Category: Volume 10 – Number 1 – September 1999

  • The Blair Witch Project: Technology, Repression, and the Evisceration of Mimesis

    David Banash

    Department of English
    The University of Iowa
    dbanash@blue.weeg.uiowa.edu

     

    The Blair Witch Project.Dir. Daniel Myrick and Eduardo Sanchez. Perf. Heather Donahue, Joshua Leonard, and Michael C. Williams. Artisan Entertainment, 1999.

     

    Given its preposterously low budget, outsider production, and a priori cult status as ludic masterpiece, The Blair Witch Project does not seem a likely candidate to become the allegorical moment of our postmodern media-scape. In fact, the major obsession of all reviewers has been, thus far, that the film somehow by-passes technology altogether, returning us to an authentic psychological (think Hitchcock) rather than technical horror (Wes Craven). The marketing of the film exploits this fact–i.e. here is the real horror of your imagination rather than the over-produced kitsch of Freddy Kruger or Pin-head. This undisguised appeal to the authenticity of imagination is paradoxically coextensive with BWP‘s presentation and marketing of itself as a documentary. Thus, not only is the film obsessed with returning the viewer to an authentic experience of self under the sign of imagination, it simultaneously presents itself as an unmediated, even “unimaginative,” reality. However, BWP is, ironically, a deconstruction of the possibility of such authenticities in our technologically mediated culture, and the return of this knowledge is where the real horror of the film is to be found.

     

    The classic horror narrative is based on the return of the repressed: From Mary Shelly’s left-for-dead monster to Candyman, the theme asserts itself as both causality and moment of terror. BWP is in this sense no exception. Written and directed by Daniel Myrick and Eduardo Sanchez, the film presents itself as the raw footage of three student filmmakers (director Heather Donahue, cinematographer Joshua Leonard, and sound technician Michael C. Williams). As they venture into Maryland’s Black Hills Forest in search of the legendary Blair Witch, we witness both the initial shots for their documentary project (complete with slates) and their continual filming of the strange events that ensue as they are stalked by a malicious presence. As we are told in the opening credits, the three were never seen again. The narrative, then, is the return of the Blair Witch, who, presumably, is responsible for the disappearance of the filmmakers. However, there is another way we might grasp the return of the repressed in this film, and thus explain both its popularity and power. The marketing and reception of the film are centered around its supposed ludic repression of technology and return to authenticity. Yet, within the narrative, we are left with only film cans, DAT tapes, and 8mm Video. To put this rather more pivotally, the substantive repression in our reception of the film is not that of the witch herself, but of technology’s mediating role in every aspect of our world. Yet at every turn in the narrative, and encoded into the documentary format which relies on both grainy black and white and shaky video, the technological apparatus and its inability to represent the witch are underscored. The real horror of the film is built out of the return of this knowledge–that we remember our powerlessness in a world saturated with, but immune to, a technological mimesis we can neither trust nor escape.

     

    Much has been made of the BWP‘s status as a psychological horror film that relies on imagination. The consensus established in the reviews is that the omnipresence of billion dollar effects in films from The Phantom Menace to Aliens are, these days, no longer effective because they alienate the audience from its imagination. As Entertainment Weekly Online puts it, “[t]oday, when moviegoers know everything about everything (and can never unimagine, say, that ‘Alien’ monster bursting from John Hurt’s chest), the only true fear lies in what’s not shown” (Schwarzbaum). The old argument here is that films which push technology towards a total mimesis no longer frighten audiences so desensitized that they can watch any evisceration disinterestedly. However, the reason for that jaded passivity is that real horror must be the evocation of our own fears; in short, a return to and paradoxical affirmation of the self. The success of BWP, so the argument continues in the New York Times, is that everything “is left to the imagination. And the imagination works overtime watching the acuity of these talented filmmakers” (Maslin). The formula for successful horror, is then, according to Kristen Baldwin, “asking the question ‘Hey, do you want to see something really scary?’ and letting your mind provide the example.”

     

    There are two moves worthy of some serious scrutiny here. First, there is an obvious backlash against over-budgeted, over-produced, studio monsters of all genres. Part of the fascination with BWP is also part of the current idolization of indie hip, and thus critics are quick to laud any successful film “whose cost, according to its makers, was about the same as a fully loaded Ford Taurus” (Brunette). However, the way BWP gets reviewed is strikingly different from say El Mariachi or In the Company of Men. These films are depicted as postmodern tales of directorial self-reliance and Horatio Alger success against late capitalist corporate culture. Such receptions are often divorced from the actual narratives of the films. In contrast, BWP is not only represented as an allegory of economic self-reliance but a more total, perhaps transcendental, affirmation of the very concept of self metonymically transformed into imagination. According to Salon, “the fact that a shoestring-budget mockumentary with no name stars, no special effects, no rivers of bloody gore and not even a musical score can be this spooky is a testament to the storytelling ability of the filmmakers, and to their trust in the audience’s imagination. It’s been a long time since a movie did so much by showing so little” (Williams). Here, reaction against studio slick is coupled with a defense of what such obviously constructed, special-effected films threaten: the very concept of self. Where the studio monster is always constructed for us, given to us in the most graphic detail, it simultaneously calls attention to the very way it is attempting to manipulate audience reactions, constantly reminding the audience that it has little control over the way in which it is being mediated. BWP is such a powerful film, so the critics conclude, because it returns the audience (think trust as empowerment) to unmediated self-hood and agency (your fears, your mind, your self).

     

    But with all this emphasis on imagination, we might wonder if critics and audiences aren’t protesting just a bit too much. BWP is now famous for what it does not show. We do not see Josh’s abduction. We do not see the presumably gruesome ends of Heather or Matt. We do not see the witch. All these, it is said, are left to the imagination. But what if this is about something more than empowering the imagination? For all these moments in the narrative are coordinated by the film’s central plot: the failure of a documentary project. It is this failure that is shown in agonizing detail as the mimetic technologies (maps, compass, DAT, video, film) break down along with the collective cohesiveness of the filmmakers. Thus, what our reception itself represses is the very failure of technology as an armature and expression of a will to knowledge and, by extension, the possibility of self.

     

    Throughout the film, technology is equated with power and control over the world. As the filmmakers enter the woods (a stark pre-modernism), they rely on a map and compass. However, immediately they have difficulty reading the map. These are the first really tense scenes of the film, and they introduce the longest narrative theme: being lost. We witness Josh and Mike becoming more fearful as Heather miscalculates their distance from shooting locations. This theme is developed over the course of two days in which the very validity and usefulness of the map is called into question. What is at stake is representation itself. Heather, though she has misread the map, maintains that it is an accurate representation of the territory which they can interpret if they simply take the time. Josh initially struggles with Heather, retaining faith in the map, but arguing over its interpretation. Mike, unable to read the map, maintains that either it is inaccurate or no one has the interpretive skills to read it. On the third day, the map disappears all together. Though Mike later confesses to destroying it, it remains uncertain if this is true. The map, then, is the first technology to be called into question. What the disappearance of the map dramatizes is their dependance on a technology of representation they either do not trust or cannot use, but on which they nevertheless must rely. This theme is repeated in the subsequent failure of the compass. Deciding to take a course south, they follow the compass all day but by nightfall have simply come full circle to their campsite. Even more emphatically than the map, the compass has failed. In the map and the compass the film presents a world immune to technological representation. This theme is more subtly but effectively developed in the failure of their audio/visual recording equipment.

     

    Though they believe they are being stalked by a presence, and speculate that it may be the witch, they cannot capture it on film. This is hardly a problem of proximity. Whatever is shadowing them approaches their tent over the course of four nights, leaving totemic piles of rocks and bundles of sticks. Though they hear noises over the course of these nights, they cannot capture a single image and manage to record only the most muted and distorted clicks and rumbles on the DAT (despite the fact that they describe these sounds to one another as shouts, footsteps, and the cries of a baby). Just as they fail to master their navigational equipment, they are unable to mobilize their recording equipment to capture (and thus understand or contain) whatever is menacing them. It is curious that our attention is displaced from this aspect of the narrative, for the horror of confronting a world that cannot be represented is shown in chilling detail.

     

    Just as they continue despite everything to rely on their map and compass, so do they continue obsessively to film their ordeal. Though when they are first lost Josh frequently argues with Heather over this, accusing her of irresponsibility given the possibility of death either from exposure or the unknown, she defends her decision and continues, as do both Josh and Mike despite their occasional protests. Yet in a tense and self-reflexive moment in the film, Josh confronts Heather. Taking her video camera, he says, “I see why you like this thing. It’s like filtered reality.” While Heather does not object to this statement, and critics and audiences have all but made a rallying cry out of it (what you can’t see on the screen is scarier), the narrative suggests something a bit darker. It is not as if Heather, or we, could simply remove our gaze from the lens. Technologies of representation are, as we know, omnipresent. Worse, they are the only possibility we have to engage the world. Yet, they are always flawed, always inadequate, always shifting and deceptive. The fact that the witch cannot be captured on the film is the horror of the film, but not because it empowers unmediated imagination. It is horrifying because it dramatizes (shows!) our total reliance on technologies that, if pushed, break, rupture, and give over to chaos. In a later scene, (perhaps the most famous of the film, in which Heather holds the camera to her face in the blackness capturing only her own image), the would-be director apologizes: “I insisted on everything [the whole project, the locations, the directions they took, etc.] I’m sorry, it was my project. I was naive.” What Heather realizes in this monologue is the position in which her own will to knowledge has placed her and her crew. Accepting the necessity of and trusting in mimetic technology, expecting that technology to adequately represent the world, she and the others have pushed it to a rupture, and death seems likely. Confronted with a world that we cannot represent/imagine (be it postmodernism itself or merely the Blair Witch), the real drama is not the empowerment of imagination but our horror in the face of our simultaneous reliance upon and critique of the technologies of representation.

     

    It is curious that our initial reception of the film has been so interested in BWP‘s specious affirmation of imagination, for the other most remarkable narrative and stylistic feature is its status as documentary. Though both the legend of the witch and the disappearance of the three students are fictional, the creators of BWP have done everything they can to present their film as an actual documentary. For instance, their web-site treats the entire story as history and journalism, complete with mock historical records, time-lines, and local news-clips. This material has even been taken up and turned into a featured special, “The Curse of the Blair Witch,” on the Sci Fi cable channel. The program, treating the material as historical fact, poses the question “[i]s this century-old pattern of murders part of a complex conspiracy by a radical cult attempting to keep the threat of the Blair Witch alive?” (scifi.com). Even the film itself has the look of truth that has come to dominate, from the emergence of MTV’s The Real World to The Fox Network’s Cops, or even America’s Funniest Home Videos. In fact, in both reviews and postings to chat-groups, viewers associate much of the fright with this realism. Such realism was part of the film’s very production. The actors retained their real names, improvised almost every scene with minimal direction, and, deprived of sleep and food, made method acting an extreme sport. Yet this, more than any other feature of the film, should make us suspicious of the endless claims in favor of imagination. Consistently employing the discursive and filmic conventions of journalism and history, BWP performs the fact that all representations are incomplete constructions incapable of laying bare a god’s-eye view. And it does this with an effortless elegance, for not only has the documentary failed, it asks its audience to adopt a critical stance toward all documentary (mimetic) claims. Thus the film contains its own self-reflexive critique, dramatizing the literal end/impossibility of mimesis. To obsess over imagining the witch is to elide the horror that is on screen throughout the film; it is a reactive desire to escape the critique of mimesis, for in the supposed freedom of imagination we forget that our very psyche is as constructed, incomplete, and mediated as the film itself.

     

    Jameson’s classic argument in “Reification and Utopia in Mass Culture” reminds us that part of the popularity of blockbuster films (horror films in particular) is their ability to “entertain relations of repression with the fundamental social anxieties and concerns, hopes and blind spots, ideological antinomies and fantasies of disaster, which are their raw material” (141). The utopian moment of popular film, according to Jameson’s Blochian reading, is a repression of these fundamental materials through “the narrative construction of imaginary resolutions and by the projection of an optical illusion of social harmony” (141). For Jameson, popular films are popular because they tap the collective’s fears. However, the Hollywood ending always resolves these fears by transforming them into an utopian moment that underwrites the immediate social order. What is so curious about BWP is not that it taps such fears, but that it offers no such resolution. The utopian moment simply is not to be found in the narrative of this film. It has been displaced onto the plane of our reception. The raw materials of BWP are, no doubt, our fears of and insecurities with (mimetic) technologies that we can neither trust nor escape. And with its stark, bleak ending–the failure of a documentary project, the disappearance of human agents, and the inhuman survival of the tapes and film–BWP offers no consolation. But such fears are repressed and turned into a utopian affirmation of our contemporary moment through the valorization of our imagination (self) coupled with the indie myth of good old American economic self-reliance. For audiences and reviewers, the film is thus coded as a return to utopian authenticity. Yet narratively, this moment is precisely what the film denies. The rhetoric of our reception thus becomes our alibi for the masochistic pleasure we take in witnessing BWP‘s horrifying and literal evisceration of mimesis.

     

    Works Cited

     

     

  • Memory, Orality, Literacy, Joyce, and the Imaginary: A Virtual History of Cyberculture

    Donald F. Theall

    Department of Cultural Studies
    Trent University
    dtheall@trentu.ca

     

    Darren Tofts and Murray McKeich. Memory Trade: A Prehistory of Cyberculture. North Ryde, NSW: A 21*C Book published by Interface, 1998.

     

    What might more properly be referred to by a more prosaic term such as “the digimediatrix” or “the digi-infomatrix” has through the poetic magic of William Gibson come to be known as “cyberspace.” And by the same token, the new cultural formations that are emerging from this amalgam of telecommunication, digital computing, information storage, and the merging of media are now denominated “cyberculture.” The standard approach to these new cultural formations is to examine them as if they represented a radical, near absolute break with the past by which we are moving beyond history. Whether pessimistic, enthusiastic, theoretic, or critical, most commentators place primary stress on the uniqueness and radical newness of the contemporary experience. With a few remarkable exceptions, academic historians, literary critics, and linguists have produced accounts of “hypertext” and “hypermedia” which are keyed almost entirely to the present. They have given us a view of some fundamental transformations in our understanding of the act of reading and the nature of the material text, but have failed to discover the ways that the cyberculture is shaped by critical moments of our remote as well as our more recent history.

     

    In this situation, Memory Trade: A Pre-History of Cyberculture written by Darren Tofts, Chair of English and Media Studies at Swinburne University of Technology, and illustrated by the Award-winning digital artist Murray McKeich from the Department of Creative Media at the Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology, is a major contribution to the current debate. This is an elaborate, complex, and yet compact book which is as remarkable for its splendidly satiric, posthuman illustrations and its high-quality production as for its intellectual and perceptual richness and the intensity of its writing. In a short review it is only possible to sketch the main points of Tofts’s analysis and critique of cyberculture, and to indicate a few of the pre-histories of the cyberworld that he proposes in his attempt to situate our cultural moment within a problematic of permanence and change. I will try to give a sense of the book’s broad contours, particularly as they relate to Tofts’s conclusions regarding the role of machines, memory, literacy, and writing in cyberculture. Special emphasis will be placed on Memory Trade‘s last chapter, which offers an important discussion of Joyce’s Finnegans Wake as a work which, published on the eve of World War II, helped to accelerate the emergence of cybernetics.

     

    I do not wish to give the impression that the other chapters of Memory Trade are lacking in interest: Chapter One, which treats the current landscape of cyberphilia, cyberhype, cyber-revisionism (including panic-oriented theorists of cyberculture such as Arthur Kroker or Paul Virilio) and those who are hyping up the text; Chapter Two, on the history and theory of “the technology within”–writing, gesture, hieroglyphs, and hypermedia; and Chapter Three, which examines various aspects of memory in the age of digitalization, including the art of memory and mnemonics, machinic and technological memories, databases, and Gregory Ulmer’s conception of chorography. While each of the first three chapters makes a definite contribution to the literature, the fourth inaugurates a particularly compelling piece of pre-history. Here, Tofts explores the implications of Joyce’s Wake–published just nine years before Norbert Weiner’s announcement of the cyberworld in Cybernetics (1948)–for an understanding of our contemporary scene. He stresses the importance of Joyce’s having declared himself “the greatest engineer” to comprehending how his assemblage of the Wake as a literary machine aids our understanding the new post-electric world in which cyberculture is emerging–the world of “modernity’s wake.” Tofts examines Joyce’s concern with the “abcedminded[ness] of writing (FW 18.17); its dramatization of “memormee” (FW 628.14) as a phenomenon rooted in the differences and repetitions of this “commodius vicus of recirculation” (FW 3.2); and its navigation of the multi-dimensions in which “we are recurrently meeting… in cycloannalism, from space to space, time after time, in various phases of scripture as in various poses of sepulture” (FW 254.25-8). Tofts discusses how the Wake already appears to be participating in the debates of the late information age. On his reading, the Wake is nothing less than a literary machine for generating permutations of “verbivocovisual” language (FW 341.19) under the impact of “electracy” (MT 72). As such, it prefigures many contemporary discussions of writing, memory, repetition, difference, play, and the ecology of sense in the closing decades of this century.

     

    It should be noted that Memory Trade is not primarily a book about Joyce, but a book that uses Joyce’s vision to understand these new phenomena and to critique the debate and discussion which have ensued. Virtually all the major contemporary figures associated with the cybercultural wars are discussed, critiqued or noted: writers professionally involved in cyberspace (e.g., David Rushkoff, Mark Dery, Gary Wolf, Erik Davis); academic communication theorists of orality and literacy (McLuhan, Ong, Havelock, Goody, Marvin); academic theorists of hypertext (Landow, Bolter, Heim); professional hypers of hypertext (Ted Nelson, Nicholas Negroponte); structuralist and post-structuralist theorists whose work impinges on hypertext and cyberculture (Derrida, Kristeva, Deleuze, Cixous, Barthes, Lyotard); panic oriented theorists of cyberculture (Kroker, Virilio); and feminist theorists of the posthuman and the cyborg (Harraway, Hayles). Tofts advances the possibility that a theoretico-practical stance illustrated in the work of such creative practitioners as Stuart Moulthrop and Michael Joyce and by such theorists as Gregory Ulmer and Donald Theall is shaping a new understanding of the digimediamatrix and its relation to what Tofts calls “cspace”–a term whose pronunciation (identical with space) stresses the presence of the history of writing in the emergence of hypermedia.

     

    In his third chapter, entitled “The Literary Machine,” Tofts raises the possibility that the process of our becoming cyborgs began with the very invention of alphabetic writing. To write such a pre-history requires producing “plausible narratives which make links between disparate, achronological moments” and, like Greil Marcus’s Lipstick Traces, involves “risk-taking and creative serendipity and flights of fancy.” Memory Trade achieves this end by locating a series of affinities between and among the new productions of hypermedia, Joyce’s Wake, a number of Borges’s tales, and Deleuze and Guattari’s description of the “ideal book.” The latter’s introduction to A Thousand Plateaus underlies Tofts’s complex and compelling argument of the inter-relation of the production and products of literacy with the production and products of cybertech’s electracy. The epigraph for the last chapter of Memory Trade, linking the Joycean project quite appropriately to SF, comes from Philip Dick’s Sci-Fi novel, Galactic Pot-Healer, in which Dick, who admired the Wake‘s treatment of dream and memory, describes a “mysterious” book given to the protagonist, Joe Cartwright, as “a peculiar book… in which, it is alleged everything which has been, is, and will be is recorded.”

     

    The connection between Joyce and Sci-Fi is important to Tofts’s work, which seeks to ground the problem of virtuality as it appears in discussions of cyberculture in particular moments of the history of the technology of writing, so that the past moments of ancient Athens and of Egyptian hieroglyphs can be seen as coexisting in the present phenomena of hypertext and hypermedia. A discussion of Derrida’s deconstruction of Socrates’ critique of writing in the Phaedrus and Plato’s more devastating condemnation in the Seventh Letter demonstrates among other aspects that contemporary technofear (e.g. Kroker’s “technopanic”) began with the introduction of alphabetic (phonetic) writing. By this point it becomes apparent that memory has a complex role in Tofts’s work, for Derrida’s privileging of writing radically “inverts the Socratic/Platonic negation of writing,” for writing “is already within the work of memory.” Beginning with Freud’s “Mystic Writing Pad” and Derrida’s reading of that essay, the treatment of memory in Chapter 3, “Total Recall” (the title of the film made from Philip Dick’s SF story “We Can Remember It for You Wholesale”), encompasses such diverse topics as: Platonic and Aristotlean mnemonics and the role of the memory theatre in the history of rhetoric; Bruno’s memory system, “technognosis” (Erik Davis), memory machines, and data cartography; the practitioners of the art of memory as eidetics–whose contemporary activity culminates in “the invention of imaginary or virtual space”; and the relation of architectonics and architecture to artificial reality construction.

     

    The book’s title, Memory Trade, reflects its concern with the links between historic and contemporary approaches to hypomnesis. As Tofts explains: “while the perception of memory as something machinic and infallible appears to us very modern, it was something well-known to the ancients. Hypomnesis, or extended memory, formed the basis of the rhetorical art of memory that underpins our contemporary fascination with powerful mnemonic technologies” (MT 61). Relating Frances Yates’s seminal work, The Art of Memory, and Giordano Bruno to psychoanalytic and postructuralist discussion of the writing machine of the psyche, Memory Trade lays the groundwork for placing a multiplex understanding of memory and its relation to concepts of space and time at the very core of the emergence of cyberculture.

     

    Tofts considers immersion to be one of the most essential characteristics of virtuality. He asserts that Gregory Ulmer’s chorography is to hypermedia what the art of memory is to the oral tradition. Chorography, which Ulmer describes as “the history of place in relation to memory” simultaneously “recognizes the importance of virtuality in the context of place.” The new world of immersion in information is for Tofts “the frontier of chorography,” a frontier which, as Ulmer and others have argued, is fundamental to Greco-Roman and Euro-American aesthetic theory (MT 73). The link is that the practitioners of the art of memory were eidetics with the ability to see verbal constructs as if they were visible–the ultimate ideal of immersion (Tofts, Ulmer). Memory Trade, therefore, can query Gibson’s coinage, for it becomes clear that Gibson does “not have a copyright on consensual hallucination” (MT 74). Early in his work Tofts posits the concept of cspace (space/cyberspace), which permits a satirically ambivalent critique of cyberspace. Cspace is an ambivalent metasignifier that rhetorically “mimes the concepts it seeks to designate.” Behind cspace is Tofts’s recognition that cyberculture’s central concern with its mediated apprehension and understanding of the world actually emerges with the advent of the alphabet and literate societies, so that cyber-enthusiastic concepts of virtual space and hyperreality (such as Heim’s ‘electric writing’) are really technologically transformed types or incarnations of Havelock’s “abcedarium.”

     

    The myths of difficulty and incomprehensibility supplemented by the concerns of intellectualism and elitism have continued to surround Joyce’s writings, particularly Finnegans Wake, even though those myths should have been dissipating over the last two decades as his works became more familiar and their relevance to the culture of the everyday world has become apparent. Joyce’s Ulysses, because of his major revisions in the last years before publication, and particularly his Finnegans Wake, consciously became the earliest major exploration of the impact of the wake of electricity on codes, writing, and memory as well as on mass media and and popular culture. Therefore, while Tofts’s selection of Joyce’s Wake as the major focus of the final chapter of Memory Trade may seem initially perverse, it proves most illuminating, yielding through the exploration of the percepts and affects generated by Joyce’s “feelfulthinkamalinks” (FW 613.19) a new, powerful critical deconstruction of cyberspace, cyberculture, and hyperspace. It serves as well to clarify the impact of Joyce on a wide variety of important writers of the latter half of the century.

     

    For example, Jacques Derrida claims to have spent thirty-five years of fascination and ressentiment with Joyce’s Wake. Deleuze’s earliest work stresses the importance of Joyce in the development of transverse communication and parallels his fascination with nonsense in his analysis of Lewis Carroll in The Logic of Sense; Julia Kristeva’s La révolution du langage poétique uses Joyce together with Mallarmé as one of its focal points; Joyce further provided the beginning point for Umberto Eco’s theoretical writing in The Open Work and remained a persistent presence in his semiotic theories; and Marshall McLuhan continually stressed the essential nature of Joyce’s Wake to his study of media and communication. To the degree that in varying ways the work of such theorists has impinged upon the same issues as those traversed in contemporary discussions of writing, extended memory, cyberculture, and hypermedia, a reconsideration of Joyce as a particular moment in the pre-history of cyberculture should be of vital assistance in our understanding of such phenomena and their pre-history. Joyce dramatically underlines how various moments and events which precede the age of cybernetics and computer networks are an intrinsic part of the culture of the digimediatrix.

     

    Tofts’s reading of the Wake is consistent with, but also extends and deepens, the recent work of other Joyce scholars. He sees the Wake as “a literary unicum that marks a transitional moment in the age of print literacy as it converges with electronic digitalization” (MT 87). Confirming what I argued in Postmodern Culture in 1992 and in James Joyce’s Techno-Poetics, he notes that “The Wake uncannily provides us with a history of the evolution of our emergent cyberculture and offers us a premonitory sampling of how it may function as an integrated whole or social machine” (MT 87). Memory Trade traces how the “abcedminded[ness]” of Joyce’s Wake, rooted in its polysemy, is the “nanotechnology of literacy, super-charged micro-machine capable of generating ‘counterpoint words’ at the speed of thought” (MT 90). It then explores the new electrification of language as exemplified in Joyce’s analysis of television as “the charge of the light barricade” (FW 349.10), noting that Joyce not only anticipated Wiener’s association of energy and information, but also anticipatorily fused the linguistics of Jakobson, the mathematics of Mandelbrot, and the game theory of von Neumann.

     

    Moving on to a consideration of the Wake as a “verbivocovisual presentement,” Tofts argues how the centrality of synaesthesia in Joyce’s work is a logical outcome of the “inclusive, immersive medium” that he has constructed, a medium which itself follows from the Joycean insight that the poetic provides an ecology of sense for human communication. The Wake being one of the most “garrulous and written” books in English thus goes beyond Ong’s “secondary orality” to a pre-post-Derridean “secondary literacy,” incorporating the sensory interplay of sight, sound, and touch. Consequently the centrality of “the babbelers” (FW 15.12), the “turrace of babel” (FW 199.31), and their “pixillated doodler[s]” (FW 421.33) is examined as a factor of the “too dimensional” (FW 154.26) dramatization of the activities of space, time, and memory in the technologization of the word within a poetic history which is introduced by Joyce as being a “commodiusvicus of recirculation.”

     

    Memory Trade‘s conclusion, reinforced by its analysis of Joyce, overtly confirms Stuart Moulthrop’s view that hypertext “differs from earlier media in that it is not a new thing at all but a return to or a recursion to an earlier form of symbolic discourse” (MT 116). The Wake, using Vico’s strategy of poetic history, blends past, present, and future. It manages both to represent the machinic, web-like social matrix within which our post-mass-mediated culture has taken shape, and to show that that machinic, web-like matrix was always already figured in earlier “technologizings of the word.”

     

  • An Academic Exorcism

    Michael Alexander Chaney

    Department of English
    Indiana University, Bloomington
    maxchi@aol.com

     

    Cary Nelson and Stephen Watt, Academic Keywords: A Devil’s Dictionary for Higher Education. New York and London: Routledge, 1999.

     

    Academic Keywords is that rare sort of polemic that consoles with humor as it enrages us with personal accounts and persuasive analysis of the current crisis in higher education. Provocative and conversational, urbane and intelligent, this is a volume that almost defies traditional categorization. Visually, the book resembles what its redoubtable subtitle announces it to be–a dictionary of keywords essential to expanding our understanding of the unfolding crisis in academia, particularly in the humanities. Entries both long and short cogently define new and often dispiriting trends, such as outsourcing, America’s fast-food discipline, company towns, and Responsibility Centered Management. Other entries trenchantly recontextualize more familiar terms like merit, faculty, and tenure in order to reverse what the authors denounce in their preface as a “vocabulary that reinforces various forms of false consciousness” (vii). As part of this effort to update our taxonomies of academia’s problems, Nelson and Watt include larger, full-length essay entries on sexual harassment, the corporate university, and affirmative action “to redefine familiar terms for each new generation, to rearticulate them to new conditions” (viii). The result is a compelling incrimination of corporatization as the source of our present academic woes.

     

    Unfortunately, while the authors eloquently describe corruption and exploitation at all levels of the university, their dictionary is not counterbalanced with a lexicon of improvement or recovery beyond terms that many academics and administrators would read with a twinge of concern if not discomfort–terms such as union, collective bargaining, strike. And yet, Nelson and Watt anticipate this criticism. They explain in their preface that the book is no panacea but a wake-up call meant to “examine present conditions” and to show “that academia is indeed a workplace more than an ivory tower” (x).

     

    What most distinguishes this book from others similar to it (Nelson’s Will Teach for Food: Academic Labor in Crisis; Robert Scholes’s The Rise and Fall of English; Michael Bérubé’s The Employment of English: Theory, Jobs, and the Future of Literary Studies) is the way in which the act of naming itself becomes not only a tool for recovering knowledge but also an effective and entertaining means of linking seemingly unrelated symptoms of academia’s hard-to-diagnose illness. Although the book predictably follows an alphabetical order, there is an unrelenting unity that governs each entry. A paragraph from the introduction explains this unity while demonstrating in a final hyperbolic flourish the rhetorical force of these linkages:

     

    The multiple crises of higher education now present an interlocking and often interchangeable set of signifiers. (8)

     

    Conversation about the lack of full-time jobs for Ph.D.s turns inevitably to the excessive and abusive use of part-time faculty or the exploitation of graduate student employees, which in turn suggests the replacement of tenured with contract faculty, which slides naturally into anxiety about distance learning, which leads to concern about shared governance in a world where administrators have all the power, which in turn invokes the wholesale proletarianization of the professoriate (8). In any other dictionary there is no similarity between one entry and the next except for those phonetically-spelled pronunciation keys in parentheses. Not so in Nelson and Watt’s, though curious parentheticals full of schwas and umlauts abound. Theirs is a primer which, like Ambrose Bierce’s Devil’s Dictionary(1911), defines divergent topics with a yoking interpretive purpose that ranges from the serious to the satiric.

     

    Without question, it is on the subject of university corporatization that we find the authors achieving a level of indignation comparable to any radical manifesto. But even the book’s most apocalyptic moments are softened by a sense of humor and an understanding of opposing views. After presenting these issues at the University of Chicago, the authors report that a “distinguished faculty member there rose to say, ‘Well, you’ve heard Mulder’s version of the story; now let me give you Scully’s’” (xii). This comparison to the X-Files conspiracy-obsessed radical is very revealing. Although the book has no conspiracy to uncover, it describes the “multiple, uncoordinated forces working to alter higher education for the worse, not the better” (xii) in essentially Mulder-esque terms, making it easy for the reader to imagine administrators and university business advisors as colluding aliens bent on world domination. Perhaps it is the subtle and comprehensive way that corporatization works that facilitates alien invasion analogies. Throughout the book, the authors refer to the unnamed agents of university denigration as “forces” governed by concomitant material changes in American society prizing corporate efficiency and profit over community and academics.

     

    Every entry touching upon problems in the profession hinges upon the impending threat of corporatization. In “Academic Departments,” a definition follows that seems virtually free of corporate attacks. Yet the effects of fractured departments split between theoretical disputes and petty differences cause individual department members to embrace what Nelson describes in Marxist terms as a sense of “entrepreneurial disciplinarity” (20), which in turn shatters any hope of that department being an academic community and leaves it vulnerable to corporate infiltration. In the same entry, Nelson suggests that departmental divisiveness is a consequence of exploitative hiring practices that trickle down a universal acceptance of dishonesty from the administration: “A department that sustains high salaries for tenured and tenure-track faculty by ruthlessly exploiting adjunct faculty with Ph.D.s is hardly well-suited to be honest about any of its other differences” (21).

     

    The term “accountability” is similarly disentangled from any “timeless Platonic form” and redefined as a “strategic term deployed in specific social and political contexts” (37). The authors argue that the current popularity of the word has less to do with keeping the outside world informed of the duties and important pursuits of researchers and teachers than with keeping bureaucratized accounts of faculty output and cost effectiveness. Justifying the authors’ insistence on interpreting fashionable university lingo in economic terms is the academic habit of invoking “apprenticeship,” which retains historical economic connotations, as a paradigm for the role that graduate-student teachers play in academia. The relevant entry in Academic Keywords calls this usage sharply into question, showing that student teachers are not adequately instructed on how to better perform their teaching duties as are other apprentices, nor are they adequately compensated as inchoate professionals should be. In a useful chart comparing the rate of pay increases among Bloomington plumber, carpenter and graduate apprentices, Stephen Watt (in several entries initials indicate single authorship) uses the predictably bleak increase in graduate pay to underscore the “inherent inadequacy of the metaphor of apprenticeship” (70).

     

    The book makes frequent and compelling use of such charts to bolster its rhetorical campaign. There are charts tracing the median level of debt for a range of graduate students, the change in faculty appointments nationwide (showing the decrease in tenured positions), and even a list of the top twelve ways in which academic freedom for faculty is undermined and curtailed. Facts, statistics, citations, and charts abound. Nelson and Watt have done their homework and are not afraid to spell out just how disastrous things are.

     

    How disastrous? In “Faculty,” the authors aver that “over 40 percent of the nation’s faculty of higher education in 1997 were part-timers” (138). In the same entry, part-timers are referred to as university cash cows and compared to Mexican factory workers and migrant fruit pickers. Elsewhere, in “Part-Time Faculty,” statements from underpaid and devalued Ph.D.s forced to travel the highways to different schools paying meager wages and offering no benefits provide sobering evidence of the job crisis. Many of these part-timers have children. Many are published researchers and talented teachers, which refutes the self-deluding myth many tenured professors embrace that “underpaid teachers are underpaid because they are inferior” (204).

     

    Indeed, much of the book has been generated by the authors’ principled opposition to the profession’s mistreatment of part-timers. Moreover, the authors, both renowned English professors, excoriate English departments in particular, as it was this field that proved to administrators throughout the country that almost all introductory courses could be taught by instructors without Ph.D.s: “Indeed, many courses are taught at a profit” (57). Nor is Nelson reluctant to implicate his own institution, which “earns a profit for [the University of Illinois] of about $8,000 for each freshman composition course taught [….] So the yearly profit on freshman rhetoric is about $1,200,000, and the profit on introductory courses is about $1,500,000” (93). According to the authors (in a clever entry on “Cafeterias”), this urge to sacrifice quality education for better revenues is linked to the corporate tactic of outsourcing. The practice of replacing tenured faculty with part-time instructors is shown to be a direct outgrowth of the profitable replacement of salaried dietitians, cooks, and cafeterias with fast-food counters, food courts, and minimum-wage workers, a development that transpired gradually in most American colleges and universities starting in the late 1970s. Neither the quality of the food nor that of the instruction has weighed heavily on university administrators as they have carried out these changes. And though the administrative determination to build profit centers within the non-profit entity of the university by outsourcing, downsizing, and reducing costs seems at this stage irreversible, Nelson and Watt offer several direct and concrete mandates for resistance.

     

    The most sensible solution Nelson posits is that “disciplinary organizations need to set minimum wages for part-timers” (203). Additionally, he calls for an “annual ‘Harvest of Shame’ listing all departments and institutions paying less than $3,000 or $4,000 per semester course to instructors with Ph.D.s” (203). A more militant suggestion is that “faculty members and administrators from those schools should be barred from privileges like discounted convention room rates and barred from advertising in professional publications” (203). Nelson goes on to consider even more serious sanctions that would disqualify those associated with the Harvest of Shame from publishing in journals and receiving health care benefits.

     

    Like his rallying cries for collective action and unionization, these recriminations force us to ponder the feasibility of such responses. For instance, how effective is the existing list of censured institutions published by Academe? Who are the disciplinary organizations that would implement these sanctions? And after all, isn’t the real problem, according to the facts set down by Nelson and Watt, that part-timers and many adjuncts are not socially part of the more permanent teaching staff, and thereby fail to garner the financial and professional sympathy of other instructors necessary before any collective action may take place? How can we make tenured faculty and administrators care about part-timers? Simply to call for collectivization before outlining the motives for doing so on the part of higher paid faculty seems, to me, to skip several steps in the solution. And any kind of national representation would naturally involve regulating what schools pay all of their employees from the highest paid athletic coaches and administrators to physical plant workers and TAs. As with all collective bargainings, the initial phase of wage balancing will prove to be the most slow-moving and painful, as Nelson himself attests in a personal chapter-entry on his dealings with the Teamsters and his predictably unwilling faculty peers (during the strike that is the subject of his Manifesto of a Tenured Radical). Nelson and Watt seem content to allude to some imaginary middle wage for all faculty, without inquiring too closely into the problem of wage scales in a capitalist economy.

     

    Ultimately, and not improperly, Academic Keywords leaves the task of working out a plan of action to its readers. The book’s objective is not to dictate a fully formed agenda, but to inform and to raise consciousness: to shock us out of our apathy. And this it does to superb effect; it is a book that can raise hairs on the back of your neck. If academia were a summer camp, then Academic Keywords could be its campfire tale, horrifying us with the brutal facts of the recent past and the plausible approach of an even more brutal future.

     

    But there is another side to this book. It would be a mistake to conclude here without mentioning the incredible humor that enriches Academic Keywords. Indeed, I find myself resisting an urge to simply quote entire sections which read like slice-of-life stand-up comedy… Like, did you hear the one about the moonlighting professor? After repeated sightings of him working in a men’s clothing store at the mall, the concerned department head set up a sting operation to catch the aberrant scholar “patting down a suit on someone else’s shoulders” (179). The mall-lighting professor was found to be working his second job forty hours a week. Or, did you hear the one about the distinguished English professor at a formal department dinner who celebrated too early? With his colleagues seated around him, “he made a series of profound pronouncements and then passed out face forward into the first course” (19). Afterwards the others “lifted him up, wiped him off, and propped him up as best they could” (19). What is so hilariously disturbing about these jokes is that they are true, and each anonymous professor mentioned is probably someone we have heard of, whose works we have read, whom we may even know. More abundant than their narrative tales are the one-liners that the authors interweave into their prose with an admirable acumen. Some of these jibes work to offset the depressing subject matter. When describing the ultra-conservative constituents of the National Association of Scholars, Nelson refers to them as “specimens of that vanishing but still aggressive species, the confrontational white male wearing a bow tie” (182). In the section on graduate employees and cafeterias, the last few lines of the entry imagines a university with a certain corporate booth in the food court: “By the way, the Disney booth is manned by an English Ph.D. who earns $5.15 an hour” (78). The introduction includes a strange advertisement listing the corporate university’s principles of governance with the heading “MOBILE OIL BRINGS YOU MASTERPIECE CLASSROOM THEATRE” (6). The first nine so-called principles farcically delimit all faculty rights and freedoms in favor of student consumers and university supervisors; the tenth generously promises faculty the “full academic freedom to accept these principles or to resign” (6). It is a truism of comedians that making light of serious troubles is not only a powerful coping device but also a way of creating agreement through humor that these serious troubles exist–which not so coincidentally is the self-declared purpose for the book set down in its preface.

     

    In closing, I find it difficult not to propose a few items to consider (which is not inappropriate in a review of a book that steadfastly demands reader response). While reading, I found myself recalling a very unpopular economic answer to the current muddle, one that is the oldest and perhaps the most pacifistic answer to any economically motivated turmoil. That answer is the same one offered by Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations that counters any kind of intervention on the grounds that the market will always organically correct itself. Is it only blind faith that impels me to think that universities passing off an inferior education will experience an eventual decline in revenues which will in turn force them to employ a better paid supply of instructors? Many prospective students and parents are deluged with brochures touting impressive faculty-student ratios. May we not collectively force these resources to include accurate listings of part-timer-student ratios? No matter how unpopular this laissez-faire view, I refuse to believe that there is no longer a need in this country for a quality education. After all, McDonald’s did not erase the existence of family restaurants or neighborhood diners as critics expected, just as malls never obliterated privately owned specialty shops and clothing stores.

     

    Regardless of how centrist my position may seem, I feel empowered in whatever stance I take after reading this book, since as the authors so justly emphasize, informed discontent naturally breeds hopeful action. I recommend this book highly, but also hope that we in the academy do not make the same mistake with this issue as we do in so many others–by speaking only to each other–and so, instead of encouraging professors and administrators to read Academic Keywords, I strongly recommend the book to parents and students.

     

  • Of Tea Parties, Poverty Tours, and Tammany Pow-wows; or, How Mr. Clinton Distanced Us All from Pine Ridge

    H. Kassia Fleisher

    kass.fleisher@colorado.edu

     

    Philip J. Deloria, Playing Indian.New Haven: Yale UP, 1998.

     

    The week I sit down to read Philip J. Deloria’s Playing Indian (which Yale UP plans to re-issue in paperback in September), President Clinton takes a “poverty tour.” He stops in rural areas of Kentucky’s Appalachia and Mississippi’s Delta, as well as urban areas like East St. Louis and the Arizona-Mexico border.

     

    He also stops at the Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota. He is the first president to visit any Indian reservation since Calvin Coolidge.

     

    The tour is designed to bring attention to the rural poverty that frequently goes unremarked in United States culture–sort of a “Boyz in the Wood” to counteract the more commonly mythologized, and demonized, “Boyz in the ‘Hood.” Clinton also wishes to introduce his new poverty-fighting program, known as “new markets.” At each stop, he recites the mantra of third-world-type entrepreneurial aid: tax credits for businesses investing in poor areas; debt guarantees for businesses investing equity in those areas; and enhanced funding for non-profit organizations that make small loans in poor areas. These investments will benefit both rich and poor, Clinton notes: “The only way you can keep the economic recovery going is to have new people working and new people buying” (23). The poor–considered “under-consumers”–are needed fuel for continuing the economic burn.

     

    It’s the same logic applied by global villagers to the developing world. The aid program is analogous to the sort offered poor countries, even as the tour itself is analogous to Clinton’s trip to Africa. But, as The Economist warns from the distance of its London offices, the tour may serve primarily to divert public discussion of exactly how it is that eight years of economic growth have failed to affect certain regions. Indeed, it doesn’t help much to throw cash (as President Johnson did in the 60s) or private-sector guarantees (as Clinton proposes) at areas that lack infrastructure and educational institutions, especially in an age when Wall Street craves high-tech goodies with fat rates of return.

     

    And especially at Pine Ridge, which The Economist titles “The Hardest Case” (24). The Economist, which frequently indulges an impulse to critique American society, provided in its July 10 issue a separate article to discuss the profound economic challenges that face Pine Ridge, the poorest county in the United States. Their coverage is remarkable because none of the major network broadcasts provided much footage or information about the visit to Pine Ridge–an appalling failure, since in the days prior to Clinton’s visit, American Indian Movement members had been staging demonstrations in the nearby town of Whiteclay, Nebraska. Two men had died; those deaths weren’t being investigated; and Russell Means was behind bars again.

     

    Sounds like news. But the networks flashed the requisite photo-op of Clinton being feted by ceremonial drummers (The Economist couldn’t help but print it too), and covered instead the visit to East St. Louis, where celeb Magic Johnson was on hand to crow about potential profits in the inner city.

     

    Clearly then, what’s been going on in recent weeks at the Pine Ridge Oglala Lakota Reservation paints a picture of Indianness–and whiteness–unpalatable to the media and their primary consumers. In June, Ronald Hard Heart and Wilson Black Elk were killed in Whiteclay, a town with a population of only 22 people–all of whom must be brilliant entrepreneurs, since they somehow manage to post annual liquor sales of $3 million. The sale of alcohol is illegal on the reservation, where–in The Economist‘s white, econometric terms–3 in 4 people are unemployed, 2 in 3 live below the poverty line, 1 in 3 is homeless, and alcoholism and fetal alcohol syndrome are rampant. Lakota leaders have long wanted the Whiteclay booze supply shut down; when Nebraska officials claimed jurisdictional problems and failed to investigate the deaths, activist tempers flared. Two days of marches to Whiteclay were staged just prior to Clinton’s visit, probably in hopes that the national lens would focus on the Whiteclay problem. But, as The Economist points out, “The influence of the liquor stores seems a parody of the president’s desire to attract small businesses to deprived areas” (25). Doubtless the networks suspected their white, middle-class viewers would not appreciate the irony.

     

    Even The Economist blames the Lakota for their own persistent poverty. The article recites the history of the theft of the Black Hills, and explains, “The Lakota Sioux [sic] go to great lengths to teach each generation this history and their culture, so that even the few who graduate rarely tolerate life beyond the reservation, choosing to return to a place where the average age of death is 45. It is a source of pride” (25). Plus, it seems that the Lakota pridefully refused to accept financial compensation for the Black Hills, preferring foolishly to continue to press for ownership.

     

    “The ability to adapt and reinvent yourself,” the article begins, “is a hallmark of American success, the admired requisite for triumphing over the odds. The Pine Ridge Reservation exemplifies the extreme opposite: the tragic consequence of defending a way of life in impossible circumstances” (24).

     

    The ability to adapt and reinvent yourself. Philip Deloria might ask, “But how is this sense of self constructed?”

     

    The day I sit down to write this review, I take my coffee with National Public Radio, which informs me that the Nez Perce tribe has settled their suit against Avista. The utility company built the Lewiston Dam some decades ago in northern Idaho, beyond the Nez Perce reservation, and had subsequently removed it, but too late. Fisheries that belonged by nineteenth-century treaty to the Nez Perce had been ruined; the Nez Perce claimed that millions of fish had been lost. A mediator proposed a $39 million compromise, and both sides signed.

     

    This is important news in itself, news European Americans need to understand: Native Americans have been successfully using the judicial system to enforce old treaties that give them control of vast resources, allowing them to act at times as a sovereignty within a sovereignty. Consequently, the country is headed for a constitutional crisis far more complicated than that old, nagging states-rights problem ever was.

     

    But the local-affiliate reporter is more distracted by another angle of his story. The negotiation, he reports, was very “unusual.” Officials from Avista came to the reservation to meet, talk, and attend ceremonies in a sweat lodge; Nez Perce leaders went to Avista’s plant to understand better the unique concerns of a utility company. This “cultural” and “spiritual” contact permitted the opposing sides to understand the “human” elements of the negotiation and act as “neighbors.”

     

    Now, that’s groovy and all, but again, a particular portrait–of Indian cooperation, and spiritual and cultural “nobility”–is privileged over the story of Indian sovereignty. The reporter decides to ignore the real story here, which is that Indians are legally–“savagely”?–kicking butt in court.

     

    In the United States, then, in 1999, Native Americans are still “seen” by mainstream culture as variously invisible, noble, and savage. Deloria explores the history of the noble/savage opposition, but argues that another factor–that of relative “distance” from the national mainstream of power–must also be understood as dramatically affecting the cultural construction of Native Americans.

     

    Deloria begins with the Boston Tea Party, “the first drumbeat in the long cadence of rebellion through which Americans redefined themselves as something other than British colonists” (2). He reminds us that the night before the tea was to be seized legally by British officials–the Sons of Liberty had refused to permit its unloading, by way of protesting the import tax–the tea was dumped into the harbor by a mob of rebel colonists.

     

    Who were dressed as Indians.

     

    The question for historians has been, why the Indian dress? Deloria notes that it can’t be that they hoped to intimidate officials, shift blame, or disguise their identities. The work of the “mob” was witnessed by large crowds of supportive townspeople and guards who must have known who the masqueraders were–since a mob of “real” Indians hiking hundreds of miles to attack the harbor would surely have caused mass terror. Instead, Deloria says, the tea party costume was deliberate, and the tea party itself was “street theater and civil disobedience of the most organized kind… plotted and controlled by elites” (2, 28).

     

    And, he reports, there were many other instances of colonial Indian play. In Philadelphia, the Tammany society was formed by John Dickinson, Benjamin Rush, Thomas Mifflin, and David Rittenhouse; like Boston’s leaders, these were elite men “well positioned not only to define the general nature of the Indian, but also to construct… national subjectivity” (27). Tammany was a fictitious Indian saint for whom a biblically proportioned–and utterly false–legend was created: Tammany had fought the devil for possession of his land; then become a great hunter, later graciously relinquishing his hard-won hunting and fishing rights to William Penn; and then–ever thoughtful–had burned himself to death to spare his family the burden of his aged self. Philadelphians dressed as Indians and annually celebrated and re-sacrificed King Tammany on an annual feast day, May Day, the start of the Schuykill fishing season. All this, Deloria says, by way of encouraging fertility (new life after death); by way of democratizing British restrictions on hunting and fishing (which in England was limited to the sport of gentlemen); and, most importantly, by way of developing a national identity. The vast abundance of game on the American continent was celebrated as egalitarian, and, Deloria notes, “through Indianness, Tammany members tied the act of hunting to political and social control over the landscape”(19).

     

    Deloria traces the Tea Party and the Tammany Society back to European history. These community events were clearly intended to create a specific meaning, the power of which was drawn from traditions of carnival and misrule. Carnival was a celebration of abundance, fertility, and bodily function, a wintry season of overconsumption that involved social disruption, disguise, transvestism, reversals of gender and hierarchical social roles (vestiges remain in Mardi Gras and Mummers Parades); while misrule was a tradition of blackface, masking, and ritual burning that involved charivari parades, which ridiculed persons who posed a threat to moral economies or social custom. Carnival and misrule (and here Deloria cites Bakhtin) served as potentially transformative opportunities to subvert and, at times, to sustain political order–useful tools for the work of separating from British rule. Not surprisingly, Puritan Bostonians took more to the shaming practices of disobedience, while Quaker Pennsylvania and other middle states indulged mummer madness.

     

    By way of differentiating from the crown, then, proto-American leaders utilized familiar rituals. But they needed a new “historical tradition” that could provide uniqueness to the emerging nation’s sense of self. “We construct our identity,” Deloria writes, “by finding ourselves in relation to an array of people and objects who are not ourselves” (21). Conveniently, the colonists discovered themselves to be in relation to the aboriginal peoples they had encountered in “The New World.” Deloria argues that the United States began almost immediately to use Indianness in an attempt to create this unique national self, appropriating a false Indian “heritage,” and Indian “history,” that had the secondary benefit of justifying the very real appropriation of Indian land. While Philadelphians portrayed themselves as the heirs apparent to both Tammany’s lands and his nobility, Bostonians appropriated a bit of intimidating savagery.

     

    All of which fueled the now-familiar division between real and ideal Indians. King Tammany and the white Indians had little to do with contemporary, actual Natives, who by 1776 tended to care little for the colonists’ efforts to create a separate national self, and at times fought alongside the British.

     

    Thus does Playing Indian provide a fascinating examination of American identity formation. Deloria would agree that, as The Economist suggests, the United States has from the beginning had to reinvent itself to triumph over the “odds” encountered in nation-formation–odds which were doubly challenging for America, confronted as it was not by one enemy, but by two: the crown, and the aborigines. Deloria cites D. H. Lawrence’s assertion (in Studies in Classic American Literature, 1924) that, for America, the “long and half-secret process” (1) of identity-formation is “unfinished” (3). For Deloria, Lawrence exposed “a string of contradictions at the heart of familiar American self-images… locating native people at the very heart of American ambivalence” (3). Playing Indian reveals the secret (Indian) part of the nation-building process, and suggests that America will remain unfinished until it has reconciled the dilemma of “wanting to savor both civilized order and savage freedom at the same time” (3). Indianness was “the bedrock” (186) of the national subjectivity built by white males “on contrasts between their own citizenship and that denied to women, African Americans, Indians and others” (8). Indianness was “one of the foundations (slavery and gender relations being the other two) for imagining and performing domination and power in America” (186). America’s resulting identity was “both aboriginal and European and yet was neither,” which ambivalence “prevented its creators from ever effectively developing a positive, stand-alone identity that did not rely heavily on either a British or an Indian foil” (36).

     

    Playing Indian also provides a fascinating examination of cultural constructs of Native America, particularly in Deloria’s application of (among others’) Todorov’s work on “distance,” and Said’s work on Orientalism. We know colonists made good use of the Enlightenment’s old noble-savage dichotomy, but, Deloria says, American colonists also developed a useful us-and-them division:

     

    [T]hey imagined a second axis focused not on Indian good or evil, but upon the relative distance that Indian Others were situated from this Self-in-the-making.... Along with the positives and negatives of the noble savage, then, we need to consider the distinction between Indian Others imagined to be interior--inside the nation or society--and those who are to be excluded as exterior.... The matter can get extremely complicated, for both interior and exterior Others can take on positive or negative qualities, depending on the nature of the identity construction in which they appear. (21)

     

    In a footnote he adds, “Indians could, for example, signify civilized colonial philosophe (interior/noble), fearsome colonial soldier (interior/savage), noble, natural man (exterior/noble), or barbarous savage (exterior/savage)” (203).

     

    While the noble/savage dichotomy has remained fairly consistent, the distance between the “inside of the nation” and the Indian Other has shifted with the sands of political necessity. “The practice of playing Indian,” Deloria writes, “has clustered around two paradigmatic moments–the Revolution, which rested on the creation of a national identity, and modernity, which has used Indian play to encounter the authentic amidst the anxiety of urban industrial and postindustrial life” (7). The modern period is flush with forest-romping, drum-whacking men’s groups; a strangely profit-driven New Age “spirituality”; Order-of-the-Arrow Boy Scouts; and “hobby Indians,” whites who in the 60’s traveled to pow-wows to dress, dance, and trade as–and with–Indians. The modern period, then, has birthed an interior/noble Indian–perhaps a good thing in its encouragement of potentially positive cross-cultural economies and understanding.

     

    But still. What effect does the noble/savage/interior/exterior conundrum–even today’s kinder, gentler version–have on Native Americans themselves? Deloria examines several cultural “bridge figures” from the past:

     

    Throughout a long history of Indian play, native people have been present at the margins, insinuating their way into Euro-American discourse, often attempting to nudge notions of Indianness in directions they found useful. As the nineteenth and twentieth centuries unfolded, increasing numbers of Indians participated in white people's Indian play, assisting, confirming, co-opting, challenging, and legitimating the performative tradition of aboriginal American identity. (8)

     

    Deloria discusses these bridge figures sympathetically, as people who saw little choice but to re-appropriate the appropriation, and use this potentially damaging rhetoric to help their people as they could.

     

    Questions remain. Deloria touches on gender issues, but his explication is incomplete, and his most important interrogation is relegated to a footnote. As Deloria reports, Indianness was often gendered (see the much-deconstructed Vespucci Discovering America, in which Jan vander Straet painted America as an Indian woman) and Indian play was used to enforce white female domestication (see the history of the Camp Fire Girls). But given intersections of race/class/gender/sexuality, exactly how interior are white women? It would be equally useful to examine the exterior-ness of women of color. Here, and elsewhere, our quadrant may have to become three-dimensional. Historically, Indian play was the purview of white men, often elite; so what do we make of elite white women like Helen Hunt Jackson, a nineteenth-century activist on behalf of natives, without appropriating mythologies and without “going native”? Is it possible that, given the complexity of women’s own situations, women worked as particularly successful bridge figures? In 1880, Jackson wrote to Henry Dawes, “I quite agree with you that even the shadow of a suspicion of what is technically known as ‘lobbying’ should not rest on a woman: and… nothing would induce me to do so. But would it not be possible for me, in a quiet and unnoticeable way–(now at the Capital)–to make opportunities of reading a few statistics–a few facts, to men whom it is worthwhile to convert?” (Mathes 150). This is the plaint of an interior white-elite but exterior woman who, despite (because of?) her exterior-ness, attempted to operate as a bridge figure.

     

    Likewise missing among Deloria’s “string of contradictions at the heart of familiar American self-images” is the profound contradiction of democracy versus capitalism. As President Clinton has all but said, contemporary federal Indian policy seems now to consist primarily of forced entrepreneurialism–which is to say, a forcing of one dominant economic structure onto another, possibly very different structure. This current movement has the potential to produce social alteration as total as that of the Indian Reorganization Act, which aided assimilation by forcing an unfamiliar governing structure on tribes. Yet entrepreneurialism is happening quietly, without public debate, without an “Act.” Mythology is necessary to support even a silent policy. Does entrepreneurialism arise from an interior or exterior, noble or savage construct? And if, indeed, we do construct identity in relation to others, where is the white Appalachian located on the interior/exterior axis? Racially, he’s interior, but by class he’s exterior. To convince American taxpayers that the badlands of Pine Ridge and the hills of Kentucky are both part of the same (exterior/them) third world– this will take some doing. How will that construct operate successfully? Or will it?

     

    And while Deloria’s audience often seems to be academics (most of whom are white/male/elite), he does not address questions of white activism. He notes that the primary Indian policy dilemma has been the question of whether to destroy Indians or to assimilate them; and that this is “a decision that the American polity has been unable to make or, on the few occasions when either policy has been relatively clear, to implement” (4-5). As he suggests, the United States could have settled on a purely genocidal policy; this decision might even have resulted in the formation of a stronger national identity. But the U.S. remained ambivalent about the peoples it displaced. Native resistance does deserve the lion’s share of the credit for providing the persistent thorn in the paw of Indian policy. But is not the American left also partly to–blame?–for this unresolved policy? Deloria might criticize–justifiably–the left’s tendency to exploit native issues by way of performing a cultural critique that presents no real threat to its own economic status. But how should we advise those among the radical left (assuming this is not an oxymoron) who wish to support indigenism? What should white activists be doing to revise this Indian-based U.S. identity? How can–or should–white anti-racists support the work of native identity-formation?

     

    Regardless of how these interrogations proceed, it’s clear from such disparate sources as National Public Radio and The Economist that Deloria is correct: Indianness is a rhetorical bank account–well-funded, profitable, and available for borrowing whenever the interior-nation needs it. Until the rhetoric is altered, perhaps, attempts to bridge the cross-cultural whitewater will do little to help Ronald Hard Heart and Wilson Black Elk; little to help the “hardest case” of Pine Ridge. Indeed, President Clinton has now expressly codified this reservation and its people as a third world (i.e., exterior from our national first world) country (without noting that country’s sovereign right to the Black Hills). Clinton was willing to make-exterior these “under-consumers” (them) in order to justify the appropriation of funds necessary to finance “new markets”–new sources of income for the CEOs (us) who support his leadership. And an Idaho utility company’s CEOs (us) have an equally urgent financial incentive to make-interior the Nez Perce, to “go native,” sit in a sweat lodge, and graciously embrace the wonderful interior/noble natives (us, for now) whose fish the CEOs have killed–which natives have graciously accepted $39 million for their trouble. National Public Radio is happy to play (Indians-R-us) along, clucking their tongues and asking why all of our CEOs don’t do business in this charming way. Which gets them out of having to critique the historical power grid that caused the fishkill in the first place.

     

    What all of us, including the editors of The Economist and NPR, could learn from Deloria’s book is that even as the United States grapples with the difficulty of a continually “unfinished” national identity, Native Americans face the struggle of cementing a national identity of their own, one free from outsider construction, and perhaps one updated from the “traditional,” addressing contemporary issues (economic and technological, for instance) in freely chosen terms. Deloria’s Playing Indian may be the first drumbeat in what promises to be a long, and long needed, rhetorical rebellion.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • “America’s Emerging Markets.”The Economist 10 July 1999: 17.
    • Deloria, Philip J. Playing Indian. New Haven: Yale UP, 1998.
    • “The Hardest Case.” The Economist 10 July 1999: 24-25.
    • Mathes, Valerie Sherer, Ed. The Indian Reform Letters of Helen Hunt Jackson, 1879-1885. Norman: U of Oklahoma P, 1998.
    • Nadvornick, Doug. “Nez Perce Indian Tribe.” Morning Edition. Natl. Public Radio. 20 July 1999.
    • “The Pockets of Poverty World Tour.” The Economist 10 July 1999: 23-4.

     

  • Postcolonial Reading

    Mark Sanders

    Department of English and American Literature
    Brandeis University

    Society for the Humanities
    Cornell University
    ms248@cornell.edu

     

    Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present.Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1999.

     

    Marx could hold The Science of Logic and the Blue Books together; but that was still only Europe; and in the doing it came undone.

