Category: Volume 12 – Number 3 – May 2002

  • Notices

     

     

     

    Volume 12, Number 3
    May, 2002
    Every issue of Postmodern Culturecarries notices of events, calls for papers, and other announcements, free of charge. Advertisements will also be published on an exchange basis. If you respond to one of the ads or announcements below, please mention that you saw the notice in PMC.

     


    Publication Announcements

    • Topia
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    • Year Zero One
    • Organdi Quarterly
    • Beyond Webcams: An Introduction to Online Robots

    Conferences, Calls for Papers, Invitations to Submit

    • University of South Carolina’s 5th Annual Comparative Literature Conference: The Desire of the Analysts
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    General Announcements

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  • Gursky’s Sublime

    Caroline Levine

    Department of English
    Rutgers University-Camden
    levinec@camden.rutgers.edu

     

    Review of: Andreas Gursky. The Museum of Modern Art, New York. 4 March – 15 May 2001. Exhibition Website

     

    Peter Galassi. Andreas Gursky. New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 2001.

     

    The modernist avant-garde made a gesture of rejecting popular entertainment and the commodification of culture. To be sure, avant-garde artists often employed the best techniques of advertising and marketing, but they did so on the sly, careful always to boast of their isolation and disinterestedness. With Andy Warhol came something new, a suggestion that there was nothing outside of commodification, that we were always already enmeshed in the repetitions of exchange. One definition of postmodernism makes this the central, the characteristic move of our time: don’t try to escape commodity fetishism, we hear, because there’s no way out, no elsewhere, no other.

     

    Jeff Koons gives us this version of postmodernism par excellence. Sneaker advertisements and basketballs, porn stars and kitsch toys, vacuum cleaners and stuffed puppies: Koons appropriates the most mass-produced objects and shines them up, making them glow with appealing prettiness at the same time that their banality appalls. Koons, astute about the marketplace, is a self-proclaimed artist of desire: he plays on the fact that his audience wants these objects, coveting the luminous glossiness of mass-marketed commodities. Shamed though we may feel, Koons seduces us into a longing for those things which appear to transcend their ordinariness, but not by any magic other than commodification itself–the bright, unmistakable sheen of the newly packaged purchase.

     

    At first glance, the photographer Andreas Gursky might seem to fall into the same category as Jeff Koons, a critic-cum-devotee of the global seductions of marketing. His huge glossy photographs offer up rows of athletic shoes, a landscape of Toyota and Toys ‘R’ Us logos, digitally doctored images of hotels and corporate offices in Hong Kong, New York, and Atlanta, floors full of stock traders, and, perhaps best of all, the endless riches of a 99¢ store, where stacks of brightly colored commodities are so radiant that they cast a gorgeous pastel glow on the store ceiling.

     

    But taken together, the photographs that are collected in Gursky’s mid-career retrospective at the Museum of Modern Art in New York hint at something else, something other than the commonplace workings of desire.

     

    It’s not easy to articulate what that something is. Peter Galassi’s richly illustrated catalogue works to do justice to the monumentality of Gursky’s oeuvre, and its large scale does succeed in evoking some sense of the work’s grandeur. Galassi, in a wide-ranging and scholarly introduction, strives to account for Gursky’s striking aesthetic by tracing major influences: his father the commercial photographer, his disciplined training under Bernd and Hilla Becher at the Kunstakademie in Düsseldorf, his references to Minimalist painting, his turn to color, to big print, and to digital techniques. Galassi also labors to differentiate Gursky from his contemporaries, arguing, for example, that although Gursky’s work can seem reminiscent of American photography, his “adherence to a ruling pictorial scheme” distinguishes him from the Americans and marks a crucial debt to the Bechers (Galassi 24). All of these contexts and conclusions are convincing, but somehow the mystery of Gursky’s work–its ability to “knock your socks off,” as Galassi puts it (9)–remains unaccounted for, elusive.

     

    Take “99 Cent” (1999), for example. Here the title and the date begin by pushing us to the brink. We are just under, just short, imminent, incomplete. And yet the image itself is one of repletion, even of excess, as candy bars and bottles of juice, shampoo, and detergent line up in row after row of color, and the products appear to go on forever. Indeed, what Gursky offers us is a tempo of fullness and insufficiency, as blocks of color are punctuated by horizontal white stripes, and the store as a whole is held up by six slender white vertical columns, rhythmically spaced. The ceiling itself repeats the inside of the store, the bright colors reflected into pale versions of themselves, echoing the floor, symmetrically placed in their own ghostly rows. The few shoppers who dot the storescape seem like prowlers hiding in the shelter of the shelves, their heads barely rising above the patterns of packaging. The remarkable effect is that the arrangement of the whole takes over, as the play of whites and colors overwhelms both the single commodity and the lone consumer. The objects are not there to be bought and sold, clutched and consumed, eaten and used. They are there to add their small notes to the vast pulsing rhythm of the spectacle.

     

    Awed, visitors to the show step back.

     

    With Gursky, the grip of consumerist desire is gone. Gone is the impulse to grasp and to own, to finger and to taste. He invites distance–the detachment of wonder.

     

    But how? How do these marvelous, luminous photographs engender a feeling of awed distance? How do they frustrate the attraction of commodification? The answer, I want to suggest, lies in their remarkable formal control–something Gursky took from his training in Düsseldorf. But even more specifically, their wonder emerges from the one formal pattern that recurs in almost all of Andreas Gursky’s work: parallel lines.

     

    Sometimes Gursky’s parallel lines come from familiar scenes of contemporary life, like store shelves and divided highways. Sometimes they are uncanny, as in “Engadine” (1995), where a trail of tiny skiers runs parallel to a vast mountain range, each echoing the other as they stretch from one frame of the photo to the other. Sometimes the lines are constructed and intentional, as in “EM, Arena, Amsterdam I” (2000), which offers up a painted soccer field, or “Untitled XII” (1999), which gives us a vastly magnified image of a leaf from a printed book, where the lines of words trace perfect parallels across the page. But at other times Gursky’s parallels seem eerily found or given, as in “Rhein II” (1999), which shows us a slice of the river running in a single straight path and flanked by green lawns in such perfectly straight lines that nature itself defies belief. Or the brilliant “Salerno” (1990), where a view of a harbor becomes mysteriously ordered and arranged in juxtaposed planes: first rows of colored cars, then rows of packing crates, then rows of houses, and finally rows of mountains and the sky. Nature and industry, sports and government, sneakers and mountain ranges, mundane and transcendent–all resolve into the twinned tracks of the parallel in Gursky’s glossy universe.

     

    For mathematicians, the parallel is defined by lines extending to infinity without intersecting. Gursky invites us to imagine that his lines not only go on forever, but that they are everywhere, underlying not only the disciplined orderings of culture but the unconscious life of nature. His parallels suggest a forever beyond the photograph, a forever of lines extending beyond the frames of each image and, more frighteningly, entirely beyond reason, representation, and calculation. Despite the formal harmonies of these photographs, then, Gursky’s infinitely extending lines evoke the sublime. Thus with their beauty comes a kind of terror.

     

    Of course, postmodernity has encountered and embraced the sublime before, as theorized in what are now its most classic articulations. Jean-François Lyotard famously pits the postmodern sublime against the eclecticism of “anything goes.” A genuine postmodernism, refusing to value art according to its profits, launches an enthusiastic defiance of conventional forms and expectations, the desire to “put forward… the unpresentable in presentation itself” (Lyotard 81). If for Lyotard this sublime can happen in Montaigne as well as in Mille Plateaux, Fredric Jameson argues for a sublime particular to the emergence of the vast, decentered complexity of multinational capitalism. Jameson’s sublime, like Lyotard’s, reveals the limits of figuration, but it results specifically from the attempt to grasp the “impossible totality of the contemporary world system” (38).

     

    While Lyotard’s sublime is evoked by unprofitable novelty and Jameson’s sublime emerges from the endless surfaces of a world overtaken by commodification, Gursky’s parallels seem to offer something older, something more metaphysical. In their extension from frame to frame the lines imply a constant, a depth beneath the surface, an underlying pattern or structure. As if Gursky was a faithful reader of Kant, his work appears to present something like an enactment of the Critique of Judgment: his lines offer a formal harmony and also, in their infinite extension, they rupture that harmony; they frame the world and they also break that frame. Thus unlike Jameson’s bewildering postmodern architecture, which dislocates and disorients, Gursky’s photographs embrace an order that is disordered only by the fact that the same forms eerily spread from one photograph to the next. In his allegiance to a venerable formalism, Gursky also seems to invoke an older philosophical paradigm. Indeed, his loving references to Romantic painters reinforce the notion of a sublime that belongs to the late eighteenth century. We see echoes of Caspar David Friedrich in “Seilbahn, Dolomiten” (1987), and we find J. M. W. Turner’s mysterious and illegible landscapes neatly framed by parallel lines in “Turner Collection” (1995).1

     

    If it is possible to see Gursky as the representative of a tradition that is now centuries old, it is worth remembering that both Lyotard and Jameson also locate their definitions of the sublime in Kant. And we can begin to bring Gursky together with these two theorists of postmodernism by recognizing that all three offer us the Kantian sublime in relation to global capitalism. For Lyotard, the sublime is that which unsettles the easy flow of the market by presenting something so unexpected that it does not lend itself to being bought and sold. For Jameson, the sublime is that which exposes our inability to grasp a world entirely overtaken by the endless surfaces of commodification. And for Gursky, the sublime transforms the banality of commodities into the grandeur of the infinite. For all three, the sublime is that which blocks desire and replaces the covetousness of a rampant materialism with a confounding awe.

     

    Notes

     

    Access to other on-line exhibitions of Andreas Gursky’s work may be gained via artcyclopedia. com.

     

    1. Galassi writes that “Turner Collection” is disappointing, “because the trick of reducing masterpieces of painting to generic objects of reverence has become all too familiar” (35). But surely Gursky’s photograph deserves a richer reading than that: by framing Turner’s wild romanticism inside the neatness of parallel lines–not only the frames of Turner’s own work, but the pristine wood floors and moldings that echo the lines of the frames–Gursky contains one kind of sublime inside another. Turner’s sublime of an overwhelming nature is bordered and enclosed by Gursky’s infinitely extending lines, what Kant called the mathematical sublime.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Jameson, Fredric. Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Durham: Duke UP, 1991.
    • Lyotard, Jean-François. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1984.

     

  • Computable Culture and the Closure of the Media Paradigm

    William B. Warner

    Digital Cultures Project
    Department of English
    University of California, Santa Barbara
    warner@english.ucsb.edu

     

    Review of: Lev Manovich, The Language of New Media.Cambridge, MA: MIT P, 2000.

     

    Most scholars of modern media now agree that the shift of symbolic representation to a global digital information network is as systemic and pervasive a mutation, and as fraught with consequences for culture, as the shift from manuscript to print. Anyone who wants to think clearly about the cultural implications of the digital mutation should read Lev Manovich’s new book, The Language of New Media. This book offers the most rigorous definition to date of new digital media; it places its object of attention within the most suggestive and broad-ranging media history since Marshall McLuhan’s; finally, by showing how software takes us beyond the constraints of any particular media substrate–paper, screen, tape, film, etc.–this book overcomes the media framework indexed by its own title. The Language of New Media leads its reader to confront what is strange yet familiar, that is, uncanny, about the computable culture we have begun to inhabit.

     

    Before characterizing Manovich in greater detail, it is helpful to say what this book is not. Pragmatically focused upon the present contours of computable media, Lev Manovich is neither a prophet nor a doomsayer, peddling neither a utopian manifesto nor dystopian warnings. Manovich also eschews the conceptual purity of those cultural critics who set out to show how new digital media realize the program of Gilles Deleuze, Jean Baudrillard, Jacques Derrida (insert your favorite theorist). Like many raised in the former Soviet Union, Manovich seems inoculated against any explicit aesthetic, conceptual, or political ideology. Instead, Manovich practices a catholicity founded in negative capability: if an art practice or popular media culture has flourished, it is part of the picture, and the critic and historian of media must find a way to account for it. This helps to explain the remarkable scope of Manovich’s book as it ranges easily from analysis of the software/hardware/network infrastructure that supports new media practice to the synthetic efforts to explain what new media is; from contemporary artistic practice to aesthetic theory; from popular media culture to advanced media theory; in short, from the Frankfurt School and Dziga Vertov to the GUI (Graphical User Interface) and Doom.

     

    Defining New Media

     

    What makes new digital media different from old media? Many early answers–discrete versus continuous information, digital versus analog media–founder upon closer inspection. A host of scholars and critics have approached this question from various vantage points: the history of technical culture (Jay David Bolter), hypertext (George Landow), narrative (Janet Murray), architecture (William J. Mitchell), virtual reality (Michael Heim), theatre (Brenda Laurel), and so on.1 From these books there has emerged a series of general traits ascribed to new media. Here are a few: new computer-based media are described as procedural, participatory, and spatial (Murray); discrete, conventional, finite, and isolated (Bolter); liquid (Mitchell); productive of virtuality (N. Katherine Hayles, Heim) or of cyberspace (William Gibson). While these traits and terms have cogency within particular analyses, the attempt to generalize their use brings diminishing returns. Thus Manovich argues that a favorite term to characterize new media–“interactive”–is simply too broad and vague to be critically useful. It not only fails to account for the variety and specificity of new media, the term also tendentiously implies that old media are fundamentally non-interactive. For example, isn’t it part of the critical point of various kinds of modernism to make its audience “interact” with the art object (56)?

     

    Trying to isolate the essential traits of new media repeatedly courts two complementary problems: one may overplay the novelty and difference of new media by ascribing to it traits in fact found in old media (so, for example, random access to packets of data is as old as the codex); or, by restricting attention to the aesthetic or phenomenological effects of new media products, for example by comparing “e-literature” and print literature as formal artifacts (cf. J. Hillis Miller on “the Digital Blake”), one may fail to come to terms with the difference made by what lies at the heart of new media–a computer running software. The sheer familiarity of the personal computer may have encouraged cultural critics to treat the cultural products of the computer (word processing documents, cinema with digital special effects, hypertext) as nothing more than old media enhanced by the flexibility and transportability of digital code and a global network. Thus, in Cybertext, Espen Aarseth has shown how literary theorists who interpret new media genres like hypertext or computer games have reduced them to conceptual terms–like labyrinth, game, and world–that annul the difference for textuality of a computer operating in the background and doing calculations (8, 75). Manovich’s first response to this dilemma is to develop a list of the five intrinsic principles of new media, a cluster of terms that specify the techniques and operations of a computer running software and suggest how an old media sphere is being “transcoded.”

     

    Here is a rather bald restatement of Manovich’s five intrinsic principles of new media. First, through numerical representation, a new object can be described formally (mathematically) and subject to algorithmic manipulation: “in short, media becomes programmable” (27). Second, new media objects have modularity at the level of representation and at the level of code. Thus, new media objects such as a digital film or a web page are composed from an assemblage of elements–images, sounds, shapes, or behaviors–that sustain their separate identity and can be operated upon separately, without rendering the rest of the assemblage unusable. In an analogous fashion, modular programming speeds the development and maintenance of large-scale software (31). Third, numerical coding and modularity “allow for the automation of many operations involved in media creation, manipulation, and access” (32). From the earliest use of computers to target weapons at high speed, to web pages generated on the fly, to intelligent agents that sift and retrieve information, automation achieves speed that is the fulcrum of computer “power.” Fourth, while old media depended upon an original construction of an object that could then be exactly reproduced (for example, as a printed book or photograph), new media are characterized by variability. Thus, browsers and word processors allow users defined parameters; databases allow selective search-sensitive views; web pages can be customized to the user. The variability of new media allows for branching-type interactivity, periodic updates, and scalability as to size or detail (37-38). Finally, new media find themselves at the center of the “transcoding” between the layers of the computer and the layers of culture (46). In new-media lingo, to “transcode something is to translate it into another format” (47). Manovich makes the strong claim that the “computerization of culture gradually accomplishes similar transcoding in relation to all cultural categories and subjects” (47). By using the term “transcoding,” Manovich acknowledges the distance between computer and culture, even as that distance is often dissimulated. Thus, as Manovich explains, the “cultural layers” of a new media object (like Microsoft’s Encarta) might be as familiar as an encyclopedia, but its “computer layers” are process and packet, sorting and matching, function and variable (46).

     

    These admittedly cumbersome five principles don’t seek to specify the computer/software in itself, nor do they characterize the specific media forms it makes possible (like hypertext, computer games, jpegs, web pages, etc). Instead, these five principles characterize that zone between and across which the transport between computer and culture is happening. These five principles offer a commonsense way to specify the capacities and tendencies of that new “universal media machine,” the computer running software: computers use numerical representation and modularity so as to automate functions and offer variability within the media objects that are produced and sustained by them (69). These four tendencies of computer-based media help to win its broader cultural effect, a “transcoding” between computer and culture, so we begin to inhabit the new forms of a computable culture. These general tendencies of a computer running software are what Manovich explores in the rest of the book, a trajectory of analysis that implicitly offers a second answer to the question “what is new media?” While several influential books have sought to embed the computer in the history of media (Bolter and Grusin’s Remediation, Borgmann’s Holding on to Reality, and Levinson’s The Soft Edge), Manovich insists that if one is to take account of the full scope of the new media, one must take account of their different “levels.” He begins at the most basic level with the “operating system” and the human-computer interface, taking account of the inheritance from print and cinema, the salience of the screen, and the body of the user (chapter 2). Moving up to the level of the software applications, Manovich offers broad cultural interpretations of operations like “selection,” “compositing,” and “teleaction” (chapter 3). At the level of user experience, Manovich turns to the “illusions” created by computer-based image making: “synthetic realism” or virtual reality (chapter 4). At the level of new computable media genres, Manovich reads the “database” and “navigable space” as rivals and alternatives to the previously hegemonic cultural form, “narrative” (chapter 5). And finally, Manovich traces the dislocations worked by new media upon what he calls the dominant medium of the 20th century, cinema (chapter 6).

     

    Manovich’s multi-layered topology of new media does not really claim conceptual comprehensiveness: surely new “layers” could be discerned between his layers. Nor does he attempt completeness at the level of media types; hypertext, which plays a large part of the critical survey of new media told by Landow and Aarseth and others writing out of literary studies, plays a rather small role in this book. Manovich’s book of new media draws its methodological rigor from Russian formalism and from the technique of doing a topology. However, that does not mean we have to accept the empiricist anti-idealist assumptions of that approach. One doesn’t have to take this multi-leveled approach to new media literally–as though Manovich has suddenly taken the blindfold from the eyes of critics groping around the elephant of new media–to appreciate the fruitfulness of this approach. Manovich’s topology of new media is based on a self-conscious analogy to the conventional “levels” of the computer hardware and software (from microprocessor through operating system to high-level application). But this analogy works because it allows him to “touch” upon more of the many constituents of computable media, and thus more of the complexity and plurality of new media, than any other critic I have read. Manovich does this by introducing new terms into the analysis of new media. The “language” of his title suggests that the computer, as the new universal media machine, is producing new discourses and new terms, and thus a new “language” in the strong sense of post-structuralism and Russian formalist theory. Manovich’s book implicitly invites the reader to enter into a language game that will develop a lexicon that can do two things: 1) specify with precision the software technique and underlying technology of new media, and 2) open these techniques and technologies out to the broader cultural practices and unsuspected historical affiliations of new media.

     

    This terminological strategy is on display in his development of the term “interface,” the term used in computer science where there is “a point of interaction or communication between a computer and any other entity” (American Heritage Dictionary). Computer culture has given a rich and diverse elaboration to this term because the interface is habitually the crucial boundary, or zone of articulation and translation, whenever a computer would communicate with devices (such as printers, networks, monitors, machines) or the human user. In Interface Culture, Stephen Johnson demonstrates the unprecedented centrality that computers give to the computer human interface. Manovich takes a different approach: he expands the concept of “interface” backward in time so that it encompasses not just the diverse software interfaces of new media (from the desktop Windows environment to the conventions of computer game design) but also the formal traits and user practices with salient media like the printed word and cinema. Rather than viewing the persistence of the printed word and cinema as the indebtedness of new to the old, perhaps by citing Marshall McLuhan’s well-known dictum that each new medium takes an old medium as its content, Manovich argues that the printed word and cinema should be considered not just as media forms but as “cultural interfaces.” Here is how he describes the crucial components of each: “the printed word” includes “a rectangular page containing one or more columns of text, illustrations or other graphic framed by the text, pages that follow each other sequentially, a table of contexts, and index”; cinema “includes the mobile camera, representations of space, editing techniques, narrative conventions, spectator activity” (71). These formal descriptions of “the printed word” and “cinema” uncouple them from their original media so that Manovich can trace how they migrate into, and become part of, the interfaces of new media. Although the human-computer interface is much newer, Manovich insists it has become “a cultural tradition in its own right” (72) featuring “direct manipulations of objects on the screen, overlapping windows, iconic representation, and dynamic menus” (71) along with operations like copy/paste and search/replace. Manovich puts these three cultural interfaces side by side so that we can see that they are richly different ways of “organizing information, presenting it to the user, correlating space and time, and structuring human experience in the process of accessing information” (72). The subsistence of these cultural interfaces at the moment when the printed word and cinema are being “liberated from their traditional storage media–paper, film, stone, glass, magnetic tape” means that a “digital designer can freely mix pages and virtual cameras, tables of content and screens, bookmarks and points of view” (73).

     

    The concept of “cultural interface” suggests what distinguishes this book from many discussions of digital media: its resolutely historical consciousness. Many critics have argued that the digital mutation, through a kind of (historical) retroaction, is enabling us to see earlier events like the “print revolution” in new ways. (For an influential example, see Landow 20-32.) Manovich carries this perspective much further by offering an archaeology of earlier cultural forms and practices that are flowing into, and receiving distinctive inflection within, new media. Thus Manovich’s discussion of the “screen” of the human computer interface [HCI] distinguishes the static screen of traditional painting from the dynamic screen of the moving image (of cinema and TV), and both of these from the screen of real time (of radar, of video feeds). This comparative perspective allows him to ask questions about how each screen places the user and entails certain costs. He shows, for example, the tension between uses of the computer screen to make it, on the one hand, a real-time control panel, and on the other, the site for an absorptive experience which expands the threshold of the visible but imposes stasis on the body of the spectator.

     

    Manovich’s Analytical Engine

     

    My discussion of Manovich’s redefinition of new media does not come to terms with the critical range of this book. With wit and elegance, Manovich coordinates several different agents: the thoughtful critic of modernism, the accomplished scholar of cinema, the innovative practitioner of new media, and the humanist who wears his vast learning lightly. All are needed to do what this book attempts: to crosscut between the full range of contemporary new media (art and popular culture) and the history of visual and technical culture. The analysis achieves a lot of its rhetorical force from the consistent operation of what I would like to call Manovich’s analytical engine. By using the word “engine,” I am seeking to isolate the recurrent movements in his analysis. I can demonstrate this analytical engine as it sorts the implications of one of the “operations” discussed in the third chapter: selection. Although selection appears as an apparently simple and modest operation in many software programs, Manovich insists upon its broader cultural implications. “While operations [like selection] are embedded in software, they are not tied to it. They are employed not only within the computer but also in the social world outside it. They are not only ways of working within the computer but also in the social world outside it. They are… general ways of working, ways of thinking, ways of existing in the computer age” (118).

     

    To suggest the key rhetorical and conceptual moves of Manovich’s analytical engine, I have put them in bold type.

     

    •Manovich begins his overview by offering several empirical examples of selection: he describes the centrality of selection in programs from Adobe Photoshop 5, Macromedia Director 7, and Apple’s Quicktime 4.

     

    •These programs suggest a basic logic of new media, which is expressed as an opening generalization, provocatively overstated: “New media objects are rarely created from scratch; usually they are assembled from ready-made parts. Put differently, in computer culture, authentic creation has been replaced by selection from a menu” (124).

     

    Archaeological questions that situate selection within the long history of visual culture: “What are the historical origins of this new cultural logic?” (125). Manovich describes the way E. H. Gombrich and Roland Barthes have critiqued the romantic ideal of artistic creation and how industrial production prepares for the artistic experiments around 1910 with montage and photomontage, culminating with their use in Metropolis (1923) and other films, and finally, to Pop artists of the 1960s.

     

    • Manovich, playing the journalistic cultural critic, makes a broad and loose cultural connection: “The process of art has finally caught up… with the rest of modern society, where everything from objects to people’s identities is assembled from ready-made parts. Whether assembling an outfit, decorating an apartment, choosing dishes from a restaurant menu, or choosing which interest group to join, the modern subject proceeds through life by selecting from numerous menus and catalogs of items” (126). After a discussion of the branching menu systems of various software program, Manovich refuses to the software user the “author” function of creating something new (128).

     

    • Manovich then poses a provocative question. How can one resist this rhetoric of endless choice through selection, the obligation to choose as a vehicle for expressing your identity? Perhaps by accepting a computer’s and software program’s bland defaults, one can refuse to choose, and thus wear the software equivalent of jeans and a tee shirt.

     

    • Manovich then invokes a new media example to clinch the case for the centrality of selection: “The WWW takes this process [of selection as more pervasive than invention] to the next level: it encourages the creation of texts that consist entirely of pointers to other texts that are already on the Web” (127), cf. Yahoo, Voice of the Shuttle.

     

    •Manovich makes a a detour into the prehistory of cinema: the Magic Lantern exhibitor was also a selector. Crucial to this practice in film and video has been the modern standardization of formats. These allow the cutting and pasting that enables selection to work.

     

    •Manovich makes a cultural connection to art theory (here postmodernism). The technique of pastiche, the quoting of earlier styles, which is widely associated with postmodernism (by Fredric Jameson and others in the early 80s) is seen by Manovich as finding its fullest realization with software: “In my view, this new cultural condition found its perfect reflection in the emerging computer software of the 1980s that privileged selection from ready-made media elements over creating them from scratch” (131).

     

    • Manovich makes a conceptual extension of the concept of selection to that of filtering, in new as well as older electronic media. It is not just selection that is central to new media, but the fact that we can modify what we select through the use of software programs, for example, through using the filters in Photoshop. But this is not a new phenomenon in the history of media. The telephone, the radio, and television were already based on a technology that made selection–through the modification of an existing signal–crucial. “All electronic media technologies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries are based on modifying a signal by passing it through various filters. These include technologies for real-time communication such as the telephone, as well as broadcasting technologies used for mass distribution of media products such as radio and television….” (132).

     

    • This leads to a retroactive interpretation of older media in light of new media: “In retrospect, the shift from a material object to a signal accomplished by electronic technologies represents a fundamental conceptual step toward computer media. In contrast to a permanent imprint in some material, a signal can be modified in real time by passing it through a filter or filters… an electronic filter can modify the signal all at once… an electronic signal does not have a singular identity–a particular qualitatively different state from all other possible states” (132). Examples include volume control for a radio receiver and brightness control for an analog TV set. “In contrast to a material object, the electronic signal is essentially mutable.” “This mutability of electronic media is just one step away from the ‘variability’ of new media” (132-33).

     

    •This allows Manovich to make an assessment of the difference effected by digital mutation: Now we can see that the mutability of signals suggests that radio and TV signals are “already new media.” “Put differently, in the progression from material object to electronic signal to computer media, the first shift is more radical than the second” (133). The increase in range of variation in the digital is accounted for by two factors: “modern digital computers separate hardware and software” (so for example, changing volume will be just a software change) and second, “because an object is now represented by numbers, that is, it has become computer data that can be modified by software. In short, a media object becomes ‘soft’–with all the implications contained in this metaphor” (133). The mutability of TV (with hue, brightness, vertical hold, etc.) becomes the much wider range of variability for display of a page in a browser window.

     

    • Manovich closes his analysis through a witty invocation of a new cultural practice: The rise of the DJ is seen as cultural symptom of the centrality of the art of selection. “The essence of the DJ’s art is the ability to mix selected elements in rich and sophisticated ways…. The practice of live electronic music demonstrates that true art lies in the ‘mix’ (135).

     

    Manovich’s analytical engine develops here an ordinary term–selection–with which to think about what living in a computable culture means. By his account, selection does not come from the computer running software. It is something humans–artists, consumers, and users–do and have done in a vast range of contexts, perhaps for as long as there has been human culture. Of course, by expanding the range of selectable commodities, modern industrial production has increased the everyday salience of the act of selection. By changing media objects into media signals, modern electronic media have expanded the powers of selection through modulation (of, for example, a radio signal, its volume, etc.). Manovich’s discussion effectively puts aesthetic theorists, moralists, and artists in dialogue around the subject of selection. Such a perspective on “selection” embeds an argument against media determinism he never makes explicit: computable media do not determine culture. The pleasures of selection help to drive the harnessing of a technology that extends the powers of selection. In this way, new media are a symptom of culture, rather than something that comes from outside it (cf. Bruno Latour on technology). Of course, it is also easy to see how selection in real time is greatly facilitated by the first four principles of new media: numerical representation, modularity, automation, and variability. Thus, by the way computers expand the pervasiveness and varieties of selection, computable media bear their effects into culture. My favorite popular cultural expression of this trend: Amy Heckerling’s film Clueless, where the heroine, Cher, begins the day by using a computer to preview and select the outfit she will wear to Beverly Hills High.

     

    Software Theory as a Theory of a-Media; or, Surpassing McLuhan

     

    Although Manovich’s book takes “new media” as its object, there is much in his book to suggest that computable culture unsettles the media paradigm introduced by Marshall McLuhan in the early 1960s. In The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man (1962) and Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man (1964), McLuhan introduced a set of terms and concepts that defined media studies. Like any other paradigm shift, McLuhan’s work helped to ground scholarly monographs in the humanities and social sciences (e.g., Elizabeth L. Eisentein’s The Printing Press as an Agent of Social Change). But McLuhan’s ideas also became part of the common sense about media that circulates in daily conversation and the Sunday supplements. To understand how the computer running software challenges the grounding premises of media theory and media history, I will suggest, very briefly, what these grounding ideas are. McLuhan’s invention of modern media theory depends on three related ideas. First, he focuses on the centrality of the physical medium of communication and insists upon the profound mutual imbrication of the medium (the material substrate of the symbolic expression) and the “message” or meaning (ideas, ideology, plausible genres, etc.) Thus the slogan, “the medium is the message.” Second, by emphasizing the way the physical contours of a medium condition the production, use, and experience of media, McLuhan shifts attention from meaning to practice, from what media do in the mind to the way bodies can dispose themselves while communicating. Thus the transformation of the first slogan into its somatic extension in an artist’s book he published with the artist Quentin Fiore in 1967 under the title “the medium is the massage.” Third, McLuhan’s approach to media encourages a broadly comparative study of media: media as different as speech, manuscript, print, radio, and television, as well as other “media” of communication such as the automobile, the airplane, the human body, etc., can be compared with each other as to their defining traits and across their long histories. Although McLuhan’s approach has been exposed to withering critique–for its central premise that [the] media [environment] determines [human] culture, for its facile anecdotal “probes” of media history, and for its quasi-religious belief that electronic media can restore an earlier time of intuitive, embodied communication, McLuhan’s writings offer a particularly ecstatic and credulous version of what Armand Mattelart calls “the ideology of communication” (xi). Nonetheless, any historian of media who accepts the centrality of the category “media” inherits and extends the three basic ideas I have listed above: the centrality of the media substrate, its implications for embodied practice, and the comparability of media. As we have seen, Manovich is a particularly effective practitioner of this sort of media history and analysis.

     

    In the way it applies this framework to “new media,” The Language of New Media also suggests the limits of the media paradigm. For Lev Manovich allows us to grasp this fundamental fact about new media: while computable cultural forms can be understood, for the sake of historical comparison and in our study of modern media culture, as successors to earlier media forms, a computer running software produces digital code which simply is not a medium. Manovich first broaches this complication in his story when he points to the limitations of the comparative historical approach he uses so well. Understanding new media as old media that are now digitized and thereby changed has fundamental limitations:

     

    [This perspective] cannot address the fundamental quality of new media that has no historical precedent–programmability. Comparing new media to print, photography, or television will never tell us the whole story. For although from one point of view new media is indeed another type of media, from another it is simply a particular type of computer data, something stored in files and databases, retrieved and sorted, run through algorithms and written to the output device. That the data represent pixels and that this device happens to be an output screen is beside the point…. New media may look like media, but this is only the surface. (47-48)

     

    The most casual acquaintance with the history of the computer suggests the relative autonomy of computable information from its media “surface.” Over sixty years of development, computers have communicated information to their users first on paper tape, then on computer cards, then on paper from printer output, then on video display screens, and most recently through a simulated voice. Media are not just used for input and output; the information within the computer is stored on computer cards, magnetic tape, floppy disks and hard-drive media, and on the silicon chip (as RAM, ROM, and bubble memory). Of course, this list of media is far from complete, and, in any case, it is subject to ongoing technological extension.

     

    The mobility of information encoded in digital form makes the objects of media study waver. Thus, although some computer code can be expressed as an image that can be printed on glossy paper (and thus resemble a conventional photograph) and other computer code can be expressed as letters on a monitor screen, the physical surface (whether paper or screen) is not the salient aspect of computable information systems. In fact, one of new media’s crucial traits is the way they elude bondage to any medium. How is one to conceptualize this different system so that we grasp not only how it extends the forms and practices of the long history of media, but also the way it simply is not a medium, but (perhaps) a species of a-media? Soon after the passage quoted above, Manovich seems to realize that his definition of new media challenges the media paradigm he still uses for his analytical framework. He invokes the “revolutionary works” of Harold Innis and Marshall McLuhan and insists that we must turn to computer science to understand new media. Then, in a gesture of surpassing that echoes the manifestoes of modernism and post-structuralism, Manovich calls for a fundamentally different approach to computable media: “From media studies, we move to something that can be called ‘software studies’–from media theory to software theory” (48, emphasis Manovich). That Manovich does not heed his own call to go beyond media study and media theory, that he just begins to explain what “software theory” might look like, does not diminish the importance of his having demonstrated the logic of a movement beyond the media paradigm toward one based on the great underlying fact that software is what is really new about new (a-)media.

     

    A computer and its software are much more intimately and essentially co-implicated with one another than a book and its written content, a television and its program. In fact, a computer scientist would be correct to point out that the phrase I’ve been using–“a computer running software”–is tautological. From the first mathematical theorization of the computer as a “universal machine” by Alan Turing, and Turing’s subsequent realization of an early (base 10) computer, the “Bombe,” built to decipher the code produced by the German Enigma machine in WWII (see Singh and Hodges), to John Von Neumann’s first designs for the computer after the war, computers receive their essential character from the software they do not just run but on which they run. When compared with the earlier analog computing devices used to point weapons and automate machinery during World War II, the flexibility and power of the computer running software comes from the way data and the program are loaded into memory at the same time (Bolter 47-49, Turing 436-42), meaning that the computer, unlike the machine, could be reconfigured by the changes introduced at the level of software. Although the phrase “the computer running software” is redundant, it offers a way to emphasize how a relatively immaterial thing–software–invades and dematerializes its supposedly hard home, what is conventionally called “hardware” but what we sometimes mistakenly identify as “the computer.” This is a mistake, not just because hardware needs software the way, by analogy, the human body needs the communications media of neurons, enzymes, and electric signals as a condition of life. From the beginning of computing, even the hardest components of design–the arrangement of circuits and vacuum tubes, the code embedded on read-only memory, and microprocessors made of silicon–were designed to embed “logic blocks” (like “and,” “or,” “invert”) and algorithms first expressed as software (see Hillis 21-38). In other words, there is a very real sense in which the computer is software all the way down.2

     

    How can we begin to think about the difference for media made by software? Manovich shows how software produces uncanny effects upon the cultural and aesthetic sphere it operates within, for example, by challenging the underlying assumptions of the realist project. The long Western commitment to mimesis as a pathway to truth (see Derrida, Disseminations) has gained expression in the development of visual technologies–from the linear perspective of painting to photography to film–that win visual fidelity for the image. It is hardly surprising that the computer running software has been used to develop new and more powerful forms of realism. For example, algorithms embedded in Adobe Photoshop allow a photographer to correct and enhance a photograph. However, the computer also simplifies the production of simulations of what was never photographed, undermining the indexical function of photography and cinema. Manovich has a vivid way of putting this idea: “Cinema is the art of the index; it is an attempt to make art out of the footprint” (295). Digital special effects technologies have enabled Hollywood films to bring a new level of realism to the visually believable representation of the impossible. For example, in Terminator 2 an ordinary policeman seems to morph into a “metal man.” Manovich notes that digital special effects like “metal man” are made possible by the software algorithms that migrate from computer science journals to software programs. Because images within the computer interface can become bit-mapped control panels, the software at the heart of the digital image disturbs the classical image of the Western aesthetic tradition. There it was assumed that the viewer assumed a detached frontal position before the image so as to compare it with “memories of represented reality to judge its reality effect” (183). The new media image summons a more active user: “The new media image is something the user actively goes into, zooming in or clicking on individual parts with the assumption that they contain hyperlinks (for instance, image-maps in Web sites). Moreover, new media turn most images into image-interfaces and image-instruments” (183, emphasis Manovich).

     

    Images supported by software turn out to be fundamentally different from the traditional images they can simulate. In order to fake photorealism, computer software does not enrich but instead downgrades the synthetic image so that we experience it as a photo: it is given the blur, graininess, and texture of the photographic image. We may think of these computer-generated images as inferior to the photographs, but Manovich notes, “in fact, they are too perfect. But beyond that we can also say that, paradoxically, they are also too real” (202, emphasis Manovich).

     

    The synthetic image is free of the limitations of both human and camera vision. It can have unlimited resolution and an unlimited level of detail. It is free of the depth-of-field effect, this inevitable consequence of the lens, so everything is in focus. It is also free of grain–the layer of noise created by film stock and by human perception. Its colors are more saturated, and its sharp lines follow the economy of geometry. From the point of view of human vision, it is hyperreal. And yet, it is completely realistic. The synthetic is the result of a different, more perfect than human, vision. Whose vision is it? It is the vision of a computer, a cyborg, an automatic missile…. Synthetic computer-generated imagery is not an inferior representation of our reality, but a realistic representation of a different reality. (202)

     

    Manovich here gives a trenchant s/f turn to his argument. If we unmoor what is being done from its arbitrary referent (here photorealism as a functional stand-in for “reality”), we can see the uncanny difference of the new digital image: it can go beyond the constraints of social conventions, aesthetic traditions, and even the human perceptual apparatus. The computer running software can serve the old ideals of visual realism, but it can also overturn that logic of appropriation through visual approximation and proceed to do very different things. Thus in Terminator 2, the fact that the metal man comes from the future offers a narrative rationale for his ability to benefit fully from the “reflection mapping algorithm” operating in the software. That algorithm creates the highly unrealistic special effect of a hyper-reflective body. In this way, the “metal man” of T2provides a visual analog of the uncanny perfection, the infinite plasticity, the soft hardness of the computer-generated image as it seems to leap past the limitations of the film medium itself.

     

    An Ethos for Software Studies?

