereignty in Franz Rosenzweig and Jacques Derrida. Her first book is Violencia. Una lectura desde la deconstrucción de Jacques Derrida (Metales Pesados, 2018).

    Cory Austin Knudson Cory Austin Knudson is a doctoral student in Comparative Literature and Literary Theory at the University of Pennsylvania. His work focuses broadly on modernism and the environmental humanities, with emphasis on the function of decomposition in both literature and ecology. His essay, “Seeing the World: Visions of Being in the Anthropocene,” has been recently published in Environment, Space, Place. With Tomas Elliott, he is currently translating Georges Bataille’s The Limit of the Useful, a preliminary manuscript to The Accursed Share, for MIT Press.

    Erin Obodiac Erin Obodiac received her Ph.D. in Comparative Literature from the University of California, Irvine and has held teaching and research appointments at the University of Leeds, SUNY Albany, Cornell University, and SUNY Cortland. She currently lectures in the UC Irvine-Dalian University of Technology joint program. Her writings assemble residual questions from the deconstructive “legacy” with emergent discourses in technics and animality, media ecology, and machinic subjectivity. She is completing a book called Husserl’s Comet: Cinema and the Trace, which repositions deconstruction within the history of cybernetics and machinic life.

    Rocío Pichon-Rivière Rocío Pichon-Rivière is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Hispanic Studies at the University of California, Riverside. Previously she was a postdoctoral fellow at New York University and a visiting scholar at the Pratt Institute. Recent works include essays on hemispheric trans theory, Latin American women’s political thinking, and phenomenologies of shame.

    Sara-Maria Sorentino Sara-Maria Sorentino is an Assistant Professor of Gender & Race Studies at the University of Alabama. Her research asks methodological questions that excavate connections between anti-black violence, philosophical abstraction, and material reproduction. She has work published or forthcoming in Rhizomes, Theory & Event International Labor and Working-Class History, Antipode, and Telos.

  • Notes on Contributors

    Jian Chen is Assistant Professor of Queer Studies in the English Department at Ohio State University, Columbus. He is a Visiting Scholar with the Asian/Pacific/American (A/P/A) Institute of New York University for Spring 2012. Chen’s curatorial projects include “SKIN: a multimedia exhibition” with the 6–8 Months Project, hosted by Kara Walker Studios, New York, “NOISE: Trans-Subversions in Global Media Networks” at the New York MIX24 Queer Experimental Film Festival, and “Transmitting Trans-Asian” with the NYU A/P/A Institute.

    Richard Grusin is Director of the Center for 21st-Century Studies at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. He has published numerous articles and four books. With Jay David Bolter he is the author of Remediation: Understanding New Media (MIT, 1999), which sketches a genealogy of new media, beginning with the contradictory visual logics underlying contemporary digital media. His most recent book, Premediation: Affect and Mediality After 9/11 (Palgrave, 2010), argues that in an era of heightened securitization, socially networked US and global media work to premediate collective affects of anticipation and connectivity, while perpetuating low levels of apprehension or fear.

    Christian Hite received a Ph.D. in English Literature from the University of Southern California; his dissertation project was Technologies of Arousal: Masturbation, Aesthetic Education, and the Post-Kantian Auto-. Most recently, he was Visiting Scholar in the MA Program in Aesthetics and Politics at California Institute of the Arts.

    Jason Read is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Southern Maine. He is the author of The Micro-Politics of Capital: Marx and the Prehistory of the Present (Albany: SUNY, 2003) as well as articles on Althusser, Negri, Spinoza, Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari. He is completing a manuscript titled Relations of Production: Transindividuality between Ontology and Political Economy for Brill/Historical Materialism.

    Alessia Ricciardi is Associate Professor in French and Italian and the Comparative Literature Program at Northwestern University. Her first book, The Ends of Mourning, won the Modern Language Association’s 2004 Scaglione Prize for Comparative Literature. Her second book, After La Dolce Vita: A Cultural Prehistory of Berlusconi’s Italy is forthcoming from Stanford University Press in July 2012.

    Darren Tofts is Professor of Media and Communications, Swinburne University of Technology, Melbourne, Australia. Tofts writes regularly for a range of national and international publications on cyberculture, new media arts, and critical and cultural theory. He is Associate Editor of 21C magazine and is a member of the editorial boards of Postmodern Culture, Hyperrhiz and fibreculture journal. His publications include Memory Trade: A Prehistory of Cyberculture (Interface, 1998), Prefiguring Cyberculture: An Intellectual History (MIT Press, 2002), and Interzone: Media Arts in Australia (Thames & Hudson, 2005).

    Erin Trapp lives and writes in Minneapolis. Her current book project, Estranging Lyric: Postwar Aggression and the Task of Poetry, articulates a theory of the poetic rearrangement of language and emotions that allows for critical reflection on the processes of reparation in the postwar. She has published articles and reviews on the postwar, psychoanalysis, and poetry.

    Birger Vanwesenbeeck is Assistant Professor of English at SUNY Fredonia. He is the co-editor of William Gaddis: ‘The Last of Something’ (McFarland, 2009) and has published essays on Thomas Pynchon, William Gaddis, and Stefan Zweig.

  • Notes on Contributors

    Tyler Bradway is a Ph.D. candidate in Literatures in English at Rutgers University. He is currently completing his dissertation on postwar queer experimental fiction. He has written reviews for College Literature and symplokē, and he has an essay on Eve Sedgwick’s ethics of intersubjectivity forthcoming in GLQ.

    Lisa Brawley works in the fields of critical urban theory, feminist theory, and American Studies at Vassar College where she directs the American Studies program. Her scholarship and teaching engage the processes of capitalist urbanization in the long 20th century United States, exploring the relation between urban form, the politics of state legitimacy, and shifting structures of citizenship. Most recently, her work explores the visual registers of everyday urbanism, and the role of photography and cinema in the 1969 Plan of New York City. She served as co-editor of PMC from 1994 to 2004.

    Dwayne Dixon is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Cultural Anthropology at Duke University where he is completing his dissertation on young people in Tokyo and their relations to urban space, changing economic conditions, and visual technologies.

    David Ensminger is an Instructor of English, Humanities, and Folklore at Lee College in Baytown, Texas. He completed his M.S. in the Folklore Program at the University of Oregon and his M.A. in Creative Writing at City College of New York City. His study of punk street art, Visual Vitriol: The Art and Subcultures of the Punk and Hardcore Generations, was published in July 2011 by the Univ. Press of Mississippi. His book of collected punk interviews, Left of the Dial, is forthcoming from PM Press, and his co-written biography of Lightnin’ Hopkins, Mojo Hand, is forthcoming from the University of Texas Press. His work has recently appeared in the Journal of Popular Music Studies, Art in Print, and M/C Journal (Australia). He also contributes regularly to Houston Press, Maximum Rock’n’Roll, Popmatters, and Trust (Germany). As a longtime fanzine editor, flyer artist, and drummer, he has archived punk history, including blogs and traveling exhibitions.

    Anne-Lise François is Associate Professor of English and Comparative Literature at the University of California, Berkeley. Her first book, Open Secrets: The Literature of Uncounted Experience (Stanford University Press, 2008), won the 2010 René Wellek Prize from the American Comparative Literature Association. Her current book project, Provident Improvisers: Parables of Subsistence from Wordsworth to Berger, weighs the contribution of pastoral figures of worldliness, commonness, and provisional accommodation, in addressing contemporary environmental crises and their political causes.

    Judith Goldman is the author of Vocoder (Roof 2001), DeathStar/rico-chet (O Books 2006), and l.b.; or, catenaries (Krupskaya 2011). She co-edited the annual journal War and Peace with Leslie Scalapino from 2005-2009 and is currently Poetry Feature Editor for Postmodern Culture. She was the Holloway Poet at University of California, Berkeley in Fall 2011; in Fall 2012, she joins the faculty of the Poetics Program at the University at Buffalo.

    Arlene R. Keizer is Associate Professor of English and African American Studies at the University of California, Irvine. She is the author of Black Subjects: Identity Formation in the Contemporary Narrative of Slavery (Cornell UP, 2004), as well as essays and articles in a range of journals including African American Review, American Literature, and PMLA. Her current work addresses black postmodernism in literature, performance, and visual art; African American literature and psychoanalytic theory and practice; and the intersections between memory and theory.

    Daniel Worden is currently Visiting Assistant Professor of English at the University of New Mexico, where he will be Assistant Professor of English in Fall 2012. He is the author of Masculine Style: The American West and Literary Modernism (2011). He has recently edited, with Ross Barrett, Oil Culture, a forthcoming special issue of Journal of American Studies, and, with Jason Gladstone, Postmodernism, Then, a forthcoming special issue of Twentieth-Century Literature.

  • Introduction: Medium and Mediation

    Matt Tierney (bio) and Mathias Nilges (bio)

    As we were composing the introduction to this special issue of Postmodern Culture, a Missouri grand jury delivered its decision not to indict a white police officer, Darren Wilson, for the killing of an unarmed black teenager, Michael Brown. This decision, baffling to many, was announced in a press conference by Robert McCulloch, the prosecuting attorney for St. Louis County. McCulloch considered the grand jury’s deliberation to have been difficult, but not because the jury was distraught over the racism built into most forms of American policing, and not because the jury knew that there would be public outcry no matter what choice it made, and certainly not because the prosecutor’s office had made any mistakes in presenting the case against Wilson. Indeed, it was never in question that Wilson had fired the gun that killed Brown on August 9, 2014. In spite of this, McCulloch professed: “The most significant challenge encountered in this investigation has been the 24-hour news cycle and its insatiable appetite for something, for anything to talk about. Following closely behind were the nonstop rumors on social media.”1 News media and social media thus bore the blame for any difficulty in the grand jury’s decision because, immediately after Brown’s death, “neighbors began gathering and anger began growing because of the various descriptions of what had happened.” Any conflict that followed the shooting was, in McCulloch’s eye, due to the contradictory and mediated “descriptions” of the shooting, and not to the shooting itself. The media, both news and social, had spread “speculation and little if any solid, accurate information.” By McCulloch’s logic, it was the inaccuracy of reporting and the media’s formal insolidity, rather than the actual death of Michael Brown, that had led to widespread anger and protest.

    The effort in this special issue is both to refine and to broaden the conceptual language of “media” and “medium,” so that we may reduce some of the distance between its scholarly employment within theory and its popular use to describe culture. This is a matter of terminological precision, not populism. McCulloch’s traffic in the language of “media” is both banal and troubling. Banal because McCulloch’s use of the word is too mundane to merit further notice. Yet troubling because the word’s flexibility is what allows McCulloch to perform an insidious rhetorical move, draping a single heading over a broad array of cultural forms, from television to print and from cellphones to the Internet, and then blaming that whole array, in one triumphant gesture, for having impeded justice in the death of Michael Brown. “Media” is just a word, it could be argued. But in this case, it is a word and an idea that, no matter how much it was touted in the struggle against reactionary social forces, had come to belong as much to the reactionary forces as to the struggle. Whatever truth-telling capacity may survive in the fourth estate, it could be said, this capacity vanishes as soon as the press is dismissed for its “insatiable appetite” and “inaccurate descriptions.” And whatever countervailing common voice might be heard in the texts and images of Twitter and Facebook, this voice is hushed by the accusation of mere rumormongering. There may be a great deal of liberation latent in the specific techniques of protest and knowledge called “media” in their plurality and “medium” in their discrete character. It is difficult to tell. As long as these words allow the techniques they name to be so easily lumped together and then marginalized, those techniques might not liberate much of anything. Conversely, we insist, as long as these words may be sculpted by someone like McCulloch, they might also bend to other hands.

    What do we mean when we say the word “media,” and is there any chance that its refinement might facilitate, or even communicate, an ameliorative language? This question stands fittingly at the beginning of the introduction to this issue, since it is the fundamental question with which each essay in the volume grapples. We also begin here because it is precisely this question that gave rise to our inquiry. Why, then, are we confused about definitions and nomenclature when dictionaries are so readily available? We agree with Siegfried Zielinski’s argument in his 2011 book [… After the Media] that “it is possible to create a state with media” because “media are an integral part of everyday coercive context” and therefore “no longer any good for a revolution” (19). He continues: “Media are an indispensible component of functioning social hierarchies, both from the top down and the bottom up, of power and countervailing power. They have taken on a systemic character” (19). Indeed, in the case of the St. Louis County prosecutor, it seems that exactly those platforms or devices that might share or show events, or exhibit a common will, can summarily be dismissed as nothing but media. This leaves to us the development of a method and an alternative set of terms: a method by which to describe media as ever in use, never neutral, sometimes liberatory, often not, and always suspect; and a terminology of “medium” and “mediation” that will both acknowledge the ideological problem of “media” and make an effort to move beyond it, to situate it and unthink it through non-systemic, partial, and processual notions of art, history, communication, and culture.

    Our confusion over the language of media is not ours alone. The more one reads into past and current work on the concept of media, the more one has the impression that the concept remains always one step ahead of any attempt to stabilize it by describing it. And while one could argue, in loosely Adornian terms, that this is always true of concepts, nevertheless the confusion surrounding the concept “media” arises to no small degree out of what we take to be precise historical and structural conditions. As Sarah Kember and Joanna Zylinska point out in their 2013 book, Life After New Media, much recent work on media tends to understand the term in a way that is connected either to what we commonly understand as “the media,” no doubt the most ubiquitous use of the term, or to primarily technological definitions like those encountered in the field of New Media studies. Media here acquires a distinctly material quality, without losing its capacity to be involved in a more conceptual analysis. Media is technology, then, and most often computational technology: the stuff that such studies take as their object, the stuff to which a lot of other dimensions—say politics, thought, or social structures—can be attached. Although much work is being done to illustrate that the secondary dimensions of media are not truly secondary but are instead more deeply and fundamentally attached to a medium’s history and ontology, the insistence upon the new in media technology still proliferates. What remains is an all-too-often reified notion of medium that is externally and not immanently defined.

    To be sure, a critique such as ours risks collapsing back into a purely immanent concept of medium, such as the one that underlies the Greenbergian notion of medium specificity. Universal and transhistorical, and relying on the idea that there might be ideal employment of a given cultural or artistic medium, such a notion might be understood as one key factor in the disciplinary constitution of contemporary archives for critical work. Yet the lapse into medium specificity is but one risk—the reverse is no better. In re-theorizing medium apart from Greenberg and apart from narrow disciplinarity, the critic seems invariably drawn to the supposedly “sexy archive,” that is, to the archive that includes not one but several media. In our view, however, pluralization only mirrors the neoliberal fetishization of multiplicity over the not-so-sexy singular. We follow Kember and Zylinska’s argument that media studies has relied on a large set of restrictive binary oppositions, such as new versus old, and to which we would add singular versus multiple. These oppositions restrict and impoverish the ability to understand what is truly meant by “medium” at a given moment in history. For us, it is important to ask how concepts of medium may be bound up—and not just on a secondary level but far more immediately—with the ideological or linguistic norms of a given moment. Stuck here, between the rock of specificity and the hard place of the multiple archive, the primary dimension of the medium remains uninterrogated. This special issue asks how analysis would change if it were to interrogate the history and presence of each individual medium, to isolate that medium without accepting it as given, precisely by studying it as a nexus of contact and tension, similarity of and difference between media. Having said this, advocating a mode of attention to the individual medium need not imply a logic of separation and medial autonomy that is no longer tenable, particularly in light of recent work in the field.

    As Kember and Zylinska so persuasively illustrate, whether we understand our moment as one guided by “intermediation” (Hayles) or “remediation” (Bolter and Grusin), the terms of critique remain defined largely by an “essentially McLuhanite emphasis on the connectedness rather than isolation of media,” which in turn “has led some commentators to propose that we are currently living in a ‘media ecology’” (12). If one dimension of our critique rests upon the overly capacious account of media (the direct commitment to technological innovation on one side and the refusal of modernist singularity via the plural archive on the other), it is important to point out that the historical difference between a commitment to “media” over and against “medium” does not signify an actual conceptual difference, as if the terms alone could announce a commitment to plurality over and against singularity. Any perceived difference has arisen, we believe, from an under-theorization of both terms. Any given medium is always already plural, as recent work on intermediality, remediation, and intermediation illustrates. But it is from this conceptual and material plurality that we derive the specific understanding of any given medium. And while the title of this issue harkens back to Baudrillard (the articulation of the logical relation between simulacra and simulation, of a relation between the terms that in not at all post-Marxist fashion provides us with a fundamentally Hegelian understanding of mediation shared by many contributions to this issue), we focus on “medium” over “media” in order to illustrate that any medium is simultaneously immanent and external plurality. Between the static singularity of the notion of medium that attaches to medium specificity and the capaciously defined inverse notion that attaches to media studies, our issue begins its intervention. As an ontological term, medium names the heterogeneous specificity of particular mediations. As a term of critical method, it names the starting point from which to study the variegated history and momentary specificity of a cultural form that neither transcends nor reduces to its parts.

    But let us step back and unfold this logic in order to illustrate the ways that the essays in this issue aim to contribute to current critical discourse. In rejecting the singularity of medium specificity and the flattening plurality of media, we follow recent work on the concept of medium by, among others, Rosalind Krauss. Krauss traces this simultaneity in the “post-medium condition” of conceptual art, and recounts that her first impulse was to sidestep the term altogether and to reframe the conditions of the debate: “at first I thought I could simply draw a line under the word medium, bury it like so much critical toxic waste, and walk away from it into a world of lexical freedom,” because “‘Medium’ seemed too contaminated” (5). Krauss notes a troubling relation between conceptual art and the concept of medium, but she is aware that the way forward cannot lie in a renewed attention to modernist definitions of medium or in a pluralizing commitment to post-mediality. The notion of medium specificity must, Krauss argues, remain intrinsic to any discussion of medium. How, then, might we speak of the specificity of a medium in ways that develop the heterogeneity of that term? Can we retain the demand for specificity (which Krauss says cannot be avoided anyway) without falling into the traps of ahistorical or nostalgic modernism? Might we explore the specificity of individual media without indulging in the secondary reductions so often attached to the notion of specificity? How might we talk about a medium in any detail and with any conceptual rigor in an era in which the medially heterogeneous archive, for better or for worse, has become the new standard? The term medium has, in art history, experienced a critical flatness that mimics the infamous flatness in Greenbergian accounts of painting. One could point toward a similar flattening of the term in literary and cultural studies, where it is increasingly reduced to a technophiliac dimension. We consider this technophilia to be directly connected to efforts to insist upon the continued relevance of literary and cultural study by empiricizing it. We consider this empiricization, in turn, to be reminiscent of the formalist project of the early and mid-twentieth century, when formalism arose not primarily as a way to develop the understanding of the category of form, but instead as a way to make literary study relevant and acceptable by lending it a scientific character and method.

    In this context, then, this special issue aims both to concretize and to open up the concept of medium. To be sure, this is not to suggest that there is no value in the technological side of the study of media. Recent books have studied important political consequences of new media.2 Yet, there are, this issue proposes, a variety of other ways to conceive the political dimension of a medium. One way of doing so is by restoring the focus on the immanent and specific processes of mediation that concretize the ontology and function of discrete media. Such a line of inquiry neither reduces the ontology and function of a medium to its mere technological properties nor does it seek to formulate a medial ontology that rests upon transhistorical universals. Instead, this inquiry asks what worldly exposures might variegate the medium, as well as the idea of medium. Such an approach also aims to sidestep well-known accounts of a medium’s essence—the reduction of painting to flatness is likely the most notorious example of this. What emerges instead is the ability to examine the specificity of media as a process. By historicizing the specific processes of mediation that provide an individual medium with its content, function, and developing ontology, this issue seeks to arrive at an appreciation of medium as a developing concept that arises in part precisely from its non-fixity and from the interaction between discrete media. Here, the notion of medium specificity is an account of the process of mediation by which an artistic medium establishes specific relations between itself and the material, the social, the historical, the political, or the technological. Hence, medium specificity conceived this way also seeks to foreground the specificity of relations and conceptual bases that are often obfuscated in the context of a sexy archive along with the different forms of mediation that occur not only between discrete media and lived reality but also between media themselves.

    The essays that make up this issue pursue the specificity of relations and processes. The different ways in which cinema or literature—or even a medium such as debt, as one of the essays in this issue illustrates—mediates a given object or socio-historical context is fundamental to a detailed effort to understand the ontology, function, and history of a medium. The history of a medium can on this account be mapped as the often discontinuous processes of hyper- and remediation that become medially and historically specific precisely via their constitutive processes of mediation, which are always simultaneously external and contextual as much as they arise immanently. Avoiding the reduction of different media both to simple notions of text, ideology, or language and to mere matters of technology, and instead developing a multi-medial archive in which the specific relations and differences between media matter and are allowed to develop in all their complexity is, we would argue, the way to arrive at the sexy archive. The specificity of the medium that allows us to speak to processes of mediation that establish clear connections and causalities and that concretize our efforts at speaking to matters of ontology and function, politics and history, is what truly brings sexy back to the archive in contemporary cultural and literary study.

    There remains the evident promise of the media on behalf of radically egalitarian social change. In spite of Zielinski’s claim that “media are no longer any good for a revolution,”3 we still hear myriad voices to the contrary, claiming that there is nothing but revolution and mediation at work in the efforts of WikiLeaks, Anonymous, or the diverse movements lumped together under the designation Arab Spring. This returns us to the events with which this introduction began, and the murder of Michael Brown by the white policeman Darren Wilson. At the same time that the prosecutor dismissed the news and social-media narratives, Brown’s family released their own brief and moving statement to the press, concluding that: “We need to work together to fix the system that allowed this to happen. Join with us in our campaign to ensure that every police officer working the streets in this country wears a body camera” (“‘Profoundly Disappointed’”). The Browns’ call to action is righteous, and was quickly embraced by representatives of the Executive Branch of the US government.4 Effectively, it also offers a practical détournement of surveillance technology, redirecting a basic technology of policing against the police by whose hand their son was slain. One week after the Wilson decision, however, a separate but symmetrical decision was delivered by a grand jury in Staten Island, New York. As in Missouri, the facts of the case were not in question. A white police officer, Daniel Pantaleo, had killed an unarmed black civilian, Eric Garner, with an illegal chokehold, as Garner whispered the now famous words, “I can’t breathe.” This time the visibility of events was not at issue. The whole event was captured, in vivid audio and video, by a bystander with a cellphone. Still, the legal results were identical: a refusal by the grand jury to indict the admitted killer, Pantaleo. Before protests from the Missouri decision had cooled, or even slowed, an identical betrayal had occurred half a continent away, but this time without even the possibility that it could have been solved through the use of digital, news, and social media—which indeed had spent months airing and re-airing the audiovisual recording of Garner’s murder. As race theorist Tricia Rose posted on Facebook and Twitter: “Body cameras can’t end racism. Rodney King, cameras, Tamir Rice, cameras, #EricGarner cameras.” Following Zielinski and Rose, we agree that the tools that “create a state” (19), along with the state’s racist apparatus of legal judgment and enforcement, are not the tools that will bring justice to Mike Brown and Eric Garner.

    How does this statement impact method, so that it is to be worked out differently by the contributions that follow in this issue? For Zielinski, marginalizing the revolutionary aspects of media does not mean diminishing their influence in the world. Instead, it means differentiating between what he names “media-explicit and media-implicit discourses” (173). In a media-explicit discourse, such as those that often obtain in media studies, but that can even be seen in the St. Louis County prosecutor’s press release, “individual media or a random collection of media or the media in the strategic generalization expressis verbis are the subject of [the] exposition” (173). By contrast, a “media-implicit discourse” is an “exact philology of precise things” as they compose social processes. In any method that pursues media-implicitness, Zielinski argues, “media phenomena are integrated as subjects of research in wider discourses or epistemes. They are thematically incorporated into other foci or overarching contexts, such as history, sexuality, subjectivity, or the arts” (173). Our contributors’ discussions of debt, communication, cinema, aesthetics, and form are bound together by such an incorporation—by the conviction that to talk about medium and mediation must mean to sideline the media themselves, at least a little bit, so that their place in the world, and their relations to each other, are what rise into the field of theoretical vision.

    In terms that resonate with our “media-implicit” approach, the late novelist Joanna Russ wrote in 1978: “Technology is a non-subject … is the sexy rock star of the academic humanities, and like the rock star, is a consolation for and an obfuscation of, something else. Talk about technology is an addiction” (27). Russ saw that it was folly to ignore the concrete effects of media change upon artistic and political ways of responding to the world. But she also saw, as an equal error, that any engagement in the science or being of technology, whether favorable or unfavorable, must risk making communication or computation into the object of a creative or scholarly myopia. She concludes: “The technology-obsessed must give up talking about technology when it is economics and politics which are at issue” (39). In the present moment, although not in the present volume, it is media in its technological character, and in its supposedly essential links to the possibility of freedom, that preoccupies many scholars and policy-makers, no matter their vast differences in political motivation. Our contributors instead focus on procedures of medium and mediation, in their particularity and interpenetration, so as to draw out of media discourse its made qualities, its cultural and political qualities, and its malleability in a moment that calls for just such a hands-on molding.

    The issue begins with Timothy Bewes’s “A Sensorimotor Collapse?,” which forcefully articulates the stakes of examining the relationship between medium, mediation, and what Deleuze calls “the mediator” for the study of cinema. If film history is, as Deleuze claims, defined by a “sensorimotor break” that separates the classical cinema of the movement-image from the modern cinema of the time-image, a break that marks the breakdown of the elements constituting the movement-image—perception, action, and affection—then how, Bewes asks, might we consider the historical status of this transition? What really is the role of cinema in what appears to be a larger historical development in the way that humankind imagines the relationship between self and world? Does cinema merely register and represent this break that is to be understood as a historical shift in consciousness? Or does cinema take on a direct role in facilitating this shift? Offering a rigorously historicized and diligently argued account of the notion of a sensorimotor break beginning with Bergson and concluding with Rancière’s critique of Deleuze, Bewes illustrates how detailed attention to the question of the mediator and mediation allows us to foreground the ways in which cinema relates to an event that is elsewhere understood as centrally informing the departure from realism and the turn toward modernism or the aesthetic shift from modernism to postmodernism. By tracing the often surprising lines of congruence between Deleuze and Rancière, Bewes shows that the shift from the movement-image to the time-image in cinema does nothing less than make thinkable the historical event of the sensorimotor collapse. The particular ontology and function of cinema as a medium in this regard, Bewes shows, lies in its ability to make some of the fundamental historical shifts of the twentieth century accessible to thought.

    Next we turn to Nicholas Brown’s essay, “Musical Affect, Musical Citation, Music-Immanence.” The essay opens with a consideration of a curious distinction between painting and music in Hegel’s Aesthetics. Instances in which painting contracts into pure form, Hegel claims, cause non-formal content to be present but “indifferent.” When music contracts into pure form, however, content falls by the wayside and the result is a display of “mere … skill in composition.” What this illustrates, Brown argues, is that Hegel “has no concept of a purely painterly or purely musical idea.” Hegel’s perplexed relation to music, Brown argues, is a result of a problem that is urgent for us today: what defines music as a medium in opposition to other arts is its ability to produce affective reactions in listeners. But, Brown suggests, if this is true, then it raises a second problem, namely that this feature would disqualify “music from the arts even more strongly in our day than in Hegel’s,” for any such provoked reaction is “always already a commodity.” Brown’s essay explains why the fundamental commitment of music as a medium to the ability to generate affective responses would disqualify it from being considered art, and why the ability to “produce music whose aim is not to produce an effect” becomes not only a crucial question for music as an artistic medium today, but also allows us to foreground some of the fundamental aspects of the current status of the work of art. In much the same way that Bewes’s account of cinema allows us to understand better the ontology and function of cinema as an artwork in the context of some of the defining historical changes of the twentieth century, Brown’s courageously argued essay illustrates how a detailed examination of the current status of music as a medium also allows us to understand some of the profound challenges that the artwork faces now.

    In ways that echo some of the fundamental concerns and approaches of the first two essays, Michael D’Arcy’s contribution engages with the status of critical attention to the category of medium in general and the problem of medium specificity in our time. If we consider Adorno’s reflections on cinematic medium as crucially depending upon the suggestion that medium-specific aesthetic analysis has become obsolete, then, D’Arcy suggests, we may be able to put Adorno’s work on medium into productive conversation with the form and language of the novel to develop forms of “aesthetic rationality.” What this means, D’Arcy suggests, is that such attention to medium allows us to formulate aesthetic rationality as a discrete category of reason that is distinct from and that allows us to aesthetically and politically critique our era’s more general, prevailing social condition of technological advancement. Like Bewes and Brown, D’Arcy believes that our current moment requires attention to the category of medium if criticism wants to be able to speak to the status of the artwork. However, we must develop a way of doing so that moves past outdated notions of medium specificity. An alternate critical approach, D’Arcy illustrates in detail in his essay, may be found in a form of critical attention to “a history of linguistic medium that exceeds the specificity of art forms.” Adorno’s analysis of novelistic-filmic language, D’Arcy argues, registers that medium-specific aesthetics may have become “fatally disabled.” At the same time, however, D’Arcy maintains, this line of argument and analysis in Adorno also contains a continued investment in the notions of art’s uneven development and of the waning of our ability to distinguish art from technological forms in their social context. Adorno’s examination of the cinematic medium allows us to understand the collapse between artistic technique and technology as it presents itself in current artistic production (and as it is discussed in critical commentary that examines medium as technology); D’Arcy shows that by studying the disappearance of art’s critical distance from reigning forms of social totality that become legible through film, we can highlight the medial abilities of novelistic language in order to better understand the material, social, and political function of the medium.

    Krista Geneviève Lynes addresses media in its aesthetic sense as well as its computational sense, while moving beyond the reflexive celebration of social media’s world-making capacities. Lynes remains skeptical of Facebook or Twitter as revolutionary tools, but insists that their legitimating rhetorics have provided a shared affective mode for some radical collectivities. She argues that even though the political effects of social media may differ broadly, these media nonetheless aid in “binding communities of protest, if not in a common language, at least in the dream of a common purpose.” To provide an account of this binding force, yet without recourse to the totalizing image of a “global village,” Lynes turns to the Belgrade artist Milica Tomic. Tomic, for Lynes, provides a picture of “worldedness, in the interest of forging sites of solidarity and resistance.” Movement politics thus coincides with the politics of art, which in turn produces a revised image of the world. Therein lies Lynes’s urgent materialism, in its development of a theory of art and technology at once, and of the struggle to transcend media even while putting media to use.

    Finally, Leigh Claire La Berge and Dehlia Hannah advance the most direct argument in favor of a materialist understanding of the category of medium. La Berge and Hannah argue that it is possible to understand debt as a medium. They show it should be very clear in our historical moment that debt itself becomes one of the principal forms that mediates the relationship between capitalism and its social dimension. A structured yet evanescent form of violence it surely is. However, for La Berge and Hannah, as for the visual artist Cassie Thornton, debt also founds a regime of aesthetics. The authors find Thornton’s practice unique in that “its radical departure from traditional media leads us squarely back to the problem of the medium itself.” Moreover, in their account of Thornton, debt aesthetics can expose the “never completed but embodied and experiential concretization of capital’s dimension of abstract labor.” La Berge and Hannah locate debt, or indebtedness, as a modified form of modernist self-reflexivity that in Thornton’s work eludes reification. Insofar as one may understand the attention to medium and mediation as the antidote to collapsing a complex social relation into the pure thing-ness of a reified relation, La Berge and Hannah show, there is much at stake in foregrounding the function of debt as medium for art today, a medium that art itself is in turn able to make legible and to inflect politically in a radically different way.

    Postscript

    In many ways, it is too soon to write about the episodes of police violence with which portions of this introduction have been concerned. It will likely always be too soon to theorize them. But at the same time, theory cannot pretend to be impervious to a world of legitimated power abuses. Such a world is barbed and hot, and must change theory by destroying it or by setting it in motion before its time. To this end, as this special issue is going to press, we note that another pair of killings has put pressure on its conclusions. These events must not be put to use by theory, or be absorbed into an existing scholarly project. They may however derail such a project—thus derailed, we risk the following. On April 2, 2015, Eric Harris was shot and killed by Bob Bates, a full-time insurance executive and part-time reserve sheriff in Tulsa, Oklahoma. Three days later, on April 5, Walter Scott was shot and killed by Michael Slager, a patrolman in North Charleston, South Carolina. Both law officers are white, both victims were black, and both killings were recorded on video.

    The shooting of Eric Harris was captured by a body camera that was carried by a second officer, not Bates. In the video, when this second officer tackles Harris, he holds him down, the camera presses onto the pavement, and viewers must rely on audio alone. We hear rapid footsteps, presumably those of Bates. We hear a pistol report, followed by the words “I shot him. I’m sorry.” We hear Harris plead, in words too reminiscent of Eric Garner, “I’m losing my breath.” And we hear the second offer reply, “Fuck your breath.” Without question, the body camera has failed to save Eric Harris’s life. Yet also without question, the body camera has produced a record, and therefore a circulable document, that would not otherwise have existed, and that can now be exhibited through a variety of online video streaming services. Any media theory of body cameras in policing must account for the difference between a version of events in which the killing of Eric Harris is recorded and a version in which it is not recorded. Yet only a media-implicit theory of racialized state violence can even begin to account for the fact of Harris’s death in spite of those cameras, or for the persistence of a nearly unaccountable object, that recording of an actual human voice that is capable of saying “fuck your breath.”

    The killing of Walter Scott was captured by a bystander’s cellphone. The phone is in motion, but it is held at a great enough distance from the scene that the entire sequence of events is visible. In the video, Scott runs from Slager, Slager raises his pistol, the pistol fires five times, and Scott falls to the ground where he lies on his stomach as Slager cuffs his wrists. Responses to this murder have been vocal, as have responses to the other killings mentioned in this introduction. Among responses to Scott’s death, the most pertinent is that of Jay Smooth, the public intellectual and Internet personality. In an edition of Smooth’s YouTube series, entitled The Illipsis, he tells his listeners that the news of Scott’s death had interrupted his plan to cover a quite different news story about the release of a new music streaming service called Tidal, founded by the hip-hop mogul Jay-Z and promoted with language of social-movement formation and community building. Confronted with the cellphone video of the events in South Carolina, says Smooth, “I can’t see that and then go back to watching people talk about movements and taking stands in reference to an Android app that keeps giving me errors.”

    Rather than speak about Tidal and its co-opted rhetoric, Smooth imagines a digital and social medium that, unlike Tidal, would be appropriate for this world-historical conjuncture. Addressing himself to the “superstars” behind Tidal, Smooth opines:

    What you should do next is take some of the money from this imitation of Spotify and put it into another app called Copify that lets us press a single button for unlimited hi-fi recording of police misconduct while also automatically live-streaming and uploading to our special Copify cloud-storage, so they can’t just snatch our phone and delete it. What we need right now more than delivering FLAC files to our homes in lossless quality is something that somehow helps us deliver black lives to their homes in lossless quality.

    For Jay Smooth, the language of new media can be writ large only under erasure, in the form of an extended metaphor that remains a metaphor, as well as a protest, rather than a concrete proposal. He concludes that it is not enough to disseminate videos like those that record the shootings of Eric Garner and Tamir Rice and Eric Harris and Walter Scott, and yet: “until we upgrade this whole operating system, and get the systemic changes we need, it seems to be all we’ve got.” For Smooth, and for us, there is no use, and no good, in imagining a world stripped of its digital media. Moreover, there are limited advancements of justice toward which such media might be directed. But only a discourse that foregrounds politics, in the way that Joanna Russ uses that word, can “upgrade” the societal “operating system.” It is such a discourse, based on a politics of culture in which media are full of legible content, and implicit rather than centered, that we mean to acknowledge and build upon with this special issue.

    Mathias Nilges is Associate Professor of English at St. Francis Xavier University in Nova Scotia, Canada. His essays have appeared in collected editions and in journals such as American Literary History, Callaloo, and Textual Practice. With Emilio Sauri, he is the co-editor of Literary Materialisms (2013) and with Michael D’Arcy of The Contemporaneity of Modernism (2015). He has recently completed a monograph titled Still Life With Zeitroman: The Time of the Contemporary American Novel.

    Footnotes

    1. A transcript of McCulloch’s decision is available from CNN, and a video is available on YouTube.

    2. See for instance Bessant and Fuller and Goffey.

    3. This claim in fact graces the back cover of Zielinski’s [. . . After the Media].

    4. For instance, in remarks on December 1, 2014, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder announced that, “this Administration will continue to strongly support the use of body cameras by local police,” and promised the federal provision of “more than $200 million to support a three-year initiative that will invest in body-worn cameras,” as well as training and other resources.

    Works Cited

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    • Byers, Dylan. “Ferguson prosecutor blames the media.” Politico. Politico LLC. November 25, 2014. November 25, 2015. Web. Fuller, Matthew, and Andrew Goffey. Evil Media. Cambridge: MIT P, 2013. Print.
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    • Holder, Eric. “Attorney General Eric Holder Delivers Remarks During the Interfaith Service and Community Forum at Ebenezer Baptist Church.” Website of the United States Department of Justice. December 1, 2014. Web. January 7, 2016.
    • Kember, Sarah, and Joanna Zylinska. Life After New Media. Cambridge: MIT P, 2012. Print.
    • Krauss, Roland E. A Voyage on the North Sea: Art in the Age of the Post-Medium Condition. New York: Thames and Hudson, 2000. Print.
    • McCulloch, Robert. “No Indictment: Brown Family Profoundly Disappointed; Pres. Obama To Speak Soon About Grand Jury Decision; Prosecutor: There was a full investigation.” Transcript. Anderson Cooper 360. CNN.com. 24 Nov. 2014. Web. 31 Jan. 2016.
    • ‘“Profoundly Disappointed’: Michael Brown Family Reacts to Lack of Indictment.” NBC News. NBC News. November 24, 2014. Web. November 20, 2015.
    • Russ, Joanna. To Write Like a Woman: Essays in Feminism and Science Fiction. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1995. Print.
    • Smooth, Jay. “On Walter Scott: ‘Why do they never try to save them?’” YouTube. YouTube, LLC. April 8, 2015. Web. November 30, 2015.
    • Zielinski, Siegfried. [. . . After the Media]: News from the Slow-Fading Twentieth Century. Minneapolis: Univocal, 2013. Print.
  • Accompanying Images:Leo Bersani and Cinematic Fascination

    Mikko Tuhkanen (bio)

    Abstract

    During the half century of his writing, Leo Bersani has worked toward an onto-ethics/aesthetics of fascination in which cinema plays an important part. With the help of Proust, Sade, Caravaggio, Pasolini, and others, he outlines two modes of fascination: the spectator’s active exploration and evisceration of an enigmatic world, and his passive receptiveness to the world’s nonsignifying forms. Bersani proposes that these modes of cinematic fascination exemplify regimes of modern subjectivation, the ways in which we are taught to become who we are in our encounters with the world.

    Our concern with history … is a concern with preformed images already imprinted on our brains, images at which we keep staring while the truth lies elsewhere, away from it all, somewhere as yet undiscovered.W. G. Sebald, Austerlitz (72)

    … there is almost always something else going on.eLeo Bersani and Ulysse Dutoit, “Merde Alors” (29)

    In a recent recontextualization of the French philosopher’s work, Calum Watt suggests that we read Maurice Blanchot as a thinker of cinema. While Blanchot’s oeuvre includes only a few oblique references to films, Watt argues that his philosophy overlaps with film theory at the site of two concepts: the image and fascination. With Blanchot, these recurrent film-theoretical concepts undergo a productive estrangement. We can approach this estrangement by observing what Blanchot, in “The Two Versions of the Imaginary,” a central source for Watt in his effort to outline Blanchotian film theory, suggests is the undoing of Platonism in his concept of the image.1 In the Platonic tradition, the image comes after eidos, a copy of an anterior ideality; the second-order realm of images gives us a world of shadows, a distorted and depleted version of the real. While for Blanchot, too, the image coincides with something like the thing’s impoverishment, the implications of this relation differ from those organizing the Platonist schema. “The image, present behind each thing,” he writes, reversing the Platonic assumption that the real resides “behind” the image, “is like the dissolution of the thing and its subsistence in its dissolution” (“Two” 255). A “thing” unravels into its image, an unspooling in which a figure nevertheless “subsists.” The image endows the object with “a luminous formal aura,” but this luminosity is, as it were, blinding, for it pushes the thing toward formlessness, toward a “fundamental materiality” or “substance” bereft of any form (255). If the image stands “behind each thing,” there is in it a force that causes the thing’s undoing: what Blanchot calls, evoking Hamlet, “that heavy sleep of death in which dreams threaten” (255). In this sense, the corpse is a privileged exemplar of the image: “Something is there before us which is not really the living person, nor is it any reality at all. It is neither the same as the person who was alive, nor is it another person, nor is it anything else” (256). The corpse is the person’s impoverishment into image, his or her withdrawal toward pure materiality, the extensive network of being; it is “the absolute calm of something that has found its place” (256). But this doesn’t mean that the corpse resembles anything. The corpse is “absolutely himself,” “he resembles himself. The cadaver is its own image. … But what is it like? Nothing” (258). In this withdrawal into impersonality or anonymity, it becomes incomparable; the corpse, as image, coincides with the appearance of what Blanchot sometimes calls Quelqu’un, Someone.

    This capacity to evoke an anonymous singularity endows the image, whether as the “cadaverous resemblance” (259) or the work of art, with the force of fascination. Fascination, as Blanchot writes elsewhere, “is passion for the image [la passion de l’image],” in which the process of “seeing” undergoes a change: “Seeing presupposes distance, decisiveness which separates, the power to stay out of contact and in contact avoid confusion. … But what happens when what you see, although at a distance, seems to touch you with a gripping contact, when the manner of seeing is a kind of touch, when seeing is contact at a distance?” (“Essential” 32; “Solitude” 25). With the phrase “contact at a distance,” Blanchot evokes philosophy’s recurrent debate concerning “action at a distance,” the idea of influences that operate without apparent contact. This problematic is addressed by ancient and medieval commentators as fascination, a tradition that is extended in Francis Bacon’s philosophy and then in the popular arts to which Franz Anton Mesmer lends his name.2 Blanchot continues: “What happens [in fascination] is not an active contact, not the initiative and action which there still is in real touching. Rather, the gaze gets taken in [le regard est entraîné], absorbed by an immobile movement and a depthless deep” (“Essential” 32; “Solitude” 25). Fascinated subjects are idle, workless; theirs is the passivity that Blanchot calls désœuvrement.

    When Blanchot writes that “fascination is passion for the image,” he summarizes what many commentators have had to say about cinema. Since the earliest admonitions concerning the new technology’s dangerously hypnotic influence, the history of film theorizing has been a history of fascination. Apart from contributing to this tradition, Blanchot anticipates—in some cases, prompts—the emergent interest in the history of fascination in the work of such scholars as Sibylle Baumbach, Andreas Degen, Hans Ulrich Seeber, Michel Thys, and Brigitte Weingart. In what follows, I propose that Leo Bersani continues the practice of depicting film as one of modernity’s fascinating technologies; he does this, moreover, in ways that are in deep sympathy with Blanchot’s thought. Like Blanchot’s, his oeuvre is a fecund archive for scholars interested in the persistent discourse of fascination.

    While Watt points out the relevance of Blanchot’s work to theorizing film, Bersani is more obviously a thinker of cinema.3 Since his first sustained discussion of the artform, an analysis of Pier Paolo Pasolini’s Salò, or the 120 Days of Sodom (1975) in “Merde Alors” (1980; cowritten with Ulysse Dutoit), he has turned to film with increasing frequency to elaborate his onto-ethics and aesthetics.4 To outline this elaboration, I offer a comparative gloss of “Merde Alors” and the recent essay “Staring,” a reading of Bruno Dumont’s Humanité (1999). The two pieces, written some forty years apart, open and close Bersani’s most recent book, Receptive Bodies (2018). Bookending the study, they allow us to observe the movement of Bersani’s film-theoretical thought, the way he returns, and returns again, to a set of questions across the decades. One of the questions that persistently appears there concerns fascination. Cinematic fascination exemplifies an enthrallment that, despite all avowals about modernity’s disenchantment, infects how we encounter the world.

    The term is used in “Merde Alors” and “Staring” but in seemingly contradictory senses. As Bersani writes in the introduction to Receptive Bodies, cinema prompts an investigative attitude from the spectator: the screen spectacle provokes “looking, probing, and detecting” (xi). Cinema evokes our will to know: we are invited to plunge the subjective depths of our others so that we can discover what resides in us, the strangeness of our own pleasures. Yet this mode of interrogative spectatorship carries within it a potentiality for another way of relating to the image, one that Bersani, in his commentary on Humanité, calls “staring.” The protagonist of Dumont’s film suggests a connectivity beyond modernity’s emphasis on interrogating the other’s enjoyment. In this way, cinema can model, perhaps precipitate, “modes of intimacy no longer centered on sex and on an obsessive, invasive curiosity about the other’s personality, and, more pointedly, about the secrets of the other’s desires” (Receptive 25). Yet if it gives us another form of capture apart from the “paranoid fascination” with which we approach the other in modernity, the new mode of relatedness—our “staring”—remains a “fascination.”

    This essay makes an argument for Bersani as a theorist of cinematic fascination. Like Gilles Deleuze’s work on cinema, Bersani’s writings on film elaborate the concerns evident in his other, non-film-theoretical texts. To make the connection, I propose that “the Proustian subject” is an important precursor to the cinematic subject in Bersani. If Marcel, in his “anxiously strained attention to the world,” becomes a passive recipient of the world’s otherness, this “passivity both exacerbates the distinction between subject and object and positions the subject for a more or less secretly wished-for relation of mastery to the object. The subject’s illusion of contributing nothing to the encounter [between him and the world] promotes the further illusion of his being able to ‘know’ the world, to penetrate and appropriate otherness” (Bersani and Dutoit, “Critical” 124). In his fascinated capture by an alien world that he strains to appropriate through knowledge, Marcel is the modern subject par excellence, the Cartesian being who, as Charles Taylor writes, “gains control through disengagement” (160). But the question of passivity or disengagement is more complicated than the above quotation from Bersani and Dutoit would suggest. To outline the concept’s intrication in Bersani’s thinking, I make occasional recourse to the clinical work of Michel Thys. If Marcel’s fascinated passivity exemplifies the dualisms whose hegemony in modernity Bersani traces to Cartesian philosophy, Thys tells us that fascination is in fact the frightening experience of the self’s disappearance in—merging with—the other. As he writes, fascination constitutes “a paralysing state of loss of self, where the subject is radically captured by an object from which it is hardly separate”; it “can … be understood as a kind of congealing confusion between self and the object” (Thys, “On Fascination” 633, 634). Read jointly, Bersani and Dutoit’s argument about Marcel and Thys’s clinical observations suggest that fascination names the subject’s cleaving, that is, at once an adhesion to and a separation from the other; it indicates the radicalization and the undoing of the subject/object dichotomy. Bersani observes this contradiction, albeit implicitly, nowhere more clearly than in his commentary on cinema in “Merde Alors” and “Staring.”

    ________

    Two apparently contradictory assumptions, then, organize Bersani’s film theorizing in “Merde Alors” and “Staring.” In the latter piece, Bersani suggests that cinema seduces the spectator into Cartesian modernity’s hegemonic mode of relationality, one premised, first, on the division between the subject and the object and, second, on knowledge as that which bridges the gap between the cogito and the world. The medium of film assumes a world in which the knower and the known—in Cartesian language, res cogitans and res extensa—are willed into being by a constitutive gap. Bersani writes in the concluding chapter of Receptive Bodies: “Film … constitutively privileges sight and sound as conducive to knowledge” insofar as the medium relies on “a frequently intricate play between showing and hiding, exposure and concealment” (112). Cinema invites the spectator onto a path of investigative desire, one where they seek the knowledge apparently secreted by the images on the screen. This entails a doubled gesture: the world enthralls the subject by at once offering and withholding its purported secrets.

    Bersani’s description of cinematic subjectivation—the spectator’s seduction into an interrogative mindset by a rhythmic “showing and hiding, exposure and concealment”—strikes a familiar theme in his oeuvre. In his earlier work, he repeatedly described the Proustian subject in an analogous way. A representative of the modern subject in his determination to penetrate the secrets of the world, Marcel is solicited by various love objects, which seem to tantalize him with a knowledge he yearns to possess: they seductively offer themselves as carriers of his being, yet also turn away from him, refusing to disclose their mysteries. Such objects, as Proust’s narrator observes, “appeared to be concealing, beneath what my eyes could see, something which they invited me to approach and seize from them, but which, despite all my efforts, I never managed to discover” (Remembrance 1.182). “Marcel is tempted to see things and people as puzzles to be solved,” Bersani writes in A Future for Astyanax: Character and Desire in Literature (1976). “He stares at [worldly objects] in order to force them to reveal a truth they seem to be both proposing and concealing” (87). Suggesting a secret, and then refusing access to it, the objects capture the subject, who now assumes that what is being withheld from him is nothing less than the truth of his being: “In Proust, it is precisely at the moment when the loved one turns away from her lover—becomes most mysterious, most inaccessible—that she (or he) is rediscovered within the lover—as if that essential secret being pursued by the lover were the lover’s own secret, his own otherness” (Bersani, “Death” 864).

    Marcel is thus called onto his search by an enigmatic world: “The address excites him, and he strains to penetrate the secret being simultaneously offered and withheld” (Caravaggio’s 66). In this description, which comes from Bersani and Dutoit’s study of Caravaggio, at stake is, again, the doubled gesture of suggesting and withdrawing, offering and withholding. This twofold address is similarly evident in the seductiveness of Caravaggio’s models. Analyzing paintings such as Bacchino Malato and The Fruit Vendor, Bersani and Dutoit note that the models at once offer their bodies to and turn away from the viewer: “the soliciting move toward the viewer, and the self-concealing move away from the viewer” constitute a “double movement” that should be “qualif[ied] as erotic. … It is … the movement away that fascinates, indeed that eroticizes the body’s apparent (and deceptive) availability” (Caravaggio’s 3). As Bersani puts it elsewhere, “the seductive young boys … freeze the viewer in an imaginary relation of erotic, paranoid fascination, in the Lacanian sense”; Caravaggio’s “enigmatic boy[s]” produce, or solicit into existence, “the fascinated viewer” (“Secrets” 59). Captured by the objects’ fascination (a relational mode that, as Bersani implies, one finds theorized in Lacanian psychoanalysis, too), the subject/viewer wants to solve—to (dis)solve or digest, we might say, heeding Proust’s tropes of appetition—the other who embodies the enigma. In this way, Caravaggio’s paintings position the viewer in what will be Marcel’s “most characteristic relation to the external world, … a devouring one; [Proust’s] metaphors generally function as sublimated incorporations. They ‘solve’ the mystery of otherness by digesting it” (Caravaggio’s 68). The teasing performance of an enigmatic world solicits the subject into being, not only flaunting the world’s otherness but also implanting a mysterious interiority in him. This interiority is called “the erotic” or “sexuality,” a mode of being-in-the-world that entails, as its desiring aim, the worldly objects’ liquidation.

    Echoing phrases he used to characterize Proust and Caravaggio, Bersani proposes in “Staring” that cinema constitutes—is constituted as—a vehicle for the dynamic of desire that he has identified in Proust’s narrator and the viewer are captured by Caravaggio’s sexy models. The Proustian subject is endowed with the two major characteristics that Bersani frequently attaches to Cartesian modernity: the subject’s separation from the world and the subject’s mode of negotiating this separation by approaching the other via knowledge. Scholars have frequently characterized fascination as an affective reaction to incomprehension: one is arrested by a teasing enigma, just out of reach. Fascination, as Ackbar Abbas writes, constitutes “any experience that captures our attention without at the same time submitting entirely to our understanding” (348); “ignorance,” Roland Barthes says, “is the very nature of fascination” (Roland 3). In Blanchot, too, a fascinated relation is figured as “essentially opposed to comprehension” (Watt 28).5 The fundamental separation of the self from the other elicits the kind of epistemic appetite that organizes Marcel’s relation to objects: he is paralyzed in his hunger for—his hunger to know—the other.

    In this, the modern subject is constituted as a fascinated being. The importance of this mode of encountering the world is indicated by its inscription in some of the most familiar documents of European modernity. In Joseph Conrad’s Heart of Darkness (1902), the otherness that is Africa calls Marlow with the force of a fascinating enigma: “Watching a coast as it slips by the ships is like thinking about an enigma,” the narrator muses. “There it is before you—smiling, frowning, inviting, grand, mean, insipid, or savage, and always mute with an air of whispering—Come and find out” (16). The continent fascinates because it flaunts, and then conceals, mysteries that, as it turns out, must be about the inquisitive spectator himself. Represented by the river that stretches out like a serpent, this world is “irresistibly fascinating” in that it “whisper[s] to [us] things about [ourselves] which [we do] not know” (57).6 In Receptive Bodies, Bersani suggests that the cinematic spectator, like the Proustian (and, we add, the Conradian) subject, is an epistemophilic being, caught by an obsession to make the world’s enigmas transparent. The cinematic medium invites an investigative zeal from the spectator: in Bersani’s reading, this constitutes what Laura Mulvey calls “the fascination of film” (“Visual” 14)—or “the fascination of cinema” (Fetishism 56)—and Abbas “the fascination of the cinematic” (363). Soliciting this mode of spectatorial attention and pleasure, cinema orients the spectator to the world in a typically modern attitude: by rendering what is out there at once enigmatic and knowable.

    However, if Bersani sees in cinematic spectatorship the construction of the fascination typical to the modern episteme’s imperialist volonté de savoir, another potentiality subsists in the cinematic address. Writing with Dutoit, he briefly alludes to this possibility in “Merde Alors,” the opening chapter of Receptive Bodies. In the essay, Bersani and Dutoit speak of “film’s potential for a vertiginous passivity (its eagerness merely to register)” (“Merde” 31; Receptive 13). If cinema calls forth an epistemophilic ardor in the spectator, it also has the capacity to reduce the spectator to a passive recipient of the image. This immobility is different from—yet, again, not unrelated to—the ravenous passivity that Bersani and Dutoit assign to Marcel (“Critical” 124). While the Proustian narrator’s passivity both separates him from the world and orients him to its otherness through knowledge, the vertigo promoted by cinema can neutralize the subject’s epistemological ambition. The spectator can receive the visible without the sense-making impulse that drives Marcel’s apprehension of the world’s signs. Rather than speculation about the psychological motivation of filmic characters, such receiving is, as Bersani and Dutoit write elsewhere, “our only legitimate activity [as spectators]: the activity of looking and of registering what we see. To explore [characters’] psychology is to play the game of the enigmatic signifier—that is, to be complicit with the anti-cinematic visuality it embodies” (Forms of Being 51). The psychoanalysis that conceptualizes anthropobecoming as a process in which the subject is called into existence by an other’s enigmatic address is an exemplar of modernity’s epistemodisciplinary schematizations. In this role, psychoanalysis betrays the potential that cinema at best evokes. Rather than “knowing” the world, the cinematic subject, in contrast to the psychoanalytic one, seeks “merely to register” what is made available, what there is to see, of the world. In this, cinema solicits “a promiscuous mobility” unconstrained by efforts to make sense of—to know and understand—the world’s spectacles (“Merde” 31; Receptive 14).

    Bersani’s two contrasting statements, about the cinematic will to knowledge and about the spectator’s “vertiginous” passivity, seem to have been inserted into the wrong essays. I say this because if “Merde Alors” is about anything, it is about the sadistic zeal to know—and, in the process, to eviscerate—the other, a procedure that, according to Bersani and Dutoit, Pasolini’s film investigates by transposing Sade’s narrative to fascist Italy; and because Bersani reads Humanité, on the other hand, as a case study in the mode of passive, contemplative, non-curious “staring” that cinema can offer the spectator as an alternative to modern culture’s volonté de savoir. Yet the apparent miscontextualization indicates the co-implication of the two modes of looking; the forms of spectatorship subsist as each other’s potentialities. That both orientations are, as Bersani implies in the two essays, forms of fascination suggests their intimate, dangerous proximity.

    Bersani and Dutoit argue that Salò is an experiment with the subjective mode of encountering otherness whose purified form one finds outlined in Sade’s The 120 Days of Sodom. Here, the other appears as the source of jouissance insofar as the world’s suffering recalls the subject’s constitutive ébranlement. According to Bersani and Dutoit, the excitement of Sade’s executioners at the sight of their victims anticipates Freud’s argument according to which the pain inflicted on the victim can be “enjoyed masochistically by the [sadist] through his identification of himself with the suffering object” (Freud 126, qtd. in “Merde” 24; Receptive 3-4). What makes this identification peculiarly seductive is that such moments recall the human subject’s early experiences of helplessness, the Hilflosigkeit engendered by the human organism’s catastrophically premature individuation. Following Freud, Jean Laplanche speculates that the infant survives his early life by turning the world’s deadly assault—deadly because the speechless being lacks all capacity to bind the overwhelming stimuli—into masochistic ecstasy, an experience that, as Freud seems to infer from his clinical observations, is constitutive of consciousness. Freud begins to suspect that, rather than outlining a minor variant of sexual life, in theorizing masochism he is in fact sketching an account of hominization. On this account, sexuality—the psychoanalytic name for the human condition—becomes “a tautology for masochism” (“Merde” 25; Receptive 5), an idea whose importance for Bersani is indicated by the frequent repetition of the phrase in his subsequent texts.7

    In some of his best-known texts—most notably, in “Is the Rectum a Grave?” (1987)—Bersani proposes that this “shattering” can counteract or neutralize the paranoid imperative that he sees driving Marcel, the modern epistemophilic subject par excellence. It can, as he writes, be cultivated into “our primary hygienic practice of nonviolence” (Is 30) insofar as its ecstasy implicates us in—scatters us into—the world that we otherwise try to appropriate and master. In a 1997 interview, Bersani claims that by theorizing ébranlement, he aims “to move to a different relation to otherness, not one based in paranoid fascination but one that might use the masochistic element in the confrontation productively” (Is 177). Yet a crucial problem—one that sounds in easily missed minor chords in “Is the Rectum a Grave?” but occupies center stage in “Merde Alors”—is illustrated by Sade’s libertines and Pasolini’s fascists. They seek shattering by compulsively staging the world’s suffering. If our constitutive enjoyment—”sexuality as a tautology for masochism”—is vicariously accessed through identification with an other’s pain, its repetition is dependent on the continued witnessing of such torture. Hence, the subject of “derived sadism” precipitates scenes through which he can relive his originary trembling. “If erotic stimulation depends on the perceived or fantasized commotion of others,” Bersani and Dutoit write, “it becomes reasonable to put others into a state of maximal commotion” (“Merde” 24; Receptive 3). It is particularly the narrativization of historical violence—the compelling stories of past atrocities—that facilitates this form of “mimetic sexuality.” We often hear that, in order to avoid repeating the past, we must keep recalling history’s outrages, a remembering that takes place mostly in the stories we tell of our devastating errors. “A major trouble with this,” Bersani and Dutoit propose, “is that the immobilization of a violent event invites a pleasurable identification with its enactment. … Centrality, the privileged foreground, and the suspenseful expectation of climaxes contributes to a fascination with violent events on the part of readers and spectators” (“Merde” 28; Receptive 10). In this way, the subject of ébranlement is not clearly distinguished from the one whose embodiment Bersani finds in Marcel and, more disturbingly, in the Italian fascists of Salò. Both seek their selves by pulling the world apart, by enjoying their others in dismembering them. Similarly, when Bersani writes in Homos (1995) that “AIDS has made us fascinating” (19, emphasis in original), he means that the spectacle of dying young men solicits the kind of projected masochism that Freud theorizes.

    But there are various ways to sink into fascinated passivity. If “narrativity sustains the glamour of historical violence” (“Merde” 28; Receptive 9), Dumont’s Humanité models another mode of fascination for Bersani. Like À la recherche du temps perdu, Dumont’s film details its protagonist’s “search” (Receptive 109), his attempt to solve a mystery. It narrates a criminal investigation, led by the protagonist Pharaon de Winter, into the rape and murder of an eleven-year-old girl. The film opens with Pharaon’s inspection of the murder scene, a sight (given in detail by the camera) that, as Bersani writes, leaves him gazing in stunned blankness at a world “uninhabitable” for its incomprehensible violence (Receptive 107). His looking is marked by a “fixed, perhaps fascinated but affectless gaze,” a “wide-eyed stare” with which he takes in his surroundings; his is “a strangely neutral fascination with an alien world” (Receptive 111, 110). Fascination is, indeed, the appropriate orientation for Pharaon: as a detective facing a crime scene, we expect him to attend to and to “fill in” what Roland Barthes calls, in his analysis of the structure of detective stories, “the fascinating and unendurable interval separating the event from its cause” (“Structure” 189). A crime occurs, pulling causality out of joint; the detective’s task is to reveal the secrets that have motivated the rupture and, by bringing the perpetrators to justice, to restore order. Suturing the fascinating wound that the crime has opened in a community, “the detective,” as Barthes continues, “becomes the modern figure of the ancient solver of riddles (Oedipus), who puts an end to the terrible why of things” (189). In this account, detective stories narrate the return to an originary balance by neutralizing the disequilibrium that the crime has introduced.

    As much as Proust’s novel follows Marcel’s efforts to penetrate the enigmas with which the world taunts him—this is why Bersani calls it an “epistemological detective story” (Death 41; Culture 114)—the narrative in Humanité concerns the detective’s attempt to make sense of the brutal killing. Both Marcel and Pharaon are spellbound by the mysteries that the world has staged for them. Yet while the fascinated gaze suggests his epistemophilic capture by the enigma of the crime—a fascination that seeks its own undoing in the solving of the murder—Dumont’s detective simultaneously embodies another mode of looking. Bersani notes Pharaon’s impassive staring at various, and often bewilderingly trivial, details in his surroundings. As much as he looks for clues that would help him reveal the criminal and explain the crime, the camera also registers his fixed gazing at material objects around him: the sweaty neck of his superior, the swollen belly of a sow, the sliver of blue sky in a painting. In them, the film medium’s seduction of its viewers by Proustian enigmatics is complicated by the protagonist’s capture by a series of “unsignifying yet absorbing objects” (Receptive 110). While they “absorb” the detective like the signs and signifiers that fascinate the Proustian/Laplanchean subject, the objects at which the detective stares in fascination imply no revelatory knowledge. Rather than luring the detective with the promise of repressed truths, they offer more of the world in its dumb materiality. In this way, the objects of Pharaon’s affectless fascination should be compared to what Bersani and Dutoit, in their analysis of Terrence Malick’s The Thin Red Line (1998), call “interestingly insignificant images” (Forms of Being 175), images that, as they frequently put it, “absorb” the spectator.

    The capture of Dumont’s protagonist is, in other words, of a peculiar kind. Rather than the penetrative eye that guides Marcel’s recherche, Pharaon’s is an “empty, monotonous, yet intense staring at the world in which such acts [as the girl’s rape and murder] can take place” (Receptive 109). In this, Pharaon exemplifies the affective paralysis that Michel Thys observes in his patients. As Thys writes, the overbearing proximity of the object arrests the subject in his tracks while simultaneously depleting him of affect: “Fascination neutralizes all affect,” producing a state of “sterile attention” (“On Fascination” 638, 636). He describes this affectlessness as a “freezing of feeling” (638): one hits fascination at the “affective freezing point” (639); it is “a frozen confusion in relation to an exclusive object” (643). Bersani similarly draws our attention to “the frozen state of [Pharaon’s] negotiations with the world” (Receptive 116). He also says that Caravaggio’s beautiful boys, offering and withholding their gifts, “freeze the viewer” into a “fascinated” posture (“Secrets” 59). Such frozenness indicates the immobility associated with fascination, the dangerous paralysis in front of the deadly object, presently opening its maw to accommodate the victim. Yet the contrastive coordinating conjunction in Bersani’s characterization of the detective’s stunned look as “fascinated but affectless” (Receptive 111) also implies that the more familiar modes of fascination are in fact anything but “affectless.” The contrast is intended to remind us of the fascination exemplified by Marcel, Pasolini’s fascists, and the homophobes celebrating the ravages of AIDS, all intensively shaken—most certainly not “affectively frozen”—in their search for the secrets of enigmatic objects. What Thys calls “the frozen state of fascination” (“On Fascination” 647) is, in the Bersanian context, but one style of fascinated attention. Moreover, this style—even in its precipitation of “the fear of annihilation” (641ff.)—offers an alternative to the one where the subject is goaded by the enigmatic signifier into a search whose goal is the world’s devastation.

    Pharaon’s “frozen” staring constitutes an “epistemologically useless” (Receptive 112) taking-in of the world. Bersani suggests that, even though Dumont’s protagonist is a detective, he does not primarily seek to neutralize the violence that immobilizes him into paralytic receptivity by rendering it comprehensible (identifying the perpetrator); unlike Marcel, he does not attempt to solve the world’s enigmas with the intention of understanding his own place in the once-again familiar, mappable world. In contrast with Marcel’s epistemophilic orientation, “Pharaon’s stare reads nothing” (Receptive 109). It refuses to, or cannot, metabolize the devastating violence of the crime by resolving it into an “epistemological detective story.” At the same time, his gaze does not bespeak the thrill of derived sadism, the ethically dubious and often unacknowledged pleasure—also a fascination—that motivates our eager viewing of representations of historical atrocities. Consequently, his movements in the world have a pace different from Marcel’s swerving from one object to another in his search for the key to his being, and different as well from the intense rhythms of narrative violence Bersani and Dutoit point to in Sade and Assyrian art in The Forms of Violence: Narrative in Assyrian Art and Modern Culture (1985). Rather than the eye that eagerly follows the storyline to its climax, the detective story in Humanité evokes a different kind of captivation.

    ________

    The passivity that Bersani attaches to fascination in Humanité, and that he suggests it is our ethical imperative to develop in Cartesian modernity, bucks the trend of conceptualizing spectatorship in contemporary, post-1968 film theory. At the intersection of Brechtian alienation techniques, Althusserian ideology critique, and Lacanian psychoanalysis, the strands of film theorizing known as “apparatus theory” and “Screen theory” sought to break the thrall that cinema was thought to wield over the spectator. As Bertolt Brecht writes, the illusionist aesthetics typical to the tradition of the “total work of art” renders “the spectator … a passive (suffering) part of the Gesamtkunstwerk. This sort of magic must of course be contested. Everything that aims to produce hypnosis, or is bound to produce undignified intoxication, or makes people befuddled, must be abandoned” (75). With the force of “magic” and “hypnosis,” bourgeois theater continues, unbeknownst to us, the dark arts (religion and other forms of superstitious thought) that Enlightenment rationality was supposed to have deactivated so that we could face our lives “with sober senses [mit nüchternen Augen]” (Marx and Engels, Manifesto 476; Manifest 465). Instead, we remain, as Brecht writes, “intoxicated,” our eyes clouded over by a spell that makes us misrecognize the world and our place in it. To overcome such bewitchment, political art must make its strategies of enchantment explicit, must reveal to the spectator how the trick of representation is pulled off.

    Post-1968 film theory similarly argues that cinema functions ideologically as long as it covers over the constructedness of its representations; echoing not only Brecht but also early commentators on cinema, its representatives frequently suggest that film exerts its influence with a thrall akin to hypnosis, a tendency that Jacques Derrida evokes as he attributes to cinema “a kind of hypnotic fascination” (23).8 The task of avant-garde cinema was to denaturalize representation and thereby strip ideology of its deceptive devices, as much as the ideology critique formulated most influentially by Louis Althusser sought to disable bourgeois glamor. If, in covering over the processes by which its realistic illusions were produced, cinema was “an ideological machine” (Baudry 44), an analytic approach to film sought “a disentangling of the fascination” that cinema exerts (Bellour 97). Psychoanalytically oriented film theorists proposed that cinema’s peculiar enchantment resided in its ability to repeat or echo the construction of subjectivity. For this argument—that the experience at the movie theater replicated subjectivation—they turned to Jacques Lacan’s account of the imaginary ego’s emergence in the mirror stage. For these commentators, the movie screen functioned much like the mirror in which the infant mis(re)cognizes herself, a miscognition brought about by—as Lacan writes, borrowing the term from Henri Wallon and surrealism—”the fascinating image” (Lacan and Cénac 122). In this model, the ethical ambition of film theorizing consists of “an attempt to disengage the cinema-object from the imaginary and to win it for the symbolic” (Metz 14).

    The Brechtian theory of spectatorship was thus reformulated with Althusserian ideology critique and the Lacanian account of subject constitution in film theory that emerged after 1968. Citing Brecht’s analysis of the legerdemain typical of the Gesamtkunstwerk, Colin MacCabe paraphrases the argument in 1975: “What is important … is that in the separation of the elements [of the total work of art] the spectator gets separated out of this unity and homogeneity—this passivity—in order to enter into an active appropriation of the scenes presented to him” (“Politics” 48). The activity in which the spectator engages is conducive to “the production of knowledge”: “Rather than the text compact with its own meaning, a text which confers a unity and gives a position to the subject, we want a text whose fissures and differences constantly demand an activity of articulation from the subject”; this work of articulation renders explicit “the contradictions of the reader’s position within and without the cinema” (“Politics” 48). Exploiting the energies inherent in the contradictions that infest ideological representations, such consciousness-raising counteracts the subject’s suture by the artwork: when the wound of antagonism is torn open, the subject morphs from a “passive consumer” (“Politics” 54) to a “reader as producer” (MacCabe, “Realism” 25), an active, knowledgeable coworker in the world’s (re)construction. This program is informed by what Althusser calls the Brechtian effort to establish “a critical and active relation” between the audience and theater (Althusser, “‘Piccolo” 146).

    Bersani never explicitly refers to this genealogy of film theorizing. Yet something of a nod to the tradition is perhaps discernable in his and Dutoit’s observation that in Salò one finds “no Brechtian distancing from Sade” (“Merde” 30; Receptive 12). Pasolini does not approach Sade the way that the cinematic subject is supposed to approach film, according to apparatus theory (by distancing himself from its ideological illusions in order to neutralize their interpellative power). Indeed, Sade seems more Brechtian than Pasolini: the latter strips the story of its most grotesque, and hence alienating, aspects, thereby denying the spectator the consolation of a distance from Sade’s intense (and, at the same time, reassuringly absurd) violence (“Merde” 27; Receptive 7-8). Instead of an ideology critique—demonstrating, say, how we can disentangle ourselves from the sadism that the bourgeois or fascist state formations have produced—Pasolini assumes the rhythms of the Sadean world, passively replicating the forms, and carrying on the movements, inherent in its narratives. As Bersani and Dutoit write, “Pasolini’s most original strategy in Salò is to distance himself from his Sadean protagonists by going along with them. He duplicates that from which he wants to separate himself” (“Merde” 30; Receptive 12). This “going-along-with” allows something like the distancing that Brechtian/Althusserian film theory sees as art’s ethico-political duty. Distancing is not the result of ideology critique, not the “articulation” of the “contradictions” that riddle social formations, not an against-the-grain reading that, exposing all sorts of logical gaps, would deprive the carefully constructed text of its fascinating appeal. Rather, Pasolini models for us a way of moving with the world, a passivity that may nevertheless distract one from the violence that calls us by our name. “It is as if a fascinated adherence,” Bersani and Dutoit write, “were, finally, identical to a certain detachment” (“Merde” 31; Receptive 13).

    The privileged figure of such dismissive synchrony in Salò is the pianist who, with very little diegetic function, appears in numerous scenes. She can be seen in the background as the libertines tell their narratives of torture; once she takes the center stage to reenact, with comically exaggerated gestures, a story; and then, toward the end of the film, she leaps to her death from a window. No psychological explanations are offered for either her presence or ultimate self-absenting. As Bersani and Dutoit write, she is at once “enigmatic” (“Merde” 32, 33; Receptive 15, 16) and “unsignifying” (“Merde” 34; Receptive 17). She can be aligned with the enigmas that evoke the Laplanchean-Proustian subject’s work of translating the world’s dispatches into one’s native idiom; yet she also reminds us of the objects that compel Pharaon’s fascination beyond the clues that, suturing the disruption caused by criminal breach with an explanatory narrative, would bring the world back to equilibrium. Her presence is “a portentous but impenetrable blankness”; her face “tells us nothing”; she “simply goes along with things” (“Merde” 32; Receptive 15, 16). A pianist, she is, as we say, an accompanist: in her, “what we recognize is nothing more than our pleasure at being carried along as spectators. It is as if the ease with which we ‘go along’ with Salò‘s sadists includes a folding movement of cognition—a repliage which constitutes our simply recognizing that ease. Thus the distance Pasolini takes from his subject consists in an excessive indulgence toward his subject; he moves away from images and styles by duplicating them rather than ‘criticizing’ or ‘opposing’ them” (“Merde” 31; Receptive 13). Unlike the methods of ideology critique or resisting reading, Pasolini offers in the pianist a way of “going along” with the world, a passive “registering” that may derail or diminish—never negate, never eradicate—the world’s violence by locating enjoyments other than the intensive pleasures of derived sadism, the ecstasies of shattered egos. In her passivity, she models for us “non-imitative recognition,” in opposition to the “mimetic sexuality” with which Sade’s stories enthrall their listeners (“Merde” 31; Receptive 13).

    If film theorizing in the 1970s followed Brecht’s call for a participatory art by modeling a spectator able to dissect the images that solicited identification (what MacCabe calls the “active[ly] appropriati[ve]” as opposed to “passive[ly] consum[ing]” viewer [“Politics” 48, 54]), Bersani’s refusal to privilege the activity of “critique” or “opposition” can be understood as an effort to avoid one’s capture within the strictures of an epistemophilially organized world. The consciousness-raising that is the traditional method of ideology critique assumes both the separation of the subject from the world—indeed, their potential, salubrious opposition—and the efficacy of knowledge in negotiating this gap. As MacCabe writes, the “active” subject espoused by ideology critique enables “the production of knowledge,” a production that, typically to representatives of apparatus theory and Screen theory, he illustrates by turning to psychoanalysis. He gives us an account of early infant development, which privileges the subject’s constitution via its separation from the object as it appears in various developmental stages (the breast, the feces, and the phallus). The separation of the subject from the object is the condition for the emergence of language insofar as it is the object’s withdrawal that produces the protolanguage gesture of the cry; in their “perpetual play of presence and absence,” such objects turn the infant into a being of language (“Politics” 48). MacCabe suggests that we read what psychoanalysis theorizes as separation—the achievement of an object-world—as analogous to the effort, in Brechtian theater, of disentangling the elements that go into constructing the illusions of the Gesamtkunstwerk. If the infant is embedded in language—a moment of hominization—through its separation from objects, ideology critique constitutes the work of (re)subjectivation: it awakens the subject into self-determining activity from slumberous suspension in ideological illusions. As Thys too suggests, the failure of separation is symptomized in the subject’s entrapment in fascination, his monopolization by an other that, deploying cinematic idiom, he describes as “an exclusive object, a colossal close-up” (“On Fascination” 635). Often drawing from psychoanalytic schemas, ideology critique analogously proposes that the inadequately individuated subject is susceptible to—or perpetuated by—the kind of ideological enthrallment that cinema, as part of the “culture industry,” is supposed to wield.

    MacCabe’s Brechtian/psychoanalytic account of separation demonstrates the adoption of the epistemic assumptions whose hegemony in modernity Bersani has spent his oeuvre elucidating and subverting. Criticism relies on the critic’s separation from the object of critique, as much as language cleaves the infant at the moment of the breast’s withdrawal. In executing this separation, moreover, the critic, like the newly speaking being, emerges in his fidelity to the epistemophilic world, where lack—the radical gap between the ipse and the other—precipitates the production of knowledge about the absented object. In order for us to “criticize” anything, we must apprehend or grasp the object, that is, arrest its movement through understanding. In the process, we bolster the subject/object dichotomy and prioritize knowledge as the technique of de-alienating the enigmatic world.

    If ideology critique is but part of modernity’s dialectic, Bersani proposes that, instead of the activity that film theory inherited from Brecht, art can gift us a “subversive passivity” (“Merde” 30; Receptive 30).9 In her non-oppositionality, her readiness to “go along with” the fascists’ stories, Pasolini’s pianist figures the rethinking of the separation that inflects the modern regime of subjectivation. Her mode of relatedness is that of accompaniment, of “being-With.” I take this phrase from a later chapter in Receptive Bodies where Bersani turns to the effort by Peter Sloterdijk, particularly in Bubbles (1998), the first volume of his Spheres trilogy, to conceptualize worldly orientations that are not premised on the assumption of primal separations. One of Sloterdijk’s targets is precisely the developmental schema that MacCabe evokes in his psychoanalytic transcription of Brecht. Sloterdijk proposes that psychoanalysis, with its “fixation on thinking in object relationships” (293), has been unable to hypothesize forms of relatedness—of “closeness,” a concept that he unfolds in Spheres—beyond the oppositionality of the self and the other. He suggests that we supplement the objects posited by developmental theory with “at least three pre-oral stages and forms of condition [that exist] before the supposedly primary oral phase” (293). These pre-oral entities—blood, voice, breath—”are not objects because they have no subject-like counterpart”; they are, in the phrase Sloterdijk borrows from Thomas Macho, “nobjects” (294).

    The move from objects to nobjects—deprivileging “the inherently confrontational nature of subject-object relations” that has occupied the modern imagination—may allow us to imagine what Bersani calls, evoking his favorite Foucauldian phrase, “new relational modes” (Receptive 97). We may do this by replacing our thinking of object relations—whose dualism, Bersani argues, psychoanalysis has inherited from Descartes—with “a less differential otherness that can be corporeally remembered as not yet objectified self-extensions” (Receptive 102). Rather than an ethical orientation toward radical unknowability (the apophatic God, the inscrutable Face of the Other, the enigmatic signifier, the ever-slippery différance, pointing to ideals always to-come), we can cultivate epistemically neutral relationships of being-with. Nobjectual relations can push us beyond the “old Western grammar” that has imprisoned psychoanalytic thinking (Sloterdijk 298).

    Apart from the accompanist to Pasolini’s libertines, Dumont’s protagonist is a figure of such being-with. Pharaon’s fascinated gaze at the world’s colorful flesh, much like the distractive actions of the pianist, exemplifies the “lateral divertissements” (“Merde” 29; Receptive 10) that may save the spectator from an obsessive fascination with either film’s stories of unfathomable suffering. If ours is, as Bersani and Dutoit write elsewhere, a “relational system limited by an obsession with knowledge” (Caravaggio’s 73), Pharaon’s fascination is of a different order, one attracted by nonenigmatic sameness. No decree of knowledge inflects the ethical stance of the spectator. Like the pianist, Pharaon suggests to us that “there is nothing ‘to know,’ only the consciousness of the movement in which we participate” (72). At such moments, Bersani offers a tentatively affirmative answer to his recurrent query whether we can even conceptualize “a nonsadistic type of movement” (Bersani and Dutoit, Arts 147), “a non sadistic relation to external reality” (Caravaggio’s 69). If this is possible—if we can cultivate interest in meeting our others beyond murderous jouissance—its potential is in a fascinated reading of the world. Yet the fact that the nonpenetrative and the epistemophilic gazes are embodied in the same character in Dumont’s film suggests that the two modes of fascination are not clearly separated but positioned on the continuum of a Möbius strip. They are each other’s dangerous supplements.

    Across “Merde Alors” and “Staring,” Bersani complicates the pleasures of witnessing sadistic tortures with Pharaon’s specular capture by an incomprehensibly beautiful and violent world. The lexical coincidence implies that Sadean desire cannot be conclusively neutralized by cultivating our participation in nonenigmatic concealment. Analogously, cinema’s ability to render the spectator a passive recipient of aesthetic play does not diminish its capacity to construct the spectator as an avid consumer of violent narratives. Bersani and Dutoit come to this conclusion in Caravaggio’s Secrets (1998). While they propose that Caravaggio’s paintings suggest how “the human fascination with the spectacle of violence [can be], as it were, deprogrammed,” they nevertheless add: “It could probably never be a question of eliminating the obscene fixation with the mechanics of violence … inasmuch as that fixation is, we believe, grounded in the excited but anguished interrogation of an originary enigmatic and invasive soliciting of our very being. If being human depends to a significant degree on that soliciting, then the paranoid aggression that is its consequence cannot be wholly erased” (Caravaggio’s 94). Bersani and Dutoit find in Caravaggio’s work a demonstration of “the impossibility of our ever detaching ourselves entirely from both imaginary and real sources of violence. We can never be entirely freed from our fascination with lack, with what is missing from our being and what we imagine as hidden in the other’s head” (Caravaggio’s 98). We will never have transcended our originary calling into paranoid relationality, a calling that initiates hominization; in this, we remain irredeemable.

    ________

    The film theory that unfolded in France and England after 1968 placed an ethico-political urgency on the spectator’s de-fascination or—if we heed Althusser’s insistence on ideology’s inescapability (“Marxism” 232-32)—re-fascination: defying our reflex to respond to authority’s call, resisting the lure of the image/imaginary, we would be able to see through the trick of representation. Conceptualized thus, ethical cinema requires that one engage representation actively, that one “work at it” (MacCabe, “Politics” 52), engage in the “work of decipherment, reading, elaboration of signs” (Comolli 140). In contrast, Blanchot’s account of cinema, as excavated by Calum Watt, suggests that the spectator’s fascinated relation to the image is necessarily one of worklessness. The Blanchotian spectator is captured by an object that sheds its “value” and “meaning”: “In the image, the object again grazes something which it had dominated in order to be an object. Now that its value, its meaning is suspended, now that the world abandons it to idleness [le monde l’abandonne au désœuvrement] and lays it aside, the truth in it ebbs, and materiality, the elemental, reclaims it. This impoverishment, or enrichment, consecrates it as image” (“Two” 256; “Deux” 347-48).

    In the image, the object is at once impoverished and enriched; it becomes less in order to become more. In these lines, we should hear Stéphane Mallarmé’s influence on Blanchot. When the object becomes an image, its “value” and “meaning [are] suspended” in the same way that, according to Mallarmé, poetry is characterized at once by language’s devaluing—withdrawn from circulation, the word loses its utility—and expansion, insofar as the poetized word regains its resonance (becomes, once again, sonant) with others from which it had to distinguish itself so as to achieve functional form, to operate in the system of language. In poetry, language “recovers … its virtuality” (Mallarmé, “Crisis” 43; “Crise” 368, my trans.).10 Mallarmé further suggests that, apart from disrupting language’s smooth economy by causing objects’ “vibratory disappearance [disparition vibratoire]” (“Crise” 368), poetry similarly annihilates the poet: “The pure work implies the elocutionary disappearance of the poet,” whose words “light up in reciprocal reflections like a virtual train of fire on precious stones [ils s’allument de reflets réciproques comme une virtuelle traînée de feux sur des pierreries]” (366). Both object and speaker vanish, are “virtualized,” in poetic expression.

    The antinomial quality Blanchot indicates in the above passage—the coincidence of “impoverishment” with “enrichment”—similarly characterizes Bersani’s philosophy, including his theorization of cinema. As in Blanchot, one of the sources for the idea in Bersani is Mallarmé. In the 1982 study The Death of Stéphane Mallarmé, he cites Blanchot’s idea that poetry is a “depersonalizing” or “de-realizing” medium insofar as in it language loses “its epistemological function”: “the self undergoes an ontological regression in poetry, it recedes into virtuality” (Death 42). If poetry virtualizes, so does cinema: both show how to unplug from the world rendered familiar through the production of knowable “personalities,” a production that Michel Foucault identifies as one of the central aspects of the modern dispositif. To use the term that Foucault coins in his effort to think his way through the fine grid of disciplinary modernity, poetry—and art in general—may occasion desubjectivation in its ability to dissolve the “I” in(to) fascination (Foucault 241). The idea of the self’s desiccation emerges in Bersani’s work under such various names as “betrayal,” “impoverishment,” “unnaming,” and—the neologism is borrowed from Samuel Beckett—”leastening.” Blanchot anticipates Foucault’s and Bersani’s argument about such undoing: “man,” he writes, “is unmade [défait] according to his image,” the image whose appearance induces fascination (“Two” 260; “Deux” 354).

    Drawing from his clinical observations, Thys similarly asserts that fascination, as the subject’s experience of “being radically sucked in by an all-embracing and overpowering object,” is “de-subjectivizing” (“On Fascination” 635). The subject is undone—devoured by the too-proximate object—in fascination, a loss that, contrary to the most valent of the term’s contemporary connotations, “is not at all enriching for the subject” (635). Although the fascinating object evokes “the fear of annihilation,” “the subject cannot allow itself to take a distance from the object because a fundamental part of the subject is stored in it. Taking a distance from the object is leaving oneself behind, which would entail signing one’s own death warrant. So the object is both life-threatening and necessary for one’s survival” (644). What would happen to such characterizations if we were to rethink the subject/object dichotomy beyond our training in Cartesian modernity? Is there a way to yield to the slow death, to one’s dissolution by the other, otherwise than through an experience of “annihilation”? It is precisely the potential for subjective dissolution that prompts Blanchot’s and Bersani’s interest in the phenomenon of fascination. Particularly for Bersani, the fascinated subject’s “freezing” coincides with a potentially new mode of connectivity. In this sense, the subject’s “cautious defrosting” will uncover a radically reorganized world (Thys, “On Fascination” 647).

    Thys echoes commentators—among them Blanchot—who have located fascination’s trigger in the experience of a teasing incomprehension: “the fascinating object,” he writes, “seems pregnant with a mysterious meaning, which for the time being doesn’t release itself” (“On Fascination” 646). Yet Bersani’s work helps us disambiguate forms of fascination by encouraging us to think doubly about the mysteries that call out to us: there is the Proustian mystery, where the fascinated subject’s unknown self is being secreted in and by the object; yet there is also the Dumontian form of this experience, where the subject’s attention perhaps continues to be solicited by the promise of the world’s redemption into meaning, but then extends into the pleasures of witnessing and participating in the formal play inherent in extension. One is a fascination prompted by the Proustian will-to-knowledge, the other a form of capture by an aesthetic pleasure, the world’s nonsignifying flesh. As a medium, cinema is apt to engage both: we are likely to be enthralled by the murder mystery in Humanité and the increasingly intense stories of sexual torture in Salò. But amidst these narratives we can also be seduced by the fleshiness of the chief inspector’s neck or the “lateral divertissements” that Pasolini weaves into—or out of—Sade’s stories (“Merde” 29; Receptive 10). If, as Bersani writes, human subjects “are educated into how they see themselves as being-in-the-world” (Is 150), we can learn to receive the fascinating world differently from the way it captures Marcel. Works of art, including films, can be vehicles for such retraining, the means by which we can begin to “de-Proustify ourselves” (Bersani, “Rigorously” 283). Blanchot implies this when he writes that, in fascination, the gaze is trained (entraîné) on but also by the enigmatic object (“Essential” 32; “Solitude” 25). Apart from evoking the fear of annihilation, the world that calls forth an epistemological and affective paralysis—that empties us out of the will to know, the will to revel in the other’s pain—can also be a site of our (always partial) deprogramming.

    Footnotes

    1. On Blanchot’s revision of Plato in this essay, see Watt 26-27; Hart 53-54; and Alanko-Kahiluoto 176-77.

    2. On “contact at a distance” in ancient and medieval texts, see Delaurenti; and Kovach esp. 204-13. On the idea’s continuation in Bacon, Mesmer, and Blanchot, see Weingart 86ff.

    3. Before Watt, Oliver Harris, in “Film Noir Fascination,” and Steven Shaviro, in “Film Theory and Visual Fascination,” had drawn English-speaking scholars’ attention to the possible connection between Blanchot and film theory.

    4. In what follows, page references to “Merde Alors” indicate both its original publication in the journal October and its reprinting in Bersani’s Receptive Bodies (2018).

    5. See also Weingart 72; and Baumbach 25-26. Oliver Harris writes that Blanchot’s own writing solicits fascination because of its opacity: “Blanchot’s account [of fascination] is so repetitious in its phrasing and of such opaque intellectual brilliance as to exercise its own form of fascination, because as a condition of radical perplexity, to be fascinated suspends the possibility of seizing experience and refuses decisive knowledge” (6).

    6. On fascination in Heart of Darkness, see Baumbach 211-18; and Seeber, “Surface.”

    7. See Bersani, “Representation” 7; Freudian 39, 89; Culture 36; Is 24. The argument concerning the human subject’s constitution-by-undoing in primary masochism enters Bersani’s oeuvre via Laplanche’s close reading of Freud in Life and Death in Psychoanalysis (1970) in the concluding chapter of A Future for Astyanax; this is subsequently elaborated in Baudelaire and Freud (1977), esp. chs. 6-7.

    8. Raymond Bellour (100ff.) is one of the 1970s film theorists to link cinema and hypnosis. On the imbrication of the reception of early cinema in discourses of mesmerism and hypnosis, see Andriopoulos esp. 116-23; and Curtis 135-40, 162ff.

    9. In “Film Theory and Visual Fascination” (1993), Steven Shaviro, too, finds an alternative to post-1968 theorization of spectatorship in Bersani. The value of Shaviro’s rethinking of cinematic fascination—whose primary goal, it should be recognized, is not to remain faithful to Bersani—is not diminished by the fact that he neglects to observe the distinction Bersani makes between two modes of fascinated spectatorship. In opposition to the distanciation efforts of apparatus theorists, Shaviro, citing The Freudian Body (and particularly the passages borrowed from “Merde Alors”), proposes as his methodology a ready acquiescence to the paralytic fascination that psychoanalytic and ideology-critical commentators, according to him, identify with unethical misrecognition: “My own masochistic theoretical inclination,” he writes, “is to revel in my bondage to images, to celebrate the spectatorial condition of metaphysical alienation, and ideological delusion, rather than strive to rectify it” (25). Consequently, he suggests, contradicting film theorizing of the 1970s and 1980s, that “we surrender to and revel in cinematic fascination, rather than distance ourselves from it with the tools of psychoanalytic reserve and hermeneutic suspicion. … Film … should … be praised as a technology for intensifying and renewing experiences of passivity and abjection” (65). This account, whose premises are drawn from the Laplanchean theory of projected masochism, is very much in line with Bersani’s methodology (and his onto-ethical account of the human), but with a crucial difference. Unlike Shaviro, Bersani, as I have indicated, distinguishes between two modes of fascination: apart from the masochistic pleasure of ébranlement, he delineates for us the distractive attention performed by Pasolini’s pianist and, later, Pharaon de Winter. Attending to these two interrelated affects, Bersani would remind us that, because the “delicious passivity” (Shaviro 56) of projected masochism entails the desire to witness objects’ undoing, it is urgent that we develop other modes of being implicated in—devoured by—the world.

    10. Bradford Cook translates sa virtualité as “its full efficacy.”

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    • —. “Les secrets du Caravage: Interview de Léo Bersani. / Sexy Paintings: Caravaggio’s Come-ons.” Interviewed by Alexandre Leupin, translated by C. Penwarden, Art Press, vol. 287, Feb. 2003, pp. 56-60. EBSCO, ebscohost.com/505047078.
    • Bersani, Leo, and Ulysse Dutoit. Arts of Impoverishment: Beckett, Rothko, Resnais. Harvard UP, 1993.
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    • Comolli, Jean-Louis. “Machines of the Visible.” The Cinematic Apparatus, edited by Teresa de Lauretis and Stephen Heath, St. Martin’s P, 1980, pp. 121-42.
    • Conrad, Joseph. Heart of Darkness. 1902. Edited by Robert Kimbrough, 3rd ed., W. W. Norton, 1988.
    • Curtis, Scott. The Shape of Spectatorship: Art, Science, and Early Cinema in Germany. Columbia UP, 2015.
    • Degen, Andreas. Ästhetische Faszination: Die Geschichte einer Denkfigur vor ihrem Begriff. Walter de Gruyter, 2017.
    • Delaurenti, Béatrice. “La Fascination et l’action à distance: questions médiévales (1230-1370).” Médiévales, vol. 50, 2006, pp. 137-53. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/43027311.
    • Derrida, Jacques. “Cinema and Its Ghosts: An Interview with Jacques Derrida.” 1998/2000. Interviewed by Antoine de Baecque and Thierry Jousse, translated by Peggy Kamuf, Discourse, vol. 37, no. 1-2, 2015, pp. 22-39. JSTOR, doi:10.13110/discourse.37.1-2.0022.
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    • Lacan, Jacques, and Michel Cénac. “A Theoretical Introduction to the Function of Psychoanalysis in Criminology.” 1951 (1950). Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English. 1966. Jacques Lacan, translated by Bruce Fink with Héloïse Fink and Russell Grigg, W. W. Norton, 2006, pp. 102-22.
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    • Metz, Christian. “The Imaginary Signifier.” Translated by Ben Brewster, Screen, vol. 16, no. 2, Summer 1975, pp. 14-76.
    • Mulvey, Laura. Fetishism and Curiosity. British Film Institute / Indiana UP, 1996.
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    • Pasolini, Pier Paolo, director. Salò, or the 120 Days of Sodom. 1975. Criterion, 2016.
    • Proust, Marcel. Remembrance of Things Past. Translated by C. K. Scott Moncrieff and Stephen Hudson, Wordsworth, 2006. 2 vols.
    • Sebald, W. G. Austerlitz. 2001. Translated by Anthea Bell, Modern Library, 2011.
    • Seeber, Hans Ulrich. Literarische Faszination in England um 1900. Universitätverlag Winter, 2012.
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    • Shaviro, Steven. “Film Theory and Visual Fascination.” The Cinematic Body, U of Minnesota P, 1993, pp. 1-65.
    • Sloterdijk, Peter. Bubbles. 1998. Translated by Wieland Hoban, Semiotext(e), 2011.
    • Taylor, Charles. Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity. Harvard UP, 1989.
    • Thys, Michel. Fascinatie: Een fenomenologisch-psychoanalytische verkenning van het onmenselijke. Boom, 2006.
    • —. “On Fascination and Fear of Annihilation.” International Journal of Psychoanalysis, vol. 98, no. 3, 2017, pp. 633-55. Wiley, doi:10.1111/1745-8315.12611.
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    • Weingart, Brigitte. “Contact at a Distance: The Topology of Fascination.” Rethinking Emotion: Interiority and Exteriority in Premodern, Modern, and Contemporary Thought, edited by Rüdiger Campe and Julia Weber, De Gruyter, 2014, pp. 72-100.

  • Notes on Contributors

    Ackbar Abbas Ackbar Abbas is Professor of Comparative Literature at UC Irvine. Previously, he was Chair of Comparative Literature and Co-Director of The Centre for the Study of Globalization and Cultures at the University of Hong Kong. Recent works include essays on Chinese cinema and urbanism, the art of Liu Dan and Antony Gormley, and a forthcoming collaborative volume on volatility in culture, politics, and finance.

    Eugenie Brinkema Eugenie Brinkema is Associate Professor of Contemporary Literature and Media at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Her articles on film, violence, affect, sexuality, and ethics have appeared in the journals Angelaki, Camera Obscura, Criticism, differences, Discourse, The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, qui parle, and World Picture. Her first book, The Forms of the Affects, was published with Duke University Press in 2014. Her forthcoming book, Life-Destroying Diagrams, is about radical formalism, horror, and love.

    Johanna Isaacson Johanna Isaacson is a Professor of English at Modesto Junior College and a founding editor of Blind Field journal. She has published articles on horror film and politics in venues such as Handbook of Marxism (Sage), Theory and Event, Commune, and Blind Field. She is the author of The Ballerina and the Bull: Anarchist Utopias in the Age of Finance (Repeater, 2016).

    Daryl Maude Daryl Maude is a PhD candidate in Japanese literature and critical theory at the University of California, Berkeley. He works on futurity and intimacy in modern Japanese and Okinawan literature, and is interested in queer, feminist, and postcolonial theory. His translation of Shinjo Ikuo’s “Male Sexuality in the Colony: On Toyokawa Zen’ichi’s ‘Searchlight’” appeared in Beyond Imperial Aesthetics: Theories of Art and Politics in East Asia, edited by Mayumo Inoue and Steve Choe, Hong Kong University Press, 2019.

    E. L. McCallum E. L. McCallum is Professor of English and Film Studies at Michigan State University. She has written Object Lessons: How to Do Things with Fetishism (SUNY, 1999) and Unmaking The Making of Americans: Toward an Aesthetic Ontology (SUNY, 2018). Her most recent book is After Queer Studies: Literature, Theory, and Sexuality in the 21st Century (Cambridge), coedited with Tyler Bradway and selected as a Choice Outstanding Academic Title in 2019. Recent essays have appeared in Quarterly Review of Film and Video and camera obscura. She’s now working on queer quantum theory and biosemiotics to analyze how art cinema represents the animacy of the nonhuman world.

    Carey James Mickalites Carey Mickalites is Associate Professor of English at the University of Memphis, where he teaches classes in modern and contemporary literature. He is the author of Modernism and Market Fantasy: British Fictions of Capital, 1910 – 1939. His current book project is on contemporary literary celebrity.

    Kwasu D. Tembo Kwasu David Tembo is a PhD graduate in the Language, Literatures, and Cultures department at the University of Edinburgh. His research interests include comics studies, literary theory and criticism, and philosophy, particularly the so-called “prophets of extremity” – Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, and Derrida. He has published on Christopher Nolan’s The Prestige in The Cinema of Christopher Nolan: Imagining the Impossible, ed. Jacqueline Furby and Stuart Joy (Columbia UP, 2015), and on Superman in Postscriptum: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Literary Studies (2017).

    Mikko Tuhkanen Mikko Tuhkanen is Professor of English at Texas A&M University, where he teaches African American and African-diasporic literatures, LGBTQ literatures, and literary theory. His recent books include Leo Bersani: A Speculative Introduction (2020), The Essentialist Villain: On Leo Bersan i (2018), and The Cambridge History of Gay and Lesbian Literature (2014), co-edited with E. L. McCallum. He has published essays in diacritics, differences, American Literature, Cultural Critique, Postmodern Culture, James Baldwin Review, and elsewhere.

    Calum Watt Calum Watt is an associate researcher at the Institut de recherche sur le cinéma et l’audiovisuel (IRCAV) at the Sorbonne Nouvelle in Paris. At IRCAV he was a Marie Curie Fellow from 2016-2018, researching French culture, financial derivatives, and the 2008 financial crisis. He is currently preparing a book manuscript on the topic. He completed his PhD at King’s College London in 2015, and a monograph based on his thesis, Blanchot and the Moving Image: Fascination and Spectatorship, was published by Legenda in 2017.

  • Neoliberalism in Crisis

    Carey James Mickalites (bio)

    A review of Van Tuinen, Sjoero, and Arjen Kleinherenbrink, editors. The Politics of Debt: Essays and Interviews. Zero Books, 2020.

    As I write this, governments the world over are calling boisterously for the “reopening” of global, national, and local markets in the face of the biggest pandemic since the 1918 influenza. The reasoning is familiar: work and consumption must return to recent levels of growth lest we slip into an unprecedented economic depression. Perhaps nowhere has this persistent and hysterical call been more pronounced than in the U.S., where sickly and irrational reactions to catastrophe have come to define the current regime. A healthy economy trumps public health. What we’re witnessing is an insistence on the ultimate kind of debt: the demand for the sacrifice of countless human lives—particularly those lacking financial security of any kind—to prop up a fiction of economic and political credit. Of course, immediate history points to several indicators that make this fiction (and the burden it demands) both palpable and predictable. The dismantling of postwar public health protocols. The dangerous privatization of medical care. World leaders ignoring the advice of medical experts on the likelihood of a pandemic. Forced austerity. Gross polarization of wealth and access, such that the credit and health of the few are paid for by the debts and diseases of the many. All of this is deeply entrenched and familiar, its realities taking hold during the Reagan-Thatcher era and sticking while we collectively failed to consider structural change during and following the 2008 crash, instead letting our leaders bail out the culprits with public money. I could go on, but the point is that the “unprecedented” impact of COVID-19 is a symptom of the neoliberal policies that enslave governments and citizens to financial markets, in turn exacerbating one of the plainest contradictions of contemporary capitalism: the inevitability of the next crisis. At the risk of sounding like a historical (or hysterical) determinist, the current economic collapse was prepared for. If the coronavirus pandemic signifies the latest global crisis—and one in which finance markets and tech industries are ready to exploit threats to public health—then it also resoundingly affirms one of the key assertions running through van Tuinen and Kleinherenbrkink’s The Politics of Debt: “more than a decade after the [2008] crisis, scholars, journalists and politicians alike agree that it is not a matter of if, but when the next crisis will hit” (11).

    The volume, consisting of six essays and five interviews, brings together the work of philosophers, economists, political scientists, and politicians to create a chorus of multidisciplinary voices that addresses the effects of the 2008 crash ten years on. (The volume was first published in 2018, and reissued in January 2020.) With the political normalization of debt at center stage, the editors, authors, and interviewees address the perils and supposed necessity of debt and crisis through historical, theoretical, and political-economic lenses. At first sight, the texts that make up The Politics of Debt may appear a fairly loose compendium. Topics include ancient and Christian moral injunctions against enforced debt; Hobbes and other early theories of sovereignty based on power as credit; genealogies of debt and guilt or sin à la Nietzsche; and the precarious financialization of every aspect of our political economies, public and private. Yet the book appears more unified when considered as part of a general intellectual trend on the left and center- (or liberal-) left that seeks to intervene in the injustices and contradictions of our contemporary political economy through historical and theoretical analyses. The Politics of Debt returns to the works of Foucault and Deleuze from the late 1970s and offers commentary on recent influential work by David Harvey, Wolfgang Streeck, Philip Mirowski, and Thomas Picketty, among others. Most of the essays and interviews share a few important assumptions and argumentative threads, at times by implication. Foremost is the specific historical entrenchment of neoliberal policy beginning in the 1960s, whose tendency to produce bubbles, crashes, mass unemployment and the like became all-too-evident during the last major global recession (more on this below). In short, what ties the collection together is an insistence that the politics of (enforced) debt is part of a long history of the political erosion of public support in favor of high finance, and that this bad history has come to a head since 2008. As some of the more progressive essays and interviews hold, we are now at a crucial historical threshold.

    The editors’ introduction provides a solid historical grounding, beginning with the collapse of the subprime mortgage market in the U.S. and its symptomatic structural spread throughout the European and, ultimately, the global economy. Following the work of Harvey, Streeck and others, the introduction and many of the pieces rightly insist that, since the prominent incursion of neoliberal policies into national governments in the 1970s (also adopted by supposed liberals and laborites like Clinton, Obama, Blair, et al.), economic crisis is not merely a symptom but the norm arising from the corresponding shift away from social democracy. The collapse that “began” in 2008, the editors argue, led to policies like bank bailouts that precipitate subsequent crises. These crises “result in part from the continued application of a solution that in fact only exacerbates the problem,” turning citizens into mere “entrepreneurs of the self,” ever in debt. Thus, “under neoliberalism, crisis itself is actively wielded as a tool by corporate and financial elites” (3). This argument, which reverberates throughout the book, rests on the important insistence that debt and credit function in a dialectic: capitalism has never been about production for subsistence, but about the creation of credit out of debt. This position problematizes or makes reductive the old moral associations with credit and with debt. (For a bad popular example of this, recall The Wolf of Wallstreet; for an even worse example currently unfolding, witness what’s happening to public universities and higher education.)

    This historical opening is further enriched by several essays in the collection, most notably by Philip Goodchild in his “The Politics of Credit.” Goodchild begins with The South Sea Company as a case study to explain what he calls “the debts of politics” (a tweak on the volume’s title), and to show how private debts in the form of taxation and investment—and sovereign authority based in credit (the promise of returns)—come to mutually reinforce each other in a system that relies on the regulatory functions of the banks. In a Hobbesian vein, the history of this tripartite development indicates that sovereign authority is premised on a fiction of the promise of returns on shared debt; at the same time, that fiction, when governed by mutual constraints on power, leads to moments of national cohesion and increasing prosperity (65-7). And yet there’s the rub. The system of faith in future returns, and the speculative bubbles it generates, makes periodic economic and social crises inevitable, and this longish history takes us to our current phase of global debt and credit. For Goodchild, this spells a crisis of faith: “Once the circle of reliable debtors shrinks to a few state, corporate and financial institutions, then it no longer offers a source of prosperity and longer time horizons for the populace at large” (72).

    Other essays offer theoretical complements to such historical analyses. Drawing on the sociological work of Marcel Mauss and Pierre Bourdieu, Émilie Bernier outlines the notion that debt—in the form of gifts and implied reciprocity—has been understood as a basis for social cohesion. Such forms of general economy have long structured religious and ethical systems of social cohesion, but with the rise of modern finance, those moral codes have given way to a system organized strictly around “financial obligation” (17). In Bourdieu’s analysis, the gift becomes insidiously immoral, “a mode of political subjugation” in a restrictive economy that inscribes everyone within a hierarchical structure of indebtedness, a social system that binds and enslaves (18, 21, 27).Richard Dienst’s similarly speculative essay returns to theories of Utopia, from More to Marx and Engels, to ask how we might rethink the necessity of debt. Withholding any firm conclusions or prescriptions, Dienst acknowledges that debt as we know it has no place in the Utopia called communism (52). He asks readers to consider “something like a form of indebtedness that allows people to share their lives without appropriating each other’s possibilities” (49), in which the necessities of work, consumption, and indebtedness might be reimagined as pursuits in common (58).

