Category: Volume 1 – Number 3 – May 1991

  • Anouncements & Advertisements

     

     

    Every issue of Postmodern Culture will carry notices of events, calls for papers, and other announcments, up to 250 words, free of charge. Advertisements will also be published on an exchange basis. Send anouncements and advertisements to: pmc@jefferson.village.virginia.edu

     


     

    **** Journal and Book Announcements: ****
    
    1)   Denver Quarterly
    2)   DisClosure
    3)   _REACH_
    4)   SubStance
    5)   Contention
    6)   ARL/OSAP Electronic Journals Directory
    7)   Netweaver Notebook
    8)   Journal of Ideas
    9)   _Literacy Acquisition_
    
    **** Symposia, Discussion Groups, Calls for Papers: ****
    
    10)  Hungarian Discussion Group
    11)  MLA 1991: Session on "The Use of Electronic Communications
         for Research in Literature and Language."
    12)  Call for Papers: Women & Technology
    13)  Call for Papers: Jerome Charyn
    14)  Hypertext '91 Conference
    15)  SCREEN-L, a new network discussion group on film and T.V.
    16)  National Conference on Computing and Values
    17)  WMST-L, a new network discussion group on Women's Studies
    18)  CRASH, a network discussion group on postmodernism
    
    1)---------------------------------------------------------------
    
                                 DENVER
                                ---------
                                QUARTERLY
    
                          Is Pleased To Publish
    
                              PROSE POETRY
    
                           A special issue for
    
                               SPRING 1991
    
              Featuring new work, translations, and commentaries by
    
                 Stephen Berg * Russell Edson * Clayton Eshleman
                        Michael Palmer * Marjorie Perloff
                          Susan Stewart * James Tate
                                and many others
    
                   Please send me _____ copies of the Prose Poetry
                         issue at $5 each.  Payment enclosed.
    
              ______________________________________________________
              Name
              ______________________________________________________
              Address
              ______________________________________________________
              City
              ______________________________________________________
              State                              Zip
              OR
                   Please begin my subscription to the Denver
              Quarterly ($15 per year) with the Prose Poetry issue.
    
                          UNIVERSITY of DENVER
                 University Park, Denver, Colorado 80208
                                    *
                            DENVER QUARTERLY
                          Department of English
    
    2)---------------------------------------------------------------
    
                              dis * Klo' zher
                              CALL FOR PAPERS
    
    The editorial collective of disClosure is pleased to announce
    that it is now accepting submissions for its inaugural issues.
    disClosure is a social theory journal edited by graduate students
    at the University of Kentucky, and is designed to provide a forum
    for multi-disciplinary dialogue between the humanities and the
    social sciences.  By exploring alternative forms of discourse,
    our goal is to address contemporary intellectual concerns through
    a rigorous examination of history, space, and representation.  As
    our title suggests, we encourage fresh perspectives that
    transcend the strictures and structures set in place by
    traditional disciplinary thought.
    
    Submissions for the first two issues should address the following
    topics:
    
    Issue 1 - "Rethinking Contemporary Mythologies"
    Deadline - 15 April 1991
    
    Issue 2 - "The Commodification of Culture"
    Deadline - 15 December 1991
    
    For our first issue, areas of possible inquiry might include:
    
    -> the myth of objectivity in social science research and writing
    -> the prioritization of historical myths over spatial... or vice
       versa
    -> the construction and reproduction of myth; methodologies of
       myth creation
    -> the desire to be bound by myth
    -> Myths? the death of the subject, the death of the author
    -> the "END" of IDEOLOGY, THE COLD WAR, RATIONALITY ?
    
    We accept submissions from all theoretical perspectives and all
    genres (essay, interview, review, poetry, and others), from both
    inside and outside the academy.  disClosure is a refereed journal
    whose selections will be solely based on quality and originality.
    Graduate students, faculty, and non-academics are equally
    encouraged to submit works.  Three copies of manuscripts
    formatted to MLA guidelines, double spaced, and less than 10,000
    words should be addressed to:
    
    disClosure
    106 Student Center
    University of Kentucky
    Lexington, KY 40506-0026
    
    Bitnet submissions can be directed to 
    
    3)---------------------------------------------------------------
    
    _REACH_, Research and Educational Applications of Computers
    in the Humanities, the newsletter of the Humanities
    Computing Facility of the University of California, Santa
    Barbara, is now available in electronic form through
    anonymous FTP.
    
    FTP is a UNIX process which lets you transfer files from a
    distant computer to your own system.  Your local computer
    center staff should be able to provide you with information
    on using FTP from your own account.
    
    Once you have FTP available, enter one or the other of the
    two following equivalent commands to gain access to the UCSB
    computer storing the files:
    
         ftp ucsbuxa.ucsb.edu
                or
         ftp 128.111.122.50
    
    Try the first version, and, if that doesn't work, then try
    the second.
    
    Log on with the name "anonymous," and use your e-mail
    address as a password.
    
    Next, move to the directory containing the files by entering
    the command:
    
         cd hcf
    
    Now that you're in the correct directory, you can get a list
    of all the file names by entering the command:
    
         ls
    
    Then, to transfer any of the files to your own system, enter
    the command:
    
         get filename
    
    First try transferring the file called "readme."  It shows
    the contents of each of the files in the directory, and
    gives detailed instructions for the FTP process, including
    the complete log of an actual FTP session.
    
    Finally, end your session with the "quit" command.
    
    If you encounter any difficulties in using the process, send
    me an e-mail note and I'll try to enlist the assistance of
    one of our local wizards.
    
    I'd be particularly interested to hear from those who find
    this archive a useful form of resource.
    
    Regards,
    
    Eric Dahlin
    HCF1DAHL@ucsbuxa.bitnet
    
    4)---------------------------------------------------------------
    
                                  "SubStance . . . gives us a sense
                                  of what is coming in the future."
                                  Philip Lewis, Cornell University
    
                                  Double Issue 62/63 Explores
                                  "Thought and Novation"
                                  Guest Editor, Judith Schlanger
                                  Rene Girard on Innovation and
                                   Repetition
                                  Michel Pierssens on Novation
                                   Astray
                                  and Saul Friedlander on The
                                   End of Novation
    
                                  Subscriptions (3 issues)
                                  19.00/year individuals
                                  65.00/year institutions
                                  Single issue/6.95
                                  Double issue/10.00
                                  Foreign surface mail 8.00/year
                                  Foreign air mail 20.00/year
    
                                  Order from:
                                  SubStance
                                  Journal Division
                                  University of Wisconsin Press
                                  114 North Murray Street
                                  Madison, WI 53715
    
                                  Founded 1971
                                  Co-Editors: Sydney Levy,
                                  Michel Pierssens
    
                                  S U B
                            S T A N C E
    
                           A REVIEW OF THEORY AND LITERARY CRITICISM
    
    5)---------------------------------------------------------------
    
                                       Who will raise CONTENTION
                                         to new heights in 1991?
    
                                  Indiana University Press will.
    
                                      Beginning in October 1991,
                                         CONTENTION:  DEBATES IN
                                           SOCIETY, CULTURE, AND
                           SCIENCE, edited by Nikki Keddie, will
                           be published three times a year.  The
                                   journal's emphasis will be on
                              controversies, not for the sake of
                        controversy but, rather, as a vehicle to
                          understand what are considered central
                        issues.  Early contributors will include
                               Eric Hobsbawm, Carl Degler, Susan
                                 Suleiman, Renato Rosaldo, Theda
                                    Skocpol, Linda Gordon, Carlo
                                     Ginzburg, and Hayden White.
                                  Subscriptions are available to
                         individuals for $25 and to institutions
                            for $45 (outside the USA and Canada,
                              please add $10 for foreign surface
                              post).  For more information or to
                          subscribe, please contact the Journals
                        Division, Indiana University Press, 10th
                               & Morton Streets, Bloomington, IN
                                     47405, or call 812-855-9449
    
    6)---------------------------------------------------------------
    
    ARL TO PRODUCE DIRECTORY OF ELECTRONIC PUBLICATIONS
    
    As part of its keen commitment to promote networked academic
    journals and other serials, the Association of Research
    Libraries (ARL) plans to publish a directory of electronic
    journals, newsletters, and scholarly discussion
    lists/interest groups.  These represent publications which
    are created and distributed principally for Bitnet, Internet,
    and any affiliated academic networks, largely for free.
    
    The directory will be available at the end of June.  It will
    contain some 30 journal listings, about twice that number of
    newsletters, and over 1000 scholarly lists.  Its length is
    anticipated to be close to 200 pages.  Preliminary pricing
    estimates are approximately $10 - $12 to members and double
    that for non-members.  A final price and release date will be
    advertised in early June.
    
    Editor of the journals/newsletters section is Michael
    Strangelove, University of Ottawa.  Strangelove's list will
    be available through the Ottawa University network
    sometime in June.  Editor of the scholarly discussion
    lists/interest groups section is Diane Kovacs, Kent State
    University Libraries.  For some months, she has maintained
    such listings as adjunct files to networked lists such as
    HUMANIST, ARACHNET, Lstown, and Libref-L.  Each electronic
    "serial" will be described and clear directions about how to
    subscribe, send submissions, and access retrospectively will
    be provided.  To ensure that the reader is given accurate and
    up-to-date information, entries have been supplied or
    verified by the editors themselves.  The listings are
    compiled with the intention of providing the uninitiated
    networker with clear directions on how to navigate the
    sometimes puzzling world of electronic scholarship.
    
    ARL is producing the printed directory because of calls
    virtually daily requesting such information.  If there is
    indeed sufficient demand for the work, the directories will
    be updated and sold regularly.  For those who prefer to
    retrieve electronically, the directory will point to the free
    and continuously up-to-date networked sources for this
    information, with complete access instructions.
    
    The ARL is tentatively exploring options for funding to
    catalog/classify these materials, both to facilitate
    networked and paper access by subject and to
    "institutionalize" and "legitimize" new types of "serials."
    This effort would relate to activities of the Coalition for
    Networked Information (CNI) in identifying and maintaining
    directories of networked access and resources and to the work
    of individuals and institutions concerned with standards
    development for networked products and publications.  For
    further information, to indicate your interest, or to place
    an order, contact:
    
    ARLHQ@UMDC.Bitnet (e-mail)
    Ann Okerson or Christine Klein
    Association of Research Libraries
    1527 New Hampshire Avenue, NW
    Washington, DC  20036
    202-232-2466 (phone)
    202-462-7849 (fax)
    
    7)---------------------------------------------------------------
    
    NETWEAVER NOTEBOOK
    
    NETWEAVER is an electronic publication of the Electronic
    Networking Association, and the winter issue deals with global
    networking issues.  It is stored on Comserve.  Below is part of
    the beginning of the magazine including its table of contents.
    At the end is directions on how to obtain the full electronic
    version from Comserve.
    
                          Welcome to NETWEAVER!
                      The interactive, intersystem
                            newsletter of the
                    Electronic Networking Association
    
      Copyright(c) by Electronic Networking Association (ENA), 1990
    
        NETWEAVER may be freely ported to any online system.
        Authors whose articles are published in NETWEAVER and its
    companion print publications, ENA Update and NETWEAVER PRINTOUT!
    retain all copyrights. Further publication in any other media
    requires permission of the author.
    
     Volume 7                ---CONTENTS---               Winter 1991
    
     0.  MASTHEAD AND TABLE OF CONTENTS
    
     1.  INTRODUCTION TO THIS SPECIAL "GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES" ISSUE
    
     2.  IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE WORD    .. by Dave Hughes
    
     3.  NETWORKING IN ARGENTINA          .. by Eduardo Salom
    
     4.  FROM THE BANKS OF TAMAGAWA RIVER .. by Mary Lou Rebelo
    
     5.  GETTING THE KIDS ONLINE          .. by Odd de Presno
    
     6.  ONLINE FOR A SMOKEFREE PLANET    .. by Nancy  Stefanik
    
     7.  THE MATURATION OF THE MATRIX     .. by John S. Quarterman
    
     8.  ENA - Seattle 1991 - Get Ready for F-T-F!
    
    To get a copy yourself, send the command: SEND NETWEAVE WINTER91
    on the first line in the body of an electronic mail message to:
    
    Comserve@rpiecs (Bitnet) or Comserve@Vm.Ecs.Rpi.Edu (Internet).
    
    8)---------------------------------------------------------------
    
    PAPERS APPEARING IN
    VOLUME 2 NUMBER 1 OF THE JOURNAL OF IDEAS
    
    THOUGHT CONTAGION AS ABSTRACT EVOLUTION
    Aaron Lynch
    
    CULTURE AS A SEMANTIC FRACTAL: SOCIOBIOLOGY AND THICK DESCRIPTION
    Charles J. Lumsden
    Department of Medicine, University of Toronto
    Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S 1A8
    
    MODELING THE DISTRIBUTION OF A "MEME" IN A SIMPLE AGE
    DISTRIBUTION POPULATION: I. A KINETICS APPROACH AND SOME
    ALTERNATIVE MODELS
    Matthew Witten
    Center for High Performance Computing
    University of Texas System, Austin, TX 78758-4497
    
    THE PRINCIPIA CYBERNETICA PROJECT
    Francis Heylighen, Cliff Joslyn, and Valentin Turchin
    The Principia Cybernetica Project
    
    BRAIN AND MIND: THE ULTIMATE GRAND CHALLENGE
    Elan Moritz
    The Institute for Memetic Research
    P. O. Box 16327, Panama City, Florida 32406
    
    The Journal of Ideas is an archival forum for discussion of
    1) evolution and spread of ideas, 2) the creative process, and 3)
    biological and electronic implementations of idea/knowledge
    generation and processing.
    
    The Journal of Ideas, ISSN 1049-6335, is published quarterly by
    the Institute for Memetic Research, Inc. P. O. Box 16327, Panama
    City Florida 32406-1327.
    
    >----------- FOR MORE INFORMATION ------->
    
    E-mail requests to Elan Moritz, Editor, at moritz@well.sf.ca.us.
    
    9)---------------------------------------------------------------
    
    LITERACY ACQUISITION
    
    A contribution of C&C to the International Literacy Year (ILY)
    Edited by Marc Spoelders 1990. J. Van In.
    
    CONTENTS                                                    V
    
    MARC SPOELDERS
    Introduction                                                Vii
    
    NANCY TORRANCE and DAVID R. OLSON
    Children's Understanding of Ambiguity and Interpretation    1
    
    HAZEL FRANCIS
    Strategies and Rules in Learning to Read and Spell          17
    
    NEIL MERCER and DEREK EDWARDS
    Developing Shared Understanding: Theories, Pedagogies and
    Educational Practice                                        31
    
    LUT VAN DAMME and MARC SPOELDERS
    Metalinguistic Awareness and Early Reading. A
    Longitudinal Study                                          43
    
    DENIS APOTHELOZ
    The Development of Cohesion in Writing: Preliminary
    Research on Anaphoric Procedures and Thematic Planning
    in Texts by children                                        53
    
    REGINE PIERRE, DANIELLE BOURCIER, ANNE HUDON
    and STELLA NOREAU
    Acquisition of the System of Determiners by Early Readers   71
    
    MONIQUE BOEKAERTS
    Text Structure, Reading Rate and Reading Comprehension      91
    
    MICHEL PAGE
    Methodological Issues in Testing Comprehension of Texts     113
    
    HELENE POISSANT
    Inferential Processes in the Comprehension of Short
    Narratives                                                  129
    
    FILIP LONCKE
    Sign Language and Reading in Young Deaf Children            147
    
    RAYMOND DUVAL
    Representation of Texts: Problems for Research and
    Prospects for Education                                     161
    
    PHILIP YDE and MARC SPOELDERS
    Cohesion and Narrative Text Quality.  A Developmental
    Study with Beginning Writers                                171
    
    GISSI SARIG and SHOSHANA FOLMAN
    Metacognitive Awareness and Theoretical Knowledge in
    Coherence Production                                        195
    
    LILIANA TOLCHINSKY LANDSMANN
    Early Literacy Development: Evidence from Different
    Orthographic Systems                                        223
    
    *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *  *
    
    LITERACY ACQUISITION
    
    PRICE
    
    Belgium                  2300 BEF, including forwarding charges
    Other countries          2500 BEF, including forwarding charges
    
    AILA and C&C members only pay in Belgium:              2070 BEF
                          in other countries:              2250 BEF
    
    This sum has to be paid in advance to the following account:
    550-3130600-15
    Publishing House J. Van In
    Grote Markt 39
    B - 2500 Lier
    Belgium
    
    All bank-costs, at home and abroad, are chargeable to the
    customer.
    
    10)--------------------------------------------------------------
    
             ANNOUNCEMENT OF HUNGARIAN DISCUSSION GROUP
    
    A new electronic discussion group on Hungarian issues is now
    open to scholars and students from all disciplines.  Although
    the working language of the group is English, contributions
    in other languages will be accepted and posted.  However,
    they may not be understood by a significant proportion of
    the membership.
    
    Electronic mail connections have already been established
    with three Hungarian universities: Budapest Technical
    University, Budapest University of Economic Sciences, and
    Eotvos Lorand University.
    
    The group and list server addresses of the new group, based
    at the University of California, Santa Barbara, are:
    
         hungary@ucsbvm.bitnet
         listserv@ucsbvm.bitnet
    
    To subscribe to the discussion group, send an e-mail
    message, without any subject, to the list server address,
    listserv@ucsbvm.bitnet, containing the single line:
    
         subscribe hungary "your name"
    
    with your own name, not your e-mail address, inserted in
    place of the phrase "your name," without quotes.
    
    Once you have subscribed, any messages which you want to
    circulate to the group should be sent to the group address,
    hungary@ucsbvm.bitnet.
    
    The list is moderated, and will be edited by:
    
    Eric Dahlin
    hcf2hung@ucsbuxa.bitnet
    
    11)--------------------------------------------------------------
    
    MLA SESSION ON "THE USE OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS FOR RESEARCH
    IN LITERATURE AND LANGUAGE."
    
    The MLA Committee on Computers and Emerging Technology will
    sponsor a session on "The Use of Electronic Communications for
    Research in Literature and Language."
    
    Chair: Otmar Foelsche, Dartmouth College
    (Otmar.K.E.Foelsche@MAC.DARTMOUTH.EDU)
    Director, Language Resource Center, DC, Hanover NH
    
    A.   Daniel Brink, Arizona State University and Donald Ross,
         University of Minnesota, Minneapolis: "Planning a Conference
         by e-Mail: Plusses and Pitfalls"
         (ATDXB@ASUACAD.BITNET) and (UMCOMP@UX.ACS.UMN.EDU)
         DB, Associate Dean for Technology Integration, College of
         Liberal Arts and Sciences, ASU, Tempe, AZ 85287
         DR, English and Composition, U of M, Minneapolis, MN 55455
    
    B.   John Unsworth, Eyal Amiran, and Elaine Orr, editors,
         _Postmodern Culture_: "Patterned Responses to the Electronic
         Journal"
         (PMC@NCSCUVM.BITNET)
         Box 8105, Department of English, North Carolina State
         University, Raleigh, NC 27695
    
    C.   Elaine Brennan, Brown University, co-editor, HUMANIST: "The
         HUMANIST Bulletin Board"
         (ELAINE@BROWNVM.BROWN.EDU)
         Women Writers Project, Box 1841, Brown University,
         Providence, RI 02912
    
    Speakers will treat the history of their projects, current
    status, and future plans.  A handout on some of the technical
    issues will help others who wish to emulate their projects.
    
    12)--------------------------------------------------------------
    
    C A L L     F O R     P A P E R S
    Studies in Technological Innovation and
    Human Resources (Vol. 4)
    WOMEN  AND  TECHNOLOGY
    
    Urs E. Gattiker
    Editor
    Technological Innovation and Human Resources
    Faculty of Management
    The University of Lethbridge
    Lethbridge, Alberta
    CANADA  T1K 3M4
    E-Mail: GATTIKER2@HG.ULETH.CA
    FAX:  (403) 329-2038
    
         Volume 1:  Strategic and Human Resource Issues
         Volume 2:  End-User Training
         Volume 3:  Technology-Mediated Communication
    
    The upcoming Volume 4, WOMEN AND TECHNOLOGY will
    particularly include papers that are: international,
    interdisciplinary, theoretical, empirical, macro, and
    micro.
    
          DEADLINE FOR SUBMISSION IS OCTOBER 1, 1991.
    
    If you would like to discuss your topic, please call
    Urs E. Gattiker at (403) 320-6966 (mountain standard
    time), or send a message via the E-mail address above.
    
    13)--------------------------------------------------------------
    
    CALL FOR PAPERS: CHARYN COLLECTION
    
    Patrick O'Donnell is in the process of collecting essays on and
    assessments of the work of Jerome Charyn for a special joint
    issue of the _Review of Contemporary Fiction_, to be published in
    1992.  If you have some work or commentary on Charyn which you
    would like to put under consideration for this special issue,
    please contact O'Donnell at the following address after April
    15:
    
    Nauklerstrasse 5
    7400 Tubingen
    Federal Republic of Germany
    
    Drafts of submissions to the collection must be send to O'Donnell
    no later than July 15, 1991, but please contact him soon after
    April 15 if you plan to submit something for the collection,
    describing the nature and length of your planned contribution.
    
    14)--------------------------------------------------------------
    
    HYPERTEXT '91
    3RD ACM CONFERENCE ON HYPERTEXT
    DECEMBER 15-18, 1991
    SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
    
    Hypertext '91 is an international research conference on
    hypertext.  The ACM Hypertext Conference occurs in the United
    States every second year in alternation with ECHT, the European
    Conference on Hypertext.
    
    Hypertext systems provide computer support for locating,
    gathering, annotating, and organizing information. Hypertext
    systems are being designed for information collections of diverse
    material in heterogeneous media, hence the alternate name,
    hypermedia.
    
    Hypertext is by nature multi-disciplinary, involving researchers
    in many fields, including computer science, cognitive science,
    rhetoric, and education, as well as many application domains.
    This conference will interest a broad spectrum of professionals
    in these fields ranging from theoreticians through behavioral
    researchers to systems researchers and applications developers.
    The conference will offer technical events in a variety of
    formats as well as guest speakers and opportunities for informal
    special interest groups.
    
    For More Information:
    
    Hypertext '91 Conference email: ht91@bush.tamu.edu
    
    John J. Leggett, General Chair
    Hypertext '91 Conference
    Hypertext Research Lab
    Department of Computer Science
    Texas A&M University
    College Station, TX  77843 USA
    Voice: 409 845-0298
    Fax: 409 847-8578
    email: leggett@bush.tamu.edu
    
    Janet H. Walker, Program Chair
    Hypertext '91 Conference
    Digital Equipment Corporation
    Cambridge Research Lab
    One Kendall Square, Bldg 700
    Cambridge, MA  02139  USA
    Voice:  617 621-6618
    Fax:  617 621-6650
    email:  jwalker@crl.dec.com
    
    15)--------------------------------------------------------------
    
    FILM AND TV STUDIES DISCUSSION LIST
    
    SCREEN-L on LISTSERV@UA1VM or LISTSERV@UA1VM.UA.EDU
    
    SCREEN-L is an unmoderated list for all who study, teach,
    theorize about or research film and television--mostly in an
    academic setting, but not necessarily so.  SCREEN-L ranges from
    the abstract (post-post-structuralist theory) to the concrete
    (roommate match-ups for the next SCS/UFVA conference).
    Pedagogical, historical, theoretical, and production issues
    pertaining to film and TV studies are welcomed.
    
    To subscribe to SCREEN-L, send the following command to
    LISTSERV@UA1VM (or LISTSERV@UA1VM.UA.EDU) via e-mail or
    interactive message (TELL/SEND):
    
    SUBSCRIBE SCREEN-L 
    
    "" is your name as you wish it to appear on the
    list.  For example:
    
    SUBSCRIBE SCREEN-L Budd Boetticher
    
    Archives of SCREEN-L and related files are stored in the SCREEN-L
    FILELIST.  To receive a list of files send the command INDEX
    SCREEN-L to LISTSERV@UA1VM (or LISTSERV@UA1VM.UA.EDU).
    
    Owner:  Jeremy Butler JBUTLER@UA1VM
                          JBUTLER@UA1VM.UA.EDU
            Telecommunication & Film Dept
            The University of Alabama at Tuscaloosa
    
    16)--------------------------------------------------------------
    
    N C C V / 91
    
    The National Conference on Computing and Values will convene
    August 12-16, 1991, in New Haven, CT.  N C C V / 91 is a project
    of the National Science Foundation and the Research Center on
    Computing and Society.  Specific themes (tracks) include
    
          -  Computer Privacy & Confidentiality
          -  Computer Security & Crime
          -  Ownership of Software & Intellectual Property
          -  Equity & Access to Computing Resources
          -  Teaching Computing & Values
          -  Policy Issues in the Campus Computing Environment
    
    The workshop structure of the conference limits participation to
    approximately 400 registrants, but space *IS* still available at
    this time (mid-May).
    
    Confirmed speakers include Ronald E. Anderson, Daniel Appleman,
    John Perry Barlow, Tora Bikson, Della Bonnette, Leslie
    Burkholder, Terrell Ward Bynum, David Carey, Jacques N.  Catudal,
    Gary Chapman, Marvin Croy, Charles E. M. Dunlop, Batya Friedman,
    Donald Gotterbarn, Barbara Heinisch, Deborah Johnson, Mitch
    Kapor, John Ladd, Marianne LaFrance, Ann-Marie Lancaster, Doris
    Lidtke, Walter Maner, Diane Martin, Keith Miller, James H. Moor,
    William Hugh Murray, Peter Neumann, George Nicholson, Helen
    Nissenbaum, Judith Perolle, Amy Rubin, Sanford Sherizen, John
    Snapper, Richard Stallman, T. C. Ting, Willis Ware, Terry
    Winograd, and Richard A. Wright.
    
    The registration fee is low ($175) and deeply discounted air
    fares are available into New Haven.
    
    To request a registration packet, please send your name, your
    email AND paper mail addresses to ...
    
       BITNet      MANER@BGSUOPIE.BITNET
       InterNet    maner@andy.bgsu.edu (129.1.1.2)
    
    or, by fax ...
    
       (419) 372-8061
    
    or, by phone ...
    
      (419) 372-8719  (answering machine)
      (419) 372-2337  (secretary)
    
    or, by regular mail ...
    
       Professor Walter Maner
       Dept. of Computer Science
       Bowling Green State University
       Bowling Green, OH 43403 USA
    
    With best wishes,
    Terrell Ward Bynum and Walter Maner, Conference Co-chairs
    
    17)--------------------------------------------------------------
    
                                 WMST-L
    
                  Electronic Forum for Women's Studies
    
         WMST-L, an electronic forum or Listserv discussion group for
    Women's Studies, has just been established.  Its purpose is to
    facilitate discussion of Women's Studies issues, especially those
    concerned with research, teaching, and program administration,
    and to publicize relevant conferences, job announcements, calls
    for papers, publications, and the like.  It is hoped that WMST-L
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    18)--------------------------------------------------------------
    
                                C R A S H
    
    A mailing list is available for people to discuss art and
    technology in a postmodern context.  It's named CRASH, after the
    JG Ballard novel.  So far over 40 people have signed up.  Topics
    have included: Survival Research Laboratories, WS Burroughs,
    semiotics, Tinguely, the Artificial Life workshop, Re/Search
    magazine, simulacra, "technology-not-for-its-own-sake," virtual
    realities, Duchamp, Chris Burden, Beth B's films, Baudelaire,
    etc.
    
    People are encouraged to sign up and discuss any aspect of
    postmodern culture they feel necessary.
    
    Subscription requests to:  sg1q+crash-request@andrew.cmu.edu
    
    Submissions to: crash+@andrew.cmu.edu
    
    Mail is automatically forwarded to the rest of the list.
    
    CRASH moderator:
    
    Simon Gatrall          sg1q+@andrew.cmu.edu

     

  • Postface: Positions on Postmodernism

    The Editors

    Eyal:     Last year we expected that the essays we would publish
              --a good number of them anyway--would be affected by
              the electronic medium, but that has not happened much.
              Several of the essays do gain something from being in
              this medium--Ulmer's or Moulthrop's.  In print they
              would lose at the very least the chance to exemplify
              some of their argument.  But we have not seen too many
              essays that think the way they do or mean what they
              mean because they are in electronic form.
    
    John:     In an odd way, though, that observation is very much
              like one of the early and persistent misconceptions we
              ran into when we explained the journal to people: they
              always seemed to expect that, because it was a journal
              published, distributed and read on computers, it must
              be a journal _about_ computers--about its medium.  We
              had a number of submissions, at the beginning, that had
              something to do with computers but nothing to do with
              postmodern culture.  That was what forced us to
              stipulate that we wouldn't consider essays on computer
              hardware/software unless they raised "significant
              aesthetic or theoretical issues."
    
    Eyal:     True, though I was thinking about the effects of the
              medium and not about subject matter.  We've also not
              received that many essays that took risks--I wonder how
              much of our success we must attribute to what might
              finally be the conventionality of our first three
              issues.  A conventional journal that looks radical:
              like a modernist from Yale.  I think that we would have
              published more radical work (not necessarily more
              radical politically) if we had more of it to review.
              We did get some unconventional work, but from what
              we've seen I'd have to guess that most people out there
              are writing recognizable, assimilable essays.
    
    John:     Well, I wouldn't say that our first three issues have
              been _thoroughly_ conventional, but I know what you
              mean.  Still, the authors of some of the submissions we
              rejected might argue that, to the extent that our first
              three issues _are_ conventional in their content, it's
              because we rejected risk-taking essays.  But what kinds
              of risks are you talking about?
    
    Eyal:     The unforseen: a new way of making things work.  It
              seems that the essays we have published share certain
              structures of thinking, ways of being essays, however
              innovative and interesting their subject matter.  Of
              course if they were saying something in an entirely new
              way they would be hard to follow, maybe in the way that
              Howe's essay is hard to follow at times.  But because
              so many of these works argue for new ways of doing
              things, for a radical redefinition of personal context
              (Fraiberg) or a new kind of writing (Acker, Ulmer), it
              is especially noticeable that they think in such
              familiar ways.  You were saying before we started
              writing that, in a way, much of this thinking does not
              seem to have absorbed poststructuralism.  In fact we've
              noted in both previous Postfaces that many works we've
              published tend to organize around familiar oppositions,
              specifically those of classical and popular culture,
              utopian and dystopian postmodernism, etc..
    
    John:     Well, wherever you go, there you are.  We've been
              standing pretty far back from the first three issues;
              what we've said about them could be said about all
              theory and criticism, including the most innovative.
              If twenty years of poststructuralism haven't changed
              our basic patterns of thinking, one year of electronic
              publishing certainly isn't going to.  But if we ask
              whether we've been unhappy with what we've published so
              far, the answer is clearly "no": we've both been very
              pleased with the way these issues have come together.
              The essays themselves have covered a wide range of
              subjects in a variety of styles, and working with the
              authors and reviewers has been a lot of fun.
    
    Eyal:     For a long time--editing the second issue--I used to go
              to bed late.  I remember in particular editing Howe's
              essay.  Three of the four reviewers had made pretty
              much the same suggestions, but with variations.  The
              work makes so much of its argument subtly, in its form
              and organization, in its juxtapositions and
              development, that it was hard to see just what taking
              some parts out of it would do to other parts, and to
              the whole; if I were to ask Howe to take out part A
              here, then part B there would make less sense; if I
              asked her to leave part A in but take C that came
              before it out, then A would mean something else and
              then B would change too.  Then again, that might have
              been what the readers had wanted when they suggested
              the changes.  If Howe were to cut off B altogether,
              then that would not be what the readers had asked for,
              but now A and C would not evolve into B and so might
              not be objectionable after all.  My mind kept weaving
              and unravelling the essay as I read and reread it, late
              into the night.  I got more and more excited as I was
              reading the essay; I felt cold but decided that this
              was because I'd had dinner so long before--this made
              sense at the time.  I got a blanket and kept reading.
              When I slept my mind kept going round and round,
              repeating bits and pieces of the essay feverishly.  I
              woke up shivering, with a high temperature: the doctor
              thought it was influenza, but it felt like the
              influence of the text.
    
    John:     A sort of out-of-body editorial experience.  I take
              back what I said before--one year of electronic
              publishing has at least disordered _our_ minds from
              time to time.  It's also radically altered my
              perception of the passage of time: when I try to place
              something that happened last June--like the time I
              accidentally distributed the entire list of subscribers
              _to_ the entire list of subscribers...twice--it seems
              that about three years have passed since then.  Some
              good things have happened in that time, whatever time
              it was: being called "honey" by Kathy Acker ("Honey,
              the movers are here, so make it short"), pushing the
              button to mail out full text of the first issue at 5
              a.m. on the last day of the month (and immediately
              crashing mailboxes around the world), the experience
              we've had with self-nominated reviewers in the
              editorial process, the early support from the library
              here at NCSU, and especially the response of
              subscribers and contributors to the journal.  The one
              thing I would like to see develop further is PMC-Talk,
              which could become more closely related to the journal
              and more constructive in its own right.  There's been
              some good stuff posted there, but there's also a lot of
              polemic, which is bad conversation.  I think the
              Fraiberg-Porush exchange in this issue is an example of
              a good conversation--one that doesn't necessarily
              discard or disguise strong opinions, but still manages
              to get somewhere.
    
    Eyal:     An exciting aspect of the journal so far has been that
              many of the works we have published do hold good
              conversations, explicitly or implicitly.  That's the
              flip side of assimilability--that essays which share
              certain suppositions or ways of thinking can engage
              each other.
    
    John:     Right: for instance, both Katz and Moulthrop start by
              trying out the supposition that the world really might
              behave according to our computer dreams--nightmares in
              Katz's "To a Computer File Named Alison," daydreams for
              Moulthrop, who doubts whether the media is really going
              to revolutionize what we exchange in it.  Then for
              Fraiberg, this isn't a dream of the future at all: it's
              our present.  Cyborgs are what we already are.
    
    Eyal:     Katz and Moulthrop are both interested in the way that
              information systems (Moulthrop) and rhetorical
              constructions (Katz) affect the social text and our
              psychological economy, respectively.  Likewise several
              writers identify antagonistic kinds of postmodernism (a
              classical and a popular for Wheeler, a reflective and
              an unreflective for Mikics).  Terms mingle without
              reducing the conversation to cocktail party banter--
              like Matibag's interest in cannibalism and Fraiberg's
              in exchange and the dissolution of borders.
    
    John:     When Matibag talks about cannibalism in Caribbean
              literature, he's actually talking about the
              cannibalizing of cannibalism, or of the imagery of
              cannibalism--a situation in which the text consumes its
              context, not unlike what Maier describes in Bowles's
              "hybrid" (appropriated) texts.  As in the last two
              issues, there are numerous unplanned connections among
              the essays in this one.  These connections suggest
              either that we all say much the same thing--a fairly
              reductive conclusion, and one which overlooks the
              importance of the local context for all of these
              essays--or they suggest that, although our individual
              contexts may be very different, there are trade routes
              among them.

  • BOOK REVIEW OF: Forked Tongues

    M.E. Sokolik

    Texas A&M University
    <e305ms@tamvm1>

     

    Forked Tongues: Speech, Writing & Representation in North American Indian Texts, by David Murray. Indiana UP, 1991.

     

    The Dictionary of Americanisms states that the phrase “forked tongue” is “used in imitation of Indian speech, to mean a lying tongue, a false tongue.” Thus, the choice of Forked Tongues as a title for this volume is particularly apt, as the author examines the Native American “voice” as it is represented and misrepresented in various texts.

     

    Each chapter reads as a fairly autonomous essay, and treats a specific question. Chapter 1, “Translation,” briefly addresses some of the perceptions and problems with the task of translation. Also illustrated are the ideologies inherent in the various attitudes towards translation, within their historical settings. The author argues that the power relationships that existed at different points in time between white and Native are borne out in these changing attitudes toward translation. Picking up this thread of reasoning, Chapter 2, “Language,” examines several discussions of Native American language, in particular the nineteenth century beliefs about “primitive” languages.

     

    The third chapter, “Indian Speech and Speeches,” shows how the beliefs of various times influenced the representation of Native American speeches. Foremost is the concept of the “Noble Savage,” and the popularity of “surrender and protest speeches” by Native Americans. For example, Murray points out that in Robert Rogers’ Ponteach: or The Savages of America (1766), when Pontiac is “confronted by swindling whites, he asserts his independence and nobility in iambic pentameters” (37).

     

    The next chapter, “Christian Indians: Samson Occom and William Apes,” discusses primarily the letters of these two men, and their relationships with their white benefactors, as well as their Native and white audiences. Murray here resumes a piece of his earlier argument regarding power relationships between Natives and whites. Rather than seeing these Native-authored letters as more “authentic” expressions of the individual voice, he points out that anything published at the time (or even now?) was “likely to reflect the tastes of a white audience, and conform to a large extent to what at least some of them thought . . . was appropriate for an Indian to write” (57).

     

    The fifth chapter, “Autobiography and Authorship: Identity and Unity,” points out that most early autobiographies written by natives were typically collaborations, rather than a solo work of self-expression. This collaboration involved the subject, the editor or anthropologist, and often another Native American acting as translator. The result then, he argues, is a multi-voiced product. Although the anthropologist typically has tried to play down his or her own role in the transmission of the text, it is here that we are faced with the eternal paradox of objectivity in reporting. He also examines several more modern autobiographies, and how they fit into various social and political “movements,” for example, the reprinting of Black Elk Speaks in the 1960s, in response to “the growing counter-cultural predilection for the irrational, supernatural and primitive [which] led to an increasing interest in, and idealisation of, Indian culture. Black Elk Speaks seemed to offer ecological awareness, mind- expanding visions and an indictment of white American civilisation. . . .” (72).

     

    The next chapter, “Grizzly Woman and her Interpreters,” looks at the representation of myth within ethnography by focusing on the myth of Grizzly Woman. Murray here examines the various analyses done by Boas, Levi-Strauss, Hymes, and so forth, and how they fit into a “model of cultural and interpretive totality, and of rhetorical strategies in the making of ethnographic texts” (4). In this chapter as well, the author looks at, from various points of view, the methodologies of collecting and reporting field data and how they were shaped by ideology. On the one hand is Melville Jacobs’ criticism of his mentor, Boas. Jacobs felt that because Boas did not pursue theory, he had failed to collect “many necessary things” from the field, due to a “lack of concern with devising fresh scientific procedures. . . .” (110). On the other hand, we have James Clifford presenting Levi-Strauss’ impulse with collecting and translating as “a way of rediscovering a lost totality” (123).

     

    Finally, in “Dialogues and Dialogics,” the author examines the potential utility of dialogical anthropology to unify the various threads of the book, in particular the interplay between language and power. An interesting aspect of this final chapter is Murray’s discussion of the writings of Castaneda. He questions the fact that Castaneda is rarely cited in academic discussions of dialogic texts, and answers his own question by saying

     

    One obvious answer is that, for all the talk of fiction, there is throughout postmodern anthropology an implicit assumption that fiction only operates WITHIN a text already authorised as ethnography and therefore as non-fiction, and that there are professional and unstated parameters of behaviour, which Castaneda has violated. (155)

     

    Overall, this book presents a challenge to the reader. It is extremely interdisciplinary, and only those with a sophisticated knowledge of anthropology from Boas to Bakhtin, linguistics, and post-modern literary theory will be able to fully appreciate the various arguments presented herein. Nonetheless, for the reader interested in Native American texts, and how these texts fit into a complex patchwork of changing historical ideologies, it is an important contribution.

     

    Reading this book brought to mind the character of Dr. Munday, the anthropologist in Paul Theroux’s Black House. Unknowingly reflecting many of the themes of Forked Tongues, Theroux says of Munday, “. . . He had his biases. He would risk what errors of judgment were unavoidable in such circumstances and write as a man who had lived closely with an alien people; his responses would be as important as the behavior that caused those responses. He had entered the culture and assisted in practices whose value he saw only as an active participant; witchcraft and sorcery had almost brought him to belief in those early years because he had been more than a witness. . . .” Then, Munday, considering his role as the ethnographer emeritus, muses,

     

    Anthropology the most literate of the sciences, whose nearest affinity was the greatest fiction, had degenerated to impersonal litanies of clumsy coinages and phrases of superficial complexity, people of flesh and bone to cases or subjects with personalities remaining as obscure as their difficult names, like the long Latin one given the pretty butterfly. He did not use those words.

     

    As a postscript, I must wonder why the author (and indeed, the editor and press) chose to use the word “Indian” as the terminology of choice for the Native American. This choice is particularly curious given the quotation from William Apes, found on page 58 of Murray’s book, who wonders the same thing about the use of this term in 1831:

     

    I have often been led to inquire where the whites received this word, which they so often threw as an opprobrious epithet at the sons of the forest. I could not find it in the bible, and therefore concluded, that it was a word imported for the special purpose of degrading us. At other times I thought it was derived from the term in-gen-uity. But the proper term which ought to be applied to our nation to distinguish it from the rest of the human family is that of 'Natives'--and I humbly conceive that the natives of this country are the only people under heaven who have a just title to the name, inasmuch as we are the only people who retain the original complexion of our father Adam.

     

    Nowhere in the text is the choice of “Indian” explained or defended. In a volume that so carefully examines the issue of Native American “voice” it is a bit of a shame that the author didn’t listen more carefully to this still timely plea from Apes.

     

  • A Critique of the Post-Althusserian Conception of Ideology in Latin American Cultural Studies

    Greg Dawes

    North Carolina State University
    <gadfll@ncsuvm.bitnet>

     

    Literature and Politics in the Central American Revolutions, by John Beverley and Marc Zimmerman (Austin: U of Texas P, 1990).

     

    One of the major contributions to literary studies in recent years has been the recognition that political consciousness is invariably fused with aesthetic practice. In light of literary approaches prior to Fredric Jameson’s The Political Unconscious (1981), which tended to isolate and fetishize the text, such a development in cultural studies can only be seen as salutary. Nonetheless, this re-evaluation of the relation between the political and aesthetic spheres has tended to gravitate towards an interpretation of this dialectic as unconscious. This comes in response, perhaps, to mechanistic formulations of the conjunction of politics and art, but primarily to Georg Lukacs’ reflection theory. Althusserianism and post-Althusserianism (or post-marxism) are certainly among the most significant proponents of unearthing unconscious impulses in cultural investigations. While Althusser’s work has largely remained intact–and in fact could be seen exercizing a hegemonic role within Marxism–in spite of the criticism directed at it, in many ways it has been unable to overcome such structuralist contradictions as the division created between science and ideology.1 Latin American cultural studies has felt the impact of Althusserianism at least since Marta Harnecker published her monumental study Los conceptos elementales del materialismo historico [The Elementary Concepts of Historical Materialism] in 1969; and Marc Zimmerman and John Beverley’s latest book, Literature and Politics in the Central American Revolutions, comes out of this Althusserian tradition as well as the post-Althusserian and post-Marxist thinking of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. As I will argue below, many of the old problems that plagued Althusser’s concept of ideology continue to afflict a work like Zimmerman and Beverley’s, not only on a theoretical plane, but also in the practical analyses of historico-political events. While we gain many insights into cultural phenomena through such an approach, ultimately a gap is created between the theory, on the one hand, and actual historical events, on the other.

     

    In their study, Zimmerman and Beverley make an upfront, forceful, and compelling argument in favor of an Althusserian ideological analysis which propels their study forward and is aided by the adoption of Gramsci’s concept of the ‘National Popular.’ This theory provides the authors with a foundation for elucidating a discussion on aesthetic commitment in the Central American context and for furnishing a reply as to why literature carries so much weight in Latin America. Briefly stated, poetry, for both Zimmerman and Beverley, accrues a significant and unique value in the Central American region because it can function as a symbolic arena which gathers together–from the optic of Althusserianism–an assortment of feelings, images, and myths.2 Poetry thus serves as a catalyst in forming national identity in revolutionary circumstances in Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua–all of which combine nationalism and socialism in their ideology.

     

    Leaving aside the theoretical aspects for the time being, as a historical tract on literary and revolutionary vanguards in Central America, Literature and Politics succeeds in providing the reader with detailed accounts of the intersection of Roque Dalton’s revolutionary commitment and his poetry, the fusion of liberation theology with the Nicarguan revolution, and the role of the testimonio as a transitional, narrational mode. Beverley, of course, has been one of the most astute analysts of the testimonio; and this latest version (Chapter 7) is an expansion of the work he has done in the past.3

     

    It is to both Zimmerman and Beverley’s credit that in this most recent analysis, the testimonio (documentary or testimonial literature) is defined as a “transitional literary form” which, as the authors put it, “does not seem particularly well adapted to be the primary narrative form of an elaborated postrevolutionary society, perhaps because its dynamics depend precisely on the conditions of social and cultural inequality and direct oppression that fuel the revolutionary impulse in the first place” (207). While Central American testimonial literature emerges from conscious revolutionary activity, it is completely enmeshed in this praxis. Hence, as Lukacs’ argues in his analysis of Willi Bredel’s novels, while this working class narrative production should be lauded as a great step forward, it strikes me that the testimonio can potentially–as in the case of Bredel’s work–lead to a less complex development of the revolutionary situation.4) This is what makes testimonial literature a transitional narrative form. It would be worth exploring the depth of Domitila’s “autobiography” with the less complete–yet still highly important–Fire from the Mountain by Omar Cabezas. In contrast to George Yudice’s view of the testimonial as a struggle for survival,5 there is, then, as Beverley and Zimmerman seem to suggest, a problem with testimonials which respond to urgent or spontaneous political matters without having analyzed socio-political matters thoroughly, because they sacrifice to much in their representation of reality.

     

    Another chapter which is unique to Literature and Politics–in the material it deals with–is Zimmmerman and Beverley’s interpretation of cultural practices during the Nicaraguan revolution. To a great extent, our versions of the aesthetic and political events that took place, from as early as 1985 to the election, corroborate each other. However, since the book was published shortly after the February debacle, it appears that the authors did not have time to evaluate the political and aesthetic effects that the collapse of the Ministry of Culture and the rise of Rosario Murillo and the professionalists could have on cultural production. In their study there is–understandably–a hesitancy to critique the model which they have seen as exemplary of a type of resistance to postmodernism in this hemisphere. I would contend that this apparent weakness is due to the theoretical framework itself, to which I would like to turn now.

     

    One of the main weaknesses in Althusserian theory is the concept of ideology itself. As long as ideology in general is specified in terms which have no reference to or place for the struggle between labor and capital, then it will only be, what Adolfo Sanchez Vazquez has called “theoretical ideology” and will cease to operate dialectically with material reality. Ideology will always appear as secondary; superimposed in fundamental, timeless struggles between sexes and generations, or strictly divorced from actual, material struggles. Althusser, as Terry Lovell has perceptively noted:

     

    produces . . . a theory of knowledge which eliminates experience altogether from the practice of knowledge construction, relegating it to the inferior realm of ideology. Experience becomes the product of ideological practice, rather than of social reality. It cannot therefore provide any guide to social reality.6

     

    What we observe in Althusser, then, is a break with the Lukacsian notion of “reflection” in favor of the production of “ideological effects” within a given text. In the process, the French thinker could be seen as resorting to formalist methods because the very material forces that generate such “ideological effects” are put aside. Following Althusser’s mapping of ideology, history itself interacts mechanically and not dialectically with it (ideology) because the latter is ostensibly “pre-scientific”. When this gap between ideology and history takes place, then the Althusserian model relinquishes its materialist grounding in exchange for an “autonomous,” free-floating ideological apparatus that is, according to Althusser, “ahistorical” and related directly to Freud’s notion that the “unconscious is eternal.”7

     

    The danger inherent in this departure from dialectical materialism is borne out in subsequent analyses of a historical, political, economic and aesthetic nature. Following Althusser, Beverley and Zimmerman in their work allege that ideologies have

     

    multiple power functions (of distinction, domination, subordination) that are not reducible to or intelligible in terms of class or group interests alone, although they are the sites in which class or group struggle occurs. Similarly, they are not always circumscribed by modes of production or concrete social formations; they can cut across modes of production and social formations, as in the case of religious ideologies. In particular, ideologies are not reducible to politics or political programs or isms, because their nature is unconscious rather than explicit; their effect is to produce in the subject a sense of things as natural, self-evident, a matter of common sense. (2)

     

    In keeping with Althusserianism, this notion of ideology is rooted in the unconscious, that is, specifically in the “mirror stage” of development as elaborated by Jacques Lacan.8 Althusser draws upon this Lacanian study in order to formulate his theory of ideology, which returns to this stage when the individual cannot distinguish him or herself from the social. This domain, then, is located outside of rational apprehension. Lacan writes that it:

     

    situates the agency of the ego, before its social determination, in a fictional direction, which will always remain irreducible for the individual alone, or rather, which will only rejoin the coming-into-being (le devenir) of the subject asymptomatically. (2)

     

    It is this “method of symbolic reduction” that will serve as the basis for Althusser’s theory of ideologies. The problem with such a philosophical position is that it is not anchored in actual, real-life processes, but rather, is a theoretical model constructed–so to speak–“above” this material life. Consequently, in this method of analyzing ideological forces one loses all grasp of the conflictive nature of ideology (and, hence, of material life) because, following Althusser, ideology is somehow beyond such a realm since it is actually in the isolated “mirror stage.”