     

    Software studies can teach us skepticism of what might be called the covert idealism of media theory’s materialism: the notion that if one knows the medium of an act of semiosis, then one grasps its essence or inner logic. There are obvious reasons to be distrustful of the reductive tendencies of this sort of materialism. Thus, if a molecular biologist tells us that all central constituents of life–DNA, RNA and proteins–are composed of “nothing” but carbon, oxygen, hydrogen, and nitrogen, we have not learned very much about what life is. For example, the life functions of these molecules–most crucially the capacity to replicate–depend in part upon the way they are folded into 3-dimensional shapes. Similarly, when a cyber critic claims that what distinguishes the computer running software is its use of digital code (bits of 1s and 0s), or that all the algorithms that a computer can perform are combinations of three logical actions: “and,” “or,” and “not,” we have not learned much about the underlying logic of computable culture. However, if software studies gets us to travel too far away from the materialism of media studies, toward a celebration of the “magic” (Bill Gates) and “power” of software code, one soon finds oneself implicated in problematic new fantasies of control and in an idealism based on the immateriality of software.

     

    A glance at the early history of computing suggests that a will to control through the powers of the mind may explain the tendency to go beyond material embodiment. Alan Turing and Norbert Weiner conceived the computer as a machine that could simulate and extend human intelligence, so it could, for example, decipher encrypted enemy messages, target weapons in real time, and perhaps someday rival human intelligence (for example, by beating human chess masters). This project–by emphasizing the distance between the human and the computer–helps to seed the s/f narratives about those robots, artificially intelligent computers, and cyborgs that exceed their assigned functions and return to haunt their human creators. This popular interpretation of the computer as a dangerous “other,” with the diverse techno-gothic scenarios it invites, may have little of the predictive value science fiction craves. Nonetheless, these narratives carry intimations of the uncanny powers of the computer running software. However, by exaggerating the distance between a software technology and the historical and cultural locus of its invention, they also breed popular new ideas of transcendence. For example, in Clarke/Kubrick’s 2001: A Space Odyssey, transcendence takes the form of the final ride where the astronaut morphs into a “star child;” at the end of Gibson’s Neuromancer the mysterious union of the information agents–Wintermute and Neuromancer–leads them to claim that they are now “the matrix” of “the whole show” (269).

     

    Katherine Hayles has developed an analysis that challenges this drift toward transcendence. In her overview of the historical emergence of the concept of information after World War II, she notes that molecular biology helped to popularize the notion that what is crucial to the constitution of human bodies are the patterns of information embedded in genetic code. The hierarchies that quickly creep into these terms breed a new form of idealism. “In the contemporary view, the body is said to ‘express’ information encoded in the genes” (69-70). Hayles shows how in this theory “pattern triumphs over the body’s materiality–a triumph achieved first by distinguishing between pattern and materiality and then by privileging pattern over materiality” (72). By constructing “information as the site of mastery and control over the material world,” this line of thinking suppresses the equally obvious insight that “the efficacy of information depends on a highly articulated material base” (72). In this way, Hayles casts suspicion on the idea that spirit (as code) is superior to matter, an idea she links to Western religious culture and which returns with the ultimate computer fantasy–Han Moravec’s scenario by which humans could achieve immortality by uploading the mind’s information from the brain to a computer (72).

     

    How can we grasp the new powers of software without refusing a necessary embodiment and materiality? The temptations of disembodied transcendence, so prevalent in books on “cyberculture,” make this reader appreciate the way Manovich has balanced the momentum and staying power of traditionally embodied media forms (like the book, cinema, and the screen) with a sustained analysis of what enables the production, networked distribution, and use of “new” media: the computer running software.

     

    Notes

     

    1. The most casual reader of this book will be able to note “where Manovich comes from”–film studies and the history of cinema. But his giving cinema pride of place among twentieth-century cultural production is less an unconscious bias than a conscious strategy. It gives this book on a vast topic (new media) the discursive coherence necessary to reconceptualize new media. Through an irony that obviously pleases Manovich, he is able to show how many of the traits ascribed to new computer-based media can be read off the practice of the Russian 1920s avant-garde filmmaker, Dziga Vertov.

     

    2. Andrew Grove, former CEO of Intel, has conceded the impossibility of making a fundamental categorical distinction between the code embedded in Intel chip designs and the software provided by Microsoft. This became a problem when Intel wanted to embed functions in their chips to prepare them for the use of Java, the open-source programming language developed by Microsoft’s rival, Sun Microsystems. Manovich notes the tendency, over the development of a computer system, to integrate functions first introduced as software into hardware defaults.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Aarseth, Espen. Cybertext: Perspectives on Ergodic Literature. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1997.
    • American Heritage Dictionary. Boston: Houghton, 1992.
    • Bolter, J. David. Turing’s Man: Western Culture in the Computer Age. Chapel Hill: U of North Carolina P, 1984.
    • Bolter, Jay David, and Grusin, Richard. Remediation: Understanding New Media. Cambridge, MA: MIT P, 1999.
    • Borgmann, Albert. Holding on to Reality: The Nature of Information at the Turn of the Millennium. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2000.
    • Derrida, Jacques. Disseminations. Trans. Barbara Johnson. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1981.
    • Eisenstein, Elizabeth L. The Printing Press as an Agent of Change: Communications and Cultural Transformations in Early Modern Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1979.
    • Gibson, William. Neuromancer. New York: Ace, 1984.
    • Hayles, N. Katherine. “The Condition of Virtuality.” Lunenfeld 68-94.
    • Heim, Michael. Virtual Realism. New York: Oxford UP, 1998.
    • Hillis, Daniel. The Pattern on the Stone: The Simple Ideas that Make Computers Work. New York: Basic, 1998.
    • Hodges, Andrew. Alan Turing: The Enigma. New York: Simon, 1983.
    • Johnson, Stephen. Interface Culture: How New Technology Transforms the Way We Create and Communicate. New York: Basic, 1997.
    • Landow, George P. Hypertext 2.0. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1997.
    • Laurel, Brenda. Computers as Theater. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1993, 1991.
    • Levinson, Paul. The Soft Edge: A Natural History and Future of the Information Revolution. New York: Routledge, 1998.
    • Lunenfeld, Peter, ed. The Digital Dialectic. Cambridge, MA: MIT P, 2000.
    • Mattelart, Armand. The Invention of Communication. Trans. Susan Emanuel. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1996.
    • McLuhan, Marshall. The Gutenberg Galaxy: The Making of Typographic Man. Toronto: U of Toronto P, 1962.
    • —. Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man. Cambridge, MA: MIT P, 1994.
    • Miller, J. Hillis. “Digital Blake.” The Digital Cultures Project. 31 October 2000. <http://dc-mrg.english.ucsb.edu/conference/2000/PANELS/BEssick/jhmiller .html>.
    • Mitchell, William J. “Replacing Place.” Lunenfeld 112-128.
    • Murray, Janet. Hamlet on the Holodeck: The Future of Narrative in Cyberspace. New York: Free, 1997.
    • Singh, Simon. The Code Book: The Secret History of Codes and Code-breaking. London: Fourth Estate, 1999.
    • Turing, Alan. “Computing Machines and Intelligence.” Mind: A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy 236-60 (October 1950): 436-42.

     

  • Information and the Paradox of Perspicuity

    Samuel Gerald Collins

    Dept. of Sociology, Anthropology and Criminal Justice
    Towson University
    scollins@towson.edu

     

    Review of: Albert Borgmann, Holding On to Reality: The Nature of Information at the Turn of the Millennium. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2000.

     

    Reacting against the Boasian study of myths for “historical data,” Claude Levi-Strauss urged anthropologists to look behind myths to what they might reveal of cultural and cognitive structures:

     

    The myth is certainly related to given facts, but not a representation of them. The relationship is of a dialectical kind, and the institutions described in the myths can be the very opposite of the real institutions. This conception of the relation of myth to reality no doubt limits the use of the former as a documentary source. But it opens the way for other possibilities; for in abandoning the search for a constantly accurate picture of ethnographic reality in the myth, we gain, on occasions, a means of reading unconscious realities. (172-73)

     

    The twenty-first century finds the myth-making apparatus producing a surfeit of narratives chronicling the emergence of the “information society.” Some of these posit a decisive break with the past, an information society so different from preceding Fordist or Gutenberg eras as to engender entirely new modes of being. Other works locate the information society at the apex (or the aporia) of developments in culture, politics, or library science. In these, the information society is only explicable in light of earlier epochs–a “Gutenberg Galaxy” giving way to more “cool” mediums, the vertical organizations of Fordism giving way to post-Fordist, flexible networks. But all of these formulations remain “emergent”; the information society has proven notoriously resistant to empirical description, and to argue for a summary break with the past or for a selective genealogy is, in these works, ultimately a metaphysical question. Nevertheless, the tremendous outpouring of commentary suggests that information–whatever its status as a bona fide object of social inquiry–is an important site for cultural work. What is at stake here is, I would suggest, nothing less than the shape of the future: the possibilities engendered in the new and the continuities with what has gone before.

     

    Albert Borgmann’s Holding On to Reality is an ultimately mythological narrative outlining a highly selective vision of the past parlayed into a Procrustean manifesto for the future. Uneasily jumping between Dionysian novelty and Apollonian continuity, Borgmann’s work is, finally, conservative and even Arnoldian, recapitulating the moral-redemptive message of his 1993 Crossing the Postmodern Divide. And yet, there is much here that might prove useful to the student of the information society, even if one sometimes works against Borgmann’s text.

     

    Unlike technocratic definitions of information as a thing, value, or signal:noise ratio, Borgmann’s information is relational: “INTELLIGENCE provided, a PERSON is informed by a SIGN about some THING in a certain CONTEXT” (38). That is, given some pre-acquired information literacy, people are able to ascertain something about the world from signs in a particular social or cultural milieu. It’s this phenomenological reading that has changed over the course of millennia, from Edenic beginnings in “natural information” to the contemporary postmodernity of “technological information.” Ultimately, Borgmann’s information is the motor informing both his historical narrative and his moral judgments on the efficacy of information for modern life.

     

    Like the savage for Rousseau, Native Americans function for Borgmann as the architectonic origin of information, the “ancestral computer,” as it were. The Salish, according to Borgmann, lived in a world characterized by natural information: for example, “Snow-capped Lolo Peak was the sign that pointed the Salish toward the salmon on the other side of the Bitterroot divide” (25). People (with proper knowledge) are surrounded by a world of signs and things in the “fullness” of natural contexts. Humans inhabit an inherently perspicuous world. In any paradise, of course, there must be a myth of the Fall. For the Salish (uncomfortably subsumed as “our” ancestors), this means the erection of monumental signs across the landscape, cairns, and “medicine wheels” that while “well-ordered” and “eloquent” nevertheless gesture to things expelled from the garden of presence. And yet, these monumental signs have only a limited capacity for reference:

     

    Since the informational capacity of the cairn is so small, large tasks remain for the people to whom the cairn is significant. Elaborate instruction and careful memorizing are needed if the message of the sign is to survive. Moreover, since the cairn as a sign is occasion-bound as well as place-bound, it normally carries one and only one message. It is not a vessel that can be used to convey different contents on different occasions. (37)

     

    We can see where Borgmann is going here. In this tale of information theodicy, successive forms of information are already immanent in their predecessors, forms that admit technical advantage while gradually surrendering the antediluvian “fullness” of signs, things, and contexts.

     

    The successor to natural information–that is, “cultural information”–is typified by the emergence of writing: “letters and texts, lines and graphs, notes and scores” (57). Its strength lies precisely in its abstraction from reality, the way that three of the five nodes signified in information “drift into the background,” i.e., “intelligence,” “person,” and “context” recede against the ascendance of “sign” and “thing.” “Writing consists of signs that are about some thing, letters that convey meaning. By itself, writing is not bound to a particular person or context, and its possession requires no particular intelligence” (47).

     

    However, by removing information from natural “presence,” cultural information opens up the world to “structure,” by both exposing structure through the study of nature and imposing structure through the elaboration of musical notation and architectural drawing. By foregrounding signs and things, cultural information begs the question of their ratio, ultimately opening the possibility of the perfect concordance of signs and things. Yet, in the wake of Wittgenstein and in the slow demise of generative grammars, this would seem an impossible goal.

     

    Nevertheless, it is cultural information that, for Borgmann, heralds the development of the sciences and humanities, of the great works that he alternately rhapsodizes and elegizes. It is cultural information that balances perspicuity and nature, reality and structure. In a vast, synthetic panorama, Borgmann turns from Euclid’s postulates to the development of writing and reading culture to Thomas Jefferson’s surveying methodologies to, finally, the architecture of Freiburg Minster, the great medieval church that, for Borgmann, is one of the finest exemplars of cultural information, a monumental structure that is also an “open book” filled with signs.

     

    Combining Romanesque and Gothic elements in the context of the mountainous landscape, Freiburg Minster is manifestly perspicuous but also highly engaged with reality, or what Borgmann begins glossing as “contingency”: “contingency, however, is inherently meaningful and so makes significant information possible. Contingency comes to us as misfortune or good luck, as disaster or relief, as misery or grace” (105). For Freiburg Minster, “contingency” means a succession of builders each appending different designs to the church–Romanesque, Gothic, Renaissance. In other words, it is in the frisson of the contending, contingent whole that we apprehend cultural information.

     

    And yet, as wonderfully balanced as cultural information is, “technological information” is already immanent in the cultural. In the search for ultimate structure and the struggle to impose structure on an obstinately contingent world, physics, mathematics, and, later, cybernetics and information science posit fundamental, fungible elements ultimately constitutive of reality; this will-to-structure generates our “digital” world. “Thus physics and mathematics engendered the hope that, once the elementary particles of information had been found, information theory might devise a semantic engine that would bridge the gap between structural and instructive information” (128). Out of the conjectural interstices of physics and the topologies of mathematics comes an “information space” structured “all the way down” to binary “bits” and, therefore, potentially infinitely transparent and infinitely controllable.

     

    However, by developing an information space, reality itself is elided by this self-contained, infinite perspicuity: signs detach from things, completing the alienation from presence that cultural information began. In a somewhat labored and oddly trivial example, Borgmann explains the difference. Your daughter attends a performance of Bach’s Cantata no. 10 and returns home. In answer to your query, she tells you she’s just attended a performance of Bach’s Cantata no. 10. This corresponds to natural information about reality. In the second case, she returns home and presents you with a score for the Cantata. This is an example of cultural information for reality. In the final case, she returns home and gives you a CD. “The compact disc, finally, can be information about and for reality. But the technological information it contains is distinctively information as reality. Information gets more and more detached from reality and in the end is offered as something that rivals and replaces reality” (182). That is, the performance itself is utterly eclipsed by the world of the compact disc. There is no need to go beyond the information space of the CD. It is all there–absolute presence premised on the absolute absence of context.

     

    It is this progressive disengagement from reality that really irks Borgmann, and he summons up touchingly dated evocations of MUDs and MOOs to drive home his point.

     

    At the limit, virtual reality takes up with the contingency of the world by avoiding it altogether. The computer, when it harbors virtual reality, is no longer a machine that helps us cope with the world by making a beneficial difference in reality; it makes all the difference and liberates us from actual reality. (183)

     

     

    Only signs matter in the hermetic, evacuated worlds of technological information. But by refusing the contingency of the world for self-contained information space, technological information risks triviality, a fatal separation from the “eloquence” of reality. The result, Borgmann suggests, is an unsatisfying life riven with postmodern versions of modern alienation: “anomie 2.1.”

     

    Not surprisingly, Borgmann cautions us to attend to the contingency and ambiguity of reality and balance that against the torpor of technological information.

     

    No amount or sophistication of cultural or technological information can compensate for the loss of well-being we would suffer if we let the realm of natural information decay to one of resources, storage, and transportation. Analogously, nothing so concentrates human creativity and discipline as the austerity of cultural information, provided the latter again is of the highest order, consisting of the great literature of fiction, poetry, and music. Our power of realizing information and our competence in enriching the life of the mind and spirit would atrophy if we surrendered the task of realization to information technology. (219-20)

     

    In a foregone conclusion, Borgmann returns to the idyll of the Montana countryside, interspersed with some unexpected paeans to urban living. For him, the “moral eloquence of reality” can only be achieved through admixtures of Virgilian nature and Arnoldian culture, heir to the Emersonian perambulations Leo Marx explores in The Machine in the Garden; indeed, Borgmann reiterates a well-worn American ambivalence towards technological change and social “tradition.”

     

    So what are we supposed to draw from Borgmann’s triptych? Certainly not lessons on historiography. Holding On to Reality is rife with jarring anachronisms and prolepses. We are told that “Theuth discovered the digital nature of letters” (60). And this “digitality,” moreover, would have resulted in “faultless copying were it not for the foibles of scribes” (81).1 The book of Genesis is testament to the fullness of natural information, with God designing to directly manifest to Moses (rather than send an e-mail with a .jpg attachment). “That there should be information of such magnitude seems incredible or incomprehensible to some of the most thoughtful people today” (32). But these examples, however fanciful, are consistent with the spurious teleology of the whole project. We have to give up much in the way of incredulity to see burial cairns as the ancestors of the CD. In anthropology, we certainly have no compelling reason to think of these things as species of proto-computers. To do so is simply to subsume the past into the present, the Other into the Self, constructing far-flung genealogies that echo the Victorian penchant for unilinear, evolutionary schema–first savages, then barbarians, and finally civilized Europeans. An “Assiniboin Medicine Sign,” a medieval church, a Vedic fire altar: we can only consider these varieties of information if we submerge their cultural and historical contexts, building, as it were, our own hermetically sealed, virtual environments where others are consigned to infinitely reflecting the West. There may be, as anthropologists have pointed out since the end of the nineteenth century, a brief thrill in discovering an information society in the Salish, in Euclid, in incunabulum, but that pleasure is bought at the cost of real understanding.

     

    But while Borgmann’s evolutionary account of “our ancestors” is unconvincing, I find his description of contemporary information compelling. “Technological information” is inherently transparent, e.g., Geographical Information Systems (GIS) can “uncover” successive features of geomorphology. Fourteen hundred digital photos of Freiburg Minster taken by a computerized camera mounted on a helicopter render every detail stunningly clear. Yet, the transparency of technological information may not be analogous to the perspicuity of natural or cultural information:

     

    The word transparency, like clarity, has a double meaning. It denotes both absence and presence. We call information transparent when the fog between us and our object of inquiry has been removed and the medium of transmission has become pellucid. But we also call clear or transparent what has become present once the fog has lifted, the objects or structures we are curious about. (176-77)

     

     

    Borgmann’s point–though deeply imbricated in a metaphysics of presence–is that information implies both transparency and occlusion, the foregrounding of some signs and the active suppression of others. Back at the aforementioned Freiburg Minster, site of cultural information’s triumph, another sort of knowledge has been suppressed. Despite heroic portrayals of many Old Testament motifs that “generally reflect the genial and cooperative relations” between Jewish and Christian citizens, Freiburg excelled–for over five hundred years–in brutal anti-Semitism (116). Is this information part of the church, or is this information in spite of the church?

     

    Part of the context in the relationship that enables information must be institutional. Surely, cultural and technological information doesn’t just exist “out there” to be apprehended by monadic intellects. Information is instead produced by governments, universities, and corporations. And it may be in the interest of institutions to suppress information even as they produce it. In the course of my research on the information society at the Library of Congress, I attended a staff introduction to the LC’s National Digital Library. In response to Head Librarian James Billington’s proclamation that the digital collection would concentrate on “American memory,” one of the staffers asked if Latin American or South American materials would be included. Billington angrily retorted that only U.S. materials would be digitized. Was there nothing in Latin or South American histories germane to U.S. history? And what does it mean to distance “U.S. history” from its military and mercantile past in these regions? We may be able to understand Billington’s summary comments, however, in the context of a budget-cutting Congress and the growing importance of corporate sponsorship in which philanthropy is oftentimes synonymous with public relations. This context is vital to the production (and reduction) of information.2

     

    By the 1960s, commentators would complain that we are awash in too much information, that, inundated with “data smog,” we suffer from “information anxiety.” The prescription for this postmodern malaise is the establishment of “limits” and “boundaries.” As Saul Wurman advises in Information Anxiety, “the secret to processing information is narrowing your field of information to that which is relevant to your life, i.e. making careful choices about what kind of information merits your time and attention” (317). This is a formidable task. Any perfunctory internet search opens onto a jumble of widely brachiating topics, each exhibiting considerable variance in relevance and banality. Efforts at limiting information, however, are immensely helped by the shape of technological information itself.

     

    As Borgmann demonstrates in an interesting chapter on Boolean architecture in information processing, technological information is binary–it is “on” or “off,” “yes” or “no.” “Between input and output, however, there is nothing but the pure structure of yeses or noes” (147). Either the file is there, or it is not; either the hyper-links are there, or they aren’t. Technological information may be hyperbolically fecund in a media-saturated, internetworked world, but it is also easier to control, to parse “all the way down.”

     

    As I write this review, the United States is engaged in a military campaign in Afghanistan. It is very much a physical battle, with many Afghani casualties, but it is also a war of information, with the United States battling its “information other,” the flexible, post-Fordist al-Qaida network.3 The United States seeks to expand its information network at all costs–detaining immigrants, seizing bank accounts, renewing a campaign of cloak-and-dagger espionage. At the same time, it tries to limit information output, winning seemingly complete complicity from news corporations in not reporting, underreporting, or misreporting details of U.S. military maneuvers and tactics. Al-Qaida seems equally invested in the occlusion of perspicuity, sundering the binary linkages in its network at the onset of U.S. investigations. On the other hand, deliberate misinformation abounds: the London Sunday Telegraph reported that, in a particularly postmodern subterfuge, Osama bin Laden has as many of 10 doubles of himself in Afghanistan (Hall and Rayment).

     

    In military communications, information is subsumed into C3I (Command, Control, Communications and Information). But, as an organizational form, the information society demands this kind of vigilant surveillance of all institutions: proprietary knowledge and spin control have arisen alongside any putative information explosion. Additionally, insofar as we have all become–à la C. Wright Mills–“organization” people, we have also been interpellated as information managers, separating public from private lives, taking care to control our appearance under the surveillant glare of the corporation and the state. In other words, not enabling information is as important as enabling it; in binary logic, “information” and “no-information” are meaningful values constituting the program of advanced capitalism. To re-work Borgmann’s initial formulation, “INTELLIGENCE provided, a PERSON is informed about a SIGN about some THING and NOT ABOUT some OTHER THING in a certain CONTEXT” (38). Erasing those errant or critical linkages to alternative things, meanings, and identities has been the great defining element in an era of technological information, resulting in an information black hole right alongside the information explosion. Alternatives to capitalism, local struggles, dialectical theorizing–all of these have disappeared into an event horizon even as other information overwhelms the public sensorium.

     

    Notes

     

    1. The “copy” has had a very long history, from Plato’s denunciations in The Republic to Benjamin’s “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction” and beyond. Monks copying the Vulgate are doing something rather different than I do when I download MP3 files!

     

    2. This is a serious–and telling–omission in Borgmann’s book. Anthony Giddens, Herbert Schiller and many others have examined political economies of information, while Borgmann considers only IT theorists (cf. Shannon and Weaver).

     

    3. Al-Qaida appears (in the U.S. press, at least) to employ the same sorts of “flexible accumulation” strategies as transnational corporations, making them the perfect foil of advanced capitalism, the ideal enemy in the post-socialist imaginary.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Borgmann, Albert. Crossing the Postmodern Divide. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1993.
    • Giddens, Anthony. The Nation-State and Violence. Cambridge: Polity, 1985.
    • Hall, Macer, and Sean Rayment. “Ring ‘Closing’ on bin Laden.” Sunday Telegraph [London] 18 Nov. 2001.
    • Lévi-Strauss, Claude. Structural Anthropology. Vol. 2. New York: Basic, 1976.
    • Marx, Leo. The Machine in the Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America. [1964] New York: Oxford UP, 2000.
    • Schiller, Herbert. Culture, Inc.: The Corporate Takeover of American Expression. New York: Oxford UP, 1989.
    • Schwartz, Hillel. The Culture of the Copy: Striking Likenesses, Unreasonable Facsimiles. New York: Zone, 1996.
    • Shannon, Claude E., and Warren Weaver. The Mathematical Theory of Communication. Urbana, IL: U of Illinois P, 1964.
    • Wurman, Richard Saul. Information Anxiety. New York: Doubleday, 1989.

     

  • Maintaining the Other

    Kelly Pender

    Rhetoric and Composition Program
    English Department
    Purdue University
    penderk@purdue.edu

     

    Review of: Simon Critchley, Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, Levinas, and Contemporary French Thought. London: Verso, 1999.

     

    In his latest collection of essays, Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity, Simon Critchley extends and modifies the discussion of deconstruction and ethics that he put forward in his earlier book, The Ethics of Deconstruction. Like that earlier work, Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity examines the nature–or rather, the possibility–of ethics and politics after (or during) deconstruction in relation primarily to the work of Jacques Derrida and Emmanuel Levinas. In contrast to his position in the earlier book, however, Critchley’s reading or assessment of Levinasian ethics in Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity is, as he puts it, “a critical reconstruction” (ix). Specifically, he extends, deepens, and modifies his arguments about the “persuasive force” of Levinasian ethics in regard to deconstruction. One way of reading Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity (a way that Critchley seems to encourage in the preface) is to see the culmination of this consideration of the subject in his affirmation of the political possibilities of deconstruction (chapter 12).

     

    However, because Critchley investigates subjectivity outside the issues of deconstruction and politics, it would be unfortunate to read his essays strictly in terms of such a culmination. For instance, his discussions of subjectivity, ethics, sublimation, and art in “The Original Traumatism: Levinas and Psychoanalysis” (chapter 8) and in “Das Ding: Lacan and Levinas” (chapter 9) provide a reconstruction (or an additional reading) of Levinasian ethics outside of the question of politics. In addition, and more importantly in regard to the aims of this review, Critchley’s careful treatment of subjectivity distinguishes Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity from a number of “postmodern” treatises on the subject. It is, I think, this carefulness (which is enacted as much as it is expressed) that makes the strongest case for the political possibilities of deconstruction.

     

    When I say “postmodern” treatises on the subject, I am referring to the work in a number of fields (e.g., literary theory, rhetoric and composition, and cultural studies) that takes for granted the dissolution of the humanist subject, declares its epiphenomenal status, and then celebrates postmodernism’s victory over the Enlightenment, or homo rhetoricus‘s victory over homo seriosus, often taking for granted the ascendancy of ethics over politics. Often these arguments contend that politics are based on the assumption that humans are free to deliberate on issues, to express opinions, and take collective action. However, since the means of reaching consensus are always already predetermined by hegemonic, capitalistic forces, the political endeavor–as traditionally understood, for example, in terms of various ideologies of the Enlightenment–is a doomed endeavor. It is on this basis that some scholars attempt to distinguish the ethical from the political, and in doing so advocate new modes of subjectivity or post-subjectivity–for instance, following Deleuze and Guattari, the schizophrenic or rhizomatic modes; following Baudrillard, the seductive mode; and following Gorgias, the sophistic mode. In fact, it is the question of subjectivity that seems to drive these arguments; that is, the exigency for their discussion of ethics and politics is the dissolution of the humanist subject. While I do not want to imply that such arguments are simplistic or unwarranted (since Quintilian’s “good man speaking well” is indeed alive and thriving), I do want to suggest that this exigency potentially leads to totalizing conceptions of the subject, or, conversely, of the dissolution of the subject, as well as problematic conceptions of the relationship between ethics and politics.

     

    It is precisely this exigency that Critchley problematizes in his third chapter, “Post-Deconstructive Subjectivity.” By turning Heidegger’s critique of Husserl (and Descartes) back onto Heidegger, Critchley explores the possibility of a conception of the subject outside of metaphysics. Specifically, he argues that the very grounds that distinguish Dasein from a contemplative subject (the openness to the call to Being) can be read metaphysically, which is to say that they can be read as modes of authentic selfhood. “It is Dasein,” he claims, “who calls itself in the phenomenon of conscience, . . . and the voice of the friend that calls Dasein to its most authentic ability to be . . . is a voice that Dasein carries within it” (58). Based on this Heideggerian argument, then, there is no subject outside of metaphysics. From this position, Critchley questions the history and the presuppositions entailed in the idea of a post-metaphysical subject. Among these presuppositions, he contends, is the idea that we have achieved an “epochal break in the continuum of history.” “For reasons that one might call ‘classically’ Derridian,” he continues, “all ideas of exceeding the metaphysical closure should make us highly suspicious, and the seductive illusions of ‘overcoming’, ‘exceeding’, ‘transgressing’, ‘breaking through’, and ‘stepping beyond’ are a series of tropes that demand careful and persistent deconstruction” (59).

     

    Indeed, Critchley finds problematic the very argument that there was a metaphysical res cogitans, a subject of representation, in Descartes’s work–a paradigmatic case and a key starting point in the history of the idea of the unified subject. It is because this unified self has been retrospectively projected onto all conceptions of the subject since Descartes that Critchley sees the history of modern philosophy as (in part) “a series of caricatures or cartoon versions of the history of metaphysics, a series of narratives based upon a greater or lesser misreading of the philosophical tradition” (60). “Has there ever existed a unified conscious subject, a watertight Cartesian ego?” he asks (59).

     

    Although Critchley’s response to the question is “no,” he does not advocate a pre-Heideggerian conception of the subject, the subject that is outside metaphysics. In other words, Critchley argues, following John Llewelyn, that we must seek a conception of the subject that tries to avoid the metaphysics of subjectivity without falling into the metaphysical denial of metaphysics (73). Critchley finds this attempt in Levinasian ethics–in its nuanced account of metaphysics, subjectivity, and the relation between subjective experience and the other. For Critchley, what’s most important in Levinasian ethics is the shift from intentionality to sensing, which is to say the shift from representation to enjoyment. As Critchley puts it, “Levinas’s work offers a material phenomenology of subjective life. . . . The self-conscious, autonomous subject of intentionality is reduced to a living subject that is subject to the conditions of its existence” (63). It is because of this sentience that the I is capable of being called into question by the other. The I, in fact, is more accurately a me in Levinasian ethics and subjectivity in that the subject is subject precisely because it (its freedom) undergoes the call of the other. According to Critchley, then, the (post-) Levinasian conception of the subject does not react conservatively to the poststructuralist or antihumanist critique of subjectivity by trying to rehabilitate the free, autarchic ego (70). Rather, it needs these discourses in order to conceive of the subject as non-identical, overflowed, and dependent on that which is it incapable of knowing. “Levinasian ethics,” Critchley contends, “is a humanism, but it is a humanism of the other human being” (67).

     

    In the final section of the essay, Critchley argues that the Levinasian conception of the sentient, ethical subject is very close to the kind of postdeconstructive subjectivity sought by Derrida. According to Critchley, Derrida has called for a “new determination of the ‘subject’ in terms of responsibility, of an affirmative openness to the other prior to questioning” (71). While Critchley does not suggest that Derrida is referring only or directly to Levinas’s conception of the subject, he does stress the consonance between the subject that is formed by non-comprehensible experience of the other and the postdeconstructive subject alluded to by Derrida. He claims, for instance, that the determination of the Levinasian subject “takes place precisely in the space cleared by the anti-humanist and post-structuralist deconstruction of subjectivity” (73). What’s more, according to Critchley, is that Levinas offers a metaphysical account of ethics and the subject while simultaneously displacing and transforming metaphysical language. For example, in Levinas’s work, “ethics” is transformed to mean “a sensible responsibility to the singular other”; “metaphysics” becomes “the movement of positive desire tending towards infinite alterity,” and “subjectivity” is “pre-conscious, non-identical sentient subjection to the other” (75). As a result of these conceptual shifts, he argues, the Levinasian subject avoids predeconstructive metaphysics, or intentionality, without attempting a Heideggerian denial of metaphysics.

     

    In “Deconstruction and Pragmatism: Is Derrida a Private Ironist or a Public Liberal?” (chapter 4), Critchley moves away from a direct discussion of subjectivity in order to consider the political/public potentialities of deconstruction. Specifically, by taking issue with Richard Rorty’s classification of Derrida as a private ironist, he articulates a connection between Rorty’s conceptions of the public and the liberal ironist and Derrida’s conception of justice and thereby argues for the public value of deconstruction. Critchley begins this argument by problematizing the grounds upon which Rorty’s classification of Derrida depends. For Rorty, Critchley explains, Derrida is a private ironist because his projects have become individualized projects of self-creation or self-overcoming–they have become non-argumentative, oracular discourses that do not address the problems of social justice (95). In Critchley’s view, Rorty’s claim (his developmental thesis) depends upon a reductive periodization of Derrida’s work, as well as a foundational conception of argument or public discourse. Moreover, Critchley argues that what Rorty has observed is not a change in the public significance of Derrida’s work, but rather a shift “from a constative form of theorizing to a performative mode of writing, or, in other terms, from meta-language to language” (96).

     

    What ultimately problematizes Rorty’s classification, however, is the connection that Critchley sees between Rorty’s definition of public liberal and Derrida’s conception of justice. For Rorty, the public is defined as that which is concerned with “‘the suffering of other human beings’, with the attempt to minimize cruelty and work for social justice” (85). According to Critchley, this definition of the public (of liberalism) attempts to ground the criterion for moral obligation in a “sentient disposition that provokes compassion in the face of the other’s suffering” (90). This criterion, he continues to argue, is found in Levinasian ethics–it is the ethical relation to the other that takes place at the level of sensibility. In addition, this criterion is found in Derrida’s conception of justice. As Critchley explains it, “Derrida paradoxically defines justice as an experience of that which we are not able to experience, which is qualified as ‘the mystical’, ‘the impossible’, or ‘aporia’ . . . an ‘experience’ of the undecidable” (99). And for Derrida, it is the experience of justice–of the unknowable–that propels one forward into politics. Critchley is careful not to suggest that Derrida locates justice in politics. To the contrary, Derrida believes that no political decision can embody justice; however, no political should be made without passing through the aporia–the face to face–of justice. Critchley concludes, then, that “what motivates the practice of deconstruction is an ethical conception of justice, that is, by Rorty’s criteria, public and liberal” (102).

     

    While he certainly does not collapse the distinction between ethics and politics in this chapter, Critchley, through his interpretation of Derrida’s conception of justice, does cast doubt upon any kind of ethics/politics polemic. Put another way, I think that by destabilizing Rorty’s private/public distinction, Critchley opens up a space in which notions such as the “post-political” can be examined and possibly understood in light of more nuanced accounts of deconstruction. Moreover, Critchley’s argument for a Levinasian conception of subjectivity as the ethical basis of deconstruction (even if it is a more cautious or reconstructed argument) calls into question the kinds of subjectivity (schizophrenic, sophistic, etc.) that some scholars see as part and parcel of the poststructuralist deconstruction of the subject. Like Critchley, many of these scholars theorize a new kind of politics that comes after the ethical experience, after the deconstructive aporia. Requisite to experiencing this aporia, however, is a kind of Dionysian or Deleuzian subjectivity–an unhinging of desires or an experience of the multiple within the individual. The problem here, and it is a problem well illuminated in chapter 3, is that in the space left by the exiled humanist, metaphysical subject, these kinds of arguments insert yet another metaphysical subject. In other words, this subject, as well as the ethics derived from it, is something we can know and control–something that we can enact or release at the level of language by obfuscating meaning, identity, and representation. As a result, the aporia is playfully characterized as a utopian dimension of discourse–or worse, as an intellectual enterprise in which one can participate through self-reflexive, parodic, paradoxical, and digressive ways of writing. And it is by virtue of this characterization that the subject, it seems, is once again reduced to representation.

     

    Critchley takes up this issue of representation, or thematization, in his discussion of Levinasian ethics and psychoanalysis in chapter 8, “The Original Traumatism: Levinas and Psychoanalysis.” Here Critchley argues that Levinas attempts to articulate the relation to the other in a series of “termes éthiques“: accusation, persecution, obsession, substitution, hostage, and trauma (184). Like Levinas, Critchley points out that this attempt is an attempt to thematize the unthematizable; it is a phenomenology of the unphenomenologizable (184). Quite contrary to Levinas, however, Critchley sees this language as indicative of a psychoanalytic understanding of the unconscious. Of particular interest to Critchley is Levinas’s use of the term “trauma.” He writes, “Levinas tries to thematize the subject that is, according to me, the condition of possibility for the ethical relation with the notion of trauma. He thinks the subject as trauma–ethics is a traumatology” (185).

     

    Critchley’s question to Levinas (a question which he admits is in opposition to Levinas’s intentions) is: “What does it mean to think the subject–the subject of the unconscious–as trauma?” (188). To begin with, according to Critchley, thinking the Levinasian subject as trauma means that the ethical relation “takes place at the level of pre-reflective sensibility and not at the level of reflective consciousness” (188). More specifically, and based on the “Substitution” chapter of Otherwise than Being, Critchley writes that the subject as trauma is a subject utterly responsible for the suffering that it undergoes–it is a subject of persecution, outrage, and suffering. He later describes this original traumatism as a deafening traumatism, as “that towards which I relate in passivity that exceeds representation, i.e. that exceeds the intentional act of consciousness, that cannot be experienced as an object” (190). “In other terms,” he continues, “the subject is constituted–without its knowledge, prior to cognition and recognition–in a relation that exceeds representation, intentionality, symmetry, correspondence, coincidence, equality and reciprocity, that is to say, to any form of ontology, whether phenomenological or dialectical” (190).

     

    Despite Levinas’ resistance to psychoanalytic theory, Critchley believes that his conceptions of the subject and the ethical relation depend on, to put it in Lacanian terms, “a relation to the real, through the non-intentional affect of jouissance, where the original traumatism of the other is the Thing, das Ding” (190). Without this notion or mechanism of trauma, Critchley claims, there would be no ethics in the Levinasian sense of the word (195). Taking this connection further, he writes that “without a relation to trauma, or at least without a relation to that which claims, calls, commands, summons, interrupts or troubles the subject . . . there would no ethics, neither an ethics of phenomenology, nor an ethics of psychoanalysis” (195). Finally, foreshadowing his argument in chapter 12, Critchley contends that without this ethical relation, one could not conceive a politics that would refuse the category of totality. It is the absence of this ethical relation–this passivity towards the other–that seems to limit, if not debilitate, so many other recent discussions of ethics, politics, and subjectivity.

     

    In chapter 12, “The Other’s Decision in Me (What are the Politics of Friendship?),” Critchley focuses primarily on the question of a non-totalizing politics, positioning his previous discussions of subjectivity as a context for his argument. As he explains early in the essay, through a reading of Blanchot’s Friendship, as well as a reading of Derrida’s reading of Blanchot in The Politics of Friendship, Critchley examines this question in regard to Derrida’s recent Adieu to Emmanuel Levinas. By way of this discussion of friendship, and its relation to the public and the private and to politics, Critchley argues that despite the connections between Derrida’s conception of “sur-vivance” (his attempt to think a nontraditional conception of the passive decision of friendship that is linked to mortality) and Levinas’s ethical relation to the other, there is an important distance between Derrida’s work and that of Levinas. Critchley sees this distance as the result of five problems in Levinas: (1) the idea of fraternity, (2) the question of God, (3) his androcentric conception of friendship, (4) the relation of friendship to the “family schema,” and (5) the political fate of Levinasian ethics in regards to the question of Israel (273-74).