     

    A Critique of Postcolonial Reason

     

    “As I work at this at the end of a book that has run away from me, I am of course open to your view. You will judge my agenda in the process…. You work my agenda out” (357-358). Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s Critique of Postcolonial Reason addresses an “implied reader” several times toward its end, inviting a response (cf. 421). We are deep in the ultimate chapter, on Culture, where the “this” refers to questions of cultural politics. By analogy with Marx, who, envisioning a reader for Capital,1 “attempted to make the factory workers rethink themselves as agents of production, not as victims of capitalism,” Spivak asks her implied readers–hyphenated Americans, economic and political migrants from the decolonized South–to “rethink themselves as possible agents of exploitation, not its victims” (357, cf. 402).2 The persistent call, voiced in Outside in the Teaching Machine (1993), for the migrant to the North to distinguish, in terms of victimage and agency, between him- or, especially, herself, and the citizen of the postcolonial nation, is reiterated in Critique. But by the time it includes its implied author and reader in the exhortation, “let us want a different agency, shift the position a bit” (358, cf. 402), Critique has given its reader to work out more than an agenda, an itinerary of agency in complicity. It has also blazed an intricate trajectory on reading. The latter is what my essay endeavors to work out.

     

    The Preface to Critique begins:

     

    My aim, to begin with, was to track the figure of the Native Informant through various practices: philosophy, literature, history, culture. Soon I found that the tracking showed up a colonial subject detaching itself from the Native Informant. After 1989, I began to sense that a certain postcolonial subject had, in turn, been recoding the colonial subject and appropriating the Native Informant's position. Today, with globalization in full swing, telecommunicative informatics taps the Native Informant directly in the name of indigenous knowledge and advances biopiracy. (ix)

     

    To track the composite figure Spivak names the Native Informant is not simply to trace and analyze its outlines as it emerges in colonial or postcolonial discourse. Finding that the Native Informant reveals, in its trail, a dispropriable “position,” a borrowed one not strictly anyone’s own, the tracker herself performs the figure, and is, in turn, performed by it. Giving shape to the tracker, this mimetic tracking engages the trace of the other which sends this book on its way.3 The writer, in other words, conjures up a reader. The result of figuring, and taking up, the “(im)possible perspective of the Native Informant” is an interventionist writing that is quasi-advocative in its conduct. Amplifying and deepening Spivak’s thinking, Critique revises major published texts to go with considerable new ones by her. Cut into four long chapters–headed Philosophy, Literature, History, Culture–and a small appendix on The Setting to Work of Deconstruction, it reframes such well known essays as “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” “The Rani of Sirmur,” and “Three Women’s Texts and a Critique of Imperialism” so that, in addition to being key interventions in colonial discourse studies and postcolonial studies, they add to the wider critical idiom by developing insights in ethics and reading gained from a thinking of postcoloniality. Among its surprises is the insistent, and at times cryptic, conversation with the later writings of Paul de Man (to whom Critique is jointly dedicated) on irony, allegory, and parabasis, which she deploys in terms of a disruptive speaking- and reading-otherwise. What emerges is an ethics of reading, of the making of a reader; and, from that, a way for writer and reader to acknowledge and negotiate discursive, and socio- and geopolitical situatedness as complicity. Herein resides the book’s particularity. Those whose passion lies in staking out a “position” in the field will be uneasy with its performance of positional dispropriability.4 No position is “proper” to one side, and all are appropriable by the other: the Native Informant leaves in its tracks a colonial subject turned postcolonial turned agent-instrument of global capital (cf. 223 n42). This is the larger itinerary of agency in complicity mapped by Critique, of which it repeatedly advises its declared implied reader. Of more than equal interest are the book’s less overt lineaments, the underlying implications, as it produces them for interception by a reader or reading less declaredly implied, of this postcolonial reading.

     

    A Critique of Postcolonial Reason begins by shadowing Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Judgement and its foreclosure of the Native Informant. The import of such foreclosure is ethical, and affectively tagged in ways that psychoanalysis allows us to think when it opens the ethical in the dynamics of transference and counter-transference (107, 207). Turning to the psychoanalytic lexicon–Critique “sometimes conjure[s] up a lexicon-consulting reader for the new cultural studies” (x)–Spivak finds foreclosure set out by Freud and Lacan as a rejection (Verwerfung) by the ego of an idea, and, along with that idea, the affect connected to it (4). To imagine the (im)possible perspective of the Native Informant in Kant, and in the other “source texts of European ethico-political selfrepresentation” (9), is thus to respond not only to a failure of representation as a lack of, or limit to, knowledge, but also to a disavowal that is ethical in character.5 The main point of using the psychoanalytic concept-metaphor of foreclosure is to register an unacknowledged failure of relation, one amounting to a denial of access to humanity: “I shall docket the encrypting of the name of the ‘native informant’ as the name of Man–a name that carries the inaugurating affect of being human…. I think of the ‘native informant’ as a name for that mark of expulsion from the name of Man–a mark crossing out the impossibility of the ethical relation” (5-6). To be a native informant is to speak, after a fashion. The native informant’s role in ethnography, Spivak’s source for the term, is to provide information, to act as a source and an object of knowledge. When this is the function of the native informant, an ethical relation is impossible, for, strictly speaking, the investigator has no responsibility for the informant. Yet a ruse is perpetrated that he or she does. In this sense, the ethnographic designation “native informant” crosses out this impossibility but does not cancel it. The mode of reading proposed and performed in Critique strives to preserve this impossibility-under-erasure.

     

    As an alternative to foreclosure, Spivak proposes a “commitment not only to narrative and counternarrative, but also to the rendering (im)possible of (another) narrative” (6). How are we to explicate this typographic matrix? In order to do so, we have to enter (more briefly than can do it justice) Spivak’s reading of the placement of the Native Informant in the Critique of Judgement, in which “he is needed as the example for the heteronomy of the determinant, to set off the autonomy of the reflexive judgement, which allows freedom for the rational will” (6). In the “Analytic of the Sublime,” in the first part of the Critique, the terror of a certain “raw man” stands in, metaleptically, as a precursor to rational subjectivity. That “raw man” is as yet unnamed. In the “Critique of Teleological Judgement,” the second part of the Critique, Kant names him. There the New Hollander (Neuholländer, or Australian Aborigine) and the inhabitant of Tierra del Fuego (Feuerländer) illustrate how, without making reference to something supersensible–such as the concept “Man”–one cannot easily decide “why it is necessary that men should exist.” This, Kant writes in parentheses, is “a question that is not so easy to answer if we cast our thoughts by chance on the New Hollanders or the inhabitants of Tierra del Fuego” (qtd. in Spivak 26). Kant’s Fuegan, according to Spivak, “is not only not the subject as such; he also does not quite make it as an example of the thing or its species as natural product” (26). Calling her reading of Kant “mistaken” (9), Spivak deliberately breaks with conventions of philosophy–for which Kant’s “raw man” would be an “unimportant rhetorical detail” (26)–by figuring, on a minimal empirical basis (little more than the fact they existed), the perspective of the New Hollander or Fuegan.6 This perspective is (im)possible–bracketing the “im” puts impossibility under erasure without submitting to the ruse of canceling it–in that it answers to a call as one would reply, having not actually been asked for an answer, to a rhetorical question.7 The Kantian text appears to summon a native informant and his perspective only to guard against their arrival as anything but that which confirms, through ideational and affective–and hence ethico-political–foreclosure, the European as human norm. The Native Informant enjoys “limited access to being-human” (30). Spivak bets on the name “native informant” as what encrypts the “name of Man” and which continues, “[a]s the historical narrative moves from colony to postcolony to globality… [to] inhabit… us so that we cannot claim the credit of our proper name” (111). With this self-implicating history of the present, the double task of the reader is at once to bind herself to the possibility of the Native Informant’s perspective as a “narrative perspective” (9), and to dramatize its foreclosure by resisting the ruse of simply canceling its impossibility. Here that double task is taken up typographically by bracketing the “im.” Elsewhere the reader employs other strategies.

     

    In Spivak’s reading of Kant, and in her reading of Hegel which follows it, typographics give way to prosopopoeia–“[a] rhetorical figure by which an imaginary or absent person is represented as speaking or acting” (OED). Weaving her text from loose ends of the empirical and the philosophical, Spivak fancies, from the trace of the unacknowledged foreclosure of their perspective, the New Hollander and the Fuegan as “subject[s] of speech.” In order to operate them as perspectives of narrative, a rhetoric of prosopopoeia, which necessarily involves a counterfactual “if,” is the minimally requisite strategy for entering an affective vein, and hence for opening the possibility of an ethical relation:

     

    But if in Kant's world the New Hollander... or the man from Tierra del Fuego could have been endowed with speech (turned into the subject of speech), he might well have maintained that, this innocent but unavoidable and, indeed, crucial example--of the antinomy that reason will supplement--uses a peculiar thinking of what man is to put him out of it. The point is, however, that the New Hollander or the man from Tierra del Fuego cannot be the subject of speech or judgement in the world of the Critique. (26)

     

    Spivak’s Critique mimes that of Kant, trying to figure the foreclosed perspective. If, in terms of a logical matrix, the ethical would have been broached by a non-foreclosure of affect, with that foreclosure already in place, the restoration of affect can only be figured counterfactually. That is why Spivak insists that the New Hollander or Fuegan, as she has him assume a narrative perspective, figures not a coming to speech but rather the Native Informant’s foreclosure. Like some works Spivak analyzes in the chapter on Literature (112-197), such counterfactual quasi-advocacy must stage as “mute” the projected voice of the other. The performance must be of a failed ventriloquism. The one, momentary, deviation from this counterfactual rhetoric in Spivak’s reading of Kant, and the most moving moment in her explication, takes place in a long footnote: “[Kant’s] construction of the noumenal subject is generally dependent on the rejection [Verwerfung] of the Aboriginal. In German the two words are Neuholländer and Feuerländer…. I took these for real names and started reading about them…. One tiny detail may give Kant’s dismissal the lie: ‘…. [the] name [the Fuegans] gave themselves: Kaweskar, the People’” (26n-29n). Roughly legible as a claim to the “name of Man,” this trace of self-naming, taken from one writer quoting another, a sign of the makings of a narrative perspective to be reconstructed by a reader, indicates a limit of this book, and the threshold of another: “I cannot write that other book which bubbles up in the cauldron of Kant’s contempt” (28n). But could anybody write such a book? The footnote cites linguistic competence and disciplinary and institutional obstacles, but other formulations appear to preclude “that other book” entirely. The reasons for this take us to the heart of the practice of reading that animates Critique, its principal contribution to a critical idiom–like Marxism, a “globalized local tradition” (70)–in ethics and reading.

     

    The intuition which guides Spivak is that, since the reader takes up, quasi-advocatively, the position of Native Informant in responding to Kant and the other philosophers, she cannot help but figure him as a reader. This tendency is, however, “mistaken”: “there can be no correct scholarly model for this type of reading. It is, strictly speaking, ‘mistaken,’ for it attempts to transform into a reading-position the site of the ‘native informant’ in anthropology, a site that can only be read, by definition, for the production of definitive descriptions” (49). In other words, in a necessary but fractured reversal of foreclosure, the reader can projectively broach affect, but cannot restore the foreclosed perspective. This is different from noting that, reading Hegel’s reading of the Srimadbhagavadgita, “an implied reader ‘contemporary’ with the Gita” (though not a Hindu reader contemporary with Hegel) can be reconstituted from the text’s structure of address: “[s]uch a reader or listener acts out the structure of the hortatory ancient narrative as the recipient of its exhortation. The method is structural rather than historical or psychological” (49-50). Whereas “strategic complicities” (46) obtain between Hegel’s argument and the structure of the Gita in how each positions a reader, Kant’s text in no way addressed, or let itself be addressed by, the Native Informant. Kant’s text does nothing to open the possibility of affective or ethical relation. To imagine the Native Informant as reader, in Kant’s case at least, is “mistaken,” and all that a reader can be taught is to mime his moves of foreclosure. In the case of Hegel, and the implied reader of the Gita, however, “I am calling,” writes Spivak, “for a critic or teacher who has taken the trouble to do enough homework in language and history (not necessarily the same as specialist training) to be able to produce such a ‘contemporary reader’ in the interest of active interception and reconstellation” (50). This is not the same as asking, and answering empirically, such questions as: For whom was he writing? Who is the audience? If “history” can assist with “active interception and reconstellation,” it is clear from Spivak’s proviso that “the method is structural” that any history must be answerable to an analysis of the address-structure of the text, with its own openings and foreclosures. Anything else can lead to wishful thinking. Spivak provides an alternative to the banal and potentially harmful empiricism of “information-retrieval” (114, 168-171), and to unproblematized advocacy on behalf of the “silenced.” Her method at once acts as a corrective to such contemporary tendencies in criticism, and makes it possible for us to see them as one-dimensional articulations of an original critical impulse, one for which she, by contrast, emerges as one of today’s most profound interpreters. To read is to figure a reader; to go out of one’s self, perhaps to make out a “contemporary reader,” more often than not to figure a “lost” perspective that cannot be made out (65). This account of reading, scrupulously drawn from engaging the text of postcoloniality and its philosophical precursors, adds both to an older notion of reading as a process of imaginative projection, and to a more recent idiom which attends to a process of dispropriative “invention,” as instantiation of the ethical, in writing and reading.8

     

    Closing her section on Kant, Spivak associates the perspective of the Native Informant, as reader, with thematics of parabasis, irony and allegory: “To read a few pages of master discourse allowing for the parabasis operated by the native informant’s impossible eye makes appear a shadowy counterscene” (37). In another of her splendid long footnotes, Spivak “recommend[s] de Man’s deconstructive definition of allegory as it overflows into ‘irony’… which takes the activism of ‘speaking otherwise’ into account; and suggest[s] that the point now is to change distance into persistent interruption, where the agency of allegorein–located in an unlocatable alterity presupposed by a responsible and minimal identitarianism–is seen thus to be sited in the other of otherwise” (156n, cf. 430). These remarks direct us to some of the most difficult passages in Paul de Man’s Allegories of Reading. Concluding his reading of Rousseau’s Confessions, at the end of the final chapter in Allegories, de Man borrows from Schlegel to recast allegory in terms of parabasis and irony: “the disruption of the figural chain…. becomes the permanent parabasis of an allegory (of figure), that is to say, irony. Irony is no longer a trope but the undoing of the deconstructive allegory of all tropological cognitions, the systematic undoing, in other words, of understanding. As such, far from closing off the tropological system, irony enforces the repetition of its aberration” (300-301). Parabasis, literally a stepping-aside, refers to the intervention of the chorus in Greek drama, and to the intervention of the author in theatre contemporary with Schlegel. Glossed as “aus der Rolle fallen,” parabasis is thus (in one sense) an interruption of the figure in performance, of an assumption of a role. It is, in other words, what fractured prosopopoeia does, stepping aside when a voice or reading-position is attributed to the Native Informant. Allegory, in one of de Man’s formulations, is what disrupts continuity between cognitive and performative rhetorics. In Rousseau’s Confessions, confession produces truth (cognitive) by disclosing the deeds of the one confessing, but undermines itself as confession when this cognitive truth functions as excuse (performative) (280). De Man’s remarks on allegory, irony, and parabasis can be linked to his coinage and explication of “ethicity,” where the disruption of rhetorical modes appears as a disruption of two value systems.9 The disruption in confession turned excuse between the systems of truth and falsehood, and good and evil, is an instance of the disruption leading de Man to a rhetorical redescription of the moral. In rhetorical terms, the disruption generates an imperative referential in its bearing:

     

    Allegories are always ethical, the term ethical designating the structural interference of two distinct value systems.... The ethical category is imperative (i.e., a category rather than a value) to the extent that it is linguistic and not subjective.... The passage to an ethical tonality does not result from a transcendental imperative but is the referential (and therefore unreliable) version of a linguistic confusion. Ethics (or, one should say, ethicity) is a discursive mode among others. (206)

     

    Spivak takes up the referential moment as response to an imperative. By imagining the Fuegan, her reading of Kant performs the empirical, or “ideological,” transgression that de Man diagnoses in Schiller’s reading of The Critique of Judgement (16). In so doing, Spivak takes from de Man the opening provided by ethicity, which, at the end of Allegories, is set out in the vocabulary of allegory, irony and parabasis. The word “allegory” comes from the Greek: allegorein, from allos, other + agoreuein, to speak publicly. “Speaking otherwise” is Spivak’s activist rendering. To speak–or read–otherwise in the name of the referential (not necessarily the empirical, since the figure is, strictly speaking, “unverifiable”), projected as the (im)possible perspective of the Native Informant, is to perform the parabasis necessary to disrupt the inscription, in Kant onwards, of the Native Informant.10Interrupting informatics (cognitive, epistemic), by exposing the ideational and affective foreclosure of humanity (performative, ethical), the reader brings to light an “ethicity” which gets ethics going by bringing the agent before an imperative. Animating the reader with alterity, this imperative comes from elsewhere, from an other. This is how allegory is produced and staged as postcolonial reading.

     

    In the most traditional of terms, works of narrative fiction and lyric poetry are understood to involve the reader in a process of imaginative projection and identification. Attention to this process underlies the emphasis placed in Critique on the teaching of literature, and its ethical implications (an issue not taken up much by commentators, but always apparent to her students at Columbia, where Spivak directed my doctoral work). Set down in an idiom of their own, Spivak’s intuitions as a critic resonate with an impulse that has animated criticism for a long time in its formulations of the relation between beauty and goodness; between the imagination, exercised by poetry, and ethical conduct. To invoke Percy Bysshe Shelley, “[a] man, to be greatly good, must imagine intensely and comprehensively; he must put himself in the place of another and of many others…. The great instrument of moral good is the imagination; and poetry administers to the effect by acting upon the cause” (488). The turn toward a de Manian thematics of allegory coded in terms of irony as permanent parabasis gives Spivak and her readers a set of concepts for making sense of what, if one kept to the idiom and concerns of a Percy Shelley (whom Spivak briefly invokes [355n]), would amount to an interference of two systems or codes of value: beauty and goodness. In this instance, the interference would be operated by an ironic interruption of the “main system of meaning” by the Native Informant’s perspective. If putting oneself imaginatively in the place of another is indispensable to ethics, it is inevitable for a reader; if there is an opening for the ethical in reading, and for the ethical to open from reading, it is this. Spivak’s point of intervention is to teach the reader to experience that place as (im)possible, as in the case of the figure she calls the Native Informant, and, in so doing, to acknowledge complicity in actuating the texts and systemic geopolitical textuality that make it so. Goodness-coding disrupts beauty-coding (cf. 146). The critical reader steps aside, introducing the bracketed “im” or figuring a more or less muted prosopopoeia, and passes through, as she must, the aporia of this impossibility. Spivak’s setting to work of this project in the teaching of literature is well enough known not to rehearse her readings of Brontë, Rhys, Mary Shelley, and Coetzee in the chapter on Literature. In order to anticipate the book’s reframing of “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” I will, however, note how, although never absent, the emphasis appears to fall with added gravity on the ethical rather than on the epistemological dimension of literary figuration. This can be observed in passages added on Mahasweta Devi’s novella, “Pterodactyl,” in which an advocacy-journalist in search of a story joins with Indian “tribals” in their work of mourning the passing of the creature. There the rhetoric of thwarted prosopopoeia is framed ethically as well as affectively: “The aboriginal is not museumized in this text…. This mourning [of the pterodactyl] is not anthropological but ethico-political” (145). To gloss this in terms of Shelley altered by way of de Man, Spivak’s attention to the affective plotting of goodness-coding is, in the more recent analysis, at least as strong as truth-coding in disrupting beauty-coding.

     

    This shift in emphasis comes through powerfully in the chapter on History. The version of “The Rani of Sirmur” included there opens, in another partaking in the work of mourning, with a quasi-transferential “pray[er]… to be haunted by [the Rani’s] slight ghost,” and a “miming [of] the route of an unknowing” becomes a “mim[ing of] responsibility to the other” (207, 241). Pointing to an ethico-affective supplementation of the epistemic, these additions to “The Rani of Sirmur” lead us to an altered reading of “Can the Subaltern Speak?” In the latter, we get a disruption, in the semantics of “representation,” of the codes of truth and goodness, or broken down more specifically, in the German of Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire, of the epistemic, the aesthetic (as darstellen), and the ethico-political (as vertreten) (256ff, 260, 263). Portrayal can amount to a self-delegating “‘speaking for’” (Arnott 83). To separate these senses, and to expose their interested conflation, as Marx did when he wrote about tragedy being repeated as farce, is to operate an ironic parabasis. Critique presents these involved theatrics, along with the rest of the essay’s intervening matter (on Foucault and Derrida, Subaltern Studies, sati) as a “digression” on the way to the “unspeaking” of the anti-colonial activist Bhubaneswari Bhaduri, after her suicide, by other women of her social class (273, 309). A coda to earlier versions of the essay,11 this unspeaking is now a portent for the (middle-class) woman of the South becoming, along with the postcolonial migrant, the agent-instrument of transnational capital (310, cf. 200-201), manager in a neo-colonial system which, enlisting feminist help (252, 255f, 259, 269, 277, 282, 287, 361, 370n), employs credit-baiting to conscript into capitalist globality the poorest woman of the South (6, 220n, 223n42, 237, 243n70). This is how the book tracks the itinerary of the Native Informant, and how the implied reader–also the “newly-born… woman as reader as model” in “a new politics of reading” (98-98n137)–is concatenated by it in a position of complicity. When Critique adds Bhubaneswari Bhaduri’s corporate-employed great-grandniece to the chain, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” is resituated in a history of the present written on her unspeaking. Yet the “digression” remains indispensable to discerning the deeper current on reading underneath the Native Informant’s itinerary structuring the book. Although, as Spivak observes, Bhubaneswari Bhaduri was “a figure who intended to be retrieved” (246), and the survivors interpret her suicide, we are not dealing, in isolation, with epistemic coding, or with ethico-political coding alone, but with the permanent disruption of these and other codes in the writing Bhubaneswari left on her body. The reader does not know, or have to know, but rather stands aside when others, ignoring the disruptive noise of other codings, claim to know.

     

    We can, on the one hand, as it has always invited us (247), read “Can the Subaltern Speak?” as irony in the classical mode, as eironeia, a Socratic questioning in feigned ignorance, provoking the law to speak12–as it inevitably has, ruling that of course the subaltern can speak and in the same breath contradicting its statement with vivid acts of foreclosure (see 309; Outside 60-61). On the other hand, Socratic irony can itself be thought in a de Manian vocabulary of “permanent parabasis,” as a disrupting of the script of informatics through a performance of the (im)possible perspective that mimes its foreclosure of that perspective. If this disruption produces an imperative, Spivak’s injunction in response appears to be: find the disruption of value systems and work at it; intervene there. Such an ethics or politics of reading may thus be another gloss on what, from her readings of Marx, and Deleuze and Guattari, Spivak refers to in other essays as the coding, recoding, and transcoding of value, a topic which continues to puzzle her ablest interpreters.13 Involving economic, cultural, and affective codes implicated in gendering (103ff, cf. Outside 281-282), and thus entering territory not explored by de Man, this is where, by analogy with the factory worker, whom Marx taught to think of himself not in terms of identity (see Outside 61ff), but as an agent, the implied reader-agent can acknowledge and negotiate complicity. Although not working out the details, Critique provides clues, in the form of concrete suggestions, that help its reader to find such links in intuitions about reading and the ethical. One, from the chapter on Culture, is the proposal that “a different standard of literary evaluation, necessarily provisional, can emerge if we work at the (im)possible perspective of the native informant as a reminder of alterity, rather than remain caught in some identity forever” (351-352). Another, from History, in response to UN efforts to “rationalize ‘woman,’” concerns “women outside of the mode of production narrative”: “We pay the price of epistemically fractured transcoding when we explain them as general exemplars of anthropological descriptions…. They must exceed the system to come to us, in the mode of the literary” (245-245n). Postcoloniality urges a training of the agent as reader in the literary–where the literary is that which, while it inevitably performs a referential function, is “singular and unverifiable” (175) in the way it evokes and invokes an elsewhere and an other, and constantly performs disruption between aesthetico-epistemic and ethico-affective codings of representation. A paradox thus appears to emerge for a reader of Critique: in order to read the book, the reader has to stand aside from the reading-position allocated her as declared implied reader; exceed her systemic placing when it risks gelling into yet another identity; and assume, where–unlocatably–she is, the (im)possible task of taking up what has been denied: the writing of an other life-script, which is not necessarily the same as one’s own autobiography. The larger project carried forward in Critique remains, as I read it, a work in progress, placed in the hands of its readers. Tracking the trajectory at a tangent, this has been my contribution toward its working out.

     

    Notes

     

    1. On the reader of Capital, see also Keenan 99-133.

     

    2. Given not only the agenda of Critique, but also the considerable Marxist reach of “Can the Subaltern Speak?,” the work by Spivak taken up most widely in postcolonial studies, one can only find bewildering Neil Lazarus’s statement that: “And in the case of Spivak, I shall risk saying that she seems to me ‘more of a Marxist’ in the wider field of critical theory than she is in the narrower field of postcolonial studies: I mean that her pointedly Marxist writings seem to me to situate themselves, for the most part, as interventions into the ‘theory’ field; within the field of postcolonial studies, by contrast, it is as a feminist exponent of deconstruction that she is most visible” (12-13). Lazarus frames his book as remedying a lack, as he perceives it, of “any credible or legitimated Marxist position within the field of postcolonial studies” (12). As disturbing as the desire for legitimation, and thus for “legitimate” intellectual filiation and affiliation, is, one could, in the context of contemporary academic politics, not easily object to such a project. Yet, when establishing the presence of the (highly contestable) lack perceived by Lazarus involves an assessment of another Marxist scholar’s work in terms of visibility in an academic field instead of her substantive contribution, one cannot help asking whether the meager gains to be had from the multiplied qualifications (“more of a”; “pointedly”; “for the most part”; “most”) justify his exertions.

     

    3. Spivak had considered the title Return of the Native Informant (“Ghostwriting” 84). Another title in play was An Unfashionable Grammatology (Spivak Reader 287).

     

    4. In White Mythologies, Robert Young describes Spivak’s relation to conventions of positioning and oppositionality: “Instead of staking out a single recognizable position, gradually refined and developed over the years, she has produced a series of essays that move restlessly across the spectrum of contemporary theoretical and political concerns, rejecting none of them according to the protocols of an oppositional mode, but rather questioning, reworking and reinflecting them in a particularly productive and disturbing way…. Spivak’s work offers no position as such that can be quickly summarized…. To read her work is not so much to confront a system as to encounter a series of events” (157). Young contrasts Spivak’s attendant “taking ‘the investigator’s complicity into account’” with Edward Said’s “oppositional criticism,” his “very limited model of a detached, oppositional critical consciousness” (169, 173; the embedded quotation is in Critique 244).

     

    5. In his introduction to the recent issue of PMLA on “Ethics and Literary Study,” Lawrence Buell, who puts Spivak under the heading of those addressing “the issue of whether discourse can yield truthful or reliable representation,” merely allegorizes his own incomprehension that Spivak’s concern with ethics and reading amounts to more than a problematization of knowing when he paraphrases her “paradoxical assertion that ‘ethics is the experience of the impossible’: an ethical representation of subalternity must proceed in the awareness that (mutual) understanding will be limited’” (10). Like Buell, Neil Lazarus fixes on ideas of truth and knowing when, in a curious miming of his accusation of “one-sided[ness],” he ignores the link Spivak explores between reading and the ethical: “The central problem with Spivak’s theorization of subalternity is that in its relentless and one-sided focus on the problematics of representation as reading, it contrives to displace or endlessly defer the epistemological question–that concerning truth” (114).

     

    6. We can compare this move to that of Kwame Nkrumah, who transgresses Kant’s proscription of “anthropology” to make “the traditional African standpoint” the starting point for ethics rather than beginning with a “philosophical idea of the nature of man” (97). The difference would be that, by preserving the moment of foreclosure in Kant–one that is indeed “anthropological”–Spivak takes precautions to avoid the mere substitution of perspective that characterizes and sets the limits of nativism.

     

    7. On the “im,” Spivak directs us to “A Literary Representation of the Subaltern,” where it relates to a rhetorical question (Other Worlds 263).

     

    8. See Keenan, Attridge. The principal source texts would be Derrida, “Psyche,” and Levinas 99-129.

     

    9. On ethicity in de Man, see Miller 41-59, Hamacher 184ff.

     

    10. In “Finding Feminist Readings: Dante-Yeats,” thinking the feminist reader and her position is Spivak’s occasion for distinguishing between deconstruction in a narrow and general sense: “Within a shifting and abyssal frame, these [minimal] idealizations [of a work being ‘about something’] are the ‘material’ to which we as readers, with our own elusive historico-politico-economico-sexual determinations, bring the machinery of our reading and, yes, judgement” (Other Worlds 15).

     

    11. Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?: Speculations on Widow-Sacrifice”; “Can the Subaltern Speak?”

     

    12. Like Socrates in Plato’s Apology (414), Spivak refers to herself as a “gadfly” (244). On eironeia, see Derrida, Gift (76), and, on irony and the question, Derrida and Dufourmantelle (11-19). I offer these notes toward an account of Spivak’s trajectory of irony as a hopeful corrective to Terry Eagleton’s trivializing remark, in his review of Critique, that “[Spivak’s] work’s rather tiresome habit of self-theatricalising and self-alluding is the colonial’s ironic self-performance, a satirical stab at scholarly impersonality, and a familiar American cult of personality” (6).

     

    13. See Young, Review 235ff.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Arnott, Jill. “French Feminism in a South African Frame?: Gayatri Spivak and the Problem of Representation in South African Feminism.” South African Feminisms: Writing, Theory, and Criticism, 1990-1994. Ed. M.J. Daymond. New York: Garland, 1996. 77-89.
    • Attridge, Derek. “Innovation, Literature, Ethics: Relating to the Other.” PMLA 114.1 (1999): 20-31.
    • Buell, Lawrence. “Introduction: In Pursuit of Ethics.” PMLA 114.1 (1999): 7-19.
    • De Man, Paul. Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust. New Haven: Yale UP, 1979.
    • Derrida, Jacques. The Gift of Death. Trans. David Wills. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1995.
    • —. “Psyche: Inventions of the Other.” Trans. Catherine Porter. Waters and Godzich 25-65.
    • Derrida, Jacques and Anne Dufourmantelle. De l’hospitalité. Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1997.
    • Eagleton, Terry. “In the Gaudy Supermarket.” London Review of Books. 13 May 1999: 3, 5-6.
    • Hamacher, Werner. “LECTIO: de Man’s Imperative.” Trans. Susan Bernstein. Waters and Godzich 171-201.
    • Keenan, Thomas. Fables of Responsibility: Aberrations and Predicaments in Ethics and Politics. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1997.
    • Lazarus, Neil. Nationalism and Cultural Practice in the Postcolonial World. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999.
    • Levinas, Emmanuel. Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. Trans. Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh: Duquesne UP, 1998.
    • Miller, J. Hillis. The Ethics of Reading: Kant, de Man, Eliot, Trollope, James, and Benjamin. New York: Columbia UP, 1987.
    • Nkrumah, Kwame. Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for De-Colonization. Revised ed. New York: Monthly Review P, 1970.
    • Plato. Apology. The Dialogues of Plato. Trans. B. Jowett. 2 Vols. New York: Random House, 1937. Vol.1. 401-423.
    • Shelley, Percy Bysshe. “A Defence of Poetry; or Remarks Suggested by an Essay Entitled ‘The Four Ages of Poetry.’” Shelley’s Poetry and Prose. Ed. Donald Reiman and Sharon B. Powers. New York: Norton, 1977. 480-508.
    • Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. “Can the Subaltern Speak?” Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture. Ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg. Urbana: U of Illinois P, 1988. 271-313.
    • —. “Can the Subaltern Speak?: Speculations on Widow-Sacrifice.” Wedge 7/8 (1985): 120-130.
    • —. “Ghostwriting.” diacritics 25.2 (1995): 65-84.
    • —. In Other Worlds: Essays in Cultural Politics. London: Methuen, 1987.
    • —. Outside in the Teaching Machine. New York: Routledge, 1993.
    • —. The Spivak Reader: Selected Works of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Ed. Donna Landry and Gerald MacLean. New York: Routledge, 1996.
    • Waters, Lindsay and Wlad Godzich, eds. Reading de Man Reading. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1989.
    • Young, Robert. Review of Outside in the Teaching Machine by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Textual Practice 10.1 (1996): 228-238.
    • —. White Mythologies: Writing History and the West. London: Routledge, 1990.
  • Contesting Globalisms: The Transnationalization of U.S. Cultural Studies

    Claudia Sadowski-Smith

    Department of American Thought and Language
    Michigan State University
    cssmith@msu.edu

     

    Fredric Jameson and Masao Miyoshi, eds. The Cultures of Globalization. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1998.

     

    Lisa Lowe and David Lloyd, eds. The Politics of Culture in the Shadow of Capital.Durham, NC: Duke UP, 1997.

     

    Duke University Press’s recent publication of two cultural studies volumes on globalization plays out an interesting paradox. While both collections signal the need to study the role of culture in a world characterized by geopolitical re-alignments, they approach these changes by expanding available postcolonial, ethnic studies, and Neo-Marxist perspectives into transnational space. This review puts the two volumes into conversation to argue that a globalism which increasingly refuses to be simply colonialism/imperialism in a new guise calls for a rethinking of binaries and underlying assumptions that have routinely shaped this scholarship.

     

    Fredric Jameson and Masao Miyoshi’s collection, The Cultures of Globalization (henceforth Cultures), and Lisa Lowe and David Lloyd’s volume, The Politics of Culture in the Shadow of Capital (henceforth Politics), contribute to the burgeoning field of U.S. cultural work on globalization, which has lagged somewhat behind comparable discourses in economics, political science, and sociology. The two volumes set out to explore cultural dimensions of what they variously term “globalization” or “transnationalism.” To name a few of its most salient developments, globalization is characterized by flexible accumulation and mixed production, the worldwide expansion of free market politics, the spread of U.S. mass culture, and the denationalization of corporations and nation-states in the context of intensified border crossings by culture, capital, and people. In this understanding of globalization, the two volumes follow Immanuel Wallerstein’s thesis of the world-system as a global capitalist economy and/or restrict their inquiries to the last decade of this century. Both collections also acknowledge the weakening ability of nation-states to perpetually reinforce nationalist discourses intended to forge what Benedict Anderson has termed “imagined communities,” even as their state apparatuses continue to facilitate the ongoing transnationalization of capital. Building upon this important distinction between state nationalism and statehood, Cultures and Politics set out to theorize “transnational imagined communities.” These are not so much anti-nationalist in direction but rather pose alternatives to globalizing developments which have been characterized by unevenness and inequality since the beginning of modernity.

     

    Grounded predominantly in U.S. literature departments, the editors of the two volumes recognize that cultural work on globalization ought to question the modernist division of knowledge production rather than constitute a new field of academic specialization. Perhaps as a result of the injunction to be more inclusive, the collections stand out from other works for their sheer length (393 and 593 pages respectively). Many of the contributors to Lowe’s anthology work in ethnic, area, and women’s studies as well as in interdisciplinary humanities programs, while Jameson’s book additionally includes essays from sociology, philosophy, geography, and anthropology as well as articles from culture workers not located within the academy.

     

    Cultures assembles original papers that were first presented at Duke’s 1994 Globalization and Culture conference and subsequently revised to facilitate an internal conversation among the contributors. This process as well as the inclusion of revised critical comments from the audience at the end of the collection are among the volume’s principal strengths and may also explain the time lag between the original date of the conference and the collection’s eventual appearance in 1998. In contrast, several of the articles in Lowe’s volume, which appeared a year earlier, are reprints from other publications. Judging by the endnotes of several essays, the remaining original contributions were first presented at the 1994 Other Circuits colloquium, which was sponsored by the University of California at Irvine.

     

    Apart from two exceptions about which I will say more shortly, both Cultures and Politics are similarly organized: they articulate a “Critique of Modernity” and explore “Alternatives” to the current conditions of globalization by focusing on Third-World localities. Regarding globalization as a form of U.S.-dominated neo-colonialism, specifically as an outgrowth and continuation of European colonialism, several essays articulate alternative conceptions of modernity. Others complicate the academy’s generally critical attitude toward nationalist projects. Fredric Jameson and Greeta Kapur in Cultures characterize the nation-state as a useful political structure for protecting its citizens from some of the consequences of globalization, and David Lloyd in Politics emphasizes the radical potential of insurgent nationalisms which lies in their general closeness to other, often more radical social movements.

     

    Following a general trend in cultural studies, both volumes do less to explore cultural productions than to theorize modes of resistance, in this case, resistance to hegemonic forms of capitalist globalization. Focusing on local adjustments to globalization that have the potential to become transnational, contributors to Cultures and Politics significantly overlap in the kinds of localities they explore. They converge specifically in their focus on the by now relatively familiar territories of Latin America and India, and, perhaps more surprisingly, on South Korea and China. But even though the two collections initiate their projects of transnational “imagined-community-building” from the same Third-World locations, they do so from different theoretical entry points.

     

    Jameson’s collection attempts, in the words of two conference co-organizers, to “develop a theory from/of the third world” (Mignolo 51, original italics) as “a counterhegemonic response to globalization” (Moreiras 90). To this end, Cultures sets itself explicitly within Wallerstein’s model of economic history. This model views globalization as the latest phase in the development of a capitalist world-system which originated in Europe and spread across the globe by the late 19th-century as a result of European colonialism. During its expansion, this system created centers and peripheral areas, which are generally identified with First and Third Worlds. In its emphasis on colonialism and in its investigation of peripheralized areas, Wallerstein’s model intersects with postcolonial theory so that contributors to Cultures also engage the work of well-known postcolonial thinkers such as Bhabha, Said, Hall, and Spivak. Chungmoo Choi’s and Paik Nak-chung’s contributions on South Korea are, however, instructive of the different emphases on postcolonial theory within the two volumes: While Choi in Politics relies heavily on such work to define South Korea’s “deferred postcoloniality” (471) as a consequence of its colonization by Japan and more recently the U.S. (which created conditions of internal displacement and external dependence), Nak-chung takes South Korea’s peripheral status for granted. He instead stresses that Korea’s projected reunification and its ongoing national literature debate might forge models for more innovative state structures and for a new understanding of world literature.

     

    Cultures‘ last subheading, “Consumerism and Ideology,” makes explicit the volume’s emphasis on ideologies of consumption as the most likely sites from which alternative, often transnationally structured, anti-globalization projects could arise. Leslie Sklair’s essay posits that “anticapitalist global system movements” could “challenge the TNCs [transnational corporations] in the economic sphere, oppose the transnational capitalist class and its local affiliates in the political sphere, and promote cultures and ideologies antagonistic to capitalist consumerism” (296). Alberto Moreiras’s and Manthia Diawara’s contributions specify examples of such an “exteriority to the global” (Moreiras 95). Moreiras identifies a new type of Latin-Americanist thinking which can preserve as well as constitute a regionalized Latin American identity, and Diawara emphasizes a West African identity whose political and cultural similarities are grounded in comparable histories and patterns of consumption, such as African markets.

     

    Rather than consumerism, Lowe’s collection highlights cultural struggles as sites from which the reproduction of global capitalism can be contested. Contributors to Politics specifically challenge what they identify as the neo-Marxist notion of an “outside” to global capitalism; Dipesh Chakrabarty’s essay, for example, sets out to transform this concept into a more heterogeneous site of intervention, into “something that straddles a border zone of temporality… something that also always reminds us that other temporalities, other forms of worlding, coexist and are possible” (57). In her introduction, Lowe similarly replaces the search for an “outside,” which, she argues, tends to subsume the cultural under the economic, with a recognition of cultural sites that arise “historically, in contestation, and ‘in difference’ to it” (Lowe 2).

     

    Somewhat crudely put, then, if Jameson’s collection represents the transnationalization of theories foregrounding “class” as a fundamental dynamic of social change, Lowe’s volume illustrates the transnationalization of “race.” In his contribution, her co-editor David Lloyd argues that Wallerstein’s approach to globalization needs to be complicated by theories of “vertical” integration “revolving around the term racism” (176). In general, contributors to Lowe’s collection provide the kind of focus on gender and race that is somewhat missing from Jameson’s anthology. Perhaps also in reaction to similar critiques by conference participants articulated at the end of the volume, Jameson concedes in the introduction that his collection does not include essays on “the conflicted strategies of feminism in the new world-system…; or the politics of AIDS on a worldwide scale; the relationship between globalization and identity politics, or ethnicity, or religious fundamentalism” (xvi). If they make reference to “race”-based analyses at all, contributors tend to characterize ideas of cultural difference as “more traditional” and in need of materialist analysis (Jameson 70-71). Readers are left to conclude the need for work such as Lowe’s collection, which she characterizes as a feminist, antiracist revision of both Marxist and neo-Marxist work.

     

    Their different approaches to globalization also affect the types of alternatives the two volumes eventually develop. Whereas Jameson’s volume emphasizes transnational theories “beyond the level of the nation-state” (Sklair 296) that stress consumerism as the main site of intervention, Politics focuses on cultural “linkings of localities that take place across and below the level of the nation-state” (Lowe 25, my emphases). “Class”- and “race”-based approaches to transnational community-building, then, articulate differently the ongoing breakdown of distinctions between the “global” and the “local” by identifying either entire regions or more local geographies as transnational sites of contestation. Noam Chomsky’s contribution to Jameson’s volume illustrates the neo-Marxist emphasis on regionalization (the formation of various supra-national regions that are marked by unequal relationships with each other) within the global world-system. He argues that the U.S., Western Europe, and Japan have been able to maintain their hegemonic positions, largely gained as a result of colonialist undertakings, by instituting various forms of market protectionism for their own economies. At the same time that they thus undermine official ideologies of capitalist modernization, these countries, however, relentlessly subject other nations in the periphery to the doctrines of free trade, thereby weakening their state apparatuses and ensuring their continuing subalternization. Alternative globalisms, in this model, may take the form of transnational struggles within or across various subalternized regions, and linkages between regions would emerge from the similarities of their peripheral positions.

     

    Focusing on the feminization and third-worldization of labor by transnational corporations, Aihwa Ong’s contribution to Politics, in contrast, privileges transnationally-connected, but more localized forms of intervention. She understands the local-global re-configuration of capital to require an exploration of how globalization effects the constitution of localized subaltern identities. Critiquing Wallerstein’s model for its notion of a homogeneous periphery, Ong emphasizes that the TNC workforce in the Third-World countries of Mexico and Asia is engaged in heterogeneous work situations. Rather than desiring to challenge the industrial system in terms of a common class consciousness, Ong argues that TNC workers envision change in the form of improved selfhood. She therefore suggests re-conceiving TNC “workers’ experiences as cultural struggles” (86).

     

    In addition to Ong’s emphasis on connections between subaltern struggles in various re-colonized locations, in Politics‘s sub-section “Unlikely Coalitions” Lowe identifies cross-nation, cross-race cultural practices of Third-World communities in the U.S. and Britain as further sites of contestation. In my opinion, this section constitutes one of the most valuable contributions to transnational cultural studies because it keeps transnational work “at home” and anchored in the problems of racialized groups in the First World (i.e., those below the level of the nation-state). Intended as a rethinking of relationships between African Americans and Japanese (Americans), George Lipsitz’s article on African American soldiers joining the Japanese army during the Asia Pacific War actually ends up illustrating that racialization by a common enemy alone cannot constitute a productive basis for transnational affiliation. Intending to show similarities in the position of African Americans and Japanese vis-a-vis imperialistic undertakings by the U.S., Lipsitz indirectly lists as many reasons why Black Americans should not have supported the Japanese struggle against the U.S. Other contributors to Lowe’s volume, however, point out that meaningful forms of solidarity need to combine struggles against racialization with materialist struggles against the ongoing restructuring of global capitalism.

     

    As both Lowe and Ong argue, this restructuring similarly effects the proletarianization of women of color and the exploitation of women in the Third World. In her interview with Lowe, Angela Y. Davis thus envisions a Third-World feminism that bases its cross-ethnic community-making on politics, rather than on the specific identities of racialized communities and their members. Clara Connolly and Pragna Patel’s essay on the British organization “Women Against Fundamentalism” (WAF) puts Davis’s admonition into practice. This organization’s conception of political activism moves beyond U.S. notions of cross-racial solidarity, which have predominantly been based on the similarities of cultural nationalist struggles and the “internal colony” model. WAF unites Black and South Asian Britons in their feminist struggles against both the racism of the British state and the patriarchal control of women’s minds and bodies that is central to religious fundamentalism in their home communities. These struggles also call for the recognition of shifting subjectivities–for example, the acknowledgement that members of an ethnic/national minority can simultaneously be oppressed in Britain and be oppressors in their home countries.

     

    Even though neo-Marxist and “race”-based cultural studies approaches thus differ with respect to their theoretical entry points into alternatives to globalization, Jameson’s and Lowe’s collections end up providing many of the same insights into the workings of global capitalism. The charges against Neo-Marxism–that its expectations of a Third-World supra-regional community-building based on class consciousness have not come true–can be similarly levelled at “race”-based models. Solidarities among interconnected re-colonized localities or cross-race, cross-nation “unlikely coalitions” have hitherto also not been able to seriously challenge the modes of global expansion. Most importantly, in their insistence on seeing U.S.-dominated globalization exclusively as an outgrowth of European colonization, the two volumes’ approaches to transnationalism reify well-entrenched First World-Third World, colonizer-colonized binaries. The increasingly more permeable global-local nexus is recast in other dichotomous terms, where the First World becomes identified with the global and the Third World (or Third-World communities in the First World) with the regional or local. While Manthia Diawara in Jameson’s volume, for example, theorizes a supra-regional West African identity that can resist the global homogenization of cultures by emphasizing regionally-specific, pre-capitalist forms of consumption, contributors to Lowe’s collection similarly emphasize the transformative potential of “pre-modern” ethnic groups, peasants, and indigenous farmers in Latin America and the Phillipines.

     

    The fact that cultural studies scholarship has already problematized First World-Third World dichotomies by recognizing the heterogeneity of peripheries is manifest in the inclusion of countries colonized by other than European powers, such as South Korea, into both Jameson’s and Lowe’s anthologies. But at the same time that the “postcolonial” has thus become more diverse, the First World continues to be portrayed as a rather homogeneous entity, except for the recognition of Third-World (immigrant) communities within it. This view does not, for example, acknowledge various forms of European colonialization, such as the subjugation of socialist countries by the USSR after 1945 or the ongoing colonization of Eastern by Western Europe since the late 1980s. The revolutions in Eastern Europe have opened to global capitalism previously unavailable areas toward which paradigms of “democratization” and “modernization,” hitherto predominantly pushed onto Third-World countries, continue to be directed. As a result, the territory of Eastern Europe is currently being subalternized by the politics of the IMF and partial promises of inclusion into First-World organizations like NATO and the European Union.

     

    The mere expansion of cultural studies’ dualistic frameworks, however, has created the perception that the former Eastern Bloc has disappeared into either the Third or First World (see, for example, Chomsky and Hetata in Cultures). This reification of old binaries that define Second and Third Worlds only in relation to First World centers rather than to each other misses an opportunity to deconstruct both East-West and North-South dichotomies. Their interrelationship originated in decolonization and post-Second World War contexts and is currently taking on new forms. A decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall, which prefigured dramatic geopolitical changes in the countries of the former “Evil Empire,” a U.S.-dominated NATO bombed Yugoslavia to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosova at the same time that it continued its airstrikes against Iraq. Viewed from this perspective, Operation “Allied Force” against Yugoslavia indicated the further multiplication of “security threats” to a U.S. national interest that has been continuously redefined since the end of the Cold War. The Balkans have joined the Middle East as another key region of U.S. interest (and have thus become, as some have called it, a “New Berlin”). At the same time, so-called former communists-turned-fascists have joined “Middle Eastern terrorists” on the list of major enemies of the U.S.

     

    After the simultaneous April 1999 bombings, even mainstream news media such as CNN have begun to link the two sites with each other. Serbians have reportedly visited Iraq to learn how to defend themselves more effectively against U.S.-led NATO airstrikes, and Iraq has declared its support for Yugoslavia. This more than “unlikely coalition” is not grounded in similarities of culture or religion, and seems especially surprising since it involves an Arab country supporting the Serb suppression of predominantly Muslim Kosovars. The strongest link between the two nation-states seems to be the “punishment” they have received from a U.S.-dominated NATO for undertaking (in many other countries and contexts perfectly “acceptable”) nationalist empire-building and state-maintaining projects.

     

    The emergence of an admittedly very tenuous “cross-nation” coalition between Iraq and Yugoslavia manifests attempts to counterbalance the disproportionate influence of the U.S. on world politics, culture, and economics, but obviously does not constitute a positive course of action. Nevertheless, much remains to be said in cultural studies about the ways in which both nations have been economically, politically, and culturally peripheralized. It is precisely the regions of Eastern Europe and the Middle East that have gotten little or no attention in Jameson’s and Lowe’s volumes, other than in Homo Hoodfar’s article about Iranian practices of veiling in Politics, and in Sherif Hetata’s re-definition of the Middle East as part of the exploited “south” within a new north/south global division. Since the subalternization of the Middle East and the Balkans has been part and parcel of intensified globalization in the 1990s, the neglect of these two areas in cultural studies cannot be explained as a case of theory lagging behind the speed and subtlety with which geopolitical changes in these two regions have taken place.

     

    Often cast in terms of clashes over religious or ethnic differences, conflicts there have, however, been integrated into public debates about the future of U.S. “multiculturalism.” Generally, events in the Middle East and the Balkans are increasingly invoked (but not sufficiently theorized) to illustrate the evils of what Benjamin Barber has called “Jihad” or what has, more recently, been termed “Balkanization” if the U.S. continues on its path of “diversity.” As Sherif Hetata writes in Cultures with respect to religious fundamentalism in the Middle East and what he calls “ethnic and racial revivals” in Eastern Europe, these “have not seemed to have excited the interest of scholars in the arts and literature, in the humanities, or in gender studies” (182). What I am arguing, along slightly different lines, is that cultural studies models of globalization need to explore new forms and instances of “nonglobalism” that have emerged in these regions. These respond to a very complex web of U.S.-dominated forms of globalization of which the perpetuation of (European) colonialism is only one trajectory.

     

  • Friedrich Kittler’s Media Scenes–An Instruction Manual

     

    Marcel O’Gorman

    Director
    Foreign Language Instructional Technology Environment
    Tulane University
    ogorman@tcs.tulane.edu

     

    Friedrich Kittler, Literature, Media, Information Systems: Essays.Amsterdam: G+B Arts, 1997.

     

    Brigadier Whitehead, a veteran of World War II, is taping his heroic adventures at the “Battle of Palermo” on a reel-to-reel, portable tape recorder. Roving about the cluttered room, he speaks animatedly into the microphone, which is plugged into the recorder by a long wire. “As you can hear, gentlemen,” the Brigadier announces portentously, “the zero hour is approaching. Invasion is imminent. We must counter-attack right away.”

     

    Six antique phonographs, arranged in two rows, trumpet out the sound-effects of a massive artillery barrage, which the Brigadier orchestrates by running from one record player to another, extending his microphone to capture specific effects.

     

    Just arrived in Catalia when messenger drove up. I tore open dispatch. News was bad--I'd lost my battalion commander. I had to reach O Group. I grabbed the bike from the messenger, and rode off to headquarters. Suddenly, a grenade exploded. I jumped for cover.

     

    This theatrical recording session continues until a peculiar, undulating sound interrupts the narrative, enveloping the scene of virtual warfare in its electronic drone. In a blinding flash of light, Brigadier Whitehead is thrown to the floor, where he will be found lifeless, still clutching a phonograph record, his entire body bleached white by a murderous ray of light. The Brigadier is down, but the tape machine goes on recording….

     

    Thus we have, in John Steed’s words, “The swan song of one Brigadier Whitehead…. Officer, gentleman, deceased Brigadier Whitehead. He died as he lived in the thick of the battle, facing the enemy.”

     

    “An enemy without a face,” replies Emma Peel, with characteristic wit.

     

    At least, that’s how Steed and Peel sum up this perplexing scene. And puzzled viewers have to wait out the remainder of this Avengers episode to discover the enemy’s true identity. After replaying the tape recording of the scene–a cacophony of phonograph artillery drowned out by a mysterious drone–for countless suspects and experts, the following conclusion is reached about the murder weapon:

     

    Detective: “Sound of light amplification of stimulation of radiation.”

     

    Steed: “In a word, a laser beam”

     

    Peel: “A laser beam. Of course. It has a bleaching effect, and boils liquids.”

     

    Crawford: “Plus a very distinctive sound.”

     

    Peel: “Where are they used?”

     

    Detective: "All over the place: dentistry, communications, eye surgery..."

     

    and of course, they are used in military strategy; although such details were not yet public in 1967.

     

    Digital/laser technology is recorded in analog on Brigadier Whitehead’s outdated tape machine, and it is the “eye surgery” clue that eventually leads Steed and Peel to the ultimate villain, Dr. Primble, an ocular surgeon who sneaks about with a powerful laser gun strapped to the top of his “U.F.O.,” a chrome-colored sports car.

     

    Obviously, this scene has not been pulled from a bastion of the Western literary canon or from a great philosophical text. We are dealing here with a piece of pop-cultural trash, the detritus of a late-’60s Cold-War obsession with espionage, governmental conspiracy, and garishly fantastic technologies. And yet, there is still something “scholarly,” something theoretical, philosophical, even, in this scene, that invites further investigation. There is a certain intersection here of communications and warfare, information transmission and military strategy, media and artillery that permits us to view this scene as a node through which a network of discourses–historical, technological, political–all travel. I would go so far as to say that in this single scene, we might trace all the ingredients for a transdisciplinary project on the nature of media in a visual age–complete with ocular surgeon.

     

    At least that’s how I sum up the scene, investigating it through the critical magnifying glass of Friedrich Kittler’s theory and practice of criticism. Kittler’s recently published collection of essays entitled Literature, Media, Information Systems provides a wide-ranging demonstration of what his followers have known all along: “the intelligibility and consequent meaning of literary texts is always and only possible because its discourse is embedded in and operates as part of a specific discourse network” (Johnston 4). And yet, in the scene mentioned above, we are not dealing with a “literary text,” but with a television episode, specifically, an episode entitled “From Venus With Love” (1967) which belongs to the British spy series The Avengers. This all too prevalent distinction between “literary text” and “cultural detritus” moves to the background, however, when we realize that Kittler’s approach to criticism may be applied to any media scene whatsoever, from Goethe’s Faust to beograd.com, a Web site supporting Yugoslavia against NATO bombing. Of course, we must first determine what a “media scene” is exactly, and what bearing it has on literary criticism, cultural studies and the history of media. I hope to answer these questions here, through a simultaneous review of Kittler’s book and an instruction manual on how to program a project in/on the discourse network of 2000.

     

    “Gramophone, Film, Typewriter”

     

    Step 1: Begin your project by describing a single situation, scene or image in which communications technologies play a crucial, or at least conspicuous, role. This will serve as the media scene for your entire project.

     

    Faust looks up from his book of magic ideograms and sighs, “Ach!1 Stoker’s Mina Harker transcribes the sounds of a phonograph on her typewriter. Guy de Maupassant’s doppelganger joins him at his writing desk. Whether they be fictional or historical (is there a difference in this case?), these scenes or situations are the crux of Kittler’s work, the points of intersection from which he draws his transdisciplinary theses on the materiality of media. “Gramophone, Film, Typewriter,” then, in book or essay form, is “a story woven from such stories. It collects, comments on and engages positions and texts, in which the newness of technical media has inscribed itself in outmoded book pages” (29).2 Since “outmoded book pages” are the subject of Kittler’s essays, we are not dealing, here, with scenes such as Brigadier Whitehead’s anachronistic sound studio. We are dealing instead with the pages of Goethe, Hoffman, and Balzac, pages in which communications technologies, sometimes with extreme subtlety, play a determinant role. Kittler is, after all, a “literary critic,” as he asserts time and again, almost suspiciously, in his essay “There Is No Software.” And yet, his method of critique reaches far beyond the brackets of “literature,” channeling its way through contemporary culture, philosophy, history, engineering, cybernetics, and political science.

     

    Hence, a chapter that we might expect to be a media-oriented commentary on a collection of literary excerpts, turns out instead to be a wide-ranging examination of the materiality of media where references to Goethe, Hoffman and Balzac are casually dispersed among technically complex observations on contemporary culture and its digital toys. In “Gramophone, Film, Typewriter,” for example, in which we may trace a network of theses, the foremost may be the following: “the technological standard of today… can be described in terms of partially connected media systems” (32). The jumbo jet, according to Kittler, is a case in point, a scene of “partial connection” that contrasts with our current utopian dream of a seamless integration of media: virtual reality, television, music, the Web, etc., all delivered over fiber optic lines. On the jumbo jet,

     

    The crew is connected to radar screens, diode displays, radio beacons, and nonpublic channels.... The passengers' ears are listlessly hooked up to one-way earphones, which are themselves hooked up to tape recorders and thereby to the record industry.... Not to mention the technological medium of the food industry to which the mouths of the passengers are connected. (32)

     

    This is not the stuff of a literary critic who writes commentary on a “story” from Goethe or Hoffman. We are dealing here with contemporary cultural criticism, media criticism, even. Or are we?

     

    Although Kittler allows himself a certain quota of McLuhanesque scenarios, his strength lies in his literary-historical perspective. Once McLuhan has been exorcised, Kittler contrasts our “partially connected” multi-media spectacle with the “homogeneous medium of writing” (38), and hence, we are instantly transported, via Foucault,3 from the jumbo jet and the Kennedy/Nixon TV debate (a contest in “telegenics”), to Goethe’s lyrical observation that literature “is the fragment of fragments, the least of what had happened and of what had been spoken was written down; of what had been written down, only the smallest fraction was preserved” (36). For us, writing is merely one medium among many, but in the age of Goethe, “writing functioned as the general medium. For that reason, the term medium did not exist. For whatever else was going on dropped through the filter of letters or ideograms” (36). This is quite a contrast to an age of camcorders and personal Web pages, an age in which recording technology is so independent of the body that Brigadier Whiteheads and Timothy Learys can accurately document the very moment of their deaths.4

     

    In the discourse network of 1800, then, writing is the only transmission media of the Spirit, and in the case of handwriting, writing also documents the identity of the body. In an excerpt that Kittler draws from Botho Strauss’s Widmung, the hero is crushingly ashamed of his handwriting, an uneven scrawl in which “everything is emptied out…. The full man is shriveled, shrunk, and stunted into his scribbling. His lines are all that is left of him and his propagation” (qtd. in Kittler 38). This existential angst incited by poor calligraphy is possible because Strauss’s character is living in a time before gramophone, film, and typewriter. The depth of his shame “exists only as an anachronism” (38) in a world where self-propagation is available in multiple forms–forms in which the body’s trace is not so easily discernible, separated as it is by networks of circuits that translate all identity into a stream of 1s and 0s.

     

    As long as the written word, hand-written or printed, reigned as the one, homogeneous medium of communication, Romanticism was possible. In Goethe’s time, “all the passion of reading consisted of hallucinating a meaning between letters and lines” (40). But, according to Kittler, technical reproduction provided a physical precision that rendered this readerly hallucination obsolete. With the advent of technical reproduction, the hallucinatory power of reading, that infernal Romantic struggle between writer and reader, Word and Spirit, is resolved indefinitely. Readerly hallucination is materialized in ghostly daguerrotypes, phantasmic phonograph records, and spectral cinema–the soul captured in, and radically embodied by, new media.

     

    We thus have a fragmented history of typewriter, gramophone and film. But from where does this triad emanate? How do we justify this trinity of communications over other possible permutations, e.g., “Phonograph, Telegraph, Camera,” or “Spectroscope, Typewriter, Radio”? There is no possible justification, except to say that a comprehensive history of media is not Kittler’s intent here or anywhere. Nor would he believe that such a history is useful or even possible. His method directs him to a series of nodal points that shed light on informative media scenes, without claiming to illuminate the entire history of media.