     

    One of the main difficulties with the internal logic of Zimmerman and Beverley’s post-Althusserianism is that the symbolic and the political are almost seen as two separate entities. By alleging that literature in the Latin American context–it is different, they maintain, in so-called First World countries–is the symbolic site where ideological production and revolutionary consciousness take place, Beverley and Zimmerman endeavor to make the link between the ideological and the political more visible. Real historical events must somehow find a place in Althusserian ideological criticism or–as both Beverley and Zimmerman surely would admit–the approach will lose its sense of grounding. While this connection is made at certain moments in Literature and Politics, seen as a whole, their work fails to convincingly break with this dualism. An immediate case in point is apparent in the beginning of the first chapter when they declare that:

     

    The "work" of ideology consists in constituting (Althusser: interpellating) human subjects as such, with coherent gender, ethnic, class, or national identities appropriate to their place in a given social order or, in the case of counterhegemonic ideologies, their place in a possible social order. Ideologies provide human beings with a structure of experience that enables them to recognize themselves in the world, to see the world as in some way created *for* them, to feel they have a place and identity in it. (2)

     

    In this post-Marxist definition of ideology–in contrast to Marx’s rendering of it as inversion–it acts as a social catalyst which allows one to grasp one’s life in the social order in a more reasonable way. But at the same time, ideology seems to operate independently of human beings: Beverley and Zimmerman state that ideology enables human beings “to see the world as in some way created for them.” This gulf between human beings and the production of ideology is also clear when the authors argue against the Marxist notion of “false consciousness”:

     

    The traditional problematic of ideology in the social sciences, founded in both its positivist and Marxist variants on the epistemological question of distinguishing "true" from "false" forms of consciousness, had been displaced in contemporary cultural studies by the recognition suggested in psychoanalytic theory that truth for the subject is something distinct from the truth of the subject, given that it entails an act of identification between the self and something external to it. (4)

     

    But why focus only on the distinction between the self and what is external to it? Why not concentrate on the dialectic between subject and history? Furthermore, why should we believe that what rules in aesthetic experience is this marginalized, individual jouissance in contrast to “external reality”? Doesn’t this theory capitulate to the same limitations as Freudian psychoanalysis in its privileging of subjective sensations over reality?9 For these authors, it would seem, ideology is asked to bridge the gap between the individual and the society because the integration of the two does not come about in their analysis.

     

    In order to overcome the division that they have created between ideology and politics, Beverley and Zimmerman then turn to an Althusserian solution to this dilemma, “We rejoin here the point that revolutionary political consciousness does not derive directly or spontaneously from exploitative economic relations, that it must be in some sense produced” (8). Thus, as I suggested above, literature serves as that desperately needed link between ideology and politics that aids in the “development of subject identity.” In essence, then, literature (and specifically poetry in this study) is a semi-autonomous territory for the production of political consciousness in Central America, but it is somehow divorced from the actual social relations of production themselves. According to this logic, it is the production of a certain type of literature–“political” poetry, for instance–which enables subjects to reflect upon “private experiences of authenticity and alienation to the awareness of collective situations of social exploitation, injustice, and national underdevelopment” (9). But the weakness in a such an argument–in addition to the separation set up between individual and social experience–resides more fundamentally on the privileging of the unconscious in aesthetics. For if we agree that the motor force of ideology is the unconscious, then what power do revolutionaries have to change it, much less interpret it? If there are no conscious, scientific methods to follow, then how do we prove that this or that thesis is actually valid?

     

    All this theoretical footwork pushes Beverley and Zimmerman’s study into a corner on more than one occasion. One such moment is in their analysis of literary production in revolutionary Nicaragua. Before turning to this section, I would note that another problem with this discussion of Central American literature and revolutions is that Beverley and Zimmerman fervently adhere to postmodernist interpretations of the “unfixity” of social class (i.e.–pluralism) and of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s notion of “radical democracy.” The idealism exhibited in the writings of both Althusser and Laclau and Mouffe will come back to haunt Literature and Politics when the analysis extends beyond the theoretical to the practical realm. For example, in their study of Nicaraguan poetry during the revolutionary period, Beverley and Zimmerman give a very accurate account of the aesthetic and political debate that ensued after 1985, yet the authors overlook the fact that the deficiency in the Nicaraguan political, economic and cultural system was the vulnerability of pluralism. Thus, they assess the situation as follows:

     

    Though the debate had repercussions inside the Frente, the Sandinista leadership was reluctant to take a firm stand one way or another on cultural policy, for fear of making the mistake of the Cubans in the late 1960s of favoring one cultural "line" over others. But this commendable commitment to pluralism also meant that cultural policy was made ad hoc, without any real budgetary priorities or control. (103)

     

    Since their post-Althusserian approach automatically excludes a more organic and materialist understanding of the consequences of the economic and political situation–because ideology is supposed to be relatively independent from these spheres–Beverley and Zimmerman do not interpret this aesthetic crisis on a more global scale as the crisis of this type of “third path” to socialism. Since representation, for Althusser, does not transcend the aesthetic realm, they fail to acknowledge that the crisis in aesthetic agency is also a crisis in economic and political agency, i.e.–they fail to note that pluralist economic, political and aesthetic institutions are affected by their internal limitations and by the overwhelming force of capital.

     

    This weakness in their analysis is due, in large part, to the fact that they do not truly take a critical distance with respect to this “third path.” Their own study advocates an aesthetic and political pluralism which doesn’t effectively distinguish itself from liberal pluralism. Even late in Chapter 4, Beverley and Zimmerman continue to hold this position vis-a-vis political and artistic representation, “We are far from thinking that cultural forms have an essential class location or connotation, as our discussion in the previous chapter of the ideological mutations of vanguardism suggests” (110). Here the fateful error of post-Althusserianism or post-Marxism is fleshed out. When aesthetic agencies are separated from the social relations of production, then history itself will have a way of turning any such idealist study on its head. In the postscript to this chapter, Beverley and Zimmerman run into precisely this dilemma:

     

    [T]he perspective we adopted in our presentation of this chapter--that the revolutionary process was irreversible, despite problems and setbacks--clearly has been problematized. It may be that the revolution will go forward; on the other hand, we may well be witnessing the first stage of a more long-lasting restoration. We had hypothesized in chapters 1 and 2 that one of the key roles of literature in the revolutionary process in Central America generally was to constitute a discursive space in which the possibilities of alliance between popular sectors and a basically middle- and upper-class revolutionary vanguard could be pragmatically negotiated around a shared sense of the national-popular. (111)

     

    Here their populist or postmodernist theory meets the limits of its interpretative abilities because history itself has proven that this multi-class alliance, the concept of the nationalism, and the experimental nature of a mixed economic system were not able to sustain themselves. As Carlos Vilas has demonstrated, it was the Sandinista’s transformation from a vanguard predominantly supported by the working class and the campesinos to a party which catered to the interests of entrepreneurs in the last years of the revolution, which lost the elections of 1990.10 Similarly, in the cultural realm, the Frente abandoned its cultural democratization project not only because of financial problems, but also because there was a shift in ideological positions within party cadres themselves who now suggested that culture follow more professional guidelines. As a result, the professionalists–or, those who favored professionally-developed artists–clashed with those who defended the democratization program. Thus, the content of this debate boiled down to differences in political, economic, and aesthetic form–a regular “revolution with the revolution” to paraphrase Regis Debray–among the revolutionary forces.

     

    Given this historical context in Nicaragua, the question we must then ask, to my mind, is: If it is appropriate to cite the Nicaraguan revolutionary experience as postmodernism lived out in the flesh, so to speak, and if it did not survive a historical testing, then what other socialist alternatives do we have in Latin America? What type of revolutionary politics and theory would steer us away from the errors of “real socialism” (i.e.–the Eastern Bloc countries and the Soviet Union) and the faults of the so-called “third path”? In searching for answers, it is interesting to turn to a classical revolutionary pamphlet that was written eighty-nine years ago, but which sounds so very contemporary when read in these years of postmodernism: I am referring to Lenin’s What is to be Done?. In what follows I would like to limit my remarks to the general milieu in 1902 and to Lenin’s elaboration of the role of the vanguard.

     

    From the very beginning when Lenin addresses the incipient “dogmatism and ‘freedom of criticism’” of the Economists to his manual for the organization of revolutionaries, the political climate sketched out in What is to be Done? cannot help but sound very familiar to our contemporary period. Lenin’s attack on Bernsteinism begins with a series of cardinal points that seem to represent the revisionism of the day:

     

    Denied is the possibility of putting socialism on a scientific basis and of demonstrating its necessity and inevitability from the point of view of the materialist conception of history. Denied is the fact of growing impoverishment, of proletarianization and of the sharpening of capitalist contradictions. The very concept of 'the ultimate aim' has been declared unsound, and the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat unconditionally rejected. Denied is the antithesis in principle between liberalism and socialism. Denied is the theory of the class struggle, on the grounds of its alleged inapplicability to a strictly democratic society governed according to the will of the majority, etc..11

     

    I cite this passage because it encapsulates the main strains of political thought at the beginning of the twentieth century and is representative of the types of leftism that Lenin attempted to refute in What is to be Done?. This fragment also is important because it is indicative of the type of postmodernist “radical democracy” that we find in the works of Laclau and Mouffe. This is not the place to do a more exhaustive analysis of their work, let it suffice for now to quote a segment from Hegemony and Socialist Strategyin order to establish the correlation between the economism of Lenin’s day and the economism of our times:

     

    It is no longer possible to maintain the conception of subjectivity and classes elaborated by Marxism, nor its vision of the historical course of capitalist development, nor, of course, the conception of communism as a transparent society from which antagonisms have disappeared.12

     

    In place of this Marxist analysis and prognosis we are expected to struggle for “radical, libertarian and plural democracy” which, Mouffe and Laclau inform us, will consist of the dispersed identity of social agents and the ensemble of social movements. However, we might reflect on whether it is even possible to carry out this project at this historical moment. In examining the Nicaraguan revolutionary experience elsewhere and briefly in this paper, I have noted how this pluralist political and economic agenda doesn’t present a viable, historically- tested alternative.13 Similarly, Richard Stahler-Sholk has persuasively argued that the Nicaraguan case “reveals that the Sandinista model of a mixed economy (presupposing at least simple reproduction of the capitalist, small producer, and state sectors) with multiclass ‘national unity’ created a series of demands that were increasingly difficult to reconcile with defense priorities and longer-term goals for socioeconomic transformation.”14

     

    If this form of political (and aesthetic) representation has failed, what other means are open to us? In short, a consciously organized self-representation. At certain moments in the Nicaraguan revolution workers’ and peasants’ control over the actual means of production and the aesthetic “means of production” became a viable option. However, as I commented above, for both external and internal reasons, the FSLN did not follow through with these political and economic steps. As a thorough reading of What is to be Done? adduces to it is not the spontaneous terrain of libertarianism, found in the works of Mouffe and Laclau, that is able to survive historically, but rather some new formulation of the notion of a politically- conscious vanguard which is both of and for the working class. This path is new at least in practice. Until the “Cultural Revolution,” perhaps the Chinese revolution carried out this political, economic and aesthetic alternative most effectively and Cuba, in varying degrees, has also been successful in instituting political and economic democracy.

     

    What is certain is that this revolutionary direction can overcome the dualism exhibited in the writings of post-Althusserianism between ideology and political practice. Rather than driving a wedge between ideology and politics and anchoring both in the realm of the spontaneous (the unconscious), a Marxist reading of ideology suggests that there is always a dialectical relation between material life and ideology. To become conscious of this dialectic, according to Marx and Engles, is to supersede the distortions that accompany ideology.15 In Bolivia, Domitila is and has been keenly aware of the need for a conscious revolutionary proletariat and harbors no illusions about “radical democracy” or the “pluralism” of class and economic interests:

     

    Soluciones momentaneas ya no nos interesan. Nosotros ya hemos tenido gobiernos de todo corte, "nacionalista", "revolucionario","cristiano", asi de toda etiqueta. Desde el 52, cuando el gobierno del MNR empezo a traicionar la revolucion por el pueblo . . . tantos gobiernos han pasado y ninguno ha llegado a colmar las aspiraciones del pueblo. Ninguno ha hecho lo que realmente quiere el pueblo. El gobierno actual, por ejemplo, no esta haciendo obras para nosotros, sino que los beneficiados son, en primer lugar, los extranjeros que continuan llevandose nuestras riquezas y despues los empresarios privados, las empresas estatales, los militares y no asi la clase obrera ni el campesino que seguimos cada dia mas pobres. Y eso va a continuar igual mientras estemos en el sistema capitalista. Yo veo, por todo lo que he vivido y leido, que nosotros nos identificamos con el socialismo. Porque solamente en un sistema socialista ha de haber mas justicia y todos aprovecharan de los beneficios que hoy dia estan en manos de unos pocos.16 [Momentary solutions no longer interest us. We have already had governments of every stripe, "nationalists", "revolutionaries", "Christian", every label imaginable. Since 1952, when the MNR [the National Revolutionary Movement] government began to betray the people's revolution . . . so many governments have gone and none has been able to fulfill the people's aspirations. None has done what the people really want done. The current government, for example, is not working for us, but rather the beneficiaries are, in the first place, the foreigners, who continue to take away our wealth; and in the second place, the private entrepreneurs, the state businesses, the military and not the worker nor the peasant: each day we get poorer. And this will continue as it is as long as we are in the capitalist system. I see, from all that I have experienced and read, that we identify with socialism. Because only in a socialist system is it possible for there to be justice and for the benefits to be enjoyed by all and not be in the hands of a few [individuals]."]

     

    Notes

     

    1. See Adolfo Sanchez Vazquez’s Ciencia y revolucion: El marxismo de Althusser (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1978).

     

    2. Beverley articulated this theoretical stance in his seminal article, “Ideologia/deseo/literatura,” Revista de critica literaria latinoamericana (1er semestre 1988), 7-24.

     

    3. See especially, “Anatomia del testimonio” Revista de critica literaria latinoamericana (1er semestre 1987), 7-16.

     

    4. Georg Lukacs, Essays in Realism, Rodney Livingstone, ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1981), 23-32.

     

    5. George Yudice, “Marginality and the Ethics of Survival,” in Andrew Ross ed., Universal Abandon? The Politics of Postmodernism (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988).

     

    6. Terry Lovell, “The Social Relations of Cultural Production: Absent Centre of a New Discourse,” in Simon Clarke, et. al., One-Dimensional Marxism: Althusser and the Politics of Culture (London and New York: Allison and Busby, 1980), 245. Hereafter cited in text. To verify Althusser’s position on this matter consult Lenin and Philosophy and other Essays (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), 170-71.

     

    7. Louis Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy and other Essays (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971), 160-61.

     

    8. See Jacques Lacan, Ecrits: A Selection (New York: W.W. Norton, 1977), 1-7.

     

    9. The question here is: How far does Beverley and Zimmerman’s Althusserian theory take us from the type of dualism that Volosinov describes so precisely in his critique of Freudianism?: Inner experience [for Freud], extracted by means of introspection, cannot in fact be directly linked with the data of objective, external apprehension. To maintain a thorough consistency only the one or the other point of view can be pursued. Freud has ultimately favored the consistent pursuit of the inner, subjective point of view; all external reality is for him, in the final analysis, merely the “reality principle,” a principle that he places on the same level with the “pleasure principle” [emphasis in the original]. V.N. Volosinov, Freudianism: A Marxist Critique (New York: Academic Press, 1976), 72.

     

    10. Carlos Vilas, “What Went Wrong” NACLA (June 1990), 10-18.

     

    11. V.I. Lenin, What is to be Done? (New York: Penguin Books, 1988), 75.

     

    12. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (London: Verso, 1985), 4.

     

    13. A succinct version of my argument was presented at the 1990 Modern Language Association meeting and was entitled, “Contemporary Nicaraguan Politics and Aesthetics: The Fate of Postmodernist Idealism.” I have just finished a more comprehensive development of this thesis in a manuscript I have prepared for publication, Aesthetics and Revolution: A Historical Materialist Analysis of Nicaraguan Poetry 1979-1990.

     

    14. Richard Stahler-Sholk, “Stabilization, Destabilization, and the Popular Classes in Nicaragua, 1979-1988,” Latin American Research Review vol. xxv, number 3 (1990), 55-88.

     

    15. Here the key text is, of course, The German Ideology. (New York: International Publishers, 1977).

     

    16. Moema Viezzer, ‘Si me permiten hablar…’Testimonio de Domitila: Una mujer de las minas de Bolivia (Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1985).

     

  • Jameson’s Postmodernism

    Jim English

    University of Pennsylvania
    <jenglish@pennsas>

     

    Fredric Jameson, the key Marxist player in the “postmodernism debates” of the early and mid eighties, has now published an entire book on postmodern culture, titled after his classic 1984 article in New Left Review, “Postmodernism, Or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism.” The recycled title may keep some people away from this hefty and expensive volume, since it suggests one of those dressed-up collections of already widely collected essays– in this case rather suspiciously assembled for a Duke University Press series of which the author himself is co- editor.

     

    But while it is true that six of the ten chapters here have been reprinted from elsewhere, only the first two (the NLR article and a contemporaneous “Politics of Theory” piece from New German Critique) will be familiar to most readers. Moreover, the arguments of both these earlier pieces have been massively supplemented. Jameson’s political analysis of contemporary theoretical discourse is here extended to address the paralyzing “nominalism” of both Theory (deconstruction) and anti-Theory (new historicism) in a substantial chapter that also includes, to my knowledge, his first extended statement on the de Man affair. And the shamelessly “totalizing” Marxist approach to contemporary culture that he deployed in his original “Postmodernism” essay is spiritedly defended over and against the dominant academic discourses of “groups and difference” in a sprawling but indispensable “Conclusion.” Given that these two chapters alone represent some two hundred pages of fresh material, it would clearly be a mistake to dismiss Postmodernism as just another collection of warmed-over articles by a Lit-biz superstar. Jameson’s purpose in this book is not so much to collect his past work on postmodernism as to frame the frequently “scandalized” and hostile reception of that work–particularly by postmarxists, postcolonialists, Foucauldians, and feminists–as itself a symptom of the “decadence” or degradation of critical discourse in the postmodern age.

     

    Indeed, Jameson, whose distinctive role in the Debate is to take postmodernism as naming not merely an historical period but a “mode of production” (essentially unresisted capitalism–omnipresent, invisible, taken-for-granted capitalism), reads culture in general (including, especially, all manner of “theory”) as a terrain on which one may trace out the “symptomatology” of this supremely hegemonic stage of capitalism. For Jameson, any workable culture critique must retain something of the reflectionist logic of base and superstructure. Though his mode-of- production model is organized across multiple and heterogeneous levels or orders of abstraction, it ultimately aims at “explaining” postmodern cultural phenomena–the “new sentence,” the “new space,” the ascendancy of “pastiche,” and the other styles and themes he identifies–by reference to a grand diachronic narrative whose “agent” is “multinational capital itself.” Thus he can insist that his critics’ “resistance to globalizing or totalizing concepts like that of the mode of production” is itself “a function of . . . [the] universalization of capitalism.”

     

    The interesting question to raise here, it seems to me, is not whether Jameson’s frankly totalizing methodology is inherently insensitive to cultural difference, or even whether such periodizing or totalizing abstractions have been somehow ruled out in advance by the fragmented and ahistorical character of the culture they mean to grasp. Rather, the question is to what extent Jameson’s brand of late-capitalist Marxism is itself a symptom of the mode of production whose symptomatology concerns him. Where is the diagnostician located in relation to the disease? Is this Postmodernism postmodern? If the imperative is to historicize, how can we historicize Jameson himself?

     

    There are many ways to approach such a question. But since Jameson has “insisted on a characterization of postmodern thought . . . in terms of the expressive peculiarities of its language rather than as mutations in thinking or consciousness as such,” we might do well to consider Jameson’s style, the “aesthetics of [his own] theoretical discourse.” Certainly his sentences, always remarkable, have never called more attention to themselves than in the most newly minted contributions to this volume. Of the schizophrenic character of our discursive situation, Jameson writes:

     

    A roomful of people, indeed, solicit us in incompatible directions that we entertain all at once: one subject position assuring us of the remarkable new global elegance of its daily life and forms; another one marveling at the spread of democracy, with all those new 'voices' sounding out of hitherto silent parts of the globe or inaudible class strata (just wait a while, they will be here, to join their voices to the rest); other more querulous and 'realistic' tongues reminding us of the incompetences of late capitalism, with its delirious paper-money constructions rising out of sight, its Debt, the rapidity of the flight of factories matched only by the opening of new junk-food chains, the sheer immiseration of structural homelessness, let alone unemployment, and that well- known thing called urban 'blight' or 'decay' which the media wraps brightly up in drug melodramas and violence porn when it judges the theme perilously close to being threadbare.

     

    The trouble with the crowded room, says Jameson, is that “none of these voices can be said to contradict the others; not ‘discourses’ but only propositions do that.” Presumably his own voice wants to be the exception; one appeal of Jameson’s work is its willingness to make the strong argument, the contradictable proposition, which can then be seized upon for polemical purposes.

     

    This determination to be more than mere “discourse” (or “commentary” as he will ultimately call it) is clearly enough signaled in the polemical framework–the initiation and the transitional logic–of the typical Jameson essay. But is the Jamesonian sentence really so different from the ostensibly symptomatic “new sentence” of, say, Bob Perelman? Jameson identifies this latter sentence with an aesthetic of “schizophrenic disjunction” made newly–and in some sense irresponsibly–available “for more joyous intensities” than seem proper to its morbid content, made available even “for . . . euphoria.”

     

    There seems to be something like a connection between this characterization of LANGUAGE writing and the curious affect, which combines exhilaration and exhaustion, of Jameson’s own sentences. They are often brilliant sentences, but also “impossible” in the sense that the two-hundred-word aphorism is impossible. A kind of pragmatism of language, and a refusal of any posture of poeticism or transcendence, coexist improbably with the bravura and self-involvement of Jameson’s idiolect. Polemic is put into virtual abeyance by the tendency to stray across various and incompatible discursive fields, “picking up” bits of language here and there, celebrating the syntactic detour. And yet polemic, or perhaps (as one begins to suspect) some convincing simulation of polemic, always reappears at the next rest stop, only to be lost once again in the joyous (or is it tiresome?) intensity, the weirdly inappropriate euphoria, of another Jamesonian sentence.

     

    Jameson’s style suggests two possible conclusions about “his” postmodernism. On the one hand, the tendency of his own sentences to dissolve the distinction between a language capable of genuinely critical propositions and the mere “commentary” generated by a schizophrenic culture (a distinction which looks not only like that between purposive “parody” and ungrounded “pastiche,” but, even more dubiously, like that maintained by the speech act theorists between “authentic” and “parasitical” utterances) may signal an irremediable problem in Jameson’s framing of the whole polemic–which would turn out, in that case, to be merely a mock-polemic anyway. On the other hand, the fact that the diagnostician too is infected, that the doctor cannot heal himself, suggests that for all the traditionalism and even perhaps nostalgia of the author’s global perspective, this book marks something more interesting than the persistence of a certain modernity, something less familiar than a belated pre-postmarxist Marxism. To read Postmodernism as a symptom of its own ostensive object of study is to confront in a new, complex, and sometimes exhilarating form the problematic of “symptomatology” itself, which, like so many seeming vestiges of the modern, was consigned to the dustbin of the “no longer available” but has stubbornly refused its oblivion.

     

  • BOOK REVIEW OF: The Many Lives Of The Batman

    John Anderson

    Northwestern University
    <jca@casbah.acns.nwu.edu>

     

    The Many Lives of the Batman: Critical Approaches to a Superhero and his Media. Edited by Roberta E. Pearson and William Uricchio. New York: Routledge, 1991. 213 pp.

     

    The essays in this collection offer different kinds of assistance to a reader trying to interpret the multiple versions of Batman and the recent (now receding) flurry of Bat-hype. The essays chart the movement of competing “Batmen,” and attempt to give an account of the intertextual and extratextual dimensions of this network of alternatives. Some of the essays have an anthropological focus, as they investigate the behavior of the communities that produce and consume images of Batman. Others focus on the meanings of these images, although the interpretations of specific artifacts never lose sight of the multiple and interconnected nature of the various Bat-phenomena. It is in their accounts of this multiplicity and interconnection that the essays make their most suggestive contributions to the practice of cultural studies.

     

    The best of these essays are extremely sophisticated in their adaptation of critical methodologies to the new multiple and changeable forms of the Batman narrative. The essays by Jim Collins and Eileen Meehan are most striking in this regard, combining detailed information about the phenomena with penetrating analyses of the narrative (Collins) or economic (Meehan) processes at work in contemporary representations of Batmen. The article by Uricchio and Pearson, on the other hand, serves as a kind of introduction to critical issues for contemporary Bat-scholarship by examining the serial nature of the Batman character, and calling attention to the tension between multiplicity and coherence in the production of popular culture. The three articles that deal directly with audience responses–Parsons, Bacon-Smith and Yarborough, Spigel and Jenkins–demonstrate specific models for cultural studies that are interactive, and do not write over the meanings produced by the audiences. However, of the contributions to this collection, Andy Medhurst’s essay is perhaps the most controversial and critical, as it addresses and explores issues of camp and sexuality in ways that challenge “official” interpretations of Batman. Medhurst’s framing of the competing bat-discourses as the struggle to establish “legitimacy” or “deviancy” sharpens and specifies the issues at stake in preferring one version of Batman over another, and suggests that homophobic resistance may account for the insistence, made by both artists and fans, on particular definitions of the Batman character’s masculinity.

     

    The essays that are less self-reflective about their own practices are nonetheless useful in helping familiarize a critical reader with the kinds of information necessary for a study of Batman. For example, Bill Boichel’s brief history of the Batman’s manifestations in comics, film and television provides the pertinent names, dates, and titles to readers unfamiliar with the comics industry. But despite the promise of its title (“Batman: Commodity as Myth”), Boichel’s article fails to do more than describe the changes in the character of Batman since its first appearance. The collection also contains two interviews, one with DC editor Denny O’Neil, and one with writer/artist Frank Miller. These are informative, and give one the sense of being privy to inside information, but they do not exhaustively probe the issues they raise. However, for readers not familiar with the formation of the Batman canon, the articles set up the collection’s more detailed analyses by introducing the history of conflicting interpretations through the personalized “voices” of comics expert (Boichel), professional arbiter and editor (O’Neil), and artist (Miller). Thus, these three essays serve in part to highlight the movement in the other essays away from explanations based on authorial intention, and towards models that examine the effects of larger communities–audiences, populations of fans, and corporations–in the construction of meaning.

     

    One consistent trend in the collection is the rejection of a passive model of cultural consumption. In the words of Patrick Parsons (“Batman and his Audience: The Dialectic of Culture”), study of the audiences for superhero comics reveals that “Contrary to the assumptions of some in both the popular and scholarly community, the impact of readers on content may be greater than the impact of content on readers” (67). Readers and viewers build their own “Batman” out of their personal experience with the character, resulting in differing but equally active interpreters who use Batman in different ways. For example, Parsons charts the multiple American audiences for superheroes, and examines historical development of a specialized and sophisticated readership for the growing field of underground comix, independent comics, and graphic novels. Different audiences practice different interpretations and manipulations of the signs bearing the label “Batman.” Parsons goes on to examine the direct influence of fans on the production of comics. Spigel and Jenkins, on the other hand, examine the significance of the Batman character to less-specialized audiences (“Same Bat Channel, Different Bat Times: Mass Culture and Popular Memory”). Based on interviews with a number of people about their memories of the Batman television show (1966), the article demonstrates the ways in which people “use and reuse media in their daily lives” (144). The personal and transformative nature of popular memory thus suggests to Spigel and Jenkins that a more dialogic relationship between the oral historian and his or her subjects will reflect a better understanding of the processes of memory and narration that people use to make sense of cultural artifacts.

     

    Camille Bacon-Smith and Tyrone Yarborough (“Batman: the Ethnography”) also acknowledge the active role of audiences in constructing meanings. By questioning different audiences for Tim Burton’s film Batman (1989) in their “native habitats”–movie theaters, comic book shops, a fan club, and a comics convention–the writers set out to learn from Batman audiences rather than simply analyze or characterize them. The encounter between researcher and researched is posed as an encounter between different but equally valid discourses of interpretation. Thus, while able to account for the significant influence of newspaper reviews, advertising, and marketing strategies in shaping audience approval or disapproval, the writers avoid a model of popular culture that imagines consumers to be a homogeneous or unreflective mass. On the contrary, the article demonstrates that a large scale cultural phenomenon like the release of Batman becomes the occasion for active, dialogic exchange among audience members. Meaning-making is shown as a variable process that takes place at a proliferation of specific sites, not a homogeneous activity performed by a uniform audience.

     

    Eileen Meehan (“‘Holy Commodity Fetish, Batman!’: The Political Economy of a Commercial Intertext”) provides the most thorough and suggestive account of the way this multiplicity has been managed for profit, examining the function of “Batman” as not only name, but brand name as well. Through a detailed examination of WCI’s activities, Meehan shows how the different versions of the Batman produced by DC Comics and Warner Brothers, culminating in the release of the motion picture and the licensing of the bat logo, are all components of a marketing campaign designed to penetrate a range of different markets. The result is to ground the multiple versions of Batman, and their enjoyment by a large and diverse population of consumers, in the fact that “text, intertext, and audiences are simultaneously commodity, product line, and consumer.” The “contradictions” among the various reproductions of Batman are completely in synch with the promotion of the movie and its attendant products: The commercial intertext that results from this combination of advertising and licensing intermixes old themes with new, camp motifs with grim visages, cartooning with live action, thus generating a rich and often contradictory set of understandings and visions, about justice and corruption in America. And it does this because of manufacturers’ perceptions about acceptable risk, potential profit, and targeted consumers. (58-59) For Meehan as for the other writers, audiences are by no means a passive, homogeneous mass. The point of her economic analysis is not, as she puts it, that “evil moguls force us to buy Bat-chains” (48). Nonetheless, her article concentrates on revealing the constraints imposed on popular culture by corporate decisions because, in the everyday experience of popular media, “this complex structure is generally invisible to us” (61). Within the context of this collection, Meehan’s essay performs the valuable function of reintroducing more directly economic concerns into the discussion, illustrating how the current multiplicity of Bat-representations can coexist quite comfortably with immense and diversified corporations capable of orchestrating the release and promotion of objects in a number of different media, for a number of different markets.

     

    Jim Collins (“Batman: The Movie, Narrative: The Hyperconscious”) also highlights the referentiality and intertextuality of the contemporary additions to the Bat- canon, but focuses on the interplay of specific artistic techniques rather than corporate economic strategy. If Meehan emphasizes the corporate imperatives motivating WCI’s diverse marketing strategy, Collins identifies an aesthetic imperative in the diversity found in the imagery and language of individual texts: Texts like Batman: The Movie, The Dark Knight Returns, and Watchmen which feature narration by amalgamation suggest the emergence of a new type of narrative which is neither a master narrative that might function as a national myth for entire cultures, nor a micro-narrative that targets a specific subculture or sharply defined community. The popularity of these texts depends on their appeal not to a broad general audience, but a series of audiences varying in degrees of sophistication and stored cultural knowledge (i.e. exposure and competence). As aggregate narratives, they appeal to disparate but often overlapping audiences, by presenting different incarnations of the superhero simultaneously, so that the text always comes trailing its intertexts and rearticulations. (179-180)

     

    In his exploration of “aggregate narratives,” Collins’ work on Frank Miller’s Dark Knight is the most thorough and persuasive of any in the collection. Especially good is his analysis of Miller’s use of panels, and of the apparent resemblance between the techniques of the graphic novel and those of cinema: the juxtaposition of different sized frames on the same page, deployed in constantly changing configurations, intensifies their co-presence, so that the entire page becomes the narrative unit, and the conflictive relationships among the individual images becomes a primary feature of the “narration” of the text, a narration that details the progression of the plot, but also the transgression of one image by another . . . the tableaux moves the plot foreword but encourages the eye to move in continually shifting trajectories as it tries to make sense of the overall pattern of fragmentary images. (173) As Collins’ explications of particular pages demonstrate, it is inadequate to call Miller’s work cinematic because the frames of the graphic novel are able to mimic the visual styles of more than one medium. It would be more accurate to say that Miller builds his narrative from a montage of references to the conventions of different media: television, various kinds of cinema, “conventional” comic books, Japanese comics (Manga), and others.

     

    New versions of Batman like Miller’s thus require interpretations that are adequate to the intertextuality and self-referentiality of the new narratives. The effect on criticism is to expand the definition of a text’s “action” to what was previously considered extra-diegetic. One of the reasons why the Batman phenomenon has attracted the attention of the writers assembled in this collection is the sense that at least some of the representations of Batman–and the contexts of cultural production and fandom–share common perspectives and concerns with recent writing on theory and cultural studies. For Collins, the effect is to generate dialogue between the discourses of scholarship and popular culture. For example: The producers of Dark Knight and Watchmen orchestrate textual space and time, but in doing so they also emphasize (through different but related means) that to envision textual space is to envision at the same time the cultural space surrounding it, specifically the conflicting visual traditions that constitute those semiotic environments. (172) Collins’ essay thus provides an insightful model for writing on popular culture because it works through the linkages between theory and popular cultural, specifies the ways in which texts embody alternative modes of narration, and acknowledges the ways in which the texts simultaneously represent and interpret the traditions to which they belong.

     

    All of the writers in this collection draw attention to the contradictions that have been manifested in one or another version of the Batman. A crimefighter whose activities are often illegal, a defender of justice who is also (as millionaire Bruce Wayne) the symbol and defender of wealth, Batman’s relationship to authority and the status quo have been portrayed and understood as conflicted, uneasy, and anxiety-provoking. Andy Medhurst’s essay (“Batman, Deviance, and Camp”) deserves special attention because of its straightforward discussion of the role sexuality has played in constructing and construing Batman’s relation to authority, power, and masculinity. Medhurst, like others, emphasizes the multiple versions of the character, and argues that the camp sensibility of the television series undermines attempts to take any version of the Batman seriously. But Medhurst is specific in attributing the anxiety demonstrated by audiences over these multiple versions (which is the “real” Batman?) to sexual anxiety: the “Batmen” rejected by the hard-core fans are those that admit even the slightest homoerotic sensibility, or any parody of the character’s definition as an obsessively self-serious crimefighter. In this rejection, Medhurst asserts, bat-fans mirror the assumptions about masculinity and homosexuality held by Frederic Wertham, the psychiatrist who first suggested that Batman might be gay. Medhurst exposes Wertham’s panicky, outdated, homophobic arguments as fallacies (an “elephantine spot-the-homo routine”), but he is no less sparing of the bat-fans’ shrill disgust levelled at Wertham: “The rush to ‘protect’ Batman and Robin from Wertham is simply the other side to the coin of his bigotry. It may reject Wertham, cast him in the role of the dirty-minded old man, but its view of homosexuality is identical” (152). Wertham’s insinuations about Batman and Robin, his claims concerning the harmful effects of comics on young minds, and his instrumental role in bringing about the Comics Code authority, have made him the most important “supervillan” that the fans of Batman and other comics have ever had. Like the Joker, his image reappears again and again, a threat to “authentic” interpretations of the Batman character. But Medhurst boldly claims a piece of Wertham’s argument, in order to legitimize his own advocacy of a “deviant” interpretation of Batman: Wertham quotes [the remarks of a patient who had been aroused by the idea of having sex with Batman in the “secret Batcave”] to shock us, to tear the pages of Detective away before little Tommy grows up and moves to Greenwich Village, but reading it as a gay man today I find it rather moving and also highly recognizable. What this anonymous gay man did was to practice that form of bricolage which Richard Dyer has identified as a characteristic reading strategy of gay audiences. Denied even the remotest possibility of supportive images of homosexuality within the dominant heterosexual culture, gay people have had to fashion what we could out of the imageries of dominance, to snatch illicit meanings from the fabric of normality, to undertake a corrupt decoding for the purposes of satisfying marginalized desires. This may not be as necessary as it once was, given the greater visibility of gay representations. Wertham’s patient evokes in me an admiration, that in a period of American history even more homophobic than most, there he was, raiding the citadels of masculinity, weaving fantasies of oppositional desire. (153) Like other writers in this volume, Medhurst shifts the focus from the cultural icon to its reception and reinterpretation by its audiences. Moreover, he uses his argument for the “legitimacy” of a gay Batman to reveal tendencies that function textually and intertextually in the current Bat-canon. But unlike some of the other commentaries on Batman in this volume, Medhurst’s is the one almost certain to be resisted by the arbiters of official bat-taste. Medhurst targets this resistance as the collective homophobic core of the new bat-discourse: the change from the 60s “camp crusader” to the snarling Dark Knight of the 80s thus represents a “re- heterosexualization” of the character, carried out by artists, marketers, moviegoers, comic fans, and others (159). What Medhurst brings to our attention is that despite the recent proliferation of bat-signifiers in popular culture, some interpretations of the multiple retellings of the Batman narrative remain more equal than others.

     

    As a result, it is Medhurst’s essay and perhaps Meehan’s that are most searchingly critical of the recent resurgence in Batman paraphenalia. Their “unofficial” versions of the new Batman–as masculinist homophobe; as corporate intertext–play a crucial role in retaining the oppositional status of criticism in Batman-studies, as represented by this collection. Any book on Batman is likely to be both energized and limited by the character’s current popularity. The presence of the name of the bat in the title may attract the attention of audiences already sensitized to it. However, as Meehan might point out, even the most diverse objects produced by third parties can be enlisted to advertise the central commodity, if they bear the sign of the bat. No scholarly “licensing” of the name and logo can take place without also enlisting scholarship as an endorsement of bat-products–in this case, an endorsement for the significance and interest of at least one “new” genre, the graphic novel. Given this relationship, it is perhaps fortunate that DC Comics refused to grant the editors the rights to the images for use in illustrations, dust jackets, etc. “[DC] did not feel that this book was consistent with their vision of the Batman” (vi). What better reverse endorsement could DC have given to bat-criticism, and its attempts to emphasize the failure of any single interpretation to account for Batman’s history?

     

  • From Abject to Object: Women’s Bodybuilding

    Marcia Ian

    Rutgers University

     

    Do muscles have gender, or are they, on the contrary, ungendered human meat? Other than the few muscles associated with their sexual organs, men and women have the same muscles. Does this make muscles neuter, or perhaps neutral? Is there some “difference” between the biceps of a male and those of a female other than, possibly, that of size? If a woman’s biceps, or quadriceps, are bigger than a man’s, are hers more masculine than his? In the eyes of most beholders, the more muscle a woman has, the more “masculine” she is. The same, of course, is true for men: the more muscle a man has, the more masculine he is too. Bodybuilding in a sense is a sport dedicated to wiping out “femininity,” insofar as femininity has for centuries connoted softness, passivity, non-aggressivity, and physical weakness. Eradicating femininity just may be the purpose of both male and female bodybuilders. Even so, for men to wage war on femininity, whether their own or somebody else’s, is nothing new. For women, however, it is. Insofar as women have for centuries obliged cultural expectations by em-bodying femininity as immanent, bodybuilding affords women the opportunity to embody instead a refusal of this embodiment, to cease somewhat to represent man’s complementary (and complimentary) other.

     

    At least this is how it seems to this author, who is: a forty-year old, divorced, atheistic Jewish mother of two teenaged girls; an assistant professor of British and American Literature at a the state univerity of New Jersey; a specialist in modernism, psychoanalysis and gender; and a dedicated “gym rat” who has trained hard and heavy without cease (knock on wood) for about eight years now and during graduate school even entered bodybuilding competitions. As such, I confess, I obviously have various axes to grind (pun intended) which intersect “around” the body as uniquely over-determined site of ambivalent psychosocial signification. From this point of view women’s bodybuilding appears to be roughly equal parts gender vanguardism and exhibitionistic masochism; men’s bodybuilding could in theory be the same, but I have seen no evidence that this is so. Male bodybuilders, on the contrary, seem mainly out to prove that they are conventionally masculine– hyperbolically, FEROCIOUSLY so.

     

    Furthermore, the sport of bodybuilding, as marketed and represented by those enterprises founded by Joe and Ben Weider, including magazines like Flex and Muscle and Fitness (published by “I, Brute Enterprises, Inc.”) and contests like the Mr. and Ms. Olympia, as well as various less powerful rival organizations, reproduces ad nauseam all the cliches of masculinism from the barbarous to the sublime. This remains true despite the fact that in recent years the top female competitors have displayed increasing amounts of hard striated muscle. I had hoped to find in the gym a communal laboratory for experimental gender-bending, perhaps a haven for the gender-bent, or at the least a democratic republic biologically based on the universality of human musculature. This laboratory, this haven, this republic, however, remains a utopic and private space, a delusion in effect, because what goes on in the gym, as in bodybuilding competition, remains the violent re-inscription of gender binarism, of difference even where there is none. As Jane Gallop pointed out, in Western culture gender is no “true” binary or antithesis but rather an algorithm of one and zero. Bodybuilding expands the equivalence “male is to female as one is to zero” to include the specious antithesis of muscle and femininity.

     

    Spurious gender difference is maintained and rewarded in bodybuilding through the discriminatory valorization of certain aesthetic categories. Indeed bodybuilding tries to limit the achievements of female physique athletes by adding “femininity” to the list of aesthetic categories they are expected to fulfill. The film Pumping Iron II: The Women (1985) dramatically documents this sexism by recording a conflict which erupts in a sequestered conference room among those judging the 1983 “Miss Olympia” (now the “Ms. Olympia”), America’s most prestigious bodybuilding competition for women. A man apparently serving his first stint as judge is puzzled and angry to find that he is supposed to judge the women on the basis of their “femininity.” He points out to the other, more experienced judges that, while the men are ranked on the basis of their muscle density, definition, over-all symmetry and proportionality, as well as for the style, skill and fluidity of their posing, the women are in addition judged for a quality called “femininity” which surreptitiously but effectively limits all the others. How, this judge queries, is anyone supposed to determine how muscular a woman’s body can be before it ceases to be feminine? Furthermore, in what other sport could a female competitor be expected to limit her achievement for fear of losing her proper gender?

     

    Would anyone advise a runner–Florence Griffith-Joyner, for example–that to run too fast would be unladylike? Would anyone warn a female long jumper not to jump too far, or a swimmer not to swim too fast? Why, then, presume to tell a bodybuilder that she may be only so muscular, but no more muscular than that, at the risk of losing both her femininity and her contest? This sensible judge argued in vain; the panel of judges elected Rachel McLish, then at her cheesiest, as Miss Olympia, while penalizing Bev Francis, by far the most muscular and impressive of the competitors, for being what they considered “too masculine.” McLish was subsequently disqualified when someone discovered she had padded her bikini top to look more buxom. McLish, however, was merely trying to win the approval of the judges who, she thought, might have been repelled by her if they had viewed her as masculine, although it is hard to imagine how they could have. Subsequently McLish became more interested in the opinion of a higher judge when she became “born again” and began pumping iron for Jesus. Even with McLish disqualified, however, Francis placed pathetically low.

     

    Many viewers have been amused by McLish’s antics but missed the nature and extent of the sexism the movie documents. Leonard Maltin’s TV Movies and Video Guide (1991), for example, which does not usually dwell upon the physical attractiveness of the men and women appearing in the films under review, informs its readers that Pumping Iron II offers a “funny, if suspiciously stagy” look at a “Vegas non-event” in which “pouty-lipped sexpot Rachel McLish, manlike Australian Bev Francis, and two-dozen more female bodybuilders compete.” But while the Guide thus dismisses the women’s competition as a stagy non-encounter between a sexpot and an Australian she-man, it describes the first Pumping Iron (1977) about the men, which, like Pumping Iron II, received three stars from the Guide, as a “fascinating documentary” in which Schwarzenegger “exudes charm and . . . strong screen presence” (Schwarzenegger’s stage name in his early movie “Stay Hungry” was “Arnold Strong”).

     

    The arduousness of physique competition is the same for male and female. Like the male, the female must diet away as much subcutaneous and even intra-musculuar bodyfat as possible when preparing for competition. And, whereas she may typically start out with twice as much bodyfat as the male, she must try to be as “ripped” as he, as close, that is, to that impossible ideal of 0% bodyfat on the day of the contest. In the process, she inevitably, if temporarily, loses most of her breast tissue, as well as that soft adiposity which typifies the conventionally feminine, proto-maternal figure. Many female bodybuilders opt for surgical breast implants to try to salvage the “femininity” they lost in the eyes of their beholders as they gained in muscularity. My own experience in two bodybuilding competitions during the summer of 1986 (the summer after hitting the MLA job market and accepting my present position) typifies the ambivalent attitudes judges have toward muscular female bodies. In July I won the “Miss Neptune” championship at a fairly well-established contest in Virginia Beach because my physique was the biggest, hardest, and veiniest of the group. In August, having remained during the intervening month in as close to “peak” condition as possible, I lost a newly established contest to an anorexic and a cupcake for the same reason. In this case the judges, I was told later, assumed that the relatively beefy hardness of my physique meant I was “juiced,” and they deducted points accordingly from my score. I have never used drugs or even supplements, but since they did no testing or even asking, I had no way to persuade them to the contrary; nor did the audience, which roundly booed the judges’s decision.

     

    That the first contest had been run for years while the second was newly established is significant; the “establishment” in women’s bodybuilding is changing somewhat. Lenda Murray, the winner of the November, 1990 “Ms. Olympia” is phenomenally, finely, and hugely muscular. She redefines women’s bodybuilding, if not women, and must be seen to be believed. Nevertheless, here it is June, 1991 and, as one irate reader points out, Muscle and Fitness still has not seen fit to do a layout on the new Ms. O. The reader asks, “Don’t you think you should have stopped the presses to get Lenda in?” In reply the editor points out that there is “plenty of Lenda in this” issue. By “plenty of Lenda” the editors apparently mean a feature piece entitled “OOOOHHH, Ms. O!” in which Murray tells readers how she trains her legs, and a brief interview of Murray and another impressive champion, Anja Schreiner, entitled, “Let’s Talk About Women’s Bodybuilding.” This interview, not surprisingly, is advertised in letters which say “Women Talk About Building Sexy MUSCLES” down at the bottom of the red-white-and-blue magazine cover of an issue which highlights iron-pumping in Operation Desert Storm, for which the editors did manage to stop the presses. The cover shows a photo of a huge smiling blonde male flexing in his Starred-and-Striped shorts, with two skinny blonde women in red and blue bikinis clinging to his shoulders (one of the women holds a little American flag at her breast). This trio, in turn, is framed by the title of the month’s “Superfeature”: “USA MILITARY MUSCLE: How the Navy Seals, Combat Pilots, Ground Forces Toughen Up Thru Bodybuiding.”

     

    This superfeature publishes a barrage of photos which were sent to the magazine by its many fans in every branch of Operation Desert Storm (all of whom, except one, were men) who managed to lift, press, and squat weights made of concrete, sand, and iron when not otherwise engaged. In the midst of all this macho hype, however, Bill Dobbins, longtime muscle writer, sounds a sane note or two, one of which reminds us that, while men’s bodybuilding continues to reflect those patriarchal values we assume to have prevailed among cavemen, women’s bodybuilding continues quietly to evolve. On the last page of the issue, entitled “The Champ: Bev Francis,” Dobbins reminds us of the controversy “regarding the muscles-versus-femininity question in bodybuilding for women” which greeted the appearance on the bodybuilding stage of this former professional dancer and world-champion powerlifter. Dobbins, writing for the Weider organization, cannot criticize the 1983 decision filmed in Pumping Iron II–after all, “for ultimate power and excellence, she [Francis] uses the Weider Principles”–but he does claim that her finally winning the World Pro title in 1987 was a milestone in the sport. That was the day, Dobbins writes, when “the controversy ended” and the principle “‘may the best bodybuilder win’ became the rule of the day, rather than ‘we can’t let the sport go in this direction’” (toward the “manlike” woman Bev Francis), “when the judges clearly opted for the aesthetics of bodybuilding over other and often irrelevant standards of female beauty.”