    Several contributors working at the intersections of recent history and theory extend the argument that, as policy and ideology, neoliberalism as a politics of debt makes recurring waves of crisis inevitable. Drawing on the work of Streeck and others, Jean-François Bissonnette’s essay focuses on credit as a “political technology” that has normalized debt by shifting the burden from states to individuals and private households during the transition from social democracy to neoliberalism over the past three decades. And whereas the postwar Keynesian policies were by no means innocent or ideal—they involved, as Streeck argues, a “class compromise … meant to secure the allegiance of workers to the capitalist system” (32)—the full-blown extension of markets into government and public institutions has altered social subjectivity to its core, forcing us all to view debt as a speculative investment in future security and wages without any guarantee. In this system, debt comes to be understood as a form of “economic empowerment,” most legible in the case of student debt that reframes subjectivity “to make the entire arrangement seem acceptable” (39). A few chapters later, Steven Shaviro offers a logical extension of some of these arguments, tracing the political normalization of indebted individuals to the end of the gold standard and the beginnings of our current free-floating exchange system in the early 1970s. Around this time, Foucault and Deleuze begin to theorize what comes to be called neoliberalism: a shift from classical economics of exchange to “the financialization of human life” in general. This shift makes debt “our universal condition” and ushers in the new order of social control under which, as Deleuze argues, “a man is no longer a man confined but a man in debt” (qtd. in Shaviro 83). This generalized economy utterly depletes former models of civil society so that we’re all calculating entrepreneurs of our own subjectivities, and spells disaster for labor. If all life is leveled to “‘investing’ my ‘human capital’” in return for subsistence, then labor disappears as a politically viable category. On this view, neoliberalism “does not provide an alibi for exploiting workers”—it doesn’t need to—”so much as it positively works to make the status of the worker, and the process of labor-asexploitation, literally unthinkable” (80, 81). (Or, at the moment, evades thought by calling exploitation “essential”?) Finally, and following the concern with the transformation of labor value to “human capital,” Elettra Stimilli argues that the transformation of the state to a commercial enterprise, coupled with the shift from public spending to private debt, helps to account for the oppressive neoliberal version of freedom that expects everyone to be an “entrepreneur of himself” (91, 89). Think, for example, of the current state of affairs in higher education: students are compelled to take on enormous debt for the profit of government lending institutions and “public” universities in order to gamble on the promise of a lucrative but increasingly precarious future.

    Were I to quibble with any of this, I would note that these essays do not address the longer history of neoliberalism and its corollary, financial globalization. While I don’t have space to do so here, others have traced the origins of current financial regimes to developments throughout Europe following World War I and the demise of empires.1 Consider, for example, that the interwar period witnessed the emergence of the likes of Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig Mises, who (with the aid of the Rockefellers) established the Geneva School and the neoliberal model that renders states and their legal institutions subject to denationalized global finance in the name of “free markets.” This small quibble over the question of a longer history of political economy raises the political specter that now haunts the term neoliberalism itself, mostly addressed from the left (the apparent position of the contributors) but not openly taken up in The Politics of Debt. As some have recently argued, the term has become so ubiquitous—basically the name for everything bad about our new world order—that its efficacy is questionable.2 In the most overstated cases, this logic can look like a backhanded affirmation of what it opposes, the kind of sweeping assumptions associated with Thatcher’s TINA (“there is no alternative” to free-market capitalism, or here, to the pernicious ontological spread of neoliberalism). That paranoid logic doesn’t apply to this volume—indeed, much of it aims at undermining financial totality—but another recurring assumption in the collection has recently been problematized by writers on the left. Contributors are right to argue that neoliberal policy and the encroachment of finance, high and low, into every aspect of political and private life have seriously clouded the horizon of social democracy, eroded the power of collective labor, and suppressed wages towards a state of desperate precarity for most citizens of a polarized global economy. However, in several essays (especially Bernier, Bissonnette, and Shaviro), this necessary critical history depends on a potentially idealized view of the postwar consensus or the welfare state prior to the evolution of today’s neoliberalism. Wendy Brown’s Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution shares this tendency; one astute reviewer characterizes it as “a markedly nostalgic work … since it hearkens to the imperiled values of a previous era of political liberalism” (Grattan). Yet this previous era’s processes of accumulation too depend on extraction, exclusion, and exploitation, as always. Writing in the immediate wake of the 2008 crash, Marcellus Andrews returns to Milton Friedman and the establishment of the Chicago School of Economics—set up in opposition to the then-widespread Keynesian model—to argue that their calculus obscures market capitalism’s tendency towards depression and mass unemployment. This kind of obfuscation reaches back to eighteenth century laissez-faire thinking and forward to current government reluctance to admit (or better: to deny outright) that the predominance of risky finance necessitates bubbled and crashes, a central tenet of “classical models of a self-regulating market economy” (Andrews 58, 59)—self-regulating, that is, with the powerful structural support of government subsidies, tax cuts to corporations, outsourced labor, etc. None of this is to argue for the wholesale denial of the neo-, but to suggest with others on the left that defining its glaring contradictions and necessary creation of crisis against some better, older form of liberalism risks a reductive elision of the long march of debt-driven financialization in Western capitalist societies.

    To be fair, the volume asks where we are ten years after the last crash rather than giving such a full history. The collected essays and interviews admirably synthesize a large body of economic scholarship and political theory, from Hobbes to Nietzsche to the most recent work on the subject. And as a means of thinking about how we got here, the historical work the volume carries out also compels us to ask the equally important question: what is to be done? As a counter to the old Thatcherite proclamation that “there is no alternative,” each of the interviews that closes The Politics of Debt offers measures for structurally reframing a global dependence on debt-driven neoliberal policy.3 Clearly, the EU impositions of austerity on countries like Greece is not a solution but rather more of the same, a neoliberal effort on the part of powerful countries (Germany) to offset debt by increasing it (premised on scapegoat logic). Mark Blyth makes this point alongside the modest proposal of actually taxing corporations (104-5, 106, 108). Andrea Fumagalli argues for a widespread end to channeling public expenses to big finance. Similarly, Costas Lapavitsas proposes a sweeping definancialization of society in noting that our age of finance is merely an historical period. How exactly this is to be done is unclear, but Fumagalli seems keen on the institutionalization of Universal Basic Income (UBI) (123-7). While UBI might take us a step towards redistribution, it is also little more than a slight readjustment from within existing financial structures, not a push for socialism. Maybe we can rethink work itself, imagining it outside the abstractions of contemporary capital. Or, in the face of such abstractions—which we can’t effectively “occupy,” as Maurizio Lazzarato observes—we need models for refusing to work (153, 156). Finally, as Tomáš Sedláček suggests, we may revisit old myths (including Christian parables) as a counter to the prevailing fictions of finance and life-as-debt, potentially allowing an “ethical dimension” made seemingly unthinkable by the immoral “redemption” of big banks (159).

    Whether thought in isolation or in some creative combination, each of these proposals m akes sense. Together, they remind us that we have the tools, wealth, and imagination to challenge the apparent ubiquity of neoliberal policy. This volume contributes to the larger discourse on the left in which neoliberal policies not only precipitate serial crises, but are perhaps approaching an historical precipice. We are in a moment fraught with tension. As Stuart Hall, Doreen Massy, and Michael Rustin suggest in a 2013 essay, “The economic model that has underpinned the social and political settlement of the last three decades is unravelling but the broader political and social consensus apparently remains in place” (8). If it takes ideology a minute to catch up with material devastation, then Philip Goodchild’s essay offers a complementary response: “we stand at the threshold of a crisis of faith for the politics of credit and debt,” he writes, speculating that “Founding political life on the riskiest forms of venture capitalism, although immensely successful for 3 centuries, may prove to be just a bubble” (72-3). I can invest some faith in that. With the historical analyses and theoretical interventions laid out in The Politics of Debt, we have some reason to believe that our future is not necessarily an increasingly precarious version of our present. COVID-19 may or may not be the crisis gone viral, as it were, but if nothing else, its spread has lifted the veil on the contradictions and inherent crises that decades of neoliberalism have cemented in place, not least the gross polarization of wealth and the enforced austerity on which it depends. The Politics of Debt leaves us with the hope that something genuinely unprecedented—structural change somehow independent of financial capitalism—might be imminent.

    Footnotes

    1. See, for example, Slobodian’s book, or Zevin for a shorter option.

    2. Within my own field of literary and cultural studies, for example, Bruce Robbins suggests that neoliberalism “always seems to be discoverable lurking behind or beneath whatever piece of culture happens to be under discussion [in this case, the state of contemporary literature], and once discovered, it never seems all that enlightening, perhaps because it is so taken for granted, and perhaps because, like capitalism itself, it has been pulled and stretched so as to signify too many different things” (840). Robbins is reviewing Mitchum Huehls’s and Rachel Smith’s edited volume, Neoliberalism and Contemporary Literary Culture. He notes that their claims for an ontologically totalizing neoliberal society (since about 2000) would preclude precisely the kind of outside critical position necessary for their analysis (841).

    3. Another notable response is Mark Fisher’s Capitalist Realism, published in the same series as this one.

    Works Cited

    • Andrews, Marcellus. “Burying Neoliberalism.” Dissent, vol. 56, no. 3, Summer 2009, https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/burying-neoliberalism. Accessed 8 July 2020.
    • Fisher, Mark. Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative? Zero Books, 2009.
    • Grattan, Peter. “Company of One: The Fate of Democracy in an Age of Neoliberalism.” Los Angeles Review of Books, 15 July 2015, https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/company-of-one-the-fate-of-democracy-in-anage-of-neoliberalism/. Accessed 8 July 2020.
    • Hall, Stuart, Doreen Massey, and Michael Rustin. “After neoliberalism: analysing the present.” Soundings: A Journal of Politics and Culture, vol. 53, Spring 2013. Project MUSE, muse.jhu.edu/article/522108. Accessed 8 July 2020.
    • Robbins, Bruce. “Everything Is Not Neoliberalism.” American Literary History, vol. 31, no. 4, Winter 2019, pp. 840-49, doi.org/10.1093/alh/ajz034.
    • Slobodian, Quinn. Globalists: The End of Empire and the Birth of Neoliberalism. Harvard UP, 2018.
    • Zevin, Alexander. “Every Penny a Vote.” London Review of Books, 15 August 2019, pp. 27-30.
  • Queer Nations and Trans-lations

    Daryl Maude (bio)

    A review of Akiko Shimizu, “‘Imported’ Feminism and ‘Indigenous’ Queerness: From Backlash to Transphobic Feminism in Transnational Japanese Context.” Lecture and Seminar, University of California, Berkeley, 27-28 Jan. 2020

    What does it mean to be trans in Japan, or in Japanese? How does it correspond with transness in North America or in English? Terms and identities travel and are translated, existing not in a relationship of one-to-one correspondence, but rather in an association with one another. To be gei or toransujendā in Japanese is not the same as to be “gay” or “transgender” in English; although the Japanese terms are loanwords from English, the meanings, identities, and practices that are organized under these terms are not exactly the same. This difference is central to Akiko Shimizu’s work in both English and Japanese. In a 2007 article, she discusses the double bind of “Japanese queers,” whose ability to identify themselves as members of a group is always influenced by the prominence of anglophone discourses of identity politics and rights-bearing minority subjects and by an awareness of the language around these concepts as imported from English. In asking themselves how they identify, Shimizu says, “In the case of ‘Japanese queers’, the questions will be: are we Japanese, are we Japanese-speakers, or are we more like the members of ‘the global queer community’, if it actually exists? Or perhaps, are we all of the above? Or none of them?” (503).

    Shimizu, a scholar in the Department of Interdisciplinary Cultural Studies at the University of Tokyo, has long been interested in the problem of queer translations, both as a figure (the travelling of conceptual categories from different groups, expressed in different ways and in different registers) and as a practice (the translation of books, papers, lectures, articles, and tweets into Japanese, and also from Japanese into other languages). She is a translator of works by Sara Ahmed and Judith Butler into Japanese, and she has written about the various complex processes of identification, terminology, and naming of queerness and sexuality in Japanese. In addition, with her students, Shimizu organizes an annual public lecture series on queer studies.

    Shimizu’s lecture and seminar at UC Berkeley in January 2020 received a warm reception from attendees. Her careful attention to the details of power and translation represents an important moment in Japanese trans and queer studies, and this importance was remarked on by those listening to the lecture and participating in the seminar. Describing her lecture as “a story” characterized by its “tedious repetitions,” Shimizu traced a genealogy of debates over gender, sexuality, and transness in Japan in the 21st century. She explained how the backlash against so-called “gender ideology” in Japan at the turn of the millennium led to the marriage equality debates of the 2010s and then to the wave of online transphobia that is happening today. Shimizu emphasized the role of translation in this system, which she claims is characterized by problems both “distinctly local and inherently transnational.” The idea of Japan as an actor in a network of discourse is not new, in itself, but Shimizu’s characterization of Japanese transphobia as both “distinctly local and inherently transnational” focuses on the movements of power between different languages and nations and dismisses any culturally essentialist explanation for the peculiarities of Japanese feminism(s). Her comment draws our attention to the texture of Japanese transphobia and Japanese feminism: their idiosyncrasies and histories. Paying attention to this texture yields interesting points of comparison: accounting for why transphobic feminism is so much more common in Britain than in the US, for example, Sophie Lewis notes the historical aspects of this failure of intersectionality. In a 2019 article in the New York Times, she links the prevalence of transphobic rhetoric in British feminism to its lack of engagement with the Black and indigenous feminisms that gave mainstream white American feminism the “pummeling” it sorely required, allowing American feminism to begin to take on a more intersectional position. Similarly, in Japan, Shimizu’s work shows us that mainstream Japanese feminism is ill-equipped to address transphobia due to the historical failures of Japanese feminism to account for intersectionality.

    Shimizu’s “story” progressed historically: following Japan’s passing of the Basic Law for a Gender-Equal Society in 1999, conservative politicians complained of feminism’s detrimental effects on traditional gender roles. Shimizu explained that conservatives characterized feminist activities, including the promotion of this gender-neutral education, as manifesting “external pressures” (gaiatsu). Thus, even activities conducted by local grassroots feminist activists were seen as originating from Western sources and therefore were considered inappropriate and inauthentic: a naïve absorption of non-Japanese ideas that were not appropriate for Japan. These conservatives took hints from right wing discourse in the US (ironically, a form of external pressure in itself) and portrayed feminists and those who promoted gender-neutral education as denying gender altogether and wanting to do away with the concepts of “manliness” or “womanliness.” Conservatives were successful in portraying the most scandalous aspects of these ideas, and many feminists reacted by denying these claims. This attempt at damage control, Shimizu argued, missed an opportunity to embrace the destructive possibilities of feminist work. Instead of affirming the questions around binary notions of gender and arguing for a more equitable society for queer and trans people, mainstream feminist pandering to the fears of conservatives threw vulnerable people to the wayside.

    Shimizu then spoke about marriage equality in Japan in the 2010s. In 2015, Shibuya Ward in Tokyo began to issue certificates recognizing same-sex partnership. This was followed by other wards, cities, and prefectures throughout Japan. While some rights can be gained from this recognition, they lack effectiveness on a national level. Central to this problem is the system of the koseki, or family register, which catalogues and organizes, among other things, the births, marriages, and deaths of all Japanese citizens. Shimizu noted that while the koseki is maintained at a local level, it is ultimately the responsibility of the national government; therefore, the government’s definition of marriage as exclusively heterosexual means that certificates of partnership recognition are mere “window dressing” (albeit politically expedient in a country that is soon to host the Olympics and needs to appear tolerant and open). Despite the important legacy of feminist activism against the strictures of the koseki system—its reinforcement of a patriarchal system that discriminates against unmarried parents and single mothers, and its imperial, colonial legacy after being used as a tool of control in colonial Korea—mainstream feminism seemed to lag behind even as awareness of LGBT rights grew in the 2010s. Due to their capitulation to political pressure during the debates over the “gender ideology” backlash in the early 2000s, Shimizu argued that mainstream feminism was unable to engage with LGBT groups in activism or to be properly intersectional.

    In her account of recent online transphobia, Shimizu began by explaining that in 2017 and 2018, as the #MeToo movement gained popularity, accounts by women of sexual harassment they had encountered began to circulate on Japanese-language Twitter. Women on Twitter used the intellectual resources provided by #MeToo in order to fight against harassment and to form links with other women in similar positions. As part of this movement, some cis women began to raise concerns about trans women “invading” “their” sex-segregated spaces, such as toilets or public baths, and harassing them. Employing a common trope of trans women as “in essence” men who are invading women’s spaces, they encouraged cis women to be on their guard, in the role of perpetual scrutinizers. Sally Hines describes this role as “the surveillance and the regulation of the female body through the notion of female authenticity” (154). Transphobic tropes were taken up by some Japanese-language feminist Twitter users and circulated, resonating beyond social media by perpetuating a transphobic environment that affects policy and behavior and in turn endangers the lives and wellbeing of trans people.

    While online transphobia in Japan seems sudden—lacking, for example, the pedigree of “feminist” transphobia in the English language Twitter-sphere or in British media—Shimizu suggested that it is actually the result of the transplantation of transphobic discourses from outside of Japan, particularly the UK and South Korea. Tweets and discourses were translated from English and Korean into Japanese and recirculated through Japanese feminist Twitter accounts. They increased significantly when, in 2018, Ochanomizu University, a women’s university in Tokyo, stated that it would begin to accept trans women as students beginning in April 2020. These applicants are still legally registered as men when they apply, due both to the fact that the age of majority in Japan is twenty, and to the legal pathologization of trans identities.1 Appeals to the anger and frustration of women, particularly with regards to sexual harassment and assault, as in the #MeToo campaign, have led to hostility toward the easily targeted: trans women. Shimizu pointed out that the hostility is exacerbated by the particularities of the Japanese feminist Twittersphere, in which many active accounts are not linked to people’s real names, and anonymity means an increase in hostility and trolling.

    This “story” that Shimizu told in her lecture was a genealogy of mainstream Japanese feminism in the last twenty years. Crucially we can also read it as a call for solidarity and a warning against the temptation to jettison members of our communities who are further or furthest from legally inscribed norms, as well as an illustration of the consequences of doing so. In the seminar she gave after her lecture, attended by scholars including Grace Lavery and Judith Butler, Shimizu made connections between the attempt to surveil trans women and prevent them from using women’s spaces (such as public toilets or baths), and the attempt to surveil other marginalized populations in Japan, such as Zainichi (resident) Koreans, or Hisabetsu Burakumin (hereditary members of groups associated with stigmatized forms of labor such as leather work). In both cases, the koseki is again crucial. It provides not only a system through which the government exerts centralized control over marriage and legal gender markers, but also a fantasy about the knowability of deviation: an authority through which to ascertain the “truth” about populations that are deemed potentially undetectable and whose ability to pass as Yamato Japanese, as members of a “normal” class, or as women, is seen as threatening.2 It is important to maintain specificity within movements of solidarity, and to acknowledge that Zainichi struggles, Hisabetsu Burakumin struggles, and the struggles of trans women are not mere copies of one another; at the same time, the struggles these groups face can, and do, overlap. Shimizu’s highlighting of these parallels is useful for thinking about the ways in which, as with other minority groups with the ability to pass, trans people are seen as insidious and invading because the possibility that they might go unnoticed is seen as threatening.

    Emphasizing the travelling nature of discourses on transphobia, and the way they are translated into new contexts, Shimizu’s work calls attention to the local textures of feminism and trans activism, and to the multiple actors within these contested and transnational ideological domains, even as she considers the pull of a homogenizing discourse of universal rights and equality that centers Euro-American experiences. She notes that there are not happy endings to the story she told, rather that it is characterized by “tedious repetitions.” Her work is crucial in giving us the texture of these ongoing repetitions in the Japanese context: the failures of mainstream feminism and the capitulations to conservative fearmongering, the lack of intersectional analysis, and the subsequent transphobia. When asked if there is any way to get around the problem of these “tedious repetitions”—what, in other words, is to be done?—Shimizu suggested that the tediousness could be overcome by breaking from this past and recognizing the pluralities and complications of history. This does not collapse into a triumphalist “it gets better” account of a history but rather, I would suggest, works with the tedium of repetition, and its attendant feelings of exasperation, disbelief, incredulity, boredom, and so on, to produce a new translation of its own, one that is provisional and multiple, and that communicates the need to talk and work together. We might also ask, beyond transphobia, what other forces and feelings might be in play in Japanese trans circles—trans love, trans joy, trans community building, or trans activism, for example—and how these forces also exist within patterns of translation. The struggles to undo the force of normativity and enable us all to live better lives continues, in multiple languages and across multiple borders.

    Footnotes

    1. In order to change one’s gender marker on legal documents, a person must be over the age of twenty, obtain a medical diagnosis of gender identity disorder, and undergo sterilization. They also cannot be married and cannot have children who are underage (Reid et al.).

    2. Until the mid-1970s, the koseki was open for anyone to view, providing an easy way for people to discriminate against neighbors and potential marriage partners, by parsing whether they fell into undesirable categories. Access is now restricted, and only certain officials or lawyers can legally view it.

    Works Cited

    • Hines, Sally. “The Feminist Frontier: On Trans and Feminism.” Journal of Gender Studies, vol. 28, no. 2, 2019, pp. 145-57. Taylor & Francis, doi:10.1080/09589236.2017.1411791.
    • Lewis, Sophie. “How British Feminism Became Anti-Trans.” New York Times, 7 Feb. 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/07/opinion/terf-trans-women-britain.html. Accessed 7 Jul. 2020.
    • Reid, Graeme, et al. “‘A Really High Hurdle’: Japan’s Abusive Transgender Legal Recognition Process.” Human Rights Watch, 2019, www.hrw.org/report/2019/03/19/really-high-hurdle/japans-abusive-transgender-legalrecognition-process#. Accessed 7 Jul. 2020.
    • Shimizu, Akiko. “Scandalous Equivocation: A Note on the Politics of Queer Self-Naming.” Inter-Asia Cultural Studies, vol. 8, no. 4, 2007, pp. 503-16. EBSCOhost, doi:10.1080/14649370701567963.
  • Fanged Future

    Johanna Isaacson (bio)

    A review of Jenkins, Jerry Rafiki. The Paradox of Blackness in African American Vampire Fiction. Ohio UP, 2019.

    At the mention of the word “vampire,” a waxen figure of European origin leaps to mind. However, Jerry Rafiki Jenkins insists in The Paradox of Blackness in African American Vampire Fiction that vampire myths have an under-explored heritage in Africa and African diasporic cultures, and that recent African American vampirology offers a subaltern approach to the genre rather than merely a sub-generic borrowing of Dracula-derived tropes. A figure conjured to navigate the horrors of colonial violence and enslavement through the nineteenth century, the black vampire re-emerges in 1970s vampire films such as Ganja and Hess and Blacula. These works inform the black vampire fiction to come and the resurrection of seemingly white vampire mythology such as the Dracula film adaptations of 1979 and 1992 (4). Yet studies of vampire mythology ignore or minimize the influence of the black vampire (6). In Paradox, Jenkins fills this lacuna by offering a detailed analysis of five black vampire fiction novels. He argues that in their articulation of race and sexuality through the “paradox of mortality,” these texts counter monolithic notions of blackness. In particular, they diverge from conservative religious visions of black unity and insist on

    an antinormative project that not only queers the traditional vampire narrative, the black literary imagination, and their guises of universality, but it also … has the potential to denormalize our disdain of hybridity, our boundaries of power, and our obsession with utopias. (8)

    Jenkins provides insightful, original, and often compelling readings of works that have been excluded from the canon of vampire fiction largely due to their racial concerns, although the book would have benefited from a more rigorous engagement with scholarly work that complicates categories of race and sexuality. His book is part of an important new series from Ohio University Press; New Suns: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Speculative (edited by Susana M. Morris and Kinitra D. Brooks) promises to recognize the significance of African American speculative culture in varied media.

    Central to Jenkins’s exploration of the implicit ideologies in the five novels is Steven Cave’s taxonomy of four immortality narratives that cultures adapt to grapple with the “morality paradox”: the fact that we must die but cannot concretely imagine death (Jenkins 11). Cave’s taxonomy includes the “staying alive” narrative, the resurrection narrative, the soul narrative, and the legacy narrative. For Jenkins, most black vampire novels reject soul and legacy narratives in favor of resurrection and staying alive narratives. The latter insist on the corporeality of the black body, and must therefore navigate black earthly experience, black appearance and its meaning, and black physical pain, along with the hope for an earthly freedom from this pain. While the vampire’s status as corporeal undead points to the conception that black identity is defined by the appearance of blackness, Jenkins argues that the novels he explores complicate this notion and instead ask “whether there is more to being black than having a black body” (16). His readings imply that race is ascriptive rather than an inherent part of the body. At times he acknowledges the intractable, structural process of racialization “in a society where economic forms are racialized, and pain is colored black” (27). However, Jenkins returns to a hope of transcending race through the imaginary of black vampire hybridity.

    In these moments of transcendence, his analysis risks becoming ahistorical. The immortal status of the vampires Jenkins analyzes allows them to stand outside of time, forming a “post-racial” horizon. Yet the paths to this post-historical status do not dismantle the structures of domination that persistently reinscribe race. The periodization of racialized capitalism is particularly relevant to the gothic mode, as Stephen Shapiro argues in his analysis of Dracula and other Victorian gothic tropes. Historical moments of crisis and rupture reveal the uncanniness of commodity fetishism: the condition in which workers are separated from any possibility of life outside capitalism and are fully alienated from their bodies, which become “units of labor-power for sale,” mere “bearer[s] of a commodity’s social energy,” while the objects they produce appear “autonomous and self-creating, like an awful, supernatural alien towering before its human meat-puppets” (Shapiro 30). In our current moment of crisis and the recalibration of racialized capitalism, we cannot begin to imagine a post-racial world without asking about “the relationship between the oppression of black bodies and the systematic economic exploitation and expropriation of black communities,” as Michael Dawson argues (144). Jenkins’s analysis of historically. Building on Nancy Fraser’s analysis of social reproduction as a central logic of emerging capitalist forms, Dawson examines “‘the hidden abode of race’” as a persistent source of expropriation that creates “inferior humans” necessary for past domination such as slavery and to current forms of super-exploitation. As Chris Chen puts it, race can be best seen as a “relation race, gender, and sexuality in vampire fiction would benefit from situating these categories of domination inside and outside the wage relation—reproduced through superficially non-racial institutions and policies.” It is not race that needs to be dismantled, then, but this relation that must be overcome. For this reason, the “post-racial” imagination needs more precision than Paradox offers.

    The book is more successful in denaturalizing a homogeneous view of racial identity and politics through an implicitly intersectional lens, queering the black vampire and evoking a feminist, anti-racist Afrofuturist imaginary. To this end, Jenkins explores Jewel Gomez’s The Gilda Stories, in which a black lesbian vampire cuts a heroic swath through history, systematically reversing the tropes of the European vampire and giving “literary and political significance to the lives of black lesbians” (25). Jenkins makes the case that The Gilda Stories attacks both Afrocentrism and multicultural conservatism as ideologies that rely on a “single-issue view of black freedom” (27). Her “staying alive” vampire, the first in African American vampire fiction, stands as a testament that immortality is not a given for the oppressed; in order to “stay alive” without transforming into monsters, vampires must evolve into a wise and inclusive beings. Jenkins explains that Gilda builds a queer, multicultural, chosen family that righteously battles against enemies—black and white, human and vampire—who wield oppressive power. These antagonists include those who represent an Afrocentric view, which accepts only the narrowest definition of black identity and refuses solidarity based on emotional ties (34), and multicultural conservatives who represent themselves as American dream success stories, thus justifying a color-blind society (36). The vision of “staying alive” in Gilda, Jenkins argues, counters both of these views. The Gilda Stories acknowledges that the black body is defined by its history of pain, and Gilda’s immortality offers a vision of a future liberation from this pain. Thus, transcendence is a visionary, inclusive leap rather than an imagination of individual resurrection or collective “single-issue” rebellion (38). This vision of intersectional experience evokes the Combahee River Collective’s project of creating “integrated analysis and practice based upon the fact that the major systems of oppression are interlocking” (15).1

    Jenkins’s analysis of “antizealot atheism” in Tananarive Dues’s My Soul to Keep looks to the character David Dawit as a figure of African atheism that contests the conservatism and colonizing subtext of the “all American bourgeois negro” (72). Jenkins describes the prejudice directed toward this African character by African Americans who see him as a “primitive” in need of civilizing Christianity (59). Dawitt defies an African American definition of blackness as inextricably tied to Christian practices. He is tacit proof, Jenkins argues, that “African Americans need to develop a multicultural approach to blackness and a unifying ideology absent of religion” (59). This resurrection vampire offers an alternate vision of immortality to the “soul narrative” of African American Christianity, framing the latter as “incapable of attending to black people’s material needs” (66) and “incapable of real tolerance” (73). Rather than endorsing a program of colonial or Christian conversion and the passivity that comes with religious belief, Dawit’s path suggests the possibility of “black solidarity that is absent of religion” and open to heterogeneity (81). Further, this refusal of religion acknowledges that blackness is ascriptive and inauthentic, not “Ham’s curse” but human creation.

    The critique of religion that runs through Paradox is acute and could be further historicized by engaging with Melinda Cooper’s critique of the post-sixties rise of religious control in racialized institutions (such as social welfare and prisons) in the wake of middle class “permanent tax revolt” against racially stigmatized state welfare (262). This evangelical takeover of social programs and institutions, with which black churches were involved, ensured that reform and support would be coupled with conservative, heteronormative compliance (262). The rejection of religion in the vampire novels described by Jenkins illuminates the complex ways in which gender, sexuality and race are ascribed through these institutions.

    While My Soul to Keep imagines a feminized Africa in need of civilizing by the Christianity of the “all American bourgeois negro,” Jenkins next explores Dark Corner, which critiques an alternate but still insufficient vision of feminized African Americans in need of masculine invigoration by “authentic” Africans. Jenkins argues that the character Kyle’s father, Diallo—an African warrior vampire—represents “paternal Pan-Africanism” and “heroic slave discourse,” two ideologies that advance patriarchal visions of masculinization and dovetail with the ideology at the heart of the influential “Moynihan report,” which diagnosed impoverished African American families as inadequate due to their lack of masculine father figures (93-94). As Cooper argues, the sexism of the Moynihan report was also a diversion “from the structural factors of urban segregation, discrimination, and educational disadvantage that might implicate contemporary white racism in the reproduction of poverty and pointed instead to the distant crime of slavery as a causal factor” (38). However, according to Jenkins, instead of pointing to this depoliticization, Pan-African ideology “solves” this problem by envisioning a “cultural return to Africa” (94). The “heroic slave” narrative offers a similarly patriarchal solution by imagining the masculine man’s individual struggle, with no possibility of collective resistance (94). Enforcing a singular definition of blackness tied to African identity erases black people who do not fit this mold, evoking Hazel Carby’s critique of patriarchal political formulas in black leadership. Under the guise of self-effacement, Carby sees “a conceptual framework [of the black intellectual] that is gender-specific; not only does it apply exclusively to men, but it encompasses only those men who enact narrowly and rigidly determined codes of masculinity” (10). Instead of valorizing these codes, Jenkins argues that blackness is defined by having a black body that is subject to the definitions, cultural meanings, and prejudices of its time (115).

    Jenkins contends that Octavia Butler’s Fledgling complicates the definition of blackness in the previous three novels – “the only requirement for being black is having a black body” (117). He explores Butler’s concept of “body knowledge” to assert that the meaning of the body is not biologically determined but is rather a social construct (118). His view of blackness seems to converge with that of Stuart Hall, who argues “black is essentially a politically and culturally constructed category, which cannot be grounded in a set of fixed trans-cultural or transcendental racial categories and which therefore has no guarantees in nature” (“New Ethnicities” 443). Jenkins’s Afrofuturistic vision begins to take shape with his engagement with Butler. The supernatural figures he describes converge with J. Griffith Rollefson’s description of Afrofuturism as an “oppositionality and an historical critique that seeks to undermine the logic of linear progress that buttresses Western universalism, rationalism, empiricism, logocentrism, and their standard-bearer: white supremacy” (84). Building on Butler’s notion that human intelligence is stoppered by our tendency to emphasize domination, Jenkins disentangles these impulses with the terms “hierarchical body knowledge” and “intelligent body knowledge” (119). The former encompasses “the idea that social hierarchies are determined by visible differences among human populations,” while the latter recognizes that ideas about bodies enforce differences and hierarchies (119). Jenkins argues that Fledgling‘s Shori Matthews, who transcends black pain as a “staying alive” vampire, represents a utopian triumph of “intelligent body knowledge” that projects the possibility of a post-racial world. He calls this “transhuman blackness,” in which the blackness (skin pigmentation) of all humans is recognized and free from hierarchical ascriptions (122). As an engineered being, Shori represents a convergence of the “staying alive” narrative with technological utopianism, but Jenkins attempts to distinguish Butler’s vision from anti-collective libertarianism or techno-idealism (128). He insists that Shori’s liminal status between human and posthuman denaturalizes “hierarchical body knowledge” and allows a focus on socially constructed meanings of the black body (129). This converges with Rollefson’s concept of Afrofuturist “myth science,” a dialectical engagement with the binary view of “white science” and “black magic.” Myth science both critiques the myths of “progress” that support white colonial domination, and questions the essentialist assumptions behind representations of black authenticity or primitivism (Rollefson 85).

    The last text Jenkins examines is K. Murry Johnson’s Image of Emeralds and Chocolate, a novel that features the first black gay male vampire. This figure serves as a lens into the possibilities for “black sexual politics” that recognize the imbrication and mutual construction of racism and homophobia. This enlightened ideology is set against a conservative religious black sexual politics that separates these oppressions and condemns homosexuality (150). Such “homonegativity” pressures gay black people to keep their sexuality “in the coffin.” Jenkins argues that the gay characters in Image implicitly critique “Black church corporatism” and conservatism, the notions that African Americans should speak in one voice and that gay men should submit to the “civilizing force” of the church. The liberation of Marquis, a gay black slave who simultaneously transforms into a vampire and a free man, is enabled by his approach to the Bible. Jenkins calls this approach “education for liberation” and distinguishes it from “education for salvation” (155). Marquis’s biblical education does not lead him to reject his own sexuality but to become an abolitionist who abets Harriet Tubman in creating the Underground Railroad and continues to play a key role in black liberation movements through his immortal future. Marquis goes on to have healthy gay relationships and becomes proof that conservative religious ideology does not define blackness. Instead, his path to identity formation leads to the conclusion that “the only requirement for being a black man in America is having a black body” (174). Jenkins interprets this as Johnson’s call for “a conception of black solidarity founded on real tolerance … [acknowledging] that queer and straight black men are just black men in the eyes of white supremacy” (174).

    Jenkins’s readings build toward a call for a “new black” politics, “a cross-racial coalition of disenfranchised groups that are ultimately defined by their politics and class rather than by physical characteristics” (176). He argues that this recognizes race as a myth that remains very much alive in the national consciousness, as seen by the rise of Trumpian white supremacy and the continued economic marginalization of African Americans (177-178). Jenkins convincingly shows the potency of African American speculative genre narratives to convey black historical trauma and impasses in racial identification, and the ingenuity with which African American culture has always imagined utopian horizons and possible paths to liberation. These themes are also explored in another title in Ohio’s New Suns series, Afrofuturism Rising. Both books at moments place President Obama in the lineage of this utopian trajectory, despite his exclusion of people of color through immigration policies and drone warfare. This may be symptomatic of the series’ need for more attention to structural racism in its analyses of the work of African American speculative narratives. Nevertheless, the series promises to foreground works often overlooked in explorations of genre fiction, film, comics, and other media, and can only assist in the rise of an Afrofuturism inclusive of queer and feminist voices. The Black speculative works explored in Paradox and the New Suns series bring to mind Robin D.G. Kelley’s evocation of the promise of black “freedom dreams” in his exploration of Black surrealism: “a living, mutable, creative vision of a world where love, play, human dignity, an end to poverty and want, and imagination are the pillars of freedom” (158).

    Footnotes

    1. The Combahee River Collective were a group of black feminist lesbians who formed a radical splinter group from the National Black Feminist Organization in 1974 and continued meeting, writing, and organizing until 1980, when their most influential tract—”The Combahee River Collective Statement”—was published. The statement examined the particularities of black women’s struggles and the need to prioritize self-organization and the examination of “manifold and simultaneous” oppressions of their own experiences, while insisting on solidarity with other struggles. The Collective is credited with pioneering the idea of “identity” politics and has been a touchstone for theorists who insist on a definition of identity politics that resists individualism or separatism. This approach has been a key influence on some of the strongest contemporary theories of race, gender, sexuality, and class such as intersectionality theory and social reproduction theory.

    Works Cited

    • Carby, Hazel. Race Men. Harvard UP, 2009.
    • Chen, Chris. “The Limit Point of Capitalist Equality: Notes Towards an Abolitionist Antiracism.” Endnotes 3, Gender, Race, Class and Other Misfortunes, Sept. 2013, https://endnotes.org.uk/issues/3/en/chris-chen-the-limit-point-of-capitalistequality. Accessed 28 Feb. 2020.
    • Combahee River Collective. “Combahee River Collective Statement.” How We Get Free: Black Feminism and the Combahee River Collective, edited by Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, Haymarket Books, 2017.
    • Cooper, Melinda. Family Values. The MIT Press, 2017.
    • Dawson, Michael C. “Hidden in Plain Sight: A Note on Legitimation Crisis and the Racial Order.” Critical Historical Studies, vol. 3, no.1, Spring 2016, pp. 143–161.
    • Hall, Stuart. “New Ethnicities.” Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies, edited by David Marley and Kuan-Hsing Chen, Routledge, 1996.
    • Kelley, Robin D.G. Freedom Dreams: The Black Radical Imagination, Beacon Press, 2003.
    • Rollefson, J. Griffith. “The ‘Robot Voodoo Power’ Thesis: Afrofuturism and Anti-Anti Essentialism from Sun Ra to Kool Keith.” Black Music Research Journal, vol. 28, no. 1, 2008, pp. 83-109.
    • Shapiro, Stephen. “Transvaal, Transylvania: Dracula’s World-system and Gothic Periodicity.” Gothic Studies, vol. 10, no. 1, 2008, pp. 29-47.
  • What We Don’t See in What We See:A Response to Cinema and Fascination

    Ackbar Abbas (bio)

    The world is an enigma, Nietzsche said, but an enigma composed of its various solutions (qtd. in Calasso 3). In much the same way, we can say that fascination in cinema is an enigma made up of its various interpretations. The essays in this special issue of Postmodern Culture, each brilliant in its own very different way, draw on a wide range of disciplines—from psychoanalysis and philosophy to sound art and quantum physics—as if to say that what is fascinating about cinema exists everywhere and not just in cinema alone. However, each essay manages to construct its argument around a reading of one or two films. The arguments are staged in dialogue with Freud or Lacan, Blanchot, Barad, or Bersani, but these canonical figures are not given the last word on the enigma of fascination. (More often than not, they appear like apotropaic gargoyles attaching themselves to an argument.) Rather, the significant emphasis is always on how fascination informs and deforms all the elements in cinema, including words and images—informs by de-forming them, like the sly way Deleuze’s “dark precursor” works, or the way Lucretius’s clinamen conditions atoms to swerve from the straight and narrow. What emerges from this special issue, then, is not a unified theory of fascination, but something perhaps more valuable: descriptions from the field of how fascination is present in a film and how a viewer or reader experiences it. Taken together, the essays suggest that behind the question “What is fascination?” lies the question “What is cinema?”

    Let me begin with Kwasu D. Tembo’s essay, which raises some key questions about fascination and cinema, including, if only by implication, the question of film form. Tembo notes that fascination is often used today as a term of approbation, especially when we do not know what to say, but he also reminds us that there is a sinister side to it, highlighted by the psychoanalytic study of sexuality. When sex is linked to power, as it always is, we find “aberrations” like sadism and masochism. In the first half of the essay, Tembo brings out the heavy artillery (Freud, Lacan, Gallop, and others) to argue that Steven Shainberg’s Secretary (2002) is about psycho-sexual fascination as a form of bondage. The film deals with the affair between Lee Halloway and her boss Edward Grey; Lee has masochistic tendencies, and Grey sadistic. Not unlike the master/bondsman dialectic, psycho-sexual bondage is “bidirectional.” Furthermore, it turns around a Lacanian “thing,” an objet petit a, a thing that is a no-thing—like the dead earthworm Lee mails to Grey—which Tembo calls in his title “the power of absolute nothing.” The work of Jane Gallop, herself a reader of Freud and Lacan, opens the further possibility of a feminist reading.

    However, it should be obvious that what accounts for the film’s fascination is not any scholarly apparatus but its overall tone, the fact that it is not a case study but a romantic comedy given several generic twists. In the film, bondage as “bidirectional exchange” is less a psychological insight than a comic formula whose automatism makes it appropriate for farce: so less a psychoanalytic tour de force than a Schnitzleresque tour de farce. The marriage of true minds takes the farcical form of a sadist and a masochist falling in love. Of course, it will have to be a kinky kind of love, romantic comedy taken to unexpected places. Nevertheless, like more conventional affairs, kinkiness has its own trials and tribulations, as well as its own precise if perverse algorithm of desire, seen most clearly in the minute detail of the fetish. One example is Grey’s red pencil. He uses it like an instrument of torture, a red-hot branding iron, to circle Lee’s typing errors. Tembo points to an even better example, the dead earthworm that Lee mails to Grey when all else fails to rekindle his passion. She tries enticing him to no avail by placing a sexy photo of herself on his desk or dressing in suggestive clothes. Then, she hits upon an inspired alternative, the perfect trigger: she mails him an earthworm, dead on arrival, an emblem of complete passivity and submissiveness. When Grey receives it, he takes out his red pencil, his “phallic ghost,” and in a fit of sexual arousal excitedly draws red circles around the worm. Peering in the door like a voyeur, Lee murmurs in sexual-comic tones, “Finally!” This coupling of worm and red pencil, the power of absolute nothing multiplied by two, is the ultimate climax and most intense sex scene in the film, because nothing happens. Grey says, “We can’t go on like this,” to which Lee replies, “Why not?”

    What makes the fetishist fantasy doubly fascinating is its coexistence with the unspoken assumptions of ordinary life and the conventions of mainstream cinema, which have not disappeared. We see these assumptions and conventions in Grey’s sense of guilt over his sadistic tendencies, Lee’s institutionalization early in the film, and the obligatory narrative that relationships should end in love and marriage. Perhaps this is the true bidirectionality of the film: its double bondage to farce as fascination on the one hand and to convention on the other, which is what allows the film to be both kinky and mainstream. This suggests that fascination in cinema is found not in subject matter, but in play with form: in the case of Secretary, in farce as the de-formation of generic forms.

    Eugenie Brinkema’s essay on Pascal Laugier’s Martyrs (2008) focuses not on farce but on horror as fascination and de-formation. As we might expect of her work, the argument on horror is provocative and original, designed not only to make us read against the grain but also to feel against the grain. Brinkema begins, like Tembo, by reversing a contemporary tendency to see fascination in too positive terms, but she takes the critique beyond the psychoanalytic tradition all the way back to myth. In traditional myth, fascination is associated with bewitchment and mystification as well as with horror and violence. The siren song is irresistible, but whoever listens to it dies. Brinkema’s reading of Martyrs develops the link between horror and fascination, suggesting that horror is a form of fascination that does not forget or mitigate the negativity that lies under the surface of contemporary life.

    Though Laugier’s film is grouped with New French Extremism and sometimes dismissed as “horror porn,” it is in fact very carefully crafted, which makes it much less sensational and much more provocative than slasher movies. The stress is not on mindless horror, but on how horror reminds us of what certain versions of culture make us forget. Brinkema makes a crucial reference to the sirens episode in Homer, which Blanchot and Horkheimer and Adorno also explicate. In Homer’s poem, when Ulysses succeeds with his stratagems to listen to and escape the sirens, he overcomes mythic repetition, but at the same time, he turns culture into kitsch; that is to say, he turns it into culture lite, culture without horror and danger. Milan Kundera famously defines kitsch in The Unbearable Lightness of Being as “the absolute denial of shit in both the literal and figurative sense of the word” (248), and shit is what Laugier’s version of horror does not allow us to forget.

    As Brinkema points out, Martyrs is a film in two parts, with a crucial scene in the middle relating the parts. For most of the film (and to a far greater extent than in most horror movies) action and motive are very murky, and we are left guessing about what is happening and why. The first part centers on Lucie, a teenage girl subject for unknown reasons to extreme torture, who manages to run away from her captors. Fifteen years later, she exacts revenge on her torturers and their two children by massacring the apparently ordinary family in their house with a shotgun and then committing suicide. The second part concerns Anna, Lucie’s only friend, who reluctantly helps Lucie with her plan for revenge and who may be in love with her. At the house, Anna discovers a door that leads to a secret chamber where she finds, in addition to horrendous photographs on the walls, another girl being tortured, thus proving that Anna’s story is based in reality. Before she can make her escape, the house is overrun by paramilitary soldiers. Their leader, an elderly woman everyone calls Mademoiselle, expounds to Anna the weird logic behind a philosophy of pain in this central part of the film: one can respond to pain either as a victim or as a martyr. A victim rejects pain as unnatural and unjustified and seeks revenge or commits suicide. In Lucie’s narrative there is neither change nor transformation: she dies a victim. A martyr, or so the argument goes, accepts pain, embraces it, looks beyond it, and emerges on the other side transfigured. (Brinkema shows how the image of Anna’s entire body flayed and bloodied, except for her face, resembles that of Joan of Arc in Dreyer’s classic film.) There is no indication whether this philosophy is esoteric doctrine or the ravings of a mad cult leader. What is clear is that the society that Mademoiselle heads has been using torture to search for martyrs and has found only victims, though Anna may be an exception. In the final scenes, we see Mademoiselle rushing to Anna’s bed to hear what visions of “the other side” Anna-asmartyr will reveal. Members of the cult, all established and well-to-do citizens, meet the next day to hear these revelations from Mademoiselle, but she shoots herself through the mouth before her scheduled appearance. Her last words are “Keep doubting.”

    Perhaps what these enigmatic last words point to is first of all the enigmatic formal complexity of the film, with close-ups that decontextualize rather than intensify, irrational cuts, visual allusions (to Dreyer for example), and dark lighting. Brinkema rightly insists on the “ultraformalist” nature of Laugier’s version of horror: “the body is made a form, violence to which produces a new form.” But even more important is the fact that this formal complexity makes us “keep doubting” the horror that we see. Such horror is speculative and not merely spectacular, and it makes epistemology the middle term standing between horror and fascination. This brings us to the film’s important coda. The film ends with the screen showing that martyr is a word etymologically related to “witness.” Perhaps epistemology is not about how the knowledge Anna arrived at as a result of torture could be openly shared, but about how the experience of violence itself transforms her and the viewer together into joint witnesses and “secret sharers” of the fascination and horror of contemporary life.

    E. L. McCallum is concerned with yet another kind of film. Michael Snow’s Wavelength (1967) is often called experimental or avant-garde. McCallum begins her essay by suggesting that even though the film is famous, it is not necessarily well known. It may be “best misremembered as the story of a 45-minute zoom shot across a New York City loft to a photograph of waves that fills the screen.” This impression of the video is based on a certain way of reading fostered by apparatus theory. It is very much an ideological reading that emphasizes first, narrativity; second, an active viewing subject identified with the camera’s perception of a passive world of objects; and third, a perspectival quattrocento space with depth. Such an ideological reading leaves out many crucial elements, which only come back into focus when we approach the video with a different reading apparatus. McCallum turns to Jean-Louis Baudry on ideology in cinema, but more importantly she turns to the work of Karen Barad on quantum physics. Quantum theory highlights the existence of many queer phenomena at the quantum level, and McCallum uses Barad’s explications of it to queer the narrative about Wavelength and assert that in the video “narrativity … is a fiction,” and “so too is its appeal to a centered and discrete subject.” While Laugier’s Martyrs turns to horror to raise epistemological questions, McCallum looks to quantum theory to queer the way we see physical reality: Wavelength may be the closest thing we have to a visual experience of quantum physics.

    In this quantum reading, Wavelength is not the story of a more or less continuous zoom shot that ends with the picture of waves. It is seen as much more multilayered, made up of a discontinuous series of reframing, with one frame in superposition over another. It feels therefore as if the video restarts every few seconds, and what we find between one frame and the next is not the persistence of identity, because subtle distortions brought about by slight twists in perspective or changes in color or lighting are constantly taking place. Superposition can be seen as a kind of relay race, where the baton of continuity is passed from one frame to another. Sometimes the baton is dropped, which is when random colors and noise show up on screen and sound track as signs that there are other things that demand the spectator’s attention. Instead of focusing on objects already valorized by a narrative of continuity, depth, and perspective, we find a flattening of value as a consequence of superposition. One example is how the distinction between meaningful sound and meaningless noise is blurred. In the video, John Lennon’s Strawberry Fields Forever, one of the greatest pop songs ever written, is no more or less important than the noise of traffic or the monotonous buzzing of a mechanical note of fixed wavelength. Similarly flattened is the distinction between the human and nonhuman. There are four human events in the video, but McCallum is right to say that they are distractions and not elements of a human-centered plot. In one scene, a man stumbles into the room from the bottom of the screen and collapses, and for the rest of the video the body becomes part of the furniture, or the material that makes up the space of Wavelength. Or could he be an avatar of Schrödinger’s cat?

    What superposition and flattening ultimately give us is a materialist film, in a sense that needs defining with the help of Barad’s work. The space of Wavelength is not a fixed entity with an identity persisting across time. Rather, it is what happens between each reframing that calls the space into existence. Barad calls “what happens between” a form of intra-action rather than inter-action. Inter-action works between finished entities, intraaction between entities on the point of becoming, entities not pre-classified as human or nonhuman, alive or dead, subject or object. This is the “new materialism,” where everything is matter and everything matters. As Barad writes, “Matter feels, converses, suffers, desires, yearns, and remembers”: it is animate. In a similar vein, McCallum talks about “the freeing of the object to its animacy.” Animacy does not mean that everything is alive, because “alive” is already a classification; it means that everything is active, in a process of becoming. That is why McCallum can title her essay on Wavelength “A Moving Which Is Not a Moving”: it concerns activity that is indiscernible but real and material, like the way “matter feels, converses,” and so on.

    McCallum’s reading of Wavelength as materialist film also draws on Barad’s notion of agential realism. Realism implies a response in the sense of a respons-ibility to all matter, rather than automatically relegating some matter to the dustbin of meaningless details or noise. This is the theoretical basis of sound art. Agential raises the question of the causal determinants of phenomena, the real agents at work. Agential realism asks the basic question of what is happening in Wavelength. To answer this requires a certain intimacy with or respons-ibility to the material of the film, a critical intimacy rather than a critical distance. This is done not on the model of interaction between subject and object, which already creates distance between them, but on the model of intra-action or entanglement. Subject and object are neither the same nor different; they are products of a process that Barad calls, using a quasi-cinematic notion, a cutting together-apart. Besides the cut that separates or connects, Barad imagines a cut, McCallum points out, that connects by separating and vice versa—which is what superposition and quantum theory make thinkable and what Wavelength demonstrates.

    McCallum reads Wavelength through Barad’s quantum apparatus to foreground its fascination. Snow’s film ends with an image of waves that takes up the whole screen. Or could it be the other way around: could the room and everything human and nonhuman in it have been made up of wavelengths that elude our perception and formalist analysis all along? Is what we have been confronted by an epistemological puzzle? In epistemology we find a surprising rapprochement between Brinkema on horror and McCallum on materialism. In her materialist account, Brinkema sees epistemology as an issue inseparable from ethics, responsibility, and fascination. She reads the film as staging an ethical onto-epistemological encounter with the material world in all its queer indeterminacy. And if ethics can be described as looking for “difference that makes a difference,” then the fascination of the project is that while such differences are real, they are at the same time, because of superposition and entanglement, indeterminate and indiscernible. The fascination of Wavelength and the fascination of quantum physics reiterate one another.

    In Calum Watt’s essay, the topic of fascination and cinema is approached in a circuitous way. The circuit relates Blanchot’s seminal work on fascination and writing to filmmaker Philippe Grandrieux’s shooting diary for Malgré La Nuit (2016) and then to film critic Raymond Bellour’s work on film spectatorship. In this circuit, we see Blanchot’s ideas on fascination re-situated and translated into cinematic terms by Grandrieux and Bellour. The circuitous approach is justified because while Blanchot’s ideas about fascination potentially seem to be very germane to cinema, he has written little on the medium. In tracing Blanchot’s obvious and acknowledged impact on Grandrieux’s and Bellour’s thinking, Watt attempts to reconstruct a picture of what Blanchot might have said had he written on fascination and cinema.

    “To write is to arrange language under fascination and, through language, in language, remain in contact with the absolute milieu” (Blanchot, “Essential” 414). To arrange language under fascination suggests that fascination informs and de-forms literary language and makes it faulty. This link between “fault” or “defect” and fascination may explain why Grandrieux chose as epigraph for his shooting diary Blanchot’s line, “Every art draws its origin from an exceptional fault.” In his essay on the “Song of the Sirens,” Blanchot suggests something similar. The sirens’ song fascinates not because it is beautiful, but because it has a defect, an exceptional fault or anomaly: the astonishing fact that these marvelous, beautiful, monstrous creatures could simply “reproduce the ordinary singing of mankind” (443), in much the same way as Kafka’s “Josephine the Mouse-Singer” does. However, the resemblance of the sirens’ song to ordinary human singing portends that the frightening opposite may also be true, “a suspicion that all human singing was really inhuman” (443). In fascination, the difference between ordinary and extraordinary, human and inhuman, seems to have disappeared, and we are in the realm of pure resemblance, where one thing can morph into another as in a dream, “when there is no more world, when there is no world yet” (Blanchot, “Essential” 414). In Blanchot’s literary essays, terms like fault, mistake, resemblance, or dream lose their dictionary meanings and take on a special valence that allows us to intuit a world we no longer or do not yet understand, a world in many ways like Ulysses’s, caught between myth and modernity. It is this special valence or mistake that constitutes “language under fascination,” and it is this language that remains in contact with “the absolute milieu.” How can we translate these thoughts into cinema?

    We can imagine Grandrieux to be saying that to make films is to arrange images under fascination. We follow Watt as he turns not to Grandrieux’s Malgré La Nuit but to his shooting diary on the film, where the focus is not on the end result but on the process of filmmaking, just as Blanchot’s essays are about the process of writing. In the diary, “mistakes” and good ideas for “film takes” coexist as in a dream, making the diary a template for Blanchot’s dream state of pure resemblance. In terms of Grandrieux’s film style, Watt points out, resemblance or de-differentiation can be seen in the frequent use of blurred images and extreme close-ups that confuse rather than clarify, in the prevalence of nocturnal shots, and in the scenes of drug use. It can also be seen in what can be pieced together with some effort as the story or non-story. The film is apparently about a man named Lenz searching for a lost love in Paris named Madeleine. In this quest, he is sidetracked by two other women, Lena and Helene. It is not difficult to surmise that all four characters, if we think about their similar-sounding names, may be aspects of the same person.

    The dream state can also be linked to what the diary calls radical passivity, some signs of which in the director himself include a constant sense of fatigue and asphyxia. It is as if Grandrieux enters into the making of a film as if he were stepping into a dream. However, passivity does not mean simply doing nothing; it is more like letting the film come to you and not forcing the process. Perhaps the most revealing gloss on this point is the last entry in Kafka’s Zürau Aphorisms: “It isn’t necessary that you leave home. Sit at your desk and listen. Don’t even listen, just wait. Don’t wait, be still and alone. The whole world will offer itself to you to be unmasked, it can do no other, it will writhe before you in ecstasy” (108). The last line of that aphorism may well describe the effect Malgré La Nuit is aiming for. Radical passivity can also be linked to at least one more major theme, namely Grandrieux’s preference for sensation over story, which is why he likes to use wide-angle lenses (up to 85mm or even 100mm) that allow him to put more pure sensation into the image. In Grandrieux, sensation has no story to tell, no event to contextualize. As in Francis Bacon’s paintings, we find in Grandrieux’s film violent sensations that do not have the garrulousness of sensationalism. If, as Blanchot says, every artist is in an intimate relation with a particular “mistake,” then Grandrieux’s “mistake” is “the temptation to lose himself in a pure sensation of the image.” But this “mistake” allows Grandrieux to claim that to make films is to arrange images under fascination.

    Watt turns next to Bellour, who sees film criticism as “capturing something of cinematic fascination through a practice of writing.” What Bellour writes about, in constant dialogue with Blanchot, is not filmmaking but film spectatorship. Film induces a hypnotic state in the spectator, but fascination in cinema has to be distinguished from hypnosis, though there is a relation between them: “if hypnosis, in the cinema,” Bellour writes, “is that which sends the spectator to sleep, fascination is that which wakes him up” (Corps 294). Sleep is associated with the night, but in the cinema we are surrounded by a different kind of night, “an experimental night” (Pensées 228). For Blanchot, “night—the essence of night—does not, precisely, let us sleep” (Space 185). Insomniac nights then are nights of fascination. E. M. Cioran, who claims not to have slept in fifty years, did all his writing on white nights. Another central thesis of Bellour’s is that the child is the paradigm of the cinema spectator; in Watt’s description, “when we are fascinated by cinema, we reawaken the fascination that typified our earliest childhood.” The experience of powerlessness and passivity that Grandrieux speaks about has far-reaching consequences for filmmaking, and by extension, for film spectatorship. In Cinema 2 Deleuze notes the importance of the child in neo-realism, whose motor helplessness goes together with an increased capacity to hear and see (36). In an act of inspired spectatorship, Bellour is able to view Malgré La Nuit, despite the night and the raw violence, as “an attempt to bring to an obscure clarity … images which would be images of childhood” (Pensées 229)—and fascination.

    I consider finally the essay by Mikko Tuhkanen, who edited the volume and also contributes a helpful introduction. Tuhkanen turns to the work of Leo Bersani on fascination and cinema, particularly the essays “Merde Alors,” co-written with Ulysse Dutoit on Pasolini’s Salò (1975), and “Staring,” a single-authored essay on Bruno Dumont’s L’humanité (1999). Fascination is a pivotal notion in both essays, but in two different and seemingly opposed senses. There is firstly fascination as “interrogative spectatorship,” an active “looking, probing, detecting.” This is the form of “paranoid fascination” associated with the will to know that cinema apparatus theory critiques. But there is also fascination that takes the form of passive staring: an intimate rather than an invasive being-with the other, on the model of Bellour’s helpless child as spectator.

    However, it is only when we place Bersani’s work on cinematic fascination together with his other work, like the texts on Proust, that we begin to understand a little more clearly how he thinks of this opposition: it is not the opposition that matters but its reversibility. The Proustian subject can be said to be the precursor of the cinematic subject because the contradictory forms of cinematic fascination, displayed separately in different films, are present together and reversible in Proust’s novel. We might say that fascination in the Proustian subject is both active and passive. Paranoid fascination, the will to know, takes on a passive form in Marcel. Does this active/passive form surreptitiously reintroduce the distinction between subject and object, which in turn reinforces the subject’s position of mastery over the world? Tuhkanen notes that this is a possible reading, but it is not the whole story. He turns to the clinical work of Michel Thys, which suggests that fascination can be traced to a cleaving of the subject, “at once an adhesion to and a separation from the other”. In other words, it is the split or gap between adhesion and separation that constitutes the subject of fascination in the first place. As constitutive gap, present and absent all at once, it has to remain hidden, secret, and lost, like time in Proust, where the search for lost time is a search that is interminable. Or, it is like the secret of the erotic in Caravaggio as described by Bersani. The viewer of Caravaggio’s paintings “strains to penetrate the secret being simultaneously offered and withheld” (Bersani, Caravaggio’s 66); his paintings flirt with the viewer, promising everything, delivering nothing. This double movement can be “qualified as ‘erotic’ … It is … the movement away that fascinates, indeed that eroticizes the body’s apparent (and deceptive) availability” (Caravaggio’s 3). Or, we might add, it is like Claude Lévi-Strauss in the jungles of Brazil in search of ‘unknown’ tribes. The anthropological dilemma begins when he miraculously stumbles across one: “I had only to succeed in guessing what they were like for them to be deprived of their strangeness … Or if … they retained their strangeness, I could make no use of it, since I was incapable of even grasping what it consisted of” (333). We know his solution to this dilemma: the rejection of phenomenology and the recourse to structuralism as method to bridge the gap. But if the gap is constitutive, success in filling it is always a Pyrrhic victory. La musique savante manque à notre désir.1

    One of Tuhkanen’s best insights in his presentation of Bersani is to show that the two modes of fascination—the epistemophilic desire to know the world and the vertiginous passivity of registering the world—imply, morph into, and have an “intimate, dangerous proximity” to each other. Salò and L’humanité show on analysis to be made up of many anomalous details: they cannot be simply slotted into one category of fascination. This is why cinematic apparatus theory and the ideological critiques associated with it cannot do justice to either film.

    Of course, it would be difficult under any circumstance to do justice to Salò, a film that is still banned in some countries, or to Pasolini himself. Pasolini was an atheist obsessed with god. He made one of the best films—amazingly, commissioned by the Vatican—about the life of Jesus Christ. He believed that certitude was the only sin, and that the forbidden and scandalous are signs of saintliness: Gramsci wrote his Notebooks behind prison bars. Yet none of this prepares the viewer for the visceral onslaught of Salò, not even its anti-fascist politics or the use of Dante’s Inferno as structural frame. In fact, the section called “the Circle of Shit” (after Dante) contains some of the most shocking and abhorrent scenes ever filmed. However, what seems like the most virulent form of “interrogative spectatorship” in the history of cinema turns out to have another, more passive side to it. Bersani and Dutoit write: “Pasolini’s most original strategy in Salò is to distance himself from his Sadean protagonists by going along with them … It is as if a fascinated adherence … were, finally, identical to a certain detachment” (“Merde” 30). In this regard, Tuhkanen points out, an important though minor figure in the film is the pianist, an accompanist to the events but not an a ccomplice, a figure at once “enigmatic” (“Merde” 32, 33) and “unsignifying” (“Merde” 34), adherent and detached. Perhaps one final twist can be added to this account. After all the atrocities and moral/sexual violations, the film ends with two ordinary soldiers, two hapless supporters of an oppressive order, dancing with each other, one talking about going back to life “outside,” the other about seeing his girlfriend again; in other words, a return to normality, to things going on as before. Except “normality” is not an escape from disaster: it is what led to the disaster in the first place. Salò ends with a bang, not a whimper.

    Like Salò, L’humanité cannot be viewed as a film that simply opposes fascination as a passive registering of the world to a will to know. For one thing, its form is that of film noir, where typically the detective in solving a crime restores order and meaning to the world. However, Pharaon is a detective of a different kind, as the opening scenes and the rest of the film show. Instead of actively working to solve the heinous crime, the rape-murder of an eleven-year-old girl, his attention seems to wander, focusing randomly on apparently trivial details, like the sweat on his superior’s neck. In the course of the film, we learn a fair amount about his affective life: his wife and child have died in an accident; he lives with his not very pleasant mother, and interaction with her consists of avoiding confrontations; he is attracted to his neighbor Domino, but does nothing about it, even when she offers herself to him, except tagging along with her and her macho boyfriend Joseph on outings. However, it is not accurate to say that what we see in Pharaon is affective paralysis or passive staring. What we see rather is affect that does not immediately result in motor action. To cite Deleuze, Pharaon is part of “a new race of characters … kind of mutant: they saw rather than acted, they were seers” (xi). It is as if something prevented affect and perception “being extended into action in order to put it in contact with thought” (Deleuze 1). When Pharaon does act, it is action that is aberrant and surprising because it follows a different logic. For example, when the child killer is caught—it turns out to be Joseph, Domino’s boyfriend—Pharaon does not berate him, but kisses him on the mouth. This is clearly a repetition of the scene in Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov where Christ kisses the murderous Grand Inquisitor on the lips. It also reminds us of Kafka’s Leni in The Trial who “finds most defendants attractive. She’s drawn to all of them, loves all of them” (184). This aberrant action goes together with atleast two others, which viewers might not even notice because they seem so inexplicable. The last shot shows Pharaon in handcuffs. Why? Has he handcuffed himself? Another example occurs a little earlier, the strange scene in the garden where Pharaon seems to levitate, reminiscent of the scene in Pasolini’s Teorema where the maid levitates.

    These scenes in L’humanité suggest that cinematic fascination in Dumont is not about seeing or not seeing, or about knowledge or non-knowledge: it is about what we don’t see in what we see. This mode of perception amounts to a radical problematization or desubjectivation of seeing. Tuhkanen explains by citing Foucault on desubjectivation as the ability “to dissolve the ‘I’ into fascination.” One example is Rimbaud’s famous line Je est un autre (“I is an other”). The “error” in grammar desubjectivates by doing violence to the pieties of language that keep subjects and objects in place. Rimbaud’s linguistic violence is paralleled by the shocks administered to the language of film in the movies discussed in this special issue. They show that nothing is more anathema to fascination than grammar and piety. There is no fascination in cinema without the promise of heresy.2

    Footnotes

    1. The beautiful untranslatable last line of Arthur Rimbaud’s prose-poem “Conte,” from Illuminations. A very clumsy paraphrase might read something like: The music of knowledge cannot gratify our desire.

    2. cf. Nietzsche’s line in Twilight of the Idols: “I fear we do not get rid of God, because we still believe in grammar…” (119).

    Works Cited

    • Barad, Karen. “Matter Feels, Converses, Suffers, Desires, Yearns, and Remembers.” New Materialisms: Interviews and Cartographies, edited by Rick Dolphijn and Iris van der Tuin, Michigan Publishing / University of Michigan Library, 2012, quod.lib.umich.edu/o/ohp/11515701.0001.001/1:4.3/–new-materialism-interviewscartographies?rgn=div2;view=fulltext. Accessed 18 Jul. 2020.
    • Bellour, Raymond. Le Corps du cinéma: Hypnoses, émotions, animalités. P.O.L., 2009.
    • —. Pensées du cinéma: Les Films qu’on accompagne, le cinéma qu’on cherche à ressaisir. P.O.L., 2016.
    • Bersani, Leo, and Ulysse Dutoit. Caravaggio’s Secrets. MIT P, 1998.
    • —. “Merde Alors.” October, vol. 13, Summer 1980, pp. 22-35.
    • Blanchot, Maurice. “The Essential Solitude.” Translated by Lydia Davis. The Station Hill.
    • Blanchot Reader, edited by George Quasha, Station Hill Press, 1999, pp. 401-415.
    • —. “The Song of the Sirens.” Translated by Lydia Davis. The Station Hill Blanchot Reader, edited by George Quasha, Station Hill Press, 1999, pp. 443-450.
    • —. The Space of Literature. Translated by Ann Smock, U of Nebraska P, 1982.
    • Calasso, Roberto. The Forty-Nine Steps. Translated by John Shepley, U of Minnesota P, 2001.
    • Deleuze, Gilles. Cinema 2: The Time Image. Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta, U of Minnesota P, 1989.
    • Kafka, Franz. The Trial. Translated by Breon Mitchell, Schocken Books, 1998.
    • —. The Zürau Aphorisms. Translated by Michael Hofmann and Geoffrey Bock, edited by Roberto Calasso, Schocken Books, 2006.
    • Kundera, Milan. The Unbearable Lightness of Being. 1984. Translated by Michael Henry Heim, Harper Collins, 1999.
    • Lévi-Strauss, Claude. Tristes Tropiques. Translated by John and Doreen Weightman, Athenium, 1973.
    • Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Twilight of the Idols. 1888. The Works of Friedrich Nietzche, vol. XI, translated by Thomas Common, MacMillan and Co., 1896., pp. 93-231.
    • Rimbaud, Arthur. “Conte.” A Season in Hell & Illuminations, translated by Bertrand Mathieu, BOA Editions, 1991, p. 86.
  • The Power of Absolute Nothing:Psycho-Sexual Fascination and Sadomasochism in Secretary

    Kwasu D. Tembo (bio)

    Abstract

    In the psychoanalytic theories of Sigmund Freud and Lacan, the term fascination – which connotes being immobilized, charmed, enchanted, attracted, enraptured, seized, captured, and/or dazzled by the power of the gaze – also evokes dynamics of power. Fascination is associated with the hypnotic bondage of love that paralyzes critical faculties and leads to dependence, docile submission, and jejune credulity; it is also associated with sexual relationships. This paper theorizes the psycho-sexual consequences of the relationship between sadomasochism and fascination through Steven Shainberg’s Secretary (2002).

    Introduction: Secretary and Fascination

    Applied to states, objects, and persons in sources as diverse as songs, films, and viral videos, the term fascination typically has positive connotations in contemporary usage. However, the etymological associations of fascination, which include being immobilized by the power of the gaze, charmed, enchanted, attracted, enraptured, seized, captured, dazzled, suggest more sinister origins in its predication on power and the dynamics of interpersonal/interobjective mediation. Within the psychoanalytic tradition, Sigmund Freud connects fascination with amorousness in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921), in which psycho-sexual fascination refers to the negatively dis-agential binding properties that Freud calls the “bondage” of love (113). In Seminar XI and in Écrits, Jacques Lacan uses the term to explore the problem of the imaginary relationship between the self and the loved Other or the authority figure, whereby fascination is inextricable from the process of ego formation.

    The inextricable relationship between psycho-sexual amorousness and fascination is a germane point of departure in the exploration of the issues and debates surrounding feminist responses to and critiques of sadomasochism, and the broader idea of female masochism. Even a cursory glance at the work of feminist scholars engaging with sadomasochism—including Patricia Cross and Kim Matheson, Lisa Downing, Andrea Beckmann, Katherine Martinez, and Ingrid Olson—suggests that the relationships between feminism, sadomasochism, and other paraphilias in which explicit tension between sexuality and power are central, are controversial. While it could be argued that an auteur can portray the physical dynamics, flows, and negotiations of power within both sexual and non-sexual contexts using acts or symbols of power—for example, through sociopolitical or economic affluence as in Sam Taylor-Johnson’s 50 Shades of Grey (2015), or more directly through extreme impact violence in Michael Winterbottom’s The Killer Inside Me (2010)—it is vastly more difficult to portray the ephemeral phenomena associated with and resulting from such acts, particularly the role of fascination in sadomasochistic relationships. This paper theorizes sadomasochistic psycho-sexual fascination by exploring common phenomenological and philological understandings of fascination alongside Freudian and Lacanian interpretations in relation to Steven Shainberg’s Secretary (2002). I begin by discussing psychoanalytical thought on fascination in order to orient my subsequent analysis of Secretary. I then explore the relation between fascination and sadomasochism in Secretary in the context of feminist critiques of power and female masochism more broadly.

    The Power and the State: A Sketch of Common Interpretations of Fascination

    Non-psychoanalytic definitions of fascination typically refer to the same set of concepts. Steven Connor describes the phenomenon as a direct derivation of the Latin fascinare, “meaning to bewitch or enchant” (9): “until the nineteenth century and even beyond, the word retained this strong association with the idea of the maleficent exercise of occult or supernatural force” (9). Similarly, Brigette Weingart states that the Greco-Roman etymology of fascination both explicitly and implicitly “locates the notion within the history of magic (or, depending upon your perspective, superstition)” (74). Historically, the power of fascination, its transmission and experience, has characteristically been assumed to be the province of sight/looking, predicated on the Medusa-Perseus archetype in Greco-Roman mythology. According to Tobin Siebers, the head of Medusa fascinates because “its horrifying countenance spontaneously transforms its beholder to stone [and] yet the mask of Medusa also serves an apotropaic function, as do all masks, by protecting its wearer against fascination. The mask of Medusa once more presents a familiar paradox: the Gorgoneion both causes and cures the evil eye. Yet Perseus also carries and cures the disease of fascination” (58). Louis Marin notes that this central paradox, between elevation and the degeneration inherent in fascination, is also at the heart of the symbol of Medusa’s head: “we have, then, two Medusas in one: a horrible monster as well as a striking beauty: the fascination of contraries mixed together” (140). Jean-Pierre Vernant explicates the notion of fascination as a type of infection or psychologically viral power that entraps and ensnares, whose functioning also latently involves reciprocity, mutuality, and transference: “fascination means that man can no longer detach his gaze and turn his face away from this Power; it means that his eye is lost in the eye of this Power, which looks at him as he looks at it, and that he himself is thrust into the world over which this Power presides” (221).

    The understanding of fascination as a force of transmission and reception through an invisible but omnipresent substance or effluvium saw a revival in the nineteenth century’s preoccupation with the occult, spiritualism, hypnosis, and mesmerism. Connor notes that “the power of the mesmerist to fascinate or entrance his subjects was most commonly explained as the effect of magnetic or electrical forces originating in the body of the mesmerizer and passing across to his subjects” (11). The implication here is that the actions of the power of fascination, while seeming mono-directional, are in fact fundamentally governed by a bidirectional exchange between reciprocally fascinated subjects and/or entities. Alongside this nineteenth-century understanding of fascination as a pseudo-supernatural force, which produces alterations in the psyche that simultaneously liberate and enslave, is a decidedly aesthetic understanding of fascination. According to Hans Ulrich Seeber, the value of fascination, its “raison d’etre, [is to] be justified by the degree of intense admiration it can, by means of its beauty, provoke, both in the artist and the recipient. But intense admiration means simply that the work of art must be an object that fascinates, that lives from the radiant power of its suggestion, its ambiguous surface” (322; emphasis mine).

    Even if pursued from a purely aesthetic standpoint, psycho-sexual fascination can similarly have numerous modalities and flows: the body, its curves, sensuous movements, and lineaments, but also its scars, wounds, scents, and maladies. However, the psycho-sexual fascination of BDSM takes the purely aesthetic dimension of fascination further into (oftentimes radical) haptic zones, whereby fascination becomes sensationalized and not merely aestheticized. In sadomasochistic interactions, fascination is both seen and felt. It is brought into the body, into its climactic capacities and the ephemeral zones of the subconscious, the innenwelt, in which the play between desire, passion, fantasy, and ethical negotiations of trust and consent in domination and submissiveness occurs. Here, there is a distinct difference between interest (or liking) and fascination. The former connotes fleetingness, alterability, and even its antonym, boredom. The latter carries with it connotations of witchcraft and, at its most radical, obsession, fanaticism, and madness: “[w]hereas ‘liking’ designates a relatively mild feeling in the aesthetic sphere, ‘fascination’, like hypnosis, affects the whole personality perhaps to the point of unbalance” (Seeber 332). Due to its power to destabilize, inherent in fascination is always already the suggestion that it also “contains an admixture of something potentially disturbing and powerful which makes it impossible for the beholder to retain an aloof, aesthetic stance” (Seeber 329).

    The notion of being drawn forth in an irresistible manner despite or because of the intimated dangers of agential loss in fascination may suggest the inescapable negativity in/of fascination. However, this very negativity is also an essential part of the power and appeal of fascination. For sadomasochism it is important that the state of being fascinated “does not necessarily have to be experienced as an oppressive loss of self-determination, but can take the form of a readiness to be invaded and/or borne away by exterior forces” (Weingart 97). The fascinating experience does not, however, occur in isolation. Implied in this definition is also the notion of a transmission of emotions, a connective process between a subject and an exterior agency, which, by being fascinating, cannot be fully appropriated (Weingart 74).

    Verliebte Hörigkeit, Pleasure, Excess, and Death: On the Psychoanalytics of Fascination in Freud and Lacan

    My attempt to theorize fascination in relation to sadomasochism is indebted to psychoanalytic interpretations of fascination and its associated phenomena, which have been developed by Sigmund Freud and Jacques Lacan. In Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, Freudian fascination takes as a part of its basic definition the etymological intimations of immobility, charm, dazzle, and enchantment outlined above. However, Freud draws these meanings together with the idea of the paralysis of the critical faculties of lovers, as well as the phenomena of (co)dependence, docility, submission, and psycho-emotional impressionability that occur when in love.1 Freud’s earliest considerations of the relationship between fascination, love, and hypnagogic states appear in his 1890 essay “Psychical (or Mental) Treatment.” Referring to the docility, obedience, and credulity of the hypnotized individual, Freud argues that a situation producing this type of “subjection on the part of one person towards another has only one parallel, though a complete one—namely in certain love-relationships where there is extreme devotion. A combination of exclusive attachment and credulous obedience is in general among the characteristics of love” (296). Freud returns to this reading in 1918 in his essay “The Taboo of Virginity,” in which he discusses the psychoanalytic aspects of love and sexual bondage. Here, “sexual bondage” refers to “the phenomenon of a person’s acquiring an unusually high degree of dependence and lack of self-reliance in relation to another person with whom he [or she] has a sexual relationship” (193). Freud goes on to posit that “this bondage can on occasion extend very far, as far as the loss of all independent will and as far as causing a person to suffer the greatest sacrifices of his [or her] own interests” (193). A basic affective tenet of Freudian fascination is that the fascinated individual is subject to psychological and emotional entrapment and to the perceptible and manipulable diminishment of the will and the faculties: a disadvantaging of the self that is the primary determinant of the value of being itself. It is important to note that the development of Freud’s thinking about fascination can be plotted on a rather steep incline, the antipodes of which centralize the oppositional states of passivity and activity. From a static state of psycho-emotional hypnosis to the forceful submission of the fascinated devotee, Freudian fascination indirectly contains within it the kernel of a sadomasochistic truth: namely, that to be fascinated is to occupy and/or be subject to a paradoxical force/subject position. To be fascinated is simultaneously to be all powerful and powerless, to be the enclosure of an empty space (metaphorically, like the cosmological phenomenon of the black hole); to be fascinated is to both be and to be subject to the seemingly insuperable power of absolute nothing.

    The principal functioning of fascination as a bidirectional exchange is seemingly absent from Freud’s thinking on the subject. It is an odd omission considering that inherent in the idea of binding one thing to another is the concept of cooperation, which, in turn, is implicit in Freud’s conceptualization of fascination as a state of amorous bondage (verliebte Hörigkeit). The most interesting and pertinent aspect of Freud’s and Lacan’s respective discussions of fascination is the relation to sadomasochism, the death drive, and jouissance. While Freud identifies fascination and/or fascinated states with the death drive and indeed amorousness and its devotions—as always already tending toward termination and repetition—he does not explicitly associate the death drive with sexual drives. In 1964, Freud and Lacan diverge on the status of the death drive, Lacan viewing the phenomenon as an irreducible aspect of every drive. In Seminar XI, Lacan states that “the distinction between the life drive and the death drive is true in as much as it manifests two aspects of the drive” (257). He underscores this position in his essay “Position of the Unconscious” (1960), stating that “every drive is virtually a death drive” for three reasons, two of which are relevant to my discussion of psycho-sexual fascination (275). First, every drive is a death drive because every drive pursues its own extinction. Second, every drive presents an attempt to go beyond the ideological prohibitions against the subject’s pursuit and eventual attainment of supra-moral pleasure—known in psychoanalysis as the pleasure principle. The subject seeks to transgress the stricture of the pleasure principle in relation to a psycho-sexual zone of excess, or jouissance, where pleasure/enjoyment is experienced as pain/suffering. The relationship between sexuality and excessive stimuli is succinctly summed up by Ruth Stein, who notes that excessive over and/or under-stimulation, including affective states of heightened anxiety, pain, and humiliation, can become or be experientially “transformed” into psycho-sexual pleasure (50).

    What is most interesting to note here is that both psycho-sexual fascination and the death drive operate through the action of a paradoxical undifferentiating ambivalence in the bondage of fascinated and fascinator to one another. While the essential bidirectional exchange that occurs between fascinator and fascinated—or for example between a dominant (dom) and a submissive (sub) in the context of a BDSM relationship—may suggest a mono-directional flow of power from f to f (dom to sub), both are ultimately fascinated by each other. Because the dominant ultimately submits to the submissive’s submission, the distinction between dominated and dominator, as with the distinction between the life drive and the death drive, is ultimately symbolic. Denuded of their “symbols of office,” both the fascination and desire of the dominant and the submissive tend toward the same terminus. While one might assume from observing the symbolic behavior of master and bondsman practiced in BDSM that it is only the submissive who somehow seeks transcendence from themself through the radical acquiescence of submission and the violence and degradation of domination (which are brought together in play to result in a symbolic death), the dominant is equally engaged in seeking symbolic death and transcendence in, through, and because of the submissive. The submissive “makes himself the instrument of the Other’s jouissance” just as much, albeit through different procedures, as the dominant (Lacan, Écrits 320). Both dominant and submissive, sadist and masochist, are fascinated by the same thing in their attempt to transgress the pleasure principle to its limit; both are ultimately trying to go “as far as [they] can along the path of jouissance” through, against, and because of one another (323). As Pansy Duncan rightly notes, fascination’s supra-subjective status ultimately suggests that “what fascinates [ … ] is always fascination itself” (89).

    From a psychoanalytic standpoint, sadism and masochism are both modalities of the drive for/of fascination, which underpins all human sexuality and is brought into stark relief in psycho-sexual relationships involving power play up to and including death. My understanding of sadomaschism derives from Gary Taylor and Jane Ussher’s definition: “SM is best understood as comprising those behaviours which are characterized by a contrived, often symbolic, unequable distribution of power involving the giving and/or receiving of physical and/or psychological stimulation. It often involves acts which would generally be considered ‘painful’ and/or humiliating or subjugating, but which are consensual and for the purpose of sexual arousal, and are understood by the participant to be SM” (301). Taylor and Ussher go on to note that reductive definitions of sadomasochism that emphasize pain do so at the risk of obfuscating the primacy of the experience of power differentials as erotic.2 BDSM practices that are considered “extreme” or “dangerous” are thus said to provoke the greatest risks of psychic and physical harm. As Downing suggests, the very notion of “edgeplay” suggests that such practices function precisely through their proximity to a limit, which simultaneously necessitates both their judicial and clinical prohibition and their transgressive pursuit.3 In the case of extreme psycho-sexual fascinations involving power play that potentiates death as an essential part of eroticism (symphorophilia, knife and/or extreme breathplay), Downing suggests that psycho-sexual extremes of this and lesser natures still hold fascination—as well as controversy—over death-driven sexuality in our contemporary milieu of so-called sexual liberalism because “it is more specifically that we have a problem with the idea of validating the right to consent to a sexually pleasurable death” (10).4

    The relationship between psycho-sexual fascination and sadomasochism starts with Freud’s interpolation of Krafft-Ebing’s 1893 coinage.5 In Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905), Freud’s usage of the term sadomasochism similarly posits an inherent link between sadism and masochism. Unlike Freud, who posits sadism as primary, Lacan argues that masochism is primary and that sadism is derived therefrom. In Seminar XI, Lacan states that “sadism is merely the disavowal of masochism” (186). Lacan gives special privilege to masochism among the drives, regarding it as the limit-experience in the subject’s attempt to transgress the pleasure principle through a preferred experience of eroticized, psycho-sexually fascinating pain (Écrits 778).6

    Lacan’s views on the nature of sexual relationships also help elucidate an interesting aspect of psycho-sexual fascination; namely, that successful, or sustained, psycho-sexual fascination is predicated on ignorance. According to Lacan, the sexual drives are essentially partial in that they are not directed toward a complete or whole person but towards what he calls part objects. In this sense, the psycho-sexual relationship is not between two subjects but rather two partial objects, whose partiality is not only reciprocal but also reciprocally fascinating. In order for fascination to maintain itself as long as possible for both fascinator and fascinated, each cannot fully know the other. The imprecise intimations of the mutual unknown are, paradoxically, precisely what compel the shared fascination produced and experienced between the two. Similarly, in a sadomasochistic arrangement, the fascination of the sub in the dom is partially based on the sub’s ignorance of the depth of what we could call the dom’s will or drive to death. It is this undisclosed potential, with all its connotations of danger, that excites the sub’s fascination, not necessarily in the dom themself, but in how far they are willing to go, how near death they are willing to push the sub. Equally, the depths of the sub’s submissiveness, that is, the sub’s potential will to submit to death, must also remain mysterious to the dom in order to excite their fascination in attempting to test this limit of death, both in themself and in/through the sub. While this position may seem extreme, Katherine Franke points out that psycho-sexual fascination is, in many ways and to many different degrees, a necessarily dangerous idea of what can be a necessarily dangerous feeling:

    Desire is not subject to cleaning up, to being purged of its nasty, messy, perilous dimensions, full of contradictions and the complexities of simultaneous longing and denial. It is precisely the proximity to danger, the lure of prohibition, the seamy side of shame that creates the heat that draws us toward our desires, and that makes desire and pleasure so resistant to rational explanation. It is also what makes pleasure, not a contradiction of or haven from danger, but rather a close relation. These aspects of desire have been marginalized, if not vanquished, from feminist legal theorizing about women’s sexuality. (207)

    The truly extreme (and, I argue, beautiful) aspect of the above proposition centers on the idea of the trust required not only to accept this potentially deadly ignorance, but to experience it as ecstatic pleasure, to pursue the inherent potential danger of psycho-sexual fascination—up to and including death—as an essential part of the rapprochement of sadomasochistic relationships, which should not be limned by either dom or sub. While the dom and sub are mutually undifferentiated by the supra-subjective force of psycho-sexual fascination, they are also mutually undifferentiated by the necessity of ignorance in its exploration and pursuit. Within the context of sadomasochistic relations, the notion of fascination helps us to think about the profoundly bidirectional exchange of bondage.

    Entangled Emancipation: Fascination, Sadomasochism, and Feminism

    The subject of sadomasochism, or power play, is fraught within feminist critical literatures in which its positional demarcations are clear. Each position attempts to negotiate the sociopolitical, cultural, and medical issues and debates that confirm and contradict what Jane Gallop describes as Western post-feminist sexual norms: “The norm for feminist sexuality is an egalitarian relation of tenderness and caring where each partner is considered as a ‘whole person’ rather than as an object of sexual fantasy” (107). Simultaneously, however, this norm, constructed as a response to oppressive heterosexist relationships, has its own oppressive moralizing force that “condemns pleasure that is not subordinate to it” (108). Within this discursive milieu, feminist perspectives on sadomasochism are generally bifurcated. On the one hand, one feminist position typically holds that sadomasochism is condemnable on account of its professed objectification of women and its eroticization of violence. On the other hand, sex-radical (sometimes known as sex-positive) feminists maintain that S/M is merely one aspect of its overarching pursuit of sexual pluralism and alternative sexualities. Maneesha Deckha describes sex-radicalism as a feminist position that champions “sexual practices such as pornography, sex work/prostitution, and sadomasochism as empowering practices for women and correspondingly characterize attempts to regulate sex as repressive” (430).7 For some, the type of psycho-sexual fascination represented in Secretary can be considered incompatible with feminist ideals of healthy sexuality. However, I argue that such a position must also and necessarily acknowledge a simple fact: in view of the vastly inexhaustible, powerful, complex, and indeed fascinating manifolds of human sexuality, “it would be too dismissive to immediately regard consensual rough or painful sex as unfeminist” (Deckha 435).

    The complexity pervading the interrelationships between pain and pleasure, morality and immorality, health and malady, social justice and patriarchal oppression defies facile categorization. There are two primary reasons for this. First, psycho-sexually sadomasochistic relationships have an interesting sense of radical play inherent in them, which simultaneously appears to affirm and negate the repressive power of heteronormative sexuality. In this way, S/M has an inherently subversive dimension where both men and women consensually (and often radically) exchange power for their own (mutual) erotic fascination. Even where women are masochists, the nature of sadomasochism contravenes the conservative fantasy of ideal romantic love, and the sacralized fetish-cum-norm of white female heterosexual innocence. More importantly, sadomasochism challenges any essentializing understanding of heterosexual masculine and feminine identities as fundamentally empowered or disempowered. In sadomasochistic encounters, it is typical for masochists to act as “dictatorial submissives” who, by and through their submission, determine the remit of play, which is another way of saying that they determine the distance from the limit that both dom and sub will reach during said encounters.

    The second reason these positions defy classification pertains to the nature of submission itself. Deckha argues that while the source of physical power may ostensibly reside with the sadist/dom—especially obvious in impact play scenarios in which the giver of violence is assumed to wield all power—the direction of its discharge is not only solely focused on but determined by the masochist/sub. Downing refers to this paradox as the “dialectical nature of S&M, the fact that it is the bottom, rather than the top, who calls the shots by setting the limits of the scene, making the demands, and having attention paid to his or her desires” (12). The implication here is that there is a more complex relationship between psycho-sexual submission and surrender. Following Deckha, I suggest that the psycho-sexual submissive does not lose (and in many ways actually accrues) agency as such: “the masochist’s intentions may be understood as a complete and active surrender to the activity and the sensations and effects it produces for the surrendered (rather than submissive or pornographic) subject” (438).8 Thomas Weinberg’s seemingly commonsense observation is important in terms of our approach to sadomasochism and other forms of non-normative psycho-sexual fascination. Weinberg argues that “if we wish to understand S/M motivations and behavior, we must look to the definitions provided by these people rather than attempt to impose our own preconceived notions upon this activity” (58). In my discussion of Secretary, the protagonists’ descriptions of their own sexuality are imperative to interpreting the nature of their respective psycho-sexual fascinations.

    Other feminist scholars have championed this sex-positive position of sadomasochistic plurality and both the causal and the participatory dynamism that approaches extreme psycho-sexual fascinations beyond pathological and judicial stigma, as well as the repressiveness of biopower. Martha Nussbaum, for example, states that consensual S/M acts can be empowering because the “willingness to be vulnerable to the infliction of pain, in some respects a sharper stimulus than pleasure, manifests a more complete trust and receptivity than could be found in other sexual acts” (280). Adjacent to this philosophico-ethical position is the problem of sadomasochism’s relationship with capitalism. More recent feminist perspectives see sadomasochism—perhaps the ur-representation of kink in the collective imagination—as having been systematically interpellated into the various ideological apparatuses of the state, from cinema to haute couture, advertising, pop music, and numerous other modes of commercialized mainstream representations of sexuality, as well as the expansion of both the ideology of sexual libertarianism and the sexo-industrial marketplace. It is right, therefore, to consider Alex Dymock’s point concerning the enervation of psycho-sexual fascination: “if kink is not protected from the normalizing effects of the commercialization of sex, it loses a validity and authenticity that it might have otherwise” (55). Issues concerning self-care and sexual health are also included in this institutionalizing movement. As a result, while capitalist enterprise often attempts to monetize the public’s ongoing fascination with their own psycho-sexual extremes, which are simultaneously prohibited and encouraged by the state itself, sadomasochism has also been claimed as a potent and effective means of encouraging self-discovery. Far from a tool for galvanizing record or movie ticket sales, many practitioners and non-practitioners alike argue that sadomasochistic psycho-sexuality represents a form of radical “safer” sex, and that it can also contribute to relaxation.

    With the above psychoanalytic and feminist understandings of the way psycho-sexual fascination involves power play, the main questions precipitating my exploration of Secretary are: does the text present the extreme fascinations of sadomasochism in a positive or negative light? And how does this text help to further elucidate the psychological and emotional subtleties of psycho-sexual fascination? Narrativized and consumed in media, the cases presented in Secretary also become a part of the Hollywood media-industrial machine. Commentaries on psycho-sexual fascination and its modalities emanate from this cultural and sociopolitical position, one that “still operate[s] as a kind of disciplinary mechanism, further marginalizing paradigms of female masochism that are cast outside the legal and clinical binary of health and harm” (Dymock 55). With that in mind, how does psycho-sexual fascination function in Secretary?

    “You Are Part of a Great Tradition”: Sadomasochistic Fascination in Secretary

    Secretary follows Lee Holloway (Maggie Gyllenhaal), the socially awkward youngest daughter of a dysfunctional family, as she adjusts to life outside of psychiatric care. The film’s opening reveals that Lee was institutionalized following a near-fatal incident of self-harm. Her reintegration into society involves her striking up an amorous relationship with a high school acquaintance named Peter (Jeremy Davies), learning to type, and endeavoring to find employment as a secretary. She is eventually hired by an idiosyncratic attorney named E. Edward Grey (James Spader), who is attracted to and ensnared by Lee’s social awkwardness, disheveled appearance, and technical over-qualification for the position. Their initial exchange acts as a prelude for the pair’s subsequent mutual, that is, bidirectional exchange of bondage, or fascination. Ostensibly, Grey is perturbed at first by Lee’s own quietly eccentric behavior as well as by the errors in her work. However, he is simultaneously psycho-sexually aroused by her unlimited submissiveness, drawn to the ostensibly unending space she makes of and within herself, which is presented as an unspoken invitation for Grey to occupy and fill, but also leads to his becoming ensnared by and bound to her. After discovering Lee’s propensity for self-harm, Grey commands her to cease such behavior entirely. She agrees and the pair begin a sadomasochistic relationship. Her submission to Grey precipitates a psychological, sexual, emotional, and identitarian awakening in Lee. In contrast, Lee’s power as a submissive creates heightened feelings of insecurity and vulnerability in Grey, most severely in the form of shame and self-disgust at his sadistic psycho-sexual fascinations. The bidirectional exchange of bondage and the phenomenon of the submissive’s power in being fascinating are precisely what fascinates Grey and what binds him to her radical acquiescence, ultimately causing him to submit to the power of Lee’s submission. Grey subsequently fires Lee, who then attempts to find other avenues for her burgeoning submissiveness. Alongside these failed attempts is her decision to pursue a more conventional relationship with Peter, who proposes to Lee. While Lee initially accepts the proposal, she later flees to Grey during a fitting for her wedding gown. She confronts Grey at his office, declaring her love for him. He commands her to sit in a chair, hands and feet planted firm, and to remain that way until he releases her, a test not only of her submissiveness, but of his fascination by it. Lee submits and maintains this position for three days and nights. Numerous individuals, including Peter, family members, and acquaintances, visit Lee, each attempting to either dissuade or encourage her in her submissiveness. Grey watches unseen, psycho-sexually fascinated—that is, bound to her binding to the bondage he imposes upon her—by the seemingly inexhaustible depths of Lee’s submissiveness. After the event that local media refer to as “The Lee Holloway Hunger Strike,” Grey returns to the office and takes the dehydrated and malnourished Lee to his home where he bathes and attends to her. The film concludes with the suggestion that Lee and Grey begin a happy sadomasochistic relationship following their marriage.

    A cursory glance at the critical responses to Secretary suggests a mixture of contentious and defensive positions. For example, reviewer Merle Bertrand writes that “Feminists Will Hate This Movie,” while Ed Gonzales of Slant Magazine writes, “Secretary May Fray Some Feminist Nerves.” More elaborate stances, marked by a latently defensive (and indeed male) sentiment, also emerge. Carlo Cavagna of AboutFilm argues that “[t]raditional feminist thinking, of course, would see Lee’s [Maggie Gyllenhaal] behaviour as incompatible with feminine equality. The analysis would be that Lee is objectified, used, and the repository of all Mr. Grey’s [James Spader] abusive male desires.” Cavagna goes on to claim that “if the roles were reversed, the gender politics of the relationship would not need to be discussed. The roles could easily be reversed. You could make almost exactly the same movie with male Lee and a Ms. Grey … or with two men … or with two women. Only when the male is dominant and the female is submissive do people insist on seeing the relationship as an expression of society’s patriarchal power structure.” Arguing that the film should not be viewed in intractably gendered terms—a difficult task considering the narrative and its subject matter—New York Times reviewer Stephan Holden suggests that “[s]ome may see Secretary [ … ] as a slap in the face to orthodox feminist thinking, since the concept of sexual harassment doesn’t seem to occur to anybody.”

    Perhaps the most vociferous critique of the film from a feminist perspective comes from Brenda Cossman. Cossman writes that, on the one hand, Lee can be construed as “an emotionally abused young woman (she comes from a dysfunctional family, with an alcoholic father), who first learns to abuse herself through self-mutilation, and then learns to redirect her abuse outward, by having someone else do it for her,” whereby her narrative is nothing but

    a story of abuse, self and other. And it is a story of the conventional exercise of heterosexual power and desire; a rescue fantasy in which the young woman is saved only to be abused again by her saviour (to say nothing of the sexual objectification of women for audience consumption). It is a film that celebrates the eroticizing of dominance and the submission of women, made all the worse by its tongue-in-cheek irony and its fantastical settings. This feminist narrative might also comment on the plot twist, in which Lee and Gray [sic] settle down into wedded, domestic bliss. The storybook ending is simply the story of the sexual subordination of all women—sexual dominance and submission within heterosexual marriage.(868)

    This position contrasts strongly with screenwriter Erin Wilson’s authorial position, which could be described as following sadomasochistic psycho-sexual fascination as a bidirectional exchange of bondage. As Wilson writes in commentary on the screenplay, Lee’s story engages with “the sexiest, strongest, and most empowering part of being submissive: that it can be an expression of strength of character to bow down and surrender to love and passion,” what Wilson describes as her “idea of feminism” (qtd. in Cossman 869).

    According to Cossman, the sex-radical position would, first, not view S/M practices, desires, and/or fascinations as invariably harmful to Lee. It acknowledges that these are, even if only potentially so, subversive and pleasurable practices, desires, and/or fascinations, and as such, bi-directional exchanges of power. The goal would be to countenance Lee’s complex of submission, domination, degradation, abuse, and fascination (that is, also a binding/being bound to) for/toward these areas of play as equally complex expressions of the inexhaustible flows of female sexuality. In view of the sex-radical acknowledgement that sex and sexuality are ambivalent, the focus of any critique launched from this position would focus on the fact that the sadomasochistic fascinations pursued by Lee and Grey are mutually consensual, bidirectional exchanges of psycho-sexual power and energy, each expressing agency and will in pursuit of exploring their respective and shared psycho-sexual fascinations (Cossman 869). From a sex-radical perspective, Lee and Grey affirmatively interpellate the psycho-sexual power and fascination of abjection, shame, danger, and potential death in both their respective and shared explorations of psycho-sexual fascination. Each seeks the self-annihilation and/or undoing of subjecthood and a merger with powerful forces beyond the self that are discussed by Leo Bersani, who suggests that the “sexual emerges as the jouissance of exploded limits” (217) and further that “sexual pleasure occurs whenever a certain threshold of intensity is reached, when the organization of the self is momentarily disturbed by sensations or affective processes somehow ‘beyond’ those connected with psychic organization” (197). This accords with Lee’s own description of her fascination, her entrapment by the potently alluring but also redemptive forces and ideas of sadomasochism distilled by an excerpt from the audio cassette book she listens to during one of her lunch breaks in the early part of the second act of the film titled, “How to Come out as a Dominant/Submissive”: “Most people think that the best way to live is to run from pain. But a much more joyful life…embraces the entire spectrum of human feeling. If we can fully experience pain as well as pleasure, we can live a much deeper and more meaningful life.”

    It could be argued by detractors of the film and its sex-radical message that the said message is already undermined by the film’s opening, when the viewer learns that Lee has just been released from psychiatric care. On the one hand, the criticism here would hold that any sex-radical hermeneutic concerning her sense of psycho-sexual growth and development must first take into account her pathological status and behavior; namely, the fact that the Lee ritually self-harms and keeps a self-harm kit (what I call a “masokit”) under her bed, full of sharp implements, such as scalpel blades and cuticle scissors, which she makes recourse to as a means of both expressing and nullifying her psycho-emotional turmoil. On the other hand, it could also be argued that Lee’s reliance on stricture, rule, and the rigidity of a schedule that offers her stability, order, and peace of mind (which she is reluctant to leave behind in institutional form) is not the only way she can attain these same effects. For Lee, regardless of method and safety, the ardent pursuit of pain acts as an emotional valve through which she can attain an emotional release. Her fascination, as well as her binding, is with/to the paradoxically psycho-emotionally ameliorative attributes of physical pain. In so many respects, an individual with a psycho-sexual fascination with pain and stricture is an ideal vessel/practitioner for the fascinating power of sadomasochism.

    The seemingly perfect union of Lee and Grey is announced in the introduction of Grey himself. He is shown to be a man both deeply obsessed and fascinated with order. During Lee’s interview, Grey is shown to be deeply drawn to her, predisposed to “fall” into her on account of how closed off she seems, and yet how open she is to accepting/acquiescing to power, instruction, and domination. This is confirmed early in the film when Grey cannot find a file of case notes. Without hesitating out of concern for odor, illness, or injury, Lee offers to jump into the garbage dumpster in order to try and locate them. Grey is subsequently entrapped, enfolded, invited, and drawn in by Lee’s willingness to debase herself for him. He watches secretly yet excitedly from the window as she rummages, having to resort to physical exercise to literally work off the bodily effects of his psycho-sexual fascination, his burgeoning binding to her, in what he observes. Interestingly, he throws away the very same notes she struggled so hard to find as a test not only of her submissive willingness, but the limits of her submissiveness. This preoccupation with the limit causes the dynamic and character of their relationship to deteriorate into cruelty for detractors of the film, and to bloom or intensify into cruelty for its supporters. Grey becomes increasingly critical and dismissive of Lee, giving her large amounts of unnecessary work to complete. Because she continues to obey, so too does his entrapment by/within the seeming limitlessness of Lee’s submissiveness continue, a directly proportional exchange of fascination that ultimately compels him further and further down a path of mutually binding psycho-sexual fascination.

    Perhaps the most devastating way Grey exerts power over Lee is by first removing her primary fascination, namely her self-harm, and replacing its affective aptitude with himself. Consider the following exchange:

    GREY:
    Why do you cut yourself, Lee?

    LEE: I don’t know.

    GREY:
    Is it that sometimes the pain inside has to come to the surface … and when you see evidence of the pain inside … you finally know you’re really here? Then when you watch the wound heal it’s comforting, isn’t it?

    LEE:
    I … that’s a way to put it.

    GREY:
    I’m going to tell you something. Are you ready to listen?

    LEE:
    Yes.

    GREY:
    Are you listening? You will never … ever … cut yourself again. Do you understand? Have I made that perfectly clear? You’re over that now. It’s in the past.

    LEE:
    Yes.

    GREY:
    Never again.

    LEE:
    Okay.

    [ … ] GREY:
    I want you to take a nice walk home … in the fresh air, because you require relief. Because you won’t be doing that anymore, will you?

    LEE:
    No, sir.

    GREY:
    Good.

    Grey takes Lee’s cutting and her fascination for and binding to it from her, a process she submits to as the most important, albeit subtle, symbol of her total submission to him. This substitution, and indeed exchange, of fascination comes to a climax during the first overtly sadomasochistic encounter between the two. After Grey spanks Lee for the first time, she staggers to the bathroom as if mesmerized and upon gaining some privacy, she inspects her bruised buttocks. She is shown to experience a moment of orgasmic relief. It is clear at this point that the fascination Lee had with the implements of her masokit was not contained by them, but was an effect of what they could produce, namely relief through pain. Unlike the inert cuticle scissors she uses to attain psycho-emotional relief, Grey has a will of his own. In taking the kit away and subjecting her to the release of acute physical pain, he becomes her relief and/or transfers or exchanges the power of her psycho-sexual relief through pain from the implements and her manipulation of them to himself. In so doing, he also becomes her primary implement, that is, means, of psycho-sexual fascination. This transfer or exchange of fascinating power is bidirectional and binds each to the other; it is formally and symbolically marked by the fact that after this initial beating, Lee discards her masokit. The bidirectionality or mutuality of this exchange cannot be stressed enough. While Grey succeeds in becoming her fascination and further stoking her need for it by denying her it, Lee also becomes his fascination. This exchange is symbolized most clearly by Grey’s discarding the symbol of his domination, which is not a whip, or collar, or chastity belt, as is common in sadomasochistic relationships. Instead, Grey disposes of his collection of red markers. In controlling her fascination, he controls her pleasure, sense of self, and raison d’etre but also simultaneously submits to its (re)discovery, development, and power.

    Born in the Absolute: The Limits of Psycho-Sexual Fascination as a Bidirectional Exchange of Bondage in Secretary

    While it would seem that Secretary concludes that the transfer of fascinating power between Lee and Grey is completely mono-directional, the most interesting subtext of Shainberg’s exploration of sadomasochism is the limit of the psycho-sexual power the sadist/dom exerts over the masochist/sub. The first instance of this limit is very subtle. After having engaged in various forms of sadomasochism, from pony play to food denial to psychedelic masturbatory fantasy sessions, Lee purposefully leaves a typing error uncorrected in the hopes that Grey will punish her for the infraction. Not only does he fail to spot it, he also appears too busy to notice her sensually and overtly licking an envelope in a direct attempt to coax his (des)ire. She offers to return later and is left frustrated by his limited attention. Here, something interesting begins to take shape whereby his normative reaction is seen as frustrating and hurtful to Lee, whereas non-normative behavior between the attorney and his secretary is not only a source of pleasure and identity for the latter, but also one of comfort.

    The removal of her means of relief but not the fascination that impels it (which is here the exigency of her binding to it) drives Lee to try and re-fascinate, that is, to re-bind and claim Grey. Her methods are both quaint and bizarre, and involve placing an erotic portrait of herself in a gilt frame on his desk, suggestively bending over it, and making deliberate errors in her work. After many attempts, she finally succeeds, by placing a dead earthworm in an envelope and mailing it to him. Upon receiving the dead worm, Grey has to perform crunches in his office to work off his arousal. Aside from the obvious phallic connotations of the worm, what fascinates, that is, re-captures, Grey most is the fact that it is a dead worm. For Grey, the dead worm is a symbol not only of Lee’s courage, but of her ostensible commitment to psycho-sexual explorations and play whose intensity and morbidity are not limited by death. Grey places the worm on a sheet of paper, retrieves the last red marker he keeps secretly in his desk drawer, and circles the carcass obsessively. Lee overhears, and, when called into his office, smiles, sighs, and enters, saying “finally.”