     

    With these problems in mind, Critchley goes on to provide a positive reading of Derrida’s position on politics in Adieu. According to Critchley, although Derrida recognizes the gap in Levinas’s work in regard to the path from the ethical to the political, he does not read it as paralysis or resignation. On the contrary, this hiatus, says Critchley, “allows Derrida both to affirm the primacy of an ethics of hospitality, whilst leaving open the sphere of the political as a realm of risk and danger” (275). It is this danger that allows for what Derrida refers to as “political invention”–an invention or creation that arises from “a response to the utter singularity of a particular and inexhaustible context” (276). Critchley then describes this response as both non-foundational and non-arbitrary–which is to say that it is a response that is both unknowable and passive. It is in this respect that Critchley relates political invention to Derrida’s nontraditional conception of friendship, his notion of “the other’s decision is made in me” (277). In summary Critchley writes that “what we seem to have here is a relation between friendship and democracy, or ethics and politics . . . which leaves the decision open for invention whilst acknowledging that the decision comes from the other” (277).

     

    As I have argued throughout this review, it is the acknowledgment of the other that distinguishes Ethics, Politics, Subjectivity from so many other works on subjectivity, ethics, and politics. Without this acknowledgment, that is, without being affected by a consideration of the incomprehensible or unthematizable, these works risk a kind of totality–they risk saying what the subject is (a fragmented stream of desires) and what it isn’t (a unified, coherent self). That they can know undermines their discussions of the other, reducing it at times to a trope. This is not to say that all discussions of subjectivity, ethics, and politics must be Levinasian. However, since they tend to use this term, “other,” in addition to many Derridian terms, in order to wage war on metaphysics, the Enlightenment, and humanism, it seems that closer readings of deconstruction, subjectivity, ethics, and politics are called for. Critchley has begun to answer that call.

     

    Work Cited

     

    • Llewelyn, John. The Middle Voice of Ecological Conscience: A Chiasmic Reading of Responsibility in the Neighborhood of Levinas, Heidegger, and Others. New York: St. Martin’s P, 1991.

     

  • The Deus Ex-Machina

    Juan E. de Castro

    Division of Liberal Arts and International Studies
    Colorado School of Mines
    jdecastr@mines.edu

     

    Review of: Jerry Hoeg, Science, Technology, and Latin American Narrative in the Twentieth Century and Beyond.Bethlehem, PA: Lehigh UP, 2000.

     

    During the electoral process of 1990, Alberto Fujimori, a little-known agricultural engineer and academic, stormed the Peruvian political scene. One of the keys to his mass appeal lay in his often-repeated promise to bring “honradez, tecnología y trabajo” (honesty, technology, and jobs) to Peru. This slogan responded directly to the concerns of a country fed up with the demagogy, corruption, and inefficiency of then-President Alan García’s regime. However, while the slogan implies, at least in part, a moral and political critique of García’s failed populism, Fujimori’s reference to tecnología signifies his campaign’s privileging of technology as the solution to the problems of Peru. Thus one can argue that Fujimori’s propagandistic mantra was also implicitly directed against the presidential candidate then leading the polls, the internationally renowned novelist Mario Vargas Llosa.

     

    It is, therefore, possible to see in this election a sign of contemporary Latin American attitudes regarding what C.P. Snow once called “the two cultures” (scientific versus humanistic). Faced with the choice between an engineer and a man of letters, and by implication between technological and humanities-based paradigms for the interpretation of and solution to the country’s problems, the Peruvian population decided in favor of the technocrat.1 At the dawn of the twentieth century, the Uruguayan José Enrique Rodó could, in his classic essay Ariel, argue for the superiority of a supposedly spiritual and artistic Latin America over a more developed, in technological and material terms, United States. But, by the end of the century, the privileging of technology–seen as neutral, apolitical, and necessarily positive–was a tenet held by large sectors of the population of Peru and the region as a whole, as demonstrated in part by the electoral success of Fujimori. While this faith in technological development as the solution to all social problems echoes discourses popular in the “First World” media, it also reflects the desire of Latin America’s population to break the cycle of poverty in which the region has been trapped. However, in one of the great ironies in Peruvian history, Fujimori’s now fortunately defunct regime has left the country mired in corruption, unemployment, poverty, and, of course, technological underdevelopment. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether Fujimori’s failure has significantly altered Latin American or even Peruvian attitudes toward technology.

     

    This centrality of technology in contemporary Latin American political discourse gives special relevance to Jerry Hoeg’s Science, Technology, and Latin American Narrative in the Twentieth Century and Beyond. This book consists of a series of powerful and persuasive interpretations of Latin American texts that emphasize the ideas (both explicit and implicit) regarding technology and science to be found in them. Hoeg’s readings are rooted in a theoretical framework that fuses Martin Heidegger’s and José Ortega y Gasset’s “philosophies of technology,” Cornelius Castoriadis’s notion of the “Social Imaginary,” and concepts originating in communications science, such as “code” and “redundancy.” From Heidegger and Ortega, Hoeg takes the idea that “the essence of our present technological era is nothing technological, but rather the product of a higher level mediation. Heidegger calls this mediation das Ge-stell, while Ortega refers to it as the social construction or definition of bienestar or well-being” (11).

     

    Hoeg sees Ge-stell/bienestar as defining the central code of the West, what Hoeg, following Castoriadis, terms its “Social Imaginary” (18).2 Using the concepts of Ge-stell/bienestar and that of the Social Imaginary, Hoeg deconstructs the traditional opposition between science and the humanities. Rather than presenting them as dichotomous, he believes that both technology and the humanities, especially literature, express in different, occasionally even contradictory, manners the same societal Ge-stell/bienestar. From the point of view of communications science, technology and literature can, therefore, be interpreted as examples of “the redundancy necessary to protect the message against the perturbations of a ‘noisy’ environment. . . . Without this coding or redundancy, a given society must necessarily succumb to the effects predicted by the Second Law of Thermodynamics, that is, it would become more and more entropic over time, until it eventually dissolved into complete disorder” (30). Thus, for Hoeg,

     

    Literature, technology, and science are among the societal messages that help constitute a Western society/communications system built upon a Ge-stell/ bienestar (and Social Imaginary) that has ultimately led not only to “controlling nature” and its side-consequences of ecological degradation, but also to “controlling humanity” and the decomposition of any semblance of social equity. (63)

     

    While the Latin American “cult of technology” is generally linked to the embrace of economic neoliberalism and the celebration of the United States (understood as the Mecca of consumerism and unbridled free markets) as the privileged societal model, Hoeg presents his analysis as oppositional to the current economic, political, and social order.3 In fact, he claims “the ultimate aim of this inquiry is to shed light on the possibility of constructing alternative codes or mediations which will produce sociotechnical messages of empowerment rather than domination” (10). And this desire for a radical change in the current Social Imaginary leads him to speculate on the possibility of a Heideggerian “Turning” from the Ge-stell that has led to our current ecological and social impasses and that would thus bring “a new coding of the relationship between nature, society, and technics [uses of technology]” (22-23). Moreover, based on his vision of society as a communications system, as well as on Ortega’s notion of bienestar as socially constructed, he believes one can assign to literature and literary criticism a central role in this possible “Turning”: “The fact that a given society’s ‘system of necessities’ is constrained and mediated by the Social Imaginary raises the question of the possible influence of literature in reshaping that Social Imaginary” (38). Hoeg not only breaks down the opposition between science/technology and the humanities/literature, he identifies the latter as a possible source of change of the Ge-stell/bienestar and the Social Imaginary.

     

    From this brief and, of necessity, incomplete summary of Hoeg’s complex theoretical framework, it should be clear that Science, Technology, and Latin American Narrative is built on a contrary philosophical base that, while not invalidating the study’s importance, is symptomatic of certain characteristic problems faced by criticism in the present political and theoretical conjuncture. But, as we will see, Hoeg’s selection of texts and his interpretation of Latin American reality camouflage the theoretical disjunctions present in this study.

     

    These contradictions are directly linked to Hoeg’s simultaneous reliance on Heidegger and Ortega. Hoeg himself notes that:

     

    A key distinction between the view postulated by Ortega and that adumbrated by Heidegger concerns the role of technics in human socio-cultural activity. For Heidegger, the imposition of a certain metaphysical enframing or Ge-stell–the Social Imaginary–is an essential feature of the Western human condition which leads inevitably to our current technological society. For Ortega, on the other hand, the technics used to realize the creative projects of humanity can also lead to symbolic rather that [sic] imaginary constructions, that is, to cultural messages, such as art or literature, which can produce a society whose relations with the real are not predominantly rationalist or metaphysical. (20)

     

    In other words, the appropriation of Heidegger’s concept of das Ge-stell necessarily leads to a deterministic vision of the development of Western culture. Western civilization–which now includes the whole world–is thus a system that can only develop in the direction pre-programmed by the Ge-stell. True change is precluded. It is, therefore, not surprising that Heidegger sees the “Turning” in mystical, even messianic terms:

     

    But the surmounting of a destining of Being–here and now the surmounting of Enframing–each time comes to pass out of the arrival of another destining that does not allow itself to be either logically or historically predicted or to be metaphysically construed as a sequence belonging to a process of history. (qtd. in Hoeg 22)

     

    Unpredictable and nearly inconceivable, the “Turning” implies the irruption into the closed system of Western civilization of an unknown and unknowable external element capable of making visible the until-then “concealed truth” of the prevailing Ge-stell and, therefore, of presenting an alternative road that can lead to the “surmounting” of the path trodden, according to Heidegger, by our culture since Socrates. But Ortega’s bienestar, at least in Hoeg’s interpretation, includes social change in its definition. As society changes, and as the discourses society produces change, bienestar can change. Bienestar thus not only determines history, but is also historically determined. Beneath the obvious similarities, Ge-stell and bienestar are, therefore, irreconcilable concepts.

     

    This tension between the Heideggerian and Ortegan poles is present throughout Science, Technology, and Latin American Narrative. Hoeg’s simultaneous reliance on bienestar and Ge-stell leads him to a contradictory search for possible agents of the “Turning” and a simultaneous dismissal of these same agents. Building on Ortega and communications science, Hoeg proposes literature as a possible source for the “Turning.” In fact, he ends his study by suggesting this possibility: “I would argue that if it [Latin American society] can change its social coding, a precondition of such a change is an awareness of the present coding, and that one source of this awareness can be found in Latin American narrative, if only we would look” (122). While Hoeg identifies what could be categorized as the kernels of a truly emancipating discourse in, for instance, the implicit criticism of the “techno-military-political structure” to be found in Gabriel García Márquez’s One Hundred Years of Solitude (33), or in the implied acknowledgment that “technology can be usefully contested only at the level of the code” discernable in Jorge Amado’s Gabriela (38), among other examples, his general evaluation of Latin American narrative and criticism is pessimistic. Hoeg finds that Latin American narrative and criticism, despite their often progressive tinge, are, as one would expect from Heidegger’s analysis, “mediated by the metaphysics of Modernity,” “mediated by a now global Social Imaginary,” and, furthermore, that “what these narratives do is perpetuate that enframing which is the essence of technology” (122). The same texts that are somehow a source for emancipation also help perpetuate the “metaphysics” of Modernity. (Indeed, both evaluations of Latin American literature are made on the same page of Science, Technology and Latin American Narrative.)

     

    Another facet of the aporia present throughout Hoeg’s study can be found in his analysis of cybernetic technology and the concomitant new media as possible “sources” for the “Turning.” Thus, Hoeg entertains the possibility that “the radical differences of electronically mediated communication” could lead to a “new social narrative” (25). Here Hoeg joins hands with other celebrants of the postmodern and even posthuman condition, such as N. Katherine Hayles and Donna Haraway. For instance, Hoeg quotes approvingly Haraway’s vision of the posthuman as overcoming “the tradition of racist male-dominated capitalism; the tradition of progress; the tradition of the appropriation of nature as resource for the productions of culture; the tradition of the reproduction of the self from the reflection of the other” (24). What is ironic is that Hoeg’s (as well as Hayles’s and Haraway’s) celebration of cybernetics and current digital innovations is nothing but the mirror image of the blind faith in technology commonplace in contemporary Latin America. If Fujimori and Latin American neo-liberals propose technology as the solution to the problems raised by the region’s lack of a “modern condition,” Hoeg, like the prophets of the posthuman, finds in current digital technologies the antidote to the “metaphysics of Modernity.”

     

    Needless to say, this belief in technology as leading not only to social change but also to a kind of utopia where all the dichotomies that haunt modernity are sutured into what could be called a “heterogeneous plenitude” contradicts the Heideggerean pole of Hoeg’s arguments. From a Heideggerean perspective, cybernetics and digital technology are nothing but the latest and until now fullest stage in the development of the Ge-stell. Hoeg, however, stops short of the full identification of technological development with the agent for the “Turning.” Despite his celebration of “postmodernity” and the “posthuman,” he remains aware of the fact that “new technologies are routinely heralded as the solution to all problems, only to be coopted shortly thereafter by the ‘system’” and of “the present impossibility of reconciling cyberscience with Third World realities” (26).

     

    It is possible, however, to argue that the contradiction between the Heideggerean Ge-stell and the Ortegan bienestar is not as clear in the case of Latin America as it would be in that of the “First World.” Despite Hoeg’s belief in the need to create a discourse of empowerment that would help generate the conditions necessary for the “Turning,” his analysis implies the impossibility of a willful change in the Ge-stell or the bienestar. After all, according to Hoeg’s version of Ortega’s bienestar, change at this level is rooted in technics. Thus Hoeg’s (as well as Hayles’s and Haraway’s) celebration of the possibilities for social change created by technological change and the new discourses derived from it is fully congruent with the version of Ortega presented in Science, Technology, and Latin American Narrative. For Hoeg, change in the Social Imaginary originates in the possibilities created by the new digital and cybernetic technologies and media and not in any type of political or social resistance (although new technologies may give rise to the latter). While bienestar is grounded in history, it is doubtful whether Ortega’s concept can be seen as directly justifying any type of individual or group action. Moreover, since Latin American literature and criticism are described as trapped by the “global Social Imaginary” and without access to the apparently liberating possibilities generated by cybernetic technology and its concomitant media, the region can only depend on a deus ex-machina for its liberation.

     

    Hoeg somewhat unwillingly acknowledges the true consequences of his analysis when he asks, “Can Latin American society change its system of necessities without a wholesale change in the global Social Imaginary, or must it await the arrival of a new global destining in order to surmount its current enframing?” (122). It is this question, rather than the somewhat forced attempt at presenting Latin American literature as leading to “an awareness of the present coding” (122), that comes closest to being the logical conclusion of his study. When it comes to Latin America, both the Ortegan and Heideggerean poles of Science, Technology, and Latin American Narrative are reconciled.

     

    Hoeg’s pessimism may, however, be reinforced by what I believe is a mistaken description of attitudes toward technology in Latin America. This misrepresentation is reinforced by his selection of texts. While there is no denying the importance of most of the texts chosen by Hoeg, the nearly exclusive selection of “Magic Realist” novels and other anti-rationalist texts such as Vasconcelos’s La raza cósmica skews his vision of Latin American narrative and culture.4 For instance, based on his analysis of García Márquez’s One Hundred Years of Solitude and Isabel Allende’s The House of the Spirits, Hoeg comes to the conclusion that contemporary Latin American fiction and, one can assume, criticism, are characterized by rejecting “technology . . . as imposed foreign domination” and as believing that it “leads inevitably to disastrous consequences” (35). However, as Fujimori’s slogan exemplifies, this is far from being today the only or, I would argue, the hegemonic attitude toward technology. In fact, rather than being possessed by an uncritical technophobia, many Latin Americans have been, to paraphrase the Mexican critic Carlos Monsiváis, “blinded by technology.”5 And this societal technophilia has led to the proliferation of writings on technology. For instance, many of Latin America’s most influential newspapers include weekly sections on technology that while frequently being just another cog in the cyber-industry’s advertising machinery also occasionally incorporate significant reflections on the subject.6

     

    This interest in technology, although clearly boosted by the “digital revolution,” is, moreover, not a new phenomenon. Monsiváis dates it to the post-Second World War and, in particular, to the introduction of television (211-12). Moreover, if, following Hoeg, one looks for literary reflections on technology, one can safely include texts that span much of the twentieth century. Such texts would include Spanish American vanguardista and Brazilian modernista narratives and poems of the 1920s, Roberto Arlt’s El juguete rabioso (1931), Adolfo Bioy Casares’s Morel’s Invention (1940), and, from an indigenista perspective, José María Arguedas’s poem “Oda al jet” (1967).7 And the obvious affinity between Borges’s interest in levels of reality in his stories prefigures contemporary concerns regarding virtual realities and simulacra present in such recent science fiction films as The Matrix, The Thirteenth Floor, and Existenz, or the Spanish Open Your Eyes and its American remake Vanilla Sky.8

     

    Nevertheless, the cultural vein analyzed by Hoeg is still important. The fact is that despite the region’s current obsession with technological development, “Magical Realism” expresses a significant tendency in Latin American culture. It is not accidental that One Hundred Years of Solitude is generally considered to be the most important Latin American novel, or that the works of Isabel Allende and Laura Esquivel are frequently best-sellers in the region. Dissatisfaction with a technological progress that never fully arrives, and distrust of a never-ending process of modernization that seems to exacerbate social inequality and environmental degradation, are the underside of the region’s technophilia.

     

    Thus, despite the contradictions and omissions analyzed above, Science, Technology, and Latin American Narrative is a groundbreaking work. Hoeg’s profound, though problematic, philosophical framework leads him to read the texts selected from a new and topically relevant perspective. After all, technology is at the center of contemporary existence, whether in the so-called “First” or “Third” World, and any attempt at thinking through social change must necessarily deal with the problematics of technology, technics, and science. And the anti-technological (and anti-rational) tradition identified and studied by Hoeg is an important tendency in Latin American culture, though at the present it is far from hegemonic. Hoeg is not alone in his inability to reconcile his desire for social change with his analyses of society and literature. Rather, this simultaneous dissatisfaction with existing social reality and an incapacity to imagine a way to move beyond it is the quandary faced by much postmodern thought. If earlier generations of critics (especially Latin American and Latin Americanist) could find in revolution the deus ex-machina capable of changing reality, it would seem that today one has to be satisfied with finding in technology, discourse, or literature the seeds of a change nearly impossible to imagine.

     

    Notes

     

    1. It is necessary to point out that I am referring to the connotations implicit in Vargas Llosa’s and Fujimori’s professions, rather than to the actual political positions held by both then candidates. Vargas Llosa, as a staunch neo-liberal, is far from being a technophobe and believes that “the internationalization of modern life–of markets, of technology, of capital–permits any country . . . to achieve rapid growth” (45). It must be noted, however, that Fujimori’s campaign played up not only his career–frequently contrasting it with his rival’s profession as a novelist–but also his Japanese background. The Japanese in Peru, as in other countries, are associated with technological prowess, among other traits.

     

    2. Heidegger defines the Ge-stell or “Enframing” as “the gathering together that belongs to that setting-upon man and puts him in position to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering as a standing-reserve,” and notes that “Enframing, as the challenging-forth into ordering, sends into a way of revealing” (24). Ortega y Gasset argues that the concept of bienestar incorporates not only physical necessities but also “the objectively superfluous” considered by a group of people as necessary (294). Thus bienestar determines technology: “technology is a system of actions called forth and directed by these necessities, it likewise is of a Protean nature and ever changing” (294). Castoriadis defines the Social Imaginary as the element “which gives a specific orientation to every institutional system, which overdetermines the choice and the connections of symbolic networks, which is the creation of each historical period, its singular manner of living, of seeing and of conducting its own existence, its world, and its relations with this world” (145). Despite the fact that one can establish differences between the three concepts (Ge-stell and bienestar are presented as defining technology, while the Social Imaginary determines society as a whole; and unlike Ge-stell, bienestar and the Social Imaginary are explicitly presented as historically determined), they all imply the existence of higher-level mediations for technology and/or society. In Hoeg’s study the exact relationship between Ge-stell, bienestar, and the Social Imaginary is, however, not fully theorized. Although Hoeg frequently uses the concepts of Ge-stell and bienestar as synonymous with that of the Social Imaginary–see the quotation in paragraph 7–it is not clear whether they only determine the fields of Western science, modern technology, and “creative production” (18). In other words, Hoeg doesn’t make explicit whether he believes that the code that “overdetermines” science and technology actually determines society as a whole, or that it is simply one of the “ensemble of societal codes that constitute . . . [the] Social Imaginary,” even if the most important (30).

     

    3. Carlos Monsiváis, the astute Mexican cultural critic, describes this attitude in the following terms: “Technology blinds and there is no doubt about the correct strategy: imitate [everything] North American” (212). The translation is mine.

     

    4. The novels studied by Hoeg include such “Magical Realist” texts as Gabriel García Márquez’s One Hundred Years of Solitude, Isabel Allende’s House of the Spirits, and Laura Esquivel’s Like Water for Chocolate. He also analyzes the Brazilian film O Boto that, in its use of regional myths, shows a certain affinity with the Magical Realism of these novels.

     

    5. See note 3.

     

    6. Among the major newspapers that include weekly sections on technology are the Argentinean La Nación and El Clarín, the Mexican La Jornada, the Brazilian O Estado de São Paulo, and the Peruvian El Comercio. Nahif Yehva’s articles on the Internet, software, and hardware for La Jornada can serve as an example of the critical discourse presented in the Latin American mass media.

     

    7. Vicky Unruh, in her account of Spanish American vanguardia and Brazilian modernista poetic movements of the 1920s, Latin American Vanguards: The Art of Contentious Encounters, writes about this interest in technology: “Vanguardist expression reinforced this self-defining image of artists as workers by portraying artistic work with technological or athletic motifs, a poetics of airplanes, automobiles, elevators, bicycles, and trampolines” (80). Flora Süssekind describes the relation of pre-modernista and modernista literature, with technology as “flirtation, friction, or appropriation” (4). In both the cases of Brazil and Spanish America, the attitude of writers toward technology during the first decades of the century cannot be characterized as being exclusively, or even mainly, one of rejection.

     

    8. This interest in simulacra, virtual realities, and technology is precisely the topic of Bioy’s Morel’s Invention, which, as is well known, is based on an idea by Borges.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Castoriadis, Cornelius. The Imaginary Institution of Society. Trans. Kathleen Blamey. Cambridge, MA: MIT P, 1987.
    • Heidegger, Martin. “The Question Concerning Technology.” The Question Concerning Technology, and Other Essays. Trans. William Lovitt. New York: Garland, 1977. 3-35.
    • Monsiváis, Carlos. Aires de familia: Cultura y sociedad en América Latina. Barcelona: Editorial Anagrama, 2000.
    • Ortega y Gasset, José. “Thoughts on Technology.” Trans. Helene Weyl. Philosophy and Technology: Readings in the Philosophical Problems of Technology. Ed. Carl Mitcham and Robert Mackey. New York: Free, 1972. 290-313.
    • Süssekind, Flora. Cinematograph of Words: Literature, Technique, and Modernization in Brazil. Trans. Paulo Henriques Britto. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1997.
    • Unruh, Vicky. Latin American Vanguards: The Art of Contentious Encounters. Berkeley, CA: U of California P, 1994.
    • Vargas Llosa, Mario. A Fish in the Water: A Memoir. Trans. Helen Lane. New York: Farrar, 1994.

     

  • Demonstration and Democracy

    Arkady Plotnitsky

    Theory and Cultural Studies Program
    Department of English
    Purdue University
    aplotnit@sla.purdue.edu

     

    Review of: Bruno Latour, Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies.Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1999.

     

    Scientists are becoming more attentive to and are addressing more openly the relationships between politics and science. (Many scientists have of course–at least since Galileo, if not Archimedes or even the pre-Socratics–been aware of and had to confront the complexity of these relationships.) As I am writing this review, I am reading a commentary by Roger A. Pielke Jr., “Science Policy: Policy, Politics, and Perspective,” in the current issue of Nature (28 March 2002), dealing with these relationships in their, I would argue, postmodern specificity, as does Bruno Latour’s Pandora’s Hope. The timing of the Nature article could not be more auspicious for this review, but other examples, articles, and books, technical and popular, are not hard to come by.

     

    It is difficult to say to what degree this increased attention is specifically due to the influence of what is known as science studies or social, or sometimes social-constructivist, studies of science, a controversial field that has emerged during the last several decades and to which Latour’s work largely belongs. It is also not altogether clear how much this attention was influenced by the controversies themselves around science studies, most recently the so-called “Science Wars.” The latter followed the appearance of Paul Gross and Norman Levitt’s book Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and its Quarrels with Science (1994), theoretical physicist Alan Sokal’s hoax article published in the journal Social Text (1995), and Impostures intellectueles (1998), co-authored by Sokal and another theoretical physicist, Jean Bricmont, first published in France, and then in England and the U.S., under the title Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science (1998). Latour has been a prominent subject of and participant in the Science Wars debates, beginning with Gross and Levitt’s book, and through Latour’s responses to his critics, including those in Pandora’s Hope (some among the essays included in the book have been published earlier). Some of these debates have been conducted in scientific journals, such as Nature and Physics Today, and have involved leading scientists. Accordingly, they may have had an impact (it is, again, difficult to say how large) on the proliferating discussions of the relationships between politics and science in the scientific community. It would be hard, however, to underestimate other factors involved, from increasing competition for funding to the problems of bioethics; these may indeed be the more significant ones.

     

    Be that as it may, Latour’s work and arguments, as presented in the book, could help scientists and others who want to understand the complexity, “the Gordian knot,” as Latour called it in his earlier We Have Never Been Modern, of the postmodern entanglement of politics and science. Indeed, the three problem phenomena invoked by the Nature article just cited, under the fitting heading “Gridlock”–“global climate change,” “nuclear power,” and “biodiversity” (367)–are paradigmatically Latourian, and the first is specifically invoked by him in We Have Never Been Modern. That need not mean that scientists or others must agree with Latour’s analysis (the present author does not always either). But they might do well to engage with it properly, or at least to stay with it for more than a sentence or two, the usual limit of most “science warriors,” which also applies to other postmodernists they “read.” I am not sure how much hope–this may be a kind of Pandora’s hope in turn–one might hold here, and sometimes the Pandora’s-box nature of these works, Latour’s included, complicates their chances. I am not sure that humanists, especially historians, sociologists, and philosophers of science, will always give Latour the chance he deserves either. I hope they will.

     

    Beyond serving as a useful introduction to the current stage of science studies and as a commentary on the Science Wars (and it is, again, worth reading for the sake of these subjects alone), Pandora’s Hope pursues, with many notable successes, at least three ambitious and interconnected tasks. The first is to redefine the concept of reality by using the research undertaken in science studies; the second is to rethink the relationships between science and politics in modern (ultimately extending from Plato) and then postmodern culture; and the third is to redefine political philosophy–indeed, Latour appears to suggest, even to define it meaningfully for the first time. These tasks are interconnected in part because the phenomena in question are, Latour rightly argues, themselves irreducibly interconnected. In particular, there can be no modernity or postmodernity other than scientific, as science was irreducibly involved with setting up what Latour calls, in We Have Never Been Modern, “the modern constitution,” which unequivocally separated nature and politics. Or rather, the moderns only claim (and can only claim) to separate them, since such a separation is, in principle, impossible, as both are ultimately entangled in any phenomena, scientific or political. Hence, Latour’s title, We Have Never Been Modern. Pandora’s Hope builds on and deepens this argument.

     

    The book has some key “postmodern” allies, in particular Michel Serres, Gilles Deleuze (in part via Isabelle Stengers’s work) and Jean-François Lyotard, who, while mentioned only in passing, may be more important for the book than it might appear. Indeed, I would argue that Latour’s work is much more postmodern, at least in Lyotard’s sense, than he is willing to acknowledge. Latour’s argument that “we have never been modern” can be coordinated with Lyotard’s famous maxim that the postmodern precedes the modern, in a pre-logical rather than ontological sense. This sense is defined by a complex underlying (“postmodern”) dynamics that both gives rise to and is suppressed or repressed by the modern, not unlike the way in which the hybrid or the “factish” (combining “fact” and “fetish”) are repressed by the moderns’ unequivocal separations (into nature and politics, into facts and fetishes) in Latour. This kind of postmodernism, that is, the one that is both Lyotardian and Latourian (keeping in mind the differences between Lyotard’s and Latour’s views), helps the richness and effectiveness of Latour’s analysis, rather than misses its arguments, as some postmodernisms, or at least some postmodernists, indeed might. Reciprocally, Latour’s analysis enriches and expands our understanding of postmodern culture and the role of science and technology in it.

     

    The book has nine hefty chapters (and a substantial conclusion). The first, “Do You Believe in Reality?: News from the Trenches of the Science War,” serves as an introduction and a set-up, but it is significant in its own right in giving its title question a necessary complexity and a necessary ambiguity, or in Niels Bohr’s phrase “essential ambiguity,” without which one cannot perhaps refer to any form of ultimate reality. The next four chapters are case studies, vintage Latour and engrossing reading, but with significant philosophical twists. Two of them, Chapters 4 and 5, extend Latour’s justly famous work on Louis Pasteur. Latour’s work is arguably the best that science studies has to offer us, in part given its greater philosopher charge, which contrasts with most other works in this generally more empiricist field. The case studies also ground and prepare the last three, more philosophical, chapters, on which I shall primarily concentrate here. These chapters define the book’s achievement as a contribution to the current state of the debates concerning the relationships between science and culture, politics included. The Science Wars are, Latour argues, a reflection and an effect of this role.

     

    Indeed, as he became arguably the main target of the Science Wars scientific critics, at least as far as science studies are concerned (Lacan, Deleuze, and, overt disclaimers to the contrary, Derrida, are targeted for their “postmodernist” abuses of science), Latour gets hold of some among the deeper underlying forces involved in shaping the confrontation. Reciprocally, however, these forces define the postmodern philosophical, cultural, and political scene. As I said, the grounds for both this insight into the Science Wars and the underlying play of forces in question are prepared in We Have Never Been Modern and, to some degree, already in Conversations on Science, Culture, and Time by Serres and Latour. The workings of these forces are now traced to Plato’s Gorgias (not coincidentally, Lyotard discusses Gorgias, the philosopher, in The Differend as well), in Chapter 7, “The Inventions of the Science War: The Settlement of Socrates and Callicles” and in Chapter 8, “A Politics Freed from Science: The Body Cosmopolitics.”

     

    Stephen Weinberg’s comment in his “Sokal’s Hoax,” parallel to Socrates’s (broader) view of the role of geometry in the world (human and divine) in Gorgias, provides a fitting point of departure: “Our civilization has been powerfully affected by the discovery that nature is strictly governed by impersonal laws….We will need to confirm and strengthen the vision of a rationally understandable world if we are to protect ourselves from the irrational tendencies that still best humanity” (216). Weinberg is not wrong in the first part of this statement, although one could, and Latour does, assess the value and significance of this impact differently. The impact itself may indeed be traced to the Greeks’ invention of mathematics rather than, as in Weinberg’s narrower context, to the invention of modern (mathematical) physics by Galileo and, especially, by Newton. It is Weinberg’s second statement, or rather the conjunction of both statements thus defined, that is Latour’s primary target. Alan Sokal’s “serious” “political,” including his “Marxist,” arguments, may be shown to follow the same “logic” (quotation marks appear obligatory here). To the degree, which is large, that this conjunction defines the Science Wars, one can indeed trace their invention to Plato’s Gorgias, defined by “the strong link…between the respect for impersonal natural laws, on the one hand, and the fight against irrationality, immorality, and political disorder, on the other” (217). More accurately, in Socrates’s case one would speak of the universal laws (of geometry), more those of mind than of nature, and Weinberg, in fairness, does not claim a role for mathematics beyond science, as his immediate context is more narrowly and differently defined. Essentially, however, Latour’s argument stands, given the deeper underpinning of Weinberg’s argument. Indeed Latour’s immediate elaboration nearly makes the case. He writes:

     

    In both quotations the fate of Reason and the fate of Politics are associated in a single destiny. To attack Reason is to render morality and social peace impossible. Right is what protects us against Might; Reason against civil warfare. The common tenet is that we need something “inhuman”–for Weinberg, the natural law no human has constructed; for Socrates, geometry whose demonstrations escape human whim–if we want to be able to fight against “inhumanity.” To sum up: only inhumanity will quash inhumanity. Only a Science that is not made by man will protect a Body Politic that is in constant risk of being made by the mob. Yes, Reason is our rampart, our Great Wall of China, our Maginot Line against the dangerous unruly mob. (217)

     

    What is perhaps most remarkable about this, one might say, naïve view, naïve as concerns both science or mathematics (for example, in applying to nature, including the nature of mind, a human, “all too human,” concept of law) and politics, or the relationships between them, is that it has been so successful. For, as Latour immediately observes, “this line of reasoning, which I will call ‘inhumanity against inhumanity,’ has been attacked ever since it began, from the Sophists, against whom Plato launches his all-out assault, all the way to the motley gang of people accused of ‘postmodernism’ (an accusation, by the way, as vague as the curse of being a ‘sophist’)” (217). Indeed the two accusations are often vaguely combined. There is no simple answer to the question why these counterarguments have more often failed than succeeded, and it would, accordingly, be difficult to blame Latour for not really pursuing the subject in the book. But he could have. This relative lack of success, admittedly, gives the other side of the Science Wars additional ammunition that is philosophically feeble but politically workable. Admittedly, too, many of these counterarguments have been equally deficient, philosophically and politically. Indeed, according to Latour, most (all?) of them have failed in at least one respect, something he aims to remedy: “None of these critiques…has disputed simultaneously the definition of Science and the definition of the Body Politic that it implies. Inhumanity is accepted in both or in at least one of them” (218).

     

    This assessment does not appear to me entirely accurate, even with respect to what Latour sees as “postmodern” critique and specifically to Friedrich Nietzsche, who, perhaps inevitably, enters the scene immediately, first by way of quotation, “human all too human,” and then by name (217). Nietzsche’s argument in On the Genealogy of Morals, invoked throughout the chapter, is not sufficiently explored by Latour, either. Nietzsche’s and Latour’s views are of course not the same, but, especially on this particular point, they share more than Latour appears to think. The philosophical effectiveness of any given argument, however, does not necessarily guarantee and sometimes prevents its success anywhere, among people or philosophers, for example, as indeed both Socrates (including in Gorgias, as Latour observes) and, more deeply, Nietzsche understood so well. Beginning with The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche undertook an investigation, unprecedented in profundity and scope alike, of the question why Socrates’s or related and parallel arguments (those shaping the history of Christian morality, for example) have, eventually, succeeded on such an extraordinary scale, including where they initially failed, in Greece.

     

    Similarly, Lyotard’s argument from The Postmodern Condition on goes quite far in understanding the “humanity,” indeed conjoined “humanity” rather than conjoined “inhumanity,” of both science and politics, that is, speaking for the moment in terms Latour uses. Ultimately, to return to the idiom of We Have Never Been Modern, we need a new “constitution,” one that, as against the (unworkable) “modern constitution,” enacts a conjunction rather than a strict separation of nature and politics, and even a certain “parliamentarity” of the human and the nonhuman. In Pandora’s Hope Latour approaches this economy, which is also a political economy, in other terms as well, such as those of the collective (of humans and nonhumans), specifically in Chapter 6, indebted in part to the work of Michel Callon (with whom Latour collaborated earlier), and also in “factish” (“fact-fetish”) in Chapter 9. This view is not far from Lyotard’s, even though Latour himself, again, juxtaposes it to postmodernism. Lyotard’s own concept of “the inhuman,” developed in his The Inhuman: Reflections on Time, could be considered from this viewpoint and used to complement and amplify Latour’s critique. On the other hand, Latour seems to give Lyotard credit, well deserved indeed, for his engagement with the political in his subsequent works, specifically along the lines of Latour’s argument here (232). These works, however, such as Just Gaming and The Differend, extend rather than depart from his argument in The Postmodern Condition. As I said, Latour is much more “postmodernist” than he suspects. Reciprocally, Latour’s argument throws a new light on postmodernism and the debates around it, or within it, for example, concerning the more Lyotardian view of postmodernist epistemology and politics versus more Marxist views, such as those of Fredric Jameson and his followers. In the latter case, a Socratic-like agenda of the governing role of a particular, almost geometrically demonstrable, political theory, often takes over.

     

    It may be noted that even short of a deeper analysis of its human or human-nonhuman nature, one could argue that, at least, modern or “postmodern” (the term has been used even by some scientists) mathematics and science are not as cooperative in the agenda in question as, for example, Weinberg would believe them to be. Even if one accepts Weinberg’s position and views modern mathematics and science in his “inhuman” terms, they appear to tell us something quite different from what Weinberg seems to hear. Indeed more limited as it is, this type of counterargument has a force of its own. The grounds on which the science warriors, from Socrates on, build their edifice are, Latour is right, untenable; but their argument fails, their edifice collapses even on its own ground. Lyotard offers this type of argument as part of his critique of modernity’s ideology of science in The Postmodern Condition (a critique that has often been misunderstood, including by the science warriors). If, he argues, one wants to follow mathematics and science or what they tell us about nature and mind, in the way the Enlightenment follows classical mathematics and physics, one might want to examine first what twentieth-century mathematics and science–relativity, quantum physics, chaos theory, modern molecular biology and genetics, post-Gödelian mathematical logic, and so forth–actually tell us. More accurately, one should speak of a certain version or reading of the Enlightenment, to begin with, since both the Enlightenment and, for that matter, classical mathematics and science tell us a different story and a different history as well.

     

    In any event, what mathematics and science in fact appear to tell us (about nature or themselves) is in conflict with the key premises of the modern (either in Lyotard’s or Latour’s sense) view or ideology of either mathematics and science or nature and politics. Among these premises are reality and causality (concomitantly defined by their mathematical, and specifically continuous, character); the independence of this mathematical, and indeed geometrical, reality of our engagement with nature through observation and measurement; a strictly logical view of mathematical reasoning (i.e., as always decidable as concerns the truth or falsity of any given proposition); and so forth. These premises and their necessity for the practice of mathematics and science have been questioned by some (it is true, not very many) mathematicians and scientists as well, in particular by Bohr, Heisenberg, and other founders of quantum physics, which puts these premises to their arguably most severe test on scientific grounds. The same premises also define the key programs of the Enlightenment and “the modern constitution,” based on the (“inhuman”) way in which mathematics and science, or nature and politics, allegedly work or, in the case of politics, ought to work. It follows, among other things, that contrary to Weinberg’s view or hope, nature may not in fact be subject to immutable, or any, mathematical laws. It goes almost without saying that to question such premises is not the same as simply abandoning them, but instead enables a better understanding of the limits of their applicability, a refinement of their conceptualization and formulations, and so forth. I say “almost” in view of persistent misunderstandings of this and related points, including those made by Latour himself, the misunderstandings that defined and in some ways (there are deeper philosophical and political factors, which is the point here) initiated the Science Wars debates.