     

    The scene, then, becomes the theory itself, and the justification for Kittler’s choice of triad can thus take the form of a single, super-saturated scene. This time, Edison is the hero, or anti-hero. The scene co-stars Christopher Latham Sholes, who pays a visit to Edison (the predestined arch-developer of cinema and phonograph) with his idea of a mass-producible typewriter. As it turns out, Edison politely refuses Sholes’s offer, and the typewriter becomes the property of Remington, an arms manufacturer. Hence, film, phonograph, and typewriter cross paths in a brief constellation that justifies–more properly, generates–Kittler’s triad. A story becomes theory, and the rest is history; it drops through the filter of Kittler’s letters and ideograms. Unlike Goethe, however, Kittler doesn’t sweat it.

     

    This type of historical snapshot, or sound bite, if you please, is typically Kittlerian, and it is left up to the reader to hallucinate a cohesive thesis out of these bits. It is as if Kittler himself were presenting his research materials anachronistically. He writes essays using a word processor when he would probably be more lucid in experimental film, or more appropriately, in hypertext or some other form of digital multi-media. Then perhaps, the move from a jumbo jet, to German Romanticism, to Edison, to Lacan, would be more sensible, especially since Turing’s Universal Discrete Machine is thrown into the mix. If “the age of media–as opposed to the history that ends it–moves in jerks, like Turing’s paper ribbon” (48), then maybe our age of media would best be represented in a medium that can embody its disconnective nature. Then again, Kittler’s unconventional style, a style that makes an anachronism of the conventional essay format, is living proof that “the content of each medium is another medium” (42). Kittler’s writing style seems to wriggle uncomfortably in its print-oriented skin. Is Kittler’s writing hypertextual then? He wouldn’t be the first, but we have yet to place him beside Mallarmé or Joyce. The scene of Kittler typing an (hypertextual) essay of historical/literary fragments with dated word processing software, remains to be written and unpacked.

     

    “Dracula’s Legacy”

     

    Step 2: In the media scene that you have chosen (see Step 1), describe the role of a particular communications technology.

     

    If conventional history stands for the end of “the age of media,” then Kittler’s “jerky” version of media history threatens to sustain “the age of media,” reanimate it. The age of media is an un-dead age, for as long as we remember that media always determine the message, we will be living in the “age of media.” Leave it to Kittler then, Vampire theorist, to seek out the trace of a technologically-determined discourse system in any given media scene, and rescue that scene from the shallow grave of history. This is how Kittler, as a media theorist, fulfills “Dracula’s Legacy.” What supernatural powers does Kittler possess that allow him to raise the dead, see the unseen? Where can the trace of technology be found? The secret power of the media theorist lies, quite simply, in the following apocryphal warning from Jacques Lacan to his students: “From now on you are, and to a far greater extent than you can imagine, subjects of gadgets or instruments–from microscopes to radio and television–which will become elements of your being.” Viewed through the lens of this prophesy, any scene becomes a media scene, even when technology is not conspicuously present. The media theorist’s mandate can thus be simplified to the extreme, with Kittlerian bluntness: “Media determine our situation, which (nevertheless or for that reason) merits a description” (28).

     

    It is with this supernatural power of vision that Kittler “implicitly rais[es] the question of the degree to which technology was always the impensé or blindspot of poststructuralism itself” (Johnston 8). Kittler takes for granted that the trace of technology is discernible in any text or scene. Although he would be reluctant to accept the title, Kittler is a master of writing the trace, which Gayatri Spivak has described as “the mark of the absence of a presence, an always already absent present, of the lack at the origin that is the condition of thought and experience” (xvi). It is one thing to proclaim the end of objectivity, the end of History and of Man, as poststructuralism has done, but quite another to make such a proclamation, accept it as an inherent element of writing, and invent ways to write that draw on this knowledge as an apriority. This is Kittler’s “post-hermeneutic”5 method (Wellbery ix). When Kittler writes media history, he does so with all the tools of poststructuralism at his disposal. Unlike many other theorists, however, he does not display the tools, or wield them about flagrantly;6 they are simply a part of his philosophical arsenal, the gears that grind away in the engine of his most apt reflections on media and culture. We can say, therefore, that Kittler does not write about the trace–he writes the trace itself. He does not write about the absence of media theory in poststructuralism–he writes the absence of media theory into poststructuralism.

     

    What strikes Kittler most poignantly, then, about the multiple film adaptations of Dracula is not that this techno-sustained legacy has allowed for “ever new and imaginary resurrections” of Stoker’s famous villain, but the fact that in none of these film adaptations do we catch a glimpse of the phonograph or typewriter that are so crucial in the novel. The role of transmission played by these devices in the novel is swallowed up by the movie projector’s ability to turn words into things, to merge human and machine. Or in Kittler’s terms, “under the conditions of technology, literature disappears (like metaphysics for Heidegger) into the un-death of its endless ending” (83). It is up to the media theorist, then, to trace the presence of literature in the discourse of technology, and vice versa. Matthew Griffin sums up this Kittlerian task quite well by stating that “Literature, which was once the realm of dissident voices swelling in a babble of languages, can now be rewritten as an effect of media technologies on the alphanumeric code” (Griffin, Literary 715).

     

    What role, exactly, do the gramophone and typewriter play in Stoker’s novel? According to Kittler (via Lacan), they demonstrate quite simply the extent to which “we are subject to gadgets or instruments” that have “become elements of our being” (143). For example, the typewriter, according to Kittler, so ingrained itself in the social evolution of Western Europe, that it radically and permanently altered gender roles:

     

    Machines remove from the two sexes the symbols that distinguish them. In earlier times, needles created woven material in the hands of women, and quills in the hands of authors created another form of weaving called text. Women who gladly became the paper for these scriptorial quills were called mothers. Women who preferred to speak themselves were called overly sensitive or hysterical. But after the symbol of male productivity was replaced by a machine, and this machine was taken over by women, the production of texts had to forfeit its wonderful heterosexuality. (71)

     

    The machine in question here is, of course, the typewriter. Paraphrasing Bruce Bliven,7Kittler observes that

     

    the typewriter, and only the typewriter, is responsible for a bureaucratic revolution. Men may have continued, from behind their desks, to believe in the omnipotence of their own thought, but the real power over keys and impressions on paper, over the flow of news and over agendas, fell to the women who sat in the front office. (64)

     

    Here, we are tantalized with the image of a cyborg woman, a woman de-sexed and empowered by a writing machine with which she is unified. We must be careful to avoid this illusion, however, since Kittler, unlike McLuhan, does not see the machine as an extension of man (or woman), but quite the opposite. And so, the female typists who write faster than most anyone can read or think are only transmission devices, extensions or reflections of the machine,8 word processors avant la lettre. They have no conscious influence on the news and agendas that they channel. This is in keeping with Kittler’s most poignant anti-McLuhanism: “it remains an impossibility to understand media…. The communications technologies of the day exercise remote control over all understanding and evoke its illusion” (30).

     

    This gender-bending or seeming cyborgism, this cultural upheaval that occurs at the hand of the typewriter, is inscribed in Stoker’s Dracula. In the concluding scene, Mina Harker “holds a child in the lap that for 300 pages held a typewriter” (70). The classical-romantic binary of femininity is interrupted by a technological variable. From now on, a woman cannot be slotted easily into the MOTHER/HYSTERIC construction, but can also fall into a third category: MACHINE. With this third term in place, the binary or even triad model is shattered. From now on, anything is possible within the circuit of female identity. Or to use Kittler’s words, “far worse things are possible,” as is proven with the case of Lucy Westenra, anti-mother, a vampiress who sucks the blood of children for sustenance (70).

     

    “Romanticism–Psychoanalysis–Film: A History of the Double”

     

    Step 3: Demonstrate that the media scene you have chosen is determined by the specific historical, technological or scientific conditions of the time in which it was created.

     

    At the center of Kittler’s collection of essays, we move from monsters to Münsterberg, a transition that gives us a more profound glimpse at Kittler’s understanding of cinema. If the Dracula films demonstrate the ability of the cinema to liquidate the soul of classical Romantic literature, this is because film can depict in moving pictures what literature could only describe in words, “and other storage media besides words did not exist in the days of classical Romanticism” (89). Through his brief “History of the Double,” Kittler demonstrates the extent to which film acts as a simulacrum of the human psyche, the poetic Spirit materialized in 24 frames/second. The doppelganger theme of 1800–a subject so prevalent in German Romanticism that Otto Rank could supply Freud with endless literary case studies of Narcissism–becomes a mere camera trick in 1900. But the camera’s trickiness, as we shall see, does not stop at the simulation of neuroses.

     

    The hero of “A History of the Double,” rather appropriately, is Hugo Münsterberg, founder of a crossbred science known as psychotechnology and producer of the “first competent theory of film”–at least according to Kittler’s formula. Münsterberg is essential to the history of media, Kittler suggests, because he “assigns every single camera technique to an unconscious, psychical mechanism: the close-up to selective attention, the flashback to involuntary memory, the film trick to daydreaming, and so forth” (100). And this allows Kittler to make the following periodic distinction on the cusp of which the Spirit of literature dissolves into mechanical technics:

     

    Since 1895, a separation exists between an image-less cult of the printed word, i.e., e[lite]-literature, on one side, and purely technical media that, like the train or film, mechanize images on the other. Literature no longer even attempts to compete with the miracles of the entertainment industry. It hands its enchanted mirror over to machines.(92)

     

    Hence, in a familiar theoretical trick of displacement, the psyche is replaced by a machine, the central nervous system by a network of communications devices.

     

    What is most interesting about this chapter, however, is not Münsterberg’s theory (it has been covered more extensively in other studies), not Kittler’s formula itself (the cyborgian theme now verges on cliché9), and not the unfashionable periodic distinction (a separation that generated enemies for Kittler’s Discourse Networks 1800/190010); what is most interesting is the manner by which Kittler arrives at his resolute distinction between pre- and post-1895. What might appear, at first glance, as some sort of techno-deterministic formula of history is actually a far-reaching and complex theory on culture and media. The most fascinating and important element of Kittler’s work is his ability to recognize and describe the intricacy of literary and cultural phenomena, and still manage to capture this complexity in a single image. Rather than provide a technical genealogy of film, then, or a historical narrative of its invention, Kittler lays out specific historical/technological conditions that make motion pictures possible, beginning with the period that immediately preceded film, in which the technology was not possible. And he does so by a trick of condensation, encapsulating an entire theory, a viable history of media, in the image of the Double.

     

    Hence, when Kittler refers to the fictional Doubles of Goethe and Fichte, Jean Paul and Hoffman (all members of Otto Rank’s Doppelganger collection), he does not stop at the uncanniness of this collective obsession with duality. He probes further into the texts in search of a common thread, a collective media scene that runs through their work and intersects with the discourse network of 1800. Naturally, he finds the trace that he is looking for, “namely, the simple textual evidence that Doubles turn up at writing desks” (87). This common denominator allows Kittler to connect the doppelganger phenomenon with writing technologies, which, in turn, opens up his study to a wider cultural phenomenon: “the general literacy campaign that seized Central Europe in [the nineteenth century]. Ever since then, people no longer experience words as violent and foreign bodies but can also believe that the printed words belong to them. Lacan called it ‘alphabêtise’” (91). Of course, Kittler mentions this campaign of a bureaucratic machine only to document its undoing at the hands of a different sort of machine, the “two-pronged” machine of film and psychoanalysis that brought the nineteenth century to a close. When the twentieth century begins, “books no longer behave as though words were harmless vehicles supplying our inner being with optical hallucinations, and especially not with the delusion that there is an inner being or a self. Along with the true, the beautiful and the good, the Double vanishes as well” (91). The nineteenth century literary fascination with the Double is brought to an end by film tricks and Freud.

     

    Kittler complexifies his media histories,11 then, by underscoring the fact that cultural phenomena are made possible by the chance encounter of various events or cataclysms, by the fortuitous meeting of disparate elements–umbrellas and sewing machines on operating tables. This is why Münsterberg is so important to him, for he was able to make the link between psychoanalysis and film, and it is these elements that bifurcate 1800 and 1900, bringing an end to Literature:

     

    The empirical-transcendental doublet Man, substratum of the Romantic fantastic, is only imploded by the two-pronged attack of science and industry, of psychoanalysis and film. Psychoanalysis clinically verified and cinema technically implemented all of the shadows and mirrorings of the subject. Ever since then, what remains of a literature that wants to be Literature is simply écriture--a writing without author. And no one can read Doubles, that is, a means to identification, into the printed word. (95)

     

    If this cut and dry equation were presented by Kittler out of hand, then it would certainly seem absurd. But the formula was not arrived at in any simple manner. On the way to this proposition, Kittler has taken us through two centuries of literature in France, England, and Germany, through optics, cybernetics, cinematography, transportation, psychoanalysis, and political science. And this list barely scratches the surface. It seems that the final equation or formula is not what really counts here, for it serves only to demonstrate the complexity of the discourse network that makes possible a single literary phenomenon of 1800, and its undoing by science and technology. Don’t be fooled; this is not an essay about the Double at all; it is a transdisciplinary journey, a careful and selective history on the interface of film and literature.

     

    The Double, then, is a sort of vehicle, or better yet, a portal through which Goethe and Fichte, Jean Paul and Hoffman, Guy de Maupassant and Baudelaire, cross paths with Otto Rank and Freud, Lacan and Foucault, and a legacy of doppelganger film-makers, including Ewers, Lindau, Hauptmann, Wegener, and Wiene. By devising a formula about the simultaneous demise of Literature and the Double, Kittler creates a story and a theory where there are none, leaving behind a distinctive trace (“the mark of the absence of a presence” [Spivak xx]) that we can only call one history of media technology among many–the rest drops “through the filter” of Kittler’s “letters or ideograms” (36). At the end of the story, Kittler is gracious enough to provide a map, just in case we were uncertain, all along, what he was up to:

     

    Without removing traces, traces cannot be gathered;.... In our current century which implements all theories, there are no longer any. That is the uncanniness of its reality.(100)

     

    “Media and Drugs in Pynchon’s Second World War”

     

    Step 4: Demonstrate that, not only is your media scene the result of specific historical or scientific conditions, but these conditions are all uncannily related in one way or another. In short, show that "everything is connected."

     

    If we were to return to our initial media scene–the one in which Brigadier Whitehead performs a wartime sound-jam on his rudimentary mixing board–and attempt to apply the steps of Kittler’s method that we have covered thus far, we might find the following observations useful:

     

    Step 1: The Avengers scene we have chosen involves a media anachronism: phonographs and tape recorders in an age of laser technology.

     

    Step 2: Storage technology is essential for solving the mystery of the Brigadier’s murder. The face of detective work is changed forever by devices that can document our every move–and document our deaths as well.

     

    Step 3: Advanced storage technology also changes the face of war by displacing it into a series of tactical strategies based on potential destruction. As the Brigadier’s demise demonstrates, war is now a staged phenomenon, a game of potentialization that can proceed without immediate corporal sacrifice. Indeed, the Brigadier is sacrificed, but at the hands of a laser, the weapon that would power virtual or “cold” warfare. “From Venus With Love” foreshadows a real, laser driven Star Wars.

     

    Step 4: In 1967, IBM released the first beta version of the floppy disk, while in Britain the ISBN numerical cataloguing system for books was introduced. At the time in which our media scene takes place, digital technology and laser reading/writing devices carry the day.

     

    Of course, 1967, the Summer of Love, also marks a time of immersive psychedelia. This brings us to Kittler’s essay on Thomas Pynchon, “Media and Drugs in Pynchon’s Second World War.” If the Avengers can have their Brigadier Whitehead, a living anachronism of war and technology, then Pynchon can give us Brigadier Pudding:

     

    Who can find his way about this lush maze of initials, arrows solid and dotted, boxes big and small, names printed and memorized? Not Ernest Pudding--that's for the New Chaps with their little green antennas out for the usable emanations of power, versed in American politics... keeping brain-dossiers on latencies, weaknesses, tea-taking habits, erogenous zones of all, all who might someday be useful.... Ernest Pudding was brought up to believe in a literal Chain of Command, as clergymen of earlier centuries believed in the Chain of Being. The newer geometries confuse him. (77)

     

    Brigadiers are the products of an outmoded discourse network, destined to fall at the hands of a system of (il)logic beyond their ken. While Brigadier Whitehead narrates his highly orchestrated version of war on analog recording machines, an interloping laser beam–master device of an invisible war and the product of a discourse network of which he is ignorant–brings his instant and unpredictable death. Similarly, when Pynchon’s Brigadier Pudding, an octagenarian soldier, volunteers for “intelligence work” in World War II, he expects to be operating “in concert… with other named areas of the War, colonies of that Mother City mapped wherever the enterprise is systematic death” (76). What he finds instead, is

     

    a disused hospital for the mad, a few token lunatics, an enormous pack of stolen dogs, cliques of spiritualists, vaudeville entertainers, wireless technicians, Couéists, Ouspenskians, Skinnerites, lobotomy enthusiasts, Dale Carnegie zealots, all exiled by the outbreak of war from pet schemes and manias damned, had the peace prolonged itself, to differing degrees of failure. (77)

     

    Much to the dismay of the Brigadier, the mortal combat that used to determine victory has been displaced by a psychotechnological information circus. The Brigadier’s “greatest victory on the battlefield,… in the gassy, Armageddonite filth of the Ypres salient, where he conquered a bight of no man’s land some 40 yards at its deepest, with a wastage of only 70% of his unit,” is an outmoded model. In WWII, such battlefield victories could be described as a mere diversion from the real war, a war without heroes on hilltops, a war that can only be won by near-invisible technologies (Pynchon 77). The human “wastage” of combat merely “provides raw material to be recorded into History, so that children may be taught History as sequences of violence, battle after battle, and be more prepared for the adult world” (Pynchon 105). “To be sure,” Kittler tells us,

     

    people still believed in dying for their homeland during World War II. But Pynchon, a former Boeing-engineer, makes it clear through precise details that "the enterprise [of] systematic death" (Pynchon 76) "serves as spectacle, as diversion from the real movements of the War" (Pynchon 105). That is to say, "the real crises were crises of allocation and priority, not among firms--it was only staged to look that way--but among the different technologies, plastics, electronics, aircraft," and so on. (Pynchon 521; Kittler 102-103)

     

    This war of information management and data delivery (played out mostly in corporate boardrooms today) is discernible behind any media scene that we might conjure up in the twentieth century: “the world’s gone insane, with information come to be the only real medium of exchange” (Pynchon 258).

     

    Evidently, there is no place in the “newer geometries” of war for hero Brigadiers or chains of command; no place for predictability, sequentiality or even narratability. And the same goes for the newer geometries of literature and criticism as well. The heroic critic or narrator has been rendered impossible by the Death of the Author. Like the Brigadiers in our media scenes, readers of Pynchon who turn the pages in search of a sequential “Chain of Command” will be assailed by a whirling circus of data, an informational jambalaya suitable in a world run by non-sequential technologies. What makes Pynchon an exceptional writer, then, (and certainly not a fiction writer) in Kittler’s eyes, is his expert use of technical data that the War’s end released from secrecy:

     

    the text, as is only the case in historical novels like Salammbo or Antonius, is essentially assembled from documentary sources, many of which--circuit diagrams, differential equations, corporate contracts, and organizational plans--are textualized for the first time. (A fact easily overlooked by literary experts.) (106)

     

    Much to Kittler’s delight, Pynchon is not an Author, but a data delivery agent. His goal is not to provide an entertaining narrative, or some sort of fictional closure, but information, tout court.

     

    Just as Pynchon’s anti-hero, Slothrop, strived endlessly to make sense of the noise and nonsense of war, Pynchon’s readers must devise a way of making sense of the novel itself. We might learn a great deal from the ill-fated Lieutenant Slothrop, who, in the absence of sophisticated “data retrieval” machinery–the only means to “the truth”–is “thrown back on dreams, psychic flashes, omens, cryptographies, drug-epistemologes, all dancing on a ground of terror, contradiction, absurdity” (Pynchon 582). In the absence of all sense, overwhelmed by an onslaught of conflicting information, Slothrop invents his own rules of the game. Kittler astutely identifies this survivalist method of sense-making in the following way: “Slothrop’s paranoia within the novel corresponds precisely to a paranoiac-critical methodology that the novelist could have learned from Dali” (105). Might I suggest that there is a little Dali in Kittler as well?

     

    Through his art and writing, Dali essentially suggested (as any good paranoid would) that everything is meaningful, and that chance encounters should not be ignored as mere co-incidence. According to Dali–and the point hits home in his paintings–even the most seemingly incidental details can be of critical importance in our understanding of an event or object. For Dali, it was (among other things) the juxtaposition of pitchfork and hunched figures in Millet’s Angelus;12 for Pynchon, it was the supposed co-incidence of Slothrop’s erections with the explosion of V2 bombs; for Kittler, we might suggest that it is the “double at his writing desk,” the sigh of Faust, the typewriter in the lap of Mina Harker. In any case, Dali, Slothrop, and Kittler provide us with a method of dealing with information overload. With the Death of the Author, the End of History, and the impossibility of Truth, we might say that we are living in the threat of “anti-paranoia, where nothing is connected to anything, a condition not many of us can bear for long” (Pynchon 434). The antidote, as Pynchon and Kittler seem to suggest, might be a good dose of critical or perhaps conscious paranoia, a critical methodology of the trace.13 “When the symbolic of signs, numbers and letters determine so-called reality, then gathering the traces becomes the paranoid’s primary duty” (105-106).

     

    “Media Wars: Trenches, Lightning, Stars” and “The World of the Symbolic–A World of the Machine”

     

    Step 5: Having revealed that "everything is connected," submit your paranoia to reason by showing that "everything is connected" only because: a) the dual apparatus of State/Technology has made the co-incidence possible, and; b) with this power structure in place, we are destined to be the physical and psychological subjects of technologies.

     

    In Lieutenant Slothrop we have the apotheosis of Kittler’s assessment of technology in culture. Not only have the political and material technologies of war crippled Slothrop’s mind with paranoia, they have also turned his body–most specifically, his penis (a cybernetic emblem of the phallic V2 rocket)–into a strategic weapon. In Slothrop, all of Kittler’s theories on technology converge: the subjection of the body and psyche to technology; the development of new technology through war; the control of technology by the State. These are the themes or theses that recur constantly in Kittler’s essays, to the point that they produce a distinct theory, a branch, even, of media studies. Nowhere are these issues more recurrent, or more pervasively explored than in the essays “Media Wars: Trenches, Lightning, Stars” and “The World of the Symbolic–A World of the Machine.”

     

    In “Media Wars,” Kittler convincingly demonstrates that the strategies of persuasion that defined military success throughout history (war “came into being only when people succeeded in making others die for them” [117]) have been replaced by “technologies of telecommunication and control” (117). The point is clear in the case of Slothrop, and perhaps even more lucid in the case of the ill-fated Brigadier Whitehead. As Foucault’s theories of panopticism have suggested, forces of command are now invisible, and their formal role has been handed over to technology. Technological apparatus and State apparatus are intricately entwined to the point of being indistinguishable. In order to illustrate this point, Kittler offers a brief history of the First and Second World Wars from a media theorist’s point of view. From the storage media of Edison (phonograph and kinetoscope) to the transmission media of Hertz and Marconi (wireless telegraphy, radio), Kittler sets out to prove, in his characteristically reductive fashion, the following equation:

     

    WWI:Storage Media :: WWII:Transmission Media.
     

    His final proof takes the following form: “Technical media have to do neither with intellectuals nor with mass culture. They are strategies of the Real. Storage media were built for the trenches of World War I, transmission media for the lightning strikes of World War II” (129). This leaves WWIII, of course, to the legacy of Alan Turing and modern computation, which has perfected the synchronization of storage and transmission media: “universal computing media for SDI: chu d’un désastre obscur, as Mallarmé would have it, fallen from an obscure disaster” (129).

     

    Once again, Brigadier Whitehead’s demise at the hands of Star Wars technology, “an enemy without a face,” is a perfect case study of storage and transmission media anachronized by a computational désastre obscur. But for a more contemporary illustration of Kittler’s equation (and more in keeping with his commitment to historical detail) we need only turn to the air strikes on Yugoslavia that are taking place as this essay is being written. At the risk of jeopardizing a lasting peace process in Yugoslavia, NATO commanders have thus far decided not to employ ground troops, a move that would surely result in human sacrifice all too reminiscent of Vietnam. Instead, American F/A jets are targeting and destroying, among other things, all radio and television transmitters in Belgrade. The war is not between soldiers, but between advanced technologies of communication: Yugoslav Power Stations (Transmission Media) vs. invisible B-52 bombers and intelligent cruise missiles (Computation Media).

     

    More than anything else, the bombing demonstrates the technological difference between this war and the Vietnam War, to which it is being repeatedly compared. While the B-52s continue their destruction of television transmitters–the technology that was truly responsible for making a tragedy of Vietnam–they have proved almost useless against a more recent media technology, the Internet. Just when William Cohen thought that the Central Nervous System of Yugoslavia had been disabled, neurons started firing in the form of e-mail and Web pages. For every B-52 gun camera that fails to provide evidence of civilian suffering in Belgrade at the hands of NATO, a Yugoslav e-mail message or Web page leaves traces of misery, affliction, and betrayal.14 If Vietnam was a TV war, this is an Internet war. The Yugoslav’s use of the Web and e-mail as weapons against the U.S. is extremely ironic, of course, considering the origins of the Internet. John Johnston explains these origins in his Introduction to Kittler’s essays:

     

    Thanks to the military need for a communications system that could survive nuclear detonations, today we have fiber optic cables and a new medium called the Internet, which, as is widely known, grew out of ARPANET, a decentralized control network for intercontinental ballistic missiles. (5)

     

    By launching an Internet counter-attack, the Belgradians are actually on a technological par with NATO. Unfortunately, bombs are more persuasive than words and digital images. The electronic traces of unsettled civilians will cease to be produced when all power sources have been destroyed in Belgrade. The moment that happens, the e-mail and Web attacks will be no more–except on hard drives, where they will exist as electronic monuments of civilian distress. This freezing is, in effect, NATO’s goal: to incapacitate the technologies of transmission in Yugoslavia, leaving them to deplete the only remaining technology of war, that of storage. Faced with a technologically dominant opponent, the only survival option for Belgradians–remnants of an obsolete war technology–is storage: entrenchment or monumentality. If only such immobilization could have been inflicted on Vietnam, or Iraq, for that matter….

     

    Of course, from a Kittlerian perspective, the very notion of “monumentality” as an option for survival begs questioning, or at least complexification. Human memory may be just another media effect, the remainder of past technologies doomed to extinction by advancements in computation, storage, and transmission. This anachronism is, according to Kittler, one of the great secrets of a self-deluding humanity: “That books, mnemotechnologies, and machine memories exist, must naturally be kept a secret, so long as memory is a quality or even a property ‘of man’…. In the name of the analphabets, the confusion between the people and the memory banks in which they land must come to an end” (“Vergessen” 111). What matters for Kittler, however, is not that we are losing our memory or our minds, but that the very notions of mind and memory have been profoundly transformed by media technologies, to the extent that “it is already clear that humanity could not have invented information machines, but to the contrary, is their subject” (143).

     

    This message, as we have already seen, was delivered rather forebodingly by Jacques Lacan, several decades before Kittler, when he told his students that they were already “the subjects of all types of gadgets” (143). But leave it to Kittler to uncover the trace of Lacan’s own subjection to gadgets, a trace that is exposed at the heart of Lacan’s theories. Kittler distinguishes between the theory of Freud and that of Lacan by pointing to the technological conditions that surrounded them. Since Freud was a subject of the telephone, film, phonograph and print, it makes sense, from a Kittlerian perspective, that his pre-computer psychological theories are rooted only in “the strict separation of transmission and storage functions,” or the separation of memory and consciousness (133). In Kittler’s terms,

     

    Freud's materialism reasoned only as far as the information machines of his era--no more, no less. Rather than continuing to dream of the Spirit as origin, he described a "psychic apparatus" (Freud's wonderful word choice) that implemented all available transmission and storage media, in other words, an apparatus just short of the technical medium of universal-calculation, or the computer. (134)

     

    The development of a computer-oriented psychology would have to wait, of course, until Jacques Lacan, who constructs the psychic apparatus not only out of storage and transmission media, but also out of computation. And hence, “nothing else is signified,” Kittler insists, “by Lacan’s ‘methodological distinction’ of the imaginary, the real and the symbolic” (135).

     

    Kittler equates the “symbolic” to computational media because it demonstrates a certain switching capability (in the digital, technical sense) of the psychic apparatus:

     

    Tombstones, the oldest cultural symbols, remain with the corpse; dice remain on their side after the toss; only the door, or 'gate' in technical slang, permits symbols "to fly with their own winds," that is, to control presence and absence, high and low, 1 and 0, so that the one can react to the other--sequential circuit mechanism, digital feedback. (143)

     

    Lacan’s “endless chain of signifiers” corresponds, not co-incidentally, to the data-processing activity of computer circuits. And the Symbolic, like the “gates” or ports on a computer, regulates the flow of the circuits.15The “discourse of the other” may therefore be renamed as the “discourse of the circuit” (135).

     

    Considering the uncanny human/machine interfacing that betrays itself in Lacan’s theories, we should not be surprised, Kittler writes, “that Lacan forbid himself from talking about language with people who did not understand cybernetics” (145). This may sound like theoretical closed-mindedness–the type that makes Luddites of some of the finest scholars. Then again, perhaps closed-mindedness is not the proper word, for Lacan is calling for an interlocutor who is versed in more than one area of specialization, and who is open to the possibility of a transdisciplinary science. Perhaps we should call it snobbery or idealism, then, for Lacan’s demands on his interlocutors are somewhat unrealistic, and based on his own desires and modes of understanding. In any case, this particular attitude, the words for which have apparently evaded me here, characterize the two final essays in Kittler’s collection.

     

    “There Is No Software” and “Protected Mode”

     

    Step 6: Having successfully practiced, and hopefully re-invented, the Kittlerian Method of Media Criticism, use your method to develop a project that aims to increase our awareness and understanding of the materialities of communication.

     

    Since, as you must agree by now, everything is connected after all, it only makes sense to point out the uncanny co-incidence (?) of the computing term “gates” (portals which regulate all circuit flow), and the name most associated with computing today, William H. Gates. Consider this man/machine coincidence as a nodal point through which many discourses pass, including Kittler’s discourse on computer hardware, and the current Microsoft antitrust trial that accuses Gates of masterminding a media monopoly. Such a monopoly, as Kittler would gladly make clear, involves more than a few icons on a computer screen; it involves the shaping of our psychic apparatus, the regulation of human communications, and the fashioning of educational institutions, political regimes, and military arsenals. Perhaps it is for this reason that William S. Cohen has been seen networking with the Microserfs in Silicon Valley. In a recent recruitment visit to the Microsoft HQ, Cohen emphasized “the military’s role in insuring global stability that allowed companies like Microsoft to prosper” (Myers A15). Gates, on the other hand, “noted that the Defense Department was Microsoft’s largest client and discussed ways the two could do even more business together in the future” (Myers A15). The irony of this catch-22 media scene is best captured, however, by a programmer who explains why she turned down a career in the military: “The Navy kept sending me letters when I was in school, offering scholarships…. But I thought, Why would I want to give up my life when I could be creating new technology?” (Myers A15). The postmodern soldier is alive and well in Silicon Valley.

     

    Those who are able to perceive an immense political network behind the Windows interface have no problem understanding Kittler’s turbulent tone in “There Is No Software.” This essay becomes all the more clear in light of the Microsoft trial, because it deals with the level of control that a computer operator possesses over the machine. In what Kittler calls a “system of secrecy,” computer and software designers have intentionally “hidden” the technology from those who use the machines:

     

    First, on an intentionally superficial level, perfect graphic user interfaces, since they dispense with writing itself, hid a whole machine from its users. Second, on the microscopic level of hardware, so-called protection software has been implemented in order to prevent "untrusted programs" or "untrusted users" from any access to the operating system's kernel and input/output channels. (150)

     

    All these levels of secrecy, Kittler explains, are designed to prevent the operator from really understanding media. We might know how to launch Microsoft Word and type up an essay with graphics, tables, and elaborate fonts, but, with each stroke of the keyboard or click of the mouse, do we realize what’s happening in the discourse networks of the purring, putty-colored box? This ignorance, according to Kittler, leaves us open to manipulation of the highest order. With characteristic bluntness, the final essay of Kittler’s book suggests that under the current technological conditions, “one writes–the ‘under’ says it already–as a subject or underling of the Microsoft Corporation” (156).

     

    In response to Microsoft, IBM et al., who insure that technologies are “explicitly contrived to evade perception,” Kittler makes the bold pronouncement that “There Is No Software.” This is at once a rhetorical provocation to the computer corporations, and a wake-up call for those who fail to see the man behind the curtain, or the circuits behind the fruit-colored shell that Apple has recently developed in an attempt to make us “Think Different.”16 There is no software because, no matter how user-friendly an interface might be, the “hardware continues to do all of the work” (158). The Microsoft antitrust case exists only because of Microsoft’s ongoing objective of completely hiding the machine behind a single unified graphical interface. Drawing on Mick Jagger, Kittler notes that “instead of what he wants, the user always only gets what he needs (according to the industry standard, that is)” (162).

     

    Neither Microsoft Windows nor the chips that really make it work–chips secured by Intel’s “protected mode”–can be reprogrammed or rewired to suit the needs of the computer operator. But then, who wants to do reprogramming anyhow? In an ironic, accidental (?) response to Kittler’s use of Mick Jagger, a recent ad campaign by Apple uses the Stones song “She’s a Rainbow” to promote the fashionable multichromatic appearance of the new iMac. Superficiality, it seems, is what the user really wants.

     

    Microsoft’s success in the trial, and as a business, hinges on the following hypothetical question: Do people really want to see behind the curtain? To my knowledge, the average computer-user, let alone “literary critic” (as Kittler repeatedly labels himself) does not like to unwind in the Kittlerian fashion: “at night after I had finished writing, I used to pick up the soldering iron and build circuits” (Griffin, “Interview” 731). But if we accept Kittler’s understanding of the relationship between media technologies, government, and the military, then the question about what’s “behind the curtain” becomes increasingly pressing, and it applies to more than software monopolies and circuits in “protected mode.” “It is a reasonable assumption,” writes Kittler, “to analyze the privilege levels of a microprocessor as the reality of precisely that bureaucracy that ordered its design and called for its mass application” (162). In short, Kittler suggests that power systems can be traced within the circuits of a computer chip. And so, those who follow Foucault’s legacy of analyzing such systems might benefit from abandoning “the usual practice of conceiving of power as a function of so-called society, and, conversely, attempt to construct sociology from the chip’s architectures”(162). Maybe we should take a closer look, then, at those digital pets on our laps and desks. In the least, we should start paying more attention to the materialities of communication.

     

    Conclusions and Beginnings

     

    As impressive as Kittler’s ability to “see a landscape in a bean”17 may be, we cannot expect the average computer user to pull the Pentium chip out of his/her C.P.U. and examine it for traces of fascism. In the same way, we can’t expect Kittler’s version of media criticism to remedy the “blind spot” of poststructuralism by turning critics into computer geeks (I suggest we take a grain of salt with his suggestion that students of cultural studies “should at least know some arithmetic, the integral function, the sine function,.. [and] at least two software languages” [Griffin, “Interview” 740]). What we might expect, however, is for Kittler’s work to incite a campaign of awareness that, if properly disseminated, might make us more cognizant of the networks of power and discourse that intersect on our media scenes. And by integrating not just “literary texts,” but any cultural phenomena, into our projects, then we can direct our work toward intervention on a social and technological level.

     

    The point here is not to create a Kittlerian cult, or to suggest that Kittler’s methods should be applied as the universal decryption key of cultural studies or literary criticism. In fact, I willingly admit that the 6 Steps described in this instruction manual essay hardly provide an accurate or comprehensive evaluation of Kittler’s critical methodology. All I have done is attempted to extract a working set of instructions out of Kittler’s imposing data banks. I have attempted to develop a mode of writing more suitable to, and aware of, our digital-oriented discourse network. What Kittler, as “structural engineer,” teaches us is to view texts and theories as complex discursive networks from which certain key components may be drawn out and soldered onto others like circuits on a motherboard. His role as a critic has less to do with archiving, transcription, and commentary (the duties of a critic of 1800 and 1900) than it does with programming, design, and invention: activities of intervention.

     

    To sum up, Kittler gathers code from Foucault, Derrida, Lacan, et. al. and sets it to work on the cultural cryptography of Goethe, Pynchon, et al. In the same way, we might draw on Kittler in order to program our own critical projects on the materialities of communication. Like circuit-tinkerers and the proponents of open source software, media critics might benefit from dissecting and reprogramming their own user interface, i.e., the conventional scholarly publication. We might not not end up with a new programming language to rival Microsoft DOS, but perhaps we’ll invent a more effective and interventional method for conducting research from inside the Discourse Network 2000–whatever that may turn out to be.18

     

    Notes

     

    1. In the first line of Discourse Networks 1800/1900, Kittler suggests that “German Poetry begins with a sigh,” Faust’s sigh, that is (3). This provides him with a primal scene from which to discuss the discourse network of 1800.

     

    2. Unless indicated otherwise, citations of Kittler are drawn from the essays in Literature, Media, Information Systems.

     

    3. Foucault’s influence on Kittler is profound and pervasive, and Kittler is quick to admit this legacy. Among all discourse analysts, Foucault is the most important to Kittler “because he was the most historical” (Griffin, Interview 734). Whereas Derrida, Lacan, etc. tend to emphasize the instability of the sign, Foucault rarely abandons his archaeological digging to muse upon the shapes of the words at the surface. This devotion to the complex historicity of discourse is, according to Kittler, why Foucault is “the best to use and carry over into other fields…. [He] offers so many concrete methodologies and leaves so many historical fields open that there are endless amounts of work one can do with him” (Griffin, Interview 739).

     

    4. In spite of the flurry of rumors that surrounded the incident, Timothy Leary’s death was not simulcast on the Internet. Leary had proposed the broadcast, but resolved instead to videotape his last moments. The footage has never been shown publicly. From America’s Funniest Home Videos to the recent television broadcast of Thomas Youk’s lethal injection by Jack Kevorkian, one could easily compile a lengthy catalog of media scenes that document our contemporary obsession with cataloguing and archiving anything and everything.

     

    5. In reference to Discourse Networks 1800/1900, David Wellbery notes that Kittler’s book “presupposes post-structuralist thought, makes that thought the operating equipment, the hardware, with which it sets out to accomplish its own research program. In Discourse Networks, post-structuralism becomes a working vocabulary, a set of instruments productive of knowledge” (vii).

     

    6. As far as poststructural methodologies, Kittler prefers the rigor and simplicity of Niklas Luhmann’s system theory over the playfulness of Derrida’s grammatology. Luhmann, says Kittler, “doesn’t make a philosophical mountain out of a molehill, unlike Derrida who, with every sentence he writes, wants to have his cake and eat it” (Griffin, Interview 733).

     

    7. See Bruce Bliven, The Wonderful Writing Machine (New York: Random House, 1954).

     

    8. In his Preface to Literature, Media, Information Systems, Saul Ostrow notes that “Kittler is not stimulated by the notion that we are becoming cyborgs, but instead by the subtler issues of how we conceptually become reflections of our information systems” (x).

     

    9. One could argue that since Donna Harraway’s important and extensive study of the topic, there has been an inordinate abundance of cyborg theory in bookstores and at conferences. This has all led to a predictable formula regarding the human/machine interface and our increasing mechanization at the hands of computers, virtual reality and global networks.

     

    10. See Thomas Sebastian, “Technology Romanticized: Friedrich Kittler’s Discourse Networks 1800/1900,MLN5: 3 (1990): 583-595, and Virginia L. Lewis, “A German Poststructuralist,” PLL 28:1 (1992): 100-106.

     

    11. This reference to “media histories” consciously echoes the title of Matthew Griffin’s excellent essay on Kittler, entitled “Literary Studies +/- Literature: Friedrich A. Kittler’s Media Histories.” Like media scenes, the conspicuous plurality of Griffin’s title attempts to capture the complexity of Kittler’s historical, critical and theoretical methodology.

     

    12. I am explicitly referring, here, to The Tragic Myth of Millet’s Angelus: Paranoiac-Critical Interpretation (St. Petersburg: The Salvador Dali Museum, 1986). Robert Ray refers to this text in The Avant-Garde Finds Andy Hardy (pp.79-80), where he gives an excellent account of how Dali’s method may be used in contemporary film criticism.

     

    13. In The Avant-Garde Finds Andy Hardy, Robert Ray offers just such a methodology in the form of a classroom exercise that relies on accident and coincidence. The exercise is partly motivated by this proposition: “The [film] shot results from photography (Godard: ‘Photography is truth, and the cinema is truth twenty-four times a second’), and thus it will inevitably offer… accidental details (Barthes’s ‘Third Meaning’)” (83). This filmic version of the truth (truth equals accident or contingency) is a good antidote to Kittler’s contention that “film-goers are the victims… of a semiotechnology that deludes them into seeing a coherent and causal life story where there are only snapshots and flash bulbs” (112). The majority of film-goers, however, seem to prefer the comfort of delusion over the responsibility of organizing a series of contingencies.

     

    14. At the time this essay was written, pro-Yugoslav Web sites documenting the demise of civilians at the hands (bombs) of NATO were available at the following URL’s, among others: <http://cnn.com/SPECIALS/1998/10/kosovo/email/>; <http://cnn.com/SPECIALS/1998/10/kosovo/related.sites/>; <http://www.beograd.com>.

     

    15. Lacan’s L-Schema provides an excellent pictorial rendering of the psychic apparatus as circuit. In The Optical Unconscious, Rosalind Kraus offers an insightful discussion of Lacan’s model, and applies it to a critique of modern visualization.

     

    16. The ironic motto “Think Different” was the crux of Apple’s advertising campaign in their 1998-99 push to compete with Microsoft’s ability to homogenize a generation of computer users. In essence, Apple managed to hide the machine from the user many years ago, but their lack of a Gates-like marketing savvy made homogenization unattainable. Interestingly, there has been a recent backlash against all the secrecy, which is manifesting itself in the growing popularity of open source software such as Linux. Open source software gives operators a greater degree of control over the interface and general functionality of their computer systems. According to the non-profit organization NetAction, “the most basic definition of open source software is software for which the source code is distributed along with the executable program, and which includes a license allowing anyone to modify and redistribute the software” (<http://www.netaction.org/opensrc/oss-whatis.html>).

     

    17. In the opening sentence of S/Z, a text which demonstrates Barthes’s prowess as a builder of codes, he makes reference to “certain Buddhists whose ascetic practices enable them to see a whole landscape in a bean” (3). Although he uses the example to dismiss the idea of applying a single structure to explain all narrative, the Buddhist practice aptly describes Barthes’s own use of myth to decode all of French culture. Barthes’s Mythologies might certainly be considered as precursors to Kittler’s writerly production of media scenes.

     

    18. In his interview with Matthew Griffin and Susanne Herrmann, Kittler reveals his opinion on the Discourse Network 2000: “Everyone wants to know what the discourse network 2000 looks like? I’m not in such a hurry, besides it can’t be written” (736). I would suggest that Kittler, unwittingly or not, is writing the discourse network 2000.

    Works Cited

     

    • Barthes, Roland. S/Z. Trans. Richard Miller. New York: Hill and Wang, 1974.
    • “From Venus With Love.” The Avengers. Dir. Roy Baker. Perf. Diana Rigg, Patrick Macnee, Philip Locke, and John Pertwee. Canal+, 1963.
    • Griffin, Matthew. “Literary Studies +/- Literature: Friedrich Kittler’s Media Histories. New Literary History 27.4 (1996): 709-716.
    • — and Susanne Herrmann. “Technologies of Writing: Interview with Friedrich A. Kittler. New Literary History 27.4 (1996): 731-742.
    • Johnston, John. “Friedrich Kittler: Media Theory After Poststructuralism.” Introduction. Literature, Media, Information Systems: Essays. By Friedrich Kittler. Amsterdam: G+B Arts, 1997.
    • Kittler, Friedrich. Discourse Networks 1800/1900. Trans. Michael Metteer, with Chris Cullens. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1990.
    • —. Literature, Media, Information Systems: Essays. Amsterdam: G+B Arts, 1997.
    • —. “Vergessen.” Discourse: Berkeley Journal for Theoretical Studies in Media and Culture 3 (1981): 88-121.
    • Myers, Steven Lee. “In Added Role, Pentagon Chief Is Traveling Salesman.” New York Times. 19 February, 1999, natl. ed.: A15
    • Ostrow, Sal. Preface. Literature, Media, Information Systems: Essays. By Friedrich Kittler. Amsterdam: G+B Arts, 1997.
    • Pynchon, Thomas. Gravity’s Rainbow. New York: Penguin, 1973.
    • Ray, Robert. The Avant-Garde Finds Andy Hardy. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1995.
    • Spivak, Gayatri. “Translator’s Preface.” Of Grammatology. By Jacques Derrida. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins UP, 1976.
    • Wellbery, David E. Forward. Discourse Networks 1800/1900. By Friedrich Kittler. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1990.

     

  • Terrible Beauties: Messianic Time and the Image of Social Redemption in James Cameron’s Titanic

    Patrick McGee

    Department of English
    Louisiana State University
    pmcgee@gateway.net

     

    Mankind, which in Homer’s time was an object of contemplation of the Olympian gods, now is one for itself. Its self-alienation has reached such a degree that it can experience its own destruction as an aesthetic pleasure of the first order.

     

    –Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction”

     

    The epigraph above comes from the last paragraph of Benjamin’s celebrated essay on the movies. Writing on the culture industry some years later, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno implied that movies could not be true works of art because the latter “are ascetic and unashamed” while “the culture industry is pornographic and prudish” (Dialectic 140). Benjamin took the more radical stand that the term “work of art” has no essential meaning; and concerning the “futile thought” that “had been devoted to the question of whether photography [or film] is an art,” he observed that the more significant question had to do with whether such inventions “had not transformed the entire nature of art” (Illuminations 227). He suggested that the work of art has only historical meaning and then proceeded to describe what constitutes the work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction. Still, when he described “the shriveling of the aura” in the traditional work of art, he also recognized “the phony smell of the commodity” produced by the money of the film industry. He concluded that “[s]o long as the movie-makers’ capital sets the fashion, as a rule no other revolutionary merit can be accredited to today’s film than the promotion of a revolutionary criticism of traditional concepts of art.” Benjamin was particularly disgusted by the “cult of the movie star,” which remains central to Hollywood’s promotional strategies. Nonetheless, Benjamin recognized that “in some cases today’s films can also promote revolutionary criticism of social conditions, even of the distribution of property” (Illuminations 231). One would like to know exactly which films Benjamin had in mind, but I think it is necessary to grasp the implications of his theory of aesthetic history beyond what may have been his own aesthetic preferences in the field of cinematic art. If traditional concepts of the work of art have been called into question by the movies, then it follows that we cannot prejudge what constitutes “aesthetic value” or a “revolutionary criticism of social conditions” in the cinema. Though we should examine the function of capital in the production of cinematic art, it may also be necessary to see capital as one of the historical conditions of the age of mechanical reproduction that makes revolutionary criticism in the cinema possible. Benjamin developed the concept of the dialectical image to explain the revolutionary potential of the commodity in historical time and used this concept to analyze the revolutionary effect of a historical perception of the Paris arcades. This essay attempts to explore contemporary mass-cultural work from a similar perspective.

     

    When in the epigraph Benjamin refers to the aesthetic pleasure that the masses take from witnessing their own destruction, however, he is not talking about the movies per se but about politics, which by the 1930s in Germany and elsewhere had become almost as spectacular, almost as much of a show, as the movies. In particular, he addresses the most brutal form of politics and yet the form that lends itself most readily to the investments of aesthetic techniques and values–war. The “property system,” as Benjamin names the social arrangements of capitalist society, has impeded “the natural utilization of productive forces” that have been released by technology in the modern world; and, as a result, these forces press for an “unnatural utilization.” For example, the futurist Marinetti, one of Mussolini’s backers, expected a new art “to supply the artistic gratification of a sense of perception that has been changed by technology” (Illuminations 242). These are the material conditions not only of fascism but of the more general society of the spectacle that has been said to characterize virtually all societies in which “modern conditions of production prevail” (Debord 12). In response to the fascism that he saw aestheticizing politics in the thirties, Benjamin wanted a form of communism or historical materialism that would politicize art. This critical response to fascism in 1936 can also be applied to postmodern versions of imperialistic war, the aesthetics of which was revealed by the television coverage of the Gulf War in the 1990s. Benjamin implicitly understood that we do not seriously challenge the aesthetics of war and social domination in the society of the spectacle by retreating into tradition and the religious cult of the autonomous work of art. In the movies as one of the epitomes of mass culture, he saw a manifestation of a new kind of social perception that destroys “the traditional value of the cultural heritage,” or the “aura” (Illuminations 221). Though “the tasks which face the human apparatus of perception at the turning points of history cannot be solved… [exclusively] by contemplation,” they can be “mastered gradually by habit.” The movies require “[r]eception in a state of distraction” that can inculcate habits of visual perception and feeling that could lead to acts of social transformation. Since individuals avoid the tasks of social change because they are painful even to contemplate, “art [in the age of mechanical reproduction] will tackle the most difficult and most important ones where it is able to mobilize the masses.” The recession of the cult value of art, its aura, has put “the public in the position of the critic,” concludes Benjamin (Illuminations 240). Art is no longer “for the happy few.” The task of the professional critic is to politicize mass culture by articulating the possible meanings that can be derived from its distracted critical reception–to unfold, in other words, the unconscious political discourse of the masses.

     

    I. True Lies

     

    James Cameron’s Titanic may be called by some a work of genius and by others an assemblage of cheap thrills and romance, but in either case it is a pure product of mass culture–in fact, it is what I would call, with some degree of irony, the masterpiece of mass culture. Several reviewers have commented that, despite the visual power of the movie, the dialogue is often trite and cliché-ridden; and one could add to these criticisms the obvious fact that the plot consists of two central components that are cinematic clichés: the disaster formula (of which the sinking of the Titanic is the classic example, for the great ship has sunk on movie and television screens over and over again throughout this century) and the romance between rich girl and poor boy. In this age of gender studies and queer theory, there are no surprises in this movie, no challenges to the dominance of heterosexuality; and any gestures toward feminism are of the safe variety that have become commonplace in popular movies, including several of Cameron’s earlier action dramas. Titanic is not a departure from Cameron’s earlier work but its culmination. I will not be suggesting that everything in the movie can be reduced to the author’s intention as auteur, but clearly Cameron is the central figure behind the choreographies of violence in The Terminator (1984), Aliens (1986), The Abyss (1989), The Terminator 2 (1991), and True Lies (1994). Still, Titanic is not strictly Cameron’s masterpiece, in the auteurist sense, because its power derives from mass culture and from a history of images that can be discovered only in retrospect. Through its evocation of the truth of the capitalist social structure, it reveals those indestructible desires that may be the only force that keeps the world from becoming the slave ship of capital accumulation.

     

    The movie is also an interpretive moment within the history of mass culture, and of Hollywood films as exemplary products of mass culture. It discloses the dialectical meaning of the images in a kind of film that has come to be one of the dominant products of the Hollywood film industry since the mid-sixties. Loosely, this kind of film has been called the “action” movie, though this term takes on a different sense from what it had before the mid-sixties, when it referred merely to westerns, war films and other movies involving some physical action. Since that time, this kind of movie has become more than a genre because it incorporates other genres into its structure. Science fiction, horror, mystery thrillers, disaster movies, crime dramas, westerns, and (in Cameron’s hands, not only in Titanic but in The Abyss, True Lies, and, to some extent, the original version of The Terminator) the passionate love story–all of these traditional film genres have tended to be absorbed into the structure of the action movie. Though the ground for this supergenre was carefully prepared by Sergio Leone’s spaghetti westerns, John Boorman’s 1967 movie Point Blank may have been the groundbreaking film that exposed the possibility of action as the pure object of cinematic representation. One of the characteristics of this movie is that the plot remains relatively unmotivated. Although the film begins with some enigmatic allusions to the background of the central character, to his involvement in a crime and his betrayal by another criminal, the revenge motif that seems to drive the action is never adequate to the action itself. The character played by Lee Marvin seems to want the money he was cheated out of more than revenge; so he goes on killing everyone who gets in his way even after he has killed the man who betrayed him; and, at the end of the film, it turns out that he has been killing the enemies of another man who mysteriously directs his actions and who actually holds the money he seeks. He never gets the money; but the implication is that the violence will continue until there is no longer anyone left to kill, anyone left to betray or to be betrayed by, anyone who can withhold the money that is the ruling object of desire in capitalist culture. The title of the movie refers not only to the Marvin character’s tendency to shoot people point blank without hesitation or remorse but to the film’s representation of violence without moral rationalization or justification. It violates the expected sensibility of its audience point blank; and, as I recall, that is how it was advertised at the time of its release. Though Lee Marvin’s character still seems human, he acts out the drive toward destruction that will later find embodiment in Cameron’s terminators. He represents the death drive of capitalist culture; and the movie itself exploits that drive as the essence of its own commodity status, of the pleasure it offers to an audience that shows itself to be hungry for images of destruction as the embodiment of its deepest social longings. This kind of action movie has become an international hit and has found some of its most sophisticated practitioners in Hong Kong, Latin America, and Europe. It embraces crime thrillers like Sam Peckinpah’s The Getaway (1972) and Walter Hill’s The Driver (1978), as well as disaster films like Irwin Allen’s The Poseidon Adventure (1972) and The Towering Inferno (1974). More recent and more conservative examples include John McTiernan’s Die Hard (1988), Jan de Bont’s Speed (1994), and Kathryn Bigelow’s witty Point Break (1991).

     

    Since the mid-eighties, James Cameron has been one of the more successful of the action movie-makers. The two early films, The Terminator and Aliens, have a self-conscious “B-movie” look that flies in the face of the effort at detailed authenticity that characterizes films like Ridley Scott’s original Alien (1979) and Blade Runner (1982). The first Terminator implicitly undermines the quest for human authenticity that lies problematically at the center of Blade Runner in both of its versions. Cameron’s machines are not simply anti-human or the creations of humans: they are the embodiment of the death drive, the end and spirit of capitalist civilization. At one point, the roommate of Sara Connor plays back her answering machine, which contains the message that “machines need love too.” The meaning of this line only takes on its real significance in Cameron’s later movies, but already in the first Terminator it is clear that the human is a simulacrum.

     

    In the future, where humans must struggle to survive the world of machines they have created, Kyle Reese (Michael Biehn) falls in love with a woman’s picture (Linda Hamilton as Sara Connor) and eventually, as he says, comes across time to meet the object of his desire. This is a postmodern love affair in which every reality is virtual and many possible futures can be substituted for one another through the slightest adjustment of the present. The B-movie texture of this Terminator foregrounds the constructed nature of the characters and of the terminator as the embodiment of the drive (see Zizek 22). The latter is not evil in itself but expresses the evil of instrumental reason that has come to substitute means for the goal of human rationality. He can’t be stopped by humans because he embodies their own darkest wish for the end of civilization. The only thing that can redeem the drive is love–I don’t mean love in the romantic sense, however, but a passionate desire that can transform the image of the past (Sara Connor, in this case) into the hope of the future. Sara Connor becomes what Benjamin would call a dialectical image, which, according to John McCole, is “one that results from the reciprocal relationship between two discrete historical moments” (249). Such an image is fleeting because it emerges from the rupture of temporal continuity that brings the present into the past and the past into the present. In the first Terminator, the past and the future coincide in the present: for Kyle, Sara Connor is the past; for Sara, Kyle is the future; but as the film announces at the very outset, the battle is fought in the present, the now. In my view, the meaning of the action movie, the effect that distinguishes it from other films that deploy violence such as the Bond movies, is the rupture of time, the subjection of the past and the future to a fleeting present, which “loads time into itself until the energies generated by the dialectic of recognition produce an irruption of discontinuity” (McCole 249). Although not all action movies play with time in the same way as the first Terminator, they always produce an image of human history as disruptive violence that contracts linear time into the time of the now or messianic time, from which can emerge the hope for apocalyptic social change.

     

    In my view, Aliens foregrounds the same apocalyptic desire, which is why it is less a sequel to Scott’s original Alien than to the first Terminator. Once again, even though Cameron had the budget to create a different look, he chooses to foreground the B-movie image, and thus to insist on the simulated nature of reality. No longer, as in Scott’s movie, do we have frail human flesh at war with the unthinkable phallic beast; on the contrary, the marines and a transformed Ripley (Sigourney Weaver) are almost as tough as the aliens themselves, who seem to embody the desire for self-destruction that could be the essence of postmodern culture. The real villain is not the alien culture that simply mirrors human desire but the representative of the capitalist drive for the accumulation of wealth. Burke (Paul Reiser) wants to transform the alien into a commodity; but Ripley instinctively knows that it is her own nature that she must confront in the final battle with the alien mother, her own simulated desire to be other. Like Kyle, Ripley has also crossed time, but hers isn’t a jump from the future to the past but from the past to the future. She has been suspended in space and time for fifty years and comes out of hibernation to learn (in one version of the film) that her own daughter has aged and died. She goes back to the place of her original confrontation with the alien because what has to be confronted is the image of her own desire for self-destruction. The object of that desire doesn’t become clear, however, until the final confrontation. First, Ripley’s own socially-determined maternal drive requires her to go back into the aliens’ nest in order to save the girl who has become the daughter she has lost; and, second, without taking anything away from the love she feels for the girl, this maternal drive, when she sees it embodied in the mother of the aliens as what Barbara Creed would call the “monstrous-feminine,” is precisely the image of her own identity and sexual nature that must be destroyed if she is to be liberated from the alienation of her own body, if she is to sustain the hope of ever creating a new body beyond gender oppression, a new woman. Finally, in order to defeat the alien image of the maternal body, she must become a machine, a kind of cyborg, after she crawls inside the robotic fork lift. In this battle with the alien mother on the spacecraft, the real cyborg (Lance Henriksen) turns out to be an ally because in Cameron’s simulacrum of the world everyone is already a simulacrum, or artificial person, who must confront the dark aim of the desire for death and what this desire signifies, the hope that there could be a different world, a different future.

     

    The second Terminator, which I will refer to as Judgment Day, comes after Cameron made the transition from the B-movie look in standard screen ratio (1.85:1) to the 70mm blow-up (2.2:1). He made this transition in The Abyss, which in some ways is a rehearsal for Titanic. While the scenes of the future war between men and machines in Judgment Day still have something of a B-movie look, the visual construction of this film is quite different. Though he is no Nicholas Ray or Stanley Kubrick, Cameron uses the widescreen effectively to enhance the apocalyptic tone of the film, particularly in the dream sequences in which Sara Connor stares through a cyclone fence into a playground full of children at the exact moment when a nuclear weapon goes off in downtown Los Angeles. The wider screen gives the images a greater depth and also, in my view, tends to create in the audience the feeling of being enveloped by the action that the film depicts. Although Cameron’s movies depend on fast, rhythmic continuity editing, the dream sequences allow him to introduce more intellectual editing into his work. Thus, where the first Terminator is more about tearing apart the fabric of linear time through passionate desire, Judgment Day explores temporal disruption as the threat of catastrophe that ironically opens up the historical process to the possibility of revision and redirection through direct human intervention. The meaning of the human, however, is one of the aspects of history that undergoes serious revision. If the first Terminator embodied the death drive, his avatar (T800) in Judgment Day undergoes a process of humanization that suggests the historical nature of what we call the human. The death drive that brings humanity closer and closer to the Judgment Day of self-destruction can be revised and redirected because it is not ultimately even the desire for death but the desire for what Jacques Lacan calls the Thing, something that we can never name and can only articulate by positing a goal or end as its substitute or representation. The desire for the Thing enables us to transform the death drive into a creative act of social transformation. In Judgment Day, no one crosses time for love, as in the first Terminator; but love is nevertheless the final result of crossing time because in the characters of Sara Connor and her son, John, human beings finally learn how to love the machine, the terminator, which is to say, the drive that can be redeemed by social desire. The terminator’s reappearance and the crisis of an approaching catastrophe bring about a temporal rupture that makes it possible to make up history as we go along, as Linda Hamilton’s Sara comments in a voice-over at one point. According to Benjamin, “History is the subject of a structure whose site is not homogeneous, empty time, but time filled by the presence of the now” (Illuminations 261). The presence of the now, or messianic time, is what the action movie has always explored as the real meaning of history, as the effect of the dialectical image it produces on the cinematic screen. In the time of the now, as the message of the future to the past suggests, “The future is not set; there is no fate but what we make for ourselves.” By learning to love the machine, we learn to love ourselves and to make ourselves into the machine that can sacrifice its drive–that is to say, its life–in order to transform its history into a narrative of hope.