    The reciprocal nature of their fascination—the bidirectional exchange of bondage—may not be entirely disrupted or broken but it certainly is uneven, and it is intimately tied to the problem of commitment to sadomasochistic psycho-sexual fascination. This manifests most clearly in a scene in which Grey masturbates and climaxes on Lee’s back while she is bent over his desk with her skirt hiked up. While exposed, Grey states, “you’re not worried that I’m going to fuck you, are you? I’m not interested in that, not in the least. Now pull up your skirt.” Immediately afterwards, Grey tells her to straighten herself up and take her lunch break as if the level of intimacy in their shared fascination, in the power dynamics subtending and constituting their exchange of bondage, had not irrevocably changed. Lee locates precisely what it is that fascinates her, what compels her binding to Grey, in this scene. After wiping Grey’s semen off of her blouse and back with an error-filled page she typed, she enters a bathroom stall somewhat confused, ashamed, aroused, and fascinated, ensnared by a complex of paradoxical psycho-emotional affects. Despite being disappointed with the fact that Grey made no gesture to suggest that his commitment to his fascination in her has deepened following the encounter, she places the document on the wall of the stall and masturbates into it, sensually, if not desperately whispering to herself, “Mr. Grey. Cock. Place your prick in my mouth. Screw me. Oh shit. Fuck. Mayonnaise. Orchid. Oh, Mr. Grey … ! Edward.” While the camera focuses on the misspelled words on the page, she is intent on symbolically carrying out the theme of commitment to her fascination, her binding in and to the possibility of his commitment to her. Yet something more radical is also taking place. In a very real sense, Lee’s will to sadomasochistic psycho-sexual fascination has, in this scene, begun to outgrow Grey’s own, and what she brings to the exchange of bondage constituting their mutual fascination with one another cannot be matched by that which Grey offers in turn. The implication here is that she does not need Grey anymore as a means to activate either the psycho-sexual relief she needs or her fascination, that is, her binding to/in it or its affects. Grey has opened a door to her sexualized pain outside the pathological context of the clinic. In doing so, he in(tro)duces the fascination in(to) her. All she requires is a symbol of that key/trigger to achieve pleasure and relief for herself, by herself. It is true that his fluctuations of fascination and commitment to both his own relief as well as to hers do not undo the fact that Grey helped Lee discover her own sadomasochistic psycho-sexual fascination. However, this “selfish” act of pleasure does not diminish her power as a submissive but in fact increases it.

    After Lee leaves the office, Grey smashes all the error-filled pages he had framed and hung in his office hallway. This retaliatory act takes place after he notices a spot of semen on his pants zipper and tries to wipe it off. In essence, he realizes that Lee’s presence and his psycho-sexual fascination with her completely divert his attention to detail. Not only is the symbolic power of the male Gaze-in-observation here eroded by his total fascination in and by Lee, his ostensibly solipsistic focus is derailed by the fact that Lee has also become the only/primary object of fascination in his life. This very subtle and complex reciprocity of fascinating power encapsulates the power of submissiveness that the title of this essay refers to as the power of absolute nothing: the deceptive and subversive superiority that results from an apparently subordinate position. In becoming empty/open for him, Grey not only fills/falls into Lee, but is closed/caught in the gravity of her fascinating power. In short, the more willing and submissive Lee is shown to be, the wider and deeper the black hole of their fascinating power and the heavier its pull, which Grey is shown to be maddened, aroused, angered, and ultimately fascinated, that is, bound, by.

    Grey’s ultimate failure as an object of fascination for Lee occurs near the end of the second act of the film. Having destroyed his secret folder of Polaroid portraits of previous secretaries under his employ, Grey attempts to type a letter to Lee, which reads, “Dear Lee, This is disgusting. I’m sorry. I don’t know why I’m like this.” Grey’s shame in his own fascination, that is, his bondage to her, his submission to her submissiveness, interrupts his ability to provide the domination Lee is both fascinated by and needs. He shreds the letter, overturns his office, and fires Lee the following day. He tells her he is firing her because of her “very bad behavior”: for kicking off her shoes while working and having odorous feet, for listening to music on a Walkman at her desk while working, and for various other idiosyncrasies. In citing these idiosyncrasies as grounds for her dismissal, he inadvertently catalogues precisely what it is about her that has psycho-sexually fascinating power over him, yet that manifests outside the typical heteronormative bounds of overt sexuality. He ends the letter, “you have to go or I won’t stop,” to which Lee defiantly responds, “don’t [ … ] I want to know you.” Again, the fascinating power of absolute nothing emerges. Grey’s use of maximal disciplinary force in the context of his office represents his ultimate weakness and failure as a dom. He uses the power of his office to redress the power disequilibrium between himself and Lee, the latter of which has a total and demanding fascination over him. Here, Lee’s dismissal is tantamount to Grey’s admission of and reaction against his weakness and, more poignantly, his submission to her submissiveness.

    During the final scenes, Lee breaks off her engagement to Peter, flees to Grey, and confesses her love for him. He responds hesitatingly, “we can’t do this 24 hours, 7 days a week,” to which Lee responds, “why not?” What results is that Grey is completely overwhelmed by Lee’s willingness to completely submit to her fascination, pleasure, and self-identification as a masochist; a depth of fascination she assumes is reciprocal in Grey as well. In this sense, Lee’s hunger strike that follows is, on the surface, a display of submissive obedience, which Grey is fascinated, that is, bound, by. On a deeper level, however, like the wedding gown she wears while performing it, her display is actually symbolic of commitment, both to herself and to him, a final test she passes. She rejects Peter, who asks her if what she is doing is about sex, failing to grasp the fact that while ostensibly divided along clear lines of agency, sex is a deeply connective exchange of bondage within the context of BDSM, functioning as a main line of power that connects fascinated parties to one another. Without the predicate of psycho-sexual fascination in the mutual giving and receiving of this power, there is nothing to connect. Sex is just sex. It carries with it no commitment, revelation, intimacy, real power(lessness), vulnerability, or affirmation of that which lays in the ever-present umbra just beyond the pleasure principle. Not only does she proceed to turn away her mother, in-laws, local media, concerned citizens, and a feminist scholar—all of whom implore Lee to seek more conventional, and arguably less committed sources and expressions of affection—Lee is clearly willing to risk death, as after three days she is severely dehydrated and malnourished. In a statement to the press, Lee beautifully draws together her willingness to die for masochistic fascination and its nature as a bridge, as well as an exchange, between love and death in all their modalities, from commitment to isolation. When asked if she is willing to starve herself to death, she responds: “In one way or another, I’ve always suffered. I didn’t know why, exactly. But I do know that I’m not so scared of suffering now. I feel more than I’ve ever felt … and I’ve found someone to feel with, to play with, to love … in a way that feels right for me. I hope he knows that I can see that he suffers too … and that I want to love him.” In this sense, a part of Lee’s fascination in Grey is predicated on the assumed necessity of a mutual and/or exchanged joyful suffering.

    The film concludes with all of Lee and Grey’s “activities melting into an everyday sort of life until [they resemble] any other couple you’d see” (Shainberg). From being his secretary, Lee becomes Grey’s housewife, and she appears to have attained everything she thought she wanted. However, perhaps the most radical aspect of the film is its final shot, which lingers on Lee staring first down the street as Grey drives to work, then directly at the viewer with an ambiguous expression. Within this expression are subtle, essential, questions. Is this the life I want now that I’m awake? Is there something/someone/others whose limits of fascination are deeper and wider than his? There is seemingly nothing else to know about him. The implication is that their non-normative fascination, that is exchange of bi-directional binding in and to one another, ossifies to routine union, thus becoming the normative fantasy of domestic bliss and socioeconomic white upper middle-class stability. Ironically, Lee and the burgeoning power, identity, and the pleasure she feels through her psycho-sexually sadomasochistic fascination are brought to such a conclusive and stiffing terminus of non-fascination by fascination itself. The brilliant suggestion of this final shot is that while Lee seems to have fully satisfied Grey’s fascination, which amounts to a fascination with not being alone, he does not satisfy her masochistic fascinations in the last instance. While the fetters and tethers of spreader bar and collar liberate her, the trappings of a “regular” relationship are actual traps to her. The viewer is left to consider whether a mainstream film about BDSM like Secretary portrays BDSM in a positive light. In the last instance, I feel that this is beside the point. The most important aspect of the film, crystallized in this final scene, is the deceptively simple yet extremely radical insight that fascination, psycho-sexual or otherwise, is predicated upon the sustained ignorance in its own depths. The binding power of psycho-sexual fascination as an exchange of bondage ossifies and dies when its intimation of the absolute becomes fathomable or known.

    Conclusion

    Ostensibly, Shainberg’s exploration of sadomasochism subtends numerous dialectics: power/powerlessness, domination/submission, pain/pleasure, commitment/isolation. These dialectics are all embodied, reified, and ultimately countermanded by Lee’s journey as a submissive. While it appears that it is Lee’s submission to Grey and her initiation of the mysterious reliefs of power play that “heal” her, it is actually Lee’s submission to herself that, paradoxically, offers her not only psycho-sexual pleasure, but psycho-emotional relief. In the last instance, Grey presents Lee with a set of psycho-sexual tools that he himself enjoys at a remove and can only engage with as partial objects of psycho-sexual relief. He is ultimately shown to be uncertain (to the point of self-disgust) about his sadomasochistic fascinations, that is, his submission to their power over him. His reluctance does not, however, stop the said psycho-sexual fascinations from exerting their power over him, a power compounded by Lee’s open and honest acquiescence to the power of her own masochistic needs and self-identification as such. The fact that Secretary sees Lee occupy an ostensibly submissive subject position deconstructs the still pervasive assumption that there is an inextricable link between powerlessness and submissiveness. I have shown that through the psycho-sexually fascinating power of absolute nothing, sadomasochistic sexualities produce interestingly paradoxical modalities of love, death, violence, pleasure, and power. Moreover, I have attempted to illustrate that sadomasochistic psycho-sexual fascination does not necessarily recirculate phallogocentric reductivisms concerning female sexuality and that a psycho-sexual subject position assumed to be absolutely powerless is in fact all powerful because of it. Assumptions about sadomasochistic psycho-sexual fascinations ultimately express themselves in contempt of the paradoxical reality that they attempt to sublimate through the essentialisms of the law, the court of public opinion, and the pathological repressiveness of the clinic, all of which oversimplify or eschew entirely the play of power, pleasure, pain, and death in psycho-sexual fascination.

    Footnotes

    1. Freud refers to this aspect of fascination indirectly in Medusa’s Head (1922).

    2. For further discussion of agency and the eroticism of power differentials, see also Cross and Matheson, “Understanding Sadomasochism” and Langdridge and Butt, “Erotic Construction.”

    3. While there exists a limited corpus of theoretical scholarship exploring the critical implications of “extreme” BDSM practices described as gesturing “beyond safety” in praxis, far less empirical work is focused on “edgeplay” that does not make recourse to clinical pathologization. See Downing, “Beyond Safety”; Downing and Gillett, “Viewing Critical Psychology.”

    4. Symphorophilia is a diagnostic term used to describe a paraphilia that involves sexual arousal primarily derived from staging, observing, or participating in a tragedy, such as a fire or traffic accident. The term is formed from the Greek root συμφορά (“symphora,” event, misfortune) and first appears in John Money’s 1984 paper “Paraphilias.” I use the term as an example of extreme psycho-sexual fascination, not diagnostically in any clinical or judicial sense.

    5. The terms sadism and masochism were coined by Krafft-Ebing in 1893, with reference to the Marquis de Sade and Baron Sacher von Masoch. Krafft-Ebing used the terms exclusively in reference to the essentiality of practices of seeking sexual satisfaction through the infliction of pain (sadism) or receiving it (masochism) as perverse.

    6. The term limit-experience is a reference to Michel Foucault’s notion of the limit: “the point of life which lies as close as possible to the impossibility of living, which lies at the limit or the extreme.” See Foucault, Remarks on Marx, pp. 30-31.

    7. For arguments against S/M, see Linden et al., eds., Against Sadomasochism; Hanna, “Sex”. For arguments in favor of S/M, see SAMOIS editors, “Coming to Power”; Califia and Sweeney, eds. The Second Coming; Califia, “Feminism”; and Pa, “Beyond the Pleasure Principle.”

    8. For an exploration of masochistic submission out of desire as opposed to fear, see Benjamin, The Bonds of Love, esp. pp. 55-61.

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    • Stein, Ruth. “The Otherness of Sexuality: Excess.” Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, vol. 56, no. 1, 2008, pp. 43-71. Sage, doi:10.2277/0003065108315540.
    • Taylor, Gary, and Jane Ussher. “Making sense of S&M: A Discourse Analytic Account.” Sexualities, vol. 4, no. 3, 2001, pp. 293-314. Sage, doi:10.1177/136346001004003002.
    • Vernant, Jean-Pierre. “Frontality and Monstrosity.” The Medusa Reader, edited by Marjorie Garber and Nancy J. Vickers, Routledge, 2003, pp. 210-32.
    • Weinberg, Thomas. “Sadomasochism in the United States: A Review of Recent Sociological Literature.” The Journal of Sex Research, vol. 23, no. 1, 1987, pp. 50-69. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/3812541.
    • Weingart, Brigitte. “Contact at a Distance: The Topology of Fascination.” Rethinking Emotion: Interiority and Exteriority in Premodern, Modern, and Contemporary Thought, edited by Rüdiger Campe and Julia Weber, De Gruyter, 2014, pp. 72-100.
    • Wilson, Erin Cressida. Secretary: A Screenplay. Soft Skull Press, 2003.
  • Circuits of Fascination and Inspiration:Blanchot, Bellour, Grandrieux

    Calum Watt (bio)

    Abstract

    This essay offers a commentary on the French experimental director Philippe Grandrieux’s shooting diary for his film Malgré la nuit (2016). Grandrieux’s quotations from Maurice Blanchot and the diary’s appearance in the journals Trafic and Mettray activate intertextual references relating to Blanchot’s ideas about fascination and inspiration. The essay argues that Grandrieux and film theorist Raymond Bellour are contemporary inheritors of these notions, which they develop in relation to filmmaking practice, cinema spectatorship, and film analysis. Through their work, fascination, often associated with passivity, can be seen to actively inspire new works.

    Introduction: Blanchot, Fascination and Malgré la nuit

    French experimental film director Philippe Grandrieux opens the shooting diary for his film Malgré la nuit (Despite the Night; completed in 2015 and released in 2016) with an epigraph from Maurice Blanchot (1907-2003): “Every art draws its origin from an exceptional fault” (“Tout art tire son origine d’un défaut exceptionnel”; Blanchot, Livre 148, Book 107). The diary was published in 2016 in two parts in the French journals Trafic and Mettray. It describes the difficulties experienced by Grandrieux while filming and reflects on the process by which the film came into existence. Why cite Blanchot here? What does Blanchot’s literary criticism from the 1950s have to do with a contemporary arthouse film?

    In this essay I theorize the Blanchotian concepts of fascination and inspiration through a commentary on Grandrieux’s diary. I discuss the significance of Blanchot’s ideas about what is at stake in the creative work of the literary writer. While his work in general has been an inspiration for Grandrieux, Blanchot’s collection of essays Le Livre à venir (The Book to Come) and L’Espace littéraire (The Space of Literature) emerge as key intertexts for the diary.1 Most of the topoi on which Grandrieux expounds or to which he alludes are treated in these texts by Blanchot: dream, night, sleep, fatigue, light. Blanchot’s theoretical lens is crucial for understanding the significance of the diary in Trafic and Mettray.2

    In the context of Trafic and Mettray, the quotations from Blanchot activate a set of intertextual references that I explore in the second part of the essay. Despite Blanchot’s apparent lack of interest in film, he is an important reference for the film critics and theorists Raymond Bellour (1939-) and Serge Daney (1944-1992), the two most influential figures associated with the film journal Trafic.3 I discuss the allusions to Blanchot in Le Corps du cinéma (The Body of Cinema), in which Bellour extends Blanchot’s account of fascination by conceptualizing the fascination of cinema in terms of hypnosis and the reopening of primordial childhood experience. Childhood also provides Grandrieux with a central figure for thinking about his practice. Like Blanchot’s “literary space,” Bellour’s “body of cinema” refers to a virtual space of fascination that links the creative work and its audience. Given the clear influence that Blanchot has on Bellour and Grandrieux, and their close friendship with one another,4 I suggest that they can be thought together as the contemporary inheritors of Blanchot’s concept of fascination, which they redefine in relation to cinema.

    Blanchot’s concept of fascination names an experience of profound passivity that occurs when things seem to a viewer to give way to their “image” (Espace 267; Space 255). Blanchot conceives this experience of the image primarily in relation to literary language (when words take on this imaginary quality), but it can also take place in lived events or in relation to artworks.5 This experience in which things sink into a fascinating image of themselves plays a role in the genesis of new artworks. What Blanchot calls inspiration is the process by which fascination starts to yield a work. Grandrieux refers indirectly to Blanchot’s account of inspiration to think about how an experience of passivity lies at the heart of his filmmaking practice, while for Bellour, Blanchot’s account of fascination accurately describes the condition of cinema spectatorship, which I will call cinematic fascination. Bellour tries to evoke cinematic fascination through film analysis that blurs the boundary between the theoretical and the literary. One can never recreate an experience of fascination, but it can be rekindled and perpetuated in writing. Taking these modalities of fascination together—fascination as part of the process by which an art work comes about, which then engenders fascination among viewers, which then gives way to new writing—we can see how fascination tends to multiply itself in circuits.6 The powerful attraction that Blanchot exerts for certain French film theorists and filmmakers demonstrates how Blanchotian fascination, characterized by radical worklessness or inoperativeness, has been productive for cinema.

    Malgré la nuit is set in Paris and is loosely structured around the young man Lenz’s (Kristian Marr) search for an elusive woman, Madeleine.7 At the same time, he is romantically involved with Hélène (Ariane Labed), a nurse with masochistic tendencies; Léna (Roxane Mesquida), a nightclub singer; and Léna’s father, Vitali (Johan Leysen), who appears to run a snuff movie ring. The film’s protagonists all seek extreme experiences (through drugs, sex, encounters with death). Malgré la nuit is, at two-and-a-half hours, the longest of Grandrieux’s films and is, as Bellour notes, “a bit mad” (“un peu déjanté”; Pensées 230). The film’s plot (such as it is) is not easy to follow due to Grandrieux’s use of blurring and a tendency to let the narrative give way to a pure aesthetic of the image, issues to which I return below. The film is Grandrieux’s fourth feature and is contemporaneous with a trilogy of installation works (the Unrest trilogy, 2012-2017) that takes his formal experimentation to an even further extreme. While I will discuss selected moments in the film, this essay takes as its primarily object Grandrieux’s account of his experience of filming and its relation to the notion of fascination as conceptualized in the work of Bellour and Blanchot, rather than the film itself.

    An “Exceptional Fault”: Grandrieux’s “Journal de tournage”

    Grandrieux’s “Journal de tournage” or “shooting diary” was published in 2016 in two parts: the first in Trafic and the second in Mettray.8 The first part runs from 6 to 18 October 2014 and the second from 15 October to the last day of shooting on 14 November (there is a little overlap, but the entry for 18 October is significantly longer in the Mettray extract), with a few additional entries through 20 December that describe Grandrieux’s trip to Montreal to edit the film (a trip that he cuts short due to difficulty with the editing process). The shoot takes place largely in Paris with a few excursions outside the city. In addition to this diary, a second, unconnected document, written by Romain Baudéan, a young camera assistant or focus-puller (pointeur) who was brought in to work on the film at the last minute, also describes the shoot. While this document is less poetic, it offers useful technical details about the shoot and an outside perspective on Grandrieux’s somewhat eccentric filming practices, highlighting the difference and relation between his psychological approach and the details of where and how the scenes were shot.

    The night before he starts shooting, Grandrieux describes feeling “suddenness” inside him, an intimation of something coming (“Journal 1” 16). Immediately before shooting begins the following night, he feels intense weakness, as if he knows nothing; he feels, and will repeatedly feel, “annihilated” (anéanti) (16). This sense of fatigue becomes more intense and he writes about it in almost every entry. During the first night, Grandrieux evokes how involved he feels as he begins the shoot: “I am in the image, in the light, in the frame, in the faces, in the rhythm that it demands, in the face of things” (17). At the end of the entry recounting the first night’s shoot, Grandrieux quotes from L’Espace littéraire, specifically the very last lines of the short appendix “Sommeil, nuit” (“Sleep, Night”): “The dream touches the region where pure resemblance reigns. Everything there is similar; each figure is another one, is similar to another and to yet another, and this last to still another. One seeks the original model, wanting to be referred to a point of departure, an initial revelation, but there is none. The dream is the likeness that refers eternally to likeness” (L’Espace 362; Space 268). Although attributed to Blanchot, the quotation is simply given in italics, set out from the main text without a gloss. In the film, resemblance is suggested by the way the characters’ names resemble each other in their liquid “l” sounds: Lenz, Léna, Hélène, Lola, Madeleine, Vitali, Louis, Paul.9 More explicitly, resemblance is thematized during a scene about forty-five minutes into the film, following Léna’s performance of a musical number in a nightclub. She meets her father Vitali afterwards, who is flanked by another young woman carrying a small dog. Léna introduces Vitali to Lenz. The scene takes place in a dark, reddish light and the camera, trained on Vitali’s ridged facial profile in close-up, moves in and out of focus and thus prevents any clear identification of the scene’s location (perhaps in a basement room of the nightclub). The walls are covered in what looks like graffiti, while the rumbling of distant music can be heard as well as a rattling sound, like that of a malfunctioning fan. Vitali and the woman talk about a synthetic amphetamine called “cannibal,” which is said to throw users into a primitive state. Switching between French and English, the woman whispers, “I think it’s fascinating,” and Vitali immediately echoes her, “we think it’s fascinating, don’t we?” Vitali then shifts from the topic of the fascinating substance and its effects to note that he is sure he has already met Lenz or someone who very much resembles him. “That happens in life, resemblance,” he says in a gravelly, somewhat sinister voice. The idea of resemblance, present in the quotation from Blanchot, is echoed thematically in the film, suggesting the effect of L’Espace littéraire on Grandrieux as he films.

    In the second part of the diary, Grandrieux develops a connection between his film and dreaming:

    To make the film with what is there, that’s what I wanted, that’s what I want intensely, it’s what I’m doing. To let the film come into my hand, against my closed eyelids. It’s for this reason that I don’t want to see anything during the shooting, no rushes, no images. I want to be able to sink into the film, into the memory that I have of it, in its memory. Day after day I go further into it. I lose myself in it when I shoot. It is this nocturnal meandering that I desire and which guides me. The scene from yesterday ends each time by a slow fade to black, by the disappearance of forms, the disappearance of light. It’s this effacement, these slow fades to black which must lead the editing of the sequence.… I would like to slow down these endings, more and more, in a long ending which never ends, an end in tatters, an end which is a collapse of the light and of the figures, in the breath of their sleep, in their exhaustion. To construct the sequence in this fatigue, in this movement which goes towards the night of the body, its burial.… It’s the curve [courbe] of the film, effacement. The scenes come with nothing preparing them. A dream. (3)

    Indicating a passive dimension to the act of filming, this notion of “sinking” into the film (s’enfoncer)—”I want to be able to sink into the film”—is used repeatedly in the diary. As Grandrieux says, the use of fades is indeed typical of the way the film’s sequences connect to each other, as if the film were the reverie of someone drifting in and out of consciousness. Immediately following this passage, Grandrieux cites one of the first notes he made about the film, in 2009: “One enters into the film by fear and as if fainting [l’évanouissement], like in a dream. Receptive [Disponible]” (4). The term “one” leaves it unclear whether Grandrieux is referring to the viewer or to himself. In these quotations, Grandrieux evokes both his relation to making the film and the effect it should have on the viewer. The experience of creating and viewing are strikingly blurred: in both cases the film should be hypnotic and have the structure of a dream. It is through this approach—of “losing himself” in a “nocturnal meandering”—that the film’s material or matter becomes a “dreamed matter” or “dream material” (12).

    Blanchot’s lines about dreams come from an appendix that refers back to the section of L’Espace littéraire on inspiration and “the night” (L’Espace 215, Space 164), which are motifs strongly resonant with Grandrieux’s evocation of the creative process as a dreamlike, fascinated state. When Blanchot writes that inspiration is fundamentally “nocturnal,” he invokes the concept of the “other night” (L’Espace 213, Space 163): while the “first night” is the obverse of the day’s action, the night in which one rests after the work of the day (L’Espace 219, Space 167), the “other night” is “the long night of insomnia” (L’Espace 244, Space 184), a non-dialectical, paralysed passivity. The experience of inspiration, then, is like being in a sleepless, fascinated state. Grandrieux says elsewhere that he does not want to see the rushes during shooting because he wants the film to “deposit itself in [him], to become a nocturnal movement, my sleep in some way” (“Journal 2” 12). In other words, he wants to enter into a blind relation with the film as it is being made. The effect of this approach is evident in the first few sequences of the film, where silence, slow motion, and fades in and out establish the oneiric aspect. The first thirty seconds of the film depict a young woman spinning and throwing her arms in the air. Seemingly illuminated by a bright spotlight, her hair is bleached white hair and she wears a short silver dress. The brief, unnerving sequence is silent and has been sped up, rendering the woman a white silhouette against a black night. It is presented apropos of nothing and sets the film’s tone. About seven minutes into the film, after another somewhat elliptical sequence, the camera fades in slowly from black to Hélène’s head, framed almost horizontally across the screen in extreme close-up. The camera drifts close by, gently moving slightly up and down, and goes lightly in and out of soft focus. The muffled sound of tracks and the passing lights in the background make clear that she is sleeping on a train, her mouth bobbing open with the train’s rolling movement. The film cuts to Lenz, standing over her; the shot has a slowed, slightly blurred effect of long exposure. In the third shot Lenz sits down beside Hélène and the film fades slowly to black.

    On 10 October, Grandrieux’s sixtieth birthday, he writes that he begins shooting at three in the morning and already feels “exhausted” (exténué), noting that the film is a “struggle” (combat) with “fatigue”: “everything seems threatened to me, leading to ruin, to a ruined film, to a ruined beauty” (“Journal 1” 17). While there are certainly trials (notably the departure two days prior of his principal actor, the musician Pete Doherty, which throws the schedule off-course), the fatigue seems disproportionate. This seems to be an unavoidable consequence of responding to the exigency of the work. In the entry for 18 October in the second part of the diary, the shoot increasingly becomes a physical and moral ordeal. Again, Grandrieux is suffering from “a nameless fatigue”; he is “drunk with fatigue” (2), “totally worn out” (exsangue) (9); it is an “ordeal” (épreuve) (9). He writes: “The fatigue is indescribable. I’ve never been so exhausted in my life. A fatigue that rest cannot diminish, a profound fatigue of the body” (6). To be sure, the shoot is physically gruelling for all concerned: not only Grandrieux, but also his focus-puller and director of production will develop lumbago during the shoot (Baudéan 21). However, for Grandrieux this fatigue sometimes takes the form of “a sort of asphyxia,” of feeling “literally asphyxiated” (“Journal 2” 6), as he is “carried away by [the film’s] power, its strength, that which it imposes, the rhythm of the shooting” (“Journal 1” 21). This asphyxia becomes another recurring motif in the diary: “the film is that enigma in which I move, blinded, too close, too asphyxiated by the force of the shoot, its rapidity, such that I am in a deep obscurity” (“Journal 1” 21). When filming, Grandrieux is taken over or hypnotized by the film; his assistant writes that he is “as if possessed, in a trance. Excited, supercharged, in heat” (Baudéan 3). Grandrieux constantly talks of trying to “access” the scene he films; it is as if he is rejected by the film. In other words, he is caught in the struggle between inspired passivity and the actual realization of the work. While Grandrieux has previously described the exhaustion and strange physical symptoms that result from filming (“La Vie nouvelle” 31), these seem particularly intense with Malgré la nuit. He often needs days of convalescence after shooting.

    These physical ailments are the symptoms of a powerlessness, a loss of knowledge and of self that takes place during the conception and execution of the work. The experience Grandrieux describes in his diary resonates strongly with Blanchot’s descriptions of some of the “risks of artistic activity” (L’Espace 57, Space 52):

    Every writer, every artist is acquainted with the moment at which he is cast out and apparently excluded by the work in progress. The work holds him off, the circle in which he no longer has access to himself has closed, yet he is enclosed therein because the work, unfinished, will not let him go. Strength does not fail him; this is not a moment of sterility or fatigue, unless, as may well be the case, fatigue itself is simply the form this exclusion takes. This ordeal is awesome. What the author sees is a cold immobility from which he cannot turn away, but near which he cannot linger. It is like an enclave, a preserve within space, airless and without light, where a part of himself, and, more than that, his truth, his solitary truth, suffocates in an incomprehensible separation. (L’Espace 59, Space 53-54)

    Note that while Blanchot’s work is normally closely or even exclusively associated with literature, he makes it clear that his discussion appertains to artists in general (albeit always gendered as male). These remarks come in the section that prepares and immediately precedes his discussion of Kafka’s diary. Juxtaposing this section with Grandrieux’s diary, we can see how the fatigue and asphyxia (echoed in Blanchot’s use of the terms “airless” and “suffocation”) are the symptoms of being in the “space” of the work. Blanchot’s “literary space” is a paradoxical space that is not strictly anywhere. It is a metaphorical space of profound solitude that the artist enters when producing a work. While Grandrieux is not literally “solitary”—he is working with a small crew—he is the one making the decisions and he reports feeling lost and alone. These themes have been present for some time in Grandrieux’s writing. In a short text for Trafic about the process of conceiving and writing another film, Grandrieux describes this experience of inspiration, of being engaged in a struggle with something enigmatic that makes him write, as “more than an obsession”: it is like being an occupied country (“Troisième film” 122). In an earlier document published in Trafic on the preparation of his second film, La Vie nouvelle (2002), Grandrieux uses a formulation very similar to those in the Malgré la nuit text: he feels that he can no longer act, that the film is destined for ruin and disaster (“La Vie nouvelle” 25). Like Grandrieux’s intuition that his film is headed for “ruin,” Blanchot writes that the work is tied to its ruin and unworking; as if pure inspiration would be not to produce anything, would consist of pure worklessness, even as it demands a work be produced (L’Espace 240, Space 182). This is why, for Blanchot, inspiration is a trap (L’Espace 219, Space 167).

    Grandrieux writes his journal because he fears losing himself in this condition. A subsection of L’Espace littéraire explicitly theorizes this relation. This subsection, “Recours au Journal” (“Recourse to the ‘Journal’”), comes immediately before the subsections “La fascination de l’absence du temps” (“The Fascination of Time’s Absence”) and “L’image” (“The Image”), two of the crucial sections on fascination. When the writer starts a work he starts to lose himself, and the journal is how he maintains “a relation to himself” (L’Espace 24, Space 28). Thus

    the truth of the journal lies not in the interesting literary remarks to be found there, but in the insignificant details which attach it to daily reality. The journal represents the series of reference points which a writer establishes in order to keep track of himself when he begins to suspect the dangerous metamorphosis to which he is exposed. … The journal indicates that already the writer is no longer capable of belonging to time through the ordinary certainty of action, through the shared concerns of common tasks, of an occupation, through the simplicity of intimate speech, the force of unreflecting habit. He is no longer truly historical; but he doesn’t want to waste time either, and since he doesn’t know anymore how to do anything but write, at least he writes in response to his everyday history and in accord with the preoccupations of daily life. It happens that writers who keep a journal are the most literary of all, but perhaps this is precisely because they avoid, thus, the extreme of literature, if literature is ultimately the fascinating realm of time’s absence. (L’Espace 24-25, Space 29-30)

    Later in L’Espace littéraire, Blanchot discusses Kafka’s diary in detail, a paradigmatic document recounting the experience of inspiration and the struggle of writing (L’Espace 63-101, Space 57-83).10 Like Kafka, Grandrieux simultaneously complains of an oppressive imperative to realize his work and of the unfavorable conditions in which he must do it: he repeatedly laments a lack of time, a lack of permission to film in certain locations (sometimes he resorts to trespassing), a lack of money (the film was made for a mere 480,000 euros), and generally “atrocious conditions.” He films in spaces borrowed from friends or friends of friends; told to hurry up, he feels like a beggar. While Blanchot describes the danger for the writer of losing track of everyday life and of one’s occupation in the 1950s, Grandrieux’s diary shows that the contemporary economy of efficiency does not give a cent for fascination.

    Grandrieux gives precise details about his filming practice at a shoot in the Bois de Vincennes, a large park in east Paris, where he films an orgy in a harsh bright light. The scene takes place about nineteen minutes into the film; directly before, we see Hélène leaving her sleeping partner and putting on makeup. The scene begins with a long shot of figures walking slowly through the woods at night. We hear twigs snapping underfoot. The film moves seamlessly to these figures undressing and making love directly on the wet fallen leaves and undergrowth, which gleams in light that seems to come from the camera. Individual hairs on the heads of the actors, like branches of the bare autumn trees, stand out in fine detail in the foreground of the shots. The illuminated skin is unnaturally pale, as if extraterrestrial. Close-ups of the faces of three onlookers offer indifferent expressions. Meanwhile, Hélène is approached by a man (Sam Louwyck) identified in the credits only as “the man with the metallic voice”.11 She seemingly submits, with a vacant look, to a sadomasochistic ritual in which she is choked and has her hair pulled and her clothes torn before having violent sex with him.. In this otherworldly scene, Hélène is pressed against the leaves and twigs near the orgy, which is silent and oblivious to Hélène and this man. In the next scene, Hélène wakes in a clearing in the morning and walks home. Grandrieux reflects on the shoot:

    When I think again about the material that was shot, I say to myself that there is there an exhausting beauty, but also the feeling of a lack. I say to myself also that the speed with which we shoot gives access to things in a strong way, strong and full of holes [forte et trouée], a dazzled way [une manière éblouie] of being in the images, in the violence of the film, in its savagery.(“Journal 1” 18)12

    The film’s principal actors come from the world of dance (with the exception of Marr), and the other “extras” are his friends. Grandrieux continues about the scene:

    That which was written in the script as a particularly sordid situation transforms into a strange purity, unattainable, an absolute strangeness. Everything is in this excessively white light, strong and white, this light which never stops varying and which gives me so much desire. The material we shot stays in my memory, shards of sensation that go well together, deep movements, a sort of rising tide which comes into me, the feeling of having achieved something well beyond that which was written or wished-for; yet also the feeling that something is missing and that in this lack a greater truth has been kept, an intimate truth which drives my gestures, my rhythm. (18)

    Generally, Grandrieux makes shooting decisions on the set quickly. In a repeated formulation, he writes that the shots are “torn” (arracher) from reality: “Everything goes quickly, everything is torn from the night, from fatigue, from the despondency that we feel shooting in this deaf violence, this instinctive brutality” (18).13

    The shooting diary shows how the filmmaker turns abstract ideas into images. For Grandrieux, the execution violently transforms the initial conception of the work: “The shooting tears from the script its unconscious material” (“Journal 2” 9). Reflecting on the scene again later, he notes what is missing: a shot of Hélène’s face, which would somehow, perhaps impossibly, simultaneously express pleasure, suffering, fatigue, fragility, and weakness. Grandrieux has stated that Hélène wills and seeks out this extreme experience of passive exposure (even though she spits and provokes the man to continue) (“Dossier”; Grandrieux and Jefferson Selve). The passivity that he figures through Hélène is like the experience of passivity that he tries to reach himself in inspiration and which Blanchot considers the work’s origin. That this is always “lacking” expresses Grandrieux’s constant search for an impossible limit; it is “that by which my film constitutes itself. In a way, a film full of holes” (“Journal 1” 19).

    In Trafic, the shooting diary appears alongside an essay on the film by Bellour, who has admired Grandrieux’s work since his first feature, Sombre (1998). Bellour focuses on light in Grandrieux’s film: “Light—its lack, its retreat just as much as its excess—has always been the torment of Philippe Grandrieux” (Pensées 227). This has been clear since Sombre, which, as its title suggests, plunges us into the nocturnal, obscure world of its violent, wretched protagonist. The film’s dominant motif of darkness is thrown into relief by well-lit scenes that represent the “ordinary dream of the anonymous social order” (227). What is new in Malgré la nuit, says Bellour, is that there are not two but three distinct lights. The first is the “extraordinary night,” typical of Sombre, in which the filmmaker plunges his “creatures” in order to extend and distend their “states of body and soul.” The second light is that of ordinariness, the light of the day: for example, the scenes in Malgré la nuit of Lenz and his friends cavorting by the Seine. There is more of this in Malgré la nuit than in Grandrieux’s previous films. The third light is “the dazzling light of cinema,” which pierces the “experimental night” in which the scenes in the Bois de Vincennes are shot, where bodies are illuminated to the point of abstraction (228). To create these moments, Grandrieux attaches a strong ring light around the camera’s lens (Grandrieux and Jefferson Selve 89). Bellour associates this excess of light with a principle of delicacy taken close to the point of unreality (Pensées 230). In other words, Grandrieux undercuts the violence in the scene with a sensual focus on the caresses and foliage under an unreal light. The term “experimental night” refers to Jean Louis Schefer’s L’Homme ordinaire du cinéma (The Ordinary Man of Cinema), a crucial text of for Bellour, Daney, and Gilles Deleuze.14 The “experimental night” is one of Schefer’s poetic characterizations of the cinematic situation: an artificial night (the darkness of the cinema hall) in which the viewer watches a screen illuminated by an unseen beam of light. In this sense, Bellour hints at the idea that the formal properties of the scene in the Bois de Vincennes figure the cinematic situation. This accords with his argument in Le Corps du cinéma that fascinating scenes in cinema tend to figure or redouble the cinematic dispositif (82). Bellour does not refer to Grandrieux’s diary in this essay, but reading his essay together with the diary helps us to see how scenes in Malgré la nuit can be interpreted as staging Grandrieux’s instinctive and animating fascination with the “experimental night.”

    The extract of the shooting diary in Trafic ends with a few remarks on the epigraph taken from Blanchot. Grandrieux writes that the film finds its strength in the same place as its greatest weakness: “This is what Blanchot says: ‘Every art draws its origin from an exceptional fault’. And what is it, this exceptional fault? Precisely of not being able to ‘represent’” (22). Grandrieux explains that his producer told him that during the shoot, the image became so blurred that it was no longer possible to follow the scene’s narrative and emotion: one was lost in the pure sensation of an image. He writes: “It is very precisely in this place that my exceptional fault is situated. This line which opposes emotion and sensation is also that by which passes the greatest strength and the greatest weakness of the film. It is between these two shores, these two irreconcilable tensions, opposing plasticity and narration, that cinema must pass” (22).15 As several scholars have demonstrated, Grandrieux’s cinema is indeed marked by this privileging of sensation over narration.16 Grandrieux goes so far as to refer to narrative as a kind of “nuisance” getting in the way (encombrement): he suggests that the dialogues and the narrative structure are conditions that he had to “accept” during the various rewritings of the script in order to obtain sufficient financing for the film (“Journal 2” 4). The fiction or representation is a kind of “weight” on the scenes, on their pure sensation (9), and the scenes must be “undone” (défaire) to find their truth (10). Grandrieux chooses relatively long focal length lenses (often 85mm or 100mm) precisely to lose himself in the pure sensation of the close-up image (Baudéan 5). Holding the camera himself, Grandrieux films extremely close to his actors, between one and five feet away from them, closely orbited by five assistants, such as the focus-puller (“Journal 2” 3, 5). The underexposed, blurry close-up effects that typify his films are already present in Sombre. As Martine Beugnet writes, the experimental use of blurring in contemporary auteur cinema evokes a sense of chaos or Bataillean formlessness beneath the visible world (L’Attrait 103-104). While this excess of sensation over narrative and the slippage of things into a formless imaginary are clearly on the side of fascination, it does perhaps explain why some critics found Malgré la nuit overwrought and the story difficult to take seriously.17

    However, there is more at stake in this reference to Blanchot. This is the third reference to Blanchot in the text and thus places the reflection under the sign of Blanchot. Again: why cite Blanchot? What place does Blanchot have in the shooting diary of a contemporary film? The full sentence of the quotation in the original context—in the essay “A toute extrêmité” (“At every extreme”)—reads: “Every art draws its origin from an exceptional fault, every work is the implementation [la mise en œuvre] of this original fault, from which come to us a new light and a risky conception of plenitude [l’approche menacée de la plénitude]” (Livre 148, Book 107). For Blanchot, every artist is in an intimate relation with a particular “mistake,” and Grandrieux identifies his as the temptation to lose himself in a pure sensation of the image. Blanchot tells us that this error is not some superficial failing but rather what animates the process. In a formulation that resembles Grandrieux’s in his diary, Blanchot writes: “an artist cannot be too mistaken or link himself too much to his mistake, in a serious, solitary, perilous, irreplaceable embrace in which he hurls himself, with terror, with delight, at the excess that, in himself, leads him outside himself and perhaps outside of everything” (Livre 148, Book 108). Crucially, “this link with error” is described as a “relationship so difficult to attain, more difficult to sustain, which clashes with a doubt, with a disavowal in the very one whom the mistake holds under its fascination, this passion, this paradoxical progress” (Livre 148, Book 108; my emphasis). To be inspired and to execute the work is to labor under the fascination of error. Being inspired to make a work is a mistake in the sense that it is to be drawn by fascination outside of oneself at great risk to oneself and the work. Grandrieux’s diary thus develops Blanchot’s concept of fascination by describing it in detail in the first person and from the point of view of a filmmaker. This experience of error is what Grandrieux describes in the shoot at the Bois de Vincennes as the “lack”—the missing image of Hélène’s expression—that draws him on like a mirage in the desert. At the core of the error that animates Grandrieux’s film is a species of fascination, the fascination at the heart of inspiration. If the finished work turns out to be fascinating for the viewer (as Bellour’s essay suggests), then it reproduces something of its condition of possibility and perpetuates this meandering, fascinating error.

    Bellour, Childhood, and Cinematic Fascination

    To date, Grandrieux has produced ten texts for Trafic and six for Mettray. Founded by Serge Daney in Paris in 1992, Trafic is the home of a particular form of cinephilic fascination in France, offering a space for reflections that “cannot be published anywhere else” (that is, texts which are too speculative or personal for academic, journalistic or other film publications).18 The inclusion of texts by filmmakers (including documents relating to filming and reflections on practice or literary texts) has been a hallmark of Trafic from the beginning.19 As the title suggests, Trafic is a space of passage and a circuit between different forms of cinematic fascination. Trafic is about images in a broad sense and is not restricted to cinema, even if that is the primary focus. In conceiving Trafic, Daney was inspired by literary revues such as La Nouvelle Revue Française and Jean Louis Schefer’s Café (Maison 235). Named after the penal colony for delinquents where Jean Genet resided during the 1920s, Mettray was created in 2001 in Marseille by the photographer and filmmaker Didier Morin and usually publishes works-in-progress, archival materials, and reflections by writers, photographers, and filmmakers. Bellour and Bertrand Schefer (one of the writers of Malgré la nuit) have contributed texts, and other regular contributors include the photographer Bernard Plossu.20 Grandrieux’s texts for these revues include reflections on his film practice (“Troisième film”); interviews (“Un lac,” “Unrest: Entretien”); commentaries on other films (“Sous le ciel“); extracts from his films’ “scripts” (“Meurtrière,” “Unrest”), including as-yet unfinished films (“Congo”); correspondence to do with the films or shooting diaries (“La Vie Nouvelle“); and short, oneiric fictional texts and other occasional writings (“La voie sombre”, “L’emprise”, “Incendie”). In one brief paragraph-long text that reads like the account of a nightmare, Grandrieux describes the experience of someone trapped underneath a huge putrefying beast (“Untitled [1]”). Another work features simply a pair of drawings of birdlike creatures (“Untitled [2]”). While we do not have the script for Malgré la nuit, Baudéan notes that it is poetic, like a novel with chapters rather than scenes and, in that respect, we can speculate that it is very much like the fictional texts and the scenarios for the other films (2). Baudéan compares Grandrieux’s script to those of Bruno Dumont, for whom he has also worked. This is significant because it means that Grandrieux’s film practice stems from a practice of literary writing. Grandrieux states that he could not make a film that did not start life as a text that he had written (with or without others in collaboration) (Grandrieux and Jefferson Selve 93).

    Grandrieux’s references to Blanchot in the shooting diary take on added resonance by appearing in Trafic. Both Bellour and Daney have said that Blanchot was for them an ideal critic: Daney refers to Blanchot as “his master” (Pensées 310), while Bellour writes that Blanchot permitted the republication of his essay “La Condition critique” in the second edition of Trafic, a text that Bellour cut out from a newspaper when he was a young boy in 1950 (Dans la compagnie 13). This is not to say that Blanchot was a model, says Bellour, because he is “inimitable” (21). Grandrieux’s affinity with Blanchot’s account of the work of the artist enters into intertextual play with the estimation in which Blanchot is held by key figures at Trafic. Blanchot’s critical insights into the creative process in L’Espace littéraire—surely among the most profound studies of the psychology of the literary writer—come no doubt in part from his own practice as an experimental writer. Bellour’s own literary writings (simply referred to as “texts”) have strong echoes of Blanchot’s récits, novels, and fragmentary texts: the enigmatic and often elliptical collection of texts Oubli (1992), for example, cannot but evoke Blanchot’s L’Attente, l’oubli. Bellour’s Partages de l’ombre (2002) similarly features key themes of childhood, the nature of the image, and other topics. A strong Blanchotian literary sensibility infuses Bellour’s understanding of the critical task of writing about film. In other words, critical work would here seem to demand the supplement of experience of literary practice. Bellour notes that for him film analysis is “an art of evocation” rather than a task of description: that is, it is about using written “style” to capture “an active shadow of the unfolding of the film in the movement of the phrase” (Pensées 12). This kind of film “analysis” is about capturing something of cinematic fascination through a practice of writing. What exactly happens in this “capture”? One is inspired to respond to a moment of spectatorial fascination by putting to work the memory of that moment in a literary practice (a practice that for Blanchot starts with fascination). Creative work stemming from fascination is always a work of memory, a renewed inspiration working from traces of an irrecuperable instant in the past (even if that past is a very recent past, for example, as one reflects on a film one has just seen while leaving the cinema). As Bellour hints at and as Elsa Boyer makes explicit, Bellour’s film analysis is “indissociable from fiction” (Boyer 110).21 Writing that begins with fascination is always partly fictive. The film analysis associated with Bellour is a hybrid form of writing inspired by an experience of cinematic fascination, a movement of writing that reanimates, transforms, and necessarily fictionalizes the memory. Underscoring the importance of writing in the revue, Trafic contains no images or illustrations.22 Even if it is an “error,” as we saw in the previous section, fascination can be seen as productive because it has the potential to activate a circuit and inspire new works. If cinema opens an interior world, then writing is a way of prolonging the fascination of cinema. As Jean Louis Schefer puts it: “Writing on cinema would here be nothing else but going further into this darkness lit by changing points, and reaching the moment where this [“experimental”] night is made in us” (95).

    Bellour’s Le Corps du cinéma, which remains untranslated, is one of the great books on the fascination of cinema. The book’s subtitle offers three core conceptual terms: hypnoses, emotions, and animalities. Fascination is a crucial additional term, along with infant and child, whose significance I sketch below. The importance of the term fascination for Bellour is clear: it “commonly serves in general terms to express most vividly the experience induced by cinema. Let us reserve for the moment this word, so full, which asks to be clarified itself, and of which this book is also in a sense the unfolding” (114). Bellour approaches fascination through a discussion of hypnosis. For Bellour, film induces a hypnotic state through the rhythms of time and movement in individual films and also through the cinematic apparatus (dispositif) itself (82). The filmic state is about maintaining a passage between two stages of hypnosis: induction and the state of hypnosis itself, in which the spectator falls into a pre-sleep state (63). The film makes “suggestions” and the spectators respond with their emotions. The dispositif is set up in such a way as to ensure this capture and “force of persuasion.” The darkness of the cinema hall individualizes the relation between spectator and screen. (Like Blanchot’s and Grandrieux’s accounts of fascination, Bellour’s cinematic fascination is essentially nocturnal.) Hypnosis as a paradigm has, of course, a long history in cinema, psychoanalysis, and film theory, and throughout the book Bellour connects these to pre-cinematic forms of hypnosis and magnetism, such as the work of Mesmer and the fascination of the guillotine during the French Revolution.

    Fascination does not seem to refer to a stage or aspect of hypnosis; rather, Bellour says, it refers to the work of art and its effects. He continues: “At most one could say, in order to distinguish the two terms while associating them, like an echo of the duality of the process of induction and the hypnotic state, that if hypnosis, in the cinema, is that which sends the spectator to sleep, fascination is that which wakes him up” (294).23 At a crucial moment in the text, Bellour turns to Blanchot, noting that the subsection of L’Espace littéraire titled “L’image” (L’Espace 28-31, Space 32-33) “seems to describe the cinema situation” (294).24 Bellour then quotes key lines on hypnosis:

    Hypnosis, however, consists not in putting to sleep, but in preventing sleep. It maintains within concentrated night a passive, obedient light, the point of light which is unable to go out: paralyzed lucidity. The power that fascinates has come into contact with this point, which it touches in the separated place where everything becomes image. Inspiration pushes us gently or impetuously out of the world, and in this outside there is no sleep, any more than there is rest. Perhaps it must be called night, but night—the essence of night—does not, precisely, let us sleep. (L’Espace 244, Space 185)

    Like Grandrieux’s evocation of his film as a dream, fascination is figured as being captured by a light in the midst of darkness. Bellour notes that while Blanchot’s discussion pertains to the notion of inspiration, that is, to the work of the artist, it also provides a way of thinking about spectatorship: “These words, beyond the solitude of the creative experience which suggests them, touch also with a strange exactitude the situation of the dark cinema hall and projection and the freely captured spectator in this apparatus” (Corps 295). Inspiration links both creation and reception in an underlying experience of fascination.

    Bellour goes on to note that for Blanchot childhood is “the moment of fascination, is itself fascinated” (295; L’Espace 30, Space 33), which is why childhood and our own childhood fascinate us: “It is because the child is fascinated that the mother is fascinating” (L’Espace 30, Space 33). Bellour draws on Blanchot’s revision of psychoanalytic doctrine in order to conceptualize cinematic fascination. Ten years after the publication of his book, Bellour returned to this idea in a seminar, noting that he is still “fascinated” by these lines.25 Bellour also develops his theory of cinema spectatorship in relation to the developmental theories of Daniel Stern, writing that “the child [infant] of Stern is the cinema spectator” (Corps 151; see 151-177). Bellour argues that when we are fascinated by cinema, we reawaken the fascination that typified our earliest childhood: the child is the “originary infra-spectator” (121-122). While Bellour develops this most extensively in relation to Stern, ideas connecting childhood to cinema are also associated with Daney and Schefer.26 The important point is that there is a bridge between “the spectator’s current state and a state of childhood that the film reanimates by conjugating occasional and renewed fascination with a primordial fascination” (en conjuguant à une fascination primordiale des fascinations ponctuelles et renouvelées) (297). Here, as throughout Le Corps du cinéma, film form is said to hypnotize and fascinate the viewer and this experience is supposed to reopen a “primal scene” characterized by fascination. Bellour’s text sometimes dramatizes this fascination through fragments that seem partly autobiographical and partly fictive (Corps 116-117)—as if to reach the deepest levels of spectatorship it would be necessary to move from an analytic approach to cinema to a speculative or fictional form. These fragments echo Blanchot’s “primal scenes” in L’Écriture du désastre (The Writing of the Disaster), which can be interpreted as representing “infant figures” (Fynsk), that is, immemorial moments of childhood exposure to nothingness.27 These “primal scene” sections are doubtless an influence on Bellour’s L’Enfant (2013), a collection of enigmatic poetic fragments, written between 1994 and 2009, that imaginatively describe the early experiences of a child.28 In one of the fragments, Bellour evokes a “child of cinema” enveloped by the screen image (74). Bellour’s work suggests that closely watching the child (one supposes it is his grandchild), perhaps like the practice of child observation in psychoanalytic training, is a form of research into fascination. Bellour thus extends Blanchot’s concept of fascination by theorizing it in relation to cinema, prolonging Blanchot’s insight that it is related to childhood, and developing forms of writing appropriate to it.

    Bellour caps his long discussion of hypnosis with a brief reading of two early moments featuring children in Grandrieux’s Sombre (Corps 122-123). Sombre begins with a series of shots that follow a car driving through the French Alps at sunset. The next sequence begins abruptly with screams of children. We see children sit on red seats in the dark, possibly in a theatre or cinema, watching a show. The camera faces them and does not show what they are watching. The children are highly animated by what they are watching, shrieking and shouting. Their eyes are wide and rapt. As this short sequence goes on, an eerie ambient music gets louder and the children’s cries are muted. Shortly before the end of the sequence, the children’s agitated and excitable movements are accelerated. About four minutes after this, after a scene in which the film’s protagonist is seen for the first time in a hotel room with an individual we might surmise is a prostitute, another elliptical sequence shows a young blindfolded boy in a field with his arms outstretched before him. As he advances in small steps, the image goes in and out of focus. A crane shot shows that he is walking away from a large barn. Together, these two sequences function somewhat ambiguously as prefatory matter for the main story. Bellour sees these “real-conceptual children” (123) as figurations of the fascinated cinema viewer.

    Bellour returns to this theme in his essay on Malgré la nuit, describing the film as “an attempt to bring to an obscure clarity, despite the night, images which would be images of childhood” (Pensées 229). As with Sombre, childhood is more a conceptual motif than a primary plot feature in Malgré la nuit, one deployed only a couple of times. At the very end of the film, as Lenz lies dying, we see two superimposed images: one of Lenz walking through a field and another of a woman cradling a young child. This echoes an earlier moment in which Lenz explores a house by candlelight and finds a polaroid of the same woman and child, which he claims is a picture of himself and his mother. In a film that follows the logic of a dream more than the logic of a story, Grandrieux thus inscribes a vanishing point. Grandrieux has elsewhere suggested this motif of childhood figures of fascination: “I’ve always thought that one accesses images more with our hands than our eyes. The images that I’m talking about are those which constitute for each of us the dream in which we live. […] It’s a world of images without light that we hold in ourselves and which we traverse like a sleepwalker who cannot escape its vision. This world is childhood, early childhood, when things are linked in us without us ever being able to know anything of them” (Grandrieux and Jefferson Selve 87). The figure of the sleepwalker resonates with the blindfolded child in Sombre. Both echo Grandrieux’s practice of carrying the camera with his own hands, advancing blindly within the “enigma” of the film (“Journal 1” 21). In this way, the circuit of fascination linking Blanchot, Bellour, and Grandrieux, each in his singular way, ultimately tends to resolve itself in the image of a fascinated child.

    Conclusion: What Remains of Fascination?

    Filming is in Grandrieux’s account firstly an active relation: it is always “I film” (je filme). And yet, this filming is a search for a way of letting oneself “be taken” (se laisser prendre) by the film. Grandrieux wants to become the void where, in Blanchot’s terms, the impersonal affirmation of the work asserts itself (L’Espace 61, Space 55). By holding the camera himself Grandrieux has a direct relation through the viewfinder to the image at the moment of its inception. It is partly for this reason that he refers to himself as the film’s “first spectator” (Grandrieux and Jefferson Selve 90). For Blanchot, the genesis of a work of art is a struggle between power and impossibility, which, in the case of literature, finally resolves itself in physical form through the figures of the reader and writer (L’Espace 263-264, Space 198); it is thus that the spectator is in some sense already in the artist (L’Espace 265-266, Space 199-200). The violence of this combat is suggested by Grandrieux’s use of arracher, discussed above, and the various physical ailments he suffers in the course of the project. Yet Grandrieux’s diary also demonstrates how fatigue and a feeling of suffocation become the substance and movement of the work, even if they are also at the same time symptoms militating against its realization. The diary thus suggests the possible political stakes of fascination’s irreducible passivity in a contemporary economy of incessant activity. As Josh Cohen has recently noted, afflictions such as burnout, which typify the Western world of work today, testify to how the creative act often consists precisely in sustaining an inactive state such as exhaustion (xxxvii).

    Just as Bellour’s filmic fascination requires passage through its own kind of writing (which elicits a second fascination), Grandrieux’s affinity with a book about the “space of literature” gestures towards the common indissociability of the literary and the cinematic today, having a common source in an experience of fascination. Theorizing the passages between these forms, Bellour and Grandrieux are two of the principal inheritors or guardians of Blanchotian fascination working today. Circuits of fascination are thus often at the same time circuits of artistic influence. As we have seen, Trafic has historically thought of fascination in Blanchotian terms. As a literary space without images, Trafic responds to what already in the 1990s was perceived to be a saturation of the world by images brought about by a marketized postmodern screen culture. While this condition has developed enormously over the last thirty years, Trafic may still be seen as a space that protects and circulates the pure fascination of cinema, away from an ambient absorption in forms of spectacle and what Daney called “the visual.”29 If Bellour and Grandrieux point to worldly forces militating against the “error” of fascination, they both nonetheless draw primal scenes testifying to it as a vital temptation of the human.

    Footnotes

    1. See for example Greg Hainge’s discussion of a 1994 documentary by Grandrieux on the Normandy landings, in which Grandrieux reads an extract from Blanchot’s L’Attente, l’oubli (Awaiting Oblivion; 1962) (Hainge 52-53).

    2. For example, Adrian Martin reads Malgré la nuit via Antonin Artaud. In his study of Grandrieux, Hainge draws notably on Deleuze and is somewhat critical of the concept of fascination (264). My account of fascination, however, is not that far from Hainge’s reference to the Levinasian il y a and his argument that Grandrieux’s cinema is about returning us to “our own ontological base condition as sensory beings receptive to sensations that traverse us in their raw immediacy” (261).

    3. On Blanchot’s relation to cinema, see Watt 1-9.

    4. Bellour mentions his “profound” friendship with Grandrieux in Dans la compagnie 129.

    5. For a discussion of fascination and the image in Blanchot, particularly as they pertain to cinema, see Watt 23-53.

    6. For different perspectives on fascination within a broader historical French context, see Declerq and Spriet. Although beyond the scope of this article, one could trace the literary sensibility associated with fascination and Blanchot back to German Romanticism; see McKeane and Opelz.

    7. The name Madeleine of course recalls Hitchcock’s Vertigo (1958), a film that could be read as a study in fascination. The name Lenz is a reference to Georg Büchner’s fragment “Lenz” (1836). Kristian Marr was explicitly chosen by Grandrieux for his ghostly, Romantic pallor (“Dossier de presse”). Grandrieux also evokes Dostoyevksy’s The Idiot (1868-69) and the question of evil as inspiration for the film. The film’s title is a reference to a poem by Saint John of the Cross. On allusions to Rilke in the film (also the subject of a significant part of Blanchot’s L’Espace littéraire), see Bellour, Pensées; Leroy.

    8. As of 2009, when the second series was launched, Mettray has no pagination; page numbers given for the Mettray “Journal de tournage” (1-14) are hence my own. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations from this and other French texts are my own.

    10. Grandrieux quotes Kafka’s diary in “Sur l’horizon.”

    11. This appears a Scheferian touch—compare the phrase “voix métallique” in B. Schefer 24.

    12. When asked why his films involve so much sexualized violence, Grandrieux states that he does not know, but that his desire to make films depends on such imagery (Bellour, Pensées 229).

    13. Baudéan confirms Grandrieux’s regular use of this word arracher on set in his instructions to actors and assistants (18).

    14. Bellour describes it as “the book of a generation” (Corps 16). For the “experimental night,” see J. L. Schefer 6, 92. For a discussion of this book and its context, see Ffrench. Schefer has contributed to Trafic throughout the life of the revue and currently serves on its advisory committee.

    15. In the Mettray extract, Grandrieux writes that it is between these two shores that “the film” must pass (3).

    16. Discussed in Hainge 75. On the broad body of contemporary French cinema in which Grandrieux’s work fits, see Beugnet, Cinema and Sensation.

    17. See for example Maillard.

    18. Remark made by Patrice Rollet at the Trafic roundtable, conference “Changer, échanger: Serge Daney au milieu du gué,” Institut national de l’histoire de l’art, Paris, 28 Sept. 2018. On Trafic‘s genesis, see Daney, Maison 23-49 and Pageau. Bellour has stated that he is the only academic on the board of Trafic—remark made at the conference “Penser les revues de cinéma et audiovisuel aujourd’hui,” Sorbonne Nouvelle Paris 3, 16 Dec. 2019.

    19. On this topic, see Fiant.

    20. Malgré la nuit was written by Grandrieux in collaboration with Bertrand Schefer, Rebecca Zlotowski, and John-Henry Butterworth.

    21. For a discussion of the French tradition of film analysis as a kind of “writing” (écriture) and Bellour and Daney’s place within this, see Costa and Maury. For a recent discussion of Bellour’s career see Radner and Fox, which contains an extract in translation of the long recent interview with Bellour, Dans la compagnie.

    22. Daney refers to a writerly eschewing of images as the “Blanchot effect” (99).

    23. For a recent reading of the connection between cinema and sleep, which we could compare with Bellour’s, see Gorfinkel.

    24. See Bellour’s discussion of Blanchot, 291-97. Bellour also discusses this text in “L’Image.”

    25. “Fragments d’une archéologie du regard romantique,” Université Paris Diderot, 3 Apr. 2019.

    26. See Jean Louis Schefer’s line “the films which watched our childhood” and Daney’s repeated formula “cinema is childhood,” both discussed in Bellour, Corps 296.

    27. Compare Grandrieux’s reference to the “infans” in “Sur l’horizon” 88.

    28. An extract was published in Mettray, vol. 10, Spring 2006, 6-9.

    29. See Bellour’s article on the history of the cinema spectator in Pensées, 353-366.

    Works Cited

    • Baudéan, Romain. “Perdre point: Journal de bord d’un pointeur sur le tournage de Malgré la nuit, un film de Philippe Grandrieux.” Romain Baudéan, Jun. 2016, www.romainbaudean.files.wordpress.com/2016/06/perdre-point.pdf. Blog. Accessed 28 December 2019.
    • Bellour, Raymond. Dans la Compagnie des œuvres: Entretien avec Alice Leroy et Gabriel Bortzmeyer. Rouge Profond, 2017.
    • —. Le Corps du cinéma: Hypnoses, émotions, animalités. P.O.L., 2009.
    • —. L’Enfant. P.O.L., 2013.
    • —. “L’Image.” Maurice Blanchot: Récits critiques, edited by Christophe Bident and Pierre Vilar, Editions Farrago, 2003, pp. 133–141.
    • —. Oubli. Éditions de la Différence, 1992.
    • —. Partages de l’ombre. Éditions de la Différence, 2002.
    • —. Pensées du cinéma: Les Films qu’on accompagne, le cinéma qu’on cherche à ressaisir. P.O.L., 2016.
    • Beugnet, Martine. L’Attrait du flou. Yellow Now, 2017.
    • —. Cinema and Sensation: French Film and the Art of Transgression. Edinburgh UP, 2007.
    • Blanchot, Maurice. The Book to Come. Translated by Charlotte Mandell, Stanford UP, 2003.
    • —. “La Condition critique.” Trafic, vol. 2, Spring 1992, pp. 140-42.
    • —. L’Écriture du désastre. Gallimard, 1980.
    • —. L’Espace littéraire. 1955. Gallimard, 1988. Collection “Folio essais.”
    • —. Le Livre à venir. 1959. Gallimard, 1986. Collection “Folio essais.”
    • —. The Space of Literature. Translated by Ann Smock, U of Nebraska P, 1982.
    • Boyer, Elsa. “Raymond Bellour, de L’Analyse du film au Corps du cinéma: une théorie sensible.” Écrire l’analyse du film: Un enjeu pour l’esthétique, edited by Fabienne Costa, et al., = Théorème, vol. 30, 2019, pp. 103-111.
    • Cohen, Josh. Not Working: Why We Have to Stop. Granta, 2019.
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    • Daney, Serge. La Maison cinéma et le monde: 4. Le moment Trafic (1991-1992). Edited by Patrice Rollet with Jean-Claude Biette and Christophe Manon, P.O.L., 2015.
    • Declercq, Gilles, and Stella Spriet, editors. Fascination des images, images de la fascination. Presses Sorbonne Nouvelle, 2014.
    • “Dossier de presse: Malgré la nuit” (2016). UniFrance, medias.unifrance.org/medias/118/125/163190/presse/malgre-la-nuit-dossier-depresse-francais.pdf. Accessed 28 December 2019.
    • Ffrench, Patrick. “Memories of the Unlived Body: Jean Louis Schefer, Georges Bataille and Gilles Deleuze.” Film-Philosophy, vol. 21, no. 2, 2017, pp. 161-187. Edinburgh UP Journals, doi:10.3366/film.2017.0042.
    • Fiant, Antony. “De la caméra au stylo: Les écrits des cinéastes dans Trafic.” La Revue des revues, vol. 33, 2003, pp. 69-77.
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    • Gorfinkel, Elena. “Cinema, the Soporific: Between Exhaustion and Eros.” Kracauer Lectures in Film and Media Theory, Goethe Universität, 12 Dec. 2017, www.kracauerlectures.de/en/winter-2017-2018/elena-gorfinkel/. Accessed 30 December 2019.
    • Grandrieux, Philippe. “Congo.” Trafic, vol. 83, Autumn 2012, pp. 138-142.
    • —. “L’emprise.” Trafic, vol. 38, Summer 2001, pp. 17-22.
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  • A Moving Which Is Not a Moving: Michael Snow’s Wavelength

    E. L. McCallum (bio)

    Abstract

    Michael Snow’s canonical experimental film Wavelength is commonly understood to model cinematic apparatus theory. This essay reads Wavelength through a different apparatus, one used in physics’ well-known double-slit experiment to demonstrate the wave theory of light. Reading the film via this quantum apparatus orients us to a different mode of spectatorship than cinema’s apparatus theory—a mode of fascination. Reading Wavelength through fascination decenters the human subject, questions the tacit humanism of even materialist interpretations of the film, and opens up a new vantage on both the animacy in the film and its critical readings.

    “He sat and stared at the sea, which appeared all surface and twinkle, far shallower than the spirit of man. It was the abyss of human illusion that was the real, the tideless deep.”—Henry James, “The Middle Years” (335)

    Michael Snow’s film Wavelength may be best misremembered as the story of a 45-minute zoom shot across a New York City loft to a photograph of waves that fills the screen. Except that it’s not a continual zoom but a montage of reframed space, and it’s not a story but a flattening, a Steinian geography of layers. While it has also commonly been taken as a staging of cinematic apparatus theory,1 Wavelength is arguably fascinated with another apparatus that toys with waves and particles. This essay reads Wavelength through the light-conducting apparatus that is used in physics’ well-known double-slit experiment to demonstrate the wave theory of light.2 This apparatus has subsequently been developed to confirm a range of queer phenomena at the quantum level, from Louis de Broglie’s discovery of the quantum duality of particle and wave to the curious problem of entanglement. This essay builds on the implications of such experiments for rethinking being and knowing, subject and object elicited by Karen Barad’s queer feminist quantum theory. Moreover, reading the film through/as this quantum apparatus orients us to a different mode of spectatorship than cinema’s apparatus theory—a mode of fascination. For a range of reasons, but hinging primarily on the relation of the object and subject, this fascinated spectatorship’s distinction from apparatus theory has been obscured by the very fascination of film theorists with Wavelength.

    The zoom-story impression of Wavelength is likely due to Annette Michelson’s influential reading of the film, which explicitly links it to narrative:

    as the camera continues to move steadily forward, building a tension that grows in direct ratio to the reduction of the field, we recognize, with some surprise, those horizons as defining the contours of narrative, of that narrative form animated by distended temporality, turning upon cognition, towards revelation. (“Toward” 175)

    This sense of “revelation” seems to undergird the way the film captures story; that is, the turn towards revelation makes it narrative, though the narrative features Michelson calls out emphasize not only temporal transformation but the experience of it. There’s a phenomenological component to the story in this movement from cognition to revelation. Yet I’m also struck by the way Michelson evokes perspective, as the horizons defining narrative’s contours. In a different essay, she doubles down on both narrative and perspective, positing that “Snow made of the slow and steady optical tracking shot or zoom the axis of a displacement whose perceptual solicitations and formal resonance are those of narrative action” (“About” 113). If Wavelength is a story of a zoom, it’s a story of our experience of film, a recognizably apparatus theory account that emphasizes the perceptual engagement—and disengagement—of the spectator.

    In other words, Michelson’s account is based on the perspectival or apparatus theory reading of the film as much as on the narrative lens; the two are imbricated in a way that reinforces their collusion to produce a discrete, individualist subject. Contextualizing the zeitgeist of the film’s making, Michelson observes: “Not narrative form, but the space in which it takes place, was the object of radical assault. For the gaze of fascination, the filmmakers of the late 1960s were to begin substituting analytic inspection” (“About” 116). Michelson’s sense of Wavelength‘s formal return to narrative thus charts a turn away from fascination and towards analysis. Wavelength‘s own analysis, however, consists of its particular cutting together of space to create an experience that seems narrative but isn’t, while the narrative effect of the film reinscribes it in a familiar paradigm of centered spectatorship, articulated through apparatus theory’s contemporaneous discussion of monocular perspectival space.3 But while it reinscribes that centered spectator, it also displaces her. For just as the narrativity of the film is a fiction, an imposition of a familiar framework, so too is its appeal to a centered and discrete subject. As Michael Sicinski observes,

    By placing Wavelength within the narrative tradition, albeit as a metacommentary on that tradition (a film whose ‘story’ is the purely temporal cognitive process of watching films), Michelson locates Wavelength within a temporal humanism, implying that the film proposes a spectatorship which posits ‘humanity’ (or more precisely, a specific, historically determined notion of what being human means) as both centered subject and represented object of any filmic experience. (67)

    Michaelson’s reading of Wavelength, then, not only glosses the film with narrative, but situates it as the model for cinematic apparatus theory, which surged into critical discourse between the film’s 1967 creation and Michaelson’s 1978 discussion. While apparatus theory underscores the ideological power of cinema, relying on a largely Marxist understanding of ideology, its reliance on a tacit humanism has been less fully appreciated.

    As one of the most insightful critical analyses to shift us away from that humanism to emphasize the materiality of the film, Sicinski’s argument attends to the way the film produces space, as “each disclosure is the creation of a new space, all the more palpably material due to the compression established by the zoom” (82). In that shift from time to space, Sicinski leverages us away from a narrative reading and into an ontological one. This ontological turn invites further consideration of the materiality of the space and of the question whether and how that materiality could represent itself. The turn to space also directs us away from a human-centered focus or a centering of the human. Yet at the same time, Sicinski’s focus on “dwelling” in the Heideggerian sense loses the aspect of the visual, and of fascination in particular.4 Because fascination holds important implications for subject/object relations (not unlike Heidegger’s reconfiguration of subject/object relations through dwelling and bridging), I aim to build on the ontological understanding laid down by Sicinski and bring it to bear on a new understanding of fascination. I suggest that the “gaze of fascination” is not so easily shaken from Wavelength, even as narrative falls short of accounting for the film’s analytic inspection not only of the loft space, but of the cinematic apparatus itself. However, when read through an apparatus other than the cinematic, that “gaze of fascination” can be understood differently. As the contestations of Michelson’s readings make clear, the imbrication of the human and the nonhuman, the problem of narrative, and the place of fascination lie at the heart of critical engagement with Snow’s film.

    I. From cinematic to quantum apparatus theory through the animacy of space

    Apparatus theory appears to account for both the uncommon experience that Wavelength presents its spectators and the persistence of phenomenological accounts of the film. Elizabeth Legge asked of Wavelength,

    Does it restore a ‘transcendent subject’ with mastery over the perceptual field, both as author and as viewer, or does it block that suspect entity? Does it somehow enact consciousness by provoking an intensified phenomenological experience in the viewer or does it interfere with our sensory immersion by stimulating a disruptive undertow of self-awareness? (18)

    The short answer—revealed by attending to the camera’s position in the loft space—is “yes, both.” And yet both are two sides of the same coin, for to block or disrupt “that suspect entity” is to constitute it, to affirm its being blocked and disrupted. What other subjects or modes of viewing might this film precipitate once we give up on its narrativity and perspectivism?

    The film begins from a conventionally transcendental perspective, from a high angle up in what seems to be the loft’s back corner. As spectators we cathect to an impossible locus of vision, an angle that Snow “[d]iscovered … to have lyric God-like above-it-all quality” (Snow, “Letter” 5). As the film proceeds, the framing shifts not only horizontally across the loft and toward the windows at the far side, but downward until the camera is situated at human eye-level. It then leans into the fullness of the wave image posted on the wall, ultimately ending in a nonhuman vantage as the full shot of waves fills the screen, with no horizon in sight to orient us in space or scale. The instability of the human vantage over the arc of the film is notable. Or rather, the fleetingness of a human vantage over the arc of the film should be notable, but our identification with the camera is such that we may readily overlook it, absorbed in the conventions of the cinematic apparatus.5 The human interest in what happens with the people who come and go onscreen is relentlessly sidelined by the framing that focuses the zoom’s attention on the opposite wall, reinforcing our identification with the camera. We come to realize that the four human events in the film are not plot but distractions. Curiously, and at the same time, the materiality of the film itself, both visually and sonically, comes to the fore in a way that counters the primacy of the camera, thus posing its own challenges to narrativizing Wavelength‘s experiment.

    One reading that quickly emerges from attending to the narrative decentering of the human in Wavelength—how Snow grants agency to the nonhuman aspects of the film—is the sense that the film produces meaning that seems to center on the mechanism of the camera as itself the action of the film. Indeed, as Martha Langford put it:

    The camera, surely the main protagonist, is a presence sensed over the course of the film, as it sometimes stutters in its cinematic language while making its way to the conclusion, a journey ruled and intensified by the sound of a rising sine wave. The colours of light (achieved through the use of gels), the artisanal quality of Snow’s ghostly montage, and elements of pure chance, such as sound drifting up from the street, offer escape and consolation to the spectator who is inexorably drawn to the watery depths of the final scene. (“Wavelength 1966”)

    Langford’s luscious description of the camera as protagonist and of film stocks, gels, and flashes as collaborators resonates with what Jean Baudry identifies as “the transcendental subject whose place is taken by the camera which constitutes and rules the objects in this ‘world’” (“Ideological” 45); here too the camera dominates the apparatus. Arguably then, Langford’s description—like Michelson’s—is still enframed in a narrative temporality that inscribes the familiar subject/object relation of linear perspective, because these ancillary collaborators serve to console the subject for the loss, presumably, of humancentered narrative, or possibly of conventional meaning in favor of a play of surfaces. Langford’s reading suggests that the real consolation offered by the gels and film stocks and ambient sound and sine wave is that they’re outside the camera—these are aspects of the film at odds with the dominance of the camera. On this view, the tension between the human/nonhuman becomes multiple, as a boundary between the subject-identifying convention of the camera and the non-objectifying sensory experiences of other materialities in film. These materialities are not producing a centered subject, a coherent identification, or a conventionally bounded sensory experience.

    Why would we necessarily identify with the camera and not with the flashes of color and light or textures of film onscreen?6 This question presents us with another angle on the intransigent projection of the human onto this film, and raises the problem of how humans might identify with nonhuman others, even machinic elements that do not stand in for them.7 As Baudry tells us, identification works because “it is to the extent that the child can sustain the look of another in the presence of a third party that he can find the assurance of an identification with the image of his own body” (“Ideological” 45). The gels offer no body, even synecdochally, for the spectator; they, the exposures, or the stutter, and especially the superpositions instead offer, in what might be seen as a Lacanian regression, le corps morcelé. We—insofar as there is a “we” here—identify part with part rather than whole with whole, projecting an imaginary composite or multiplicity. The oscillation between identifying as the transcendental subject and as a located human gives rise to the mental appeal of the film: it seduces us to mastery via a conventional perspectival framing, even as it uses that perspective to quell identification with any characters.8 While not exactly fragmentation, this oscillation creates its own form of continuity to cross the gap it limns, rendering our subjectivity necessarily incomplete. As Baudry observes, “continuity is an attribute of the subject” (“Ideological” 44); the film challenges us to retain our centeredness within the linear progress of the zoom, which produces our oscillation between attachment and resistance to the film. In watching Wavelength, we are constantly called to the present moment of what is before us in a way that throws us on our own resources of memory, experience, and attention; we are absorbed and bored, focused and distracted simultaneously or serially. Watching Wavelength tests our patience, unless we can lapse into that hypnotic zone of inattentive attention that suspends our desire for narrative in favor of enthrallment with the changing image, a play of surfaces rather than depths.

    Exacerbating this oscillation some two-thirds of the way through the film, however, is a series of superpositions of images, double exposures of what we have seen layered onto what we are seeing now.9 The linearity of narrative and spatial trajectory is disrupted by this superposition, as is the subject’s continuity: Where are we in time and space? What are we seeing? The superposition means that spectators oscillate between then/now and between being attentive and being diverted. The splitting in the image returns us to the surface of the image, resisting the referent. However, because this superposition is crucial for opening up the vector to consider the quantum apparatus in/for the film, the better question may be how are we seeing, and who is this we? The superposition goes beyond the earlier visual effects of the film—the gels, the exposure changes, the stutter—which can nonetheless be resolved into familiar perspectival relations. Baudry himself argues that the ideological efficacy of the cinematic apparatus relies on the exclusion of the instrumentation of cinema from the film; its incursion onto the screen disrupts our repression of its seaming us into ideological smoothness: “Both specular tranquillity and the assurance of one’s own identity collapse simultaneously with the revealing of the mechanism, that is of the inscription of the film-work” (“Ideological” 46). Such a collapse of identity is precisely what opens up the possibility for a spectatorial relation of fascination. If the superposition of images serves to reveal the mechanism of the apparatus, cinematic or otherwise, it also invites a collapse of the centered subject, which relies on an ideology of depth.

    There is, no doubt, an apparatus displayed in Wavelength through its apparent use of perspective as the zoom crosses the loft space. But the cinematic apparatus is not the only one at work here. The problem of superposition not only troubles the spectator’s tranquility when it erupts onscreen in Wavelength, but also yields a connection to quantum physics, since superposition is a mode of being inherent to the quantum world, where a quantum object can be in two states at the same time. This view builds on Sicinksi’s ontological shift to reading the film, but changes the ontological stakes. To clarify those stakes, let us consider Barad’s quantum-physics-based notion of the apparatus. Barad uses the double-slit experiment not simply to illustrate the wave/particle indeterminacy, but to question humans’ separation from that observation. Discussing the intricacies of an experiment that sends atoms through a two-slit apparatus that registers them as waves (rather than as particles), Barad notes that the experiment reveals that “wave and particle are not inherent attributes of objects, but rather the atoms perform wave or particle in their intra-action with the apparatus. The apparatus is an inseparable part of the observed phenomenon” (“Diffracting” 180). Key for Barad is the experiment’s performative aspect and the apparatus’s role in producing that performance: there is no essential underlying mode of being (particle or wave). Instead, an atom is either a particle or a wave depending on how apparatus and atom interact. As physics experimenters essayed to understand why the diffraction pattern (indicating waves) resulted rather than a scatter pattern (indicating particles), they found that changing the apparatus affected the outcome. More curiously, even if the experimenter went back and erased any information that indicated which slit an atom would go through (and thus, whether it would be particle or wave), “the finding of this experiment indicates that it is possible to determine after the particle has already gone through the slits whether or not it will have gone through one slit or the other (as a proper particle will do) or both slits simultaneously (as waves will do)!” (Barad 180). Perhaps even weirder but more germane, Barad extrapolates from this example that “There is no ‘I’ that exists outside of the diffraction pattern, observing it, telling its story” (181). Bringing Barad’s quantum apparatus into consideration troubles the human center of the cinematic apparatus, and invites us to consider how this queer quantum apparatus destabilizes ontology and subjectivity in ways relevant to a film called Wavelength.

    That relevance hinges on the linearity of time, the animacy of the object under investigation, and the separability the spectators from—or rather, their implication in relation to—the object observed in Wavelength. This turns us to two interrelated questions: 1) Must we buy the depth model of the film’s action, whether in terms of the geometry of perspective or perspective’s precipitation of the (phenomenal) subject? 2) How does Wavelength then reconfigure the subject/object relation? I have suggested that the film unworks the transcendental subject of apparatus theory precisely through the unraveling of perspective, narrative, and phenomenology to induce fascination as a relation of superposition.10 To do so, it must unwork perspective. Snow says of Wavelength that “It’s all planes, no perspectival space” (“Letter” 5), and Legge corroborates his reading in observing that “the floorboards of the loft may seem to mark out a perspective-like linear recession into depth, but they are only a reference to perspective as content or subject matter, not as a structuring system, since the zoom compresses and flattens as it goes” (49). Perspective is a reference on a flattened surface, just as narrative is a metaphor or dynamic form. Let us take seriously for a moment Snow’s claim that perspective is not a subject of the film; what if Wavelength has no linear perspective?11 At best there is only the viewer’s belief in perspective, cued by the initial realism of the scene—an afterimage of depth persisting across an increasing flatness of the image. The zoom marks interrupted and arrested movement; the camera stays still as the image expands to fill the frame (in what is conventionally called mobile framing). The trajectory through the loft comes not as a dolly shot but from a repositioning of the camera, which was packed away at the end of each shooting. You could say this film is a series of repeated reframings through the zoom. In mobilizing the frame without moving the camera, Wavelength formalizes the tension between arrest and movement that is the essence of fascination.

    If there is no perspective, what does that do to the subject who is the interlocutor for the horizon’s vanishing point (or he who contemplates the surface and twinkle of the sea)? Jacob Potempski argues that “the event that the film constitutes does not function as a mirror of experience; it effectuates a rupture with the world as it is experienced by a subject” (16). Potempski’s Deleuzian argument that the film’s time-image directness shatters the subject certainly diverts us away from a projection of wholeness in the image in favor of embracing the fragmentation that it displays. Yet he does not fully engage the fragmentation Wavelength presents when he argues that “the coherence of the subject, its identity across time is broken. … If there is a unity between consciousness and its object, the camera eye and the photograph, it lies in the continuity that the zoom establishes” (14). The zoom’s continuity is, on another view, a series of expanding, stretching fragments, cut together into a composite. The zoom’s “continuity” stitched together into a whole film marks not only the undoing of the subject, but the undoing of the object as well.

    Or rather, it marks the freeing of the object to its animacy. What if we consider Wavelength as composing an animate space? This would be a lesson from Barad’s queer quantum view that sees matter as animate, even performative. Consider that the loft is not a static, inert object of the camera but an active participant in the filming. What if instead we see Wavelength as letting the space articulate itself—join itself together as well as express itself—as it moves in for its closeup? The animacy of the camera is clear enough in film theory’s negotiation of the intricacies of cinema’s imbrication of human and technological. The animacy of the filmed object is also a thread in film theory, ever since Louis Delluc’s introduction of photogénie—an indefinable, vital quality taken on by a filmed object—and Kracauer’s insistence on the indeterminacy of natural objects and their psychophysical correspondences. Supporting this view, Sicinski argues that “Snow foregrounds the activity of seemingly ‘passive’ space” and that “one becomes aware that ‘spaces,’ and the ‘things’ within them, are not solid but rather in a constant state of flux” (79). Sicinski singles out the yellow chair, which “pops into deep greens only to burst into a white flare of light” (79)—a description that casts this chromatic activity as the chair’s performance. Might the cuts, on this view, indicate moments when the light or the loft either completes its scene or even possibly somehow fails in its role? In short, might the cuts mark the limits of the space’s performance? Is this scene a dialogue between space and light? Consider how some of the cuts also limn the limit of the medium—the moment for change in stock or filter so as to alter the light, or the traces of the end of shooting for that day. If we see the filmmaker as responsive to the performance of the space in the light of the mise en scène rather than as master over that space, we come closer to the sense of Baradian apparatus theory, in which the observer and the entity observed co-constitute one another (to put it schematically, if reductively). Moreover, if the space of the loft is actively engaging the film, then the superpositions refract how that space may engage with itself over time, responding to itself or to others in the space. If this seems preposterous, consider Barad’s contention that matter is animate, always coming into being and engaging with itself: “in a breathtakingly intimate sense, touching, sensing, is what matter does, or rather, what matter is: matter is condensations of responses, of response-ability” (“Transmaterialities” 401). Indeed, Barad’s elaboration of superposition sheds new light on the distinctive turn Wavelength makes in its doubled exposures, notable because it happens as the camera height reaches the human scale. These moments perform the imaged objects’ response-ability to one another.

    The fictionality of Snow’s 80-ft. zoom, moreover, underscores the film’s reliance on montage. As William Wees reminds us, nearly all zoom lenses are subject to side-drift, where a defect in the zoom lens “causes the image of an object in the center of the frame to gradually slip off-center during a zoom-in” (190n18). Wees elicits a different angle on the machinic aspects of Wavelength, positing that “the richest visual experience provided by Snow’s films comes from his manipulation of the ‘machine-ness’ of cinema” (154); indeed, Wavelength‘s “mechanical eye of the zoom lens creates a perceptual experience that cannot be duplicated by the human eye” (157). While the very nature of cinema is to produce perceptions that cannot be replicated by the human eye, this perceptual experience is unique in the way it animates the space. Because Snow was changing the camera position each day of shooting, and because shooting did not happen in sequence from long shot to closeup, he could recalibrate the center of the image. In my reading, Snow becomes the agent of the loft’s, chair’s, and photograph’s collaboration against the camera lens’ distortion. Wees observes that

    By imposing its narrow angle of vision on the space of the room, the zoom makes the wall seem to approach the viewer, rather than the viewer approach the wall. The wall seems to come forward exactly as the buildings across the street seem to advance until they look like flat images pressed against the windows of the room. (157)

    This flatness not only facilitates the layering of spaces; it also solicits fascination.

    Attending to the animacy of the filmed space reveals that, insofar as the film does center a spectator—and it does produce the illusions of cinematic apparatus and of perspective—we are the object of the film’s fascination, created by the space’s pursuit of an audience. Or possibly, we are the object of the photograph’s fascination as it stretches out the edges of its film image to bring itself into the fullness of the screen. To display itself. This is a nuance on the illusion of humanity in my epigraph, which constructs a series of linked binaries: shallow vs. depth, the sea vs. human, the surface vs. abyss. While we might initially read “the abyss of human illusion” to refer to the illusions that humans hold, I suggest instead that it is a claim about the illusion of being human: that the illusion of humanness is also an illusion of depth. If we dismiss the animacy of the loft in its approach towards us, its transformation from room to sea, we seek to reassert the illusion of human mastery over space and objects within it, and thus the very illusion of depth, of staring into the abyss, limned by cinematic apparatus theory. Because Wavelength is invested and engaged in fascination rather than classical fiction film spectatorship, it precipitates a subject differently—a fascinated subject, if you can even call it a subject. To acknowledge the animacy of the filmed entities, to turn from classical cinematic apparatus to a Baradian apparatus, is to turn towards an understanding of fascination as a reconfiguration of the subject/object relation. As Iris van der Tuin remarks, “Barad comes up with an onto-epistemology according to which knower, known, and laboratory instrument act and come into being simultaneously, in their mutual entanglement” (31). Barad’s apparatus theory necessarily shifts our understanding from the apparatus as producing discrete entities—however bound together in a system of projection, image, and spectatorship—to an understanding of phenomena. For Barad, “We do not uncover preexisting facts about independently existing things as they exist frozen in time like little statues positioned in the world. Rather, we learn about phenomena—about specific material configurations of the world’s becoming” (Meeting 90-91). She describes phenomena in terms of cutting-together apart. To think through how the spectator becomes fascinated with the animacy of the filmed space—that is, how the subject who will come to be the spectator encounters the object that is arguably the matter of the film in a relation that we will call fascination—let us turn to consider what fascination means.

    II. fascination

    To return to the epigraph: “He sat and stared at the sea, which appeared all surface and twinkle, far shallower than the spirit of man.” This describes the spectatorial experience of Wavelength, only we don’t know at the outset that we are staring at the sea. Or, for that matter, at the abyss of human illusion. We think we are staring at a New York loft, but in fact we are looking at a picture of the sea that we cannot yet see, and overlooking the space in which we dwell. Moreover, the photograph of waves on the far wall of the loft anchors the center of the image on screen across the film’s whole trajectory, and arguably its action clears out the rest of the loft so it can take center stage.12 The agency of the photograph, or the animacy of the mise en scène, bears on the question of fascination insofar as fascination posits an inversion of the conventional subject/object relation that privileges the human subject who subordinates an inert object world to his mastery (and it is a specifically gendered human subject). From the vantage of fascination, if this film has a centered subject, it is the photograph, not the cinematic apparatus-precipitated spectator.

    Because of the way Wavelength displaces or decenters the human, recutting the subject/object relation across human/nonhuman distinction, it stages fascination rather than identification or any other dominant mode of spectatorship (e.g., fetishistic scopophilia). Noting “the strangely dehumanizing state of fascination” (86), Pansy Duncan argues that the form of this affect is triangulated: “I experience fascination when the glossy surface’s hermeneutic and thus emotional bounty magnetizes me with the promise of an other ostensibly possessed of the emotional immediacy I conceive myself as lacking” (100). In Duncan’s view, fascination becomes a relation for negotiating lack by substituting another’s fullness or plenitude. She derives this understanding in a discerning reading of David Cronenberg’s Crash, a film in which she would like us to “consider the image as an aesthetic surface rather than as a representation of a spatially and psychologically rounded world” (77). I find Duncan’s description quite hospitable to reading Wavelength. The film’s subject is not a room we enter but a series of surfaces we confront or encounter. This is why I have been at pains to lay out but also question the intransigent phenomenological and narrative readings of the film, which hinge on the human, and turn instead to the flatness, the surfaces, and the mechanical, objectal, and spatial agencies it offers. However, I am troubled by Duncan’s investment in an overly familiar paradigm of plenitude and lack, even as she allows a certain dynamism between the self and other in terms of who lacks and who possesses. Duncan’s view seems to rewrite fetishism’s substitution of lack with an other’s plenitude without the epistemic ambivalence. There is fetishism in Cronenberg’s film, to be sure, but on behalf of the characters, who are car-crash fetishists. Duncan argues that the film itself refuses identification through its relentless emphasis on flatness: “its flatness and depthlessness leaves Crash stubbornly impervious to identification and emotional engagement” (78). And yet, she suggests, this flatness produces a richness of texture that should not go unheeded: “its riot of texture equally precludes an interpretation that would reduce it to mere surface lack” (78). In emphasizing the fullness of the image via texture, Duncan’s reading renders surface and flatness as curiously sufficient, if not plenitudinous.

    Fetishism has been identified as a classic mechanism for cinema: a bright surface with no depth or interiority, an absent presence, a signifier whose plenitude the spectator knows to be imaginary, but nonetheless accepts the world of the screen as full.13 Christian Metz has charted

    a few of the many and successive twists, the ‘reversals’ (reduplications) that occur in the cinema to articulate together the imaginary, the symbolic and the real … in order to work, the film does not only require a splitting, but a whole series of stages of belief, imbricated together into a chain by a remarkable machinery. (71)

    Metz incorporates Octave Mannoni’s discussion of knowledge and belief in theatrical fiction to say that “Any spectator will tell you that he ‘doesn’t believe in it,’ but everything happens as if there were nonetheless someone to be deceived, someone who really will ‘believe in it’” (72). Fascination operates through a similar splitting and oscillation, but on the axis between stillness and movement, fixity and animacy, which is also an organizing trope of cinema. Duncan remarks on “fascination’s strange synthesis of fixity and animation, stasis and excitement” (81). Fascination is similar to but not the same as fetishism. Both entail a transformation in conventional subject/object relations that subordinates a presumed-inert object to the subject’s control. But where the fetish privileges the object in order to negotiate a threatening absence,14 fascination submits the subject to the object without ambivalence. The subject’s experience of the object in fascination may be as a threatening presence that overwhelms the self, or even potentially affirms loss of self, but this does not pit belief against knowledge. Steven Shaviro, drawing on Blanchot,15 emphasizes the loss of a proper distance to the object and the radical passivity that cinematic fascination entails:

    I do not have power over what I see, I do not even have, strictly speaking, the power to see; it is more that I am powerless not to see. The darkness of the movie theater isolates me from the rest of the audience, and cuts off any possibility of ‘normal’ perception. I cannot willfully focus my attention on this or on that. Instead, my gaze is arrested by the sole area of light, a flux of moving images. I am attentive to what happens on the screen only to the extent that I am continually distracted, and passively absorbed, by it. I no longer have the freedom to follow my own train of thought. (47)

    For Shaviro, this dispossession leads to a counterparadigm for film spectatorship, “a radically different economy/regime/articulation of vision” that dispenses not only with film theory’s formulation of fetishism (as fetishistic scopophilia or as the imaginary signifier), but also with dominant models of spectatorship founded in voyeurism and identification in favor of masochism and fascination (49).

    Where Shaviro sees fascination as a mode of being transformed, even energized, by involuntary participation in watching highly affective scenes like blatantly prurient and pornographic scenarios (49), Duncan picks up on fascination’s formation in postmodern theory (Jameson, Harvey) as emotionally lacking. Fascination is seen as an antiemotional experience, fake, inauthentic, or apparitional, from which Duncan argues that we should appreciate its function as an undiminished emotion, albeit one of stasis and narcolepsy rather than animation. Like Shaviro, Duncan underscores the stillness of the fascinated spectator: “Fascination, that is, may be an emotion in which we are moved, paradoxically, to stop moving” (87). What’s key for me in Duncan’s reading of fascination is its “oddly depthless object” (87). The depthlessness of the object and the stasis of the subject put the energy, movement, emphasis on the relation between the two, a relation mediated by an other, a projection who is equally entranced. Moreover, Duncan establishes a certain reversibility between the one who is fascinated and the one who fascinates: “the definition of fascination moves from denoting a generalized intransitive condition (‘the state of being fascinated’) to indexing a particular transitive power (‘the state of being fascinating’). What fascinates, it seems, is always fascination itself” (89). Both Duncan and Shaviro develop their theories of fascination from fairly mainstream narrative films (Crash, Blue Steel, A Clockwork Orange). While they risk reintroducing narrative, their readings avoid doing so by focusing on the perceptual experiences offered by the films rather than on the phenomenological ones.

    How does this understanding of fascination apply to an experimental film like Wavelength? I argue it adapts well; read as a zoom-story or as the eruption of an abyss of time or as a photograph’s search for screentime, Wavelength is all about perceptual experience. Duncan’s and Shaviro’s specimen films afford a kind of limit test—as narrative fiction films, they could solicit identification, but both critics read them as working against this. Fascination is beyond identification and its depth model of subjectivity. The flatness that Duncan insists on in Crash‘s texture might be considered in light of Shaviro’s assertion that “the body is a flat surface of inscription and reflection, comprising all the image layers that are incised or overlaid upon it” (227). Although Shaviro is discussing drag queens here (Warhol’s filmed Superstars in particular), this view complements his insistence on the radical passivity of the fascinated spectator and the problem of emptiness, absence, lack, or loss in the subject’s experience of fascination. The loss of classical perspective and the subject precipitated by that quattrocento visual organization also entails the loss of the ideologies that subtend such perspective and its individualist paradigm. Fascination cannot be sustained under the template of individual experience; to individuate the fascinated subject is to take the viewer out of the relation to the object that is fascination. Similarly, because the fascinating object relies on being just close enough, if not a little too close, the looming proximity of the object can be reined in by putting it into proper perspective, reasserting distance and resolving the surface into a depiction of depth. In short, without the apparatus of linear (quattrocento) perspective, the outcome of Snow’s experiment is different, going beyond the centered subject/image relation of Baudry’s apparatus theory. The change in apparatus, from quattrocento to fascinated, also accounts for the persistence of a sense of “loss” or absence in the theorizations of the fascinated observer. Without perspective, or even with diminished or undone perspective, Snow’s film also challenges identification. Beyond the fact that we are constantly refused identification with humans in the film—they are, like the Walking Woman on the wall, only images—we are also refused identification with the camera. We may be deluded into thinking we identify with the camera moving through the loft’s space, or with the wholeness embodied in the artist’s intention, as in Michelson’s phenomenological reading. But the recentering of the image evokes the loft’s pressure and/or the photograph’s will to overcome the camera’s activity.

    Shaviro’s and Duncan’s models for fascinated spectatorship help us better articulate what makes this film so moving. But bearing in mind Barad’s apparatus theory, we may come to the realization that how we watch the film—how we dispose ourselves in relation to it or cultivate our attention to the screen—materially affects the outcome. Fascination, in short, is the apparatus that affords observational stasis in the face of animacy of the nonhuman.16 With the loss of linear perspective, we can no longer dominate the image or objects onscreen. While a range of viewing positions exists for all kinds of films (especially experimental nonnarrative ones), the turn to fascination acknowledges the animacy of the filmed objects, opening up space for the active participation of the nonhuman element via the apparatus of observation. Whether consciously or inadvertently, we viewers set ourselves aside to be fascinated by this activity. This is also and necessarily different from the way in which narrative functions, if we understand narrative itself as an apparatus for observation that arrays before us—in relations that may not be human-dominant—an understanding of causality and ordering that is only one possible cutting-together apart of the events observed. In this sense, I’m not attempting to overturn Michaelson’s narrative and phenomenological reading so much as to diffract it through fascination. Fascination is one way to talk about Wavelength‘s relation between subjects and objects, inviting us to embrace its animacy of spaces and things (photograph, chair, loft). In lieu of identification and its subject/object configuration, fascination offers spectators an affective attachment to the object, an inhuman narcissism. Consider it a nonhuman self-finding, where our “self” or subjectness fades in the face of the object, creating space for another to occupy or act—to inscribe itself. Fascination’s diminishment of the subject in favor of attention to the object’s force allows us to acknowledge the agency of the loft, the yellow chair, the photograph, but more importantly, the animacy of the light that is the real subject of the film. The light facilitates our sense that we, unconsoled spectators bereft of character, narrator, and ostensible meaning, lack what Duncan calls the emotional bounty or immediacy promised by an other. We are held, transfixed in contemplation of the object, subject to it rather than over it, but that relation is sustained as light.

    III. a quantum apparatus

    To elaborate this other apparatus theory, let me focus on the queer animacy posited by Barad’s discussion of quantum mechanics, picking up on Wavelength‘s wave to bring in particles. This animacy necessarily challenges any notion of discrete, stable identity. Here I would like to superimpose the discussion above about superposition, in which an entity—say, a photon—can occupy two different states at the same time until a human measures it or its angle of polarization and determines it to be a particle or wave. As van der Tuin puts it in her diffraction of Barad and Bergson and feminist epistemology, Barad is asking scientists and philosophers to “account for the ‘cuts’ they enact in the world’s becoming” (8). Our way of studying things brings them into being in a particular mode, whether by creating a film or by formulating an interpretation of it.

    To delve into the possibilities of a Baradian apparatus theory, let’s look again at the apparatus and experiment—the phenomenon—on which she builds her onto-epistemology. Here’s how Barad describes a two-slit experiment to determine waves from particles, an experiment at the heart of our understanding of quantum physics:

    [E]lectrons passing through a diffraction apparatus fail to behave like proper particles. Rather they behave like waves. Indeed, it seems that each individual electron is somehow going through both slits at once. … To make matters worse, each individual electron arrives at one point on the screen just like a proper particle. Now add a which-slit detector to the apparatus (to watch an electron going through the slits) and the electrons behave like particles. Impossible they say, but this is the electron’s lived experience. (“Diffracting” 173)

    This appears to be a straightforward description of the double-slit experiment until Barad avers, “but this is the electron’s lived experience,” which seems a charming but extraneous flourish. We may be struck by the animacy afforded to the electron by her turn of phrase, but the wording also recalls how often marginalized peoples’ experiences are not given credence if they don’t conform to dominant patterns of what experiences are. The rhetorical appeal to someone’s lived experience is often used to translate, with sympathetic intent, a marginalized experience to an audience thinking only in dominant paradigms. In other words, this is not a neutral description that reasserts the nonhuman on par with the human, but a specific politics about whose experiences count or are intelligible, and who lives experiences.

    The particle/wave dichotomy that the double-slit experiment describes thus brings us back to the question of superposition. The weirdness of superposition—where both states uncannily obtain—is lost by measuring the particle’s state in passing through the slit. Beyond that, superposition also affords a weird wrinkle in time at the quantum level.17 This temporal paradox is part of the reason Barad draws on superposition to undermine any sense of essence or singularity of being. She claims that “[s]uperpositions – here and there, now and then – are not a simple multiplicity, not a simple overlaying or a mere contradiction. Superpositions aren’t inherent; they are the effects of agential cuts, material enactments of differentiating/entangling” (“Diffracting” 176). What she means is that there is no thing, no quality, called superposition, but that it emerges as a feature of a particular arrangement of the experimental setup and presents complex effects or interconnections.18 The agential cut, which she also describes as a “cutting together-apart,” is one way to arrange the material. It may be visualized by Snow’s cinematic superpositions, which cut together along the z-axis shots we have seen separately; at the same time, it holds them apart because we can recognize them as separate shots. The temporal kick is that we see some of those shots later in the film, and we may recall others from our prior experience of this screening; the linearity of before/after is disrupted in this simultaneous display. Arriving as the film arrives at human height from its initial Archimedean vantage, the superpositions shift from a spatial perspective to a temporal one that nonetheless disorients our linear experience of time. The photon, like the loft, is out there doing what it does; the physicist or filmmaker registers it and produces the phenomenon. The eruptions of superpositions in Wavelength cut together-apart the very ordering of the zoom’s fiction to fascinate us with the loft’s intra-actions. Barad’s notion of the cut seems remarkably like film’s: a separation that also brings together. But where cinema’s cut produces montage (a shot interrelated with other shots to create meaning), Barad’s cutting together-apart produces an entanglement rather than bounded, autonomous entities. Where the cut in film enables the generative meanings that montage produces along the x-axis, the cutting-together-apart of quantum physics coimplicates the very things being separated: “Quantum entanglements are not the intertwining of two (or more) states/entities/events, but a calling into question of the very nature of twoness, and ultimately of one-ness as well. Duality, unity, multiplicity, being are undone” (Barad 178). This is why it is crucial to recognize the montage along the zaxis—heightened or amplified at the moment of superpositions, but structural to the film as a whole—in order to understand Wavelength‘s ontological disruption.

    Barad holds that the key epistemological cuts we make at the macro level—such as the distinctions between animate and inanimate, between subject and object, and between matter and energy—have led us astray in thinking about difference, rendering it, harmfully, as polarity rather than relationality. By turning to diffraction, by thinking through the way diffraction invites a performative rather than substantive or essential sense of an entity, she opens up new paths for thinking relations as entangled phenomena, brought into existence in the moment of observation. For Barad, diffraction offers one way to cut-together apart, to combine without relying on notions of difference or identity. I juxtapose with her diffraction the phenomenon of fascination, to shift the nuance from the object (the photon as particle or wave entangled in diffraction) to observer (who is holding whom in this fascinated relation?).

    What would fascination entail when understood via diffraction if subjects and objects are held together through its performative relation, if they are not preexisting subjects or objects in the classical metaphysical sense but provisional ends of a triangulated affective relation of one to an other, both animate? And not even opposed, or negated; as Barad says, “Subjectivity and objectivity are not opposed to one another; objectivity is not notsubjectivity” (“Diffracting” 175). Such ends would precipitate the subject and the other, but that subject could be the wave photograph’s fascination with us as it presses forward through its ever-changing field of the flat image. Entanglement, curiously, means that we can be the object of the photograph’s fascination because the two of us are co-constituted—cut together-apart—through Wavelength. As Barad works towards a sense of entanglement, she lays out a different kind of relationality beyond opposition or contradiction, a bringing together simultaneously with separating: “double movement, this play of in/determinacy, unsettles the self/other binary and the notion of the self as unity. The self is itself a multiplicity, a superposition of beings, becomings, here and there’s, now and then’s. Superpositions, not oppositions” (176). Shaviro’s reading of the body as a performed surface layered with meanings resonates with Barad’s and with Wavelength‘s superpositions, disorienting a sense of the distinctions primary/secondary, before/after. We see simultaneously the loft as we have already seen it and the loft as we have not yet seen it, a folding in time (and here not just Wavelength but also the radically recut WVLNT should come to mind, which is even more vividly entangled).19 Fascination is thus a particular mode of cutting together-apart. Fascination recognizes entanglement between subject and object that reorients their relation in a tension between stasis and movement, and defuses the ontological distinction between the two. In Barad’s queer quantum world and in the light of Wavelength, fascination gives us an experience that recognizes how provisional is our illusion of humanity—separateness, individualism, depth, object-domination—in a world of entangled surfaces. Fascination reveals to us our entanglement with the material world that undoes the boundaries of the subject/object relation and/or the perspectival relations of quattrocento habits of seeing. Fascination suspends our causal and linear interpretation of time, much as the quantum double-slit experiment does.

