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  • Between Interpellation and Immunization: Althusser, Balibar, Esposito

    Warren Montag (bio)

    Occidental College

     

    Abstract

    Althusser’s “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” Balibar’s “Citizen Subject,” and Esposito’s Communitas may be read together as insisting on the indissoluble link between the notion of the subject as agent and the subject as the name of the subjected individual, the one who is submitted to the will of another. Each philosopher, from his own perspective, seeks to explore the paradox of the subject who is free and self-determining only to the extent that he is called upon, separated and immunized by a sovereign power. Each also offers the tools that make possible a way out of the vicious circle of subjection.

     

    I briefly examine here the concepts of subject, subjectivity, and subjection in the works of three philosophers: Louis Althusser’s “Ideology and the Ideological State Apparatuses,” Étienne Balibar’s “Citizen Subject,” and Roberto Esposito’s Communitas. Before doing so, however, I want to make a few preliminary remarks. While I argue that there exists between the concepts of interpellation and immunization a theoretical kinship so powerful that it may no longer be possible to think about one without at least taking the other into account, my inquiry into this kinship does not take the form of a chronology, as if interpellation, a notion developed by Althusser in the mid-1960s and introduced publically in “Ideology and the Ideological Sate Apparatuses” (1970), were the anticipation or even the pre-emption of a concept first outlined by Esposito nearly thirty years later in Communitas (1998). Such an approach would inevitably lead to the question of whether Esposito developed and advanced or, on the other hand, suppressed or replaced Althusser’s concept, perhaps by means of or against the intervening work of Balibar, published in 1989; such a question might be reduced to whether the thirty-year interval had been the site of progress or regression. Thus my title, “between interpellation and immunization,” should not be read as “from interpellation to immunization.” At the same time, I do not intend to pursue what might be understood as the opposite course: establishing the dialectical unity of the two apparently distinct concepts of interpellation and immunization by means of a mediation that would negate and overcome their difference. Such a procedure might take Balibar’s work on the subject as providing the common denominator or abstract equivalence into which Althusser and Esposito might be translated in order to be made commensurable. Instead, I regard these three texts and three concepts as forming a body in Spinoza’s sense, a composite unity made up of irreducibly distinct parts capable of acting together to be the cause of a single effect—in this case, of a theoretical and perhaps political effect.
     
    I begin by recalling that Althusser’s verb “interpellate” (interpeller) is usually understood by English readers on the basis of Ben Brewster’s translation of it as “to hail someone,” or perhaps to address or call someone, as God, to use Althusser’s own example, calls on or to Moses. Brewster, however, does not quite capture the extent to which Althusser draws on one of the term’s meanings in modern French, a meaning particularly current in the period immediately following the revolt of May 1968. “Interpellate” refers to the action of the police when, as it is said in English, they “stop” or “detain” an individual; this action implies more than simply a hailing or calling out to the individual and instead takes the form of a command, which is to say, of a speech act necessarily grounded not simply in a specific legal context but also in an inequality of forces, to produce proof of the identity already assigned by the very process of interpellation: “it is the Prefecture of the Police which provides the individuals whom policemen interpellate with the identity papers that policemen request (demand) that one show” (“Three Notes” 83n21).
     
    Perhaps even more significantly, none of Althusser’s numberless English-language commentators, to my knowledge, thought to inquire into the term’s use in English prior to its reintroduction into the language precisely by the translation of Althusser’s text. The verb “interpellate,” now listed as obsolete in the Oxford English Dictionary, was used as late as the end of the sixteenth century to signify “to interrupt a person speaking,” and, in a broader sense, to interrupt a process or action. This now unfamiliar use of interpellate was in fact derived directly from the Latin verb interpello, which also means to interrupt or disturb someone who is speaking. There exists a Latin noun, interpellator, to denote the one who interrupts or disrupts. A related term, appello, not only means to make an appeal to or to address someone, but also to accost that person, to call him out of and thus separate him from an assembly of which he is a part. The etymology of “interpellate” thus reminds us that Althusser is himself an “interpellator” in the Latin sense, one who disrupts an ongoing discourse with an unwelcome appeal or application, as if he were owed something, a debt that no one knew remained outstanding, perhaps nothing more than an explanation—the demand for which, however, can only disturb the ongoing discourse whose perpetuation is perhaps organized around the denial of that debt.
     
    That Althusser’s disruptive appeal concerns the category of the subject hardly allows us to separate the disturbance he caused in philosophy and political thought from that of his contemporaries, from Heidegger to Lacan to Foucault. They, too, while never declaring or attempting to bring about the disappearance of the subject—as has been so often claimed—nevertheless in different ways and to different degrees question the status of the concept as a given and as the unquestioned origin and therefore source of explanation for any conceivable human activity. Texts such as Heidegger’s “Letter on Humanism” and Foucault’s “What is an Author?” pose difficult and disquieting questions about the historical emergence of the category of the subject that themselves proved disruptive, as if their authors also are interpellators interrupting the assembly of learned discourse.
     
    The disturbance caused by Althusser’s introduction of the notion of interpellation therefore could not simply be attributed to its demand for a theory of the constitution of the subject heretofore regarded as the condition of intelligibility of any social practice. To grasp the singularity of this disturbance, I turn to the specific textual form or, more precisely, forms in which Althusser develops the concept of interpellation through an important but thus far unnoticed revision of his account of what he calls “the duplicate mirror-structure of ideology [la structure spéculaire redoublée]” in the ISAs essay (“Ideology” 180). This essay, dated January-April 1970 and appearing in the Communist journal La Pensée in June 1970, is described in an editorial footnote as consisting of “two extracts from an ongoing study” (127n1). The manuscript from which the essay was “extracted” bears the handwritten title “De la superstructure” and is itself dated one year earlier, January-April 1969; this piece would be posthumously published in a collection edited by Jacques Bidet, entitled Sur la reproduction. The idea of extraction, however, which suggests that the two sections were removed as is from the manuscript, is a bit misleading. Within the extracts themselves, words, phrases, sentences, paragraphs, and, indeed, entire sections were suppressed, in certain cases decisively altering the meaning of the text.
     
    No omission has more decisively changed the philosophical and political significance of Althusser’s analysis than that which shaped the section entitled “The State” in “Ideology and the Ideological State Apparatuses.” The corresponding section in Sur la reproduction (“The State and its Apparatuses”) is not only significantly longer, but represents an attempt, of which there is little trace in the later version, to theorize the process of the reproduction of the relations of production as the simultaneous production/reproduction of antagonism and conflict. From the perspective of the earlier text, the relations of production could never take the form of an order or a system, but rather could only take the form of a perpetual, ever-changing battle; here, even Gramsci’s model of hegemony appears to Althusser to freeze or fix the relationship of class forces as if to abstract it from the contingencies of actual combat. The final sections of the chapter on the State in Sur la reproduction were all omitted in their entirety from the ISAs essay and their titles alone suggest positions at odds with what is now known as Althusser’s theory of ideology: “The Ideological State Apparatuses and the Ideological By-products of Their Practices,” “The Double Functioning of the State Apparatuses and Their ‘Combined Action,’” and “The Fragility and Solidity of the Ideological State Apparatuses” (Reproduction 113-123). In these suppressed parts of his discussion of the state and its apparatuses, Althusser offers an account of the way class struggle, present from the beginning, is constitutive of the apparatuses themselves, which thus arise to counter already existing movements against the reproduction of the relations of production. Class struggle thus deforms the apparatuses, not only inhibiting their functioning but causing them to produce contradictory effects. He argues that while an ideology does not precede and give rise to apparatuses that would correspond to it (an “idealist” error he attributes to Stalin), neither do the apparatuses precede and give rise to the ideology or ideologies proper to them; the second proposition is merely the inverse of the first (113). There is instead, first, an ideology that “exists in,” is immanent in, or is consubstantial with an apparatus and, second, the ideology produced by the practice or practices of this apparatus insofar as it is engaged in and shaped by the struggles outside of which it has no existence or meaning. These “secondary ideologies,” as Althusser calls them, “are produced by a conjunction of complex causes in which figure, along with the practice in question, the effect of other external ideologies and other external practices—and in the last instance, however dissimulated they may be, even the distant (but in reality very near) effects of class struggles” (115).1 The apparatuses, in other words, cannot be understood as inert institutions or mechanisms existing independently of their actual operation, which is to say, independently of their participation in struggles subject to the variability of fortune that characterizes war and especially, as in this case, an interminable war whose ever changing modes and sites of engagement require perpetual adjustment of tactics and strategy. As such, the apparatuses “secrete” (a term always placed in quotation marks by Althusser) “secondary ideological sub-formations [sous-formations]” or “by-products [sous-produits].” The effects of struggle thus cause the ISAs to secrete a by-product that by definition is not only not functional but may even prove “toxic,” as if through a kind of autoimmune reaction. An apparatus can thus be described, depending on the disposition of forces internal and external to it, as more or less “fragile” (120). Often, though, the apparatuses remain “solid,” despite the by-products whose toxicity only occasionally and in the right circumstances (in combination with other by-products of other apparatuses) reaches a level that threatens the very existence of the apparatus itself (119). This description of the apparatuses and their double functioning or their tendency to produce conflict instead of order, and thereby in their totality to destabilize rather than promote the stability of class relations, is notoriously absent from the ISAs essay (with the exception of its postscript, where the primacy of class struggle appears as an afterthought). It also allows Althusser to devote an entire chapter in Sur la reproduction to the very phenomenon critics of the ISAs essay had charged him with excluding a priori: revolution.2
     
    Althusser’s suppression of his own account of the process of the production of irreducible conflict in favor of the rigorously functionalist account of capitalist society offered in the published version of the text is undoubtedly an example of the theoretical bending of the stick that he repeatedly justified until the end of the 1970s, when he recognized that hyperbole in the realm of theory could correct theoretical-political errors only by introducing new and different errors, replacing existing confusion not with clarity but with other and perhaps more powerful, durable forms of confusion. It would be a mistake, however, to allow ourselves to be distracted by what Jacques Rancière (who perfectly represented the intended audience of what he calls Althusser’s theater of the abstract and who knew it when he accused Althusser of employing a philosophical sleight of hand to dupe and amaze his “spectators”) has referred to as Althusser’s “philosophy of Order.” Instead, we should keep in mind that the genesis of the concept shows that the Ideological State Apparatus only has meaning in relation to the resistance that precedes and provokes its emergence and its operation: the ISAs taken together in their tendential and always unstable unity can at best temporarily preserve a certain equilibrium of forces without ever being able to resolve or abolish the conflict itself.
     
    The ISAs essay did not, however, simply consist of extracts shaped and determined by omissions and elisions. Althusser also introduced changes and additions. Of these, none are perhaps more important or decisive than those made to the section described as “an example” of the “central thesis” that ideology interpellates individuals as subjects, that is, the section entitled “An Example: Christian Religious Ideology” (“Ideology” 177-183). In both versions of the text, Althusser begins with a justification of the very notion of “an example,” which as an illustration of a generality would seem to commit him to an emanationist logic at odds with his insistence elsewhere on immanence and singularity. He restricts his “analysis to a single example, one accessible to everyone,” because “the formal structure of all ideology is always the same” (177). It is important to note, however, that Althusser offers two different accounts of this formal structure that is everywhere and always the same. In the longer, 1969 manuscript, this formal structure is “a triple system” that ensures or guarantees (he uses the verb assurer) three simultaneous operations: 1) the interpellation of individuals as subjects; 2) the mutual recognition between subjects and the Subject, mutual recognition between subjects, and each subject’s recognition of himself; 3) the absolute guarantee that everything really is so: that God really is God, that Pierre really is Pierre, and that, if the subjection of subjects to the Subject is truly respected, everything will go well for them: they will be “rewarded (récompensé)” (Reproduction 232-233).
     
    In the more familiar, published version of 1970, the triple system had grown into a quadruple system of ideological operations, and the addition is anything but trivial. Between points 1 and 2–between, that is, the interpellation of individuals as subjects, on the one hand, and the three forms of recognition (between subjects and the Subject, between subjects, and each subject’s recognition of himself), on the other–Althusser inserts an additional operation, that of “their subjection to the Subject” (“Ideology” 181). The fact of subjection (assujettisement) is thus situated between, on the one hand, the interpellation of individual as subject, as agent and author of thought, speech, and action, and, on the other hand, the recognition of this fact by the Subject, by other subjects, and by each subject in relation to himself. Althusser will add to the 1970 version an explanation of the link between what we might call subjectivation and subjection. That the subjects produced by this quadruple system “work all by themselves [marchent tout seul]” seems, Althusser admits, a “mystery,” but the mystery is itself an effect of the irreducible “ambiguity” of the term “subject.” In “current usage [l’acception courante],” the term “subject” signifies, in effect, 1) “a free subjectivity, a center of initiatives, author of and responsible for its actions; (2) a subjected being, who submits to a higher authority, and is therefore stripped of all freedom except that of freely accepting his submission” (“Ideology” 182). The order of these definitions is anything but arbitrary; for Althusser, the subject is interpellated as free and as a consenting subject so that it will freely choose or consent to its own subjection (with the word “consent” remaining strategically absent from the entirety of the ISAs essay).
     
    It is difficult not to see in these phrases a more or less direct reference to Hobbes, to whom, moreover, Althusser devoted a course at the École Normale Supérieure in 1971. The only limit—itself perhaps the point of intersection between law and nature—on the individual’s right to self-government is that at which a man is “forbidden” not to act to preserve himself (to use Hobbes’s own ambiguous phrase [189]). This quasi-absolute right of the individual to direct himself and thus to be governed by no power other than that to which he freely consents is accorded him precisely so that he will choose to transfer the right of which he is the sole proprietor to the Sovereign, so as to preserve himself from the dangers of the state of nature. If, once he has consented to the sovereign, he should repent of his actions and attempt to recover the right he had earlier transferred, he will, properly speaking, initiate a war with himself and will consequently be himself the author of any punishment carried out against him. Here the individual is addressed as a free agent and author so that the power to which he consents and to which he thus freely submits will have the greatest possible legitimacy: whatever it does, whether to him or for him, it does with his own authorization.
     
    Is this then Althusser’s interpellatio, his disruption and disturbance of political thought: the argument that the attribution of freedom to a subject is the retroactive effect of a submission whose voluntary acceptance of authority furnishes its absolute ground? To judge the ISAs essay and particularly the substantially revised passages referred to above by their effects, the answer would have to be no. In both versions of the essay, Althusser acknowledges that the interpellated subject does not always heed the call of the Subject. There are those who, once called into existence as subjects, turn away from the vocation of or the call to submission, as if the free will with which they are endowed permits them on occasion to refuse the destiny in relation to which they are inscribed as subjects. These are what Althusser famously called “bad subjects”: criminals, heretics, and rebels. Michel Pêcheux was perhaps correct to worry that the phrase, “they work all by themselves,” could suggest that once interpellated (and every subject is always already interpellated), they become indistinguishable from the “classical subject” (215). It was perhaps to forestall such a reading that Althusser added this italicized sentence to the second version as the penultimate phrase of the inserted paragraph: “There are no subjects except by and for [par et pour] their subjection” (“Ideology” 182). Here Althusser moves beyond the notion that subjects only exist for the subjection that they will freely choose, to the far less familiar statement that subjects exist only by or through their subjection, as if subjection (in a logical if not chronological sense) precedes rather than follows the constitution of subject as author and agent, as the subject’s condition of possibility or sine qua non, that without which it cannot exist.3 Only here in the penultimate sentence of the penultimate paragraph of “Ideology and the Ideological State Apparatuses” does Althusser pose a question without a response: what precisely is the relation between the two meanings of the term subject and, more precisely, how does the subject arise from subjection (assujetissement)?
     
    As I now turn to Balibar’s “Citizen Subject,” published nearly twenty years after the ISAs essay and in as radically different a historical conjuncture as could be imagined, I want to be clear that I do not read it as a response to or rectification of Althusser’s text, nor even in a strict sense as “following” Althusser’s intervention; rather I read it as another approach different from and in certain ways opposed to that of Althusser. Of the differences, none is more obvious than the absence of any notion of the transhistorical if not the eternal existence of the subject (as in Freud’s dictum: “the unconscious is eternal”) and therefore, to follow Althusser’s argument, of subjection. Balibar begins by examining another critical account of the subject, one which in its own way posits a ground of the being of the subject that is necessarily present to its historical permutations: that of Heidegger, especially in the 1938 text “Die Zeit des Weltbildes,” translated into English as “The Age of the World Picture.” For Heidegger, “This word, Subjectum, must certainly be understood as the translation of the Greek ΰποκείμενον. The word names that which lies before [das Vor-liegende], that which as ground gathers everything on itself [das als Grund alles auf sich sammelt]” (“Age” 128; “Zeit” 81). The original of which “subjectum” is a translation and that marks “subjectum,” like all translations, with a certain loss of meaning has, unlike its modern versions, no special relationship “to men [Menschen] and none at all to the I” (“Age” 128; “Zeit” 81). As Heidegger approaches Descartes, with whom he credits the introduction of the anthropological notion of the subject into Western thought, he reminds us that it is “impossible to say that the modern understanding of whatever is, is more correct than that of the Greeks” (“Age” 117; “Zeit” 77). On the contrary, with Descartes (an origin whose function in Heidegger’s discourse Balibar calls into question by simply reading Descartes’s text) comes a contraction of the subject that has as its corollary a reduction of Being to World and a reduction of World to a picture. Man, understood less as species than as the human individual, as if the separation of individuals were the form of its species-being, becomes ground, the “subjectum,” or subject of Being. I would note here that Heidegger has in fact projected the modern sense of subject as that which “as ground, gathers everything on itself” onto the Greek “ΰποκείμενον,” which normally signifies not the agent of an action but precisely that which is acted upon, that which is placed under or in front of, that which is subjected or submitted to something else. It is perhaps more often translated as substrate or substance than as subject, no doubt because of its use in Aristotle’s texts.4 Heidegger’s “ΰποκείμενον” is, in contrast, a strange agent that not only places itself under, but collects together (sammeln) all the things that will be on top of or above it, as if choosing to subject or submit itself in an Opfer or sacrifice to that which is by its own effort and agency made literally higher or superior. Heidegger’s assertion that Descartes carried out an anthropologization of Western Metaphysics by instituting the ego cogito as original ground is thus itself based on or grounded in an already anthropologized or anthropomorphized conception of the ΰποκείμενον as the agent of a gathering or collecting that is also a subjection, as if a certain notion of the subject as agent and author possessed, as Althusser argued, an omni-historical existence.
     
    Heidegger’s interpretation of Descartes’s Meditations as introducing into Western thought the anthropological subject (subjectum), an interpretation hardly peculiar to him, is all the more remarkable in that, as Balibar shows, not only is the word subjectum itself missing from the Meditations, but the concept is as well: to follow Descartes’s reasoning to its end is to see that the ego cogito finally discovers the impossibility of its functioning as a ground and that its being a subject at all is predicated on its being subjectus, not the subject of knowledge but subject to a knowledge that originates in something greater, namely God, subjection to whom is the condition of any knowledge including, above all, the subject’s knowledge of itself. It is as if, Balibar tells us, speaking not only of Heidegger or of Heideggerians, but also of a general tendency to accept Heidegger’s reading with or without any reference to Heidegger himself, there has occurred around the concept of the subject a generalized “forgetting” (“Citizen” 33). And what has been forgotten is precisely the irreducible division of the subject. First, there is the subjected subject, the subject of a sovereign, the sovereign’s subject, as opposed to the sovereign subject. At the extreme, of course, since there is no king but God, we are in this sense God’s subjects, subject here being understood as a “subditus,” literally, as he who is subject to the words and commands/commandments of another, not as a slave (servus) who is coerced, but as one who chooses to obey and who therefore possesses or is possessed by a supplement of will or faith in the sense of fide or fidelity. Secondly, alongside the sovereign’s subject is the sovereign subject, the subject subject only to itself and therefore the sole and unconditioned author of thought, speech, and action. However, it is not only the irreducible division of the subject that has been forgotten, but also and perhaps even more importantly the historical and political anteriority of the former over the latter.
     
    For Balibar, the modern notion of the subject as origin and center of initiatives begins with Kant, but paradoxically only in the form of an interpretation of Descartes that attributes to him a “Cartesian subject” that in fact appears for the first time only in the Critique of Pure Reason. Far from overcoming the contradiction tying subjectivity to subjection, the Kantian/”Cartesian” subject only multiplies its effects, dispersing them even more widely than before. It is in the Critique of Pure Reason that Kant first transforms the verb “cogito” or “I think” into a noun, “das Ich denke” or “the I think,” as if the subject is something or someone that exists only through the act of thinking: “the ‘I think’ expresses the act of determining my existence” (169). The subject can thus no longer be conceived as substrate in the classical sense, but is instead an activity, thinking thinking itself as both agent and object of thought. While, as Balibar points out, there is little overtly political or practical in the discussion of the “I think” in the Critique of Pure Reason (except briefly at the conclusion of the discussion of the “Paralogisms of Pure Reason”), Kant insists that my (and we must speak in the first person here) thinking myself thinking constitutes a representation or intuition (as opposed to a rational knowledge) of “my existence as a self-active being” (169), and this opens the way to its “correlate” (“Citizen” 77), the notion of freedom that underlies the very possibility of morality. It does so in a double sense: Kant posits the “spontaneity” of the I think, that is, the fact that it determines itself, while at the same time denying the subject a knowledge of this self-activity that would be anything other than an intuition (Anschauung) or a representation (Vorstellung). Thus, as Balibar notes, “the Kantian ‘subject,’ that is, the Ich or better the Ich denke, is fundamentally caught in a relation of imputation” (“Citizen” 77). Because I can know myself “only as I appear to myself and not as I am to the understanding” (Kant, Critique 167), my intuition or representation of my spontaneity (Critique of Pure Reason) or my freedom in the sense that I am a causa libera (Metaphysics of Morals) “can never aid me in advancing beyond the field of experience” to know myself “as noumenon” (383, 382). Because practical existence, however, “is always directed to objects of experience,” we may apply these intuitions to the problem of how “a subject that is possessed of freedom” should act, that is, how it should legislate for itself and then obey moral law (383). In fact, this very freedom, the ground of any possible morality and that which separates the human from the natural world, cannot be known in the pure sense and thus must be “imputed.” Thus, in the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant defines the person “as a subject whose actions can be imputed to him” and moral personality as the “freedom of a rational being under moral laws,” which are only those “which he gives himself (alone or with others)” (50).
     
    Imputation, however, is not an unconditioned act of recognition or projection on the part of one subject in regard to another, as if it would grant to the other what it intuits about itself in a kind of spontaneous sociability. On the contrary, there is nothing spontaneous about imputation; it occurs only in the context of a fundamental Ungleichheit: both inequality (and not simply in law, but also an inequality of force) and dissimilarity. Imputation (Zurechnung) is above all a “judgment by which someone is regarded as the author (causa libera) of an action” formulated by a judge or person “authorized to impute with rightful force” (Metaphysics 53). To argue that Kant’s subject, even as it emerges in the Critique of Pure Reason, is a kind of Zurechnungssubjekt or subject of imputation, a subject to whom a freedom not rationally knowable can and perhaps must be ascribed or imputed, is to suggest the primacy of the political dimension. To be a person and to have a moral, legal personality is not to be free, that is, demonstrably the free cause of one’s own actions as an author (Kant’s term is Urheber, which means origin and creator, but also perpetrator), but is rather to have this freedom imputed by one “authorized to impute by rightful force.” The imputation of freedom is thus a violent imposition of causal, moral, and legal responsibility on an individual by an anonymous juridico-political order (note that the judge himself “is authorized” in the passive voice, as if he too were a subject of imputation authorized by yet another subject of imputation in a necessarily endless chain). This order precedes the subject of imputation, and his subjection to it is the condition of the act by which he is imputed freedom, which in turn is necessary to any morality. If he can be said to have given himself either alone or with others the (moral) laws he then freely obeys, this giving or creating is also then imputed and so requires the temporal and logical precedence of the legal over the moral. Thus, Kant too has affirmed in his own way that there are no subjects except by and through their own subjection.
     
    To draw the line of demarcation that will make the hierarchical opposition inscribed in the notion of subject in its historical existence permanently visible, that is, to undo the repression to which it has been “subject,” so to speak, Balibar proposes that after the sovereign subject that itself follows the sovereign’s subject—but only by folding subjection into itself as the condition or result of its freedom—there emerges through a rejection of the subjection/subjectivation antinomy the figure of the citizen, a figure born out the revolutionary movements of the late eighteenth-century, particularly the French Revolution. To be precise, the citizen is
     

    a historical figure that is no longer the subjectus and not yet the subjectum. But from the outset, in the way that it is formulated and put into practice, it exceeds its own institution. The citizen is what I have called the statement of a hyperbolic proposition; its developments can only emerge from conflicts whose stakes can be sketched out.
     

    (Citoyen Sujet 53; my translation)

     

    It exceeds its own institution: the citizen is thus a utopian figure not in the sense that its essence lies in a future to be realized, but in the sense that it exists nowhere—neither in the collectivity nor in the individual, neither publicly nor privately, neither as subjectus nor as subjectum—and in the sense that its very identity grows out of these exclusions. Historically it emerges within the development of the subject, dividing it from itself by working to overturn the primacy of a subjection that, even when it originates in the unconditioned will of free and equal subjects, produces inequality and unfreedom. The citizen exists only in and through a struggle that is by definition permanent, a struggle that leads it beyond its own limits, as if to remain within them would reduce the citizen to the very subject against which it has defined itself. The citizen thus exists only through the activity in which its objectives remain immanent.

     
    The work of Roberto Esposito on immunity may well appear to be inscribed in a different register than that of Althusser and Balibar. As a response to some of the theoretical problems engendered by Foucault’s work on biopower, particularly that “interval of meaning which remains open in Foucault’s text between the constitutive poles of the concept of biopolitics, namely biology and politics,” it would seem to address the question of the appropriation of life by politics that in a certain way would allow us to sidestep or circumvent the question of the subject altogether. Reading Esposito in the light of the foregoing discussion, however, we cannot escape the sense that the opposition between communitas and immunitas is another way to think the constitutive aporia of the subject and the irreducible conflict at the heart of the notion of citizen. As Esposito demonstrates, the concept of immunity is political before it is biological. Communitas or community is not only not “a property belonging to subjects that joins them together,” the totality to which they would pertain before their separation into individuals; it is not even a thing (the res publica) that could be substantified as that which individuals “share” or possess (Communitas 8). If we can speak of a sharing, it would be the sharing of a munus, an obligation, a debt, a tax, even the paradox of an obligatory gift, the sharing of which Esposito describes as a lack or void. Communitas is thus not more than the individual, but less; it does not add but subtracts and is finally the experience of destitution and expropriation (depropriazione) (6-7). Such a subject is subject of and to debt and despoliation: an outside that marks its own limit is rediscovered within, as that which separates each subject from itself. It is here, in a gesture whose timing in relation to the argument concerning the subject’s relation to communitas as well as whose content can only remind us of Althusser, that Esposito turns to Scripture and the example not of Moses but of Paul. Even fellowship, κοινότης, in the community of the faithful, the κοινονία, is a “taking part in” that entails a loss and a diminution, a participation in a loss of freedom that is δούλεια or slavery in Christ, in whose death one must participate (11). These, of course, are the images of subjection so total that the subjected subject is threatened with extinction, a destitution that leaves no remainder.
     
    It is in relation to the “unacceptable” as well as “unbearable” munus, in which the subject is lost to itself at the heart of the Christian communitas, that the countermovement of immunization takes place. Immunity emerges as the demand for exemption from debt, obligation, service, and above all from the shared debt of communitas, which is now experienced at the extreme as a claim on one’s life and therefore as the threat of death. Every social tie becomes a threat against which the subject must be immunized by as complete a separation as possible from others whose claims on him can be ignored with impunity (a term closely related to immunity). Immunity evacuates the void of the munus by emptying the common: there is nothing in common. But the subject thus free from obligation and from the movement of alienation and exteriorization represented by the munus, a subject therefore restored to the self-sovereignty and self-proprietorship that community had denied it–the subject, that is, in the modern sense—can only become and remain a subject in this sense by virtue of its subjection to that which will protect or immunize it against the threats to its autonomy. The subject thus can exercise sovereignty over itself (over its life, property, and liberty) only to the extent that it is subjected or subjects itself to the sovereign power capable of assuring its immunity. To translate this into Althusser’s idiom, there is no subject except by and through subjection.
     
    It is, at least in part, on the terrain of Hobbes’s philosophy that the link between interpellation and immunization becomes intelligible: “the Leviathan-state coincides with the breaking [la dissociazione] of every communitarian bond, with the squelching [l’abolizione] of every social relation that is foreign to the vertical exchange of protection-obedience” (14). As Esposito argues, this state is the denial of the very possibility of relation, not only of the cum, as if human beings are originally separated and unite only secondarily, but even of the entire transindividual dimension from which the juridical individual cannot be disentangled and extricated without violence and loss and without being deprived of that part of himself that is in common with others and nevertheless proper to him. In fact, taken to its logical conclusion, which is, as Esposito notes, paradoxically a remnant of irrationality, individuals are “preserved” and “protected” only at the cost of the very sociality that makes their existence in a material as well as cultural sense possible: “they live in and of their refusal to live together [convivere]” (14). Every possible combination, coagulation, and confusion in which the juridical individual might become lost or dispersed – or, on the contrary, might become part of a composite singularity ranging from couples, in particular (the INSERT DESCRIPTION - inline graphic or “one flesh” of the first couple–a phrase establishing that their separation could only be a tearing or laceration of the composite but irreducible body they had become), to collectivities of all kinds, whether “natural” or “artificial”-is abolished and replaced by the relation between subject and Subject. In fact, politics itself becomes prevention, not only the prevention of war, but just as importantly a prophylaxis against any exposure to others that would automatically carry the danger of transindividual contagion and a weakening of the vertical relation of subjection. Hence the immunitary practice that both precedes and accompanies interpellation as its simultaneous condition and result.
     
    But Esposito also shows that the Hobbesian model requires a foundation that, if not exactly missing from, nevertheless remains underdeveloped in his texts. The self-mastery that both requires the protection or granting of immunity to the individual by the sovereign (the process by which every social tie is broken except that of the vertical relation to the sovereign) and that simultaneously serves as the guarantee of the legitimacy of the individual’s subjection to the sovereign (the transfer of the right of self-government must itself be grounded in right) is made possible by an original or natural right. As Hobbes explains in the opening of chapter 14 of Leviathan, this jus naturale is “the Liberty each man hath to use his own power, as he will himself, for the preservation of his own Nature, that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently of doing anything which in his own Judgment and Reason, he shall conceive to be the aptest means thereunto.” The assertion of liberty here is of course designed precisely to make it possible for the individual to “divest himself” of that liberty for the sake of self-preservation (190). But what is critical here and regularly overlooked by commentators is that in this brief passage immediately following the account of the state of nature and in which Hobbes states very forcefully that “there be no Propriety, no Dominion, no Mine and Thine distinct,” the phrase “his own” (power, nature, life, judgment, and reason) occurs no less than four times (188). While “his own judgment” may appear merely to assign in a descriptive sense the agent or cause of a judgment, “his own life” is clearly more complicated insofar as it is the object of the action of using one’s own liberty: it is that which our natural right enjoins us to “preserve.” To say my own life (or even, to complicate matters further, “myself”) in this context is to assert possession: it is my life by right and no one else’s, and what liberty and power I “possess” or “have” by natural right, I will use in defense of what is “my own.” Here, a certain form of property precedes and makes possible, even as for Hobbes it paradoxically requires, the absolute sovereignty of the Leviathan state.5
     
    For Esposito it is Locke who will “solve” the problem that appears in Hobbes’s version of immunization (that is, by intensifying and multiplying its contradictions).6 In order simply to refer to myself, my own self, what I myself own, the self that is mine and no one else’s,7 the self that is separate from what is common—in order, that is, to declare or establish that which is to be immunized (and interpellated)–“man” must be both “master of himself, and Proprietor of his own person, and the actions or labor of it” (27; ch. 5, sec. 44). Property has now become an attribute or property of life (or at least human life) itself, which means that just as there can be no property without the life that it will (pre)serve, so there can be no life without the property, proprietorship, and appropriation that allow it to exist: Man has “still in himself the great foundation of property; and that, which made up the great part of what he applied to the support or comfort of his being . . . was perfectly his own” (27; ch. 5, sec. 44). The common is that which must be overcome through the labor of a single individual whose proprietorship of his own person insures that his labor remains his and cannot (legitimately or de jure) be mixed or confused with the labor of others. To appropriate through individual labor is thus not simply to remove “out of the state that nature hath provided,” but it also “excludes the common right of other men.” (18; ch. 5, sec. 27). The original separateness of the body confers the status of property on the “fruit or venison” it appropriates from the natural state, so that it must be his who appropriates it and it requires the exclusive right that property brings (“another can no longer have any right to it”) “before it can do him any good for the support of his life” (19; ch. 5, sec.26).
     
    Thus property not only precedes sovereignty as its condition, it also more problematically precedes any form of interhuman existence at all, with the result that it is not simply the common that threatens the existence of the individual proprietor, but also the mere presence of another, separate individual. The threat here is not that of violence and despoliation, as in the case of Hobbes, but instead is the properly biological threat of contagion, infection, and contamination, an invasion of the “mine” by the “thine” at the corporeal level, a mingling whose effects can only deprive the body of what is its own and what is necessary to its preservation. This danger is forestalled in the state of nature where everyone is free (from others; the danger there is that individuals will lose contact with their fellows in the “vast wilderness of the earth,” rather than feel “straightened” by their presence [ch. 5, sec. 36]) and where there exists a rough equality of appropriation and consumption. Both liberty and equality, however, disappear in the social state, or rather persist as that which must be imputed to those who no longer appear to be either free or equal. While everyone theoretically continues to have a property in his own person, the continuum between life, body, work, appropriation, and property is broken and the fruits of one’s labor are immediately the property of another. Immunization becomes the means by which it is possible to say “that men have agreed to a disproportionate and unequal possession of the earth,” as if declaring the human-individual proprietor of himself only turned him into the thing that he owned, permitting his expropriation, an expropriation that is all the more violent insofar as it results from the individual’s own labor that now drains life instead of preserving and strengthening it (ch. 5, sec. 50). For Locke, the vertical relation of subjection is subordinate to and in fact serves the horizontal separation of individuals understood as proprietors of themselves, their persons, and whatever they, through their labor, “annex” to themselves—an immunity given by both nature and reason and that must itself be protected by the state. The danger lies less in the threat to property posed by the absolute monarch’s taxes on his subjects than in the threat posed by those (in)human predators who ignore the fact that a man’s possessions have been annexed to his person and that an attempt to steal his coat (or occupy his land) represents an attempt on his very being.
     
    Against a line of thought that connects Schmitt, Arendt, and Agamben, both Althusser and Esposito have thus, in different ways, displaced the question of sovereignty from the center of political life, insisting that, if it has any meaning at all in the modern context, sovereignty (and the notion of law that it implies) must be understood to be co-extensive with the specific forms of property and appropriation characteristic of modernity itself. Not only have interpellation and immunization been mobilized (often but not only by the state) to bring about and maintain a regime of absolute private property against all other forms of use and occupation; they also ascribe to the individual a property in his own person and a possession of his own liberty that, in the guise of restoring freedom and equality, actually provides the means of his alienation through the transfer, sale, or forfeiture that in the vast majority of cases has always already taken place. Thus, if there is struggle, it is as much against the merely horizontal relations that, through a universal individualization and separation, produce new and durable forms of subjection and inequality, as it is against the vertical relation of subject/sovereign.
     
    But I cannot conclude without acknowledging the precise point at which Althusser and Esposito diverge from each other. For the former, interpellation remains profoundly functional, serving the reproduction of the system of production (and property) that makes life possible. We have noted that Althusser’s decision to exclude the discussion of resistance and revolt found in Sur la reproduction from the published text of the ISAs essay results in a theory of reproduction in relation to which opposition can only arrive from outside or be deferred to the end or limit (as in the letter of Althusser’s own text, where class struggle appears only after the essay’s conclusion, in a postscript), as if it can never arrive but instead remains irreducibly to come. But can we not see this error, so often identified and criticized, as itself a symptom of another conflict, that which animates what we might call Althusser’s biopolitics? Capitalism appears in his essay as a constantly expanding and optimizing system whose ability to guarantee subsistence to its population is never in doubt, insofar as this subsistence, according to Althusser, is necessary to its functioning. Here too, by imputing a generalized rationality to the capitalist mode of production, Althusser has banished the possibility not only of understanding the tendency to crisis outlined by Marx in the third volume of Capital, but also of grasping the contradictions that set capitalism against itself—of understanding capitalism, in certain circumstances, in a certain conjuncture, and in a certain balance of forces, as a mode of (self) destruction rather than production. Esposito, by contrast, insists on the ever-intensifying contradiction of a society that works to deprive itself of the very relations that allow it to survive, as if “life were sacrificed to its own preservation,” or as if life were destroyed in the process of its own production (14).
     
    It is here, and I give Balibar the last word, that the concept of the citizen intervenes, not as the mediator between interpellation and immunization understood as vertical subjection and horizontal privation, but as a wedge that prevents their convergence. Balibar recalls that which has been subject to a forgetting, precisely the historicity of the citizen, a historicity whose traces remain indelible. Inscribed in the historical reality of the citizen is a refusal to accept a merely formal or symbolic definition of the liberty and equality that constitute it, an imputation of freedom whose function is primarily punitive and penal and an equality that is the retroactive projection of actually existing hierarchy. The citizen represents the unfulfilled demand for a freedom and equality immanent and inseparable from the ability to think and to act. If there is no subject except by and through subjection, there is no subjection except in response to a resistance that it arises to contain. In a sense, the citizen is the deferred effect of that to which subjection is a response, the resistance that is life itself, life resisting that which threatens to weaken and destroy it, the actually existing forms of coercion and privation, the symptoms of the profound autoimmune reaction of a notion of society from which all that is genuinely social must be eliminated. In the figure of the citizen as it emerges in Balibar’s essay, a figure that is less the antithesis of or antidote to the subject than the marking of its limit, we see the insurrection to come, which, like every future, is already inscribed in the present.
     

    Warren Montag is the Brown Family Professor of European Literature at Occidental College. His most recent book is Althusser and His Contemporaries: Philosophy’s Perpetual War (Duke University Press, 2013). He is also editor of Décalages, a journal devoted to scholarship on Althusser and his circle.
     

     

    Footnotes

     

    1. All translations are my own.

     

    2. See Chapter X, “Reproduction des Rapports de Production et Révolution” (179-195).

     

    3. Judith Butler makes this point in “Althusser’s Subjection,” but in relation to “law” in a psychoanalytic sense: the subject is always already subjected to law.

     

    4. See de Libera.

     

    5. This is of course the classic thesis of C.B. Macpherson’s The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism. Macpherson overstates the centrality of an explicit concept of property in Hobbes, which is from my perspectiveboth a necessary and necessarily absent concept in Leviathan, in that it is necessary to the foundation of sovereignty even as it would form its (for Hobbes, impossible) limit.

     

    6. In what follows, I refer particularly to the discussion of property in relation to the “paradigm of immunization” in Esposito’s Bios: Biopolitics and Philosophy (63-69).

     

    7. See Balibar’s “‘My Self’ et ‘My Own:’ variations sur Locke.”

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Althusser, Louis. “Ideology and the Ideological State Apparatuses.” Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays. Trans. Ben Brewster. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971. 127-187. Print.
    • ———. “Idéologie et appareils idéologiques d’État.” La Pensée 151 (Juin 1970). Print.
    • ———. “Three Notes on the Theory of Discourse.” The Humanist Controversy and Other Writings (1966-1967). Trans. G.M. Goshgarian. Verso: London, 2003. Print.
    • ———. Sur la reproduction. Ed. J. Bidet. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1996. Print.
    • Balibar, Étienne. “Citizen Subject.” E. Cadava, P. Connor, and Jean-Luc Nancy, eds. Who Comes After the Subject? London: Routledge, 1991. 33-57. Print.
    • ———. Citoyen Sujet: et autres essais d’anthropologie philosophique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2011. Print.
    • ———. “‘My Self’ et ‘My Own:’ variations sur Locke.” Citoyen sujet. 121-154. Print.
    • Butler, Judith. “Conscience Doth Make Subjects of Us All: Althusser’s Subjection.” The Psychic Life of Power. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1997. Print.
    • Esposito, Roberto. Communitas. Trans. Timothy Campbell. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2010. Print.
    • ———. Bios: Biopolitics and Philosophy. Trans. Timothy Campbell. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2008. Print.
    • Heidegger, Martin. “The Age of the World Picture.” The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays. Trans. William Lovitt. New York: Harper, 1977. Print.
    • ———. “Die Zeit des Weltbildes.” Holzwege. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1952. Print.
    • Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. Middlesex: Pelican, 1968. Print.
    • Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Trans. Norman Kemp Smith. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965. Print.
    • ———. The Metaphysics of Morals. Trans. Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991. Print.
    • de Libera, Alain. Naissance du sujet. Paris: Vrin, 2007. Print.
    • Locke, John. Second Treatise of Government. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1980. Print.
    • Macpherson, C.B. The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1962. Print.
    • Pêcheux, Michel. Language, Semantics and Ideology: Stating the Obvious. Trans. Harbans Nagpal. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1982. Print.
    • Rancière, Jacques. Althusser’s Lesson. Trans. E. Battista. London: Continuum, 2011. Print.
  • Citizen-Subject and the National Question: On the Logic of Capital in Balibar

    Abstract

    The work of Étienne Balibar has long emphasized the link between the juridico-political forms of citizenship and subjectivity implied by the transition to a world order of “bourgeois universalism,” while also linking the emergence of the nation-form and accompanying regime of “anthropological difference” to the specific concerns of the Marxian critique of political economy. Taking a series of clues from the entire range of Balibar’s work, this essay reinvestigates the centrality of the national question to the capital-relation itself, particularly around the problem of the labor power commodity.

     

    Commodities cannot themselves go to market and perform exchanges in their own right. We must, therefore, have recourse to their guardians (Hütern), who are the possessors of commodities (Warenbesitzern).
     

    (Marx, Das Kapital 99; Capital 94)

     

    The owner of labour-power is mortal. If then his appearance in the market is to be continuous, and the continuous conversion of money into capital assumes this, the seller of labour-power must perpetuate himself, “in the way that every living individual perpetuates himself, by procreation.” The labour-power withdrawn from the market by wear and tear and death, must be continually replaced by, at the very least, an equal amount of fresh labour-power. Hence the sum of the means of subsistence necessary for the production of labour-power must include the means necessary for the labourer’s substitutes, i.e., his children, in order that this race of peculiar commodity-owners (diese Race eigentümlicher Warenbesitzer) may perpetuate its appearance in the market.
     

    (Marx, Das Kapital 186; Capital 182, my emphasis)

     

    1. The Presupposition of Homo nationalis

     
    “The history of nations, beginning with our own, is always already presented to us in the form of a narrative which attributes to these entities the continuity of a subject” (Balibar and Wallerstein 86). So begins Étienne Balibar’s now-famous inquiry into the “nation-form,” the term he gives to the aggregate of “apparatuses” and “practices” that institute the individual as “homo nationalis from cradle to grave” (93). Already in this short sentence we are introduced to an entire network of concepts and issues—the field of the historical, the nation-form, the problem of the beginning, origin, or commencement, the national as narrative, the form of the subject, and its possibility of being grasped as a continuity—that circle around a theoretical question that is not only historical but profoundly actual: the relation between the inner logic of capital, the fundamental expression of modern social relations, and the form of the nation-state, the quintessential entity within which the modern form of belonging is most often cartographically, politically, and conceptually organized. In turn, this excavation of homo nationalis is inseparably linked to a set of questions posed in another famous text, one in which Balibar introduces us to a very specific problematic characterizing our modern world order: the volatile articulation or process of referral between the citizen and the subject. Here, he emphasizes something that will become absolutely central for the present inquiry when he states, “The citizen is the subject, the citizen is always a supposed subject (legal subject, psychological subject, transcendental subject). I will call this new development the citizen’s becoming-a-subject (devenir-sujet)” (“Citizen Subject” 46). As we attempt to think the relation between these two fields of concerns, we will need to extensively examine the problem here of supposition and presupposition. This sequence—the intense and complex conceptual field of Setzung and Voraussetzung in Marx—will allow us to productively complicate the ways in which homo nationalis remains not merely a corollary or peripheral question to the broad concerns of capitalist development, but rather a profoundly historical field of force located at the very core of the logic of capital, in which the abstract individual who is the presumed subject of exchange is always presupposed not merely as a subject, but as a national subject.
     
    When we imagine the national question, we generally think of a field of problems that presume or presuppose the givenness of the nation-form. That is, we often presuppose that the national question involves simply the excavation and categorization of the putatively national factors of development, the relative stage of a given national capital in relation to various other national capitals, the dynamics internal to a particular national formation’s reproduction, the distinction of one national market from another and so forth. In other words, the national question is typically posed as if the national itself is not a question, but rather an answer: the notion of specificity or particularity is frequently treated here as if it were something that explains, rather than something to be explained, a split between explanans and explanandum that has a long rhetorical history. But we might also say that the national question can be understood in precisely the opposite manner, an insight to which Balibar’s work has long alerted us.
     
    It is relatively common to conceive of the nation as a form in which belonging is organized and to which the state responds. That is, the form of the nation-state is often understood in a common-sense manner by means of a simple sequence: the nation must precede the state, because it legitimates and justifies the state, giving it a certain solidity that would otherwise be lost in attempting to link the state’s boundaries to a given community. But this sequence cannot be logically sustained for a number of reasons. First and foremost, if the nation were to precede the state, it would imply that a concept of boundary or border could be rigorously drawn between one nation and another prior to the advent of the modern political community. It would imply, for instance, that national language or custom could be strictly delimited or demarcated within boundaries that correspond to concrete differences on the level of the concept. This in turn would imply that prior to such nations, there exists a natural stratum of difference in which difference could be understood as already organized. In this sense, it would imply that each national community is simply a historical concretization of a set of differences that not only existed in antiquity, but exists eternally, in an infinite regress, though always corresponding to some natural hierarchy inscribed in the earth itself.
     
    Needless to say, we know, and have known for centuries, that such a conception of an inherent systematic ordering of difference inscribed in the earth never existed. Nations rise and fall, they are constituted and dispersed, the borders of languages fluctuate and mutate in historically complex waves, groupings emerge, and accidentally aggregated groups become peoples who migrate, resettle, colonize, are colonized, are eradicated, or flourish. None of the communities that emerge from or submerge into the historical body of the earth has ever corresponded to a prior systematic ordering of difference, in which their divergences and continuities could be simply proven by reference to a given natural stratum. This leads us, therefore, to assert the precise opposite of the commonly held wisdom. In other words, the state—a social form always associated with an intensive concentration of systems and institutions that in turn are made to correspond to an extensive territoriality and formation of borders—must always precede the nation. This would lead us quickly to another means of understanding why the nation-form is so critical to modernity in general, as well as to two fundamental characteristics of modernity as we know it: its irreversible historical imperialism and colonialism, and the fundamental basis of modern social relations in the form that we call “capital.”
     
    If we accept a divergent ordering of the common wisdom of the formation of the nation-state as a building-block or unit of analysis through which the modern international state system was formed and continues to be maintained, it remains to be clarified why this form of the nation should be necessarily produced. In thinking this problematic, there is, for instance, the famous line from Alfred Jarry’s Ubu roi, later utilized by Lacan: “Long live Poland, for without Poland there would be no Poles!”1 This apparently cursory line in fact theoretically condenses the problem: at first glance, this statement has a certain uncanny functioning in its recalibration of the expected dynamic of relation between the nation-form and the national subject. It strikes us as humorous precisely because it apparently implies its inverse—”There must be Poles first, so that they can constitute a Poland”—as a matter of course. But in fact we should read it in a quite faithful manner: the national people, as an extension of the presupposed national subject, is a production of the nation-form, itself a technology of belonging that is subsequent to the form of the state, and not the reverse. That is, the supposedly concrete, obvious, and real national subject is in fact always a derivation from the most abstract schema of modern life.2
     
    But behind this problem of the temporality or ordering of the genesis of the nation-form lies a more basic problem of the national question. Because the national question is essentially concerned with the specificity or particularity of a given national scenario, its peculiar developmental features and so forth, the national question is always linked to a specific field of historical concerns. That is, it is always linked to the question of the transition. The various debates on the transition to capitalism on a world-scale have long been at the center of the problem of the nation-form. Why and for what concrete material reasons should a certain national situation develop a particular arrangement of factors, a particular trajectory of the concentration of capital, particular expressions of social relations, particular cultural features or rituals, customs, linguistic specificities, and so on?
     
    This type of question has typically been answered by understanding the specific mixture of social factors that were present in the local elements that preceded a given transition to capitalism. Was there a strong feudal social stratum, as in Western Europe, with its broadly developed seigneurial system and burgeoning urban centers? Was there a type of absolutist social system with an inverted form of overpopulation in the rural village rather than the city, as in the Russian or Japanese countryside? Was there a strong legal character to the transition, as in the English Enclosure Acts and Poor Laws, which threw the peasantry off the land and simultaneously criminalized movement through the category of vagabondage, or as in the eastern German Bauernlegen, which stripped land tenancy protections from small farmers and subordinated them to a vast estate system? And what about the profoundly colonial character of the transition to a world capitalist system throughout Africa, South and East Asia, and Latin America, wherein the growing global character of markets was from the very outset tied to the experience of slavery and imperial plunder of natural resources?
     
    What we see in all these cases is that the transition to capitalism has always been tightly linked to the history of the formation and global ordering of putatively national communities, areas or regions that serve as consistent frames for differentiation. In this sense, the historical background of the transition to world capitalism, situated just behind the formation of the global and systematic arrangement of the world on the basis of the form of the nation-state, is always linked to the production of national subjectivity. That is, the nature and character of the national question, when investigated historically and theoretically, always reveals itself to be first and foremost a question of how this peculiar and generalized arrangement, in which territory, human beings, and social systems are articulated together into national units, came into existence in the first place. The question of why this particular arrangement should obtain, as opposed to the infinite variety of other possibilities of social organization, is involved from its very origins with the production of individuals who would furnish, in their forms of citizenship, and above all, in their supposed forms of subjectivity, the raw materials through which the nation-form could emerge, this homo nationalis that the social apparatuses of our modern world system essentially presuppose.
     

    2. Citizen-Subject and Capital

     
    Let us go back and briefly develop this somewhat spatial lexicon in relation to Balibar’s analysis of the citizen-subject. The citizen is a historically specific form of individuality which corresponds to a general mode of social relations. That is, “the citizen (defined by his rights and duties) is that ‘nonsubject’ who comes after the subject, and whose constitution and recognition put an end (in principle) to the subjection of the subject” (“Citizen Subject” 38-39). This figure of the citizen as a new development in the production of individuality is located at a critical historical juncture: “We can even give it a date: 1789, even if we know that this date and the place it indicates are too simple to enclose the entire process of the substitution of the citizen for the subject. The fact remains that 1789 marks the irreversibility of this process, the effect of a rupture” (39). But what precisely does such a rupture consist in?
     

    It has often been demonstrated how, in the political history of Western Europe, the time of subjects coincides with that of absolutism. Absolutism in effect seems to give a complete and coherent form to a power that is founded only upon itself, and that is founded as being without limits (thus uncontrollable and irresistible by definition). Such a power truly makes men into subjects, and nothing but subjects, for the very being of the subject is obedience. From the point of view of the subject, power’s claim to incarnate both the good and the true is entirely justified: the subject is he who has no need of knowing, much less understanding, why what is prescribed to him is in the interest of his own happiness. Nevertheless, this perspective is deceptive: rather than a coherent form, classical absolutism is a knot of contradictions, and this can also be seen at the level of theory, in its discourse. Absolutism never manages to stabilize its definition of obedience and thus its definition of the subject.

    (40)

     

    By linking the subject to absolutism, and the citizen to the aftermath of absolutism, Balibar introduces this question immediately into the discourse, central to Marxist historical inquiry, of the transition to capitalism. Now, of course, 1789 does not mark this transition as such, nor in fact, can we pinpoint a date of the transition itself. Rather, the transition in Marx is a relational and elongated process, a process that ebbs and flows in waves of historical developments, rewriting and reordering the social sphere in divergent modes and differing arrangements with the microscopic logic of capital as a social relation. But what 1789 does mark is the development of a figure of the citizen that will become absolutely essential to the functioning of world capitalism, a figure that remains for us today crucial for an understanding of the dynamics of the national question, among other problems. As Balibar notes, however, and here we see an important parallel in Marx, there is never a moment when the citizen in fact completely replaces the subject, when the form of citizenship is fully untethered from its absolutist precursors (nor, of course, is absolutism or feudalism ever merely the simple and pure other of capitalism).3 Rather, like the entire historical and theoretical question of the transition itself, the figure of the citizen always remains in a paradoxical complicity or conspiracy with its antecedents; that is, it always remains in a process of referral whereby it only comes to operate through those seemingly absolutist mechanisms that its genesis was presumed to have overthrown. “The citizen,” Balibar notes, “is a man in enjoyment of all his ‘natural’ rights, completely realizing his individual humanity, a free man simply because he is equal to every other man.” But because installing this field of putative equality among citizens requires from the outset the capacity to differentiate or distinguish a citizen from a non-citizen, the citizen must in fact remain “always a supposed subject” (“Citizen Subject” 46).

     
    In order to determine who is and who is not a citizen, a border must be drawn around citizenship; the citizen must therefore be imbued with something external to itself as a purely political category. Here is where we see how the process of referral between citizen and subject takes place, silently and cyclically. Because the citizen is a category that can in principle include anyone, it is historically able to function as a universal aspiration and general form of individuality suitable for civil society and property relations. But the category of citizen cannot include everyone, precisely because it would therefore be impossible to mark a boundary or differentiation where the space of the citizen would begin and end. Immediately, we are thrown into the domain of the subject. In order to determine the inside and outside of the citizen, this category of individuality must be referred to the field of law, the field of economy, and the field of belonging. (Obviously, numerous other fields of subjectivity would apply here also.) Thus, citizenship would begin where the citizen coincides with the subject of law, for instance, subject to certain rights and duties of a given political community. But above all, the borders of citizenship are referred to the figure of homo nationalis, the specific form in which the citizen is made to coincide with or is superimposed onto the figure of the national subject. Here, we must enter into the relation between the citizen-subject and capital.
     
    When we inquire into the problem of how to locate the specific local form of capitalist development, concretized in the single nation-state, within the overall nature of global capital, which in itself knows no such boundaries, we immediately confront the problem of the logical and the historical. This problem of the relation of world and nation is mediated or supported by the concept of civil society, the general social form of economic life, which in turn is based on both the logical necessity and the historical contingency of the form of the individual, a problem that will be directly linked to the question of the production of subjectivity. In this term “civil society,” two lexical sequences are immediately opened up. These two lexical sequences are in turn related to two semiotic fields, two registers of signification: on the one hand, the existence of civil society expresses, in Louis Althusser’s well-known terms, a “process without a subject” in which concrete individuals are merely shells corresponding to positions in relations of exchange or commerce, existing solely as the “bearers” (Träger) or “guardians” (Hütern) of the forms of commodities and money.
     
    On the other hand, precisely because interest and need are expected to appear at the basis of these social interactions, the individuals who engage in the social process of exchange are produced as subjects of these needs. This double structure itself returns back into the unstable core of the concept civil society, where it exerts forces that produce a set of fundamental limitations or boundaries within which the vast and aporetic question of the subject is located. For Marx, civil society (bürgerliche Gesellschaft), designating the development of a form of society in which the bourgeoisie becomes the quintessence of social relations, is precisely the sphere in which the exchange of commodities is buttressed by very specific forms of individuality through which the subjects of exchange can be produced or convoked. It installs in history a bizarre situation in which “the bourgeoisie idealizes and universalizes its own conditions of existence under the name of ‘man’, or more generally, the form of individuality which allows private property to be considered ‘natural’” (Citoyen sujet 473). In turn this creates a situation of something like a “multiple personality” for “man”: homo nationalis, homo economicus, homo juridicus, and so forth (474), whereby all the institutional aspects of bourgeois life are generalized and naturalized as inalienable characteristics of historical progress. What appears as the historical installation of a very specific regime of differentiation so as to furnish the basis of exchange relations comes to be linked to property, a question we will return to in the following section.
     
    When Marx refers to civil society (bürgerliche Gesellschaft), he indicates in the most general sense “the total material intercourse (Verkehr) of individuals within a determinate stage of development of the productive forces.” He continues, “It embraces the whole commercial and industrial life of a given stage and, insofar as this, goes well beyond the state and the nation.” However, I believe Marx gives us an absolutely decisive clue that we must pay close attention to when he critically reverses this claim, or more accurately, adds to this claim a simultaneous paradox: “Yet, on the other hand again, civil society must assert itself externally [or “on the outside”] (nach Außen) as nationality (Nationalität), and internally [“on the inside”] (nach Innen) must organize itself as the State” (Das Kapital 36; Capital 89). Marx provides us here with an extremely suggestive problem to insert into the question of civil society, and in turn, into the articulation of citizen and subject. If civil society, or the historical emergence of the tendency towards the universalization of the bourgeois, is the field in which the citizen-subject is formed and joined together, it is significant that Marx identifies two directionalities or vectors of its function: exteriority and interiority.
     
    The sphere of civil society corresponds, for Marx, to the sphere of economic life on the surface of society in general; it connotes, in other words, the sphere of circulation or exchange, the site wherein given commodities are exchanged between given individuals occupying specific roles. As we have mentioned above, the citizen installed into the scene of society with the advent of “bourgeois universalism,” in Balibar’s terms, always maintains a complex relation with the form of the subject, and specifically with the form of the national subject, or homo nationalis. In a concrete sense, then, the form of individuality that is presumed or presupposed within relations of exchange is itself assumed to be historically continuous with a given national formation. In turn, this indicates that, if the individual presumed in capitalist society on the level of abstract generality must always be homo nationalis, this national element intervenes at a primal stage of the reproduction of social relations. Social relations in capitalist society take on a specific character that stems from the logic of this relation itself from the very outset. It means homo nationalis is a central mechanism, apparatus, or arrangement that capitalist social relations are founded on. Thus when Marx reminds us that “civil society” designates exactly the social level at which “exchange” (Verkehr and thus “intercourse” but also “échange” and therefore the later sense of Austausch for “exchange”) between “individuals” is made into the motor-force of social life, he draws our attention to the bizarre and paradoxical relation of the sphere of circulation and the sphere of production. That is, the productive capacity of society exerts a historical force on the way in which social relations can operate. But the image or schema of a rational civil society based on the undivided unit, literally the in-dividual, is not derived from the production process, but from the circulation process, which itself must be presupposed. Therefore, there is always already, at the core of civil society, some hard kernel of irrationality or impossibility, an impossibility that has been made to operate as if it were not there.
     
    The world of capital, which presents itself as a total systematic expression of pure exchange, produces civil society in order to invert itself and tries to derive itself precisely from its own presuppositions. Civil society connotes a field in which is presupposed a formal equality between sellers, the owners of this strange thing called labor power, and buyers, the owners of money. Exchange between them puts the form of money into the hands of the seller of labor power, who in turn uses it to purchase means of subsistence by which he or she can reproduce him- or herself. Thus, Marx importantly points out, the value of labor power as a commodity always “contains a historical and moral element,” that is, this value always has a necessary reference to something outside the exchange process, outside the supposedly smooth sphere of circulation. This shows us too that the theory of the exchange process, in which social relations are represented as a rational field of smooth circulation, is implicated from the very beginning in the real functioning of this circuit:
     

    The economic is in this sense the object itself of Marx’s “critique”: it is a representation (at once necessary and illusory) of real social relations. Basically it is only the fact of this representation that the economists abstractly explicate, which is inevitably already shared practically by the owners-exchangers (propiétaires-échangistes) of commodities, that the “economic” relations appear as such, in an apparent natural autonomy. The representation is implicated in the very form of the manifestation of social relations. This is precisely what enables producers-exchangers to recognize themselves in the image that the economists present of them. The “representation” of the economic is thus for Marx essential to the economic itself, to its real functioning and therefore to its conceptual definition.

     

    Therefore, civil society presupposes the form of the individual endowed with these needs and socially engaged to pursue them. Civil society in this sense is a name for the field of effects in which the production of subjectivity is undertaken. Without this specific form of social life characteristic of modernity and the world-scale of social relations, we cannot speak about the concept of the subject. On the other hand, in a disciplinary sense, we thus see that the production of subjectivity, in which the form of singularity must necessarily be violently re-produced as the form of individuality which belongs to a genus, is in no way separate from the logic of capital.

     
    Civil society is a paradox: the relations that compose it can only be understood as adequately civil (i.e., founded on the smooth and supposedly equal exchange of the market) on the basis of an entire volatile historical sequence. The pre-history of capitalism’s emergence into the world constitutes the genealogy of the concept: the bands of feudal retainers are broken up, the self-sufficient peasantry is transformed into the proto-proletarian small tenant on the one hand and the “beggars, robbers, and vagabonds” on the other; this movement of enclosure on the scale of the land is thus mirrored in the enclosure of bodies, sentiments and so forth into the form of the “individual” or “property in his own person” (Locke). In turn, it is this form of identification between the formation of the property-owner endowed with rights and the individual endowed with social rationality that forms the specific historical movement which culminates in the figure of the bourgeois or indeed the civilian (cives). But the entire capacity of civil society to form the bond or articulation between social organization (state) and social legitimation (nation), a capacity presumed to be a rational, coherent, and necessary development from within its own logic, is therefore always reliant on its outside, or what must be axiomatically excluded from its own process: the volatility of historical time. In this sense, the whole logic of the citizen-subject is that of a volatile amalgam: held together, but always threatening to expose the fundamental volatility of this amalgamation itself. In this sense it is exactly something like the (im)possibility, the instability that underpins the social forms that exist under capital.
     
    Let us now sum up the contours of the problem and put forward a further complication. Capitalism is a form of society organized by capital. This already presents us with a certain regressive structure in theory, because capital is not a thing but a social relation. At the same time, capital in capitalist society is the only thing that expresses itself as an individuality, that is, not as a bearer or guardian but as a true individual in the sense that it cannot be divided, but operates as one. The social human being is always divided in capitalist society, as the bearer of the thing that proves its social position, labor power. The human being in this sense is not active in capitalist society, but passive, a receptacle for the object—labor power—that is generated inside him or her. Thus when we say that capitalism is organized by capital, we mean that capitalism is a society in which relationality is a perspectival or focal point devoted to the logical reproduction of this originally historical relation itself. This is the broad philosophical point behind the description of capital as self-expanding value. Capital is itself a relation devoted to the reproduction of the relations that it itself implies as the motor-force of a social field. Labor power, in this sense, is a kind of exterior or externality whose givenness must be assumed in precisely the same way that the boundaries of citizenship must presuppose that they can be mapped onto a set of coordinates already given by the form of the national subject—it is precisely here that we must carefully note Marx’s point that civil society expresses itself externally as nationality, and internally as the state. The entire question of the function of the nation-form within the capital-relation thus pivots around this complex and unstable object at the core of capital’s logic, the commodity-form of labor power. It is this strange form of labor power that constitutes one of the most important advances of Marx’s critique of political economy, an advance that we are still seeking to understand. After all, “If there is an element of ‘proletarian politics’ in Marx which is a genuine third term, it is necessary to seek it in the direction of everything which resists and dislocates the civil society/state dichotomy. If it is to be found above all in the critique of political economy, this is because this dichotomy, as it is handed down to Marx (and to us after him) is above all an effect of economic ideology” (Balibar, “Marx” 18). Labor power, as we will see, cannot be located in either pole of civil society or the state, but it exposes something critical about this dichotomy: both civil society and the state must essentially presuppose the existence of labor power, yet neither can guarantee it.
     

    3. The Nation-Form and the Labor Power Commodity

     

    die Erbsünde wirkt überall. [“the original sin is at work everywhere.”]

    (Marx, Das Kapital 620; Capital 589)

     
    Although the national question has a long polemical history, not only within Marxist theory but also in the broadest political sense,4 the relation between the supposedly political content of the national question and the supposedly theoretical content of the critique of political economy remains complex and open. Typically, this relation has been posed in a dual structure: theoretical analysis of capitalism’s local development furnishes the basis on which the national question may be strategically resolved according to an accompanying political line. But this tendency therefore treats the national question as something inherently separate from the inner logic of capital itself. In order to disrupt this prior reading and reassert the centrality of the national question to the capital-relation itself, we will investigate certain paradoxes that characterize the labor-power commodity. This strange commodity, which never attains a stable existence, but is always within capital’s circuit of positing (Setzung) and presupposition (Voraussetzung), must be assumed to be capable of reproduction. But its reproduction does not take place in the style of any other commodity: it is something indirect for capital, an effect of the worker’s body that must, in effect, be given from the outside so that the inside may function in the style of a logical process. Because of this exteriority, Marx emphasizes to us that the value and price of labor power can only be determined by means of a whole field of historical and moral factors. Here is where the nation-form is always entering the picture, but not merely as a corollary moment: rather, the nation-form is a mechanism that is always-already located at the alpha and omega of capital, where the volatile play of force and torsion cyclically repeats itself in the form of crisis.
     
    Labor power and land are the two elements of capitalist production that can be circulated as commodities but that cannot be originally produced as commodities. Rather, they must be encountered or stumbled upon historically—in the process of the “so-called primitive accumulation” (Marx, Capital; ch.26)—in order to function thereafter logically. Already this introduces a rupture or gap into capital’s own image of itself as a social totality in which all social relations are expressed (darstellt) as a pure field of exchange. Because labor power cannot be produced directly, as in the case of all other commodities, its presence can never be assumed to be stable or assured. Therefore, in order to traverse this gap so that capitalist production can be established as a circuit-process, capital must continuously utilize the form of the relative surplus population to pretend or act as if the labor power commodity can be limitlessly supplied, or to indirectly produce it, so to speak. Only by means of this immaculate deception can capital expand itself in the form of the business cycle. In turn, the relative surplus population must always be formed through something that appears external to capital, through which it can be aggregated and managed. This typically appears in the modern world in the form of the border, or in the form that Balibar has often referred to as “the anthropological difference.” In other words, when Marx describes the irrationality that characterizes the form of labor power as a commodity, it is no accident that he refers to the modern proletariat as “this race of peculiar commodity-owners” (Marx, Das Kapital 186; Capital 182).
     
    In order to clarify how “the anthropological difference,” based on the fundamental figure of the citizen-subject, can be understood in the social logic of capitalist society, we must also look for the antecedents of this theoretical problem in the historical production of the individual, a continual movement of inclusion and exclusion with which the individual is imagined and constructed. This production of difference by means of an oscillation or torsion between inclusion and exclusion culminates in the discourse of citizenship, which underpins not only the modern state-form but also its genesis in the form of empire and colony. Here we confront immediately the logic of contractualism that grounds the creation of the citizen, the free contractuality of social life that stabilizes the enclosures or borders of the regime of citizenship, installing a discourse of governing and managing the state centered around what Locke called “property in his own person.” This logic of the citizen as the bearer of this strange property of his or her own person called labor power shows us how the contemporary management of the nation-state is inseparably linked to the reproduction of the aggregate capital. In turn, this mode of analysis can also show us how the figure of the citizen is the nodal point through which we can see the function of racism within contemporary global capitalism.
     
    The operation of this strange thing can therefore be summed up by emphasizing that labor power, while it can function as a commodity (as variable capital in the production process), cannot be a commodity as a direct product of capital. Thus, the whole issue of labor power shows us this torsional and recurrent loop, whereby it must be presumed in order to exist, yet the condition of its very presupposition itself presumes that what should be a result of the process must somehow be there at the beginning. That is, in order to control and maintain something that escapes its control, capitalism forms a means of producing the labor power commodity as if it were, in fact, under its direct jurisdiction. What it requires is the formation of social-historical institutions capable of inciting forms of the historical and moral aspects of the field of physical life (from which labor power is drawn) that are suitable for capitalism’s own reproduction. Thus, capitalism’s specific form of population is a complex aggregate of techniques that are overlaid like a grid on the existing “natural” stratum of bodies, words, physiognomies, affects, desires, etc., recalibrating and reformulating them as countable or computable as inputs for capital’s circuit-process:
     

    Capitalism turns all products into commodities—it turns labor power itself into a commodity as well, but it cannot produce this labor power as a commodity by means of capital. As a result, in order to completely commodify labor power, capital requires the industrial reserve army. Yet, unless this industrial reserve army is formed by capital itself, capitalism cannot posit the social foundations of its own establishment as one historical form of society.

     

    That is, capital is repeatedly exposed to its inability to produce the foundations of its own order. Yet, without in effect convincing itself of the possibility to generate itself, capital cannot expand, because its expansion presumes the availability of labor power, which in turn presumes the industrial reserve army effect. Capital can give form or direction to the relative surplus populations that appear in the territorial domains of capital’s manifestation, but the industrial reserve army effect paradoxically presupposes that wage labor, and therefore a working population, exists. Because of this presumption, the excess population that would guarantee capital’s ability to act as if it were capable of producing labor power directly is a result of capital’s untraceable beginning (Anfang), which should always logically precede the ordering of the population. But if capital therefore presumes this Anfang, it must silently or magically repeat the beginning over and over again every time the circuit C-M-C’ reaches its end.

     
    Capital must repeat the violent capture of the beginning, the violent verso of the supposedly smooth cycle of circulation, but thus cannot rid itself of this fundamental “condition of violence” (Gewaltverhältnis) (Balibar, “Reflections” 110), located in its logical alpha and omega, the labor power commodity, whose indirect production is located paradoxically outside commodity relations. An excess of violence is haunting capital’s interior by means of this constantly liminalizing/volatilizing forcible production of labor power. Precisely by this excessive violence, capital endangers itself and opens itself up to a whole continent of raw violence, and it is exactly on this point that we see something important in terms of the question of how capital utilizes the “anthropological difference” to effect the indirect production of labor power, how the nation-form is entering into this historical circuit of violence to force labor power into existence.
     
    The primal violence, sustained as a continuum or status quo, appears as a smooth state, a cyclical reproduction cycle without edges. But this appearance or semblance of smooth continuity is in fact a product of the working of violence upon itself: violence must erase and recode itself as peace by means of violence. In other words, when we encounter the basic social scenario of capitalist society, the exchange of a product for money, we are already in a situation in which the raw violence of subjectivation—whereby some absent potentiality within the worker’s body is exchanged as if it were a substance called labor power which can be commodified—is covered over by the form of money, which appears as a smooth container of significations that can serve as a measure of this potentiality. But in order for labor power to be measured and exchanged as money, there must be a repeated doubling of violence. What must remain on the outside of capital as a social relation is paradoxically what must also be forced into its inside, perpetually torn between the forms of subjectivation that produce labor power as an inside, and the historical field of reproduction in which the worker’s body is produced on the violent outside of capital.
     
    In this sense, the commodification of labor power is the degree zero of the social itself, the apex or pinnacle of the social relation called capital. But this thing indicated by the problem of the commodification of labor power, or more specifically the excess or seeming (im)possibility of the commodification of labor power,5 is also an analytical or theoretical object that discloses the limits of the social itself. In other words, the original accident, the chance or hazardous historical encounter between capital and the owner of labor-power, is continuously being set in motion by capital in the circulation-form of the buying and selling of labor power, where we see the basic social antagonism (Gegensatz) between capital and labor. Yet when we enter the “hidden abode of production,” we discover not the stable yet concealed ground of this relation, but rather the site of its ultimate expression of contradiction (Widerspruch): we are immediately thrown back on the fact that although labor power cannot be originally produced by capital as a commodity, it can be circulated on the surface as a commodity; that is, the excess or absurdity of the commodification of labor power can be overcome without being resolved. Thus this historically excessive or irrational accident of the original encounter that is being incessantly reinscribed on the circulation-surface of social life, leads us from history to logic in the sphere of production. But critically, we are not presented here with something like the truth or a pure relation of depth that lies behind or below the surface. Rather, we see that a certain process of coding is always taking place. What is coded as free contractual exchange between substantial entities of purely random origin is recoded in the sphere of production as the logical impossibility or even absurdity of the stability of this relation itself.
     
    This relation of (im)possibility—in which capital cannot produce labor power directly, but can circulate it on its surface as if it had—is above all a question of reproduction, a question that returns us to the link between the national question and the form of labor power as a commodity. The paradox of the modern nation-state is that, while the nation and the state cannot be said to coincide, but rather must be kept separate in order for there to be a process of referral between them, nevertheless the nation is always utilized by the state in order to trace the contours of its interiority. Thus, this installs a permanent site of slippage within the nation-state as a form. On the one hand, the state must utilize the nation in order to imagine itself as an interiority with clear borders and demarcations that would separate it from a general exterior, itself composed of other interiorities. In turn, the nation, as a purely ideational link between individuals that cannot be strictly located in terms of territory, institutions, or boundaries, must rely on the form of the state to provide it with a determinate field of localization, a concrete sphere within which one nation-form can be said to be dominant or hegemonic. This process of referral, in which state and nation essentially require each other in order to imagine themselves as pure interiorities that could then legitimate a given hierarchical arrangement of phenomena in the form of a community, is therefore always linked to the question of reproduction. On this point, we can turn to a famous letter of Engels:
     

    According to the materialist view of history, the determining factor in history is, in the final analysis (das in letzter Instanz bestimmende Moment), the production and reproduction of actual life (wirklichen Lebens). More than that was never maintained by Marx or myself.

    (Engels, Marx-Engels Werke 462-465; Collected Works 34-36)

     

    What is intriguing and important here is the concept of the production and reproduction of “actual life” (wirklichen Lebens),6 that is, the reproduction not only of the social factory that is the worker’s physical body (itself the site of production of labor power), but also the literal reproduction of the body through the consumption of means of subsistence, a process which takes place outside of yet internal to the sphere of circulation. It also means something much broader: what Michel Foucault called, in The History of Sexuality, the “entire political technology of life” (145). Here, we require a focus not only on labor power and its complex role within the dynamics of capital, but also on its bearers or guardians. Marx reminds us that precisely because commodities, including labor power, cannot themselves go to the market and sell themselves, we must have analytical recourse to their “guardians” (Hütern). That is, we must have recourse to the historical forms of individuality that furnish the social bodies within which labor power, the archi-commodity at the origin of all other commodities, could be produced, reproduced, and borne to the market so as to be exchanged. Paradoxically, therefore, we see something crucial here that once again Balibar has drawn our attention to: the somewhat absent or blank character of the proletariat, that position most central to the sphere of circulation, wherein the possessor of nothing but labor power exchanges it as a commodity for a wage. Let me quote an especially crucial passage from Balibar here at some length:

     

    Everything takes place as if the proletariat as such had nothing to do with the positive function that exploited labor power carries out in the sphere of production, as the “productive force” par excellence; as if it had nothing to do with the formation of value, the transformation of surplus labor into surplus value, the metamorphosis of “living labor” into capital. Everything occurs as if this term connoted merely the “transitional” character of the working class in a triple sense:
     

    1. 1. The condition of the worker is an unstable state, perhaps even a state of “marginality,” of exclusion from a relation to “normal” social existence (a society that proletarianizes itself thus tends towards a situation of generalized insecurity).
    2. 2. It perpetuates a violence that characterized initially, in a open and “political” manner, the transition from feudalism to capitalism, and for which it later substitutes a mechanism that is purely “economic” in appearance, simply because it is juridically normalized.
    3. 3. It is historically untenable and thus implies another transition that erases the previous one, and through which capitalist accumulation prepared its material conditions.
    (La crainte 223)

     

    In essence, Balibar links together two critical moments in the unfolding of the capital-relation: its unstable history in the “so-called primitive accumulation” or process of enclosure, and its unstable logic in the form of exchange, the moment in which labor power, itself generated in the volatile contingency of history, must be presupposed in order to convoke itself when its bearer exchanges this inner potential for a wage. In essence, therefore, we see that the entire question of how something like the nation-form could constitute one of the crucial historical and moral factors in the formation of value is linked to a repetition, a repetition that effectively erases its own defects in order to operate as a logical rationality. The transition here thus indicates not only the transition from feudalism to capitalism, but the constantly repeating transition of the salto mortale, or fatal leap, of exchange, the irruption into existence of the labor power commodity, this absent potential that links together capital’s history and capital’s logic in an intimate relation to the nation-form.

     

    4. Translation and Transition

     

    The nature of a great philosophy is not only to incomplete itself, but to incomplete others, by introducing itself or by being introduced in their writing. […] If it is true that the regulating idea of “system” is fundamentally a modern version of the old imago mundi, the meaning of all these aporetic undertakings is, if not to “transform,” probably to incomplete the world, or the representation of the world as “a world.”

     
    The concept of the transition is not only concerned with the historiographical identification of the transformation of the basis of a given social order, or the “articulation of modes of production.”7 It is also a temporal question that goes beyond the simple possibility of periodization to encompass the question of how divergent temporalities, divergent trajectories of development, could be located within the same sphere, that is, the world. The transition is thus not simply a notion of how an individual social formation, or a given nation-form can be understood in its emergence, maintenance, and transformation; more broadly, the transition is a concept central to the historiographical discovery of the world as itself an integrated unit of analysis. In turn, the transition itself has long been a crucial site of contestation around the ways in which the world could or could not be understood as a unity. That is, the concept of the transition has always been profoundly linked to the history of representations of the world, a history that links together the national question and the inner logic of capital.
     
    Capital is always operating retrospectively as a relation, preparing the ground of its outside from within its logical orbit. This perverse, irredeemable quality of capital’s historical time is miniaturized within the logic of civil society—the citizen, whose existence cannot be grounded, must be legitimated by the retrojection of a national subject that gives continuity to something purely discontinuous, heterogeneous, and contingent. This process of fixing or ordering is always-already present in capital’s form of presupposition. That is, by presupposing its own suppositions, capital acts in such a way as to ensure that its limits are sealed off, removed from the historical process. Yet, precisely by therefore according such an essential place to history, capital acknowledges at all times its fundamental weakness or the defective moment in its logic: the contingent continent of history is the field of flux wherein the practical expressions of the representations essential to the image of a continuous subject are inscribed, and this field of history cannot be accounted for in capital’s logic as such. But capital attempts to do just that in the form of its own peculiar historical time. It conjures itself up from a history that it inscribes back onto the historical process, giving consistency and continuity to an accidental moment, a continuity that then serves as a legitimating device, a narrative that capital appeals to in order to prove itself.
     
    It is precisely on this point that Sandro Mezzadra underscores the importance of the postcolonial condition that contemporary capitalism inhabits.8 In other words, because capital’s reliance on the schematic array of differences furnished and maintained in the contemporary world constitutes the concrete reality of the globality of the present, we must connect contemporary capitalism to the long and complex history of “the continual movement of inclusion and exclusion with which the individual is imagined and constructed” (Mezzadra 43). This production of difference by means of an oscillation or torsion between inclusion and exclusion culminates in the discourse of citizenship, which underpins not only the modern state-form but also its genesis in the form of empire and colony. Through a pre-history of the postcolonial condition, we are alerted immediately to the chain of signification between the logic of the citizen as image of the state, and the logic of property as a microphysics of capitalist development as a whole. This dual homology traces for us the inscriptions of power that irreparably condition the modern regimes of citizenship and that continue to show to us what is at stake in the state’s policing of the figure of the citizen.
     
    It is no longer a surprising or shocking historical intervention to note that the regime of control constituted by the discourse of citizenship is something that has a directly colonial legacy, but it remains an important task to theoretically demonstrate how the political and juridical theorizations that accompanied the colonial project attempted to naturalize “precise racial hierarchies” in the division of the earth itself, recalling Carl Schmitt’s notion of the originary nomos of the earth that characterized the juridical field of the colonial era, the jus publicum europaeum.9 What we must constantly emphasize is the cyclical deployment of borders, margins, limits, interiors, and exteriors, in the historical production of the colonial difference, the means of recoding the incommensurabilities of the world as hierarchical commensurabilities, whereby the underdeveloped or colonized are temporally located in a permanent waiting-room of history. It is no surprise therefore, that these conditions of the historical production of difference, located within the production of the nation-form itself, not only condition the emergence of labor power, but also therefore condition the entire circuit of capital itself:
     

    The historical conditions of [capital’s] existence are by no means given with the mere circulation of money and commodities. Capital only arises when the owner of the means of production and subsistence finds the free worker selling his own labor-power on the market. This one historical precondition comprises a world’s history [or, a world-history] (diese eine historische Bedingung umschließt eine Weltgeschichte). Capital, therefore, ushers in from the outset (von vornherein) a new epoch in the process of social production.

    (Das Kapital 184; Capital 180)10

     

    We see here a complex integration of the formation of the world with the production of labor power as a commodity, two moments without which the concept “world” itself is unthinkable, the single and decisive precondition of world history itself. Without this precondition a concept like “world” could not be produced precisely because labor power, while generated in relation to the nation-form, also reveals a new universality of the possibility of proletarianization. In this sense, it is only because the logical world of commodities (what Marx called the Warenwelt) and the historical world of bodies are volatilely amalgamated together in the form of labor power, that we can have a concept of world at all. Yet, this systematic logic of capture is only part of the story. The paradox of the historical formation of the colonial difference and its juridical recoding is that it is being continuously undermined from within by the “discovery of equality” (in Fanon’s phrase) that the increasing integration of the world implied (see Mezzadra 28; 52-55). In other words, by integrating the world into a single schematic, based on the unit of the nation-state, the colonial project also produced the conditions for a global politics of equality, by placing difference into an overall framework of commensurability. It is precisely this moment that shows us the way in which the history of the anti-colonial movements, those political irruptions that demanded the nascent equality implied in the organization of the world be raised to a principle of society, continues to impact our world today, insofar as it is irreversibly and irrevocably a world. Therefore, the experience of the twentieth century, which we have lived through, can be characterized by this colonial paradox—on the one hand, this discovery of the world as a world produced an irreversible threshold in the historical process of planetary unification. On the other hand, insofar as this unification is a historical tendency that emerges from the colonial scenario, it also shows us that the colonial project is always tensely moving in two directions at once: it requires the form of confinement above all else (and it is on this point that Mezzadra’s work has opened new analytical directions complementary with Balibar’s thought)—the bordering of groups, national languages, racial hierarchies, bounded spaces and so forth—and at the same time the revolt against this confinement or bordering. The principle of equality or globality that is produced under the effect of the colonial enclosures is this revolt, the development for the first time of a world as world (rather than a world as collection of divergent parts); therefore, this form of enclosure “constitutes the fundamental principle and at the same time, the internal limit, of the colonial project” (Mezzadra 53-54).

     
    Today we remain within this tension or paradox, in a world in which humanity itself is framed, in the final analysis, through its historical character of irreversibility. This irreversibility is contained in the fact that “the violence of origin imposes a common language which erases forever any experience of difference that has not been mediated by the colonial relations of power and by the logic of global capital” (Mezzadra 65). It is here that we see the link to the transition.
     
    The transition, Balibar argues, takes shape in a particular way, what we might call a dialectic of limit and threshold, through the gradual emergence of the elements of the nation-state, those elements that have gradually begun to nation-alize society. Here, we can think not only of socio-economic apparatuses, such as the examples Balibar provides of the reemergence of Roman law, the development of a broad mercantilism, and the domestication of the feudal aristocracies. We can also conceive here of a certain dynamics of translation, wherein the historical forms of language, diffused in entirely different arrangements according to localities, rituals, and so forth, experience an increasing concentration into the early elements through which the nation is concatenated and pulled together. Translation, in this sense, would be precisely the experience of the historical formation of the national border as an ideational moment, the process through which “this side” and “that side” of a gap could be posited, the moment when two sides are presupposed, in turn necessitating a regime of translation between them.11 Thus, “the closer we come to the modern period, the greater the constraint imposed by the accumulation of these elements seems to be. Which raises the crucial question of the threshold of irreversibility” (Balibar and Wallerstein 88).
     
    The question of the transition, therefore, is linked in Balibar’s work to this concept of threshold, for which Foucault provides us a careful formulation:
     

    What might be called a society’s ‘threshold of modernity’ has been reached when the life of the species is wagered on its own political strategies. For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics place his existence as a living being in question.

    (History of Sexuality 143)

     

    Foucault’s vocabulary here of “wager” as the key to the transition between apparatuses of the limit and apparatuses of the threshold should be linked back into the interior of the social relationality that composes capital. What is wagered is the capacity of life—that is, specifically social life—to both generate the building blocks and shoulder the burden of this social relation that is capital. Capital originates as a social relation capable of initiating and rejuvenating certain internally produced formations of relation. This is the sense in which Althusser points out that capitalist reproduction is never the simple reproduction of the material basis of capitalist society, but rather the reproduction of the relations that allow for this reproduction itself. Capital, as a social relation, can initiate and maintain itself but only as a defective circle, or a circuit process that never quite reaches its cyclical starting point (see Nagahara, Warera; “We, the Defective“). In order, therefore, to bridge this gap marked by the (im)possibility of the labor power commodity, the “whole political technology of life”—the statements, formations, apparatuses, modalities, and so forth that sustain the arrangement called “life”—must be mobilized to seal over the contingency of this wager. And it is exactly this constancy or inseparability of capital from its putative outside—the form of the nation and so forth—that Althusser indentifies as the “naïve anthropology” of humanism haunting the world of capital. Capital’s “wager” on “life” constitutes a “vicious circle,” one which never adequately returns to its starting point, because the whole sequence of presupposition forms an abyssal and regressive chain, in which something must always be given: “the homogeneous given space of economic phenomena is thus doubly given by the anthropology which grips it in the vice of origins and ends” (Althusser 163).

     
    In the final analysis, Balibar reminds us that “it is the concrete configurations of the class struggle and not ‘pure’ economic logic which explain the constitutions of nation-states” (Balibar and Wallerstein 90). Without doubt, this is correct. But is it not also the case that the entire schematic of Marx’s critique of political economy is devoted to showing us precisely that the “concrete configurations of the class struggle” always haunt and contaminate the supposedly pure interiority of the logic of capital? The labor power commodity, the product of a historical accident in the form of a contingent encounter (the “so-called primitive accumulation”), is given a central role within the logical drive of capital. How could the relation of self-expanding value form itself as a circuit, as a cyclical and repeating process, without presupposing the presence of the labor power commodity, which is precisely that which can never be strictly presupposed in capital’s interior? In other words, from the very outset of the form of exchange relations, the labor power commodity, which is a product of a volatile and purely contingent history, is made to function as if it could be assumed to be a “‘pure’ economic logic.” This is exactly where the secretive role of the form of the nation comes into the innermost moment of the logic of capital, a moment which behaves as if historical considerations are axiomatically excluded, a moment intimately related to capital’s most fundamental phenomenological “conjuring trick” (escamotage; Derrida, Specters). In this sense, we ought to push Balibar’s argument slightly further by emphasizing that the “concrete configurations of the class struggle” and “‘pure’ economic logic” are in fact always contaminated with each other in the historical experience of capitalist society.
     
    In other words, this “naïve anthropology” or “anthropological difference” which is supposedly excluded from the circulation process or the “total material exchange” between rational individuals, is in fact located at its very core. The form of the nation is already contained at the very origin of the supposedly rational and universal process of exchange, a process that acts as if it represents the smooth and perfect circle of pure rationality, but that is actually permanently suspended between its impossible origin, which it is compelled to cyclically repeat, and its end, which is equally impossible, because it would relativize the circuit of exchange and expose it to its outside, which it must constantly erase. Thus civil society itself must remain in its state of insanity or derangement, forever pulled in two directions of the production of subjects. It cannot exit this deranged form but must try perpetually to prove its universality simply by oscillating between these two boundaries, two impossibilities. Its underlying schema of the world, which “seems absent from the immediate reality of the phenomena themselves,” is permanently located in “the interval between origins and ends,” a short-circuit that incessantly reveals to us that “its universality is merely repetition” (Althusser 163).
     
    Just like the representation of translation as pure exchange (Sakai and Solomon), the transition must always be represented as if it were a natural growth, a “simple and contentless” leap of inevitability from one side to the other. But when we closely examine the transition, we find something truly disquieting: we discover that the transition is not an accomplished fact of history, or a necessary step in the evolution of social life, but rather an endless loop of falling short, never accomplishing its task, always erasing or recoding its failure. In this sense, the paradox of civil society is not that it is strong, weak, absent, inverted, or so forth. It is rather that civil society is never fully established anywhere, precisely because the exchange process on which it is based must always traverse the historical outside while pretending to be a pure interiority, a pure logical circle. What sustains this circle that is always not quite returning to itself is its repetition. But because this circular logic of civil society in the world of capital is compelled to repeat, it is also compelled to constantly re-remember its incompleteness, contingency, and relativity, a problem that remains in the everyday life of society in the form of the “indetermination” of the citizen (Balibar, “Citizen Subject” 53). In other words, the figure of the citizen itself, the juridical and political figure in whom is incarnated the historical body producing labor power, remains in a permanent state of incompleteness or chance, a figure that depends “entirely on an encounter between a statement and situations or movements that, from the point of view of the concept, are contingent. If the citizen’s becoming-a-subject takes the form of a dialectic, it is precisely because both the necessity of ‘founding’ institutional definitions of the citizen and the impossibility of ignoring their contestation—the infinite contradiction within which they are caught—are crystallized in it” (53).
     
    It is around this point that Balibar’s work itself functions as one of the great philosophies that incompletes others, that incompletes our image of the world. By showing us that “world” as a concept, “world” as a project, remains incomplete, it also restores to us a politics of the world, a politics that would restore precisely those concrete struggles to their central place in its incompleteness. Above all else, Balibar’s work, in linking together the logic of capital, the history of capitalism, the transition from subject to citizen and back again, the emergence of the nation-form and its regime of anthropological difference, shows us the persistence of politics, the open politicality that always remains within the core of the supposedly rational and closed social forms we inhabit. Balibar argues that
     

    All of Foucault’s work, or at least that part of it which, by successive approximations, obstinately tries to describe the heterogeneous aspects of the great “transition” between the world of subjection and the world of right and discipline, “civil society” and State apparatuses, is a materialist phenomenology of the transmutation of subjection, of the birth of the Citizen Subject.

    (“Citizen Subject” 55)

     

    We might as well say that it is Balibar’s thought itself that has most importantly developed and undertaken this “materialist phenomenology” for us today. In the face of another world crisis, a crisis in which the reproduction of the aggregate capital has come into a clear conflict with the tendency towards an increase in the rate of appropriation of surplus value, we also see that this moment of crisis in the capital-relation is mirrored in a crisis of the nation-form and the existing arrangements of the “anthropological difference.” By repeatedly exposing us to the politicality that can never be erased from the logic of capital and its complicit inner relation to the nation-form, Balibar has taught us, and continues to teach us, that another arrangement of social life is always possible, that another sociality, beyond the enclosure into capital and the nation, remains a potential in the history of the present.

     

    Gavin Walker is Assistant Professor of History and East Asian Studies at McGill University in Montréal, Québec. Recent publications include “On Marxism’s Field of Operation: Badiou and the Critique of Political Economy” in Historical Materialism (20.2) and “Primitive Accumulation and the Formation of Difference: On Marx and Schmitt,” in Rethinking Marxism (23.3).

     

    Notes:

     

    All translations from languages other than English mine unless otherwise indicated.

     

    1. This line is recalled at the outset of Copjec.

     

    2. Although I cannot take it up here for reasons of space, it would be necessary to take another occasion to develop this question in relation to the work of Nicos Poulantzas, in particular his final work, State, Power, Socialism (1978, Eng. trans. 1980). In relation to Poulantzas, Balibar has given us an exceptionally important set of reflections in his “Communisme et citoyenneté: Sur Nicos Poulantzas” in La proposition de l’égaliberté: essais politiques 1989-2009, 179-200, in particular his discussion of the specific form of the nation-state (185-188).

     

    3. This point should be strongly emphasized, because the transition from feudalism to capitalism is never a break, a cut. It is rather a strange form of evolution subtended by a series of elements that retrospectively leap into a consistency that appear to have seized together into a whole, albeit a whole that never fully completes the transition it presupposes.

     

    4. See Haupt, Löwy, and Weill’s Les marxistes et la question nationale, 1848-1914.

     

    5. This is the point on which Uno Kozo’s work has developed a set of important and original theses related to the originary and unavoidable absence or impasse of rationality characterizing the position of the labor power commodity. See here also Yutaka Nagahara’s important developments of this point in Warera kashi aru mono tachi and “We, the Defective Commodity-Beings.” See also Walker’s “The World of Principle, or Pure Capitalism: Exteriority and Suspension in Uno Kôzô” for a discussion of this problematic.

     

    6. We should note that the concept of “actual life” in Marx and Engels cannot be encompassed in the vitalist understanding of life: rather it is here specifically social life that is at stake, the entire life of a social formation, not an abstract and quasi-mystical conception of life. I owe thanks to Benjamin Noys for discussions on this point.

     

    7. For reasons of length and topicality, I cannot extensively enter into a re-examination of the “articulation” debate here, but it is necessary to read and re-read this debate in our current moment. For an overview of the questions at stake, see Foster-Carter’s “The Modes of Production Controversy.”

     

    8. See Mezzadra’s La condizione postcoloniale, and on Mezzadra’s work see Walker’s “Postcoloniality in Translation.”.

     

    9. See Walker’s “The World of Principle.”

     

    10. Translation modified. The term “comprises” in the second to last sentence (“…umschließt eine Weltgeschichte”) also indicates an “enveloping,” “en-closing,” or “en-compassing.” This topological sense should be kept in mind.

     

    11. On this crucial concept of the “regime of translation,” see the many works of Naoki Sakai.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Althusser, Louis and Étienne Balibar. Reading Capital. Trans. B. Brewster. London: Verso, 1970. Print.
    • Balibar, Étienne. “Sur la dialectique historique: Quelques remarques critiques à propos de Lire le capital.” Cinq études du matérialisme historique. Paris: Maspero, 1974. Print.
    • ———. “Marx, the Joker in the Pack (or, the Included Middle).” Economy and Society 14.1 (1985): 1-27. Print.
    • ———. “The Vacillation of Ideology.” Eds. Nelson, Cary and Lawrence Grossberg. Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture. Chicago: U of Illinois P, 1988. Print.
    • ———. “Citizen Subject.” Eduardo, Peter Connor, and Jean-Luc Nancy, eds. Who Comes After the Subject? New York: Routledge, 1991. 33-57. Print.
    • ———. “The Infinite Contradiction.” Yale French Studies 88 (1995): 142-165. Print.
    • ———. La crainte des masses: Politique et philosophie avant et après Marx. Paris: Galilée, 1997. Print.
    • ———. “Reflections on Gewalt.” Historical Materialism 17.1 (2009): 99-125. Print.
    • ———. La proposition de l’égaliberté: essais politiques 1989-2009. Paris: PUF, 2010. Print.
    • ———. Citoyen sujet et autres essais d’anthropologie philosophique. Paris: PUF, 2011. Print.
    • ———. and Immanuel Wallerstein. Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities. Trans. Chris Turner. London: Verso, 1991. Print.
    • Copjec, Joan. Imagine There’s No Woman: Ethics and Sublimation. Cambridge: MIT, 2002. Print.
    • Derrida, Jacques. Specters of Marx. Trans. Peggy Kamuf. London: Routledge, 1994. Print.
    • Engels, Friedrich. Letter of 21 September 1890 to Joseph Bloch. Marx-Engels Werke, Bd. 37. Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1962. Print.
    • ———. Letter of 21 September 1890 to Joseph Bloch. Collected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, vol. 49. New York: International, 2005. Print.
    • Foster-Carter, Aidan. “The Modes of Production Controversy”. NLR 1. 107 (1978). Print.
    • Foucault, Michel. History of Sexuality, Vol. 1. Trans. R. Hurley. London: Allen Lane, 1979. Print.
    • Haupt, Georges, Michael Löwy, and Claudie Weill. Les marxistes et la question nationale, 1848-1914. Paris: L’Harmattan, 1997. Print.
    • Marx, Karl. Das Kapital. Bd. 1. Marx-Engels Werke. Bd. 23. Berlin, Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus: Dietz Verlag. 1962. Print.
    • ———. “Randglossen zu Adolph Wagners Lehrbuch der politischen Ökonomie.” Marx-Engels Werke. Bd. 19. Berlin, Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus: Dietz Verlag. 1962.
    • ———. “Marginal Notes on Adolph Wagner’s Lehrbuch der politischen Ökonomie.” Collected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Vol. 24. Moscow: Progress, 1989. Print.
    • ———. “Economic Manuscripts of 1861-1863“. Collected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Vol. 34. Moscow: Progress, 1994. Print.
    • ———. Capital. Vol. 1. Collected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. Vol. 35. New York: International, 1996. Print.
    • Mezzadra, Sandro. La condizione postcoloniale: Storia e politica nel presente globale. Verona: ombre corte, 2008. Print.
    • Nagahara, Yutaka. Warera kashi aru mono tachi: Han ‘shihon’-ron no tame ni. Tokyo: Seidosha, 2008. Print.
    • ———. “We, the Defective Commodity-Beings.” The Journal of International Economic Studies 26 (2012): 67-91. Print.
    • Poulantzas, Nicos. State, Power, Socialism. London: Verso, 1980. Print.
    • Sakai, Naoki, and Jon Solomon. “Addressing the Multitude of Foreigners, Echoing Foucault.” Translation, Biopolitics, Colonial Difference. Hong Kong: U of Hong Kong P, 2006. Print.
    • Uno, Kozo. “‘Rôdôryoku shôhin no tokushûsei ni tsuite’ (On the Specificity of Labor Power as a Commodity).” Uno Kôzô chosakushû Vol. 3. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1973. Print.
    • Walker, Gavin. “Postcoloniality in Translation: Historicities of the Present.” Postcolonial Studies 14.1 (2011): 111-126. Print.
    • ———. “Primitive Accumulation and the Formation of Difference: On Marx and Schmitt.” Rethinking Marxism 23.3 (2011): 384-404. Print.
    • ———. “The World of Principle, or Pure Capitalism: Exteriority and Suspension in Uno Kôzô.” The Journal of International Economic Studies 26 (2012): 15-37. Print.
  • Adam Smith and Economic Citizenship

    Craig Carson (bio)

    Adelphi University

     

    Abstract

    Recent Adam Smith scholarship, whether focusing on his Stoic inheritance, Moral Sentiments‘ impact on economic theory, or influences of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson or Rousseau, has gained traction rereading Smith against the cultural myths in which his name stands as cipher for self-interest and laissez-faire capitalism. Ironically, Smith has now re-emerged as a proponent of the naturally social quality of human beings. This essay argues that the new critical focus on natural sociality elides from Smith’s work the absolutely central mode of unnatural relations: citizenship. Accordingly, this essay outlines the consequences of Smith’s overlooked, thoroughly economic theory of citizenship.
     

     

     

    Recent reevaluations of Adam Smith in political philosophy, eighteenth-century studies and economics have tended to pivot on a single claim: despite clichés concerning unfettered markets and unrestrained self-interest, Smith’s oeuvre has always maintained that human beings are naturally social animals. Anyone who has so much as thumbed through The Theory of Moral Sentiments will recognize this claim as true. If such widespread cultural misperceptions do indeed exist, they could only result from reducing Smith’s entire body of work to a single, decontextualized citation from the Wealth of Nations: “[i]t is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest” (29; I.ii). Nonetheless, recent Smith scholarship, whether focusing on his Stoic inheritance, Moral Sentiments’ impact on economic theory, or influences of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson or Rousseau, has gained traction rereading Smith against the cultural myths according to which “Adam Smith” stands as cipher for self-interest and laissez-faire capitalism.1 Consequently, Smith has reemerged as a peculiar inversion of the former caricature. Rather than shorthand for homo economicus, Adam Smith has been mystically transformed into a theorist of our ineluctable being-in-common. This depiction, too, reads like a caricature, again reducing Smith’s work to a single quote, this time the first words from Moral Sentiments: “How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortunes of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it” (60; I.i).2 These countervailing myths, which distinctly resemble the nineteenth-century debates clumsily dubbed “das Adam Smith problem,” have found traction again with conservatives, liberals, and Marxists alike, for whom natural human sociability has become something of a new political catechism.3
     
    This recent critical turn to Smith’s “natural sociability,” as innocuous as it may at first appear, is not without a host of problems. First and foremost, as this essay argues, it elides from Smith’s work the absolutely central mode of unnatural relations: citizenship. Even if it accepts that human beings are always political creatures – a tradition running from Aristotle’s anthropos zoon politikon physei to Burke’s “art is man’s nature” and social contract theory’s principle adversary – Smith’s work “naturalizes” human relationships, rendering citizenship a superfluous political category. As Smith’s Lectures on Jurisprudence suggest, the citizen is a historical remnant from republican traditions of antiquity, undoubtedly central to Smith’s humanist education at Glasgow and Oxford, but out of place in the modern global economic order described in the Wealth of Nations. Citizenship, however, does not simply vanish from Smith’s texts. When Smith addresses citizenship head-on, the limitations of “natural” human relationships become all too clear, as does the need for its unnatural double, the citizen. As I will argue, the re-evaluations of Smith’s sympathy, his impartial spectator, and his vague gestures toward Stoic cosmopolitanism appear like so many liberal-humanist pipedreams, if not apologies for the status quo. Most notably, Rothschild, McCloskey and Sen use Smith’s moral philosophical work to justify the ever-increasing inequalities of the market. At best, what they propose is a kinder and gentler capitalism. At worst, their argument is pure cynicism. Imagine seriously arguing that inequalities of the marketplace are always already cushioned by velvet ties of sympathy!
     
    Against this liberal humanist resuscitation of Smith’s sympathy, I am interested in reading Smith’s moral philosophy – the seemingly benign categories of sympathy and natural sociability – as a screen displacing the critical issue of citizenship. Behind “natural sociability” lurks the profound implication of Smith’s unsystematic treatment of the unnatural citizen. In what follows, I present Smith’s rejection of the citizen as a consequence of people’s supposed natural disposition for society. As a result, both Moral Sentiments and Wealth of Nations turn every citizen into a potential refugee, ultimately displacing onto capital all the benefits of cosmopolitan citizenship. It is this line of inquiry that this essay outlines, an opening salvo into demystifying “natural” associations by placing these empty concepts alongside Smith’s overlooked economic theory of citizenship.
     

    i. Decline of the Republic and the Rise of Creaturely Life

     
    Citizenship is today undeniably a central political battleground precisely because it is haunted by its double; estimates suggest that undocumented residents, les sans papiers, and all of those living in the citizen’s shadow may have already surpassed 30 million people worldwide.4 Even if the U.S. has made small gains (such as President Obama’s DACA Act), divisive rhetoric about immigration has sunk to new lows, and anti-immigration legislation has rarely been more draconian. While the country was still reeling from the passage of anti-immigration legislation, Arizona SB 1070, Republican ideologues, especially Kris Kobach, continued to cultivate the so-called “self-deportation” legislation. Passed into law in both Alabama and South Carolina, Kobach’s “self-deportation” vision had also been adopted by the defeated Romney campaign. So-called “self-deportation” relies entirely on making the lives of undocumented residents intolerable, so that living in the United States will seem worse than staying in the hopeless situations people fled. If the Arizona anti-immigration bill essentially transforms the police into an anti-immigration force, Kobach’s proposals go one step further, transforming every “citizen” – every cashier, repairman, as well as potential employer – into an “immigration checkpoint.” If we are naturally social and sympathetic, this legislation clearly stands human nature on its head. No longer is man a wolf to man; it is the citizen one must fear. Now more than ever, America’s economic refugees emerge as the new stateless people, recalling the displaced refugees for whom, as Hannah Arendt argues, the “rights of man” have been revealed as a groundless abstraction without the rights of citizenship. Economic refugees have continually faced the double-bind: mare than the obvious fact that the U.S. economy depends on illegal labor,, the impossible logic of attaining political refugee status is perhaps the most illuminating of refugee’s position. In the latter case, many applications are denied because political refugees are always economic refugees as well, the latter invalidating the former.5 These political refugees perfectly capture the modern contradiction of immigration: they are denied political asylum because they also have a body, and therefore are always necessarily economic beings as well.
     
    In light of its contemporary importance, it does seem strange that for Smith, citizenship barely warrants being mentioned. It is tempting to pin Smith’s lack of attention to citizenship on the historical fact that his unfinished work on jurisprudence, burned by Smith’s express wish before his death in 1790, may well have contained a more nuanced reflection on this point. To the extent that, as Smith explains in the “Advertisement” to the sixth edition of Moral Sentiments, the Wealth of Nations functions as an inquiry into the government as it concerns the “police, revenue and arms,” one might expect a more thorough discussion of citizenship in another, unfinished work dedicated to the theory of jurisprudence. And yet, Smith’s 1763 lectures on jurisprudence delivered in Glasgow give no such indication. To the contrary, Smith’s spotty thoughts on citizenship are clearly dismissed as of limited importance, especially in the context of large, modern nation-states. Student notes of his lectures, published as Lectures on Jurisprudence, record him as saying:
     

    In generall when the citizenship intitles one to peculiar priviledges, family descent (…) the number of citizens being small, gives one a probable chance of being preferred to some office or employment as their number is very large in proportion to that of the number of citizens (…). But in large ones, where this priviledge gives one no other advantage than that of electing or being elected out of a vast number of others, the place of ones [sic] birth generally determines whether or not he is to be accounted a citizen.

    (40)

     

    In other words, republican citizenship in a small principality may help one to obtain an administrative position, taking one’s turn at ruling and then at being ruled. In a large nation, as “descent” gives way to merely indicating place of “birth,” the value of citizenship declines. Significantly, the principal reason that someone would care about citizenship in this era before strict immigration laws, worker protections, or modest welfare-state benefits, would be political enfranchisement – which these student notes record with a clear sense of derision: citizenship “gives one no other advantage than that of electing or being elected out of a vast number of others.”

     
    In this context, citizenship becomes an empty category, its only value being access to an irrelevant electoral political system. Smith’s position makes sense historically, however, as the importance of politics in the old republican sense of the term has waned in the new globalized, commercial world.6 Implicitly, Smith appears to champion what contemporary citizenship theory describes, against the competing communitarian and republican models, as the model of liberal citizenship. This may have seemed self-evident to Smith as Smith’s own historical moment signals the birth of the self-interested liberal citizen whose orientation becomes his own “life, liberty and … happiness,” while politics gives way to political economy. As Herman van Gunsteren points out in his Theory of Citizenship, “Until a hundred years ago, owning property, rather than having a job, was considered the primary condition of citizenship” (103), but once workers were included, insurance and potential labor-power came to function as if it were property.7 As a consequence, the workplace and the worker have all but elided active citizenship; the political citizen retreats to work, becoming thereby a passive economic citizen, the very essence of liberal “citizenship.” Here, for Smith, citizenship, no longer tied to the active politics of the republic, has become a category without content. Workers, not citizens, are the inhabitants of the burgeoning industrial age, and the workplace, not the agora, provides their stage.
     
    Even while Smith appears to dismiss the importance of citizenship, it nonetheless does play a role in both Moral Sentiments and Wealth of Nations, the implications of which are dramatic. The use of the word “citizenship” in Moral Sentiments is revealing. Twice, both in Parts I and II of his moral philosophical treatise, Smith replaces his standard term, “fellow-creatures,” with a surprising and politically inflected “fellow-citizens” (19; I.III; 8; II.II). In both instances, however, Smith employs “fellow-citizens,” ironically, to point to an unequal relationship between a “superior” and the subordinated citizen-subject, not to describe the mutual respect of co-citizens. In the first instance, Smith designates a superior “nobleman” to function as a model of propriety for subordinate “fellow-citizens,” while in the second a “superior” imposes propriety on his “fellow-citizens” by law. Surprisingly, in both instances, “fellow-citizens” replaces “fellow-creatures” to mark the subordination of the citizen and his presupposed inability to act in such a way that “natural” sympathy prescribes. In fact, here, the citizen is marked out by his inability to act appropriately and needs lessons in the propriety of natural sympathy. And yet this makes perfect sense according to the logic of Moral Sentiments, in which sympathy is entirely contingent on propriety. That is to say, everyone appears to be potentially worthy of sympathy – not, to be sure, of pity, but of simple human relations as such – if and only if they act according to the rules of propriety. Sympathy, in this light, requires a disciplinary society. Otherwise, sympathy breaks down and individuals are cast beyond the pale of human emotions, or at least beyond “our” sympathy. In fact, such people become worse than mere outsiders; they become objects of disgust evoking antipathy. In these two instances, Smith’s “citizen” has not yet internalized the propriety of action that makes “natural” sympathy possible, and he must learn to endure suffering like so many statues of Laocoön who, as Winkelmann explains, makes us “wish that we were able to endure our suffering as well as this great man” (qtd. Lessing 7).
     
    Remnants of Smith’s republican citizen emerge again in Part III of Moral Sentiments. Smith introduces this section, entitled “Of the Foundation of Our Judgments Concerning our Own Sentiments and Conduct, and the Sense of Duty,” by saying that “[i]n the two foregoing parts of [Moral Sentiments], I have chiefly considered the origin and foundation of our judgments concerning the sentiments of others. I come now to consider more particularly the origin of those concerning our own” (148; III.i.i). While the first two sections famously articulate a theory of social relations determined by one’s ability (or, as is often the case, inability) to imagine one’s self in the place of another person, then to sympathize with figures in what Smith renders as so many tableaux vivantes, the third section redirects the viewer’s gaze back on himself, thereby taking up the perspective of the “impartial spectator.” This marks a shift from judging spectator to moral actor—or, more accurately, to the moment when one becomes both. Tellingly, Smith here also dismisses, in the most explicit terms of Moral Sentiments, a solitary individual who might live, literally or figuratively, in the isolation imagined by the theorists of the state of nature: “Were it possible that a human creature could grow up to manhood in some solitary place, without any communication with his own species, he could no more think of his own character, of the propriety and demerit of his own sentiments and conduct, of the beauty or deformity of his mind, than of the beauty or deformity of his own face” (148). Society is the mirror reflecting the moral person back to the individual, even if it is not literally there; the individual can see himself through the eyes of his “fellow-citizens” or the impartial spectator, even when alone. Ultimately Smith insists that, against the skepticism of Bernard Mandeville or Pierre Nicole, not only do we want to appear praise-worthy to our “fellow-creatures,” but we desire to be praise-worthy in actuality as well. Such a distinction is only possible, however, once one becomes both actor and spectator of the drama of one’s own unfolding life.
     
    This is a crucial moment in the Moral Sentiments, for two reasons. The first, as David Marshall suggests in The Figure of Theater: Shaftesbury, Defoe, Adam Smith and George Eliot, is that here “[i]dentity is itself undermined by the theatrical model which pictures the self as an actor who stands beside himself and represents the characters of both spectator and spectacle” (176).8 This is actually what it means to never be without others; rather than sympathetic human relations, Moral Sentiments pushes toward the vaguely Stoic and fully neurotic internalization of social normativity under the guise of “propriety.” Secondly, Smith addresses directly the skeptical critique of social relations, perhaps most notably the version proposed by Bernard Mandeville’s Fable of the Bees. This skeptical position, everywhere in eighteenth-century moral thought, was associated (and often confused) with Epicureanism.9 But in Mandeville’s formulation, which became a touchstone for Smith, Rousseau, Hutchinson, and Kant, civic-minded action results from nothing other than self-interest. According to the Fable of the Bees, asocial man recognizes that the best way to satisfy self-interested desires is to act as if he were civically minded.10 Smith’s theory of propriety serves as a much better argument against Mandeville’s skepticism than do the more explicit engagements with Mandeville’s work (such as the opening pages of Wealth of Nations, Moral Sentiments’ Part VII, chapter IV “Of Licentious Systems” which he revised continually from the first edition to the end of his life and “Letter to the Edinburgh Review,” in which Smith unconvincingly presents Mandeville as espousing natural sympathy). Smith returns to well-worn territory, to a common place of moral philosophy at least since Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics; here, however, the objective is to dispel the skeptical threat that humanity is simply a loose aggregate of self-interest machines. We judge ourselves, Smith insists, according to the same criteria by which we judge the actions of others. We become another to ourselves, in fact, in order to make this possible, adopting the position of the impartial spectator. In this respect, there can be nothing hidden, no secret self-motivated objectives distinguishing the vain “pretentions of the coxcomb” from truly praise-worthy action that is properly motivated.
     
    The impact of Smith’s logic becomes clear by way of the opposition between the citizen and the public enemy. Because we supposedly know our own motives, “we dread the thought of doing any thing which can render us the just and proper objects of the hatred and contempt of our fellow-creatures” (154; III.ii.ix), even when nobody else could possibly know. We would ourselves know, by virtue of our ability to imagine what others would say if they did know, the criminal nature of our thoughts and deeds. But if it is criminal thought or action that puts us at odds with our “fellow-creatures,” it is public punishment that ironically sutures the citizenry and its outcast, the criminal, back together:
     

    Men of the most detestable characters, who, in the execution of the most dreadful crimes, had taken their measures so coolly as to avoid even the suspicion of guilt, have sometimes been driven, by the horror of their situation, to discover, of their own accord, what no human sagacity could ever have investigated. By acknowledging their guilt, by submitting themselves to the resentment of their offended fellow-citizens, and, by thus satiating that vengeance of which they were sensible that they had become the proper objects, they hoped, by their death to reconcile themselves, at least in their own imagination, to the natural sentiments of mankind.

    (155; III. II.xi)

     

    The concept of citizen, here, limits our universal, natural sympathetic “fellow-feeling.” Indeed, Smith’s citizen comes into relief at the moment of the criminal’s exclusion from this category. After committing a crime, guilt puts us at odds with the suddenly clearly defined category of the citizen, with whom the criminal can reunite only by “submitting themselves to the resentment of their offended fellow-citizens.” “By thus satiating that vengeance” of one’s fellow-citizens, citizens who in the context of Smith’s text emerge by virtue of antipathy of resentment and vengeance, one can regain natural sympathy. Capital punishment reconciles man (or “creature,” to use Smith’s language) and citizen. This reconciliation, however, can only be anticipated in the imagination, because in the cold hard light of reality the death penalty must take place. More than anything else, however, Smith’s citizenry takes shape in this bizarre vignette, to paraphrase Carl Schmitt, precisely around the decision on the exception. If natural sympathy is universal, Smith’s citizens appear to draw the line between citizen and criminal, the exclusion overriding (or, underwriting, as the case may be) the universalism of natural sympathy or Stoic cosmopolitanism. Citizens emerge and tighten their ranks, precisely at the moment when they exclude the criminal–or even as they watch his execution.

     

    ii. Constructing the Economic Citizen

     
    In the previous section, a reading of Smith’s casual reflections on citizenship makes clear the limits of natural sympathy and, inversely, the need for a much more concrete definition of citizenship. In this section, I want to focus on yet another problem of natural sympathy – its commodification – as an implication of Smith’s unsystematic treatment of the problem of citizenship. Commodified natural relations are not relegated to the political economic formulae of the Wealth of Nations, but emerge in the pages of Moral Sentiments at the very heart of human sympathy itself. At its outset, Moral Sentiments imagines an ambiguous concatenation of theatricality and sympathy as somehow essential for counteracting the “Epicurean” threat posed by “those who are fond of deducing all our sentiments from certain refinements of self-love” (64; III.II.i). Appearances, Smith assures his reader at the commencement of Moral Sentiments, do not lie. As such, after the initial definition of sympathy as the process by which an observer “chang[es] places in the fancy with the sufferer” (61; I.i.i), the reader is presented with a litany of exemplary scenes demanding our sympathy. The list of examples paints a perplexing portrait of this experience: the reader confronts, first, “our brother on the rack,” then “a stroke aimed and just ready to fall upon the leg or arm of another person,” and “a dancer on a slack rope,” or “the sores and ulcers which are exposed by the beggars in the street,” culminating in the “heroes of tragedy or romance who interest us” (61). Conjuring a vertiginous world of street performers, beggars who simply function as a locus for “sores and ulcers,” and scenes of inflicted pain, Smith finally leaves the reader in the relative tranquility of the aesthetic domain of the theater or romance. This list already presents something of a hierarchy, juxtaposing inexplicable cruelty with scenes of poverty and public spectacle and, finally, the sentiments of the theater. Indeed, the theater will have been the truth and the end point of all the other examples: aesthetic, pleasurable and, ultimately, commodified. While public punishments may be free and open to the public, theatrical dramas of star-crossed lovers are not.
     
    Of course the text claims to be, on the contrary, depicting the bonds forged immediately between individuals, simply relying on “fancy” to bridge the gap between them. At its most basic level, moral sentiments claim to suture humanity in a perfectly symmetrical relation: both, as Smith writes, according to the “great law of Christianity” to “love our neighbor as we love ourselves,” and according to the “great precept of nature to love ourselves only as we love our neighbor” (17; I.i.v). Against this backdrop, the example of the “real calamity” – such as Smith’s hypothetical drama of a man losing his leg which provides an example of bad drama, one no one would willingly pay to see – proves an exception to the rule. As for drama properly speaking, even if the eighteenth-century British stage had been the focus of much censorious scrutiny, certainly neither ancient nor Elizabethan tragedy lacked physical suffering. Tragic drama, for all its historical differences, appears to be an uninterrupted display of physical suffering, from Oedipus to Titus Andonicus. Smith parries this criticism, stating that “some Greek tragedies attempt to excite compassion, by the representation of the agonies of bodily pain. Philoctetes,” for instance, in Sophocles’s adaptation of the myth, “cries out and faints from the extremity of his suffering” (80; I.ii.i). However, “it is not the pain that interests us, but some other circumstance… not the sore foot, but the solitude, of Philoctetes which affects us, and diffuses over that charming tragedy, that romantic wildness that is so charming to the imagination” (80). Without these attenuating circumstances, physical suffering, in every case, becomes burlesque or simply looks “ridiculous.” Theater should, therefore, model the very propriety that allows neighbors to become fully human objects of sympathetic interest.
     
    But art – the theater in particular – appears to play a disproportionate role in Smith’s examples of “natural” sympathy. Moral Sentiments does attempt to ward off the potential difficulty that sympathy may be an aesthetic rather than a moral category by distinguishing intellectual from moral judgments, disinterested curiosity from sympathetic engagement. To this end, Smith writes, “We may judge of the propriety or impropriety of the sentiments of another person by their correspondence or disagreement with our own, upon two different occasions; either, first, when objects which excite them are considered without any peculiar [i.e., particular] relation, either to ourselves or to the person whose sentiments we judge of; or secondly, when they are considered as peculiarly affecting one or the other of us” (70; I.ii.iii.). The first class of judgments, which Smith calls “qualities of taste and good judgment” of the “man of taste,” and which concerning such things as “the beauty of a plain, the greatness of a mountain, the ornaments of a building, the expression of a picture, the composition of a discourse” (70) are disinterested judgments. Aesthetic judgments such as these, ostensibly, are not of terribly great concern because they do not intersect with the moral world, and therefore do not appear to have any direct bearing on social or political relations. In that these judgments are abstracted from the pragmatic concerns of utility, the fact that two people disagree about what is beautiful or sublime will not make them mortal enemies. By contrast with these thoroughly aesthetic judgments – not only clearly “aesthetic” by virtue of references to questions of taste and beauty which inundated the aesthetic treaties of the period but also the “disinterestedness” which Kant will soon pick up as the crucial component of aesthetic judgment – sympathy needs to keep both feet in the world of practical action, the touchstone of moral philosophy since Aristotle’s articulation of phronesis as practical judgment. Here Smith says that moral philosophy and aesthetics must be treated as separate categories, declaring his moral philosophy to be inoculated against the contagion of art.
     
    Even so, Smith’s text does precisely the opposite, inverting the relation between theatrical and real worlds, transforming sympathy into a theatrical construction, and moral philosophy into an aesthetic theory. One finds the key precisely in what is now a growing list of the scenes of cruelty in Moral Sentiments. Why then does Smith insist that the scene of real suffering makes for such bad drama and the failure of sympathy? This is the case in the section “Of Passions which take their Origin from the Body,” because one cannot sympathize with another’s physical pain, hunger, or any other affliction grounded in biological existence rather than in symbolic economies of wealth, reputation, honor, etc. This is true, not because “these are the passions that we share in common with the brutes”; instead, the “true cause of the peculiar disgust which we conceive for the appetites of the body when we see them in other men is because we cannot enter into them” because they remain strictly bodily, obtuse, and cannot therefore be part of the symbolic register of the imagination (78; I.ii.i). That is to say, we cannot make them into a tragic drama or an aesthetic object to contemplate in the tranquility of the theater of our imagination. They remain at the register of brute fact.
     
    To return to the list of pathetic scenes at the outset of the Theory of Moral Sentiments: following immediately after the often cited example of seeing “our brother on the rack” in the first section of Part I, Smith famously explains that sympathy functions by “changing places in fancy with the sufferer.” As such, “when we see a stroke aimed and just ready to fall upon the leg or the arm of another person, we naturally shrink and draw back our own leg or our own arm; and when it does fall we feel it in some measure” (61; I.ii.i). In section I, Part II, just before the apparent digression into the tragedy of the leg, Smith repeats himself virtually verbatim, making however two crucial changes: “If, as I have already observed, I see a stroke aimed and just ready to fall upon the leg, or the arm, of another person, I naturally shrink and draw back my own leg, or my arm.” Here, not only does Smith exchange pronouns, substituting an “I” for the “we,” but his conclusion also points in an entirely different direction. Sympathy, one learns, remains possible just until the stroke falls. Smith adds the conclusion: “when it does fall, I feel it in some measure… My hurt, however, is, no doubt, excessively slight, and, upon that account, if he makes a violent out-cry, as I cannot go along with him, I never fail to despise him” (79; I.ii.i). At the precise moment that suffering passes from potentiality to actuality, when the sympathetic “we” dissolves into the solipsistic “I,” sympathy, contrary to all expectations, transforms into its opposite, becoming disgust at the scene and even contempt for the sufferer. Sympathy comes to an abrupt halt the moment the decorum of the theater has been broken; the fourth wall between spectator and spectacle reemerges precisely at the point at which it should come crumbling down, and sympathy gives way not to apathy, but to antipathy. The spectator cannot “fail to despise” the sufferer.
     
    Smith’s affective world, therefore, diverges between two different registers: sympathy with the imaginative afflictions of the symbolic order and vile disgust with the suffering, physical and abject body that hungers, receives blows and bears wounds. No doubt, the former is a theatrical sympathy, or in Rousseau’s terms, amour proper passing itself off as amour de soi, a theatrical self-interest masquerading as sympathetic fellow-feeling. One can easily imagine the value of Smith’s inquiry, especially as it describes the mechanisms and mediations by which experience of sympathy’s “immediacy” gets produced. Sympathy’s long standing connection to occult promises of direct access to the other, here, stand exposed as so much mysticism. Smith’s moral philosophy, therefore, asks: which objects mediate our affective relations? By contrast to Sen’s and Rothschild’s archeology of modern economics, which returns to some moral philosophical soil, Albert Hirschman’s The Passions and the Interests makes precisely the opposite claim concerning the relationship between Smith’s economic work and moral philosophy, stating that Moral Sentiments “paves the way for collapsing […] other passions into the drive for the ‘augmentation of fortune’” and “the drive for economic advantage [which] is no longer autonomous but becomes a mere vehicle for the desire of consideration” (108-9).
     
    What sets Hirschman apart from the resuscitation of a so-called “ethics of the marketplace” without a consideration of citizenship is his focus on the perplexing chapters which begin Section III of Part I of Moral Sentiments. Yet even Hirschman’s examination avoids the nucleus of Smith’s sympathy, one binding the market to the theater. It is in this section, “Of the Effects of Prosperity and Adversity upon the Judgment of Mankind with Regards to the Propriety of Action,” that Smith begins his overlooked discussion of the function of sympathy with respect to commercial society. He begins with the relatively modest claim that, even if “our sympathy with sorrow is, in some sense, more universal, than with joy,” what the spectator feels, for precisely the reasons that pain makes for bad theater, “does not, indeed, […] amount to that complete sympathy, to that perfect harmony and correspondence of sentiments which constitutes approbation.”11 At the outset of Moral Sentiments, Smith cautions his reader to hear “sympathy” resonate in its fullest etymological sense and not limit its connotations to feeling another’s sorrow only. Of the OED‘s examples, only two, both later than Smith’s Moral Sentiments, explicitly distinguish sorrow and joy: first, Coleridge’s August 30 th Table-talk of 1833, which states that, “For compassion a human heart suffices: but for full and adequate sympathy with joy, an angel’s only,” and, second, Disraeli’s Endymion, which claims that the “sympathy of sorrow is stronger than the sympathy of prosperity.”12 By contrast to these examples, however, Smith pushes the definitions of sympathy away from the former – mere “agreement, accord, harmony” – but in precisely the opposite direction from the one pursued by Coleridge and Disraeli. Even if misery provides a “more pungent feeling,” fellow-feelings with pleasurable emotion, according to Moral Sentiments, “approaches much more nearly to the vivacity of what is naturally felt by the people principally concerned” (95; I.i.iii). In retrospect, this seemingly offhand theatrical example reveals its exemplary status; one can sympathize with another’s misery, but only if it is adequately theatrical and, therefore, creates a certain element of pleasure. As Smith states, “there are evidently some principles in [man’s] nature, which interest him in the fortunes of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it” (60; I.i). Sympathy with misery, unless already theatrical or aesthetic, remains an impossibility.
     
    For Smith’s moral sympathy the divisions between theater and society become indistinct and the question of sympathy, no longer relegated to the space of the literal theater, enters into civil society as a generalized spectacle.13 This is true not only because one experiences another’s success with a more accurate “vivacity,” but because one cannot fail to despise the sufferers of “real calamity.” Smith writes: “It is because mankind are disposed to sympathize more entirely with our joy than with our sorrow, that we make a parade of our riches, and conceal our poverty” (99; I.iii.ii). More to the point, it is the “parade of riches” which makes one visible before the eyes of others, while poverty’s condemnation is not simply the want of necessary goods, but one’s disappearance altogether from the scene of public concern. If the man of “rank and distinction” “is observed by all the world,” the poor are “out of the sight of mankind.” As wealth makes an individual a proper subject for sympathy, the spectacle of the suffering of the monarch, in the final instance, is where one can sympathize with physical suffering. Not only does penury make for a much less spectacular display – precisely why we love the useless displays of the palace much more than the utility of the prison – but it also opens onto the biological need or what Hannah Arendt will refer to as the “social problem,” a problem that cannot be aestheticized or transformed into a commoditized spectacle, which is precisely what prevents it from moving into the domain of sympathy. Strikingly, while Smith’s text collapses ethics and wealth, recent criticism has mirrored the movement of the market itself, specifically the latest mode of late-capitalism, with its increasing focus on “ethics” (everywhere, from market coffee to shoes, we see increasing “ethical” commerce and fair trade, while the financial industry remains as invidious as ever). Natural, sympathetic relations are never natural. More than that, they always divide friends from enemies, rich from poor. Artificially contrived antipathy proves to be the truth of natural sympathy.
     

    iii. Capital’s Cosmopolitanism

     
    If Smith’s oeuvre appears, up to this point, to outline little more that the limitations through which citizenship dismembers the inclusive nature of natural sympathy, this does not mean that Smith presents no positive theory of citizenship at all. It is just that for him the benefits of citizenship apply to what we would call today corporate investment – or simply “capital” – rather than to people, a logic that seems only to have been fully realized in the U.S. Supreme Court’s notorious Citizens United decision. What little discussion there is of citizenship in The Wealth of Nations is based on the similar logic, the logic of exclusion, now not of impropriety or criminality but of labor. Only a handful of references to citizenship in the Wealth of Nations occur within the context of national defense. As such, the concept of the citizen appears to be deployed by Smith rather cynically as a necessary fiction to generate national identity in time of war; most of his examples refer to the citizen-soldiers of ancient Greece and Rome, especially in Book 5, “Of the Expenses of the Sovereign of Commonwealth.” Smith’s most significant comment on the question of citizenship within The Wealth of Nations is, however, precisely a disavowal of the concept. In Chapter IV, “How the Commerce of the Towns Contributed to the Improvement of the Country,” of Book III, Smith writes that “A merchant . . . is not necessarily the citizen of any particular country. It is in a great measure indifferent to him from what country carries on his trade; and a very trifling disgust will make him remove his capital, and together with all its industry which it supports, from one country to another” (346). With this gesture, Smith supplants citizenship by the cosmopolitanism of modern capitalist societies. The notion of citizenship appears anachronistic to the extent that new forms of mobile capital, rather than land, are the foundation of Smith’s vision of the emerging economic-political order.
     