     

    Latour amplifies the preceding argument by his powerful and elegant analysis, one of the best in the book, in Chapter 8, “A Politics Freed from Science: The Body Cosmopolitics,” concerning the actual practice of science, which he sees, rightly, as in conflict with the Science Warriors’, the Socrates-Weinberg, view of science. This argument also allows one to

     

    see…how the sciences can be free from the burden of making a type of politics that shortcuts politics. If we now calmly read the Gorgias, we recognize that a certain specialized form of reasoning, epistèmè, was kidnapped for a political purpose it could not possibly fulfill. This has resulted in bad politics but in an even worse science. If we let the kidnapped science escape, then two different meanings of the adjective “scientific” become distinguishable again after being lumped together for so long. (258)

     

     

    The implications of this argument thus reach beyond our understanding of science, although not beyond science, which cannot be dissociated from modern politics–and there is perhaps no other politics, beginning with the Greeks and their invention of demonstration and democracy. As will be seen, for Latour, bringing science and politics, and demonstration and democracy, together so that both they and we could indeed benefit from each other is a task, a formidable “task of today” (265). First, however, we need to consider the two different meanings of “scientific” in question. As Latour writes:

     

    The first meaning is that of Science with a capital S, the ideal of transportation of information without discussion or deformation. This Science, capital S, is not a description of what scientists do. To use an old term, it is an ideology that never had any other use, in the epistemologists’ hands, than to offer a substitute for public discussion. It has always been a political weapon to do away with the constraints of politics. From the beginning, as we saw in the dialogue, it was tailored to this end alone, and it has never stopped, through the ages, being used in this way. Because it was intended as a weapon, this conception of Science, the one Weinberg clings to so forcefully, is usable neither to “make humanity less irrational” nor to make the sciences better. It has only one use: “Keep your mouth shut!”–the “you” designating, interestingly enough, other scientists involved in controversies as much as the people in general. “Substitute Science, capital S, for political rationality” is only a war cry. In that sense, and that sense only, it is useful, as we can witness in these days of the Science Wars. However, this definition of Science No. 1, I am afraid, has no more uses than a Maginot Line, and I take great pleasure in being branded as “antiscientific” if scientific has only this meaning. (258-59)

     

    The actual situation may be somewhat more complex, since Weinberg’s view of science (but not of politics) could be related to what scientists actually do, as Latour acknowledges in his discussion of the second meaning of “scientific,” but to which one might give further attention (259). In this sense, it is indeed the ideology in question that is the main problem here. Paul Feyerabend sees this move–this tremendous and impoverishing, “cold,” reduction of science and, through thus reduced science, of politics or even of life itself–as “the tale of abstraction against the richness of being,” his subtitle of Conquest of Abundance. He traces this move to the pre-Socratics, especially to Democritus’s atomism and Parmenides’s logic of oneness, and, ethically-politically, to Homer (on virtue), and then to the modern view of science, from Newton to Einstein and beyond. (Weinberg’s view would be an example as well.) Keats drives the point home more speedily and effectively in Lamia (with Socrates, and his philosophy, and both Descartes and Newton, and their optics, in mind, and perhaps with Democritus and Boyle as well, all figures crucial to Latour’s argument, here and elsewhere): “… Do not all charms fly/ At the mere touch of cold philosophy? … Philosophy will clip an Angel’s wings/ Conquer all mysteries by rule and line,/ Empty the haunted air …” (Part II, ll. 229-30, 234-35).

     

    At least, a certain philosophy and/as a certain form or ideology of mathematics and science, since the latter views pursued differently (or even also differently) could also create “the richness of being,” even by their rules and lines. “But,” Latour continues, “‘scientific’ has one other meaning, which is much more interesting and is not engaged in doing away with politics, not because it is apolitical or because it is politicized, but because it deals with entirely different questions, a difference that is never respected when Science No. 1 is taken, by its friends as well as by its foes, as all there is to say about science” (259). It is, thus, first of all, not a question of an argument or discourse against science, quite the contrary. Latour’s conception of science (or, and again comcomitantly, of reality or truth)–one of his most important and original in the book–also goes beyond earlier and more rigid forms of social constructivism, such as that of David Bloor and his school (197). This richer and subtler “constructivism” is arrived at in part by reciprocally rethinking the social as well, most especially through the concept of the collective of human and nonhumans, and of their entangled and mutually defining relationships, in Chapter 6. As Latour writes:

     

    The second meaning of the adjective “scientific” is the gaining of access, through experiments and calculations, to entities that at first do not have the same characteristics as humans do. This definition may seem odd, but it is what is alluded to by Weinberg’s own interest in “impersonal laws.” Science No. 2 deals with nonhumans, which in the beginning are foreign to social life, and which are slowly socialized on our midst through the channels of laboratories, expeditions, institutions, and so on, as recent historians of science have so often described. What working scientists want to be sure of is that they do not make up, with their own repertoire of actions, the new entities to which they have access. They want each new nonhuman to enrich their repertoire of action, their ontology. Pasteur, for example, does not [arbitrarily] “construct” his microbes; rather his microbes, and French society, are changed, through their common agency, from a collective [of humans and nonhumans] made up of, say, x entities into one made up of many more entities, including microbes. (259)

     

    This argument may need a more nuanced stratification as concerns the production and circulation in question, as Latour indeed intimates (259). In particular, one might need to consider multiple circulations of and circulations between circulations, within science and between science and culture. It is also clear that these profusions or circulations within circulations are bound to give rise to other meanings of “scientific” as well. Latour adds one himself (260, note 3), but still others, either more limited to science or mathematics or more extended, are conceivable and indeed necessary. Latour’s argument is, however, fundamentally right and momentous in its implications. First of all, it follows that there could be neither a concept of reality nor a meaningful relation to any reality outside such circulations. Accordingly, all “realities” of science studies (such as those defined by various collectives of humans and nonhumans, hybrids, factishes, and so forth) in turn emerge in relation to these circulations. This view also makes “it possible to say, without contradiction,” as Latour does in his analysis of Pasteur, “both ‘Airborne germs were made up in 1984’ and ‘They were there all along’” (173). The same logic applies to several of his similar arguments elsewhere, often equally misunderstood or unread, for example, by science warriors.

     

    Indeed one of the most remarkable capacities of modern science, specifically quantum theory, is to “construct” (using this terms with Latour’s qualification in the above passage in mind) and place in circulation unconstructible entities (such as those known as “elementary particles”). That is, it is capable of constructing and placing in circulation something to which no conceivable notion or property, physical or mathematical, could be rigorously attributed. They are circulated as such both within and outside physics, albeit far from without much resistance to this type of epistemology, either within science (Einstein was one the primary forces of this resistance and inspiration for many others) or outside it. It is not surprising that the idea meets so much resistance since, as I have indicated, it puts on hold the claims, such as Weinberg’s, that “nature” could ultimately be described or governed by mathematics. This is, of course, not to say that one no longer uses mathematics, but only that one uses it differently, including for the purposes of circulating the work concerning such un-objects.

     

    From a Latourian perspective, Weinberg’s or others’ “interests,” grounding (but not identical to) their view of science as Science No. 1, would be part of such circulations, possibly by grounding some among them. But this view must also be understood in relation to other circulations, possible or actual, or of course also to impossibilities of circulation. The same argument would apply to mathematics (so crucial for Weinberg’s or Socrates’s views of the world), to mathematical circulation, and to the circulation of mathematics itself (as a field). Mathematics may well be a special case, including (a special case of its own) specifically geometrical demonstration or proof, and we must account for this specificity, in turn, in a special way. But it is not outside of this picture. Mathematics is not likely to be some special gift from the “heavens” (divine or human), although some mathematicians, scientists, and philosophers may think it is. Instead, like science or philosophy, it may be seen as having arisen and continuing to arise from translating and refining more common experiences and practices, and from circulations they entail or that give rise to them.

     

    As Latour elegantly argues in Chapter 3, “Circulating Reference,” the work of science studies, such as Latour’s own, participates differently from but reciprocally with science itself in these circulations and circulations of circulation (78-79). This circulation is contiguous or metonymic. A remarkable case of a circulation, indeed a circulation between, at least, two circulations, where reciprocity and metonymy are accompanied by metaphoric parallels, is that of Frederic Joliot, considered in Chapter 3, “Science’s Blood Flow: Joliot’s Scientific Intelligence.” Latour’s title is aptly fitting on both counts, in its circulation metaphor and its blood metaphor. Circulation is the life-blood of science, which also needs what exceeds it. (Latour also puns on “intelligence.”) I ought to add, however, that this argument is only a part, a small part, of this superb chapter, which offers a brilliant and complex analysis of a complex case, defined as much by Joliot’s political as by his scientific activities, and by the complex circulations between science and politics. This economy, Latour shows, defines Joliot’s work well before he becomes (after the Second World War) a prominent presence on the political scene in France and beyond.

     

    Now, the analysis of such circulations and circulations between circulations is not easy, either in their historical specificity or (to the degree we can separate them) in terms of the necessary concepts, and Latour’s analysis by and large succeeds on both counts. But he seems to me stronger on the work and abundance of circulations than on “breaks” in circulations or the impossibility of circulation or “construction,” in mathematics and science or elsewhere, which seems to me just as important, in some cases, more important. In general, Latour’s thought is closer to what may be seen as the (more utopian?) philosophy of abundance and continuity, which also defines the thought of Feyerabend and Deleuze, or Whitehead and Bergson, or earlier Leibniz and Spinoza (the last three in turn major inspirations for Deleuze). This philosophy may be contrasted to the philosophy of insufficiency and rupture, extending from Kant’s critical philosophy to Heidegger, Bataille, Levinas, Derrida, and de Man, among others. Descartes, Hegel, and Nietzsche may be seen as the thinkers of both, and it is to be observed that in all these cases it is also a question of relative balance, rather than unequivocal determination. Allegiances to the first and, conversely, distances from the second line of thought are quite apparent in Latour’s views–sometimes, I would argue, at a price, and especially, again, as concerns a more rigorous understanding of heterogeneities and breaks in the circulations in question. On that score, Latour’s analysis could benefit from the ideas of the figures just mentioned, especially Bataille, Derrida, de Man, or, again, Lyotard (specifically on “the inhuman”). Lyotard defines the political as the irreducible heterogeneous, even if interactive–interactively heterogeneous and heterogeneously interactive–and subject to equally irreducible breaks in its circulations. Latour, however, is quite right to insist on the significance of circulation, especially insofar as the relationships between science and politics, or culture, are concerned. His analysis of such circulations, their rhizomatic networks, and circulations between circulations, networks linking networks, is a major contribution, whose significance extends well beyond science studies.

     

    Latour is also right in arguing that “to do justice to this scientific work,” the work defined as Science No. 2, (the ideology of) Science No. 1 is “totally inadequate” (260). He adds a significant observation:

     

    We recognize here, by the way, the two enemy camps between which science studies is trying to gain a foothold: those from the humanities who think we give too much to nonhumans; and those from some quarters of the “hard” sciences who accuse us of giving too much to the humans. This symmetrical accusation triangulates with great precision the place where we in science studies stand: we follow scientists in their daily scientific practice in the No. 2 definition, not in the No. 1 political definition. Reason–meaning Science No. 1–does not describe science better than cynicism describes politics. (260)

     

    This statement, again, makes clear a crucial point. It is not a matter of a discourse against science, any more than against reality or truth, but rather that of refiguring and re-delimiting both and their relationships, in their relationships, naturally, as against, the ideology, ultimately itself non-scientific, although political, of Science No. 1. This is a brilliant reversal with respect to the attacks (such as those by the science warriors) against science studies. It is the science warriors’ view of science that is in fact political and not scientific; the science studies political view of science will be shown to be more scientific.

     

    Nor is this all, as we now begin to perceive Latour’s ultimate, and quite elegant, logic more clearly. First of all, it is worth reiterating yet another more obvious and more easily apparent reversal. The “politics” of science warriors, let’s call it Politics or, with Latour, the Social No. 1, is not really political or social, any more than their science, Science No. 1, is scientific. Science No. 2 is more political as well, along with being scientific. It is, however, by combining both reversals that Latour’s logic reaches its ultimate conclusions. The form, the formal logic, as it were, of Socrates’s argument is in fact repeated. Science is indeed crucial to and defines politics, which might, finally (might!) enable us “to benefit from the Greeks’ two inventions, demonstration and democracy” (265). But how different is the substance of both politics and science, and of their relationships, and, hence, how different is the political philosophy one now needs to pursue! For, thanks in large measure to what Science No. 2 could do for politics, this new constitution entails a very different social, or in Serres’s terms, natural or social-natural contract and a new collectivity and, in the language of We Have Never Been Modern, a new “parliamentarity” of both humans and nonhumans. Latour writes:

     

    Far from taking us away from the agora, Science No. 2–one clearly separated from the impossible agenda of Science, capital S–redefines political order as that which brings together stars, prions, cows, heavens, and people, the task being to turn this collective into a “cosmos” instead of “unruly shambles” [as invoked by Socrates]. For scientists such an endeavor seems much more lively, much more interesting, much more adapted to their skills and genius, than the boring repetitive chore of beating the poor undisciplined demos with the big stick of “impersonal laws.” This new settlement is not the one Socrates and Callicles agreed on [in Gorgias ]–“appealing to one form of inhumanity to avoid inhuman social behavior”–but something that could be defined as “collectively making sure that the collective formed by ever vaster numbers of humans and nonhumans becomes a cosmos.” (261)

     

    Naturally, this new politics is not easy to put into practice. (But then it took Socratic politics, defined by Science No. 1, a while to take a hold, indeed a grip, upon the world.) For, as Latour says,

     

    For this other possible task, however, we not only need scientists who will abandon the older privileges of Science No. 1 and at last take up a science (No. 2) freed from politics [Politics No. 1, defined by Science No. 1], we also need a symmetrical transformation of politics. I confess that this is much more difficult, because, in practice, very few scientists are happy in the artificial straitjacket that Socrates’s position imposes on them, and they would be very happy to deal with what they are good at, Science No. 2. But what about politics? To convince Socrates is one things, but what about Callicles? To free science from politics [Politics No. 1] is easy, but how can we free politics from science [No. 1]? (261)

     

    Latour may be too optimistic about scientists. He is right, however, to see politics as a more difficult problem here. Latour makes few suggestions in this direction, in this and in the following chapter. In the end, however, we, Latour and myself included, end with a question:

     

    How can we mix Science No. 2, which brings an ever greater number of nonhumans into the agora, with Social No. 2, which deals with the very specific conditions of felicity that cannot be content with transporting forces or truth without deformation? I don’t know, but I am sure of one thing: no shortcuts are possible, no short-circuits, and no acceleration. Half of our knowledge may be in the hands of scientists, but the other, missing half is alive only in those most despised of all people, the politicians, who are risking their lives and ours in scientifico-political controversies that nowadays make up most of our daily bread. To deal with these controversies, a “double circulation” has to flow effortlessly again in the Body Politics: the one of science (No. 2) free from politics, and the other of politics freed from science (No. 1). The task of today may be summed up in the following odd sentence: Can we learn to like scientists as much as politicians so that at last we can benefit from the Greeks’ two inventions, demonstration and democracy? (265)

     

    Latour, it is true, does not end here, observing that, while he “seem[s] to have accomplished [his] task, to have dismantled the old settlement that held sway over us,” “it is still as if [he has] achieved nothing” (266). Accordingly, he proceeds to his final chapter, Chapter 9, “The Slight Surprise of Action: Facts, Fetishes, Factishes,” more constructive and more constructivist, but, again, beyond (merely) “social constructivism,” which he contends (I think, rightly) he never really subscribed to (197). We, as the book’s readers, can indeed be only slightly surprised here, since Latour’s analysis is well prepared and anticipated, and partly accomplished in an earlier chapter, but is now given a more rigorous conceptual architecture.

     

    And yet the questions return and even bring a war with them, “a world war, even–at least a metaphysical one,” but also the Science Wars, now as “a respectable intellectual issue, not a pathetic dispute over funding fueled by campus journalists.” It is a war between the two views of reality and two settlements in opposition, the modernist one (with the reality of the world out there and Science No. 1 and Politics No. 1) and the settlement defined by the view of reality, science, and politics that is defined by Science No. 2. In this war, however, one might be sure, or “pretty sure,”

     

    we will be without weapons, dressed in civilian clothes, since the task of inventing the collective [of humans and nonhumans] is so formidable that it renders all wars puny by comparison–including, of course, the Science Wars. In this [twentieth] century, which fortunately is coming to a close, we seem to have exhausted the evils that emerged from the open box of the clumsy Pandora. Though it was here unrestrained curiosity that made the artificial maiden open the box, there is no reason to stop being curious about what was left inside. To retrieve the Hope that is lodged there, at the bottom, we need a new and rather convoluted contrivance. I have had a go at it. Maybe we will succeed with the next attempt. (300)

     

    Maybe we will. Latour thus ends (this is his last sentence) with an implicit question mark, for the new century perhaps. He begins the book with a warning to the reader. “This,” he says,

     

    is not a book about new facts, nor is it exactly a book of philosophy. In it, using only very rudimentary tools, I simply try to present, in the space left empty by the dichotomy between subject and object, a conceptual scenography for the pair human and nonhuman. I agree that powerful arguments and detailed empirical studies would be better, but, as sometimes happens in detective stories, a somewhat weaker, more solitary, and more adventurous strategy may succeed against the kidnapping of scientific disciplines by science warriors where others have failed. (viii)

     

    The book does achieve this success and, as I have argued, it offers much more in the way of both “powerful arguments” and, especially, “empirical studies” than Latour here suggests. Accordingly, a deeper conceptual and, thus, more deeply philosophical scenography of the scenes in question is not impossible. It is perhaps permissible to view the book as setting the stage for a deeper philosophical exploration in spaces more closed than, as Latour suggests, left empty by so many dichotomies and pairs, from subject and object to, not inconceivably, human and nonhuman.

    Works Cited

     

    • Feyerabend, Paul. Conquest of Abundance: A Tale of Abstraction Versus the Richness of Being. Ed. Bert Terpstra. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1999.
    • Gross, Paul, and Norman Levitt. Higher Superstition: The Academic Left and its Quarrels with Science. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1994.
    • Latour, Bruno. We Have Never Been Modern. Trans. Catherine Porter. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1993.
    • Lyotard, Jean-François. The Differend: Phrases in Dispute. Trans. Georges Van Den Abbeele. Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota P, 1988.
    • —. The Inhuman: Reflections on Time. Trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1991.
    • —. The Postmodern Condition. Trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Brian Massumi. Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota P, 1984.
    • Lyotard, Jean-François, and Jean-Loup Thêbaud. Just Gaming. Trans. Brian Massumi. Minneapolis, MN: U of Minnesota P, 1985.
    • Pielke, Roger A. Jr. “Science Policy: Policy, Politics, and Perspective.” Nature 416 (2002): 367-68.
    • Serres, Michel (with Bruno Latour). Conversations on Science, Culture, and Time. Trans. Roxanne Lapidus. Ann Arbor, MI: U of Michigan P, 1995.
    • Sokal, Alan, and Jean Bricmont. Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals’ Abuse of Science. New York: Picador, 1998.

     

  • Radiohead’s Antivideos: Works of Art in the Age of Electronic Reproduction

    Joseph Tate

    Department of English
    University of Washington
    jtate@u.washington.edu

    I. Introduction: Test Specimens

    Figure 1

     

    The blinking icon you see above is called a “test specimen.” Wide-eyed bears with murderous grins, drawn alternately as symmetrical, disembodied heads or frantically sketched, stiff-limbed figures, they punctuate the art of the music group Radiohead, from CD packaging and packing slips to web site images and promotional stickers.

     

    Although directly analogous to easily recognizable character-mascots used to establish a product’s unique brand identity, the bears function like painter Philip Guston’s hooded men, with a difference (see Guston’s “City Limits”). While Guston’s figures, versions of Ku Klux Klansmen, gave a disturbingly organic shape to American civil unrest and racial injustice in the late 1960s and early ’70s, Radiohead’s test specimens are protagonists in a self-referential aesthetic that pastiches the band’s commodification and the operation of capital at large.1

     

    In what follows, I explore the bears’ appearances in QuickTime computer-animated music video shorts released concurrently with Kid A, the band’s critically anticipated fourth album.2 Titled “antivideos,” or “blips,” the short videos (10-30 seconds in duration) were released only on the internet, a virtually inexhaustible distribution channel. Via this medium, the antivideos provide a useful plateau from which to consider popular art’s current state and future potential in the age of electronic reproduction.

     

    II. Commodified Culture, Culturalized Commodification

     

    In The Fragile Absolute, or Why is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For?, Slavoj Zizek observes that “today’s artistic scene” consists of two opposed movements. The first is the “much-deplored commodification of culture (art objects produced for the market),” while the second, and “less noted but perhaps more crucial opposite movement,” is “the growing ‘culturalization’ of the market economy itself.” He elaborates:

     

    With the shift towards the tertiary economy (services, cultural goods), culture is less and less a specific sphere exempted from the market, and more and more not just one of the spheres of the market, but its central component (from the software amusement industry to other media productions). (25)3

     

    We can add to this latter list the music industry. The paired phenomena of commodified culture and a culturalized market are nowhere more evident than in the music business, and it is these movements of commodification and culturalization that Radiohead’s antivideos thematize.

     

    Originally released on the band’s web site (<http://www.more-radiohead.com/alps .html>) several weeks before the 2 October 2000 release of Kid A, the antivideos jettison the standard hierarchy between song and music video as elaborated by media critic Jody Berland. According to Berland, “the 3-minute musical single” is a music video’s

     

    unalterable foundation, its one unconditional ingredient. A single can exist (technically, at least) without the video, but the reverse is not the case. As if in evidence of this, music videos, almost without exception, do not make so much as a single incision in the sound or structure of the song. However bizarre or disruptive videos appear, they never challenge or emancipate themselves from their musical foundation, without which their charismatic indulgences would never reach our eyes. (25)

     

    As if in direct response to Berland’s phonocentrism, the antivideos do exactly what music videos do not and/or should not: make radical incisions and changes to the sound and structure of the songs they promote.

     

    The web site’s title introduces the antivideos bluntly as “brief films used as promotional material.” Immediately, visitors are alerted to the antivideo’s situation within a matrix of capitalist exchange, an unusual acknowledgment in an industry that regularly denounces any discernible trace of commercialization. As music critic Lawrence Grossberg has noted, “Rock fans have always constructed a difference between authentic and co-opted rock. And it is this which is often interpreted as rock’s inextricable tie to resistance, refusal, alienation, marginality, etc.” (Grossberg 202). Authentic rock has as its ideal a “collective, spontaneous creativity,” in the words of Kalefa Sanneh, critic for the New York Times, that is unfettered by the crass demands of capital. Co-opted rock, however, is an example of what Zizek calls the “much-deplored commodification of culture (art objects produced for the market)”; co-opted rock is commercially successful music with an international distribution that fails to hide adequately its commodification, thus opening itself up for censure. Radiohead’s music, videos, cover art, and packaging, however, expose its commodification and culturalize it.

     

    As one example, the CD packaging for Kid A foregrounds its own commodification. A limited number of CDs contained a supplementary text hidden beneath the jewel case’s polystyrene tray. The untitled booklet by Stanley Donwood, the band’s artist, and Tchock, a pseudonym for Thom Yorke, the band’s lead singer, comprises fragmentary phrases juxtaposed against images of test specimens posed as either cartoonishly violent corporate sycophants or traumatized victims of surveillance. Rarely are listeners asked to disassemble the object that distills a performer’s presence for uniform portable consumption, only to find a text that decries consumption. Radiohead’s antivideos work similarly as agents of disassembly, leading consumers into a labyrinthine network of hyperbolic images that pastiche commodification.

     

    III. Flying Bears

     

    The first antivideo on the Radiohead site is titled “Flying Bears,” a nineteen-second movie that imagines limitless reproduction with a twist of surreal horror. The scene opens on two figures, both of which stare up in horror at a murky sky crowded with flying test specimen bears (see Figure 2).

     

    Figure 2

     

    The movie then fades into an exclusive focus on the flying bears, the brand icons for Radiohead, while the antivideo’s soundtrack plays an excerpt from the song “In Limbo.” Yorke’s voice unhurriedly croons the refrain, “You’re living in a fantasy / You’re living in a fantasy” (see Figure 3).

     

    Figure 3

     

    Finally, our view shifts to a close-up of a frightened onlooker, eyes fixed upward and mouth opened in muted fear. Furiously he clutches a mobile phone, a device that may be his last connection to the world: a connection enabled and mediated by an electronic communication network (see Figure 4).

     

    Figure 4

     

    The fantasy, then, of which the lyrics speak and that the onlookers inhabit is not a pleasant one, as the alarmed facial expressions evince. Instead, it is the ultimate fantasy of the capitalist/Communist dyad: “unbridled productivity” (Zizek 18). As Zizek notes, it is no accident that capitalism and Communism rose simultaneously: “Marx’s notion of Communist society is itself the inherent capitalist fantasy–a fantasmatic scenario for resolving the capitalist antagonism he so aptly described” (Zizek 19). The bears metaphorize the boundless commodification that modern technologies facilitate. Radiohead’s symbols threaten to overcome the onlooker. In this way, the antivideo critiques its own medium–the internet, a technology that allows endless and nearly effortless production. Once an antivideo reaches the internet, it can be accessed indefinitely by multiple viewers simultaneously.

     

    The limitless reproducibility of visual and aural art objects that the internet enables is the apogee of simulation, as it is defined by Jean Baudrillard. Via digital technologies, “The real is produced from miniaturized cells, matrices, and memory banks, models of control–and it can be reproduced an indefinite number of times from these” (Baudrillard 2). The real or the authentic ceases to matter, an inevitability that Radiohead’s music and art incorporate.

     

    Nevertheless, the real is what audiences, music critics and fans alike, desire. Critic David Fricke commented in Rolling Stone that despite the experimental sounds of Radiohead’s electronic music, what you actually hear is “real rock singing and chops, altered beyond easy recognition” (Fricke 48). What Fricke fails to grasp is that Radiohead’s aesthetic undermines the real that he attempts to recuperate on the band’s behalf. This misreading of Radiohead’s music by Fricke and others has a venerable antecedent: Walter Benjamin’s “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.”

     

    Fricke would agree with Benjamin that mass reproduction corrupts the art object’s authenticity, an essential, if intangible, element of art: “that which withers in the age of mechanical reproduction is the aura of the work of art” (Benjamin 221). But, unlike Benjamin, Fricke and the sum of music industry rhetoric stops there. Benjamin’s anxiety gains a dimension as he considers the possibility that the real may cease to exist at all. As he explains in the case of photography, the question of authenticity “makes no sense” when one can make innumerable prints from a photographic negative (Benjamin 224). Similarly, the internet acts as a spectral production line, an immense factory, open to all comers, that has transcended production’s physical limitations.

     

    A fear that authenticity will lose significance animates Benjamin’s essay but does not explain Fricke’s naïve praise for a hidden, real rock music underlying Radiohead’s experimentation. The band’s music, I argue, is not a distortion of real rock, but an uncovering of its absence, its phantasmic structure. Fricke assumes that the real continues to bloom when, as Baudrillard told us and as Benjamin knew would happen, it has long since been a desert.

     

    Benjamin’s anxiety is the emotion that animates the onlookers’ faces in “Flying Bears.” The antivideo’s countless test specimens are the epitomic image of electronic reproduction, specifically, the internet’s realization of the fundamental capitalist fantasy of unimpeded production. But here the capitalist dream is refigured as a nightmarish scenario of flying bears looming over frightened mobile phone users. However, the precession of simulation, to use Baudrillard’s phrase, is that capital desires its own undoing, as I argue in the following section.

     

    IV. “I’m not here / This isn’t happening”

     

    The fourth song on Kid A is titled “How to Disappear Completely.” The lyrics, while supposedly based on a dream, eerily narrate the singer’s subject position as experienced by the listener: “I’m not here / This isn’t happening.” The point is so simple as to go unnoticed: when I hear Radiohead’s music the band is not here, where I am at the moment of listening; and the performance is not happening, and may have, in fact, never happened. Like Miles Davis’s Bitches Brew, an achievement not of instrumental virtuosity but of production technique ahead of its time, Kid A is the record of a performance never performed, an electronically constructed collage of disparate studio recordings, found sounds, drum loops, samples, and other forms of noise.

     

    While Kid A challenges authenticity, the antivideo “Screaming Bears” pastiches it. “Screaming Bears” casts the test specimens as performers furnishing what spectators crave–an authentic performance. Gradually, five agitated bears (notably, Radiohead has five band members) appear from stage-left on a flat, desolate landscape (see Figure 5) populated randomly by pyramids, resembling Cy Twombly’s Anabasis. The performance is blatantly pointless: the bears enter, the bears leave.

     

    Figure 5

     

    Nevertheless, the bears’ performance is more compelling than what the performers of Radiohead offer. In “Morning Bell,” Thom Yorke plays a piano, face averted from the camera and downcast, in a lonely, possibly domestic setting. We are given an authentic band member, but the authentic person, compared to the screaming and dancing test specimens, is far less thrilling. It is the simulation that captures our attention, not the authentic. The intimate, if artificially staged, mood of “Morning Bell,” signaled by the black and white film and overhead film angle–the common position of surveillance cameras–is more akin to voyeurism than to spectatorship (see Figure 6).

     

    Figure 6

     

    Whatever authenticity “Morning Bell” lays claim to is dissolved by “Yeti,” another antivideo that calls attention to the band’s role as victims of surveillance and status as objects, or rather of an institutionalized gaze so well given voice by David Fricke, above. To return to Fricke’s assessment, Radiohead’s music is “real rock singing and chops” (48). Fricke’s desire to establish the band’s music as real rock is a near-death symptom of capitalism. Capitalism, especially its embodiment in the music industry, frequently reminds us of “its foundations in real people and their relations” (Zizek 16). Underneath the mysterious celebrity-identity there is a real person, which the hunched-over Yorke of “Morning Bell” perfectly signifies. Another example proves instructive: on 8 August 2001, fans had the chance to chat online with Jonny Greenwood, the band’s lead guitarist and keyboardist. An event hosted by the Yahoo! web site, such a promotional move is not unlike another that Zizek describes: “Visitors to the London Stock Exchange are given a free leaflet which explains to them that the stock market is not about some mysterious fluctuations, but about real people and their products–this is ideology at its purest” (16). Being able to chat with Jonny Greenwood in real time: this, too, is ideology at its purest.4

     

    But this reassertion of the real, Baudrillard argues, is capital’s attempt to calm its characteristic powers of “abstraction, disconnection, deterritorialization” (22), the very powers that now threaten it. To confront the oceanic elision of difference it inaugurated, capital re-injects the real, but to no avail:

     

    as soon as [capital] wishes to combat this disastrous spiral by secreting a last glimmer of reality, on which to establish a last glimmer of power, it does nothing but multiply the signs and accelerate the play of simulation. (22)

     

    It is this reassertion of the real that “Yeti,” the next antivideo, pastiches.

     

    In “Yeti,” a test specimen bear is caught on camera, much in the same way the appearances of supposedly mystical monsters, such as Bigfoot and the Loch Ness Monster, are captured on videotape. To reinforce the antivideo’s relation to surveillance footage, the movie begins with and is interrupted by moments of static (see Figure 7). Most often a nuisance, the camera’s disruption of images, its intrusion as creator of artifice into a reality that would ideally otherwise remain unaltered, here signals reality. Between these staged disruptions, the camera slowly pans across an empty snow field (see Figure 8) and eventually locates a test specimen (see Figure 9) who flees upon realizing that he has been discovered.

     

    Figure 7
    Figure 8
    Figure 9

     

    Like Sartre at the keyhole, hearing footsteps approaching from behind, the test specimen turns in shock: “Someone is looking at me!” (Sartre 349). Presumably, the test specimen escapes into the forest; the antivideo ends before the bear is captured. We are left with a noisy image of the bear running away (see Figure 10).

     

    Figure 10

     

    Surveillance video, the electronic gaze with which authorities establish incontrovertible fact, is used frivolously–to follow a cartoon bear. Comparatively, this antivideo renders the ostensibly authentic scene of “Morning Bell” artificial and thus simultaneously lampoons authenticity more generally, exposing capital’s covert insistence that commodified celebrities are real people.

     

    V. Is a Music Video Without Music a Music Video?

     

    Slavoj Zizek tells an interesting personal story in The Fragile Absolute worth quoting at length. During a trip to Berlin he

     

    noticed along and above all the main streets numerous large blue tubes and pipes, as if the intricate cobweb of water, phone, electricity, and so on, was no longer hidden beneath the earth, but displayed in public. My reaction was, of course, that this was probably another of those postmodern art performances whose aim was, this time, to reveal the intestines of the town, its hidden inner machinery, in a kind of equivalent to displaying on the video the palpitation of our stomach or lungs–I was soon proved wrong, however, when friends pointed out to me that what I saw was merely part of the standard maintenance and repair of the city’s underground service network. (n. 13, 162)

     

    Before recounting the story of what he terms a blunder, Zizek contextualizes his confusion, citing the example of a recent art performance in Potzdamerplatz in Berlin, where the movements of several gigantic cranes were orchestrated for an art performance. A similar performance, he fails to note, happened in Helsinki in the early 1980s.

     

    In this context, Zizek’s confusion in Berlin is understandable, and, I argue, symptomatic of the postmodern era. What begins to emerge is that postmodernism cannot be regarded merely as a set of objective attributes for which objects can be tested, but might instead be considered a perspective, a condition of the subject as well as objects. Not a radical thesis, by any means, but an important one that marks the difference between Jean-François Lyotard and Fredric Jameson: the former promoting distrust of metanarratives, a subjective state, as distinctive of postmodernism (Lyotard xxiv), the latter elaborating a stylistic description with architecture serving as the “privileged aesthetic language” (Postmodernism 37).

     

    Another example of confusion symptomatic of postmodernism is my own. Thirteen of sixteen antivideos released in June 2001 in support of the band’s fifth album, Amnesiac, are musicless. These latest antivideos, to reuse Jody Berland’s vocabulary quoted above, emancipate themselves from their musical foundation so thoroughly that the foundation is abandoned altogether. My initial response to these musicless antivideos was to declare myself in the presence of a postmodern pastiche of John Cage’s revolutionary 4’33”.

     

    At 8:15 p.m. on 29 August 1952, an audience gathered at the Maverick Concert Hall in Woodstock, New York to hear the pianist David Tudor perform John Cage’s latest composition. They heard nothing, a nothing entitled 4’33”. Inspired by Robert Rauschenberg’s three-paneled White Painting of 1951, Cage’s handwritten score indicated a silence of three movements. Music without music: is it still music? Cage, of course, thought it was. Cage’s modernist aesthetic was heavily influenced by Eastern philosophy. The point of the performance of 4’33” was to force the listener to listen closely, to close read his or her immediate sonic environment. The common reference to 4’33” as Cage’s “silent piece” is, from the composer’s standpoint, a mistake. For one aim of the piece is to underscore Cage’s belief that silence does not in fact exist (Cage 8).5

     

    Radiohead’s aesthetic, then, in this instance, was Cage’s impulse turned against the commercialization of music through the relentless promotion of music videos. Music videos are promotional materials, but without music, what can they promote? Nothing, and by promoting nothing they become advertising simply for advertising’s sake. Further, the resulting affect isn’t modernist shock (what have I endured!?), but what Jameson termed the postmodern sublime: a panic-boredom (I have to endure this for how long!?) (37-8).6

     

    My theory of the antivideos along these lines was disturbed, however, by information I received from the primary artist responsible for Radiohead’s antivideos, Chris Bran, one of the self-titled Vapour Brothers. In July of 2001 I interviewed Bran via email. Responding to a question regarding how and when the Amnesiac antivideos were created, Bran wrote that they were “just out takes, left overs, works in progress. they were all created for the current radiohead project I am doing. we just decided to put these online and try to build up a gallery of video ideas” [sic]. When asked specifically why a majority of the shorts do not use music, Bran referred to his earlier response: “as i said these are all works in progress, unfinished ideas or out takes.” The last comment Bran added was, “check out radiohead.com in the next few weeks.” What was to come was the release of “I Might Be Wrong” (available at <http://www.radiohead.com/009.html& gt;), an internet only, traditional music video constructed from the various musicless antivideos and created entirely on a laptop computer.

     

    What Bran’s comments required of me was to erase the earlier response, or at least to rewrite that response, in this way: the soundless antivideos are not the postmodern descendents of John Cage’s famous silence; they are, instead, waste, leftovers–in a word, excrement. While Bran’s comments frustrate the genealogical connection to John Cage, his they open up a new set of theoretical problems. Waste, in its various forms, is now routinely handled by critical theory and theorists.

     

    Zizek, leaning on the work of his former mentor and analyst Jacques-Alain Miller (the son-in-law of Jacques Lacan), offers a compelling description of what material condition is historically particular to postmodernism: waste. Late capitalism, Zizek writes, has “introduce[d] a breathtaking dynamics of obsolescence” (40) that generates massive mounds of waste. I quote Zizek quoting Miller:

     

    The main production of the modern and postmodern capitalist industry is precisely waste. We are postmodern beings because we realize that all our aesthetically appealing consumption artifacts will eventually end as leftover, to the point that it will transform the earth into a vast waste land. (qtd. in Zizek 40)

     

    Along these lines Zizek notes that

     

    in today’s art, the gap that separates the sacred space of sublime beauty from the excremental space of trash (leftover) is gradually narrowing, up to the paradoxical identity of opposites: are not modern art objects more and more excremental objects, trash (often in a quite literal sense: faeces, rotting corpses…) displayed in–made to occupy, to fill in–the sacred place of the Thing? (25-26)

     

    Perhaps the most famous example of this is Chris Ofili’s 1996 painting “The Holy Virgin Mary,” a portrait of the religious icon as a black woman decorated with elephant dung. The painting was featured in the 1999 Museum of Modern Art exhibit “Sensation: Young British Artists from the Saatchi Collection,” an exhibit former Mayor of New York Rudolph Giuliani called “sick stuff.”

     

    Back in Berlin, the aesthetic wonder Zizek felt at seeing the innards of the city exposed need not necessarily be considered a blunder. The actual circumstances of any situation, the ultimately phantasmic Real, is, as Lacan instructs us, only a fantasy that has yet to be unveiled. Instead, what we witness in Zizek’s confusion (which was, interestingly, submerged in a footnote–the semi-exposed innards of the book, the book’s waste products) and in my own is the epitome of the postmodern condition–the subject thrust into a state of perpetual awareness, never knowing where art will come from next.

     

    VI. In Place of a Conclusion: A Myth

     

    With the release in June 2001 of Amnesiac, the band’s fifth album, the test specimen bears of Kid A have been replaced by crying minotaurs. While the bears were adaptable to various situations, the minotaurs are unambiguously and consistently modeled as victims. In one interactive portion of the Radiohead web site <http://www. waste-game.com/hogger/numeeja/minotaur.html>, visitors can participate in “Experiment #6: Torturing the Minotaur” where they have a chance to inflict pain upon a crying minotaur using a small trident. The game, if it can rightly be called a game, is in the tradition of Stanley Milgram’s psychological experiments conducted from 1961 to 1962. A somewhat milder version of the same experiment is available at Capitol Records’ Radiohead site, <http://hollywoodandvine.com/ radiohead/>, a separate site not directly maintained by the band. At the top of the main page, one click will cause a minotaur to weep while a continuously depressed mouse button intensifies the minotaur’s sorrow, prompting him to ruefully rub his tearful eyes as he shakes his head.