    To further think through this question of subject/object relation—or subject/object/other relation—in fascination, let me shift also from its visual dimension (long central to fascination’s appeal and conceptualization) to its oral dimension. Steven Connor remarks on “a more general association between the optical and the oral, looking and consumption, in the history of fascination” (11). Along similar lines, Duncan suggests that “fascination traffics in the physiological suspension of stilled breath and interrupted movement” (91). Fascination may be seen as the stilled anticipation of the mouth breather, the stopped breath as blocked consumption, not taking it in, the movement of the flow of air interrupted from the nasal trajectory to the oral, mouth agape. In other words, fascination offers a trajectory across a face, across the facialized entity: the face as experienced, not as viewed. This view suggests a reading of Wavelength as oral consumption by room rather than phallic penetration of it. The orality of the loft space is its yawning grasp of us, assimilating the viewer to its self in the same way that the image of the sea is already assimilated to its surface, on its wall. Connor’s attention to orality recalls that classical apparatus theory has a curiously oral component to it. The baby at the breast is analogous to the spectator at the screen because both figure the same effect: “it expresses a state of complete satisfaction while repeating the original condition of the oral phase in which the body did not have limits of its own, but was extended undifferentiated from the breast” (Baudry 117).20 Baudry uses oral regression to figure “a more archaic mode of identification, which has to do with the lack of differentiation between the subject and his environment, a dream-scene model which we find in the baby/breast relationship” (120). While Baudry focuses on the simulation of the subject through the cinematic apparatus, the orality of apparatus theory hinges on the lack of distinction between the subject and its surroundings, a regression to the phase of development where one has no boundaries. Connor discerns a certain opposition between flatness and perspective that hinges on the shift to oral from visual, respectively: “the dream screen is the effect of a merging of identities centred specifically on the mouth, and on a substitution of orality for perspective, of eating for seeing” (15). His insights suggest that a shift to the oral works in conjunction with the move to surfaces, superpositions.

    Barad’s model of entanglement offers a non-psychoanalytic way to think through the lack of differentiation that cinematic apparatus theory presents as a regression because of its investment in individualism. Rather than be inscribed within a psychoanalytic scene of regression, this particular lack of differentiation of the subject/environment can be realized in a diffracted configuration that delineates the entangled relation between (human) subject and environment, spectator and materiality; the former is only precipitated out of the latter through a process of observation that establishes the relations among, and even existence of, the phenomena. Barad’s queer quantum theory moves us away from thinking of this mode of differentiation/sameness as lack, or on a lack/loss paradigm. The oral provides a figure for apprehending the loss of bounded individuality as a gain or fullness of entangled relations. As it opens and closes, the mouth is another site for Barad’s cutting together-apart, mediating our relation with the external world, transforming the external into the internal, macerating our comestible material into particles that provide energy. The mouth is not only the boundary between the baby and breast, but also the site for regressing to the un-cutting that such a boundary enables. In cinematic apparatus theory’s view, this returns to the psychoanalytic claim that the oral phase is one of the paths for the development of sexuality, and thus of the desiring subject. If we give up on a model of regression, are we also giving up on this paradigm of desire?

    Barad’s model also moves us beyond this subject-based desire, and although a fuller account of Barad and desire is beyond the scope of this essay, let me offer a short sketch of where this could go in conclusion. If cutting together-apart is one way to look at the way relations constitute entities (with perhaps a tacit underscoring of the “apart”), Barad imagines another model in a less cutting set of relations:

    The notion of a field is a way to express the desires of each entity for the other. The attraction between a proton (a positively charged particle) and an electron (a particle with negative charge) can be expressed in terms of fields as follows: the proton emanates an electric field; the field travels outward in all directions at the speed of light. When the electric field of the proton reaches the electron, it feels the proton’s desire pulling it toward it. Likewise, the electron sends out its own field, which is felt by the proton. Sitting in each other’s fields, they feel a mutual tug in each other’s direction. (“Transmaterialities” 395)

    Here attraction is not the familiar metaphor for eroticism. Instead, it offers an account that takes us out of the psychoanalytic model of desire that underpins cinematic apparatus theory. The desire at work in fascination might be better understood as such a field. In redirecting us from the humans, Wavelength stages this Baradian mode of desire, moving from a formation of attachment to particular individuals (whether out of curiosity or eroticism or identification) to the space, to the layers of the space, to the way the loft itself is cut together apart along the z-axis. The interplay of surfaces dispels our individualism and entangles us in a collective gathering of observers, loft walls, chairs, images, windows, etc. It cuts the observer together with the space and apart from it (those moments when we’re watching this film and are acutely aware of watching this film, maybe averting from watching this film). Even as we face the desire to flee the screening of Wavelength, that is when we are most held in place, fascinated, cut together into it.

    Footnotes

    The author thanks Lyn Goeringer, Ken Harrow, and the members of the Moving Image workshop at MSU for their insights on an earlier version of this essay.

    1. Apparatus theory was a dominant film theory in the early 1970s accounting for the way that spectators view film from a position centered on the vanishing point of linear perspective (also known as quattrocento perspective because it emerged as a system of representation in late 14th century Italian art). Apparatus theory combined psychoanalytic theory of the subject with Marxist ideological critique to argue for the way film reproduces a sense of reality by centering the spectatorial subject, a centering at once ideological, psychological, and a feature of how camera lenses work to create an illusion of depth in a flat image. The theory accounts for the dream state of film spectatorship, the sense that everything unfolds for the spectator, who identifies primarily with the camera and then secondarily with the character(s). Jean Baudry is a key apparatus theorist.

    2. Two centuries before quantum physics, Thomas Young developed an experiment that reveals an interference pattern that can only be accounted for if light is a wave: a beam of light passes through a barrier with two slits cut into it; on the other side of the barrier is a screen that registers any light that passes through the slits. The screen reveals an interference pattern in which the waves may combine together to produce a peak or cancel each other out to produce a trough. As Amir D. Aczel observes, “The Young experiment has been carried out with many entities we consider to be particles: electrons, since the 1950s; neutrons, since the 1970s; and atoms, since the 1980s. These findings demonstrated the de Broglie principle, according to which particles also exhibit wave phenomena” (21).

    3. Michael Sicinski’s critical reading of the film’s criticism breaks this out in detail, as I will discuss shortly.

    4. Sicinski describes Heidegger’s notion of dwelling, from “Building, Dwelling, Thinking,” as

    profoundly dialectical; by attending to a space, one recognizes that the space exists as a space by differing from other spaces around it. We create the space, in effect, by focussing on it, allowing it to presence. But this process is not only subjective. The presencing of the space involves an assertion of its material presence, and our role as beholders and dwellers within that space is one also of being held within or shaped by that space. (76)

    I cite Sicinski’s description rather than Heidegger’s because it renders the notion of dwelling in a way more aligned with this reading of Wavelength. Heidegger aims to show that dwelling is not a settled thing for humans but that we must continually search for it in our learning. His conception is centered on a human subject, Dasein, for whom dwelling is an ongoing practice, a relationality. While this notion does transform subject/object relations, it still centers human subject in a way that I argue fascination does not.

    5. Quite a few readings of this film argue for our identification with the camera, which bolsters classical cinematic apparatus theory. See David Sterritt, as well as Langford and Michelson.

    6. One answer, of course, is synecdoche. The camera stands in for the filmmaker in a way that gels or exposures cannot; these are the more inhuman aspects of the film.

    7. There is a large literature on the film’s balance between human and machine, much of which tacitly tips the balance towards the human (which makes sense if you’re reading it on the cinematic apparatus level, but less so on the quantum apparatus level). For instance, David Sterritt recoups the human behind the camera:

    the ‘imperfections’ are essential to the film, since they reveal the presence of the artist who operates the camera, transforming what might have seemed a detached mechanical exercise into a work with manifestly human meanings and sensibilities.(103)

    Craig Sinclair finds the nonhuman in the soundtrack, arguing that

    Wavelength proves itself an experiment in sound above vision. Indeed, one can only describe Wavelength phenomenologically, because the soundscape is presented in a raw mathematical form that is alien to the ear and that forces experiencers to think for themselves rather than be dictated to by the eye.(20)

    Sinclair has a point, because the tensions among sine wave and ambient noise and human voices should be read in relation to the tensions among camera action and film event and mise-en-scène depictions.

    8. As a structural film, which P. Adams Sitney defines as “a cinema of the mind rather than the eye” (370), Wavelength seems to offer the perfect illustration of apparatus theory.

    9. The first superposition flashes briefly onto the screen at 19:48, but it’s only after the 30-minute mark that the frequency of double exposures picks up, shifting in its patterning from a flash of superposition within a single shot to the doubling of the image over a cut.

    10. Such a view goes against a debate raging in the 1980s, when “Stephen Heath argued with Michelson, suggesting that the film’s implied narrative and linear perspective prevents [sic] it from questioning how the apparatus of cinema constitutes the subject in the first place” (Potempski 13n3). Both readings prevent them from questioning how the film questions cinematic theory.

    11. Potempski further recalls Heath’s argument that Michelson’s reading “makes it complicit with a certain ideology of the (all-powerful) subject. Snow, for his part, claimed that neither narrative nor perspective were the true subjects of the film” (13n3).

    12. Wees’s description situates the photograph as the subject of the verb actions, underscoring its agency:

    the center of the projected image on the screen is occupied by the photograph of waves pinned on the far wall of the room. Throughout the zoom, the photograph holds its central position, and as it expands toward the borders of the projected image, everything around it gradually disappears. (156).

    Sicinski corroborates this animacy of the loft and its collaborators:

    Sight and sound are nothing more than reactions to light and air, material subatomic particles in motion. In Wavelength, it is not that everything is ‘alive,’ in some sort of fantastic realm. … it is that everything is active and in motion, including the viewer him/herself. (80)

    13. In a slightly different approach from Mulvey’s well-known reading of the image of woman, Metz argues that the apparatus of cinema is itself the fetish:

    As strictly defined, the fetish, like the apparatus of cinema, is a prop, the prop that disavows the lack and in doing so affirms it without wishing to. … The fetish is also the point of departure for specialized practices, and as is well known, desire in its modalities is all the more ‘technical’ the more perverse it is. (Imaginary 74)

    14. Classically, this absence is lack, but as I have argued elsewhere, it is also loss.

    15. “But what happens when what you see, even though from a distance, seems to touch you with a grasping contact, when the matter of seeing is a sort of touch, when seeing is a contact at a distance? What happens when what is seen imposes itself on your gaze, as though the gaze had been seized, touched, put in contact with appearance?” (Blanchot 75, qtd. in Shaviro 46).

    16. Metz argues that the fetish is necessarily material, that “insofar as one can make up for it by the power of the symbolic alone one is precisely no longer a fetishist” (75). I am arguing that fascination offers a different material relation between spectator and film and filmed object.

    17. John Wheeler refined the double slit experiment to give the experimenter the option of deciding whether or not to insert the beam splitter; even if the experimenter decides the position of the beam splitter (in or out of the setup) after the photon has done its travel, it still determines what route the photon will have taken. This quantum phenomenon seems to reverse time. Wheeler notes that

    in a loose way of speaking, we decide what the photon shall have done after it has already done it. In actuality it is wrong to talk of the ‘route’ of the photon. For a proper way of speaking we recall once more that it makes no sense to talk of the phenomenon until it has been brought to a close by an irreversible act of amplification. (qtd. in Aczel 93)

    18. Or as she puts it elsewhere, “properties are only determinate given the existence of particular material arrangements that give definition to the corresponding concept in question” (Meeting 261).

    19. Snow recut the original film as a digital version in 2000 called Wavelength for Those Who Don’t Have the Time or WVLNT. It is all superpositions, and turns the axis of montage from a horizontal linearity to a layered, z-axis orientation, making us realize that the space in the film is always already layered. Not just the images pinned to the wall, but the windows framing the street space and even the spaces within the opposite buildings seen through their windows manifest this layering. In this sense, the temporal superpositions of shots we have just seen over shots we are seeing now or shots we will see disrupt the illusion of linearity in the progress across the loft and call attention to the dynamics of this layering, that some moments in the film present highly compressed layers while others—seemingly unsuperimposed, a single shot—present. But these are all just different modes of planar division.

    20. Legge also notes the Medusa-like image of the screen in this contemporaneous theory (54).

    Works Cited

    • Aczel, Amir. Entanglement. Plume, 2003.
    • Barad, Karen. “Diffracting Diffraction: Cutting Together-Apart.” Parallax, vol. 20, no. 3, 2014, pp. 168-187. Taylor and Francis Online, doi:10.1080/13534645.2014.927623.
    • —. Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning. Duke UP, 2007.
    • —. “Transmaterialities: Trans*/Matter/Realities and Queer Political Imaginings.” GLQ, vol. 21, no. 2–3, 2015, pp. 387-422. doi:10.1215/10642684-2843239.
    • Baudry, Jean-Louis. “Ideological Effects of the Cinematographic Apparatus.” Film Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 2, Winter 1974-1975, pp. 39-47.
    • Connor, Steven. “Fascination, Skin and the Screen.” Critical Quarterly, vol. 40, no. 1, 1998, pp. 9-24.
    • de Lauretis, Teresa. Alice Doesn’t: Feminism, Semiotics, Cinema. Indiana UP, 1984.
    • Duncan, Pansy. The Emotional Life of Postmodern Film: Affect Theory’s Other. Routledge, 2016.
    • James, Henry. “The Middle Years.” Complete Stories, 1892-1898, edited by John Hollander and David Bromwich, Library of America, 1996, pp. 335-355.
    • Kracauer, Siegfried. Theory of Film. U California P, 1962.
    • Langford, Martha. “Wavelength 1966.” Michael Snow: Life & Work, Art Canada Institute, https://www.aci-iac.ca/michael-snow/key-works/wavelength.
    • Legge, Elizabeth. Michael Snow: Wavelength. Afterall Books, 2009.
    • McCallum, E. L. Object Lessons: How to Do Things with Fetishism. SUNY P, 1999.
    • Metz, Christian. The Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis and the Cinema. Translated by Celia Britton et al., Indiana UP, 1982.
    • Michelson, Annette. “About Snow.” October, vol. 8, Spring 1979, pp. 111-125.
    • Michelson, Annette. “Toward Snow.” The Avant-Garde Film: A Reader of Theory and Criticism, edited by P. Adams Sitney, New York UP, 1978, pp. 172–183.
    • Potempski, Jacob. “Revisiting Michael Snow’s Wavelength, after Deleuze’s Time-Image.” Acta Univ. Sapientiae, Film and Media Studies, vol. 6, 2013, pp. 7–17. doi:10.2478/ausfm-2014-0001.
    • Shaviro, Steven. The Cinematic Body. U Minnesota P, 1993.
    • Sicinski, Michael. “Michael Snow’s Wavelength and the Space of Dwelling.” Qui Parle, vol. 11, no. 2, Fall/Winter 1999, pp. 59-88. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/stable/20686096.
    • Sinclair, Craig. “Audition: Making Sense of/in the Cinema.” The Velvet Light Trap, no. 51, Spring 2003, pp. 17-28. doi:10.1353/vlt.2003.0009.
    • Sitney, P. Adams. Visionary Film: The American Avant-Garde 1943-1978. Oxford UP, 1979.
    • Snow, Michael. “A Statement on Wavelength.” Film Culture 46, Autumn 1967, p. 1.
    • —. “Conversation with Michael Snow.” Interview with Jonas Mekas and P. Adams Sitney, Film Culture 46, Autumn 1967, pp. 1-4.
    • —. “Letter from Michael Snow.” Film Culture 46, Autumn 1967, pp. 4-5.
    • Sterritt, David. “Wrenching Departures: Mortality and Absurdity in Avant-Garde Film.” Last Laugh, edited by Murray Pomerance, Wayne State UP, 2013, pp. 93-108.
    • van der Tuin, Iris. “‘A Different Starting Point, A Different Metaphysics’: Reading Bergson and Barad Diffractively.” Hypatia, vol. 26, no. 1, 2011, pp. 22-42.
    • Wees, William. Light Moving in Time: Studies in the Visual Aesthetics of Avant-Garde Film. U California P, 1992.
  • The Violence of a Fascination with* a Visible Form (on Martyrs, Cruelty, Horror, Ethics) [*on and vs. with vs. as]

    Eugenie Brinkema (bio)

    Abstract

    This essay argues that Pascal Laugier’s 2008 new-extremist horror film Martyrs generates a formal violence coextensive with the aesthetic fascinations that structure it, rendering an account of violence that is monstrative and creative. Reversing theoretical presumptions that horror is a mixed sentiment comprised of fascination and disgust, or that horror names a fascination with violence, the essay positions Martyrs as part of an alternative philosophical lineage that posits a fascination with form itself constitutes a mode of violence. Martyrs cinematically demonstrates the impersonal, non-embodied violence of a fascination with formal possibility, one shared by horror and metaphysics.

    The imperfect is the tense of fascination: it seems to be alive and yet it doesn’t move: imperfect presence, imperfect death; neither oblivion nor resurrection; simply the exhausting lure of memory. From the start, greedy to play a role, scenes take their position in memory: often I feel this, I foresee this, at the very moment when these scenes are forming.—Roland Barthes, A Lover’s Discourse: Fragments

    Fascination is neither knowledge nor ignorance: It is an enigmatic relation to what we do not know, a response to other imaginaries, other musics, other strange gods. We can call it, in a first approximation, a paracritical mode of attention.—Ackbar Abbas, “Dialectic of Deception”

    Yeah, I like you in that like I like you to screamBut if you open your mouth, then I can’t be responsibleFor quite what goes in or to care what comes outSo just pull on your hair, just pull on your pout—The Cure, “Fascination Street”

    Fascination and [X]

    and, conj., adv., and n.
    from the Old English ond, ‘thereupon, next’
    I. Coordinating. Introducing a word, phrase, clause, or sentence,
    which is to be taken side by side with, along with, or in addition to,
    that which precedes it.
    * Connecting words.
    1. a. Simply connective.

    Almost all discussions of the aesthetic-affective mode called horror arrive at some point at the foundational assertion that horror is a mixed sentiment comprised of fascination and negative affect. Sometimes this formulation is given as a dialectic of fascination and disgust, fascination and revulsion, fascination and abhorrence, fascination and anxiety, even fascination and boredom. In The Philosophy of Horror, or, Paradoxes of the Heart, Noël Carroll insists that fascination is the affect most central to “art-horror”; what mitigates the fear and disgust that the ontological impropriety of the monster compels is that “this fascination can be savored, because the stress in question is not behaviorally pressing” (190). In Powers of Horror Julia Kristeva describes her theory of abjection as “a discourse around the braided horror and fascination” (209) that names a seductive yet rejected and oblique meaning for the constitutively incomplete yet speaking subject. In volume two of The Accursed Share, Bataille writes that one’s fascination is ethically bound to what most disgusts, most horrifies: “If they horrify us, objects that otherwise would have no meaning take on the highest value in our eyes” (104). This critical genealogy insists that horror turns on a dialectical oscillation between a negative affective pole or cluster and an undertheorized placeholder given by the name fascination. That oscillation is asymmetrical and nonreciprocal: the fascination and the mixed sentiment comprise an overwhelming compensatory pleasure that, each time, without fail, compromises, redeems, mitigates, colors, accents, domesticates, supersedes, even obliterates the negativity of whatever X stands in the place of that negative affective pole or cluster.

    The bond between revulsion and fascination is not a recent phenomenon or structure of thought—it dates back at least as far as the founding texts of metaphysics. Consider the story of Leontius in Plato’s Republic: “on his way up from the Piraeus under the outer side of the northern wall, becoming aware of dead bodies that lay at the place of public execution at the same time felt a desire to see them and a repugnance and aversion, and that for a time he resisted and veiled his head, but overpowered in despite of all by his desire, with wide staring eyes he rushed up to the corpses and cried, There, ye wretches, take your fill of the fine spectacle!” (682). The Greek description of the spectacle uses the term kalon, which means “fine or beautiful,” “admirable or noble.” It confers a worthiness of being-attended-to that is simultaneously reproached, presenting an ironic juxtaposition of the language of the ideals of beauty and the appetitive lure of what is ugly or base, at once debased and debasing. Fascination in relation to violence thus comes to name an attraction that draws affective, aesthetic attention towards something while also compelling critical if not kinetic retreat. Fascination as a type of conscripted curiosity names an epistemological drive (to know, to know more) that functions against a revulsion marked as naming epistemic reluctance or resistance (the drive above all not to know, the flailing impossible wish to unlearn); in a final rotation, fascination recursively comes to name the sticky Western philosophical fascination with the capacity of fascination to coexist with an empty placeholder for negative affectivity as such and in general.

    The conceptual bond between fascination and bad feelings points to a meta-textual experience lodged at the origin of philosophical aesthetics itself: a critical fascination with the question of how negative affect can be pleasurable under certain aesthetic constraints or in certain aesthetic contexts. Is tragedy corrupting or purgative, inciting or pedagogical? Why spectators would seek out occasions for unpleasurable feelings is a question fundamental to the broader aesthetics of the negative affects, including Kant’s 1790 prohibition on Ekel (disgust) in The Critique of Judgment—for that which arouses loathing is an ugliness that “cannot be represented in a way adequate to nature without destroying all aesthetic satisfaction, hence beauty in art” (190)—and Freud’s opening rejoinder in his 1919 essay “The Uncanny,” that “As good as nothing is to be found upon this subject [the uncanny] in comprehensive treatises on aesthetics, which in general prefer to concern themselves with what is beautiful, attractive and sublime—that is, with feelings of a positive nature—and with the circumstances and the objects that call them forth, rather than with the opposite feelings of repulsion and distress” (194). In 1757, Hume formulated what has become a general model for this problem: “It seems an unaccountable pleasure which the spectators of a well-written tragedy receive from sorrow, terror, anxiety, and other passions, that are in themselves disagreeable and uneasy. The more they are touched and affected, the more are they delighted with the spectacle” (433). More than two hundred years later, Hume’s formulation still has currency as the starting point for aesthetic treatments of horror; James Twitchell follows this blueprint to the letter in Dreadful Pleasures, which asks “why we have been drawn to certain images in art and popular culture that we would find repellent in actuality” (9).

    Noël Carroll brings the most robust thinking about Hume’s tragic structure to horror, orienting his exploration in Paradoxes of the Heart around the foundational question: “why would anyone want to be horrified, or even art-horrified?” (158). Carroll repeats this question, “Why horror?” throughout his text with variations: “Why are horror audiences attracted by what, typically (in everyday life), should (and would) repel them?” (158) and “How can horror audiences find pleasure in what by nature is distressful and unpleasant?” (159). Though he revives the Humean aesthetic meta-concern, Carroll’s preferred interlocutor, and the source of his book’s title (that “paradox of the heart”), is the lesser-known poet Anna Laetitia Aikin, author of the 1773 meditation, “On the Pleasure Derived from Objects of Terror”; for Aikin, “well-wrought scenes of artificial terror” are not themselves pleasurable, but engage “the pain of suspense, and the irresistible desire of satisfying curiosity,” which “once raised, will account for our eagerness to go quite through an adventure, though we suffer actual pain during the whole course of it. We rather choose to suffer the smart pang of a violent emotion than the uneasy craving of an unsatisfied desire” (32). Aikin uses the word “fascination” to extend the affective range of displeasures that are aesthetically endurable, from boredom to extreme sympathetic suffering in cases of representational cruelties:

    And it will not only force us through dullness, but through actual torture—through the relation of a Damien’s execution, or an inquisitor’s act of faith. When children, therefore, listen with pale and mute attention to the frightful stories of apparitions, we are not, perhaps, to imagine that they are in a state of enjoyment, any more than the poor bird which is dropping into the mouth of the rattlesnake—they are chained by the ears, and fascinated by curiosity.(32)

    Aikin the poetic critic is, of course, in a manner, fascinated by this capture of fascination and curiosity—turning from aesthetic law to metaphor to put to her reader’s imagination the death-dealing snares in which the pale, mute children are caught; the chaining by the ears of these pale, mute children, these children who will reappear not as children in general but as specific, particular children—as Anna, as Lucie, as traumatized little running naked things in the course of this article when I turn to the film Martyrs (but it is not the proper conjunction for this; not yet). Aikin concludes with a hierarchy of aesthetic evaluations, according to which the highest promise of the gothic text, she submits, is the good feeling offered by “surprise from new and wonderful objects,” such that, stimulating the imagination, “the pain of terror is lost in amazement. Hence, the more wild, fanciful, and extraordinary are the circumstances of a scene of horror, the more pleasure we receive from it” (32). Likewise, Carroll resolves his paradoxical presumptions in favor of the deeply pleasurable fascination with and curiosity about the category admixtures that constitute the provocative object of fear and loathing. Ultimately, the reason the analytic philosopher’s theory of art-horror requires a monster—conceptually it fails without one—is that that figure is the non-arbitrary site of revulsion, disgust, and fear that simultaneously constitutes a riveting attraction and curiosity, itself enhanced and sustained through narrative structures related to disclosure.

    And yet, the form of these questions—Why spectators find horror and its many violences endurable yet pleasurable? Why that fascination? How can fascination mitigate or supersede or suspend or trouble the general unpleasure of negative affect?—cannot, it seems, be left behind: it is the tic of a nervous criticism. So Alex Neill responds to Carroll in an article entitled “On a Paradox of the Heart,” while Berys Gaut quibbles with, and ultimately nullifies, the paradox in “The Paradox of Horror”; years later, considering both of those essays, Katerina Bantinaki pens “The Paradox of Horror: Fear as a Positive Emotion.” Offering a titular interrogatory that crystallizes the emotional puzzle, “Why Horror?: The Peculiar Pleasures of a Popular Genre,” Andrew Tudor turns his version of the query into a meta-inquiry—”precisely what we are asking is far from clear”—and then into endless iterations of the question, insisting finally that the question should be “why do these people like this horror in this place at this particular time?” (461). The classical paradox of tragedy, and its contemporary update as/in the paradox of horror, pose a dilemma: paradoxes tense a field; they like to be resolved. In place of aporetic thinking-with undecidability and irresolvability, this affective puzzle of fascination and some negative affect is constantly solved and resolved. Each time, the verdict forgoes and forgets the very negativity of negative affects, supplants it with forms of attentive, attracted fascination that reassert the dominance of pleasure or at least the neutralization of displeasure. This is, in itself, a judgment of value, a way of reviving a priority of the good, the establishment of noncontradiction at the cost of failing to read the negativity of negative affect as such and thereby obliterating the very object one would contemplate.

    The insistence on slotting fascination into structures in which it names the general positivity of positive affects, and is always available to mitigate the general negativity of negative affects, makes the history of fascination into a form of violent eradication in which fascination’s ancient bond to wounding, violence, transfixion, and the denaturing work of force is erased or at least suspended—a bond both etymological (fascinare: to bewitch, enchant, with evocations of witchcraft) and mythological-critical, as in Sibylle Baumbach’s summation of the privileged trope of fascination, the petrifying gaze of Medusa, as “a double image of fascination and counter-fascination: she also resembles an unspeakable event, functioning as both a symbol of and a talisman against trauma in a myth that deals with physical and visual assault” (67). Instead, the captivations of fascination (its modern, and accelerating, discursive bond to sublimity, awe, wonder, attraction, desire) supplant those etymological and mythological links to bewitchment, occult forces, the exercise and direct action of maleficence—in other words all performances of harm. In this way, the vicissitudes of fascination are not so unlike the transformations of the word passion, which transitioned in just a few centuries from the early medieval sufferings of Christ on the cross to a seventeenth-century absorption into the episteme of the sentiments—what Diderot dubbed “penchants, inclinations, desires and aversions carried to a certain degree of intensity”—rendering passion akin to “enthusiasm,” or “strong liking,” and even figuring it as the lusty core of erotic love. Fascination, paradoxically, despite its etymological, intellectual-historical, and mythological debts to transfixion and stasis—to what stuns and stills—is thereby put to work for the busiest of philosophical labors: it names the frenetic machine of sublation, defending against the losses and risks of the negative as such. Fascination takes on the speculative burden of a positive project of the negative affects, thereby erasing its own debt to forms of violence. In the long history of an aesthetic philosophy of horror, violence is the constant companion of fascination—and my argument here does not attempt to cleave the two so much as to insert a rotation and infidelity at the heart of their intimate relation. In place of the conventional understanding of horror as comprising a fascination and X combined in a sentimental structure, and in place of assuming that horror narrates fascination with violence, positions shared by the diverse theoretical camps named at the outset, my claim is that horror, rather, is an attestation of a logic of the violence of fascination, or, rather, of a specific type of fascination, a fascination with an eidos or a visible form, a fascination that is to be thought as itself a mode of violence. Horror will come to name the aesthetic mode that attempts to literalize what it is for fascination not to mitigate violence or make violence tolerable, even pleasurable, but to constitute a mode of violence that is coextensive with textual form. And by literalize, in relation to a mode of violence coextensive with textual form, I specifically mean formalize. In formalizing a mode of violence that is coextensive with a fascination with textual form, horror becomes a privileged site for testing formalism’s own aporias, ultimately bearing out something of a law for an ethics of formalism: a formalism that refuses to linger with visible forms, continually relocating itself with what undoes visible form, but formally so. Rejecting foundational presumptions about the relation of horror to form, such as Twitchell’s claim that “the experience of horror is first physiological, and only then maybe numinous” (11), figuring horror as an immanent experience of the body such that “the instructions embedded in horror resist literary, especially formalist, interpretation” (17), I argue that horror constitutes an ultraformalism, that it puts on display form’s own (terribly) risky and unavoidable bond to violence. This ultraformalism does not require that we renounce formalism but, in fact, that we pursue it through the maze as far as we can.

    Fascination with [X]

    with, prep., adv., and conj.
    from the Old English wið, against, opposite, toward or by or near
    I. Denoting opposition and derived notions (separation; motion towards).
    1. a. In a position opposite to; over against
    b. In exchange, return, or payment for
    2. Of conflict, antagonism, dispute, injury, reproof, competition, rivalry, and the like:
    In opposition to, adversely to
    5. a. Towards, in the direction of
    II. Denoting personal relation, agreement, association, connection, union, addition.
    * Senses denoting primarily activity towards or influence upon a person or thing.

    While it now means space, means towards or near, with used to mean force,
    meant against or opposite: the Old English
    wið færstice meant
    against a sudden, stabbing, violent pain

    And so which is it, really? What is against, as in battle, as in what injures, directs force,
    or what is in
    exchange for, as in reciprocity or barter; what is asunder as in
    what moves farther and farther apart, or as in what inches
    towards
    or in the direction of,
    as in friendship, as in love?

    Push-pull: the separation and the conjunction at once.
    A tension that could tear some, any form apart.

    Pascal Laugier’s 2008 film Martyrs, sometimes awarded the mantle of “New Extremism” or considered “torture porn” (itself a designation and denigration of what ostensibly ought (a moral judgment) to count as an object of spectatorial, critical, or fannish fascination), is a privileged testing ground for the way horror speculatively grapples with the violent logic of fascination. First and foremost, the film’s narrative obsessively turns on fascination, understood in its modern sense as a mode of attraction or interest or affective-epistemic captivation. From the viewpoint of the agental cause of violence in the film’s narrative structure, it is nothing but the alibi for a fascination with violence all the way down.

    Martyrs has a strict AB structure, consisting of two halves in hypotactic relation; the violent cleaving at the film’s midpoint leaves many viewers disoriented. The film opens in medias res with a young girl, Lucie, running towards the camera in a frantic state of corporeal disrepair. The cause of her hysteria is articulated through psychoanalytic and anthropological discourse in the first half of the film, which presents a narrative of her unimaginable torture and abuse. The mute, traumatized creature is safely placed in an orphanage in the first half of the film, and is befriended by a girl named Anna, who becomes her protector. Still in the first part of the film, the text jumps forward fifteen years to depict the morning rituals and unremarkable domestic conversation of a family at this point unknown to the viewer. At the ring of the doorbell, a grown Lucie stands in the frame. She murders the two adults and two children in an explicit, protracted, nearly wordless sequence. Anna then shows up to care for her friend, and she, like the viewer, is left in doubt as to whether Lucie imagined a connection between her childhood abuse and this anonymous family. The film’s near lack of dialogue, overt refusal to confirm causality, and Lucie’s hallucinations and eventual suicide frustrate epistemic closure, framing the narrative as either a revenge tragedy that has concluded too quickly, or an ironic if vicious melodrama about the potentially asymmetrical and unpredictable (and complicit, guilt osmotic) reactions to violence by those who suffer extreme trauma.

    The second half begins at the exact midpoint of the film when Anna, cleaning up the corpses and the blood splattered around the house, opens the doors to a wooden hutch, finds a staircase leading into the basement, and proceeds to descend into a cavernous wall. Like the film’s beginning, the B-part begins without apparent cause and without words. Ultimately, it validates Lucie’s account of events, confirming that the murdered parents did have a direct hand in her abuse as a child. Simultaneously, the B-section dispenses entirely with the narrative of the first part of the film as a subject of concern or attention. The second half of the film, in other words, withdraws any and all cathectic spectatorial investments in the story of Lucie, burying them as unceremoniously as the corpses of Lucie and the family, which are thrown into a ditch by a group of bureaucrats after Anna’s descent into the wall. The mass grave does not just include the cast of the first half of the film, save for Anna—it also brutally dismisses the epistemic, ethical, and formal conceits of the first half. Part A is endured solely to be rendered irrelevant; it solicits an aesthetic interest in order to announce through a volta that the text itself no longer retains any interest, or finds any value, in its own preliminary structure.

    The underground—the second part of the film—produces epistemic closure about Lucie’s childhood through a new rhetorical mode governed by epistemic abundance. If the first half of the text is marked by extreme doubt, the second opens with excessive confirmation, presenting an overt attestation to what is now happening (with what motivation, cause, reasoning) and what is going to happen (with what process, methodology, consequence). A woman known only as Mademoiselle explains to Anna that she is in charge of a sect obsessed with the literal question of metaphysics, the ta meta ta phusika: What is beyond, or after, the physics? What is beyond the world of being? After decrying how easy it is to create a victim (she intones the protocol: “It’s so easy to create a victim. You lock someone in a dark room. They begin to suffer. You feed that suffering methodically, systematically, and coldly. And make it last.”), Mademoiselle praises the counter-case of the martyr: “Martyrs are exceptional people. They survive pain, they survive total deprivation. They bear all the sins of the earth. They give themselves up, they transcend themselves. […] They are transfigured.”

    There are at least three modes of fascination demonstrated in Martyrs: first, and most plainly, the narrative superstructure that retroactively sutures together the two halves of the film, presenting the cult’s fascination with the martyr as a rare, exceptional case of perseverance through suffering, a remaining-alive while glimpsing death, a fascination with the knowledge uniquely accessible to the ecstatic martyr, a knowledge the cult seeks (a Gnostic fascination); second, the visual fascination shared by both the cult and the film with the image of the martyr in a liminal state, evident in the magnified photographs of tortured martyrs on the wall and in Mademoiselle’s photographic archive of transformed and transfigured faces, which are presented through a haptic, pre-technological montage as she turns pages in a perverse album. The figure that condenses epistemic and visual fascination exemplifies the last stage of martyr-production: the suspension of Anna’s body and its flaying, an act that reminds one that a lineage dating back to Francis Bacon bonds scientific experiment and the discovery of knowledge to the language of torture (he advocated putting nature “on the rack,” forcing it to reveal its inmost secrets). The third mode emerges in light of the presumed commercial investment in a positive fascination with the capacity of the spectator to endure intense negative affective experiences, which can be seen, for example, when Martyrs is considered “New Extremism” or “torture porn.” The aesthetic privileges the opened body and unwavering images of fluids, viscera, and all manner of abject stuff and matter, and provides minimal metanarrative diversions or alibis.

    The film thereby attempts the project that it depicts the sect undertaking—to formalize the conditions for the possibility of fascination with a visible appearance, with the possibility of a successful attestation and demonstration of a limit—a project to which both spectators and adherents are bound as their singular drive. The film obsessively tracks the sect’s obsessive efforts to martyr Anna; it dispenses with extraneous projects and ends at the task’s culmination. Not unlike The Odyssey, which Blanchot interprets as organized around Ulysses’s meeting with—and fascination with, survival of, endurance despite—the Sirens, Martyrs is organized around a single event: the martyring-but-not-yet-extinguishing of Anna. Blanchot’s formula for the conversion of a fascinating encounter into the communication of fascination on the level of narrative begins with the general formulation that “something has happened, something which someone has experienced who tells about it afterwards, in the same way that Ulysses needed to experience the event and survive it to become Homer, who told about it” (109). The narrative of fascination with an “exceptional event,” however is also a transformation of that endurance: “[I]f we regard the tale as the true telling of an exceptional event which has taken place and which someone is trying to report, then we have not even come close to sensing the true nature of the tale. The tale is not the narration of an event, but that event itself, the approach to that event, the place where the event is made to happen” (Blanchot 109). In Martyrs the event of fascination with a visage, enduring the limits of the most extreme cruelty, is made to happen; it is not narrated or reported on, but is the event itself of encountering, studying, being fascinated by (as in, attending to) the visible form of that limit state of transcendence. The text is nothing but that event, occurring solely to the extent that Anna persists in enduring it; the sect is nothing but the effort to make the unbearable event of survival (despite what is taking place) possible to bear. Both signify above all that unbearable process, the toleration of the intolerable in time. For Blanchot, fascination with the violence of the encounter and with the survival of this violence is the necessary precondition for the tale, for relating the encounter as event. Commuting writing to witnessing in its ineluctably visual register, the final title card in Martyrs traces the etymology of martyr back through marturos to the French témoin, meaning “witness”—but with whose witnessing is the film most fascinated? Whether the tortured (body, subject) or the spectatorial (body, subject) is the ultimate martyr of the work is the central question that the film invites.

    However, it is not the right question to pose of the film. For the question operates at the expense of a different question altogether (one has to choose, that is: it is either to be and or with or ?). Put another way, one should not take the film’s posing of this question at face value or in good faith. It is not the question that actually permits a confrontation with how the violence and negative aesthetic-affectivity of horror work. These dominant readings of fascination as fascination with in Martyrs share the problematic use of the term with which I began, presuming that fascination functions as a positive analogue of attention and curiosity, the drive to look offsetting an affective negativity opposed and exterior to it. These approaches are marred by their fundamental inability to speak to the aesthetic language of the second half of the film without converting it into a mere instrument of visual displeasure, or an index of intensity for a spectator positively fascinated by their own capacity to endure that displeasure. Unable to speak to the way the torture sequences of the second half are themselves formalized in Martyrs, these readings convert torture into a positive object of fascination, its violence thereby erased by this conversion into spectacle. In the next section, I recover an alternative philosophical thinking of fascination and suggest that the only way to account for violence and form in Martyrs is to see the film as part of a philosophical lineage that posits a fascination with form as itself constituting a mode of violence.

    Fascination as [X]

    as, adv., conj., pron.
    c. 1200, worn-down form of Old English alswa “quite so, wholly so,”
    literally “all so” (as in: also)
    Phrase as well “just as much” is recorded from late 15c.;
    the phrase also can imply “as well as not,” “as well as anything else.”
    Phrase as if, in Kantian metaphysics (als ob).
    Phrase as it were “as if it were so” is attested from late 14c.

    The idea that fascination itself be thought as a form of violence is at the heart of Derrida’s essay “La forme et la façon,” his preface to Alain David’s 2001 Racisme et antisemitisme. Derrida views David as suggesting that the “originary crime” of racism and anti-Semitism is “privileging form and cultivating formal limits” (“la faute quasiment originelle du racisme et de l’antisemitisme consiste it privilegier la forme et it cultiver la limite formelle”; 15). By this he means that the violence of racism results from a primary investment in form and from the limitations it poses. Catastrophic violence is driven by this obsession with a purity of form, which posits within its own thinking a threatening contamination of that purity. Derrida writes that the violence of such evil pivots on “rien d’autre que la forme elle-même, la fascination pour la forme, c’est-à-dire pour la visibilité d’un certain contour organique ou organisateur, un eidos, si l’on veut, et donc une idéalisation, un idéalisme même en tant qu’il institute la philosophie même, la philosophie ou la métaphysique en tant que telle” (“nothing other than form itself, the fascination for form, that is for the visibility of a certain organic and organizing contour, an eidos, if you will, and thus an idealization, an idealism itself insofar as it institutes philosophy itself, philosophy or metaphysics”; 10). Note that the promiscuous même runs through Derrida’s accusation of la fascination pour la forme: as in very, even, the same, itself, a self-folding, self-referring accusation of a kinship, an even-the-very-sameness-as-itself of a fascination with form that belongs equally to violence and to philosophical thinking.

    Unlike (and in some tension with) Derrida’s other treatments of racism—for example, his reading of apartheid in “The Last Word of Racism,” the piece in which he pronounces, “there’s no racism without a language,” such that it “is not that acts of racial violence are only words but rather that they have to have a word” (292)—here the violence of racism and anti-Semitism is rendered as fastening to a fascination with a visible form. If, in the earlier piece, the linguistic violence of racism “institutes, declares, writes, inscribes, prescribes” and is a “system of marks,” something that “outlines space in order to assign forced residence or to close off borders” (292), in “La forme et la façon” visible form (la forme: shape, appearance) organizes via delimiting processes as if it were a natural or inevitable form, as opposed to what marks distinctions and boundaries and differences as the essential workings of language. The subtitle for Derrida’s preface indeed vows “(plus jamais: envers et contre tout, ne plus jamais penser ça ‘pour la forme’)” (“never again: against all odds, do not ever think ‘merely formal’”). What is never to be done again is to act “pour la forme,” for form’s sake, to do something only superficially or perfunctorily or rhetorically (or what is never again to happen is to insist that something done is merely for form’s sake, only just for formality’s sake, what is pro forma). The problem here is that of qualification: mere, only, just. The danger of being pro forma, however, is also the risk of all formalisms. The more resolute the formalism, the more this risk of a fascination with form as a mode of violence, an acceptance of its perversion, an acceding to its idealisms. Despite the fact that, of course, Derrida’s preface is nothing but a thinking of, a being-in-the-service-of a thinking of, what is for—as in towards, as in thinking before, in the face of, in the presence of, for the sake of, an advocacy of—this very problem of the question of form (for philosophy). Thus, in his own writing, Derrida promises an erasure and effacement of the labor and discourse of the metaphysical philosophy he simultaneously writes and is bound to (fastened to)—”J’ai déjà commis les deux péchés (philosophiques! si la philosophie peut pécher!), les deux délits incriminés par Alain David. Ce serait d’ailleurs une seule et même faute: délimiter en donnant forme ou en croyant voir une forme.” (“I have already committed the two sins (philosophical ones, if philosophy can sin!), the two offenses incriminated by Alain David. It would be one and the same fault: to demarcate by giving form or in believing to see a form“; 11).

    Acknowledging that it is a surprise that “une chose aussi abstraite, la forme, la limitations, la limitation par la forme” (“such an abstract thing, form, limitations, the limitation by form”) is to be regarded as so horrific, as what “déforme la forme, à savoir le monstrueux” (“deforms form, namely the monstrous”; 11), Derrida writes that it is the “désir de la forme et de la limitation formelle” that “produire due tératologique” (“it is the desire for form and for formal limitation that produces monstrous anomalies”; 11). Racism and anti-Semitism are iterations of the idealism of philosophical thinking’s fascination with the question of essence, the foundational “What is it?” of the study of being in Western metaphysics. Philosophy, misrecognizing its own debt to the notion of the “objectivity of form,” is unable to see how its own passion for a purity and generalizability of formal delimitation colludes with the monstrosities of the worst violence. David’s book, as Derrida reads it, comes to constitute a critique of form as such, putting “form on trial”—and in turn, David’s counterproposal is a new phenomenology that would be based on the limitless and on a responsibility to affirm what is unlimited (with strong affinities to the ethical thinking of Levinas), to interrupt form and to exceed a formalism of limits aligned with visibility and the gaze.

    Jean-Luc Nancy pushes the logic of the violence of metaphysics and form even further; in “Image and Violence” he suggests that particularly excessive violence involves a fascination with a specific form. Violence, he finds, is not only monstrous, but “monstrative” (21): violence is what “exposes itself as figure without figure” (17). All violence thus makes an image of itself, imposing and enacting a specific visual fascination with a specific aesthetic possibility. As Nancy writes, “Cruelty takes its name from bloodshed (cruor, as distinct from sanguis, the blood that circulates in the body). He who is cruel and violent wants to see blood spilt. [ … ] He who is cruel wants to appropriate death: not by gazing into the emptiness of the depths, but, on the contrary, by filling his eyes with red (by ‘seeing red’) and with the clots in which life suffers and dies” (24-25). Cruelty is a fascination with “a little puddle of matter” (25), precisely what representation seeks to stand in place of and supplant. If for Derrida philosophy shares the violence of racism’s fascination with form, for Nancy, representation stands as the violence of cruelty’s fascination with rendering a specific form (the “seeing-red” that metonymizes an encounter with a form that can stand in for the real of matter).

    The thinker of horror must move away from the claim that Martyrs is either about or performs a “fascination with violence,” and consider the more radical thesis that the film performs “the violence of a fascination with form,” regarding a fascination with form as itself a form of violence, because the second half of the film is nothing but a study of purely formal propositions: the rhythm of frantic, frenzied straining against chains (see fig. 1); the light tones and the sounds of metal rings; the glottal choking panic of Anna’s hysteria.

    Fig 1. Laugier, Martyrs (2008).

    Having erased and withdrawn the narrative of the first half, having declaimed an exhaustion of the conceit of the second half, the only remaining thing for the text to do is to distend Anna as a form until a sufficient transformation occurs. This rendering of a martyr does not involve the torture (which is to say: twisting and torment) of a body so much as the distortions of pressure, duration, rhythm, chromatic intensity, and the modulations of light that posit the body as nothing but a series of constraints given, limited, and navigated by matters of form. Put another way, the sect is fascinated with the singular limit case of the martyr’s strange ontology, transfixed into a privileged instant in the photographic stills in the basement archive—fascinated, that is, with martyrdom as end (as peras: the limit or boundary of being at the reach of possible still-beingalive-in-death)—while the aesthetic object Martyrs is durationally fascinated with unfolding forms of violation, with martyrdom as means (with the texture, sound, and movement of chains that bind; with the struggling of the pale, mute martyred girl; with the pulsations of forced feeding; with flailing and skinning as light- and chromatic-modulating processes). The two fascinations are simultaneously fascinations with form but they do not line up: one is fascinated with the form of the martyr, the other fascinated with the distensions of aesthetic form that martyring effects. A robust theory of form itself is required, therefore, to account for the multiple ways in which fascination as violence manifests. One place to start is the double sense of the term form itself: not unlike fascination’s etymological vicissitudes, which name both the most unpleasurable (and death-bringing, vulnerable) captivations and simultaneously positive attraction and epistemic-affective conscription, form is a passive description of outward appearance and simultaneously a determining and shaping active principle. Because it can refer to a Platonic idea or a sensible shape; because it may mean the formation or arrangement of something in and of itself, or, by contrast, the formation or arrangement as determined in opposition to ideological or historical development or the “real” dimension of critical attention, Raymond Williams phrases its essential tension thusly in Keywords: “It is clear that in these extreme senses form spanned the whole range from the external and superficial to the inherent and determining” (94). Fascination with form, therefore, is not quite like fascination with any other thing, for it is a fascination that is unstable and potentially double, refusing to disclose what precise register of appearance or essence, shape or structure, surface or depth, it addresses.

    The film’s fascination with processes of manipulating aesthetic form moves through a study of the lines of force of the chains, the rhythms of struggle and passivity, the negative space of the darkness. Each of these studies extracts formal qualities of rhythm, space, color, angle, and line, to arrive at the final formal transformation and extraction protocol: the suspension of Anna in a large metal wheel and the flaying of all the skin of her body, save for her face. Like the originary account of flaying in Metamorphoses Book VI, lines 387-391, the death of Marsyas about which Ovid writes, “his skin was torn off the whole surface of his body: it was all one raw wound,” the target of fascination (what is unable to resist violence) is also that Anna is “nisi vulnus erat” (“nothing but a wound”). Fascination as violence is not a case of force levied against a subject; rather, this spell cast against another now unable to resist, this event marked by a lack of resistance to bewitchment and harm, is addressed to the form of the body, what torture distorts—in other words, continually makes otherwise, against itself. The body becomes the site of the violent transformation of a limitation, transfixion, and modification by a series of formal constraints.

    One sees versions of this in numerous horror films—we are approaching a general definition of horror—so consider, as just one example, Luca Guadagnino’s 2018 reimagining of Dario Argento’s Suspiria, orchestrated around the spectacular transformations, transfixions, and formal modifications of various female bodies, most spectacularly early in the film with the blackmagical joining of the bodies of dancers Susie and Olga (a formal corporeal sympathy), such that as Susie moves through space, dances, leaps, bends, and strains, Olga’s body is forced to mimic the formal coordinates of the dance, will-less and art-less: dance reduced to its formal navigation of force on and through extremities, through limbs and joints and organs. The force of Susie’s dancing compels Olga’s body into new postures, such that the dancing of one form, structured and purposive, is commuted to the dragging of another form, deprived of the freedom to choose aesthetic force and its purposiveness, reduced to nothing but force qua force: Olga’s form is dragged; that form is bent; the form is torn; this form’s structure things (= bones) are made discontinuous (= broken; = fractured); its formal touching parts (= joints) are cleaved (= burst), their formal relation to container, to surface (= skin) made perpendicular (= pierced); one form (= unified) is made multiple, one form (= the upright, linear) is made different (= the spiraled, bent). Olga-as-form is neither deformed nor malformed: this She = a this, and this form is reformed (see fig. 2). From the point of view of the feeling body, the scene is one of agonizing and unending torture and the destruction of essential living form; from the point of view of visible form, the same event is the construction of and generation of and attestation of new forms. Navigating the antinomy of form itself, then, torture recalls its Latin roots from torquere, to twist, turn, wind, wring, distort, refusing to settle in itself the subject of what is twisted, turned, wound, wrung, distorted. Suspiria is not a horror film because it portrays witches or gives a vague affective account of its effect on implied or actual spectators; it is a horror film because it attests to the state in which the deformation of the body in one given form is aesthetically generative of another: the destruction of the body from an anthropocentric perspective is aesthetically generative of a new form of bodily distortion (i.e. a new genre of dance from a compositional perspective). Suspiria does not express a narrative fascination with violence so much as the violence of a fascination with form—fascination as a mode of violence—as precisely what ex-presses new choreographic potential.

    Fig 2. Guadagnino, Suspiria (2018).

    Martyrs‘s presencing of the resulting formal limit of a torture that twists, turns, and distorts form involves a slow zoom into the flayed face of Anna-cum-martyr. Juxtaposed against Anna’s stasis and transfixion, the camera’s relentless projective movement beyond the borders of the body, beyond the limitation of line into a pure field of color, beyond the image to a blinding field of white light, exposes the materiality of the cinema and the condition of possibility for appearance as such (see fig. 3).

    Fig 3. Laugier, Martyrs (2008).

    Film form here is fascinated—transfixed and wounded—by an encounter with pure abstraction; it arrives at the blankness of a screen and waits to be given form by inscriptive representation at a time that remains in the future, speculative and inaccessible. Martyrs also cites one of the more famous instances of martyring in the history of film, Carl Theodor Dreyer’s Passion of Joan of Arc (see fig. 4), which itself poses the question of fascination’s bond with both violence and affect. This is why Deleuze calls The Passion of Joan of Arc “the affective film par excellence” (106), setting in place a double relation: the narrative state of things, the all of the what-is-happening that he dubs “the trial,” and the realm of emotions as properties, such as the “anger of the bishop,” Joan’s suffering, her ecstasy and agony. This first relation sets in place a difference between the historical and the emotional, but it still links emotion to individual subjects. The second relation, however, what he dubs the genius of the film and what sets in place “the difference between the trial and the Passion,” is the more essential project of the film: “To extract the Passion from the trial, to extract from the event this inexhaustible and brilliant part which goes beyond its own actualisation, ‘the completion which is never completed’” (106). Faciality is no longer the privileged site for a legibility of emotion but the setting for a distension of film form that extracts passion as a desubjectified affective potential in its awkward angles, distorted framing, and broken-up mise-en-scene. “The affect is like the expressed of the state of things,” Deleuze concludes, “but this expressed does not refer to the state of things, it only refers to the faces which express it” (106). This pure form of affective intensity—a swill of anger, martyrdom, rage, suffering, passion itself—is ineluctably bound to form. No longer narratives about emotions or emotions as properties of characters, aesthetic language bears out the pure intensity of passion itself (see fig. 5).

    Fig 4. Dreyer, Passion of Joan of Arc (1928).

    Fig 5. Laugier, Martyrs.

    This encounter with nothing but form, this attestation of the way the shown shows itself, how illumination is illuminated, and what holds together the cinematic image, is not parasitic on the violence of torture that has denatured Anna; rather, the film unfolds in order that Anna be converted into yet another formal element available for being formally given otherwise. From the point of view of form, martyring is not an act of negation or destruction: rather, the deformation of the body is a pure experiment in the formation of variation, that is, of new forms. It is not, as Tim Palmer has it, that new extremisms and horrors are cinemas of the body; rather, they are nothing but cinemas of form. Or, if cinemas of the body, they are cinemas of the body rendered nothing but form. If one follows Palmer’s cinéma du corps, “an on-screen interrogation of physicality in brutally intimate terms” (171), which regards Martyrs ‘ “sadistic torture chambers” (133) as targeting a corpus, the violence remains at the level of a fascination with a visible form (the body). But the interest of horror, as in its investment, what it profits from, is not in fascination with but fascination as the action itself of changing forms into new forms. Fascination as violence in the violence of a fascination with form is precisely this: to the extent that the text commits to a fascination with formal possibility, it rescinds a textual place that would nominate torture’s violence as being on the side of negation or erasure or ruination. Torture, from the point of view of form, is always and inherently aesthetically generative.

    Horror is a formal act of decision. Horror is the formal act of decision to regard the body as a form subject to formal constraints, restraints, possibilities, and re- and de-formations and re-and de-formative possibilities.

    Horror is the attestation of the state in which torture is ethically neutral but aesthetically interesting.

    To refuse to regard the body as a form (in other words, to speculatively retain torture for a critique of violence) is to linger solely with the first half of the film, to put torture to work for what Nancy dubs the realm of meaning: “the element in which there can be significations, interpretations, representation” (22). In that case, the body would remain a body, the torture an ethical abomination. But this requires that we shield our eyes like Leontius and do not look upon the second half of the film. To look, however, and to encounter the formalist attestations of the second part of Martyrs, is to encounter the body stripped of meaning, put on display as formally navigable, which is to say, also indestructible because its form can always be made otherwise. Horror is not the affective-aesthetic mode that puts on display violence done to bodies. My redescription of horror is that it is the affective-aesthetic mode in which violence can, in fact, never be done to the body: the body is made a form, violence to which produces a new form; the body is posited as that for which infinite variations in its formal constitution are possible. Torture, reading, fascination—each thus names the realm of apeiron, of the unlimited and limitless, while each is, simultaneously, within its own thinking, bound to the violence of the boundary, the limit, finitude.

    This reversal comes, of course, at an extraordinary critical cost. There is no critique of violence possible within a speculative grappling with horror because horror imagines violence only ever as monstrative, as the condition of possibility for generating the aesthetic. This is coextensive with its formal language: the motor of possibility for its textual continuance is the infinite destructibility of the human imagined as the infinite variability of its form. The conventional reading of Martyrs as demonstrating a fascination with violence never need think horror as such because horror is continually converted into the anti-horrifying, entirely genial, and positive lessons of liberal critique. However, to take seriously fascination as a form of violence requires the critic herself to defend this with her own speculative fascination with reading closely, even obsessively, always with an unhealthy fixation, the details of textual form. This is the most extreme, the last, violence: the transfixion of criticism by the very logic of force one would purport to think, now no longer from the safe distance of the outside, but squarely in the absorptive maw of the structure of fascination itself.

    All things come at some cost. Closely reading for form can no longer be obviously claimed for anti-violence.

    The question for the formalist is not unlike the question that the metaphysical philosopher puts to himself: how and when and where and with what inevitability have I erred here? How, then, to proceed? If formalisms (as aesthetic or interpretive strategy) share a homological structure with violence in a fascination with a visible form such that we must think fascination as violence, what antidote or reinvention of formalism sidesteps this unwanted intimacy? One answer is to fight tooth and nail, skin and all viscera, against the conversion of form into the intelligible, and to refuse to allow form to remain defined as a partial sense of a visible static shape or appearance (as it is by the sect, and the film, and by plenty of weak formalists as well): to refuse, that is, transfixion’s fixations, fascination’s bond to stasis, and to put back into formalism its motor, its movement, its process, its circulation. Let it go; risk a loss (of control, of payoff); let it stir; let it churn. This requires relinquishing the association of formalism with the recovery of (static, knowable, fixed, given) forms and instead demands that formalism name an unsatisfied, relentless, interminable grappling with the antinomies of form, failing to produce readings that pay out dividends (call them ethical metanarratives, historical analogues, whatever) and instead retaining reading as process, the business of interpretation with what in form remains speculative and as-yet unthought, naming the antidote to a violence that would take the form of a fascination with a visible given appearance. In the language of wonder that continually edges fascination, the critical praxis must not convert fascination with form as the drive of thought into a fascination with intelligible forms (including the very ones that Martyrs seduces: that Anna and Lucie are female; that they are both non-white; that the film moves through nothing but institutions, theological, psychiatric, familial, etc.…).

    One must, as it were, take seriously the film’s final cruelty from Mademoiselle as a charge for thought. It takes a double form. After she alone has received Anna’s ecstatic whisper, Mademoiselle insists, “It admitted of no interpretation.” Of her sect’s access to whatever it is that admits of no interpretation, she cruelly declares to the rest of the group “Doutez,” and proceeds to her suicide, taking the revelation with her. The English translation of the film’s dialogue gives it as “Keep doubting,” though douter names a broader register of temporal waverings: to hesitate, procrastinate, linger, defer, put off, delay. Doutez names a truly radical formalism, letting form function as the rootedness of uncertain speculative claims: what names a demand for the work of ongoing reading; what refuses to let fascination resolve into the mere recovery of prior forms, retaining what admits of nothing but an unceasing doubt, in perpetual parenthetical worries about errors of thought that must nonetheless impose themselves; what fails to linger with fascination’s transfixions, instead remaining bound to the vital energies of deriving no interest or profit from reading and yet continuing to read nonetheless. A formalism that could be claimed by nonviolence, that can be claimed for ethics, requires that it be taken to its most extreme limit. If there is a fascination at the heart of a radical formalism that would enable speculative thought about the ethical—and resist Derrida’s and Nancy’s warnings of a formalism perfectly amenable to cooptation by violence, cruelty, fascism, and racism—it is nothing but the risk of allowing the theorist’s fascination with form to never arrive at a final interpretation, nor imagine that any visible form does not require further reading. The antidote to what admits of no interpretation is what admits of nothing but interpretation all the way down. An ongoing risk of a fascination with form that wields itself as a form of violence is risky because ongoing, ongoing because risky. Neither God nor grammar promises the conjunction that would keep aesthetics and brutality (error, force) sufficiently apart. And yet, there is no other way a thinking of violence can go if it is not to merely shield its eyes from the start. So look. And read. Take your formal fill of all fine spectacles. But never for the first time; never for the last.

    Works Cited

    • Abbas, Ackbar. “Dialectic of Deception.” Public Culture, vol.11, no. 3, Spring 1999, pp. 347-63. EDuke Journals, doi:10.1215/08992363-11-2-347.
    • Aikin, Anna Laetitia. “On the Pleasure Derived from Objects of Terror.” 1773. Fantastic Literature: A Critical Reader, edited by David Sandner, Praeger, 2004, pp. 30-36.
    • Bantinaki, Katerina. “The Paradox of Horror: Fear as a Positive Emotion.” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 70, no. 4, 2012, pp. 383-92. JSTOR, doi:10.1111/j.1540-6245.2012.01530.x.
    • Barthes, Roland. A Lover’s Discourse: Fragments. Translated by Richard Howard, Noonday Press, 1978.
    • Bataille, Georges. The Accursed Share, Vols. 2 and 3: The History of Eroticism and Sovereignty. Translated by Robert Hurley, Zone Books, 1993.
    • Baumbach, Sibylle. Literature and Fascination. Palgrave Macmillan, 2015.
    • Blanchot, Maurice. The Gaze of Orpheus, and Other Literary Essays. Translated by Lydia Davis, edited by P. Adams Sitney, Station Hill Press, 1981.
    • Carroll, Noël. The Philosophy of Horror, or, Paradoxes of the Heart. Routledge, 1990.
    • David, Alain. Racisme et Antisemitisme: Essai de philosophie sur l’envers des concepts. Ellipses, 2001.
    • Deleuze, Gilles. Cinema 1: The Movement-Image. Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam, U of Minnesota P, 1986.
    • Derrida, Jacques. “La forme et la façon.” Preface. Racisme et Antisemitisme: Essai de philosophie sur l’envers des concepts, by Alain David, Ellipses, 2001.
    • —. “Racism’s Last Word.” Translated by Peggy Kamuf. Critical Inquiry, vol. 12, no. 1, Autumn 1985, pp. 290-99. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/1343472.
    • Diderot, Denis. “Passions.” The Encyclopedia of Diderot & d’Alembert Collaborative Translation Project, translated by Timothy L. Wilkerson, Michigan Publishing / University of Michigan Library, 2004.
    • Freud, Sigmund. “The ‘Uncanny.’” Writings on Art and Literature, edited by Werner Hamacher and David E. Wellbery, Stanford UP, 1997, pp. 193-233. Meridian: Crossing Aesthetics. Originally published in The Complete Works of Sigmund Freud, edited by James Strachey, vol. 17, pp. 219-56.
    • Gaut, Berys. “The Paradox of Horror.” British Journal of Aesthetics, vol. 33, no. 4, Oct. 1993, pp. 333-45. Gale Academic OneFile Select, link.gale.com/apps/doc/A14633203.
    • Hume, David. “Of Tragedy.” Eight Great Tragedies, edited by Sylvan Barnet et al., Meridian, 1996, pp. 433-39.
    • Kant, Immanuel. Critique of the Power of Judgment. Edited by Paul Guyer, translated by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews, 2nd ed., Cambridge UP, 2000.
    • Kristeva, Julia. Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection. Translated by Leon S. Roudiez, Columbia UP, 1982.
    • Martyrs. Directed by Pascal Laugier, Wild Bunch, 2008.
    • Nancy, Jean-Luc. “Image and Violence.” The Ground of the Image, translated by Jeff Fort, Fordham UP, 2005. Originally published as “Image et violence.” Le portique, vol. 6, University of Metz, 2000.
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    • Passion of Joan of Arc. Directed by Carl Theodor Dreyer, Société Générale des Films, 1928.
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    • Suspira. Directed by Luca Guadagnino, Amazon Studios, 2018.
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    • Williams, Raymond. Keywords. 1976. Oxford UP, 2015.
  • Introduction:”The Most Fascinating Medium”

    Mikko Tuhkanen, Guest Editor (bio)

    Their enchantment is disenchantment.- Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory (297)

    Fascination is our sensation.- Mel & Kim, “Respectable”

    Speaking to students at the American Film Institute in Los Angeles in 1975, Ingmar Bergman evokes familiar tropes when he enthuses about cinema’s ability to prompt a cognition closer to dream logic than to rational thought. “To me, the cinematography, the real cinematography, is very, very close to our dreams,” he asserts.

    You can’t find in any other art, you can’t create a situation that is [as] close to the dreams as [in] cinematography when it’s at its best. Think [of] the time gap: you can make things as long as you want, exactly as in a dream; you can make things as short as you want, exactly as in a dream. You are—as a director, as a creator of the picture—you are like a dreamer. … That is one of the most fascinating things that exist.

    Appropriately for the date (he is speaking on Hallowe’en), Bergman suggests that the medium’s uncanny effects extend also to the viewer:

    The reception, for the audience, of a picture … is hypnotic. You sit there in a completely dark room, very anonymous … and you look on a lighted spot in front of you, and you don’t move; you sit and you don’t move, and your eyes are concentrated on that white spot on the wall. I think that’s exactly what some hypnotists do: they light a spot on the wall and they ask you to follow it with your eyes, and then they talk to you and hypnotize you. (“Conversation”)1

    Bergman not only leans on the longstanding association of cinema with dreams—the “oneiric metaphor” in film theory (Levine; Rascaroli)—but also echoes the tradition that, beginning with the earliest commentary, confers on film a hypnotic potential. At the end of the nineteenth century, the conception of cinema as an offshoot of the mesmeric arts was arguably strengthened by the screening of early films alongside various vaudeville acts, including spectacles of stage magic and hypnotism. What Stefan Andriopoulos calls the “structural affinities … [that] connected hypnotism with the newly emerging medium of cinema” (92) are evident in numerous early films that thematize the dangers of mesmerism, including Robert Wiene’s The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari (1920) and Fritz Lang’s Dr. Mabuse films of the 1920s and 1930s.2 Weimar commentators express concern about cinema’s “powerful hypnotic influence” (Killen 41); Jean Cocteau in 1946 suggests film’s potential for inducing “collective hypnosis” (qtd. in Andriopoulos 116); and Siegfried Kracauer, writing in 1960, alludes to the “compulsive attractiveness” of the cinematic image (Theory 158). Crowds, compulsion, loss of control: these themes are rife in discussions of industrial modernity, which frequently figure the disorientation and unfamiliarity of modern life as the undoing of the wakeful clarity of Enlightenment reason. The dangerous effects of this undoing are outlined by Gustave Le Bon and Sigmund Freud in their analyses of crowd psychology. In this way, cinema is thought to encapsulate what Mary Ann Doane calls “the fascinations and anxieties of modernity” (205).

    Even as he evokes this long history in his address to students, Bergman also holds the line against a later offshoot of such conceptualizations of cinema. In the mid-1970s, when he visited Los Angeles, this tradition was being continued in the film theorizing that emerged in England and France after 1968 under the names “apparatus theory” and “Screen theory.”3 The scholars connected with these theories maintained the connection between film and hypnosis; Raymond Bellour, for example, asserts in 1979 that there is “a fundamental relationship between the cinematographic apparatus and the hypnotic apparatus” (“Alternation” 101). Yet cinema’s influence was now theorized under a term borrowed from Marxism via Bertolt Brecht and Louis Althusser: ideology. Brechtian theater’s effort to break the thrall of ideology by developing various strategies of “alienation” (Verfremdung), in conjunction with Viktor Shklovsky’s method of “defamiliarization” (ostranenie) from the Russian formalist tradition, filtered into film theorizing together with Althusser’s account of the forces of subjectivation typical to “ideological state apparatuses.” The task of ideology critique was to render the subject conscious of the manipulative strategies through which he had been called into existence. If cinema did not lay bare the constructedness of its illusion—if it did not expose “the ideological systems of recognition, specularity, truth-to-lifeness” (Comolli 133), render film “‘readable’ in its inscription” (Baudry, “Ideological” 41)—then it was likely to function as one of the state apparatuses that guaranteed the viewer’s compliance with instituted identity positions, covering over the sleight-of-hand of their production.

    Cinema was considered “an instrument particularly well suited to exert ideological influence” (Baudry, “Apparatus” 119) because of its presumed ability to reactivate the processes of subjectivation. According to the Lacanian schematization adopted by many scholars—among them Christian Metz, Jean-Louis Baudry, Jean-Louis Comolli, and Laura Mulvey—the screen was a mirror that induced the spectator to reexperience the miscognition that had given birth to the imaginary ego. The imaginary relation is marked by the malevolent glamor that Jacques Lacan frequently calls “fascination.” “Fascination,” as he puts it in an early seminar, “is absolutely essential to the phenomenon of the constitution of the ego” (Seminar II 50), which coalesces as the infant is gripped by a “dyadic fascination” with its mirror image (Lacan, “On” 56). The idea, if not always the exact term, can be found in other sources of post-1968 film theorizing, too. When Brecht speaks of the work of Verfremdung as the undoing of the “magic” and “hypnosis” that traditional art weaves over the spectator (75), he evokes the function of the “evil eye” that capitalism extends into modernity in order to guarantee its dominance. Althusser continues this tradition by figuring “interpellation” as a process whereby the subject is constituted as a response to the other’s commanding call. Through his “deluded ego” (Metz 55), the spectator is bound to an “ideological, i.e., imaginary, representation of the real world” (Althusser, “Ideological” 164), powerlessly embedded in what Theodor Adorno calls the capitalist culture industry’s “bewitched reality” (Aesthetic 227).

    For Lacan and (more implicitly) Althusser, “fascination” names the organizing principle of the process of subjectivation, the coming-into-being of the entity designated by the double entendre of “subject(ion)”: that is, the process of “men’s subjection [l’assujettissement des hommes]: their constitution as subjects in both senses of the word” as agents of and subordinates to power (Foucault, History of Sexuality 60; Histoire 81). According to the post-1968 tradition of film theory, cinema captures the viewer with the lethal passivity that makes the bird easy prey for the snake. As Colin MacCabe writes, in cinematic representation “subject and object [are] caught in an eternal paralysed fixity” (“Realism” 19). The capture is particularly deadly insofar as it produces the illusion of the spectator’s self-determination; MacCabe speaks of “this petrification of the spectator in a position of pseudo-dominance” (“Realism” 24). “Fascination” designates this posture: the attitude of an autonomous subject unaware of his subjection to a foreign will, a purported master devoured by his presumed servants. Post-1968 film theorizing takes on the task of awakening the enthralled spectator to the lethality of his capture. If “cinema is a technique of the imaginary” (Metz 15), the work of ideology-critical film theorists is to jam its machines, to “[break] the imaginary relation between text and viewer” (MacCabe, “Theory” 21). Like avant-garde art itself, film theory was to undo this imaginary spell, to achieve disenchantment.

    The term “fascination” circulates in commentaries from cinema’s earliest days, often without being defined or placed in its long conceptual history. As scholars who have begun to excavate this history in various contexts have indicated, the concept suggests the uncanny underside of modern life insofar as it evokes the enchantments that Enlightenment modernity, for better or worse, is supposed to have defused. Derived from the Latin fascināre, the term’s semantic range moves from “irresistibly attractive influence” and “enchantment” to the obsolete meanings of “witchcraft” and “sorcery” (OED). In its older denotation, it refers particularly to the kind of deadly, arresting magic that folklore ascribes to the “evil eye.” Serpents are said to wield this magic in hypnotically immobilizing their prey; under this spell, the victim surrenders to being eaten alive. In this way, fascination names a capture—most often a specular one—by a malevolent other. While modern rationality is often figured as the eradication of the superstitions that informed (ancient or medieval) discourses about “fascinating” influences, we are by now used to observing the ways in which various “irrationalities” persist in the modern mind. Although the Enlightenment is presumed to have woken us up from the spell of ancient beliefs and forced us to observe the world rationally, fascination remains a “key concept [Schlüsselphänomen] in modernity” (Hahnemann and Weyand 26).4

    Post-1968 film theorizing is representative of the various commentaries on cinema that have contributed to what Hans Ulrich Seeber calls the concept’s “sensational career” from Shakespeare to the twenty-first century (“Funktionen” 92). In its entanglement with mesmerism and then as an exemplar of ideology’s functioning, cinema has always been a part of “fascination culture” (Baumbach 1). In this context, the term largely retains its negative connotations, its suggestion of the influences of malevolent witchcraft, the “binding” of one’s will by insidious means (Weingart, “Faszinieren” 210). If the task of political cinema was to de-fascinate the spectator, to unravel ideological illusions by rendering the film viewer an active part of signification, the post-1968 generation of scholars was driven by what Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, addressing 1990s queer theory, would call “the paranoid imperative”: the critic’s determination to decode the ingeniously obscured mechanisms by which power infiltrates—becomes constitutive of—the most intimate regions of our being. This imperative produced a generation of scholars who were, in Martin Jay’s hyperbole, “cinephobe[s]” (479). Writing in the early 1990s in reference to the conceptualizations of cinema that emerged after 1968, Steven Shaviro similarly observes that this mode of film theorizing is marked by “an almost reflex movement of suspicion, disavowal, and phobic rejection. It seems as if theorists of the past twenty years can scarcely begin their discussions without ritualistically promising to resist the insidious seductions of film” (11). Shaviro’s project in “Film Theory and Visual Fascination” is to nudge academic film theory—”largely a phobic construct” (16)—off the groove in which it has been stuck since 1968. He does this by reevaluating the very term that for his immediate predecessors indicated cinema’s functioning as an ideological state apparatus. He proposes that cinematic fascination be reconsidered beyond the assumption of the dire consequences—the imaginary/ideological capture—of its presumed passivity (42-50).

    Shaviro is not the only scholar who—on the heels of Metz, Baudry, Comolli and others—seeks to push beyond the “paranoid imperative” that culminated in post-1968 film theory. Even if “the eye is always evil” (MacCabe, “Theory” 15), there are ways to dance with danger. A partial list of other scholars who have reorganized our understanding of cinematic fascination includes Steven Connor, who offers a condensed account of the concept’s circulation from ancient philosophy to film theory in “Fascination, skin and the screen” (1998); Oliver Harris, whose reading of film noir (2003) should be considered in the context of his study on William Burroughs (2003); and, most recently, Pansy Duncan and Calum Watt, who return to the concept to explore, respectively, the “flat” aesthetics of postmodern film and Maurice Blanchot’s overlooked contribution to film theory. The concept’s implicit theorizations by Julia Kristeva, D. A. Miller, Eric Santner, and Leo Bersani in the context of cinema have yet to be engaged by scholars of Fascination Studies.5

    Neither Althusser nor Lacan offers an ethics of de-fascination in any simple sense. Rather, their projects can be described as efforts to think re-fascination, ways of being otherwise enthralled, without assuming what Jacques Rancière calls “the Pauline transition from the indistinct perception in the mirror to direct perception” (2). Contrary to some versions of classical Marxism, there is no passage through the mirror, no ascent into “incorruptibility” or a realm free of mediation and misrecognition, but only various ways of yielding to one’s alienated capture (Althusser, “Marxism” 232-33). Similarly, the mechanism of “fascination” persists in Lacan’s work beyond his early descriptions of the infant’s ego-constituting méconnaissance. Most notably, the word figures centrally in his reading of Antigone in Seminar VII, where it at once names the inability of Sophocles’s heroine to avert her gaze from her brother’s rotting corpse, her refusal to relinquish the filial duty to bury his remains—a stubbornness that leads to her own living burial—and signals the spectator’s capture by “the fascinating image of Antigone herself”:

    it is Antigone herself who fascinates us, Antigone in her unbearable splendor [c’est elle qui nous fascine, dans son éclat insupportable]. She has a quality that both attracts and startles us, in the sense of intimidates us; this terrible, self-willed victim disturbs us. (Seminar VII 247; 290)

    Apart from “the fascinations of the imaginary” (199), Lacan thus proposes that the real “shines” (or “explodes”) through the symbolic in ways that arrest the subject in postures of terrified attention. Rather than the jubilant assumption of one’s image in which film theorists see an allegory of cinematic identification, the fascinated paralysis now carries an ethical charge as it indicates the impossible ground, the aporia, of the symbolic order. We encounter, in Slavoj Žižek’s words, “the deadly fascination of the Real as it threatens to draw us into its vortex of jouissance” (32).

    His comments to students suggest that Bergman too should be counted among the thinkers who encourage a more nuanced understanding of—or rather, who remind us of an alternative tradition of conceptualizing—cinematic enthrallment. While not in direct dialogue with post-1968 film theorists, he anticipates Shaviro and others not only in his insistence on thinking film otherwise than as an insidious possession of the spectator’s will—his imaginary/ideological interpellation—but also in his repeated deployment of the very term that indicated the culture industry’s wiles for apparatus and Screen theorists. “Isn’t that fascinating?” he banters, speaking of film’s ability to conjure up the illusion of movement from still images. “I think that must be magic.” Oddly—and to his own amusement—he reaches for a German word to characterize what amounts to the antithesis of cinematic thought: “We can be how[ever] intellectual we want, we can be vernünftig.” While the audience members suggest “sensible” as a translation, we may want to insist on “reasonable” or “rational,” which retain the German word’s relation to the Vernunft of Kant’s usage. Given that the German that intrudes on him is etymologically allied with förnuft (as in the Swedish rendering of the First Critique, Kritik av det rena förnuftet), Bergman may indeed have the Kantian convention in mind. But above all the reference evokes the tradition of film commentary that affirms the medium’s ability to bypass the circuits of rational thought. Sergei Eisenstein locates in film the potential for “sensual, pre-logical thinking” (131); according to Rudolf Arnheim, cinema can “lead the spectator beyond the sphere of ordinary human conceptions” (42). Apart from frequently tackling the presumed disenchantment that flattens modern times in his work, Bergman echoes such ideas—which Ian Aitken suggests comprise the “intuitionist paradigm” of film theory—when he argues that cinematic thinking exceeds the parameters of “reason.” Like Shaviro some fifteen years later, Bergman refuses “[t]he imperialistic movement of scientific rationality” (Shaviro 11) that informs the apparatus theorists’ enlightened convictions.

    “Fascination” is the name for the work that film does as a foreign body, the ability of this modern technology par excellence to unground modernity at its constitutive site. “The cinema from its earliest days,” Laura Mulvey writes, “has fascinated its audiences as a spectacle, and one that engages belief in the face of rational knowledge” (Fetishism 7). Many commentators saw in cinema the ability of culture industry to solicit what Adorno calls “will-less fascination,” to protract people’s “fascinated eagerness to consume the latest process of the day” (Minima §150 [238], §76 [118]). Bergman further identifies the antinomy of belief and reason with that of “feeling” and “intellect.” Cinema’s ability to scramble their dialectic constitutes its singularity: “We are in the position to work with the most fascinating medium that exists in the world,” Bergman tells his audience. “Because we always, like music, we go straight to the feeling, not intellect, as in music. Afterwards, we can start to work with our intellects.” The filmmaker distances himself from the ideology-critical view that political cinema must work to “disenchant” us (Adorno, Aesthetic 227). Anticipating the emergence of affect theory in post-1980s film scholarship, he instead suggests that “fascination” is that which “keeps (us) feeling,” as The Human League, too, tells us. Bergman similarly shares the wisdom of Mel and Kim, who hold that the culture industry knows not what it does in constructing the subject as a “sensational” being, open to the affective dimension that cognitivism and Deleuzean-influenced scholarship promote as a corrective to the perceived failures of apparatus theory. Cinematic fascination, Bergman proposes, is to be embraced for its misunderstood and relatively untapped potential.

    In this special issue of Postmodern Culture we explore this potential, presenting new directions for the traditions—culminating in post-1968 film theory—in which cinema has been theorized under the heading of “fascination.” We begin with Eugenie Brinkema’s account of the fascination of horror in Pascal Laugier’s Martyrs (2008). If her earlier work in The Forms of the Affects (2014) can be considered “a formalist rejoinder to affect theory” (Brinkema, “We Never” 68), this essay offers a similar supplement to theorizations of fascination. With a detailed attention to the aesthetics of the film, Brinkema argues for a formal reading of fascination: we must move away from theorizing a fascination with violence to conceptualizing “a fascination with form as itself constituting a mode of violence.” Beyond Martyrs, as Brinkema shows, such “formal violence” can be theorized with the help of Jacques Derrida’s and Jean-Luc Nancy’s work.

    E. L. McCallum argues for the necessity of disambiguating modes of fascination, suggesting that the concept is in fact misnamed in apparatus theory. To theorize fascination proper, we must relinquish the idea of the spectator’s identification with the image, on which apparatus theorists largely premise their understanding of the work cinema does. Instead, McCallum turns to Michael Snow’s experimental film Wavelength (1967) to search for more apposite delineations. Rather than psychoanalysis and ideology critique, a new theory of fascination can be developed through reading Wavelength in the context of Karen Barad’s studies of quantum physics. If the account of “fascination” in post-1968 film theory assumes the subject/object distinction typical of Western modernity (and exemplified, for many, in Renaissance art), McCallum suggests that, when inflected through Snow and Barad, fascination in fact “reveals to us our entanglement with the material world that undoes the boundaries of the subject/object relation and/or the perspectival relations of quattrocento habits of seeing.”

    Calum Watt unfolds the relatively unexplored potential of Maurice Blanchot’s philosophy for film theory, a task that he had already begun in Blanchot and the Moving Image: Fascination and Spectatorship (2017). He proposes that we read filmmaker Philippe Grandrieux and film theorist Raymond Bellour as Blanchot’s “heirs” insofar as each thinks cinema in terms of the contemplative capture that “fascination” names. In the shooting diary for his film Malgré la nuit, Grandrieux deploys Blanchotian fascination to describe the dreamlike state that he associates with artistic inspiration, a state of suspension that in Blanchot’s work often goes under the name of “other night.” Watt also shows that, of all apparatus theorists, Bellour—who has engaged extensively with Grandrieux—has spent the most time explicating the role of fascination in the cinematic experience across his extensive oeuvre, much of it untranslated into English.

    My essay takes as its starting point Watt’s recent book-length study of Blanchot as a thinker of cinema. I propose that Leo Bersani, in his work on film and beyond, formulates a philosophy—an onto-ethics/aesthetics—that is closely related to Blanchot’s theorization of the “fundamental passivity” experienced in one’s “fascination” with “the image” (Blanchot, “Essential” 25). While for McCallum we must move beyond apparatus theory if we are to think fascination proper, I propose, with Bersani, that we pluralize the concept in order to think about the entanglement of various forms of fascination. Across the decades—and with the help of Proust, Sade, Caravaggio, and Pasolini, among others—Bersani sketches an onto-ethics/aesthetics of fascination where the concept is split between the spectator’s active exploration and evisceration of an enigmatic world (which we find in Proust and Sade) and his passive receptiveness to the world’s nonsignifying forms (exemplified in later Caravaggio and in Bruno Dumont’s film Humanité [1999]).

    In his essay, Kwasu Tembo takes up the psychoanalytic account of sadomasochism by situating its development in Lacan, feminist theory, and the film Secretary (2002). He proposes that what he calls the “radical psycho-sexual fascination” of S/M operates on the “bi-directionality” of libidinal affects between “the dom” and “the sub.” This “bi-directionality” alludes to a concern that emerges as central in a number of our other essays, too: we find it in McCallum’s effort to conceptualize “fascination as a reconfiguration of the subject/object relation” (a proposal in which we recognize a version of the argument she has made in her previous work regarding fetishism);6 we can similarly recognize it in Bersani’s decades-long deconstruction of Cartesian dualisms, whose film-theoretical aspects I explore in my contribution.

    It is not unusual to hear that at stake in the shift to modernity is the destiny of our “fascination”: the enthrallment or disenchantment that characterizes our constitutive relationship to the world. Michel Foucault adopts this language early on when, in History of Madness (1961), he proposes that the modern era begins with René Descartes’s banishment of madness as an unthinkable option for the cogito. At this moment, he writes, “Descartes [breaks] with all fascination” (244). Such de-fascination is repeated in the subsequent moment of modernity’s double birth (a gesture that Lynne Huffer identifies as typical in Foucault’s thinking about epistemic shifts [209-10]). Coinciding with the end of the great confinement and the emergence of positivist psychiatry in the late eighteenth century, the second delivery similarly marks something like the dissipation of a mystified and compulsive—again, “fascinated”—relationship to the world:

    Here was madness offered up to the gaze. This had also been its position in classical confinement, when it presented the spectacle of its own animality; but the gaze that had then been cast upon it was one of fascination, in that man contemplated in that figure so foreign an animality that was his own, which he recognised in a confused manner as being indefinably close yet indefinably distant; this existence that a delirious monstrosity made inhuman and placed as far from the world as possible, he secretly felt it inside him.(Foucault, History of Madness 442)

    Both moments of modernity’s birth are marked by the end of a mode of being in which the subject had been “indefinably” imbricated in and yet detached from the “outside,” figured in the curious wretches on the Ship of Fools. Either way, the enthrallment that modernity’s cool gaze was supposed to exclude hardly disappears. Our essays suggest that one of the technologies of its continued insinuation is cinema. Whether with enthusiastic praise or as paranoid critique, the history of film theory has been a history of fascination.

    Footnotes

    1. In addition to the recording on YouTube, parts of this dialogue can be found in the supplemental material on the Criterion Collection’s DVD edition of The Virgin Spring. The lines quoted here are not included in the print version of the discussion that appears in Bergman, “Dialogue.”

    2. On early comments on suggestibility, hypnosis, and cinema, see Andriopoulos, especially 116-23; and Curtis 135-40, 162ff. On debates concerning cinema’s “evil” nature, many referencing the dangerous suggestibility of audiences, see Gunning.

    3. Richard Lapsley and Michael Westlake’s introduction remains a helpful account of this strand of film theorizing. See also Jay 456ff. and Harvey.

    4. For recent texts that have inaugurated what we might call “Fascination Studies,” see Baumbach; Baumbach, Henningsen, and Oschema; Degen; Hahnemann and Weyand; Seeber; Thys; and Weingart. Earlier explorations, particularly in the context of cinema, include Abbas, Connor, Harris, and Shaviro. See also the variously-slanted encyclopedia articles by Beth, Desprats-Péquignot, Lotter, and Türcke.

    5. An account of cinematic fascination in Kristeva would begin by situating her commentary on spectatorship in “Ellipsis on Dread and the Specular Seduction” (1975) in relation to the affective ambivalence she often calls “fascination” in her psychoanalytic accounts such as Powers of Horror, Strangers to Ourselves, and Black Sun. Miller evokes fascination across his studies on cinema and literature. For his work on film, see 8 ½; “Anal Rope“; and Hidden Hitchcock. Of particular interest in Santner’s work is the concluding chapter of Stranded Objects on Hans-Jürgen Syberberg. My contribution to this issue of Postmodern Culture addresses Bersani’s theorization of cinematic fascination.

    6. In Object Lessons: How to Do Things with Fetishism (1999), McCallum writes: “fetishism is a form of subject-object relation that informs us about basic strategies of defining, desiring, and knowing subjects and objects in Western culture. More importantly, in the way that it brings together peculiarly modern anxieties—especially those about sexuality, gender, belief, and knowledge—fetishism reveals how our basic categories for interpreting the world have been reduced to binary and mutually exclusive terms. … [F]etishism is a subject-object relation that violates the modern, Western assumption that subjects and objects are mutually independent” (xi-xii, xxi; for elaboration, see 151-68).

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    • —. “Ellipsis in Dread and the Specular Seduction.” 1975. Translated by Dolores Burdick, Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology: A Film Theory Reader, edited by Phillip Rosen, Columbia UP, 1986, pp. 236-43.
    • —. Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection. 1980. Translated by Leon S. Roudiez, Columbia UP, 1982.
    • —. Strangers to Ourselves. 1988. Translated by Leon S. Roudiez, Columbia UP, 1991.
    • Lacan, Jacques. “On My Antecedents.” 1966. Écrits, translated by Bruce Fink with Héloïse Fink and Russell Grigg, W. W. Norton, 2006, pp. 51-57.
    • —. Le séminaire de Jacques Lacan, Livre VII: L’éthique de la psychanalyse 1959-1960. Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller, Seuil, 1986.
    • —. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book II: The Ego in Freud’s Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis 1954-1955. 1978. Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller, translated by Sylvana Tomaselli, W. W. Norton, 1991.
    • —. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VII: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959-1960. 1986. Edited by Jacques-Alain Miller, translated by Dennis Porter, W. W. Norton, 1992.
    • Lapsley, Richard, and Michael Westlake. Film Theory: An Introduction. Manchester UP, 1988.
    • Le Bon, Gustave. The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind. 1895. Viking P, 1965.
    • Levine, Matt. “A Ribbon of Dreams: Dreams and Cinema.” Crosscuts, 3 Aug. 2012. https://walkerart.org/magazine/dreams-cinema-history-matt-levine.
    • Lotter, Konrad. “Faszination.” Lexikon der Ästhetik. Edited by Wolfhart Henckmann and Konrad Lotter, C. H. Beck, 1992, pp. 60-61.
    • MacCabe, Colin. “Realism and the Cinema: Notes on Some Brechtian Theses.” Screen, vol. 15 no. 2, Summer 1974, pp. 7-27. doi.org/10.1093/screen/15.2.7.
    • —. “Theory and Film: Principles of Realism and Pleasure.” Screen, vol. 17 no. 3, Autumn 1976, pp. 7-28. doi.org/10.1093/screen/17.3.7.
    • McCallum, E. L. Object Lessons: How to Do Things with Fetishism. State U of New York P, 1999.
    • Mel and Kim. “Respectable.” Composed and produced by Mike Stock, Matt Aitken, and Peter Waterman, F.L.M., Supreme, 1987. Vinyl.
    • Metz, Christian. “The Imaginary Signifier.” Translated by Ben Brewster, Screen, vol. 16 no. 2, Summer 1975, pp. 14-76. doi.org/10.1093/screen/16.2.4.
    • Miller, D. A. “Anal Rope.” inside/out: Lesbian Theories, Gay Theories, edited by Diana Fuss, Routledge, 1991, pp. 119-41.
    • —. Hidden Hitchcock. U of Chicago P, 2016.
    • —. 8 ½. Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.
    • Mulvey, Laura. Fetishism and Curiosity. British Film Institute / Indiana UP, 1996.
    • Rancière, Jacques. “On the theory of ideology (the politics of Althusser).” Radical Philosophy, vol. 7, Spring 1974, pp. 2-15. https://www.radicalphilosophyarchive.com/issue-files/rp7_article1_althusserstheoryofideology_rancière.pdf.
    • Rascaroli, Laura. “Oneiric Metaphor in Film Theory.” Kinema, Fall 2002, pp. 1-11. University of Waterloo Libraries Open Journal System, https://openjournals.uwaterloo.ca/index.php/kinema/article/download/982/1054?inline=1.
    • Santner, Eric L. Stranded Objects: Mourning, Melancholy, and Film in Postwar Germany. Cornell UP, 1990.
    • Shaviro, Steven. “Film Theory and Visual Fascination.” The Cinematic Body. U of Minnesota P, 1993, pp. 1-65.
    • Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky. “Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading; or, You’re So Paranoid, You Probably Think This Introduction Is about You.” Novel Gazing: Queer Readings in Fiction, edited by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Duke UP, 1997, pp. 1-37.
    • Seeber, Hans Ulrich. “Funktionen der Literatur im Prozess der Modernisierung.” Funktionen von Literatur: Theoretische Grundlagen und Modellinterpretationen, edited by Marion Gymnich and Ansgar Nünning, WVT, 2005, pp. 79-98.
    • —. Literarische Faszination in England um 1900. Universitätverlag Winter, 2012.
    • Thys, Michel. Fascinatie: Een fenomenologisch-psychoanalytische verkenning van het onmenselijke, Boom, 2006.
    • Türcke, Christoph. “Faszination.” Historisch-kritisches Wörterbuch des Marxismus, edited by Wolfgang Fritz Haug, Frigga Haug, Peter Jehle, and Wolfgang Küttler, Vol. 4, Berlin Institute of Critical Theory, 1999, pp. 186-94.
    • Watt, Calum. Blanchot and the Moving Image: Fascination and Spectatorship. Legenda, 2017.
    • Weingart, Brigitte. “Contact at a Distance: The Topology of Fascination.” Rethinking Emotion: Interiority and Exteriority in Premodern, Modern, and Contemporary Thought, edited by Rüdiger Campe and Julia Weber, De Gruyter, 2014, pp. 72-100.
    • —. “Faszinieren.” Historisches Wörterbuch des Mediengebrauchs, edited by Heiko Christians, Matthias Bickenbach, and Nikolaus Wegmann, 2015, pp. 209-24.
    • Žižek, Slavoj. Less than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism. Verso, 2012.

  • Notes on Contributors

    Kevin Cooley is a PhD Candidate in the English Department at the University of Florida, where he works with animation, visual culture, and queer media. He is managing editor of ImageTexT: Interdisciplinary Comics Studies, guest editor for Synoptique‘s special issue “Animating LGBTQ+ Representations,” and the 2020 recipient of the Lucy Shelton Caswell Award from the Billy Ireland Cartoon Library at Ohio State University. His work has appeared in Modernism/modernity, Animation, Horror Studies, and elsewhere.

    Walter Johnston teaches in English and Comparative Literature at Williams College. His recent publications include “Land and See: the Theatricality of the Political in Schmitt and Melville,” in Handsomely Done: Aesthetics, Politics, and Media after Melville (Northwestern UP, 2019), and “Critique of Populist Reason,” Diacritics Vol. 45, No. 3, 2017. He is completing a monograph entitled Political Romanticism Now: the Power of Judgment in Times of Dissent, which traces the anarchic horizontalism, open-endedness, and ephemerality of contemporary protest culture back to the tradition of “political romanticism.”

    Nathaniel Likert is a PhD candidate in English at Cornell University, specializing in early modern literature, the history of science, and the philosophy of mind. His essay on Margaret Cavendish is forthcoming in ELH.

    Margherita Long teaches Japanese literature and environmental humanities in the Department of East Asian Studies at UC Irvine. Her first book was a study of Tanizaki Jun’ichiro (1886-1965) called This Perversion Called Love: Reading Tanizaki, Feminist Theory and Freud (Stanford 2009). Her current project is a study of literature, activist narratives, and documentary cinema, Care, Affect, Crackup: Literature and Activism after Fukushima. The book discusses novelists Kimura Yūsuke, Kobayashi Erika, Ōe Kenzaburō, Tsushima Yūko, Yū Miri and Kawakami Hiromi, activists Mutō Ruiko, Sasaki Keiko and Sato Sachiko, and filmmakers Kamanaka Hitomi, Doi Toshikuni and Iwasaki Masanori.

    Chris Malcolm received his Ph.D. in Comparative Literature from UC Irvine in 2017. He is Assistant Professor of Environmental Humanities and Coordinator of the Minor in Sustainable Ecosystems: Art & Design at Maine College of Art. His book project, Ecological Concessions: Environmental Damage and the Management of Harm, focuses critically on moments when environmental discourse seems preoccupied with conceding, admitting, confessing, and apologizing for its involvement in causing harm.

    Joanne Randa Nucho, an anthropologist and filmmaker, is the author of Everyday Sectarianism in Urban Lebanon: Infrastructures, Public Services, and Power (Princeton University Press 2016) and Assistant Professor of Anthropology at Pomona College. Her films have been screened in various venues, including the London International Documentary Film Festival.

    Mark Steven is the author of Red Modernism (Johns Hopkins) and Splatter Capital (Repeater). He teaches literature at the University of Exeter.

  • Earth on the Frontier: the Environment as Consistent Relation

    Chris Malcolm (bio)

    A review of Neyrat, Frédéric. The Unconstructable Earth: An Ecology of Separation. Translated by Drew S. Burk, Fordham UP, 2019.

    Frédéric Neyrat’s The Unconstructable Earth: An Ecology of Separation is a wide-ranging study of what Neyrat calls “geo-constructivism” (the French subtitle is Critique du Geoconstructivisme): his term for the scientific, economic, and philosophical assumptions that underlie the contemporary engineering of Earth. Composed of thirteen chapters across three sections, Neyrat argues that there is significant overlap between the responses of engineers, architects, biologists, geographers, anthropologists, philosophers, and ecologists to the climate crisis. What they all share, knowingly or unknowingly, is a commitment to an idea of the Earth as malleable. In the first of the book’s sections, “The Mirror of the Anthropocene,” Neyrat covers the more properly scientific discourse of those who, in response to climate collapse, would terraform the Earth and manage or “steward” (57) its damaged state. In the second section, “The Future of Eco-constructivism,” he focuses on the convergence of a major strand of political ecology with contemporary eco-materialist philosophy. These modern environmental discourses are tied together by a techno-fetishism that projects an absence of limits in order to argue for increased access to the management of the world. The logic is one in which the right to damage the environment and the right to manage the process of damage, legitimate one another. The book’s final section, “An Ecology of Separation,” positions itself against these discourses to argue for a nascent anti-capitalist and anti-colonial separation, one latent to the Earth itself, in which nature can neither be controlled nor dominated. The ambitious scope of the text, its unusual form, and its creative object selection allow one to see how long-held relations with nature reappear in contemporary discourses that continue to disavow their own violent character.

    The notion that the Earth is dying has been a gift to contemporary thinking on the environment. As the climate crisis enters its emergency phase, the contours of what this death might mean for the planet, and—just as crucially—for its killers, is becoming clearer and clearer. The UK-based activist movement, Extinction Rebellion, embodies this idea, voicing sentiments that include: “our governments have failed to protect us,” “we are facing an unprecedented global emergency” (“Climate Emergency”) that is “beyond politics” (“The Truth”), “we need a mass mobilization on the scale of World War II” (“Rebel Starter Pack”). Read alongside The Unconstructable Earth, we can see what the war of the world for the world is already beginning to look like and in whose interests it is being fought. Nourished by the scientifico-cultural Anthropocene thesis, Neyrat writes that the planet’s apparent terminality has allowed for Earth “[to] become the object of a technological colonization project” (8). The geo-constructivist program is, as Neyrat terms it, “anaturalist” (4), figuring “nature as nonexistent” (4) and, therefore, establishing the “condition for the ontological possibility of technologies whose goal is to replace nature” (5). The moment of the Blue Marble (NASA), according to Neyrat, more properly furnished the conditions for the whole Earth to be considered, paradoxically, as the final frontier: a total object unto itself, one that can be repaired, renovated, improved, and, ultimately, reconstructed.

    Like all frontier projects, geo-construction is presented in the rhetoric of development and improvement.1 And, like all frontier projects, what is to be improved is thought of as already dead in principle, so the improver or developer must also be dead. As Neyrat has it, “humanity is [imagined as] external to Earth not simply because humanity considers itself as some kind of nonliving entity but also because the Earth is considered as being nonterrestrial” (49). In its attempt to develop and improve the Earth, geo-constructivism inherits the ideology of the Space Age and combines it with the aftermath of the nuclear imaginary. We read its ideology as one of techno-fantasy that relies on the apocalyptic investments adopted by environmental discourse, and whose endpoint is the kind of post-raciality in which groups like Extinction Rebellion participate. However, geoengineering, says Neyrat, is a “firefighter technology” acting “after the fact, on the consequences [of our actions]” (33). This belated activity ought to be understood not simply as action that comes too late and is in denial of its own extractive capitalist drive, but as activity that, equally after the fact, aims to reinterpret what counts as life, what losing life has looked like historically, and what it looks like now. The narrative of urgency and threat that characterizes much environmental discourse—the belief that violence like this really is unprecedented, against which Neyrat usefully pushes back—accepts the terms by which geo-constructivism functions and naturalizes its effects. “Climate engineering,” writes Neyrat, “considers itself as ready to save the planet—even if we have to pay for it by way of some collateral damage, such as with periods of severe drought in equatorial Africa and certain parts of India” (32). I found Neyrat’s book to be most useful when it helped me better see how that collateral damage is figured as a necessary cost—not just by geo-constructivists but by environmental discourse in general—and the pervasiveness of the kinds of relationality that sustain those conceptions.

    Under the horizon of the nonliving geo-constructivist who rearranges the non-terrestrial Earth, the bulk of the book’s project is to trace how relationships to nature are formed. But hasn’t the Earth, or at least its grounded image, nature, been dying for a while? As critics like Raymond Williams suggest, the concept of nature emerges, dialectically, just as it starts to disappear on entering the modern period, if not before.2 Unconstructable Earth chooses to stick with nature as a concept and, thereby, partially stick with the Western dialectical schema occasioned by the nature/culture distinction. It thereby begs the question prominent at least since the time of Marx, and central to, for example, Dialectic of Enlightenment: is a non-dialectical conception of nature, which can also register loss, possible? It’s a simple question, but one from which most studies of this kind fail to escape.3 This is a particular problem, especially when, as Neyrat argues, in almost all environmental thought, “relation takes precedence and must be protected against what ravages it” (148). However, the humanist critique of environmental destruction all too often inaugurates a grieving, rueful and urgent subject and, in so doing, re-substantiates the notion of the “others of Europe” as those who either bear the effects of this destruction or were simply not mourned in time (da Silva 250).4

    The tendency to reject the nature/culture distinction altogether has, of course, become prominent in posthumanist environmental thinking. Neyrat quotes Deleuze as emblematic of this approach: “It should be clear that the plane of immanence, the plane of Nature that distributes affects, does not make any distinction at all between things that might be called natural and things that might be called artificial” (140). However, this position also resubstantiates Western universality via the nonsubjective backdoor, so to speak, and Neyrat complains it “[liquidates] the possibility of existing for the beings that populate the world” (140).5 Indeed, much of new materialist thinking on the environment makes ontological claims about the status of relations between humans and non-humans as repressed historical arguments that are concerned with attempting to resolve culpability and reverse historical damage.1

    Unconstructable Earth faces the problem of the nature/culture distinction head on by suggesting that the two most prominent Western conceptions—that a difference must be affirmed and that a difference doesn’t exist—actually merge. A more humanistic and dialectical claim like “everything is connected” converges with a techno-modernist claim like “everything is uncertain.” Likewise, a more traditionally ethical idea like “nature must be preserved” can be read as the other side of a more contemporary one like “there is no such thing as nature.” This is because, as Neyrat has it, both conceptions imagine as consistent a notion of relation between things and therefore figure relation as “more permeable, more contagious—than we would ever have thought” (12). With this idea, Neyrat arrives at what texts in Indigenous Studies take as a starting point. His claim here would match up with a book like Glen Coulthard’s Red Skin, White Masks, which holds that relations of access characterize settler-colonial extraction and that maintaining those relations is and has been the historical work of the State and of capital.

    Before concluding the book with more straightforwardly philosophical arguments, Neyrat spends most of his time on the second of the two nature/culture conceptions and those who think that there is no longer—or never was—a self-sufficient nature: post-environmentalists, geo-constructivists, and eco-modernists. Although varied, this grouping broadly follows a conception of nature as “naturing nature (natura naturans)—that is, the permanent genesis of things, nature as process, as productivity” (135). They consist of resilience ecologists—those who figure a political economy which requires that its subjects adapt themselves to “programmed uncertainty” (71)—as well as all agencies that demand more and greater intervention into the ecosphere. One of the tasks of this group is to define the relational field through the terms of movement and stasis, as well as to “insist on the fact that the environment is not separate from human beings” (86). Post-environmentalists like Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger, for example, sound similar to Bruno Latour because they understand that “showing that everything is connected is the best way for affirming the idea that the entirety of nature has been anthropomorphized” (93). They therefore find it possible to direct their desire to de-extinction and re-wilding projects in order to more emphatically “resuscitate a nature that was already dead and buried” (53). This discourse suggests that loss is, paradoxically, as irreversible as it is recoverable. “It’s as if the numbing of the Earth,” writes Neyrat, “was one of the necessary conditions for allowing geoengineers to justify their mode of intervention” (56). Only a dying world—whoever caused it to be so hardly matters—would be in need of the kind of management that these thinkers conceive: “it’s this administration a posteriori that they call ‘ecology’” (127). Of course, it turns out that such a position is not possible to maintain. While reconstructing the Earth, “the anaturalist drive of the West will be in need of an ecosphere in order to continually revitalize itself” (115). Therefore, anaturalism requires both a position outside the Earth—Neyrat names it “off-planet” (8)—as well as a concept of nature itself.

    So, are we back within the matrix of an ethical humanism that would show that geo-constructivism must construct the notion of nature it then claims it has the legitimacy to manipulate? Not quite. What Neyrat argues throughout is that the nature/culture divide is both rejected and maintained, not only by post-environmentalists but also by older versions of environmentalism. Neyrat quotes John Muir to say that “when we try to pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything else in the universe” (147). Again, what we discover as we follow Neyrat through each different position is the insistence on what he calls the “principles of principles”: that everything is connected. “Resistant to any sort of Romanticism [of the Muir type] as much as to any kind of deep ecology,” he writes, “Latour nevertheless founds his ecological political thought on the concept of ‘attachments’; and Stengers speaks of ‘entanglements’ […] Alaimo maintains that the substance of the human being is ‘inseparable’ from its environment” (147). What Unconstructable Earth shows is that the ontologization of relation—its reliability and everywhere-ness—provides the philosophical grounds for the permanence of a principle of accessibility that we can read as colonial and violent. “If the battle against the great divide of nature/culture means to do away with any sort of separation, then this battle will do nothing but nourish a globalized anaturalism” (149), he suggests. For this reason, the final part of the book turns toward a theory of that separation, “without,” he adds, “wholeheartedly agreeing with the Cartesian and post-Cartesian denial of relation (object-oriented thinking and speculative realism)” (149).