    Capital remains free to move from one country to another due to the slightest “trifling disgust.” This is perhaps why Smith, always so attentive to his prose style, here finds himself reaching with an ambiguous expression: “A merchant . . . is not necessarily the citizen of any particular country” (346). On the one hand, this may mean simply something like that a capitalist’s citizenship is of no real importance. Money recognizes no national borders, only the reach of the market. But given the context of this quote, the ambiguity of “not necessarily a citizen” appears to result from another cause. Once one establishes the context, Smith’s reflections on citizenship and cosmopolitanism resonate with an entirely different tenor:
     

    The capital, however, that is acquired to any country by commerce and manufactures is all a very precarious and uncertain possession till some part of it has been secured and realized in the cultivation and improvement of its lands. A merchant, it has been said very properly, is not necessarily the citizen of any particular country. It is in a great measure indifferent to him from what place he carries on his trade; and a very trifling disgust will make him remove his capital, and together with it all the industry which it supports, from one country to another. No part of it can be said to belong to any particular country, till it has been spread as it were over the face of that country, either in buildings or in the lasting improvement of lands.

    (122)

     

    I find this quote extraordinary for several reasons: First, there is substantial evidence for another way of reading Smith’s equivocation concerning the capitalist as “not necessarily the citizen of any particular country.” Certainly, it is clear that the actual citizenship of an individual with money to invest is of little interest; from Smith’s perspective, capital is economic potential that can take shape virtually anywhere in the world where “the market” has spread and where sufficient division of labor has made investment possible. And yet the cosmopolitan potential of capital must necessarily be realized somewhere, in a particular space, within a particular political order: “capital,” Smith states here, remains “very precarious and uncertain . . . till some part of it has been secured and realized in the cultivation and improvement of its lands.” Further, “no part of [capital] can be said to belong to any particular country, till it has been spread as it were over the face of that country, either in buildings or in the lasting improvement of lands” (346; V.IV.iii). That is to say, capital remains precarious until located in country, at which point it “belongs” to that country. The formerly cosmopolitan capitalist must also belong, at some point, to a country. But now the cosmopolitan logic of capital trumps the local logic of the citizenry.

     
    The second aspect of the passage that I find interesting is the elision from this formula of one of the three crucial terms that make up the triumvirate of Smith’s Wealth of Nations: land, capital, and labor. Following immediately after the opening consideration of the division of labor, Smith’s text introduces its three key concepts – land, capital, and labor – as the constituent elements of price, which require rent, interest, and wages. Much of the rest of the text follows the circuitous logic of the interrelation of these three elements. In this respect, the preceding quote specifically addresses the relation between two of these three concepts: land and capital. Again, it is precisely the capitalist who is “not necessarily the citizen of any particular country,” but the missing term here – laborers – appears to have no real bearing in this discussion of the citizen. Even as Smith bemoans the fact that wages are typically pushed as low as possible and often fall below the level of human decency, he does say explicitly, in Chapter VIII (“Wages of Labor”) of Book III, that “the demand for men, like that for any other commodity, necessarily regulates the production of men” (118). Indeed, man as laboring man appears to have no claim to citizenship precisely because, while clearly situated in a particular location, the laborer remains a mere commodity. If any notion of citizenship appears possible, it is certainly the exclusive domain of the “not necessarily the citizen,” or the capitalist, who begins to belong to a country to the extent that he begins not to work or fight, but to invest “either in buildings or in the lasting improvement of lands.” The unprotected laborer now finds herself or himself subordinated to the cosmopolitan circulation of the new citizen: money itself.
     
    What then to make of the resolute choir of recent critics singing Smith’s praises by resituating his legacy within a philosophical, rather than solely economic, tradition? What are we to take from these new readings of Smith, each text making some new apology for the most pernicious myths of Smith’s supposed unqualified support of lassez-faire economic theory, but now civilized, refined, and domesticated by what McCloskey would have us believe are the “bourgeois virtues”? One might recall, as Smith does in the notoriously incomplete section of the Moral Sentiments, that Bernard Mandeville had just decried these precise “virtues” as simply one more tool in self-interest’s arsenal – and among them, sympathy as being particularly effective. Smith’s sorely neglected reflections on the citizen make these recent formulations of Adam Smith an inverted problem, consciously or otherwise, of the relation between sympathy and economics. Rather than being an ethical economics, Smith’s notion of cosmopolitanism – and the lack of any definite citizenship – begins to erode his conception of ethics. It demonstrates that ethics itself becomes a commodity exchanged in the marketplace. Through a notion of “economic citizenship,” Smith insists on the reciprocal relationship between capital and citizenship. Indeed, in the Wealth of Nations, Smiths designates capital as a kind of “world citizenship” or cosmopolitanism that, although fundamentally nation-less and abstract, must eventually manifest in a particular locale, or geography. As Smith reiterates throughout the Wealth of Nations, capital must eventually “cultivate the land”; this concrete intersection of capital and geography is the location of Smith’s citizenship. It is precisely at these locations that one must demand not sympathy, but the rights of citizen-laborer.

    Craig Carson is Assistant Professor of English at Adelphi University and a former Harper-Schmidt Fellow and Collegiate Assistant Professor at the University of Chicago. His current book project, Eighteenth-Century Society of the Spectacle: Ethics and the Marketplace, examines eighteenth-century British literature, political economy, and commodity culture.

     

    Footnotes

     

    1. Perhaps most notably, Rothschild’s Economic Sentiments argues that, biographically as well as theoretically, Smith’s supposed “life of cold rational calculation was intertwined with the life of sentiment and imagination,” thereby insisting on Smith’s own human, affective relationships. Similarly, Nicolas Phillipson’s Adam Smith: An Enlightened Life focuses on Smith’s intellectual debts, especially the concept of human beings’ natural sociability as presented in the work of Shaftesbury and Hutchinson. More interesting still is Amartya Sen’s work on Smith in On Ethics and Economics, in which he makes a case, not unlike the claims in Deidre McCloskey’s Bourgeois Virtues, that economists must reconsider the fundamental presupposition that the individual in capitalist society is an entirely self-interested agent without any sympathetic, social or ethical concerns. Also see, for instance, Ryan Patrick Hanley’s Adam Smith and the Character of Virtue (2011) or, within the context of Anglo-American philosophy, Charles Griswold’s Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment (1998).

     

    2. Warren Montag’s “Tumultuous Combinations: Transindividuality in Adam Smith and Spinoza,” in my view, is the most incisive reading of this first sentence, and ranks as one of the best readings of The Moral Sentiments in general. I have both read the essay and heard Montag present this essay on several occasions, and I have been indelibly marked by his argument.

     

    3. Over the last several decades, Adam Smith scholarship has been regularly revisiting “das Adam Smith problem,” the apparent contradiction between The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations. At the inception of this controversy were several late nineteenth-century German scholars, who began asking how to reconcile the concept of sympathy outlined in the pages of Smith’s 1759 moral philosophical treatise with the unyielding pull of self-interest, supposedly the motor force behind the 1776 political and economic work of the Wealth of Nations. On the history of the “Adam Smith problem,” see Dogan Göçmen’s study, The Adam Smith Problem: Human Nature and Society in the Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations.

     

    4. In 2010, the International Organization for Migration estimated that the number of undocumented residents worldwide was between 25.5 and 32.1 million people, which amount to a staggering 10-15% of the total number of immigrants internationally.

     

    5. This is described in all its infuriating detail in Jacques Derrida’s “On Cosmopolitanism” lecture.

     

    6. On this point, see for example Leo Strauss’s Natural Right and History, Joyce Appleby’s Economic Thought and Ideology and Karl Polanyi’s Great Transformation.

     

    7. As the theory changes, not real property, but leveraged future earnings become the basis of citizenship, a transition into debt rather than property. From this perspective, the continued controversy over the welfare state is a question of whether to include or exclude citizens from this new, liberal form of citizenship. Not only is the undocumented workforce excluded from the rights of citizens (even though they perform civic activity), but so too are the poor and unemployed. The new neo-liberal labor increasingly produces the worker as a member of the new “precariate,” increasingly even the employed are denied these socio-economic rights.

     

    8. By highlighting the theatrical dimension of Moral Sentiments, Marshall establishes theatricality as the central concern for Smith criticism by insisting that the traditional focus on philosophical impartiality of Smith’s “impartial spectator” needs equally to consider the question of its status as spectator. According to Marshall, Smith’s subject internally divides itself between actor and “impartial spectator,” giving rise to the sympathetic subject at the moment of its self-consciousness or self-policing.

     

    9. This is a central point in Pierre Force’s excellent book, Self Interest before Adam Smith.

     

    10. In Self-Interest, Force outlines the manner in which the eighteenth-century viewed itself as divided between “Epicureans,” who were thus labeled more for a skeptical guardedness against humanity’s self-interest (rather than any direct connection to either Epicurean or Lucretian thought), and the supposedly civic mindedness of the “Stoics,” such as Smith.

     

    11. Tellingly, as previously noted, the first reference to the theater elucidates that sympathy means “fellow-feeling,” whether it be joy or sorrow: the “heroes of tragedy or romance who interest us” create a “fellow-feeling with their misery [which] is not more real than that with their happiness.”

     

    12. In its first few definitions, in addition to physiology and market “sympathies,” the OED foregrounds the non-affective notion of sympathy: first, its occult connotations, legible in the example from Sir Charles Sedley’s 1688 “Mulberry Garden” – “I have Sympathy-powder about me, if you will give me your handkerchief while the blood is warm, will cure it immediately” – and then simply “agreement, accord, harmony,” giving as an example Othello’s “There should be simpathy in yeares, Manners, and Beauties: all which the Moore is defectiue in.”

     

    13. Here, I would insist on the somewhat awkward English word “spectacle” not only to tie provisionally the eighteenth-century work into the discourse of Guy Debord, but also (and more crucially) to insist on spectacle’s ambiguity of place. In the French, for instance, spectacle designates theater as well as show, spectacle, and various other extra-theatrical presentations, so that Rousseau’s Lettre à d’Alembert sur les spectacles addresses both the politics of theater and the theatrical state of politics and society.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Appleby, Joyce. Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England. Princeton: Princeton U P, 1978. Print.
    • Arendt, Hannah. “Decline of the Nation-State and the End of the Rights of Man.” Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Houghton, 1973. Print.
    • Derrida, Jacques. “On Cosmopolitanism.” On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness. New York: Routledge, 2001. Print.
    • Force, Pierre. Self-Interest before Adam Smith: A Genealogy of Economic Science. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003. Print.
    • Göçmen, Dogan. The Adam Smith Problem: Human Nature and Society in the Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations. New York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2007. Print.
    • Griswold, Charles. Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999. Print.
    • Gunsteren, Herman R. A Theory of Citizenship: Organizing Plurality in Contemporary Democracies. Boulder: Westview, 1998. Print.
    • Hanley, A.P. Adam Smith and the Character of Virtue. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2011. Print.
    • Hirschman, Albert. The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1977. Print.
    • Lessing, G.E. Lacoön: An Essay on the Limits of Painting and Poetry. Trans. E.A. McCormick. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1984. Print.
    • Marshall, David. The Figure of Theater: Shaftesbury, Defoe, Adam Smith and George Eliot. New York: Columbia UP, 1986. Print.
    • McCloskey, Deidre. Bourgeois Virtues: Ethics for the Age of Commerce. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2007. Print.
    • Montag, Warren. “‘Tumultuous Combinations’: Transindividuality in Adam Smith and Spinoza.” Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 28.1 (2007): 117-158.Web. 12 Mar.2013.
    • Phillipson, Nicolas. Adam Smith: An Enlightened Life. New Haven: Yale UP, 2010. Print.
    • Rothschild, Emma. Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet, and the Enlightenment. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2001. Print.
    • Sen, Amartya. On Ethics and Economics. Oxford: Wiley, 1991. Print.
    • Smith, Adam. Lectures on Jurisprudence (Essays on Philosophical Subjects). Liberty Fund facsimile of 1795 ed. Lectures on Jurisprudence. Liberty Fund, 1982. Web. 12 Mar.2013.
    • Strauss, Leo. Natural Right and History. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1953. Print.
  • Citizen and Terrorist, Citizen as Terrorist: Military, Citizenship, and Race in the Age of War on Terror

    Abstract

    This essay compares figurations of racialized soldiers in the U.S. military to argue that while they may stand as proof of democratic nation and polity, they also serve as reminders of the unfulfilled promise of equality and inclusion and reveal the duplicitous role of the military in the reproduction and maintenance of racial, gender, class, and sexual hierarchies. Focusing on figurations of Muslim and Asian American soldiers in particular, the essay argues that they embody this contradiction and reveal the boundaries between “citizen” and “enemy” to be both flexible and precarious.

     

    In October of 2008, less than two weeks before what would turn out to be an historic presidential election, the former Secretary of State Colin Powell announced his support for then-senator Barack Obama’s candidacy, over that of the Republican candidate John McCain, on national television. Powell’s announcement received particular attention for several reasons, not least among them that this endorsement for a man poised to become the first African American president came from a man who, for many years, was considered the most likely candidate to be elected to that position, especially following his leadership during the first Gulf War.1 Not surprisingly, Powell quickly dismissed any suggestion that racial solidarity was a factor or motivation for his endorsement. Despite Powell’s disavowal, his comments on race came to be noted as arguably the highlight of his endorsement. Among other criticisms, Powell reserves particularly strong words of reproach for the Republican party’s racist rhetoric:
     

    I’m also troubled by, not what Senator McCain says, but what members of the party say. And it is permitted to be said such things as, “Well, you know that Mr. Obama is a Muslim.” Well, the correct answer is, he is not a Muslim, he’s a Christian. He’s always been a Christian. But the really right answer is, what if he is? Is there something wrong with being a Muslim in this country? The answer’s no, that’s not America. Is there something wrong with some seven-year-old Muslim-American kid believing that he or she could be president? Yet, I have heard senior members of my own party drop the suggestion, “He’s a Muslim and he might be associated terrorists.” [sic] This is not the way we should be doing it in America.

    (“‘Meet the Press’”)

     

    Powell goes on to explain that he “feel[s] strongly about this particular point” because of a photo that he saw showing a soldier’s mother leaning on a gravestone that “had crescent and a star of the Islamic faith.” The gravestone belongs to Kareem Rashad Sultan Khan, a corporal in the U.S. Army, whose biography is succinctly summarized thus by Powell: “[H]e was an American. He was born in New Jersey. He was 14 years old at the time of 9/11, and he waited until he can go serve his country, and he gave his life.” While Powell does not elaborate further, his example—the figure of the dead Muslim American soldier—works to counter Republican rhetoric that situates Islam and Muslims as un-American. In other words, the figuration of Corporal Khan, his service in the army, and his death serves as the proof of national belonging. The moral weight of the story is further compounded by Powell’s praise for Obama’s “inclusive, broader reach . . . crossing lines—ethnic lines, racial lines, generational lines” (“‘Meet the Press’”). Likewise, Powell himself has also been described as a figure who “transcends race: even as he addresses many blacks’ skepticism about the American Dream, many whites find Powell a reassuring symbol of the American meritocracy” (Lane). In other words, Powell’s (and Obama’s) bodies and stories provide the grounds through which to argue for and make legible the Muslim soldier’s body as an American one.

     
    Powell powerfully reiterates the ideology of a multicultural nation of which all races and ethnicities should and could be a part, reanimating his role during the first Gulf War. In Powell’s figuration, Melani McAlister argues, the meaning for both the military and the nation converges as “open-minded, as multicultural, as pluralist, and thus as having already successfully achieved the aims that ‘p.c.’ college professors and their students were agitating for” (Epic Encounters 255). In reprising his role as a spokesperson for and embodiment of liberal multicultural America, Powell’s pointed question—”Is there something wrong with being a Muslim in this country?”—and its response reaffirm these values. And in doing so, Powell’s “nod to racial injustice,” as McAlister notes elsewhere, functions as both “inoculation . . . and proof of exemplary righteousness” for American power and global expansion (“Virtual Muslim” 225). In other words, his criticism of racism works to reassure us of our liberalism and tolerance while enabling imperialism and militarism. But in glossing over America’s ongoing wars and military occupations all over the world, Powell’s comments also mask the extent to which war, imperialism, and militarism have actively sustained and produced racism. Powell’s invocation of a Muslim American soldier to highlight and criticize anti-Muslim discourse in the wake of the “war on terror” is no accident; it is not only Powell’s own military background and therefore presumed affinity that inform his rhetorical decision, but also other powerful and long-standing links between the military, citizenship, and race.
     
    The enlistment of volunteers for the U.S. military in the years since the Cold War and the Vietnam War has a particular relationship to the national body and racial ideology. As McAlister has shown, the post-Vietnam War U.S. military not only functions as a representative microcosm of a diverse and multi-racial nation, but also provides the justification for America’s imperial militarism while disavowing racism.2 Thus, the citizen-soldiers of the modern U.S. military serve a dual purpose: to protect and defend the nation-state, but also to stand in for the national community they call upon to rally around the nation-state at war.3 The racialized soldier of the multicultural military is invoked in an appeal to the national community to see itself as pluralist, meritocratic, and multi-racial and simultaneously represents that national self-image. Because of the powerful link between the military and citizenship, which I will elaborate on later in the essay, the military continues to serve as the premier site through which race, racism, belonging, and citizenship are negotiated and resolved. But if it has historically functioned as such, the military has not, in fact, effectively resolved the contradictions of race and citizenship in national and political life. While the military has appeared to promote racial progress, its recruitment and integration of racial minorities in the U.S. reveal the opposite.4 The figure of the racialized soldier tasked with resolving these negotiations instead reveals the military’s complicity in the reproduction of conditions that compel racialized citizens and non-citizens to participate in militarism and warfare. By perpetuating and exploiting the narrative that these racialized subjects “loved their country so much . . . that they were able to look beyond the discrimination they experienced and in time overcame racism,” militarism and racism work hand in hand to sustain racial hierarchy and domination and exploit them for warfare (Fujitani 262).
     
    The military has an intimate connection to formal citizenship as well as to symbolic citizenship. Military service can expedite naturalization processes for both non-citizen green card holders/permanent residents and non-green card holding immigrants.5 According to the Department of Homeland Security, service in any branch of the U.S. Armed Forces can also qualify service members for waivers of certain general naturalization requirements. During peacetime, one or more years of service counts as qualifying service, while during “Periods of Hostilities” any length of service qualifies, even for those who are not permanent residents. It is worthwhile noting that this provision—requiring no minimum period of service—was authorized after September 11, 2001, and that we have been in a “Period of Hostility” since that date.6 The Pentagon also announced in 2008 plans to begin recruiting immigrants with temporary visas, not just green card holders or permanent residents, for the military.7 While the initiative itself is not specifically geared towards racial and ethnic minorities, given the patterns of immigration to the U.S. in the past several decades, it would be safe to assume that this initiative has the potential to attract and increase the number of recruits from minority communities. Significantly, a New York Times article reporting on this initiative notes that the program specifically aims to attract and recruit native speakers, including Arabic-speaking immigrants, as language specialists (Preston).
     
    The affinity of militarism, citizenship, and racism is also illuminated through the genealogy of power that Michel Foucault outlines in his 1976 lectures.8 The decline of sovereign power and its “right to take life or let live,” as Foucault argues here and elsewhere, came to be transformed into “the power to ‘make’ live and to ‘let’ die” (241). The difference between the two is, in short, power over death versus power over life. Under biopower and disciplinary power, management and regulation of life become the primary modes through which individual bodies and populations are governed. We might also understand citizenship as a technology or mechanism of regulatory State power. The nation, as Foucault theorizes, is not determined by its ability to exercise domination but by “its ability to administer itself, to manage, govern, and guarantee the constitution and workings of the figure of the State and State power” (223). In other words, citizenship is one site or technology through which the State exercises biopower.
     
    The military is a central apparatus for managing populations on the margins of the national community—that is to say, those whose citizenship, formal or otherwise, has always already been in question—and their relationship to the nation-state. The military, especially in times of war, has offered itself as a vehicle through which various communities from which it solicits manpower might gain the rights and benefits of citizenship. But if we understand that the military exists primarily to provide State security, we must understand that it operates in the interests of the nation-state.9 Citizenship, at its simplest, names a juridical status within a particular state, with attendant rights and benefits, yet its operation suggests much more. That various populations (including women and African Americans) with formal citizenship status within the nation have been consistently denied the rights and benefits that other citizens enjoy, while others (Asian Americans, Latina/o Americans) have consistently been seen and treated as foreigners and non-citizens regardless of formal citizenship status, speaks to the dynamic operations of citizenship and citizenry as technologies of State power for the management of people and populations. The history of the so-called second-class citizenry in the United States reveals the ideological and social domains of citizenship that have implications far beyond one’s legal status in the State. The promise or guarantee of citizenship is always and necessarily conditional. Especially in times of war and national crises, such promises are at once powerfully seductive and dangerous, revealing the precariousness of citizenship and belonging.
     
    The racialized citizen-soldier exists at the uneasy intersection of biopower and disciplinary power, and consequently at the intersection of life and death. If, as Foucault suggests, racism is the limit of making, controlling, and managing life, if it is “the indispensable precondition that allows someone to be killed, that allows others to be killed,” then the racialized soldier exemplifies the paradox of how technologies oriented toward making live also make die (256). Because of biopower’s commitment to life, only racism permits the State to kill, and racism makes it possible for subjects to be exposed not only to literal death but also to forms of social death such as rejection and expulsion (256). Racism here, as Foucault explains, has two functions: it allows for distinction, for “the break between what must live and what must die” (254). But it does not simply authorize death. Racism also enables war by authorizing the logic of biopower, which dictates that the destruction of one race is necessary for another race to live and regenerate itself (255). In other words, war is not simply waged to kill enemy races but also to continue and maintain one’s own race. War and racism are twin expressions of a murderous state that is otherwise obliged to preserve and guarantee life.
     
    That is to say, war and racism are not defined by a causal relationship. Rather, if we follow Foucault and understand both as “basic mechanism[s] of power” of the modern state, we might also see war and militarism as racism and vice versa (254). And if war itself is an expression and function of racism that makes possible the operation of State power, the racialized soldier is positioned simultaneously as agent and object of racism. As members of the military responsible for State security and waging war who are at the same time targets of the State power to let die, racialized soldiers occupy a paradoxical and precarious position between life and death. To put it another way, the racialized soldier is a figure at once for citizen and enemy. Cynthia Enloe shows how soldiers from minority communities reveal the ways in which imperatives of State security come into conflict with those of national community. As Enloe’s study notes, their inclusion and participation in the military can lead to demands for equal standing and rewards befitting full members of the national community. While such demands have led to some shifts in policy and public opinion, the ethnic/minority soldiers’ status does not necessarily shift accordingly. The perils of embodying both citizen and enemy simultaneously are perhaps particularly hazardous for those who are perceived as threats to State security.
     
    Like the Japanese in America during World War II, Muslim populations in America in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and the ensuing “war on terror” became racialized as foreign, suspect, and threatening.10 Similarly, the objectives of both wars were (and continue to be) articulated in racial terms, even while racism was disavowed.11 It is significant to note that in this rhetoric, the Japanese and Muslims do not merely represent enemy nations during wartime; instead, the enemy is turned into fungible racialized categories that encompass populations abroad and at home.12 The consolidation of “Muslim” as a racial category, as Leti Volpp and Muneer Ahmad argue, is based on the interchangeability of members of certain racial, religious, and ethnic groups with those who committed acts of terrorist violence on 9/11. This logic, as both Volpp and Ahmad note, is also nothing new. It recalls and reanimates similar logic from the past, most notably the logic that led to the incarceration of the Japanese in America during World War II. 13 Thus, any persons who merely appear to be Arab, Muslim, or Middle Eastern are consolidated together as “Muslim-looking.” (Ahmad 104). The material effects of being categorized as “Muslim-looking” have been particularly hazardous: in addition to petty acts of harassment and racial profiling by the government and the general public, many have been physically assaulted, killed, detained, and deported. As Ahmad has noted, many people who are not in fact Muslim, but “who are, for lack of a better descriptor, merely brown-skinned” (105), have been subject to this violence.14 American Muslims share with Asian Americans the dubious distinction of being turned into an enemy race as a response to war. In conjunction with their shared status as outsiders in relation to the nation and its citizenry, both groups also share histories of violence in relation to the state. In the rest of this essay, I will examine figurations of Muslim and Asian American soldiers in the context of recent wars in the Middle East as intersecting racial projects.15
     
    Because their particular relationship to the state makes them especially subject to State discipline, racialized soldiers highlight the exploitation of racialized citizen-subjects that is in fact intrinsic to negotiations of citizenship and national belonging. That is to say, if the figure of the racialized soldier is meant to provide the proof of the promise of inclusion, it is also at the same time a reminder of the unfulfilled and continuously deferred promise of the same, and it reveals the duplicitous role of the military in the reproduction and maintenance of racial, gender, class, and sexual hierarchies. We should also consider that the crises and the violence of inclusion that are illuminated by war and militarism are not necessarily exceptional moments. Indeed, as America officially ends the war in and occupation of Iraq, the war in Afghanistan continues on, while the memories and narratives of earlier wars continue to be reanimated.16
     
    Although the objects of my inquiry here are Muslim and Asian American soldiers, the figuration of Colin Powell himself as a racialized citizen-soldier is not unrelated. If African Americans have not historically been perceived as perpetually foreign or as enemy combatants in the way that Muslims and Asian Americans have been, African American soldiers have nevertheless borne similar burdens of contradiction, ambiguity, and precariousness.17 In other words, even as the symbolic narrative that Colin Powell embodies does a great deal of work to fix meaning for both himself and Kareem Khan, that work in itself is incomplete. The photo— which Powell describes in his interview—does the other part of this work. The photo appears as part of an online portfolio titled “Service” for The New Yorker magazine by photographer Platon. The series depicts members of U.S. military at various stages of their service, from graduating from West Point to lying under gravestones at Arlington National Cemetery. In keeping with the logic of military multiculturalism that McAlister argues for, the series represents men and women of various races and ethnicities. What makes the portrait of Corporal Khan (which is more literally a portrait of his mother and gravestone) especially legible in the context of the series is, as Powell points out, the crescent and the star that symbolizes Islam and that marks the gravestone. Khan’s mother, Elsheba Khan, who sits behind and carefully frames the stone with her arms and head, provides an additional cue for Khan’s Muslim-ness as non-white. This framing places the gravestone at the center of the photograph, where the light is fixed on the stone and its inscriptions, which include Khan’s name, rank, dates, and medals.
     
    The photo is made legible largely through two connected and overlapping discourses: the myth-making work of what historian George Mosse terms the “cult of the fallen soldier” and the iconography of the pietà. Instead of cradling the actual body of her dead son, the mother mourns by cradling the gravestone. And like the figuration of the Virgin Mary in classic pietàs, Elsheba Khan’s face appears “beautifully serene,” signifying “the transcendent purpose of maternal sacrifice” and “marking the magnitude and purpose of this death and the certainty of future life precisely in and through the face of her loss” (Tapia 16). Ruby Tapia suggests that “the essential constituent of the pietà’s timeless function as a fleshed-out screen is . . . the maternal body and its inextricable relationship to the threat of death and the promise of resurrection” (18). In this sense, the mother of the dead soldier is one of the most affective figures in times of war because she embodies most closely the meanings of the maternal in the pietà. Like the Virgin Mary of the original pietà, she sacrifices her son without protest, calmly accepting her role in the larger narrative of collective national suffering and the redemptive figure (the son/soldier) who would die in the place of others so that they would be saved.
     
    Like the pietà the photograph reflects and recalls, the image invokes another powerful symbol, which also has roots in Christian iconography. The “cult of the fallen soldier,” which emerged during and after World War I, similarly relies on and reflects Christian themes of redemption and resurrection through death. Closely tied to the “myth of the war experience,” which rearticulates war experience and memory as a way to “transcend the horror of war and at the same time supported the utopia which nationalism sought to project,” the fallen soldier serves as symbolic martyr for the regeneration of the nation and calls on others to participate in this project (106). As a central motif to this figuration, youth mythologizes death “as not death at all but sacrifice and resurrection” (73). So while its work may be quite similar to that of the pietà (many images and depictions of the fallen soldier are, in fact, versions of the pietà), the cult of the fallen soldier, Mosse argues, is central to the glorification of war and by extension, the nation. But if the myth of the fallen dissipated by the time of World War II in Europe, as Mosse concludes, its power to evoke nationalist sentiment remains. Mosse suggests that the scale of death and violence that World War II wrought meant that war and its brutalities could no longer be mythologized in the ways they had been previously. However, the realities of war that European nations and people faced during World War II were very different from the realities that America and most of its citizens faced during two of the longest running wars in modern American history.18 Fought by strategically smaller armed forces made up of volunteers in lands many could not locate on maps, America’s military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan created burdens that were more or less borne solely by those in the military and their families. The wars in and occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan still have a vexed relationship with the images of their casualties, however.19
     
    Central to Tapia’s reading of the pietà in American culture is the argument for its work conjoining race, death, and the maternal in the project to resurrect the nation and national subject(s) at particular moments of rupture. As Tapia notes, these differentiated maternal bodies mean that “the nation imbues some maternal bodies with resurrecting power and leaves others for (the) dead” (24). That the maternal or the mother is always already a raced figure can help us to see how the differentiated maternal bodies are deployed through visual culture to reproduce and resurrect the national body and the citizen-subject. The Khan photo by itself does not have the power to resurrect the national body through the raced body of the Muslim mother (although it is no coincidence that the actual body of the soldier is invisible in the image). Powell’s invocation of the soldier, the image, and his unequivocal American-ness does the supplemental work of securing the meaning of the photograph.
     
    In the remainder of this essay, I want to turn to another figure who, like Khan, is an American Muslim soldier who served during the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Unlike Khan, James Yee, the former Muslim chaplain assigned to U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, is not racially or ethnically Arab or “Muslim-looking,” to borrow Ahmad’s phrase. Unlike Khan’s, Yee’s story would end neither with praise for his honor and courage nor affirmation of national belonging from the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If Khan’s story and the context through which his story is made legible to us obscure this relationship between war, militarism and race, Yee’s story provides the necessary supplement to our understanding and reminds us of the precarity of the status of racialized soldiers. That Yee’s race is not one often associated with Muslims further highlights the shared racialization of Muslim and Asian Americans in the history of U.S. wars throughout the 20th and 21st centuries.
     
    In 2003, U.S. Army Chaplain Captain James Yee was taken into military custody and detained on charges of sedition, espionage, aiding the enemy, and failure to obey a general order following 11 months of service as the Muslim chaplain at Camp Delta, the military prison at Guantánamo Bay.20 A third-generation Chinese American and graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Yee converted to Islam shortly before the first Gulf War and pursued further study of Islam with the specific goal of becoming and serving as a chaplain in the Army. Yee was stationed at Fort Lewis in Washington in 2001 when the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon occurred. In response, Yee embraced his new role not simply as a chaplain but as a spokesperson for Islam, who could educate the military as well as the general public about Islam and diffuse rising hostility and antagonism against Muslims. In fall of 2002, Yee was assigned to Camp Delta. In addition to the usual duties of an army chaplain, his duties included meeting the prisoners’ religious needs as well as advising other staff about the prisoners’ religion and culture. He was also frequently called on to speak to visiting media, fulfilling his role as “the U.S. military’s poster child of a good Muslim—a devout chaplain who comfortably served both God and country” (Yee 40).
     
    Yet he would come under increasing suspicion from the camp’s security officer and staff for what they perceived as Yee’s undue sympathy for the detainees. Some of the suspicious evidence against Yee included his ridiculing a psychological operations poster with a detainee (overheard by one of the base’s Arabic translators) and his use of a security clearance stamp to circulate materials from the prison’s library. Compounded by suspicions of his close association with other Muslim personnel, a group dubbed by others as a “Muslim clique,” camp security and counterintelligence opened an investigation on Yee and others in the “clique” (including Senior Airman Ahmad Al Halabi, a translator) in the spring of 2003.21 The mounting investigation eventually culminated in Yee’s arrest at Jacksonville Naval Air Station on September 10, 2003, as he prepared to board a flight to Seattle, where he was going to spend his leave with his family. Yee was placed in solitary confinement at the U.S. Naval Brig in Charleston, South Carolina, where he remained for 76 days. Eventually, the cases against both Yee and Al Halabi collapsed as a result of insufficient and irrelevant evidence, mistranslations, and mishandling and misunderstanding of what constituted classified documents, among other irregularities. As the case for espionage and aiding the enemy began to crumble, all criminal charges against Yee were dropped, and he was charged instead with adultery and downloading pornography—charges which were also later dismissed. Yee was eventually able to leave the army with an honorable discharge. As Al Halabi’s lawyer put it: “The U.S. . . . oversold, overcharged, and overreacted” (Rivera).
     
    While Yee’s race and ethnicity were not foregrounded in the case or in media coverage of the case the way his religion was, they were conjoined with religion in an anonymous military official’s reference to Yee as “that Chinese Taliban.”22 No longer the poster child for the liberal and pluralist nation, Yee as “Chinese Taliban” poses an external threat to the national body and the nation-state through his race and religion. Despite the “terribly American” markers of Yee’s biography—third-generation American, model citizen, graduate of West Point, etc.—the ease with which his race and religion became legible as external and threatening is a reflection of the racialization of both Asian Americans and Muslims (Yee 13). If Muslim and “Muslim-looking” people are racialized as terrorists who stand outside of citizenship and construct the citizen as its opposite, Asians and Asian Americans, too, have long been figured as outsiders to the nation. From the exclusionary laws that barred would-be Asian immigrants from entering the U.S. to the long history of America’s wars in and against Asian nations, Asian Americans have been “defined antithetically against those who enjoy citizenship,” regardless of their formal citizenship status (Volpp, “Obnoxious” 57).23 The Asian American, at once perpetual immigrant and always already foreign to America, “remains the symbolic ‘alien,’ the metonym for Asia who by definition cannot be imagined as sharing in America” (Lowe 6). Yee’s Muslim-ness and his Asian-ness thus work to doubly mark him as a suspect and a threat. The precariousness of Yee’s racial identity in relation to the war on terror and to the nation-state is thus informed by his status as an Asian American Muslim and also as a citizen-soldier representing the multicultural military and nation. In fact, what marks Yee as “the U.S. military’s poster child” is the very same condition which marks him as a potential terrorist, and vice versa.
     
    In this sense, the predicament of the racialized soldier is not unlike that of the translator or interpreter. Much of James Yee’s work in the army, like that of Arabic interpreters, involved serving as a cultural intermediary between the US military and the general public, and between the military command and the Muslim and Arab detainees. One of the commanding officers describes Yee’s predicament at Camp Delta as an “awkward position. . . . Because of his unique background, the scarcity of that religion in the chaplain’s service, we relied on him to do things, and actually put him in the middle of that.”24 Acts of translation in wartime are, as Vicente Rafael eloquently explains, “weaponized for the sake of projecting American power abroad while ensuring security at home” (3). Those who possess strategic foreign language skills necessary for warfare abroad are called upon to serve as both linguistic and cultural interpreters and mediators; it is in that capacity that translators become the most suspect and vulnerable.25 Accounts of events that led to Yee’s arrest show that initial suspicions emerged from the cultural briefings that Yee routinely provided the soldiers—that he, “in the subtle nuances in the way he was crafting things,” appeared unduly sympathetic to the detainees, speaking as if he were justifying terrorist acts in his explanation of cultures and worldviews of Islam.26 Mary Louise Pratt’s reading of the predicament of the translator substantiates this dynamic:
     

    When relations are adversarial, the people assigned to mediate become suspect because the adversaries cohabit in them. The knowledge that enables them to do their work makes them dangerous, because what it takes to become a linguistic and cultural mediator are long-standing, varied, nonadversarial relations with the enemy culture.

    (1527)

     

    But Pratt’s point offers only a partial explanation for Yee’s situation. While his religious commitment as well as his affinity with other Muslims and Islamic culture were central to the case against him, the prevailing racial ideologies that have long genealogies in American culture and its imperial wars have done just as much work to mark him as suspicious and vulnerable. So Yee (as well as Khan) is both like and unlike a translator in that sense: if the position of the Iraqi interpreter is rendered ambiguous because of his or her presumed belonging and loyalty to another nation-state (not the U.S.), the racialized soldier’s race marks the precarity of his or her position. Racialized soldiers in the U.S. military are tasked with an impossible contradiction. They are called upon to stand as proofs of the nation and empire’s capacity for tolerance and inclusivity precisely because they are always already suspects and enemies. But their labor, like that of the Iraqi interpreters, is vital for military and imperial campaigns. This inherent contradiction in the figure of the racialized soldier makes its meanings and positions radically unstable. And this is why so much work goes into representing the racialized soldier as either the unquestionable patriot and citizen (as in the case of Khan) or as the treasonous other, the enemy (as in the case of Yee and Al Halabi) with virtually no room in between for other possibilities.27 They remain in some ways, to borrow from Rafael, untranslatable:

     

    [T]ranslation is incapable of fixing meaning across languages. . . . Hence it is impossible for imperialists as well as those who oppose them to fully control its workings, much less recuperate them. The treachery and treason inherent in translation in a time of war are the insistent counter-points to the American notion of translation as monolingual assimilation, with its promise of democratic communication and the just exchange of meanings. In the body of the interpreter, translation reaches its limits.

    (17-8)

     
    Rafael’s analysis of the interpreter offers a way to think about the contradiction of the racialized soldier. Because the soldier’s meaning must be fixed in particular ways, it is, as Rafael writes, “impossible for imperialists as well as those who oppose them to fully control its workings, much less recuperate them.” The state cannot quite grasp or control the final meaning(s) of the racialized soldier. Kareem Khan’s story, as narrated by Colin Powell and memorialized in the photograph in The New Yorker, insists upon his loyalty to his country even unto death as the ultimate proof of his patriotism and belonging. It thus seeks to mask the threat of treachery that plays out in the case against James Yee. That the two Gulf Wars produced radically different narratives for Powell, Khan, and Yee reveals the precarity of these claims and identifications. Even as the two subject positions appear to be irreconcilable opposites, Khan’s and Yee’s stories reveal how they are not merely interchangeable but constituted together as part and parcel of the same racial project of war.
     
    War is a crisis of citizenship because even as the line between citizen-subject and terrorist gets fortified, these terms are made tenuous.28 Such racial projects of war and militarism do not only affect specifically targeted populations (in the case of present war, those identified as Muslim). Tram Nguyen’s aptly titled We Are All Suspects Now collects narratives that reveal how multiple immigrant and ethnic minority communities have been impacted by post-9/11 policy changes. Judith Butler argues that in the face of state-sanctioned violence that targets and differentiates particular communities, we need to “understand precariousness as a shared condition” and, in doing so, recognize all forms and conditions of life as precarious, challenging hierarchies of violence and grief (Frames 28). What Butler urges here is not quite so simple: for it is not that we should cease to recognize specific and differentiated precariousness, but that we should recognize and oppose “state violence and its capacity to produce, exploit, and distribute precarity for the purpose of profit and territorial defense” (Frames 32). Ahmad raises similar concerns when he points out the “inadequate levels of grief” for the victims of post-9/11 hate crimes and violence in contrast to the outpouring of mourning and grief for the victims of the 9/11 attacks themselves (107). The consequences of uneven hierarchies of grief do not merely demonstrate lack of empathy or collective emotional shortcomings; they demonstrate and perpetuate the otherness of racial others that casts their lives as unworthy of grieving, as un-grievable, to borrow again from Butler.29 That such lives are and have not been regarded as human, and are “derealized,” as Butler explains, is not merely an abstract idea: “their dehumanization . . . gives rise to a physical violence that in some sense delivers the message of dehumanization that is already at work in the culture” (Precarious Life 34).
     
    To be clear, here Butler is speaking specifically about the unnamed and ungrieved civilian and other non-American casualties of America’s wars in the Middle East. By virtue of their status as soldiers in the U.S. military, American Muslims and other racialized soldiers are, of course, made available for mourning in ways that Iraqi and Afghani civilians are not. But acknowledging one kind of death or violence should not necessarily preclude the mourning of another. In fact, Butler’s point speaks to the ways in which the conditions of life and death are shared. Military service has a long history of negotiating the price for immigrants and other minorities to enter into the nation-state. But the price it exacts—the state’s right to exploit and to kill for its benefit—is, and should be, repugnant, not just to racial minorities but to all. To recall Foucault again, the generalization of biopower as part of state function and power also means the generalization of the “sovereign right to kill anyone, meaning not only other people, but also its own people” (260). The recuperation of Kareem Khan as the loyal American Muslim soldier and the indictment of James Yee as the treacherous “Chinese Taliban” must both be understood as forms and results of state and imperial violence. One dead, one alive: it is no wonder that only the dead soldier is bestowed with the power to resurrect. But the power to resurrect and to recuperate only masks the very real violence that continues to make life precarious, not only for Muslims and Asian Americans but also for all others.

    Ji-Young Um is Visiting Assistant Professor with appointments in the American Studies Program and the English Department at Williams College. Um has written and presented on representations of minority soldiers in the U.S., intersections of militarism, empire, and racism, Asian Americans and U.S. wars in Asia, and visual cultures and race. She is currently working on a book manuscript that argues for reading America’s wars as racial projects that reveal the constitutive relationship between militarism and racism.
     

     

    Footnotes

     

    1. Joe Klein, “Can Colin Powell Save America?” Also see James Kelly, “Colin Powell on Colin Powell.”

     

    2. See Chapter 6, “Military Multiculturalism in the Gulf War and after, 1990-1999” in Epic Encounters. It should, however, be noted that the military’s relationship to racial ideology and its self-fashioned role as champion of racial diversity and pluralism is not entirely new: the demand for and the eventual desegregation of the military in 1948 has also allowed the military to claim a genealogy of tolerance and pluralism that has been, and continues to be, vanguard for the rest of the nation.

     

    3. For some theorizations of the “citizen-soldier,” see Enloe’s Ethnic Soldiers, 82-3. Also see George Mosse’s genealogy of the emergence and production of the citizen-soldier during the French Revolution wars in Fallen Soldiers. Mosse argues that the “new kind of war,” no longer fought in the interest of the monarch or the ruling class, called upon and created “citizen-soldiers” who fought “for an ideal which encompassed the whole nation under the symbol of the Tricolor and the Marseillaise” (18).

     

    4. Ronald Krebs, in Fighting For Rights: Military Service and the Politics of Citizenship, makes a similar point that African American military service and participation during World War II and Cold War era have not, in fact, resulted in “first-class” citizenship and attendant rights and benefits.

     

    5. It should be noted that the process has not always been practiced as intended. As Leslie Lord, the army’s liaison to Citizenship and Immigration Services notes, “even the soldier with the cleanest of records, if he has a name that’s very similar to one that’s in the FBI bad-boy and bad-girl list, things get delayed.” See “Fast Track to Citizenship Fails Service Members.”

     

    6. Source: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.

     

    7. According to Preston’s article in The New York Times reporting on this initiative, there are currently about 29,000 foreign-born non-citizens serving in the armed forces.

     

    8. The lectures I am referring to are collected in “Society Must Be Defended,” the March 17 lecture in particular.

     

    9. This conclusion leads us to what could be troubling assumptions: that those from racial and ethnic minority communities who volunteer and enlist all desire membership and inclusion in the national community, and that they allow the military (and state) to simply utilize them to this end for the benefit of the nation-state. While this paper is not about individual agency or the motivation of the racialized soldier, these assumptions risk oversimplifying what is ultimately a complex and often contradictory negotiation between the military and racialized subjects.

     

    10. See Kandice Chuh, Chapter 2, “Nikkei Internment,” in Imagine Otherwise for her analysis of “transnational” racialization of the Japanese in America.

     

    11. I read and understand both wars—World War II and the Iraq/Afghanistan wars—as “race wars,” following Paul Kramer’s definition of a race war as “a war whose ends were rationalized in racial terms before domestic publics, one in which imperial soldiers came to understand indigenous combatants and noncombatants in racial terms, one in which race played a key role in bounding and unbounding the means of colonial violence, and in which those means were justified along racial lines. . . . [T]he war prompted, and was in turn fundamentally structured by, a process of racialization in which race-making and war-making were intimately connected” (89). See Kramer’s Blood of Empire. While Kramer’s definition emerges out of and describes the Philippine-American War, his insight about the intimacies of war, empire, and race is useful and applicable to the consequent US wars in Asia.

     

    12. See Muneer Ahmad’s “Homeland Insecurities” and Leti Volpp’s “The Citizen Terrorist.”

     

    13. Just as the racialization of Asians in America as “Oriental” and inassimilable other has an older genealogy long preceding Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, racialization of Arabs and Muslims has a deeper and longer genealogy in orientalism and orientalist discourse, theorized perhaps most famously by Edward Said in Orientalism. Also see Said’s Covering Islam and McAlister in Epic Encounters for analysis of media representations of Islam and the Middle East.

     

    14. Moustafa Bayoumi, in “Racing Religion,” also offers a useful and compelling argument for how the “special registration” program under the George W. Bush administration functioned as a technology through which race was created out of a religion. Bayoumi argues: “In requiring that citizens and nationals of those countries suffer through its burdens, special registration collapses citizenship, ethnicity, and religion into race” (277).

     

    15. Michael Omi and Howard Winant, in their Racial Formation in the United States, define “racial project” as “an interpretation, representation, or explanation of racial dynamics,” that “connect what race means in a particular discursive practice and the ways in which both social structures and everyday experiences are racially organized, based upon that meaning” (56). Similarly, my use of Omi and Winant’s concept seeks to highlight both the ideological and structural function of wars in Asia as racial projects. They serve not only as events through which conflicts around “race” might erupt; they also have the potential to “resolve” such conflicts.

     

    16. See Marilyn Young, “Permanent War.”

     

    17. While this topic is relevant to but ultimately beyond the scope of this essay, the following pieces offer some examples and analyses of the African American soldier’s ambivalent relationship to war and empire: Rene Ontal’s “Fagen and Other Ghosts: African Americans and the Philippine American War”; George Lipsitz’s “Frantic to Join . . . the Japanese Army: Black Soldiers and Civilians Confront the Asia Pacific War”; Katherine Kinney’s reading of John A. Williams’s Captain Blackman in her Friendly Fire: American Images of the Vietnam War; and Reginald Kearney’s African American Views of the Japanese: Solidarity or Sedition?

     

    18. The war in Afghanistan began in October 2001 shortly after the Taliban regime’s refusal to hand over Osama Bin Laden to U.S. authorities. The war in Iraq began in March 2003, shortly following Colin Powell’s presentation of evidence that Saddam Hussein possessed “weapons of mass destruction.” Although George W. Bush declared the end of “major combat activity” in Iraq in May 2003, the Pentagon only recently announced the official end of the mission in December 2011. As of December 15, 2011, two American military bases and approximately 4,000 troops still remain in Iraq, however. See “In Baghdad, Panetta Leads Uneasy Moment of Closure” by Thom Shanker, Michael S. Schmidt and Robert F. Worth, The New York Times, Dec. 15, 2011.

     

    19. During the first Gulf War in 1991, President George H.W. Bush instituted a ban on photography and other media coverage of America’s returning dead. Since the ban, there have been intermittent attempts to lift the ban. The debates around the ban (and its consequent reversal in 2009) center around the issue of rights: the families’ right to mourn in private versus the public’s right to witness to the costs of war and the right to recognize and honor the war dead. On one hand, this is simply a contestation of public versus private rights to these images. On the other hand, this is also a conflict and debate over the meanings of these images, especially meanings as they are understood to be political or not: the families’ right to keep private the image and memory of their own dead is assumed to be apolitical while the demand for public access to these images is assumed to be politically motivated, regardless of which ideological position motivates it.

     

    20. Much of the information about Yee’s case and biography comes from his own account, For God and Country, as well as Ray Rivera’s special report for The Seattle Times, “Suspicion in the Ranks,” Jan. 9-16, 2005.

     

    21. Al Halabi’s arrest occurred just before Yee’s, during the summer of 2003. Al Halabi faced 30 different charges, including attempted espionage and aiding the enemy. He was held in jail for much longer than Yee—nearly a year—and was eventually freed only after pleading guilty to some of the minor charges. As in Yee’s case, most of the serious charges against Al Halabi were dropped because of a lack of concrete and credible evidence. See Rivera’s “Suspicion in the Ranks” and “Loyalties and Suspicions” by Tim Golden for The New York Times.

     

    22. Possibly because of the racist and slanderous overtones of this phrase, there is neither print documentation nor positive identification of who first uttered it. Yet it is a notorious phrase that has circulated widely. James Yee acknowledged that he did indeed recall being referred to as a “Chinese Taliban” during his talk at University of Washington’s Diversity Book Talk Series, Feb. 8, 2005. The case of John Walker Lindh, the “American Taliban,” offers a fairly straightforward but instructive contrast to Yee’s case and moniker. John Walker Lindh, a white American-born citizen fighting with the Taliban forces, was captured in Afghanistan in 2001. The irony of the moniker “Taliban” for Lindh and Yee is, of course, that Lindh was actually found to be fighting for and colluding with the Taliban while for Yee, it simply conflates “Muslim” with “Taliban.”

     

    23. In “‘Obnoxious To Their Very Nature’: Asian Americans and Constitutional Citizenship,” Volpp examines the racialization and racial identities of Asian Americans through four discourses of citizenship: citizenship as legal status, rights, political activity, and identity. Volpp shows how Asian Americans have historically been and continue to be systematically excluded from all four forms of citizenship and participation: “The discourse of constitutional citizenship claims that all citizens ought to be treated equally. But . . . there are particular assumptions about Asian Americans that have forever rendered their presumptive fitness for citizenship suspect” (68).

     

    24. Command Sergeant Major John VanNatta, the prison’s superintendent at Camp Delta, quoted in Rivera’s “Suspicion in the Ranks” series, chapter 3, “Fear of Betrayal.”

     

    25. In addition to Rafael’s “Translation, American English, and the National Securities of Empire,” also see Mary Louise Pratt’s “Harm’s Way: Language and the Contemporary Arts of War.”

     

    26. Quote from Captain James Orlich, the lead security officer at Camp Delta who eventually initiated investigations against Yee, in Rivera’s “Suspicion in the Ranks,” chapter 3, “Fear of Betrayal.” The same article goes on to quote Orlich’s observation that “Everybody who walked out after it was over sat there going, ‘Is he on our side, or is he on the enemy’s side?’”

     

    27. One such example, among many, is the history of Filipino veterans who fought in the U.S. armed forces to liberate the Philippines from Japan during World War II. Many Filipinos, as U.S. nationals who were not quite citizens and not quite aliens, fought as part of the U.S. army for their homeland and campaigned for U.S. citizenship after the war. For the Filipinos in the U.S., their experience and stories, as Theo Gonzalves elaborates in his essay, reveal complex negotiations of multiple obligations and expectations, both to the United States and the Philippines. See Gonzalves’ “‘We Hold a Neatly Folded Hope’: Filipino Veterans of World War II on Citizenship and Political Obligation.”

     

    28. My formulation here that war is a “crisis of citizenship” is borrowed from and builds on Mae Ngai’s observation that “Internment [Japanese American] was a crisis of citizenship, in which citizenship was first nullified on grounds of race and then reconstructed by means of internment, forced cultural assimilation, and ethnic dispersal” (201). Similarly, for the figurations of American Muslim soldier that I examine here, citizenship gets alternately re- and de-constructed over and over again.

     

    29. See Butler’s “Violence, Mourning, Politics” in Precarious Life.

     

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Ahmad, Muneer. “Homeland Insecurities: Racial Violence the Day after September 11.” Social Text. 20:3.72 (2002). Web.
    • Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. 1983. Revised ed. New York: Verso, 1994. Print.
    • Bayoumi, Moustafa. “Racing Religion.” The New Centennial Review. 6.2 (2006): 267-293. Web.
    • Butler, Judith. Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence. New York: Verso, 2004. Print.
    • ———. Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable? New York: Verso, 2009. Print.
    • Chuh, Kandice. Imagine Otherwise: On Asian Americanist Critique. Durham: Duke UP, 2003. Print.
    • DeYoung, Karen. “Falling on His Sword.” The Washington Post 1 Oct 2006. Web.
    • Enloe, Cynthia. Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies. Athens: U of Georgia P, 1980. Print.
    • Foucault, Michel. “Society Must Be Defended”: Lectures at the Collège de France 1975-1976. Trans. David Macey. New York: Picador, 2003. Print.
    • Fujitani, T. “Go For Broke, the Movie: Japanese American Soldiers in U.S. National, Military, and Racial Discourses.” Fujitani, White, Yoneyama 239-266. Print.
    • ———, Geoffrey White, and Lisa Yoneyama. Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s). Durham: Duke UP, 2001. Print.
    • Golden, Tim. “Loyalties and Suspicions: The Muslim Servicemen.” The New York Times 19 Dec 2004. Web.
    • Gonzalvez, Theo. “‘We Hold a Neatly Folded Hope’: Filipino Veterans of World War II on Citizenship and Political Obligation.” Amerasia Journal 21:3 (1996): 155-174. Web.
    • Kearney, Reginald. African American Views of the Japanese: Solidarity or Sedition? Albany: State U of New York P, 1998. Print.
    • Kelly, James. “Colin Powell on Colin Powell.” Time 18 Sept 1995. Web.
    • Kinney, Katherine. Friendly Fire: American Images of the Vietnam War. New York: Oxford UP, 2000. Print.
    • Klein, Joe. “Can Colin Powell Save America?” Newsweek 9 Oct. 1994. Web.
    • Kramer, Paul. Blood of Empire: Race, Empire, the United States, and the Philippines. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 2006. Print.
    • Krebs, Ronald. Fighting for Rights: Military Service and the Politics of Citizenship. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2006. Print.
    • Lane, Charles. “The Legend of Colin Powell.” The New Republic 17 Apr 1995. EBSCOhost. Web.
    • Lipsitz, George. “‘Frantic to Join . . . the Japanese Army’: Black Soldier and Civilians Confront the Asia Pacific War.” Fujitani, White, Yoneyama 347-377. Print.
    • Lowe, Lisa. Immigrant Acts: On Asian American Cultural Politics. Durham: Duke UP, 1996. Print.
    • McAlister, Melani. Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East, 1945-2000. Berkeley: U of California P, 2001. Print.
    • ———. “A Virtual Muslim is Something To Be.” American Quarterly 62.2 (2010): 221-231. Print.
    • “‘Meet the Press’ transcript for October 19 2008.” Meet the Press. NBC News. 19 Oct. 2008. Web. 22 Feb. 2013.
    • Mosse, George. Fallen Soldiers: Reshaping the Memory of the World Wars. New York: Oxford UP, 1990. Print.
    • Ngai, Mae. Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2004. Print.
    • Nguyen, Tram. We Are All Suspects Now: Untold Stories from Immigrant Communities After 9/11. Boston: Beacon Press, 2005. Print.
    • Omi, Michael, and Howard Winant. Racial Formation in the United States: From the 1960s to the 1990s. Second ed. New York: Routledge, 1994. Print.
    • Ontal, Rene. “Fagen and Other Ghosts: African Americans and the Philippine American War.” Vestiges of War: The Philippine-American War and the Aftermath of an Imperial Dream 1899-1999. Eds. Angel Velasco Shaw and Luis Francia. New York: NYU P, 2002. 118-133. Print.
    • Platon. Service. The New Yorker on-line. 29 Sept 2008. Web.
    • Powell, Colin. Interview by Tom Brokaw. Meet the Press. NBC. 19 Oct 2008. Web.
    • Pratt, Mary Louise. “Harm’s Way: Language and the Contemporary Arts of War.” PMLA 124.5 (2009): 1515-1531. Print.
    • Preston, Julia. “US Military Will Offer Path to Citizenship.” The New York Times. 14 Feb 2009. Web.
    • Rafael, Viente. “Translation, American English, and the National Insecurities of Empire.” Social Text 101 27.4 (2009): 1-23. Web.
    • Rivera, Ray. “Suspicion in the Ranks: Inside the Spy Investigation of Captain James Yee.” Special Report. Seattle Times. January 9-16 2005. Web.
    • Said, Edward. Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books, 1978. Print.
    • ———. Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World. New York: Vintage Books, 1981. Print.
    • Santos, Fernanda. “Fast Track to Citizenship Fails Service Members.” The New York Times. 24 Feb 2008. Web.
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    • ———. “The Citizen and the Terrorist.” UCLA Law Review 49.5 (2002): 1575-1600. Web.
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  • Transgenics of the Citizen (I)

    Erin Obodiac (bio)

    Cornell University

     

    Abstract

    Citizenship exposes non-humans and sub-humans—both animate and inanimate—to abandonment on the far side of its amity line. This essay explores how the figure of the human being designates a technical limit to the isometric principle of limitless access to civil and political rights. As zoon politikon, the human being inhabits a tautegorical enclosure, immuring itself from the claims of all other entities: there is no citizenship for robots or automaton chess players nor even for the wolf of Gubbio with his signatory paw, even while corporations are given rights of personhood. And yet: a pending South Korean Robot Ethics Charter signals that a new planetary order might be afoot.

    The figure of the human being, especially in its management of anthropological differences, designates a technical limit to the isometric principle of limitless access to civil and political rights. With species being, the zoon politikon inhabits a tautegorical enclosure, immuring itself from the provocations of all other forms of the animate and the inanimate alike: there is no citizenship for robots or automaton chess players or even the wolf of Gubbio with his signatory paw, even while corporations are given rights of personhood and are subject to the command structure, the subditus, of reason. Today, our era of biopolitics and biotechnology challenges traditional theories of human subjectivity, including the rights and privileges that used to be reserved for human beings alone. Citizenship is an example of one such right and privilege: in the future, will animals be citizens? What about creatures that are part animal and part human? And what about robots? Jaquet-Droz, the creator of the eighteenth-century writing automaton, was subject to punishment from the Spanish Inquisition for exhibiting his non-living writing machine: it was just as heretical to say that man is a machine as it was to say that God is a man. What are we saying when we ask whether or not human beings can welcome animals, robots, and other creatures as citizens?
     
    Citizenship, as derived from immunitarian human rights, exposes non-humans and sub-humans—both animate and inanimate—to abandonment on the far side of its amity line. Pastoral power, with its herd and herdsmen, pastures this frontier, incising a territorial limit that, though traversed together by all living being, is also a limit that traverses living being. Following Hannah Arendt’s comment that “the distinction between man and animal runs right through the human species itself,” Giorgio Agamben reiterates: “The division of life into vegetal and relational, organic and animal, animal and human, therefore passes first of all as a mobile border within living man, and without this intimate caesura the very decision of what is human and what is not would probably not be possible” (Human Condition 19; The Open 15). We will also recall that in the first chapter of The Animal That Therefore I Am, Derrida describes the border, the limit, as something living, something that is fed, something nourished, something around which growth happens: “what feeds, is fed, is cared for, raised, and trained, what is cultivated on the edges of a limit . . . what sprouts or grows at the limit, around the limit, by maintaining the limit, but also what feeds the limit, generates it, raises it, and complicates it” (29). The term transgenic, then, takes on a new meaning: not only does it indicate a crossing of species, a splicing together of different species, but would also before that already indicate that the limit between genomes and species is itself generative. The limit is a living entity; it is perhaps the entity from which the living is engendered. The limit engenders the living. The border between the human and the non-human always ends up being a rationale for a territorial border as well. In the case of certain emergent subjectivities—artificial life and artificial intelligence—the border often concerns the ecosystem or vivarium of the lab—”laboratorium” as the place for labor or work—set apart from the rest of the world. Animals cross the border as things, goods, or livestock and not as persons, subjects, or citizens; yet, as living beings they animate a certain threat asleep in the supposed personhood of the human being: the specter of inanimation, not only in our era of technics (the machine-man, the automaton, the robot), but also more generally in the anthropomorphic as a technics. Transgenic bioartworks like the Semi-Living Worry Dolls awaken us to what is usually dormant in the question of citizenship: although willing to confess their deepest secrets to cultured knobs of human epidermal cells in the shape of human dolls, and despite discomfort at the destruction of these dolls (they are not subject to the law’s protection and cannot cross international borders) as the art-show breaks up camp to exhibit in another country, the art-goers tacitly acknowledge that knobs of human skin can be anthropomorphically addressed as persons. But the anthropomorphic address does not constitute a potential call to/of citizenship because citizenship does not concern the anthropomorphic: it is something more akin to a graft of the transcendental subject.
     
    Though the citizen must be a human being, it is not human species being that grounds citizenship. We see this contradiction come into play when biotech industries produce transgenic creatures—for instance, pigs with segments of human DNA as part of their genome—that genetically cross the divide between animal and human being, yet are barred from borders of another order. Partial human DNA is not a basis for the protections of the legal person or human rights, yet scientists have recently discovered that many human beings are already, to a certain extent, transgenic: many living homo sapiens have DNA from homo neanderthalis—a different species—as part of their genome. Donna Haraway notes another way in which the human being is always already transgenic: “I love the fact that human genomes can be found in only about 10 percent of all the cells that occupy the mundane space I call my body; the other 90 percent of the cells are filled with the genomes of bacteria, fungi, protists, and such” (4). Citizenship as a right derived from human speciesism fails at its origin: transgenic entities—human beings with Neanderthal DNA—have already been and currently are citizens. We might go as far as to say that citizenship, rather than precluding transgenic entities, is inherently transgenic in the sense that it is a technical or inanimate graft upon the genetic as such. Although the “transgenic citizen” suggests a crossing or traversal that happens across living being, and bioartworks, writes Monika Bakke, “build an awareness of zoe (life) as a trans-species generative force” (22), the ground for the possibility of the transgenic citizen just might not be anything genetic, living, or animate. The nomos of the transgenic territory cannot concern living being: transgenic citizenship as a recognition of living being per se would only be a new mode of biopolitics or an autochthonic isonomia born from technology rather than the earth. The lab would become the new territorial frontier. Writes Bakke: “The contemporary politics and biotechnologies of zoe cannot escape questions of belonging and identity, responsibility and sustainability in the environment, including the territorially expanding ‘extreme’ environments of biotech labs, where technologically-augmented life dwells in highly controlled, human-made environmental networks” (24). The lab (and the art gallery, we might add) constitutes a frontier or zone in which mere zoe takes on a form of life, a bios. The laboratory/gallery as a frontier zone is also inhabited by other kinds of liminal lives—entities that are themselves traversed by the border of the organic and the inorganic, the living and the non-living, the animate and the inanimate. The Semi-Living Worry Dolls, for instance, introduce new worries: “technologically-augmented life,” writes Bakke, “is not a solution to our problems, but rather is in a need of care and protection itself” (26). Extending our conception of “life” merely extends de rigueur questions concerning subjectivity, personhood, and citizenship. Must we return then to Heidegger’s insistence on the abyss between the Umwelt of the animal and the Welt of human Dasein as that which might mark the radical lack, the munus as Esposito might say, that could constitute the nomos of the transgenic commune? The caesura between animality and human being, which Heidegger insists upon, is also technically a splice, is also a technical splice, a technics of media montage and genetic engineering. Something other than living being must open the possibility of transgenic citizenship. Painter Paul Klee gives us a clue when he speaks of art, of technics, as a Zwischenwelt: art, or technics, is that which is between worlds. Artificial intelligence, robotics, biotechnology, biocomputing, biomedia, transgenic bioart, genetic architecture, and other emergent modes of technological morphogenesis inhabit a Between-World in which we today might pose the question of citizenship.
     

     

    In 2007—over two hundred years after Karl-Gottlieb de Windisch wrote in Inanimate Reason; or a Circumstantial Account of the Astonishing Piece of Mechanism, M. de Kempelen’s Chess-Player (1784) that “The boldest idea that ever entered the brain of a mechanic was, doubtless, that of constructing a machine to imitate man” (1)—South Korea’s Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy announced that the government would be drawing up a Robot Ethics Charter to regulate relations between humans and robots.1 The charter anticipates a territorial shift concerning where humans and robots interface: as automated labor, robots are moving from the factory into the service sector and even into the household. In a public statement, the Ministry announced that “The move anticipates the day when robots, particularly intelligent service robots, could become a part of daily life as greater technological advancements are made” (qtd. Lovgren, “Robot Code”). As one of the world’s most high-tech societies, South Korea is at the forefront of the increasing integration of technology and living beings. The country’s Ministry of Information and Communication says it is working on plans to put a robot in every household by 2020. A September 6, 2006, report from National Geographic News states that “South Korea intends to make robots full members of society” (Lovgren, “A Robot in Every Home”). The Robot Ethics Charter addresses matters concerning interactions between humans and robots, specifically questions of risk, danger, and abuse. Emergent risks are anticipated in this shift that we might generalize as one from the polis to the oikos. In a statement to Agence France-Presse, Park Hye-Young, a scientist on the Robot Ethics Charter’s five-member task force (which includes a sci-fi writer), puts it this way: “Imagine if some people treat androids as if the machines were their wives” (qtd. Lovgren, “Robot Code”). Apart from the peculiar ambiguity of this comment (is it worse to imagine that people might treat robots as badly as they do their wives or that they might have sex with robots? Not an incidental question given that the word “citizen” [cives] comes from kei, meaning to lie, bed, couch, night’s lodging; also beloved, dear, i.e., the one you couch with), the speculative nature of the concern signals that the territorial border between science fiction and contemporary social reality has been overstepped. The inclusion of guidelines for the robots themselves suggests that South Korea’s Robot Ethics Charter follows in the footsteps of sci-fi writer Isaac Asimov’s “Three Laws of Robotics,” which dictates a right of robot self-protection as well as the responsibility to do no harm to humans. Says Mark Tilden, employee of “Wow Wee Toys” in Hong Kong and designer of the RoboSapien toy, “From experience, the problem is that giving robots morals is like teaching an ant to yodel. We’re not there yet, and as many of Asimov’s stories show, the conundrums robots and humans would face would result in more tragedy than utility” (qtd. Lovgren, “Robot Code”). Although we are “not there” yet, the drawing up of a Robot Ethics Charter is a preemptive mandate that would restructure not only the border between machines and human beings, but territorial borders as well. The colonial nomos of the earth, for instance, required mandates that deemed colonized people as either human, sub-human, or inhuman depending on the territorial objective (which I will discuss later in this essay). We might ask, what kind of territorial objective does the South Korean Robot Ethics Charter anticipate?With the advent of the twenty-first century, risk or danger as a concern of the human being is being dislodged in favor of a shift to what has always been at the heart of the anthropocentric machine: rather than a ubiquitous “vestigium hominis video!” [I see the trace of a man!], the specter of the inhuman or non-human recurrently emanates from each new conception of the human. Although, for instance, Aristotle’s De Anima might secure zoon logon ekhon—the (animal) being held by speech (logos)—a place in the realm of animate beings, logos itself is peculiarly inanimate and technical (techne). Twentieth century artificial intelligence, computer technology, and the Turing test (or its pulp-fictional equivalent—the Voight-Kampff test—brought to life in Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? and Blade Runner) indicate that non-living artificial intelligence (automaton logon ekhon?) can embody and perform that which is preeminently human.
     
    Already in the Politics, Aristotle envisions a kind of robotic entity when he writes, “If every instrument could accomplish its own work, obeying or anticipating the will of others . . . if the shuttle could weave, and the pick touch the lyre, without a hand to guide them, chief workmen would not need servants” (31). Autonomous machines have always haunted the order of work, posing a threat to both Kant’s conception of autonomy as characteristic of humanity and the primacy of the human worker as a revolutionary subject of history. At its linguistic inception in Karel Čapek’s play R.U.R. (Rossum’s Universal Robots), the robot, which derives from the Czech word “robota,” is already figured as a revolutionary subject, one that entirely usurps the species being of humanity and takes over the planet. The play reminds us that each human being, no matter how triumphal, is perpetually at risk of hearing, like the Roman general whose slave calls out behind him: “Respice post te! Hominem te esse memento! Memento mori!” [Look behind you; remember that you are but a mortal.].
     
    Yet when Aristotle inadvertently invites the specter of the automaton into his discussion of animate being, he is not anticipating some of the provisions of South Korea’s Robot Ethics Charter. As would be expected, the charter sets up guidelines concerning the threat that robots represent to human beings and human community. The first guideline concerns limiting the autonomy of the robot. In an attempt to specify the form of animate beings in De Anima, Aristotle heads off effigies or simulations that merely represent the external appearance of the human being: the form of the animate being concerns functionality. A true hand, for instance, would be one that could do the work of a hand; semblance without functionality is the mark of the artificial and inanimate. Writes Aristotle, “there cannot be a hand in any and every state, such as metal or wood, except homonymously like the doctor in the picture. For it will not be able to do its own work any more than stone flutes or the painted doctor can do theirs” (De Anima 223). This nevertheless suggests that any inanimate entity—for instance, an automaton—that performs the work of the hand, would have the form of the animate. Aristotle cannot keep the phantasm of the mechanical entity far from his discussion of the living being. In Movement in Animals, he writes: “The movement of animals is like that of automatic puppets” (235). Although their material composition differs—pegs instead of bones, sinews instead of wires—the animal and the automaton function in the same manner, something Descartes would later elaborate in his infamous discussion of the bête-machine. Despite the persistent lurk of the automaton, from Aristotle to Kant autonomy remains the hallmark of the living being, in particular the human being. Aristotle is determined, even though logos is inanimate, to define man as “zoon logon ekhon,” and will not entertain any intrusions by any automaton logon ekhon. He wants to retain the principle of autonomous, internally caused movement as belonging essentially to the living being: he will not go down the road of a radical morphogenesis and the activation of machinic systems in his hyle-morphism of the living being. In The Beast and the Sovereign, Derrida observes, however, that even such classic attributions as spontaneous self-movement define life as well as its opposite, the inanimate mechanism: “the living being concentrates in a single ambiguous value this automotive spontaneity that gives itself its law, its autonomy and which, by the same token, is right up close to automotive autonomy but also signifies its opposite, namely automaticity, or in other words the automat’s mechanics of action and reaction” (Vol. I 221). South Korea’s charter reaffirms that the human being is an owner or user of the robot, and as such limits the robot’s autonomy. The charter is in effect an immunization measure: the robot’s autonomy is limited by the extent to which it is a threat to the community, a dangerous wager given that Aristotle articulates a second concept of automaton in the Physics: automaton is also a mode of chance. As chance, automaton concerns an effect that occurs incidentally in the material realm of nature. Automaton is a sheer random happening: one that is unpiloted, one that is without a cyber.
     
    Aristotle begins Physics, Book II, by discussing chance and the accident as modes of causality: “Luck [tyche] and the automatic [automaton] are reckoned as causes, and we say that many things are and come to be on account of them” (100). Acknowledging the philosophers who don’t admit of anything but determinate causes into their cosmos, Aristotle writes, “They say that nothing comes to be as an outcome of luck, but that there is a definite cause of everything . . . it is always possible to find some cause for them other than luck” (100). Aristotle counters this by arguing that the old cosmologists could not assimilate outcomes of supposed luck to any determined mode of causality, and were hence avoiding the question. On the other hand, Aristotle also resists the claim that the cosmos—”the Swirl”—came to be from luck, what he calls “the automatic” [automaton]” (101), since plants and animals are not likewise said to be outcomes of the automatic or luck. Plainly, says Aristotle, some things come to be “of necessity and always” (102) or “for the most part,” and that “luck or its outcome is not called the cause of either of these” (102). However, other things are said to come to be from luck. Before differentiating two different modalities of luck, Aristotle specifies that some things come to be for a purpose while others do not, and of the things that come to be for a purpose, some belong to choice and others do not. If something comes to be in the realm of purpose and choice and happens “concurrently,” it is called tyche (fortune). Aristotle tells us that “a cause by virtue of concurrence is indeterminate” and “unlimited” (102). In other words, when purposeful activity involves a collateral effect which was not the purpose of the activity, then this effect is called luck in the mode of tyche (fortune). The mode of luck distinct from tyche, which Aristotle calls automaton (“in-itself” [auto] “to-no-purpose” [maten]), also concerns concurrence, yet the concomitant effect does not accompany rational activity or choice. “Hence nothing done by an inanimate object, beast, or child, is the outcome of luck, since such things are not capable of choosing” (104), but it can be the outcome of automaton: “The automatic, on the other hand, extends to the animals other than man and to many inanimate objects” (104). In short, a human being might have tyche, but a stone can only have automaton. An ontological difference in concurrent outcomes depends on whether the participants or actants are human beings or not. If a stone falls and happens to hit a man, it is automaton not tyche, accident not fortune, the latter marked by rational choice, the former not.
     
    In his “Notes On a Theory of Gambling,” Walter Benjamin puts into question this Aristotelian schema that divides tyche from automaton. What Benjamin observes in the gestural phenomenology of the gambler is threefold: 1) that the throw or the cast is a highly mechanical movement, a kind of muscular Gestalt seemingly void of reflective consciousness, 2) that the gambler mobilizes a form of knowing before knowing whereby this reactive embodiment picks up cues or signs in advance of conscious knowing, and 3) that in this scene of mechanical determinism there is, nevertheless, an opening onto immeasurable uncertainty, an opening onto the possibility of the indeterminate, whether understood as the random clinaminic swerving of the atom, Brownian motion, or cosmic epoché (297). The experience of gambling is both a recognition that the human being is, like the bête-machine, an automaton, and an affirmation that even within the machine-work of materialist determinism and causality, there is, perhaps not the actuality of the indeterminate, but its possibility. It is interesting to note that even Descartes, who famously relegates the bête-machine and the humanoid automaton to mechanical reaction, reserving the freedom of authentic response for the human being, nevertheless lets slip an exception: in a letter from March 1638, a year after the arguments concerning the human being and the automaton in the Discourse on Method, Descartes writes, “never unless it be by chance, do these automatons respond, either with words or even with signs, concerning what is asked of them” (Oeuvres et letters, 1004, qtd. Derrida, The Animal 79). We see here that what Descartes calls chance opens up the possibility of something other than mechanical reaction and determinism for the automaton. Chance—an opening of possibility outside of mechanistic determinism—is the condition of possibility for response in the automaton. Chance suspends the machine-workings of the machine, and the automaton is for a moment something other than itself. By way of chance, there emerges something other than a machinic assemblage. Benjamin goes even further with this in his discussion of the messianic as an irruption of chance in the machinic now: chance is a split-nanosecond gate through which something other than mechanical determination might enter. An accelerated relationship to automaticity precipitates this chance. For instance, Benjamin suggests that a release from consciousness and creaturely life and a relating to the inanimate world of things precipitates Glück. The messianic is a potentiality that is immanent but incalculable.
     
    The automaton, or robot, embodies a kind of surplus of autonomy, an ability to act outside the cybernetic control of the owner-user. Articles such as “Does a Robot Have an Umwelt? Reflections on the Qualitative Biosemiotics of Jakob von Uexküll,” by Claus Emmeche, suggest that contemporary robotics, with its development of autonomous systems, breaks the mold concerning questions of self-governance, governance, and subjection. W. Grey Walter’s Machina Speculatrix is considered an early example of an autonomous system with emergent behavior that does not rely on programming, but on an ecology of perception with which it interacts. Just like simple animals, Machina Speculatrix instantiates “a circular information-based relation between sensor devices and motor devices” (Emmeche 678), a feedback loop, in effect. In his 1950 article “An Imitation of Life,” Walter notes that, though simplistic, Machina Speculatrix gives “an eerie impression of purposefulness, independence and spontaneity” (45), in other words, an impression of autonomous agency. Curiously, as South Korea’s Robot Ethics Charter indicates, this surplus autonomia in turn prompts protections for robots. It will be an offense under Korean law to deliberately, or through gross negligence, damage or destroy a robot. More vaguely, it is also an offence “to treat a robot in a way which may be construed as deliberately and inordinately abusive” (Turner). In its final section, “Rights of Robots,” the charter mock-up even goes as far as to refer to the existence and death of the robot: “Under Korean Law, robots are afforded the following fundamental rights: i) The right to exist without fear of injury or death. ii) The right to live an existence free from systematic abuse” (Turner). All of this indicates that any future conception of post-human citizenship will likely end up as an extension of humanistic ideology, even as it puts into question the concept of the human being as distinct from the animal and the machine.2
     
    Donna Haraway’s book When Species Meet uses the term “companion species” for those animals—usually domestic or domesticated—that interact with humans; likewise, Kate Darling’s essay “Extending Legal Rights to Social Robots” employs the term “companion” for those technological beings—usually social robots, robotic toys, or cybernetic pets—designed for human interaction and designed, in particular, to elicit anthropomorphic projections. Any robotic entity that is a “physically embodied, autonomous agent that communicates and interacts with humans on an emotional level” is counted as a “social robot” (Becker 4). Darling argues that a case could be made for extending second-order rights—limited rights that are not inherent or inalienable, yet offer legal protection of the “subject”—to non-human entities such as social robots based on current legal practices concerning protections for animals. Second-order rights of personhood have also been extended to corporations under the framework of “corporate personhood.” In The Animal That Therefore I Am, Derrida argues against any animal rights charter that would derive its principles from human rights since the human being is predicated on—at least in biblical and western philosophical tradition—a kind of holocaust of animality. What Derrida will argue instead is that the Cartesian tradition (if we can name it such) must itself be put in question: the rights and capabilities assigned to human beings perhaps do not rigorously inherently belong to them either. Likewise, any charter that bases its principles on animal/human rights ends up disavowing another more glaring possibility: that the human being is inherently machinic, already a social robot to a certain extent. Darling suggests that “humans form attachments to social robots that go well beyond our attachment to non-robotic objects. These reactions to robotic companions appear to stem from our inherent inclination to anthropomorphize objects that act autonomously, especially when they are designed to exhibit ‘social’ behavior” (5). It is hard not to conclude from this allusion to an “inherent inclination” a kind of mechanistic, involuntary programming or hardwiring, rendering the human being as always already a social robot. Agamben uses the term “anthropological machine” to describe the machining of that which institutes the human being in western philosophy; we might call the “inclination to anthropomorphize objects that act autonomously” a kind of “anthropomor phic machine,” in short the figure/device/machine of anthropomorphism (personification, apostrophe, and other rhetorical figures of animating the inanimate). Darling continues: “The projection of lifelike qualities begins with a general tendency to over-ascribe autonomy and intelligence to the way that things behave, even if they are merely following a simple algorithm . . . we respond to the cues given to us by lifelike machines, even if we know that they are not ‘real’” (6). Rather than the (Cartesian) term “response,” Darling might have used “reaction,” since what she is describing here is a kind of involuntary machinic reaction in the human being, one that is so trenchant that even with “consciousness” of the “real,” it cannot be resisted.
     
    In The Animal That Therefore I Am, Derrida asserts that Descartes’s exercise of radical uncertainty also disposes of the assumptions that the cogito is necessarily human and that the human being is animal rationalis. With Descartes, an opening onto a non-human cogito is already at work. Suspended as well is the assumption that the “I am” is a living entity since at this point Descartes abstracts the living body from the “I am” and designates the living body as machine or already cadaver (72). Although Heidegger attempts to distance his account of the human being from the Cartesian thinking thing and his account of animality from the Cartesian bête-machine, the distancing of the human being from the living being is common to both Descartes and Heidegger. Human Dasein is not essentially a living being. Derrida reminds us that “Dasein is explicitly defined by Heidegger as a ‘being’ [existant] that is not, essentially, a ‘living’ being. The determination regarding life, reference to it, is not essential in order to determine Dasein” (155). Existence is to be differentiated from life. Human existence does not essentially have the “living character of the living being.” Descartes anticipates Heidegger here in designating a Dasein apart from living being. Writes Derrida: “in order to define access to a pure ‘I am,’” Descartes “must suspend or, rather, detach, precisely as detachable, all reference to life, to the life of the body, and to animal life” (72). This insistence on the separability of the “I am” from animate being, and the fact that this Cartesian “I am” is the ground or basis of so many human rights, protections, and privileges, indicate that something other than an animate or living being could have these rights as well. A non-living, non-animate “I am” apart from its usual attachment to the living human being could inhabit this space. The thinking thing (res cogitans) is not animate or living. Life or animation does not attach to the “I am”; only the “thinking thing” attaches to the “I am.” Although we usually take it for granted that ipseity, the auto-position, and the self-reflective subject must concern the human being as a living human being, Derrida indicates that, “the indubitability of existence, the autoposition and automanifestation of ‘I am’ does not depend on being-in-life but on thinking, an appearance to self that is determined in the first place not as respiration, breath, or life, indeed on a thinking soul that does not at first appear to itself as life” (87). The thinking thing does not at first appear as a living thing: this has huge consequences for any discussion of AI and robotics. Although even almost all cyberneticists and bioinformatic scientists will agree that robots and AI entities do not think —they are still not thinking things in the Cartesian sense—this would not at first according to Descartes have anything to do with the fact that robots and AI entities are not living beings. As Derrida clarifies, the Cartesian “I am” in effect disarticulates thinking from being-in-life.
     
    Discussing Heidegger’s dissatisfaction with man defined as animal rationale or zoon logon ekhon, which leaves unelaborated what is living in life and is an insufficient ground for man’s mode of being, Derrida in The Beast and the Sovereign writes: “the zoon of this zoology remains in many respects questionable (fragwürdig). In other words, so long as one has not questioned ontologically the essence of being alive, the essence of life, it remains problematic and obscure to define man as zoon logon ekhon” (Vol. I 264). The absence of a definition of life is a feature of both the scientific and the philosophical discourse on life. Part of the difficulty has to do with a slippage between “living” and “being.” Derrida puts it briefly: “livingness, what now maintains life in life, but that which stands back at the very place where the question ‘What is living in life?’ holds its breath before the problematic legitimacy of a subjection of the question of life to a question of Being, of life to Being” (Vol. I 219).
     
    Derrida goes one step further and insists on the essential antagonism between zoon and logos. There has always been a war against the animal, a holocaust against the animal: against living being we prefer reason—especially in its Kantian formulation—and other inanimate principles (is this preference an apotropaic gesture against finitude and mortality?). But are we ready to cast our lot with the robots and drones, which will “outlive” us in their inanimation? Derrida suggests that we already have: a fight to the death against living being—which belongs to the “I think”—has been in effect since Genesis:
     

    [T]his unthought in the “I think,” where the animal that I am (following) follows me from the place of the other or of the unconscious, is indeed a function of machinality, which haunts automatically, like an evil conjuring genius, the Cartesian concept of animal-machine as much as the Kantian concept of providence, of a providential machine, a Maschinenwesen der Vorsehung, so as to teleologize in advance, by means of prescription and prediction, the history of war machines that are presumed to have a civilizing effect.

    (102)

     

    Drones would certainly fit into that civilizing effect category: no death for the human soldier, only death and destruction for the dehumanized enemy. Should there be, then, a kind of commiseration between the robot and the human being, a commiseration based on a shared “structure of the human being” and a shared mechanics of reason? If there is for what Derrida is calling here “the Kantian man” a hatred of the animal, die Erinnerung an die Tierähnlichkeit des Menschen, should there be a commiseration for the non-animal rational entity, i.e., the robot?

     
    Although Darling makes a well-illustrated argument for the life-like or human-like operations of social robots, she shies away from any overt recognition of the robotic or machinic dimension of the human being. For instance, when she discusses a U.S. Army colonel’s calling-off of an experiment using a robot to defuse land mines, Darling foregrounds the colonel’s anthropomorphizing of the robot that “was modeled after a stick insect with six legs” (6). Although the robot was not even humanoid in form, the colonel “could not stand the pathos of watching the burned, scarred and crippled machine drag itself forward on its last leg. The test, he charged, was inhumane” (6). Although the colonel is able, by virtue of the robot’s autonomous action, to anthropomorphize a non-living insect-like machine, I would like to argue that this reaction is an apotropaic gesture to ward off a more worrisome recognition that the human being is a machine and that, more specifically, human soldiers are mechanical parts in a military apparatus that has already turned the so-called human being into a robotic entity reacting to ironclad commands. When Darling goes on to discuss robotic entities in the household—such as the Roomba vacuum cleaner robot, which does not distinguish between human and object obstacles as it maneuvers around them—she notes again that the sheer presence of autonomous movement triggers an emotional and anthropomorphizing reaction from human household dwellers. Although she goes so far as to say that robotic behavior that is lifelike “specifically targets our involuntary biological responses, causing our perceptions to shift” (7), Darling passes over the realization that we share a lot more in common with machines than we would perhaps like to acknowledge. Although she raises some ethical questions concerning the use of robots with human beings—dementia patients, for instance—who cannot tell the difference between social robots and human nurses, she does not elaborate any meaningful distinction between social robots and human beings who are cognitively impaired (perhaps because Descarte s’s fabulation of the res cogitans has done that for us, once and for all). At some base level—I would argue, the machinic reactive level, not the subconscious or unconscious—the behaviors of the social robot and the human being are barely distinguishable. Discussing Sherry Turkle’s “A Nascent Robotics Culture: New Complicities for Companionship,” Darling suggests that there is a qualitative difference between social robots and, for instance, traditional toy dolls (should we or not include The Semi-Living Worry Dolls here?): “While a child is aware of the projection onto an inanimate toy and can engage or not engage at will, a robot that demands attention by playing off of our natural response may cause a subconscious engagement that is less voluntary” (8). In effect, the social robot that strikes a chord with our own robotic nature will cultivate with us a mechanical reciprocity. Clearly, in Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?, Rick Deckard, the bounty hunter who falls in love with Rachel Rosen, doesn’t seem to care that she is an android: “she” presses all the right buttons for him.3 Darling likens this kind of attachment to social robots to a relationship with a companion species or pet, which is not far off the mark if we follow the Cartesian line and count animals as bêtes-machines. As the video “AIBO robot playing with a cat!” demonstrates, the live kitty cat, the robotic dog, the inanimate ball, and the android voice-over engender a new ecology of techno-attachments and so much more, as the news report “Man marries video game character” and this YouTube video and this News9 report indicate.
     
    One of Darling’s particularly symptomatic comments—”in countries with politically powerful religion-based groups, one might question whether robot protection could even become subject to debate” (15)—indicates that what is at stake is the human exceptionalism of the divinely created rational soul: even the mere question of rights for robots threatens the ontological status of the human being. Animistic cultures, which view all entities—whether human or not, whether animate or not—as ensouled might be better oriented toward considerations for robot rights. Masahiro Mori’s The Buddha in the Robot already opens this question. Mori even places a certain kind of stone above the human being. In “On Uncanny Valley,” he writes, “once I positioned living human beings on the highest point of the curve in the right-hand side of the uncanny valley. Recently, however, I came to think that there is something more attractive and amiable than human beings in the further right-hand side of the valley. It is the face of a Buddhist statue as the artistic expression of the human ideal.” Although a stone statue might represent the highpoint for Mori, the story of the golem—a mound of clay animated by an inscription on its forehead—warns us of the specters and consequences of inanimate personhood: it can work both for and against human beings. Even Isaac Asimov, the progenitor of the Three Laws of Robotics, intimates in his 1946 story “Evidence” (adapted twice for TV in the series Outer Limits as “I, Robot” in 1964 and 1995) that his interest in robotics emerged from the anti-Semitism he encountered in his military training. What are we intrigued by and what are we threatened by in the phrase, “The Stone That Therefore I Am”?
     
    While a line between the animate and the inanimate has traditionally been drawn in discussions of rights, responsibilities, and protections, now with such initiatives as the Robot Ethics Charter we see that there is a gesture of inclusion whereby the reach of the animate extends beyond the line into the inanimate. In a sense, the distinction between the animate and the inanimate is an amity line drawn up and agreed upon by the animal and the human being beyond which all bets are off. Robots are, hence, abandoned to the far side of this line and the mechanical labor they perform is freely extracted. Measures such as South Korea’s Robot Ethics Charter, however, bring what was typically left on the far side of the line—inanimate entities that are not persons, and that do not have the rights, responsibilities, and protections of personhood—into the fold.
     
    If, as Giorgio Agamben tells us in The Kingdom and the Glory, economy (oikonomia) is the management of persons and things, robots pose a dilemma for economy: if the robot ends up bearing the secondary rights of personhood (perhaps modeled after corporate personhood), should the robot be counted as a thing or a person in the oikos? What kind of nomos, what kind of ordering, should determine the placement of the robot? The specter of the robot citizen is, like the pirate, a hostis generis humani, usually figured as a threat to the human race. Texts such as the novel Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? and the early twentieth-century play R.U.R: Rossum’s Universal Robots indicate the manner in which humanoid non-humans point to humankind’s greatest peril: that the caesura demarcating human from non-human, and even animate from inanimate, is more like the temporary trace or wake left by a ship as it sails across the sea than fixed enclosures or fences constructed on terra firma. What grounds a non-human nomos, especially now that we have entered the twenty-first century, and now that South Korea, for instance, has plans to develop a Robot Ethics Charter? Should we consider such charters appropriations of the inanimate, extensions of the law of the earth upon the open sea of new forms of life and work? Are charters like this one a new form of land appropriation or an opening of the sea? Land appropriation is usually considered a first step to polis-formation and the life of the city, i.e., citizenship. In his book The Nomos of the Earth, Carl Schmitt writes, “Every ontonomous and ontological judgment derives from the land. For this reason, we will begin with land appropriation as the primeval act in founding law” (45). What type of metaphysical land appropriation has occurred that encloses only the human being and shuts out the robot who is, after all, preeminently capable of a certain kind of work and should hence be subject to a certain kind of law? Schmitt tells us that as a constitutive act, land appropriation is an external process as well as an internal one, i.e., not just an ordering of land but an ordering in relation to others. Typically, this external constitution has been designated as a relation to other human beings, yet there are non-human others that have been divided against by the very division of land appropriation into internal and external. The fact that land appropriation has a twofold character indicates that there has already been a kind of nomos at work even before the radical title of land appropriation. This nomos sets up the internal and external relations by way of an even more primal division of animate and inanimate: the appropriation occurs as an event by some kind of agent, whether individual, clan, or even perhaps a wolf pack or divinity. These non-human agents—divine and animal—nevertheless bear the fiction of the persona, whereas the inanimate earth does not. Or does it? Schmitt acknowledges the role of mythological sources in jurisprudence, and a primal one would be taking the earth as person, as mother earth (humanus comes from the proto Indo-European word for earth [dhhem]). The first sentence of Schmitt’s book indicates that “In mythical language, the earth became known as the mother of law” (42). Land appropriation, then, as a primeval act of founding law, already concerns a certain appropriation of the mythical figure of personhood. So when Schmitt quotes Locke, as asserting that jurisdiction over land is the essence of political power, or Kant, as stating that the acquisition of a thing can only be acquisition of land, there is a perhaps primal forgetting here of mythical language, i.e., that “‘the earth became known as the mother of law’” (42).
     
    For Schmitt, Heimat bequeaths the right to citizenship. Again the genetic comes into play, the engendering by birth or nativity, the native land as that which engenders the citizen (Kant’s Rechtlehre): das Land of the occupants gives by birth a community of citizens (the Vaterland). The land here becomes a genetic principle that animates the possibility of an originary or proto-citizenship: not biological ancestry but a filiation with the land (nomos of the earth). Do transgenic entities participate in their own kind of proto-citizenship born from the land? What is engendered along with the birth of the transgenic? Where is the place of birth of the transgenic? Does the transgenic have a native land? The fact that The Semi-Living Worry Dolls cannot cross sovereign territorial boundaries invites us to ask about transgenic life in the context of citizenship. The deracinating of citizenship from human life (and the deracinating of human Dasein) is already in progress, especially visible in the swarmings of network citizenship. Spawned from biotechnology, the transgenic has neither fatherland nor motherland. The genos anthropon and the genealogy of the anthropos already concerns not only archaic hominids and interbreeding with Neanderthals, but chimpanzee ancestry as well. The issue is the genealogy of the political from the biological (zoon politikon), which in Athens had to be fabricated by a founding myth of the autochthonic (originating where found) birth from the mother earth: the place of the ancestors. Isonomia (equality) is a nomos of the earth. With frontier biopolitics, there is often a kind of isonomia in play that has to do with the pasturing of the land by both herdsman and herd: pastoral power has an isonomic tendency. Autochthonic isonomia, which concerns the genos, is set against the division between oikos and polis, the constitution of the political (the zoon politikon, the life of the city as the ground for the political animal, human being). Transgenic citizenship would perhaps more easily stretch the autochthonic isonomia than the zoon politikon as a ground for citizenship. The transgenic mythically says: I was born here. The Semi-Living Worry Dolls cannot leave the country, but they can listen to your innermost concerns. The nomos of the earth (autochthonic isonomia) creates citizenry by division [daiomai, partager, diviser, cut, country, territory]. The demes, the division of tribes, is a cut, which is always already a splice. The community of territory: the demos, the clan. Aristotle separates the ethnos (oikos) from the polis (division from oikos): in this sense, the polis provides a basis for transgenic citizenry. The city depends upon an equality by reciprocity, hence of difference, perhaps not only anthropological difference (or ethnic difference) but species difference as well: an opening for the transgenic. The possibility of transgenic citizenship falls between two possibilities: an autochthonic isonomia that would include species other than human and an isonomia of reciprocity within the walls of a polis that includes species other than human. The between of these two possibilities is clearly a no man’s land. Then there’s the plethos of centurions as citizens: the plurality of citizens. The company model of citizenship: do drone airplanes then, as part of the military company, have a right to citizenship? In many sci-fi movies with robot warriors and automaton soldiers, there is a sense that these machines form a kind of class that is capable of going to war with living beings. In these films, the drones, automatons, and robots are not instruments of human beings but have a kind of diabolical life (unheimlich?) of the animate-inanimate. Here we move into the question of citizenry of the inanimate. I think the centurions (professional mercenaries reduced to the empty equivalence of the money form and hence made inanimate) provide a model for this. With the plethos, the quantity becomes the quality. Anyone can be enlisted, even the transgenic, even the robot.
     
    Rather than a legal basis for robot citizenship, an alternate, nomos-based one, which subjects the earth and inanimate entities to a concrete ordering, might be especially appropriate.4 Schmitt stresses that nomos is always land appropriation, division, and even pasturing of land. So to say “nomos of the earth” is almost a redundancy. Nomos is always the ordering of the earth; ordering is always the ordering of the earth. He emphasizes here that this ordering is a concrete measure, not an abstraction: it is the spatial event of a division. Schmitt warns against understanding land appropriation as an intellectual construct; rather it should be understood as a historical event and a legal fact. Recent conflicts, for instance, over the setting up of eruvim—ritual enclosures around Orthodox Jewish communities—in North America bear this out. The eruv is not meant to be only a metaphysical marker, but must have a material basis—a string or a fishing line, for example—that has a material upkeep and must be vigilantly maintained. This is why the setting up of eruvim has been contested, most recently in Quebec: courts have ruled that a concrete ordering and division set up simultaneously with an already existing order of public and private space and property is a kind of land appropriation. The almost metaphysical filigree of the string or fishing line demarcating the eruv is a nomos, a land appropriation. Yet the eruv can have multiple doors, perhaps infinite doors—”Jewish law places no limits on the number of doorways which are permitted within a wall. This means, in effect, that eruv walls are allowed to consist entirely of doorways” (Smith 404), which poses a dilemma for the concept of marking the border. What kind of fence or wall do we have if it is all door or endless doors? Within what kind of fence or enclosure might robots work according to their own terms?
     
    Posing the barely-serious question of robot citizenship requires a topos, a new nomos of the earth. What kind of land appropriation of a new world (Landnahme) could set the ground for a twenty-first century nomos that includes robots? Robots have already enabled interplanetary land appropriations, for instance, on the Moon and Mars, which are considered open frontier, free to anything that can get there. Yet Schmitt warns us, in 1952, from thinking in this direction:
     

    The traditional Eurocentric order of international law is foundering today, as is the old nomos of the earth. This order arose from a legendary and unforeseen discovery of a new world, from an unrepeatable historical event. Only in fantastic parallels can one imagine a modern recurrence, such as men on their way to the moon discovering a new and hitherto unknown planet that could be exploited freely and utilized effectively to relieve their struggles on earth. The question of a new nomos of the earth will not be answered with such fantasies, any more than it will be with further scientific discoveries. Human thinking again must be directed to the elemental orders of its terrestrial being here and now.

    (39)

     

    With these comments, Schmitt forecloses any nomos, for instance, that maps out a digital order or one that carves up anew earth as a technological ecology. Nevertheless, right now it might not be “human thinking” that is directed toward the elemental order of terrestrial being: artificial intelligence, artificial life, and humanoid robots that have a new mandate in South Korea’s Robot Ethics Charter might prepare the way for an unforeseen discovery of a new world.

    The inclusion of robots within an ethics charter signals that a new line is being drawn up, which enables free commerce between the animate and the inanimate. Shall we consider the Robot Ethics Charter as a type of sympathy for the commodity, of which Walter Benjamin speaks concerning the phantasmagoric entities in the Arcades? Or should Julien Offray de la Mettrie’s L’Homme Machine be a guide here, given that it extends Descartes’s suggestion that the animal is a mere machine to include humans as well? Especially if there is no clear distinction between animate matter and inanimate matter, then we might have to say not that “man is a wolf to man,” but that “man is a machine to man.” Any conception of humanity engenders an outside humanity devoid of rights. The strategy of confirming that the robot is a person—similar to the way sixteenth-century theologian Francisco de Vitoria confirms that the inhabitants of the Americas are human beings and not animals—is facilitated by a materialism that already thinks of man as a machine. More typically, though, as machine, the robot has stood outside humanity without rights, enabling an age-old formula for land appropriation and subjugation. In his critique of the concept of the higher humanity of the conqueror and the manner in which the subjugated stand outside of humanity, Schmitt demonstrates how the idea of the inhuman, “emphasized the discriminatory power of division inherent in humanitarian ideology . . . in the 18th century, it was consistent with the victory of a philosophy of absolute humanity. Only when man appeared to be the embodiment of absolute humanity did the other side of this concept appear in the form of a new enemy: the inhuman” (104). Should we take the robot as the embodiment of an absolute inhumanity? With the appearance of the robot, does the pair humanity/inhumanity still have the power to divide?
     
    Schmitt’s Nomos of the Earth suggests a way of addressing the division between the human being and its others—whether animal or machine—as a territorial division, a territorial appropriation. The division between the human and the non-human or the inhuman is always in play with any nomos of the earth, for instance, with the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century land appropriations of the New World, which rendered the native peoples as sub-human. Earlier, with Aristotle, man as zoon politikon is determined by the walls of the polis, outside of which there is nothing but gods and beasts. The territorial division traverses living beings, relegating most outside the life of the city. This is the first indication that the human being can be understood by way of what Schmitt calls “a spatially conceived concrete measure” (68). That living being is traversed by nomos should come as no surprise if we follow the philological examination of nomos as coming from “nemein—a Greek word that means both ‘to divide’ and ‘to pasture.’ Thus, nomos is the immediate form in which the political and social order of a people becomes spatially visible—the initial measure and division of pastureland, i.e., the land-appropriation as well as the concrete order contained in it . . . in Kant’s words, it is the ‘distributive law of mine and thine’” (70). Although we might be tempted to see an originary biopolitics in nemein, understood as to divide and to pasture, the emphasis should be on pasturing as spatial and territorial ordering rather than on the pastoral management of living beings.
     
    A clarification about the connection between nomos and pastoral power can be found in Schmitt’s comment: “In the nomadic age, the shepherd (nomeus) was the typical symbol of rule . . . the nemein of the shepherd is concerned with the nourishment (trophe) of his flock, and the shepherd is a kind of god in relation to the animals he herds” (340). Foucault tells us that pastoral power sets the terms for biopolitics as the management and administration of life, yet we can see how the example of the American myth concerning the frontier, especially in Westerns, indicates the manner in which the management of herds serves as a rationale for land appropriation. Rather than conquistadors seizing land for Spain by way of a Church missionary mandate, rugged cowboys, like the ones portrayed by John Wayne, seize the land for themselves (for civil society instead of the state), a seizure which in turn serves as a founding myth for U.S. territorial claims in the west. Elaborating the threefold meaning of nomos and nemein as appropriation, division/distribution, and pasturing, Schmitt explains that pasturing [weiden] “does not mean feeding or drinking, but rather producing, which expresses a preliminary distribution” (345). In this manner, we see how nomos, even in its sense as pasturage, retains its relation with land appropriation, with terra firma and the inanimate, rather than with life as such. We might venture to say that living being, animate being, is traversed by something inanimate, by a spatial and territorial division. This is the case even if the wall of the polis is an animate one. The fence or enclosure, Schmitt reminds us, determines the world of men. He writes, “The enclosing ring—the fence formed by men’s bodies, the man-ring—is a primeval form of ritual, legal, and political cohabitation . . . law and peace originally rested on enclosure in the spatial sense” (74). A spatial ordering encloses the human being outside of which all are beasts or gods; furthermore, a spatial ordering encloses animate beings, outside of which all is inanimate.
     
    Rather than extending the biopolitical reach of humanitas to include forms of artificial life and artificial intelligence, South Korea’s 2007 announcement that it was drawing up a Robot Ethics Charter might be taken as a sign that a new nomos is afoot. Does a kind of quasi-alliance between robots and human beings indicate that a new amity line is being drawn up on the earth? Is this charter a kind of truce between machine and man? Does South Korea’s charter suggest that robots and human beings could become what Schmitt calls “equal parties to a treaty of division and distribution concerning land appropriation” (92)? The old amity lines enabled a kind of pirate raid free-for-all “beyond the line.” What kind of free-for-all is at hand outside the onto-spatial ordering mapped out by the Robot Ethics Charter? Just as beyond the old amity lines men were as wolves to men, so now with the new nomos might there be an amity line beyond which men are as robots to men, in effect a new no man’s land, located this time not in the Americas but in a space inhospitable to the living being as such? If the old amity line freed the area on this side of the line from “the immediate threat of those events ‘beyond the line’” (97), what does this new one free us from? In effect, it protects the human being from being “man as robot to man,” a state that, according to La Mettrie’s 1748 L’Homme Machine, man is, nevertheless, already in. But just as deeming Native Americans savages and barbarians placed them outside of the law and made their land free for appropriation, so too does the designation of both the human being and the robot as man-machines facilitate an unforeseen appropriation.
     
    Schmitt reminds us that the “papal missionary mandate was the legal foundation of the conquista” (119). In the guise of saving souls, land is stolen. Now that the Robot Ethics Charter encloses the robot within a humanistic guideline, we might ask what is driving the humanitarian mission or crusade to protect robots from abuse? In the guise of preventing abuse of robots, what kind of land appropriation is in store?
     
    When Schmitt writes that during the European discovery of the New World, “A scientific cartographical survey was a true legal title to a terra incognita [uncharted territory]” (133), one wonders what kind of uncharted territory the Robot Ethics Charter entitles. A new land division, a new divisio? Again, if we follow Schmitt here, the stakes do not really concern the robot as such, but land appropriation, division, distribution, production. Just as whether Indians were sub-human ultimately became irrelevant to European colonialists because the dispute was really between European states, so too whether robots can be included within a humanistic ethics charter might be irrelevant if we consider that the dispute chiefly concerns the corporate entities and industries that produce them. As such, the dispute is not between human persons, but personae publicae [public persons] or legal persons. Not only are corporations counted as persona ficta, their artificial personhood—which bears many of the rights of the natural person —is extended to the artificial intelligence contraptions that they produce. In his discussion of the Early modern institution called the “state,” Schmitt similarly reminds us that these “new, contiguous, and contained power complexes were represented as persons. . . . These states were conceived of as magni homines. . . . Personification was important for the conceptual construction of the new interstate international law, because only thereby did the 16th and 17 th century jurists, schooled as they were in Roman legal concepts, find a point of departure for their juridical constructions” (143-144). This personification process of political powers was “influenced strongly by the allegorical tendency of the Renaissance” (144). By way of personification, the state became the legal subject of international law and was “recognized as a magnum homo [great man] . . . and a sovereign ‘person’” (145). Such states were subject, says Schmitt, to secondary questions such as “whether one should think of these ‘great men’ as existing in a ‘state of nature’ beyond an amity line and, in turn, should consider this state of nature (in the sense of Hobbes) to be an asocial struggle of leviathans, or (in the sense of Locke) already to be a social community of thoroughly proper gentlemen” (146). In a sense, these magnos homines inhabited the non-state freedom of the sea, which was “impervious to human law and human order” (181).
     
    Rather than deriving a basis for posthuman or non-human citizenship from the earth (for instance, as a reward for labor, to which the robota would be preeminently entitled), we might look to the sea, which has no fixed ground, where “firm lines cannot be engraved” (42), but which nevertheless sets out a zone. The sea, says, Schmitt, “has no character, in the original sense of the word, which comes from the Greek charassein, meaning to engrave, to scratch, to imprint” (43). The upshot of this for the early modern period was that the sea was not state territory; today, asking the question of robot citizenship is akin to “the hazardous wager of having sailed the open sea” (43). The fear of the open sea evokes what is at risk with opening citizenship to the non-human, whether animate or inanimate.
     
    That Descartes’s elaboration of the cogito happens in the context of a discussion about bêtes-machines and humanoid automata is not only a historical accident of a seventeenth-century interest in mechanical life. Thinking, reason, and ipseity are inherently machinic, technological, and peculiarly inanimate, as the western philosophical tradition—from Aristotle to Descartes, to Pascal, to Leibniz, to Kant and Heidegger—indicates. Political philosophers and thinkers also suggest that the state and government are essentially cybernetic systems, something Hobbes makes clear in Leviathan when he asserts that the state is an “Artificial Life.” Kant also indicates that what he calls the “providential machine” governs the teleology of nature and the perfectibility of the human being. Following Hobbes, contemporary thinkers such as Derrida describe the state as a human prosthetics, a prosthstatics, which is in essence a death machine. And Kant’s concept of war as a providential machine—the perfectibility mechanism at work in the teleology of nature—which heeds the dictates of reason’s supersensible vocation, announces, for Derrida, a holocaust of animality, reason’s war against living being as such. Agamben’s recent book The Kingdom and the Glory elaborates on Kant’s concept of the providential machine, suggesting that the governance of the cosmos happens by way of a divine machinic apparatus, a dispositif, an oikonomia, which is in essence the Trinity as a divine cybernetic system.
     
    In Hobbes’s Leviathan, it is art, or techne, that creates the state, the civitas. Derrida foregrounds the mechanical artificiality and prosthetic monstrousness of this civitas as figured by the leviathan. Derrida quotes Hobbes’s Introduction: “Art goes yet further, imitating that Rationall and most excellent work of Nature, Man. For by art is created that great Leviathan, called a common-wealth or state, (in latine civitas) which is but an Artificiall Man; though of greater stature and strength than the Naturall, for whose protection and defense it was intended” (Beast Vol. I 27). The state in its figuration as an artificial man can be likened to a synthetic life-form, an automaton, a cybernetic system. In making explicit this likeness, Derrida writes: “the state is a sort of robot, an animal monster” (28). In our era of artificial intelligence, artificial life, humanoid robots, and genetically engineered life forms, we might also ask if robots and artificial life forms are conversely like the state, and can we figure them as such, for instance, on the model of corporate personhood? In his discussion of marionettes, Derrida asks, “Do marionettes have a soul, as people used to wonder about both women and beasts? Are they merely substitutes and mechanical prostheses? Are they, as is said, made of wood? Insensible and inanimate, spontaneously inanimate, not having sovereignly at their disposal the source itself, sponte sua, their animation, their very soul? Or can they, on the contrary, lay claim to that grace that grants life or that life grants? The marionette—who or what” (187). The grace that would grant life to the automaton could be likened to what gives life to the leviathan, the artificial man.
     
    When Hobbes writes that the civitas is an artificial man, he adds, “Sovereignty is an artificial Soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body” (qtd. Derrida Beast Vol. I 28). Conversely, again we might ask: does the artificial soul, the artificial life and soul of the marionette, tell us something about the Walten, the artificial force, of the sovereignty machine? Can robots and artificial life tell us something about the state? In his discussion of the marionettes, Derrida continues,
     

    What we named, on the basis of Hobbes’s Leviathan, prosthstatics sent us down this track, in which it was no longer possible to avoid the figure of a prosthetic supplement, which comes to replace, imitate, relay, and augment the living being. Which is what any marionette seems to do. And any art of the marionette, for, let’s never forget this fact, it’s a question of art, of tekhnē as art or of tekhnē between art and technique, and between life and politics. And it is, moreover, art itself, you remember, that Celan, at the beginning of “The Meridian,” compares to a childless marionette.

    (187-188)

     

    We see here that art crosses the divide between life and politics, that prosthstatics crosses the divide. Art creates the artificial man, the leviathan, the state, says Hobbes. At the heart of life and politics, there is the art of the automaton. Derrida retrieves from Celan the idea of “the appearance of art as a marionette, i.e. a sort of technical who and what. Who will deny that the marionette is a technical thing, and even a sort of allegorical personification of technical power itself, of machinality?” (251). The marionette exhibits in its artificial life the prosthstatics of the state, the machinic life that, says Hobbes, art creates. Leviathan opens with the following statement: “Nature (the Art whereby God hath made and governs the World) is by the Art of man, as in many other things, so in this also imitated, that it can make an Artificial Animal” (qtd. Derrida Beast Vol. I 47). Artificial life is the figure for what man builds, and notes Derrida, “this human mimesis produces automats, machines that mimic the natural life created by God. The life of these automats, of these machines, is compared to that of clocks and watches. Why could we not say, Hobbes asks immediately afterward, that all the automata (machines or engines that move by virtue of springs and wheels, like a watch) have an artificial life?” (47). With this question, we see why what Derrida calls prosthstatics supplants the zoon politikon in a formation that we might call automaton politikon. Here again, like Heidegger’s assertion that human Dasein does not essentially concern living being, we have an abandonment of the zoon as a ground: the machinic life of the civitas as automaton replaces the biopolitical.

     
    Hobbes, among others, configures the state as a giant person and human persons like automata. In his introduction to Leviathan, he infamously writes,
     

    Why may we not say, that all Automata (Engines that move themselves by springs and wheeles as doth a watch) have an artificiall life? For what is the Heart, but a Spring; and the Nerves, but so many Strings; and the Joynts, but so many Wheeles, giving motion to the whole Body, such as was intended by the Artificer? Art goes yet further, imitating the rationall and most excellent worke of Nature, Man. For by Art is created the great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-WEALTH, or STATE, (in latine CIVITAS) which is but an Artificiall Man; though of greater stature and strength than the Naturall, for whose protection and defence it was intended; and in which, the Soveraignty is an Artificiall Soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body.

    (81)

     

    Rather than thinking that robot citizenship is a new question, belonging to a new nomos of the earth, we see here that the modern citizen is always already a kind of automaton of a state that is always already an artificial person.

     
    Earlier, in “Artificial Man,” the last chapter of Man and Citizen, Hobbes writes that a persona (mask) always indicates the artificial man, according to the theatrics of Greek tragedy and comedy: “For in the theatre it was understood that the actor himself did not speak, but someone else” (83). Hobbes begins the chapter “Artificial Man” by noting the divergent translations of prosopon into Latin: alternately facies (face), os (countenance), and persona (mask). Although Hobbes specifies that “face” indicates the true man and “mask” the artificial man, it is unclear what the status is of the countenance. Is there an os between the face and the mask? Does the os mediate the face and the mask, does it bind the two, does it indicate the gap or difference between, or does it open the possibility of the two? In the theatre, it is the mask that speaks and not the face. The actor does not speak in his own voice, but in the voice of another, i.e., allegorically. This scene of puppetry or ventriloquism is often taken up, as with Hobbes, to discuss the theatrics of the political: “on account of commercial dealings and contracts between men not actually present, such artifices are no less necessary in the state than in the theatre” (83). In a supposedly very different time, Walter Benjamin’s discussion of the Automaton Chess Player in “The Concept of History” also unmasks the actor behind the persona when he says that, just as the automaton is piloted by a human puppeteer hidden within the construct, so too does the theologic pull the heart’s chords buried within historical materialism. In all instances, there is something that mediates or opens up the mask and the face, the automaton and the human agent, historical materialism and the theological: there is an os, or might we venture to say, a nomos, between the two. If the automaton is an artificial person, a persona, and such artifices as persona are “no less necessary in the state than in the theatre,” we see that the political stage is much like Kleist’s Marionette Theater. By suggesting that the automaton has artificial life, Hobbes also intimates that natural life is itself mechanical: “For what is the Heart, but a Spring; and the Nerves, but so many Strings; and the Joynts, but so many Wheeles, giving motion to the whole Body, such as was intended by the Artificer?” (Leviathan 81). To a certain extent, artificial life and natural life are one and the same, and especially in relation to the state. The automaton and the human being are both personae.
     
    As it extends the reach of human rights to include robots, South Korea’s Robot Ethics Charter attempts to articulate a new assembly of personae and social relations. A model for this is already operative in the concept of corporate personhood, which designates a person that is neither human, nor individual, nor animate. If personhood has, since 1823, been extended in the U.S. to include corporations and bodies politic, why not humanoid entities whether transgenic or robotic? Mitt Romney, a corporate leader with failed Presidential aspirations, took flack for publicly insisting that “Corporations are people too.” Although some might not share Romney’s political orientation, an entire series of Supreme Court rulings nevertheless backs his words. Corporations are persons, and the state, as we’ve seen, is a giant artificial person. Again we might ask, if bodies politic and corporations are counted as persons in the U.S. (and most other first world countries), what about robots and other forms of artificial intelligence and life? Some might feel that turning toward things such as robots as philosophical toys for the question of personhood only repeats and projects the anthropomorphic realm or is perhaps just an allegory of it. This is a commonplace of sci-fi pulp fiction in which discrimination against androids is a cover for an investigation into the legacy of human slavery. If we revisit the heyday of the automata craze in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe, we see that La Mettrie already insists that man is an automaton, “a self-winding machine, a living representation of perpetual motion” (Man a Machine 6). And for Jacques de Vaucanson, an early cybernetic craftsman, whose inventions were seen as profanity, another risk emerged: robots and automata not only pose a threat to religious dogma concerning the human soul, but also threaten to replace the body of the worker with a machine. What is at stake here, even now, even after (and because of) the industrial and post-industrial revolutions, is the replacement of man by machine. In a sense, the ecology of the twenty-first century is not new: we still worry with Marx and Engels that the human being will end up as a mere piece of meat hung on automata, and that the worker “becomes an appendage of the machine . . . daily and hourly enslaved by the machine” (Marx 28). On the other hand, taking a cue from Walter Benjamin and configuring our relation toward the robota as something akin to empathy for the commodity seems equally imprudent.
     
    The citizenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ensures that corporations and natural persons enjoy same rights and protections. In 2010, the First Amendment gave the corporation Citizens United freedom of speech protection. Unions, in theory, also have this protection. It is argued that, unless the persona ficta is endowed with rights and protections, governments could ban books, and corporations and unions would not be allowed to hire an author to write a political book. The corporation, union, or body politic is a form of organization that is meant to mediate a group of natural persons, yet this mediation is a fiction, and the rights and protections of the natural person are extended to this mediation, this artificial person. This is no small matter in our media age, especially if we think of the artificial person or the persona ficta—whether corporation, union, or body politic—upon the model of the Automaton Chess Player. Despite being an association, hence a construct or a fiction (and corporate interest is as much a fiction as common interest), the puppet has its strings pulled, we assume, by a natural person somewhere down the line. Yet today—and the test site might be South Korea and its Robot Ethics Charter—whether corporations are organizations of human beings is unclear, especially when we have computers and digital media so heavily participating in these organizations. Clearly, a corporation is a cybernetic system, a hybrid apparatus of natural persons, technologies, legal fictions, and relations of all sorts. The right to act collectively involves many players who are neither human nor animate. The right of association enables the legal fiction of taking the corporation as a person. Although it was industrial capitalism, with its massive technological projects, that required corporations for the raising of capital, courts in England as early as the sixteenth century call corporations artificial persons as a remedial measure. Under the laws of the time, corporations could not be sued or otherwise subjected to liability because the laws are worded “No person shall . . . ” The industrial revolution instituted a shift away from sole proprietorship to corporate proprietorship, so that corporations had to become accountable in a manner similar to the individual person. By way of corporate personhood, corporations are given the rights and protections of the natural person. Corporations these days are also counted as species, as Tom Cohen notes in a footnote: “As an example of how this corporate appropriation of the ‘anthropocene’ proceeds, sometimes under the rubric of an ‘earth systems’ approach, Peter Kareiva explains that ‘If one considers the planet earth and asks what are the keystone species for our global ecology, it is hard to conclude anything but major global corporations.’ See Andrew Revkin, “Another Round: Conservation on a Human-Shaped Planet” (“Polemos” 23).
     
    In the wake of this wager concerning personhood, an entire cosmos of risk has inadvertently opened up: the persona ficta can own property, can sue and be sued, can enter into contracts, and is obliged to pay taxes (no taxation without representation?). In the U.S., corporations also have civil rights: freedom of speech. Sovereign states are legal persons, and in some countries, so are temples. Since the nineteenth century, legal personhood has been further construed to include a citizen, resident, or domiciliary of a state. The European Convention of Human Rights extends human rights to all legal persons. Although the person ficta was originally a remedial measure to make corporate entities subject to the law, today corporate liability effectively shields individual natural persons from liability: corporate personhood is a new form of protection for shareholders. The corporation provides a supplement of protection —an artificial prosthesis of protection—to individuals in associations, which individuals who are not in associations do not have. Do we have today with corporate personhood a situation in which, as with the Automaton Chess Player, an artificial person or persona ficta is not much more than a theatrical stunt or magic trick that obscures the living cyber that pilots the mechanism? Does the automaton obscure the human agent pulling the puppet strings? For Benjamin, the agent was theology, and the puppet was historical materialism. Today, although corporations don’t have the right to vote, they in effect do so through a form of financial remote control—campaign funding—which is now considered a form of speech protected by the First Amendment. If corporations have the right to protected speech in the mathematical modality of the money form—which is no doubt a kind of ventriloquism that obscures who or what is speaking—what are we risking if we allow robota—human, cybernetic, transgenic, or otherwise—to speak up as well?
     

    Erin Obodiac received her Ph.D. in Comparative Literature from the University of California, Irvine and has held teaching and research appointments at UC Irvine, the University of Leeds, and SUNY Albany. Her writings inquire about the relation between the institutional history of deconstruction, posthumanist theory, the discourse on technics and animality, and new media art forms. She is currently a Fellow at Cornell University’s Society for the Humanities completing a book called Robots at Risk: Transgenic Art and Corporate Personhood.
     

     

    Footnotes

     
    1. Although South Korea’s Ministry announced in 2007 that they were drafting up a Robot Ethics Charter, upon which National Geographic and the BBC reported, the charter has yet to be finalized. There is nevertheless an outline of the charter, Establishing a Korean Robot Ethics Charter, distributed online by the Ministry. Also, there is a work of what Saidiya Hartman might call critical fabulation entitled “South Korean Robot Ethics Charter 2012” published by Chris Field on his blog Enlightenment of An Anchorwoman.

     

     

    2. There is obviously a trajectory here with these rights manifestos: from the rights of man, to women, to animals, and now to robots. A full arc from the inanimate reason of man to the inanimate reason of the robot has been spanned. In between, we have the suffering of animate bodies—the woman and the animal.

     

    3. We might alternately speculate about what might motivate Descartes’s own desire to construct an automaton of his dead, illegitimate daughter Francine, which is perhaps just a fish-tale. Would Descartes have constructed a mechanical toy of a legitimate daughter? We cannot rule out the detail of Francine’s illegitimacy as an enabling factor in the construction of any such effigy: that the daughter’s illegitimacy perhaps partially dislodges the taboo nature of creating an artificial replacement of one’s own child—the daughter was not legitimate, not engendered within the sacred contract of marriage, and hence, only biologically his child—cannot be ignored. We might even say—and this is going too far—that as illegitimate, as engendered outside a theological contract, Descartes’s daughter was already an automaton, a being without a created rational soul in the sense that she was engendered by two human animals, two human bêtes-machines, two high-end monkey-machines, so to speak.

     

    4. Cornell professor of mechanics Andrew Ruina insists that biomimetic robotics increasingly demonstrates that living beings, human as well as animal, operate according to mechanical principles and physical laws, and that when designing biomimetic robots, neither a brain center, nor a symbolic system, nor even a motor, is needed for the kind of autonomous movement that is supposedly the hallmark of the living being. Gravity, balance, and other physical and mechanical principles determine the possibility of autonomous movement, not a vitalism, be it of the living being or the electric animal.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Agamben, Giorgio. The Open. Trans. Kevin Attell. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2004. Print.
    • ———. The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Geneology of Economy and Government. Trans. Lorenzo Chiesa. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2011. Print.
    • Arendt, Hannah. The Human Condition. Introduction by Margaret Canovan. 2nd ed. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1998. Print.
    • Aristotle. De Anima (On the Soul). Trans. Hugh Lawson-Tancred. New York: Viking Penguin, 1986. Print.
    • ———. “Movement in Animals.” A New Aristotle Reader. Trans. J. L. Acker. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1987. Print.
    • ———. “Physics, Book II.” A New Aristotle Reader. Ed. JL Ackrill. Princeton UP, 1987.
    • ———. Politics. Trans. Benjamin Jowett. New York: Dover Publications, 2000. Print.
    • Bakke, Monika. “Zoe-philic Desires: Wet Media Art and Beyond.” Science and the Political: Parallax 14.3 (2008): 21-34. Web.
    • Becker, Barbara. “Social Robots—Emotional Agents: Some Remarks on Naturalizing Man Machine Interaction.” International Review of Information Ethics 6.12(2006): 37-45. Web.
    • Benjamin, Walter. “Notes On A Theory Of Gambling.” Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings: Volume 2. Ed. Michael William Jennings and Rodney Livingstone. Harvard UP, 2005. 297. Print.
    • Čapek, Karel. R.U.R. (Rossum’s Universal Robots). Trans. David Wyllie. Adelaide: U of Adelaide P, 2012. Web.
    • Catts, Oron and Ionat Zurr. Semi-Living Worry Dolls. 2011. Tissue Culture and Art Project, Australia.
    • Cohen, Tom. “Polemos: ‘I am at war with myself’ or, Deconstruction™ in the Anthropocene?” Oxford Literary Review 34.2 (Dec. 2012): 239-257. Web. 26 Feb. 2013.
    • Darling, Kate. “Extending Legal Rights to Social Robots.” We Robot Conference. University of Miami. Miami. 23 Apr. 2012. Address.
    • Derrida, Jacques. The Animal That Therefore I Am. Ed. Marie-Louise Mallet. Trans. David Wills. New York: Fordham UP, 2008. Print.
    • ———. The Beast and the Sovereign Vol. 1. Ed. Michel Lisse, Marie-Louise Mallet, and Ginentte Michaud. Trans. Geoffrey Bennington. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2009. Print.
    • Emmeche, Claus. “Does a Robot Have an Umwelt? Reflections on the Qualitative Biosemiotics of Jakob von Uexküll.” Semiotica 134.1/4 (2001): 653-693. Web. 1 Dec. 2012.
    • Esposito, Roberto. Communitas: The Origin and Destiny of Community. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2010. Print.
    • Field, Chris. “South Korean Robot Ethics Charter 2012.” Enlightenment of an Anchorwoman. n.d. Web. 12 Dec. 2012.
    • Grey, Walter W. “An Imitation of Life.” Scientific American 182.5 (1950): 42-45. Web.
    • Haraway, Donna. When Species Meet. Posthumanities Series Vol 3. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2007. Print.
    • Heidegger, Martin. Discourse on Thinking. Trans. John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund. New York: Harper and Row, 1969. Print.
    • Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. New York: Penguin Classics, 1982. Print.
    • ———. Man and Citizen (De Homine and De Cive). Garden City: Anchor Books, 1972. Print.
    • Lovgren, Stefan. “Robot Code of Ethics to Prevent Android Abuse, Protect Humans.” National Geographic News. 16 Mar. 2007. Web. 1 Dec. 2012.
    • ———. “A Robot in Every Home by 2020, South Korea Says.” National Geographic News. 6 Sept.2006. Web. 1 Dec. 2012.
    • Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. The Communist Manifesto. New York: Signet Classic, 1998. Print.
    • Mori, Masahiro. “On Uncanny Valley.” Proceedings of the CogSci-2005 Workshop: Toward Social Mechanisms of Android Science, Stresa, Italy, 18. Aug. 2005. Web. 13 Mar. 2013.
    • Offray de la Mettrie, Julien. Man a Machine. Whitefish: Kessinger Publications, 2004. Print.
    • Schmitt, Carl. The Nomos of the Earth. Trans. G. L. Ulmen. New York: Telos Press, 2006. Print.
    • Smith, Barry. “On Space and Place: The Ontology of the Eruv.” Cultures: Conflict Analysis Dialogue. Frankfurt: Ontos. 413-416. Print.
     
  • Environmentality: Military Maneuvers, the Ecosystem, and the Accidental

    Robert P. Marzec (bio)

    Purdue University

     

     

    Abstract

    This essay argues that current efforts by United States security institutions and the security society to adopt climate change as a central mandate have begun to reformulate radically the constitution of the citizen-subject. State-formed life and the liberatory pole of citizen-subject life face a collapse in this reformulation that pulls the citizen-subject away from its relation to a groundless liberation. The action around which this separation of the citizen-subject from “permanent revolution” (Balibar) occurs is what the essay calls, after Virilio, “The Accidental.” The Accidental is a name for the colonization of groundless liberation, and manifests in the security society’s deployment of the accident of global ecological crisis as a naturalized enemy of the State.
     

     

     

    “The military isn’t waiting while Congress and the general public might be having some debate. They’re stepping out as they have on so many other things,” Cuttino said. “If there’s anybody that’s going to be at the forefront of how to save energy, reduce global greenhouse-gas emissions and become more efficient, it’s [the military], because it’s in their best interest,” Cuttino continued. “If they can do it well, it proves to the rest of us that we can do it well … We’re all going to benefit from what they’re doing.”
     

    —Phyllis Cuttino, Director of Global Warming, Pew Charitable Trust (qtd. in Stillman)

     

    “The Cold War was a specter, but climate change is inevitable.”
     

    —Gordon Sullivan, Former US Army Chief of Staff (10)

     

    “As to whether this [citizen-subject] figure, like a face of sand at the edge of the sea, is about to be effaced with the next great sea change, that is another question.”
     