     

    Unlike Milgram’s experiments, however, these opportunities to torture a minotaur test not our willingness to obey, but the limits of curiosity–our desire for knowledge. However, like Milgram’s experiments, and more significantly, “Experiment #6” is a simulation. We torture nothing. We instead simulate a torture, a process far more dangerous according to Baudrillard. Comparing a simulated and a real hold-up, he writes:

     

    the latter does nothing but disturb the order of things, the right to property, whereas the former attacks the reality principle itself. Transgression and violence are less serious because they only contest the distribution of the real. Simulation is infinitely more dangerous because it always leaves open to supposition that, above and beyond its object, law and order themselves might be nothing but simulation. (20)

     

    Capital attempts to stabilize its power through the maintenance of reality. This, to reiterate Zizek, “is ideology at its purest” (16). Simulation resists this stabilizing influence.

     

    However, the band’s reflexive aesthetic effectively disrupts naïve consumption, confronting the listener with music and art that adhere to opacity versus authenticity as a guiding principal. As the novelist Nick Hornby wrote in a New Yorker review deriding Radiohead:

     

    You have to work at albums like Kid A. You have to sit at home night after night and give yourself over to its paranoid millennial atmosphere as you try to decipher elliptical snatches of lyrics and puzzle out how the titles (‘Treefingers,’ ‘The National Anthem,’ and so on) might refer to the songs. … Kid A demands the patience of the devoted …. (qtd. in Dettmar)

     

     

    That a listener would be given pause by a mass-produced art object troubles Hornby, who prefers not to enter Radiohead’s maze of possible meaning.

     

    Thus, explicitly evoking the myth of the minotaur with Amnesiac, Radiohead has found an icon more fitting than the test specimens. A limited-edition CD of the album is packaged in a cloth-bound book. Inside we find the following disclaimers: “This book is to be hidden. Labyrinthine structures are entered at the reader’s own risk. Nosuch Library and Lending Service cannot be held responsible for Misuse.” Radiohead’s music and art are, finally, as Hornby acknowledges, a labyrinthine structure that, once entered, baffles with its mesmerizing difficulty.

     

    While Radiohead’s music and art together sustain a significant critique of capitalist ideology, the band has no pretension of saving the world single-handedly. Instead, their web site at <http://www.radiohead.com/00.html> recommends links to alternative news and information sites with similarly worthy, if unattainable, goals: to revise the relationship between consumer and commodity. The goal of both Kid A and Amnesiac, however, is far more modest: to revise our relationship to popular music and forms of popular culture more generally, a goal that Radiohead, I argue, achieves.

     

    Notes

     

    1. I follow Fredric Jameson’s assertion that, in postmodernism, pastiche eclipses parody. His definition is useful: “Pastiche is, like parody, the imitation of a peculiar or unique style, the wearing of a stylistic mask, speech in a dead language: but it is a neutral practice of such mimicry, without parody’s ulterior motive, without the satirical impulse, without laughter, without that still latent feeling that there exists something normal compared with which what is being imitated is rather comic” (Cultural Turn 5).

     

    2. Kid A, which received a Grammy Award for Best Alternative Album in 2000, was highly anticipated due to the success of OK Computer, the band’s 1997 album which was among the top-ten highest selling albums in Great Britain. In 1998, OK Computer received a Grammy Award for Best Alternative Album (Hale 127) and the band was nominated for four MTV awards (133). Comprehensive indexes of the band’s album reviews and awards are available in both Jonathan Hale’s Radiohead: From a Great Height and Martin Clarke’s Radiohead: Hysterical and Useless.

     

    3. This echoes Jameson’s claim that “aesthetic production today has become integrated into commodity production generally” (Postmodernism 4).

     

    4. Discussants’ questions remained superficial throughout the chat. At one point, Greenwood comments, “Apparently 90% of your questions are about hair.”

     

    5. A now-famous anecdote tells of Cage visiting NASA’s soundproof room at Harvard University. Expecting absolute silence, he instead heard two sounds: “one high and one low” (8). The first, he was told, was his nervous system, the second his circulatory system. Even silence could not be silent.

     

    6. One antivideo, “minotauralley,” makes an excellent case for Jameson’s postmodern sublime. For 46 seconds the viewer watches a cartoon minotaur weeping with inexplicable calm in a deserted, wet alleyway.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Baudrillard, Jean. Simulacra and Simulation. Trans. Sheila Faria Glaser. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1994.
    • Benjamin, Walter. “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.” Illuminations. Ed. Hannah Arendt. Trans. Harry Zohn. New York: Schocken, 1968. 217-251.
    • Berland, Jody. “Sound, Image and Social Space: Music Video and Media Reconstruction.” Frith et al. 25-43.
    • Bran, Chris. “Re: questions.” Email to the author. 15 July 2001.
    • Cage, John. Silence: Lectures and Writings by John Cage. Hanover, NH: Wesleyan UP, 1973.
    • Clarke, Martin. Radiohead: Hysterical and Useless. London: Plexus, 2000.
    • Dettmar, Kevin. “Is Rock ‘n’ Roll Dead? Only if You Aren’t Listening.” The Chronicle of Higher Education. 11 May 2001 <http://chronicle.com/ free/v47/i35/35b01001.htm>.
    • Fricke, David. “Radiohead: Making Music That Matters.” Rolling Stone. 2 August 2001. 42-48, 73.
    • Frith, Simon, Andrew Goodwin, and Lawrence Grossberg, eds. Sound and Vision: The Music Video Reader. London and New York: Routledge, 1993.
    • Greenwood, Jonny. Online chat. 8 August 2001. < http://hollywoodandvine.com/radiohead/rha_primary_frame.html?chat>.
    • Grossberg, Lawrence. “The Media Economy of Rock Culture: Cinema, Post-Modernity and Authenticity.” Frith et al. 185-209.
    • Hale, Jonathan. Radiohead: From a Great Height. Toronto: ECW, 1999.
    • Jameson, Fredric. The Cultural Turn: Selected Writings on the Postmodern, 1983-1998. New York: Verso, 1998.
    • —. Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Durham: Duke UP, 1991.
    • Lyotard, Jean-François. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1984.
    • Saneh, Kalefa. “Rock Groups that No Longer Rock.” New York Times on the Web. 1 July 2001 <http://www.nytimes.com/ 2001/07/01/arts/01SANN.html>.
    • Sartre, Jean-Paul. Being and Nothingness. 1943. Trans. Hazel E. Barnes. NY: Washington Square, 1992.
    • Zizek, Slavoj. The Fragile Absolute, or Why Is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting For? London: Verso, 2000.

     

  • Cannibalism and the Chinese Body Politic: Hermeneutics and Violence in Cross-Cultural Perception

    Carlos Rojas

    Department of African and Asian Languages and Literatures
    University of Florida
    crojas@ufl.edu

     

    One question that always stymies us–that is, why cannot people eat people?

     

    Zhu Yu

     

    Rumors of cannibalism began to circulate over the internet during the early months of last year (2001), typically accompanied by graphic photos of a Chinese man calmly chewing on what appears to be a dismembered human fetus (see Figure 1), together with sensational commentary along the lines of:

     

    What u are going to witness here is a fact, don’t get scared !” It’s Taiwan’s hottest food…” In Taiwan, dead babies or fetuses could be bought at $50 to $70 from hospitals to meet the high demand for grilled and barbecued babies … What a sad state of affairs!! (“Fetus”)

     

    These internet rumors began to achieve a modicum of legitimacy in mid-March, when the small Malaysian tabloid Warta Perdana fed a growing international controversy in reporting that a certain Taiwanese restaurant was serving a dish consisting of the baked flesh of human fetuses. The story eventually precipitated such an uproar that the CIA and Scotland Yard ultimately got involved to try to sort things out.

     

    While these allegations of cannibalism were, at a literal level, apocryphal, they are nevertheless quite instructive. The rumors themselves, together with the morbid transnational fascination that fed them and allowed them to grow, are interesting for two reasons. First, these rumors did not spring up in a vacuum, but rather they are implicitly in dialogue with a rich and multifaceted discursive tradition of cannibalism in modern, and premodern, China. And, second, cannibalism itself occupies a rather curious position in our own (Western) cultural imagination, and the challenge of how to read cannibalism cross-culturally has important implications for the broader question of what is at stake, and at risk, in cross-cultural reading and criticism in general.

     

    Cannibalism is a curious thing. In modern Western culture, cannibalism enjoys a virtually unparalleled hold on the popular imagination as an act of primal social violence. It is frequently held up as an almost unthinkable transgression of the social and moral codes which make us who we are.1 At the same time, however, this nearly unthinkable act has consistently, and somewhat paradoxically, proved to be all-too-thinkable, as evidenced both by the abundance of cultural representations of cannibalism which exist in our “own” culture, together with the voyeuristic fascination occasioned by the prospect of cannibalistic practice among primitives, deviants, etc., in “other” cultures.2 Discourses and fantasies of cannibalism, therefore, occupy a crucial liminal space where the presumptive limits of human society are simultaneously challenged and implicitly reaffirmed.3

     

    Taking the Taiwan restaurant rumors as my starting point, in this essay I will elaborate a selective discursive genealogy of representations of cannibalism in twentieth-century Chinese culture. Specifically, I will consider four such cases, together with the cultural and social contexts in which they are embedded. In this survey, my intention is not to focus on the literal, physical act of cannibalism, but rather to use the discursive tradition of cannibalism as a prism through which to reflect on the processes of identification and differentiation by which not only the Self but also an array of social collectivities are constituted. Rather than being derived from explicit, manifest criteria, these psychic, social, and epistemological constructs are, instead, the result of complex flows of equivalence and alterity, and often it is, ironically, precisely at the closest points of identification that the most systematic patterns of social rupture are produced.

     

    My discussion of cannibalism will be conducted at two levels. On the one hand, I will seek to consider the significance of each instance of discursive cannibalism in its respective context, noting the way in which each elaboration builds, in part, on a shared discourse of cannibalistic allusions. On the other hand, I will seek to generalize from these specific instances of cannibalism and encorporation and use them as an abstract model for the reading process itself. Finally, at the end of the essay, I will seek to bring these two dimensions of cannibalism (contextualized specificity and abstract model, respectively) together, to consider the hermeneutic ethics of the act of reading cannibalism itself in a cross-cultural context. In particular, I will suggest that these actual discourses of cannibalism constitute an important challenge to how we approach the possibility of cross-cultural reading and perception, even as the abstract trope of cannibalism may itself provide a useful model for better understanding the hermeneutic ethics of cross-cultural reading and perception itself.

     

    Zhu Yu

     

    The human corporal body is, perhaps, a mere signifier. After this signifier has been developed [xianying] and fixed [dingying] on a roll of Kodak film, it becomes dark shadows [heiying]. On a sheet of wove paper that has been exposed to sunlight, it becomes a cluster of lights and shadows, with washes of ink and color added to lines and curves.

    Wuming Shi, “Reflections on the Body”

    Figure 1

     

    The Taiwanese restaurant cited in the Malaysian tabloid article had not, it turns out, done anything out of the ordinary, though the images which accompanied the article were themselves not without a basis in reality. Specifically, the photos were taken as part of a performance entitled “Eating People” (or “Man-Eater”) [shiren] performed on 17 October 2000 in Shanghai by the 30-year-old avant-garde performance artist Zhu Yu (see Figure 1). One widely publicized report quotes Zhu as saying that “to create Man-eater, he said he cooked the corpses of babies that had been stolen from a medical school. Zhu admitted that the meat obtained from the bodies tasted bad, and said he had vomited several times while eating it. However, he said, he had to do it ‘for art’s sake’” (“Baby-Eating”).

     

    In public comments he made at the time of the performance, Zhu Yu sought to address the significance of the scandalous nature of the his act, while at the same time attempting to relativize the social and cultural assumptions which make it appear scandalous in the first place:

     

    One question that always stymies us–that is, why cannot people eat people?

     

    Is there a commandment in man’s religion in which it is written that we cannot eat people? In what country is there a law against eating people? It’s simply morality. But, what is morality? Isn’t morality simply something that man whimsically changes from time to time based on his/her own so-called needs of human being in the course of human progress.

     

    From this we might thus conclude:

     

    So long as it can be done in a way that does not commit a crime, eating people is not forbidden by any of man or societies laws or religions; I herewith announce my intention and my aim to eat people as a protest against mankind’s moral idea that he/she cannot eat people. (qtd. in Hua 192)

     

    Here, Zhu Yu draws attention to cannibalism’s peculiar position at the center of contemporary society’s own self-conception, while also foregrounding its status as being effectively outside the purview of secular authority. Like the proverbial incest taboo, cannibalism is often viewed as a foundational prohibition on which the social order is grounded, but which, at the same time, derives significance precisely through its own potential transgression. The prohibitions against incest and cannibalism are both examples of socio-cultural taboos which, by their very ostensible universality, bring into question the ontological status of the categories of cultural identity within which they are imbedded. Furthermore, it is not coincidental that both prohibitions are explicitly concerned with negotiations of identity and contestations of equivalence. René Girard, for instance, includes both incest and cannibalism under the master category of sacrificial violence, speculating that “We are perhaps more distracted by incest than by cannibalism, but only because cannibalism has not yet found its Freud and been promoted to the status of a major contemporary myth” (276-77).

     

    Despite the universalizing tenor of Zhu Yu’s own remarks, his “Man-Eater” performance quickly became mired in a rather mundane debate over cultural and social differences. For instance, by mid-July of 2001, the R.O.C. [Taiwan] Government Information Office [GIO] had sprung into action, repeating the explanation that the story and the photographs were actually derived from Mainlander Zhu Yu’s October performance the preceding year, rather than from any culinary malfeasance on the part of the Taiwanese restaurant, and concluded cheerfully that “the GIO wishes to emphasize that no event of this kind has ever taken place in Taiwan, and that the serving or eating of such a dish would break an ROC law against the defiling of human corpses” (Republic). With this rhetorical flourish, the GIO report succeeded in taking a debate which might have appeared to center on cultural universals concerning the sanctity of the human body and adeptly translated it into a rather more provincial debate over regional mores and secular authority.4

     

    In this way, the debate provides a prism into how various Chinese communities attempt to portray themselves and each other under the eyes of a globalized public. Aihwa Ong has proposed the notion of “flexible citizenship” to describe the processes by which “refugees and business migrants” (in her study, specifically Sino-Asian ones) negotiate affiliations and loyalties to multiple nation-states (often investing and working in one or more countries, while keeping their families in another). She argues that these forces of transnational migration have had the effect not only of encouraging these migrant businessmen to rethink their symbolic location within an increasingly complex web of ethnic and national alliances and rivalries (she cites, for instance, the example of how a “triumphant ‘Chinese capitalism’ has induced long-assimilated Thai and Indonesian subjects to reclaim their ‘ethnic-Chinese’ status” [7]), but also, at the same time, producing important “mutations in the ways in which localized political and social organizations set the terms and are constitutive of a domain of social existence” (215). Speaking metaphorically, therefore, we might conclude that what each of these interventions (by Zhu Yu himself, the Malaysian newspaper, the Taiwan GIO, the overseas Chinese e-mail communities, etc.) have in common is that they each ironically take the same alleged act of cannibalism and use it is as a pretext to begin cannibalistically feeding on each other on a global stage, as they try to negotiate the competing imperatives of a localized, “national” locus of identity on the one hand and of an increasingly fluid, transnational network of ethnic alliances and identifications on the other.

     

    Though unquestionably shocking in and of itself, Zhu Yu’s October 17th, 2000 performance was by no means an anomaly when viewed in the context of his own recent corpus of work or that of the larger community of iconoclastic young artists with whom he is frequently associated. To understand the social and cultural context in which these artists were working, however, it is necessary to backtrack briefly. During the first couple of decades following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, and particularly during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), cultural production in Mainland China was tightly controlled. After the death of Chairman Mao and the official end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976, Chinese artists began to have a somewhat freer rein to express themselves, and some chose to develop in an experimental, avant-garde direction. These trends in experimental art have became increasingly pronounced during the 1990s, following the 1989 Tiananmen “democracy” protests and the subsequent military crackdown.

     

    Art historian Wu Hung has identified four general historical phases or “generations” in post-Cultural Revolution experimental art, beginning with the initial emergence of Chinese experimental art between 1979 and 1984: the “’85 Art New Wave Movement” (1985-1989); the internationalization of experimental art (1990-93); and the “domestic turn–art as social and political critique” (1994-present) (Transience 16). Within each of these broad generational groupings, however, the artists and their works generally span the spectrum from committed political protest to a cynical cultivation of foreign capital (and of the attendant Western fetishization of Oriental exotica). While initially much of this experimental art was primarily a response to the historical trauma of the Cultural Revolution, an important theme which began to emerge in the mid-1980s was that of a response to, and commentary on, the rapid economic development under Deng Xiaoping. The ideological vacuum created in the wake of the death of Mao and the end of the Cultural Revolution, combined with the widespread interest in getting rich, led to a brief period of “Nietzsche fever” in the late 1980s, with his motto “god is dead” being perceived as having particular relevance to China’s current condition.5

     

    Having mostly emerged onto the art scene in the mid- to late 1990s, Zhu Yu and his colleagues could generally be placed in this fourth generation. No longer responding directly to the Cultural Revolution (as was initially the case with many of their older colleagues), they see themselves as trying to push the envelope of artistic acceptability, while at the same time remaining keenly aware of the interest taken in their work by foreign academics and curators. Many of the artists in Zhu Yu’s immediate circle are best known for what can be seen as a combination of installment and performance art, often using their own bodies as well as human and animal flesh in elaborately choreographed performances. They tend to work on the margins of official permissibility, with their “closed-door” performances generally well-publicized (though often at the last minute), but usually not “officially” open to the public.

     

    Zhu Yu’s “Eating People” performance itself was reportedly part of a series of exhibitions entitled “Obsession with Injury” [dui shanghai de milian].6 Part of a larger phenomenon of “shock-art” in contemporary China, this provocative series of avant-garde performances used not only animal and human corpses, but also the bodies of the artists themselves, in order to challenge conventional assumptions about the limits of both human and social mortality. As the artists themselves describe their project: “We have always wanted to explore fundamental problems concerning the existence and death of human beings, as well as the transformative process of spirit into material” (Wu, Exhibiting 207).

     

    For instance, the second, closed-door installment of the “Obsession with Injury” series, held on 22 April 2000, featured a performance in which Zhu Yu himself “had cut a piece of skin from his own body and sewn it onto a large piece of pork. A photo on the wall showed him in the middle of surgery; a videotape showed the process of the operation” (Hua 190-91; Wu, Exhibiting 206). In another performance, the artists Sun Yuan and Peng Yu sat in adjacent chairs as nurses transfused their own blood into the preserved corpses of a pair of infant Siamese twins (Hua 98; Wu, Exhibiting 204). Peng Yu also participated in another performance which consisted of “dropping oil extracted from human fat into the mouth of a medical specimen of a child’s corpse,” with this latter performance also incorporating a video of the oil-extraction. All three of these performances shared a common concern with challenging conventional boundaries between human and animal, between living flesh and preserved corpses, as well as the boundaries between reality and electronic simulation (in their integration of live performances and videotaped reproductions).

     

    The performances in this “Obsession with Injury” exhibition, and others like it, collectively sought to bring a fresh perspective to conventional assumptions about the status of human corporality. While it has become commonplace, within the experimental trends in Chinese literature and art, to feature representations of acts of extreme violence being performed on the human body (consider, for instance, Tang Yuanbao’s act of peeling off the skin of his own face at the end of Wang Shuo’s novel Please Don’t Call Me Human), what is remarkable about the “Obsession” performances is their use of actual human flesh (both from the artists’ own bodies, as well as that of preserved human corpses).

     

    The use of human and animal flesh was clearly a striking component of these sorts of exhibits, to the point that contemporary critics speak in general terms of the fascination with “meat art” in contemporary Chinese avant-garde art. At the same time, however, the artists, in their discussions of their work, repeatedly tried to downplay the significance of their use of this “meat.” For instance, at one point they explain that,

     

    First of all, we did not use corpses in a conventional sense, because all of the human bodies we employed were specimens that had been medically treated. Their cells had been conditioned by formaldehyde and could no longer rot or be infected by germs. These so-called bodies are germ-free and had already been turned into chemical substances. (Wu, Exhibiting 206)

     

    These comments are almost as startling as the performances to which they refer. While on the surface appearing to undercut the transgressive implications of their performances which appear to center around the deliberate desecration of human bodies (claiming, in effect, that they are not actual human bodies which they are using), these comments actually raise a host of potentially even more problematic questions concerning the limits of “human” mortality and human corporeality. Particularly interesting is the implication that infectious “germs,” typically viewed as contaminants, are actually part of what makes the bodies “human” in the first place.

     

    Furthermore, even as these “shock-artists” were capitalizing on the referential presence of their subject matter (be it actually “human” or otherwise), they were at the same time struggling to get beyond the purely material dimension of their performances. As Zhu Yu explained in a later interview:

     

    Our intention was not to use these materials to say something. We want our works to say something. But right now, the audience doesn’t have the ability to accept something like this is. People haven’t seen this kind of an exhibition before, where real things are used. The audience is reacting to the materials. After seeing it more times, then maybe they will be able to see what’s inside of these works. […] The result is already pre-determined because these materials, from a certain perspective[,] are concepts in themselves. So it’s easy for the audience to think purely about the materials when they see these works. From another perspective, the materials are an obstacle for us. (Wang, “Sadistic”)

     

    These comments take one of the central issues of the later cannibalism debate and turn it back upon itself. That is to say, one of the key themes in the various discussions of the cannibalism allegations was one of reference or denotation: to what extent did the photographs constitute mere visual simulacra, or to what extent could they be taken as a standing in an indexical relationship with an outer reality?

     

    Moreover, even after it was revealed that the controversial photographs were actually derived from Zhu Yu’s performance in Shanghai, questions still remained for some viewers over what precisely that performance consisted of: was it actual cannibalism, or not? Was it a cannibalistic act that was being presented as a work of art, or was it instead an elaborate mock-up intended to mimic an act of consuming actual human flesh? Similarly, in the “Obsession with Injury” performances, the question ultimately becomes not simply that of the reliability of the various visual reproductions being used, but also, and even more importantly, that of the referential status of the human body itself. The human body is, in a sense, being subjected here to a chiasmatic conjunction of mutually opposed hermeneutic imperatives. On the one hand, the medical specimens are being effectively evacuated of their conventional connotations, becoming essentially empty shells of their former selves. At the same time, however, these newly sterilized bodies are then remobilized as potent cultural signifiers, connoting the bodily fragility to which their own transformation itself stands as an eloquent testament.

     

    Zhu Yu’s and his colleagues’ “shock art” appears to challenge conventions of human morality and propriety, even as it pushes the envelope of acceptable artistic expression. Building, in part, on contemporary Chinese youths’ perception that they lack an effective public forum in which to express their views and concerns, these sorts of sensational performances effectively transform the human body into a textually inscribable medium. Living in a post-Maoist social ethos commonly described as lacking a coherent moral center, these young artists rely on the deliberate transgression of some of society’s most deeply ingrained cultural prohibitions in order to make socially meaningful statements.

     

    Eat thy Neighbor

     

    Since it is possible to “exchange sons to eat,” then anything can be exchanged, anyone can be eaten.

     

    Lu Xun, “Diary of a Madman”

     

    As iconoclastic as it might seem at first glance, Zhu Yu’s cannibalistic performance was also implicitly in dialogue with a variety of other contemporary and historical discourses of cannibalism in Chinese culture. Some of the most recent such examples include Scarlet Memorial: Tales of Cannibalism in Modern China, Zheng Yi’s exposé on the cannibalism practiced during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), as well as Yu Hua’s provocative 1980s short story “Classical Love,” in which an errant wanderer falls in love with a beautiful maiden at a remote inn, who is ultimately killed and dismembered for her meat. More abstract, but equally graphic, is the Hong Kong director Siu-Tung Ching’s popular 1988 film, A Chinese Ghost Story, which revolves around a graphic theme of vampiric cannibalism, with the hermaphroditic tree-spirit “Laolao’s” preposterously oversized tongue snaking through the half-real/half-fantasy space of this epistemological hinterland.

     

    Probably the more famous evocation of cannibalism in modern Chinese literature, however, is Lu Xun’s celebrated 1918 short story, “Diary of a Madman,” in which a Gogolesque paranoiac becomes convinced that his neighbors, and even his immediate relatives, are all scheming to eat his flesh. The story concludes with the narrator’s conviction that he, too, has unwittingly consumed human flesh, and as a result will himself become a cannibal, yet still holds out hope that “the children” may somehow be saved from this vicious cycle of self-consumption: “Perhaps there are still children who have not yet eaten men. Save the children….” (18).

     

    Lu Xun’s story is typically read as an allegorical excoriation of the “cannibalistic” society which China had become–one in which people feed off of each other’s weaknesses, rather than rallying together to a common cause. The work itself is also generally held up as marking the symbolic birth of a Chinese literary modernism, in that it not only constitutes an allegorical critique of the old society, but furthermore is itself one of the earliest works to be written in the modern vernacular.

     

    Lu Xun himself is generally recognized as one of the leading figures of the reformist May Fourth Movement of the late 1910s and 1920s. Following on the heels of the 1911 fall of China’s last official dynasty, the Qing, the May Fourth Movement was generally concerned with attempting to strengthen the Chinese nation by both introducing into China a variety of foreign (primarily Western) social ideas, scientific paradigms, and aesthetic trends, as well as identifying and critiquing those “traditional” tendencies in Chinese society which were perceived as being responsible for its weakness and inability to “modernize” effectively. Historian Lin Yü-sheng identifies the May Fourth Movement’s general attitude as being one of “totalistic anti-traditionalism”: an ostensible wholesale rejection of the social and ideological legacies of the past, which at the same time has the ironic effect of partially obscuring the degree to which the reformists were themselves building pre-existing models of literati involvement and social critique.

     

    “Diary of a Madman” is the first of the socially motivated stories which Lu Xun wrote during this May Fourth period, but its metaphor of cannibalism is one to which he would return in several of his subsequent writings (as, for instance, with the blood-soaked mantou bun which is presented, in his story “Medicine,” as an unsuccessful cure for tuberculosis), and which many other authors would later pick up on and develop in their own right. At the same time, however, the signifier of cannibalism in Lu Xun’s work is a richly overdetermined one, in the sense that it inevitably exceeds the straightforward allegorical reading outlined above. Cannibalism is an abstract symbol in the story, but is also a symbol which builds in part on allusions to actual historical accounts of cannibalism. Part of the narrator’s horror is precipitated by his gradual realization that many of the references to cannibalism in familiar historical texts, ranging from the fourth-century B. C. E. Warring States period to the sixteenth-century Ming dynasty, might actually be literal references, rather than mere rhetorical expressions. Therefore, the subtext of the story becomes not only one of critiquing contemporary societal conditions, but also one of distinguishing between empty signifiers and actual historical referents. In short, it becomes a question of how to read, how to make sense of the literal or figurative dimensions of familiar historical texts.

     

    At another point in the story, Lu Xun relates how the narrator stayed up late one night rereading the canonical dynastic histories, which were filled on every page with allusions to the Confucian ideals of “Virtue and Morality.” The madman is then described as having an epiphany, whereby he suddenly becomes able to read through the surface meaning of the texts and discern their implicit, underlying meaning:

     

    Everything requires careful consideration if one is to understand it. In ancient times, as I recollect, people often ate human beings, but I am rather hazy about it. I tried to look this up, but my history has no chronology, and scrawled all over each page are the words: “Virtue and Morality.” Since I could not sleep anyway, I read intently half the night until I began to see the words between the lines. The whole book was filled with the two words–“Eat people.” (10)

     

     

    “Cannibalism,” here, becomes not only a trope for a kind of clarity of social vision, an ability to perceive the involutive and self-destructive tendencies of contemporary Chinese society, but also a figure for a certain kind of hermeneutics, an ability to read a (historical) text against itself. What is at stake is not merely a simple dialectics between surface visibility and hidden meaning, but rather the ability to recognize the (potential) meaning in what was (always) already “visible” in the first place.

     

    Lu Xun died somewhat prematurely in 1936, at the age of 55. Although he was actively involved with the League of Left-Wing Writers during the last decade or so of his life, he made a point of never formally joining the Chinese Communist Party. Chairman Mao Zedong nevertheless subsequently lauded Lu Xun as “the major leader in the Chinese cultural revolution. He was not only a great writer, but also a great thinker and a great revolutionary” (372). In spite of this unconditional accolade, it nevertheless remains very questionable to what extent the acerbically critical Lu Xun would have approved of the subsequent Maoist regime. Nevertheless, under the P.R.C. Lu Xun was elevated to the pinnacle of the Chinese literary canon (thanks, in no small part, to Mao’s own unreserved endorsement of Lu Xun’s revolutionary credentials). Speaking metaphorically, therefore, we could say that his writings and legacy were subsequently consumed and incorporated by the Maoist socio-political orthodoxy, as, for instance, in the case of his celebrated condemnation of the “human-eating old society,” which ultimately became monumentalized within the post-1949 ideological rhetoric of the Chinese Communist Party. At the same time, this rhetorical incorporation on the part of the Party also involves an important process of misreading, an attempt cannibalistically to make a part of itself a position of ideological critique which, otherwise, might have potentially constituted one of its strongest challenges.

     

    I would take this conclusion and carry it a step further, arguing that the problematic posed by cannibalism (under this latter, more abstract understanding of the concept) is not only one of reading history, or of reading historically, but rather it is one of “reading” in general. The physical act of cannibalism is only meaningful when positioned at the interstices of identity and alterity (in that it is an act of consuming the non-Self with whom one has strong, categorical ties), and is grounded on the ways in which we make sense of the complex social tapestry which the cannibalistic act itself simultaneously negates and reaffirms. Furthermore, the act of cannibalism is itself grounded on a complex hermeneutics of identity, of how we understand and imagine our relationship with a variety of social Others. In the following section, I will pursue this reading to its logical conclusion, looking not at the consumption, but rather at the constitution of human flesh, and the way in which the human body itself has been imagined as a complex mass of incommensurable elements, lacking a preconceived identity, and instead actively constituted through the immune system’s continual hermeneutic process of “reading” patterns of identity and alterity.

     

    Devouring Oneself from Within

     

    Pre-eminently a twentieth-century object, the immune system is a map drawn to guide recognition and misrecognition of self and other in the dialectics of Western biopolitics.

     

    Donna Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women

     

    Lu Xun’s allegorical encounters with cannibalism mark an important turning point in his own intellectual development. It is well known that Lu Xun initially studied medicine in Japan, and that he later claimed that it was the perceived need to get to the root of the spiritual and social ills which afflicted contemporary China which led him to abandon his medical studies and instead devote himself to healing not the bodies of his compatriots but rather their spirits. His critical description of China as a cannibalistic society in “Diary of a Madman” became one of the rallying points of his generation and has continued to echo throughout the twentieth century. At the same time, even as his earlier interest in corporal healing was effectively sublimated, that same medicinal orientation was making an uncanny return in many of his later writings, as well as those of his contemporaries.

     

    For instance, in an essay entitled “Random Thoughts #38” and published under Lu Xun’s name in 1918,7 the same year of “Diary of a Madman,” there is an explicit parallel drawn between the contagion of the human bloodstream by syphilis bacteria and the ideological “confusion” of the social corpus resulting from the influence of “Confucians, Taoists, and Buddhist monks”: “Even though we might now want to become real people, it is uncertain whether or not we will [be able to avoid being] confounded by the dark and confused elements in our blood-stream” (389). The essay expresses concern, furthermore, that this ideological disease not reach the nadir of syphilis and concludes with the hope that science may discover some magic cultural/ideological panacea, a so-called “707,” based on the recently discovered treatment for syphilis (arsphenamine, conventionally known at the time as “606”). The image of harmful reactionary ideological elements flowing through society’s bloodstream is evocative in and of itself, but the specific allusion to syphilis makes the metaphor even more compelling, in that the tissue damage from syphilis results, at least in part, from white blood cells’ attacking previously healthy tissue. The result is a cannibalistic extravaganza ironically reminiscent of “The Diary of a Madman” from a few months earlier.

     

    While the connection between the immune system and “cannibalism” is admittedly somewhat indirect in this 1918 essay, it is nevertheless developed much more explicitly in several other reformist essays published during the same general period. In the following discussion, I will consider three of these essays, all of which were published between 1915 and 1918 in the same journal, New Youth, which also published not only “Diary of a Madman” but also the 1918 “Random Thoughts” essay as well. In particular, I will focus on the ways in which each of these essays develops an increasingly elaborate double metaphor, whereby the metaphoric “cannibalism” on the part of the immune system’s white blood cells itself becomes a model for the ways in which different elements within Chinese society feed upon each other.

     

    The first of these essays appeared in the 1915 inaugural issue of New Youth. There, the editor of the journal, Chen Duxiu, published an influential article entitled “Call to Youth,” where he explicitly elaborates a metaphorical correspondence between individuals in society and cells in the human body:

     

    Youth have the same relationship to society that the new and lively cells have with respect to the human body. In the metabolic process, the old and rotten cells are constantly being weeded out, and openings are thus created which are promptly filled with fresh and lively cells. If this metabolic process functions correctly, the organism will be healthy; but if the old and rotten cells are allowed to accumulate, however, the organism will die. If this metabolic process functions properly at a social level, society will flourish; but if the old and corrupt elements are allowed to accumulate, society will be destroyed. (Chen 1)

     

    In this essay, the references to metabolic processes and cell replenishment represent an interesting synthesis of Western medical metaphors, on the one hand, and of the longstanding tradition, in Chinese writings, of elaborating metaphorical parallels between the human body and the social “body politic,” on the other.8

     

    The biomedical underpinning of the corporal metaphor is elaborated in more detail in “The Thought of Two Modern Scientists,” an essay Chen Duxiu wrote the following year, on the occasion of the death of Russian biologist Elie Metchnikoff (1843[5?]-1916). In the second section of this essay, Chen addresses Metchnikoff’s work and its relevance to human longevity.9 In particular, he stresses Metchnikoff’s discovery of the significance of white blood cells in the immune system, and specifically their ability to engulf and absorb harmful microbes. To describe these white blood cells, Metchnikoff coined the term “phagocyte,” derived from Greek terms “phago” (“to eat”) and “kyto” (“tool”), and which Chen translated into Chinese as “shijun xibao,” or “bacterium-eating cell.” The obvious question to ask next, Chen writes, is whether the white blood cells can be seen as acting out of a sense of duty to the larger body, or whether they are simply pursuing a narrow course of individual self-interest. The answer is clear, he writes in response to his own rhetorical question: they are simply acting in their own self-interest, to feed themselves. This explains the apparent paradox which Metchnikoff observes, whereby as the body ages and loses its vigor, the white blood cells, by contrast, may become overly active, attacking elements of the body itself (from the nervous system to the cells responsible for hair pigment), “mistakenly” regarding them as foreign pathogens. After a further discussion of the role played by intestinal bacteria in the aging process, Chen concludes that once a way is found to control (or even eliminate) these “cannibalistic” white blood cells, it may be possible to extend human longevitty by a century or more (49).

     

    More than the specifically medical implications of Metchnikoff’s model, Chen was apparently fascinated by the question of the social implications which this model of phagocytes and their relationship to the larger body (politic), and of how they might enable us to rethink the relationship between “altruism” and “individualism.” Chen concludes the essay by applying some of these same questions of altruism vs. individualism to his Metchnikoff himself:

     

    Although Metchnikoff advocates individualism, nonetheless the principles by which he lived out his life were definitely not ones of absolute individualism. Although he did not take benevolence and altruism to be ultimate ends, his actions were nonetheless compatible with these general principles (51).

     

    What we see here, therefore, is Chen’s attempt to use biological metaphors to provide a model for a position of constructive social criticism, one which avoids the dual dangers of self-effacing conformism and “altruism,” on the one hand, as well as that of “absolute individualism” (e.g., the white blood cells which destroy the body itself), on the other.

     

    In 1918 fellow reformist Hu Shi developed this same immune system metaphor in the lead article of a New Youth special issue on Ibsen. Hu Shi concludes the article with a medical metaphor inspired by the figure of Dr. Stockman in Ibsen’s play, “Enemy of the People”:

     

    It is as if [Ibsen] were saying, “People’s bodies all rely on the innumerable white blood cells in their bloodstream to be perpetually battling the harmful microbes that enter the body, and to make certain that they are all completely eliminated. Only then can the body be healthy and the spirit complete.” The health of the society and of the nation depend completely on these white blood cells, which are never satisfied, never content, and at every moment are battling the evil and the filthy elements in society, and only then can there be hope for social improvement and advancement. (Hu 20)

     

    When we read this essay in conjunction with Chen’s original 1915 one, we realize that what is implied is that the “evil and filthy elements in society” are actually not foreign pathogens, but rather they are none other than the same “old and rotten” cells from the body itself. Therefore, in this essay–almost precisely contemporaneous with Lu Xun’s identification, in “Diary of a Madman,” of cannibalism as the metaphorical condition from which society must attempt to extricate itself–we here have instead an implicit argument in support of figurative cannibalism, a call for social “white blood cells” to seek out and consume “the evil and filthy elements in society.” An act of collective self-awakening, therefore, implies a process of self-alienation, a systematic identification and excision of unprogressive elements.

     

    While Lu Xun, Hu Shi, and Chen Duxiu were all leading members of the May Fourth Movement, they nevertheless all occupied quite distinct positions within Chinese ideology and politics. Chen Duxiu was one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party, while Lu Xun made a point of never joining the party, though he worked closely with several Party leaders during the 1920s and 1930s. Hu Shi, meanwhile, ended up siding with the Kuomingtang and consequently has been generally reviled in much Mainland historiography.10 Despite these manifest differences in their political and aesthetic orientations, it is nevertheless striking that they have each come together on this same medico-political metaphor of the cannibalistic white blood cells. Somewhat independently of the meaning which they each originally might have intended the metaphor to convey, this metaphor itself can nevertheless be read deconstructively, suggesting a body at war with itself, but the underlying implication being that this condition is, in fact, part of the status quo. Young and lively cells must, for the benefit of the whole, seek to eliminate and replace old and tired ones. The boundary between productive regeneration and cannibalistic self-consumption, therefore, is an exceedingly tenuous one, largely contingent on the speaker’s relationship with the elements which are doing the “consuming.”

     

    The irony inherent in these various white blood cell metaphors is that while Metchnikoff originally suggested that the elimination of these cells would, in effect, forestall the aging process, in the metaphorical formulations of many of these May Fourth reformers, the white blood cells’ ability to feed on ossified portions of the social Self becomes an asset, rather than a liability. Hu Shi and company are, in effect, arguing that we must combat social cannibalism with cannibalism, devouring those reactionary elements of society before they can succeed in devouring us.