    Broadly, I am in support of what Neyrat theorizes in the book’s final sections but feel like they perform a certain kind of methodological rigor and philosophical sophistication in a way that produces familiar philosophical modes and thereby avoids more complicated questions of self-positioning and reflexivity. I think it is important, as Neyrat does, to clarify that some relations exist as unknown and remain separate, even if decolonial theorists consider this a given.6 And as I suggest above, I also think it’s important to show the theoretical and structural assumptions of the productivist thrust of much post-humanist theory, which can appear to coincide with the politics of a post-racial extractivism. But if I were to be critical, I would wonder whether or not it has become part of the ideology of philosophical method to search for a quasi-transcendental figure that does not fall prey to the errors and mistakes of previous positions. Neyrat writes,

    we must then consider as unconstructable that which escapes all construction—whether past, present, or future—and, as a consequence, precedes the primordial… The unconstructable does not escape destruction because it is indestructible, or because it is fleeing from death, but because destruction itself requires the unconstructable. Every action—whether constructive or destructive—requires a contraction, a subtraction, an antiproduction that precedes it as its dark side or counterlining (revers). The unconstructable is the inaccessible transcendental of production, which we will call its transcendental dark side or counterlining. (163)

    By holding to this kind of familiar philosophical movement, the book leaves me wondering whether the limit of philosophical critique is to show the failure of a method to account for itself, and to create one that doesn’t. I raise this question—the question of this search, and the rhetoric of its creation—because the book is, avowedly, in the service of what Neyrat calls, in two fleeting sections (one at the end of the introduction and one at the end of the first chapter), “the minoritarian bodies of the Anthropocene” (65). What would the book have been like had these bodies been more central to it? Without this, concluding with the ethic of separation departs from an articulation of violence and moves toward a universalist ethics that doesn’t sit well in this context. As Neyrat writes, “I am connected to others because I am separate, because I bear within me alterity” (150). This is, of course, a question of tradition, archive, and discipline. But for a text that largely breaks with convention on what can count as an object of study in a way that is helpful for environmental inquiry, it’s important to keep in mind that disciplines are also formed as new texts reassert what literatures and cultures are valued. According to Unconstructable Earth, those literatures and cultures still center on the likes of Latour, Spinoza, Deleuze, Schelling, and Meillassoux, which appear not simply as projects to be supplemented by a philosophical addition. But if one of philosophy’s problems is the ability to dream up relation when there is none, as Neyrat convincingly argues, I wonder what it would mean to really write philosophy and to conceive of academic projects with that in mind.

    Footnotes

    1. For such an argument, see Bhandar’s Colonial Lives of Property.

    3. For a symptomatic example of this problem, see Heise’s Imagining Extinction.

    4. On the former, see Affective Ecocriticism. Risling-Baldy foregrounds the concept of “survivance” in order to insist upon the parallel acts of survival and resistance by Native peoples. See her We Are Dancing for You.

    5. For more on how this resubstantiates Western universality, see Spivak’s “Can the Subaltern Speak?”

    6. For two of the influential texts of the type, see Morton’s Hyperobjects and Bennett’s Vibrant Matter.

    7. The idea that colonial, visual, and epistemological regimes cannot see, comprehend, or understand colonized peoples, and that these peoples have their own non-colonial regimes, is commonplace in decolonial thinking. In this context, therefore, the idea of “separation” is assumed. See, for example, Gomez-Barris’s The Extractive Zone.

    Works Cited

    • Bennett, Jane. Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things. Duke UP, 2010.
    • Bhandar, Brenna. Colonial Lives of Property: Law, Land, and Racial Regimes of Ownership. Duke UP, 2018.
    • Bladow, Kyle, and Jennifer Ladino, editors. Affective Ecocriticism: Emotion, Embodiment, Environment. Nebraska UP, 2018.
    • Coulthard, Glen. Red Skin White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition. Minnesota UP, 2014.
    • Da Silva, Denise Ferreira. Toward a Global Idea of Race. Minnesota UP, 2007.
    • Extinction Rebellion Massachusetts. “Climate Emergency.” 2020. https://www.xrmass.org/climate-emergency. Accessed March 27, 2020.
    • Extinction Rebellion. Rebel Starter Pack. 2019. https://rebellion.earth/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Rebel-Starter-Pack-4-September-2019.pdf. Accessed July 15, 2019.
    • Extinction Rebellion. “The Truth.” 2020. https://rebellion.earth/the-truth/demands/. Accessed March 27, 2020.
    • Gomez-Barris, Macarena. The Extractive Zone: Social Ecologies and Decolonial Perspectives. Duke UP, 2017.
    • Heise, Ursula. Imagining Extinction: The Cultural Meanings of Endangered Species. Chicago UP, 2016.
    • Morton, Timothy. Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology After the End of the World. U of Minnesota P, 2014.
    • NASA. Blue Marble-Image of the Earth. 1972. https://www.nasa.gov/content/blue-marble-image-of-the-earth-from-aapollo-17. Accessed March 8, 2020.
    • Neyrat, Frédéric. The Unconstructable Earth: An Ecology of Separation. Translated by Drew S. Burk, Fordham UP, 2019.
    • Risling-Baldy, Cutcha. We Are Dancing for You: Native Feminisms and the Revitalization of Coming-of-Age Ceremonies. Washington UP, 2018.
    • Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. “Can the Subaltern Speak?” Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, edited by Cary Nelson and Larry Grossberg, Illinois UP, 1988, pp. 271-313.
    • Williams, Raymond. Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society. Oxford UP, 1976.

  • A Quiet Manifesto

    Nathaniel Likert (bio)

    A review of Kramnick, Jonathan. Paper Minds: Literature and the Ecology of Consciousness. U of Chicago P, 2018.

    Literary studies has recently seen a sharp uptick in interest in all things broadly “empirical:” from the influx of cognitive approaches (Lisa Zunshine, Alan Palmer) to sociological methods (Heather Love) to science studies (Bruno Latour). This scholarship attempts, on the one hand, to walk back the discipline’s longstanding skepticism of empirical approaches as theory-laden political positions in disguise (a poststructuralist legacy) without, on the other hand, naïvely embracing the merely given. Jonathan Kramnick’s new book, Paper Minds: Literature and the Ecology of Consciousness, weighs the stakes of empirical approaches for literary criticism, and expertly cashes out a version of this approach in particular readings. Broadly conceived, the book does two things. Its first third assesses the potential for literary study to intervene in extra-disciplinary debates. To do so, it combats various reductionisms—those of many of Kramnick’s empiricist forebears—that would situate the literary as little more than a data set for the methodologies of other disciplines. Against this, he proposes a version of form that presents the subject matter (or content) of other disciplines in a unique way, allowing literature to reframe those disciplines’ questions and thereby make new answers possible. The rest of the book fleshes out this new formalism by reading a clutch of literary works, from the eighteenth century to the present day, with the help of recent cognitive-scientific work on embodied perception. These works present, at the level of form, a picture of mind as enmeshed within rather than floating above the world. The book’s primary achievement, to my eye, is that it advocates a rapprochement between literature and cognitive science that, unlike other recent calls for this sort of détente, preserves the special status of the literary artifact (as form) without romanticizing it.

    Most centrally, the book aims to carve out the precise niche of literary contribution to two current questions in the philosophy and science of mind. The first concerns consciousness. In Kramnick’s telling, there are two basic accounts of the origin of conscious experience. In the first, consciousness is an emergent property of inert, unfeeling matter. In the second—called panpsychism—emergence is unnecessary because matter already enfolds consciousness as an inherent property of the universe at large. This debate links up with the second question, a related puzzle about perception: is consciousness ultimately an internal “bringing the world to mind” as mental representation, thus prioritizing mediation and skepticism? Or is it a direct “[reaching] out” (10) to things in the world as they lie and as they invite the perceiver, like a kind of touch? The latter answer to this second question forms the book’s moral heart. Kramnick champions “direct perception” (8) as “ecophenomenological” (3) or a “dissident [strain] of empiricism” (9) that brokers mind and world without positing either as the determining ground of the other.1 Because direct perception dissolves the internalism of the representational view, mind has a commonsensical access to world, and yet, because that world is still phenomenal—an “affordance” (5) enabling certain kinds of action for certain creatures with certain physical makeups—we aren’t forced to do away with the subject altogether. The world, in this view, invites action rather than contemplation—an ecological engagement whose watchword for Kramnick is “skill” (6). 2

    One could object that this account courts scientific reductionism by positing a way of life grounded in a morphological feature of the human body, but Kramnick parries this attack through an account of literary form. For Kramnick, literature helps historicize our perceptual apparatus by encoding, in its formal features, various stances about both the nature of perception and the kinds of environments that prompt it to act in different, contingent ways: “The emphasis on motion, skill, and environment broadens the discussion from the ostensibly unchanging nature of the brain to the historically variable conditions of circumstance” (6). If direct perception syncs up mind and world, and world is historical, then mind is historical too and literature helps shape for us its (local) contours. The argument is a series of nested analogies: the direct perception of represented characters or speakers is like the craft aesthetics of the writer which, in turn, is like the skill of the critic. Seeing is writing is reading. Each draws on the perceptual attunement of the others.

    In the first two chapters, Kramnick tackles directly the way we read now. Many claim that literary studies are in crisis. While blame teleports between external (the neoliberal university and its bottom-line agenda, frowning at declining majors and uneasily quantified research output) and internal factors (our critical methodology, balking at value judgments), the prognosis is the same: the continued decline of the humanities’ relevance in the academy. One answer to this bleak forecast has been an ever-more-insistent borrowing from disciplines more firmly vested with public confidence (like the sciences), and Kramnick’s twin chapters address this move (and its underlying cynicism). The first mounts the paradoxical case that “the best way to be interdisciplinary is to inhabit one’s discipline fully” (17). This case depends, crucially, on what Kramnick calls “ontological pluralism” (18) or the idea that each “corner of the world” (51) is not reducible—that is, fundamentally explicable—in the terms of any other area of study. This model is explicitly drawn from Jerry Fodor’s well-known argument about “special sciences” (i.e. all those that are not physics) which resists the idea that these can be reduced to physics (or any to a level more granular than itself) on the grounds that their phenomena are all multiply realizable. That is, they can be instantiated by any number of physical systems—for example, silicon could conceivably give rise to brain function as well as organic matter does—and, thus, cannot be reduced. This view would establish literature as an autonomous field of study, prompting reflection on what Kramnick calls “explanatory pluralism” (18): the idea that a nonreducible panoply of objects in the world requires the same plurality of disciplines to study them, and that each must therefore cultivate its own garden of explanatory terms, definitions, and methods of study. For Kramnick, that particularity lies in form itself, which is the mode of presentation of any phenomenon in a literary text (21); to restate these phenomena as propositions in the language of another discipline is to dissolve the mode of presentation—the form—that makes them unique. Form simply is literature, with the caveat that form is itself beholden to disciplinary norms of explanation, and these remain “inquiry-relative” (38) and context-specific. Even within a discipline, one cannot posit a unifying notion of form that would foreclose others.3 This reductionism (by literary critics themselves) is the target of the next chapter—previously a much-discussed article in Critical Inquiry written with Anahid Nersessian—which argues against the “polemic” of wielding a single notion of form to the exclusion of others (52), defending both the separation of literature from other disciplines and the necessity of ongoing pluralism and debate within its confines.

    The remainder of the book puts this capacious notion of form to work by reading a selection of literary texts from the eighteenth to the twenty-first centuries, all of which foreground the two key debates in the philosophy of mind: consciousness and embodied perception. These chapters divide into two sections. Chapters three and four examine eighteenth-century locodescriptive and Georgic poetry to excavate an aesthetic “counter-tradition” that privileges tactile immediacy over the classic conception of disinterested, distanced contemplation. Kramnick shows how these poems, through the “homely style” (60) of formal elements like apostrophe, ferry the world to the speaker for active engagement. The remaining chapters turn to the novel, and primarily concern consciousness while keeping hold of embodied perception. The fifth chapter compares eighteenth-century and contemporary theories of mental representation, arguing that literary scholars can’t assess which theories are right, per se, but can only trace historical change. The eighteenth-century representational view helped produce the epistolary novel, whose sequence of letters resembles the association of ideas in the mind. This chapter also takes up contemporary cognitive scientific approaches to literature, arguing that attempts to posit the biologically essentialist structure of mind that novels approximate miss the historical warp and woof of empirical theory. The sixth chapter suggests that the so-called “hard problem of consciousness” is only a problem because it defines consciousness as purely private experience.4 Kramnick takes up two contemporary novels—Ian McEwan’s Saturday and Tom McCarthy’s Remainder—which illustrate two distinct ways to rethink this “hard problem,” encoded in the structure of their sentences. The final chapter turns to panpsychism, tracing its fortunes from Margaret Cavendish’s 1666 speculative romance The Blazing World to the recent novels of Marilynne Robinson. Both Cavendish and Robinson respond to reductionist orthodoxies of their day (the Royal Society, New Atheism) that believe grasping the structure of matter will provide the key to experience. Panpsychism holds that since all matter is experiential, the form of that experience will vary infinitely based on the material structure of any given organism. Kramnick teases out this variety in each author’s nested layers of narration.

    Paper Minds takes a decidedly hopeful bent toward the future of literary study. The critic seeks to cultivate habitable lifeworlds: both literary texts and a sense of dwelling in a world partially made by one’s own skilled activity aid in and aesthetically christen such work. This is all quite apart from the literary-critical mainstream’s gloomy cultural determinism, descended at least from Saussure, for whom langue showed up precisely in the unconscious moment when one heard a word and automatically supplied its meaning—language preceded the subject, and the signified dangled always out of reach. Not so here. This constructive, realist, optimistic stance shares much with contemporary postcritical thought in its refusal to allegorize texts as symptoms of discursive forces and structures. Critique’s “disputing of ‘common sense’” (Anker and Felski 3) as insufficient to grasp the gears of power behind the curtain has been supplanted by a trusting, even loving attention to the immediately present. What shows up for us in sensory experience is accepted as the given.5 Kramnick makes good on this commitment in his prose style, which limits complicated clauses and jargon while adopting a comfortable, good-naturedly modest tone. There is a politics to this style, of course: assent is all but guaranteed by the very simplicity Kramnick claims for his points. To take one example, he constantly uses “just” or “just so” to describe the inviting presence of a three-dimensional object calling out to be handled—as in “a pail placed just so” (65) or “when positioned just so” (146). Similarly, Kramnick uses “just” to discuss both an object being addressed—”a creature who is just here” (95)—and the perceiving subject who is addressing it: “when the head turns just so” (5). The word most obviously means “precisely,” emphasizing the nuanced skill of the perceiver, but it means also “simply” or “merely,” suggesting a plainly available rather than a deviously occluded world.

    While launching plenty of critical salvos against reductionism, Kramnick doesn’t have much to say about the position of his positive claims vis-à-vis other contemporary theorists. In fact, at both the theoretical and historical levels, Kramnick comfortably perches his claims beside the standard ones without saying that they’re wrong. A non-interventionist pluralism has been gathering steam for a few years now, against what Jason Potts and Daniel Stout call our “theory-as-wholesale-transformation model” (8), which serves to “effectively linearize the intellectual landscape” (9). In its refusal to figure heroic reinvention as the only way to play, Kramnick’s work doesn’t ask “what’s next,” but rather “what else?” (“Theory Aside”). This is hardly a radical move in the sphere of theory, of course, as fewer scholars would claim today to profess allegiance to, say, poststructuralism or Marxism as the orienting lens of their work. It’s much more of an intervention in historical scholarship, though, which remains relatively committed to the “replacement” model (9). Kramnick emphasizes dissident strands that aren’t the period’s real story but merely a forgotten subplot. He doesn’t deny the dominant representational theory of perception or the importance of the distance aesthetics it subtends—the fifth chapter makes the former’s importance quite clear for early eighteenth century novels, and the latter is so ubiquitous as to almost go without saying—but reintroduces its forgotten double, troubling the self-evidence of the representational account’s progress while adding to, rather than clearing up, our sense of the period’s (and the questions about the nature of mind’s) complexity.

    This brings us back to Kramnick’s main achievement in Paper Minds: the deployment of formalism as literature’s key offering to extra-literary debates. On one side of the text, this justifies literary study as an enterprise without lapsing into sentimental claims about improving our moral receptivity or reifying literature itself as some kind of special site that triggers this sort of thing. On the other, it frees literature from its status as either symptom or romantic critic of other discourses, since its formal mode of “presentation” of extra-textual questions reframes rather than merely denouncing or reflecting those questions. Certain speaker-communities (disciplines) are stable enough to broker formal definitions of certain texts that hail them as literature within the context of literary study. Literature, in other words, is what literary critics talk about. And yet, Kramnick also holds that literature is an object with its own “corner of the world” (51), pre-existing our use. It’s therefore an affordance: it has certain properties that invite responses and a certain kind of response coaxed from a certain kind of reader with certain training would be called literary criticism.6 Kramnick thereby offers a defense of professionalism without making it disdainful toward or categorically distinct from non-specialist reading.

    An especially successful example can be found in the book’s penultimate chapter. There, Kramnick reads Tom McCarthy’s novel Remainder not as either a rejection of or a straightforward answer to Chalmers’s “hard problem of consciousness” (the inexplicable way in which non-conscious matter gives rise to conscious experience)—as though literature itself simply made propositions—but instead as a way to ask the question differently by presenting it formally in a particular way. Discussing Thomas Nagel’s related conception of consciousness as “what it is like” to have a certain experience, Kramnick notes that “Asking what it is like to be a bat therefore defined consciousness in a specific way merely by posing the question in a certain manner” (121, emphasis mine). In other words, the emphasis on qualia—subjective experience—automatically builds a notion of consciousness as interior into the very fabric of the question, determining in advance the kind of answer possible (or in this case, precisely not possible). Remainder doesn’t so much answer this question as pose it differently, suggesting a very distinct sort of answer without forcing one: McCarthy’s “deadpan, uninflected first person… does not attempt to represent a thing, so much as to be that thing, to make it present” (Kramnick 134-5). In this way, the formal layout of the sentences themselves—with their affectless presentation of objects as cues for action—suggests that consciousness cannot simply be equated with interior qualia. Crucially, the novel (again, anti-polemically—this is perhaps another reason Kramnick likes literature) never states that position directly: “McCarthy’s innovation in any case lies more in the way his novel presents things than in the content of its ideas” (Kramnick 136), leading us to “wonder whether even the hardest problems posed by the sciences have been phrased or shaped in the right way” (137). This reading is a perfect illustration of Kramnick and Nersessian’s claim that all explanations “are relevant only insofar as they respond to a question in a way that actually answers what is being asked” (51); those questions are in turn the stock-in-trade of disciplines, revisable by “consensus judgment” (51). Positioning questions as discipline-dependent and answers as question-dependent recovers agency for both the critic—whose “workaday interpretive habits” (50) can tweak the questions being asked without tipping over into the mastery of critique—and for the literary text itself, without recourse either to dilettantish cribbing from other disciplines or nostalgic appeals to empathy-training or the undecidability of language.

    All of this said, Kramnick’s commitment to the immediate and self-evident experience of the individual also presents the book’s greatest shortcoming: its lack of attention to large-scale, systemic conditions. This is partly a simple consequence of the subject matter and archive, because analytic philosophy of mind deals in minds and persons rather than in subjects and structures. Moreover, on a modular view of the self (again with an eye towards the pluralism so alive in Kramnick’s work), there need not be anything inherently political or apolitical about either one’s disciplinary commitments or one’s conscious experience; one could leave one’s apolitical scholarship at the end of the day and head straight to the union rally, or feel the affordances of a voting booth. Still, this reader couldn’t help but feel, while gliding across Kramnick’s satisfied, warmly reasonable prose about how good it is to take pleasure in, say, apple-growing, that broader political issues—so obviously the context of Kramnick’s bracing call for disciplinarity—simply don’t register to trouble individual pleasure. This attitude actually characterizes quite a bit of recent theory, much of it in the postcritique line, in what Carolyn Lesjak calls an “accommodation to the given” (249). For Lesjak this is a defeatist surrender of Marxist utopian hopes for the blinkered consolation of the good-enough: the jobs we have, the circumstances we find ourselves in, the now rather than the future.

    To give Kramnick his due, he is at least committed to a kind of immediate material agency of the perceiving mind. In a passage crucial to the book’s politics characteristically buried in the middle of a close reading of Robinson Crusoe, Kramnick remarks that

    What Defoe adds to the Gibsonian picture is the emphasis on how skilled action alters the encountered world. The aesthetics of the handsome is not just a kinetic adjustment to something that is, in Gibson’s preferred word, ‘invariant’; it is a way of adjusting or varying things in turn.(77, emphasis mine)

    No mere psychological coping, direct perception presents the world as a set of affordances for action, and that action brings yet more affordances into being in an evolving kinesis of action, reaction, and imbrication. Mind is world is mind, tumbling over each other such that neither enjoys a fully deterministic edge, and the perceivers’ aesthetically-pleasurable skill confirms them as agents in a sort of ongoing homemaking. Still, as a long line of theorists have argued (Foucault is the most obvious example), spatial arrangements call forth certain kinds of actions and the self-perceptions that are their epiphenomena; direct perception, in this account, would be one of the most useful tools of normative social arrangements. Feeling at home in my corporate cubicle, in other words, may be rather more constraining than liberating.

    These problems are only exacerbated by an unfortunate tendency to leave out rather vital bits of information in some of the textual readings—specifically political contexts that complicate Kramnick’s soothingly smooth account. Here, for example, is his rendering of a passage from Sterne’s Sentimental Journey:

    I own my first sensations, as soon as I was left solitary and alone in my own chamber in the hotel, were far from being so flattering as I had prefigured them. I walked up gravely to the window in my dusty black coat, and looking through the glass saw all the world in yellow, blue and green, running at the ring of pleasure. . . . Alas poor Yorick! cried I, what art thou doing here? (qtd. 47)

    Kramnick very cleverly reads Yorick’s cloistering in the hotel room as a critique of Locke’s camera obscura: the locus classicus of the alienating representational view of perception. For Sterne, “The world does not project to a point” (72). Yet Kramnick’s ellipsis erases a part of the passage that turns the screw a couple more times: “—The old with broken lances, and in helmets which had lost their vizards—the young in armour bright which shone like gold, beplumed with each gay feather of the east—all—all tilting at it like fascinated knights in tournaments of yore for fame and love—” (47). The aggressively figurative language here cannot be assimilated to the specific objects of Yorick’s perception; they are imagined, not perceived. Farther still from the simply-available real, the lines are satirical in their use of stately chivalrous language to describe ribald chaos. The same holds for the Hamlet reference: the Prince’s existential carpe diem musings as he stares at the jester’s skull receive a mocking echo here in Yorick’s desire to get out there and get laid. In other words, a vertical gulf of textuality yawns in the horizontal gap between Yorick and the street. It isn’t surprising, then, that Kramnick would banish these lines from his account, committed as it is to the empirical: to what literally shows up before us.

    None of this discredits Kramnick’s achievement or the often brilliant formalist insight of his readings. Again, one of the most valuable takeaways of his approach is that realms of human experience always retain at least a partial Venn diagram-separation from each other; my direct perception of a rabbit doesn’t stop me from imagining his kin being harvested at a Smithfield processing plant and acting accordingly. All I’m saying is that the hyper-local focalization necessitated by Kramnick’s topic and the snapshot layout of his readings often doesn’t explicitly acknowledge itself to the extent that it could, such that mere differences in method and emphasis end up looking like willful exclusions.

    Literary studies has ridden for some time now on the wave of the manifesto. While the content of these trumpet blasts varies drastically, the overall sense is clear: a change is needed. How we define the status quo of what we do—critique, symptomatic reading, antinormativity, et al.—and what we think is wrong with it—its remove from public life, its dismissal of care, its denial of the “real,” etc.—may matter less than the shape of whatever we think should come next. As I have tried to show, this is where Kramnick’s Paper Minds makes such a timely intervention. We need not accept his answers to appreciate the formal presentation of disciplinary precision as a means to ask better questions. Our profession is by nature interdisciplinary—literature represents the world in all its extra-textual richness—and treating it at the level of representation is necessarily to brush up against other silos of knowledge. But Kramnick shows that, in so doing, we need not play the zero-sum game of getting closer to what “really matters” at the expense of what we already have: literary texts, and specialized if constantly-changing angles of approach to them. Paper Minds thus stands as a quiet manifesto for several bugbears of literary study: the normative (insisting that definitional criteria for disciplines and their objects are useful), the constructive (touting the pleasure of world-building rather than the subtractive impulse of critique), and the distinct (refining our vocabulary to better focalize our critical objects). Mind is bound to world, world is bound to mind, but literary study—minding and binding both—is bound to the future it makes for itself, nothing less.

    Footnotes

    1. The key figure drawn on here (and arguably the éminence grise of Kramnick’s book) is James J. Gibson, with his influential theory of “affordances,” which are features of a natural or designed environment that enable particular actions for creatures with particular bodily makeups.

    2. As opposed to “knowledge,” with its subject/object split. Another of Kramnick’s favorite words is “naïve.”

    3. Kramnick holds elsewhere that “any explanation that literary studies can provide of any phenomena of interest must rely in some sense on form and that we ought to be generous and flexible in what we understand the meaning of ‘form’ to be” (12). The trick, here, is that, as with mental states, literary explanations are “multiply realizable” by different kinds of form. Form, thus, is the literary but not in any reductive sense because there are many (perhaps infinite) varieties of form.

    4. See David Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness.”

    5. Anker and Felski provide a good overview of critique and its discontents in their introduction to Critique and Postcritique.

    6. The concept of “affordance,” thus, does a lot of work for Kramnick, whose argument (with Nersessian) about the explanatory work of form may, otherwise, court circularity; form is in a “corner of the world” which, itself, only comes into being through our corner-talk.

    Works Cited

    • Anker, Elizabeth S. and Rita Felski, editors. Critique and Postcritique. Duke UP, 2017.
    • Chalmers, David J. “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness.” Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol. 2, no. 3, 1995, pp. 200-219.
    • Fodor, J.A. “Special Sciences (Or: The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis).” Synthese, vol. 28, no. 2, 1974, pp. 97-115.
    • Kramnick, Jonathan. Paper Minds: Literature and the Ecology of Consciousness. U of Chicago P, 2018.
    • Lesjak, Carolyn. “Reading Dialectically.” Criticism, vol. 55, no. 2, 2013, pp. 233-277.
    • Potts, Jason and Daniel Stout, editors. Theory Aside. Duke UP, 2014.
    • Sterne, Laurence. A Sentimental Journey Through France and Italy. Ed. Paul Goring. Penguin, 2005 [1768].
    • “Theory Aside.” Duke University Press, https://www-dukeupress-edu.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/theory-aside. Accessed 16 Mar. 2020.
  • Acting Otherwise: Literary Justice and the Politics of Compassion

    Walter A. Johnston (bio)

    A review of Weber, Elisabeth. Kill Boxes: the Legacy of Torture, Drone Warfare, and Indefinite Detention. Punctum Books, 2017.

    In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt argues that the distinctively totalitarian strategy of absolute mobilization produces among the ruled not only the feeling of constant motion, but—by virtue of the inscrutable principle guiding the tumult to which they are subjected—of a chaos that legitimates authority by conferring the combined irrationality and inexorability of the natural event upon its decree. However farcical its repetitions appear, the current executive branch of the United States government has arguably achieved something of that effect, which makes it difficult to establish meaningful continuity between this government and even its most proximate antecedents: the mutations of United States national and international policy during the H.W. Bush and Obama administrations. Elisabeth Weber’s Kill Boxes: Facing the Legacy of US-Sponsored Torture, Indefinite Detention, and Drone Warfare analyzes a set of political phenomena that may appear to be yesterday’s news in the presentist atmosphere produced by today’s executive caprice. First and foremost, Weber focuses on the military use of “kill boxes” that allows for targeted drone strikes where no war has been declared, which exemplifies for Weber the blurred boundary between norm and exception within which US-sponsored torture, indefinite detention, and drone warfare all operate. Although Weber restricts her analysis to the pre-Trump era, her book helps to overcome the stunned fatalism that authoritarianism induces by sensitizing us to a logic that links the deliberate stupefaction of contemporary public discourse with the organized traumatization of the victims of US military practice in the pre-Trump era.

    Weber issues a sustained plea for a notion of “compassion” she draws from Jacques Derrida’s “Avowing—the Impossible: ‘Returns,’ Repentance, and Reconciliation,” and which she posits as an antidote to the “contempt” that inspires torture, indefinite detention, and drone warfare at the turn of the millennium.1 According to Weber, compassion is not merely one feeling among the many that already comprise our relations to others in the world. Rather, it is a “fundamental mode” of “living together” (these terms are borrowed directly from Derrida) that conditions relationality from the ground up, and obligates us, as witnesses to the suffering of others, to heed an unavoidable “call to action” (162). Though Weber does not specify the actions to which we are called, her book exemplifies the response and the responsibility she theorizes; and one of her central claims is that the humanities have a crucial role to play in addressing a set of phenomena that might more traditionally be confronted by political science or international law. According to Weber, compassion involves a “shock of recognition,” and “to initiate and explore such shocks of recognition is . . . one of the major responsibilities but also one of the major promises of the practice called ‘the humanities’” (13). Weber’s collaborator Richard Falk is more direct about the resulting calls to action in his afterward; he argues that “at the very least, the challenges posed throughout this book point to an urgent need to reconstruct international humanitarian law in light of the realities of [the] non-territorial patterns of transnational conflict” (241). Though trained in international law, Falk concurs with Weber “that the humanist sensibility poses a real challenge, if not a threat, to the militarized mentality that allows the modern forms of cruelty to pass undetected through the metal detectors of ‘civilized societies’” (241).

    But how or why might that be? What is the link between the “humanist sensibility,” “compassion,” and resistance to such a “militarized mentality” (241)? Weber’s answer is performative rather than constative. Her book is valuable primarily for the way in which it brings the humanistic practice of close textual analysis to bear upon discourses that might not traditionally receive such attention. With some help from W.J.T. Mitchell, this approach allows Weber to read the “shock of recognition” produced by the Abu Ghraib photographs, which relies on their legibility as images of crucifixion, and to suggest some consequences for our understanding of the mode of universality that they convoke (21). Later on, it gives rise to an illuminating analysis of military naming practices—in particular the shocking designation of the victims of drone strikes as “bug splat”—in light of Kafka’s The Metamorphosis (203). That reading makes more vivid and consequential one of her book’s main political-theoretical suggestions: that the “kill boxes” that allow drone strikes where no war has been declared blur the distinctions between norm and exception established by Carl Schmitt as the foundation of political sovereignty. Throughout Kill Boxes, Weber’s attention to the poietic and para-literary dimension of military and governmental practices goes far toward accomplishing the book’s main objective: Whereas state-sanctioned contempt ensures the victim’s “absence from public space and discourse in the US,” she suggests, a “shift in awareness” associated with compassion “will reveal this absence as overwhelming presence” (39).

    The object of Weber’s critique is not the paucity of publicly available information about torture, drone warfare, and indefinite detention, but the way in which state-sanctioned representation “ghosts” the tortured individuals to whom it appears to grant access. The difference between contempt and compassion—and, implicitly, between the ways of knowing proper to state power and humanistic research—is qualitative rather than quantitative. It is the difference between what one might call two regimes of the sensible, which is crystallized in Weber’s analysis of an anonymous art collective’s work, titled “#Notabugsplat.” This 90 X 60 foot piece of Martha-Rosler-esque didactic photomontage superimposes journalist Noor Behram’s disarmingly intimate portrait of an unnamed Pakistani girl projected atop drone footage of the village where she lived before the strike that killed her parents and seven-year-old brother. Weber devotes the following words to the image:

    Facing directly up from the giant reproduction of the photo, cropped to feature only the girl, her eyes are “squarely trained on the lens of the camera.” She frontally addresses, literally con-fronts the drone operator, thousands of miles away, and with him or her all those in whose name the attacks are carried out, with nothing but the vulnerability of her face, thereby, to quote Mitchell’s formulation again, “hailing the viewer as the ‘you’ who is addressed by an ‘I’.” The result, I would argue, is not so much “empathy,” which, “in the context of empire,” as Keith Feldman cautions, “has the capacity to exacerbate a liberal divide between the civil enlightenment of Euro-American nations and the objects of former colonial rule.” Rather, belying the official discourse replete with words like “the enemy,” “collateral damage,” “targets of opportunity,” a “shadowy foe” to be eliminated in a “signature strike” (in which the killed person’s name is actually not known), the girl’s face is inescapable, and with it the realization that what occurs in a drone strike cannot be called by any other name than murder. For Emmanuel Levinas, the “alterity that is expressed in the face provides the unique ‘matter’ possible for total negation.” What “resists” in the face is precisely the face, “the primordial expression, […] the first word: ‘you shall not commit murder.’” Behram’s photograph reintroduces a face into a war zone where a death sentence can be executed on the basis of fitting the target demographic alone: all males aged 18 to 65, since the United States deems these men to be combatants “unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent”—again: “posthumously.” The photograph might puncture what Peggy Kamuf has called in the context of the acceptability of the death penalty in the US the “wholesale anesthetizing of public sensibility.” The image contrasts and confronts the fatal “kill boxes,” into which suspected combatants and everybody else in their vicinity are trapped for extrajudicial assassination, with the wide-open field of a face. (43-44)

    I quote Weber at length because the work she describes is clearly a version of what she aims to accomplish in her own text and identifies as the promise of humanistic research more broadly. The “overwhelming presence” she aims to restore is that of the Levinasian face as she understands it. The face inspires a compassion that undoes the demographic categories and conceptual distinctions underwriting US government discourse and the murderous violence it unleashes. In the context of such violence, this undoing is tantamount to “a call to action” for Weber—in this case, the act of halting drone warfare.

    The sheer scale of #Notabugsplat and its citation of military jargon leave little doubt that the collective was inspired by similarly ambitious (and laudable) goals. Yet taken as an oblique description of the aims and orientation of Weber’s project, her account of the image poses several difficulties, particularly concerning her concept of action and the forms of experience that, she suggests, enable or are even equated with such action. Weber wants an experience hardwired to produce certain effects: “the girl’s face is inescapable, and with it the realization that what occurs in a drone strike cannot be called by any other name than murder,” such that one is immediately compelled by the commandment “you shall not commit murder.” Compassion is the name of this compulsion, which is why Weber consistently positions it as both an experience and an action. According to Weber, while the spectral object of state representation “anaesthetizes” and leaves us unmoved, the present object of compassion moves us infallibly—so infallibly that to experience others in a compassionate mode is somehow already to act toward their just treatment.

    Weber elaborates this concept in a reading of the tension between the Quranic notion of compassion and the prohibition of mutual aid among inmates at Guantanamo Bay:

    Rahma is a compassion that cannot but act, because one’s “womb” commands it and because God commands it. As Mouhanad Khorchide explains, the “straight road” or the “right path” consists in “accepting God’s love and compassion and to give it reality in one’s actions.” Sells writes that “holding or keeping the faith […] includes not only intellectual assent to certain propositions but also engagement in just actions,” such as “protecting those who are disinherited or in need.” By contrast, “those who reject the reckoning [the final judgment]—which, in early Meccan revelations, is the foundation of religion—are those who abuse the orphan, who are indifferent to those suffering in their midst, and who are neglectful in performing the prayer.” Not helping the orphan and the widow, or worse, preventing others from helping the orphan and the widow is a fundamental rejection of the oldest and most ingrained obligation towards the other. (160)

    Weber reads this tension in poems written by detainees at Guantanamo Bay. For Weber, the state censorship of these poems and its prevention of practices of compassionate mutual aid among inmates are deeply intertwined because compassion is linked to what she, following Shoshana Felman, calls “literary justice” (130). Literary justice is associated with access to the face in its singularity and is opposed to “legal justice,” which relies on preexisting abstract concepts or categories under which the other is subsumed (130). The censorship of the Guantanamo Bay poems is thus emblematic of a larger strategy that invokes legal categories to justify indefinite detention of prisoners and, conversely, to explain the impossibility of determining their legal guilt or innocence (a strategy akin to what Giorgio Agamben has called the inclusive exclusion of life in the juridical).

    The association of compassion and literary justice brings to light a further link between compassion and aesthetic experience in the Kantian sense. I would suggest that this notion tacitly subtends Weber’s understanding of the distinctiveness of humanistic modes of inquiry. For Kant, scientific knowledge is the subsumption of a singular intuition under a general concept, while aesthetic experience is the singular judgment of an intuition for which one lacks an adequate concept. Kant famously links aesthetic experience to seeing “as the poets do,” and associates it with the reflective capacity to disrupt and transform the conceptual matrix that governs knowledge. Similarly, for Weber, a compassionate reading of the Guantanamo poems challenges contempt by interrupting the application of prefabricated concepts used by the state to represent the detained, thus enabling an encounter with their testimony in its singularity. Yet for Kant, in contrast to aesthetic judgments, practical judgments capable of providing the basis for action must determine the object or end in relation to which one acts. Here a difficulty emerges for Weber’s understanding of compassion as the singular judgment of the face of the other, and as action. The claim that compassion entails action is based on Levinas’s association of the face and the commandment interdicting murder. Like aesthetic experience in Kant, the relationship to the face and the prohibition it entails are not for Levinas instances of moral cognition in the traditional sense. Instead, they involve insight into the phenomenological irreducibility of a relationship to the other that precedes and destabilizes all possible object relation. Murder is prohibited by the face because murder presupposes a cognitive relation to a known other, whereas exposure to the face is pre-conceptual for Levinas. The face intervenes before I perceive the other as a known object (an “orphan” or a “widow”) that I can murder or not, and expresses the way in which the knowing subject is always already related to others in advance of him or herself by virtue of the immediate mediation of experience via forms that are socially and temporally disseminated (194). This is why, for Levinas, the relationship to the face must be conceived not as an immediate visual or sensory relation, which would position it as a form of knowledge, but rather as a relation to the “speech” through which the other “dawns forth in his expression” in a manner that remains productively “incomprehensible.”

    The face . . . cannot be comprehended, that is, encompassed. It is neither seen nor touched—for in visual or tactile sensation the identity of the I envelops the alterity of the object, which becomes precisely a content. (194)

    Speech cuts across vision. In knowledge or vision the object seen can indeed determine an act, but it is an act that in some way appropriates the “seen” to itself, integrates it into a world by endowing it with a signification, and, in the last analysis, constitutes it. In discourse the divergence that inevitably opens between the Other as my theme and the Other as my interlocutor, emancipated from the theme that seemed for a moment to hold him, forthwith contests the meaning I ascribe to my interlocutor. The formal structure of language thereby announces the ethical inviolability of the Other. (195)

    If compassion is the relationship to a face in this sense, how can it constitute either action or a call thereto? Levinas seems to withdraw precisely that possibility on the eminently Kantian grounds that although “in knowledge or vision the object seen can indeed determine an act,” this action presupposes the reduction of the singularity of the other through conceptual subsumption, which “integrates it into a world by endowing it with signification” only by foreclosing the appearance of the face together with the possibility of compassion.

    This difficulty is intertwined with another. Weber frames the “shift in awareness” from contempt to compassion as a transition from “absence” to “overwhelming presence,” and this transition brings about the compulsion to act that Weber associates with Derrida’s notion of compassion. Yet as Weber herself notes, Derrida’s work has always critiqued the traditional metaphysical valorization of presence over absence, and the preference for a fully present other over the traces or ghosts of the departed (166). For Derrida, then, to welcome the written ghost of the Guantanamo Bay detainee could never amount to making him fully or indeed overwhelmingly present. Weber’s desire to do so is linked to her desire to defend the “shadowy” others produced by US military practice from the horrifying spectralization to which they are subjected. In contrast to US military practice, which anaesthetizes and thus disables the intended addressee of the testimony of the tortured, compassion would restore the “ghosted” other to an overwhelming presence that compels their just treatment. Restored presence is thus linked to infallible communication—a form of address that cannot fail to hit its mark and compel its addressee to act. Yet this too stands in tension with the deconstructive reading of address, which associates the possibility of political resistance to the cognitive status quo that reinforces state power with the fallibility or waywardness of address. In a passage on the divine call received by Abraham that Weber quotes in her introduction to Living Together, Derrida writes that the call

    conjures up more future to come than many others . . . by calling us to this truth . . . that anyone responding to the call must continue to doubt, to ask himself whether he has heard right, whether there is no original misunderstanding: whether it was in fact his name that was heard, whether he is the only or the first addressee of the call . . . . It is possible that I have not been called, me, and it is not even excluded that no one, no One, nobody, ever called any One, any unique one, anybody. The possibility of an originary misunderstanding in destination is not an evil, it is the structure, perhaps the very vocation of any call worthy of that name, of all nomination, of all response and responsibility.(34)

    Applying the consequences of Derrida’s insight to instances of humanitarian crisis, Thomas Keenan interrogates the equation of address, knowledge, and action that informs Weber’s notion of compassion. For Keenan, this notion also informs the understanding of the public sphere operative within humanitarian discourse. Responding to the coincidence of overexposure and inadequate response during the Bosnian genocide, Keenan writes that “Humanitarian action seems . . . to depend on . . . a fairly limited set of presuppositions about the link between knowledge and action, between public information or opinion and response” (22).

    What failed in Bosnia? We often say that we failed and imply that “we” means this well-known public of the so-called Enlightenment project. But the more we rely on and retreat to the idea that the public sphere has collapsed, the more we shore up a notion whose apparent solidity may be implicated in the disaster. What if belief in this public was part of the failure? What if the faith in the obviousness—the evidence or self-evidence of the pictures and the automatic chain of reasoning they inspire—was not what failed, but was the failure itself? The conceit or fantasy of this kind of public sphere must, after Bosnia if nowhere else, contend with what we could call the rule of silence—no image speaks for itself, let alone speaking directly to our capacity for reason. Images always demand interpretation, even or especially emotional images – there is nothing immediate about them. This implies a second rule, that of unintended consequences or misfiring – the story of Bosnia is that images which might have signified genocide or aggression or calculated political slaughter seemed for so long to signify only tragedy or disaster or human suffering and hence were available for inscription or montage in a humanitarian rather than a political response. So what failed in Bosnia is an idea or an interpretation—and a practice—of publicity, of the public sphere as the arena of self-evidence and reason, an idea which now must be challenged, not to put an end to the public sphere but to begin reconstituting it. (34-35)

    Though Keenan’s critique of the operative notion of the public sphere hinges on its faith in reason rather than compassion, reason, for him, like compassion for Weber, is nothing more than the name of what articulates experience and appropriate response. To the extent that we take this articulation for granted, we often help to ensure that it will fail. This is what demands the rethinking of address along Derridian lines: “The public, we could say in shorthand, is what is hailed or addressed by messages that might not reach their destination. Thinking about the images at hand, we could even say that what makes something public is precisely the possibility of being a target and of being missed” (25).

    Later Keenan continues:

    Hypothesis: to the extent that we imagine or take for granted the articulation between knowledge and action, which seems to define the public sphere, it is bound to fail. But what can only be thought of as a failure in those terms is, in another sense, the success of a political strategy, and if we continue to think that images by virtue of their cognitive contents, or proximity to reality, have the power to compel action, we miss the opening of ‘new fields of action’ (Benjamin) that they allow.(34)

    For Keenan, then, deconstructing the Enlightenment identification of knowledge and action does not imply an abandonment of action or of the public sphere, but rather their joint reconceptualization. To do so, we must relinquish the fantasy of moral obviousness, whether at the level of the meaning of the address or of the identity of the public hailed by it. Relinquishing that fantasy shifts us from a humanitarian to a political optic: from an optic that sees in the image only the self-evidence of a suffering we wish to alleviate to one that apprehends political struggle as the ongoing modification of processes of mediation that continually constitute, deconstitute, and reconstitute ontologically intertwined objects and agents, redefining the public as merely the “possibility of response to an open address” (25).

    Keenan’s shift from certainty to possibility also shifts from a cognitive to a reflective approach to politics. While it would be easy to understand this shift as a subjectivist abandonment of objectivity and of the concrete political action that depends upon it (Hegel was the first to do so), it may also redefine concrete political action as the reflective modification of modes of mediation rather than a struggle over pre-constituted objects. To the extent that Weber associates compassionate action with the disruption of conceptual subsumption by the singularity of the face and with the reflective reading practices fostered by humanistic research, she also points politics in this direction. Still, if one takes compassion and contempt not merely as two different ways of orienting oneself toward a pre-constituted object world but as events that give rise to fundamentally different worlds, more remains to be done to specify how these modes of emergence differ.

    By designating compassion as a “fundamental mode” of “living together,” Derrida points us toward such analysis. His formulation invokes the Heideggerian relationship between “fundamental attunement” and “being-with,” and thereby the differential analysis of modes of collective worlding or different ways of apprehending one’s unavoidable entanglement with the world in its facticity. These modes refer not to the world’s objective presence to a knowing subject, but rather to the process of its ongoing “disconcealment,” which is always-already technologically or linguistically mediated and socially distributed. When action is conceived only as actualization and thus as immediately bound to a subject’s univocal relation to the presence of a compelling object, this other strangely diffuse and yet world-forming activity disappears from view, and with it, the possibility for the reflective opening of a future that could be other than a repetition of the same. If that opening is what apprehending the face of the other is about, then this apprehension cannot take the form of restoring the ghosted other to full or overwhelming presence; to do so would be to obviate the possibility for a reflective transformation of the way in which the present presences. Yet while Weber sometimes seems to call for such a restoration, the overall effect of her work is quite different. State-sponsored spectralization produces a desire for restored presence that in fact enhances the power of those who exploit the fear of living death. This effect parallels Arendt’s observation that state-induced chaos and the promulgation of incompatible falsehoods generate a desire for normalcy that reduces the possibility of resistance to a presentist grounding of politics in matters of fact, which may inadvertently enhance the power of those who exploit the desire for normalcy through its strategic withdrawal. To the extent that Weber helps to release us from the stultifying effects of today’s chaos-induced presentism, her book moves its reader not to action per se, but to the possibility of acting otherwise.

    Footnotes

    1. Derrida delivered this essay as the keynote of a conference Weber co-organized at UC Riverside in 2003, the proceedings of which appeared in her edited volume Living Together: Jacques Derrida’s Communities of Violence and Peace.

    Works Cited

    • Derrida, Jacques. “Abraham, the Other.” Judeities: Questions for Jacques Derrida, edited by Bettina Bergo, Joseph Cohen, and Raphael Zagury-Orly, translated by B Bergo and Michael Smith, Fordham UP, 2007, pp. 1-35.
    • Keenan, Thomas. “Publicity and indifference: Media, Surveillance, and ‘Humanitarian Intervention.’” Killer Images: Documentary Film, Memory, and the Performance of Violence, edited by Joram ten Brink and Joshua Oppenheimer, Wallflower P, 2012, pp. 15-40.
    • Levinas, Emmanuel. Totality and Infinity. Translated by Alphonso Lingis, Kluwer, 1991.
    • Weber, Elizabeth. Living Together: Jacques Derrida’s Communities of Violence and Peace. Fordham UP, 2012.
  • Pygmalion Punks:The Shared Stitches of Puppetry and the Sex Pistols

    Kevin Cooley (bio)

    Abstract

    The essay turns to a rarely acknowledged but rich contextual overlap between puppetry, on the one hand, and punk sartorial and musical cultures, on the other. Through readings of two texts that present this overlap most clearly, namely, the film Labyrinth (1986) and the sitcom The Young Ones (1982-84), it shows that both the punk and the puppet challenge the domestication of specific materials as unified sites of meaning.

    When the political stratosphere’s objectification of people erects walls, condemns refugees, and controls people’s bodies, the language we use to refer to things that exist in liminal spaces between personhood and puppetry becomes especially saturated with critical meaning and political power. During the third US presidential debate of the 2016 election, the Republican candidate held Vladimir Putin’s contempt for Hillary Clinton against her, claiming, “Look, Putin…from everything I see, has no respect for this…person,” with a long pause preceding the word person, during which the W of the word “woman” partially formed on his lips, itching to be pronounced (NBC). Clinton’s response—”Well, that’s because he’d rather have a puppet as president of the United States”—invokes the objectifying power of the word “puppet.” The politician responds with angry, somewhat unintelligible reiterations (two times each), “No puppet…” and “You’re the puppet!” From the thin-skinned president’s distasteful nicknaming of former Miss Universe Alicia Machado as “Miss Piggy” (Barbaro and Twohey), to his writing off Chris Stirewalt & Marc Threaten as “two dumb puppets” just days before the third debate (@realDonaldTrump), calling political adversaries and bullying targets “puppets” seems to be one of his go-to moves. Why is this word such a charged and offensive one to most powerful man in the world? Perhaps the word makes him recall the 2005 Sesame Street episode “Grouch Apprentice,” in which Oscar the Grouch’s toupee’d cousin, “Ronald Grump,” offers a portion of his trash to the winner of his contest. Either way, the tycoon who inspired Grump has himself frequently besmirched his critics as puppets, and has tried to demean women by comparing them to cartoon characters and Muppets. In the process, he contributes to a reductive understanding of what it means to be a puppet.

    The presidential candidates’ negative associations with puppethood are part of a larger tradition. In US politics, to be puppeted is to be objectified and to be cartooned is to be mastered. As Kenneth Gross writes, the word puppet often “gets applied to a thing or person [who is] both insignificant and subjected to the power of others—not a word people will readily apply to themselves” (3). The dominant understanding of “puppet,” one that codes the word s an insult that deprives its target of agency, situates it within master-slave relations. But the kind of complete, stratospheric control that common parlance attributes to the puppet master does not in fact apply to puppeteering. As Henrich von Kleist says of the marionette, “the limbs that function as nothing more than a pendulum, swinging freely, will follow the movement in their own fashion without anyone’s aid,” and “often when simply shaken in an arbitrary manner, the whole figure assumed a kind of rhythmic movement that was identical to dance” (22). For Kleist, the effect of the puppeteer on the puppet’s non-human movement is more like a ripple than a controlled motion, because the puppet is free of self-sabotaging human cognition, a perfect non-being that has “…that has no consciousness at all—or has infinite conciousness—that is, in the mechanical puppet, or in the God.” (26). A (non-)being that telegraphs its artificiality as much as it professes to not practice artifice, the puppet cultivates its own ambiguity for political intervention.

    To exemplify the rebellious potential of the puppet, I argue that contemporary puppetry shares a barely acknowledged contextual overlap with some of the most grandiose and illustrious cultural rebels of the Western world: the English new-wave subcultures of the late ’70s and early ’80s, the most prominent of them being the punk movement. Both puppetry and sartorial punk/new-wave aesthetics deliberately draw attention to the material of their bodies and parody normative bodies. While both draw attention to the artificial construction and adornment of bodies, they paradoxically allow for a glimpse of the adorned or artificial body’s humanity and agency, even if these are only legible through seemingly inert materials. Thus the marked otherness and inhuman material of the puppet operated as a means in ’80s visual culture through which normative populations could seemingly dilute the residual nihilism of punk while covertly preserving the sticky fun of subcultural rebellion.

    The payoff of this argument is a greater appreciation of puppetry as a mode of resistance to (and as marking a space outside) political repression. Jim Henson’s 1986 film Labyrinth and the absurd, 1982-84 sitcom The Young Ones articulate the praxis of the punk-puppet’s simultaneous denial and assertion of its own subjectivity. They arrive in the aftermath of the punk movement and its offshoots, and offer varying approaches to the punk-puppet’s contradictory sense of self (and non-self). Labyrinth relates the otherness of the punk and the puppet by asking a normative, bourgeois figure to navigate the titular labyrinth of the subcultural in order to preserve the domestic unity of her family, while The Young Ones begins with a world in which the puppet has already invaded everyday space and is just as chaotic and disruptive as the humans who inhabit this space. In spite of their different beginnings, both texts end in the same place, with the puppet’s (or materialized other’s) contradictory subjectivity/lack-of-subjectivity tending to do violence upon any fixed semiotic (including, for example, that of a political administration that treats only specific bodies as “American” bodies, and treats historical, racialized, Imperial violence as a hallmark of undebatably all-American virtuosity). The puppet, like the punk whose image it is tangled up in, interrupts the stranglehold that bourgeois ideology maintains on the semiotic understandings of objects and bodies. The puppet endows objects and bodies with a new kind of life, and it erodes the forms of signification around these things that otherwise masquerade as natural and timeless.

    Punks, Puppets, and Persondrag

    As Dick Hebdige explains at length, the punk aesthetic was perhaps more grounded in the anti-ideology that its music championed than in that music itself. It exhibits the totality of its aesthetic ideology in its visual culture, particularly in the cosmetic and fashion designs of its participants. Hebdige describes a kind of “cut-up form” of material anachronisms left over as residual elements of a rainbow of twentieth-century English cultures and subcultures. Like the material body of the puppet, the punk was “kept ‘in place’ and ‘out of time’ by the spectacular adhesives: the safety pins and plastic clothes pegs, the bondage straps and bits of string which attracted so much horrified and fascinated attention” (26). For both kinds of artificially-bodied beings, the striking materiality of the violently rearranged body grounds bodies in the present and, at the same time, stresses the impossibility of their residing in such a present. Angela McRobbie ties the sartorial existence of the punk to the secondhand shopping practices that allowed the items of punk fashion to circulate and become costume elements, practices that “point back in time to an economy unaffected by cheque cards, credit cards and even set prices” (30).

    Among the sources that McRobbie claims were “continually raided by the ‘new’ stylists in search of ideas” were television shows and “even puppet TV shows,” among several other mass culture artifacts. Like the puppet shows from which secondhand fashion entrepreneurs borrowed, television shows promoted styles that were “worn self-consciously with an emphasis on the un-natural and the artificial” (McRobbie 40). This deliberate attention to the artificial trappings of the human-punk subject’s body is paralleled in puppetry by what Paul Piris calls “the particularity of the puppet,” the puppet’s tendency “to present an ontological ambiguity because it is an object that appears in performance as a subject” (30). The puppet asserts that it has a cognitive interior, even while its obviously constructed body asserts otherwise. The puppet is, then, in a static state of unresolved contradiction and pure otherness that it cannot help but generate in its existence as an abstraction. The voice of the puppet may resonate from a being inside it, underneath it, across the room, or in a recording studio across the world. Its movements are propelled by body that is not it but attempts to animate it. . The puppet’s agency is tangled, in many ways, with the suspension of disbelief that the puppet begs from its audience, a suspension that overcompensates for the falseness of the puppet’s pieced-together and (perhaps) felt plastic, or rubber, body. These materials not only adorn bodies, but also adorn and become the same body at the same time, complicating any possibility of understanding the body through its contextualized clothes.

    These attempts to locate the origin of the puppet’s being, which is scattered across time and space, reflect back on what the consolidation of organs, titles, and textiles that make up the human body and are often treated as constitutive of a concrete self. As Barthes puts it, the puppet can state “without any falsehood” that “which is refused to our actors under pretense of a ‘living’ organic unity” (172). The puppet can come closer to depicting the abstraction of a self than a human body because it is (at least, more openly) an abstraction, while the actor’s body struggles to live up to the “living organic unity” we mythologize it as having. Our puppet not only performs, it is performative: it brings a being into existence through the constitutive power of repeated action. It is here, then, in a constitution that occurs through the tangled acts of speech and gesture, that the puppet assaults the performative invention of the actor through an exaggerated parody of that same performativity, a parody that asks an audience to anoint a pile of strings, timber, and fabric with agency. The puppet uses performativity not to subordinate itself to its human referents, but to question the concrete self that is assumed to be intrinsic to the humans it references. This drag performance of human subjectivity, which I find most helpfully abbreviated as persondrag, is the tool with which the puppet pulls back harder on its strings than its puppeteer can, enticing the viewer to read it as human-nonhuman and as an odd object-subject. In this performance of contradiction and violence against the semiotics of being, the puppet not only lays out a procedure for interrogating the subject position of the human, it also tears a rift in the fixity of language categories as a whole, opening the way for the political interventions of charged puppet narratives.

    A Labyrinth of Paradoxical Puppets

    The puppet’s threat of subsuming and delegitimizing everything from specific social codes to the status of the human itself is covertly at play throughout the puppet world of Jim Henson’s Labyrinth. Henson’s film features a young woman, Sarah (Jennifer Connelly), journeying into a sometimes nightmarish dreamland to save her infant brother from the campy, glam-rock Goblin King Jareth (David Bowie) and a wide spectrum of hybrid puppet-humanoids. Forced to stay in and babysit her little brother by her distant and unappreciative parents, Sarah makes the mistake of wishing that little Toby, the very emblem of the future of the bourgeois family, would be “taken away” by the Goblin King character in the play for which she’s rehearsing. In a be-careful-what-you-wish-for scenario, Jareth grants Sarah’s request, and whisks Toby away to his goblin kingdom. Immediately regretting her decision, Sarah’s only way to rescue Toby is to find her way to the center of Jareth’s immense labyrinth. While this labyrinth’s parallel in antiquity hosts in its depths the murderous Minotaur, Jareth’s labyrinth is populated by a host of fantastic puppet creatures patrolling every curve. His private army of armored goblins; a pit lined with arthritic hands, talking tikis, and doorknockers; double-headed dogs bearing shields like people on playing cards; worms living in walls; and the selfish but sympathetic hermit Hoggle are just a few of the puppet characters that help and hinder Sarah’s quest through the labyrinth. More often than not, helping and hindering blur together: most of Jareth’s pawns favor a kind of rambunctious chaos over direct intervention into Sarah’s plans to recover her brother. They swap sides casually or forget that they were working against Sarah to begin with. The film concludes with the materialization of the puppets, goblins and all, back in Sarah’s very real world, shattering any easy assumptions that the puppets might quarantine rebellious desires within a distant, fleeting space.

    While the other’s invasion of the domestic characterizes all the puppet performances in Labyrinth, the most obvious and most viscerally immediate connection between the puppet and the subcultural subject comes in the form of David Bowie’s performance (in several senses of the word) as Jareth. In Bowie, Henson and his team chose a performer who is inseparable from a long history of complicating identity roles through material trappings and performance. Hebdige notes that Bowie “created a new sexually ambiguous image for those youngsters willing and brave enough to challenge the notoriously pedestrian stereotypes conventionally available to working-class men and women” (60). Bowie’s early alter ego Ziggy Stardust dons a vibrant streak of red face paint in the shape of a lightning bolt, dyed hair, silver lipstick, dandyish skintight jumpsuits with vertical pinstripes, and elaborate jackets trimmed with frills. Ziggy’s wardrobe illustrates what Julie Lobalzo Wright calls Bowie’s “lack of a real person to project as a public presence,” which makes him like those puppets he was cast alongside and amongst, and leaves him “without any ordinariness to balance his extraordinariness” (240). Bowie seems to understand the theoretical machinations of his drag-play as intricately as the scholars writing on him (and with delightfully succinct phrasing at that). In an interview with Ellen DeGeneres, Bowie offered the (perhaps only semi-humorous) quip, “Around seventeen I realized I was a mime trapped in a man’s body,” as he attempted to explain his brief involvement with a “revolutionary company” of speaking mimes. When Ellen suggests that their willingness to speak disqualifies them from mime status, Bowie replies, “That’s why they were revolutionary.” The “[‘accurate’ gendered noun] trapped in [an ‘inaccurate’ gendered noun]’s body” aphorism, commonly associated with trans recollections of confusing childhoods, is reworked here to tone down the potential to read any gender identity with which the person associates as “true.” As Bowie lays it out, in the “true” gender and identity expression’s place, we have the mime: a being who is defined by their mimicking other beings. In other words, Bowie positions his gender expression as an imitation by nature rather than something natural in itself, a move that recalls Butler’s assault on gender as imitating its own idealized self.

    Hebdige partially unpacks what Bowie brings to the performativity of both gender and material personhood when he notes that “his entire aesthetic was predicated upon a deliberate avoidance of the ‘real’ world and the prosaic language in which that world was habitually described, experienced and reproduced.” But Hebdige also undersells Bowie’s work by chalking it up to apolitical escapism, claiming that Bowie was “patently uninterested…in contemporary political and social issues” (61). Hebdige’s “‘real’ world” air quotes brush away the decidedly political parody that Bowie performs by spotlighting the performative nature of gender and of the unification of the body’s material into a subject. And yet when Hebdige, in his seminal 1979 volume, describes Bowie’s fans as “exquisite creatures” playing “a game of make-believe” in following Bowie’s visual precedents (60), he unknowingly anticipates the conjunction of the puppeted figure and the fantastic Bowie personality that occurs seven years later. A look at the specific content of Bowie’s performance in Labyrinth almost immediately reveals that it exemplifies the political weight of what Hebdige calls avoidance.

    It’s tempting to suggest that Sarah, Jareth, and the baby are the only human players to appear in the world of the goblins, and to claim that their bodies operate on a different visual register than that of the rest of the denizens of the puppet world. But to divvy the characters into the neat categories of puppets and humans reduces the complexity of the film’s treatment of bodies and subjects. Bowie’s body and its material trappings offer the most glaring complication of a reduction of the cast to puppets and people. His Jareth in Labyrinth is different from his other theatrical characters like Ziggy Stardust only in the degree to which Jareth offers a concentrated dose of his to-be-expected complication of gender. Bowie’s face is somewhere between made-up and painted—there is no attempt to conceal his cosmetic efforts, and every attempt to advertise them. They’re as loud and flamboyant as his choppily layered goldenrod hairdo, flowing somewhere between a messy mullet and a contemporary scene-girl cut. His wardrobe fluctuates between shimmering drag queen capes, leather jackets, heeled boots, Elizabethan ruffled shirts, and medieval armor. Brian Froud, the conceptual designer of the film, admits to sculpting Jareth’s image to evoke the alluring sexuality of the rock star, in the documentary “Journey through the Labyrinth: The Quest for Goblin City.” He says that Jareth’s crystal ball cane (or, as Froud calls it, a “swagger stick”) is meant to stand in for a microphone, and that the fan forum favorite topic of Bowie’s genital bulge “got [the team] in a lot of trouble about maybe how tight his pants were, but that was deliberate” (9:03).

    Every corner of this film and the labyrinth from which it takes its name is populated with bizarre beings whose material bodies and pretensions to agency exhibit and perform persondrag. The “Magic Dance” scene, in which Jareth and his puppet-goblin cronies revel in the plasticity of their bodies inside the king’s throne room to an upbeat and dancy Bowie number, flaunts the powers of persondrag perhaps most openly. Puppet coordinator Brian Henson recalls forty-eight puppets being packed into the room with Bowie, the baby, “eight to twelve little people in costumes running around,” a handful of chickens, and a small pig on a leash (Saunders). The puppets were directed by a brigade of “fifty-one or fifty-two” puppeteers. Instead of imitating gender, the drag show performs a potentially infinite spectrum of genders whose very quantity and campy existence call into question the innateness of the male/female binary. Similarly, the puppet ensemble of “Magic Dance” conjures a spectrum of various levels of personhood, with varying levels of subjectivity and objectivity appearing as concurrent and contradictory and yet still somehow unproblematic.

    The campily clad Bowie/Jareth and the baby made to act as Toby may be played by human actors, but their approaches to performance in this scene are entirely different. Jareth is voluntarily dressed in a bricolage of apparel from across temporal contexts, in an attempt to perform the magical non-personhood of the Goblin King, while Toby, like the puppet-defined-as-powerless, performs only by the proxy efforts of those around him. The happy baby sounds that Toby seems to emit are actually performed by Bowie (according to Bowie’s commentary in “Inside the Labyrinth,” the baby actor “really buttoned its lips, so I ended up doing the gurgles”), and crew members used calming puppets behind the camera in lieu of strings to direct the baby’s attention (Saunders). With Jareth and Toby’s complicated bodies, little people in goblin suits that look indistinguishable from medium-sized puppets, and, of course, puppets operated by hand and radio signal, the musical number hosts a chaotic spectacle of beings that embody different levels of subjectivity. No one being can or cannot claim an organic autonomy as a self grounded in a natural body.

    The chorus “Dance, magic, dance” mingles and mixes the noun form of the word “dance” with the verb, coding the repeated phrase as both an imperative to dance and a description of the kind of dance performed. Our puppet goblins are of course performing a kind of magic dance, not only as dancing goblins, but, more importantly, in the expectation that we believe these material contraptions are dancing goblins, with a kind of semiotic magic animating their artificial bodies and lending them a frenetic being. The only participant in the “Magic Dance” scene that seems to be puppeted is, oddly enough, the only character that the narrative expects us to believe is entirely human: the baby Toby. The song itself is celebratory in nature, and seems to be looking forward to the completion of the theft of Toby after Sarah’s thirteen hours in the labyrinth are up, when Toby will (how, exactly, remains mysteriously unspecified) become one of the denizens of the puppet-populated goblin realm. “In nine hours and twenty-three minutes…,” Jareth whispers in a spoken interlude, “you’ll be mine” (24:55). The number begins with an exchange between Jareth and the goblins, in which Jareth reflects on the traces of the human that exist in the goblin-puppet, and on the puppeted nature of any organic whole treated as human:

    Jareth:
    You remind me of the babe.

    Goblin:
    What babe?

    Jareth:
    Babe with the power.

    Goblin:
    What power?

    Jareth:
    Power of voodoo.

    Goblins:
    Who do?

    Jareth:
    You do.

    Goblin:
    Do what?

    Jareth:
    Remind me of the babe…

    Jareth (spoken):
    Quiet! [pointing at Toby]. A goblin babe!

    (22:55)

    During the song, we see Toby’s transformation (into something Jareth can call “mine”) unfold before our eyes as he flutters between object and subject. Here his body serves more as an object-prop than as a being, tossed around by Jareth and the goblins like a football. At times, this morphing into an object is material as well as semiotic: when Jareth tosses the baby half a dozen or so feet in the air and then passes him off to a goblin henchman, the baby is replaced with either a digital or a physical model (it’s difficult to discern which, especially because the film was released during the advent of CGI, and its blending of the computer-generated with physical puppetry is rudimentary). In the forced performance of this act, Toby performs the kind of jump to which Jareth/Bowie’s lyrics allude when he and his goblins sing, “Put that magic jump on me/ Slap that baby, make him free.” The lyrics function as a kind of plea for some external animator of the body to enable impossible feats of motion, movement, and liveliness, a plea that paradoxically equates the controlled motion of the puppet with freedom, and is answered as the goblins perform wire-assisted jumps. The goblins themselves seem to understand that the baby is not so different from them, in juxtaposing their own ability to move and jump with their reference to the freedom of the baby. In one sequence, two goblins (seemingly costumed performers) use Toby’s arms as strings and puppet the child actor: in other words, two costumed humans posing as puppets that are posing as goblins playact at turning a human body into a puppet. If you’re finding that sentence hard to follow, then you’re in the ideal position to understand it.

    As an artform that deliberately dwells in the hard-to-follow, it’s no surprise that the persondrag of puppetry manifests easily in dreams. Dreamer, in a sense, perform a kind of perfect puppetry, becoming the dupes of their own duplicity in performing/puppeting the real and unreal people they dream of (and all for an audience of which they’re the only member). Shiloh Carroll notes that Labyrinth can be read as a “dream vision” in the tradition of medieval dream poetry; the film “contains many of the same elements, such as the nature of the dreamer, the dream guide, and allegorical figures” (103). The more local example, however, that Labyrinth channels in its play with dreams and reality is the work of Maurice Sendak: its final credits state outright that “Jim Henson acknowledges his debt to the works of Maurice Sendak.” The acknowledgement refers most directly perhaps to Outside, Over There, Sendak’s 1981 picture book from which Henson borrows the core plot in which a girl’s younger sibling is captured by goblins. But it’s also a reference to Outside, Over There‘s prequels, Sendak’s acclaimed picture books Where the Wild Things Are and In the Night Kitchen, both of which appear scattered about Sarah’s bedroom, and are like Labyrinth in that they complicate the line between fantasies of dreamlike childish play and reality. Both picture books rip young protagonists from their domestic lives, reinstall them in an exciting fantastical realm, and, after some chaotic adventuring, allow them to return home, refusing to comment on whether the fantastic body of the story, framed by the quotidian on all sides, was the stuff of imaginative fancy.

    And yet, Labyrinth doesn’t exactly perform the Sendak formula. Whereas Sendak refuses to say whether the fantastical journey was real or imagined, Labyrinth simultaneously confirms that, like the bodies of the puppet-people who populate its world, the journey was both real and imagined. That these are contradictory conditions is not an issue. At the end of the film, after Sarah decides that growing up does not mean abandoning all that is childish and wild, an entourage of partying puppets from Sarah’s adventures appears in her room. She does a double take in response to the visions of her closest puppet companions in the mirror, as if asking the same question that audiences familiar with the Sendak picture-book structure might be compelled to ask: “So did the stuff with the puppets actually happen?” Sarah’s puppeted friends defiantly assert their existence as the film closes, kicking off a dance party in the very real bedroom. The moment seems to resolve the matter of the puppet’s reality: they’re not puppets at all, but indeed, animated creatures with a claim to exist in the film’s world. In a blatant contradiction, however, Sarah’s room is also the site of confirmation for the “it was all a dream” approach that the film paradoxically makes possible. The astute viewer will note that Sarah’s bedroom is littered with objects that are dreamed into an adventure: each major puppet has a corresponding stuffed animal or item that Sarah seems to have dreamed into a breathing being. Jareth has two defining objects. The first, a statue of a campy performer, occupies a prominent spot on Sarah’s nightstand. The statue stands out from the picture books and teddy bears of her childhood, as if it were a recent purchase embodying a liminal, less domestic identity. Jareth’s other symbol is, in a certain sense, not Jareth’s at all. Sarah’s biological mother, who, as a pan over of some collected newspaper clippings reveals, was a Hollywood actress, is featured in one photograph pinned to Sarah’s mirror and in another with none other than David Bowie as her celebrity lover. Not Jareth, but David Bowie, the musician and performer himself.1 The newspaper clipping of Bowie and Sarah’s mother bears the legend “On-Off Romance! Back Together?” injecting a kind of semi-Elektra complex into Jareth and Sarah’s already sexually charged encounters (6:16). As if Sarah understands the photograph’s foreclosure of the reality of the puppets, she examines it and tucks it away in a desk drawer, just before she communes with the specters of her puppet friends in the mirror—who, as mentioned, shortly reveal themselves to be more than specters.

    Sarah is not so different from the masses of children watching the film in 1986: her gradually nuancing sexuality is stimulated by her erratic consumption of the texts around David Bowie, and her exposure to Bowie’s play with gender and personhood seems to have opened the door to a fantastical world. It’s a world where one is always unsure who is the puppeteer and who is the puppeted; who is the creator and who is the perceiver; who is the real, historical musician and who are the identities read onto that body. The dream, in this sense, becomes the ultimate triumph of persondrag: the person pulling the strings is asleep, and the dream-persons that the deeply latent places of the dreamer’s mind breathe life into can hardly be said to be animated by the dreamer as an active agent. But then who is the subject animating them? The first material referent (the real David Bowie), the second material referent (the real David Bowie playing the real David Bowie in Labyrinth’s photograph), the puppeteer intermediary (Sarah), the Bowie-amalgam she puppets in dreaming (Jareth), the armies of puppets that Jareth strings along, or the person at the beginning of this headache of a chain: the first material referent, in our case, David Bowie? Power, life, and agency seem to come from nowhere once the puppet is brought into play, as if an agentless passive voice whispered these things into being. It becomes necessary, then, to perform a simultaneous confirmation that the puppet world is both real and not real, that its inhabitants are both objects and subjects who are not eradicated by this contradiction, but created by it.

    The Plastic Ones, the Flesh Ones, The Young Ones

    Labyrinth draws on the ontological ambiguity of the punk and the puppet by inviting the human into the fantastical realm of the material other. Yet, the unsorted subjectivities of the punk and the puppet demand that we also examine the opposite case: the materially othered being crossing over into the domestic realm. The 1982-84 British sitcom The Young Ones follows a group of four subcultural miscreants living in a London where punk-puppets have made the fear of invasion a reality, shattering the quotidian with spontaneous animation and visual hijinks. Evan Smith describes The Young Ones as “an over-the-top and surreal portrayal of student life” in which we can locate “the zeitgeist of Britain under Margaret Thatcher” (14-15). It’s tempting to suggest that The Young Ones, in throwing the orderly systems of the Thatcher-era English bourgeoisie into disarray, harbors a residual fear of invasion by rebellious youth subcultures, but this fails to acknowledge that The Young Ones treats the invasion as already complete. A seemingly infinite army of costumed figures, hybrid puppets, Eastern European immigrants, men chained to rafts, and musical celebrities populate the teeming liminal spaces between the not-quite private space inside the walls of the young ones’ rundown home and the public space of the world beyond it. Anyone from a sentient broom to an anti-terrorist task force to Buddy Holly hanging upside down as if he were a puppet can freely navigate what would seem to be private space as if were public. Even without the fantastic interruptions by those hybrid and prosthetically-adorned humanoids lurking in and bursting forth from the walls, the titular characters themselves realize the fear that the subcultural would undermine the hegemonic. These “students” mostly stand in for archetypal (and silly) personages associated with subcultures: Neil the hippie, Rick the socialist intellectual youth, and Vyvyan the punk (while their fourth roommate, Mike, is something of a generic cool guy and a semi-straight man). With the extravagant material of their costumes (studded stars, tiny ponytails, wigs, eccentric clothes) and the aimlessness of their pursuits, the boys are just like the puppets that populate their space: angry, angsty, and stomping all over the image of the nuclear family grounded in the home.

    Any household object in The Young Ones reserves the uncanny right to animate itself at any moment, with clever cuts of the camera swapping out models for puppets or humans in wearable apparatuses that reside somewhere between puppet and costume, as if it were useless to try to differentiate between them. At the beginning of the second episode, “Oil,” the young ones move into the rented house where they’ll perform a twisted parody of domesticity for the rest of the series. A dime-store “The Thinker” statue knockoff, perfect for a tiny garden, and a colorful sunflower flank the boys’ front porch, suggesting an odd twist on domestic tranquility that the audience is well aware will be destroyed by their antics henceforward. With no warning, the garden variety statue becomes animate and complains to itself in a vernacular that contrasts with its philosophical pose. “More bloody students?” it grumbles to the sunflower peeking over its shoulder (1:40). The flower’s brown center disc morphs into rough eyes and a mouth, and it snaps back: “Oh, shut up, and put some clothes on!” The domestic objects of the garden have found their voices, and they sound nothing like the signs they’ve been mythologized into by a bourgeois world. Straying out of their symbolic context, time, and space, the material beings resist their status as the never-signifying and always signified; they grow mouths at will to define themselves, and they define themselves as they see fit.

    The mythologies around quotidian objects, then, in a very dramatic sense, immaterialize: without hesitation a carrot heartlessly abandons his lover, a stick of butter, after Vyvyan crushes her with a plate and in spite of her heart-wrenching plea, “Darling carrot? Could you ever love a cripple?” (“Boring,” 19:48). The critters that crawl through these walls aren’t compelled by cheese and definitely don’t sleep in matchbooks like the tame postwar protagonist of Tom and Jerry. They proudly munch on the poetry of high culture as if it were worth nothing more than the material it’s printed on. One rat crudely muses, “I managed to nibble away at a few lines of Hippolytus the other day,” to which the other responds snarkily, “Oh, lucky you! Euripides is my dream poet” (“Demolition,” 6:30). Even the word “Euripides” is stripped of its semiotic stickiness of culture and context and boiled down to its material (in this case, sound), in the form of a punny knock-knock joke whose punch line is “Euripides trousers, you-menda-dese trousers!” by the puppet-rodents. They treat all culture as material substance and all material substance as worthy of disposal down the same digestive system. This is especially evident when one of the rats cannibalizes the body of his recently smashed friend, justifying it by saying that “It’s what he would’ve wanted.” As Kenneth Gross says of Collodi’s original Pinnochio story, the “image of the hunger of the puppet” here “even suggests a hunger that belongs to objects themselves, a desire in objects for voice, for play, for relation and use—though also their being lent a power to devour the humans who make and use them” (105). Here, the physical nonhuman item is not hungered for by the consumer, but is imagined to have a rabid, predatory hunger of its own, and threatens to undo the central tenets of object relations as it eats. Rats are, of course, unwelcome house guests, but the domestic pets are indistinguishable in their (vocally and culinarily) foul-mouthed countercultural bristle. Vyvyan’s often-puppeted hamster, named “Special Patrol Group” after the London law enforcement division, is the constant perpetrator of odor-based humor, flatulating wildly in one bean-related gag and protesting the use of Vyvyan’s deodorant on his body in another. “And was I consulted, pally?” he shouts, now visibly bearing four punky metal stars on his forehead just like Vyvyan, which the hamster has apparently picked up since his last appearance. “How do you think I feel, stinking like a student’s armpit?” (“Bomb,” 3:05). Even a box of generic corn flakes, about as everyday middle-class domestic as it gets, doesn’t hesitate to come to life and speak its mind with a crude countercultural vernacular. The white-bread suburban family branded on the box bicker amongst themselves about the artificiality of their positions; the daughter complains that, “I wish I’d had time for a crap before we started!” and her father scolds her and her brother for the subsequent argument, bellowing, “Would you two shut up and keep smiling! We’re supposed to be the ideal nuclear family!” (“Bomb,” 8:24).

    The language of these material performers rings of the crass vernacular of punk speech, and the puppets’ foul-mouthedness shatters the fragile linguistic safety of domestic space. Their language is the same as the Sex Pistols’ in their infamous 1976 interview with Bill Grundy on the Today show, when Steve Jones called Grundy a “fucking rotter” on live television (ThamesTv). But this language performs a more specific kind of bricolage when erupting from the mouth of a puppet. Hebdige recalls the studies of working-class youth subcultures performed by John Clark and Tony Jefferson, who wrote that “when the bricoleur re-locates the significant object in a different position within [a characteristic form of] discourse, using the same overall repertoire of signs, or when that object is placed within a different total ensemble, a new discourse is constituted, a different message conveyed” (qtd. in Hebdige 104). Grounding this rewiring of sign-systems in examples, Hebdige notes that “the mods could be said to be functioning as bricoleurs when they appropriated another range of commodities by placing them in a symbolic ensemble which served to erase or subvert their original straight meanings” (104). By giving the puppet a lexicon of swear words couched within the cadences of the working class, The Young Ones shatters the friendly-domestic mythology around the puppet in the contemporary Western world—it would be difficult to imagine, after all, Henson’s Muppets, the cast of Sesame Street, or even the puppets of Labyrinth using this kind of language.

    Though the puppets of The Young Ones are certainly bricoleurs, the fact that they are objects that speak at all performs an even more powerful kind of bricolage—especially when they’re domestic objects that barely resemble creatures, as Henson’s creations at least try to do. Though the speech act is so ubiquitous amongst humans that the signification of agency and subject-hood granted to the speaker often goes unnoticed, the should-be inanimate object complicates the authority and subjectivity associated with the speech act by maintaining its object-ness while speaking like a subject. Like the subcultural mod’s use of the capitalist prop of the tie, the teddy boy’s appropriation of Edwardian dress, and the punk’s semiotic sharpening of the domestic safety pin, the puppet re-signifies, but it re-signifies the speech act itself. It does so by dragging speech out of subjectivity and allowing those things that should not have voices to speak (and speak raunchily). As Connor puts it, “the shifting conditions of vocalic space are illustrated…in the curious, ancient, and long-lived practice of making voices appear to issue from elsewhere than their source” (13). The puppet exists out of time, place, and possibility when its material body speaks in this shifting vocalic space, but that same material paradoxically reminds us that the puppet is present and grounded in the present.

    Though the act of speaking by an object may be revolutionary in nature, it does not dictate the content of the puppet’s speech. At times, the objects in The Young Ones that animate themselves into existence do so in an over-the-top eagerness to fulfill their roles as servile objects. Their parroting of the language of servility emphasizes the object’s instrumentality, but at the same time eliminates the grounding for that instrumentality in speech. The declaration of its inherent uselessness and status as an object, as opposed to a subject, presents a message with one specific claim and a medium with a contrasting claim; the language says one thing and the act of speaking in language says another. By hyperbolizing the language of self-denial, the performance of the ability to speak contrasts disarmingly with the self-deprecating words that are said, a kind of bricolage that intersects with the logic of the appropriation of the tie. Both the puppet and the subcultural bricoleur appear as impossible beings, and the contrast between the words of some of these self-denying puppets and the fact that they can speak at all illustrates that The Young Ones‘ puppets live in the contradiction rather than attempt to resolve it.

    The delicate dance between self-denying words and self-assertion through speech is most potently enacted in The Young Ones by those most mistreated of household objects: the cleaning supplies that make their abode in the small cupboard beneath the stairs. A hesitantly rebellious puppet sponge begins the conversation in a broom closet under the stairs, couching the terms of its rebelliousness in apologies and backtracking: “Ah, dear me, ma’am. Our whole job is to serve the young gentlemen and look out for them the best we can. But, I’m sure young master Neil do treat us very rough sometimes” (“Oil,” 19:40). The sponge’s voice is like that of a child’s, but the seemingly wiser and older Broom, who speaks like the patriarch of the cleaning supplies, sets the poor sponge straight. “And so he should, young Lucy,” he corrects the apologetic rebel. “For we love it. The complete negation of our personality, the mind-numbing servility, the eighteen-hour work day. And we expect no reward but a staircase over our heads.” “Oh, dear, yes, Lucy,” a spray can of “Pledge” chimes in. “We love it. The personal abuse is our lot, and the further back you go, the better it gets.” At the sound of Neil and Rick approaching for a “house meeting” in the broom closet, the Broom commands absolute reverence and continued servitude: “Oh, no! The young lads are coming down to beat us. Everyone on your best behavior, or you’ll have me to answer to.”

    The two parental puppets send contradictory messages in their speech, exemplifying the very rebellious behavior they detest by speaking, but speaking to express their disapproval of rebellious behavior. These puppets undermine the subcultural young ones who are their masters by drawing attention to the callousness with which the masters treat them in their pathetic existence. But beneath this seemingly pro-puppet, anti-punk understanding, they embody many of the values of the punk, hippie, and more broadly anarchist movements the boys stand for. Were it not a joke, the puppets’ almost academic precision in explaining the instrumentalization that is regularly performed on their bodies, paired with their decidedly un-critical and comfortable acceptance of their objectification, would make even a lukewarm Marxist cringe. Their bricolage is a strange one that taunts the seemingly stable mythologies of objects into which bourgeois logic shepherded both people and materials, by eliminating these objects’ limits and exaggerating their complacency.

    The puppet’s role as violator and critic of domestic space and domestic material does not prevent those characters who seem to be coded as human from breaking the rules as well as the architectural structures that mirror those rules. The boys in The Young Ones are constantly smashing through the barriers of their own space, so frequently intruding upon one another by crashing through cabinets, walls, and doors that they almost never take notice of the intrusions of puppets and costumed characters. Labyrinth and The Young Ones only seem to differ in the distance with which they hold the domestic and normative world away from the subcultural one. But they share a common ground in their eventual illumination of a spectrum of personhood that ultimately complicates the organic unity of the human being in a spectacle of persondrag. The material otherness of the puppet serves more to complement the material otherness of the young subculturals than it does to distinguish the puppets from them. As if he were made from felt and fur instead of skin and bones, Neil’s body takes an absurd amount of slapstick damage without any real or lasting repercussions. As The Young Ones Production Manager Ed Bye puts it in the show’s twenty-fifth-year anniversary documentary, all of the show’s “cartoon violence actually kind of worked, because in cartoons people get smashed to pieces and then four seconds later they’re alright again, and there was a lot of that going on in the The Young Ones, I mean, well, obviously otherwise they’d all be dead” (“25 Years”). Poor Neil, almost always the butt of the joke and the target of the fist or projectile, was particularly prone to this cartoon violence from which only the non-human body can regenerate. Toward the end of “Boring,” after a demon impales his head with a metal skewer, Neil wanders around unaware of his injury, telling Rick, “I’m just going down to the local paper shop, okay?” When he meanders outside, he notices the long spike and removes it, musing out loud to the camera, in a calm monotone, “that’s funny, I don’t remember ramming this skewer into my head” (30:50). This is a comparatively ordinary incident in Neil’s life. In “Interesting,” Neil takes a drag of marijuana and literally gets high, as visible wires raise him to the moon. He’s puppeted through the cosmos, where two astronauts comment from a rocket-ship model that “it’s like that song by David Bowie,” and jokingly recite lyrics from Bowie’s “Space Oddity,” mumbling, “hey, look…the planet Earth is blue and there’s nothing we can do” (“25:40”). Neil finally arrives at the moon, where two puppeted robot-alien creatures blast him with dynamite. Surprised that it has no effect on his body, one robot laughs out, “Hey, that hippie must be really out of it.” Like Bowie’s Ziggy Stardust and Jareth, Neil is otherworldly, and like the bodies of the puppets in Jareth’s court, Neil’s otherworldly body is animated in ways a normal humans cannot be and, we’re asked to believe, made of materials that are not human. “I’m gonna hide in the wall cavity and pretend to be thermal insulation,” Neil muses aloud in “Demolition,” when the authorities demolish the boys’ first home. His fantasy is really to be human—that his body might finally be destroyed like the human he wishes he could be when the authorities come to demolish the house. Neil fulfills the maxim laid out by Margaret Williams: “the death or suicide of the puppet is a recurring theme in puppetry, since it exposes the problematic nature of the puppet’s ‘life’” (18). The material of his body, which is more text than it is flesh, “remains a human form, able to be empathized with,” as Williams says of the suicidal puppet, “and to be revived and to ‘die’ all over again at the next show” (18).

    As the obvious representative of the punk scene, Vyvyan’s person is also defined by the material his body is adorned in and, in a sense, composed of. The back of his vest, which reads “VERY METAL,” can be understood in more than one way. In addition to the obligatory bricolage of punk memorabilia (the metal studded belt and vest, Doc Martens, three-pointed Mohawk, and dyed hair), Vyvyan wears a lock on a steel chain and bears four metallic stars which seem to be grafted into his forehead. He even makes these stars into a metonym of his body when he whines, “I don’t want my forehead to rust!” as his reason for exemption from grocery shopping duty (“Flood”). Like Neil’s body, his body operates as a performance object and, as such, can take a serious beating and constantly reanimate for the next show. “Oil” sees him taking a pickax to the head with no lasting consequences, but this is not the most gratuitous of injuries performed on his inhuman body. When the group goes by train to do three years of laundry, Vyvyan learns the hard way why the train has a small sign that says “Do Not Lean Out of the Window” and literally loses his head when it collides with a passing object. In spite of the gratuitous blood that jets out of a hole in his neck, Vyvyan is for the most part okay; his headless body wanders around the tracks while his impatient decapitated head plays a frustrated game of “follow my voice” (22:57). When his body finally arrives, instead of picking up the head and holding onto it for safe keeping, it kicks the head along like a child kicking a rock along the street. Next we see Vyvyan, he is, of course, in one piece, as if the accident had been no more severe than a papercut (“Bambi”).

    Even Rick’s absurdly short ponytails, pathetically chalk-drawn anarchy symbol, and menagerie of activist lapel pins emphasize the material elements of his costume as a part of his archetypal personage and physical person. Like his friends, he is immune to human death, only crumpling under the weight of violence to reanimate for the next joke. It is perhaps not a coincidence that the only flatmate who is not immune to death is Mike (the only one who is not immediately associated with a cookie cutter subcultural archetype). While most humans outside the quartet of stooges do not fall victim to the kinds of physical violence that the young ones seem immune to, they also behave like puppets. Alexei Sayle, for example, plays various essentially identical members of the Balowski family (the most prominent member being the faux-Russian landlord of the four young subculturals, Jerzei Balowski, who appears in three episodes). Every Balowski practices a humanity that is as flexible as that of Jerzei’s tenants. The only way to tell which unpredictable and volatile Balowski character he’s playing at any given moment is by the way the other characters refer to him, and what name he identifies with. The expectation that his body could signify so many different beings strips away its claim to being representative of a being and relocates the source of “being” from an innate truth grounded in the body to language and perception. Even as a human in the flesh, his perceived and muddled subjectivity is like that of the puppet: contingent, corralled, and ultimately played for kicks.

    Don’t Cut the Strings—We’re Going to Need Them

    In March 2017, the Trump administration’s proposed budget would have eviscerated funding for the public broadcasting network, which houses Sesame Street. In “Elmo Gets FIRED,” a two-minute-and-eighteen-second viral video created by What’s Trending? in advocacy of PBS, the audience witnesses Elmo sitting alone at a table while an offscreen voice informs him that, due to these budget cuts, he’s being laid off. “It does me no great joy to inform you that, due to recent cuts in government funding to PBS, you are no longer employed by Sesame Street Workshop.” Bewildered and stumbling over his words, the devastated Elmo finally manages to reply (in his high-pitched, singsong, child’s voice): “just like that? Elmo’s been working at Sesame Street for thirty-two years….Elmo doesn’t…Elmo doesn’t, Elmo doesn’t….” After waving away Elmo’s concerns about his rising rent, his access to health insurance, and the impending vacuum of educational content for children, the faceless PBS executive sends Elmo on his way. “Elmo will go bye-bye now,” the puppet concedes, but the executive interrupts him: “One more thing…leave the puppet.” Before Elmo can finish saying “Leave the puppet? What do you [mean?]” a faceless body enters the shot and tears the Elmo puppet off the performer’s hand. The human hand—still curved into a duck’s bill shape, as if it had never stopped operating the puppet now lying dead on the table—bounces offscreen, leaving behind most of the body of the being it is performing into existence. Elmo’s lifeless puppet strewn across the table, the message “PBS is an essential source for preparing children for the future” flashes across the screen, followed by “Support PBS today,” as the video fades to black.

    The Trump administration must rip the puppet off of the human hand because even on Sesame Street the puppet is a punk. This is the case in the puppet’s assault on individual human subjectivity, in its punking of the domestic fabrics and materials of the household occupied by the heterosexualized nuclear family, and in its redistribution of agency collectives (and public networks) instead of individuals (and private corporations). The puppet and its punk tendencies are an ideological threat to that administration. Even in defeat, Elmo’s complicated intersubjectivity performs a rhetorical battle with the Trump administration. As his body falls, the actant network that Elmo was a part of lives on, embodied by the now homeless hand of the puppeteer, able to retreat, rethink, and rematerialize elsewhere. All the while, the limp body of Elmo, in twenty-two excruciating seconds of motionlessness, grates against our usual experience of the frenetic and upbeat puppet, pulling at the heart-/puppet strings of anyone who is attached to Sesame Street. Margaret Williams says that, in Phillipe Genty’s untitled performance in which a puppet commits suicide by cutting its own strings, the puppet’s “reduction to object status is incomplete…it still retains that ‘after-life’ that lingers around any figure with which an audience has emotionally identified” (18). Like Genty’s puppet, Elmo’s body was never charged with a biological life, and yet, as it lies on the table, it has never looked more dead and never been more alive.

    Of course, there is a risk of overstating the comparison here between Elmo’s body and real bodies: the bodies at risk of being owned, mastered, deported, and sanctioned as a result of the political and social turmoil in our very real world are not, unfortunately, like those of the superhumanly regenerating Young Ones stars, which can bounce back from any injury, or like Elmo’s, which can survive, in some state, the fracturing of its operator and its husk. But, like those cartoonish bodies, these real bodies at risk of being made into objects can resist by animating themselves and by speaking. In many cases, resistance is performed by the simple condition of the material presence of their animated bodies that testifies to their status as subject. And when more direct forms of resistance are compromised, the specter of the punk-puppet and its disruptive persondrag suggests an alternate narrative that could inspire any number of plans for resistance—plans that find a power in being puppeted when being the puppeteer is not an option. The puppet’s strings are, after all, not a tool by which some “puppet master” controls the puppet. They are, rather, tethers to lives of levity beyond the physical and its embodied restrictions, lives that, like Kleist’s marionettes, “possess the virtue of being immune to gravity’s force” and, “like elves, the puppets need only to touch upon the ground” as a point of departure, and then “the soaring of their limbs is newly animated through this momentary hesitation” (Kleist 24). Elmo, in communication with a long and nuanced tradition of the contradictory figure of the puppet and its assault on traditionally inflexible configurations of meaning, has shown us just such a point of departure. Our challenge, then, is to learn how to renew that flight during a momentary hesitation.

    Footnotes

    1. Even in the A. C. H. Smith novelization and its tie-in manga series by Forbes and Lie, both of which call the Jareth character Jeremy, the character is very much like Bowie: Sarah swoons at his associations with culture, his European sensibilities, and the degree of fame he enjoys that makes it necessary to dodge paparazzi.

    Works Cited

    • “Bambi.” Directed by Paul Jackson. The Young Ones: Extra Stoopid Edition, series 2, episode 1, BBC Video, 2007. DVD.
    • Barbaro, Michael and Megan Twohey. “Shamed and Angry: Alicia Machado, a Miss Universe Mocked by Donald Trump.” The New York Times. 27 Sep. 2016.
    • Barthes, Roland. “Lesson in Writing.” Image, Music, Text. Edited and translated by Stephen Heath, Fontana Press, 1977, pp. 170-178.
    • “Bomb.” Directed by Geoff Poesner. The Young Ones: Extra Stoopid Edition, series 1, episode 4, BBC Video, 2007. DVD.
    • “Boring.” Directed by Geoff Poesner. The Young Ones: Extra Stoopid Edition, series 1, episode 3, BBC Video, 2007. DVD.
    • Bowie, David. “David Bowie Interview-Ellen Degeneres [sic].” Dailymotion, uploaded by Susan Jobe, 12 Jan. 2016. https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x3lyg53.
    • Butler, Judith. Bodies that Matter. 1993. Routledge, 2011.
    • Carroll, Shiloh. “The Heart of the Labyrinth: Reading Jim Henson’s Labyrinth as a Modern Dream Vision.” Mythlore, vol. 28, no. 1, Fall/Winter 2009, pp. 103-113.
    • Connor, Steven. Dumbstruck: A Cultural History of Ventriloquism. Oxford UP, 2011.
    • “Demolition.” Directed by Paul Jackson. The Young Ones: Extra Stoopid Edition, series 1, episode 1, BBC Video, 2007. DVD.
    • “Elmo Gets FIRED (PARODY).” Written by Alex Firer and Adam Bozarth. What’s Trending, 2017, www.whatstrending.com/video/23876-elmo-gets-fired/. “Flood.” Directed by Paul Jackson.
    • The Young Ones: Extra Stoopid Edition, series 1, episode 6, BBC Video, 2007. DVD. Forbes, Jake T., and Chris Lie. Return to Labyrinth. 4 vols. TokyoPop, 2006-2010.
    • Gross, Kenneth. Puppet: An Essay on Uncanny Life. The U of Chicago P, 2011.
    • “Grouch Apprentice, Episode 4104.” Directed by Kevin Clash, Ken Diego, Victor DiNapoli, Jim Martin, Ted May, Lisa Simon, and Emily Squires. Sesame Street. Season 36, Amazon PrimeVideo, 2005. https://www.amazon.com/Grouch-Apprentice-Episode-4104/dp/B002T33IOG/ref=cm_cr_arp_d_product_top?ie=UTF8
    • Hebdige, Dick. Subculture: The Meaning of Style. Routledge, 1979.
    • Henson, Jim, director. Labyrinth. Lucasfilm Ltd., 1986.
    • “Interesting.” Directed by Paul Jackson. The Young Ones: Extra Stoopid Edition, series 1, episode 5, BBC Video, 2007. DVD.
    • “Journey through the Labyrinth: The Quest for Goblin City.” Directed by Michael Gillis., MogoMedia Inc., 2007. Labyrinth (30th Anniversary Edition), Sony Pictures, 2016. DVD.
    • Kleist, Heinrich von. “On the Marionette Theater.” Translated by Thomas G. Neumiller, The Drama Review, vol. 16, no. 3, Sep. 1972, pp. 22-26.
    • McRobbie, Angela. “Second-Hand Dresses and the Role of the Ragmarket.” Zoot Suits and Second-Hand Dresses: An Anthology of Fashion and Music, edited by Angela McRobbie, Macmillan, 1989, pp. 23-49.
    • “Nasty.” Directed by Paul Jackson. The Young Ones: Extra Stoopid Edition, series 2, episode 3, BBC Video, 2007. DVD.
    • NBC News. “The Third Presidential Debate: Hillary Clinton And Donald Trump (Full Debate) | NBC News.” YouTube, uploaded by NBC News, 19 Oct. 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=smkyorC5qwc.
    • “Oil.” Directed by Paul Jackson. The Young Ones: Extra Stoopid Edition, series 1, episode 2, BBC Video, 2007. DVD.
    • Piris, Paul. “The Co-Presence and Ontological Ambiguity of the Puppet.” The Routledge Companion to Puppetry and Material Performance, edited by Dassia N. Posner et al., Routledge, 2014, pp. 18-29.
    • @realDonaldTrump (Donald Trump). “Every poll, Time, Drudge, Slate and others, said I won both debates-but heard Megyn Kelly had her two puppets say bad stuff. I don’t watch.” Twitter, 15 Oct. 2016, 7:22 p.m., https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/654844831903170560.
    • —. “Megyn Kelly has two really dumb puppets, Chris Stirewalt & Marc Threaten (a Bushy) who do exactly what she says. All polls say I won debates.” Twitter, 15 Oct. 2016, 7:00 p.m., https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/654839227612549120.
    • Saunders, Desmond, director. Inside The Labyrinth: The Making of Labyrinth. Nelson Entertainment, 1987.
    • Sendak, Maurice. In the Night Kitchen. 1970. HarperCollins, 1996.
    • —. Outside Over There. 1981. HarperCollins, 1989.
    • —. Where the Wild Things Are. 1963. HarperCollins, 2012. Print.
    • Smith, A. C. H. Jim Henson’s Labyrinth: The Novelization. Archaia, 2014.
    • Smith, Evan. “‘I hope you’re satisfied, Thatcher!’: Capturing the Zeitgeist of 1980s Britain in The Young Ones.” Agora, vol. 49, no. 4, 2014, pp. 14-22.
    • ThamesTv. “Swearing |Sex Pistols interview |Today Show |Thames TV | 1976.” YouTube, uploaded by ThamesTv, 28 May 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LtHPhVhJ7Rs. “25 Years: Young Ones Silver Jubilee.” The Young Ones: Extra Stoopid Edition. BBC Video, 2007. DVD.
    • Williams, Margaret. “The Death of ‘the Puppet’?” The Routledge Companion to Puppetry and Material Performance, edited by Dassia N. Posner et al., Routledge, 2014, pp. 18-30.
    • Wright, Julie Lobalzo. “David Bowie: The Extraordinary Rock Star as Film Star.” David Bowie: Critical Perspectives, edited by Eoin Devereux et al., Routledge, 2015, pp. 230-244.

  • On Being Worthy of the Event:Four Fukushima Stoics

    Margherita Long (bio)

    Abstract

    This essay reads the testimonies of four Fukushima women interviewed by journalist Iwakami Yasumi in the summer and fall of 2011. At the time, mandatory evacuations had emptied the zones closest to the triple meltdowns, but people in surrounding areas were left to decide for themselves: should they stay at their ancestral homes, or flee to protect their bodies? These four women are inspiring as leaders and as activists because of their ability to think beyond the crippling dichotomy and become worthy of Fukushima as an “event” in the sense explored by Deleuze in The Logic of Sense (1969).

    ________

    After three reactors at the Fukushima Dai’ichi Nuclear Power Station melted down in March 2011, the Japanese government issued mandatory evacuation orders for the twenty-kilometer radius around Futaba, the plant’s host town. In April 2011 the government evacuated two additional towns outside this radius, Iitate and Katsurao, located under the plume that had spread northwest after the explosions.1 People in these zones had no choice but to leave. But what about people living just outside the zones, where radiation readings were also high, yet the government was offering no compensation for relocation? Should they stay or should they go? This essay reads a series of interviews conducted by journalist Iwakami Yasumi in the summer and fall of 2011. Iwakami’s interviewees hail mostly from the cities of Iwaki, Fukushima City, and Kōriyama, which are 40, 55, and 60 kilometers respectively from Fukushima Dai’ichi. A subset of interviewees is from the areas around Kawauchi-mura and Tamura-shi, 30 and 35 kilometers away. In all these places, disagreements about the implications of staying or going were tearing communities apart. Iwakami laments:

    By that summer [. . .] Fukushima was divided [and . . .] elements from both groups had begun quarreling. Among those who evacuated there were many who got called “traitor” (uragirimono) by those who had decided to stay. In turn, many of them were criticized by those who advocated evacuation. “How can you not consider the children?” they demanded. It was a painful sight to behold, these mutual attacks by groups that had both been victimized by the nuclear accident. (5-6)

    Iwakami is the founder of an internet-based independent television station called Web Iwakami, which flourished after the disaster by countering government misinformation in the mainstream media. Collecting testimonies, he wanted to access local truths and give voices to g otherwise merely be managed as a “population.”2 He conducted dozens of interviews and published them as long-form videos on the website of his media organization, IWJ (Independent Web Journal). Then, in 2012 and 2014, he published two bound volumes, titling them Hyakunin hyakuwa: One Hundred People, One Hundred Stories.3

    As an admirer of Svetlana Alexievich’s Nobel-prizewinning Voices from Chernobyl: The Oral History of a Nuclear Disaster, I was interested in reading Iwakami’s interviews as literature. As a feminist, I also wanted to read them for insights into how people were overcoming the split Iwakami describes, between a kind of materialism, namely the physical reality of children’s health, and a kind of idealism, namely the spiritual importance of the family home. To study Fukushima is to see that this split has mapped itself directly onto stark political oppositions between left and right. The left criticizes the government’s failure to acknowledge the real physical danger of radiation. The right insists that what the left calls danger is actually just “harmful rumors” (fūhyō higai) damaging the economic recovery (fukkō) and community bonds (kizuna) they idealize. Arguably, it a version of the same schism that feminist new materialism has been trying to overcome, especially in an age of climate crisis, by insisting on the importance of what Elizabeth Grosz calls “the incorporeal.” 4 The incorporeal is a concept that emphasizes the interdependence of the material and the ideal, the world of things and the world of ideas, and the harm done to both when they are conceived separately. When Iwakami uses his interviews to address the harm done by nuclear victims’ mutual recriminations, is he making a similar point–that the two sides would be better off if they stopped seeing themselves as separate?

    As I made my way through his two volumes, I was reminded repeatedly of a line from Deleuze in The Logic of Sense: “Either ethics makes no sense at all, or this is what it means and has nothing else to say: not to be unworthy of what happens to us” (149). Rather than resent the nuclear disaster as something happening to them personally, many of the people in Iwakami’s books “become worthy” of it by understanding it as something vast and impersonal. They do not put the materialism of contaminated soil, food and bodies on one side, and the idealism of safety and community on the other. Instead, they link them all together by means of what Deleuze would call “the logic of sense,” replacing the on-high moralism of nuclear judgement with an immanent ethics of day-to-day nuclear engagement.

    We see it first in the way Iwakami assembles his interviews. In the introduction to his first volume he cites as inspiration the American journalist Studs Terkel, whose oral histories he had first emulated in the early 1990s when collecting personal narratives about the dissolution of the Soviet Union. After Fukushima, Iwakami says his aim is to debunk stereotypes by means of the authenticity of “ichininshō hitori katari,” “first person singular narrative” (Iwakami, 6). However, the emphasis in the two volumes never becomes a confessional grammar; it is never the individual subjectivity of his speakers. Instead, because Iwakami allows each twenty-page narrative its own logic, the emphasis falls on the relation between the disparate voices. In quick succession we encounter people who are not only on opposite sides of the issue, but often internally conflicted themselves. Paradoxically, we feel affinity for all of them. Like Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Deleuze’s discussion of the paradox from Logic of Sense, everyone in Iwakami’s book asks, “Which way which way?” Iwakami’s point, like Deleuze’s, is that “the question has no answer, because it is characteristic of sense not to have any direction” (77).

    “No obvious direction.” How does this work, philosophically? The second place we see “sense” and “the incorporeal” replacing moral judgement in Iwakami’s volumes is in a subset of fascinating interviews that answer the question directly. These are my favorite interviewees, and the remainder of this essay is devoted to them: Saitō Hideko, Sasaki Keiko, Mutō Ruiko, and Satō Sachiko. All are women,5 all are activists, and all offer narratives that pivot on a series of recurring infinitives—”to be irradiated” (hibaku suru), “to eat” (taberu), “to get sick” (byōki ni naru), “to grow old” (toshi o toru), “to die” (shinu), “to live” (ikiru). The four women push themselves to understand both how these verbs connect the people of the event, and how they can be used to extract something useful from it for activism.

    In Deleuze, the reason “sense” has no obvious direction is that it is incorporeal: it belongs to the enigmatic but crucial philosophical category that proves the inherence of the material in the ideal, and vice versa. Deleuze acknowledges that using “sense” and the “the incorporeal” as concepts is difficult. To understand them, he says, we have to go all the way back in the history of Western philosophy, past the Platonic dichotomy between the material and the ideal, to the pre-Socratic Stoics, who put both on one side of a conceptual divide, and opened another side for what explains their relations. That is, the Stoics put both bodies and souls, both substances and qualities, on one side, and saved the other for what operates by the incorporeal “logic of sense.” Deleuze explains:

    The Stoics’ strength lay in making a line of separation pass—no longer between the sensible and the intelligible, or between the soul and the body, but where no one had seen it before—between physical depth and metaphysical surface. Between things and events. Between states of things and compounds, causes, souls and bodies, actions and passions, qualities and substances on the one hand, and, on the other, events or impassive, unqualifiable, incorporeal Effects, infinitives which result from these amalgams. (Dialogues II 63)

    What is interesting about Saitō, Sasaki, Mutō, and Satō is the way they make using “impassive, unqualifiable” infinitives seem not enigmatic and ancient but obvious and modern. Theirs is nuclear-induced Stoicism that has much to teach not only fellow Fukushimans, but everyone looking for new ways of being worthy of environmental catastrophe.

    To take the most obvious example: both within and outside of Japan, intellectuals have responded to the nuclear accident with angry incredulity toward the Japanese government’s two main responses. The first was a safety campaign, legitimized by a group of “government scholars” (goyō gakusha) who insisted raising the annual legal radiation exposure limit from 1 to 20 millisieverts in Fukushima was fine, even for children, and that increased rates of juvenile thyroid cancer beginning in 2012 and 2013 were due solely to increased screening rates.6 The second was a decontamination (josen) campaign, which allocated the lion’s share of national disaster money not to evacuations but to collecting the top six inches of soil, leaves, branches, and other organic material from all “special decontamination zones” in one-ton plastic bags that were then be stacked near the crippled reactors.7 With both responses, the government’s willful denial of radiation’s actual material properties was truly staggering. As intellectuals, should we not insist on a materialism that would take radiation seriously?