    —Étienne Balibar (55)

     
    On July 27, 2008, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) brought together forty-five scientists, military strategists, policy experts, and business executives from Asia, South Asia, Europe, and North America to engage in a new type of military exercise: the Climate Change War Game. The exercise was supported by an extensive governmental, military, scientific, and business community, including the Brookings Institution, the Center for American Progress, the Center for Naval Analysis, the Heinrich Böll Foundation, McKinsey Global Institute, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, the Pew Center on Global Climate Change, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the Sustainability Institute, and Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. Set in the year 2015, the war game began with the following premises: 1) the agreements made at the Copenhagen UN Climate Change Conference of 2009 did nothing to alleviate the production of greenhouse gases; 2) most nations around the world are physically confronting sea-level rises, floods, and droughts; 3) new information from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) details that climate change will soon unfold faster and more dramatically than previously anticipated (the IPCC’s next report is due out in late 2014); 4) public concern for climate change will have increased substantially after having to confront more volatile and destructive weather events; 5) the accumulations of CO2s in the atmosphere will have reached 407 parts per million (ppm); 6) we are locked into this environmentally destructive pattern until at least the year 2050; 7) if this pattern continues, by the end of the century climate change will have reached catastrophic levels (see Burke and Parthemore).
     
    Players of the game were divided into four groups, representing the planet’s four greatest emitters of greenhouse gases: China, India, the European Union, and the United States. The point of the game was to establish a framework that all could agree on for addressing long-term climate change. In addition to this scenario, the players were given nonfictional statistical figures of climate change projection models that were generated by the most recent IPCC data (the “A1F1” model made available to the public in 2011), and both the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the Sustainability Institute were on hand to provide additional “non-fictional” (i.e., empirically-based) projections during the course of the game. Although ostensibly the point of the exercise was both to educate important international leaders on the reality of climate change and its growing effects on planetary status and intergovernmental relations and to generate practical solutions for the risks of probable international conflict, its goal was clear: “to explore the national security consequences of climate change” (Burke and Parthemore 6). Despite its attempt to bring together a massive international community, the game compulsorily reinvigorates and is symptomatic of the return of the late twentieth century’s most touted repressed: the nation state. (As we will see, however, this is a particular form of the nation state that, in part, leaves the traditional idea of the narrated nation and its homogenous cultural identity gasping and struggling to catch up in its wake.) At the level of the traditional form of the State, the key concern of impending climate change was the nation-State boundary—specifically the change in borders that will result from the rise of sea levels, and the need for greater border patrol in the face of the new, twenty-first century phenomenon of climate change refugees: the mass migrations that will threaten national structures and identities for the next century. The “findings” of the game—that is, the common ground for agreeing on how to address climate change—were governed by an intensely military mode of thought. National security formed he basis of this ontology, and was presented not simply as a main concern, but as the central “framework for understanding climate change” (7, emphasis added). In fact, the game had the effect of installing the military focus on national security in the minds of the players:
     

    Participants widely accepted and responded to the security framework for understanding the consequences of climate change. Participants, who had diverse backgrounds, raised their level of knowledge and their acceptance of the current state of knowledge, including the range of consequences, the plausible projections associated with global climate change, and the ways in which national and global security will be affected.

    (7)

     
    These military “maneuvers,” I argue in this essay, constitute a new and formidable pressure on current theoretical formulations of the citizen-subject. The Climate Change War Game raises the level of a specifically militarized form of knowledge-production and extends it beyond the site of military life to become a generalized form of knowing, thereby affecting the constitution of State subjectivity. This extension, in other words, is not confined by a traditional conception of “the military,” in the sense of armed forces and structures such as the Department of Defense. Both the signifier and the event “climate change” were reterritorialized as vehicles for expanding the structural being of the military to the civilian register on the levels of conceptual production and thought itself: “Note that participants in this case did not equate ‘security’ with ‘military’ and in some cases noted that militaries were not the most important elements of national power in concerns about climate change” (Burke and Parthemore 7). Securitizing the nation state and maintaining the reproduction of national power were grounded in the significant need to break down any and all barriers between civilian life and military life.
     
    At the level of representation, the militarized constitution of “military life” and its opposite, “civilian life,” names the two poles of what might be more clearly understood 1) as State-formed life and 2) as a citizen-subject life enacting an extra-State existence that Étienne Balibar has identified as the other, more radical and liberatory pole of the citizen-subject (I elaborate on this distinction below). These two poles might be better understood, that is, as the constitution of the citizen-subject by the State and as her (presumably) less colonized and more radical constitution as an actor understood in relation to a groundless liberation. (In this representational militariality, “civilian” should not be mistaken as the subject of “civil society” in Gramsci’s sense.) This breakdown of the borders of customary military configurations and identifications—taken as a productive outcome of the game—became a motif in the narrative summary of the game in its aftermath. The breakdown effectually redefined and exploded the supposed empirical neutrality of the scientist, the game’s other major player: the military community and the science community “were able to develop mutually intelligible positions and collaborate to develop a negotiating strategy” (Burke and Parthemore 7, emphasis added).
     
    Despite the work of De Landa and Virilio—and recent work by people like Elizabeth DeLoughrey and Mike Hill—this indissoluble epistemological and ontological connection between the military, the sciences, and ecology, and the effects this trinity has on the constitution of subjectivity are relatively unacknowledged.1 I am tempted to say there is even a studied blindness in effect here. While the popular press and its interpellated citizenry debate the “actuality” of climate change, and the conservative public denies its existence out of a sense of an anti-State, individualized succor for freedom, the military continues to expand its control of the planet’s ecosystems. In September 2009, the CIA opened its new branch, the Center on Climate Change and National Security. But as early as 1992, the CIA had begun to establish direct connections with climate scientists in the program known as MEDEA (Measurements of Earth Data for Environmental Analysis), which declassified satellite imagery for patriotic climate scientists). In 2006, the Center for Naval Analysis convened a military advisory board of retired, three-star and four-star admirals and generals to assess the impact of global climate change on key matters of national security, and to lay the groundwork for future military responses to the threats posed by this “unavoidable catastrophe.” And in the strategy of the climate change war game, a rationale develops based on the assumption of an empirical, clear-headed approach to the problem of climate change that in fact installs an axiomatic breakdown of the boundary between military and civilian modes of existence—a breakdown in the construction of the citizen, as we historically and ontologically understand this subjectivity. This breakdown then opens the door to the ontological supremacy of what I call environmentality: a new political ecological paradigm that functions by generalizing and normalizing a military pattern of thought across the various twenty-first-century ecological fields of concern—including human to human and human to nonhuman interactivity. Within this environmentality, the citizen-subject of late modernity is transformed into a militarized form of neoliberal subjectivity to become what we might call the green patriot.2
     
    How do these developments in the State’s shifting relationship to the geopolitics of ecology in the age of climate change affect our understanding of subjectivity and citizenry, especially the kind of insurrectionary politics that, according to Balibar, is at the heart of legitimate democratic formulations in our contemporary occasion? Balibar argues that the citizen is “unthinkable” as an individual (despite the appearance of individuality within the discourse of modern neoliberalism); his subjectivity only makes sense through an “active participation in a politics that makes him exist” (51). But the citizen is not absolutely merged into this political field imaginary. As an entity, the citizen must be understood from the standpoint of a certain “indetermination,” the character of which is understood in and through a dialectic of being a “constituent element of the State” and the “actor of a revolution” (54). This antagonism of a being “being constituted” and a being in a “permanent state of a groundless liberatory struggle” names the contestatory and unending dialectical essence that Balibar identifies as the site of the citizen-subject. Thus the citizen can only be approached “from both the point of view of the State apparatus and that of the permanent revolution” (55). As a foundationless concept, “permanent revolution” requires a breakage in the systemic constitution of a State’s citizenry, which, we might add here, is both a breakage in subjectivity and a breakage in the system. (A breakage in a subjectivity without a breakage in the system would be an impossibility, since both are part of an indissolubly constituted discursive network.) It would seem, then, that such a concept of rupture is crucial to Balibar’s open-ended dialectic. Given the environmental-military events currently unfolding, what happens when a breakage in the State’s systemic constitution of itself and its subjects (the breakage, for instance, of global warming) begins to be incorporated into the State’s field imaginary at such an intense level that it begins to support the further closure of the State’s constituted structure—through the installment of “adaptation” and “security” measures rather than through the search for ecologically sustainable alternatives to current State formations of human existence? Or, in other words, what happens when the “enclosure” that is the State and its material reality are accepted within the terms of an end-of-history discourse—when the process of its metaphysical historical constitution has reached its fulfillment, in the sense of its completion and total expansion across the totality of existence, in the form of “nation-State” and “global security”? Or, to put it yet another way, what happens to the radical act of revolution when emergency conditions (as Agamben would say) and “homo sacer” become the rule? Current theoretical formulations of the citizen-subject, I argue in this essay, undergo a transformation when securitization goes global, and when the security State begins to constitute itself as the ground of human future existence (in direct opposition to the environment, which is understood to have failed as the traditional historical ground sustaining life). One of the key questions we need to address is the following: if the historical “other” in Balibar’s equation of the citizen subject is the colonized other of a European political citizenry, then what happens to that structure of otherness when the other becomes more radicalized as the environment itself, or as the other other of this environmentality: the climate change refugee suddenly deprived of her foundation in any State formulation of citizenry by the effects of global warming? This essay explores some avenues for considering these and other questions, and tries to contemplate the future potential for citizen-subject constitutions in the context of twenty-first century military maneuvers designed to reformulate the political in relation to the ecological. Adaptation Maneuvers
     
    In the Climate Change War Game, the players’ initial “moves” reflected an openness to a variety of potential scenarios for addressing environmental degradation. However, the military exercise quickly established a firm field imaginary that subsequently governed future approaches and solutions to ecological dilemmas. The rise to dominance of a single scenario became a turbulent force, subsuming like a mushroom cloud the activities of all concerned in its expansive but centripetal flow. The swiftly adopted problematic enforced an extremely narrow relation to the future: climate change was accepted as an unavoidable catastrophe, and any and all means to alleviate this threat to the planet’s ecosystem became a secondary and ultimately impractical concern. The designers of the game actually considered multiple approaches (such as third-world alternative ecological relations or first-world explorations of new, sustainable forms of technology) to be a worrisome distraction from the central issue of security: “A focus on cutting greenhouse gas emissions runs the risk of crowding out full consideration of adaptation challenges” (Burke and Parthemore 8). When game players did attempt (during the early stages of the game) to focus on methods for alleviating climate change, they each found it to be ultimately “insoluble.” “Adaptation challenges” were seen as “difficult but soluble,” whereas emissions reductions were not, especially for developing nations that might attempt to “act on their own” (8). Thus the focus on how to address a category 5 hurricane hitting Miami, or when and where mass migrations of “climate change refugees” would occur, gradually overtook any discussion of multiple solutions. Conflict overrules cooperation in the war game, and the ultimate conflict in this new theater of operations becomes the one between the world’s strongest nations (led by the US) and the environment now constituted as the radical enemy other.
     
    Despite glaring evidence of capitalism’s direct complicity with climate change (Western overconsumption, the depletion of resources, the production of wastes and CO2s, etc.), the “iron law” of economic growth superseding issues of climate change held firm when it came to each nation’s concern for reproducing its sovereignty: “Throughout the game, both [India and China] never wavered in their drive to balance any agreement with economic growth” (Burke and Parthemore 8). The US and EU teams also acknowledged the primacy of the economy. This relentless passion for economic growth is indicative of the continuing, ruthless pursuit not only of financial gain on the economic register of being, but also of the control of resources (and the territories associated with resources) that defines military existence.3 This unholy alliance between the military and the economy is nothing new, but its insistent—practically zealous— repetition is indicative of a self-destructive, Accidental influence that even its advocates do not recognize (I develop the concept of the Accidental below). By 2050, current conceptions of the economic will no longer be applicable. The very concept of “economic growth” and the models generated by its demand are already becoming outdated. Such growth was based on the naïve view that resources would always be available, and on the view of the earth as a mere resource for the anthropological machine. (Might the radical liberatory potential of the citizen-subject also be seen as arising from this idealization of the earth as an always-already available resource for human expansion and transformation?) As we enter the age of resource wars, we shift into a mode of existence that will be underwritten by the knowledge that the resources we covet are coming to an end. If we accept this end-oriented narrative (which environmentalists have been iterating for some time), then the idea of a sustainable citizenry is threatened. Projection models indicate that by the end of the twenty-first century, the resources currently defining human survival will have been compromised. Crops will fail more often, even with agronomists’ efforts to design new varieties of staple crops like rice and wheat.4 The “economic,” therefore, will not be a movement tending toward growth. With this establishment of the supremacy of an economy-without-growth, an economy that must entirely redefine itself because it will no longer be able to postpone its own limit (the definition of capitalism according to Deleuze and Guattari), the politics of openness is replaced by the policing politics of environmentality. The movement of the economic will consequently be defined as the movement of exhaustion, of a mode of production oriented to the telos of depletion. Depletion, coupled with the ecological destruction it generates, will power the motor of (anti)development, and serve as the captivation mechanism that disinhibits any relation to an exterior. As each race for the next dwindling resource begins, the difference between the economic and military registers of being will become less distinguishable—to the point at which they will be one and the same.
     
    Thus the premise of the game is clear: the United States, working specifically with China (with the other two national communities following behind like initiates), should expand its institutional security structures at a transnational level to prepare for planetary-wide clashes that will soon consume and redefine international geopolitics as we know it. A key rationale working against technological innovation stems from the way in which “security” and militariality in general focus almost exclusively on near-term narratives of insecurity. Concentrating on technological solutions to the problem (of liberation from the state of existence)—which are always long-term in their implementation—is understood to take away from the immediate threats to national security. If the immediate issues of security are not fully addressed, then all future security crumbles. This logic, presented as plain and disinterested, reflects the self-strangulating dynamic of the closed-loop structure of environmentality. It seeks to release the full potential of climate change—exploding nature as a great destructive force that may erupt at any moment, making it necessary for us to be constantly on our guard and to be “realistic” about what will happen not only to our loss of resources and shifting geographies of agricultural production, but to the threat to national borders when “un-Stated” climate change refugees begin their forced migrations. Throwing sustainability into oblivion (or even making it a secondary concern that, formalistically, never arrives since adaptation will always be a more pressing concern) manifests the martial logic of redirecting our attention towards the next impending ecological accident, taking our attention, at the same time, away from potentials for different forms of citizen-subject liberation.
     

    The New Military Political Mandate

     
    The CNAS war-game exercise was not an isolated occurrence, but rather is part of a growing number of synecdochic events that signal a telling expansion in the military’s relationship not only to sites of human production (specifically geopolitical and ecopolitical), but also to the nonhuman continuum of being, namely the ecosystem as re-presented (that is, interpellated in the problematic of environmentality) in terms of “energy resource.” Various branches of the military have embarked on major initiatives to address climate change. In March 2007, the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College held a conference entitled “The National Security Implications of Global Climate Change” to inaugurate its transition to ecological awareness. (The Strategic Studies Institute is the Army’s collegiate arm that “serves to influence policy debate and bridge the gap between Military and Academia.”) The “Colloquium Brief” outcome of the conference stressed the need to ensure that “public awareness should follow a coordinated strategic communication plan” (Johnson 1). Though the “facts” of climate change and its long-term effects were disputed, it is clear that this intelligence propaganda arm of the Army War College was already thinking in the direction of manipulating public opinion. (By 2009, the Strategic Studies Institute will have adopted the position that climate change is indisputable and that it is the result of human activities.) Like the worst-case scenario of the Climate Change War Game, the Brief stresses the anticipation of catastrophic change: “The entire range of plausible threats needs to be delineated, then analyzed and early warning criteria established” (1). Unlike the War Game, the Strategic Studies Institute calls for global cooperation, but suggests that such cooperation is not yet available: “Climate change will require multinational, multi-agency cooperation on a scale heretofore unimaginable” (1). The specifics of such cooperation are not articulated (and the Brief also states that no conference participants made mention of the United Nations), with the emphasis falling instead on the mass displacement of people that will occur if “global cooperative measures fail” (1). Despite the suggestion of such multinational cooperation, the report makes it clear that the “catastrophic vision” of climate change can only reduce all other courses of action to “one of national survival” (2). Summaries of the presentations indicate that many found the then newly-published IPCC 2007 report to be too moderate in its predictions. The development of a terminology for establishing a clear discourse was foregrounded, and the final presentation emphasized the need to keep “the discourse at the national security level rather than the disaster relief level” (Johnson 4). It was suggested that this emphasis be extended to other state security structures, and to become a key focus of the National Security Act of 2010.5 Thus the radical liberatory pole of the citizen-subject was gradually and thoroughly erased from this hyper-pragmatic military narrative.
     
    Less than two months later (July 2007), the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA)—the Navy and Marine Corps’s federally funded research center, which provides information for all US military organizations and the government—released its first major publication directly addressing the current and future status of the environment. Called “National Security and the Threat of Climate Change,” the report serves as a major indicator of a general military attitude towards the problem of climate change, and stands as perhaps one of the first official and extensive public responses from the military on a subject matter that it had found to be, for all intents and purposes, of little importance. (As I have argued elsewhere, previous articulations, such as those by R. James Woolsey and others, were tightly focused on such matters as the production of biofuels on domestic and “friendly” foreign soil so as to end US dependency on foreign oil.6 ) The report’s introductory statement makes it clear that CNA authorities have accepted the findings of climate scientists without question: “Carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere are greater now than at any time in the past 650,000 years, and average global temperature has continued a steady rise. . . . The trends are clear” (Sullivan et al. 1). The report ends with a series of “recommendations” calling for the event of climate change to be “fully integrated into national security and national defense strategies” (46). These recommendations suggest especially the need for the US war machine to expand its power globally if it is to successfully “stabilize climate change at levels that will avoid significant disruptions to global security and stability” (46). This expansion includes the construction of new military bases and command centers, such as the establishment of a new Africa Command—a proposal that originated in the offices of the Department of Defense.
     
    The impact of climate change in Sub-Saharan Africa—already experiencing the effects of global warming—is of particular importance to the US military. The Department of the Army, in conjunction with the Department of Defense, began producing a series of reports in 2009 that articulated the need to establish new “Sino-American military-to-military cooperation” in the Sub-Saharan region (Parsons). One of the first reports, Rymn Parsons’s “Taking Up the Security Challenge of Climate Change,” frames its narrative with statements that unequivocally accept the scientific data about global warming produced by the IPCC and, when referring to global warming, it always adds the qualifier “manmade.” In its opening declarations (a section titled “The Science of Global Warming”), the report presents a genealogy that explains how global warming came to be fully accepted by the Army:
     

    Even as recently as 2006, the year in which the Academy Award winning film An Inconvenient Truth . . . was released, climate change as a consequence of manmade global warming was hotly debated and deeply politicized in the United States and elsewhere. The following year, 2007, the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change released its long-awaited Fourth Assessment. The IPCC report is of signal importance because it is well-balanced and moderate. It did not quell all controversy surrounding the subject; but because of it climate change is generally accepted, scientifically speaking, to be a product of manmade global warming, even though uncertainties remain as to where, when, and how much.

     

    The report also cites the work of Thomas Friedman to substantiate its claims. These narratives and their particular emphases and genealogies make it clear not only that climate change has been accepted, but that it has been adopted by the US military as its new primary enemy: “The idea that the environment has security implications is not new. . . . What is new is that climate change poses security threats unmatched among environmental phenomena” (2). Climate Change is even incorporated into new Army field manuals.

     
    The CNA’s report characterizes climate change as a greater threat than any of the wars that America fought in the twentieth century, and as an event more volatile and difficult to handle than the ongoing war against terror: “During our decades of experience in the U.S. military, we have addressed many national security challenges, from containment and deterrence of the Soviet nuclear threat during the Cold War to terrorism and extremism in recent years. Global climate change presents a new and very different type of national security challenge” (Sullivan et al. 3). The being of climate change is definitively framed in terms of past US military conflicts. The report resituates environmental concerns, which were formerly tangential to military institutions, at the center of security matters: “Climate change, national security, and energy dependence are a related set of global challenges. . . . The national consequences of climate change should be fully integrated into national security and national defense strategies” (7). The environment consequently becomes part of the signifying chain of military history, further solidifying the perception that nature presences itself in the narration of the nation as fundamentally a concern of the war machine.
     
    As mentioned above, a key concern of the military is the tension that will erupt from the displacement of millions of people in the wake of sea-level rise. The CNA report emphasizes the insecurity that will arise from floods and droughts, declines in agricultural productivity due to lack of water resources, the erasures of coastlines in the Pacific, and the potential spread of infectious disease. It emphasizes the need to establish a different rhetoric in US relations with China, specifically to rethink US recommendations to “enhance environmental progress,” which are understood to come at the cost of economic growth. It repeats the argument made in a number of military circles concerning the threat of “Islamification” to Europe, stating that the primary concern for Europeans will be massive migrations: “The greater threat to Europe lies in migration of people from across the Mediterranean, from the Maghreb, the Middle East, and sub-Saharan Africa” (Sullivan et al. 29). It also emphasizes the threat to security in the homeland, especially to the aquifer that underlies the west-central United States, which supplies water for twenty-seven percent of the country’s irrigated land. Concern also exists for the US military’s bases, weapons systems, and platforms in the Middle East and the Pacific. The Arctic is highlighted as an area of particular concern. Once the ice canopy no longer exists, the region will “require an ‘increased scope of naval operations,’” which will in turn require new considerations for “weapon system effectiveness” (38). The report also stresses the weakness of the Department of Defense’s reliance on the national grid for daily operations, tacitly urging the construction of an alternative (presumably ecologically innovative, therefore more defendable) source of energy.
     
    The volatile nature of climate change (scientific uncertainty about specific sea level rises, world temperature increases, when polar ice caps will disappear, the precise timing and location of the next category 5 hurricane…) puts pressure on national defense structures. The logic of Security and its nationalized systems must incorporate a certain form of insecurity in order to justify its existence and function properly: “As military leaders, we know we cannot wait for certainty” (Sullivan et al. 7). In the ontology of environmentality, the act of decision functions by banking on an artificial future deployment of a perverse absolute certainty (ecological catastrophe, failed crops, massive displacement, political unrest …), or, what amounts to the same thing, a constant deployment in the present of uncertainty. The certainty of catastrophic collapse in the future exists side by side with the uncertainty of that knowledge in the present. This enables the security specialist to annex disagreement (in both the traditional conception of that word and in Rancière’s philosophical sense) from the domain of the political. The military authority employs the policing idea of “risk” at the expense of the political transformation of the field of possibility, so as to justify “action now”:
     

    This approach [ending the discussion and acting now] shows how a military leader’s perspective often differs from the perspectives of scientists, policymakers, or the media. Military leaders see a range of estimates and tend not to see it as a stark disagreement, but as evidence of varying degrees of risk. They don’t see the range of possibilities as justification for inaction. Risk is at the heart of their job: They assess and manage the many risks to America’s security. Climate change, from a Military Advisory Board’s perspective, presents significant risks to America’s national security.

    (9, 11)

     

    We thus find the most conservative, policing organization standing on the side of environmentalists who for years have been trying to convince the public to take climate change and other ecological problems seriously. Time to stop debating whether or not climate change is real: “Debate must stop,” says former US Army Chief of Staff Gordon Sullivan, “and action must begin” (12). Do we not see in the supreme military authority an earnest advocation of exactly the kind of commitment long sought by environmentalists, one that breaks through the endless liberal democratic debate surrounding the issue of climate change that we see, for example, in the (ongoing) fiasco of “Climategate”?7 Sullivan takes a stand, and speaks in such a way as to move beyond the fundamental deadlock of civilized debate:

     

    We seem to be standing by, and, frankly, asking for perfectness in science. . . . People are saying they want to be convinced, perfectly. They want to know the climate science projections with 100 percent certainty. . . . We never have 100 percent certainty. . . . If you wait until you have 100 percent certainty, something bad is going to happen on the battlefield.

    (10)

     
    Unlike the endless and innocuous deliberation about the “reality” of climate change that thoroughly engulfs the registers of the mediatized public, environmental efforts, the government, and the paralyzed political state of all three, we see here, in the military commander’s “no-nonsense rhetoric,” the core of today’s neomilitary power—the adoption of a (policing) State-constituted citizenry denuded of its open-relation to a radical liberatory potential. Or, to put this foreclosure of “openness” in traditional poststructuralist terms, this large-scale enfolding of environmental concerns into the military machine—a new and hyperactive discursive incitement—has the ability to cut straight through the endless postmodern, “tolerant” chain of signification (the constant but empty engagement with differential points of view). As such, this rhetoric is able to co-opt the Real of liberal democracy—that is, the ability of a subject or group to assume an overtly political mandate and a larger (populist) cause without being demonized as fanatical. This ability of the military to touch upon the Real of democratic American and global neoliberalism has the potential to galvanize the population without being turned into what such movements normally appear to be to the democratic capitalist system: the external Enemy that must always be avoided (the Enemy that “guarantees Society’s consistency,” as Žižek says [121])—the socialist, the tree hugger, etc. This military engagement with the Real therefore brings about a perversion of the authentic ethico-political act. This reinsertion of the environment within the realm of debate (including public opinion, government policy, and even private corporate development now that the various branches of the military are seeking new, eco-friendly corporate contracts) cuts through the endless procrastination of action to speak directly to society’s destructive ecological habits. In more than one sense, Phyllis Cuttino of the Pew Charitable Trust is spot on: the military are at the forefront of the environmental fight, working on all levels to achieve what scientists and activists have sought for decades. Indeed, as the sudden and increasing production of these and many similar military reports suggests, the military is genuinely performing the authentic, radical act of directly assuming responsibility and taking action on behalf of the environment—thereby breaking through the overload of ideological representations that act as a congestion to a concrete Act that would change the entire playing field controlling all ideological points of view. For an act to be truly genuine—for the citizen-subject to be an “actor” in relation to freedom—it must be more than a movement that resolves a series of problems given or existing within a determined field of action; it must enact the “more radical gesture of subverting the very structuring principle of this field” (Žižek 121). As Rancière puts it, the genuine act must name a wrong and put into play—against the naturalized play of accepted parts/identities/activities/representations—the “part of no part” (30). And the part of no part shared by environmental activists, ecocritics, and the military alike is a commitment to break through the mystifying cloud of debate to represent the truth of climate change, name it as a wrong that has been committed, and take action to confront the event fully. Within the liberal humanist political constitutions of democracy, the military is indeed currently winning the battle for environmental justice, and laying the groundwork for new forms of environmental activism and new formations of the environmental citizen-subject. These developments suggest that the twenty-first century is on the verge of an inauguration or a new, genuine “event” of history, as Heidegger would say—a history in which environmentalists will need to subjectivize themselves in accordance with the new practices of military ecologies.
     

    Decision and Necessity

     
    Nonetheless, this military activation of the act is, as we shall see, not in the service of the truth-event of ecological vulnerability, but something very different. One way to sharpen the difference between the military’s and the environmentalists’ triggering of the act is to consider their close but very different relations to uncertainty, to think “uncertainty” specifically in terms of Derrida’s important theorization of “undecidability.” Sullivan’s argument—that there is no absolute certainty upon which we can base our decisions—shares a dangerous affinity with the traditional poststructuralist argument that we live in a decentered universe and inhabit a world that can never offer the certainty of an absolute ground. Or, as Derrida says, the lack of an absolute order of stability presents us with an irreducible undecidability—the liberatory pole that the citizen-subject enacts (298). This philosophical concept of undecidability is often grossly misunderstood to be a form of liberal relativism, as if Derrida were arguing that in the final analysis we cannot make a decision. Nothing could be further from the mark. For Derrida, undecidability is a name for the moment when a subject—in the act of deciding—unchains itself from constrictions of an existing program of already determined relations. If there were one-hundred percent certainty, there would be nothing to decide: the field of existing relations would then be nothing more than a force making the decision for the subject. The subject would only have to follow the plan of action given over by the ruling situation. If a genuine decision is to occur, if a subject is to make a decision without everything already having been decided for her, then the subject must decide without knowing; she must make a choice without full knowledge of the situation. Otherwise the subject gives over the power of deciding to a set of knowns that control the totality of choices. To sharpen this one step further, undecidability refers to that which has not already been decided, and the leap away from the already decided—the encounter with undecidability that has not be reduced to something decided—makes an authentic, not an imitative, act possible.
     
    Where, then, lies the difference between the Derridian encountering the freedom given by undecidability and the military commander fully facing the lack of absolute certainty? The difference lies in the relation to necessity. In a state of existence in which everything is governed by environmentality, the freedom to choose that arises out of a relation to uncertainty or an unknown is turned around so as to affirm all the more the empiricism of necessity. The military commander, the scientist, and the ecocritic all share a relation to a fundamental “lack of perfection,” to quote Sullivan. But for the military commander, this lack of perfection is not a source for a groundless act of decision-making; it is incorporated into so as to strengthen the power of an instituted program of action. Uncertainty and the lack of perfect knowledge is reterritorialized so as to generate a state of anxiety, which is then used to justify the institution of a state of necessity that positions itself beyond any form of debate—whether that debate is political, legal, or critical-ontological. Nor can this necessity be understood according to any known form of reasoning, conservative or otherwise. It turns the openness given by the event of uncertainty into an unquestionable and insurmountable absolutism. Again, the line between this state of necessity (which, it must be kept in mind, should not be equated too easily with classical Reason, since necessity trumps any form of reason in this structure, even a deconstructed reason) and the space of uncertainty that offers the potential for un-cementing oneself from the ruling order (which also poses fundamental challenges to forms of reasoning) is thin and difficult to trace. But the difference could not be more substantial, and it is this difficult difference that will come to define our ecological future with greater decisive force.
     
    From within the ideological position of the de facto state of necessity, the leap from environmental action to national security is swift: “While the developed world will be far better equipped to deal with the effects of climate change, some of the poorest regions may be affected most. This gap can potentially provide an avenue for extremist ideologies and create the conditions for terrorism” (Sullivan et al. 13). From this position, the leap from environmental activism to postcolonial nation-state warfare is even quicker: “Many governments, even some that look stable today, may be unable to deal with these new stresses. When governments are ineffective, extremism can gain a foothold” (13). In these lightening moves, the complexity and diversity of the current environmental occasion is reduced to a single concern: national and global security. Issues such as biodiversity, animal rights, sustainability, bioengineering, threatened habitats, and so on no longer appear as part of the arena of human political and existential concerns. These calculative moves, which work by preying on the fears of geopolitical insecurity (“extremism”), are designed to camouflage the violence of a reductive logic that shrinks all environmental concerns to the world of “security policy.”
     
    Thus the military demand for action—a mode of action that presents itself as an unconstructed, matter-of-fact empiricism that puts an end to debate—is precisely the line of reasoning we should reject. Its relation to an empiricism based on a state of necessity makes it differ in a secondary fashion from the forms of ecocriticism performed in the humanities. One of the primary concerns of such ecocriticism is the exploration of possible forms of cutting open limiting forms of institutionalized decision-making. In doing so, it foregrounds the ideological nature of any ecological concern, as opposed to the military demand for action, which conceals its complicity with ideology, in part through the use of narratives of neutrality. Consider the argument presented by Vice Admiral Richard H. Truly, former NASA administrator and the first Commander of the Naval Space Command. (The Naval Space Command was established in 1983 during the Reagan Administration; it is the Navy’s institution of global surveillance and uses extensive satellite observation to support naval action around the planet. It also includes a “space watch” that operates around the clock, tracking satellites in orbit with a “fence” of electromagnetic energy that “can detect objects in order around the Earth out to an effective range of 15,000 nautical miles.” The Command operates “surveillance, navigation, communication, environmental, and information systems” in order to “advocate naval warfighting.”8 ) In articulating his particular stance on the environment, Truly deploys a particular form of representative transparency:
     

    I had spent most of my life in the space and aeronautics world, and hadn’t really wrestled with [environmental issues]. . . . Over the course of [a] few years I started really paying attention to the data. When I looked at what energy we had used over the past couple of centuries and what was in the atmosphere today, I knew there had to be a connection. I wasn’t convinced by a person or any interest group—it was the data that got me. As I looked at it on my own, I couldn’t come to any other conclusion. Once I got past that point, I was utterly convinced of this connection between the burning of fossil fuels and climate change. And I was convinced that if we didn’t do something about this, we would be in deep trouble.

     

    Truly’s argument attempts to ground itself in an empirical verifiability that arises outside of human fabrication and ideological influence. “Data” as an object in existence appears without human generation, and as if outside of any narrative construction. No human speaks to the military commander about climate change; the data “speaks for itself.” This fantastic ex nihilo argument undermines itself, however, in the symptomatic pressure put upon Truly to deny twice the existence of any author or organization that might have a relationship to the collected knowledge of climate change: the Admiral “was not convinced by any person or interest group.” Nor did the Admiral encounter any human other than himself during the process of coming to understand the data. Like Robinson Crusoe, who learned how to see the bounty of “Providence” hidden underneath the wildness of his island without the help of others, and was thus able to become the self-reliant and meaningful Cartesian Self he always yearned to be, the Admiral “looked at [the data] on [his] own.” This dynamic of data “speaking for itself” conceals a design meant to trigger specific behaviors and results—key among them is the construction and preservation of an irrefutable state of necessary military action.

     

    Environmentality and the Accidental

     
    Ecological catastrophe becomes the basis, in this neomilitarism, for reterritorializing the earth as essentially an abyssal milieu—an “unforgiving environment,” to use the language of the CNA’s national security climate change report—incapable of supporting human existence without the aid of the US war machine. In this maneuver, the war machine takes over the former role of the ecosystem as supporter and sustainer of human life. Such a re-presenting of the earth erases the entire history of enclosure and the West’s colonial, politico-economic relations to nature that have ruled the human-nature nexus from the seventeenth century to the present. The history of US Military presence in the Pacific, for instance (which became of paramount importance during the ecological catastrophe of the tsunami in 2005),9 is steeped in American imperialism and colonial expansion. The US Pacific military structure is the world’s largest naval command, with close to three hundred bases and facilities and active personnel from the Marine Corps, the Air Force, and the Army in addition to the Navy. Walden Bello’s recent description of the Pacific military is revealing: “Perhaps the best way to comprehend the U.S. presence in the Pacific is to describe it as a transnational garrison state that spans seven sovereign states and the vast expanse of Micronesia” (312). Typical historical periodizations of US colonial expansion tend to focus on the “errand in the wilderness” activities that engulfed the lives of Native Americans and Mexicans. But the entrance of the United States into the Asian “theater”—with the successful wresting of Guam and the Philippines from Spain in 1898—was also a key part of US colonial history, extending US sovereignty to a global register. The new bolstering of military presence stems from a different type of ideological imperative, an eco-imperial ontology that grounds its entire rationale in the troubling, anarchic essence of nature, which it transforms into an exploitative logical economy that matches the never-ending and centerless essence of the previous military transcendental-signified, “terrorism.”
     
    The United States’ prosperity and technological advancement was made possible by inflicting catastrophes elsewhere, outside its borders, in the form of low-wage factories, the support of dictatorships, internecine warfare, the unequal distribution of resources, uneven development, and a mystification process that kept US soil metaphysically separated from the rest of the planet in the mythology of American exceptionalism. Throughout all of this it turned a blind eye to the effects of this destructive development in and upon ecosystems across the planet. Its sense of a different historical development from all others conceals its imperial genealogy and ontology. This exceptionalism involves the constitution of a national biopolitical settlement and an autonomous consciousness that lives and sustains its existence far from any connection to nature. If nature exists at all in this paradigm, it comes to presence as the enemy/other that poses a threat to economic development and the security of all people. Today—in the form of global warming—that decision to annex nature to profit machines and colonial apparatuses of power have returned to haunt the imperial logic of exceptionalism.
     
    This peculiar deployment of catastrophe brings me to my ultimate point concerning the essence of environmentality—that is, its relation to the formation of a closed system that I call the Accidental. The Accidental names a combination of Kant’s conception of the Transcendental and Paul Virilio’s “accidental thesis.” The basic point of Virilio’s thesis is that in the current historical occasion, worldly accidents, oddly, are not accidental. From inside the ruling ideological world picture (in Heidegger’s sense) that uncritically presents a certain mode of technology as the highest achievement of human production, the accident is re-presented (vorgestellt) as a mere or unwanted side effect, as an error in human judgment or design, or as a limitation in the reliability of materials. As such, the accident is comprehended as an event that can be overcome through an increase in the security of procedures (the explicit military rationale for its environmental concern). The concept of the Accidental directly opposes this view. The accident, as Virilio argues, “is becoming a clearly identifiable historical phenomenon” (6). But I want to argue more emphatically that, given the events I have laid out, late modernity’s techno-scientific mode of production releases the accident into existence as a major, primary component of reality. No longer an occasional offshoot of worldly manufacturing, the accident arises out of a fundamental change in the essence of modern human production: “the invention of [a] substance [in techno-modernity] is also the invention of the ‘accident’” (6). The substance of existence has internalized the accident as part of its very composition: “The shipwreck is indeed the ‘futuristic’ invention of the ship, the air crash the invention of the supersonic plane, and the Chernobyl meltdown, the invention of the nuclear power station” (6). In the example of the Climate Change War Game and these other military engagements with ecology, we discover that modernity’s techno-military-scientific mode of production replaces transcendence with Accidence. In other words, it replaces the functioning metaphysical transcendental signified (and non-metaphysical forms of quasi-transcendence) with the (a)transcendental accident, which I am calling the Accidental. It approaches the accident of climate change so as to release its “full potential,” and to establish the future as the necessity for the narrative of security policy. But the current connection of military matters to environmental matters—what I have been calling environmentality—flips this equation: thus, the accident of ecological climate change becomes the motor of military production and reproduction.
     
    Situating the Accidental as the First Cause, or Principle, deploys a form of coherence in contradiction. The demand for and installment of increasing security structures as a reaction to impending climate catastrophe privileges closed systems (because too much openness means too little control). More tightly controlled systems in turn generate more accidents, thus generating a self-perpetuating, closed loop. The accident of climate change marks the shift from the local to the global, and the apparatuses of security follow suit to establish global enclosed systems. This means that the military and various forms of security systems are increasingly ecological in nature—a sign of the indissoluble interlocking of military, techno-scientific instrumentality with our atmosphere, biosphere, hydrosphere, and lithosphere: from nineteenth-century coal-mining and the industrial revolution to the more recent events of Chernobyl, Japan, and the unexpected outcomes of the genetic manipulation of crops in Europe and elsewhere. The increased pressure to overcome obstacles to the production of high-yields through technological manipulation— defined in terms of either commodity production or efficiency production (faster means of transportation)—creates an increased potential for accidents to occur.
     
    Considering the actions of the military described above, it would help to sharpen the particular way in which exceptionalism relates to environmental matters. Documents such as the national security report and events such as the Climate Change War Game are symptomatic of attempts to fully activate the Western metaphysical addiction to a defensive totalizing world view that, in its refusal to admit the potential for any other ecological narrative, essentially puts an end to any form of democracy that might be connected to significant and various environmental concerns (namely, to the complexity that surrounds ecological degradation— deforestation, flooding, droughts, soil erosion, excess salinization of land from sea-level rise, species extinction, biopiracy, plant gene manipulation, etc.). This enclosed world picture— grounded in the deployment of catastrophe as the ultimate threat and in the rationale for global military control—generates a state of existence that can only turn the citizen-subject against itself, i.e., against its liberatory potential. The strengthening of the Pacific Command reflects this environmentality-economy, which was further expanded when the idea of “anticipatory action”—the preventative defense-strategy policy favored by the George H.W. Bush Administration—was institutionalized by the National Security Strategy Paper issued in September 2002. This new defensive policy redirected US military strategy to center specifically on an “anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. In the new world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action.”
     
    This “anticipatory action” is a symptom of what Giorgio Agamben identifies as “the State of Exception”—the key paradigm of government in the twentieth century, a form of executive action mystified by the liberal humanist argument that the declaration of the exceptional state in a time of crisis reflects a benign government’s logical, pragmatic response in order to maintain the institution of democracy. What Agamben does not theorize, however, is the transformation of the State of Exception as it shifts from the exploitation of terror to the exploitation of the being of nature as the new, fundamental threat to human existence. In military documents, Nature is made out to be more terrifying than terrorism itself. Nature poses far greater problems for humanity, since the very system that supports human life itself has begun to turn against humanity. As nature replaces terrorism as the ultimate anti-liberal humanist peril, anticipatory action multiplies beyond its previous ties to human entities (terrorists and their cells) and human institutional structures (nations that “harbor” terrorists) to engulf the planet itself. Agamben’s astute and important analysis of the State of Exception puts great weight on the power of the sovereign to suspend a nation’s normal state of political and civil existence (through suspension of civil liberties, the law, the constitution, personal liberties, privacy, etc.). The central node within the establishment of this exceptional state is the sovereign, the executive branch of a State. The extension of executive powers introduces a new “threshold of indeterminacy between democracy and absolutism” (3). To “protect” democracy, democracy must be suspended absolutely by the Sovereign, the figure who stands above the law, and who claims the right to revoke the law for any citizen. What Agamben alludes to in his analysis, but does not fully consider, is the connection of this State of Exception to a pivotal and ontologically defining Western concept of a Natural State of Existence (and here again we brush up against the apolitical idea of a pragmatic empiricism). The State of Exception is supposedly a State’s natural response to “extreme internal conflicts” (2).
     
    The move to environmentality involves a shift of the institutionalization of a State of Exception by the Sovereign to the condition of existence itself. In this sense it is not the nation-State, or a Sovereign identified with any particular nation-state, but a more difficult to identity relation of entities that act, not necessarily in clear, homogenous unison, by putting into motion a cohesion of concerns that share a certain, directed course of action. In the age of climate change, in which nature itself is the ultimate threat, it is no longer the sovereign that suspends the law and extends executive powers; it is a coalition of forces that extend the Absolute, that extend a form of power that suspends forms of rationality, the law, democracy, and various possibilities for freedom. Instead of the Sovereign suspending the law it is the military industrial complex that spearheads the move towards a State of Exception. This shift of “full powers” from the executive branch of the nation-State to the more complex confederacy signifies the rise of the Accidental State (a structure composed of military complexes, corporate allegiances, university-industrial centers, private interests, and so on). As Foucault would say, this shift cuts off the head of the king who presumably stood behind and controlled the workings of power (89). More specifically, it makes visible the structure of the Accidental that was the true ontological essence lurking behind the more “ontically visible” State of Exception.
     
    Such a shift away from executive sovereignty, from a subject who always acts and speaks in public on behalf of the nation-State (but who secretly works always for necessity: necessitas legem non habet [necessity has no law]), can be seen lurking behind statements such as those made by the military leaders supporting environmentality. Parsons’s report makes this shift explicit, and even provides a military transliteration of the postcolonial genealogy of empire. In a section entitled “The Future Security Environment,” he lays out the Accidental narrative of a “post-American” State:
     

    A time is coming, measured in decades, not centuries, in which American military superpower status may remain, but its relative economic power may be less and its resulting political prerogatives may be fewer, that is, a “post-American” world of increasing multipolarity. For nearly 300 years, world order has been shaped by the hegemony of Western liberalism, first in the form of Pax Britannica, and then Pax Americana. But a post-American world, though globalized, may also be more non-Western. It will be a world of evolving modernity to which the United States must adapt, not a world the United States will dictate. It will be a world in which China, already the second-most-important country in nearly every respect, will take a decidedly American tack, though not by employing American methods, to expand its influence in hopes of molding the international system to suit its interests. Further, it will be a world in which a healthy international community will still be a vital U.S. interest.
     
    The most important bilateral relationships China and the United States have today are with each other. Strenuous efforts must be made to keep the U.S.-China relationship nonconfrontational and to encourage China to broaden its responsibility for promoting and maintaining peace and stability. American grand strategy and military strategy must include ways and means to achieve these ends. Because the effects of global warming-related climate change are of as great, if not greater, concern to China than the United States, the two countries will find much common ground in this arena. China, like America, will perceive the security implications of climate change, but it remains to be seen whether it will play a constructive or discomfiting role. The United States must focus intently on this issue.

    (5)

     

    In Parsons’s exceptionalist, somewhat anxious and quasi-apocalyptic narrative we begin to see the full force and meaning of the signifier “adapt,” which before this appeared as the military-empirical necessity of succumbing to the inevitability of climate change on the grounds of protecting national security. Here, however, “adapt” names the end of American national supremacy in favor of a “multipolarity” of powers—an indication of the expansion of the structure of the Accidental beyond the “control” of a single nation-State. This suggests an extension of “full powers” (and here we should keep in mind Foucault’s theorization of “power”) from the central node of the sovereign to the complex network of the Accidental itself. The futural characterization of the post-American world equally reveals that this discursive military constitution of an ecological imperative is not really about the environment at all, but about the effect that climate change will have on the future of global geopolitics.10 In February 2009, the CNA and the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) produced a “Panel Discussion Report” on China’s sixth defense white paper, issued a month earlier. Though this report is not available to the public, Parsons indicates that the CNA and the INSS are concerned about the waning of US supremacy in the wake of China’s declaration that it will be an “active and constructive” “key player” in the post-climate change world (16). Environmental policy therefore becomes the vehicle for constituting new military flows of power in key locations around the globe.

     
    We are thus in the midst of experiencing a folding of the accident into the substance of existence. “Substance” here names two elements: a co-constitution 1) of accidents and 2) of a technology inherently connected to the production of what should properly be called “accidental thought.” As every child knows, technology is constantly advancing from within its own closed system—that is, outpacing human understanding of the precise working of technological inventions. This authorizes, however, a curious activity of accepting products without understanding how they work, and this becomes a naturalized state for the human user. (The average consumer can use and understand the function of material instruments, but cannot fix these instruments since the specific knowledge of how they operate is not part of consumer consciousness.) Instrumentality disappears from the field of the visible. For instance, with the slippage of instruments into the automatism of habit—the acceptance of greater sophistication with greater incomprehension—the only substance and the only awareness of substance that enters consciousness is the breakdown of the instrument. It is the accident and the accident alone that fills out the field of the visible: “‘Consciousness now exists only for accidents’” (Valéry, qtd. Virilio 6). The substance of existence is consequently transformed into a recipe for producing and maintaining a constant state of anxiety, which in turn produces the feedback loop of a need for increased security—the problematic solution produced by a system that can never get outside of itself. We thus find ourselves in the absurd, precisely opposite position of the kind of instrumental breakdown thematized by Heidegger (in his example of the broken hammer that suddenly opens the subject to a cessation in the normal state of human production). The breakdown of the instrument does not open us to an encounter with the ontological essence of existence, with the “being of being”; as instrumentality disappears from consciousness, its breakdown can only confront us with the terror of the accident. To put this more emphatically, in today’s world broken devices no longer have the power to enable us to realize the ideological underpinnings of existence. Breakdowns are not the cessation of the specific substance of existence that colonizes our lives; breakdowns are the primary substance of existence itself—the confirmation of and justification for more technological advancement, “states of exception,” jingoistic patriotism, surveillance, and global security. In this closed-loop system, the only action left is to increasingly overexpose and develop that which is. This drive to “overexpose” for purposes of total (final) explanation and control, technological manipulation, and economic development (the high-yield logic of the discourse of enclosure) creates a world of increasingly dangerous and globally-consequential accidents.
     
    In philosophizing ecology, we can draw a firm connection between the accident, the environment, and what I have referred to elsewhere as the war on inhabitancy. The event of the Love Canal disaster in the United States, which galvanized a specific environmental awareness and movement, is one example of an accident that damaged an environment and its inhabitants. But the accident is more firmly connected, even embedded now, in the planet’s ecosystems in this late, enclosing age of postmodernity, as made evident in the overproduction and subsequent destruction of ecosystems for today’s profit-oriented system. The technological manipulation of land that defined the Green Revolution in the Punjab is symptomatic of an “overexposing” of land that leads to the “accident” of excess salinity and water logging. This in turn leads to the “accident” of mass hunger and a global decrease in calorie intake. The push to monocrop by transnational corporations turns food into a commodity for sale on the international market. Monocropping eliminates the chances of a community to fall back on locally produced food and forces the community to pay for food produced elsewhere. When an “accidental” dip occurs in the market, agricultural workers’ pay drops and communities already underpaid find themselves in the position of having no money to buy food. The struggle to survive produces the “threat” of encroachment by these communities looking for new sources of food in forests and privatized farmland. This in turn requires the transformation of nature into “threatened” nature, which in turn produces legislation that represents nature as a being in need of “environmental protection.”
     
    Here Elizabeth DeLoughrey’s exemplary work on the origin of “ecology” as a university discipline within the war effort of the Cold War is of paramount importance. DeLoughrey has productively revealed the years from 1952 to 1954 to be the specific moment when the US military successfully manipulated the earth’s ecosystem so as to achieve full global enclosure and overexposure:
     

    The hundreds of nuclear tests conducted in the Pacific Islands . . . have largely been erased from global memory, and yet we all carry their radioactive traces in our bodies. With the shift from atomic (fission) to thermonuclear (fusion) weapons, global radioactive fallout increased exponentially. . . . The first detonated thermonuclear weapon—the H-bomb Mike—unleashed in the “Pacific Proving Grounds” in 1952, blew the island of Eugelab out of existence. At ten megatons, Mike was seven hundred times the explosive force of the atomic weapon dropped on Hiroshima, which had killed over 200,000 people. Radioactive fallout from Mike was measured in rain over Japan, in Indian aircraft, and in the atmosphere over the US and Europe.

    (475)

     

    One scientist working for the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) declared in 1954 that after just two years of testing, all humans on the planet now had “hot” strontium in their bones and teeth and “hot” iodine in their thyroid glands: “Nobody believed you could contaminate the world from one spot. It was like Columbus when no one believed the world was round” (qtd. DeLoughrey 475). In fact, it was because of these post-WWII Cold War nuclear experiments conducted by the US military industrial complex that ecology became a field of study in the university system. To study the effects of this militarized radioactive contamination on the environment, the AEC created the discipline of “radiation ecology.” As DeLoughrey so powerfully documents, the establishment of this field began with the hundreds of nuclear tests conducted in what was known as the “Pacific Proving Grounds.” By 1958, the U.S., the United Kingdom, and the USSR had exploded nearly one hundred nuclear weapons, leading to record levels of strontium-90 in American soil, wheat, and milk. This Cold War arms race was, more than anything else, a race for the total control of the planet through targeting, and this race for total control has led to the accident of total planetary ecosystem exposure and the impossibility for any human to transcend this contamination.

     
    As a theoretical term, “accident” defines the environment at the level of its being in our current historical occasion and plays a role in the way our minds constitute the environment as an object of investigation and use. Current connections to the environment consequently have their basis in what we should more properly call “the Accidental”—a term that names the colonization of transcendence by breakdowns that occur as the prime mover of the system, not by breakdowns that radically open a free space for the potential to restructure the system. In the ontology of the Accidental, productive and successful citizen-subjects are constituted in terms of their ability, and consent, to “protect” the environment (in other words, to secure the highest yield of energy). Unproductive subjects and the poorest of humans—especially those working in the worst possible conditions in agricultural communities in the third world, the shadow humans that make the north and the west possible—are increasingly seen as a threat to the environment and to this new, enclosed environmentality. The Accidental thus names a world in which constituents and their environments can only appear in the form of accidents.
     
    In this erasure of the transcendental in favor of the Accidental, our access to ecology changes fundamentally. “Environmentality” is the term I have been using to mark that change, and it is meant to invoke, in part, Foucault’s conception of governmentality—that is, as a political constitution and administration of planetary ecosystems on the basis of their ability to be technologically “improved” so as to produce “high yields.” To this we can now add the force of the Accidental, which chokes out the possibility of alternative ecological relations for purposes of total control and total security. Manipulation can thus be addressed more critically (i.e., outside dominant theories of sovereignty) in terms of the lines being drawn between corporate/State flows of power and ecosystemic developments—namely the corporate, judicial, and legislative alliances being formed around the struggle for diminishing resources, and the impending shift to non-petroleum sources for global mass transportation and global mass consumption. Though the State is part of this shift, it and the cultural socius lag behind the direct activity of what should be understood properly as the developing Accidental State—a structure composed of environmental organizations, State and corporate officials, security institutes, centers for foreign and domestic policy, private companies, and the military. In the constitution of the Accidental State (that functions through acts of “speaking for,” not “speaking before”) inhabitants and the environment are manifested so as to face one another as antagonisms.
     
    This self-destructive pattern of existence restages the Cold War scenario of nuclear testing. Unlike the Cold War experiment, however, this new attempt to transfer our environmental and economic future to the military (culture does not even have a place in this arena) manifests the full-scale structure of environmentality. Before, humans only achieved their realization of the Accidental by accident, so to speak (though this accident was firmly organized according to an Accidental economy—the targeting logistical control and command theater of geopolitical concern); now, humans have learned how to harness the full potential of the Accidental by organizing its structures wholly in accord with its rigid and closed-loop structural dictates. In the discourse of this neomilitarialism, environmental breakdown replaces humanity’s concern for the environment. The environment as essentially a being-breaking-down becomes the new universal truth of humanity’s existence in the world—humanity’s mandate—essentially hard-wiring conflict and adaptation to the civilian brain, and erasing the pole of the citizen-subject that potentializes liberation. From this position it is a small step for the military to install in the minds of a civilian population the idea that the environment is humanity’s ultimate enemy. In this fantasmatic imaginary, the preservation of the planet—namely, the conception of the antagonistic paradox of the citizen-subject—is so far from the problematic field view that it starts to disappear from human consciousness in favor of walled and viciously defended spaces, all in the name of a pragmatics totally alienated from its own assumptions, a pragmatics that unrelentingly extinguishes any other economic, political, or cultural conceptions of existence. If these developments continue as they are currently beginning, the figure of the citizen-subject will most definitely become “like a face of sand at the edge of the sea,” “effaced [in] the next great sea change” (Balibar 55).
     

    Robert P. Marzec is Associate Professor of ecocriticism and postcolonialism in the Department of English at Purdue University. He is the author of An Ecological and Postcolonial Study of Literature (Palgrave 2007), the editor of Postcolonial Literary Studies: the First 30 Years (Johns Hopkins 2011), and the associate editor of Modern Fiction Studies. He has published articles in journals such as boundary 2, Radical History Review, Public Culture, The Global South, and The Journal of Commonwealth and Postcolonial Studies.
     

     

    Footnotes

     

    1. See Manuel De Landa, War in the Age of Intelligent Machines (New York: Zone Books, 1991); Paul Virilio, War and Cinema: The Logistics of Perception (London: Verso, 1989); Paul Virilio, Popular Defense and Ecological Struggles (New York: Semiotext(e), 1990); Elizabeth DeLoughrey, “Radiation Ecologies and the Wars of Light,” Modern Fiction Studies 55.3 (Fall 2009): 468-495; Mike Hill, “Ecologies of War,” in Telemorphosis 171-97, forthcoming.

     

    2. The term “green patriot” has actually been adopted by US neoconservatives since 2007. See http://greenpatriot.us/.

     

    3. As we will see, though, even this iron law can be pushed beyond its limit to open a new threshold of military sovereignty. Argues retired Marine Corps General Anthony Zinni, former commander of US forces in the Middle East: “We will pay to reduce greenhouse gas emissions today, and we’ll have to take an economic hit of some kind. Or, we will pay the price later in military terms. And that will involve human lives. There will be a human toll” (qtd. Sullivan et al. 31).

     

    4. “A warmer climate will be bad news for global agriculture, with regional winners and losers, says Andrew Challinor of the University of Leeds, UK. Agronomists are busy designing new varieties of staple crops like rice and wheat able to survive more frequent heatwaves and droughts, and organisations like the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research are helping farmers find out what works for them. Despite such efforts, crops will fail more often, probably leading to food-price spikes” (see Marshall).

     

    5. This catastrophic language was in fact transferred over to the National Security Act of 2010. The Act, however, placed more emphasis on developing sustainable energy solutions within an economic model that would help to rebuild the American economy. See National Security Strategy 2010, 9.

     

    6. See my article on “Energy Security: the Planetary Fulfillment of the Enclosure Movement.”

     

    7. At the time of this writing, sixteen scientists had just published a screed on the “pseudoscience” of climate change in The Wall Street Journal. See “No Need to Panic About Global Warming.”

     

    8. See Air University’s Air University Space Primer (3-1), especially Chapter 3. See also Allen Thomson. The Command appears to have become the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command.

     

    9. As Walden Bello points out, the US actions in relation to the 2005 tsunami were anything but this touted humanitarian engagement:
     

    The relief operations were not a disinterested, peacetime military mission. One immediate sign was the deliberate U.S. effort to marginalize the United Nations (UN), which was expected by many to coordinate, at least at the formal level, the relief effort. Instead, Washington sought to bypass the UN by setting up a separate assistance ‘consortium’ with India, Australia, Japan, Canada, and several other governments, with the U.S. military task force’s Combined Coordination Center at University of Tapao, Thailand, effectively serving as the axis of the entire relief operation.

    (309)

     
    The stealth orchestration of the relief efforts was, in part, an attempt on the part of the Bush Administration to repair the damaged image of the US military machine in the wake of the Iraqi War and the War on Terror, which was particularly unpopular to the Muslim majority in Indonesia and the Southeast Asian region in general. It was also a chance for the “Pacific Command”—the oldest of the US military commands—to reenergize its waning power and influence in the “Pacific theater,” which had diminished after the Vietnam War (309).

     

    10. The report was apparently originally available to the public, but the URL provided in Parson’s report is no longer available. Research on the CNA Web site produces the title of the report, but the page states that the report is not for public viewing. See http://www.cna.org/research/2009/chinas-national-defense-2008-panel-discussion. Accessed Dec. 2, 2011.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Agamben, Giorgio. State of Exception. Trans. Kevin Attell. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2005. Print.
    • Air University. Air University Space Primer. Maxwell Airforce Base. Aug. 2003. Web. 13 Sept.2011.
    • Balibar, Étienne. “Citizen Subject.” Who Comes After the Subject? Ed. Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor and Jean-Luc Nancy. New York: Routledge, 1991. 33-57. Print.
    • Bello, Walden. “Conclusion: From American Lake to a People’s Pacific in the Twenty-First Century.” Militarized Currents: Toward a Decolonized Future in Asia and the Pacific. Ed. Setsu Shigematsu and Keith L. Camacho. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2010. 309-322. Print.
    • Burke, Sharon and Christine Parthemore. Climate Change War Game: Major Findings and Background. Working Paper. Center for a New American Security. Jun. 2009. Web. 15 Feb. 2013.
    • DeLoughrey, Elizabeth. “Radiation Ecologies and the Wars of Light.” Modern Fiction Studies 53:3 (Fall 2009): 474-75.
    • Derrida, Jacques. “Ethics and Politics Today.” Negotiations: Interventions and Interviews: 1971-2001. Ed. and trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2002. 295-314. Print.
    • Foucault, Michel. The History of Sexuality: An Introduction Vol. 1. Trans. Robert Hurley. New York: Random House, 1990. Print.
    • Johnson, Douglas V. II. “Global Climate Change: National Security Implications.” US Army War College and Triangle Institute for Security Studies. 1 May 2007. Web. 15 Jun. 2011.
    • Marshall, Michael. “Earth in Balmy 2080.” New Scientist 5 Dec. 2011. Web. 12 Feb. 2013.
    • Marzec, Robert P. “Energy Security: the Planetary Fulfillment of the Enclosure Movement.” Radical History Review 109 (Winter 2011): 83-99. Print.
    • “No Need to Panic About Global Warming.” The Wall Street Journal 26 Jan. 2012. Web. 13 Feb. 2013.
    • Parsons, Rymn J. “Taking Up the Security Challenge of Climate Change.” US Army War College and Triangle Institute for Security Studies. Aug. 2009. Web. 15 Jun. 2011.
    • Rancière, Jacques. Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1999. Print.
    • Stillman, Dan. “DoD Takes Aim at Climate Change.” Imaging Notes Spring 2010. Web. 1 Aug.2011.
    • Sullivan, Gordon, et al. “National Security and the Threat of Climate Change.” The Center for Naval Analyses. 2007. Web. 13 Feb. 2013.
    • Thomson, Allen. “US Naval Space Command Space Surveillance System.” Space Policy Project. Federation of America Scientists. n.d. Web. 13 Sept. 2011.
    • United States. White House. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington. Sept. 2002. Web. 13 Feb. 2013.
    • ———. National Security Strategy 2010. Washington. May 2010. Web. 16 Jun. 2011.
    • Virilio, Paul. Unknown Quantity. London: Thames and Hudson, 2003. Print.
    • Žižek, Slavoj. “Class Struggle or Postmodernism? Yes, please!” Contingency, Hegemony, Universality. London: Verso, 2000. 90-135. Print.
  • Impossible People, Queer Futures: Dean Spade and Critical Trans Politics

    Charles J. Gordon (bio)

    University of California, Irvine
    cjgordon@uci.edu
     

     

    Review of Dean Spade, Normal Life: Administrative Violence, Critical Trans Politics, and the Law. New York: South End Press, 2011.

     

     

    Roughly ten years ago, the government changed my name to Charles. Ironically, this closely followed the moment when I’d decided to go by C.J. in an effort to avoid the gender-marker of my unmistakably female birth name. After filing my tax returns, what was presumably a clerical error altered the personal data on file with the IRS. When I attempted to have the mistake corrected and my information regularized, I discovered that the new data had spread to a number of government agencies, including the Social Security Administration. Newly christened in some, but not all contexts, I confronted the acute difficulties of navigating the administrative apparatuses of the state that govern daily life while equipped with an illegible gender and mismatched identity documents. The lethal consequences of these administrative systems for trans people, especially those suffering from multiple vectors of discrimination, is the subject of Dean Spade’s Normal Life. As trans activism becomes institutionalized and mainstreamed, channeled into the paths taken by lesbian and gay organizations, Spade asks us to reconsider the costs and benefits of centering social justice work in demands for legal recognition which take the form of inclusion in anti-discrimination acts, hate crimes legislation, marriage recognition, and military service rights. A series of questions surrounding the place of legal work in the context of activism motivate Normal Life, a text that is fundamentally suspicious of the promises made by the law to rectify inequality and remediate damages through its power to punish. In the historical moment in which the dominant institutions of the neoliberal state are offering some degree of legitimation and recognition to trans people, who benefits from incorporation into protected categories and full citizenship, and who is excluded? Does power operate in such a way that modifications to the law actually change the conditions of life faced by those suffering from poverty, employment discrimination, and criminalization? What roles should lawyers play within grassroots organizations, and what risks attend prioritizing the goals of professionals within these groups? As a lawyer, a law professor, and the founder of an important legal aid nonprofit that serves trans people and gender-nonconforming people enduring poverty, Spade’s text is marked by a continuous reconsideration of the possibilities and dangers of appeals to the law. Perhaps because the law is slippery, offering the pretense of change while co-opting the language of oppressed groups, processing is the dominant mode of Normal Life‘s argumentation about legal strategies every step of the way, such that the text embodies a practice that “questions its own effectiveness, engaging in constant reflection and self-evaluation” (19).
     
    Drawing on important work in critical race theory and women of color feminism, Spade argues that claims for legal inclusion do little to impact the actual life chances of most trans people, either by reducing levels of violence towards gender nonconforming subjects or by alleviating the structural conditions that disproportionately consign trans people to lives of poverty, criminalization, and medical neglect. Indeed, such demands take the teeth out of the transformative potential of activism, benefiting only the most privileged trans people at the expense of the most vulnerable members of the community, those whose marginalization is compounded by their immigration status, disability, race, class, and indigeneity. Worse yet, by soliciting the law’s recognition, such activism stands to aggravate already terrible conditions by legitimizing institutions that perpetuate racist, heterosexist, xenophobic, and transphobic violence, amplifying their power to punish and control. In equal parts critical and constructive, Normal Life links a manifesto for a transformative politics firmly focused on the needs of the most vulnerable members of the queer and trans communities with a blistering appraisal of the assimilationist strategies of gay and lesbian rights organizations in the context of neoliberalism.
     
    While Spade explicitly intervenes in critical prison studies and critical legal studies, I want to tap Normal Life as a significant contribution to queer theory’s turn to futurity, texts that seek out alternate political and social formations that cannot be recuperated by what Lee Edelman terms the heteropatriarchal project of “reproductive futurism.”1 Normal Life is an especially important example of what José Muñoz identifies as the chief task of queer utopianism: to envision new and better worlds, different modes of social relation and political organization that break out of the suffocating “here and now” by distilling transformative potentials from the “then and there.” A striking poverty of imagination informs the advocates of the new homonormativity, groups unable to envision either how the benefits they associate with legally recognized partnership might be uncoupled from the institution of marriage or how those benefits would fail to address the needs of those most vulnerable to homophobia.2 Spokespersons from these conservatized activist groups espouse a certain brand of political realism that rejects the possibility of meaningful change in favor of surface-level modifications that make fundamentally unequal institutions appear more multicultural and inclusive. By way of contrast, Spade returns to the activist movements of the 60s and 70s, renewing their demands for sweeping structural change that cannot be conceptualized, much less met by the institutions that distribute security and vulnerability: “a critical trans politics imagines and demands an end to prisons, homelessness, landlords, bosses, immigration enforcement, poverty, and wealth. It imagines a world in which people have what they need and govern themselves in ways that value collectivity, interdependence, and difference” (68-69). Not merely incorporation into the status quo, but massive wealth redistribution, an abolition of state-sponsored violence, and an end to the racist and xenophobic apparatuses of state power animate the project described in Normal Life. Such demands are emerging from grassroots organizations led by people of color and dedicated to mobilizing those most affected by the issues at stake. Spade outlines a politics emanating from, and responsive to, the pressing needs of the trans community as a set of “impossible people” repeatedly told by “legal systems, state agencies, employers, schools, and our families” that we “are not who we say we are, cannot exist, cannot be classified, and cannot fit anywhere” (209). Activism that would truly attend to the difficulties of such impossible people could never come from altering the law to say “good” things about trans people (incorporating them into anti-discrimination laws) rather than “bad” things (for instance, criminalizing cross-dressing). Against the tunnel vision of conservatized, mainstream movements and the narrow realism that underwrites their limited demands, Spade judiciously reminds us not to believe the stories the law tells about itself, and to put less stock in what the law says about us.
     
    In the first chapter, Spade brackets the standard narrative peddled in textbooks and in the media claiming that American institutions were once racist and sexist but now ensure equality and fairness; that the law is colorblind and impartial; and that individuals must therefore be responsible for their own failure to flourish in an equitable society conditioned by market forces and governed democratically. To elaborate the context in which trans politics is taking shape, and in which legal reform strategies are situated, Spade discusses the neoliberal landscape of contemporary politics, a field marked by the upward distribution of wealth driven by factors such as privatization, trade liberalization, coercive debt loads, the elimination of unions, and the taxation of income rather than wealth. While the state sponsors this redistribution of wealth, preserving and protecting benefits enjoyed chiefly by white, heterosexual, middle- and upper-class populations, at the same time it drastically decreases the funding available for public services that benefit those groups disproportionately exposed to poverty. As the safety net recedes and services like education, public housing, food assistance, and health care are slashed under the political rhetoric of “belt-tightening” and “shared burdens,” massive resources have been allocated to ever-expanding criminalization and imprisonment systems that recapture those abandoned to poverty. Both cuts to crucial, life-preserving social services and the growth of the prison industrial complex have been sold to the public through the circulation of racist, sexist tropes such as the “Welfare Queen.” Because the cycles of abandonment and recapture are amplified and intensified for subjects experiencing multiple vectors of exclusion on account of race, class, disability, immigration status, or trans status, incorporation into the institutions responsible for producing this widespread vulnerability can only help the fraction of trans people who already enjoy race, class, education, citizenship, and passing privileges. Although Spade’s demands are utopian in the sense that José Muñoz describes, we can see that his view of life rendered illegible or impossible to the systems of institutional control is certainly not romanticized. Like other “impossible” groups, for instance illegal aliens, the very existence of trans people is written out of administrative apparatuses of the modern state, which consistently excludes trans people from protective and care-taking services while recapturing them for the necropolitical goals of abandonment, punishment, and imprisonment.3
     
    Chapter two more closely examines the problems that follow from demanding rights and legal recognition, specifically inclusion in anti-discrimination statutes and hate crimes laws, as the central measure of progress. In both cases, Spade powerfully argues that such laws have essentially no effect on the life chances of populations who experience outrageous levels of violence and discrimination. There is no evidence that hate crimes laws actually reduce instances of bias-motivated crime, and more to the point, law enforcement officials are the primary source of violence against queer and trans people, especially transwomen of color. Similarly, as critical race theory has amply demonstrated for other marginalized groups, despite the existence of laws explicitly forbidding discrimination on the grounds of race, sex, or sexuality, these laws are interpreted so narrowly as to be essentially useless, even for those individuals that can afford the high costs of legal aid associated with enforcing those rights. Furthermore, Spade argues that these legal reform strategies have serious misconceptions of what constitutes discrimination, recognizing it only when it operates at the individual level. As such, the institutional vectors that exacerbate poverty and directly inflict state-sponsored violence at the level of population remain untouched. Changing anti-discrimination and hate crimes law so that, officially, the law says it values the lives of trans people, will not prevent discrimination and violence. Instead, by promoting such laws, the prison industrial complex co-opts the grief and suffering of the trans community and turns it into an avenue for further expansion, new prisons, additional funding to police, and increased prosecutorial discretion. Inevitably, those resources will be exercised against communities of color, the homeless, sex workers, and illegal immigrants, including those who are trans.
     
    In chapter three, Spade offers an alternative to the perpetrator/victim model of discrimination, locating the sources of systematic abandonment in sites other than the individual intentions of biased people in order to understand the real causes of shortened life spans in trans subjects. Taking his theoretical cues from Foucault’s Society Must Be Defended and Ruth Gilmore’s Golden Gulag, Spade describes the state as a system of distributed, decentralized agencies designed to manage the productive and reproductive forces of different populations while unequally distributing life chances among them. Although he rarely uses the word, Spade provides a thick account of the neoliberal state as biopolitical, a system of population-management.4 When the state is conceptualized as a caretaker that promotes the life of the nation, invariably certain populations are cast as internal threats to the body politic, “drains” on its energy that unfairly consume resources and menace the health, security, and economic well-being of the “deserving” members. A politics centered on legal inclusion recapitulates this logic, dividing the community internally by lobbying for the incorporation and protection of good, deserving members while abandoning those who are the most excluded and compromised. A more transformative platform would aim for the elimination of institutions founded in racism and settler colonialism, insisting on race, gender, and economic justice for all without exception.
     
    Having established the biopolitical framework that governs the allocation of security and vulnerability in the context of neoliberalism and advanced capitalism, Spade reconsiders the legal apparatuses that actually impact the lives of trans people, the administrative systems responsible for distributing life chances. If anti-discrimination and hate crimes laws will have little effect on the daily life of most trans people, the administrative systems that interface between state power and individual subjects are a significant source of violence, discrimination, and abandonment for trans individuals. Spade focuses on the complexities trans people face in their attempts to secure identity documents that correspond to gender identity; receive access to sex-segregated facilities such as rehabilitation centers, public bathrooms, homeless shelters, and prisons; and acquiring health care. Identity documents are governed by a variety of institutions, most of which have entirely different requirements that must be met before gender markers can be altered, many of which require evidence of medical treatment and surgery. Because Medicaid and most private health insurance policies specifically exclude trans people from receiving the gender-confirming health care required to change these documents (and to prevent some measure of street harassment, employment discrimination, and suicide), most trans people have conflicting sets of IDs. These discrepancies significantly increase the barriers trans people face when attempting to access social service agencies, which play a particularly ubiquitous role in the lives of impoverished communities. The outright rejection of welfare services contributes to the abandonment and exposure of trans people already experiencing poverty. Trans people also have difficulty accessing sex-segregated facilities that correspond with their gender identity, exposing them to enormous violence. An analysis of the biopolitical nature of the actuarial state indicates that legal-reform strategies, to the extent they are employed for a critical trans politics, should focus their energies on the administrative systems that regularly contribute to the shortened life spans experienced by trans people.
     
    The final chapter addresses concerns with the emerging shape of non-profit organization, which increasingly borrows its infrastructural models from the private sector. Because of the shortage of social services, these non-profits play an important role in meeting the needs of groups abandoned by the state. However, the function of non-profits in distributing resources is suspect because they tend to be funded by corporations and the wealthy, who maintain active roles in directing the goals of the organizations, and as such, these groups cannot be expected to achieve any transformative changes in the maldistribution of wealth and security. Furthermore, organizations lack radical agendas because grassroots mass-mobilizations have been targeted and criminalized for the past thirty years while non-profits with limited demands that support the status quo have been funded. This has also encouraged the emergence of non-profit administration as a career track for young white people with graduate degrees who concentrate decision-making power in the hands of executive boards and funding agencies while excluding the voices of those who are purportedly being served. Spade turns to the Miami Workers Center’s “Four Pillars of Social Justice Infrastructure” for alternate models of community organizing that truly respond to the needs of marginalized groups and build leadership from within the community itself. As counter-examples to the non-profit industrial complex, the conclusion looks to activist groups and coalitions, especially those organized by people of color, that provide models of consensus-based, grassroots organizing dedicated to eliminating violence without expanding the logics of imprisonment, exile, colonialism, and nationalism.
     
    Normal Life encourages us to imagine and organize for queer futures that reject the restrictive vision of legal reforms that would exchange the incorporation of a sliver of trans people while consigning the rest to abandonment. At a time in which gay marriage is promoted as the last remaining civil rights issue, Normal Life insists that a properly queer agenda would not exclude anyone and would work for a world without prisons or borders or poverty. Against lobbying campaigns that insist that assimilation into the ever more quickly diminishing middle class is the only available channel for activism, Dean Spade reminds us that what’s really queer is to give away money.
     

    Charles Gordon is a Ph.D. student in Comparative Literature at UC Irvine. He is currently completing a dissertation on Shakespeare’s architectural imaginary entitled “Shakespeare’s Landscape Futures.” He has published articles on Shakespeare and design as well as medieval host desecration narratives.
     

     

    Footnotes

     
    1. Important recent texts engaging with queer futurity include Jasbir Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (Durham: Duke UP, 2007); José Muñoz, Cruising Utopia: The Then and There of Queer Futurity (New York: NYU UP, 2009; Jack Halberstam, In a Queer Time and Place: Transgender Bodies, Subcultural Lives (New York: NYU UP, 2005); Elizabeth Freeman, Time Binds: Queer Temporalities, Queer Histories (Durham: Duke UP, 2010).

     

     

    2. On the new homonormativity, see Duggan (50).

     

    3. Mae Ngai describes the illegal alien as an “impossible subject” for the modern state, “a person who cannot be and a problem that cannot be solved” (5).

     

    4. Spade writes elsewhere with an explicitly biopolitical framework (Spade and Willse).

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Duggan, Lisa. Twilight of Equality? Neoliberalism, Cultural Politics, and the Attack on Democracy. Boston: Beacon, 2003. Print.
    • Edelman, Lee. No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive. Durham: Duke UP, 2004. Print.
    • Ngai, Mae. Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of America. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2004. Print.
    • Spade Dean and Craig Willse. “Freedom in a Regulatory State? Lawrence, Marriage and Biopolitics.” Widener Law Review 11.2 (2004): 309-329. Print.
    • Copyright © 2013 Postmodern Culture & the Johns Hopkins University Press
  • The Temporal Logic of Digital Media Technologies

    Kurt Cavender (bio)

    Brandeis University

    kcavende@brandeis.edu

    A review of Wolfgang Ernst, Digital Memory and the Archive. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2012.

    Digital Memory and the Archive represents the first collection in English of Wolfgang Ernst’s particular brand of media theory. As such, the volume necessarily attempts to satisfy three distinct demands: to outline the “media archeology” that characterizes Ernst’s work, to sample instances where this broad logic engages various technologies with particularly productive results, and to establish Ernst’s relation to a so-called “Berlin school” of German media theory that began to emerge with the work of materialist thinkers such as Friedrich Kittler, and in which Ernst is a central figure. The result is a collection of essays in which the hand of the editor, Jussi Parikka, is remarkably present. In addition to an extensive introduction, in which Parikka articulates the media-archeological method in the context of Ernst’s career and the German media theory of Kittler, Bernhard Siegert, and Wolfgang Schaffner, Parikka introduces each of the three bundles of essays that compose the book—”The Media-Archeological Method,” “Temporality and the Multimedia Archive,” and “Microtemporal Media”—carefully curating the conceptual unity of the volume. In this sense, Digital Memory and the Archive is as much a triumph of Parikka’s own clear theoretical and editorial vision as it is a presentation of Ernst’s work.
     
    To speak of German media theory or a Berlin school is, Parikka concedes, to rely on “a catch-all term that does not account for the variety of disciplinary perspectives that fit the category” (3). This might be useful, but such a broad generalization risks ignoring real and important theoretical or methodological differences. In his own book, What Is Media Archeology?, Parikka suggests that the apparent unity of Ernst’s, Kittler’s, and others’ individual concerns emerges from two common impulses: first, “a critical reaction to the Marxist analyses of media by the Frankfurt school, and . . . a desire to differentiate from British cultural studies”; and second, a materialist insistence that “it is mathematics and engineering that concretely construct worlds through modern technology” (66-7). These twin concerns—to liberate media studies from the narrativizing tendencies of historical analysis, and to privilege the material forms of technology hardware and scientific apparatus over merely cultural content—become the clear foundation of Ernst’s own program for media archeology, offered in the second essay, “Media Archaeography: Method and Machine versus the History and Narrative of Media”:

    The term media archeology describes modes of writing that are not human products but rather expressions of the machines themselves, functions of their very mediatic logic. . . . Technological media that operate on the symbolic level (i.e., computing) differ from traditional symbolic tools of cultural engineering (like writing in the alphabet) by registering and processing not just semiotic signs but physically real signals. The focus shifts to digital signal processing (DSP) as cultural technology instead of cultural semiotics.

    (58)

    In moments like this, the affinity between Ernst’s media archeology and Kittler’s media discourse analysis is most strongly felt. Indeed, Ernst’s insistence that reality is in some sense constituted by media technology rather than by a mediated circulation of signs strongly resonates with Kittler’s claim, in the introduction to Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, that “we [are] in possession of storage technologies that can record and reproduce the very time flow of acoustic and optical data. Ears and eyes have become autonomous. And that changed the state of reality. . . . Media ‘define what really is’; they are always already beyond aesthetics” (3).

     
    If anything distinguishes Ernst’s own project, it is his consistent foregrounding of the agency of archival technologies themselves (not entirely ignored, but perhaps underdeveloped in Kittler’s work), and his persistent focus on the mechanical conditions of temporal perception. Here, Ernst’s reliance on Foucault’s argument that archeological or archival excavation of the epistemic conditions of knowledge can liberate the past from the narrativizing logic of historical discourse becomes clear—not in the materialist-technologist commitments, but in its account of historical rupture: “a Foucault-driven media archaeology accentuates discontinuities and primordial differences” (24). Foucault’s innovation in The Archaeology of Knowledge is to reconceptualize the archive as “the law of what can be said, the system that governs the appearance of statements as unique events” (129), but also as
     

    that which determines that all these things said do not accumulate endlessly in an amorphous mass, nor are they inscribed in an unbroken linearity, nor do they disappear at the mercy of chance external accidents; but they are grouped together in distinct figures, composed together in accordance with multiple relations, maintained or blurred in accordance with specific regularities. . . . that which differentiates discourses in their multiple existence and specifies them in their own duration.

    (129)

    For Ernst, the critical connection in Foucault’s thought is between discursive accounts of temporality—linearity, duration, chronology, history—and the set of laws, rules, protocols, and algorithms that organizes knowledge. Parikka’s arrangement and framing of Ernst’s work emphasizes this connection as a generative insight for media archeology: “temporal ontology offers a way to understand how all computer-based, calculational media are temporal, and this forces us to rethink the spatial emphasis of older regimes of memory” (77). The digital revolution in archival technologies—from the old media of film, print, and record to a new “technomathematical media” of “read-only and random access, registers, accumulators, buffers, cycle and access times, and latency” (77)—constitutes not just a technological shift, but a materialization of an always latent temporal dimension of the archive.

     
    The sense that the algorithms and protocols that govern digital archives are merely a continuation of the governing logic of the Foucaultian archive makes one point of contact between German media theory and Anglo-American thinkers. It is hard not to hear intimations here of Marshall McLuhan’s proposal that the content of media is always only other media, or even Matthew Fuller’s claim, in Media Ecologies, that “a technology is a bearer of forces and drives . . . is composed by the mutual intermeshing of various other forces that might be technical, aesthetic, economic, chemical” (56). Indeed, Fuller’s theorization of media ecologies as Deleuzian assemblages of forces, processes, and techniques that support and animate the technological artifact might be understood as a dialectical negation of the Berlin school’s articulation of the determinative power of the technological artifacts themselves.
     
    But what does Ernst mean by suggesting, against a prior spatial understanding of the archive, that a latent temporality is activated by new digital media technologies? And more importantly, what is at stake in such a claim? The answer begins with the media phenomenon known as time-shifting, the recording of programming to a storage medium for viewing at a later time. Ernst writes in the fourth essay, “Archives in Transition: Dynamic Media Memories,” that the implication of, for instance, online archival storage of recently broadcast television programming is that “the old opponents ‘past’ and ‘present’, ‘archive’ and ‘immediate event’, become submerged in time shifting, which is the temporal essence of digital media operations” (99). This archive-enabled dislocation of the broadcast event from the structure of its programmed context becomes, for Ernst, the characteristic operation of digital media technologies.
     
    In the following essay, “Between Real Time and Memory on Demand: Reflections on Television,” he writes: “Minimal-delay memories are at work in time-based and time-critical media, especially if we do not notice them. Dramatically, these binary micromemories dissimulate apparent live transmission by calculation in real time” (100). More than just one of a set of functions made available by digital media technology, this memory-supported disruption of linear programming, and the “increasing spatiotemporal entanglement” that follows (100), become the defining operation of new archival technologies. The necessary result, for Ernst, is not just a shift in the way we perceive temporality in the present—from linear narrative progression to multi-tiered, anti-sequential sets of interchangeable protocols—but a discursive challenge to the very regimes of historical knowledge that Foucault first excavates in The Archaeology of Knowledge. What Foucault achieves with a sociological approach to knowledge production, Ernst intends to supplement and affirm through the study of technomathematical media structures in which the discontinuities, gaps, absences, silences, and ruptures that constitute the unspoken real of historical discourse are materialized.
     
    The question that remains, then, is what sort of temporal model the archive offers in place of narrative discourse. Ernst suggests in the seventh essay, “Telling versus Counting: A Media-Archeological Point of View,” that the key function of the archive has always been quantification, sequential ordering, and the raw accumulation of data-points without positing the kind of relational connectivity that generates narrative: “Historical imagination asks for iconic coherence, to be separated from the organization of knowledge about the past in the form of naked data banks. But registering time does not necessarily require the narrative mode to organize the factual field in a form that we call information” (150). The linear coherence of historical discourse is not the necessary or inevitable form that temporal information assumes; rather, it is imposed upon historical knowledge by discursive imagination. The digital data bank is, in its temporal arrangement, a rematerialization of an historical technology that precedes the discourses of modernity, the medieval annales:
     

    When all sensual dimensions are quantifiable, even the temporal resolution, telling gets liberated from the narrative grip—a media-archeological amnesia of cultural techniques like that of the early medieval annales, sequential notations of temporal events with no metahistorical, narrative prefiguration. We get a glimpse of a way of processing cultural experience that does not need stories (not yet? not anymore?).

    (149)

    For Ernst, the power of digital memory technologies is twofold. First, embedded within their protocols, processes, and algorithms is a material privileging of pure sequential quantification over the “iconic coherence” of the narrative impulse. The alphabet and even more-so its successor, binary code, exist as memory operations of pure “diachronic clustering,” where “data exist not for themselves but in relation to the series that in each case precedes or follows— without being subjected to romance, where causality and the foregrounding/backgrounding of events are expressed through explicit narrative subordination” (150-51). The full range of media technologies that emerge from and depend upon these operations are therefore predisposed to a particular, anti-historical temporal logic. The second power of digital technologies is that, by manifesting this operational logic in the present, they rewrite or restructure the very history of archival technologies themselves. The passage from epic discourse of listed knowledge (such as Homer’s “Catalogue of Ships”) to medieval annales to the digital hard drive is no longer a narrative of progression, but a series of iterations of the same temporal logic – what Ernst calls “a way of processing cultural experience that does not need stories” (149).

     
    In his brief introduction to “Temporality and the Multimedia Archive,” the volume’s second and most theoretically substantial bundle of essays, Parikka articulates the stakes of Ernst’s project. The essays and articles collected here form a necessary program of reading, not just for media theorists, but also for cultural studies thinkers and archival professionals, because they present a compelling argument that “we need to update our notions of the archive in order to understand the specific technicity of contemporary culture” (78). It is here, perhaps, that we encounter the limit of the Berlin school’s media archeological project. Parikka argues that “if we fail to address the time-critical, technomathematical modulation of what comes out as the almost like [sic] metaphoric surface effect . . . we fail to understand where power lies in contemporary culture” (78-9). Parikka’s claim, echoing the arguments of Ernst, Kittler, and their colleagues, is that only by studying the digital technologies that constitute modern media societies can we uncover the deep system of discursive rules that structure modern cultural experience. It is too easy, I think, to raise the obvious objections—that such a claim seems to simplistically assume an evenly distributed level of global technological penetration into daily life, that it seems to focus too much on the technology itself and not enough on the technological practices and habits of persons or institutions, that it approaches a reductive technological determinism that does not account for the ways in which a technology might embody multiple contradictory logics—but these are all critiques of which Ernst is aware and which he attempts, to some extent, to anticipate in his work.
     
    The most significant limitation to the essays presented in this volume seems to emerge in their relationship to Foucault’s project, from which they draw substantial methodological and theoretical support. Fuller, writing about Friedrich Kittler, voices a critique that seems equally appropriate here because it addresses some of the broad theoretical priorities that characterize the Berlin school as a whole. The critical excavation of deep discursive formations, he writes,
     

    is crucial to Foucault’s project, and it is what allows it to be so readily taken up as a political tool: The variability and power that Foucault’s approach in its various forms allows is recapitulated by Kittler, but with something of a sense in which this readily political aspect has itself been attenuated. Kittler’s glee at the displacement of “so-called man” from a universe that cradled him at its center tends occasionally toward a relocation of Hegelian Geist from the human to the technical object.

    (60-61)

    In Ernst’s work, as in Kittler’s, this “relocation of Hegelian Geist from the human to the technical object,” an almost celebratory attention to emerging techno-agencies as actors and determiners of human social relations, seems to leave very little room for the social effects of economics, politics, or culture. This is not to say that Ernst is a non-political thinker, merely that his work is far abstracted from its own explicitly political implications. Indeed, in the interview with Ernst that constitutes the final chapter of the volume, he says: “I want to be concerned with a reentry of economical, political, and cultural aspects into this media-archeological field—without giving up to cultural studies, though, which has overly neglected a precise analysis of technologies” (198). It may be most appropriate, then, to understand Digital Memory and the Archive not only as a self-contained work of materialist media theory, but also as a corrective text, an intervention into an Anglo-American media studies discourse that, Ernst suggests, is dominated by the technology-indifferent legacies of the Frankfurt school and British cultural studies.

     
    If Digital Memory and the Archive has a weakness, then, it is an occasional tendency to under-appreciate current trends in established media-focused fields such as Film Studies and the Digital Humanities, and emerging fields such as software studies and platform studies, all of which counter traditionally poststructuralist readings of digital cultural texts with various kinds of materialist reconsiderations of the role of hardware and software in shaping culture. For instance, N. Katherine Hayles’s work on “the cultural perception that information and materiality are conceptually distinct” suggests that human consciousness always exists in a dialectical relationship with technology (18), and her articulation of a post-liberal posthumanism posits a marked shift in postmodern cultural treatment of the material-consciousness relation. This seems to imply a distinctly historicist understanding of technoculture that, while sharing Ernst’s investment in technicity and technology, draws productively different conclusions about the temporality of technomathematical apparatus in ways that would only strengthen Ernst’s work if engaged. On the other hand, D.N. Rodowick’s study of the ontological shift from film cinema to digital cinema as a site for reconceptualizing virtuality and the imaginary seems to share Ernst’s anti-historicist impulse—new digital technologies disrupt the linear narrative by revealing a latent virtual dimension already present in celluloid film—without explicitly articulating Ernst’s sequential temporality. Lev Manovich’s Software Studies Initiative at UCSD and CUNY and the platform studies work of Nick Montfort and Ian Bogost represent similar emerging projects which do not seem to fit into Ernst’s characterization of Anglo-American neglect of technological analysis.
     
    These thinkers are connected with German media archeology not so much by methodological practices or theoretical commitments as by a set of motivating questions: What happens if, instead of analyzing the content of media, we interrogate media technologies, processes, and practices themselves? How might these technological conditions influence the shape of emerging human consciousness and self-consciousness? Can we expand our narrow, subject-oriented understanding of agency to include the kinds of tendencies and properties exhibited by complex machinic entities? Does the transition from analogue to digital technologies constitute an ontological shift from material reality to virtual informatics, or is there a deep unifying media logic? If Ernst is offering some sort of corrective intervention into a cultural studies approach to media studies, it is as part of a larger, trans-Atlantic challenge to humanistic, language-focused analysis that excludes or minimizes the real material conditions in which culture emerges. The result is an invaluable addition to a growing body of media scholarship willing to push beyond the insights of post-structuralism and cultural studies.
     

    Kurt Cavender is a Ph.D. candidate at Brandeis University. His work is concerned with theories of history and the American novel, with secondary interests in Film studies and the Digital Humanities. He has another review forthcoming in Cultural Studies (Spring 2013).

    Works Cited

    • Foucault, Michel. The Archaeology of Knowledge and The Discourse on Language. Trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith. New York: Harper Colophon, 1976. Print.
    • Fuller, Matthew. Media Ecologies: Materialist Energies in Art and Technoculture. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005. Print.
    • Hayles, N. Katherine. How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature and Informatics. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1999. Print.
    • Kittler, Friedrich A. Gramophone, Film, Typewriter. Trans. Geoffrey Winthrop-Young and Michael Wutz. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1999. Print.
    • Parikka, Jussi. What is Media Archeology? Malden: Polity Press, 2012. Print.
  • Notes On Contributors

    Étienne Balibar is Professor Emeritus of moral and political philosophy at Université de Paris X – Nanterre and Distinguished Professor of Humanities at the University of California, Irvine, and is currently Visiting Professor at Columbia University in the City of New York. He has published widely in the area of Marxist philosophy and moral and political philosophy in general. His many works include Lire le Capital (with Louis Althusser, Pierre Macherey, Jacques Rancière, Roger Establet, and F. Maspero) (1965); Spinoza et la politique (1985); Nous, citoyens d’Europe? Les frontières, l’État, le peuple (2001); Politics and the Other Scene (2002); L’Europe, l’Amérique, la Guerre. Réflexions sur la mediationeuropéenne (2003); and Europe, Constitution, Frontière (2005).

    Craig Carson is Assistant Professor of English at Adelphi University and a former Harper-Schmidt Fellow and Collegiate Assistant Professor at the University of Chicago. His current book project, Eighteenth-Century Society of the Spectacle: Ethics and the Marketplace, examines eighteenth-century British literature, political economy, and commodity culture.

    Kurt Cavender is a Ph.D. candidate at Brandeis University. His work is concerned with theories of history and the American novel, with secondary interests in Film studies and the Digital Humanities. He has another review forthcoming in Cultural Studies (Spring 2013).

    Charles J. Gordon is a Ph.D. student in Comparative Literature at UC Irvine. He is currently completing a dissertation on Shakespeare’s architectural imaginary entitled “Shakespeare’s Landscape Futures.” He has published articles on Shakespeare and design as well as medieval host desecration narratives.

    Jennifer Greiman
    Jennifer Greiman is Associate Professor of English at the University at Albany, SUNY. She is the author of Democracy’s Spectacle: Sovereignty and Public Life in Antebellum American Writing (Fordham, 2010) and co-editor, with Paul Stasi, of The Last Western: Deadwood and the End of American Empire (bloomsbury 2013). Her current research is on democratic theory and the work of Herman Melville.

    Kir Kuiken is Assistant Professor of English at the University at Albany, SUNY. He recently completed a book manuscript entitled “Imagined Sovereignties: Towards a New Political Romanticism” and is currently working on a project about the role of Romanticism in contemporary critical and political theory. His published work includes essays on Derrida, Heidegger, and Benjamin.

    Robert P. Marzec is Associate Professor of ecocriticism and postcolonialism in the Department of English at Purdue University. He is the author of An Ecological and Postcolonial Study of Literature (Palgrave 2007), the editor of Postcolonial Literary Studies: the First 30 Years (Johns Hopkins 2011), and the associate editor of Modern Fiction Studies. He has published articles in journals such as boundary 2, Radical History Review, Public Culture, The Global South, and The Journal of Commonwealth and Postcolonial Studies.

    Warren Montag is the Brown Family Professor of European Literature at Occidental College. His most recent book is Althusser and His Contemporaries: Philosophy’s Perpetual War (Duke University Press, 2013). He is also editor of Décalages, a journal devoted to scholarship on Althusser and his circle.

    Erin Obodiac received her Ph.D. in Comparative Literature from the University of California, Irvine and has held teaching and research appointments at UC Irvine, the University of Leeds, and SUNY Albany. Her writings inquire about the relation between the institutional history of deconstruction, posthumanist theory, the discourse on technics and animality, and new media art forms. She is currently a Fellow at Cornell University’s Society for the Humanities completing a book called Robots at Risk: Transgenic Art and Corporate Personhood.

    Ji-Young Um is Visiting Assistant Professor with appointments in the American Studies Program and the English Department at Williams College. Um has written and presented on representations of minority soldiers in the U.S., intersections of militarism, empire, and racism, Asian Americans and U.S. wars in Asia, and visual cultures and race. She is currently working on a book manuscript that argues for reading America’s wars as racial projects that reveal the constitutive relationship between militarism and racism.

    Gavin Walker is Assistant Professor of History and East Asian Studies at McGill University in Montréal, Québec. Recent publications include “On Marxism’s Field of Operation: Badiou and the Critique of Political Economy” in Historical Materialism (20.2) and “Primitive Accumulation and the Formation of Difference: On Marx and Schmitt,” in Rethinking Marxism (23.3).

  • One or Two Ghosts for One or Two Lines

     
     

    Tan Lin

     

       
    tall blank zebras appear
    
     
                  A
    To care. The aerogramme made a lily of necessity,
    stumped box, redolence ribboned far off in the glass
    cities I opened and closed to the dandy
    drawers. A colt emerged on a clotted pansy. A pan
    required fanning. This repose a thread files.
    Inside the spitting rope sweeps
    like a foppish knot or lighthouse,
    a beam where the sun withers like snow
    in its box of jewels. Like a towel-like now.
    
     
    
    tiny broom zippers boxed
    
     
                   Z
    Light as a ruler, I knitted the whiffing train to coverlet.
    Dark, I had my lips. They travel apart when I kiss.
    Exonerated groove. The captioned stock box
    waved to the master's bedroom.
    Clacked suds. All flaking tide and shout
    was music walking out a headlamp.
    Engined isthmus, emerged track of levels, it could be
    nice. The pubescent birdie sleeps
    in a closed head. So,
    it knows or it knows.
    A crumb held out a mighty
    citron in a beak, screwed backwards.
    But no ox sniffled to an owl
    or stockinged box strum through bedroom.
    

     

  • Two Poems

     
     

    Judith Goldman and Lisa Jarnot

     

    One

     

    And where did the Dutch get their vocabulary?
    A “generation and transition” company make the
    water muddy. Transitional generation in company
    of a muddy mere formality: or was it going Dutch,
    in transmission to transition? A mere formality of Dutch,
    a merely formal vocabulary, to be used “in company”
    of Dutch transmissions. My mission was to dutch
    a trans-generation, to formulate transitions.
    Or was it going muddy in the company?
    I threw mud at mimesis, a mere Dutch formality.
    And where did the Dutch get their vocabulary?
    Formerly, the Dutch kept company without vocabulary.
    My former mission was a mere formality,
    but I doubled my Dutch on the company’s transmission.

     

    Two

     

    Primitive haze or composite rejection?
    Such training requires persistence–
    a fateful hour, a stupid wheel, praiseworthy
    annals–the main term “reaction” would be
    retained, though searching for innocuous
    phenomena. It was not enough to have
    a patternbook, a dictatorship, or to claw walls
    looking for paint. Returning to the decoding end:
    you make it more cryptic. I’ll pant effectively.
    Roughly, in the rough, we are roughing it.
    This happens when I forget to differentiate–
    a false proposition of the first order.
    Or say: “When you hate maps, you hate the future.”
    Our lines are at stake in the border.
     

  • The Fable of the Ants: Myopic Interactions in DeLillo’s Libra

    Bill Millard

    Department of English
    Rutgers University
    millard@zodiac.rutgers.edu

     

    “There are only two things in the world. Things that are true. And things that are truer than true.”

     

    –Weird Beard (Russell Lee Moore, a.k.a. Russ Knight), KLIF disk jockey in Libra

     

    I. Paranoias and paradigms: Who’s afraid of Don DeLillo?

     

    One of the most challenging qualities that Frank Lentricchia finds in Don DeLillo is that he “offers us no myth of political virginity preserved, no ‘individuals’ who are not expressions of–and responses to–specific historical processes” (“Introducing” 241). While most mainstream fiction of the Reagan era is marked by regionalisms and privatisms that bespeak an alarming poverty of imagination, DeLillo dares to project a world in its full political complexity and to grapple with ideas that might make some sense of events observed in the public sphere. Working within a culture that was both postmodern and nostalgic, a culture that longed for the pieties of laissez- faire economics and Euro-American bourgeois individualism while its socioeconomic institutions were busily breaking down any remaining space for individuals or individuality, DeLillo recognized that the 1980s could not be understood without attention to the problem of individual behavior in a social sphere hypersaturated with the products of signifying systems. The “seven seconds that broke the back of the American century” (Libra 181) is a superb symbolic moment on which to focus such attention, since it is obviously much more than a symbol.

     

    To publish a historical novel that posited a plausible chain of events leading to the assassination of John Kennedy was more than an act of defiant imagination or political chutzpah; it raised the stakes for the enterprise of fiction within a culture rapidly losing its allegiance to written language as a practical means of organizing experience. Libra makes the implicit claim that no matter what one might believe of the lone-gunman theory or the Warren Commission’s report–in CIA master-researcher Nicholas Branch’s view, “the megaton novel James Joyce would have written if he’d moved to Iowa City and lived to be a hundred” (181)–the assembly of explanatory narratives from the available evidence surrounding the events at Dealey Plaza is as legitimate a concern for a novelist as for any journalist, historian, or member of an investigative body. Given the evidentiary problems surrounding this assassination, the unexplained (or unsatisfyingly explained) deaths of participants in these events and witnesses to them, and the proliferation of conspiracy theories of varying degrees of credibility, the novelist may in fact be on stronger ground than members of these other fields in asserting truth claims about Kennedy’s death.

     

    This position depends on a precise characterization of the nature of a historical truth claim. Libra achieves its disruptive force by offering a fresh paradigm by which an event like the Kennedicide may be understood. This paradigm1 is post-individualist, while accounting for individual actions and decisions within social signifying systems; it refuses both the easy gambit of universal skepticism toward the possibility of explaining such an event and the equally easy temptation of overreaching causal conjecture. It is immune to charges that might be lodged from opposite directions: the accusation of credulity, involving the sense of universal connectivity associated with conspiracy theory (regarded as paranoid in both the vernacular and the Pynchonian senses), and that of ahistorical nihilism, involving the disjunctivity of explanations that lodge sole culpability with Oswald (and thus reduce an incident with massive social causes and consequences to private motivation, mere inexplicable insanity). DeLillo’s text implies an interpretive paradigm that neither overplays nor underplays its hand, connecting events with participants’ intentions while eschewing any model of those intentions as deliberate, purposeful, or necessarily connected with their outcomes.

     

    Libra‘s reception among the guardians of a conceptual border between fiction and the presumably nonfictional discourses of history, politics, and journalism was venomous to an astonishing but hardly inexplicable degree. Like Lentricchia, journalist Hal Crowther assesses the vituperation directed at DeLillo by George F. Will and Jonathan Yardley of the Washington Post as a significant barometer of the book’s power, an indication of the authoritarian paranoia that it arouses–a deeper and truer paranoia than the accounts Oliver Stone, James Garrison, the aficionado of the Austin bookstore’s “Conspiracy” section in Slacker, or any caller to a WBAI-FM talk show might conjure. Crowther posits a credible reason why the paranoia in corporate journalism’s higher circles might mirror or exceed the paranoia in the lower: “At the Post they love to talk about Watergate, but they don’t want to talk about Dallas. Establishment journalists know in their guts that they chickened out on the biggest story of their time and left it to fringe players and exhumers of Elvis” (330).2

     

    Both of the Post commentators are sniffishly dismissive of the political implications of Libra, but Will also makes an explicit case for historical disjunctivism: “It takes a steady adult nerve to stare unblinkingly at the fact that history can be jarred sideways by an act that signifies nothing but an addled individual’s inner turmoil” (qtd. in Crowther 323). Characteristically, Will takes a reasonable-sounding position in favor of willfully limiting the reach of historical reasoning. One may safely presume that any historian, journalist, congressional investigator, or novelist does desire “a steady adult nerve,” but Will’s argument fails to consider why causal inquiry must stop with the observation of individual pathology.

     

    Oswald, as DeLillo represents him in Libra, is indeed addled–afflicted, apparently congenitally, with a moderately severe combination of dyslexia and dysgraphia– and in constant personal turmoil. Will’s criticism thus seems not only disproportionate but misapplied to this novel. In depicting a clueless gunman who bases his actions on romantic adolescent notions of political destiny, plays into the hands of nearly every conspirator or would-be conspirator around him, and even carries the requisite familial baggage for the privatistic banalities of Freudian interpretation (absent father, domineering mother, and largely repressed but recurrent gay desires), doesn’t DeLillo provide individual-pathology theorists with all the evidence they need? But the crucial distinction here is between a reading that incorporates individual pathology and an individualist, disjunctivist reading. DeLillo’s offense, beyond merely “exhibit[ing] the same skepticism that was almost universal at the time the Warren Report was released” (Crowther 323), is continuing the investigation into and through the pathological individual. Oswald is pathological without being particularly distinct from his surroundings.

     

    Will and Yardley’s wagon-circling responses to Libra also resemble Tom Wolfe’s comments about Noam Chomsky’s theories of the structural imperatives of the news media within the corporate state, included in the documentary Manufacturing Consent (1992). Wolfe derisively dismisses Chomsky’s argument about control over the limits of permissible public debate on the grounds that it would require the manipulation of the media by a cabal of plotters, presumably gathered in a single room–a laughably cinematic image of organized malignity, mirrored from the right by Gen. Edwin Walker’s rant about the “Real Control Apparatus”:

     

    The Apparatus is precisely what we can’t see or name. We can’t measure it, gentlemen, or take its photograph. It is the mystery we can’t get hold of, the plot we can’t uncover. This doesn’t mean there are no plotters. They are elected officials of our government, Cabinet members, philanthropists, men who know each other by secret signs, who work in the shadows to control our lives. (Libra 283)

     

    Because his account of the Chomskyist critique adheres to the same individual-intentionalist paradigm, Wolfe cannot imagine a controlled discourse without conscious and practically omnipotent controllers; because they refuse to entertain possibilities beyond Warren Report orthodoxy and rational intentionalism, Will and Yardley conflate DeLillo with the “fringe players and exhumers of Elvis.” To posit mechanisms by which fringe players operate is hardly to embrace the fringe oneself. Like Chomsky elucidating the hard-wired requirements of the information industry, DeLillo outlines certain inevitable tendencies of organized sub rosa actions, aware that those tendencies go into effect no matter who does the organizing or why.

     

    Cluelessness is indeed central to the actions of this novel, but it is crucial to recognize that cluelessness in this political atmosphere is by no means limited to Oswald. From Win Everett’s private mixture of motivations (only belatedly incorporating the recognition that “the idea of death is woven into the nature of every plot” [221]) to David Ferrie’s sexual desires and religious mysticism, private perceptions with distinct limits shape the actions of each participant in the action of Libra. A plot against JFK arises, but without the conscious guidance of its master plotters. It is a conspiracy that Wolfe, Will, and Yardley would not recognize, an overarching “deathward logic” (221) that encompasses clever players like George de Mohrenschildt, whose loathing for Gen. Walker elicits his only expressions of strong emotion (55-56), and the CIA’s Laurence Parmenter (“part of the Groton-Yale-OSS network of so-called gentlemen spies . . . the pure line, a natural extension of schoolboy societies, secret oaths and initiations” [30]) along with willfully delusional Birchers like Guy Banister, who spends late-night hours poring masturbatorily over his “final nightmare file” purporting to document “Red Chinese troops . . . being dropped into the Baja by the fucking tens of thousands,” and who “wanted to believe it was true. He did believe it was true. But he also knew it wasn’t” (351-52). Each conspirator, seeing no further than his own interests, fears, or desires for revenge, moves in a private direction; the resultant vector of all these individual movements is something no individualist interpreter dares call conspiracy.

     

    II. Insects and insubordinations: A myopic-interaction model

     

    An interdisciplinary model of collective behavior that develops its own directionality, regardless of any single participant’s agenda, comes from the improbable intersection of two fields of study: entomology (as practiced on an amateur basis by a budding physicist) and computer science. Richard Feynman, recalling his home experiments with ants’ navigational behavior, finds that the insects either move randomly or follow each other’s trails, and that the repetition of small deviations when they follow each other results in a composite trail that gives the illusory appearance of order.

     

    One question that I wondered about was why the anttrails look so straight and nice. The ants look as if they know what they’re doing, as if they have a good sense of geometry. Yet the experiments that I did to try to demonstrate their sense of geometry didn’t work. . . . At first glance it looks like efficient, marvelous, brilliant cooperation. But if you look at it carefully, you’ll see that it’s nothing of the kind. (95-96)

     

    None of Feynman’s ants moves individually in a straight line, but the collective movement nevertheless produces a straight line, simulating purposeful effort.

     

    Transylvanian computer scientist Alfred Bruckstein, working with mathematical pursuit problems at the Technion in Haifa, Israel, has formalized Feynman’s conjecture, proving the theorem that an initially disorderly series of pursuit paths will converge to the straight segment connecting the initial point of departure, e.g., an anthill, and the destination of the original “pioneer ant,” e.g., a recently discovered food source (Bruckstein 60-61). His model of “global behavior that results from simple and local interaction rules” (62) has implications for robotics as well as for the behavior of animal colonies. It also has implications for the behavior of human organizations, at least metaphorically–and perhaps, if one notes its resemblance to the “political resultant” theory used in the field of geopolitical decision analysis (Allison 7-8), literally as well.3 If “globally optimal solutions for navigation problems can be obtained as a result of myopic cooperation between simple agents or processors” (Bruckstein 62), can any form of multiple myopia–perhaps the combined myopias of a disgraced, “buried,” and resentful CIA agent; a soldier of fortune with no fixed address and undiscernible loyalties; a disease-obsessed and mystically inclined pilot, sacked from an airline job because of institutional homophobia, who contemplates developing hypnotism as a weapon and claims to “believe in everything” (Libra 314-15); and a dyslexic political naif who daydreams of merging with the flow of history–also give the appearance of directed movement?

     

    In the national security state as depicted by DeLillo, myopic interaction is not a human imperfection in an otherwise efficient system; it is built into the system from the outset. During the planning that resulted in the Bay of Pigs invasion, Everett and Parmenter were part of a layered and deliberately fragmented bureaucracy, described by DeLillo in parodically numbing detail:

     

    The first stage, the Senior Study Effort, consisted of fourteen high officials, including presidential advisers, ranking military men, special assistants, undersecretaries, heads of intelligence. They met for an hour and a half. Then eleven men left the room, six men entered. The resulting group, called SE Augmented, met for two hours. Then seven men left, four men entered, including Everett and Parmenter. This was SE Detailed, a group that developed specific covert operations and then decided which members of SE Augmented ought to know about these plans. Those members in turn wondered whether the Senior Study Effort wanted to know what was going on in stage three.

     

    Chances are they didn’t. When the meeting in stage three was over, five men left the room and three paramilitary officers entered to form Leader 4. Win Everett was the only man present at both the third and fourth stages (20).

     

    The point of all this Beckettish enumeration is not simply that antlike bureaucrats come and go, talking of Guantanamo, but that the form of rationality peculiar to such organizations depends precisely on minimizing the possibility that anyone might know enough to comprehend the full narrative:

     

     Knowledge was a danger, ignorance a cherished asset. In many cases the DCI, the Director of Central Intelligence, was not to know important things. The less he knew, the more decisively he could function. It would impair his ability to tell the truth at an inquiry or a hearing, or in an Oval Office chat with the President, if he knew what they were doing in Leader 4, or even what they were talking about, or muttering in their sleep. . . .

     

    It was the President, of course, who was the final object of their protective instincts. They all knew that JFK wanted Castro cooling on a slab. but they weren’t allowed to let on to him that his guilty yearning was the business they’d charged themselves to carry out. The White House was to be the summit of unknowing. (21-22)

     

    Resemblances to the Reagan-Bush White House, the unpenetrating Tower hearings into the Iran-contra phase of covert national security operations, and the doctrine of “plausible deniability” are perfectly coincidental, of course. But the plot against Castro, taking grimly comic turns at first (poisoned or exploding cigars, “a poison pen in the works . . . testing a botulin toxin on monkeys . . . fungus spores in his scuba suit” [21]), then culminating in the botched invasion at the Bay of Pigs, serves as a kind of prologue-plot, prefiguring the myopically planned spectacle of Dealey Plaza. When the control of public events requires the diffusion of awareness and dispersal of control, it is unsurprising that Everett’s initial idea of a theatrically managed, well-controlled near miss–as executed, or functionally interpreted, by black-ops technician T-Jay Mackey and his team of shooters, including “Leon” Oswald–goes out of control, its multiple shades of signification simplified to the brutality of an actual hit.

     

    The tendency toward myopic interactions pervades the official and unofficial national security apparatus, not only in the Bay of Pigs fiasco but in the meetings that continue after the official dispersal of groups such as Leader 4 and SE Detailed. “True believers” like the men of Leader 4 may be too “overresponsive to policy shifts, light- sensitive, unpredictable” (22) to continue in covert operations, but they carry on meeting obsessionally out of sheer momentum, a shadow-cabal without real powers (and a caricature of Tom Wolfe’s vision of conspirators). Everett, the one agent who knew enough details of the anti-Castro operations to serve as the Agency equivalent of a pioneer ant, is relegated to the emasculated existence of a planted fake professor at Texas Woman’s University, repeating pointless movements:

     

    Mary Frances watched him butter the toast. He held the edges of the slice in his left hand, moved the knife in systematic strokes, over and over. Was he trying to distribute the butter evenly? Or were there other, deeper requirements? It was sad to see him lost in small business, eternally buttering, turning routine into empty compulsion, without meaning or need (16).

     

    He imagines a painting commemorating the confrontation of Leader 4 with agents of the CIA’s Office of Security, titling this canvas “Light Entering the Cave of the Ungodly” (24)–implying religiosity and the Fall, not instrumental rationality, which they have tried for a time and found inoperative.

     

    III. Cinema and simulacra: The fallacy of forensic romance

     

    Everett and his fellow ex-“clandestines” are drawn to pointless activity as lapsing believers are drawn to ritual, no longer convinced that their actions have political content, but compelled to continue them nonetheless. They are not so much a conspiracy as the simulacrum of a conspiracy, performing according to a script whose composition is ongoing and is not under their control. They have effects on history, but hardly the “personal contribution to an informed public. . . . the major subtext and moral lesson” (53) that Everett hopes will ensue, redeeming him in the eyes of history. He fails to see that this romantic vision (the truth seeing the light of day!) is incompatible with the simulacral nature of postmodern political activity–that his plan’s complex elegance is unlikely to survive its implementation by field operatives such as Mackey and Wayne Elko, who have consumed too many images of themselves as Seven Samurai (145) to be reliable executors of subtle instructions (much as follower ants simplify the intricate paths of a pioneer ant).4 Once Everett has embraced the politics of the public image, hoping to manipulate the media and the Agency through the perception of a vengeful Castro–publicly raising the question of just what actions Castro is seeking to avenge–he reveals his myopia: he forgets that the politics of the public image tends to embrace you back.

     

    It is practically inevitable that a consideration of Libra, with its displacements of agency and its recurrent coincidences between engineered events and happenstance (“It was no longer possible to hide from the fact that Lee Oswald existed independent of the plot” [178]), will lead to a Baudrillardian vision of social processes. The use of Oswald, Boy Marxist, as the instrument of the anti-Castroite conspiracy (a “negative Libran” [315] whom Ferrie believes might flip in either direction) is a clear example of Baudrillard’s “Moebius-spiralling negativity” whereby

     

    [a]ll the hypotheses of manipulation are reversible in an endless whirligig. . . . Is any given bombing . . . the work of leftist extremists, or of extreme right-wing provocation, or staged by centrists to bring every terrorist extreme into disrepute and to shore up its own failing power . . . ? All this is equally true, and the search for proof, indeed the objectivity of the fact does not check this vertigo of interpretation. (30-31)

     

    Even the Post‘s pet conspiracy Watergate was a nonscandal to Baudrillard, a show trial designed to create a “moral superstructure” (27) behind which the amoral capitalist state can function. To interpret such events as struggles of right and left over rationally expressible questions of public interest–rather than structural fictions obscuring the fact that the Watergate break-in and cover-up, or whatever plot culminated in Dealey Plaza, were closer to normative than exceptional state behavior.5–is to mistake vertigo for orientation.

     

    Power, in Baudrillard’s vision, both uses and fears simulacra. It strives for a monopoly on simulation, punishing acts such as a theatrical “fake hold-up” (39); it fears unsanctioned simulation more than it fears violent transgression, precisely because simulation “always suggests, over and above its object, that law and order themselves might really be nothing more than a simulation” (38, emphasis Baudrillard’s). The Everett/Parmenter/Banister/Mackey/Elko/Raymo/ Ferrie/Oswald mechanism converts the near-miss, a simulation that might have publicized sensitive covert operations, into a hit on Kennedy, a shock that the state apparatus can ultimately absorb. Sociopolitical structures could tolerate actual violence against this president, but not symbolic violence against the system of signs that functions as protective coloration for the operations of capital. “Power can stage its own murder to rediscover a glimmer of existence and legitimacy. Thus with American presidents: the Kennedys are murdered because they still have a political dimension. Others . . . only had a right to puppet attempts, to simulated murders” (37).

     

    Discourses of truth come in for rough treatment in Baudrillard’s world, and the figures in Libra who try to enact discourses of truth are likewise disoriented and defeated. At the opposite end of the plot from the hapless Everett, who thought he could induce media hyperreality to do the work of the real, sits Nicholas Branch, performing historical reconstruction from the masses of evidence supplied to him by the Curator. Branch, the would-be panoptical reader who can synthesize the entire mass of materials into a credible historical truth claim, is at first driven to complete his history whether or not anyone will ever read it. It steadily becomes apparent to him, however, that he is performing a simulacrum of research. His position is both a scholar’s heaven, with apparently infinite research materials provided instantly on request, and a scholar’s hell of overabundance and nonintegration; his papery environment is hallucinatorily Borgesian, part Library of Babel and part Garden of Forking Paths. Branch is Homo documentarius, linear-thinking Gutenbergian Man, with his logical and recombinatory faculties underscored in his surname,6 but his attempt at a definitive reconstruction of the Kennedicide peters out as miserably as Everett’s attempt to send true information to the public.

     

    For his naive belief in the possibility of a realist discourse about Dealey Plaza, Branch receives a different form of knowledge, which he comes to interpret as a form of punishment, from the sources he depends on. He is damned to an eternal investigation, drowned in information that is sensory as well as documentary, including the contradictory, the irrelevant, and the gruesome. The primary texts that the Curator continues to send him include not only the obligatory Zapruder film (that most exhaustively scrutinized of cinematic texts) but autopsy photos, “the results of ballistics tests carried out on human skulls and goat carcasses, on blocks of gelatin mixed with horsemeat. . . . an actual warped bullet that has been fired for test purposes through the wrist of a seated cadaver. We are on another level here, Branch thinks. Beyond documents now. They want me to touch and smell. . . . The bloody goat heads seem to mock him. He begins to think this is the point” (299). In place of the coherence of an explainable conspiracy, he comes to see the plot as “a rambling affair that succeeded in the short term due mainly to chance. Deft men and fools, ambivalence and fixed will and what the weather was like”–yet “[t]he stuff keeps coming” (441), defying comprehension at Branch’s end of the plot just as events defied control at Everett’s. Instead of attaining the closure one expects from a narrative syntagm, the successful completion of his forensic romance, Branch becomes the Sisyphus of mediated information. He is still reading signs at the close of the novel; he has still written little; he has accepted a grim role as the goatherd of historical hell, keeper of the unintelligible secrets of the state.

     

    IV. Infocide

     

    DeLillo’s plot is a nightmarish parable of the transmission of any type of consequential information through the public sphere under late capitalism. The sender, mediators, and receiver of the message (Everett, the other conspirators, and Branch, respectively) are all maintained in a state of myopia throughout the process; the initial message is replaced by an antithetical counter- message and never reaches its true intended receiver, the politically responsible public. This is precisely as ruling-class apologists of George Will’s ilk would have it, of course, with forensic interpretation forestalled and political accountability rendered risible. Useful communication is stultified under such conditions; the state’s literal control apparatus (from police to spies) becomes redundant, if not vestigial, when much of the citizenry is occupied with information-games that lack real referents and consequences. In Baudrillard’s glum description of daily life in the realm of infinite simulation, there is “[n]o more violence or surveillance; only ‘information,’ secret virulence, chain reaction, slow implosion and simulacra of spaces where the real-effect again comes into play. We are witnessing the end of perspective and panoptic space” (54).

     

    The capitalist polity, of course, has always had its own defensive mythologies to characterize its processes as positively benign. The theory of myopic interactions is by no means the only case of insect behavior offering a metaphoric explanation of human behavior. If, under this paradigm, a series of antlike actions in pursuit of private interests combine to result in public calamity, one formative myth of the early capitalist era uses another arthropod collective to extol the processes that Adam Smith would anthropomorphize and anatomize some 70 years later as capitalism’s benevolent Invisible Hand. Bernard Mandeville’s The Fable of the Bees: or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits, first appearing in 1705, offers a conceptual structure remarkably similar to Bruckstein’s. His beehive prospers as long as it tolerates a rich array of interlocking iniquities, but it loses both its wealth and its power relative to other hives when it gives in to the impulses of reform, economic leveling, and anti-imperalism. A critical difference between these two images of human- society-as-insect-colony is that Mandeville, while applauding the system that transmutes private vices into public benefits, also inverts the equation and identifies public-spiritedness itself, on an individual scale, with disaster on the social scale. Throughout the period of capital’s social dominance, it seems, one encounters a form of consciousness that wilfully refuses to form a lucid and integrative social vision.

     

    Mandeville’s account of apian society is founded on the same sort of macro/micro disjunction by which Feynman and Bruckstein explain formic navigation: behavior that looks like error or disorder at the individual level combines with other such behavior to produce order for the collective. Like any capitalist utilitarian, pre-Marxian or post-, Mandeville rationalized the glaring class distinctions among his bees with the observation that “Industry/Had carry’d Life’s Conveniences,/It’s real Pleasures, Comforts, Ease,/To such a Height, the very Poor/Lived better than the Rich before” (ll. 198-202). This is the classical rationalization of inequities and iniquities under capitalism; it would recur in the Reaganite trope of a rising tide lifting all boats. And Mandeville’s identification of social reform as counterproductive, removing the incentives that drive the invisible hand, would recur nearly three centuries later in Margaret Thatcher’s denouncements of any public policy based on compassion or economic justice as tearfully sentimental, or “wet.”

     

    The same contempt for social interaction reaches a peak of comic exaggeration in Libra when David Ferrie, joking with Mafioso Carmine Latta (who will later manipulate Jack Ruby into taking his role in the script) about the Cold War apocalypse that might ensue if the U.S. tried to bomb Cuba to retrieve it from the Communists for the mob, asserts a positive preference for postnuclear Hobbesianism:

     

    . . . I like the idea of living in shelters. You go in the woods and dig your personal latrine. The sewer system is a form of welfare state. It’s a government funnel to the sea. I like to think of people being independent, digging latrines in the woods, in a million backyards. Each person is responsible for his own shit. (173)

     

    How clearly can one distinguish this parodic hyperindividualism from the attitude expressed in the Impeach Earl Warren signs7 and swastika graffiti that sends Weird Beard into nervous premonitory improvisations? (381-82).

     

    On a fundamental level, communication itself is at odds with the belief system shared by Mandeville, Will, Reagan (the “Great Communicator”!), Ferrie, Latta, Gen. Walker, and the looming Bircher population of 1963 Dallas. This is a community that has been immunized against community, unified in acceptance of fragmentation. Much has been written about the proliferation of signifiers from commercial culture in DeLillo’s works, and about how these intersecting messages shred the idea of an individual consciousness: “a whole network of popular mythology, allowing DeLillo to show how the possibilities of meaning and action are shaped by the contemporary ethos of simultaneity and indeterminacy . . . . Character, the transformation and realization of the novelistic subject’s depth through narrative time, is replaced by the notion of character as a function of the frequently self-canceling languages of representation in which the novelistic self is situated” (Wacker 70-71).

     

    These environments are so oversaturated with disconnected messages that they pose a risk of what one might call “death by information”–a particular hazard for someone like Oswald, who lacks (probably for hereditary neurologic reasons) the integrative capacity that makes purposeful linguistic behavior possible. For all his protestations about economic injustice, Oswald’s image of Communism is a consumer item, a boy’s perverse fantasy of becoming the Other the whole culture fears; the roles of Stalin and Trotsky are natural outgrowths of teenage idol- worship, exotic alternatives to John Wayne, in whose screen- sanctified presence he also bathes while on mess duty at Corregidor (93-94). He forgets to visit Trotsky’s house in Mexico City, and “[t]he sense of regret makes him feel breathless, physically weak, but he shifts out of it quickly, saying so what” (358), like a visitor to Hollywood missing part of a Universal Studios tour. Writing his Historic Diary while in Russia, he is “[s]tateless, word- blind”:

     

    Always the pain, the chaos of composition. He could not find order in the field of little symbols. They were in the hazy distance. He could not clearly see the picture that is called a word. A word is also a picture of a word. He saw spaces, incomplete features, and tried to guess the rest.

     

    He made wild tries at phonetic spelling. But the language tricked him with its inconsistencies. He watched sentences deteriorate, powerless to make them right. The nature of things was to be elusive. Things slipped through his perceptions. He could not get a grip on the runaway world. (211)

     

    Word-blindness is not the same thing as ignorance: “He knew things. It wasn’t that he didn’t know” (211). Spymaster Marion Collings gives Oswald a recruiting speech about the interpretive importance of context–“A fact is innocent until someone wants it. Then it becomes intelligence. . . . An old man eating a peach is intelligence if it’s August and the place is the Ukraine and you’re a tourist with a camera . . . . There’s still a place for human intelligence” (247)–but Oswald is unsuited for this type of cognitive work. He incorporates within his own cranium the perspectivelessness and disconnection of the whole culture; he is a living representative of a myopically interactive informational realm.

     

    Death by information goes hand in hand with the death of information. In a hyperreal environment where messages are infinitely reproducible and convertible, Collings’ elision of the two meanings of “intelligence” (the raw informational material itself and the human skill at making sense of it) metastasizes throughout the culture, and the former overcomes the latter. As William Cain observes after discussing this passage, “in American culture, there are always more facts, more intelligence. . . . The irony is that the spread of information fails to lead to clearer meaning and more finely focused intelligence. People assemble knowledge, and its transmission from person to person and place to place does signify, yet the import of it all stays mysterious” (281). Such a quantity of information ensures that little or no actual informing ever occurs.

     

    Is the dominance of the myopic-interaction paradigm absolute? Does Libra reinforce “what we darkly suspect about the postmodern alteration of the mind” (Cain 281)? The bathetic but intensely imagined monologue by Marguerite Oswald (448-456), patching together incoherent cliches and insights until they achieve a desperate coherence, concludes Libra in a minor key, but it is hardly the same fatalistic minor key in which Baudrillard composes. Implicitly, at least on a metafictional level, passages like this imply that it is still possible to select information from the ceaseless media Babel and combine it in ways that generate power (at least if one has Don DeLillo’s ear for the spoken American language). The question remains whether the borders between art-language and world-language are permeable.

     

    For one alternative to communicative myopia, one can do worse than return to the empiricist intelligence of Richard Feynman. The ant-navigation paradigm is opposed in his text by a recurrent behavioral model that equates global awareness of purpose with problem-solving effectiveness. The most explicit description of this informed-interaction model occurs in the long chapter “Los Alamos from Below,” where he recounts his experiences working on the Bomb. Security interests have mandated the fragmentation of knowledge–with a level of control and surveillance that can properly be called paranoid, however justifiable under wartime conditions–but Feynman intuits that disseminating more knowledge about the project among technical workers will improve the quality and efficiency of their work. Experience proves him right:

     

    The real trouble was that no one had ever told these fellows anything. The army had selected them from all over the country for a thing called Special Engineer Detachment –clever boys from high school who had engineering ability. They sent them up to Los Alamos. They put them in barracks. And they would tell them nothing.

     

    Then they came to work, and what they had to do was work on IBM machines–punching holes, numbers that they didn’t understand. Nobody told them what it was. The thing was going very slowly. I said that the first thing there has to be is that these technical guys know what we’re doing. Oppenheimer went and talked to the security and got special permission . . . .

     

    Complete transformation! They began to invent ways of doing it better. They improved the scheme. They worked at night. . . . [A]ll that had to be done was to tell them what it was. (127-128)

     

    The bureaucrats who set up Special Engineer Detachment counted on the efficacy of myopic interactions, under the assumption that only a small coterie (analogous to the pioneer ant that knows the location of the food) could be trusted with information about the direction of the collective endeavor, but Feynman explicitly demonstrates the superiority of informed interactions for certain types of operations. What works for ants and assassins does not necessarily improve results for engineers, and DeLillo’s account of the information-structures that produced the Kennedicide–regardless of whether the specific events he imagines to occupy that structural framework are veridical, a proposition unlikely ever to be confirmed or disproved– qualifies him as something like a conceptual engineer. This status adds weight to his works’ implicit claim to have influence in the public sphere.

     

    In Mao II, DeLillo extends and deepens the intimation that the Gutenberg/Branch paradigm cannot make sense of the postmodern era’s public events. The transition from the world of Libra to that of Mao II–perhaps a paradigm shift within DeLillo’s work to mirror the one he sees occurring in the political world–becomes clear toward the conclusion of the latter book as Bill Gray approaches death, sensing that his form of information is in eclipse during the days of Moon and Khomeini (“‘What terrorists gain, novelists lose’” [157]). The literary world where he once enjoyed ferocious debate with his friend and editor Everson is in decline, eroded by the perks of capital (“‘Who owns this company?’ ‘You don’t want to know.’ ‘Give me the whole big story in one quick burst.’ ‘It’s all about limousines’” [101-02]). His belief that his actions have public consequences is also in decline; his agreeing to meet with Abu Rashid’s hostage-holders represents the beginning of a prolonged suicide for both Gray and his mode of thought. Moving eastward toward the rendezvous and the grave, Gray sustains an inner monologue that retreats from public observation into the myopic realm of personal and familial nostalgia.