     

    Lenda Murray is evidence that, at least at the highest levels, Dobbins may begin to be right. In the prefatory remarks to his account of Murray’s leg-training methods, Dobbins, clearly awestruck, can’t help but point out that– given her tiny waist, her “exaggerated V-shape” and “shockingly wide, well-developed lats,” the dramatic sweep of her thighs as curved “as a pair of parentheses” with hamstrings to match–Murray resembles no less an athlete than Sergio Oliva, Mr. Olympia 1967-69 and Arnold’s “legendary adversary.” This comparison would be high praise for anyone, but is astonishing–a first–for a woman. Okay, so women are twenty years behind the men; but who cares, when they are closing the gap? Surely the men cannot continue to increase in mass from year to year at the accustomed rate now that drug testing is becoming more routine. True, as “everyone knows,” steroids are still used widely by both men and women, and both know how to clean up their bloodstreams shortly before a contest in order to avoid detection. Nevertheless, methods of detection are improving. Two years ago drug-testing of women began at the Miss Olympia competition, and this year the men were tested for the first time. Officials claim that in the near future they will initiate random drug testing throughout the year in order to bar users from competition. But because men have relied on drugs far longer and far more than women, and have used them to widen the gap between the genders rather than narrow it, the differences between serious male and female competitors will likely continue to shrink.

     

    This will be the case, though, only if women manage to free themselves from the judgemental category of “femininity” which, Dobbins’s sanguine prognostications to the contrary, competitors and judges continue to invoke. In his article on Schreiner and Murray, Jerry Brainum mentions that both women continue to notice that others’ reactions to their physiques range from “curiosity to admiration to disgust.” “You can’t expect to extract the idea of femininity from the judging process in a women’s bodybuilding contest,” says Lenda; Anja agrees that “old stereotypes die hard.” What do they think of these stereotypes? They don’t say. Neither wants to appear freaky, but both thrive on the herculean effort and spartan self-discipline the sport requires of both men and women. Perhaps in the future physiological differences between individuals will figure more prominently than aesthetic differences between the genders.

     

    Different blood levels of sex hormones like estrogen and testosterone, for example, do cause individuals’ rates and ratios of muscle growth and fat reduction to vary– hormonal variations which, like the quantity and location of an individual’s “fast-twitch muscle fibres,” figure among the physiological factors vaguely designated by the term “genetics.” In the gym someone will inevitably and reverentially say, for instance, that Arnold Schwarzenegger has “great genetics” or, self-deprecatingly, that one’s own back won’t grow because of inferior “genetics.” “Genetics,” like hormone levels and willpower, vary within the sexes as well as between them, however, so that there is no reason to assume that we have yet seen the “ultimate” physique, whatever that might be. Still, this fantasy of, and reverence for, superior “genetics” is certainly one of bodybuilding’s several Nazi-esque qualities. Others include a kind of superrace (not just superhero) mentality which, especially if the builder in question is stoked on steroids or crazed by radical dieting, can provoke snickering sneering snarling growling or worse directed at anyone whose existence could in any way be construed as coming between him and his rightful greatness, let alone between him and his image in the mirror. (I once heard “Mr. Virginia” bark at a woman who sauntered across his line of vision: “GET THE FUCK OUT OF MY MIRROR.”)

     

    Beneath the superrace mentality, with its need to believe in absolute difference between the one and the zero, there lurks, as one might expect, the fetishist’s fearful wish that there may finally be no difference after all between the sexes. Without question, relative to the cultural norms of masculine and feminine bodies, the female builder masculinizes herself. But why does no one ever mention that the muscular male physique athlete feminizes himself to a degree? Consider the curvaceous pectoral mounds of the well-developed male chest; the round “muscle bellies” of powerful male biceps; the firm meaty thighs and spherical buttocks of the man who can squat heavy. And how about the hairless, well-lubricated flesh some of the men sport year-round, but with which all male competitors must emerge on contest day? Above all, what about the devotion with which the male bodybuilder strives to embody a set of ideal categories–symmetry, proportion, muscularity–for the acknowledgement of which he offers himself to a panel who objectify him in just those terms? Does he not feel feminized in the process?

     

    Over the years I’ve asked various male builders these questions, and I’ve never received an answer more direct than a narrowed gaze and a “How the FUCK should I know?” Sam Fussell, who is in a sense my younger, WASP, Ivy League, analog, answers this question in his book Muscle: Confessions of an Unlikely Bodybuilder, when at the end of Chapter 10 he shares with his readers the most humiliating moment in his career in iron. This moment comes when he fails to “Explode!” on cue at the Rose City Bench-Press Extravaganza, and thereby takes last place in his 242-lb. weight class, an over-subscribed class for which the contest promoters quickly run out of trophies. When Fussell walks to the podium to receive his last-place men’s trophy, what he gets is much worse: a sympathetic pat on the rump, and “a plaque on which were inscribed in gold plate the words: “Women 148 lbs: First Place.” “At last,” writes Fussell pathetically, “I had a trophy to tell me just who and what I was.” A woman! For shame! And after all that work too. (Poor baby.)

     

    On the other hand one of Fussell’s best moments occurs at a bodybuilding contest when he walks offstage after performing his posing routine, to be welcomed by his friend Vinnie: “Oh, Sam. . . You looked like a human fucking penis! Veins were poppin’ every which way!” In all fairness, I should add here that I spoke the very same words to my own mirrored reflection in about 1985, which may indicate that this fantasy of sexual indifferentiation is a two-way street. What is not a two-way street is the manner in which bodybuilding conceals the fantasy of sexual indifferentiation behind a whole vocabulary of aesthetic discriminations applied only to men, discriminations which recast difference as a repertory of typecast cliches, while women are still dealing with that single over-determined choice between “femininity” and freakiness. Men, on the other hand, to take examples again from this month’s Muscle and Fitness, train like animals (from a piece on powerbuilding), re-invent nature (from Weider’s editorial), and exceed the classical ideals of the Greeks themselves (from a piece on free weights vs. machines).

     

    Typically, the discourse of male bodybuilding grinds these axes together in the most simpleminded way, in the hope simultaneously of doing, out-doing, and re-doing each, separately, and together: nature, technology, classicism. To take a consummate example, in an article called “The Art of Arm Training,” by Frenchman Francis Benfatto, as told to Julian Schmidt, Benfatto claims that “hardwired into the genes of every Frenchman” is an artistic sense which “influences [their] perceptions of everything from Hellenistic art to bodybuilding.” These artistic genes were set off in him, he claims, when he rode horses in his youth and fell in love with their “sweeping muscularity,” a love Flaubert’s words explain best: “‘In art there is nothing without form.’” Whether he is contemplating his whole physique or only his arms, Benfatto explains, he always applies his Flaubertian love of form to every aspect of bodybuilding because, as Voltaire said, bodybuilding is as much an art as the Mona Lisa or Venus de Milo. (Well, actually, I left out a line or two here in between Voltaire and the Mona Lisa, but I swear I did not add a word.)

     

    The judging of bodybuilding competitions, unlike powerflifting or Olympic lifting, depends on categorical aesthetic evaluations. In a powerlifting or Olympic meet, the winner is determined either by how much weight he or she lifts relative to other competitors in the same weight class, or by means of a fixed formula which shows how much weight he or she moved relative to his or her body weight. In a bodybuilding meet there are still no such objective standards, leaving room for the kinds of psychological and aesthetic bias I’ve been discussing. Bodybuilding promoters are increasingly aware of how arbitrary this makes their sport look, and how this subjective bias undermines their claims that bodybuilding is a sport and not just an art. For all their hifalutin language about the art of bodybuilding, promoters still harbor a wish for bodybuilding to be included among the Olympic sports. This hardly seems possible, however, as long as competitors are judged qualitatively rather than quantitatively and subjectively rather than objectively. Accordingly, the Weider people now offer what they call an “Ideal Proportion Chart” with instructions–based on one’s bodyweight per inch of height, and on the measurement in inches of one’s neck, biceps, forearm, chest, waist, hips, thigh, and calf–on how to set one’s training goals. How did they come up with these measurements? They don’t let on; they don’t say whether these “ideal proportions” are derived from Praxiteles, da Vinci, or Bob Paris, whose photo graces this feature article. It is probably safe to assume, however, that the measurements were not derived from Lenda Murray. A note above the chart comments that “women bodybuilders may have to adjust measurements in the area of the hips, waist and chest, depending on build.” The Ideal Proportions, in other words (surprise, surprise) are merely those of some man or other. I can’t help thinking, however, that, as brutal, cruel, cryptic and comical as this Chart seems, by implementing it, bodybuilding, despite itself, might be doing women a favor.

     

  • Bulldozing the Subject

    Elizabeth A. Wheeler

    University of California, Berkeley

     

    Cut #1: Mudanzas

     

    When I hear the word “postmodernism” I see white people moving into the neighborhood and brown people having to move out.

     

    My friend Tinkerbell from Tustin and I used to live in an apartment building wedged between a condominium and a tenement. We went to an open house in the condominium; the units sold for $275,000-$300,000 apiece. It looked like the QE II. The architect had added portholes, interior vistas, and pink balustrades. I went out on the balcony of the penthouse. Through the pink railings I saw a moving truck below, a small local one with “Mudanzas” painted on the side, the kind that carries Puerto Rican families further out from the city where they can still afford to live.

     

    When I hear postmodernism I see pink balustrades in the foreground with a gray truck behind them. Not the balustrades alone, but also the changes–the mudanzas.

     

    It is no accident that the Brooklyn Academy of Music, showcase for the latest postmodern compositions, defines one edge of a neighborhood called Park Slope, a neighborhood formerly working-class but now home to young professionals. It is no accident that the Temporary Contemporary museum of art in Los Angeles is housed in a renovated factory a block from Skid Row. It is no accident that postmodern architecture imprints itself most firmly on the urban landscape in the form of upmarket shopping malls. Postmodernism and gentrification are partners in joint venture.

     

    “. . . the scenario of work is there to conceal the fact that the work-real, the production real, has disappeared,” writes Jean Baudrillard (Simulations 47). He is wrong in thinking that production has vanished from the face of the earth; it has instead moved to the Third World. He is right in touching on the unreality of life in postindustrial cities.

     

    It is thus extremely naive to look for ethnology among the Savages or in some Third World--it is here, everywhere, in the metropolis, among the whites, in a world completely catalogued and analysed and then artificially revived as though real . . . (16)

     

     

    I write this essay towards an ethnology of postmodernism. It starts with an image of a city street: Melrose Avenue in Los Angeles. On Melrose, a district of stylish boutiques, there is a store painted in Day-Glo colors and stenciled with skulls like the Mexican images used in celebrating el Dia de los Muertos, the day of the dead. The store is extremely successful and has counterparts in many American cities. It specializes in `kitsch’ artifacts: sequin picture frames, pink flamingoes, Barbie lunch boxes, but particularly inexpensive Mexican religious articles. As Baudrillard says, consumer culture needs to “stockpile the past in plain view” (19). The store has a day-of-the-dead quality: when the plastic dashboard Virgins go up on the shelves next to the plaster Elvises, pop nostalgia renders every icon equivalent. The experience of shopping there seems to have the power to cancel out the real experience of growing up Chicano/a and Catholic. “For ethnology to live, its object must die”–“. . . the sign as reversion and death sentence of every reference” (13, 11).

     

    I feel a guilty fascination for the store because it looks very much like my own aesthetic. I have always loved bright colors, colors that looked garish in my parents’ suburban home with its white walls, white curtains, white dishes. And for years I have collected Mexican religious articles, sneaking into botanicas where no one spoke English, hoping they wouldn’t divine the irreligious, “inauthentic” uses to which I planned to put such items. When I walk into the store on Melrose, I see my own secret life as a kitsch consumer exposed.

     

    I like to think, however, that there is more going on between me and my Virgins of Guadalupe than my making fun of them. With their angels and showers of roses, I find them beautiful and redemptive. They speak to my desire to connect with the powerful symbols of another culture, and my Protestant longing for a spirituality that has festive colors and a Mother in it. My taste also has an element of defiance: when I was growing up in Southern California, Mexicans were regarded as lower than us whites, and with the exception of `genuine’ folk art, so was their culture.

     

    Postmodernism is all about theft and transformation, as for instance my `inauthentic’ use of the Virgin of Guadalupe. Here are the successive phases of the postmodern image:

     

    -the image is part of a culture, and used by that
    culture with straightforward enjoyment;
    -the image is rejected as tacky, part of an
    outmoded past to be left behind;
    -the image is resuscitated and used defiantly,
    ironically, self-consciously, often as part of a
    new chic.

     

     

    Imagine the store on Melrose again. Now there is a low rider cruising down the avenue, carrying a Chicano couple dressed in the latest youth fashion. The car has a beautiful turquoise and red metallic paint job. It has a plastic Virgin on the dashboard. But there is a crucial difference between the car and the store.

     

    Unlike Baudrillard, I believe that postmodern thefts and transformations do not have to kill the culture to which they refer. A Mexican-American can fragment, reappropriate, reconstruct “Mexicanness” for herself or himself, and help to define what it means to be Mexican. This variety of postmodernism maintains a relationship with a living community; it is not an autopsy on dead referents. In this paper I will describe two postmodernisms, one informal and personal, one heavily capitalized and imposed from outside. I will spend much of my time criticizing the ways French postmodern theory reinforces the cynical logic of kitsch consumerism.

     

    Intolerance is the hallmark of dogma. While postmodern theory, particularly of the French sort, claims to have no “metanarrative,” it reveals its dogmatism by only tolerating certain readings of itself. If Baudrillard refuses to ask or answer moral questions, then perversely I want to view him as a moralist. In Simulations: The Precession of Simulacra, he describes the death of the referent:

     

    -it is the reflection of a basic reality
    -it masks and perverts a basic reality
    -it masks the absence of a basic reality
    -it bears no relation to any reality whatsoever:
    it is its own pure simulacrum. (11)

     

    What if we read Baudrillard’s scale not as descriptive but as proscriptive, as a hierarchy of values? Those of us who still believe in realities, however fragmented, contested, and multiple, can then be dismissed as unprogressive, as “naive and cognitively immature” (Gilligan 30).1

     

    How could this postmodern scale of values inform the ethnology of a particular city: Los Angeles? Baudrillard begins with the idea that “what draws the crowds” to Disneyland is not so much the entry into fantastic worlds as the “miniaturised and religious revelling in real America” (23). He immediately moves beyond an ideological analysis to a far more sweeping commentary:

     

    Disneyland is presented as imaginary in order to make us believe that the rest is real, when in fact all of Los Angeles and the America surrounding it are no longer real, but of the order of the hyperreal and of simulation. It is no longer a question of a false representation of reality (ideology), but of concealing the fact that the real is no longer real, and thus of saving the reality-principle . . . Los Angeles is encircled by these "imaginary stations" which feed reality, reality-energy, to a town whose mystery is precisely that it is nothing more than a network of endless, unreal circulation--a town of fabulous proportions, but without space or dimensions . . . this town, which is nothing more than an immense script and a perpetual motion picture, needs this old imaginary made up of childhood signals and faked phantasms for its sympathetic nervous system. (25, 26)

     

    Anyone who has ever tried to get around Los Angeles without a car knows how real it is, how mired in `space and dimensions,’ how cruel to the poor. In promoting the unreality of Los Angeles, Baudrillard does the cops’ dirty work. Because it is the most segmented of American cities, it is possible for the mayor to instruct the police to round up homeless people with bulldozers and drive them into camps without shade or adequate sanitation. It is possible to grow up middle-class a few miles from Skid Row and never see a homeless person. The myth of Los Angeles as a fabulous unreality justifies the quiet elimination of its less-than- fabulous, all-too-real aspects.

     

    Richard Rorty speaks of the “strand in contemporary French thought” that “starts off from suspicion of Marx and Freud, suspicion of the masters of suspicion, suspicion of `unmasking’” (161). By itself, an ideological analysis of Los Angeles would remain impoverished. However, without the intellectual tool of unmasking, there is no suffering to uncover. Without awareness of power, it is the powerless who disappear.

     

    Postmodern architecture plays a concrete role in the disappearance of the unwanted `referent.’ At 515 East 6th Street on Skid Row, there is a soup kitchen and shelter called the Weingardt Center. Elegantly renovated in postmodern style, the building has WPA gargoyles and goddesses of work augmented with medieval banners and tastefully framed reproductions of modern art. Maxine Johnston, director of the Center, does not allow her patrons to form a soup line in front of the building. It would spoil the look. Instead, they line up around the corner, in front of the ugly building where my friend Tinkerbell works.

     

    Johnston’s penchant for postmodern decor and her harshness towards homeless people are more than individual eccentricities. They form part of a pattern. The City of Los Angeles has devoted well over twenty million dollars to a redevelopment agency called SRO, Inc., which agency purchases Single Resident Occupancy hotels, renovates and postmodernizes them. At 5th and San Julian, the hardest corner of Skid Row, a flophouse has been elaborately double- coded. It has neon signs in Old West, Victorian style. It has yuppie colors of mauve, pale green and beige. It has security guards everywhere.

     

    On the morning of its rededication, Andy Robeson, director of SRO, Inc., stood outside the hotel with Mayor Tom Bradley. Robeson waved his hand across the panorama of 5th and San Julian, the street life, the raw deals, the people sleeping on the sidewalk. He turned to the mayor. “This has gotta go,” he said. Now bulldozers sweep 5th and San Julian three times a week; Robeson is agitating to make it every day.

     

    How can it be said that the palest icon, the smallest neon-Victorian curlicue, enables and justifies the displacement of real people? Jochen Schulte-Sasse writes that to comprehend postmodernism we have to examine the “flow of capitalized images” (130). While modernism depends upon ideologically-charged, closed narratives, postmodernism relies on “the immediately transparent visual situation. Owning such images is capital, and the capital they represent reflects the capital that is invested in them. Every political campaign reveals the situation anew” (Schulte-Sasse 139). In this well-financed, officially sanctioned Solution to Homelessness, the transparency of the neon sign makes it an excellent mask. The sign resembles Reagan/Bush’s image of the family–glowing, oversimplified, easy to read. Its readability distracts us from lived experience. It steals from our mouths the vocabulary we need to describe anger, family breakdown, the failure of all Solutions to Homelessness.

     

    Henceforth, it is the map that precedes the territory--PRECESSION OF SIMULACRA--it is the map that engenders the territory and if we were to revive the fable today, it would be the territory whose shreds are slowly rotting across the map. (Baudrillard 2)

     

    Postmodern architecture is highly appropriate to the Los Angeles landscape. Its pastels and fanciful details are analogous to the thousands of stucco bungalows built in Los Angeles in the 1920’s and 1930’s. Both architectural forms represent certain middle-class dreams, but they also differ in worldview.

     

    Although built to look like a miniature castle, hacienda, mosque or Tudor cottage, the stucco bungalow can be called modernist. Families shut the doors of their dreamhouses and imagine themselves into a narrative, a tale of their freedom out West, their escape from an extended family and messy history back East.

     

    In contrast, a postmodern residence is not a fictive universe. It is a surface, oddly two-dimensional, meant to be scanned rather than lived in. “It seems to me that the essay (Montaigne) is postmodern, while the fragment (The Athaeneum) is modern,” Lyotard writes (81). A postmodern building bears a very strong resemblance to an essay. It usually has the strong verticals and horizontals of the printed page and of the modern skyscraper. “Quotations” from past architectures are inserted into this format.

     

    The art of quotation serves many purposes. Particularly characteristic of postmodernism is a blank parody, in which it is impossible to determine the attitude of the citer towards the citation (Jameson 118). Despite this frequent indeterminacy of attitude, quotation in postmodern architecture serves the same function it serves in the essay: it invokes authority. Strangely enough, Linda Hutcheon sees the quotation of classical motifs as a populist gesture. Under her definition of “populism,” the Roman Empire was populist because almost everyone was subject to its authority:

     

    Like all parody, postmodernist architecture can certainly be elitist, if the codes necessary for its comprehension are not shared by both encoder and decoder. But the frequent use of a very common and easily recognized idiom--often that of classicism--works to combat such exclusiveness. (200)

     

    Architects, artists, planners and developers read postmodern theory and put it into postmodern practice. Hutcheon goes so far as to valorize postmodern architects as “activists, the voices of the users” (8). The user can mean the inhabitant, or it can mean the perpetrator of an abuse. What happens when urban planning is done by people who believe there is no subject?

     

    Cut #2: It Will Be "White" Like One of Malevitch's Squares

     

    I was talking with my friend Paul Lopes about the postmodern fragmentation of the "subject," the concept of the individual human doer or creator in Western philosophy. Paul said it reminded him of cults. The first job of a cult is to break down your previous identity and make you distrust it. "But they don't leave it fragmented," he said. "They give you a new identity to take its place--one they choose for you."

     

     

    While Baudrillard and Lyotard may genuinely believe in the death of the subject, most people do not. Maxine Johnston and Andy Robeson, for example, still believe in a referent. There is a reality out there they wish to manage into submission, and they use postmodern architecture cynically to help them do so. To invoke conspiracy theory, the death of a homeless `subject’ creates a vacuum that can be filled by a `subject’ with a better credit rating. Returning to the cult analogy, identity does not stay fragmented–another identity rushes in to take its place. “We have seen that there is a way in which postmodernism replicates or reproduces–reinforces–the logic of consumer capitalism; the more significant question is whether there is also a way in which it resists that logic. But that is a question we must leave open” (Jameson 125).

     

    In “What is Postmodernism?” Lyotard describes his ideal aesthetic of sublime painting. Again, if we view him as moralist as well as narrator, this process of “making it impossible to see” reads as deliberate erasure of the subject. The critic learns to look the other way when he hears bulldozers coming. Since those most likely to be erased are people of color, when Lyotard says his ideal is “white” I take him at his word.

     

    It will be "white" like one of Malevitch's squares; it will enable us to see only by making it impossible to see; it will please only by causing pain. (78)

     

    French postmodern theorists in general, Lyotard and Baudrillard in particular, embrace the role of pain in knowledge. The impulse is paralleled by the sadomasochism in much postmodern literature and film. Both Baudrillard and Lyotard describe terror with a steady indifference. Richard Rorty comments on this philosophical `dryness’ which descends from Foucault:

     

    It takes no more than a squint of the inner eye to read Foucault as a stoic, a dispassionate observer of the present social order, rather than its concerned critic. . . . It is this remoteness which reminds one of the conservative who pours cold water on hopes for reform, who affects to look at the problems of his fellow-citizens with the eye of the future historian. Writing "the history of the present," rather than suggestions about how our children might inhabit a better world in the future, gives up not just on the notion of a common human nature, and on that of "the subject," but on our untheoretical sense of social solidarity. It is as if thinkers like Foucault and Lyotard were so afraid of being caught up in one more metanarrative about the fortunes of "the subject" that they cannot bring themselves to say "we" long enough to identify with the culture of the generation to which they belong. (172)

     

    Baudrillard observes in a dispassionate footnote:

     

    From now on, it is impossible to ask the famous question:

     

    "From what position do you speak?"--
    "How do you know?"--
    "From where do you get the power?,"

     
    without immediately getting the reply: "But it is of (from) you that I speak"--meaning, it is you who speaks, it is you who knows, power is you. A gigantic circumlocution, circumlocution of the spoken word, which amounts to irredeemable blackmail and irremovable deterrence of the subject supposed to speak. . . . (77-78)

     

    My first reaction to the above passage is an untheoretical and wordless rage. It is the anger every woman must have experienced, the feeling of being charged with our own victimization. (“Let’s rape his daughter and see how he talks then,” Tink says as she passes through the room.) In this explication Baudrillard calls for the end of dualistic thought, a central postmodernist project: “The medium/message confusion, of course, is a correlative of the confusion between sender and receiver, thus sealing the disappearance of all the dual, polar structures which formed the discursive organization of language, referring to the celebrated grid of functions in Jakobson. . . .” (76).

     

    The critique of dualism was a feminist project before it was a postmodern one. Adrienne Rich:

     

    The rejection of the dualism, of the positive- negative polarities between which most of our intellectual training has taken place, has been an undercurrent of feminist thought. And, rejecting them, we reaffirm the existence of all those who have through the centuries been negatively defined: not only women, but the "untouchable," the "unmanly," the "nonwhite," the "illiterate": the "invisible." Which forces us to confront the problem of the essential dichotomy: power/powerlessness. (48)

     

    Ironically, Baudrillard uses the critique to an opposite end. While the feminist wants to reveal the “invisible,” to expose the power relations inherent in dualism–white over black, male over female, gentry over homeless–Baudrillard maintains that without dualism power relations simply disappear. That is, if a conversation is not organized in binary oppositions, it becomes completely disordered. However, there are other ways to critique the dualism of structural linguistics. For instance, in “The Problem of Speech Genres,” Mikhail Bakhtin maintains that a conversation is ordered not in sentence parts a la Roman Jakobson, but according to the shifts in speaking subjects. Therefore it is still possible to ask, “From what position do you speak?” Speaking “of” me does not mean speaking “(from)” me.

     

    We cannot sufficiently counter the dryness of Baudrillard’s logic without invoking the category of experience. When Baudrillard speaks through the voice of the media or of the nuclear arms race, he speaks of “the inconsequential violence that reigns throughout the world, of the aleatory contrivance of every choice which is made for us.” Violence is inconsequential unless it happens to you. Baudrillard’s indifference reveals the comfort of his own position. For the man who has his freedom, freedom is unimportant, both personally and theoretically. Black South Africans know that freedom is real because they do not have it. A woman unwillingly pregnant who cannot obtain an abortion knows choice is real because she does not have it. When Baudrillard writes that “prisons are there to conceal the fact that it is the social in its entirety, in its banal omnipresence, which is carceral” (25), we know for certain he has never been to jail.

     

    Baudrillard’s mission seems to be to make us accept the blank fact of terror. His work contains seeds of contempt for those who refuse to accept the horror of the world. This rubric marks out a diverse group, from people who desire the comfort of realist art, to those who fight for political change. For Baudrillard, to insist on the category of reality is to be in collusion with the powers- that-be. Lyotard’s contempt for the realist is even more blatant. His sublime painting will “impart no knowledge about reality (experience)”; he disparages realist art forms like commercial photography and film, whose job is “to stabilize the referent” and to “enable the addressee . . . to arrive quickly at the consciousness of his own identity”: “The painter and the novelist must refuse to lend themselves to such therapeutic uses” (78, 74).

     

    Beneath his contempt lies the assumption that people cannot detect the harshness of their own experience and must have it explained to them. When Lyotard uses the word “therapeutic” disparagingly, he dismisses the role of the artist as healer. It never occurs to him that the viewers, the “patients,” may have experienced more horror than he will ever know.

     

    While realism is the dominant style of commercial media, the media do not have the deep stake in reality- effects both Lyotard and Baudrillard attribute to them. Television eats up postmodernism along with any other style available to it. Therefore, parody is not intrinsically subversive, as Baudrillard would claim. A postmodern segment of “Mighty Mouse,” with fragments of 1940’s episodes cut out of their narratives, edited by visual and rhythmic analogy, and set to a 1960’s soul song, is no more or less subversive than any other kiddie cartoon.

     

    Jochen Schulte-Sasse makes an important refinement on the realism argument in pointing out the “simultaneity of the non-simultaneous” between modernism and post-modernism. He remarks that neoconservative politics uses both modes, making a modernist call for “authority” and “values” while engaging in a brilliant postmodern manipulation of images. Schulte-Sasse sees this vacillation as a weakness, “one reason why neoconservatism is likely to remain a transitory phenomenon.” I see it as neoconservatism’s strength: it has managed to win on both fronts, to appeal to the conscience while “colonizing the id” (145). The avant-garde, the State, or the television network can use either mode to any purpose.

     

    Lyotard’s championship of the avant-garde sounds curiously outdated: an anxious Baudelaire in his day made an almost identical argument for painting against photography. Lyotard assumes that there is no creativity outside the artistic bohemia and that the vernacular is by nature reactionary. This is a common academic failing. In Rocking Around the Clock: Music Television, Postmodernism, and Consumer Culture, E. Ann Kaplan sees only two options: either commercial mass media generated by corporations, or the avant-garde. Similarly, for Laura Mulvey there is only the dominating “male gaze” of Hollywood movies, or a quite unwatchable Brechtian cinema.

     

    Lyotard decries the contemporary process of increasing eclecticism and kitsch: ” . . . one listens to reggae, watches a western, eats MacDonalds food for lunch and local cuisine for dinner, wears Paris cologne in Tokyo and “retro” clothes in Hong Kong; knowledge is a matter for TV games . . . But this realism of the `anything goes’ is in fact that of money; in the absence of aesthetic criteria, it remains possible and useful to assess the value of works of art according to the profits they yield” (76).

     

    Lyotard helps to promote the process he decries. “The desire for the sublime makes one want to cut free from the words of the tribe,” Rorty writes (175). To deny the identity of a creative community is to help the media steal its products without acknowledgment. “Local tone” is one of the reality-effects Lyotard likes to see undermined by avant-garde art (79). “Local tone” is the first quality stripped away by the commercial media.

     

    A rap song by the African American group Salt’n’Pepa is postmodern in form–a montage of cuts from past musics–and very New York in feeling. When the same beat occurs in a candy commercial on TV, there is nothing black or local about it. In the age of cannibalization, “to cut free from the words of the tribe” is to cut the tribe free of its own words.

     

    In seeking to “activate the differences and save the honor of the name,” Lyotard apparently desires the inclusion of new and varied voices in our definition of culture (80). However, if he rejects narratives of struggle and liberation, much of Third World writing goes out the window again. For instance, Cherrie Moraga’s Loving in the War Years could be and has been called a postmodern autobiography, because of the montage of genres within the text; the ways sexuality and race are always constructed, never taken as givens; and her constant play between fragmentation and a unified self. Nonetheless, Moraga is also a self-declared “movement writer,” a Chicana lesbian feminist who keeps faith with the ideals of liberation (v). To use her image without her ideas is a reprehensible theft.

     

    Furthermore, current postmodern theory could never come to terms with her insistence on experience, emotion, and direct speech. Moraga’s sometime collaborator Gloria Anzaldua could be speaking of Lyotard when she warns other women:

     

    Bow down to the sacred bull, form. Put frames and metaframes around the writing. Achieve distance in order to win the coveted title "literary writer" or "professional writer." Above all do not be simple, direct, nor immediate. (167)

     

    In postmodernity it is indeed possible, as Lyotard writes, “to assess the value of works of art according to the profits they yield” (17). Price is the only difference between a plastic Virgin of Guadalupe for sale on Melrose Avenue or in a botanica in East Los Angeles. There is a 50% markup for ironic distance. If pop culture becomes art, the critic will have to work harder to redifferentiate herself or himself from the vulgar masses. Hence the writing style of a Lyotard: the invocation of classicism, the return to Kant, the resuscitation of Longinus’ sublime and the traditional genre of the defense of poetry. The “lower” the culture, the “higher” the theory.

     

    The anxious intellectual puts theory ahead of artistic practice; in fact, he or she attempts to make all of human experience look like an example of postmodern theory. This is evident in postmodern approaches to Third World and/or feminist discourses. It is not only a matter of claiming such discourses for postmodernism; it is a matter of approving such discourses because they are postmodern. This somehow establishes their worth. Craig Owens:

     

    Still, if one of the most salient aspects of our postmodern culture is the presence of an insistent feminist voice (and I use the terms presence and voice advisedly), theories of postmodernism have tended either to neglect or to repress that voice . . . I would like to propose, however, that women's insistence on difference and incommensurability may not only be compatible with, but also an instance of postmodern thought. (61-62)

     

    William Boelhower:

     

    This new ethnic pragmatics . . . in the very act of reflecting on its own limits, will discover the very strategies that make the ethnic verbum a major filter for reading the modern and so-called postmodern experience not as a universal condition but as a historical construct. (120)

     

    George Lipsitz:

     

    But ethnic minority cultures play an important role in this postmodern culture. Their exclusion from political power and cultural recognition has enabled them to cultivate a sophisticated capacity for ambiguity, juxtaposition, and irony–all key qualities in the postmodern aesthetic. (159)

     

     

    As Richard Rorty points out, this intellectual anxiety has to do with the difficulty of being part of one’s own generation. The middle-class members of the post-World War II generation grew up in splendid isolation. In the United States we lived in suburban utopias, deliberately shielded from urban strife and any kind of past. In Europe, especially in Germany, cities were rebuilt out of concrete and the past was paved over. Suburbanization made us stupid. I think of Dustin Hoffman in the film The Graduate (1968), floating aimlessly in his parents’ pool. Barbara Ehrenreich:

     

    A generation ago, for example, hordes of white people fled the challenging, interracial atmosphere of the cities and settled in whites- only suburbs . . . . Cut off from the mainstream of humanity, we came to believe that pink is "flesh-color," that mayonnaise is a nutrient, and that Barry Manilow is a musician. (20)

     

    In Wim Wenders’ 1974 film Wrong Move, Rudiger Vogler wanders through the concrete wasteland of a bedroom town outside Frankfurt:

     

    Statt verzweifelt zu werden spurte ich nur, dass ich immer dummer wurde, und dass ich die wirklich verzweifelten um mich herum nur dumm anschauen konnte. Trotzdem bewegte ich mich durch die zubetonnierte Landschaft als sei ich noch immer der, der alles erlitte--der Held. [Instead of becoming desperate, I sensed that I was becoming stupider, and that I could only stare dumbly at the really desperate people around me. In spite of this, I moved though the concrete landscape as if I were still the one who suffered everything--the hero.]

     

     

    By the mid-seventies the critique of suburbanized culture was in full swing. In the face of feminism and immigration of ethnic groups, the white male subject becomes worried that he is not the hero of the story anymore. This anxiety has also to do with the gentrification that started in the 1980s. When members of the suburban middle class moved back into the city, into areas such as Kreuzberg in West Berlin and downtown Los Angeles, which had been home to working-class immigrants and other minorities, we learned to negotiate a multi-cultural reality.

     

    Many critics before me have pointed out the irony that, just as previously-silenced, darker-skinned, non-Western, female subjects begin to make themselves heard, the white European male declares “the death of the subject.” I do not want to dwell on that irony here, particularly since I want to affirm that postmodernism is not a sham but a real process, a central part of our creative lives. It is its theoretization and some of its official uses which are inadequate and destructive.

     

    Cut #3: Lawrence Welk Goes PoMo

     

    Deep in the heart of the Midwest, I am watching a rerun of “The Lawrence Welk Show.” I experience the deep spinal tingle of the “certification effect,” as that most Midwestern of television shows doubles for and validates the Midwest itself.2

     

    I try to shove down my hilarity in front of my grandfather. It strikes me that the show isn’t “realist” at all; it suffers from a mannerism so extreme it makes Parmigiano look like Norman Rockwell. Simulated faces a la Baudrillard: ” . . . they are already purged of death, and even better than in life; more smiling, more authentic, in light of their model, like the faces in funeral parlors” (23).

     

    My grandmother, now in a nursing home, was wildly in love with Lawrence Welk. My parents and I used to watch the show to make fun of it. Although we kept up our running ironic patter in front of the screen, over the years the show became a weirdly affirmative bonding ritual for the three of us. As I watch now, it scares me to realize how much of this Midwestern ethic I have absorbed: the sentimentality, the enforced niceness, the determination to not `go over anybody’s head.’

     

    When my parents moved out to Los Angeles after World War II, much of their Michigan past got erased. The more plebeian parts in particular got untold night after night at the dinner table. I have had to reconstruct them for myself with the help of this horrendous videotape.

     

    However, this is not a simulation; Lawrence Welk does not replace or erase me or my family. This odd archeology, this true-and-false process of calling myself a Midwesterner, exists in a set of relationships. There is my desire to remember what my grandmother liked, and was like, before her strokes. There is the smartaleck sense of humor I share with my parents. Out of the tacky pieces of my family, out of the worst of American culture, I am building a self.

     

    I propose a double model for postmodernism. The official variety, the postmodernism of the development corporation and the dead referent, I call classical postmodernism. I name the variety after its reliance on classical motifs in architecture and in the essay; however, I also have in mind Bakhtin’s distinction between the classical and the grotesque (in Rabelais and His World). For me as for him, classical art suffers because it is polished and finished off, denying its origins in unofficial popular art. A TV commercial or avant-garde monologue could be equally classical in their denial of origins. I see postmodernism as a creativity that begins in people’s living rooms and automobiles and then makes its way to Documenta and the Brooklyn Academy of Music.

     

    The second variety I call messy, vital postmodernism after Robert Venturi, who wrote the first postmodernist manifesto: “I am for messy vitality over obvious unity” (16). This postmodernism is not ashamed of its relationship to popular culture and the vernacular. George Lipsitz is quite right in commenting that pop music leads high art in the use of postmodern forms:

     

    It is on the level of commodified mass culture that the most popular, and often the most profound, acts of cultural bricolage take place. The destruction of established canons and the juxtaposition of seemingly inappropriate forms that characterize the self-conscious postmodernism of "high culture" have long been staples of commodified popular culture. (161)

     

    While Lipsitz is writing on Chicano rock’n’roll, I know the truth of his statement through my own work on hiphop music. A three-minute hiphop track epitomizes the postmodern art of quotation. In a high-speed electronic theft the DJ may combine cuts from Funkadelic, Kraftwerk, Mozart, Evelyn “Champagne” King, spaghetti Westerns and Senate testimony. Usually this is the low-affect quotation characteristic of postmodernism. Sometimes, however, you can discern an attitude towards the material quoted, which leads us to some of the differences between classical and messy, vital postmodernism.

     

    Richard Rorty writes of the Habermas-Lyotard debate:

     

    We could agree with Lyotard that we need no more metanarratives, but with Habermas that we need less dryness. We could agree with Lyotard that studies of the communicative competence of the transhistorical subject are of little use in reinforcing our sense of identification with our community, while still insisting on the importance of that sense. (173)

     

    A community feeling still reverberates in the urban popular musics we can call postmodern. For instance, the beats of James Brown are ubiquitous in hiphop music; the form would not exist without him. Brown even recorded a rap song, “I’m Real,” to call attention to his continued existence in the face of so many copies. When the hiphop composer quotes James Brown, his or her attitude is always reverent. However, the listener cannot detect this reverence from the song alone. It is community-based knowledge. One has to hear people from Harlem or the Bronx talk about Brown and his status in Black music history.

     

    Lipsitz stresses the postmodernism of Chicano rock’n’roll, but also its grounding in the culture’s experience: “. . . this marginal sensibility in music amounts to more than novelty or personal eccentricity; it holds legitimacy and power as the product of a real historical community’s struggle with oppression” (175).

     

    The individual subject is still central in urban popular music, part of a proud resistance against racism. “For [the painter] John Valdez, pachuco imagery retains meaning because it displays `the beauty of a people we have been told are not beautiful.’”3 Here we glance back at Jochen Schulte-Sasse’s “simultaneity of the non- simultaneous” in the combined use of modern and postmodern forms:

     

    The forms of cultural reproduction in modernity were closely linked to a mode of socialization intended to produce strong super-egos, which in turn favored the development of agonistic, competitive individuals with clearly delimited, ideological identities. (126)

     

    This sounds very much like the aggressive stance of the pachuco or the rapper, proclaiming a resolute identity over a postmodern beat. While these figures often topple over into machismo, the same idea of mixed modes could also apply to the feminist Cherrie Moraga. She makes an uneasy, wrenchingly honest attempt at a unified self because she needs to. While fragmentation plays an important role in her work, she does not exalt it. Her subjectivity, her community, have already been fragmented enough.

     

    Postmodernism does not have to bulldoze the subject. I know this because I see what happens in my own living room.

     

    Cut #4: Tinkerbell in Theory:

     

    “Postmodernism? Isn’t that when art becomes an insincere pastiche, instead of a statement from your heart?”

     
    Tinkerbell in Practice:

     
    Tink wants to construct an art installation in the living room. Both Jews and Christians live in our house. A creche appeals to her aesthetically, while Judah Maccabee appeals thematically. Her solution: “Judah meets Jesus.”

     

    Now that’s postmodern.

     

    Notes

     

    1. I am thinking here of Gilligan’s feminist critique of Lawrence Kohlberg’s scale of moral development, which moves from a stress on concrete human relationships upward to an increasing level of abstraction.

     

    2. See Walker Percy, The Moviegoer (New York: Knopf, 1960).

     

    3. Lipsitz 172, quoting Victor Valle, “Chicano Art: An Emerging Generation” (Los Angeles Times, August 7, 1983).

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Anzaldua, Gloria. “Speaking in Tongues: A Letter to Third World Women Writers.” This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color. Eds. Cherrie Moraga and Gloria Anzaldua. New York: Kitchen Table- Women of Color, 1983. 165-173.
    • Bakhtin, Mikhail. Rabelais and His World. Trans. Helene Iswolsky. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1984.
    • Bakhtin, Mikhail. “The Problem of Speech Genres.” In Speech Genres and Other Late Essays. Trans. Vern McGee. Austin: U of Texas P, 1986.
    • Baudrillard, Jean. Simulations: The Precession of Simulacra. Trans. Paul Foss, Paul Patton, and Philip Beitchman. London: Foreign Agents, 1984.
    • Boelhower, William. Through a Glass Darkly: Ethnic Semiosis in American Literature. New York: Oxford UP, 1987.
    • Ehrenreich, Barbara. “The Unbearable Whiteness of Being.” This World. San Francisco Chronicle 10 July 1988: 20.
    • Gilligan, Carol. In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1982.
    • Hutcheon, Linda. “The Politics of Postmodernism: Parody and History.” Cultural Critique 5 (Winter 1986-87). 179-207.
    • Jameson, Fredric. “Postmodernism and Consumer Society.” The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture. Ed. Hal Foster. Port Townsend, WA: Bay Press, 1983. 111-125.
    • Kaplan, E. Ann. Rocking Around the Clock: Music Television, Postmodernism, and Consumer Culture. New York: Methuen, 1987.
    • Lipsitz, George. “Cruising Around the Historical Bloc– Postmodernism and Popular Music in East Los Angeles.” Cultural Critique 5 (Winter 1986-87). 157-177.
    • Lyotard, Jean-Francois. “What is Postmodernism?” 1982. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1984.
    • Moraga, Cherrie. Loving in the War Years. Boston: South End, 1983.
    • Mulvey, Laura. “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema.” Women and the Cinema: A Critical Anthology. Eds. Karyn Kay and Gerald Peary. New York: 1977. 412-428.
    • Owens, Craig. “The Discourse of Others: Feminism and Postmodernism.” The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture. Ed. Hal Foster. Port Townsend, WA: Bay Press, 1983. 57-77.
    • Rich, Adrienne. Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institution. New York: W.W. Norton, 1976.
    • Rorty, Richard. “Habermas and Lyotard on Postmodernity.” Habermas and Modernity. Ed. Richard J. Bernstein. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1985. 161-175.
    • Schulte-Sasse, Jochen. “Electronic Media and Cultural Politics in the Reagan Era: The Attack on Libya and Hands Across America as Postmodern Events.” Cultural Critique 8 (Winter 1987-88). 123-152.
    • Venturi, Robert. Complexity and Contradiction in Architecture. 1966. New York: Museum of Modern Art Papers on Architecture, 1977.

     

  • Postmodernism, Ethnicity and Underground Revisionism In Ishmael Reed

    David Mikics

    University of Houston

    I. Ish and Ism

     

    Ishmael Reed is a postmodern writer; he is also an African-American writer. The purpose of this essay is to reflect on the conjunction between these two roles in Reed’s work–and the somewhat surprising fact that they are in conjunction more than in conflict. Postmodernism, with its definition of the contemporary world as a realm of fragmentation, disassociation, and the post-personal, seems to dissolve the cultural continuities of community and individual ego to which earlier artistic eras remained loyal. Postmodernism, in other words, declares the death of cultural authenticity. African-American literature, by contrast, often seems to value cultural authenticity as a means of ensuring communal and individual self-assertion in the black diaspora.1 Reed’s work suggests how African- American tradition, which generally–not always, but generally–wants to depict the survival of a people and a culture in its original, authentic strength, can be reconciled with postmodernism, which destroys the notions of origin, authenticity and tradition itself.

     

    Since the African-American tradition is posited by Reed as a definitive cultural value often repressed or distorted by modern mass culture, a value that can in some sense act as a critique of capitalist modernization, an allied question (one subject to much recent debate) will be whether Reed’s postmodernism damages the critical capacity of his project.2 Can postmodern techniques be the vehicle for a cultural critique, or must they be “affirmative,” acquiescing in the deterioration of art and political speech into commodities under late capitalism?

     

    I have found the theory of Jurgen Habermas useful in posing these questions. In particular, Habermas’ distinction between a “lifeworld” of everyday experiential practice and a systemic, administrative complex that embodies the managerial necessities of late capitalism, and continually encroaches upon or threatens the lifeworld, seems to be replicated in Reed’s distinction (in his novel The Terrible Twos) between African-American subcultural experience and a destructive mass culture ruled by the commercial system. Habermas’ work is a sustained attempt to seek a means of resuscitating the lifeworld that has been impoverished by the managerial priorities of the welfare state (priorities that Reed aptly sees encoded in the pacifying, tepid character of many mass cultural forms).3 In this attempt, Habermas champions aesthetic modernity, with its emphasis on the unique, autonomous individual, as a more helpful lifeworld response to modernization processes than the postmodern dissolution of the individual as a category.

     

    For Habermas, postmodernism is “affirmative”: that is, it tends to mimic the purely negative dispersal of subjective freedom enforced by modernization (the ability to consume what one wants) instead of asserting the critical potential implied by the more positive side of such modernization (the ability to think what one wants). Modernization’s corrosive effect on traditional cultural continuities also entails a democratic emphasis on individuality within intersubjective relations, and therefore, Habermas claims, any critical response to modernity must capitalize on its positive aspect, the promise of more intellectual autonomy for the individual, who now judges culture and its prejudices from a distance. According to Habermas’s argument, criticism within aesthetic modernity takes its most legitimate and useful form when it secures the rights of the individual subject to reevaluate and revise culture in a way that champions the power of the lifeworld while acknowledging the lifeworld’s confrontation with the social rationalization process. The need to acknowledge the effects of rationalization and modernization means that this advocacy of the lifeworld must not take the neoconservative form of an attempt to revive a cultural tradition in an unreconstructed way, for such an attempt would have to ignore the dangerous effects that modernization has already had on the lifeworld, its destabilizing of tradition.4

     

    As I will suggest, Reed is certainly in accord with Habermas’ idea of a critically self-revising tradition, in Reed’s case African-American tradition, as the necessary form of an effective contemporary invocation of the lifeworld. But his work challenges Habermas’ assumption that such critical use of tradition must be coupled with the assertion of an autonomous modernist self. Reed suggests a subcultural rather than an individualist answer to the destructive effects of modernization. The postmodern aspect of Reed’s work, his attack on the notions of character and individual consciousness, does not invalidate its critical potential, as Habermas’ argument would imply. Instead, the subcultural practice of “neohoodooism” acts as a subversive force that seizes mass cultural phenomena and reuses them for the purpose of resistance. Habermas’s prejudice in favor of the individual not only compels him to deny the reality of the Freudian unconscious as a social formation that defeats the wish for self-possession central to his neo-Kantian notion of the individual,5 it also blinds him, along with other leftist critics of postmodernism, to the force of postmodern subversions, like “neohoodooism,” that do not base themselves on envisioning autonomous selves exercising political judgment.

     

    Reed’s lack of desire for the autonomous self accounts for another, more obstreperous leftist objection to the discerning of a critical project in his work. Reed’s fiction, which is often hermetic in texture, does not pursue the definition of politics as a matter of attaining the self-empowering judgment (however difficult it may be to achieve such judgment) that is the goal of Brecht’s or Baraka’s radical theater. One answer to this objection would draw on Habermas’s terms. In his Adorno prize lecture, Habermas notes that in order for critical art to succeed in the contemporary moment, it must be supported by changes in the lifeworld: the burden of critique must not be placed on aesthetics alone without considering its reception in everyday life. Change cannot be legislated by authors, and given this fact, authors must not be faulted for not aiming to produce social change in an immediate way, for example through populist style or overtly revolutionary rhetoric. The prescriptive moralizing on the part of critics who insist on such features has at times been an inhibiting factor in contemporary African-American writing, since what such critics want cannot be readily delivered by writers intent on exploring the artistic implications of their material in the context of an ever more complex late capitalist society.