    Yet what Saitō, Sasaki, Mutō, and Satō teach us is not only that compassion for people who cannot leave is crucial, but also that the innovative thinking needed to address the disaster may require the refusal to separate reflecting on the world from living in it. Interested less in critique than in affirmation, they each find impetus in the circumstances themselves, responding not to the enormity of the disaster but to the possibility of extracting something immanent to it: something lighter and less personal, something “incorporeal.” Each manages to orient her creativity along lines of sense already traced by the event itself. Explaining how this can work, Elizabeth Grosz notes that Deleuze returns to the Stoics because it is precisely their concept of the incorporeal that allows them to locate the force of idealism within materiality:

    We think only because we are forced into invention by external exigencies on which we must rely to live, let alone prosper. Thinking does not come easily and is wrenched not only from the living being’s interior but above all from the capacity for sense that the alignment of events—these external exigencies—make possible. (149)

    Modeling the ability to wrench thought from the capacity for sense after 3.11, Saitō, Sasaki, Mutō, and Satō become worthy of the event not just to keep from resenting it, but to find out what it will allow them to think if they acknowledge their place within it, and its place within them.

    SAITŌ HIDEKO

    Let’s start with Saitō Hideko, the director of a daycare center affiliated with a hospital complex in Iwaki. Speaking about what it has meant to “take responsibility” after 3.11, Saitō objects to a recent op-ed in the local newspaper with the headline, “Now More than Ever, Let’s Eat Fukushima Produce.”8 The op-ed complains that even local customers in area restaurants are reluctant to eat food raised in Fukushima. “If the people of the prefecture don’t take the initiative [and eat it],” the op-ed asks, “what kind of thanks are they offering their supporters elsewhere in Japan” who do? (Iwakami, vol. 1: 157). This is a central controversy surrounding economic recovery in a heavily agricultural area. Saitō counters that not only do outside supporters not expect Fukushima residents to eat contaminated food, it is also not the role of ippan shimin, the general populace, to take responsibility for an accident wrought by national policies and the Tokyo Electric Power Company. She sounds full of anger and resentment, and at this moment, not particularly Stoic. Yet even though she has sent her own children to live with relatives in western Japan, she herself remains in Iwaki, which we come to realize she does to model her own version of responsibility.

    Deleuze calls events “impersonal” because they correspond to a part of the present that exceeds one’s own particular “now.” When he suggests, for instance, that every event is “a kind of plague, war, wound, or death” (Logic 151), he does not mean simply that events always happen to more than one person or entity, but rather that they never inhere in the personal, actualized moment of “I get sick,” “I shoot the enemy,” “my body is cut,” or “I die.” They inhere instead in the unlimited set of other possible actualizations or self-structurings to which this same set of conditions could give rise: to sicken (or not), to shoot (or not), to be cut (or not), to die (or not). Deleuze calls these “counter-actualizations” that are “grounded in me” but also have “no relation to me at all” (Logic 151). This is why, in Stoic thought, the bodies and passions that are causes can be described with nouns and adjectives, but the events that are their effects are always described with verbs (infinitives). One of the main arguments in The Logic of Sense is that to be worthy of the event is to attune oneself to the simultaneity of these different temporalities, one personal and the other impersonal. As Deleuze scholar James Williams explains, “We have to express the event in its eternal significance and we have to represent it in its present happening” (144).

    In Saitō’s narrative we discern at least three separate events: “to feed,” “to irradiate internally,” “to sicken.” She relates that, as a daycare director, she “can not take responsibility for other people’s . . . children based on government assurances of ‘no immediate health effects’” (158).9 So she proposes that the daycare forego local produce, even though it meets national radiation standards, and secure a regular supply from Nara Prefecture in Western Japan. This, however, results in yet another dilemma. Hearing about the daycare’s dietary precautions, and also that it has removed contaminated soil from its play area, a number of parents who never left Iwaki move their children to Saitō’s school. They also telephone friends who have evacuated and convince them to return and enroll in Saitō’s school. Saitō worries that this makes her a hypocrite. “Right here, right now,” she says, “I’m proud to be taking some degree of definitive action. But when I think about looking back at myself in five or ten years to ask whether what I did was right or wrong, I worry” (Iwakami, vol.1: 159).

    The phrase “right here, right now” hints at Saitō’s investment in “representing the event in its present happening.” But what does it mean to “express it in its eternal significance”? At first Saitō seems to be judging herself; she tries to solve her dilemma by imagining herself looking back with the understanding of hindsight. Yet her gesture of splitting time into two categories can also be said to correspond to a key gesture Deleuze admires in the Stoics: their division of time into Chronos and Aion, the corporeal present and the incorporeal past-future.10 When parents phone their friends to say the Iwaki daycare is safe, and when op-ed writers say the same about Fukushima food, they are seeing, in Saitō’s words, “only what is right in front of their eyes” (158)—the immediacy of Chronos. The Stoic trick, and indeed the trick that Saitō exhibits, is in addition to cultivate an appreciation for the way the present never exhausts events because, as Deleuze says, “there is a part of them which their accomplishment is not enough to realize, a becoming in itself which constantly both awaits us and precedes us” (Dialogues II 65). This becoming awaits us in the eternal past-future of Aion, an immaterial well of difference to which Deleuze says we can only gain access if we constantly replay the event, like an actor who knows her role is always there to be played differently by others.

    In Saitō’s narrative, these others appear at two key moments. She says, first:

    Four years ago we went to Hiroshima, visiting the Genbaku Dome and Museum, and having the opportunity as a family to talk about what took place there. If not for that experience, I think I would have been much more resistant to acknowledging my fear of radioactive contamination. (155-156)

    Saitō traces her ability to stay in Iwaki and lead the daycare creatively to having pondered the photographs and exhibits of the Hiroshima Peace Museum. There, she saw firsthand how the infinitive “to be irradiated” was played out in hundreds of lives before hers. We sense her thinking about a similar impersonality of events in the future when she then relates:

    During Golden Week in May my son and I were eating okonomiyaki in Himeji [where he is living with my relatives when] the conversation turned to whether we should sprinkle it with aonori (shredded seaweed). We decided on just a little, since it tends to stick to your teeth. But then quite a lot stuck to our teeth, and we laughed that this must be exactly what’s meant by ‘there is no particular threshold’ (shiki’ichi ga nai), just like with radioactivity. Sometimes you use lots of aonori and none sticks, and other times you’re careful to use only a little and your teeth get covered.11

    The metaphor gives voice to a Stoic insight easily lost in polarized post-3.11 thinking, namely that the relations between “to ingest,” “to be irradiated,” and “to sicken” will be actualized differently in every body that performs them. This is what it means for Stoic thought to find its origins in what Grosz calls “the capacity for sense that the alignment of events—these external exigencies—make possible” (149). Depending on this alignment, sense, in both of its senses, as meaning and as material orientation, will direct itself differently, and outcomes will change. The crucial difference between this insight, and the much crueler biopolitics of “letting die” a small but inevitable percentage of the irradiated population, is positionality. As Deleuze writes, “[t]he eternal truth of the event is grasped only if the event is also inscribed in the flesh” (Logic 161). He continues, introducing the keyword “counter-actualization”:

    But each time we must double this painful actualization by a counter-actualization which limits, moves, and transfigures it. . . . Counter-actualization is nothing, it belongs to a buffoon when it operates alone and pretends to have the value of what could have happened. But, to be the mime of what effectively occurs, to double the actualization with a counter-actualization, the identification with a distance, like the true actor and dancer, is to give to the truth of the event the only chance of not being confused with its inevitable actualization. (161)

    When Saitō and her son act out the statistics of “sticking” and end up with their teeth covered, it is a painful actualization of the way in which their exposure may already be wreaking havoc on their health, and even more so on the health of friends who have not evacuated. But when they double this possibility with its non-stick inverse, they also connect it to the variability of what is “effectively occurring” in Fukushima: a counter-actualization in which many are also not getting sick. In a single performance they manage to maintain both intimacy with and distance from the inevitability of cancer and all the other illnesses caused by long-term internal exposure to radiation. To borrow James Williams’s language, Saitō and her son are “willing the event” by “conduct[ing] [its] intensity . . . while resisting [its] . . . compulsion to confirm injuries, ideas and values as final and inevitable” (140).

    SASAKI KEIKO

    Let’s turn next to retired teacher and activist Sasaki Keiko, a native of Fukushima City. Now in her sixties, Sasaki might be said to have been grasping the eternal truth of the event “to be irradiated” for four full decades.

    In her twenties, she marched in the streets to protest the construction of the nuclear plant at Futaba. It was built. Ten years later, she rallied anti-nuclear study groups and lectures. Nevertheless Fukushima elected a pro-nuclear governor, Satō Eisaku. After Chernobyl, when Governor Satō agreed to allow the Futaba plant to add an even riskier “fast breeder” reactor to burn reprocessed mixed-oxide fuel, Sasaki and her comrades picketed the prefectural government. This time, to their delight, Governor Satō changed his mind. But his refusal angered the nuclear industry and the national government so much that he was arrested on politically motivated bribery charges, and his successor quickly acquiesced.12 At this point Sasaki herself ran for prefectural assembly, lost, and then helped form an activist group for peace and the environment.13 At the time of the earthquake, her group had begun staging daily silent vigils at the prefectural capital to protest the 2010 implementation of the fast breeder plan, holding giant banners that read “No Second Chernobyl” and “Don’t Make Fukushima a Nuclear Dumpsite.” After 3.11 she continued these vigils.

    In her interview with Iwakami, Sasaki invokes the politician Hachiro Yoshio, who had recently lost his job because he referred to the specter of evacuated hometowns as shi no machi—towns of death.14 Having been appointed Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) by incoming Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko on 2 September 2011, Hachiro made his fateful remarks during a visit to the towns of Futaba and Namie on 9 September. Upon his return to Tokyo, he is also said to have joked to an Asahi Newspaper reporter that he would “share the radiation” emitted by his clothing. Within the week he had tendered his resignation. Yet Sasaki notes that she embraces the term “town of death.” Speaking about her own town, Fukushima City, she says she thinks families with young children should leave, and seniors, who are “dull” (nibui) to the effects of radiation, and whose generation is responsible for the disaster, should stay. Where her definition of shi no machi parts company with Hachiro’s is in its insistence on the ability of death’s impersonal, incorporeal dimension to generate new ways of thinking about how to live:

    I myself have appealed to seniors to be the first to do what they can, and have drawn up a proposal called “Senior Paradise Fukushima Plan,” calling for the cooperative creation of a safe environment with sponsored employment and community policing, to be paid for primarily by a self-governing body. I want to build a system that would give seniors a reason to live, and on which they would want to stake those lives, and live them out. It would be like a special development zone, a hometown so unique that seniors from other prefectures would want to live here too. (179-180)

    Sasaki’s plan to convert her “town of death” into a paradise that would draw seniors from other prefectures is wonderfully absurd. Repurposing the neoliberal idea of a “special development zone,” she imagines Fukushima City as a site for counter-actualizing death with life. Here, growing older and slower will mean growing more purposeful and more lively. How is she able to imagine this?

    Deleuze would say she can do it because she knows how to be “led back to the surface” – how to reject both philosophical heights and philosophical depths (136). In The Logic of Sense, the term “philosophical heights” refers to the idealism of Plato, “he who leaves the cave and rises up” (127). The term “philosophical depths” refers to Plato’s predecessors, the pre-Socratics, who never left the cave—who “sought the secret of water and fire [and] philosophized with a hammer” (128). In Fukushima in 2011, Hashiro Yoshio strikes us as something of a pre-Socratic, his humor (“Contamination!” “Certain Death!”) not only falling flat but swiftly censured by on-high Platonic officialdom. In contrast, when Sasaki sets out to think “what we can do as seniors,” her humor succeeds by tracing its way to the surface of the same state of affairs. Interested neither in relegating death to a safe outside, nor in immersing herself in it, she thinks rather about all the ways it might be played out by people already oriented along its axis: already sensing it. Given that, for “us seniors,” “to die” is both immanent and limitless, why should it not include sponsored employment and community policing? This is her utterly original question, and she answers it in the affirmative. Certainly! Why not? It is a good example of what Deleuze means when he says it is “characteristic of sense not to have any direction” (Logic 77). “To die” means both to grow older and younger at the same time. It also shows why Deleuze says Stoic thinkers are funny: “humor is the co-existence of sense with non-sense” (Logic 141).

    It is interesting to imagine what Sasaki would make of the fate of her city four years later. On my way home from a conference in September 2015, I got off the bullet train in Fukushima City, moved to visit some of the places Sasaki mentions in her narrative. I started by googling her organic-yeast bakery Papa Gēna, but an online review noted it was “closed due to the disaster.” Then I took a taxi to a residential neighborhood to find her favorite natural food cafe, “Wind and Wood” (Fū to boku), but it was shuttered. Finally at her favorite art-house cinema, Fukushima Forum, I found friendly faces. While those I met were willing to list several films that dealt with 3.11 in thought-provoking ways, they said those films were only of interest to tourists because local people cannot afford to think about radiation, especially if they have young children. In the taxi on the way to the theater my driver said the population of Fukushima City hadn’t changed much since 3.11. Right after the disaster, it dropped from 310,000 to around 250,000, but many people moved back, and the population was now around 290,000. Wikipedia corroborated his numbers. To the naked eye, the city was bustling. It was in no way the “city of death” peopled by a small but revolutionary group of seniors that Sasaki had envisioned four years earlier.

    On my walk from the theater back to the station I stumbled upon the Fukushima Office for Environmental Restoration (Fukushima kankyō saisei jimusho), funded by the Ministry of the Environment (Kankyōshō). Near the entry were a series of wide-screen displays with interactive features for answering questions and quelling fears. In low-tech contrast, the inner walls were covered floor to ceiling with painstakingly updated handwritten charts of the progress of soil decontamination (josen) in every city, town, and village in the prefecture. Many boasted “100% decontamination.”15 Given my itinerary, I couldn’t help thinking that the minority who would contest such reassurances—those who bake organic-yeast bread, for instance, or eat at natural food cafes—had long since evacuated. Historically speaking, had Sasaki’s revolutionary plan for “Senior Paradise Fukushima” not ended in colossal failure?

    This question resembles one Antonio Negri puts to Deleuze in their 1990 interview, “Control and Becoming.” Pushing Deleuze to explain how we can get from minority “becoming” to full-scale political insurrection, Negri admits, “[R]eading you, I’m never sure how to answer such questions” (Negotiations 173). Deleuze’s reply is remarkable for the way it repeats a line from Logic of Sense, in which he quotes the French poet Charles Péguy on the difference between “history” and “event”:

    What history grasps in an event is the way it’s actualized in particular circumstances; the event’s becoming is beyond the scope of History. History isn’t experimental, it’s just the set of more or less negative preconditions that make it possible to experiment with something beyond history. […] In a major philosophical work, Clio, Péguy explained that there are two ways of considering events, one being to follow the course of the event, gathering how it comes about historically, how it’s prepared and then decomposes in history, while the other way is to go back into the event, to take one’s place in it as in a becoming, to grow both young and old in it at once, going through all its components or singularities. […] They say Revolutions turn out badly. But they’re constantly confusing two different things: the way revolutions turn out historically and people’s revolutionary becoming. (Negotiations 170-71)16

    The passage invites us to consider whether we can say that Sasaki’s revolutionary becoming, as narrativized in Iwakami’s book, outlives its positive or negative actualization in Fukushima City. In other words, although Sasaki’s historical, material now is very much the starting point for her experiment, very much its source and location, there is also something immanent in that same history, something incorporeal, which history is not equipped to address and that she herself exploits. Is this not how she manages to be in the middle of a great failure of politics and thought—a massively depressing historical now—and still to practice an affirmative philosophy? Speaking with Iwakami, she jokes about converting her husband to an anti-nuclear stance (“It required a long-haul battle plan, but that’s my style!” [174]) and reminisces about when Satō Eisaku changed his position to anti-nuke (“We sent him flowers!” [173]). Her levity and joy are infectious. For her the event “to be irradiated” is ongoing, so she can always take her place in it anew.

    MUTŌ RUIKO

    Let’s meet another woman activist for whom the event “to be irradiated” began long before 3.11. Mutō Ruiko is a long-time antinuclear activist in Fukushima whom Negri would likely love for her concrete political victories. In 2012 she co-headed the “Complainants for Criminal Prosecution of the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster,” a group that in 2015 successfully petitioned Tokyo district court to hold TEPCO executives responsible for the professional negligence that led to the disaster. As Norma Field and Tomomi Yamaguchi emphasize, the resulting “Fukushima Nuclear Plant Criminal Proceeding” (Fukushima genpatsu keiji soshō) is not a civil lawsuit, of which there have been many, but an unprecedented criminal prosecution.17 Since June 2017, five court-appointed attorneys representing the state have extracted 31 days of testimony from three retired executives representing the nuclear industry. Mutō and her comrades attended all these testimonies as members of an organization they founded, Supporters of the Fukushima Nuclear Plant Criminal Proceeding (Fukushima genpatsu keiji soshō shiendan).18 If found guilty, the executives face up to five years in prison, and Mutō’s political, historical revolution will have turned out well.19 But what about her revolutionary becoming? Back in October 2011, when Mutō spoke with Iwakami, she was still in the early stages of thinking through her dilemma, and she did not mention criminal charges or TEPCO executives. Instead, we see her deep in the process of trying to grapple with the events directly, to extract what she will need to play her role.

    Mutō Ruiko’s parents were educated Marxists who grew up in Fukushima. They moved back after her father attended Waseda University in Tokyo and served in the Pacific War on Karafuto (the Russian island of Sakhalin, colonized at the time by Japan). She went to university both at Wakō Daigaku in Tokyo and in nearby Miyagi Prefecture, where she earned a second degree in special education. After twenty years as a teacher of children with intellectual disabilities, she inherited land from her grandfather in Miharu. She then worked for three years to clear the land, built an energy efficient house, and opened a small cafe. At the time of the earthquake she was living with her mother, her partner, and her dog. They had been running the cafe for eight years, experimenting with ways to use as little energy as possible, serving tea made from their own herbs and grasses and curry made from their own acorns. For light they used a kerosene lamp and for heat a wood stove. Both home and cafe were active workshops for living lightly on the earth.

    Mutō’s investment in the ethics of energy production and consumption recalls Deleuze’s assertion in The Logic of Sense that Stoicism is “a concrete [and] poetic way of life” (148). Mutō traces these ethics to the shock of Chernobyl and the subsequent books of Fujita Yūkō, which prompted her to join a group called Fukushima Network for Denuclearization (Datsugenpatsu Fukushima nettowāku). If the “eternal” side of the nuclear wound became clear for Saitō Hideko during a visit to Hiroshima, for Mutō that same vastness of temporal scale impressed itself as she attended more lectures and study groups about a massive precariat of uranium miners, plant workers, and waste haulers. In 1991 Mutō lay down in the road with 300 other protesters to stop uranium from being delivered to the Rokkasho-mura reprocessing plant in Aomori Prefecture. She was adamant that spent fuel from the two nuclear plants in her own backyard not spread its misery any further.

    In scenarios like this, what Deleuze calls Aion, the impersonal past-future of the event, is easier to discern than in Deleuze’s own examples. One of his best-known Stoic portraits in The Logic of Sense is of the WWI-wounded paraplegic and French poet Joë Bousquet, who lived his life in symbiosis with his injury, determined to become its equal. Bousquet wanted his wound to select in him only “what is best and most perfect” (148). Deleuze writes:

    Joë Bousquet must be called Stoic. He apprehends the wound that he bears deep within his body in its eternal truth as a pure event. To the extent that events are actualized in us, they wait for us and invite us in. They signal us: “My wound existed before me, I was born to embody it.” It is a question of attaining this will that the event creates in us; of becoming the quasi-cause of what is produced within us, the Operator; of producing surfaces and linings in which the event is reflected, finds itself again as incorporeal and manifests in us the neutral splendor which it possesses in itself in its impersonal and pre-individual nature, beyond the general and the particular, the collective and the private. (148)

    What does this mean? If for Bousquet the event is the crippling war injury, and if it “existed before him,” it is because he is not the first to embody such a wound, and he will not be the last. It exceeds him in the sense that there have always been and will always be particular weapons and particular wars. These weapons and wars, these bodies, become corporeal causes for all the equally particular, equally personal, equally corporeal soldier and civilian bodies that they wound. But what the Stoic appreciates is not just bodies, not just things, not just causes or passions, but also effects: the incorporeal infinitive “to wound,” which is a relation between bodies, a way of understanding their alignment, and an understanding of their connection.

    The parallel in Mutō’s case might go something like this: There have always been and will always be people who need heat and energy to do work. In an example Deleuze develops from Sextus Empiricus, “the fire, a body, becomes cause to the wood, a body, of the incorporeal predicate ‘to burn’” (qtd. in Grosz 30). What labor harvests the wood? What hands and lungs distill the kerosene? What eyes enjoy the light? What bones soak in the heat? These are particular, personal, material questions, both evoked and exceeded in the infinitive “to burn,” which establishes their relation. Mutō is comfortable with the way these questions get answered in her little cafe. She has thought deeply about what it means to be worthy of the event “to burn” in her daily life.

    In contrast, as we have seen, she is not comfortable with the way these questions get answered at the Fukushima Dai-ichi and Dai-ni nuclear power plants. She tells us that one concession her Denuclearization group did win from TEPCO was a monthly audience for such questions, where, one year prior to 3.11, they learned of a recent thirty-minute power outage. It was at about the same time in 2010 that the significantly more toxic fast-breeder reactor, Reactor Three, started burning mixed-oxide MOX fuel at Dai-ichi, and Mutō’s group had invited journalist Hirose Takashi for a lecture.20 The author of Nuclear Reactor as Ticking Time Bomb, Hirose had cited seismologists’ predictions of major tectonic plate shifts in line with the hundred-year patterns of what is known as the Tōkai earthquake series. Hirose himself had predicted a tsunami and power outage in Fukushima. This is why, when Mutō felt the earthquake on 11 March 2011, her thought as she dove under a table with her dog was, “Will the nuclear plants be okay?” It is also why, when she heard on 14 March that Reactor Three at Dai-ichi exploded, she knew its fallout would be more toxic than that of Reactor One, which had already exploded, or of Reactor Two, which would explode the following day.21 Being worthy of these events, of the infinitive “to burn,” would be much more demanding than any fire in a kerosene lamp or wood stove.

    The point is that Mutō and her friends in the Denuclearization Network were already infinitely more worthy of the events than the Tokyo Electric Power Company, which has maintained ever since that they were completely unforeseeable. What Mutō and her friends understand, and TEPCO does not, is the difference between an accident and an event. In Deleuze, Joë Bousquet says, “My wound existed before me; I was born to embody it” (Logic 148). He apprehends it in what Deleuze calls its eternal truth by thinking through the limitless past-future of war. In Iwakami, Mutō Ruiko never says, “My radiation existed before me; I was born to embody it.” But by having done such a careful job of pondering its implications—by having cataloged so diligently the relations it sets up, its effects far beyond her own body–she understood, like Bousquet, its “neutral splendor.” Was it not in this sense waiting for her, signaling her? Because it was not for her an accident, because it was eternal, she knew resentment would be useless; she knew that 3.11 was not only happening to her. Rather than be resigned to it, she would begin to will it, to replay it, in a series of narratives including the one she provides for us via Iwakami and another she provided one month prior to that interview in front of a crowd of 60,000 at the first major rally of the Sayonara Nuclear Power National Action Group in Tokyo.

    Let’s take a look at her speech on that occasion, which is remarkable because it ends with a listing of infinitives. These infinitives appear just after she has evoked the natural beauty of the landscape of her home prefecture:

    With 3.11 as the threshold,
    that same landscape was flooded with invisible radiation
    and we became hibakusha.
    In the ensuing confusion,
    various things happened to us.
    Our connections to each other were tested and broken
    by stress and [the false promises] of a hastily instituted safety campaign.
    One can only imagine peoples' vast worry and sadness:
    in their communities, their workplaces,
    their schools, and within their own households.
    And every day, the endless, pressing, compulsory decisions:
    To flee, or not. To eat, or not.
    To make the children wear masks, or not.
    To hang the laundry outside, or not.
    To till the fields, or not.
    To say something, or to remain silent.
    
    (Fukushima kara 11-13)

    Mutō prefaced these remarks in Tokyo in September 2011 by asking everyone from Fukushima to stand and to remain standing during her ten-minute performance.22 This meant that her audience could associate the devastating choices she recounted that had been made thousands upon thousands of times with the thousands of people standing. These were the people who had become hibakusha six months earlier, at the same time that they were also torn from one another [hiki sakarete i[tta]], their connections broken. The phrase “broken connections” refers to the effects not only of a safety campaign that asked them to ostracize those who did not believe its promises, but also of a paltry compensation policy that asked them to compete for insufficient state resources. What Mutō accomplishes with her infinitives is the reestablishment of these connections. By attributing the devastating choices to all those standing, she lightens and depersonalizes the individual choices, transforming the heavy moral burden faced by individual parents, farmers, and activists, into a hovering, impersonal event. Her simple poetic infinitives announce that there is no longer any wrong answer to these questions, and their impact is only the force of the sense they evoke, a force that can be extracted and used. The infinitives raise the question of how to think about time. To flee? To eat? To hang laundry? To wear masks? To till land? Mutō converts the question marks to simple declaratives, refusing the isolating neoliberal decisions of 3.11’s “present moment” and affirming the expansive past-future of these ongoing events.

    On the Left in Japan, rallies like the one that brought 60,000 people to Meiji Park in September 2011 (or that brought 170,000 to Yoyogi Park the following July) are themselves considered tremendous victories: collective exercises in democratic free speech not witnessed in mainland Japan since the collapse of the student movements in the 1960s. Yet according to Mutō, such protests are meaningless without significant intellectual work beforehand from each constituent. She tells Iwakami:

    We need to understand the degree to which we are made dependent on nuclear power without even realizing it.

    It’s something you have to think through with your own head. You can’t rely on someone else’s opinion or someone else’s idea. I personally am not that smart. So I have to really wring my brain out, and think hard to make my decisions, and then take action. I think this relates directly to the question of how to change society. [Each individual thinker] must ask from her own perspective, “What is Nuclear Power Really?” (305)

    Rather than speak truth to power, Mutō’s strategy, like Sasaki’s and Saitō’s, is to extract truth, not from those who are named in criminal cases, or from one’s politicians, but from the power of the event itself. “I think the world has changed a lot since 3.11,” she says, “and this change has come at great sacrifice. But we have been able to think about an amazing number of things, to feel them, to experience them. It’s not something for government to do. It’s for us, one by one” (308).23

    CONCLUSION: SATŌ SACHIKO

    Let’s conclude with Satō Sachiko, an organic farmer, social worker, and activist, whose interview with Iwakami is unique because it narrates Fukushima as an event less of radiation than of mental health.

    Satō was born to generations of farmers on both the maternal and paternal sides of her family in the hamlet of Kawamata-town, Iitate-village, 55 kilometers as the crow flies from the Fukushima Dai’ichi plant. At the time of the triple meltdowns she was raising the youngest two of her five children and training interns at “Sea of Mountains Nōjō,” an organic farm she founded with her husband thirty years earlier. She was also running a nonprofit welfare center for elderly and disabled people in Fukushima City, thirty minutes away by car. As she tells her story, readers slowly discern the scope of her accomplishments. In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, having relocated her family 90 minutes to the west in Yamagata Prefecture, she continued commuting to the welfare center. There, she formed a volunteer group to take radiation readings at elementary schools in Kawamata and Fukushima City and, finding the radiation levels three and five times higher than the upwardly adjusted legal limits, she successfully petitioned the prefectural government to monitor all 1400 schools in the prefecture, not just in the restricted zone. The same group supported social media platforms to facilitate communication among worried and angry parents. In April 2011 Satō launched the “Fukushima Network for Protecting Children from Radiation,” a 250-member NGO committed to “refuge [hinan], evacuation [sokai], respite travel [hoyō]” and, for children who cannot leave, “protection [bōgo]” (228). In September of the same year she traveled abroad for the first time in her life, joining representatives of other Japanese anti-nuclear NGOs in New York to address the National Press Club, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the United Nations Human Rights Commission.24 Participating in a street demonstration, she even managed to land a zinger on Prime Minister Kan Naoto as he emerged from a speech at the UN: “It’s cowardly to talk about the safety of nuclear power when you can’t protect the children of Fukushima!” (231).

    If readers discern the scope of Satō’s achievements only slowly, it is because the spotlight is stolen by the family narrative she uses to frame them. The interview begins with her recounting that, as her family fled during the meltdowns, she stopped at her mother’s grave to beg forgiveness for her decision not to endanger her children by returning again: “I want be like you mother; I want to save the children. Please forgive me” (226). We learn that her mother had suffered three major bouts of depression: first when she was in her second year of middle school and her parents both died, leaving her with an infant brother who died in her care; second, when she was a young mother and her youngest daughter almost drowned; and third, when she was a grandmother and the same daughter, pregnant during Chernobyl, gave birth to a child who later developed hydrocephalus. We also learn that Satō has struggled with depression, which she traces to her second year of middle school when she watched her mother rush into their burning house to save a sister she herself had failed to wake. These narratives underscore the pain and conflict at the heart of Satō’s activism on behalf of children. Explaining the scene at her mother’s grave, she reveals, “[Mother] would be out of the hospital for several years, then back in again, but she never recovered, and in the end she committed suicide. Thinking of the lives she had gone so far to protect (sō made mamotta inochi), I knew I had to carry them forward, and live as she had lived” (226).

    Living as her mother had lived, heroic but depressed, protecting children on a journey that threatens to veer toward suicide: this is a trajectory Satō desperately wants to avoid even as she finds herself hurtling along it, committed to its vigilance, its love, and its intensity. By launching the Fukushima Network for Protecting Children from Radiation, she effectively expands the scope of her maternal line from one family to thousands. But what are the stakes for her mental health? It is a question we could ask of all activists in Fukushima. If Deleuze’s concept of “being worthy of the event” is relevant for the triple meltdown it is because he draws a careful distinction between the kind of “crackup” that killed Satō’s mother, and the kind of “crack” we wish for Satō herself.

    In a key section in his discussion of the Stoics, Deleuze identifies alcoholism and schizophrenia as some of the modern psyche’s most devastating events, and advocates not that we cure them but that we draw a line of separation between their weighty physical and intellectual burdens and the whisper-thin, incorporeal crack that runs across their surface. This crack, Deleuze insists, is the source of crucial resources:

    If one asks why health does not suffice, why the crack is desirable, it is perhaps because only by means of the crack and at its edges thought occurs, that anything that is good and great in humanity enters and exits through it, in people ready to destroy themselves. (Logic 160)

    In March 2018, when several Fukushima activists came to Washington D.C. for a round-table at the Association for Asian Studies, I had a chance to ask after Satō Sachiko and her NGO, Fukushima Network for Protecting Children from Radiation. The activists replied that they and Satō had fallen out of touch after Satō violated an unwritten rule of grassroots activism in Japan and accepted money from a Marxist sect called Chūkaku-ha. I will end with some observations about this choice, which returns us to the problem with which we began: community division.

    Formed in 1957 during the heyday of Japan’s New Left, Chūkaku-ha is still associated with the excesses of its 1960s and 70s rivalry with another sect, Kakumaru-ha. After Fukushima, Chūkaku-ha established a network called NAZEN, short for “Subete no genpatsu ima sugu NAkusō ZENkoku kaigi” (Nationwide Association to get rid of all nuclear reactors right now!). Collaborating with NAZEN, Satō drew criticism from those who agreed with the Japanese police, which continues to classify Chūkaku-ha as a terrorist organization.25 What we appreciate from Satō’s interview with Iwakami, however, is that if there is money to help children, she does not care whether it comes from Chūkaku-ha, because the fraught history of Japanese Marxism is not the event of which she is striving to be worthy. What both fuels her activism and imperils her mental health is a different event, that of ongoing threats to children’s bodies in Fukushima, and mothers’ attempts to intervene. Reading her story we can see that what makes her special as a human being and powerful as a thinker is her ability to sidestep moral judgment and pursue an ethics immanent to the intensive care-work of parenting in a prefecture where radiation is only the most recent in a long series of challenges. In its enormity this event threatens to crack her up. Yet she strives to make it select in her something equally powerful and impersonal, maintaining her sanity by raising it up and bringing it out to the surface, to the infinitive “to care.”

    Footnotes

    1. In March 2011 the Japanese government designated the 20-kilometer radius of the plant a “restricted zone” (keikai kuiki). In April 2011 it extended the designation to include more places where annual exposures were also expected to exceed 20 microsieverts (mSv). For a timeline of these and other key policy dates, see Iwakami, Dai ishū, 341-349.

    2. For a comprehensive Media Studies account of Japan’s two main post-3.11 citizen-based online news initiatives, Web Iwakami and Our Planet TV, see Liscutin..

    3. Iwakami’s videos can still be viewed at the IWJ site for a small membership fee. See “Hyakunin hyakuwa.” Iwakami edited the final video and print versions of One Hundred People, One Hundred Stories to 59 interviews: 25 women and 34 men. The print versions are divided into two volumes published with San-ichi Shobō, the first of which is the source of the four interviews I analyze here. Translations are mine unless otherwise noted.

    4. Grosz takes the title of her most recent book, The Incorporeal: Ontology, Ethics and the Limits of Materialism, from the Stoic concept of the incorporeal as developed by Deleuze in The Logic of Sense. One of her aims is to encourage the “new materialist” feminism with which she is often associated to avoid swinging from the idealism of cultural constructivism to the vitalism of new materialism, and instead to understand materialism and idealism as mutually constitutive, each “the implicit condition for the other” (13).

    5. For additional studies that theorize women’s responses to Fukushima, see 1) Kimura, on citizen radiation-monitoring organizations both in and outside of Fukushima (sociology), 2) Slater, Morioka and Danzuka, on young mothers from Fukushima (anthropology), and 3) DiNitto on gender and nuclear containment in post-Fukushima fiction films (literature/film). All three emphasize women’s positions as arbiters of competing social/discursive and scientific/material claims.

    6. Until April 2011, the Japanese government followed standards set by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) allowing a maximum external exposure of 1 millisievert (mSv) per year for the general public and 20 mSv per year for nuclear workers. One month after the triple-meltdowns, the government raised the maximum to 20 mSv per year for the general public, including children, and 250 mSv over five years for nuclear workers. Two “government scholars” responsible for promoting the new standards were Yamashita Shun’ichi and Takamura Noboru, whose names are cited repeatedly and often angrily by Iwakami’s interviewees, many of whom attended Yamashita’s and Takamura’s public lectures in the spring and summer of 2011. Yamashita’s assurances were difficult to rebut because he had done research in Chernobyl and co-authored World Health Organization studies on its epidemiological legacy. In 2011 he was also chair of the Japan Thyroid Association. For a concise account of Japan’s shifting safety standards after Fukushima, see Normile, 909. For a discussion of how Yamashita put politics over science, see Kamanaka, 7.

    Official post-disaster thyroid cancer screenings have been conducted by Fukushima Prefecture’s “Health Management Survey” (Fukushima kenmin kanri chōsa, or FHMS). In his introduction to the second volume of “One Hundred People One Hundred Stories,” published in April 2014, Iwakami explains that in November 2013 the FHMS examined 254,000 children and found seven “definite” and nine “probable” cases of thyroid cancer. By early 2014 the numbers had risen to 33 “definite” and 41 “probable” cases. Nevertheless, the FHMS maintained that it was “difficult to think” (kangaenikui) that the increase was the effect of radiation (Dai nishū 9).

    7. In March 2012 the “restricted” zones outlined in note 1 were reclassified and subdivided by the Ministry of Environment into 1) areas expected to receive more than the allowable 20 mSv of external radiation annually, which became “difficult to repatriate zones” (kikan kon’nan kuiki), 2) areas expected to receive around the limit of 20 mSv, which became “residence-restricted zones” (kyojū seigen kuiki), and 3) areas expected to receive less than the maximum legal 20 mSv, which became “zones in preparation for the cancellation of evacuation” (hinan shiji kaijo junbi kuiki). As levels fall, the zones are recalibrated in keeping with the extension of the 20 mSv air-dose limit (see note 5). Meanwhile, the centers of the “difficult to repatriate zones” are not expected to be opened in the foreseeable future. As Iwakami notes in the 2014 introduction to his second volume of interviews, these zones, which include the seaside towns of Futaba-machi, Ōkuma-machi, and Naraha-machi, have become the primary storage site for the organic material scraped from the surface of the rest of the prefecture. One interviewee notes with sadness and irony, “They couldn’t have dreamed of a better solution to the problem of having nowhere to dump nuclear waste than an actual nuclear accident. We should have seen this coming when they chose our towns for the plants to begin with” (207).

    8. The two major local newspapers are Fukushima Minpō and Fukushima Minyū. In a recent interview, documentary filmmaker Kamanaka Hitomi explains that both papers, together with local radio and television stations, had long since abandoned investigative reporting on the prefecture’s nuclear plants because the nuclear industry had been their biggest advertiser since the plants were first constructed in the 1960s and 1970s, and negative press was taboo (Kamanaka 11).

    9. Saitō is parroting the words of Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano Yuiko, who first used the phrase “tadachi ni kenkō ni eikyō wa nai” (no immediate health effects) on 16 March 2011 after the third reactor, Reactor Two, blew up. Noriko Manabe notes that Edano “would repeat this infamous phrase on seven occasions” thereafter (49). Iwakami’s interviewees cite it frequently.

    10. As John Sellars notes, Deleuze derives the terms “Aion” and “Chronos” more directly from Victor Goldschmidt’s (1953) reading of the Stoics than from the Stoics themselves (161).

    11. P. 155. With the term “shiki’ichi ga nai” (no threshold) Saitō and her son refer to the “linear no threshold” (LNT) model for calculating risk, according to which the long-term biological damage from radiation is proportional to dose, with no dose low enough (“no threshold”) to pose zero risk. LNT has long been the dominant model used in Japan and globally to set safety standards, although competing models exist. For a history of the LNT model from a Japanese perspective, including that of the geneticists who collaborated with the US-led Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC) after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, see Onaga.

    12. Satō Eisaku served five terms as governor of Fukushima from 1988 to 2006. He suspended the MOX (Mixed Uranium-Plutonium Oxide Fuel) program in 2000 after filing a number of unheeded safety complaints, then was forced to resign in 2006 amidst charges that he had misappropriated public funds for a dam project. After the triple meltdowns, his June 2011 book The Truth About Nuclear Power in Fukushima (Fukushima genpatsu no shinjitsu) became a best-seller, as did his September 2009 book, Expunging the Governor: False Charges of Corruption in Fukushima (Chiji massatsu: Tsukurareta Fukshima-ken oshoku jiken). For the specifics on the numerous safety complaints that Satō submitted to TEPCO, see Onuki.

    13. Sasaki ran as an independent. The group she formed is called “Fukushima Wawawa no kai” (Fukushima Wawawa Association), where “wawawa” corresponds to characters meaning “environment” (環), discussion (話), and peace (和). The group’s website is www.wawawa1210.blog.fc2.com/. It was last active in 2015.

    14. On Hachiro’s gaffe see Mochizuki and Oribe; see also “Hachiro Yoshio.”

    15. The information is also kept online at http://josen.env.go.jp/plaza/. The address of the “Decontamination Information Plaza” (Kankyō saisei purazā) is ₸ 960-8031 Fukushima Prefecture, Fukushima, Sakae-machi, 1-31.

    16. Here Deleuze repeats what he says about Péguy in the ninth series of The Logic of Sense when he is talking about the difference between history and event: “Péguy clearly saw that history and event were inseparable from . . . singular points” (53) but that “singularit[ies], unlike history, are not discursive and not realized in the present: the singularity belongs to another dimension than that of denotation, manifestation, or signification. It is essentially pre-individual, non-personal, and a-conceptual” (52).

    17. Field explains, “Citizens can file a criminal complaint with the police or prosecutors when they believe that a crime has been committed but has not been pursued by the police or prosecutors. To do so is to insist that responsible parties be identified by public authorities and not just by private citizens who feel they have sustained injuries” (3). Given that neither TEPCO nor the Japanese government has acknowledged their role in causing the disaster, the criminal prosecution was not expected to go forward. For coverage in English, see Negishi and McCurry.

    18. The group’s website (https://shien-dan.org/) provides analysis of each day of testimony.

    19. The three executives were found not guilty on 19 September 2019. See Sheldrick and Kelly.

    20. This is the same MOX fuel that Sasaki Keiko and her group petitioned Governor Satō Eisaku to stop allowing. His successor allowed it after he was driven from office in 2006.

    21. The reprocessed MOX fuel in Reactor Three was more dangerous because it contained both plutonium and uranium. As science writer Natalie Wolchover explains, unlike the all-uranium fuel used in the other reactors, “Plutonium emits alpha radiation, a highly ionizing form of radiation, rather than beta or gamma radiation. External exposure to alpha particles isn’t much of a health risk, because they have a low penetration depth and are usually stopped by skin. When alpha-emitters get inside cells, on the other hand, they are extremely hazardous. Alpha rays sent out from within cells cause somewhere between 10 and 1,000 times more chromosomal damage than beta or gamma rays. According to the Environmental Protection Agency, plutonium enters the bloodstream via the lungs, then moves throughout the body and into the bones, liver, and other organs. It generally stays in those places for decades, subjecting surrounding organs and tissues to a continual bombardment of alpha radiation and greatly increasing the risk of cancer, especially lung cancer, liver cancer and bone sarcoma.”

    22. The performance is on Youtube. See Mutō “9.19.” The speech was published in Mutō’s 2012 book, Fukushima kara.

    23. In a recent essay about Mutō, Katsuya Hirano also emphasizes her role as a thinker: “For Mutō, to despair properly (kichinto zetsubō suru) is to fix one’s gaze firmly on the outrage of the nuclear disaster and continue pondering it, resolutely.”

    24. Satō recounts the journey in her 2013 book Fukushima no sora no shita de (Underneath a Fukushima sky, 128-135). Her collaborator Aileen Miyoko Smith writes about the same trip in “Bridging the Plight.”

    25. For an account of activist groups’ attempts to steer clear of a newly revived anti-nuclear New Left after Fukushima, see Kimura, 116-120.

    Works Cited

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    • Deleuze, Gilles. The Logic of Sense. Edited by Constantin V. Boundas and translated by Mark Lester, Columbia UP, 1990.
    • Deleuze, Gilles. Negotiations 1972-1990. Translated by Martin Joughin, Columbia UP, 1995.
    • Deleuze, Gilles, and Claire Parnet. Dialogues II. Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. Columbia UP, 2007.
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    • Field, Norma. “From Fukushima: To Despair Properly, To Find the Next Step.” Asia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, vol. 14, no. 3, 1 Sept. 2016, www.apjjf.org/2016/17/Field.html.
    • Grosz, Elizabeth. The Incorporeal: Ontology, Ethics, and the Limits of Materialism. Columbia UP, 2017.
    • “Hachiro Yoshio.” Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia. Wikimedia Foundation, Inc, 16 July 2018, ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/%E9%89%A2%E5%91%82%E5%90%89%E9%9B%84.
    • Hirano, Katsuya. “3.11 o kokoro ni kizande” (3.11 Engraved on our hearts). Iwanami shoten no WEB magajin ‘Tani o maku’ (The “Planting a Seed” online magazine of Iwanami Publishing House), 11 Aug. 2018, tanemaki.iwanami.co.jp/posts/1093.
    • “Hyakunin hyakuwa (One Hundred People, One Hundred Stories).” IWJ Independent Web Journal, www.iwj.co.jp/wj/open/100-100. Iwakami Yasumi, editor. Hyakunin hyakuwa dai isshū: Kokyō ni todomaru, kokyō o hanareru, sorezore no sentaku (One Hundred People, One Hundred Stories Volume 1: Hometown Fukushima, to Stay or to Go? Their Various Choices). San’ichi shobō, 2012.
    • Iwakami Yasumi, editor. Hyakunin hyakuwa dai nishū: Kokyō ni todomaru, kokyō o hanareru, sorezore no sentaku (One Hundred People, One Hundred Stories Volume 2: The Cruelty of Time, Which Stops for No One). San’ichi shobō, 2014.
    • Kamanaka Hitomi. “Fukushima, Media, Democracy: The Promise of Documentary Film.” Interview with Katsuya Hirano. Translated by Margherita Long. Asia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, vol. 9, no. 1, 21 Nov. 2011, apjjf.org/2018/16/Kamanaka.html.
    • Kimura, Aya Hirata. Radiation Brain Moms and Citizen Scientists: Gender Politics of Food Contamination after Fukushima. Duke UP, 2016.
    • Liscutin, Nicola. “Indignez-Vous! ‘Fukushima,’ New Media and Anti-Nuclar Activism in Japan.” Asia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, vol. 16, no. 3, 15 Aug. 2018, apjjf.org/2011/9/47/Nicola-Liscutin/3649/article.html.
    • Manabe, Noriko. The Revolution Will Not Be Televised: Protest Music After Fukushima. Oxford UP, 2015.
    • McCurry, Justin. “Fukushima Nuclear Disaster: Former TEPCO Executives Go on Trial.” The Guardian, 30 June 2017, www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jun/30/fukushima-nuclear-crisis-TEPCO-criminal-trial-japan.
    • Mochizuki, Takashi, and Mitsuru Oribe. “Minister’s Gaffe Hits Japan.” Wall Street Journal, 12 Sept. 2011, www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111904353504576564313482660614 Mutō Ruiko. “9/19 (Sayōnara genpatsu) Mutō Ruiko san” (Ms. Moto Ruiko at the September 19th Sayonara Genpatsu Rally). YouTube, uploaded by sievert311, 21 Sept. 2011. www.youtube.com/watch?v=5xdszFXI2J0
    • Mutō Ruiko. Fukushima kara anata e (From Fukushima to You). Ōtsuki shoten, 2012.
    • Negishi, Mayumi. “Japan Indicts Three Former TEPCO Executives Over Fukushima Nuclear Disaster.” Wall Street Journal, 29 Feb. 2016. www.wsj.com/articles/japan-indicts-three-former-TEPCO-executives-over-fukushima-nuclear-disaster-1456735802.
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    • Onaga, Lisa. “Measuring the Particular: The Meanings of Low-Dose Radiation Experiments in Post-1954 Japan.” positions: asia critique, vol. 26, no. 2, May 2018, 265-304. Project MUSE, muse.jhu.edu/article/701279.
    • Onuki, Satoko. “Former Fukushima Governor Sato Eisaku Blasts METI-TEPCO Alliance: ‘Government Must Accept Responsibility for Defrauding the People.’” Translated by Julie Higashi. Asia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, vol. 9, no. 4, 11 Apr. 2011, apjjf.org/2011/9/15/Onuki-Satoko/3514/article.html.
    • Satō Sachiko. Fukushima no sora no shita de (Underneath a Fukushima sky). Sōshinsha, 2014.
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    • Sheldrick, Aaron, and Tim Kelly. “Ex-Tepco Bosses Cleared Over Nuclear Disaster.” Reuters, 19 Sept. 2019, www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-fukushima/tokyo-court-clears-former-tepco-executives-of-negligence-over-fukushima-disaster-idUSKBN1W40CP.
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    • Yamaguchi, Tomomi, and Mutō Ruiko. “Mutō Ruiko and the Movement of Fukushima Residents to Pursue Criminal Charges Against TEPCO Executives and Government Officials.” Asia Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, vol. 10, no. 2, 7 May 2016, www.apjjf.org/2012/10/27/Tomomi-Yamaguchi/3784/article.html.
  • Garbage Infrastructure, Sanitation, and New Meanings of Citizenship in Lebanon

    Joanne Randa Nucho (bio)

    Abstract

    In 2015, protestors south of Beirut, Lebanon, blocked the road to the landfill in Naimeh, an improperly prepared and overflowing dumpsite that serves as a collection point for Beirut’s garbage. As piles of garbage grew on Beirut’s streets, so did a massive protest that was not defined or organized by either of the major political factions or any of the sectarian political parties in Lebanon. Why were the 2015 protests not organized along the dominant sectarian political lines? This article analyzes the protests and their aftermath to understand how a relation to shared infrastructures plays a role in the emergent forms of citizenship brought about in the protest movement.

    Naimeh, Lebanon had long borne the burden of the capital city’s trash. The local landfill, an improperly prepared dumpsite in use since 1997, was supposed to have been temporary (Abu Rish, “Garbage Politics”). Complaints about the overflowing and poorly managed site went unheeded for years. In the summer of 2015, residents of the town blocked the road leading to the landfill. This was not the first time that protestors had blocked the road, but years of broken promises by government officials made this protest more serious (ibid). Garbage throughout Beirut remained uncollected. During those weeks, mountains of garbage piled up on Beirut’s streets. Sukleen, the private company hired to carry out sanitation services, was unable to haul the garbage off to Naimeh. Out of desperation, people started burning it on the streets, releasing noxious fumes and odors into the humid summer air.

    The protests that accompanied the accumulation of garbage in the city streets were aimed at the state’s inability and unwillingness to manage public goods and services, and at the illegal extension of parliament, the subsequent deferral of the 2014 elections, and the absence of an acting president. By August, an estimated 20,000 protestors had gathered in downtown Beirut, a site that was rebuilt during post-civil war reconstruction in the 1990s as a luxury shopping destination inaccessible to most Lebanese (El Deeb and Karam). This was the largest protest in years that was not organized or backed by one of the prevailing political factions (the Sunni dominated March 14 coalition and the Shi’a dominated March 8 coalition) or by any of the sectarian political parties. The broad spectrum of protestors in attendance, presumably from different political factions, was rare in recent years. Since the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in 2005, the polarization of political factions had deepened. However, this protest defied the narrow framework that positions Lebanese politics as a binary of Sunni and Shi’a dominated politics (often reductively mapped onto regional disputes between Saudi Arabia and Iran). The protestors did not direct their critique against any particular political faction. Instead, the protestors’ critique took as its central defining feature the failure of infrastructure and thus the failure of the government itself, rather than the failure of a particular political faction. Because sect is a salient and important political category in Lebanon, it was all the more remarkable that the protests were not attached to sectarian political formations. In Lebanon, each political party is affiliated with a religious sect, and representation in parliament is based on a sectarian quota system. Aside from formal political representation, Lebanese religious courts have jurisdiction over personal status laws regulating marriage and divorce. Furthermore, many Lebanese people rely on sect-affiliated institutions for access to basic services and infrastructures.1

    What is it about coming together around the buildup of failure that compels thinking about collectivity outside of the usual ways of conceptualizing sociality through belonging or exclusion? We can approach this question using Lauren Berlant’s framework of breakdown as a “transitional” moment, a moment when new forms of being together might come into view without an insistence on sameness as the starting point for politics (Berlant, “The Commons”). The garbage crisis represents a moment in which, as Berlant writes, “just because we are in the room together does not mean that we belong to the room or each other” (“The Commons” 395). The protests that ensued when garbage collection broke down created an opening in the highly fragmented, privatized identitarian political framework. This political framework is constituted by infrastructure channels that form what Paul Kockelman might call “sieves” that produce belonging and exclusion not in terms of religious belief, but in terms of sectarian identity and identification. The protests provide an opening to a way of thinking about the terms of citizenship that does not rely on likeness, but is articulated in relation to the demand for functioning infrastructures.

    While no single coherent movement emerged from Beirut’s garbage protests, they did present the possibility for a form of collective action that neither required nor denounced a sectarian discourse of belonging, which is important, given that many of those involved presumably had attachments to sectarian identification and even to sectarian institutions. The result was that an ambiguous space opened, one of being together in opposition to the privatization and state neglect of vital infrastructures. In and through their focus on infrastructure, the Beirut garbage protests of 2015 staged new forms of relation and even demands for citizenship outside of likeness as belonging. These forms of citizenship are important to think about not only within the context of Lebanese politics, but more conceptually as well. The protestors performed something akin to what Kyle Shelton calls “infrastructural citizenship” in his work on the collaborative activism against highway construction by residents of a mainly affluent white suburb and a lower class black suburb of Houston. For Shelton, this citizenship is not defined by national belonging or by belonging to a certain community, but “by the quotidian acts residents used to construct themselves as political actors” (422). In Beirut, a new imaginary of citizenship was forged through acts of protest and civil disobedience and in the face of violent state suppression of the protestors. This connection between Houston, an American city built on histories of violent racist exclusion, and Beirut, a city that is still recovering from civil conflict and ethnic cleansing, illuminates the importance of shared infrastructures to the determination of citizenship beyond the framework of the nation-state.2

    While the 2015 protests ended without resolving the sanitation crisis in Lebanon, I take up Julia Elyachar’s provocation in “Upending Infrastructure” not to read an uprising in terms of success or failure. In what follows, I argue that the 2015 protests present the possibility of non-teleological citizenship, citizenship that is still unfolding and that does not necessarily lead to the emergence of a secular national identity, which Lebanon has allegedly “failed” to develop owing to its underlying sectarianism.3 Instead, the protestors articulated an emerging notion of citizenship attached to shared, equitably distributed and well-functioning infrastructures and services. In some ways, the idea that public goods and infrastructures can play a role in bringing people together and in creating a sense of belonging is very old.4 The difference in the Beirut protests is that this demand for functioning universally accessible infrastructure was not made in a top-down nation-building moment, but in and through a moment of protest against infrastructural failures and the failure of the state to provide adequate infrastructure. While the implication of these protests remains unknown, they hold potential and promise for everyone living in an era when privatized and fragmented infrastructures differentiate access and perpetuate vast inequalities.

    How Did We Get Here?

    Access to infrastructures in Lebanon is often facilitated through private or sectarian channels. In fact, there is little distinction between the “state” and sectarian and private channels in Lebanon. Actors occupy multiple positions or navigate through their connections to others who may also occupy multiple positions. In many contexts, accessing services depends upon the ability to make a claim to belonging to a sectarian community, determinable through birth or marriage and further dependent upon class, neighborhood belonging, and the capacity to demonstrate social and gendered notions of propriety. For example, in the Beirut suburb of Bourj Hammoud, low-income housing, managed and maintained by an Armenian political party, is available to men who marry out of sect, but not to women who marry men from another sect.5 Getting access or connection usually involves the mobilization of classifications and their “attendant […] moral dimensions,” as is apparent for example in the different gendered dimensions of what would be considered a correct marriage (Bowker and Star 5). The process of connecting is not always seamless for those who navigate these channels, which is why they recalibrate and negotiate sectarian belonging through infrastructure.

    The broad coalition of protestors in 2015 is a remarkable achievement in the Lebanese political context where every major political party is affiliated with a religious sect. Lebanon’s political sectarianism does not stem from an ancient system; it is the result of modernizing reforms that started in the late Ottoman empire and extended into the French Mandate period, essentially from the mid-19th century to Lebanon’s independence in 1943 (U. Makdisi). In Lebanon, there are eighteen officially recognized religious sects (including Shi’a Muslim, Sunni Muslim, Maronite Christian, Druze and others), and even among non-observant people, sectarian identity cannot just be “opted” out of, as sectarian identity does not always equate with religious belief. While religious belief and piety certainly animate some political movements in Lebanon, as Lara Deeb argues, sectarian politics and conflicts are not reducible to religion as theology and have continued to evolve and change in the years since independence in 1943.6 As Maya Mikdashi reminds us, the state itself is secular, and that state secularism is produced in and through its regulating and managing “both sexual and sectarian difference” (281).

    During the Lebanese Civil War of 1975-1990, sect-affiliated militias carried out ethnic cleansing in the city and divided it into zones that were dangerous or inaccessible to members of certain groups. But conflict is not entirely a thing of the past. Particularly since the assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in 2005, Beirut has seen the resurgence of street battles and car bombs. These conflicts are not the same as those of the Civil War era: they are fought along different lines and between different factions. Still, the continuity of violence keeps the memory of the war alive and present for many people who face ongoing insecurity and unpredictability.7 Many of my Lebanese interlocutors born after the end of the Civil War avoid visiting neighborhoods dominated by certain sectarian political parties where they feel the people would be hostile towards them because of their own sectarian affiliation.

    Sectarian parties and affiliated organizations play a critical role not only in formal political life but in the provisioning of infrastructures, urban planning, and services, as I have argued elsewhere. In most areas, the Lebanese state does not provide sufficient services like water, electricity, or medical care, though infrastructure failure in Lebanon today is not a direct result of the Civil War of 1975-1990. Electricity infrastructures were never fully functional and available to all Lebanese, even before the war years (Abu Rish, “On Power Cuts”). Electricite Du Liban, a public electricity utility, is subject to frequent electricity cuts, especially outside of the Beirut municipal district. Private generator subscription systems have cropped up all over the city and are especially needed in the city’s peripheral suburbs where electricity cuts can go on for several hours each day, while in Beirut cuts average three hours. These generator subscription systems are often owned by wealthy patrons, some of them connected to important political figures or officials, or at least to officials presumed to be important by residents in the neighborhood. Many of my interlocutors believe there is no real distinction between the “state” and the patrons and important families that monopolize the provision of some of these goods, and they do not express distinctions in these terms. Rather, these relationships are described by invoking the term wasta or “connections”—the idea that knowing people in power allows certain individuals access to ownership, political power, or exceptional treatment. As Kristin Monroe writes, this notion of the power of wasta extends even in dealings with traffic police, who must think twice about issuing a ticket to someone who might be well-connected.

    In 1994, the private company Sukleen was contracted to handle Beirut’s sanitation services, an arrangement that only ended in 2018, owing partially to the controversy over the garbage pileup of 2015.8 Even before the 2015 protests began, the growing problem of improperly prepared landfills prompted the state to come up with a comprehensive system for sanitation. The plan was to allow the private sanitation company Sukleen to negotiate the disposal of garbage regionally with “local power brokers” (Abu Rish, “Garbage Politics”). The sectarian political actors and patrons that run most of the patchwork shadow infrastructure services, like electricity, are precisely the people with whom Sukleen would have needed to negotiate. Municipalities that are dominated by members of one sectarian political party can make planning decisions that have profound impacts on urban development for all residents in their jurisdiction.9 While the pileup of garbage on Beirut’s streets might be called a “crisis” in media shorthand, those solutions that propose to pick up garbage alone will not address the larger framework that has produced the broken sanitation system and the numerous failed infrastructures.

    Failure in itself does not prompt transformation. In fact, infrastructural failure can serve to reinscribe existing relations of power as sectarian patronage networks use instances of breakdown to enrich themselves or consolidate their political positions. Sectarianism is more than just a divisive discourse manipulated by elites, it must also be understood as a material process rooted in service provisions, urban planning, and development. In the lead-up to 2015, there was a growing sense of frustration with the ways neoliberal ideologies “as translated through Lebanon’s sectarian‐clientelist regime on the ground” put further pressures on low income people and their “right to the city,” especially in relation to housing (Fawaz 828). In other words, over the years people have realized that the channels available to them through which to secure resources, through affiliation and sectarian political parties, were far from stable or guaranteed.

    The garbage pileup represented a breaking point partially because of the uniqueness of sanitary infrastructure. It does not have an analog in water or electricity infrastructures, both in terms of its material qualities and attendant modes of management, and these differences matter. As Brian Larkin argues, the aesthetics of infrastructures are just as vital as their technical function, because they “produce the ambient conditions of everyday life” (“The Politics” 336). The pileup of garbage presents a unique disruption to the everyday conditions of a city, in contrast to shortages of water or electricity, which do not play as significant a role in a city’s ambient conditions – things like everyday smells or sounds and how people think about them. Electricity in Lebanon, which suffers frequent timed cuts, does not work in the same way. People with the money to do so can keep their supply of electricity going during the frequent public cuts by subscribing to privately owned electricity generators. Some people may share expenses in order to buy a generator for their building, and wealthy individuals may buy a generator for their building. The pileup of garbage does not really have an individual solution, payout, or workaround, and it must be collectively managed. Even if wealthy individuals could hire private trash collectors to remove their own garbage, the smells and physical obstacles produced by the trash bags piling up on sidewalks and streets and the clouds of smoke from burning trash would be inescapable. Trash in the streets, unlike electricity cuts or water shortages, produces a different urgency for collective action. While by no means inevitable (or sustainable without a considerable long term strategy), the pileup of trash in Beirut quickly brought protestors to a breaking point.

    The circulation of trash, including its disposal, transport, and removal, crystallizes and makes visible certain relationships and relations (Moore). The removal of trash from Beirut and its relocation in the Naimeh landfill are of course not accidental, even when they are poorly planned and executed. That is why the accumulation of trash on the streets of Beirut, the capital city of Lebanon and the privileged beneficiary of services, resources, transportation, electricity, and water, is political: it “makes visible that which had no reason to be seen, it lodges one world into another” (Rancière). Naimeh had always lived with Beirut’s trash, and suddenly Beirut had to do it.

    It is not only the visibility of trash that matters here, however. Christina Schwenkel reminds us of the need “to move beyond the primacy of vision and visuality” and to be attentive to the other senses and the experiences they produce in relation to infrastructures (“Sense”). In some of the worst months of summer heat and humidity, Beirut was smothered with terrible odors and with smoke rising from burning trash. Air travels unfettered between Beirut’s neighborhoods and its suburbs, and with it the stench of rotting trash. The meaning of garbage is produced in relation to its physical qualities, its nauseating smell and the health risks it brings. Trash is dirty, and as Rosalind Fredericks writes, “its associations of filth govern its management and its sociopolitical power” (“Vital Infrastructures” 532). Garbage carries social and even moral meanings and interpretations, hence the emergence of the “You Stink” hashtag lobbed at the politicians involved in what protesters deemed “dirty” political games.

    Anatomy of the 2015 Protest

    As garbage piled up on the streets of Beirut, anger and disgust grew. As Ziad Abu Rish writes in “Garbage Politics,” the protests were started by a movement calling itself “You Stink,” which also created an online presence documenting the garbage pileup with photos and videos. These initial protests were small, but eventually they became more popular, drawing in people from outside the initial circle of activists. However, the You Stink organizers were not at the helm of the more popular protests; in fact, You Stink at one point tried to withdraw from the ongoing protests, claiming provocateurs had infiltrated them after a particularly violent clash in August (Abu Rish, “Garbage Politics”). While they later reversed their position and continued to participate in the protests, this account demonstrates that most of the protestors were not represented by this initial group of activists. The protests had the force of a truly popular demonstration, which was also ignited by the violent state reaction to the protestors. Soon “You Stink” appeared all over social media, referring to the politicians and government actors the protestors found responsible for inefficiencies in all utilities and services (and, of course, for the garbage).

    It is no accident that downtown Beirut ended up as the site and setting for protests demanding better public infrastructure and services. The downtown has always been the spatially privileged recipient of infrastructures and resources, not only in relation to its larger urban metro area but also compared to other parts of Lebanon. As Rosalind Fredericks argues in Vital Infrastructures of Trash in Dakar, in Senegal the capital city plays a major role in the imaginary of Senegalese citizenship, and the same can be said for Beirut, where the pileup of garbage in the capital of this small country represents the “trashing of the nation” (6). For many Lebanese, the downtown is a symbol of the many unpopular postwar investments that privatized public space and resources. In 1997, Saree Makdisi presciently wrote that the battles over the narrative of Lebanese national identity would be fought over the image of downtown Beirut. The battles over the rebuilding and redevelopment of the downtown had already been fought in the 1990s, and for the vast majority of people who hoped the downtown would regain its prewar glory, they were also lost. After the end of the civil war, Lebanon faced the challenge of recovering from the destruction of most of its institutions and many of its urban spaces. The controversial overhaul of downtown Beirut by former Prime Minister Hariri’s company, Solidere, turned the downtown into a space for luxury consumers. The overhauled area has little connection to the downtown of the prewar years, with its popular markets and major transit hub. In fact, today’s downtown is designed to exclude most Lebanese people who are not wealthy enough to consume within its spaces. Its shopping mall boasts international luxury chains that cater to wealthy tourists and to Lebanese elites and expats. The downtown is not easily approachable on foot and feels cut off from the neighborhoods around it. For many, the overhaul of the downtown was one of the postwar era’s most searing betrayals of an implicit promise to restore or to rebuild public spaces in the country’s capital.

    Of course, infrastructure and urban planning are often used to create and entrench forms of exclusion. As Antina von Schnitzler writes in Democracy’s Infrastructure: Techno-Politics and Protest after Apartheid, infrastructures were not primarily used to “produce or to maintain a public” (15). She recounts that townships in South Africa lacked services and basic infrastructures like electrification. White wealthy neighborhood residents retreated to private gardens or country clubs and did not demand public parks. Von Schnitzler makes the keen observation that “apartheid infrastructures were deployed to prevent a public from coming into being” (15), inverting the presumed relationship between infrastructure and its powers to constitute a sense of being part of a public. Infrastructures can also alienate.

    The 2015 Beirut trash protest was both about reclaiming the downtown and performing a different kind of sociality and collective action in the wake of a hitherto unseen form of infrastructural failure: garbage piling up in the streets of the capital city. However, to imagine that the crisis only begins when garbage is left on the streets of Beirut is to maintain the hierarchy of geographies in terms of infrastructure provisioning in Beirut and its peripheries. As Janet Roitman argues in Anti-Crisis, the crisis framework prevents certain questions from emerging, particularly in instances where breakdown is not exceptional, but part of an ongoing continuum. Describing the events in Beirut as a garbage “crisis” implies a framework of mutually exclusive problem and solution, where solutions involving the removal of garbage in Beirut may leave unexamined the impact of this removal on Beirut’s peripheries or rural areas. This notion of crisis implies the normalcy of the preceding period, which is understood as having been interrupted by a deviation that led to the current situation. The protestors demanded much more than better sanitation infrastructure, demonstrating their understanding of the garbage pileup of 2015 beyond the terms of crisis. We can understand the pileup of garbage as the materialization of the trash politics of the state, an emblem of the layers of theft and political patronage systems that keep systems patchworked together and broken, partially privatized for the benefit of a small elite.

    The 2015 protests expressed frustration with the failure of the Lebanese government to provide and maintain state infrastructures, including electricity, water, and management of public services. Failing infrastructures, however, can still create the conditions of possibility for imagined futures, for the promise of modernity. As Brian Larkin writes, “It is precisely because infrastructures are invested with promise and because that promise is reflexively foregrounded that—when they work or when they fail—they bring into visibility the operation of governmental rationality and offer that rationality up for political debate” (“Promising Forms” 183). The infrastructure of sanitation contains within itself a kind of promise, at the very least, to move trash out of the city streets and into landfills, out of sight and out of senses, at least for the residents of the city.

    The protesters’ appeal was not for the fall of the state, but rather a demand for the state to provide. Perhaps this demand for reform should not come as a surprise since the state can be understood, according to Lauren Berlant, as “a resource as well as a site of domination” (Berlant “On Citizenship”). When the police and military attacked protestors, social media users began to post photos of the violence. Artist Jana Traboulsi created iconic graphics juxtaposing these photos with phrases like “Kif ma fi dawleh? Hon al dawleh wa hek shekleha!” (What do you mean there is no state? Here is the state and this is what it looks like!).10 The phrase “here is the state,” which appeared all over social media sites, was a reference to the often-repeated wayn al dawleh? (Where is the state?), a common Lebanese saying used to locate responsibility for failing infrastructure in Lebanon. As James Ferguson writes, “infrastructure does its violence in ways that make it peculiarly hard to ascribe responsibility” (559). Indeed the violence of infrastructures and the pervasive inequalities it produces are often naturalized and made to seem inevitable. The dawleh, or “state,” in wayn al dawleh? does not point to one faction or sectarian political organization; it points to a “state” that has failed to live up to its normative promises. The protestors’ demands are not nostalgic and do not necessarily have precedents. Still, everything from electricity cuts to water shortages and traffic jams could be an occasion for someone to ask wayn al dawleh? as a way of assigning accountability to a state that has left the provisioning of certain utilities to a patchwork of private entities that skim profits for themselves and deliver goods that are both expensive and low in quality. These private entities include wealthy patrons who sell a few amps of electricity via private generator systems and water from privately owned water trucks that fill tanks atop apartment buildings when water supply runs low.

    In 2016, state officials responded to the infrastructural breakdown with a familiar makeshift solution: the garbage was dumped in other improperly prepared landfills. One of the places where the garbage ended up was the working class municipality of Bourj Hammoud (see fig. 1). If we are to pay attention to the aesthetics of infrastructure, it is meaningful that a disused and informal Civil War era landfill in Bourj Hammoud, a working-class suburb of Beirut, was one of the sites chosen in 2016 to take Beirut’s garbage. Most of the residents who live in Bourj Hammoud earn little or are precariously employed. It is a relatively affordable area near Beirut that is home to many migrant workers and to displaced people from Syria. In recent years, the number of displaced Syrians in Lebanon has grown, due to ongoing conflict in Syria. The UNHCR estimates that there are almost one million Syrian refugees in Lebanon, but it is likely these figures are low, as they only include registered refugees (“Refugee Situations”). The Bourj Hammoud municipality was reportedly offered 25 million US dollars to reopen its landfill to Beirut’s trash for a five-year period (“Lebanon’s Trash Crisis”).

    The reopening of the informal landfill in Bourj Hammoud was met by protests, but they did not draw the crowds that Beirut’s protests did, partly because their choice was cast within a sectarian framework. While Bourj Hammoud is a diverse working-class district in terms of its population, the municipality’s leadership is Armenian, and most of the city’s social welfare institutions, medical facilities, and schools are run by Armenian political and religious organizations, namely the Armenian Tashnag party. It was the Maronite Christian Kataib party that organized a protest opposing the municipality’s decision to accept the garbage deal (El Amine). While valid environmental concerns motivated the protest, it did not draw the broad coalition of protestors that Beirut’s trash pileup did. The Bourj Hammoud protest was reminiscent of other political mobilizations against failing infrastructure, which remain within sectarian frameworks. Éric Verdeil describes earlier protests against the dysfunctional electricity distribution system, which “never coalesced into a unified movement; instead, they have served sectarian and local political agendas, reinforcing the city’s current political fragmentation” (162). In Bourj Hammoud, protests against the informal landfill’s reopening ended up looking like a dispute between two political parties with sectarian overtones. It was far more difficult for Armenians in Bourj Hammoud to join in local protests than it was for them to protest in Beirut because in Bourj Hammoud it would have been regarded as a protest against the Armenian Tashnag party-dominated municipality rather than against the Lebanese “state” and its actors, which everyone could (and frequently does) justifiably critique. Given that they were not promoted by any particular sectarian political party, the protests in downtown Beirut had more legitimacy in their call for a new form of citizenship attached to a demand for functioning infrastructure.

    Fig. 1. Bourj Hammoud’s landfill (on the left) as seen from the Mediterranean Sea. Photo by Laleh Khalili. Used by permission.

    For many of my Armenian interlocutors living in Bourj Hammoud, affinities emerge from feeling part of a community. This community is often defined in sectarian ways and reproduced through everyday transactions and exchanges in medical clinics, microlending facilities, and social welfare centers (Nucho). In 2015, people were deeply frustrated with the patchwork systems that kept electricity erratic and expensive and the water supply unpredictable. The ambivalence that many felt between their affinities for sect-affiliated organizations and resentment towards a state that seemed to provide very little in the way of infrastructure left an opening. In the 2015 protests, people said, the object of their ire was not the failure of specific parties or factions but rather their totality in the state. It was wayn al dawleh? that activated the garbage protests in 2015 in the capital city. It was this stage that provided for the emergence of a broad-based coalition and an emergent citizenship imaginary.

    The Protest and New Meanings of Citizenship

    In the postwar era, the Lebanese state did not mobilize infrastructure as a mediator to state institutions. In fact, the intentions of the state are not always important for understanding, experiencing, and apprehending infrastructures. Nikhil Anand’s provocation to think about human relationships formed in and through urban water pipes and distribution systems that “exceed human intentionality, thought, and action” (7-8) is useful here. What he calls “hydraulic citizenship” is a process worked out incrementally through relations between residents, city officials, plumbers, and the pipes themselves; it is not a teleological project but can be reversed, pushed back against. In Lebanon in 2015, everyday relations to infrastructure were instructive: people were tired of having to pay two electricity bills (one to a private generator owner and another to the state grid) or of asking well-connected people for favors in order to secure a hospital bed. These accumulated experiences of breakdown and lack provided for an alternative vision of politics and political action, one that imagined a right to infrastructure that could be guaranteed to citizens, rather than being a privilege. In that sense, the protests were built on a citizenship imaginary unintentionally shaped through infrastructural failure rather than its even provision.

    A citizenship imaginary based on the demand for equitable, functioning infrastructures is nothing less than a new kind of public imaginary. Abdoumaliq Simone’s notion of the formation of publics is instructive: “Instead of people coming together to consensually decide the markers of identity and common rules necessary to recognize common participation, the public is a matter of projecting a way of talking and regarding that goes beyond the specificity of one’s life situation” (119). Material infrastructures provide that possibility, as what is shared between protestors is the experience of brokenness, of patchwork systems, even as they are left vulnerable to these breakdowns quite differently, especially those with the least resources. In 2015, the citizenry insisted that the starting point for assembly would be the experience of infrastructural breakdown. Many contemporary infrastructures divide territories and populations both through uneven accessibility and privatization (Graham and Marvin). In Lebanon, infrastructure did the inverse of what it is often presumed to do; the shared sense of brokenness allowed people to unite around its failure. The failure of sanitation infrastructure created the conditions of possibility for a shared project, a shared hope, and a shared sense of belonging and citizenship. Of course, what happened in Lebanon is not the first or only case in which the brokenness of official or state infrastructures mobilized alternative forms of solidarity around both the critique of state failure and the development of ways to cope with infrastructural inadequacies.11 Julia Elyachar’s concept of the social infrastructures of communicative channels is helpful here (“Phatic Labor”). We can think about these “social infrastructures” as resources that are not entirely subsumed by sectarian political organizations. As Diana Allan reminds us, moments of collaboration that come from experiences of “shared marginality” and that exceed both nationalist frameworks and sectarian divisions are often overlooked in the context of Lebanon. These moments emerge through mundane or even illicit activities that are rendered somehow outside of politics, even by the participants themselves (Allan 94-95). As Elyachar argues, moments of breakdown might make these pathways and channels more visible (“Upending Infrastructure”).

    The fact that this starting point for a new citizenship imaginary had been a potential for a long time not only dispels the “crisis” framework, but also explains why many of those who joined the protest later were not only residents of Beirut fed up with a local garbage problem. The protest was instead an opportunity to express disgust with the rampant “theft” of state actors across sectors and sects. The fragmented infrastructures of Beirut and its urban periphery can tell us something about the contours of a particular political process, given that “they represent long-term accumulations of finance, technology, know-how, and organisational and geopolitical power” (Graham and Marvin 12). The incidents of 2015 represent the possibility of a still-emerging “infrastructural citizenship” (Shelton).

    In contrast to the popular garbage protests of 2015, in which a large and diverse group of people took part, a smaller 2011 protest organized by a movement called “The people want the fall of the sectarian regime” was not as popular (Abu Rish, “Garbage Politics”). The latter protest did not foreground material politics, though it held up the sectarian system itself as the object of protest. What is notable here is that the garbage protests did not explicitly call for the “fall” of the sectarian system. According to Abu Rish, some of the original organizers considered broaching the topic of a larger critique of the political order, but they backed off, fearing they would lose public support. The popularity of the 2015 protests was due in part to the fact that they provided an opportunity to enact a citizenship imaginary that did not require the denouncement of or recourse to sectarian attachments. The protestors made a claim for better sanitation as citizens, not as members of a “community.” This change in the citizenship imaginary was precisely what made the protests so notable.

    Despite the fraught nature of Lebanese narratives of national identity, protestors in 2015 waived the Lebanese flag. Still, the protestors’ demands do not explicitly attach themselves to an already articulated Lebanese nationalist project. The presence of the Lebanese flag can be read as insisting on a collectivity outside of sectarian affiliation or likeness. This idea of citizenship involves ideas of belonging as enacted in and through functioning infrastructures that link all parts of the city (and the wider metropolitan region and beyond) in relations that could produce a new kind of “imagined community” (Anderson). According to Abu Rish’s compelling account, the protest movement fell apart in the wake of violent police responses and of internal disagreements (“Garbage Politics”). However, the protests and their ability to stage a mass political movement around the question of infrastructure are still unfolding in Lebanon today.

    Citizenship Imaginaries and Futures

    While the 2015 protests were ultimately dispersed, the memory of that moment where wayn al dawleh? was no longer a hopeless curse mumbled under one’s breath, but a rallying cry to reimagine a new way of relating to infrastructure and to each other, is still animating protests in Lebanon today. In Lebanon and elsewhere, a plan to make these infrastructures a point of departure for new forms of citizenship and belonging that are not based on likeness will take the sustained commitment of new and emergent forms of organizing.12 As I write these words, protests are again taking place, but this time all over Lebanon and quite beyond any specific infrastructural demand. The situation is evolving, and it is too soon to draw any conclusions about the protests. However, it is clear that the organizational efforts of political platforms like Beirut Madinati, or Beirut My City, while focused on the municipality of Beirut, have pushed forward the demand for equitable social processes through their focus on material infrastructures.

    In Lebanon and elsewhere, demands for even provision of services and infrastructures are dominating political discussions. Protestors in Beirut in 2015 gathered in the hope of articulating a different citizenship imaginary out of the frustrations of dealing with infrastructural fragmentation and disrepair. Lebanon is not unique or exceptional in this regard. The American Society of Civil Engineers issued US infrastructure a D+ rating on its 2017 Report Card (“American Infrastructure Report Card”). Does this moment allow for imagining infrastructural solidarities and forms of reciprocity that reach beyond the current geographic and conceptual frameworks of nation states? Given the global and yet unevenly distributed risks in the era of rapid climate change, it is not an unimaginable idea.

    Footnotes

    1. For further details on access to services, see Cammett, Compassionate Communalism, and Nucho, Everyday Sectarianism.

    2. On forms of citizenship beyond the nation-state, see Seitz, A House of Prayer.

    3. Below I discuss this idea of sectarianism, which is a problematic and frankly inaccurate framework.

    4. See Elyachar, “Next Practices,” and Graham and Marvin, Splintering Urbanism.

    5. For more on various aspects of belonging, see Nucho, Everyday Sectarianism.

    6. For an excellent discussion of religion and sectarian identity, see Joseph, “Pensée 2.”

    7. On the past and present of war, see Hermez, War is Coming.

    8. See “Sukleen Ends Services in Beirut.” Another private company, Ramco, now collects Beirut’s trash; see “Ramco Wins Tender.”

    9. See Bou Akar, “Contesting Beirut’s Frontiers,” and Bou Akar, For the War Yet to Come.

    10. For more on these graphics, see Abu Rish, “What Do You Mean.”

    11. See Schwenkel’s discussion of the Vietnamese example in “Spectacular Infrastructure.”

    12. See for example Mona Harb, “New Forms of Youth Activism.” Harb identifies the growing importance of new forms of youth activism in Beirut who work outside of the frameworks of sect-affiliated identities or professional NGOs.

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  • Cinematic Masculinity in the Age of Finance

    Mark Steven (bio)

    Abstract

    This essay shows how popular cinema represents financialization and finance capitalism by leveraging male stardom as an allegory for superannuated forms of productive labor in Cosmopolis (2012), Dark Knight Rises (2012), Magic Mike (2012), The Wolf of Wall Street (2013), The Lego Movie (2014), and The Big Short (2015). Building on recent film history and scholarship about financialization and the 2008 banking collapse, it illustrates that popular cinema remains committed to the representation of finance even as the credit crisis recedes from view in the mass media, and that it recalls large-scale productive industry while contributing to racialized and gendered myths of labor and value.

    … money has taken a turn. All wealth has become wealth for its own sake. There’s no other kind of enormous wealth. Money has lost its narrative quality the way painting did once upon a time. Money is talking to itself. (DeLillo 77)

    The Market Without Us?

    The epigraph—lifted from Cosmopolis, Don DeLillo’s minor masterpiece of 2003—announces a unique moment in the passage of late capitalism. While money’s personification might speak to the ongoing process of capitalist reification, through which things become human and humans become things, what remains singular to this claim is its emphasis on the here and now, on the present tense. Money has “lost its narrative quality,” but that loss is very recent, or at least more recent than painting’s supersession by photomechanical reproduction. Which is to say, money is now post-industrial in the most literal sense of that phrase, following the historical transformation of industrial capitalism into something else. This is consistent with Fredric Jameson’s description of the advent of finance capital in his seminal essay from 1997: “Speculation—the withdrawal of profits from the home industries, the increasingly feverish search, not so much for new markets (those are also saturated) as for the new kinds of profits available in financial transactions themselves and as such—is the way in which capitalism now reacts to and compensates for the closing of its productive moment” (250-251).1 Finance means sourcing profits through speculative claims to wealth that has become untethered from the traditional sites of industrial manufacture and resource extraction, and that might exist elsewhere and in the future. The ongoing process of financialization has rendered money non-productive, fictitious, or immaterial in a more absolute sense than ever before. For capital to transition from mercantilism into manufacture and then through finance is to shift the privileged sites of accrual from the humanly populated zones of interpersonal trade and heavy industry to the abstract and impersonal space of what DeLillo calls in Cosmopolis “cyber-capitalism,” a cool-sounding neologism used to describe the world of futures markets as mediated by high-tech computers that deliver revenue but produce naught.

    Within the frame of narrative, it would be tempting to say that it is much easier (or at least more familiar) to describe personal loans and production lines than it is to account for the inhuman calculus of high-speed derivative trading. In Annie McClanahan’s account, the development of finance maps onto the evolution of literature: “the emergence of modern credit markets enabled the development of the realist novel. In the nineteenth century, likewise, literature responded to the expansion of finance by asserting its own figurative economies, and early-twentieth-century modernism used formal abstraction to register new kinds of monetary abstraction” (“Financialization” 239).2 But, from the late twentieth-century on, we have been forced to apprehend what Alison Shonkwiler defines as “the financial sublime,” an economic matrix comprising “the full range of mystifications of capital—technological, political, and otherwise—that make it difficult or impossible to distinguish the actuality of money from the increasing unreality of global capitalism” (75). The important distinction is not that capital’s narrative has become altogether more bewildering; it is, rather, that capital’s already bewildering narrative wants to secede from its human predicate. What money has lost in its progression through finance is lost because capitalism claims to no longer need people to deliver profits, ostensibly divesting itself from the immemorial bearers of both living labor power and something like narrative vitality.3 Here it must be emphasized that this divestment is not absolute or even material actuality; it is, rather, part of the ideology capital promotes, a means of distancing itself from its vast systems of exploitation. Rather than being independent of materiality, finance is still very much grounded in the way it organizes social relations. We encounter the truth of this claim in such forms as industrial monetization and collateralized debt but also more generally, at the level of everyday life, in the recasting of stability as risk and in what Marx once called “secondary exploitation,” the extension of credit to workers so as to ensure both subsistence and subservience (Capital, vol. 3, 596).

    Building on these preliminary remarks, my thesis is that cinema, and specifically popular, commercial cinema, has been seriously intent to meet the task of narrating financialization—to show us the force and the flux of money’s specious dematerialization in real time—and that it has been doing so via an emphatically patriarchal manipulation of what is commonly theorized as the star system.4 After the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, white male stars in their 30s and 40s have been performing as characters that internalize a culture of financialization and its speculative risks and algorithmic abstractions, but in ways that emphasize the work of both characters and actors. I will try to demonstrate that these performances of what Jane Elliott calls “neoliberal personhood” have given rise to an historically unique tension between financialization as thematic content and the eminently recognizable and ultimately physical labor that goes into acting. The material presence of the white male star thus becomes an allegory for work and value in the culture of financialization, in ways that recall large-scale productive industry whilst simultaneously contributing to racialized and gendered myths of labor and value. Before explaining this thesis, it should be stated categorically that numerous films have consciously taken finance capital as a formal challenge, and it almost goes without saying that all of this must be driven, in part, by the fact that motion picture production is materially entangled in finance markets. It is in these terms that cinema parallels literature, as Rachel Greenwald Smith argues, comparing contemporary fiction to a literature assessed on social value or its capacity to entertain. “The growth of neoliberalism,” she writes, “has meant that these systems of valuation have undergone a transformation to conform to an economic matrix of investment and return” (32). Not only is film finance its own kind of speculation, a wager that might or might not turn investments into profit and that is often discussed using a lexicon borrowed from stock trading, it is also a business model that attracts real speculators. For instance, Walt Disney is a publicly traded company, and America’s largest cinema chain, AMC, has the majority of its share controlled by the Wanda Group, a media conglomerate from Mainland China. Indeed, financialization is what the studio system’s most perspicacious historian, Thomas Schatz, seems to have been sensing in 2008, on the eve of the market crash, when he described the transition from New Hollywood into Conglomerate Hollywood during the early 2000s: “a period that in my view,” he claims, “has proved to be quite distinctive, due particularly to the combined impact of conglomeration, globalization, and digitalization—a veritable triumvirate of macro-industrial forces whose effects seems to intensify with each passing year” (19). It is in the films born of this conjuncture that we encounter some of the most aesthetically adept and ideologically noxious narratives of financialization.

    This essay is in conversation with a growing body of research on the imbrication of popular cinema and finance capital, and especially on cinema in the wake of the global financial crisis. My contribution illustrates some of the ways in which cinema approaches finance as both an impetus and impediment to the animation of characters “as living and moving before us,” primarily via recourse to stardom. Through the relationship between finance and stardom, popular cinema engages critically with and produces new visual narratives of the changing mode of production. In what some formalists call a “motivation of the device,” the star has become a phenomenon through which a film’s audience might be encouraged to grasp the interactions between a speciously inhuman market and the human biopower that remains, despite whatever abstraction is taking place, an originator of surplus value and so of profit. When it comes to film, the actor’s performance is a commodity whose embodied labor is captured at the point of delivery, preserved before the camera lens, so as to circulate in the market as a spectral trace of work undertaken elsewhere and in another time. Danae Clark explains acting and stardom in these terms. “Even though,” in the process of mechanical reproduction, “the image or star icon was dislocated from the sphere of production, its representational form appeared to capture ‘the real thing,’ thus providing a strong source of fetishistic attachment with which to link the consumer to the actor’s body in the sphere of circulation” (13). Stars, as exceptional actors, therefore inhabit a kind of paradox, whereby the labor of their iconicity is never entirely conjured away by commodity fetishism. “Stars,” explains Paul McDonald, “have a place in the film industry both as a category of labor and a form of capital: a star becomes a form of capital because in the commercial film industry, he or she is a valuable asset for a production company” (10). The star system emerges as the market consolidation of these becomings, guaranteeing not the believability of a role but instead the personality of an actor or actress performing that role. While leading men obviously occupy a compromised position in cinema’s hierarchies of production (different from character actors, supporting players, extras, and in addition, cinema’s vast pool of feminized non-screen labor), their presence on screen is a reminder of the labor power that underwrites all cinematic value—a reminder that, in the prominent examples cited here, assumes labor is both more white and more male than it really is.

    Wall Street’s Libidinal Thrust

    Since its inception, cinema has been lauded as the one medium superlatively capable of speaking to the masses. As capitalism’s medium of choice, it has always had a vested interest in translating the otherwise incomprehensible or even uninteresting language of the economy into readily accessible narratives.5 But outside of explicitly communist cinema, this translation has often taken place in the liberal-cum-libertarian imperatives of individual responsibility. Perhaps this is why, during the American economy’s transition from large-scale industry to credit-based finance, Hollywood delivered a rash of films whose collective attainment was to normalize, humanizing in however grotesque form, the beneficiaries of this newfound strategy for monetary accumulation. As a unique breed of capitalism, finance would require a different kind of embodiment—an update on the robber barons and demiurgic industrialists that populated cinema during the first half of the twentieth century, a shift away from the magnificent Ambersons and the Citizen Kanes.

    While films made during this period announced the arrival of finance through star-bloated productions—as with Trading Places (1983) and Working Girl (1988)—its full-blooded embodiment as an individual character is what we encounter, most explicitly of all, in the figure of Gordon Gekko. First appearing in Oliver Stone’s Wall Street (1987), Gekko is a composite character based on several real life financiers amalgamated into something like Ayn Rand’s wet dream. Gekko is played by Michael Douglas—the screen embodiment of wealthy white licentiousness—who starred in Fatal Attraction the same year. Douglas infuses the character with a weird virility, the unmistakably physical form of finance: that of a vaguely threatening middle-aged man stuffed into an expensive suit. Linda Ruth Williams reads Gekko in relation to the fundamentally deficient masculinity Douglas brought to numerous sex thrillers. “Michael Douglas is the leading man of the erotic thriller,” she claims, “the initially hapless and sometimes revengeful dupe of femmes fatales from Glenn Close through Sharon Stone to Demi Moore” (177). As an image of what Williams calls “sovereign power” (177), Gekko represents the compensatory inversion of Douglas’s star icon, and yet the fact that Gekko is performed by Douglas surcharges the character’s apparent power, drawn from his occupation in corporate finance, with psychosexual deficiency, itself a kind of impotence or flaccidity. Similar things can be said of more niche characters, like the investment banker Patrick Bateman or the holdings CEO Christian Grey, whose sociopathic perversities are linked, by a logic of reversal, to their seemingly disembodied source of income, and whose actors, if not yet stars at the time of casting, nevertheless supplement the roles with an undercurrent of embattled fragility (the young Christian Bale) or sexual menace (Jamie Dornan, best known as the serial killer and rapist Paul Spector in The Fall).

    Within the frame of individuation, the psychosexual pathology of financial labor finds its visual apotheosis with Martin Scorsese’s The Wolf of Wall Street (2013). Released after the relative success of several other big-budget finance films—Moneyball (2011), starring Brad Pitt; Margin Call (2011), with Kevin Spacey, Jeremy Irons, and Demi Moore; and Arbitrage (2012), with Richard Gere and Susan Sarandon—The Wolf of Wall Street is adapted from the autobiography of Jordan Belfort, a corrupt stockbroker. It shows Belfort and his crew establish a boiler room outfit selling penny stocks in Long Island and then shift their operations to Wall Street. On the whole, this film derives its comedy from aristocratic decadence, with Belfort, played by Leonardo DiCaprio, firmly committed to every known vice. “On a daily basis,” we are told in an opening monologue, “I consume enough drugs to sedate Manhattan, Long Island, and Queens for a month. I take Quaaludes 10-15 times a day for my ‘back pain,’ Adderall to stay focused, Xanax to take the edge off, pot to mellow me out, cocaine to wake me back up again, and morphine… Well, because it’s awesome.” As the hyperbole suggests, this is far from a morality tale of depravity and corruption; instead, the drug abuse, the sex addiction, the casual racism, and the rampant misogyny are played almost exclusively for laughs. What it all amounts to, however, is the same kind of compensatory reflex encountered with Douglas’s seminal performance as Gekko, which might well signal an aesthetic desire to supplement the world of finance with some human form, a libidinal complement to the money-commodity, which might also explain why the dominant mode of humor on display in this film is physical comedy. If episodes of herculean drug intake render financial labor an altogether more physical enterprise than is otherwise expected—witness DiCaprio massaging the name of a potential IPO, “Steve Madden,” out of Jonah Hill’s catatonically-stoned face—sex is what conjoins that physicality with money (though, of course, cocaine is always inhaled through hundred dollar bills).

    Here DiCaprio’s inestimable star power becomes significant to the presentation of finance. Since his ascent to fame in the 1990s, DiCaprio has been infamous for his sexual voracity in a way that might read as the immoral counterpoint to his branding as the monogamously romantic heartthrob. A well-known profile from 1998 describes DiCaprio and his closest friends, Tobey Maguire and David Blaine, as the “Pussy Posse,” a group that, we are told before a list of DiCaprio’s sexual partners, “didn’t get its name for nothing” (Sales). While many of the roles DiCaprio has taken since the days of the Pussy Posse, beginning in 2002 with Gangs of New York (another Scorsese film), might be linked by a certain type of masculinity (psychically damaged and socially isolated yet physically powerful), the off-screen persona of the sexed-up playboy has followed him into the subsequent decades. The Wolf of Wall Street, unlike any of DiCaprio’s other mature roles, seems to bank on the star’s personality and predilections as much as it does on his expertise at playing a type. Indeed, DiCaprio notes the unique personal commitment, a kind of method acting, he brought to the role. “It was all me,” he claims. “There were no doubles. Hey, man, I’m playing a modern-day Roman emperor and I’m going to play the hell out of this guy, and anything goes” (Bamigboye). In this way the star supplements financial abstraction with a base physicality. That these two aspects of the film, narrative and character, intersect through the libidinal codification of money is confirmed in a scene where Belfort and his trophy wife Naomi rut vigorously atop a Scrooge McDuck-esque bed of cash—a scene shot from overhead, with Naomi obscured beneath him as he gazes lustily into the eyes of Benjamin Franklin. Clint Burnham is surely correct to interpret this “gendering of money” in the terms I am suggesting here: “the film offers that money,” he says, “as an analogy for finance capitalism’s materiality, an objectness or thingness that is still a matter of exploitation. This is why it is crucial that Belfort fucks on his money” (111).

    This jockish masculinization of financial labor and the codified feminization of money read as an attempt to mount an almost Keynesian critique, suggesting that individual psychology, however perverse, is necessary to the system. But, aesthetically, at stake here is a gulf opened up between people and money, between the subjects of narration and the exigencies of the market, namely, the abstraction of finance. This is revealed in an early scene that serves as an interpretive key to the film’s aesthetic: here market guru Mark Hanna, performed by a jittery and emaciated Matthew McConaughey (yet to regain weight after his role as an AIDS patient in Dallas Buyers Club), offers sage wisdom to Belfort, his young protégée. After endorsing a regime of daily cocaine and explaining the immateriality of financial labor—”It’s fairy dust. It doesn’t exist. It’s never landed. It’s no matter. It’s not on the elemental chart. It’s not fucken real. Stay with me. We don’t create shit. We don’t build anything”—he suggests a novel corrective:

    Hanna:
    You jerk off?

    Belfort:
    Do I…do I jerk off? Yeah. Yeah, I jerk off, yeah.

    Hanna:
    How many times a week?

    Belfort:
    Like, uh… three… three, three, four… three or four times, maybe five.

    Hanna:
    You gotta pump those numbers up. Those are rookie numbers in this racket. I, myself, I jerk off at least twice a day.

    Belfort:
    Wow.

    Hanna:
    Once in the morning, right after I work out, and then once right after lunch. Mm-hmm. Why? I don’t want to. That’s not why I do it. I do it because I fucking need to. Think about it, you’re dealing with numbers all day long. Decimal points, high frequencies, bang, bang, bang. Eh-eh-eh-eh. Fucking digits. Kick, kick, kick. All very acidic above the shoulders mustard shit. Kinda wigs some people out. You gotta feed the geese to keep the blood flowing. Keep the rhythm below the belt.

    To insinuate that all finance operators are chronic onanists is not so much to miss the point as it is the point itself. Precisely this, the disconnection between an immaterial kind of money, taking the form of numbers as such, and its human counterparts, is what underwrites the film’s exorbitant and isolating libidinal economy. The only way to experience the stock market affectively, to retain a sense of self against all this “very acidic above the shoulders mustard shit,” is through atavistic chest-thumping and rampant masturbation. This is one way that money regains some of its errant narrative, by answering the disarticulation of human industry from the profit nexus with a fragile masculinity that mistakes itself for virility. “Pop off to the bathroom,” Hanna rounds off the advice, “work one out anytime you can, and when you get good at it you’ll be stroking it and you’ll be thinking about money.”

    While in Scorsese’s film money finds its collusive fantasy and so acquires visual form in Belfort’s wife Naomi, played by Australian actor Margot Robbie, perhaps it is not to be wondered why, in one of Robbie’s subsequent roles—a brief cameo in The Big Short (2015) directed by Adam McKay—her stardom is used to figure the aesthetic problem faced by The Wolf of Wall Street. As a director, McKay has experience with the narratives of finance. He first approached the supersession of traditionally masculine labor in the shift to a finance economy with his buddy comedy, The Other Guys (2010). The Other Guys couples Mark Walberg and Will Ferrell as two cops investigating a conspiratorial web of embezzlement centered on a leading hedge fund manager. Its comedy develops from the incompatibility between explosive cop films and the complexity and the accountancy of monetary crime—from the fact that Walberg’s character cannot grasp that they are pursuing white collar fraudsters as opposed to drug cartels or organ traffickers. “The Other Guys nearly links directly to the crisis at various points,” reflect Jeff Kinkle and Alberto Toscano, “but never quite does so, except in superficial and obvious ways, always falling back on cop-film conventions” (47). By contrast to this self-conscious failure to represent financialization from within the generic confines of the police procedural, McKay’s 2015 film, The Big Short, is about that crisis, and spends its 130-minute runtime following the analysts, investors, and operators that first sensed and ultimately gained from the subprime mortgage bubble and ensuing market crash. Adapted from Michel Lewis’s book of the same title, it serves as a companion piece to the earlier film.

    Whereas The Other Guys was on the laugh-out-loud side of tragicomic, The Big Short pitches far deeper into tragedy—and with that comes an almost moralistic sensibility. “If we’re right,” speculates Brad Pitt as a securities trader, “people lose homes. People lose jobs. People lose retirement savings. People lose pensions. You know what I hate about fucking banking? It reduces people to numbers. Here’s a number—every 1% unemployment goes up, 40,000 people die, did you know that?” What makes this film aesthetically laudable is not so much the moral handwringing—Pitt’s character still turns a profit of $80 million—but the way it translates a sense of moral obligation into populist pedagogy, explaining complex financial instruments in remarkably simple terms. While this film boasts an ensemble cast of stars—Pitt is joined by Christian Bale, Steve Carell, and Ryan Gosling—more striking is that it also features a handful of interjected non-diegetic clarifications that leverage both the screen charisma and star power of figures like Selena Gomez and Anthony Bourdain to render exciting the otherwise specialist material we would expect from the likes of Naomi Klein, Thomas Picketty, or Michel Lewis. The Big Short therefore appears as distinct not only from McKay’s previous effort, The Other Guys, but also from The Wolf of Wall Street, whose antiheroic narrator frequently stops short of explaining financial instruments and monetary operations so as to resume focus on sex and drugs. By contrast, the book from which this film is adapted opens with an epigraph, taken from Leo Tolstoy, that confirms an aspiration to didactic realism: “The most difficult subjects can be explained to the most slow-witted man, if he has not formed any idea of them already; but the simplest thing cannot be made clear to the most intelligent man if he is firmly persuaded that he knows already, without a shadow of doubt, what is laid before him” (Belfort).

    Robbie’s scene is exemplary of this pedagogical impulse. A Michael Moore-inspired voiceover, accompanying a montage of stock footage, complains about the opacity of finance: “Does it make you feel bored? Or Stupid? Well, it’s supposed to. Wall Street loves to use confusing terms to make you think only they can do what they do. Or even better, for you to just leave them the fuck alone. So: here’s Margot Robbie in a bubble bath to explain.” What follows is Robbie—heavily made up, in a bathtub with ocean views, surrounded by candles, sipping champagne, waited on by a butler in a penguin suit—delivering a sharp explanation of the subprime mortgage crisis and its origins both in the structures of credit and in predatory lending:

    Robbie: mortgage bonds were enormously profitable for the big banks. They made billions and billions on the 2% fee they got for selling each of these bonds. But then they started running out of mortgages to put in them. After all, there are only so many homes and so many people with good enough jobs to buy them, right? So the banks started filling these bonds with riskier and riskier mortgages. That way they can keep the profit machine churning. By the way, these risky mortgages are called “sub-prime,” so whenever you hear “sub-prime” think “shit.”

    The genius of this scene is that it clarifies a potentially confusing aspect of the film’s plot and in doing so renders plain and plainly threatening an otherwise complicated financial instrument (not to mention just how easily this clip converts into a sharable YouTube meme). And yet, as the staging makes resoundingly clear, we still face an insuperable distance between the image itself and what that image is saying, between the actor’s body and the object of the monologue. From the standpoint of narrative, these two things—the super-eroticized embodiment of visual beauty and Robbie’s discourse on synthetic collateralized debt obligations—remain worlds apart. But the film seems to know this, and to know it at the level of casting no less than in its ultimately misogynistic fantasizing. Sergei Eisenstein once claimed that “the sex appeal of a beautiful American heroine-star is attended by many stimuli: of texture—from the material of her gown; of light—from the balanced and emphatic lighting of her figure; of racial-national […]; of social class, etc.” (66). The obscene wealth implied by the setting and the economic acumen suggests that the beauty in the bathtub is the payoff for being on the right side of an economic crisis—all of which is confirmed by the particular star, whose Hollywood fame depends on her role in The Wolf of Wall Street. But the scene also foregrounds those additional meanings. “In a word,” Eisenstein concludes, “the central stimulus (let it be, for instance, sexual as in our example) is attended always by a whole complex of secondary stimuli” (66). Note the visual pun: forged here is an undeniable association between the bubbles with which Robbie surrounds herself in the bathtub and in the champagne flute, and the financial bubble she is describing. The pun secures a mediation between central and secondary stimuli, so that financial abstraction acquires bodily form by way of wealth and beauty. These interlocking forms, centered on Robbie’s star, are an expression not just of finance but of financial crisis.

    Class Struggle on Steroids

    Despite the salaciousness of these two films—the way male visual pleasure is used to frame economic operations—the realization of finance as a problem for social class largely stays hidden from the camera’s voyeuristic eye. Be that as it may, the apparent distance between people and money is not just a problem for narration, a challenge to be overcome in the visual regime. It’s also material, a thing we all live and breathe, and in that capacity words like “opposition” and “contradiction” might serve as better descriptors than “distance” and “abstraction.” If there is a narrative distance between people and money, if money seems more abstract than ever before, then that distance and that abstraction are only suggestive of the fact that we are really dealing with a contradiction between the human and finance—or, more precisely, an antagonism between the direct beneficiaries of finance and those who suffer its consequences. The problem, then, is less about market ontology than it is about social class. So write Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin in their history of American capitalism, emphasizing the unreconstructed class antagonisms that enable and are simultaneously reinforced by finance:

    Workers reduced their savings, increased their debt, and looked to tax cuts to make up for stagnant wages; they cheered rises in the stock markets on which their pensions depended, and counted on the inflation of house prices to serve as collateral for new loans, provide some added retirement security, and leave a legacy for their children. All this, along with increasing inequalities among workers themselves, left a working class more individualized and fragmented, its collective capacity for resistance severely atrophied. (192)

    It is thus that finance escalates the polarization between classes and simultaneously worsens collective experience for all but the wealthiest. This contradiction—the way workers in particular are suffocating under a mountain of paper money to which they will never have access—is what more generic cinema seems resolved on staging. It does so, as can be seen in The Wolf of Wall Street and The Big Short, from the standpoint of those increasingly excluded from the profit nexus, namely a working class now trapped in the force of the neoliberal deracination, and the growing class of “frictionless” professionals. If the likes of McKay and Scorsese have attempted to render finance transparent from the top down, other filmmakers are more intent on showing the negative effects of finance from the bottom up—and, again, they do so with recourse to masculine stardom.

    Steven Soderbergh’s Magic Mike (2012) uses its eponymous stripper, played by Channing Tatum, to center a story about aspiration and precariousness in the age of finance capital. Set in Tampa, Florida, this film follows Mike as he works multiple jobs to fund his dream business as a carpenter making artisanal furniture from industrial detritus. While the plot devolves into neoliberal clichés about redemption through self-sacrifice, it nevertheless appeals within the present context because it is one of the most economically intelligent films to be made in recent years. In almost all of the film’s dialogue, Mike’s singular preoccupation with the credit market is made evident; he waits for the banks to introduce what he calls “competitive loan schemes” so as to finally buy himself out of his day job as a construction worker and his night job as a stripper. It is significant that all of this centers on, and revolves around, a hapless everyman played by Channing Tatum, an actor cast because of his star power, having just performed in three movies (in different genres) that collectively made a return on $100 million in six months. “Brad, George, Matt,” claims Soderbergh, “you pick it: nobody’s done that” (Cohen). Tatum’s acting career was launched with his performances in several romantic melodramas, for which he played an archetypal hunk. “Even if you don’t know Channing Tatum’s name,” reads a Vanity Fair profile released in the wake of Magic Mike, “you’ve seen his face—handsome but not too handsome, big, ruddy, a football player enjoying a respite between downs” (Cohen). More germane for his eponymous role in Soderbergh’s film, after his tenure as a high-school athlete Tatum worked the same kind of menial jobs as Mike, in the same location, until he too found himself working as a stripper:

    He was at the clubs a few times a week, getting hammered and dancing like a hip-hop Deney Terrio. One afternoon, he heard an ad on the radio. Dancers wanted. Young men. Big money for those who make the cut. A few days later, he and a friend stood beside a few other stunned rookies in back of Club Joy, a male strip joint in Tampa. Hair gel, body oil, G-strings, gyration. The impresario pushed Tatum and his friend onto the stage, into the jaws of the howling lady mob. It was a human sacrifice, blood entry into a cult. “They were like, ‘All right, ladies, these are our newbies. We’re thinking about hiring ’em. What do you think?’” Tatum said, laughing. “They put on a song, and we danced.” (Cohen)

    Echoing Tatum’s life story, the film’s economic intelligence obtains in the interplay between three different kinds of work—construction, stripping, carpentry—that are all mediated by finance to shape Mike’s status as a working-class subject playing the self-defined “entrepreneur.” In Tatum’s case, stripping is used to leverage between class positions. Here the ironies are manifold.