     

    The individual artist in language, this plot implies, is obsolete because he has always been bounded by, and bound to, his privacy–an artifact of a social order that no longer exists. Yet Gray’s language is succeeded by a different language, that of Brita Nilsson’s camera. She does not refuse to participate in history; her gesture to unmask the armed youth at the end of her meeting with Abu Rashid dramatizes her willingness to be an active participant in events, not a passive recorder (236). She, like DeLillo, is still a public citizen and an artist who can surprise the public; her visual language produces factual texts that are indeed selected–hardly the panoptical god’s-eye view of a would-be master historian like Branch, or of the illusory “objective” news media–but selected with the informed, receptive eye of a new kind of informational engineer. Myopia, after all, is easily corrected with lenses.

     

    Notes

     

    1. I will designate this paradigm the “theory of myopic interactions,” borrowing the term from Alfred Bruckstein. Bruckstein does not use the term “myopic interactions” in his Mathematical Intelligencer article, but the phrase is attributed to him in a brief description of this article in Science (April 23, 1993). It is broader in scope than the phrase he originally uses, “myopic cooperation,” since it allows for noncooperative or actively antagonistic interactions such as those involving governmental operatives and Oswald or Ruby.

     

    2. Whether they would still love to talk about Watergate after talking about it with Baudrillard, however, is an open question.

     

    3. Graham Allison offers competing explanatory models for a particularly intricate geopolitical test case, the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba. According to the “Rational Actor” or “classical” model, the one most foreign policy analysts and laymen have implicitly embraced, governments make decisions monolithically as individual chess players do, referring to specific defined objectives and calculating the rational means of attaining them. However, the “Organizational Process” and “Governmental (Bureaucratic) Politics” models better explain the “intra-national mechanisms” (6) that determine international behavior: each apparent monolith or chess player is in fact a black box containing competing organizations, interests, and individuals, each of whom pursues distinct and only partially compatible objectives. Analysis of the organization, routines, and relative bargaining power of these components yields an understanding of how participants come to make irrational decisions. I am indebted to Katie Burke, MD, FACEP, for calling my attention to Allison’s work and its applications to medical and governmental decision analysis, as well as to the argument presented here.

     

    4. Elko’s identification of his paramilitary role with cinematic models is made explicit, as is his own form of myopia, when he muffs his task of killing Oswald at the arranged rendezvous site, the Texas Theater, by waiting through the feature (Cry of Battle) to “let the tension build. Because that’s the way they do it in the movies” (412), allowing police to apprehend him instead. Staying for the second feature (War Is Hell) after “Leon” is removed confirms Elko’s priorities.

     

    5. “In fact, the charges against Nixon were for behavior not too far out of the ordinary, though he erred in choosing his victims among the powerful, a significant deviation from established practice. He was never charged with the serious crimes of his Administration: the ‘secret bombing’ of Cambodia, for example. The issue was indeed raised, but it was the secrecy of the bombing, not the bombing itself, that was held to be the crime. . . . We might ask, incidentally, in what sense the bombing was ‘secret.’ Actually, the bombing was ‘secret’ because the press refused to expose it” (Chomsky 81-82).

     

    6. Branch is among the first characters introduced in the book, appearing within six pages of another Nicholas: one of young Oswald’s taunting truant companions in the Bronx, Nicky Black, who “know[s] where to get these books where you spin the pages fast, you see people screwing” (8). Referring to himself in the third person as “the kid,” collapsing the distinction between written language and cinema with his primitive porn, bearing the Devil’s conventional given name (though “the name was always used in full, never just Nicky or Black” [8]), and vanishing from the book after a single scene, Nicky Black is the sort of background character whose very irrelevance to the narrative charges him with symbolism. When a second Nicholas B. then appears among larger, more important masses of paper, does the inference that DeLillo is setting up early subtextual linkages between an obsession with textual forms and Auld Nickie-Ben constitute interpretive overaggression?

     

    7. The irony of rightists calling for the impeachment of the very man who would head the commission that performed a simulacral investigation, thus protecting the plotters (in yet another Moebius-spiral), is unlikely to be lost on many readers of Libra but is probably lost on quite a few of the rightists.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Allison, Graham T. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. Boston: Little, Brown, 1971.
    • Baudrillard, Jean. “The Precession of Simulacra,” in Simulations. Trans. Paul Foss, Paul Patton, and Philip Beitchman. New York: Semiotext(e), 1983. 1-79.
    • Bruckstein, Alfred M. “Why the Ant Trails Look So Straight and Nice.” Mathematical Intelligencer 15.2 (1993): 59-62.
    • Cain, William E. “Making Meaningful World: Self and History in Libra.” Rev. of DeLillo, Don, Libra. Michigan Quarterly Review 29.2 (1990): 275-287.
    • Chomsky, Noam. Towards a New Cold War: Essays on the Current Crisis and How We Got There. New York: Pantheon, 1982.
    • Crowther, Hal. “Clinging to the Rock: A Novelist’s Choices in the New Mediocracy.” South Atlantic Quarterly 89.2 (1990): 321-336.
    • DeLillo, Don. Libra. New York: Viking Penguin, 1988.
    • —. Mao II. New York: Viking, 1991.
    • Feynman, Richard. “Surely You’re Joking, Mr. Feynman!”: Adventures of a Curious Character. Ed. Edward Hutchings. New York: Norton, 1985.
    • “Follow-the-Leader Math.” (News report on Bruckstein’s paper, with quote from Bruckstein.) Science 260 (April 23, 1993): 495.
    • Lentricchia, Frank. “The American Writer as Bad Citizen–Introducing Don DeLillo.” South Atlantic Quarterly 89.2 (1990): 239-244.
    • —. “Libra as Postmodern Critique.” South Atlantic Quarterly 89.2 (1990): 431-453. Originally published inRaritan 8.4 (1989): 1.
    • Mandeville, Bernard. The Fable of the Bees: or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits. Eighteenth-Century English Literature. Ed. Geoffrey Tillotson, Paul Fussell, Jr., Marshall Waingrow, and Brewster Rogerson. New York: Harcourt, 1969: 267-277.
    • Manufacturing Consent: Noam Chomsky and the Media. Dir. Peter Wintonick and Mark Achbar. 1992.
    • Slacker. Dir. Richard Linklater. 1991
    • Wacker, Norman. “Mass Culture/Mass Novel: The Representational Politics of Don DeLillo’s Libra.” Works and Days 8.1 (1990): 67-87.

     

  • Libra and the Historical Sublime

    Stephen Bernstein

    Department of English
    University of Michigan – Flint
    bernstein_s@crob.flint.umich.edu

     

    Aside from their humor, Don DeLillo’s novels are noted almost as frequently for their brilliant terror, manifested as a frisson at the core of contemporary existence. Frank Lentricchia comments on DeLillo’s “yoking together terror and wild humor as the essential tone of contemporary America” (“American” 2), while Arnold Weinstein observes that “one is tempted to posit terror itself as the ground for the psyche in DeLillo, an indwelling creatural horror that underlies all the codes and systems” (294). The terror is not simply the terrorism with which DeLillo is almost obsessively concerned, but also that of a sublime dimension of experience. Again and again DeLillo’s characters are faced with the inexplicability of events and the giddy suspicion, terrifying in its eventual impact, that a darker force determines reality.

     

    The sublime appears in DeLillo’s fiction in several forms. As John Frow has shown, White Noise‘s airborne toxic event and the sunsets it subsequently influences trigger a representational inadequacy on the part of their viewers. Jack Gladney wonders why he should try to describe what the sunsets have become. This is not the eighteenth-century sublime of Kant or Burke, however, but one more specifically postmodern: “the inadequacy of representation comes not because of the transcendental or uncanny nature of the object but because of the multiplicity of prior representations” (176). The sublime of belatedness Frow formulates does not exhaust DeLillo’s excursions into the category; Michael W. Messmer reveals an “activist (Kantian) sublime” (410) in White Noise which centers on the ability of the Gladneys to respond to the terrifying sublimity of the airborne toxic event, to question the gains of science if they produce such aberrations.

     

    In Libra DeLillo returns to the more familiar Kantian sublimes of magnitude and ineffability. For Kant the sublime “is to be found in an object even devoid of form, so far as it immediately involves, or else by its presence provokes, a representation of limitlessness, yet with a super-added thought of its totality” (90). The result for the observer is an emotion “dead earnest in the affairs of the imagination . . .a negative pleasure” (91). Kant’s “mathematical” sublime is rooted in cognition, being that “in comparison with which all else is small”(97), while his “dynamically” sublime appeals more to imagination, raising it “to a presentation of those cases in which the mind can make itself sensible of the appropriate sublimity of the sphere of its own being, even above nature” (111-12). DeLillo’s sublime will not share the more transcendental aspects of this model, as his characters are predictably limited, from the postromantic vantage of the 1950s and 1960s, in their ability to appreciate the sublimity of the imagination’s sphere.

     

    For Kant “One who is in a state of fear . . . flees from the sight of an object filling him with dread; and it is impossible to take delight in terror that is seriously entertained” (110). Containing as it does the account of terror which is largely absent from Kant’s, Burke’s model is similarly relevant to DeLillo. While DeLillo’s readers may have the appropriate distance from his novels’ terror to appreciate the sublimity of his depiction of a culture about to spin out of orbit, his characters do not. Thus they are more helpfully considered in the Burkean model, which holds that “Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain, and danger . . .whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, or operates in a manner analogous to terror, is a source of the sublime” (39); the imaginative response to the sublime, then, “is Astonishment; and astonishment is that state of the soul, in which all its motions are suspended, with some degree of horror” (57). What we will see in Libra is a hybrid combination of Kant and Burke, a sublime which is manifested through magnitude and ineffability, exhausting the powers of enumeration or speech to give any representational account of it. At the same time this sublime will arouse a powerful terror, the terror so frequently noted in DeLillo’s work which gestures frantically toward apocalypse.

     

    This definition is obviously devoid of contemporary models of the sublime. Frow alludes to Lyotard, but the aesthetic program contained in the last pages of The Postmodern Condition will not be particularly relevant to this investigation of Libra. In a by now quite familiar formulation, Lyotard charges the postmodern sublime to put forward “the unpresentable in presentation itself” (81). By this account we would have to consider DeLillo resolutely modern (in Lyotard’s schema), since his sublime will be that which is more concerned “to present the fact that the unpresentable exists” (78). Probably more to the point in terms of specific periodization is Fredric Jameson’s discussion of a postmodern sublime that can only be “adequately theorized” “in terms of that enormous and threatening, yet only dimly perceivable, other reality of economic and social institutions” (P 38).

     

    Now this “other reality” is immediately recognizable to readers of DeLillo. It is the “world inside the world” ofLibra (13), the massively structured shadow machinery which so covertly scripts the possibilities of quotidian existence. Jameson acknowledges in DeLillo “the formal dilemma” presented by “a totalized world . . . finally unavailable for perception” (Rev. 122), but in a slight departure from his model I would like to suggest that DeLillo’s most important sublime occasions in Libra go beyond configurations of “economic and social institutions” and the “totalized world” to become attempts at the comprehension of history itself. For the committed Marxist, of course, there is no difference between the terms, and I am merely performing a willful mystification of the great motor of culture. Nevertheless, DeLillo’s novel offers visions of society and economics which are at variance with another and much larger operator, and this is where levels of the text’s sublime must be discerned.

     

    There is, in fact, some difficulty in stratifying the sublime in Libra since it is so consistently present. In the chiaroscuro world of covert operations men are “light-sensitive”; the interruption of a past plot by internal security is fancifully allegorized as “Light Entering the Cave of the Ungodly” (22, 24). Thus the various CIA and former-CIA agents inhabit an unrepresentable world of darkness, a gloom the magnitude of which is ungraspable by the isolated intellect. Win Everett’s plot spins out of his control almost immediately, largely because he fails to foresee its ability to expand to fill the larger magnitude of the plotters’ darkness. When Everett first unfolds his plan to T. J. Mackey and Larry Parmenter it is under a Texas sky which “towered unbearably” (25), yet another reminder of the eighteenth-century sublime and its predeliction for natural settings which “make our power of resistance of trifling moment in comparison with their might” (Kant 110).

     

    Parmenter’s wife Beryl appears in Libra on only a few occasions, the “domesticated version” (Cain 282) of the rarified intelligence-gathering absurdity of the career CIA operatives. She runs “a small picture-framing shop” (124) and corresponds with friends by sending them newspaper clippings, isolated vignettes “that tell us how we live” (261). Toward the end of the novel she watches replays of Oswald’s televised murder. “[T]his footage only deepened and prolonged the horror,” the narrator comments; “It was horror on horror” (446). This horror arises from the fact that Oswald’s death is “not at all like the news items she clipped,” that is, Beryl is unable to decontextualize it from the magnitude of the exterior world: “She didn’t want these people in her house” (446). Oswald’s death provides the sublime alternative–“The far reaching ‘something’ that . . . can never be named” (Cain 287)–to her earlier desire to find “Refuge only in irony” (259). In the videotape she is confronted again and again with a terror too present and unprecedented to be clipped and folded. But even this gives way: as anyone knows who sat through several days of coverage of the Challenger explosion, Tiananmen Square, or a host of other recent news stories, repetition begets numbness. As Beryl perceives, “After some hours the horror became mechanical. They kept racking film, running shadows through the machine. It was a process that drained life from the men in the picture, sealed them in the frame. They began to seem timeless to her, identically dead” (447). The sublime is finally subsumed, framed, by the numbing repetition of the image as DeLillo pinpoints the moment in which one form of the sublime gave way to the other–the moment when the terror of Kant’s mathematical sublime (Oswald and the world too vast to enumerate) recedes into the sublime Frow discusses, that which leaves its subjects edgy through their inability to develop an appropriate specificity representation.

     

    In the world of the plotters and the experiences of Beryl Parmenter we see two versions of a socio-economic sublime, a sublime dependent upon the mental formulations of human actors fixed in social and historical specificity. This sublimity differs markedly, however, from the sublime as we might apply it to Oswald and to the actual mechanisms of history in the novel. DeLillo himself mentions “coincidence and dream and intuition and the possible impact of astrology” as motivating forces in the novel (DeCurtis 55); he also speaks of “a sense of something extraordinary hovering just beyond our touch and just beyond our vision” in contemporary life (DeCurtis 63). “This extraordinary wonder of things,” he goes on, “is somehow related to the extraordinary dread, to the death fear we try to keep beneath the surface of our perceptions” (DeCurtis 63). This dread is activated in Libra as DeLillo gives it dimensions it never had in White Noise. It is certainly true, as Weinstein points out, that with the earlier novel’s airborne toxic event DeLillo sheds light “on our deep-seated need to believe in the supernatural. In so doing he gives the disaster . . . the authority of subject not object, of agent not setting” (303). But in Libra this role is transferred to history itself, with an effect far more vast than Jack Gladney’s fear of death.

     

    As Daniel Aaron notes, “Subways figure in the educations of both Billy Twillig and Oswald” (79). The protagonist (in DeLillo’s novels hero seems far too strong a word) of Ratner’s Star is shown the “substratum” by his third-rail inspector father; it becomes an important metaphor for the novel’s constant dualities, its mirror worlds and the idea that “existence tends to be nourished from below” (RS 4). But this below is also “the fear level, the plane of obsession, the starkest tract of awareness,” and the walk Billy and Babe take through the subways is made for “the sheer scary fun of it, a sort of Theban initiation” (RS 4). The sublime traits of this chthonian realm are suggested in the earlier novel; in Libra the subway metaphor is even more fully developed. The novel’s first sentence, “This was the year he rode the subway to the ends of the city, two hundred miles of track” (3), introduces the image immediately and its sublime characteristics are not far behind.

     

    The subway is of course symbolic of the “world within the world” that Oswald seeks throughout the novel, the inner workings of the external real. Win Everett suggests that “when the world is no longer accessible” one might be moved to “invent a false name, invent a destiny, purchase a firearm through the mail”(148). And as Thomas Carmichael puts it, assassination for Oswald becomes one way to escape “all that which would undermine the illusion of an unmediated access to the real and the sound assumption of a coherent and stable subjectivity” (214). In the sublime experience of the subway Oswald already has intimations of such an approach to the real. In the train his “body fluttered in the fastest stretches. They went so fast sometimes he thought they were on the edge of no-control” (3). The sublimity of rapid movement is evoked as the novel’s primal gesture and finds its own echo when one of the metamorphosed assassination plot’s mercenaries, Wayne Elko, speculates that “They were making a crash journey over the edge” (379-80). So from the very first we understand Oswald as someone craving a literal rush, one which will have to be metaphorically converted into the rush of history as it sweeps by. Oswald thinks “the only end to isolation was to reach the point where he was no longer separated from the true struggles that went on around him,” and that “The name we give this point is history”(248). The point of no separation, the point of going over the edge, these become the novel’s metaphysical analogia for the actuality of history.

     

    Seen in this light, Oswald is, in Frank Lentricchia’s words, “an undecidable intention waiting to be decided” (“Libra” 201), the object of Weinstein’s formulation above waiting to be acted upon by history as subject. But what sort of subject is history? Certainly on one level history is the plot, conceived by Win Everett and modified by T. J. Mackey, against Kennedy. But on a hazier and more complicated level there is something else happening in Libra, a causality seemingly too eerie, too sublimely ineffable to be reducible to human intention. While Everett plans to “Create coincidence so bizarre they have to believe it” (147), this intention is not enough to explain Oswald’s status as “a fiction living prematurely in the world,” word made so fleshly that it arouses “the eeriest panic” in Everett himself (179). DeLillo reaches for a more comprehensive mode for depicting this strangeness; as the novel’s title suggests this will be astrology. Thus, to quote Lentricchia again, “astrology is the metaphor in Libra for being trapped in a system whose determinative power is grippingly registered by DeLillo’s double narrative of an amorphous existence haphazardly stumbling into the future where a plot awaits to confer upon it the identity of a role fraught with form and purpose” (“Libra“202).

     

    The novel’s chief proponent of astrological explanation is David Ferrie, one of very few characters who look to an explanation for events external to the world of humans. Astrology for Ferrie is “the language of the night sky, of starry aspect and position, the truth at the edge of human affairs” (175) and thus is linked to what Everett thinks of as “whatever force was out there, whatever power ruled the sky, the endless hydrogen spirals, the region of all night, all souls” (148). But astrology’s truth is sublimely ineffable. “We don’t know what to call it, so we say coincidence,” Ferrie says at one point (172), effectually assigning a linguistic version of Kant’s mathematical sublime to the problem of causality. Kant suggests that “In the case of the logical estimation of magnitude the impossibility of ever arriving at absolute totality by the progressive measurement of things of the sensible world in time and space was cognized as an objective impossibility, i.e. one of thinking the infinite as given, and not as simply subjective, i.e. an incapacity for grasping it . . .” (108). Thus Ferrie suggests that beyond the world of plots there is a level of cause that cannot be adequately cognized. The resultant effect is that of the sublime. “[W]hat history consists of,” Ferrie claims later, is “the sum total of all the things they aren’t telling us” (321). In this formulation ineffability still plays the central role. The shadowy “they” who “aren’t telling” are politicians and the media in this context, but given Ferrie’s usual tenor throughout the novel, the agent is far closer to the ominous and sublime “Them” of Gravity’s Rainbow.

     

    Ferrie eventually attributes all control over the assassination to the forces alluded to above. “Truth isn’t what we know or feel,” he claims, “It’s the thing that waits just beyond” (333), so that the explanation of how everything converges on Dallas is also ineffable: “We didn’t arrange your job in that building or set up the motorcade route. We don’t have that kind of reach or power. There’s something else that’s generating this event” (384). Now if it were only Ferrie who felt this way in the novel we would have to attribute such a conception of causality to his extreme peculiarity as a character. But similar thoughts, not so clearly articulated, appear elsewhere. “Summer was building toward a vision, a history,” Oswald thinks several times during 1963 (322), while the crowd around the Kennedy motorcade is “a multitude, a storm force” producing “the roar of a sand column twisting” (393, 394).

     

    Perhaps most striking in the novel as a sublime indicator of history’s presence, however, is the Dallas disc jockey Russ Knight, the Weird Beard. Not only does his name allude homonymically to the darkness which resists attempts at causal explanation, but what his radio persona says provides some of the strangest passages in the book. In the novel’s first transcription of his show, the Weird Beard is on the radio in Jack Ruby’s car: “Who is for real and who is sent to take notes? You’re out there in the depths of the night, listening in secret, and the reason you’re listening in secret is because you don’t know who to trust except me. We’re the only ones who aren’t them” (266). The passage’s relevance to Ferrie’s usual concerns are obvious, and the Weird Beard acts too to link several of the narrative’s numerous characters. His listeners include Win Everett’s daughter and wife as well as the men Mackey sends to Dallas for the assassination. Knight is also present at an abortive press conference the Dallas police try to arrange for Oswald. Even Nicholas Branch, the novel’s beleagured historian of the assassination, has a note that “The Dallas disc jockey known as Weird Beard was Russell Lee Moore, who also used the name Russ Knight” (301).

     

    The Weird Beard’s genealogy in DeLillo’s fiction goes back to his first novel, Americana. In that work Warren Beasley (who even shares the Beard’s initials), fired from his job as a television weatherman after announcing that “the true weather report had been concealed from the public all these years. Storm warnings up and down the subconscious” (94), has a radio program called “Death Is Just Around the Corner” (93). Beasley’s show is pure talk – “I know you’re out there somewhere, all you prankish gunmen, pacing your scurvy rooms, making lists of likely targets with your Scriptomatic ballpoints, thinking incredibly in your wistfulness of the grandeur of state funerals” (232) – talk which gives the narrator David Bell “frightening dreams” (235), just as the Weird Beard inspires strange behavior in the Everetts’ daughter.

     

    Both disc jockeys attest to Norman Wacker’s assertion that in “DeLillo’s novels, mass culture is a spectral presence haunting and disorienting every appeal to grounds outside its protean representational fields” (69). For listeners of both the Weird Beard and Beasley, this disorientation is sublime. Unlike the numbness Beryl Parmenter develops to the televised image of Oswald’s murder, the eeriness felt by the radio listeners is unabated. To the assassins traveling west to Dallas the Weird Beard is “an eerie voice rid[ing] across the long night,” a voice speaking uncanny versions of the future: “Tell you something,dear hearts, Big D is ner-vus tonight. Getting real close to the time. Notice how people saying scaaaary things. Feel night come rushing down. . . . Danger in the air. . . . Some things are true. Some are truer than true. Oh the air is swollen. Did you ever feel a tension like right now? . . . All the ancient terrors of the night. We’re looking right at it. We know it’s here. We feel it’s here. It has to happen. Something dark and strange and dreamsome. Weird Beard says, Night is rushing down over BigD” (381-82). The deadpan summation of this passage is the sentence “Raymo, Wayne and Frank had never been to Dallas and they wondered what this creep could mean” (382), but the sentence is perfectly apposite to the operation of the historical sublime in the novel. Since the three men are carnal manifestations of the larger ineffable, they are properly unaware of the greater force, the “subject not object” in Weinstein’s coinage, which directs their actions.

     

    What is by now abundantly clear is that DeLillo signifies the operation of history through the sublime at nearly every step. The operations of the plotters are sublime at one level; the gradual shaping of the actual assassination sublime at another. For the former the organization of the plot on the president’s life is a project which gradually gets out of control due to what is considered an inherent fault in human protection of secrets: “The thing that hovers over every secret is betrayal” (218). The plot veers away into the sublime darkness of plotting, but that darkness is to a great degree the product of human manipulation, the cloaking of cloak and dagger men. But the historical forces which gather their sublime strength in the areas of the novel I have just been reviewing operate on a far different level, on a literally awesome plane of ineffable cause.

     

    A remaining question, however, is just what we can make of such a text, a historical novel with an ineffable model of historical process. The tendency toward unspeakability in DeLillo’s writing has been maligned: John Kucich, writing before Libra‘s publication, criticizes DeLillo’s “lack of clarity, “which is actually, Kucich believes, “a symptom of his own postmodern inability to reason out an alternative politics” (340-41). And Theodor Adorno, criticizing not DeLillo but the American attraction to irrational explanation, cites the “type of irrationality in which the total order of our life presents itself to most individuals: opaqueness and inscrutability. Naive persons fail to look through the complexities of a highly organized and institutionalized society, but even the sophisticated ones cannot understand it in plain terms of consistency and reason, but are faced with antagonism and absurdities . . . . Who wants to survive under present conditions is tempted to ‘accept’ such absurdities, like the verdict of the stars, rather than to penetrate them by thinking which means discomfort in many directions” (20). In the cases of both Kucich and Adorno the problem is, of course, mystification. The mysterious or ineffable can only mask a level of shrugged-off analysis and wind up as an opiate for the reading public.

     

    Surprisingly even DeLillo himself, in “American Blood,” the article that was Libra‘s genesis, writes that there is “No need” to “lapse into mystical fatalism” in quest of the truth of the assassination (24). As he goes on, “Dallas remains unique in its complexity and ambiguity, in the sinister links, the doublings, the organized deceits, but we tend to see it now as simply the first of a chain of what we might call instances of higher violence–violence with its own liturgy of official grief, its own standards of newsworthiness, with its built-in set of public responses” (“AB” 24). In this view the “complexity and ambiguity,” the very things which have helped mark the event’s historical sublimity, recede before the ritual level of American violence. But there is a marked shift between “American Blood” and Libra, a shift that is again helpfully elucidated through DeLillo’s own account. “My books are open-ended,” he tells an interviewer, “I would say that mystery in general rather than the occult is something that weaves in and out of my work. I can’t tell you where it came from or where it leads to” (DeCurtis 55). Here, succinctly, we find the very ineffability which characterizes Libra‘s historical sublime. “I can’t tell you” resonates with Ferrie’s conjecture that history is “the sum total of all the things they aren’t telling us,” and again questions of process are left in limbo.

     

    What Kucich, directly, and Adorno, indirectly, criticize is the authorial refusal to confer a predetermined ideological closure on a given narrative. Lentricchia has noted that “The telling assumption of DeLillo’s media right reviewers is that he is coming from the left” (“American” 5). In the left critique the telling assumption is that DeLillo is a bourgeois apologist, writing from the “obvious privilege of the liberal middle-class intellectual” (Kucich 334). But it is consoling to few members of the middle-class, I would guess, to be told that history is a mixture of chaos and fearsome sublimity. This is the message of Libra, a model of history beholden to theories of chaos and the lack of certainty which has haunted Western science throughout this century.

     

    DeLillo is not alone in such conjecture either; Toni Morrison’s Song of Solomon and T. Coraghessan Boyle’s World’s End both feature models of causality which finally rest on the random or the ineffable. For Morrison the chaotic carelessness which results in the naming of the first Macon Dead (18) has vast historical consequences absolutely relevant to the name’s literal and punning meanings, while the never explained scent of ginger haunts several of the novel’s moments of historical revelation (185, 241, 324, 339). In Boyle’s novel, indebted both to Pynchon and to Grass, the historical currents of an upstate New York town are controlled by a grotesque dwarf, the Dunderberg Imp. Though the Imp resembles a character in the novel’s present no confirmation of this link is ever made and the Imp’s meaning or purpose is never fully revealed. Yet he governs traffic on the Hudson, metaphorically the movement of time, a “capricious gnome . . . deranged and irresponsible” (170).

     

    Political motivation is not lacking in this company. Morrison’s novel is part of a larger project involving the reclamation of unwritten history and the nomination of the African-American subject. Boyle uses World’s End as a satire of 1960s pop-existentialism while simultaneously hypothesizing a history of betrayal within the American labor movement. All three novelists seek some purchase on the Sixties, the decade in which all the novels are chiefly set, and all three find that a level of sublime ineffability is central to such a project. It may be that despite a widespread effort by novelists, historians, and others there is nevertheless a strong current of feeling that we are not sufficiently distant from the Sixties to be able to historicize them with any accuracy.

     

    But in DeLillo’s case there is an additional impetus for the sublime: a sense on the novelist’s part of a larger and indescribable system at work. “It is just my sense that we live in a kind of circular or near-circular system,” he tells DeCurtis, “and that there are an increasing number of rings which keep intersecting at some point, whether you’re using a plastic card to draw money out of your account at an automatic teller machine or thinking about the movement of planetary bodies. I mean, these systems all seem to interact to me. . . . The secrets within systems, I suppose, are things that have informed my work. But they’re almost secrets of consciousness, or ways in which consciousness is replicated in the natural world” (61). This quasi-mystical formulation again finds its predecessors in Kant (“Sublimity . . . does not reside in any of the things of nature, but only in our own mind” [114]) and Burke (“the idea of bodily pain . . . is productive of the sublime; and nothing else in this sense can produce it” [86, emphasis mine]). Libra‘s awesome historical sublime may simply have its roots in the related sublime of consciousness itself, and the impossibility of understanding the latter is writ large in the impossibility of encompassing the former. The resultant conceptual implosion leaves us with a better understanding of Libra as it points directly toward David Ferrie’s implicit description of the novel itself: “Think of two parallel lines . . . One is the life of Lee H. Oswald. One is the conspiracy to kill the President. What bridges the space between them? What makes a connection inevitable? There is a third line. It comes out of dreams, visions, intuitions, prayers, out of the deepest levels of theself. It’s not generated by cause and effect like the other two lines. It’s a line that cuts across causality, cuts across time. It has no history that we can recognize or understand. But it forces a connection. It puts a man on the path to his destiny” (339).

     

    Any supposed evasion of politics or history by DeLillo is thus a misreading of what we might call a depth politics; history’s intention is the sublime intention of subjects, billions of them, and what novelist would want to claim certainty about what those intentions might be? Perhaps, as a line in Mao II asserts, “The future belongs to crowds” (16). Still, we should not be quick to blame DeLillo for not wanting to predict the future, to divine the intentions of these crowds. Libra finally makes the same case for history that chaos theory has clarified about weather forecasting: the impossibility of grasping the plurality of details inherent in initial conditions renders any human attempt at understanding the present or forecasting the future proportionally deficient. Like other aspects of the novel (the Nicholas Branch sections for example) and indeed the Kennedy assassination itself, Libra‘s sublimes are variations on the theme of uncertainty, variations which drive home a stunning postmodern inheritance: what Arnold Weinstein terms “a special purgatory of epistemological murk, of never again seeing clear, of permanent exile in the realm of information glut and data overload” (311). If this is an evasion of political realities and a prescription for bourgeois comfort, then many of us should feel shortchanged. Instead it appears that DeLillo has successfully transferred the infinite of the classical/romantic sublime to the postmodern conception of history itself. History is not acausal but too complex, too immense, to be reckoned by the unitary subjective mind. With the lens turned the right way, DeLillo’s conversion of an eighteenth-century aesthetic to a postmodern analytic has the terrific–in every sense– flavor of whatever might remain as truth.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Aaron, Daniel. “How to Read Don DeLillo.” Introducing Don DeLillo. Ed. Frank Lentricchia. Durham: Duke UP, 1991. 67-81.
    • Adorno, Theodor W. “The Stars Down to Earth: The Los Angeles Times Astrology Column.” Telos 19.1 (1974): 13-90.
    • Boyle, T. Coraghessan. World’s End. New York: Penguin, 1988.
    • Burke, Edmund. A Philosophical Enguiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful. Ed. James Boulton. London: Routledge, 1958.
    • Cain, William E. “Making Meaningful Worlds: Self and History in Libra,” Rev. of Libra, by Don DeLillo. Michigan Quarterly Review 29 (1990): 275-87.
    • Carmichael, Thomas. “Lee Harvey Oswald and the Postmodern Subject: History and Intertextuality in Don DeLillo’s Libra, The Names, and Mao II.” Contemporary Literature 34 (1993): 204-18.
    • DeCurtis, Anthony. “‘An Outsider in This Society’: An Interview with Don DeLillo.” Introducing Don DeLillo. Ed. Frank Lentricchia. Durham: Duke UP, 1991. 43-66.
    • DeLillo, Don. “American Blood: A Journey Through the Labyrinth of Dallas and JFK.” Rolling Stone 8 Dec. 1983: 21-2, 24, 27-8,74.
    • —. Americana. New York: Penguin, 1989.
    • —. Libra. New York: Penguin, 1989.
    • —. Mao II. New York: Viking, 1991.
    • —. Ratner’s Star. New York: Vintage, 1980.
    • Introducing Don DeLillo. Ed. Frank Lentricchia. Durham: Duke UP, 1991. 175-91.
    • Jameson, Fredric. Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Durham: Duke UP, 1991.
    • —. Rev. of The Names, by Don DeLillo and Richard A, by Sol Yurick. Minnesota Review 22.1 (1984): 116-22.
    • Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Judgement. Trans. James Creed Meredith. Oxford: Clarendon, 1952.
    • Kucich, John. “Postmodern Politics: Don DeLillo and the Plight of the White Male Writer.” Michigan Quarterly Review 27 (1988): 328-41.
    • Lentricchia, Frank. “The American Writer as Bad Citizen.” Introducing Don DeLillo. Ed. Frank Lentricchia. Durham: Duke UP, 1991. 1-6.
    • —, ed. Introducing Don DeLillo. Durham: Duke UP, 1991.
    • —. “Libra as Postmodern Critique,” Introducing Don DeLillo. Ed. Frank Lentricchia. Durham: Duke UP, 1991. 193-215.
    • Lyotard, Jean-Francois. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Trans. Geoff Bennington, and Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1984.
    • Messmer, Michael W. “‘Thinking It Through Completely’: The Interpretation of Nuclear Culture.” Centennial Review 34 (1988): 397-413.
    • Morrison, Toni. Song of Solomon. New York: NAL, 1977.
    • Wacker, Norman. “Mass Culture/Mass Novel: the Representational Politics of Don DeLillo’s Libra.” Works and Days 8 (1990): 67-88.
    • Weinstein, Arnold. Nobody’s Home: Speech, Self, and Place in American Fiction from Hawthorne to DeLillo. New York: Oxford UP, 1993.

     

  • The Terrorist as Interpreter: Mao II in Postmodern Context

    Peter Baker

    Department of English
    Towson State University
    e7e4bak@toe.towson.edu

     

    Through the issues it raises, the kind of writing style it employs, and coming as it does in a series of other novels by Don DeLillo, Mao II demands to be treated seriously in the context of postmodern work and theory. Rather than spend time developing that theory explicitly, hooking in to the arguments presented by, say, Fredric Jameson and Jean-Francois Lyotard, Brian McHale and Linda Hutcheon, I want to develop a series of themes and meditations through a comparison of Mao II with two other texts that are roughly contemporary, Thomas Pynchon’s Vineland and Neil Jordan’s film, The Crying Game (1992). That is, rather than attempt to define “postmodernism,” I will take as a given that all three of these works are postmodern and explore what this might mean. The comparison of DeLillo to Pynchon has become rather widespread, but Mao IIspecifically presents the character of a hyper-reclusive novelist, Bill Gray, who may interestingly be compared to the real-life figure of Pynchon, whether or not we want to argue that Gray is “based” on Pynchon.1 The comparison with Jordan’s film rests principally on the way The Crying Game stages an encounter between a “terrorist” and a hostage that is not dissimilar from some of DeLillo’s meditations on this theme. As novelist Bill Gray travels, first to London, and finally to Lebanon, he seeks to engage the relationship he has theorized between novel-writing and “terrorism” through his own person. I want to argue that Gray (and maybe DeLillo as well) is fundamentally–and in Gray’s case, at least, fatally–mistaken in his view that equates the role of the novelist with that of the “terrorist.” As Jordan’s film carries this theme out, I think it becomes clear that the “terrorist” occupies a role more like that of the interpreter, and moreover, that this has something to do with our “postmodern condition.”

     

    There is beginning to emerge a critical consensus that Thomas Pynchon “is perhaps the preeminent practitioner” of English-language postmodern fiction (McHale 1992: 83). I want to argue briefly in this context that this is at least in part due to the fact that Pynchon’s work deals with historical materials exactly defining the parameters of the rise of the United States to the status of the world’s only superpower, roughly that period from the end of World War II to the Persian Gulf War known from “our” point of view as the Cold War. Edward Said’s recent epoch-making work, Culture and Imperialism, argues for an ongoing reinterpretation of the canonical works of the modern European/American tradition based on an examination of the relationship between imperialism and culture. Twenty or thirty years from now, anyone’s first reaction to hearing the phrase “the Western tradition” will not be “Great Books” or whatever catchphrase is currently being pushed by the pundits in The New Criterion and elsewhere; it’s going to be (and for many of us already is): imperialism.2 Said’s approach is not to reject the works of the western tradition, but to reexamine them in light of these geopolitical realities for how they reveal “a structure of attitude and reference” (62). Whereas Said’s primary cultural analysis concerns texts produced at the height of colonial experience, Verdi’s Aida, Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, Kipling’s Kim, I would argue that the same kind of analysis could be used to examine works by such “preeminent” figures as Pynchon and DeLillo for what they say about U.S. imperialism and its deep and intricate relations to American culture. Such an analysis, to be adequate to Said’s complexity, would clearly have to go beyond assigning terms implying value judgments, such as “progressive” or “pessimistic.”3 I want to begin to explore some of the outlines for such a discussion with regard to the work of Pynchon, especially Vineland, before examining how some of these same issues are worked out by DeLillo in Mao II.

     

    Pynchon’s “big” book, Gravity’s Rainbow, principally concerns the time frame at the end of World War II when the position of being the leading nation-state in the Western global hegemony passed from France and Great Britain–and for a brief time, Germany–to the United States. This is at least one reason for its enormously important cultural position and the intense reactions it continues to provoke. While many other works of fiction deal with the American experience of the world war, Pynchon’s novel gives a mythic embodiment to this central shift in power of the twentieth century, focusing significantly on the transfer of rocket technology from Germany to the United States, while ostensibly concerned with the resulting terror of the British population during the V-2 bombings. The earlier V. deals mainly with the underside milieu of fifties America, but significantly this underside also has its military aspect, indicating the strong links between culture and hegemony that Said outlines. Again, significantly, those segments of V. that predate the fifties mainly concern French and British efforts to maintain and extend their political influence in the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin. The Crying of Lot 49 again links paranoid systems of meaning and control of power to European antecedents, the Tristero system seemingly related to the more ancient Thurn and Taxis. Pynchon’s famous paranoia remains tremendously appealing to many of us because he, almost alone among American novelists, has attempted to describe a wide-ranging response to social life in the world’s sole superpower. Pynchon’s works outline the interpellation of subjects into the U.S. cultural system and point, usually through humorously paranoid gestures, to moments of resistance to that interpellation.

     

    My officemate at the university is someone who is proud of having taught a course on everything you need to know to read Gravity’s Rainbow; but every time I mention Vineland he says he has yet to finish it, saying of Pynchon, “he’s tired, we’re all tired.” Something of this fatigue has shown up in the initial critical response to the novel, the neo-conservatives accusing Pynchon of indulging his “nostalgia” for the sixties and more progressive writers finding a lack of existential commitment to the struggle. In the Cold War context that I have begun to suggest, this fatigue is perfectly explainable as what is left at the end of an era. If Pynchon is the writer who most forthrightly takes on the issues, both global and cultural, of the Cold War era in which he came of age, then Vineland can be viewed as his “last word” on the subject (raising once again the sempiternal mystery of what he could possibly produce after this). This is not primarily a story of the relation of the U.S. to Britain, France and Germany, or even to the rest of the world where American domination is played out–it is the story of “our” government declaring war on key segments of its own population as a necessary corollary to maintaining its “preeminent” position. Pynchon’s paranoid view of the American social landscape of the Reagan eighties, though he tries hard to maintain the comic book humor and some of the same verve and excess to the writing as in the past, is less easy to take this time in part because he strikes so close to home.

     

    One way Pynchon strikes at the home base is to implicate Left resistance types in the triumphant success of Reaganism (in itself nothing more than another variation on triumphant Americanism generally).4 While former hippies like Zoyd Wheeler are stuck in a self-induced haze of pot smoke and mental disability benefits, former committed revolutionaries like Frenesi Gates have sold out the revolution to the forces of repression represented by Brock Vond. The main plot, such as it is, of Vineland concerns Zoyd’s and Frenesi’s daughter Prairie and her efforts to locate her mother when word comes down that Frenesi may be making a move to get back in touch.5 The story of leftist betrayal in Vineland is enacted by Prairie viewing the films of Frenesi’s revolutionary collective, 24fps, many of these shot by Frenesi, while the narration is presented by former co-members of the collective Darryl Louise (DL) and Ditzah Pisk Feldman. Prairie is presented with both visual evidence and an oral history of her mother’s seduction by super-narc and federal hitman Brock Vond, and Frenesi’s participation in a scheme to murder protest leader Weed Atman. In terms of narrative levels, much of this material is not recounted directly to Prairie, but rather focalized through Frenesi in overlapping flashbacks, so that some of Frenesi’s inner life of the time is made clearer. This reveals the worst betrayal of all, since Frenesi’s only positive motivation in all of this seems limited to her strong sexual attraction to Vond and to uniformed men in general. Her negative motivation seems to be an existential crisis of meaning–more on that in a minute. The question remains why Pynchon chooses to tell the story of the underside of the triumph of the political Right in America as a parable of political betrayal by members of the Left. Is this simply an instance of scapegoating, or is Pynchon trying to tell a more complicated story of the co-implication, or interpellation, of various smaller narratives in the larger political narratives of our time?

     

    Perhaps tellingly, I want to insist that this kind of large question is one that can have no definitive answer, but rather demands repeated acts of interpretation and reinscription into different political and cultural contexts.6 To make this analysis more exact, I want to concentrate briefly on the interpretive dilemma that Vineland stages with respect to “drugs.” I place “drugs” in scare quotes to indicate that any discourse on this subject can not simply take the concept as a given, but must attempt some kind of contextualization before any analysis is possible, an approach carried out in exemplary fashion by Avital Ronell in Crack Wars. As Ronell states, with her usual economy and forcefulness, “While everywhere dealt with, drugs act as a radically nomadic parasite let loose from the will of language” (52). Drugs escape the closed circle of hermeneutic inquiry because they are one name for the desire that overwhelms language. Ronell quotes Heidegger to this effect on the first page inside the cover: “Addiction and urge are possibilities rooted in the thrownness of Dasein.” What it is to be human is inextricably linked to our strongest (and strangest) desires. Frenesi’s existential torment and her politically incorrect fixation on Brock Vond’s erect penis can be seen, in some sense, as aspects of each other. But what happens when the word “drugs” is invoked to elicit and to control this generalized desire?

     

    Zoyd Wheeler’s comic and slightly sad fixation on weed is nothing compared to Pynchon’s scathing contempt for how the Reagan-era Department of Justice uses “drugs” as a code for enforcing a clampdown on Americans as desiring creatures. The feds are seen moving in on the last outpost of northern California marijuana growing in a community called Holytail:

     

    Sooner or later Holytail was due for the full treatment, from which it would emerge, like most of the old Emerald Triangle, pacified territory reclaimed by the enemy for a timeless, defectively imagined future of zero-tolerance drug-free Americans all pulling their weight and all locked in to the official economy, inoffensive music, endless family specials on the Tube, church all week long, and, on special days, for extra-good behavior, maybe a cookie. (221-2)

     

    This passage has been quoted often as revealing Pynchon’s attitudes toward a whole range of issues, from drugs to television to Reagan’s America. While I agree with Brian McHale that even the “extra-diagetic narrator” is never simply identifiable as the author Thomas Pynchon (see especially, McHale 90ff.), the elements presented in this passage are understandable as a means of talking fundamentally about the Cold War at home. The key here is that “drugs” can be used to mobilize military force–in a manner exactly parallel to that used to enforce American policy in places like Central America–to extend governmental control over the behavior of its own citizenry. And as usual in Pynchon’s work, this paranoid vision is based on and corresponds to historical realities. Why this vision of the American social polity should be threatening to neo-conservatives is clear enough. But this view of the limitations on the possibility for effective, engaged political action is likewise such that left critics like Alan Wilde complain of “Vineland‘s very different dereliction: its refusal of the existential commitment it ponders only to evade” (180). But this is just the point: the political engagement of Vineland is too close to the realities of the culture/imperialism nexus to admit the individualist revolutionary project as a satisfactory “existential” solution.7 Without a fully realized dialectical context, the revolutionary project itself can become, as it seems to have for Frenesi, just another in an array of interchangeable “drugs” that can be used by the forces of order to enforce a hegemonic social program.8

     

    Don DeLillo’s Mao II presents a fundamental engagement with many of these same issues of geopolitical concern, such as the United States’s leading role in maintaining global hegemony and what that means with respect to U.S. cultural production, and their necessary interpretive scenarios. Part of its brilliant strategy is to stage some of these dilemmas through delving into the thoughts and actions of its novelist character, Bill Gray, who presents certain similarities, at least when viewed externally, to Thomas Pynchon. The irony of a blurb by Pynchon figuring prominently on the back cover of Mao II is only one of the many nestings typical of postmodern culture. Bill Gray is a hyperreclusive figure who obsessively guards his privacy with the aid of two live-in helpers, Scott Martineau and Karen Janney. Karen has been glimpsed briefly in the prologue to the novel as one of the six thousand five hundred couples married in a mass ceremony by Reverend Moon, to whom Karen refers as “Master,” in Yankee Stadium. The action of the novel begins when Scott goes to New York to transport photographer Brita Nilsson to Gray’s secret domicile for a photo session that will result in the first pictures of Bill to be published in over thirty years. Now, Bill Gray could be based on any number of prominent American writers. J. D. Salinger, for example, is at least as famous a literary recluse. The connection with the reclusive Pynchon, however, is tantalizing for several reasons: Pynchon’s famous reluctance to be interviewed or photographed, extending if one believes the stories to excising his picture from copies of the high school yearbook; his cultural centrality, or “preeminence,” despite a somewhat limited body of published work, very similar to the fictional Gray; and the insistent linkage that has taken place in the critical discourse between Pynchon and DeLillo, offering DeLillo a convenient alter-ego who is both like himself and plausibly identifiable as someone else.9

     

    One of the concerns of Mao II most clearly identifiable as postmodern is the cultural centrality of images, and how this relates to the role of political leaders and artists in society. The photo session of author Bill Gray rhymes insistently with references to the work of Andy Warhol and to Warhol’s posthumous existence in image form. Warhol’s famous dictum concerning everyone’s fifteen minutes of fame and his use of political and culture icons insistently pose questions of simulacra and the role of cultural figures in the experience of individuals in a society. This in turn relates to an almost obsessive series of meditations on the relation between the individual–figured in Mao II insistently as the figure of the novelist/writer, but also relating to political, spiritual and terrorist leaders–and the masses. Mao Zedong is both the leader of the Chinese revolution and the enigmatic figure who appears in a photograph swimming across the Yangste River after a long period of reclusion and rumored death. Mao is the embodiment of the revolution whose writings are memorized by the faithful millions, particularly around the time of the Cultural Revolution, and he is the mass-produced silk-screen image hanging in the MOMA and reproduced on the cover of Mao II. Mao’s influence over millions of Chinese is clearly meant to rhyme with Sun Myung Moon’s influence over the 6,500 couples married together in Yankee Stadium, an event that so shocks the parents of Karen Janney, parents who metonymically represent the masses of middle Americans.10 What does the much-vaunted American concept of selfhood and individuality amount to when compared to the experience of the crowd? The prologue ends with the apothegm, “The future belongs to crowds” (Mao II 16), and Part I ends with the figure of Bill Gray leaving his publisher’s office building in New York, the beginning of his escape or disengagement from his former life, “where he joined the surge of the noontime crowd” (103.

     

    Is the novelist an artist who works alone in a room with a typewriter, or is the novelist the creation of a commodity culture, packaged and marketed for consumption by the masses? Mao II‘s Bill Gray is clearly both, and the conflict that this causes “inside” him is the leading motor of the various plot machinations. Scott Martineau, Gray’s assistant, is first pictured in New York in a bookstore:

     

    Bookstores made him slightly sick at times. He looked at the gleaming best-sellers. People drifted through the store, appearing caught in some unhappy dazzlement. There were books on step terraces and Lucite wall-shelves, books in pyramids and theme displays. He went downstairs to the paperbacks, where he stared at the covers of mass-market books, running his fingertips erotically over the raised lettering. Covers were lacquered and gilded. Books lay cradled in nine- unit counterpacks like experimental babies. He could hear them shrieking Buy me. There were posters for book weeks and book fairs. People made their way around shipping cartons, stepping over books scattered on the floor. He went to the section on modern classics and found Bill Gray’s two lean novels in their latest trade editions, a matched pair banded in austere umbers and rusts. He liked to check the shelves for Bill. (19-20)

     

    The tonality of this passage is reminiscent of the often-praised supermarket segment of White Noise (35ff.). Just as contemporary novelists rarely pay attention to the details of food shopping and other quotidian tasks, so they rarely venture into bookstores in their prose. The self-image of the novelist as “artist” would seem to require viewing the novel as just another commodity, even a refined and highly valuable one, as demeaning to the artistic integrity of the work. DeLillo not only faces this question–one could pose it as the relation of the writer to the audience, but that would already involve certain presuppositions, including the commodity aspect addressed here–he begins to burrow inside it. There is finally something queasy-making about the ambiguity of the last sentence. Is Scott checking the shelves “for Bill” to be interpreted as: checking for Bill’s works, checking the shelves on Bill’s behalf, or checking for some kind of commodified version of Bill’s corpse? After all, it is the commodification of the author, as Foucault reminds us, that leads to the author’s disappearance.

     

    Mao II could even be interpreted as a complex meditation that stages what Roland Barthes has called “the death of the author,” this being in some sense the “point” of the novel. Bill Gray dies an anonymous death on a ferry from Cyprus to Lebanon, with a crew member seen lifting Gray’s passport and identification. Although DeLillo is well known for his ambling and unresolved plot lines, Gray’s death seems particularly “unmotivated,” his internal injuries stemming from an apparently random accident in Athens.11 Having gone to great lengths to create the Pynchon-like Gray, imagining his secretive retreat, his relationships with his assistants and his publisher, even sending him on an Amnesty International/PEN mission of mercy across the European continent–this denouement is reminiscent of the classic ending “and then they all got run over by a bus.” The question is whether this unmotivated death of Gray is some kind of complex joke DeLillo is playing on his audience and his critics, or whether Gray’s death has been planted (like Jack Gladney’s death in White Noise) in the circumstances of his writing, his fame, and his reclusion from the world.

     

    As Walter Benjamin states, famously, in his essay “The Storyteller”: “Death is the sanction for everything that the storyteller can tell.” Any writer who tries to represent the story of a human life borrows, as Benjamin says, from the authority of death. Bill Gray would seem to wear this mantle heavily. The theme of death has been introduced, as I have been suggesting, even before Gray makes an appearance in the text, but he himself is clearly obsessed with the idea of death and how this relates to his role as a writer. During the photo session, Gray says, “I’m playing the idea of death.” He expands for Brita Nilsson:

     

    “Something about the occasion makes me think I’m at my own wake. Sitting for a picture is morbid business. A portrait doesn’t begin to mean anything until the subject is dead. This is the whole point. We’re doing this to create a kind of sentimental past for people in the decades to come. It’s their past, their history we’re inventing here. And it’s not how I look now that matters. It’s how I’ll look in twenty-five years as clothing and faces change, as photographs change. The deeper I pass into death, the more powerful my picture becomes. Isn’t this why picture-taking is so ceremonial? It’s like a wake. And I’m the actor made up for the laying-out.” (42)

     

    Gray’s theory of photography exactly parallels Benjamin’s theory of the story; the meaning of each develops from and depends upon the end of the person’s life being known. DeLillo had already given classic expression to an aspect of this idea in Libra through the speculations of Win Everett: “Plots carry their own logic. There is a tendency of plots to move toward death. He believed that the idea of death is woven into the nature of every plot. A narrative plot no less than a conspiracy of armed men” (Libra 221). Significantly for our understanding here, death serves as a key mediating term between the work–whether image or text–and its role in the culture. This preunderstanding is necessary, I think, to understanding Gray’s (and DeLillo’s) meditations on the link between the novelist and the terrorist.

     

    Gray consents to have his photograph taken in part because the burden of his fame, specifically his reclusion from the world that is both a reaction to and source of that fame, has become too great for him to bear. He has a sense that if he releases photos of himself to the public he can delay the inevitable tightening of the noose that he represents as those fans who are desperately seeking to find his whereabouts. So if, as I have speculated, Bill Gray’s death has been “planted” long before his death on the ferry, the seeds lie both in his writings and in the effects of his reclusion, which in turn bears a complex relationship to those very writings. Arnold Weinstein has provocatively proposed a reading of Hawthorne’s story “Wakefield” as an “ur-narrative” for understanding depictions of the self in American fiction (13-26). Hawthorne’s Wakefield is a man who disappears from his life for a period of twenty years and sets himself up across the street from his former home to observe the effects of his absence, particularly on his wife. Weinstein takes this creepy parable as paradigmatic of a concern for self-shaping in American letters generally. If we want to view DeLillo’s Bill Gray as a kind of postmodern Wakefield, some of the key differences between the two may begin to emerge more clearly. For one thing, Gray disappears from the scene of his self-imposed seclusion; more importantly, he dies without a trace, whereas Wakefield eventually returns. Gray’s “self-shaping” is more emphatically oriented around his own death, although when it arrives, it seems to catch him at least partially unaware. Also, in keeping with DeLillo’s insistence on the writer being superseded by a public image, Gray’s actual death may in the end be irrelevant to his continued “existence” as a writer and public figure: Scott and Karen are seen planning to keep the household going as before, releasing the photographs, and perhaps even publishing the latest book manuscript as well (Mao II 222-4).

     

    The most significant aspect of Bill Gray’s determined reclusion from public life is the variation this allows DeLillo to play on the trope of the isolated writer as outlaw or criminal, leading to the central importance in Mao II of the figure of the terrorist. As Scott is taking photographer Brita Nilsson to Gray’s secret residence, she says to him:

     

    “I feel as if I’m being taken to see some terrorist chief at his secret retreat in the mountains.”

     

    “Tell Bill. He’ll love that,” said Scott. (27)

     

    Gray has his own extensive theories on this relationship, which he expounds on in the first part of the narrative and then tries to enact in the second part. He tells Brita:

     

    “There’s a curious knot that binds novelists and terrorists. In the West we become famous effigies as our books lose the power to shape and influence. Do you ask your writers how they feel about this? Years ago I used to think it was possible for a novelist to alter the inner life of the culture. Now bomb-makers and gunmen have taken that territory. They make raids on human consciousness. What writers used to do before we were all incorporated.” (41)

     

    Clearly we need to distinguish between what Bill Gray the character says, and what Don DeLillo might be said to believe, but there is no doubt that the figure of the terrorist plays an important role in nearly every one of DeLillo’s more recent works. Further, the equation that Gray draws here is complexly enacted in the plot of Mao II, as Bill Gray leaves his private seclusion and enters into an active role in the interplay between the forces of culture and the forces of terror. My working hypothesis is that DeLillo views Gray’s statement here as at least somewhat deluded and that Gray’s eventual death is in some important sense the price he pays for that delusion. But the entire, complex treatment of the “terrorist” theme in Mao II would seem to require two related moves that were adumbrated in the discussion of Vineland. One move is to investigate the highly-charged polyvalence of the term “terrorist”; the other is to uncover, if possible, what Said calls “a structure of attitude and reference” that emerges in DeLillo’s staging of the interplay between the novelist and the terrorist, particularly as this involves an American writer’s necessary implication in the culture/imperialism nexus.

     

    Terror and its derivatives, terrorism and terrorist, are highly complex conceptual markers all of whose complexity I cannot hope to outline fully. The usual pairing places terror in a conceptual binary with reason or enlightenment. Perhaps the paradigmatic historical event linking these two terms is the French “Reign of Terror,” when the enlightenment motives of the 1789 revolution were seen as overcome by the forces of the revolutionary vanguard, leading to a paradigmatically undemocratic dictatorship sustained by raw force and unrestrained cruelty. This binary serves to shape Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s strange and controversial examination of the Stalin purges, Humanisme et terreur (1947), and may serve to remind us of the stand taken by many French intellectuals at the outset of the Cold War.12 Although Merleau-Ponty quickly abandoned even this qualified support for Stalinism, his high-level analysis that seriously attempts to contextualize Stalin’s violence by comparison to the violence present in liberal democracies shows a need to understand the argument for liberal democracy within a specifically postwar historical context. Jean-Francois Lyotard has renewed aspects of this controversy, in the context of theorizing the postmodern, by examining shifts in the meaning of terror:

     

    Terror is no longer exercised in the name of freedom, but in the name of `our’ satisfaction, in the name of the satisfication of a we which is definitely restricted to singularity. And if I judge this prospect intolerable, am I still being too modern? Its name is tyranny: the law which `we’ decree is not addressed to you, to you fellow-citizens or even to you subjects; it is applied to them,to third parties, to those outside, and it is simply not concerned with being legitimized in their eyes. I recall that Nazism was one such way of mourning emancipation and of exercising, for the first time in Europe since 1789, a terror whose reason was not in theory accessible to all and whose benefits were not to be shared by all. (1981; trans. 316-317)

     

    For Lyotard, as theorist of the postmodern, terror also needs to be contextualized in what he calls the “regime of phrases” and not only, or even primarily, in the totalizing discourses of emancipation or human progress. Who is addressed by the various sentences, laws, discourses that have recourse to terror? Who is excluded? How do totalizing discourses elide these questions, necessarily placing them on the outside of the discourse of rational humanism? What are the results of this marginalization?

     

    This marginalized outside is what is always hidden by the ideology of liberal democracy, an ideology constituted during the Cold War by the unquestioned binary opposition between freedom and communism, and now, given the breakdown of the world communist system, transferred to an equally unquestioned opposition between democracy and terrorism. According to this logic, whatever injustices may exist in the liberal democratic system or in the relationship of liberal democracies to the rest of the world, this system represents an undeniable advance over previous and currently existing political systems based on terror, cruelty and coercion.13 Whether consciously or not, this logic underlies the commonly accepted usages of “terrorism” and “terrorist.” The United States is not seen as using terrorism when it wages war with Iraq, using overwhelmingly superior technology and force to inflict a large number of both military and civilian casualities (the casualty estimate itself, or more precisely the lack of an official American estimate, is only one of the scandals of this war). The bombing of the World Trade Center, by contrast, is instantly branded an act of international terrorism. American domestic lawlessness, whether it be Randall Terry and the borderline murderous “Operation Rescue” or David Koresh and his armed-to-the-teeth suicidal followers, is never referred to as terrorism in the American media.14 The end of the Cold War and establishment of the United States as the sole remaining superpower has seen all opposition by lesser nation-states to U.S. control branded as terroristic: first came “state-supported terrorism” (read: Iran); then “terrorist states” (read: Libya, Iraq). Whether one supports American foreign policy or not, and whatever one’s views may be on recent armed conflicts and other acts of violence committed in the context of these struggles, it should be clear that the terms “terrorism” and “terrorist” are markers invoked to build ideological consensus for certain kinds of U.S. domination abroad. Just as the Reagan-Bush era “war on drugs” was a code for all sorts of government-sponsored paramilitary, ideological, class- and race-specific attacks on “them,” so “terrorism” functions as what Ronell terms a “parasite” on language, possessing an enormous resonance that threatens to overwhelm our interpretive structures of understanding.15

     

    DeLillo obviously realizes much of this and he utilizes (or one could say, exploits) the recurrent theme of terrorism in Mao II and other works in order to tap into the tremendous force of these associations. His willingness and ability to face these central, defining geopolitical issues is a primary reason that he, much like Pynchon, is seen as one of our “preeminent” writers. But, at the same time, because he is a “preeminent” writer and one who moreover deals, as an American, with issues such as terrorism, his work may be seen to point to some of the necessarily limiting and blinding effects of the culture/imperialism nexus outlined by Said, even as it presents what critics mainly agree is a “progressive” position on most ostensibly political issues. Said’s astonishing discussion of Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, for example, highlights the interconnections between a novelistic discourse that presents an outward critique of the ostensible effects of the dominant ideology while in many ways remaining under the sway of that same ideology.16 DeLillo bravely sets out to imagine a complex political and cultural connection between his postmodern novelist, Bill Gray, and a “terrorist” leader, Abu Rashid. While the motivation of novelist Gray in seeking to act out his theories equating the novelist with the terrorist in terms of cultural significance is both fascinating and revealing, DeLillo’s imagined portrait of the “terrorist” half of the equation reveals some of his–perhaps necessary, maybe even inevitable–limitations as both a Westerner and an American.

     

    Richard Rorty, associated with the liberal democracy argument rehearsed above, might also be said to represent the putative position of the “early” Bill Gray (“Years ago I used to think it was possible for a novelist to alter the inner life of the culture” [Mao II 41]). Rorty has argued for the shaping value of novels for the ethical thinking members of a culture engage in. In works such as Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Rorty says that there is an unbridgeable gap between what philosophers and other intellectual and cultural workers do, and the real world in which innocent people are imprisoned, tortured, killed or left to starve to death. The value of the liberal democratic system is that by eliminating the worst kinds of government-sponsored cruelty and coercion it establishes a reason-oriented rule of peaceful discussion to attain pragmatic social goals. One of these goals is the establishment of an intellectual climate in which writers and intellectuals can discuss issues such as ethics and morality, but crucially without the responsibility for anybody’s actual well-being, which is guaranteed by the liberal-democratic state. Since the intellectual sphere is primarily engaged in imaginative exercises, novelists in Rorty’s view are much more able to engage thoughtful, well-intentioned people with questions of ethical and moral import. Novelists present imagined situations that parallel real-life ones in which people face the questions of how to resist state terror, whether or not to engage in political action, how to respect other people’s choices, and so forth, showing how individual characters are capable of the wrong as well as the right choices. Because of this imaginative license, Rorty’s novelists–his primary examples in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity are Nabokov and Orwell–are better able to engage and shape readers’ moral reactions than are, say, professional philosophers, educators, political or religious leaders.

     

    Now, Rorty has been widely criticized for ignoring the cruelty, violence and coercion that exists within the liberal democratic state. He has also been accused of establishing a kind of analytical “apartheid” with his insistence on the absolute separation between the realms of intellectual endeavor and real-world situations of power and domination.17 Richard Bernstein also argues, “Rorty’s praise of novelists who educate not by didactism but by imaginative concrete description depends on a dubious presupposition which he never justifies and for which there seems to be little, if any, concrete empirical evidence”; and that “in a society such as ours where there are fewer and fewer readers of novels, it seems little more than a false nostalgia to think that novels can play the role Rorty so desperately wants them to play” (285). This would seem to be the stage of thinking that Don DeLillo’s Bill Gray has reached, one we could fairly term postmodern. Yet the consequences of this thinking are potentially devastating for Gray’s view of himself, since he is a novelist others had indeed credited with giving expression to the inner life of the culture, and he had at least until a certain point believed himself capable of sustaining such a role. If the postmodern culture is one in which novels and their creators are increasingly commodified (the heightened commodification correlating to a presumably diminishing public) rather than read and cherished, this may explain Gray’s increasingly morose view of himself and his writing. Certainly this view provides a motivation for Gray’s thinking that the only possible remaining step is to try to bridge the gap between the interiorized experience of novel-writing (and reading) and engaged action in the public sphere.18 The second half of Mao II sketches Gray’s itinerary in a distinctively postmodern and hallucinatory way; as the stages of this journey are increasingly marked by setbacks and failure, the possible interrelation between the private and public spheres is both questioned and problematized.

     

    The first stage in Gray’s journey away from his former seclusion and toward a version of public action is precipitated by a request for a meeting from his old friend and publisher, Charlie Everson, communicated by Brita Nilsson. At this meeting Everson explains a situation in which Gray can be of use in his role as famous author and public figure. Everson is the “chairman of a high-minded committee on free expression” (98); and he wants Gray to appear at a media event in London on behalf of the group. This media event will be timed to correspond to the release of a hostage held by terrorists in Beirut, a hostage who is of special interest to Everson’s group because he is a Swiss poet. When Gray leaves the initial meeting with Everson, he purposely avoids his assistant Scott Martineau, and begins a process of disappearing from his life as it has been constituted up until then.19 In London, the media event never comes off, in part because the place chosen for the meeting is bombed. Gray’s itinerary is furthered, however, by his encounter and conversations with George Haddad, an intermediary figure between the literary group Everson represents and the terrorist group holding the hostage. Haddad suggests that Gray may be able to serve as an agent for freeing the hostage, if he is willing to meet directly with a leader of the terrorist group. As the bombing in London has demonstrated, however, Gray may be the object of the same “terror” that the group practices in Beirut, the fear for his personal safety placing him in a position parallel to the Swiss poet. Eventually Gray accedes to Haddad’s wish that he travel to Haddad’s base in Athens (in a significant place-echo with The Names), where according to Haddad true dialogue is easier. In Athens, though, Gray comes to understand that his only possible mediating role is to substitute himself for the hostage, a kind of literary “trading up.” Caught in this extremely uncertain position, unable to return to his previous life and apparently enmeshed in his own logic equating the novelist and the terrorist, Gray travels to Cyprus and arranges ferry passage to Beirut, during which trip he dies.

     

    If the novel ended there, we might speculate that DeLillo was trying to stage the impossibility of the Western individualist-author “crossing over” to the “terrorist” Orient, trapped as Gray is by his own imaginative limitations. But in an ironic doubling that resonates with the postmodern themes of image, simulacra and personal identity examined earlier, the postscript, “In Beirut,” presents the photographer Brita Nilsson completing Bill Gray’s journey and meeting with terrorist leader Abu Rashid. Nilsson has abandoned her project of photographing authors and switched to terrorists, enacting Gray’s theorized substitution. Her experience of Beirut is hazy and surreal, dominated by the dizzying simulacra of Coke ads and the cult of the terrorist leader’s personality. As a Swede, Brita Nilsson is coded “international” from the outset and so might be seen as more able than the American Gray to move easily in this “foreign” setting. But Nilsson’s art of photography is also more capable than Gray’s written medium of communicating the surface reality of Beirut, a reality DeLillo seems to urge is all there is. (In a telling juxtaposition as the book ends, Nilsson experiences flashes followed by no sound that she realizes are not shell bursts, but someone taking photographs.) DeLillo’s Abu Rashid, seen in a single encounter with Nilsson, is a taciturn terrorist, given to mouthing phrases like “Don’t bring your problems to Beirut” (232). Much as Scott Martineau parrots statements made by Bill Gray, so Abu Rashid’s interpreter expands on, even makes up, statements for Abu Rashid. Abu Rashid also exerts an unspoken control over his hooded young followers who wear his picture on their T-shirts. But, somewhat paradoxically, Abu Rashid does seem to care what Brita Nilsson thinks of him, saying repeatedly: “You must tell me if you think I’m totally mad” (236). Where Bill Gray’s “failure” to cross over fully to the other side might be said to enact a certain reality, a division between world views and systems of thinking, Mao II‘s Abu Rashid represents, in my view, DeLillo’s imaginative “failure” even to attempt to render any kind of satisfactory counterpart to the Western novelist in the figure of the terrorist leader.

     

    It may be that in order to render anything like an adequate view of what it is to be a terrorist, one must have had the actual experience. But when confronted with a situation like that presented in Mao II of someone held hostage, how is one to image the captor’s mentality? The Swiss poet has no direct contact with the leader, Abu Rashid, only with someone referred to as “the boy” who may or may not be the same “boy” with the hood that Brita Nilsson sees with Abu Rashid. The scene of captivity is imagined entirely through the consciousness of the Swiss poet. Throughout the text, “the boy” is credited with having almost no independent thought or existence; instead, his actions are random and forgetful:

     

    The boy forgot to replace the hood after meals, he forgot the meals, the boy was the bearer of randomness. The last sense-making thing, the times for meals and beatings, was in danger of collapse. (110)

     

    There were strip fragments of concrete still attached to the bent steel rod the boy used to beat the bottoms of the prisoner’s feet when he remembered. (203)

     

    I don’t know what logic this representation of the captor’s random forgetfulness is meant to serve, but it does correspond in its way to the lassitude and taciturnity attributed to the terrorist leader Abu Rashid in the Postscript. Whatever the case may be, this semi-bored, inattentive approach to torture is most certainly not what narratives told from the “other side” present. Marguerite Duras’ brief narrative that presents an autobiographical account of torturing a French collaborator, for example, shows her and her compatriots to be tense, alert and extremely involved with the process of torturing their prisoner (La douleur 135-162). And in a note preceding this narrative, Duras “the author” tells her readers: “Therese is me. She who tortures the informer is me. I give you she who tortures along with the other texts. Learn to read: these are sacred texts” (134; my trans.). This same “sacred” quality permeates Elie Wiesel’s (one would think at least somewhat fictionalized) account in Dawn of a Jewish terrorist, as a member of a group in Palestine, holding hostage and finally shooting a British army officer.

     

    The recent, surprisingly successful, film The Crying Game (dir. Neil Jordan, 1992) devotes roughly the first half of its narrative to a similar terrorist/hostage confrontation.20 Both in its representation of the terrorist/hostage relationship and in the terrorist’s very different set of experiences in the second half of the film, Jordan presents material suggesting the terrorist’s role in postmodern culture is less that of the “novelist” (someone who influences the inner mind of the culture) and more that of the “interpreter” (someone who participates in smaller-scale interpretive acts). Although the second half of the film and its focus on the mysterious transvestite or transsexual Dil has provoked the most response, I find the first half of the film to be as powerful a cinematic experience as any in recent memory. Jordan has said that his depiction of the hostage/terrorist relationship in the context of Northern Ireland–though he wouldn’t tend to use the word “terrorist,” would he?–bears a relationship to two previous treatments of the theme, Frank O’Connor’s story “Guest of the Nation” and Brendan Behan’s play The Hostage (Introduction to The Neil Jordan Reader [NJR], xii). He continues:

     

    O’Connor and Behan dealt with simple friendship between two men. Underlying this friendship lay an erotic possibility, a sense of mutual need and identification that could have provided salvation for their protagonists. That possibility remained subdued, and so both stories ended tragically. With The Crying Game, I brought the erotic thread to the surface. Instead of two, there were now three. A hostage, a captor, and an absent lover. The lover became the focus for the erotic subtext, loved by both men in a way they couldn’t love each other. (NJR xii)

     

    Although there are many differences in all of these situations of captivity, I would propose that Jordan’s romanticizing tendency is one way to explore the “sacred” element both Duras and Wiesel insist upon, and that DeLillo’s narrative either denies or completely elides.21

     

    The Crying Game‘s hostage Jody is a British soldier on assignment in Northern Ireland. He is also a black man, born in Antigua, and the film uses his racial identity to comment in repeated, ironic fashion on the complex interrelations inhering in Britain’s “postcolonial” experience. In the film’s opening sequence, Jody is seduced by Jude, an IRA operative, while the music from the opening credits “When a Man Loves a Woman” fades in the background. There are multiple ironies operating here, of course, as when we find out that Jude is merely playing a role in Jody’s capture, and later when we find out that the woman Jody does love is not a woman at all. The film consistently sets up these enactments of interpretive scenarios, in which the principal characters are presented with situations requiring responses to bodies of information. The film’s audience is likewise asked to participate in these interpretive actions; but, unlike the audience who are given clues and may even guess “right” (“I knew all along” “No, you didn’t” “I did too”), the film’s principal characters almost always are wrong. Jody makes a huge error when he goes with Jude, something he appears to admit when he says, “I didn’t even fancy her. . . . She’s not my type” (NJR 189). Fergus, of course, makes a big mistake in getting involved with the prisoner, a mistake that leads to a whole series of others, including letting Jody take off his hood when he is about to be executed. The film’s most notorious interpretive dilemma involves Fergus’ lack of insight into the clues presented regarding Dil’s gender. Even once his error has been exposed, Fergus continues not to recognize Dil fully, and thus both to underestimate her and to pass on faulty information to his cohorts: for example, when Maguire asks “And who is she?” and Fergus responds “Just a girl” (NJR 245). Underestimating Dil leads Fergus to botch his next assignment, when Dil ties him up, preventing him from making his rendezvous with Maguire and Jude. When Jude arrives at the apartment, Dil correctly identifies her as an agent in Jody’s abduction and shoots her. Now, we could say that all of these errors are part of the romantic plot of the film–Fergus the terrorist with a heart simply making a muddle of things–but that would likewise be a mistake of interpretation in my view.

     

    Jordan’s IRA terrorists (or any other terrorists, for that matter) are by no means in control of the meanings generated by their actions, despite what they might like to think, and despite DeLillo/Gray’s equation of the terrorist with the novelist. The situations in which terrorism arises do not admit of these kind of unambivalent messages in which one person or group does the emitting and the wider culture or the masses do the receiving. Following the analysis of Lyotard in Le Differend, it is this impossibility of a universal or totalizing discourse, as paradigmatically represented by the silencing of the wronged party, e.g., the holocaust victim, that leads inevitably to the incommensurable difference or differend. The language of the Law, the language of Western imperialism, even the language of liberal democracy, does not address all subjects and does not allow all subjects to formulate utterances (most notably those who are victims of genocide). Operating out of a determinant us/them opposition, the universalizing discourse of Western humanism necessarily excludes and marginalizes certain utterances, prevents them from being heard or even from being made. The Abu Rashids of this world are not taciturn “by nature”; they are rather denied the fundamental conditions in which to formulate language in a meaningful way. Of course, this leads the Abu Rashids and the Ferguses to undertake actions that rational, moral and ethical thinking is quick to condemn. What this analysis of terrorism uncovers as an aspect of our “postmodern condition,” however, is that we all occupy roles as speakers and interpreters in various discourse communities that may or may not overlap or communicate with each other. This does not excuse any one of us (as the by-now routine misreading of Lyotard would claim) from the obligation to try to understand the ideological structures determining our own discourse communities, and the way these same structures systematically distort the meanings generated by others.

     

    It is no longer a viable option, pace Rorty, to say that Western humanism is the best show we have and everybody else had better be convinced (preferably by persuasion rather than force) to get on board. The famous “conflict of interpretations,” which Lyotard continues to insist upon through linking the differend to theories of justice, means from this perspective that no one occupies the role of the “novelist” in the sense of entering into the inner mind of a culture and determining what its members should think about key moral questions. Our various social formations lack the kind of cultural consensus necessary for such a “preeminent” figure. It is a fatal error to think that the “terrorist” is any more able to occupy such a position and in this way I think DeLillo’s Mao II is exemplary in presenting Bill Gray’s doomed attempt to somehow force this connection. Where Mao II falls short, in my view, is in its imaginative representation of the figure of the terrorist. Neil Jordan’s Fergus may be a romanticized version of the terrorist, but at least Jordan’s terrorist is given a “sacred” dimension. DeLillo may wish to deny this “sacred” character to his terrorists, showing rather something like the banality of evil in “the boy”‘s random behavior and Abu Rashid’s programmatic and taciturn utterances. But it is only in attempting to understand the silenced utterances resulting from the inherent lack of justice in our society and leading to all kinds of terrorism both at home and abroad that our postmodern culture deserves to survive at all.

     

    Notes

     

    1. This notion is advanced by Glen Scott Allen in the fuller version of a paper presented at the 1992 Modern Language Association meeting in New York, “Spectral Authorship: Thomas Pynchon, Don DeLillo and the Postmodern Legacy,” and in his essay in this collection.

     

    2. In Said’s terms, ‘imperialism’ means the practice, the theory and the attitudes of a dominating metropolitan center ruling a distant territory; “‘colonialism,’ which is almost always a consequence of imperialism is the implanting of settlements on distant territory. . . . In our time, colonialism has largely ended; imperialism, as we shall see, lingers where it has always been, in a kind of general cultural sphere as well as in specific political, ideological, economic, and social practices” (9).

     

    3. This is a stage where not only the anti-Left reviewers of The Washington Post and other media outlets are stuck. For a forceful critique of these, see the articles by Hal Crowther and Frank Lentricchia in (Lentricchia, ed.) Introducing Don DeLillo. On the other side of the ideological divide are the little + – symbols that Fredric Jameson affixes on his chart next to various theorists of modernism and the postmodern, according to whether they are “progressive” or “reactionary” (61).

     

    4. Something about the mirror symmetry, or pleonastic quality, of “triumphant Americanism” and “American triumphalism” ought to give pause to anyone wishing to assume the label of “Americanist.” Paul Bove has given an incisive expression to some of the problems associated with the Americanist discourse in literary studies (48-66). I am very disturbed by the suggestion voiced by some that American literature should be seen in the context of “post-colonial” literatures. Here again, I think Said’s recent work is indispensable for understanding “America”‘s role as a leading imperialist power and for providing ways of contextualizing any analysis of U.S. cultural production.

     

    5. Prairie’s search is similar to that in another roughly contemporaneous work, T. Coreghessan Boyle’s World’s End (1988). In this novel, a young man’s search for identity hinges on finding out what happened during a leftist political rally that took place when he was just a child. The betrayal committed on this occasion by his father led to the death of his mother and his father’s permanent estrangement. A combination of mystery story and search for personal identity, World’s End counts for its tacit support by readers of leftist sympathy in order to invest its traditional patterns of mystery story and identity quest with political resonance. This topic has obvious resonances with Borges’ “Theme of the Traitor and the Hero,” and Bernardo Bertolucci’s film based on the Borges story, The Spider’s Strategem (1968). In the Bertolucci film, where Borges’ indeterminate setting is replaced by postwar Italy, a son returns to the town in which a statue of his father, martyred by the fascists, dominates the town square. The son intends to investigate the background of his father’s murder, but the further his investigation takes him, the more it looks like the father planned his own murder in order to make amends for betraying his cell of partisan resistance fighters. My guess is that a more thorough examination of modern European and European-influenced literatures would yield countless examples of this motif.

     

    6. As should be clear by now, I am following some of the conceptual apparatus for understanding postmodernism proposed by Jean-Francois Lyotard, particularly in The Postmodern Condition and Le Postmoderne explique aux enfants.

     

    7. That is, if existentialism was ever in itself a satisfactory solution on a political level. Edward Said’s discussion of Albert Camus’ work in L’Etranger and other texts shows that Camus’ vaunted existential crisis of meaning, particularly the supposedly “unmotivated” murder of the Arab by Meursault, serves as a cover for his deep intrication in the colonialist history and mindset of the French Algerians (Said 169-185).

     

    8. That Marx had this metaphorical/nonmetaphorical sense of “drugs” is clear from his statement regarding religion. Lindsay Anderson’s film O Lucky Man! (1973) turns Marx’s dictum around in a prominent wall graffiti: “Revolution is the opium of the intellectuals.”

     

    9. These concerns with selfhood and authorship are central to Arnold Weinstein’s recent magisterial study of American fiction, Nobody’s Home.

     

    10. In American and Western thinking generally, Asians mean numbers. In Guy Banister’s paranoid imagination, Chinese are massing in the Baja on the border with California: “There was something classic in the massing of the Chinese” (Libra 352). It is too simple merely to call this racist (though it clearly is), because we thus tend to indulge in self-righteous determinations of other people’s racism. DeLillo’s work consistently moves in to the minds of Americans–the Banisters, the Oswalds, the Bill Grays–to show how these racist and other ideological principles serve as organizing tropes for the larger social entities in which we all participate to one degree or another.

     

    11. The paranoid reading of DeLillo’s fiction, as solicited for example by The Names, would raise the question of whether there can ever be an “unmotivated” killing of an American in Athens. That is to say, perhaps Gray’s ultimately fatal accident, like the near-fatal shooting of David Keller / James Axton in The Names, stages the “return of the repressed,” mirroring Meursault’s “unmotivated” murder of the Arab in Camus’s L’Etranger. But maybe America’s leading role in maintaining the “New World Order” is not as transparent as I see it as being. Arnold Weinstein, for example, says (astonishingly) about the situation presented in The Names: “American hegemony is a thing of the past” (291).

     

    12. Merleau-Ponty says, for example: “It is from the conservative West that communism has received the idea of history and learned to relativize moral judgment. Communism has retained this lesson and sought at least within the given historical milieu those forces which had the best chance to realize humanity. If one does not believe in the power of the proletariat to establish itself or that it can accomplish all that Marxism believes it can, then the capitalist civilizations which have, even if imperfect in themselves, the merit of existing, represent perhaps the least terrible of what history has made; but the difference between these and other civilizations, or between these and the Soviet enterprise, is not between heaven and hell, or between good and evil: it is only a matter of the different uses of violence” (295; my translation).

     

    13. This apology for Western-style pragmatic humanism under the guise of liberal democracy is usually associated with the work of Richard Rorty; see especially, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Specifically in an article entitled “Cosmopolitanism without emancipation: A response to Jean-Francois Lyotard,” Rorty rejects the idea that there is anything wrong with taking liberal democracy as the norm when dealing with other cultures: “We cannot leap outside our Western social democratic skins when we encounter another culture, and we should not try. All we should try to do is get inside the inhabitants of that culture long enough to get some idea of how we look to them, and whether they have any ideas we can use” (212-213). If that sounds like cultural imperialism, that is fine with Rorty, because liberal democracy is unquestionably the best social system yet devised. It is unfortunate that in the past force was used to colonize non-Western peoples in the name of liberal humanism, but that doesn’t diminish the ultimate validity of Western values (cf. 218-219). These very significant differences in political outlook between Rorty and Lyotard are consistently overlooked by those who want to lump the two together and accuse Lyotard of Rorty’s political shortcomings.

     

    14. As DeLillo well knows, and as Mao II explores in great depth through the character of Karen Janney and her association with the Moon organization, Koresh’s Branch Davidians are known as a “cult.” Karen’s free indirect discourse formulates this as follows: “The other word is `cult.’ How they love to use it against us” (9).

     

    15. In the context of the PC wars, one has only to recall George Will’s suggestion, in his Newsweek column on the debate over the Carol Iannone nomination to the NEH advisory board, that members of the MLA were the domestic equivalent of Saddam Hussein’s palace guards, comparing Dick Cheney’s role in defeating Saddam to wife Lynn Cheney’s role in fighting far more insidious enemies within the American academy. This analogy would be ludicrous if it weren’t so revealing of the links between imperialism abroad and cultural hegemony at home.

     

    16. As Said says, “Conrad’s tragic limitation is that even though he could see clearly that on one level imperialism was essentially pure dominance and land-grabbing, he could not then conclude that imperialism had to end so that ‘natives’ could lead lives free from European domination. As a creature of his time, Conrad could not grant the natives their freedom, despite his severe critique of the imperialism that enslaved them” (30).

     

    17. Richard Bernstein addresses “Rorty’s logic of apartheid–his rigid separation of the private and the public. For like all apartheid, it has violent consequences. It seems curious that Rorty, who shows us that most distinctions are fuzzy, vague, and subject to historical contingencies, should rely on such a fixed, rigid, ahistorical dichotomy. My objection is not to drawing sharp distinctions. Without doing so, no thinking would be possible. My objection is to the way Rorty uses this specific dichotomy, which leads to all sorts of violent consequences” (286). I dispute the ability of Rorty to maintain this distinction, specifically with regard to the language of gendered violence, in Chapter Six of The Ethical Turn: Postmodern Theories of the Subject (forthcoming).

     

    18. One recalls that Jean-Paul Sartre in What is Literature? argued for the superiority of the novel as an art form precisely because it alone was able to accomplish a satisfactory synthesis of these domains.

     

    19. Weinstein, as we have seen, sees the Wakefield story as paradigmatic of this desire to disappear from one’s life. In the postmodern context I am working to establish here, I see parallels with two fairly recent films, Antonioni’s The Passenger (1975) and Wim Wenders’ The American Friend (1977). In each of these films the male protagonist seeks a form of disappearance: in The Passenger, Jack Nicholson’s character switches identities with a dead man who turns out to be an itinerant arms dealer; in The American Friend, the character played by Bruno Ganz is tricked into committing a mob murder by his “American friend” (Dennis Hopper), and then finds that he enjoys the thrill and isolation from his family that results. I think we could call each of these films postmodern in part because of the dissolution of previously stable identities both main characters go through, linked to paranoid systems of shady power figures, both political and criminal, similar to the terrorist network DeLillo constructs in Mao II. This postmodern connection between the individual and the larger conspiracy as a form of what he calls “totality” drives Fredric Jameson’s discussion of recent North American film in The Geopolitical Aesthetic (1992).

     

    20. My continued use of the word “terrorist” to describe the IRA character of Fergus (Stephen Rea) is deliberate. Reviews of the film also used this term, although somewhat more casually, calling Fergus, for example, “the terrorist with a heart” or “the thoughtful terrorist.” Lest it seem that I am shifting ground–from the Middle East to Ireland–without justification, I would refer to Edward Said’s discussion of W. B. Yeats in the context of the resistance to imperialism (Said 220-238). Said calls Yeats “the indisputably great national poet who during a period of anti-imperialist resistance articulates the experiences, the aspirations, and the restorative vision of a people suffering under the dominion of an offshore power” (220).

     

    21. Raymond Queneau’s 1947 novel, We Always Treat Women Too Well (On est toujours trop bon avec les femmes), set during the Easter Rising of 1916, is a wickedly satirical take on the erotic possibilities of the terrorist / hostage situation, as well as being what now seems a presciently postmodern work.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Barthes, Roland. “The Death of the Author.” The Rustle of Language. New York: Farrar Straus and Giroux, 1987.
    • Benjamin, Walter. “The Storyteller: Reflections on the Works of Nikolai Leskov.” Illuminations. New York: HBJ, 1968.
    • Bernstein, Richard J. The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizons of Modernity/Postmodernity. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992.
    • Borges, Jorge Luis. “Theme of the Traitor and the Hero.” Labyrinths. New York: New Directions, 1962.
    • Bove, Paul A. In the Wake of Theory. Hanover, NH: Wesleyan/New England UP, 1992.
    • Boyle, T. Coreghessan. World’s End. New York: Viking, 1988.
    • DeLillo, Don. The Names. New York: Vintage, 1982.
    • —. White Noise. New York: Viking Penguin, 1985.
    • —. Libra. New York: Viking Penguin, 1988.
    • —. Mao II. New York: Viking Penguin, 1991.
    • Duras, Marguerite. La douleur. Paris: P.O.L., 1985; translated as War, by Barbara Bray, New York: Pantheon, 1986.
    • Foucault, Michel. “What is an Author?” Textual Strategies. Ed. Josue Harari. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1979. 141-160.
    • Hawthorne, Nathaniel. “Wakefield.” Tales and Sketches. New York: Library of America, 1982 (Ohio State UP, 1972, 1974).
    • Hutcheon, Linda. A Poetics of Postmodernism: History, Theory, Fiction. New York: Routledge, 1988.
    • Jameson, Fredric. Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Captalism. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1991.
    • —. The Geopolitical Aesthetic: Cinema and Space in the World System. Bloomington: Indiana UP, and London: BFI Publishing, 1992.
    • Jordan, Neil. A Neil Jordan Reader (including Night in Tunisia [stories], The Dream of a Beast [novella], and The Crying Game [screenplay]). New York: Vintage, 1993.
    • Lentricchia, Frank, ed. Introducing Don DeLillo. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1991.
    • Lyotard, Jean-Francois. La condition postmoderne. Paris: Minuit, 1979; translated as The Postmodern Condition. Minneapolis: U Minnesota P, 1986.
    • —. “Histoire universelle et differences culturelles,” Critique 456 (1981): 559-568; translated by David Macey as “Universal History and Cultural Differences,” The Lyotard Reader. Ed. Andew Benjamin. Oxford: Blackwell, 1989, 314-323.
    • —. Le differend. Paris: Minuit, 1983; translated by Georges Van Den Abeele, Minneapolis: U Minnesota P, 1986.
    • —. Le postmoderne explique aux enfants. Paris: Galilee, 1986.
    • McHale, Brian. Constructing Postmodernism. London and New York: Routledge, 1992.
    • Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Humanisme et terreur: essai sur le probleme communiste. Paris: Gallimard, 1947; translated by John O’Neill, as Humanism and Terror Boston: Beacon, 1969.
    • Pynchon, Thomas. Vineland. New York: Little, Brown, 1990.
    • Queneau, Raymond. On est toujour trop bon avec les femmes. Paris: Gallimard, 1947; translated by Barbara Wright, as We Always Treat Women Too Well. New York: New Directions, 1981.
    • Ronell, Avital. Crack Wars: Literature Addiction Mania. Lincoln: U Nebraska P, 1992.
    • Rorty, Richard. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989.
    • —. “Cosmopolitanism without emancipation: A response to Jean-Francois Lyotard.” Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991.
    • Said, Edward W. Culture and Imperialism. New York: Knopf, 1993.
    • Sartre, Jean-Paul. Qu’est-ce que la litterature? Paris: Gallimard, 1948; translated by Bernard Frechtman, as What is Literature? New York: Harper and Row, 1949.
    • Weinstein, Arnold. Nobody’s Home: Speech, Self, and Place in American Fiction from Hawthorne to DeLillo. New York: Oxford, 1993.
    • Wiesel, Elie. Dawn. Trans. Frances Frenaye. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1961.
    • Wilde, Alan. “Death in and around Vineland, U.S.A.” Boundary 2 18:2 (1991), 166-180.

     

  • Raids on the Conscious: Pynchon’s Legacy of Paranoia and the Terrorism of Uncertainty in Don DeLillo’s Ratner’s Star

    Glen Scott Allen

    Department of English
    Towson State University
    e7e4all@toe.towson.edu

     

    “Terror: from the Latin terrere, to frighten; intense fear; the quality of causing dread; terribleness; alarm, consternation, apprehension, dread, fear, fright.”

     

    Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary

     

    “Years ago I used to think it was possible for a novelist to alter the inner life of culture. Now, bomb-makers and gunmen have taken that territory. They make raids on human consciousness.”

     

    –William Gray in Mao II

     

    Terrorism has played an important part in nearly every novel Don DeLillo has written to date. While the terrorists of Running Dog (1978) are essentially cartoon figures in search of a hypothetical pornographic film made in Hitler’s bunker, the more realistic terrorists in Players (1977) assassinate stock brokers and attempt to convert (albeit apathetically) disillusioned upper middleclass New Yorkers. The Names’ (1982) use of terrorism is more complex, positing a terrorist group–or perhaps cult is closer to the mark–whose assassinations are either random or based on an arcane understanding of a “pre-linguistic” language, depending on what they believe that day; and White Noise (1985), with its “airborne toxic event” extends this unpredictability factor and presents terrorism as something perhaps beyond the control of human agency at all. Libra (1989) suggest that terrorism of a bureaucratic but inherently uncontrollable nature lurks at the heart of the Kennedy assassination. And finally DeLillo’s most recent novel, Mao II (1991), returns to an human terrorist, Abu Rashid, and suggests a complex and almost hypnotic symmetry between his praxis and that of a famous but disillusioned writer in the novel, William Gray. This symmetry is of course not unique to Mao II; the extended meditation about “solitary plotters” in Libra posits that both the scheming terrorist and the struggling writer are at root “men in small rooms” seeking to reconnect with a society from which they feel alienated, and so they both must “write” themselves back into the world.

     

    Terrorism in DeLillo seems an integral component of the postmodern condition, its ubiquitousness aiding and abetting in the construction of a subject for whom paranoia is not so much a neurosis as a canny adaptive strategy of survival; a strategy which has “evolved” from what we might call its classical form in the works of Thomas Pynchon, especially his magnum opus Gravity’s Rainbow (1973). Terrorism in GR is figured as the product of increasingly omniscient institutional surveillance over the increasingly impotent and isolated civilian. While the agents of this surveillance are obscure, still they are agents, coherent sites of surveillance and control. In DeLillo’s work, however, terrorism seems to have evolved beyond the need of human agency, to have seeped into the very texture of contemporary life. DeLillo’s response to this postmodern dynamic of terrorism and paranoia argues for an almost romantic return to the sovereign powers of the individual, an entity considered essentially extinct in postmodern fiction. This resurgent individualism is in fact not only a rejection of the paranoid strategy for postmodern survival formulated in Pynchon, but it also represents a rejection of the postmodern subject (as figured in the works of critics like Benveniste, Jameson, and Beaudrillard to name only a few) as something nearly inseparable from the semiotic “signal soup” of postmodern life.1 For instance, Kaja Silverman singles out the writings of Benveniste as an example of the representation of this spectral postmodern subject: “[In Benveniste’s] writings, the subject has an even more provisional status . . . it has no existence outside of the specific discursive moments in which it emerges. The subject must be constantly reconstructed through discourse.” (Silverman, 199). But I will argue that DeLillo seems to feel our only hope for redemption from a self-perpetuating cycle of terrorism, repression and paranoia is in moving away from formulations of the subject which work to deny or subvert classical conceptions of the individual as the primary site of responsibility and authority.

     

    Typically when we speak of terrorism we’re referring to violence committed by a minority in demonstration of its status as victim: of political repression or geographic isolation or “cultural ghettoization.” Thus terrorism is fundamentally an act meant to call attention to itself; like postmodern fiction, it is inherently self-conscious. And in order to disseminate its self-conscious image as victim, it must have recourse to the media. Clearly when DeLillo’s character William Gray suggests that terrorists have usurped the role in the public conscious that novelists once held, he is referring to the fact that terrorist acts must be circulated to attain identity, and thus such acts compete for the public’s limited attention span with other circulating “texts.” Much of the debate within the scholarship of terrorism does in fact center on whether or not mass media encourages terrorist acts or is largely irrelevant to them. Two recent articles in the journal Terrorism are good examples of this debate. Ralph Dowling suggests that TV coverage is unimportant to terrorist aims, while Russell F. Farnen argues that terrorism and TV have a fundamentally symbiotic relationship, and that in fact terrorism is “made to order” for the specific requirements of the television media: “Terrorism is different, dramatic, and potentially violent. It frequently develops over a period of time, occurs in exotic locations, offers a clear confrontation, involves bizarre characters, and is politically noteworthy. Finally, it is of concern to the public” (Farnen, 111). Farnen cites what is apparently the majority opinion in terrorism studies by paraphrasing (unfortunately) Margaret Thatcher, to the effect that TV coverage is the “oxygen” which allows terrorism to breathe.

     

    Whatever one’s opinion about the relationship between TV and terrorism, a far more interesting point is to be found in Dowling’s suggestion that understanding terrorist acts is no more–and no less–difficult than understanding any human attempt at communication. For certainly “understanding” terrorist acts is the one thing the “authorities” must claim to be incapable of doing. By its very definition, terrorism, at least to modern western democracies, is “mad.” To see why this is the case we begin with a quote from a member of Al Fatah on the purpose of their use of violence: “Violence will purify the individuals from venom, it will redeem the colonized from inferiority complex, it will return courage to the countryman” (Quoted in Dowling, 52). Violence for this terrorist is not the medium, it is the message. Violence is the transcendental signifier, the one term that cannot be reduced to any positive correlative within the discourse itself; axiomatic, beyond justification or logical debate; beyond logic. Thus to the logocentric Western sensibility, the terrorists’ use of violence is the most “senseless” of all terms he/she could possibly employ. It is, in terms of cultural linguistics, essentially impossible for most “First World” Western civilians to “read” the terrorist text, to see in it any expression worth interpreting. Farnen quotes the U. S. Ambassador at Large, L. Paul Bremer, who casts terrorism in its familiar Western role of evil incarnate: “Terrorism’s most significant characteristic is that it despises and seeks to destroy the fundamentals of Western democracy–respect for individual life and the rule of law” (Farnen, 104).

     

    Though these two authors disagree about the relationship between terrorism and the media, they both agree that terrorism does in fact serve a fundamental rhetorical purpose, like any other form of human communication consisting of the manipulation of symbols. The communicative act is, Dowling argues, the way humans “find a place in the world,” the process of identifying oneself and one’s group as distinct from other selves and other groups. Terrorist acts signal to the terrorists themselves who they are. In Dowling’s view, the cultural effect of mass media-broadcasted terrorist violence is quite secondary to the more fundamentally human need of terrorists to “speak” themselves: “The seemingly senseless killings by terrorists serve the same function for terrorist society that wars and punishment of criminals and dissidents perform for mainstream society” (Dowling, 51). Farnen also believes that terrorism is a form of expression, a text which all the parties involved seek to control.2 He uses the example of the kidnapping of Aldo Moro in 1978 by the Brigate Rosse, which Farnen says was “played out” as a classic narrative of sacrifice and tragedy by all the parties involved: government, media, and the terrorists themselves: “The saga was complete with ‘Christians’ (Moro and his martyred bodyguards), BR ‘lions,’ state ‘Caesars,’ media ‘tribunes,’ and the anxious Italian public” (Farnen, 116). In fact, Farnen argues that the terrorists intentionally and specifically “wrote” various symbolism into the entire kidnapping drama, in such forms as the “placement of [Moro’s] dead body in the center of Rome, on a street linking the two major party headquarters” (118). Even more interesting is Farnen’s observation that, though the event was discussed at obsessive length in the media for months, very little was ever said about the terrorists’ possible motivations or rationale. In fact, he concludes that, like many such terrorist acts, the entire event was treated as though it occurred somewhere outside the normal course of human events: “The Moro affair was treated much like an inexplicable natural disaster or an act of God” (118). Finally, Farnen points out terrorism’s usefulness as a dramatic trope, which has made it a mainstay of TV shows and popular spy novels: “With the sudden demise of post-Gorbachev communism as the main enemy, terrorism has become ‘public enemy number one’ in American public discourse” (103). (Certainly this move is evident in the work of Tom Clancy, who began by casting Soviets in the role of arch villain, but has easily substituted terrorists–both narco- and political–in that role in his more recent novels.)

     

    While much of Dowling’s argument seems finally rather simplistic–at times he appears to cast terrorists in the role of the misunderstood teens from “West Side Story”–at the very least he works to move the discourse about terrorist acts from reductive tactical debates to a recognition that terrorism is a means of expression. However, by downplaying and eventually denying the role the mass media audience plays in the formation of the “terrorist identity,” he skims over what is clearly for many postmodern writers, especially DeLillo, the most interesting, perhaps the most terrifying aspect of modern terrorism. For if terrorists have become nearly ubiquitous players in the contemporary social narrative, then, whatever the intent of their “expressive” acts, they contribute as much to the formation of our identity as to their own, and their acts of seemingly random and “meaningless” violence have become an integral component of what being a modern individual means. Given that it has become something of a commonplace to say that part of what being a postmodern subject means is a pervasive sense of anxiety and vulnerability, then terrorism’s chief aim would seem to be perfectly consistent with that “meaning.” According to an authority on terrorism, its chief “objective . . . is to convey a pervasive sense of vulnerability”; vulnerability which produces consequent paranoia and guilt in the civilian; guilt which arises “when terrorism proves that societal institutions cannot provide the peace and security they promise” (qtd. in Dowling, 52). Thus in a broad cultural context, terrorism is an all-too material demonstration of the uncertainty principle, i.e., that we cannot absolutely control our environments and destinies, and that our ability to dictate the narrative of our own lives is limited and circumstantial.

     

    In order to describe DeLillo’s presentation of this dynamic of terrorism and paranoia, we first need to discuss terrain so often considered Pynchon’s preeminent stomping ground. Pynchon’s chief contribution to literature may well be considered a body of fiction where the legacy of a paranoid style–out of Orwell via Burroughs, Kerouac and Mailer–comes to full fruition in what a character in Running Dog calls the “age of conspiracies.” According to John McClure, the appeal of conspiracy theories in the late 20th century stems from their essentially indisputable, self-justifying, self-referencing hermeneutics: “For conspiracy theory explains the world, as religion does, without elucidating it, by positing the existence of hidden forces which permeate and transcend the realm of ordinary life” (McClure, 103). Though McClure is writing here of the work of Don DeLillo, Pynchon’s Gravity’s Rainbow would undoubtedly serve equally well as an example of this conspiracy fiction, with its nearly infinite schemes crossing and crisscrossing nations, continents, and decades, while in the center of these intersecting plot-lines sits forlorn Tyrone Slothrop, like a target in a crosshairs.

     

    But a target of what? Certainly the V-2 rocket is one possibility; by the end of the novel we have reason to believe that the rocket is in fact “pursuing” Slothrop, or that he is pursuing it. In any case, they seem bound, through the early experiments of Dr. Jamf with Imoplex-G, in some complicated dance of death. But this “chemical bond” is only conjectural, and certainly not the only candidate for some They out to get Slothrop. In fact, by the time Slothrop wanders the Zone, They has become nearly every postwar institution, regardless its national or ideological boundaries. Finally what pursues Slothrop is the World; but what pursues the reader is the lasting image of a rocket, poised an infinitesimal inch above our heads, completing an arc which began with its vapor trail first witnessed by Pirate Prentice 800 pages earlier. And in a purely physical sense, the greatest terror of the novel is the V-2, the German “terror weapon” that was intended to demoralize the British civilian population. By using the V-2 as a trope of paranoia, Pynchon categorically identified the primary legacy of our victory in WWII as anxiety; anxiety fueled by a world armed with weapons which had transcended all classical theories and strategies of warfare. This fundamentally “material” terrorism is one easily recognized by anyone who lived through either WWII or the 25 years of intense Cold War which followed. As critic John Johnston has argued, the “They-system” of Gravity’s Rainbow “is depicted as arising out of the new bureaucratic needs and technologies of World War Two” (“Post-Cinematic Fiction,” 91); bureaucratic needs and technologies which would come to identify Slothrop’s “time” as the progenitor of this age of conspiracies:

     

    There is also the story about Tyrone Slothrop, who was sent into the Zone to be present at his own assembly–perhaps, heavily paranoid voices have whispered, his time’s assembly–and there ought to be a punchline to it. But there isn’t. The plan went wrong. (GR, 680)

     

    Though Pynchon’s Theys are depicted as beyond traditional national ideologies, Their politics are clearly identifiable as essentially those of isolation, repression and control. In the post-WWII world of Pynchon’s fiction, the development of modern and efficient state surveillance is a form of terrorism which motivates the civilian to seek out patterns of information which may (or may not) reveal hidden agencies and concealed plots. Thus paranoia is an adaptive reaction formation to omniscient institutional surveillance. And the mass media in Pynchon–radio, TV and print journalism, even the US. postal system–has been largely co-opted by these forces of surveillance and control until they have become little more than state-dominated networks for distributing dis-information. Pynchon correctly predicted that the surviving nation-states, unable to take to the battlefield against foreign enemies, would turn all their powers of surveillance on their own citizens, project their institutionalized paranoia onto these civilians, and thus construct an international and domestic tension where peace in the world was purchased with the disappearance of this very civilian as an independent subject. What Pynchon represents in GR is, for want of a better term, the ascendancy of State Terrorism; not the state terrorism claimed by the PLO as a underlying reality in the foreign policy of the United States and other world powers, but rather an intra state terrorism, i.e., the development of complex and interconnected domestic and international networks of surveillance which depend on the acquisition and circulation of vast quantities of new information.

     

    And these new information technologies also become central to the thematics of DeLillo’s novels, but in quite different ways. For instance, the information in DeLillo’s work often seems utterly ahistorical. The characters of DeLillo’s novels often “inhabit” identities whose connection to history–either personal or cultural–is merely theoretical. DeLillo’s fictions seem set in a time when World War II has become a distant influence. In Running Dog, for instance, there is the pornographic film from Hitler’s Bunker, yet nothing else about World War II seeps through into the novel; even Vietnam seems to belong to an entirely other world. Of course, the paranoiac “fallout” from World War II and the stalemate of the Cold War is only one of the trademarks of Pynchon’s fiction. Others include conspiracies whose agencies are dispersed or uncertain, characters who disappear in ways which mirror the dispersal of those agencies, and endings which suggest imminent and perhaps apocalyptic revelation. Yet, while all of these components are evident in DeLillo’s novels as well, they are all warped by this increasing mass of information which shapes, or perhaps is the postmodern subject.

     

    In other words, many of DeLillo’s characters seem to be in danger of becoming exactly the sort of postmodern specter to which I referred earlier. In fact, critic Daniel Aaron has suggested that, in all of DeLillo’s novels, his characters are less Cartesian individuals than “integers in a vast information network” (70). And LeClair sees information and its various incarnations as the very essence of DeLillo’s works: “The novels are all about communication exchanges, the relations between information and energy and forces, the methods of storing, retrieving, and using new kinds of information” (“Postmodern Mastery,” 101). How, then, is DeLillo arguing against the acceptance of the dissipated postmodern subject? This is a point I will return to in a moment. But first I want to pursue the ways in which DeLillo re-structures Pynchon’s legacy of paranoia, and the relationship in Ratner’s Star between paranoia and what DeLillo presents as the “new, improved” version of postmodern terrorism.

     

    DeLillo remaps Pynchon’s legacy of paranoia onto a distinctly American, largely urban post-historical landscape. In novels of middle class ennui like Players, White Noise, and even to a certain extent Mao II, the America of DeLillo is not only a land existing completely within this “age of conspiracies,” its inhabitants seem capable of defining themselves only as victims of these conspiracies. Frank Lentricchia believes that DeLillo’s works serve as cautionary tales about such conspiracy and media-bound identity, illustrating “how the expressive forces of blood and earth are in the process of being overtaken and largely replaced by the forces of contemporary textuality. Lives lived so wholly inside the media are lives expressed (in the passive mood) through voices dominated by the jargons of the media” (“Postmodern Critique,” 211). And while the terrorism in DeLillo’s novels often begins as something familiar to us as terrorism–small bands of individuals plotting acts of violence against “innocent” civilians–this “prosaic” terrorism typically metamorphoses into something else: an independent, uncontrolled, mysterious and perhaps even unfathomable force which disrupts the best laid plans of terrorist and civilian alike. Again, the airborne toxic event in White Noise is one example. But the best sustained representation of this “agentless” terrorism is to be found, oddly enough, in one of DeLillo’s earliest novels, Ratner’s Star (1976); a novel unique among his works if only because there is no representative terrorist among its characters; at least no recognizably human terrorist. But we do recognize in Ratner’s Star a “Pynchonian” mise en scene, complete with proliferating plots, daunting intertextual connections, hidden and potentially non-existent agencies, dispersing narrative voices, and, at the center of the plots and counter-plots, a lone and relatively naive protagonist, Billy Twillig, whose task it is to determine whether he is a perceptive victim or a delusional paranoid. In Ratner’s Star, DeLillo rewrites the global plots of Gravity’s Rainbow onto the larger stage of the Universe, which itself becomes both scheme and schemer, as well as the chief “terrorist.”

     

    The premise of Ratner’s Star is that we have received a signal from outer space. Fourteen-year-old Billy Twillig, a mathematical prodigy, is summoned to a distant research complex, Field Experiment Number One (FENO), to help decode the message. From the beginning of the novel the uncertainty of Billy’s task and the instability of the fictional world which surrounds him are emphasized: “Little Billy Twillig stepped aboard a Sony 747 bound for a distant land. This much is known for certain. . . . But ahead was the somnolent horizon, pulsing in the dust and fumes, a fiction whose limits were determined by one’s perspective” (RS, 3). From the moment Billy arrives at FENO, he is besieged by what any reader of Pynchon would recognize as an overabundance of signal which threatens to degenerate into noise; and the only scientist other than Billy capable of deciphering the alien message–the aged and venerable Henrik Endor–has run away from the complex and is out in the desert, digging a hole.

     

    Billy’s dilemma is not unlike that of Benny Profane or Oedipa Maas or Tyrone Slothrop: to “sort noise from signal,” and determine whether or not there is an intelligent “agency” at the origin of the message; but to determine first of all if there is a message. And like Benny and Oedipa and Tyrone before him, Billy encounters a dizzying array of characters in his search, all with their own interpretation of the message, all with their entirely idiosyncratic agenda of signals and counter-signals. But whereas in Pynchon the “terror” generated by mysterious plots is largely a result of the revealed size and complexity of those plots, in Ratner’s Star the terror arises from the randomness and potential irrelevance of the information with which Billy is bombarded; which is to say, in Pynchon what is learned contributes to the background of terror, while in DeLillo the acquisition of knowledge is problematized to the point where “learning” itself is an experience of random and meaningless violence; the very process of searching is, in and of itself, terrifying.

     

    This terrible process of learning is figured as inescapably arising from the dynamics and limits of language. While the later half of the novel is devoted to the revelation of many things Billy doesn’t really want to know (about adulthood and sex, trust and betrayal), the first half concentrates on reducing language, and particularly conversation to something more like hand-to-hand combat than communication. For instance, dialogue between characters is less the revelation of information than an exchange of cliches, a sort of preliminary sizing up of one another for soft spots. A dialogue between Billy and a vaguely sinister man he meets on a plane (an entrepreneur who will turn out later to be the closest thing the novel has to an actual terrorist) goes like this:

     

    "How was the bathroom."
    "I liked it."
    "Mine was first-rate."
    "Pretty nice."
    "Some plane."
    "The size."
    "Exactly."

     

    Throughout the novel most of the characters play their conversational cards very close to the vest, but Billy’s responses to questions particularly are more like stage directions for speech than speech itself: “My mouth says hello”; “I do not comment.”; “I make no reply” (RS, 11). And when Billy eventually reaches the secret complex FENO, he is almost literally assaulted by a blizzard of scientific jargon from a dozen different fields–biology, child “sexology,” astrophysics, architecture–as well as the apparently secret agendas of everyone he meets. All of this secretive and gestural communication occurs in an atmosphere of instantaneous computer networks, portable communicators, super intelligent computers and hyperbolic referentiality, which makes language something violent, unrelenting, and unpredictable. No communication is simply referential, pointing to any unambiguous signified. In fact, signification in the world of FENO is (in Barthes’ terms) all connotation, no denotation–rhetorical “slippages” alone accounting for what little coherent meaning can be derived. Language here is often so rote as to be almost all ritual, its meaning residing entirely in its context. For instance, when Billy reaches his room in FENO, certain “safety precautions” are read to him by his escort:

     

    “The exit to which your attention has been directed is the sole emergency exit point for this sector and is not to be used for any purpose except that contingent upon fire, man-made flooding, natural trauma or catastrophe, and international crisis situations of the type characterized by nuclear spasms or terminal-class subnuclear events. If you have understood this prepared statement, indicate by word or gesture.”

     

    “I have understood.”

     

    “Most people just nod,” Ottum said. “It’s more universal.” (17)

     

    And often language “attacks” occur without any context. In fact, individual words often take on a paranoiac aura which is completely independent of either their denotation or connotation. For instance, Billy feels certain words are threatening all by themselves–words like gout, ohm, ergot, pulp; “organic” words which he refers to as “alien linguistic units.” And his paranoid reaction makes perfect sense: in a world where all quotes are taken out of context, each utterance would indeed seem an “alien linguistic unit,” something whose purpose is suspect and presumptively threatening. Thus the material violence which is the transcendental signifier for terrorists like the member of Al Fatah becomes in Ratner’s Star the abstracted violence of decontextualized and seemingly nonsensical language; language without a logical referent, pointing either to itself or nowhere, or both.

     

    Of course much postmodern fiction depends on this technique of decontextualization for its disorienting effect. But typically accompanying this technique is the employment of intertextual references which signal to the reader exactly what sort of larger context–often ironic–is to be used to “ground” signification. Throughout Ratner’s Star, however, what we would typically refer to as the intertextual references are made not to individual texts at all, but rather to vague “sites” of cultural signification. These sites are in turn reduced to single tropes, what we might call “signature” tropes, the decoding of which depends on the reader’s possession of a repertoire of contemporary cultural trivia: cliches from classic films, one-liners from TV shows, characters and quotes from comic books, popular novels, newspaper headlines, tabloids, the jargon of Scientific American, the newspeak of federal bureaucrats, the glib argot of tabloid journalists . . . all of these idiolects existing side-by-side as equally valid discourses. Thus “texts” are less discrete and more continuous, terms which Ratner’s Star uses with considerable frequency; something like subatomic particles, which aren’t really “particular” at all but rather fields whose density fades vaguely off into other fields. And very often these “fields” of reference merely deflect the reader to still other “tropic fields” (to coin a perfectly awful phrase) until the paths of reference become so intricate that any map of this referentiality would look like the tracings of subatomic collisions produced in particle accelerators.3

     

    In such a miasmic communicative environment, traditional boundaries between “texts” are dissolved. The result is more chaotic tropic plasma than orderly intertextual network. In this new form of intertextuality, the process whereby texts make contributions to the intertextual langue are best thought of as something like a field of signification, something one measures with probabilities and approximations rather than certainties and units. The characters of Ratner’s Star move through clouds of such tropes, charged with the reflexive urge to find some sort of order, to arrange these signals into “spectra” based not on the content of the original text from which the signature trope is derived, but rather on the degree to which each trope serves as a vector pointing toward a potential agency at the message’s point of origin. For instance, even when Billy believes he has finally decoded the message from space, he is admonished for working toward the wrong goal: “Content is not the issue. So don’t go around telling people you broke the code. There is no code worth breaking” (416). Robert Softly, the character who has conceived of the perfectly logical, perfectly useless language called Logicon (a language for which one of the key rules is “i. All language was innuendo.”) often speaks with every word–even articles and prepositions–in quotes: “‘It’ ‘is’ ‘time’ ‘for’ ‘me’ ‘to’ ‘get’ ‘out’.” Each word is thus partitioned by an ironic valence even from its immediate, syntagmatic context. Thus severed from all context global and local, much of the language in the book does indeed seem like the “alien linguistic units” which so terrorize Billy. To what do such “alien linguistic units” refer? For Billy at least, that common direction, the principle which he uses in an attempt to bring shape to the tropic plasma, is the discourse of mathematics–the only discourse which he does not find threatening. Language which is not simply “alien” is “comforting” to the extent that it can be translated into mathematical equivalents. And what Billy finds comforting in mathematics is the distinct quality of its constituent components–at least its integer components: “Words and numbers, writing and calculating. . . . Ever one more number, individual and distinct, fixed in place, absolutely whole” (7). Fractions, we are told, have always made Billy feel “slightly queasy.”

     

    The typical Pynchonian reaction to such a state of paranoia would be a dispersal of agency. By dispersal of agency, I mean both the figurative way in which the plots in Pynchon’s novels are always potentially agentless and self-perpetuating, and the literal manner in which Pynchon’s protagonists have a tendency to disappear: we recall Benny in V. disappearing into the sunset of Malta, Oedipa in Lot 49 disappearing into the auction room, and, most significantly, Slothrop in Gravity’s Rainbow, who disperses into the plot itself, becoming a “pretext” and a concept which is “just too remote” to hold together. We might also remember the way in which Slothrop merges with the symbol of what’s been pursuing him–the V-2 rocket–by becoming Rocketmensch just before he merges with the plot ever further and becomes vaguely visible (at least to Pig Bodine) but insubstantial; before he becomes, that is, a specter. And such a move is, again, perfectly in keeping with the paranoid logos of the novel, as the other trademark of Pynchon’s plots is their undecidability, their sense of imminent but unrealized revelation. In one sense, revelation ought to be the ultimate moment for the paranoid, as it is the moment when the “truth” of his world view is substantiated, made incarnate; but of course this ultimate moment is also the final moment–for if paranoia is more the state of seeking agency than the moment of finding it, then revelation threatens the paranoid’s very raison d’etre. Thus the most dedicated paranoid would be the one able to forever defer this moment of revelation.

     

    At this point I need to briefly discuss the idea of tropes. The root of the word trope is the Greek tropaion, which was a marker left to indicate where an enemy had been turned back. We might ask, then, what “enemy” is it that tropes turn back? As tropic or figural language is, at least in a basic sense, considered the opposite of literal language, a first order answer might be that tropes mark the place in language where literality is “turned back.” What is literal is “made up” of letters; and literal reading is after all an effort to reduce the ambiguity of a term to a single meaning; to transform signifiers into signals whose meaning is constant across all possible contexts. Tropes, on the other hand, tug language in the opposite direction, toward a multiplicity of meaning and thus toward an uncertainty of interpretation. With this understanding of the tension between literal and tropic reading in mind, I would suggest then that the paranoid reader is in fact a very literal reader, one who works to reduce the ambiguity of the signifiers about him to mere signals which can all be traced back to the same and central agent–the agency at the center of the “plot.”

     

    Who or what is this agent? To quote first from Gravity’s Rainbow:

     

    “There never was a Dr. Jamf,” opines world-renowned analyst Mickey Wuxtry-Wuxtry–“Jamf was only a fiction, to help him explain what [Slothrop] felt so terribly, so immediately in his genitals for those rockets each time exploding in the sky . . . to help him deny what he could not possibly admit: that he was in love, in sexual love, with his, and his race’s, death.” (861)

     

    By the end of Ratner’s Star, Billy Twillig feels “there was something between himself and the idea of himself . . . and what he knew about this thing was that it had the effect of imposing a silence” (RS, 361). Is Death, then, the elusive agency at the heart of both Pynchon and DeLillo’s paranoid plots? After all, a paranoid’s literal reading of Revelation–as in the revelation of agency–would necessarily dictate that it be followed inevitably by the completion of apocalypse, i.e., annihilation. And here we might remember the ending of Gravity’s Rainbow, with the tip of the rocket suspended above our heads and the words, “All together now” uniting us in the paranoid’s penultimate embrace. But in Ratner’s Star, DeLillo again raises the stakes of this near moment of revelation: for, while the imminent apocalypse in Gravity’s Rainbow is global, the imminent apocalypse of Ratner’s Star is “literally” universal.

     

    Ratner’s Star posits something in space called a “mohole,” where all the recognized laws of physics cease to apply. “‘If I had to put what a mohole is into words’ (asks the reporter, Jean, who is chronicling the development of Logicon)’what would I say?’ ‘You’d have a problem,’ Mainwaring said” (365). By the end of the novel, the earth seems to be in just such a place, to be “mohole intense,” as it is cast into darkness by an “unscheduled” solar eclipse. Though the gathered scientists predict that life in a mohole will be radically different, they have no idea how to explain or describe the difference: “I don’t feel any different,” Softly said. “Rob, we don’t know. That’s it. We don’t know what it means. This is space-time sylphed. We’re dealing with Moholean relativity here. Possibly dimensions more numerous than we’ve ever before imagined” (410). Thus DeLillo gives Pynchon’s formula of dispersed and uncertain agency a boost by moving his imminent apocalypse into an area of potentially absolute dispersal and infinite uncertainty. Perhaps at the conclusion of Ratner’s Star we are on the verge of a literal apocalypse; that is, an apocalypse of literality; and, potentially, the genesis of an entirely “figural” universe where there is absolutely no consistent, predictable relationship between one experience and the next, between any word and any thing, between cause and effect. At the very least, such a universe would mean, in Ambassador at Large Bremer’s words, the end of “respect for individual life and the rule of law”; i.e., the final and complete triumph of terrorism.

     

    So perhaps Slothrop’s disappearing act could well be considered a maneuver intended to outflank this revelation of universal uncertainty and thus omnipresent terrorism: a countering of the “reign of terror” engendered by the dispersal of agency by mirroring it and becoming the dispersed subject. And this dispersal of the subject is also found in Ratner’s Star–but again, with a twist. While Slothrop disperses into the narrative, still the narrating voice of Gravity’s Rainbow remains relatively coherent. However, in Ratner’s Star, while Billy Twillig retains his coherence as a character, what had been the third person omniscient narrating voice of the novel essentially disperses into the characters, moving in the same sentence between locales, even between thoughts:

     

    Softly stopped reading here, thinking I am old, I will die, no one cares, her upper body slumped forward on the desk and what an implausible object it is, she thought . . . the photoelectric command at the end of Bolin’s hand, thinking I am old . . . Wu’s middle ear conveying vibrations inward . . . the implausibility of my parts, she thought. . . . (425)

     

    In this final section of the novel, sentences intrude on one another like filaments of conversations overheard on car phones, as if the very atmosphere of the novel were filled with detached segments of dialogue drifting about, looking for a conversation to link up with. Thus it is the “voice” of Ratner’s Star which disperses, and which anticipates and evades the imminent revelation that its own end implies but does not quite reach.

     

    DeLillo particularly seems interested in the link between death as the final paranoid revelation and the act of authoring itself. One of the entries quoted from Oswald’s diary in Libra expresses Oswald’s greatest longing, which is to cease being Oswald the individual and to merge into a spectral identity called “the struggle”: “Happiness is taking part in the struggle, where there is no borderline between one’s own personal world, and the world in general” (quoted in Lentricchia, “Postmodern Critique,” 197). Lentricchia sees in Oswald’s banal desire something other than merely one soldier of the revolution wishing to become one with the army of the revolution. Rather, he suggests that Oswald wishes to exchange places with Win Everett (the former CIA agent who is “plotting” Kennedy’s fake assassination), to become the author of the plot in which he is only a character–or perhaps to become an author, period: “Oswald, in his desire for a perfectly distilled, scripted self–propelled by itself as its own novelist/prime mover–is a figure of the assassin as writer, a man isolated by his passion, room-bound, a plot schemer” (“Postmodern Critique,” 209). Lentricchia suggests that in his feelings of impotence, victimhood, and insubstantiality Oswald is the perfect representation of the spectral and manipulated postmodern subject: “Self-constructed, constantly revised, Oswald’s narrative is a search for the very thing–a well-motivate, shapely existence–whose absence is a mark of the negative libran . . . Oswald’s patched voice produces the presiding tone of the postmodern absence of substantial and autonomous self-hood” (Lentricchia, “Postmodern Critique,” 209).

     

    And DeLillo’s most recent novel Mao II centers on another “room-bound” plot schemer, a writer whose infrequent books are considered vastly intricate and dauntingly knowledgeable (which is of course also reminiscent of Pynchon). The writer’s name is William Gray–a fine name for blending into the background. 4 Gray is a recluse, in the style of J. D. Salinger and Thomas Pynchon. In the novel, Gray has become something of a cultural “trope,” whose usefulness to his culture resides in the very insubstantiality of his celebrity. However, Gray feels his best work is behind him; or rather, that the best role of the author in society is behind him, and that authors as enactors of literature no longer have any effect on society. “Years ago I used to think it was possible for a novelist to alter the inner life of culture. Now, bomb-makers and gunmen have taken that territory. They make raids on human consciousness” (Mao II, 87). Yet the “plot” Gray eventually becomes involved with is one authored by terrorists, not novelists; a plot which leads him to the realization of what seems to be his ultimate desire, which is not so much a merging into the struggle, as Oswald wanted, but a disappearing altogether into an anonymous death. There is the suggestion that Gray trumps the terrorist Abu Rashid’s plans for him by dying before he can be victimized, by making his sacrifice his own statement rather than allowing it to be shaped to Rashid’s purposes. But of course this is a statement no one reads, which we can think of either as an act of supreme idealization.

     

    Or supreme futility. Mao II hardly endorses Gray’s self-willed abdication of self, his “devout” wish “to be forgotten,” as any sort of positive solution to the problem of postmodern terrorism and paranoia. For one thing, Gray’s anonymous death does not end the novel; we see the various characters adjusting to Gray’s disappearance, using it, shaping his absence to their own ends: his friend Scott settles into Gray’s house, becoming a simulacrum of the absent author; the photographer Brita who sought to “reproduce” Gray shifts her aim easily to the terrorist instead, in a move both opportunistic and smoothly adaptive (and one which models the very sort of symbiotic interdependence Farnen suggests between those who “write” violence into the text of everyday life and those who disseminate it). Gray’s dispersal leaves only a vacuum which others rush in to fill, without giving a second thought to the “message” intended by his disappearance. Thus the novel poses a subtle, even tragic question: what are the limits of dispersed subjecthood? If one seeks to evade the terror of random violence by blending into the background and denying the terrorist–whether individual or Universe–a coherent, identifiable site of violence, what is sacrificed? To what extent is Gray’s preemptive vanishing a death not only of potential victimhood, but also of personal identity, of responsibility, and thus of legacy? How thoroughly can the author disown author-ity before also surrendering integrity; the ability, in the words of Gravity’s Rainbow, to appear as any sort of “integral creature”?

     

    Lentricchia suggests that, in the traditional American novel, the author provides a stable point of reference from which the reader can take society’s “critical measure,” that the reader can find relative detachment “within the value of the ‘omniscient’ author who displays the workings of the dynamic but is not himself subject to them. The author, then, is a transcendent figure, someone the reader is implicitly asked to identify with . . . that constantly throws us forward into some other, some imagined, existence” (“Postmodern Critique,” 210). Lentricchia goes on to say that this “exit” is “sealed off” in Libra. Johnston makes essentially the same observation about Ratner’s Star, which he sees as refusing to grant authority to any univocal narrator or point of view: “[Ratner’s Star] refuses to privilege any single ‘authoritative’ version or to subordinate its varied stories and discourses to a higher or more englobing authorial narrative discourse, which would amount to yielding to precisely those powers and functions that it wants to lay bare. Instead, it inscribes an uncertainty and indeterminacy in its own narrative structure, and plays with how we might know certain connections between events” (“Post-cinematic Fiction,” 91). I would point again to the novel’s last section, when what has previously been a coherent and recognizable narrating voice disperses into the “text.” Thus Ratner’s Star robs the reader of the comfort of any transcendental authorial figure who might otherwise serve to “make sense” of the random violence of decontextualized language; who might, that is, provide relief from the terrorism of meaninglessness. And this absence further denies the reader any detached platform from which he/she might, with impunity, take his/her society’s “critical measure.” Thus, in the absence of the narrator and author, the reader is forced to construct some central embodying principle to grant overall context to the otherwise terrifying uncertainty of the novel; to build upon an interpretive principle which is secretive, elusive, coded, with a potentially totalizing or “universal” agenda and capable of explaining vast and obscure connections. . . . In other words, the reader must write a plot. He/she must actively engage the terrorism of meaninglessness which seeks to overwhelm the novel; to assert, that is, his/her individual strategies of sense-making.

     

    However ambiguous the endings of DeLillo’s novels, there is almost always at least one character who “models” this sort of adaptive strategy for the reader: one thinks of Pammy in Players, moving away from the violent ennui of her husband-become-terrorist toward an alternative she can’t quite articulate; or the final image in Ratner’s Star, which is not the ascendancy of the dispersed voice of the narrator (as in Gravity’s Rainbow), but rather the frail and oddly exuberant image of Billy Twillig–who has spent the last half of the novel almost paralyzed with terror–exuberantly pedaling a tricycle into the “reproductive dust of existence” (120). While DeLillo’s representation of terrorism in novels like Ratner’s Star and Mao II seems even more universal, insidious and hegemonic than Pynchon’s in Gravity’s Rainbow, his work finally does not seem to completely accept Pynchon’s solution, i.e., that we abandon the field to the ablest postmodern paranoids. In fact, I would argue that DeLillo’s characters often embrace the plots which surround them, which perhaps construct them, and work–against all reasonable odds–to adapt to such a statement of existence so that they might in turn alter the statements of that existence. They seek some alternate way of existing within a world admittedly filled with random violence and meaningless communication, to resist both the role of surveilled and terrorized subject and paranoid, dispersed specter. Though there is certainly an overlay of despair and futility in DeLillo’s work, there often seems too an indefatigable energy, a belief just as strong that the production of plots we call novels might not be completely futile or always already culpable. DeLillo himself has expressed a willingness to embrace rather than resist what other writers see as the terrorism of technology and technological modes of existence in postmodern society: “Science in general has given us a new language to draw from. Some writers shrink from this. . . . To me, science is a source of new names. . . . Rilke said we had to rename the world. Renaming suggests an innocence and a rebirth” (LeClair, “Interview” 84).