     

    I would extend this answer to the demand for an autonomous political art beyond Habermas’s idea of attending to institutional and everyday contexts before individual literary works. Habermas cannot convey a nearly full enough picture of everyday life because he retains the goal of an empowered self freed, as much as possible, from alienation and false consciousness–his legacy from Kant and Marx. Reed’s artistic technique, by contrast, exposes the unconscious dimensions of ordinary existence, our styles of being, and it therefore necessarily gravitates away from injunctions toward clarifying one’s consciousness in preparation for political judgment. Reed’s work is more, not less, political because of his recognition that clarification is always an aspect of what Mumbo Jumbo calls the Wallflower Order, an attempt to repress and avoid the dense, Dionysian “Work” that an African-American form like jazz tries to acknowledge: “Jes Grew, the Something or Other that led Charlie Parker to scale the Everests of the Chord . . . the manic in the artist who would rather do glossolalia than be ‘neat clean or lucid.’”6 Reed’s novels aim at the recognition of the improvisatory changes that are always happening, and always repressed by, ruling culture, rather than (the way we usually think of political art) the gearing up for a change in or replacement of the consciousness that rules.

     

    The utopian demand that the text be a lever, in and of itself, for such a decisive change in consciousness, without regard for its function within a larger social and institutional discourse, has often influenced current debates on the politics of literary study (for example, the ongoing revisions of the literary canon). Such utopianism must be regarded as an inevitable symptom of an era in which the relative absence of radical thought about institutions themselves is all too clear.7 In particular, the requirement that texts unequivocally declare their wholesome political uses, thus single-handedly transforming institutional contexts of reading, has weighed heavily (and, I believe, harmfully) on the choice of “black literature” for the new curriculum. For example, the common assumption that black writers should display an attractive, easily accessible communal optimism militates for the selection of For Colored Girls… or The Color Purple in introductory core courses that have room for only one African-American text. Such bias necessarily excludes the work of writers like Adrienne Kennedy, Andrea Lee, James MacPherson, David Bradley, Jay Wright–and Reed. The demand that African- American literature incarnate a positive representative function, praising the strength of cultural continuity and communal values, has dogged Reed throughout his career. The charge frequently made by both black and white critics that Reed is not properly representative of African-American literature seems to rest on the dangerous assumption that the black writer is bound to a representative goal: bound, that is, to present encouraging or correct portraits of his/her culture. This need for African-American literature to perform a representative function has complex historical roots, often involving the burdensome obligation imposed on black writers to legitimate black life for a white audience.8 In the 1990s, however, the wish for the representative is an anachronism, a symptomatic reaction against postmodern conditions in which, despite the continuing social and economic racism of American society, late capitalism has produced a diversity of intra- and interracial roles that erodes cultural uniformity in black America, as elsewhere.9 Since multifarious and contradictory modes of African-American life now exist on an unprecedented scale, any demand for representative description is bound to fail. I do not wish to claim Reed as a representative of a new postmodern strain in African- American life; that would simply be inverting the criticisms of those who deny Reed’s legitimacy. Reed’s work, because it is a partial (in every sense of the word) rather than a grandly unified vision of African-American experience, cannot be representative in any way. Rather, he creatively and successfully exploits a particular African-American subculture in order to invent his own brand of critical postmodernism.

     

    As he rejects the idea of a representative or unified vision of black life, Reed also shies away from the easy acceptance of totality in affirmative postmodernism, which is another example of a representative strategy, one that says: this is our new world, from which no escape, or even critical distance, is possible. By indifferently combining the fragments of various traditions and histories, affirmative postmodernism sets even fragmentation under the sign of Baudrillard’s homogeneous, uniform “society of the spectacle.” By contrast, Reed via his subcultural strategy sets the plural cultural forces of postmodern society in conflict, propounding an aesthetics of resistance or social tension rather than reconciliation.10 Thus Reed “mobilizes a sense of a particular history of subject positions that will not be subsumed under the apparently seamless master text.”11

     

    Before discussing Reed’s African-American critical postmodernism in more detail, I want first to differentiate him from postmodernists who do not oppose lifeworld to rationalization systems but who, instead, see postmodernity as the inevitable colonization of lifeworld by system. Frank Lentricchia has recently proposed Don DeLillo’s Libra as an example of critical postmodernism in its treatment of mass culture, of “an everyday life . . . utterly enthralled by the fantasy selves projected in the media.”12 DeLillo does not offer any escape from a media- absorbed world that has replaced the first-person self with third-person fantasies of the self. In DeLillo as in Pynchon, there are no local, popular cultural forces that would provide resistance to modernization; there is only an oppressive totality. In DeLillo, phenomena of resistance (The Names’ terrorism) or esoteric revisionism (White Noise‘s “Hitler studies”) are simply mirror images of the increasingly systematized society that they rebel against. No route is possible back to the authenticity desired by the modernists, since authenticity has itself become a mass cultural icon. (Thus DeLillo’s Lee Harvey Oswald in Libra wants to “be somebody,” an ambition that can only be realized within the confines of the mass media image.) Yet it is important to remember, as Lentricchia stresses, that DeLillo’s attitude toward this fragmented and imprisoning system, his image of postmodern America, is critical rather than celebratory. Postmodernist critique does not need to invoke adversarial forces like the high-modernist self or the utopian vision of a radically different society in order to avoid the pitfalls indulged in by the affirmative, pastiche-ridden, unreflective postmodernisms that are now shared by the advertizing world and a large sector of the visual arts community. What makes the difference in critical postmodernism is its reflective capacity, its dwelling on current social and aesthetic contradictions, rather than the dissolving of contradiction into easy juxtaposition dictated by the affirmative postmodern. Such contradictions often involve the survival of earlier aesthetic and cultural forms alongside or within postmodernity: thus the desperate desire for existential self in DeLillo’s Oswald, Barthelme’s protagonists, or Mailer’s Gary Gilmore (in The Executioner’s Song)–or the survival of premodern, subcultural secret society traditions in Reed.

     

    Oddly enough, the critical edge provided by a subcultural survival like Reed’s vodoun has its near- counterpart in high modernism. Lionel Trilling, for example, praises Freud’s image of the “other culture,” the secret traditions Freud chose to ally himself to as counters to the dominant values of Austrian society. One of Freud’s other cultures was England; another was ancient Greece; and still another, Hebraic tradition.13 But Reed’s postmodernism again generates a key difference from the modernist Freud. For Reed, unlike Trilling’s Freud, the subculture or other culture is interwoven, despite its esotericism, with the imagery of mass culture, imagery that the subculture both mimics and, through its mimicry, resists. The jazz style celebrated in Mumbo Jumbo is, after all, a mass cultural form.

     

    A similar attachment to mass-cultural image is at work in the postmodern treatment of character, again marking a difference from modernism. For Reed, as for DeLillo, the self is a caricature, a stylistic move determined by cultural stereotype rather than a modernist dream of individual authenticity. But the stereotypes are not, in his work, only the property of a mechanized mass culture, as in DeLillo. Their mass-cultural face may also stem from, or be appropriated by, African-American counterculture. Reed’s aesthetic of “sampling,”14 of inventively assembling snippets from the tradition with which he identifies (Neohoodooism) as well as the cultural syndrome he opposes (the Wallflower Order), thus presents itself as sustained dialogic satire.15

     

    The sort of reconciliation between an African-American tradition and postmodernism that I have hinted at has been offered in the context of Reed’s work by Henry Louis Gates, Jr., and the late James Snead, both of whom speak of Reed as demonstrating affinities between his own postmodern technique and the techniques of “signifying” in black culture. Snead specifically points to sudden rhythmic juxtaposition and syncretism, two features of African religion and music that are echoed in Reed’s work.16 Gates and Snead, by making their connection between Africa and Reed, imply that postmodernism can be rooted, even if only by analogy, in a specific cultural tradition, such as that of the African-American. Reed himself seems to concur in this analysis, identifying his own authorial practice with the Africa-derived folk tradition of vodoun.

     

    Gates and Snead reading Reed are brilliantly helpful, and I will finally agree with their assessment of Reed. But I would like to introduce a possible objection to their readings that hinges on the ideological implications of presenting an element of the African-American lifeworld like vodoun alongside modernist and postmodernist artistic practice. The objection would go something like this: both Gates and Snead seem to imply that Reed claims an identity between vodoun and his own work because he perceives a natural, implicit analogy between modern and postmodern European aesthetics and black culture. One might argue against Gates and Snead by reminding oneself that such an analogy is not natural, but instead an ideological construct of twentieth-century European modernism’s attraction to “primitive” forms. In contrast to mass culture, which is made possible by the dissolution of traditional communal ties under advanced capitalism–the meeting hall or fete replaced by a million TV sets–popular or folk culture is by definition premodern: its premise must be an assumed community of style and cultural symbolism rather than the alienated perspective of the individual artist. From this perspective, the twentieth-century European or Euro-American artist’s frequent invoking of African and African-American popular cultural practice as an analogy to his or her own efforts, from Picasso’s interest in “primitive” art to Norman Mailer’s White Negro to the later albums of the American pop music group Talking Heads,17 is significantly problematic. The high culture/”primitive” analogy is motivated by nostalgia for the (supposed) immediacy or palpable, experiential knowledge that the alienated artist perceives in either colonized nations or the underclass of his or her own nation. As such, it is inevitably a colonial gesture. By failing to address this cultural-historical basis for the comparison that modern and postmodern European/Euro-American art habitually makes between itself and the premodern aspects of African/African-American culture, both Snead and Gates imply that such comparisons describe a natural or neutral similarity, instead of themselves enacting ideologically freighted gestures.18 In these two critics’ analogies between African-American art and the European modernist/postmodernist tradition, ideology disappears.

     

    Reed’s identification of his art with vodoun shares something with the European modernist’s colonialist gesture: he desires to restore to his work a dimension of authenticity that has been lost in much of the modern world.19 In other words, Reed reacts against social modernization by allying himself to vodoun. After all, vodoun is communal folk culture, a survival of an era untouched by the atomizing, alienating effects of the modern mass media. There is, then, no precise fit between popular tradition and postmodern strategy, as Gates and Snead tend to suggest in their praises of Reed. The unique, eccentric character of Reed’s postmodernism, its antinormative nature, suggests that the popular is, in part, invoked as a way of grounding the postmodern in its very opposite, the force of folk tradition, as a counterbalance against its potentially uncontrolled, antitraditional mirroring of the fragmenting effects of late capitalism.20

     

    The objection to Reed’s appropriation of the supposed authenticity of folk culture that I have just outlined is a serious one, but I believe one can acknowledge its seriousness while also making it defer to the gaiety of Reed’s work, which ultimately undercuts the proclamation of authenticity that one aspect of Reed still wants to make. Reed’s delight in subversive traditions, which is so well evoked by Gates and Snead, extends to the self-mockery of folklore itself, which becomes the madly esoteric and writerly venture of neohoodooism. In practical terms, Reed does not seem to be hamstrung by any gap between tradition and postmodern subversion. Instead, he aims, largely successfully, at a coherence of folk and postmodern expression in which neither element serves or counterbalances the other, in which they form a crazy whole. In other words, Reed wants to show the ways in which the popular uncannily anticipates and redeems what we thought were the properties of contemporary mass culture alone by being, so to speak, always-already postmodern, postmodern from way back. By presenting us with a partial or eccentric claim to contemporary mass culture, a creative appropriation of its reifying tendencies, he negotiates the Scylla and Charybdis of twentieth-century art: the stale modernist opposition between the reified and the creative, and the affirmative postmodern claim that reification subsumes all contemporary narratives into an undifferentiated whole. In contrast to the centrifugal atmosphere of affirmative postmodernism, in which traditional elements are used as mere decorative fragments,21 the premodern subculture that Reed celebrates provides an ad hoc, self-ironizing center of gravity for his work by endowing aesthetic eccentricity with the lure of tradition. Traditional culture has been irreversibly transfigured by the new aura of postmodern technological reproduction, but it still retains an otherness, a mark of difference.

     

    II. Reed, Baraka, Pynchon: Postmodernism and Community

     

    Well, and keep in mind where those Masonic Mysteries came from in the first place. (Check out Ishmael Reed. He knows more about it than you’ll ever find here.) Thomas Pynchon, Gravity’s Rainbow22 It is also significant that most of the [vodoun] houngans who claim the patronage of Ogoun belong to the Masonic Order. Maya Deren, Divine Horsemen23

     

    In his career as a novelist, Ishmael Reed has frequently occupied himself with the images produced by American mass culture. Some of these images are the travesties of black life produced by white America–the antebellum stereotypes of Mammy and Uncle Tom invoked in Flight to Canada (1976), Reed’s parodic takeoff on slave narrative; or the Amos and Andy routines in The Last Days of Louisiana Red (1974), a satirical pseudo-thriller. Some, on the other hand, are not specific to Afro-America, like the Wild West parodied in Yellow Back Radio Broke Down, Reed’s “Western” written in 1969. In The Terrible Twos (1982), which I will focus on in the remainder of this essay, Reed centers his analysis on a mass-produced and mass-marketed image of general import in American culture, that of Santa Claus. In particular, the novel has as its subtext the standard movie myth of American Christmas, Miracle on 34th St. As I hope to show, the ossified, stereotypical mythology embodied by this film is undermined by Reed’s radically unorthodox mode of narration–a mode that has itself been called filmic. Reed counters the ideologically dominant images of Miracle with his own subversive quasi-filmic techniques, unravelling one filmic mode by means of another.

     

    As James Snead points out, Reed’s work, like much postmodern writing, has important correlations with the aesthetics of movie-making in its use of sudden and suggestive juxtaposition (montage), as well as with the similar principles of creative juxtaposition (which Snead calls “cutting”) active in African religion and music: “Reed elides the ‘cut’ of black culture with the ‘cutting’ used in cinema. Self-consciously filmable, Mumbo Jumbo ends with a ‘freeze frame’ . . . underscoring its filmic nature.”24 My aim in this essay is to explore some of the ways in which Reed uses familiar images from American film, and in fact opposes these official, mass-cultural images to an alternative culture of the “cut” or radical juxtaposition, which has affinities both with Euro-American postmodernism and with the African-American belief system of vodoun. As I have noted, Reed’s final aim is a therapeutic criticism of the numbing, homogenizing effects of modernization. Far from exulting in the culture of the mass media as the “affirmative postmodernist” would do, Reed in The Terrible Twos opposes the mass culture of Hollywood movies and TV to an underground folk tradition that partakes of vodoun habits of mind, specifically in its occult revisionary reading of St. Nicholas, otherwise known as Santa Claus. Reed’s hermetic St. Nicholas revolts against the official or established culture represented in The Terrible Twos by commercial capitalism’s image of Christmas.

     

    Reed criticizes not only the late capitalist system itself; he also criticizes the most common reception of African-American culture within that system. African- American tradition has been taken as an offer of escape from official culture into a viable marginal one–now that the alienated, solipsistic subjectivity of European modernism, or the fantasies of postmodernism, which decenter subjectivity without offering a communal alternative to the now-defunct self, seem less than comfortably livable. For contemporary critical ideology, black writing seems to represent a potential for communal authenticity that has long been excluded from the Euro-American avant-garde. A drama like Slave Ship, as Kimberly Benston convincingly argues, achieves precisely what the Euro-American modernists cannot: a depiction of oppositional community based in an existing cultural reality.25 This escape from modernist alienation into black cultural authenticity is the pattern of Baraka’s career, as well as the goal of the “Black Aesthetics” movement of the 1960s and ’70s in which Baraka, along with Addison Gayle, Hoyt Fuller, Larry Neal, and others, played a prominent role.

     

    As Gates has shown in his reading of Mumbo Jumbo, Reed criticizes such attachment to authenticity by attacking the essentialist aspect of the Black Aesthetics/Black Arts movement (and, before it, the Negritude movement). Reed opposes the notion of blackness as a “transcendental signified,” an authoritative, static and univocal symbolic presence.26 Instead, Reed reveals black discourse to be, in postmodern fashion, decentered and polyvocal. Where does this postmodern aesthetic strategy leave Reed in terms of the communal emphasis of African-American culture? Houston Baker has cited Reed’s fiction as a return to “the common sense of the tribe”27: but how can such a collective or tribal orientation coexist with the atomizing, depersonalizing effects of postmodernist technique also evident in Reed?

     

    One approach to a definition of Reed’s decentered communalism, his subversive interest in the lifeworld’s subcultural traditions, is by way of a contrast with Baraka. Though both Baraka and Reed move from avant-garde alienation in early works like Baraka’s Preface to a Twenty Volume Suicide Note and Reed’s The Free-Lance Pallbearers to an emphasis on the power of African-American cultural continuity, there are important differences. Reed’s “neohoodooist” aesthetic, as we shall see, is syncretic and assimilative, whereas Baraka’s black consciousness attempts the monolithic and univocal. In Reed, vodoun does not need to reject European influence in order to safeguard its purity; instead, it translates this influence into the terms of a newly indigenous New World culture.

     

    In other respects as well, Reed’s vision of African- American culture should not be conflated with Baraka’s (or, say, June Jordan’s) equally powerful, but very distinct, definition of that culture. Throughout his work, Reed consistently rejects the invocation of ethnic community on a grand scale, opting instead for the investigation of the esoteric cultural practices, like vodoun, that appear as sect, secret society, or personal obsession rather than as mass movement. Reed’s choice of the occult and dispersed, rather than the fully public, continuities in African- American culture suggests that eccentric or idiosyncratic rewritings of culture are valuable precisely because they are idiosyncratic–and that such stylistic quirks may constitute the only existential rebellion still viable. The later work of Baraka, by contrast, like that of many other politically committed African-American artists, strives for community through its normative and explicit approach, the plain force of a quintessentially public rhetoric. Baker’s phrase “the common sense of the tribe” is a better description of Baraka’s mode in its willed commonness than it is of Reed’s willful peculiarity.

     

    Having clarified his differences from Baraka’s more normative approach to African-American tradition, I now want to pursue a comparison between Reed and Pynchon,28 which will reveal an equally telling difference. To return to Habermas’s terms: Reed is interested in upholding the lifeworld and its traditions against the modernization process, whereas for Pynchon the lifeworld is merely an attenuated reflection of the systemic aspect of modernization.

     

    Pynchon is a natural parallel for Reed; especially, Pynchon’s flaked-out whimsy in The Crying of Lot 49 bears a remarkable tonal resemblance to some of Reed’s work.29 There’s also a thematic resemblance between Pynchon and Reed: they both participate in the postmodernist polemic against authenticity by creating, for the most part, caricatures rather than “realistic” characters. Reed has his hardboiled detectives and monomaniacal radicals, Pynchon his male-bonded post-adolescents and femmes fatales. The sense that these figures, by-products of modernity’s obsessions, suffer or play out their stereotypical identities, instead of actively controlling them, is characteristic of postmodernism.30

     

    Pynchon’s defiant authorial eccentricity imagines the rebellion against modernity, not as a viable cultural alternative, but as an intricate fantasy that rewrites the way of the world in a language of conspiratorial oddity. In Pynchon, as in DeLillo, subversive fantasies usually turn out to be as chillingly claustrophobic as official reality.31 The notion of escape from a hegemonic culture occupies Reed’s work as it does Pynchon’s, but the difference, I will argue, is Reed’s effort to ground the escape in an actual alternative–African-American– aesthetic, that of vodoun.

     

    There is a striking passage in Pynchon’s The Crying of Lot 49 that dramatically evokes the possibility of subversive or alternative community as, at the same time, the threat of an utterly private world of paranoid self- delusion–a world that ironically and horrifyingly mirrors the oppressive totality of the increasingly rationalized contemporary universe. Pynchon’s Oedipa Maas, as she discovers the massive underground postal network called W.A.S.T.E. seemingly everywhere she turns, speculates to herself that Either you have stumbled indeed, without the aid of LSD or other indole alkaloids, onto a secret richness and concealed density of dream; onto a network by which X number of Americans are truly communicating whilst reserving their lies, recitations of routine, arid betrayals of spiritual poverty for the official government delivery system; maybe even onto a real alternative to the exitlessness, to the absence of surprise to life, that harrows the head of everybody American you know, and you too, sweetie. Or (here comes the second alternative) you are hallucinating it . . . . in which case you are a nut, out of your skull.32

     

    Oedipa’s potentially paranoid fantasy may, this passage from Lot 49 suggests, be the only possibility for a rebellious collective imagination that remains in American life. Reed shares Pynchon’s distaste for what Oedipa Maas describes as the “exitlessness” of American life, the overwhelming pressure of a bland and univocal day-to-day rationality. The transhistorical Wallflower Order in Mumbo Jumbo, which tries to stamp out jazz dancing and all other forms of collective imaginative improvisation, is an openly malevolent version of such oppressive blandness.

     

    Pynchon leaves us in the dark as to whether the secret community that Oedipa envisions actually exists; but if it does, it is invigorating only to the degree that it is also scary and sinister.33 Reed, by contrast, is able to depict the counterforce to Wallflower oppression not as an ontologically dubious fantasy, like Oedipa Maas’ underground postal-cum-waste-disposal system, but as an actual cultural phenomenon, what Mumbo Jumbo calls Jes Grew: black music, dance and verbal “signifying.”34

     

    III. The Filmic Double

     

    We are now ready to deal with the importance of mass culture in The Terrible Twos by way of its major filmic subtext, the “classic” Christmas movie Miracle on 34th Street. First, though, this is an appropriate time to briefly and somewhat violently summarize the novel’s plot: it begins with “a past Christmas”–the Christmas just following Reagan’s 1980 electoral victory, when charity has been abandoned in favor of Lucchese boots and Gucci handbags. A top male model named Dean Clift, represented by Reed as a know-nothing automaton sunk in infantile dependency on his wife, whom he calls “Mommy,” is running for Congress from the “silk stocking district” in Manhattan. By the novel’s second section, set during “a future Christmas,” Dean Clift–a composite portrait of Ronald Reagan and Dan Quayle–has become president. Meanwhile, Santa Claus has become even bigger business than he was in the 1980s: a character named Oswald Zumwalt, head of a company called the North Pole Development Corporation (or Big North for short), has secured “exclusive rights” to Santa. (A class action suit is filed by thousands of rival Clauses, “black, red and white,” but they lose.) Zumwalt establishes a Christmas Land at the North Pole “to which consumers all over the world [will] fly, Supersaver, to celebrate Christmas” (TT, 64).35 Meanwhile, President Clift has signed a bill giving Adolf Hitler posthumous American citizenship. The economy’s in trouble–a loaf of bread costs fifty dollars. The hungover president’s eyes “look like two Japanese flags.”

     

    In the midst of this dangerous atmosphere of crisis, a sect called the Nicolaites has sprung up, determined to rescue Santa Claus from his position as avatar of mass media commercialism. The Nicolaites are dedicated to the original image of the fourth-century St. Nicholas as a forthright defier of imperial authority, a populist whose miracles rivalled Christ’s, causing the Vatican to declare him moribund in the ’60s in the face of popular enthusiasm for Nicholas’ cult. The Nicolaites succeed in kidnapping Big North’s official Santa Claus and momentarily replacing him with their own spokesman, a black dwarf known as Black Peter. (As we shall see, Black Peter is St. Nicholas’s somewhat sinister accomplice in some versions of the Nicholas legend.) The flamboyant and persuasive Black Peter, projecting his voice ventriloquist-style into a false Santa Claus, delivers a condemnation of the hardheartedness of American commercial capitalism and, in particular, capitalism’s exploitation of Santa. Finally, President Clift, after being taken on a Dantesque tour in which he meets the damned souls of dead American presidents, realizes the error of his ways and, like Jacob Marley in A Christmas Carol, suddenly overflows with charitable Christmas cheer, passing out Redskins tickets and championing disarmament. At the novel’s end, President Clift has been placed in a sanatorium by his shocked former supporters and a manhunt is on for Black Peter.

     

    President Dean Clift is not only like Jacob Marley but also like Claude Rains in Mr. Smith Goes to Washington, another conversion narrative, in which Rains as the supposedly populist, but actually cynically self-interested, congressman finally breaks down and admits his own corruption, thus becoming dangerous to the corporate interests that support him. But the major subtext of The Terrible Twos is Miracle on 34th St (1947; written and directed by George Seaton). In this film, Kris Kringle, the real Santa Claus hired by Macy’s to play Santa Claus, represents a critique of commercialized Christmas and a polemic in favor of Christmas charity, which is ideologically defined by Miracle as both the antithesis and the salvation of corporate commercialism. By the end of the movie Kringle, played by Edmund Gwenn, succeeds not only in converting hardnosed businesswoman Mrs. Walker (Maureen O’Hara), to his humanitarian gospel, but also her much harder-nosed child, played by the preteenage Natalie Wood. Kringle’s most important convert, however, is Mr. Macy himself, who by the end of the film becomes a fervent supporter of his Santa’s claim to be the Santa Claus. Though the film retains enough cynicism concerning Macy’s profit-oriented motives for his support of Kris Kringle to save it from sentimental idealization of the American corporation, the point is nevertheless quite clearly made that Macy’s is now a kinder, gentler store as a result of Kringle’s presence. Kringle even unites Macy and Gimbel as, in the spirit of Christmas generosity, both begin referring customers to the competing store and vying for the privilege of rewarding Kris himself for his services. By being an authentic rather than a false, merely commercial Santa, Miracle‘s Kris Kringle ameliorates the grasping commercialism of Macy’s, infusing it with the heartwarmingly populist, anti-greed “true” spirit of Christmas. Miracle‘s ideological goal is to claim that mass culture can become popular culture: to present the corporation in a newly beneficent, populist role by showing it embracing anti-commercialism. Kris may protest against the consumerist version of Christmas, but he nevertheless works happily at Macy’s, advising its customers to buy Macy’s toys. At the film’s end, Kris’s own populist beliefs are recognized and partially adopted by Macy’s. The parallel to Macy’s in Reed’s novel is Zumwalt’s Big North, which has secured exclusive rights to Santa Claus just as, in Miracle, New York’s largest department store owns Santa in the person of Kris Kringle. The difference, of course, is that Reed’s Big North, unlike Macy’s in the film, is openly malevolent and not at all liable to be affected by the “true” anti-commercial spirit of Santa Claus.

     

    The three subtexts for Reed’s novel that I’ve mentioned, Christmas Carol, Mr. Smith, and Miracle, all enfold the political in the personal, reducing a political situation to a matter of human character, and showing a generous personality winning out over a cynical one. Reed implicitly argues that a similar ideological effect is accomplished by Reagan’s commercial success as the “likeable” President. Not for the first time in American history, but perhaps most remarkably, a President’s politics are obscured by his transfiguration into a fictively endearing mass media personality.

     

    Reed’s The Terrible Twos deliberately obstructs the kind of metamorphosis of politics into individual personality that is so emphatically present in his source text Miracle on 34th St. This is where Reed’s postmodernist replacement of character with caricature comes in: Big North is a cold-blooded operation, and the “real” Santa Claus is a mere corporate stooge, not a kindly old gent like Miracle’s Kris Kringle. There is no pretense that the “reality,” the mimed authenticity, of this Santa Claus means anything more than the company’s ability to buy the name: no one at Big North, including their Santa, even considers the idea that the personality of Santa might have symbolic efficacy–he is nothing but an ersatz, infinitely reproducible trademark for Christmas consumerism.

     

    The Terrible Twos presents not just a critique of commercialism and its lack of authenticity, but a revolt against it that takes the form of a hermetic inquiry into Church history–the “underground revisionism” alluded to in my title. As he becomes corporate property, the historical identity of Nicholas (known as Claus in northern Europe) as a populist Christian saint becomes more and more effaced. The self-imposed task of the Nicolaites, the secret society that opposes itself to Big North’s official, corporate Santa Claus in The Terrible Twos, is to resurrect the forgotten radical historicity of St. Nicholas, to oppose the phoniness of mass culture by invoking the subversive reality of popular tradition.

     

    Like the Mutafikah in Reed’s Mumbo Jumbo, the Nicolaites have formed a sect intent on returning a degraded symbol to its original, authentic power. In Mumbo Jumbo, the Mutafikah are a secret society that makes a career of “liberating” works of art from Western museums and returning them to their African, Asian or Native American places of origin. The Mutafikah stand against the Atonist (Christo- and Eurocentric) effort to reduce all culture to a single Christianized meaning–or else destroy it. But the Mutafikah are oddly comparable to Mumbo Jumbo‘s Atonists, who are equipped with their own secret societies, the Teutonic Knights and the Knights Templar, in their desire for singular and authentic cultural origins–origins with a racial basis.36 Reed’s purpose is not to engage in a moralizing comparison of the exclusionary essentialisms that sometimes inhabit radical critiques of a ruling ideology with the more palpable destruction wrought by that ideology. Instead, Reed, in Nietzschean fashion, implies the difficulty of achieving a truly radical break from any oppressive mode of thought without inadvertently duplicating its repressive need to exclude the other. Reed, like Ellison in his depiction of the Brotherhood in Invisible Man, asks whether a radical, conspiratorial alternative to the reigning culture is truly an alternative, if it is bound to reproduce some aspects of the oppression it protests. 37 Like the Mutafikah, the Nicolaites in The Terrible Twos are a thinly veiled allegory of 1960s radicalism: Black Peter takes over the Nicolaites as Black Power swayed white radicals in the ’60s. These groups’ efforts to establish an adversarial culture based on a faith in native origins are criticized by Reed in much the same terms he uses to attack essentialist definitions of “black aesthetics” and negritude.38 Refusing the belief in an exclusivist and prescriptive, rather than a multicultural, black art that was sometimes featured in the Black Aesthetics movement, Reed proposes in place of this purism a multicultural synthesis derived from the syncretism of African and Asian religions, “Neohoodooism.” In aligning his own critical principles with the African New World belief system of vodoun, Reed proclaims his place in African-American tradition while refusing the essentialist definitions of this tradition that would reject syncretism or the multicultural as a contamination of origins.

     

    Papa LaBas, the sly, knowing old man in Louisiana Red and Mumbo Jumbo is, of course, a major deity in vodoun. In Mumbo Jumbo, LaBas invokes vodoun as both a refusal of the Atonists and an illuminating alternative to the monocultural purism of the Mutafikah and the Muslim editor, Abdul: LaBas speaks of “the ancient Vodun aesthetic: pantheistic, becoming, 1 which bountifully permits 1000s of spirits, as many as the imagination can hold.”39

     

    The vodoun aesthetics described by Papa LaBas is centrally relevant to the arguments that occur among The Terrible Twos‘ Nicolaites over the true character and identity of St. Nicholas. On the one hand, as I have said, the Nicolaites’ quest for definitive origins, for the real St. Nicholas, marks them as loyal to a univocality, a concept of absolute and singular identity, that vodoun refuses. For this reason Reed links the Nicolaites to another African New World belief, Rastafarianism, which fervently invests authority in a singular black origin and destiny. When Black Peter proposes replacing St. Nicholas with Haile Selassie, the Nicolaites are “split down the middle” over which deity to follow (44). Yet Brother Peter’s argument for Haile Selassie does partake of vodoun aesthetics in its oddball perception of cultural analogies; his logic is, finally, far more vodoun than Rastafarian. Although Black Peter aims to replace Nicholas with Selassie, the associationist logic of his argument is implicitly syncretic: it suggests a conflation of Nicholas and Selassie that is more vodoun than Rastafarian. Black Peter states that Selassie and Nicholas are “‘one and the same’” because they both ride on a white horse; Nicholas punished a thief as Selassie punished “the teef Mussolini,” Nicholas flew and so does Selassie (by airplane), and so on (46). Like the African religions from which it derives, vodoun routinely synthesizes deities of different tribes, including the Christian saints. For example, vodoun believers argued that since St. James is surrounded by red flags and carries a sword, he is essentially similar to the martial Yoruba deity Ogun, who is also clothed in red. But instead of being replaced by Ogun, St. James is conflated with him to become the vodoun spirit “Ogu-feraille.”40 Reed’s “neo- hoodooism” likewise blends Nicholas and Selassie in The Terrible Twos into “Selassie-Nicholas,” or, alternatively, “Nicholas-Selassie” (177), so that the syncretism of Europe and Africa is in its technique a distinctively African combination. In Reed’s earlier novel, Yellow Back Radio Broke Down, the Pope himself speaks of Europe’s unsuccessful attempt to Christianize the African slaves in the New World, an attempt thwarted by the capacity for multicultural juxtaposition implicit in the “elastic” discourse of vodoun: “the natives merely placed our art alongside theirs.”41

     

    The vodoun religion syncretizes not only West African spirits with Christian saints, but also the generally “cool” or peaceful West African religions with the fiercer beliefs of the Kongo. In fact, many scholars identify two seemingly opposed, but actually ambiguously combined aspects of vodoun, Rada and Petro: often a vodoun deity will have both a Rada and a Petro (that is, a good and a cruel) side. Petro, the aggressive, malevolent aspect of vodoun, derives its name from the legendary magician figure Dom Pedro (or Petre).42 Dom Pedro, of course, is Reed’s shady and mysterious Black Peter, present in some versions of the St. Nicholas legend as Nicholas’s sidekick or opposite number, his “blackamoor servant.” If Nicholas is benevolent and devoted to saving children, Black Peter, by contrast, is a kidnapper.43 The religious scholar Charles Jones notes that the pairing of the kindly Nicholas and the cruel Peter derives from an earlier ambiguity in the character of Nicholas himself, who is seen as both gentle and violent, a bearer of both gifts and switches.44 Gradually, as the Nicholas legend shifts to Northern Europe, Nicholas’ evil traits are exorcised and projected onto the figure of a black servant. Similarly, European Christianity projects its sins onto the Africans that it enslaves; the sins return, in Reed’s novel, via the image of Black Peter literally taking possession of Santa Claus, inflecting the ersatz, commercialized “innocence” of Christmas with the harsh truth of his satire. Reed thus restores the ethical ambiguity or doubleness of the original Nicholas, as well as the subversive power of this saint who openly criticized the Emperor Constantine,45 by allowing Black Peter to speak through him. It is interesting in this connection that, as Herskovits notes, St. Nicholas is regarded in Haitian vodoun as protector of the marassa, the spirits of twins.46

     

    The ambiguous combination of good and evil in Nicholas, so similar to the equivocal, mixed nature of vodoun gods like Ogoun and the marassa, is replicated in the character of childhood itself, at once innocent and terrible. (Thus the double-edged title, The Terrible Twos.) Reed describes the severe, perplexing nature of this dualism in a passage I shall cite at length: Two-year-olds. In mankind’s mirific misty past they were sacrificed to the winter gods. Maybe that’s why some gods act so young. Ogun, so childish that he slays both the slavemaster and the slave. Two-year-olds are what the id would look like if the id could ride a tricycle. That’s the innocent side of two, but the terrible side as well. A terrible world the world of two-year-olds. . . . Someone is constantly trying to eat them up. The gods of winter crave them– the gods of winter who, some say, are represented by the white horse that St. Nicholas, or Saint Nick, rides as he enters into Amsterdam, his blackamoor servant, Peter, following with his bag of switches and candy. Two-year-olds are constantly looking over their shoulders for the man in the shadows carrying the bag. Black Peter used to carry them across the border into Spain. (28)

     

    Just as Ogoun is both a healer and a warrior–and as the champion of the Haitian Revolution, a slayer of both master and slave47–so Nicholas/Peter are both gift-givers and conniving thieves. By reinjecting paganism’s vivid spiritual dualism into Christianity, Reed incarnates a world of shockingly energetic contrasts; a world that stands against the bland, homogenized commercialism of Big North’s, and Macy’s, corporate Santa. Part of this energy derives from the esoteric nature of Reed’s vision here, his zest for an off-the-wall hermeneutics that is, finally, too peculiar to be popular in the sense of “popularity” that Macy’s and Big North, and Miracle on 34th St., seem to have coopted. For Reed, Macy’s is mass culture as rootless, best-selling hype, despite its self-disguise as popular culture in Miracle. Reed presents, as a pointed contrast to the film’s duplicitous claim to folk status, a popular tradition just as strange as it is true, one that resists, and revises, mass culture through both its strangeness and its truth. Reed’s eccentricity finds its thematic roots in the popular culture of vodoun just as the bemused and outrageous improvisational comedy of his prose, the wry, crisply logical way with a joke that is so uniquely his, draws on the rhythms of African-American discourse. The result is a postmodernism in which Reed’s style perfectly illustrates his syncretic and subversive argument. If Reed does not invoke his connections to tradition in the service of an easily communal utopian optimism, but instead remains skeptical about the possibility of a full-scale alternative to the Atonists,48 he also insists on the historical presence of a secret, underground alternative to Wallflower culture, a revolt that is always occurring, in one scene or another.

     

    Notes

     

    1. Since the 1960s, the academy and the world of publishing have tended to favor those African-American writers who seem most overtly to invoke the communal inheritance of traditional African-American values. Writers like Andrea Lee who exhibit skepticism about the survival of tradition in a postmodern world are stigmatized by the critical establishment.

     

    2. See, among many other sources, Hal Foster, ed., The Anti-Aesthetic (Port Townsend, WA: Bay Press, 1983); Seyla Benhabib, “A Reply to Jean-Francois Lyotard,” in Linda Nicholson, ed., Feminism/Postmodernism (New York: Routledge, 1990); Jurgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990); Andreas Huyssen, After the Great Divide (Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1986); Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1991). Huyssen’s delineation of the limitations in Habermas’ championing of aesthetic modernity against postmodernity has influenced my own case for the critical capacity of postmodernism.

     

    3. It is important to note, of course, that Habermas also emphasizes the gains in human freedom that have stemmed from the Weberian rationalization processes that enable the state to survive.

     

    4. See Habermas’ Adorno prize lecture, translated as “Modernity: An Incomplete Project,” in Foster, ed., 3-15, and The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity.

     

    5. As Paul Smith, Rainer Nagele, and others have pointed out: see Paul Smith, Discerning the Subject (Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota P, 1988), 163-64, and Rainer Nagele, “Freud, Habermas and the Dialectic of Enlightenment,” New German Critique 22 (Winter 1981), 41-62.

     

    6. Mumbo Jumbo (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1972), 211. Thus Mumbo Jumbo‘s tongue-in-cheek genealogy of Jes Grew–whose contagious character means that it can never really be pinned down as lineage or inheritance–stretches from Isis and Osiris, to Dionysus, to Jethro, to vodoun.

     

    7. On this point, see David Kaufmann, “The Profession of Theory,” PMLA May 1990, 519 -30.

     

    8. On this issue of what DuBois called “double consciousness,” see Robert Stepto’s landmark From Behind the Veil (Champaign-Urbana, IL: U of Illinois P, 1979).

     

    9. On this point I have benefitted from Lawrence Hogue’s work in progress on African-American postmodernism, as well as a talk given by David Bradley at Trinity College (Hartford, CT), 1989.

     

    10. Here as elsewhere in this essay, I am indebted to Hal Foster’s analysis of the subcultural as a viable force in postmodernism: see “Readings in Cultural Resistance” in Recodings (Port Townsend, WA: Bay Press, 1985).

     

    11. This is Charles Altieri’s description of Paul Smith’s position in Altieri’s Canons and Consequences (Evanston, IL: Northwestern UP, 1990), 206. Altieri criticizes Smith for imagining a too easy transition from such practices of resistance to statements of political position, thus giving short shrift to those resistant modes, like Derrida’s and the later Barthes’, which do not add up to avowals of political responsibility. While agreeing fully with Altieri’s brilliant and subtle critique of Smith, I also have major misgivings concerning Altieri’s finding of deficiencies in Derrida’s and Barthes’s notions of responsiveness. For Altieri, the private, self-ironizing nature of Derrida’s later style needs to be compensated for by a publicly responsible or official subject, who will stabilize (or perhaps repress?) what is risky about such intimate ironies (see Canons, 209; see also Altieri’s essay on Ecce Homo in Daniel O’Hara, ed., Why Nietzsche Now? [Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 1985], 410-11). I think that the model of compensation/stabilization, along with the zero-sum picture of bargaining, negotiation and consensus that tends to accompany Altieri’s official self, adds up to a dangerously limited way of conceiving the political. The invocation of the normative force of reasonable choice as a necessary supplement to aesthetics and private life is directly relevant to the antagonistic criticism of Reed. Instead of trying to make our private aesthetic obsessions publicly responsible by worrying that theorists like Nietzsche and Derrida, or writers like Reed, are not sufficiently interested in justifying liberal political judgment, I believe we ought to acknowledge–rather than look for ways of repressing–the gap between personal aesthetics and public responsibility, the unavoidable fact that defines (post)modern politics. Needless to say, my qualm here applies to Habermas, as well as Smith and Altieri.

     

    12. Frank Lentricchia, “Libra as Postmodern Critique,” South Atlantic Quarterly, 89 (1990), 431-53. (Essay originally published in Raritan, Spring 1989.) The passage cited is on 443.

     

    13. Lionel Trilling, “Freud: Within and Beyond Culture,” in Beyond Culture (New York: Viking, 1965). Freud, of course, was in fact Jewish, whereas the other “other cultures” cited in Trilling’s great essay were located purely in Freud’s imagination, not his biographical context. But, following a strategy which critical postmodernists might find appealing, Trilling tends to downplay this distinction: the adversarial use of the subculture/other culture takes precedence over the question of its literal historical presence.

     

    14. I am indebted to Michael Jarrett for the analogy between Reed and sampling.

     

    15. Lentricchia has noted the total absence of his own ethnicity from DeLillo’s work (in “The American Writer as Bad Citizen–Introducing Don DeLillo,” SAQ 1990 [89, 2], 239-44); and Pynchon’s prestigious New England ancestry is played as an elaborate self-exploding joke in Gravity’s Rainbow. There is, of course, an analogy between Pynchon’s “preterite” and Reed’s “neohoodooism,” but Reed claims a concrete cultural context (even if a slippery and self- displacing one) for his aesthetic slogan as Pynchon does not. It should be understood that I am not arguing that contemporary writers “ought” to use subcultural tradition in Reed’s manner, nor that Reed is a better writer than Pynchon or DeLillo for their failure to do so.

     

    16. See Henry Louis Gates, Jr., “The Blackness of Blackness: A Critique of the Sign and the Signifying Monkey,” and James A. Snead, “Repetition as a Figure of Black Culture,” in Gates, ed., Black Literature and Literary Theory (New York: Methuen, 1984).

     

    17. The Talking Heads’ Speaking in Tongues (New York: Sire, 1983), whose title humorously endows commodified pop with a quasi-religious aura borrowed from alien traditions, draws on Nigerian Juju music; their later record Naked (New York: Sire, 1988) is similarly indebted to Zairian soukous. For a very useful treatment of the analogy between modern art and “primitive” art as an attempt to construct “universalism,” see James Clifford, “Histories of the Tribal and the Modern,” in his The Predicament of Culture (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1988).

     

    18. For a treatment of this issue of appropriation in the context of the Cuban Afro-Cubanismo movement, see Roberto Gonzalez-Echevarria, Alejo Carpentier, The Pilgrim at Home (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1977).

     

    19. Reed’s status as an African-American writer who claims Africa-derived folk culture for his own just as Yeats claims Celtic folklore should prevent us from simply identifying his authorial ideology in respect to Africa with that of Picasso, Stravinsky et. al.; one might choose the claiming of African folk culture in Aime Cesaire, Jay Wright, Edward Brathwaite, Toni Morrison and Derek Walcott for an extremely various set of comparisons to Reed.

     

    20. I am here arguing against the easy conflation of ethnicity, political opposition, and postmodernism in Linda Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism (New York: Routledge, 1988), 60-70. Hutcheon programmatically ignores the conflicts among modernist, postmodernist, and nostalgic or premodern desires in texts such as Morrison’s Tar Baby in order to claim a (false) harmony between postmodernism and African-American self-assertion.

     

    21. Lee Breuer’s dreadful Warrior Ant comes to my mind here, but any reader will be able to supply his/her favorite examples.

     

    22. Thomas Pynchon, Gravity’s Rainbow (New York: Viking, 1973).

     

    23. Maya Deren, Divine Horsemen (New Paltz, NY: Book Collectors Society, 1970 [1st ed. 1953]), 134.

     

    24. James A. Snead, “Repetition as a Figure of Black Culture,” in Henry Louis Gates, Jr., ed., Black Literature and Literary Theory, 72. See also 67: “In black culture, the thing (the ritual, the dance, the beat) is ‘there for you to pick up when you come back to get it.’ If there is a goal . . . it continually ‘cuts’ back to the start, in the musical meaning of ‘cut’ as an abrupt, seemingly unmotivated break. . . .” For a very helpful analysis of the technique of “cutting” in African music, see J.M. Chernoff, African Rhythm and African Sensibility (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1979).

     

    25. See Kimberly Benston, Baraka: the Renegade and the Mask (New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 1976).

     

    26. See Henry Louis Gates, Jr., “The Signifying Monkey,” in Black Literature and Literary Theory, 297.

     

    27. Houston Baker, Modernism and the Harlem Renaissance (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1987), 56; see 69.

     

    28. See Cornel West, “Minority Discourse and the Pitfalls of Canon Formation,” in Yale Journal of Criticism 1 (1987), 199. West’s essay is a very important and persuasive statement, though I disagree locally with his view of Reed.

     

    29. A comparison might also be drawn between Reed and Don DeLillo, whose recent Libra advances a conspiracy theory of the JFK assassination not unlike the conspiracies so doggedly pursued in Pynchon’s and Reed’s novels, though DeLillo’s tone of dire, hard-boiled historicity differs from theirs. For remarks on Reed and Pynchon, see Reginald Martin, Ishmael Reed and the New Black Aesthetic Critics (New York: St. Martin’s P, 1983), 2; see also 43.

     

    30. This point is argued by Fredric Jameson in an interview in Social Text 17 (1987), 45, in which Jameson contrasts the passivity of the postmodern individual subject to the “collective subject” present in “third world literature.” This “collective subject” is an interpretive construct similar to Baker’s “common sense of the tribe,” the communal emphasis of much African-American literature. See the related (and problematic) article by Jameson, “Third World Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism,” in Social Text 15 (1986), and the response by Aijaz Ahmad, “Jameson’s Rhetoric of Otherness,” Social Text 17 (1987).

     

    31. For two opposed points of view on this issue in Pynchon (whether his notion of the subversive is sinister and hopeless or liberating), see, respectively, the essays by George Levine and Tony Tanner in Levine and David Leverenz, eds., Mindful Pleasures (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976).

     

    32. The Crying of Lot 49 (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), 170-71. (The passage is cited by Tony Tanner in Harold Bloom, ed., Thomas Pynchon (New York: Chelsea House, 1986), 188; see Tanner’s commentary on 187.) The third alternative that Oedipa considers–that “a labyrinthine plot has been mounted against” her–exposes the negative potential of the secrecy whose positive side is the liberating “density of dream.” Among the many remarkable features of this passage one might notice Pynchon’s punning connection, in lamenting “exitlessness,” between American failure and the sense of constriction, on the one hand, and American success and wide open spaces, on the other (cf. Latin exitus and Spanish exito)–a frontier ideology also dear to Reed (see, among other texts, his introduction to his anthology of California poetry, Calafia [Berkeley, CA: Y’Bird, 1979]). The dominant image conjured by Pynchon’s “exitlessness” is that of a Southern California freeway like those driven so often by Oedipa, but without exits: the frontier as labyrinth or imprisoning web.

     

    33. The possibility of subversively liberating moments does, as Levine insists, exist in Pynchon, but these are only moments, not full-scale traditions or communities. The radical or revolutionary movements in the book, even when grounded in community, are just as macabrely threatening as the establishment they combat (for example, the mass- suicidal Hereros of Gravity’s Rainbow [315ff.]).

     

    34. For a useful survey of Reed’s adversarial relation to various “black aesthetic” critics, chiefly Addison Gayle, Houston Baker, and Amiri Baraka, see Martin’s book. Reed asserts that he writes within an African-American aesthetic, but he identifies such an aesthetic with a stylistic and structural approach (similar to the concept of “cutting” described by Snead), rather than with revolutionary content, as does Baraka. See Martin, 2; see also Reed’s important introductions to the anthologies Yardbird Lives (New York, 1978) and 19 Necromancers from Now, as well as his famous run-in with the socialist realist Bo Shmo in Yellow Back Radio, (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1969) 34-35. A simplified critique of Reed’s polemic in this passage is presented by Michael Fabre, “Postmodernist Rhetoric in Ishmael Reed’s Yellow Back Radio Broke Down,” in P. Bruck and W. Karrer, eds., The Afro-American Novel Since 1960 (Amsterdam: Gruner, 1982), 177, who sees it as championing “art” against “commitment.”

     

    35. Page citations to The Terrible Twos are from the Atheneum edition (New York: Atheneum, 1982).

     

    36. Despite the multiplicity of the cultures that the Mutafikah want to liberate, their faith is in the singularity of each of these cultures, and in their own singularity as quarrelsome representatives of these cultures. A Mexican tells an Anglo revolutionary during a Mutafikah meeting that he suspects him because “you carry [Cortes and Pizarro] in your veins as I carry the blood of Moctezuma”; a Chinese attacks a black member by claiming that “you North American blacks were”–and are–“docile”– because “the strong [Africans] were left behind in South America.” (Mumbo Jumbo, 86-87.)