    Surely, in a 2012 film obsessed with finance, there must be some greater significance to the fact that Mike builds houses in Florida, of all places, a pre-crisis hub of speculative investment at the epicenter of the mortgage default bubble (Florida is also the setting for revelatory scenes in The Big Short and other crisis films, like 99 Homes, from 2014). The houses constructed are the commodities in which the credit market finds its material base, serving as “investment properties,” not homes, which exist primarily because of their exchange as opposed to their use value. Mike only works construction to save toward his dream of working as a self-employed carpenter. The first irony is that construction and carpentry are similar types of labor. The key difference, however, is that carpentry of the sort Mike desires is artisanal and, in that capacity, decoupled from predatory loan schemes. And yet, as Mike is refused bank loans, the second irony is that his day job enables the very market to which he desires entry but from which he is ultimately excluded. For this reason he has to work a second job as a stripper, and here is a third irony: as a stripper he performs, alongside other similar fantasies of masculine labor, as a muscle-bound construction worker. His night job is to enact his day job, and with that comes a fourth layer of irony. The owner of the club and director of the troupe for which Mike dances can (unlike Mike) get a loan, with which he buys up new real estate. He plans to shift the business from Tampa to Miami so as to begin consolidating an “empire” of strip clubs. (Here, too, is contiguity in the star system: this actor is McConaughey, before the weight loss but with the stripper name, Dallas, as a kind of pre-productive premonition of the film for which he would lose weight to star the following year.) The film ends with an anti-climax—how else could it finish?—when a flat broke and unemployed Mike walks away from stripping and into an unknowable future. That everything besides a romantic subplot remains narratively unresolved is testament to the complexity of the film’s economy, vast entanglement that it is. Whereas Soderbergh’s 2009 film, The Girlfriend Experience, handles similar material but in a form calculated to produce dread and alienation, capitalizing on the altogether different star power of porn actor Sasha Grey; and while Side Effects (2013) does likewise from within the suspenseful narrative of an Hitchcockian thriller; Magic Mike, by contrast, uses the market to generate its melancholia and its suspense, but in a goofier, more populist fashion. It wants an audience to side with Mike, identifying sympathetically with him and against the market. Both films have a sense that working- and middle-class desperation would need to be freed from the depredations of wage-labor within an environment where professional mobility is dictated wholly by access to the finance and the vicissitudes of its market.

    Christopher Nolan’s third Batman film, Dark Knight Rises (2012), achieves something similar while deploying the visceral force of action cinema more so than the intimacies of melodrama. This film is thoroughly confused in its political vision—appearing to shuttle between the philosophies of Hobbes, Robespierre, and Schmitt—and offers several suggestions of revolutionary romanticism in the figure of its chief villain. There is, as Mark Fisher rightly says, “at least a suggestion here of an Idea so powerful that it can motivate people to give up their lives” (Fisher and White). If Bruce Wayne is played by an increasingly rickety and affectively alienating Christian Bale, the antagonist, Bane, cuts an altogether different figure. Tom Hardy, the actor playing Bane, is unique in his familiarity. There has been debate in the popular press whether Hardy is indeed a star, counting his apparent versatility against that status. “Hardy,” writes one commentator, “who has made quite a name for himself by vanishing into assorted roles, has a Zelig-like quality. He’s here. He’s there. He’s everywhere. He can do anything, play anybody: a dimwit New York bartender, a Russian copper, a cruel, atavistic London gangster. Make that two cruel, atavistic London gangsters” (Queenan). There is, however, a consistency to all of Hardy’s best-known performances, in that his starring roles seem less about the actor’s personality than they are about sheer physicality and its working-class conditioning. That is what we encounter most powerfully in Nicolas Winding Refn’s Bronson (2008), in Gavin O’Connor’s Warrior (2011), and—subsequent to the release of Dark Knight Rises—in Mad Max: Fury Road (2015) and Dunkirk (2017). In all of these films, Hardy’s face is obscured and his voice is muffled or muted, which makes for a different kind of recognition. Rather than disappear into roles, as might Daniel Day Lewis or even Bale, Hardy appears to be actively self-effacing, the effect of which is to amplify the laborious occupation of a given role and Hardy’s physical preparation which resonates with the work required by other comparable roles.

    That semi-anonymous physicality is what we encounter in the film’s most satisfying action sequence, which takes place in Gotham City’s equivalent to the New York Stock Exchange. The sequence begins with several slow travelling shots in and around the exchange floor, all of which focus on underdressed service workers: a shoe-shine, a delivery driver, a janitor, and a courier. The first three produce automatic weapons, as the fourth—Bane, the film’s masked antagonist—is braced by security. He beats three guards senseless with a red motorcycle helmet and shoots one of them with another’s handgun. The other three “workers” open fire on the exchange floor, gunning down a handful of traders and shooting out the monitors and the electric tickers. The camera tilts down and tracks backward from a large ticker screen, now throwing off sparks and smoke, as Bane enters through the glass doors beneath it. He stalks about the floor, surrounded by cowering traders, and turns to face the only one not yet gone aground. The over-the-shoulder shot focuses in as Bane sizes up his quarry: his predatory gaze locks onto a man we just saw having his shoes polished. “This is a stock exchange,” he blurts, somehow managing to sound smug despite the circumstances, “there’s no money you can steal.” Indeed, the details of what Bane is doing at the stock exchange remain hazy at best, though it has something to do with bankrupting his nemesis. Nevertheless, Bane replies in an impossibly loud and alien voice, like an English Darth Vader—”Then why are you here?”—before dragging the trader to a bank of monitors and beating him unconscious on the desk. The idea for which Bane’s comrades are willing to die is here given full articulation, via a cathexis that rallies around an identifiable working class savagely expropriating from the grand temple of finance.

    What takes place in these two films is a kind of visual prosopopoeia. Money, in its most disembodied form, is counterposed to certain kinds of physicality and, specifically, to physical labor. This is a direct reversal of the cultural ideology that ushered finance into American culture during the late 1970s—when, in Marc Faber’s well-known phrasing, growing debt was figured as “an injection of stimulant, of steroid” (qtd. in Neville 1) or when Arnold Schwarzenegger publicly endorsed the ideology of Milton Friedman. “I have been able,” announced Schwarzenegger in 1980, “to parlay my big muscles into big business and a big movie career. Along the way I was able to save and invest and I watched America change and I noticed this, that the more the government interfered and intervened and inserted itself in the free market, the worse the country did” (qtd. in Neville 12). Unlike that context-specific allegiance of market and muscle, in the second decade of the twenty-first century those two things are counterposed in capital and labor. The market compels physicality, but, in its financialized form, the market can only be that physicality’s antithesis. Finance necessitates Channing Tatum’s strip routines. Or it becomes a piece of software to be stolen by Tom Hardy’s masked terrorist. And this, as might be obvious enough, allows popular film to do what popular film does best: it grants the audience a properly affective relationship to finance. The market thus serves as what Alfred Hitchcock called a MacGuffin, a plot device used to propel the narrative but without any narrative value in itself. It allows those narratives to reflect back on finance, to inscribe it with new meanings, which consistently stimulate opposition in the form of sympathetic stars. Here, in genre cinema, the embodied revivification of narratives about money doubles as an invitation to reanimate class struggle.

    The Voice of Awesome

    Cinema’s favored medium has recently changed from film stock to digital pixels, a move that can be viewed as analogous to the broader shift from a manufacture-based economy to an economy ruled by the seemingly immaterial powers of finance. For this reason, digital cinema will predictably be the site of a redoubled deployment of star power against collapsing regimes of value. Here, for example, is D. N. Rodowick on the virtual life of film:

    In terms of market differentiation, computer-generated imagery codes itself as contemporary, spectacular, and future-oriented; a sign of the new to bolster sagging audience numbers. At the same time, the photographic basis of cinema is coded as “real,” the locus of a truthful representation and the authentic aesthetic experience of cinema. Photography becomes the sign of the vanishing referent, which is a way of camouflaging its own imaginary status. (5)

    This assessment should sound familiar to readers interested in finance, that economic mode initially employed to “bolster” profitability and which seems superficially to leave behind the “real” of capitalism—the insoluble fact that surplus value is sourced in the exploitation of human labor power. Finance, economically comparable to much older modes of imperial speculation, becomes a “vanishing referent” in the foreclosure and offshoring of mines and factories.6 That photographic imagery is, famously, the result of industrial production scarcely requires mentioning here. The same goes for the way that a photograph serves as indexical, documentary proof that an actor labored before the camera. This is to remind us that the medium’s eschewal of photography is a shift from industrial production to a different kind of materiality whose predicate in intellectual labor (as well as displaced material labor) corresponds to the apparent financialization of the economy as a whole. Whereas film stock is said to have borne some fidelity to the human subject and its concrete milieu by way of causal-indexical image capture, micro-indexical digitalism is a claim to human and concrete phenomena that might or might not exist at all. The resulting aesthetic is, like finance, built on speculation, from which stars in their singularity are all but occluded.

    If a single movie knowingly inhabits these historical, technological, and formal dynamics; if it registers the virtualization of its own medium as cognate to financialization; if it understands the materiality of bare life caught in the speciously immaterial unrest of the digital matrix; if it enacts the contradiction between humanity and finance at the level of its shifting medium, as a matter of class struggle, but also addresses that contradiction with a compelling story about the economic structuration of life itself; if it not only experiences but also names the affective comportment of finance capitalism, thus providing the language with which to narrate its complex operations—if a single cinematic production can do all of that, then surely it is The Lego Movie (2014). While this text fires and misfires on all manner of political symbolism, here we can temporarily set that aside and look first at the world it depicts, which is—for all its wild inconsistencies and ideological hypocrisies—quite obviously our own. The opening musical number is emblematic of this. It takes place when the non-heroic protagonist—minifigure construction worker Emmett—drives beneath a John Carpenter-inspired billboard that reads, “Enjoy Popular Music,” an injunction he repeats while turning on the car stereo just in time for a tune to drop. “Oh my gosh I love this song!” A thumping EDM bassline. Vocal track from Tegan and Sara. “Everything is awesome! Everything is cool when you’re part of a team! Everything is awesome—when you’re living on a dream!” The morning proceeds in lockstep to the song’s beat, as Emmett runs through daily rituals and arrives at the construction site, all synced up to the song, which, a time-lapse intertitle tells us, will play out the duration of the working day.

    If the notion of “living on a dream,” with its faint echo of Bon Jovi’s faux-workerism, connects the labor of industrial teamwork with some immaterial promise, the syllogism of the hook—”everything is awesome!”—corresponds to that of capitalism itself in its apparent shift from industry to finance, harmonizing in particular with David Harvey’s account of economic totalization. “Neoliberalization has meant,” for Harvey, “the financialization of everything” (33). Little wonder the rule of law is announced not only on billboards but also via the electric news tickers usually reserved for stock prices. Perhaps the intelligence of this song is to be expected, given the film’s musical design was overseen by Mark Mothersbaugh, the brains behind Devo, an iconic band whose philosophy of human devolution in the onset of neoliberalism is echoed here. So Mothersbaugh has come to reflect on the song: it “was supposed to be like mind control early in the film. It’s totally irritating, this kind of mindless mantra to get people up and working.” As readers of Harvey and fans of Mothersbaugh already know, and as the characters will soon learn, the song is plain torturous. Its tinny dubstep and earworm lyricism are annoying as hell, and that’s the point; everything is indeed awesome, but awesome in the way that Kant might use that term to describe the ever-threatening sublime – or, better yet, how H. P. Lovecraft uses “awesome” to account for the minimal difference between our reality and some vast undersea conurbations of the dead and damned. Awesome is the totalized form of financial terror, the affective comportment of living every second of one’s life in relation to the market.

    With an emphasis on music leading our analysis, we encounter another mobilization of the star system and its coded forms of masculinity. While Emmett and his co-actors are animate commodities in the most literal sense of that term—each is visualized as an assemblage of scanned blocks originally designed in Denmark but manufactured in Hungary, Mexico, and China—the fetishism that attends their wholesale reproducibility would appear to render them antipathetic to the recognition of performative labor requisite for star power. This is not the case. Concluding an essay on cinema’s “vococentric” tendencies in the 1980s and 90s, Michel Chion suggests that star recognition at the level of voice appeared as becoming less and less common. “The voice is ceasing to be identified with a specific face,” he claims. “It appears much less stable, identified, hence fetishizable. This general realization that the voice is radically other than the body that adopts it (or that it adopts) for the duration of a film seems to me to be one of the most significant phenomena in the recent development of the cinema, television, and audiovisual media in general” (174). And yet, it is in CGI movies that the voice reasserts itself, in its accent and its timbre, as an index to a given actor’s identity. While this tendency is closely associated with Pixar Studios and their ilk, originating with Tom Hanks’s and Tim Allen’s performances in Toy Story (1995), with The Lego Movie voice recognition is itself a mode of comedy that demands consideration of the irreducible and altogether familiar human body reincarnate before our eyes as commodity. Chris Pratt, the likeable-but-not-yet-a-leading-man actor, is the everyman construction worker; Will Ferrell is Lord Business, a super-camp supervillain; Liam Neeson is a one-man police force; Morgan Freeman is the wise old wizard; Channing Tatum is superman as well as his civilian cover; and Will Arnett, with a voice both hyper-gravelly and associated with a cast of self-involved characters, is not just Batman but more specifically the hyperbolic parody of Christian Bale’s Batman. In this way, through voice recognition, masculine labor once again haunts the nigh-on absolute formal realization of finance.

    Celluloid Bloodsuckers

    This essay concludes by returning to its epigraph, the claim that “money has lost its narrative quality,” but this time from the standpoint of a medium I suggest has tasked itself with restoring that very quality via appeals to masculine stardom. Adapted in 2012 under the direction of David Cronenberg, Cosmopolis follows Eric Packer, a young man made rich on financial speculation, as he rides through a traffic-jammed Manhattan in a stretch limousine pimped out to serve as a base of operations. The words from the epigraph are recited in a scene where Packer is visited by Vija Kinsky, his Chief of Theory. She delivers her monologue from the back seat of the limousine, with Packer farther forward and to her right and with a bank of computerized monitors to the left. The shot begins in medium close-up on her face and slowly pulls backward, taking in the vehicle’s interior. Her words direct our attention to the mise-en-scène. “Oh and this car, which I love, the glow of the screens, I love the screens, it’s the glow of cyber-capital, so radiant and seductive.” The camera keeps pulling back. The dialogue turns to profits, and the camera frames the two speakers in a series of shot reverse-shots. “Time is a corporate asset now. It belongs to the free market system. The present is harder to find. It is being sucked out of the world to make room for uncontrolled markets and huge investment potential.” The scene cuts to the exterior. Swelling chords on a distorted guitar. Times Square during an anti-capitalist protest. Rioters carry a giant rat effigy. Another, wearing a rat mask, climbs atop a parked car and is shot. A man in a suit and tie chokes a masked protester preparing to hurl a brick. Back to the interior, where Packer fills tumblers of vodka before a glowing screen that tracks global shifts in capital. “This is what the protest is all about. Visions of technology and wealth. The force of cyber-capital that will send people to the gutter to retch and die.” The camera peers through the rear window—a patently digital image—showing two signs, each emblematic of a different kind of capitalism. To the left, in the dim afternoon light, a vertical banner for Hershey’s, a giant chocolate bar suspended above the city; to the right, the red text of electric tickertape glides across a black void: “A SPECTER IS HAUNTING THE WORLD,” it plays on Marx and Engels, “THE SPECTER OF CAPITALISM.” The dialectic of production and finance compressed into a single shot. That Kantian or Lovecraftian sense of awesome applies to “cyber-capitalism,” the kind of economic system that shapes the present with immense force and at imperceptible speeds, but it also applies to a mise-en-scène approaching the surreal and to the conspicuously digital imagery. Unlike The Lego Movie, here is a more palpable dread, or terror, which registers in the dissonance and the darkness of the scene and will only ratchet up as the narrative progresses toward its bloody denouement.

    Giving the game away here is a tendency we have already seen at work that has everything to do with the star system: no matter what social type or unique personality an actor is portraying, the audience will always see the star through the character. As cinema parallels finance in its transition from one kind of materiality to a different kind of abstraction, the medium retains its human actors—embodiments of labor power—as a key source of value. In the films we have considered, specific actors appear and reappear, never quite shedding their previous roles, haunting whatever narrative and whichever marketing campaign with the specter of labor past. Michael Douglas and Leonardo DiCaprio are libido made flesh. Channing Tatum and Tom Hardy are just as much the work of their sheer physicality as they are trained actors. Christian Bale is both Patrick Bateman and hedge fund manager Michael Burry, not to mention Batman. Matthew McConaughey is both the coked-up Mark Hannah and Magic Mike’s employer, Dallas. Margot Robbie is both Naomi Belfort and, well, Margot Robbie. When finance is narrated in the cinema, part of that narrative’s quality derives from the value of the medium’s laborers—the starring actors, and the wealth of other narratives they bring with them—and it serves as a reminder that, no matter the sublime abstractions or the ideologies of immateriality, surplus value is still the stuff of exploited human labor.

    We have tracked cinema’s effort to maintain its stars as material presences and persisting sources of value, and must also remember that these undying titans of the film industry are to that industry what high-ranking workers of the developed world are to the economy as a whole: they form what Vladimir Lenin called—after Jack London and Karl Kautsky—an aristocracy of labor, the working beneficiaries of exploitation and immiseration suffered by the impoverished and dispossessed. We can conclude here by suggesting that Cronenberg’s Cosmopolis mobilizes the star system as a properly vituperative satire on both the film industry as a whole and on its wealthiest beneficiaries. Recall the allusion made on the electric ticker to Marx and Engels, and recall Kinsky’s insistence that capitalism has come to “suck” time out of the world. These two things direct us to a well-known line of thought. “Capital,” writes Marx, “is dead labour, that, vampire-like, only lives by sucking living labour, and lives the more, the more labour it sucks” (Capital vol. 1, 342). This is a film that knows its medium really is the message, that its apparently bloodless digital form is synonymous with the apparently bloodless finance capital it prophesies—but this film also reminds us, with the genius of its casting, that he who identifies with all of this, with post-filmic cinema and with financial accumulation, is an incurable bloodsucker. Robert Pattinson is, as any moviegoer will know, a goddamned vampire—but of course he is, just as finance capital is, after all, still capital.

    Footnotes

    1. For more recent accounts of this tendency, see Costas Lapavitsas, Profiting Without Producing, and Cédric Durand, Fictitious Capital.

    2. My thinking on finance and film is also indebted to McClanahan’s tremendous book, Dead Pledges: Debt, Crisis, and 21st Century Culture, and especially to its chapter on mortgage horror.

    3. To be sure, DeLillo’s line about “narrative quality” should be finessed: money has a narrative in finance, but that narrative is less about human actants. For an excellent take on the relationship between finance and narrative in literature, see La Berge.

    4. The work cited above, especially that of Shonkwiler and McClanahan, includes useful summaries of scholarship dedicated to the relationship between literature and finance, and detailed accounts of ways in which literature parallels film in absorbing an ongoing process of financialization. Several other works have shaped my thinking here. These include Joshua Clover’s writing in general, but especially “Value | Theory | Crisis,” and Jeff Kinkle and Alberto Toscano’s essay, “Filming the Crisis: A Survey.” Two articles published in this journal also make significant contributions to the discussion of financialization by addressing the apparent disconnect between finance capital and human agency: Robert Meister’s “Reinventing Marx” and Melinda Cooper’s “Secular Stagnation.”

    5. This is an idea with a long critical history, from Walter Benjamin through Jacques Rancière in theory and Sergei Eisenstein through Michael Moore in practice, but in this rhetorical formulation I am echoing Sean Cubitt in The Cinema Effect.

    6. This view is indexed to the world-systemic theory of capitalist accumulation, which describes finance as a distinct and recurring phase of an economic cycle and a temporary curative to secular stagnation. See Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century; Braudel, The Perspective of the World; and Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulance.

    Works Cited

    • Arrighi, Giovanni. The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power, and the Origins of Our Times. Verso, 1994.
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    • Belfort, Jordan. The Wolf of Wall Street. Random House, 2007.
    • The Big Short. Directed by Adam McKay, performed by Christian Bale, Steve Carell, and Ryan Gosling, Paramount Pictures, 2015.
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    • Burnham, Clint. Fredric Jameson and The Wolf of Wall Street. Bloomsbury, 2016.
    • Chion, Michel. The Voice in Cinema. Columbia UP, 1999.
    • Clark, Danae. “The Subject of Acting.” Stars: The Film Reader, edited by Lucy Fischer and Marcia Landy, Routledge, 2004. pp. 13-28.
    • Clover, Joshua. “Value | Theory | Crisis.” PMLA, vol. 127, no. 1, 2012, pp. 107-14.
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    • Cosmopolis. Directed by David Cronenberg, performed by Robert Pattinson, Alfama Films, 2012.
    • Cubitt, Sean. The Cinema Effect. MIT P, 2004.
    • The Dark Knight Rises. Directed by Christopher Nolan, performed by Christian Bale, Tom Hardy, and Gary Oldman, Warner Bros., 2012.
    • DeLillo, Don. Cosmopolis. Picador, 2003.
    • Durand, Cédric. Fictitious Capital: How Finance Is Appropriating Our Future. Verso, 2017.
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    • La Berge, Leigh Claire. Scandals and Abstraction: Financial Fiction of the Long 1980s. Oxford UP, 2015.
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    • Mothersbaugh, Mark. “Devo lead singer dishes on creating catchy Lego song.” Foxnews.com. 18 Feb. 2014. http://fxn.ws/1uajZLX Accessed 9 Oct. 2018.
    • Neville, Carl. No More Heroes? Steroids, Cocaine, Finance and Film in the 70s. Zero Books, 2015.
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  • Notes on Contributors

    Sungyong Ahn is a PhD candidate in the Institute of Communications Research (ICR) at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He has published research on algorithmic culture, attention economy, and media theory in media studies journals. His research interests include wearable health devices, videogames, self-tracking technologies, and their affective dimensions.

    Ian Balfour is Professor Emeritus of English and of the Graduate Program in Social & Political Thought at York University. He has published books on Northrop Frye and The Rhetoric of Romantic Prophecy. He edited a special issue of SAQ on Late Derrida. With Atom Egoyan he co-edited Subtitles: On the Foreignness of Film; with Eduardo Cadava he edited an issue of SAQ on “The Claims of Human Rights.” In 2014 he curated an exhibition at Tate Britain on William Hazlitt. Recent essays address Baldwin’s film criticism, Shelley’s Frankenstein, Hölderlin’s theory of tragedy, and adaptations of Austen’s Emma. He is finishing and not finishing a book on the sublime.

    Will Kujala is a PhD candidate at the University of Alberta in Edmonton, Alberta, Canada. His PhD project in political theory examines the intellectual history of antiracist and anticolonial internationalism in the era of decolonization. He has broader interests in the politics of historiography, early modern political thought, and questions of race and empire in international relations.

    Robert McRuer is Professor of English at George Washington University, where he teaches critical theory, disability studies, and queer theory. He is the author, most recently, of Crip Times: Disability, Globalization, and Resistance (NYU, 2018), and is co-editor, with Anna Mollow, of Sex and Disability (Duke, 2012).

    Tamas Nagypal is a lecturer at Ryerson University’s School of Image Arts. He holds a PhD in Cinema and Media Studies from York University, and he is currently working on turning his dissertation into a book with the title The Dark Passage to Human Capital: Film Noir and Neoliberalism. His publications include articles in the journals Film International, The Journal of Religion and Film, and Mediations, as well as book chapters in the edited volumes Zizek and Media Studies: A Reader and Monstrous Children and Childish Monsters: Essays on Cinema’s Holy Terrors.

    Janet Neary is Associate Professor of English at Hunter College, City University of New York. She is the author of Fugitive Testimony: On the Visual Logic of Slave Narratives (University Press, 2017), as well as essays in J19, ESQ, African American Literature, and MELUS. She is the editor of Conditions of the Present: Selected Essays by Lindon Barrett (Duke University Press, 2018). Her current research focuses on African American literature of Western migration in the wake of the California Gold Rush and the passage of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850. In pursuit of research for the book, she was a 2018 visiting scholar at Stanford University’s Bill Lane Center for the American West.

    Mikko Tuhkanen is Associate Professor of English at Texas A&M University, where he teaches African American and African-diasporic literatures, LGBTQ literatures, and literary theory. His most recent books include The Essentialist Villain: On Leo Bersani (2018) and The Cambridge History of Gay and Lesbian Literature (2014), co-edited with E. L. McCallum. He has published essays in diacritics, differences, American Literature, Cultural Critique, James Baldwin Review, and elsewhere.

    Parisa Vaziri received her Ph.D. in Comparative Literature from UC Irvine in 2018. She is Assistant Professor of Comparative Literature and Near Eastern Studies at Cornell University. Her current book project explores representations of blackness in Iranian cinema through the historical lens of Indian Ocean slavery.

  • Black Execration

    Parisa Vaziri (bio)

    A review of Warren, Calvin. Ontological Terror: Blackness, Nihilism, and Emancipation. Duke UP, 2018.

    Plumbing Frantz Fanon’s frequently cited but not always well elaborated pronouncement that “ontology does not allow us to understand the being of the Black man” (90), Calvin Warren’s Ontological Terror: Blackness, Nihilism, and Emancipation brings to bear a black archive upon the work of one of ontology’s most important critics and thinkers: Martin Heidegger. Warren’s premise, which unfolds throughout his book, is that black being, stricken in execration, registers the unthought of metaphysics and its philosophical afterlives. Thus, he launches a unique form of critique potent enough to surprise and inspire both avid and indifferent readers of Heidegger, while contributing—in a highly original way—to a robust lineage of black engagement with canonical Western philosophy.

    Each chapter of Ontological Terror pursues distinct domains (philosophy, law, science, and visual culture) through the historical example of the antebellum free black, which Warren instructively transforms into a philosophical paradigm: the free black allegorizes the “problem of metaphysics” (51). Deactivated from its historical context, the figure of the free black illuminates its own truth—a truth which resides in this possibility of deactivation. This paradigm defines Warren’s experiment with historico-philosophical exemplarity. If, like Warren, we understand freedom as more than a legal or empirical condition, then black freedom disintegrates in the antiblackness of World; this proposition conditions the substrate of Ontological Terror. It also informs Warren’s important contention that philosophical anthropology is rarely guided by black archives, reducing black history to the inchoate swell of empirical and irrelevant data. Warren takes on the writing of a number of inheritors of Heidegger’s thought (“postmetaphysicians” [5]) to discuss the status and necessity of riven black being in the project of Being’s unveiling. His text assumes a minimal familiarity with Heideggerian language and a decidedly greater immersion in contemporary discourses in Black studies, notably, Afro-pessimism. This anomalous set of expectations may posit an idiosyncratic readership, but it also projects a new region of possibility toward which Warren wishes to guide the future of black thinking.

    Chapter One, “The Question of Black Being,” builds a case for the distinction between human and black being that is important for Heideggerian philosophical thought. Heideggerian thought, through its deep engagement with the question of being and metaphysical violence, helps to clarify this distinction in powerful ways. Through the history of African slavery, Warren reinterprets Heidegger’s famous arguments that technology is an aid to the human’s approximation of Being. Since chattel slavery murders “African existence” and produces the “Negro” as “available equipment … for the purpose of supporting the existential journey of the human being” (27), black being is itself a technology in service of Dasein’s movement toward Being. Warren’s limited explication of Heidegger’s complex position on both technology and Dasein contains and tempers the power of his propositions, which nevertheless remain highly significant. The Afropessimist refrain that antiblackness is necessary to the coherence of global civil society resounds, now, in the analogous necessity of technology and black being. But the impossibility of showing this necessity remains a problem that repetition cannot resolve. To succeed as a proposition, this impossibility demands a stronger thematization.

    In Chapter Two, “Outlawing,” the work of Oren Ben-Dor (Thinking about Law) and Jean-Luc Nancy (The Birth to Presence) on abandonment offers occasion to elaborate Warren’s sometimes contradictory claim that Heideggerian ontological difference both depends upon and absolves blackness. Abandonment clarifies a counterintuitive dimension of black invisibility. For Ben-Dor and Nancy, the law of abandonment describes Being’s doubled movement of withdrawal and unfolding: a doubling that produces invisibility as the demand to see. To this formulation, Warren adds the “not seeing … of the non-place”: the outlawing of black being, which clarifies that “black being … is without a world” (Ontological Terror 70). Black invisibility describes the non-seeing of its non-worldliness and the lack of “there-ness” that is the condition of blackness. Here, as elsewhere in the book, the full relation between Warren’s formulation and those of his interlocutors is not as clear as it might be. Is his insistence on the outlawing of black being simply inspired by Ben-Dor and Nancy’s writing, or is Warren suggesting that these thinkers misrecognize a crucial dimension of Heidegger’s work on Being—a dimension to which Heidegger too remains blind? Warren’s transitional phrasing elicits such questions. He calls outlawing an “additional problematic” (70) and suggests that Ben-Dor “provides a hermeneutic” (73) with which to discuss it, leaving the relation between blackness and Heideggerian abandonment ambiguous. Even in the introduction, he implies an integration that is not fully explained—perhaps, not fully explainable: “the Negro is the missing element in Heidegger’s thinking (as well as in that of those postmetaphysicians indebted to Heidegger” (9). Elsewhere Warren adds parenthetically that “Heidegger’s philosophy … can be read as an allegory of antiblackness and black suffering—the metaphysical violence of the transatlantic slave trade” (9). How is the reader to reconcile the “missing element” with Warren’s claim for allegory? Such questions remain latent in the text, coalescing in unexpected places, thus demanding and also producing patient readership.

    In the second half of the chapter, Warren explains that a move from the ontological to the ontic register of law shows a lack of ontological difference for blackness. He shifts from the law of abandonment to the Dred Scott case—an ontic, legal iteration. Through a close reading of Chief Justice Roger Taney’s language in the Dred Scott case, Warren reads the historical event of slave emancipation as an ontological black condition (nonrelation; nothing), suggesting a fundamental distinction between freedom and emancipation (I will return to the challenges inherent in using historical examples this way, particularly in light of Heidegger’s singular and difficult position on history and Being). According to Warren’s reading of Taney’s language, blacks emerge through modernity as merchandise; their ontological origins as objects debilitate any future political standing for them. Blackness has no place within human relationality and community. Thus it has no place in the world, at either the level of Being or of being, for “the Negro is a saturation of abject historicity and worldlessess; the Negro is the ‘thing’ whose ancestors were imported and sold” (82). Blackness is between thing, animal and human—a theme Warren revisits in each chapter.

    As he does with the concept of abandonment, Warren blackens Nancy’s notion of suspension, rethinking its Heideggerian sense of lawfulness in light of American history. For Nancy, suspension conditions and names the difference between undecidability and indecision that allows for Being’s unfolding, while decision closes off Being in an act of self-assurance and security. Warren divines, in “suspension,” the terror of legal emancipation and the transposition of the slave master’s ownership of the slave to the state’s management of blacks’ social condition: “emancipation simply transfers property rights to the state” (97). Warren shows, through historiographical commentaries, that manumission depended on the state’s consent and that the state recognized, in slave emancipation, a major threat to civil society: “the evil of the free Negro … that invades” society (97). Warren calls this suspended freedom, between belonging to the slave master and belonging to the antiblack state, “black time” (97), and develops it in his remarkable essay of the same name. Black time includes the impossibility of self-restoration that Warren sees symbolized in the figure of the freedom paper—the “materialization of this self-as-property” (100)—and in the phenomenon of kidnapping. According to Warren, both of these historical concepts manifest paradigms, showing that the black continues to live for a white civil society, “suspended ontometaphysically” (101), in wait of judgment and death. Just as freedom papers could be easily ignored or destroyed, so kidnappers frequently abducted free blacks, particularly along the Mason-Dixon Line, often targeting children.1

    Warren’s analysis focuses exclusively on the antebellum South, but he claims his insights on post-abolition culture carry an analytic force that transcends geotemporal specificity. Though his own evidence for this transcendence is limited to modern American history, the claim is compelling and can instruct scholars of comparative slavery. For example, both freedom papers and kidnapping have cognates in post-abolition cultures of Indian Ocean slavery. As Ehud Toledano and Liat Kozma document, manumitted black slaves were regularly kidnapped and resold in Ottoman territories, and slaveholders considered so-called manumission papers a mere formality that could be ignored (Toledano 199). Ottoman officials showed little concern when cases of kidnapping were reported. The documentation of such cases shows that, like their American counterparts, African slaves in the Ottoman empire often witnessed their manumission papers—and, thus, freedom—shredded before their eyes. Warren uses these examples to abstract historical events into a theory of ontological terror. This is the idea that “the essence of kidnapping is not legal, but ontometaphysical,” for “[one] experiences terror precisely because one never knows when this self will be targeted, or when one will be forced to prove the improvable” (107). Historians of Indian Ocean slavery can learn from Warren’s anti-historicist handling of historical facts.

    In Chapter Three, “Scientific Horror,” Warren brings perceptive clarity to the refractory proximity between Heideggerian terminology and discourses of blackness. The challenge for the reader, in this chapter, lies in intuiting how to navigate frictive, seemingly irreconcilable ideas. Warren suggests that blackness is nothing, but also that science projects nothing onto blackness in order to master it. He claims that nothing is the “essence of science—the void, the abyss” (111), and also that science desires “substitutes or embodied projections of this nothing” (111). Blackness embodies this monstrous nothing that is both scientific essence and that which science abhors. Again, Warren’s use of historical examples fortifies what initially appear as wild speculations. He presents a number of antebellum cases which he treats with uncompromising care: the case of Joe, a “young Negro” (112) on a Charleston plantation who claimed and believed that he was dead, and whom his doctor, W.T. Wragg, diagnosed with mental alienation and treated through repeated bleeding, blistering, purging; Benjamin Rush’s medical thesis that leprosy both causes and is the origin of blackness2; Dr. Samuel Cartwright’s study on drapetomania, the fugitive’s pathology—the disease that causes a slave to desire escape—and dysaesthesia aethiopica, mental hebetude or black “rascality” (125); and the 1840 decennial census which collected information about insanity and in whose statistical logic Warren perceives a sharp, “causal relationship between emancipation and insanity” (132). Warren also spends (less) time examining more familiar instances of illicit scientific experimentation on black bodies: Dr. J. Marion Sim’s experiments with gynecological surgical techniques on un-anesthetized black women; the federally backed Tuskegee study, which exploited black sharecroppers in pursuit of research on syphilis and left the study’s subjects to die, uncured and uninformed about their condition; black female sterilization; and modern theories of racial inferiority and intelligence.

    Blackness enthralled not only 19th century science but also 18th century philosophy. Although he does not make it explicit, this observation connects Warren’s third chapter with a larger body of race scholarship that implicates this fascination and its perverse, still unrealized consequences for the origins of the humanities. If the title of Benjamin Rush’s 1799 “Observations Intended to Favor a Supposition That the Black Color (As It Is Called) of the Negroes Is Derived from Leprosy” sounds absurd to contemporary readers, Warren’s analyses demonstrate that to ignore such texts as iterations of antiquated pseudoscience is to disavow a crucial stage in the history of modern science. In Toward a Global Idea of Race, Denise Ferreira da Silva demonstrates the sacrifice of rigor for race scholarship that such disavowal entails. In the late 18th century, obsessions like Rush’s were common, and supported the great critical project of modernity. Race scholarship that focuses on this fascination shows that the Kantian critiques emerged alongside Kant’s infatuation with the concept of race.3 More specifically, in lectures on anthropology at the University of Königsberg and in published essays such as “Of the different races of human being” (1775), “Determination of the concept of a human race” (1785), and “On the use of teleological principles in philosophy” (1788), Kant’s fixation on blackness (e.g. why black people are black) informs a crucial distinction between theory and empirical observation (natural history and natural description) that elicits speculation both about the relationship between blackness and critique and between the theory of black skin and teleology. Blackness offers, to philosophy, a fantasy playground for the exploration of causality, mechanism, classification, and, crucially, purposiveness—the route to the transcendental. What Warren’s chapter helps to show is the cryptic, common context of this perverse scientific obsession with black skin: the originary antiblackness of modernity.

    This scientific fascination with blackness offers sounder insight into the constitutive relation between blackness and universal science than Warren’s more sensational references to phlebotomy, or “rubbing away” (141). Rush and Wragg’s cures—gruesome-sounding for modern readers—lose some of their depravity in a larger historical context where bloodletting and leeching were common medical practice. This larger context depletes some of the theoretical force drawn from details in Warren’s examples in “Scientific Horror.” The difference in framing symptomatizes the precarity of historical examples as the ground of theory. For history, the meanings examples produce are always vulnerable to dissolution by more history. On the other hand, I believe aspects of Warren’s theory of black time, if enlarged, might protect his historical examples from the self-evidence of specificity and context, or historicism. Black time feels like the auspicious beginning of a unique articulation of historicity.4 Black time embodies the incapacity for orientation that renders all history a kind of vertiginous fall into antiblackness. This embodiment becomes truer the less attached we are to the idea that modernity is merely an enclosed temporal period, rather than the ground of our historical thought and comprehension of historicity. It is precisely this dimension of modernity, magnified in Western philosophy’s articulation of the relationship between universal science and historicity from Hegel to Heidegger, that renders scholarship like Warren’s absolutely crucial. The question of the status of blackness inside the articulation of science and historicity is still relatively unexplored. As the ground of future research, it bears major theoretical consequences for how to think the relationships between subjectivity, universality, blackness, and history.

    Warren’s fifth chapter, “Catachrestic Fantasies,” reads an archive of mid-19th century illustrated journalism, including Edward Clay’s “Life in Philadelphia Series,” political caricatures published by Currier and Ives, Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, and Harper’s Weekly. The illustrations, and images more generally, issue philosophical pronouncements entangled in antiblack fantasy and desire that reproduce the impasse of the free black. In an 1863 Harper’s Weekly cartoon, a black man with his head held high pops his collar while addressing a group of farm animals. The caption reads, “I ain’t one of you no more. I’se a Man, I is!” Warren sees the illustration as a statement of the ontometaphysical status of “this new creature,” the free black who “lacks a place within the world … [and is] in the interstice of existence” (153), between human and animal. In the foreground of a battlefield illustration, a soldier straps a cannon to a smiling, bare-footed black man seated on the grass. Around him black men are similarly strapped to weapons. The caption reads: “Dark Artillery; or, How to Make the Contrabands Useful,” referring to the Union’s strategic use of “confiscated” runaway slaves for warfare. Warren reads the black man’s smile to suggest obsequiousness, as well as “the masochistic embrace of destruction,” combining the two as a demand or obligation to enjoy one’s annihilation and nonbeing. As he says, “the smile gets us to the essence of the image. What the black weapon is smiling at is nothing” (160). Through these selective examples, Warren argues that “The black body is finished” (160). By this, he means to refuse gestures of rehabilitation, creation, and claims to transgression that he sees exemplified in black humanist scholarship. For Warren, antiblack fantasy circulates in an ether beyond representation. Representation may be one particularly violent manifestation of antiblack fantasy, but the essence of this fantasy lies not in the production of images but in destruction and annihilation. Antiblack fantasy is the projection of nothingness onto blackness and the repetitive destruction of that nothingness—the obliteration of black being.

    The transcendentalizing of black suffering may appear dogmatic to readers unfamiliar with Afropessimist thought, and criticism of this body of work—most frequently affiliated with the work of Frank B. Wilderson III—indeed centers on the discomfort, even anger, such absolutism produces.5 Warren’s underlying premise—that unsubsiding reflection on black suffering refigures the meaning of being—grows out of a broader movement of black scholarship that has become affiliated with, appropriated by, or vitalized and inspired by Wilderson’s work in recent years. Names that have become associated with Afropessimist thinking, regardless of these scholars’ endorsements, criticisms, or rejections of Afro-pessimism, recur in Warren’s citational practices without qualification: Hortense J. Spillers, Sylvia Wynter, Saidiya Hartman, Ronald Judy, Nahum Chandler. To the extent that it inadvertently performs the cohesion of such internally conflicted assemblage or—more powerfully—to the extent that it follows a trajectory of relentless exposure of the structure of antagonism that characterizes the Human-Black (non)relation, Warren’s book is thoroughly Afropessimist. But by taking up ontology explicitly at the register of philosophical discourse and engaging one of philosophy’s most important thinkers of ontology, Warren’s book appears to avoid an abiding suspicion about Afro-pessimism, namely that it reduces ontology to a moralistic logic.6 Afro-pessimism, in turn, invites this concern about a reduction of ontology to ethics precisely because of its claim to speak in ontological terms, where ontology sacrifices some of its rigor in a proliferation whose self-evidence is rarely questioned or thematized: “ontology of suffering,” “ontology of captivity,” “‘Savage’ ontology,” etc.7

    The commentary on Heideggerian thinkers in the first part of Ontological Terror suggests not only a serious engagement with Heidegger’s thinking about ontology but a desire to intervene in its scholarship. Precisely because of his sophisticated grasp of Heidegger’s oeuvre, a number of Warren’s moves in Ontological Terror might confound readers interested in the Heideggerian aspect of his work. Heidegger famously distinguishes Being from beings. Reserving a grandeur for the former, Warren’s writing illustrates that unique beingness of the human, whose historicity builds its proximity to Being. Dasein’s distinction from ordinary being threatens to make redundant Warren’s insistence on writing black being under erasure. It is precisely the black’s non-humanness, its non-Daseinness, its being ready-to-hand that Warren wishes to highlight with the negative cipher. Perhaps the case distinction of “being” captures this difference well enough, without the accessory of the bar. In Heidegger’s 1955 Zur Seinsfrage, addressed to Ernst Jünger, he also crosses out das Sein to “neutralize” its object-ness, suggesting crossing-through as a polyvalent grammatical action in need of powerful justification to succeed rhetorically (Derrida 21).

    Heidegger’s idiosyncratic terminology makes instances like this inevitable. The special sense Heidegger intends by the word existence is similarly obscured in Warren’s usage when he repeats, at a crucial moment, that “blacks lack being but have existence” (12). This is a crucial moment because Warren counters the obvious charge that Being, by definition, includes everything, including black people—though Being is not a totality, especially not a totality of beings. Dasein’s existence in Heidegger belongs to the etymological sense of ek-sist: to stand forth from a past heritage and to project future possibilities. In sections of Being and Time, existence designates this futural mode of Dasein (Polt 34). The special sense in which Heidegger takes up the term existence, and its translated grammatical variations—”existential,” “existentiell,” etc.—opposes Warren’s intention, that “[blacks] inhabit the world in concealment and non-movement” (13). Instead, black time describes the impossibility of black existence—of “Temporality without duration” (Ontological 97): no heritage (obliterated by the Middle Passage), no future (impossibility of freedom, terror of emancipation), and no present (life in suspension, exposure to kidnapping and death). The black “is nothing—the nonhuman, equipment, and the mysterious” (Ontological 15). Blackness fuels the quest for Being, and it does so precisely through its blackness—a kind of absence and excess of form: “The Negro is black because the Negro must assume the function of nothing in a metaphysical world. The world needs this labor” (6).

    More significantly, because of Warren’s recurring emphasis on projection of nothing onto blackness, readers might expect a clearer articulation of the meaning of “nothing” (das Nichts, in Heidegger). This meaning is far from self-evident, and its minimal elaboration makes Warren’s writing susceptible to the same kind of broad, sweeping dismissals that banished Heidegger from the analytic tradition. As Richard Polt writes, it was the precarity of Nothing in What is Metaphysics? that frustrated Anglo-American philosophers, who could not fathom, in Nothing, meaning independent of negation and denial (123). This is a charge of illogic against which Heidegger defends in the text itself. For Heidegger, Nothing bears a sense that is irreducible to pure negation, even if it is not a thing. He says that Nothing is the only “other” to Being (Heidegger 83), that “even Nothing ‘belongs’ to ‘Being’” (89), and that “true talk of Nothing” lends itself to dissolution (30)—it is always unfamiliar. Heidegger’s opening sentence to Introduction to Metaphysics—”Why are there beings at all instead of nothing?” (1)—extends the enigmatic integrity of Nothing to beings. In the first section of this concise book, Heidegger expounds, in detail, upon the “embellishing flourish” (24) in the interrogative sentence. He ultimately concludes that the phrase “instead of nothing” is what charges the question with its force, shaking all beings in the extreme insecurity of vacillation between being and a fall into nothing. It is because Heidegger prioritizes the mystery of his own use of Nothing that Warren’s underdeveloped engagement with the Heideggerian sense of the term, despite its centrality to his own argument, is disappointing.

    Warren’s ongoing interpellation of those with or, respectfully, against whom he writes shapes the reader’s global orientation toward his project and circumscribes a critique of a field he designates “black humanism”: a body of scholarship that employs humanist tools (historiography, ethnography, statistical research, literary formalism) in black archives without asking how “the metaphysical holocaust” of blackness recursively bears upon the very methods used to describe and represent it. This is one of the more concrete contributions the book offers to Black studies (though the valorization of the concrete, as well as disciplinary progress, are both at stake as problems in Warren’s work). Equally importantly, Warren explicitly rejects “the humanist fantasy (or narcissism) that anything humans have created can be changed. Some creations are no longer in the hands of humans, for they constitute a horizon, or field, upon which human existence itself depends. Antiblackness is such a creation” (24). Framed this way, the intransigence of antiblackness articulates a useful response to the logic certain apocalyptic discourses wield in order to distinguish their often colorblind urgency from the supposedly dated and dating concerns of race scholarship more generally. Warren extinguishes the exhausted assumptions of change that fuel humanist thought about race, and thus crafts a form of urgency independent of duration and temporality.8 Antiblackness is a war without end.

    Ontological Terror is an experiential kind of text in that it has the potential to fully absorb its reader into its strong gravity. I attribute its sometimes repetitive quality to the immersive, soberly meditative nature of the book. At the same time, when repetition replaces elaboration, as I have suggested it sometimes does, it produces a feeling of anxious anticipation for an analysis that awaits ripening. To this extent, Warren’s appeal, in the book’s coda, for an “ontological revolution,” for black thinking to “imagine black existence without Being” (171), and to disinvest from humanism and the human suggests Ontological Terror itself as the transformative groundwork for a future of inquiry that will “imagine existence anew” (172).

    Footnotes

    1. See Carol Wilson’s Freedom at Risk and Rothman’s Beyond Freedom’s Reach.

    2. Inspired by the case of Henry Moss’s vitiligo (spontaneous depigmentation), Rush thought that black skin could whiten and that blackness could be cured—again, depleting bleeding black bodies.

    3. Robert Bernasconi is, perhaps, the best known figure associated with this scholarship, though interest in Kant and race has continued to grow over the past two decades. See Bernasconi, Race; Eigen and Larrimore, The German Invention of Race; David Lloyd, Race Under Representation; Mensch, Kant’s Organicism. Some articles published on this topic within the past few years include Hoffman, “Kant’s Aesthetic Categories”; Zhavoronkov and Salikov, “The Concept of Race in Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology”; Sandford, “Kant, Race, and Natural History”; Terada, “The Racial Grammar of Kantian Time”; and Hong, “Kant’s Critical Philosophy and Race Theory.”

    4. See David Marriott’s Wither Fanon? for work on race and psychoanalysis belonging to this radical rethinking of historicity.

    5. For a moralizing critique of Wilderson that reflects the incensing power of Afro-pessimism, see Greg Thomas, “Afro-Blue Notes.”

    6. See Marriott’s review of Wilderson’s Red, White, and Black: Cinema and the Structure of US Antagonisms in “Black Cultural Studies,” 46-49.

    7. For a helpful summary of Afro-pessimism’s relation to political ontology, see Kline’s “The Pragmatics of Resistance.”

    8. Warren explores this exhaustion of temporality in “Black Time.”

    Works Cited

    • Bernasconi, Robert, ed. Race. Blackwell, 2001.
    • Derrida, Jacques. Heidegger: the Question of Being and History. Translated by Geoffrey Bennington, U of Chicago P, 2016.
    • Eigen, Sara and Mark J. Larrimore. The German Invention of Race. State U of New York P, 2006.
    • Fanon, Frantz. Black Skin, White Masks. Translated by Richard Philcox, Grove P, 2008.
    • Ferreira da Silva, Denise. Toward a Global Idea of Race. U of Minnesota P, 2007.
    • Heidegger, Martin. Introduction to Metaphysics. Translated by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt, Yale UP, 2000.
    • Hoffman, John. “Kant’s Aesthetic Categories: Race in The Critique of Judgement.” Diacritics, vol. 4, no. 2, 2016, pp. 54–81.
    • Hong, Wooram. “Kant’s Critical Philosophy and Race Theory.” Journal of the Society of Philosophical Studies, vol. 120, 2018, pp. 23–54.
    • Kline, David. “The Pragmatics of Resistance: Framing Anti-Blackness and the Limits of Political Ontology.” Critical Philosophy of Race, vol. 5, 1, 2017, pp. 51–69.
    • Kozma, Liat. “Black, Kinless, and Hungry: Manumitted Female Slaves in Khedival Egypt.” In Race and Slavery in the Middle East: Histories of Trans-Saharan Africans in Ninteenth-Century Egypt, Sudan, and the Ottoman Mediterranean. Edited by Walz, Terence and Kenneth M. Cuno, American U in Cairo P, 2010.
    • Lloyd, David. Under Representation: the Racial Regime of Aesthetics. Fordham UP, 2019.
    • Marriott, David. “Black Cultural Studies.” The Year’s Work in Critical and Cultural Theory, vol. 20, no. 1, 2012, pp.37–66.
    • —. Whither Fanon? Studies in the Blackness of Being. Stanford UP, 2018.
    • Mensch, Jennifer. Kant’s Organicism: Epigenesis and the Development of Critical Philosophy. U of Chicago P, 2013.
    • Polt, Richard. Heidegger: an Introduction. Cornell UP, 1999.
    • Rothman, Adam. Beyond Freedom’s Reach: a Kidnapping in the Twilight of Slavery. Harvard
    • Sandford, Stella. “Kant, Race, and Natural History.” Philosophy & Social Criticism, vol. 44, no. 9, 2018, pp. 950–977.
    • Terada, Rei. “The Racial Grammar of Kantian Time.” European Romantic Review, vol. 28, no. 3, 2017, pp. 267–278.
    • Thomas, Greg. “Afro-blue notes: The death of afro-pessimism (2.0)?” Theory & Event, 21(1), pp. 282–317.
    • Toledano, Ehud R. As If Silent and Absent: Bonds of Enslavement in the Islamic Middle East. Yale UP, 2007.
    • Warren, Calvin. “Black Time: Slavery, Metaphysics, and the Logic of Wellness. The Psychic Hold of Slavery: Legacies in American Expressive Culture, edited by Colbert, Soyica Diggs, et al. Rutgers UP, 2016.
    • —. Ontological Terror: Blackness, Nihilism, and Emancipation. Duke UP, 2018.
    • Wilson, Carol. Freedom at Risk: the Kidnapping of Free Blacks in America, 1780–1865. UP of Kentucky, 1994.
    • Zhavoronkov, Alexey, and Alexey Salikov. “The Concept of Race in Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology.” Con-Textos Kantianos, no. 7, 2018, pp. 275–292.

  • The Analytic that Flesh Makes Possible

    Janet Neary (bio)

    A review of Moten, Fred. Stolen Life. Duke UP, 2018.

    Stolen Life is the second book in Fred Moten’s recent series, consent not to be a single being, published within a year by Duke University Press. Like the other books in the series, Black and Blur and The Universal Machine, Stolen Life is a set of interrelated essays in which Moten uses blackness as an analytic to propose open-ended ways of being in the world that sharply cut and exceed the seeming wholes and totalities that form the commonplace understanding of the modern world. In this aleatoric collection that resists collection (xii), Moten presents his inimitable and endlessly generative mode of thought in encounters with a wide range of primary and scholarly texts. From the opening essay, “Knowledge of Freedom,” which draws on Winfried Menninghaus, Olaudah Equiano, David Kazanjian, Ronald Judy, and Bryan Wagner (among others) to produce a sustained analysis of the foundational disturbance of blackness in Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Judgment, to the concluding essay, “Erotics of Fugitivity,” which thinks alongside Sora Han’s “Slavery as Contract” to present a fierce and beautiful re-thinking of consent as refusal in order to dismantle the terms of liberal statism, Moten illuminates what he has called the “improvisational immanence” of blackness to show how—as concept, radical aesthetic, political tradition, and mode of being—it precedes and disrupts the regulative discourses that enshrine notions of sovereignty.

    Situating himself as student and teacher, Moten is both frank pragmatist addressing concrete realities of life in the academy and among subjects who imagine themselves to be sovereign and sonic theorist performing devotional acts of analysis. The dynamic essays collected in Stolen Life enact the black radical tradition, recursively unfolding a reclamation of the antenormative (what he terms the “insistent previousness” of blackness in In the Break), dispatching “normative individuation,” “judicial ownership,” and “legislative priesthood” in ways that entail a rethinking of every aspect of epistemology and of human relations. If the collection is a kind of intellectual ensemble that returns often to Moten’s primary interlocutors (Denise Ferreira da Silva, Nahum Chandler, Hortense Spillers, and Nathaniel Mackey), the essays are predominantly dialogic, each taking flight from a particular intellectual point of departure, drawing in and from many voices but moving by way of a devotional agonism in which one principal text becomes the grain against which Moten thinks. This method of critical close reading is the foundation of Moten’s powerful critique of the academy’s abetting of liberal individualism, even while he thinks out loud about how to be inside these structures without acceding to their terms. To describe Moten’s fugitive engagement with continental philosophy, one could do worse than to cite his comment that in Kant’s writings he finds an “unruly sociality, anarchic syntax, extrasensical poetics” (2).

    Stolen Life extends and amplifies the work of In the Break, presenting us definitions of blackness as boundless, dynamic, and vital, as “non-performed performance[,]…the surrealization of space and time,” against the notion of blackness as “death-driven epiphenomenon…[either] bound by [or] originating in the white/nonwhite binary” (33). In Stolen Life, as in his other work, blackness is, rather than is not, and Moten recruits DuBois (via Chandler’s reading of his early work) to present “blackness as that which is before the binary that has been said to define our existence” (35). In so doing, Moten presents a temporal and logical challenge to the notion of “blackness as an effect of the color line, which is to say the white/nonwhite binary which orients it and by way of which it is plotted” (33). Moten argues that to imagine that blackness is reducible to this axis is to accede to the very terms of the negation, which, in “its most extreme development,” refuses “the idea of blackness as a form of life” (33-34).

    One consequence of this intervention is the philosophical distinction between blackness and black people. Though Moten is clear that “black people have a privileged relation to blackness” and “that black cultures are (under)privileged fields for the transformational expression and enactment of blackness” (18), quoting Wagner he identifies his aims as

    ‘to name the blackness in the black tradition without recourse to those myths that have made it possible up to this time to represent the tradition as cultural property’; to ‘track…the emergence of the black tradition from the condition of statelessness’; and ‘to describe its contours by tracking the tradition’s engagement with the law.’ (27)

    He differs from Wagner “regarding the origin of blackness and of law” (27). This difference represents the collection’s most novel intervention: Moten’s mobilization of blackness as legal critique. Rather than a reaction to state brutality, Moten understands blackness as “jurisgenerative,” which is to say, before the law, “ante-interpellative” and “anterelational” (27), a proposition that identifies a disruption at the heart of the law, a kind of ‘call coming from inside the house’ in which blackness itself is critical capacity: “The black radical tradition is in apposition to enlightenment…. Stolen by it, it steals from it, steeling itself to it in preservative, self-defensive, disjunctively anachoreographic permeance” (41).

    “Stolen life,” the philosophical through-line of the essays, is most clearly articulated in “Knowledge of Freedom,” the collection’s cornerstone. “Stolen life” names a fugitive dynamic wherein the very regulatory discourses that organize themselves by exclusions, limitations, and hierarchical assessments of human life are dependent upon race as the categorical instantiation of regulation, a recognition that illuminates a paradoxically intimate relationship between regulation and the disturbance(s) or wildness that it attempts to distinguish, extinguish, name, contain, or transcend. Moten’s meditation on Kant’s treatment of imagination recognizes the ambivalently generative potential of the disavowal at the heart of Kantian philosophy:

    The regulative discourse on the aesthetic [taste] that animates Kant’s critical philosophy is inseparable from the question of race as a mode of conceptualizing and regulating human diversity, grounding and justifying inequality and exploitation, as well as marking the limits of human knowledge through the codification of quasi-transcendental philosophical method, which is Kant’s acknowledged aim in the critical philosophy. (2)

    To recognize this more-than-proximity is also to engender what Moten elsewhere calls “the enthusiastic social vision” of blackness, to reclaim the “radical sociality of the imagination,” and to dwell in the materiality that is the ground of distinction and the substance of thought; as Moten puts it, “the ones who work the ground are the ground” (3).

    Extending this recognition of how “race moves against its own regulatory derivative” (17), Moten adapts the foundational solipsistic American metaphors of the “errand into the wilderness” to describe constitutive, generative abjection:

    Too often life is taken by, and accepts, the invasive, expansive aggression of the settler, venturing into the outside that he fears, in search of the very idea as it recedes from its own enabling condition, as its forms are reclaimed by the informality that precedes them. (xi)

    “This,” he writes, is “how the unnameable comes to bear the imposition of a name” (3). The violence indexed by this maneuver, however, also marks the critical capacity and generative force of reclaiming the anoriginal “ground” of philosophy and of modern statehood: “What if,” Moten asks, “the ones who are so ugly that their utterances must be stupid are never far from Kant’s mature and critical thoughts? What if they, or something they are said and made to bear alone, are the fantastical generation of those thoughts?” (2). One of the most interesting aspects of Moten’s theory, here, is the relationship between the material and the temporal: “The irreducible materiality of the beautiful and the irreducible irregularity of the imagination define an enclosure that will have always been disruptively invaded, as it were, from the inside” (5). The dynamic captured here is the critical move that characterizes all of the essays in the collection: the recognition of anoriginal, undifferentiated materiality that is paradoxically foundational to the regulatory, a recognition that enacts critical capacity and enables collective insurgency.

    In turning Kantian philosophy inside out, all the essays in Stolen Life perform immanence, directing our attention to the potential of reclaiming anoriginal, unnamed materiality from the false transcendence and violent naming that is the engine of sovereignty. Such a rethinking has at least three primary, related consequences: a critique of individuality, a recentering of black women, and an insistence on—and celebration of—the pathological.

    Moten continually turns to unruly black narratives to challenge what Lindon Barrett has called the “subject-effect” (256). Calling on Ronald Judy, Wahneema Lubiano, Sylvia Wynter, and Barrett, Moten replaces the notion of a “‘universal’ Kantian subject” with an “improvisational” Kantian subject whose “generative incoherence” “opens a critique of being” (52). Repeating a version of the question that inaugurates In the Break, Moten asks, “What would it mean to think and to inhabit the object?” (84). The figures most powerfully situated to challenge normative individuality are black women. As figures that materially exist in the space between two fantasies—”the black (woman) as regulative instrument and the black (woman) as natural agent of deregulation”—Moten asserts black women’s privileged access to “a turmoil foundational to the modern aesthetic, political, and philosophical fields” (3). Here Moten seems to be working in the same groove as Harryette Mullen, who argues that, “in some instances the stark materiality of [black women’s] embodied existence gave [them] a clarity of vision about their position as slaves and as women” (246). Consequently, the arc of Stolen Life moves from the identification of black immanence within Kant, which establishes that it is “the outlaw that guarantees the law” (15), to the “anoriginal lawlessness” enacted by an enslaved black woman, Betty, who refuses the terms of liberal subjectivity by electing to return to slavery with her masters after the Massachusetts Supreme Court declares her to be free (the basis of Sora Han’s reading in “Slavery as Contract”). In Han’s words, Betty’s “decision is an a priori fugitivity to becoming a fugitive of the law of slave and free states” (qtd. in Moten, 247). In Moten’s, “The question of breaking the law is immediately disrupted by an incapacity for law, an inability both to intend the law and intend its transgression” (15). Moten celebrates Betty as a figure of abjection.

    For Moten, to be in and with the generative disruption is to reclaim pathology against uplift. Rather than work to “negate the negation” (a reactive pose Moten unequivocally rejects), Moten’s thought recovers what is “before and against the grain of that negation” (xi). In other words, Moten suggests that rather than cleaving to the false comfort of recovery and uplift, endlessly demonstrating the error of the exclusion, one must claim and revel in abjection:

    What if blackness is, in fact, abject, threatening, servile, dangerous, dependent, irrational, and infectious precisely insofar as it is the continual refusal of normative individuation, which is supposed to be the enactment of everything opposite to these qualities? (265-266)

    The collection ends by dwelling on the historical and literary trace of a black woman inhabiting the tension between the two fantasies into which the modern liberal state and existential discourse would attempt to corral her. Moten calls out “certain critico-redemptive projects” (x), such as the scholarly impulse toward uplift. Following Saidiya Hartman, Moten rejects academic projects characterized by a “tendency toward the production of anti-anti-blackness that will have been activated by the way of the liberal subject’s capacity to imagine some combination of uplift and overturning” (265). He has yet harsher words for defenders of academic freedom, which he understands to be an expression of settler colonialism: “Academic freedom is a form of violence perpetrated by academic bosses who operate under the protection and in the interest of racial state capitalism” (221).

    The two essays in the collection that wrangle most personally with life in the academy are also the most formally experimental and the most affecting. In “The Touring Machine (Flesh Thought Inside Out),” oblique autobiography breaks into the essay as Moten thinks through the ways his neuroatypical son was risked in traditional schools. Writing from the other side, as an agent within the academy, in “Anassignment Letters,” Moten adapts the assignment form into an epistolary essay that directly addresses his students, beginning, “I think I figured out what my job is: to support you in the development and refinement of your own intellectual practice” (227). In what follows, Moten deconstructs the assignment form as a tool of possessive individualism that forces hierarchy, closure, and arrival, offering in its stead “intellectuality [as] fugitivity, as a mode, and as a quality, of life” (227). Rejecting the assignment as such, Moten insists on cultivating intellectual practice as open-ended, processional, and fundamentally collective.

    Despite the emphasis on the flesh (and the distinction he teases between Spillers and Fanon, the distinction between flesh and skin), to read Stolen Life is to move into language and live differently there. Moten’s agility with language is unparalleled (though to say so is to speak in categorical and hierarchal terms at odds with his writing; one of the book’s commitments is a rejection of the solo). Yet it is impossible to encounter the book without tangling with and marveling at Moten’s virtuosity with language, which is, in his hands, difficult, opaque, inexhaustible, material, and suggestive. Language is thought, rather than a medium for thought, and language itself often drives the essays’ analytic innovations. For example, in the preface he writes that “in that exhaustion of what it is to acquire, a choir is set to work” (ix), using homophones to stage the tension between the collective ensemble’s organization against an eviscerating, acquisitive, destructive racial capitalism. Later, the insurgency of oral culture disrupts the text of continental philosophy and becomes a way of getting at blackness’s immanence within Kant: “Black chant, is, among other things a transverse reenactment of black Kant, pronounced cant, of blackness in Kant insofar as it intones the foundational interplay of sense and non-sense” (32). In both of these examples it is unclear whether argument or sound (inseparable for Moten) have priority. The most sustained example of Moten’s sounding openings for philosophical paths is the essay “Black Op,” dedicated to Lindon Barrett, an interlocutor whose ideas are felt beyond this essay that bears his name. The title of this short essay enacts multiple-entendre by operating both sonically and graphically as shorthand, cut-off generation, unfinished multiplicity; one may imagine an asterisk at the end of “Black op*” such as one would use when entering a term into a search engine to capture all the potentialities of a beginning—or at least to refuse the limit of completion—proliferating/suggesting/searching “black optimism,” “black operation,” “black opposition,” “black optics,” and on. As he does with the assignment form, Moten uses the sonic materiality of language to counter the ways it has been used violently to name, identify, limit, and categorize.

    Finally, it is important to note that what Moten deems the “improvisation of [the Kantian] subject” (52) has implications for literary study. It is in deconstructed literary texts that Moten finds the most compelling enactments of the black radical tradition, but also where we most urgently see the necessity of rejecting narrative. Considering the violent imposition of narrative form on enslaved peoples’ experiences of slavery as they are related in slave narratives, Moten identifies the problem as “how to tell the story of a rupture that has broken the ability to tell and how to have that telling be free and be in the interest of freedom” (42). Moten’s answer to this question is to recover the improvisational subject instantiated by a forever rematerializing, always anoriginal frontier. Recalling Sylvia Wynter and putting what I will call his Kantian formula into action, Moten is

    interested in how the free story that forms the paradoxically anarchic ground of the black radical tradition will have rationalized that conception of ‘Man,’ improvising through its exclusionary force and toward theory and practice that reconstitutes both the methods and the objects of ethics, epistemology, and ontology. (42)

    Throughout the collection, Moten demonstrates the ways blackness is paradoxically both foundational to and disruptive of the law, continental philosophy, aesthetics, imagination, and what we understand to be the contours and commitments of the archive. Employing a series of logical and linguistic declensions, Moten confronts grammatical and philosophical cul-de-sacs that he repeatedly finds his way out of, tracing “the open obscurity of a field of study and a line of flight” (x). His analysis is animated by and dwells in the materiality of language and flesh that precedes naming, subjects, and sovereignty, preparing the ground for his reclamation of the abject. It is fundamentally collective and non-dyadically relational, sketching a world that is appositional, simultaneous, irreducible. To end with his own words,

    What I’ve written may seem confusing, but try to remember what we have been working through all along: this weird and arrhythmic doubleness of the term subject…. In order to get a plain sense of this you have to use your imagination. (233, 241)

    Works Cited

    • Barrett, Lindon. “Dead Men Printed.” Conditions of the Present: Selected Essays, edited by Janet Neary, Duke UP, 2018, pp. 237–269.
    • Mullen, Harryette. “Runaway Tongue: Resistant Orality in Uncle Tom’s Cabin, Our Nig, Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl, and Beloved.” The Culture of Sentiment: Race, Gender, and Sentimentality in Nineteenth-Century America, edited by Shirley Samuels, Oxford UP, 1992, pp. 244–264.
  • Promiscuous Relations

    Robert McRuer (bio)

    A review of Robbins, Bruce. The Beneficiary, Duke University Press, 2017.

    Bruce Robbins opens The Beneficiary with a 1948 State Department memo written by George F. Kennan. The memo acknowledges a stark disparity between the United States and the rest of the world (the U.S. held 50% of the world’s wealth but had little more than 6% of its population). Kennan encourages the development of relations that would sustain that disparity. Robbins’s point in opening with this secret memo is to argue that many people would now find its explicit call for inequality between the U.S. and other countries embarrassing; he suggests that the embarrassment implies the existence of a perhaps unexpected strong cosmopolitanism, a developed belief that there actually is something wrong with such disparity and inequality. This anecdote allows Robbins to introduce the central topic of his book, the beneficiary, or rather the discourse of the beneficiary.

    A beneficiary in Robbins’s study is one whose privileges and comfort depend, in various direct or indirect ways, on the suffering of others. The discourse of the beneficiary is at times in implicit conversation with certain Marxist arguments that point to the ways in which commodities appear while the labor that generated them is erased. The discourse of the beneficiary is generally more about those perceived to be very distant others, and often generates guilt that may or may not be alleviated by various humanitarian efforts. This is in contrast, as Robbins makes clear, to Marxism’s emphasis on nearness, solidarity, and direct political transformation. The Beneficiary thus of necessity engages a complex history of humanitarianism, illustrating many of its problems and pitfalls. Robbins acknowledges from the outset that we are all beneficiaries; anyone likely to be reading his book is already in a position to reflect on his or her beneficial relation to the rest of the world. The discourse of the beneficiary is, in fact, Robbins contends, always spoken to and by the beneficiary: to and by those whose privilege in some ways depends upon unjust relations. Even workers in quite dire circumstances in the U.S. are positioned in Robbins’s analysis as beneficiaries in relation to the rest of the world; it is perhaps controversial but actually important to his concluding argument (which considers immigrant workers in the U.S. who send remittances back to their home countries) that Robbins partially brackets more localized disparities (say, within the metropole, or within the U.S.) to reflect globally on the discourse of the beneficiary: those living below the poverty level of $11,000 in the U.S., including many immigrant workers, he points out, still have incomes in the top 15% globally. Robbins draws this figure from William MacAskill’s Doing Good Better: How Effective Altruism Can Help You Make a Difference; MacAskill makes clear that these figures of comparison have been corrected to account for the differential value of a dollar in different global locations (19).

    The discourse of the beneficiary is now quite entrenched and might in fact be said to generate what Lauren Berlant calls cruel optimism. As the history of humanitarianism makes very clear, sincerely-desired, optimistic efforts on the part of beneficiaries to redress the injustices upon which our world depends often or usually risk participating in those very injustices. At the very least, humanitarianism reifies an agentic “us” always and everywhere helping a passive and objectified “them.” The discourse of the beneficiary, however, cannot be entirely dispensed with; ultimately it is from within that discourse or other compromised discourses that the imagination (arguably the key player in The Beneficiary) works to generate possibilities. Put differently, the discourse of the beneficiary can be worked with and through. Late in The Beneficiary, Robbins suggests that a quotation from John Berger could well have served as the epigraph to the book: “The world is not intolerable until the possibility of transforming it exists but is denied” (qtd. 126). For ancient Greeks, for example, slavery was not intolerable because they could not imagine a world without slavery. In the U.S., slavery did eventually become intolerable because an abolitionist discourse existed that—despite its various weaknesses—pointed to the possibility of transforming the system. The discourse of the beneficiary is indeed inevitably compromised, but it is from within that discourse that the imagination accesses the idea that the world might be configured otherwise.

    Jean-Paul Sartre, Virginia Woolf, Jamaica Kincaid, Naomi Klein, and a range of other writers play an important role in Robbins’s study as he traces the twists and turns of the discourse of the beneficiary and the history of humanitarianism; the literary imagination, as this list might suggest, has often allowed for sustained reflection on the beneficiary. In the first chapter, Robbins works through the utilitarian humanitarianism of Peter Singer and others in Larissa MacFarquhar’s study Strangers Drowning. Singer’s image of a child drowning in a shallow pond (from which MacFarquhar’s study of “do-gooders” draws its title) serves as the starting point: if you walked by a child drowning in a shallow pond, you would not think twice about wading in and rescuing that child. Utilitarian humanitarianism seeks to extend this seemingly self-evident obligation; your obligation to distant, unseen children should be the same as that obligation to the child drowning. Thus, in his famous essay reflecting on a 1971 famine in Bangladesh, Singer asks how it could be possible not to do everything we can to alleviate the hunger there. Robbins concludes that Singer asks too much and too little, because on the one hand the call for alleviating distant injustice through sacrifice is unlikely to be taken up by many beneficiaries, and on the other, Singer’s attention to beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries is insufficiently political. Singer’s appalled reaction to the famine is not, in Robbins’s view, properly attentive to the political causes of that famine, which could have easily been traced (and potentially altered).

    I would underscore fiercely Robbins’s sense that Singer’s utilitarian philosophy is insufficiently political and would add that it can be read as actually self-serving. This is because, across his career, Singer’s utilitarianism is selectively or even capriciously appalled in ways that could position many of his ideas as outright inhumanitarianism, as when he argues that it could be morally wrong (taking into account the greatest good for the greatest number) to not kill infants with various severe disabilities. Arguably in both the example Robbins examines (the famine) and the one he avoids (Singer’s notorious views on disability), there is something to critique about the self-righteousness of a beneficiary like Singer, whose knowing, self-satisfied and consolidated subjectivity–a subjectivity consolidated in and through how he navigates the discourse of the beneficiary–essentially allows him to decide (and to dictate to “you”) who must be rescued through sacrifice and who should be killed.

    The central figure across The Beneficiary is not Peter Singer but George Orwell. Robbins focuses in his next chapter on a particular assertion in Orwell’s Road to Wigan Pier that for people in England to live in relative comfort, “a hundred million Indians must live on the verge of starvation.” It may not be an easy or welcome recognition that such “evil” relations exist, but “you acquiesce in it every time you step into a taxi or eat a plate of strawberries and cream” (qtd. 9). Robbins uses Orwell’s belief in an unjust global, capitalist system to reflect on later developments in the history of the discourse of the beneficiary, especially world systems theory, which has posited that the metropolitan Global North systemically depends upon extractions from the Global South. World systems theory may be more directly political than utilitarian humanitarianism, but still generates for Robbins one of the central problems that he locates in the discourse of the beneficiary: an “economic Orientalism” that sustains a too neat (and basically exoticizing) division between an “us” and “them.” We have learned, from Edward Said on, to critique discourses that so fully sediment an us/them logic, and world systems theory arguably generates, Robbins says, an “economic Orientalism.” Like the discourse of the beneficiary more generally, however, this compromised logic is still a site where the imagination generates alternatives.

    Robbins is very concrete about compromised imaginations in the central chapters of The Benificiary. He demonstrates first, in an engaging history of “commodity recognition,” that our awareness of the way commodities reach us, and of the way labor and suffering are erased in the process, has often had a misogynist core. A key example here is the figure of Nicole shopping in F. Scott Fitzgerald’s Tender Is the Night: “as the whole system swayed and thundered onward it lent a feverish bloom to such processes of hers as wholesale buying” (qtd. 57). We learn to “see” the commodity and the exploitation and erasure of labor embedded in it by looking at the figure of the woman. However misogynist this discourse has been, Robbins insists that it provides a place from which other writers imaginatively consider alternatives. This includes feminist writers in the 19th and early 20th century who recognized the ways in which women were essentially being cast as commodity recognition’s magic sign and who began to shape politics that might configure relations of consumption and production differently.

    Similarly, however compromised nationalist discourses may obviously be, Robbins suggests that the welfare state and its insistence that injustice can be alleviated emerged from within those discourses. This attention to what the welfare state made possible is important to the rest of the book and is a significant contribution of The Beneficiary. There are good reasons for contemporary cultural theory’s critique of the state, especially given how thoroughly the neoliberal capitalist state has lubricated the worst excesses of capitalism of the past 40 years. And yet Robbins dares to ask whether engagement with the state might be necessary, non-innocent as that engagement might be. Robbins makes this point especially with regards to discussions, in the second half of the book, of the climate emergency, which simply cannot be addressed solely at the level of an anarchistic local politics.

    A central contribution of The Beneficiary for me emerges in (and beyond) Robbins’s chapter on Naomi Klein. The word queer never appears in The Beneficiary, but Robbins’s chapter on Klein can be read as queer theory and placed in conversation with the global, materialist turn that queer theory has taken in the past few decades. The chapter in question is titled “Naomi Klein’s Love Story.” Klein’s oeuvre from No Logo forward posits that capitalists run from particular kinds of relations in order to maximize profit. Robbins asks, provocatively, whether this description of the behavior of multinational corporations (they use people and leave them) is fully an analysis of capitalism or whether it is, even more, an analysis of men or masculinism. I would argue that Robbins’s description of Klein’s alternative to capitalist relations is queer in the broad sense:

    her critique of corporate irresponsibility must also presuppose some alternative vision of commitment or relationship, whether achieved or not, that would perhaps be longer-term and certainly would be emotionally more fulfilling. Erotic inclinations and the possibility of their satisfaction are politically relevant, even politically indispensable. Perhaps what we are dealing with is, after all, a kind of love story. (emphasis added) (102)

    This idea—that erotic inclinations and the possibility of their satisfaction are politically indispensable—is, for me, one of the central contributions of The Beneficiary.

    The belief in “longer-term commitment” might sound conservative (or at least not particularly or obviously queer), but I would say that Robbins is actually teasing out the ways in which Klein is a promiscuous global theorist who uses outward-looking erotic inclinations to imagine otherwise. Promiscuous is a word that only appears once in The Beneficiary, in relation to Woolf’s observations of a “promiscuous mix of luxuries” and necessities on the London docks (), but I’m arguing that a queer, imaginative promiscuity, positioned by Robbins as globally indispensable, is made available in The Beneficiary as a path for reading Klein’s analysis of global injustice. Queer theorists have often lamented that our concerns in relation to gender, sexuality, and desire have been positioned as secondary or subsidiary to the (materialist, economic) concerns of supposedly “real” politics. The global turn in queer theory (at least since Licia Fiol-Matta’s groundbreaking 2002 A Queer Mother for the Nation: The State and Gabriela Mistral) has made clear that issues of gender, sexuality, and desire are in fact always imbricated in, and help to both sustain and contest, relations of power, and that our analyses of relations of power are necessarily incomplete without attention to these issues. By insisting that erotic inclinations are politically indispensable, that indeed a materialist politics must take them seriously in order to understand both the current state of the world and how it might be changed, Robbins is at least in the neighborhood of this indispensable queer work. Robbins makes it possible to understand Klein’s writing, I would argue, as an example of what the late queer theorist José Esteban Muñoz calls “cruising utopia.”

    This is of course a strong claim and is not in any obvious way Robbins’s intent. I think it’s a claim worth making in the interest of not marginalizing questions of desire and eros in our conversations about global disparities (and not marginalizing queer theory, which—in spite of the global turn it has taken—is still not engaged as much as it might be by theorists of political economy more generally). Robbins ends the chapter on Klein with a sexualized image—”roommates with benefits”—that, he suggests, might be more appropriate for shaping a global ethos than the masculinist corporate ethos of use-them-and-leave-them. The metaphor of roommates with benefits emerges both when Robbins reads Klein’s meditation on London Fog in No Logo from the perspective of shops in Toronto and sweatshops in the Philippines, and from his provocative analysis of remittances sent home to the Philippines and elsewhere from workers abroad (remittances from elsewhere account for 10% of the country’s GDP). Robbins does not ultimately find Klein’s thoughts on reinventing the connections between consumers in Toronto and workers in Manila entirely satisfying; there are in fact no entirely satisfying answers in The Beneficiary, and perhaps that necessarily fuels the politicized erotic imagination Robbins traces in Klein. Again, however, Robbins sees within Klein’s meditation a will to imagine something else that could begin to undermine the global disparities that are the focus of Klein’s work generally. Remittances, likewise, are hardly the answer to global inequalities, but for Robbins they show both that the us/them logic of economic Orientalism is already inadequate for comprehending our world and the recognition that multiple agents are (promiscuously) engaged in imagining relations between supposed beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries otherwise.

    Robbins’s analysis of Klein’s promiscuous approach emerges from a mother/daughter connection: the activist Bonnie Klein described her daughter, before she became an anti-globalization writer/activist, as mainly thinking about the question: “what’s wrong with having a good time?” (). Robbins argues that Naomi Klein continually tries to sustain a concern with pleasure and balance it with a concern for injustice, putting forward in the process what Robbins describes as a politics of “global justice for selfish people” (101). Bonnie Klein’s question animates the chapter, and as part of the queer moves he makes in it, Robbins takes the question quite seriously. The argument in the chapter is arguably queer because it does not dismiss pleasure as trivial—as, say, Peter Singer might as he consolidates a humanitarian subjectivity—but rather sits with pleasure and weaves it through his analysis. Klein is always in danger, as Robbins makes clear, of slipping into the self-righteousness that I earlier identified with Singer, but it is the imaginative eros of her project that saves her from going there.

    Robbins’s title for this chapter doesn’t need to acknowledge more of Bonnie Klein’s own work, and he in fact may not be very familiar with it. Interestingly, the chapter title (probably inadvertently) flips the title of one of Bonnie Klein’s early documentaries, Not a Love Story: A Film about Pornography (1981), about the supposed abuses of the pornography industry. It’s an incredibly-compromised documentary that is very much of its time (in the U.S., this is right before the height of the feminist “sex wars” that pitted anti-pornography and “pro-sex” feminists against each other). It positions pornography as a form of violence against women through its objectification of those supposedly trapped within the industry. Despite the limitation (and in many ways predictability) of the documentary, it’s interesting to think of it in relation to Robbins’s larger points about imagination emerging out of even extremely compromised sites (such as, earlier, the misogyny of commodity recognition, or the nationalism of the welfare state). The young Naomi Klein would have undoubtedly internalized Not a Love Story‘s theses about masculinist exploitation, lack of responsibility, use of women’s bodies, fear of commitment, and so forth, even as she also (to judge by her later work) came of age alongside other more generative feminist alternatives. The promiscuous theory that Naomi Klein ultimately develops (“what’s wrong with having a good time?”) could be said to push through and beyond a hard-line anti-sex or anti-pleasure position to a queer place where alternative and multiple kinds of relations might be imagined.

    Robbins rightly identifies Bonnie Klein as a disability activist; she is perhaps as well known for her work in and on disability culture following strokes that she experienced in 1987 as she is for Not a Love Story. Her work includes the memoir Slow Dance: A Story of Stroke, Love and Disability (1997) and the documentary Shameless: The ART of Disability (2006). The word disability only appears in Robbins’s study when Bonnie Klein is first mentioned (she is identified as a disability activist). Given this secondary context in which Naomi Klein came of age, however, I found myself wondering (as I often have when thinking about Naomi Klein’s work) whether disability theory also provides a site for understanding Klein’s oeuvre and searching for ways of imagining with and beyond the discourse of the beneficiary. The discourse of the beneficiary, after all, is in many ways a discourse of health, vigor, capacity, and—arguably—able-bodiedness. In contrast, non-beneficiaries are often literally disabled: by the toxic or backbreaking conditions in which they work, by exhaustion from long and inhumane hours, by conditions that inevitably generate mental distress (female maquiladora workers on the U.S.-Mexican border, for instance, exhibit astronomical rates of depression). The Beneficiary at times, if rarely, bumps up against this point about disability, as for instance when Robbins notes Orwell’s discussion of an Indian’s legs being smaller than an Englishman’s arms.

    Disability activism at its best has generated an awareness of these global embodied differences, and as some disabled people in the West, especially over the past few decades, are clearly made into beneficiaries, they have often sustained an outward-looking vision that marks an awareness that bodies like theirs in other locations suffer more. Robbins concludes his final full chapter by arguing that young people who are beneficiaries are “more and more capable of seeing and knowing the system they live on and explaining the discomfort that goes with that” (138). It’s a cautiously optimistic note in the text, but begs the question of whether such critical epistemologies (or, we might say, cripistemologies) might be likewise germinating in other groups yearning to work through and beyond the discourse of the beneficiary. A crip outward-looking disability politics of solidarity, based on a phenomenological awareness that certain bodily experiences are in some ways shared and similarly marginalized elsewhere, is actually a nice contrast to the inward-looking utilitarian humanism of Singer which—as I’ve suggested—has no problem arguing that some disabled children should perhaps be killed.

    Reading Robbins’s text through disability is perhaps as unexpected as reading it through queer theory. And yet, in explaining why Orwell is central to his project, Robbins argues that Orwell is a “heroic figure that recognized the inequality between rich and poor at the global scale was a massive hindrance to political progress anywhere” (136). Orwell kept searching, Robbins continues, “for evidence that [such inequality] was not as immovable as it seemed, and he found some” (136). In reading The Beneficiary in part through queer and disability theory, my point is to underscore that queer and disabled theorists and activists—like the young people Robbins invokes a page later, and like antiracist and indigenous activists, and many other groups—are similarly among those searching for evidence that global inequality between rich and poor is not as immovable as it seems. Robbins does not and cannot ultimately provide answers to these entrenched conundrums, but The Beneficiary is a book that invites us to look towards sites where multiple subjects (and of course not just individuals) are searching for and finding evidence that inequality is not as immovable as it seems. And, as Robbins modestly concludes in a final reflection on young people’s discomfort with our moment, “Perhaps something will come of it” (138).

    Work Cited

    • MacAskill, William. Doing Good Better: How Effective Altruism Can Help You Make a Difference. Penguin, 2015.

  • Toward a Post-War Political Philosophy?

    Will Kujala (bio)

    A Review of Lambert, Gregg. Philosophy After Friendship: Deleuze’s Conceptual Personae. U of Minnesota P, 2017.

    Philosophy after Friendship intervenes productively in our contemporary political and philosophical moment. Lambert’s central thesis is that the contemporary world, precisely because of its intensification and disorientation of war and violence, has opened a space for thinking after war. For Lambert, Western philosophy has always been silent about the “end of war” (160). He argues that the waning of the political today—defined in terms of a politics of friendship—is an opportunity for crafting the post-war thought of which political philosophy has hitherto been incapable. He carries this out by presenting six conceptual personae—friend, enemy, foreigner, stranger, deportee, and the revolutionary people—as sites for teasing out the limits of the politics of friendship. While Lambert responds primarily to the world of and to central figures in critical theory (such as Agamben, Badiou, Derrida, Deleuze and Guattari, and Žižek) rather than to contemporary scholars, his book makes two main contributions to contemporary political thought and continental philosophy. First, Lambert provides a genealogical critique of the concept of friendship in politics and philosophy, crafting a novel methodology for conceptual history through Deleuze and Guattari and Benveniste. Second, against many contemporary critical theorists, he insists on the need to turn away from the metaphor and practice of war as political paradigm. Using peace as his first principle, he pushes against those who would centre the concepts of animosity, contradiction, antagonism, and conflict, while refusing as impossible a return to liberal management and negotiation.

    Friendship and the Limits of the Political

    Lambert argues that contemporary politics exceeds the boundaries, borders, and limits that have been the conditions of possibility for political philosophy. Modern political thought, he contends, gave us a compromise: politics within limits. Internal conflict is muted as debate, negotiation, and rights claims. Conflict that exceeds this limit is displaced, externalized, and therefore preserved as war, bracketed as conflict between two mutually recognized enemies aiming at mere defeat and not elimination. For Lambert, as for many contemporary political philosophers, this compromise is increasingly fragile: “Today we might ask whether polities (from the Greek term politika), which was used to designate a privileged place for the display of civil conflict (stasis), can any longer contain the extreme states of conflict that constantly break out in modern societies” (6). These extreme conflicts are symptomatic of an “extreme opposition between [the] richest and poorest populations that belong to the global polis” (6). A deepening divide between rich and poor has blurred the spatial boundaries that enabled the compromise of modern politics. Lambert’s conceptual personae (friend, enemy, stranger, foreigner, deportee, people) come under intense strain in a world in which “all contemporary territorial boundaries have been overrun and made permeable and subject to change, and there is neither a distinctly ‘foreign’ place nor a central location, or polis” (65).

    This diagnosis resonates with critical theory over the past twenty years, whether Hardt and Negri’s examination of new forms of sovereignty that blur the differences between policing and war, Derrida’s analysis of the war on terror, or Agamben’s take on the notion that modern politics is the internalization of a state of war within law. Evoking this theoretical work, Lambert argues that we are currently confronted by a “new form of combat” (114) between an unassimilable remainder or surplus of humanity left to the futile defense of its remaining privileges, and the rich who can no longer include or subsume this remainder into the figure of universal humanity. What makes his account different is his assertion that this new form of combat is not a new form of resistance in relation to power. Instead, this new combat marks the limit of combat as a political paradigm, even of the political as such: “this limit to the political dialectic of inclusion and exclusion, power and resistance, is nothing less than the impasse and the final exhaustion of the concept of the political itself” (115). Conflict in the contemporary moment “marks the absolute limit where both political and economic powers have reached a threshold of postmodernity that cannot be addressed by a secularized ideal of the universal” (112).

    Lambert turns, in this conjuncture, to the concept of friendship. “The friend” stands in for a politics of friendship that has defined modern politics as association with those like us in contradistinction to outsiders and enemies. Using a compelling and novel methodology based on Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of conceptual personae and Benveniste’s etymological investigations, Lambert argues that friendship “actually refers to an original or even primitive ‘conceptual persona’ first invented by the Greeks, the meaning of which is now difficult to discern … since many of its social and ritual significations have become hopelessly and irretrievably lost” (2). The goal, in this methodology, is not to retrieve a pure, original vision of friendship to which we could return against the one linked to war. The point is to find the limits of political philosophy’s appropriation of friendship by tracing the irrevocable loss of this vision (13). Lambert contributes to an expanding literature on friendship in politics and philosophy by arguing that friendship and war are linked in Western political philosophy. Friendship offers political and philosophical orientation when God and nature offer little or no guidance, such that politics is “based on the idea of ‘free election,’” on impermanent and spontaneous promises of alliance (29). In lieu of essential and inherent indexes of belonging, friendship acts as a political technology of boundaries, borders, and limits. By saying who is in (the political) and who is out (subject to war, exclusion, rejection), friendship “demarcates the social sphere of those members ‘who directly have a share in political rights’” (85). The basic arrangement of the politics of friendship is a compromise that, in creating an “inside” for political community and freedom, leaves war “outside” and intact as the constitutive condition of possibility for politics. As I read Lambert’s account, as friends, we get politics within limits but we are also never finally able to “quit the state of nature” (19), and can therefore never live in a “post-war” society (18).

    This compromise has always been unstable. Lambert locates the origin of this instability in Plato’s writings and traces it through to Schmitt’s Concept of the Political. Plato realizes that the polis contains not only an internal rival and external enemy, but also “social beings” who fit into neither category (86). These ambiguous presences introduce the ever-present possibility of misrecognizing the enemy. Lambert shows that Plato insists on an apparently “natural” enemy to resolve this problem: the barbarian. The barbarian orients animosity away from the polis (57). This natural distinction can be traced through Western political thought, embodied in figures of racial difference, colonial subjection, gendered hierarchies, and “uncivilized” or “undeveloped” peoples. Schmitt marks an innovation in this respect, arguing that natural enemies are a dangerous mystification. Instead, he offers the enemy as an artificial foundation for friendship, i.e., for political community. The enemy recursively determines the friend not on any natural or self-evident basis, but on condition of its threat. Many political theorists appropriate Schmitt precisely because he offers this non-foundational account of the political premised on antagonism. His idea of politics as irreconcilable conflict has allowed political theorists to push back against the “post-political,” neutralizing character of our times.1 Lambert makes an implicit contribution here by taking aim at the central premise of Schmitt’s appropriation: namely, the recursive determination of our identity and position by way of the enemy. He notes that while Schmitt, in one sense, solves Plato’s problem by finding a way to stabilize the figure of the friend without appealing to natural difference, Schmitt also conceals a “fundamental dissymmetry” between the friend and enemy that threatens to undo the recursive determination of the friend by way of the enemy. Lambert writes that “while … there is general agreement (consensus) concerning, ‘who is the enemy?’ there can only be multiple and highly variable responses to the question ‘who is the friend?’” (58). Here, he chips away at Schmitt’s scheme of the political with evidence from lived experience. We often find it difficult to say, specifically, why we are friends with someone. This is not because we have no idea, Lambert insists, but because we have so much to say about the friend. We have a whole set of “individualistic, subjective, intuitive, culturally relative, probabilistic, and overdetermined” inclinations, but the reason for our friendship remains mysterious (59).

    Lambert builds on this point by mapping enemy and friend onto Deleuze and Guattari’s distinction between the molar and molecular. The enemy is “clearly molar in the sense that … the enemy is always one, and all the traits of individuality can be submerged behind the appearance of this opposition” (60). By assimilating differences to a unifying centre of molar unification, enmity solidifies the fragile, artificial politics of friendship. At the same time, however, the mystery of friendship’s origins threatens to kick this backstop out. Friendship is precisely not a molar, unified identity but a molecular one. Friendship arises out of a set of inclinations that are “preindividual and unconscious” (63). Friendship is not a unified identity in opposition to an enemy but an instantiation of what Deleuze and Guattari would call a “concrete multiplicity” irreducible to any unifying identity (62). To emphasize this vision of friendship, Lambert asserts, would be to find at the heart of political philosophy’s politics of friendship a concept that enjoins “friends [to] ally themselves against the existence of such a self”: a unified political body or “solipsistic” experience of self (63). Lambert gestures toward a critique of any political theory that uncritically appropriates Schmittian discourses of animosity to ground revolutionary politics or, for that matter, any kind of political subject. In the very friend on whom they rely, a set of heterogeneous, molecular possibilities exceeds any schematic opposition between friend and enemy, pointing toward a politics not premised on a metaphor (or reality) of war or combat.

    What does not appear in this rereading of friendship is the notion of fraternity central to the politics of friendship and to Derrida’s Politics of Friendship, to which Lambert owes a clear debt. If the political subject has too often been considered a unified or molar identity that defines itself only against a killable, excludable, or deportable enemy, fraternity is a key ideology through which this politics has been naturalized. Balibar, for example, has persuasively shown that fraternity mediates and naturalizes universal concepts of political equality and freedom in their necessarily concrete context (50). An engagement with fraternity in relation to friendship might also indicate the crucial importance of gender to questions of friendship. Feminist critics have long argued that, insofar as the politics of friendship has been linked to fraternity, it was always already premised not only on war but on the exclusion, subjugation, and traffic of women.2 These theorists have interrogated the limits of political inclusion and exclusion, and engaging with them would have strengthened Lambert’s analysis.

    Thinking after War

    Lambert’s novel genealogy of friendship as molecular provides a way to see beyond the vision of the friend that enshrines war as the necessary complement to political freedom. His rereading allows him to argue that the other conceptual personae reveal the instability of these attempts to naturalize war and the enemy as the outside of politics. The foreigner attests to an original foreignness that is just what Kant called our “unsocial sociability” (44). Society here is “the possibility of hospitality, exchange, communication, and generosity” covered up and obscured by the hardened link of sameness that friendship establishes (75). The stranger-guest relationship, as a special realm of friendship in which the guest is utterly dependent on the host, marks “the failures of this circle of the closed group to complete itself and become absolute,” revealing that beneath “positive laws,” we are all, as singular beings, dependent “strangers by nature” (93, 97, 94). The revolutionary people, sharing political rights by virtue of a molar identity and unity, make this unity through historically productive violence. Instead, Lambert argues that the only way to refuse war as the condition of possibility for politics would be to refuse the conversion by which violence is “put to work for a higher goal” (132). The deportee, finally, works as the master sign under which the crisis of the politics of friendship manifests, insofar as surplus populations are no longer enemies to be defeated or friends to be included, but remain locked in a “double bind” in which they can only be ignored or punished, deported or detained (106). Each conceptual persona reveals both the compromise by which politics is bought at the expense of war and points to the destabilization of this compromise. Lambert’s personae point to the possibility of “post-war philosophy” today in the refusal to rationalize or provide a historical justification for the condition of the global poor and victims of imperial wars. These are instead figures of inconvertible violence that can only evoke a stutter and aphasia from a tradition of political philosophy premised on this rationalization of violence.

    For Lambert, Kant is the one exception in the Western tradition of political thought. Lambert argues that Kant was unique in his insistence on the end of war and in his refusal to provide any (explicit) legitimation or justification of war. Here Lambert finds his most challenging problem: moving beyond the “internalized” principle of war (159) as metaphor and guiding paradigm in political thought without returning to the also-defunct liberal political philosophy of legal negotiation and rational agreement. For Lambert, Kant offers a theory of consensus that goes beyond war even as a metaphor (159). Kant’s refusal to justify or even rationalize war links up with a contemporary scene in which we are confronted with unjustifiable violence that punitively ensures the fragile and doomed order of rich and poor (146). For those who see Kant’s philosophy as legitimizing a post-political cosmopolitan order, this is a provocative turn. It is also a compelling one, insofar as Lambert insists that Kant foregrounds peace in order to eliminate (by way of an international federation) the displaced yet persistent war outside of political community.

    Lambert’s final chapter ventures furthest into the speculative and normative, and would have benefitted had he deviated from his otherwise productive propensity to ignore contemporary scholarship in favour of key figures in critical theory. The large critical literature on Kant emphasizes his ambiguous relationship to war.3 Scholars insist that, far from refusing all legitimations of war, Kant refuses explicit theodicies of war in favor of a historical logic according to which war propels us to peace just as economic and rational conflicts lead to greater rationality and human powers. The regulative idea of peace—as the infinitely distant telos behind Nature’s pitting us against each other in war—shows that absolute peace is, strictly speaking, impossible and possibly undesirable for Kant. Kant’s superficial emphasis on peace notwithstanding, perpetual peace leads to a dilemma: either what Deleuze calls a “peace more terrifying than fascist death” (115, 132) or infinite progress toward peace that amounts to war in perpetuity. In response, scholars like Murad Idris ask whether the road to war is paved with ideas of perpetual peace.4

    Lambert no doubt chooses Kant because he is a liminal figure in the tradition to which Lambert is responding, since Kant at least challenges us to think after war, even if the solution is imperfect—that is, all too finite. However, the problem lies in thinking that peace is the answer to war, as if these two terms are not thoroughly imbricated in the tradition Lambert wants us to think beyond. The desire for peace (to “quit the state of nature”), far from being merely a critique of war, has also functioned as an insidious legitimation of colonial violence.5 The rest of Lambert’s book clearly points beyond Kant’s idea of peace, which is a culmination rather than a rejection of the long tradition of political thought. Lambert’s references to Derrida’s “democracy to come” (144) to Agamben, and to Deleuze’s molecularity (62-3) in his understanding of a potentially alternative, immanent critique of friendship imply that he wants us to think beyond Kant, while rejecting any positive, transcendental project (143-44). As a student of Deleuze’s philosophy, Lambert might have given a provocative re-reading of Kant’s perpetual peace in light of the Deleuzian reading, where peace might appear not as the transcendental telos to a set of pre- existing dynamics, but as obscure virtualities and tendencies. In the spirit of Lambert’s argument, we could see Kant as the sharper limit to Western political thought, and the real challenge Lambert opens up for future thought: how to think peace otherwise than in contradistinction to war. His response, both to the valorization of antagonism and the politics of friendship, opens precisely the question of peace. Lambert himself points in this direction, acknowledging that peace can only be a preliminary principle, an alternate beginning, and not a “solution” (160). This preliminary principle or “theoretical judgment,” as Kant would put it, is that no justification or rationalization can secure violence (157).

    Philosophy after Friendship makes a provocative contribution to philosophical thinking about war and peace, to the difficult problem of diagnosing our political and philosophical present, and to the question of what the end of philosophy looks like. This book is fourteen years in the making (161), which shows in its sedimentation of and reflection on thinking from the last twenty-five years. In this book, political theorists will find an important insistence on peace as a key concept of philosophy; those concerned with postmodernity will find a compelling diagnosis of the contemporary conjuncture; and those concerned with continental philosophy will find a new appropriation of Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptual personae as method. Even those sceptical of the overall argument will find many interpretive insights into difficult texts and problems. Above all, Lambert’s book is questioning, and opens us onto new ways of engaging with critical theory and with the problem of war.

    Footnotes

    1. See Chantal Mouffe’s On the Political and The Democratic Paradox. For a brief review, see Douzinas’s Human Rights and Empire. For a critique, see Žižek’s “Carl Schmitt in the Age of Post-Politics.”

    2. See Pateman’s The Sexual Contract.

    3. For a review of the literature concerning global politics, see Buchan’s “Explaining War and Peace: Kant and Liberal IR Theory” and Hurrell’s “Kant and the Kantian Paradigm in International Relations.”

    4. For a similar argument, see Bennington’s Kant at the Frontiers, 63-84.

    5. See Neocleous’s War Power, Police Power and Nichols’s “Contract and Usurpation in Settler-Colonial Contexts.”

    Works Cited

    • Agamben, Giorgio. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Translated by Daniel Heller-Roazen, Stanford UP, 1998.
    • Balibar, Etienne. Masses, Classes, and Ideas: Studies in Politics and Philosophy Before and After Marx. Translated by James Swenson, Routledge, 1993.
    • Bennington, Geoffrey. Kant at the Frontiers. Fordham UP, 2017.
    • Buchan, Bruce. “Explaining War and Peace: Kant and Liberal IR Theory.” Alternatives, vol. 27, 2002, pp. 414–418.
    • Derrida, Jacques. Rogues: Two Essays on Reason. Translated by Pascale Anne-Brault and Michael Naas, Stanford UP, 2005.
    • Douzinas, Costas. Human Rights and Empire. Routledge, 2007.
    • Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri. Empire. Harvard UP, 2000.
    • Hurrell, Andrew. “Kant and the Kantian Paradigm in International Relations.” Review of International Studies,vol. 16, no. 3, 1990, pp. 183–205.
    • Idris, Murad. War for Peace: Genealogies of a Violent Ideal in Western and Islamic Thought. Oxford UP, 2019.
    • Kant, Immanuel. Political Writings. Edited by Hans Reiss, translated by H. S. Nisbet, Cambridge UP, 1991.
    • Lambert, Gregg. Philosophy After Friendship: Deleuze’s Conceptual Personae. U of Minnesota P, 2017.
    • Mouffe, Chantal. The Democratic Paradox. Verso, 2005.
    • —. On the Political. Routledge, 2005.
    • Neocleous, Mark. War Power, Police Power. Edinburgh UP, 2014.
    • Nichols, Robert “Contract and Usurpation in Settler-Colonial Contexts.” Theorizing Nature Studies, edited by Audra Simpson and Andrea Smith, Duke UP, 2014.
    • Pateman, Carole. The Sexual Contract. Stanford UP, 1988.
    • Žižek, Slavoj. “Carl Schmitt in the Age of Post-Politics.” The Challenge of Carl Schmitt, edited by Chantal Mouffe, Verso, 1999.
  • The Nation, Sublime and Sublimating

    Ian Balfour (bio)

    A review of Karatani, Kōjin. Nation and Aesthetics: On Kant and Freud. Translated by Jonathan E. Abel, Hiroki Yoshikuni, and Darwin H. Tsen, Oxford UP, 2017.

    Kōjin Karatani has long been a distinctive, powerful voice in critical theory on the global or quasi-global stage, a key mediator between Eastern and Western thought, a distinguished historian and critic of Japanese literature, and an incisive, agile thinker of Marxism in an expanded field. He is almost equally at home in philosophy, political economy, literature, and history proper. Karatani’s intellectual range is vast. He is one of few people who could plausibly take on, elsewhere, so immense a topic as “the structure of world history,” as the title of that volume of his has it.

    The essays collected in this volume—though it’s not just a “collection”—stretch back to the early 1990s, and form the start of an arc in Karatani’s work to the ongoing present. Karatani proposes that we focus more on processes and effects of circulation than on production, at least as classically conceived. In his view, the historical dynamics of capitalism—more late capitalism than early or middle—have unfolded in such a way as to make circulation more crucial a matter and topic than it had been before. He has been arguing, moreover, for a mode of transcritique conjoining, first, the two not-usually-thought-to-be-so-compatible figures of Marx and Kant, a procedure he adopts in this book with Kant and Freud, if in a less thoroughgoing fashion than in his major study under that rubric.

    The subtitle of the volume is a little misleading. Kant and Freud are only front and center in one essay, important in a couple, and a looming presence in others. For better or worse, theoretical studies are almost guaranteed a wider audience than ones focused on one country or a circumscribed area, however crucial in the world system or compelling in itself that nation or area might be. As it happens, the very conjunction of broad-ranging, resonant reflections on nation, empire, and aesthetics together with focused analyses of individual intellectuals, institutions, and problematics mainly located in Japan, is one of the strengths of the book, with the two differently weighted endeavors supplementing each other to the benefit of both. (This translation of Karatani’s study is published in a series called “Global Asias.”)

    Karatani contends, following somewhat in the train of Benedict Anderson’s pioneering Imagined Communities, that the Marxist tradition has generally been ham-fisted or oblivious or in denial about the force of the nation and nations and, more particularly, that it has denied the constitutive function of imagination in their construction. Nations as such are entities that contain class tensions, struggles, and contradictions within them, however differently these struggles and more might be negotiated. (Japan’s distinctive national/state history comes into play here, as the nation of Karatani’s greatest scrutiny and expertise, not least in its overdetermined relations to China and Korea, which extend down to the charged status of the seemingly “micro” matter of the provenance of what written characters are in use and what not.) One of the key contentions shaping Karatani’s work is that what he calls the “trinity” of nation-state-capital is a kind of Borromean knot, one that cannot be untied. That trinity is coeval and coterminous with the slippery, moving-target notion of “modernity”—but not so slippery for Karatani. The coupling of state and capital occurred, in Karatani’s view, in the era of absolute monarchy. The nation joined capital already in progress. The first benchmark moment for the historical trinity emerges in England’s Glorious Revolution, as monarchy becomes constitutional. Other nations follow, in staggered fashion. The more advanced capitalism is, the more the nation and state are joined at the hip as nation-state.

    The nation is, in the beginning, not a given. Not given until it is given. There is nothing particularly natural—despite the notion of birth built in to the etymology of the word—about the nation, even if the configurations of some nations are shaped, as Fichte and others argued, by natural forces such as rivers or mountains, as if they were natural borders. Karatani is suspicious of claims, such as Habermas’s, that language is the constitutive, unifying force of the nation. (And he is, in this volume’s chapter on “Nation-State and Linguistics,” in turn critical, via an appeal to Saussure, of certain strains of Japanese linguistics that imagine language to be natural, conceived of in terms of roots, branches, families and the like.) The nation takes shape in the ruins of empire, to borrow a phrase from Volney, and can still be “imperialistic,” Karatani maintains, without being of the order of empire.