     

    Much of DeLillo’s work, especially Ratner’s Star, points toward a strategy of adaptation and rebirth particularly of our sense of individual identity and responsibility as, perhaps, the only counter to becoming the dispersed and irresponsible postmodern specters. But his work also recognizes that such a rebirth of our sense of self and community involves a considerable struggle; a struggle Jacques Derrida seems to have had in mind when, writing about the importance of a new formation of European cultural identity in response to terrorism–whether it be religious, political, or ethnic–he calls for a postmodern subject which is informed by rather than frightened of our increasing and inescapable connectedness; a cultural identity “constituted in responsibility” shaped by, in a quite traditional way, the anticipation of one’s cultural legacy. “For perhaps responsibility consists in making of the name recalled, of the memory of the name, of the idiomatic limit, a chance, that is, an opening of identity to its very future” (Derrida, 35). Perhaps such an interpretation reads DeLillo (and Derrida) as more neo-existentialists than postmodernists; perhaps it even suggests that DeLillo’s work needs to be re-examined for its links to modernism, even romanticism, in its representation of the theoretically obsolete individual as the only viable site of resistance to the ubiquitous terror of postmodern life.

     

    Notes

     

    1. See, for instance, Emile Benveniste’s Problems in General Linguistics (1971); Fredric Jameson’s Postmodernism or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (1992); and Jean Baudrillard’s In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities, or The End of the Social (1983).

     

    2. Farnen also has a second and more interesting point to make, which is that the portrayal of terrorism in the media has created a false trope. He quotes at length statistics which show that, especially in the last five years, terrorists acts have become so rare that “[I]n the United States, a person is more likely to die as a victim of an asthma attack than as a victim of a terrorist attack” (101).

     

    3. See John Johnston’s discussion of the heavy use of cinema in the works of both Pynchon and DeLillo in “Post- Cinematic Fiction: Film in the Novels of Pynchon, McElroy, and DeLillo,” where he suggests that “the interest in cinema revealed in these novels seems to respond to a sense of the cinema as an apparatus for producing and disseminating images which both construct and control a new kind of subject.” A subject, I would add, which is a product not of the accumulated content of interrelated texts, but rather the transient acontextual moment of intersecting tropes.

     

    4. In fact, it is rumored that Bill Gray is the name Don DeLillo often used when traveling incognito.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Aaron, Daniel. “How to Read Don DeLillo.” Introducing Don DeLillo. Ed. Frank Lentricchia. Durham: Duke University Press, 1991. 67-81.
    • DeLillo, Don. Ratner’s Star. New York: Vintage Books, 1980 (1976).
    • —. Players. New York: Vintage Books, 1977.
    • —. Running Dog. New York : Vintage Books, 1978.
    • —. The Names. New York: Vintage Books, 1982.
    • —. White Noise. New York: Penguin Books, 1985.
    • —. Libra. New York: Penguin Books, 1989.
    • —. Mao II. New York: Penguin Books, 1991.
    • Derrida, Jacques. The Other Heading: Reflections on Today’s Europe. Tr. Pascale-Anne Brault & Michael B. Naas. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992.
    • Dowling, Ralph E. “Victimage and Mortification: Terrorism and Its Coverage in the Media.” Terrorism 12-1, (1989): 47-59.
    • Farnen, Russell F. “Terrorism and the Mass Media: A Systemic Analysis of a Symbiotic Process.” Terrorism 13-2, (1990): 99-123.
    • Harris, Robert R. “A Talk with Don DeLillo.” New York Times Book Review, 10 Oct. 1982: F26.
    • Johnston, John. “Generic Difficulties in the Novels of Don DeLillo.” Critique 30-4, (1989): 261-275.
    • —. “Post-Cinematic Fiction: Film in the Novels of Pynchon, McElroy, and DeLillo.” New Orleans Review 17-2, (1990): 90-97.
    • LeClair, Tom. In The Loop: Don DeLillo and the Systems Novel. Chicago: U. of Illinois Press, 1987.
    • LeClair, Tom. “Interview with Don DeLillo.” Anything Can Happen: Interviews with Contemporary American Novelists. Ed. Tom LeClair and Larry McCaffery. Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1983. 79-90.
    • LeClair, Tom. “Post-Modern Mastery.” Representation and Performance in Postmodern Fiction. Ed. Maurice Couturier. Nice: Delta Press, 1983. 99-111.
    • Lentricchia, Frank. “Libra as Postmodern Critque.” Introducing Don DeLillo. Durham: Duke University Press, 1991. 193-215.
    • McClure, John A. “Postmodern Romance: Don DeLillo and the Age of Conspiracy.” Introducing Don DeLillo. Ed. Frank Lentricchia. Durham: Duke University Press, 1991. 99-115.
    • Price, Andrew Jude. “The Entropic Imagination in 20th Century American Fiction: A Case for Don DeLillo.” Dissertation abstracts, ’88 nov 49-5, 1143A.
    • Pynchon, Thomas. Gravity’s Rainbow. New York: Viking, 1976.
    • Silverman, Kaja. The Subject of Semiotics. New York: Oxford University Press, 1983.

     

  • Editor’s Introduction

    John Unsworth

    Department of English
    University of Virginia
    jmu2m@virginia.edu

     

    This journal does not usually run editor’s introductions, but with this issue it enters a new phase of its existence, and that new phase deserves some comment. For more than three years, Postmodern Culture has been publishing peer-reviewed critical and creative work in a text-only format that accommodates electronic mail: we will continue to publish in that format, but beginning with this January, 1994 issue, we will also publish each new issue (and provide all back issues) through the World-Wide Web. Regular subscribers of the journal will also note that this is the first issue ever to be published late: unfortunately, producing two versions of each file and setting up templates for article and issue design proved more time-consuming than anticipated. That it came out at all is due in large part to the efforts of the guest editors, Scott Allen and Stephen Bernstein for the DeLillo cluster and Tan Lin for the poetry cluster–and no less to Jim English, the review editor, and the editorial staff, Jonathan Beasley, Chris Barrett, Amy Sexton, and Jason Haynes.

     

    What’s the Web?

     

    The World-Wide Web may already be familiar to some of our readers, since its use is growing faster even than the internet itself, but many others will not yet have discovered it and may welcome some background information. The World-Wide Web is a client-server system for providing integrated text, graphics, sound, and video over the internet. The most important feature of the Web, though, is its ability to link files to one another in a hypertextual structure: in fact, it has the capability of turning the entire internet into one hypertextual web.

     

    The Web has been around for a couple of years, making it older than gopher, the more well-known client-server program that currently underlies (for example) many campus- wide information systems. At the moment, Web traffic is growing much faster than gopher traffic–341,634% per year vs. a mere 997% per year, according to one estimate1 –but its relatively slow start was due in part to the lack of an adequate client program. The National Center for Supercomputing Applications at the University of Illinois, Champaign- Urbana, has filled that void with Mosaic, an excellent, free, mouse-oriented client for the Web. Mosaic clients are available for Macintosh, Windows, RS6000, DEC, and Sun computers (by anonymous ftp from ftp.ncsa.uiuc.edu). The entry-level equipment for using these clients might be, for example, a 386 with a VGA monitor and an ethernet card– equipment that costs under $1000 at this point. In fact, the nature of one’s connection to the internet is more likely to be an obstacle than is the nature of one’s equipment: since using the Web involves transmitting sizable files (graphics, sound, etc.), the transmission speeds of an ethernet connection are required for satisfactory performance. It’s possible to cruise the Web over your modem, with an additional layer of SLIP software, but this is agonizingly slow and can be absurdly difficult to set up.

     

    Since June of 1993, the World-Wide Web has been growing at a rate faster than one new server a day. In June, there were 100 sites; in November, there were 270 sites; in December, there were 623 sites (according to Matthew Gray of MIT, author of the WWW Wanderer, a program that follows links from one server to another, to determine the extent of the web). These estimates are certain to be low, but they give an idea of the curve. At present, something on the order of a quarter of a million documents are provided over the Web; the increase in use of Web clients is on the order of 2000% a month. In other words, while it is not clear how well all this will scale up, it is clear that we’ll find out the answer to that question very soon. The Web has its shortcomings (for example, its hypertext pointers refer to literal file- and path-names, making it easy for someone on one system to set up a pointer to a file on another system that gets moved or renamed, resulting in a non-functioning link), but these shortcomings are minor in comparison to the great advance it provides in the general usability and perusability of the net. And since Mosaic can also open ftp, telnet, WAIS, and gopher sessions, all with a mouse- and icon-oriented graphical user interface, it functions as a kind of meta-menu for a panoply of networked information services.

     

    What Does It Mean for PMC?

     

    Explanations of the Web tend to make the eyes glaze over; demonstrations tend to make the eyes light up. The first outing induces a kind of informational vertigo, especially when one considers the implications of this medium for networked scholarship and publishing. The network-as-hypermedia implies that the connections now gesturally performed in notes and citations can–will– become explicit and navigable links from document to document. It means that in the very near future, authors will propose and editors will review such links, and it means that readers can keep private marginalia on networked documents, as well. For Postmodern Culture, it means that we can begin publishing film clips, readings of poetry or fiction, musical performances, and hypertexts of all kinds. It also means that, as more and more of the material published in PMC incorporates non-text elements, the e-mail version of the journal will inevitably become less authoritative or complete.

     

    We welcome comments on this new phase in the journal’s existence, suggestions on the journal’s hypermedia format and design, and submission of hypermedia texts. Excellent information and extensive tutorials on the various techniques and requirements of the Web are available under the Help button on the Mosaic clients (though you may find it impossible to get through to the beseiged hosts at uiuc.edu at certain times of day); information specific to PMC’s implementation of the Web’s standards is available from the Table of Contents page for the January, 1994 issue. Moreover, since Mosaic allows you to view the underlying markup for any Web page, it is easy to learn by example.

     

    In closing, I should note that older offshoots and avatars of PMC have not been amputated in this new phase of our existence. PMC-Talk continues its fitfully productive existence, and a thread from that discussion group is included in this issue. PMC-MOO has moved from North Carolina to Virginia (hero.village.virginia.edu 7777) and has adopted email registration in the interest of discouraging irresponsible and unpleasant behavior (there was the mention of PMC-MOO in Wired, followed by a wave of rather juvenile net-tourists who came tramping through with little interest in postmodernism and many personality problems to work out…but they’ve moved on now, for the most part, to new encampments). We have a new gopher site (jefferson.village.virginia.edu), but the old ftp site remains (ftp.ncsu.edu), and the listserv archives continue as before. Appropriately enough, the Web version of the journal provides an integrated menu of all of these services and versions.

     

    Notes

     

    1. The Internet Index, revised 1/7/94, compiled by Win Treese (treese@crl.dec.com).

     

  • Editors’ Note

    Lisa Brawley
    lbrawley@kent.edu

     

    Stuart Moulthrop
    samoulthrop@UBmail.ubalt.edu

     

    Co-editors

     

    With this issue, we introduce an interactive annotated bibliography of postmodernism and critical theory. This bibliography began as a graduate student project in John Unsworth’s seminar on postmodern fiction and theory at the University of Virginia in the Fall of 1998. Students in that seminar contributed about 120 annotated entries on critical and theoretical works in the study of postmodernism. This database of annotated bibliograp hic entries has now been migrated to Postmodern Culture: readers of the journal are invited to register with the database and contribute entries of their own. We hope that, over time, this might develop into a valuable resource for students, theorists, a nd critics working in this area.

     

    We also wish to draw attention to the return of the PMC prize, announced in our September issue. Each June, the editorial board of Postmodern Culture will choose an outstanding critical and/or creative work published in the journal during the previous volume year. The author of this work will receive $500 and special billing on our main page.

     

  • Peripheral Visions

    M. Klaver, r rickey, and L. Howell

    Department of English
    Universities of Calgary and Victoria
    lhowell@mtroyal.ab.ca
    rrickey@acs.ucalgary.ca
    klaverm@cadvision.co

     

    E. Ann Kaplan, Looking for the Other: Feminism, Film, and the Imperial Gaze. New York: Routledge, 1996.

     

    Looking for the Other responds to the charge that white feminist film theories, especially psychoanalytic ones, neglect issues of race. In this ambitious project, E. Ann Kaplan defends a psychoanalytic approach to the racialized subject through examinations of gender and race in mainstream and independent film. Targeted at liberal arts students, the text is a useful introduction to these issues within film, women’s studies, and postcolonial/cultural studies. Unfortunately, Kaplan sometimes sacrifices quality of critique for quantity, and subtlety of argument for scope, in an attempt to satisfy her audiences. The result is a text which ultimately surveys and summarizes more than it stakes out new ground in the ongoing debates about whiteness and feminist film theory.

     

    The book is divided into two main sections. Part I, “Theories of Nation, Psychoanalysis and the Imperial Gaze,” primarily explores the male and imperial gazes in Hollywood film. Part 2, “Travelling Postcolonialists and Women of Color,” examines the ways in which independent film offers the alternative of “inter- and intra-racial looking relations.” Throughout, Kaplan argues by analogy, risking oversimplification of a number of key concepts. For example, Chapter 1, “Travel, Travelling Identities and the Look” depends on the assumption that race, like gender, operates through internalized binary oppositions. She offers examples from Fanon, DuBois, hooks, and Appadurai which support theories of “a network of diasporic black peoples dislocated around the globe in the late twentieth century who share experiences of the alienating gaze” (10). Kaplan’s theory layers colonialism on top of discourses of the gaze initiated by Laura Mulvey. Thus situated non-dialectically, racial difference becomes little more than another instance of split subjectivity. Combined with the constant deferral of her explanation to later sections in the book plus numerous editing errors, such oversimplifications undermine her argument.[1]

     

    Chapter 2, “Theories of Nation and Hollywood in the Contexts of Gender and Race” surveys “male theories” of nations as modern, industrial concepts linked to the rise of literacy and popular culture (29). Kaplan continues her reliance on binary oppositions, countering these male ideas of nation with a feminine sphere of culture. Most significant for her later analysis of Hollywood film is the concept of nation as a fiction, and of America as a construct divided between European cultural allegiances and American national ones. Kaplan relies on Jane Flax to support a claim for a womanly perspective on global history, one in which “problems might not be framed as debates about First, Second or Third Worlds but rather in terms of ongoing struggles to connect or not connect with an Other,” to juggle public and private roles, to link local and global concerns, and “to make oneself a subject within national struggles” (46). These are important questions, and Kaplan offers a sampling of fascinating alternatives to the narrow conception of national identity at work in Hollywood film. However, we wonder why her discussion of these alternatives runs to three pages, in comparison with the eighteen or so pages of “male theory.” If it is because, as she states, “the problematic relation of ‘woman’ to ‘nation’… urgently needs more research” (46), we would add that the binary opposition of male nation to female culture also needs deconstructing.

     

    In Chapter 3, “Hollywood, Science and Cinema: The Imperial and the Male Gaze in Classic Film,” Kaplan tackles D.W. Griffith’s Birth of A Nation, notably its anxieties about the black man’s rape of the white woman, to illustrate interlocking structures of masculinity and whiteness in the imperial gaze. According to her reading, stereotypes of lascivious black men and pure white women “image forth” white supremacy and male supremacy respectively. Through these stereotypes, the film appeals to Southerners to see themselves as part of an American nation preparing for World War I (68). Similarly, masculinity and imperialism collude in a series of 1930s ape movies–King Kong, Tarzan the Ape Man, and Blonde Venus. Devices such as the map of the “dark” continent penetrated by the explorer/hunter, the sexual objectification of the white woman, and the feminization and oversexing of the black man illustrate Hollywood’s continuing attempts to manage America’s sexual and racial anxieties. Kaplan also notes that these films may be seen as attempts to come to grips with national guilt about slavery, or to console “a generation of white males without sufficient opportunities for heroism” (74).

     

    Kaplan also discusses interesting complications of the stereotypical view that the imperial gaze is solely male. In looking at Black Narcissus (1946) and Out of Africa (1985), she notes that “white women become the surrogates for men when there is a need to show male power waning” (81)–in this case British power in India. The white nuns in Black Narcissus are bearers of the imperial gaze on their mission into Nepal, but that gaze is destabilized by the orientalized sensuality of the place: the nuns’ repressed sensuality emerges at the same time that their strength and independence from men begins to crack; a heterosexual narrative asserts itself. Kaplan argues, following Laura Kipnis, that the construction of “colonialism as female megalomania” rationalizes colonialism’s failures (88). Here, Kaplan participates in ongoing critiques of white womanhood and its interlocking privileges as shown in the work of Jane Gaines, Mary Ann Doane, Rey Chow, Donna Haraway, and others.

     

    How disappointing then, to read that the main difference between the stereotypes in Black Narcissus and the less offensive depictions in Out of Africa seems to be a matter of characterization: Karen Blixen “cares about [Africans] as individuals” and her “main servant is individualized” and allowed to return her look (89). Kaplan’s assumption that this treatment remains a viable alternative to stereotyping troubles us in its allegiance to liberal humanism. She notes that “something else is going on in these films in regard to images of white women” and wonders “how can [white] feminists enjoy their empowerment” through these images “at the expense of women of other colors?” (92). One answer may be the rewards and pleasures of individualism which structure the major liberation movements of the West, including white liberal feminism. Nevertheless, Kaplan makes an important contribution in Chapter 3 with her understanding that these films forge American identity through European colonial narratives.

     

    Chapter 4, “Darkness Within: Or, The Dark Continent of Film Noir” further investigates the effect of psychoanalysis on American film when dealing with issues of “othering” that cross race and gender. The chapter starts by briefly describing the possibilities of psychoanalytic readings of film, especially the value of British transcultural psychiatry, and summarily explaining the racist, sexist, and homophobic origins of psychoanalysis. Kaplan then performs a close reading of Home of the Brave, Pressure Point, Candyman, and Cat People. Oddly, considering the chapter’s title, only the latter falls within the normal definition “film noir.” All four films use psychoanalysis within their plots; especially important to this reading is the claim that psychiatry is a “science,” the authority of which is either supported or destabilized by these films. Kaplan attempts to analyze the psychoanalytic readings both of and within these films, which all blur, or attempt to blur, characters’ race and gender. However, Kaplan’s readings rely heavily on plot and character description, possibly because, as Kaplan notes, these older films are likely not to have been seen by her readers.

     

    Black and white interaction in mainstream film sets up Kaplan’s ensuing discussion of independent films. Before Part II, “Travelling Postcolonialists and Women of Color,” she clarifies her use of psychoanalysis and reads its use in film to construct the white subject. Kaplan argues that “the formation of the white subject as white, as it depends upon difference from blackness, is one area for study” (129). Though not theoretically innovative, Kaplan’s readings of film related to this question and her working through the problematics of psychoanalysis facilitate entry into the second part of Looking for the Other.

     

    Kaplan asserts that Part II intends “to open a window on how women directors imagine and create fictional worlds about issues of sex, race and the media. And how, in so doing, they dramatically challenge Hollywood male and imperial gaze structures to begin the hard work of moving beyond oppressive objectification within the constraints of inevitable looking structures” (16). Kaplan selects Hu Mei, Claire Denis, Mira Nair, Pratibha Parmar, Alice Walker, Trinh T. Minh-ha, Julie Dash, and Yvonne Rainer for discussion in Part II because, though they all deal with sex, race, gender and class in “cinematic forms deliberately in opposition to classical commercial film” (16), they approach their projects differently.

     

    Yet Kaplan only partially delivers on her promises for Part II. In Chapter 5 she explores the relationship between white theorists/theories and China. Stressing that cross-cultural exchange is possible both from West to East and East to West, yet not ignoring the power differential, Kaplan uses Trinh T. Minh-ha’s concept of “approaching” to assert that there is a way if not to “know” the Other, at least to “speak nearby.” In her discussion of the relationships between Western and Asian critics and their views toward Western readings of Asian culture, she summarizes the debate between Fredric Jameson and Aijaz Ahmad regarding the possibility of the West “knowing Chinese or Indian culture and politics (17).” Jameson’s construction of three worlds in which First-World texts are related to the public/private split while in Third-World texts all libidinal desires are politicized, is critiqued by Ahmad who posits only one postcolonial world constructed of economic, political, and historical links. Kaplan rereads this debate to show that both Jameson, particularly in his comments regarding allegory’s inherence in Third-World texts, and Ahmad, in underlining Western critics’ arrogant assumption that they can understand an Other culture through partial knowledge, make valuable contributions to the discourses of “knowing the other.” She locates herself between her readings of Jameson and Ahmad, but directs her criticism more strongly toward Ahmad, whose position she calls an “overreaction.”

     

    From her assumed position of subject-in-between, Kaplan’s second focus in Chapter 5 addresses criticism of her 1989 article “Problematizing Cross-Cultural Analysis: The Case of Woman in the Recent Chinese Cinema.” She argues effectively that in this essay she attempted to position herself as an “outsider” whose readings might untangle one of many strands of meaning to be found in Chinese film texts. Included among Western critics censured for perpetuating cultural colonization, Kaplan reads Yoshimoto Mitsuhira’s criticisms as a reconstruction of Asia as feminine or victim. By turning to the complexities of subjectivity, as many feminists do, Kaplan stresses the possibility of showing “how resilient peoples are to such cultural and capitalist ‘invasions,’ and how they find strategies to divert their impacts” (152). Kaplan is constantly aware that histories of colonization and appropriation cannot be ignored. Her consistent attention to the complexities of the history, economics, and politics of intercultural “knowing” creates, at times, an apparently disjointed argument, but one worth teasing out by engaged readers.

     

    Kaplan’s selection of Denis’ Chocolat, Parmar and Walker’s Warrior Marks, and Nair’s Mississippi Masala to search for an answer to the question “Can One Know the Other?” is most appropriate. All three non-American films illustrate her desire to explore the possibilities of inter-racial looking and to challenge the dominance of the male and imperial gazes. These challenges contribute to a form of looking which exemplifies a desire to know rather than to dominate. Kaplan astutely explores the processes of looking that occur between spectator and film and between characters within films. In these “looking relations,” Kaplan indicates ways in which women directors alter the subject-object binary; when traditionally subjugated characters look back, stereotypes are challenged, and the gaze, with its inherent anxieties and domination, becomes a mutual process of looking.

     

    Kaplan states: “There has surely to be a way between the alternatives of an oppressive Western application of humanism to the Other and surrendering any kind of cross-cultural knowing” (195). She sees that for women travelling outside their cultures, the best way to accomplish cross-cultural knowing is “speaking nearby.” She explores Trinh’s Reassemblage and Shoot for the Contents with emphasis on ideas that inter-racial looking relations should be reconstructed as a meeting of multiple “I’s” with multiple “I’s” in the Other. For Kaplan, the women’s bodies that Trinh presents are not objectified but instead become sites for discussions of subjectivity, nationhood, and transnational feminism. She looks conscientiously at the work of Hu Mei, Denis, Parmar and Walker, Nair, and Trinh, all women “in postcolonialism travelling to foreign cultures” (216), revealing ways in which imperial and male gazes are and can be disrupted, finding new ways of knowing, of seeing, and of looking for the Other.

     

    Chapter 8, “‘Healing Imperialized Eyes’: Independent Women Filmmakers and the Look,” continues to explore how women filmmakers rework the “look” in an attempt to redefine colonial images. Kaplan reads two of Julie Dash’s films, Illusions and Daughters of the Dust, as attempts to redefine audience perceptions of blacks in film and films’ assumptions about audience. Kaplan then moves on to examine Mi Vida Loca, a film on Chicana “gang girls,” by white director Allison Anders. Finally, she argues that Yamazaki Hiroko’s Juxta uses themes of generation and immigration to complicate racialized images.

     

    Kaplan argues that these films do not confront the imperial and male gazes in an attempt to reverse or undo their effects, but instead involve themselves in an entirely different project: “Other films I call ‘healing’ because they seek to see from the perspective of the oppressed, the diasporan, without specifically confronting the oppressor’s strategies” (221). She suggests that these filmmakers occupy the position of the hybrid, furthering her argument for the subject-in-between. Caught between cultures, their films concern themselves in constructing “‘intra-racial’ looking relations rather than inter-racial ones” (222). Kaplan asserts that while white women suffer from “too much visibility” in Hollywood, black women remain largely invisible or consigned to a narrow range of stereotypes. Her inquiry into Dash’s Daughters exposes the construction of black images that step outside the Hollywood mainstream: Dash creates a strong intelligent matriarch to oppose the traditional “mammy” image. At stake in the idea of healing, therefore, is the possibility that seeing from the perspective of the oppressed produces new points of identification for film audiences.

     

    Kaplan also notes that formal devices can be used to challenge imperial and male gazes. From film speed, to narrative structures, to genre mixing, these films often reposition their audiences in order to step outside the hegemony of Hollywood film. Kaplan reads all four of these movies, sensitively drawing out how this feat is accomplished. She also notes that these films do not necessarily share the same tones: some are celebratory while others are melancholic. The importance of these films is that they do not reproduce the imperial gaze, but rather strive to find power in “healing” its alienating effects.

     

    In Chapter 9, “Body Politics: Menopause, Mastectomy and Cosmetic Surgery in Films by Rainer, Tom and Onwurah,” Kaplan detours from film criticism to medical discourse. Her review of plastic surgery texts reveals how parallel constructions of age or race become associated with disease and deformity. Relying on ideas of nation from Part I, she posits a norm of womanhood: young and white. Though we cannot argue against her notions of this norm, we do note that it relies on a collapse of Western thought into an exclusively American “look.” With this assumption, Kaplan reads Tom’s Two Lies and Rainer’s Privilege in terms of a conflict between an “authentic” immigrant body and the American body assimilated through surgical intervention. Her argument recognizes that the “casualties” of the American look need further attention.

     

    Another important contribution is Kaplan’s argument that aging white women either fall into Hollywood’s typecast characters or do not appear at all. Always careful to acknowledge that these women do not lose all their privileges in aging, Kaplan does however point out that aging further complicates women’s positioning by the male and imperial gaze. By drawing affinities between menopausal white women and women of color, Kaplan invites further discussion of generational differences and their implications for women’s studies.

     

    Kaplan’s research into plastic surgery and aging reveals intriguing concepts in relation to American film, but her sweeping statements often hinder her arguments. For example, she states, “It is in male interest to keep alive the myth that after menopause women have no particular interest and therefore can be passed over for younger women who still depend on men” (286). Like the “male theories” of Part I, the assumption of “male interest” once again collapses a complex argument into a traditional gender category. Throughout her book, Kaplan attempts not to essentialize various groups while arguing that dominant film does; occasionally she missteps and her statements reinscribe the generalizations which she seeks to critique.

     

    The risk of reinscription is addressed in the “Afterword” as Kaplan attempts to negotiate the tricky gaps between white and non-white positions on the emerging field of “whiteness studies.” Cautioning her readers not to conflate varieties of alienation, she insists that it is essential that “one recognizes that whites are not necessarily reinscribing whiteness but taking the lead from the peoples whites have oppressed” (294; original emphasis). Is Kaplan prescribing a point of view here, or offering an anti-colonialist strategy? The ambivalence continues in the statement, “Because of white supremacy, it seems to me that it is the responsibility of whites to start the process of recognition of the Other as an autonomous subject” (299). Does this imply that the process has not yet begun outside of “whiteness studies”? Does the notion of responsibility imply a conferring of subjectivity or authority? We are uncomfortable with the vagueness of such “responsibility” because it implies that if whites do not begin this process of recognition, it will not be done at all. In fact, Kaplan hazards misrecognizing the Other when she concludes her book by asserting a belief “that black women may have an incredibly important role to play at this historical moment…. Hopefully, this is a moment when white women can listen” (301). Having just warned readers not to conflate varieties of alienation she subsumes all non-white women under the term “black women.” In this ostensibly conciliatory gesture, Kaplan falls back on a black-white binary that grounds her global survey in America.

     

    Future discussions surrounding Kaplan’s new work will need to complicate its layered relations between race and gender by adding the undiscussed categories of class and sexuality. Her conception of the imperial gaze largely ignores the dynamics of capitalism within patriarchal and racist structures, and discussions of gay and lesbian contributions are cursory. Nevertheless, we applaud Kaplan’s commitment “to the idea… that the level of signification can impact on the imaginary and produce change in subjects reading or viewing texts” (xv). It is through this ability of texts to change subjectivity that Kaplan sees a possibility for prejudices based on race, ethnicity, color, age, sexual orientation, and gender to be deconstructed. For her, perhaps the best route to change is through the work of women directors of all colors (including white). The value of her text lies in the attention she pays to these women directors, their films, and their changing audiences.

    Note

     

    1. The editing errors are frustrating. For instance, in Chapter 1 Kaplan claims she will discuss six directors, though seven are listed (15-16); likewise, she announces that Anders’ Mi Vida Loca will be discussed in Chapter 6, but it appears in Chapter 8.

     

  • If You Build It, They Will Come

    Brian Morris

    Department of English with Cultural Studies
    University of Melbourne
    b.morris@english.unimelb.edu.au

     

    John Hannigan, Fantasy City: Pleasure and Profit in the Postmodern Metropolis. London: Routledge, 1998.

     

    Last year I found myself staggering down the very long sidewalk of the Las Vegas Strip in a somewhat disoriented state, an Antipodean on his first trip to the United States. There I was, during the middle of a scorching Las Vegas July afternoon, foolishly trying to walk from Circus Circus to the Luxor Hotel–a case of culture schlock perhaps? While this moment of pedestrian delusion was partially attributable to the intense desert heat, it was no doubt helped along by some of the “delirious” sights I passed on my foot journey. The structures facing on to the Strip, such as the extraordinary New York New York casino-hotel with its giant replicas of Manhattan buildings and associated landmarks (Statue of Liberty, the Brooklyn Bridge) neatly wrapped up in a rollercoaster ribbon, present themselves to the contemporary would-be flaneur like purpose-built entries in a giant VR encyclopedia devoted to the subject of the postindustrial/postmodern city. Celebrated urban critic Mike Davis recently described the city as “the brightest star in the firmament of postmodernism” (54),1 and indeed Las Vegas has long provided theorist-tourists with a productive stomping ground for engaging with postmodern urban forms, experiences, and structures, which manifest themselves in this place with a peculiar luminosity and intensity.

     

    Among the first to “discover” this exemplary postmodern landscape were the architects Venturi, Scott Brown, and Izenour, whose seminal manifesto Learning From Las Vegas (1972) provided the blueprint for a number of ongoing debates on postmodern aesthetics and the built environment. Almost three decades, however, have passed since that book was published, and Las Vegas itself now exudes quite a different kind of postmodernity. Regardless of whether you prefer the older and seedier Vegas or the more recent “Disneyfied” version, the city continues to exert a strong attraction with new residents, tourists, and cultural theorists (myself included in the latter of these two categories), who continue to travel there in ever increasing numbers. However, as Mike Davis has slyly noted, the philosophers who celebrate Las Vegas as a postmodern wonderland–presumably he is referring to Baudrillard?–don’t actually have to live there and deal with the city’s less appealing aspects. It’s an important critical point, yet as John Hannigan’s suggestive and welcome new book, Fantasy City: Pleasure and Profit in the Postmodern Metropolis, indicates, there is in fact no need for postmodern philosophers to live in Las Vegas because the chances are that many of the urban trends spectacularly visible there will be probably coming to a city near those philosophers soon (if they haven’t already done so). Centrally, Hannigan proposes that we are witnessing a new phase in the development of consumer societies: the introduction of an “infrastructure of casinos, megaplex cinemas, themed restaurants, simulation theaters, interactive theme rides and virtual reality arcades which collectively promise to change the face of leisure in the postmodern metropolis” (1). According to Hannigan, this development trend, which one finds in a heightened form in Las Vegas, will become a fully-fledged global phenomenon as we enter the new millennium. Certainly my own delirious pomo walk on the Las Vegas Strip was not framed just by an experience of the now “clichéd” tropes of simulation, hyperreality, and time-space compression, but also mediated by my own experience of a new casino-entertainment complex that had recently opened a hemisphere away in my home city of Melbourne.

     

    Yet while Las Vegas may epitomize many of the elements of this new entertainment infrastructure in the city and is a regular reference point in Hannigan’s book (a pre-redevelopment image of downtown’s Fremont Street graces the cover), the neon capital is but just one stop on a much more ambitious urban tour which ranges across a large number of North American cities and also does a quick comparative circuit of select cities in the Asia-Pacific Rim. At its best, then, Hannigan’s book sketches out a complex differential history of a new kind of “uneven development” in which postindustrial cities are being both reconstructed and trying to differentiate themselves as centers or “hubs” of leisure and consumption.

     

    In his introduction Hannigan defines “fantasy city” according to the following six features: it is organized around a marketable theme; it is aggressively branded; it operates day and night; it features what might be termed modular components; it is solipsistic in so far as it ignores surrounding neighborhoods; and it is postmodern. These features then prompt Hannigan to set up some central questions and problematics (some of which seem more useful than others):

     

    Are fantasy cities the culmination of a long-term trend in which private space replaces public space? Do these new entertainment venues further entrench the gap between the haves and have-nots in the "dual city"? Are they the nuclei around which new downtown identities form or do they simply accelerate the destruction of local vernaculars and communities? And, finally, do they constitute thriving urban cauldrons out of which flows the elixir to reverse the decline of downtown areas or are they danger signs that the city itself is rapidly becoming transformed into a hyperreal consumer commodity? (7)

     

    This last question is a pivotal one, for the author frames his overall inquiry within a general thesis (to which I shall return) that fantasy city is “the end-product of a long-standing cultural contradiction in American society between the middle-class desire for experience and their parallel reluctance to take risks, especially those which involve contact with the ‘lower orders’ in cities” (7).

     

    As a means of plotting the trajectory behind contemporary manifestations of that “cultural contradiction,” Fantasy City strategically opens with a three-chapter section on the historical context of entertainment’s role in the development of the American city from the late nineteenth century to the present day, particularly as it manifests itself in spatial terms (downtown life versus that of the suburbs). Thus in his first chapter, Hannigan discusses the so-called “golden age” of urban entertainment that invigorated downtown city life in North America between the 1890s and 1920s and that provides a possible historical precedent for the contemporary emergence of “fantasy city.” Here the author traces the construction of the notion of a then new commercial leisure culture in the city that while representing itself as “public”–in the sense of it being democratic and affordable to all–still managed to maintain rigid socio-spatial barriers along class, race, and gender lines. This chapter seems especially important because it challenges nostalgic laments by those contemporary urban critics who yearn for an often idealized public realm. The second chapter in this section, entitled “Don’t go out tonight,” moves on to chart the slow and gradual decline of the popularity of central city entertainment precincts from the 1950s onwards, a decline connected to widespread suburbanization and the evacuation of downtown areas by the middle classes. Finally, in the third chapter, Hannigan charts a remarkable return of entertainment developments to the central city. This return begins in the 1970s with the building of downtown malls and festival markets and eventually consolidates and expands into “fantasy city” in the 1990s thanks to a proliferation of “new” forms and technologies such as themed restaurants, sports-entertainment complexes, I-Max theaters, and virtual reality arcades.

     

    Having set up this useful historical context, Hannigan directs our attention to the attractions of contemporary Urban Entertainment Developments (UEDs) in a section on “Landscapes of Pleasure” which contains two chapters. In the first of these chapters Hannigan tries to outline the appeal of fantasy city to consumers and argues that this can be summarized in terms of four categories: “the siren song of seductive technology; a new source of ‘cultural capital’; a prime provider of experiences which satisfy our desire for ‘riskless risks’; and a form of ‘affective ambiance’” (10). The author also asks (in a rather insubstantial one and a half pages) how these new environments stack up as sites for the production of identities and lifestyles. The second chapter in this section takes a different tack by highlighting the vital “synergies” or convergences in fantasy city between previously segregated and distinct leisure/consumer practices such as shopping, entertainment, dining, and education.

     

    This second section offers some tantalizing insights but is, I would suggest, a bit thinly spread in its coverage (relative to the other two sections of the book). While the material that Hannigan covers in this section is engaging, cogent, and relevant, it does seem to be somewhat uncertainly situated methodologically speaking. In particular, the structure of the book has much to indirectly say about the difficult interdisciplinary challenges faced by anyone writing in regard to the slippery signifier of “the postmodern city.” Studies of the city are going through a boom phase at the moment, riding high on a surge of interest in the problematics of space and place. That interest is spread across a diverse range of disciplines, a number of which feature in Routledge’s subject description on the back of Hannigan’s book: “Urban studies, Sociology, Urban geography, Cultural studies, Tourism.” Despite its invitation to interdisciplinarity, however, the style of the book will, I suspect, appeal more to those adhering to the traditions of the first two of those fields. In other words, while the subtitle of his book suggests an equal division of inquiry into “pleasure” and “profit” (which seems to be roughly analogous to saying “consumption” and “production”), Hannigan’s emphasis tends to fall rather too heavily on the production side of the equation. In this regard, then, Hannigan’s book seems to fit most into a tradition of urban analysis that is articulated in such classic works as David Harvey’s Postmodernism: An Enquiry into the Origin of Cultural Change (1990), itself a pivotal work much concerned with “the postmodern and the city,” and that while outlining a complex relationship between base and superstructure ultimately posits the latter as a reflection or symptom of the former.

     

    Thus the final and lengthiest section, where Hannigan flexes his urban-sociological muscles to chart contemporary developments regarding entertainment and the city, stands out as the strongest and most coherent. Here the scope of the study and its considerable empirical evidence make the arguments particularly compelling. At the same time, in these latter chapters a potentially tedious reliance on a barrage of reports and statistics concerning the ownership of various developments, their building costs, and economic performance threatens to halt the momentum and flow of Hannigan’s argument. Fortunately, however, some relief is available in the form of an often illuminating series of mini-case studies of about one to three pages that are scattered throughout the book. For example, one such section discusses the failure of the Freedomland U.S.A. theme park in the 1960s, another charts the failure of a public-private partnership, while another considers the effect of the introduction of legalized gambling on the community of Gilpin County. These case studies engagingly ground some of the broader issues and trends with which Hannigan grapples.

     

    In this third and final section of Fantasy City, Hannigan opens with a chapter outlining some the key corporate and entrepreneurial players (including the coalition of entertainment conglomerates and real-estate developers) in the leisure development game. This discussion dovetails smoothly with the following chapter, which addresses the increasing importance of private-public partnerships and focuses in particular on sports complexes. In the opening of this chapter, the author quotes the famous invitation from the baseball film Field of Dreams (1989): “If you build it, they will come.” While for my taste Hannigan may have not have explained this enough in terms of why consumers take up such an invitation, and the different kinds of value they might produce or experience in relation to these sites, he certainly offers a compelling and informative analysis of why city authorities find themselves under increasing pressure to “join forces with a corporate savior” in order to build projects that will hopefully “constitute an economic miracle”(129). How often, asks Hannigan, do taxpayers really get a reasonable return for their subsidies or regulatory concessions, what are the risks, and who is really “calling the shots” in this sort of urban development?

     

    Hannigan then turns to Las Vegas and its transformation from a seedy mixture “of neon, glitter, blackjack and organized crime… [to a] booming entertainment center” (10). Here, he helpfully contrasts Vegas’s economic miracle with other more troubled gambling developments and teases out the implications and consequences of the recognition of gambling as the entertainment equivalent of a cash crop for economically struggling cities. Following this, in a chapter on the leisure revolution taking place “off-shore,” Hannigan takes us on a quick tour around a number of cities in the Asia-Pacific Rim. While his attempt to move beyond a North American focus is admirable, it is undermined by its whistle-stop nature and can’t really do justice to the specific entertainment histories of the countries. Chief among those differences is the spatialization of cities along class lines. Hannigan acknowledges this when he notes that unlike the American case, “the Asian middle class don’t regard a trip into the central city as a safari into a zone of crime and danger” (185). To his credit, this leads him to conclude that despite “the considerable American content of these new urban entertainment destinations… they are by no means carbon copies” (186).

     

    Finally, in his concluding chapter on the future of fantasy city, Hannigan argues that the civic worth of urban entertainment developments hinges upon the ability of urban policy makers to be “proactive rather than reactive” participants in costly projects. In this same chapter Hannigan also reiterates his central argument that driving the production of fantasy city is the American middle-class desire “for predictability and security [that] has for a long time spilled over into the domain of leisure and entertainment” (190). I wonder, though, whether this is the most interesting conclusion to be drawn from the diverse range of case studies that the author presents to the reader. It appears to me that this component of Hannigan’s argument is an unnecessary generalization–must these new urban entertainment developments be grouped together as one coherent form that is constituted in relation to the motives of such a specific “public”? Perhaps it would be equally productive to explore how specific sites constitute themselves in order to attract “mixed” markets–and how and why, do different socially marked groups decide a certain site is worth patronizing (something that Hannigan’s studies admittedly attempt to do). In Melbourne, where I live, for example, one of the most interesting things about the new central city Crown Casino Entertainment Complex (the largest structure of its kind in the southern hemisphere) is precisely the way it tries to negotiate interactions between a necessarily diverse customer base. For example, while the “high rollers” and “whales” as they are known in gambling parlance may remain invisible thanks to private gaming rooms and private elevators, there is still a significant blend of middle-class, professional-managerial-class, and working class patrons in the “public” part of the casino. In terms of American developments, and particularly that of Las Vegas, Hannigan’s work encourages me to wonder about the distinctions that mark the different Vegas casino venues, and the question of who goes there versus say the more “low-rent” gambling town of nearby Laughlin on the Colorado River. Put another way, how do the operators of “fantasy city” attempt to manage the social production of difference at these sites and how do consumers negotiate those management strategies? “Build it and they will come” intones the mantra, but as a cultural theorist with an interest in the productivity of consumption I wanted to know more; specifically, who will come, why do they come, and how do you keep them coming back once they have already visited the place? These reservations aside, John Hannigan’s book is to be heartily welcomed as an excellent starting point–setting up as it does a stimulating range of questions–for the investigation of a topic that deserves to be foregrounded in studies of the city, entertainment, postmodernism, and urban culture.

     

    Note

     

    1. In this same chapter Davis argues that Las Vegas is in fact just an exaggerated version of Los Angeles.

    Works Cited

     

    • Davis, Mike. “Las Vegas Versus Nature.” Reopening the American West. Ed. Hal K. Rothman. Tuscon: U of Arizona P, 1998. 53-73.
    • Harvey, David. The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change. Oxford: Blackwell, 1990.
    • Izenour, Steven, Denise Scott Brown, and Robert Venturi. Learning From Las Vegas: The Forgotten Symbolism of Architectural Form. Cambridge, MA: MIT P, 1972.

     

  • The Truth About Pina Bausch: Nature and Fantasy in Carnations

    Lynn Houston

    Department of English
    Arizona State University
    lynnmhouston@yahoo.com

     

    Pina Bausch, Carnations. Perf. Tanztheater Wuppertal. Gammage Auditorium, Tempe. 22 October 1999.

     

    Freud’s elision of body-mind also suggests that the private mental space accorded to “the self” on modern models of identity, the space of fantasy, is produced to some extent by the body’s being-in-culture. Slavoj Zizek notes that “at its most fundamental, fantasy tells me what I am to others”… That is to say, our fantasies, those wonderful or terrifying stories we weave about ourselves in our supposedly most private moments, are actually extensions of culture into that space formerly and mistakenly called “mind.” Zizek argues that fantasy has a “radically intersubjective character” insofar as it is “an attempt to provide an answer to the question ‘What does society want from me,’ to unearth the meaning of the murky events in which I am forced to participate.”

     

    –Sharon Crowley, Rhetorical Bodies, 362.

     

    Billed as ballet, Pina Bausch’s work is a choreography that prompts audience members who expect the tutus and pirouettes typical of traditional ballet to leave the theater. Bausch brings a critical consciousness to choreography and to representations of the body, a consciousness which she then places in dialogue with the history of ballet. Her work is a postmodern art especially inspired, it seems, by forces at play in psychoanalysis and its attempts to formulate the subject. In the piece Carnations, performed recently in Tempe,1 Bausch plays with the interaction between the stage and the audience, between the dancers and the spectators, so that the absence of traditional ballet and the audience’s expectations for it become the subjects of the ballet. Thus her piece becomes both a study in the violence of tradition and a commentary on the tradition of violence that pervades human interaction.
     
    In Carnations, Bausch reveals a Borgesian sensitivity in her treatment of the uncanny that haunts the relationship between author and reader, and between performer and spectator, as she links the play of power in the gaze to other struggles for power in human relationships. In the refusal of her dancers to remain simply performers who exist just for the entertainment of the audience–Bausch’s dancers shout to us that their feet hurt–her art can be likened to Pirandello’s at its most surreal. Carnations powerfully brings into conjuction art, theory, and collective fantasy as it explores the struggle over institutional uses of power present in how we represent ourselves physically, expressionistically, gesturally, and in how we tell the stories that construct our subjectivity.
     
    Bausch’s piece invokes moments in the history of psychoanalysis where the relationship between the patient and the psychoanalyst are critiqued, where the notions of cause and effect that support psycholanalytic discourse are examined and questioned, and where definitions of repression and the unconscious are advanced. Her piece resounds particularly strongly with the categories advanced by Lacan in “Function and field of speech and language,” the categories which he believes betray the amnesia of the unconscious, or, in other words, the spaces where the text of truth has been collected and stored. “The unconscious is that chapter of my history,” he states, “that is marked by a blank or occupied by a falsehood: it is the censored chapter. But the truth can be rediscovered; usually it has already been written down elsewhere….” (50). Bausch works with the categories proposed by Lacan that label spaces where the truth has been posited: the body, childhood memory, systems of signs, and tradition. She communicates with these categories, these cultural warehouses of truth, in order to excavate the idea of truth that must precede such a positioning, and in order to politicize the myth of the unconscious and of the “natural innocence” of humankind, as well as to show us the violence underlying–and masked by–these constructions.
     
    As acknowledged in Sharon Crowley’s reading of Zizek (reading Lacan) found in the passage quoted at the beginning of this article, any notion of subjectivity must be rooted in a political economy of construction. Much contemporary theorizing about subjectivity dismisses the idea of a hidden “natural” self. It encourages, instead, the view that all ideas about subjectivity are always constructions, already constructions before we can even think of them, that these ideas are already built into a limited set of categories in which we can conceive of ourselves, and that they are the only tools with which we bring ourselves into being. These tools, these strategies of narration, which come from collective spaces, are already prescribed for us. Fantasy demythified can no longer exist as the realm of wild individualism, for it must be seen as a recognizable part of the textual structure readable by society. It is out of this dynamic, out of this search for the kernel of the self, that the fascination for fantasy comes. Bausch takes this dynamic apart at its seams, problematizing the categories recognizable to this system and satirizing the authoritative processes whereby deviation from the approved norms of this system of literacy is punished. Her piece presents fantasy as a springboard into something more dangerous, both as something imposed on us, and also as something that seems to respond to our search for an irreducible essence. It is here, in the way the structure of Carnations parallels the defense of the unconscious found in Lacan’s “Function and field of speech and language,” that Bausch’s work becomes politically relevant to postmodern ideas about the construction of subjectivity, for it is here that her departure from the tenets of earlier Lacanian psychoanalytic theory becomes most clear.

     

    But the truth can be rediscovered; usually it has already been written down elsewhere. Namely:–in monuments: this is my body… (Lacan 50)

     

    Power, in Bausch’s Carnations, is examined in a variety of its incarnations. Her dance looks to the dynamics of the romantic relationship and to the context of food for the use of the body as a signifying medium. Bausch sees these as special situations in regard to manifestations of power. At one moment in the piece, for example, a man (like the referee in a boxing match) watches while sets of couples (representing relationships of varying nature) act out various forms of abuse on each other. The first set of couples says something to us about nature, human development, and repression. A woman comes out on stage with a bucket full of dirt and a pail and, while facing the audience with her eyes closed, begins spooning dirt on top of her head. Next, a man comes out on stage and, after spilling one pile of dirt on his own head, begins throwing dirt on top of the woman’s head. Finally the woman stops and begins running around the stage screaming (it is a primal sound). The referee comes to her and puts the microphone on her chest and we hear the sound of a heart beating. One of the other couples in this same sequence is constituted by a man and a woman (the heterosexual union). The woman in this couple runs from one side of the stage to the other side trying to escape the man. The man runs after her and each time he catches up he jumps on her back violently. The couple freezes and the referee puts a microphone to each of their chests. Since we hear the sound of a heart beating each time, it is possible that we are to note that this is not “art” (que “ceci n’est pas une pipe”) but that this is “reality.”
     
    A later instance explores the sometimes mundane forms of power in the heterosexual relationship. A man stands next to a woman who is facing the audience. Her eyes are closed. The man is trying to force her to eat an orange that she doesn’t want to eat. He continues to try to persuade her, slice by slice, to eat the whole orange. She protests and then acquiesces each time. We do not know of any other objective, any other intention to his wanting her to eat the orange other than just to get her to do it. He counters her protests with a trite response, telling her that it is good for her. In not offering any other reason than this, Bausch plays with the habitual, with the rituals of custom, with practices for which we no longer remember the justification, traditions which are based on reasons we have forgotten, based on world-views that may no longer be relevant. We don’t know why we do it, we just know that we are supposed to do it. Bausch makes us wonder about the relationship of food and the body to the natural.
     
    In the above situation, the statement made by Slavoj Zizek at the very beginning of this article would seem to speak about the violence done through fantasy (as infused and reproduced by tradition or that to which we are “accustomed”) not only to the “ideal” space of subjectivity, but also to the body of the subject herself, in these “murky events in which [she is] forced to participate.” While the intricacies of Bausch’s choreography suggest that appeals to nature are fruitless, since even what we perceive as nature, even the category “nature” itself, can only ever be a contrivance, in such a way that the act of naturalizing becomes too dangerously steeped in the forces of politics not to create in us the necessity of being aware of this history. While all of this is present in Bausch’s work, at the same time, in a move which mustn’t be read as doing that which she cautions us against, she reminds us that any theory, any art, must account for the body.

     

    But the truth can be rediscovered; usually it has already been written down elsewhere. Namely:–in archival documents: these are my childhood memories… (Lacan 50)

     

    Many of the scenes in Carnations deal, at least on some level, with how childhood and adulthood coexist but yet remain somehow foreign to each other. Childhood, in being associated with a “natural” state, serves as that which has been erased in order to make way for the civilized being that is, supposedly, the adult. Here we have a tension between nature and civilization, or between the natural environment and industrialization, or, yet, in Blakean terms, between innocence and experience. Childhood, in being that which must give way to progress, is the realm of repression, and hence it is the past from which future fantasies will, supposedly, arise. At the climax of the dance, the Fall of mankind is reenacted amid chaos and confusion, amid the trampling of the flowers that filled the stage floor. But it possesses no transcendent significance. It is not the corruption of what used to be pure, but it is simply one among many of the violent breeches, of our glimpses into the horror of the pre-arrangement of form, into our inextricability from the Symbolic and the abuses it engenders. Carnations undoes the notion that violence is somehow a quality of a fallen world and points instead to nature and purity as that which has been constructed.
     
    In this scenario, then, childhood is a period much like the space of the unconscious itself: “that chapter of my history that is marked by a blank or occupied by a falsehood: it is the censored chapter….” (Lacan 50). Repression and truth, here, are positioned in relation to one another in Bausch’s supposed affirmation of the existence of the unconscious, but not in the way that either Freud or the early Lacan meant it to exist. It exists, according to Bausch, because we are not conscious of how others have constructed not only ourselves but also our own memories of who we were in our “natural state” of childhood. This phantasmatic place must exist, she would add, as the space to which our awareness of the violence in which we participate has fled. Bausch’s representation of this tendency toward blindness, or refusals to see, is what puts her in tension with the psychoanalytic tradition, among others, in a way that echoes Nietzsche’s dismantling of the transcendental in “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense”: “Truths are illusions about which we have forgotten they are illusions” (81).
     
    In one scene in Carnations, the dancers, now seemingly children, are playing a child’s game called “Un, Deux, Trois, Soleil.”2 The oppressive power-structure of the game lends itself easily to a clear perception of the tremendous amount of yelling and abuse occurring among the children. Quite suddenly, one of the dancers emerges from the back of the stage and takes the position of mother. She is twice as tall as the others and her body is ill-proportioned: she has an elongated lower body and a small upper body. When she appears the violence becomes worse, as the child who had been abusing the other children now becomes the target for the mother’s wrath. The mother also figures as a malevolent Alice-in-Wonderland, a reference made plain not only by her elongated figure but also by her costume: long blond hair and blue dress.3
     
    At the end of her piece, Bausch introduces confessional narrative into the performance. The dancers enter holding their arms above their heads in an arc, in what is perhaps the most easily recognizable stance of traditional ballet, and they begin to tell us stories about incidents in their childhood that made them want to become dancers. The dancers recount their subject-formation as non-traditional ballet dancers while performing the central gesture of traditional ballet. Here, in the making public of the private space of childhood recollection, Bausch’s piece seems again to take up the question of the coherent self and of the inability to posit the cause-and-effect relationship between childhood and adulthood that audiences seem to expect. Here, Bausch seems to come full circle by positing an incomprehensibility against which any enterprise rooted in language must struggles. She seems almost to invoke Hélène Cixous, who talks about the instability of stages of identity: “at the same time we are all the ages, those we have been, those we will be, those we will not be, we journey through ourselves… as the child who goes snivelling to school and as the broken old man… We: are (untranslatable). Without counting all the combinations with others, our exchanges between languages, between sexes….” (“Preface” to the Hélène Cixous Reader, xvii-xviii).

     

    But the truth can be rediscovered; usually it has already been written down elsewhere. Namely:–in semantic evolution; this corresponds to the stock of words and acceptations of my own particular vocabulary, as it does to my style of life and to my character… (Lacan 50)

     

    Signs in Bausch’s Carnations enter into a relationship with the body in its potential as sign-maker or sign-producer, as in her use of sign language as dance. One of the first scenes in Carnations is that of a man signing the words to the song written by George Gershwin entitled “The Man I Love,” while at the same time the recording of this song made by Ella Fitzgerald is played. Associations with childhood scenes in the rest of the piece and with psychoanalysis create an impression of a homosexual fantasy of ideal love, or of the ideal partner-subject, at the same time that it denotes a sort of pre-verbality or inability to articulate the message in speech.
     
    Bausch’s flowers, her pastel colors and twirling men, represent a narrative realm of the fantastical that in its apparent playfulness, its jouissance, permits the exploration of more dangerous, more violent themes. Lacan’s jouissance surrenders to violence so that what was once playfulness becomes grotesque, what was a masculinist aesthetic of play, of jocularity, becomes dangerous. In Bausch’s passport scenes (twice a man steps on stage to ask one of the dancers for his passport: “your passport, please”), what underlies the question of otherness, the command to demonstrate legitimacy as a subject, is an accusation of otherness whose impact on the life of the subject is displayed well by the dancers in their apparent gestures of dejection: moving slowly, looking back, they wait for a signal that would remove the imperative, but it never comes. In the second passport scene we are shown how this pre-scribed punishment is, in fact, carried out in the power to humiliate. In this scene the official makes the man do tricks like a dog, like a sub-human. He even has the commands translated by a bystander into the man’s own language, in an effort to assure that the man know and understand as fully as possible his own degradation.
     
    Both passport scenes target men who are wearing dresses. It is certainly not a coincidence that these figures have been pointed out as not belonging, that an aspect of their subjectivity has caused them to come into suspicion, to be questioned. The question/command of authority marks an ideology that wishes to punish difference, wishes to identify it and humiliate it, and which includes the idea of difference, of not “amounting” (it “tarries with the negative,” if you will) in the very elaboration of itself as a system. It is by this process of conditioning that ideology reproduces itself, and it is in conceiving of this process as a passing of what is outside the self into the inside of the self that Lacan finds his idea for the birth of the subject, what he calls the mirror stage. What many Lacanians wish to argue is that Lacan does away with the Freudian conception of an interior being that gets projected outward and that Lacan prefers to view this process of subject formation as an internalization of a public conception of identity.

     

    But the truth can be rediscovered; usually it has already been written down elsewhere. Namely:–in traditions, too, and even in the legends which, in a heroicized form, bear my history… (Lacan 50)

     

    Bausch’s Carnations, in questioning the genre of classical ballet, asks us to consider what enjoyment the dancer is supposed to have in presenting the piece for the viewing pleasure of the audience. Bausch’s dancers tell us their feet hurt, that if we want to see grand-jetés we can do them ourselves. We are not presented with the transcendental subject of classical ballet (except in shadowy profile when Bausch takes an opportunity to mock this tradition of dance). Bausch’s piece also asks us to consider what fun the audience is supposed to have in attending the ballet. How is it, she seems to ask, that the bodies of the audience are completely forgotten, that in being asked to watch the art of dance, the audience members are asked to forget themselves, their own bodies? Bausch proposes to resolve this dilemma at the same time she makes us aware of it. When her dancers ask the audience to stand up and perform a simple dance that includes four arm movements, we suddenly realize that we are making the motion of a hug around the space where a body should be, and the dancers then encourage us to give hugs to those around us. It is in this way that the body of the audience member is reinscribed into the performance.
     
    Pina Bausch might, in fact, be seen as acting as a sort of therapist to her ballet audience in counseling us to rid ourselves of our expectations about what ballet should be. She prompts her audience to conclude that when we are confronted with art that doesn’t function as we think it should, the problem isn’t with the art but with our expectations, with the way we think about the art. In underscoring the humanity, the mortality of her dancers, Bausch’s art offers itself, then, not to mere enjoyment of beautiful forms, but to political reflection through a perception which no longer originates from the carefree attitude of a ballet-goer out for a night on the town, which no longer originates from the comfort of theater seats, but from a reversal of the gaze, from a space where the dancer becomes the one who watches and the erstwhile spectator becomes the spectacle. It is in this reversal that the truth in Bausch’s art can be found. By invoking fantasy (or the Imaginary) and playfulness (innocence, her field of one thousand carnations) in order to explore patterns of cruelty and subjection, her dance troupe, the Tanztheater Wuppertal, demythifies the fantasy of innocence, the collective cultural fantasy by which we wish to posit claims of a natural state, and thereby persists in reproducing the violence of the social.

     

     Notes

     

    1. Carnations was originally performed in 1982. Pina Bausch’s Tanztheater Wuppertal made Arizona State University’s Gammage Auditorium one of the few stops on their Fall 1999 United States tour. A schedule of their upcoming performances can be consulted under the heading “spielplan” at the dance troupe’s homepage <www.pina-bausch.de>.

     

    2. In this game the person who is “it” stands with his or her back to the group of children and turns around quickly after yelling the phrase, “un, deux, trois, soleil.” The other children have up until the time the one who is “it” turns around in order to sneak up on him or her. If one of the children is able to touch the person who is “it” before he or she turns around, then there is a winner, and the winner of the game becomes the next person to be “it.” If the child who is “it” sees any of the children moving when he or she turns around, then the child who was caught moving is sent back to the starting line and must begin again advancing on the one who is “it.”

     

    3. This Bad Alice may also be a reference to the work of Luce Irigaray. Although Pina Bausch is not solely feminist in her agenda, her feminism cannot be mistaken in the context of the present discussion as a clin d’oeil in the direction of Irigaray, a pupil of Jacques Lacan whom he repudiated because of her feminist approach to psychoanalysis. One of her most famous re-readings of psychoanalysis, a feminist appropriation of Lacan’s idea of the mirror-stage, is “The Looking Glass, from the Other Side.”
     

    Works Cited

     

    • Cixous, Hélène. The Hélène Cixous Reader. Ed. Susan Sellers. New York: Routledge, 1994.
    • Crowley, Sharon and Jack Selzer, eds. Rhetorical Bodies. Madison, WI: U of Wisconsin P, 1999.
    • Derrida, Jacques. “Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression.” Diacritics 25.2 (1995): 9-63.
    • —. “Freud and the Scene of Writing.” Yale French Studies 48 (1972): 74-117.
    • Foucault, Michel. The History of Sexuality: An Introduction. Volume 1. 1978. Trans. Robert Hurley. New York: Vintage, 1990.
    • Irigaray, Luce. This Sex Which Is Not One. 1977. Trans. Catherine Porter. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1985.
    • Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. 1966. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: W.W. Norton, 1977.
    • Nietzsche, Friedrich. “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense.” Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche’s Notebooks of the Early 1890s. Ed. and trans. Daniel Breazeale. New Jersey: Humanities Press International, 1979.
    • Zizek, Slavoj. The Plague of Fantasies. New York: Verso, 1997.
    • —. Tarrying With The Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1993.
    • —. The Zizek Reader. Ed. Elizabeth and Edmond Wright. Oxford: Blackwell, 1999.

     

  • Post-Avant-Gardism: Bob Perelman and the Dialectic of Futural Memory

    Joel Nickels

    English Department
    University of California, Berkeley
    joeln@uclink4.berkeley.edu

     

    Review of: Bob Perelman, The Future of Memory. New York: Roof Books, 1998.

     

    There is a play on words somewhere in the title of Bob Perelman’s recent book of new poems, but what exactly is the substance and import of this wordplay? The Future of Memory: in this title, Perelman is suggesting that it is time to question the comfortable status “memory” has achieved as a source of poetic emotion. If memory is to have a future, he seems to be saying, then its uses and meanings must be rethought; and for this unregenerate Language poet that primarily means dissociating memory from the forms of lyric subjectivity that the term currently evokes. For memory to retain any living value, it must be prepared to extend itself beyond the individual world of confession and reminiscence and become the site where possible collective futures are negotiated. The Future of Memory therefore approaches memory not as the inviolable substance of individual identity, but rather as a function of ideologically charged social regulations. It is the place where concrete political practices express themselves as collective emotional dispositions; as such, it constitutes a network of shifting and contradictory values, which Perelman hopes to animate with a view to a more various and capacious form of sociality.

     

    Perelman’s emphasis on memory sheds a great deal of light on the Language poets’ critiques of “persona-centered, ‘expressive’” poetry (Silliman et al. 261). In “Aesthetic Tendency And The Politics of Poetry,” the important contribution to Social Text which Perelman co-authored, for example, confessional poetry is aligned with a lyric disposition in which “experience is digested for its moral content and then dramatized and framed” (264). In this poetic tradition, “authorial ‘voice’ lapses into melodrama in a social allegory where the author is precluded from effective action by his or her very emotions” (265). However, it is important to note that the Language poets who authored this article distinguish themselves from the confessional tradition not through a wholesale rejection of the categories of self, memory, and experience, but rather through a poetically embodied critique of the specific forms of self, memory, and experience that confessionalism privileges. This is never a merely negative critique; on the contrary, it is one that attempts to broaden and reconstitute our understanding of subjective processes and their relation to the “beyond” of the subject. For instance, when the authors of “Aesthetic Tendency and the Politics of Poetry” compare their compositional practices to Coleridge’s “refusal to identify the I with the horizon of the ‘I,’ and thus with easily perceived moral categories” (266), when they recommend an “openness of the self” to “processes where the self is not the final term” (266), they are clearly proposing alternate models of subjectivity–models in which the “I” is in an animating and animated relation to the “not-I” (269). Perelman’s interrogation of the future of memory can therefore be understood as part of this larger ambition to multiply and complicate the forms of selfhood that poetry has at its disposal.

     

    It is strangely appropriate, therefore, that The Future of Memory begins with a poem entitled “Confession.” Perelman admits in an interview that this is a provocative gesture, since confessional poetry has been the object of “great scorn” for the Language writers since the 1970s (Nichols 532). But again, this opening move is less surprising if we understand The Future of Memory‘s deep concern with problems of consciousness and subjectivity, and its consequent exploration of the forms of “poetic intentionality that oppose [themselves]… to the elision of consciousness that occurs in habitual constructions of belief” (Silliman et al. 266). This oppositional intentionality is expressed quite casually in the opening poem of The Future of Memory, in which Perelman assumes the confessional mode only to state: “aliens have inhabited my aesthetics for / decades” (9). In this succinct poetic statement, Perelman grounds himself mimetically in the camp images of postmodern public culture, while at the same time harnessing the utopian energy of this culture’s most characteristic fantasy: an “alien” form of life beyond the known horizons of current social formations. As he notes, this image confers a “transcendental gloss on the avant-garde by saying that it’s otherworldly, heavenly, in this case, alien” (Nichols 532). In other words, for Perelman the avant-garde is defined by its attempts to point beyond the horizons of the historical period to which it belongs; the essence of the avant-garde’s relation to historically futural modes of being therefore resides in its being captured or abducted by alien possibilities which express themselves unconsciously at the level of form. According to this model, poets do not heroically project themselves beyond historical determinacy, but are instead “inculcate[d]… with otherworldly forms” (Perelman, Future 11) whose import is necessarily opaque and un-masterable.

     

    Clearly, Perelman’s dramatically fictional solution to the problem of avant-garde temporality is a joke that we cannot help but take seriously. Contained within it is a problem that has obsessed postmodernity: from what position might one inaugurate a contestatory relation to the meaning-systems of the present? Nevertheless, Perelman’s fantasy of an absolute Other lending the “naïve poet” its otherworldly agency calls attention to itself as a deus ex machina that saves the poet from phenomenological complexities that cannot be ignored for long (Future 11). Naturally, he acknowledges that there is “no Other of the Other”: “There’s no place from which to live a different life. So critical distance in that sense doesn’t seem possible. But what about provisional contingent critical distance within that world?… It doesn’t have to be outside that there’s a place for a fulcrum, it can be inside” (Nichols 536). Much of The Future of Memory can be understood as an attempt to anatomize the negotiatory practices capable of generating this “internal distance.” And to follow the “argument” of The Future of Memory we must be willing to imagine this space that is beyond the opposition of immanence and alterity. For Perelman, it is important that this space has an essentially futural character–in its first determination, it should be seen as a space in which the poet is actively lending himself to a possible future, whose contexts of understanding are necessarily unintelligible from his temporally anterior standpoint. The poet is to be imagined here as constantly operating on the margins of intelligibility, all the while trusting that his moments of incoherence are the formal harbingers of an emergent social configuration that will belatedly lend a coherence and practical intelligibility to his literary experiments.

     

    There is thus a theory of historical time at work in The Future of Memory which is self-consciously in dialogue with Raymond Williams’s concept of emergent social formations. Perelman’s concept of avant-garde artistic practice hinges on the idea that the poet can make him/herself available to inarticulable “structures of feeling” which anticipate futural social practices. A historically anticipatory structure of feeling is defined by Williams as a “formation which, because it is at the very edge of semantic availability, has many of the characteristics of a pre-formation, until specific articulations–new semantic figures–are discovered in material practice” (Williams 134). This sense of poetry as the embodiment of historically proleptic half-meanings which an emergent historical community may “take up” with a view to practical action is essential to Perelman’s poetic method.1

     

    A long poem entitled “The Womb of Avant-Garde Reason,” which serves as a centerpiece to The Future of Memory, gives life to this idea:

     

    Quotation from 'The Womb of Avant-Garde<br />
Reason' by Bob Perelman

     

    Here, Perelman is imagining the time lag that must take place between the composition of a poem and the various interpretive communities who will encounter the work in the future. He has faith that the process of temporalization that the text must undergo will allow future communities to realize the concrete practices that the amorphous half-meanings of his poem could be said to anticipate. He symbolizes this in the image of time sprouting legs and hands: changed historical circumstances will allow future readers to recuperate and lend propositional content to structures of feeling present in the poem only at the level of form. This will make possible a transliteration of poetic values into the everyday realm of “annoyances” and practical particulars. A “lien” is “a claim on the property of another as security against the payment of a just debt.”2 Perelman is saying that he has “given over” part of his being to the future, has surrendered his poetic property with the understanding that the future will “make good” the meanings that he has temporarily suspended, and that he cannot untangle by himself. But what form will this futural payback take? In what direction will the hermeneutic elaboration of Perelman’s text proceed? By the time one can ask these questions, the issue is already out of the poet’s hands: “others” are responsible for recasting the terms of Perelman’s text with a view to the future–one which, he hopes, will make possible “less destructive circumstances” and the “capacious translation between groups” (Nichols 538).

     

    The “memory” Perelman evokes in The Future of Memory is therefore a combined function of both the poet and his temporally posterior interpretive communities. He is profoundly sensitive to what this essay will define in terms of a “cultural semantics.” The poet must be committed to “mutually contemplating the rhetorical force of–not words, but of historical sentences, phrases, genres” (Nichols 538). Existing beneath these macrohistorical semantemes, whose power to “interpellate and to stir up emotion” (538) Perelman alerts us to, there are the local articulative possibilities that he leads us to picture in terms of the shifting drives of Kristeva’s semiotic. Kristeva, we should recall, refers to anamnesis as the process whereby the semiotic is introduced into the symbolic in order to pluralize its significations (Revolution 112). For Perelman, the function of memory is similar. Its value resides not in its ability to provide the poet with Poundian historical exempla, which could serve as concrete existential alternatives to those provided by contemporary systems of value. Rather, memory refers to the process whereby poetic intentionality is capable of “carrying one back” to the level of a primordial sense of possible relations, similar to the condition of primary functional and social competence which characterizes infantile life. Here, then, we see the futural value of memory in The Future of Memory: memory is the function which enables the poet to inhabit a shifting and pre-articulate “social sense,” whose ability to lend itself to newly emergent social configurations aligns it with Williams’s structures of feeling.

     

    Essential to the method and meaning of The Future of Memory, therefore, is the complex Kristevan thesis that our “intuitive” sense of possible social relations is rooted in the primordial regulation of our senses: a process that takes place when our affective and even our physical comportment toward others is first established in concert with symbolic (and therefore social) values which continue to hold sway throughout our adult lives. However, for Perelman, poetry is best suited to contest and complexify our social sense not when it strives to mimic the kinematics of the mother’s voice through a Kristevan “musicalization” of language. Rather, Perelman seeks to induct the reader into this primordial world of sense in a way that is necessarily and in the first instance disposed toward a constructive relation to a possible future. In other words, he establishes a relation to the world of “sense” not by amplifying the sound texture of his poems in order to evoke a Kristevan chora, but rather by precipitating a hermeneutic crisis that will force the reader to marshal all the values of emergent and half-cognized sense with a view to its various possible futural consummations.

     

    “The future of memory” therefore designates a process that includes both the text as a document of sensed possibilities for affective recombination and the futural communities of readers whose concrete practices can lend these half-meanings a social intelligibility. The locus of memory’s futurality is therefore the mediating position of the reader–a reader who is continually “carried back” to the historically incipient senses of the text, while at the same time incorporating its primordial “feel” for new and capacious intersubjectivity into its concrete political strategies.

     

    For Perelman, this mediative role of the reader is essential, because he strives to write a poetry that is socially prophetic yet escapes the phenomenological paradoxes of poetic “genius,” in which the writer is somehow capable of delivering a “message” which is “‘far ahead’ of its time” (Trouble 7). To be sure, poems such as “To the Future” partake of a general problematic of genius, in which the author lends his/her voice to futural possibilities that are unavailable to conscious articulation. In this poem, Perelman figures himself as writing “fake dreams” and “skittish prophecy” on the empty pages of books that have been “cleaned” in a kind of ideological laundromat (Future 40). Again, the ideological “distance” that the laundromat creates is of the same order as the alien visitation of “Confession.” Perelman emphasizes the absurdity upon which his own models of “genius” are founded, and yet allows their urgency to be registered beneath their kitschy exterior. In fact, his 1994 critical study, The Trouble with Genius, can be understood as an attempt to think through the paradoxes and necessities which such unstable moments of his own poetry express. In that text, he says of modernism: “While these works may have been written to express the originary, paradisal space where genius creates value, they do not travel directly to the mind of the ideal reader, the critic who accepts the transcendent claims of these works and the subsequent labor involved” (10). It is precisely by stressing the un-ideal character of the readerly function, therefore, that Perelman hopes to move beyond this modernist version of genius and the false models of pre-ideological “paradisal space” which his own laundromats of negativity parody.

     

    To this end, Perelman focuses on what might be described as the “time lag” that exists between a text’s “signification” and the various interpretive “enunciations” the reader effects with respect to the values latent in the text. In this model, readership becomes the site of various mediations which serve to frustrate the seamless transmission of textual meaning to an ideal reader. As we have seen, the most important of these mediations has a historical provenance. The reader, for Perelman, is always historically futural–both in the sense that readership must inevitably come after authorship, and in the larger sense that this belatedness allows the reader to serve as a representative of all futural historical communities. This belatedness is essential, since he is writing for an audience that shares a set of social codes which is historically in advance of his own text. The fact that his text will only “realize” its meaning in the material practices to which these social codes correspond means that Perelman’s technical experiments can only emerge as socially “pre-formative” if a futural interpretive community belatedly accords them this status.

     

    This is a significant departure from the modernist model of genius, because it means that it is ultimately up to “others” to determine the prophetic value of Perelman’s text, or to put the point more strongly, prophetic value is precisely what is missing from his text, and must be supplied by the interested and transformative readings that futural audiences will provide. It is therefore only by amplifying this “missing-ness” or incompletion in his text, while at the same time “calling out” to his audience’s sense of possible, but as yet undetermined, social practices, that Perelman can hope to be accorded a paradoxically belated proleptic significance. In this way, he abjures the totalizing centrality of properly avant-garde temporality, and institutes what he describes as a “post-avant-garde” poetic practice, which consists in an “acknowledgement that the social is all margins these days. Poetry–innovative poetry–explores this condition” (Nichols 542).

     

    The Future of Memory employs this post-avant-garde poetic practice by calling out to be completed by the reader in various ways. One of Perelman’s most provocative gestures is his insertion of a darkened page into the middle of the volume–into the middle of another poem, in fact, which the piece of paper “interrupts.” This darkened page is entitled “A Piece of Paper,” and clearly evokes his desire to allow various external contexts of understanding to “intrude” upon his text and combine themselves with its meanings. The piece of paper is represented as “signifying others who speak and live or not they weren’t given air time and paper to ride this recursive point of entry” (71). The text’s blind spot is thus the existence of others as such, which Perelman can only virtually “presentify” in the image of a piece of paper coming from “without” the text and carrying alterity with it. When he invites the reader to “blink your blindness inside legibility” (71), he is hoping to extend our notion of textuality to include the unforeseeable acts of interpretation which his poem will elicit.

     

    Another long poem, entitled “Symmetry of Past and Future,” expresses even more vividly the “post-avant-garde” dialectic that Perelman hopes to establish between text and reader:

     

    Quotation from 'Symmetry of Past and<br />
Future' by Bob Perelman

     

    The first thing to note here is that the facticity of the historical past is aligned with the facticity of Perelman’s own “plies of writing.” The pun on “executed” is important, since it suggests that the status of this textual and historical pastness as “already executed” serves to “execute,” or put to death, the agency of desire–a function allied with the movement of history and interpretation, as opposed to the fixity of official history and the written word. But in at least one case out of twenty, this execution has been granted a “reprieve”–something has been left “unwritten” in history (and in Perelman’s text) which calls out to the desire of the contemporary reader. This reader is oriented toward the “vanishing point” of the future; s/he thus occupies the site where the “blindnesses” of official history–its “missing” elements–can be “written into” an emergent meaning-system and rendered legible.

     

    It is important, however, that the political desire of the contemporary reader is not free of a certain kind of facticity. Every attempt to move creatively into a possible future is performed against the backdrop of “involuntary memories” and psychological “reflexes” which limit the kinds of social relatedness that the contemporary reader can imagine and work towards. This explains why Perelman aligns this kind of historical “work” with the interpretive work that readers perform on texts. For him, the primordial world of “sensation” constitutes a kind of libidinal “text” whose emotional grammar is determined by the patterns of human relationality that hold sway during socialization. The attempt to expand this emotional grammar to include a more capacious form of collective relationality thus entails a return to this most primordial “text,” in the interest of elaborating and extending the “meanings” to which it is sensitive. And just as Perelman offers his own text as a document of inarticulate structures of feeling whose formal patterns (or “shapes”) he hopes will be rendered meaningful through the material practices which they anticipate, so does the world of “sense” constitute a half-written text which can be revisited with a view to renegotiating what makes “sense” in a given social formation.

     

    In Perelman, then, we find a profoundly complex exploration of the historical determination of our deepest psychical structures and, more importantly, a reformulation of what it means to be avant-garde when this historicizing imagination is applied to the condition of the poet him/herself. Of course, this perspective is not new to Perelman or unique to him. Since at least the late 1970s, Language poetry has attempted to reconstitute the poetic avant-garde while remaining responsible to the theoretical complications of structuralist analysis and ideology critique. In fact, it is in his interventions from the early and middle 1980s that we find the meditations on sense and ideology most central to the strategies of The Future of Memory. In his contribution to the important Writing/Talks collection, appropriately entitled “Sense,” Perelman refers to an “invisible reified atemporal empire, this sense of decorum that’s backed by political power, that tries to define all language” (66). He is exploring here how the world of “sense” is determined and delimited by this ideological “empire,” but also how it can be imagined as a pre-semantic reserve which is capable of decomposing and temporalizing the illusive “atemporality” of reified social conditions. And as in “Symmetry of Past and Future,” the agency that is accorded “sense” is aligned with the interpretive mediations of textual meaning that historically situated readers embody.

     

    A poem entitled “The Classics,” which was first published in Perelman’s 1981 collection, Primer, is included in his essay on “Sense,” and stands as a tripartite allegory of the origin of infantile consciousness, the transmission of textual meaning, and the dynamics of ideological interpellation and negotiation. As such, it usefully illustrates the basic conceptual relations between memory, textuality, and collective history that he animates in The Future of Memory:

     

    In the beginning, the hand
    Writes on water. A river
    Swallows its author,
    Alive but mostly
    Lost to consciousness.

     

    Where’s the milk. The infant
    Gradually becomes interested
    In these resistances. (“Sense” 66)

     

    As a narrative of infantile consciousness, these first two stanzas suggest that at the beginning of life, “thought” is almost purely unconscious–it is figured as an instinctual, automatic hand, whose intentional marks are not registered by the fluid, unengravable medium of consciousness. As a narrative of the transmission of textual meaning, this would correspond to the modernist ideal that Perelman outlines in The Trouble with Genius: a pure and unmediated transcription in the reader’s mind of the author’s valuative systems.

     

    Perelman explicitly draws this connection in his self-interpretation in “Sense”: “That’s Piaget’s theory that intelligence–it’s preprogrammed obviously, but–it gets triggered by the fact that you can’t find the breast very easily. So the sense behind here is of reader and writer being the infant, and the milk being meaning. The resistances are the words” (67). In other words, the author is the writing hand, the reader is the fluid medium of consciousness, and words are the “resistances” which interpose themselves between a pure authorial intention and an ideal reader. That is to say, words are the site of an irreducible mediation; they could be said to “get in the way” of an ideal transmission of authorial meaning to readerly consciousness. Instead of conveying a transparent meaning, words provoke an active process of “feeling out” meanings–an interpretive process which requires many half-conscious creative gestures, all oriented around enunciating the hidden or “ideal” meaning of the text in highly indeterminate ways. Similarly, “instinct” is the automatic hand that should lead the infant directly to the breast without any need for the mediations of half-consciously coordinated actions. But since the physical world presents “resistances” to the ideal, unconscious working of instinct, the infant must begin actively to “interpret” the world, in order to begin consciously coordinating its actions.

     

    “Instinct” and “pure authorial meaning” are aligned here, then, because they are “preprogrammed” and should “ideally” produce subjects who are pure automatons: unconscious reflections of somatic drives or unalterable meaning-systems. The Future of Memory‘s concern with practices capable of generating critical “distance” from contemporary meaning-systems is thus clearly anticipated here. As we have seen in “Symmetry of Past and Future,” Perelman is concerned with a similarly “ideal” model of ideological preprogramming, in which ideology inscribes itself primordially as a kind of social “instinct,” determining human subjectivity even at the most basic level of “sense” or “sensation.” The consequences of this for Perelman’s own poetry are profound: he suggests that we should understand the transmission and assumption of authorial meaning as a moment within a larger process of ideological transmission–a process in which the subject assumes and “enunciates” the ideal “content” of ideology with an agency which could be described as having a hermeneutic provenance.3

     

    In this sense of his own text’s implication in dynamics of ideological transmission, Perelman reflects Language writing’s awareness that the very legibility of a text depends upon the social meaning-system in which it exists.4 As Ron Silliman writes in “The Political Economy of Poetry,” “What can be communicated through any literary production depends on which codes are shared with its audience” (Silliman, Sentence 25). To make this point even more strongly, Silliman quotes Volosinov: “Any utterance is only a moment in the continuous process of verbal communication. But that continuous verbal communication is, in turn, only a moment in the continuous, all-inclusive, generative process of a given social collective” (22). This means that meaning as such is always implicated with the “generative process” of ideology; and this is a problem for writers who hope to assume an oppositional stance toward current social formations.

     

    Perelman’s “solution” to this problem centers around a constitutive misprision which he sees as part and parcel of the reader’s relationship to ideology’s “message”:

     

    Success is an ideal method.
    For itself the sun
    Is a prodigy of splendor.
    It did not evolve. Naturally,
    A person had to intervene.

     

    Children in stage C succeed.
    Emotion is rampant. We blush
    At cases 1 and 2. (“Sense” 67)

     

    In his prose commentary, Perelman alerts us to Quintillian’s tautological definition of clarity as “what the words mean” (“Sense” 67). But for Perelman the idea that words could “successfully” convey a transparent and universal meaning represents an impossible “ideal.”5 “Pure meaning,” perfect clarity, can only be conceived as an extra-human abstraction: a sun existing only “for itself,” removed from the processual “evolution” of syntax. In order for meaning to actualize itself, it must temporalize itself, subject itself to the interpretive interventions which language incites; it must constantly be reborn in a human world.

     

    As a description of ideology’s perpetual re-birthing of itself in individual subjects, these passages are profoundly suggestive. Perelman suggests in these rather casually executed, but philosophically resonant, parataxes that if “ideology has the function of ‘constituting’ concrete individuals as subjects” (Althusser, Lenin 171), then concrete individuals simultaneously occupy a location where the subject(-matter), the discursive elaboration and performative accentuation of ideology, is negotiated. In Perelman’s developmental narrative in “The Classics,” therefore, as well as in his historical narratives in The Future of Memory, ideology is there from the beginning, as a kind of immanent textuality: an instinctual matrix which positions the subject in socially determined discursive fields. However, for Perelman the “content” or “meaning” of this ideological (sub)text is indistinguishable from the various interpretive enunciations it receives when its meaning is “realized” in the social being of individual subjects.6 This is important, since it means that ideology may be subjectively enunciated in ways that Bhabha describes as “catachrestic”–i.e., intentional or unintentional “misprisions” of ideology are always in danger of producing the embarrassing “bad subjects” referred to above as “cases 1 and 2.”7

     

    Perelman hopes to introduce precisely such a transgressive enunciatory practice into the reader’s relation to his own text, but insofar as authorship and textual meaning are associated with the instinctual inscription by which ideology “textualizes” itself, he is faced with the difficulty of not being able to instantiate this transgressive practice “from the side of poetry.” Instead, a peculiar kind of memorial agency on the part of the reader is invoked:

     

    Hidden quantities
    In what he already knows
    Eventually liberate a child
    From the immediate present. (“Sense” 68)

     

    Again, the child here stands in, first, for the developmental subject as s/he becomes liberated from the automaticity of instinctual responses by actively assuming the functional patterns which were originally “lived” at a purely somatic level; second, s/he stands in for the subject of ideology, insofar as this subject, in its enunciative practices, gives shape to an imperative which in another essay Perelman jokingly expresses in profoundly voluntaristic terms: “I don’t want to be an automaton” (“First Person” 161); finally, s/he stands in for the readerly function, which can never be the automatic transcription of textual fact into objective meaning, but must rather express the irreducible mediation of interpretive enunciation.

     

    This means, of course, that the “immediate present” of a unitary and inescapable textual meaning is as much a fiction as the unilateral “voicing” of ideology and the conative determinism of “instinct.”8 In each of the above cases, the mediacy of enunciation has always already corrupted the putative immediacy whereby the conative life of the subject, its ideological positionality and interpretive agency, could all be understood as direct and inevitable reflections of various somatic regulations, subject-positions, and semantic facta. The question that remains, then, is what these “hidden quantities” are, which allow for what Lacan describes as the “little freedom” of the subject in his/her comportment toward these various aspects of the Symbolic Order: i.e., the functional distribution of instinctual responses, the ideological totality of “effective discourse,” and the matrices of textual meaning.9

     

    For the Perelman of The Future of Memory as much as for the Perelman of Primer, the answer resides in the “semiotic”–a primordial system of psychical “marks” which both forms the instinctual fundament of the symbolic, and exists as a labile force of “unsignifying” beneath its socially organized systems of value.10 In other words, what the subject “already knows” should be understood in terms of its participation in an ideological meaning-system, which can be imagined as a constellation of semantemes: discursive units that provide the most basic coordinates of what can “make sense” in a given culture. For Perelman, then, the “hidden quantities” in this semantic structure would be the even more primordial system of phonemes, which constitutes a semiotic reserve prior to, and yet organized by the horizon of possible meanings embodied in the semantemes. According to this analogy, the fact that individuals “automatically” sort the phonemic values they hear according to the lexical and semantic values with which their language-competence has made them familiar is the psycholinguistic parallel to a process of ideological automaticity.

     

    In a 1980 essay entitled “The First Person,” Perelman quotes Jonathan Culler to help illustrate this point:

     

    A speaker is not consciously aware of the phonological system of his language, but this unconscious knowledge must be postulated if we are to account for the fact that he takes two acoustically different sequences as instances of the same word and distinguishes between sequences which are acoustically very similar but represent different words. (150)11

     

    The subject thus “already knows” how to make sense out of the pre-semantic semiotic elements which s/he encounters, but this knowledge is not conscious. In fact, in his juxtaposition of the above quote with another by Culler, which refers to the “variety of interpersonal systems” and “systems of convention” that define subjective functional operations (Perelman, “First Person” 151), Perelman means to stress that the “automaticity” that characterizes the individual’s relationship to the microcosm of individual speech-acts has its origin in the regulatory systems of a social macrocosm. However, Perelman’s notion is that if it were somehow possible to dwell at the level of the phoneme, and “consciously” to assume the seemingly instinctual movement from pre-semantic values to socially recognized meaning, one might be capable of multiplying the possible meanings of any individual speech-act in ways that are potentially contestatory. He provides the following gloss on the “hidden quantities” passage above: “My sense of connection here is: liberation from the present…. Somehow, the initial sense of the combinatorial power of language destroys this hierarchical frozen empire” (“Sense” 68).

     

    If the transition from a phonemic sequence to a semantic ensemble to a socially guaranteed meaning is understood to occur immediately–i.e., according to the mythical temporality of Perelman’s “immediate present”–then the desemanticizing process whereby constituted meanings are allowed to dissolve into their phonemic “raw materials” offers the possibility of protracting the time lag which continually “liberates” the subject from what would otherwise be the mechanistic nightmare of semiotic unicity. In Perelman’s work up to and including The Future of Memory, the sense that it is possible to inhabit a semiotic space which is in principle separable from the social totality that organizes it into systems of meaning leads to an idealist agency that post-structuralism’s semiotic model of resistance has made familiar. He explains, in reference to one of his earlier talks, “I talked about Robert Smithson’s sense that if you stare at any word long enough, it fragments. You can see anything in it. It’s the axis of selection. We all have this file cabinet with a million cards. We can say anything” (“Sense” 75).

     

    The phoneme thus comes to represent a space of radical non-identity, in which the semantic inheritances of a given social organization may be “broken down” and re-articulated. Perelman calls attention to the fact that it is only at a level beneath the signifier that this kind of absolute differentiation holds sway. In contradistinction to Saussurean linguistics, which stresses the fact that a signifier has meaning only in relation to another signifier, he references Jakobson’s idea that signifiers, while contrastive and significantly related, are already constituted as discrete ideational quanta: “Only the phoneme is a purely differential and contentless sign. Its sole… semiotic content is its dissimilarity from all other phonemes” (“Sense” 73).12 This is an important distinction, since for Perelman, the word is already heavily weighted with the values of socially organized meaning, whereas the phoneme is closer to what he describes in his essay as the physical world of “sense” (“Sense” 75). In other words, the perceptual ontology of language, the sonic texture of words, intimately tied to the physical coordination of the vocal apparatus, represents a pre-lexical universe of possible meaning, whose “contentlessness” ensures its status as a “beyond” of the constituted meanings that he hopes to challenge.

     

    Of course, the alterity of the sensate, or the “semiotic,” with respect to the world of socially organized meaning, or the “symbolic,” is anything but pure, and should perhaps be designated as an “intimate alterity,” or extimité, to adopt Jacques-Alain Miller’s term.13 Kristeva’s work provides the most systematic articulation of this dialectic, and its importance has been registered by theorists of the Language movement since its inception. Famously, Kristeva’s chora is a modality of the semiotic which denotes the vocal and kinetic rhythms that primordially articulate instinctual functions “with a view” to their social organization. Kristeva writes:

     

    We emphasize the regulated aspect of the chora: its vocal and gestural organization is subject to what we shall call an objective ordering [ordonnancement], which is dictated by natural or socio-historical constraints such as the biological difference between the sexes or family structure. We may therefore posit that social organization, always already symbolic, imprints its constraint in a mediated form which organizes the chora not according to a law (a term we reserve for the symbolic) but through an ordering. (26-27)

     

    In other words, at the developmental phase when an infant’s instinctual responses are first becoming coordinated through its pre-linguistic interaction with the mother and the family structure, socially regulated symbolic positions are already ordering the infant’s pre-symbolic affective and motor dispositionality. This is important, since it means that the labile, pre-figurative world of the semiotic, which Perelman seeks to draw upon as an absolutely differential reserve of pre-symbolic and purely possible meanings, has already received the impress of symbolic agency, and the socially organized law which is its predicate. Even the semiotic beyond of the symbolic–the fractal world of phonemic distribution, sensorimotor articulation, sound as opposed to meaning–is subject to symbolic regulation, if not symbolic legislation.

     

    In many ways, however, the undecidability of the semiotic, its combined determinacy and indeterminacy, its status as a primordial corollary of the symbolic which is nevertheless irreducible to the symbolic, is precisely what guarantees its value for a contestatory poetics such as Perelman’s. The semiotic emerges as a “moment” of the symbolic, which is somehow in excess of the symbolic–a moment which is therefore immanent in what we “already know,” but which represents the possibility of decomposing and reconfiguring “the known.”

     

    In The Future of Memory and his recent critical work, Perelman is attempting to imagine ways that poetry could mobilize the semiotic with a view to such epistemological shifts. It is well known that for Kristeva, poetry is valuable because in it “the semiotic–the precondition of the symbolic–is revealed as that which also destroys the symbolic” (Revolution 50). In its amplification of the pre-figural rhythms and kinematics of language, poetry offers a glimpse of the dissolution of a symbolic whose unicity has become, in Kristeva’s terminology, “theologized.” This simultaneously sets in motion a process of resignification, in which the semiotic chora is raised to “the status of a signifier” (57), thereby rendering plural and multivalent the meanings that are allowed to accrue to any given constellation of linguistic performances.

     

    It is important to stress this resignificatory moment in Kristeva, since it constitutes the difference between Kristeva’s dialectic of signifiance and what she calls the dérive: the “‘drifting-into-non-sense’… that characterizes neurotic discourse” (51). Likewise, in critical statements that anticipate The Future of Memory‘s strategies, Perelman is very careful to distinguish himself from what one might describe as purely “semiotizing” appropriations of Kristevan thought–ones that concentrate on pure “deterritorialization” and “decoding,” without the complementary re-assertion of emergent identities in what Kristeva calls the “second-degree thetic” (Revolution 50). In reference to the early formulations of poets such as Ron Silliman and Steve McCaffery, George Hartley can point quite casually to the “Reference-Equals-Reification argument” in which thetic signification as such is irremediably aligned with the values of existing ideological meaning-systems (Hartley 34). But far more complicated lines of enquiry into textual politics have been opened up from within the camp of Language poetry itself. Along with Perelman, Barrett Watten is at the forefront of this enquiry, interrogating how it might be possible to refer the moment of resignification beyond the immanence of Kristeva’s textual dialectic, and toward a more “total syntax” which would include a holistic social “situation” as the site of such a reterritorializing agency.14

     

    In an essay entitled “Building a More Powerful Vocabulary: Bruce Andrews and the World (Trade Center),” Perelman engages precisely this debate by focusing on his fellow Language poet’s demand for “‘a structuralist anti-system poetics’… that would disrupt transparent reference” (119). Perelman writes:

     

    Andrews recognizes the problem that his call for such subversion raises. By its processes of interchangeability multinational capital has already produced a radical dislocation of particulars. Marx’s “All that is solid melts into air” can in fact be read as saying that capitalism is constantly blowing up its own World Trade Centers in order to build newer ones. If this is true, then “to call for a heightening of these deterritorializing tendencies may risk a more homogenizing meaninglessness… an ‘easy rider’ on the flood tide of Capital.” (119)

     

    Perelman is quoting from Andrews’s essay, “Constitution / Writing, Language, Politics, the Body,” which builds upon an earlier submission to the seminal “Politics of Poetry” number of L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E, in which Andrews called for a poetics of “subversion”: “an anti-systemic detonation of settled relations, an anarchic liberation of energy flows. Such flows, like libidinal discharges, are thought to exist underneath & independent from the system of language. That system, an armoring, entraps them in codes & grammar.”15 Perelman objects to the Kristevo-Deleuzian rhetoric of libidinal flow and “deterritorialization,” because he holds out hope for a semiotic process that could “join the center and make it more various” (“Building” 128), rather than foreclosing all “investment in present-tense collectivities” (126) in a desemanticizing process dangerously similar to the “flood tide of Capital” which it hopes to contest.

     

    Again, one must note that both Kristeva and Deleuze are more complex than this anarchizing application of them might suggest; every Deleuzian decoding process has “conjunctive synthesis” as its dialectical complement,16 just as every Kristevan encounter with the semiotic drives is completed in its secondary thetic phase. But what Perelman demands we consider much more closely is how a textual practice might intervene in this dialectic in such a way that both its decoding and, most crucially, its recoding moments might embody a process of signifiance which does not merely pluralize meanings according to the expansionist and dispersive logic of capitalist production, but instead might offer a locale in which meanings may be contested in ways that are both determinate and politically transitive. In The Future of Memory, this requires that we go beyond the Kristevan dictum “musicalization pluralizes meanings” (Revolution 65) and instead begin to explore the historical relation of reader to text, the kinds of interpretive agency this relationship makes available, and the possibility that a text’s political semantics may ultimately be evolved in an extra-textual process very different from the historical avant-garde’s ambition to “sublate society into art” (Perelman, Trouble 4).

     

    In fact, The Future of Memory‘s emphasis on political transformations that must occur beyond the text allows Perelman to resolve contradictions that remain aporetic and disabling in his prose work:

     

    If language is made up of units, broken apart as all things are by capitalism, and if nothing new is created beyond the horizon of the phrase or the sentence, then these new, charged units would still depend on capital for energy to band together in momentary transgression…. To avoid this conclusion I think it is necessary to posit… a writer for whom the aesthetic sphere forms an autonomous space. Within this space, however, the notion of political art would be a metaphor if not an oxymoron. (“Building” 130)

     

    Here, Perelman is registering the fear that the “resignificatory” moment that poetic texts make available must derive its coherence and epistemological valence from the larger social meaning-system in which these texts are situated. And unless one is to fall prey to what Peter Middleton calls the “linguistic idealism” inherent in the belief that avant-garde texts punctually and empirically reconstitute this system (Middleton 246), one must confront the proposition that even the most radical recombinative strategies necessarily leave the historical ground of their intelligibility uncontested.

     

    In the above essay, reprinted in the 1996 The Marginalization of Poetry, Perelman’s impossible solution to this problem is to suggest that art could constitute an autonomous meaning-system, capable of challenging the current one without borrowing any of its terms. But such a phantasmal art-practice would necessarily be removed from the contemporary horizon of possible significations in a way that would render it perfectly unintelligible, and thus politically unviable. Notice, however, that in the above passage he allows room for an epistemological contingency that is not generated from an impossibly isolated creative locale, but partakes of a historical process of transformation which is beyond the horizon of merely textual agency. To rephrase Perelman, “if something new is created beyond the horizon” of the text–in other words, if an extra-textual process of social transformation makes available a new organization of socially coded meanings–then the “broken units” of his poetry could be resignified according to the values of a newly emergent meaning-system, and come to express the structures of feeling that predate this system’s concrete practices.17

     

    This sense that a historically futural readership may be able to “charge” Perelman’s text in unforeseeable ways, and that the poet should therefore create enclaves of non-meaning in order to call out to these supplementary futural meanings, is what makes The Future of Memory such a brilliant and strange document of “post-avant-garde” poetic practice. The “memory” of The Future of Memory evokes the text’s ambition to carry the reader back to the pre-semantic level of Kristeva’s semiotic–the shifting territory where social meanings are pluralized and rendered fluid. Kristeva recognizes that meaningful social practice is impossible at this level, and therefore posits the “second-degree thetic,” which represents–at the level of the text and of the social dialectic which it “joins”18–“a completion [finition], a structuration, a kind of totalization of semiotic motility” (51). But The Future of Memory exceeds these formulations by insisting that the practical completion and structuration of the text’s semiotic processes cannot be performed by the text itself. Perelman, one might say, gestures beyond certain kinds of “linguistic idealism” by separating the practices of the text from the practices of society. And yet the responsibility of the text to a larger social dialectic is maintained in Perelman’s sense that poetry should dispose itself toward a collective future, and surrender its meanings over to futural communities whose concrete practices will constitute an extra-textual “thetic” phase in the significatory process.
    This is why The Future of Memory so often offers itself as a kind of unconscious love letter to the future. The final passage from “Symmetry of Past and Future” is an eloquent example of the text’s solicitation of its unknown readers:

     

    Quotation from 'Symmetry of Past and<br />
Future' by Bob Perelman 19

     

    Perelman is giving his love to the material circumstances of his futural readers, lobbing his poem into this unknowable future, in the hope that this world of particulars will confer a social legibility on his text’s illegibilities. It is important that “Symmetry of Past and Future” ends on a note of radical asymmetry, its incomplete final sentence and concluding comma imploring the reader to complete the poem with meanings unavailable to Perelman in his historically prior and epistemologically determinate condition. And as in the first passage we examined from this poem, this determinacy is figured as a form of embodiment here. He seems to be lamenting the fact that a “sense” of possible forms of affective relationality is always rooted in the psycho-somatic constitution of specific historical individuals. If “sense” were somehow capable of emancipating itself from the body, and thus from the various symbolic regulations that express themselves at the somatic level, then one’s sense of possible “social intersection[s]” and “interaction[s]” (Nichols 536) could develop itself in complete freedom from the restrictive symbolic positions which the current social formation has to offer.
    The impossibility of this kind of freedom is indicated by the poet’s sense of his own body as an obstacle. His body represents the fact that “sense” is always an embodied possibility attempting to project itself toward the eternally futural “day” when sense will be able to legislate to itself the terms of its own most primordial constitution–in other words, the utopian day when our affective comportment toward each other will be able to create itself ever anew, without the “obsessive” historical work of symbolic revision and negotiation.

     

    Until that day–“a day that will / never die”–Perelman’s future is “the future of memory.”

     

    Notes

     

    1. In his “Language Poetry and Linguistic Activism,” Peter Middleton draws the connection to Williams by defining Language poetry as an emergent cultural formation, which “cannot fully comprehend itself within the available terms of the pre-existent social order, nor can it be fully comprehended from within that knowledge produced by the dominant order” (Middleton 244).

     

    2. Webster’s New Universal Unabridged Dictionary, Second Edition.

     

    3. The notions of “enunciation” and “time lag” are both derived from Homi Bhabha. In The Location of Culture, Bhabha references Stuart Hall’s use of the “linguistic sign as a metaphor for a more differential and contingent political logic of ideology: ‘The ideological sign is always multi-accentual, and Janus-faced–that is, it can be discursively rearticulated to construct new meanings, connect with different social practices, and position social subjects differently’” (Bhabha 176). Enunciation therefore refers to the process whereby “customary, traditional practices” are resignified in order to express “displacements and realignments that are the effects of cultural antagonisms and articulations–subverting the rationale of the hegemonic moment and relocating alternative, hybrid sites of cultural negotiation” (178). “Time lag” thus refers to the discursive space which opens up between Bhabha’s “hegemonic moment” of the ideological sign and the dialogic, contestatory processes of its “articulation” as discourse, narrative and cultural practice.

     

    4. For example, the terminology of “social meaning-systems” and much of the terminology of this essay is derived from Bruce Andrews’s formulations, esp. the important “Total Equals What: Poetics and Praxis.”

     

    5. Perelman writes: “when everybody understands what it’s saying, the words seem perfectly transparent and it all seems ideal” (“Sense” 67).

     

    6. The conceptual framework for this account of ideology obviously owes much to Althusser’s well-known account of knowledge-production, but the emphasis on negotiation or re-inscription is decidedly post-Althusserian, and is represented most recognizably in recent works such as Tom Cohen’s Ideology and Inscription. In Althusser’s account of the three Generalities, contemporary knowledge-production “always works on existing concepts, ‘Vorstellungen,’ that is, a preliminary Generality I of an ideological nature” (184). However, for Althusser, there is always the possibility that knowledge qua “science” might come to “break with ideology” (191). For Cohen, and the intellectual milieu which guarantees his book’s legibility, this is no longer an option, and epistemological breaks of even the most radical order must be seen as revisionary re-inscriptions of the terms of extant ideology. For Cohen, then, “inscription” refers both to the way in which present knowledge production (Generality II) is determined (inscribed) by previous abstract generalities, and to the way it redefines (inscribes) the terms of this extant “raw material” with a view to the production of new concrete generalities (183). “On the one hand, inscription in this premimetic sense seems encountered as a kind of facticity, as the crypt of some reigning or deterritorialized law, once posited and installed. On the other hand, it is precisely in the non-site of inscription that the possibility of historical intervention and the virtual arise” (Cohen 17). But since the ideological process of “being inscribed” (4) is effective at the deepest levels of our being–in the ways we “narrate” our very “perception and experience” (17), it is difficult to know how and when it is possible for genuine “reinscription” to occur–i.e., the process whereby the “instituted trace-chain is disrupted, suspended” so that “alternatives to programmed historicist models can appear accessed” (17). For Cohen, however, the domain of “the aesthetic” represents a central site of “conceptual remapping,” which “is linked to a programming of the senses by mnemo-inscriptive grids” (11). This emphasis on the pre-figural world of “the senses” and the way in which this world is ideologically “programmed,” resonates very clearly in Perelman’s work, and helps contextualize his own sense of the poem as a site of “conceptual remapping.”

     

    7. Again, the notion of “time-lag” is crucial to this understanding of catachresis: “I have attempted to provide the discursive temporality, or time-lag, which is crucial to the process by which this turning around–of tropes, ideologies, concept metaphors–comes to be textualized and specified in postcolonial agency: the moment when the ‘bar’ of the occidental stereotomy is turned into the coextensive, contingent boundaries of relocation and reinscription: the catachrestic gesture” (Bhabha 184).

     

    8. On ideological “voicing,” see Bhabha’s “Signs Taken for Wonders” in The Location of Culture, especially “the voice of command” (116).

     

    9. In “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious,” Lacan refers to the unconscious as a chain of signifiers which “insists on interfering in the breaks offered it by the effective discourse and the cogitation that it informs” (Lacan 297). However, “effective discourse” refers for Lacan not just to analytic discourse, but more profoundly, to the historically determinate “symbolic form” which it reproduces, and which guarantees its intelligibility (296). I mean to evoke this latter meaning here, whereby effective discourse is understood as an intersubjective knowledge-formation, derived from the historical punctuality of the Symbolic, and representing its various imaginary sedimentations.

     

    10. Kristeva gives this particular valence to the term “un-signifying” in her Revolution in Poetic Language (65). The English term “instinctual,” which I use above, is Strachey’s translation of Freud’s trieblich. However, the naturalistic connotations of the English term risk foreclosing the sense of the drives’ availability to social regulation. Unfortunately, English has no corresponding word for the German evocation of “drive-ly” forces. See J. Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis.

     

    11. Cited from Jonathan Culler, Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism, Linguistics, and the Study of Literature.

     

    12. Cited from Roman Jakobson, Six Lectures on Sound and Meaning.

     

    13. See Jacques-Alain Miller, “Extimité.

     

    14. See Barrett Watten, “Total Syntax: The Work in the World.” Watten’s interventions on this topic are many and various; especially important seems his recent attention to “emergent social meaning,” in which a formal dialectic of romantic particularity and contextual disjunction dynamizes and defamiliarizes a public sphere which is thereby called upon to revise and reformulate itself. See Brito’s “An Interview with Barrett Watten,” in which the private oppositionality of a graffito image is seen as “emerging from a blanketed and negated background into ‘saying something’ it can scarcely recognize” (21). For Watten, this emblematizes poetic practices in which “private language qualifies the public and creates a new ground on which instrumental meanings can be modified and redefined” (21). Also relevant are his recent articles, “The Secret History of the Equal Sign: L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Between Discourse and Text” and “The Constructivist Moment: From El Lissitzky to Detroit Techno.”

     

    15. Bruce Andrews, “Writing Social Work & Political Practice,” L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E 9/10 (Oct. 1979), unpaginated. The quoted passage appears on page 17 of the reprinted essay in Bruce Andrews, Paradise & Method: Poetics and Practice.

     

    16. See Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. In this system, conjunctive synthesis corresponds to a function called the “celibate machine” which denotes the dialectical eventuation of “a new humanity or a glorious organism” (17).

     

    17. This sense of intuited half-meanings which precede concrete practices is expressed in the great paradox of Marx’s introduction to the Grundrisse–i.e., that the simplest categories of politico-economic thought are only conceptually available once they have been complexified as the expression of manifold and juridically mediated concrete relations. For example, possession, in its abstract simplicity, is only available to thought once the complex system of property relations has been constituted as a concrete category in which “possession” denotes a host of possible relations between families, clan groups, masters and servants, etc. And yet, Marx speculates about conditions under which an abstraction may lead an “antediluvian existence” before it has become the expression of fully developed concrete relations (Marx 101). In such a case, “the simple categories are the expressions of relations within which the less developed concrete may have already realized itself before having posited the more many-sided connection or relation which is mentally expressed in the more concrete category” (102). This means that one might posit a moment of emergent simplicity in which liminally concrete relations could find expression only in pre-categorical figurative modes, or what Raymond Williams describes as “structures of feeling” (Williams, esp. 128-135). I would suggest that Perelman’s method takes shape as a self-conscious deployment of precisely such pre-conceptual forms of historical abstraction: forms that “call out” to the futural system of instituted, concrete relations which alone will render their import intelligible.

     

    18. See Revolution in Poetic Language: “And thus, its complexity unfolded by its practices, the signifying process joins social revolution” (61).

     

    19. I retain Perelman’s misspelling of “obsessiveness” in this passage, since this particular “illegibility” radiates poetic value, even in the absence of a readable authorial sanction. Perelman deletes the word in the revised version of the poem which appears in Ten to One: Selected Poems (216).

    Works Cited

     

    • Althusser, Louis. For Marx. Trans. Ben Brewster. New York: Verso, 1969.
    • —. Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays. Trans. Ben Brewster. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971.
    • Andrews, Bruce. “Constitution / Writing, Language, Politics, the Body.” L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E 4 (1981). Ed. Bruce Andrews and Charles Bernstein. Combined issue with Open Letter 5.1 (Winter 1982): 154-165.
    • —. Paradise & Method: Poetics and Praxis. Evanston, IL: Northwestern UP, 1996.
    • —. “Total Equals What: Poetics & Praxis.” Poetics Journal 6 (1986): 48-61.
    • —. “Writing Social Work & Political Practice.” L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E 9/10 (Oct. 1979), unpaginated.
    • Bhabha, Homi. The Location of Culture. London and New York: Routledge, 1994.
    • Brito, Manuel. “An Interview with Barrett Watten.” Aerial 8. Washington, DC: Edge Books, 1995: 15-31.
    • Cohen, Tom. Ideology and Inscription: “Cultural Studies” After Benjamin, de Man, and Bakhtin. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998.
    • Culler, Jonathan. Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism, Linguistics, and the Study of Literature. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1975.
    • Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1983.
    • Jakobson, Roman. Six Lectures on Sound and Meaning. Trans. John Mepham. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978.
    • Hartley, George. Textual Politics and the Language Poets. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1989.
    • Kristeva, Julia. Revolution in Poetic Language. Trans. Margaret Waller. New York: Columbia UP, 1984.
    • Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1977.
    • Laplanche, J. and J.-B. Pontalis. The Language of Psychoanalysis. Trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1973.
    • Marx, Karl. Grundrisse: Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy. Trans. Martin Nicolaus. New York: Penguin Books, 1973.
    • Middleton, Peter. “Language Poetry and Linguistic Activism.” Social Text 8.3-9.1 (1990): 242-53.
    • Miller, Jacques-Alain. “Extimité.Lacanian Theory of Discourse: Subject, Structure, and Society. Ed. Mark Bracher, Marshall Alcorn, Jr., Ronald J. Cortell and Francoise Massardier-Kenney. New York: New York UP, 1994. 74-87.
    • Nichols, Peter. “A Conversation with Bob Perelman.” Textual Practice 12.3 (Winter 1998): 525-43.
    • Perelman, Bob. “Building a More Powerful Vocabulary: Bruce Andrews and the World (Trade Center).” Arizona Quarterly 50.4 (Winter 1994): 117-31. Rpt. in The Marginalization of Poetry: Language Writing and Literary History. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1996. 96-108.
    • —. “The First Person.” Talks: Hills 6/7. Ed. Bob Perelman. San Francisco: Hills, 1980.
    • —. The Future of Memory. New York: Roof Books, 1998.
    • —. The Marginalization of Poetry: Language Writing and Literary History. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1996.
    • —. Primer. Berkeley: This, 1981.
    • —. “Sense.” Writing/Talks. Ed. Bob Perelman. Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL: Southern Illinois UP, 1985. 63-86.
    • —. Ten to One: Selected Poems. Hanover, CT: Wesleyan UP/UP of New England, 1999.
    • —. The Trouble with Genius: Reading Pound, Joyce, Stein, and Zukofsky. Berkeley: U of California P, 1994.
    • Silliman, Ron. The New Sentence. New York: Roof Books, 1985.
    • Silliman, Ron, Carla Harryman, Lyn Hejinian, Steve Benson, Bob Perelman, Barrett Watten. “Aesthetic Tendency And The Politics Of Poetry: A Manifesto.” Social Text 19/20 (Fall 1988): 261-75.
    • Watten, Barrett. “The Constructivist Moment: From El Lissitzky to Detroit Techno.” Qui Parle 11.1 (Winter 1997): 57-100.
    • —. “The Secret History of the Equal Sign: L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Between Discourse and Text.” Poetics Today (Winter 1999): 581-627.
    • —. “Total Syntax: The Work in the World.” Total Syntax. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1985. 65-114. Rpt. in Artifice and Indeterminacy: An Anthology of New Poetics. Ed. Christopher Beach. Tuscaloosa: The U of Alabama P, 1998. 49-69.
    • Williams, Raymond. Marxism and Literature. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1977.

     

  • “Hip Librarians, Dweeb Chic: Romances of the Archive.” A review of Suzanne Keen. Romances of the Archive in Contemporary British Fiction. Toronto: U of Toronto P, 2001.

    Amy J. Elias

    Department of English
    University of Tennessee
    aelias2@utk.edu

     

    Suzanne Keen. Romances of the Archive in Contemporary British Fiction. Toronto: U of Toronto P, 2001.

     

    “Understanding, which separates men from brutes,” writes Suzanne Keen of Edmund Spenser’s The Faerie Queene, “amounts to an enumeration of debts” (69). This statement asserts that in Spenser’s narrative world, comprehension of a state of social reality is possible through something called “understanding”; that such understanding results from uniquely human processes of ratiocination; and that this understanding can be produced only through a comprehensive training of the intellect that includes the study of history, defined as knowledge of the wisdom and ethical questing of previous human generations who have shaped the present. Examining the importance of historical knowledge to Spenser’s work is hardly shocking in the context of Early Modern studies, but encountering a critic who takes Spenser’s position as a starting point for a study of the post-imperial moment in British fiction gives one whiplash. Keen’s Romances of the Archive in Contemporary British Fiction does just this: it asserts that Spenser’s romance begins a tradition that, despite postmodernist countercurrents, remains vigorous and has even gained cultural force in the novels of the last few decades.

     

    This is a (sub)genre study: the genre is the novel, the subgenre is detective fiction (with traces of the historical novel), and the sub-subgenre is the “romance of the archive.” Keen defines seven characteristics of the romance of the archive: it contains character-researchers, endowed with the corporeality and round psychology of the realistic novel; romance adventure stories, in which research features as a kernel plot action, resulting in strong closure, with climactic discoveries and rewards; discomforts and inconveniences suffered in the service of knowledge; sex and physical pleasure gained as a result of questing; settings and locations containing collections of papers; material traces of the past revealing the truth; and evocation of history, looking back from a post-imperial context (63).

     

    The book’s thesis is that there has been a resurgence of interest in sleuthing in contemporary British fiction, but that this sleuthing has taken a special form: academic and non-professional researchers (“questers”) are main characters of novels, and the goal of these characters is to investigate the past through archival research. Their objective is to arrive at some truth about the past, and more often than not, after doing investigative research in libraries or private collections, they do indeed find this previously hidden truth. These “romances of the archive” thus are a traditionalist narrative rejoinder to the proliferation of mid- and late twentieth-century postmodernist experimental fiction. Keen complicates this thesis by arguing that these books form a conservative sub-genre that reflects the need to assert British heritage in the face of England’s traumatic loss of imperial and colonialist status in the late twentieth century. The romance of these novels–their construction of the researcher as “questor” and their frequent assertion through plot construction that it is possible to “seek and find solid facts, incontrovertible evidence, and well-preserved memories of times past”–is what links them to the Spenserian tradition of romance, as well as to detective fiction, gothic fiction, and conspiracy thrillers (à la John Le Carré).

     

    Keen approves of these novels; it is clear throughout the study that she is not sympathetic with postmodernism’s insistent interrogation of cultural metanarratives. She is also distrustful of much recent “theory”: this is not a book participating in the (increasingly self-referential) theoretical conversation about postcolonialism and globalization. In this book, Keen does not feel compelled to make sweeping claims about British culture or global capitalism. She focuses her analysis on specific novels, and while working out the whys and wherefores of this fiction, she keeps theoretical musings to a minimum. The book is tightly focused on literature itself, making claims about literary history and using historical context to reveal rationales for literary construction.

     

    However, Keen avoids being hermetically sealed within a formalist method, for she historicizes this British fiction in the context of post-Suez and post-Falklands political anxiety, debates about the teaching of history in British schools, and the real-world attitudes of contemporary British writers toward their homeland, toward history, and toward narrative. In her analysis of Peter Ackroyd’s work, she quotes from his papers, housed at the Beinecke Library at Yale University; when making claims about British history as an area study today, she quotes from documents relating contemporary controversies in England concerning the National Curriculum for History. Her twenty-one page bibliography attests to her fastidious research. Clearly, Keen has the kind of archival sensibility that she identifies in her subject. Romances of the Archive is itself a “romance of the archive” in many ways, a tour de force of literary criticism that assumes that answers can be found through the practice of rational critical investigation.

     

    Keen recognizes that “even the fluffiest romances of the archive” are freighted with “political visions of contemporary Britain and its relation to its past” (60). While novels such as Barry Unsworth’s Sugar and Rum and Sacred Hunger complicate and criticize the British past, novels such as Peter Ackroyd’s Chatterton reveal “a fundamental romanticism” about history that values connections between the present and the past. At the other side of the continuum, a novel such as A.S. Byatt’s Possession defends British heritage against a postmodern attack on history. Thus these romances of the archive run the gamut from postmodernist critique to neo-conservative assertion of nationalist history. These

     

    romances of the archive...show fictional characters endeavouring to come to terms with a British past unexpurgated of its rough patches. Gravitating to the gaps in school history, revisiting glorious episodes with a critical eye, and attempting to recuperate heritage sensations from periods rendered inert or shameful by academicians, romancers of the archive enact and criticize their culture's fascination with the uses of the past. (109)

     

    Yet in the final analysis, Keen asserts, many of these contemporary British novels are epistemologically traditionalist, overtly supporting modern humanist values and repudiating the supposed “crisis in history”: “they unabashedly interpret the past through its material traces; they build on a foundation of ‘documentarism,’ answering the postmodern critique of history with invented records full of hard facts” (3). In addition, these novels often are politically conservative, reviving a Whig interpretation of history and rebuilding a nationalist pride in Britishness. While she has sympathy with their support of modern rationalism, Keen is much more skeptical and critical of these novels’ defensiveness about the British national past. With touches of acerbic wit, she often points out their ideological contradictions. For example, when discussing Byatt’s Possession, which pits theory-sodden and status-seeking American academics against English amateur researchers in a race to find valuable historical documents, she notes that Byatt writes as if British heritage were at stake: the amateur British sleuths represent pure, disinterested research that will serve as the basis of true British history and autonomy, both threatened by American materialism and cultural imperialism. Byatt therefore “plays the heritage card in defence of literary history. When she invokes the competing literature of American and postcolonial writers, Byatt places Britain and British writing in the sympathetic role of underdog. The fact that British libraries and museums still contain treasure troves gathered from around the world lies concealed, for Byatt does not invite closer scrutiny of the imperial history of collecting and acquisition” (60).

     

    Keen is right to note that the Right’s attitudes toward the “postmodernists” closely resemble those found in romances of the archive: that is, they construct a new arena for the ancients vs. the moderns debate, pitting postmodernism against the keepers of the culture (what Keen would call the heritage preservationists). While in the 1980s this conservative contingent railed against secular humanists in the academy, in the 1990s and later they tended to decry the ascendancy of the “postmoderns,” who strip secular humanism of its utopian social action agendas and even of its basic assumptions about human agency, reality, truth, and meaning.

     

    What Keen doesn’t consider as deeply is that these novels critique and re-present not just a politically conservative need to assert British heritage over academic history, but also the turn toward history and archival research in academic theory since the 1970s. Great Britain played a large role in the genesis of this trend. Fueled by the events of 1968, the turn to history was indebted to an influx of ideas from outlets such as the New Left Review; the growth of cultural studies at the Birmingham Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies (founded in 1964) under the influence of, first, social science inquiry and then, later, the Marxist work of Louis Althusser and the cultural studies work of Stuart Hall; and the cultural materialist work of Raymond Williams. Combined with the development of New Historicism and neo-Marxist (or poststructuralist Marxist) theories in the U.S. and the general “crisis in history” perceived in all disciplines but especially in history, the post-1960s academy on both sides of the Atlantic has fueled ferocious debates about history and repeatedly advocated that we return to it as the wellspring of understanding. In its poststructuralist forms, this theoretical return to history has implied that we can get some “truth” about history from our archival research, even if that truth is the truth about historical contingency. For Marxist theorists, this is not an implication but an imperative: Fredric Jameson’s injunction to “Always historicize!” asserts that there is a point to historical research, that digging in the archives leads to some real revelation about the past that is provisional only in the sense that it may be incomplete. Keen is justifiably skeptical about the ultimate significance of what transpires in the arcane world of academic theory. But this turn to history in influential British academic centers such as the Birmingham Center clearly needs to be credited with a certain real impact, not only in Britain but in universities throughout the world. And it needs, as well, to be differentiated from the “postmodernist perspectives on history” that Keen constructs as the antithesis of archival romance.

     

    As the notion of an acting self was increasingly attacked by the notion of the constructed subject in post-1960s linguistic and Foucauldian theories, Marxist and other social justice theories scrambled to find a way to repudiate or modify the idea of social determinism of the psyche without relinquishing the idea of the economic and/or cultural determinism of lived experience. As the century drew to a close, even the more linguistic or seemingly formalistic strains of poststructuralism had turned back to the problem of self and ethics, worrying the paradox of (historically situated) ethical action in the face of subject construction. The Left was turning to history with a vengeance and puzzling out its own theoretical self-contradictions as a result. The confusing result was often that both the Left and the Right attacked postmodernism as the bogeyman of history and social justice (the Left calling it fascist and the Right calling it nihilist). Postmodernist theory became the Other to both sides of the political spectrum in the “theory wars.” The relationships among the turn to a traditional belief in history in romances of the archive, the coterminous return to a belief in historical research in academic Leftist theory, and the demand for a return to history by the conservative Right on both sides of the Atlantic could be elucidated a good deal more clearly in this study.

     

    Keen’s book, however, not only gives useful readings of specific works of fiction but also posits a social significance for the rise of this particular subgenre at this particular moment in British history. Keen discusses fiction by Julian Barnes, A.S. Byatt, Penelope Lively, Barry Unsworth, Peter Ackroyd, Kingsley Amis, Lindsay Clarke, Lawrence Norfolk, Nigel Williams, P.D. James, Robert Harris, Peter Dickinson, Margaret Drabble, Alan Hollinghurst, Adam Mars-Jones, Robert Goddard, Stevie Davies, Derek Walcott, Keri Hulme, Amitav Ghosh, and Bharati Mukherjee. A dual focus on technique and thematic subject leads her to interesting linkages. For example, she links detective fiction to romance through their shared “questing for truth,” a claim that runs counter to many studies of detective fiction that regard it as the genre most aligned with realism and modernity, particularly in its assumptions that deductive logic and humanist values can solve the puzzles of the universe. The romance of the archive incorporates detective fiction’s rationalist questing but adds to it romance’s “theological, political, and personal frames of reference for making moral and ethical judgments about human behaviour” (157). For example, in her chapter “Envisioning the Past,” Keen discusses novels that scrutinize the archival past to re-evaluate expectations of gender roles and sexual orientation and concludes that these novels tend toward the uncanny and a libidinal narrative experimentation. In the last chapter, “Postcolonial Rejoinders,” she unflinchingly discusses how English writers often display a “nostalgia, defensiveness, and anxiety” about British colonial history that includes “regret about Britain’s decline in global status and annoyance at the complaints of postcolonial subjects” (215). These writers, she believes, attempt to manage the anxieties of the post-Falklands decades by offering a “reassertion of British glory” (230).

     

    Keeping her focus tightly trained on realist literature and British literary history, Keen observes the psychology of contemporary British writers often ignored by critics trained on avant-garde or postcolonial fiction. Keen offers a study of the British realist novel in a post-imperial age, a discussion of the mainstream center rather than the postcolonial border. Her book is written clearly (this is a critical study that undergraduate students could actually read and understand) and could be used as the basis for a special topics course on contemporary British fiction, particularly in this subgenre. Romances of the Archive is a nuanced account of contemporary British fiction that analyzes the way that romances of the archive are indeed romances, incorporating presentism, antiquarianism, and humanist (even theological) values. What Keen’s own archival and critical quest has revealed–essentially, a new mode of literary nationalism–certainly deserves our further attention.

     

  • Adorno Public and Private

    Steven Helmling
    University of Delaware
    English Department
    helmling@UDel.Edu

    A review of:

    • Adorno, T.W. History and Freedom: Lectures 1964-1965. Ed. Rolf Tiedemann. Trans. Rodney Livingstone. Cambridge: Polity, 2006.
    • —. Letters to His Parents: 1939-1951. Ed. Christoph Gödde and Henri Lonitz. Trans. Wieland Hoban. Cambridge: Polity, 2006.
    • —, and Thomas Mann. Correspondence 1943-1955. Ed. Christoph Gödde and Thomas Sprecher. Trans. Nicholas Walker. Cambridge: Polity, 2006.
    • Gerhardt, Christina, ed. “Adorno and Ethics.” Special issue of New German Critique 97 (Winter 2006).

    When students excited by “The Culture Industry” or some other Adorno reading ask how to get a larger grip on Adorno overall, I finally have a good answer: History and Freedom, Adorno’s previously unpublished 1964-1965 lectures at Frankfurt. There are now several of these collections: in the 1960s, tape recorders were usually running when Adorno was speaking; and these lectures, addressed (from notes but without script) to undergraduates, are far more accessible than the self-consciously “difficult” writings addressed to fellow-adepts. Buzz on these lectures always mentions that they were given while Adorno was composing Negative Dialectics; History and Freedom is among the collections that can be read as a collateral draft of parts of that “late” work. Actually History and Freedom reprises Adorno’s whole career: the lectures continue the argument of Dialectic of Enlightenment (the opening lecture is called “Progress or Regression?”); along the way, two lectures elaborate the crucial early essay, “The Idea of Natural History,” and no fewer than four extend the hints in “The Actuality of Philosophy” on “the transition from philosophy to interpretation.” All of Adorno’s major career investments are here except “the aesthetic”: there are, indeed, many asides on art especially in the lectures on interpretation, but “the aesthetic” connects with the main theme mostly via Hegel’s “end of art.”
     

    Oh, yes: Hegel. Hegel’s ubiquity in Adorno and Adorno’s conflictedness about him are evident even to beginners, but hitherto it needed hard-won expertise to discriminate Adorno’s near-idolatry of Hegel from his often angry critique of him. By contrast, History and Freedom compels Adorno to engage systematically with the major Hegelian themes: the [historicized] dialectic, universal and particular, identity and non-identity, objectivity and subjectivity, self-consciousness (both individual and collective), the World Spirit, the Absolute, conscience and law, race and nation. (Short version of the critique: Hegel too often ontologizes or absolutizes one term of a binary pair, thus reifying what he, of all people, should have kept fluid and “dialectical”; worse, Hegel’s lapse into this error is always in favor of the “universal” and against the “particular,” for the master and against the slave.) When Adorno mentions (without quoting) some “famous” remark from Hegel (or whomever), Rolf Tiedemann’s expert notes quote generously from the relevant sources, with invariably helpful comment–and, often, instructive pointers to dissonances with Adorno’s other writings. (Adorno here also gives his most straightforward evaluation of Kant.)
     

    Advanced students, too, will find this collection (more than any of Adorno’s other lecture collections) a thrilling read, because even improvising for undergraduates, Adorno’s thinking aloud produces a Niagara of insight and provocation that overloads the most diligent attention. Adorno’s power to “ram every rift with ore” is as striking here as anywhere in his oeuvre. I have said this book is more accessible than Adorno’s “finished” prose; it is often more stirring as well, because more spontaneous and digressive, as well as more passionate in venting Adorno’s vibrant indignation at the course of the world, reprising and updating his chronic anxieties “after Auschwitz” and after Hiroshima.
     

    Here as in Dialectic of Enlightenment Adorno diagnoses the devolution of “spirit” from Hegel’s dialectical joining of spirit and matter “objectively” (anticipating dialectical materialism) to positivism’s dichotomizing of the two, which renders “spirit” merely “subjective,” the disvalued term of an antithesis. In the problem of universal and particular Adorno elicits the agon of history and the individual. “Philosophy of History” in the West has presupposed “universal history”–an idealist and reifying concept that Adorno of course historicizes to yield the heuristic of a “technological rationality” which may usefully be staged as a single story, that of the “progress” from slingshot to atom bomb–with “progress” pointedly in scare-quotes. Technology promises universal mastery over nature even as it reduces millions of particular suffering individuals to servitude. “Domination” (Herrschaft) as universal “master” produces the “dominated” as particular “slave.” History promises universal freedom, but delivers instead universal compulsion, unfreedom.
     