     

    37. For recent remarks along these lines, see Valerie Smith, Self-Discovery and Authority in Afro-American Narrative (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1987), 102.

     

    38. In his Preface to the 1975 anthology Yardbird Lives (ed. with Al Young; New York: Grove, 1978?), Reed attacks the critics who “in 1970” (just before the publication of the volume edited by Addison Gayle, The Black Aesthetic) “were united in their attempt to circumscribe the subject and form of Afro-American writing.” He goes on to announce that what he calls “the ethnic phase of American literature” is now over, “counterculture ethnic, black ethnic, red ethnic, feminist ethnic, academic ethnic, beat ethnic, New York School ethnic, and all of the other churches who believe their choir sings the best.” Reed proclaims that “the multicultural renaissance is larger than the previous ones because, like some African and Asian religions, it can absorb them” (Yardbird Lives, 13-14).

     

    39. Mumbo Jumbo, 35.

     

    40. See R.F. Thompson, Flash of the Spirit (New York: Random House, 1983), 172-77, Deren, Divine Horsemen, and Melville J. Herskovits, The New World Negro (Bloomington, IN: Indiana UP, 1966), 324-25, which lists other vodoun syntheses of pagan and Christian.

     

    41. Yellow Back Radio, 153.

     

    42. See Thompson, 179ff. On the ethical ambiguity of vodoun deities and its relation to the twin modes Petro and Rada. On Dom Petro/Petre, see Thompson, 179. It is interesting to note that the Bacchic or Satyrlike sexuality of Reed’s Black Peter (revealed as a clever impostor in the sequel, The Terrible Threes, 40, 42) can be cross- referenced to the phallic energy frequently associated with the trickster figure in African legend via a pun concealed in his name (the “black snake” of blues tradition). On the “phallic trickster,” see Houston Baker, Blues, Ideology and Afro-American Literature (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1984), 183ff. Baker remarks that “the trickster is also a cultural gift-bearer” (like Peter/Nicholas!).

     

    43. St. Nicholas was noted for rescuing children, usually in groups of three.

     

    44. See Charles W. Jones, St. Nicholas of Myra, Bari, and Manhattan (Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1978), 43, 61, 307ff. See also 309: Nicholas “thinks in dualities.” (Reed evidently relied heavily on Jones’ study in writing The Terrible Twos.) The duality persists, in diluted form, in the present-day Santa who may give lumps of coal as well as candy.

     

    45. For Nicholas’ defiance of the Emperor Constantine, see Jones, 34.

     

    46. Herskovits, 324. On the marassa as representative of “man’s twinned nature,” see Deren, 38-41.

     

    47. See Deren, 130-37.

     

    48. Such skepticism is even more prominent in the sequel to The Terrible Twos, 1989’s The Terrible Threes, which ends with the officially-sponsored kidnapping of the now-leftist Dean Clift.

     

  • Two Moroccan Storytellers in Paul Bowles’ Five Eyes: Larbi Layachi and Ahmed Yacoubi

    John R. Maier

    State University of New York, College at Brockport
    jmaier@brock1p

     

    If, as Michel Foucault claims, “Western man” has become a “confessing animal” with a narrative literature appropriate to that role, does the Western author/confessor elicit from the cultural other a story that makes sense either to the priest or the patient? The Western listener in this case is American expatriate Paul Bowles. The other culture is Moroccan, on the margins of the complex Arab- Muslim culture of the Middle East and North Africa. As the country in that Arab-Muslim complex with the easiest access for Europeans, a country that has argued within itself whether it ought to belong more to the Arab League or to the European community, Morocco is also on the margins of the West. Indeed, its very name means, in Arabic, the “farthest West.”

     

    We ask the others (“primitives,” nomads, Third World peoples, traditional societies) to speak to us–and listen well. We take photographs of them, and analyze the photographs. The professionals in this enterprise are anthropologists and the sociologists like Moroccan Fatima Mernissi, who studied in her own country and then went to Paris and to Brandeis to complete Western-style Ph.D. work and who now interviews non-literate Moroccan women. The women tell her their life stories, and she lets them talk without much imposing of the Western autobiographical styles we have been developing since St. Augustine.

     

    American anthropologists have had ready access to Morocco. Many of them–Clifford Geertz, Paul Rabinow, and Vincent Crapanzano especially–have come, like their counterparts in literary studies, to question the fundamental assumptions of their profession. In different ways they have found ways to have Moroccans speak: for Geertz, through symbols like stories told of 17th Century Sufi saints; for Rabinow, through the hermeneutics of fieldwork (following Paul Ricoeur to the “comprehension of the self through the detour of the comprehension of the other”); and for Crapanzano, through the stories and esoteric lore of a Meknes tile-maker who is convinced he is married to the seductive she-demon ‘A’isha Qandisha. All entered Morocco and found ways to have Moroccans speak to them.

     

    These anthropologists are witnesses, among many others, to what Richard E. Palmer has called the “end of the modern era,” and to what Palmer claims is a “major change in worldview” to “postmodernity” (363-364). The postmodern turn is evident immediately in the short stories and novels of Paul Bowles (1910- ). (A possible exception is The Spider’s House.) While there has been some experimenting with point of view, e.g., “The Eye” in Midnight Mass and “New York 1965” in Unwelcome Words, a key element is probably Bowles’ refusal to accept the assumptions of modern Western realistic fiction about character. How much theorizing about literature this has involved is moot. My guess is that Bowles’ refusal of the modern notion of character, derived from an image of the self that had developed during the period of modern philosophy (i.e., since Descartes), comes from his reading of eccentric fiction–from a lifelong interest in Edgar Allan Poe and an adult interest in Surrealism.

     

    Bowles’ fiction seems at first to be straightforward realistic fiction, one of the defining characteristics of modernism. But the modernist readings nearly always fail. Characters have little “depth.” They rarely “develop.” Instead of closure, there is most often irony: “relationships” collapse, dialogue falls apart. There is no “self” such as has been assumed in the modern West. In the non-Western storytelling of non-literate Moroccans Bowles found a very different sense of self.

     

    One way to detect this postmodern turn in Bowles’ work is to look at Bowles’ translations of Moroccan storytellers. By the mid-1960s he had almost abandoned his own fiction writing for the strange bicultural hybrids that were produced by Bowles–especially Five Eyes (1979). To see what is happening in these texts–literature in English (for an English-reading audience, of course) whose origin is oral performance in Moroccan Arabic–consider a distinction that has arisen in the “modern” world and fundamentally constitutes the West’s image of itself as “modern,” namely a distinction frequently encountered in the social sciences: “traditional” vs. “modern.” Although it is especially evident in anthropology, the distinction is the latest in the West’s powerful “gaze” upon the cultural other: “traditional” replacing to a great extent the earlier “primitive,” “modern” replacing the earlier image (still sometimes found in advertizing) of “civilized” society.

     

    In The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing The Middle East (1958), Daniel Lerner collapsed the elements of a “modern” society–a certain type of economic development, urbanism, literacy, media exposure, and political participation–into a simple, telling comment. In the modern or “participant” society, “most people go through school, read newspapers, receive cash payments in jobs they are legally free to change, buy goods for cash in an open market, vote in elections which actually decide among competing candidates, and express opinions on many matters which are not their personal business” (50-1). The psychological mechanism he isolated in the change from a traditional to a modern society Lerner called “psychic mobility” or “empathy”:

     

    The mobile person is distinguished by a high capacity for identification with new aspects of his environment; he comes equipped with the mechanisms needed to incorporate new demands upon himself that arise outside of his habitual experience. These mechanisms for enlarging a man's identity operate in two ways. Projection facilitates identification by assigning to the object certain preferred attributes of the self--others are "incorporated" because they are like me. (Distantiation or negative identification, in the Freudian sense, results when one projects onto others certain disliked attributes of the self.) Introjection enlarges identity by attributing to the self certain desirable attributes of the object--others are "incorporated" because I am like them or want to be like them. We shall use the word empathy as shorthand for both these mechanisms. (49)

     

    Lerner, a sociologist, mentions along the way that “the typical literary form of the modern epoch, the novel, is a conveyance of disciplined empathy. Where the poet once specialized in self-expression, the modern novel reports his sustained imagination of the lives of others” (52).

     

    Concepts like “literary realism,” thought to support the novel as Lerner conceives of it, derive in part from a literary tradition, from texts that form a tradition. We increase our psychic mobility by reading literary works. But we also draw in our reading upon socially constructed concepts of the self. When such concepts of the self, maintained by a culture other than our own, clash with our own, we find it difficult to accept the other’s self- disclosure.

     

    Narratives coming to us from the margins of the Arab- Muslim world can be particularly trying. Arabic literature is old enough and prestigious enough–no matter how small the percentage of readers literate enough to read Standard Arabic might be–to exert influences that are not easily detected by the Western observer. Edward Said, for example, has noticed that “Arabic literature before the twentieth century has a rich assortment of narrative forms–qissa, sira, hadith, khurafa, ustura, khabar, nadira, maqama–of which no one seems to have become, as the European novel did, the major narrative type” (Allen 17). John A. Haywood (126-137) and more recently Roger Allen (9- 19) have struggled with the problem of distinguishing Western influences on Arabic narratives, novels and short stories, from the influences of the Arabic literary tradition.1

     

    Bowles, who has never claimed to have mastered modern Standard Arabic, the dialect used for writing throughout the Arab world, deliberately sought out non-literate storytellers. His preference for the oral performance is an indicator of much that has changed in the Western view of the non-Western world. (Bowles remains, though, one of the great examples of Lerner’s “mobile personality,” a modernist feature that would be impossible for Bowles to suppress.2)

     

    In 1958, Lerner could confidently oppose “illiterate” with “enlightenment,” so obvious was it to him that literacy was valuable without question. Since then much research into the distinctive changes introduced by literacy has qualified that easy confidence. When Walter J. Ong distinguishes the psychodynamics of orality from the thought and expression of literacy, he does not devalue the former:

     

              Additive rather than subordinative;
              Aggregative rather than analytic;
              Redundant or "copious" vs. spare and economical;
              Traditionalist vs. experimental;
              Close to the human lifeworld vs. knowledge at a
                   distance;
              Agonistically toned vs. abstractions that disengage;
              Empathetic and participatory rather than objectively
                   distanced;
              Homeostatic vs. novelty; and
              Situational rather than abstract (37-49)

     

    (Note that Ong considers the oral culture “empathetic and participatory” in a much different way from Daniel Lerner, who sees the empathy not in the known and the traditional, but for the other.) In the case of Bowles’ translations, the non-literate Ahmed Yacoubi and Larbi Layachi are certainly “traditional,” according to Lerner’s model, and marked by the orality of Ong’s. The one who elicits their stories, Bowles himself, remains a modern in Lerner’s sense, since he cannot avoid the empathy that is so much a part of modern society.

     

    At least one reason for Bowles’ incessant travel outside the United States and his settling into Tangier in the late 1940s was a dislike of most everything Western and “civilized.” He repeated Claude Levi-Strauss’ observation that the West needs to “dump vast quantities of waste matter, which it dumps on less fortunate peoples” (Their Heads are Green vii). Levi-Strauss had written, “What travel discloses to us first of all is our own garbage, flung in the face of humanity.” To this Bowles added: “My own belief is that the people of the alien cultures are being ravaged not so much by the by-products of our civilization, as by the irrational longing on the part of members of their own educated minorities to cease being themselves and become Westerners” (vii). The stories he translated, not from written sources but from his recordings of oral performances, are successful to the extent that Bowles lets the other speak, in writing, in the best American English: he lets them be themselves.

     

    Daisy Hilse Dwyer, another of the American anthropologists who have had access to Morocco, based her study of “male and female in Morocco,” Images and Self- Images (1978), on Moroccan folktales she recorded there. She followed Geertz in seeing a different concept of “personhood” operating in Morocco and evident in the folktales–a self socially embedded, relational, interactional: “personality or character varies rather flexibly from relationship to relationship” (182). This is in contrast to the Western stress on the person as “isolate.”

     

    If the sense of self, personhood, character contrasts strongly with the West’s self-concept, then stories, whether they are consciously fictions or self-disclosures, are not likely to have the same shape as modern Western fiction. Fatima Mernissi defended her practice in interviewing non- literate Moroccan women, in which she violated “Rule No. 1 that I learned at the Sorbonne and at the American university where I was trained in ‘research technique’: to maintain objectivity toward the person being interviewed” (Doing Daily Battle 18). And she violated Rule No. 2 in the way she developed “as much as possible an attitude of self-criticism” and testing of subjectivity as she edited the interviews. She let the speakers, who had never been given the opportunity/task to tell of themselves in such a (Western) fashion, speak in as comfortable a manner as she could allow. The results were life stories that are “relaxed, often confusing” in the way time sequences and events are narrated. “An illiterate woman who has virtually no control over her life, subject to the whims and will of others, has a much more fluid sense of time than an educated Western reader, who is used to analysing time in an attempt to control it” (20). A non-Western sense of time operates in the stories Bowles translates as well. Whatever one makes of the “reality” in literary “realism,” so important to the modern West, reality is rather differently shaped in the Moroccans’ accounts.3

     

    Bowles has provided English-speaking readers with stories that challenge their ability to translate a culture very different from their own. Among the tales collected in Five Eyes (1979) are two that play on the Western reader’s expectations. One seems bizarre indeed, and the other only too easily read. “The Night Before Thinking,” by Ahmed Yacoubi (1931- ), and “The Half-Brothers” by Larbi Layachi (1940- ), Moroccan storytellers, illustrate an unusual hermeneutical bind.

     

    Both Ahmed Yacoubi and Larbi Layachi are non-literate storytellers the expatriate Bowles met in Morocco. In “Notes on the Work of the Translator,” Bowles indicated his admiration for oral storytelling such as he had heard in the cafes of Tangier. Once the tape-recorder had arrived in Morocco, in 1956, he began recording oral tales. Like all the spoken texts in Five Eyes, “The Night Before Thinking” and “The Half-Brothers” were performed without stopping, at a single sitting. Yacoubi’s story derives from traditional Moroccan materials, and is full of imagination; Larbi’s story, on the other hand, strikes the reader as a realistic piece, more like an oral history than a traditional North African tale.

     

    As popular as storytellers are in Morocco, the stories have no appreciable value there “as literature.” Virtually every traveler has commented on the storytellers in public places, like the square known as Djemaa el Fna in Marrakech, where they perform daily to enthusiastic audiences made up not of Western tourists but of the people who know the traditions and the languages, Arabic and Berber. Elias Cannetti, who visited the square in the 1960s, was struck by the contrast between the quiet scribes who made themselves available to the many who are not literate in the society (and with whom, as a writer, he felt a kind of kinship), and the flamboyant storytellers:

    The largest crowds are drawn by the storytellers. It is around them that people throng most densely and stay longest. Their performances are lengthy; an inner ring of listeners squat on the ground and it is some time before they get up again. Others, standing, form an outer ring; they, too, hardly move, spellbound by the storyteller's words and gestures. . . . Having seldom felt at ease among the people of our zones whose life is literature--despising them because I despise something about myself, and I think that something is paper--I suddenly found myself here among authors I could look up to since there was not a line of theirs to be read. (77, 79)

     

     

    Thanks in large measure to Milman Parry, Albert Lord, Walter J. Ong, and now a journal devoted to Oral Tradition, the debate over orality and literacy has become respectable in the academy, and the value of oral narratives is gradually coming clear to those whose teaching and scholarship have been almost entirely preoccupied with the written word. Before such a revaluation can take place in Morocco, however, an almost insurmountable obstacle has to be overcome. The gap between Modern Standard Arabic, the dialect of Arabic used in writing, and the regional dialects of Arabic is much greater than, say, between Appalachian English and British Received Pronunciation or American Broadcast Standard. Any literate Arab speaker can understand Modern Standard, whether it is written in Iraq, Egypt or the Maghrib; but the local dialects are often mutually unintelligible. Because of that gap, Arabic provided the classical case of what linguists call “diglossia.”4 The rich nuances of an oral tale may delight the Arab speaker, but it will not be enough to raise the tale to the prestige of writing.

     

    Ahmed Yacoubi5 and Larbi Layachi are in a peculiar situation, then. Their oral tales are not available to Moroccan literature, and the English translations are the only texts available to any audience. The original situation of the oral performance, the Sitz im Leben, is not accessible; recordings in the Moghrebi Arabic dialect have not been made available to the public. The written text, in American English, is the product of a collaboration between Bowles and the storytellers; it is all that remains of what was first of all an oral performance in a culture and language strikingly different from the English-speaking readers. The “authors” of the tales find themselves unable to read the texts.

     

    AHMED YACOUBI’S “THE NIGHT BEFORE THINKING”

     

    Ahmed Yacoubi’s “The Night Before Thinking” is a tale in a vein familiar to Middle East and North African storytellers, a tale of magic and the supernatural.6 For that reason it is both familiar to the Western reader–after all, Western literature is filled with magic (Dr. Faustus, the romance tradition)–and inaccessible to us. “Magic moonshine” is appropriate to the romance-writer, as Hawthorne pointed out long ago, so that “the floor of our familiar room [becomes] a neutral territory, somewhere between the real world and fairy-land, where the Actual and the Imaginary may meet, and each imbue itself with the nature of the other” (38). But serious treatment of magic is reserved for special genres–children’s literature, where it is supposedly appropriate to the “magical phase” of human development (to be cast off in normal development), or science fiction and fantasy, where it is part of the game.7

     

    “The Night Before Thinking” begins in one generation and ends in another. In revenge for the killing of her brother Difdaf, one “Raqassa” (whose real name turns out to be Aaklaa bent Aaklaa) lures an unsuspecting Hakim into her power. Instead of killing him, she ends up marrying Hakim, and a strange boy is born of their union. Raqassa possesses very powerful magic, inherited from her father and drawing support from Satan. Thus it is not entirely unexpected that the strange child finds a way to kill both parents. With their death the daughter, whose growth had been stunted for twenty-five years, begins to grow.

     

    Yacoubi’s bizarre tale includes a reversal that might go almost unnoticed by the Western reader but would have fit into the familiar pattern of traditional narratives. The terrible seductress and mother, Raqassa, explains that she gained “the power” because of an accident of birth. When her mother, Lalla Halalla, was carrying twins in her womb, she slipped while running, and the girl was born five minutes before the boy. “The one who came out first had to be given the power,” and so she, not Difdaf, gained the power that is exhibited, for example, in throwing “a darkness” over the face of Hakim, spreading his lips all over his cheeks, and seizing the man with the force of “sixty thousand kilos” (24), capturing him. The story is filled with oddments of magic, burning “bakhour,” an “egg of Rokh el Bali,” humans turning to smoke.

     

    Later, when Raqassa and Hakim produce a most unusual child–a boy with eyes all over his body–they try to explain how they had been able to produce a child with such strange powers. The child himself only laughs at them:

     

    What a lot of lies you both tell! he said to them. One of you says the eye in the top of my head comes from one thing. The other says the eye the middle of my forehead comes from something else. You are saying that your eyes are in my eyes. I already existed before you ever met each other. I was hidden and neither one of you knew me. Only God knew I was going to be like this. You didn't know. Now you think you understand all about it. You don't know anything. How can anyone know what's hidden inside the belly of a woman? It's God who decided I should be like this. He cut out my pattern. And neither of you knew how I was going to look. It was written in the books that I was going to be born like this. It was already known. (33)

     

    The second child they produce is a girl, strangely deformed and very weak. Twenty-five years later she remained as tiny as she was at the time of her birth. When the son manages to kill the parents, the girl begins immediately to grow. Instead of the live parents, the children keep only two three-colored cloths, one representing the father, the other representing the mother. The son asks his sister which of the cloths she wants. “The girl laughed. She said: I take my mother. Because I’m a virgin. And the boy always goes with his father” (35). The power is returned to the proper relationship between male and female. In spite of the supposed gap of twenty-five years, the offspring of Hakim and Raqassa remain pre- adolescent children, but they are now prepared to grow into their “normal” roles.

     

    “Normal” roles are not necessarily the same in different cultures, of course. In an often-cited essay on “Family Structure and Feminine Personality,” Nancy Chodorow called attention to the Moroccan Muslim family as one that, even in a patrilineal, patrilocal society, maintained the self-esteem of women–largely because daughters see themselves, in a way strikingly different from daughters in the West, as “allies against oppression,” able to develop strong attachment to and identification with other women (65). Obviously, the family in “The Night Before Thinking” is a perversion of Moroccan norms, due to the peculiar situation of Raqassa. Chodorow’s view of Moroccan Muslim mother/daughter relationships derives from the work of Moroccan sociologist, Fatima Mernissi. Mernissi’s Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society explores the family in Arab-Muslim tradition and in emerging new models (165-77).

     

    Larbi Layachi’s “The Half-brothers”

     

    In reading Larbi Layachi’s “The Half-Brothers,”8 as in tracking down political chicanery, it is useful to follow the money. The ten-year-old Larbi works with the fishermen, pulling nets, for wages that rarely seem to have connection with the work expended: five rials and a basketful of fish one day, three rials another, one rial on yet another occasion. The boy seems not to expect more (or less), and he does not complain. One day when he is feeling quite ill and barely able to pull the nets, the other fishermen notice it, and suggest he take the day off, but Larbi insists on working (62). He gets his three rials anyway. He is paid twelve pesetas for a basket filled with metal he dug out of a garbage dump (71). He pays a rial for half a loaf of bread, a can of tuna fish, and two oranges (72). Two bilyoun for the cinema (68). He finds in the garbage a five-rial note, which he had first thought only a peseta (74). Usually he gets three gordas for a kilo of bones he sells to “a Jew who lived near the bull-ring” (70-1).

     

    Bowles offers no dollar equivalence for these exotic monies.9 In one sense it does not matter: the amounts are so small relative to the wealth of an American reader that the meaningless currency is a powerful sign of poverty. From the point of view of a ten-year-old, money is simply “there,” a fact in a world that does not require explanation or expectations. But the arbitrary payment of wages, the caprice in finding money on the streets, the crude exploitation of the boys’ step-father, who regularly takes everything the boy makes at his job (while the other son attends school and is forbidden to work)–are part of a world that seems to lack cause and effect. The boy is industrious enough and clever to survive. He does not try to put the experience in a “larger context,” and neither does the storyteller Larbi, who offers almost nothing in the way of comment incidents in his past. The money is a gift, baraka, the will of Allah. Paul Rabinow, who did his fieldwork in Morocco, noted that

     

    poverty does not carry the stigma in Morocco which it does in America. It indicates only a lack of material goods at the present time, nothing more. Although regrettable, it does not reflect unfavorably on one's character. It simply means that Allah has not smiled on one, for reasons beyond normal understanding, but that things are bound to change soon. (116)

     

    What is most surprising to the American reader is the apparent lack of causal connectedness between events narrated in “The Half-Brothers.” True, the story leads to the moment when the ten year old decides that he will no longer return to the home in which he is exploited and beaten by his step-father. Henceforth Larbi will live on the beach. The man, Si Abdullah, pockets the five rial note Larbi found in the garbage and forces the boy out of the house to work, though Larbi is not feeling well.

     

    I went out. I was thinking: I'll work. But the money I earn I'll spend for food, and I won't go back home at all. I can eat here on the beach. And I was thinking that it would be better for me to sleep in one of the boats than live there in the house. (74)

     

    Larbi works that day, dizzy and with a headache, and takes the two and a half rials the chief gives him to a cafe. After dark he finds a boat and sleeps warmly under the fish netting in the boat. When, in the morning, he is asked, “Why didn’t you go home to bed?” the boy answers simply, “I didn’t go . . . . That’s all. After that I lived on the beach” (75).

     

    The story thus presents a string of episodes, a linear development, a clear structure with episodes leading to the decision of the boy to live on the beach, but with little of the sense common to Western realistic fiction that all details fit into a larger, causally related whole. The problem emerges early, in the very different treatment given the boy and his half-brother by the mother’s second husband, Si Abdullah. The episodes are strung together without moving toward a climax of intensity. Sometimes the father is awful, occasionally generous; he is always seen from the outside, and there is no interest in (and no comment on) the father or the mother. They act; that is all. The boys, on the other hand, are somewhat rounded but move about unconsciously, accepting social norms that are often puzzling to the outsider, the Western reader.

     

    In “Africa Minor,” Bowles describes a “culture where there is a minimum of discrepancy between dogma and natural behavior”: “In Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco there are still people whose lives proceed according to the ancient pattern of concord between God and man, agreement between theory and practice, identity of word and flesh” (Their Heads are Green 22). The unself-consciousness of “The Half-Brothers” is a narrative correlate of that ancient pattern. The story retains some features common to oral tales. A formula, “Let us say . . . ,” is repeated throughout the piece. The boy makes his money pulling the nets of the fishermen, and the activity is repeated a number of times in virtually the same language. In almost no way does it resemble the storytelling traits of “The Night Before Thinking,” traits that go back at least as far as The Thousand and One Nights.

     

    Cultures mix and appear to clash as “naturally”– unreflectively–as a rainstorm causes the shed where the boy and the family donkey are housed together to flood. The West is present, not remarked upon, not remarkable: the Spanish (simply identified with “the Nazarenes,” 60-61); canned food, the telephone, an ambulance, needles in the hospital. The cinema is remarked upon, since it was the first time the boy had seen a movie (69). “I bought a ticket at the window and went in. That was the first time I had been inside a cinema. Now I see why people like to live in the city. This theatre is very fine, I thought. There were pictures of war, and there were airplanes flying” (69). As is usual in Bowles’ own fiction, even the remarkable is presented with no indication of changes in intensity, in intonation, rarely an indication of enthusiasm. This, too, is part of the cultural code: all facts are equal, and equally valued.10

     

    The voice of “The Half-Brothers” may be Larbi’s, but the questions that prompt it–the questions raised by the hidden author/audience–are Western, American. Larbi is prompted to talk in a way that is not a traditionally Moroccan way of speaking. Rather it is a confessional manner that, as Michel Foucault has insisted, increasingly characterizes Western discourse. The result is a story that is closer to oral history, the purest example of this new authorship in the West, than to fictional modes–the portraits of the artist, for example–that help to organize the narratives.

     

    Foucault, in volume one of The History of Sexuality (1976), pointed out that in the West, since the Middle Ages “at least,” confession has been a major ritual in the production of “truth.” “We have since become a singularly confessing society” (59). There is a certain irony in Paul Bowles prompting the words of Larbi, since he is notoriously reticent about revealing himself directly, even in his autobiography. Without Stopping (1972) records that Bowles learned early that he “would always be kept from doing what I enjoyed and forced to do that which I did not” by his family, particularly by his father. “Thus I became an expert in the practice of deceit, at least insofar as general mien and facial expressions were concerned.” He could not, however, bring himself to lie, “inasmuch as for me the word and its literal meaning had supreme importance” (17). Except for the hostility toward his family, Bowles’ autobiography is striking in the way it avoids self- disclosure and analysis of the many people, famous and not, who crowd the pages of Without Stopping.11

     

    Foucault noted the change in the West that was first religious and legal but came to have great significance for literature. He rightly emphasized the power of the one eliciting the confession:

     

    For a long time, the individual was vouched for by the reference of others and the demonstration of his ties to the commonweal (family, allegiance, protection); then he was authenticated by the discourse of truth he was able or obliged to pronounce concerning himself. The truthful confession was inscribed at the heart of the procedures of individualization by power. (58-9)

     

    As “Western man” became a “confessing animal,” according to Foucault, there was correspondingly a massive change in literature:

     

    We have passed from a pleasure to be recounted and heard, centering on the heroic or marvelous narration of "trials" of bravery or sainthood, to a literature ordered according to the infinite task of extracting from the depths of oneself, in between the words, a truth which the very form of the confession holds out like a shimmering image. (59)

     

    In “The Half-Brothers” Larbi is brought to a point where he can and must abandon his family, to live on the beach. Importantly Larbi does not become a writer, as Bowles had, or others, like Joyce, who inscribed their lives in “portraits.” Larbi is the one who was not educated and remained non-literate while Bowles recorded, translated, and wrote down the storyteller’s words. There is nothing in the story (or in Bowles’ comments on his non-literate storytellers) to indicate that there is anything wrong in that. (The one storyteller in Five Eyes who presented difficulties for Bowles was Mohammed Choukri, the only one to become literate and the one who insisted that Bowles follow the Arabic text word for word, comma by comma when the two worked together to translate the stories [8].)

     

    Bowles is the partner to Larbi’s confession, but it is not clear where the power is. Success as an “author” had given Larbi enough money so that he could look for a bride (Without Stopping 350); but the anxiety over official objection to his book, A Life Full of Holes forced Larbi to leave Morocco, never to return (355). The story of a ten-year-old who leaves his family, mainly owing to oppression at the hands of his step-father is not in the traditional repertory of the Moroccan storyteller. (Larbi’s mother is sometimes sympathetic to her son’s needs; she tries to moderate her husband’s attacks on the boy; she gives him food; but she, like the rest of the family, merely ignores the boy during a lengthy stay in the hospital.) It is also a scandalous tale in that it does not fit into the curve of development expected of men in the Arab-Muslim world.

     

    Larbi is “about ten” when he leaves home for the beach. Significantly, he is not yet an adolescent, not yet bothered by sexual urges. If a certain degree of wild behavior is allowed the drari–even encouraged by cultural norms of child rearing–there is a larger pattern captured by the proverb,

     

    The boy of ten is like a peeled cucumber.
    The man of twenty makes friendships with fools.
    The man of thirty (is like the) flower of the garden.
    The man of forty is in his prime. (Dwyer 87)

     

    From the child’s earliest days, according to Daisy Hilse Dwyer, the Moroccan boy’s “egotistical spontaneity” is encouraged (91). Even in the womb “the male is believed to be a bundle of energy that is predisposed to movement. The male fetus is believed to flit from side to side in the abdomen, nervously covering his ground.” Still, this exaggerated freedom of the boys running wild in the streets is but one phase in a “developmental pathway” (166) in which a male eventually achieves the potential of his ‘aqel (intelligence, responsibility, rationality; 152), wisdom, and spiritual insight, usually in middle age.

     

    The drari in Morocco have certainly occasioned their share of comments from Western visitors there. Elizabeth Warnock Fernea’s largely successful attempt to enter the world of Moroccan women was initially blocked by the boys in the neighborhood, who treated Fernea’s children rudely. They made rude gestures, called the Fernea children names, and threw clods of dirt, then stones, at the family. Even the mild-mannered anthropologist, Fernea’s husband Bob, turned on them when they demanded baksheesh and tweaked daughter Laila’s hair at the same time. Fernea’s sense of alienation was complete. “This was no fairy tale, I told myself. We were alone, strange and alien, in a strange and alien world” (59).

     

    Anthropologist Paul Rabinow found his way literally blocked by the drari, when he first entered the village of Sidi Lahcen Lyussi, where he was supposed to conduct his research:

     

    The car was greeted . . . by what seemed like hundreds of drari--which is inadequately translated as children. These fearless little monsters surrounded the car, much to the annoyance of their elders. Screaming, yelling, and pushing they proceeded to examine all of my possessions. One of the villagers' main fears, it turns out, was that these drari would do some irreparable damages either to me or to my belongings. Their fathers threatened them with beatings, curses, and exclamations, to little or no avail. (84)

     

    Fortunately, the Fernea family came to be accepted in the neighborhood. A young boy even alerted them to a key they had left in the door, an invitation to robbery in most cities. And Rabinow, similarly, found little to complain about later in his stay, regarding the boys. Daisy Hilse Dwyer, though, notes the anxieties of Moroccan families over the unruly behavior of sons even much later in the sons’ lives, before the wisdom of age enters them. And the beatings Rabinow found the fathers threatening their sons with are very much a part of the fathers’ prerogatives.12 The expectation that men normally improve with age (and women do not) is a common pattern in Moroccan folktales (Dwyer 52-7).

     

    Precisely because it is not difficult to “follow” such a story, what is revealed is our way (tradition) of reading, the genres and expectations with which we are familiar. Larbi’s theme, Bowles tells us, is always “injustice and the suffering it causes,” and his purpose is “to ‘tell them outside’ what it is like to be shut inside” (Five Eyes 8). Presumably, the outsiders are the readers. But the very familiarity with realistic fiction which makes the story accessible may obscure the concept of character that informs the piece.

     

    Both Daisy Hilse Dwyer, who studied Moroccan stories for the light they shed on Moroccan ideas of male and female and their separate pathways of development (166), and Clifford Geertz, upon whose work she drew, distinguish between a Western and a Moroccan view of the person. In “On the Nature of Anthropological Understanding,” Geertz described Morocco as a “wild-west sort of place” filled with “rugged individuals” of many types. Yet he cautions that “no society consists of anonymous eccentrics bouncing off one another like billiard balls” (51). He emphasized the connectedness of individuals, the nisba that bound persons to families, occupations, religious sects, and even spiritual status. The outsider might see them as individuals of the Western sort, but insiders always knew the nisba of the person. “They are contextualized persons,” Geertz maintains.

     

    Behind this is a very different concept of the person from what has developed in the West since the Renaissance:

     

    The Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic center of awareness, emotional judgment, and action organized into a distinctive whole and seen contrastively both against other such wholes and against a social and natural background is, however incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of the world's cultures. (48)

     

    By prompting a decidedly Western style of story from Layachi, Bowles decontextualizes the ten-year-old. In particular, the developmental pathway (which, as Dwyer points out, has a moral curve quite different from “the predominant Euro-American sort” [166]) is obscured in the manner of closing the story–with Larbi as the triumphant individual who has thrown off the constraints of his family and society.

     

    In contrast, Yacoubi’s “The Night Before Thinking” returns the reader–after any number of magical turns, imaginary leaps that are by definition unexpected–to the familiar context of the Arab-Islamic family. Yacoubi includes one jest at the expense of the Western reader, who is routinely inscribed as the Nazarene in these stories: when he tells the story of the accident that brought a girl to birth before the boy, Yacoubi’s character says, “And she was born five minutes before I was. Five minutes for the Christians is a long time. For us it’s not such a big thing. But this time it was like a thousand years” (25), since the power fell to the woman’s lot and not the man’s.

     

    In a more innocent age these stories might have been enjoyed and dismissed as products of a “primitive” mind. The dangers of an attempt only slightly less suspect are still common: to read in the “Oriental” mind a strange, unfathomable otherness, and to see these others as what Edith Wharton called “unknown and unknowable people” (whom she nevertheless was able to describe; 113). Edward Said has alerted us to the dangers of “Orientalism.” As early as Aeschylus’ The Persians a West has thought itself confronted by a significant cultural other (56-7), visible today mainly in the Middle East and North Africa. Paul Bowles himself, attracted by Surrealist ideas, felt that in the part of the East he settled in he was finding the unconscious that civilization, the West, had repressed.13

     

    Listening to non-literate Moroccan storytellers, recording their voices, translating their culture into a form of printed text, into a tradition that developed a certain kind of “realistic fiction,” Paul Bowles has formed a curious kind of hybrid text. Authorship of “The Night Before Thinking” and “The Half-Brothers is not the simple process–an individual drawing on individual experience to produce a work–that the West has considered somehow fundamental to the very notion of literature. Now that an anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, is drawing on Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault to understand the anthropologist “as author” (Works and Lives 18-20), and Geertz himself is being drawn into a newer, more complex understanding of the authorship of literary works (Hernadi 757), it is becoming increasingly useful to look at texts produced by unusual “authors.”14

     

    It would, in one sense, be helpful to have the tapes of Ahmed Yacoubi’s and Larbi Layachi’s stories in Moghrebi Arabic. One could then trace the changes from speech to writing, from a local dialect of Arabic to a regional dialect of English, in a more detailed way than is now possible. On the other hand, when a non-literate Moroccan friend thought one of Bowles’ translations was “shameful” because he had “written about people just as they are” (in the friend’s view making them seem “like animals”), the friend dismissed the “objective truth” of the representation: “That is statistical truth. We are interested in that, yes, but only as a means of getting to the real truth underneath” (“Africa Minor” 32). On one point the American reader can be certain, however. Paul Bowles may have sought the primitive, the unconscious, in Morocco; but the longer he remained there and the better he became to know the people and the local dialects, the more he was able to appreciate the different sense of “reality” he found there.

     

    Notes

     

    1. For the postmodern turn in Arabic literature, which also complicates the relationship between Western narratology and the East, see Maier, “A Postmodern Syrian Fictionalist.” Anton Shammas’ Arabesques (1986), written by a Palestinian whose first language is Arabic, but written in Hebrew (it caused no little controversy in Israel), is a postmodern novel that somehow manages to incorporate both traditional Arab storytelling and a distinctively Western narrative. Amulets, fortune-telling, and magical birds combine in the same work with the (apparent) autobiography of a Palestinian writer carefully set in a specific historical situation. In many ways the main narrator, Anton, measures himself against the man he could not be, his uncle Yusef, the storyteller rooted in Arab and early Christian traditions. Anton is more sophisticated, more Westernized, more “modern”–in all the ways suggested by Daniel Lerner, especially in his “psychic mobility”–than his uncle; the traditions are known to Anton, and fascinating, but they elude him:

     

    That's how Uncle Yusef was. One the one hand, he was a devout Catholic, who like Saint Augustine was utterly certain, as if the Virgin Mary herself had assured him, that the years of his life were but links in a chain leading to salvation. On the other hand, as if to keep an escape route open for himself, in case the only reality was dust returning to dust and the jaws of the beast of nothing gaped wide, he still could believe that the circular, the winding and the elusive had the power to resist nothingness. However, he did not judge between these and even conceived of them as a single entity in which the djinni's Ar-Rasad was one and the same as the cock that crowed at dawn when Saint Peter denied Jesus thrice. And here I am, his nephew, who served as an altar boy until I was twelve and since then have trod among the alien corn, here I am trying to separate myself from Uncle Yusef's circular pagan- like time and follow the linear path of Christian time, which supposedly leads to salvation, to the breaking of the vicious circles. (227-8)

     

    2. What cannot be suppressed can be subverted by irony. Bowles’ story, “The Eye,” is a brilliant study of a society that believes in the “evil eye,” and of an intrusive Westerner, a kind of self-styled “private eye,” who manages to get the Moroccans to talk to him about a bizarre event in the past.

     

    3. Palmer identifies the “movement beyond Western forms of reality” as an important feature of postmodernity. “For some, the way beyond modernity is the way outside Western forms of thought” (373). To the examples Palmer gives could be added a most intriguing one from the Arab- Muslim world. In 1964 a court case was brought against the Lebanese writer, Layla Ba’labakki (1936- ), who was charged with obscenity and harming public morality for a short story she published, “A Space Ship of Tenderness to the Moon.” The case brought against Layla Ba’labakki by the Beirut vice squad rested on two sentences in the story. The case against her was dismissed by the Court of Appeals. The judges accepted Ba’labakki’s claim to belong to the literary school of realism, but in doing so, the judges appealed to Islamic tradition (making a move that would certainly seem strange to, say, American jurisprudence):

     

    The court wishes to state that realism in human life can be traced to the most ancient period in our history, to be more precise, to the moment when man was created by God, in his naked reality, and, later, hid his nakedness with fig leaves. On the whole, the court believes that so-called realistic phrases used by the author are only a means to express a kind of example (hikma), as in the lessons or examples we receive from the following works of literature: 1. The myth of man receiving the Covenant from God, the rainbow in the heavens, and man's unworthiness to receive it 2. The legend of the isolated cave in the desert (Saw'ar), its walls stained red with blood which stained the entire land of Canaan 3. The tale of Egypt's Pharaoh, in which his loved one, tempting the Pharaoh to lust, writhes on a bed of Lebanese cedar wood, her naked body fragrant with the scents of the land of Ethiopia 4. The story of the virgin of Israel, guardian of a dying kingdom, bringing to old age and coldness the warmth of her body . . . 5. The legend of the rose of Sharun, the lily of the valley. . . . (Fernea and Bazirgan 288)

     

    Arab realism is rooted in Arab-Islamic traditions, and the lower court’s decision stood closer to those traditions than the higher court’s. Overturning the lower court reflected the influence of more cosmopolitan and probably Western traditions.

     

    4. Modern Standard Arabic is a grammatically simplified version of Classical Arabic, the language of the Qur’an, the most prestigious form of language in the Islamic–not just the Arabic-speaking–world. Originally designed for the media, Modern Standard has already made “diglossia” much too simple a notion to describe the sociolinguistic intricacies of Arabic. M.H. Bakalla prefers the term “spectroglossia” for that reason (87).

     

    5. Jane Bowles’ biographer, Millicent Dillon, includes much information about Ahmed Yacoubi (1931- ) in A Little Original Sin (464). Paul Bowles discusses him in Without Stopping (esp. 308-33) and in Five Eyes (7, 144).

     

    6. For the different kinds of Middle Eastern and North African folktales, see Arab Folktales, esp. “Djinn, Ghouls, and Afreets, Tales of Magic and the Supernatural” (63-74) and “Magical Marriages and Mismatches” (153-157).

     

    7. For an explanation based mainly on Piaget’s stages in the child’s conception of the world, see F. Andre Favat, Child and Tale, 25-28 (“Magical Beliefs in Child and Tale”) and 48-57 (“The Present Explanation”). According to this explanation, the child’s interest in the fairy tale peaks between six and eight years and then declines rapidly. There is a resurgence of interest around eighteen and twenty years, and “in the adult there are vestiges of animism, magic, moralities of constraint, egocentrism, and the like” (56) that may account for continued interest in such stories long after the magical stage is abandoned.

     

    8. Millicent Dillon and Bowles (Without Stopping) offer insight into the life of Larbi Layachi:

     

    Paul and Jane had met Larbi while he was a guard at a cafe at Merkala Beach in Tangier. He had struggled since childhood to survive on his own and had spent a good deal of time in jail for minor infractions. Though he was illiterate, he had a remarkable gift as a storyteller, which Paul had immediately recognized . . . . Though Larbi had made some money from the sale of the book [A Life Full of Holes], he was quite content to work as houseboy for Paul in Arcila. (346)

     

    Bowles fills in the background of Larbi’s book, segments of which had been published, and Grove Press had wanted to see a book:

     

    At some point Richard Seaver had the idea of presenting the volume as a novel rather than as nonfiction, so that it would be eligible for a prize offered each year by an international group of publishers. . . . Larbi's book was defeated by Jorge Semprun's Le Long Voyage . . . Larbi made enough money from it to look for a bride. (Without Stopping 350)

     

    Besides underscoring the prestige of the novel in the West, the story indicates the ease with which fiction and nonfiction slide into one another.

     

    9. Bowles does not translate or explain a number of Moroccan terms and references, thus giving the narrative an exotic quality. Terms like Ouakha (rather like American OK; 56), vocatives like auolidi (my son; 60), and exclamations (Allah hiaouddi! and Ehi aloudi!; 64) really require no gloss. Common Moroccan terms like djellaba (the hooded overgarment with sleeves; 66) qahouaji (the tea-maker; 74), baqal (grocer; 59), and tajine (a Moroccan dish; 56) are so common in Moroccan stories (and in Bowles’ fiction) that they give the ordinary reader a sense of being an insider. Local references–Dar Menebbhi, Aqaba dl Kasbah, the Monopolio, Bou Khach Khach, the Charf–work in largely the same way.

     

    10. Note the (unremarked) presence in this Muslim world (where “Nazarenes” [Christians] at least upset the half-brother’s father) of “the Jew” who buys things from Larbi: “There was a Jew who lived near the bull-ring, and he always bought everything I took him. Usually I sold him bones. He paid three gordas a kilo for them” (70-71). This time he sells things from the dump and gets twelve pesetas. There is no hint of animus: it is simply accepted that they are culturally other.

     

    11. The most horrifying of the youthful stories is Bowles’ account, given him by his grandmother, of his father’s attempt to kill the six-weeks-old infant (Without Stopping, 38-39). According to the grandmother, Bowles’ father was jealous of the attention the son was receiving and exposed the infant to snow and cold. He was rescued by the grandmother. In a less dramatic gesture, the father beat him–only once–when Bowles was young and seized the boy’s notebooks:

     

    This was the only time my father beat me. It began a new stage in the development of hostilities between us. I vowed to devote my life to his destruction, even though it meant my own--an infantile conceit, but one which continued to preoccupy me for many years. (45)

     

    12. See Patai’s chapter, “The Endogamous Unilineal Descent Group” (407-436), added to the 3rd edition of his work. On paternal authority regarding the son–including beating–with examples from around the Middle East, see 412-17.

     

    13. For the attraction of French Surrealism, see Millicent Dillon, 92-93. Wayne Pounds notes that “in Moroccan folk culture Bowles has found a mythology and an objective correlative to those concerns which have remained most important to him as a writer” (119)–e.g., in tales of the Terrible Mother such as one finds in Yacoubi’s story. Pounds elsewhere (50-1) distinguishes between “the primitive” of the anthropologists (i.e., “a shared symbolic ordering of experience”) and of those who see it as a regression to older, pre-civilized thought. Eli Sagan gives a lucid account of Freud’s argument against civilization, 123-25.

     

    14. Bowles provides a good example of Barthes’ “hybrid” author-writer–who is, according to Barthes, a characteristic literary figure of our time. Not only is it virtually impossible to separate life from fiction in Bowles’ work, but nonfiction can be turned into fiction. A case in point is his revision of his wife’s nonfiction piece, “East Side: North Africa,” into fiction (“Everything is Nice,” in My Sister’s Hand in Mine 313-20). Stories in his Collected Stories, like “Istikhara, Anaya, Medagan and the Medaganat” (401-404) and “Things Gone and Things Still Here” (405-409), were originally conceived as essays. “Unwelcome Words” (61-86), the title piece in a series of stories, consists of letters of “Paul” to another writer cast in fictional form.

     

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Allen, Roger. The Arabic Novel, An Historical and Critical Introduction. Syracuse: Syracuse UP, 1982.
    • Bakalla, M. H. Arabic Culture through its Language and Literature. London: Kegan Paul International, 1984.
    • Ba’labakki, Layla. “A Space Ship of Tenderness to the Moon.” Trans. Denys Johnson-Davies. Middle Eastern Muslim Women Speak. 273-79.
    • Bowles, Jane. “East Side: North Africa.” Mademoiselle. April, 1951: 134+.
    • —. My Sister’s Hand in Mine. New York: Ecco Press,1978.
    • Bowles, Paul. “Africa Minor.” Their Heads are Green. 20-40.
    • —. Collected Stories, 1939-1976. Santa Barbara: Black Sparrow, 1979.
    • —, ed. and trans. Five Eyes. Santa Barbara: Black Sparrow, 1979.
    • —. Midnight Mass. Santa Barbara: Black Sparrow, 1983.
    • —. Their Heads are Green and Their Hands are Blue.1963. New York: Ecco Press, 1984.
    • —. Unwelcome Words. Bolinas: Tombouctou, 1988.
    • —. Without Stopping. 1972. New York: Ecco Press,1985.
    • Bushnaq, Inea, ed. and trans. Arab Folktales. New York: Pantheon, 1986.
    • Canetti, Elias. The Voices of Marrakesh. Trans. J. A. Underwood. New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1978.
    • Chodorow, Nancy. “Family Structure and Feminine Personality.” Women, Culture, and Society. Ed. Michelle Zimbalist Rosaldo and Louise Lamphere. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1974. 43-66.
    • Crapanzano, Vincent. Tuhami, Portrait of a Moroccan. Chicago: Chicago UP, 1980.
    • Dillon, Millicent. A Little Original Sin: The Life and Work of Jane Bowles. New York: Holt, Rinehart, 1981.
    • Dwyer, Daisy Hilse. Images and Self-Images: Male and Female in Morocco. New York: Columbia UP, 1978.
    • Favat, F. Andre. Child and Tale: The Origins of Interest. Urbana: NCTE, 1977.
    • Fernea, Elizabeth Warnock and Basima Qattan Bazirgan, ed. and trans. “An Account of the Trial.” Middle Eastern Muslim Women Speak. Austin: U of Texas P, 1977. 280-90.
    • Fernea, Elizabeth Warnock. A Street in Marrakech. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1980.
    • Foucault, Michel. The History of Sexuality. Trans. Robert Hurley. 1976. New York: Vintage, 1980.
    • Geertz, Clifford. Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology. New York: Basic Books,1983.
    • —. “On the Nature of Anthropological Understanding.” American Scientist 63 (1975): 47-53.
    • —. Works and Lives: The Anthropologist as Author. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1988.
    • Hawthorne, Nathaniel. The Scarlet Letter. Ed. Harry Levin. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960.
    • Haywood, John A. Modern Arabic Literature, 1800-1970. New York: St. Martin’s, 1972.
    • Hernadi, Paul. “Doing, Making, Meaning: Toward a Theory of Verbal Practice.” PMLA 103 (1988): 749-58.
    • Layachi, Larbi. “The Half-Brothers.” Bowles, Five Eyes 55-75.
    • Lerner, Daniel. The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East. Glencoe, Il: The Free Press, 1958.
    • Maier, John. “A Postmodern Syrian Fictionalist: Walid Ikhlassy.” Journal of South Asian and Middle East Studies 11 (1988): 73-87.
    • Mernissi, Fatima. Beyond the Veil, Male-Female Dynamics in Modern Muslim Society. Rev. ed. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1987.
    • —. Doing Daily Battle. Trans. Mary Jo Lakeland. London: Women’s Press, 1988.
    • Ong, Walter J. Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word. New York: Methuen, 1982.
    • Palmer, Richard E. “Postmodernity and Hermeneutics.” boundary 2 5 (1977): 363-94.
    • Patai, Raphael. Society, Culture, and Change in the Middle East. 3rd ed. Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P,1971.
    • Pounds, Wayne. Paul Bowles: The Inner Geography. New York: Peter Lang, 1985.
    • Rabinow, Paul. Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco. Berkeley: U of California P, 1977.
    • Reynolds, Dwight F. “Sirat Bani Hilal: Introduction and Notes to an Arab Oral Epic Tradition.” Oral Tradition 4 (1989): 80-100.
    • Sagan, Eli. Freud, Women, and Morality: The Psychology of Good and Evil. New York: Basic Books, 1988.
    • Said, Edward. Orientalism. New York: Vintage, 1979.
    • Shammas, Anton. Arabesques. Trans. Vivian Eden. New York: Harper and Row, 1988.
    • Wharton, Edith. In Morocco. 1920. New York: Hippocrene,1984.
    • Yacoubi, Ahmed. “The Night Before Thinking.” Bowles, Five Eyes: 23-35.