     

    Before Titanic, The Abyss is Cameron’s most explicit love story in which intense action sequences and scenes that entail incredible alternations between life and death (i.e., characters die, either literally or figuratively, and then come back to life) are substituted for sex. It is also the movie whose history illustrates the problems a director like Cameron encounters in trying to produce his almost Blakean vision of the postmodern world in the framework of mass culture. There are two or more versions of Judgment Day; but I don’t find the special editions to be significantly different from the originally released version. The second version of The Abyss, originally released on laserdisc and videotape, is almost a different movie. The first half of the movie develops much more slowly and offers a more complex view of the relationship between the central couple, Bud and Lindsey Brigman (Ed Harris and Mary Elizabeth Mastrantonio). They are in the process of getting a divorce largely for reasons of career or, if you will, a conflict between the different goals of their separate life histories. In other words, they embody the typical bourgeois couple of a postmodern patriarchy in which the authority of the male is gradually losing ground. Bud tries to assert his authority by reminding Lindsey that her last name is the same as his, but she quickly dispels any illusion he may have about that. Whereas the first version of The Abyss leaves it at that, the second version makes it clear that Lindsey has already had a relationship with another man, though it seems to have come to an end. Ironically, the second version is more male-centered, more focused on the crisis of masculinity; and at least one female member of the crew of the deep-sea rig expresses her loyalty to Bud and criticizes Lindsey. In a way that anticipates the structure of Titanic, these ordinary social relations are transformed by a series of catastrophes that rupture normal time. After a nuclear submarine encounters an anomalous submerged entity and crashes, a unit of Navy seals is sent to the deep-sea rig to use it as a stepping-off point for examining the damage to the submarine. Various miscalculations during a hurricane cause the deep-sea rig to lose its lifeline to the surface. The leader of the seals (Michael Biehn) develops symptoms of paranoia due to high-pressure syndrome after retrieving a nuclear warhead from the submarine. Meanwhile, Lindsey and another crew member witness an underwater entity that appears to be an intelligent alien life-form. The paranoid seal intends to destroy the aliens with the nuclear device, which leads to the most intense action sequences in the film. In the process, Lindsey drowns and is revived, and Bud employs a special breathing fluid to dive to the bottom of a three-mile abyss in order to dismantle the nuclear warhead. At one point, Lindsey and the crew think Bud is dead when in fact he has been carried into the submerged city of the aliens.

     

    When I first saw this movie, I was mesmerized by the underwater sequences, although I thought the plot and visual style resembled that of a comic-book. Nonetheless, as in all of Cameron’s movies, the acting was energetic enough to make the unbelievable believable, or at least, in my case, to enable me to suspend disbelief. The one effect that really did not seem to work were the aliens, who look like humanoid jellyfish, and their angelic underwater machines. In the second version, however, the machines somehow make more sense to me because their allegorical functions within the plot are more obvious. Cameron employs the style of cinematic realism to develop the relationship between the central characters, but his disruption of space and time by locating the story under the sea during a catastrophe transforms reality into allegory that makes the aliens into the angelic machines who give the story its constructed meaning. In the second version, as the masters of some miraculous water technology, they produce a global tidal wave that reaches to the edge of every major city and then stops. Their purpose is to teach human beings a lesson about the appropriate use of technology before mankind destroys itself in a nuclear war and winter. In the context of Cameron’s ongoing exploration of humanity as a machine that has to make itself human by directly intervening in the historical process, these angelic machines (for it is almost impossible to distinguish the aliens themselves from the machines they make) seem to allegorize the utopian possibility of what a human being could become. They manifest what Susan Buck-Morss, in a reading of Benjamin, sees as the “very essence of socialist culture”: “the tendency… to fuse art and technology, fantasy and function, meaningful symbol and useful tool” (125-26). Such a socialism, in the present context, must be a utopian image; but the poetics of mass culture in Cameron’s movies suggests this very fusion as the real possibility of the contemporary culture industry to emancipate, in Benjamin’s own words, “the creative forms… from art, just as in the sixteenth century the sciences liberated themselves from philosophy” (qtd. in Buck-Morss 125). The Abyss concludes with a deus ex machina in which the aliens inexplicably succeed in doing what God or the gods have consistently failed to do: they save mankind not so much through the suspension of nature as through its recreation by technology that has been liberated from the domination of capital.

     

    The second version of the film begins with a quote from Nietzsche: “When you look long into an abyss, the abyss looks also into you.” In these movies, the abyss is messianic time in which the real structure of history is revealed as the self-creation of the collective human subject. What looks back from the abyss is what humanity ought to be–not some ideal humanity but one that has learned the ethical imperative that says, according to Lacan, “the only thing of which one can be guilty is of having given ground relative to one’s desire” (Lacan, Ethics, 319). This is the ethical imperative that opposes the morality of power, which says, “‘As far as desires are concerned, come back later. Make them wait’” (315). The act of remaining faithful to, or living in conformity with, one’s desire is not simply an act of selfishness or narcissism because, in the Lacanian system, desire is never strictly individual: it is always derived from a relation to the other, to the cultural unconscious, which finds expression in yet another formula: “‘There is no satisfaction for the individual outside of the satisfaction of all’” (292). Though we can only know and articulate our desire as individuals, it is never simply for the individual that desire seeks satisfaction in the object but for the socius that determines the individual in his or her being. The first version of The Abyss belies this message because the alternative is between the mad soldier who would use technology to destroy all of humankind to satisfy the demands of his paranoia and the reasonable employees of corporate capital who merely want to save their individual lives and the lives of other individuals (including the aliens). In the second version, there is no middle road: either technology (as the embodiment of the death drive) will annihilate humanity as the answer to the demand for absolute satisfaction that it articulates, or it will transfigure the human condition through the realization of collective human desire that exists presently in the cultural unconscious. Desire, of course, is a process, a temporal postponement of ends, a promise of collective satisfaction that will never be realized in utopian perfection but will always be strived for as the condition of human life. In every Cameron movie, with the possible exception of True Lies, there is no escaping the alternatives between destruction and creation, death and life, formal closure and perpetual process.

     

    True Lies could be the title of any Cameron movie, but it does seem to have a special significance for the movie that bears it. When I first saw True Lies, I was disappointed and even a little shocked. The movie is extremely misogynist at times; and its style has the gleam of commodified art without, as far as I could see, any redeeming allegorical significance. The gossip, at the time, was that the movie reflected the director’s unstable marital history and suffered from the absence of Gale Ann Hurd, who may have been responsible for the feminist subtext of the earlier films. Though that may be true, the feminism in Cameron’s movies, including Titanic, are primarily responses to social context and reflect the ambivalence of that context; already in The Abyss, there is a tension, if not outright contradiction, between misogynist representations (Lindsey is frequently labeled by others as, and even calls herself, “the cast-iron bitch”) and feminist thematics (understood as theoretically unsophisticated). In retrospect, True Lies would appear to be both a politically-retrograde entertainment and a satirical critique of one of the dominant representations of the masculine subject and of gender relationships in popular movies. In television interviews, Cameron said that the movie takes its inspiration from the spy thriller, particularly the James Bond movies. To me, the movie suggests that while Bond is usually seen as a philandering loner without any domestic attachments, he is also the government man who defends the status quo and as such must ultimately embody the ideology of the normative bourgeois masculine subject. In other words, if one scratches beneath the surface of Bond’s image, one finds Harry Tasker (Arnold Schwarzenegger), the secret agent who is also a family man. While Harry wages war against two-dimensional villains (in this case, utterly racist images of Near Eastern terrorists), the real battle is within the nuclear family between the bored wife (Jamie Lee Curtis) and the husband who lives only for his work. As a satire of the precursor of the action genre, the movie virtually deconstructs the Bond film to show that beneath its exotic surface it articulates the values of domesticity and patriarchal authority. Ultimately, Harry may not be that different from the sexually-inadequate used-car salesman (Bill Paxton) who pretends to be a secret agent in order to attract women: that is, the secret agent with a license to kill turns out to be the fantasy of the domestic masculine subject who cannot sexually satisfy his wife. The ending of the film, from this perspective, is doubly ironic. The condition of Harry’s return to the family in order to assume his domestic responsibilities (including his sexual responsibilities) is that his wife enters into the fantasy world of the secret agent. In this case, the feminist subtext of the earlier movies is turned on its head. The family survives because the dominant masculine subject recognizes its dependence on domestic space for its true sexual identity, and the woman who has effectively been imprisoned in that space discovers her liberation by entering the world of masculine fantasy. In the last scene of the movie, now that both husband and wife are secret agents, they encounter the weakling Paxton character again and humiliate him in public. The wedding of the feminist subject and the masculinist hero constitutes the disavowal of sexual inadequacy and domestic boredom. Though the representations of the world that the film projects are all lies, they are also true insofar as they articulate the ideological fantasies that cover the contradictions of the nuclear family as the “natural” social unit. These lies say something true without ever ceasing to be true lies.

    II. Dream Ship

     

    With the release of Titanic, all of the movies of James Cameron and all of the movies from which that work derives and to which it relates are dragged into the present, into a new constellation of historical images. (I refer not only to the action movies but to other spectacle films like Spartacus [1960] and Doctor Zhivago [1965], which Cameron has occasionally mentioned as the type of movies he was trying to emulate.) Benjamin insisted that materialist historiography cannot be satisfied with a linear history that follows “the sequence of events like the beads of a rosary.” “A historical materialist,” he says, “approaches a historical subject only where he encounters it as monad.” Such a monadic structure is a form that blasts “a specific era out of the homogeneous course of history”; but it can also blast “a specific work out of the lifework.” The monad that produces this effect derives from the constellation that the individual work forms with a specific earlier work or works, including, as in the case of Titanic, the life of a genre. As a result, “the lifework [or, in this case, the genre] is preserved in this work and at the same time canceled” (Illuminations 263). The term translated as “canceled” here is a form of the Hegelian sublation or Aufhebung. In other words, if the movie Titanic has the effect that I am claiming for it, it sublates or virtually transforms the historical meaning of the works I have referred to or analyzed in the first section of this essay–to the extent of virtually cancelling or negating their conventional meanings as commodities or pure entertainments–and makes possible the readings I have already performed.

     

    The first image in Titanic may lead the spectator to expect a nostalgia film, which, as Fredric Jameson suggests, transforms the past into a commodity that becomes a simulacrum of historical understanding in a present that has lost the sense of history per se (Jameson, Postmodernism 1-51). I refer to the shots of the R.M.S. Titanic pulling away from the wharf while the passengers wave as the initial credits appear on the screen. These images are captured on slow-speed film and convey the hazy quality of old photographs to create the image of the “dream ship” that the central female character, Rose Dewitt Bukater (Kate Winslet), refers to later in the movie. This nostalgic image corresponds to what I will call, improvising on Benjamin, the historical image, i.e., an image of the pastness of the past that enters the present as a reification of time, something we can consume without disrupting the present, without disturbing our historical understanding, so to speak. Yet almost immediately, after the title appears on the screen over the image of a segment of ocean devoid of human forms, there is a cut to two small submarines (deep submersibles) on the way down to the bottom of the sea. In a few moments, the submarines flash their searchlights on the prow of the Titanic. Since Cameron filmed the actual wreckage of the Titanic with the help of his brother, who designed the mobile titanium housing for the 35-millimeter camera operated by remote control from another submarine, one can only assume that this first glimpse of the wreck is the actual Titanic. This documentary footage may not have been necessary to produce the effect of reality in this movie, but once the spectators know it is there it becomes a part of the experience. In effect, this piece of the real deflates or erases the initial dream image, the historical image, and substitutes for it an allegorical image. Again improvising on Benjamin, the allegorical image is an image of the ruins of time, an image of something that has been separated from its original context and meaning so that now we must attribute a meaning to it. It no longer signifies the pastness of the past as an object of consumption but the moral and ultimately transcendental significance of history, the moral truth that must be derived from decay and ruin. If the historical image turns the past into a commodity fetish that gives pleasure through consumption, the allegorical image moralizes history as an image of the vanity of time. It is a piece of the past that survives into the present as a message that cannot change anything but nonetheless reminds us of change itself. The whole movie pivots, so to speak, on the tension between the historical image and the allegorical image; but, though that tension is never resolved, it gives ground finally to the dialectical image as the disruptive embodiment of social contradiction that tears the fabric of time and makes possible the articulation of hope not as the resolution of contradiction or tension but as the manifestation of contradiction, its material articulation.

     

    At the most general level, Titanic as a dialectical image articulates the social contradiction between demand and desire in class society. I take these words from the work of Lacan, but I am going to give them specific meanings in the context of this discussion. In my view, since the terms “demand” and “desire” can both translate what Freud called a wish, the distinction between these two terms is a refinement of the Freudian theory of wish-fulfillment. Stated simply, demand arises out of the needs of the body that take the form of the drive in the symbolic realm of language and culture. Like the infant who has learned how to manipulate symbols in order to make the demand for food or comfort but who has not yet mastered the reality principle that requires the acceptance of postponement and partial satisfactions, the subject of demand seeks an absolute and final satisfaction, either through death, which extinguishes all needs, or through the construction of an illusion. Though for the infant and for most adults that illusion may take the form of a dream or a fantasy, on the broader social level of a class society it takes the form of value and can be associated with capital, property, the commodity, and class identity itself. In the movie, this illusion is the image of the Titanic as a dream ship, an enormous and socially totalizing commodity. This dream ship answers the social demand for a reality that works, that can fulfill all human needs, including the need for a social arrangement that allows each subject to coexist with others in such a way as to permit a life without terrible suffering and pain, and that can permit some limited free play to desire, a free play that constitutes hope. Unfortunately, such free play is also meant to coexist with the absolute satisfactions of power and privilege, which can only be realized through the accumulation of wealth and the exclusion and/or control of the other. The class system as a fantasy found one of its most beautiful expressions in the R.M.S. Titanic, the fantasy of an order in which everything and every person has their proper place and value without contradiction or conflict–in other words, without the unsolicited intrusions of desire.

     

    The ambivalent nature of the Titanic as the answer to demand discovers its limits in the two central male characters. The embodiment of desire’s subversive play in the movie is Jack Dawson (Leonardo DiCaprio), who defines his own allegorical significance in the first line he speaks, “When you got nothing, you’ve got nothing to lose.” Jack is nothing but hope and desire, and ironically the Titanic answers his need for a reality that permits him the freedom to pursue desire’s enigmatic goals. For Jack, desire is an end in itself, but an end that the dream ship seems to make possible. In accepting the illusion that the Titanic offers him, Jack evades the contradiction between his desire as a form of hope and the demand for social closure and control that animates the class system, though in evading this contradiction he also remains faithful to the ethics of desire by refusing to give ground. As he says, standing on the prow of the Titanic as it cuts through the ocean, “I’m the king of the world”; but he is not referring to his power over others or to his ability to make the world and its people conform to his fantasy but to the irrepressible force of his own desire. Jack is no revolutionary; but the desire he channels is dangerous and makes possible revolutions (including the long revolution that is cultural change itself). At the opposite extreme of the social world on the Titanic is Cal Hockley (Billy Zane), the almost comically arrogant manifestation of pure class privilege. For Cal, the answer to demand can only be possession and domination of the other. The phrase that Walter Lord attributed to a deck hand (42) goes to Cal in Cameron’s screenplay: “God himself could not sink this ship!” Cal’s bombastic behavior has offended many reviewers, even the ones who like the movie; but in my view he is an essential ingredient of the movie’s constellatory structure, its melodrama. Nothing, not even God, can threaten the social order that Cal fantasizes as somehow the product of his own will. He constantly proclaims throughout the movie that a “real man makes his own luck,” though it is rather obvious that this man’s self-made character is the product of inherited wealth and privilege (which, in the end, is a commentary on the ideology of self-making itself). What Cal does make, though not in isolation as he imagines but as a member of the dominant class, is the fantasy of ownership and the natural rule of class. He treats not only his possessions but his fiancé as forms of private property and demands from Rose that she stay in her place and perform the functions for which, in his view, she has been designed and for which he has paid. I refer to this ownership and natural rule of class as a fantasy because Cal cannot see the contradictions that these social relations generate, contradictions that have the potential of destroying what seems natural and bringing about a social transformation.

     

    Desire is something different from demand, though they are intimately related to one another. Desire involves postponement and compromise, the satisfaction of needs consistent with the existence of others. Desire has these qualities because it always responds to the reality principle, which means that it takes the other into account, even to the point of identifying the desire of the subject with the desire of the other. The true object of desire can never be owned and always remains just out of reach, even though it enables the subject to satisfy its needs without succumbing to the destructive force of the drive and its demands. Jack wants Rose not as the answer to his demand for pleasure and comfort but as the condition of his desire. At least one authority on the historical Titanic, whom I heard through the barrage of media commentaries on this movie, has observed that the romance between Jack and Rose is the most glaring historical anomaly in the film. Such a relationship would have been impossible because there could have been no contact between a person from first class and one from steerage. One should always be suspicious of such historical certainties, for there are always exceptions to every rule; there are no laws without the possibility of transgressions. Yet this challenge to historical verisimilitude foregrounds the dialectic of desire that generates the contradiction between the fantasies of demand, which take the ultimate form of the commodity itself, and the displacements of desire, which in a sense dissolve the fantasies that bring desire into being. As Lacan stressed, desire is what remains after you subtract need from demand. It is the real part that derives from the imaginary whole, the satisfaction that can only leave you unsatisfied and longing for the other who always remains internal to desire itself and just out of reach.

     

    Quite simply, the passionate relationship between Jack and Rose arises from the class system and the domination of capital that makes Rose into a commodity and Jack into something like the abjected other that I will call the flaneur. The latter position is one not without some transformative power that Jack channels, a power that derives from desire itself; but ironically the condition of that desire is social exclusion and repression. Old Rose, who narrates this tale in the present, expresses the extreme limit of that repression in describing her state of mind as she boarded the Titanic in 1912. To everyone else it was the “ship of dreams,” but to her it was a “slave ship.” She is going back to America “in chains” as the chattel property of Cal Hockley. Later in the movie, Jack aligns himself with this social position after he joins Cal Hockley’s party for dinner in the first class section of the ship. As he leaves, he tells Rose that he needs to go back to rowing with the other slaves in steerage. Twice in the movie Jack is literally chained with handcuffs and even dies with the chains still dangling from his wrists. Rose has another kind of chain attached to her, one that is most fully revealed in the scene with Cal as she faces the mirror in her state room. Cal takes out the Heart of the Ocean diamond necklace and places it around her neck, seemingly as an expression of his love for her but more realistically as an estimation of how much he values her as a commodity. Earlier in the movie, Rose has demonstrated her taste for modern art (in the form of early Picasso); but in the present scene, Rose herself manifests Cal’s taste in art. In the shots of her in the mirror, she takes on the appearance of a pre-Raphaelite woman, a sort of human jewel for which the mirror functions as a frame or setting, an object that can also be possessed by Cal’s masculine gaze. If we carry this logic to its conclusion, we could say that Cal’s taste in art is more conservative than Rose’s. She prefers the modernist view that fragments and deconstructs the subject, whereas Cal identifies with an older aesthetic that reduces the subject to an object of pure beauty. While the modernist representation tries to subvert its own effect of transforming the real into an aesthetic commodity, the earlier aesthetic representation makes beauty into the ideal commodity, the pure fantasy, an art for art’s sake that ironically answers Cal’s demand for the ownership of the other. Rose is not the recipient of the diamond necklace but an extension of it, and she is enchained by her status as a commodity. Though Cal wants Rose to satisfy his sexual demand, he really wants her beauty for its own sake; that is to say, he wants those qualities of class and physical grace that mark her as an ideal trophy wife, a woman who resembles a work of art to the extent that she can be purchased and displayed as the signifier of a natural class distinction.

     

    As she ties her daughter’s body into the corset that makes it a more perfect commodity, Rose’s mother reminds her that the family money is gone and that the only thing that can save the two women from a descent into the working class is Rose’s marriage. She also reminds her of what she (the mother) takes to be the natural cause of this situation: “We’re women–our choices are never easy.” Ironically, there can be no doubt that what initially draws Jack’s gaze to Rose is precisely her “picture-perfect” beauty, corset and all. He sits on a lower deck staring up at the forbidden object of desire, the symbol of masculine class privilege, on the upper deck. Of course, Jack, the Irish-American, is immediately reminded by his Irish friend in steerage that he has no chance of achieving that object of desire and so might as well desist. His friend points out, in other words, that such desire violates the very system that calls it into being. The future trophy wife of Cal Hockley has been chosen precisely for her ability to capture and mesmerize the gaze of other men and thus to bring honor and social distinction on a man who considers himself to be, as Rose says, one of the “masters of the universe.” She is there to be looked at not just because, as feminist film theorists have sometimes argued, this is a Hollywood movie and the women in such mass-cultural works function as spectacle, as something to be looked at and consumed by the masculine gaze. The movie certainly exploits this cinematic convention, but it also discloses the source of this convention in the social system of the Titanic, a class system that contradicts itself when it becomes the condition of a desire that has the potential to undermine the system itself. The power of Jack’s gaze to consume the image of the woman as commodity derives from his marginalized status as the social vagabond or flaneur.

     

    Benjamin, in his reading of Baudelaire and the Paris arcades in the nineteenth century, identified the flaneur as a type of modern individual under capitalism, an individual who first appears in the nineteenth century but who anticipates figures of Benjamin’s own time and, as I will argue, beyond that time. Within the class system of the Titanic, the flaneur is by no means a member of the proletariat, a class position given representation in the movie by the stokers and other men who work in the red light of the boiler rooms and who are the first to die after the collision with the iceberg. Though Jack is certainly a “poor guy,” as he says to Rose, he must be distinguished, as Benjamin stressed about the flaneur, from the typical pedestrian who “would let himself be jostled by the crowd.” On the contrary, like the flaneur, Jack requires “elbow room” and is “unwilling to forego the life of the gentleman of leisure” (Benjamin, Illuminations 172; Charles Baudelaire 54). When Cal sees Jack in a borrowed tuxedo and remarks that one could almost mistake him for a gentleman, he says more than he knows. Jack may not have Cal’s social power or pedigree, but he has seized for himself some of the leisure time and the seemingly pointless existence that used to be the exclusive privilege of the aristocratic gentleman. Jack as flaneur parodies the gentleman but at the same time secretly identifies with what the gentleman has–the appearance of freedom. A figure “on the threshold… of the bourgeois class,” the flaneur moves through the commodity world “ostensibly to look around, yet in reality to find a buyer” (Benjamin, Reflections 156). Jack, after all, is an artist; and though he has not yet found a buyer, he has chosen a way of life that places hope in the aesthetic marketplace. When Rose’s mother crudely interrogates Jack about how he is able to find the means to travel, he explains that he works only as much as he needs to in order to maintain his vagabond existence. Ironically, the upper-classes who have inherited, stolen (in the ideological guise of free enterprise), or married into their wealth maintain the puritan ideal of the value of labor as the purpose of human existence. Most of the first-class passengers who meet Jack find him amusing and perhaps even enjoy the way he mirrors their own lifestyles. He shows that the image of wealth can be transformed into a commodity and then appropriated by someone who is not wealthy but who desires the image of freedom that wealth seems to make possible. Jack anticipates men like Henry Miller or, from a more socially marginalized location, Langston Hughes, who represent the survival of the flaneur in the first half of the twentieth century, men and sometimes women who could move between America and Europe and beyond, without sufficient funds or resources, and work as little as possible while enjoying an unprecedented freedom. In the second half of this century, such freedom becomes more and more difficult to achieve, perhaps because it is such a threat to the class system itself; but as the proletariat withers away as a class, a new group is emerging, perhaps something different from a class, that combines some of the qualities of the original proletariat and some of the qualities of the petty-bourgeois flaneur. I refer to the army of service workers and young people destined to be service workers, who labor in order to enjoy the pleasures of leisure time, however limited those pleasures may be. Though these people work more than they travel, they are able to function as flaneurs by continually visiting the three late twentieth-century versions of the Paris arcades: the cineplex movie theater, the television set with attached video player, and the computer. Today it is possible to travel and wander through the mazes of commodity culture while sitting still.

     

    According to Benjamin, the flaneur is “someone abandoned in the crowd.” For this reason,

     

    he shares the situation of the commodity. He is not aware of this special situation, but this does not diminish its effect on him and it permeates him blissfully like a narcotic that can compensate him for many humiliations. The intoxication to which the flaneur surrenders is the intoxication of the commodity around which surges the stream of customers. (Charles Baudelaire 55)

     

    As the flaneur, Jack is the character in the movie who embodies or represents the spectator. Like Jack, the spectator is also abandoned in the crowd and shares the situation of the commodity in his or her longing for a buyer, that is to say, for the social capital that would make it possible to translate the wish-demand for pleasure and happiness into a reality that would function as the fantasy of absolute satisfaction. The pleasure Jack takes from the Titanic, as he stands on the prow with his arms spread out as if he were flying, is pleasure not only in the dream ship as commodity fetish but in his own identification with the dream ship; and the spectator enjoys a similar identification with the movie Titanic as the intoxicating experience of the commodity (something that cost over 200 million dollars). This identification with the commodity gives Jack the freedom to want what the system implicitly and explicitly tells him he cannot have. In other words, the wealth of capital has created the Titanic in which it is possible for a “poor guy” like Jack to look at and long for the freedoms and pleasures of dominant culture, including the freedom and pleasure of loving someone like Rose; but capital has also created the movie Titanic, which makes it possible for the spectator to desire what Jack desires. As a dialectical image, the Titanichas been torn from its original context in which it was a wish image of early twentieth-century culture and dragged into the present in which it makes visible a dialectical transformation of the original Marxist concept of the class struggle. In the present context, it is no longer the proletariat as a class which constitutes the exclusive site of capitalism’s internal contradiction and, as such, the possibility of a social revolution that would destroy capitalism itself. Today there is no single class formation that occupies such a critical relation to the mode of production, but there is a configuration of desiring subjects which embraces people from different locations in the social system. In addition to declining numbers of industrial workers, there are underpaid service workers who include, among their ranks, many women, young people, and minorities; and there are the unemployed, the underemployed, the homeless, and so forth. Like Jack, these people are not just victims of commodity culture (though many of them are victims and experience brutal and unjustifiable economic oppression); they also find in commodity culture the support of their desires, the very thing that keeps their hopes alive. Jack sees in Rose as a commodity the very support his desire needs in order to reproduce itself; yet, even though the first image he takes from Rose derives as much from her status as a commodity as does the image Cal takes from her, Jack’s desire exceeds the demand that brings it into being and dissolves the illusion of the commodity so that Rose becomes for him something real, something he cannot know or control absolutely.

     

    The passion between Jack and Rose transforms the Titanic from a commodity, the dream ship as metaphor that articulates the fantasy of a closed class system without contradiction, into the collective body of social desire. Benjamin remarked at the end of his essay on surrealism that “The collective is a body, too”; but he probably did not mean to suggest that such a body can be hailed into existence by propaganda or transformed through the act of dreaming. He spoke of a “profane illumination” in the “image sphere” that makes possible the liberation of the collective body through the mediation of “the physis that is being organized for it through technology.” The nature (physis) produced by humans is the technology in which “body and image so interpenetrate that all revolutionary tension becomes bodily collective innervation, and all the bodily innervations of the collective become revolutionary discharge” (Reflections 192). In other words, in the realm of the image, the collective body, the sensorium or bodily ground of human perceptions, is restructured; through the transference of nerve-forces or collective desires to the sleeping parts of the social body, a new body begins to awaken; and something emerges similar to what Raymond Williams called a “structure of feeling,” a bodily mode of understanding that precedes conceptual understanding, “not feeling against thought but thought as felt and feeling as thought: practical consciousness of a present kind, in a living and interrelating continuity” (132). Through the passion of Jack and Rose, transfers of feeling take place that break through or explode the Titanic as a metaphor of social harmony through natural hierarchy. The condition of this explosion, however, is the pessimism that underlies all of the movie’s representations from the first images of the dream ship leaving its dock with the promise of a fulfilled social totality. As reviewers love to remind potential spectators, we know how the movie will end from the beginning; and we know that this ending is more than a tragic representation of the universal human condition. The Titanic wreck that we see at the bottom of the sea is real, even though it is nothing but an image, a representation made possible by technology. The fate of the Titanic is real because it has already happened; the wreckage is real, but the images of it become a commentary on the very technologies that bring them to the spectator, on the future of technology itself and the prospects of the culture that is based on it.

     

    Unlike most mass-cultural movies that entice us with the promise of critique and then hand us over to the dream world of capital (movies like Jerry Maguire or even a classic like Preston Sturges’s Sullivan’s Travels), Titanic becomes the object of its own critique (though not necessarily of the director’s critique), an image of the real that discloses its own technology as a piece of the real it imagines. Benjamin criticized the program of bourgeois parties for being a “bad poem on springtime, filled to bursting with metaphors,” like Ronald Reagan’s “Morning in America” speech. He criticized a false socialist imagination that glorifies “a condition in which all act ‘as if they were angels,’ and everyone has as much ‘as if he were rich,’ and everyone lives ‘as if he were free.’” Ironically, this could be the world of American television sitcoms. To such optimism, he opposes the “communist answer” of surrealism: “And that means pessimism all along the line…. Mistrust in the fate of literature, mistrust in the fate of freedom, mistrust in the fate of European humanity, but three times mistrust in all reconciliation: between classes, between nations, between individuals” (Reflections 190-91). Cameron’s Titanic is a surrealist work of art to this extent: it gives us an image of the real as impossible. As spectators see the image of the Titanic sweep across the widescreen in a high-angle shot, they know that the image is too real to be real even if they do not know that the characters on the deck or the water curling against the sides of the hull are animated. My point is that the movie displays a reality and a sense of history as the uncanny, as a constructed image that discloses its own conditions of production not because we see the limitations of representation but because we recognize the incredible powers of technology to reinvent the past. Some of the first reviewers of the movie expressed their awe at the sheer power of cinematic technology itself. Can they really do this? Is it possible? But if the Titanic embodies within the movie the fate of the technology that the movie itself exploits in order to bring us this image, it also manifests the death drive that animates technology and that can only be redeemed by desire. Cameron has not left the terminator behind because in this movie the R.M.S. Titanic is the terminator: not a machine that looks human but a machine that frames and makes possible what we call the human. Through their passion, Jack and Rose redeem this machine by making it into the instrument and support of desire; but they cannot prevent the collision between the machine as the embodiment of the death drive and the real that it seeks to master and possess. Death–even the death of a civilization–cannot be avoided; but it can be redeemed as the support of desire.

     

    In Cameron’s script, the love story is not very original; but the movie transforms it into the poetry of the flesh and, if it works for anyone, it works for that reason. As early film theorist Rudolph Arnheim and Benjamin both understood, in movies the actor is a prop (see Benjamin, Illuminations 230). This is especially true of Cameron’s Titanic in which casting is more critical to the movie’s production of the dialectical image than the script itself. I would even argue that some of what the movie cannot say escapes the censor through the physical mediation of the actors. Kate Winslet has commented that it was a challenge for her to play the lover of a man more beautiful that she is; and this remark seems to refer to something more than conventional masculine good looks. Whether one agrees with her assessment or not, the compulsory heterosexuality that the movie does not disturb creates its own sort of self-subversion in the representation of a heterosexual love affair in which the man could not be said to symbolize the masculine heterosexual norm. I’m not suggesting that we have a covert “lesbian” romance here but that, in this movie, there is no escaping the interimplication of normative heterosexuality, patriarchy, and capitalism that find their embodiment in Cal and a point of resistance in Jack. The latter’s sexual ambivalence, or multivalence, suggests that his desire trangresses not only class but gender and sexual boundaries as well.

     

    Initially, Rose resists the appeal of Jack’s desire to her desire; but when she watches a little girl being trained, as she was trained, to be a lady, she abruptly surrenders to her own desire. Eventually, she says to Cal on the deck of the sinking Titanic, “I’d rather be his whore than your wife.” In this context, the term “whore” is a complex signifier. Benjamin saw the prostitute as a dialectical image in her own right: she is “saleswoman and wares in one” (Reflections 157). Rose doesn’t proclaim herself to be a whore so much as she deconstructs the relationship between whore and wife. She would rather be Jack’s whore because she realizes that, in this social context, the whore is only the mirror image of the wife; by inverting the relation between whore and wife, she takes possession of her own body and subverts its commodity status by giving it up to the general or unrestricted economy of desire, by which I mean an economy that cannot be reduced to a master code or system of values. Rose subverts her status as the commodity by giving herself to Jack in an act of symbolic exchange that cannot be translated into capital or any other finalized value. Before the collision, she asks Jack to draw her in the nude wearing only the Heart of the Ocean. In this scene, she virtually transforms the relationship between her body and the jewel that signifies its commodity status: she gives the term “priceless” a literal meaning by transforming the jewel into the symbol of the desiring body. She says that she doesn’t want another picture of herself as a “porcelain doll” (an uncanny remark since, at the beginning of the movie, the spectator sees the present-day image of the doll’s face in the wreckage of the Titanic). Instead, she gives her body to Jack’s gaze not only as an object to be enjoyed but as the sublime of object of desire, which, as Slavoj Zizek insists, is the “embodiment of Nothing” (Sublime Object 206). Her body becomes a sublime object not because, in drawing her, Jack’s gaze is disinterested in the Kantian sense but because her body fills his eye with the desire of the other that he tries to express in the drawing. Her body is not the symptom of his lack or need–the answer to his demand for pleasure or fulfillment–but the embodiment of desire itself; and desire is not a thing in itself but the Nothing, the desire for desire, that every thing, every commodity, tries to substitute itself for. The shots in this scene intercut between extreme closeups of Jack’s gaze, his hand drawing, and Rose’s body; then an extreme closeup of Rose’s eye slowly dissolves into an extreme closeup of Old Rose’s eye on the salvage ship in present time. And this is done as if to suggest that while the body may dissolve into age the desire that it supports continues as the absolute condition of life.

     

    Rose’s gaze has answered Jack’s gaze since in giving him her body as the sublime object she only returns his gift to her on the prow of the Titanic when, in effect, he teaches her to fly by transforming the ship itself into the support of desire. Jack originally saved Rose from suicide at the ship’s stern; but in this scene, with a red sunset in the background, he teaches her to transform her own death drive into a life force, and the Titanic, as the embodiment of the death drive, into the embodiment of Nothing, the sublime object that materializes, in the words of Lacan, “the fact that desire is nothing more than the metonymy of the discourse of demand. It is change as such.” To the extent that sublimation refers to “satisfaction without repression,” it articulates itself not through the negation of demand and the death drive that animates it but through the metonymic displacement of demand that we call desire, which seeks “not a new object or a previous object, but the change of object in itself” (Ethics 293). The sublime object is the embodiment of Nothing because it represents change in itself, change or the desire for desire as the end or purpose of life. Jack teaches Rose to see the Titanic as such a sublime object, what I have already called the collective body of social desire. Together they displace its function as commodity or the slave ship and make it into the materialization of social change. At that moment, starting from an angled side shot of Rose and Jack standing above the ship’s prow, there is another spectacular dissolve from the past to the present as the prow of the Titanic comes to rest as the wreckage at the bottom of the sea with the fading image of the lovers still visible.

     

    After this, as Old Rose continues her story, the lovers retreat to Rose’s stateroom where Jack draws her. Old Rose calls this scene “the most erotic moment of my life,” but then adds, “at least up to that time.” This last statement is important because Jack as the sublime object of Rose’s desire cannot be the end of desire but only a beginning. Rose takes the drawing and puts it in Cal’s safe with a note, addressed to Cal, commenting that now he can keep the diamond and the woman locked up together. Then the policeman-turned-valet Spicer Lovejoy (David Warner), whose job is to enforce the rule of class, comes into the room to prevent transgressive pleasures. Rose and Jack escape through the back; and though for a moment Jack wants his drawing, he leaves it behind. The drawing as the expression of desire is not allowed to become a commodified work of art. In these scenes, Jack and Rose embody a transgressive desire that cuts through and denaturalizes the class system. By ignoring these social divisions, they end up in the boiler room where the stokers, so to speak, feed the heart of the beast. Their presence in these locations is both absurd and subversive and culminates in their love-making inside what I take to be the Renault in the cargo hold. Once again escaping disciplinary agents, they emerge from the depths of the ship onto the forward well deck just minutes before the collision. At that moment, Rose tells Jack that she intends to disembark with him; and when he remarks that she’s crazy, she says, “It doesn’t make any sense, that’s why I trust it.” The Titanic has become the ship of desire.

     

    III. Sublime Terror

     

    As the articulation of a structure of feeling, the Titanic disaster in the movie takes place at the moment when desire has momentarily disrupted the order of class society. Even the lookouts and First-Officer Murdoch are appreciatively watching Rose and Jack just before they look up and see the iceberg. The latter is what Lacan would call the answer of the real to the impulses of desire. It does not invalidate desire, but it reminds us that desire does not find the end to its quest in a utopia or in a narrative of the usual Hollywood sort. It reminds the spectator that if there is to be any hope, which is the real goal of desire, it can only come from the most pessimistic vision as to the direction in which the current social order is heading. As a dialectical image, the collision and sinking of the Titanic articulates the fate of class society and thus embodies what Fredric Jameson would call the “absent cause” of contemporary culture. It is not the Titanic disaster as an actual historical event that is the absent cause but the image of its destruction as the embodiment of a social process. This process is history in the specific way that Jameson speaks of it as the “experience of necessity”–necessity itself understood not as a type of content but as the “inexorable form of events,” the formal limits of our ability to imagine and understand the meaning of the world in which we live. In Cameron’s movie, the Titanic‘s collision tears open the process of time so that we see the event not as something that took place long ago, an event in relation to which we are now in a convenient position to mourn and regret the loss of life; on the contrary, the collision takes place now and reveals the forms of temporal change from which we cannot escape. The movie shows that, in Jameson’s words, “History is what hurts, it is what refuses desire and sets inexorable limits to individual as well as collective praxis, which its ‘ruses’ turn into grisly and ironic reversals of their overt intention” (102). Yet history is also what makes desire possible in the first place as the metonymy or displacement of demand. It wasn’t desire that drove the Titanic toward its collision with the iceberg that shattered the dream and the fantasy of the unsinkable ship; it was the demand of class society for a reality that would justify its own existence, of a configuration of power and knowledge that would express the natural authority of the ruling classes and legitimate their claim to be the masters of the universe. Desire tries to break through this fantasy; but if it is not simply to construct another fantasy and to succumb to the same drive that creates the demand for a closed and oppressive reality, it must confront the real, the absent cause as the horror that social change will necessarily entail.

     

    In other words, the Titanic cannot be stopped from meeting its fate because, as every spectator knows, it has already happened. The real question is not how do we prevent the Titanic from sinking? but how do we take hope from the violence of history? As I said before, the action movie is about hope and the desire for social change; and from the instant the iceberg is sighted by the lookouts in the crow’s nest, Cameron’s Titanic becomes an action movie. Even before the message of the lookouts reaches him, Murdoch sees the iceberg and flies into action. The music, the sound-effects, the fast editing–everything at this point contributes to the feeling that time itself has been torn open in such a way as to reveal its inner structure as the signifier of desire; and the spectators are drawn into this temporal structure and enveloped by it. I have already suggested that in the action movie the plot remains relatively unmotivated. In Titanic, the plot, though based on actual history, becomes the occasion for action sequences that are not essential to its development, though they are essential to the structure of feeling that the movie produces.

     

    When Rose and Jack come to warn Cal and Rose’s mother about the imminent danger, Lovejoy slips the Heart of the Ocean into Jack’s pocket, which leads to his arrest and detainment in the hold of the ship. For the second time Jack is in chains (the first time being when he saved Rose’s life at the stern of the ship). Now it is up to Rose to save him, a task which she undertakes after she witnesses the ethical bankruptcy of her mother and fiancé in a crisis. The mother wonders if the lifeboats will be boarded by class and worries that they may be uncomfortably crowded. Rose angrily explains that there aren’t enough boats and half of the people on the ship are going to die. Cal remarks, “Not the better half.” Revolted, and proclaiming that she would rather be Jack’s whore than Cal’s wife, Rose is off to save Jack. This action sequence hardly contributes to the documentary representation of what happened on the Titanic when it sank; but it does create another kind of effect. Rose runs through the ship, finds the ship’s designer Thomas Andrews and learns where Jack would be held, reaches him but can’t find the key to the handcuffs, runs around looking for help, almost gives up and then finds an ax, runs back to Jack and, while closing her eyes, breaks the handcuff chains with the ax. Then the two of them rush back toward the boat deck but find that the passages out of steerage have been blocked. Eventually, with the help of other steerage passengers, they break through and finally reach the boat deck. Cal finds them as Jack is trying to persuade Rose to get on a boat. Cal suggests that he and Jack will escape on another boat, though he has no intention of helping Jack. Rose gets on the lifeboat; but as it is lowered, she suddenly leaps from the boat and grabs hold of one of the lower decks. She joins Jack at the foot of the Grand Staircase, but Cal suddenly grabs Lovejoy’s revolver and starts firing at them. In an action sequence that momentarily recalls the Terminator movies, they must rush back into the hold of the ship where they have more adventures and overcome another barrier before they find their way back to the boat deck. Now obviously this is all rather contrived, but it nonetheless creates the intense feeling of temporal disruption. It resembles the sort of dream in which you rush to escape something but no matter how fast and furiously you move you get nowhere. Though the body discharges an enormous amount of energy in motion, it can’t fill the time that seems to move at a snail’s pace. Jack and Rose embody the intensity of life, the intensity of desire, in the face of a reality that hurts, that cannot be avoided or displaced but only lived through.

     

    All of these movements aim at drawing the spectators into the event and not at keeping them at a safe distance from the documented past. Cameron’s movie has been called a “quasi-Marxist epic,” while Cameron himself said, during the making of Titanic, “We’re holding just short of Marxist dogma” (Brown and Ansen 64; Maslin E18). Cameron has also said that he is uncomfortable with great wealth or great poverty and attributes “the evils of the world… to the concentration of wealth and power with a few” (Brown and Ansen 66). Cameron’s intention, however, cannot explain the global popularity of the movie, which in my view derives primarily from the formal properties of the supergenre. In effect, the form of the action movie transforms the historical disaster into a politically-charged image of violence that expresses a desire and produces an ambivalent pleasure, an image of violence that solicits and gives expression to the fundamentally ambiguous attitude of the Western and non-Western subject toward the dominant social system of the late twentieth-century global community. One could almost call it an act of cultural terrorism, though the word “terrorism” may seem inappropriate to describe the representation of an event that has no agent, of a disaster that, if it was not a pure accident, was at worst the outcome of bad judgment and bad luck. Yet one has only to compare Cameron’s movie with the more classical and, in the view of one cultural historian, modernist book, A Night to Remember, to see that Cameron has done something quite different. As Steven Biel argues, “A Night to Remember embeds a modernist event in a modernist form: fragmented, uncertain, open-ended” (Biel 152-54). Another cultural historian has identified the movie version of A Night to Remember as “postmodernist” (Heyer 130), but that term applies more properly to Cameron’s movie. However, in order to demonstrate why this is so, I will have to make a detour into the field of literary criticism.

     

    In a significant reading of James Joyce’s Ulysses, the literary critic Enda Duffy has explored the response of “subaltern” subjects (i.e., colonized or otherwise socio-economically exploited subjects) to images of violence, particularly as they seem to bear on the positions of women in situations of social conflict. As Duffy demonstrates, postcolonial literature from Irish writers like Joyce to the “third-world” authors of the second half of the twentieth century is replete with images of terrorist violence and the ambivalent response to it of those subjects who are either members of or identify with oppressed groups. In particular, Duffy focuses on the poem by Seamus Heaney, “Punishment,” in which the author records his witnessing of the public punishment of Catholic women in Northern Ireland for fraternizing with the British army: he “stood dumb” and “would connive/ in civilized outrage/ yet understand the exact/ and tribal, intimate revenge” (qtd. in Duffy 131). The two emotions that Heaney experiences in this context combine the official attitude toward terrorism (“civilized outrage”), which one associates with the dominant state formations, and the subaltern’s feeling of complicity with such violence (“tribal, intimate revenge”), which crosses the space between public and private life and reveals the complicity of individual desires with social domination and social resistance. In the Heaney poem, women become both the objects of social revenge and the source of guilt because, as Duffy notes, they occupy a unique position in colonial or subaltern culture: they “represent both the subaltern’s fear of colonial power as the imposition of consumer culture, a culture where women’s bodies are commodities, and at the same time the site of utter abjection, where oppression seems to legitimize kinds of resistance suggestive of terrorist actions” (Duffy 139).

     

    Though the Titanic is not a postcolonial work of art, it nevertheless addresses the subalternity of gender and class identity in capitalist culture. For example, Rose represents, first, the commodified female body that is offered by her mother as a sacrifice to the class system and as the ticket of admission for herself and her daughter to the comforts and privileges of upper-class society; and, second, she represents the abject body that seeks escape from social oppression on the “slave ship” through death. As I have argued, Jack is both attracted and intimidated by the culture of the commodity that Rose embodies as she stands above him on the first-class deck. At the same time, on the stern of the ship when she tries to kill herself, there can be little doubt that Jack, even as he rescues her, takes a certain pleasure from this “intimate revenge” on the “rich girl.” As she hangs over the side of the ship in his grasp, she’s the one looking up and he’s the one looking down. Later, however, Jack identifies with Rose as another subaltern subject; and when she tries to break away from the social order into which she was born, she inspires Jack to take risks and engage in acts that are subversive of the class system. In this way, the movie constructs a position for the spectator that requires a certain identification with something like a subaltern subject–or, in this case, a class subject. As I said before, Jack Dawson is probably Irish-American; and he aligns himself with an Irish national, Tommy Ryan, and an Italian, Fabrizio de Rossi. In the movie, Tommy, after fighting his way up from steerage quarters, is eventually shot in ambiguous circumstances by the ship’s First Officer Murdoch who then kills himself, while Fabrizio heroically struggles to cut the ropes on one of the lifeboats before he is crushed by a collapsing smokestack. Dominant press reports of the sinking sometimes demonized the Italian steerage passengers, suggesting that they tried to save themselves by storming a lifeboat full of women and children, even though there is no evidence that such an event had taken place. By the early twentieth century, the Irish were leaving behind their subaltern status in American society, while the Italians and other “new” immigrants from Europe were among the new subalterns (see Biel 18-21).

     

    In other words, Cameron’s Titanic constructs an ambivalent “subaltern” view of the great ship’s destruction, one that solicits both our “civilized outrage” and sorrow at the horrific disaster and our “intimate” complicity with the “revenge” of nature or God or fate or history (depending on your viewpoint) on the brutality of class society. The agent of the terrorism that constitutes the sinking of the Titanic in this movie is the spectator. The movie’s portrayal of the class system and its inherent injustice invites the spectator’s desire to align him- or herself with the desire of Jack and Rose and to experience the disaster as simultaneously a horrific event and a condition of hope. Unlike the neutral, disinterested representations in the movie version of A Night to Remember, the destruction of the Titanic in Cameron’s movie is not an accident but a judgment. Cameron does not vilify every member of the upper-classes: Molly Brown becomes a sort of hero, and men like Astor and Guggenheim are given some dignity in death. But there is absolutely no idealization of the wealthy: though the rule of the sea that women and children be saved first is acted out, it seems not to express the heroic impulses of the rich but rather the almost mechanical operations of ideology and social habit in a context of sheer confusion and shock. The spectator, however, is not in a state of shock and can take in and comprehend the representations in the movie as spectacle. The meaning of this spectacle can be clarified by mapping onto the movie the “three modes of representing terrorism” that Duffy identifies in his historical reading of Joyce. These modes are conveniently the “realist,” the “modernist,” and the “postmodern”; and each one has particular bearing on the representation of women that I can apply to Cameron’s Titanic (with my comments in brackets): “the first erases the woman as character [the story about heroic masculinity], the second uses the figure of woman as ambivalent image [Rose as both wife and whore, symbol of upper-class privilege and embodiment of transgressive desire], and the third… provides a space in which a potential subject-after-subalternity can be imagined as woman [Rose as the survivor, the ethical subject who refuses to give ground relative to her own desire]” (133).

     

    The realist representation of the Titanic disaster (and ironically this is the most ideological view of all) is the story told in all the major newspapers in the United States after the event: it is the story of the heroic upper-class men who went down with the ship after the women had been evacuated. In this version of the events, the men had to fight a class war to save the women. According to one newspaper account, “Manhood met brutehood undaunted, however, and honest fists faced iron bars, winning at last the battle for death with honor” (qtd. in Biel 49). As Biel observes, this was social Darwinism with a twist, since, instead of the survival of the fittest, it was “‘a battle for death’ in which chivalric sacrifice for the weaker sex proved the superiority of Anglo-Saxon ruling class men” (49). This representation of the Titanic disaster is virtually subverted by Cameron’s movie-making. Yet ironically this act of subversion is brought about through the orchestration of facts, through the production of a reality on the screen that no previous movie or book could have produced. For the first time, the sheer magnitude of the Titanic itself and the horror of its sinking, including the fact that it broke in two before it plunged into the sea, gives the lie to the “realist” myth. Cameron creates an atmosphere of shock and desperate confusion that makes impossible any pretension to class heroics. If the steerage passengers were desperate, they were also the last to reach the boat deck and the first to die. Benjamin Guggenheim’s nobility is reduced to the shocked gaze of a man who cannot really grasp what is happening. Only Ida and Isidor Straus survive this demystification as they are depicted in a high angle shot clinging to each other in their stateroom bed while water rushes beneath them to the music of “Nearer, My God, to Thee.”

     

    The modernist representation, which achieved its purest form in the documentary style of A Night to Remember, survives here in the ambivalent image of the Titanic itself as the supreme commodity and in the self-reflexive mode of Cameron’s storytelling. The multiple viewpoints of the earlier movie can be identified with “These fragments I have shored against my ruins,” as Eliot wrote in The Waste Land, that is to say, with those neutral, disinterested images that belie the ravages of time through the construction of absolute beauty. According to Hayden White, the dominant view of historical representation that arose in the nineteenth century privileged the Kantian category of the beautiful as leading to a disinterested narrative that enters “sympathetically into the minds or consciousnesses of human agents long dead” in a way that privileges understanding over judgment (67). Similarly, the purely modernist representation of the disaster makes no judgment and merely recreates the image for its own sake, as a memorable event that documents and contemplates the fundamental truth of human nature. Cameron’s movie incorporates the modernist mode but at the same time ironizes it. The movie’s frame story, for example, gives us the illusion of going back in time in order to enter the lives of those who are long dead through the testimony of a living witness. Old Rose’s storytelling not only takes us into the past but makes the Titanic itself a living memory, an image of the absolute beauty of the commodity form. Even the modernist work of art becomes a crucial figure in the film as Rose unpacks the paintings she has purchased in Europe, including one with many faces by someone named Picasso. As she contemplates it, she remarks that “there’s truth but no logic.” Rose herself comes to embody this truth when she surrenders to her passion for Jack and decides to follow him with the remark: “it doesn’t make any sense, that’s why I trust it.” This beauty is ironized, however, by the fact that Old Rose tells her story to men who ultimately seek profit, not truth or beauty. The modernist works of art, like Titanic itself as an object of disinterested beauty, become ironic signifiers of the violence of history. As the ship sinks further into the sea, there is the image of a Degas painting floating under the water. Rose herself undergoes a transformation from the beautiful to the sublime, a process that is metonymically signified by the butterfly hair comb that she finds on the salvage ship more than eighty years after the sinking of the Titanic. Though she never says anything about it to the salvage team, she falls into contemplation every time she looks at it. Eventually, we realize that she was wearing the comb on the day of the Titanic disaster and took it out when she posed for Jack’s drawing. She took it out and let her hair down, so to speak, and never put it back up again. Like the Heart of the Ocean, the comb recalls her own status as a beautiful commodity and the process of her self-transformation.

     

    The postmodern representation of the disaster is what this whole essay has documented in some detail. It is the fabricated story of passionate desire that transgresses the class system, a story that subverts the multiple perspectives of the modernist viewpoint by transforming the image of reality, which is really nothing but the commodification of the real itself, into a dialectical image that congeals the contradiction between the allegorical meaning constructed in the present context and the historical meaning that articulates the past as a form of wish-fulfillment. The dialectical image is the object or goal of what Hayden White would call the historical sublime. If history is ever to be anything more than what Benjamin called the history of the victors, it must move beyond the principle of disinterested contemplation that claims to represent all perspectives in a fair and non-contradictory formal narrative. As White argues,

     

    One can never move with any politically effective confidence from an apprehension of "the way things actually are or have been" to the kind of moral insistence that they "should be otherwise" without passing through a feeling of repugnance for and negative judgment of the condition that is to be superseded. And precisely insofar as historical reflection is disciplined to understand history in such a way that it can forgive everything or at best to practice a kind of "disinterested interest" of the sort that Kant imagined to inform every properly aesthetic perception, it is removed from any connection with a visionary politics and consigned to a service that will always be antiutopian in nature. (72-73)

     

    The historical image of the Titanic is the object of seemingly disinterested contemplation, though in truth the beauty that makes this contemplation disinterested is the effect of the commodity form that erases the historical truth of the class system or the social relations that made the production of the “dream ship” possible. It is the image that answers the social demand for a monological reality that is not split by contradictory social interests. Such an image is historical in the traditional aesthetic sense that White describes: it views the Titanic disaster as a tragedy that nonetheless articulates the beauty of civilization as the expression of a timeless human nature. It attempts to reimagine the Titanic as the object of a collective wish, the dream of a harmonious class society in which everyone happily occupies or at least accepts their own social position. The allegorical image is, to some extent, the other side of the same coin. In the movie, this image emerges in the frame story of the deep sea salvage crew that is exploring the Titanic in search of the Heart of the Ocean diamond, which is now worth more than the Hope diamond. They see the wreckage of the Titanic two and a half miles beneath the sea, and the spectator sees it along with them. As an allegorical image, the wrecked ship embodies history as a destructive process that can only be redeemed by the meanings that are attributed to it in the present context. By inviting moralization as a way of making sense out of the traces of the past, the image comments on the hubris of the technological civilization that thought it could build an unsinkable ship. In this way, the allegorical image virtually domesticates the past and puts it at a distance: it articulates a memory that forgets the past as a present full of contradictory social desires. The allegorical and historical images, taken together and in isolation from the present socio-historical context, constitute such a forgetful memory that separates “‘the way things actually are or have been’” from the utopian social desire that they “‘should be otherwise.’” The dialectical image emerges as the revelation of the social contradiction between the allegorical image as moral truth and the historical image as wish-fulfillment. The moral truth of history as destructive process contradicts the belief that the past can be understood or explained without any reference to the present social context, without any form of political commitment. However, this contradiction remains invisible until the dialectical image makes the past present through, in the phrase of Hayden White, “the recovery of the historical sublime.” White finds plausible the notion that such a recovery is “a necessary precondition for the production of a historiography of the sort that Chateaubriand conceived to be desirable in times of ‘abjection’,” which is “a historiography ‘charged with avenging the people’” (81). I am arguing that, in a movie like Titanic, mass culture has ironically produced just such a historical representation, a dialectical image that avenges the people by transforming the Titanicdisaster into an image of social desire in the present.

     

    Such an image is postmodern because it rejects every master narrative (be it the capitalist myth of progress, the Marxist myth of scientific socialism, the Christian myth of otherworldly salvation, or the Hegelian myth of absolute knowledge) as a form of forgetful memory that reduces the past to the fully understandable or explainable and makes the present world an inevitable phase in a fully determinate historical process. The dialectical image is not an image of moral or historical truth that transcends time and posits an inevitable future but a transitory image that articulates the relation of a particular past to a particular present. The dialectical image weds the dream image of the past, which harbored the unconscious desire for classless society, with the unconscious social desire of the present that can only conceive of the future by drawing on images of the past that can be made to signify the possibility of social transformation. In Cameron’s Titanic, the intense passion between Rose and Jack embodies the desire for a classless society, a desire that drags the Titanic disaster into the present where it signifies the social obstacles in late capitalist culture that would prevent the realization of such a desire. Yet the image of the Titanic itself and its terrifying destruction offers a strange ground of hope. In the contemporary global economy, wealth inequality continues to increase; and while the middle classes of the so-called “first world” stagnate in their relative comfort, the lower classes of the first world and their counterparts on the other side of the international division of labor experience vicious socio-economic displacements. Yet, at the same time, the dominant ideology of the first world continues to reduce all socio-economic realities to questions of personal responsibility and refuses to recognize any form of class determination. In the culture of the United States and, increasingly, of Western Europe, class has become more and more the unsayable and the unrepresentable. Even when it is represented, the potential resentment of the victims of multinational capitalism is carefully contained by the implication that the system always has a place for those it displaces if they have the imagination to invent new ways of making themselves into commodities. (For example, in a recent independent movie from Great Britain, The Full Monty, the unemployed steel workers learn that if they can’t sell their physical labor, they can sell their bodies by taking off their clothes, a rather ironic way of resolving the crisis of working-class masculinity in the post-industrial age). So it is not difficult to see why the spectators of mass culture would find in the historical image of the Titanic a revelation of the structural truth of their own social situation. The wealthy may not be as visible as they once were; but their invisibility only speaks to their thorough domination of the current social system. From this perspective, the unambiguous articulation of the class system from the upper decks to the boiler rooms of the Titanic becomes a utopian wish image for a clarity of social vision that is anything but unambiguous in everyday life.

     

    The image of the Titanic disaster in Cameron’s movie is apocalyptic in a way that exceeds anything that one finds in the movie version of A Night to Remember. The earlier movie is obviously a source of inspiration for Cameron; and he draws a lot of material from it, especially images pertaining to the fate of the steerage passengers. More than the book on which it is based, the movie A Night to Remember shows the situation of the steerage passengers rather dramatically as they struggle to find their way to the boat deck and encounter blocked passageways defended by stewards. In one case, some of these passengers break through a barrier with an axe; but when they reach the boat deck, most of the boats are gone. In many ways, the movie A Night to Remember is far less generous in its representation of the upper-classes than is Lord’s book. The heroes of the movie are the crew members, most especially the Second Officer Charles Lightoller (Kenneth Moore), not the upper-classes. Nonetheless, while the movie A Night to Remember leans more toward the realist mode of representation than does the book, its minimalist cinematic style in black and white with very little music also embodies a disinterested modernist viewpoint that finally gives way to a rationalization of the event at the end. As Lightoller gazes out from the deck of the Carpathia at the sea into which the Titanic sank, words appear on the screen that explain how the Titanic disaster led to maritime reforms that would prevent such an accident in the future. In effect, though this movie reveals a social system that could be subject to criticism, it glorifies the technocrats of the future who will see the event as the meaningful occasion for reform. In addition to the idealization of Lightoller and, to some extent, Captain Smith, the other idealized figure in the movie is the architect Thomas Andrews who, in front of the passengers, never shows the least apprehension concerning his own fate. He is virtually the embodiment of technical reason that ultimately justifies the disaster as a means to an end, the improvement of the human condition through infinite social progress. Curiously, the movie A Night to Remember makes the Titanic disaster into a purely British representation. You would never guess from the accent of Thomas Andrews in this movie that he was from the North of Ireland or that the Titanic was built by Irish workers. In Cameron’s movie, on the other hand, Tommy, an obviously lower-class Irish character who is probably Catholic, tells Jack that the Titanic was built by 15,000 Irishmen, though he does not mention the fact that few of these Irishmen would have been Catholic in a Catholic-majority country that had not yet undergone partition. Tommy is probably emigrating because he can’t find good-paying job in Ireland. Furthermore, the musical score to Cameron’s movie uses Irish instruments and motifs that signify “Ireland” in stark contrast to the purely “British” score in A Night to Remember, including the British version of “Nearer, My God, to Thee.” While the latter song may be more historically accurate, it helps to disguise the true material forces and conditions that made the Titanic possible and also made it into another symbol of the British empire.