    To make sense of the nation (by definition, for him, a phenomenon of modernity), Karatani turns not just to Benedict Anderson’s generative analysis of nations but further back to the late eighteenth century, to Adam Smith’s notions of empathy and understanding in his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), and especially to Kant for his articulation of the imagination as mediator between sensibility and understanding. As such, the (Kantian) imagination is a faculty whose products are both historical and aesthetic (the latter, if only in the baseline sense of being of the order of representation) and its exemplary, consequent product is, in this historical moment, the nation. Karatani makes much, in this book and in his The Structure of World History, of the fact that the nation comes into its own at the end of the eighteenth century—in itself a claim also made by Benedict Anderson and Eric Hobsbawm—at the very same time that philosophy is “discovering”1 the imagination in a positive fashion. It’s true the coincidence is striking, though it’s not as if anyone needed philosophy to confirm what was already the case in discourse about the nation in the Enlightenment period and after.

    Karatani is gently critical of Anderson’s paradigm of the imagined community, not because it is wrong but rather because it is somewhat reductive in its notion of imagination and does not go far enough.2 Whereas Anderson, in a chapter of his later The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia, and the World, provided an account of how the nation tends to tell itself that it is “good”3—a kind of predictable group narcissism—Karatani has pertinently repeated recourse to the notion of the sublime, one of the two (and really only two, in Kant and Burke) aesthetic modes whose articulation with the imagination organizes the whole of Kant’s analysis of aesthetic judgement in the third Critique.4 Not only does this sublime discourse of the nation fit well with what plays out in texts about the nation a little before and after 1800 (Burke, Wollstonecraft, Fichte, and more), the dynamics of it are well suited to be set in dialogue with Freud’s work. It is the Freud of Beyond the Pleasure Principle, with its enigmatic articulation of the death drive, Jokes [Der Witz] and Their Relation to the Unconscious, with its attention to striking conjunctions of pleasure and unpleasure, and essays such as “Why War?” and “Timely Reflections on War and Death,” perhaps the places in Freud where the state most visibly rears its head and where one finds a specific sort of trauma for which the nation is a defining factor. (In Anderson’s Imagined Communities it’s determinate for the nation that so many people are willing to die for what might be understood as an arbitrary construct.)

    It doesn’t take a Ph.D. in Comparative Literature or the History of (Un?)Consciousness to recognize the Freudian superego as a kind of perfect Kantian non-thing in itself, so to speak, a powerful force that sits in judgement, as do so many modalities of reason in Kant. (Freud, Karatani points out, casts the psyche as a courtroom, very much as Kant does. And Freud himself explicitly aligned the Oedipus complex with Kant’s categorical imperative.) In his understanding of how the aesthetic works, Kant presents the judging function as (even) pre-cognitive, before proceeding to the higher sort of judgements executed by reason on the far side of sublime disruption, with its telltale mixture of or oscillation between pleasure and unpleasure (which Kant collapses to a single notion: “negative pleasure,” negative Lust). It’s no wonder that Karatani can profitably toggle back and forth between Kant and Freud, laying out the dynamics of the nation as a sublime object of ideology—not to coin a phrase—which just might issue, in a certain triumph of reason, a product of what is, in small way, a triumph of Kant’s and Freud’s own reason, on the other side of their dark insights and critical rigor.

    The various chapters more resolutely focused on Japan and Japanese discourse treat the nation as a (strategically conceived) totality, internally divided, and rather more beset upon by surrounding nations than has long been suggested by the myth of Japanese insularity. The chapter on “History As Museum” is an eye-opener to someone like me—only sketchily versed in Japanese culture (some novels, lots of films, the odd general history and scholarly study)—and it shows Karatani as a fine analyst of both sides of the world clunkily called East and West, categories which nonetheless have their pertinence for Karatani’s set of reflections. Here his precise topic is the scholars Okakura Kakuzō (author of the famous Book of Tea from 1906, written in Boston!) and Ernest Fenollosa, the American art historian, and the institutions for which they were foundational or central, especially The Tokyo School of Fine Arts. The empirical fact that both scholars, like Karatani, worked both sides of the street, as it were, in Japan and the USA, is only one small index of how aesthetics and imperial politics in both parts of the world—but France too is in play via Impressionism—are mutually implicated in dialectical and not-so-self-evident ways.5 Karatani can show, strikingly, that certain forms of Japanese art, considered traditional in the “home” culture, could count as avant-garde in the West. The converse is also true: what counted at some moments as progressive in Japan was then received in the West as if traditional for Japan. Go figure. In fact Karatani does go figure it out, by situating the circulation of art in a nexus of commercial and historical forces, all of which point to the not-exactly-ontological status of the work of art. Karatani deftly unsettles a good many conceptions of what is—especially from the outside—understood as tradition in Japan.6 (This entails something that is rather different from the familiar story about how what starts out as avant-garde can over time become mainstream.) Art, for Karatani, is a medium of national consciousness, from within and without, and the museum is a privileged site for it in more ways than one, often standing-in, more or less violently, as a synecdoche of national culture in and beyond a given artistic medium or two or three. The museum allows for a spatial articulation of history, something that, in Okakura’s case, unfolds at the end of the nineteenth century (on the cusp of the Imperial constitution being promulgated), and takes the shape of a teleological narrative derived from Hegel via Fenollosa. Karatani ascribes to Okakura nothing less than the invention of the East via his discourse on art (72)! It’s an inverted Hegelianism, not remotely Eurocentric, and one that appeals to the oneness of Asia, not a nationalism but a kind of imperialism sans empire from within Japan, itself conceived, in Karatani’s analysis, as a kind of museum of history.

    An essay on the aftermath of Edward Said’s Orientalism explores that massively influential argument with an eye to the ways dynamics diagnosed by Said play out specifically in East Asia, under and not under western eyes. Karatani is concerned to expose especially how, with respect to the various nations of East Asia, a scientific gaze from a position of condescension is coupled with aesthetic judgements of admiration and respect, but with the latter bracketed (in a bad way) from the world in which that art is made and received. Respect, a category of the Kantian sublime, has been shown to be, not least by psychoanalytically minded critics such as Sarah Kofman, a double-edged phenomenon, by no means all sweetness and light (as Kofman shows for eighteenth century philosophical discourse about women, much of it officially in a mode of respect that nonetheless undermines, brackets, or cordons off the objects of putative respect). Karatani returns to the era of high aesthetic theory, in the wake of Baumgarten, to invoke again Kant and especially the sublime to argue that the aesthetics of the period in general brackets the world, from the famous notion of disinterestedness on. Karatani contends that the colonialist and imperialist postures are less dismissive of the art of polities under their sway than they are appreciative and respectful. These latter gestures, however, are problematic to the extent that they tend to cordon off the aesthetic, as if a thing unto itself, divorced from the world in which it lives and breathes and has it being. In this context, Karatani turns again to Okakura, in Japan’s imperial era, and to the practice of handicraft. Here Okakura is singing “the praises of anti-modernism and anti-industrial capitalism,” but in a posture that Karatani calls “modern and colonial” (89). A similar but more open set of impulses is registered in the work of Yanagi Sōsetsu—William Morris is something like his Western counterpart—whose progressive character takes the form of an openness to Korean art, in the overdetermined agon of neighbouring cultures. It’s a resistance to Said’s general paradigm which nonetheless helps make sense of the “Orient” from within, an internal differentiation separating itself from what Karatani glosses as “myopic nationalism.”

    The final chapters chart the changing historical situation of language in Japan in the shadow of the nation-state. Karatani has argued that the nation-state emerges after and from empire with a certain imperative, via language, for homogeneity but also, in Japan’s case, for a willed independence from the written form of the formerly imperial language. The complicated history of written characters and spoken sounds results in the singular situation that Karatani describes thus: “Perhaps nowhere other than in Japan exists a group of people which distinguishes the origin of a word by using various kinds of characters” (124), noting that this has been the case for a thousand years. The system of written characters is such that, even if internalized in speech, the foreignness of Chinese characters is retained in writing. “[E]verything foreign,” Karatani concludes, extravagantly, “is preserved in Japan” (125). It’s as if Walter Benjamin’s theory of a just translation—which preserves the foreign in the target language—is embodied in Japanese writing generally.

    In Karatani’s hands, the impurity of Japanese and of each Asian language under his scrutiny displays difference and so calls up something that transcends the particular form the given language takes at a given time. Openness to the other is embedded in these languages (and perhaps in languages in general), all but demanding a going-beyond of the given. The parole of the moment conjures up something on the way to the universal. The penultimate essay on “Nation-State and Linguistics” ends with a call to arms for the United Nations to “initiate a project to create a universal language.” It’s a circumscribed linguistic—which is also to say representational (but not only) and aesthetic (but not merely)—version of Karatani’s persistent imagining, in this book and elsewhere, of a world republic, a kind of association that returns society to an economy of reciprocity and gift. Karatani’s vision is not of some revamped League of Nations or United Nations, but of the Kantian imaginary of a world republic, as sketched out in the hypothetical “Perpetual Peace” essay. It’s a global configuration that transcends the “transcendental illusions” that characterized the individual nations in the first place. To read in the pages of such a hard-nosed theorist, a lifelong student of Marx and admirer of de Man, of a world republic to come, one is prompted to ask: is it for real? Is it a kind of Kantian regulative idea, not imagined ever to be known or realized but something to think with? Something to orient oneself in the world without a world republic? Or a cosmopolitan version of what even Karatani’s Freud, the Freud of the dark war essays, can call “the hope of the world”?

    Footnotes

    1. Karatani’s term of “discovery” is perhaps borrowed from or indebted to Hannah Arendt’s comment on the greatness of Kant’s “discovery” of the imagination in The Critique of Pure Reason. See her Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy (80). For a more recent, powerful take on the imagination in Kant and its political stakes, see the opening chapter (“Knowledge of Freedom”) in Fred Moten’s Stolen Life, especially pp. 1-15.

    2. On one point, Karatani’s critique of Anderson seems to me off target, namely when he charges that for Anderson the nation is a kind of “ideal superstructure” (Nation 38).

    3. The final chapter in The Spectre of Comparisons is titled “The Goodness of Nations.” This rich and varied collection, a great supplement to Imagined Communities, does not seem to have garnered all that much attention.

    4. In his valuable introduction to this volume, Hiroki Yoshikuni highlights at some length the relation of Karatani’s analysis to that of Paul de Man’s various essays on the sublime. Though I think Karatani’s thinking is indeed shaped somewhat by de Man’s analysis of the stakes of the sublime, I don’t think he follows de Man in seeing what Yoshikuni points to as de Man’s diagnosis of the “deep, perhaps fatal break or discontinuity” at the center of the third Critique (79). Karatani also has a far more positive sense of the Kantian imagination as something positive than does de Man. It’s a curio of intellectual history that, as Yoshikuni recounts—and as I happened to hear from Karatani himself prior to the publication of Nation and Aesthetics—four days before de Man’s death, de Man had agreed to be interviewed by Karatani precisely about the wartime years in Belgium. The whole history of the reaction to the scandal that resulted from the revelations of de Man’s collaborationist and other activity of the period might have been utterly different had that interview taken place. Karatani chose for a long time not to make this incident public in writing.

    5. Okakura writes in The Book of Tea: “You may laugh as us for ‘having too much tea’ but may we not suspect that you of the West have ‘no tea’ in your constitution?” (12). The context is a “discussion” of European imperialism and the “absurd cry of the Yellow Peril.” One might think Okakura himself guilty of too clunky a notion of the East but he earns it, so to speak, via his knowledge of analysis of the non-uniqueness of Japanese culture within its proximate geographical orbit, arguing, for example, for the formative influence of Chinese and Indian Buddhism in and on Japan, among other things.

    6. Various parts of the volume sketch out the heightened attention to canon and what counts as traditional within Japan, from the analysis of how national classics, kokugaku, functioned in the Tokugawa shogunate and beyond. Eric Cazdyn, in a work partly indebted to Karatani, shows that Japanese culture puts a premium on filming its literary canon as a way of keeping a certain tradition alive and of having the film industry provide just that sort of content. He notes: “Almost every work in the canon of modern Japanese prose fiction has been made into film, usually more than once,” and proceeds to analyze that distinctive tradition (88).

    Works Cited

    • Anderson, Benedict. The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, South East Asia and the World. Verso, 1998.
    • Arendt, Hannah. Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy. Edited by Roland Beiner, U of Chicago P, 1982.
    • Cazdyn, Eric. The Flash of Capital: Film and Geopolitics in Japan. Duke UP, 2002.
    • De Man, Paul. Aesthetic Ideology. U of Minnesota P, 1996.
    • Karatani, Kōjin. The Structure of World History: From Modes of Productions to Modes of Exchange. Translated by Michael K. Bourdaghs, Duke UP, 2014.
    • Moten, Fred. Stolen Life. Duke UP, 2018.
    • Okakura, Kakuzō. The Book of Tea. Putnam, 1906.
  • Bartleby, the IoT, and Flat Ontology: How Ontology is Written in the Age of Ubiquitous Computing

    Sungyong Ahn (bio)

    Abstract

    The Internet of Things, as the object-oriented reconstruction of the traditional internet, is characterized by its smart objects freely inter-operating without being necessarily under human control. Re-building the internet’s information economy from the data captured by and communicated through these autonomous objects, the IoT operationalizes a sort of flat ontology, which recent realist philosophers suggest as a means to speculate about the world-making activities of nonhumans not necessarily correlated to human subjects. This paper examines the coincidence of recent interest in these nonhuman world-making processes drawn by two traditionally distinctive but now converging fields: computer engineering and philosophical ontology.

    The wide distribution of microsensors, processors, and actuators into our environments during the last decade has changed the information economy of the Internet. According to Kevin Ashton, who coined the term Internet of Things (IoT), before the intervention of these small machines, the Internet was “almost wholly dependent on” the data “first captured and created by human beings—by typing, pressing a record button, taking a digital picture or scanning a bar code.” Replacing humans’ “limited time, attention and accuracy,” which are “not very good at capturing data about things in the real world,” the IoT has been developed as a platform for these things to expand their online presence by overcoming “the limitation of human-entered data” with thing-generated data, communicated in frequencies inaudible to humans (Ashton). Through their further miniaturization and attachment to various natural and technical objects, thing-generated data becomes extractable not only from smart appliances such as refrigerators and smartphones responding to users and environments, but from the territorial/migratory behaviors of animals (Gabrys) and physiological patterns of human organs (Parisi). Just as the digital remediates the incompatibility of analog signals through its binary codes (Bolter and Grusin), the attachment of these smart entities relocates objects from different contexts to the same communicational platform.

    At the same time, actor-network theory (ANT) has been introduced in media studies as a critical tool to rethink the conventional boundaries of subject/object, human/nonhuman, cultural/natural, social/technological categories. Actor-network theory has taught us that these categories are not higher orders or contexts that define the legitimate places of things in hierarchies, and showed us how the categories can be resolved back into each thing’s way of influencing others or their mutual engagements. The IoT’s “new sensor/processor/actuator affiliations” (Crandall 83-4) expose hidden actor-networks of objects in our life world, once black-boxed by the habitual contexts of our uses of them as the only definitive typology of their use values. As these objects are now enrolled in a non-hierarchal communication structure of the IoT, the contexts of their human uses are also “unboxed” and their usefulness is re-measured in a digital network, not so much for their contribution to our self-imposed goals, but for the network’s prediction of human purposes.

    Marx thought of the use value of commodities as realizable only through their consumption for human needs at “a terminal point” of exchange (Grundrisse 89), such as one’s non-smart home. But in the IoT and its domestic application called smart home, value is conversely concretized by the exchange of thing-generated signals between the smart objects, whose smartness is often advertised as the ability to detect the urgent needs of users even before the users recognize their own needs. John Law says that a black box, which refers to a “complex piece of equipment with contents that are mysterious to the user” (Merriam-Webster), can be reopened only by the appearance of “a stronger adversary, one better able to associate elements” (111). According to this “principle of symmetry,” the IoT would also unbox the previous contexts of the human uses of nonhuman beings, or their monopoly of the right to define the functionality of objects, since the IoT is more capable than humans of associating smart objects together into networks that address human needs. The human consumption of commodities “not only as a terminal point but also as an end-in-itself” was for Marx something easily put aside as “outside economics except in so far as it [what they reproduce namely living labor] reacts in turn upon the point of departure and initiates the whole process anew” in the labor market (Grundrisse 89). This reductionist interpretation of use value based entirely on human “needs as biologically given and the natural” (Dant 501) has been denaturalized by cultural critics such as Baudrillard, whose unboxing of human needs and desires out of “pure, natural, asocial” cocoons has relocated the concept of use value to “a system of relations of difference with other objects” (504). While this revisionist view of use value as “a fetishized social relation just as much as exchange-value” (504) still defines the social exclusively as human construction,1 the IoT—as one of the most advanced commodity forms today—pushes its users to agree with its “terms of use,” which suggest why humans should delegate their right to use objects for their needs to smart objects better at activating themselves in the most customized way to human needs. If outside economics in the Marxian sense has been preserved in domestic space for our inalienable right as tool users, this delegation of human right reopens and reconnects these spaces, renamed “smart homes,” to the economy of digital signals. Humans are the only smart beings whose access to this hidden economy is denied; other smart objects freely exchange queries and answers about their not-smart-enough human hosts.

    This actor-network description of the IoT and its reversed user-object relation lead us to a “structure of ontological systems” characterized by the radical liquidation of any hierarchies among things: a world-view that recent realist philosophers, or speculative realists such as Quentin Meillassoux, Graham Harman, and Levi Bryant, call flat ontology.2 This paper instead examines this ontology of objects as something resonant with the recent media industry’s attempt to expand its domains even to the speculative realities of autonomous objects. Despite these philosophers’ inattentiveness to software businesses, the use of the term ontology in computer science as the protocol for machine-to-machine communication3 indicates a sort of commercial necessity for objects to be defined not by human use and access, but through their mutual nonhuman uses and inter-operations. For these philosophers, the autonomy of objects is required for “absolute truth” and reality to be redeemed from their subjective construction in anthropocentric “correlationism” (Meillassoux 5). But for the IoT, the autonomy of objects is required for problems inaccessible to humans to be managed instead by their environment-sensitive operations. The Internet of Things in this sense provides a starting point for a critical inquiry into the question Galloway once posed about “a coincidence between the structure of ontological systems and the structure of the most highly evolved technologies of post-Fordist capitalism” (347).

    To re-contextualize this coincidence, this paper focuses on how the architectures of algorithmic systems have changed over the past few decades as programmers and users have delegated more control over a system’s operational environments to its algorithmic objects, which are better able to associate themselves into a more optimal collective state to respond to their environment. It then discusses two cases of algorithmic systems that concern this change: Herman Melville’s Bartleby, the Scrivener: A Story of Wall-street and the MIT Sensible City Lab’s Affective Intelligent Driving Agent. The justification for this unorthodox comparison of a literary work and a media application can be found in the story’s problematic character, Bartleby. In Marxist criticism of the last century, Bartleby has been understood as the “perfect exemplum” of dehumanized workers under industrial capitalism, whose existence as living labor has no other choice for realization than to participate in commodity exchange. The story restages this through its algorithmic distribution of “speculative-conditional” statements or the “logic of the ‘if…then’ statement” to define his possible uses in certain conditions of an office (Reed 258). Bartleby’s famous response, “I would prefer not to,” has been interpreted in this context as a gesture “to get out of circulation entirely” to the “space outside or beyond circulation,” never achievable “except, of course, through death” (266). However, what this reading of his gesture, delayed by one-and-half centuries, focuses not on his suicidal exit to the “humanity” outside commodity exchange, but on his sneaking into the edges of an employer’s algorithmic human resource distribution. Put differently, Bartleby’s withdrawal to the peripheries of commodity exchange is interpreted “in the era of computerized capitalism” as a gesture to nonhumanize himself as an office object not ontologically superior to other office supplies with which he persists in creating a secret network of nonhumans unseen by the employer (Galloway, “The Poverty” 362). Redefined as one of these objects whose inter-operations retrieve the office from the human employer’s exclusive use of nonhumans, Bartleby reminds us of the objects that prevail in recent smart offices. As I will discuss in the following section, these objects are the building blocks of today’s algorithmic culture, which construct both ontologies for those nonhumans and the most customized interface for humans under digital capitalism.

    1. From Determination to Agencies

    As digital infrastructures become increasingly networked, media studies’ focus on their ability to re-organize media environments has also shifted. Affordance in media studies was once descriptive of media’s function to program “the possibilities in the world for how an agent (a person, animal, or machine) can interact with something” (Norman 18), but it seems more important now to study the way undetermined actions afforded to such agents can update and contribute to the functionality of a network. For instance, in 1986, Friedrich Kittler anticipated that the IF-THEN commands in computer languages would substitute for the symbolic order of human discourses as these “conditional jump instructions” would translate one’s free will into a cybernetic servo-mechanism. For Kittler, the IF-THEN command represents the computational logic of the early cybernetics, which analyzed human behaviors, including language, as “cruise missile”-like variables whose linear trajectories are conditioned by simple feedback loops executable in a linear manner (258). In contrast, what Katherine Hayles calls “a cognitive assemblage” describes how today’s technical infrastructures consist of many autonomous “technical cognizers” controlling the objects that behave like “highly mobile and flexible insurgents and ‘terrorists’” (132).4 Distributed in a swarm-like state, the modularity of these interoperable agents is designed to form an assemblage flexible enough not only to adapt to the changeable environments—like the US military “drone swarms” targeting actual human guerillas—but also to cultivate the things enmeshed by its environmental sensors into the nodes of a potential network. In Frans van der Helm’s media performance MeMachine, for instance, a human body in “a high-tech data suit outfitted with sensors” such as electrocardiography (ECG), electromyography (EMG), and electroencephalography (EEG) is transformed into an object as a source of manifold vital signals that organize these technical cognizers into a network (ARlab; Hayles 129-30). This change in the character of media affordance over recent decades, also coincident with the relocation of humans in digital infrastructures from outside-facing (facing the user) to inside-facing (as hosts for machine-readable signals), has been spurred not simply by the users and objects becoming too elusive to be caught in IF-THEN commands. It rather reflects the media industry’s need to disturb the traditional boundaries between human-subject and nonhuman-object in order to dispatch their machinic cognizers into a larger number of still-unexcavated human problems, and to market their possible solutions through the interoperations of these cognizers. As much as the ubiquitous dangers of guerilla-like intelligences have presented problems to which a military network can respond, smart clothes have conversely transformed wearers’ bodies into things full of ubiquitous problems manageable only through the network computing of microprocessors under their fabrics (Andrejevic). This twofold goal in engineering, namely to redefine problems to justify algorithmic solutions, has transformed human bodies and behaviors into research objects in the same communicational layer with smart objects and appliances. A peculiar commodity-form called IoT generalizes this engineering scenario even in our everyday practices in order to maximize its use value proportional to the number of ubiquitous risks properly manageable only by the networks of nonhuman cognizers.

    The algorithm has been marketed as the commodification of efficient and automatized circuit-change technologies that can be applied to any goal-oriented processes from industrial production to domestic reproduction. Modeled as cybernetic servomechanisms, both human bodies and nonhuman objects were previously thought to be functional units that could be distributed most optimally by the discursive protocols or hard-wired circuits of IF-THEN logic, which controlled their sites of consumption and employment, such as a workplace for bodies to be exploited as the hosts of living labor and a house for objects to be used for reproducing labor power. As part of the IoT’s sensor/processor/actuator relations, on the other hand, they can now be placed in the same digital network, which affords their autonomous operations in swarm-like states rather than assigning them to predefined positions for the programmed goals. This design decision to give higher degrees of freedom to objects may entail inefficiencies in the case of simple goal-oriented processes, which were the most important tasks for the IF-THEN based systems, but its long-term advantage, the versatility of a network, is enough to compensate for these problems. In a typical IoT system such as a smart home, software applications newly added to the system usually reach their full functionality only after certain environmental parameters are detected as changing relative to the interoperation of smart objects. This necessary mapping period conversely promises more possible uses of the network in the long run insofar as more parameters are still assumed to hide in the environment, waiting to be detected by different combinations of smart objects for the applications marketed and purchased in the near future. From sequential computing to ubiquitous computing, the method of realizing the use value of an algorithmic system or of operationalizing the meaning of its efficiency has changed from hard-wiring to autonomous networking. This has also been paralleled by the changing understanding of the problems assumed to be embedded in the operational environments of algorithmic systems, from something re-constructible as a cruise-missile-like object in the linear reasoning of IF-THEN sequences to another that can be concretized only through its simultaneous and nonlinear interactions with distributed others.

    In computational environments, this change can be described in terms of the shift from the correlationist modeling of early cybernetics to ubiquitous computing’s pan-correlationist modeling, which also distinguishes Hayles’s emphasis on technical agency from Kittler’s technological determinism. Galloway uses the term pan-correlationism to describe how Graham Harman’s object-oriented ontology (OOO) “democratizes” the concept of relation from its monopolized uses in the human construction of reality “by disseminating it to all entities” (“The Universe”). For Harman, a disciple of Bruno Latour, object-orientation is a philosophical method that restores the speculative autonomy of objects in the world represented by actor-network theory, in which the only definitive evidence for the presence of actors is their mobilizing or being mobilized by each other. For this redemptive mission, Harman instead takes as definitive for its becoming an object each entity’s withdrawal into its own core, which “contains unknown realities never touched by any or all of its relations.” By doing so he achieves two goals. First, he liberates objects from any correlationist others, both humans and nonhumans, who attempt to monopolize all the relations between objects for constructing and expanding their subjective reality or networks of technoscience, because “relations do not exhaust a thing” insofar as it always preserves hidden realities to withdraw further into. At the same time, insofar as relations conversely “rely on” the traces of the thing’s withdrawals, there always remain more relations to be further extracted between the objects that constantly withdraw from each other (Prince 132). Galloway chooses the term pan-correlationism to expose how vulnerable this endeavor of OOO (to cut all relations away from the speculative inner realities of objects) is to the ideological reprogramming of capitalist relationism. In his reframing, Harman’s assumption of the inexhaustible inside preserved for the objects’ further withdrawals ironically turns out to be what guarantees the inexhaustible correlations ever extractable from the exteriors of the objects as a result of their constant withdrawals from one another. In object-oriented ontology, there always remains “the sensual skin of exchange value” to be excavated from between any interacting objects (Galloway, “A Response”).

    As “the structure of the most highly evolved technologies of post-Fordist capitalism” (Galloway, “The Poverty” 347), ubiquitous computing can be understood as what operationalizes this capitalist repurposing of speculative reality into the reservoir for ubiquitous correlations. In computer science, the object-orientation is a “computational logic” (Kowalski) that defines each algorithmic agent by its own “beliefs (what the agent knows), desires (what the agent wants) and intentions (what the agent is doing) at its core” (Jennings 288). Re-operationalized through ubiquitous computing, which affords more autonomous and unexpected encounters between these objects, the logic of object-orientation in turn redefines its shared environments as full of hidden data that can be extracted through any objects under interaction, transmitted as inputs to any others, and thus never fully bound by any attempt of linear modeling from a single object, but only concretizable through the constant relation-making between distributed objects. In this sense, the term pan-correlationism suggests how resonant the anti-correlationism of the speculative realists is, in fact, with the recent use of the term “correlation” by tech-savvy gurus such as Chris Anderson in Wired magazine. For Anderson, correlation is what manifests the end of “causation” as the human means for “crude approximations of the truth.” Correlation for him is anything that can be data-mined between any interactive objects except subject-object relations. If the recent software industry believes in the inexhaustible and ubiquitous problems always preserved for further excavation and commodification, the pan-correlationist modeling of reality promises this ever-exploitable future of the IoT.

    For the formal architecture to accommodate this coincidence between the structures of ontological systems and the most advanced commodity form of today, we may need to first examine a programming paradigm called object-oriented programming. As Alan Kay, the architect of the early OOP language Smalltalk, writes, “Its semantics are a bit like having thousands and thousands of computers all hooked together by a very fast network” (70). OOP is characterized by its “behavioral building blocks,” objects that “have much in common with the monads of Leibniz” (70), as each object enfolds the definitions of its own constituents, data structures, and possible interoperations with others. Put differently, an object envelops its own “tiny ontology,” stating its selective exposures and responses to environments (Bogost 21). To build an algorithmic system for object-oriented programmers is thus to design the recursive inter-operations of these objects to replace cumbersome IF-THEN sequences in the obsolete procedural programming. In the source code of a program, the objects are distributed as autonomous behavioral units but held in a metastable state or in the “initial absence of interactive communication” until after its execution or compiling for “a subsequent communication between orders of magnitude and stabilization” (Simondon 304). The compiling of a source code begins as its exposure to an environment, namely, a set of user inputs or a database, triggers the response of the object assigned in the beginning, whose behavioral outputs in turn trigger further responses from the others until the intended set of states is singled out from, created in, or removed from their shared environment. Despite their seemingly autonomous becoming as a collective, the inter-operations of the objects during the compiling is designed as a sort of pre-established harmony, as a human programmer puts them in designated locations in a source code to make their environmental exposure happen in a predetermined order.

    On the other hand, the recent achievements in the miniaturization of digital sensors/processors/actuators to a size attachable to any scale enables these purely algorithmic objects to be transplanted into natural/technical entities in the real world. In OOP, each object undergoes a process of individuation as its interactions with others gradually adjust the parameters in its data structure to niche values. The physical objects in ubiquitous computing undergo a similar process as they are enrolled in its sensor/processor/actuator affiliations. However, their new niches in the networks are not pre-established by human assumptions of harmony, but concretized through corporeal interactions with other sensor-augmented objects in environments. Just as a drone swarm constantly updates its flying formation using the aerodynamic data extracted from each drone’s interactions with others, the operational environment of an algorithmic system is no longer simply a metaphor for “human-entered data” but also for the ubiquity of data that can be extracted from any physically distributed interacting objects. These objects are virtually all re-locatable to a digital network from their own natural and technical contexts. And insofar as each of these contexts is what today’s commodification of ubiquitous computing advertises as the problem that can be more efficiently managed by its unboxing and tracing the objects’ relation-making in an actor-network-like manner, it is inevitable that the objects once stabilized in their own context will resume the individuation to find their new functional niches in the algorithmic cultures. For instance, one’s heart, muscles, and brain, already stabilized in a psychosomatic context, are now relocated to a digital network under a “smart cloth” outfitted with ECG, EMG, and EEG. Their resumed individuations to the digital niches are not based on the pre-established harmony between bodies and minds under one’s conscious or reflexive control. Rather, they can be harmonized further with other digital objects capable of sneaking under the cloth as new members of the affiliation, such as the Apple Watch or Fitbit. These gadgets, “better able to associate” the organic and machinic elements into more optimal states for different situations, such as workin out, sleeping, working, or shopping, begin to teach us what to do, much as the fitness app in your Apple Watch commands you to slow down or speed up. Human organs are no longer particular organs employed in a servomechanism but constantly re-individuate themselves for their temporal niches and uses within the nonhuman networks with which they are newly affiliated. From this changed use of human bodies, Bartleby’s gesture to disconnect himself from any capitalist uses of human beings by saying “I would prefer not to” do anything assigned by the human employer earns a new meaning. His gesture can be reinterpreted as a prophecy of recent smart objects and their withdrawals into the peripheries of human control.

    2. Bartleby, the Scrivener

    Melville’s narrator devotes the first quarter of this story of a Wall Street law office in the 1850s to describing the functional relations between his employees, which also define the end state for the rest of the story to restore after the disturbance caused by Bartleby. Nonhuman nicknames, Turkey, Nippers, and Ginger Nut, are “mutually conferred upon each other” because they are “deemed expressive of their respective persons or characters” (par. 6). It is Ginger Nut’s job to deliver “ginger-cake” to Turkey and Nippers, whose performances of “copying law papers” are complementary to each other because the former is reliable only in the morning whereas the latter works well only in the afternoon. For the lawyer confident in reorganizing their different responses, to make the office operational for his own goal is to distribute these workers along a procedural sequence: “it being morning, Turkey’s answer is couched in polite and tranquil terms, but Nippers replies in ill-tempered ones … to repeat a previous sentence, Nippers’s ugly mood was on duty, and Turkey’s off” (par. 45); to repeat in an object-oriented pseudo-code, IF it is morning THEN call Turkey or ELSE call Nipper. The lawyer’s “doctrine of assumptions” is applied everywhere in the office and enables him to predict how the actors will respond in certain conditions and to mobilize their conditional responses “to enlist the smallest suffrage in [his] behalf” (par. 155, 46). Following a pre-established harmony assumed by the lawyer, Ginger Nut claims his contribution by circulating ginger-cake, which in turn demonstrates its functionality through “probable effects upon the human constitution” of Turkey and Nippers (par. 52), whose functions as scriveners alternate in the morning and afternoon. However, the lawyer’s confidence in mobilizing these switching circuits faces a crisis in Bartleby, a new scrivener. As “more a man of preferences than assumptions,” his becoming a meticulous actor in the office is defined at first by his highly selective response of “prefer[ing] not to do” any tasks other than transcribing law papers “at the usual rate of four cent a folio” (par. 83). In the middle of the story, Bartleby begins to narrow this response further to the extent of preferring not to answer any queries from the lawyer and finally ceasing to produce any readable texts. At this point, the lawyer (as a system builder) has the following conversation with Bartleby:

    “Now what sort of business would you like to engage in? Would you like to re-engage in copying for some one?”

    “No; I would prefer not to make any change.”

    “Would you like a clerkship in a dry-goods store?”

    “[…] I would prefer not to take a clerkship,” he rejoined, as if to settle that little item at once.

    “How would a bar-tender’s business suit you? There is no trying of the eyesight in that.” “I would not like it at all; though, as I said before, I am not particular.”

    […]

    “Well then, would you like to travel through the country collecting bills for the merchants? That would improve your health.”

    “No, I would prefer to be doing something else.”

    “How then would going as a companion to Europe, to entertain some young gentleman with your conversation,—how would that suit you?”

    “Not at all. It does not strike me that there is anything definite about that. I like to be stationary. But I am not particular.” (par. 197-209)

    ANT’s principle of symmetry states that “all the elements that go to make up a heterogeneous network, whether these elements are devices, natural forces, or social groups,” can make themselves present as actors only “by influencing the structure of the network in a noticeable and individual way” (Law 124-6). Conversely, the same principle implies that any actors withdrawing from their current network should enroll in another that is “better able to associate elements” (111), unless they prefer not to return any noticeable responses and thus not to be present any longer to others. Bartleby’s preference not to do something else expresses his fatigue over being this kind of element unable to be present at all if not assigned to a new functional niche in the office or in an outside labor market according to the lawyer’s “doctrine of assumptions.”5 Bartleby’s strategy to respond to the queries by saying that he prefers not to suggests the minimum that an actor should do to stay in a current state. As a dehumanized object stuck within the algorithmic human resource management, Bartleby’s gesture to postpone his assignment to particular uses thus unboxes the apparently seamless commodity exchange in the labor market. The lawyer’s subsequent and never-ending IF-THEN questions, “would you like to re-engage in …? Well then, would you …? How then would …?,” reveal the maximum that the employer needs to do to black-box again the formal symmetry of the capitalist uses of human beings.

    The lawyer’s efforts to find a new niche for Bartleby, however, always turn out to be undertaken too late, after Bartleby has already declared his preference not to do that work. And when Bartleby is proved not to be handled by the servo-mechanical “logic of the ‘if…then’ statement,” the lawyer discovers a secret network of nonhumans in which Bartleby’s withdrawal finds the smallest niche for his presence: a “bachelor’s hall” that “Bartleby has been making” with things hidden at the peripheries of the lawyer’s attention, such as “a blanket” under his desk rolled away, “blacking box and brush” under the empty grate, “a tin basin, with soap and a ragged towel” on a chair, “a few crumbs of ginger-nuts and a morsel of cheese” in a newspaper (par. 88). Shortly after Bartleby declares his presence in the office despite his refusal to accept any of the new positions the lawyer recommends, these objects, once supposedly governed under the lawyer’s “doctrine of assumptions,” appear to converge instead upon an alternative network. In this flat network, each thing’s presence is concretized not through the lawyer’s monopoly of (non)human resources, but through their mutual engagement at the peripheries of capitalist resource distribution. Contrary to the traditional interpretations of Bartleby’s gesture as a suicidal disconnect from any social ties, what he really achieves through his withdrawal is not the redemption of humanity “through death” (Reed 266) but the retrieval of social ties among nonhumans from capital’s dehumanizing correlationism, which defines every object, including human labor, as exchange or use value to preserve or increase capital. The withdrawal of objects into their inner realities “never touched by any or all of [their] relations” is enough for these objects to be present without necessarily being engaged in the businesses of others (Harman, Prince 132); at the same time, for Harman, this withdrawal also suffices to enable the ubiquitous distances between these objects to be filled with finer-grained relations as “the joints and glue that hold the universe together” (Guerilla Metaphysics 20). Bartleby’s disappearance into the peripheries of commodity exchange likewise finds a hidden society of nonhumans in which his presence in the world stands on an equal footing with everything else. Through the lawyer’s lost confidence in his assumption as to the possible uses of Bartleby, Melville’s story dramatizes a conflict between two ontologies: the correlationist modeling of reality through a human employer in the center as the avatar of old capitalism, and the pan-correlationist through the distributed nonhumans and their mutual engagements. However, there are also things his story fails to anticipate, such as how vulnerable these nonhumans are to the finer-grained resource management algorithms under advanced capitalism, and how the new avatar of capitalism will, 150 years later, appear in the form of these distributed nonhumans called smart objects.

    3. Ontic Principle of Ubiquitous Computing

    Mark Weiser defines ubiquitous computing as the withdrawl of microprocessors from the center of users’ attention towards the peripheries, where they are more correlated with other microprocessor-augmented things such as smart appliances (Weiser and Brown). Once they stop competing for human attentions to be chosen as indispensable units dragged to a narrow Graphical User Interface (GUI), the devices become more functional to each other in their exchange of the data secretly extracted from humans. Information technologies before ubiquitous computing such as “pagers, cellphones, newservices, the World-Wide-Web, email, TV, and radio” were designed to “bombard us frenetically” to draw our attention and claim their increasing presence in a human-centered network (79). Like Turkey claiming his functionality to the lawyer even in the afternoon when he malfunctions by asking “if his services in the morning were useful, how indispensible, then, in the afternoon?” (par. 6), these machines once appealed for their usefulness to human users who monopolized what ANT calls the “Obligatory Passage Point (OPP)” of the network, through which all actors must pass to be assigned and specified as the actors appropriate for the goal of a system (Callon 205-6). On the other hand, objects in the Ubiquitous Computing (UC) era prefer not to respond to queries from users. Like Bartleby, they stay “calm” in the periphery of attention and maintain the slightest presence in “a confederacy of ‘smart’ objects,” which “whisper information to one another in inaudible frequencies,” not in order to reoccupy the center of attention at the most timely moment for our needs (as Weiser’s original design intended), but to “conspire to sell us products” in a timely manner (Andrejevic 113-4).

    In their withdrawal to the peripheries where they awaken each other to avoid awakening users, devices spend most of their time performing the minimum for their enrollment as sensors, namely scrivening “unmodulated digital data” from their operational environments. As actuators influencing others, the devices also undergo a constant and creative process of individuation to find the functional niches within their temporal inter-operations (Clemens and Nash). Unlike the lawyer’s algorithmic IF-THEN instructions, ubiquitous computing as the global intelligence of these distributed devices is capable of and patient with performing this task of never-ending resource distribution to transduce all non-particular objects in metastable states into each individual in situ. It does this by calculating the optimal way to weave the devices’ autonomous and oft-conflicting operations and goals into a collective that can be mobilized for a problem at the system level. In this sense, what become ubiquitous in the UC era are not only the symmetrical edges of the network for the smart devices’ horizontal communications but their asymmetries to a collective intelligence that seems to replace successfully the lawyer in Melville’s story and intervene in the stabilization of conflicting devices into the reciprocal and modular functions of the network. As Galloway writes, “no arbiter impedes” these symmetrical individuations of smart objects into the actors influencing each other along the edges of a network, but for their autonomous responses to each other to be gradually realigned in the most efficient and harmonious way to reach collective goals, a sort of “ultimate mystical medium” is still assumed to operate as an invisible hand (“A Response”). In the Personal Computing (PC) era, human users performed this arbiter by monopolizing the obligatory passage point represented by intuitive user interfaces that enabled them to design the harmonious interoperations of algorithmic agents for their conscious goals. In the UC era, the mystical arbiters are rather omnipresent in the form of microprocessors that may attach anywhere, more ethereal in infiltration into every edge of the networks; the operations of these smart arbiters are as immanent as marketplaces that have also infiltrated into every corner of our lives, augmented by the so-called smart applications. Harmony is no longer pre-established by the assumptions of human designers but, like the flying formation of a drone swarm, must be constantly gathered and updated from lots of minute discrepancies between each object’s expectation of its environment and its actual operation within the data extracted from others.

    Whitehead’s philosophy of actual entities provides another ontological model of “the universe of things” in the UC era that, as Steven Shaviro notes, supplements the “countless tiny vacuums” between objects mutually withdrawing in Harman’s object-oriented ontology with “a finely articulated plenum” of data left by each object’s becoming (Shaviro 39). For Galloway, in my interpretation, the coincidence between OOO and OOP implies the former’s vulnerability to ideological reprogramming; the “unknown realities” preserved and inexhaustible inside each object ironically promise the constant extraction of correlations from any objects under interactions, whose exteriors, or “sensual skin[s] of exchange value” (Galloway, “A Response”), are thus able to create ever-regenerative inter-objective realities. As a critical approach to demystify these worldly relations supposedly waiting to be excavated for ubicomp solutions, we can examine how Whitehead brings the problematic realities that OOO hides inside each object back to the platform for inter-objective communications. Whereas an object for Harman preserves its speculative presence through constant withdrawals, an actual entity for Whitehead lives only for its process of becoming called “concrescence.” Through this process, an entity prehends the universe as a “multifold datum” left by the already finished becoming of all others until the process is completed with the satisfaction of its “subjective aim” and turned into just another datum for the genesis of others (Whitehead 19, 185). The resources for creations are not hidden inside but scattered all over the world, revealed to be a large data set accumulated from the finished processes of concrescences and given for further data-mining by new actors to come. In this respect, the speculative presence of actual entities in Whitehead provides a philosophical analogy for the algorithmic objects in a source code, which also live only during their exposure to shared environments for processing input data and are then left just as what they processed, namely the changed state of these environments for others to process further. However, in that each actual entity’s concrescence is not determined by any others but performed according to its own assumption on the “harmony” between its “subjective forms” and the objective data it feels (27), the source code as the nexus of objects in this analogy should not be based in the hardwired electromagnetic circuits of personal computers. Rather, the technical incarnation of Whiteheadian actual entities is found in the smart objects in the Internet of Things as they constantly re-individuate themselves within their data-intensive environments without predefined orders. Besides this structural similarity, Whitehead’s “secularization of the concept of God” (207) as no other than one of these entities provides another rationale for the appropriateness of the analogy. Contrary to those whose concrescences are temporal and short-lived, the Whiteheadian God is characterized by its never-completed concrescence. This God’s subjective aim is “the ultimate unity” between the entire multiplicity of actual entities it senses and its conceptual prehension of their ideal harmony “in such a perfect system” (346), and this is inevitably an ever-delayed goal insofar as God cannot determine the courses of other entities’ becoming but only induces them to adjust their subjective aims. Taking the position of this global but not omnipotent agent in the analogy, the aim of an ubicomp system—the algorithmic calculation of the optimal way for the smart objects to inter-operate for systemic goals—is also a never-completed process that must be constantly updated from each object’s actual operation without any pre-given harmony.

    This secularized understanding of God is decisive in order to preserve the symmetry that Harman’s OOO sees in a flat ontology. Shaviro emphasizes that “all actual entities in the universe stand on the same ontological footing,” and even God for Whitehead has “no special ontological privileges” over the most trivial entities “in spite of” the asymmetrical “gradations of importance, and diversities of function,” among entities (Shaviro 29). However, in the emerging universe of things called IoT, these gradations of importance and functionality relocated and persisting in a flat ontology are in fact what make Whiteheadian philosophy a better analogy for the recent smart environments than Harman’s, and also make media studies’ recent interest in Whitehead (Gabrys; Parisi; Hansen) more coincident with “the structure of the most highly evolved technologies” of today. The particular entity standing at the apex of these gradations was once called God, but now reappears in the form of ubiquitous computing, and its never-ending concresence as a global intelligence intervenes in all the other entities’ temporal concresence as the nodes of its network. Rather than assigning each entity one-by-one to a specific place already prepared—what Melville’s lawyer attempted but failed—ubiquitous computing encourages the entities to find their own bachelor’s hall within the multifold data transmitted from the actual world by letting them interact according to their preferred responses to environments and in turn enabling their data structures to be coupled optimally to each niche in the ubiquitous thing-generated data. It is not in spite but because of these asymmetrical interventions of omnipresent microprocessors that all other less important but still functional entities are relocated and “rethingified” upon a flat and symmetrical platform of smart objects (Gabrys 192).

    The “ontic principle” of speculative realism often promotes itself as a democratic principle for nonhumans in opposition to “the vertical ontologies of ontotheology or a humanism” that “trace back and relate all beings to either God, humans, language, culture or any of the other princes.” It suggests “a flat ontology, one made exclusively of unique, singular individuals, differing in spatio-temporal scale but not ontological status” (Bryant, “The Ontic Principle” 268-9). The Internet of Things as the commodification of ubiquitous computing seems to operationalize this principle by liberating digital objects from their previous obligation to pass through the mediations of human princes. However, its blatant attempts to diversify the problems that can be detected and marketed along the networks of these liberated objects reveal the ideological undertone of the societal metaphors for objects such as Bryant’s “democracy of objects” (The Democracy), applied to today’s media systems without mention of the primary asymmetry of the network. The ubiquity of smart objects and their autonomous operations translate and integrate each singular reality they locally perceive into a larger data set as a shared environment in which all of them are interoperable no matter how different their narrow world views are from one another. These ubiquitous symmetries for the ubiquitous accumulation of sharable data are, however, also asymmetrically engaged in the quasi-theological individuation of a global intelligence. As the following section will exemplify by examining a scenario involving a smart navigation system, Bartleby’s gesture to non-humanize himself as one of many office objects in a flat and invisible network does not mean his or its liberation from capitalist resource management. This instead forms the condition for a global intelligence system to emerge from its asymmetrical interventions in each symmetrical edge of the network.

    4. AIDA: A New Bachelor’s Hall

    AIDA (Affective Intelligent Driving Agent) is an in-dash navigation system developed by MIT’s SENSEable City Lab, Media Lab, and the Volkswagen’s Electronics Research Lab. Equipped with several projectors that display a 3D map on the dashboard, AIDA visualizes the most efficient route to a destination as a solution to the possible need of a registered driver (see fig. 1).

    Fig. 1 AIDI’s dashboard display. MIT Sensable City Lab. “AIDA 2.0.” Youtube, uploaded by MIT SENSEable City Lab, 11 May, 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zKLAeq1m2TY

    Unlike non-smart systems, “AIDA analyses the driver’s mobility patterns, keeping track of common routes and destinations” to “identify the set of goals the driver would like to achieve” (MIT Sensible City Lab). To provide the driver with the most customized niche not only in a vehicle but in the traffic networks and points of interest (POI) in neighboring areas, AIDA interfaces sensor-generated driver data concerning her implicit needs with the data “pertaining to various aspects of the city including traffic, seasonal information, environmental conditions, commercial offerings, and events” (Lorenzo et al.).

    An ordinary object-oriented navigation simply receives the data packets from outside sources, such as GPS and traffic information, in order to remodel its surroundings with algorithmic objects such as a street, intersection, or geo-tagged landmarks, whose functional relations as nodes in a graph individuate the shortest route on the map to solve the problem of the “human-entered” destination. On the other hand, as a prophet-like agent smart enough to direct the driver to where she must go to fulfill her current need, what AIDA should individuate foremost is not the shortest route but the most urgent problem of the driver, which has yet to surface but is lurking in the peripheries of her attention as the ubiquitous symptoms filling the car. AIDA’s ubiquitous computing individuates the problem preemptively and puts it in a navigable form that would be solved progressively as she drives the car along the route to a spot it recommended on the map. As an IoT system counterinsurgent to this guerilla-like problem—namely, a human driver demoted to a host of machine-readable vital signals—AIDA populates not only the interior network of the Audi full of interconnected sensors for facial expressions, voices, galvanic skin response, braking/acceleration pressures, seat position, and steering (see fig. 2), but “a multitude of tags, sensors, locationing devices, telecommunications networks, online social networks, and other pervasive networks … proliferating in cities,” as well as the driver’s social networks.

    Fig 2. A network of sensor-augmented things in AIDA 1.0. The AIDA Project (Affective, Intelligent Driving Agent), MIT SENSEable City Lab and Personal Robots Group of Media Lab, 2009, http://senseable.mit.edu/aida/. Accessed 10 Dec. 2019.

    Suppose that Bartleby, hired as a test driver, found his new bachelor’s hall in this Audi. After the first week, long enough for the sensor network to be trained to relate the behavioral signals collected from the distributed body parts to his current affective state, AIDA would begin to figure out his “home and work location” and “be able to direct” him to the grocery store that he is likely to prefer. After a month, AIDA could detect his hunger from the signals collected and analyzed through the “historical behavioral collector (HBC)” and “historical route collector (HRC),” and then recommend the restaurant rated highest by Yellow Pages users with similar social networking service (SNS) profiles (Lorenzo et al.). Bartleby may find that he is aware of his hunger only several minutes after the distributed symptoms were identified by AIDA, but may not seriously care about this delay even though it is always long enough to pass the restaurant most customized to his taste. However, after he learns that his too-human consciousness is, as Hayles warns, always behind the non-conscious responses of his body by at least several hundred milliseconds, so-called “missing half-second,” long enough to be hijacked by other non-conscious cues from “the advent of affective capitalism and computational media” (Hayles 191; Hansen 190), even hunger would become a crisis that should be preempted by AIDA and immediately visualized as a red route to the restaurant on the map. He is now responsible for eliminating this route by driving his Audi corner to corner according to AIDA’s instructions (see fig. 3).

    Fig 3. AIDA recommending a restaurant. MIT Sensable City Lab. MIT SENSEable City Lab and Personal Robots Group of Media Lab, “AIDA 2.0.” Youtube, uploaded by MIT SENSEable City Lab, 11 May, 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zKLAeq1m2TY

    What has occurred in this local network of smart sensors after a month of test driving is Bartleby’s individuation as a registered driver. But, on the other side of the interface, where his current physiological and behavioral states are ceaselessly translated into the red route heading somewhere to be resolved, his individuation appears to have been driven entirely by another individuation of AIDA into a prophet-like intelligence, ceaselessly weaving a flat ontology out of many different types of sensor data—such as GPS data, a city’s Points of Interest and their rankings in Yellow Page, lots of geotagged images of the city, the driver’s and his neighbors’ social network profiles, and his historical route and behavior data—by folding them into the pathway he draws (Lury and Day 30).

    After these reciprocal individuations, Bartleby on the day of his public demonstration would see something reminiscent of the compulsive questions of the lawyer in Melville’s story haunting the dashboard, tuned up for the maximum functionality of AIDA. On the way to the destination that AIDA would already have predicted from his route histories, Bartleby would encounter many small pop-up windows and tags on the map referring to places for entertainment, social events, and other sensor-augmented commodities, claiming to concretize his unknown desires distributed across his facial expressions, voice, galvanic responses, butt position, accelerating and braking foot pressures (see fig. 4).

    Fig 4. AIDA advertising a social event. MIT SENSEable City Lab and Personal Robots Group of Media Lab, “AIDA 2.0.” Youtube, uploaded by MIT SENSEable City Lab, 11 May, 2011, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zKLAeq1m2TY

    Just like the lawyer in the story, AIDA asks, “would you like to …? Well then, would you …? How then would …?” Contrary to the lawyer who failed to keep enumerating all possible niches for Bartleby due to his too-human managerial skill, AIDA’s recommendation is ever-extendable. Only this global intelligence can access the problem called ubiquity, and it does not ask him to share his preferences out loud. Bartleby may already find himself in his most customized bachelor’s hall, which eliminates any possible disturbances even before they actually occur. Now he needs to accept the “terms of use” for AIDA, but what pushes him to agree with these terms—which describe his new human condition as the host of digitalized vital signals—is the dormancy of problems whose symptoms are too widely distributed to be cognized by any single object except AIDA.

    Conclusion

    In critical theories after 9/11, these sorts of omnipresent agents and their asymmetrical interventions in the life of local actors have been justified by the ubiquity of problems. The latency of these problems in the peripheries of each actor’s narrow attention has justified the local actors’ commitments to a collective intelligence that preempts problems before they actually occur. Hardt and Negri claim that “the gray zone of war and peace,” in permanent danger of insurgency and terrorism, justifies the “total mobilization of social forces” for the preemptive strike of a military power that is “in asymmetrical conflicts” over unpredictable “guerrilla attacks” (13, 51-2). Massumi also writes that civilian life in this “crisis-prone environment” falls “onto a continuum with war” in which a preemptive power’s intervention should be “as ubiquitously irruptible as the indiscriminate threats it seeks to counter” (27-8). Not necessarily based on the wide spaces reminiscent of battlefields, or necessarily generalizing these military environments to the scales of human bodies to be covered by wearable devices and home/office for smart appliances, the Internet of Things invents a novel strategy for its market penetration from this tension between the insurgency of ubiquitous problems and the counterinsurgency of an intelligent system. In Melville’s fiction, Bartleby’s symmetry-breaking insurgency was never preventable by the lawyer’s linear management programmed in IF-THEN statements. But, as I re-fictionalized through Bartleby in AIDA, this human inaccessibility to the problem called ubiquity is also the justification for the humans’ participation in the IoT as the non-humanized hosts of vital signals. For its becoming as a collective intelligence from the concrescence of these vital signals with other thing-generated data, the ubiquity of lurking problems should be advertised as the reason why it is time for humans to relinquish their right to the uses of objects that they have unfairly held for a long time and why it is time to hand it right over to the IoT, which can use them more preemptively to maintain a space always customized to our needs.

    Footnotes

    1. Fetishism in this Marxian context has been consistently defined as the mis-imposed value of the object-in-itself, which can be analyzed as the social relations congealed around the object. Arjun Appadurai instead takes fetishism as his methodology for “a corrective to the tendency to excessively sociologize transactions in things” (5). But even in his “methodological fetishism,” the values of objects are subject to a multitude of local contexts of symbolic transactions, despite their irreducibility to the global capitalist economy.

    2. For “flat ontology” in their speculative realism see Bryant, “The Ontic Principle”; Bogost, Alien Phenomenology. For Galloway’s criticism of flat ontology as the “structure of ontological systems” in recent software companies, see “The Poverty,” p. 347.

    3. In “The Role of Common Ontology,” Gruber suggests ontology as an engineering term for “knowledge-level protocols” between AI systems, each of which is distinguished by its own “symbolic-level” of representation of environments. The role of ontology is not to organize a single globally shared theory of the environment. It rather aims to provide languages for an output of a system to be translated into the input for another to maximize the inter-operability of and communicability between the systems.

    4. These objects and object-like users may be modeled best as the actor in the term actor-network, not an “individual atom” hyphenated to a network in a deterministic way, but a “circulating entity” that draws lots of hyphens to “hook up with” each other for both specifying its local agency and organizing global structure (Latour 17-8). For these actors, “a substrata: something upon which something else ‘runs’ or ‘operates’” is no longer a proper metaphor for infrastructures; rather, technological infrastructures are installed as communication protocols for these circulating entities to make their “local practices afforded by a larger-scale technology” into the modular functions “which can then be used in a natural, ready-to-hand fashion” by others (Star and Ruhleder 113-4).

    5. It is noteworthy that David Kuebrich relates the lawyer’s “doctrine of assumption” about the niche positions for each actor in his design of the fully operational office to “the larger culture that there is no inherent contradiction between the dedicated pursuit of self-interest, even when it involves the exploitation of others, and devotion to traditional Christian values” (396). According to him, the doctrine “exemplifies the values and attitudes of the Protestant entrepreneur who fused his Christian faith,” such as the faith in the “Starvation and wretchedness … by Heavenly appointment,” with “emerging economic practices in such a way as to legitimate inequality and class privilege” (383, 386).

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  • From Death Drive to Entrepreneurship of the Self: Film Noir’s Genealogy of the Neoliberal Subject

    Tamas Nagypal (bio)

    Through the comparative analysis of Double Indemnity (1944), Body Heat (1981), and The Usual Suspects (1995), this paper argues that what Michel Foucault called the neoliberal entrepreneur of the self has its prototype in the subject constructed by the classical discourse of film noir. While in the genre’s early form the individual’s attempt at existential self-valorization remains death driven, incommensurable with the ideological values of classical liberalism, neonoir reframes its isolated protagonist’s unique mode of being as a reservoir of human capital beyond the limits of shared social norms.

    In film noir privacy establishes itself as the rule, not as a clandestine exception.
    Joan Copjec1

    In neo-liberalism […] homo oeconomicus is an entrepreneur, an entrepreneur of himself.
    Michel Foucault2

    The Neo-Noir Hero as an Entrepreneur of Himself

    At the end of Bryan Singer’s neo-noir mind-game film The Usual Suspects (1995), Verbal—the limping, stuttering small-time crook who narrates the story from police custody—is revealed to “be” legendary criminal mastermind Keyser Söze, allegedly the man behind a series of high stakes robberies and drug deals whom the FBI had never been able to identify because he killed every witness to his crimes. After the authorities cluelessly release him, his disabilities are revealed to have been faked, and the name Söze turns out to be nothing but an empty signifier he made up to manipulate others to do his bidding—in much the same way that the film deceives viewers and puts them to cognitive work through this unorthodox narrative device. As J. P. Telotte observes, Verbal remains “unknowable, at least in the manner of classical narrative: as a figure who is marked by easily observable traits, whose motivations are readily understood, and who sets the plot in motion along a straight line” (17). By going against expectations about character and narrative form (even deploying an unreliable flashback sequence), the film compels the viewer to reflect on classical Hollywood conventions as nothing but arbitrary constructs (Telotte 19). The postclassical narration informs both the carefully calculated unfolding of the hero’s fabricated persona, which is designed to eliminate Verbal’s rivals within the diegesis (as generic character types transparent to him and to the viewer), and the revelation of film’s fabrication, which is designed to compete with conventional Hollywood products on the extra-diegetic marketplace. The key to its success on both levels is the preservation of the Söze-myth: the accumulation of social and economic capital through this enigmatic brand name, the signifier of a unique hero with the potential to be everything in the eyes of others because he never allows himself to be pinned down. Just as Söze kills those who can identify him, the film undercuts the viewer’s attempt to construct a coherent narrative by flaunting its unreliability.3

    Verbal’s narrative self-mobilization is that of the neoliberal homo oeconomicus in the Foucauldian sense: the subject turning his mental and physical traits, abilities, and skills into human capital to invest in and improve upon. Profiting from the inflated reputation of his manufactured identity, Verbal is an “entrepreneur of himself, being for himself his own capital, being for himself his own producer, being for himself the source of [his] earnings” (Foucault 26).4 Besides neoliberalism’s creative dimension, however, Verbal also reveals the dark underside of such neoliberal selfhood: the noir subject thrown into a Hobbesian world where capitalist competition, rather than the liberal platform of meritocratic self-affirmation, becomes a struggle for life and death. As Marx notes, classical liberalism relied on a split between its subject’s public and private personas: the bourgeois pursuing his private self-interest in the unequal domain of capitalist economy and the citoyen sharing equal rights with others in the public sphere (“On the Jewish Question” 34). Both neoliberalism and classical noir break this balance in favor of an all-encompassing private domain, but they attach different values to the shift (Copjec 183; Harvey 3). The characters of classical noir suffer from an existential malaise; they “have no place of refuge in [noir’s] cruel naturalistic world, this life-as-a-jungle setting. Alone and unprotected, they are truly strangers, to themselves as well as to others. The world is littered with pitfalls against which the individual has, at the most, meager defenses” (Hirsch 4). Neoliberalism, by contrast, presents the expansion of the private sphere as an opportunity for increasing individual freedom and self-empowerment. Verbal is a case in point, insofar as he is a successful self-made man whose refusal to depend on reciprocal relationships with others makes him stronger rather than more vulnerable: he triumphs by cutting his ties to fellow criminals. A flashback even shows him (as Keyser Söze) killing his own wife and children to avoid being cornered when they are taken hostage—an escalation of Gary Becker’s notorious neoliberal economic model that sees family members calculating cost-benefit ratios while investing into being with each other (108-135).

    Verbal’s path to victory is not without its own noir pitfalls, however. His amoral autonomy as a neoliberal subject is strangely machinic, chasing an ideal of freedom that paradoxically coincides with absolute unfreedom: his successful management of his life through rational choices leads to the total subordination of himself to an efficient algorithm of capital accumulation. Thomas Elsaesser points out a similar contradiction in the way contemporary mind-game films address their viewers. The increasing amount of cognitive labor required to untangle the narrative puzzles of films like The Usual Suspects, Memento (1998), or The Matrix (1999) reflects a neoliberal ideal of becoming active, self-conscious, self-improving media users rather than merely passive consumers. At the same time, what the new interactive viewers are invited to discover and enjoy is not their unconstrained freedom but their containment by the predetermined “rules of the game”: Hollywood cinema’s formal techniques of capturing and manipulating audience attention (34-37).5 This shows another key difference between classical liberalism and neoliberalism: unlike classical liberalism, which posited the spontaneously emerging equilibrium of the free market against the pre-established hierarchies of feudalism, neoliberalism is not at all antithetical to technologies of domination and social control as long as these technologies, like mind-game films, enable their subjects to actively and freely participate in their own subordination.6 I will argue that, parallel to this neoliberal shift in the idea of freedom, film noir has moved from being a limit-discourse of classical liberalism (exploring the point where bourgeois individualism turns anti-social and unproductive) to reveal radical individualism as an efficient neoliberal technology of control facilitating new forms of capital accumulation.

    From Generic to Genetic Human Capital

    Pushing the ideal of the self-programmed entrepreneur to its sociopathic, “noir” conclusion, The Usual Suspects is symptomatic of what Lauren Berlant calls the contemporary “waning of genre,” the increasing difficulty of applying social imaginaries of a “good life” to the conditions of neoliberal capitalism (6). The script of the ensemble crime genre (men cooperating to break the law) reaches a crisis in the film, collapsing into a noir story of an isolated individual whose very voice-over is a genre-destroying weapon (weaving the fable about Söze killing off the team of hard-boiled criminals he hired one by one). Insofar as genres are ideologies in the Althusserian sense, mapping an “imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence” (Althusser 162), the film offers a post-ideological perspective of the world where individuals can directly access the real of the capitalist market without the mediation of now outdated imagined communities like family or brotherhood. As Foucault suggests, under neoliberalism “wage is nothing other than the remuneration, the income allocated to a certain capital, a capital that we will call human capital inasmuch as the ability-machine of which it is the income cannot be separated from the human individual who is its bearer” (Foucault 226). Lacking a generic measure of value beyond the individual, neoliberalism makes no clear distinction between innate and acquired human capital. The abilities determining one’s market value, such as mobility, flexibility, educational investment, or creativity, appear now as components of the simultaneously intrinsic and engineered, but always unique genetic makeup of the neoliberal subject (what Foucault calls genetic human capital) (Foucault 228-233).

    This neoliberal notion of value, Foucault observes, represents a radical break from Marx’s influential theory of value as socially necessary labor time—an abstract category constructed with the economic totality in mind, and therefore detached from the concrete, tangible labor of individual workers (Foucault 221). For Marx, market exchange, by making commodities appear outside their socially interdependent production process, obfuscates the social relations between their producers (hides the fact that their different products contain commensurable units of abstract labor) while also giving these abstract relations of production a concrete, if distorted, expression as “social relations between things” exchangeable with each other for money (Marx 165-66). This is why Marx talks about the “twofold social character” of labor: the abstract “element of the total labor,” and the concrete, “useful private labor,” one of the commodities exchanged on the market insofar as it satisfies particular social needs (166). The same duality appears in the distinction between the (abstract) value and exchange value of commodities in general—a dialectical tension in which Marx locates the source of commodity fetishism: the false attribution of intrinsic value to exchanged things.

    From a Marxian standpoint, Hollywood genres are fetishistically distorted expressions of the social relations between the totality of producers; they are ideological formulas mapping the social relations between (human beings as) exchangeable things, where the source of common measure is not abstract labor but what can be called generic value. Film characters have generic value for viewers insofar as they successfully mediate between two contradictory social functions of generic narratives. On the one hand, as Rick Altman emphasizes, genre plots appeal to audiences by suspending the reality principle of the hegemonic social order in favour of the pleasure principle. “[Generic] pleasure,” he maintains, “derives from a perception that the activities producing it are free from the control exercised by the culture and felt by the spectator in the real world. For most of the film, then, the genre spectator’s pleasure grows as norms of increasing complexity and cultural importance are eluded or violated” (156). In other words, viewers are set up to root for the villains of various genre plots and take pleasure in seeing the social order of a family, a city, or a nation disrupted by internal and external threats. On the other hand, Thomas Schatz asserts, “as social ritual, genre films function to stop time, to portray our culture in a stable and invariable ideological position” (573) by offering symbolic resolutions to the multitude of social conflicts that play out between a genre’s familiar character types. This ideological outcome is reached through a process of reduction whereby characters antagonistic to the dominant culture (such the Indians and outlaws of classical Western films) are eventually either eliminated or integrated into the social order (Schatz 574). Genre plots are therefore examples of ideology’s “inherent transgression” in the Žižekian sense: they offer illicit fantasies of enjoyment that temporarily suspend the explicit rules and norms of the social symbolic order, but these generic pleasures are themselves governed by the “unwritten rules” of genres preventing the transgression from going too far, which is why in the end they help to sustain the status quo (Žižek, The Plague of Fantasies 24-37). In classical Hollywood, this tension is most effectively mediated by the ideal white, heterosexual, male hero described by Robin Wood as “the virile adventurer, the potent, untrammeled man of action,” whose indirect support for the social order genre plots tend to privilege over the “dependable but dull” “settled husband/father”—over the rigid representative of patriarchal law and order incapable of inherent transgression (594). In the classical Western, this hero is the lone cowboy often with a history as a criminal, who saves the community of settlers from bandits/Indians, then rides away into the sunset, like Ringo Kid in John Ford’s Stagecoach (1939). As Žižek puts it, “an ideological identification exerts a true hold on us precisely when we maintain an awareness that we are not fully identical to it, that there is a rich human person beneath it: ‘not all is ideology, beneath the ideological mask, I am also a human person’ is the very form of ideology, of its ‘practical efficiency’” (27). What I call the generic value of Hollywood’s familiar character types is then the degree to which they can serve as vehicles for inherent transgression—for an ideological identification with the “good life” animated by the genre. Far from being a monolithic concept, the “good life” is the name for the lived contradiction between the reality and the pleasure principle—often mapped as the conflict between community and individual—temporarily stabilized in the resolution of the generic plot. In this framework, the ideology of classical liberalism is revealed as generic in nature, its split form establishing the private as the inherent transgression of the public sphere.

    In classical Hollywood genre films, the ideal male hero embodies what Marx calls the general form of value: a commodity expressing the value of other commodities (163), namely the generic value of various character types, who, through the narrative range of inherent transgression set by the white male protagonist, become commensurable with him insofar as they traverse the continuum between the written and unwritten rules of the generic community. In Stagecoach, for instance, Ringo Kid, after redeeming himself from his criminal past by helping to save the white settlers from an Apache attack, lends his generic value to the prostitute Dallas by proposing to marry her, retroactively turning her sexual deviance into a transgression inherent to the Western’s normative community. If, as Richard Dyer observes, whiteness in classical genre films functions as an invisible social norm connoting “order, rationality, [and] rigidity” (47-48), generic masculinity can be seen as the variable that adds the ideologically acceptable deviation from this norm. On the other hand, characters who are eliminated in the plot’s final resolution offer transgressive pleasures for audiences that are excessive, beyond the ideological range of the genre, that is, beyond the measure of generic value. In The Ususal Suspects, Keaton represents the trajectory of the classical Hollywood hero: he is a former crime boss who has turned into a legitimate restaurant owner with the help of his uptown New York lawyer girlfriend. Predictably, he is the police’s number one Söze suspect; they misread him playing the classical gangster’s game of inherent transgression, using his legal businesses as a front for more lucrative criminal enterprises. By contrast, Verbal/Söze is like a classical villain with a potentially unlimited (incommensurable) range of transgressions, which, however, are mobilized through his self-made fiction of a neoliberal entrepreneur rather than the physical action of a classical hero (he remains at the police station until the very end of the film except for the flashbacks he narrates with dubious authenticity).

    The Usual Suspects sets up the contrast between neoliberal and generic masculinity via the scene of the lineup, an image that also serves as the publicity poster for the film. The lineup presents the five male protagonists standing against a white wall with a height chart—a panoptic device of the law constructed to measure their (masculine) deviance. They are picked up by the police as the “usual” (or we might say: generic) suspects in an armed robbery where the perpetrators left no hard evidence, and are asked to read the line, “Hand me the keys, you fucking cocksucker!” out loud so the security guard who witnessed the crime could identify their voice. Since none of them (with the possible exception of Verbal) were involved, they treat the questioning as an opportunity to prove their manhood (generic value) to the law, alternating between the performance of cool detachment (Hockney and Keaton) and ridiculously exaggerated macho mannerisms (McManus and Fenster)—two affective extremes of the stereotypical Hollywood gangster demarcating a range of inherent transgression. It is only Verbal who actually produces a tone of voice, both calm and threatening, that could have been used by the robbers. In addition, he accentuates the word “me” in the sentence, providing a clue to the suspect’s “true” identity—and yet he, the “cripple,” won’t be treated as a real suspect (and similarly, the spectator doesn’t pay attention to him because he doesn’t offer the same generic pleasures as the others). To use Žižek’s distinction in “Desire: Drive = Truth: Knowledge,” Verbal thereby lies in the guise of the truth (148): his response could very well be factually accurate, but his visible nonconformity to the generic masks of masculine criminality undercuts the symbolic efficiency of his statement, turning it opaque. The others, by contrast, tell the truth in the guise of a lie: while their posturing doesn’t have a factual basis (they didn’t commit the robbery), their performance reveals their identification with the gangster type. Contrary to his peers, Verbal ignores the fetish of a generic masculinity that he is supposed to express to gain status among the others, and it is because of this that he is able to treat this exercise, like his entire narration, as calculated roleplaying.

    Along these lines, one can argue that The Usual Suspects is a post-patriarchal film: by revealing the nonexistence of the hyper-phallic gangster boss Söze, an ideal that none of the protagonists can really embody, generic masculinity is de-fetishized, exposed as a hollow shell—or as Judith Butler would say: a performance with no essential core at its center—and Verbal’s market value is attributed not to his manliness (his generic human capital) but to his entrepreneurial abilities as an individual (his genetic human capital). For Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, this is how Empire, the global regime of neoliberal capitalism, functions: instead of ideologically prescribing a particular identity for the multitude of productive subjects, as former paradigms of capital accumulation did, Empire mobilizes the creative potential of human life as such, even in the forms that were formerly considered useless and unproductive (like Verbal’s disabilities). Rather than tying value to previously fetishized forms of western white heterosexual masculinity, now “the construction of value takes place beyond measure,” “determined only by humanity’s own continuous innovation and creation” (Hardt and Negri 356).

    A closer look at its identity politics, however, reveals the dissolution of the film’s post-ideological facade. After his release from police custody, Verbal drops the fake limp and stutter he performed to remain invisible among hardened criminals and lawmen flaunting their machismo, and he is driven away in a Jaguar by his chauffeur/lawyer as an able-bodied white man of the American bourgeoisie—a clear exception to the paradigm of entrepreneurial self-reliance. As it turns out, he strategically wore the mask of the social abject not to subvert hegemonic masculinity but to make it more flexible, hybrid, and all-encompassing, deploying it against the limited range of his male peers’ generic tough-guy personas. This synthesis between hegemonic and abject is perfectly captured in the protagonist’s (fake) German-Turkish hyphenated identity: while in flashbacks he is depicted as a dark-skinned, long-haired gypsy from the Balkans (a romanticized nomadic subject in the southeastern border zone of Europe), he has a western name (Kaiser is German for “emperor”). He is an “abject hegemonic”7 subject of a neoliberal Empire that, despite its openness to the productive potential of multiple forms of life, hasn’t quite given up its allegiance to white masculinity as its fetishistic anchoring point.

    Verbal’s performance of neoliberal entrepreneurship—and the film’s—is therefore doubly cynical: first, for putting on counter-hegemonic masks without believing in them, and second, for embracing white masculinity after undermining its generic status as common measure. This double cynicism constitutes the film’s neoliberal persona as completely flexible yet utterly rigid. On the one hand, through Verbal’s subjective narration, the film interpellates the viewer as a cynic in Paolo Virno’s sense of the term, as the figure who emerges after the decline of the classical liberal social contract that used to ground the symbolic community of equal citizens who share common values. “From the outset,” Virno argues, cynics “renounce any search for an inter-subjective foundation for their praxis, as well as any claim to a standard of judgement which shares the nature of a moral evaluation” (88). As a cynic, he suggests, one “catches a glimpse of oneself in individual ‘games’ which are destitute of all seriousness and obviousness, having become nothing more than a place for immediate self-affirmation—a self-affirmation which is all the more brutal and arrogant, in short, cynical, the more it draws upon, without illusions but with perfect momentary allegiance, those same rules which characterize conventionality and mutability” (87). Cynics are not bound by the generic range of inherent transgression because they don’t believe in shared symbolic norms—the background against which their transgressions could be commensurable with the transgressions of others. On the other hand, the film is also cynical in the Žižekian sense insofar as its cynicism betrays an unconscious, post-generic ideology on its own:

    The fundamental level of ideology […] is not that of an illusion masking the real state of things but that of an (unconscious) fantasy structuring our social reality itself. And at this level, we are of course far from being a post-ideological society. Cynical distance is just one way—one of many ways—to blind ourselves to the structuring power of ideological fantasy: even if we do not take things seriously, even if we keep an ironical distance, we are still doing them. (The Sublime Object of Ideology 30)

    Ideologies are effective not (merely) because we believe in them, but because we enjoy practicing them (73). We should add a distinction here between generic and extra-generic enjoyment: while the former is the expression of the pleasure principle as the inherent transgression of the reality principle and therefore remains tied to ideological belief in intersubjective norms, the latter can be understood as what Žižek (after Lacan) calls the surplus-enjoyment (jouissance) beyond the pleasure principle (89). In the case of the film, this beyond the pleasure principle is found beyond the generic range of inherent transgression, and therefore beyond common measure.8 Cynicism undermines ideological investment in the former but not in the latter. In the neoliberal era, cynical reason (not generic belonging) is purported to guarantee the self-governing subject’s market value through entrepreneurial self-fashioning. Ideology returns as the constitutive exception to this paradigm: as the no less cynical enjoyment of one’s socially constructed identity as private property (genetic human capital), beyond its function as the general equivalent of value.

    In The Usual Suspects, cynical (post-generic, but ideological) enjoyment is solicited most explicitly in the final scene, when Verbal drops his fake limp, lights a cigarette, and gets into his Jaguar, while the audio track repeats fragments of his unreliable voiceover narration. He silently exchanges gazes and smirks with his driver Kobayashi, whom the viewer recognizes as Söze’s lawyer from Verbal’s narrative—a white man engaged, much like the protagonist, in a symbolic performance of racial drag to lend himself an impenetrable Oriental authority. What is captured here is the moment when the engineered aspects of the neoliberal subject’s human capital are retroactively transformed into innate, genetic capital expressed through signifiers of white affluence—or, to put it differently, this is the moment when the aesthetic of cynical reason is transformed into that of cynical enjoyment. Contrary to classical genre films, whiteness doesn’t function here as the symbolic norm against which generic transgressions can be measured, but as the ultimate transgression, conspiracy against the social order. Unlike generic white masculinity, this genetic white masculinity is not a universal measure of the “good life” but a state of exception from it, a privilege gained through its neoliberal deconstruction. The genetic value of the film, that is, the fundamental, unconscious ideological fantasy offered to the viewer for surplus enjoyment beyond the puzzle-algorithms of Verbal’s tactically changing masks is then white masculinity as the hidden monopoly of human capital, the condition of possibility of successful neoliberal entrepreneurship. Unlike the inherent transgressions of the film’s now obsolete criminals, this new white masculinity is fetishized as the mysterious, innate component of genetic human capital that makes the market value of the neoliberal “abilities-machine” potentially infinite.

    The Proto-Neoliberalism of Classical Noir

    It is no coincidence that The Usual Suspects uses film noir tropes (voice-over confession, nonlinear narration, homme fatale, deception and betrayal, murder as an existentialist act, etc.) to reflect on the transformation of Hollywood cinema in the age of neoliberal cynicism. Film noir, in its classical form, is the Hollywood discourse of the self-enclosed, alienated modern subject par excellence—a generic anomaly that emerged during the sociopolitical rupture of the Second World War and pushed the film industry’s established visions of the “good life” into crisis. As I have argued, the “good life” offered in generic fantasies is the result of a fragile balance between its characters’ docility and transgression, their abiding by and subverting the abstract law of the land. Film noir, however, tips this balance in favour of a surplus enjoyment (jouissance) that, instead of serving as the measure of inherent transgression, is exhibited as the burdensome property of an isolated individual, an (anti-)hero’s existential excess without generic value. As Hugh Manon notes, noir’s typical male protagonist has a desire for a femme fatale that, despite its ostensibly heteronormative nature, is fundamentally masturbatory. Instead of seeking heterosexual intimacy, the male hero tends to be fixated on fetish objects, the real function of which is to block their access to the woman they merely pretend to pursue. Walter Neff, the homicidal insurance salesman of Double Indemnity (1944), for instance, falls in love with the ankle bracelet of his female partner in crime, Phyllis Dietrichson, only for his already distorted desire for the woman to get further diverted by his male colleague, Keyes, who is investigating them for murder and insurance fraud. Keyes is the obstacle to the heterosexual couple’s official romantic quest and therefore the real-impossible homoerotic love object to whom Walter addresses the final intimate confession of his sins. While in classical narratives, Manon argues, obstacles to heterosexual romance are challenges set to raise the male protagonist’s desire for his partner (they are what Lacan calls objet a, the object-cause of desire), noir’s perverse hero gets fixated on the obstacle, which prevents him from getting the “good life” he is supposed to want (31).

    From a Lacanian standpoint, film noir’s fixation on the pervert’s private jouissance signals the crisis of the symbolic order’s efficiency in keeping enjoyment at bay by limiting it to a generic range of illicit fantasies. As Joan Copjec observes, the noir narrative centers on the shameless exhibition of jouissance that overturns the former (liberal democratic) notion of privacy as a “clandestine exception” (183) to public visibility—the balanced dialectic between the reality principle and the pleasure principle that gave form to genre films. When considering the role of the symbolic order in the field of vision, Lacan stresses that human subjectivity is always already a condition of being looked at by the gaze of a presupposed other. This gaze is the real, primordially separated objectal correlate (objet a) to the subject, the reminder of his founding trauma, the constitutive loss of jouissance he suffered when entering the social symbolic order. It is both a testament to his inability to reach completeness by eliminating the other, and the cornerstone of the fantasy that his self-disclosure as a fully enjoying subject is nevertheless possible (Lacan 83). The symbolic order functions here as a mediatory bar between objet a and the subject insofar as, contrary to the (impossible) real gaze, the gaze of the symbolic (big) Other is part blind, and therefore unable to see the supposedly complete, fully enjoying self the subject imagines to have lost. By giving up the attempt to fully recover it, the subject can take partial control over his loss, fill in its place with socially constructed fantasy scenes of desire that cover over the traumatic real of objet a. Symbolically “castrated” or “split” subjects therefore have access to a limited enjoyment in a separate, neither public, nor fully private, but emphatically social sphere (like the one mapped by Hollywood genres) where they imagine that the gaze of a public authority (such as the Production Code censor) cannot fully see them.

    However, as Žižek asserts, in film noir’s atomized social landscape (which lacks the mediation of modern symbolic institutions such as the bourgeois family, the workplace, the army, or the church), the isolated male hero becomes terrorized by the hallucinated return of the all-seeing, real gaze of his superego, which, unlike symbolic authority, not only knows about jouissance but even commands it, turning it into a perverse ethical duty, from the call of which there is nowhere to hide (Žižek, Enjoy Your Symptom! 149-162). Copjec describes this shift as the move from “the old modern order of desire, ruled over by an oedipal [symbolic] father” to “the new order of drive” in which “ever smaller factions of people [are] proclaiming their duty-bound devotion to their own special brand of enjoyment” (182-183). This new noir subject of drive is caught in the libidinal economy that Manon calls perverse, as it suspends the forward movement of generic narratives towards the desired symbolic resolution of their conflicts. Instead, the subject gains satisfaction from what Lacan associates with the topology of drive: the repetitive, circular movement around objet a (Lacan 174-187). As Copjec maintains, the ultimate noir fetish is the masturbatory jouissance of one’s own being, the subject’s own gaze and voice as objet a that, without the mediation of the symbolic, fall back on him. The noir protagonist is driven to make his inner excess seen and heard, paradoxically, beyond the possibility of reciprocal communication and acknowledgement, to the point where it clearly undermines his belonging to any generic community of common measure and risks sliding into madness (Copjec 188).

    There are two clarifying remarks to make here. First, for Lacan “the drive […] is profoundly a death drive and represents in itself the portion of death in the sexed living being” (205). Second, this portion of death is immanent to the symbolic order, not some enjoyment-substance separate from it. As Alenka Zupančič puts it, “it is by means of the repetition of a certain signifier that we have access to jouissance and not by means of going beyond the signifier” (158). She argues that Lacan describes this unconventional deployment of the signifier with his category of the “unary trait,” a contingent semiotic marker, like a nervous tick or a unique tone of voice, that becomes libidinally invested by the subject, standing for his singular being in the world. “The uniqueness of the trait,” she argues, “springs from the fact that it marks the relation of the subject to satisfaction or enjoyment, that is to say, it marks the point (or the trace) of their conjunction” (157). As a contingent stand-in for objet a that carries no meaning, the unary trait is part of a non-signifying semiotic; as the gravitational center of the subject’s libidinal economy it perpetuates the repetitive jouissance of the death drive, the surplus enjoyment that is the useless but necessary byproduct of the social symbolic order (Zupančič 159). It is this nonsensical death drive that comes to the fore in film noir’s fetishization of the unary trait through formal devices such as the voice-over, extreme facial close-ups, skewed camera angles reflecting the fantasy of being looked at from a unique perspective, and flashbacks to traumatic or emotionally charged past events like the male hero’s first encounter with the femme fatale, whose intense presence is often condensed into a piece of clothing or jewelry. The death drive is the Lacanian name for the unproductive excess of life, for life threatening to throw itself off balance. It doesn’t so much kill the organism as infinitely prolong its agony, like that of the noir hero stuck in a lonely place, between social life and biological death, with the self-enclosed enjoyment of his voice, which “bear[s] the burden of a living death, a kind of inexhaustible suffering” (Copjec 185).

    Walter Neff is a case in point insofar as he narrates his perverted crime story as a flashback while fatally wounded; the deadly bullet in his body fired by Phyllis Dietrichson marks his singular encounter with jouissance. Driven by death, he then records his confession of murdering both Phyllis and her husband on a dictaphone, addressing Keyes as if he were his all-knowing, obscene, machinic superego demanding proof that Walter had been enjoying properly—a pervert’s projection that undermines his homosocial friendship with his colleague. As Žižek insists, the paralyzing relationship to such a hallucinated all-seeing gaze in film noir should not be simply identified with illicit homosexual desire, nor should it be reduced to the power of rebellious femininity: whoever comes to occupy the place of the superego is there as the noir hero’s fetish, masking the fundamental breakdown of the social symbolic order (Žižek, Enjoy Your Symptom 160). It’s important therefore to distinguish this psychoanalytic notion of the fetish from Marxian commodity fetishism. As Žižek explains, “in Marxism a fetish conceals the positive network of social relations, whereas in Freud a fetish conceals the lack (‘castration’) around which the symbolic network is articulated” (Žižek, Sublime Object 50). In classical Hollywood films, commodity fetishism is responsible for the generic value of characters, while the psychoanalytic fetish signifies the unary trait as an exception from and an existential threat to the regime of generic value. It is the fetishistic taming of the void of the real in the psychoanalytic sense that Copjec identifies in the noir hero’s desperate attempt to impose rational limits on his surplus enjoyment by establishing it as matter of exchange with an all-powerful specter of the femme fatale. This is why, she argues, in Double Indeminty Walter accepts Phyllis’s proposal to murder her husband for his life insurance money, then blames her in his voice-over confession for his own death drive that eventually destroys them both. “Having chosen jouissance,” Copjec argues, “the noir hero risks its shattering, annihilating effects, which threaten his very status as subject. In order to indemnify himself against these dangers, he creates in the femme fatale a double to which he surrenders the jouissance he cannot himself sustain” (193-94).

    Critical readers have argued that Hollywood’s “noir anxiety”9 about the boundaries of traditional gender roles and its panic-ridden attempts to re-establish them were responses to the Second World War, during which many women in the US had to enter the workforce. As a result, after the war the returning GIs were faced with a double loss; not only did they have to abandon the enjoyment of wartime male bonding, but their formerly homosocial workplace back home also lost its phallic status, that is, its clear separation from the feminine household. As life returned to “normal,” a large number of women were eventually fired from their jobs, and the femme fatale, representing the threat of female labor power, also gradually disappeared from film noir (Boozer 23). At the core of film noir is therefore a conflict inherent in the capitalist mode of production that the Wertkritik (value criticism) school of Marxism refers to as value dissociation. Contra Marx, Wertkritik argues that fetishism is already at work at the level of production, not merely in commodity circulation. In other words, the classical Marxian notion of value is itself a fetish (Trenkle 9). As Roswitha Scholz asserts, Marx’s concept of abstract labor, far from being the objective measure of value in capitalism, is an ideological construct created through the devaluation of non-productive activities seen as the gendered opposite of “commodity-producing patriarchy” (Scholz 125). What Wertkrtitik calls “value dissociation,” Scholz argues, “means that capitalism contains a core of female determined reproductive activities and the affects, characteristics, and attitudes (emotionality, sensuality, and female or motherly caring) that are dissociated from value and abstract labor” (127). The theory of value dissociation can explain why capitalism’s transformation of all human life into wage labor threatens to undermine its own condition of possibility: an effective organizing principle of “abstract” labor is always already distorted by an ideology of sexual difference. This is the contradiction American society had to face during the Second World War when the use of a female labor force both strengthened and weakened the nation: it increased production but destabilized the masculine identity of workers—a tension that could be resolved through the re-exclusion of femininity from the productive community.

    Nevertheless, such a reading of film noir as an allegory for fetishized labor relations ignores the ways in which the noir universe is fundamentally antithetical to both productive and reproductive labor (the fact that it is primarily the psychoanalytic, not the Marxian fetish that drives the noir narrative). In Double Indemnity Phyllis is a bored housewife plotting to kill her husband, fatally distracting Walter from his respectable job as a salesman. As Vivian Sobchack argues, the noir narrative operates under a spatiotemporal suspension she calls the chronotope of “lounge time,” where the protagonists idle their life away in hotel rooms, dining lounges, night clubs, gambling joints, and cars, cut off from the stability and safety of work and home alike, forever stuck in a transitory moment without arriving anywhere. From the standpoint of Wertkritik, noir’s atmosphere of unproductive, anxious idleness signals the crisis of not only masculine labor but productive labor as such, that is to say, of capitalism’s real abstraction, guaranteeing the common measure of value in different human lives that served as the economic base of the ideology of classical liberalism. This is why in film noir the capitalist market turns from benevolent invisible hand co-measuring the economic endeavours of equal-born citizens into a “life-as-a-jungle setting” where individuals seek to express their life’s value as genetic human capital beyond a general equivalent. This is the stake of the final confrontation between Walter and Phyllis in Double Indemnity: while both protagonists have chosen their private jouissance over the ideological pleasures of the dominant society when they murdered Phyllis’s husband (the film’s symbolic father figure), to fully express their individuality (to have full control over the insurance money) they each have to become independent from their partner in crime. Such a drive for individual self-fetishization is the drive to reveal one’s objet a to the real-impossible superego gaze of the market beyond the mediation of liberal democracy’s symbolic order. This is the properly proto-neoliberal dream of classical noir: to valorize the idiosyncratic jouissance of one’s unary trait, the fundamentally unproductive dimension of the subject, emancipated from any socially mediated generic value.

    Classical noir’s proto-neoliberal project, however, fails when it hits the bedrock of patriarchal value-dissociation. In Double Indemnity, both protagonists bring a gun to their final meeting; Phyllis shoots first, wounding Walter. Surprisingly, she does not kill him with a second shot but confesses her love for him instead. As Robert Pippin writes, “We have come to expect from her what she clearly expects from herself—unremitting self-interest, her destiny—and her own genuine puzzlement at what she does not do, what in effect gets her killed, figures the puzzlement of the viewers” (104). Phyllis, for a brief, tragic moment, seems to realize the internal contradiction of her death drive: while it is a drive towards fetishistic self-valorization, it simultaneously undermines the social condition of capitalist value under commodity-producing patriarchy, that is, membership in masculine community. By contrast, when Walter, skeptical of her sudden change of heart (“Sorry baby, I don’t buy it”), shoots Phyllis dead, he does it as a man reacting to the feminine jouissance (love) that threatens to de-quantify his life’s market value (the insurance payoff he got for his murder). Through this act, he establishes a minimal distance between his socially mediated gender role and his death drive. In Lacanian terms, he symbolically castrates himself by setting up a bar between himself and his objet a in order to project the latter on Phyllis, disavowing the woman’s autonomous subjectivity so she could be reduced to her role as femme fatale (a villain to be eliminated) in a generic patriarchal fantasy. This is why his subsequent voice-over confession can be finally overheard by Keyes, even though the earlier addressee of Walter’s message had been the real-impossible gaze of his own superego. And this is how, although his colleague officially condemns him by calling the police, their brief exchange can restore patriarchy as the dominant generic institution of capitalist value production:

    Walter:

    “You know why you couldn’t figure this one, Keyes? I’ll tell you. Because the guy you were looking for was too close. He was right across the desk from you.” Keyes:

    “Closer than that, Walter.” Walter:

    “I love you too.”

    The film then ends with Keyes lighting Walter’s cigarette.

    From Death Drive to Stubborn Attachment

    In Double Indemnity, the death-driven excess of the male hero’s singular jouissance is therefore ambiguous: it’s condemned but also indirectly valorized over the femme fatale‘s, reflecting the gender hierarchy of commodity-producing patriarchy based on the exclusion of feminine life from masculine value-producing labor. It reveals the conjunction of the ideological operation of value dissociation (Walter’s killing of Phyllis) with a generic regime of labor (the homosocial work-relationship between Walter and his colleague Keynes) while also repressing it by enforcing the symbolic norms of the Hollywood Production Code (Walter is punished for his crime). In other words, masculine jouissance appears here as patriarchy’s unforgivable yet necessary original sin, something beyond measure that sets up (white) masculinity as a general equivalent of value. With the advent of neoliberalism proper in the 70s, production becomes increasingly decentered and deterritorialized, extending the regime of capital accumulation to hitherto devalued spheres of human life, like that of femininity. In this mode, traditional value-dissociation starts to lose its efficacy. While in classical noir the femme fatale‘s death-driven narrative trajectory serves as a cautionary tale about the impossibility of generic human capital outside patriarchy, in neo-noir she returns as an entrepreneur of herself, representing the vanguard of the new economic paradigm precisely because of her subversion of the now outdated commodity-producing patriarchy.

    In Body Heat (1981), a Reagan-era, post-Production Code reimagining of Double Indemnity, not only is the female protagonist, Matty, allowed to get away with orchestrating the murder of her rich husband, she then successfully emancipates herself from her partner in crime, Ned, whom she dupes into taking the fall for her. In the film’s denouement, when Ned discovers that his femme fatale lover is planning to kill him with explosives rigged to the door of a boathouse, he asks her to prove her love to him by opening the door herself. The woman calls his bluff and starts walking towards the building while the camera remains static, giving us Ned’s point of view. Before she disappears into the darkness, she stops and turns back for a moment, her white dress and blonde hair lit up by moonlight, uttering with a soft voice: “Ned, no matter what you think, I do love you!” Once her image fades into black, a reverse shot shows the growing doubt on Ned’s face. He starts running after her, but it is too late: the boathouse goes up in flames. We then cut to Ned in prison a few months after, yet again suspicious about Matty’s real intentions. He manages to get ahold of a copy of her high school yearbook that proves she stole the identity of one of her classmates after most likely murdering her. Matty’s real name is Mary, nicknamed “The Vamp” by her fellow students—a serial homecoming queen whose declared ambition (unary trait) was “to be rich and to live in an exotic island.” The close-up of her yearbook photo then transitions to show Matty lying on the beach of an actual tropical island, but instead of satisfaction her face is fraught with melancholy. A local man by her side asks, “Is this what you’ve been waiting for?” referring to the cocktail that was just served to her. “What?” she asks without looking. “It’s hot,” he says, to which the distracted woman answers “Yes…” with an empty tone. The camera tilts up from her profile, settling on the clouds covering the blue sky while the credits start rolling.

    This new femme fatale both differs from and fundamentally resembles her classical predecessor. On the one hand, as a neoliberal entrepreneur of herself she now manages to outmaneuver the generic patriarchal gaze by consciously masquerading as the stereotypical spider woman fetishized by classical noir’s male protagonist. By performing her femininity for a symbolic (part blind, ignorant) rather than a real (all-seeing) gaze, she tames the classical noir femme fatale‘s death drive and avoids being discarded as the devalued double of the male hero: the clueless Ned is duped into “excluding” a mere simulacrum of the historically fetishized fatal woman while Matty slips away. At the same time, her singular jouissance (expressed through her unary trait), the reward for her separation from the regime of generic masculinity, is depicted as melancholy, sutured together through continuity editing with the gaze of the man she pushed away, remaining obsessed with her femme fatale persona. Butler calls this phenomenon stubborn attachment, arguing that subjects would rather maintain their subordination to a power apparatus in an unhappy consciousness than have no attachment at all, which leads them to desire unfreedom even when their masters are gone (Butler 31-63). Butler sees a melancholic stubborn attachment, an inability/unwillingness to mourn a lost libidinal cathexis, at the core of all gender identities (132-51). While she focuses on the child’s affections for the same-sex parent, which are ungrievable in heteronormative societies, her theoretical framework can be extended to the subject formation involved in Body Heat‘s neoliberal identity politics where the mourning (letting go) of the generic white male patriarch would leave the femme fatale‘s entrepreneurial scheme without an anchoring point against which to direct itself. Cutting this umbilical cord would jeopardize the woman’s indirect membership in a productive community, risking the loss of her life’s generic value for capitalism.

    The film offers a dialectical image of neoliberalism where the immobile white man (Ned, stuck in prison for murder) and the feminine nomadic subject (Matty, travelling alone for pleasure) are conjoined in a unity, allegorizing the mutual dependence of patriarchal law and the feminine flight from it, generic and genetic human capital, territorialization and deterritorialization. In a temporal synthesis of past and present, America’s mid-century regime of commodity-producing patriarchy is pushed away but also evoked with nostalgia. As Fredric Jameson observes,

    Everything in the film […] conspires to blur its official contemporaneity and make it possible for the viewer to receive the narrative as though it were set in some eternal thirties, beyond real historical time. This approach to the present by way of the art language of the simulacrum, or of the pastiche of the stereotypical past, endows present reality and the openness of present history with the spell and distance of a glossy mirage. (30)10

    This nostalgic tone of the film makes Matty’s neoliberal jouissance the inherent transgression of commodity-producing patriarchy, valorizing her singular affect only as the melancholy she feels over leaving generic masculinity behind.

    From Stubborn Attachment to Cynical Self-Affirmation

    Contrary to Double Indemnity and Body Heat, The Usual Suspects presents a neoliberal subject who is neither death driven nor melancholic but is, as we have seen, cynical. In the historical trajectory of American neoliberalism, the film can be productively read as a backlash noir, part of a conservative response to second wave feminism’s emancipation of women from the constraints of the household. As Margaret Cohen argues, since the late 80s a series of neo-noirs like Internal Affairs (1990), Bad Influence (1990), and The Silence of the Lambs (1991) had started replacing the femme fatale with an homme fatale figure resembling the Freudian primordial father as a patriarchal reaction against the growing female presence in the neoliberal job market. The specter of the non-castrated man (like The Silence of the Lambs‘s cannibal-psychiatrist or Internal Affairs‘s sexually overpotent policeman-godfather) is conjured up as an ideological guarantee that real power will remain with those who not only have the symbolic phallus (the signifier of power) but also an actual penis, as Margaret Cohen argues. The Usual Suspects reproduces this backlash masculinity but with a cynical twist. Verbal doesn’t actually embody characteristics of the primordial father; he rather mobilizes the narrative of such demonic masculinity (“Keyser Söze is the Devil!” cries one of his victims) as an efficient device of capital accumulation, part of the neoliberal “abilities-machine” inseparable from his opaquely ordinary white male body. The return of this ordinary manhood as the exceptional rather than the generic index of a now hybrid, decentered, and deterritorialized capitalist apparatus—abstract and unmappable, like Keyser Söze himself, in its multitude of incompatible language games—provides the final twist of the film. It is as if the earlier unconscious attachment of the female-driven neo-noir suddenly came back to life, breaking from his quarantine as an impotent remainder of a past regime of production (Ned in Body Heat) to stabilize the new, increasingly abstract rule of neoliberal capitalism. Unlike Walter or Matty, whose attachment to commodity-producing patriarchy contradicts and thereby weakens their flight from it, Verbal’s enjoyment of his white male identity doesn’t undermine his cynical masquerade because white masculinity changes its status from general equivalent to genetic exception. If generic white masculinity was the ideologically distorted manifestation of abstract labor’s principle of equivalence, the genetic white masculinity of Verbal is rather the fetishistic expression of another one of capitalism’s real abstractions: the creditor who is exempted from the universal paradigm of abstract labor and accumulates capital passively by making others work for him through debt bondage. Crucially, it is their debt to Keyser Söze that connects the five male protagonists in Verbal’s narrative, a debt that disrupts the criminals’ generic life of inherent transgressions while also parasitizing it as the basis of their prolonged repayment process (the men keep doing assignments for Söze until they are dead, and viewers continue to enjoy the generic value they thereby create until the end of the plotline).

    Viewed through the lens of the creditor/debtor relation, the classical noir hero’s death-driven, impossible quest to put value on his real self (his unary trait) appears as an attempt to pay back an unpayable debt to a hallucinated real superego-other beyond the liberal democratic symbolic order. To put it differently, classical noir depicts the creditor/debtor relation as a perversion of the private sphere, an unproductive excess to the genres of commodity-producing patriarchy. By contrast, the neo-noir cynic turns the creditor/debtor hierarchy into a productive social relation, positioning himself as a creditor in the real by giving the impression that he is always more than the sum of his symbolic masks. Significantly, Keyser Söze is not Verbal’s own superego, but a superego he created for others (generic men) to indebt and control them, a meta-generic device to extract the generic value out of their lives, much the same way finance (the creditor/debtor relation) comes to overdetermine the sphere of production in neoliberalism, undermining the classical liberal fiction of equal citizenship.11 Söze, the neoliberal fetish of absolute individual sovereignty, is like the feudal monarch in Marx’s example: “king only because other men stand in the relation of subjects to him. They, on the contrary, imagine that they are subjects because he is king” (Marx, Capital 149). In a striking contrast to both Double Indeminty‘s Walter and Body Heat‘s Matty, The Usual Suspects‘s Verbal lacks any unary trait, a unique point of conjunction between his enjoyment and the signifier he would be anxiously fixated on. At the end of the film, we learn that he randomly used signifiers from his interrogator’s office (e.g. newspaper clippings attached to the wall in front of him or the brand name Kobayashi displayed at the bottom of his coffee mug) to embellish his fake Keyser Söze narrative. It is thus not Verbal as an individual but capital itself that is, to use Marx’s term, the “automatic subject” of this masquerade, “constantly changing from one form into the other, without becoming lost in this movement” (Marx, Capital 255). Verbal’s (and the film’s) jouissance lies somewhere else entirely, revealed, as I have suggested, at the very end of the film when he stops being the facilitator for capital’s shifting automatisms and momentarily stabilizes himself as a white man, exceptional and enigmatic in his very ordinariness. Only then can he enjoy the creditor’s privilege of not having to be the entrepreneur of himself, and the viewer can likewise finally rest from the cognitive labor of puzzle solving.12

    The Usual Suspects manages to reconcile the tension between searching for the real-impossible exchange value of the subject’s singular life and the generic apparatus needed for its valorization—the tension at the core of classical noir. It finds a way to represent uniqueness as productive without letting it slip into death-driven madness (the problem with classical noir) or normalizing it only as unhappy consciousness (the shortcoming of melancholic neo-noir). The film’s solution is a theological one, following the New Testament injunction, “Give to Caesar what belongs to Caesar, and give to God what belongs to God” (New Living Translation, Mark 12.17). Singularity is externalized on the Capital-God (Keyser Söze), whom Caesar (Verbal, the neoliberal cynic) unleashes on the multitude as credit, thereby freeing himself from the burden of death driven self-valorization, mandating the indebted others to do it for him (instead of doing it himself) and exploiting the productive potential of their generic identities until they dissolve in the process. For the white male neoliberal subject of The Usual Suspects, the key to a successful entrepreneurship of the self therefore isn’t self-realization but self-splitting (self-castration), not the pursuit of authenticity but the cynical installation of a bar between one’s always shifting social symbolic masks and the jouissance of belonging to an exceptional, unchanging, and unproductive creditor community that manages the capital accumulation of others from a distance. If the classical noir subject’s unproductive jouissance was a pathological, death-driven excess of the generic regime of commodity-producing patriarchy, in cynical neo-noir this jouissance returns as the genetic human capital driving neoliberal finance to parasitize the generic value of the indebted multitude.

    Footnotes

    1. Joan Copjec, “The Phenomenal Nonphenomenal: Private Space in Film Noir” 183.

    2. Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France (1978-79) 226.

    3. In his analysis of Cosmopolis (2012) and Nightcrawler (2014), Kirk Boyle similarly observes that the protagonists of contemporary neo-noirs can defy realist character representation and act as allegorical stand-ins for the political economic abstractions of neoliberal capitalism.

    4. Going a step further, in his commentary on Foucault’s theory of neoliberalism, Byung-Chul Han suggests that “Today, we do not deem ourselves subjugated subjects, but rather projects: always refashioning and reinventing ourselves” (1).

    5. For a detailed conceptualization of the way the cinematic apparatus turns viewer attention into capital, see Jonathan Beller (88-150).

    6. As Tiqqun suggest, neoliberalism is therefore best understood as a cybernetic project of “producing social self-regulation” through “the visible production of what Adam Smith called the ‘invisible hand.’” Similarly, Han argues that freely turning oneself into a neoliberal project is “a more efficient kind of subjectivation and subjugation” (1).

    7. For an analysis of how self-abjection can be an efficient tactic of hegemonic masculinity, see Claire Sisco King, “It Cuts Both Ways: Fight Club, Masculinity, and Abject Hegemony.”

    8. The Lacanian separation of pleasure and (surplus-)enjoyment (jouissance) recalls the Deleuzian distinction Steven Shaviro makes (after Brian Massumi) between emotion and affect: “affect is primary, non-conscious, asubjective or presubjective, asignifying, unqualified and intensive; while emotion is derivative, conscious, qualified and meaningful, a ‘content’ that can be attributed to an already-constituted subject” (3). However, while it’s tempting to identify jouissance with affect in this narrow sense, the crucial difference between the two categories is that for Shaviro, affect escapes social subjection, while for Žižek, jouissance, however unconscious it may be, is nevertheless the core component of any ideological subject position.

    9. For a study of anxiety as a quintessential film noir affect, see Kelly Oliver and Benigno Trigo, Noir Anxiety.

    10. For Jameson, the aesthetic forms of postmodern cinema can offer a cognitive mapping of our global capitalist situation through allegory, representing local power dynamics in relation to the sublime forces of the capitalist totality. For more recent examples of Jamesonian film theory used as the cognitive mapping of neoliberal capitalism, see Alberto Toscano and Jeff Kinkle, Cartographies of the Absolute, and Clint Burnham, Fredric Jameson and the Wolf of Wall Street.

    11. On the centrality of the creditor/debtor hierarchy in neoliberalism see Maurizio Lazzarato, The Making of the Indebted Man: An Essay on the Neoliberal Condition. In popular cinema, the horror genre has been the most studied as an allegory for the political economic abstractions of the neoliberal creditor/debtor relation. See Fred Botting, “Undead-Ends: Zombie Debt/Zombie Theory,” and Mark Steven, Splatter Capital: The Political Economy.

    12. Interestingly, the white male Verbal’s dis-identification from capital’s automatic subjectivity is the exact opposite of what Shaviro sees as the afrofuturist strategy of absolute identification with capital in Grace Jones’s music video Corporate Cannibal (2008). There, Jones’s digitally altered body becomes “an electronic signal whose modulations pulse across the screen,” embodying the versatility and flexibility of neoliberal capital (Shaviro 16).

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