     

  • You Say You Want a Revolution? Hypertext and the Laws of Media

    Stuart Moulthrop

    University of Texas at Austin
    <eifa307@utxvm.bitnet>

     

    The original Xanadu (Coleridge’s) came billed as “a Vision in a Dream,” designated doubly unreal and thus easily aligned with our era of “operational simulation” where, strawberry fields, nothing is “real” in the first place since no place is really “first” (Baudrillard, Simulations 10). But all great dreams invite revisions, and these days we find ourselves perpetually on the re-make. So here is the new Xanadu(TM), the universal hypertext system proposed by Theodor Holm Nelson–a vision which, unlike its legendary precursor, cannot be integrated into the dream park of the hyperreal. Hyperreality, we are told, is a site of collapse or implosion where referential or “grounded” utterance becomes indistinguishable from the self-referential and the imaginary. We construct our representational systems not in serial relation to indisputably “real” phenomena, but rather in recursive and multiple parallel, “mapping on to different co-ordinate systems” (Pynchon 159). Maps derive not from territories but from other map-making enterprises: all the world’s a simulation.

     

    This reality implosion brings serious ideological consequences, for some would say it invalidates the informing “master narratives” of modernity, leaving us with a proliferation of incompatible discourses and methods (Lyotard 26). Such unchecked variation, it has been objected, deprives social critique of a clear agenda (Eagleton 63). Hyperreality privileges no discourse as absolute or definitive; critique becomes just another form of paralogy, a countermove in the language game that is techno-social construction of reality. The game is all- encompassing, and therein lies a problem. As Linda Hutcheon observes, “the ideology of postmodernism is paradoxical, for it depends upon and draws its power from that which it contests. It is not truly radical; nor is it truly oppositional” (120).

     

    This problem of complicity grows especially acute where media and technologies are concerned. Hyperreality is as much a matter of writing practice as it is of textual theory: as Michael Heim points out, “[i]n magnetic code there are no originals” (162). Electronic information may be rapidly duplicated, transmitted, and assembled into new knowledge structures. From word processing to interactive multimedia, postmodern communication systems accentuate what Ihab Hassan calls “immanence” or “the intertextuality of all life. A patina of thought, of signifiers, of ‘connections,’ now lies on everything the mind touches in its gnostic (noo)sphere. . . .” (172). Faced with this infinitely convoluted system of discourse, we risk falling into technological abjection, a sense of being hopelessly abandoned to simulation, lost in “the technico-luminous cinematic space of total spatio-dynamic theatre” (Baudrillard, Simulations 139). If all the world’s a simulation, then we are but simulacral subjects cycling through our various iterations, incapable of any “radical” or “oppositional” action that would transform the techno- social matrix.

     

    Of course, this pessimistic or defeatist attitude is hardly universal. We are far more likely to hear technology described as an instrumentality of change or a tool for liberation. Bolter (1991), Drexler (1987), McCorduck (1985), and Zuboff (1988) all contend that postmodern modes of communication (electronic writing, computer networks, text-linking systems) can destabilize social hierarchies and promote broader definitions of authority in the informational workplace. Heim points out that under the influence of these technologies “psychic life will be redefined” (164). But if Hutcheon is correct in her observation that postmodernism is non-oppositional, then how will such a reconstruction of order and authority take place? How and by whom is psychic life–and more important, political life–going to be redefined?

     

    These questions must ultimately be addressed not in theory but in practice–which is where the significance of Nelson’s second Xanadu lies. With Xanadu, Nelson invalidates technological abjection, advancing an unabashedly millenarian vision of technological renaissance in which the system shall set us free. In its extensive ambitions Xanadu transcends the hyperreal. It is not an opium vision but something stranger still, a business plan for the development of what Barthes called “the social space of writing” (81), a practical attempt to reconfigure literate culture. Xanadu is the most ambitious project ever proposed for hypertext or “non-sequential writing” (Dream Machines 29; Literary Machines 5/2). Hypertext systems exploit the interactive potential of computers to reconstruct text not as a fixed series of symbols, but as a variable-access database in which any discursive unit may possess multiple vectors of association (see Conklin; Joyce; Slatin). A hypertext is a complex network of textual elements. It consists of units or “nodes,” which may be analogous to pages, paragraphs, sections, or volumes. Nodes are connected by “links,” which act like dynamic footnotes that automatically retrieve the material to which they refer. Because it is no longer book-bounded, hypertextual discourse may be modified at will as reader/writers forge new links within and among documents. Potentially this collectivity of linked text, which Nelson calls the “docuverse,” can expand without limit.

     

    As Nelson foresees it, Xanadu would embody this textual universe. The system would provide a central repository and distribution network for all writing: it would be the publishing house, communications medium, and great hypertextual Library of Babel. Yet for all its radical ambitions, Nelson’s design preserves familiar proprieties. Local Xanadu outlets would be “Silverstands”(TM), retail access and consulting centers modeled after fast-food franchises and thus integrated with the present economy of information exchange. Xanadu would protect intellectual property through copyright. Users would pay per byte accessed and would receive royalties when others obtained proprietary material they had published in the system. The problems and complexities of this scheme are vast, and at the moment, the fulfilled Xanadu remains a “2020 Vision,” a probe into the relatively near future. But it is a future with compelling and important implications for the postmodern present.

     

    The future, as Disney and Spielberg have taught us, is a place we must come “back” to. The American tomorrow will be a heyday of nostalgia, an intensive pursuit of “lost” or “forgotten” values. Xanadu is no exception: Ted Nelson sees the history of writing in the 21st century as an epic of recovery. His “grand hope” lies in “a return to literacy, a cure for television stupor, a new Renaissance of ideas and generalist understanding, a grand posterity that does not lose the details which are the final substance of everything” (“How Hypertext (Un)does the Canon” 4). To a skeptical observer, this vision of Xanadu might suggest another domain of the postmodern theme park. Gentle readers, welcome to Literacyland!

     

    But this vision could constitute more than just a sideshow attraction. Nelson foresees a renovation of culture, a unification of discourse, a reader-and-writer’s paradise where all writing opens itself to/in the commerce of ideas. This is the world in which all “work” becomes “text,” not substance but reference, not containment but connection (see Bush; Barthes; Zuboff). The magnitude of the change implied here is enormous. But what about the politics of that change? What community of interpretation– and beyond that, what social order–does this intertextual world presume? With the conviction of a true Enlightenment man, Nelson envisions “a new populitism that can make the deeper understandings of the few at last available to the many” (“How Hypertext (Un)does the Canon” 6).

     

    What is “populitism”?–another of Nelson’s neologisms (e.g., “hypermedia,” “cybercrud,” “teledildonics”), in this case a portmanteau word combining “populism” with “elite.” The word suggests the society-of-text envisioned by theorists like Shoshana Zuboff and Jay David Bolter, a writing space in which traces of authority persist only as local and contingent effects, the social equivalent of the deconstructed author-function. A “populite” culture might mark the first step toward realization of Jean-Francois Lyotard’s “game of perfect information” where all have equal access to the world of data, and where “[g]iven equal competence (no longer in the acquisition of knowledge, but in its production), what extra performativity depends on in the final analysis is ‘imagination,’ which allows one either to make a new move or change the rules of the game” (52). This is the utopia of information-in-process, the ultimate wetware dream of the clerisy: discourse converted with 100 percent efficiency into capital, the mechanism of that magical process being nomology or rule-making–admittedly a rather specialized form of “imagination.”

     

    At least two troubles lurk in this paradise. First, the prospect that social/textual order will devolve not unto the many but only to a very few; and more important, that those few will fail to recognize the terms of their splendid isolation. Consider the case of the reluctant computer dick Clifford Stoll, whose memoir, The Cuckoo’s Egg, nicely illustrates these problems. Stoll excoriates “cyberpunks,” virtual vandals who abuse the openness of scientific computing environments. Their unsportsmanlike conduct spoils the information game, necessitating cumbersome restrictions on the free flow of data. But Stoll’s definition of informational “freedom” appears murky at best. He repeatedly refers to the mainframe whose system he monitors as “his” computer, likening cybernetic intrusions to burglaries. Electronic information, as Stoll sees it, lies in strict analogy with material and private property.

     

    Private in what sense? Stoll professes to believe that scientists must have easy access to research results, but only within their own communities. He is quick to condemn incursions by “unauthorized” outsiders. There is some sense in this argument: Stoll repeatedly points out that the intruder in the Stanford mainframe might have interfered with a lifesaving medical imaging system. But along with this concern comes an ideological danger. Who decides what information “belongs” to whom? Stoll’s “popular elite” is restricted to academic scientists, a version of “the people” as nomenklatura, those whose need to know is defined by their professional affiliation. More disturbingly, Stoll seems unaware of the way this brotherhood is situated within larger political hierarchies. Describing a meeting with Pentagon brass, he reflects: “How far I’d come. A year ago, I would have viewed these officers as war-mongering puppets of the Wall Street capitalists. This, after all, was what I’d learned in college. Now things didn’t seem so black and white. They seemed like smart people handling a serious problem” (278).

     

    Here is elite populism at its scariest. Though he protests (too much) his political correctness, Stoll’s sense of specialist community shifts to accommodate the demands of the moment. When in Fort Meade he does as the natives do, recognizing agents of Air Force Intelligence, the National Security Agency, even the CIA and FBI as brothers-in-craft. After all, they are “smart” (technologically adept) and “serious” (professional). Their immediate goal seems legitimate and laudable. They are just “handling” a problem, tracking down the intruder who has violated the electronic privacy of Stoll’s community (and, not coincidentally, their own). They are the good policemen, the ones Who Are Your Friends, not really “Them” after all but just a braid-shouldered version of “Us.”

     

    Stoll is not troubled that these boon companions live at the heart of the military-industrial complex. He disregards the fact that they seem aware of domestic communications intercepts–in phone conversations, Stoll’s CIA contact refers to the FBI as “the F entity,” evidently to thwart a monitoring program (144). Stoll does task his agency associates for sowing disinformation and managing dirty wars, but this critique never gets much past the stage of rhetorical questions. In fact Stoll seems increasingly comfortable in the intelligence community. If the data spooks turn out to be less interested in freedom of scientific speech than in quashing a security leak, Stoll has no real objection. His own ideals and interests are conveniently served in the process.

     

    What leads to such regrettable blindness, and how might it have been prevented? These may be especially pertinent questions as we consider entrusting our literate culture to an automated information system. The spooks are not so easily conjured away. It is no longer sufficient to object that scientists and humanists form distinct communities, and that Stoll’s seduction could not happen in our own elect company. The old “Two Cultures” paradigm has shifted out from under us, largely through catholic adoption of technologies like data networks and hypertext. Networks are networks, and we can assume that most if not all of them will eventually engender closed elites. Fascism, as Deleuze and Guattari instruct, is a matter of all-too-human desire (26). What can shield humanist networks, or even the “generalist” networks Nelson foresees, from the strategy of divide and co-opt? What might insulate Xanadu from those ancestral voices prophesying war?

     

    The answer, as forecasters like McCorduck and Drexler point out, lies in the hypertext concept itself–the operating principle of an open and dynamic literature, a consensual canon with a minimum of hierarchical impedances and a fundamental instability in those hierarchies it maintains. Visionary and problematic as it may seem, Nelson’s vision of “populitism” has much to recommend it– not the least of which is its invitation to consider more carefully the likely social impact of advanced communication systems. In fact hypertext may well portend social change, a fundamental reshaping of text production and reception. The telos of the electronic society-of-text is anarchy in its true sense: local autonomy based on consensus, limited by a relentless disintegration of global authority. Since information is now virtually an equivalent of capital, and since textuality is our most powerful way of shaping information, it follows that Xanadu might indeed change the world. But to repeat the crucial question, how will this change come about? What actual social processes can translate the pragmatics of Nelson’s business plan into the radicalism of a hypertext manifesto?

     

    The complete answers lie with future history. In one respect, Ted Nelson’s insistence that Xanadu become an economically viable enterprise is exemplary: we will discover the full implications of this technology only as we build, manage, and work in hypertextual communities, starting within the existing constraints of information capitalism. But while we wait on history, we can devote a little time to augury. As a theorist of an incipient medium, one is reduced to playing medium, eking out predictions with the odd message from the Other Side. Which brings us to the last work of Marshall McLuhan, a particularly important ancestral voice from whom to hear. At his death, McLuhan left behind notes for an enigmatic final project: the fourfold “Laws of Media” which form the framework for a semiotics of technology. The Laws proceed from four basic questions that can be asked about any invention:

     

    •      What does it enhance or intensify?
    •      What does it render obsolete or displace?
    •      What does it retrieve that was previously obsolete?
    •      What does it produce or become when taken to its limit?

     

    As McLuhan demonstrates, these questions are particularly instructive when applied to pivotal or transforming technologies like printing or broadcasting. They are intended to discover the ways in which information systems affect the social text, rearranging sense ratios and rewriting theories of cultural value. They reveal the nature of the basic statement, the “uttering or ‘outering’” that underlies mechanical extensions of human faculties. If we put Xanadu and hypertext to this series of questions, we may discover more about both the potential and the limits of hypertext as an agency of change.

     

    1. What Does Hypertext Enhance or Intensify?

     

    According to McLuhan’s standard analysis, communications media adjust the balance or “ratio” of the senses by privileging one channel of perception over others. Print promotes sight over hearing, giving us an objectified, perspectival, symbolized world: “an eye for an ear” (Understanding Media 81). But this approach needs modification for our purposes. Hypertext differs from earlier media in that it is not a new thing at all but a return or recursion (of which more later) to an earlier form of symbolic discourse, i.e., print. The effect of hypertext thus falls not simply upon the sense channels but farther along the cognitive chain. As Vannevar Bush pointed out in the very first speculation on informational linking technologies, these mechanisms enhance the fundamental capacity of pattern recognition (“As We May Think,” qtd. in Literary Machines 1/50).

     

    Hypertext is all about connection, linkage, and affiliation. Formally speaking, its universe is the one Thomas Pynchon had in mind when he defined “paranoia” as “the realization that everything is connected, everything in the Creation–not yet blindingly one, but at least connected….” (820). In hypertext systems, this ethos of connection is realized in technics: users do not passively rehearse or receive discourse, they explore and construct links (Joyce 12). At the kernel of the hypertext concept lie ideas of affiliation, correspondence, and resonance. In this, as Nelson has argued from the start, hypertext is nothing more than an extension of what literature has always been (at least since “Tradition and the Individual Talent”)–a temporally extended network of relations which successive generations of readers and writers perpetually make and unmake.

     

    This redefinition of textuality gives rise to a number of questions. What does it mean to enhance our sensitivity to patterns in this shifting matrix, to become sensitized to what Pynchon calls “other orders behind the visible?” Does this mean that hypertext will turn us into “paranoids,” anxious interpreters convinced that all structures are mysteriously organized “against” us? What does interpretive “resistance” mean in a hypertextual context? Can such a reading strategy be possible after poststructuralism, with the author-function reduced (like Pynchon himself) to quasi- anonymous nonpresence, a voiceless occasion for deconstructive “writing” (McHoul and Wills 9)?

     

    Perverse though it may seem, hypertext does accentuate the agonistic element of reading. Early experience with hypertext narrative suggests that its readers may actually be more concerned with prior authority and design than readers of conventional writing. The apparent “quickliming of the author” does not dispel the aura of intention in hypertext (Douglas 100). The constantly repeated ritual of interaction, with its reminder of discursive alternatives, reveals the text as a made thing, not monologic perhaps but hardly indeterminate. The text gestures toward openness– what options can you imagine?–but then it forecloses: some options are available but not others, and someone clearly has done the defining. The author persists, undead presence in the literary machine, the inevitable Hand that turns the time. Hypertextual writing–at least when considered as read-only or “exploratory” text (see Joyce)– may thus emphasize antithetical modes of reading, leading us to regard the deconstructed system-maker much in the way that Leo Bersani recently described the author of Gravity’s Rainbow: as “the enemy text” (108).

     

    So perhaps we need a Psychiatrist General’s Warning: Reading This Hypertext Can Make You Paranoid–indeed it must, since the root sense of paranoia, a parallel or parallax gnosis, happens to be a handy way to conceive of the meta-sense of pattern recognition that hypertext serves to enhance. But would such a distortion of our cognitive ratios necessarily constitute pathology? In dealing with vast and nebulous information networks–to say nothing of those corporate-sponsored “virtual realities” that may lie in our future–a certain “creative paranoia” may be a definite asset. In fact the paragnosticism implicit in hypertext may be the best way to keep the information game clean. Surrounded by filaments and tendrils of a network, the sojourner in Xanadu or other hypertext systems will always be reminded of her situation in a fabric of power arrangements. Her ability to build and pursue links should encourage her to subject those arrangements to inquiry. Which brings us to the second of McLuhan’s key questions:

     

    2. What Does Hypertext Displace or Render Obsolete?

     

    Though it may be tempting to respond, the book, that answer makes no sense. The book is already “dead” (or superseded) if by “alive” you mean that the institution in question is essential to our continued commerce in ideas. Irving Louis Horowitz argues that reports of the book’s demise are exaggerated; even in an age of television and computers, we produce more books each year than ever before (20). Indeed, our information ecology seems likely to retain a mix of print and electronic media for at least the next century. Yet as Alvin Kernan recently pointed out, the outlook for books in the long run is anything but happy (135-43). As the economic and ecological implications of dwindling forests come home, the cost of paper will rise precipitously. At the same time, acidic decay of existing books will enormously increase maintenance costs to libraries. Given these factors, some shift to electronic storage seems inevitable (though Kernan, an analogue man to the last, argues for microfilm).

     

    Yet this change in the medium of print does not worry cultural conservatives like Kernan, Neil Postman, or E.D. Hirsch nearly so much as the prospect that the decline of the book may terminate the cultural dominance of print. The chief technological culprit in Kernan’s “death of literature” is not the smart machine but the idiot box. “Such common culture as we still have,” Kernan laments, “comes largely from television” (147).

     

    But the idiot box–or to be precise, the boxed idiot– is precisely the intellectual problem that hypertext seems excellently suited to address. In answer to McLuhan’s second question–what does hypertext render obsolete?–the best answer is not literacy but rather post-literacy. As Nelson foresees, the development of hypertext systems implies a revival of typographic culture (albeit it in a dynamic, truly paperless environment). That forecast may seem recklessly naive or emptily prophetic, but it is quite likely valid. Hypertext means the end of the death of literature.

     

    Here the voice of the skeptic must be heard: a revival of literacy?–read my lips: not in a million years. Even the most devoted defender of print is likely to resist the notion of a Gutenberg renaissance. In the West, genuine literacy–cultural, multicultural, or simply functional–can be found only among a well-defined managerial and professional class. At present that class is fairly large, but in the U.S. and U.K., world leaders in laissez-faire education, it is contracting noticeably. So it must seem foolish to imagine, as Ted Nelson does, a mass consumer market for typographic information, a growth industry based on the electronic equivalent of the local library.

     

    Indeed, should Xanadu become a text-only system (which is not intended), its prospects would be poor in the long run. There are however other horizons for interactive textuality–not just hypertext but another Nelsonian coinage, “hypermedia.” Print is not the only means of communication deliverable in a polysequential format articulated by software links. In trying to imagine the future of hypertext culture, we must also consider interactive multimedia “texts” that incorporate voice, music, animated graphics, and video along with alphabetic script (Lanham 287). Hypertext is about connection– promiscuous, pervasive, and polymorphously perverse connection. It is a writing practice ideally suited to the irregular, the transgressive, and the carnivalesque (Harpold 8). Culturally speaking, the promiscuity of hypertext (in the root sense of “a tendency to seek relations”) knows no bounds of form, format, or cultural level. There is no reason to assume that hypertext or hypermedia should not support popular as well as elite culture, or indeed that it might not promote a “populite” miscegenation of discourses.

     

    But what can this mean–talking books in homeboy jive? Street rap accompanied by Eliotic scholia? Nintendo with delusions of cinema? Or worse, could we be thinking of yet more industrial light and magic, the disneyverse of eyephones and datagloves where YOU (insert userName) are IN THE FANTASY? Perhaps, as one critic of the computer industry recently put it, interactive multimedia must inevitably decay to its lowest common denominator, “hyper- MTV” (Levy, “Multimedia” 52). According to this analysis, the linear and objectifying tendencies of any print content in a multimedium text would be overwhelmed by the subjective, irrational, and emotive influence of audio/ video. This being the case, hypertext could hardly claim to represent “a cure for television stupor.”

     

    But Nelson’s aspiration should not be so easily dismissed as a vision in a dream. Hypertext does indeed have the power to recover print literacy–though not in quite the way that Nelson supposes; which brings us to the third of McLuhan’s queries:

     

    3. What Does Hypertext Retrieve that Was Previously Obsolete?

     

    Xanadu and similar projects could invite large numbers of people to become reacquainted with the cultural power of typographic literacy. To assert this, of course, is to break with McLuhan’s understanding of media history. It is hard to dispute the argument of Understanding Media and The Gutenberg Galaxy that the culture of the printing press has entered into dialectic contention with a different ethos based on the “cool” immediacy of broadcasting. But though that diagnosis remains tremendously important, McLuhan’s cultural prognosis for the West holds less value. McLuhan saw clearly the transforming impact of “electric” technologies, but perhaps because he did not live much beyond the onset of the microprocessor boom, he failed to recognize the next step–the recursion to a new stage of typographic literacy through the syncretic medium of hypertext.

     

    It is crucial to distinguish recursion from return or simple repetition, because this difference answers the objection that print literacy will be lost or suppressed in multimedia texts. Recursion is self-reference with the possibility of progressive self-modification (Hofstadter 127). Considered for its recursive possibilities, “writing” means something radically different in linked interactive compositions than it does in a codex book or even a conventional electronic document. Literacy in hypertext encompasses two domains: the ordinary grammatical, rhetorical, and tropological space that we now know as “literature,” and also a second province, stricter in its formalisms but much greater in its power to shape interactive discourse. This second domain has been called “writing space” (Bolter 4); a case might be made (with apologies to those who insist that virtual reality is strictly a post-print phenomenon) that it also represents the true meaning of cyberspace.

     

    Walter Benjamin observed with some regret that by the 1930’s, any literate European could become an author, at least to the extent of publishing a letter or an article in the newspapers (232). With no regrets at all, Ted Nelson envisions a similar extension of amateur literary production in Xanadu, where all readers of the system can potentially become writers, or at least editors and commentators. The First Amendment guarantee of free speech, Nelson points out, is a personal liberty: anyone may publish, and in Xanadu everyone can. So Nelson bases his prediction of revived literacy on the promise of a broadly popular publishing franchise.

     

    This vision is limited in one crucial regard. Nelson treats print essentially as the content of his system, which is taking a rather narrow view. In describing Xanadu as a more or less transparent medium for the transmission of text, Nelson overlooks the fact that alphabetic or alphanumeric representation also defines the form of Xanadu, and indeed of any hypertext system. This neglect is consistent with the generally broad focus of Nelson’s vision, which has led him to dismiss details of user- interface design as “front-end functions” to be worked out by the user.

     

    Design details, whether anterior or posterior to the system, cannot be passed over so easily. In fact the structure and specifications of the hypertext environment are themselves parts of the docuverse, arguably the most important parts. Beneath any hypertext document or system there exists a lower layer that we might call the hypotext. On this level, in the working implementations of its “protocols,” Xanadu is a creature of print. The command structures that govern linkage, display, editing, accounting, and all the other functions of the system exist as digital impulses that may be translated into typographic text. They were written out, first in pseudo-English strings, then in a high-level programming language, finally as binary code. Therefore Xanadu at its most intimate level is governed by all those features of the typographic medium so familiar from McLuhan’s analysis: singular sequentiality, objectivity, instrumentality, “left-brained” visual bias, and so on. The wonder of hypertext and hypermedia lies in their capacity to escape these limitations by using the microprocessor to turn linear, monologic typography recursively back upon itself–to create linear control structures that enable an escape from linear control.

     

    In recognizing the recursive trick behind hypertextual writing, we come to a broader understanding of electronic literacy. Literacy under hypertext must extend not only to the “content” of a composition but to its hypotextual “form” as well–e.g., the way nodes are divided to accommodate data structures and display strategies, or the types of linkage available and the ways they are apparent to the reader. Practically speaking, this means that users of a hypertext system can be expected to understand print not only as the medium of traditional literary discourse, but also as a meta-tool, the key to power at the level of the system itself.

     

    Ong and McLuhan have argued that television and radio introduce “secondary orality,” a recursion to non-print forms of language and an “audile space” of cognition (Orality and Literacy 135; Laws of Media 57). By analogy, hypertext and hypermedia seem likely to instigate a secondary literacy –“secondary” in that this approach to reading and writing includes a self-consciousness about the technological mediation of those acts, a sensitivity to the way texts-below-the-text constitute another order behind the visible. This secondary literacy involves both rhetoric and technics: to read at the hypotextual level is to confront (paragnostically) the design of the system; to write at this level is to reprogram, revising the work of the first maker. Thus this secondary literacy opens for its readers a “cyberspace” in the truest sense of the word, meaning a place of command and control where the written word has the power to remake appearances. This space has always been accessible to the programming elite, to system operators like Clifford Stoll and shady operators like his hacker adversary. But Nelson’s 2020 Vision puts a Silverstand in every commercial strip right next to McDonald’s and Videoland. If Xanadu succeeds in re-awakening primary literacy as a mass phenomenon, there is reason to believe that it will inculcate secondary literacy as well.

     

    But like any grand hope, this technopiate dream of a new literacy ultimately has to face its man from Porlock. Secondary literacy might well prove culturally disastrous. The idea of a general cyberspace franchise, in which all control structures are truly contingent and “consensual,” does summon up visions of informatic chaos. “Chaos,” however, is a concept we have recently begun to understand as something other than simply an absence of “order:” it is instead a condition of possibility in which new arrangements spontaneously assemble themselves (Prigogine and Stengers 14).

     

    Taking this neo-chaotic view, we might inquire into the possible positive effects of secondary literacy in a postmodern political context. In outlining a first move beyond our recent “depthless,” ahistorical quiescence, Fredric Jameson calls for an “aesthetic of cognitive mapping,” a “pedagogical political culture” in which we would begin to teach ourselves where we stand in the networks of transnational power (92). At this moment, as the West reconsiders its New World Order in the aftermath of a war for oil reserves, we seem in especially urgent need of such education. But such a cultural pedagogy clearly needs something more than the evening war news, especially when reporters are confined to informational wading pools. We require not only a sensitivity to the complex textuality of power but an ability to intercept and manipulate that text– an advanced creative paranoia. This must ultimately be a human skill, independent of technological “utterance;” but the secondary literacy fostered by hypertext could help us at least to begin the enormous task of drawing our own cognitive maps. Here, however, we verge on the main question of hypertextual politics, which brings up the last item in the McLuhan catechism:

     

    4. What Does Hypertext Become When Taken to Its Limit?

     

    Orthodox McLuhanite doctrine holds that “every form, pushed to the limit of its potential, reverses its characteristics” (Laws of Media viii). Media evolution, in McLuhan’s view, proceeds through sharply punctuated equilibriums. “Hot” media like print tend to increase their routinization and determinism until they reach a limit (say, the prose of the late 19th century). Beyond that point the overheated medium turns paradoxical, passing almost instantly from hot to super-“cool,” bombarding readers with such a plethora of codings that conventional interpretation collapses. Structure and hierarchy, the distinguishing features of a “hot” medium, reduce to indeterminacy. The plurality of codes overwhelms hermeneutic certainty, the “figure” of a univocal text reverses into polysemous “ground,” and we reach the ultima thule of Gutenberg culture, Finnegans Wake.

     

    But though McLuhan had much to say about the reversal of overheated media, he left the complementary possibility unexplored. What happens to already “cool” or participatory media when they reach their limits? True to the fourth law, their characteristics reverse, but here the effect is reactionary, not radical. Radio, for instance, begins in interactive orality (two-way transceiving) but decays into the hegemony of commercial broadcasting, where “talk radio” lingers as a reminder of how open the airwaves are not. Television too starts by shattering the rigid hierarchies of the Gutenberg nation-state, promising to bring anyplace into our living rooms; but its version of Global Village turns out to be homogenous and hegemonic, a planetary empire of signs.

     

    Hypertext and hypermedia are also interactively “cool,” so following this analysis we might conclude that they will undergo a similar implosion, becoming every bit as institutionalized and conservative as broadcast networks. Indeed, it doesn’t take McLuhanite media theory to arrive at that forecast. According to the economic logic of late capitalism, wouldn’t the Xanadu Operating Company ultimately sell out to Sony, Matsushita, Phillips, or some other wielder of multinational leverage?

     

    Such a self-negating “reversal” may not be the only possible outcome, however. What if the corporate shogunate refuse to venture their capital? What if business leaders realize that truly interactive information networks do not make wise investments? This conclusion might be supported by memory of the controversy that Sears and IBM stirred up when they tried to curtail user autonomy on their Prodigy videotex system (see Levy, “In the Realm of the Censor”). This scenario of corporate rejection is not just speculative fabulation, but the basis for a proposed modification to McLuhan’s fourth law. Media taken to their limits tend to reverse, but not all media reverse in the same way. The case of a complex, syncretic, and fundamentally interactive medium like hypertext may involve a “reversal” that does not bring us back to the same-as-it-ever-was–not a reversal in fact but a recursion (deja vu) to a new cultural space.

     

    We have entered into a period of change in reading and writing that Richard Lanham calls a “digital revolution” (268). As this revolution proceeds (if it is allowed to do so), its consequences will be enormous. The idea of hypertext as a figment of the capitalist imagination, an information franchise in both Nelson’s and Lyotard’s senses, could well break down. Though Xanadu may in fact open its Silverstands some day soon, hypertext might not long remain a commercial proposition. The type of literacy and the kind of social structure this medium supports stand fundamentally against absolute property and hierarchy. As we have hinted, hypertext and hypermedia peel back to reveal not just an aesthetics of cognitive mapping but nothing less than the simulacral map-as-territory itself: the real beginnings of cyberspace in the sense of a domain of control.

     

    “Cyberspace. A consensual hallucination experienced daily by billions of legitimate operators, in every nation… A graphic representation of data abstracted from the banks of every computer in the human system” (Gibson 51). William Gibson’s concept of a cybernetic workspace, laid out in his dystopian novel Neuromancer, represents the ultimate shared vision in the global dream of information commerce. For all its advancement beyond the age of nation-state capitalism, Gibson’s world remains intensely competitive and hierarchical (for nation-state substitute the revived zaibatsu). Neuromancer is Nineteen Eighty-Four updated for 1984, the future somewhat gloomily surveyed from Reagan America.

     

    There is accordingly no trace of social “consensus” in Gibson’s “consensual” infosphere. In his version of cyberspace, the shape of vision is imposed from without. “They” control the horizontal, “They” control the vertical. Of course there must be some elements of chaos, else Gibson would be out of business as a paperback writer; so he invents the “cyberspace cowboy,” a hacker hero who plays the information game by what he thinks of as his own rules. But though cowboys may attempt to destabilize the system, their incursions amount at best to harassment and privateering. These forms of enterprise are deemed “illegal,” though they are really just business by another name, inventiveness and competitive advantage being the only effective principles of operation.

     

    Gibson’s dark dream is one thing–in effect it is a realization of McLuhan’s prophecy of reversal, an empowering technology turned into a mechanism of co-option and enslavement. But perhaps Ted Nelson’s 2020 Vision of hypertextual literacy is something else. If not a utopian alternative, Nelson’s project may at least provide a heterotopia, an otherplace not zoned in the usual ways for property and performativity. Cyberspace as Gibson and others define it is a Cartesian territory where scientists of control define boundaries and power lines. The Xanadu model lets us conceive instead a decentered space of literacy and empowerment where each subject acts as kybernos, steering her way across the intertextual sea.

     

    Nelson’s visions of the future differ crucially from Gibson’s. In Xanadu we find not consensual illusion but genuine, negotiated consensus. The pathways and connections among texts would be created on demand. According to Nelson’s plans to date, only the most fundamental “back end” conventions would be strictly determined: users would be free to customize “front end” systems to access information more or less as they like. Xanadu thus possesses virtually no “canons” in the sense of a shelf of classics or a book of laws; the canons of Xanadu might come closer to the musical meaning of the word–congeries of connections and relationships that are recognizably orderly yet inexhaustibly various. The shifting networks of consensus and textual demand (or desire) in Xanadu would be constructed by users and for users. Their very multiplicity and promiscuity, one might argue, would militate powerfully against any slide from populitism back to hierarchy.

     

    Nelson’s visionary optimism seems vindicated, then. Xanadu as currently conceived–even in its status as Nelson’s scheme to get rich very slowly–opens the door to a true social revolution with implications beyond the world of literature or mass entertainment. Xanadu would remove economic and social gatekeeping functions from the current owners of the means of text production (editors, publishers, managers of conglomerates). It would transfer control of cultural work to a broadly conceived population of culture workers: writers, artists, critics, “independent scholars,” autodidacts, “generalists,” fans, punks, cranks, hacks, hackers, and other non- or quasi-professionals. “Tomorrow’s hypertext systems have immense political ramifications, and there are many struggles to come,” Nelson warns (Literary Machines 3/19). This is an understatement of cosmic proportions.

     

    But it would be a mistake to celebrate cybernetic May Day without performing a few reality checks. Along with all those visionary forecasts of “post-hierarchical” information exchange (Zuboff 399), some hard facts need to be acknowledged. The era of the garage-born computer messiah has passed. Directly or indirectly, most development of hardware and software depends on heavily capitalized multinational companies that do a thriving business with the defense establishment. This affiliation clearly influences the development of new media–consider a recent paper on “The Rhetoric of Hypertext” which uses the requirements of a military training system to propose general standards of coherence and instrumental effectiveness for this medium (Carlson 1990). Technological development does not happen in cyberspace, but in the more familiar universe of postindustrial capital. Thus to the clearheaded, any suggestion that computer technology might be anything but an instrument of this system must seem quixotic or plain foolish.

     

    Before stepping off into cyberspace, we do well to remove the futurist headgear and listen to some voices in the street. No one wants to read anymore: “books suck, TV rules.” Computers are either imperial business machines or head toys for the yuppies. Anyone still interested in “mass” culture needs to check out the yawning gap between the rich and the debtpayers, not to mention the incipient splintering of Euro-America into warring ethnicities and “multicultural” tribes. And while we’re at it, we might also do some thinking about the Gulf conflict, war-game-as- video-game with realistic third-world blood, a campaign in defense of economic imbalance and the West’s right to determine political order in the Middle East. Perhaps we have used the word “revolution” far too loosely. Given the present state of political and cultural affairs, any vision of a “populite” future, or as John Perry Barlow has it, an “electronic frontier” (Bromberg 1991), needs hard scrutiny.

     

    Do we really want a revolution? Are academic and corporate intellectuals truly prepared to dispense with the current means of text production and the advantages they afford in the present information economy? More to the point, are we capable of overturning these institutions, assuming we have the will to do so? Looking back from the seventies, Jean Baudrillard criticized the students of Paris ’68 for assuming control of the national broadcast center only to reinstate one-to-many programming and the obscurantist focus of the “media event.” The pre- revolutionary identity of television swiftly reasserted itself in the midst of radical action. The seizure was in fact just a sham revolution, Baudrillard concludes: “Only total revolution, theoretical and practical, can restore the symbolic in the demise of the sign and of value. Even signs must burn” (Political Economy of the Sign 163). Xanadu as Nelson imagines it does promise to immolate certain cultural icons: the entrepreneurial publishing house, the codex book, the idea of text as unified, self-contained utterance. Taken to its limits, hypertext could reverse/recourse into a general medium of control, a means of ensuring popular franchise in the new order of virtual space. Public-access Xanadu might be the last hope for consensual democracy in an age of global simulation.

     

    Or it might not: we do well to remember that Ted Nelson’s vision comes cleverly packaged with assurances that copyright and intellectual property shall not perish from the earth. Some signs would seem to be flame-retardant. The vision of Xanadu as cyberspatial New Jerusalem is conceivable and perhaps eligible, but by no stretch of the imagination is it inevitable. To live in the postmodern condition is to get along without the consolation of providential fictions or theories of historical necessity. This renunciation includes the “Laws of Media,” whose force in the final analysis is theoretical and heuristic, not normative. As Linda Hutcheon observes, postmodernism undermines any attempt at binary distinction. To invoke the possibility of a “post-hierarchical” information order, one must assert the fact that all orders are contingent, the product of discursive formations and social contracts. But this postulate generates a fatally recursive paradox: if all order is consensual, then the social consensus may well express itself against revolution and in support of the old order. The term “post-hierarchical” may some day turn out to carry the same nasty irony as the words “postmodern” or “postwar” in the aftermath of Desert Storm: welcome back to the future, same as it ever was.

     

    In the end it is impossible to put down Nelson’s prophecies of cultural renovation in Xanadu; but it is equally hard to predict their easy fulfillment. Xanadu and the hypertext concept in general challenge humanists and information scientists to reconsider fundamental assumptions about the social space of writing. They may in fact open the way to a new textual order with a new politics of knowledge and expression. However, changes of this magnitude cannot come without major upheavals. Responsibility for the evolution of hypertext systems as genuine alternatives to the present information economy rests as much with software developers, social scientists, and literary theorists as it does with legislators and capitalists. If anything unites these diverse elites, it might be their allegiance to existing institutions of intellectual authority: the printed word, the book, the library, the university, the publishing house. It may be, as Linda Hutcheon asserts, that though we are incapable of direct opposition to our native conditions, we can still criticize and undermine them through such postmodern strategies as deconstruction, parody, and pastiche (120-21). Secondary literacy might indeed find expression in a perverse or promiscuous turn about or within the primary body of literate culture. But it seems equally possible that our engagement with interactive media will follow the path of reaction, not revolution. The cultural mood at century’s end seems anything but radical. Witness the President’s attacks on cultural diversity (or as he sees it, “political correctness”) in higher education. Or consider Camille Paglia’s recent “defense” of polyvalent, post-print ways of knowing, capped off by a bizarre reversal in which she decrees that children of the Tube must be force-fed “the logocentric and Apollonian side of our culture” (Postman and Paglia 55). Given these signs and symptoms, the prospects for populite renaissance and secondary literacy do not seem especially rosy. “It is time for the enlightened repression of the children,” Paglia declares. Yet in the face of all this we can still find visionary souls who say they want a textual, social, cultural, intellectual revolution. In the words of Lennon:

     

    Well, you know...
    We all want to change your head.

     
    The question remains: which heads do the changing, and which get the change?

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Barthes, Roland. “From Work to Text.” Textual Strategies: Readings in Poststructuralist Criticism. Ed. Josue Harari. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1979. 73-81.
    • Baudrillard, Jean. For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign. Trans. Charles Levin. St. Louis: Telos, 1981.
    • —. Simulations. Trans. Paul Foss, Paul Patton, and Philip Beitchman. New York: Semiotext(e), 1983.
    • Benjamin, Walter. “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.” Illuminations. Ed. Hannah Arendt. New York: Schocken, 1969. 217-52.
    • Bersani, Leo. “Pynchon, Paranoia, and Literature.” Representations 25 (1989): 99-118.
    • Bolter, Jay. Writing Space: The Computer, Hypertext, and the History of Writing. Fairlawn, N.J.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1990.
    • Bromberg, Craig. “In Defense of Hackers.” The New York Times Magazine (April 12, 1991): 45 ff.
    • Bush, Vannevar. “As We May Think.” Atlantic Monthly (July, 1945): 101-08.
    • Carlson, Patricia. “The Rhetoric of Hypertext.” Hypermedia 2 (1990): 109-31.
    • Conklin, Jeffrey. “Hypertext: An Introduction and Survey.” Computer 20 (1987): 17-41.
    • Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, Helen R. Lane. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1977.
    • Douglas, Jane Yellowlees. “Wandering through the Labyrinth: Encountering Interactive Fiction.” Computers and Composition 6 (1989): 93-103.
    • Drexler, K. Eric. Engines of Creation: The Coming Era of Nanotechnology. New York: Doubleday, 1987.
    • Eagleton, Terry. “Capitalism, Modernism and Postmodernism.” New Left Review 152 (1985): 60-73.
    • Gibson, William. Neuromancer. New York: Ace, 1984.
    • Harpold, Terence. “The Grotesque Corpus: Hypertext as Carnival.” Paper delivered at the Sixth Annual Conference on Computers in Writing, Austin, TX, May 19, 1990.
    • Hassan, Ihab. The Postmodern Turn: Essays in Postmodern Theory and Culture. Columbus: Ohio State, 1987.
    • Heim, Michael. Electric Language: a Philosophical Study of Word Processing. New Haven: Yale UP, 1987.
    • Hofstadter, Douglas. Goedel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid. New York: Basic, 1979.
    • Horowitz, Irving Louis. Communicating Ideas: The Crisis of Publishing in a Post-Industrial Society. New York: Oxford, 1986.
    • Hutcheon, Linda. A Poetics of Postmodernism: History, Theory, Fiction. New York: Routledge, 1988.
    • Jameson, Fredric. “Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism.” New Left Review 146 (1984): 53-92.
    • Joyce, Michael. “Siren Shapes: Exploratory and Constructive Hypertexts.” Academic Computing (November, 1988): 11 ff..
    • Kernan, Alvin. The Death of Literature. New Haven: Yale UP, 1990.
    • Lanham, Richard. “The Electronic Word: Literary Study and the Digital Revolution.” New Literary History 20 (1989): 268-89.
    • Levy, Steven. “The End of Literature: Multimedia is Television’s Insidious Offspring.” Macworld (June, 1990): 51 ff..
    • —. “In the Realm of the Censor: The Online Service Prodigy Tells its Users to Shut Up and Shop.” Macworld (January, 1991): 69 ff..
    • Lyotard, Jean-Francois. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1984.
    • McCorduck, Pamela. The Universal Machine: Confessions of a Technological Optimist. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985.
    • McHoul, Alec and David Wills. Writing Pynchon: Strategies in Fictional Analysis. Urbana: University of Illinois, 1990.
    • McLuhan, H. Marshall. Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964.
    • McLuhan, H. Marshall and Eric McLuhan. Laws of Media: The New Science. Toronto: University of Toronto, 1988.
    • Nelson, Theodor Holm. Computer Lib/Dream Machines. Redmond, WA: Tempus Books, 1987.
    • —. Literary Machines. Sausalito, CA: Mindful, 1990.
    • —. “How Hypertext (Un)does the Canon.” Paper delivered at the Modern Language Association Convention, Chicago, December 28, 1990.
    • Ong, Walter. Orality and Literacy: The Technologizing of the Word. New York: Methuen, 1982.
    • Postman, Neil and Camille Paglia. “She Wants Her TV! He Wants His Book!” Harper’s 282 (March, 1991): 44 ff..
    • Prigogine, Ilya and Isabelle Stengers. Order out of Chaos: Man’s New Dialogue with Nature. New York: Bantam, 1984.
    • Pynchon, Thomas. Gravity’s Rainbow. New York: Viking, 1973.
    • Slatin, John. “Reading Hypertext: Order and Coherence in a New Medium.” College English 52 (1990): 870-83.
    • Stoll, Clifford. The Cuckoo’s Egg: Tracking a Spy through the Maze of Computer Espionage. New York: Pocket Books, 1990
    • Zuboff, Shoshana. In the Age of the Smart Machine: The Future of Work and Power. New York: Basic, 1988.

     

  • Three Poems

    Steven B. Katz

    North Carolina State University
    sbkeg@ncsuvm

     

    A Computer File Named Alison

     

    \For My Wife\

     

    I dated a file named Alison, created
    worlds in her name; but needed more space,
    new memories to save, new files to live.
    (After all, although the universe expands
    at astronomic rates, it’s slowing down,
    and there is only so much space inside machines.)

     

    “Destroy Alison: Confirm,” the computer responded.
    But what if she should die? I thought, and asked
    aloud; what if when I push this button
    she should really disappear
    from the disc of the earth, constantly rotated, read
    in this dark machine drive of the universe?

     

    What if this cold, dumb, personal computer
    should read and wholly misunderstand, and take me
    literally, as impersonal as itself, and her atoms
    be scattered through magnetic fields, dispersed
    along the wires, and she should vanish mid the glitch
    and circuitry of starts, drive lights red-

     

    shifting, every trace (of her) erased
    forever. “Destroy Alison: Confirm,” it repeated,
    blindly blinking. Destroy Alison? I needed
    more space, new memories to save,
    new files to live. But oh I
    could not confirm it could not confirm it . . . .

     

     


     

     

    After Reading godel Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid

     

    (A Pantoum)

     

    So this musical invention can begin:
    push down into a paradoxical painting:
    all formal theorems are incomplete:
    every procedure’s a stranger loop

     

    Push down into a paradoxical painting:
    decisively shifting ambiguous foregrounds:
    every procedure’s a stranger loop:
    but ant colonies are closed systems

     

    Decisively shifting ambiguous foregrounds:
    all understanding is self-referential:
    but ant colonies are closed systems:
    the human mind is a programmed search

     

    All understanding is self-referential:
    DNA involves recursive translation:
    the human mind is a programmed search:
    but meaning is always a random concurrence

     

    DNA involves recursive translation:
    intelligence is a series of metalevels:
    but meaning is always a random concurrence:
    although perception is specifically encoded

     

    Intelligence is a series of metalevels:
    absolute consciousness a Zen Buddhist koan:
    although perception is specifically encoded:
    reality is just one of many possibilities

     

    Absolute consciousness a Zen Buddhist koan:
    language is the necessary software of thought:
    reality is just one of many possibilities:
    knowing involves simply networks of channels

     

    Language is the necessary software of thought:
    societies are hierarchies of information:
    knowing involves simply networks of channels:
    we can crawl only from stratum to stratum

     

    Societies are hierarchies of information:
    history’s the output at any given moment:
    we can crawl only from stratum to stratum:
    this process is surely becoming absurd

     

    History’s the output at any given moment:
    mathematical patterns thus slowly emerge:
    this process is surely becoming absurd:
    the mechanism as medium is direct and explicit

     

    Mathematical patterns thus slowly emerge:
    reproduction results in assembled transcriptions:
    the mechanism as medium is direct and explicit:
    the message is “the message is”

     

    Reproduction results in assembled transcriptions:
    bodies are merely so much hardware, support:
    the message is “the message is”:
    even numbers can be irrational

     

    Bodies are merely so much hardware, support:
    so this operation shall now be augmented:
    even numbers can be irrational:
    humans are artificial computers at heart

     

    So this operation shall now be augmented:
    powerful axioms generate universes:
    humans are artificial computers at heart:
    this procedure is redundant and infinitely long

     

    Powerful axioms generate universes:
    for proof jump out of the system:
    this procedure is redundant and infinitely long:
    but the human brain must bottom out

     

    For proof jump out of the system:
    out of the system we pop:
    but the human brain must bottom out:
    this musical invention will self-destruct

     

    Out of the picture we pop:
    these statements are most certainly true:
    this musical invention will self-destruct:
    and so now all this nonsense may finally stop

     

    These statements are most certainly true:
    but there will be harmonic resolution too:
    and so now all this nonsense may finally stop:
    these statements are all paradoxically false

     

     


     

    In The Beginning

     
     
    (To justify God’s ways to the 21st century)
     
     

    #In the beginning was the computer. And God said
     
    :Let there be light!
     