     

    In Cameron’s movie, the spectacular use of special effects to represent the destruction of the Titanic produces an image of sublime terror that cannot be rationalized as the ground of social progress. It represents, rather, the end of the world as we know it. It is not a justification of but a judgment on technical reason and the theory of social progress that privileges it. Though Titanic reproduces the reality of the event in far greater detail than any other movie, it is nonetheless a “surreal” image, as I suggested earlier, because it gives us a reality that exceeds the system of social representations through which “we”–the collective subject of contemporary history–bestow meaning on “our” historical experience. For this reason, despite its technical limitations and flaws, A Night to Remember still seems the more realistic representation, while Titanic offers a glimpse of historical experience as something meaningless, an image of sublime terror that virtually shatters the neutral, disinterested historical viewpoint. It is meaningless not because we cannot give it a meaning but because we can only give it a meaning that comes from the outside of the event itself, that is not intrinsic to its representation. As a matter of historical fact, there were a few witnesses who claimed that the ship broke apart before it sank; but the dominant representation until the rediscovery of the Titanic in the mid-eighties was that the ship sank as a whole (Lynch and Marschall 195). This representation was consistent with the myth of the calm nobility of the upper-classes who went down with the ship, while the historical truth is so horrifying that it is impossible to imagine “calmness” and “nobility” as really being the issue. In A Night to Remember, the spectator sees the Titanic slide into the sea from a distance. In Cameron’s movie, the camera creates the illusion that the spectator is on the stern of the ship’s aft when it is perpendicular to the sea. The spectator is there as the remnant of the Titanic slowly descends; and then, in a medium long shot from the rear (not the extreme long shot of A Night), we watch the stern go under with Jack, Rose, and a few other passengers standing on it. Just before the ship sinks, a priest on the ship’s poop deck emphasizes the apocalyptic nature of these images by reading from Revelation about “a new heaven and a new earth,” an end to death, mourning, and all sadness, for “the former world has passed away.” This is a utopian image but not an image that rationalizes or justifies the horror of the event itself. On the contrary, it articulates the irrationality of history, its utter lack of meaning unless it is transformed and redeemed by the revolutionary force of social desire.

     

    With these images and with the image of the band playing the Protestant hymn “Nearer, My God, to Thee” (American version), the movie Titanic seems almost to endorse the Christian interpretation of the Titanic disaster as the judgment of God on materialist civilization (see Chapter 3 of Biel). Some may see it that way, but I think the movie deploys apocalyptic imagery in order to support a materialist vision. I would put it this way in the context of the themes that I have already highlighted in this reading of the movie: when theology is not the illusion of demand, it is desire of and for the other. Simply put, when theology is not the institution that formulates the demand for happiness and answers that demand with the illusion of another world, it is the ethical drive that refuses to give ground relative to one’s desire, a desire that comes from the other (in the sense that desire responds to the reality principle and takes into account in its internal structure the being of others) and a desire that seeks the other (the sublime object that represents and channels desire as the quest for a meaningful life through the postponement of death). Cameron’s movie implicitly understands what Benjamin suggested in the first of his “Theses on the Philosophy of History” when he linked the success of historical materialism with theology (Illuminations 253). The force that drives historical materialism as a form of social critique–a critique that, to echo Marx’s “Theses on Feuerbach,” attempts not only to interpret the world but to change it–is desire, the same force that reveals itself in religion through the apocalyptic imagery that foregrounds not the content of the afterlife but the terrorizing violence of the end of the world as the necessary condition of human redemption. Such violence is what Jameson means by defining history as “the experience of necessity” or “the inexorable form of events.” The price of a historical vision that does not rely on a master narrative, which would guarantee the outcome of our ethical actions in the present, is the sublime terror of social change, of a transformative event that does not have a predetermined form that can rationalize its violence. In the movie, the social desire that is allegorically unleashed by the romance between Jack and Rose must confront the horror of the social change that will have to come about if they are not to give ground relative to their desire. Insofar as that desire is constituted in opposition to the class system, it cannot avoid in some form the experience of the destruction of that system, the destruction of capitalism itself,or at least capitalism as we currently know it. In Cameron’s Titanic, the destruction of the dream ship is, symbolically though not logically, the outcome of ethical desire that refuses to give ground and accept the social system or the illusion of demand.

     

    Finally, I need to explain how this violence becomes the ground of hope and makes possible the formation of the “subject-after-subalternity… imagined as woman.” Rose is the subject as survivor in Titanic, and in the symbolics of this movie this can hardly be an accident. Jack’s death, like the sinking of the Titanic itself, is symbolically necessary to this story about the meaning of survival as the historical condition of the liberated subject in the postmodern world. Just as the sublime terror of the Titanic‘s destruction in the movie can be a pleasurable experience for the spectator who unconsciously wishes for the end of the world that the great ship embodies, Jack’s death is the necessary condition for the movie’s message of hope; and though this movie can easily be dismissed as a “tear-jerker,” there is a political significance to the pleasure-in-pain that these images evoke. Jack can die because he has lived, because, as Freud put it in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, “the aim of all life is death,” with the crucial qualification that each “organism wishes to die only in its own fashion” (38-39). The qualification, however, is critical in this case; for Jack’s desire, though it incorporates and transforms his own death drive, has to be distinguished from the death drive of the Titanic and the social system it represents. The creators of the Titanic as the sign of the class system–Bruce Ismay, who, as Rose points out early in the movie, has invested not only his money but his phallic fantasies in the Titanic, and Cal Hockley, who melodramatically represents the venality of the ruling class that requires the dream ship as the self-expression of its identity, a closed reality that they are able to own as if it were property–manage to survive by becoming the living dead, by submitting to a death drive that can never lead to any sort of hope because it mistakes the possession of power over others as the true goal of life. Historically, the real Bruce Ismay spent his life after the disaster in shame for having saved himself; in the fiction of the movie, Cal Hockley, as Rose learns, will eventually shoot himself after the stock market crash of 1929. The architect of the Titanic, Thomas Andrews, at least chooses a tragic end by going down with the ship he created in the process of saving as many people as he can. Andrews transforms the death drive that he has served into the wish for a death with dignity; but Jack is the hero of desire who brings his life to an end with something more than tragic nobility as his legacy. “Desire,” writes Peter Brooks, “is the wish for the end, for fulfillment, but fulfillment delayed so that we can understand it in relation to origin, and to desire itself” (111). Jack’s legacy is Rose’s desire–a desire that he helps to liberate from the enslavement of social demand and that constitutes an end that makes sense out of his own life and death. As he slowly freezes in the north Atlantic, Jack compels from Rose the promise that she will never let go; but, of course, the irony is that in order to keep her promise she has to let go of Jack, to accept his death, and fight for her life. According to Lacan, a subject’s desire is always “the desire of the Other” (“Écrits”312), which is to say that desire as the displacement of demand, as the quest for what Brooks calls “the right death, the correct end” (103), is never simply the possession of the individual subject but the desire of the collective subject of history. For every individual, desire takes the form of the life story; but no story, no matter how unique, is ever completely personal. Narrative is a socially symbolic act; and the stories we tell about ourselves are shaped by the stories we have read or heard or even told about others. Jack does not give Rose her desire, for desire is neither Jack’s to give nor Rose’s to receive. Jack’s death is the realization of the “correct end” of social desire in its self-reproduction, in the transformation of Rose from the sexual commodity that answers the demand of Hockley and his class into the surviving subject who “never lets go” of the desire for the right death.

     

    Ironically, the thing that comes to embody for Rose the structure of desire that shapes and determines the story of her life is the Heart of the Ocean. This diamond represents the contradiction between desire and demand, for Rose has the choice (at least, after the death of Hockley and the others who had a claim on it) to use the diamond as the immediate answer to the demand for wealth and privilege or to keep the diamond as the expression of the desire for something more, something beyond value. If I may resort to anecdote, I have been fascinated by the number of spectators I’ve talked to who were offended by Rose’s selfishness in throwing the Heart of the Ocean into the sea. In particular, my professional friends, who perhaps have greater than usual expectations of wealth and privilege, find it preposterous that anyone would pass up such an opportunity. “Why not pass it on to her granddaughter?” they say. Certainly, there is a conflict of desires here that goes to the heart of contemporary culture, which seems to posit money as the measure of all things. Rose’s story, however, is the story of a desire that never lets go; and within the frame of that story the diamond has undergone a transformation from a commodity with a specific socio-economic value to a symbolic thing that remains incommensurable. In a sense, the meaning of Rose’s life has become identical with the Heart of the Ocean. In telling the story of the Titanic that she has never told before, she explains that a woman’s heart is a deep ocean of secrets; and the diamond is the signifier of her secret. At the beginning of the movie, she asks Brock Lovett (Bill Paxton), the head of the salvage team, if he has found the Heart of the Ocean, even though she still has it. The question, if you will, is not addressed to Brock Lovett the person but to the Other as the embodiment of a social demand that mistakes capital value for the meaning of life. The Heart of the Ocean is the incommensurable that is the true goal of life, the true desire of the Other, the right death, the correct end. Rose never cedes her desire but transforms her life into the incommensurable sublime object of desire by giving the Heart of the Ocean back to the sea, back to its symbolic origin. Rose discovered the diamond in the pocket of her coat (the coat Cal had put around her when the Titanic was sinking) just as the Carpathia passes by the Statue of Liberty in New York harbor. It becomes the symbol of the liberation of her own desire; and in giving it back to the ocean, the final act of her social defiance, she translates her desire to infinity. The diamond is more valuable than the Hope diamond because it represents true hope or the interminable reproduction of desire.

     

    Does Rose die in her bed after throwing the Heart of the Ocean into the sea? This interpretation gives meaning to the images of her life in the photographs on the table next to her bed (that the camera tracks across) and then to the final dream image of her return to the wrecked Titanic. In a sudden dissolve, the ship regains its form before the disaster, and Old Rose becomes a young woman again as she mounts the Grand Staircase to embrace Jack while they are surrounded by the spirits of the dead who applaud their lifelong romance. I don’t think it’s important whether Rose lives or dies in the last scene of the movie, and I don’t think the meaning of her life can be summed up by her reunion with Jack’s spirit. The meaning of her life is the sublime object of desire that Jack has come to symbolize, but for that very reason he is not the object of desire as a thing in itself. As Old Rose suggested earlier in the movie, she did not stop loving after the death of Jack; and if he facilitated her most erotic experience up to the day the Titanic sank, he was not around to perform that function for the next eighty years. The meaning of Rose’s life lies in the photographs that document her decision to pursue her desires wherever they may lead and in the passionate loves that still haunt her imagination like the spirits on the allegorical ghost ship. Rose is the “subject-after-subalternity” not because she can transform the world or her position in it by a simple act of the will that need not take into account the desire of the others. She transforms the world by transforming her own desire into something sublime, something that will never be satisfied by the objects of the marketplace, be they economic, cultural, or intellectual.

     

    After seeing the movie a number of times, I continue to see an image in my mind, which signifies, perhaps, those things that have been left unresolved. Rose clings with Jack to the outside of the railing at the Titanic‘s stern, which has broken away from the rest of the ship and is perpendicular to the sea. She gazes into the face of a woman hanging onto the railing from the opposite side, a woman with whom she has exchanged glances earlier. As she looks, the other woman can no longer hold on and falls to some kind of horrifying and meaningless death. That woman has no voice and we will never know what she desires. In all probability, she is a steerage passenger. She now lies somewhere in the heart of the ocean, one of those secrets awaiting social redemption that will come, if it comes, through the temporal disruptions of messianic time. As Benjamin writes, “Only that historian will have the gift of fanning the spark of hope in the past who is firmly convinced that even the dead will not be safe from the enemy if he wins. And the enemy has not ceased to be victorious” (Illuminations 255). Of course, the enemy is often ourselves; and it is not only the historian but every cultural producer who must protect the dead from the forgetful memories and narratives that would bury them. In this process of recovering the historical sublime, we should not automatically eliminate any producer of cultural images, including the impresarios of Hollywood when they manage to transgress their own censorship and turn the profit motive against itself. Mass culture is not just loss but a revolutionary opportunity for those who make visible the cultural unconscious that harbors the true subject of social desire.

     

    Works Cited

    • Benjamin, Walter. Illuminations. Trans. Harry Zohn. New York: Schocken, 1969.
    • —. Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism. Trans. Harry Zohn. London: Verso, 1983.
    • —. Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings. Ed. Peter Demetz. Trans. Edmund Jephcott. New York: Schocken, 1986.
    • Biel, Stephen. Down with the Old Canoe: A Cultural History of the Titanic Disaster. New York: Norton, 1996.
    • Brooks, Peter. Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative. New York: Knopf, 1984.
    • Brown, Corie, and David Ansen. “Rough Waters.” Rev. of Titanic, dir. James Cameron. Newsweek 15 Dec. 1997: 64-68.
    • Buck-Morss, Susan. The Dialectics of Seeing: Walter Benjamin and the Arcades Project. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT, 1991.
    • Creed, Barbara. The Monstrous-Feminine: Film, Feminism, Psychoanalysis. London: Routledge, 1993.
    • Debord, Guy. The Society of the Spectacle. Trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith. New York: Zone Books, 1995.
    • Duffy, Enda. The Subaltern “Ulysses.” Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994.
    • Eliot, T. S. “Tradition and the Individual Talent.” Selected Essays. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1950. 3-11.
    • Freud, Sigmund. “Beyond the Pleasure Principle” (1920). The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. Vol. 18. Trans. James Strachey. London: Hogarth, 1955.
    • Heyer, Paul. Titanic Legacy: Disaster as Media Event and Myth. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1995.
    • Horkheimer, Max, and Theodor W. Adorno. Dialectic of Enlightenment. Trans. John Cumming. New York: Continuum, 1993.
    • Jameson, Fredric. The Political Unconscious: Narrative as a Socially Symbolic Act. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981.
    • —. Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Durham: Duke University Press, 1991.
    • Lacan, Jacques. “Écrits”: A Selection. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Norton, 1977.
    • —. The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959-1960. Book 7 of The Seminar. Trans. Dennis Porter. Ed. Jacques-Alain Miller. New York: Norton, 1992.
    • Lord, Walter. A Night to Remember. New York: Bantam, 1997.
    • Lynch, Don, and Ken Marschall. Titanic: An Illustrated History. Toronto: Madison, 1992.
    • Maslin, Janet. “‘Titanic’: A Spectacle as Sweeping as the Sea.” Rev. of Titanic, dir. James Cameron. New York Times 19 Dec. 1997: E1, E18.
    • McCole, John. Walter Benjamin and the Antinomies of Tradition. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993.
    • White, Hayden. The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987.
    • Williams, Raymond. Marxism and Literature. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977.
    • Zizek, Slavoj. The Sublime Object of Ideology. London: Verso, 1989.
    • —. Looking Awry: An Introduction to Jacques Lacan through Popular Culture. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT, 1991.

     

  • Theoretical Tailspins: Reading “Alternative” Performance in Spin Magazine

    Patrick McGee

    Department of English
    University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
    finnegan@uiuc.edu

     

    Media and commerce do not just cover but help construct music subcultures…. Subcultural capital is itself, in no small sense, a phenomenon of the media.

     

    –Sarah Thornton, “Moral Panic, the Media and British Rave”

     

    If you only talk to people who already agree with you, you are not a political organization. You’re a support group.

     

    –Elizabeth Gilbert (Spin April 1995)

     

    In the June 1995 issue of Details, Generation X was declared dead-on-arrival by the very author who had himself risen to instant fame only a few short years earlier with his first novel, Generation X: Tales for an Accelerated Culture. And indeed in the years since Douglas Coupland’s Details pronouncement perhaps nothing has been assumed to be so thoroughly incorporated, so cliché, as the term Generation X. The common-sense consensus in both academic popular culture studies and subculture theory, as well as in the “alternative” youth culture industries themselves, is that Generation X is so passé, so universally un-hip, that even by remarking its passing one risks marking oneself as square beyond repair, like foolish white tourists who go to Harlem and speak nostalgically about the lost authenticity of the original 1920s Cotton Club. The word Generation X is deader than dead. Yet media images invoking the iconography of Generation X continue to proliferate in the youth culture industries, particularly in the pop music, television, fashion, and junk-food markets. With the now familiar mix of manic-paced MTV jump-cuts, a multicultural brew of post-punk haircuts, piercings and retro-seventies grunge styles, neon-streak color bursts, roller-blade grrrl-power “attitude,” and the requisite “cheese” of self-mocking irony, Pepsi’s 1997 “Generation Next” campaign typifies the current alternative youth marketing scene, except perhaps insofar as its slogan came dangerously too near speaking the signifier that dare not speak its name.

     

    It is in this cultural climate of “alternative” simulacra, or a simulacra of alternativeness, that I want to take up theoretical issues surfaced by Spin magazine from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, as it sought to take avant-garde pop undergrounds and transform them, and itself, into post-avant-garde, alternative “overgrounds.” My theoretical goal is to make a first pass at “reading” Spin magazine in a Cultural Studies context, and in the process map the boundaries of Andreas Huyssen’s construction of the “post-avant-garde” as the hope of a political postmodernism. “Some hope!” you may be thinking. For many people with personal investments in youth subculture scenes Spin represents at best a laughable example of counterfeit “alternative” culture and at worst the very enemy of genuine subcultural resistance, the thing that threatens to rob a subculture scene of its essence of oppositionality.1 While I agree with much of this line of argument, I am equally suspicious of the knee-jerk refusal of any-and-everything “commercial” expressed by so many subculture members and theorists who seem to have forgotten that, as Stuart Hall reminds us, opposition to the current state of capitalist society and culture does not necessarily mean a blanket refusal of the reproductive power of the commodity and commodification (“Meaning”). Opposition to postmodern capitalism, Hall points out, does not mean refusing a priori the productive and cultural forces of mass society and mass culture. Oppositional culture, or revolutionary ideology, means critiquing current hegemonic discourses of modernity/postmodernity; it also means rethinking and reconfiguring the cultural-material forces of modernity/postmodernity at multiple local, national, and trans-national levels.

     

    Perhaps what offends most about Spin is its brashness, its haughty prior claim to cosmopolitan cultural hippness. Spin magazine, like Andy Warhol’s Pop Art interventions a generation earlier, presumes to have already obliterated and transcended those traditional boundaries between mass-cult and high art, pop culture and progressive oppositional politics. And it does so despite the fact that the contradictions of capitalist production and distribution, which fuel the worlds of Pop and mass-cult, have only become more pronounced–despite, that is, Spin‘s unlikely insistence that one can have a genuine cultural revolution and maintain a brand-name consumer lifestyle too.

     

    Realizing the unlikeliness of my own thesis, I nevertheless contend that Spin is a step in the right direction, and that Spin magazine may function as a popular progressive model–a structure of pop culture resistance. The Spin model offers a form that combines (sub)cultural opposition and mainstream fun, and it’s a form that proved itself capable of keeping pace with the shifting forces of cultural Reaganism and the New Right in the late ’80s and early ’90s. The Spin model might, therefore, function as a counter-balance to the infinite adaptability presumed to be the defining characteristic of so-called “late capitalism”: its apparently endless capacity to appropriate any-and-all forms of subcultural resistance, oppositional meanings, or semiotic critique.

     

    As such, Spin magazine also offers itself as an excellent case study to explore the practical implications of Michael Bérubé’s claim that perhaps the single most important and difficult challenge for Cultural Studies critics is to think through the problematics that arise when academics theorize popular audiences and subcultures who are already theorizing themselves. This is an important challenge because, as Bérubé argues, the very “existence and autonomy of the academic professions,” which have been under relentless (and frequently successful) attack by misinformation and de-funding campaigns from the cultural and political right, depends in no small part on mobilizing popular support from the very “ordinary people” which Cultural Studies frequently writes about and for, but not to; it depends, in other words, on our ability to popularize academic theory and criticism, which means “struggling for the various popular and populist grounds on which the cultural right has been trying to make criticism unpopular” (176). This is a difficult challenge, however, because academics must carry on this struggle in a world in which, as Bérubé notes, “there isn’t a chance that academic criticism will ever be popular [and yet at the same time] the kind of criticism known as critical theory already is popular” (161). In such a context, academics must not only struggle for cultural ground that the Right explicitly targets; we must continue to build and strengthen coalitions with otherwise left-leaning mass-media culture industries, where much of the fall-out from the more explicit PC wars ultimately lands–that is, we must reach out to consumer subculture media like Spin, a magazine which in many ways is already popularizing academic criticism, but which frequently does so by rhetorically positioning itself against academic discourses portrayed as being either too “serious,” too “obscure,” or too “PC.”

     

    Such academic work is of course already being done. Indeed, for many it’s what Cultural Studies is all about in the first place. The most notable, sustained example of this kind of academic-popular criticism can perhaps be found in the pages of Social Text, which regularly brings together people from a wide range of cultural positions (people who work in various culture industries, mass media, and academic disciplines) in an attempt to forge alliances and cross the great theory/practice divide. In the Fall 1995 issue of Social Text, for example, Andrew Ross hosts a symposium on “The Cult of the DJ” in which Ross, two mass media music critics and two prominent dance music DJs discuss, among other things, the “changing role of DJs in the history of popular music” (67) and reasons for the general neglect of dance music in the mainstream music press. Though later on I will take issue with the way the term “mainstream music press” gets deployed in Cultural Studies subculture criticism, the discussion in this Social Text symposium, as well as in the more fully developed book-length symposium on alternative youth culture edited by Andrew Ross and Tricia Rose (Microphone Fiends: Youth Music and Youth Culture ), suggests that the relationship between academic discourses, “alternative” artistic practices or “underground” scenes, and commercial subculture/Gen X magazines like Spin is more complex, more symbiotic and, as I hope to demonstrate here, not so problematic as many academics might be conditioned to assume. It demonstrates, for one, that one doesn’t have to dig too deep to find so-called “academic” cultural criticism lurking just below the surface of nearly everything in the Gen X scene, despite the fact that anti-academic rhetoric (bordering sometimes on outright neo-conservative anti-intellectualism) is standard Gen X fare.2 It is within this more general context of symbiosis between critical theory, Madison Avenue, and oppositional subcultures that I want to apply a few Cultural Studies subcultural models to one specific “mass-cult” medium which explicitly markets itself as “oppositional.” By working through the magazine’s structure and then taking a close look at Spin‘s coverage of Riot Grrrl in 1992 and a 1995 Diesel Jeans advertisement depicting two sailors kissing (which is an appropriation of an ACT UP/Gran Fury poster), I want to see what might happen if we try to take Spin magazine at “face-value.” What happens if I accept their unlikely marketing claims that, in the acts of consuming/reading Spin, I too can identify with, and participate in, an on-going youth-music cultural “revolution” [see Figure 1]–what if I accept their claim that, with Spin‘s help, I too can be a Riot Grrrl [see Figure 2]?

     

    Figure 1. “The Voice of a Generation: Yours.” Junk mail subscription renewal notice. Reprinted by permission of Spin.
    Figure 2. “For Girls about to Rock.” “Flash” section article in Spin April 1992: 26. Reprinted by permission of Spin.

     

    Though Spin is frequently scorned (alike by academics, its own readers, and various self-identified subculture members) as being nothing more than a slick Gen X fashion magazine pimping corporate rock and Madison Avenue to the masses of middle-class (mostly male) suburban youth, the writers and editors of Spin repeatedly defend themselves against such criticism, both directly in their writing and indirectly in their editing and design choices, insisting that Spin is a genuine organ of an on-going youth revolution even if it is brought to you by the corporate world’s latest-and-greatest, newest-and-coolest, mass marketing gimmicks. Spin‘s tenth anniversary issue, “Ten Years That Rocked the World,” for example, is framed by two essays that specifically position Spin at the forefront of an on-going Gen X youth “Revolution”–a theme that is foregrounded in the title of this special issue, which, in its echo of John Reed’s Ten Days That Shook the World, locates Spin within a longer historical tradition of radical journalism and a generationally-identified revolutionary temperament centered on images of “youth.” Both publisher Guccione, Jr., in his editorial column (“TopSpin”), and Senior Contributing Writer Jim Greer, on the back page (what used to be called “SpinOut”), tell a retrospective narrative that links the evolution of Spin magazine with the emergence of a “cultural and generational wave at the beginning of its ascension” (Guccione, Jr., April 1995, 24); both define the mission of the magazine (Guccione refers to it as the magazine’s “higher calling”) as one that has evolved from an unselfconscious rock and roll naiveté into a self-conscious mission to give voice to “Gen X or whatever we’re calling it this week” (Greer 224):

     

    [I]t was precisely our complete inappropriateness to the prevailing zeitgiest [of mid-'80s cynicism] that gave us our power and value and readership, all of which, eventually, became our conscious mission. We wrote about and for a then-disempowered generation, to which we belonged not (by now) by the citizenship of similar age, but by the universal solidarity of purpose. Our readership's culture and causes and self-defining discoveries were ours too, and so were their enemies. (Guccione, Jr. 24)

     

    Responding to those readers who repeatedly attack the magazine in “Point Blank” (the letters page) for merely exploiting the Gen X scene for commercial gain, Greer not only defends the mission of the magazine as a “rock magazine,” he also defends the magazine’s Madison Avenue commercialism as well, insisting that Spin is “more independent, both in terms of corporate structure and mindset, than most so-called independent record labels.”3

     

    These are no small claims–claims, I suspect, at which most academics and subculture members would raise a skeptical eyebrow.4 Nevertheless, I contend that, sometimes by design and sometimes in spite of itself, Spin does in fact manage to articulate what constitutes a popularized form of Cultural Studies criticism–a kind of Social Text for a particular mass youth audience as it were–in which the cultural-political meanings of youth music (not always rock) and “alternative” subculture scenes are explicitly addressed and in which issues of representation are repeatedly brought to the surface, even if academic discourses are specifically avoided. More specifically, I take issue with the kind of disgust that Dick Hebdige vents in Hiding in the Light towards the Face, the 1980s British subculture consumer magazine which likely inspired, or at least certainly influenced, the original conception and design of Spin. The first sections of this essay read Spin‘s Riot Grrrl coverage to address both Hebdige’s critique of the kind of facile “flat-earth” postmodernism produced by the Face and Sarah Thornton’s critique of the tendency of subculture theory to ignore the role mass media plays in the formation of youth subculture identities. The final sections engage the Diesel Jeans advertisement to question the larger tendency within Cultural Studies to read subcultural practices as models for more traditional forms of political organization.

     

    I. Generation X: A Generation By No Other Name?

     

    To say that Cultural Studies academics must get beyond their aversion towards Gen X posturing does not mean, however, that we must silence our criticisms of those who speak in the name of Generation X (including Spin), particularly since, as Andrew Ross has noted, the Generation X moment is one in which American youth are being scrutinized by a glut of journalistic and sociological hacks in the most “frankly exploitative way” since the late fifties (Microphone Fiends 4). Ross’s own take on Gen X seems to be guardedly sympathetic at best, suggesting that the crucial questions for academics writing about Gen X at this juncture are: 1) whether or not Gen X discourses can free themselves from the journalistic and sociological voices speaking from above on behalf of Generation X (even the more sympathetic ones such as Howe and Strauss’s 13th Gen: Abort, Retry, Ignore, Fail?) and 2) whether or not the “subject” of Gen X can be expanded beyond the narrow voice of white, middle-class heterosexual males–what Ross refers to as “those postadolescents who were temporarily confused but [are] more likely to succeed in the long run, and thus fill the target consumer demographic with high-end disposable incomes” (3), what one of my students has referred to as “all those Reality Bites kids, the MTV Real World kids or those people on NBC’s Friends.” Whether or not some construct of “alternative” culture (call it “Generation X” or whatever) can become a touchstone for a wider and more inclusive range of youth culture formations is by no means certain. And it will take more than academics analyzing grunge, rave, gansta rap, or riot grrrls in papers with Gen X in the title and delivering those papers in conventional academic venues to forge any such multicultural alliances. If “Gen X” fails to become common-coin to a broader range of youth subjects, then academics rushing to speak about or in the name of Gen X risk merely duplicating and sanctioning journalistic exploitative discourses.

     

    It is perhaps fittingly ironic then that at the very moment a 1995 MLA Convention special session and a collection of academic essays was being prepared under the title “Generation X Culture,” Douglas Coupland had declared “Gen X” dead-on-arrival in an article published in Details, the preferred “cross-over” magazine for many Cultural Studies academics. According to Coupland, Gen X has been eaten alive by the marketing “trendmeisters,” who have taken what he believes was a genuine “way of looking at the world”–an implicitly “authentic” and “original” aesthetic perspective–and they’ve turned it into just so much more white noise (72). That the term Gen X, along with the terms “slacker” and “grunge,” has become one of the “most abused buzz words of the early ’90s” is hardly debatable, nor is the fact that Gen X has been appropriated by Madison Avenue style industries to a degree that exceeds all previous generational signifiers, such as those of the 1920s and 1960s, which have also been reductively associated with avant-garde and counter-cultural movements. What is debatable, however, is Coupland’s specious attempt to maintain his status as “author” of the concept “Generation X” based on the fact that he has penned a decent, but hardly exceptional, first-novel by the same name–a novel which I personally see as the epitome of the Gen X cliché, in which Coupland’s aestheticized middle-class male suburban angst and self-indulgent narrative posturing cancels out whatever 1990s social realism may be at work in the novel. Generation X is a novel that may arguably mark, not the beginning of the Gen X moment, but rather the beginning of the very corporate marketing appropriations he now only half-heartedly bemoans (Coupland’s own characteristically camp-ironic phrasing here is to say that it “was harsh”).

     

    By expressing my personal distaste for Coupland’s novel, I do not mean to deny the important role that the mass popularity of his novel has played in generating the cultural currency that Gen X signifiers now possess, however appropriated or narrow that currency may be. Nor do I mean to deny the very real economic, political, and cultural changes (everything that makes up the historical “reality” of the postmodern, late capitalist moment of our “accelerated culture”) that inform and shape the generational angst of Coupland’s novelistic world, however privileged and aestheticized the expression of that angst may be. Certainly I do not mean to align myself in any way with the openly hostile mass media cranks, such as David Martin in his infamous Newsweek piece, who dismissively attack self-identified Gen X twentysomethings as whiners who should just shut up and live with it.5 My objection to Coupland’s representation of Gen X is less an aesthetic judgment as it is an ideological judgement about the kinds of narrow subject positions and the historical narratives that his novel articulates.

     

    The way Coupland summarizes his novel and bemoans its mass-media appropriations in this Details article is itself enough to see the narrow focalization and ahistorical aestheticizing tendencies that make up Coupland’s Gen X world. Though his three characters presumably live on “the fringe” and work at “dreary jobs at the bottom of the food chain,” they do so because they, like Coupland, “decided to pull back from society and move there.” Though they find themselves struggling to patch together individual identities in a dramatically reshaped environment, this environment is ultimately one that is, in Coupland’s own words, a “psychic” reality more than a social or historically specific one. Coupland’s claim that the worldview his characters manage to cultivate (“simultaneously ironic and sentimental”) constituted “a new way of thinking I had never before seen documented” is merely another self-promoting throw-away comment which seeks to affirm the originality of Gen X as his baby at the same time that it attests to the representational “authenticity” of his characters as part of some larger Gen X whole–an authenticity that only gets asserted again as Coupland claims authorship in the very act of his “Gen-X-cide,” as if it were his to kill or to declare null-and-void because something called “boomer angst-transference” has reduced his characters and ideas to Madison Avenue stereotypes and media clichés:

     

    The problems started when trendmeisters everywhere began isolating small elements of my characters' lives... and blew them up to represent an entire generation. Part of this misrepresentation emanated from baby boomers, who, feeling pummeled by the recession and embarrassed by their own compromised '60s values, began transferring their collective darkness onto the group threatening to take their spotlight. (72)

     

    The problem with such reductive narratives, staked out in neatly packaged us/them terms, is that they have in turn become the standard line of post-Coupland mass media Gen X historical clichés. (See, for example, the “valedictorian speech” delivered by Winonna Ryder’s character in the opening scene of Reality Bites, as well as Douglas Rushkoff’s self-aggrandizing, pseudo-intellectual, misinformed, and homophobic manifesto and introductory blurbs in The GenX Reader.6)

     

    Whether or not one believes Coupland when he attempts to set the record straight and locate the “origins” of the title of his book in the final chapter of Paul Fussell’s book Class rather than the name of Billy Idol’s punk band is really beside the point. Historically, long before there was Douglas Coupland’s Generation X, Generation X was there–both as a signifier and a signified, an attitude, a pose, an aesthetic, a sensibility, a way of looking at the world, but also the economic and cultural political realities of post-Fordist capitalism and cultural Reaganism. Whenever it can be said to have arrived, Gen X was certainly as much a punk sensibility as it was the kind of neo-beat Bohemianism Coupland now (re)locates in Fussell’s X class. Fourteen years before Coupland’s novel caught the wave of media interest in Richard Linklater’s independent film Slacker, Billy Idol’s Generation X opened at the Roxy Club, and a month prior to that the Vibrators released their single “Blank Generation.” This on-going punk theme would be taken up again in 1985, the first year of Spin, by the Replacements in “Bastards of Young”:

     

    God, what a mess
    On the ladder of success 
    Where you take one step  
    And miss the whole first rung. 
    Dreams unfulfilled
    You graduate unskilled
    But it beats picking cotton
    And waiting to be forgotten.   
    
    CHORUS:
    We are the sons of no one 
    Bastards of young 
    We are the sons of no one 
    Bastards of young 
    The daughters and the sons...
    
    Clean your baby room
    Trash their baby boom 
    Elvis's in the ground
    There'll be no beer tonight.
    Income tax deduction
    One hell of a function!   
    It beats picking cotton
    And waiting to be forgotten.
    
    CHORUS:
    Now the daughters and the sons....
    A willingness to claim us
    You got no word to name us.

     

    If there is in fact an “X sensibility” that describes “a way of looking at the world” rather than “a chronological age,” it is nonetheless a historically specific sensibility, one that is popular now because of the more general and on-going cultural and political backlash against youth, one that is not so new after all and one that’s much more complex than Coupland’s reductive Boomer v. Buster narrative suggests. One that should not therefore be limited to the privileged romanticisms of new-Bohemian aesthetes.

     

    I invoke this brief sound-bite from punk history (a kind of “roots-of-GenX” narrative) here, not to try to distinguish between “authentic” and co-opted strains of Gen X, but rather as a check to the tendency in many self-identified media and academic Gen X discourses to define Gen X as an uniquely late 80’s/early ’90s scene or aesthetic. Regarding punk, I agree with David Laing, who argues that to talk about the history of “punk rock” is really to talk about a discourse–a loose, fluid (frequently contradictory) consensus of users between 1976 and 1978 that can be found circulating in punk artifacts (records, zines), punk events (concerts, interviews, staged media hoaxes, and interventions), and punk institutions (underground, scene-specific record labels, clubs, and shops, as well as established record companies, radio stations, and the music press) (viii). If in the early 1990s a similar kind of new consensus or discourse formation emerged under the sign Generation X (even if there can be no such directly stated signifier), then one thing that seems to separate it from its punk predecessors is the lack of any clearly identifiable artifacts, events, and institutions. If there are no artifacts of Generation X but only a handful of novels and films about the lack of generational artifacts now taken up as artifacts in themselves, if with Generation X what we have is an emerging consensus that positions itself as a subculture but lacks any clearly identifiable subaltern scene, then what happens when we try to apply our tried-and-true academic questions about the mainstream’s appropriation of subcultural resistant practices only to transform their original oppositional cultural politics into trite morality clichés for middle class fashion consumers? Does it make any sense to even ask whether or not GenX-identified symbols of disaffection and dissent have been appropriated as fashion symbols? Or should we be asking instead what happens when fashion symbols of images of disaffection and dissent are taken up and disseminated by people (like Coupland) who may or may not be disaffected but who nonetheless identify themselves as part of a newly disaffected generation emerging on the scene of their imagined post-Boomer wasteland?

     

    How then, in other words, do I deal with the fact that everything I have just described and critiqued as the narrow privileged range of Coupland’s Gen X world frequently gets articulated in the pages of Spin as it presents itself as “the voice of a generation”? How do I explain the fact that, when I discussed Spin magazine and Generation X with my undergraduate rhetoric students in the spring of 1996, we ended up switching roles and I was the one defending Spin against their teacherly-intoned, ironic, and theoretically informed critiques? This essay has, in fact, largely grown out of that 1996 course, where I found myself in the unlikely position of defending Spin against my students, half of them senior English and Rhetoric majors ten years younger than myself. As part of this on-going debate, one of my students wrote an essay arguing that this whole Gen X thing is all just one big (M)TV media scam in the first place. He only half-ironically, and rather convincingly, argued that Gen X is something that was invented by the MTV-Spin-Geffen music industrial complex, that the whole thing is just so much more white noise–the projection of pop industry workers and academics in their lower thirties (he meant me) waxing nostalgic for a punk past that they never really lived in the first place: “The whole thing makes me want to barf,” he wrote. “The fact is that there is/has been an ongoing and Real punk movement since the mid seventies and it lives and thrives in the streets and in the underground–where it belongs–and this Gen X crap is just yet another attempt to appropriate and somehow control the anarchy of real punk culture.” And of course I think he’s partly right on that. The thing that interests me, however, is that Spin magazine frequently says basically the same thing, and I think my student was getting some of his arguments against Spin for exploiting and appropriating the punk scene in their cover story “Greenday: The Year Punk Broke” (Nov. 1995) from that very article. And if that’s the case, then what the heck does that mean!? What it means is you end up trying to “read” Spin by reading someone else reading Spin reading itself. Then you get thrown into theoretical tailspins–brought to you by the “Tailspinners,” which is Spin‘s name for their list of this month’s feature writers, editors, and contributors, who, not unlike the contributors in a typical issue of Social Text, are drawn from a wide range of cultural positions, including established music critics, new journalists, fiction writers, musicians, and artists, as well as pop culture academics and other public intellectuals.

     

    There is in fact another, perhaps even more significant, reciprocal chain of signification going on here alongside the example I just cited of my student’s reading of Spin reading itself: take this sound-bite from Bob Guccione, Jr.’s January 1994 “TopSpin” column specifically addressing the Gen X phenomenon, which is also where my student was getting some of his rhetorical ammunition against Spin and which pre-dates Coupland’s Details “eulogy” of Gen X by six months:

     

    This year belonged to something that doesn’t exist: Generation X.

     

    Generation X is a phantom, an hysterical hallucination of baby boomers, suddenly realizing they are no longer the life of the party.... With a speed befitting long-honed instincts of self-interest, they created the mythology of a blank generation that has inadvertently wandered onto the stage, awkward and whining, clueless as to what to do. (12)

     

    Unlike Coupland, however, Guccione isn’t just haggling over Gen X property rights under the guise of narratives about “corporate marketing appropriations” (though that may be a factor too and a legitimate critique of Spin); rather, his complaint against Boomer-sponsored Gen X narratives is aimed at the insidious side-effects they are producing: deflecting attention away from the social and economic devastation wrought by 1980s Boomer-complicit Reaganism and, most importantly for Guccione, further deflating the politically energized atmosphere of youth cultures which had galvanized around the 1992 Rock the Vote campaign. Guccione concludes his year-end editorial on a hopeful note, predicting that 1994 would be “a watershed year. Because, like it did in 1968 and 1969, America is ready to burst again.” The prediction itself turned out to be woefully off the mark. 1994 of course brought instead Newt Gingrich’s other, all-too-familiar kind of Republican revolution and ushered in the era of the Clinton compromise, and if anything, the usual academic suspects tell us, youth political apathy seems to be on the rise. Yet, Guccione’s allusion to the barricades of 1968 ironically locates Gen X once again back in the discourses of punk rock–not punk rock as my student would construct it (and as Coupland would re-construct Gen X), as an aesthetic “way of looking at the world” forever living in the wishful imaginary space of some “authentic” media-free underground streets, but rather punk rock as The Clash attempted to define it in explicitly extra-generational political terms on the back sleeve of their first single release “White Riot”/”1977”:

     

    there is, perhaps, some tension in society, when overwhelming pressure brings industry to a standstill or barricades to the streets years after the liberals had dismissed the notion as "dated romanticism"... the journalist invents the theory that this constitutes a clash of generations. Youth, after all, is not a permanent condition, and a clash of generations is not so fundamentally dangerous to the art of government as would be a clash between rulers and ruled. (qtd. in Marcus Lipstick Traces 11-12)

     

    That Guccione, Jr. and Spin will repeatedly critique the concept of Generation X as a Boomer-Media-Madison Avenue phantom while at the same time marketing the magazine as the voice of a (Gen X) generation, and frequently do so in explicitly political terms, is, to say the least, a contradiction, one that’s not easy to work through. But it’s a contradiction that we will have to get used to if academics are going to, in Huyssen’s terms, “catch on” and work in the same postmodern, post-avant-garde world that has been “home” to Spin and the youth cultures and subcultures it has been reporting and disseminating since the mid 1980s.

     

    II. “Bone-Crunching Contradictions” and Theoretical Tailspins: Spin is Not Just a Magazine

     

    To live in the postmodern moment of contemporary youth cultures, according to Andrew Ross, is to live in a world in which confronting “bone-crunching contradictions” is the norm, a “daily item” (1). The particular “contradiction” that Ross uses to frame the academic/pop-cult dialogue taking place in Microphone Fiends (co-edited by Tricia Rose) is the fact that, in the opening feature page of Vibe‘s preview issue, Greg Tate launched the first major commercial magazine devoted to hip hop by hosting a “swinging assault on hip hop commercialism consciously spoken from within the belly of the Madison Avenue beast” (1). This is precisely the kind of contradiction that is both found on the pages of Spin and that constitutes the underlying logic of the magazine’s mission, design, and style–a logic that may or may not be merely another face of the logic of consumerism as we have no doubt been conditioned to assume.

     

    As a way of framing Spin‘s specific coverage of Riot Grrrl in 1992, let’s skim the surface of a few brief, relatively random samples of Spin‘s own spin on its relationship to the postmodern:

     

    Spins

     

    Everything in Spin spins off the metaphors of the word spin. There was a good deal of media flap back in April of 1985, the date of Spin‘s first issue, as to just what it meant to have another mass-circulation rock magazine enter the market. Was Spin Rolling Stone revitalized for a new emergent youth culture formation (a rock re-formation)? Is it Rolling Stone for an accelerated culture? If so, how so–as in merely having “advanced” one generation or as in having “progressed” (as in accelerating the revolution)? Or is the title of Spin merely a self-reflexive wink at a consumer culture gone mad, spinning out of control–spinning directionlessly in a world where there is no more up or down? Is “spin” a self-conscious, self-implicating metaphor for postmodern vertigo? Or, does it refer to political spin? A particular political spin or more generally the politics of spin at work in a media society, a testimony to the power of media in shaping the spin of the world? Or, is it something even larger in its philosophical implications: an entrance sign into a poststructuralist world where all meaning is relational and contingent? A world where Guccione’s editorial column is titled “TopSpin” because that’s how he both is positioned and positions himself–how he is positioned within the management hierarchy of the magazine itself, but also how he is socially positioned in terms of class, race, and gender more generally? Or, is the answer the obvious one: all of the above?

     

    “Spins” is also the title of the album review section in the magazine, which (until recently) came framed by the following “Handy Omniscient Rating System” and which is typical of Spin‘s logic of the “bone-crunching contradiction”:

     

    Green  = Go directly to your local record 
             store.  Buy this album.  
             Immediately.  Kill if you must.
    
    Yellow = Whoa! Slow down pal! This album is 
             pretty good, but you can't buy 
             everything in the store.  Can you?
    
    Red    = Stop it.  Put that down.  Go buy 
             something to eat instead.  You have 
             to eat, too, you know.

     

    But what kinds of critical space does Spin open up with such a gesture when the reviewers then go on to make serious critical distinctions about specific albums up for review? And exactly what irony survives when those reviews are framed by columns of advertising for these same newest CD releases? What picture is being drawn here of the reciprocal relationship between music industry advertising goals and those of Spin (an alternative music media industry) as it implicates itself in this process by drawing attention to the fact that a good review means you should go out and buy the merchandise? What does it mean, however, when each and every month anywhere from six to ten albums get the green light and another half dozen or so get the yellow? What narratives of youth poverty and affluence are being invoked here by this ironic ratings guide? How does it map out consumer categories? Here’s one possible reading of the implied ironic critique:

     

    Green  = poverty/the poverty of desire. Urban 
             kids (implicitly of color?) killing 
             for a pair of sneakers or a cd, 
             killing for the (false) "image" 
             behind some mass-produced band or 
             album.
    
    Yellow = affluence/the boredom of getting what 
             you want. You suburban white kids who 
             can buy everything, plus the guilt of 
             knowing that your satiated poverty of 
             (false) desire is got by someone 
             else's (real) poverty.
    
    Red    = junkie/consumerism itself as a 
             cultural psychosis. The shop-aholic 
             and the alternative music aficionado 
             collapsing into one with Spin 
             magazine as simultaneously the 
             ultimate aficionado and the 
             compulsive consumerist ideologue.

     

    In the movement from “green” to “yellow” to “red,” Spin not only offers a critique of advanced capitalism’s multiple forms of false consciousness (affecting both the haves and the have-nots), they also ground these “individual” or internalized moments of false consciousness in a deeper, cultural logic of consumer society, which, like the shop-aholic/aficionado, is driven towards a commodification of desire to the exclusion of basic social needs (“you have to eat, too, you know”). Yet, there’s still the question of gauging the end effect of Spin‘s ironic posturing and whether such irony facilitates or nullifies the possibility of any “cultural critique” taking place at all. Has Spin so thoroughly implicated itself in the advertising function of album reviews that it frees a space for critical narratives to speak themselves and, in that way, paradoxically lays bare an otherwise hidden logic of consumer capitalism? Or is the irony here (and throughout Spin more generally) merely another superficial postmodern wink at the reader that reasserts a consensus ideological space for business-as-usual in a world where “there is nowhere else to go but the shops” (Hebdige 168)?

     

    Similar sets of ironic questions can be generated by just about everything in the pages of Spin.

     

    AIDS: Words From the Front

     

    This is serious spin by Spin dropping its standard line of parodic Thompson-esque outlaw journalism. The fact that from January 1988 Spin maintained a sustained monthly discussion of AIDS under the subheading “Words From the Front” and gave it a central place in the magazine is itself somewhat remarkable and commendable. However, it may also, as does everything else in Spin, raise more questions than it answers–which, regarding AIDS discourses, sometimes is and sometimes isn’t necessarily a good thing. How, for instance, should one read Spin‘s long-running series of stories on whether or not HIV is the cause of AIDS, particularly as they take a pro-sex stance and popularize certain Cultural Studies analyses of AIDS discourses (e.g., Crimps’s AIDS: Cultural Analysis/Cultural Activism)? On the one hand, these articles appear to popularize the Cultural Studies assumption that “AIDS does not exist apart from the practices that conceptualize it, represent it, and respond to it” (Crimp, “AIDS” 3). As such they may successfully deploy the discourses of pop culture journalism to deconstruct medical/scientific discourses and their authoritative claims to objective knowledge, demonstrating that, when it comes to AIDS, “no clear line can be drawn between the facticity of scientific and nonscientific (mis)conceptions” (Treichler 37). Celia Farber’s “Words From the Front” articles in particular seem to give popular voice to what Crimp describes as “the genuine concern by informed people that a full acceptance of HIV as the cause of AIDS limits research options, especially regarding possible cofactors” (“How to Have Promiscuity” 238). They certainly seem to “perform a political analysis of the ideology of science” and in doing so also take a pro-sex stance. On the other hand, one might also argue that Farber’s articles do so in a regressive tabloid fashion by celebrating Duesberg as a “maverick hero” without critiquing Deusberg’s views on the causes of AIDS, or without adequately reporting the controversy surrounding those views (as The Village Voice did when Ann Fettner characterized Deusberg’s views as a “regression to 1982” when the medical community viewed AIDS as a collection of diseases related to “the gay life style” [see Crimp 238]). Other AIDS articles written for Spin are even more suspect, suggesting that Spin‘s preoccupation with the HIV controversy may be motivated more by a need to confirm a political-medical “establishment” conspiracy against “sex” than by a genuine desire to engage in AIDS cultural analysis-activism. If this is the case (and I’m not concluding here that in fact it is), what then separates Spin‘s reporting from the kinds of exploitative reporting that Crimp finds in the pages of the New York Native, which, according to Crimp, merely trots out “the crackpot theory of the week” and exploits “the conflation of sex, fear, disease, and death in order to sell millions of newspapers” (Crimp 237-238)? Certainly the fact that Spin would run an article rehashing the “poppers theory” (Nov. 1994) in a totally unselfconscious article that makes no mention of the homophobic medical-politics surrounding this theory is cause for some concern if not outright alarm. If silence equals death, and it does, Spin is at least not silent. But the fact that silence equals death does not, of course, mean that the inverse is always true: sound does not always equal life. Sometimes sound isn’t voice, it’s just more noise, and, as ACT UP Cultural Studies analyses of AIDS discourses have all too frequently demonstrated, some kinds of noise can be deadlier than viruses. By positioning itself on the “front lines” of the AIDS War, has Spin succeeded in articulating and popularizing an ACT UP frame of reference on AIDS, as well as, in the process, popularizing Cultural Studies notions of hegemony as a “war of position,” not least perhaps in Spin‘s 1989 infamous ad-stunt/political intervention of including a free condom with one of its special issues?7 Or, has Spin merely appropriated ACT UP rhetoric as a kind of cutting-edge neo-punk style, exploiting the AIDS epidemic and PWAs as a way of furthering its own self-promoting image of Spin as front-line pop (i.e., Spin as shades of Michael Stipe)?

     

    In fact, Spin‘s relationship with the tabloid-style New York Native may be even more complex and problematic, as is made clear in Celia Farber’s outrageously off-the-mark “TopSpin” editorial on ACT UP published in May 1992. Most outrageous (it would be funny if it weren’t so dangerously misinformed) is Farber’s completely unselfconscious presumption to lecture ACT UP on the dangers of being “absorbed” by the mainstream media. ACT UP and other activists need to realize, she concludes in her lecture about the dangers of being too “entertaining,” that the mainstream media always gets the last word: “We don’t use the media: the media uses us. And the government uses the media. If AIDS activism did not exist, as a vent system for AIDS fury, the government would have reason to worry. As it is they’re grinning from ear to ear” (12, my emphasis). Talk about a bone-crunching contradiction! Who’s the “we” here? If Spin ain’t “the media” then who is? Again, if it weren’t so dangerously inane, it might be funny. I won’t bother to detail the contradictions here, except to note that it’s hard to imagine how it is that Farber, who has led the charge of Spin‘s own brand of mass media appropriations of ACT UP activism, can be so blind as to turn around and try to blame successful ACT UP media interventions for derailing some imaginary “AIDS fury” that would otherwise unleash itself, when of course those ACT UP and Gran Fury successes are themselves the only reason Farber can conjure up the signifier of “AIDS fury” in the first place.8

     

    Sex in the ’90s

     

    After ACT UP AIDS activism had lost much of its radical, alternative cachet, Spin shifted gears in 1995 and ran a series of self-identified, third-generation, sex-positive “feminist” articles under the heading “Sex in the 90s”–which again raises questions about the commodification of oppositional culture. How, for example, should one read Elizabeth Gilbert’s feature article on “feminist porn” titled “Pussy Galore” (April 1995)? Here is an article that has clearly been informed by Cultural Studies positions on the anti-porn/”pro-sex” debate within feminism–positions such as those articulated in Ross’s chapter on “The Popularity of Pornography” in No Respect, or in the Social Text special issue “Sex Workers and Sex Work.” Again, however, one might ask whether this article, or similar Spin discussions under the heading “Sex in the ’90s,” survives the seemingly masculinist framing devices that accompany it? Take, for instance, the way this article gets framed on the contents page: “Pussy Galore. Sick of the same old sleaze, feminist pornographers are getting off their backs and behind the cameras. Meet the revolutionaries in the flicks-for-chicks business. By Elizabeth Gilbert.” This blurb, along with the rest of the contents blurbs, is printed over a black-and-white still photo from an S/M film covered in the article depicting a topless woman gazing down at her outstretched feet which are being suckled by a blond submissive dressed in a teddy and collar. In small print off to the side is the following photo caption: “Toe-lickin’ good: A scene from An Elegant Spanking. See Elizabeth Gilbert’s article on feminist porn.” Of course, the first academic question is likely to be (and with emphasis), who is being invited to gaze into such a “revolutionary” porn world? Or rather, whose gaze is being invited to gaze? Do such phrases as “pussy galore,” “toe-lickin’ good,” or “flicks-for-chicks” appropriate masculinist porn-speak and rearticulate it in a sex-positive feminist-porn voice? Or are we seeing instead the limits of such acts of appropriation which have become increasingly commonplace in Gen X underground scenes and discourses? Is such a world, framed as it is here, revolutionary or merely exoticized for the titillation of male readers looking to rationalize their heterosexist porn appetites? Or, are we freed from struggling with these questions because Elizabeth Gilbert raises most of them herself in the article, as when she puts down her pen and picks up the camera to shoot some footage for a director while on the set of an S/M film, remarking in retrospect that she felt more like a tourist than a pornographer?

     

    “The A to Z of Alternative Culture”

     

    Let’s take as one final example the issues raised when one attempts to analyze Craig Marks’s multiply-ironic introduction to Spin‘s April 1993 “A to Z of Alternative Culture,” a highly eclectic, kitsch “dictionary” of what it means to be Gen X in 1993 that lists, in mock encyclopedia style, items ranging from consumer products like Snapple to “in” bands like Nirvana and TV shows like The Simpsons, as well as underground subculture scenes like rave and Riot Grrrl. Marks’s introduction to this feature offers itself up as a perfect example of Spin‘s trademark ironic style (marked by MTVish Gen X posturing):

     

    The outpouring of scribblings recently about the generation born in the ’60s and ’70s reads like a misguided conclusion to that psych experiment where twins are separated at birth to answer the nurture versus nature debate. Could it be that these profiles of you and yours are nothing but covert attempts to reduce a complex, confounded generation to its lowest common denominator, thereby making it easier to blame you for all that’s wrong with the world, and easier to exploit you when there’s a new soft drink on the market? Does the word “duh” mean anything to you?

     

    What your birthdate does provide you is common ground, a shared vocabulary. The items we've selected, when added together, do not equal your thoughts, feelings, fears, and aspirations. That's for you and your confidants to sort out. There is, though, a lexicon that develops among the members of a generation, a secret language that's so pervasive it's taken for granted. Asking a 40-year-old to comprehend a conversation between two 24-years-olds is as fruitless an exercise in code-breaking as reading the Daily Racing Form. What you'll find on the following pages is more the result of sifting through the contents of your pants pockets than of unlocking the door to your soul. We'll save that for next year's anniversary issue. (38)

     

    What does it mean when Spin, which already ironically sells itself as THE monthly tour-guide to “Alternative” scenes, publishes an A to Z tour-guide to Alternative Culture? What does it mean when the music editor then writes an introduction to this pastiche cultural dictionary by announcing that these profiles you are about to read are reductive and commercially exploitative and that such a list could never really be compiled except as a set of already appropriated mass media stereotypes of a self-identified generational youth culture that could never really exist? What does it mean when Craig Marks goes on to suggest, in a seeming reversal, that a generational lexicon is “so pervasive it’s taken for granted,” and cites as proof of its existence the fact that it lies in the shared consumer goods found in the contents of our pockets?

     

    Two months later, the editors throw into the mix, as Spin always does, that one last twirl: a reader’s response to the A-Z tour-guide to the always-already-thoroughly-appropriated-GenX-scene–a letter published by Spin further implicating Spin as it simultaneously represents, constructs, and exploits the scene that never quite yet was:

     

    Just when I thought SPIN had a clue, we get "The A to Z of Alternative Culture." Why can't people realize that the basis of an alternative culture is that it can't be alphabetized? A better title for the piece would have been "26 Steps to Becoming Trendy"--or better yet "What's out for '93."

     

    Insofar as the article at issue is a simulacra of Spin, each of these substitute titles may be read as already popularized meta-commentaries on what it means to read Spin magazine itself. Staked out here between these two alternative titles to Spin‘s alternative tour-guide, lies a wonderfully complex and illustrative debate about the relationship between popularized postmodernism and essentializing patterns in Cultural Studies subculture criticism.

     

    “26 Steps to Becoming Trendy”: Spin as Just a Magazine

     

    Of course, Spin magazine is only one of a growing number of mass-circulation pop-cult magazines which have learned, in a sense, to talk the talk of academic theory and cultural criticism. And even though I’ve invested more time than I’d care to admit in this paper and I consider myself a “fan” of Spin (whatever that might actually be), I, too, am sometimes inclined to dismiss it wholesale as so many of Spin‘s own readers do. I too am tempted to read Spin as merely a tour guide to what’s trendy–to interpret Spin according to the logic of Hebdige’s reading of the Face as a magazine that articulates nothing more than a facile, flat earth postmodernism in which everything is always already commercially appropriated, where the line between the ads and the articles isn’t just blurred, it collapses altogether, and for Hebdige it always collapses into the ad.

     

    Borrowing Jean-Luc Godard’s famous maxim “This is not a just image. This is just an image,” Hebdige reads the Face as a way of marking the differences between what he sees as “a just magazine” (Ten.8) and “just a magazine” (the Face). Comparing these two British youth culture magazines on points of design, content, and style, Hebdige maps a cultural terrain between, on the one hand, the last remnants of an avant-garde world (a three dimensional world of words capable of historical perspective and motion over time) and, on the other hand, the emergent dominance of a postmodern, post-avant-garde world (a flat depthless world of images happily fixated on its own eternally changing kaleidoscopic present). According to Hebdige, Ten.8, with its more traditional magazine style and print-dominated three-column layout, is a magazine capable of offering up “knowledge of debates on the history, theory, politics and practice of photography,” where as the Face, with its oversized “continental format,” its emphasis on photo images and a design that blurs the boundaries between article and ad, ends up offering nothing but flat surfaces: “‘street credibility,’ ‘nous,’ image and style tips for those operating within the highly competitive milieux of fashion, music and design” (158):

     

    The Face is a magazine which goes out of its way every month to blur the line between politics and parody and pastiche; the street, the stage, the screen; between purity and danger; the mainstream and the “margins.” (161)

     

    […]

     

    All statements made inside the Face, though necessarily brief are never straightforward. Irony and ambiguity predominate. They frame all reported utterances whether those utterances are reported photographically or in prose. A language is thus constructed without anybody in it (to question, converse or argue with). Where opinions are expressed they occur in hyperbole so that a question is raised about how seriously they’re meant to be taken. Thus the impression you gain as you glance through the magazine is that this is less an “organ of opinion” than a wardrobe full of clothes (garments, ideas, values, arbitrary preferences: i.e., signifiers)….

     

    As the procession of subcultures, taste groups, fashions, anti-fashions, winds its way across the flat plateaux, new terms are coined to describe them.... The process is invariable: caption/capture/disappearance (i.e., naturalisation). [...] Once named, each group moves from the sublime (absolute now) to the ridiculous (the quaint, the obvious, the familiar). It becomes a special kind of joke. Every photograph an epitaph, every article an obituary. On both sides of the camera and the typewriter, irony and ambiguity act as an armour to protect the wearer (writer/photographer; person/people written about/photographed) against the corrosive effects of the will to nomination. Being named (identified; categorised) is naff; on Planet Two it is a form of living death. (170)

     

    Hmmmmm. Smells like team Spin. What’s in Spin is out because being in Spin marks one as having already been “sold out” long enough to be included in Spin. Regardless of how frequently Spin may implicate itself in the ironic world of its own making, such acts of self-implication are themselves, however, only part of the language of simulacra… every month the world of youth cultures and pop is made anew in the pages of Spin only to be declared dead already, only in turn to be made new and declared already dead again next month. Or is it?