    In the final third of the course, Adorno pursues “Antinomies of Freedom” not anticipated in Dialectic of Enlightenment, often eliciting psychoanalytic overtones. “Enlightenment” since Spinoza has held that happiness is living “in accordance with Reason,” but even apart from the “dialectic of Enlightenment” sketched above, some obdurately bodily “impulse” intuits freedom as archaic and primordial, and thus irreconcilably at odds with administered modernity. Reason becomes the opposite of happiness, that chancy state that ratio can never “rationalize.” (Both German Glück and English “hap”-piness connect etymologically to chance or [good] luck.) The body experiences happiness as freedom from reason, freedom of and for “impulse” itself–a word whose connotations of irrationality Adorno charges with utopian voltages. Oddly, Adorno doesn’t cite the distinction, posited by his erstwhile Oxford colleague Isaiah Berlin, of “positive freedom” (freedom to participate in political life), as against “negative freedom” (freedom from unnecessary social constraints). But here as elsewhere Adorno’s thematic of “ego weakness” converts Nietzsche’s warnings about “the last man” from a portent for the future to a present condition, and in ways that resonate richly with Lacan and Zizek on the ways we learn to love our unhappiness. Adorno himself almost yields at moments to the premise that consciousness enlarges fruitfully only under the sting of unhappiness, though obviously the lectures as a whole assimilate freedom to happiness, however “broken” this “promise.” But in the closing lectures, a critique of Kant’s coercive categorical imperative, another universal master by which the individual is condemned (in Sartre’s phrase) to freedom, the “somatic impulse” of happiness has its analogue in morality as well, thus opening at least the possibility of a happy and moral futurity, a “not yet” worthy to be called “history.”

     
    In his “Foreword ” to History and Freedom, Rolf Tiedemann observes that for Adorno, “freedom” is a problem “in the philosophy of history, rather than in moral philosophy where it has traditionally been found” (xvi). I cite the point by way of an introduction of the Winter 2006 New German Critique special issue on “Adorno and Ethics.” Adorno’s acid comment that “ethics” is “the bad conscience of morality” is a slam at ethics and morality both–he goes on to speak of “the blunt incompatibility of our experience with the term ‘morality’” (Problems 10)–and in History and Freedom, he asks whether good and evil can still mean anything for us, living as we do “[in] a kind of infernal reflection of the utopia of which Nietzsche had dreamt” in Beyond Good and Evil (History and Freedom 207). Almost half the New German Critique articles don’t address ethics at all; those that do mostly project ethics as a high ideal that “we” continually fail, especially “after Auschwitz,” to live up to. (“We” professionals? “We” practitioners of critique? “We” whose professional ethic should be to gag at the very phrase “professional ethics”?) The New German Critique ethicists fret over “the very possibility of an ethics,” finding (of course) for impossibility, and duly lamenting it. The problematizations are subtle and scrupulous, but they skirt the problem Adorno rubs raw, the corruption and illegitimacy of “ethics” at large. After Auschwitz?–no; since long before Auschwitz, and as cause, not as effect: after “administration,” doing ethics has become barbaric.
     

    The “ethics” essays are led off by J.M. Bernstein’s “Intact and Fragmented Bodies: Versions of Ethics ‘After Auschwitz’.” Bernstein identifies four “lacunae” in Adorno’s attempt at a “philosophical” response to the Shoah, and finds these deficits supplied by Agamben’s Remnants of Auschwitz, “almost as if Agamben’s book were designed to fill in the missing arguments in Adorno’s account” (33). Besides Agamben, Bernstein takes bearings from Primo Levi and Hannah Arendt (a footnote explains that the essay is part of a larger attempt to reconcile Arendt and Adorno [35n7]); another waypoint is Foucault’s “modernity as biopolitics”–the claim not merely to power over subject populations, but of “administrative” sovereignty over biological process as such. Hence the “administrative” drive, in the camps, to reduce the inmates to “living dead”: to kill individuality and moral agency in advance of killing the “mere” physical bodies. Bernstein rewrites a famous sentence in the Dialectic of Enlightenment, putting “biopower” where the original had “enlightenment”: “biopower is mythical fear radicalized” (40, adapting the Jephcott trans. 11). Hence if Agamben’s account of “domination” is more philosophically coherent than Adorno’s, this achievement proves to be self-discrediting. “Biopolitics” requires a constitutive distinction of reason from bios, and in deconstructing this binary Bernstein shows that Agamben’s critique of it actually preserves its kernel of domination (reason as master, bios as slave). Thus does Agamben’s ethical argument compromise the very possibility of an ethics. Adorno partisans will think this a satisfying result, but it raises the question, Why adduce Agamben at all?–since the terms in which Bernstein sets up his argument are drawn rather from Arendt. Presumably Agamben is a foil for Arendt, setting the terms for Bernstein’s projected Arendt/Adorno rapprochement. Bernstein defaults to the Adorno premise that a properly philosophical response to the Shoah must resist the “dialectic of enlightenment” dynamic of domination. In Adorno, that means (at minimum) a response that owns affect, and on that ground, surely, Arendt is closer to Adorno than to Agamben. I can’t guess whether Bernstein’s pursuit of his theme will traverse the question of “philosophy and literature,” but his evocation of Primo Levi (in a moving passage from The Drowned and the Saved) seems a promising, if oblique nod toward “the aesthetic.”
     

    Bernstein’s article is followed by Michael Marder’s “Minima Patientia: Reflections on the Subject of Suffering,” an eloquent inquiry, in implicit dialogue with Bernstein, into how, if at all, “we,” the living, can witness for the six million dead–questions that generate discussion of “ethics” and/as memory. Christina Gerhardt’s “The Ethics of Animals in Adorno and Kafka” reviews Adorno’s treatment of cruelty to animals, the relevant contexts from Kantian “Reason” (in which animals figure simply as the not-rational) to Freud’s account of totemism (which uncovers telling cathexes of animals in the unconscious), and Schopenhauer. The essay is more a survey than a critical discussion: the account of Kafka, for instance, makes nothing of the affective distance between the stories functioning within the “animal fable” paradigm (the ape of “Report to an Academy,” the dog of the “Investigations”) and that wholly original ordeal of guilty revulsion, “The Metamorphosis.” Alexander Garcia Düttmann, in “Adorno’s Rabbits; or, Against Being in the Right,” mounts impressive indignation on Adorno’s behalf against recent culture-wars detractors in the German press, and re-enacts Adorno’s protest against “domination” in all its forms (cognitive, affective, material, economic), in the proposition that “Being right . . . is not an ethical category”: insofar as philosophy is invested in being right, so much the worse, ethically, for philosophy.

    The richest of the “ethics” essays is Robert Kaufman’s “Poetry’s Ethics? Theodor W. Adorno and Robert Duncan on Aesthetic Illusion and Sociopolitical Delusion.” Kaufman floats free of the straitening scruples of “philosophy” to demonstrate that “Poetry’s ethics”–the aesthetic at large–dramatizes the conflicting claims of is and ought “rather than, as might seem to be required in philosophy itself, abstractly deciding between them” (77). Kaufman is a professor of literature, with joint appointments in English and German; he offers close readings of key passages, almost always citing (and discussing) the German text as well as the translation, beginning with the first “after Auschwitz” quote and Adorno’s many variant restatements of it throughout the ensuing controversy. “Lyric” is a focus for Kaufman–references to his other articles suggest a book in progress–because lyric, untrammeled by the burdens of narrative and character, epitomizes one extreme of aesthetic “semblance,” a mimesis that maintains a dialectical non-identity with what it ostensibly offers a semblance of. A “semblance,” in short, that refuses “adaequatio” conceptions of representation, can “keep the difference” between (the terms of Kaufman’s title) “aesthetic illusion,” which “keeps determination and ethical possibility open for exploration,” and the “sociopolitical delusion” that “the poem itself is already an ethical or political act” (118).

     
    Kaufman writes and argues with a daring that accepts the challenge of Adorno’s dictum (which he quotes [92]) that “The prudence that restrains us from venturing too far ahead in a sentence, is usually only an agent of social control, and so of stupefaction” (Minima Moralia 86). He pursues, for example, the “poetry is barbaric” meme via the “homeopathic” twists of “immanent critique,” to the point of turning Adorno’s initial scorn of a certain genteel denial of twentieth-century barbarism into a justification of an unflinching poetry of shock, of “semblance”-barbarism like Paul Celan’s. (A two-page coda features Duncan’s poem, “A Song From the Structures of Rime Ringing as the Poet Paul Celan Sings.”) Most daringly of all, Kaufman shares a story told him by his father, an Auschwitz survivor–and then interprets it, in just the way Agamben et al. would insist that “we,” whose witness can never be “authentic,” mustn’t do. On Kaufman’s (as on Adorno’s) showing, poetry’s ethics prove more flexible, more open, more ethical indeed, than philosophy’s; but Kaufman makes explicit the “ultimate [ethical] concern” (to recall Adorno’s under-acknowledged early mentor, Paul Tillich) that Adorno refused to declare in so many words. (As in the famous Hemingway passage about the words we don’t use anymore, refusal of the word attests commitment to the thing.)

     
    Kaufman’s emphasis on Adorno’s language segues conveniently to two articles that touch on Adorno’s implicit “philosophy of language.” Gerhard Richter, in “Aesthetic Theory and Nonpropositional Truth Content in Adorno,” replies to Rüdiger Bubner’s indignant refusal of Adorno’s ethicizing (so to speak) of the aesthetic. Richter argues the case by reading the last section of Minima Moralia with close attention to the German and with many instructive dissents from the standard translation by Edmund Jephcott. As in Kaufman, Adorno’s “non-propositional” truth-claim refuses “adaequatio” in favor of a Messianically-tinted “mimesis of what does not yet exist, the negative traces of a futurity that can be neither predicted nor programmed in advance but that nevertheless inscribe themselves into the artwork and into the philosophy that enters a relation with that artwork, as a nonidentical and negatively charged otherness” (Richter 129).
     

    Samir Gandesha defends Adorno in “The ‘Aesthetic Dignity of Words’: Adorno’s Philosophy of Language” against Habermas’s charge that Adorno remains stuck in a “philosophy of consciousness” by appealing to what he considers Adorno’s implicit philosophy of language. The argument is based on Adorno’s early “Theses on the Language of the Philosopher,” which Gandesha and Michael Palamarek have translated for the first time, in a forthcoming University of Toronto volume, Adorno and the Need in Philosophy. (The translation is not included here.) Adorno writes that “all philosophical critique today is possible as the critique of language,” a dictum that Gandesha calls “programmatic for his philosophy as a whole” (139) and that he connects with the early Wittgenstein’s adviso that “all philosophy is critique of language” (Tractatus 4.0031). He likewise assimilates Horkheimer and Adorno’s diagnosis of the “entwinement of myth and enlightenment” to the later Wittgenstein’s campaign against the “bewitchment” of thought by language. Gandesha’s effort (in which the defense against Habermas recedes) is to situate Adorno vis-à-vis not only Wittgenstein early and late but also vis-à-vis Heidegger, by the light (mostly) of the contemporaneous “Idea of Natural History” (in which Heidegger is the implicit adversary) and “Actuality of Philosophy” (in which it’s the Vienna-circle Wittgenstein). As for the later Wittgenstein, Gandesha finds unacknowledged rapprochement in “The Essay as Form” and in “Words from Abroad.” But Gandesha passes over Adorno’s dissents from Wittgenstein on clarity and on remaining silent, and from Wittgenstein’s adherence, early and late, to the “adaequatio” ideal, which would rule out critical negation (Kaufman’s “semblance,” Richter’s “mimesis”). Adorno does not share Wittgenstein’s aspiration to “leave everything as it was.”
     

    I come at last to the two essays that come first in the New German Critique special issue. Detlev Claussen, in “Intellectual Transfer: Theodor W. Adorno’s American Experience,” wants to overturn the received view of the “mandarin” Adorno holding his nose through his forced exile in vulgar America. This meme is in the air, as witness David Jenemann’s Adorno in America (U of Minnesota P, 2007)–but whereas the American Jenemann stays modest in his claims, to avoid any appearance of grabby over-reach, Claussen, a German, stages the “American Adorno” as an affront to his countrymen, who take their proprietary title to Adorno too complacently for granted. “Simply put: without America, Adorno would never have become the person we recognize by that name” (6). Indeed, he might not have adopted that name; Claussen’s freshest suggestion is that Adorno dropped “Wiesengrund” (in 1942 in California) not to minimize his Jewishness (the usual conjecture) but to downplay his Germanness. (But see below.) Claussen overstates his case regarding Adorno’s absorption of American social-science research methods: Adorno’s indictments of positivism and empiricism, early and late, attest that his work on Paul Lazarsfeld’s Radio Project and The Authoritarian Personality only intensified his disdain of quantitative “research.” Perhaps Claussen argues the point more persuasively in his recent (as yet untranslated) 2003 biography, but as a short essay, the case seems more a provocative “exaggeration” than a worked-out attempt to convince.

     
    Martin Jay’s “Taking on the Stigma of Inauthenticity: Adorno’s Critique of Genuineness” is less concerned to rehearse (again) Adorno’s critique of Heidegger, Jaspers, et al., than to pursue subtle contrasts between Adorno and Walter Benjamin on, e.g., “aura.” The famous peroration of Benjamin’s “Mechanical Reproduction” essay–where fascism aestheticizes politics, communism politicizes art–is usually taken proscriptively; hence Adorno’s differences with Benjamin on “aura” (etc.) have been extensively discussed, but almost always on political grounds. Jay is alert to the politics, most interestingly with the suggestion that “authenticity” as a subtext of fascist racism prompted Adorno and Benjamin to valorize “the stigma of inauthenticity” (Jay adapts his title from Minima Moralia 154) on behalf of those condemned in Nazi-speak as “rootless cosmopolitans.” But by coming at these issues via “authenticity,” Jay illuminates the aestheticization sustaining that fetish. Especially illuminating is Jay’s articulation of “authenticity” with “mimesis.” As a conformity-imperative on behalf of authenticity, mimesis simply is ideology; but Jay also discerns along lines similar to Richter’s and Kaufman’s (above) a critical and negative mimesis that foregrounds its dissonance from “what is,” thus (in Jay’s words) “resisting identity thinking and the preponderance of the subject over the object,” and promoting a “passive receptivity that avoided domination of otherness” (21). To that extent mimesis has the potential to function not as the repetition but as the critique of “what is,” and not despite its “inauthenticity” but because of it. Hence the stakes in “taking on the stigma of inauthenticity.” (Jay also confronts a contradiction most commentators ignore: for all his sneers at “authenticity,” Adorno can evoke it honorifically in praise of artworks that realize these critical potentials. Jay deftly explains the terminological aspects of the question–i.e., the range of terms that English translates as “authenticity”: Authentizität, Eigentlichkeit, Echtheit–without reducing it to them.)

     
    I picked up the Adorno-Mann correspondence expecting light on the Doctor Faustus collaboration, and I salivated over the early letter in which Mann woos Adorno, explaining what kind of novel he has in mind, and what kind of help he wants, but the actual work took place in real time when Mann and Adorno lived within easy reach of each other in Los Angeles, and by page 18 Doctor Faustus is already in print. (There are appendices reprinting Adorno’s two memos on how to characterize particular works by “Adrian Leverkuhn,” Mann’s composer-protagonist; these are apparently the principal documentary remains of the collaboration.) The reviews and controversies following Faustus‘s publication prompt some interesting exchanges, but the interest of these letters lies elsewhere. (I place Schoenberg’s pique at Mann’s novel, whose protagonist is credited with the dodecaphonic system Schoenberg himself invented, among the “elsewhere.”) Mann and Adorno exchange worries about the emerging Cold War; about Germany’s “recovery” from the war, especially its numbed and, both agreed, morally deficient posture toward (or away from) the genocide; about the German future and the question of their own return (or not) to Germany. Mann swore never to return; when he finally left California, it was to end his days in Switzerland. Adorno’s 1949 Frankfurt University stint as visiting lecturer was intended as a reconnaissance, but receptive students, a sense of duty as a public intellectual, and his unforeseen home-coming emotions (not to mention the rise of HUAC and McCarthy in America) started him thinking of returning for good. His first letter from Frankfurt to Mann makes a rich complement to the one he wrote his mother (see below).

     
    Throughout, Mann and Adorno are exchanging current work: on Adorno’s side, Philosophy of New Music (Mann had read the Schoenberg sections in draft while writing Faustus, but the Stravinsky sections were new to him), Against Epistemology, In Search of Wagner, and numerous essays, reviews, radio talks, etc. Mann sent along The Holy Sinner, The Black Swan, and drafts of Felix Krull, as well as various essays and lectures. The back-and-forth, as each comments on the other’s latest work, is intellectual exchange of a very high caliber. (The extensive discussion of Wagner [92-7] is particularly rich.) There is, however, almost no disagreement between these two, and such differences as there are, they express in the mildest possible terms. Mann was ever the canny literary diplomat, but an Adorno who pulls his punches is something new.
     

    Here is the largest interest (or guiltiest pleasure?) of these letters, the keyhole they open onto the personal relations of these two. For Mann, Adorno is (initially) an intellectual whose musical expertise he needs and whose continuing allegiance he wants; his praises of Adorno’s works can feel more than a little overdone. It helps, of course, that Adorno is an admirer from the beginning. Adorno, for his part, finds himself dealing for once with more than an equal: with a great and politically committed literary artist and cultural icon. (Mann’s Nobel came in 1929, when Adorno was 26.) Mann clearly had, and kept, the upper hand. Adorno saw that association with Mann could greatly boost his own prestige. Doesn’t Adorno compromise principle (not to say, make his own Faustian bargain) in agreeing to serve Mann’s basic premise–Schoenberg as the proto-Nazi Faust?–for Adorno thought Schoenberg the preeminent modernist good guy; wouldn’t he have preferred a Wagner-like protagonist for Mann’s Faustus? or a Stravinskian “reactionary” (see Philosophy of New Music)? Mann’s view of Wagner was aesthetic (à la early Nietzsche) rather than political; insofar as Mann and Adorno both took bearings from Freud, Mann sees Wagner as aesthetically potent in ways Freud helps confirm, Adorno as ideologically symptomatic in ways Freud helps diagnose. In any case, when Mann announces that he is writing a memoir about the composition of Faustus, Adorno is thrilled that his backstage role will get a curtain call, a prospect Mann played up while the book (Story of a Novel) was in progress. In the event, Adorno would be disappointed: Mann’s praise was fulsome, but (Adorno thought) understated his contribution. And of course Adorno had to swallow his spleen; he could never confess to Mann how slighted he felt.1
     

    Mann, as accredited culture-hero, can address Adorno with magisterial aplomb; Adorno, by contrast, is as usual (indeed, more than usual) anxious to dazzle. Story of a Novel isn’t the only case in which Mann seems almost to toy with the feelings of his admirer; consider also the issue of Mann’s “modernism.” Mann was a touchstone of modernism for Adorno; of anti-modernism for Adorno’s adversary in debate, Lukács–so of course Adorno sought to win the protean, shape-shifting Mann to the “modernist” side, away from the Lukácsean “demand for realism” (103). This push-pull is the subtext of a late exchange that begins when Mann confides his despair over Felix Krull, a comical picaresque of horny youth he had left unfinished decades earlier; resuming it now, at age 77, alas! he can’t find the right style, is uncertain of his genre, can’t reconcile the conflicts…. The letter is clearly fishing for encouragement, and Adorno is positively gallant in response: Mann’s past accomplishment has brilliantly reinvented genres, evaded the old-fashioned “will to style,” drawn power from dramatizing, not reconciling, tensions–assurances, of course, encoding an undeclared manifesto for (Mann’s) modernism. You can’t help imagining Mann’s Mona Lisa smile when, in a later letter, he shakes his head over Waiting for Godot in terms Lukács would applaud (“I cannot help feeling some anxiety for the society that finds acclaimed expression in such a work,” etc. [107]).
     

    The head-games are of an altogether different kind in Adorno’s Letters to His Parents. To his public, Adorno was a virtuoso of unhappy consciousness; en famille, he’s a virtuoso of cheery exuberance–allowing that “virtuoso” connotes a certain willfulness. To his parents Adorno ever remained the adored only child, the star family performer and perpetual center of attention–but in these letters, Adorno must keep everyone’s spirits up during a maximally anxious period: the flight from Nazism and adjustment to a new and exigent life in a strange land. There is almost too much to discuss here, so let me simply list some principal interests of these letters. First, the candor and Gemütlichkeit of the family atmosphere: the abundant endearments and pet-names; gossip about family and fellow exiles; health complaints; and anxieties about the fate of dear ones (and property) left in Europe. Adorno’s parents devotedly read all their son’s work, and when (just once), the assiduousness falls short, Adorno’s protest is plaintive and loud–“Though . . . I can also understand that your weary old heads want to have some peace . . . Even the simplest things in life are just so damned dialectical” (165). Adorno’s father was the intellectual parent, and intellectual interest falls off after his death (8 July 1946), to which Adorno reacts with a classic, and eloquent, spasm of survivor guilt (258-59) well worth comparison to his published meditations on the Shoah.
     

    To his mother, Adorno confesses his erotic turmoils–three of them: one, the disquieting reappearance of an old flame; one a heady but harmless infatuation with a charismatic beauty; and one a full-blown (but unserious) infidelity. If you only browse this book, don’t miss letter #83, a comic masterpiece in which Adorno boasts of his smitten-ness and of the charms of the sublime object, which are such as to arouse the cloddish hoi polloi to envy and hatred–“just like our theoretical writings” (139)! (Greta’s reaction to these adventures is not recorded here.)
     

    Another fascination is Adorno’s running commentary on war news–e.g., the first letter after 1 Sept. 1939 swings between foreboding and sarcasm, in anxious hope that the whole thing may prove a drôle de guerre and end quickly. There is no reaction at all to Pearl Harbor, though America’s entry into the war had been a consummation devoutly to be wished. By late 1943 Adorno has become unrealistically optimistic about victory, consistently underestimating how long it would take, even as he remains apprehensive about fascist currents in America. We glimpse the effects of “enemy alien” restrictions: curfew (monitored by unannounced drop-ins from police); miles-from-home limits; travel permits from the FBI; worries about possible “evacuation” (i.e., internment). To his father Adorno blames his name-change (the loss of the patronymic Wiesengrund) on a stupid bureaucratic error.
     

    These letters also give a vivid sense of the collaborative relationship with Horkheimer, especially of the degree to which Adorno was the one who set the words on paper, not only in their co-authored work but in much that is credited to Horkheimer alone, which Adorno edited, revised, rewrote–ghost-wrote, to put it no more strongly. Adorno briefs his parents on the inception and progress of what would eventually become Dialectic of Enlightenment. He also fumes about the research projects (especially the “Studies in Prejudice” reported in The Authoritarian Personality) whose quantitative method he disdains, but whose reputation-making power he is determined to make the most of.
     

    I’d always assumed Adorno’s 1941 move from Manhattan to Los Angeles galled him; not so: he disliked New York, and raved about the Riviera-like beauties of Southern California. Most touching is his recurrent wonder, despite the provincialism and vulgarity, at the fundamentally democratic culture of America: bureaucratic encounters are friendly as they would never be in Europe, and even the police who showed up unannounced to check curfew compliance were amiable and courteous. (That was then, this is now.) In November 1949, Adorno’s triumphant return to the family’s war-ravaged home-town (Frankfurt) generates poignant accounts of the ruins, both architectural and human.
     

    We’ve been in something of an Adorno boom for some time now. Books, articles, and special issues of journals (like New German Critique‘s) continue to appear; even more auspiciously, important works like History and Freedom are being translated and published. (What I want next is Adorno’s first Habilitationschrift, a neo-Kantian reading of Freud that Adorno withdrew when it lost the support of Hans Cornelius, his advisor. In later years Adorno would veto its publication.)2 Some of Adorno’s “canonical” works are even being re-translated: just in the last few years, we’ve had Dialectic of Enlightenment translated anew by Edmund Jephcott, and Philosophy of New Music by Robert Hullot-Kentor, and Hullot-Kentor is reportedly at work on a retranslation (long overdue) of Negative Dialectics. There is also a loosening of the strictures against interest in Adorno’s personal life. High-minded disdain of “the personal” is widespread in our highbrow culture; it has been consistent, however diversely motivated, from the New Criticism to la nouvelle critique and beyond; and it’s a disdain that Adorno, virtuoso of the hairshirt, might seem to epitomize. But predictably enough, Adorno’s centenary year (2003) announced the arrival of what we might call the moment of biography. In Germany, three of them have appeared. Detlev Claussen’s Der Letzte Genie remains untranslated, but as for the two now available in English, Lorenz Jäger’s Adorno: A Political Biography is a culture-wars screed; Stephan Müller-Doohm’s Adorno: A Biography is a reverential academic monument; neither gives any sense whatever of Adorno as a personality. Nor have the hitherto available letters: Adorno’s correspondence with Benjamin, despite the mutual affection between them, stays on a remarkably stratospheric plane of high-minded intellectualism. I would expect the correspondence with Horkheimer to be warmer and more personal, but it remains untranslated. Only the just-published letters to Berg have hitherto given us any flavor of Adorno’s humor, lustig very much in the Viennese manner. The letters reviewed here give us a more lively sense than any we’ve had so far (in English, at least) of what the private Adorno was like as a social being and as a family man. Of course the “personal” isn’t the only interest of these letters: as we’ve seen, Adorno’s commitment to his work was of an intensity to fuse public preoccupations with the personal ones. But “the personal” as such in Adorno proves to hold surprising fascinations of its own. If the letters to Mann suggest something of the degree to which the public Adorno’s hairshirt mortifications, all the guilt of history and the agonies of “after Auschwitz” granted, also had their springs in predictable personal ambitions and vanities, the letters to his parents disclose a real, and attractively “happy” surprise that I, at least, never anticipated: how lively and mercurial a sprite capered under the hairshirt.

    Notes

    1. For a strongly pro-Adorno account of further details–side-by-side comparisons of Adorno’s memos with Mann’s published text, anti-Adorno invective from Mann’s family after the great man’s death, Adorno’s reaction to slighting remarks about him that Mann had written in letters to others–see Müller-Doohm 314-20.

    2. Der Begriff des Unbewußten in der transzendentalen Seelenlehre [The Concept of the Unconscious in the Transcendental Theory of the Psyche] (Philosophische Früschriften 79-322); for details of the episode and a brief account of the dissertation, see Müller-Doohm 103-6.

    Works Cited

    • Adorno, T.W., with Max Horkheimer. Dialectic of Enlightenment. Trans. Edmund Jephcott. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2002.
    • —. Minima Moralia. Trans. E.F.N. Jephcott. London: Verso, 1974.
    • —. Philosophische Frühschriften. Theodor W. Adorno. Gesammelte Schriften, Band 1. Ed. Rolf Tiedemann. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1996.
    • —. Problems of Moral Philosophy. Ed. Thomas Schröder. Trans. Rodney Livingstone. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2001.
    • Müller-Doohm, Stephan. Adorno: A Biography. Trans. Rodney Livingstone. Cambridge: Polity, 2005.
    • Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Trans. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1972.

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                        MLA SESSION ANNOUNCEMENT
    
         Special Session #344, Friday 28 December, 1:45-3:00 PM
         Grand Ballroom East, Hyatt Regency (1990 MLA
         Convention, Chicago, Illinois, 27-30 December 1990)
    
         "Canonicity and Hypertextuality: The Politics of
         Hypertext"
    
         Session leader: Terence Harpold, University of
              Pennsylvania
         Panelist 1: Ted Nelson, Autodesk, Inc.: "How Xanadu
              (Un)does the Canon"
         Panelist 2: Stuart Moulthrop, Univ. of Texas/Austin:
              "(Un)doing the Canon I: The Institutional Politics
              of Hypertext"
         Panelist 3: Jay David Bolter, UNC Chapel Hill:
              "(Un)doing the Canon II: Hypertext as Polis and
              Canon"
    
         For more information, contact:
              Terence Harpold
              420 Williams Hall
              University of Pennsylvania
              Philadelphia, PA 19104
    
              Bitnet:   
              Internet: 
    
         _______________________________________________________
    
                     VERSE: JOHN ASHBERY'S INFLUENCE
    
         Susan M. Schultz and Henry Hart invite submissions for
         a collection of essays on the subject of John Ashbery's
         influence on contemporary poetry.  Essays may address
         Ashbery's influence on particular poets or on the
         climate of contemporary poetry more generally (e.g.,
         his influence on the Language movement, New Formalism,
         etc.).  Two copies of abstracts are due 15 November;
         two copies of your essays by 15 December to Susan
         Schultz at the Department of English, University of
         Hawaii-Manoa, 1733 Donaghho Road, Honolulu, Hawaii
         96822.
    
         _______________________________________________________
    
                          THE CENTENNIAL REVIEW
    
                         Edited by R.K. Meiners
    
              The Review aims to be a journal of cultural study,
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                        Ethics in the Profession
                    Volume XXXIV, No. 2, Spring 1990
                    Guest Editor: Stephen L. Esquith
    
         Locating Professional Ethics         Stephen L. Esquith
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           Teaching Engineering Ethics
         Called to Profess: Religious and         David H. Smith
           Secular Theories of Vocation
         The Ethics Boom: A Philosopher's          Michael Davis
           History
         Pricing Human Life: The Moral          Leonard M. Fleck
           Costs of Medical Progress
         Faith and the Unbelieving Ethics           Judith Andre
           Teacher
         Professional Ethics, Ethos, and     William M. Sullivan
           the Integrity of the
           Professions
         Bioethics and Democracy                  Bruce Jennings
    
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                                DISCOURSE
    
         _Discourse_, Journal for Theoretical Studies in Media
         and Culture, edited by Roswitha Mueller and Kathleen
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                         Announcing "MAGAZINE"
                  An Electronic Hotline/Conference
                             moderated by
                      Professor David Abrahamson
    
         Interested individuals are invited to participate in an
         electronic conference, MAGAZINE Hotline, addressing the
         journalistic/communicative/economic/technological issues
         related to magazine publishing.  Though MAGAZINE's primary
         focus will be journalistic, it will also address other
         magazine-publishing matters of economic (management,
         marketing, circulation, production, research),
         technological, historical and social importance. In sum,
         MAGAZINE will explore the history, current state and future
         prospects of the American Magazine.  Among the topics
         included will be: magazine editorial trends and practices;
         journalistic and management norms in magazine publishing;
         evolving magazine technologies (those currently in use and
         new ones envisioned); the economics of magazine publishing,
         including the economic factors influencing magazine content;
         the history of magazines; the role of magazines in social
         development; educational issues related to teaching magazine
         journalism; "laboratory" magazine-project concepts and
         resources; and studies and research exploring the issues
         above.
            The conference will be moderated by Professor David
         Abrahamson of New York University's Center for Publishing,
         where he teaches the editorial segments of the NYU
         Management Institute graduate Diploma Course in Magazine
         Publishing and the Executive Seminar in Magazine Editorial
         Management. He is also the author of two teaching texts,
         "The Magazine Writing Workbook" and "The Magazine Editing
         Workbook."
    
         The MAGAZINE Hotline is scheduled to begin October 1, 1990.
         Magazine publishing professionals, magazine journalism
         educators, scholars and students, and other individuals
         interested in magazine issues are encouraged to participate.
         The MAGAZINE Hotline is sponsored by New York University's
         Center for Publishing and Comserve (the online information
         and discussion service for the communication disciplines).
    
         Those interested in participating in MAGAZINE can subscribe
         free by:
    
         (1) From a Bitnet or Internet account, sending a one-line
         e-mail message to either COMSERVE@RPIECS or
         COMSERVE@VM.ECS.RPI.EDU with the following text:
              Join Magazine YourFirstName YourLastName
              [Example: Join Magazine Mary Smith]
    
         (2) From an MCI-Mail account, sending a message adressed as
         follows:
              [To:] COMSERVE (EMS)
              Internet
              COMSERVE@VM.ECS.RPI.EDU
              [No Subject]
              [Message text] Join Magazine YourFirstName YourLastName
    
         (3) From a Compuserve account, send the same one-line
         message (no subject) to:
               >INTERNET:COMSERVE@VM.ECS.RPI.EDU
               [Note: Include the indicated ">".]
    
         Further information about the MAGAZINE Hotline will be sent
         to subscribers when the Hotline begins. However, if you have
         any immediate ideas, suggestions or questions about the
         Hotline, please contact David Abrahamson, at:
         abrahamson@acfcluster.nyu.edu or 3567652@mcimail.com or
         165 east 32, NY 10016.
    
         _______________________________________________________
    
         A Screaming comes across the wires--the list, PYNCHON.  Its
         purpose is the discussion of and exchange of information
         about Thomas Pynchon and his writing.  Appropriate topics
         range from serious critical discussion through esthetic
         opinions to apocryphal stories and unsubstantiated sightings
         (or non-sightings).
    
         Simon Fraser University does not have a LISTSERVER, so I
         have kludged together a group with remote addresses.  To
         join the list send a request to me (E-mail
         USERDOG1@SFU.BITNET  or  USERDOG1@CC.SFU.CA).  Because of
         the nature of the kludge, I need a name, or pseudonym if you
         prefer, as well as your Email address.  The list is
         unrestricted, its just that I have to add members
         manually.
    
         List address: PYNCHON@SFU.BITNET  or  PYNCHON@CC.SFU.CA
    
         Jody    USERDOG1@SFU.BITNET   or     USERDOG1@CC.SFU.CA

     

  • Postface: Positions on Postmodernism

     
     
    What follows is a written exchange among the editors about the contents of the first issue of Postmodern Culture. It is called a “postface” because it is meant to be read after the other items in the issue; we hope it will serve as a preface to discussion among other readers.

     


     
    Eyal:
     
    Several of the works in this issue imply that there is a dynamic relationship between the decentered individual or event generally celebrated by postmodernity and some governing ideal, a hidden ground that operates through these texts. Kipnis, for instance, argues finally not only that the body is a text, or that intellectual history has a body, but also that there are “moments in the social body”– intellectual constructs which organize history as an idea, more than just the sum of its parts. She shows an interest in “TRANSITION,” and not just in particulars, and those transitions–which are explicitly staged in her medium–imply some organizing principle.
     
    Elaine:
     
    I find it provocative to consider whose bodies, and what relationships between them, are represented in these essays. For example, Kipnis’s narrative movement back and forth from Marx to his maid Helene to late twentieth century teenage girls suggests, to me at least, a feminization of Marx’s body (feminists have argued that women’s bodies are sites for masculine writing, but here, Marx’s body, like the anorectic’s, occupies the position of tablet for cultural text)

     

    John:
     
    I’d agree that Kipnis is making a connection between particular male bodies and particular female bodies as “tablets for cultural text,” but I’m not sure the movement between particulars amounts to the projection of a “governing ideal, a hidden ground” that Eyal sees here. It strikes me that many of these writers (Acker, English, Kipnis, even Yudice) emphasize the rude eruptions and crude particulars of the body in a way that is anything but idealizing. And while I agree with the idea that Kipnis, and others in this issue, want to see history as having a meaning, I don’t think this necessarily involves each of these authors in a commitment to an “ideal,” or to a teleology. I think that Kipnis, Ross, hooks, and others try to establish a context, rather than a ground, for the particular.
     
    Eyal:
     
    That may be what they would say. It’s a popular position–and one that Larsen takes to task. He writes that Marxist thought criticizes Enlightenment values by offering “particular universals” (15): reason is time-bound, but it is universal at any point in time because of “the social universality of the proletariat” (6). Larsen uses this claim to indict postmodernism– which he reads much as you do here, John–as promoting contexts that are not grounds; he charges that postmodernists appeal to irrationalism instead of recognizing the claims of Marxist universals, and their irrationalism then allows them to deflect the charge against capitalism (7, 9).
     
    Elaine:
     
    As a feminist reader responding to these essays, I find myself struggling with the very tension we are talking about–between attention to the particular and a yearning, to use hooks’s word, for a transcending idea, a narrative which helps me evaluate what I read. hooks begins her essay by telling us that she is a black woman at a dinner party (which one other black person is attending). This is certainly a context, but in the end when she tells us about talking with other black people about postmodernism, context attains a kind of transcendence–hooks’s “authority of experience.” Likewise, Yudice’s focus on bulimia seems driven by a desire to understand the body’s participation in larger designs and meanings.
     
    Eyal:
     
    There is a similar impulse in several of these works. Yudice moves from class and gender to “the mystic” (5); hooks returns to “yearning” as the common condition (9); Schultz finds in Bernstein’s poem an “elegiac tone” (10); and Acker says that she is a romantic and projects that romanticism in her stand as artist- against-the-dead-world.
     
    John:
     
    Acker does sound like an idealist when she asks whether “matter moving through forms [is] dead or alive,” and she sounds romantic when she asserts that “they can’t kill the spirit.” But the transcendence she describes at the beginning of her narrative is transcendence within language: “when I write, I enter a world which has complex relations and is, perhaps, illimitable. This world both represents and is human history, public memories and private memories turned public, the records and actualizations of human intentions. This world is more than life and death, for here life and death conjoin.” Perhaps she fails in her stated desire not to have a voice (as Schultz argues the Language Poets do), but it seems to me that her piece is not only about “the artist against the world,” but also about the contact between the writer and the world–an unpleasant contact between a fragmented individual and the monolithic forces behind property law, involving a struggle over language, and the right to language.
     
    Elaine:
     
    Many of the writers here (Schultz, English, hooks, Beverley, Ross) illustrate the power of culture (rather than of the individual) to determine our use of language and the creation of texts. Schultz’s point about McGann’s classification of the contributors to Verse–that the difference between “Language writing, properly so called” and “language-centered writing” appears to be a matter of big names vs. lesser knowns– raises the issue of politics within academic writing (a criticism that may be relevant to the project of creating this journal). But what Schultz’s review accomplishes, and what Ross, Beverley, and hooks suggest we should attempt, is an interrogation of authorities. These writers believe such a practice can make a difference.John:I think Larsen would say that the interrogation of authority is not in itself the practice that will make a difference; he feels, as Eyal pointed out, that liberal critiques of authority ultimately serve the interests of authority by helping to “displace or pre-empt” revolutionary political practice. On the other hand, the authors you mention all aim at something beyond critique or interrogation. Ross, for example, argues directly against the idea (expressed in Larsen) that cultural authority is monolithic, because he wants to persuade us that change is possible: “capitalism is merely the site, and not the source, of the power that is often autonomously attributed to the owners and sponsors of technology” (37). Larsen’s rejoinder is to ask “Where has imperialism, and its attendant ‘scientific’ and cultural institutions, actually given way and not simply adapted to the ‘new social movements’ founded on ideals of alterity?” (29).
     
    Eyal:
     
    On the whole, the writers in the issue value those who, like themselves, oppose the authoritarian tendencies of society. Social power resides in architecture and we fight it with music (Beverley); political repression is enforced by manipulating our collective image of the body and we fight it with dietary negativity–obesity, bulimia, anorexia (Yudice); society uses “viral hysteria” and the “Computer Virus Eradication Act” to restrict access to technology and information, and we fight it with countercultural hacking (Ross); the publishing establishment enforces copyright and we fight it by acknowledging the intertextual transgression implicit in all artistic practice (Acker). These writers are looking for a place from which to criticize the impulses to power which they uncover in the social text–but then any critical position is bound within that text.
     
    Elaine:
     
    Critical positions may be bound within the social text, but as we said earlier, some of these writers appear to be in two places at once, positioned in a particular historical political struggle but casting their writing beyond the particular toward some larger claim or understanding. In any case, the difference in our readings of these writers suggests that postmodernism remains fertile territory within which writers can explore new positions, and I find this encouraging. We hoped that Postmodern Culture would provide a place for experimentation, for opening discussions, for dialogue. In some of our early explorations of what the journal could or should be (and do), we expressed a hope that we could dis-establish the practice of admitting only those who speak our language or who position themselves as we do. In fact, we hoped that the medium itself would encourage us to think of our writing as constituted both from the writer’s position and from the readers’. Such thinking (about writing and reading) can lead to further experimentation within the academy, in culture, and with/in those relationships fostered through Postmodern Culture. How much difference we make remains to be seen.
     

  • Vacation Notes: Haute-Tech in the Hautes-Montagnes

    Jim English

    University of Pennsylvania

     

    Even to a fan like me, the Tour de France seems a pretty weird sporting event. By the standards of contemporary spectator sport, there is something almost laughable in a three-week-long bicycle race that is so elaborately staged and involves so much apparatus and so many people, yet offers so few moments of real excitement. Race organizers are aware of this, and have lately been attempting to bring the event better into line with the contemporary sporting scene. But to judge by this year’s Tour, which two friends and I followed during its final week through the Pyrenees, these attempts to improve or normalize the race are only making it stranger. While we certainly enjoyed the race as a race, we found ourselves enjoying it even more as a sort of comedy of cultural contradictions. The recent efforts to “modernize” what remains basically an old-world, pain-oriented, macho sport (its traditional off-season counterpart is boxing) have created some bizarre incongruities. The commercial packaging and the “look” of the Tour have been dramatically altered by the introduction of new technologies, but the mythology of the sport, along with the activity itself–the actual physical demands made on competitors–have scarcely changed since the turn of the century. More and more one is confronted with disconcerting asymmetries between the “modernized” Tour de France and a cycling culture whose material and mythological elements resist modernization.

     

    One such material element is the bike rider’s derriere. For the second year in a row, an apparently secure victory was imperilled in the closing days by a saddle boil, reminding everyone that despite impressive recent developments in clothing and hygiene technologies, there has been little success in containing eruptions of the lower bodily stratum: a rider’s sore bottom can still become the focal point and the decisive factor of the whole colossal production. It’s easy to be misled in this regard by today’s aerodynamic, miracle-fiber uniforms, which have a cleaner, zippier look than the old suits and, with their shiny surfaces, make far more effective billboards for team sponsors. But the fact is that inside this state-of-the-art gear there is not only perspiration, blood, and puss but also sometimes urine and even diarrhea. Seven consecutive hours of racing will induce unhappy effects in even the best dressed of competitors.

     

    Like the uniforms, the bikes too keep getting sleeker, more reliable, more specialized and rational in design. But this only accentuates the extreme unreliability of the riders, who this year seemed more than ever uncertain of their abilities and confused about their roles. Consider Claudio Chiappucci, a second-rank rider for the struggling Carrera Jeans team. Judged a non-contender, Chiappucci was permitted a substantial lead on the opening stage, and then spent the entire race losing time to rivals while hurling insults at them for lacking his “panache.” Yet this apparent mediocrity held on for an impressive second place and very nearly became the first rider in modern times to “steal” a Tour de France. Pre-race favorite Raul Alcala, a brilliant natural climber, was all bulked up this year to improve his strength on the flats. His weight training seemed to be paying off, and for the first week everyone was in awe of the new, more muscular Alcala. But as soon as the race hit the mountains, this aura of invincibility dissolved and, as one rider remarked at Mont Blanc, Alcala suddenly just seemed “big and slow like a dirigible.” The other rider who came to the race with a new and more robust physique was defending champion Greg LeMond. But in this case no one was intimidated by the extra poundage. With his cutting-edge aerodynamic equipment and flawless position on the bike, the blimp-like LeMond had been a comical sight all season, putting in performances that can only be described as embarrassing. “I worry more about my grandmother,” 1987 Tour winner Stephen Roche said at one point this spring. Yet LeMond proved against all evidence to be the fittest rider in the race, and produced a beautifully economical victory. As so often happens, the French cycling press was reduced in the end to explaining the race in terms of “miracles.” While technological developments have succeeded in virtually eliminating the wild card of mechanical failure, oddsmakers are still losing their shirts on the Tour and sportswriters are still narrativizing it as spiritual quest.

     

    Of course this is, for many, the whole appeal of the event, that it forces riders past known limits, past the point of predictability. The cumulative strain of stage racing actually makes the riders ill; by the final week you can hear collective coughing and wheezing at the crest of quite modest inclines. Under these conditions a rider’s form is so fragile that even a proven champion can, as they say, “crack” or “explode” at a crucial moment. Indeed, such moments are for aficionados the race’s main attraction. “Suffering” is the established god term of the French cycling vernacular. For diehard Tour fans, the only spectacle that matters is that of the body in pain. (The male body, that is. Though a women’s race has been part of the Tour for a decade, few fans have accepted the idea of a woman stage racer. This year organizers finally gave up and, despite the near certainty of another French victory by the great Jeannie Longo, abolished the Tour Feminin.)

     

    To take part in these pain-fests, fans are willing to suffer a bit themselves. To catch the finish of the decisive 16th stage at Luz-Ardiden in the Pyrenees we had to negotiate an enormous traffic jam at the base of the climb, hike fifteen kilometers uphill in near- record heat, wait three hours for the race, and then hike back down again through the exhaust fumes and honking horns of a traffic jam that now extended from the top of the mountain to the center of Lourdes, 35km away. All this to see a few small clusters of contenders shoot past, followed by perhaps a half hour’s worth of intermittent stragglers. It is difficult to explain to non-Tour fanatics why five hundred thousand people would put up with so much for so little, some of them actually camping out at the summit days in advance, staking their ground at Luz- Ardiden while the race was still in Marseilles. For Tour fans, the point is simply to be there, not just for social reasons (as is the case in small villages en route) but in order to share in some measure the lived space of the riders during their moments of suffering. Even to know the final outcome of the stage is not as important as experiencing simultaneously with the riders themselves the terrain, the weather, the exact force of the obstacles that must be overcome. A particularly difficult stretch of road two or three kilometers from the summit, or an haute-categorie climb at some much earlier point in the race–any spot where a key contender is likely to “crack”–will attract nearly as many fans as the finish area itself.

     

    But this determination simply to be there at all costs is not really what Tour organizers desire in a spectator, and the fans who made the trek up to Luz- Ardiden–variously French, Bearnaise-French, Basque, and Spanish, but overwhelmingly low-income farmers and laborers–do not represent an ideal mix from the standpoint of prospective sponsors. The predominance of “peasants” is one bottom-line disadvantage to the sport’s old-world ethic of suffering. Another is that high levels of sickness and pain in the Tour can only be secured by long (sometimes week-long) stretches of utterly routine, and in themselves uninteresting, softening-up stages. And while it’s true that a body at the breaking point has a certain marketability, in the grand calculus of advertising a 22-day sporting event configured around two or three moments of extreme anguish (for which, moreover, there can be no charge of admission) leaves plenty of room for commercial adjustments.

     

    Hence the recent efforts to “modernize” the Tour, of which the increasing emphasis on equipment innovation and technological advantage is just one sign. Another and more telling sign was the giant “television” (actually a collapsible scoreboard-type screen mounted in a mock-TV cabinet) that was perched at the very summit of the Luz-Ardiden climb. The mountain is so barren, and rises so steeply to such a sharp peak, that this mammoth symbol of the “new” Tour de France was clearly visible four and five kilometers down the road. As the riders made their way over the fearsome col de Tourmalet, the last hurdle before the Luz, all eyes, binoculars, and telescopic camera lenses were trained on this impressive publicity gimmick from Antenne 2, the official channel of the Tour. It was quite a sight: half a million people clustered densely together atop a magnificent mountain in the Pyrenees, all watching TV. From our naked-eye perspective at the 2km mark, the screen itself looked blank: the scene resembled nothing so much as pilgrims come to make sacrifice before some great and impassive idol, their TV-God. But the real moment of truth arrived when the first of the riders came charging past. With the actual race now taking place before their eyes, many people continued to watch the simulation. And who can blame them? If we had been closer, or had brought binoculars, we would have done the same. A bike race on a TV screen is far more “watchable” by the measure of contemporary sports entertainment than is the erratic parade of men in pain that constitutes a bike race on a mountain side.

     

    And of course this is what is really at stake in “modernizing” the Tour; altering patterns of consumption, reshaping the practice of spectatorship. The new parameters of the route, to which fans are already growing accustomed–fewer ultra-high-mileage days, fewer marathon climbing stages, more half-stages, more intermediate sprints for bonus points, etc.–are not just increasing the proportion of watchable to unwatchable moments, but re-presenting the whole race as something you watch rather than something you do. Persuading mountaintop spectators to keep their eyes on the box rather than the road is only an incidental step in this process of modernization. The main thing is to persuade a new and more “contemporary” audience, the chic boutique owners in the Marais, for example, or the yuppies who are buying condos out at La Villette (French for Silicon Valley)–all those upscale Parisians whose only contact with the race is the annoying jam of tourists along the Champs Elysees during the ceremonial final stage–that the Tour de France is for them, too. That it’s fun to watch!

     

    Whether this marketing strategy can ever really succeed with a “peasant sport” so strikingly ill-suited to the demands of commercial television is not at all certain. When the Tour rolled through the Alps this year there was a stylish young Parisian in the lead, yet organizers were unable to translate this into anything remotely resembling “Tour fever” in Paris. And their inability to sell the Tour Feminin, perhaps the boldest modernizing step of all, is another sign that their effectivity is far from unlimited. Nonetheless, that giant TV screen atop Luz Ardiden did represent genuine change. The Tour de France is already being practiced differently by its fans, and the transformation of cycling culture is likely to continue even if it doesn’t pay off in the end for the sponsors. And although there’s nothing to regret in the Tour’s shedding of its pseudo-spiritual, macho- masochistic character, we can hardly celebrate the emergence of one more frameable, watchable sports- entertainment package. Personally, I take heart from the Tour’s caricatural American twin–perhaps the first truly postmodern bicycle race–the Tour de Trump. Even a thoroughly banalized Tour de France can still exceed the organizers’ intentions and leave space for some saving cultural comedy.

     

  • Voicing the Neonew

    Susan M. Schultz

    University of Hawaii-Manoa

     

    “Postmodern Poetries: Jerome J. McGann Guest -Edits an Anthology of Language Poets From North America and the United Kingdom,”Verse 7:1 (Spring, 1990): 6-73.

     

    Postmodern poetry, especially Language poetry, is coming in from the cold. Not so long ago, postmodern poets published their work exclusively in small journals and disseminated it through small presses. Their radical differences from members of the Deep Image, Confessional, New York, and New Formalist schools probably condemned them to the margins of the publishing and the teaching worlds. But so, it seems, did their desire not to take part in (or to be co-opted by) that world. The climate is changing, however; a poetic greenhouse effect has lured well-known Language poets, among them Bob Perelman and Charles Bernstein, into the academy. Susan Howe has a book forthcoming from the well-established Wesleyan University Press. And the generally conservative pages ofVerse, a journal published in Great Britain and the United States, have opened to their “neonew” (the word is Perelman’s) attack on traditional versifying. The shepherd for this latest assault is Jerome McGann, long a lobbyist (or apologist, depending on your sympathies) for Language poetry.

     

    Language writing is at once post-structuralist and interested in history, power, and leftist ideology. Language poetry bears an acknowledged debt to the Modernists’ style, if not their substance; it also shores fragments against ruins, although it means to revel in that fragmentation. This issue ofVerse seems geared more toward the demands of the initiated than toward those of the merely curious; as McGann notes in his introduction, no anthology of postmodernist poetry is complete without postmodernist prose (these writers, like the Modernists, are poet- critics). The lack of a critical background hurts, as does McGann’s teasing introduction. I will dwell a bit on the introduction, because its paradoxes seem to me central to the movement that McGann describes in it.

     

    If editors are a species of literary parent, McGann is a benevolent father who neither instructs his progeny nor leaves them to fend entirely for themselves. His introduction takes the middle ground between these options, hinting at purpose, yet refusing at all turns to name it. And a tenuous middle ground it is, at least for readers not already privy to postmodernism’s concerns–and perhaps also for those who are. For McGann does not so much mediate between the reader and the texts that follow as write an introduction that consistently fails to introduce. His various indeterminacies would not be so frustrating were he not to promise something more specific. “[T]he aim here is to give a more catholic view of the radical change which poetry has undergone since the Vietnam War” (6). “From a social and historical point of view, this collection aims to show certain features of the contemporary avant-garde poetry scene which are not apparent in [other collections]” (7). McGann never makes clear what he means by “radical change” and the “certain features” that distinguish his anthology from those that come before (Ron Silliman’sIn the American Tree and Douglas Messerli’s 1987,Language Poetries, An Anthology).

     

    McGann’s prose imitates the postmodern poetries he has chosen, and begins to define them by unravelling the kinds of definitions that we still like to believe govern the selection-process for any anthology. Curiously, however, McGann subscribes to his own set of definitions. According to McGann, these are not just Language poems, though “all the writing here is language-centered, whether the work in question is ‘Language Writing’ properly so-called (e.g., the selections from Hejinian, Bernstein, and McCaffery) or whether it is not (e.g., the selections from Howe, Bromige, or D.S. Marriott).” The secret to the difference between Language writing and language-centered writing lies, one assumes, in the names here mentioned. Rather than witness the move from the “authority” of Blake and Shelley to the nonauthoritative postmodernist realm of language, we move from one set of Big Names to another. The proclaimed gulf between “vision” and “language,” the Romantics and the postmoderns, is not so wide after all.

     

    McGann’s introduction, then, for all its principle of uncertainty, violates its own code. For McGann describes postmodern poetry as poetry in which “The [decentered] I is engulphed in the writing; not an authority, it becomes instead a witness, for and against” (6). This jibes with Charles Bernstein’s attack on poetic voice in “Stray Straws and Straw Men,” inThe L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Book: “‘The voice of the poet’ is an easy way of contextualizing poetry so that it can be more readily understood . . . as listening to someone talk in their distinctive manner” (LB 41). This emphasis on voice “has the tendency to reduce the body of a poet’s work to little more than personality.” And finally, “Voice is a possibility for poetry not an essence” (42). Several of the poets in this issue go to fascinating lengths to disrupt our expectation that we will be hearing poetic voices. Their strategies are often formal; the disjunction between form and content has become as much a critical standard these days as the New Critical junction was some forty years ago.

     

    The most dramatic attempt to deflect us into language, away from the poet, is by Tina Darragh, in her sequence, “Bunch-Ups.” Darragh gives us four rectangular boxes in which she has drawn long pipe-shaped lines; it’s as if the reader looked at what she knew was the page of a book, but found that the lines were empty of words. At the bottom right section of each page, the lines “bunch-up”; below them one sees the portions of several lines of what looks like the OED: a number here, the beginning of a Latin term there, parts and wholes of English words. The piece effectively dramatizes the way in which the reader of a dictionary becomes–at random–the writer of an incomplete text. As she has written elsewhere, “Reading the definitions is like reading a foreign language developed specifically for English” (LB 108). And yet readers suspicious that nothing any writer sets down is, in truth, random will note that the seemingly haphazard glimpses from a dictionary that she gives us are in fact fragments about the self, about a network, a definition that includes a reference to “sense,” and one that reads “post in a statio” and is the 17th, archaic sense of a word. She makes connections, in other words, between dictionaries and selves, between networks of language and of people; her final fragment also suggests historical depth, even as it argues against the possibility of understanding history.

     

    There are other notable attempts to foreground language and downplay the author, instances when, as Bernstein puts it, “the writing itself is seen as an instance of reality / fantasy / experience / event” (LB 41). Christopher Dewdney, for example, whose “source text” is a museum catalogue, describes his method as follows: “InThe Beach,The City,The Theatre Party andThe Self Portrait source lines alternate with interference lines which are generally permutations of the adjacent source lines. The permutation lines echo the line before at the same time as they preview the line after them. This profoundly skews the semantic valences of most of the reading subsequent to the first interference line (which is the second line in these four poems) [two of which are printed here]” (21). The two poems printed here reminded me very much of John Ashbery’s “Finnish Rhapsody” (fromApril Galleons), which Ashbery based on the repetitive style of theKalevala. But Dewdney’s procedure is, in its way, more radical; where Ashbery writes, and then rewrites his own text, Dewdney’s contribution to a pre-existing text is his “interference” in it.

     

    Bob Perelman’s poem “Neonew” experiments with stanzas, the shapes of which are reflexive of the shape of history. Each section, until the end of the poem, is numbered “1,” which reminds us that history exists always in the present. In the second section “1” Perelman writes about the way in which a change in spelling affected the “poor Tatars.”

     

    backwards into the body into the body of the poor
    the body of the poor Tatars
    body of the poor Tatars Roman
    of the poor Tatars Roman history
    the poor Tatars Roman history intercalated an
    alphabetic letter
    Tatars Roman history intercalated an alphabetic
    letter they continue Tartars
    Roman history intercalated an alphabetic letter
    they continue Tartars of fell
    Tartarean nature to this day (41)

     

    Political power does not just give the victors the power to rewrite history; it also governs the empire’s spelling books. As Foucault knew, power operates everywhere, even when its effects seem accidental. Perelman’s limited text is also an open one, because it eschews poetic “voice” in favor of “writing” (like Derrida, Language poets reverse the traditional narrative, according to which voice precedes writing). In his talk, “The Rejection of Closure,” Perelman notes that, “The open text often emphasizes or foregrounds process, either the process of the original composition or of subsequent compositions by readers, and thus resists the cultural tendencies that seek to identify and fix material, turn it into a product; that is, it resists reduction and commodification” (quoted in Hartley, 38). This conception of the text is radically utopian; are we not able to describe the passage about “poor Tatars” in story-form? Can we not “interpret” this poem as we do “closed” texts? I suspect that we can, and that what Perelman–like any good poet–gives us is a new style in which to say what we already know. That the style is impersonal–that it does not reflect back on a subjective “I”–aligns it with the Modernism of T.S. Eliot and Marianne Moore. That this impersonal style works in the service of leftist politics does distinguish Perelman and his cohorts from the “great Modernists.” Thus, the line: “‘polis is eyes’ ‘O say can you see’ ‘police is eyes’,” conveys the sweep of history from the Greek polis to the United States, and joins them through the connection of sight and authority.

     

    Yet McGann’s reliance on names to define postmodern poetries is revealing–not for anything it tells us of McGann, but for what it tells us about this –and other–anthologies of postmodern verse. Many of these poets do have recognizable styles. In that sense, to paraphrase Stevens, every disorder depends on there being an ordering consciousness in the background. If not voices, then, these poets have idiosyncratic ways of placing words on the page, individual means to distort syntax and to break “the basic assumptions of bourgeois subjectivity,” as George Hartley phrases it in his cogent book on the Language poets (34). As Bernstein writes, “The best of the writing that gets called automatic issues from a series of choices as deliberate & reflected as can be” (43). Or, one might add, the best of postmodern writing issues through the filter of a mind that makes choices.

     

    Charles Bernstein and Lyn Hejinian, identified by McGann as “proper” Language poets, and Susan Howe, an “improper” Language poet, all write with a lyricism that argues against the “decentered I”–or at least works in tension with it. Bernstein’s “Debris of Shock/Shock of Debris” is a collage of mixed cliches (like mixed metaphors) that engages political concerns:

     

       Never
    burglarize a house with a standing army,
    nor take the garbage to an unauthorized
    junket. (69)

     

    He satirizes the capitalist’s conflation of art with money, authority with seductiveness, as well as his “style,” which formalizes capitalist politics:

     

    Yet it is the virile voice of authority, the
    condescending
    smugness in tone, that is thrilling. What
    does it matter that he hasn’t any . . .
    “Creative
    goals and financial goals are identical: we
    just
    have different approaches on how to research
    those goals, and we have different
    definitions
    of risk.” (71)

     

    Yet the comedy of pastiche that Bernstein creates melts into a lyricism that recalls John Ashbery’s “Soonest Mended,” where that poet moves abruptly from talk of brushing one’s teeth to a lush Keatsian conclusion. We move from satire to a sense of loss:

     

       The salt
    of the earth is the tears
    of God, torn for
    penitence at having created this plenitude
    of sufferance. So we dismember (disremember)
    in homage to our maker, foraging
    in fits, forgiving in
    forests, spearing what we take
    to be our sustenance: belittling to rein things
    in to human scale. A holy land parched
    with grief & dulled
    envy. The land is soil
    & will not stain; such
    hope as we may rise from. (73)

     

    Here lyricism operates against what we think of as lyrical vision; this is a post-apocalyptic, post-Romantic vision. It is not Bernstein’s only register, and yet the elegiac tone of the poem–the poet’s grief for a wasted earth–suggests a new direction for postmodern poetry. Such poetry might acknowledge more fully its double desire to be jarring and lyrical, iconoclastic and reverential, skeptical and faithful to what land we have left. It might at least tease us with the possibility of an integrated self, even as it testifies to its loss, and the dangers of our nostalgia for it.

     

    Let me add that there are moments of good fun in this anthology. After all, the deconstruction of established canons and styles is more often Dionysian than Apollonian. Consider David Bromige’s “Romantic Traces,” which proclaims its purpose in empurpled Keatsisms:

     

    It is time I pledge some vows,
    apart from those, that is, I’ve taken to the
    lyre,
    to be as true to it as chainsaw is to boughs
    ready to make a widow the next forest fire–
    and suddenly I hear I’m to be retired
    for failing to accumulate sufficient fans
    and denied a seat with the Olympians
    because I sang and wrote when by democracy
    inspired! (51)

     

    Now that poets like Bromige and his fellow postmoderns are “accumulating sufficient fans,” anthologies such as this one should provide an important link between poets and whatever “common readers” remain.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Andrews, Bruce and Charles Bernstein, eds. The L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Book.  Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1984.
    • Hartley, George.Textual Politics and the Language Poets. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1989.

     

  • Postmodernism and Imperialism: Theory and Politics in Latin America

    Neil Larsen

    Northeastern University

     

    My remarks here1 concern the following topics of critical discussion and debate: 1) the ideological character of postmodernism as both a philosophical standpoint and as a set of political objectives and strategies; 2) the development within a broadly postmodernist theoretical framework of a trend advocating a critique of certain postmodern tenets from the standpoint of anti-imperialism; and 3) the influence of this trend on both the theory and practice of oppositional culture in Latin America. So as to eliminate the need for second-guessing my own standpoint in what follows, let me state clearly at the outset that I will adhere to what I understand to be both a Marxist and a Leninist position as concerns both epistemology and the social and historical primacy of class contradiction. In matters philosophical, then, I will be advancing and defending dialectical materialist arguments. Regarding questions of culture and aesthetics, as well as those of revolutionary strategy under existing conditions–areas in which Marxist and Leninist theory have either remained relatively speculative or have found it necessary to re-think older positions–my own thinking may or may not merit the attribution of ‘orthodoxy,’ depending on how that term is currently to be understood.

     

    (1)

     

    One typically appeals to the term ‘postmodern’ to characterize a broad and ever-widening range of aesthetic and cultural practices and artifacts. But the concept itself, however diffuse and contested, has also come to designate a very definite current of philosophy as well as a theoretical approach to politics. Postmodern philosophy–or simply postmodern ‘theory,’ if we are to accept Jameson’s somewhat ingenuous observation that it “marks the end of philosophy”2–arguably includes the now standard work of poststructuralist thinkers such as Derrida and Foucault as well as the more recent work by ex-post- Althusserian theorists such a Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, academic philosophical converts such as Richard Rorty and the perennial vanguardist Stanley Aronowitz. The latter elaborate and re-articulate an increasingly withered poststructuralism, re-deploying the grandly dogmatic and quasi-mystical “critique of the metaphysics of presence” as a critical refusal of the “foundationalism” and “essentialism” of the philosophy of the Enlightenment. These two assignations–which now come to replace the baneful Derridean charge of “metaphysics”–refer respectively to the Enlightenment practice of seeking to ground all claims regarding either truth or value in terms of a self-evidencing standard of Reason; and to the ontological fixation upon being as essence, rather than as relationality or ‘difference.’

     

    Postmodern philosophy for the most part adopts its “anti-essentialism” directly from Derrida and company, adding little if anything to accepted (or attenuated) post-structuralist doctrine. Where postmodernism contributes more significantly to the honing down and re-tooling of poststructuralism is, I propose, in its indictment of foundationalism–in place of the vaguer abstractions of “presence” or “identity”–as the adversarial doctrine. It is not all “Western” modes of thought and being which must now be discarded, but more precisely their Enlightenment or modern modalities, founded on the concept of reason. Indeed, even the charge of “foundationalism” perhaps functions as a minor subterfuge here. What postmodern philosophy intends is, to cite Aronowitz’s forthright observation, a “rejection of reason as a foundation for human affairs.”3 Postmodernism is thus a form, albeit an unconventional one, of irrationalism.

     

    To be sure, important caveats can be raised here. Postmodernist theoreticians often carefully stipulate that a rejection of reason as foundation does not imply or require a rejection of all narrowly ‘reasonable’ procedures. Postmodernity is not to be equated with an anti-modernity. Aronowitz, for example, has written that “postmodern movements” (e.g., ecology and “Solidarity” type labor groups) “borrow freely the terms and programs of modernity but place them in new discursive contexts” (UA 61). Chantal Mouffe insists that “radical democracy”–according to her, the political and social project of postmodernity–aims to “defend the political project [of Enlightenment] while abandoning the notion that it must be based on a specific form of rationality.”4 Ernesto Laclau makes an even nicer distinction by suggesting that “it is precisely the ontological status of the central categories of the discourses of modernity and not their content, that is at stake. . . . Postmodernity does not imply a change in the values of Enlightenment modernity but rather a particular weakening of their absolutist character.”5 And a similarly conservative gesture within the grander irrationalist impulse can, of course, be followed in Lyotard’s characterization of “paralogy” as those practices legitimating themselves exclusively within their own “small narrative” contexts, rather than within the macro-frames of modernist meta-narratives of Reason, Progress, History, etc.6

     

    Two counter-objections are necessary here, however. The first is that any thoughtful consideration of claims to locate the attributes of reason within supposedly local or non-totalizable contexts immediately begs the question of what, then, acts to set the limits to any particular instance of “paralogy,” etc.? How does the mere adding of the predicate “local” or “specific” or “weakened” serve to dispense with the logic of an external ground or foundation? Cannot, for example, the ecology movement be shown to be grounded in a social and political context outside and ‘larger’ than it is, whatever the movement may think of itself? If reason is present (or absent) in the fragment, does not this presence/absence necessarily connect with the whole on some level? If, as one might say, postmodernism wants to proclaim a rationality of means entirely removed from a rationality of ends, does it not thereby sacrifice the very “means/ends” logic it wants to invoke, the very logical framework in which one speaks of “contexts”? I suggest it would be more precise to describe the measured, non-foundationalist ‘rationalism’ of postmodernism as simply an evasive maneuver designed to immunize from critique the real object here: that is to preserve “Enlightenment” as merely an outward and superficial guise for irrationalist content, to reduce “Enlightenment,” as an actual set of principles designed to govern consciously thought and action, to merely the specific mythology needed to inform the project of a “new radical imaginary” (Laclau,UA 77).

     

    Clearly, there is a complete failure–or refusal– of dialectical reasoning incurred in postmodernism’s attempted retention of an Enlightenment ‘micro’- rationality. And this brings up the second rejoinder: postmodern philosophy’s practiced avoidance on this same score of the Marxist, dialectical materialist critique of Enlightenment. Postmodern theory, virtually without exception, consigns something it calls “Marxism” to the foul Enlightenment brew of “foundationalism.th” Marxism is, in effect, collapsed back into Hegelianism, the materialist dialectic into the idealist dialectic–or, as Aronowitz somewhat puzzlingly puts it, the “form of Marxism is retained while its categories are not” (UA 52). But in no instance that I know of has a postmodern theorist systematically confronted the contention first developed by Marx and Engels that “this realm of reason was nothing more than the idealized realm of the bourgeoisie.”7 I think perhaps it needs to be remembered that the Marxist project was not and is not the simple replacement of one “universal reason” with another, but the practical and material transformation of reason to be attained in classless society; and that this attainment would not mean the culmination of reason on earth a la Hegel but a raising of reason to a higher level through its very de-“idealization.” Reason, then, comes to be grasped as a time-bound, relative principle which nevertheless attains an historical universality through the social universality of the proletariat (gendered and multi-ethnic) as they/we who–to quote a famous lyric–“shall be the human race.”

     

    But again, postmodern irrationalism systematically evades confrontation with this critique of Enlightenment. It typically manages this through a variety of fundamentally dogmatic maneuvers, epitomized in the work of Laclau and Mouffe–who, as Ellen Meiksins Wood has shown,8 consistently and falsely reduce Marxism to a “closed system” of pure economic determinism.

     

    Why this evasion? Surely there is more than a casual connection here with the fact that the typical postmodern theorist probably never got any closer to Marxism or Leninism than Althusser’s left-wing structuralism and Lacanianism. One can readily understand how the one time advocate of a self-enclosed “theoretical practice” might elicit postmodern suspicions of closure and ‘scientism.’ Indeed, Althusser’s ‘Marxism’ can fairly be accused of having pre-programmed, in its flight from the class struggles of its time and into methodologism, the subsequent turn-about in which even the residual category of “theoretical practice” is deemed “foundationalist.”

     

    But this is secondary. What I would propose is that postmodernism’s hostility towards a “foundationalist” parody of Marxism, combined with the elision of Marxism’s genuinely dialectical and materialist content, flows not from a simple misunderstanding but, objectively, from the consistent need of an ideologically embattled capitalism to seek displacement and pre-emption of Marxism through the formulation of radical-sounding “third paths.” That postmodern philosophy normally refrains from open anti- communism, preferring to pay lip service to “socialism” even while making the necessary obeisances to the demonologies of “Stalin” may make it appear as some sort of a “left” option. But is there really anything “left”? The most crucial problem for Marxism today– how to extend and put into practice a critique from the left of retreating “socialism” at the moment of the old communist movement’s complete transformation into its opposite–remains safely beyond postmodernist conceptual horizons.

     

    Postmodernist philosophy’s oblique but hostile relation to Marxism largely duplicates that of Nietzsche. And the classical analysis here belongs to Lukacs’ critique of Nietzschean irrationalism inThe Destruction of Reason, a work largely ignored by contemporary theory since being anathematized by Althusserianism two decades ago. Lukacs identifies in Nietzsche’s radically anti-systemic and counter- cultural thinking a consistent drive to attack and discredit the socialist ideals of his time. But against these Nietzsche proposes nothing with any better claim to social rationality. Any remaining link between reason and the emancipatory is refused. It is, according to Lukacs, this very antagonism towards socialism–a movement of whose most advanced theoretical expression Nietzsche remained fundamentally ignorant–which supplies to Nietzschean philosophy its point of departure and its principal unifying “ground” as such. “It is material from ‘enemy territory,’ problems and questions imposed by the class enemy which ultimately determine the content of his philosophy.”9 Unlike his more typical fellow reactionaries, however, Nietzsche perceived the fact of bourgeois decadence and the consequent need to formulate an intellectual creed which could give the appearance of overcoming it. In this he anticipates the later, more explicit “anti- bourgeois” anti-communisms of the coming imperialist epoch–most obviously fascism. This defense of a decadent bourgeois order, based on the partial acknowledgement of its defects and its urgent need for cultural renewal, and pointing to a “third path” “beyond” the domain of reason,10 Lukacs terms an “indirect apologetic.”

     

    Postmodern philosophy receives Nietzsche through the filters of Deleuze, Foucault and Derrida, blending him with similarly mediated versions of Heidegger and William James into a new irrationalist hybrid. But the terms of Lukacs’ Nietzsche-critique on the whole remain no less appropriate. Whereas, on the one hand, postmodernist philosophy’s aversion for orthodox fascism is so far not to be seriously questioned, its basic content continues, I would argue, to be “dictated by the adversary.” And this adversary–revolutionary communism as both a theory and a practice–assumes an even sharper identity today than in Nietzsche’s epoch. Let it be said that Lukacs, writing forty years ago, posits an adversarial Marxism-Leninism more free of the critical tensions and errors than we know it to have been then or to be now. If, from our own present standpoint,The Destruction of Reason has a serious flaw, then it is surely this failure to anticipate or express openly the struggles and uncertainties within communist orthodoxy itself. (Lukacs’ subsequent allegiance to Krushchevite positions–by then, perhaps, inevitable–marks his decisive move to the right on these issues.) But the fact that postmodern philosophy arises in a conjuncture marked by capitalist restoration throughout the “socialist” bloc and the consequent extreme crisis and disarray within the theoretical discourse of Marxism, while it may explain the relative freedom from genuinely contestatory Marxist critique enjoyed by postmodern theorists, in no way alters the essence of this ideological development as a reprise of pseudo-dialectical, Nietzschean “indirect apologetics.”

     

    This becomes fully apparent when one turns to post-modernism’s more explicit formulations as a politics. I am thinking here mainly of Laclau and Mouffe’sHegemony and Socialist Strategy, a work which, though it remains strongly controversial, has attained in recent years a virtually manifesto-like standing among many intellectuals predisposed to poststructuralist theory.Hegemony and Socialist Strategy proposes to free the Gramscian politics linked to the concept of “hegemony” (the so-called “war of position,” as opposed to “war of maneuver”) from its residual Marxian ‘foundationalism’ in recognition of what is held to be the primary efficacy of discourse itself and its “articulating” agents in forming hegemonic subjects. And it turns out of course that “socialist strategy” means dumping socialism altogether for a “radical democracy” which more adequately conforms to the “indeterminacy” of a “society” whose concept is modeled directly on the poststructuralist critique of the sign.

     

    The key arguments ofHegemony and Socialist Strategy–as, in addition, the serious objections they have elicited–have become sufficiently well known to avoid lengthy repetitions here. What Mouffe and Laclau promise to deliver is, in the end, a revolutionary or at least emancipatory political strategy shorn of ‘foundationalist’ ballast. In effect, however, they merely succeed in shifting the locus of political and social agency from “essentialist” categories of class and party to a discursive agency of “articulation.”11 And when it comes time to specify concretely the actual articulating subjects themselves,Hegemony and Socialist Strategy resorts to a battery of argumentative circularities and subterfuges which simply relegate the articulatory agency to “other discourses.”12

     

    Ellen Meiksins Wood has shown the inevitable collapse ofHegemony and Socialist Strategy into its own illogic as an argument with any pretense to denote political or social realities–a collapse which, because of its very considerable synthetic ambitions and conceptual clarity perhaps marks the conclusive failure of poststructuralism to produce a viable political theory. But the failure of argument has interfered little with the capacity of this theoretical tract to supply potentially anti-capitalist intellectuals with a powerful dose of “indirect apologetics.” The fact that the “third path” calls itself “radical democracy,” draping itself in the “ethics” if not the epistemology of Enlightenment, the fact that it outwardly resists the “fixity” of any one privileged subject, makes it, in a sense, the more perfect “radical” argument for a capitalist politics of pure irrationalist spontaneity. And we know who wins on the battlefield of the spontaneous.13 While the oppressed are fed on the myths of their own “hegemony”–and why not, since “on the threshold of postmodernity” humanity is “for the first time the creator and constructor of its own history”? (Laclau, UA 79-80)–those already in a position to “articulate” the myths for us only strengthen their hold on power.

     

    (2)

     

    In my remarks so far I have emphasized how contemporary postmodern philosophy’s blanket hostility towards the universalisms of Enlightenment thought might merely work to pre-empt Marxism’s carefully directed critique of that particular universal which is present-day capitalist ideology and power. Does not the merely theoretical refusal of the (ideal) ground serve in fact to strengthen the real foundations of real oppression by rendering all putative knowledge of the latter illicit? When Peter Dews criticizes Foucault for his attempt to equate the “plural” with the emancipatory, the remark applies to more recent postmodern theory with equal force: “the deep naivety of this conception lies in the assumption that once the aspiration to universality is abandoned what will be left is a harmonious plurality of unmediated perspectives.”14 In light of this perverse blindness to particular universals, postmodernism’s seemingly general skepticism towards Marxism as one possible instance of ‘foundationalism’ would be better grasped as a specific and determining antagonism. Is there an extant, living–i.e., practiced–philosophy other than Marxism which any longer purports to ground rational praxis in universal (but in this case also practical-material) categories? We are saying, then, that postmodern philosophy and political theory becomes objectively, albeit perhaps obliquely, a variation of anti-communism.

     

    It might, however, be objected at this point that postmodernism encompasses not only this demonstrably right-wing tendency but also a certain ‘left’ which, like Marxism, aims at an actual transcendence of oppressive totalities but which diverges from Marxism in its precise identification of the oppressor and of the social agent charged with its opposition and overthrow. Under this more “practical” aegis, the axis of postmodern antagonism shifts from the universal versus the particular to the more politically charged tension between the “center” and the “margin.” Such a shift has, for example, been adumbrated by Cornel West as representing a particularly American inflection of the postmodern. “For Americans,” says West,

     

    are politically always already in a condition of postmodern fragmentation and heterogeneity in a way that Europeans have not been; and the revolt against the center by those constituted as marginals is an oppositional difference in a way that poststructuralist notions of difference are not. These American attacks on universality in the name of difference, these 'postmodern' issues of otherness (Afro-Americans, Native Americans, women, gays) are in fact an implicit critique of certain French postmodern discourses about otherness that really serve to hide and conceal the power of the voices and movements of Others.15

     

    Among instances of a “left” postmodernism we might then include certain of contemporary feminisms and the theoretical opposition to homophobia as well as the cultural nationalisms of ethnic minority groups. The category of the “marginal” scarcely exhausts itself here, however. Arrayed against the “center” even as also “concealed” by its discourses and “disciplines” are, in this conception, also the millions who inhabit the neocolonial societies of the ‘third world.’ Hence there might be a definite logic in describing the contemporary anti-colonial and anti-imperialist movements of the periphery as in their own way also “postmodern.”

     

    It is this “marginal” and “anti-imperialist” claim to postmodernity which I now wish to assess in some depth. In particular I propose to challenge the idea that such a “left” movement within postmodernism really succeeds in freeing itself from the right-wing apologetic strain within the postmodern philosophy of the “center.”

     

    The basic outlines of this “left” position are as follows: both post-structuralism and postmodernism, as discourses emergent in the “center,” have failed to give adequate theoretical consideration to the international division of labor and to what is in fact the uneven and oppressive relation of metropolitan knowledge and its institutions to the “life-world” of the periphery. Both metropolitan knowledge as well as metropolitan systems of ethics constitute themselves upon a prior exclusion of peripheral reality. They therefore become themselves falsely ‘universal’ and as such ideological rather than genuinely critical. The remedy to such false consciousness is not to be sought in the mere abstract insistence on “difference” (or “unfixity,” the “heterogeneous,” etc.), but in the direct practical intervention of those who are different, those flesh and blood “others” whom, as West observes, the very conceptual appeal to alterity has ironically excluded. As a corollary, it is then implied that a definite epistemological priority, together with a kind of ethical exemplariness, adheres to those subjects and practices marginalized by imperialist institutions of knowledge and culture.

     

    Among ‘first world’ theorists who have put forward this kind of criticism perhaps the best known is Fredric Jameson. In his essay “Third World Literature in the Era of Multi-national Capitalism” Jameson argues that “third world texts necessarily project a political dimension in the form of national allegory: the story of the private individual destiny is always an allegory of the embattled situation of the public third world culture and society.”16 Third world texts, then–and by extension those who produce them and their primary public–retain what the culture of postmodernism in the ‘first world’ is unable to provide, according to another of Jameson’s well-known arguments: a “cognitive map”17 equipped to project the private onto the public sphere. As such, these peripheral practices of signification consciously represent a political bedrock reality which for the contemporary postmodern metropole remains on the level of the political unconscious. (It should be pointed out of course that Jameson’s schema is largely indifferent in this respect to the modernism/postmodernism divide.) What enables this is the fact that the third world subject, like Hegel’s slave, exhibits a “situational consciousness” (Jameson’s preferred substitute term for materialism). As “master,” however, the metropolitan consciousness becomes enthralled to the fetishes which symbolize its dominance.

     

    An analogous but weaker theory of the marginal as epistemologically privileged is to be found in the writings of Edward Said. InThe World, the Text and the Critic, for example, Said chastises contemporary critical theory, especially poststructuralism, for its lack of “worldliness”–by which he evidently means much the same thing designated by Jameson’s “situational consciousness.” What is needed, according to Said, is “a sort of spatial sense, a sort of measuring faculty for locating or situating theory”18 which Said denotes simply as “critical consciousness.”The World, the Text and the Critic ultimately disappoints in its own failure to historically or “spatially” situate such “critical consciousness,” but given Said’s public commitment to Palestinian nationalism it wouldn’t seem unreasonable to identify in his call for “worldliness” a prescription for “third-worldliness.”

     

    Both Jameson and Said–the former far more openly and forthrightly than the latter–violate central tenets of postmodernism, of course, insofar as they posit the existence of a marginal consciousness imbued with “presence” and “self-identity.” That is, they appear to justify an orthodox postmodernist counter-accusation of “essentialism.” Lest this should be thought to constitute a final incompatibility of postmodernism for an anti-imperialist, post-colonial standpoint, however, it is imperative to mention here the work of Gayatry Chakravorty Spivak. Foreseeing this difficulty, Spivak has (in her critical reading of the work of a radical collective of Indian historians known as the “subaltern studies group”) sought to justify such “essentialism” as a strategic necessity, despite its supposed epistemological falsity. The radical, third world historian, writes Spivak, “must remain committed to the subaltern as the subject of his history. As they choose this strategy, they reveal the limits of the critique of humanism as produced in the west.”19 Spivak, that is to say, poses the necessity for an exceptionalism: a conceptual reliance on the “subject of history,” which as a poststructuralist she would condemn as reactionary and “humanist,” is allowed on “strategical” grounds within the terrain of the “subaltern.” It begins to sound ironically like the old pro-colonialist condescension to the “native’s” need for myths that the educated metropolitan city- dweller has now dispensed with–but more on this below.

     

    Even if the “marginal” cannot be proved to enjoy an epistemological advantage, however, its very reality as a ‘situation’ requiring direct action against oppression can be appealed to as politically and ethically exemplary. Thus, in her very poignant essay entitled “Feminism: the Political Conscience of Postmodernism?” (UA 149-166) the critic and video artist Laura Kipnis proposes that feminism, seemingly entrapped between the “textualist” (i.e., modernist) aestheticism of French poststructuralist critics on the order of Cixous, Irigaray, etc., and North American liberal reformism (another case of “essentialism”), adopt “a theory of women not as class or caste but as colony” (UA 161). The efforts of a Rorty or a Laclau to salvage “Enlightenment” by ridding it of foundationalism and leaving only its “pragmatic” procedures would, in this view, be too little too late. For Kipnis, as for Craig Owens,20 postmodernism denotes what is really the definitive decline of the “West” and its colonial systems of power. If those marginalized within the center itself, e.g., women, are to rescue themselves from this sinking ship they must model their opposition on the practice of non-Western anti-colonial rebels. Referring to the 1986 bombing of Libya, Kipnis writes: “When retaliation is taken, as has been announced, for ‘American arrogance,’ this is the postmodern critique of Enlightenment; it is, in fact, a decentering, it is the margin, the absence, the periphery rewriting the rules from its own interest” (UA 163).

     

    An analogous proposal for third world revolt within the conceptual terrain of postmodernism has been issued by George Yudice. Against the postmodern ‘ethics’ formulated by Foucault as an “aesthetics of existence”–manifesting itself, e.g., in the liberal comforts of pluralism–Yudice suggests finding an ethical standard “among the dominated and oppressed peoples of the ‘peripheral’ or underdeveloped countries.”21 As a mere “aesthetic” the postmodern “explores the marginal, yet is incapable of any solidarity with it” (UA 224). Yudice terms this marginal ethic an “ethic of survival” and points to the example set by Rigoberta Menchu, a Guatemalan Mayan woman who has recorded her experiences as an organizer for the Christian base community movement against genocidal repression.22 “Menchu, in fact, has turned her very identity into a ‘poetics of defense.’ Her oppression and that of her people have opened them to an unfixity delimited by the unboundedness of struggle” (UA 229). In Menchu’s ethical example we thus have, so to speak, the subversive promise of “unfixity” a la Mouffe-Laclau made flesh.

     

    Yudice is not the first to attempt this particular inflection with specific reference to Latin America. The “liberation theology” which guides Menchu’s practice as a militant might itself lay some claim to represent an indigenously Latin American postmodernism–“avant la lettre” insofar as Foucault and his followers are concerned. The philosophical implications of liberation theology have been worked out by the so-called “Philosophy of Liberation,” a intellectual current which developed in Argentina in the early 1970s. As recounted recently by Horacio Cerutti-Guldberg,23 “Philosophy of Liberation” set out explicitly to formulate a uniquely Latin American doctrine of liberation which would be “neither a liberal individualism nor a Marxist collectivism” (LAP 47). Rather, it would set itself the goal of “philosophizing out of the social demands of the most needy, the marginalized and despised sectors of the population” (LAP 44). This in turn requires, according to exponent Enrique Dussel, a new philosophical method–known as “analectics”–based on the logical priority or “anteriority” of the exterior (i.e., the marginal, the Other) over totality.24 “Analectics” are to supplant the “Eurocentric” method of dialectics. As Cerutti-Guldberg observes:

     

    Dialectics (it doesn't matter whether Hegelian or Marxist, since analectical philosophy identifies them) could never exceed "intra-systematicity." It would be incapable of capturing the requirements of "alterity" expressed in the "face" of the "poor" that demands justice. In this sense, it would appear necessary to postulate a method that would go beyond (ana-) and not merely through (dia-) the totality. This is the "analectical" method which works with the central notion of analogy. In this way, analectical philosophy would develop the "essential" thinking longed for by Heidegger. Such thinking would be made possible when it emerges out of the cultural, anthropological "alterative" Latin American space. This space is postulated as "preliminary in the order of Being" and "posterior in the order of knowledge" with respect to the "ontological totality." It is constituted by the poor of the "third world." (LAP 50)

     

    In Dussel’sPhilosophy of Liberation the logic of going “beyond” the totality ultimately leads to explicit theology and mysticism. “What reason can never embrace–the mystery of the other as other–only faith can penetrate” (Dussel 93). But the “analectical” method has received other, non- theological formulations in Latin America, most notably in the case of the Cuban critic Roberto Fernandez Retamar, whose theoretical writings of the early 1970s25 were aimed at refuting the possibility that a “universal” theory of literature could truthfully reflect the radical alterity of “Nuestra America.” This is argued to be so not only as a result of the unequal, exploitative relation of imperial metropolis to periphery–a relation which is historically evolved and determined and thus subject to transformation–but because all notions of universality (e.g., Goethe’s, and Marx and Engels’ idea of aWeltliteratur) are fictions masking the reality of radical diversity and alterity.

     

    One should point out here that Retamar’s philosophical authority is Jose Marti and certainly not Derrida, Deleuze or Foucault, whom, had he been aware of them at the time, Retamar would almost surely have regarded with skeptical hostility. Dussel and the various Latin American philosophers associated with “Philosophy of Liberation” have obvious debts to European phenomenology and existentialism, especially Heidegger and Levinas. But here, too, a philosophical trend in which we can now recognize the idea of postmodernity as a radical break with Enlightenment develops out of what is perceived at least as a direct social and political demand for theory to adequately reflect the life-world of those who are, as it were, both “marginal” and the “subject of history” at once. One can sympathize with the general impatience of Latin American critics and theorists who see in the category of the “postmodern” what appears to be yet another neo- colonial attempt to impose alien cultural models. (Such would probably be Retamar’s conscious sentiments.) But the example of the “analectical” critiques of Dussel and Retamar shows, in fact, that the intellectual and cultural gulf is overdrawn and that all roads to postmodernism do not lead through French poststructuralism.

     

    (3)

     

    Do we then find a Latin American culture of postmodernism linked to these particular conceptual trends? I would argue–and have argued elsewhere26— that the recent proliferation in Latin America of so- called “testimonial” narratives like that of Rigoberta Menchu, as well as the fictional and quasi-fictional texts which adopt the perspective of the marginalized (see,inter alia, the works of Elena Poniatowska, Eduardo Galeano and Manlio Argueta), give some evidence of postmodernity insofar as they look for ways of “giving voice” to alterity. Significant here is their implicit opposition to the more traditional (and modernist) approach of “magical realism” in which the marginal becomes a kind of aesthetic mode of access to the ground of national or regional unity and identity. One could include here as well the general wave of interest in Latin American popular and “barrio” culture as an embodiment of ‘resistance.’

     

    But our direct concern here is with the ideological character of the conceptual trend as such. Does the move to, as it were, found post-modernism’s anti-foundationalism in the rebellious consciousness of those marginalized by modernity alter orthodox postmodernism’s reactionary character?

     

    I submit that it does not. Basing themselves on what is, to be sure, the decisive historical and political reality of unequal development and the undeniably imperialist and neo-colonialist bias of much metropolitan-based theory, the “left” postmodernists we have surveyed here all, to one degree or another, proceed to distort this reality into a new irrationalist and spontaneist myth. Marginality is postulated as a condition which, purely by virtue of its objective situation, spontaneously gives rise to the subversive particularity upon which postmodern politics pins its hopes. But where has this been shown actually to occur? Where has imperialism, and its attendant “scientific” and cultural institutions, actually given way and not simply adapted to the “new social movements” founded on ideals of alterity?

     

    Jameson, whose argument for a third-world cognitive advantage points openly to an anti- imperialist nationalism as the road to both political and cultural redemption from postmodern psychic and social pathologies, speaks to us of Ousmane Sembene and Lu Hsun, but leaves out the larger question of where strategies of all-class national liberation have ultimately led Africa and China–of whether, in fact, nationalism, even the radical nationalism of cultural alterity, can be said to have succeeded as a strategy of anti-imperialism. As Aijaz Ahmad remarked in his well-taken critique of Jameson’s essay, Jameson’s retention of a “three worlds” theoretical framework imposes a view of neo-colonial society as free of class contradictions.27

     

    Spivak’s move to characterize the “subaltern” as what might be termed “deconstruction with a human face” only leads us further into a spontaneist thicket– although the logic here is more consistent than in Jameson and Said, since the transition from colonial to independent status itself is reduced to a “displacement of function between sign systems” (Spivak, 198).

     

    Kipnis, whose attempt to implicate both textualist and reformist feminisms in a politics of elitism and quietism has real merits, can in the end offer up as models for an “anti-colonial” feminism little more than the vague threat of anti-Western counter-terror from radical third-world nationalists such as Muammar Khadafy. We recall here Lenin’s dialectical insight inWhat is to be Done? regarding the internal link between spontaneism and an advocacy of terrorism. Yudice’s counter-posing of a third world “ethic of survival” to a postmodern ethic of “self- formation” possesses real force as itself an ethical judgement and one can only concur in arguing the superior moral example of a Rigoberta Menchu. But where does this lead us politically? Those super- exploited and oppressed at the periphery thus become pegged with a sort of sub-political consciousness, as if they couldn’t or needn’t see beyond the sheer fact of “survival.”

     

    Are these lapses into the most threadbare sorts of political myths and fetishes simply the result of ignorance or bad faith on the part of sympathetic first world theorists? Not at all, I would suggest. Regarding current political reality in Latin America, at least, such retreats into spontaneism and the overall sub-estimation of the conscious element in the waging of political struggle merely reflect in a general way the continuing and indeed increasing reliance of much of the autochthonous anti-imperialist left on a similar mix of romantic faith in exemplary violence and in the eventual spontaneous uprising of the “people,” whether with bullets or with ballots. Although bothfoquismo and the strategy of a “peaceful road to socialism” based on populist alliances are recognized on one level to have failed, the conclusions drawn from this by the mainstream left have on the whole only led to an even more thorough- going abandonment of Marxist and Leninist political strategies in favor of a “democratic” politics of consensus. The strategic watchword seems to be “hegemony”–as derived, so far, from Gramsci, although who can say whether Laclau and Mouffe might not stage a rapid conquest of the Latin American left intelligentsia the way Althusser did two decades ago? If the left is to reverse the disastrous consequences of praetorian fascism in the Southern Cone and Brazil, for example–a reversal now basically limited to the regaining of a “lost” bourgeois “democracy”–this will supposedly require a less “sectarian” approach in which such slogans as “democracy” and “national sovereignty” are given a “popular” rather than an “elite” content. The matter of ideology–the question of whether, for example, “democracy,” “national sovereignty,” etc., are the political ideas through which the masses of exploited Latin Americans are to attain true emancipation–is now generally dropped. (Another case of “essentialism.”) What is needed is to wage a “war of position” fought by a left-hegemonized “popular bloc” and not by a movement of workers and class-allies organized in a revolutionary party.

     

    This is not to say that the Gramscian political strategy associated with “hegemony” is necessarily tied to spontaneism; for Gramsci, at least, the “hegemony” required could only be the result of conscious political organizing and guidance by a working-class party itself led by its own “organic intellectuals.” (To what extent this accords or diverges from the Leninist strategy of democratic centralism is a matter we cannot go into here.) In its currently general acceptation in Latin America, however–linked as it is to purely reformist ends–“hegemony” implies a need to substitute a form of organization based on spontaneously arising social and cultural ideologies and practices for the “older” one of party-based, consciousness-raising agitation and recruitment. The almost unanimous move of the mainstream left to embrace liberation theology and the Catholic Church-led Christian base-community movement (or at least to refrain from open polemics with it) is the most significant example of a politics of “hegemony” over one of ideology.

     

    I think this entire political trend within Latin America can be correctly grasped only as a consequence of the failure of Marxists, in particular the established Communist Parties and allied organizations, to carry out a self-criticism from the left, and of the resulting shift rightward into political positions which merely compound the errors of the past. The response of traditional Latin American Marxism to the evident failure of populism (with or without afoco component) as a variation on the orthodox “two-stage” model (democratic capitalism first, then socialism) has typically been to jettison the second stage entirely. One could argue with a certain justice that this collapse was inevitable, given the political mistakes already embedded in the older line. As Adolfo Sanchez Vasquez has recently pointed out,28 Latin Americans inherited the Marxism of the Second International, the Marxism which regarded revolution in the Western centers of capitalism as the necessary precondition for even national liberation, much less socialism or communism on the periphery. The Marx who, after studying British colonialism in Ireland, concluded that the liberation of Irish workers from imperialism was key to the political advance of an increasingly reformist and conservative British working class; the Marx who speculated that peasant communes in Russia might make feasible a direct transition to socialism: this Marx was largely unknown in Latin America. Thus when the Communism of the Third International adopted the “two stage” model for neocolonial countries, Latin American revolutionaries had scarcely any theoretical basis upon which to dissent. (This, according to Sanchez Vasquez, held true even for so original a Marxist thinker as Mariategui, who, perhaps because he had to go outside Marxism for theories sensitive to factors of unequal development, was ultimately led in the direction of the irrationalism of Bergson and Sorel.) Latin America is in no way unique in this, needless to say. Everywhere the dominant trend is to compound past errors with even greater ones, thus reaching the point of renouncing the very core of Marxism as such in preference for liberal anachronisms and worse.

     

    I dwell on this because I think a truly critical assessment of an “anti-imperialist” postmodernism, as of orthodox postmodernism, requires a prior recognition of the essentially parasitical dependence of such thinking on Marxism and particularly on the crisis within Marxism–a dependence which, as we have repeatedly observed, postmodernism must systematically seek to erase. The very insistence on a politics of spontaneism and myth, on the tacit abandonment of conscious and scientific revolutionary strategy and organization, is, I am suggesting, the derivative effect of developments within Marxism itself, of what amounts to the conscious political decision to give up the principle of revolution as a scientifically grounded activity, as a praxis with a rational foundation. The contemporary emphasis on “cultural politics” which one finds throughout intellectual and radical discourse in Latin America as well as in the metropolis, while useful and positive to the degree that it opens up new areas for genuinely political analysis and critique, is symptomatic, in my view, of this theoretical surrender, and more often than not simply ratifies the non-strategy of spontaneism. One might almost speak these days of a “culturalism” occupying the ideological space once held by the “economism” of the Second International revisionists. To adopt the “postmodern” sensibility means, in this sense, to regard the “culturalization” of the political as somehow simply in accordance with the current nature of things–to so minimize the role of political determination as to eliminate it altogether. And yet, this sensibility itself is politically determined.

     

    Spontaneism, however it may drape itself in populist slogans and admiration for the people’s day to day struggle for survival, etc., rests on an intellectual distrust of the masses, a view of the mass as beyond the reach of reason and hence to be guided by myth. The Latin American masses have a long history of being stigmatized in this way by both imperial and creole elites. This elitism begins to lose its hold on the intelligentsia in the writings of genuine “radical democrats” such as Marti and is still further overcome in the discourses of revolutionary intellectuals such as Mariategui and Guevara, although even here vestiges of the old viewpoint remain. (Mariategui, who saw the Quechua-speaking indigenous peasants of Peru as beings with full historical and political subjecthood, maintained ridiculously archaic and racist views regarding Peru’s blacks.) And, of course, sexism has been and remains a serious and deadly obstacle.

     

    But in the era of ‘postmodernity’ we are being urged, in exchange for a cult of alterity, to relinquish this conception of the masses as the rational agents of social and historical change, as the bearers of progress. Given the increasing prevalence of such aristocratism, however it may devise radical credentials for itself, it becomes possible to fall short of this truly democratic vision, to be seduced by the false Nietzschean regard for the masses as capable only of an unconscious, instinctual political agency.

     

    Ultimately, it may be only revolutionary practice, the activity of strategy and organization, that can successfully trouble the political reveries of postmodernism. But just the sheer history of such practice, particularly in Latin America, makes risible any theory which considers politics (in the Leninist sense) to be either too abstract to matter, or–in what finally amounts to the same thing–to be “self- produced,” as Aronowitz has phrased it.

     

    Perhaps the most eloquent refutation of spontaneist faith in “new social movements” is recorded in Roque Dalton’s “testimonial classic”Miguel Marmol, in which the legendary Salvadoran revolutionary named in the title recounts a life as a communist militant in Central America. It is impossible to do justice to the combined practical wisdom and theoretical profundity of this narrative by citing excerpts–but one in particular speaks poignantly to the question at hand: In the third chapter of the text, Marmol discusses his return in 1930, shortly before he participates in founding the Salvadoran Communist Party, to his home town of Ilopango. His task is to organize a union of rural workers. At first, as he tells it, the workers reject him, suspicious of his being anti-Catholic. He is led to recall the failure of previous union organizing efforts carried out by a local teacher and a railroad engineer. “However, we suspected they had always worked outside reality, that they hadn’t based their organizing work on the actual problems of people and, on the contrary, had created an impenetrable barrier between their ‘enlightenment’ and the ‘backwardness’ they ascribed to the people.”29

     

    Marmol, however, persists in “finding out what the people thought” (M 119)–that is, he refuses to take their initially backward reaction (defense of the church) to mean that they lack “enlightenment.” Meetings are called, and as the people begin to talk about working conditions, Marmol recalls, “it wasn’t hard to hear, over and over again, concepts that sounded to me just like the ‘class struggle,’ the ‘dictatorship of the proletariat,’ etc.” (M 136-136). Marmol’s task, then, is not that of “enlightening” the “backward” masses, nor is it simply to acknowledge “what the people thought” as sovereign. Rather, it is to collect these isolated concepts, to articulate them, and to draw the logically necessary conclusions.

     

    Here, in so many words, Marmol demonstrates his profound, dialectical grasp of the essential, contradictory relation of theory to practice, of concept to reality, of the conscious to the spontaneous, of the “from without” to the “from within.” Postmodernism, meanwhile, even at its most “left,” political and self-critical, remains cut-off from the dialectical truths discovered in the practice of Marmol and of the millions of others in Latin America and across the planet who preceded and will follow him.

     

    Notes

     

    1. An original version of this paper was presented as a lecture, entitled “Postmodernism and Hegemony: Theory and Politics in Latin America,” at the Humanities Institute at SUNY Stony Brook on March 2, 1989.

     

    2. Fredric Jameson, “Postmodernism and Consumer Society,” inThe Anti-aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture, ed. Hal Foster (Port Townsend, WA:Bay Press, 1983), 112.

     

    3. Stanley Aronowitz, “Postmodern and Politics,” inUniversal Abandon?: the Politics of Postmodernism, ed. Andrew Ross (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 50.Universal Abandon? cited hereafter in text and notes asUA.

     

    4. Chantal Mouffe, “Radical Democracy,”UA 32.

     

    5. Ernesto Laclau, “Politics and the Limits of Modernity,”UA 66-67.

     

    6. Jean-Francois Lyotard,The Postmodern Condition, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).

     

    7. Frederick Engels,Socialism: Utopian and Scientific (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1975),46.

     

    8. See Ellen Meiksins Wood,The Retreat from Class: a New ‘True’ Socialism (London: Verso, 1986) chapter 4, “The Autonomization of Ideology and Politics.”

     

    9. Georg Lukacs,The Destruction of Reason, trans. Peter Palmer (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1981), 395.

     

    10. “The two moments–that of reason and that of its other–stand not in opposition pointing to a dialecticalAufhebung, but in a relationship of tension characterized by mutual repugnance and exclusion” (Habermas, “The Entry into Postmodernity: Nietzsche as Turning Point” inThe Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), 103).

     

    11. See the introductory chapter to myModernism and Hegemony: a Materialist Critique of Aesthetic Agencies (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990).

     

    12. “[T]he exterior is constituted by other discourses.” Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards Radical Democratic Politics (London: Verso, 1985), 146.

     

    13. See Lenin,What is to Be Done?: Burning Questions of Our Movement (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1973):

     

    all worship of the spontaneity of the working class movement, all belittling of the role of the "conscious element," of the role of Social- Democracy, means, quite independently of whether he who belittles that role desires it or not, a strengthening of the influence of bourgeois ideology upon the workers. (39) Since there can be no talk of an independent ideology formulated by the working masses themselves in the process of their movement, the only choice is--either bourgeois or socialist ideology. There is no middle course (for mankind has not created a "third" ideology, and, moreover, in a society torn by class antagonisms, there can never be a non-class or an above-class ideology). Hence to belittle the socialist ideology in any way, to turn aside from it in the slightest degree means to strengthen bourgeois ideology. There is much talk of spontaneity. But the spontaneous development of the working class movement leads to its subordination to bourgeois ideology. . . . (40-41)

     

    14. Peter Dews,Logics of Disintegration (London: Verso, 1987), 217.

     

    15. “Interview with Cornell West,”UA 273.

     

    16. Fredric Jameson, “Third-World Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism,”Social Text 15 (Fall 1986): 69.

     

    17. See Fredric Jameson, “Postmodernism: the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism,”New Left Review 146 (July-August 1984).

     

    18. Edward Said,The World, the Text and the Critic (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983),241.

     

    19. Gayatry Chakravorty Spivak,In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics (New York, London: Methuen, 1987), 209.

     

    20. See “The Discourse of Others: Feminism and Postmodernism,” in Foster, 57-82.

     

    21. George Yudice, “Marginality and the Ethics of Survival,”UA 220.

     

    22. See Rigoberta Menchu,Me llamo Rigoberta Menchu y asi me nacio la conciencia (Mexico: Siglo veintiuno, 1983).

     

    23. See “Actual Situation and Perspectives of Latin American Philosophy for Liberation,”The Philosophical Forum 20.1-2 (Fall-Winter 1988-89): 43-61. Cited hereafter in text asLAP.

     

    24. See Enrique Dussel,Philosophy of Liberation, trans. Aquilina Martinez and Christine Morkovsky (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 1985), 158-160.

     

    25. Roberto Fernandez Retamar,Para una teoria de la literatura hispano-americana (Habana: Casa de las Americas, 1975).

     

    26. Neil Larsen, “Latin America and Postmodernity: a Brief Theoretical Sketch,” unpublished paper; andModernism and Hegemony.

     

    27. Aijaz Ahmad, “Jameson’s Rhetoric of Otherness and the ‘National Allegory’,”Social Text 17 (Fall 1987): 3-27.

     

    28. Adolfo Sanchez Vasquez, “Marxism in Latin America,”The Philosophical Forum 20.1-2 (Fall-Winter 1988-89): 114-128.

     

    29. Roque Dalton,Miguel Marmol, trans. Kathleen Ross and Richard Schaaf (Willimantic, CT: Curbstone Press, 1982), 119. Cited hereafter in text asM.

     

  • The Ideology of Postmodern Music and Left Politics

    John Beverley

    University of Pittsburgh

     


     

    This article appeared initially in the British journal Critical Quarterly 31.1 (Spring, 1989). I’m grateful to its editors for permission to reproduce it here, and in particular to Colin MacCabe for suggesting the idea in the first place. I’ve added a few minor corrections and updates.

     


     

    for Rudy Van Gelder, friend of ears

     

     

    Adorno directed some of his most acid remarks on musical sociology to the category of the “fan.” For example:

     

    What is common to the jazz enthusiast of all countries, however, is the moment of compliance, in parodistic exaggeration. In this respect their play recalls the brutal seriousness of the masses of followers in totalitarian states, even though the difference between play and seriousness amounts to that between life and death (...) While the leaders in the European dictatorships of both shades raged against the decadence of jazz, the youth of the other countries has long since allowed itself to be electrified, as with marches, by the syncopated dance-steps, with bands which do not by accident stem from military music.1

     

    One of the most important contributions of postmodernism has been its defense of an aesthetics of theconsumer, rather than as in the case of romanticism and modernism an aesthetics of the producer, in turn linked to an individualist and phallocentric ego ideal. I should first of all make it clear then that I am writing here from the perspective of the “fan,” the person who buys records and goes to concerts, not like Adorno from the perspective of the trained musician or composer. What I will be arguing, in part with Adorno, in part against him, is that music is coming to represent for the Left something like a “key sector.”

     

    * * * * * * * * *

     

    For Adorno, the development of modern music is a reflection of the decline of the bourgeoisie, whose most characteristic cultural medium on the other hand music is.2 Christa Burger recalls the essential image of the cultural in Adorno: that of Ulysses, who, tied to the mast of his ship, can listen to the song of the sirens while the slaves underneath work at the oars, cut off from the aesthetic experience which is reserved only for those in power.3 What is implied and critiqued at the same time in the image is the stance of the traditional intellectual or aesthete in the face of the processes of transformation of culture into a commodity–mass culture–and the consequent collapse of the distinction between high and low culture, a collapse which precisely defines the postmodern and which postmodernist ideology celebrates. In the postmodern mode, not only are Ulysses and his crew both listening to the siren song, they are singing along with it as in “Sing Along with Mitch” and perhaps marking the beat with their oars–one-two, one-two, one-two-three-four.

     

    * * * * * * * *

     

    One variant of the ideology of postmodern music may be illustrated by the following remarks from an interview John Cage gave about his composition for electronic tapeFontana Mix (1958):

     

    Q.--I feel that there is a sense of logic and cohesion in your indeterminate music.

     

    A.--This logic was not put there by me, but was the result of chance operations. The thought that it is logical grows up in you... I think that all those things that we associate with logic and our observance of relationships, those aspects of our mind are extremely simple in relation to what actually happens, so that when we use our perception of logic we minimize the actual nature of the thing we are experiencing.

     

    Q.--Your conception (of indeterminacy) leads you into a universe nobody has attempted to charter before. Do you find yourself in it as a lawmaker?

     

    A.--I am certainly not at the point of making laws. I am more like a hunter, or an inventor, than a lawmaker.

     

    Q.--Are you satisfied with the way your music is made public--that is, by the music publishers, record companies, radio stations, etc.? Do you have complaints?

     

    A.--I consider my music, once it has left my desk, to be what in Buddhism would be called a non- sentient being... If someone kicked me--not my music, but me--then I might complain. But if they kicked my music, or cut it out, or don't play it enough, or too much, or something like that, then who am I to complain?4

     

    We might contrast this with one of the great epiphanies of literary modernism, the moment of the jazz song in Sartre’sNausea:

     

    (...)there is no melody, only notes, a myriad of tiny jolts. They know no rest, an inflexible order gives birth to them and destroys them without even giving them time to recuperate and exist for themselves. They race, they press forward, they strike me a sharp blow in passing and are obliterated. I would like to hold them back, but I know if I succeeded in stopping one it would remain between my fingers only as a raffish languishing sound. I must accept their death; I must evenwillit: I know few impressions stronger or more harsh.I grow warm, I begin to feel happy. There is nothing extraordinary in this, it is a small happiness of Nausea: it spreads at the bottom of the viscous puddle, at the bottom ofour time-- the time of purple suspenders and broken chair seats; it is made of wide, soft instants, spreading at the edge, like an oil stain. No sooner than born, it is already old, it seems as though I have known it for twenty years (...)

     

    The last chord has died away. In the brief silence which follows I feel strongly that there it is, thatsomething has happened.

     

    Silence.

     

    Some of these days
    You'll miss me honey

     

    What has just happened is that the Nausea has disappeared. When the voice was heard in the silence, I felt my body harden and the Nausea vanish. Suddenly: it was almost unbearable to become so hard, so brilliant. At the same time the music was drawn out, dilated, swelled like a waterspout. It filled the room with its metallic transparency, crushing our miserable time against the walls. I amin the music. Globes of fire turn in the mirrors; encircled by rings of smoke, veiling and unveiling the hard smile of light. My glass of beer has shrunk, it seems heaped up on the table, it looks dense and indispensable. I want to pick it up and feel the weight of it, I stretch out my hand... God! That is what has changed, my gestures. This movement of my arm has developed like a majestic theme, it has glided along the jazz song; I seemed to be dancing.5

     

     

    * * * * * * * *

     

    The passage fromNausea illustrates Adorno’s dictum that music is “the promise of reconciliation.” This is what betrays its origins in those moments of ritual sacrifice and celebration in which the members of a human community are bonded or rebonded to their places within it. InNausea the jazz song prefigures Roquentin’s eventual reconciliation with his own self and his decision to write what is in effect his dissertation, a drama of choice that will not be unfamiliar to readers of this journal. Even for an avant-gardist like Cage music is still–in the allusion to Buddhism–in some sense the sensuous form or “lived experience” of the religious.6

     

    Was it not the function of music in relation to the great feudal ideologies–Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, Hinduism, Shinto, Confucianism–to produce the sensation of the sublime and the eternal so as to constitute the image of the reward which awaited the faithful and obedient: the reward for submitting to exploitation or the reward for accepting the burden of exploiting? I am remembering as I write this Monteverdi’s beautiful echo duetDue Seraphim–two angels–for theVespers of the Virgin Mary of 1610, whose especially intense sweetness is perhaps related to the fact that it was written in a moment of crisis of both feudalism and Catholicism.

     

    Just before Monteverdi, the Italian Mannerists had proclaimed the formal autonomy of the art work from religious dogma. But if the increasing secularization of music in the European late Baroque and 18th century led on the one hand to the Jacobin utopianism of the Ninth Symphony, it produced on the other something like Kant’s aesthetics of the sublime, that is a mysticism of the bourgeois ego. As Adorno was aware, we are still in modern music in a domain where, as in the relation of music and feudalism, aesthetic experience, repression and sublimation, and class privilege and self-legitimation converge.7

     

    * * * * * * * *

     

    Genovese has pointed out in the Afro-American slave spiritual something like a contrary articulation of the relation of music and the religious to the one I have been suggesting: the sense in which both the music and the words of the song keep alive culturally the image of an imminent redemption from slavery and oppression, a redemption which lies within human time and a “real” geography of slave and free states (“The river Jordan is muddy and wide / Gotta get across to the other side”).8 Of the so-called Free Jazz movement of the 60s–Cecil Taylor, Ornette Coleman, Albert Ayler, late Coltrane, Archie Shepp, Sun Ra, etc.–the French critic Pierre Lere remarked in a passage quoted centrally by Herbert Marcuse in one of the key statements of 60s aesthetic radicalism:

     

    (...)the liberty of the musical form is only the aesthetic translation of the will to social liberation. Transcending the tonal framework of the theme, the musician finds himself in a position of freedom(...) The melodic line becomes the medium of communication between an initial order which is rejected and a final order which is hoped for. The frustrating possession of the one, joined with the liberating attainment of the other, establishes a rupture in between the Weft of harmony which gives way to an aesthetic of the cry (esthetique du cri). This cry, the characteristic resonant (sonore) element of "free music," born in an exasperated tension, announces the violent rupture with the established white order and translates the advancing (promotrice) violence of a new black order.9

     

    * * * * * * * *

     

    Music itself as ideology, as an ideological practice? What I have in mind is not at all the problem, common both to a Saussurian and a vulgar marxist musicology, of “how music expresses ideas.” Jacques Attali has correctly observed that while music can be defined as noise given form according to a code, nevertheless it cannot be equated with a language. Music, though it has a precise operationality, never has stable reference to a semantic code of the linguistic type. It is a sort of language without meaning.10

     

    Could we think of music then as outside of ideology to the extent that it is non-verbal? (This, some will recall, was Della Volpe’s move in his Critique of Taste.) One problem with poststructuralism in general and deconstruction in particular has been their tendency to see ideology as essentially bound up with language–the “Symbolic”– rather than organized states of feeling in general.11 But we certainly inhabit a cultural tradition where it is a common-sense proposition that people listen to music precisely to escape from ideology, from the terrors of ideology and the dimension of practical reason. Adorno, in what I take to be the quintessential modernist dictum, writes: “Beauty is like an exodus from the world of means and ends, the same world to which beauty however owes its objective existence.”12

     

    Adorno and the Frankfurt School make of the Kantian notion of the aesthetic as a purposiveness without purpose precisely the locus of the radicalizing and redemptive power of art, the sense in which by alienating practical aims it sides with the repressed and challenges domination and exploitation, particularly the rationality of capitalist institutions. By contrast, there is Lenin’s famous remark–it’s in Gorki’sReminiscences–that he had to give up listening to Beethoven’sAppasionata sonata: he enjoyed it too much, it made him feel soft, happy, at one with all humanity. His point would seem to be the need to resist a narcotic and pacifying aesthetic gratification in the name of the very difficult struggle–and the corresponding ideological rigor–necessary to at least setting in motion the process of building a classless society. But one senses in Lenin too the displacement or sublation of an aesthetic sensibility onto the field of revolutionary activism. And in both Adorno and Lenin there is a sense that music is somehow in excess of ideology.

     

    Not only the Frankfurt School, but most major tendencies in “Western Marxism” (a key exception is Gramsci) maintain some form or other of the art/ideology distinction, with a characteristic ethical-epistemological privileging of the aesthetic over the ideological. In Althusser’s early essays– “A Letter on Art to Andre Daspre,” for example–art was said to occupy an intermediate position between science and ideology, since it involved ideology (as, so to speak, its raw material), but in such a way as to provoke an “internal distancing” from ideology, somewhat as in Brecht’s notion of an “alienation effect” which obliges the spectator to scrutinize and question the assumptions on which the spectacle has been proceeding. In the section on interpellation in Althusser’s later essay on ideology, this “modernist” and formalist concern with estrangement and defamiliarization has been displaced by what is in effect a postmodernist concern with fascination and fixation. If ideology, in Althusser’s central thesis, is what constitutes the subject in relation to the real, then the domain of ideology is not a world-view or set of (verbal) ideas, but rather the ensemble of signifying practices in societies: that is, the cultural. In interpellation, the issue is not whether ideology is happening in the space of something like aesthetic experience, or whether “good” or “great” art transcends the merely ideological (whereas “bad” art doesn’t), but ratherwhat or whose ideology, because the art work is precisely (one of the places) where ideology happens, though of course this need not be the dominant ideology or even any particular ideology.

     

    * * * * * * * *

     

    If the aesthetic effect consists in a certain satisfaction of desire–a “pleasure” (in the formalists, the recuperation or production of sensation)–, and if the aesthetic effect is an ideological effect, then the question becomes not the separation of music and ideology but rather their relation.

     

    Music would seem to have in this sense a special relation to the pre-verbal, and thus to the Imaginary or more exactly to something like Kristeva’s notion of the semiotic.13 In the sort of potted lacanianism we employ these days in cultural studies, we take it that objects of imaginary identification function in the psyche–in a manner Lacan designated as “orthopedic”– as metonyms of an object of desire which has been repressed or forgotten, a desire which can never be satisfied and which consequently inscribes in the subject a sense of insufficiency or fading. In narcissism, this desire takes the form of a libidinal identification of the ego with an image or sensation of itself as (to recall Freud’s demarcation of the alternatives in his 1916 essay on narcissism) it is, was or should be. From the third of these possibilities–images or experiences of the ego as it should be–Freud argued that there arises as a consequence of the displacement of primary narcissism the images of an ideal ego or ego ideal, internalized as the conscience or super ego. Such images, he added, are not only of self but also involve the social ideals of the parent, the family, the tribe, the nation, the race, etc. Consequently, those sentiments which are the very stuff of ideology in the narrow sense of political “isms” and loyalties–belonging to a party, being an “american,” defending the family “honor,” fighting in a national liberation movement, etc.–are basically transformations of homoerotic libidinal narcissism.

     

    It follows then that the aesthetic effect–even the sort of non-semantic effect produced by the organization of sound (in music) or color and line (in painting or sculpture)–always implies a kind of social Imaginary, a way of being with and/or for others. Although they are literature-centered, we may recall in this context Jameson’s remarks at the end ofThe Political Unconscious (in the section titled “The Dialectic of Utopia and Ideology”) to the effect that “all class consciousness–that is all ideology in the strict sense–, as much the exclusive forms of consciousness of the ruling classes as the opposing ones of the oppressed classes, are in their very nature utopian.” From this Jameson claims–this is his appropriation of Frankfurt aesthetics–that the aesthetic value of a given work of art can never be limited to its moment of genesis, when it functioned willy-nilly to legitimize some form or other of domination. For if its utopian quality as “art”–its “eternal charm,” to recall Marx’s (eurocentric, petty bourgeois) comment on Greek epic poetry–is precisely that it expresses pleasurably the imaginary unity of a social collectivity, then “it is utopian not as a thing in itself, but rather to the extent that such collectivities are themselves ciphers for the final concretion of collective life, that is the achieved utopia of a classless society.”14

     

    What this implies, although I’m not sure whether Jameson himself makes this point as such, is that the political unconscious of the aesthetic is (small c) communism. (One would need to also work through here the relation between music–Wagner, Richard Strauss –and fascism.)

     

    * * * * * * * *

     

    I want to introduce at this point an issue which was particularly crucial to the way in which I experienced and think about music, which is the relation of music and drugs. It is said the passage fromNausea I used before derived from Sartre’s experiments in the 30s with mescaline. Many of you will have your own versions of essential psychedelic experiences of the 60s, but here–since I’m not likely to be nominated in the near future for the Supreme Court–is one of mine. It is 1963, late at night. I’m a senior in college and I’ve taken peyote for the first time. I’m lying face down on a couch with a red velour cover. Mozart is playing, something like the adagio of a piano concerto. As my nausea fades–peyote induces in the first half hour or so a really intense nausea–I begin to notice the music which seems to become increasingly clear and beautiful. I feel my breath making my body move against the couch and I feel the couch respond to me as if it were a living organism, very soft and very gentle, as if it were the body of my mother. I remember or seem to remember being close to my mother in very early childhood. I am overwhelmed with nostalgia. The room fills with light. I enter a timeless, paradisiacal state, beyond good and evil. The music goes on and on.

     

    There was of course also the freak-out or bad trip: the drug exacerbated sensation that the music is incredibly banal and stupid, that the needle of the record player is covered with fuzz, that the sound is thick and ugly like mucus; Charlie Manson hearing secret apocalyptic messages in “Helter Skelter” on the Beatles’sWhite Album; the Stones at Altamont. Modernism in music, say the infinitely compressed fragments of late Webern, is the perception in the midst of the bad trip, of dissonance, of a momentary cohesion and radiance, whose power is all the greater because it shines out of chaos and evil. In Frankfurt aesthetics, dissonance is the voice of the oppressed in music. Thus for Adorno it is only in dissonance, which destroys the illusion of reconciliation represented by harmony, that the power of seduction of the inspiring character of music survives.15

     

    * * * * * * * *

     

    Consider what moderation is required to express oneself so briefly… You can stretch every glance out into a poem, every sigh into a novel. But to express a novel in a single gesture, a joy in a breath–such concentration can only be present in proposition to the absence of self- pity. –Schoenberg on Webern16

     

    * * * * * * * *

     

    Cage’s4’33”–which is a piece where the performer sits at a piano without playing anything for four minutes and thirty-three seconds–is a postmodernist homage to modernist aesthetics, to serialism and private language music. What it implies is that the listening subject is to compose from the very absence of music the music, the performance from the frustration of the expected performance. As in the parallel cases of Duchamp’s ready-mades or Rauschenberg’s white paintings, such a situation gives rise to an appropriately “modernist” anxiety (which might be allegorized in Klee’s twittering birds whose noise emanates from the very miniaturization, compression and silent tension of the pictorial space) to create an aesthetic experience out of the given, whatever it is.

     

    Postmodernism per se in music, on the other hand, is where the anxiety of the listener to “make sense of” the piece is either perpetually frustrated by pure randomness–Cage’s music of chance–or assuaged and dissipated by a bland, “easy-listening” surface with changes happening only in a Californianlongue duree, as in the musics of La Monte Young, Philip Glass, Terry Riley, or Steve Reich. The intention of such musics, we might say, is to transgress both the Imaginary and Symbolic: they are a sort of brainwashing into the Real.

     

    * * * * * * * *

     

    I [heart] ADORNO

     

    --bumper sticker (thanks to Hilary Radner)

    * * * * * * * *

     

    One form of capitalist utopia which is portended in contemporary music–we could call it the Chicago School or neoliberal form–is the utopia of the record store, with its incredible proliferation and variety of musical commodities, its promise of “different strokes for different folks,” as Sly Stone would have it: Michael Jackson–or Prince–, Liberace, Bach on original instruments ora la Cadillac by the Philadelphia Orchestra, Heavy Metal–or Springsteen–, Country (what kind of Country: Zydeco, Appalachian, Bluegrass, Dolly Parton, trucker, New Folk, etc.?), jazz, blues, spirituals, soul, rap, hip hop, fusion, college rock (Grateful Dead, REM, Talking Heads), SST rock (Meat Puppets etc.), Holly Near,Hymnen, salsa, reggae, World Beat,norteno music, cumbias, Laurie Anderson, 46 different recorded versions ofBolero, John Adams, and so on and on, with the inevitable “crossovers” and new “new waves.” By contrast, even the best stocked record outlets in socialist countries were spartan.

     

    But this is also “Brazil” (as in the song/film): the dystopia of behaviorly tailored, industrially manufactured, packaged and standardized music–Muzak–, where it is expected that everyone except owners and managers of capital will be at the same time a fast food chain worker and consumer. Muzak is to music what, say, McDonalds is to food; and since its purpose is to generate an environment conducive to both commodity production and consumption, it is more often than not to be heard in places like McDonalds (or, so we are told in prison testimonies, in that Latin American concomitant of Chicago School economics which are torture chambers, with the volume turned up to the point of distortion).

     

    In Russell Berman’s perhaps overly anxious image, Muzak implies a fundamental mutation of the public sphere, “the beautiful illusion of a collective, singing along in dictatorial unanimity.” Its ubiquity, as in the parallel cases of advertising and packaging and design, refers to a situation where there is no longer, Berman writes, “an outside to art (…) There is no pre-aesthetic dimension to social activity, since the social order itself has become dependent on aesthetic organization.”17

     

    Berman’s concern here I take to be in the spirit of the general critique Habermas–and in this country Christopher Lasch–have made of postmodern commodity culture, a critique which as many people have noted coincides paradoxically (since its main assumption is that postmodernism is a reactionary phenomenon) with the cultural politics of the new Right, for example Alan Bloom’s clinically paranoid remarks on rock inThe Closing of the American Mind.18

     

    Is the loss of autonomy of the aesthetic however a bad thing–something akin to Marcuse’s notion of a “repressive desublimation” which entails the loss of art’s critical potential–, or does it indicate a new vulnerability of capitalist societies–a need to legitimize themselves through aestheticization–and therefore both anew possibility for the left and a new centrality for cultural and aesthetic matters in left practice? For, as Berman is aware, the aestheticization of everyday life was also the goal of the historical avant garde in its attack on the institution of the autonomy of the aesthetic in bourgeois culture, which made it at least potentially a form of anti-capitalist practice. The loss of aura or desublimation of the art work may be a form of commodification but it is also, as Walter Benjamin pointed out, a form of democratization of culture.19

     

    Cage writes suggestively, for example, of “a music which is like furniture–a music, that is, which will be part of the noises of the environment, will take them into consideration. I think of it as a melodious softening the noises of the knives and forks, not dominating them, not imposing itself. It would fill up those heavy silences that sometimes fall between friends dining together.”20 In some of the work of La Monte Young or Brian Eno, music becomes consciously an aspect of interior decorating. What this takes us back to is not Muzak but the admirable baroque tradition ofTafel Musik: “table” or dinner music. Mozart still wrote at the time of the French Revolution comfortably and welldivertimentii meant to accompany social gatherings, including meetings of his Masonic lodge. After Mozart, this utilitarian or “background” function is repressed in bourgeois art music, which will now require the deepest concentration and emotional and intellectual involvement on the part of the listening subject.

     

    The problem with Muzak is not its ubiquity or the idea of environmental music per se, but rather its insistently kitsch and conservative melodic-harmonic content. What is clear, on the other hand, is that the intense and informed concentration on the art work which is assumed in Frankfurt aesthetics depends on an essentially Romantic, formalist and individualist conception of both music and the listening subject, which is not unrelated to the actual processes of commodification “classical” music was undergoing in the late 18th and 19th centuries.

     

    * * * * * * * *

     

    The antidote to Muzak would seem to be something like Punk. By way of a preface to a discussion of Punk and extending the considerations above on the relation between music and commodification, I want to refer first to Jackson Pollock’s great paintingAutumn Rhythm in the Met, a picture that–like Pollock’s work in general–is particularly admired by Free Jazz musicians. It’s a vast painting with splotches of black, brown and rust against the raw tan of unprimed canvas, with an incredible dancing, swirling, clustering, dispersing energy. As you look at it, you become aware that while the ambition of the painting seems to be to explode or expand the pictorial space of the canvas altogether, it is finally only the limits of the canvas which make the painting possible as an art object. The limit of the canvas is its aesthetic autonomy, its separation from the life world, but also its commodity status as something that can be bought, traded, exhibited. The commodity is implicated in the very form of the “piece;” as in the jazz record in Nausea, “The music ends.” (The 78 RPM record–the commodity form of recorded music in the 20s and 30s– imposed a three minute limit per side on performances and this in turn shaped the way songs were arranged in jazz or pop recording: cf. the 45 and the idea today of the “single.”)

     

    Such a situation might indicate one limit of Jameson’s cultural hermeneutic. If the strategy in Jameson is to uncover the emancipatory utopian- communist potential locked up in the artifacts of the cultural heritage, this is also in a sense to leave everything as it is, as in Wittgenstein’s analytic (because that which is desired is already there; it only has to be “seen” correctly), whereas the problem of the relation of art and social liberation is also clearly the need totransgress the limits imposed by existing artistic forms and practices and to produce new ones. To the extent, however, such transgressions can be recontained within the sphere of the aesthetic– in a new series of “works” which may also be available as commodities–, they will produce paradoxically an affirmation of bourgeois culture: in a certain sense theyare bourgeois high culture.