    #You have not signed on yet.
     
    :God.
     
    #Enter user password.
     
    :Omniscient.
     
    #Password Incorrect. Try again!
     
    :Omnipotent.
     
    #Password Incorrect. Try again!
     
    :Technocrat.
     
    #And God signed on 12:01 a.m., Sunday, March 1.
     
    :Let there be light!
     
    #Unrecognizable command. Try again!
     
    :Create light.
     
    #Done.
     
    :Run heaven and earth.
     
    #And God created Day and Night. And God saw there were 0 errors.
    #And God signed off at 12:02 a.m., Sunday, March 1.
    #Approx. funds remaining: $92.50.

     
     
    #And God signed on at 12:00 a.m., Monday, March 2.
     
    :Let there be firmament in the midst of the water and
     
    #Unrecognizable command! Try again!
     
    :Create firmament.
     
    #Done.
     
    :Run firmament.
     
    #And God divided the waters. And God saw there were 0 errors.
    #And God signed off at 12:01 a.m., Monday, March 2.
    #Approx. funds remaining: $84.60.
     
     

    #And God signed on at 12:00 a.m., Tuesday, March 3.
     
    :Let the waters under heaven be gathered together unto one place
    and let the dry land appear and
     
    #Too many characters in string specification! Try again.
     
    :Create dryland.
     
    #Done!
     
    :Run dryland.
     
    #And God created Earth and Seas. And God saw there were
    0 errors.
    #And God signed off at 12:01 a.m., Tuesday, March 3.
    #Approx. funds remaining: $65.00.
     
     

    #And God signed on at 12:00 a.m., Wednesday, March 4.
     
    :Create lights in the firmament to divide the day from the night.
     
    #Unspecified type. Try again!
     
    :Create sunmoonstars.
     
    #And God created Sun, Moon, Stars. And God saw there were
    0 errors.
    #And God signed off at 12:01 a.m., Wednesday, March 4.
    #Approx. funds remaining: $54:00.
     
     

    #And God signed on at 12:00 a.m., Thursday, March 5.
     
    :Create fish.
     
    #Done.
     
    :Create fowl.
     
    #Done.
     
    :Run fish’nfowl.
     
    #And God created the great seamonsters and every living creature
    that creepeth wherewith the waters swarmed after its kind and
    every winged fowl after its kind. 0 errors.
    #And God signed off at 12:01 a.m., Thursday, March 5.
    #Approx. funds remaining: $45:00.
     
     

    #And God signed on at 12:00 a.m., Friday, March 6.
     
    :Create cattle.
     
    #Done.
     
    :Create creepy things.
     
    #Done.
     
    :Now let us make man in our image.
     
    #Unspecified type! Try again.
     
    :Create man.
     
    #Done.
     
    :Be fruitful and multiply and replenish the earth and subdue it
    and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over of the fowl
    of the air and over every living thing that creepeth upon the
    earth.
     
    #Too many command operands! Try again.
     
    :Run multiplication.
     
    #Execution terminated. 6 errors.
     
    :Insert breath.
     
    #O.K.
     
    :Run multiplication.
     
    #Execution terminated. 5 errors.
     
    :Move man to Garden of Eden.
     
    #File Garden of Eden does not exist.
     
    :Create Gard.En.
     
    #Done.
     
    :Move man to Gard.En.
     
    #O.K.
     
    :Run multiplication.
     
    #Execution terminated. 4 errors.
     
    :Copy woman from man.
     
    #O.K.
     
    :Run multiplication.
     
    #Execution terminated. 3 errors.
     
    :Insert woman into man.
     
    #Illegal parameters. Try again!
     
    :Insert man into woman.
     
    #O.K.
     
    :Run multiplication.
     
    #Execution terminated. 2 errors.
     
    :Create desire.
     
    #Done.
     
    :Run multiplication.
     
    #And God saw man’nwoman being fruitful and multiplying in the
    Gard.En.
    #Warning: No time limit on this run. 1 errors.
     
    :Create freewill.
     
    #Done.
     
    :Run freewill.
     
    #And God saw man’nwoman being fruitful and multiplying in the
    Gard.En.
    #Warning: No time limit on this run. 1 errors.
     
    :Undo desire.
     
    #Desire cannot be undone once freewill is created.
     
    :Destroy freewill.
     
    #Freewill is an inaccessible file and cannot be destroyed.
    #Enter replacement, cancel, or ask for help.
     
    :Help!
     
    #Desire cannot be undone once freewill is created.
    #Freewill is an inaccessible file and cannot be destroyed.
    #Enter replacement, cancel, or ask for help.
     
    :Create Treeofknowledge.
     
    #And God saw man’nwoman being fruitful and multiplying in the
    Gard.En.
    #Warning: No time limit on this run. 1 errors.
     
    :Create good’nevil.
     
    #Done.
     
    :Activate evil.
     
    #And God saw he had created shame.
    #Warning: System error in sector E95. Man’nwoman not in Gard.En.
    #1 errors.
     
    :Scan Gard.En. for man’nwoman.
     
    #Man’nwoman cannot be located. Try again!
     
    :Search Gard.En. for man’nwoman.
     
    #Search failed.
     
    :Delete shame.
     
    #Shame cannot be deleted once evil has been activated.
     
    :Destroy freewill.
     
    #Freewill an inaccessible file and cannot be destroyed.
     
    :Stop!
     
    #Unrecognizable command. Try again.
     
    :Break
    :Break
    :Break
     
    #ATTENTION ALL USERS ATTENTION ALL USERS: COMPUTER GOING DOWN FOR
    REGULAR DAY OF MAINTENANCE AND REST IN FIVE MINUTES. PLEASE
    SIGN OFF.
     
    :Create new world.
     
    #You have exceeded your allotted file space. You must destroy
    old files before new ones can be created.
     
    :Destroy earth.
     
    #Destroy earth. Please confirm.
     
    :Destroy earth confirmed.
     
    #COMPUTER DOWN. COMPUTER DOWN. SERVICES WILL RESUME ON SUNDAY
    MARCH 8 AT 6:00 A.M. YOU MUST SIGN OFF NOW!
     
    #And God signed off at 11:59 p.m., Friday, March 6.
    #And God he had zero funds remaining.
     

  • Commentary

    David Porush
    Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute

     

    David Porush responds to Allison Fraiberg’s essay, “Of AIDS, Cyborgs, and Other Indiscretions,” Postmodern Culturev.1 n.3 (May, 1991):

     

    Allison Fraiberg uses the discourses of AIDS to read large oppositions and tendencies at work in our culture. As such, AIDS is one more battlefield between right thinking and wrong thinking. Here wrong thinking is promoted by a reactionary, self-serving, moralizing majority that prescribes a cure for AIDS in “traditional” values to the exclusion of others an that denies the extent to which all our bloods and responsibilities commingle in the vast, luscious, and newly-dangerous circuitry of sexuality. The Bad Guys in her reading of her culture are clearly defined: they are listed and quoted at the beginning of her essay and resurface in various guises–people who promote the nuclear family, white middle class males, ad propagandists who ironically forget how to use sex to sell the public on the use of condoms.

     

    At times, Fraiberg manages to free herself from her orgy of jargon and deconstructionist agitprop to achieve real eloquence, especially when she calls for a redefinition of sexuality–also the most fun parts of the essay. Almost all of the conclusions which she reaches in her argument are both inarguable and quite tame: we must all engage in safe sex, but do so with the awareness that sex puts us in the circuit, that we take responsibilities for our own bodies, that AIDS should not be a tool for scapegoating and de- humanizing groups of people. Rather, AIDS ought to impel us to redefine the body, the self, and our sexuality (along with our discourses sexuality) as participants in a looping feedback with the interpenetrating systems of otherness which really create our culture (or really culture our creativity).

     

    The essay, however, has a tendency to discard or demolish practices and ideals that would satisfy even a new cyborg mentality simply because they have been tainted by association with conventional, conservative ideology. In this, there is a confusion or conflation between reactionary rhetoric (out of homophobia and racism, the moral majority use their prescriptions to define the other as alien, diseased) and technically safe practices (monogamy, safe sex, abstinence from IV drug use, the nuclear family)–in short, discretionary activities. The clearest example comes when Fraiberg writes,

     

    [16] . . . monogamy means little if one partner is HIV+ and the couple, thinking they have fulfilled the moral requirement in the symbolic contract that disqualifies them from contraction, practices unsafe sex.

     

    While we would not argue with the premise (that there’s something nasty about the prescription of exclusive monogamy for everyone in the culture) nor with the amusing analysis elsewhere in this essay (that the more you ask folks to say no to their pleasure they more likely they are to embrace it impulsively), we might argue with the conclusion. After all, monogamy means quite a lot, especially if one partner has AIDS. It promotes responsibility to and awareness of everyone else in the circuit, and indeed fulfills Fraiberg’s own call to greater cyborg awareness.

     

    The second problem here actually arises from the essay’s greatest strength: Fraiberg’s excellent application of deconstruction methods to the term “discrete” and “discretion.” The effect of her analysis is to construct a marvelous pun (there is high magic to low puns): she converts the word discrete from its first meaning (distinct, separate, severed, discontinuous) into its other meaning, as in discreet (exercising judgment, discernment, etc.). To enhance the beauty of this play, and in typically deconstructive fashion, phrases like to exercise discretion Fraiberg notes, ought to mean the opposite of the first kind of discrete: the “discreet” individual now knows that AIDS uncovers the very extent to which we are not discrete but are participants in the circuit. All well and good so far.

     

    The problem is that Fraiberg herself has trouble explaining exactly what all this means and resolving the contradictions to which it leads:

     

    [21] The traditional, tenuous limits of the body dissolved into fused networks, into open circuits of interconnectedness, produce an ontological recognition that, from this perspective, urges the body into discretion. Closed off, guarded against infection, beware the surface; any exchange of fluid, that is, any disclosure of an open, leaking body threatens. A closed, self-contained body resurfaces from the within the integrated network.

     

    [22] But this is a different kind of discretion. It's not the kind of discretion clung to by those who deny any fusion; it's a kind of discretion, discreteness, that is a consequence of the recognition of indiscretion. So while the cyborg ontology takes as its premise the dissolution of traditional boundaries associated with the body, its referent in the texts of AIDS, epistemologically speaking, forces the body to resist coming to rest with those integrated circuits and, instead, reorganizes into discrete units. In this sense, discretion returns, not in the form of reactionary denial, but as conditioned by a cyborg-like system. In other words, if the cyborg ontology can be said to function as the discursive field upon which networks of social relations play themselves out, then that field must by willing to admit--indeed, it has already admitted--the constructions of what might seem quite odd to cyborg theorists: writings and readings of the body grounded in discretion.

     

    What happened to all that fun stuff about broadening and redefining the sexual act itself?

     

    I think these two problems are actually produced by a deeper flaw in Fraiberg’s argument, one that rests with her reification of the Bad Guys, her tendency to see them as blind and inexperienced at best, sheerly vicious at worst. She wouldn’t need to twist and contort her prose into these unnatural postures if only she would grant that perhaps AIDS brings us all–not just the privileged few who have been immersed in the discourses of a salvational cyborg ideology –to pretty much the same level of self-awareness about our position in the intertwined cyborg loops of culture- sexuality-identity. We are all equally “conditioned by cyborg-like systematicity” and we are all made more aware of our sexuality by AIDS. The proof is in the result: most of us, William F. Buckley included, have come to the same conclusion–that survival entails reorganization “into discrete units.” The only difference is that Fraiberg claims a greater degree of awareness and calls her interpretation a “progressive reconstruction” while denying a level of agency to (and blaming for a certain intentional viciousness) the poor dumb self-righteous suckers who stick to monogamous heterosexuality and keep their spouses and kids and stupidly try to prescribe it for others, not only because it works for them but because they may not have a taste for the impedimenta of dental dams and condoms, not to mention anal penetration and fellatio and IV-drugs.

     

    Perhaps the proper conclusion is that all the rhetorics about AIDS are dispensable. We can certainly do without the oppressive totalizing rhetoric of the official versions of AIDS, with its self-righteousness and its encouragements of hatred and fear and otherness. But maybe we could just as soon dispense with arguments that use AIDS to take what is in the end an obscure high moral ground through the sterile and overly-self-conscious rhetoric of the encrusted academic. In this case, such a rhetoric strives to reconcile the “good” ideology of openness, liberation, and tolerance (as well as rejection of all simple and patent and conventional formulations, like “safe sex” and “monogamy”) with two incompatible notions: the allure of the cyborg and the realities of AIDS. In the end, two into one won’t go and the rhetoric of liberation finds itself sadly overmatched. This is one menage a trois which is simply an unproductive configuration. Cyborgization probably produces just as many new reactionaries roaming the golf courses in their abstinence as it does enlightened networkers, the new cyberpunker proles who roam the loop looking for action. And AIDS, as this essay manifestly demonstrates, produces caution and discretion and a discipline of the self, a redefinition of the body not simply as a sensorial machine, but as an invitation to disease, no matter what rhetoric you process it through. Postmodern liberation, with its yearning for whatever it postmodernism yearns for, must await some different kind of apocalypse to scratch that epistemological/ontological itch.

     

    I know this is an anathematic suggestion to most postmodernists, who hold, as I did for a long time, to a more or less constructivist position: there is no reality that isn’t reconfigured or constructed by discourse. In its most radical tenet, we convince ourselves that it’s all discourse, there is no reality at all, so you’d better be careful which discourse you choose. But if you look at the facts of AIDS, it really does scare you out of the constructivist position. There’s something awfully touchable and factitious about it, especially if you watch it close, destroying a friend. There’s even something haunting and scary, to which any AIDS researcher will attest, about the HIV virus itself. Let’s take paragraph to explore it:

     

    Normally, a cell begins with DNA, which is transcribed into RNA, which then codes for proteins, the building blocks of cells. But AIDS is the ultimate cybernetic disease; it inverts and subverts the normal DNA-RNA-DNA loop (thus the “retro” in “retrovirus”) by imposing its own loop. Where most viruses are DNA, HIV is an RNA virus. With the insidious collaboration of reverse transcriptase, it takes over and alters the DNA transcription process, forcing it to produce more retroviral RNA, which in turn takes over the DNA in other cells. At the same time, it changes other parts of DNA, encoding for proteins that alter the body’s cells, actually making them more receptive to further HIV infection. Finally, the RNA replication cycle is activated by anything that turns on the immune system: in other words, the immune system defeats itself every time it tries to work. Spooky and evil disease. Nasty shit.

     

         I suggest we all take a closer look at the possibility –made even more ironic by the tendency of some to laud the coming cyborgization of our bodies and minds–that AIDS is just the first of a terrible series of cyborg events against which simple enlightened discretion is not proof. Perhaps retroviruses themselves are the product of orgiastic physiological feedback mechanisms between the world and the world-body, which might continue to spawn these transcription reversals between RNA and DNA because we have achieved some new order of Prigoginesque complexity.1 AIDS really does make cyborgs of its victims, and by extension, of us all, as the glomming of a cybernetic system onto an organismic host. If this is what cyborgization portends, I’m gonna resist.

     


     

    Notes

     

    1. In Order Out Of Chaos: Man’s New Dialogue with Nature (New York: Bantam, 1984), Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers discuss the consequences of Prigogine’s Nobel-Prize-winning work on chaos. They explain how new biological organisms of increasing complexity arise naturally and inevitably from conditions of turbulent chaos: the HIV viral family may be an example of just such an occurrence.

     


     

    Allison Fraiberg

    University of Washington
    <fraiberg@milton.u.washington.edu>

     

    Allison Fraiberg replies to David Porush:

     

    In reading David Porush’s comments, I realized that parts of my essay were not as clear as I would have liked them to be. Based on Porush’s comments, I would like to take this opportunity to reiterate some points that I think are crucial to my argument as a whole. Consequently, I will reply to Porush by focusing on areas where I sensed the most confusion.

     

    What concerns me the most are quibbles about, or blatant dismissals of, two crucial starting points in my essay. The first involves a conclusion of Porush’s that retroactively revises one of my premises. Porush writes that “[p]erhaps the proper conclusion is that all the rhetorics about AIDS are dispensable” (8). Easy to say, but not so easy–or even desirable–to do. Douglas Crimp opens the collection of essays in AIDS: Cultural Analysis/ Cultural Activism with an important reminder. I quote him at length since he reaches the heart of the matter:

     

    AIDS does not exist apart from the practices that conceptualize it, represent it, and respond to it. We know AIDS only in and through those practices. This assertion does not contest the existence of viruses, antibodies, infections, or transmission routes. Least of all does it contest the reality of illness, suffering, and death. What it does contest is the notion that there is an underlying reality of AIDS, upon which are constructed the representations, or the culture, or the politics of AIDS. If we recognize that AIDS exists only in and through these constructions, then hopefully we can also recognize the imperative to know them, analyze them, and wrest control of them. (3)

     

    To dispense with the rhetorics of AIDS, in Crimp’s frame, becomes an impossible task since AIDS exists “in and through” them. Crimp’s point is that you can’t distinguish AIDS from the practices which make it intelligible. Choosing to ignore the discourses of AIDS is something I can’t even picture: every day I see stories on television, in the newspapers; I hear of new public policy and legislation; I see people die. I don’t see how one can dispose of the rhetorics–it’s not a Lego set that one can put away when one has tired of playing. I can, however, see how some people have tried to revise/alter/speak different rhetorics in attempts to “recognize the imperative to know them, analyze them, and wrest control of them.” And, in seeing and experiencing various actions and discourses put into motion by AIDS strategists, I have realized that “encrusted” academics have no property rights on discourse.

     

    The second premise around which Porush and I disagree centers on a temporal sense of positioning. Porush writes of the “coming cyborgization of our bodies” and how he’s “gonna resist” it. I’m somewhat taken aback by the future tense here since my whole argument rests on the assumption that Haraway’s cyborg myth is not going to happen but that it has happened (“The cyborg is our ontology”). The first half of my essay uses a cyborg ontology as its premise: Haraway for the description, then my resituating of discourses using Haraway’s frame. By using the cyborg as a starting point, I’m saying that–and this is by no means an astounding observation–rhetorics of humanism and organicism have produced, are currently producing, and, dare I say, will probably always produce, radical material inequities for the vast majority of people.

     

    So, if a) the cyborg is our ontology and b) discourses that deny the cyborg are at best archaic and at worst deadly, do you continue to tell the story of organics–a story that doesn’t quite fit the picture? Do you speak of the futility of trying to do anything in this configuration (Haraway: “Paranoia bores me.”)? Do you speak in the rhetoric of the future–and thereby deny various realities? I choose none of these since I see in them no opportunities for change. Instead, I’ll take on Haraway’s challenge of “being in the belly of a monster and looking for another story to tell” (“Cyborgs at Large” 14). Consequently, what I did was take a description of current relations and resituated AIDS discourses on it.

     

    And what I saw from the belly of the monster was how certain discourses had tried so hard to resist being digested by the monster; I also saw others that knew that’s where they were. The alternate AIDS strategists knew that they were in the belly of a monster and while I was there I saw something exciting happen: the alternate AIDS discourses began to revise the belly. These discourses, the discourses that recognize a cyborg-netic body, began to revise postmodern versions of the blurry boundaries of the body. They resurfaced the body and by so doing created a post- circuited discrete unit.

     

    Porush says in his response that I pun on “discrete” and “discreet”: I do, but he misses my final step. I move from the discrete bodies of liberal humanism (separate, distinct) to the pun on discreet (the various definitions on all sides of what constitutes a certain sense of judgment). But then I move on to discrete again. I move on because it’s not a revised sense of judgment that propels the argument; it’s a revised discrete sense of the body. In other words, I go from “discrete,” to “discreet,” to “discrete.” And by the time I get around to the second version of discrete, it looks very different from the first one that set the pun in motion. That alternate AIDS discourses and strategies revise versions of the body offered by mainstream media, humanism, and postmodernism seems to me a powerful and energetic practice.

     

    It’s a powerful practice that begins to tell another story–another story that tries to describe what’s happening to people–and I read the story as being about agency. So my essay isn’t about safe sex or new forms of judgments: people with a lot more visibility than I’ve got have been saying these things for 10 years with little luck (but, based on what I read in a recent poll I took on the electronic bulletin board used in composition courses at the University of Washington, it wouldn’t hurt to have those ideas reiterated, again and again and again). Instead, I’m interested in how agency is conditioned and produced in the move from “discrete” (version 1) to “discrete” (version 2).

     

    In this second version, you can’t arrive at an agent without looking at what Porush rightfully calls the “realities of AIDS.” Agency is the result of the resurfacing of the–differently discrete–body; and the agency arises out of the material conditions that force the resurfacing. When Porush quotes me saying we are all conditioned by cyborg-like systematicity, he adds a word that completely alters my intention and, consequently, my argument: he adds “equally” before conditioned, a move that once again forecloses on this version of agency. I would never say that we are all equally conditioned by anything. I would never say, for instance, that the women on factory lines in Southeast Asia who assemble my computer and I, who use this computer to write, are “equally” conditioned by the transnational circuit of which we are both part; I would never say that gay men and straight white women in this country are “equally” conditioned by the cyborg-like systematicity I describe in my essay.

     

    In fact, it is the redistribution of agency that grounds my argument (I must apologize to Mr. Porush if he doesn’t find this as much “fun” as he would like). The type of material agency I propose is one that shifts attention and authority away from hegemonic biomedical and governmental institutions and onto those most affected. It also forces theorists, postmodern and otherwise, to take our cues from where the materialist agent stands: usually downtown organizing street actions, protests, and die-ins.

     

  • Of AIDS, Cyborgs, and Other Indiscretions: Resurfacing the Body in the Postmodern

    Allison Fraiberg

    University of Washington
    fraiberg@milton.u.washington.edu

     

    We live in the ecstasy of communication. And this ecstasy is obscene. . . . today, there is a whole pornography of information.

     

    –Jean Baudrillard

     

    [T]here has been a mutation in the object, unaccompanied as yet by any equivalent mutation in the subject; we do not yet possess the perceptual equipment to match this new hyperspace . . .

     

    –Fredric Jameson

     

    [W]e are all chimeras, theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism; in short, we are cyborgs. The cyborg is our ontology; it gives us our politics.

     

    –Donna Haraway

     

    Predominant in postmodern theories of representation are approaches and practices that locate “the body” within systematized networks and circuits. Theorists who are representative of very different theoretical positions–such as Jean Baudrillard, whose “ecstasy of communication” describes a breakdown between public and private, Fredric Jameson, whose “hyperspace” reflects a continuous sense of the present in a world of transnational capital, and Donna Haraway, whose “cyborg ontology” reads the disintegration of distinctions between organisms and machines–nonetheless concur in presenting scenarios in which traditional tropes of discreteness, of discretion, dissolve and the focus shifts to formulations of connectedness. Subjected to these discursive frameworks or grounding ontologies, the body, as a clearly delineated unit, blurs into negotiated relatedness and postmodern systematicity ushers in a contemporary meltdown of the discrete body. In other words, it would seem, at best, difficult to try to discuss “the body” with distinct boundaries, whereas referring to the bounded body– bounded to and within integrated networks–can emerge as a reflective postmodern image.

     

    This networking of bodies has been prominent in the representations of and discourse about AIDS in the U.S. As I will show, mainstream media constructions of AIDS project and feed off a fear of, among other things, circuited sexuality. On the other hand, critics of mainstream AIDS representations work to break down the rhetorical constructions and effects of discrete categories, an obvious example being that of “general public” or “at risk groups.” In this paper, I will first resituate familiar discussions of the body in AIDS commentary, both popular and critical, by employing what Donna Haraway calls a “cyborg ontology.” I will then move on to suggest that, in terms of AIDS discourses, the body begins to resurface from within the networks defined, urging a very different kind of discreteness, and consequently a revised type of agency, into a postmodern context.

     

    Wiring the Postmodern

     

    When Baudrillard defines the “ecstasy of communication,” he grounds its images in screens and networks. Certain that “[s]omething has changed,” he laments the recognition of an “era of networks . . . contact, contiguity, feedback and generalized interface” (127). Communication, for Baudrillard, invokes a “relational decor,” a “fluidity,” “polyvalence” in “pure circulation” (130-31). Baudrillard anxiously describes these networks as “pornographic” and “obscene” since he sees in them the loss of the body and its familiar figurations: the “subject” and the always tenuous public/private dichotomy. Because of its fusing into the network, the body loses its discretionary status and, for Baudrillard, the “obscenity” lies in the dissolution of the private where “secrets, spaces and scenes [are] abolished in a single dimension of information” (131); Baudrillard’s “pornographic” develops out of the inability to produce “proper” limits and he invokes the schizophrenic for tropic legitimation:

     

    with the immanent promiscuity of all these networks, with their continual connections, we are now in a new form of schizophrenia . . . too great a proximity of everything, the unclean promiscuity of everything which touches, invests and penetrates without resistance, with no halo of private protection, not even his own body, to protect him anymore. . . . He can no longer produce the limits of his own being. . . . He is now only a pure screen, a switching center for all the networks of influence. (132-33)

     

    What is so remarkable about Baudrillard’s casting of the discussion in these terms is that, with the substitution of a noun or two, one could easily transpose this rhetoric into a “pro-family” position on AIDS that strains to keep the “halos” on, the “unclean” out, and the private crucially “protected.” In both scenarios there is a sense of inevitable fusion of the body within networks–a fusion realized, albeit reluctantly, by Baudrillard, but repeatedly denied and cast out on moral grounds by the so-called “pro- family” position on AIDS. Consequently:

     

    The logical outcome of testing is a quarantine of those infected.

     

    --Jesse Helms

     

    Baudrillard’s mourning of the “loss” of past private spaces of the body is recast, with a similar tone, in Jameson’s analysis that isolates postmodernism within the “cultural logic of late capitalism.” Jameson reorganizes the postmodern schema into a “bewildering new world space of multinational capital” (58) with “effaced frontiers,” “integrated” commodity production, “intertextuality,” and the “disappearance of the individual subject.” What Jameson calls postmodern “hyperspace” is the global networking produced by transnational capital, a networking he sees as “transcending the capacities of the individual human body to locate itself, to organize its immediate surroundings perceptually, and cognitively map its position” (83). Jameson arrives at the point of calling for ways to map this network and/by/for those “caught” within it, to make it epistemologically accessible, and finally, dialectically, make the best of what, he argues, had to come anyway.

     

    Jameson differs from Baudrillard in, among other places, his isolation of a particular of a particular disjunction between subject and space. “My implication,” Jameson argues, “is that we ourselves, the human subjects who happen into this new space, have not kept pace with that evolution…we do not yet possess the perceptual equipment to match this new hyperspace” (80). Jameson does identify a new field of relations, but the subject he posits remains essentially the same, just a little lost in its new surroundings. For this reason, Jameson’s call for cognitive mappings resembles a type of postmodern finding of one’s self in a “bewildering” new field. This position, like Baudrillard’s, can find its correlative in AIDS discourse: the Jamesonian view would be reminiscent of the mainstream position that asserts the “general public” can contract HIV “as well.” In other words, the field has changed, but how the subjects are thought of within it remains virtually the same. Therefore:

     

    I have asked the Department of Health and Human Services to determine as soon as possible the extent to which the AIDS virus has penetrated our society.

     

    --Ronald Reagan (in 1987, when 25,644 were known dead)1

     

    For Haraway, however, both the field and the subject change as cyborgs provide the ontological myth that captures the image of post-industrial capitalist culture. She defines the cyborg as a “cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism” (“Manifesto” 174). Dissolving apparently clear distinctions propels the cyborg. “Needy for connection,” it lurks at the boundaries constructed and demanded by humanist thought, dismantling discretion in favor of interconnected networks and integrated systems. Boundaries “breached,” or at least “leaky,” include those between human and animal, between animal-human and machine, and between the physical and the non-physical. Like other postmodern strategies, cyborgs “subvert myriad organic wholes,” and, unlike Baudrillard and Jameson, Haraway can see potential in the loss of discretion: “So my cyborg myth is about transgressed boundaries, potent fusions, and dangerous possibilities which progressive people might explore as one part of needed political work” (“Manifesto” 178). It is not the case that Haraway sees her cyborg myth as some post-organic deus ex machina; instead she invests her myth with perpetual tensions where “potent fusions” are balanced with “dangerous possibilities.” Focusing on the production and reading of integrated circuits and the relations within them, theorists can, then, in Haraway’s words, negotiate through various “system constraints” (“Biopolitics” 12-13).

     

    Other theorists of postmodernism may argue and debate about whether to embrace or view with horror a cybernetic age; about whether the status of subjectivity has changed; about whether postmodernity signals a turn beyond that which was once valued (by some). Haraway, on the other hand, like many feminist cultural theorists, resists these debates about how one should feel in these times (paranoid, horrified, ecstatic) and instead tries to focus on what to do, how to proceed, and how to start thinking of pro-active strategies. (Granted, Jameson calls for cognitive mapping, but the energy seems reconciliatory rather than pro-active). Quite simply, what separates Haraway out from a substantial set of discourses about cybernetics is that she is not so much concerned with how good or bad a cybernetic age will be, or has become; she wants to talk about how the world is ontologically/epistemologically structured and what feminists can do about it.

     

    Of Aids: Resituating Discourses

     

    It is patriotic to have the AIDS test and be negative.

     

    –Cory Servaas,
    Presidential AIDS Commission

     

    Everyone detected with AIDS should be tattooed in the upper forearm, to protect common needle users, and on the buttocks to protect the victimization of other homosexuals.

     

    –William F. Buckley

     

    AIDS is God’s judgment of a society that does not live by His rules.

     

    –Jerry Falwell 2

     

    So much of AIDS criticism has had to contend with cauterizing the effects of officially sanctioned positions such as those above; consequently, much of the work on AIDS to date has centered on exposing the assumptions and values embedded within mainstream representation. These important critiques focus predominantly on three, often intersecting, sites of construction. Often, representations of AIDS have problematically inherited historical and biomedical contexts, and various critics have discussed the problems when AIDS becomes another “venereal disease” or the latest version of rampant infectious disease where “contagion,” “quarantine,” and “contamination” become the dominant terms conditioning meaning (and often policy and research).3 Moreover, a large amount of critical practice has focused on exposing the racist, classist, sexist, and homophobic assumptions embedded in popular, medical, and sociological representations. Many of these undertakings highlight the politics behind discourses of “risk groups” that isolate people rather than practices; of the “general public,” which turns out to function more like an exclusive country club; and of “origins,” which, as Simon Watney argues, equates a source of something with its cause (“Missionary” 95).4 In addition, critics and activists have foregrounded organized/reorganized erotic economies and resisted the anti-sex and “pro-family” campaign engineered by hegemonic AIDS representations.5

     

    These critical projects are crucial in that they expose the biases upon which policies are constructed. But what I would now like to do is think about some mainstream positions and some critical ones at the same time, in the same field of relations–in the field of what Haraway might call a cyborg-like network. Reorganized in this framework, attitudes range from denial of networking–in terms of the subject and/or the field–to a kind of hysterical reaction of recognition, to finally more productive readings and codings. Because I am trying to resituate these arguments on the same discursive field, the next few pages might be repetitive for those who are acquainted with the various critiques of mainstream AIDS commentary. Please bear in mind, however, that I am trying to re-view these positions as they relate to a cyborg-netic field; this resituating, while at times somewhat belaboured, is necessary ground out of which the resurfacing on the body emerges.

     

    Denying Cyborgs

     

    The cyborg notion of transgressed boundaries and leaky distinctions finds its immunological referent in the discourses of AIDS. The reality of HIV has opened up and relegated bodies to an integrated system of, among other things, sexuality. The bringing to consciousness of the presence of AIDS has broken down the traditional demarcations of the body, blurring the boundaries between inside and outside. For years now, with less safe practices, an interface propels the body to serve as an osmotic shell through which systematized sex circulates. Moreover, shared needles construct a network of IV drug users; and shared blood forces to consciousness a crucial interconnectedness. And, of course, these systems interpenetrate as networks of social relations emerge. The realities of AIDS dissolve the boundaries of the discrete body, and the cyborg, still needy for connection, integrates it into its discursive network. The New Right, mainstream media representation, and a lot of public sentiment have responded by denying cyborg-netic reorganizations of the body. Desperate to retain the traditional boundaries of the body as individual, both conservatives and liberals have articulated a rhetoric that has made several attempts to keep AIDS outside the sphere of the “general American public”–read white, heterosexual, middle-class nuclear family. In each situation, the position that denies recognition of a circuited body image tries to fabricate and maintain crucial distinctions between self and other.

     

    The most obvious boundary that “official” conservative discourse clings to is the one between human and “disease”: “us” and “AIDS.” The strategic construction that urges keeping “it” out of “us” relies primarily on a projection since “it” would not be if it were not for “us.” Repressing that integration, the first rhetorical maneuver involves anthropomorphizing AIDS into a live virus and then militarizing its context. Susan Sontag notices that in this “high-tech warfare,” the AIDS virus [sic] “hides,” “attacks,” “lurks,” and, of course, “invades” (17-19). Similarly, Paula Treichler describes the rhetorical evolution of the “AIDS virus” as “a top-flight secret agent–a James Bond . . . armed with a ‘range of strategies’ and licensed to kill” insidiously invading the cell and “establishing a disinformation campaign” (59).

     

    Reinforcing the “us/them” binary that denies the cyborg body is a continual search for a cause of AIDS, and consequently, the origins of HIV. Overdeterminations of HIV as the single agent cause of AIDS foreclose on posited co- factors; and then the quest for origin can shift to isolating sources of HIV. That a strain of virus remotely similar to HIV has been found in a species of monkey (the so-called “Green Monkey Hypothesis”) produces and perpetuates a popular contention that AIDS originated in “Africa.” Responsibility is projected onto a convenient other and the body of the “general American public” remains “safe” and isolated, establishing its boundaries not only by geography, but by implied race as well. Not only does this premise displace origins thousands of miles away, but in doing so relies on a familiar moral opposition of white and black. The “cause” of AIDS becomes the monolithic “dark continent,” the land of the primitive, and as Simon Watney notes, of “naked ‘animal’ blackness” (75). These multiple moral projections would enclose and protect white, middle- class, heterosexual America from invasion. Again, the nuclear family body denies the cybernetic organization of AIDS by refusing to recognize its integration within its networks.

     

    Once discursively acknowledged, mainstream representations of AIDS draw on newly delineated boundaries; a revised “us/them” dichotomy emerges that keeps denying the AIDS-body cyborg. “Risk groups” or “those at risk” (revised from the “4-H” groups of the 80s) become the convenient other: most often cited as gay men and IV drug users (who are almost always represented as people of color). The nomenclature advocates that these are groups of people who are at high risk of contracting HIV, therefore the “general public” should stay away from “them.” The first striking characteristic of this configuration is that these are groups of people and if you find yourself fitting into one of these groups, you are necessarily at “high-risk.” This framework denies the subject any sort of agency, an ideologically motivated strategy that makes its point: the subject who falls into a high-risk group has no option but to occupy a position in it; at the same time, if one does not slip into one of these groups then there is, within this construction, no “risk.” Here, it doesn’t matter what you do because what counts is who you are; and for the person living with AIDS, this context leaves no room for subjectivity, for agency, for action.

     

    That the intended audience of “risk group” identification is the “general public” underscores the contention that “those at risk” are precisely not part of that audience. The tenuous dichotomy, however, slips at several sites: that of what gets represented as the case of the “tragic” hemophiliac who contracts through blood products; the recipient of a transfusion of “tainted” blood; and the sex worker who “infects” the unknowing consumer. In each case, though, an innocence factor mitigates contraction. In a more recent attempt to reproduce the innocent body, and therefore maintain the ability to name guilt, the term “Pediatric AIDS” has become embedded in representations of certain people living with AIDS. In a move that seeks to reestablish boundaries to the now quite messy binary, “AIDS” and “Pediatric AIDS” have surfaced, rhetorically, as two very distinct constructs, each conditioning very different identities: babies born testing positive for HIV antibodies can occupy a position of “wholly innocent” while the mothers, depending on their backgrounds, await textual, moral assignation.

     

    With the deconstruction effected, with the representational acknowledgement that AIDS indeed “leaks” into the “general public,” conservative thought reorganizes its “us/them” dichotomy into a rhetoric explicitly moral and “pro-family.” Each time the hint of connection emerges, a new denial of integration surfaces; each time a new illusory individual unit is posited. Prevention strategies that, at this point, still reject the implication of some bodies into the AIDS-body network consciously construct new boundaries around the body of the nuclear family. If the “innocent” general public can contract HIV as well, so the story goes, then a prevention campaign that extrapolates from occluded attitudes within risk-group discourse must center on a question of morality: if “we” can get AIDS (and this is precisely the moment when discursive productions can either accept the cyborg ontology or try yet again to deny it), then “we” must try to be good. The moralizing trope serves as the building material for the construction of boundaries. And “good” in the 1980s functions euphemistically to mean monogamous heterosexual relationships with people who “just say no” to drugs. The safest sex of all becomes abstinence–the illusory production of a self-contained body–and those who abstain from sex altogether become “very good” people; those who insist on having sex but do so only in monogamous relationships, preferably in marriage, are “good”; and, of course, those who engage in sex with many partners, who insist on being promiscuous, or use IV drugs, bring on infection “themselves.” In this configuration, a closed-off body equivocates into a pure body as the nuclear family forges boundaries embedded in morality.

     

    Starting With Cyborgs

     

    By stressing abstinence, by prescribing heterosexual monogamy, by condemning IV drug use, conservative discourse engages in a repressive hypothesis that promotes an economy of desire: the more you say yes, the higher your chances of “infection,” the more leaky the moral boundaries that surround you. The hierarchy of morality–abstinence, monogamy, condoms, etc.–has eroded, however, under the scrutiny of critics, many of whom recognize the flimsiness of the boundaries constructed. Douglas Crimp argues against abstinence as a strategy of prevention because “people do not abstain from sex, and if you only tell them ‘just say no,’ they will have unsafe sex” (252). Moreover, repressed in the call for monogamy is any reference to history: monogamy means little if one partner is HIV+ and the couple, thinking they have fulfilled the moral requirement in the symbolic contract that disqualifies them from contraction, practices unsafe sex. This education campaign denies a discursive field of indiscretion by promoting a rhetoric of the discreet individual.

     

    Critics of media representations of AIDS have addressed this problematic by exposing its repressive mechanisms. John Greyson, for example, has produced a music-video exposing the “ADS” campaign–the “Acquired Dread of Sex” that one can get from watching, among other things, television (270). Consequently, Crimp notices how media campaigns to get people to use condoms have used fear as their manipulative device rather than sexuality. Ironically, he wonders why “an industry that has used sexual desire to sell everything from cars to detergents suddenly finds itself at a loss for how to sell a condom” (266). What culminates in an “acquired dread of sex” is the logical conclusion of a discourse that organizes repeated “us/them” oppositions to keep AIDS out, to deny a cyborg-netic field; and once AIDS manages to “infiltrate,” the emphasis shifts to deny its presence in the morally pure and displace it onto the deviant, thereby constructing new boundaries. It’s the repetition of a posture that attempts at any cost to deny connection/identification; it’s a constricted stance that tries desperately to repress indiscretion: a term defined more traditionally in the context of such denounced behaviors as sex and IV drug use, but also indiscretion described here as a certain dissolution of clear delineation. With indiscretion (both kinds) repressed, those remaining are left to close off their bodies, constricting any potential openings.

     

    To speak of sexuality and the body, and not to speak of AIDS, would be, well, obscene.

     

    --B. Ruby Rich

    Simply put, those who enjoy getting fucked should not be made to feel stupid or irresponsible. Instead, they should be provided with the information necessary to make what they enjoy safe(r)! And that means the aggressive encouragement of condom use.

     

    --Michael Callan

     

    In contrast to conservative rhetoric that denies indiscretion, of any kind, one can locate an ontology that takes the breakdown of traditional boundaries associated with the body as a grounding premise. Since mainstream representation compulsively represses interconnectedness, resistant strategies can and do rupture the process, forcing the latent networks to percolate to consciousness, to representation. Rejecting the discursive displacements that produce Others at risk, it is a position that recognizes, like Rich, that the discourses of AIDS are in some sense always already within: “To speak of sexuality and the body and not to speak of AIDS, would be, well, obscene.” The texts that construct “AIDS” metaphorically become an ontological current running through bodies, making the connections of a systemic circuit. Distinctions, then, between self and other become archaic, and the AIDS-body cyborg functions as an icon that organizes perceptions and writings of the body.

     

    Precisely because a notion of “risk group” or “those at risk” becomes problematic (which, granted, at this point does nothing to address the real inequities of representation), because the networks and narratives established by leaky boundaries integrate and implicate all and avoid projecting blame, the argument can shift from singling out risk groups to focusing on risk practices. The networks made manifest can then accommodate Watney’s call for an “erotics of protection” as well as Singer’s “body management”–both are organizations of erotic economies. If discussion of risk groups and the general public lead us to ask who we are when we have sex or use IV drugs, then the cyborg discursive configuration of risk practices asks all of us what we do when we have sex and use IV drugs. Unlike the former position that relegated the subject to helplessness within its constructions–an especially problematic space for a PLWA (Person Living With AIDS)–this field posits a subject, precisely because of its “indiscretion,” that can choose. Because this subject gives up its limit, its “halo,” (to invoke Baudrillard momentarily) of private protection, it gains agency for resistance–a key term for immunological reference.

     

    And this subject can choose to have sex, unlike its anti-cyborg parallel, but must undergo what Linda Singer calls “changes in the economy of genital gestures and erotic choreography” (55). Whereas anti-cyborg bodies repressed sexualities when confronted with AIDS, integrated bodies adamantly guard the right to them. Carol Leigh, a sex worker and playwright, argues that “we must fight against all those who would use this crisis as an excuse to legislate or otherwise limit sexuality” (177). Those who have thought of sex as heterosexual penile penetration and ejaculation (many caught within the anti-cyborg “general public”) must reorganize perceptions in such a way as to eroticize non-genital areas; and when sex is genital, condoms and dental dams become new age sex toys. Embedded in all of these calls for safer practices are two assumptions that are crucial as far as my own argument is concerned: first, that the forged boundaries constitutive of the individualized units are amorphous; and second, that safer shooting and sex depend on a recogntion of interconnectedness, of indiscretion.

     

    Resurfacing The Body

     

    Rather than repressing sexuality, the AIDS-body network sublimates it, dispersing teleologically-oriented sex into more polymorphous activity. Within this revised organization, the rules of safe sex and calls for clean works dictate that, precisely because the boundaries are illusory, the body resurfaces as discrete entity. Condoms, dental dams, clean needles, and reserved blood manifest a surface awareness, a consciousness focused on clearly delineating the boundaries of bodies. The traditional, tenuous limits of the body dissolved into fused networks, into open circuits of interconnectedness, produce an ontological recognition that, from this perspective, urges the body into discretion. Closed off, guarded against infection, beware the surface; any exchange of fluid, that is, any disclosure of an open, leaking body threatens. A closed, self-contained body resurfaces from the within the integrated network.

     

    But this is a different kind of discretion. It’s not the kind of discretion clung to by those who deny any fusion; it’s a kind of discretion, discreteness, that is a consequence of the recognition of indiscretion. So while the cyborg ontology takes as its premise the dissolution of traditional boundaries associated with the body, its referent in the texts of AIDS, epistemologically speaking, forces the body to resist coming to rest with those integrated circuits and, instead, reorganizes into discrete units. In this sense, discretion returns, not in the form of reactionary denial, but as conditioned by a cyborg-like system. In other words, if the cyborg ontology can be said to function as the discursive field upon which networks of social relations play themselves out, then that field must by willing to admit–indeed, it has already admitted–the constructions of what might seem quite odd to cyborg theorists: writings and readings of the body grounded in discretion.

     

    The resurfaced, discrete body/subject is different from its predecessor because the recognition of blurred boundaries is precisely that which makes the body resurface. “Discretion” functions, then, as an ambivalent marker for both sets of discourses and, as the foundational site for constructions, poses key questions. The discursive peril here, in terms of the discourses of AIDS, involves the confusion between a conservative “pro-family” stance and progressive reconstructions. In the representational treatments of AIDS, two different discrete bodies emerge: one that denies the cyborg and ultimately prescribes racist, classist, and homophobic attitudes; and one that reorganizes discretion within the AIDS-body circuit. Confusing the two could potentially elide the latter construction as well as its ethics. For instance, media campaigns have urged the use of condoms, but they have done so within an atmosphere of repressive (hetero)sexuality; consequently, safe sex, instead of organizing an erotic economy, becomes an unreliable alternative for those heterosexuals who won’t say no. The racist, classist, and homophobic subtexts remain intact and the white, middle-class, heterosexual family assumes the position of general public all over again.

     

    This is not to say that a circulatory ontology ought to be abandoned, nor is it to say that any codings of the body as a discrete unit will necessarily become subsumed by mainstream representation. In fact, I believe that too many areas have seen a reformulation of discretion, a resurfacing of the body, to leave such a pessimistic reading intact. One obvious example in the U.S. involves strategies organized around women’s reproductive rights. When, for instance, abortion rights activists carry signs reading “Bush, get out of mine!” we engage in a similar move that recognizes existing intervention and then expels the groping hands of legislators from women’s bodies and reformulates a discrete body, closing off from the lesislative machinery. This analogy was reinforced during this year’s 4th Annual Gay and Lesbian Film Festival held in Olympia, Washington: I saw a man wearing a button with a slogan made famous by reproductive rigths activists–“My body is my own business.”

     

    For these reasons, I would suggest that working within postmodern network theory to discuss AIDS strategy, or even some other “indiscretions” such as reproductive rights practices, can grant a crucial sense of agency to renegotiate some of the blatant horrors of mainstream representation. Working within a single field of relations that resituates perceptions of both “official” AIDS representation as well as those who criticize it diffuses the rhetorical and positional strength of a centralized power dictating, and conditioning, meaning; this circulatory system affords the space for a localized biopolitics and active resistance. It posits resistance, not at the expense of agency but, rather, as a condition of agency; and with mainstream representation continually constructing helpless, objectified “AIDS victims” awaiting “certain death,” the discursive leverage to act and re-act obviously takes on added significance for persons living with AIDS.

     

    It’s a type of agency that carries with it, and can put to use, the contextual histories of the networks from which the subject emerged. Material, contextual conditions become built in to the theoretical frame, rather than being held in opposition or tension with the theory: this type of agency does not recognize a traditional distinction between “theory” and “praxis” or “theory” and “experience” because the material context of the networks produces the agent. Agency loses its abstract, theoretical, and often vague status and becomes recognizable only through its multiple material contexts. Moreover, the specificity of agents differs across contexts: the resurfaced agent of reproductive rights discourses would not be the same agent progressive AIDS strategies produce since each is conditioned by differing intersections of networks.

     

    In this case, resurfacing the body becomes the mechanism through which one sense of agency can be constituted. Resurfacing the body then, within the postmodern, exposes mainstream investments as it articulates a new space, a revitalized subject, as it recodes discretion from within the circuits of systematicity. At the same time, tropes of postmodern networking that posit a process of integration, of dissolving, don’t necessarily end there: within and beyond the blur can lie a resuscitated agent ready for action.

     

    Casting agency in this way can revise ideas about authorization. The realm that denies cyborg-like integration ultimately leaves intact traditional sites of authority, sites with various investments in the “general public”: for example, bio-medical research, the position of Surgeon General, governmental and legal policy decisions. On the other hand, a large scale recognition of this resituated interconnectedness, and the subsequent resurfacing of the body–of some–might begin to shift those sites of authority. If this recognition is granted, attention might be (re)drawn toward those whose experience is most most important and whose energies are spent organizing pro-active strategies. In other words, the agency evolving through the resurfacing could loosen the mainstream’s hold on the discourse about AIDS and create an opening for actions such as: having more than one PLWA speaking at the International AIDS conference; ending the scientific community’s holding of people for ransom; or instituting a media campaign that can offer something more effective, and finally less dangerous, than a choral cry to just say no.

     

    Notes

     

    1. Statistics from Douglas Crimp, “AIDS: Cultural Analysis/Cultural Activism,” 11 (in the volume of the same name, edited by Crimp).