     

    “What’s Out For ’93”: Spin as Not Just a Magazine

     

    The Spin reader who wants to dismiss the magazine as a consumerist tour guide to what’s trendy also, unwittingly, acknowledges in his letter that one might read Spin as a way of gauging what’s not authentic alternative culture–as a guide to “What’s out.” The logic underlying such a critique reflects Sarah Thornton’s argument that (as well as perhaps Spin‘s self-conscious realization of the fact that) mass subculture consumer magazines such as the Face, however ironically scorned by people who identify themselves with underground scenes, nevertheless play a crucial, constitutive mediating role in the formation of subculture scenes and identities. In “Moral Panic, the Media and British Rave Culture,” Thornton challenges the way Cultural Studies subculture theories “tend to position the media and its associated processes in opposition to and after the fact of subculture” (189):

     

    Their segregation of subcultures from the media derives, in part, from an intellectual project in which popular culture was excavated out from under mass culture (that is, authentic people's culture was sequestered from mediated, corporate culture). In this way, the popular was defended against the disparagement of "mass society" and other theorists; youth could be seen as unambiguously active rather than passive, creative rather than manipulated. In practice, however, music subcultures and the media--popular and mass culture--are inextricable. In consumer societies, where sundry media work simultaneously and global industries are local businesses, the analytical division eclipses as much as it explains. (188)

     

    We see this kind of interpretive “eclipse” at work in Hebdige’s account of the “invariable” process he maps out regarding the relationship between the Face and the subculture scenes it covers: “caption/capture/disappearance.” In her reading of British rave scenes, however, Thornton finds that, in the mainstream as well as in niche/zine media (and everything in between), one can chart a relationship that looks more like caption/formation/caption/re-formation–a reciprocal relationship in which subcultures are not “subversive until the very moment they are represented by the mass media,” but rather “become politically relevant only when they are framed as such,” frequently by disparaging mass media/tabloid coverage which becomes “not the verdict but the vehicle of their resistance” (184). Moreover, Thornton argues that subculture theorists need to acknowledge the existence of mass media that cater specifically to counter-cultural desires of young people, what she refers to as “subcultural consumer magazines.”

     

    III. (White) Riot Grrrl: who really wants a riot right now?

     

    Joanne Gottlieb and Gayle Wald take up a similar post-Hebdige position in “Smells Like Teen Spirit: Riot Grrrls, Revolution and Women in Independent Rock,” where they conclude that the limits of Riot Grrrl “revolutionary” rock are to be found in the movement’s self-imposed media black-out, some of which has remained in effect since 1992. Though they concede that Riot Grrrls have legitimate reasons to fear and loathe masculinist “mainstream” media and the gaze of academia, both of which threaten (in different ways of course) to exploit and trivialize the movement and incorporate it into various forms of cultural tourism, Gottlieb and Wald conclude that such a stance against academia and the “popular” is ultimately politically regressive and elitist:

     

    In pinning its resistance to the undifferentiated "mainstream," Riot Grrrl risks setting itself up in opposition to the culturally "popular," as well as to the political status quo; in this they echo the collegiate erudition and elitism of independent music generally. Moreover, in rejecting the popular, Riot Grrrl may preclude the possibility of having a broad cultural or political impact.... If Riot Grrrl wants to raise feminist consciousness on a large scale, then it will have to negotiate a relation to the mainstream that does not merely reify the opposition between mainstream and subculture. (271)

     

    This criticism is perhaps especially poignant when one considers that many Riot Grrrls are themselves current or former graduate students and that much of Riot Grrrl’s neo-punk “revolution” resides in the translation of academic feminist critical theory into everyday subcultural practice. For the purposes of my argument here, however, what’s most relevant about Gottlieb and Wald’s essay is not only the fact that their conclusions about the limits Riot Grrrl counter-hegemonic practices echo Thornton’s analysis of the symbiotic, constitutive relationship between media and subculture identity but also the performative criticism that their essay enacts by violating, in the acts of composition, presentation, and publication, Riot Grrrl resolve to resist incorporation in/by the gaze of both “mainstream” media and academia. This is made all the more clear when one considers the ways Gottlieb and Wald undermine their own analysis by constructing Riot Grrrl as an “original” underground that “emerges as a bona fide subculture” and then gets “discovered” by mainstream journalism and subsequently popularized (262-263).

     

    This is precisely the kind of violation for which Spin magazine is routinely vilified, again by academics, subculture members, and so-called “mainstream” readers alike. Moreover, Gottlieb and Wald’s implicit rationale for committing such a violation is identical to that which is frequently asserted in the pages of Spin as it reports and disseminates “alternative” underground scenes to “mainstream” readers–namely, “politics,” or in the words of Gottlieb and Wald, the “possibility of [Riot Grrrl] having a broad cultural or political impact.” Compare this statement to Spin‘s own coverage of Riot Grrrl just prior to the movement’s semi-official 1992 media blackout in the magazine’s “Flash” section (a series of short articles in the front of the magazine devoted to, among other things, alerting readers to new and emerging underground scenes):

     

    When asked about their inspiration, many of the women involved cite Kathleen Hanna, lead singer of Bikini Kill. Hanna, however, doesn't exactly have mass-media savvy--she declined to speak to Spin and, with that, gave up the opportunity to reach thousands with her motivating voice. (Furth 26)

     

    To punctuate their certainly self-serving critique further, and to give Riot Grrrl the benefit of the mass media advertising plug that Hanna expressly tried to refuse, Furth concludes her brief Spin article by listing Riot Grrrl Washington D.C. contact addresses for “girl bands” and “girls interested in Riot Grrrl” (a rhetorical gesture that echoes Spin‘s monthly Amnesty International updates, which appeared on donated ad-space for 12 months in 1991-92, including an entire special issue guest-edited by Amnesty International Executive Director Jack Healey in November 1991).

     

    The bottom line from both Gottlieb and Wald and Spin‘s perspective seems to be the same: if you really want to have a progressive riot (or a cultural revolution), first you have to assemble a crowd. And you can only do that by reaching out to Others, even to those (or perhaps especially to those), who threaten to incorporate your slogans, your “look,” and your politics into their own agendas and their own practices and pleasures of everyday life; and you can only do that if you’re willing to work in the mediums of the popular. Spin sound-bite:

     

    Sinéad O’Connor: I don’t believe that rock’n’roll is only about entertainment.

     

    SPIN [Bob Guccione, Jr.]: I don't either, but it's certainly an entertainment medium. ("Special Child" 48)

     

    Or, as Elizabeth Gilbert would write in her article on feminist porn after being snubbed by a NOW spokesperson who refused to distinguish between Penthouse publisher Bob Guccione, Sr. and his son who publishes and edits Spin: “If you only talk to people who already agree with you, you are not a political organization. You’re a support group.” Spin writers and editors frequently echo academic critiques of the traditional divisions between the margins and the mainstream–as they do, for instance, in an article on Stone Temple Pilots (August 1995): “As mainstream rock bands continue to emulate indie ways, they become lightening rods for ridicule. ‘Poseurs!’ cry the righteous arbiters of indie. But shouldn’t we encourage the mainstreaming of indie values?” (Azerrad 57). This is the core of Spin‘s theory of its own relationship to mass culture–this is at once its angle into the market of subculture consumer magazines and its moral mission, what Guccione, Jr. calls its “higher calling.”

     

    The arguments against Spin successfully articulating or performing any such cultural criticism should by now be familiar. Regarding Spin‘s Riot Grrrl coverage specifically, one might argue that Spin doesn’t perform an act of criticism by publishing a “Flash” article on Riot Grrrl and that it performs, instead, a double act of Madison Avenue mainstream incorporation. On the one hand, it appropriates Riot Grrrl interventions to serve a masculinist spectacle of rock ideology, the kind of thing that Ross defines as “some homosocial version of young, straight males out on the town, partying, and so on.” On the other hand, it appropriates an academic critique of the relationship between popular culture and mass media to serve its own self-congratulatory, self-promoting, moralistic editorial voice. One might argue that Riot Grrrl revolution is, to return to Hebdige’s phrasing, merely the latest commodity to appear in Spin‘s endless parade of revolutionary youth cultures as fashion that it deploys to better market its own self-styled image of “street credibility.” In this regard, one might note that the word “Grrrl”–which in Riot Grrrl usage performs a multi-valent intervention into, and recuperation of, the language of patriarchy, as well as a critique of the woman-centered discourses of mainstream feminism–appears on the pages of Spin as “girl.” Spin articles do give a certain voice to Riot Grrrl concerns about masculine-media appropriations: “At a recent CBGB Bikini Kill show, many guys panted at the prospect of seeing Hanna topless (she had doffed her shirt at a previous gig), turning a potential act of defiance into an oglefest.” But those same Spin articles also tend themselves to “ogle” at and invite male readers to be titillated by Riot Grrrl displays of women’s rage: “Some of the older females present saw the show as just a Poly Styrene/X-Ray Spex retread. But to the younger, less jaded Goo-girls, Hanna is the Angriest Girl. They understand. They see this scary, sexy girl, who pogos while singing about sexual abuse, as the future of punk rock–where girls can have fun for a change.” With the final sentence of the article collapsing Riot Grrrl anger into Cindy Lauper’s “girls just wanna have fun,” one might conclude that, indeed, “violation” is the appropriate word to use regarding Spin’s Riot Grrrl reporting and its diluted critical performances–that Spin’s refusal to respect Riot Grrrl’s “no” in response to its media advances constitutes a form of sexual violence.

     

    Though there is no doubt some validity to each of these claims, the problem with such arguments is that: 1) they all depend upon a return to an interpretive paradigm that constructs Riot Grrrl subculture as existing apart from and outside of the multiple levels of media (mass media, tabloid media, niche or zine media, as well as subculture consumer media, and, I would add, academic media), which are in fact the materials out of which subcultures and undergrounds are made; and 2) they presuppose that a valid, qualitative (if not quantitative) distinction can be drawn between Spin‘s violation of Riot Grrrl media black-outs and the violation performed by Gottlieb and Wald’s academic essay, which is of course only the tip of a whole wave of Riot Grrrl seminar papers that began hitting the beaches of traditional academic venues. Gottlieb and Wald tend themselves to reify the opposition between mainstream and subculture, and in the process exaggerate the anti-hegemonic resistance of the subculture, by turning to Riot Grrrl performances in order to validate academic gender-as-performance criticism while at the same time holding those performances up as a model for future feminist political strategies: “Using performance as a political forum to interrogate issues of gender, sexuality and patriarchal violence, Riot Grrrl performance creates a feminist praxis based on the transformation of the private into the public, consumption into production–or, rather than privileging the traditionally male side of these binaries, they create a new synthesis of both” (268). Making such an intellectual and political investment in a “popular” scene that refuses to engage the popular almost as a matter of policy, however, makes me wonder exactly what kind of praxis we’re really talking about here, bringing to mind Steven Tyler’s joke about rock critics: “Why do rock critics like Elvis Costello? Because they all look like him” (“Cult of the DJ” 75). But even assuming that Riot Grrrl has indeed managed (in spite of itself) to mobilize a popularized form of feminist cultural criticism centered on a Hebdigian post-modernist “problematics of affect” (and I think the subsequent mass popularity of Courtney Love and other popularized “angry womyn” Grrrl-styled “alternative” rock bands indicates that is has), I would argue that it could only do so, as Gottlieb and Wald themselves hesitantly acknowledge, in its popularized forms in the mass media:

     

    Possibly, the riot grrrl movement would have been significantly diminished had it not been for its careful coverage [in Sassy], which gave a mass audience of teenage girls access to a largely inaccessible phenomenon in the rock underground. This suggests a variation on Dick Hebdige's model of ideological incorporation in that--in this case--the media, beyond its function to control and contain this phenomenon, may also have helped to perpetuate it. Sassy's role in publicizing and perpetuating the riot grrrl phenomenon may arise from a gendered division in the experience of youth culture, with girls' participation gravitating towards the forms, often mass-market visual materials, that lend themselves towards consumption in the home. While it appropriates riot grrrl subculture as a marketing strategy, the magazine also enables riot grrrl culture to infiltrate the domestic space to which grrrls--particularly young teenagers--are typically confined. (265-266)

     

    All of which tends to circle without directly facing the more fundamental questions of exactly where Riot Grrrl performances might be said to perform and who in fact might be said to perform them, which ultimately leads to a question of who qualifies to identify themselves as part of the Riot Grrrl revolution: underground rock bands and underground zines, certainly; readers, writers, and editors of Sassy, maybe; but presumably not readers (let alone writers and editors) of the likes of The Village Voice, Rolling Stone, and Spin.

     

    Of course, there are important differences to note between underground scenes and mass media disseminations of underground messages and styles, between the reading spaces and reading practices of contemporary teenage girls and boys (though Hanna herself allows that boys too, like Bikini Kill’s guitarist, can be “girly boys”); however, Gottlieb and Wald’s compulsion to police the boundaries between Sassy‘s “careful,” “respectful,” and ideologically “committed” mass media disseminations on the one hand, and an otherwise undifferentiated mass of “mainstream” media dilutions on the other, seems to me to overplay all of these differences, especially given the collegiate nature of “alternative” youth cultures more generally. The overall effect of this is to exaggerate Riot Grrrl underground agency in “infiltrating” the mainstream with presumably more “authentic” Riot Grrrl articulations and to discount any empowering potential in the readerly consumption of mass media marketing appropriations of those articulations.

     

    Thornton claims that, because mass media is the stuff out of which subcultural identity is formed, we must concede that subcultures are themselves likely to be more passive than we have been conditioned to believe. The converse of this may be, however, that subculture consumer magazines (their articles and ads) are more actively subversive than we have been conditioned to assume. From this perspective, one could argue that Riot Grrrl as Gottlieb and Wald construct it not only risks “echoing the collegiate erudition and elitism of independent music generally” by positioning itself against the “mainstream,” but rather it was from the start already collegiate, erudite and elitist, and that it remained so in part because Riot Grrrl subculture identity grounded itself in limiting rather than expanding the stage upon which it would perform popularized articulations of academic feminism, which, as Gottlieb and Wald acknowledge, remains itself a largely collegiate white middle class woman’s (as opposed to “girl’s”) tradition/culture/movement. Spin writer Charles Aaron was perhaps (ironically) correct, then, when he prematurely concluded in his Village Voice article on the movement that Riot Grrrl circa 1992 would turn out to be only a white college women’s riot after all (though he might have emphasized that that’s significant in and of itself!). Aaron missed the mark, however, when he failed to see Riot Grrrl media coverage itself as a constitutive part of that subcultural resistance movement–a movement of cultural critique which (even more ironically) may have only appeared to evaporate in news photographer’s “flash” to later re-emerge (in spite of everyone) in other, more popular popularized forms.

     

    IV. Conclusion: Post-Scripts (Again): Cultural Work in the “Always Forever Now”

     

    Part of our point is that nobody owns these 
    images. They belong to a movement that is 
    constantly growing--in numbers, in militancy, 
    in political awareness.
    
              --Douglas Crimp, AIDS demo graphics

     

    I want to conclude by way of a brief turn back to Hebdige’s “Post-Scripts” which make up the conclusion of Hiding in the Light–where Hebdige seems to grudgingly accept that, like it or not (and he clearly doesn’t), postmodernism is “here” to stay, so we might as well “get used to it.” Meaning, it’s time to stop complaining about the postmodern (or waxing nostalgic for those more knowable “modernist” times that never quite were anyway) and figure out how to work within it–how to “work it.”

     

    Diesel[TM]: Jeans and (ACT UP) Cultural Work

     

    So let’s begin again by taking Hebdige at face value. Let’s allow that Spin, like the Face and Vibe and other consumer subculture magazines, not only blurs the line between article and ad, it collapses it all together. And let’s allow that it all collapses into the ad. Following Thornton’s line of thinking, ads like Diesel Jeans’ “Victory” [see Figure 3],

     

    Figure 3. Diesel Jeans and Workwear, “Victory!”
    Rpt. from Spin August 1995: 3-4.
    Reprinted by permission.

     

    which was published as a full two-page spread in the opening pages of Spinin 1995, can be read as a post-avant-garde counter-cultural intervention (commercial to be sure) that does not merely appropriate “original” ACT UP signs of subcultural opposition, but in fact resemanticizes and disseminates (popularizes) those oppositional values on a scale that no subcultural articulation ever could. There are indeed multiple moments of commercial appropriation taking place here, appropriations of what traditional subcultural theories would either explicitly or implicitly define as “original” or “authentic” ACT UP oppositional signs. The ad-series slogan and logo, which appears at the bottom corner of all the Diesel Jeans shock ads, borrows directly from ACT UP subcultural styles and rhetoric. The logo features a profile face of a punk/new wave rebel whose image calls to mind ACT UP’s initial appropriation of earlier punk-rock looks; surrounding that profile, arranged like the print surrounding an activist logo, is the series slogan printed in the fashion of ACT UP protest slogans: “Number 80 in a Series of Diesel ‘How to…’ Guides to SUCCESSFUL LIVING for PEOPLE interested in general HEALTH and mental POWER.” The central image of the two sailors kissing on the dock of a World War II home-coming Victory celebration is specifically an appropriation of a 1988 ACT UP poster titled “Read My Lips” [see Figure 4] featuring two World War II era sailors in a similar pose of loving embrace and full-mouthed kiss that gets rearticulated as an in-your-(heterosexist)-face assertion of gay pride and resistance, the visual equivalent of “we’re here, we’re queer, get used it.”

     

    Figure 4. Gran Fury, “Read My Lips (boys)” (1988). Rpt. in Crimp and Rolston 56. Reprinted by permission of ACT UP. 
    Figure 5. “VD DAY!” Illustration accompanying Phil Ochs’s “Have You Heard? The War Is Over!” The Village Voice 23 Nov. 1967. Rpt. in Phil Ochs, The War Is Over (New York: Collier Books, 1971) 93. Reprinted by permission.

     

    However, this “original” ACT UP poster, which was produced by Gran Fury to promote a “kiss in” protest rally, itself borrows from similar tactics of appropriation deployed by 1960s anti-war protests. In fact, this Diesel ad bears an even more direct resemblance to Eisenstaedt’s famously staged World War II V-J Day photograph, which was itself incorporated into a 1968 Vietnam War Protest poster promoting the parodic celebration of “VD Day: The End of the War!” [see Figure 5].

     

    The Diesel Jeans “Victory” ad therefore ends up being not merely a commercial appropriation of ACT UP signs of subcultural resistance, but rather an appropriation of what was itself an ACT UP appropriation. The questions facing us, then, in light of Thornton’s critique of Cultural Studies’ tendency to romanticize and essentialize subcultural resistance are: What, if any, kinds of oppositional cultural work (including but not limited to queer cultural critique) may survive the commodification process? What other kinds of oppositional images might be for sale? Does this image of commodified queerness mark or elide the cultural-historical systems of power and social struggle that lie behind the multiple appropriations taking place? The expected “disclaimer” is clearly present in the lower left corner where a man is wearing a placard in which a sampling of the song “God Bless America” (“America, God shed his grace”) reads as a moral/religious invective against homosexuality. But it’s difficult for me to imagine that virtually all of the in-your-(heterosexist)-face activism of the “original” Gran Fury “Read My Lips” poster gets lost in the popular commercial appropriations here. In fact, when one considers that the timing of the ad proclaiming “victory” comes right on the heels of newly-elected President Clinton’s soon-to-be doomed attempt to lift the ban on gays in the military, this appropriation might be interpreted as reflecting a fuller image of the important role World War II played in the historical development of gay and lesbian identity and community in America because the photograph evokes a wider contextual image of the role World War II and post-war cultural environment in the development of contemporary gay subcultural identity and resistance. The realpolitik optimism of this ad may have been misplaced; however, the larger political successes of ads such as this and of commodified queerness more generally is not to be located in any direct influence they may have on public policy, but rather in their ability to win popular consent for the free and open expression of “outlaw” sexuality. As one reader of an earlier version said in response to someone else’s dismissal of the queer politics in this ad as merely appropriating ACT UP rhetoric as the latest image of suburban “alternative” hippness: “Yes, but that may be precisely the point. We want and need for young people to be able to look at images like this, or video images of Madonna kissing a woman, and see them as ‘cool.’”

     

    The potentially successful populist politics of this ad and similar consumer culture appropriations reveals the limitations of Crimps’s claim that ACT UP subcultural pop art interventions succeed in breaking down the barriers of mass culture and high art which earlier generations of Pop artists sought but failed to achieve. In AIDS demo graphics, Crimp credits ACT UP’s Gran Fury with having successfully circumvented “the fate of most critical art” in the twentieth century, which is to be “co-opted and neutralized” by the overriding commodity constraints of the art world:

     

    Postmodernist art advanced a political critique of art institutions--and art itself as an institution--for the ways they constructed social relations through specific modes of address, representations of history, and obfuscations of power. The limits of this aesthetic critique, however, have been apparent in its own institutionalization: critical postmodernism has become a sanctioned, if still highly contested, art world product, the subject of standard exhibitions, catalogues, and reviews. The implicit promise of breaking out of the museum and marketplace to take on new issues and find new audiences has gone largely unfulfilled. (19)

     

    Crimp claims that ACT UP’s Gran Fury delivers on postmodernist art’s failed promise to break out of the twin confines of “the museum and the marketplace” because they target their art-politics at the “streets” of AIDS activism. Though Crimp is justified in his critique of Pop as museum-bound cultural critique, in his celebration of Gran Fury he tends to fall into the reverse trap of exaggerating and romanticizing the authenticity and independence of queer subculture, much in the same way as George Chauncey does in his analysis of gay subcultures in the 1920s and 1930s, and as Hebdige does regarding punk in the late 1970s and as Gottlieb and Wald do with Riot Grrrl in the late 1980s.

     

    Cultural Studies subcultural theories, as important as they are in mapping the complexities of power relationships operating according to the “spectacle” logics of consumer capitalism, frequently fail to take full account of the constitutive role that mass media technologies play in the long history of dissatisfied people locating ruptures in the hegemonies of cultural dominants and rearticulating resistant cultural practices within those ruptures. What Spin magazine offers us, then, is a demonstration of the limits of relying on subcultures as a paradigm for political action and activism against a global system of multinational consumer capitalism. That’s the bad news. The good news is that rethinking the post-avant-garde politics of Spin may lead to new, more successful strategies of Left coalition-building between intellectuals, counter-cultural celebrities, consumer-subcultural media industries and “the people” which Stuart Hall called for in the conclusion of The Hard Road to Renewal.

     

    When one more fully acknowledges the interdependent, symbiotic relationship between the media and subculture identity formations, the Face becomes more than “just a magazine,” even if one doesn’t yet want to call it “a just magazine.” And so too does Spin, which has from the late ’80s on increasingly positioned itself in more explicit political cultural terms and which had always been more explicitly “political” than the Face from the very beginning. But Spin may arguably be “a just magazine” as well, not because it offers up the kind of academic-friendly, rational argument and criticism that Hebdige locates in Ten.8, but rather precisely because it is able to use irony and hyperbole to mobilize an effective form of “sound-bite” criticism–because Spin manages to reach, with its Gen X posturing and hyperbolic irony, the kinds of readers that neither Hebdige nor media-phobic undergrounds ever will: those center-leaning, educated-but-decidedly-not-academic, generally-conservative-but-still-reachable mass cult readers against whom both subculture theorists and undergrounds scenes ritualistically define themselves, but upon whom they must also depend if their alternative cultural politics are going to be effective.

     

    Jeans II: Celebrating Whose Specialness?

     

    In arguing that contemporary Left pop culture academics need to rethink their relationship to commodified media technologies that shape the shapeless mass of the known world through which progressive cultural politics work, I do not mean to suggest that Spin magazine has arrived at the promised land of post-avant-garde political postmodernist practice. Rather, I’m suggesting that its appropriations of Riot Grrrl and ACT UP counter-culture have functioned progressively and that the Spin model of commodified resistance represents a viable strategy. In many ways, of course, Spin‘s appropriations do function conservatively, particularly regarding issues of race and race representations. Since the advent of Vibe (which now owns Spin), Spin appears to have abandoned its 1989 to 1993 political vision of an alliance between alternative rock and hip-hop manifesting itself under the banner of some vaguely defined multi-cultural Gen X signifier. The magazine continues to market itself as Gen X radical chic, but regarding race, Spin in 1996 and 1997 resorted to merely paying lip service to hip-hop as an imaginary post-racist ally to the (now more than ever) implicitly-coded white world of Gen X iconography.

     

    In the post-Gen X, post-punk, post-Vibe world of the late 1990s, “Gen X” ironically remains a potent signified for both Spin and its fashion-music advertisers, even though any and all explicit signifiers of Gen X have long since past being passé. Moreover, the percentage of multi-ethnic imagery associated with Gen X iconography continues to grow in inverse proportion to the rise of de facto ethnic segregation and racial conflict over the last two decades. Similar to Spin‘s Riot Grrrl coverage, the current proliferation of multi-ethnic Gen X signs again raises complex questions about commodified images of progressive political ideals and the resistant practices of subordinate peoples. In the construction of an explicitly multi-racial Gen X hippness, are we seeing a progressive proliferation of racial integration imagery in a neo-racist age that seems to have forgotten the brief respite of 1960s integration idealism, or are we seeing instead merely another set of “post-racist,” feel-good images that only fuel current, so-called voluntary segregationist trends by white consumers who deny the existence of racial difference and racism even as they run out to buy stylized images of urban, racially-coded hippness?

     

    The narrative logic of Spin‘s racial positioning can be seen in a Levi’s Silver Tab advertisement featured in the October 1997 issue of Swing: A Magazine About Life in Your Twenties, itself a spin-off of the Spin phenomenon. In this ad, which is typical of the Silver Tab campaign, a kitsch late ’70s family portrait that screams white-bread suburbia gets intruded upon by a moment of inter-racial “contact” [see Figure 6].

     

    Figure 6. Levi’s SilverTab,
    “Celebrate Your Specialness.”
    Rpt. from Swing: A Magazine
    About Life In Your Twenties

    November 1997: 14-15.
    Reprinted by permission of Levi’s.

     

    The authenticity of the 1970s suburban dress, the stiff poses and the sterile smiles of the family stand in stark juxtaposition to the relaxed posture, the gently mocking smile and the “alternative” street style of this urban female hipster whose punked-out afro touches the white house-wife’s do-it-yourself-perm cut. Of course, the “in joke” of the ad is that white people aren’t hip. But the deeper irony, the implied commercial message of the ad, seems to be that white people, these twenty-something college students who read Swing and Spin,can in fact purchase a kind of second-degree hippness through Levi’s SilverTab products. White people can’t be hip, but they can achieve a level of hippness by ironically acknowledging the fact of their unhippness. This is the appeal of urban hip-hop styles for suburban whites more generally, made all the more ironic here since the product is not really hip-hop attire at all but instead pretty run-of-the-mill suburban causal wear, which is perhaps also designed to sell images of economic and social uplift to a secondary market of black middle-class twentysomethings. (Note, for example, in the photograph of the black woman relaxing alone in the elegant chair that she has now lost much of her former punk/hip-hop signifiers in favor of a decidedly more assimilated, middle-class posture.) For the white twentysomething, the emotional appeal is partially located in the way that wearing an image of inter-racial integration offers the consumer a feel-good sentiment of racial harmony in the midst of racial segregation, racial tensions, and perhaps even their own race prejudices.

     

    The images of multi-racial, multi-cultural harmony are now common ad stock. But in our increasingly segregated society, it remains to be seen whether any of the progressive taboo-shattering meanings of ads like the popular Benneton’s United Colors series [see Figure 7]

     

    Figure 7. United Colors of Benneton,
    rpt. from Spin October 1996: 9-10.
    Concept: O. Toscani.
    Courtesy of United Colors of Benetton.

     

    will survive the neo-colonialist race or race essentialist meanings implied by these kinds of shock “idea” ads which are so crucial to Spin magazine’s own street-wise and “alternative” hip currency. Benneton’s United Colors ad series has become for many skeptics of political postmodernism the epitome of commercial appropriations masquerading as social protest imagery. Appignanesi and Garratt contend, for example, that Benneton’s appropriation of photojournalism and the stylized imagery of social protest “art” merely appropriates the “hyperreality” cachet of those original forms, gleaning that reality onto the unreal construct of the magazine ad page and condensing it down to the image of the Benneton product name and logo–a purely commodified image (and for Appignansesi and Garratt it is also onlyan image) of global identity and “social conscience” (138-39). In this particular ad, the scene is obviously staged and, similar to the camped-up homosexual overtones in the Diesel jeans ad, the visual racial marking is really over-the-top. The straight blond mane of the female horse and kinked and curled mane of the “black” horse is as camped-up as the applauding, beef-cake sailors or the phallic shape of the submarine with “sea-men” descending from the tip in the Diesel ad. But there is still the vexing question of whether this image of interracial contact deconstructs race as a binary black-white discourse or whether it reconstructs race essentialist myths by reifying race as a set of natural attributes? Does this image force readers, particularly young white readers, to confront their internalization of deeply entrenched racial taboos? Does it make the braking of taboos “cool” in the same way that the Diesel Jeans “Victory!” ad makes the image of homosexuality a cool transgression, or does it merely allow the consumer to trick themselves into feeling multi-cultural, “third-world hip,” or radical-chic, through their fashion purchases? The questions are easy to form. The answers, of course, are the hard part. It should be clear, however, that it is too easy and counter-productive to dismiss as appropriation the constitutive role that commercialism and commodification play in the historical, material construction of progressive cultural studies ideals: internationalism, economic justice, racial harmony, gender parity, and sexual liberation [see Figure 8].

     

    Figure 8. Ben Thornberry, photograph from ACT UP “Stop The Church” March on St. Patrick’s Cathedral, New York City, December 10, 1989. Reprinted by permission of ACT UP.

     

    Always Already the Spin Doctors

     

    Subcultural capital is, as Thornton points out, “in no small sense” constructed out of and by media and commerce–by the likes of Spin, which includes its photo spreads and fashion ads as well as its articles, editorials, and album reviews. It is equally important, however, to keep reminding ourselves that subcultural capital is at once a form of academic cultural capital as well. The cultural dollar signs may take different forms, but Gottlieb and Wald, Ross and Rose, and Social Text are all cashing in on the Riot Grrrl phenomenon, too. Though academics do so in the higher registers of subculture theoretical discourses, and only after first expressing the appropriate academic sensitivity about “who will speak for whom, and when, and under what conditions or circumstances” (Bérubé 271), we all unavoidably traffic in the spectacle of “street credibility.” As am I in this very essay. As are so many other graduate students who are trying to scramble for Cultural Studies vita credits to compete in a job market which, professors tell us with simultaneously sinister and apologetic jocularity, probably isn’t going to materialize after all. As were the hundreds of graduate students who paid $95 to deliver papers at an open-invitation Cultural Studies conference at the University of Oklahoma in 1990, which, according to Cary Nelson, only “testifies to the sense that putting a ‘Cultural Studies in the 1990s’ label on your vita is worth an investment in exploitation and alienation” (26). But Cultural Studies capital circulates beyond the traditional academic systems of credentials and rewards as well. As Clint Burnham notes in the conclusion to The Jamesonian Unconscious, Cultural Studies theory and criticism is itself being consumed by graduate students and other “alternative,” self-identified Gen X readers as mass culture:

     

    I would argue that many intellectuals of my generation read the work of Jameson, and theory in general (Jameson means something else) as mass culture; by my generation I suppose I mean those born in the late fifties or in the sixties, Generation X as my fellow Canadian put it.... [I]n this milieu, Jameson and Butler and Spivak and Barthes are on the same plane as Shabba Ranks and PJ Harvey and Deep Space Nine and John Woo: cultural signifiers of which one is as much a "fan" as a "critic," driven as much by the need to own or see or read the "latest" (or the "classic" or the "original") as by the need to debate it on the Internet and in the seminar room. You think Rid of Me is good? Check out 4-Track Demos. True Romance is more of a John Woo film than Hard Target. If you like Gender Trouble, check out Bodies That Matter. Jameson's piece on Chandler in Shades of Noir is a remix of his older essay and samples some of the comments on modernism at the end of Signatures of the Visible. (244)

     

    And this comes to us in a Duke University trade paperback that is self-consciously designed to be a simulacra of Jameson’s own Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, which is itself now (in)”famous” amongst critics and reviewers for its self-consciously styled presence as “a gorgeously produced 400-page document” (Bérubé 127). By the time I finished Burnham’s text, I could no longer be certain why I had originally plunked down my VISA card and paid $17.95 for this aesthetically pleasing book (no longer merely a “text”) whose marketing blurb, appearing both in the Duke University Press mail-order catalogue and on the back of the book, sounds a lot like a heady academic version of that subscription junk mail I keep getting from Spin: “Imagine Fredric Jameson–the world’s foremost Marxist critic–kidnapped and taken on a joyride through the cultural ephemera, generational hype, and Cold War fallout of our post-post-contemporary landscape. In The Jamesonian Unconscious, a book as joyful as it is critical and insightful, Clint Burnham devises unexpected encounters between Jameson and alternative rock groups, new movies, and subcultures…. In an unusual biographical move, Burnham negotiates Jameson’s major works… by way of his own working-class, queer-ish, Gen-X background and sensibility. Thus Burnham’s study draws upon an immense range of references familiar to the MTV generation, including Reservoir Dogs, theorists Slavoj Zizek and Pierre Bourdieu, The Satanic Verses,Language poetry, the collapse of state communism in Eastern Europe, and the indie band Killdozer.”

     

    I don’t know about you, but I definitely hear the sound of some bones crunching now–but can anyone tell me with any degree of certainty anymore who’s doing the crunching and who’s being crunched?

     

    Notes

     

    1. My position in relation to Spin and the contemporary music and subculture scenes it covers is primarily as a fan of so-called popular “alternative music,” what Robert Christgau insists should more accurately be called “college rock,” and even here I am more of a tourist and fan than a fellow traveler in any specific indie scene. I have, however, been reading Spin (or perhaps as Hebdige would have it, I’ve been “cruising” Spin) since 1986, when I was introduced to the magazine while attending a small midwestern state college by a friend from Decatur, Illinois, who read Spin with, what seemed to me then, an odd intensity to determine his position in relation to the “mainstream” and some notion of a true punk “underground.”

     

    2. In a May 1994 Spin cover story on Courtney Love, for example, Dennis Cooper will point out that Love grew up in a liberal intellectual environment and “remains an avid reader of feminist theorists like Susan Faludi, Judith Butler, Camille Paglia, and Naomi Woolf” (42), but neither he nor she will articulate anything that even remotely smacks of academic criticism–even though there is clearly a long, rich history of academic feminist cultural critique and avant-garde artistic intervention associated with the name of Love’s band alone. It is perhaps true that one doesn’t need to be an academic feminist to interpret the band’s name, Hole, as a cultural critique of the hegemonic sexual ideologies of phallic domination, nor does one need to be a professor of pop culture to link the band Hole to its many punk predecessors, such as the Slits–the first all-woman punk band whose members, like so many other early punk rock musicians and contemporary “alternative” musicians, walked straight out of their university studies and into the punk “streets.” There is, however, something troubling about the way contemporary popular artists deny their academic backgrounds and intellectual influences, just as many academics, whose cultural writings may be influenced by the postmodernism they (we) encounter in pop culture, are equally reluctant to acknowledge the knowledges that they derive from their own practices as fans and consumers, though they are increasingly eager to acknowledge their pleasures. And this is true, despite the fact that both popular music artists and academics luxuriate in the art of surreptitious quotation of one another.

     

    3. Though I don’t take it up here, Spin‘s relationship to the PC Wars is particularly interesting and, as with everything else in Spin, contradictory. Both Spin and Guccione, Jr. have been very vocal concerning the censorship of pop music. In fact, in the mid ’80s when Tipper Gore and the PMRC were waging their war against youth, Guccione, Jr. propelled himself to the status of celebrity/public intellectual, regularly debating William F. Buckley and the usual cast of right-wing pundits on CNN’s Crossfire and similar news talk shows. Yet, when it comes to academics and their battles with many of these same pundits, Spin has remained uninterested at best, too often picking up anti-PC catch-phrases from the New Right along the way.

     

    4. I say my “suspicion” because I don’t personally know many academics who read Spin. If one can judge academic readership by the availability of library resources, then I would suspect that indeed very few do. Trying to research the early years of Spin proved to be a bit of an unexpected challenge. The Chicago Public Library was the only library in the state of Illinois that I could find holding Spin since its first issue in April 1985, including the University of Illinois, which is the only college or university out of the 42 state and private schools on the state-wide library computer search system that carries the magazine at all (and the U. of I. only started carrying it from 1994 on). Moreover, Spin is not indexed in The Reader’s Guide to Periodicals or any bibliographic indexes or databases that I’m aware of (with the exception of The Music Index, which started indexing Spin in 1989, but only very selectively music-specific articles). If you research Spin, you may feel like you’re in some warped version of a VISA card commercial–you’re walking around with Spin and everywhere you turn they only accept Rolling Stone.

     

    5. “The Whiny Generation,” from David Martin’s “My Turn” column in Newsweek (Nov. 1, 1993), rpt. in Rushkoff 235-37.

     

    6. On Rushkoff: 1) Self-Aggrandizing: “Exposed to consumerism and public relations strategies since we could open our eyes, we GenXers see through the clunky attempts to manipulate our opinions and assets, however shrinking” (5); 2) Pseudo-Intellectual: “Our writers are our cultural playmakers and demonstrate an almost Beckettian ability to find humor in the darkest despair, a Brechtian objectivity to bracket painful drama with ironic distance, and a Chekhovian instinct to find the human soul still lurking beneath its outmoded cultural façade” (8); 3) Misinformed: “To most of us, concepts like racial equality, women’s rights, sexual freedom, and respect for basic humanity are givens. We realize that we are the first generation to enter a society where, at least on paper and in the classroom, the ideas that Boomers fought for are recognized as indisputable facts” (6); 4) Homophobic: “We watched a sexual revolution evolve into forced celibacy as the many excesses of the 1970s and 1980s rotted into the sexually transmitted diseases of our 1990s” (5).

     

    This is not to say, however, that academics and public intellectuals aren’t guilty of similar kinds of lazy thinking. Take for example, this throw-away comment made by Frank Owen in “The Cult of the DJ” symposium concerning the mainstream music press and its refusal to cover dance music: “What I can’t understand, though, is how the current rock scene is portrayed by some rock critics as radical. I listen to a band like Pearl Jam, and I guess they’re critical favorites, but to me they sound like Bad Company. I mean, am I wrong or are they Bad Company? Why is grunge radical? What is so radical about it?” (78). Owen, who was a music editor at Spin for two years and who received an MA from the Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham in England, ought to know better–making his sweeping dismissal of any and all politics of grunge in the context of this symposium on dance music DJs appear suspect, perhaps even patronizing. Certainly, he should realize that Pearl Jam isn’t just a sound but also a look, an attitude, a stance; he should realize, as Ross has noted elsewhere, that, among other things, grunge asserts “a politics of dirt… as a scourge upon the impossibly sanitized, aerobicized world of 90210” (Microphone Fiends 5). However white and middle-class the grunge phenomenon is (Ross also characterizes it as white suburban kids “style slumming with a vengeance”), there is something “radical,” or at least oppositional, about it, not least the fact that at the very moment Owen is making these comments Pearl Jam was waging its legal battle and media campaign against the monopolistic price-fixing practices of Ticketmaster.

     

    7. Though even here, when one considers the practical uses of this condom, Spin might once again be accused of promoting its own radical image rather than any substantive subcultural resistance, in this case putting hype before health; for, as a reader of an earlier version of this paper pointed out to me, one would really have to question whether or not this condom, after going through the rigors of mass circulation magazine distribution, would even be safe. (My thanks to Elizabeth Majerus for this comment, as well as for her responses to the essay as a whole.)

     

    8. Most of this nonsense seems to be just a case of journalistic sour grapes resulting from Farber having been publicly spanked by ACT UP and The Advocate which, I think correctly, denounced Farber’s 1989 Spin article on AZT as dangerously overstating her case about evidence of the drug’s risks and how that should impact the medical decisions made by people living with AIDS.

    Works Cited

     

    • Azerrad, Michael. “Peace, Love and Understanding.” Spin August 1995: 56-58.
    • Bérubé, Michael. Public Access: Literary Theory and American Cultural Politics. London: Verso, 1994.
    • Burnham, Clint. The Jamesonian Unconscious: The Aesthetics of Marxist Theory. Durham: Duke UP, 1995.
    • Cooper, Dennis. “Love Conquers All.” Spin May 1994: 38+.
    • Coupland, Douglas. Generation X: Tales for an Accelerated Culture. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991.
    • —. “Eulogy: Death of Gen X.” Details June 1995: 72.
    • Crimp, Douglas, ed. AIDS: Cultural Analysis/Cultural Activism. An October Book. Cambridge, MA: MIT P, 1988.
    • —. “AIDS: Cultural Analysis/Cultural Activism.” Crimp, AIDS: Cultural Analysis/Cultural Activism 3-16.
    • —. “How to Have Promiscuity in an Epidemic.” Crimp, AIDS: Cultural Analysis/Cultural Activism 237-271.
    • Crimp, Douglas, with Adam Rolston. AIDS demo graphics. Seattle: Bay Press, 1990.
    • “The Cult of the DJ: A Symposium.” Social Text 43 (Fall 1995): 67-88.
    • Farber, Celia. “TopSpin.” Spin May 1992: 12.
    • Furth, Daisy. “For Girls About To Rock.” Spin April 1992: 26.
    • Gilbert, Elizabeth. “Pussy Galore.” Spin April 1995: 150+.
    • Gottlieb, Joanne, and Gayle Wald. “Smells Like Teen Spirit: Riot Grrrls, Revolution and Women in Independent Rock.” Rose and Ross 250-274.
    • Guccione, Bob, Jr. “Special Child” (An Interview with Sinéad O’Connor). Spin November 1991: 42+
    • —. “TopSpin.” Spin April 1995: 24.
    • —. “TopSpin” Spin Jan. 1994: 12.
    • Greer, Jim. “Letter From Dayton, Ohio, Bureau.” Spin April 1995: 224.
    • Hall, Stuart. The Hard Road to Renewal: Thatcherism and the Crisis of the Left. New York: Verso, 1988.
    • —. “The Meaning of New Times.” in Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies. David Morely and Kuan-Hsing Chen, Eds. London: Routledge, 1996: 223-37.
    • Hebdige, Dick. Hiding in the Light: On Images and Things. London: Routledge, 1988.
    • Huyssen, Andreas. After the Great Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture, Postmodernism. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1986.
    • Kipnis, Laura. “(Male) Desire and (Female) Disgust: Reading Hustler.” Cultural Studies. Eds. Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson and Paula Treichler. New York: Routledge, 1992. 373-391.
    • Laing, Dave. One Chord Wonders: Power and Meaning in Punk Rock. Milton Keynes, England: Open UP, 1985.
    • Marcus, Greil. Lipstick Traces: a Secret History of the Twentieth Century. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1989.
    • Marks, Craig. “A to Z of Alternative Culture.” Spin April 1993: 38-52.
    • Nelson, Cary. “Always Already Cultural Studies: Two Conferences and a Manifesto.” Journal of the Midwest Modern Language Association. 24.1 (1991): 24-38.
    • Rose, Tricia and Andrew Ross, eds. Microphone Fiends: Youth Music and Youth Culture. New York: Routledge, 1994.
    • Ross, Andrew. “Introduction.” Rose and Ross 1-13.
    • Rushkoff, Douglas. “Introduction: Us, by Us.” The GenX Reader. New York: Ballantine Books, 1994. 3-8.
    • Thornton, Sarah. “Moral Panic, the Media and British Rave Culture.” Rose and Ross 176-192.
    • Treichler, Paula A. “AIDS, Homophobia, and Biomedical Discourse: An Epidemic of Signification.” Crimp, AIDS: Cultural Analysis/Cultural Activism 31-70.

     

  • Technical Ex-Communication: How a Former Professional Engineer Becomes a Former English Professor

    Joe Amato

    Department of English
    University of Colorado at Boulder
    joe.amato@colorado.edu

    I.

     

    Imagine: Once upon a time, I left the corporate world to join the academic world, thinking the lofty latter would tower above the corruption of corporate complicity.

     

    Yup. I really thought that. Imagine.

     

    Picture this: you’re seated at a table with nine other faculty, all strangers. Five such clusters of ten fill the carpeted room–off-white walls, acoustical ceiling tiles, fluorescent lighting–and everyone boasts a terminal degree in science, engineering, architecture, law, psychology, or design. Everyone except you, that is–you hold a doctorate in English.

     

    Before you, on the table, glares a ream of white, 20 lb., 8.5″ x 11″ paper. A beaming but otherwise nondescript man looming at the front of the room announces, “You have one half-hour in which to devise a high-quality paper airplane. The team whose airplane hangs aloft for the longest stretch of time will be judged a true success–a leader in quality.” Everyone in the room chuckles. “Let’s see who the winner will be,” the nondescript man teases. And with that he props a large digital timer on the table before him, and slaps the start button.

     

    All but five of the fifty strangers in the room are men. Most are white, eight speak an inflected English that indicates an Asian upbringing. Most of the men are middle-aged, some are older, nearing retirement. Most of the middle-aged men wear trousers, oxfords, ties, rolled shirtsleeves. Most of the older men relax in three-piece suits. Most of the men sport beards. Four of the five women in the room are all business–navy or black suits, skirts just above the knee, heels, lipstick, eye liner, nail polish. The four younger men and one younger woman are, like others of your generation, dressed casually–new jeans, polo shirts, sweaters.

     

    As the timer begins its countdown, most people begin chatting, noisily, to others in their group. About their families, about the weather. One of the engineers seated at your table immediately takes command. He urges that the team proceed, first, by taking note of specific aerodynamic principles–lift, for example. He lectures the team on such principles. A few of the engineers in the group get antsy, grab a few sheets of paper from the ream, experiment by folding their sheets this way and that. The self-elected leader seems annoyed, barks a few orders. A few people in the group, intent on making progress, are willing to cooperate.

     

    But you, you’re someplace else, because you’ve been here before.

     

    II.

     

    You may have heard recently of Illinois Institute of Technology (IIT) in Chicago. The school has been splashed across the news in the past year. IIT’s College of Architecture has a worldwide reputation for housing the program that Ludwig Mies van der Rohe directed during his post-Bauhaus years. IIT: the campus Mies built, the campus that boasts Crown Hall, the campus whose buildings announce in bold the Miesian orthogonal imprint, the less-is-more flatland structures of steel and glass and high HVAC bills.

     

    And thanks to one of the largest (matching) gifts ever made to a postsecondary educational institution–120 million dollars, courtesy of two wealthy members of IIT’s Board of Trustees–a new student center is being built on campus, with leftover dollars funding much-needed building and equipment upgrades, and endowing engineering-only full-tuition scholarships (IIT’s tuition is currently $17,000 a year). The international design competition for the student center attracted all sorts of media attention, with the commission awarded finally to renowned Dutch architect and architectural theorist Rem Koolhaas. Completion of the actual structure is scheduled for sometime next year, a convenient cornerstone in IIT’s ongoing effort to reset its collegial clock.

     

    I won’t be around to see the center open. I’m happy for the students, though it remains unclear to me whether the surrounding community will reap any actual material benefits from the hoopla. IIT sits on the northernmost edge of the largest public housing project in the US–the Robert Taylor Homes-Stateway Gardens complex, which houses nearly 40,000 African-American residents, most of whom receive welfare, as I once did. Directly to the north of IIT are more projects, beyond which is the frenzy of development and gentrification that marks Mayor Daley’s and the City’s efforts to move the South Loop frontier further south. As you might imagine, IIT has had a tough time responding to its location over the years. So perhaps the attention given to the new student center, and to a revitalization effort currently underway along 35th Street–the historic “Bronzeville” area, part of which has been tagged a federal “empowerment zone”–will help to invigorate neighborhoods suffering from decades of neglect, of racial and economic segregation. Hence perhaps I should be spending my time, and yours, talking about the sorts of social, political, and cultural conditions that have permitted the situation on Chicago’s south side to decline to such a degree. But I’m not a sociologist– I’m an English prof who happens to be a poet. And to paraphrase Wallace Stevens, part of my work as a poet is to help people live their lives–an ambitious agenda, to be sure, whether in poetry or in prose.

     

    My tenure with the Department of Humanities at IIT began in August of 1992. Like my former employer, the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC), IIT hired me primarily because my undergrad math scholarship and seven years of plant engineering experience, followed by a doctorate in English, seemed automatically to qualify me to teach technical and professional writing. As an aspiring poet and a single white heterosexual male of 37, I was happy to be afforded the opportunity to live in a more “happening” environs–and in any case, I had no choice. My two-year “visiting” stint at UIUC had expired, and IIT was offering me a tenure-track position with a “3/3” teaching load–3 courses per semester. Not something one in my notoriously job-depleted profession, with my credit card debt, turns down.

     

    When I arrived at my new school, demolition of the old Comiskey Park, just the other side of the Dan Ryan expressway from IIT, was nearly complete. The new Sox stadium, standing alongside the old, gleamed across the Ryan at the projects, daring south-side African-Americans to make the trek into Bridgeport, where racial tensions have always run high, and would explode most notably of late upon the person of young Lennard Clark. On campus, things weren’t quite what I’d expected. There were rumors that budget deficits were reaching a crisis state. And IIT exuded a certain corporate ambience–reflected both in the language of my senior colleague in English (a person prone to going on about how her technical communication program is “technology-driven”), as well as in the market “savvy” of our upper-level administrators (who were just then learning to mouth the now-ubiquitous student-as-consumer rhetoric). The corporate lip-service disturbed me, not least because I thought I had left behind such thinking eight years prior, when I left my second Fortune 500 job as an engineer.

     

    III.

     

    Picture this: you’re seated at a table with five other people, all strangers. Five such clusters of five fill the carpeted room–off-white walls, acoustical ceiling tiles, fluorescent lighting–and everyone holds an undergraduate degree in engineering or business. All but two of the twenty-five strangers in the room are men. Most are younger, a few are middle-aged, two are black. Most wear shirts and ties, a few lounge in their sports jackets. The two women in the room have opted for solid-color blouses, and skirts well below the knee.

     

    You’re handed a three-ring binder, inside of which are sequenced instructions that describe a series of role-playing exercises (red, orange, yellow, green, blue tabs). Each exercise will require a high level of cooperation among members of your group. “I think we should start out by trying to–.” “Wait a minute,” the only woman in the group interrupts you, smiling but firm, “who put you in charge?” “Well, nobody,” you respond, “but someone has to be in charge, no?” You look around at the other faces in your group. Two look vaguely uncomfortable, one seems to want to follow your lead.

     

    By the end of that first day, the group has–simply by doing what you suggest–informally chosen you as its leader. At least one person in the group is not a happy camper. And after four days of working together, arguing together, and sweating together, everyone is asked to evaluate–not, as expected, the work accomplished–but one another.

     

    A four-quadrant blackboard grid is used to map personal qualities, warm/cold on the abscissa, dominant/submissive on the ordinate. Everyone has their day in the sun–or, as the case may be, gloom. Participants take turns shouting out adjectives that describe each monkey-in-the-middle, with a time-clock to make it seem either a pressing exercise, or a game show. Each adjective is chalked into a given quadrant. If you’re lucky, you might learn that you’re primarily a dominant/warm personality–excellent leadership material. If not, you might leave that intense final session, as some have been known to, in tears.

     

    IV.

     

    “Dimensional Management Training” is what they called it–part of the corporate training package I’d received while employed at Miller Brewing Company in Fulton, New York. My job with the Philip-Morris-owned brewing giant was my first after graduation, and Miller would send me to corporate headquarters in Milwaukee for a week at a crack. Days were spent in seminar rooms; evenings, gulping down mugs of beer. Most of this training was geared ultimately toward helping trainees account for theirs and others’ motivations, with the mutual goals of enhancing organizational cooperation and enlightening employees as to their latent or manifest leadership qualities. I often returned from the training seminars eager to test on-the-job my newly acquired interpersonal skills, as they called them. In this sense, such training cultivated in me the desire to lead. I guess I was lucky. In some it may well have cultivated the resignation to follow.

     

    But leadership training or no, there seemed to be little I could do to shake my new-guy status at Miller. At 26, I’d found myself stuck after four years, unable to advance beyond my entry-level engineering position with the nation’s second largest brewer. So I’d gone on the market intent, as only a former welfare recipient can be, on landing a job with Aramco. By my calculations, a mere two years in Saudi Arabia and I’d have enough cash saved to handle my father’s expenses until long after he was eligible to receive his whopping $500-per-month social security check, and his $80-per-month pension check from General Electric–the latter so absurdly low because of his decision to withdraw his severance pay after the company had laid him off, with hundreds like him, in 1969. That was the year after my folks’ divorce, the year after my old man started hitting the bottle. The way I’d figured it, me and my adolescent dreams of fortune and power, I’d have enough cash saved to live like a working-class hero.

     

    But after six months of applying, and waiting, and inquiring, the previously optimistic job placement agent wound up with a frown on his face. “They want only seasoned veterans now,” the headhunter informed me, “guys with ten or more years experience.”

     

    And so, with failed postcolonial aspirations, I applied for a senior project engineering position with the local pharmaceutical plant, Bristol-Myers Co. This plant’s claim to industrial fame was that it had at one time manufactured half of all the penicillin produced in the US. The interview went well. The person I’d be working for directly was a former West Point cadet who had that annoying habit of inserting “sir” into every other sentence. The cadet’s boss, the plant engineering manager, was a strictly-by-the-book, suit-and-tie man, very old school, with a master’s in engineering-based, Taylorized management.

     

    After exchanging industrial horror stories with the cadet–bonding–I was ushered into the engineering manager’s office by the office manager (they still used a secretarial pool there). “Please take a seat,” she instructed, nodding vigorously at the chairs across the desk from the engineering manager, who was momentarily preoccupied perusing what looked to be a budget report of some sort, all rows and columns. “Just a moment, Joe,” he said, without looking up through his bifocals. Just then I noticed that my chair sank low, so low in fact that this older man, perhaps an inch shorter than me standing, loomed several inches above me. An old trick, I thought, and gazing around the office I spotted a portrait depicting a Canadian Mountie against an alpine backdrop above the caption, “One Canadian Stands Alone.”

     

    My interview with the engineering manager was a tight-lipped affair, and I’d learned by then when to be tight-lipped myself. I even started mouthing a few “Yes sirs,” which were snapped up approvingly. But there was one final hoop-jump to go–an interview with the plant manager. The cadet was commanded to hand-deliver me.

     

    He marched me through what seemed an ancient maze of seeping and odoriferous production areas, laced with piping and crowded with chemical processing equipment, in the midst of which were constructed makeshift white-collar habitats. It was nearing lunch, and I caught a glimpse of several salary employees seated at their desks, chomping down their brown-bag lunches. When we reached the plant manager’s office, he greeted us at his office door. My escort abruptly relinquished his duties with an enthusiastic “Thank you sir,” and the plant manager whisked me past his high-heeled young secretary. I did my best not to stare at her black fishnet stockings.

     

    At first this manager seemed less officious than my prior interviewers. A not-unhandsome man of perhaps fifty, his clothes were elegantly, if conservatively, tailored: navy double-pleated trousers, white-on-white oxford, red-and-blue-checkered silk tie, silk navy jacket. He seated himself behind a large wooden desk in a lush, paneled office that, in my view, reflected his rank without pretension. I sat in a leather-cushioned chair, almost at ease. The blinds were shut, the desk lamp lighting the room with a warm, subdued glow. The plant manager was clearly taking his time. “Would you like a cup of coffee?” he asked. “No thank you, sir,” I replied. He cupped his impeccably manicured hands, and finally began, casually.

     

    “What do you think of change?” he asked, smiling.

     

    Bastard. He was toying with me, and he knew I knew it. I bit my tongue, hard, struggled for composure. “Depends what kind of change you mean,” I replied, surprising even myself with my reciprocally casual tone, “organizational change, or evolutionary change, or social change, or–”

     

    He cut me off, impatient but still smiling. “Well, let me put it differently. Suppose,” he began, “–suppose you were asked by one of the production managers to retrofit a production process in such and such a way in order to increase output.” “Uh-huh,” I nodded, all bright-eyed and bushy-tailed. “Now suppose,” he continued, “–suppose this manager, a man with some twenty-five years of experience, feels that the modifications required are thus and so. As the senior engineer, what do you feel your response should be? Do you think you should yourself investigate the process to determine the nature of the modifications, or do you think you should instead follow the production manager’s lead?”

     

    Trick question, of course. Why of course no self-respecting engineer simply does what someone else tells him to do when it comes to design. And of course this asshole wouldn’t even be asking me this question unless he wanted to test my compliance.

     

    I thought about my situation at the brewery. I thought about how the Return On Investment for capital upgrades had dropped from five years to two years in the course of my short industrial life–this was change, to be sure, but it didn’t bode well for the US worker, blue or white collar. I thought about my father’s eligibility for social security, still three years off. More change, a life change that in some sense I couldn’t help but look forward to. I thought about telling this plant manager fucker to go take a good shit for himself, him and that $500 jacket and that shit-eating grin of his.

     

    “Well,” I said, “I figure that if the production manager has twenty-five years of experience, he knows what’s going on. So I’d be inclined to do things his way.” The plant manager nodded. I nodded. Everybody nodded. The job placement agent was elated. The offer came in at $34,500 per year.

     

    And when I left that job in 1984–or it left me–I was making nearly $40,000 a year. This was in Syracuse, New York. To help put this in perspective: earlier this year, in Chicago, as a full-time, tenure-track professor of English with the Department of Humanities at IIT–and with bachelor of science degrees in mathematics and mechanical engineering, my Professional Engineer’s license, and a masters and doctorate in English–my annual salary was $36,800.

     

    V.

     

    It didn’t take a clairvoyant to see that, from the start, my days with Bristol-Myers Co. were numbered. For one, ever since my first day on the job with Miller Brewing Co., I’d somehow gotten it into my head that I wanted to be a poet. I still don’t know where this impulse came from, but in my sixth year with Bristol-Myers I started looking into graduate schools. I figured that I’d get a doctorate, teach college students to support my writing. I didn’t know then what I know now about the teaching profession: it’s not only a job-and-a-half in itself, it’s also vital social work.

     

    At any rate, I’d found myself, after nearly three years at the pharmaceutical factory, wanting out of the engineering profession. I’d grown plain sick and tired of the industrial-organizational life-support system. The brownnosing chain-of-command, along with the daily shit-shower-shave routine, conspired to create a chain of veritable being, my one-and-only life strapped to the often capricious imperatives of plant production and the global marketplace. True, a few of my bosses saw me–despite or perhaps because of my outspoken nature–as management stock, attempting to lure me into the supervisory world with more money and power. But once I’d made it clear to them that I wanted to hone my technical talents only, they behaved as though I’d turned my back on the company. I found it increasingly difficult to keep my mouth shut, and they found it increasingly difficult to tolerate my open mouth. The warning memo–red-stamped “confidential”– threatened me with “termination” if I didn’t just do it.

     

    But my mouth would not close, and I was called into the engineering conference room on a bright Monday morning in April. I seated myself across the table from the engineering manager. Next to him was my new supervisor, Stan, put in charge after the cadet was canned–for incompetence brought about by excessive ass-kissing (so ass-kissing doesn’t really work after all). “Stan has something to tell you,” the engineering manager commanded. And he turned to Stan, who choked out, nervously, “We’ve decided that… we have to… let you go.” I was immediately escorted out of the plant, and told to return at four o’clock for my exit interview.

     

    Later that day, I walked through the factory distributing copies of my four-page long exit statement to anybody and everybody. Therein I explained, with quotes from Montaigne and Emerson, how I thought the company could be more fairly managed. You see, I’d seen my termination coming, and I’d planned accordingly. And like they say on the job: you plan the work, and you work the plan.

     

    VI.

     

    The second most powerful member of IIT’s Board of Trustees is former Motorola CEO, Bob Galvin. Galvin’s father, Paul Galvin, founded Motorola, the company that produces, among so many other communications-based products, the 68030 microprocessor chip that powers (as they say) the aging Macintosh on which I’m composing this essay. IIT’s Board of Trustees is in fact run by two Bobs, Galvin and his (even richer) billionaire buddy Bob Pritzker, who together are responsible for that 120 million dollar gift. For years these two have reached deep down into their endless wool-blend pockets to bail IIT’s ailing, tuition-driven campus out of the red and into black–to the tune, I believe it is, of something like ten million a year. Only thing is, in accordance with the First Law of Thermodynamics, you don’t get something for nothing. (Thanks to an anonymous reader for pointing out that a variation of the Second Law—you can’t even break even—appears in the Rolling Stones soundtrack heard in Motorola’s new mobile pager commercials: “You can’t always get what you want.”)