     

    These sorts of physiological metaphors represent a chiasmatic intersection of objectivity and fantasy. They draw on an increasingly detailed medical understanding of the structure and function of the human immune system, while at the same time reducing the imaginary space of the nation to a highly metaphoric plane. The increased precision with which the function and behavior of these white blood cells is described goes hand-in-hand with an increased degree of abstraction in the description of human behavior.

     

    Furthermore, it is highly appropriate that it was specifically the immune system which provided the May-Fourth-period reformers with one of their favorite models in this struggle to define themselves through the mediated gaze of the other, appropriate in that the immune system is itself essentially a machine of self-recognition and self-reproduction, one which functions by reducing processes of identification to the barest heuristic strategies. In fact, the immune system can even be seen as a quintessential sublimation of the process of self-identification, whereby the process of “identification” operates essentially independently of the “self” which it ostensibly presupposes. Accordingly, the immune-system metaphor provides an ironically apt model of a “pure” form of cannibalism, as well as an illustration of its theoretical limits. In the case of the immune system, relations of identity and alterity are explicitly created in the process of recognition itself.

     

    The coherence of the organism, therefore, is itself premised on a continual struggle of identity politics at the cellular level. Phagocytotic consumption on the part of white blood cells represents a conceptual limit-point for our understanding of cannibalism–it is, in a sense, not “true” cannibalism, because the cells only devour that which they recognize as “Other.” At the same time, however, the functioning of these cells illustrates the degree to which these categories of Self and Other are never a priori givens, but rather are themselves the product of metaphorical processes of reading itself.

     

    In a critical overview of more recent Western medical models of the immune system, feminist theorist Donna Haraway suggests that these models come to assume a notion of “identity” as merely an amorphous, decentered play of difference:

     

    Does the immune system–the fluid, dispersed, networking techno-organic-textual-mythic system that ties together the more stodgy and localized centers of the body through its acts of recognition–represent the ultimate sign of altruistic evolution towards wholeness, in the form of the means of co-ordination of a coherent self? (219)

     

    “In a word, no,” she writes, in reply to her own rhetorical question. The notions of “self” presupposed by these immune system models are, instead, continually contested and always already “under erasure.” While Haraway posits that this deconstructive turn in immune system models represents a specifically “post-modern,” late-twentieth-century development, my reading of these May-Fourth-period texts suggests that many of these deconstructive implications were latently present in the model all along.

     

    The “Western” medical and hygienic perspectives being introduced into China during the May Fourth era contributed to a number of radical shifts in the understanding of the constitution of not only the human body itself, but also the social communities and societies which these bodies inhabit. One of the more prominent examples of Chinese incorporation of Western medical knowledge is that of these immunological models of social organization. Ironically, however, one of the implications of these immunological models, as they were developed in the May Fourth era, involves precisely a recognition of the inherent contingency of the processes by which corporal or social bodies are differentiated from “foreign” elements. That is to say, the act of incorporating “Other” (Western) models ironically resulted in an implicit rethinking of the conceptual basis upon which the boundaries between “Self” and “Other” are constructed in the first place.

     

    Journeys into the Interior

     

    Mo Yan Sir Mo Yan Sir what’s wrong please wake up This guy wrote Red Sorghum but he’s a fledgling with alcohol can’t hold his liquor but comes to Liquorland to stir up trouble take him to the hospital bring a car over first give him some carp broth to sober him up carp promotes lactation don’t tell me he just had a baby a meat boy set it in a big gilded platter […]

     

    Mo Yan, The Republic of Wine

     

    The preceding May Fourth-era explorations into “cannibalistic” practices deep within the human body are ironically mirrored by the allegorical investigation of cannibalistic allegations deep within China’s own geographic interior in the 1993 novel The Republic of Wine by one of contemporary China’s most pre-eminent writers, Mo Yan. Born into a peasant family in 1955 and raised in rural Northern China, Mo Yan began publishing short stories and novels in the mid-1980s. Though he is sometimes grouped with the experimental writers who came of age in the 1980s (including figures such as Yu Hua, Ge Fei, Can Xue, etc.), Mo Yan’s early fiction tends to emphasize conventional storytelling and rural subject matter more than these other authors, and as such would be more accurately categorized as a “native soil” author. The events associated with the 4 June 1989 protests in Tiananmen Square appear to have had a significant influence on him, and it was in the latter part of that year that Mo Yan began writing The Republic of Wine, which perhaps still stands as his most innovative and unconventional work to date–whereby the social violence of the Tiananmen military crackdown would almost appear to have been displaced onto the narrative structure of the novel itself.

     

    Mo Yan is probably best known for his 1986 novel Red Sorghum, on which the renowned fifth-generation director Zhang Yimou based his directorial debut the following year. The earlier work opens with the evocative epigraph, “[…] As your unfilial son, I am prepared to carve out my heart, marinate it in sauce, have it minced and placed in three bowls, and lay it out as an offering in a field of sorghum”; and acts of symbolic cannibalism similarly lie at the heart of the work itself. For example, the secret recipe of the novel’s trademark wine is that it is fermented with human urine. Furthermore, later in the novel, there is an extended description of how, during the Chinese civil war, previously domesticated dogs gone wild feed on the decaying flesh of the human corpses which litter the landscape, and how the protagonists themselves have no other recourse but to feed on this dog flesh, flesh which is only one step away from their own. In this way, the canine-mediated cannibalism becomes a powerful metaphor for the internecine warfare in which China found itself in the 1940s following the withdrawal of the Japanese troops.

     

    The Republic of Wine, which Mo Yan began to write roughly three years later, builds quite directly on the thematic precedent set by Red Sorghum–literalizing Red Sorghum‘s attention to bacchanalian excess and cannibalistic transgression, even as it transposes the earlier novel’s concerns onto a more self-consciously fictional plane. The Republic of Wine constitutes not only a journey into the fictional space of China’s interior hinterland, but furthermore can also be seen as a figurative journey back into China’s own literary history of cannibalistic metaphors. For instance, it tropes quite explicitly on one of China’s greatest travel narratives: the fifteenth-century novel Journey to the West, whose own assorted allusions to cannibalistic practice constitute part of the cultural background of Mo Yan’s development of the topic.11 Furthermore, The Republic of Wine‘s attention to the theme of child cannibalism inevitably finds itself in dialogue with Lu Xun’s own classic short story on the topic, with Mo Yan’s novel alluding repeatedly to Lu Xun as an ironic avatar of literary canonicity.

     

    The basic premise of the main The Republic of Wine narrative concerns a hapless government investigator by the name of Ding Gou’er, who has been sent to a fictional province deep in the Chinese interior to investigate allegations of cannibalism, and specifically the consumption of human infants. When he finally arrives at this “Liquorland,” his hosts treat him to a decadent banquet, the pièce-de-résistance of which is a dish consisting of a human boy prepared whole and roasted to a deep shade of brown:

     

    The boy sat cross-legged in the middle of the gilded platter, golden brown and oozing sweet-smelling oil, a giddy smile frozen on his face. Lovely, naïve. Around him was spread a garland of green vegetable leaves and bright red radish blossoms. The stupefied investigator swallowed back the juices that rumbled up from his stomach as he gawked at the boy. A pair of limpid eyes gazed back at him, steam puffed out of the boy’s nostrils, and the lips quivered as if he were about to speak. (75)

     

    Upon seeing this culinary confirmation of his darkest suspicions, Ding Gou’er–who, by this point, is rather drunk–immediately attempts to arrest his hosts for practicing cannibalism. His hosts, however, patiently explain to him that it has all been a misunderstanding, and that the dish in question is actually merely an elaborate culinary simulacrum, carefully designed to mimic the shape and texture of a human infant, while in fact consisting only of mundane comestibles:

     

    “Old Ding, good old Ding, you’re a fine comrade with a strong humanistic bent, for which I respect you,” Diamond Jin said. “But you’re wrong. You’ve made a subjective error. Look closely. Is that a little boy?” His words had the desired effect on Ding Gou’er, who turned to look at the boy on the platter. He was still smiling, his lips parted slightly, as if he were about to speak. “He’s incredibly lifelike!” Ding Gou’er said loudly. “Right, lifelike,” Diamond Jin repeated. “And why is this fake child so lifelike? Because the chefs here in Liquorland are extraordinarily talented, uncanny masters.” The Party Secretary and Mine Director echoed his praise: “And this isn’t the best that we have to offer! A professor at the Culinary Academy can make them so that even the eyelashes flutter. No one dares let his chopsticks touch one of hers.” (77)

     

    What began as a scandal of cannibalism thus becomes, instead, a postmodern scandal of representation and reference; and as the novel progresses, it remains ambiguous (and ultimately irrelevant) whether that which the inebriated Ding Gou’er witnessed was an actual human infant, or merely a culinary facsimile of one. Furthermore, this radical skepticism towards the boundary between reality and representation, referent and simulacrum, in turn comes to feed parasitically on the plot of the actual novel itself, causing it to fold back upon itself, as a spectral apparition of the author himself ends up falling into the fictional abyss of the novel that he is attempting to write. To understand what is meant by this, however, it will be necessary to return briefly to a description of the structure and contents of the novel.

     

    The core The Republic of Wine narrative, as summarized above, is embedded within an outer narrative frame, in which a fictional “Mo Yan” (appearing as a character within his own novel) is portrayed as trying to complete the Republic manuscript. A central premise of this outer narrative frame is that the fictional “Mo Yan” finds himself in the position of being a reluctant cultural icon idolized by enthusiastic fans of Red Sorghum, and in particular by a certain Li Yidou, a Ph.D. candidate in liquor studies at the Brewer’s College in Liquorland, whose passion for wine is rivaled only by his morbid fascination with cannibalism and other dark recesses of the human soul. In this outer frame of the novel, the fictional “Mo Yan” is in the process of writing the The Republic of Wine narrative itself, even as he finds himself in epistolary dialogue with Li Yidou, who asks “Mo Yan” to use his institutional connections to help him gain a foothold within the publishing industry. Accordingly, Li Yidou sends “Mo Yan” a series of short stories, each more outlandish than the last, several of which center around discussions of children being raised with the express purpose of later being sold to the slaughterhouse. The fictional “Mo Yan” finds himself in a conundrum over how to continue to be encouraging in the face of what he increasingly perceives to be an onslaught of literary drivel, a conundrum which is reinforced by his growing ambivalence towards his own fiction.

     

    About two thirds of the way through the novel, however, this boundary between the outer and inner narrative frames begins to dissolve, as “Mo Yan” ultimately succumbs to writer’s block and abandons the The Republic of Wine narrative, deciding instead to travel to “Liquorland” himself to pay Li Yidou a visit. In doing so, he effectively abandons his presumptive authorial authority and steps into the same fictional space that he has already condemned to incompleteness, becoming an ironic Pirandellian character fleeing from his own authorship.

     

    In The Republic of Wine, the act of cannibalism constitutes an aporia of signification, on the basis of which the rest of the novel’s plot is structured. The figure cannibalism similarly provides a bridge between Lu Xun’s arch-canonical 1918 short story and Li Yidou’s own anti-canonical literary rantings. Understood more metaphorically, the figure of cannibalism could be seen as a pivot around which regimes of cultural and literary orthodoxy revolve, whereby the orthodox canon and more “popular” or marginalized culture are seen as actually being symbiotically dependent on each other, feeding parasitically on the textual remains which the other has left behind. That is to say, just as cannibalism represents a challenge to the conventional boundaries between Self and Other, individual and collective, similarly Mo Yan’s novel as a whole interrogates the boundaries between literary orthodoxy and the popular or transgressive genres against which it defines itself, together with the more ontological boundary between literary representation and the outer reality which literature seeks to denote.

     

    Afterimages of the Flesh

     

    The eyes of the fish were white and hard, and its mouth was open just like those people who want to eat human beings.

    Lu Xun, “Diary of a Madman”

    When you eat a fish, you must start with the eyes.

    Xu Shunying, Gushing Out

     

    Chinese society and culture have long been haunted by the specter of cannibalism.12 This uncanny apparition not only represents a profound challenge to the presumed sanctity of the human body (and, in the case of “survival” cannibalism, marking moments at which the very bonds of human society dissolve in the face of extreme adversity), but also, ironically, at the same time potentially standing as an ultimate gesture of social unity and filial devotion (as in the case of Chinese “endophagy,” in which children are said to feed their ailing parents with flesh taken from their own bodies). Throughout the twentieth century, a variety of authors, artists, and political reformers have repeatedly used the figure of cannibalism to reflect on a range of issues relating to the constitution of social collectives and corporal subjects, while in the process effectively deconstructing the metaphoricity of the trope of cannibalism itself. While the four cases of Chinese “discursive cannibalism” which I have considered in this essay each date from different periods and involve diverse social groups and representational media, a common characteristic which they all share is that they are each located in a volatile liminal space in which a variety of social and epistemological boundaries may be problematized and rethought.

     

    To recapitulate briefly, the Zhu Yu controversy foregrounds the way in which the specter of cannibalism has been, and continues to be, used to reinforce perceived differences between different ethnic, national, or transnational social groups. Furthermore, even as the subsequent debates bring attention to issues of social signification, they also problematize issues of signification in general. That is to say, a recurrent theme throughout many of the debates has been one of the limits of reference: to what extent do the photographs actually denote a tangible reality? And, how does this outer “reality” signified by these texts (be it “actual” cannibalism, a performative act of cannibalism, or a performative mimicry of a cannibalistic act, etc.) ultimately impact our understanding of the implications of the subsequent debates? In the case of Lu Xun’s story, one of the central issues was the boundary between “history” and “narrative”: what is the relationship between narrative schemata and the historical “realities” which they seek to describe? How are we to understand the ultimate “truth value” of what appear to be metaphorical figures?

     

    With the May Fourth immunological metaphors, a central issue was that of how to understand the boundaries between “bodies” (either corporal or social bodies) and the heterogeneous elements (pathogens or contaminants) against which they define themselves. Finally, Mo Yan’s recent novel The Republic of Wine brings us back to some key issues concerning the truth-value of (“literary”) textual production, while at the same time encouraging a rethinking of the conventional boundaries between orthodox canonicity and the heterogeneous array of more “popular” or “marginal” discourses against which it seeks to define itself. Also central to the novel was another version of the semiotic quandary which we observed in the Zhu Yu debates–namely, the figure of the “perfect” simulacrum, which stymies attempts to draw meaningful distinctions between signifier and referent (which is paralleled in the Zhu Yu case by an ambiguity between signifiers with referents and those without).

     

    I will conclude here by returning to the Zhu Yu performance with which I began. An intriguing detail which none of the published commentaries on the performance has (to my knowledge) hitherto remarked upon is that, in each of the endlessly reproduced images of Zhu Yu eating the human infant, he is always positioned in front of, and below, a large poster containing a representation of what appears to be an anatomy textbook (see Figure 2). The book is open to a page containing four dissected views of a human eye. Easily overlooked by viewers drawn, in horrified fascination, to the cannibalistic drama unfolding below it, these ocular images actually provide crucial insight into some of the issues involved in the production, circulation, and visual consumption of the cannibalistic images themselves.

     

    Figure 2

     

    These images of the human eye provide an alternate focal point for this photograph, graphically illustrating the degree to which the primal scene it depicts gains significance precisely through its process of being exchanged and viewed by others. Furthermore, these defamiliarizing views of the human eye constitute a useful reminder that our understanding of the human body, even our own body, is never “pure” and direct, but rather is necessarily mediated through different pre-existing orders of knowledge, vision, and experience.

     

    The implications of this autonomous, disembodied gaze for our understanding of the scene as a whole are multiple. First of all, the human visual system is dissected and subjected to the cold, disinterested gaze of medical science. The resulting medical gaze, in turn, provides an ironic counterpoint to the sensationalistic, morbid gaze which the photographs inevitably elicit. As a result, these scandalous and endlessly reproduced images are not as transparently intelligible as one might think and are actually located at the site of multiply fractured gazes: spectacular, medical, anthropological, political, and epistemological. My intention in this essay has been to provide additional perspectives to each of these components of the gaze, and in the process to suggest that the figure of cannibalism may itself be seen as pointing to a crucial border region wherein conventional categorical distinctions between Self and Other, us and them, reality and representation are deconstructed and put on display.

     

    More generally speaking, last year’s cannibalism “scandal” presents us with a problem of perception and perspective. On the one hand, a recurrent theme in most of the ensuing discussions of Zhu Yu’s performance emphasized a sense of cultural distance, of voyeuristically looking into a cultural space (Asian, Chinese, Taiwanese, etc.) which is perceived as being either subtly or radically distant from the socio-political location of the perceiver. On the other hand, many of the discussions implicitly held this cannibalism up to “their own” culturally specific standards, and indeed used the transgressive implications of Zhu Yu’s performance rhetorically to reinforce their own assumptions about the universality of certain cultural prohibitions.13

     

    Under the reading I have outlined above, the figure of cannibalism itself involves a paradoxical combination of identification and alterity, of violence and desire. The act of incorporating into oneself flesh of an Other with whom one shares a categorical identification, implicitly breaks down relations of alterity, even as it retrospectively reinforces them. Accordingly, this transcultural perception of cannibalism can itself provide a useful metaphor for the act of transcultural perception itself. In perceiving “other” cultures, we seek to understand, to internalize part of their inherent distance, even if only to reaffirm their inherent distance from “our” own.

     

    This “scandal” of cannibalism, therefore, encapsulates a compelling problem from the perspective of cross-cultural perception. On the one hand, many viewers are inclined to view cannibalism in absolute, universal terms which transcend specific cultural difference. It is simply unthinkable, according to this common view, that any human society would knowingly and willing practice cannibalism. On the other hand, to the extent that anthropologists recognize the possibility that some societies might practice (or might have previously practiced) cannibalism, they often proceed to attempt to contextualize these acts of cannibalism by reducing them entirely to the cultural level–suggesting that even actual acts of “actual” cannibalism are themselves metaphors for an underlying symbolic meaning. The question of cannibalism thus emblematizes, in a particularly graphic way, a problem which plagues all cross-cultural hermeneutics–namely, how to negotiate the competing impulses to view cultural alterity by one’s own standards, on the one hand, or to bracket it as radically “Other,” on the other.

     

    At the same time, I would suggest that the trope of cannibalism also presents a potential model for how to rethink the possibility of cross-cultural perception itself. Speaking in abstract terms, cross-cultural perception frequently contains a dimension of epistemic violence, functioning as an act of symbolic incorporation which, at the same time, retrospectively constructs and reaffirms the imaginary boundaries between Self and Other which make such reading meaningful in the first place. Like the figurative act of cannibalism itself, cross-cultural perception is typically grounded on a uneasy combination of epistemic violence and hermeneutic fusion, though the relative weightings of each of these components will naturally differ according to the specific circumstances involved. Just as the errant May Fourth white blood cells literally (re)shaped their own corporal environment through incorporative acts of “reading” alterity, I would propose a model of cross-cultural perception which is similarly grounded on acts of scopically and/or intellectually “ingesting” socio-cultural “alterity,” so as to reinforce, or restructure, the perceiver’s understanding of epistemic networks by which that notion of “alterity” is produced in the first place.

     

    Notes

     

    I would like to thank Eric Hayot and an anonymous reader for their suggestions. Research for this essay was supported by a University of Florida Humanities Enhancement Grant.

     

    1. In Lacanian terms, cannibalism can be seen as a figurative “stain” or “quilting point,” a point which is radically outside a certain symbolic system while at the same time providing the necessary which gives that system form in the first place. Similarly, Slavoj Zizek, in a related context, speaks of the “asystematic” points of radical alterity which are a necessary component of any system.

     

    2. Here and throughout this essay these sorts of generalizations about “our” and “other” cultures are being used strategically, or are “under erasure” (to borrow Derrida’s useful term); and, indeed, one of my arguments is precisely concerned with the re-evaluation of these accepted notions themselves.

     

    3. In 1979 the anthropologist William Arens published a highly polemical book in which he argues that there is no conclusive material evidence that cannibalism has ever existed as a systematic social practice anywhere in the world at any point in history, arguing instead that all apparent instances of cannibalism are merely the result of optimistic over-readings of either textual rhetoric or fundamentally ambiguous material evidence (see The Man-eating Myth: Anthropology and Anthropophagy). Arens’ book provided a lightning rod of contention and was useful to the extent that it brought critical attention to the latent ethnocentrism implicit in Western anthropology’s longstanding fascination with cannibalism. At the same time, however, Arens’ position, with its emphatic and almost messianic opposition to the very possibility of human cannibalism, can actually be seen as itself stemming from a parallel ethnocentrism, insofar as he is unwilling to confront the implications such cannibalism would have for our perception of the cannibals as anthropological subjects (see Gardner 27-50).

     

    4. In this respect, the 2000/2001 round of cannibalism allegations can be seen as a ironic reprise of a similar series of allegations only five years earlier, on the occasion of the 1995 International Conference on Women’s Rights in Beijing. At that time, foreign tabloids, Christian organizations, and even U.S. Representative Frank Wolf of Virginia were taken in by spurious claims that human fetuses were considered a rare delicacy by many Chinese gourmands. The politicians, in particular, used the story rhetorically to support their opposition to granting China Most-Favored-Nation status, but saw little need to pursue the actual allegations any further (see Dixon; this article was apparently first published in early October of 2000, shortly before Zhu Yu’s performance, but may have been revised as recently as 5 June 2001 [judging by the dates of the file and its folder in the web site’s publicly readable directory]).

     

    5. On “Nietzsche fever” in China in the mid-1980s, see Wang and Cheng.

     

    6. According to the Taiwan GIO report, Zhu Yu admitted in a telephone interview that the performance was part of the April 12 “Obsession with Injury” performances (that is, the second installment of the “Obsession” series), which does not correlate with the November 13 date cited in most other sources. It is unclear at this point, therefore, whether the repeated identification, in many Chinese reports, of the performance with the “Obsession” exhibit is in reference to a subsequent installment of the “Obsession” series, or merely an unwitting perpetuation of an original error. The question is left somewhat ambiguous in the Fuck Off catalogue, where the images are only identified by the title “Eating People” and the date, 13 November 2000 (though other images, in the same catalog, from Zhu Yu’s April 13 “Obsession with Injury” performances in Beijing are clearly identified as such).

     

    7. Lin Yü-sheng notes that there is some evidence that this piece was written not by Lu Xun himself, but rather by his brother Zhou Zuoren (who was also an accomplished and well-recognized literary figure in his own right; the “evidence” which Lin cites is that Zhou himself claimed authorship in a subsequent letter to Cao Juren). However, as Lin also notes, Zhou did not actually deny that the views he had expressed were shared by Lu Xun, but only that there were minor stylistic differences in the essay which distinguished it from Lu Xun’s own work, differences which so far had gone unnoticed by the general readership. Furthermore, the essay continues to be included in Lu Xun’s collected works under his own name (Lin 116).

     

    8. For instance, the classical medical text Simple Questions of the Yellow Emperor (probably dating from the first century B.C.E.) states that “the heart functions as the prince and governs through the soul; the lungs are liaison officers who promulgate rules and regulations; the liver is a general and devises strategies.” Similarly, the Tang dynasty Taoist master Sima Chengzhen (eighth century C.E.) elaborates, “The country is like the body: follow the nature of things, don’t let your mind harbor any partiality, and the whole world will be governed” (qtd. in Schipper 102).

     

    9. Chen is drawing here primarily on Metchnikoff’s monograph. The subject of this essay, and of Metchnikoff’s original book, is particularly poignant in that the essay was written in the year of Metchnikoff’s death.

     

    Metchnikoff’s claims to fame include his discovery of the phagocytotic role of white blood cells in the immune system as well his being the younger brother of Ivan Ilyitch, immortalized by Tolstoy in his story “The Death of Ivan Ilyitch.”

     

    10. Lin Yü-sheng contrasts these three figures as follows:

     

    Chen Duxiu, who eventually became a Marxist and the first leader of the Chinese Communist Party, was known as a man of intense moral passion, combative in temperament and fearlessly individualistic. His mind was more forceful than subtle; he was not greatly concerned with the nuances of meaning or the complexities involved in social and cultural issues. Hu Shi, on the other hand, was a Deweyan liberal and eventually became an ambivalent supporter of the Guomindang. He was a well-rounded and self-content personality, affable and urbane, and not without a touch of vanity. He possessed an alert mind, and was superficially lucid in his manner of expression, but he did not involve himself in social and cultural issues at their most difficult levels and never probed deeply into the problems with which he was concerned. Lu Xun, by contrast, was an extremely complex person, with a sharp wit and a sensitive, subtle, and creative mind. He was known for his sardonic humor and mordant sarcasm. Outwardly, he was distant and cold; inwardly, deeply pessimistic and melancholy–but with a genuine warmth and moral passion which enabled him to express the agony of China’s cultural crisis with great eloquence. Politically, he was highly sympathetic to the Communists in his later years, but he eschewed formal party ties and firm ideological commitments. (9)

     

    11. For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between these two texts, see Yang.

     

    12. For an interesting, though thoroughly uncritical, survey of discourses of cannibalism from throughout Chinese history, see Chong.

     

    13. On one web site discussion, for instance, the author confidently asserts that “the taboos against eating one’s own are universal, and rumors about violations of these taboos are used to vilify members of competing cultures” (“Fetus”)(emphasis added).

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Arens, William. The Man-eating Myth: Anthropology and Anthropophagy. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1979.
    • “Baby-Eating Photos Are Part of Chinese Artist’s Performance.” Taipei Times. 23 Mar. 2001 < http://www.taipeitimes.com/news/2001/03/23/story/0000078704>.
    • Chen Duxiu. “Call to Youth” [jinggao qingnian]. New Youth [Qingnian zazhi]. 1.1 (Sept. 1915): 1-6.
    • —. “The Thought of Two Modern Scientists” [Dangdai er da kexuejia zhi sixiang]. Duxiu wenji. Anhui: Anhui renmin chubanshe, 1986. 46-69.
    • Cheng Fang. Ni Cai zai Zhongguo [Nietzsche in China]. Nanjing: Nanjing chubanshe, 1993.
    • Ching, Siu-tung. A Chinese Ghost Story [Qian nu youhun]. Hong Kong: Star TV Filmed Entertainment, 1987.
    • Chong, Key Ray. Cannibalism in China. Wakefield, NH: Longwood Academic, 1990.
    • Dixon, Poppy. “Eating Fetuses: The Lurid Christian Fantasy Of Godless Chinese Eating ‘Unborn Children.’” Adult Christianity. 2 Oct. 2000 < http://www.jesus21.com/poppydixon/sex/chinese_eating_fetuses.html>.
    • “Fetus Feast.” Urban Legends Reference Page. Ed. Barbara Mikkelson. 19 Jun. 2001 <http://www.snopes2.com/horrors/cannibal/fetus.htm>.
    • Gardner, Don. “Anthropophagy, Myth, and the Subtle Ways of Ethnocentrism.” The Anthropology of Cannibalism. Ed. Laurence Goldman. Westport, CT: Bergin, 1999. 27-50.
    • Girard, René. Violence and the Sacred. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1979.
    • Haraway, Donna. Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature. New York: Routledge, 1991.
    • Hu Shi. “Ibsenology” [yibusheng zhuyi]. Hu Shi zuopinji. Vol. 6 Taipei: Yuanliu chubanshe, 1986. 9-28.
    • Hua Tianxue, Ai Weiwei, and Feng Boyi, eds. Fuck Off [Bu hezuo de fangshi, which literally means “an uncooperative approach”]. Shanghai: Eastlink Gallery, 2000.
    • Lin Yü-sheng. The Crisis of Chinese Consciousness: Radical Antitraditionalism in the May Fourth Era. Madison: U of Wisconsin P, 1979.
    • Lu Xun. “Diary of a Madman.” Lu Hsun: Selected Stories. Trans. Yang Hsien-yi and Gladys Yang. New York: Norton, 1977. 7-18.
    • —. “Random Thoughts #38.” New Youth [Qingnian zazhi]. 1918.
    • Mao Zedong. “On New Democracy.” Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung. Vol. 2. Beijing: Foreign Language, 1965. 339-384.
    • Metchnikoff, Elie. The Prolongation of Life: Optimistic Studies. New York: Putnam’s, 1910.
    • Mo Yan. The Republic of Wine New York: Arcade, 2000.
    • Ong, Aihwa. Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality. Durham: Duke UP, 1999.
    • Republic of China. Government Information Office. “Rumors of Fetus Eating in Taiwan Traced to Mainland Performing Artist”. 18 Jul. 2001. < http://www.taipei.org/official/rumors/rumors.htm>.
    • Schipper, Kristofer. The Taoist Body. Berkeley: U of California P, 1993. 102.
    • Wang, Jing. High Culture Fever: Politics, Aesthetics, and Ideology in Deng’s China. Berkeley: U of California P, 1996.
    • Wang Shuo. Please Don’t Call Me Human. Trans. Howard Goldblatt. New York: Hyperion, 2000.
    • Wang, Val. “Sadistic Art? A Roundtable with Performance Artists.” ChineseArt.com 3:2 (2000) < http://www.chinese-art.com/artists/openstudio.htm>.
    • Wu Hung. Exhibiting Experimental Art in China. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2001.
    • —. Transcience: Chinese Experimental Art at the End of the Twentieth Century. Chicago: U of Chicago Museum of Art, 1999.
    • Wuming Shi. “Reflections on the Body” [Dongti ningsi]. Expressing Emotion of Mist and Clouds [Shuqing yanyu]. Taipei: Wenshizhi chubanshe, 1998.
    • Xu Shunying. Gushing Out [Daliang liuchu]. Taipei: Hongse wenhua chubanshe, 2000.
    • Yang, Xiaobin. “The Republic of Wine: An Extravaganza of Decline.” positions 6.1 (1998): 6-32.
    • Yu Hua. “Classical Love.” The Past and the Punishments. Trans. Andrew Jones. Honolulu: U of Hawaii P, 1996. 12-61.
    • Zheng Yi. Scarlet Memorial: Tales of Cannibalism in Modern China. Trans. and ed. T.P. Sym. Westview: Boulder, CO., 1996.
    • Zizek, Slavoj. The Sublime Figure of Ideology. London: Verso, 1997.

     

  • Grand Theory/Grand Tour: Negotiating Samuel Huntington in the Grey Zone of Europe

    Dorothy Barenscott

    Department of Art History, Visual Art, and Theory
    University of British Columbia
    bridot@shaw.ca

     

    In conflicts between civilizations, the question is “What are you?” That is a given that cannot be changed. And as we know, from Bosnia to the Caucasus to the Sudan, the wrong answer to that question can mean a bullet in the head.

     

    –Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations (1996)

     

    If the search for difference is widely presented as a tourist attraction, it is obvious that cultural differences are being negated. The new types of difference that emerge are hard to identify and require too much time to decode.

     

    —Chris Rojek, Touring Cultures (1997)

     

    In 1996, the Russian based photo-conceptualist group AES (made up of artists Tatyana Arzamasova, Lev Evzovitch, and Evgeny Svyatsky) launched its “Travel Agency to the Future” with the Islamic Project. Promoting a set of fictitious Grand Tours which would set out in the year 2006 into a radically changed and dystopic landscape, AES drew inspiration from Samuel Huntington’s popular political paradigm of the mid 1990s, which anticipated the time when Islamic and Western cultures would come violently into collision. Well before the events of September 11th and well before George W. Bush’s “crusade against terror,” AES prepared clients for travel to the future through advertising and promotional material that featured fantastic projections of what the new world order would bring. More specifically, AES produced a series of digitally altered images, in the form of postcards, depicting the monuments and spaces of familiar tourist destinations (such as those found in Paris, Rome, Berlin, and New York) invaded, occupied, and altered by Islamic civilization. Not surprisingly, AES images were scattered among the many “ground zero” photographs widely circulated on the Internet in the days and weeks following the attack on the World Trade Center–a specific moment when a “Western” public was made to confront its own fears of an “Islamic” Other (see Figure 1).1

     

    Figure 1: New Freedom (2006)
    Copyright © AES & GRAF d’SIGN 1996

     

    Over the past five years, AES, the agency, and its promotional material have been set in a variety of locations and spaces each with its own set of complexities, be they the spaces of the gallery, the spaces of the street, or the virtual spaces of its agency website on the World Wide Web.2 Central to the Islamic Project is the constructed tension between “East” and “West,” a monolithic paradigm and theoretical concept that works strategically at many levels, be they geographic, economic, cultural, or political.

     

    The unique position of AES, as a group of Russian artists, to begin exploring, problematizing, and articulating what is at stake in the construction of an East/West split emerges out of its own status as postcommunist citizens in what Piotr Piotrowski terms the “grey zone of Europe” (37). Therein, the processes and rhetoric of globalization and multiculturalism have played out on the terrain of a hotly divided and increasingly nationalistic social body where geographic tensions have undermined the West’s call for a harmonizing of all divisions–a united Europe. We can begin to unpack AES’s use of the conventions and identity of a travel agency and the circulation of postcards and other tourist objects as a productive way to explore, question, and problematize both the tourist gaze and the gaze of the global consumer–forces which activate and reinforce the East/West divide on many levels. As such, AES’s images operate at progressive degrees and within multiple layers of desire, beyond the broader desire to travel and to consume. They are entangled with the intellectual crisis of a post-Soviet world coming to grips with issues of national and individual identity, the changing dynamic of cultural representation, and the removal of borders (physical, theoretical, cultural, and economic) in everyday life. Therefore, AES’s Islamic Project can be read in relationship to a range of issues stemming from the articulation of difference through the guise of tourism and the ways in which the East/West divide is capitalized upon and upheld, and to what ends. These issues relate directly to AES’s use of the manipulated image as a medium of cultural exchange, the spaces in which AES operates and proliferates its messages, and the kinds of monuments and places that are digitally altered and reconfigured within AES’s artistic practice.

     

    The impetus behind the project’s conception was the emerging body of political theory in the mid-1990s that forecast new directions for American foreign policy and global relations. In the post-Cold War era, political scientists and government strategists began to formulate new theories about the state of future global affairs. Francis Fukuyama was among the most infamous for his announcement in 1992 of the “end of history” and the triumph of liberal democracy. But beginning shortly after the Gulf War when America and its Western partners faced combat with a new Eastern enemy, Fukuyama’s grand theory was quickly eclipsed by that of Samuel Huntington, Harvard Professor and Chairman of the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies. In a 1993 article for Foreign Affairs titled “The Clash of Civilizations?,” Huntington sketched out what would become arguably the most influential and highly controversial political theory governing American foreign relations in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century. In the opening passage of the article, Huntington declares a radical reconceptualization of politics (indeed for the discipline of political science itself). He states:

     

    World politics is entering a new phase, and intellectuals have not hesitated to proliferate visions of what it will be–the end of history, the return of traditional rivalries between nation states, and the decline of the nation state from the conflicting pulls of tribalism and globalism, among others. Each of these visions catches aspects of the emerging reality. Yet they all miss a crucial, indeed a central, aspect of what global politics is likely to be in the coming years.

     

    It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future. (22)

     

    Huntington goes on to count a number of civilization “identities,” which by the time of his 1996 book-length treatment of the original article (The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order) numbers nine: Western (by which he means Christian and liberal-capitalistic); Latin American; African; Islamic (where he includes Indonesia as well as the Middle East and the northern half of Africa); Sinic (including China and cultures descended from it, e.g., Korea and Vietnam); Hindu; Slavic-Orthodox (i.e., Catholicism as localized in Russia in the late Middle Ages); Buddhist; and Japanese. With strong claims that conflicts will emerge as alignments of the “West against the Rest,” and especially the West against Islam, Huntington appeals to Western civilizations to join against the common enemy. He sets out a number of goals, including the incorporation of Eastern Europe and Latin America into the West, the pursuit of cooperative relations with Russia and Japan, and the strengthening of international institutions that reflect and legitimate Western interests and values. Moreover, Huntington lists a number of “fault lines” of the world, relying heavily on examples from conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, to illustrate and support his overall argument that “as people define” their civilization-consciousness, “they…likely…see an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ relation existing between themselves and people of different ethnicity or religion” (25).

     

    Indeed, what Huntington constructs through the various permutations of his argument is a paradigm–one that posits culture in all its subjective ambiguity as the distinguishing trait of political struggle. But perhaps more problematically, Huntington leaves open the question of whether his clash thesis places civilizational conflicts beyond the power and means of mediation through political partnership (e.g., the United Nations or NATO) and/or diplomacy. He therefore appears to suggest that all civilizations should live in peace with one another at the same time as claiming their inability to reach mutual compromise. In the end, Huntington’s paradigm leaves the onus of successfully disavowing his theory upon those who can formulate a better hypothesis. Borrowing from Thomas Kuhn’s discourse on scientific revolutions, Huntington establishes a highly convincing master system built upon a monolithic set of predetermined “truths.”3 However, as critics have noted, these “truths” actively distort the vastly complex issue of globalization. Within the United States, much of the debate since 1993 has been limited to certain aspects of the clash thesis, seldom broaching the fundamental question of whether Huntington’s views are in fact dangerous and even racist.4 Therefore, the most vocal and sustained opposition to Huntington has emerged from non-Western scholars, none of whom has exerted anywhere near the kind of influence that Huntington has in American foreign policy circles. Publishing in lesser-known journals or small collaborative collections such as “The Clash of Civilizations?” Asian Responses (published in 1997 in Karachi, Pakistan through Oxford University Press), these scholars established the discourse for the earliest critiques of the clash thesis, underscoring the very real consequences that such a paradigm holds and drawing out the weaknesses and potential danger inherent to adapting Huntington’s model to transglobal relations. As Salim Rashid notes in the introduction to The Clash of Civilizations?: Asian Responses,

     

    In the long sweep of history, Europe has continually looked with trepidation upon Asia. Whether it be the attacks of the Persians upon the Hellenes, or the Moors who long ruled Spain or the Ottomans at the gates of Vienna or the Mongols sweeping through Poland and Hungary, it is Asia that has continually threatened Europe with destruction. While three hundred years of European dominance have dimmed these memories, Samuel Huntington has succeeded in a charming revival of a long historical tradition. In an article entitled, “The Clash of Civilisations” one is struck first by the definite article in the title–not “A Clash” but “The Clash.” (i)

     

    This insistence upon empiricism in Huntington’s arguments, the claim to describing the reality of the world, is at the core of critics’ concerns since these claims revive a tradition of viewing the East, the Other, in highly mythologized and problematic ways. Therefore, if critics charge Huntington with escapism, reductivism, isolationist politics, racism, and fear-mongering, what lies at the heart of these concerns is the way Huntington mobilizes and trades in cultural myths to support his thesis.