     

    A representation of this paradox in terms of 60s leftism is the great scene in Antonioni’s film Zabriskie Point where the (modernist) desert home of the capitalist pig is (in the young woman’s imagination) blown up, and we see in ultra slow motion, in beautiful Technicolor, accompanied by a spacy and sinister Pink Floyd music track, the whole commodity universe of late capitalism–cars, tools, supermarket food, radios, TVs, clothes, furniture, records, books, decorations, utensils–float by. What is not clear is who could have placed the bomb, so that Jameson might ask in reply a question the film itself also leaves unanswered: is this an image of the destruction of capitalism or of its fission into a new and “higher” stage where it fills all space and time, where there is no longer something–nature, the Third World, the unconscious–outside it? And this question suggests another one: to what extent was the cultural radicalism of the 60s, nominally directed against the rationality of capitalist society and its legitimating discourses, itself a form of modernization of capitalism, a prerequisite of its “expanded” reproduction in the new international division of labor and the proliferation of electronic technologies–with corresponding “mind- sets”–which emerge in the 70s?21

     

    * * * * * * * *

     

    From Punk manifestos:

     

    Real life stinks. What has been shown is that you and I can do anything in any area without training and with little cash.

     

    We're demanding that real life keep up with advertising, the speed of advertising on TV... We are living at the speed of advertising. We demand to be entertained all the time, we get bored very quickly. When we're on stage, things happen a thousand times faster, everything we do is totally compressed and intense on stage, and that's our version of life as we feel and see it. In the future T.V. will be so good that the printed word will function as an artform only. In the future we will not have time for leisure activities. In the future we will "work" one day a week. In the future there will be machines which will produce a religious experience in the user. In the future there will be so much going on that no one will be able to keep track of it. (David Byrne)22

     

    The emergence and brief hegemony of Punk–from, say, 1975 to 1982–was related to the very high levels of structural unemployment or subemployment which appear in First World capitalist centers in the 70s as a consequence of the winding down of the post-World War II economic long cycle, and which imply especially for lower middle class and working class youth a consequent displacement of the work ethic towards a kind of on the dole bohemianism or dandyism. Punk aimed at a sort of rock or Gesamtkunstwerk (Simon Frith has noted its connections with Situationist ideology23) which would combine music, fashion, dance, speech forms, mime, graphics, criticism, new “on the street” forms of appropriation of urban space, and in which in principle everybody was both a performer and a spectator. Its key musical form was three-chord garage power rock, because its intention was to contest art rock and superstar rock, to break down the distance between fan and performer. Punk was loud, aggressive, eclectic, anarchic, amateur, self-consciously anti- commercial and anti-hippie at the same time.

     

    As it was the peculiar genius of the Sex Pistol’s manager, Malcolm McClaren, to understand, both the conditions of possibility and the limits of Punk were those of a still expanding capitalist consumer culture –a culture which, in one sense, was intended as a compensation for the decline in working-class standards of living. Initially, Punk had to create its own forms of record production and distribution, independent of the “majors” and of commercial music institutions in general. The moment that to be recognized as Punk is to conform to an established image of consumer desire, to be different say than New Wave, is the moment Punk becomes the new commodity. It is the moment of the Sex Pistols’ US tour depicted inSid and Nancy, where on the basis of the realization that they are becoming a commercial success on the American market–the new band–they auto- destruct. But the collapse of Punk–and its undoubted flirtation with nihilism–should not obscure the fact that it was for a while–most consciously in the work of British groups like the Clash or the Gang of Four and also in collective projects like Rock Against Racism–a very powerful form of Left mass culture, perhaps–if we are attentive to Lenin’s dictum that ideas acquire a material force when they reach the millions–one of the most powerful forms we have seen in recent years in Western Europe and the United States. Some of Punk’s heritage lives on in the popularity of U2 or Tracy Chapman today and or in the recent upsurge of Heavy Metal (which, it should be recalled, has one of its roots in the Detroit 60s movement band, MC5).

     

    * * * * * * * *

     

    The notion of postmodernism initially comes into play to designate a crisis in the dominant canons of American architecture. Hegel posited architecture over music as the world historical form of Romantic art, because in architecture the reconciliation of spirit and matter, reason and history, represented ultimately by the state was more completely realized. Hence, for example, Jameson’s privileging of architecture in his various discussions of postmodernism. I think that today, however, particularly if we are thinking about how to develop a left practice on the terrain of the postmodern, we have to be for music as against architecture, because it is in architecture that the power and self-representation of capital and the imperialist state reside, whereas music–like sports– is always and everywhere a power of cultural production which is in the hands of the people. Capital can master and exploit music–and modern musics like rock are certainly forms of capitalist culture–, but it can never seize hold of and monopolize its means of production, as it can say with literature. The cultural presence of the Third World in and against the dominant of imperialism is among other things, to borrow Jacques Attali’s concept, “noise”–the intrusion of new forms of language and music which imply new forms of community and pleasure: Bob Marley’s reggae; Run-DMC on MTV with “Walk This Way” (a crossover of rap with white Heavy Metal); “We Shall Overcome” sung at a sit-in for Salvadoran refugees; the beautiful South African choral music Paul Simon used onGraceland sung at a township funeral;La Bamba; Public Enemy’s “Fight the Power”; Ruben Blades’Crossover Dreams.

     

    The debate overGraceland some years ago indicates that the simple presence of Third World music in a First World context implies immediately a series of ideological effects, which doesn’t mean that I think there was a “correct line” onGraceland, e.g. that it was a case of Third World suffering and creative labor sublimated into an item of First World white middle-class consumption.24 Whatever the problems with the concept of the Third World, it can no longer mark an “other” that is radically outside of and different than contemporary American or British society. By the year 2000, one out of four inhabitants of the United States will be non-european (black, hispanic of latin american origin, asian or native american); even today we are the fourth or fifth largest hispanic country in the world (out of twenty). In this sense, the Third World is alsoinside the First, “en las entranas del monstruo” (in the entrails of the monster) as Jose Marti would have said, and for a number of reasons music has been and is perhaps the hegemonic cultural form of this insertion. What would American musical culture be like for example without the contribution of Afro-American musics?

     

    Turning this argument on its head, assume something like the following: a young guerrilla fighter of the FMLN in El Salvador wearing a Madonna T-shirt. A traditional kind of Left cultural analysis would have talked about cultural imperialism and how the young man or woman in question had become a revolutionaryin spite of Madonna and American pop culture. I don’t want to discount entirely the notion of cultural imperialism, which seems to me real and pernicious enough, but I think we might also begin to consider how being a fan of Madonna might in some sensecontribute to becoming a guerrilla or political activist in El Salvador. (And how wearing a Madonna T-shirt might be a form of revolutionary cultural politics: it certainly defines–correctly–a community of interest between young people in El Salvador and young people in the United States who like Madonna.)

     

    * * * * * * * *

     

    Simon Frith has summarized succinctly the critique of the limitations of Frankfurt school aesthetic theory that has been implicit here: The Frankfurt scholars argued that the transformation of art into commodity inevitably sapped imagination and withered hope–now all that could be imagined was what was. But the artistic impulse is not destroyed by capital; it is transformed by it. As utopianism is mediated through the new processes of cultural production and consumption, new sorts of struggles over community and leisure begin.25 More and more–the point has been made by Karl Offe among others–the survival of capitalism has become contingent on non-capitalist forms of culture, including those of the Third World. What is really utopian in the present context is not so much the sublation of art into life under the auspices of advanced consumer capitalism, but rather the current capitalist project of reabsorbing the entire life energy of world society into labor markets and industrial or service production. One of the places where the conflict between forces and relations of production is most acutely evident is in the current tensions–the FBI warning at the start of your evening video, for example–around the commercialization of VCR and digital sound technologies. Cassettes and CDs are the latest hot commodities, but by the same token they portend the possibility of a virtual decommodification of music and film material, since its reproduction via these technologies can no longer be easily contained within the “normal” boundaries of capitalist property rights.

     

    As opposed to both Frankfurt school styleAngst about commodification and a neopopulism which can’t imagine anything finer than Bruce Springsteen (I have in mind Jesse Lemisch’s polemic against Popular Front style “folk” music inThe Nation)26, I think we have to reject the notion that certain kinds of music area priori ethically and politically OK and others not (which doesn’t mean that there is not ideological struggle in music and choice of music). Old Left versions of this, some will recall, ranged from jazz=good, classical=bad (American CP), to jazz=bad, classical=good (Soviet CP). The position of the Left today–understanding this in the broadest possible sense, as in the idea of the Rainbow–should be in favor of the broadest possible variety and proliferation of musics and related technologies of pleasure, on the understanding–or hope–that in the long run this will be deconstructive of capitalist hegemony. This is a postmodernist position, but it also involves challenging a certain smugness in postmodernist theory and practice about just how far elite/popular, high culture/mass culture distinctions have broken down. Too much of postmodernism seems simply a renovated form of bourgeois “art” culture. To my mind, the problem is not how much but rather how little commodification of culture has introduced a universal aestheticization of everyday life. The Left needs to defend the pleasure principle (“fun”) involved in commodity aesthetics at the same time that it needs to develop effective images ofpost-commodity gratification linked–as transitional demands–to an expansion of leisure time and a consequent transformation of the welfare state from the realm of economic maintenance–the famous “safety net”–to that of the provision of forms of pleasure and personal development outside the parameters of commodity production. While it is good and necessary to remind ourselves that we are a long way away from the particular cultural forms championed by the Popular Front–that these are now the stuff ofour nostalgia mode–, we also need to think about the ways in which the Popular Fronts in their day were able to hegemonize both mass and elite culture. The creation–as in a tentative way in this paper–of anideologeme which articulates the political project of ending or attenuating capitalist domination with both the productionand consumption of contemporary music seems to me one of the most important tasks in cultural work the Left should have on its present agenda.

     

    Of course, what we anticipate in taking up this task is also the moment–or moments–when architecture becomes the form of expression of the people, because that would be the moment when power had really begun to change hands. What would this architecture be like?

     

    Notes

     

    1. Theodor Adorno, “Perennial Fashion–Jazz,” in Prisms, trans. Samuel and Shierry Weber (London: Neville Spearman, 1967), 128-29.

     

    2. On this point, see Adorno’s remarks inThe Philosophy of Modern Music, trans. Anne Mitchell and Wesley Blomster (New York: Seabury, 1980), 129-33.

     

    3. Christa Burger, “The Disappearance of Art: The Postmodernism Debate in the U.S.,”Telos, 68 (Summer 1986), 93-106.

     

    4. Ilhan Mimaroglu, extracts from interview with John Cage in record album notes for Berio, Cage, Mimaroglu,Electronic Music (Turnabout TV34046S).

     

    5. Jean-Paul Sartre,Nausea, trans. Lloyd Alexander (New York: New Directions, 1959), 33-36.

     

    6. Cf. the following remarks by the minimalist composer La Monte Young:

     

    Around 1960 I became interested in yoga, in which the emphasis is on concentration and focus on the sounds inside your head. Zen meditation allows ideas to come and go as they will, which corresponds to Cage's music; he and I are like opposites which help define each other (...) In singing, when the tone becomes perfectly in tune with a drone, it takes so much concentration to keep it in tune that it drives out all other thoughts. You become one with the drone and one with the Creator.

     

    Cited in Kyle Gann, “La Monte Young: Maximal Spirit,” Village Voice, June 9, 1987, 70. (Gann’s column in the Voice is a good place to track developments in contemporary modernist and postmodernist music in the NY scene.)

     

    7. “Beethoven’s symphonies in their most arcane chemistry are part of the bourgeois process of production and express the perennial disaster brought on by capitalism. But they also take a stance of tragic affirmation towards reality as a social fact; they seem to say that the status quo is the best of all possible worlds. Beethoven’s music is as much a part of the revolutionary emancipation of the bourgeoisie as it anticipates the latter’s apologia. The more profoundly you decode works of art, the less absolute is their contrast to praxis.” Adorno,Aesthetic Theory, trans. C. Lenhardt (New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), 342.

     

    8. Eugene Genovese,Roll, Jordan, Roll. The World the Slaves Made (New York: Vintage, 1976), 159-280.

     

    9. Pierre Lere, “Free Jazz: Evolution ou Revolution,”Revue d’esth tique, 3-4, 1970, 320-21, translated and cited in Herbert Marcuse, Counterrevolution and Revolt (Boston: Beacon, 1972),114.

     

    10. See Attali’s,Noise: The Political Economy of Music, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1985).

     

    11. Barthes is perhaps an exception, and Derrida has written on pictures and painting. John Mowitt at the University of Minnesota has been doing the most interesting work on music from a poststructuralist perspective that I have seen. He suggests as a primer on poststructuralist music theory I. Stoianova,Geste, Texte, Musique (Paris: 10/18, 1985).

     

    12.Aesthetic Theory, 402.

     

    13. The semiotic for Kristeva is a sort of babble out of which language arises–something between glossolalia and the pre-oedipal awareness of the sounds of the mother’s body–and which undermines the subject’s submission to the Symbolic. “Kristeva makes the case that the semiotic is the effect of bodily drives which are incompletely repressed when the paternal order has intervened in the mother/child dyad, and it is therefore ‘attached’ psychically to the mother’s body.” Paul Smith,Discerning the Subject (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1988), 121.

     

    14. Fredric Jameson,The Political Unconscious. Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act (Ithaca: Cornell, 1981), 288-91.

     

    15.Aesthetic Theory, 21-22.

     

    16. I’ve lost the reference for this quote.

     

    17. Russell Berman, “Modern Art and Desublimation,”Telos, 62 (Winter 1984-85): 48.

     

    18. Andreas Huyssen notes perceptively that “Given the aesthetic field-force of the term postmodernism, no neo-conservative today would dream of identifying the neo-conservative project as postmodern.” “Mapping the Postmodern,” in hisAfter the Great Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture, Postmodernism (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1986), 204. I became aware of Huyssen’s work only as I was finishing this paper, but it’s obvious that I share here his problematic and many of his sympathies (including an ambivalence about McDonalds).

     

    19. See in particular Susan Buck-Morss, “Benjamin’sPassagen-Werk: Redeeming Mass Culture for the Revolution.”New German Critique, 29 (Spring- Summer 1983), 211-240; and in general the work of Stuart Hall and the Birmingham Center for Cultural Studies. Peter Burger’s summary of recent work on the autonomy of art in bourgeois society is useful here: Theory of the Avant-Garde, trans. Michael Shaw (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota, 1984), 35-54. In a way Frankfurt theory didn’t anticipate, it has seemed paradoxically necessary for capitalist merchandising to preserve or inject some semblance of aura in the commodity–hence kitsch: the Golden Arches–, whereas communist or socialized production should in principle have no problem with loss of aura, since it is not implicated in the commodity status of a use value or good. Postmodernist pastiche ormode retro–where a signifier of aura is alluded to or incorporated, but in an ironic and playful way–seems an intermediate position, in the sense that it can function both to endow the commodity with an “arty” quality or to detach aspects of commodity aesthetics from commodity production and circulation per se, as in Warhol.

     

    20. John Cage, “Erik Satie,” inSilence (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1966), p.76.

     

    21. “Yet this sense of freedom and possibility– which is for the course of the 60s a momentarily objective reality, as well as (from the hindsight of the 80s) a historical illusion–may perhaps best be explained in terms of the superstructural movement and play enabled by the transition from one infrastructural or systemic stage of capitalism to another.” Fredric Jameson, “Periodizing the 60s,” in Sohnya Sayres ed., The 60s Without Apology (Minneapolis:Social Text/Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1984), 208.

     

    22. From Isabelle Anscombe and Dike Blair eds., Punk! (New York: Urizen, 1978).

     

    23. Simon Frith,Sound Effects. Youth, Leisure and the Politics of Rock ‘n’ Roll (New York: Pantheon, 1981), 264-268.

     

    24. On this point, see Andrew Goodwin and Joe Gore “World Beat and the Cultural Imperialism Debate,” Socialist Review 20.3 (Jul.-Sep., 1990): 63-80.

     

    25.Sound Effects, 268. Cf. Huyssen: “The growing sense that we are not bound tocomplete the project of modernity (Habermas’ phrase) and still do not necessarily have to lapse into irrationality or into apocalyptic frenzy, the sense that art is not exclusively pursuing some telos of abstraction, non- representation, and sublimity–all of this has opened up a host of possibilities for creative endeavors today.”After the Great Divide, 217.

     

    26. “I Dreamed I Saw MTV Last Night,”The Nation (October 18, 1986), 361, 374-376; and Lemisch’s reply to the debate which ensued, “The Politics of Left Culture,”The Nation (December 20, 1986), 700 ff.

     

  • Dead Doll Humility

    Kathy Acker

         IN ANY SOCIETY BASED ON CLASS, HUMILIATION IS A
    
         POLITICAL REALITY.  HUMILIATION IS ONE METHOD BY WHICH
    
         POLITICAL POWER IS TRANSFORMED INTO SOCIAL OR PERSONAL
    
         RELATIONSHIPS.  THE PERSONAL INTERIORIZATION OF THE
    
         PRACTICE OF HUMILIATION IS CALLED HUMILITY.
    
         CAPITOL IS AN ARTIST WHO MAKES DOLLS.  MAKES, DAMAGES,
    
         TRANSFORMS, SMASHES.  ONE OF HER DOLLS IS A WRITER
    
         DOLL.  THE WRITER DOLL ISN'T VERY LARGE AND IS ALL
    
         HAIR, HORSE MANE HAIR, RAT FUR, DIRTY HUMAN HAIR,
    
         PUSSY.
    
              ONE NIGHT CAPITOL GAVE THE FOLLOWING SCENARIO TO
    
         HER WRITER DOLL:
    
         As a child in sixth grade in a North American school,
    
         won first prize in a poetry contest.
    
              In late teens and early twenties, entered New York
    
         City poetry world.  Prominent Black Mountain poets,
    
         mainly male, taught or attempted to teach her that a
    
         writer becomes a writer when and only when he finds his
    
         own voice.
    
         CAPITOL DIDN'T MAKE ANY AVANT-GARDE POET DOLLS.
    
         Since wanted to be a writer, tried hard to find her own
    
         voice.  Couldn't.  But still loved to write.  Loved to
    
         play with language.  Language was material like clay or
    
         paint.  Loved to play with verbal material, build up
    
         slums and mansions, demolish banks and half-rotten
    
         buildings, even buildings which she herself had
    
         constructed, into never-before-seen, even unseeable
    
         jewels.
    
              To her, every word wasn't only material in itself,
    
         but also sent out like beacons, other words.  Blue
    
         sent out heaven and The Virgin.  Material is rich.
    
         I didn't create language, writer thought.  Later she
    
         would think about ownership and copyright.  I'm
    
         constantly being given language.  Since this language-
    
         world is rich and always changing, flowing, when I
    
         write, I enter a world which has complex relations and
    
         is, perhaps, illimitable.  This world both represents
    
         and is human history, public memories and private
    
         memories turned public, the records and actualizations
    
         of human intentions.  This world is more than life and
    
         death, for here life and death conjoin.  I can't make
    
         language, but in this world, I can play and be played.
    
              So where is 'my voice'?
    
              Wanted to be a writer.
    
              Since couldn't find 'her voice', decided she'd
    
         first have to learn what a Black Mountain poet meant by
    
         'his voice'.  What did he do when he wrote?
    
              A writer who had found his own voice presented a
    
         viewpoint.  Created meaning.  The writer took a certain
    
         amount of language, verbal material, forced that
    
         language to stop radiating in multiple, even
    
         unnumerable directions, to radiate in only one
    
         direction so there could be his meaning.
    
              The writer's voice wasn't exactly this meaning.
    
         The writer's voice was a process, how he had forced the
    
         language to obey him, his will.  The writer's voice is
    
         the voice of the writer-as-God.
    
              Writer thought, Don't want to be God; have never
    
         wanted to be God.  All these male poets want to be the
    
         top poet, as if, since they can't be a dictator in the
    
         political realm, can be dictator of this world.
    
              Want to play.  Be left alone to play.  Want to be
    
         a sailor who journeys at every edge and even into the
    
         unknown.  See strange sights, see.  If I can't keep on
    
         seeing wonders, I'm in prison.  Claustrophobia's sister
    
         to my worst nightmare: lobotomy, the total loss of
    
         perceptual power, of seeing new.  If had to force
    
         language to be uni-directional, I'd be helping my own
    
         prison to be constructed.
    
              There are enough prisons outside, outside
    
         language.
    
              Decided, no.  Decided that to find her own voice
    
         would be negotiating against her joy.  That's what the
    
         culture seemed to be trying to tell her to do.
    
              Wanted only to write.  Was writing.  Would keep on
    
         writing without finding 'her own voice'.  To hell with
    
         the Black Mountain poets even though they had taught
    
         her a lot.
    
              Decided that since what she wanted to do was just
    
         to write, not to find her own voice, could and would
    
         write by using anyone's voice, anyone's text, whatever
    
         materials she wanted to use.
    
              Had a dream while waking that was running with
    
         animals.  Wild horses, leopards, red fox, kangaroos,
    
         mountain lions, wild dogs.  Running over rolling hills.
    
         Was able to keep up with the animals and they accepted
    
         her.
    
              Wildness was writing and writing was wildness.
    
              Decision not to find this own voice but to use and
    
         be other, multiple, even innumerable, voices led to two
    
         other decisions.
    
              There were two kinds of writing in her culture:
    
         good literature and schlock.  Novels which won literary
    
         prizes were good literature; science fiction and horror
    
         novels, pornography were schlock.  Good literature
    
         concerned important issues, had a high moral content,
    
         and, most important, was written according to well-
    
         established rules of taste, elegance, and conservatism.
    
         Schlock's content was sex horror violence and other
    
         aspects of human existence abhorrent to all but the
    
         lowest of the low, the socially and morally
    
         unacceptable.  This trash was made as quickly as
    
         possible, either with no regard for the regulations of
    
         politeness or else with regard to the crudest, most
    
         vulgar techniques possible.  Well-educated,
    
         intelligent, and concerned people read good literature.
    
         Perhaps because the masses were gaining political
    
         therefore economic and social control, not only of
    
         literary production, good literature was read by an
    
         elite diminishing in size and cultural strength.
    
              Decided to use or to write both good literature
    
         and schlock.  To mix them up in terms of content and
    
         formally, offended everyone.
    
              Writing in which all kinds of writing mingled
    
         seemed, not immoral, but amoral, even to the masses.
    
         Played in every playground she found; no one can do
    
         that in a class or hierarchichal society.
    
              (In literature classes in university, had learned
    
         that anyone can say or write anything about anything if
    
         he or she does so cleverly enough.  That cleverness,
    
         one of the formal rules of good literature, can be a
    
         method of social and political manipulation.  Decided
    
         to use language stupidly.)  In order to use and be
    
         other voices as stupidly as possible, decided to copy
    
         down simply other texts.
    
              Copy them down while, maybe, mashing them up
    
         because wasn't going to stop playing in any playground.
    
         Because loved wildness.
    
              Having fun with texts is having fun with
    
         everything and everyone.  Since didn't have one point
    
         of view or centralized perspective, was free to find
    
         out how texts she used and was worked.  In their
    
         contexts which were (parts of) culture.
    
              Liked best of all mushing up texts.
    
              Began constructing her first story by placing
    
         mashed-up texts by and about Henry Kissinger next to
    
         'True Romance' texts.  What was the true romance of
    
         America?  Changed these 'True Romance' texts only by
    
         heightening the sexual crudity of their style.  Into
    
         this mush, placed four pages out of Harold Robbins',
    
         one of her heroes', newest hottest bestsellers.  Had
    
         first made Jacqueline Onassis the star of Robbins'
    
         text.
    
              Twenty years later, a feminist publishing house
    
         republished the last third of the novel in which this
    
         mash occurred.
    
         CAPITOL MADE A FEMINIST PUBLISHER DOLL EVEN THOUGH,
    
         BECAUSE SHE WASN'T STUPID, SHE KNEW THAT THE FEMINIST
    
         PUBLISHING HOUSE WAS ACTUALLY A LOT OF DOLLS.  THE
    
         FEMINIST PUBLISHER DOLL WAS A BEAUTIFUL WOMAN IN A ST.
    
         LAURENT DRESS.  CAPITOL, PERHAPS OUT OF PERVERSITY,
    
         REFRAINED FROM USING HER USUAL CHEWED UP CHEWING GUM,
    
         HALF-DRIED FLECKS OF NAIL POLISH, AND BITS OF HER OWN
    
         BODY THAT HAD SOMEHOW FALLEN AWAY.
    
         Republished the text containing the Harold Robbins'
    
         mush next to a text she had written only seventeen
    
         years ago.  In this second text, the only one had ever
    
         written without glopping up hacking into and rewriting
    
         other texts (appropriating), had tried to destroy
    
         literature or what she as a writer was supposed to
    
         write by making characters and a story that were so
    
         stupid as to be almost non-existent.  Ostensibly, the
    
         second text was a porn book.  The pornography was
    
         almost as stupid as the story.  The female character
    
         had her own name.
    
              Thought just after had finished writing this, here
    
         is a conventional novel.  Perhaps, here is 'my voice'.
    
         Now I'll never again have to make up a bourgeois novel.
    
              Didn't.
    
              The feminist publisher informed her that this
    
         second text was her most important because here she had
    
         written a treatise on female sexuality.
    
              Since didn't believe in arguing with people, wrote
    
         an introduction to both books in which stated that her
    
         only interest in writing was in copying down other
    
         people's texts.  Didn't say liked messing them up
    
         because was trying to be polite.  Like the English.
    
         Did say had no interest in sexuality or in any other
    
         content.
    
         CAPITOL MADE A DOLL WHO WAS A JOURNALIST.  CAPITOL
    
         LOVED MAKING DOLLS WHO WERE JOURNALISTS.  SOMETIMES SHE
    
         MADE THEM OUT OF THE NEWSPAPERS FOUND IN TRASHCANS ON
    
         THE STREETS.  SHE KNEW THAT LOTS OF CATS INHABITED
    
         TRASH CANS.  THE PAPERS SAID RATS CARRY DISEASES.  SHE
    
         MADE THIS JOURNALIST OUT OF THE FINGERNAILS SHE
    
         OBTAINED BY HANGING AROUND THE TRASHCANS IN THE BACK
    
         LOTS OF LONDON HOSPITALS.  HAD PENETRATED THESE BACK
    
         LOTS WITH THE HOPE OF MEETING MEAN OLDER MEN BIKERS.
    
         FOUND LOTS OF OTHER THINGS THERE.  SINCE, TO MAKE THE
    
         JOURNALIST, SHE MOLDED THE FINGERNAILS TOGETHER WITH
    
         SUPER GLUE AND, BEING A SLOB, LOTS OF OTHER THINGS
    
         STUCK TO THIS SUPER GLUE, THE JOURNALIST DIDN'T LOOK
    
         ANYTHING LIKE A HUMAN BEING.
    
         A journalist who worked on a trade publishing magazine,
    
         so the story went, no one could remember whose story,
    
         was informed by another woman in her office that there
    
         was a resemblance between a section of the writer's
    
         book and Harold Robbins' work.  Most of the literati of
    
         the country in which the writer was currently living
    
         were upper-middle class and detested the writer and her
    
         writing.
    
         CAPITOL THOUGHT ABOUT MAKING A DOLL OF THIS COUNTRY,
    
         BUT DECIDED NOT TO.
    
         Journalist decided she had found a scoop.  Phoned up
    
         the feminist publisher to enquire about plagiarism;
    
         perhaps feminist publisher said something wrong because
    
         then phoned up Harold Robbins' publisher.
    
              "Surely all art is the result of one's having been
    
         in danger, of having gone through an experience all the
    
         way to the end, where no one can go any further.  The
    
         further one goes, the more private, the more personal,
    
         the more singular an experience becomes, and the thing
    
         one is making is finally, the necessary, irrepressible,
    
         and, as nearly as possible, definitive utterance of
    
         this singularity . . . Therein lies the enormous aid
    
         the work of art brings to the life of the one who must
    
         make it . . .
    
              "So we are most definitely called upon to test and
    
         try ourselves against the utmost, but probably we are
    
         also bound to keep silence regarding this utmost, to
    
         beware of sharing it, of parting with it in
    
         communication so long as we have not entered the work
    
         of art: for the utmost represents nothing other than
    
         that singularity in us which no one would or even
    
         should understand, and which must enter into the work
    
         as such . . . "  Rilke to Cezanne.
    
         CAPITOL MADE A PUBLISHER LOOK LIKE SAM PECKINPAH.
    
         THOUGH SHE HAD NO IDEA WHAT SAM PECKINPAH LOOKED LIKE.
    
         HAD LOOKED LIKE?  SHE TOOK A HOWDY DOODY DOLL AND AN
    
         ALFRED E. NEUMAN DOLL AND MASHED THEM TOGETHER, THEN
    
         MADE THIS CONGLOMERATE INTO AN AMERICAN OFFICER IN THE
    
         MEXICAN-AMERICAN WAR.  ACTUALLY SEWED, SHE HATED
    
         SEWING, OR WHEN SHE BECAME TIRED OF SEWING, GLUED
    
         TOGETHER WITH HER OWN TWO HANDS, JUST AS THE EARLY
    
         AMERICAN PATRIOT WIVES USED TO DO FOR THEIR PATRIOT
    
         HUSBANDS, A FROGGED AND BRAIDED CAVALRY JACKET, STAINED
    
         WITH THE BLOOD FROM SOME FORMER OWNERS.  THEN FASHIONED
    
         A STOVEPIPE HAT OUT OF ONE SHE HAD STOLEN FROM A BUM IN
    
         AN ECSTASY OF ART.  THE HAT WAS A BIT BIG.  FOR THE
    
         PUBLISHER.  INSIDE A GOLD HEART, THERE SHOULD BE A
    
         PICTURE OF A WOMAN.  SINCE CAPITOL DIDN'T HAVE A
    
         PICTURE OF A WOMAN, SHE PUT IN ONE OF HER MOTHER.
    
         SINCE SAM PECKINPAH OR HER PUBLISHER HAD SEEN TRAGEDY,
    
         AN ARROW HANGING OUT OF THE WHITE BREAST OF A SOLDIER
    
         NO OLDER THAN A CHILD, HORSES GONE MAD WALLEYED MOUTHS
    
         FROTHING AMID DUST THICKER THAN THE SMOKE OF GUNS.  SHE
    
         MADE HIS FACE FULL OF FOLDS, AN EYEPATCH OVER ONE EYE.
    
         Harold Robbins' publisher phoned up the man who ran the
    
         company who owned the feminist publishing company.
    
         From now on, known as 'The Boss'.  The Boss told Harold
    
         Robbins' publisher that they have a plagiarist in their
    
         midst.
    
         CAPITOL NO LONGER WANTED TO MAKE DOLLS.  IN THE UNITED
    
         STATES, UPON SEEING THE WORK OF THE PHOTOGRAPHER ROBERT
    
         MAPPLETHORPE, SENATOR JESSE HELMS PROPOSED AN AMENDMENT
    
         TO THE FISCAL YEAR 1990 INTERIOR AND RELATED AGENCIES
    
         BILL FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROHIBITING "THE USE OF
    
         APPROPRIATED FUNDS FOR THE DISSEMINATION, PROMOTION, OR
    
         PRODUCTION OF OBSCENE OR INDECENT MATERIALS OR
    
         MATERIALS DENIGRATING A PARTICULAR RELIGION."  THREE
    
         SPECIFIC CATEGORIES OF UNACCEPTABLE MATERIAL FOLLOWED:
    
         "(1) OBSCENE OR INDECENT MATERIALS, INCLUDING BUT NOT
    
         LIMITED TO DEPICTIONS OF SADOMASOCHISM [ALWAYS GET THAT
    
         ONE IN FIRST], HOMO-EROTICISM, THE EXPLOITATION OF
    
         CHILDREN, OR INDIVIDUALS ENGAGED IN SEX ACTS; OR (2)
    
         MATERIAL WHICH DENIGRATES THE OBJECTS OR BELIEFS OF THE
    
         ADHERENTS OF A PARTICULAR RELIGION OR NON-RELIGION; OR
    
         (3) MATERIAL WHICH DENIGRATES, DEBASES, OR REVILES A
    
         PERSON, GROUP, OR CLASS OF CITIZENS ON THE BASIS OF
    
         RACE, CREED, SEX, HANDICAP, AGE, OR NATIONAL ORIGIN."
    
         IN HONOR OF JESSE HELMS, CAPITOL MADE, AS PILLOWS, A
    
         CROSS AND A VAGINA.  SO THE POOR COULD HAVE SOMEWHERE
    
         TO SLEEP.  SINCE SHE NO LONGER HAD TO MAKE DOLLS OR
    
         ART, BECAUSE ART IS DEAD IN THIS CULTURE, SHE SLOPPED
    
         THE PILLOWS TOGETHER WITH DEAD FLIES, WHITE FLOUR
    
         MOISTENED BY THE BLOOD SHE DREW OUT OF HER SMALLEST
    
         FINGER WITH A PIN, AND OTHER TYPES OF GARBAGE.
    
         Disintegration.
    
              Feminist publisher then informed writer that the
    
         Boss and Harold Robbins' publisher had decided, due to
    
         her plagiarism, to withdraw the book from publication
    
         and to have her sign an apology to Harold Robbins which
    
         they had written.  This apology would then be published
    
         in two major publishing magazines.
    
              Ordinarily impolite, told feminist publisher they
    
         could do what they wanted with their edition of her
    
         books but she wasn't going to apologize to anyone for
    
         anything, much less for twenty years of work.
    
              Didn't have to think to herself because every
    
         square inch of her knew.  For freedom.  Writing must be
    
         for and must be freedom.
    
              Feminist publisher replied that she knew writer
    
         was actually a nice sweet girl.
    
              Asked if should tell her agent or try talking
    
         directly to Harold Robbins.
    
              Feminist publisher replied she'd take care of
    
         everything.  Writer shouldn't contact Harold Robbins
    
         because that would make everything worse.
    
              Would, the feminist publisher asked, the writer
    
         please compose a statement for the Boss why the writer
    
         used other texts when she wrote so that the Boss
    
         wouldn't believe that she was a plagiarist.
    
         CAPITOL MADE A DOLL WHO LOOKED EXACTLY LIKE HERSELF.
    
         IF YOU PRESSED A BUTTON ON ONE OF THE DOLL'S CUNT LIPS
    
         THE DOLL SAID, "I AM A GOOD GIRL AND DO EXACTLY AS I AM
    
         TOLD TO DO."
    
         Wrote:
    
              Nobody save buzzards.  Lots of buzzards here.  In
    
              the distance, lay flies and piles of shit.  Herds
    
              of animals move against the skyline like black
    
              caravans in an unknown east.  Sheeps and goats.
    
              Another place, a horse is lapping the water of a
    
              pool.  Lavendar and grey trees behind this black
    
              water are leafless and spineless.  As the day
    
              ends, the sun in the east flushes out pale
    
              lavendars and pinks, then turns blood red as it
    
              turns on itself, becoming a more definitive shape,
    
              the more definitive, the bloodier.  Until it sits,
    
              totally unaware of the rest of the universe,
    
              waiting at the edge of a sky that doesn't yet know
    
              what colors it wants to be, a hawk waiting for the
    
              inevitable onset of human slaughter.  The light is
    
              fleeing.
    
              Instead, sent a letter to feminist publisher in
    
         which said that she composed her texts out of 'real'
    
         conversations, anything written down, other texts,
    
         somewhat in the ways the Cubists had worked.  (Not
    
         quite true.  But thought this statement
    
         understandable.)  Cited, as example, her use of 'True
    
         Confessions' stories.  Such stories whose content seemed
    
         purely and narrowly sexual, composed simply for
    
         purposes of sexual titillation and economic profit, if
    
         deconstructed, viewed in terms of context and genre,
    
         became signs of political and social realities.  So if
    
         the writer or critic (deconstructionist) didn't work
    
         with the actual language of these texts, the writer or
    
         critic wouldn't be able to uncover the political and
    
         social realities involved.  For instance, both genre
    
         and the habitual nature of perception hide the violence
    
         of the content of many newspaper stories.
    
              To uncover this violence is to run the risk of
    
         being accused of loving violence or all kinds of
    
         pornography.  (As if the writer gives a damn about what
    
         anyone considers risks.)
    
              Wrote, living art rather than dead art has some
    
         connection with passion.  Deconstructions of newspaper
    
         stories become the living art in a culture that demands
    
         that any artistic representation of life be non-violent
    
         and non-sexual, misrepresent.
    
              To copy down, to appropriate, to deconstruct other
    
         texts is to break down those perceptual habits the
    
         culture doesn't want to be broken.
    
              Deconstruction demands not so much plagiarism as
    
         breaking into the copyright law.
    
              In the Harold Robbins' text which had used, a rich
    
         white woman walks into a disco, picks up a black boy,
    
         has sex with him.  In the Robbins' text, this scene is
    
         soft-core porn, has as its purpose mild sexual
    
         titillation and pleasure.
    
              [When Robbins' book had been published years ago,
    
         the writer's mother had said that Robbins had used
    
         Jacqueline Onassis as the model for the rich white
    
         woman.]  Wrote, had made apparent that bit of politics
    
         while amplifying the pulp quality of the style in order
    
         to see what would happen when the underlying
    
         presuppositions or meanings of Robbins' writing became
    
         clear.  Robbins as emblematic of a certain part of
    
         American culture.  What happened was that the sterility
    
         of that part of American culture revealed itself.  The
    
         real pornography.  Cliches, especially sexual cliches,
    
         are always signs of power or political relationships.
    
         BECAUSE SHE HAD JUST GOTTEN HER PERIOD, CAPITOL MADE A
    
         HUGE RED SATIN PILLOW CROSS THEN SMEARED HER BLOOD ALL
    
         OVER IT.
    
         Her editor at the feminist publisher said that the Boss
    
         had found her explanation "literary."  Later would be
    
         informed that this was a legal, not a literary, matter.
    
         "HERE IT ALL STINKS," CAPITOL THOUGHT.  "ART IS MAKING
    
         ACCORDING TO THE IMAGINATION.  BUT HERE, BUYING AND
    
         SELLING ARE THE RULES; THE RULES OF COMMODITY HAVE
    
         DESTROYED THE IMAGINATION.  HERE, THE ONLY ART ALLOWED
    
         IS MADE BY POST-CAPITALIST RULES; ART ISN'T MADE
    
         ACCORDING TO RULES."  ANGER MAKES YOU WANT TO SUICIDE.
    
         Journalist who broke the 'Harold Robbins story' had
    
         been phoning and leaving messages on writer's answering
    
         machine for days.  Had stopped answering her phone.  By
    
         chance picked it up; journalist asked her if anything
    
         to say.
    
              "You mean about Harold Robbins?"
    
              Silence.
    
              "I've just given my publisher a statement.
    
         Perhaps you could read that."
    
              "Do you have anything to add to it?"  As if she
    
         was a criminal.
    
              A few days later writer's agent over the phone
    
         informed writer what was happening was simply horrible.
    
         CAPITOL DIDN'T WANT TO MAKE ANY DOLLS.
    
         How could the writer be plagiarizing Harold Robbins?
    
              Writer didn't know.
    
              Agent told writer if writer had phoned her
    
         immediately, agent could have straightened out
    
         everything because she was good friends with Harold
    
         Robbins' publisher.  But now it was too late.
    
              Writer asked agent if she could do anything.
    
              Agent answered that she'd phone Harold Robbins'
    
         publisher and that the worst that could happen is that
    
         she'd have to pay a nominal quotation rights fee.
    
              So a few days later was surprised when feminist
    
         publisher informed her that if she didn't sign the
    
         apology to Harold Robbins which they had written for
    
         her, feminist publishing company would go down a drain
    
         because Harold Robins or harold Robbins' publisher
    
         would slap a half-a-million [dollar? pound?] lawsuit on
    
         the feminist publishing house.
    
              Decided she had to take notice of this stupid
    
         affair, though her whole life wanted to notice only
    
         writing and sex.
    
         "WHAT IS IT" CAPITOL WROTE, "TO BE AN ARTIST?  WHERE IS
    
         THE VALUE THAT WILL KEEP THIS LIFE IN HELL GOING?"
    
         For one of the first times in her life, was deeply
    
         scared.  Was usually as wild as they come.  Doing
    
         anything if it felt good.  So when succumbed to fear,
    
         succumbed to reasonless, almost bottomless fear.
    
              Panicked only because she might be forced to
    
         apologize, not to Harold Robbins, that didn't matter,
    
         but to anyone for her writing, for what seemed to be
    
         her life.  Book had already been withdrawn from print.
    
         Wasn't that enough?  Panicked, phoned her agent without
    
         waiting for her agent to phone her.
    
              Agent asked writer if she knew how she stood
    
         legally.
    
              Writer replied that as far as knew Harold Robbins
    
         had made no written charge.  Feminist publisher
    
         sometime in beginning had told her they had spoken to a
    
         solicitor who had said neither she nor they "had a leg
    
         to stand on."  Since didn't know with what she was
    
         being charged, she didn't know what that meant.
    
              Agent replied, "Perhaps we should talk to a
    
         solicitor. Do you know a solicitor?"
    
              Knew the name of a tax solicitor.
    
              Since had no money, asked her American publisher
    
         what to do, if he knew a lawyer.
    
         WOULD MAKE NO MORE DOLLS.
    
         American publisher informed her couldn't ask anyone's
    
         advice until she knew the charges against her, saw them
    
         in writing.
    
              Asked the feminist publisher to send the charges
    
         against her and whatever else was in writing to her.
    
              Received two copies of the 'Harold Robbins' text
    
         she had written twenty years ago, one copy of the
    
         apology she was supposed to sign, and a letter from
    
         Harold Robbins' publisher to the head of the feminist
    
         publishing company.  Letter said they were not seeking
    
         damages beyond withdrawal of the book from publication
    
         [which had already taken place] and the apology.
    
              Didn't know of what she was guilty.
    
              Later would receive a copy of the letter sent to
    
         her feminist publisher from the solicitor whom the
    
         feminist publisher and then her agent had consulted.
    
         Letter stated: According to the various documents and
    
         texts which the feminist publisher had supplied, the
    
         writer should apologize to Mr. Harold Robbins.  First,
    
         because in her text she has used a substantial number
    
         of Mr. Robbins' words.  Second, because she did not use
    
         any texts other than Mr. Robbins' so there could be no
    
         literary theory or praxis responsible for her
    
         plagiarism.  Third, because the contract between the
    
         writer and the feminist publisher states that the
    
         writer had not infringed upon any existing copyright.
    
              When the writer wrote, not wrote back, to the
    
         solicitor that most of the novel in question had been
    
         appropriated from other texts, that most of these texts
    
         had been in the public domain, that the writers of
    
         texts not in the public domain were either writers of
    
         'True Confessions' stories (anonymous) or writers who
    
         knew she had reworked their texts and felt honored,
    
         except for Mr. Robbins, that she had never
    
         misrepresented nor hidden her usages of other texts,
    
         her methods of composition, that there was already a
    
         body of literary criticism on her and others' methods
    
         of appropriation, and furthermore [this was to become
    
         the major point of contention], that she would not
    
         sign the apology because she could not since there was
    
         no assurance that all possible litigation and
    
         harassment would end with the signature of guilt,
    
         guilt which anyway she didn't feel: the solicitor did
    
         not reply.
    
              Not knowing of what she was guilty, feeling
    
         isolated, and pressured to finish her new novel, writer
    
         became paranoid.  Would do anything to stop the
    
         pressure from the feminist publisher and simultaneously
    
         would never apologize for her work.
    
              Considered her American publisher her father.
    
         Told her that the 'Harold Robbins affair' was a joke,
    
         she should take the phone off the hook, go to Paris for
    
         a few days.
    
              Finish your book.  That's what's important.
    
         WOULD MAKE NO MORE DOLLS.
    
         Paris is a beautiful city.
    
              In Paris decided that it's stupid to live in fear.
    
         Didn't yet know what to do about isolation.  All that
    
         matters is work and work must be created in and can't
    
         be created in isolation.  (Remembered a conversation
    
         she had had with her feminist publisher.  Still trying
    
         to explain, writer said, in order to deconstruct, the
    
         deconstructionist needs to use the actual other texts.
    
         Editor had said she understood.  For instance, she was
    
         sure, Peter Carey in Oscar and Lucinda had used other
    
         people's writings in his dialogue, but he would never
    
         admit it.  This writer did what every other writer did,
    
         but she is the only one who admits it.  "It's not a
    
         matter of not being able to write," the writer replied.
    
         It's a matter of a certain theory which is also a
    
         literary theory.  Theory and belief."  Then shut up
    
         because knew that when you have to explain and explain,
    
         nothing is understood.  Language is dead.)
    
         SINCE THERE WERE NO MORE DOLLS, CAPITOL STARTED WRITING
    
         LANGUAGE.
    
         Decided that it's stupid living in fear of being forced
    
         to be guilty without knowing why you're guilty and,
    
         more important, it's stupid caring about what has
    
         nothing to do with art.  It doesn't really matter
    
         whether or not you sign the fucking apology.
    
              Over the phone asked the American publisher
    
         whether or not it mattered to her past work whether or
    
         not signed the apology.
    
              Answered that the sole matter was her work.
    
              Thought alike.
    
              Wanted to ensure that there was no more sloppiness
    
         in her work or life, that from now on all her actions
    
         served only her writing.  Upon returning to England,
    
         consulted a friend who consulted a solicitor who was
    
         his friend about her case.  This solicitor advised that
    
         since she wasn't guilty of plagiarism and since the law
    
         was unclear, grey, about whether or not she had
    
         breached Harold Robbins' copyright, it could be a legal
    
         precedent, he couldn't advise whether or not she should
    
         sign the apology.  But must not sign unless, upon
    
         signing, received full and final settlement.
    
              Informed her agent that would sign if and only if
    
         received full and final settlement upon signing.
    
              Over the phone, feminist publisher asked her who
    
         had told her about full and final settlement.
    
                   A literary solicitor.
    
              Could they, the feminist publishing house, have
    
         his name and his statement in writing?
    
              "This is my decision," writer said.  "That's all
    
         you need to know."
    
         WROTE DOWN "PRAY FOR US THE DEAD," THE FIRST LINE IN
    
         THE FIRST POEM BY CHARLES OLSON SHE HAD EVER READ WHEN
    
         SHE WAS A TEENAGER.  ALL THE DOLLS WERE DEAD.  DEAD
    
         HAIR.  WHEN SHE LOOKED UP THIS POEM, ITS FIRST LINE
    
         WAS, "WHAT DOES NOT CHANGE/ IS THE WILL TO CHANGE."
    
              WENT TO A NEARBY CEMETERY AND WITH STICK DOWN IN
    
         SAND WROTE THE WORDS "PRAY FOR US THE DEAD."  THOUGHT,
    
         WHO IS DEAD?  THE DEAD TREES?  WHO IS DEAD?  WE LIVE IN
    
         SERVICE OF THE SPIRIT.  MADE MASS WITH TREES DEAD AND
    
         DIRT AND UNDERNEATH HUMANS AS DEAD OR LIVING AS ANY
    
         STONE OR WOOD.
    
         I WON'T BURY MY DEAD DOLLS, THOUGHT.  I'LL STEP ON THEM
    
         AND MASH THEM UP.
    
         For two weeks didn't hear from either her agent or
    
         feminist publisher.  Could return to finishing her
    
         novel.
    
              Thought that threats had died.
    
              In two weeks received a letter from her agent
    
         which read something like:
    
              On your express instructions that your publisher
    
         communicate to you through me, your publisher has
    
         informed me that they have communicated to Harold
    
         Robbins your decision that you will sign the apology
    
         which his publisher drew up only if you have his
    
         assurance that there will be no further harassment or
    
         litigation.  Because you have requested such assurance,
    
         predictably, Harold Robbins is now requiring damages to
    
         be paid.
    
              Your publisher now intends to sign and publish the
    
         apology to Harold Robbins as soon as possible whether
    
         or not you sign it.
    
              In view of what I have discovered about the nature
    
         of your various telephone communications to me, please
    
         contact me only in writing from now on.
    
              Signature.
    
              Understood that she had lost.  Lost more than a
    
         struggle about the appropriation of four pages, about
    
         the definition of appropriation.  Lost her belief
    
         that there can be art in this culture.  Lost spirit.
    
         All humans have to die, but they don't have to fail.
    
         Fail in all that matters.
    
              It turned out that the whole affair was nothing.
    
         CAPITOL REALIZED THAT SHE HAD FORGOTTEN TO BURY THE
    
         WRITER DOLL.  SINCE THE SMELL OF DEATH STUNK, RETURNED
    
         TO THE CEMETERY TO BURY HER.  SHE KICKED OVER A ROCK
    
         AND THREW THE DOLL INTO THE HOLE WHICH THE ROCK HAD
    
         MADE.  CHANTED, "YOU'RE NOT SELLING ENOUGH BOOKS IN
    
         CALIFORNIA.  YOU'D BETTER GO THERE IMMEDIATELY.  TRY TO
    
         GET INTO READING IN ANY BENEFIT YOU CAN SO FIVE MORE
    
         BOOKS WILL BE SOLD.  YOU HAVE BAGS UNDER YOUR EYES."
    
              CAPITOL THOUGHT, DEAD DOLL.
    
              SINCE CAPITOL WAS A ROMANTIC, SHE BELIEVED DEATH
    
         IS PREFERABLE TO A DEAD LIFE, A LIFE NOT LIVED
    
         ACCORDING TO THE DICTATES OF THE SPIRIT.
    
              SINCE SHE WAS THE ONE WHO HAD POWER IN THE DOLL-
    
         HUMAN RELATIONSHIP, HER DOLLS WERE ROMANTICS TOO.
    
         Toward the end of paranoia, had told her story to a
    
         friend who was secretary to a famous writer.
    
              Informed her that famous writer's first lawyer
    
         used to work with Harold Robbins' present lawyer.
    
         First lawyer was friends with her American publisher.
    
              Her American publisher asked the lawyer who was
    
         his friend to speak privately to Harold Robbins'
    
         lawyer.
    
              Later the lawyer told the American publisher that
    
         Harold Robbins' lawyer advised to let the matter die
    
         quietly.  This lawyer himself advised that under no
    
         circumstances should the writer sign anything.
    
              It turned out that the whole affair was nothing.
    
              Despite these lawyer's advice, Harold Robbins'
    
         publisher and the feminist publisher kept pressing the
    
         writer to sign the apology and eventually, as
    
         everything becomes nothing, she had to.
    
              Knew that none of the above has anything to do
    
         with what matters, writing.  Except for the failure of
    
         the spirit.
    
         THEY'RE ALL DEAD, CAPITOL THOUGHT.  THEIR DOLLS' FLESH
    
         IS NOW BECOMING PART OF THE DIRT.
    
              CAPITOL THOUGHT, IS MATTER MOVING THROUGH FORMS
    
         DEAD OR ALIVE?
    
              CAPITOL THOUGHT, THEY CAN'T KILL THE SPIRIT.

  • Feeding the Transcendent Body

    George Yudice

    CUNY, Hunter College

     

    To eat is to appropriate by destruction; it is at the same time to be filled up with a certain being…. When we eat we do not limit ourselves to knowing certain qualities of this being through taste; by tasting them we appropriate them. Taste is assimilation…. The synthetic intuition of food is in itself an assimilative destruction. It reveals to me the being which I am going to make my flesh. Henceforth, what I accept or what I reject with disgust is the very being of that existent….

     

    It is not a matter of indifference whether we like oysters or clams, snails or shrimp, if only we know how to unravel the existential signification of these foods. Generally speaking there is no irreducible taste or inclination. They all represent a certain appropriate choice of being.

     

    Jean-Paul Sartre1

     

    At first glance, it seems unlikely that contemporary U.S. culture can offer a gastrosophy to match that of other civilizations. Brillat-Savarin’s (and Feuerbach’s) adage, “You are what you eat,” does not throb today with metaphysical significance as it did scarcely two generations ago for Sartre. In the United States, it is indeed a matter of indifference “whether we like oysters or clams, snails or shrimp”; much of the lower priced seafood today is made from other processed fish. Consequently, the differences between particular foods are less important; what really matters is taste itself, laboratory produced flavor. Food as substance gives way to the simulacrum of flavor, which is something that “science” recombines in ever new ways to seduce us to this or that convenience food. As synthetic food replaces Sartre’s “synthetic intuition of food,” we find it impossible to transcend the brute “facticity” of eating, which is ironically as fake as it is real. We eat substances (the “real”) yet we do not know them as such but as simulations (the “fake”).

     

    The portrait I’ve drawn here obviously calls for a reference to Baudrillard, which will come in due time. First, however, it is necessary to reflect a bit more on the changes wrought by the transition to simulation in our (seemingly) most immediate experience: eating. Anthropologists have explained in great detail how entire civilizations defined themselves allegorically through their eating practices. Inclusion or exclusion, symbolic and material exchange, body boundaries, gender, and other identity factors are systematically and most deeply inscribed in the members of a given group through eating practices. Consequently, the metaphysics of most groups is conveyed by these practices. This inscription conditions, for example, how people understand divinity. For the Greeks of Hesiod’s Theogony, the rituals of sacrificial cooking and eating, paralleled in agricultural, funereal and nuptial practices, establish a communication between mortals and immortals which paradoxically expresses their incommensurability. In contrast, the Orphic anthropogony makes possible the mystical transcendence of the barrier between gods and humans by rejecting the sacrifice of the official religion.

     

    By refusing this sacrifice, by forbidding the bloodshed of any animal, by turning away from fleshy food to dedicate themselves to a totally "pure" ascetic life--a life also completely alien to the social and religious norms of the city--men would shed all the Titanic elements of their nature. In Dionysus they would be able to restore that part of themselves that is divine.2

     

    Since mystical transcendence usually involves some relation to eating–or not eating, as in the Orphic cult–it is interesting to ask what are the possibilities of such transcendence in an age of fake fat and microwavable synthetic meals. The mystic engages in a struggle whose reward is nourishing grace. As Saint Teresa says, the soul “finds everything cooked and eaten for it; it has only to enjoy its nourishment.”3 In our consumer culture, however, such convenience food comes to most of us without the struggle. Unlike the mystic–who is “like a man who has had no schooling…and [yet] finds himself, without any study, in possession of all living knowledge”–we are not graced by any special knowledge. Without negativity–Sartre’s “appropria[tion] by destruction”– there is no transcendence. And negativity is precisely what gives the Orphics and mystics like Saint Teresa– often taken as heretics by orthodoxy–a feeling of power which makes them “master of all the elements and of the whole world.”4 Transcendence, in these cases, is closely related to contestatory social movements which attempted to invert the power differential between the dominant and the subaltern.

     

    The experiences of people (mostly women) with eating disorders today seems to contradict the argument that there are no longer any practices of negativity. In fact, on the basis of power reversals similar to the ones claimed by mystics, contemporary theorists/practictioners of ecriture have rediscovered–and extended to the anorectic–the prototype of an “herethics” beyond the dominant order of things,5 or a “mysterique” (fusion of mystic and hysteric) who carves out her own space of enunciation within Western discourse.6 Following this latter analogy, the mystic’s relationship to the inquisitor would be like that of the hysteric before the psychoanalyst who seeks to extract her secrets for the benefit of his doctrine.7

     

    The correlation of mystic/heretic, hysteric and anorectic, however, encounters a serious problem: against what or whom is the anorectic wielding her negativity? Endocrinological and other biomedical factors aside, anorexia and other eating disorders are, of course, an expression of gender struggle in our society.8 But that does not explain everything; if that were the case, we could expect all the victims of patriarchy to suffer from eating disorders. It seems to me that the issue of control is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the negativity of the anorectic (or the bulimic or the obese woman). Class and/or gender analysis is not enough to account for all questions of subjectivity and desire. We are all constrained but some of us go on to become mystics or anorectics. Why? In the most suggestive essay I have read on the topic, Sohnya Sayres argues that some of us are more sensitive to the limitless loss brought on by the shrinking of experience. As in mystical experience, the loss becomes the point of departure for the will to greatness and glory, to empowerment:

     

    It is glory that these body-loss-obsessed men and women seek, in making themselves "lost," rapacious glory in society constraining them in rituals around limitless loss. They externalize the return of the repressed in this society which, more than others, is rationalized around the ledger sheets and the accountants of gain, whose most serious intonations are about the "bottom line"--which has remade the "full plate" into the latest idiom for dealing with bad news. One wonders, now, whether the ultimate loss that young people say they are almost sure will be their not too distant future--millennialist, cataclysmic loss--hasn't excited, but sent deeper, those fantasies of messianic rescue lying choked beneath weeds the body imperatives plant in the spirit. Fat and anorectic women and men want to be great, in ways unaccountable...unless we accept the enormity of the unaccountable in this society. Then, perhaps, the drama of food and the body can be given a storyteller's innovations, that is, when it is released from explanation and accommodation, all that quantifying, into flights of wit and provocation--released, in other words, from a singular, petty, tale of compulsion into one of sacrifice, mortification, and redemption-- into a grander delusion, worthy of the person, worthy of hearing about, worthy of transforming.9

     

    I have quoted Sayres at length because she expresses so well the dialectic of loss and transcendence which Baudrillard, in turn, will transform into a paean to banality. Baudrillard’s hyperreality has no place in it for delusions of grandeur and redemption. Or it may be more exact to say that he does acknowledge grandeur, but it is the grandeur of limitless banality. There is no sense, however, of how people suffer and struggle against that banality. In fact, he has taken the figure of the obese/anorectic, in which some feminists situate a radical negation of patriarchy, and cast it as the emblem of a society in which there is no longer any possibility of opposition because everything has been “digest[ed into] its own appearance”:

     

    This strange obesity is no longer that of a protective layer of fat nor the neurotic one of depression. It is neither the compensatory obesity of the underdeveloped nor the alimentary one of the overnourished. Paradoxically, it is a mode of disappearance for the body. The secret rule that delimits the sphere of the body has disappeared. The secret form of the mirror, by which the body watches over itself and its image, is abolished, yielding to the unrestrained redundancy of a living organism. No more limits, no more transcendence: it is as if the body was no longer opposed to an external world, but sought to digest space in its own appearance.10

     

    Like the social systems in which we live, which are “bloated with information” and deprived of significance, Baudrillard’s obscene obese/anorectic body has lost the “principle of law or measure” that once supported it. Its meanings and representations have also transmuted into metastatic self-replication. History is now seen as a succession of devourments which, along with ideology and politics, reach a saturation point that knows no limits; metastasis encompasses everything, nothing is at odds with it, nothing can transcend it. And as every condition has its symptomatic figuration, Baudrillard’s obscene hyperreality finds its “perfect confirmation and ecstatic truth” in the obscene body, which “instead of being reflected, captures itself in its own magnifying mirror.”11

     

    Europe has long served as the proscenium for the death of the subject and history; the allegory of the death of life could have no other setting, of course, than the United States, home of those exemplary killers of experience: fast food, safe sex and genetic engineering. I would like to talk about an anomaly–that fascinating obesity, such as you find all over the U.S., that kind of monstrous conformity to empty space, of deformity by excess of conformity that translates the hyperdimension of a sociality at once saturated and empty, where the scene of the social as well as that of the body are left behind.12

     

    In the grand allegorical tradition, Baudrillard offers us a new reading of the body-as-microcosm-of- the-world. This body is not a temple, nor a machine, nor a holistic organism. It is the obscene body without order, whose cells have gone rampant in “cancerous metasteses” that parallel the useless flow of information in the postmodern world. If disease was once interpreted as lesion (the body as machine model) or as adaptive response to stress (the organic model),13 Baudrillard’s viral analogy construes it as coextensive with “life.” It is, however, a life with no rhyme or reason other than the momentum/inertia of self-replication: “Quite simply, there is no life any longer […] but the information and the vital functions continue.”14

     

    The body registers the “useless and wasteful exhaustion” of all systems in the figure of the obese (satiation) and/or the anorectic (inertia). On this view, the obese and the anorectic are neither the victims of some accident whose results can be reversed by altering a body part (“removing portions of the stomach or intestine so that only small amounts of food could be eaten or digested”) nor the adaptation to stressful “environmental factors (exercise habits, self-image, personal relationships, work pressures, etc.).”15 They are, rather, the embodiment of permanent crisis: inflation, overproduction, unemployment, nuclear threat, anomaly, to sum up.

     

    Yes. At first sight, the example seems irrefutable. What better emblem of the empire of the senseless, useless waste of resources than the insatiable obese and anorectics of (North) America, driven to passivity, apathy and indifference by the infinite choice of consummables?16 In a very insightful essay in which he mines the contradictions between capitalism and transgression, Octavio Paz notes that by rigorously applying the norm of the “limitless production of the same,” North American society succeeded in coopting the erotic and gastronomic rebellions of the 60s into slogans for the media:17

     

    The popular character of the erotic revolt was immediately appreciated by the mass media, by the entertainment and fashion industries. For it is not the churches nor the political parties, but the great industrial monopolies that have taken control of the powers of fascination that eroticism exerts over men. [...] What began as a[n erotic] liberation has become a business. The same has happened in the realm of gastronomy; the erotic industry is the younger sister of the food industry. [...] Private business expropriates utopia. During its ascendancy capitalism exploited the body; now it has turned it into an object of advertising. We have gone from prohibition to humiliation.18

     

    Paz did not fathom the extent to which gastronomy was being appropriated by industry. Today it no longer takes a major intellectual to understand that food is subject to the same image manipulation as all other commodities. Flavor, color, consistency, texture, smell, caloric and nutritional value, even genetic composition are all engineered to seduce each and every consumer. Food has, in effect, become a simulacrum which the omnivorous psyche of North America cannot get enough of even at the ever quicker pace of production, preparation and consumption

     

    With the ever-accelerating pace of life, the act of eating--once a leisurely undertaking synonymous with pleasure and social interaction--has been reduced to a necessary function not unlike shaving or refueling the car, in the view of food manufacturers, social scientists and others.19

     

    The loss which Sayres refers to above, is not only the erosion of the supreme experience of transcendence; even the petty pleasure of eating a cheeseburger fades as the milk fat is replaced by vegetable oils (if not a cellulose-based fat substitute) and the grill gives way to the microwave. Even the singe marks are painted on the frozen patty. Increasingly, we consume in solitude; a recent Gallup poll found that only 1/3 of North American adults dine at home in the company of others.20 By 1992, cars will come equipped with microwaves so we can consume on our way to and from work.21 And moms are now free to stay at work as children from two years of age and older pop My Own Meals or Kid Cuisine in the microwave.22

     

    “Freedom” seems to come so easily, there is no struggle; there isn’t even an “other” to struggle against; the values once instilled by preparing our own food and eating together as a family have given way to a new ethos: flip the switch. For Baudrillard, we become the simulacra we consume, hostages “of a fate that is fixed, and whose manipulators we can no longer see.”23 We are thus levelled to a homogeneous status of victim and perpetrator. None of us and all of us are to blame. A very convenient fiction that furthers the hegemony of those whom he refuses to see.

     

    It is hardly a secret that a handful of transnational corporations–General Foods, Nestle, Monsanto, R.J. Reynolds, etc.–control agribusiness, from production to shipping, processessing, distribution and marketing. It is no secret that this control puts those “disappeared” others who produce what we consume in the most onerous of conditions– twelve hours of work for a couple of dollars in Central America–in a situation which has been getting worse under the Reagan and Bush administrations. Nor is it a secret that people here in the United States are also going hungry due to increases in prices and the erosion of welfare benefits by inflation and cutbacks.24 Add to these “secrets” the devastation of the world’s natural resources for the ingredients and packaging of fast and convenience foods,25 and you get a good sense of the loss, the other side of the simulacrum.

     

    Baudrillard’s allegory is a rather simplistic correlation of digestion and information processing, which permits passing over the intense battles which are currently waged in the medium of the body. The body is not simply the screen on which the rampant exchange of information and images is captured; it is, rather, the battleground in which subjects are constituted, contradictorily desiring and rejecting prescribed representations. Baudrillard does not even recognize this struggle; in his hyperreal world there is only conformity, an unproblematic consensus in which not only consumers but even terrorists collaborate.

     

    Since, for Baudrillard, experience has disappeared his allegorical viral body is raceless, classless, genderless, ageless; it has no identity factors. Consequently, and contrary to the reported experience of most people, it is not shaped by the ways particular social formations interpellate specific bodies through these factors. The struggle of women against what Kim Chernin has called the “tyranny of slenderness” is a good example of how some bodies and not others are made to incarnate certain social contradictions on the basis of gender.26 Obesity and anorexia, then, do not correlate so much with the self-replication of information but rather with the control of bodies. In the United States, control of the body by means of “idealizing” representations (consumerism and the media) and ever more frequently through outright coercion and the interdiction of counterrepresentations (the conservative offensive) have pretty much replaced prior forms of maintaining hegemony. For Susie Orbach, the anorectic’s “hunger strike” is a metaphor for this struggle of representation.27 But this is a struggle to which Baudrillard seems quite indifferent; in his view, we have already lost and there is no way of transforming that loss into the “grander delusion” of something worthy (Sayres). Why play the deluded fool that resists the body snatchers; the sooner we yield the sooner we can all enjoy the obscenity.

     

    Baudrillard bears a resemblance to the confessors of the mystics. They attempted to control the interpretation of the mystics’ experiences, differentiating those inspired by God from those inspired by the devil, thus negotiating the mystics’ relationship to the church. Baudrillard also differentiates between experiences of transcendence (“This is not Georges Bataille’s excessive superfluity”) and the sublime banality of the hyperreal and hypertelic, which know “no other end than limitless increase, without any consideration of limits.”28 Baudrillard, of course, does not evaluate the experiences in terms of divine/demonic inspiration, but he does clearly valorize the banalization of life by capital-logic, with its concomitant emptying of moral value. As such he embodies Jameson’s description of the sublime hysteric, hungering after figurations (simulacra) of the other of capitalism once Nature and Being have been eclipsed.29 Control and limits, nonetheless, continue to be important, even constitutive, for Baudrillard because his fascination with obscenity, like all appreciations of sublimity, plays off the point at which limits can no longer be controlled. Hence, the body, not figuratively but (hyper)really embodies the world. In becoming image, it matches the mediatedness that is the world.

     

    In one respect I think that Baudrillard has chosen a very apt allegory of sublime banality in the obese/anorectic body. In some sense, women with eating disorders are today’s mystics; the ethical substance of their search for transcendence may not be sublime in the conventional sense, but they occupy a privileged space in a world that has depleted its divine incommensurabilities. In other words, today’s incommensurability is the representational space of their own bodies, which they struggle to control. Most interpretive (in contrast to biomedical) analyses of eating disorders take a psychoanalytic and/or feminist stance according to which the obese or the anorectic woman strives to manage the double binds of prescriptions of slenderness and consumption, will and abandon to instant gratification. Whether these analyses take an essentialist (e.g., Kim Chernin) or a social constructionist (e.g., Susie Orbach) approach, they almost exclusively emphasize repression and control.

     

    Susan Bordo summarizes very well the “deeper psycho-cultural anxieties…about internal processes out of control–uncontained desire, unrestrained hunger, uncontrolled impulse.” Bordo posits the bulimic as the embodiment of the “contradictions that make self-management a continual and virtually impossible task in our culture.”30 The bulimic, she argues, plays out on her body the “incompatible directions” of consumerist temptations and the freedom implied in the virile image of a well-muscled slender body. If consumerism makes the feminine image central to our culture (because of its seductive power, Baudrillard would argue),31 such that even literary theorists can claim that writing is a subversive feminine activity, it nevertheless requires repressing the very materiality or essential nature, as Kim Chernin puts it, of women’s bodies.32 For Chernin it is repression that transforms the body into an “alien” that may in momentary lapses of control rear its head and return with a vengeance.

     

    But clearly it is also the relatively non- repressive introjection of images that produces this alienation. In contrast to Chernin, I would argue that alienation is not the loss of an essential nature; in an age in which people believe and practice making themselves over, the traditional notion of essence becomes absurd. It is, rather, a question of remaking not only oneself but even more importantly the social formation that attributes value to the “nature” that we embody.33 It is this capacity which so many people experience as having been lost. Sociality can then be understood as the struggle for value, which entails the recognition of diverse “natures” and the social ministration to their needs. Elsewhere I have elaborated on how such ministration responds to the struggle over needs interpretation, which is basically a struggle over the representation of our “nature,” be it in the form of gender, ethnicity, age, and so on.34

     

    On this view, the materiality that defines us need not be understood monolithically as the rejected archaic maternal body which according to Kristeva undergirds the radical limit-experience of abjection. It seems to me that the very notion of the archaic is remade in the image of the media. The current “fat taboo” may in fact hark back to the separation process performed by traditional dietary and other ritual prohibitions, although today fat food and fat image are hypostatized in our consciousness:

     

    [Such prohibitions] keep a being who speaks to his God separated from the fecund mother... [the] phantasmatic mother who also constitutes, in the specific history of each person, the abyss that must be established as an autonomous (and not encroaching) place and distinct object, meaning a signifiable one, so that such a person might learn to speak.35

     

    Dietary taboos, however, are increasingly becoming a matter of image manipulation. For example, you can still have your cake and eat it too if you’re kosher and desire to eat a slice of (simulated) cheesecake after your pastrami on rye at Katz’s Delicatessen, that exemplary custodian of Glatt kosher cuisine. Taboo only makes a difference if you can have your cake and not eat it. Does this mean, then, that in a culture of simulation there are no longer ways of distinguishing the abject from the proper object, thus making the will to transcendence irrelevant? Rather than accept this premise, it seems preferable to me to explore Mary Douglas’s notion that anxiety around bodily boundaries signals significant social change or crisis. What and how we eat undergirds other kinds of social boundaries (marking off the difference between purity and pollution, inside and outside, etc.). As such, dietary practices function as a support for the cognitive systems by which cultures make sense of the world. They wire, so to speak, the way in which our bodies interface with the media of signification.36 This is what Kristeva means when she says, in the passage quoted above, that the maternal body archaically establishes radical negativity, which she then goes on to fetishize, in the metaphor of the abyss, as the very condition of speech. But this is to reduce speech to the verbal and practice to negativity, thus privileging avant-gardist practices in the registers of high aesthetics. The recognition of mediation as necessary for our survival does not have to lead, however, to a Baudrillardian celebration of the simulacrum:

     

    Seduction as an invention of stratagems, of the body, as a disguise for survival, as an infinite dispersion of lures, as an art of disappearance and absence, as a dissuasion which is stronger yet than that of the system.37

     

    The struggle over representation as I have briefly sketched it out does not fetishize the disguise nor lead one to confuse the high aesthetic appropriation of pop and mass culture with political effectivity. Its political value is more complex than the simple play of quotes or intertextuality. It challenges institutional control over images but not by remaining totally within the frame of the institution as, say, in the work of Cindy Sherman or Sarah Tuft. In a recent video,Don’t Make Me Up (1986),38 Tuft seeks to reframe commercial images of women’s bodies variously eating, exercising, courting, etc. by overlaying them with critical comments (e.g., “I just won’t buy this pack of lies”) and by juxtaposing them with images that give a critical twist to the prescription of thinness, such as photographs of emaciated concentration camp prisoners. The images succeed each other rapidly to the beat of a rap song, a vehicle which should have helped give the video a more contestatory tone. However, due to the blandness of the voice (this is no Public Enemy) and the too rapid succession of images (which does not leave enough time to register that some of the images run counter to commercial idealizations), the video does not succeed in raising the consciousness of those who aren’t already convinced. Even the convinced tend to enjoy it for its display of “idealized” bodies and its danceable rhythm. The overall effect is the very opposite of its punch line: “I must get free of the messages being fed to me.” With a better sound track, it would not seem out of place on MTV.

     

    David Cronenberg’sVideodrome (1983) also flirts with the possibility of resistance to the implosion of reality into media imagery. But the video images which the hero/victim Max Renn consumes end up consuming him, absorbing him into the image world of video. As head of a small TV station in search for seductive programming, he views a pirated snuff movie which, unbeknownst to him, inoculates him with electronic frequencies that produce a brain tumor that takes control of body and mind. A vagina-like VCR slot opens up in Max’s abdomen in which video cassettes with behavioral programming are inserted by the agents of Videodrome, a transnational corporation engaged in a conspiracy to take control of North America in order to counter the debilitating effects of liberal ways of life. Through the video-mediated intervention of Professor Brian Oblivion, a thinly disguised combination of McLuhan and Baudrillard, Max turns the weapon of his “new flesh” against Videodrome. The film ends with Max killing off his old flesh and fusing with the “new flesh” of the video monitor, whose screen stretches out like a pregnant belly. Professor Oblivion’s daughter and assistant Bianca tells Max that he has “become the video word made flesh.” Mysticism and abjection thus collapse onto the flesh of mediation.

     

    Despite the evident retaliation which the protagonist carries out,Videodrome is less about resistance or rearticulation of society than a Baudrillardian celebration of the apocalyptic collapse–or implosion–onto the surface of the image. This implosion, however, does not collapse the conventions of capitalist, patriarchal culture. The hero is the proverbial white middle class male, female figures are portrayed as the usual stereotypes (whore or primal medium-mother), there is no solidary consciousness on the part of the very few racial minorities or otherwise marginal characters, like the homeless man whose begging is facilitated by the “dancing monkey” of a TV monitor on a leash. The closest to a political intervention is Professor Oblivion’s video version of a soup kitchen: The Cathode Ray Mission, where patrons are given a diet of TV frequencies rather than food. They are being prepped, it is suggested, for taking on the “new flesh” of electronic mediation.

     

    E. Ann Kaplan makes a half-hearted attempt to argue for some “progressive” content in Videodrome.39 It is not, for example, typical of mainstream media in presenting the abject in the form of a male body. Secondly, the body is made androgynous by the vagina-like slot that opens up in Max’s belly and the placenta-like covered handgun that he sticks in and out of the slot. As a feminist, Kaplan interprets “postmodern discourse of this kind” as an implicit critique of the “horror of technology that deforms all bodies and blurs their gender distinction.”40 I am not convinced of the contribution to feminism, however, of the positive conclusions which Kaplan draws from the androgynizing blurring of distinctions effected by Videodrome, rock videos and other forms of mass culture:

     

    Many rock videos have been seen as postmodern insofar as they abandon the usual binary oppositions on which dominant culture depends. That is, videos are said to forsake the usual oppositions between high and low culture; between masculine and feminine; between established literary and filmic genres; between past, present and future; between the private and the public sphere; between verbal and visual hierarchies; between realism and anti-realism, etc. This has important implications for the question of narrative as feminists have been theorizing it, in that these strategies violate the paradigm pitting a classical narrative against an avant-garde anti- narrative, the one supposedly embodying complicit, the other subversive, ideologies. The rock video reveals the error in trying to align an aesthetic strategy with any particular ideology, since all kinds of positions emerge from an astounding mixture of narrative/anti-narrative/non-narrative devices.41

     

    The hybridity, ambiguity and lack of a “fixed identity” which Kaplan and cultural historians of video like Roy Armes attribute to the medium,42 are also terms that Kristeva has used to describe the abject. They both are about “the breaking down of a world that has erased its borders.”43 In this sense, Cronenberg’sVideodrome is not so much a metaphor or allegory of the abject but rather the cinematic demonstration that experience is the consumption of media, that the body of mediation is the body of the real (“whatever appears on the television screen emerges as raw experience for those who watch it,” says Professor Oblivion). If the reality of mediation in Videodrome is its embodiment in “uncontrollable flesh,” for Kristeva the blurring of the corporeal limits established by food, waste, and signs of sexual differentiation produces “uncontrollable materiality.” In both cases there is an avowal of the death drive (“To become the new flesh [of mediation] first you have to kill off the old [demarcated] flesh,” Bianca says to Max) and a disruption of identity (“I don’t know where I am now. I’m having trouble finding my way around,” says Max).

     

    This dissolution of identity, furthermore, takes place for Kristeva in relation to the mother’s body, the “place of a splitting,” “a threshold where `nature’ confronts `culture’.”44 InVideodrome, Max’s dissolution (which is concomitant to the vaginal stigmata that opens up in his belly) and his transformation into the “new flesh” take place in the medium of video, a body on which viewers “gorge themselves” and with which Max fuses in an inverse birth (i.e., when he sticks his head into the “pregnant” TV monitor). In fact, both maternal body and mediation come together in Kristeva’s positing of the mother as the agency that maps or formats the body and readies it for the mediation that is language.

     

    [Maternal authority] shapes the body into a territory having areas, orifices, points and lines, surfaces and hollows, where the archaic power of mastery and neglect, of the differentiation of proper-clean and improper- dirty, possible and impossible, is impressed and exerted. It is a `binary logic,' a primal mapping of the body that I call semiotic to say that, while being the precondition of language, it is dependent upon meaning, but in a way that is not that of linguistic signs nor of the symbolic order they found.45

     

    Can we call this experience a transcendence? And what does it achieve? If we consider mysticism, we readily see, as in Saint Teresa’s writings, that transcendence is experienced as a freedom which empowers the subject through infinite expansion:

     

    When a soul sets out upon this earth, He does not reveal Himself to it, lest it should feel dismayed at seeing that its littleness can contain such a greatness; but gradually He enlarges it to the extent requisite for what He has set within it. It is for this reason that I say He has perfect freedom, since He has power to make the whole of this palace great.46

     

    But the mystic’s experience is not totally determined by a God from the outside. Self-mastery through prayer and meditation is the precondition for fashioning a space without which the divinity could have no presentation. Perhaps Saint Teresa’s best known claim for the constitutive capacity of the mystic is the metaphor of the silkworm inThe Interior Castle. Through speech-prayer (_oracion), the nuns spin their interior dwellings, like the silkworm its cocoon. In language that recalls Heidegger’s, Saint Teresa describes these dwellings as the resting place of the nuns, the space of their death. It is also the space of the Godhead, the “new [mystic] flesh.” Saint Teresa would seem to be on the verge of heresy here for she claims that it is the nuns who can place or withdraw God at will since it is they who “fabricate the dwelling which is God so that they might live/die in it.47 “[The Lord] becomes subject to us and is pleased to let you be the mistress and to conform to your will.”48

     

    I have brought up the case of Saint Teresa because, as inVideodrome, transcendence takes the form of the subject embodying the medium. For both the mystic (Saint Teresa) and the subject of the “new flesh” (Max Renn) phenomenality is overcome not by reaching beyond it but by collapsing what would otherwise be the “supersensible idea” of the sublime onto appearance or image itself. The “new flesh” is the collapse of idea and body as medium, a collapse which, in Saint Teresa’s words, provides “free[dom] from earthly things…and master[y] of all the elements and of the whole world.”49 In Saint Teresa’s case it is not too difficult to understand how the dialectic of freedom and mastery enabled this marginal and subaltern person (woman, “new Christian,” eccentric) to negotiate a measure of power in a hierarchical and patriarchal society overseen by the all-pervasive scrutiny of the Inquisition:

     

    You will not be surprised, then, sisters, at the way I have insisted in this book that you should strive to obtain this freedom. Is it not a funny thing that a poor little nun of St. Joseph's should attain mastery over the whole earth and all the elements?50

     

    The influence of St. Catherine of Siena over popes and monarchs is also well known. Through radical fasting both of these saints brought their bodies to extreme states of abjection that resulted in death. But abjection gave them a power over and above representation that the authorities of the Inquisition felt obliged to recognize and to channel in ways that did not topple the institution, for both saints were also reformers.

     

    Can the same be said for either Max Renn or the anorectics of today? What is their power, if any? Can they, like the mystics, transform their abjection into transformative power? I think not. The problem is that the thematics of abject rebellion have been conceived in relation to high art. Kristeva’s examples–Dostoyevsky, Lautreamont, Proust, Artaud, Kafka, Celine–are not easily transferred to the mass mediated reality of today, say Roseanne Barr. Why is that?

     

    In the first place, Kristeva’s privileged abjects are all (male) avant-gardists and as we know the lynchpin of the avant-garde was to transform life by recourse to an aesthetic modality that had its raison d’etre in bourgeois modernity. Secondly, since aesthetics is thoroughly commodified as mass culture absorbs it, it can hardly be the means for a transformation of life in the service of emancipation. To collapse idea and body onto medium, then, implies a commodification which is not sufficiently thematized in Videodrome. Can the “new flesh” really be other than commodified flesh? The references to simulated foods in an earlier section of this essay only reinforce the idea that mass mediated simulation is in fact transforming us all into commodified media. The rebellion of the anorectic counters this but only at the cost of dysfunction or death, that is, disembodiment.

     

    Is there, then, any other politics of representation that can prove more successful? One attempt is the acceptance of the premise that we too are simulations but that we can rearticulate the way we have been constituted. This takes at least two forms: one which continues to accept that an autonomous aesthetics can have an impact on the culture. For example the work of Cindy Sherman or the Sarah Tuft’s videoDon’t Make Me Up. Ultimately, I think these are failed attempts not because they work with commodified images but rather because they still accept the confines of aesthetic institutionalization. On the other hand, the aesthetic practices involved in identity formation among ethnic groups and certain social movements like gays and lesbians do not distinguish between the market, the street, the university and the gallery. The work of such groups as ACT-UP and Guerrilla Girls as well as many other groups working in collaboration with particular constituencies stake out new public spaces for re-embodying media and struggle within and against the dominant media to reconfigure the institutional arrangements of our society. New “safe-sex” videos, for example, attempt to re-eroticize body in an age increasingly defined by a new puritan fundamentalism (which includes the anti- abortion movement, reinforced homophobia, and the War on Drugs).

     

    It is not enough, in the face of this offensive, to reshuffle representations. If this were all to contemporary cultural politics, Baudrillard would indeed be correct in understanding any practice as the body “digest[ing] space in its own appearance.”51 As regards the consumption of food, the age of the counterculture, which saw the emergence of the new social movements, also spawned contestatory movements like Fat Liberation and the politically motivated vegetarianism ofDiet for a Small Planet.52 Warren Belasco’s history of the Food Revolution in the past two and a half decades recognizes that the powerful food industry ultimately won, in part because of the counterculture’s too diffuse means of implementing its utopian visions. As an individualistic politics, it gave way to its own commodification and presented no unified front against the social causes of obesity in the U.S. and exploitation of agricultural workers in the third world. A contestatory politics of food production and consumption would have to articulate more directly with other social movements and to take into account the ways in which myriad factors intersect in the constitution of subjectivity and identity. This means also taking into consideration ethical as well as aesthetic questions, even the experience of transcendence as I have been describing it here.

     

    There are signs, however, that a coalitional politics is possible. An example is the Institute for Food and Development Policy, which Frances Moore Lappe founded with the profits from her counterculturalDiet for a Small Planet. The most recent direction of the institute is to encourage the formation of new social values that, on the one hand, contest the conservative rapaciousness in industry and its attack on civil rights and, on the other, the redefinition of the individual, grounding his/her sense of value not in the isolated person, as proclaimed by Liberal ideology but, rather in the entirety of society. InRediscovering America’s Values, Lappe argues that the privatization of values in the Reagan 80s (“fidelity, chastity, saying no to drugs”) have to be re-publicized.53 This entails examining how they have become embodied in us, what social and aesthetic practices have enabled us to become inured to widespread hunger and environmental devastation throughout the world. Lappe’s strategy for recreating public values is of a piece with current progressive agendas: new ways of eroticizing, new ways of articulating needs in pursuit of recognition, valuation, and empowerment. In an age of simulation, these are worthy transformations. Perhaps if the will to transcendence were articulated along these lines, we would be able to find more socially responsible and convincing values than those advocated by the Right and by Liberals. The aesthetics accompanying current analyses of eating disorders tend to celebrate the individual body, thus not posing any challenge to the Right or to Liberalism. We need an aesthetics that instills the values of the social body.

     

    Notes

     

    1. Jean-Paul Sartre,Being and Nothingness (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966).

     

    2. Jean-Pierre Vernant, “At Man’s Table: Hesiod’s Foundation Myth of Sacrifice,” in Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant,The Cuisine of Sacrifice among the Greeks, trans. Paula Wissing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 51.

     

    3. Saint Teresa of Avila,The Life of Saint Teresa of Avila By Herself (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1957), 190.

     

    4. Saint Teresa of Avila,Way of Perfection, tr. E. Allison Peers (Garden City, NY: Image Books/Doubleday, 1964), 137.

     

    5. Julia Kristeva, “Stabat Mater,” inThe Female Body in Western Culture, ed. Susan Rubin Suleiman (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 99-118.

     

    6. Luce Irigaray,Speculum of the Other Woman, trans. Gillian C. Gill (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 191.

     

    7. “It is easy to learn how to interpret dreams, to extract from the patient’s associations his [sic] unconscious thoughts and memories, and to practise similar explanatory arts: for these the patient himself [sic] will always provide the text.” Sigmund Freud, Dora: An Analysis of a Case of Hysteria (New York: Collier, 1963), 138. Freud goes on to observe that the difficult part of interpretation is taking into account unavoidable transferences, “new editions” or replays of fantasies in which the analyst stands in for prior actors. This phenomenon must also be taken into consideration in the very production of the subaltern’s text. In the mystic’s case, an analysis of the role of confessors and inquisitors is crucial. The role of the mystic and the hysteric should also be considered transferentially in the production of current theories of gendered discourse or behavior (such as eating disorders).

     

    8. Recognition of endocrinological and biomedical factors in the etiology of eating disorders does not diminish the relevance of an approach that focuses on the social interpretation and evaluation of thinness and obesity. Moreover, it is mistaken, in my view, to take biomedical factors asreal and social factors as epiphenomenal. On the contrary, the social may work in tandem with the biomedical in a synergistic way. In any case, how one interprets the relative importance of these factors depends on the models of biology, society and disease that frame one’s discourse. This essay is part of a more general attempt on my part to discern the workings of the aesthetic as it interfaces bodily sensation and social valuation.

     

    9. Sohnya Sayres, “Glory mongering: food and the agon of excess,”Social Text, 16 (Winter 1986-87): 94.

     

    10. Jean Baudrillard, “The Obese,” inFatal Strategies, trans. Philip Beitchman and W.G.J. Niesluchowski (New York: Semiotext(e)/Pluto, 1990), p.27.

     

    11. “The Obese,” 34.

     

    12. “The Obese,” 27.

     

    13. For an account of the “body as temple/machine/holistic organism/etc.” cognitive schemas which underwrite these different accounts for disease, see Mark Johnson,The Body in the Mind. The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination and Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 126-36.

     

    14. Jean Baudrillard, “The Anorectic Ruins,” in Jean Baudrillard, et al.,Looking Back at the End of the World, eds. Dietmar Kamper and Christoph Wolf, trans. David Antal (New York: Semiotext(e) Foreign Agents Series, 1989), 39.

     

    15. Johnson,The Body in the Mind.

     

    16. Cf. Lena Williams, “Free Choice: When Too Much Is Too Much,”The New York Times (2/14/90): C1, C10.

     

    17. For a recent account of the radical potential and eventual cooptation of the “gastronomic counterculture,” see Warren Belasco,Appetite for Change: How the Counterculture Took On the Food Industry, 1966-1988 (New York: Pantheon, 1989).

     

    18. Octavio Paz, “Eroticism and Gastrosophy,” Daedalus, 101, 4 (1972): 81.

     

    19. Dena Kleiman, “Fast Food? It Just Isn’t Fast Enough Anymore,”The New York Times (12/6/89): A1, C12.

     

    20. The September 1989 Gallup poll is cited in Kleiman, C12.

     

    21. Kleiman, C12.

     

    22. Denise Webb, “Eating Well,”The New York Times (2/14/90): C8.

     

    23. “The Obese,” 35.

     

    24. Dr. DeHavenon, director of a private research committee on welfare benefits stated that the “basic welfare grant in New York had gone up only 28 percent since 1969, while prices have increased 180 percent, and that cutbacks in the foodstamp program have contributed to the problem.” Richard Severo, “East Harlem Study Shows Hunger Worsens,”The New York Times (6/3/84): 46.

     

    25. The literature on transnational control of agribusiness and destruction and contamination of resources is voluminous. It includes such books and essays as: Joseph N. Beldon, et al.Dirt Rich, Dirt Poor. America’s Food and Farm Crisis (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986); James Danaher, “U.S. Food Power in the 1990s,”Race & Class, 30, 3 (1989); Susan George,How the Other Half Dies. The Real Reasons for World Hunger (Washington, DC: Institute for Policy Studies, 1977); Frances Moore Lappe and Joseph Collins,World Hunger. Ten Myths (San Francisco: Food First, 1982); James O’Connor, “Uneven and Combined Development and Ecological Crisis: A Theoretical Introduction,”Race & Class, 30, 3 (1989); N. Shanmugaratnam, “Development and Environment: A View From the South,” Race & Class, 30, 3 (1989); Jill Torrie,Banking on Poverty: The Impact of the IMF and World Bank (San Francisco: Food First, 1986).

     

    26. Kim Chernin,The Obsession. Reflections on the Tyranny of Slenderness (New York: Harper and Row, 1981).

     

    27. Susie Orbach,Hunger Strike: The Anorectic’s Struggle as a Metaphor for our Age (New York: Norton, 1987).

     

    28. “The Obese,” 31.

     

    29. Fredric Jameson, “Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism,”New Left Review, 146 (July-August 1984): 77.

     

    30. Susan Bordo, “Reading the Slender Body,” in Women, Science, and the Body Politic: Discourses and Representations, eds. Mary Jacobus, Evelyn Fox Keller, and Sally Shuttleworth (New York: Methuen, 1989), 88.

     

    31. Cf. Jean Baudrillard,The Ecstasy of Communication (New York: Semiotexte, 1988).

     

    32. Chernin,The Obsession, 45-55.

     

    33. “Remaking the self” is part of the contemporary politics of representation, which is often understood in two different ways: as an expression of the collective identity of diverse social movements (feminists, gays and lesbians, racial and ethnic minorities, workers, and so on) or as the expression, in the language of liberal democracy, of interests. The difference is important because the latter understanding of representation does not take into consideration the ways in which particular identity factors traverse other collective identities. There is no general, uncontested interest for a particular group because it is not monolithic; certainly the participation of lesbians within AIDS activist groups like ACT UP, or the objections of women of color to “general” feminist interests bears this out. The politics of this “transversal” critique of interests is an ongoing will to transform the institutions that fix particular interests in place. Jane Jensen (“Representations of Difference: The Varieties of French Feminism,”New Left Review, 180 (March/April 1990), 127-60) lays out this theoretical perspective and applies it in an historical analysis of French Feminism. This is also the direction that Frances Moore Lappe takes in her recent work (see below).

     

    34. Juan Flores and George Yudice, “Living Borders/Buscando America. Languages of Latino Self- Formation,”Social Text, 24 (1990).

     

    35. Julia Kristeva,Powers of Horror. An Essay on Abjection (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982),100.

     

    36. See Mary Douglas,Purity and Danger. An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution and Taboo (London/Boston/Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969),121. See also Kristeva, 69.

     

    37. Baudrillard,The Ecstasy of Communication,75.

     

    38. This video was included in “Unacceptable Appetites,” a video program at Artists Space (2/25- 4/2/88) curated by Micki McGee. McGee’s catalogue essay is an invaluable resource for the interpretation of interrelations of images of food and eating, feminine identity and the dialectic of control and self-determination.

     

    39. E. Ann Kaplan, “Feminism/Oedipus/Postmodern- ism: The Case of MTV,” inPostmodernism and its Discontents. Theories, Practices, ed. E. Ann Kaplan (London/New York: Verso, 1988).

     

    40. Kaplan, 40.

     

    41. Kaplan, 36.

     

    42. “[It] is a form which is both fascinating and self-contradictory: distributed in video format but shot on film, free-wheeling yet constrained by its advertising function, visually innovative yet subordinated to its sound track, an individual artefact which is parasitic on a separate and commercially more important object (the record or the cassette), a part of the distinctive youth culture that needs to be played through the equipment forming the focus of family life. Despite–or perhaps because of–these contradictions, the pop video points to the new potential of video as a medium in its own right.” Roy Armes,On Video (London/New York: Routledge, 1988), 158.

     

    43. Kristeva, 4.

     

    44. Julia Kristeva, “Motherhood According to Giovanni Bellini,” inDesire in Language. A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 238.

     

    45. Kristeva,Powers of Horror, 72.

     

    46. Saint Teresa of Avila,Way of Perfection,189.

     

    47. “Que Su Majestad mesmo sea nuestra morada, como lo es en esta oracion de union, labrandola nosotras! Parece que quiero decir que podemos quitar y poner en Dios, pues digo que El es la morada, y la podemos nosotras fabricar para meternos en ella.” Las moradas_ (The Interior Castle of the Dwellings of the Soul) (Madrid: Espasa-Calpe, Col. Austral, 1964), 72.

     

    48.The Way of Perfection, 175.

     

    49.The Way of Perfection, 136-37.

     

    50.The Way of Perfection, 137.

     

    51. “The Obese,” 27.

     

    52. Cf. “Judy Freespirit and Aldebaran, “Fat Liberation Manifesto,”Rough Times (formerlyThe Radical Therapist), 4, 2 (March-April-May 1974); Aldebaran, “Fat Liberation–a Luxury?”State and Mind, 5 (June-July 1977): 34-38; Alan Dolit,Fat Liberation (Millbrae, CA: 1975); Frances Moore Lappe, Diet for a Small Planet (New York: Ballantine Books, 1975).

     

    53. Frances Moore Lappe,Rediscovering America’s Values (New York: Ballantine, 1989). The quote is from an interview with the author: Diana Ketcham, “Author Lappe’s plan for planet: Back to basics,”The Tribune Calendar (5/28/89).

     

  • Marx: The Video (A Politics of Revolting Bodies)

    Laura Kipnis

    University of Wisconsin, Madison

     

    A note on the mise-en-scene: There are large projections –stills, film clips, etc.–behind the action (referred to in the text as KEYS) in many scenes. There is also a Greek chorus of DRAG QUEENS (or DQs) who pop in and out of the action (or are KEYED over the action) in other scenes.

     

    FADE UP ON:
    
    1. MARX'S ROOM, he is
    lying in bed, carbuncular,
    in pain. ROLLING TEXT OVER:
    
    Karl Marx was born in Germany in 1818, and died in
    London in 1883, having been deported from numerous
    European countries for revolutionary activity.
    Throughout his life he suffered from chronic and
    painful outbreaks of carbuncles--agonizing skin
    eruptions--particularly during the years he was at work
    on his magnum opus, _Capital_. His 30-year
    correspondence with Frederick Engels, his friend and
    collaborator, deals regularly and in great detail with
    the state of his own body.
    
    DISSOLVE TO:
    
    2. CLIP _La Marseillaise_    King: What is it?
    
    SUPER TITLE: 1789            Minister: Sire, the
                                 Parisians have taken the
                                 Bastille.
                                 King: So, is it a revolt?
                                 Minister: No sire, it is
                                 revolution.
    FREEZE on king
                                 V/O: Once power resided
                                 in the person of the King.
                                 The people's task was
                                 clear. Get rid of the
                                 king.
    
    3. CLIP: Berlin wall         V/O: Once power resided
    going down.                  in repressive state
                                 bureaucracies. The
                                 people's task was clear.
    SUPER TITLE: 1989            Smash the state.
    
    4. STILL dead Ceausescu      V/O: At certain moments in
                                 history power is centralized
                                 and visible, the sites of
                                 repression are clear and
                                 identifiable; resistance
                                 movements arise out of
                                 those relations of
                                 subordination and
                                 antagonism.
    
    5. STILL Postmodern          V/O: At other moments the
    urban landscapes             task is less clear. Power
                                 is entrenched, but
                                 dispersed. Where does
                                 power reside? Who are the
                                 agents of change?
    
    TRANSITION EFFECT going
    back in time
    
    6. STILLS: 1848              V/O: In 1848, Toqueville
    uprising                     warned: "We are sleeping
                                 on a volcano. A wind of
    TITLE: 1848                  revolution blows, the
                                 storm is on the horizon."
                                 That year Marx and Engels
                                 completed The Communist
                                 Manifesto. Jean Martin
                                 Charcot, who would later
                                 devote himself to the
                                 study of hysteria, enters
                                 medical school. The same
                                 year, revolution swept
                                 Europe. Students and
                                 workers united, but three
                                 years later the revolution
                                 was toppled.
    
    Time passing TRANSITION
    
    7. STILLS Paris, May 68      V/O: France, May '68.
                                 Students and workers
                                 united in a three week
                                 general strike, demanding
                                 radical democratic
                                 reforms. Momentarily,
                                 revolution seemed
                                 possible, but once again
                                 that possibility was soon
                                 dispelled. In the decades
                                 following '68, like the
                                 aftermath of 1848--the
                                 defeat of forces of change
                                 left traces, absences, an
                                 unfilled place where
                                 something is wanting.
                                 Where is the repository of
                                 those absences--where are
                                 they buried, embodied,
                                 misrecognized?
    
    TITLE:  MARX: THE VIDEO  A Politics of Erupting Bodies
    1848-1990
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    8. SUPER: 1863               V/O BIOGRAPHER: Looking
    over first image of          back, fifteen years later,
    MARX; he lies in bed         to the failed revolution.
    
                                 MARX: Dear Engels: One
                                 thing is sure, the era of
                                 revolution is now once
                                 more fairly opened in
                                 Europe. And the general
                                 state of things is good.
                                 But the comfortable
                                 delusions and the almost
                                 childish enthusiasms with
                                 which we greeted the era
                                 of revolution before
    SUPER: Trotsky waving        February 1848 are gone to
    from a train                 the devil. Old comrades
                                 are gone, others have
                                 fallen away or decayed,
                                 and a new generation is
                                 not yet in sight. In
    looming supers of            addition, we now know what
    Stalin, Lenin                role stupidity plays in
                                 revolutions and how they
                                 are exploited by
    Stalin looms over body       scoundrels...Let us hope
                                 that this time the lava
    Mao looms over body          pours from East to West
                                 and not vice versa.
    
                                 V/O BIOGRAPHER: He writes
                                 with nostalgia and longing
                                 for something thwarted,
                                 for something that didn't
                                 happen.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    9. DOCTOR KEYED over         DOCTOR: His body just
    examining room STILL.        erupted...It became
    Addresses camera             like a battleground. The
                                 only cure at the time was
                                 arsenic. Terribly painful,
                                 like a body trying to turn
                                 itself into another body.
                                 I think it started shortly
                                 after his mother died.  It
                                 continued throughout his
                                 life.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    10. STILLS, 19c.             V/O NARRATOR: Marx took up
    industrialization            the task of exhaustively
    superimposed on              analyzing the historical
    Marx's body                  moment in which he found
                                 himself: the rise of
                                 industrialization and the
                                 inception of the working
                                 class movement. He
                                 stripped the facade off
    Poster International         capital to reveal what was
    workingmens assoc.           concealed: the labor in
    STILL                        the commodity, the
                                 alienation of the worker,
                                 naked exploitation by the
                                 capitalist. He looked to
                                 the material foundations
    zoom on worker body          of the moment, he looked
    worker injury photo          to the body. His analysis
                                 of capital relies on a
                                 language of the body:
                                 "production"
                                 "consumption"
                                 "reproduction" and
                                 "circulation." For Marx,
                                 the collective wealth of
                                 the state is the body--the
                                 labor--of the workers.
     worker injuries             Capital amputates the
                                 worker from his own body;
                                 he has phantom pain for
                                 his missing limbs. But for
                                 Marx, which bodies were
                                 absent, unspoken,
                                 unacknowledged?
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    11.                          DRAG QUEEN 1: What's a
                                 real body, a natural body?
                                 It doesn't exist, there's
                                 only a social body, the
                                 body as theater,
                                 the body that speaks,
                                 unbidden. But in
                                 whose language?
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    12. MARX'S ROOM              MARX: Dear Frederick: Two
    Fade up on MARX, in          hours ago I received a
    foreground, writing.         telegram that my mother is
    In suit, suitcase at         dead. Fate claimed one of
    feet                         my family. I must go to
                                 Trier to settle my
                                 inheritance. I myself
                                 stood with one foot in the
                                 grave...
    DRAG QUEEN CHORUS
    supered over MARX,           DQ CHORUS: His body just
    all dressed as nurses        erupted.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    13.                          DQ2: What a problem the
                                 body is. Keeping it
                                 confined to its boundaries
                                 (like the lower classes).
                                 Concealing anything that
    BACKGROUND:                  comes out of it, or
    CLIPS porn, slo-mo           protrudes from it.
                                 Certainly not speaking of
                                 such things. The creation
                                 of a meek, submissive
                                 hygienic public body.
    
                                 DQ2: His body just
                                 erupted.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    14. Hygiene products,        V/O NARRATOR: Capital
    douche, dolls, float         produces a disgusting
    through blue sky             body, so it can create new
                                 regimes, new products, to
                                 police it and make it
                                 acceptable. Capital has
                                 achieved historical
                                 advances in the threshold
                                 of delicacy, it produces
                                 new varieties of bourgeois
                                 disgust, then markets a
                                 new and improved body
                                 without byproducts,
                                 without smells, to exist
                                 in a public sphere that is
                                 increasingly phobic about
                                 the collective body, the
                                 lower class body--the
                                 mob--a body that might not
                                 mind its manners.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    15. MARX'S ROOM, he          MARX: Dear Fred: It is
    writes in bed.               clear that on the whole I
    Dolly in                     know more about the
                                 carbuncle disease than most
                                 doctors...Here and there
                                 I have the beginnings of
                                 new carbuncles, which keep
                                 on disappearing, but they
                                 force me to keep my working
                                 hours within limits...I
                                 consider it my vocation to
                                 remain in Europe to
                                 complete the work in which
                                 I have been engaged for so
                                 many years but I cannot
                                 work productively more
                                 than a very few hours daily
                                 without feeling the effect
                                 physically...I think this
                                 work I am doing is much
                                 more important for the
                                 working class than anything
                                 I could do personally at a
                                 Congress of any kind...I
                                 would consider myself
                                 impractical if I had
                                 dropped dead without having
                                 finished my book, at least
                                 in manuscript.
    
    Cut to second angle          V/O BIOGRAPHER: Writing
    on MARX with smoking         Capital, his narrative of
    factory, keyed in            the conditions of the
    background                   English proletariat, his
                                 body broke out with "a
                                 proletarian disease."
                                 Marx was desperate to
                                 finish his work, but
                                 unable to. Instead of
                                 writing, he was being
                                 written. The revolution he
                                 anticipated, the thwarted
                                 revolution, was displaced
                                 onto his own skin.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    16. MARX'S ROOM: high        MARX: Dear Frederick: You
    angle down on bed            see I am still here and I
                                 will tell you more, I am
                                 incapable of moving about.
                                 This is a perfidious
                                 Christian illness. In the
                                 meantime, I can neither
                                 walk, nor stand, nor sit,
                                 and even lying down is
                                 damned hard. You see how
                                 the wisdom of nature has
                                 afflicted me. Would it not
                                 have been more sensible if
                                 instead of me it had been
                                 consigned to try the
                                 patience of a good
                                 Christian? Like a true
                                 Lazarus, I am scourged on
                                 all sides.
    
                                 DRAG QUEEN 3: His body
                                 became sarcastic, taunting
                                 the tasteful, discreet
                                 body, the one that stays
                                 politely behind the
                                 scenes, the one that knows
                                 its place like the servant
                                 serving the master, like
                                 the subject serving the
                                 state. This wasn't a body
                                 you could take into the
                                 drawing room.  This was an
                                 ill-mannered body.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    17. MARX writing             Dear Kugelmann: Cut,
    at desk, bandaged            lanced, etc, in
    REAR SCREEN CLIPS            short treated in every
    Russian Revolution           respect. In spite of this
                                 the thing is continually
                                 breaking out anew...I
                                 hope it will end this
                                 week, but who can
                                 guarantee me against
                                 another eruption?
    
    DRAG QUEEN CHORUS            V/O: Marx, writing
    POPS ON                      Capital, imagining
                                 Capital's overthrow. His
                                 body living out his split
                                 identifications--
    
                                 DQ1: (the bourgeois who
                                 champions the overthrow of
                                 the bourgeoisie)
    
                                 DQ3...the body begins to
                                 embody another kind of
                                 psyche, another sociality.
                                 It desired transformation.
    
                                 DQ2: He swathed his
                                 carbuncles behind bandages
                                 and focused his attention
                                 on the working class.
    
    CU Marx at                   BIOG V/O: As he nears
    desk, bandaged               completion of the first
                                 volume, his carbuncles,
                                 mobile, sardonic, and
                                 insistent, break out in
                                 ever new vicinities.
                                 Seizing the flesh,
                                 sculpting it into a body
                                 bulging, protuberant, not
                                 closed and finished, not
                                 refined.
    
                                 MARX: You have too low an
                                 opinion of the English
                                 doctors if you think that
                                 they cannot diagnose
                                 carbuncles, particularly
                                 here in England--the
                                 land of carbuncles, which
                                 is actually a proletarian
                                 illness. It is only in the
                                 last few years that I have
                                 been persecuted by the
                                 thing. Before that, it was
                                 entirely unknown to me.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    18. CLIP riot footage        V/O BIOGRAPHER: Marx--who
    KEYED onto his body          would disavow the
    high overhead onto           opposition between the
    body lying in bed            social and the psychic as
                                 mere bourgeois psychology
                                 --was possessed of a body
                                 whose symptoms mocked the
                                 social order; it had
                                 become grotesque: open,
                                 protruding, extended,
                                 secreting: in process,
                                 taking on new forms,
                                 shapes; his body the
                                 figure of the new society
                                 that had failed to emerge.
                                 He was producing more and
                                 more body--too much body
                                 for a social order
                                 dedicated to its
                                 concealment.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    19. MARX'S ROOM              Dear Engels: It was good
    he writes on couch           you did not come on
                                 Saturday. My story--now
                                 fourteen days old--had
                                 reached the crisis point.
                                 I could talk a little, and
                                 it hurt even to laugh on
                                 account of the big abscess
                                 between nose and mouth,
                                 which this morning has
                                 been reduced at least to
                                 reasonable proportions.
                                 Also the violently swollen
                                 lips are becoming reduced
                                 closer to their previous
                                 dimensions. May the head
                                 of the devil go through
                                 such fourteen days. All
                                 this stops being a joke.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    TITLE: ELIMINATING THE BODY.
    
    20. TEENAGE GIRL'S ROOM,     I hate my body, god, it's
    a number of TEENAGE          so gross, look at these
    GIRLS gabbing, shot          thighs...It's disgusting,
    documentary style            I'm so fat...
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    21. DISSOLVE TO:
    BATHROOM, high shot
    toilet, GIRL retching
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    SUPER TITLE: THE AGE OF CONSUMPTION
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    22. Map of the U.S.          V/O: Anorexia, bulimia
    little inserts of            --epidemic in abundant
    girls retching into          western societies, post
    toilets keyed over           1968. 10 to 20 percent
    U.S. capitals                of American women now have
                                 eating disorders. A
                                 symptomatic eruption of the
                                 body. Let's wrest this out
                                 of secrecy, out of the
                                 private sphere and view it
                                 for a moment as the social
                                 collective act that it is.
    
    TITLE: THINKING THROUGH THE BODY
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    23.                          DRAG QUEEN 3: Like a body
                                 trying to turn itself into
                                 another body, like a body
                                 trying to invent another
                                 kind of social existence.
    
                                 DRAG QUEEN 2: Women's
                                 bodies as tablets of
                                 social meaning, as sites
                                 of regulation...
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    24. Pills, laxatives,        V/O: With our increasingly
    diet products float          phobic relation to the
    through blue sky             collective body, the
                                 working class body, with
                                 our creation of an ideal
                                 public body without fat,
                                 without snot or BO, with a
                                 yearning for refinement,
                                 we will the disappearance
                                 of the body, the
                                 containment of the mass,
                                 the body politic, the
                                 threat.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    25. Worker STILLS            BIOGRAPHER V/O: Marx,
    dissolve to                  writing history from
    MARX body/                   below: a history of wealth
    dissolve to                  as labor, a history of the
    riots                        body, a history of the
                                 mass, his own body acting
                                 out...
    
                                 V/O: Stories told by the
    SUPER:                       body--after the failed
    STILLS hysterics             revolutions of 1848 this
                                 comes to be known as
                                 "hysteria" and sweeps
                                 Europe.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    TITLE: THE HYSTERIC IS SUBJECT TO MULTIPLE
    IDENTIFICATIONS
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    26. MARX ROOM, he is         Dear Frederick: I would
    writing at desk. REAR        have written you sooner,
    SCREEN workers               but for approximately the
                                 last twelve days all
                                 reading writing and
                                 smoking have been strictly
                                 forbidden. I had a sort of
                                 eye inflammation tied up
                                 with very unpleasant
                                 effects on the nervous
                                 system. The thing is now
                                 so far under control that
                                 I can again dare to write.
                                 In the meantime I had all
                                 kinds of psychological
                                 reveries, like a person
                                 going blind or crazy.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    27. STILL:                   V/O: Marx's symptoms make
    "Lecon clinique              their appearance around
    de Charcot"                  the time that Freud's
                                 future teacher, Charcot,
                                 is beginning to recognize
                                 and treat a new disease,
                                 "traumatic hysteria."
                                 Before hysteria was
                                 relegated to a female
                                 disorder, it afflicted
                                 many men as well: Charcot
                                 began to recognize that
                                 what is novel about
                                 traumatic hysteria is that
                                 in these cases what lay
                                 behind the symptoms were
                                 not physical disorders,
                                 and not just nerves, but
                                 ideas.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    28.  CHARCOT speaks          "Male hysteria is not all
                                 that rare, and just among
                                 us, gentlemen, if I can
                                 judge from what I see each
                                 day, these cases are often
                                 unrecognized even by
                                 distinguished doctors.
                                 One will concede that a
                                 young and effeminate man
                                 might develop hysterical
                                 findings after
                                 experiencing significant
                                 stress, sorrow or deep
                                 emotions. But that a
                                 strong and vital worker,
                                 for instance, a railway
                                 engineer never prone to
                                 emotional instability
                                 before, should become
                                 hysteric--just as a woman
                                 might--this seems to us
                                 beyond imagination. And
                                 yet it is a fact--one
                                 which we must get used
                                 to."
    
                                 DRAG QUEEN 1: Hysteria
                                 which entraps and speaks
                                 the patient.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    29. FILM: BRITISH            Dear Fred: I wanted to
    MUSEUM LOCATION              write you yesterday from
    Marx, ill, stumbling,        the British Museum, but
    drops a book, camera         I suddenly became so
    zoom in on copy of           unwell that I had to close
    "Vindication of the          the very interesting book
    Rights of Women"             that I held in my hand. A
                                 dark veil fell over my
                                 eyes. Then a frightful
                                 headache and a pain in the
                                 chest. I strolled home.
                                 Air and light helped and
                                 when I got home I slept
                                 for some time. My
                                 condition is such that I
                                 really should give up all
                                 working and thinking for
                                 some time to come; but
                                 that would be difficult,
                                 even if I could afford it.
    --------------------------------------------------------
    
    30. STILL, male              V/O: Freud recounted how
    hysterics                    disturbed Charcot became
                                 when the German school of
                                 neurology resisted the
                                 idea of male hysteria and
                                 suggested pejoratively
                                 that if it occurred in
                                 males, it occurred
                                 only in French males.
    --------------------------------------------------------
    
    31. MARX'S ROOM, he          Dear Frederick: In recent
    paces in the set             weeks it has been
                                 positively impossible for
                                 me to write even two
                                 hours a day. Apart from
                                 pressure from without,
                                 there are the household
                                 headaches which always
                                 affect my liver. I have
                                 become sleepless again,
                                 and have had the pleasure
                                 of seeing two carbuncles
                                 bloom near the penis.
                                 Fortunately they faded
                                 away. My illness always
                                 comes from the head.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    32. STILL another            V/O: Charcot related male
    male hysteric                hysteria to trauma. As the
                                 industrial era progressed,
                                 the number of unexplained
                                 work related illnesses
                                 increased enormously;
                                 Charcot worked to
                                 demonstrate how these
                                 could be understood as
                                 hysterical.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    33.                          DRAG QUEEN 2: There were
                                 many who thought that the
                                 commotion of the French
    DRAG QUEEN CHORUS            Revolution may have
    supered over                 affected the nervous system
    Delacroix's "Libertie        of Frenchmen and Europeans
    Leading the Masses"          adversely.
    
                                 DRAG QUEEN 1: It was an
                                 infection by ideas, the
                                 spread of violent
                                 influences displaced from
                                 social and class upheaval,
                                 fearful ideas about
                                 progress, new
                                 technologies, social
                                 transformations.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    34. REARSCREEN: Capital      Dear Frederick: The dr. is
    MARX at desk, single         quite right: the excessive
    lamp burning, fullscreen     nightwork was the main
    behind of "workday" text,    cause of the relapse. The
    violently moving camera      most disgusting thing for me
                                 was the interruption of my
                                 work. But I have drudged on,
                                 lying down, even if only
                                 at short intervals during
                                 the day. I could not
                                 proceed with the purely
                                 theoretical part, the
                                 brain was too weak for
                                 that. Hence I have
                                 enlarged the historical
                                 part on the workday, which
                                 lay outside the original
                                 plan.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    35. Keyed over Marx          DRAG QUEEN 3 (as Nurse)
                                 Like other symptomatics of
                                 the day, he took the cure.
    MARX in wheelchair,
    spa backdrop                 BIOGRAPHER V/O: The
                                 medical world had
                                 devised various techniques
                                 for palliating an
                                 irritated and erupting
                                 human nervous system.
                                 Popular techniques
                                 included warm milk and bed
                                 rest, hydrotherapy and
                                 sojourns at peaceful
                                 pastoral spas. Doctors
                                 intuitively offered
                                 patients physical and
                                 psychological means to
                                 flee psycho-cultural
                                 stress--sending patients
                                 to the country, the sea,
                                 the mountains. Marx tried
                                 all of these. On doctor's
                                 orders, he fled his work.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    36. MARX writing from        Dear Frederick: So far I
    lounge chair, spa            have had two sulfur baths,
    background, rushing          tomorrow the third.
    water noise                 From the bath one steps on
                                 a raised board, in the
                                 altogether; the bath
    In bathing costume           attendant uses the hose
                                 (the size of a firehose)
                                 the way a virtuoso does
                                 his instrument; he
                                 commands the movement of
                                 the body and alternately
                                 bombards all parts of the
                                 corpus except the head for
                                 three minutes, first
                                 strongly, then weakly, up
                                 to the legs and feet, an
                                 always advancing
                                 crescendo. You can see how
                                 little desire a man has to
                                 write here.
    
    DRAG QUEEN KEYED OVER        DRAG QUEEN 2 (as nurse):
    as nurse                     Removing himself from his
                                 work brought some relief.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    37.  MARX at the spa         Dear Frederick: From the
    walking around, in           delayed appearance of this
    suit, cane                   letter you can see how
                                 professionally I use
                                 my time here. I read
                                 nothing, write nothing.
                                 Because of the arsenic
                                 three times daily, one has
                                 time only for meals and
                                 strolling along the coast
                                 and the neighboring
                                 hills, there is no time
                                 left for other things.
                                 Evenings one is too tired
                                 to do anything but sleep.
    
    DRAG QUEEN KEYED OVER        DRAG QUEEN 1: His symptoms
                                 began to speak him.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    38. MARX, spa                My dear daughter: I run
    walking                      about the greatest part of
                                 the day, airing myself,
                                 going to bed at ten, reading
                                 nothing, writing less, and
                                 altogether working up my
                                 mind to that state of
                                 nothingness which Buddhism
                                 considers the climax of
                                 human bliss...I am
                                 afflicted with an
                                 inflammation of the eye,
                                 not that there is much to
                                 be seen of it...the eye
                                 has taken to the vicious
                                 habit of shedding tears on
                                 its own account, without
                                 the least regard to the
                                 feelings of his master.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    39. MARX'S ROOM; he          V/O BIOGRAPHER: The
    writhes in bed               carbuncles continued
                                 to erupt, stalling the
                                 writing of Capital,
                                 inscribing themselves into
                                 the text. Marx focused
                                 doggedly on the laboring
                                 body (while his own body
                                 exploded into new and
                                 ever changing configurations)
    Pan to STILL of              as if fearful of the
    "Libertie Leading the        effect of introducing the
    Masses" over desk            unregimented body into the
                                 realm of the political.
    
                                 DRAG QUEEN 2: But then,
    dressed as Marianne,         this brings other bodies
    one "breast" bare            into the picture--the
                                 desiring body, the woman's
                                 body, the undisciplined
                                 body.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    TITLE: WOMEN'S BODIES
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    40.                          HELENE V/O: For the 19th
                                 century bourgeois male,
                                 the servant provokes
                                 social anxiety: she is the
                                 conduit through which the
                                 working class infiltrates
                                 the middle class home.
                                 Introducing the maid and
                                 her sexuality into the
                                 bourgeois household is
                                 threatening in a period in
                                 which both were linked in
                                 the bourgeois imagination
                                 to the discontent of a
                                 dissatisfied working
                                 class. But then what is
                                 excluded socially is
                                 desired, eroticized--the
                                 maid becomes a figure of
                                 transgressive desire for
                                 the bourgeois male, a
                                 desire produced by the
                                 very categories that rule
                                 the bourgeois body. Marx,
                                 in the Communist Manifesto
                                 mocks the bourgeois male,
                                 with an array of women at
                                 his disposal, not only
                                 proletarian wives and
                                 daughters but prostitutes
                                 to pick up the slack. This
                                 was written two years
                                 before he conceived a son
                                 with the family maid.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    41. 19c porn STILLS of       V/O: Women in the public
    maids                        sphere were tantamount to
                                 prostitutes: they bring the
                                 filth and corruption of the
                                 market, of wage labor, into
                                 the middle class home.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    TITLE: HELENE
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    42. MARX'S ROOM, he          V/O BIOGRAPHER: Marx, even
    writes, HELENE enters,       in the most dire poverty,
    serves tea                   did what he could to
                                 maintain a bourgeois
                                 household. It was Helene
                                 Demuth, the servant, who
                                 marked his own separation
                                 from the working class.
                                 She, more than Marx,
                                 straddles two worlds,
                                 belonging to both the
                                 bourgeois family and the
                                 working class: she was the
                                 certainly the member of
                                 that world that Marx knew
                                 best.
    
    "pregnant" DRAG QUEEN        DRAG QUEEN 3: The hysteric
    KEYED OVER                   is subject to multiple
                                 identifications.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    43. MARX'S ROOM, writing.    Dear Laura, Some recent
    PROJECTION from October,     Russian publications,
    on rearscreen as HELENE      printed in Holy Russia,
    serves tea                   not abroad, show the great
                                 run of my theories in that
                                 country. Nowhere is my
                                 success more delightful to
                                 me, it gives me the
                                 satisfaction that I damage
                                 a power, which besides
                                 England, is the true
                                 bulwark of the old
                                 society.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    44. Looking down on tile     HELENE V/O: She was ten
    floor, HELENE scrubbing,     years younger than Marx's
    as MARX walks across         wife Jenny. Lenchen, as
    frame                        she was called, ran the
                                 Marx household. Often
                                 Marx was too poor to pay
                                 her but she cast her lot
                                 with the Marx family. She
                                 did the cooking,
                                 housecleaning, laundering,
                                 dressmaking, nursing, and
                                 everything else, including
                                 taking the bedsheets to
                                 the pawn shop when
                                 eviction was threatened.
                                 In 1851, at age 28, she
                                 gave birth to Marx's son,
                                 secretly.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    45.  HELENE appears very     BIOGRAPHER V/O: Marx wrote
    pregnant, serving tea        to Engels of a "very
                                 tangled family situation,"
                                 hinting at a "mystery," a
                                 "tragicomic" mystery, in
                                 which he, Engels, also
                                 played a role. Marx
                                 traveled to Manchester, to
                                 see Engels, where the two
                                 negotiated Lenchen's fate.
    
    DRAG QUEEN KEYED OVER        DRAG QUEEN 1: As men are
                                 accustomed to negotiating
                                 the fate of women's
                                 bodies.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    46. CLIP: beauty             HELENE V/O: Did
    contest                      introducing a woman into
                                 their collaborative
                                 association disrupt it?
                                 This triangle--did it
                                 trouble a theory that saw
                                 the role of women strictly
                                 in economic terms? What
                                 bodies aren't
                                 acknowledged?
    
    clip: Stalin kissing         BIOGRAPHER V/O: Marx
    woman; footage keyed         persuaded Engels to accept
    onto Helene's pregnant       paternity for Lenchen's
    stomach                      child, who was named
                                 Frederick, after him, in
                                 the custom of
                                 patrilineage. Engels
                                 accepted responsibility
                                 for the child, binding the
                                 two men together over
                                 Helene's mute body, over
                                 the body of the working
                                 class woman.
    
    DRAG QUEEN KEYED OVER        DRAG QUEEN 3: Jenny, the
                                 wife, was easily persuaded
                                 that Engels was the father
                                 as she never really
                                 approved of his morals.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    TITLE: THE SECRET
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    47. HELENE speaks            I never betrayed the
    directly to camera           secret; I let my baby be
                                 brought up by a working
                                 class family. Engels
                                 occasionally sent money.
                                 Marx never acknowledged
                                 Freddy as his son. He
                                 chose not to acknowledge
                                 paternity. After Marx's
                                 death, I moved into
                                 Engel's home as his
                                 housekeeper. My  son
                                 Freddy visited regularly
                                 once a week: however, as
                                 an ordinary working-
                                 man, he entered through
                                 the kitchen. He was Marx's
                                 only living son. He had
                                 grown up to be a poorly
                                 educated proletarian, his
                                 wife had left him and run
                                 away with his few
                                 possessions. His life was
                                 one of trouble, worry and
                                 hardship.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    48.                          V/O BIOGRAPHER: "We
                                 should, none of us, want
                                 to meet our pasts in flesh
                                 and blood," wrote Marx's
                                 daughter after his death,
                                 after discovering that
                                 Freddy Demuth was her
                                 father's son. These
                                 strategies of concealment
                                 are central to bourgeois
                                 identity, which wishes
                                 most of all to conceal the
                                 crucial place of the
                                 woman in its network of
                                 exploitation, which wishes
                                 most of all to conceal the
                                 symptomatic and erupting
                                 body and the tales it
                                 tells.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    49. DRAG QUEEN CHORUS        DQ 1: The pregnant body,
                                 the unruly female body,
                                 swollen, grotesque, must
                                 be regulated, particularly
                                 its appearances in the
                                 public sphere.
    
                                 DQ 3: As men are
                                 accustomed to negotiating
                                 the fate of women's
                                 bodies.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    50. COURTROOM LOCATION       NEWSCASTER: "COURT
                                 REJECTS PLEA FOR ABORTION
                                 BEFORE JAIL" Oct 26, 1989
                                 A Florida county judge
                                 has refused a woman's
                                 request to postpone her 60
                                 day jail sentence so she
                                 can have an abortion
                                 first. You want a
                                 continuance so you can
                                 murder your baby, is that
                                 it?" Judge Rasmussen of
                                 Pasco County Court asked
                                 the 26 year old defendant
                                 before sending her to
                                 jail. While the prosecutor
                                 agreed that Ms. Forney
                                 whose third month of
                                 pregnancy began today,
                                 could postpone her
                                 sentence by 10 days before
                                 serving her term for
                                 violating probation for
                                 driving under the
                                 influence of alcohol. The
                                 violation was that she
                                 paid only $100 of the $500
                                 fine assessed against her.
                                 Ms. Forney, a part time
                                 bartender who is not
                                 married, asked for the
                                 additional time because,
                                 she said, she was afraid
                                 it might be to late for a
                                 safe abortion when she got
                                 out of jail. She pleaded
                                 that she was financially
                                 unable to care for a baby.
                                 Judge Rasmussen suggested
                                 that she carry the baby to
                                 full term and then give it
                                 up for adoption. In a jail
                                 interview Tuesday Ms.
                                 Forney said: I thought it
                                 was my choice. He's
                                 telling me I don't have a
                                 choice. It's not right
                                 that he can choose for
                                 me."
    ------------------------------------------------------
    
    SCENES 51-60 QUICK MONTAGE:
    
    51. HELENE addresses         He simply chose not to
    camera                       acknowledge paternity. I
                                 hadn't that choice.
    
    52. Abortion rally           "Get your laws off my
    FOOTAGE                      body. Get your laws off my
                                 body."
    
    53. Background:              DRAG QUEEN 1: Get your
    Bondage STILLS               laws off my body.
    
    54. COURTROOM                JUDGE: I can't define it
                                 but I know it when I see
                                 it.
    
    55. Background:              DRAG QUEEN 2: They want to
    Bondage STILLS               ban pornography because it
                                 tells the truth.
    
    56. TITLE: THE LINKING OF WHAT IS POLITICALLY DANGEROUS
    TO FEELINGS OF SEXUAL HORROR AND FASCINATION.
    
    57. Abortion rally           "Get your laws off my
    FOOTAGE                      body..."
    
    58. WOMAN bent over          DQ3: Desiring a body that
    toilet, bathroom             doesn't speak, desiring a
                                 body that has the right
    DRAG QUEEN keyed over        desires, desiring a
                                 different social being, a
                                 different social body...
    
    59. WOMAN bent over          WOMAN: How can I live in
    toilet                       my body? Where could I
                                 live in my body?
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    60. MARX'S ROOM, Marx        How can I live in my body?
    in bed, writhing (FIRST      Where can I live in my
    SYNC SOUND ON MARX)          body?
    
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    61. KEY text of Capital      Dear Engels: I had decided
    over MARX body so            not to write you until I
    that one seems to be         could announce the
    emerging from the other      completion of the book
                                 which is now the case.
                                 Also I did not want to
                                 bore you with the reasons
                                 for the frequent delays,
                                 namely carbuncles on my
                                 posterior and in the
                                 vicinity of the penis, the
                                 remains of which are now
                                 fading and which permit me
                                 to assume a sitting (that
                                 is, writing) position only
                                 at great pain. I do not
                                 take arsenic, because it
                                 makes me too stupid and at
                                 least for the little time
                                 that I have when writing
                                 is possible, I want to
                                 have a clear head.
    
                                 V/O BIOGRAPHER: Finishing
                                 the book left his body
                                 racked and scarred. He
                                 was subject to increasing
                                 outbursts with each new
                                 translation of the book.
                                 He continued to search for
                                 a cure.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    62. MARX writing,            My dear Jenny: I am
    HELENE cleaning              sending you today the
                                 proofs of the French
                                 translation of Das
                                 Kapital. Today is the
                                 first day that I have been
                                 able to do anything at
                                 all. Until now despite
                                 baths, walking, splendid
                                 air, careful diet, etc. my
                                 condition has been worse
                                 than in London. That is
                                 also the reason why I am
                                 postponing my return,
                                 because it is absolutely
                                 necessary to return in a
                                 condition for work.
    
                                 BIOGRAPHER V/O: The
                                 eruptions of his body
                                 weren't matched by the
                                 social eruptions he
                                 anticipated.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    63. MARX'S ROOM              Dear Sorge: How did it
    REARSCREEN civil             happen that in the US
    rights riots                 where relatively that is,
                                 compared to civilized
                                 Europe, land was
                                 accessible to the great
                                 masses of the people and
                                 to a certain degree (again
                                 relatively) still is, the
                                 capitalist economy and the
    Text emerging                corresponding enslavement
    from carbuncles              of the working class have
                                 developed more rapidly and
                                 more shamelessly than in
                                 any country?
    
    DRAG QUEEN KEYED OVER        DQ 2: His body continued
                                 its parody. Marx came to
                                 regard the carbuncles as
                                 having a life of their
                                 own, his affliction had
                                 a theory and a practice.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    64. MARX'S ROOM, bed.        Dear Kugelmann: After my
    Riot FOOTAGE KEYED onto      return, a carbuncle broke
    bandages                     out on my right cheek
                                 which had to be operated
                                 on, then it had several
                                 smaller successors, and I
                                 think that at the present
                                 moment I am suffering from
                                 the last of them. For the
                                 rest don't worry at all
                                 about newspaper gossip;
                                 still less answer it. I
                                 myself allow the English
                                 papers to announce my
                                 death from time to time,
                                 without giving a sign of
                                 life.
    