     

    Sending IIT faculty to QCEL training at Motorola on a Saturday was part of the payback. At the time, IIT administrators were hoping Galvin might kick some additional millions their way. So they’d agreed to bus all IIT faculty out to what is known casually as Motorola’s Schaumburg “campus”–the Galvin Center of Motorola University (no shit), the company’s corporate training ground. And on a bright fall Saturday there we all were, sipping coffee, bitching under our collective breath, and ready to be indoctrinated in the company’s much-vaunted QCEL managerial philosophy–Quality, Creativity, Ethics and Leadership.

     

    It was quite an event. Several hundred phuds, most in the engineering and science fields and some with international reputations, marched through “creativity” sessions in which a trainer with a master’s degree in creativity (no shit) inculcated them in the beauty of “convergent and divergent thinking.” Or in which they were asked to work in teams to create that “best” paper airplane (i.e., Quality through teamwork, teamwork through Leadership). Or in which they were instructed in the importance of sound (business) ethics–without being asked to consider (e.g.) the ethical impact of divorcing ethics from more bracing issues of morality or politics.

     

    But the IIT-Motorola coup de grâce was the wrap-up session, in which the powers-that-be hit upon the tactic of using outstanding student leaders at IIT to impress upon faculty the inevitable necessity of QCEL training. “We students sincerely hope you faculty take QCEL seriously,” advised one especially emphatic, rosy-faced, head-shaved, undergrad ROTC engineer, “because we believe that IIT needs this sort of thinking in order to become a technical leader in the 21st century.” The ensuing faculty response was punctuated by several outbursts from senior faculty members who found the entire enterprise an insult to their professional integrity and expertise. “I have an international reputation in my field,” one distinguished research engineer rose to exclaim during the wrap-up session, “and I find it utterly humiliating that you have brought me to this place, to be lectured at by those who could very well be my students. I regard this as a distressing, if not ludicrous, development.”

     

    And if I couldn’t help but sympathize with the gent, I thought at the same time that he probably could stand to learn a thing or two about political action. I understood at that QCEL session what I’d learned the hard way years prior: to get through to the corporate mindset requires something a bit more vulgar, or of the “common people,” than solitary expressions of distress–something a bit more collective. As in collective bargaining, for one, anathema to so many academics because they think of themselves, with some (historical) justification, as necessarily independent thinkers and researchers, as free-agent intellectuals–as anything but common-cause workers. IIT is a private postsecondary institution, and it’s been only in the past year or so that the National Labor Relations Board has given some indication that it might eventually permit faculty at private institutions to unionize. Of course, union or no, it’s unlikely that intellectual freedom–and an institutional commitment to do some good in the world–will emerge from top-down enforcement of an ever-more-severe bottom line.

     

    Needless to say, QCEL fever hit IIT hard, and lickety-split we were all being asked to devise a QCEL component for each of our courses, and to attend mandatory brown-bag lunches with the purpose of brainstorming innovative applications of QCEL thinking. Some faculty took up the QCEL banner, but many of us just plain refused, calling the administration’s bluff. Most of us readily understood that QCEL, though perhaps appropriate to a workplace bound by short-term constraints of efficiency and end product, hardly suited the long-term goals of informed personal awareness, discovery, and self-critique that true education demands.

     

    And I mean, what were they going to do, fire us?

     

    It was especially difficult for those of us in the Department of Humanities, which at IIT is comprised of history, philosophy, and English. In the minds of corporate-leaning administrators, the humanities are understood as revolving around communication, and this narrow conception of what we do empowers those of us in English studies only to the extent that we’re willing to teach students how to structure effective memos, accurate lab reports, and so forth. Further, according to Motorola’s QCEL logic, communication practices–most conspicuously writing–fall under the L category, L for Leadership. Where else? We all know that the primary purpose of words is to help you gain control over others, right?

     

    In any case, IIT’s ongoing public relations effort seems to suggest that, in order to produce the finest technical leaders for the next millennium, faculty must maintain close ties with the corporation. As stated in IIT’s Undergraduate Bulletin, one of the things that distinguishes IIT is its “unique Introduction to the Professions program”:

     

    Throughout the curricula, the IIT interprofessional projects provide a learning environment in which interdisciplinary teams of students apply theoretical knowledge gained in the classroom and laboratory to real-world projects sponsored by industry and government. (7)

     

    Interprofessional projects, or IPROs, have now displaced QCEL as the newest curricular fad at IIT. The clause “sponsored by industry and government” has given many of us conniptions, and has been met with substantial faculty resistance. Some are now trying to redefine the IPRO initiative to better align it with more liberal-educational impulses. For years now, engineering education has been the subject of modest reform efforts–from expanding the curriculum to require a full five years of study, to removing undergraduate area designations (mechanical, electrical, civil, chemical, etc.) in favor of a general engineering degree. From my point of view, none of these reforms satisfactorily addresses the dearth of historical, social, and cultural thinking that characterizes most engineering curricula, curricula which have begun to bear an uncomfortable resemblance to vocational ed. But the IPROs represent a truly pernicious kind of “reform.” To insist that industry and government sponsor IPROs, to permit these latter consolidations to drive an educational mission “focused,” as it says elsewhere in IIT promotional literature, “by the rigor of the real world”: is this the best way to usher in the next millennium?

     

    VII.

     

    Picture this: it’s the spring of 1995, and Galvin and Pritzker have threatened to shut down undergraduate education at IIT unless the IIT administration and faculty manage to produce a convincing plan to increase undergrad enrollment. Thus, endless talk of IPRO’s. And to cut costs: buy-outs of tenured faculty; appointment of a new V-P without faculty input; and removal of the provost position. Of course, the provost, as the chief academic (faculty) officer, is a key player in granting faculty tenure and promotion; any problems with tenure are typically addressed to this office. When the President, with the backing of the wool-blend Board, removes the provost position from the organizational flow chart, he delegates tenure and promotion duties to himself–a non-faculty administrator. Meantime, key faculty cooperate with the development of a professional, preprofessional, and interprofessional educational package. You know–professional master degree programs (with, for instance, reduced math requirements), three-course certificate programs, and the like, programs designed primarily to credential employees while attracting tuition dollars from their employers, and marketed accordingly.

     

    It’s important to understand these institutional changes from the point of view of the bottom-feeders. At IIT, as at many universities, “bottom feeders” equals “humanities profs.” Consider: the highest paid, non-administrative faculty line in my department–which now reports to the Armour College of Engineering as a result of the 1995 disbanding of the Lewis College of Liberal Arts–is approximately $45,000 per year. Which is to say, a full (tenured) professor of history, philosophy or English, with twenty years or more experience, earns approximately $5000 less than the average starting assistant professor at IIT. Chalk up these salary disparities to those large government contracts and grants that form the staple of scientific and technological research in today’s major and minor research institutions. Wage-wise, IIT is ranked near the bottom of the nation’s twenty or so tech campuses, so even engineering faculty aren’t exactly brimming with joy. Still, a thirty-ish engineering prof drives home in his new Chevy sedan, while I drive home in my 1986 Escort (148,000 miles, and counting).

     

    This is IIT, folks–a school that had its beginnings in the Armour Institute of Technology, established in 1890. Yes, that’s Armour of meat-packing fame–think hog butcher for the world, everything but the squeal. But it’s also the IIT where Marvin Camras, “Father of Magnetic Recording,” conducted the research that led to his more than 500 patents. It’s the IIT that once boasted a linguistics program with the likes of S. I. Hayakawa on its faculty. And it’s the IIT where László Moholy-Nagy, another of Bauhaus fame, founded the Institute of Design. So whatever you make of it, it’s a school with a legacy, with a place in the postsecondary sun.

     

    Picture this: the week after our trip to Motorola U, a book appears in all faculty mailboxes. It’s entitled The Idea of Ideas, by one Robert W. Galvin, “Special Limited Edition” published in April 1991 by Motorola University Press.

     

    VIII.

     

    Motorola University Press? All right, Bob & Co.–hereafter simply Bob–I get your point. You’re a do-it-yourselfer, and your book is for the billionaire or would-be billionaire who has (of course), or wants to have (of course), everything. Like any good communications engineer, Bob begins at his beginning: he engineers communication of his ideas by fabricating a pseudo-academic press to poke fun at (academic) book-learnin’ even as it affords its wannabe author the privilege to spin his worldview in certified academic trappings.

     

    It’s a beautifully crafted book, believe me, at least insofar as its design goes. Let’s start with a few design notes, as provided by the publisher on the copyright page:

     

    Typeset in Perpetua
    by Paul Baker Typography Inc., Evanston, Illinois.
    Five thousand copies printed
    by Congress Printing Company, Chicago, Illinois.
    Soft cover is Mohawk Artemis, Navy Blue; cloth cover
    is Arrestox B, B48650. End sheets are French
    Speckletone,
    Briquette; text stock is Mohawk Superfine, Soft White.
    Binding by Zonne Book Binders, Inc., Chicago, Illinois.

     

    Design by Hayward Blake & Company, Evanston, Illinois.
    Illustration [of Paul V. and Robert W. Galvin]
    on page 6 by Noli Novak.
    Quotation on cover by Robert W. Galvin.

     

    Bob, like any civic leader who thinks global and acts local, chose wisely to patronize Chicagoland firms. Most small-press poets would be thrilled to publish a book with a spine, or a book with a print run of even a thousand copies, let alone a book of such silky smooth, hefty pages (214 of them). And the book comes with its own bookmark, folded Hallmark-card-like.

     

    That “quotation on cover” by Bob: “We can and should apply consciously, confidently, purposely and frequently, the simpler, satisfying, appropriate steps to create more and then better ideas.” Four adverbs followed by three adjectives–Bob lays it on thick. Key words for the discussion that follows (please allow for cognates): apply, confidently, purposely, frequently, simpler, appropriate and of course ideas.

     

    Reading over that cover sentence in fact brings to mind the old white-collar acronym, KISS–“Keep It Simple, Stupid.” Bob wants you to know that he’s a down-to-earth, WYSIWYG kinda guy. On the bookmark we find a checklist of his handy ideas, such gems as “Set the idea target,” “Go for quantity,” “Question. Question!” and “Ignore quality. Don’t judge it ’til last.” But bromides aside, and to riff on Adrienne Rich, Bob has access to machinery that could cost you your job.

     

    Bob’s book has eight chapters: an Introduction followed by “The Idea Process: Its Role,” “Leadership,” “Purposeful Differences,” “The Customer Idea,” “Global Strategies,” “Some Outside Ideas,” and “Special Ideas.” As I’ve indicated, English studies has been understood increasingly by university administrators as writing, with writing at IIT itself subsumed under the QCEL rubric, Leadership. Hence I’ve chosen to restrict my remarks to Bob’s “Leadership” chapter–to its first subsection, entitled “The Paradox of Leadership.”

     

    “Leadership” begins with two quotes, one from Bob himself: “At times we must engage an act of faith that key things are doable that are not provable” (24). Spoken, I might say, like a true engineer. And I should know. Engineering is not about theory per se, but about how to apply theoretical principles to produce results. And this does in fact constitute, as Bob indicates, an act of faith–a faith in doing in the absence of explanation. But this emphasis on doing somewhat sidesteps the sticky matter of what “key things” get done, and who is to decide what “key things” get done, and why such “key things” need getting done–why in fact they are deemed “key.”

     

    “The Paradox of Leadership” strikes me at first glance as oddly literary, which is another reason why I’ve chosen to respond to it. Paradox is, after all, a staple of poetry, and of literary writing. Paradox is generally understood as an assertion in which apparently contradictory words, or ideas, reveal upon close examination a truth of sorts.

     

    So what exactly is the paradox of leadership? Well, Bob begins by saying that this idea “finds its expression in a series of paradoxes” (25). To put it another way, the “idea of leadership” (25) as a paradox is realized in actuality as a series of paradoxes. Here as elsewhere, the “idea of” is Bob’s modest way of formulating the idea not as abstract, but as evidenced in the particular, “real-world” example. But this constant harping on the idea of what is ultimately the whole wide real world–presumably including the idea of ideas in such a world–reveals that Bob’s commonsensical, pragmatic appeal is predicated on an idea of order.

     

    “It is neither necessary to impress on you an elaborate definition of leadership,” Bob asserts, “nor is this an appropriate time to characterize its many styles” (25). Suffice to say that leaders must have “creative and judgmental intelligence, courage, heart, spirit, integrity and vision applied to the accomplishment of a purposeful result.” “When one is vested with the role of leader,” Bob grudgingly concedes, “he inherits more freedom” (26). Yet the leader is at the same time subject to “responsibilities that impose upon” this freedom (26). Hence the first paradox of leadership: that the apparent “independence” of leaders may in fact be offset, if not checked and balanced, by the “dependence of others” on the leader (26). Powerful leaders like Bob are evidently accountable to their followers.

     

    “For one to lead implies that others follow” (26). Uh-huh. “But is the leader a breed apart,” Bob asks, rhetorically, “or is she rather the better follower?” The answer is as expected–the latter–which yields our second paradox: “to lead well presumes the ability to follow smartly” (27). So smart leaders are not entirely free, because they are responsible to others and must, as leaders, learn how to follow wisely. By this odd if obvious bit of logic, the workplace is divided into leaders and followers, but everyone is in essence a follower. Hence, paradoxically, leaders are in fact merely better followers. And thus leaders have attained their role as leaders not through politicking, or manipulation, or (gosh!) inheritance–like Bob, who “inherits” only “more freedom” (as above). Nope. Instead, a leader becomes a leader because she “learns more quickly and surely from the past, selects the correct advice and trends, chooses the simpler work patterns and combines the best of other leaders.”

     

    “Because a leader is human and fallible,” Bob over-theorizes, “his and her leadership is in one sense finite–constrained by mortality and human imperfection” (27). Yet “[i]n another sense, the leader’s influence is almost limitless,” for the leader “can spread hope, lend courage, kindle confidence, impart knowledge, etcetera etcetera etcetera” (27). In fact, the “frequency with which one can perform these leadership functions seems without measure” (27). “Again we see the paradox of the leader,” Bob concludes, “a finite person with an apparent infinite influence” (28).

     

    This third paradox reveals Bob at his most–elegiac? Leaders labor under an Olympian strain, forced to apply such infinite “influence” (power?) so frequently, and to such magnanimous ends, capable of doing so much good for others, yet ultimately frustrated by their inevitable, all-too-human demise. One wonders whether Bob–the physical Bob–harbors notions of biostasis, cloning, perhaps even network consciousness á la Max Headroom, in order to provide a personalized hereafter for his elderly, leaderly, thereby reengineered self.

     

    “A leader is decisive, is called on to make many critical choices,” and may therefore “thrive on the power and the attention” (28). And yet–here emerges our fourth and final paradox–“the leader of leaders moves progressively away from that role” (28). In fact, according to Bob, a chief responsibility of leaders is to delegate to others the “privilege” of “decision making” (28), of leading, within an institution that, through such leadership, “generates… an ever-increasing number of critical choices” (29).

     

    A key to leadership, then, is the ability gradually to convert followers into would-be leaders, spreading the upwardly mobile aspiration throughout the management and worker-bee ranks (think, e.g., of those hourly workers who make the often difficult move into supervisory positions). And this conversion process is necessary in order to cope with the decision-making demands of a larger and larger institution. So though we were given to understand in a prior paradox that all leaders are in essence followers, we are now given to understand that followers are themselves potential leaders, and that cultivating these acorns of leadership, paradoxically, is one of the chief responsibilities of true leaders. With U.S. universities graduating 90,000 or so MBAs each year, we’re talking a whole lotta acorns, folks.

     

    For both followers and leaders, this game of follow-the-leader, like all games, requires a willingness to play by the rules–requires cooperation. And cooperation is hardly the benign process entities like Bob make it out to be. Much has been written about the emergence of cooperation as a chief organizational variable, from Chester I. Barnard’s classic business treatise, The Functions of the Executive (1938)–in which authority becomes “another name for the willingness and capacity of individuals to submit to the necessities of cooperative systems” (184)–to Robert Axelrod’s The Evolution of Cooperation (1984), in which cooperation evolves strategically and in accordance with game-theory logic, making it applicable even to trench warfare. But I’ve never found discussions of cooperation as such to square with my experience in the trenches: information-age push-pull come to shove, your boss is likely to demand of you that you just do it.

     

    Bob wraps up his thoughts on the paradox of leadership with vague mention of “others which, if not paradoxes, at least are incongruities” (29). He states that “[e]ach one of us is at once part leader and part follower as we play our roles in life” (29). Bob concludes with the following quote from Walter Lippman: “The final test of a leader is that he leaves behind in other men the conviction and will to carry on” (29).

     

    I couldn’t help but think here of Bob’s desire for a legacy–of Bob’s son Chris, in fact, himself the current CEO of Motorola, whose compensation in 1997, while a sizable two million dollars, is itself small potatoes on the national CEO scale. Paul, Bob, Chris: that’s three generations, folks–I guess it’s in the blood.

     

    In the face of which we have four paradoxes that, contrary to–conventional wisdom? popular opinion?–work successively to reinforce the logic of benign corporate leadership: (1) leaders are dependent on followers; (2) leaders are followers; (3) leaders are all-powerful but human; and (4) leaders convert their followers into leaders.

     

    In 1970 it was, for some very good reasons, Everybody is a Star. Today, for some not-so-good reasons, it’s Everybody is a CEO.

     

    That so?

     

    IX.

     

    Bob–the corporate entity Bob–is much like his book: judged by his career, his cover as multizillion-dollar corporate concern, he seems to reek of good intentions combined with cutting-edge quality objectives–good things brought to life. But when you get into his book, into his narrative of corporate expansion, you find a life-form that insists on being judged by its own criteria. As the aspiring global leader of communication leaders, Bob would be the measure of all company men and women. To lift from Eliot: in (the aging) Bob’s corporeal end is his and your beginning. Or, Be Like Bob. Yet Bob, dear readers, amounts only to the message of his medium.

     

    Now medium may itself be understood as material form, so a few words about form here: People who spend an inordinate amount of time studying texts are used to distinguishing between content and form. It’s a nice shorthand, but then too there is what Hayden White famously referred to as the content of the form, which should give some idea of the vexed nature of any form/content dichotomy. Even poets and those who study poetry often come to believe that a specific form–whether deemed “organic” or rigorously metrical–must necessarily signal, however indirectly, a specific social context, even agenda. This is because, historically speaking, one can identify formal attributes that mark the work of poets who seek, by their own account, specific social or aesthetic ends (poets, too, being political creatures). Yet formal content does not intrinsically dictate, for example, ideological content, any more than ideological content stipulates, of necessity, a given form. And the same may be said of formal material, or medium, whether black typeface on white page, or multicolored pixels flickering across your computer screen. Advertising firms today regularly appropriate artistic techniques deriving from former avant-garde practices (and, I must add, reap vast amounts of revenue in the process, unlike many of their artist-precursors).

     

    However occasionally contorted the syntax, however unpoetic the sentences and single-sentence paragraphs, Bob’s book as a book takes its lead and in some sense its imprimatur from this common public and professional confusion regarding form. Even literate readers are likely to be duped by his presentation, his appearance–at the very least, sold on the idea that he represents something of import. Yet except for the content of Bob’s material form–the soft cover, stock, typesetting, even proofreading (to the extent that I could locate no typos) that serve ostensibly as testament to Bob’s monied success–he really has nothing to say.

     

    If you read Bob carefully, his pages might as well be blank, for his is a bureaucratic tale, full of cautiously modulated sound and utterly devoid of fury, signifying that what words mean is of little importance save for the degree to which they reinforce and amplify the platitude, a good manager can manage anything–can manage even words, without really knowing how they work. In this mad pursuit of formal appearances, what signals success is the simple yet profound capacity to manufacture faith in appearances. Arranged on the page with little rhyme and all sorts of reason–or is it vice versa?–words are enlisted in the effort to ensure that even the alphabet as a communications technology will lead future leaders/readers toward the mega-objectives of corporate domination and expansion–the way things are meant to be. It’s what you do that counts, and finessing words is what those who can’t do, do. What Bob does (do) is generate billions of dollars of profit worldwide, the bulk of which ends up in decidedly few pockets.

     

    Hence corporate identity as Identity Inc.: the clothes make the man or woman, and with nice teeth, Doc Martens, discreet piercing, and unlimited credit, you too can and will attain success success SUCCESS. Content (is) for dummies, and as for you English phuds, you/had better/toe/the line/here.

     

    Hey, but this can be immensely seductive stuff, especially to an 18-year old who’s looking for a way out of financial strife, and who’s found an acceptable social slot, Professional Engineer, that appears to guarantee her a job–if she’s lucky, at Motorola. This helps to explain why so many of my engineering majors envision themselves as engineers for three or four years, with a quick move out and up and into management. Not only does this serve to redirect professional (engineering) loyalties and technical passions toward management objectives, but it satisfies Bob’s desire to see everyone as a reduced version of the CEO, committed to and dependent upon the corporate being. This is what Bob’s idea of ideas amounts to, finally, and the only paradox in sight is that this immaterial realm of ideas can be so clearly predicated on material entitlement, that a self-professed leader like Bob–the physical Bob–can reveal himself to be such a wishful and irresponsible thinker.

     

    X.

     

    In my seventh and final year at IIT, my tenure denial of the prior spring was official–I’d been fired, again, but this time with a final year under contract (the industry standard). And this time I’d been fired along with a colleague in Humanities who was also up for tenure–a specialist in African-American lit. But that’s his story to tell. The reasons why I’d been denied tenure remained unclear–to some.

     

    Even my poker-faced Chair had been caught off-guard. This typically punctual man kept me waiting twenty minutes, and when he walked into his office his expression was one of deep concern. “The news is not good,” he began. And after he handed me the President’s letter, in an envelope red-stamped “confidential,” he choked out, “It’s a shocker.” He cleared his throat, tried to be supportive.

     

    I was not shocked. I’d been here before.

     

    When I pressed him on options, he was at a loss save for making vague reference to the faculty handbook, and recommending that I make an appointment to discuss my situation with our (outgoing) V-P. (Discuss my “situation” with the man who devised IPROs?) He also indicated that I might reapply for tenure in the fall. (When the denial had come from the highest level of administration? Or beyond?) He was clearly unprepared for the news himself, uncertain who to turn to in order to establish the correct, let alone expedient, course of resistance. We left it at him getting back to me, and I asked him to inform the department of my denial (using an online discussion list I founded and ran for my colleagues). In fact most everyone in my department was either “shocked” or “stunned.”

     

    My Chair never did get back to me, and had little to say to me in my demoralizing final year. In accordance with faculty handbook standards and procedures, and AAUP recommended policies, I’d asked the President of my university for clarification–in writing–of the reasons he denied me tenure; and in the same memo I appealed his decision, whatever the reasons forthcoming. The President’s response was as expected: he conceded the “quality” of my scholarship and teaching but reiterated his decision to deny me tenure, admitting “concerns” his deans had regarding my being insufficiently “aligned with the new vision of IIT”–“specifically” with those “contributions needed” to interprofessional projects, writing across the curriculum, and technical writing programs. Naturally he concluded on an ostensibly upbeat note, wishing me “success in finding a position more closely aligned with [my] talents.”

     

    The tenure process was a closed-door affair. But I had it on good authority that I’d received the highest recommendation for promotion and tenure from all faculty committees, and that the sole opposition within my department was from my technology-driven colleague. I had it on good authority, but I’d never have it in writing–unless I sued. My mentors often advised me that my situation made for the perfect lawsuit–out of the question given my finances. But the administration clearly knew nothing of my finances, and feared legal exposure; repeated requests for the return of my tenure file were subsequently refused. When in doubt, surrender no paper.

     

    In the wake of the denials, members of my department and several committees busied themselves distributing memos of their own to the administration, memos filled with polite expressions of distress and dismay. So much writing, so many words words words–collegial sentences of moderate tone configured, no doubt, in compliance with the organizational logic underwriting IIT’s newest instructional mission. But I remained confident that, my decorous letters included, this was all a strictly pro forma gesture: if you read between the lines you would likely have concluded, with me, that my days at IIT were numbered. Academe, like industry, is all about institutional survival, and survive or no, one learns over time to read the writing on the wall. A final meeting the week of Thanksgiving between the President and all faculty committee chairs merely confirmed the administration’s adamance.

     

    XI.

     

    In the same month that I was fired, Bob Pritzker announced to a faculty delegacy that he would pull his funding from IIT if the faculty acted to remove our top administrator from his post. If you haven’t already guessed, IIT is anything but a happy campus. In a faculty survey conducted fall of 1997, no less than 60% of the respondents disagreed with the statement that the President “[i]s truthful and honest.” But if power is relational, both IIT’s President and my technology-driven colleague, albeit each in their own ways instrumental in my professional demise, were empowered by their adherence to bottom-line thinking. And my hunch is that, as it proliferates throughout academe, such thinking will continue to profit from the public’s poor grasp of ivory-tower policies and procedures, which policies and procedures are complicated further by backroom corporate incursion. Given the arcana and general mystification associated with such practices, I can hardly blame the public. So I suppose (pardon the exhortation) that it’s up to profs like yours truly to help the uninitiated to understand that tenure, whatever its inefficacies, is about academic freedom–a much maligned and commonly misunderstood term. Simply put: we faculty need such freedom if the classroom is to remain a place where even the mighty machinations of corporate Earth come under critical scrutiny.

     

    So here I am, distributing another exit statement, making my departure from yet another institution a matter of public record–my life as the eX-Files. As things stand–with my bread and butter on the line, and with students who need to be challenged to develop alternative ways to think and act both as professionals and as responsible social beings–I’ve had little choice but to continue to struggle with these urgent and conflicting realities.

     

    In the meantime, the Department of Humanities has elected its first new chair in fifteen years, and is embarking on a new undergrad major in “Professional and Technical Communication”; and the campus has hired a new “vice-president and chief academic officer”–this time with faculty input. (And I’m not quite sure what to make of the fact that, during my final semester on campus, Michael Moore used IIT’s Hermann Hall auditorium to film episodes of his new show, The Awful Truth.) But from where I’m sitting, it’s IIT business as usual, and it’s spreading elsewhere. These days there is little talk of QCEL, and “communication” seems to have become the Humanities buzzword–yet the writing-to-lead/succeed drift prevails. Even the customary teaching-research-service triad is currently under assault, with a proposal on the boards earlier this year to add an additional tenure category, “impact.” Faculty would be granted 15 points for supervising an IPRO–and 8-12 points (depending on the press) for publication of a book. (I am happy to report that some Humanities faculty are balking at this.)

     

    As part of the Introduction to the Professions program, Bob–the physical, Motorola Bob–has made occasional appearances at IIT, lecturing students about tactics and traits applicable to success (or failure) on corporate Earth. I’ve never met the guy, and I sometimes imagine that Bob and I might have something to talk about, given that, as Bob notes in his book, he served at one time on Nixon’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. (Bob and Nixon, together–the mind reels.) For that matter, I’ve never met the other Bob (Pritzker), either–he chairs our Board of Trustees, is an IIT alumnus, and–as President and Chief Executive Officer of The Marmon Group, Inc.–is reputedly worth a couple of the Motorola Bobs.

     

    But I can’t talk with these guys unless they’re willing to unclip their word pagers, deactivate their cell phones, and do some real listening–and I have my doubts. One of my former students, a computer science major, attended a Motorola Bob lecture a few years ago, and was courageous enough to challenge Bob directly as to what seemed at the time ominous threats to the humanities effort at IIT. “I’m an English minor,” the student declared, “and you’ve eliminated the major in English, in History, in Philosophy.” Bob observed–quite accurately, if in apparent disregard for how catalyzing agents often come in small proportions–that those disciplines had never managed more than a handful of majors, anyway. And besides, Bob quipped, he’d managed himself to get a whole lot more reading done once he’d gotten himself a chauffeur.

     

    XII.

     

    Picture this: On the thirtieth anniversary of his father losing a twenty-year union job with General Electric, university professor with a decade of teaching and seven years of industrial experience files Chapter 7–and shortly thereafter, as incredible luck would have it in this job-depleted profession, finds gainful employment on academic Earth.

    Imagine.

     

    But wait. Academic Earth? Or corporate-academic Earth?

     

    Picture cloudy.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Axelrod, Robert. The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books, 1984.
    • Barnard, Chester Irving. The Functions of the Executive. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1938.
    • Galvin, Robert W. The Idea of Ideas. Schaumburg, IL: Motorola UP, 1991.
    • IIT Undergraduate Bulletin 1998-1999. Issued April 1998.
    • White, Hayden. The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins UP, 1987.

     

  • Love and the Debasement of Being: Irigaray’s Revisions of Lacan and Heidegger

    Krzysztof Ziarek

    Department of English
    University of Notre Dame
    Krzysztof.Ziarek.2@nd.edu

     

    In Écrits Lacan remarks: “Of all the undertakings that have been proposed in this century, that of the psychoanalyst is perhaps the loftiest, because his task is to act in our time as a mediator between the man of care and the subject of absolute knowledge” (105).1 These words are quoted at the beginning of Richardson’s 1983 essay “Psychoanalysis and the Being-question,” and taken to mean that, in developing the logic of desire, Lacan attempts to mediate between Heidegger’s critique of the subject, that is, the idea of Dasein as care, and the Hegelian notion of absolute knowledge. Noting Lacan’s proximity to Heidegger in the 1950s and disputing his later assertion that the references to Heidegger were merely propadeutic, Richardson goes on to sketch a Heideggerian reading of some of the key notions in Lacanian psychoanalysis, among them, language, desire, and the Other. He suggests that Heidegger’s redefinition of language underlies Lacan’s reformulation of Saussurean linguistics and ties the notion of desire to the ecstatic temporality of Dasein. In a way what Richardson outlines, although very briefly and not exactly in those terms, is the critical project of rethinking the subject of desire through the ontico-ontological difference, that is, through the unstable and repeatedly erased difference between being as event and beings as things or entities. What Richardson’s essay does not address is the reciprocal effect that the problematic of sexual difference might have on the question of being, on the idea of a “pre-sex” Dasein as the temporalizing structure of the human mode of being. For such a reformulation of the question of being we need to look to Irigaray, whose work should be approached, I would argue, in terms of a double re-reading: on the one hand, in L’oubli de l’air and certain other texts, particularly in An Ethics of Sexual Difference, Irigaray reconceives the question of being through sexual difference; on the other hand, and this is a point which Irigaray’s reception has almost completely missed, Irigaray revises Lacanian psychoanalysis and the role that sexual difference has played in philosophical discourse, including Heidegger’s own, through the prism of the ontico-ontological difference. What emerges from this criss-crossing critique is a rethinking of love and sexual difference, which reformulates the relation to the other outside the logic of both recognition and desire. As I argue in this essay, Irigaray’s double intervention into psychoanalysis and philosophy shifts the discussion of love and sexual relation away from negation and lack to temporality and embodiment.

     

    This reading I am tracing in Irigaray’s work takes Lacan’s remark from Écrits at its word and situates the Lacanian subject of desire between Heidegger and Hegel, or, more specifically, between Dasein’s originary temporality and unhomeness (Unheimlichkeit) and Hegel’s dialectics of recognition. It is important to note that, at the time when interpretations of Lacan concentrate on Kant and Hegel, Irigaray’s work pursues, although critically, a decidedly post-Heideggerian path. Of the many provocative implications of Irigaray’s Heideggerian turning of Lacan, I will focus here on her rethinking of love in the context of the debasement of being and the various forms it takes in Lacan’s Encore: knowledge, truth, certain forms of love, the good, beauty. What this approach makes possible is the articulation of Irigaray’s pivotal move from the critique of the subject of desire to the reformulation of love in terms of temporality and wonder. The significance of this reformulation of Lacan through the prism of Heidegger’s revision of temporality lies in underscoring the openings in Lacan discourse beyond the logic of desire, which remains the focus of contemporary Lacanian readings. Recent innovative approaches to Lacan have tended to elaborate the logic of desire and sexual relation either in terms of the Hegelian dialectic of desire and recognition or by way of the Kantian notion of das Ding. Zizek’s interpretations of Lacan in the context of popular culture and political ideology emphasize the dependence of Lacan’s understanding of desire and the Other on the Hegelian dynamic of recognition. In Tarrying with the Negative, Zizek reads Hegel and Kant through each other in order to emphasize the limit to subjectivation, the unsignifiable real which marks the gap or lack in the constitution of the subject. He illustrates how substance, the Real, and the Thing are mirages instantiated retroactively by the surplus of desire. In another influential reading, Joan Copjec reaffirms and reformulates in “Sex and The Euthanasia of Reason” the Kantian thread in Lacan, explaining the Lacanian formulas of sexuation through Kant’s antinomies of reason in order to illustrate the extra-discursive existence of sex. Although emphatically not prediscursive, sex in Copjec’s argument, like Kant’s thing-in-itself, “is still unknown and must remain so” (234).

     

    Irigaray’s work revises these arguments specifically in terms of what Kant’s formulation, at least in Heidegger’s opinion, does not thematize: temporality. For Irigaray, sexual difference signifies the limit of language not in terms of Kant’s thing-in-itself but in terms of the Heideggerian withdrawal of being. The limit then indicates the impossibility of presence marked by the ecstatic character of temporality, by the unfolding of time irreducible to the historicist conceptualization of history. In other words, Irigaray follows neither the Kantian nor the historicist route. Rather, her reformulation of love demonstrates how the logic of desire, which produces the substantialization of the (foreclosed) Real, is itself put into motion by an evacuation of temporality and a consequent “debasement” of being into things, objects, or substances. For Irigaray, the fact that the limit is not the non-signifiable real but futural temporality implies a critical change in the function of the negative: it no longer signifies negation or repression but becomes the marker of transformation, the sign of the possibility of love and ethical relation.2

     

    What I am proposing, therefore, is a turn in reading Lacan, which would foreground the issue of temporality and its bearing on the problematics of love, desire, and sexual relation–a turn that might finally open up a constructive and critical dialogue between Irigarayan and Lacanian scholars. Fleshing out the revision of the subject of desire through the Heideggerian rethinking of temporality becomes critical for such a project, because it allows us to open up the space of relating to the Other that “escapes” and revises the logic of desire dominant in current discussions of this problem. Heidegger’s revision of temporality provides a critique of both Hegel’s dialectical conception of history and the Kantian notion of the inaccessible thing-in-itself, and makes possible an important rethinking of the very dynamic of relation to otherness from within the temporal unfolding of being. The approach I outline here underscores the role of temporality and non-appropriative relatedness to the Other which Irigaray reformulates from Heidegger and Levinas. My approach also complicates the relationship between Lacan and Irigaray beyond the current feminist interpretations of Irigaray, which still underplay the importance of Heidegger for her critique. It also calls into question the refusal to engage Irigaray’s reformulations of Lacan on the part of most Lacanian critics, a disavowal that follows in part from the misrecognition of Heidegger’s import for Lacan’s thinking. I argue that the critique and contextualization of desire in relation to the temporality of para-being, which Lacan signals in Encore, makes visible unexplored proximities between late Lacan and Irigaray and allows us to address the multiple points of Irigaray’s engagement and reformulation of Lacan’s work: desire, love, the Other. It highlights the ways in which Lacan’s Encore opens beyond its own formulations of jouissance and sexual relation and points beyond the logic of desire toward the non-appropriative relation which Irigaray redefines in terms of wonder.

     

    These revisions underscore the need for an important reformulation of the current discourse on desire and power which characterize many approaches from Lacanian psychoanalysis and readings of Irigaray, to Foucault studies, and cultural and postcolonial studies. The approach that I negotiate between Lacan, Heidegger, and Irigaray, makes it possible to propose a modality of relatedness to the other that eschews the logic of the negative and of constitutive lack. To open up this perspective, desire and its entanglements with power need to be rethought in terms of the event temporality of being, through which Irigaray resignifies relationality into the non-appropriative and transformative wonder. At stake in this critique is the possibility of a relationality that is no longer structured in terms of lack and desire, power and subjection, and that remains “ethical” and non-appropriative. Heidegger sees the possibility of such freedom in the very temporal modality of human being (Dasein), i.e. in its unhomeness, or openness to what is other. The temporality of this openness ruptures the pathways of desire and makes possible an encounter with the other without confusing it with sameness or elevating it into sublimity. This reading of Irigaray’s Heideggerian intervention into Lacan and her Lacanian reformulation of Heidegger’s Dasein enables the reformulation of sexual relation in terms of a future-oriented and transformative being-two, to recall Irigaray’s most recent articulation of the problematic of sexual difference.

     

    Drawing on Heidegger’s rethinking of temporality and being, I will explain how Irigaray redefines love beyond narcissism and fusion, and reworks the Hegelian labor of the negative, which remains so pivotal to Lacan’s logic of desire. This redefinition of love, however, can be carried out only in conjunction with the simultaneous reformulation of the question of being through sexual difference. Offering those revisions, Irigaray’s critique of psychoanalysis is never simply negative: it is not criticism and certainly not a rejection of Lacan but is a transformative encounter, a further elaboration of the openings which Lacan himself makes in Encore. The critique of love as a certain debasement of being, as a veiling of the temporality and finitude of existence, is obviously at the heart of Encore. Tracing an historical path from Aristotle through courtly love and the baroque aesthetic to Freud and contemporary linguistics, Lacan’s Seminar XX reappraises the questions posed in the ethics seminar in order to explore the possibility of ethical love differentiated from the ideal of the One in which Lacan sees one of the forms of the foreclosure of both the historicity and the jouissance of being–a collapse or debasement of being’s occurrence into substantiality or ideality. Repeating his own formulas of sexuation, his understanding of the work of desire and of the deceptions of love, Lacan points in Seminar XX toward the possibility of rethinking love in connection with a certain jouissance and in terms of the revised notion of being as para-being. Encore opens a path to thinking the ethics of love outside of the mirroring enclosures of narcissism and the effects of sameness associated with the idea of the One. This possibility pivots on redrawing the very notion of relation to the other into a new, non-appropriative mode of relationality which is not encompassed by desire, narcissistic or fusional love, or the labor of the negative.

     

    Recalling de Beauvoir’s hope that the future will bring new, re-imagined relations, Irigaray develops such relationality into a redefinition of sexual difference as a transformative event in which an encounter with the sexed other keeps reinventing difference and thus opens the possibility of a new future. The issues of the debasement of being and the possibility of ethical love are closely connected in Irigaray’s revision of sexual difference and form her response to Lacan’s repeated assertion that sexual relationship does not take place. For Irigaray the failure of sexual relation reflects the effective erasure of sexual difference within the cultural paradigms of sexuation: the figuration of “woman” as absence or the not-whole, as the other to “man”–which issues from the metaphysical desire for sameness and the unity of being–forecloses the possibility of exchange in sexual relation and produces the illusion of unified and universalizable experience. It is only by redefining the relation between the sexes outside of the metaphysical strictures of presence and absence, negation and unity, that it may become possible to rethink the sexuate dimension of being beyond its phallocratic debasement. Considering Irigaray in the context of Heidegger’s thought, I reappraise her redefinition of the relationality of love in terms of a rethinking of Dasein into an ethical, non-appropriative event of being-two. At stake in this redefinition of love as a non-appropriative encounter, as is the case with Lacan’s seminars VII and XX, is also the question of ethics.

     

    To illustrate these re-negotiations between Lacan, Irigaray, and Heidegger, I will focus on the implications of thinking the subject of desire as a mediation, a middle link between Dasein and being, on the one hand, and the subject of absolute knowledge, on the other. Lacan’s reading of Freud brings the question of lack and absence, reformulated as the work of the signifier, to bear on the Cartesian subject of certainty and also on the Hegelian idea of history as the manifestation of the subject’s development toward absolute knowledge. It is the structuring and grounding function of lack that dislocates the Cartesian subject and opens it onto the subject of desire, which emerges as another layer of subjectivity, constantly enveloping and fracturing the subject of knowledge. Examining various forms of love against the backdrop of the splits and lack intrinsic to subjectivity, Lacan indicates that love functions as a supplement both to the lack that structures desire and to the failure of sexual relationship. Love takes two primary forms: narcissism, a self-love described by Freud, and the philosophical-theological idea of unity which, as Lacan puts it, has to do with the One, that is, with the ideal of oneness and fusion that can be traced back at least as far as Plato’s Symposium. Against these two dominant forms, Encore (hereafter abbreviated E) signals the importance of rethinking love with respect to the failure of sexual relationship, which, Lacan insists, although articulated as a negation, marks something positive: “Yes, I am teaching something positive here. Except that it is expressed by a negation” (E 59). What fails in sexual relationship is objective; what fails is, in fact, the object or objet a, which the desiring subject keeps searching for and ascribing to the Other. “The essence of the object is failure” (E 58). One crucial historical instance of this failure of the object or of the object as failure that Lacan analyzes in Encore is courtly love, which sublimates the absence of sexual relation into poetic rhetoric. In courtly love, which seems to have had a lasting influence on European conceptions of love, love becomes the symptom of the absence of sexual relation, a compensation for the lack in the double form of idealized femininity and one’s “courtly” relation to it. Lacan’s remark that the failure of sexual relation represents something positive implies, however, that grasping this failure as lack or negativity is already a misinterpretation of the “being” of sexual relation, of the very manner in which sexes relate. It is indeed possible to regard Encore as a series of attempts to signal the positivity of the failure of sexual relation, to open the door to reimagining this failure outside the logic of supplementarity and its tendency toward substantialization of being. I would argue that Seminar XX, though at points hesitant and unclear, can be read in terms of an effort to think difference and relation beyond the various forms of negativity, logical or dialectical, in order to discern the positivity marked in the failure of sexual relation.

     

    As supplements to the failure in the “object” of love, the diverse forms of love which Lacan mentions in the course of Seminar XX produce a certain debasement of being, enclosing the subject within narcissistic desire or evacuating the temporality of being into phantasmatic objects or metaphysical ideals. An attempt to counter this “depreciation” of being, Lacan’s comments about a certain positivity manifested in the failure of sexual relationship which does not require supplements allow us to read this failure as opening a path, a different trail, as it were, to the other. These remarks indicate the need for reformulating the discourse of love into a new mode of relationality, disengaged from knowledge and desire. More importantly, they can be read as signaling the critical importance of rethinking relationality apart from the logic of negativity which underpins the metaphysical articulations of being and the cultural logic of sexuation. The ending of Encore expressly dissociates love from the order of knowledge (E 146). Since love may occur only as that something positive marked negatively as the failure of sexual relation, it does not require the support of objet a and, although related, perhaps often inextricably, to desire, does not belong to the same order or operate the same relation. Such “new” love points to a different layer of subjectivity, marked within but at the same time pointing beyond the subject of knowledge and the subject of desire. Lacan does not expand on the possibility of this “may be” of love in Encore, hinting only that it has to do with the body and with a jouissance whose economy “should not be/could not fail to be phallic” or that of the not-whole which Lacan associates with the possibility of feminine jouissance.

     

    This jouissance emerging from Lacan’s remarks dispersed throughout Encore marks a certain mode of bodily being, which Lacan associates with the para-being of signifierness (signifiance) and opposes to the substantialized being and its diverse avatars: truth, knowledge, supreme being, soul, etc. (E 71). If the soul unifies the body, jouissance “writes” it, i.e. unfolds the bodily being as a certain drift and a text or texture of experience, irreducible to our knowledge of it (E 110-112). The jouissance occurs in the mode of “failing to be,” that is, it fails to be substantialized, it eschews the substantive and signified forms of being, marking itself as the positivity of this failure. Since it fails to ever be (as substantive), this jouissance cannot be known: it represents an affect or passion of para-being, a passion that has neither the positivity of presence nor the negativity of absence. This is why Lacan refers to it as a “passion for ignorance” (E 121), opposed to the passion for knowledge and working beyond the dialectic of love and hate. If knowledge works within or at least toward the temporality of presence and desire operates the temporality of absence and lack, the passion for ignorance would have to be thought in terms of a different temporality, one that cannot be explained by the logic of progress, negation, or accumulation. It is neither the positivity of the one nor the negativity of the not-whole, with its “failing,” accumulative logic of one plus one plus one. As this mode of being, the jouissance that Lacan is after is also differentiated from objet a and the symbolic, which produce semblance of being and block the path to the other (E 93-94). Such a jouissance is never properly of language (langue) or appropriate to it but, rather, operates as its inter-dit: as lalangue (E 121). Inter-said only in its interdiction, this jouissance of being finds itself prior to signification, prior to the effects of the signifier and its “stupid” logic of collectivization. This jouissance undermines the hold that truth and thought have on being, a hold that debases being into the “stupidity” of the One and the illusory permanence of substantives. As Lacan suggests, this jouissance allows us “to relegate the truth to the lowly status it deserves” (E 108). In a Heideggerian gesture, Lacan opposes to the truth the pathway, the changing and temporalizing path of wisdom offered by Taoism. Finally, since this jouissance is inappropriate for language or truth, it is linked to the fact that sexual relationship fails, that is, fails to be ever constituted. The positivity of the failure of sexual relation has to do with pathways of this bodily jouissance, with the temporality of its being, which prohibits sexual relationship, that is, lets it happen only as inter-dit, as inter-said. Inter-dit marks the different temporality of jouissance, which refracts the logic of presence and absence, and therefore fails to articulate itself in terms of the operations of negation. It is in relation to this different temporality–neither of knowledge nor of desire–that we need to rethink the failure of sexual relation.

     

    Irigaray’s Speculum and This Sex Which Is Not One reformulate feminine morphology and the jouissance Lacan discusses in Encore away from the economy of the not-whole and into a new relationality of proximity, based on a critical appropriation, through the prism of sexual difference, of Heidegger’s idea of nearness (Nähe) and Levinas’s proximity, together with their explicit ethical connotations. In an important way, Irigaray’s notions of proximity and wonder, critical to her project in An Ethics of Sexual Difference (hereafter abbreviated ESD) form a response to the Levinasian rethinking of ethical relation as a radical proximity in Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, a response that resignifies proximity specifically in terms of sexual difference.3 The notion of proximity developed by Irigaray, delineating an interval which cannot be crossed or thematized, is also evocative in its spatio-temporal drift of Lacan’s inter-dit: the writing in-between words or lines, both prohibited by language and representation and yet marked and thus in some way arriving in the very interdiction that forecloses its expression. Proximity inter-says itself between presence and absence, between knowledge and desire, mapping a relationality that is too close for producing either identification (sameness) or separation (negation). As Irigaray refers to it, proximity is “neither one nor two,” it has to do neither with the One nor with negation. The modality of relation which Irigaray calls proximity provides an alternative to the subject-object relation and its basis in the logic of negation with the corollary opposition between presence and absence. It is a relation that fails to “be,” i.e. fails to identify the one with the other, that, in other words, does not submit to the labor of the negative. Without either becoming present or being simply absent, proximity does not fail to mark difference, albeit otherwise, in its non-substantive, spatio-temporal drift.

     

    Lacan’s inter-dit recalls Heidegger’s distinction between logos and glossa from Introduction to Metaphysics, where logos refers to what gets said between words, as it were, and, at the same time, becomes veiled by the play of signs.4 This distinction reappears in Heidegger’s 1951 essay “Logos,” which Lacan translated into French: “Thus, the essential speaking of language, Legein as laying, is determined neither by vocalization fwnh nor by signifying shmainein. Expression and signification have long been accepted as manifestations which indubitably betray some characteristics of language. But they do not genuinely reach into the real of the originary, essential determination of language, nor are they at all capable of determining this realm in its primary characteristics” (Early 64). There is something of language beyond signification and articulation, beyond the play of the signifier and the solidifying force of the signified. Heidegger claims that signification does not determine the originary realm of language, i.e. that spatio-temporal event which in each moment has always already laid out the relationality within which signification becomes possible. This laying out of a relationality is the meaning of logos as a language “beyond” language: logos is the saying that inter-says itself in the play of significations, both marked and foreclosed by the logic of the signifier. This rethought Heideggerian logos is then non-logocentric and refers to a relationality that, within the spatio-temporal unfolding of being, fails to be either present or absent, and yet marks a certain positivity, a non-metaphysical pulsation of being which cannot be reduced to negation or lack. Still, logos cannot fail but to conceal itself within the negative logic of being, within the opposition between presence and absence. Making a distinction between words and signs, Heidegger remarks that logos is the word marked as erased between signs, the word that sinks down into and becomes concealed in language (Einführung 131). Logos then marks the rhythm in which being lays itself out, its historico-temporal unhoming, that is, its intrinsic openness onto the unheimlich. Reinterpreting truth as aletheia or unconcealment, Heidegger remarks in “On the Essence of Truth” that unconcealment happens in the midst of concealment, within the non-essence (Un-Wesen ) or pre-essential essence (vor-wesende Wesen ) of truth, which is constituted as a Geheimnis, a mystery (Pathmarks 148; “Vom Wesen” 191). The mystery at stake in Dasein is not “mystical,” but rather concerns the unhoming intrinsic to Dasein, its modality of being itself as unheimlich. Playing with Heidegger’s later remarks on the function of Ge- in Ge-stell, or the “enframing” characteristic of modern technology (note to “The Question Concerning Technology”) we could say that this mystery (Geheimnis) or concealment relates the various ways in which otherness and being-outside-itself constitute Dasein into the disclosedness of beings.

     

    As inter-dit, Lacan’s jouissance from Encore can be interpreted in terms of the concealing temporality of the logos and its Unheimlichkeit. What interdicts jouissance is its modality of para-being, its concealment from both presence and absence, its neither negative nor positive logic. If this jouissance always fails it is because its positivity has the mode of logos: inscribed into the logic of fulfillment and lack, such jouissance has always already failed. Not because it fails to fulfill the expectation and thus marks a lack but because jouissance’s logos is not of the logic of fulfillment, which presupposes presence and immediately brings with it its negation: lack. Lacan suggests that this inter-dit grants us access to a certain kind of the real which needs to be exposed (E 119), unconcealed in its logos of concealment. At stake in the inter-dit is, therefore, a different logos of relationality, a mode of relatedness that inhabits the real beyond the signification of this logos as having to do with the one, as “sayable” in terms of the metaphysical logic of being and its labor of the negative. The difficulty of exposing this real lies in its refraction of presence, a refraction which, however, cannot be mistaken for the force of negation and subsequently constituted into lack. Such real is not the inaccessible Kantian Ding, separated from language and perception, but is rather the inter-said whose “failed positivity” inlays and de-structures language. While little of this real remains accessible in terms of signification, it is hardly absent from language, continuously inlaying expression.

     

    For Irigaray, this real and its different mode of relationality takes place as the event of wonder, constituted as the fluid proximity between the one and the other: “A third dimension. An intermediary. Neither the one nor the other” (Ethics 82). This event where there is neither one nor two, where, in other words, the logic of identity and difference underpinning the subject’s relation to the other does not operate, frames Irigaray’s attempt to articulate new, so far unimagined forms of sexual relations–a new relationality of love. In order to articulate this new relationality more clearly, I will examine Irigaray’s work in terms of the effects that the ontico-ontological difference and the ecstatic temporality it encodes produce on both the subject of knowledge and the subject of desire. Her writings discern a certain parallel between the operations of knowledge and desire with respect to temporality and the ontico-ontological difference: both desire and knowledge end up collapsing the ontico-ontological difference and, thus, conceal the finitude of being. While the subject of knowledge effaces the temporality of being by constituting consciousness into the presence of representations, desire, as a relation structured through lack, clothes the paradoxically constitutive absence into the desired presence of objet a. Both knowledge and desire are structured in terms of the opposition between presence and absence: knowledge as the sublation of difference into presence, desire as lack or the lost presence of primary jouissance. For Irigaray, desire remains coupled with the fantasy of origin, of the original or primary satisfaction, and can only with difficulty be disconnected from the gesture of encircling or taking hold of. It seems that for Irigaray both the subject of consciousness and the subject of desire are still metaphysical, although in different ways. The first one sublates absence into the presence of knowledge and the self-presence of consciousness; the other, in Lacan’s re-reading of Hegel, foregrounds the structuring force of absence, the effect of the signifier, the lack desiring its own perpetuation.

     

    These appropriative tendencies in knowledge and desire lead Irigaray to reconceptualize love in a way that calls into question both the subject of knowledge and the subject of desire. In An Ethics of Sexual Difference, this critical reformulation is developed through a reading of Descartes’ philosophy of passions, in which Irigaray points out that for Descartes desire remains secondary to wonder (ESD 77) and she comments on the conspicuous absence of wonder in Freud’s theory of passions: “[Descartes] does not differentiate the drives according to the sexes. Instead, he situates wonder as the first of the passions. Is this the passion that Freud forgot?” (ESD 80). Although Irigaray does not develop her comments on the relation between wonder and desire, the direction of her argument is clear: she considers wonder to be the first passion, prior to desire and knowledge, though not in a developmental or linear sense. Wonder can be, then, seen as parallel to that third jouissance, to the passion for ignorance, which Lacan opposes to love and hate toward the end of Encore. Freud forgets this passion because it is covered over not only by knowledge but also by the logic of desire. Preceding desire, wonder functions as the very intermediary of relations, their third term (ESD 82). Irigaray thinks of wonder as the passion in which there is no separation between body and mind, between thought and affect, between thought and action: “A passion that maintains a path between physics and metaphysics, corporeal impressions and movements toward an object, whether empirical or transcendental” (ESD 80). It becomes clear, then, that rereading Descartes,5 Irigaray is also reinterpreting the Lacanian subject of desire in relation to the bodily jouissance of being reformulated as admiration or wonder. What this rereading points to is another layer, or better, a different mode of being, beyond both the subject of knowledge and the subject of desire: it is the temporality of wonder in terms of which Irigaray redefines love.

     

    To flesh out this opening of the subject of desire onto a new relationality of love beyond narcissism and the idea of the One, Irigaray reinterprets Diotima’s speech from Symposium, not only setting Diotima’s remarks explicitly against the idea of unity but also using them to distinguish between the workings of love and desire. She situates desire in the context of will, intention, and teleology, contrasting it with wonder, which describes a non-appropriative and transformative relation to the other. Tracing this distinction between love and desire, Irigaray remarks that love (eros)–the pathos that guides wonder–has the force of an intermediary but becomes stymied and declines when desires, aims, and objectification set in: “It seems that during the course of her speech, she diminishes somewhat this daimonic, mediumistic function of love, such that it is no longer really a daimon, but an intention, a reduction to the intention, to the teleology of human will, already subjected to a kind of thought with fixed objectives, not an immanent efflorescence of the divine of and in the flesh. Love was meant to be an irreducible mediator, at once physical and spiritual, between the lovers, and not already codified duty, will, desire” (ESD 30, my emphasis). As the passion of wonder, love remains prior to desire, because desire operates on the level of intention and, turning what is desired into an object or a goal, “debases” its being. Elaborating on this critical change in being, Irigaray remarks that, instead of loving one’s lover, one begins to desire one’s beloved: “In the universe of determinations, there will be goals, competitions, and loving duties, the beloved or love being the goal…. Love becomes a kind of raison d’ état ” (ESD 30). When love becomes distanced from becoming, the temporality of wonder, its jouissance, becomes collapsed into goals and reasons: family, procreation, the state, politics, production and so on.

     

    Perhaps the most important aspect of wonder is that, unlike desire, it is not constituted through lack. Wonder operates as a transformative interval, in which the other’s difference is encountered in a “positive” way, i.e. it produces a change not simply in the manner of the subject’s being but in the very mode of the relation itself. As Irigaray puts it, wonder is “the opening of a new space-time” and “a mobilization of new energies” (ESD 75). This distinction between desire and wonder is critical for Irigaray, specifically with respect to how the other’s difference becomes manifested and affects the valency of relation. Lack points to alienation; it is read negatively, as a repeatedly missed satisfaction. It could be argued that the logic of lack presupposes the idea of presence: even though lack is the effect of the signifier and the signifier never produces full presence, the very notion of lack becomes accessible via its presupposed opposition to presence. As Lacan points out, access to language is opened through the mastering of the absence of the lost object. But the paradigm of absence/presence already marks a certain forgetting of the temporality of being: the oedipal logic operates as a covering of the originary event-temporality, as a veiling of the para-being (par-être), which Lacan explores in Encore.6 If desire owes its dynamic to a lost origin, i.e., to primary satisfaction, then it is put into motion by a (mis)reading of being in terms of possession and lack–a logic that substantializes and objectifies the non-substantive spatio-temporality of being in an attempt to appropriate it. This is why in her remarks on Descartes Irigaray emphasizes the force of motion intrinsic to wonder: this force marks the non-substantive and non-essential modality of being, indicating that being is not about having or losing, since in wonder there is nothing, literally no-thing or object that could be possessed. Wonder is a modality of relatedness that does not transpire in terms of the subject-object relation, it is a disposition in which there are no positions that are proper to subjectivity or its objects. While desire is haunted by the specter of satisfaction, wonder is about jouissance without satisfaction, without objects, real or imaginary.

     

    What changes in the turn from wonder to desire is the mode of relating: from non-appropriation and proximity to relation instituted in terms of goals, appropriation, hierarchy, subordination, and command. From the perspective of wonder one could say that desire is a repetition of the missed satisfaction not because such satisfaction cannot be recovered, i.e., because it belongs to a lost past, but rather because being in its temporality is not about satisfaction or having. Lacan’s critique in Encore of the logic of presence and absence in terms of para-being indicates that desire keeps misreading its own dynamic, it keeps missing the way being works only as para-being. As a result, desire keeps knotting being into the cause of desire, a cause that remains without substance, a void. In other words, desire still reads being metaphysically, in terms of lack and absence. Desire feeds on this lack and replenishes it in order to reproduce its own circular or knotting logic. From Heidegger’s perspective, this logic is nihilistic: “In the forgetfulness of being to drive [betrieben] only at beings–this is nihilism” (Einführung 155).7 When the force, the pulsation of being becomes forgotten and what is repeatedly belabored, driven at, are objects or beings, nihilism takes over existence. Nihilism is not annihilation of beings or lack of values, but is, on the contrary, the forgetting of being in the fixation on objects, whether real, imaginary, or symbolic. These objects include values, ideas, knowledge, the One of love and the One of knowledge. It is only in relation to such objects that being can be seen as lacking. The fact that being is not and lacks in being an object or a substance to be possessed, brings desire into being–desire that wants to forget being and imagine objects in place of the non-appropriable event. At the same time, the fact that being is not, that it is no-thing, no thing or object, undoes any and all such attempts: no being or entity, because it occurs, because it is in being, can ever be an object and live up to desire. Nihilism produces its own frustration and feeds on its repetition. To undermine the hold of this nihilism, it is necessary to call into question the debasement of being’s historico-temporal event into objects–it is, in other words, to question the logic of desire.

     

    In her reformulation of wonder, Irigaray thinks para-being precisely as a counter to the appropriative, nihilistic logic of desire, and to the lack that it marks in being. To explain this, I would need to flesh out in more detail the similarities and differences in Lacan’s and Heidegger’s approaches to language. Let me just suggest here that such a comparison would disclose the possibility of rethinking the logic of the Lacanian signifier from the effect of lack to what, in Heideggerian parlance, might be called an event temporality, which operates beyond the idea of lack and satisfaction. Lacan himself gestures in this direction with his comments on para-being, on the par-être that does not appear. This understanding of temporality underpins Irigaray’s notion of wonder, to which she explicitly refers as an event: an event and advent of the other. To explain the implications of Irigaray’s idea of wonder, I will focus on two of its aspects: temporality and the sense of otherness disclosed in it, and I will do so by commenting on those two facets in Heidegger’s discussion of Dasein in Being and Time. I suggested earlier that Irigaray reads Lacan as diagnosing the “missing” link, the subject of lack, located between Dasein and the subject of knowledge. This reading allows Irigaray not only to rethink Lacan encore, as it were, through Heidegger but also to reconsider Dasein in relation to desire and sexual difference.