     

    In this connection, it is useful to recall Roland Barthes’s analysis of myth in the section of Mythologies called “The Form and the Concept.” “In myth,” Barthes writes, “the concept can spread over a very large expanse of signifier. For instance, a whole book may be the signifier of a single concept; and conversely, a minute form (a word, a gesture, even incidental, so long as it is noticed) can serve as signifier to a concept filled with a very rich history” (120). Here Barthes stresses the uneven nature of mythic constructs. What’s more, he describes these concepts as lacking fixity so that “they can come into being, alter, disintegrate, [and] disappear completely” (120). Barthes positions the distinguishing character of the mythical concept as something that is appropriated and recycled. In this way, what remains “invested in the [mythical] concept is less reality than a certain knowledge of reality” (119)–one that is often ahistorical and contingent upon shifting power relations. As Barthes goes on to state: “In actual fact, the knowledge contained in a mythical concept is confused, made of yielding, shapeless associations” (119). These aspects further situate the myth-making process as an act of deliberate distancing without clear fixity or return to origins, an ephemeral power of disconnection.

     

    But more importantly, Barthes’ analysis points to the inherent instability of the uneven processes through which cultural differences are most often communicated and internalized. And while the staging of AES’s critique has manifested far beyond the original concerns of the non-Western critics, as we shall see, it is arguable that the first step to unpacking AES’s engagement with Huntington circulates around this Barthesian sense of the mobilization of myths. Indeed, embedded in the very sign system of culture are a myriad of such myths that make Westerners feel secure when images of Islamic men shaving off their beards or Muslim women applying make-up signals the triumph of the West in its “war on terror.” These cultural differences and the way they are signified, experienced, and circulated through media projections, fantasy scenarios, and manufactured myths of all kinds form a key construct of AES’s Islamic Project.

     

    Chris Rojek, in his provocative article “Indexing, Dragging and the Social Construction of Tourist Sights,” describes the position of the “extraordinary place” as a social category in these very terms–places that “spontaneously invit[e] speculation, reverie, mind-voyaging, and a variety of other acts of imagination” (52).5 What is undoubtedly immediate in the AES images is that each depicts a spatial location already richly embedded with the aura of the extraordinary, holding a powerful draw to the average tourist–places such as the Statue of Liberty, Notre Dame Cathedral, Disney World, Sydney Harbor, Red Square, etc. Yet, as Rojek points out, these sites also abound in a “discursive level of densely embroidered false impressions, exaggerated claims and tall stories.” It thus becomes “difficult… to disentangle” the “tradition of deliberate fabrications from our ordinary perceptions of sights” (52). Therefore, in order to make these sites legible, the tourist must draw on a whole range of conflicting signs to construct what is being seen. This process involves activating the tourist’s familiarity with and relationship to the place through a configuration of these signs. And while this “activation” remains largely an abstract endeavor, often facilitated through media imagery, it does implicate very material spaces and contexts.

     

    Rojek’s specific discussion of indexing and dragging provides a fertile stopping point in this analysis. Here, Rojek appears to invoke the practice of clicking and dragging a computer’s mouse to help explain the process through which tourists apprehend the “extraordinary” or the “different.” In this model, indexing refers to a kind of inventory-taking of all the visual, textual, and symbolic representations to the original object (e.g., in Los Angeles, one might think of the Hollywood sign, the L.A. riots, the L.A. of Beverly Hills Cop, the TV show Melrose Place, palm trees, and Marilyn Monroe–not a uniform procedure by any means). Importantly, Rojek stresses that indexing takes account of metaphorical, allegorical, and false information resources, “interpenetrat[ing] factual and fictional elements” in order to “frame the sight” (53). The term “dragging” is thus evoked as both an abstract and a corporeal experience that illuminates the complex feelings one encounters as a tourist. Specifically, “dragging refers to the combining of elements from separate files [or indices] of representation to create a new value” (53). As Rojek explains, dragging is often facilitated “through tourist marketing, advertising, cinematic use of key sights and travellers tales” (54). The result is that a superficial/surface relationship emerges in relationship to the place, creating one extraordinary site after another in a laundry list of sites to explore and engendering a kind of blasé attitude toward the places of travel as well as a constant state of distraction:

     

    The desire to keep moving on and the feeling of restlessness that frequently accompanies tourist activity derive from the cult of distraction. Pure movement is appealing in societies where our sense of place has decomposed and where place itself approximates to nothing more than a temporary configuration of signs. (71)

     

    Notions of the touristic quest for authenticity as outlined by Dean MacCannell in The Tourist: A New Theory of the Leisure Class (1989) are thus problematized specifically because the process of indexing and dragging precludes any attempt to experience any “real” place. As such, the restless nature of tourism is precisely envisioned by Rojek as the process of quickly moving from sight/site to sight/site, drawing on Virilio’s emphasis that velocity, as a “potent source of attraction in contemporary culture,” outstrips any temporally prolonged engagement with any one place (71). Importantly, Rojek distinguishes and continually stresses the important place of myth in all travel and tourist sites. This link emerges as a result of the physical remoteness of most tourist sights to the traveler and the accompanying speculation of the unknown, including the “fantasy about the nature of what one might find and how our ordinary assumptions and practices regarding everyday life may be limited” (53). Therefore, myths can come into play as a way to apprehend the unknown, to fill in the patches of what cannot be understood or ascertained.

     

    Within AES’s Islamic Project, these elements of re-presentation, tourism, and myth are strongly punctuated. First, in relationship to indexing, AES provides the photograph, index par excellence, and loads its images with a veritable file of indices (the effect of montaging multiple photographs) of both the West and of Islam. Importantly, distinctions are kept firmly within a binary of re-presentation. The West is most often signified in the images through its institutions, technology, and modernity, while Islam is pictured as traditional, religious, aggressive, and ubiquitous (I am thinking here specifically of the many Muslim bodies filling several of the images, tapping into Western anxieties and stereotypes about immigration and the fear of being outnumbered–see Figure 2).

     

    Figure 2: Rome, (2006)
    Copyright © AES 1996

     

    Second, it is important to note that each of the digital photographs is created with existing imagery (appearing to fulfill the appropriating function highlighted by Barthes) and thus represents a kind of assemblage produced by indexing and dragging. This lends the images a feeling of familiarity, making them seem safe, yet still fantastical. Third, the familiarity of the images is further evoked through their seriality. The tourist can anticipate where some of the stops will be and begin the process of quickly looking from one image to the next, anticipating the next place, distracted from engaging with any one image. This sparks the process of movement, acceleration, and distraction in an attempt to apprehend the entirety of what is being presented and to collect or check off each site/sight visited. Fixity is further removed with the proliferation and flow of multiple objects in multiple forms (postcards, t-shirts, mugs, posters), objects that provide evidence of the visit while constructing new indices and contexts for re-presentation. And adding still further to the familiarity and seriality of the images is the distinctive green logo mark referencing Benetton’s “United Colors of the World” campaign (see Figure 3)6, raising another aspect of Rojek’s argument, the rise of “neo-tribes” or new virtual collectives in which social identity is expressed and recognized in conditions of anonymity and disembodiedness (61-62).

     

    Figure 3: Northern Germany, (2006)
    Copyright © AES 1996

     

    This is a “controlled approach of disassociation” where interaction with others is ostensibly treated as a symbolic matter:

     

    …the attachments are basically superficial and have the propensity to be reconfigured in response to the opportunities of contingency. In consuming this experience neo-tribes recognise that their attachments can be pulped and reconstituted to form other temporary attachments elsewhere. Mobility rather than continuity is the hallmark of this psychological attitude, and restlessness rather than anxiety defines this emotional outlook. (61)

     

    In this way, the logo, itself a complex sign, signals the consuming aspects of tourism supported by a global economy and travel industry penetrating every corner of the globe. And, as Mika Hannula argues in his short essay “The World According to Mr. Huntington,” the problematic success of the clash thesis emerges in a world where consumer behavior demands convenience:

     

    There was the demand and voilà, before you could stutter ch-ch-ch-cheeseburger, there also was the supply. There was a huge demand for an answer, a schema that would explain the world in these chaotic, insecure post Wall times. There was fear, and there was uneasiness in the face of a pluralist, multicultural world awash with contingency. The fear was fuelled by images of rebels from far-off lands, and with hard-to-spell names, bluntly labelled Islamic fundamentalists’ [sic] and, quite obviously, terrorists…. On the face of it, these claims do in general have strong argumentative force. They support deeply rooted prejudices, and help explain the world order, or disorder, and all the threats you feel when watching the evening news presented in a compact, consumable, comprehensible way. (4)

     

    Hannula touches here upon two key concepts worked through the Islamic Project.7 First, Hannula underscores the relationship between consumer culture and the mass media in shaping ideas about cultural difference. Second, there is a suggestion of interactivity and contingency pointing to the type of virtual mobility that today’s consumer can access through ever increasing and complex means. In turn, both dynamics relate to ideas around exchange and travel. And since it is through the theoretical and conceptual spaces of travel and tourism that most cultural differences can be and often are marked out, AES’s choice to take up the identity of a travel agency, one which trades in images of difference, comes into clearer focus.

     

    Reading AES’s images in this context points to a number of important implications relating not only to the use of manipulated photographs and their relation to the social construction of touristic space, but also to the emerging cultural milieu of postcommunist Europe where newly opened borders allow for travel (both physical and imaginary) in both directions. In the context of these connections, we can ask what is the significance of an altered image, how is it conceived, and what does its relationship to the production and signification of difference mean? Moreover, we can explore how the circulation of that image, or a series of related images, calls up the mobilization of a tourist gaze and sensibility, and to what ends. As a mock travel agency, AES is able to stage the elements of tourism both inside the gallery and on its interactive website. In the gallery, the images are shown in postcard stands and on consumable items such as t-shirts and mugs (which can be purchased, becoming souvenirs of the exhibit). The artists, dressed as travel agents, mill around, passing out questionnaires (see Figures 4 and 5).

     

    Figures 4 & 5:
    Photographs from inside
    the 1997 Installation of Islamic Project in Graz, Austria.

    Copyright © AES 1997

     

    Providing a nondescript corporate name, AES does not register the agency’s Russian identity or artist identity any more than the promotional material or questionnaires (all of them in English) do. The corporate identity, streamlined office space, and glossy promotional materials create an environment of familiarity and comfort for the largely Western audience of gallery goers and tourists, new not only to the clash thesis but to postcommunist art as well.

     

    This performance has the effect of distancing both the cultural identity of the artists and the subject matter of the individual images. In this way, the agency’s visitors are initially distracted from the political undertones of the work and made to feel as consumers. To be sure, the exhibit as a whole becomes one of a number of sights that a gallery visitor sees. In Budapest, where AES installed their agency at the After the Wall show of “Art and Culture in Post-Communist Europe” in 2000, the irony of consuming and touring cultures was played out when gallery employees gave perfume samples of Warhol perfume to gallery goers visiting the Andy Warhol show upstairs from After the Wall. AES and other postcommunist artists surely noted the irony of having its work upstaged and out-marketed by the American cultural export.8

     

    On the Islamic Project website, the visitor encounters the touring and consuming dynamic somewhat differently when asked the question “Where do you want us to take you?,” an appropriation of Microsoft’s “Where do you want to go today?” trademark. Once inside, the visitor is presented with a map of the world. Prompted to click on geographic regions, the viewer is presented with a series of images and links, creating the effect of quickly moving from site/sight to site/sight. While on the home page, the visitor is confronted with a whole range of fictional and factual information that has been dragged into one frame, none of which is easy to discern (critical essay of Huntington, pictures of Muslim individuals, accounts of AES activities, order forms for AES merchandise, contact information that does not work, and the agency questionnaire).9 The very language of travel is elucidated through and embedded in the medium of the World Wide Web at successive levels with notions of discovery, exploring sites, surfing, bookmarking places, sending messages, e-cards, etc.

     

    Returning to Huntington’s paradigm, it is clear that cultural difference explored through the rhetoric, gestures, and construction of such a tourist gaze facilitates a mode of political engagement far removed from the specificity of place or history. The role of nation and civilization myths are therefore central to any analysis of cultural difference dependent on the model I’ve sketched out. This is a crucial aspect of Huntington’s hypothesis since it allows stereotypes and oversimplified binary divisions to mask the complexities of the global age in which we live. This in itself is an important political strategy, one all too familiar to a postcommunist public shifting between political ideologies. As such, problematizing and exposing another aspect of AES’s project, that of the fault lines between Eastern and Western Europe, links AES’s more abstract critique of Huntington with a wider geo-political conflict emerging in Europe. Piotr Piotrowski’s description of Central and Eastern Europe as the “grey zone” is apt and telling in this regard. After the collapse of the Berlin Wall, any uniting ideological structures were not only abandoned in Eastern Europe but also made suspect to a high degree. For this reason, the urgent endeavors of the liberal democratic “West” to fold in the “East” have often been met with resistance and hostility. As Piotrowski writes, “the historico-geographical coordinates of Central Europe are in a state of flux… we are between two different times, between two different spatial shapes” (36). This state of affairs, in all of its complexity, is often too much to register. In interviews with a Ukrainian e-journal, AES likened Russia to a “porridge,” a confusing muddle of interests that “you cannot make…out” (“AES Today”). Moreover, AES taps into the psychological minefield of the Chechen War through its montaged imagery portraying a civil conflict riddled with ambiguity and paradox, leaving individuals to grapple with who the enemy really is:

     

    Chechnya is a unique phenomenon that is not considered by the civilized society from conventional aspects. Because Russia does not understand itself what Chechnya is–minority or terrorists. Even the Russian authorities do not have such ideas. What can we say, then, about intellectuals who are absent as such in Russia now? Now…they are just silent. (“AES Today”)

     

    What remains then is a deep intellectual crisis–a crisis where the notion of reality is what is most at stake. This crisis registers in AES’s images in a number of striking ways, not surprisingly when the tourist gaze is momentarily suspended and the images critically interrogated to consider the importance of place. First, it is notable that when mapped out, the most violent, confrontational images converge precisely in the grey zone of the East/West split, what Huntington terms the “fault lines” of Europe. Notably, the Moscow (see Figure 6), Belgrade (see Figure 7), and Tel Aviv (see Figure 8) series illustrates the most violent conflicts, where the viewer is made to experience the clash of civilizations in a very direct and bodily way.

     

    Figure 6: Moscow, Red Square, (2006)
    Copyright © AES 1996
    Figure 7: Belgrade, Serbia, (2006)
    Copyright © AES 1998
    Figure 8: Tel-Aviv, (2006)
    Copyright © AES 1996

     

    Here, the hacked-off hands of enemies, advancing tanks, and children astride canons underscore the local and specific bloody conflicts seen in the wake of postcommunism. The images are generally zoomed-in, with figures confronting the camera. The most confrontational gaze is strategically placed in Moscow, where one is made to consider on which side the Muslim Chechen-like fighters belong–East or West. Moving geographically outward, the images tend toward progressive abstraction as people appear more distant and then finally removed altogether at the sites furthest from the fault lines (see Figures 9 and 10).

    Figures 9 & 10:
    New York (2006) and Sydney (2006)

    Copyright © AES 1996

     

    Here we are left with images that register an excess of signs, punctuated in the New Freedom 2006 image (recall Figure 1), where gender, religion, ideology, and culture are conflated into one penultimate, monolithic mega-sign of the clash between West and East. It is notable that AES took its travel agency to the streets of Belgrade and the Austrian city of Graz (see Figures 11 and 12), two cities signifying the imaginary dividing line between Eastern and Western Europe, while choosing to show only in the conceptual spaces of the gallery in America and Western Europe.

     

    Figures 13 & 14:
    Photographs of the Travel Agencies
    in Belgrade (1998) and Graz (1997)

    Copyright © AES 1998 and 1997

     

    AES engages with a clash of cultures to this end through its depiction of the Pompidou Center in Paris and the Guggenheim Museum in New York (see Figures 13 and 14).

     

    Figures 13 & 14:
    Gugenheim [sic] Museum, NYC, (2006)
    and Paris, Beabourg [sic], (2006)

    Copyright © AES 1996

     

    Here, AES presents powerful stereotypes that suggest both the ghettoizing of Eastern European art and the guerilla tactics artists must employ to fight the myths of their identity. This tension emerges in relation to the Benetton logo with the significant 2006 date, the projected deadline for final European Union acceptance of several Eastern European nations.10 The appropriated logo also references the many forged name-brand goods produced and marketed in the “East” on the black market–the monies with which many operative groups fund their “terrorist” activities.11

     

    In the final analysis, there is a peculiar ambivalence that emerges in the Islamic Project precisely because of the struggle AES encounters in its role as a group of Russian artists trying to find a place for critique. Emerging from the underground, from a time when art was made to fight crippling ideology, AES saw something familiar in the work of an American political scientist wishing to postulate a new paradigm to replace Cold War rivalries. Victor Tupitsyn, in an evaluation of the “Soviet mythologizing machine” reminds us of the process of Stalinist-era derealization as eerily familiar to our own world where, awash in images and sound bytes, we often stand dumbfounded:

     

    the ‘victory’ over reality belonged to those who, firstly, controlled its representation and secondly, neutralized suspicions of the existence of its Other (i.e., the other of representation). Such suspicion was ‘cured’ and is still being ‘cured’ by hypnotizing us through the magic of repetition inherent in mass printing and by our inferiority complex in the face of huge numbers, large scales, and long distances, which manifests itself in the inability to distinguish between much and all. (82)

     

    For Edward Said, it is precisely the reckless disregard for criticality that he fears in Huntington’s work. He argues that the “Clash of Civilizations,” like a bad take-off of Orson Welles’s “The War of the Worlds,” is “better for reinforcing defensive self-pride than for critical understanding of the bewildering inter-dependence of our times” (“Clash of Ignorance”).

     

    For AES, it seems that the place for criticality may indeed be receding, as its work circulates in ways and in contexts that it cannot control. Removed from the spaces of its mock travel agency, AES’s images travel precariously and within the same uneven process of indexing and dragging that it seeks to question. And indeed, with the events of September 11th, the issues taken up through AES’s Islamic Project have found a particular currency, positing its work as somewhat prophetic if not completely disturbing. To be sure, AES has been and will continue to be made to answer for their art. In a recent statement posted on the website of the Sollertis Gallery in Toulouse, France, AES attempts to make sense of its predicament:

     

    When horrible terror broke out in America our artistic phantasm grotesque of 1996 seemed real and Mr. Huntington appeared to be right, we could feel as artists that [we] became prophets. But now all of us understand that revenge for the events in America would not be the last link in the chain, but the start of the 21st century history when mankind has to solve the problems of coexistence in [a] global world of poor and rich, religious and consumer societies. The project is neither anti-Islamic nor anti-Western, but tries to function as a psychoanalytical therapy in which phobias from both Western and Eastern society are uncovered and work[ed] through. In “Islamic project: AES–The Witnesses of the Future” we tried to reveal the contradictial [sic] ethics and aesthetics of our times. We believe that contemporary art does not solve the problems, but it can raise the major questions. (AES)

     

    Notes

     

    1. Immediately following the events of September 11th, a wide and diverse number of e-cards, amateur, professional, and media photographs, and existing images related to the sites of the attacks circulated as e-mail attachments and links to impromptu memorial websites worldwide. Unaccredited AES images, often surfacing as satirical e-cards or mixed in with a stream of actual photographs, were among those circulating as a part of this phenomenon. I immediately recognized the images as the work of AES because of a trip I had made to Budapest in July 2000, where I first viewed the digital photographs displayed in the travelling exhibition After the Wall: Art and Culture in Postcomunist Europe. However, most people who received these images in their e-mail or ran across them on these memorial sites were not aware of the intended conceptual nature of the images, nor of their specific context in relation to AES’s Islamic Project. The AES image I found most widely circulating was New Freedom 2006 (see Figure 1). Yet it is precisely the ephemeral and shifting nature of the World Wide Web with its various image search engines and endless e-card links that prevents me today from tracking down and tracing the sources and current locations of these e-cards and remote websites where I first came across the AES images. I credit and would like to thank Dr. John O’Brian for encouraging me to write this essay as a way to think through the intersection of photography, tourism, and the spaces of travel.

     

    2. The AES website can be found at <http://aes.zhurnal.ru/>.

     

    3. There are many indications of Huntington’s connection to Kuhn, short of their real-life friendship. For a careful critique and analysis of Huntington’s use of Kuhn’s model, see Hammond.

     

    4. The popularity of Samuel Huntington’s thesis only continues to grow in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington D.C., and with today’s escalating crisis in the Middle East.

     

    5. Here, Rojek too is thinking of a Barthesian understanding of myth. Rojek writes, “Mention of the mythical is unavoidable in discussions of travel and tourism. Without doubt the social construction of sights always, to some degree, involves the mobilisation of myth (Barthes 1957)” (52).

     

    6. I have seen AES postcards presented with and without the logo. I have provided an example of one that does have the distinctive green striping.

     

    7. A copy of Hannula’s article is reproduced on the AES website.

     

    8. The Andy Warhol Museum in Pittsburgh, PA, in partnership with the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, organized Andy Warhol, the comprehensive retrospective exhibit of Warhol’s work, which began its international touring life in January 2000 and continues through spring 2002. The exhibition began at the Pushkin State Museum of Fine Arts in Moscow, Russia, before moving on to venues in Turkey, Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. For the full State Department press release, complete with dates and an explanation of the initiative, see <http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/statements/2000/ps000118.html>.

     

    9. When I began writing this essay, I attempted to contact AES for an interview. I quickly realized that the various contact information and e-mail addresses posted on the Islamic Project website were not operative. Likewise, if you attempt to fill out and submit the online questionnaire, the program refuses to fill in the fields.

     

    10. This date, of course, continues to change, and the specific context may not be as clear-cut as I suggest. However, I think it significant since many Central European nations focus so much of their media attention on the future of EU inclusion and on the importance of that end date. In 1996, when AES conceived the Islamic Project, the projection was for ten years into the future with some anticipation of a larger and more powerful European Union.

     

    11. This black-market trade in “fakes” exposes further complexities of the East/West construction. Naomi Klein, writing in The Guardian only a month after September 11th, explains:

     

    Maybe a little complexity isn’t so bad. Part of the disorientation many Americans now face has to do with the inflated and oversimplified place consumerism plays in the American narrative. To buy is to be. To buy is to love. To buy is to vote. People outside the U.S. who want Nikes–even counterfeit Nikes–must want to be American, love America, must in some way be voting for everything America stands for.

     
    This has been the fairy tale since 1989, when the same media companies that are bringing us America’s war on terrorism proclaimed that their TV satellites would topple dictatorships. Consumers would lead, inevitably, to freedom. But authoritarianism co-exists with consumerism, and desire for American products is mixed with rage at inequality.

     

     

    Works Cited

     

    • AES. “Islamic Project: AES Witnesses of the Future.” Artist Statement. Galerie Sollertis Online November 2001: 1 par. <http://www.sollertis.com/ AESWitnesses.htm>.
    • —. “AES Today.” Interview. Boiler Online 3-4 (1999) <http://www.boiler.odessa.net /english/34/>.
    • Barthes, Roland. Mythologies. Trans. Annette Lavers. New York: Hill, 1957.
    • Hammond, Paul Y. “Culture Versus Civilization: A Critique of Huntington.” The Clash of Civilizations?: Asian Responses. Ed. Salim Rashid. Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford UP, 1997. 127-149.
    • Hannula, Mika. “The World According to Mr. Huntington.” SIKSI The Nordic Art Review 12 (1997) <http://aes.zhurnal.ru/isartic.htm>
    • Huntington, Samuel. “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs 72.3 (1993): 22-49.
    • —. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon, 1996.
    • Klein, Naomi. “McWorld and Jihad.” The Guardian 5 Oct. 2001: 13 pars. < http://www.guardian.co.uk/waronterror/story/0,1361,563579,00.html>.
    • Piotrowski, Piotr. “The Grey Zone of Europe.” After the Wall: Art and Post-Communist Europe. Eds. Bojana Pejic and David Elliott. Stockholm: Moderna Museet Modern Museum, 1999. 37-41.
    • Rashid, Salim. “Introduction.” The Clash of Civilizations?: Asian Responses. Ed. Salim Rashid. Karachi, Pakistan: Oxford UP, 1997. i-iv.
    • Rojek, Chris. “Indexing, Dragging and the Social Construction of Tourist Sights.” Touring Cultures: Transformations of Travel and Theory. Eds. Chris Rojek and John Urry. London: Routledge, 1997. 52-74.
    • Said, Edward. “The Clash of Ignorance.” The Nation 22 Oct. 2001: 15 pars. <http://www. thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20011022&c=1&s=said>.
    • Tupitsyn, Victor. “The Sun Without a Muzzle.” Art Journal 53.2 (1994): 80-84.

     

  • Blanchot, Narration, and the Event

     

    Lars Iyer

    Philosophical Studies
    Centre for Knowledge, Science and Society
    University of Newcastle upon Tyne
    lars.iyer@ncl.ac.uk

     

    Trust the tale, not the teller–but what if the identity of the teller is given in the articulation of the tale? What if there would be not only no tale without a teller, but no teller without a tale? What if tale and teller were bound up in an interdependence that is far more complex than hitherto supposed? The “narrative turn” in the humanities is born of an insistence that there are modes of experience that cannot be captured by a theory that would transcend the historicity of experience.1 It calls for a new concretion, a new plunge into existence through the examination of the way in which experiences are meaningfully interconnected as elements in a sequence. In this sense, as David Carr argues in an admirable book, narrative is not a later imposition on pre-narrative experience but constitutes experience itself.2To posit the real as something that is experienced and only thereafter narrated is to misunderstand the way in which human behavior is directed toward the achievement of projected ends.

     

    The turn in question might appear to strike a great blow for the freedom of human beings to determine their existence for themselves. Likewise, the appeal to a new understanding of the role of narrativity seems to permit communities to redefine their place in the world.3 But communities themselves are vulnerable to powerful reactionary forces, and individuals, as narrativists show, are never to be considered in isolation from the communities that shape and inform their values.4 It is always possible for certain fundamentalist elements to invoke a hidden but originary orthodoxy, regulating the lives of “insiders” and governing their attitude to “outsiders.” But what is it that permits communities to, as it were, fold in upon themselves, submitting themselves to the enforcement of programmable, carefully regulated behavior?

     

    No doubt the drive to unify, to relate everything back to a point of origin, is a liability inherent to all forms of narration. In this sense, it might be possible to invoke a grand narrative that unifies all other narratives, a broader, deeper story that always aims to perpetuate a reassuring order, regulating the relationship between members of a community and between that community and others. In The Postmodern Condition, Lyotard tells us that the age of the grand récit has passed, but perhaps the grandest tale of them all–the tale that is told in the elaboration of any tale–still exerts its dominion. In this way, the narrative turn risks granting dignity to a debilitating and demobilizing story of the dominance of hegemonies and elites. It becomes necessary, therefore, as part of this turn to rethink narration, treating it, as Linda Singer recommends of community, not as “a referential sign” but as “a call or appeal” (125). The turn in question calls for provocative responses, for attempts to resist the prevailing determination of meaning and value.

     

    Maurice Blanchot, I will suggest, shows us how we might respond to an appeal inherent in the desire to narrate that would permit us to articulate a different relationship to the dominating narratives of our time. In some of his most vehement and programmatic pages, he argues that there is a desire indissociable from Western civilization (indeed, it could be said to constitute civilization itself) to recount its history and its experience, recapturing and thereby determining its past. Blanchot retraces this desire to the monotheisms that inaugurate “the civilization of the book” (Infinite 425). As he argues, the exigencies that are realized by the Book are reaffirmed over the course of history through a certain determination of the humanitas of the human being, implying notions of subjectivity, community, and historicity.

     

    In one sense, it is necessary for disciplines and genres, for philosophy, scientific discourse, and historiography, to reinforce a certain conception of the human being. But while the human being can be treated as a physiological specimen, as a collection of chemicals or as a physically extended body among other bodies, this does not mean that this is all the human being is. Anatomy presupposes a corpse, but are there practices that would allow us to attest to experience as it is shaped in human existence? Would literary narratives provide the model for the narrative structures that constitute our experience? It might seem the narrativist has a great deal to learn from literary criticism. As Lewis and Sandra Hinchman observe, the narrativists “have assimilated the idiom of literary criticism in which narrative has always played a very big part” (xiii). But as David Carr argues, literary critics often depend on a contrast between narration and the real that threatens to make literature merely a practice of representation.5 Narrative, he insists, does not simply attribute a structure to our experience after the fact, but has always already shaped that experience.

     

    Thus, although the great novel might seem to represent the human being in the midst of the world, setting events back into their time and place, into the concreteness one might think the narrativist seeks, there is another kind of literary writing and another kind of literary criticism. Blanchot shows us that there is a drive in a certain literary practice to realize a non-representational work, a thing of pure language, an object that is made of language in the same way that the image on the painter’s canvas is made from colors.6 Moreover, Blanchot also shows that this drive is at work in the most worldly novel: even the novel, he argues, is linked to a certain writing that attests to another kind of narration. The writing he affirms challenges many of the preconceptions about language and the human being that other literary critics (and perhaps other thinkers associated with the narrative turn) maintain.

     

    I will focus in this essay on one of his stagings of the play of writing in the Book that he ironically recasts canonical accounts of self-determination.7 In his retelling of a section of Homer’s Odyssey that opens Le Livre à venir, Blanchot relates a story about the way literature bears witness to an experience of historicity, memory, and community that indicates another way we might relate ourselves to the Book. Homer relates the story of two half-bird and half-woman Sirens who sang so beautifully that they enticed sailors to wreck their ships on the rocky shores of their island. Ulysses wanted to hear their song and, on Circe’s advice, stopped the ears of his crew with wax and had himself lashed to the mast of his ship, bidding them to pay no heed to whatever he said as the ship drew near the Sirens’ island. In “The Sirens’ Song,” Blanchot collapses the figures of Ulysses and Homer into one, imagining that the Odyssey was written by a Ulysses who had, after his long and risky journey, safely returned home. The composite figure Ulysses-Homer stands in for the novelist who merely confirms the conception of the human being that belongs to the Book. The composition of the Odyssey becomes the figure for any act of recounting that confirms the underlying identity of the human being without taking into account an experience that Blanchot links to writing. For Blanchot, the novel can be counterposed with another literary form, the récit.8 The Blanchotian novel is bound by the same covenant that binds our civilization to itself; the Blanchotian récit, however, indicates the call that draws writing out of the Book. As I will explain, the latter is not to be regarded as a separate genre from the novel, but as an event that bestows the possibility of narration even as it is dissimulated in its movement.

     

    I

     

    Zoon logon echon: for the Greeks, it is the ability to talk discursively, to speak, that marks out the human being as the human being.9 But for the human being, language is not a tool but a condition: one speaks not with a language but from it. We inhabit language–or rather language inhabits us. Language is not a tool that would offer itself to be used, but a field that opens through us and opens the world to us, determining what it is possible for us to say and not to say. But it is, for this reason, never the “object” of our awareness. It dissimulates itself, except at those moments when the capacity to express oneself comes to crisis. Language opens like the day itself, granting a world to the human being–but furled in this opening and opening with it is the dim awareness that something has come between the human being and the rest of nature.

     

    As soon as Adam steps onto the scene, Blanchot claims in his retelling of the story of Genesis, everything is born again to the human being whose humanitas resides in his ability to speak. In Blanchot’s words, “God created living things, but man had to annihilate them. Not until then did they take on meaning for him, and he in turn created them out of the death into which they had disappeared” (Work 323). Adam, naming the animals, has first of all negated each of the animals in its particularity. The animal cannot talk discursively; the human being, who is defined by this faculty, is granted thereby a mastery over the world. The world is named and thereby possessed, but this possession, which issues from the very humanitas of the human being as the animal that speaks, depends upon the distance that opens between real and ideal existence: between the thing named and the abstract generality of the name.

     

    In this sense, language might be said to depend on a preliminary annihilation. Death is the condition of possibility of the human being as the animal who speaks. But this means in turn that there can be no return to life before language. As Blanchot writes, “man was condemned not to be able to approach anything or experience anything except through the meaning he had to create” (Fire 323). But this means that the animal that speaks bears an essential relation to negation, to death, since it is only through negation, through death, that language means. Language, in this sense, always alludes to the possibility of this destruction; without it, as he writes, “everything would sink into absurdity and nothingness” (Work 324).

     

    But the power that reaffirms the humanitas of the human being turns on the speaker. The capacity to speak depends on the annihilation of the speaker in the here and now; as Blanchot writes, “I say my name, and it is as though I were chanting my own dirge”; I can only speak by interrupting the order to which I belong as a human being. I say “I” and negate the “I”; the impersonal presence of this word affirms itself in my place (Work 324). There remains only the ideal existence of a word that could exist without me. Language depends upon this trembling enunciation, upon the void that opens even as it appears possible for the human being to speak of everything. This means that the mastery of the human being comes at a price: Adam’s act of naming begins a more general idealization of everything that exists, but it simultaneously encloses the human being within a certain order of being. This enclosure permits the great acts of the literary imagination: the epic, the Bible, the medieval Summa, but finally, as I will show, the novel: books that would say everything. But the mastery over speech presumes a weakness or susceptibility. The human being remains receptive to another experience of language which no longer permits the opening of a field of power and possibility.

     

    Blanchot figures this double experience of language in terms of Ulysses’ encounter with the Sirens. The Odyssey is the story of a homecoming, recounting Ulysses’ long journey home from Troy. Although he saw “many cities of men… and learned their minds” (I.4), Homer tells us, Ulysses was at all times “fighting to save his life and bring his comrades home” (I.6). Although Ulysses appears capable of everything (he is heroic and wily), his adventures are episodes on a journey home, they are contained within the broader story of a return. The Odyssey is a figure for a movement that is ultimately conservative, in which the heterogeneous experience is ultimately determined by the law (nomos) of an underlying homogeneity. In this case, Ulysses can be said to be at home (oikos) insofar as he remains confident in his powers and is not challenged by a heterogeneity that might turn him from himself.

     

    For Blanchot (but also for Levinas10), the Ulysses of The Odyssey can be said to enjoy an economic existence insofar as okio-nomia is understood to refer to the ever-renewed attempt to secure his self-identity. Ulysses’ journey home stands in for the subject for whom everything that exists is opened and unfolded as to a unitary point of convergence, the ego. Like the Ulysses of The Odyssey, the task of the subject is to trace a circular itinerary through what is unknown, experiencing it, undergoing it, to what is known. The reaffirmation of the “I” as the “I” means that I can never encounter anything new–it is as if everything I meet came from me since the heterogeneity of the thing is always and already subordinated to language. There is no possibility of heterogeneity, of anything that could occur that would outstrip its circular journey. It is this self-identification that lies at the root of both the solitary subject and language itself.

     

    Both representation and the determination of narrative are economic notions of this kind. So, too, is the conception of the novel that I indicated. But a certain literary writing attests to an aneconomic experience, an experience of a genuine heterogeneity. It refers to an interruption of the most human capacity of the animal who speaks, that is, the bestowal of meaning, nomination. Everyday language uses the name to identify the thing, idealizing it, taking it into the universal. But this is to lose the thing in its real existence. The living thing and its name are not identical; the word can only encounter the thing as an instance of a universal, as a particular that awaited idealization. The literary writing in question, by contrast, understands that the negation of the word gives the thing a new, ideal existence as a word. As Blanchot puts it, “it observes that the word ‘cat’ is not only the nonexistence of the cat but a nonexistence made word, that is, a completely determined and objective reality” (Work 325). This sort of literary language would become thing-like, transposing the singularity of the thing into language. It realizes that in listening to a single word, one can hear nothingness “struggling and toiling away, it digs tirelessly, doing its utmost to find a way out, nullifying what encloses it–it is infinite disquiet, formless and nameless vigilance” (Work 326). Thus the work of literature realizes something unreal and non-representational, letting non-existence exist as a kind of “primal absence,” not as the sign of absent things but as a thing itself, as an object made of words (Work 72).

     

    In the literary work, language would thus exist in the manner of a thing, as something that has no meaning beyond its own opacity. It would rid language of everything it would name by allowing it to achieve a physicality of its own. Words emerge from the dictionary and from language, drawing attention to their own weight, the presence of what appeared previously to be an absence, the being of what was once nothingness. To write, as Blanchot observes of Mallarmé, “is not to evoke a thing but an absence of thing… words vanish from the scene to make the thing enter, but since this thing is itself no more than an absence, that which is shown in the theater, it is an absence of words and an absence of thing, a simultaneous emptiness, nothing supported by nothing” (Work 49). And yet, words must mean if literature is to be readable. And indeed, the poem, made of language, cannot become a thing. The literary work must allow itself to become a cultural object, available and accessible. Likewise, the literary writer may always become a great writer whose work evidences a mastery of narrative modes, of incident and characterization, who is lauded because his or her work can reflect back the glories of the world. It is this tendency in the literary work that Blanchot captures when he invokes the novel. The work of literature becomes the novel when it fails to become an autonomous thing unto itself. In so doing, it becomes impure and non-absolute because it depends on the world it mirrors: “Willing to represent imaginary lives, a story or a society that it proposes to us as real, it depends on this reality of which it is the reproduction or equivalent”; it is always in collusion with a certain mimetologism (Work 191).11 In this sense, literature hovers at the crossroads of verisimilitude and the creation of an autonomous thing. It is never a pure thing nor a pure representation; it comprises both movements and cannot do without them. Literary language depends on a paradox, on an irresolvable contradiction.

     

    Blanchot figures this contradiction by retelling Ulysses’ encounter with the Sirens, the secret search to join language with the language of the thing, to attend to nothingness digging in the word. One can detect the same insistence that literary language is joined to ordinary language in the claim that the Sirens’ song is neither extraordinary nor inhuman; it is simple and everyday; it possesses an extraordinary power, to be sure, but it is a power that lurks within ordinary singing (“Sirens’” 443). Nevertheless, to be lured by the Sirens is to be attracted by that which is extraordinary in the most human of capacities. It is to discover another voice at the heart of the human one–a song that cannot be possessed by a singer. It is to find out that human singing is ultimately inhuman, that to sing is always to sing “with” the song of the Sirens–to join one’s voice to theirs, but in doing so, to relinquish one’s voice. From the first, the song is polyphonous; but this does not mean it is a duet–to sing, rather, is to be joined by an inhuman voice.

     

    This is why the voice in question dissimulates itself. The ultimate object of literary aspiration is not one of which its author or its reader need be aware. What is “marvelous” about the song of the Sirens is that “it actually existed, it was ordinary and at the same time secret” (“Sirens’” 443). The song was heard, and in such a way that it allowed more discerning hearers to heed a secret strangeness within ordinary singing. It stands in for the literary text, which, like the encounter with the Sirens, belongs to “strange powers,” to “the abyss” (“Sirens’” 443). To hear the abyssal song of the Sirens is to realize that an abyss has opened in every utterance; and that any utterance, even the indexical “I,” is enough to entice those who heard it to disappear into an abyss. But just as the literary writer is unable to realize the impossible “object,” to allow the poem to become a thing, the sailor cannot reach the source of the song.