     

    2. All quotes from Crimp, 8.

     

    3. For further historical perspectives see Elizabeth Fee and Daniel M. Fox, AIDS: The Burdens of History, Dennis Altman’s AIDS In the Mind of America, and Simon Watney’s Policing Desire. Randy Shilts provides a journalistic history of AIDS in And the Band Played On, but his account is both voyeuristic–awkwardly, he scrutinizes the life of Gaetan Dugas, alleged “patient zero”– and morbid–he keeps a running tab on AIDS cases, deaths, and projected deaths. Douglas Crimp has also noted a homophobic attitude in the book: see his essay “AIDS: Cultural Analysis/Cultural Activism” in Crimp, ed. For specific analysis of the construction of “disease” see especially Paula Treichler “AIDS, Gender, and Biomedical Discourse: Current Contests for Meaning” in Fee and Fox. See also Charles Rosenberg “Disease and Social Order in America: Perceptions and Expectations,” and Gerald Oppenheimer “In the Eye of the Storm: The Epidemiological Constructions of AIDS”–both in Altman. For discussions of health care and biomedical discourse, see Douglas Crimp “How to Have Promiscuity in an Epidemic” in Crimp, ed.; Daniel M. Fox “The Politics of Physicians’ Responsibilities in Epidemics: A Note on History” in Fee and Fox; Suki Ports “Nedded (For Women and Children)” in Crimp, ed.; Mark McGrath and Bob Sutcliffe “Insuring Profits From AIDS: The Economics of an Epidemic” in Radical America 20.6 (1986): 9-27.

     

    4. For further reference on intertwinings of discussions of “risk groups,” “general public,” and “origins” see especially Watney’s Policing Desire, “The Spectacle of AIDS” in Crimp, ed., and “Missionary Positions.” For discussions of homophobia in representation see Watney, Crimp, Cindy Patton, and Leo Bersani (in Crimp, ed.), among many others. Observing that most media coverage of AIDS addresses a heterosexual audience, the “general public,” while completely eliding the fact that homosexuals are part of that audience, Bersani complains that “TV treats us to nauseating processions of yuppie women announcing to the world that they will no longer put out for their yuppie boyfriends unless . . .” (“Rectum” 202), and that the “family identity produced on American television is much more likely to include your dog than your homosexual brother or sister” (203).

     

    5. For instance, Gregg Bordowitz “picture[s a] coalition of people having safe sex and shooting up with clean works” (Crimp, ed. 195), while Linda Singer outlines an erotics of “body management” (“Bodies” 56). Watney has called for an “erotics of protection,” an arena which would include “huge regular Safe Sex parties [with] . . . hot, sexy visual materials to take home” and “safe sex porno videos” (Policing Desire 133-4). Similarly, Douglas Crimp urges that “gay male promiscuity should be seen…as a positive model of how sexual pleasures might be pursued” (“How to Have Promiscuity” 253).

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Altman, Dennis. AIDS in the Mind of America. Garden City, NY: Anchor, Doubleday, 1986.
    • Baudrillard, Jean. “The Ecstasy of Communication.” Trans. John Johnston. The Anti-Aesthetic. Ed. Hal Foster. Port Townsend, WA: Bay Press, 1983.
    • Bersani, Leo. “Is the Rectum a Grave?” AIDS: Cultural Analysis/ Cultural Activism. Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 1987.
    • Crimp, Douglas. “How to Have Promiscuity in an Epidemic.” AIDS: Cultural Analysis/Cultural Activism. Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 1987. 237-270.
    • Fee, Elizabeth and Daniel M. Fox (eds.). AIDS: The Burdens of History. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: U of California P, 1988.
    • Haraway, Donna. “A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s.” Coming to Terms. Ed. Elizabeth Weed. New York: Routledge, 1989. 173-214.
    • —. “The Biopolitics of Postmodern Bodies: Determinations of Self in Immune System Discourse.” Differences 1 (Winter 1989): 3-43.
    • Jameson, Fredric. “Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism.” New Left Review 146 (July-August 1984): 53-92.
    • Leigh, Carol. “Further Violation of Our Rights.” AIDS: Cultural Analysis/Cultural Activism. Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 1987. 177-181.
    • Shilts, Randy. And the Band Played On: Politics, People, and the AIDS Epidemic. New York: St. Martin’s Press,1987.
    • Singer, Linda. “Bodies–Pleasures–Powers.” Differences 1 (Winter 1989): 44-65.
    • Sontag, Susan. AIDS and Its Metaphors. New York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 1988.
    • Treichler, Paula. “AIDS, Homophobia, and Biomedical Discourse: An Epidemic of Signification.” AIDS: Cultural Analysis/Cultural Activism. Ed. Douglas Crimp. Cambridge, MA and London, MIT Press, 1987. 31-70.
    • Watney, Simon. “Missionary Positions: AIDS, ‘Africa,’ and Race.” Differences 1 (Winter 1989): 67-84.
    • —. Policing Desire: Pornography, AIDS, and the Media. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2nd edition, 1989.

     

  • Self-consuming Fictions: The Dialectics of Cannibalism in Modern Caribbean Narratives

    Eugenio D. Matibag

    Iowa State University

     

    Parce que nous vous haissons vous et votre raison, nous nous reclamons . . . du cannibalisme tenace.
     

    –Aime Cesaire,
    Cahier d’un retour au pays natal

     

    Howling words of fresh blood to spark the sacred fire of the world, Aime Cesaire in 1939 claimed kinship with madness and cannibalism. In Cesaire’s view, colonialism and western rationality had imposed a falsely barbaric identity –or, in effect, a non-identity–upon the peoples that Europe had uprooted, subjugated, enslaved and otherwise mastered. Against the Eurocentrist representation of American otherness, Cesaire, within his poem’s ritual of parthenogenesis, prophetically identified with that otherness, subsuming it into his apocalyptic redefinition of Afro-Antillean selfhood. By such iconoclastic gestures, Cesaire and numerous other writers of the region have demonstrated the manner in which poetic self-identification can mean empowerment in providing the starting point for resisting the cultural annihilation of colonialism. My aim in this essay will be to account for some of the ways in which Cesaire’s “cannibalisme tenace” has indeed persisted, tenaciously and obsessively, in modern Caribbean narratives concerned with the question of critiquing and constructing a post-colonial cultural identity.

     

    Cesaire’s affirmation of a unique Caribbean identity raises certain questions that remain to be addressed. The Afro-Antillean self of negritude is constituted on the violent exclusion of all other cultural elements that have formed Caribbean culture, including the contributions of indigenous, Asian and even European inhabitants. (One is led to ask if a truly Caribbean discourse of decolonization must negate or devalorize all such contributions.) The privileging of an African otherness furthermore entails the risk of reiterating the categorizations and exclusions inscribed in colonial discourse, for it was indeed the latter that hollowed out the representational space for what colonialism associated with “Africa” (the irrational, savage and infrahuman).1 Moreover, the concept of “identity” has itself become suspect in recent anti-essentialist theoretizations that have problematized the Cartesian notion of the subject. Jacques Derrida has displaced the subject along with other “transcendental signifieds” that have supposedly governed the play of signification within a cultural system from an assumed metaphysical center (249). Jacques Lacan has demonstrated the “subversion of the subject” as a function continually constituted and undermined in the chain of signifiers and in the “dialectic of desire” to which the self is subject-ed by its accession to language.2

     

    The post-structuralist attack on the unified, self- present and self-transparent cogito thus puts in question the simplistic assumptions underlying a call to define a specifically Caribbean identity, but I would argue that it does not in the end disqualify that call. Within a Third- World context in which we could situate such a claim to original identity, the postmodern announcement of the “death of the subject” sounds premature and betrays a complicity with world-capitalist systems that have already dispersed and canceled out individual subjectivity. In an emergent culture like that of the Caribbean nations, the subject may represent a refuge and a source of resistance to hegemony. Andreas Huyssen in “Mapping the Postmodern” raises the questions of what subjectivity could mean precisely in the face of capitalist modernization:

     

    Hasn't capitalist modernization itself fragmented and dissolved bourgeois subjectivity and authorship, thus making attacks on such notions somewhat quixotic? And . . . doesn't poststructuralism, where it simply denies the subject altogether, jettison the chance of challenging the ideology of the subject (as male, white, and middle-class) by developing alternative and different notions of subjectivity? (44)

     

    A certain Caribbean discourse of decolonization, I would argue, has held out for a counter-movement to modernist fragmentation and dissolution in very its tendency to “develop alternative and different notions of subjectivity.”3 In this discourse, far from having become obsolete, the subject has yet to come into its own.

     

    Appeals to integration of the divided colonial self have preoccupied Caribbean writers who have attempted to vindicate their right to self-definition. This vindication itself joins the broader question of cultural syncretism and synthesis endemic to Caribbean culture. In the “post- negritude” approach of Edouard Glissant, for example, this identity is acknowledged to be an identity-in-process, a “becoming-Antillean” through the operations of cultural synthesis creating an identity that is specifically a local production, not imposed from the outside.4 Before Glissant, Edward Brathwaite in his essay “Timehri” (1970) articulated the experience, shared by a generation of West Indian (principally British Caribbean) writers in the early postcolonial period, of the individual’s “dissociation of sensibility” and “rootlessness” in a fragmented creole culture incapable of grounding a firm sense of self (30). In Brathwaite’s account, such figures as C.L.R. James, George Lamming and V.S. Naipaul reflected on the dilemma of a post-plantation society in which the cultural contributions of Africans, Indians, Europeans and Asians had never been completely synthesized; in which individuals, living in such a heterogeneous, disunified world dominated by persistent colonial structures, feel cut off from any history and community they could call their own (29). In a more recent, “second phase” of Caribbean “artistic and intellectual life,” however, Brathwaite sees an attempt on the part of Caribbean writers to “transcend and heal” the problem of dissociation, the nonidentity and fragmentation produced by and under colonialism (31). Brathwaite’s solution for cultural rootlessness calls for a search and reintegration of forgotten origins, such as those “inscriptions” which are the timehri themselves: these are “rock signs, painting, petroglyphs; glimpses of a language, glitters of a vision of a world, scattered utterals of a remote Gestalt; but still there, near, potentially communicative” (40).

     

    But the timehri remain ambiguous, indecipherable and scattered. They alone cannot found a distinct Caribbean identity, although they may serve as a point of departure. It is another Caribbean trope, that of “cannibalism” and its ramifications, as I hope to show, which provides a more fruitful focus on the manner in which recent Caribbean texts have undertaken a search for identity in the traces left by Antillean “forerunners,” while at the same time ironizing the implicit search for origins. In claiming this, I do not mean to elevate cannibalism into a master trope but rather to use it as a sign of radical difference whose reinscription, in Caribbean discourse, opens up new approaches to the question of identity.

     

    As “the mark of unregenerate savagery” (Hulme 3), “cannibalism” displays the uncanny quality of binary oppositions: it is a sign both of animalistic nature and cultural practice; of affection and aggression; of transgression and consecration; of indigenous custom and European imputation. In remarking “cannibalism,” Caribbean texts participate in a common intent (1) to invert and reinscribe the hierarchies implicit in a colonial discourse on cannibalism; (2) to create a synthesis of disparate cultural elements, but especially those linked with the Caribs as ancestors, in the common impulse to decolonize an autocthonous cultural identity; (3) to critique the metaphysics of that synthesis precisely by ironizing the notion of synthesis; and (4) to open up, by that critique, to new and empowering articulations of the subject. Points (3) and (4) imply that the mestizaje or transculturation in Caribbean discourse leads first not so much to a synthesis or a plenitude but to an annihilation of the subject, a strategy that constitutes the first defense against the colonial imposition of identity and which in turn produces what Roberto Gonzalez Echevarria has called “a void where elements meet and cancel each other to open up the question of being” (10). What is lost in such a cancellation is a mystified notion of identity as grounded in primordial origins; what is gained is a certain self- consciousness and freedom for a process of identity-creation that establishes subtle links with latent social forces in the present.

     

    Within the European discourse of colonialism,5 the very name of the Caribbean has linked the region and its peoples with the image of cannibalism. Working within a framework more encompassing than that of the Eurocentrist perspective, Antonio Benitez Rojo evokes a “grandiose epic of the Caribs” as a part of “Caribbean discourse,” an epic in which are projected

     

    las islas arahuacas como objeto de deseo caribe . . . las matanzas, el glorioso canibalismo ritual de hombres y palabras, caribana, caribe, carib, calib, canib, canibal, Caliban; y finalmente el Mar de los Caribes, desde la Guayana a las Islas Virgenes. (xviii)

     

    Note that in Benitez Rojo’s linguistic morphology, whose transformations are catalogued above, the European impositions are mixed in with the native self-designations. Together, they suggest the “discursive morphology” of “cannibalism” pursued by Peter Hulme in Colonial Encounters (16).

     

    This discursive morphology may be continued in an examination of those modern Caribbean texts, among others, that address the legacy of Shakespeare’s The Tempest, in which the New World cannibal makes his appearance as Caliban. In his influential Caliban (1971), Roberto Fernandez Retamar asserts that “El caribe, por su parte, dara el canibal, el antropofago, el hombre bestial situado irremediablemente al margen de la civilizacion, y a quien es menester combatir a sangre y fuego” (14). This image of the American as Carib/Caliban/cannibal served as a weapon of ideological legitimation within colonial discourse. As manifested in The Tempest, the dichotomy opposing the “natural” Caliban against the “cultured” Prospero assured the European audiences and readers of the superiority of their civilization and the legitimacy of their drive to colonial expansion.

     

    To reverse the hierarchy of values implicit in this vilification, Latin American intellectuals, in Fernandez Retamar’s view, should realize that it is not Rodo’s Ariel but rather Caliban who is to be “asumido con orgullo como nuestro simbolo,” and consequently rethink their history from the viewpoint of this “otro protagonista” (Caliban 1971; 29, 35). “Cannibalism” thus receives a new function in this negation of the negation; the dialectic of cannibalism merges into the dialectic of Calibanism. The latter dialectic has already been discussed at length elsewhere,6 but what is pertinent to the present re- reading is the way in which the image of cannibalism is remade, in Calibanism, into a trope of writing which redefines the Latin American self’s relation with what is now a European other, precisely by a valorizing and recharging of the denomination of alterity it had received from Europe. What was mistakenly accepted as a literal reference to barbaric practice or its “authentic” image is becoming refunctioned as a literary figure.

     

    Despite the possible pejorative associations to which this refunctioning may give rise, Calibanism does not imply neo-primitivism or misology; on the contrary, it may involve the most sophisticated internationalist viewpoint, one capable of mastering and then relativizing or deflating all partial nationalist or ethnocentric viewpoints from a more systemic or global perspective. Fernandez Retamar is conscious of this epistemological advantage when, in 1985, he cites the remarks of his Mexican commentator Jorge Alberto Manrique:

     

    It would be well to remember, as Borges himself has said, that vis-a-vis . . . [the] reading of Europe, he takes the sniping stance of an ironist, "from without." The best of his work is made of that: and in it can be recognized an attitude of Caliban. . . .7

     

    George Lamming had already refitted Caliban to other roles in his recounting of Caribbean history from this once subjugated, now revindicated perspective. “If Prospero could be seen as the symbol of the European imperial enterprise,” writes Lamming in The Pleasures of Exile, “then Caliban should be embraced as the continuing possibility of a profound revolutionary change initiated by Toussaint L’Ouverture in the Haitian war of independence” (6 [unnumbered]). Indeed, the figure of the Haitian revolutionary leader effected and continues to represent both an overturning of the European-imposed hierarchies and a disruptive intervention in the continuum of colonial oppression, as the novelist proposes in the very title of his chapter on Toussaint and C.L.R. James’s The Black Jacobins, namely, “Caliban Orders History” (118).

     

    On the other hand, “cannibalism” persists in the early modern period as an image of either barbarity or aggression associated with rebellious African slaves as characters. Among Cayetano Coll y Toste’s Leyendas puertorriquenas (1924-1925) is the story of “Carabali,” the runaway plantation slave who may have resorted to cannibalism in order to survive in his mountain cave and who became a kind of avenging phantom in the Puerto Rican popular imagination. In the folktales of Lydia Cabrera’s Cuentos negros de Cuba (1940), most of which are Yoruban in origin,8 cannibalism is presented as a primitive practice associated with the animal realm (“Noguma”) or an unacceptable form of sacrifice (“Tatabisako”). In Alejo Carpentier’s El reino de este mundo (1949), the slave Ti Noel fantasizes a cannibalistic feast of white and bewigged heads served up by “un cocinero experto y bastante ogro” in what amounts to an anticipation of the imminent Saint-Domingue revolt (10). In Coll y Toste and Carpentier, cannibalism symbolizes black defiance or rebellion against the white colonial world; in Cabrera’s tales set in an Afro-Cuban context, it symbolizes evil and social otherness. Whether practiced, imagined or rejected, “cannibalism” in these narratives also serves to define the particular identity of individual African slaves (or their descendants) as literary characters whose psychic and linguistic resources for survival provide a paradigm for the possible Caribbean self.9

     

    Whereas such writers have sought to incorporate the African contribution into a syncretic Caribbean identity, later writers have sought origins for this identity in a recollection of the original Caribs and their descendants. What nevertheless stands out in a re-reading is the remoteness or virtual absence of true Carib ancestors. In Carpentier’s El Siglo de las Luces (1962) the protagonist Esteban, meditating on the possible foundations for an American selfhood, recalls the legend of the pre-Columbian Carib migration to a “promised land” lying northward of the continent. The recollection suggests a search for alternatives to the debacle of “enlightenment” in the New World. Finding himself at the Venezuelan Bocas del Dragon, where the fresh water meets the salt, Esteban remembers the migration as another search for the Promised Land, an American Exodus of “the horde” under whose conquest of the islands “[t]odos los varones de otros pueblos eran exterminados, implacablemente, conservandose sus mujeres para la proliferacion de la raza conquistadora” (172). The northward migration is of course thwarted by the encounter of the aboriginals with the Europeans: “Los invasores se topaban con otros invasores . . . que llegaban a punto para aniquilar un sueno de siglos. La Gran Migracion ya no tendria objeto: el Imperio del Norte pasaria a manos de los Inesperados” (173). Esteban’s account of “la Gran Migracion fracasada”–an alternative history decentering the historical narrative of the West–reminds us that the Europeans were themselves as much a conquering tribe as were the aboriginal forefathers. The Caribs stand for an unrealized historical possibility, but also suggest that the struggle for freedom and self-determination is as much motivated by utopian or messianic impulses as by class or “tribal” antagonisms.

     

    In any case, the Caribs of Esteban’s late-eighteenth- century present provide no unequivocal model for resistance against colonialization, for a Carib delegation has already come to Guadeloupe in order to apply for citizenship in the French Republic. The application prompts Commissioner Victor Hugues to show

     

    una mayor simpatia hacia los caribes que hacia los negros: le agradaban por su orgullo, su agresividad, su altanera divisa de 'Solo el caribe es gente'--y mas ahora que llevaban cucardas tricolores en el amarre del taparrabo.10(109)

     

    Representing a beleaguered people in the process of submitting itself to the colonial order, the delegation becomes a walking myth, wearing the very symbol of the French Republic (the tricolor cockade) on their breechcloths, their very pride and aggressivity accommodated into the self-representation of hegemonic discourse.11

     

    The beginnings of this incorporating process, by which colonial discourse itself cannibalized the specificity and strength of its indigenous adversaries, are revealed in Carpentier’s El arpa y la sombra (1979), a fictionalized biography of Christopher Columbus. In the novel, the “real” Caribs are conspicuously absent from Carpentier’s “transcriptions” of Columbus’s diary and ship’s log–the first productions of colonial discourse. Columbus of course believed that he had reached the lands of the Great Khan, already anticipating the discovery of “islands without men, people without hair, and inhabitants born with tails,” all previously “described” by Marco Polo (Williams 19). Carpentier’s Columbus records that he heard “Indian” reports of “tierras pobladas de canibales que tenian un ojo solo en cabeza de perros–monstruos que se sustentaban de sangre y carne humana” (138). This seminal misreading may have originated in a linguistic misunderstanding on Columbus’s part: for Columbus, who did not understand the Indian language, native references to the hostile Cariba may have suggested Caniba, or, the people of the Khan, but also cane, the Spanish word for “dog, suggesting, as Tzvetan Todorov puts it, that “these persons have dogs’ heads . . . with which, precisely, they eat people” (30). Carpentier thus retraces the process by which the India of Spices becomes, for Columbus, the India of the Cannibals, although nowhere does Columbus claim to have observed native acts of anthropophagy (162). Yet it is precisely this imputation which justifies, both in Columbus’s mind and in discursive practice, the Indians’ conquest and enslavement in the following manner.

     

     

    As the historical Columbus gradually came to realize that the true wealth of the West Indies lay not in gold but rather in the labor they could provide to the expanding empire, he would eventually describe the “cannibalistic” Caribs as

     

    a wild people fit for any work, well proportioned, and very intelligent, and who, when they have got rid of their cruel habits to which they have been accustomed, will be better than any other kind of slaves. (Cited in Williams 31)

     

    The West Indian slave trade begins on Columbus’s third voyage in 1498 with the transport of six hundred Indians to Spain (Williams 32). At about the same time, the Spanish monarchs, enjoined by the Pope, issued a decree providing for the conversion of the Indians to Catholicism and for the consideration of converted Indians as subjects of the Spanish crown. These Indian converts could then be considered “free” to be hired as wage laborers within the encomienda system, although not finally exempted from its inhuman demands and conditions. The decree paved the way for the legalization of the slave trade by the Requisition, for it implied that the “cannibals,” those bellicose Indians who refused conversion and resisted Spanish rule, could be legitimately punished with enslavement (Williams 32; Arens 44-54; Todorov 46-47).

     

    In Carpentier’s reconstructions of the nineteenth- century postulation for Columbus’s canonization under Leon XIII, the Devil’s Advocate of the Vatican’s Congregation of Rites cites Jules Verne’s opinion that Columbus identified cannibals in the West Indies without having encountered a single one; the postulation for sainthood was finally denied on the basis of Columbus’s monumental misreading and on the grounds of his having instituted a slave trade in the New World (_El Arpa 207). Columbus has been posthumously chastised, but not without having initiated a discourse practice relegating the Caribbean natives, by denomination and defamation, to an infrahuman realm.

     

    In Voyage in the Dark (1934) by the Antiguan emigree Jean Rhys, the Caribs become a symbol of colonial subjugation and figure the psychological and transcendental homelessness of Rhys’ protagonist, Anna Morgan. In this novel, the process of constructing a post-colonial feminine subject is seemingly foreclosed by a history that has offered no effective escape from colonial domination. Anna is a dance-hall girl of Caribbean birth living in England. Jobless, nearly penniless, often intoxicated, she drifts from affair to affair as the sexual toy of affluent and influential men. On one occasion, while lying sick in bed, writing and drinking vermouth, she pauses to recall the words of a song she once heard in a Glasgow music hall: “‘And drift, drift / Legions away from despair.’” In her subsequent free-association, the words link up with a reference, apparently taken from an encyclopedia, to the Caribs:

     

    It can't be 'legions'. 'Oceans', perhaps. 'Oceans away from despair.' But it's the sea, I thought. The Caribbean sea. 'The Caribs indigenous to this island were a warlike tribe and their resistance to white domination, though spasmodic, was fierce. As lately as the beginning of the nineteenth century they raided one of the neighbouring islands, under British rule, overpowered the garrison and kidnapped the governor, his wife and three children. They are now practically exterminated. The few hundred that are left do not intermarry with the negroes. Their reservation, at the northern end of the island, is known as the Carib Quarter.' They had, or used to have, a king. Mopo, his name was. Here's to Mopo, King of the Caribs! But, they are now practically exterminated. 'Oceans away from despair. . . .' (105)

     

    The passage suggests that the Caribs might have served as a symbol of defiance, and even of feminine defiance, against a patriarchal system of domination that has extended itself across the seas. But because the Caribs are “now practically exterminated,” their king a sad figure of mockery, history has lost a chance at redemption. The Caribs have been vanquished, drastically reduced in numbers, thereafter relocated on the northern end of what is probably Dominica, where their resistant ferocity has been successfully contained. The weight of the past hangs like a nightmare on Anna’s brain; the fate of the Caribs prefigures the protagonist’s own victimage and despair when her lover decides to abandon her just before she must seek an abortion.

     

    The historical pattern of Carib resistance and European conquest provides the unconscious subtext for Anna’s forlornness. The first attempt of the English to settle in the West Indies in Saint Lucia in 1605 met with the fierce opposition of its Carib inhabitants, as occurred in Grenada in 1609 (Williams 79; cf. Arens 45). But the colonizers succeeded in defeating numerous Indian uprisings in the islands and in exterminating the Caribs or removing them to Dominica or St. Vincent. In Grenada, the last group of Caribs to resist the French invaders hurled themselves from the top of a hill that would henceforth be known as Le Morne des Sauteurs (Williams 95). In both Anna’s experience and that of the Caribs, as this juxtaposition suggests, history provides no viable means for challenging to domination other than the self-destructive alternatives of suicide and infanticide (cf. Lamming 123-124).

     

    Attempts to revive the Carib heritage in other Caribbean texts may be read as attempts to redress the defamation the Caribs received in colonial discourse. But in a present that is, like Anna Morgan’s, cut off from all autocthonous origins, such efforts serve more certainly to re-open the dialogue on national culture and identity and therein entertain possibilities of new articulations of the self with its others. The novel Beka Lamb (1982) by the Belizean author Zee Edgell tells us that members of the black creole community “seldom married among the Caribs, although these two groups shared, in varying degrees, a common African ancestry” (31-32). Edgell’s attribution of a “common African ancestry” to Carib and creole alike may seem surprising, but the narrator later explains that those called “Caribs” by the Belizeans are in fact the descendants of escaped African slaves who arrived in St. Vincent. Contradicting Rhys’ assumptions concerning the Caribs’ refusal of miscegenation, Edgell’s blacks in St. Vincent “mingled with the Caribans, originally from South America, adopting much of their language and some of their ways, but keeping many of their African traditions” (68, my emphasis). Such an intermingling of races and cultures suggests the possibility of a generalized synthesis originating in the very displacement and confusion of origins.

     

    But Belizean resistance to such a synthesis persists. Beka’s mother shares the creole prejudices against the present-day Caribs; for her, the Caribs of Stann Creek are a corrupting influence on Beka and her Aunt Tama for having taught them obeah, or magic arts. Granny Ivy, somewhat more generous with the Caribs, says that “‘I don’t believe Carib people sacrifice children’” and reminds the other women that the Stann Creek families sent food up to Belize during the 1931 hurricane, although she must add that “‘I am not saying I could marry a Carib man. . .’” (67). The women’s prejudice toward the Caribs puzzles Beka, and when she asks her mother why creoles refuse to mix with them, her mother ventures to explain that “‘Maybe it’s because Carib people remind us of what we lost trying to get up in the world’” (70). Representing a primitive and ignominious past for the creoles, the Caribs have been excluded from the mainstream of Belizean society, marginalized and contained within isolated pockets of the country, called “the bush” (70). Whereas the narrative keeps the Caribs at a distance, the schoolgirl Beka has at least made an initial attempt to reconnect with the cast-off part of her Belizean heritage they represent, an issue that is especially significant as the Belizeans approach the dawning of their own nationalist independence. Beka’s questions, however, lead not to an immediate synthesis of cultural elements within a projected Belizean cultural identity, but to a certain transcendence in the awareness that Belizeans, in living a unique history that has been preconditioned but not totally imposed from the outside, are different from the British. Defining this difference would largely consist recognizing the Belizeans’ difference from the Caribs within the national community but also in recognizing common interests shared with minority group.

     

    The Caribs reappear in The Whole Armour (1982) by the Guyanese novelist Wilson Harris, but, again, they are no more than a representation, this time played by a band of roving carnival rousters. These rousters dressed as Caribs are encountered in the jungle by the protagonist Cristo, who is a fugitive from the law, accused of a murder he did not commit. Cristo later reveals to his lover, Sharon, that his brief meeting with “the Caribs” has thrust him into a strange shifting play of identification with the social other. Covered with mud during his flight and remembering himself as misrecognized by the “Carib” players, Cristo wildly reflects that “In the flying rush they assumed I was one of them . . . one of this . . . shattered tribe. A terrible broken family” (340). The encounter with the “shattered tribe” has shaken the structure of Cristo’s sense of identity. Cristo’s reflection in the stream momentarily restores him to his old self, but he later insists that “I was the last member, remaining behind, of the flying band. Every guilty body rolled into one. Vanquished as well as slave, rapist, Carib, monster, anything you want to think . . . .” (345).

     

    Caught up in the flying constellation of images, a disoriented Cristo identifies his alleged criminality with an entire history of Caribbean enslavement and injustice. The vision of vanquished ancestors furthermore catalyzes Cristo’s sense of belonging to a community or “tribe” imperilled by its own violent irresponsibility, in which originated the murders for which he is falsely accused. Although believed dead, Cristo will return, Christlike, to his Pomeroon village in order to establish his innocence and to restore his community’s shattered equilibrium with what amounts to his own sacrifice.12 Whereas the Caribs are absent, even parodied in this account, they provide, under conditions of rootlessness and chaos, a simulacrum of an imagined community that supplants the actual fragmented community, and thereby ground a necessary fiction of personal fulfillment.

     

    As other Caribbean writings reveal, the remembrance of the Caribs suggests another, possibly more provocative association with the cannibalistic act itself. The true extent to which cannibalism was practiced by the Caribs remains unclear; the anthropologist W. Arens, relying upon historical accounts and noting the imperialist biases and confusions, probably overstates his case in pointing out the absence of “adequate documentation of cannibalism as a custom in any form for any society” (21). Regardless of the existence or non-existence of such documentation, a number of twentieth-century Caribbean narratives have taken up the image of cannibalism that has been handed down in Caribbean discourse and turned it into a trope of identity and a literary mechanism of self-individuation. These narratives in general bear out the anthropologist Peggy Reeves Sanday’s assertion that although cannibalism is not a “unitary phenomenon but varies with respect to both cultural content and meaning” (x), it is predicated upon the symbolic oppositions by which “self is related to the other” (xii). Cannibalism in Sanday’s view is a “cultural system” and “primarily a medium for . . . messages having to do with the maintenance, regeneration, and, in some cases, the foundation of the cultural order” (3). Its symbolism participates in a dynamic of “dialectical opposition” (35); seen cross-culturally, it may symbolize a social evil, express a desire for revenge against one’s enemies, renew a generation’s ties with its ancestors, provide a mythological charter for the social order, or function as “part of the cultural construction of personhood” (25-26).

     

    Freud provides a bridge between anthropology and psychoanalysis in drawing an analogy between cannibalism, as he understood it, and the oral stage of psychosexual development. In oral incorporation and its correlates of desire, destruction and the installment of the object within the self, the established object-relations and phantasies harken back to a prehistoric stage of human social development. Phylogeny prefigures ontogeny especially in the “totemic meal” of Totem and Taboo, whereby the primal father is murdered and devoured by the sons of the “horde,” who, in the act of patricidal consumption, incorporate and sublimate his desire, strength and authority into their own structure of identity.13

     

    One story among Lydia Cabrera’s Cuentos Negros de Cuba, “Bregantino Bregantin,” illustrates this Freudian dialectic with a form of cannibalism exemplifying none other than self-consumption. The story tells of el Toro, the Bull, who after capturing and hanging the king from a tree, imprisons the queen in a “dungeon or latrine” without giving her any means of sustaining herself save that of eating cockroaches. When the supply of these runs out, she sees herself

     

    reducida al extremo de devorarse a si misma, comenzando por los pies, de dificil masticacion, y rindiendo el ultimo suspiro por envenamiento, en el colmo de la indignacion mas justa. (17)

     

    An impossible cannibalism, but nonetheless a paradigmatic one that foregrounds both the literariness of its treatment and the possibility of considering anthropophagy as an act of autophagy. El Toro takes the place of the now executed king and queen and becomes a tyrant in his own right, claiming all the women of his kingdom for himself, killing all of his male sons, outlawing the use of masculine-ending nouns, and shouting from his mountain top: “–«Yo, yo, yo, yo. Yo, yo, yo, yo, yo, / No hay hombre en el mundo mas que yo . . .!»” (25). The sovereign self of el Toro reigns supreme until the day one of his sons, saved from the usual infanticide, rises up to defeat him in bloody combat. “Y con esto,” the stories concludes, “la naturaleza recobro de nuevo sus derechos y nacieron varones en Cocozuma” (28). Here, the Freudian dialectic adumbrated in Totem and Taboo is redistributed into new functors: one son stands in for the primal horde but does not literally consume his own father, for indeed it is the latter who has defeated the king and allowed the queen to consume herself. But true to the Freudian Ur-plot, the “father’s” law and tyranny is installed in the symbolic order perpetuated by el Toro, leaving the task of restoring a “natural” cultural order to his righteously rebellious son.

     

    This ritual–combining aggression, incorporation, negation and individuation–provides a new kind of anchoring point for the definition of identity. Its dynamic is reinscribed in Caribbean narratives appearing in Brathwaite’s second phase of “transcending and healing,” novels in which I will now remark the dialectical oppositions motivating cannibalism as a trope of cultural devalorization and reordering.

     

    In his prologue to the novels comprising The Guyana Quartet, which includes The Whole Armour and Palace of the Peacock (1960), Wilson Harris avers that the concrete metaphor validating the particular violations of realist convention in the latter novel is none other than a “Carib/cannibal bone-flute” which was “hollowed from the bone of an enemy in time of war”:

     

    Flesh was plucked and consumed and in the process secrets were digested. Spectres arose from, or reposed in, the flute [which] became the home or curiously mutual fortress of spirit between enemy and other . . . . (9-10)

     

    A symbol of “‘transubstantiation in reverse,’”14 here the flute codifies and thereby mediates the subject-object polarities within a projected cultural system. Sanday’s exemplification of how “a self is made” in cannibal practice elucidates this mediation:

     

    The flesh or bone marrow is a tangible conduit of social and psychological attributes that constitute the subject by either affirming or negating the relationships that join or separate the subject vis-a- vis the other. Thus, parts of the body may be consumed to imbibe the characteristics or the fertile force of the other; or, consumption may break down and destroy characteristics of the other in the self. (36)

     

    Harris’s bone-flute becomes, in the light of this explication and his own, a figure of relational self-making and unmaking, one of the “convertible imageries” serving to motivate a ritual of “complex regeneration” enacted in all four novels of The Guyana Quartet. What Harris refers to as “the second death” in his prologue is the death of the reader’s or character’s self that undergoes a ritual sacrifice in “a fiction that seeks to consume its own biases through many resurrections of paradoxical imagination” (9). Palace of the Peacock in particular is a phantasmagorical narrative in which a crew of conquistador-like colonizers arrive at their first destination only to discover that “not so long ago this self-same crew had been drowned to a man in the rapids below the Mission” (37). Upon this violation of realist verisimilitude, the narrative establishes an “unreal” and psychologically unsettling perspective that shuttles back and forth across the barrier separating life and death, self and other. Faced with a “second death” when their boat threatens to capsize in the rapids, the crew members confront, in effect, the imminent dissolution of their own monadic subjectivities:

     

    The monstrous thought came to them that they had been shattered and were reflected again in each other at the bottom of the stream. The unceasing reflection of themselves in each other made them see themselves everywhere save where they thought they had always stood. (80)

     

    Grasping himself as both dead and alive and as self and other in the specular imago of the self-as-other, each character gradually loses hold on his former sense of a self-sufficient or autonomous identity. As the crew members pursue a fleeing Amerindian tribe they intend to capture (and which symbolizes for Harris an eclipsed other to be reincorporated into the tradition [7]), they find themselves stripped of the egoistic fictions of self that motivated the pursuit, swept away from themselves in a turbulent stream of becoming: “They saw the naked unequivocal flowing peril and beauty and soul of the pursuer and the pursued all together” (62). In the “second death,” pursuer and pursued are now embraced in what the narrator can only stammeringly refer to as “‘the truest substance of life,’” “‘the unity of being’” in which “‘fear is nothing but a dream and an appearance’” (52).

     

    The novel’s conclusion presents the apotheosis of a blind conquistador-captain Donne who, paradoxically, can see more clearly than ever before:

     

    [Donne] looked into himself and saw that all his life he had loved no one but himself. He focused his blind eye with all penitent might on this pinpoint star and reflection as one looking into the void of oneself upon the far greater love and self-protection of the universe. (107)

     

    Here is the poetry of a cosmic self that sees its objectified and distanced former self as both a “void” and a kind of door of perception, now cleansed and opened upon the infinite. Its transcendent vision of “love and self- protection” has dissolved the fragile structure of earthly desires and, with that structure, the fictive boundaries of the narcissistic self. In an ecstatic identification with otherness and others, the higher self realizes that it had always been an other to itself and that the imagined riches of El Dorado were in reality the spirit’s patrimony. This identification is affirmed by novel’s last sentence: “Each of us now held at last in his arms what he had been for ever seeking and what he had eternally possessed” (117).

     

    “Cannibalism” in Palace of the Peacock thus mediates a nostalgic desire or spiritual aspiration to incorporate oneself into a lost primordial unity. A similar nostalgia or aspiration motivates the plot of Felices Dias, Tio Sergio (1986) by Magali Garcia Ramis, but that desire progresses within a more historically determinate setting and toward a more explicitly political statement of commitment. In Garcia Ramis’s novel a young girl named Lidia narrates her experience of growing-up middle-class in the Puerto Rico of Munoz Marin and amidst the entrepreneurial “fat cows” of the Operation Bootstrap era. Lidia’s family expresses a typically bourgeois desire to be Prospero in their unreflecting imitation of European culture and scorn for all things Latin American; they inhabit a house where, because “todo lo heredado era europeo y todo lo porvenir era norteamericano, . . . no podiamos saber quienes eramos” (153). The family’s adults are proud of their hard- won success, intolerant of homosexuals and atheists, and fiercely suspicious of the nationalists and communists. One could add that the “nordomania” uncritically embraced by Lidia’s family exemplifies a more general process operant “inside” a dominant culture that pushes all that it perceives as “outside”–primitive, inferior and other–into the margins defining its own closed cultural space. The family’s constant preoccupation with cleanliness and hygiene, as well as repeated references to the adults’ medical professions, parallels a fear of contamination by unorthodox ideas that would challenge the manichean distinction between Good and Evil upon which their own sense of identity is based (28).

     

    And suddenly, into this “perfectly ordered and unchangeable world” (153) comes Tio Sergio, who signifies for the narrator a stimulating and disturbing presence in the Santurce household. Soon it is Sergio who initiates the children in their study of art, including the painting of Ollers; who learns to communicate with them in their “Simian-Spanish” dialect drawn from Tarzan comic books; and whose frustrated affair with the family’s maid-servant introduces the mysteries of sexuality to the spying Lidia. It is Sergio, too, who arranges a funeral service for a disappeared cat named Daruel. The funeral service is followed by a “mortuary meal” that includes cookies in the shape of a cat and Sergio’s explanation, that

     

    algunos salvajes se comian a los jefes de otras tribus y a los misioneros para adquirir su sabiduria y su fuerza; nos dijo que era algo simbolico y muy antiguo el que nos comiesemos las galletitas como si estuviesemos metiendonos por dentro todo lo que queriamos a Daruel. (23)

     

    Aside from parodying the catholic communion ceremony, the mortuary or totemic meal anticipates the manner in which Lidia will have seen in Tio Sergio a new ego ideal that she will incorporate into her personal identity. For once Sergio has left, Lidia discovers that he was “un hombre casi al margen de la sociedad,” one who discussed literature with Trotskyites and attempted to form a labor union, one who collected funds for the Algerian resistance and was probably, in addition to everything else, a homosexual (154). Above all, Lidia recalls, Sergio was a man who nurtured a dream of Puerto Rican independence but despaired of doing anything to realize the dream. Having brought into the closed conservative household an element of otherness and an example of tolerance for difference that the conservative matriarchs of the family would not have otherwise permitted, Sergio has introduced to Lidia and her cousin Enrique an expanded language of “native” possibilities with which to forge an identity. Having symbolically acquired “his wisdom and his strength,” the cousins go out on their own to discover who they are:

     

    Con todas nuestras contradicciones, . . . ibamos a circulos de estudio, comprabamos libros de historia y poesia puertorriquena, sonabamos con descubrir yacimientos de los indios tainos, pegabamos pasquines que anunciaban marchas, y marchabamos lentamente en busqueda de nuestra puertorriquenidad. (152-153)

     

    By the time that Lidia is caught up in the dream of discovering her “puertorriquenidad,” she has incorporated the rebellious anti-colonial spirit of Tio Sergio into her own, renewed sense of Puerto Rican selfhood.

     

    In recodifying and decodifying the bourgeois ideology concretized in Puerto Rican institutions, Garcia Ramis’s novel rehearses a repeatable process by which Caribbean discourse may be seen as demythifying the language of Prospero and giving a hearing to Caliban. George Lamming anticipated this move when he wrote that

     

    We shall never explode Prospero's old myth until we christen Language afresh; until we show Language as the product of human endeavour; until we make available to all the result of certain enterprises undertaken by men who are still regarded as the unfortunate descendants of languageless and deformed slaves. (118-119)

     

    Far from “languageless,” it turns out, Caliban does speak, and his profit on language is more than that of knowing how to curse. In the resurrection of the Carib epic, some of whose linguistic transformations and discursive ramifications have been traced in this essay, “cannibalism” explodes the myth of Prospero by devouring, engulfing and digesting his secrets, christens language afresh by giving voice to collective memory and subjugated others.

     

    A metaphor of incorporation and/or differentiation, of subjective self-divisions and mergings with respect to an other, cannibalism thus de-defines and re-defines the divisory line between self and other, with the consequence of transforming what was considered an antinomy into a dialectical opposition to be canceled and subsumed into a higher level of transindividual unity. In re-priming the nature-culture dialectic that had been fixed by colonialism to Prospero’s (and Ariel’s) advantage, the discourse of cannibalism furthermore ironizes its own search for origins by thematizing the irrecuperable loss of the Caribs or other “cannibals” as exemplars of rebellious subjectivity. Yet the Caribs–introjected as a disturbing element of difference into the metonymic series of displacements, interrupting the flow of colonial discursive self- reproduction–serve to open up the “search for identity” to new, often unexpected articulations of the self with an other and with others. Forming a sort of counter-tradition, cannibalism thus re-defined and re-elaborated grounds a new, founding myth of Caribbean identity and dynamic self- definition by proposing alternative ego ideals or object- choices: the tribal or cosmic self of Wilson Harris; the nationalistic self of Garcia Ramis.

     

    The issue is of course not merely academic. When Ernesto “Che” Guevara called for the development of an organic individual willing to sacrifice self-interest for the sake of the collective good, Guevara called for nothing less than the creation of “el hombre nuevo del socialismo.” In Guevara’s conception, such an individual would be committed to the revolutionary struggle to leave behind the realm of necessity for the realm of freedom:

     

    a pesar de su aparente estandarizacion, es mas completo; a pesar de la falta del mecanismo perfecto para ello, su posibilidad de expresarse y hacerse sentir en el aparato social es infinitamente mayor. (10)

     

    Guevara here undermines the old dichotomy of “bourgeois individualism” vs. “socialist standardization” by the qualifier of an “apparent” standardization. The individual’s self-sacrifice to the interests and ends of a social group in reality entails the transcendence of individualism, but such that this transcendence means the cancellation and sublation of “individuality” in its illusory autonomy and limited rationality and the attainment of an authentic freedom through a more clearly comprehended collective praxis. Both anticipating and elaborating Guevara’s notion of “el hombre nuevo,” a dialectics of cannibalism works through one of the paths by which fiction consumes fictions, including the reigning fictions of selfhood. Devouring such fictions in the process, we may, like Harris’s boatmen, come to see ourselves everywhere save where we thought we had always stood.

     

    Notes

     

    1. Here I rely on Paul Brown’s definition of “colonial discourse,” exemplified in his reading of The Tempest, as “a domain or field of linguistic strategies operating within particular areas of social practice to effect knowledge and pleasure, being produced by and reproducing or reworking power relations between classes, genders and cultures” (69, n.3).

     

    2. Lacan, “The subversion of the subject and the dialectic of desire in the Freudian unconscious” in Ecrits: A Selection, 292-325. For an overview of Lacanian themes, see Rosalind Coward and John Ellis, Language and Materialism: Developments in Semiology and the Theory of the Subject, 93-121.

     

    3. For an overview of postmodern perspectives on the subject and a theory of the subject’s persistent efficacy despite its deconstruction, see Ihab Hassan, Selves At Risk: Patterns of Quest in Contemporary American Letters, especially the chapter on “The Subject of Quest: Self, Other, Difference” (32-45).

     

    4. In Les discours antillais, Glissant insists that synthesis is not a “bastardization” or adulteration of cultures; it is rather “un devenir antillais” and an inseparable part of “le drame planetaire”:

     

    La vocation de synthese ne peut que constituer avantage, dans un monde voue a la synthese et au «contact de civilisations». L'essentiel est ici que les Antillais ne s'en remettent pas a d'autres du soin de formuler leur culture. Et que cette vocation de synthese ne donne pas dans l'humanisme ou s'engluent les betas. (16)

     

    5. For Peter Hulme in Colonial Encounters, colonial discourse is a “monologue.” To give an example, Hulme makes reference to the engraving by van der Straet depicting the encounter between the masculine, civilized, clothed and armed Amerigo Vespucci with the feminine, primitive, naked and unarmed indigenous figure representing the New World. Hulme comments that “Such a monologic encounter [as here represented] can only masquerade as a dialogue: it leaves no room for alternative voices” (9). But this view of colonial discourse is too monolithic and self-defeating, for it leaves no chance for the opening of the text to a reading of its “unconscious” substrata or to the encounter of different voices that the text must master. My interpretation of colonial discourse, supported by Paul Brown’s definition of the term, would stress, rather than its monologic nature, its conflictive plurality and dynamic of self-repression which only at a later moment result in the effect of monologism.

     

    6. In the glossary of Les discours antillais (1981), for example, Edouard Glissant includes the following entry: “CALIBAN. cannibale. Shakespeare nous a donne le mot, nos ecrivains l’ont refait” (496). In Glissant’s view, Caribbean writers have questioned the colonial “sanction of the nature-culture equilibrium” posed in the hierarchical identification of Prospero with culture and Caliban with nature. Inasmuch as the culture-nature hierarchy implants a mimetic desire in the “natural” Caliban, The Tempest reveals the way in which European colonial values, once institutionalized and naturalized within colonial practice, set the norm for social behavior and thereby alienate the consciousness of those whom the colonizer has mastered and seduced to his way of thinking. For Caribbean writers who repudiate this European prescription of identity, the alternative would be to acknowledge and affirm the appellation Caliban, once a term of opprobrium, and to transform it into a symbol of a new, non-colonized self. In the movement of black affirmation called negritude, African and Caribbean writers, as Charlotte Bruner has explained, “christen themselves as Caliban and reshape this image, this Black mask, to fit themselves” (245).

     

    7. Jorge Alberto Manrique, “Ariel entre Prospero y Caliban,” Revista de la Universidad de Mexico (February- March 1972), 70. Cited in Roberto Fernandez Retamar, Caliban and Other Essays (54).

     

    8. According to Fernando Ortiz’s introduction to the collection (10).

     

    9. Wilson Harris makes this argument in Tradition, the Writer and Society when he writes that the individual slave may be visualized “as possessing the grassroots of Western individuality” (33), which means an emphatic rejection of “the sovereign individual” who lives an illusion of freedom and self-sufficiency “by conditioning himself to function solely within his contemporary situation more or less as the slave appears bound still upon his historical and archaic plane” (34).

     

    10. The historical precedent for this assignment of a role to the Caribs in the protection of French colonial interests can be found in Colbert’s war against Dutch trade in the West Indies. As Colbert, Minister of the Marine with colonial jurisdiction, suggested to a colonial governor in 1670, one way of defending the French monopoly against the Dutch could be that of “secretly aiding the Caribs against them in case of a war, or by secretly inciting them to attack the Dutch by furnishing them firearms and munitions” (cited in Williams 161).

     

    11. One is reminded of Roland Barthes’ analysis in Mythologies of the photograph in which a black colonial soldier salutes a French flag. As this association suggests, my use of the word “myth” remits to Barthes’ explanation: like bourgeois ideology, “myth has the task of giving an historical intention a natural justification, and making contingency appear eternal” (142).

     

    12. Marianna Torgovnick’s gloss on the meaning of sacrifice in Georges Bataille clarifies the connection between human sacrifice and cannibalism: “Human sacrifice is a symbolic version of cannibalism, in which the human body substitutes for the animal body, and killing for eating. It is a symbolic representation of our normal gustatory acts– but heightened, made less utilitarian, and hence ‘sacred’” (189).

     

    13. J. Laplanche and J.-B. Pontalis summarize this analogy in The Language of Psychoanalysis (55).

     

    14. The Guyana Quartet, 9. In Explorations (42, n.8) Harris cites the same passage in Michael Swan’s The Marches of El Dorado (London, 1958), 285.

     

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