     

    The term Dasein refers to the specifically human mode of being in its finite temporality. It does not designate the subject but, rather, describes the pre-subjective and embodied mode of being, which comes to understand itself in terms of an open context of relations which make up Dasein’s spatio-temporal being-in-the-world. Those relations include Being-with, or Dasein’s comportments toward other human beings. In the frequently misunderstood remarks about authenticity from Being and Time, Heidegger maintains that Dasein is “authentic” (eigentlich) only in the mode of Unheimlichkeit, that is, uncanniness or, better, “unhomeness.” Dasein occurs authentically only at the moments when the temporalizing force of its finitude undermines the impersonal familiarity of its daily identifications. Heidegger calls these identifications the “they-self,” the self that comprises the realm of language, symbolic and imaginary identities: “It is Dasein in its uncanniness [unhomeness]: originary thrown being-in-the-world as ‘not-at-home,’ the naked ‘that’ in the nothingness of the world” (Being 255, slightly modified).8 The term Un-zuhause (not-at-home) makes clear that Heidegger’s notion of Unheimlichkeit places the emphasis on being “un-homed,” understood as the mode of being in which Dasein occurs as “authentic.” To put it differently, Dasein is “authentic” in an originary exposition to alterity, which means that it is its-self as unhomed toward what is other, as divested of stable or substantive identities offered in its culture. When Dasein experiences itself as “at home” in its everyday being, it has forgotten the otherness, the “un-homing” at work in its own temporal mode of being, and has covered over its originary openness to what is other. The originary opening to the other constitutes a temporal event, in which the modality of being is not presupposed or imposed but, instead, brought about and co-constituted in relation to the other. To put it differently, the shape or the form which being-in-the-world takes depends on the modality of relating to the other, on whether one does not forget that the familiarity of everyday being–with its “routine” forms of experience, understanding, and representation–takes place each moment within an originary “unhomeness.”

     

    Dasein understands itself without ever being able to articulate this understanding into a knowledge, because this understanding is “practical”: it happens as the activity of being-in-the-world in which Dasein comports itself toward things and others. What is so unhoming in this understanding, i.e. in the human mode of being, is finitude, and the de-substantializing effects of its temporality, which disclose to Dasein the fact that things are not substantive, that they are never objects, that, in psychoanalytic terms, they cannot be satisfactory in the way our desire wants them to be. Heidegger’s rethinking of Freud’s uncanny certainly indicates that the finite temporality of Dasein calls into question the logic of desire, that it forces a rethinking of the dynamic of relation to what is other. That dynamic would have to be rethought from what Heidegger calls the ecstatic temporality particular to Dasein. Heidegger writes that Dasein’s time unfolds as an always momentary complex of the three ecstasies of time: the has been (Gewesenheit or the “past”), the making present, and the coming-toward (Zu-kunft) or the future. For our purposes, what matters in Heidegger’s detailed explanation of the rise of the common concept of time out of the ecstatic temporality of Dasein9 is that ecstatic temporality provides a critique of the concepts of time and history grounded in the metaphysical opposition between presence and absence. As the name indicates, ecstatic temporality is the originary mode of being outside itself, that is, of being open to otherness: “Temporality is the originary ‘outside-of-itself’ [Ausser-sich] in and for itself” (BT 377/329 modified). Temporality means being always extended outside itself, beyond what becomes present. Dasein occurs as concerned with the “outside-of-itself,” and this concern or care, as Heidegger refers to it, takes the form, especially in his later writings, of letting-be. In other words, the possibility of letting what is other be as what it is in its difference is linked with the temporal occurrence of Dasein as an originary “outside-of-itself.” What makes Dasein Dasein, that is, what constitutes the human mode of being, is this originary extending or openness toward otherness.

     

    Dasein “understands” itself existentially in terms of its project, i.e. as a projection onto its possibilities for being, it sees itself futurally in relation to its power to be. Within this projection, the past is not a matter of re-membering or reconstructing past situations with historical exactness, but of retrieving it “existentially,” that is, as a kind of (self)interpretive acting which always already extends the present’s paths into the future. Therefore, history is primarily futural: its temporalizing matrix works as a disjoining structure, in which historical being orients itself in terms of a sheaf of possibilities. As Heidegger remarks, temporality discloses “the silent force of the possible” (die stille Kraft des Möglichen) (Sein 394) as intrinsic to the dynamic of being. This silent force of the possible indicates that transformation is intrinsic to the very dynamic of occurring: it is tied to the shape which the relation to the other takes.

     

    This transformative vector of temporality is of critical importance to understanding Irigaray’s remarks about wonder. In Heidegger, Dasein names a mode of being, which does not have a place but occurs as an interval, as a temporal project, if you will, within which the relation between the subject and the other unfolds. In “On the Essence of Truth,” Heidegger explains that Dasein does not belong to human beings but constitutes a relationality of freedom into which humans can be “released”: “The human being does not possess freedom as property. At best, the converse holds: freedom, ek-sistent, disclosive Dasein, possesses the human being….” (Pathmarks 145). Dasein stands for a relatedness to being in which the human being can participate, a relatedness which is always tuned in a particular way, as the play of concealment and unconcealment. It is the manner in which beings become unconcealed that brings Dasein into an attuning (a Gestimmtheit or a Stimmung) in which it can be free. Stimmung, pitch or mood, cannot be understood here in terms of psychology or lived experience. Instead, it refers to what is best understood as a disposition, a disposing of relations between being, beings, and human beings. The site, the there or the Da of such a disposition is called Da-sein, there-being. Entering into this modality of being, humans find themselves within a certain relatedness where their relation to being and beings becomes disposed into either a disclosive freedom, a non-appropriative mode of relationality, or into a grasping, appropriative relation that obscures the disposition of Dasein. In Heidegger, the non-appropriative and appropriative exist in a tension, which marks the occurrence of the event or Ereignis. The notion of Dasein as a temporal project marked by the transformative force of the possible allows Heidegger to disentangle a mode of being which remains free from the Hegelian dialectic of recognition and its intricate mesh of desire and knowledge. Heidegger shows that, as such a temporal project, Dasein is in each moment “mine”; however, it is “mine” not by way of possession or identity, but is “mine” in its very force to be, in its transformative, futural vectors.

     

    I see Lacan’s remarks from Encore on para-being and jouissance as the context that allows Irigaray to introduce into this Heideggerian way of thinking a critical reformulation of Dasein into what Irigaray’s recent writings call being-two.10 If Dasein is the in-between, the fold from which the relation between subject and the Other emerges, the change Irigaray suggests is that this in-between is itself vectored as being-two. Being-two refers not to the subject’s relation to the other but to a mode of encounter, in which there is no “one” as the subject and no “other” as the object of desire: “one” and “other” only occur in the mode of being two, which does not signify the split or the lack that (un)grounds the subject but the originary openness to otherness as the possibility of the future and transformation. According to Irigaray, prior to the uneasy embrace of the subject of desire and the subject of knowledge, there is a mode of being-two, a mode of being-in-sexual-difference. In this openness constitutive of being two, otherness has the positive valency of the possibility of transformation: it is not a sign of lack or threat but of the possibility of freedom and change as the vectors of the encounter with the other. Being-two thus redefines otherness beyond the subject-object opposition on the level of knowledge, and beyond the subject-Other relation on the level of desire. If Dasein is a temporal project of possibilities-to-be, within being-two, this project is already inflected, asymmetrical; it is transformative by virtue of the other’s singularity. It is in this specific sense that I refer to Irigaray’s wonder as originary: Heidegger’s term ursprünglich, mistakenly interpreted as primordial, does not refer to a past which Dasein would somehow try to repeat or get back to but to the originary force with which each moment opens itself into the futural possibilities for being. To say that wonder is originary does not mean that it refers to an origin, to a primal moment or scene, but that it happens with the transformative force of a future-opened temporal project. If desire operates in relation to a primary satisfaction, to an idea of an original jouissance, wonder sketches a different dynamic of relation, one turned toward the future as the new.

     

    Being-two is Irigaray’s way of marking being with sexual difference and also her attempt to rethink love in terms of wonder. As she remarks in Être Deux, “The dualism of subject and object is no longer overcome in the fusion or ecstasy of the One but in the incarnation of the two, a two irreducible to the One….” (108).11 Being-two becomes the figure for a mode of being that bespeaks neither the unity of the one nor the difference between the two (or more, i.e. multiplicity), but refers to an incarnated and concrete mode of being that eschews both monism and dualism. In social and political terms, being-two sketches an economy of relations alternative to the dominant paradigm of sociality conceived as the integration of individuals into a social totality. For Irigaray universality is not produced by sublating particularity into generality but marks itself within the singularity of the event of being-two. Being-two functions an “existential,” i.e. incarnate and concrete, universal from which existence unfolds: “[w]ithout doubt, the most appropriate content for the universal is sexual difference. Indeed, this content is both real and universal” (I Love 47). This revised universality eludes the idea of totality or homogeneity and inscribes, instead, an unquantifiable proximity between the two (sexes) from which social and political relations develop. Such a “universal” remains intrinsically futural: it is not produced as unified totality but remains to be enacted, carried out and decided, futurally, as the transformative and differential event of being-two.

     

    Irigaray’s remarks about being-two allude to Lacan’s critique of love in Encore, and try to spell out a new relationality of love as the asymmetrical event of being-two beyond narcissism and the idea of the One. The unhoming (unheimlich) and transformative temporality of this event make it possible to rethink sexual relation in the following way: the failure of sexual relation becomes the mark of its event dynamic, it reflects the fact that sexual relation cannot be written, signified, or substantialized, because it is real. Sexual relation becomes “real” not in any substantive or atemporal, unreachable sense, but precisely by virtue of the silent force of the possible that it literally keeps incarnating in the event of being-two. Rethinking Irigaray’s being-two in the context of Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein lets us flesh out the real in terms of its futural temporality and its forces of the possible. Irigaray would say that it is precisely love as sexual relation that enacts, as it were, and keeps incarnating the real as the transformative force of being. In being-two, the unhoming/transformative force of being becomes real. Reformulating de Beauvoir’s “one becomes a woman,” Irigaray would say that love and sexual difference become real with each pulsation of being, and they become real to the extent that the unhoming force of the encounter is not produced as lack but as the force of the possible.

     

    Conceiving being-two in futural terms as a transformative relationality can be seen as a response to the problem of the debasement of being, which Lacan’s Encore associates with the logic of presence and absence, with the opposition between being and non-being. What such a “debasement” forecloses is precisely the futural vector of the “silent force of the possible,” to recall Heidegger’s remark from Being and Time. Irigaray rewrites this force of the possible into a relationality of love, into a space of freedom and transformation marked in the proximity of being-two. Irigaray’s wonder disengages desire from the logic of lack and reformulates it in terms of the futural vector of the possible: “Desire would be the vectorialization of space and time, the first movement toward, not yet qualified…. In a way, wonder and desire remain the spaces of freedom between the subject and the world. The substrate of predication? Of discourse?” (ESD 76). Desire thought in the register of wonder has no cause, only a momentum which vectorializes relations without qualifying or substantializing them; it is desire that does not operate on lack and repetition but in terms of excess and the new.

     

    Lacan’s Encore reappraises the question of ethical love in terms of jouissance, the body, and para-being as the alternative to the phantasmatic logic of desire and the power of the One. How thin a line separates the possible ethical jouissance of para-being in our relation to the other from the domains of desire and knowledge is staged by the ending of Encore. Staged, not articulated, because Lacan clearly disengages the possibility of the different understanding of love Encore is after from knowledge, from the kind of love that knows the other as the One: “to know what your partner will do is not a proof of love” (E 146). This sentence closes the last page of Seminar XX, the page on which Lacan plays with the idea of encore as both enacting and subverting the logic of desire: “Shall I say, “See you next year”? You’ll notice that I’ve never ever said that to you. For a very simple reason–which is that I’ve never known, for the last twenty years, if I would continue next year. That is part and parcel of my destiny as object a” (E 146). The not-knowing in this remark is part and parcel of the logic of objet a, tempting with the possibility of its own impossible materialization. Lacan positions his discourse as objet a, enticing with the supposed final knowledge, desiring it yet again, encore, and making it still (encore) to come. This doubling encore can be read as the lack constitutive of the nihilistic desire to know or as a freeing encore, liberating the event (of the end of the seminar) from the logic of presence and absence into the event’s possible force of the future to be. One could say that the not-knowing Lacan mentions masks the understanding of how the futurity of being makes desire unsatisfiable; and yet desire cannot help but keep collapsing being’s event into an object. What emerges from Lacan’s performance is a distinction between two senses of possibility. In the first sense, possibility is grasped in terms of the knowledge of what it might be; possibility is either conceived in its deferred presence or enacted in its repeated lack, the two sides of the repetition of absence in desire. In the first sense, possibility is either grasped in terms of the knowledge of what it might be, and thus conceived in its deferred presence, or enacted in its repeated lack, the two sides of the repetition of absence in desire.

     

    Irigaray’s An Ethics of Sexual Difference, seen as a response to Encore, explores the collapse of these two possibilities in terms of the turn from wonder to the logic of lack, lack which desire keeps repeating and knowledge tries to supplement. Both Lacan and Irigaray indicate the difficulty of keeping this difference in play, and both underscore its importance for the possibility of love and ethical relation to the other. To articulate this originary relation of wonder apart from lack and negativity, I have brought together Heidegger’s critical approach to being, more specifically, his reading of being in terms of a futural temporality opened by the critique of the subject in Being and Time, and Irigaray’s appropriation of it in her reformulation of sexual difference. The futural relationality in terms of which Dasein understands itself as being-in-the-world breaks free of the dialectical labor of the negative, at the same time that it does not entail positing the real as unchangeable or inaccessible. Such a futural-transformative modality of relatedness allows Irigaray to articulate the being-two of love as a relation in which difference marks itself neither in terms of negation nor separation but as the transformative interval, as the proximity that keeps reformulating the very parameters of relation and obligation to the other. My tiered reading of Lacan, Irigaray, and Heidegger suggests a new direction for Lacanian interpretation, one that takes neither the Kantian nor the Hegelian route but revises the question of (sexual) relation and love in terms of the Heideggerian rethinking of being through temporality. This perspective reinforces Irigaray’s critique of Hegel’s understanding of love and helps further radicalize her reworking of the labor of the negative in terms of the transformative relatedness of wonder beyond negation. It makes possible fleshing out the problem of love in radically temporal and embodied terms, as the ethical relationality of wonder distinct from the temporal logic of negation and lack. Such an ethics of wonder becomes distinguished in the “positivity” of its transformative event from the labor of negation which underlies the repetitive replaying of the possible as the deferred or missed possibility of actualization. Reading Lacan’s Seminar XX in relation to Irigaray and Heidegger illustrates how love and ethics, always encore, ride on this distinction in the vectors of possibility between lack and wonder.

     

    Notes

     

    1. I quote this remark in the slightly modified version given by William Richardson in “Psychoanalysis and the Being-Question,” 139.

     

    2. This argument underpins Irigaray’s I Love to You: Sketch for a Felicity within History; see, for instance, 56-57.

     

    3. Irigaray’s first response to Levinas comes in “The Fecundity of the Caress” (ESD 82). In her later “Questions to Emmanuel Levinas,” she underscores the ethical tenor of Heidegger’s work to suggest the possibility of opening ethics beyond the relation to other human beings. The link between Levinas’s and Lacan’s approaches to ethics, at least suggested in Irigaray’s work, is the focus of a recent collection of essays Levinas and Lacan: The Missed Encounter, ed. Sarah Harasym.

     

    4. “So finden wir denn bei Parmenides die scharfe Entgegensetzung von logos und glwssa (Frg. VII, v. 3 ff.)” (Einführung 132).

     

    5. For Descartes wonder brings with it the possibility of being overwhelmed and crushed by what is other: it marks the anxiety afflicting the subject of certainty who finds itself in the face of what exceeds the grasp of its knowledge. (I would like to thank Dalia Judovitz for drawing my attention to this aspect of Descartes’ theory of passions.) Irigaray clearly reformulates Descartes’ wonder and this revision would have to be explained in the context of her trilogy about the elements, in which one of the organizing factors is the engagement with the pre-Socratic notion of wonder and with Heidegger’s rethinking of it. For Heidegger, wonder pertains to both the affective and the intellectual registers. In What Is Philosophy?, Heidegger regards thinking, passion, and action as the axes of philosophia, whose meaning Heidegger redefines, in the context of Pre-Socratics, as the striving after that which astonishes. “The rescue of the most astonishing thing–beings in Being [Seiendes im Sein] was accomplished by a few who started off in the direction of this most astonishing thing, that is, the sophon” (51). Philosophy is not motivated by the desire to know but names as a certain relatedness or disposition (Heidegger’s term is Stimmung) in which what is astonishes–it is a question of maintaining thought in wonder of what is.

     

    6. “What we must get used to is substituting the ‘para-being’ (par-être)–the being ‘para,’ being beside–for the being that would take flight [fuir],” 44; see also 45.

     

    7. “In der Vergessenheit des Seins nur das Seiende betreiben–das ist Nihilismus.”

     

    8. The original reads: “Er ist das Dasein in seiner Unheimlichkeit, das ursprüngliche geworfene In-der-Welt-sein als Un-zuhause, das nackte ‘Das’ im Nichts der Welt” (Sein 276-277).

     

    9. The whole of Division Two of Being and Time is devoted to the discussion of temporality; for Heidegger’s revision of the idea of temporality see, in particular, sections I, II, and III; section VI discusses the “vulgar” concept of time.

     

    10. This term is the translation of the title of Irigaray’s recent book Être Deux.

     

    11. “Ce n’est plus dans la fusion ou l’ecstase de l’Un que se surmonte alors le dualism entre sujet et objet. Mais dans l’incarnation de deux, un deux irréductible à l’Un…” (my translation).

    Works Cited

     

    • Copjec, Joan. Read My Desire: Lacan Against the Historicists. Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1994.
    • Harasym, Sarah, ed. Levinas and Lacan: The Missed Encounter. Albany: SUNY Press, 1998.
    • Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. Albany: SUNY Press, 1996.
    • —. Early Greek Thinking: The Dawn of Western Philosophy. Trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi. San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1975, 1984.
    • —. Einführung in die Metaphysik. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1966.
    • —. Pathmarks. Ed. William McNeill. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1998.
    • —. Sein und Zeit. Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1986.
    • —. “Vom Wesen der Wahrheit.” Wegmarken. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978.
    • —. What Is Philosophy? Trans. and intro. William Kluback and Jean T. Wilde. [NY]: Twayne, 1958.
    • Irigaray, Luce. An Ethics of Sexual Difference. Trans. Carolyn Burke and Gillian C. Gill. Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP, 1993.
    • —. Être Deux. Paris: Grasset, 1997.
    • —. I Love to You: Sketch for a Felicity within History. Trans. Alison Martin. NY: Routledge, 1996.
    • —. “Questions to Emmanuel Levinas.” The Irigaray Reader. Ed. Margaret Whitford. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991.
    • Lacan, Jacques. Écrits: A Selection, trans. A. Sheridan. NY: Norton, 1977.
    • —. Encore. Trans. Bruce Fink. New York: Norton, 1997.
    • Richardson, William. “Psychoanalysis and the Being-Question.” Interpreting Lacan. Ed. Joseph H. Smith and William Kerrigan. New Haven: Yale UP, 1983.
    • Zizek, Slavoj. Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology. Durham: Duke UP, 1993.

     

  • “This Book Spill Off the Page in All Directions”: What Is the Text of Naked Lunch?

    Carol Loranger

    English Department
    Wright State University
    carol.loranger@wright.edu

     

    William S. Burroughs’s Naked Lunch appears “by wide public agreement” whenever lists of postmodern texts in English are compiled (Connor 129). Its status as a work of art seems clear. But its textual status is less clear: as yet, no effort has been made to establish an edition of Naked Lunch which would either provide readers with a reliable critical or scholarly version or, by accounting for its protean materiality as a series of unstable historical-textual events, help make a reality “the fully open, scriptible, postmodernist edition of literature” envisioned by textual scholar D. C. Greetham half a decade ago (17). Given the novel’s shiftily enduring, if cult, status as a political and artistic touchstone in American letters, the absence of a reliable edition is lamentable. But given the peculiar circumstances of the novel’s evolution, establishing such an edition poses serious editorial problems. The textual history of Naked Lunch prophesies both Jerome McGann’s rejection (on specifically textual-historical grounds) of the ideology of authorial intention, central to modern textual scholarship since Fredson Bowers, and Peter L. Shillingsburg’s post-electronic affirmation of the radical non-equivalence of “the work of art” with “the linguistic text of it” (35).

     

    What follows should be taken as a series of first steps toward a postmodern edition of Naked Lunch: an edition which, following the novel’s explicit and manifold rejections of such social (and editorial) values as “authority,” “intention,” “stability,” and “purity”–“the old cop bullshit” (NL 5)1–comes closest to capturing the mutability, aimlessness and contamination it offers in their stead–“Let go! Jump!” (NL 222). While it must account for the “work’s historical passage” (McGann 24), such an edition would not be a critical edition, in that the problem of identifying a copy text from which to identify variants may not be easily settled. The unavailability of the manuscript2 and the peculiar events surrounding the compilation of the first, Olympia Press, edition of Naked Lunch (see below) militate against deferring to Bowers’s theory of final intentions. Naked Lunch has undergone at least five significant changes in the three and a half decades since its first publication. The changes in each case have consisted of the addition or deletion of large, often self-contained portions of text. None of these changes can be considered accidental variants, since changes of this magnitude and these particular kinds were enacted by author or publisher in response to specific pressures. But neither can these changes be satisfactorily marked in each case as deliberate authorial revisions in the sense that, for example, passages in the 1909 “New York” edition of Daisy Miller can be clearly marked as the late James’s late-Jamesifying amplifications of the 1878 edition. Some of Burroughs’s additions pre-date Naked Lunch, others are mutually contradictory, and yet others were written or transcribed by third parties and were included in some editions but omitted from others, presumably with Burroughs’s blessing. Moreover, Burroughs’s history of abandoning the text to circumstance and necessity and his authorial claim to have “no precise memory of writing the notes which have now been published under the title Naked Lunch” (NL xxxvii)–coupled with his subsequent experiments with the unauthored cut-up in the Nova books and his call for guerrilla assault on the idea of authorial ownership in The Third Mind–suggest very strongly that authorial intent is antithetical to the very spirit of Naked Lunch.

     

    Perhaps most adequate to the special problem of Naked Lunch would be the “eclectic text” McGann proposes for another heavily revised text, Byron’s “Giaour”: based on the first edition but incorporating later additions to and revisions from subsequent editions. But the eclectic text McGann imagines generally addresses smaller scale revisions than those occurring in Naked Lunch. He warns that the resulting “Giaour” will be “marked throughout by ‘accidental’ distractions–variations in styles of punctuation and capitalization” (59), but he does not suggest that additions and revisions might radically alter the implicitly coherent, stable, recognizable boundaries of the text. The distractions caused by subsequent additions to and deletions from Naked Lunch, by contrast, call into question the very assumption of textual boundaries. Moreover, “accidental” distractions in punctuation and capitalization are central elements of even the most stable portions of Burroughs’s work: the elliptical and fragmentary narrative portion, for example, features random capitalization, inconsistent spellings of common slang and standard English words, and highly idiosyncratic and variable use of punctuation and italics. Even the ellipsis, necessitated by Burroughs’s preliminary experiments here with cut-up and fold-in composition,3 appears in three- and four-point variations on a single page and without reference to any internal or external editorial standards.

     

    There are, as I’ve said, at least five distinct texts called Naked Lunch. In addition there are David Cronenberg’s 1992 film version, whose popularity on the midnight movie circuit makes it in some cases the younger reader’s primary, perhaps sole, experience of the work, and the notorious fragment “Ten Episodes from Naked Lunch,” which led to the censorship of Big Table 1 in 1959 and established the as-yet unpublished work as an outlaw text. None of these versions contains all the textual material which is Naked Lunch, though all share one or more elements (see Table 1). This variety presents problems for both the reader and writer of this essay–since all are called by the same name, how to distinguish which is which?–and should, as I hope to demonstrate, be accounted for by the postmodernist edition. That four of the five versions are Grove Press publications complicates things further. For simplicity’s sake I will refer to the texts throughout this essay by the same combination of imprint and publication date used in Table 1.

     

    A glance at the table of elements might suggest that the editorial problem is not as great as I have indicated. Each of the five editions has in common a narrative composed of twenty-three “routines”4; surely the other four elements are simply paratexts: those perhaps interesting, but nonetheless secondary, supplements which Gerard Genette has identified as attaching themselves with varying degrees of tenacity to texts. Moreover, that portion of Naked Lunch which I identify as “narrative,” beginning with the untitled routine “<I can feel the heat closing in>” through “Quick…”, has not, but for the addition of two words,5 changed since the Olympia Press publication, suggesting that this text alone is Naked Lunch. The Grove 25th Anniversary edition adopts this view by limiting the text to the Olympia Press narrative.6 But Burroughs’s fabled passivity during the production of the novel–which he insists upon throughout the introductory “Deposition” (added upon the first Grove publication in 1962) and again in the routine “Atrophied Preface: Wouldn’t You?”, theorizes in essays and interviews in The Job (1970) and The Third Mind (1978), and develops as a compositional practice in the cut-up novels forming the Nova trilogy (The Soft Machine [1961], The Ticket That Exploded [1962], and Nova Express [1964])–besides anticipating Roland Barthes’s notion of the death of the author, calls into question any assumption that, in the absence of intentional revision, the authentic text is limited to that which appears in the first printing.

     

    The narrative portion of Naked Lunch consists of twenty-three routines, drawn, according to the mythology, from letters, sketches and a detective pot-boiler written by Burroughs during the Tangier period (1954-58).7 Pieces of the novel had circulated during these years among Burroughs’s circle. Some had been published in small presses as early as 1957.8 Varying reports have it that the manuscript was collated from “a mass of pages” by Burroughs with the assistance of Sinclair Beiles and Brion Gysin over a ten- to fourteen-day period in 1959 after Maurice Girodias offered to publish the novel as part of Olympia Press’s Traveller’s Companion Series. Sections of the novel were sent to the printer in the order they had been found, revised, and typed. The story goes that Burroughs had intended to organize the text from the galley proofs, but either Burroughs or Girodias decided that the accidental ordering of the routines worked best.

     

    My aim in referring to the above account as part of the mythology of Naked Lunch is not to contest its truth-value, but to specify its function. The story of the novel’s production is so much a part of its initial reception and continuing apprehension that it forms part of the novel’s aura. The seeds of the mythology appear in the “Introduction/Deposition: Testimony Concerning a Sickness,” added on the occasion of the first American and British editions (of which more later), and the essential elements, which I include in my account, belong to accounts given by nearly all the participants in the Olympia Press publication.9 Of course, given Burroughs’s career-long, semi-ironic self-identification as a huckster, one can never be certain what actually happened. This uncertainty, too, is part of the aura of Naked Lunch. The point I wish to make by recounting the mythology is that, even before its first publication, Burroughs may be seen relinquishing authority over the novel, allowing it to begin to form itself in response to accident and environmental pressure. Burroughs’s passivity at this point, however, is as yet only partial, as can be seen by considering the amount of revision he undertook between the novel-in-progress of Big Table and the Olympia Press publication later that year (see Tables 2 and 3).

     

    A comparison of the relevant routines in Naked Lunch with their earlier “episodes” in Big Table shows Burroughs making significant changes in the text. Aside from what appear to be cosmetic changes–the numbered episodes in Big Table become unnumbered, titled routines in Naked Lunch–Burroughs makes extensive revisions of all but two episodes. These revisions most often consist of developing what were essentially brief scenes into longer routines, interpolating material from separate episodes with additional material to form longer routines, and, in one instance, dividing an episode across two longer routines. Episodes 2 and 5, with minimal revision and the addition of the “vigilante” incident (NL 8-9), are joined to become the novel’s untitled opening routine “<I can feel the heat closing in>.” Part of Episode 3 (BT 86-89) and all of Episode 4 appear with significant revision as the “Hospital” routine in Naked Lunch. The remainder of Episode 3 (BT 89-90), lacking one paragraph, appears as the closing sequence of the routine “Lazarus Go Home” (NL 73). Episodes 6 and 8 comprise much of “Islam Incorporated and the Parties of Interzone” (NL 144-169), though the routine shows significant revision of these and contains an additional fourteen pages which describe the political parties at length. Episode 1 makes up only a small part of the “Atrophied Preface” (NL 229-231). Episode 9 is not text but a page of calligraphic markings suggestive of the jacket design for the Olympia Press edition of Naked Lunch.10 Only Episodes 7 and 10 appear to have been essentially finished at the time of the Big Table publication. With minimal revision they become the second (“Benway”) and third (“Joselito”) routines respectively.

     

    Despite the implication that there is a necessary narratological, or, at least, numerical, order to the episodes as they appear in Big Table, Burroughs’s revision changes that order significantly. Keeping the myth of the novel’s production in mind, it is possible to see the movement from active to passive authorship as it occurs. It is reasonable to assume that, as the first three routines of Naked Lunch (“<I can feel the heat closing in>,” “Benway,” and “Joselito”) are among those most complete at the time of the Big Table publication (Episodes 2, 5, 7 and 10), they were the first to go to Girodias. Episodes, which Burroughs revised more heavily, fall later in the Olympia Press narrative, depending on their time of completion. Episode 1, which would become the “Atrophied Preface,” for example, underwent the addition of some ten pages of text. Its placement near the end of the narrative portion of Naked Lunch is perhaps more indicative of the quantity of revision undergone than of any authorial decision to violate textual norms.

     

    In Big Table, Episode 1 clearly serves an introductory purpose, introducing Burroughs as author of the whole (“Now I, William Seward, will unlock my word horde” [NL, 230, BT 80]), laying forth the early elements of Burroughs’s viral theory of language, and prophesying the novel’s future mutations: “The Word is divided into units which be all in one piece and should be so taken, but the pieces can be had in any order being tied up back and forth, in and out fore and aft like an innaresting sex arrangement. This book spill off the page in all directions” (NL 229, BT 79). Moved to the end of Naked Lunch and expanded theoretically, “Atrophied Preface” effectively postpones until the last moment the revelation of the theory of the novel and the arrival of the “novelist” who has produced the text and would direct our reading of it: “You can cut into Naked Lunch at any intersection point…. I have written many prefaces. They atrophy and amputate spontaneous [….] Naked Lunch demands Silence from The Reader. Otherwise he is taking his own pulse” (NL 224). After Burroughs’s revision, the narrative portion of Naked Lunch begins in media res, with a monologue routine (“<I can feel the heat closing in>”; Episode 2 in Big Table) by (Inspector) Bill Lee, huckster, con-man, junkie sizing up the marks–including by implication the reader and implying that what follows–part hard-boiled detective novel, part science fiction hallucination, part social and political satire, part scholarly treatise of underworld jargon–is simply more of Lee “giving the fruit[s their] B production” (NL 2, BT 81).

     

    It is not my intention here to perform a detailed analysis of Burroughs’s revision of “Ten Scenes from Naked Lunch” into Naked Lunch, though I believe such a study would be an important addition to Burroughs scholarship. Rather, I simply want to specify the point at which Burroughs began to relinquish active control over the novel’s production to other forces, setting a precedent for future unauthored, though not unauthorized changes. The next series of textual mutations, circa 1963-84, would be authored by circumstance, even when actual words were written by Burroughs.

     

    Grove Press had begun negotiations with Girodias for an American printing of Naked Lunch as early as November 1959 and continued despite interference by the United States Post Office and seizure of the Paris edition by U.S. Customs agents (Goodman 142). The edition which Grove finally printed in 1962 contained the significant additions of an introduction, Burroughs’s “Deposition: Testimony Concerning a Sickness”11 (NL xxxvii-xlviii), reprinted from an earlier essay in Evergreen Review 12; and an appendix consisting of Burroughs’s 1956 article “Letter From a Master Addict to Dangerous Drugs” (NL 237-55) reprinted from The British Journal of Addiction.13 Both appear to have been added at least in part to appease U.S. and British censors, but remained part of the textual package long after the threat of official prosecution ended, effectively becoming part of the narrative experience. “Letter From a Master Addict,” written and published during the Tangier period, not only predates the Grove/Olympia negotiations, but also precedes the Olympia Press publication by enough years to make it an unrelated text, drawn into the orbit of Naked Lunch by the threat of obscenity charges. “Deposition: Testimony Concerning a Sickness,” on the other hand, was written specifically to pave the way for U.S. publication of Naked Lunch.14 As apologia for Naked Lunch the two texts offer distinctly different, though not entirely contrary, defenses for the novel.

     

    “Letter from a Master Addict” presents Burroughs as a scientist, coolly experimenting on himself and others and disinterestedly recording the results of his experiments for the public at large: “I once took two nembutal capsules (one and a half grain each) every night for four months and suffered no withdrawal symptoms. Barbiturate addiction […] is probably not a metabolic addiction like morphine, but a mechanical reaction from excessive front brain sedation” (NL 251). The fact of prior publication on drug addiction in a serious medical journal implied respectability; by adding it to the text Grove anticipated its (failed) contention in the 1965 Massachusetts Superior Court trial that, as an accurate, journalistic account of the culture of addiction, Naked Lunch was not obscene. The language of the article, together with Burroughs’s heavy use of passive constructions and medical jargon, careful attention to definition of terms, and (for botanicals) use of Latin species names, combines with its encyclopedic organization and tabulations of data to effectively imitate science writing of the day–an imitation Burroughs then undermines with odd anecdotes (“I once gave marijuana to a guest who was mildly anxious about something (‘On bum kicks’ as he put it). After smoking half a cigarette he suddenly leapt to his feet screaming ‘I got the fear!’ and rushed out of the house” [NL 250]) and irrelevant asides (“Pain could have no function for plants which are, for the most part, stationary” [NL 248]). “Letter from a Master Addict” is, arguably, one of Burroughs’s most subversive pieces of comic writing. The “scientific” language and deadpan asides both anticipate and replicate (because they are temporally prior, yet textually posterior, to) the “scientific” language and asides of much of the narrative of Naked Lunch, from the textual notes (“Note: Catnip smells like marijuana when it burns” [NL 4]) peppered throughout the narrative to Bill Lee’s self-interrupted tall tales. The narrative voice in the narrative portion of Naked Lunch is, in places, indistinguishable from the reportorial voice in “Letter from a Master Addict,” even though the first identifies himself as Bill Lee and the second signs himself as William Burroughs.15

     

    Signed by William S. Burroughs, “Deposition: Testimony Concerning a Sickness” in part seconds the assertion that Naked Lunch is journalism: “Since Naked Lunch treats this health problem, it is necessarily brutal, obscene and disgusting. Sickness is often repulsive details not for weak stomachs” (NL xliv). But the “Deposition” compromises what respectability the “Letter” might attain with grotesque parody of its detached language and style: “TERMINAL addicts often go two months without a bowel move and the intestines make with sit-down-adhesions–Wouldn’t you?–requiring the intervention of an apple corer or its surgical equivalent” (NL xlvi). “Deposition” also offers the contradictory defense that the narrative is Swiftian satire, the position John Ciardi would take in his 1965 testimony for the defense: “Certain passages in the book that have been called pornographic were written as a tract against Capital Punishment in the manner of Jonathan Swift’s Modest Proposal. These sections are intended to reveal capital punishment as the obscene, barbaric and disgusting anachronism that it is” (NL xliv). As if these defensive motions were not enough, the “Deposition” begins with the radical step of Burroughs denying all responsibility for the text and its title: “I have no precise memory of writing the notes which have now been published under the title Naked Lunch. The title was suggested by Jack Kerouac” (NL xxxvii); and ends with the implication that Naked Lunch is an anti-drug tract: “So listen to Old Uncle Bill Burroughs [….] Look down LOOK DOWN along that junk road before you travel there and get in with the Wrong Mob…. A word to the wise guy” (NL xlviii). Like the “Letter,” the “Deposition” is signed by its author but its slangy, elliptical style approaches that of Bill Lee, the voice of the narrative portion of the text. Once the “Deposition” was added to Naked Lunch it became enough part of the text to be as often cited in critical studies as the narrative itself. It is the introduction which articulates Burroughs’s (or is it Lee’s?) clearest indictment of capitalism. This discussion of “The Algebra of Need” (NL xxxviii-xl) provided the title for at least one book-length treatment of Burroughs’s work,16 occupied part of the Massachusetts Superior Court obscenity proceedings, and is remembered by casual readers who may not manage to read the difficult narrative portion in its entirety. From 1962 onward, with the exception of the Grove 25th Anniversary edition in 1984, Burroughs’s introduction and appendix, and the resulting conflation of narrative identities, remained part of Naked Lunch and subject to critical, judicial, and interpretive responses by its readers. The “I” who begins Naked Lunch, William S. Burroughs, ex-junkie not responsible for the text, mutates into Bill Lee, junkie-detective-huckster on the lam; mutates again to “I, William Seward,” pulling off the Bill Lee mask in the “Atrophied Preface”; and resolves itself as William Burroughs, Scientist–an avatar which actually predates any of the textually precedent selves.

     

    Despite these attempts to head off obscenity charges, Naked Lunch was banned in Boston upon publication, and bookseller Theodore Mavrikos arrested for the sale of an obscene book in 1963.17 Grove stepped in immediately, as did the ACLU, urging an in rem procedure to determine the book’s obscenity rather than a criminal procedure against the bookseller. Naked Lunch was brought to trial before the Massachusetts Superior Court in January 1965 and found obscene. Defense witnesses for Naked Lunch included writers Norman Mailer, John Ciardi, and Allen Ginsberg, and sociologist Paul Hollander. Perhaps because he had adopted all possible defense postures in the introduction and appendix, Burroughs himself did not appear at the trial, leaving it to become a fifth part of the novel, one composed entirely by collaborators, among whom would number two lawyers and a bemused judge.18 Ciardi’s and Hollander’s testimony focused on the subject of the novel’s journalistic integrity–previously canvassed in the Big Table trial–but drew largely on the newly added textual material. Mailer’s and, with one exception, Ginsberg’s testimony ignored the introduction and appendix, focusing on the artistic merits of the narrative portion of Naked Lunch. Stating that “it appears that a substantial and intelligent group in the community believes the book to be of some literary significance” and therefore not “prurient […] to the exclusion of all other values” the Massachusetts Supreme Court overturned the Superior Court’s verdict on July 7, 1966 (NL viii-ix). Grove issued the first paperback edition of Naked Lunch in October. The Grove Black Cat edition, which would be the most commonly available paper edition until the 1992 Grove Weidenfeld trade edition released in conjunction with Cronenberg’s film, included thirty pages entitled “Naked Lunch on Trial” (NL vii-xxxvi). This addition reprinted the full text of the majority decision of the Supreme Court as well as excerpts from the Superior Court testimony of Ginsberg and Mailer.

     

    Inclusion in the Black Cat edition of the Supreme Court decision may be considered at least partly a triumphant, allusive gesture on Grove’s part, reminiscent of Modern Library’s inclusion of Woolsey’s 1933 decision lifting the ban on Ulysses. Naked Lunch emerges from its obscenity trials part of a select group of works whose “prurience” is outweighed by their “literary significance” and “redeeming social importance” (NL viii). But the inclusion of testimony from the Superior Court action is another matter. None of the testimony excerpted in “Naked Lunch on Trial” provides compelling legal evidence for the Supreme Court’s overturning of the Superior Court decision. The court was clearly nonplussed by the novel and its witnesses. Throughout the excerpted testimony, the question of the novel’s obscenity is confused with the novel’s critique of the American political and justice systems (which the court takes to be one and the same) and the very real problem of making meaning out of Burroughs’s more heightened passages. During Ginsberg’s testimony, for example, a line of questioning directed at Burroughs’s intention to be obscene quickly turns instead to a discussion of the meaning of the phrase “newspaper spoon” (NL xxii).

     

    The Court then turns to the nature of political parties described in Naked Lunch, with the judge worrying that political parties in the future may be “concerned with sex.” In a series of questions the court asks Ginsberg “What political struggles are homosexuals involved in?”; “Do you think he is seriously suggesting that sometime in the future that a political party will be in some way concerned with sex?”; and “some time in the future will there be a political party, for instance, made up of homosexuals?” (NL xxviii-ix). Ginsberg’s answers are patient and mollifying, but not helpful. At the end of the exchange the court concludes “there may be homosexuals in every political party, but I don’t think they are predominant” (NL xxix). The excerpted portion of Ginsberg’s testimony ends with a reading of his poem “Reality Sandwiches,” which can hardly have clarified matters for the court.

     

    Mailer’s testimony is similarly unhelpful. Under questioning he admits that he has “read the book, not completely, but I have read the book completely twice” (NL x) and engages in the following negotiation:

     

    MAILER: …I have written a little bit about that [Naked Lunch‘s form] to bring in–Should I read that, if you wish?

    Q: You have some notes I think?

    THE COURT: You have some notes?

    MAILER: I have some notes.

    THE COURT: You may.

    MAILER: Well, in these notes, I said–

    THE COURT: Incidentally, when did you draw up these notes? (NL xvi)After these disjointed preliminaries, Mailer, reading from the notes, launches into a comparison of Burroughs’s work with the paintings of Hieronymus Bosch.

     

    Of the literary witnesses, only Mailer’s and Ginsberg’s testimonies are included in “Naked Lunch on Trial.” A reading of Ciardi’s testimony from the court records suggests why he was omitted. Ciardi’s testimony, like Hollander’s, restricted itself to more conventional questions of the novel’s literary and social value. Excluding this testimony, which focuses almost solely on the novel as a journalistic recounting of the addict’s experience and its value as such a document, has the effect of negating Burroughs’s introduction, which follows it, and the appendix, which imply that Naked Lunch is journalistic or scientific. The excerpts which make up “Naked Lunch on Trial” seem rather to have been selected for their comic similarity to passages in the narrative portion of Naked Lunch and edited with an eye toward retaining every hesitation, interruption, and confused utterance of the court. The typography of “Naked Lunch on Trial” replicates that of dramatic dialogues in the routines “Islam Incorporated and the Parties of Interzone” and “Ordinary Men and Women” that also concern themselves with party demographics, the American judicial system, and interrogation. The reader of the Black Cat edition of Naked Lunch, then, who begins at the beginning and continues to the end of the text encounters a series of self-canceling, self-replicating routines–a hyper- or meta-reality sandwich–which foregrounds intertextuality as not just a condition of texts but as a semi-independent creator of texts.

     

    The interpretive questions raised by the testimony, especially Ginsberg’s, place in relief those routines of the narrative which explicitly comment on the nature of American legal and bureaucratic systems, in particular, the routines “Hauser and O’Brien,” “The Examination,” and “The County Clerk”–none of which appeared in “Ten Episodes from Naked Lunch“–and sections of “Benway” and “Islam Incorporated and the Parties of Interzone” added after the Big Table publication. Where Burroughs’s introduction and appendix limited the novel’s “social relevance” to its critique of drug addiction (and, by implication, capitalism), the selective transcript in “Naked Lunch on Trial” effectively expands its range of reference to all forms of addiction (sex, drugs, power, language, order) and implicates the most fundamental institutions of American culture in those addictions. The curious effect of the mutation engendered by the Superior Court action, then, was to rewrite Naked Lunch as a more pointed piece of political satire than it originally was.

     

    Almost one-fourth of the matter included in the Black Cat edition was produced in response to external pressures on a completed narrative whose production has been documented by Burroughs and others as itself partly accidental. Only half of this new matter was written by Burroughs, and that includes a direct statement of non-responsibility for the major, narrative portion of text. The remaining half, actual testimony from the obscenity trial, both imitates significant portions of the narrative, in form, content, and typography, and foregrounds portions of the narrative which would lead a reader to an interpretation of the narrative at variance with that offered by its putative author. The reader, moving in a (spatially) linear fashion through the text, from Supreme Court decision to appendix, is not only confronted immediately and prior to the narrative with an example of Burroughs’s themes in action but is also supplied with a quantity of contradictory interpretive matter which effectively and successively rewrites the narrative that follows. Even a chronologically, rather than spatially, linear reading of the elements of the Black Cat edition results in similar, though more programmatic, textual self-subversion. In either case, the seemingly forthright (and, from the perspective of the 1990s, quaint) binary structures written into the 1950s narrative–hip/square, outlawry/authority, investigation/addiction, etc.–unfold and overlap themselves into less certain, more recursive, more postmodern structures. Given, too, that the non-narrative material takes the form of traditional literary or scholarly apparatus which Naked Lunch incorporates into its very substance (as the narrative with its “scholarly” footnotes anticipates), one might argue that Naked Lunch implicates present and future notions of textuality and authorship in its catalogue of addictions, and academic culture in its satire of authoritarian institutions. Even the textual scholar’s desire for a stable artifact identifiable as Naked Lunch is implicated.

     

    While the 1992 Grove Weidenfeld Naked Lunch unfortunately (to my mind) omits “Naked Lunch on Trial,” it does include yet another new text. Burroughs’s “Afterthoughts on a Deposition” appears directly following his introductory “Deposition” and directly contradicts it. In “Afterthoughts” Burroughs claims that Naked Lunch is not (or is no longer) about addiction/drug abuse but rather about the current U.S. War on Drugs:

     

    When I say 'the junk virus is public health problem number one in the world today,' I refer not just to the actual ill effects of opiates upon the individual's health (which, in cases of controlled dosage may be minimal) but also to the hysteria that drug use often occasions in populaces who are prepared by the media and narcotics officials for a hysterical reaction. The junk problem, in its present form, began with the Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914 in the United States. Anti-drug hysteria is now worldwide, and it poses a deadly threat to personal freedoms and due-process protections of the law everywhere. (Grove 1992 xviii)

     

    The war on drugs, according to the new Naked Lunch, exists so that the government can extend its repression of individuals to convincing them that their ideas of freedom are dangerous to themselves and society. The logic of this passage reiterates the satire of the narrative routine “The Examination,” particularly, but also hearkens the reader to those routines previously highlighted by “Naked Lunchon Trial,” which appear now, given Burroughs’s “Afterthoughts,” to have always specifically addressed repressive governmental institutions.

     

    In the preceding pages I have limited myself to the problem of the textual boundaries of Naked Lunch, which extend beyond the limits of the narrative. Other editorial problems, such as determining the best text when there are multiple fragmentary versions available, are implied in Table 2, but would extend to comparison of all elements of Naked Lunch with prior published versions and correspondence from the Tangier period. But what then? Both Burroughs and his publishers have frequently been cavalier with the texts. Grove’s 1980 release Three Novels: The Soft Machine, Nova Express, The Wild Boys, for example, omits an entire page from The Soft Machine at the end of the routine “I Sekuin,” despite having been printed from the same plates as the 1966 edition of The Soft Machine. Though the resulting routine ends abruptly even for a cut-up, nobody seems to have noticed. To attempt to stabilize the text of Naked Lunch by regularizing its typography and stylistics, removing “errors,” and relegating to a textual apparatus material deemed to be variant or external to the text proper would be a grave editorial sin. To do so would not only violate the spirit of the text and, insofar as one can guess them from Burroughs’s own statements about authors and authority in Naked Lunch and elsewhere, “the author’s original (or final) intentions” (McGann 15, 33-5), it would also have far-reaching implications in terms of how readers read, approach, and comprehend this and other literary works. Naked Lunch‘s enduring appeal arises in large part from its instability, its openness to multiple and alternative readings, and its protean ability to seem always to be addressing the addictions and oppressions of today. Despite its having a history as a text, it is not simply an historical artifact. In fact, its history has helped write it. These qualities would be lost in an edition consisting of a slimmed down narrative trailing a bulky, probably forbidding, apparatus. Popular readers, choosing the 1992 Grove Weidenfeld trade edition off the bookstore shelves, lose “Naked Lunch on Trial,” which is so central to the text’s historical self and, as I’ve argued, offers a gloss on part of the narrative. It also bears witness that the courts are often part of the “social nexus” of textual production, wherein textual authority “takes place within the conventions and enabling limits that are accepted by the prevailing institutions of literary production” (McGann 48), a view of authority the narrative portion of the novel seems to second.

     

    With Burroughs’s death in 1997, it does not seem likely that Naked Lunch will undergo any further substantial additions. However, the pattern since 1984 has been one of the publisher inconsistently deleting whole sections of non-narrative text. Clearly some effort to stabilize the whole text would ensure reliability. Shillingsburg has argued forcefully that “a work of art… is made more accessible in each of its versions by having alternative versions presented in conjunction with it” (35). That has already been the case during the forty-year history of Naked Lunch, and a reliable edition would capture, in particular, that quality of “spill[ing] off the page in all directions.” Given its author’s career-long interest in applying state-of-the-art technology to his writing, a “fully open, scriptible, postmodernist edition” of Naked Lunch would necessarily be a hypertext edition. Such an edition would initially allow the reader to move among the five existing textual elements, the Big Table and other individually published fragments, and, perhaps, the pen and ink calligraphic drawings Burroughs submitted to Grove to illustrate the U.S. edition (among other things) “in any order […] back and forth, in and out fore and aft.” But the temptation to limit that edition to the materials I have outlined here, for example in CD-ROM format, should be resisted for two reasons. First, even the most cursory reading of other Burroughs texts–most notably the Nova trilogy (1964-1967) and The Yage Letters (1963)–shows Burroughs consistently reworking material from the narrative portion of Naked Lunch. Lynch’s film begs its audience to consider Exterminator! (1973) and Burroughs’s biography as the narrative context for Naked Lunch‘s largely unrelated routines. Audio recordings of Burroughs and others reading portions of Naked Lunch and Lunch-related materials abound and are largely uncatalogued; these readings may well represent other variants. Burroughs’s oeuvre has not yet received the level of consistent textual, as opposed to interpretive, scrutiny to account completely for his rather casual approach to recycled text. Second, as the above history suggests, the text of Naked Lunch evolved in direct response to various of its readers’ and transcribers’ over-writings. Reader response is central to its being as a work of art. A truly reliable edition of the work would have to permit ongoing revision by readers, even at the risk of overwhelming the archival texts, i.e. by courting unreliability. The postmodern editor’s monumental task is to enable the “innaresting” arrangement promised by Burroughs in 1959 and fulfilled by the text for forty years. Only a fully interactive, continually augmented, electronic edition can realize this task.

     

    Notes

     

    1. Unless otherwise noted, all citations to Naked Lunch refer to the 1966 First Black Cat edition. When both Naked Lunch and Big Table are cited, wording, punctuation and spelling follow the Black Cat version. I retain Burroughs’s use of italics throughout. Unbracketed ellipses appear in the text. Bracketed ellipses mark my deletion of material from quoted matter.

     

    2. According to Maurice Girodias, the manuscript was seized by the French government in the 1960s. The whereabouts of the William S. Burroughs Archive, which might have included manuscript material for Naked Lunch, are not known. Goodman and Coley report that the archive, formerly housed in Lichtenstein, was sold to a private collector and possibly broken up for resale sometime during the late 1970s. See Goodman and Coley 189, 211.

     

    3. For Burroughs’s theory of the cut-up see Burroughs and Gysin, The Third Mind (1978). Cut-up is produced by literally cutting passages of typed script into vertical strips, then rearranging these strips with other cut-ups or inserting individual strips into uncut passages. The fold-in consists of folding a page at random, inserting the visible portion into a second page and transcribing the result as a third page of text. In both cases the resulting passage(s) receive a minimal editing for contingent sense: dismembered bits of words are joined and reconstituted as homophones, and punctuation is distributed around what can be recognized as phrases.

     

    4. “Routine” is Burroughs’s term for the individual sections of the narrative portion of Naked Lunch. The term implies their comedic and sketchy character and suggests their provenance as part of an elaborate con game played on the “Rubes,” “flatfoots,” and “advertising Fruits.”

     

    5. The words are “see Appendix” (NL 30), referring readers of the narrative to elements added for the Grove 1962 edition.

     

    6. Oddly, this edition retains the words “see Appendix,” even though the appendix has been omitted.

     

    7. Dating roughly from the death of Joan Burroughs until Burroughs’s first apomorphine cure.

     

    8. See “from Naked Lunch,Chicago Review 12 (Spring 1958): 23-30; “from Naked Lunch,” Black Mountain Review 7 (Autumn 1957): 144-48; and “from Naked Lunch,” Chicago Review 12 (Autumn 1958): 3-12.

     

    9. And recounted in the standard biographies. See, for example, William S. Burroughs, “My Purpose Is to Write for the Space Age,” New York Times Book Review (19 February 1984): 9-10, and Morgan 313.

     

    10. This contributes to breaking down the textual barrier which conventionally determines our idea of text: contemplation of the jacket becomes part of the reading experience. Burroughs will later incorporate calligraphy into the text of The Ticket that Exploded.

     

    11. The table of contents gives the title as “Deposition: A Testimony Concerning a Sickness” (my italics), while the introduction itself leaves out the first indefinite article.

     

    12. Evergreen Review 4 (January-February 1960): 15-23. Evergreen Review was a bimonthly literary and arts publication of Grove Press.

     

    13. The British Journal of Addiction 53.2 (1956): 119-131.

     

    14. See Joe Maynard and Barry Miles, William S. Burroughs: A Bibliography, 1953-73 (Charlottesville: UP of Virginia, 1978): 113.

     

    15. This conflation of identities merely continues that begun with Burroughs’ earlier, more naturalistic “journalistic” account of drug addiction, Junky (1953), authored by “William Lee.”

     

    16. Eric Mottram’s William Burroughs: The Algebra of Need (Buffalo: Intrepid Pr., 1971).

     

    17. Details which follow are drawn from Michael Barry Goodman’s account of the trial in Contemporary Literary Censorship: The Case History of Burroughs’ Naked Lunch (Metuchen: Scarecrow, 1981).

     

    18. A portion of a letter from Burroughs to defense lawyer Edward de Grazia was read into the record and is included in “Naked Lunch on Trial.” It addressed the relationship between literature and scientific investigation.

     


     

    Table 1
    Naked Lunch Variations
    Olympia
    1959
    Grove
    1962
    Grove Black Cat[a]
    1966
    Grove 25th[b]
    1984
    Grove Weidenfeld
    1992
    _____ _____ Naked Lunch on Trial _____ _____[c]
    _____ Introduction/
    Deposition
    Introduction/
    Deposition
    _____ Introduction/
    Deposition
    _____ _____ _____ _____ Afterthoughts
    Narrative Narrative Narrative Narrative Narrative
    _____ Appendix Appendix _____ Appendix

     

     


     

    Table 2
    Revision from Big Table to Naked Lunch
    “Ten Episodes from Naked Lunch“[d] Naked Lunch (pagination identical for all Grove editions 1963-84)
    Episode 1 (79-81) “Atrophied Preface” (229, 230-31)–13+ pages additional material
    Episode 2 (81-86) <“I can feel the heat closing in…. “> [1-8]–minimal revision.[e] This section also includes Episode 5 plus 1 1/2 pages additional material
    Episode 3 (86-89) “Hospital” (64-68)–two paragraphs switched; 8 1/2 pages additional material, including 6 pages from Episode 4 (largely dramatic dialogue between Benway, nurse, Limpf, diplomat, and tenor)
    (89-90) “Lazarus Go Home” (73)– 4+ pages additional material
    Episode 4 (90-95) “Hospital” (56-61)–minimal revision
    Episode 5 (95-104)[f] <“I can feel the heat closing in…. “> (9-20)–minimal/no revision
    Episode 6 (105-111) “Islam Incorporated…. ” (144-148, 152-53, 158-59)–additional material on 147, 148-52 including Sample Menu); Two paragraphs from Big Table are deleted, the only deletion which occurred. This section also includes Episode 8 and 14+ pages additional material
    Episode 7 (111-129) “Benway” (21-45) entire; minimal/no revision[g]
    Episode 8 (129-131) “Islam Incorporated…. ” (164-67)–no revision.[h]
    Episode 9 (132) Dust jacket calligraphy for Olympia Press edition?
    Episode 10 (133-137) “Joselito” (45-50)–entire, minimal/no revision

     

     


    Table 3
    Re-Ordering of Episodes from Big Table in Naked Lunch
    Naked Lunch Routines, in Order of Appearance Episode from Big Table
    <“I can feel the heat closing in…. “> 2 (81-86); 5 (95-104)
    “Benway” 7 (111-129)
    “Joselito” 10 (133-137)
    “The Black Meat” _____
    “Hospital” 3 (partial) (86-89); 4 (90-94)
    “Lazarus Go Home” 3 (partial) (89-90)
    “Hassan’s Rumpus Room” _____
    “Campus of Interzone University” _____
    “AJ’s Annual Party” _____
    “Meeting of International Conference of Technological Psychiatry” _____
    “The Market” _____
    “Ordinary Men and Women” _____
    “Islam Incorporated and the Parties of Interzone” 6 (105-111); 8 (129-131)
    “The County Clerk” _____
    “Interzone” _____
    “The Examination” _____
    “Have You Seen Pantopon Rose?” _____
    “Coke Bugs” _____
    “The Exterminator Does a Good Job” _____
    “The Algebra of Need” _____
    “Hauser and O’Brien” _____
    “Atrophied Preface: Wouldn’t You?” 1 (79-81)
    “Quick” _____
    Jacket? (Olympia Press only) 9

     

    Notes to Tables

     

    a. The narrative portions of Grove 1962, Grove Black Cat, and Grove 25th appear to have been printed off the same plates and bear identical pagination; likewise, the appendices of Grove 1962 and Grove Black Cat. Since Grove Black Cat contains the most additional text, all citations are to that edition, unless otherwise noted.

     

    b. The 25th Anniversary edition was a limited edition reproduction of the 1959 Olympia Press edition with an introduction by Jennie Skerl.

     

    c. Subsequent printings of this trade edition have restored “Naked Lunch on Trial.”

     

    d. Big Table 1 (Spring 1959): 79-137.

     

    e. Revision limited to corrected spelling, individual words changed, altered punctuation.

     

    f. Reprinted from Evergreen Review Autumn 1958.

     

    g. Despite omitting the Appendix, the 25th Anniversary edition retains Bill Lee’s recommendation that we “See Appendix” (30).

     

    h. This forms part of a larger discussion of the political parties of the Interzone, which was of so much interest during the obscenity trial (162-9). Additional material includes a statement of Burroughs’s viral theory of language in nascent form (163-4).

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Burroughs, William S. Naked Lunch. NY: Grove, 1966.
    • —. Naked Lunch. NY: Grove Weidenfeld, 1992.
    • —. “Ten Episodes from Naked Lunch. Big Table 1 (Spring 1959): 79-137.
    • — and Brion Gysin. The Third Mind. NY: Viking, 1978.
    • Connor, Steven. Postmodernist Culture: An Introduction to Theories of the Contemporary. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Blackwell, 1997.
    • Goodman, Michael Barry. Contemporary Literary Censorship: The Case History of Burroughs’ Naked Lunch. Metuchen: Scarecrow, 1981.
    • — with Lemuel B. Coley. William S. Burroughs: A Reference Guide. NY: Garland, 1990.
    • Greetham, D. C. “Editorial and Critical Theory: From Modernism to Postmodernism.” Palimpsest: Editorial Theory in the Humanities. Ed. George Bornstein and Ralph G. Williams. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1993: 9- 28.
    • McGann, Jerome. A Critique of Modern Textual Criticism. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1983.
    • Morgan, Ted. Literary Outlaw: The Life and Times of William S. Burroughs. NY: Holt, 1988.
    • Shillingsburg, Peter L. “Polymorphic, Polysemic, Protean, Reliable, Electronic Texts.” Palimpsest: Editorial Theory in the Humanities. Ed. George Bornstein and Ralph G. Williams. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1993: 29- 43.

     

  • Editors’ Announcements

     

     

    New Co-Editor

    With this issue, PMC welcomes Jim English, who joins Lisa Brawley as co-editor of the journal. This welcome is more properly a welcome back, as Jim served as review editor from the journal’s founding to 1996. Paula Geyh, who succeeded Jim in that role, will continue to oversee the review section. Assisting us will be Lisa Spiro, who has replaced Anne Sussman as managing editor. Deepest thanks to Anne for her years of service to the journal, and to Stuart Moulthrop, who concluded his tenure as co-editor in May.

    PMC Essay Prize Winners

    We are pleased to announce the winners of the PMC essay prize for Volume 9. This prize is a five hundred dollar award given to the author of the most outstanding essay to appear in the journal in the previous volume year. Winners are selected by the PMC editorial board. The prize for Volume 9 is shared by Terry Harpold, for “Dark Continents: A Critique of Internet Metageographies” (9.2, January 1999), and Jed Rasula, for “Textual Indigence in the Archive” (9.3, May 1999). Congratulations to them both.