    DRAG QUEEEN KEYED OVER       DQ 3: Like the
                                 revolutionary, the
                                 erupting, symptomatic body
                                 displays monstrous and
                                 unreadable forms to a
                                 horrified society.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    65. HELENE clears the        Dear Frederick: The doctor
    table as MARX writes         has opened up the pleasant
    in bed                       prospect that I will have
                                 to deal with this
                                 loathsome disease until
                                 late in January. Still
                                 this second Frankenstein
                                 on my hump is by far not
                                 so fierce as was the first
                                 in London. You can see
                                 this from the fact that I
                                 am able to write.  If one
                                 wants to vomit politics
                                 out of nausea, one must
                                 take it daily in the form
                                 of telegraphic pills, such
                                 as are delivered by the
                                 newspapers.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    TITLE: IF ONE WANTS TO VOMIT POLITICS OUT OF NAUSEA...
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    66. STUDIO high shot         WOMAN: How can I live in
    toilet, WOMAN bending        my body? where can I live
    over in black space          in my body?
    
    Pan to drag queen            DQ1: Where is the history
    riot FOOTAGE                 of the body written? In
    KEYED behind toilet          your politeness, in your
                                 deodorant and douche,
                                 behind the bathroom door,
                                 in your shame and
                                 revulsion.
    
    Pan to next drag queen       DQ2: In your symptoms.
    -------------------------------------------------------
    
    67. MARX'S ROOM              Dear Frederick: I hope
    in bed. Zoom into            that with this, I will
    bandaged carbuncle           have paid my debt to
                                 nature. In my state of ill
                                 health, I can do little
                                 writing, and then only by
    revolutions                  fits and starts. At any
    emerging out of              rate, I hope the
    carbuncles                   bourgeoisie will remember
                                 my carbuncles all the rest
                                 of their lives.
    Zoom into, then
    CREDITS

     

  • Postmodern Blackness

    bell hooks

    Oberlin College

     

    Postmodernist discourses are often exclusionary even when, having been accused of lacking concrete relevance, they call attention to and appropriate the experience of “difference” and “otherness” in order to provide themselves with oppositional political meaning, legitimacy, and immediacy. Very few African-American intellectuals have talked or written about postmodernism. Recently at a dinner party, I talked about trying to grapple with the significance of postmodernism for contemporary black experience. It was one of those social gatherings where only one other black person was present. The setting quickly became a field of contestation. I was told by the other black person that I was wasting my time, that “this stuff does not relate in any way to what’s happening with black people.” Speaking in the presence of a group of white onlookers, staring at us as though this encounter was staged for their benefit, we engaged in a passionate discussion about black experience. Apparently, no one sympathized with my insistence that racism is perpetuated when blackness is associated solely with concrete gut level experience conceived either as opposing or having no connection to abstract thinking and the production of critical theory. The idea that there is no meaningful connection between black experience and critical thinking about aesthetics or culture must be continually interrogated.

     

    My defense of postmodernism and its relevance to black folks sounded good but I worried that I lacked conviction, largely because I approach the subject cautiously and with suspicion. Disturbed not so much by the “sense” of postmodernism but by the conventional language used when it is written or talked about and by those who speak it, I find myself on the outside of the discourse looking in. As a discursive practice it is dominated primarily by the voices of white male intellectuals and/or academic elites who speak to and about one another with coded familiarity. Reading and studying their writing to understand postmodernism in its multiple manifestations, I appreciate it but feel little inclination to ally myself with the academic hierarchy and exclusivity pervasive in the movement today.

     

    Critical of most writing on postmodernism, I perhaps am more conscious of the way in which the focus on “otherness and difference” that is often alluded to in these works seems to have little concrete impact as an analysis or standpoint that might change the nature and direction of postmodernist theory. Since much of this theory has been constructed in reaction to and against high modernism, there is seldom any mention of black experience or writings by black people in this work, specifically black women (though in more recent work one may see reference to Cornel West, the black male scholar who has most engaged postmodernist discourse). Even if an aspect of black culture is the subject of postmodern critical writing the works cited will usually be those of black men. A work that comes immediately to mind is Andrew Ross’ chapter “Hip, and the Long Front of Color” in No Respect: Intellectuals and Popular Culture; though an interesting reading, it constructs black culture as though black women have had no role in black cultural production. At the end of Meaghan Morris’ discussion of postmodernism included in her collection of essays The Pirate’s Fiance: Feminism and Postmodernism, she provides a bibliography of works by women, identifying them as important contributions to a discourse on postmodernism that offers new insight as well as challenging male theoretical hegemony. Even though many of the works do not directly address postmodernism, they address similar concerns. There are no references to work by black women.

     

    The failure to recognize a critical black presence in the culture and in most scholarship and writing on postmodernism compels a black reader, particularly a black female reader, to interrogate her interest in a subject where those who discuss and write about it seem not to know black women exist or to even consider the possibility that we might be somewhere writing or saying something that should be listened to, or producing art that should be seen, heard, approached with intellectual seriousness. This is especially the case with works that go on and on about the way in which postmodernist discourse has opened up a theoretical terrain where “difference and otherness” can be considered legitimate issues in the academy. Confronting both the lack of recognition of black female presence that much postmodernist theory reinscribes and the resistance on the part of most black folks to hearing about real connections between postmodernism and black experience, I enter a discourse, a practice, where there may be no ready audience for my words, no clear listener, uncertain, then, that my voice can or will be heard.

     

    During the Sixties, black power movements were influenced by perspectives that could be easily labeled modernist. Certainly many of the ways black folks addressed issues of identity conformed to a modernist universalizing agenda. There was little critique among black militants of patriarchy as a master narrative. Despite the fact that black power ideology reflected a modernist sensibility, these elements were soon rendered irrelevant as militant protest was stifled by a powerful repressive postmodern state. The period directly after the black power movement was a time when major news magazines carried articles with cocky headlines like “what ever happened to Black America?” This was an ironic reply to the aggressive unmet demand by decentered, marginalized black subjects who had at least for the moment successfully demanded a hearing, who had made it possible for black liberation to be a national political agenda. In the wake of the black power movement, after so many rebels were slaughtered and lost, many of these voices were silenced by a repressive state and others became inarticulate; it has become necessary to find new avenues for transmitting the messages of black liberation struggle, new ways to talk about racism and other politics of domination. Radical postmodernist practice, most powerfully conceptualized as a “politics of difference,” should incorporate the voices of displaced, marginalized, exploited, and oppressed black people.

     

    It is sadly ironic that the contemporary discourse which talks the most about heterogeneity, the decentered subject, declaring breakthroughs that allow recognition of otherness, still directs its critical voice primarily to a specialized audience, one that shares a common language rooted in the very master narratives it claims to challenge. If radical postmodernist thinking is to have a transformative impact then a critical break with the notion of “authority” as “mastery over” must not simply be a rhetorical device, it must be reflected in habits of being, including styles of writing as well as chosen subject matter. Third-world scholars, especially elites, and white critics who passively absorb white supremacist thinking, and therefore never notice or look at black people on the streets, at their jobs, who render us invisible with their gaze in all areas of daily life, are not likely to produce liberatory theory that will challenge racist domination, or to promote a breakdown in traditional ways of seeing and thinking about reality, ways of constructing aesthetic theory and practice. From a different standpoint Robert Storr makes a similar critique in the global issue of Art in America when he asserts:

     

    To be sure, much postmodernist critical inquiry has centered precisely on the issues of "difference" and "otherness." On the purely theoretical plane the exploration of these concepts has produced some important results, but in the absence of any sustained research into what artists of color and others outside the mainstream might be up to, such discussions become rootless instead of radical. Endless second guessing about the latent imperialism of intruding upon other cultures only compounded matters, preventing or excusing these theorists from investigating what black, Hispanic, Asian and Native American artists were actually doing.

     

    Without adequate concrete knowledge of and contact with the non-white “other,” white theorists may move in discursive theoretical directions that are threatening to and potentially disruptive of that critical practice which would support radical liberation struggle.

     

    The postmodern critique of “identity,” though relevant for renewed black liberation struggle, is often posed in ways that are problematic. Given a pervasive politic of white supremacy which seeks to prevent the formation of radical black subjectivity, we cannot cavalierly dismiss a concern with identity politics. Any critic exploring the radical potential of postmodernism as it relates to racial difference and racial domination would need to consider the implications of a critique of identity for oppressed groups. Many of us are struggling to find new strategies of resistance. We must engage decolonization as a critical practice if we are to have meaningful chances of survival even as we must simultaneously cope with the loss of political grounding which made radical activism more possible. I am thinking here about the postmodernist critique of essentialism as it pertains to the construction of “identity” as one example.

     

    Postmodern theory that is not seeking to simply appropriate the experience of “otherness” in order to enhance its discourse or to be radically chic should not separate the “politics of difference” from the politics of racism. To take racism seriously one must consider the plight of underclass people of color, a vast majority of whom are black. For African-Americans our collective condition prior to the advent of postmodernism and perhaps more tragically expressed under current postmodern conditions has been and is characterized by continued displacement, profound alienation and despair. Writing about blacks and postmodernism, Cornel West describes our collective plight:

     

    There is increasing class division and differentiation, creating on the one hand a significant black middle-class, highly anxiety- ridden, insecure, willing to be co-opted and incorporated into the powers that be, concerned with racism to the degree that it poses constraints on upward social mobility; and, on the other, a vast and growing black underclass, an underclass that embodies a kind of walking nihilism of pervasive drug addiction, pervasive alcoholism, pervasive homicide, and an exponential rise in suicide. Now because of the deindustrialization, we also have a devastated black industrial working class. We are talking here about tremendous hopelessness.

     

    This hopelessness creates longing for insight and strategies for change that can renew spirits and reconstruct grounds for collective black liberation struggle. The overall impact of the postmodern condition is that many other groups now share with black folks a sense of deep alienation, despair, uncertainty, loss of a sense of grounding, even if it is not informed by shared circumstance. Radical postmodernism calls attention to those sensibilities which are shared across the boundaries of class, gender, and race, and which could be fertile ground for the construction of empathy–ties that would promote recognition of common commitments and serve as a base for solidarity and coalition.

     

    “Yearning” is the word that best describes a common psychological state shared by many of us, cutting across boundaries of race, class, gender, and sexual practice. Specifically in relation to the postmodernist deconstruction of “master” narratives, the yearning that wells in the hearts and minds of those whom such narratives have silenced is the longing for critical voice. It is no accident that “rap” has usurped the primary position of R&B music among young black folks as the most desired sound, or that it began as a form of “testimony” for the underclass. It has enabled underclass black youth to develop a critical voice, as a group of young black men told me, a “common literacy.” Rap projects a critical voice, explaining, demanding, urging. Working with this insight in his essay “Putting the Pop Back into Postmodernism,” Lawrence Grossberg comments:

     

    The postmodern sensibility appropriates practices as boasts that announce their own--and consequently our own--existence, like a rap song boasting of the imaginary (or real--it makes no difference) accomplishments of the rapper. They offer forms of empowerment not only in the face of nihilism but precisely through the forms of nihilism itself: an empowering nihilism, a moment of positivity through the production and structuring of affective relations.

     

    Considering that it is as a subject that one comes to voice, then the postmodernist focus on the critique of identity appears, at first glance, to threaten and close down the possibility that this discourse and practice will allow those who have suffered the crippling effects of colonization and domination to gain or regain a hearing. Even if this sense of threat and the fear it evokes are based on a misunderstanding of the postmodernist political project, they nevertheless shape responses. It never surprises me when black folk respond to the critique of essentialism, especially when it denies the validity of identity politics, by saying “yeah, it’s easy to give up identity, when you got one.” Though an apt and oftentimes appropriate comeback, this does not really intervene in the discourse in a way that alters and transforms. We should indeed suspicious of postmodern critiques of the “subject” when they surface at a historical moment when many subjugated people feel themselves coming to voice for the first time.

     

    Criticisms of directions in postmodern thinking should not obscure insights it may offer that open up our understanding of African-American experience. The critique of essentialism encouraged by postmodernist thought is useful for African-Americans concerned with reformulating outmoded notions of identity. We have too long had imposed upon us, both from the outside and the inside, a narrow constricting notion of blackness. Postmodern critiques of essentialism which challenge notions of universality and static over-determined identity within mass culture and mass consciousness can open up new possibilities for the construction of the self and the assertion of agency.

     

    Employing a critique of essentialism allows African-Americans to acknowledge the way in which class mobility has altered collective black experience so that racism does not necessarily have the same impact on our lives. Such a critique allows us to affirm multiple black identities, varied black experience. It also challenges colonial imperialist paradigms of black identity which represent blackness one-dimensionally in ways that reinforce and sustain white supremacy. This discourse created the idea of the “primitive” and promoted the notion of an “authentic” experience, seeing as “natural” those expressions of black life which conformed to a pre-existing pattern or stereotype. Abandoning essentialist notions would be a serious challenge to racism. Contemporary African- American resistance struggle must be rooted in a process of decolonization that continually opposes reinscribing notions of “authentic” black identity. This critique should not be made synonymous with the dismissal of the struggle of oppressed and exploited peoples to make ourselves subjects. Nor should it deny that in certain circumstances that experience affords us a privileged critical location from which to speak. This is not a reinscription of modernist master narratives of authority which privilege some voices by denying voice to others. Part of our struggle for radical black subjectivity is the quest to find ways to construct self and identity that are oppositional and liberatory. The unwillingness to critique essentialism on the part of many African-Americans is rooted in the fear that it will cause folks to lose sight of the specific history and experience of African-Americans and the unique sensibilities and culture that arise from that experience. An adequate response to this concern is to critique essentialism while emphasizing the significance of “the authority of experience.” There is a radical difference between a repudiation of the idea that there is a black “essence” and recognition of the way black identity has been specifically constituted in the experience of exile and struggle.

     

    When black folks critique essentialism, we are empowered to recognize multiple experiences of black identity that are the lived conditions which make diverse cultural productions possible. When this diversity is ignored, it is easy to see black folks as falling into two categories–nationalist or assimilationist, black-identified or white-identified. Coming to terms with the impact of postmodernism for black experience, particularly as it changes our sense of identity, means that we must and can rearticulate the basis for collective bonding. Given the various crises facing African-Americans (economic, spiritual, escalating racial violence, etc.) we are compelled by circumstance to reassess our relationship to popular culture and resistance struggle. Many of us are as reluctant to face this task as many non-black postmodern thinkers who focus theoretically on the issue of “difference” are to confront the issue of race and racism.

     

    Music is the cultural product created by African- Americans that has most attracted postmodern theorists. It is rarely acknowledged that there is far greater censorship and restriction of other forms of cultural production by black folks–beginning with literary and critical writing. Attempts on the part of editors and publishing houses to control and manipulate the representation of black culture, as well as their desire to promote the creation of products which will attract the widest audience, limit in a crippling and stifling way the kind of work many black folks feel we can do and still receive recognition. Using myself as an example, that creative writing I do which I consider to be most reflective of a postmodern oppositional sensibility–work that is abstract, fragmented, non-linear narrative–is constantly rejected by editors and publishers who tell me it does not conform to the type of writing they think black women should be doing or the type of writing they believe will sell. Certainly I do not think I am the only black person engaged in forms of cultural production, especially experimental ones, who is constrained by the lack of an audience for certain kinds of work. It is important for postmodern thinkers and theorists to constitute themselves as an audience for such work. To do this they must assert power and privilege within the space of critical writing to open up the field so that it will be more inclusive. To change the exclusionary practice of postmodern critical discourse is to enact a postmodernism of resistance. Part of this intervention entails black intellectual participation in the discourse.

     

    In his essay “Postmodernism and Black America,” Cornel West suggests that black intellectuals “are marginal–usually languishing at the interface of Black and white cultures or thoroughly ensconced in Euro- American settings” and he cannot see this group as potential producers of radical postmodernist thought. While I generally agree with this assessment, black intellectuals must proceed with the understanding that we are not condemned to the margins. The way we work and what we do can determine whether or not what we produce will be meaningful to a wider audience, one that includes all classes of black people. West suggests that black intellectuals lack “any organic link with most of Black life” and that this “diminishes their value to Black resistance.” This statement bears traces of essentialism. Perhaps we need to focus more on those black intellectuals, however rare our presence, who do not feel this lack and whose work is primarily directed towards the enhancement of black critical consciousness and the strengthening of our collective capacity to engage in meaningful resistance struggle. Theoretical ideas and critical thinking need not be transmitted solely in the academy. While I work in a predominantly white institution, I remain intimately and passionately engaged with black communities. It’s not like I’m going to talk about writing and thinking about postmodernism with other academics and/or intellectuals and not discuss these ideas with underclass non-academic black folks who are family, friends, and comrades. Since I have not broken the ties that bind me to underclass poor black community, I have seen that knowledge, especially that which enhances daily life and strengthens our capacity to survive, can be shared. It means that critics, writers, academics have to give the same critical attention to nurturing and cultivating our ties to black communities that we give to writing articles, teaching, and lecturing. Here again I am really talking about cultivating habits of being that reinforce awareness that knowledge can be disseminated and shared on a number of fronts, and the extent to which it is made available and accessible depends on the nature of one’s political commitments.

     

    Postmodern culture with its decentered subject can be the space where ties are severed or it can provide the occasion for new and varied forms of bonding. To some extent ruptures, surfaces, contextuality and a host of other happenings create gaps that make space for oppositional practices which no longer require intellectuals to be confined to narrow, separate spheres with no meaningful connection to the world of every day. Much postmodern engagement with culture emerges from the yearning to do intellectual work that connects with habits of being, forms of artistic expression and aesthetics, that inform the daily life of a mass population as well as writers and scholars. On the terrain of culture, one can participate in critical dialogue with the uneducated poor, the black underclass who are thinking about aesthetics. One can talk about what we are seeing, thinking, or listening to; a space is there for critical exchange. It’s exciting to think, write, talk about, and create art that reflects passionate engagement with popular culture, because this may very well be “the” central future location of resistance struggle, a meeting place where new and radical happenings can occur.

     

  • Hacking Away at the Counterculture

    Andrew Ross

    Princeton University

     

    Ever since the viral attack engineered in November of 1988 by Cornell University hacker Robert Morris on the national network system Internet, which includes the Pentagon’s ARPAnet data exchange network, the nation’s high-tech ideologues and spin doctors have been locked in debate, trying to make ethical and economic sense of the event. The virus rapidly infected an estimated six thousand computers around the country, creating a scare that crowned an open season of viral hysteria in the media, in the course of which, according to the Computer Virus Industry Association in Santa Clara, the number of known viruses jumped from seven to thirty during 1988, and from three thousand infections in the first two months of that year to thirty thousand in the last two months. While it caused little in the way of data damage (some richly inflated initial estimates reckoned up to $100m in down time), the ramifications of the Internet virus have helped to generate a moral panic that has all but transformed everyday “computer culture.”

     

    Following the lead of DARPA’s (Defence Advance Research Projects Agency) Computer Emergency Response Team at Carnegie-Mellon University, anti-virus response centers were hastily put in place by government and defence agencies at the National Science Foundation, the Energy Department, NASA, and other sites. Plans were made to introduce a bill in Congress (the Computer Virus Eradication Act, to replace the 1986 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, which pertained solely to government information), that would call for prison sentences of up to ten years for the “crime” of sophisticated hacking, and numerous government agencies have been involved in a proprietary fight over the creation of a proposed Center for Virus Control, modelled, of course, on Atlanta’s Centers for Disease Control, notorious for its failures to respond adequately to the AIDS crisis.

     

    In fact, media commentary on the virus scare has run not so much tongue-in-cheek as hand-in-glove with the rhetoric of AIDS hysteria–the common use of terms like killer virus and epidemic; the focus on hi-risk personal contact (virus infection, for the most part, is spread on personal computers, not mainframes); the obsession with defense, security, and immunity; and the climate of suspicion generated around communitarian acts of sharing. The underlying moral imperative being this: You can’t trust your best friend’s software any more than you can trust his or her bodily fluids–safe software or no software at all! Or, as Dennis Miller put it on Saturday Night Live, “Remember, when you connect with another computer, you’re connecting to every computer that computer has ever connected to.” This playful conceit struck a chord in the popular consciousness, even as it was perpetuated in such sober quarters as the Association for Computing Machinery, the president of which, in a controversial editorial titled “A Hygiene Lesson,” drew comparisons not only with sexually transmitted diseases, but also with a cholera epidemic, and urged attention to “personal systems hygiene.”1 In fact, some computer scientists who studied the symptomatic path of Morris’s virus across Internet have pointed to its uneven effects upon different computer types and operating systems, and concluded that “there is a direct analogy with biological genetic diversity to be made.”2 The epidemiology of biological virus, and especially AIDS, research is being closely studied to help implement computer security plans, and, in these circles, the new witty discourse is laced with references to antigens, white blood cells, vaccinations, metabolic free radicals, and the like.

     

    The form and content of more lurid articles like Time‘s infamous (September 1988) story, “Invasion of the Data Snatchers,” fully displayed the continuity of the media scare with those historical fears about bodily invasion, individual and national, that are often considered endemic to the paranoid style of American political culture.3 Indeed, the rhetoric of computer culture, in common with the medical discourse of AIDS research, has fallen in line with the paranoid, strategic style of Defence Department rhetoric. Each language-repertoire is obsessed with hostile threats to bodily and technological immune systems; every event is a ballistic manoeuver in the game of microbiological war, where the governing metaphors are indiscriminately drawn from cellular genetics and cybernetics alike. As a counterpoint to the tongue-in-cheek AI tradition of seeing humans as “information-exchanging environments,” the imagined life of computers has taken on an organicist shape, now that they too are subject to cybernetic “sickness” or disease. So, too, the development of interrelated systems, such as Internet itself, has further added to the structural picture of an interdependent organism, whose component members, however autonomous, are all nonetheless affected by the “health” of each individual constituent. The growing interest among scientists in developing computer programs that will simulate the genetic behavior of living organisms (in which binary numbers act like genes) points to a future where the border between organic and artificial life is less and less distinct.

     

    In keeping with the increasing use of biologically derived language to describe mutations in systems theory, conscious attempts to link the AIDS crisis with the information security crisis have pointed out that both kinds of virus, biological and electronic, take over the host cell/program and clone their carrier genetic codes by instructing the hosts to make replicas of the viruses. Neither kind of virus, however, can replicate themselves independently; they are pieces of code that attach themselves to other cells/programs– just as biological viruses need a host cell, computer viruses require a host program to activate them. The Internet virus was not, in fact, a virus, but a worm, a program that can run independently and therefore appears to have a life of its own. The worm replicates a full version of itself in programs and systems as it moves from one to another, masquerading as a legitimate user by guessing the user passwords of locked accounts. Because of this autonomous existence, the worm can be seen to behave as if it were an organism with some kind of purpose or teleology, and yet it has none. Its only “purpose” is to reproduce and infect. If the worm has no inbuilt antireplication code, or if the code is faulty, as was the case with the Internet worm, it will make already-infected computers repeatedly accept further replicas of itself, until their memories are clogged. A much quieter worm than that engineered by Morris would have moved more slowly, as one supposes a “worm” should, protecting itself from detection by ever more subtle camouflage, and propagating its cumulative effect of operative systems inertia over a much longer period of time.

     

    In offering such descriptions, however, we must be wary of attributing a teleology/intentionality to worms and viruses which can be ascribed only, and, in most instances, speculatively, to their authors. There is no reason why a cybernetic “worm” might be expected to behave in any fundamental way like a biological worm. So, too, the assumed intentionality of its author distinguishes the human-made cybernetic virus from the case of the biological virus, the effects of which are fated to be received and discussed in a language saturated with human-made structures and narratives of meaning and teleological purpose. Writing about the folkloric theologies of significance and explanatory justice (usually involving retribution) that have sprung up around the AIDS crisis, Judith Williamson has pointed to the radical implications of this collision between an intentionless virus and a meaning-filled culture: Nothing could be more meaningless than a virus. It has no point, no purpose, no plan; it is part of no scheme, carries no inherent significance. And yet nothing is harder for us to confront than the complete absence of meaning. By its very definition, meaninglessness cannot be articulated within our social language, which is a system of meaning: impossible to include, as an absence, it is also impossible to exclude– for meaninglessness isn’t just the opposite of meaning, it is the end of meaning, and threatens the fragile structures by which we make sense of the world.4

     

    No such judgment about meaninglessness applies to the computer security crisis. In contrast to HIV’s lack of meaning or intentionality, the meaning of cybernetic viruses is always already replete with social significance. This meaning is related, first of all, to the author’s local intention or motivation, whether psychic or fully social, whether wrought out of a mood of vengeance, a show of bravado or technical expertise, a commitment to a political act, or in anticipation of the profits that often accrue from the victims’ need to buy an antidote from the author. Beyond these local intentions, however, which are usually obscure or, as in the Morris case, quite inscrutable, there is an entire set of social and historical narratives that surround and are part of the “meaning” of the virus: the coded anarchist history of the youth hacker subculture; the militaristic environments of search-and-destroy warfare (a virus has two components–a carrier and a “warhead”), which, because of the historical development of computer technology, constitute the family values of information techno-culture; the experimental research environments in which creative designers are encouraged to work; and the conflictual history of pure and applied ethics in the science and technology communities, to name just a few. A similar list could be drawn up to explain the widespread and varied response to computer viruses, from the amused concern of the cognoscenti to the hysteria of the casual user, and from the research community and the manufacturing industry to the morally aroused legislature and the mediated culture at large. Every one of these explanations and narratives is the result of social and cultural processes and values; consequently, there is very little about the virus itself that is “meaningless.” Viruses can no more be seen as an objective, or necessary, result of the “objective” development of technological systems than technology in general can be seen as an objective, determining agent of social change.

     

    For the sake of polemical economy, I would note that the cumulative effect of all the viral hysteria has been twofold. Firstly, it has resulted in a windfall for software producers, now that users’ blithe disregard for makers’ copyright privileges has eroded in the face of the security panic. Used to fighting halfhearted rearguard actions against widespread piracy practices, or reluctantly acceding to buyers’ desire for software unencumbered by top-heavy security features, software vendors are now profiting from the new public distrust of program copies. So, too, the explosion in security consciousness has hyperstimulated the already fast-growing sectors of the security system industry and the data encryption industry. In line with the new imperative for everything from “vaccinated” workstations to “sterilized” networks, it has created a brand new market of viral vaccine vendors who will sell you the virus (a one-time only immunization shot) along with its antidote–with names like Flu Shot +, ViruSafe, Vaccinate, Disk Defender, Certus, Viral Alarm, Antidote, Virus Buster, Gatekeeper, Ongard, and Interferon. Few of the antidotes are very reliable, however, especially since they pose an irresistible intellectual challenge to hackers who can easily rewrite them in the form of ever more powerful viruses. Moreover, most corporate managers of computer systems and networks know that by far the great majority of their intentional security losses are a result of insider sabotage and monkeywrenching.

     

    In short, the effects of the viruses have been to profitably clamp down on copyright delinquency, and to generate the need for entirely new industrial production of viral suppressors to contain the fallout. In this respect, it is easy to see that the appearance of viruses could hardly, in the long run, have benefited industry producers more. In the same vein, the networks that have been hardest hit by the security squeeze are not restricted-access military or corporate systems but networks like Internet, set up on trust to facilitate the open academic exchange of data, information and research, and watched over by its sponsor, DARPA. It has not escaped the notice of conspiracy theorists that the military intelligence community, obsessed with “electronic warfare,” actually stood to learn a lot from the Internet virus; the virus effectively “pulsed the system,” exposing the sociological behaviour of the system in a crisis situation.5 The second effect of the virus crisis has been more overtly ideological. Virus-conscious fear and loathing have clearly fed into the paranoid climate of privatization that increasingly defines social identities in the new post-Fordist order. The result– a psycho-social closing of the ranks around fortified private spheres–runs directly counter to the ethic that we might think of as residing at the architectural heart of information technology. In its basic assembly structure, information technology is a technology of processing, copying, replication, and simulation, and therefore does not recognize the concept of private information property. What is now under threat is the rationality of a shareware culture, ushered in as the achievement of the hacker counterculture that pioneered the personal computer revolution in the early seventies against the grain of corporate planning.

     

    There is another story to tell, however, about the emergence of the virus scare as a profitable ideological moment, and it is the story of how teenage hacking has come to be increasingly defined as a potential threat to normative educational ethics and national security alike. The story of the creation of this “social menace” is central to the ongoing attempts to rewrite property law in order to contain the effects of the new information technologies that, because of their blindness to the copyrighting of intellectual property, have transformed the way in which modern power is exercised and maintained. Consequently, a deviant social class or group has been defined and categorised as “enemies of the state” in order to help rationalize a general law-and-order clampdown on free and open information exchange. Teenage hackers’ homes are now habitually raided by sheriffs and FBI agents using strong-arm tactics, and jail sentences are becoming a common punishment. Operation Sundevil, a nationwide Secret Service operation in the spring of 1990, involving hundreds of agents in fourteen cities, is the most recently publicized of the hacker raids that have produced several arrests and seizures of thousands of disks and address lists in the last two years.6

     

    In one of the many harshly punitive prosecutions against hackers in recent years, a judge went so far as to describe “bulletin boards” as “hi-tech street gangs.” The editors of 2600, the magazine that publishes information about system entry and exploration that is indispensable to the hacking community, have pointed out that any single invasive act, such as that of trespass, that involves the use of computers is considered today to be infinitely more criminal than a similar act undertaken without computers.7 To use computers to execute pranks, raids, frauds or thefts is to incur automatically the full repressive wrath of judges urged on by the moral panic created around hacking feats over the last two decades. Indeed, there is a strong body of pressure groups pushing for new criminal legislation that will define “crimes with computers” as a special category of crime, deserving “extraordinary” sentences and punitive measures. Over that same space of time, the term hacker has lost its semantic link with the journalistic hack, suggesting a professional toiler who uses unorthodox methods. So, too, its increasingly criminal connotation today has displaced the more innocuous, amateur mischief-maker-cum-media-star role reserved for hackers until a few years ago.

     

    In response to the gathering vigor of this “war on hackers,” the most common defences of hacking can be presented on a spectrum that runs from the appeasement or accommodation of corporate interests to drawing up blueprints for cultural revolution. (a) Hacking performs a benign industrial service of uncovering security deficiencies and design flaws. (b) Hacking, as an experimental, free-form research activity, has been responsible for many of the most progressive developments in software development. (c) Hacking, when not purely recreational, is an elite educational practice that reflects the ways in which the development of high technology has outpaced orthodox forms of institutional education. (d) Hacking is an important form of watchdog counterresponse to the use of surveillance technology and data gathering by the state, and to the increasingly monolithic communications power of giant corporations. (e) Hacking, as guerrilla know-how, is essential to the task of maintaining fronts of cultural resistance and stocks of oppositional knowledge as a hedge against a technofascist future. With all of these and other arguments in mind, it is easy to see how the social and cultural management of hacker activities has become a complex process that involves state policy and legislation at the highest levels. In this respect, the virus scare has become an especially convenient vehicle for obtaining public and popular consent for new legislative measures and new powers of investigation for the FBI.8

     

    Consequently, certain celebrity hackers have been quick to play down the zeal with which they pursued their earlier hacking feats, while reinforcing the deviant category of “technological hooliganism” reserved by moralizing pundits for “dark-side” hacking. Hugo Cornwall, British author of the bestselling Hacker’s Handbook, presents a Little England view of the hacker as a harmless fresh-air enthusiast who “visits advanced computers as a polite country rambler might walk across picturesque fields.” The owners of these properties are like “farmers who don’t mind careful ramblers.” Cornwall notes that “lovers of fresh-air walks obey the Country Code, involving such items as closing gates behind one and avoiding damage to crops and livestock” and suggests that a similar code ought to “guide your rambles into other people’s computers; the safest thing to do is simply browse, enjoy and learn.” By contrast, any rambler who “ventured across a field guarded by barbed wire and dotted with notices warning about the Official Secrets Act would deserve most that happened thereafter.”9 Cornwall’s quaint perspective on hacking has a certain “native charm,” but some might think that this beguiling picture of patchwork-quilt fields and benign gentleman farmers glosses over the long bloody history of power exercised through feudal and postfeudal land economy in England, while it is barely suggestive of the new fiefdoms, transnational estates, dependencies, and principalities carved out of today’s global information order by vast corporations capable of bypassing the laws and territorial borders of sovereign nation-states. In general, this analogy with “trespass” laws, which compares hacking to breaking and entering other people’s homes restricts the debate to questions about privacy, property, possessive individualism, and, at best, the excesses of state surveillance, while it closes off any examination of the activities of the corporate owners and institutional sponsors of information technology (the almost exclusive “target” of most hackers).10

     

    Cornwall himself has joined the lucrative ranks of ex-hackers who either work for computer security firms or write books about security for the eyes of worried corporate managers.11 A different, though related, genre is that of the penitent hacker’s “confession,” produced for an audience thrilled by tales of high- stakes adventure at the keyboard, but written in the form of a computer security handbook. The best example of the “I Was a Teenage Hacker” genre is Bill (aka “The Cracker”) Landreth’s Out of the Inner Circle: The True Story of a Computer Intruder Capable of Cracking the Nation’s Most Secure Computer Systems, a book about “people who can’t `just say no’ to computers.” In full complicity with the deviant picture of the hacker as “public enemy,” Landreth recirculates every official and media cliche about subversive conspiratorial elites by recounting the putative exploits of a high-level hackers’ guild called the Inner Circle. The author himself is presented in the book as a former keyboard junkie who now praises the law for having made a good moral example of him: If you are wondering what I am like, I can tell you the same things I told the judge in federal court: Although it may not seem like it, I am pretty much a normal American teenager. I don’t drink, smoke or take drugs. I don’t steal, assault people, or vandalize property. The only way in which I am really different from most people is in my fascination with the ways and means of learning about computers that don’t belong to me.12 Sentenced in 1984 to three years probation, during which time he was obliged to finish his high school education and go to college, Landreth concludes: “I think the sentence is very fair, and I already know what my major will be….” As an aberrant sequel to the book’s contrite conclusion, however, Landreth vanished in 1986, violating his probation, only to face later a stiff five-year jail sentence–a sorry victim, no doubt, of the recent crackdown. Cyber-Counterculture?

     

    At the core of Steven Levy’s bestseller Hackers (1984) is the argument that the hacker ethic, first articulated in the 1950s among the famous MIT students who developed multiple-access user systems, is libertarian and crypto-anarchist in its right-to know principles and its advocacy of decentralized technology. This hacker ethic, which has remained the preserve of a youth culture for the most part, asserts the basic right of users to free access to all information. It is a principled attempt, in other words, to challenge the tendency to use technology to form information elites. Consequently, hacker activities were presented in the eighties as a romantic countercultural tendency, celebrated by critical journalists like John Markoff of the New York Times, by Stewart Brand of Whole Earth Catalog fame, and by New Age gurus like Timothy Leary in the flamboyant Reality Hackers. Fuelled by sensational stories about phone phreaks like Joe Egressia (the blind eight- year old who discovered the tone signal of phone company by whistling) and Cap’n Crunch, groups like the Milwaukee 414s, the Los Angeles ARPAnet hackers, the SPAN Data Travellers, the Chaos Computer Club of Hamburg, the British Prestel hackers, 2600‘s BBS, “The Private Sector,” and others, the dominant media representation of the hacker came to be that of the “rebel with a modem,” to use Markoff’s term, at least until the more recent “war on hackers” began to shape media coverage.

     

    On the one hand, this popular folk hero persona offered the romantic high profile of a maverick though nerdy cowboy whose fearless raids upon an impersonal “system” were perceived as a welcome tonic in the gray age of technocratic routine. On the other hand, he was something of a juvenile technodelinquent who hadn’t yet learned the difference between right and wrong—a wayward figure whose technical brilliance and proficiency differentiated him nonetheless from, say, the maladjusted working-class J.D. street-corner boy of the 1950s (hacker mythology, for the most part, has been almost exclusively white, masculine, and middle- class). One result of this media profile was a persistent infantilization of the hacker ethic–a way of trivializing its embryonic politics, however finally complicit with dominant technocratic imperatives or with entrepreneurial-libertarian ideology one perceives these politics to be. The second result was to reinforce, in the initial absence of coercive jail sentences, the high educational stakes of training the new technocratic elites to be responsible in their use of technology. Never, the given wisdom goes, has a creative elite of the future been so in need of the virtues of a liberal education steeped in Western ethics!

     

    The full force of this lesson in computer ethics can be found laid out in the official Cornell University report on the Robert Morris affair. Members of the university commission set up to investigate the affair make it quite clear in their report that they recognize the student’s academic brilliance. His hacking, moreover, is described, as a “juvenile act” that had no “malicious intent” but that amounted, like plagiarism, the traditional academic heresy, to a dishonest transgression of other users’ rights. (In recent years, the privacy movement within the information community–a movement mounted by liberals to protect civil rights against state gathering of information–has actually been taken up and used as a means of criminalizing hacker activities.) As for the consequences of this juvenile act, the report proposes an analogy that, in comparison with Cornwall’s mature English country rambler, is thoroughly American, suburban, middle-class and juvenile. Unleashing the Internet worm was like “the driving of a golf-cart on a rainy day through most houses in the neighborhood. The driver may have navigated carefully and broken no china, but it should have been obvious to the driver that the mud on the tires would soil the carpets and that the owners would later have to clean up the mess.”13

     

    In what stands out as a stiff reprimand for his alma mater, the report regrets that Morris was educated in an “ambivalent atmosphere” where he “received no clear guidance” about ethics from “his peers or mentors” (he went to Harvard!). But it reserves its loftiest academic contempt for the press, whose heroization of hackers has been so irresponsible, in the commission’s opinion, as to cause even further damage to the standards of the computing profession; media exaggerations of the courage and technical sophistication of hackers “obscures the far more accomplished work of students who complete their graduate studies without public fanfare,” and “who subject their work to the close scrutiny and evaluation of their peers, and not to the interpretations of the popular press.”14 In other words, this was an inside affair, to be assessed and judged by fellow professionals within an institution that reinforces its authority by means of internally self-regulating codes of professionalist ethics, but rarely addresses its ethical relationship to society as a whole (acceptance of defence grants, and the like). Generally speaking, the report affirms the genteel liberal ideal that professionals should not need laws, rules, procedural guidelines, or fixed guarantees of safe and responsible conduct. Apprentice professionals ought to have acquired a good conscience by osmosis from a liberal education rather than from some specially prescribed course in ethics and technology.

     

    The widespread attention commanded by the Cornell report (attention from the Association of Computing Machinery, among others) demonstrates the industry’s interest in how the academy invokes liberal ethics in order to assist in the managing of the organization of the new specialized knowledge about information technology. Despite or, perhaps, because of the report’s steadfast pledge to the virtues and ideals of a liberal education, it bears all the marks of a legitimation crisis inside (and outside) the academy surrounding the new and all-important category of computer professionalism. The increasingly specialized design knowledge demanded of computer professionals means that codes that go beyond the old professionalist separation of mental and practical skills are needed to manage the division that a hacker’s functional talents call into question, between a purely mental pursuit and the pragmatic sphere of implementing knowledge in the real world. “Hacking” must then be designated as a strictly amateur practice; the tension, in hacking, between interestedness and disinterestedness is different from, and deficient in relation to, the proper balance demanded by professionalism. Alternately, hacking can be seen as the amateur flip side of the professional ideal–a disinterested love in the service of interested parties and institutions. In either case, it serves as an example of professionalism gone wrong, but not very wrong.

     

    In common with the two responses to the virus scare described earlier–the profitable reaction of the computer industry and the self-empowering response of the legislature– the Cornell report shows how the academy uses a case like the Morris affair to strengthen its own sense of moral and cultural authority in the sphere of professionalism, particularly through its scornful indifference to and aloofness from the codes and judgements exercised by the media–its diabolic competitor in the field of knowledge. Indeed, for all the trumpeting about excesses of power and disrespect for the law of the land, the revival of ethics, in the business and science disciplines in the Ivy League and on Capitol Hill (both awash with ethical fervor in the post-Boesky and post-Reagan years), is little more than a weak liberal response to working flaws or adaptational lapses in the social logic of technocracy.

     

    To complete the scenario of morality play example- making, however, we must also consider that Morris’s father was chief scientist of the National Computer Security Center, the National Security Agency’s public effort at safeguarding computer security. A brilliant programmer and codebreaker in his own right, he had testified in Washington in 1983 about the need to deglamorise teenage hacking, comparing it to “stealing a car for the purpose of joyriding.” In a further Oedipal irony, Morris Sr. may have been one of the inventors, while at Bell Labs in the 1950s, of a computer game involving self-perpetuating programs that were a prototype of today’s worms and viruses. Called Darwin, its principles were incorporated, in the eighties, into a popular hacker game called Core War, in which autonomous “killer” programs fought each other to the death.15

     

    With the appearance, in the Morris affair, of a patricidal object who is also the Pentagon’s guardian angel, we now have many of the classic components of countercultural cross-generational conflict. What I want to consider, however, is how and where this scenario differs from the definitive contours of such conflicts that we recognize as having been established in the sixties; how the Cornell hacker Morris’s relation to, say, campus “occupations” today is different from that evoked by the famous image of armed black students emerging from a sit-in on the Cornell campus; how the relation to technological ethics differs from Andrew Kopkind’s famous statement “Morality begins at the end of a gun barrel” which accompanied the publication of the do-it-yourself Molotov cocktail design on the cover of a 1968 issue of the New York Review of Books; or how hackers’ prized potential access to the networks of military systems warfare differs from the prodigious Yippie feat of levitating the Pentagon building. It may be that, like the J.D. rebel without a cause of the fifties, the disaffiliated student dropout of the sixties, and the negationist punk of the seventies, the hacker of the eighties has come to serve as a visible public example of moral maladjustment, a hegemonic test case for redefining the dominant ethics in an advanced technocratic society. (Hence the need for each of these deviant figures to come in different versions– lumpen, radical chic, and Hollywood-style.)

     

    What concerns me here, however, are the different conditions that exist today for recognizing countercultural expression and activism. Twenty years later, the technology of hacking and viral guerrilla warfare occupies a similar place in countercultural fantasy as the Molotov Cocktail design once did. While I don’t, for one minute, mean to insist on such comparisons, which aren’t particularly sound anyway, I think they conveniently mark a shift in the relation of countercultural activity to technology, a shift in which a software-based technoculture, organized around outlawed libertarian principles about free access to information and communication, has come to replace a dissenting culture organized around the demonizing of abject hardware structures. Much, though not all, of the sixties counterculture was formed around what I have elsewhere called the technology of folklore–an expressive congeries of preindustrialist, agrarianist, Orientalist, antitechnological ideas, values, and social structures. By contrast, the cybernetic countercultures of the nineties are already being formed around the folklore of technology–mythical feats of survivalism and resistance in a data-rich world of virtual environments and posthuman bodies– which is where many of the SF-and technology-conscious youth cultures have been assembling in recent years.16

     

    There is no doubt that this scenario makes countercultural activity more difficult to recognize and therefore to define as politically significant. It was much easier, in the sixties, to identify the salient features and symbolic power of a romantic preindustrialist cultural politics in an advanced technological society, especially when the destructive evidence of America’s supertechnological invasion of Vietnam was being daily paraded in front of the public eye. However, in a society whose technopolitical infrastructure depends increasingly upon greater surveillance, cybernetic activism necessarily relies on a much more covert politics of identity, since access to closed systems requires discretion and dissimulation. Access to digital systems still requires only the authentication of a signature or pseudonym, not the identification of a real surveillable person, so there exists a crucial operative gap between authentication and identification. (As security systems move toward authenticating access through biological signatures– the biometric recording and measurement of physical characteristics such as palm or retinal prints, or vein patterns on the backs of hands–the hacker’s staple method of systems entry through purloined passwords will be further challenged.) By the same token, cybernetic identity is never used up, it can be recreated, reassigned, and reconstructed with any number of different names and under different user accounts. Most hacks, or technocrimes, go unnoticed or unreported for fear of publicising the vulnerability of corporate security systems, especially when the hacks are performed by disgruntled employees taking their vengeance on management. So, too, authoritative identification of any individual hacker, whenever it occurs, is often the result of accidental leads rather than systematic detection. For example, Captain Midnight, the video pirate who commandeered a satellite a few years ago to interrupt broadcast TV viewing, was traced only because a member of the public reported a suspicious conversation heard over a crossed telephone line.

     

    Eschewing its core constituency among white males of the pre-professional-managerial class, the hacker community may be expanding its parameters outward. Hacking, for example, has become a feature of the young adult mystery-and-suspense novel genre for girls.17 The elitist class profile of the hacker prodigy as that of an undersocialized college nerd has become democratized and customized in recent years; it is no longer exclusively associated with institutionally acquired college expertise, and increasingly it dresses streetwise. In a recent article which documents the spread of the computer underground from college whiz kids to a broader youth subculture termed “cyberpunks,” after the movement among SF novelists, the original hacker phone phreak Cap’n Crunch is described as lamenting the fact that the cyberculture is no longer an “elite” one, and that hacker-valid information is much easier to obtain these days.18

     

    For the most part, however, the self-defined hacker underground, like many other protocountercultural tendencies, has been restricted to a privileged social milieu, further magnetised by the self-understanding of its members that they are the apprentice architects of a future dominated by knowledge, expertise, and “smartness,” whether human or digital. Consequently, it is clear that the hacker cyberculture is not a dropout culture; its disaffiliation from a domestic parent culture is often manifest in activities that answer, directly or indirectly, to the legitimate needs of industrial R&D. For example, this hacker culture celebrates high productivity, maverick forms of creative work energy, and an obsessive identification with on-line endurance (and endorphin highs)–all qualities that are valorised by the entrepreneurial codes of silicon futurism. In a critique of the myth of the hacker-as-rebel, Dennis Hayes debunks the political romance woven around the teenage hacker: They are typically white, upper-middle-class adolescents who have taken over the home computer (bought, subsidized, or tolerated by parents in the hope of cultivating computer literacy). Few are politically motivated although many express contempt for the “bureaucracies” that hamper their electronic journeys. Nearly all demand unfettered access to intricate and intriguing computer networks. In this, teenage hackers resemble an alienated shopping culture deprived of purchasing opportunities more than a terrorist network.19

     

    While welcoming the sobriety of Hayes’s critique, I am less willing to accept its assumptions about the political implications of hacker activities. Studies of youth subcultures (including those of a privileged middle-class formation) have taught us that the political meaning of certain forms of cultural “resistance” is notoriously difficult to read. These meanings are either highly coded or expressed indirectly through media–private peer languages, customized consumer styles, unorthodox leisure patterns, categories of insider knowledge and behavior–that have no fixed or inherent political significance. If cultural studies of this sort have proved anything, it is that the often symbolic, not wholly articulate, expressivity of a youth culture can seldom be translated directly into an articulate political philosophy. The significance of these cultures lies in their embryonic or protopolitical languages and technologies of opposition to dominant or parent systems of rules. If hackers lack a “cause,” then they are certainly not the first youth culture to be characterized in this dismissive way. In particular, the left has suffered from the lack of a cultural politics capable of recognizing the power of cultural expressions that do not wear a mature political commitment on their sleeves. So, too, the escalation of activism-in-the- professions in the last two decades has shown that it is a mistake to condemn the hacker impulse on account of its class constituency alone. To cede the “ability to know” on the grounds that elite groups will enjoy unjustly privileged access to technocratic knowledge is to cede too much of the future. Is it of no political significance at all that hackers’ primary fantasies often involve the official computer systems of the police, armed forces, and defence and intelligence agencies? And that the rationale for their fantasies is unfailingly presented in the form of a defence of civil liberties against the threat of centralized intelligence and military activities? Or is all of this merely a symptom of an apprentice elite’s fledgling will to masculine power? The activities of the Chinese student elite in the pro-democracy movement have shown that unforeseen shifts in the political climate can produce startling new configurations of power and resistance. After Tiananmen Square, Party leaders found it imprudent to purge those high-tech engineer and computer cadres who alone could guarantee the future of any planned modernization program. On the other hand, the authorities rested uneasy knowing that each cadre (among the most activist groups in the student movement) is a potential hacker who can have the run of the communications house if and when he or she wants.

     

    On the other hand, I do agree with Hayes’s perception that the media have pursued their romance with the hacker at the cost of underreporting the much greater challenge posed to corporate employers by their employees. It is in the arena of conflicts between workers and management that most high-tech “sabotage” takes place. In the mainstream everyday life of office workers, mostly female, there is a widespread culture of unorganized sabotage that accounts for infinitely more computer downtime and information loss every year than is caused by destructive, “dark-side” hacking by celebrity cybernetic intruders. The sabotage, time theft, and strategic monkeywrenching deployed by office workers in their engineered electromagnetic attacks on data storage and operating systems might range from the planting of time or logic bombs to the discrete use of electromagnetic Tesla coils or simple bodily friction: “Good old static electricity discharged from the fingertips probably accounts for close to half the disks and computers wiped out or down every year.”20 More skilled operators, intent on evening a score with management, often utilize sophisticated hacking techniques. In many cases, a coherent networking culture exists among female console operators, where, among other things, tips about strategies for slowing down the temporality of the work regime are circulated. While these threats from below are fully recognized in their boardrooms, corporations dependent upon digital business machines are obviously unwilling to advertize how acutely vulnerable they actually are to this kind of sabotage. It is easy to imagine how organised computer activism could hold such companies for ransom. As Hayes points out, however, it is more difficult to mobilize any kind of labor movement organized upon such premises: Many are prepared to publicly oppose the countless dark legacies of the computer age: “electronic sweatshops,” Military technology, employee surveillance, genotoxic water, and ozone depletion. Among those currently leading the opposition, however, it is apparently deemed “irresponsible” to recommend an active computerized resistance as a source of worker’s power because it is perceived as a medium of employee crime and “terrorism.” 21 Processed World, the “magazine with a bad attitude” with which Hayes has been associated, is at the forefront of debating and circulating these questions among office workers, regularly tapping into the resentments borne out in on-the-job resistance.

     

    While only a small number of computer users would recognize and include themselves under the label of “hacker,” there are good reasons for extending the restricted definition of hacking down and across the caste system of systems analysts, designers, programmers, and operators to include all high-tech workers, no matter how inexpert, who can interrupt, upset, and redirect the smooth flow of structured communications that dictates their positions in the social networks of exchange and determines the temporality of their work schedules. To put it in these terms, however, is not to offer any universal definition of hacker agency. There are many social agents, for example, in job locations that are dependent upon the hope of technological reskilling, for whom sabotage or disruption of communicative rationality is of little use; for such people, definitions of hacking that are reconstructive, rather than deconstructive, are more appropriate. A good example is the crucial role of worker technoliteracy in the struggle of labor against automation and deskilling. When worker education classes in computer programming were discontinued by management at the Ford Rouge plant in Dearborn, Michigan, union (UAW) members began to publish a newsletter called the Amateur Computerist to fill the gap.22 Among the columnists and correspondents in the magazine have been veterans of the Flint sit-down strikes who see a clear historical continuity between the problem of labor organization in the thirties and the problem of automation and deskilling today. Workers’ computer literacy is seen as essential not only to the demystification of the computer and the reskilling of workers, but also to labor’s capacity to intervene in decisions about new technologies that might result in shorter hours and thus in “work efficiency” rather than worker efficiency.

     

    The three social locations I have mentioned above all express different class relations to technology: the location of an apprentice technical elite, conventionally associated with the term “hacking”; the location of the female high-tech office worker, involved in “sabotage”; and the location of the shop- floor worker, whose future depends on technological reskilling. All therefore exhibit different ways of claiming back time dictated and appropriated by technological processes, and of establishing some form of independent control over the work relation so determined by the new technologies. All, then, fall under a broad understanding of the politics involved in any extended description of hacker activities. [This file is continued in ROSS-2 990]

     

    The Culture and Technology Question

     

    Faced with these proliferating practices in the workplace, on the teenage cult fringe, and increasingly in mainstream entertainment, where, over the last five years, the cyberpunk sensibility in popular fiction, film, and television has caught the romance of the popular taste for the outlaw technology of human/machine interfaces, we are obliged, I think, to ask old kinds of questions about the new silicon order which the evangelists of information technology have been deliriously proclaiming for more than twenty years. The postindustrialists’ picture of a world of freedom and abundance projects a sunny millenarian future devoid of work drudgery and ecological degradation. This sunny social order, cybernetically wired up, is presented as an advanced evolutionary phase of society in accord with Enlightenment ideals of progress and rationality. By contrast, critics of this idealism see only a frightening advance in the technologies of social control, whose owners and sponsors are efficiently shaping a society, as Kevin Robins and Frank Webster put it, of “slaves without Athens” that is actually the inverse of the “Athens without slaves” promised by the silicon positivists.23

     

    It is clear that one of the political features of the new post-Fordist order–economically marked by short-run production, diverse taste markets, flexible specialization, and product differentiation–is that the New Right has managed to appropriate not only the utopian language and values of the alternative technology movements but also the marxist discourse of the “withering away of the state” and the more compassionate vision of local, decentralized communications first espoused by the libertarian left. It must be recognized that these are very popular themes and visions, (advanced most famously by Alvin Toffler and the neoliberal Atari Democrats, though also by leftist thinkers such as Andre Gortz, Rudolf Bahro, and Alain Touraine)–much more popular, for example, than the tradition of centralized technocratic planning espoused by the left under the Fordist model of mass production and consumption.24 Against the postindustrialists’ millenarian picture of a postscarcity harmony, in which citizens enjoy decentralized, access to free-flowing information, it is necessary, however, to emphasise how and where actually existing cybernetic capitalism presents a gross caricature of such a postscarcity society.

     

    One of the stories told by the critical left about new cultural technologies is that of monolithic, panoptical social control, effortlessly achieved through a smooth, endlessly interlocking system of networks of surveillance. In this narrative, information technology is seen as the most despotic mode of domination yet, generating not just a revolution in capitalist production but also a revolution in living–“social Taylorism”–that touches all cultural and social spheres in the home and in the workplace.25 Through routine gathering of information about transactions, consumer preferences, and creditworthiness, a harvest of information about any individual’s whereabouts and movements, tastes, desires, contacts, friends, associates, and patterns of work and recreation becomes available in the form of dossiers sold on the tradable information market, or is endlessly convertible into other forms of intelligence through computer matching. Advanced pattern recognition technologies facilitate the process of surveillance, while data encryption protects it from public accountability.26

     

    While the debate about privacy has triggered public consciousness about these excesses, the liberal discourse about ethics and damage control in which that debate has been conducted falls short of the more comprehensive analysis of social control and social management offered by left political economists. According to one marxist analysis, information is seen as a new kind of commodity resource which marks a break with past modes of production and that is becoming the essential site of capital accumulation in the world economy. What happens, then, in the process by which information, gathered up by data scavenging in the transactional sphere, is systematically converted into intelligence? A surplus value is created for use elsewhere. This surplus information value is more than is needed for public surveillance; it is often information, or intelligence, culled from consumer polling or statistical analysis of transactional behavior, that has no immediate use in the process of routine public surveillance. Indeed, it is this surplus, bureaucratic capital that is used for the purpose of forecasting social futures, and consequently applied to the task of managing the behavior of mass or aggregate units within those social futures. This surplus intelligence becomes the basis of a whole new industry of futures research which relies upon computer technology to simulate and forecast the shape, activity, and behavior of complex social systems. The result is a possible system of social management that far transcends the questions about surveillance that have been at the discursive center of the privacy debate.27

     

    To further challenge the idealists’ vision of postindustrial light and magic, we need only look inside the semiconductor workplace itself, which is home to the most toxic chemicals known to man (and woman, especially since women of color often make up the majority of the microelectronics labor force), and where worker illness is measured not in quantities of blood spilled on the shop floor but in the less visible forms of chromosome damage, shrunken testicles, miscarriages, premature deliveries, and severe birth defects. In addition to the extraordinarily high stress patterns of VDT operators, semiconductor workers exhibit an occupational illness rate that even by the late seventies was three times higher than that of manufacturing workers, at least until the federal rules for recognizing and defining levels of injury were changed under the Reagan administration. Protection gear is designed to protect the product and the clean room from the workers, and not vice versa. Recently, immunological health problems have begun to appear that can be described only as a kind of chemically induced AIDS, rendering the T-cells dysfunctional rather than depleting them like virally induced AIDS.28 In corporate offices, the use of keystroke software to monitor and pace office workers has become a routine part of job performance evaluation programs. Some 70 percent of corporations use electronic surveillance or other forms of quantitative monitoring on their workers. Every bodily movement can be checked and measured, especially trips to the toilet. Federal deregulation has meant that the limits of employee work space have shrunk, in some government offices, below that required by law for a two-hundred pound laboratory pig.29 Critics of the labor process seem to have sound reasons to believe that rationalization and quantification are at last entering their most primitive phase.

     

    These, then, are some of the features of the critical left position–or what is sometimes referred to as the “paranoid” position–on information technology, which imagines or constructs a totalizing, monolithic picture of systematic domination. While this story is often characterized as conspiracy theory, its targets–technorationality, bureaucratic capitalism–are usually too abstract to fit the picture of a social order planned and shaped by a small, conspiring group of centralized power elites. Although I believe that this story, when told inside and outside the classroom, for example, is an indispensable form of “consciousness-raising,” it is not always the best story to tell.

     

    While I am not comfortable with the “paranoid” labelling, I would argue that such narratives do little to discourage paranoia. The critical habit of finding unrelieved domination everywhere has certain consequences, one of which is to create a siege mentality, reinforcing the inertia, helplessness, and despair that such critiques set out to oppose in the first place. What follows is a politics that can speak only from a victim’s position. And when knowledge about surveillance is presented as systematic and infallible, self-censoring is sure to follow. In the psychosocial climate of fear and phobia aroused by the virus scare, there is a responsibility not to be alarmist or to be scared, especially when, as I have argued, such moments are profitably seized upon by the sponsors of control technology. In short, the picture of a seamlessly panoptical network of surveillance may be the result of a rather undemocratic, not to mention unsocialistic, way of thinking, predicated upon the recognition of people solely as victims. It is redolent of the old sociological models of mass society and mass culture, which cast the majority of society as passive and lobotomized in the face of the cultural patterns of modernization. To emphasize, as Robins and Webster and others have done, the power of the new technologies to despotically transform the “rhythm, texture, and experience” of everyday life, and meet with no resistance in doing so, is not only to cleave, finally, to an epistemology of technological determinism, but also to dismiss the capacity of people to make their own uses of new technologies.30

     

    The seamless “interlocking” of public and private networks of information and intelligence is not as smooth and even as the critical school of hard domination would suggest. In any case, compulsive gathering of information is no guarantee that any interpretive sense will be made of the files or dossiers, while some would argue that the increasingly covert nature of surveillance is a sign that the “campaign” for social control is not going well. One of the most pervasive popular arguments against the panoptical intentions of the masters of technology is that their systems do not work. Every successful hack or computer crime in some way reinforces the popular perception that information systems are not infallible. And the announcements of military-industrial spokespersons that the fully automated battlefield is on its way run up against an accumulated stock of popular skepticism about the operative capacity of weapons systems. These misgivings are born of decades of distrust for the plans and intentions of the military-industrial complex, and were quite evident in the widespread cynicism about the Strategic Defense Initiative. Just to take one empirical example of unreliability, the military communications system worked so poorly and so farcically during the U.S. invasion of Grenada that commanders had to call each other on pay phones: ever since then, the command-and- control code of Arpanet technocrats has been C5– Command, Control, Communication, Computers, and Confusion.31 It could be said, of course, that the invasion of Grenada did, after all, succeed, but the more complex and inefficiency-prone such high-tech invasions become (Vietnam is still the best example), the less likely they are to be undertaken with any guarantee of success.

     

    I am not suggesting that alternatives can be forged simply by encouraging disbelief in the infallibility of existing technologies (pointing to examples of the appropriation of technologies for radical uses, of course, always provides more visibly satisfying evidence of empowerment), but technoskepticism, while not a sufficient condition of social change, is a necessary condition. Stocks of popular technoskepticism are crucial to the task of eroding the legitimacy of those cultural values that prepare the way for new technological developments: values and principles such as the inevitability of material progress, the “emancipatory” domination of nature, the innovative autonomy of machines, the efficiency codes of pragmatism, and the linear juggernaut of liberal Enlightenment rationality–all increasingly under close critical scrutiny as a wave of environmental consciousness sweeps through the electorates of the West. Technologies do not shape or determine such values. These values already exist before the technologies, and the fact that they have become deeply embodied in the structure of popular needs and desires then provides the green light for the acceptance of certain kinds of technology. The principal rationale for introducing new technologies is that they answer to already existing intentions and demands that may be perceived as “subjective” but that are never actually within the control of any single set of conspiring individuals. As Marike Finlay has argued, just as technology is only possible in given discursive situations, one of which being the desire of people to have it for reasons of empowerment, so capitalism is merely the site, and not the source, of the power that is often autonomously attributed to the owners and sponsors of technology.32

     

    In fact, there is no frame of technological inevitability that has not already interacted with popular needs and desires, no introduction of new machineries of control that has not already been negotiated to some degree in the arena of popular consent. Thus the power to design architecture that incorporates different values must arise from the popular perception that existing technologies are not the only ones, nor are they the best when it comes to individual and collective empowerment. It was this kind of perception–formed around the distrust of big, impersonal, “closed” hardware systems, and the desire for small, decentralized, interactive machines to facilitate interpersonal communication–that “built” the PC out of hacking expertise in the early seventies. These were as much the partial “intentions” behind the development of microcomputing technology as deskilling, monitoring, and information gathering are the intentions behind the corporate use of that technology today. The growth of public data networks, bulletin board systems, alternative information and media links, and the increasing cheapness of desktop publishing, satellite equipment, and international data bases are as much the result of local political “intentions” as the fortified net of globally linked, restricted-access information systems is the intentional fantasy of those who seek to profit from centralised control. The picture that emerges from this mapping of intentions is not an inevitably technofascist one, but rather the uneven result of cultural struggles over values and meanings.

     

    It is in this respect–in the struggle over values and meanings–that the work of cultural criticism takes on its special significance as a full participant in the debate about technology. In fact, cultural criticism is already fully implicated in that debate, if only because the culture and education industries are rapidly becoming integrated within the vast information service conglomerates. The media we study, the media we publish in, and the media we teach within are increasingly part of the same tradable information sector. So, too, our common intellectual discourse has been significantly affected by the recent debates about postmodernism (or culture in a postindustrial world) in which the euphoric, addictive thrill of the technological sublime has figured quite prominently. The high-speed technological fascination that is characteristic of the postmodern condition can be read, on the one hand, as a celebratory capitulation on the part of intellectuals to the new information technocultures. On the other hand, this celebratory strain attests to the persuasive affect associated with the new cultural technologies, to their capacity (more powerful than that of their sponsors and promoters) to generate pleasure and gratification and to win the struggle for intellectual as well as popular consent.

     

    Another reason for the involvement of cultural critics in the technology debates has to do with our special critical knowledge of the way in which cultural meanings are produced–our knowledge about the politics of consumption and what is often called the politics of representation. This is the knowledge which demonstrates that there are limits to the capacity of productive forces to shape and determine consciousness. It is a knowledge that insists on the ideological or interpretive dimension of technology as a culture which can and must be used and consumed in a variety of ways that are not reducible to the intentions of any single source or producer, and whose meanings cannot simply be read off as evidence of faultless social reproduction. It is a knowledge, in short, which refuses to add to the “hard domination” picture of disenfranchised individuals watched over by some by some scheming panoptical intelligence. Far from being understood solely as the concrete hardware of electronically sophisticated objects, technology must be seen as a lived, interpretive practice for people in their everyday lives. To redefine the shape and form of that practice is to help create the need for new kinds of hardware and software.

     

    One of the latter aims of this essay has been to describe and suggest a wider set of activities and social locations than is normally associated with the practice of hacking. If there is a challenge here for cultural critics, then it might be presented as the challenge to make our knowledge about technoculture into something like a hacker’s knowledge, capable of penetrating existing systems of rationality that might otherwise be seen as infallible; a hacker’s knowledge, capable of reskilling, and therefore of rewriting the cultural programs and reprogramming the social values that make room for new technologies; a hacker’s knowledge, capable also of generating new popular romances around the alternative uses of human ingenuity. If we are to take up that challenge, we cannot afford to give up what technoliteracy we have acquired in deference to the vulgar faith that tells us it is always acquired in complicity, and is thus contaminated by the poison of instrumental rationality, or because we hear, often from the same quarters, that acquired technological competence simply glorifies the inhuman work ethic. Technoliteracy, for us, is the challenge to make a historical opportunity out of a historical necessity.

     

    Notes

     

    1. Bryan Kocher, “A Hygiene Lesson,” Communications of the ACM, 32.1 (January 1989): 3.

     

    2. Jon A. Rochlis and Mark W. Eichen, “With Microscope and Tweezers: The Worm from MIT’s Perspective,” Communications of the ACM, 32.6 (June 1989): 697.

     

    3. Philip Elmer-DeWitt, “Invasion of the Body Snatchers,” Time (26 September 1988); 62-67.

     

    4. Judith Williamson, “Every Virus Tells a Story: The Meaning of HIV and AIDS,” Taking Liberties: AIDS and Cultural Politics, ed. Erica Carter and Simon Watney (London: Serpent’s Tail/ICA, 1989): 69.

     

    5. “Pulsing the system” is a well-known intelligence process in which, for example, planes deliberately fly over enemy radar installations in order to determine what frequencies they use and how they are arranged. It has been suggested that Morris Sr. and Morris Jr. worked in collusion as part of an NSA operation to pulse the Internet system, and to generate public support for a legal clampdown on hacking. See Allan Lundell, Virus! The Secret World of Computer Invaders That Breed and Destroy (Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1989), 12-18. As is the case with all such conspiracy theories, no actual conspiracy need have existed for the consequences–in this case, the benefits for the intelligence community–to have been more or less the same.

     

    6. For details of these raids, see 2600: The Hacker’s Quarterly, 7.1 (Spring 1990): 7.

     

    7. “Hackers in Jail,” 2600: The Hacker’s Quarterly, 6.1 (Spring 1989); 22-23. The recent Secret Service action that shut down Phrack, an electronic newsletter operating out of St. Louis, confirms 2600‘s thesis: a nonelectronic publication would not be censored in the same way.

     

    8. This is not to say that the new laws cannot themselves be used to protect hacker institutions, however. 2600 has advised operators of bulletin boards to declare them private property, thereby guaranteeing protection under the Electronic Privacy Act against unauthorized entry by the FBI.

     

    9. Hugo Cornwall, The Hacker’s Handbook 3rd ed. (London: Century, 1988) 181, 2-6. In Britain, for the most part, hacking is still looked upon as a matter for the civil, rather than the criminal, courts.

     

    10. Discussions about civil liberties and property rights, for example, tend to preoccupy most of the participants in the electronic forum published as “Is Computer Hacking a Crime?” in Harper’s, 280.1678 (March 1990): 45-57.

     

    11. See Hugo Cornwall, Data Theft (London: Heinemann, 1987).

     

    12. Bill Landreth, Out of the Inner Circle: The True Story of a Computer Intruder Capable of Cracking the Nation’s Most Secure Computer Systems (Redmond, Wash.: Tempus, Microsoft, 1989), 10.

     

    13. The Computer Worm: A Report to the Provost of Cornell University on an Investigation Conducted by the Commission of Preliminary Enquiry (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1989).

     

    14. The Computer Worm: A Report to the Provost,8.

     

    15. A. K. Dewdney, the “computer recreations” columnist at Scientific American, was the first to publicize the details of this game of battle programs in an article in the May 1984 issue of the magazine. In a follow-up article in March 1985, “A Core War Bestiary of Viruses, Worms, and Other Threats to Computer Memories,” Dewdney described the wide range of “software creatures” which readers’ responses had brought to light. A third column, in March 1989, was written, in an exculpatory mode, to refute any connection between his original advertisement of the Core War program and the spate of recent viruses.

     

    16. Andrew Ross, No Respect: Intellectuals and Popular Culture (New York: Routledge, 1989), 212. Some would argue, however, that the ideas and values of the sixties counterculture were only fully culminated in groups like the People’s Computer Company, which ran Community Memory in Berkeley, or the Homebrew Computer Club, which pioneered personal microcomputing. So, too, the Yippies had seen the need to form YIPL, the Youth International Party Line, devoted to “anarcho- technological” projects, which put out a newsletter called TAP (alternately the Technological American Party and the Technological Assistance Program). In its depoliticised form, which eschewed the kind of destructive “dark-side” hacking advocated in its earlier incarnation, TAP was eventually the progenitor of 2600. A significant turning point, for example, was TAP‘s decision not to publish plans for the hydrogen bomb (which the Progressive did)–bombs would destroy the phone system, which the TAP phone phreaks had an enthusiastic interest in maintaining.

     

    17. See Alice Bach’s Phreakers series, in which two teenage girls enjoy adventures through the use of computer technology. The Bully of Library Place, Parrot Woman, Double Bucky Shanghai, and Ragwars (all published by Dell, 1987-88).

     

    18. John Markoff, “Cyberpunks Seek Thrills in Computerized Mischief,” New York Times, November 26,1988.

     

    19. Dennis Hayes, Behind the Silicon Curtain: The Seductions of Work in a Lonely Era (Boston, South End Press, 1989), 93. One striking historical precedent for the hacking subculture, suggested to me by Carolyn Marvin, was the widespread activity of amateur or “ham” wireless operators in the first two decades of the century. Initially lionized in the press as boy-inventor heroes for their technical ingenuity and daring adventures with the ether, this white middle-class subculture was increasingly demonized by the U.S. Navy (whose signals the amateurs prankishly interfered with), which was crusading for complete military control of the airwaves in the name of national security. The amateurs lobbied with democratic rhetoric for the public’s right to access the airwaves, and although partially successful in their case against the Navy, lost out ultimately to big commercial interests when Congress approved the creation of a broadcasting monopoly after World War I in the form of RCA. See Susan J. Douglas, Inventing American Broadcasting 1899-1922 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), 187-291.

     

    20. “Sabotage,” Processed World, 11 (Summer 1984), 37-38.

     

    21. Hayes, Behind the Silicon Curtain, 99.

     

    22. The Amateur Computerist, available from R. Hauben, PO Box, 4344, Dearborn, MI 48126.

     

    23. Kevin Robins and Frank Webster, “Athens Without Slaves…Or Slaves Without Athens? The Neurosis of Technology,” Science as Culture, 3 (1988): 7-53.

     

    24. See Boris Frankel, The Post-Industrial Utopians (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987).

     

    25. See, for example, the collection of essays edited by Vincent Mosco and Janet Wasko, The Political Economy of Information (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), and Dan Schiller, The Information Commodity (Oxford UP, forthcoming).

     

    26. Tom Athanasiou and Staff, “Encryption and the Dossier Society,” Processed World, 16 (1986): 12-17.

     

    27. Kevin Wilson, Technologies of Control: The New Interactive Media for the Home (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 121-25.

     

    28. Hayes, Behind the Silicon Curtain, 63-80.

     

    29. “Our Friend the VDT,” Processed World, 22 (Summer 1988): 24-25.

     

    30. See Kevin Robins and Frank Webster, “Cybernetic Capitalism,” in Mosco and Wasko, 44-75.

     

    31. Barbara Garson, The Electronic Sweatshop (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988), 244-45.

     

    32. See Marike Finlay’s Foucauldian analysis, Powermatics: A Discursive Critique of New Technology (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987). A more conventional culturalist argument can be found in Stephen Hill, The Tragedy of Technology (London: Pluto Press, 1988).

     

  • Preface

     

     

    Postmodern Culture is an electronic journal of interdisciplinary studies. We hope to open the discussion of postmodernism to a wide audience, and to new and different participants. We feel that the electronic text is more amenable to revision, and that it fosters conversation more than printed publications can. Postmodern Culture can accommodate, and will include, different kinds of writing, from traditional analytical essays and reviews to video scripts and other new literary forms. Pos tmodern Cultureis formatted as ASCII text (the character-code used by all personal computers): this permits the items in the journal to be sent as electronic mail, and it means that you can download the text of the journal from the mainframe (where y ou receive your mail) to a wide variety of computers, and import it into most word-processing programs, should you want to. If you do call up the journal’s text in a word-processing program, make sure that line-spacing is set to single-space and that marg ins are set to accommodate a 65-character line (one-inch margins, in most cases).

     

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                          d i f f e r e n c e s
    
                  A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies
    
                  Edited by Naomi Schor & Elizabeth Weed
    
    Vol. 1, No. 1                      Vol. 2, No. 1
    LIFE AND DEATH IN SEXUALITY:       SEXUALITY IN GREEK AND ROMAN
    REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND      SOCIETY
    AIDS                               Edited by David Konstan and
    With essays by Donna Haraway,      Martha Nussbaum
    Linda Singer, Janice Doane &       With essays by David M.
    Devon Hodges, Simon Watney,        Halperin, John J. Winkler,
    Ana Maria Alonso & Maria           Martha Nussbaum, John Boswell,
    Teresa Koreck, Avital Ronell,      Eva Stehle, Adele Scafuro,
    and Rosi Braidotti.  Price:        Georgia Nugent, and David
    $11.75                             Konstan.  Price: $11.75
    
    Vol. 1, No. 2                      Vol. 2, No. 2
    THE ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCE:          With essays by Nancy
    ANOTHER LOOK AT ESSENTIALISM       Armstrong, Karen Newman, Tania
    With essays by Teresa de           Modleski, Cathy Griggers,
    Lauretis, Naomi Schor, Luce        Judith Butler, and R.
    Irigaray, Diana Fuss, Robert       Radhakrishnan.  Price: $11.75
    Scholes, Leslie Wahl Rabine,
    and Gayatri Spivak with Ellen      Vol. 2, No. 3
    Rooney.  Price: $11.75             FEMINISM IN THE INSTITUTION
                                       With essays by Michele Le
    Vol. 1, No. 3                      Doeuff, Ellen Rooney, Rey
    MALE SUBJECTIVITY                  Chow, Rosi Braidotti with
    With Essays by Kaja Silverman,     Christien Franken, and
    Christopher Newfield, Paul         Maurizia Boscagli.  Price:
    Smith, George P. Cunningham,       $11.75
    Marjorie Garber, and Carole-
    Anne Tyler.  Price: $11.75
    
    Order from
    
                   INDIANA UNIVERSITY PRESS
    
    Tenth & Morton Streets * Bloomington, IN  47405 * 812-855-9449
    Major credit cards accepted * Subscriptions available at $28 for
    individuals and $48 for institutions (three issues).
    
    7)===============================================================
    
                                _EJournal_
    
            _EJournal_ is an all-electronic, Bitnet/Internet
    distributed, peer-reviewed, academic periodical.  We are
    particularly interested in theory and praxis surrounding the
    creation, transmission, storage, interpretation, alteration and
    replication of electronic text.  We are also interested in the
    broader social, psychological, literary, economic and pedagogical
    implications of computer-mediated networks.  Texts that address
    virtually any subject across this broad spectrum will be given
    thoughtful consideration.
            Members of the electronic-network community and others
    interested in it make up a large portion of our audience.
    Therefore we would be interested (for example) in essays about
    whether or not anyone should own a communication that has been
    shared electronically, about the pragmatics of cataloguing and
    indexing electronic publications, about net-based collaborative
    learning, about artful uses of hypertext, about the challenges
    that distance learning may offer to residential campuses, about
    the role of The Matrix in cultural history and Utopian polemic,
    about digitally recorded aleatoric fiction, about the
    significance of resemblances between the electronic matrix and
    neural systems, . . . and so forth.
            The journal's essays will be available free to
    Bitnet/Internet addresses.  Recipients may make paper copies;
    _EJournal_ will provide authenticated paper copy from our
    read-only archive for use by academic deans or other supervisors.
    Individual essays, reviews, stories--texts--sent to us will be
    disseminated to subscribers as soon as they have been through the
    editorial process, which will also be "paperless."  We expect to
    offer access through libraries to our electronic Contents,
    Abstracts, and Keywords, and to be indexed and abstracted in
    appropriate places.
            _EJournal_ is now soliciting essays for possible
    publication.  We will be happy to consider reviews, letters, and
    (eventually) annotations that ought to accompany texts we have
    already published.  We would be happy to add interested
    specialists and generalists to our panel of consulting editors.
            Please send essays for review, and inquiries, to
    
            ejournal@albnyvms.bitnet
            ejournal@rachel.albany.edu
    
            Ted Jennings, Editor, _EJournal_
            Department of English
            University at Albany, State University of New York
    
            Ron Bangel, Managing Editor (acting)
            University at Albany, SUNY
    
    Board of Advisors:
    
            Dick Lanham, University of California at Los Angeles
            Ann Okerson, Association of Research Libraries
            Joe Raben, City University of New York
            Bob Scholes, Brown University
            Harry Whitaker, University of Quebec at Montreal
    
    -----------------------------------------------------------------
    Consulting Editors      November 1990
    ------------------      -------------           --------------
    ahrens@hartford         John Ahrens             Hartford
    ap01@liverpool          Stephen Clark           Liverpool
    crone@cua               Tom Crone               Catholic U
    djb85@albnyvms          Don Byrd                Albany
    donaldson@loyvax        Randall Donaldson       Loyola College
    ds001451@ndsuvm1        Ray Wheeler             North Dakota
    eng006@unomal           Marvin Peterson         Nebraska - Omaha
    erdt@vuvaxcom           Terry Erdt              Villanova
    fac_aska@jmuvax1        Arnie Kahn              James Madison
    folger@yktvmv           Davis Foulger           IBM - Watson
                                                    Research Center
    george@gacvax1          G. N. Georgacarakos     Gustavus Adolphus
    gms@psuvm               Gerry Santoro           Pennsylvania
                                                    State University
    jtsgsh@ritvax           John Sanders            Rochester
                                                    Institute of
                                                    Technology
    nrcgsh@ritvax           Norm Coombs             Rochester
                                                    Institute
                                                    of Technology
    pmsgsl@ritvax           Patrick M. Scanlon      Rochester
                                                    Institute
                                                    of Technology
    r0731@csuohio           Nelson Pole             Cleveland State
    ryle@urvax              Martin Ryle             Richmond
    twbatson@gallua         Trent Batson            Gallaudet
    usercoop@ualtamts       Wes Cooper              Alberta
    userlcbk@umichum        Bill Condon             Michigan
    
    8)===============================================================
    
                                 ANNOUNCING
           A NEW RESEARCH TOOL FOR FRENCH AND ITALIAN STUDIES,
    
                      ******************************
                     ********************************
                    ***___ ___  ___  ___        __ ***
                   *** I__ I__I I  I I__ I I   I_   ***
                  ***  I__ I  \ I__I I   I I__ I__ ***
                 ***                              ***
                  *********************************
                   ** ELECTRONIC
                    ** REVIEWS
                     ** OF
                      ** FRENCH &
                       ** ITALIAN
                        ** LITERARY
                         ** ESSAYS *****************
                          ************************
    
    A free electronic newsletter accessible to all on Bitnet
    and Internet.
    ___________________________________________________________
    
    _EROFILE_ takes advantage of the rapidity of electronic mail
    distribution to provide timely reviews of the latest books
    in the following areas associated with French and Italian
    studies:
    
         - Literary Criticism
         - Cultural Studies
         - Film Studies
         - Pedagogy
         - Software
    ___________________________________________________________
    
    _EROFILE_ will disseminate a collection of solicited and
    unsolicited reviews and therefore welcomes submissions from
    QUALIFIED reviewers.  Publishers of scholarly journals in
    appropriate fields may also wish to consider sending backlogged
    reviews to _EROFILE_ for early electronic publication.  The
    well-known interdisciplinary journal, SUBSTANCE, has already
    shown interest in such an arrangement.
    
    _EROFILE_ will also provide an open forum for comments on
    previously published reviews.  In this way, we hope to create a
    on-going dialogue on a variety of issues in the field.
    Consequently, our editorial policy will have two aspects: we will
    reserve the right to edit reviews, while promising to publish
    letters to the editor as they arrive.  In much the same spirit as
    the _HUMANIST_ listserver then, we trust that letters to the
    editor will not abuse our forum by including inappropriately
    offensive or unnecessarily familiar language.
    ___________________________________________________________
    
    We also welcome recommendations of qualified reviewers such as
    graduate students who have formed a specialization on any topic
    in the above areas.
    ___________________________________________________________
    
    Please send submissions, subscription requests, and questions on
    policy to the editors of _EROFILE_:
    
                  EROFILE@ucsbuxa.bitnet
                           or
                  EROFILE@ucsbuxa.ucsb.edu
    
    Submissions should in all cases be forwarded by e-mail or on
    diskette, preferably in the form of an ASCII file.
    ___________________________________________________________
    
    Nota bene:
    
    Those who do not yet share the privilege of Bitnet access will
    miss out on a great resource.  Please tell your colleagues in
    French and Italian to get on-line with the times and to obtain a
    Bitnet or Internet account.
    ___________________________________________________________
    
    editors:
                      Charles La Via
                      Jonathan Walsh
                      Department of French & Italian
                      University of California
                      Santa Barbara, CA 93106
    
    9)===============================================================
    
                                SYNAPSE
    
    _Synapse_ is a new electronic literary quarterly published by
    Connected Education, Inc.  The journal seeks poetry, fiction,
    and criticism on any cultural issue, from new and established
    writers.  _Synapse_ will be issued on MS-DOS and Macintosh
    diskettes, and over networks.  Subscriptions: $15/year.
    (Please state format preference.)  Manuscripts should be
    submitted in ASCII format (with return postage) on MS-DOS or
    Macintosh diskettes to William Dubie, Editor, _Synapse_,
    150A Ayer Road, Shirley, Massachusetts  01464.  Also, submissions
    can be sent to CompuServe account 71571,3323.  Payment is in
    copies.
    
    10)==============================================================
    
                         ATHANOR (a new journal)
    
    Directors:  Augusto Ponzio and Claude Gandelman.
    Published by Bari University (Universita degli Studi di
     Bari-Istituto di Filosofia del Linguaggio).
    
    Address 6, via Garruba, 70100 BARI, Itali.
    
    Price:  35,000 Italian Lire or their equivalent in dollars for
    one annual issue sent by airmail to be paid to
    
    A.Longo Editore, Via Paolo Costa 33, 48100 Ravenna.
    Postal Account 14226484.
    
    ATHANOR is published in three languages: French, Italian, English
    and we are always looking for contributions.  The first issue on
    "The Work and its Meaning" has already appeared.  The next issue
    is on "Art and Sacrifice/Art as sacrific."
    
    The contents of the issue on "The Work and its Meaning" were as
    follows:
    
    Emmanuel Levinas:   The work and its meaning.
    Claude Gandelman:   Le corps comme "signe zero."
    Omar Calabrese:     Il senso nascosto dell'opera.
    Guy Scarpetta:      Warhol ou les ruses du sens.
    Angela Biancofiore: L'opera e il metodo.
    Graham Douglas:     Signification, metaphor and molecules.
    Alain J.J. Cohen:   Du narcisssisme electronique.
    Rachele Chiurco:    Grammatiche dell'immaginazione.
    Carlo Pasi:         Il senso della fine.
    Nasos Vagenas:      De Profundis di Rodokanakis.
    Luigi di Sirro:     Grafie.
    Luigi Ruggiero:     Del movimento e della flessibilita.
    Dialogo con Iannis Kounellis.
    
    The next issue on "Sacrifice" contains texts by Gandelman, Naomi
    Greene (UCSBarbara.CA) on the cinema of Pasolini.  Mikhal
    Friedman
    on "Sacrifice" by Tarkovski.  Marc LeBot on "Modern art as
    sacrificial ritual."  Georges Roque on modern art and Louis Marin
    on baroque painting... and many others...
    
    11)==============================================================
    
     0101010101010101010             E-mail
              A                      pegasus     suephil
       101010101010101               APC     peg:suephil
              R                      UUCP suephil@peg.pegasus.oz.au
         01010101010                 DIALCOM  (DE3PEG)suephil!
              T
           1010101
              S
             010                      Snail Mail
              N                      PO Box 429
           1010101                   EASTWOOD  5063
              E                      South AUSTRALIA
         01010101010
              T
       101010101010101
     E L E C T R O N I C             - - - - - - - - - - - -
        N E T W O R K                Creative Communication .
    
    r rrrr   eeee   v     v  i   eeee   w          w
    rr   r  ee  ee   v   v   i  ee  ee   w   ww   w
    r       eeeee     v v    i  eeeee     w w  w w
    r       ee         v     i  ee         w    w
    r        eeee      .     i   eeee      .    .
    
    An Australian magazine dedicated to Comptemporary Cross
    Cultural, Arts & Electronic Networking issues.
    ----------------------------------------------------------------
              December 9, 1990           Volume 2 : Number 2
    ----------------------------------------------------------------
    
    EDITORS: PHILLIP BANNIGAN, SUSAN HARRIS
    
    EDITORIAL POLICY
    ----------------
    ARTSNET REVIEW is a bimonthly magazine.
    
    This magazine is free to be copied.
    
    To get on our mailing list just email to our above address
    [Note: the UUCP address is recommended for those on Bitnet and
    Internet--eds.]
    
    Contributions on any arts issues welcome
    
    Contributors to supply for inclusion with their article an
    introduction of themselves, including information on their
    background / discipline/s.
    
    12)==============================================================
    
    ************************************************************
    ***           EFF News #1.00  (December 10, 1990)        ***
    ***       The Electronic Frontier Foundation, Inc.       ***
    ***                        Welcome                       ***
    ************************************************************
    
    Editors:  Mitch Kapor  (mkapor@eff.org)
              Mike Godwin  (mnemonic@eff.org)
    
    The EFF has been established to help civilize the electronic
    frontier; to make it truly useful and beneficial to everyone, not
    just an elite; and to do this in a way that is in keeping with
    our society's highest traditions of the free and open flow of
    information and communication.
    
    EFF News will present news, information, and discussion about the
    world of computer-based communications media that constitute the
    electronic frontier.  It will cover issues such as freedom of
    speech in digital media, privacy rights, censorship, standards of
    responsibility for users and operators of computer systems,
    policy issues such as the development of national information
    infrastructure, and intellectual property.
    
    Views of individual authors represent their own opinions, not
    necessarily those of the EFF.
    
    ************************************************************
    ***         EFF News #1.00: Table of Contents            ***
    ************************************************************
    
    Article 1: Who's Doing What at the EFF
    
    Article 2: EFF Current Activities - Fall 1990
    
    Article 3: Contributing to the EFF
    
    Article 4: CPSR Computing and Civil Liberties Project
              (Marc Rotenberg, Computer Professionals for Social
               Responsibility)
    
    Article 5: Why Defend Hackers? (Mitch Kapor)
    
    Article 6: The Lessons of the Prodigy Controversy
    
    Article 7: How Prosecutors Misrepresented the Atlanta Hackers
    
                           --------------------
    
    REPRINT PERMISSION GRANTED: Material in EFF News may be reprinted
    if you cite the source.  Where an individual author has asserted
    copyright in an article, please contact her directly for
    permission to reproduce.
    
    E-mail subscription requests: effnews-request@eff.org
    Editorial submissions: effnews@eff.org
    
    We can also be reached at:
    
    Electronic Frontier Foundation
    155 Second St.
    Cambridge, MA 02141
    (617) 864-0665
    (617) 864-0866 (fax)
    
    USENET readers are encouraged to read this publication in the
    moderated newsgroup comp.org.eff.news.  Unmoderated discussion of
    topics discussed here is found in comp.org.eff.talk.
    
    This publication is also distributed to members of the mailing
    list eff@well.sf.ca.us.
    
    13)==============================================================
    
                           Seminar/Symposium on
                Problems of Affirmation in Cultural Theory
                            October 4-6, 1991
    
    The Society for Critical Exchange will sponsor an intensive
    seminar/symposium on "Problems of Affirmation in Cultural
    Theory,"  Oct. 4-6, at Case Western Reserve University in
    Cleveland, Ohio.  Persons interested in participating should
    contact either David Downing (English, Indiana Univ. of
    Pennsylvania) or James Sosnoski (English, Miami Univ. of Ohio).
    
    14)==============================================================
    
                         ANNOUNCING KIDS-91
    
    Schools, teachers, parents, and others interested in children
    in the age group 10 - 15 are invited to help out with KIDS-91.
    The project aims at having children participate in a global
    dialog from now and until May 12 1991.  Some of it will be
    electronic--for those who have access to modems and computers
    --some of it will be by mail or in other forms.
    
    We want to collect the childrens' responses to these questions:
    
      1) Who am I?
      2) What do I want to be when I grow up?
      3) How do I want the world to be better when I grow up?
      4) What can I do NOW to help this come true?
    
    We want them to draw or in other creative ways "illustrate"
    themselves in their future role/world.
    
    The responses will be turned into an exhibition that will be
    sent back to the children of the world.
    
    By mid-January 1991 responses have been received from Japan,
    Australia, India, Israel, Norway, Finland, USSR, Latvia, the
    United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, Spain, Argentina, Brazil, the
    United States and Canada.  The responses are available for
    educators and others through the archives of the discussion
    list KIDS-91@vm1.nodak.edu.  There is also a discussion list
    for participating kids.
    
    To subscribe to the discussion list, send e-mail to
    listserv@vm1.nodak.edu (or LISTSERV@NDSUVM1 on BITNET) with the
    BODY or TEXT of the message containing the command
    
    SUB KIDS-91 Yourfirstname Yourlastname
    
    For more information, contact Odd de Presno, Project Director at
       opresno@ulrik.uio.no
    
    15)==============================================================
    
                              MAGAZINE
    
                  An Electronic Hotline/Conference
    
                            moderated by
    
                     Professor David Abrahamson
              New York University Center for Publishing
    
    Interested individuals are invited to participate in an
    electronic conference, MAGAZINE Hotline, addressing the
    journalistic/communicative/economic/technological issues related
    to magazine publishing.  Though MAGAZINE's primary focus is
    journalistic, it also addresses other magazine-publishing matters
    of economic (management, marketing, circulation, production,
    research), technological, historical and social importance. In
    sum, MAGAZINE explores the history, current state and future
    prospects of the American Magazine.  Among the topics included
    are: magazine editorial trends and practices; journalistic and
    management norms in magazine publishing; evolving magazine
    technologies (those currently in use and new ones envisioned);
    the economics of magazine publishing, including the economic
    factors influencing magazine content; the history of magazines;
    the role of magazines in social development; educational issues
    related to teaching magazine journalism; "laboratory" magazine-
    project concepts and resources; and studies and research
    exploring the issues above.
    
    The conference is edited and moderated by Professor David
    Abrahamson of New York University's Center for Publishing, where
    he teaches the editorial segments of the NYU Management Institute
    graduate Diploma Course in Magazine Publishing and the Executive
    Seminar in Magazine Editorial Management.  Prof. Abrahamson is
    also the president of Plexus Research/Editorial Consultants, a
    management consulting firm, and the author of two teaching texts,
    "The Magazine Writing Workbook" and "The Magazine Editing
    Workbook."
    
    The MAGAZINE Hotline began discussion on October 1, 1990.
    Magazine journalism educators, scholars and students, magazine
    publishing professionals and other individuals interested in
    magazine issues are encouraged to participate.  The MAGAZINE
    Hotline is sponsored by New York University's Center for
    Publishing and Comserve (the online information and discussion
    service for the communication discipline).
    
    Those interested in participating in MAGAZINE can subscribe by
    either:
       (a) sending an interactive message to COMSERVE@RPIECS with the
              following command:
    
              Subscribe Magazine First_Name Last_Name
    
              (Example:)  Subscribe Magazine Mary Smith
    
       (b) sending this same command (with no other punctuation or
              words) in the message portion of an electronic mail
              message addressed to either:
    
              COMSERVE@RPIECS      (Bitnet)
              COMSERVE@VM.ECS.RPI.EDU (Internet)
    
    The moderator of the MAGAZINE Hotline, David Abrahamson, may be
    contacted at:
    
    INTERNET: abrahamson@acfcluster.nyu.edu
    BITNET: abrahamson@nyuacf.bitnet
    VOICE: (212) 689-5446
    FAX: (212) 689-1088
    MCI-MAIL: 3567652@mcimail.com
    USPS: 165 east 32, ny ny 10016
    
    For more information about Comserve, send an interactive message
    or electronic mail message to COMSERVE@RPIECS containing the word
    "help" (without quotation marks).
    
    For other questions about how to subscribe to the Hotline, send
    an electronic mail message to Comserve's editors at
    SUPPORT@RPIECS or write to: Comserve, Dept. of Language,
    Literature & Communication, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute,
    Troy, NY 12180.
    
    16)==============================================================
    
                              CALL FOR PAPERS
    
    LITERATURE, COMPUTERS AND WRITING: THE ADVANCEMENT OF LEARNING IN
              THE HIGH SCHOOL AND COLLEGE ENGLISH CLASSROOM
    
                               April 19,1991
    
    The fourth annual Computers and English Conference for high
    school and college teachers of writing
    
                    Sponsored by the Program in English
                    New York Institute of Technology
    
    The 1991 conference on Literature, Computers and Writing will
    focus on the shared challenges high school and college English
    teachers face teaching literature and composition in a computer
    environment.
    
    The conference has two primary lines of inquiry:
    
      * how are the English studies canon and curriculum changing in
    response to computerized learning?
    
      * how should we design projects for collaborative learning in
    literature, computers and writing between high schools or between
    high schools and colleges to share pedagogical resources and
    methods?
    
    In addition to keynote addresses the conference supports
    presentations which can be either demonstrations of exercises (no
    longer than five minutes) that work well in the English classroom
    or arguments (ten to fifteen minutes long) that explain or
    justify a philosophy or method for a particular classroom
    practice.  Please submit a brief abstract detailing your
    demonstration or argument.  Panel discussions are also welcome.
    Be sure to include your name, high school or college affiliation,
    address, and daytime phone number.
    
    Suggested Topics:
    
      1.  How can computers develop more active readers of
              literature?
      2.  How can teaching writing teach literature?
      3.  How can we use computers to teach literary genre or
              metaphor?
      4.  How can we use computers to connect writing to literature?
      5.  How do computers widen or narrow the concept of literature?
      6.  How can we use computers to teach the role of audience in
         literature and writing?
      7.  How can rhetoric inform the experience of hypermedia?
      8.  How can speech-act theory apply to hypermedia?
      9.  How will hypermedia affect the student's understanding of
              critical consensus?
      10. How do computer-based research projects affect students'
              conception of literary research?
      11. How do computers in writing and literature classes change
         the role of the teacher?
      12. How can we use computers to connect high school teachers to
              high school teachers and/or college teachers?
      13. What resources are available to facilitate high
              school-to-high school and college-to-high school
    collaboration?
      14. How can student collaborative writing, network writing, or
              talk-writing, be integrated into a literature class?
    
    Dates for Submission of Proposals
    
    The submission deadline is February 15, 1991.  Notification of
    acceptance is March 10, 1991.
    
    Send proposals and requests for information to
      Department of English
      New York Institute of Technology
      Old Westbury, New York  11568
      Attn: Ann McLaughlin (516) 686-7557
    or
      r0mill01@ulkyvx.bitnet
      72347.2767@compuserve.com
      rroyar on NYIT technet (CoSy)
    
    17)==============================================================
    
                           Call for Proposals
    
                   Society for Literature and Science
    
                           Annual Conference
    
                          October 10-13, 1991
    
                                Montreal
    
    International, interdisciplinary organization invites proposals
    for papers and sessions on any aspect of the conference theme:
    
        Science and Literature  --  Beyond Cultural Construction
    
    Possible topics might include:
    
       -- l'ecriture de la connaissance et la connaissance de
    l'ecriture
    
       -- the popular scientific essay
    
       -- literature as technology
    
       -- practices in professional life
    
       -- texts and contexts
    
       -- disciplinary and interdisciplinary language and values
    
    Alternative formats -- workshops, debates, poster sessions,
    roundtables, works-in-progress -- will be welcomed
    enthusiastically.
    
    Deadline for submissions:  February 1, 1991
    
    For further information and for submission guidelines, contact:
    
              David Lux
              Bryant College
              450 Douglas Pike
              Smithfield, RI  02917
              Bitnet:  LDM116 at URIACC
    
    18)==============================================================
    
    II INTERNATIONAL ENCOUNTER IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE
    August 04-09, 1991.
    
    II WINTER INSTITUTE
    July 8 to August 3, 1991
    
    Universidade Estadual de Campinas (Brazil)
    
          THE INTER-RELATIONS BETWEEN MENTAL AND VERBAL DISCOURSE
                    INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES
    
                      c a l l   f o r    p a p e r s
    
    Although the Greek term "Logos" referred both to language and
    to cognition, suggesting an intimate relationship between them,
    this relation has been traditionally assumed to be relatively
    simple: in production, a language-independent train of thought
    ("mental discourse") is translated (or "encoded") into language
    ("verbal discourse"); and in reception, verbal discourse is
    decoded into its appropriate mental counterpart.
    
    Such a picture of the inter-relations between the two most
    important of our intellectual activities has been challenged in
    the course of history on many grounds. Most recently, with the
    development of empirical disciplines such as artificial
    intelligence, cognitive science, semantics, pragmatics,
    neurophysiology, cognitive anthropology, and others -- interested
    both in language and in mental processes -- and with the renewed
    and intense interest of philosophy in these issues, it is clear
    that the traditional picture is, to say the least, excessively
    simplistic. Given the complexity of the two activities involved,
    and the wealth of information on each of them, a proficuous study
    of their inter-relations can only be the result of a
    co-operative, multi-disciplinary endeavor. It is the purpose of
    this Encounter to provide a forum for, and thereby to stimulate,
    such an endeavor.
    
    Here are some precisions concerning the kind of contributions and
    topics that the organizers are seeking:
    
    1. By choosing the term `discourse', we intend to stress our
    interest in processes (mental, verbal), rather than on products.
    The latter are to be discussed only in so far as they illuminate
    the former.
    
    2. The focus should be on the inter-relations of mental and
    verbal discourse, rather than on independent analyses of each.
    
    3. The theme may be envisaged from a number of points of view,
    varying in aspect, methodology, and level of analysis. The
    following list is not intended to be exhaustive:
    
    METHODOLOGY: phenomenological description; experimental studies;
    statistical studies; epistemological analyses;...
    
    LEVELS: historical; comparative; metalinguistic; philosophical;
    pragmatic;...
    
    ASPECTS: description and theory; acquisition, development, loss;
    pathology; neurophysiology; therapy; applications;...
    
    Any particular kind of mental/verbal interaction can be looked at
    through the lense of a specific combination of aspect,
    methodology, and level. For instance, suppose one is interested
    in the mental/verbal inter-relations involved in the production
    and understanding of jokes. One can then investigate how such an
    ability is, say, acquired; one's methodology can be, say,
    experimental; and one can, say, either investigate only one
    culture, or else compare the acquisition of the ability across
    cultures.
    
    Different combinations of the above points of view are likely to
    be characteristic of different disciplines, or of various
    multi-disciplinary combinations, already established or radically
    new.
    
    PRACTICAL INFORMATION:
    
    1. Deadline for submission of 500 words abstracts, in 4
    camera-ready copies: February 28, 1991.
    
    2. Address for correspondence:
    
      International Encounter in the Philosophy of Language
      CLE/UNICAMP
      C.P. 6133
      13081 Campinas SP BRAZIL
      e-mail (bitnet): eifl@bruc.ansp.br
    
    3. Fees:
    
      U$ 40.00 - if paid until if paid until March 15, 1991
      U$ 80.00 - if paid after if paid after March 16, 1991
    
    4. Official Languages: Portuguese, Spanish and English .
    
    5. Winter Institute: There will be a Winter Institute, prior to
    the Encounter, for graduate students and faculty. This consists
    of up to six one-month intensive courses granting graduate
    credits. A list of the courses will be available early in 1991.
    Faculty will include well-known foreign and local researchers in
    fields related to the theme of the Encounter. Fellowships for
    Brazilian and Latin-american students are being negotiated with
    financing agencies.
    
    6. Invited Scholars: So far, the following foreign scholars have
    agreed to participate as plenary lecturers: James Higginbotham
    (MIT), Yorick Wilks (COmputing Research Laboratory, Las Cruces,
    New Mexico), Stephen Stich (Rutgers), John Perry (Stanford
    University), Humberto Maturana (Universidad de Chile), Frantisek
    Danes (Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences).  Yorick Wilks,
    Frantisek Danes and James Higginbotham will also teach graduate
    courses during the Winter Institute.
    
    7. Organizing committee:
    
       Marcelo Dascal, chair
       Edson Francozo, secretary
       Claudia T. G. de Lemos
       Eduardo R. J. Guimaraes
       Itala L. D'Ottaviano
       Rodolfo Ilari, Winter Institute (director)
    
    Please, fill in the form below and mail it as soon as possible.
    
    ----------------------- cut here -------------------------------
    
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    You can send your registration through e-mail. In this case,
    append your 500-word abstract to the e-mail message. An
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                         PLEASE, PRINT AND POST
    
    19)==============================================================
    
    programme of POSTMODERNIST POSTMORTEM (held on January 2, 1991)
    
    Claude Gandelman. Introductory words on the subject: "Various
    interpretations of the POSTMODERNIST concept... is there an
    "after"?
    
    David Gurevitch (Philosophy, Bar Ilan University):"Postmod:
    rejection of ideology and rejection of the 'avant-garde'
    conception".
    
    Mikhal Friedmann (Tel-Aviv University)"Postmodernist Cinema: from
    Godard to Godard".
    
    Dagan Moshli (Aechitecture Department, The Israel Institute of
    Technology - Technion): "The postmod-deconstructivist
    transition".
    
    Sanford Sheymann (Curator of the University Gallery):"On a
    postmod painter: Robert Yarbur".
    
    Claudine Elnekaveh (Haifa University). "Postmodernist theater in
    Spain".
    
    The afternoon session was devoted to two round-tables:
    
    1. Roundtable session around the book of Brian McHale (Porter
    Institute, Tel-Aviv University):Post-Modernist Fiction.
    Brian McHale answered the numerous questions that mainly focused
    on two main problems: his division of fiction into ontological
    types and epistemological types; and his concept of "breaking the
    ontological frames" as a characteristic of postmod devices.
    
    2. The second round-table was devoted to the state of
    postmodernism in French letters. According to Jacqueline Michel
    (Haifa University) none of the contemporary leading French poets
    use the term "postmodern" though some of them seem to be heavily
    under the influence of postmodernist American poetry. Sylvio
    Yeshuah (Tel-Aviv Univ.) evoked the "NON FINITO" component in
    Postmodernism and the relation between postmod literature and
    "the fragment".  David Mendelson (Tel-Aviv University) evoked the
    Bible as the source of specific postmodernist games with
    typography.
    
    20)==============================================================
    
    Sessions on SCIENCE, KNOWLEDGE, AND TECHNOLOGY
    
    at the Southwestern Social Science Association
    Annual Meetings in San Antonio, Texas.
    
    DATES FOR THE MEETINGS ARE MARCH 27 - 30, 1991.
    
    SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE: CONSTRUCTION, SELECTION, AND DECONSTRUCTION
    Chair: Raymond A. Eve, University of Texas at Arlington
    
    1. "Information Technology as Instantiation of Cultural
        Knowledge."  Brian Moore, University of Texas at Dallas.
    
    2. "Knowledge as Metaphor." Gretchen Sween, University of
        Texas at Dallas.
    3. "The Selection and Ordering of Knowledge."  John Pester.
        University of Texas at Dallas.
    
    4. "Some Social Implications of Chaos Theory."  Alex
        Argyros, University of Texas at Dallas.
    
    Discussant: Alex Argyros, University of Texas at Dallas
    
    SCIENTICE AND LEGITIMATION: SOME CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES
    Chair: Larry Stern, Collin Co. Community College
    
    5. "The Autonomous Scientific Authority of an Unorthodox
        Theory about AIDS."  Christopher P. Toumey.  North
        Carolina State University.
    
    6. "The Cultural Basis of American Medical Technology:
        Implications for Health Care." Kathryn J. Luchok,
        University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
    
    7. "Cultural Risk: An Analysis of the Social Implications of
        Biotechnology."  Will D. Boggs, The University of Texas
        at Austin.
    
    8. "The Reception of Extrodinary Scientific Claims." Larry
        Stern, Collin Co. Community College.
    
    9. "Departmental Structure and Scientific Productivity."
        Thomas K. Pinhey, Cal Poly State University and Michael
        D. Grimes, LSU.
    
    Discussant: Raymond A. Eve, University of Texas at Arlington
    
    21)==============================================================
    
                          NOTE ON UNC PRESS FIRE
    
         The staff of the University of North Carolina Press greatly
    appreciates the many expressions of support following the fire
    that destroyed our office building on December 5.
         Fortunately, no one was injured, and although we lost a
    great deal of Press history, we can now report that all books on
    the Spring 1991 list will be published on time.
         It is not surprising that, hearing news of the fire, many
    are concerned about the future of the Press. Despite the loss of
    our office building, we are in remarkably good shape. We have
    saved many paper and electronic files; our contracts are safe;
    our warehouse inventory was not involved in in the fire. And UNC
    Press editors and marketing staff were at our December book
    exhibits at the AHA, MLA, and AIA/APA as usual.
         Rebuilding our office building will take a number of months.
    In the interim, while we are housed in our temporary offices, you
    can reach us at the same telephone and FAX numbers--and at the
    same mailing address.
         Thank you for your good wishes. We have lost a building, but
    the University of North Carolina Press itself is very much in
    business, functioning well, and publishing award-winning books.
    
    The University of North Carolina Press             David Perry
    PO Box 2288                                             Editor
    Chapel Hill, NC 27515                            carlos@ecsvax
    919-966-3561                                 carlos@uncecs.edu
    919-966-3829 (FAX)
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    -----------------------------------------------------------------

     

  • Postface

     

     

    [What follows is a written exchange between the editors about the contents of this issue of Postmodern Culture. As a “postface,” it is meant to be read after the other items in the issue; we hope it will serve as a preface to discussion among other readers. Please send your comments on the issue to the discussion group, PMC-TALK@NCSUVM (PMC-TALK@NCSUVM.NCSU.EDU on the Internet).]

     


     

        John:Many of the works in the last issue of PMC were concerned in one way or another with that “crude particular,” the body: this concern seems to carry over into the second issue, focusing on the body as one pole–positive or negative–in the field of identity. As you might expect, the body brings with it some familiar metaphysical pitfalls– nostalgia for presence and for the unitary sense of self, especially. What’s interesting is the way a number of the works in this issue address these problems.Eyal:While body and voice are conventional opposites, several of the works here also bring out the slippage between them, the way one can become the other. For Howe body becomes voice: the figure of other is “thin as paper,” present in her own writing and so made concrete, part of “invincible things as they are.” For O’Donnell voice becomes body: he singles out the “Frigicom process” proposed as an invention in

    JR

        whereby voice is frozen, made portable. Both are kinds of transferal, bridging gaps, but one is redemptive and necessary to the identity of the present, the other threatening, potential ordinance.John:The technology of communication is directly implicated in both the redemptive and the threatening aspects of ‘language made portable’– redemptive for Ulmer, threatening for O’Donnell. Bernstein, talking about the way some postwar poets accept the materiality of language, makes a point which might be applied to many of these essays: he says that there is a “persistence of dislocation, of going on in the face of all the terms being changed” which nonetheless does not amount to a new “equilibrium grounded on repressing the old damage.” It is at least arguable that language or voice acquires materiality exactly in the moment of being dislocated from the body of the speaker, and though that dislocation is potentially dangerous (in that it makes it possible to commodify voice), it also makes it possible to break up and break into the authoritative monologues of history and identity, constructing a present out of the frozen (and shattered) voices of the past.Eyal:This dis-location, disjunction, and portability of language-as-body, material language, enables both openness and control. Because the self is disjunctive it can be reconstructed, reinvented (Trembath); poetry has a special claim on us because it is its own monument, because in it loss and presence coexist (Hart’s reading of Mills- Courts); and if we are to undertake a critical project that would disown what Bernstein calls the “nonbiodegradable byproducts” of logocentrism (as Ulmer urges us to do), such a project would have to acknowledge that nonbiodegradability and to contain the metaphors it deconstructs, the broken idols now made to dance in a godless pantheon. On the other hand, this disjunction stages language in the theater of mass-media production, making identity (as Dolan implies) especially susceptible to simulation and manipulation.John:These writers respond to disjunction in different ways, though. There’s Howe’s project of understanding how the past structures the present, which is the sort of project Bernstein; then there’s the activity of restructuring the manner in which we appropriate the past, which is a large part of what Ulmer wants us to do; there’s also a sort of reconstruction in bad faith (Dolan discusses this) where the present is justified with reference to a past reconstituted to suit the purposes of the moment; and finally, there’s the sense that one can never really adapt to disjunction. McCorkle’s “Combustion of Early Summer” is an example:

     

     
                 Sorting things out, nothing really fits:
                 The puzzle of mountains with pieces from a
                                                      regatta,
                 We have pieces from other lives,
    
                 The difficulty is to remember them . . . .
    
              If these responses have anything in common, it's a
              lack of nostalgia or the note of loss.
       

        Eyal:There is no nostalgia here because nothing was there in the first place–if nothing was lost then nothing can be recovered–but there is no coldness in relation to the past. These writers feel the past, whether they find it to be immediate (as Bernstein does so explicitly) or inaccessible. In McCorkle’s work the past is intangible but its effect is not:

     

     
                                    the past buzzes around us,
                 A conversation in another room we thought
                                                      dormant,
                 Soon its occupants will crash through the door
       

        The past makes us up, but we do not know it and so cannot be sure of ourselves, either. The effect is a lyrical desire that comes out of ignorance, out of absence rather than loss. Howe also recognizes the task of deciphering the “buried texts” of the past, and feels “haunted and inspired” by them. Hashmi’s posthumous Beckett is a Sibylline figure for the perseverance of the voice despite the dissolution of the body–or especially because of it.

     

  • Graven Images

    Henry Hart

    The College of William & Mary

     

    Karen Mills-Courts. Poetry as Epitaph, Representation and Poetic Language. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1990. 326 pp. $39.95 cloth, $16.95 paper.

     

    It might seem strange that a book erected on the deconstructionist foundations of Jacques Derrida should take its title from that celebrated advocate of hierarchies, T.S. Eliot. Since titles foreshadow unities of theme and stance, at first glance it would appear that Karen Mills-Courts’s Poetry as Epitaph courts the courtly values of Eliot, authorizing and ordering her own critical principles by locating them in Eliot’s authoritative shadow. Eliot’s presence certainly haunts much of her book, most noticeably at the end of the introduction where she quotes from “Little Gidding”: “Every poem [is] an epitaph.” She also provides the longer passage which sketches Eliot’s belief in poetic propriety, “where every word is at home / Taking its place to support the others, / The word neither diffident nor ostentatious, / An easy commerce of the old and new. . . .” For Mills-Courts, this endorsement of a poetic language that is decorous, humble, and unified, organically lodged in tradition yet politely asserting its modernity, mixing memory and desire, ends and beginnings, dead and living, is the gist of “T.S. Eliot’s remarkable moment of insight.”

     

    The moment is also an end and a beginning for her own investigation into poetry’s ability to either present or represent, incarnate or imitate the mind’s inspired thoughts. Her attitude towards Eliot typifies the theme of the book. If she supplicates Eliot’s ghost, engraving his words on the gray, tombstone-like cover of her book, she also argues against and periodically expels his presence and the Platonic and Christian notions of spiritualized language (“tinged with fire beyond the language of the living”) that during privileged “timeless moments” supposedly incarnate the poet’s visions. She explains her own stance as poised between “Heidegger [who] thinks of language as presentational or ‘incarnative’” and “Derrida [who] thinks of language as ungrounded ‘representation’.” Through her bifocal lenses she examines representative texts from the beginning of what she would call, with Derrida, the logocentric tradition of western culture, and proceeds to map a gradual disillusionment with the capacity of the logos to embody or present intended meanings. She moves from Plato, the Bible, and Augustine through George Herbert, Wordsworth, and Shelley, and finishes with a lengthy discussion of John Ashbery. In some ways, however, Eliot remains her shadowy guide, her principle example of the poet torn between an ontotheological conviction that poetry is the living incarnation of the maker’s divinely inspired conceptions, analogous to God’s creation and incarnation, and the more sober recognition that word and world are always already fallen, that “Words strain, / Crack and sometimes break, under the burden, / Under the tension, slip, slide, perish, / Decay with imprecision, will not stay in place, / Will not stay still,” as Eliot said in “Burnt Norton.” To this disillusioned view, words are simply dead or dying marks on the page, representations of representations that are continually losing their representational power and slipping into a confusion of tangential meanings.

     

    Although Heidegger and Derrida provide most of the theoretical framework for her debate, dividing the book between a logocentric viewpoint at the beginning and a deconstructionist one at the end, Mills-Courts shies away from taking a firm, dogmatic stand on one side or the other. She is critical of Plato for his denigration of writing as a paltry substitute for speech but she is also critical of Derrida for his repudiation of authorial intentionality. If Plato is too idealistic, Derrida is too skeptical. In the end she sides with the poets who shy away from factional positions, who, in contrast with the ideologues, vacillate in the tense no-man’s-land between rival camps. Referring to Heidegger’s and Derrida’s conflicting linguistic views, she says: “Caught between them, the poet creates a poem that is overtly intended to work as ‘unconcealment,’ as the incarnation of a presence, the embodiment of a voice in words. Yet, he displays that voice as an inscription carved on a tombstone. In other words, he covertly acknowledges that the poem is representational, that it substitutes itself for a presence that has been absolutely silenced. For the very words that seem to give life simultaneously announce the death of the speaker.” Although Mills-Courts acts as a moderator to the two sides, occasionally stepping aside to note inconsistencies or biases in the views propounded by her theorists, the procedures and preoccupations of her book–the way she progresses from one major figure to another in western tradition, outlining and evaluating their attitudes toward speech, writing, being, and meaning–it readily becomes apparent that she favors one over the other, that her largest debt is to Derrida. In Poetry as Epitaph she has written her own Grammatology, although in a less eccentric style and from a more compromising point-of-view than Derrida’s. Still it is Derrida’s deconstructionist perceptions and tactics that captivate her most overtly.

     

    The problem motivating the sort of linguistic discussion that attracts Derrida and Mills-Courts arises from a promise or ideal that language, on close examination, fails to fulfill. Ideally, language would mean what it says; it would communicate an unambiguous message and reveal in unmistakable terms, like a clear window, the being and intentions of its author. But because signs are not what they signify, because there is always a gap between mark and meaning, sign and signified, and because signs usually trigger off chains of significance rather than one, intelligible reference, all sorts of strategies have been concocted to circumvent linguistic imprecision and attain a more fulfilling way of communicating. Plato and Socrates advocated discovering the logos of reason, thought, and spirit through the logos of speech. Writing, they argued, distorted and distanced the mind’s meaning through dead representations which could not be questioned because the author was absent. Meaning and intention were veiled by the text rather than revealed by it. Only the voice through dialogue could present and clarify authorial truths. As a result, Socrates spoke rather than wrote. Christian and other religious ideologies frequently sought to dispense with the cumbersome medium of language altogether, associating it with the corrupt body or the fallen material world. The transcendental silence of meditation provided a more felicitous way to commune with inner spirit and external divinity. Frustrated by the circuitous way words refer to things, Jonathan Swift’s professors at the Academy of Lagado came up with their own way of short-circuiting traditional communication. According to them, it was “more convenient for all Men to carry about them, such Things as were necessary to express the particular Business they are to discourse on.” Swift is obviously ridiculing the linguistic idealists and their schemes to contain the sign’s ambiguous proliferation of meaning–what Derrida calls dissemination or play. In this case the linguistic purists must bear the burden of their rectified language on their backs. Like Mills-Courts, Swift favors a more realistic attitude. Behind her praise for Derrida, Ashbery, and the postmodernists is the same desire to expose and demystify linguistic idealism. She too criticizes the various tribes of Lagado that fail to accept the way language actually works.

     

    Her culminating chapter posits Ashbery as Derrida’s closest cousin among postmodernist poets mainly because his poetry expresses the epitaphic way in which she feels language works. Throughout the book she argues that language, and specifically poetry, resembles a gravestone marking the presence of its absent author and the absence of its author’s presence. It is a dead representation haunted by the presence of a dead but somehow living person, one who once intended meanings though they are now obscure (not unfathomable or nonexistent, as some deconstructionists would maintain). In short, poetic language is Derridean as well as Heideggerean. Ashbery bridges these contraries, Mills-Courts believes, like no other contemporary poet. He is radically skeptical of language’s power to present or incarnate the spirit of the authorial logos, but still he believes–and this is why Mills-Courts celebrates him–in “Poetry as performance, as an epitaphic endeavor that displays both the absence and the presence of an intending ‘I,’ poetry that does not delude itself into believing that it has captured self-presence in a privileged moment, [but still exerts] . . . hope against all odds.” For Mills- Courts Ashbery is heroic and exemplary because he deconstructs the sacred tenets of the logocentric tradition, yet he never bottoms-out in nihilistic despair. His poetry keeps questioning and questing, tracing an elegant, quixotic path toward self-representation that never completely arrives. It resists the death of all conclusive representations and resolutions, all its temporary domiciles along the romantic way, in order to generate the desire for new ones which, in turn, must be deemed tentative and dismantled in order to keep the ongoing quest going on.

     

    In her Acknowledgements Mills-Courts pays homage to one of her teachers for showing her “the elegance of theory.” Like Ashbery’s poetry, her book manages to be elegant and theoretical at the same time, which is quite a feat, especially when one considers the plethora of theoretical books which equate turgid style with profound thought. Deconstruction, she argues, does not necessarily entail stylistic butchery. This is one of the ironies she insists on: deconstructing often requires the most careful and rigorous constructing; it tears apart old, petrified conceptions but erects elegant scaffolding and newfangled equipment in the process. Its judicious reordering of hierarchies which have imprisoned though and oppressed conduct in the past does not simply scatter all thought, being, and meaning to the winds. Instead, it offers different systems for consideration and most notably advocates a tolerance of differences where intolerance and hierarchy were the rule. She makes this point in an examination of Ashbery’s “Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror”: “The irony involved in writing words that ‘are no words’ has its roots in a gesture in which language is employed to convey even as it declares the impossibility of containing meaning.” Although Ashbery and Mills-Courts elegize the death of traditional concepts of meaning, presence, self, author, and so on, as in most elegies they acknowledge an afterlife for the deceased. Their Elysium is the haunted house of language. Their deconstructionist styles do not demolish the graveyards and empty tombs in anarchic revolt but, by contrast, reembody the remains in epitaphic valediction.

     

    While Mills-Courts musters her theoretical arguments with a judicious clarity rare in academic books, and applies her tools to a wide variety of texts with great skill, the book would be even better if more writers were investigated or at least mentioned. After reading Poetry as Epitaph, for instance, one might assume that Ashbery is the only postmodernist poet concerned with such things as authorial status, linguistic dissemination, and logocentric myths. Yet these preoccupations are shared by dozens of other postmodern poets, some conservative and some radical, some formalist and some antiformalist. Geoffrey Hill, Seamus Heaney, Philip Larkin, James Merrill–to name just a few of the ‘neoformalist’ heirs to the New Critics and Modernists– as it turns out, address the same grammatological issues as the Language Poets, although they are stylistically and often ideologically different. It is odd that none of these poets is mentioned in Poetry as Epitaph. The last word in her book, which is taken from Ashbery, is “guidelines,” and Mills-Courts is probably as aware as we are that her book, which surveys so much, has its limits. Her chosen guidelines contribute to the book’s strengths, but as she says of Ashbery, “longing” surfaces when guidelines are delineated, and our natural response to her own book is to long for more.

     

  • The Satanism Scare

    Gerry O’Sullivan

    University of Pennsylvania

     

    The satanism scare has spawned its share of rumor panics over the last several years. This past Halloween, fundamentalist and evangelical pastors across the country fed faxes to one another about an international convocation of satanists allegedly held in Washington, D.C. in September. The gathering–or so self-described experts claimed–was intended to allow devil-worshippers from around the world to meet in order to further the downfall of Christendom, intensify the war on family values, and to continue consolidation of their stranglehold on government.

     

    Based upon the dubious assertions of one self-styled former satanist, Hezekiah ben Aaron, the rumor achieved widespread currency. Pat Robertson made mention of the meeting on his “700 Club,” USA Today reported both on the tale and the Christian countermeasures, and one California- based ministry used it in a fundraising letter.

     

    While the infernal ingathering never occurred, it did produce a flurry of counterfeit documents. Detailed day-to- day schedules of events were photocopied and circulated among church leaders, complete with reports of satanic weddings and baptisms. Christians across the country convened to wage a prayerful campaign of “spiritual warfare” against the perceived evildoers. And the complete lack of evidence regarding the convention was received as still further proof of the cunning of the conspirators, always able to successfully cover their hoofprints.

     

    Several such “panics”–usually far more localized–have had tragic results. Several churches with largely black congregations have been vandalized or set ablaze when word spread that parishioners were, in actuality, practicing satanic rites behind closed doors. Preschools have been emptied of children by parents fearful that teachers were “ritually abusing” their charges. Timothy Hughes of Altus, Oklahoma murdered his wife after watching the now notorious 1988 Geraldo special on satanism, convinced that she was a devil-worshipper. And armed mobs in upstate New York threatened to assault punks who had gathered at a warehouse for a hardcore concert, fearing that they were “really” assembling to sacrifice a blonde-haired, blue-eyed child to Lucifer.

     

    A handful of folklorists have tracked such regional rumor panics, finding startlingly similar patterns from case to case. One constantly recurring theme concerns the racial identity of the satanists’ “intended victim.” The ideal offering, at least according to popular mythology, is a young and virginal child–always white, always fair-haired, always blue-eyed. Jeffrey Victor, a sociologist at Jamestown Community College (Jamestown was the location of the New York warehouse scare cited above), has collected hundreds of such stories from across the country, all with this theme at its center. And in each case, the racial component is key. The unseen and vaguely identified satanist is therefore defined as desiring his or her other– the pure and virginal as opposed to the dark and contaminated. The binarism is assumed, and the selfhood of the devil-worshipper is automatically constituted, through its ritualized desire, by inversion.

     

    For instance, in the wake of the Matamoros affair, when the bodies of a University of Texas student and the murdered rivals of a drug-running gang were found buried on a Mexican ranch, daycare centers along the Tex-Mex border were rife with rumors that “Mexican satanists” were planning to storm south Texas towns in retaliation for arrests in the case–an occult twist on the myth of the brown invading horde. And said devil-worshippers were again in search of blue-eyed, fair-haired children from surrounding communities.

     

    Central to the satanism scare is a specific social (and, as we’ve seen, racial) fantasy of the family. Mythical satanists allegedly prey upon infants, young children, and pets–threshold figures and “weak links” in the household. Once abducted, the child, cat or dog is offered as a sacrifice during some sexually-charged, moonlit rite. But the victim is never simply slaughtered. In the lore of pop satanism, its body must be cannibalized and its blood consumed by the “coven” of devil-worshippers in order to allow for a transfer of power.

     

    But the family is threatened from within as well as from without. While both children and pets are seen as satanic quarry, adolescents are depicted as ideal candidates for membership in such cults. Teenagers are cast as potential and unwitting dupes of cult leaders, properly socialized for the requisite ritual violence by the icons of their culture –heavy metal, hardcore and neo-gothic music, “occult” jewelry, black clothing, and Saturday morning cartoons which–as some pastors and Christian activists allege–are covertly training children in satanically- inspired, “new age” thinking.

     

    In all of this, the teenager is never described as an agent, possessed of volition. Rather, feeling disempowered, the adolescent is said to seek out power “from below” (but through necromancy rather than, say, insurgency). His or her choice is never, however, seen as a simple act of willful defiance or resistance. It is conditioned by a kind of devious social programming which, in its way, parodies both consumerism and marketing.

     

    The typical teenager, or so the professional lore of the satanologist has it, goes to his or her local music store to buy the latest Judas Priest, Dio, or King Diamond release. Little does he or she know, however, that certain tracks have been “backmasked” with demonic messages which are intended to engender devil-worship, mayhem, suicide and murder (usually of parents). There’s a kind of truth-in- advertising problem here–kids aren’t getting what they pay for. And once so hooked, they move on to ritual cannibalism, itself a fantasy of consumption gone wild.

     

    Hundreds of professional training manuals on satanism and “occult-related crime” have appeared over the past several years, aimed at police officers, pastors, school administrators and psychologists. And in most cases, adolescent behavior of the most typical varieties is described as satanic or “pre-occultic.” Kids who question traditional religion or refuse to attend church, act rebelliously, meditate, or dress in black are, according to several checklists, automatically suspect. Adolescence is itself demonized as something wild, dark and uncontrollable.

     

    Based upon incorrect information in such training manuals, schools in Kentucky, Florida and California–among others–have banned the wearing of peace symbols on t-shirts or in jewelry because it is, in reality, the satanic “cross of Nero”–a broken and inverted cross used by the “pagan” Romans (and later the nazis) to mock Christianity. This is an old right-wing canard originally promulgated by Louis Pauwels and Jacques Bergier in The Morning of the Magicians, later picked up and circulated by “former satanic high priest,” Mike Warnke, in a wildly popular little anti-occult book called The Satan Seller. Unfortunately, this piece of folklore has appeared and reappeared in police guides over the years.

     

    Likewise, one high school principal in Annapolis, Maryland sent letters home to the parents of black-clad teens, warning that their sons and daughters might very well be involved in devil-worship and advising them to search rooms and bookbags for other tell-tale signs of occult dabbling. Anyone wearing a t-shirt emblazoned with the name of a metal band was also picked out of the cafeteria line-up by the vigilant principal, to be later reported to parents. Unfortunately, some families have taken the satanic panic one step further, sending their children off to “de- metalizing” and “de-satanizing” camps for “treatment” at the hands of fundamentalist pastors. Centers with names like “Back in Control” and “Motivations Unlimited” have been established to forcibly deprogram the would-be teen satanist.

     

    The satanism scare is “about” several things, among them: the demonization of adolescent behavior through folkloric and often lurid accounts of bloodletting, cannibalism and sex; a struggle over the constitution of knowledge elites (the satanologist–usually a self-described cult cop or pastor–versus “professional” educators and psychologists who may be skeptical of their claims: it’s no coincidence that most so-called cult cops are professing Christians and members of groups like Cops for Christ); and the ideological reinstitution of the family as racially pure, intact, and continually threatened from without by dark and hooded people emerging from the shadows to steal “our” tow-headed children. Combined with forged documents modelled upon The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, fears of bloodthirsty invaders from the south, and tales which simply reiterate the medieval blood libel, the fear of satanism seems to point in several different, and very dangerous, directions.

     

    The satanic panic combines the worst of several scares peculiar to the eighties–terrorism, secular humanism, drugs and child-kidnapping–to frame a largely Christian, populist critique of mass cultural forms. But its analyses remain mired in conspiracy thinking, racism, eschatological anticipation, and the displacement of what are primarily familial ills (child abuse and incest) onto highly secretive and hooded outsiders.