     

    It is for this reason that the Sirens’ song can never be said to be never actually present. Rather, it only implies the direction of the true sources of the song; the song of the Sirens is “only a song still to come,” a song that would lead its listener toward “that space where the singing would really begin” (“Sirens’” 443). The Sirens seduce because of the remoteness of their song; their song is only the attraction of a song to come. Likewise, the unattainable ideal of the literary “object” is seductive because of its very unattainability. Those sailors, who are led toward the source by the Sirens’ song, steer their ships onto the rocks that surround the Sirens’ isle; finding that in reaching the ostensible source of the song, there is nothing but death, they “disappear.” The negation that the literary author would address implicates the author, who is unable to undertake the task he or she sets himself or herself in the first person. Likewise, the sailors discover in this region that music itself is absent, that the goal is unattainable; there is no attainable literary “object,” no possibility of making the literary work into a thing. From this perspective, the writer is too early because the goal recedes, because the work is unrealizable, because she can never wait long enough. The sailor has always weighed anchor too soon; the source of the song is always infinitely distant; they die broken-hearted because they have failed not once but many times. But the writer is also too late; the goal has been overshot, the writer is originarily unfaithful to his impossible goal.

     

    Ultimately, the search for the “essence” of the song, its source and its wellspring, disappoints. And yet, though the Sirens’ song seems to promise a marvelous beyond to which it can never deliver us, we should not regard it as a lie. The song to come will never make itself present, yet it exists as the “hither side” of essentialization. And the search for the “object” of literature remains an admirable one. Blanchot unfolds this analysis through the example of Ulysses. But his Ulysses is not Homer’s. For Blanchot, Ulysses becomes Homer himself, becomes the writer of his own Odyssey: not only a traveler whose journey secretly figures an authorial itinerary, but a literary author himself, who has set out to write a novel.

     

    II

     

    Now it is true, Blanchot concedes, Ulysses did overcome the Sirens in a certain way. Indeed, he has himself bound to the mast, his wrists and ankles tied, in order to observe them, to pass through what no other human being had endured. He endures the song; his crew, ears plugged, admire his mastery. Ulysses appears all the more impressive for the way his response to the song of Sirens allows him and the sailors he commands to regain a mastery that was challenged or had been lost: the mastery over song itself. Indeed, Ulysses’ apparent courage allows the sailors to regain their grip on the human activity of singing; they are no longer daunted by the inhumanity of the Sirens’ song. Moreover, Ulysses’ actions cause the Sirens, who figure for the lost, sought-after “object” of literature, to understand that the song is nothing special: it is merely a human song that sounds inhuman, and the Sirens are merely animals with the appearance of beautiful women. The Sirens can no longer delude themselves that they bear a privileged relationship with the song they thought was in their power. They recognize themselves in the sailors over whom they once had power, for they are fated to remain as far away from what they seek as the sailors. In an extraordinary turn, this knowledge turns the Sirens into real women; they become human because they belong, with the sailors, on the hither side of the origin they too would seek.12

     

    It would appear, then, that the literary object is, in the end, just a special kind of language, an imitative echo of the song that men have always sung to themselves. The literary work that would strive to be something more than another cultural artifact, more than a novel that would reflect the world back to itself, must be content with this modest role. Just as the Sirens become real women, the unattainable literary object becomes a mere goal among other goals; the literary writer is a human being like other human beings. Indeed, we might even condemn the writer for holding out such a ridiculous dream.

     

    But the story is more complex. Blanchot suggests that although the author might appear to want to strike out and make a thing of words, the literary writer is held back by cowardice. Blanchot condemns Ulysses because he exposes the Sirens’ song for what it is without exposing himself to the risk of seeking its source. The apparent bravery of his self-exposure to the Sirens belies a certain cowardice, for Ulysses will not confront the greater mystery here: that of the relation between human and more-than-human that is at stake in singing itself. While the sailors might believe Ulysses is heroic, Blanchot knows that Ulysses does not want to succumb to the desire that would lead him toward the source of the Song. Ulysses is reluctant to “fall,” wanting to maintain his mastery. He cannot let himself “disappear,” but would endure and save for posterity the experience that is granted to him because of his uncanny “privilege.” The writer conceals a similar reluctance, simultaneously heeding the abyss in every utterance and refusing to heed it, refusing to hear what would cause him to disappear and would overcome his powers. Like Ulysses, who would endure the Sirens’ song without letting himself be seduced by it, the writer merely feigns adventurousness.

     

    However, Ulysses’ cunning ploy to stop the ears of his crew with wax and have himself bound to the mast of his ship cannot preserve him from the Sirens. The novelist, in the same way, cannot withhold himself from the effects of the language he employs. Unbeknownst to Ulysses, and, indeed, unbeknownst to the sailors who watch him grimace in ecstasy, he does indeed succumb to the enchantment of the Sirens. Ulysses is not free of the Sirens; his technical mastery does not prevent them from enticing him into the other voyage which is, he explains, the voyage of the récit–of a song that has been recounted and, for this reason, is made to seem harmless, “an ode which has turned into an episode” (“Sirens’” 445). Ulysses’ ruses do not prevent his “fall.” Although it appears that Ulysses emerges from his encounter with the Sirens unscathed, returning to Ithaca to reclaim his wife, his son, and his domestic hearth, he drowns just as others have fallen before him. Ulysses is ensorcelled by the Sirens and “dies”; he has embarked on another voyage.

     

    Likewise, the literary writer appears able to navigate successfully through the process of literary creation and is able to accomplish the literary work. Readers admire the fact that books are produced, that literature remains important, reading, perhaps, the biography of the writer who wrote the novels on their shelves, or of the vicissitudes of their composition. This is the novelist who has exhibited a mastery of language and whose language, upon closer examination, reveals what is extraordinary about all language. But the novelist is the virtuoso who re-invents our world and enriches our language. However, the novelist, unbeknownst to himself or herself, reveals a caesura at the heart of the process of literary creativity that is the condition of the possibility of literature. Blanchot writes of an experience whose inscription in the novel escapes author and reader, but that nevertheless makes the novel possible. He writes of a secret struggle at the heart of Ulysses’ encounter with the Sirens that is, he claims, the very struggle that marks the birth of the novel.

     

    How might one explain this “other” voyage? Now Blanchot is not on the trail of a secret intention that, beneath the conscious will of the novelist, would lead the commentator toward a reserve that remains undiscovered by literary critics or psychologists. As he writes, “No one can sail away with the deliberate intention of reaching the Isle of Capri”; the other voyage is marked by “silence, discretion, forgetfulness” (“Sirens’” 445-6). It cannot be undertaken as just another task to be accomplished. Silence, discretion, and forgetfulness dissimulate the voyage from the narrative of the novel–this is why, indeed, the author does not know of the fascination that rules over what he takes to be “his” creation.

     

    Yes, Ulysses is a cowardly figure who seeks to preserve himself against his disappearance, but he really does “fall” or “disappear” nonetheless; the encounter with the Sirens overcomes his mastery. Although we can imagine Ulysses regaling Penelope and Telemachus with stories of his exploits, there is one tale he would be unable to recount. If Ulysses were to begin one day on a book of reminiscences, if he were, as Blanchot suggests, to become Homer himself and tell the story of his exploits by narrating the first story, an entire dimension of the encounter with the Sirens would hold itself in reserve. But it is this encounter with the Sirens that allows the author to assume the power to write. Ulysses-Homer could not begin his book without having undertaken the journey as Ulysses.

     

    It follows that for every Homer, every novelist, there is, for Blanchot, always and already a drowned Ulysses. The novelist will have already undertaken an Odyssey, albeit one whose memory conceals itself from him. In order to write an account of his adventures, Ulysses-Homer will draw on his memories of the real journey; but he will also, unbeknownst to him, have undertaken his encounter with the Sirens in another dimension. In asking us to entertain the notion that Ulysses and Homer were one and the same person, Blanchot separates out the moments of the composition of the novel in accordance with the two versions of the story of Ulysses’ encounter that he recounts.

     

    One might imagine Ulysses-Homer sitting down in peace to begin his memoirs. Telemachus and Penelope are close by; he writes under the protection of his home, his Kingdom, and is confident in the powers that accrue to him as a novelist. But even as he picks up his pen to write, Ulysses-Homer undergoes a peculiar transformation: this novelist is no longer the real Ulysses who cleverly defeated the Sirens, but the “other” Ulysses, one who is stirred by the dream that he could follow the song to its source. This Ulysses sets himself the impossible goal of laying bare the power of song itself, and as such, must be defeated in this aim, which demands, as its toll, that he, Ulysses, disappear as Ulysses. Likewise, no novelist as a novelist can endure this disappearance. The source of writing does not reveal itself to him. In refusing to allow itself to be measured by the wiliness and native cunning of Ulysses, the source envelops Ulysses himself, drowning him as it drowned the Sirens when they became real women. The Odyssey–and this name stands in for any novel–is the tombstone not only of the Sirens, but of Ulysses the sea-captain, the adventurer. The fact that the real Ulysses survived his encounter with the Sirens does not mean that the other Ulysses can secure his grasp upon the source, the power of writing itself. That power is denied him because he can never reach it as Ulysses. He falls, he must fall (and he even wants to fall) because he cannot seize upon that which he would seek.

     

    There is thus another voice and another order of the event; there is a Ulysses who is the shadow of the first who does not return to Ithaca, completing the circle and thereafter settling down to write his memoirs. The novel that Ulysses-Homer writes likewise depends upon his drowned double, who lies at the bottom of the ocean. The human time in which Ulysses-Homer sets himself the task of writing the novel called The Odyssey and, indeed, accomplishes it, depends upon the other time–the inordinate instant when he embarks on another journey. The birth of the novel cannot be understood without reference to the aneconomic movement of Ulysses. The psychologist of creativity will never grasp the relationship between the power of creativity and the other voyage to the end of the possible. Nor can the philosopher broach the question of the temporality of time without taking this inordinate instant into account. It is only the critical commentator who could attend to the hidden vicissitudes of the birth of the novel, who is privy to the instant that has secretly inscribed itself in the novel. Blanchot tells us that the novel tells another tale, one unbeknownst to its teller and to an entire industry of cultural reception. I will try to make sense of his claim that the composition of the novel implies a récit, with reference to Breton’s Nadja.

     

    III

     

    The récit, a history of French literature might tell us, names a literary form of which Breton’s Nadja, Duras’s The Malady of Death, and Blanchot’s own Death Sentence and When the Time Comes are examples: short, novella- or novelette-length fictions that are focused around some central occurrence. As Blanchot writes in “The Sirens’ Song,” although “the récit seems to fulfill its ordinary vocation as a narrative,” it nevertheless bears upon “one single episode” in a way that does not strive to narrate “what is believable and familiar” in the manner of the novelist (446).

     

    In Breton’s récit, this episode is the series of meetings with the young woman who bears its name. In one sense, Breton is aware of the singularity of the récit. He insistently rejects conventional genres; Nadja, unlike the novel, is not keen to pass for fiction. It does not draw attention to its artifice, keen to present itself as a form of entertainment, as a diverting series of episodes. Breton’s récit narrates an encounter that is extraordinary not only because the young women its narrator meets is exceptional but also because this encounter transforms the world. For Clark, Nadja “enact[s] an unprecedented mode of writing whose provenance is a new experience of the streets as a space of inspiration and mediation to the unknown” (213). As Clark observes, it is neither simply a fictional work nor an autobiography; it does not relate anecdotes from afar, but indicates its own relation to the events: “the actual writing of the text is affirmed as part of the writer’s own exploration of the events he is living” (214). It does not merely imitate Breton’s experience but is part of the articulation of an event that escapes the measure of the experiencing “I.” The very narration of the encounter with Nadja transgresses the ordinary conceptions of the ego, consciousness, the will, and freedom. Breton is not, like the Blanchotian novelist, the creator-God who freely and sovereignly sustains his creation–a God for whom anything is possible in the field of his creation. His récit would interrupt both the assurance of the novelist who creates and preserves a world and also the assurance of the reader, for whom the world the novel imitates is the same world he or she inhabits.

     

    Breton’s récit narrates an extraordinary event; but, for Blanchot, it also names the unattainable “object” of literary fascination, the source of the Sirens’ song. He insists that the récit does not recall or re-stage the event, but brings it about:

     

    The récit is not the narration of an event, but that event itself, the approach to the place where that event is made to happen [le lieu où celui-ci est appélé à s’produire]–an event which is yet to come and through whose power of attraction the tale can hope to come into being, too. (“Sirens’” 447)

     

    How should we understand this apparently self-contradictory claim? It might appear that Breton seeks to write about his encounter with Nadja, but his récit hides another and more fundamental encounter, one that is the condition of possibility of any narration. The event that Breton would narrate is joined in his récit by another narration and another event: that of the interruption of his capacities as an author, the figure for which, in Blanchot, is the song of the Sirens. Breton, in short, has forgotten what he set out to remember; he has lost what he sought to find.

     

    How might one understand this claim? To recall: the sailors were too impatient and dropped anchor because they thought they had reached what they sought. But the only way to “find” the source of song was, Blanchot said, to undergo an involuntary “disappearance.” Just as it is impossible to endure this disappearance in “human” or ordinate time, it would also be impossible for anyone or anything, the récit included, to endure the event. Ulysses is condemned only to approach the event until he “disappears.” Likewise, the author of a récit can do no more than approach until he too “disappears.” The very notion of a “patient” approach to the source of the song of the Sirens is that of a relinquishment of will; the author cannot simply choose to become “patient,” to “disappear,” or to “fall,” but passively undergoes “disappearance,” and in so doing is caught up in what happens as the récit.

     

    In writing of Nadja, in attempting to re-experience his encounter with her at what appears to be one remove from the “real” event, Breton the writer undergoes a “disappearance.” Is this what Breton understands when he asks, in the last lines of his book, “Who goes here? Is it you, Nadja? … Is it only me? Is it myself?” (144). These lines, responding like an echo to the first words of Nadja, “Who am I?” mean for Blanchot “that the whole narrative is but the redoubling of the same question maintained in its spectral difference” (Infinite 420). Both questions put the authorial identity under question. Was it Breton who wrote Nadja, or did he vacate his position, allowing the encounter with Nadja to have, as it were, written itself?

     

    In writing of Nadja, thereby granting her an ideal existence, Breton allows us to hear nothingness digging tirelessly in the name that is the name of his book. But who, then, is Breton the writer? For Blanchot, Breton’s récit testifies in an extraordinary way to the encounter with the Sirens that redoubles his enigmatic encounter with Nadja. True, Breton met Nadja and was intrigued by her. He set out to write a book without genre, a work that related this encounter and this fascination. But in writing Nadja, in recasting his adventure on an ideal plane, apparently subordinating words and sentences in order to tell his tale, Breton removes himself yet further from her. Writing of Nadja, he loses her anew and has to make do with a papery Nadja, made of words. But the redoubled loss of Nadja demands another loss, for Breton yields himself up as a writer, that is, as the one who freely, sovereignly, would sign his name to the book that is ostensibly his. Breton does not do so voluntarily, nor, afterwards, is it given to him to remember, at least in a straightforward and unambiguous way, the vicissitudes of literary creation. Nevertheless, the attempt to write about a marvelous moment itself requires his “disappearance” as an author. It is as if the act of narrating set a trap for him. To take up writing, to narrate an encounter, is to give oneself up as a lure to the trap that threatens to snap shut. That the author escapes it, recovering in order to finish a work, is not a tribute to his ingenuity. To be sure, Breton finishes Nadja, but his narrative depends upon the other journey he was compelled to undertake as soon as he took up his pen. He is lost, as Blanchot writes, “in a preliminary Narrative,” in an event that begins when he starts to write (Infinite 414).

     

    Homer’s Odyssey traces the journey of Ulysses to his homeland, but it does not bear upon those intermittences and discontinuities that would expose the economy of the journey to a troubling event. The Ulysses of the novel is always safe; even when he risks himself, he does so assured of his survival. He is always the man who undergoes adventures without risking a profound self-alteration: his ruses allow him to accomplish deeds that appear brilliant, but are actually hollow. This Ulysses seems to have mastered the song itself, to have mastered this power and to be able to recall the vicissitudes of his encounter at leisure, writing safely beside Penelope and Telemachus. But the watery death of the other Ulysses, for whom The Odyssey is a tomb, is testament to the fact that the contrivance of Ulysses could never allow him to endure what he cannot endure in the first person.

     

    The novelist believes, like Ulysses-Homer, that he is in command of that which he would narrate, but Blanchot argues otherwise. He is, on Blanchot’s account, like the wily Ulysses; he can only become a novelist by refusing to relinquish himself to the call that solicits him. If he is able to write books, it is only because he is cut off from the original source of his “inspiration” by his own ruses and machinations. But his work attests to an inhuman effort to heed what the novelist cannot endure: another narration, a récit. The Blanchotian récit marks the memory of the experience that the novel leaves behind in order to become a novel. The struggle at the birth of the novel is therefore the struggle to do away with the event to which the récit bears witness, that is, to leave the “dead” or “disappeared” Ulysses in the water, to abandon death in favor of the deathless life of the whole, discontinuity in favor of absence, the absence of work for the work that gathers everything together. In leaving behind the récit, the novel also leaves the event itself behind. The novel is, for all its riches, only a narration of that which it has already lost. Yes, it dazzles; the novel reproduces the richness and detail of the world. The Blanchotian novelist dreams of Unity, where discontinuity would be merely a sign of the failure of the understanding, a mark of our finitude. In this way, the novel exerts, in advance, a grasp of the whole, of the time and space in which everything unfolds. The Blanchotian novel does not accomplish an absolute invention, creating something ungoverned by pre-existing rules. But in another sense, it is the Blanchotian récit that marks itself into the opening of the novel as the novel is marked as an inventive event. It is only the critical commentator who can attend to the happening of an event that itself reinvents the notion of invention and the inventor, for it no longer refers to the contrivance of an ingenious person. The novelty of this event is not that of a new art, instrument, or process. The invention that the récit “is” (beyond the intentions of the author of the novel) happens each time singularly and without precedent, cutting across what offers itself too readily to appropriation, identification, and subjectivation.

     

    Blanchot’s account of the “other” voyage of Ulysses stages the joining of the inhuman voice of the récit to that of the novelist. The journey of this Ulysses is not circular. The primordial relation through which he would constitute himself as a self-centered and hedonistic subject is interrupted by a call that contests his self-realization. The closed circuit of his interiority is opened; Ulysses no longer experiences himself as an “I can” who can pass unhindered through the finite order of being. The song of the Sirens is unintegratably foreign. Ulysses can only give himself over in response to this call and, thus summoned, is prevented from recoiling or turning back upon himself. The infinite resistance of the song to Ulysses’ powers cannot be understood in terms of a clash of contrary wills, because Ulysses is precisely no longer “there.” Ulysses cannot exist with, or alongside, the song. Ulysses’ “disappearance” means that he is henceforward unable to unfold his potentialities in a realm in which willed action is possible. No higher synthesis will allow him to mediate the song of the Sirens and integrate it into his own endeavors. Rather, he is co-constituted by the call; his selfhood is simultaneously economic and aneconomic. He is defined by the wiliness and the cleverness that attest to the auto-affirmative strength and vitality that permit his boundless curiosity; but he is also governed by a lethal susceptibility to the call of the Sirens. At once, Ulysses is driven toward what satisfies the circular demand that would permit his economic return to himself and toward the aneconomic “experience” that denies this return. It is precisely this irresolvable play of economy and aneconomy that allows Ulysses to stand in for both the writer of the novel and the récit. It is this play that determines the relationship between novel and récit, preventing their resolution into a higher synthesis, that is, the incorporation of the récit as an episode in a novel. But the récit does not name a literary genre that is separable from the novel, just as the Blanchotian event would involve beings not separable from a certain order of civilization. Novel and récit are moments of the same movement of invention. The dissension between novel and récit in Blanchot’s writings can be found in any act. As such, all synthesizing, economic movements are provisional.

     

    One can read “The Sirens’ Song” in terms of a struggle in a certain narrative recounting, concluding that the relationship between novel and récit bears upon a deeper struggle that has shaped our civilization, since the kind of narrative recounting one discovers in the novel is the sort of story–the story of stories, the narration that gathers up all other stories as such–that Western civilization has told to itself. There is no doubt that the narratorial voice of the novel is that of the Ulyssean subject who would recount episodes in a certain sequence. But the possibility of narration is predicated upon a recollection that is already determined by a certain conception of time. “The Sirens’ Song” bears upon the condition of possibility of narration.

     

    What is it that permits this incredible recollection of an event that is said to escape all memory? How does Blanchot explain the relationship he describes between the “other” voyage, in which Ulysses drowns and is lost, and the voyage of the novel, in which this drowned Ulysses is forgotten and the living Ulysses–the one who, miraculously, survives his own death (understood as his disappearance qua Ulysses)–sails back to his homeland, to his wife and his son, to the okios, the family hearth?

     

    In order to address this question (the way in which I choose to present the question of the condition of possibility in Blanchot’s theoretical writings in general), I will supplement Blanchot’s story of the two voyages of Ulysses with my own story of a third Ulysses. This is the Ulysses-Blanchot who has followed the others and watched them rise from the bottom of the sea, and, furthermore, who still remembers his fall (and the fall of the Sirens). This Ulysses-Blanchot is the writer of the story at the beginning of Le Livre à Venir.

     

    IV

     

    In Blanchot’s retelling of the encounter with the Sirens, The Odyssey becomes a memoir: it is the story Ulysses tells of his return, of the completion of the circle. Ulysses not only undergoes his encounter with the Sirens, but he relates this encounter himself. Nothing happens to him that he cannot relate: his is the memory that can recall everything, lifting it out of oblivion and recounting it in turn. Ulysses becomes Homer, the virtuoso of memory, the adventurer who, after his adventures, can tell his own story to entertain others. Ulysses-Homer writes, in the narratorial voice, of his triumph and his return.

     

    Yes, Ulysses returns to his family, to his kingdom, and sets right all wrongs. But the Ulysses who returns to Ithaca, to the family hearth, to settle down and write, is followed by another Ulysses. Blanchot, in the guise of a sea-traveler, has followed Ulysses on both his voyages, remembering what Ulysses does not and disclosing this gap in Ulysses-Homer’s memory in “The Sirens’ Song.” Who would recognize this worn and threadbare Ulysses who returns to his home in order to remember what outstrips the memory of his homeland? And yet it is this other, hypermnestic “memory” that will allow him to write of the journey at the heart of the novel and the récit. This Ulysses, ineluctably marked by death, has been vouchsafed a secret that cost him his intimate relationship with his and any homeland, rendering his Odyssey infinite. This Blanchotian Ulysses drowns; and at the same time, he is able to bring us, his readers, tidings of the voyages that the literary writer has undertaken.

     

    It is this Blanchotian Ulysses who waits at the elbow of the Ulysses-Homer, composer of The Odyssey. This Blanchotian Ulysses remembers the other story, the exile or the wandering of Ulysses. As the critical commentator who follows Ulysses to lose and then rediscover him, Blanchot triumphs because he alone can retrace this journey. Blanchot is capable of remembering what Ulysses forgets; moreover, since he, too, has written récits and novels, he can also remember what he had to forget as a literary author. His is the power to bear witness to the extraordinary happening of the récit but, as such, is a mastery of that which cannot be mastered–a tale of an event which will not allow itself to be recounted.

     

    How are we to understand the adventures of this Blanchotian Ulysses? Blanchot is not the adept who has had an experience and would teach others about it; he does not keep a secret. Rather, he remains vigilant, on the look-out, waiting for the chance for his writing to be seized by an unknown current. He relinquishes his grip and allows his mastery to be taken from him, but this is what allows him to escape the trap, to recover himself from the preliminary récit. Blanchot is thus open to what the author of Nadja is not. He writes, with “The Sirens’ Song,” a récit of the récit, a text dense with beginnings, a text that belongs alongside every literary-critical essay he has written and every work of literature. This is why his writing is able to invent, why it says the true, why the accomplishment it would realize is much more decisive than the production of an aesthetics. For the récit of the récit would reveal the historicity of history in the shining out of events like the light that sparkles up from waves of water. Beginning and rebeginning, flashing up and into nothing, it is of the aleatory, of the event, of the instant without program and without project of which Blanchot would write. He shows us that Ithaca is traversed by waves, that there is no place of safety to which Ulysses, each of us, any of us, might return.

    Notes

     

    1. Lewis and Sandra Hinchman’s edited collection Memory, Identity, Community makes a convincing case for such a turn, showing how the human sciences are moving toward models of explanation of human behavior drawing on narrative models rather than nomological models.

     

    2. Carr’s Time, Narrative, and History presents a powerful account of narrative as the temporal structure of human existence.

     

    3. As Lewis and Sandra Hinchman argue, “a community’s stories offer members a set of canonical symbols, plots, and characters through which they can interpret reality and negotiate–or even create–their world. The culture ‘speaks to itself’ as members replicate these canonical forms in their own lives” (235). Likewise, Alistair Macintyre and Charles Taylor have argued that our understanding of the world as individuals depends upon an intelligibility granted by communal life.

     

    4. As Georges Van Den Abbeele reminds us, “to the left’s investment in ‘community activism’ as a strategic retreat designed to reconstruct and build anew a base of popular support in the wake of severe electoral defeats by the right in England and the United States, corresponds the Thatcherite and Reaganite discourse on the return of juridical and managerial responsibilities to the level of ‘local communities,’ a cynical euphemism for the dismantling of the welfare state at the hands of so-called private enterprise” (xi). The essays in the volume he introduces provide a valuable attempt from various perspectives to reinvest community with a new sense.

     

    5. For example, he shows us how Kermode’s The Sense of an Ending depends on the separability of the sense of the real and reality itself that Carr convincingly overturns (9). Likewise, he claims that Barthes demarcates art and life, depending once again on a model of representation as the imposition of a structure on the “real” world (9).

     

    6. As Blanchot shows in The Work of Fire, it is not in order to represent the world that Lautréamont gave The Chants of Maldoror the body of a monumental thing, always pushing it toward impenetrability despite the coherence and the eloquence of his language. Maldoror strives to suffice to itself, to exist as a monad of words that reflects nothing but words. The sonority and rhythmic mobility of the poem is a sign of the attempt to render itself sovereign, to conquer its own space, literature’s space, and remain there. Literature, as Blanchot argues in dozens of essays, attends to an experience of language itself that escapes all kinds of narrativization (see Work 162-175).

     

    7. See the retelling of Orpheus’ descent into Hades to rescue Eurydice in The Space of Literature (171-176) and the meetings between Theseus and the Sphinx in The Infinite Conversation (17-20) and Narcissus and Eurydice in The Writing of the Disaster (125-128). For a commentary on “Orpheus’s Gaze,” see my “The Paradoxes of Fidelity.” For a commentary on the passages on Theseus and the Sphinx, see my “The Sphinx’s Gaze.”

     

    8. Timothy Clark has some marvellous pages on Blanchot’s notion of the récit in Derrida, Heidegger, Blanchot. Derrida has written at length on Blanchot’s notion of the récit in Parages.

     

    9. Logos, as Heidegger remarks, means more than language simply understood as a collection of words: “it means the fundamental faculty of being able to talk discursively, and, accordingly, to speak” (305). The human being can use language in a way the animal cannot since, according to Heidegger, “the animal lacks the ability to apprehend as a being whatever it is open for” (306). It is the way in which the human being comports itself to beings that separates it from human beings.

     

    10. In Totality and Infinity, Levinas argues that we are all–all of us, philosophers and non-philosophers–mediators or relays of a certain totality whether we assume, disavow, or transform its movement. Today, in the West, Levinas asks us to renew philosophy and with it to renew our civilization in response to a call that has gone unheard–the call of infinity, the infinite. This call resounds within the totality itself: we hear it, whether we know it or not–whether we respond to it or deny its unbridled force. Levinas asks us to overturn the “egology” or “economics” upon which what he calls totality is predicated by hearkening to this call. Ulysses, the voyager of Homer’s Odyssey, is the authentic figure of this egology; his travels are, in turn, a perfect figure for an economic return upon the ego. As Levinas remarks: “the itinerary of philosophy remains that of Ulysses, whose adventure in the world was only a return to his native island–a complacency in the Same, an unrecognition of the Other (48). See, for an examination of the relationship between Blanchot and Levinas, my “The Sphinx’s Gaze” and William Large’s “Impersonal Existence.”

     

    11. On the other hand, there are authors for whom the novel must attain the status of an object sufficient unto itself. Can Sarraute’s Tropisms or Beckett’s The Unnameable be regarded as novels? It would be here that the novel unravels itself or approaches the condition of what Blanchot might call the “poem-thing.” One might admit that there are novels that are non-representational (Blanchot’s own Thomas the Obscure would be an example, or indeed The Chants of Maldoror [see note 6 above]), but the roman of “The Sirens’ Song” refers to the hegemonic notion of the novel. Furthermore, the novel cannot separate itself from the practice Blanchot calls writing. As I will make clear, roman and récit are bound up with one another in a complex economy.

     

    12. Almost as soon as the Sirens become women, Blanchot tells us, they die. But Blanchot tells us nothing of the fabulous animals who are turned into women and undergo their own deaths (and perhaps their own resurrection). He writes of Ulysses’ death and resurrection, but Blanchot does not consider the fate of the Sirens after their deaths. Does he, in this silence, speak for them, and, thereby in the place of the women who, when their secret is revealed, die at the bottom of the ocean? In a sense, they have died before they have even begun–before they have been given the chance to begin, before any such chance has been envisaged to explore the source of the song that resounds in the speech they would speak as human women. Crucially, the Sirens die as soon as they become human women, preventing them from uprooting themselves, journeying according to other imperatives and exploring their own form of existence. Deprived of autonomy, determination, or identity, these dead women are more comforting than women who are still alive because they can serve as the screen without depth onto which Ulysses-Blanchot can project his fantasies. Does he exclude the possibility of their return or resurrection, of the story that they might tell about their adventure or their death? “The Sirens’ Song” is, perhaps, more complex than this reading would allow since Ulysses, Blanchot tells us, recognizes himself in the Sirens just as the Sirens recognize themselves in the sailors. The non-human females become human and Ulysses recognizes that he, too is in some sense non- or inhuman: he, too, is female or animal. Ulysses, part-Siren, is claimed by the feminine in a way that he does not realize, just as the Sirens are implicated in the masculine. There is a redistribution of the terms femininity and masculinity beyond a simple polarization of gender here. The scene of tutelage I invoked could be understood in terms of a hetero-affection, an affection that interrupts the economy of the masculine just as it disrupts the economy of the feminine. In this sense, “The Sirens’ Song” would attest to a certain feminization of the masculine that has always and already occurred–a feminization that does not happen from outside the masculine but is co-implicated with it, collaborating with and contaminating any notion of a pure masculinity–and, likewise, to a masculinization of the feminine that would co-determine and co-constitute what in the classical sense is taken to be the rigid opposite of masculinity. For a feminist interpretation of Blanchot’s writings, see Cixous’s Readings.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Beckett, Samuel. Trilogy: Molloy, Malone Dies, The Unnameable. London: Calder Publications, 1995.
    • Blanchot, Maurice. Le Livre a Venir. Paris: Gallimard, 1959.
    • —. The Infinite Conversation. Trans. Susan Hanson. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1993.
    • —. “The Sirens’ Song.” Trans. Lydia Davis. The Station Hill Blanchot Reader. New York: Station Hill, 1998. 443-450.
    • —. The Space of Literature. Trans. Ann Smock. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1982.
    • —. Thomas the Obscure. Trans. Robert Lamberton. New York: D. Lewis, 1973.
    • —. The Work of Fire. Trans. Charlotte Mandell. Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1995.
    • —. The Writing of the Disaster. Trans. Ann Smock. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1986.
    • Breton, André. Nadja. Trans. Richard Howard. New York: Grove, 1960.
    • Carr, David. Time, Narrative, and History. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana UP, 1986.
    • Cixous, Hélène. Readings: The Poetics of Blanchot, Joyce, Kafka, Kleist, Lispector, and Tsvetayeva. Trans. Verena Conley. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992.
    • Clark, Timothy. Derrida, Heidegger, Blanchot: Sources of Derrida’s Notion and Practice of Literature. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1992.
    • —. The Theory of Inspiration: Composition as a Crisis of Subjectivity in Romantic and post-Romantic Writing. Manchester: Manchester UP, 1997.
    • Derrida, Jacques. Parages. Paris: Galilée, 1986.
    • —. The Politics of Friendship. Trans. George Collins. London: Verso, 1997.
    • Gill, Carolyn Bailey, ed. Maurice Blanchot. The Demand of Writing. London: Routledge, 1996.
    • Heidegger, Martin. The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, World, Finitude, Solitude. Trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana UP, 1995.
    • Hinchman, Lewis and Sandra, eds. Memory, Identity, Community: The Idea of Narrative in the Human Sciences. New York: State U of New York P, 1997.
    • Homer. Odyssey. Trans. Robert Fagles. London and NY: Penguin, 1996.
    • Iyer, Lars. “The Birth of Philosophy in Poetry: Blanchot, Char, Heraclitus.” Janus Head, Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies in Continental Philosophy, Literature, Phenomenological Psychology and the Arts 4. 2 (2001): 358-383.
    • —. “Cave Paintings and Wall Writings. Blanchot’s Signature.” Angelaki, Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 6.3 (2001): 31-43.
    • —. “The Impossibility of Loving: Blanchot, Sexual Difference, Community.” Cultural Values (forthcoming).
    • —. “The Paradoxes of Fidelity: Blanchot, Philosophy and Critical Commentary.” Symposium, Journal of the Canadian Society for Hermeneutics and Postmodern Thought 4. 2 (2000): 189-208.
    • —. “The Sphinx’s Gaze. Art, Friendship and the Philosophical in Blanchot and Levinas.” Southern Journal of Philosophy 39. 2 (2001): 189-206.
    • —. “The Temple of Night. Reflections on the Origin of the Work of Art in Blanchot and Heidegger.” Asociación de Estudios Filosóficos. Revista de Filosofma (forthcoming).
    • Large, Will. “Impersonal Existence: A Conceptual Genealogy of the There Is from Heidegger to Blanchot and Levinas.” Angelaki, Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 7.3 (forthcoming).
    • Lautréamont. Maldoror and Poems. Trans. Paul Knight. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1988.
    • Levinas, Emmanuel. Basic Philosophical Writings. Ed. and trans. Adriaan Peperzaak et. al. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana UP, 1996.
    • —. Totality and Infinity. Trans. Alphonso Lingis. Pittsburgh: Duquesne UP, 1969.
    • Lyotard, Jean-François. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. Trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi. Manchester: Manchester UP, 1984
    • Macintyre, Alistair. After Virtue. Notre Dame: U of Notre Dame P, 1981.
    • Miami Theory Collective, eds. Community at Loose Ends. U of Minnesota P, 1991.
    • Nancy, Jean-Luc. The Inoperative Community. Trans. Peter Connor et. al. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1991.
    • Sarraute, Nathalie. Tropisms. London: John Calder, 1964.
    • Singer, Linda. “Recalling a Community at Loose Ends.” Community at Loose Ends. 121-30.
    • Taylor, Charles. Sources of the Self. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1989.
    • Van Den Abbeele, Georges. Introduction. Community at Loose Ends. ix-xxvi.

     

  • Benjamin in Bombay? An Extrapolation

    Rajeev S. Patke

    Department of English Language and Literature
    National University of Singapore
    ellpatke@nus.edu.sg

     

    "I searched around those ruins in vain and all I found was a face engraved on a potsherd and a fragment of a frieze. That is what my poems will be in a thousand years--shards, fragments, the detritus of a world buried for all eternity. What remains of a city is the detached gaze with which a half-drunk poet looked at it."

     

    — Amin Maalouf, Samarkhand

    The Profane Aura of the City

     

    This essay brings together two seemingly unrelated bodies of writing: Walter Benjamin’s work on the cities of European modernity, and literary discourse emanating from the Indian metropolis of Bombay treated as an instance of Asia’s post-colonial induction into modernity. These apparently unrelated discourses are brought together with three aims in mind: first, to show the usefulness of Benjamin in recognizing affinities between geographically diverse manifestations of metropolitan experience; second, to suggest reasons why such affinities and resemblances should be seen as other than random coincidence (in other words, to show that they bespeak the divergent developments of identical processes); and third, to identify some of the ways in which an interaction between these two types of discourse invites a revaluation of both.

     

    Benjamin analyzed the effects of commodification on urban culture and consciousness within the confines of a Europe that still retained its colonial empires. In teasing out the relation between the materialism of culture and the culture of materialism, his work continues to offer a suggestive critique of the nexus between societal modernity and urbanism. Benjamin’s interests may have been confined to Europe, but the processes he studied became asymmetrically global, especially after the “new” nations of Asia had made their urban centers the focus for the belated pursuit of a modernity denied them by colonialism. This asymmetry makes it possible to expand upon his work in Asian contexts shaped first by European colonialism and then by local nationalisms inspired by the Enlightenment rationality that accompanied colonialism. While Benjaminian lenses bring aspects of metropolitan Asian cultures into focus, these cultures have undergone belated metamorphoses from the colonial towards a kind of postmodern modernity for which there are no adequate terms of reference in Benjamin. In that sense, the European lenses he provides require an adjustment of focal length, and an immersion of Benjaminian discourse in the writing from the vastly different world of an Asian metropolis like Bombay provides a partial correction of his inadvertant Eurocentrism. In the pursuit of its triple aim, this essay will proceed through a series of thematic elaborations in which successive aspects of Benjamin’s approach to the culture of cities will be refracted through literary writing from and about Bombay.

     

    The City as Palimpsest

     

    The first such constellation involves the metaphor of the city as text: a text from and about Bombay, which I here juxtapose with Benjamin’s own work on cities as composite texts. In Midnight’s Children, Salman Rushdie invokes Bombay as an originary island transformed over three centuries, by the marriage of imperialism and capitalism, into today’s whirlpool of over twelve million. Once it was a sleepy fishing-village, where people worshipped a local deity called Mumba-bai; the Portuguese, who loved its harbour, named it Bom Bahia (Dwivedi 8). The city is thus a layered site excavated in language through the force of collective memory. “Bombay” becomes one among many names for the movement of peoples, commodities, exchanges, conflicts, aspirations, and values through time.

     

    Benjamin not only read cities as if they were texts, he also collected texts as if they were cities he had visited–layered and seemingly random accretions burdened with the possibility of their own erasure. His reading of cities, like his citing of texts, is overshadowed by a presentiment of ruins. He was born in Berlin but became infatuated with Paris, where he read Baudelaire, translated Proust, welcomed the Surrealists from a distance, and concocted an urban mythology out of walking the streets, alone among crowds. The excited apprehension of his gaze consumed “the occult world of business and traders” (Selected II 619) with a voluptuousness of intent that had to keep reminding itself not to be melancholic that we live in a time indemnified for humanity by a future married to technology. His travels east, however, only took him as far as Moscow, where he spent two months in the winter of 1926-27. He concluded that “a new optics is the most undoubted gain from a stay in Moscow” (Selected II 22).

     

    For Benjamin, the city becomes a performative text whenever we realize our experience of it in and as language: “language has unmistakably made plain that memory is not an instrument for exploring the past, but rather a medium” (Selected II 576). The city circumscribes a series of fragmentary impressions that resist totalization, and are interpreted by memory as collage, in which “He who has once begun to open the fan of memory never comes to the end of its segments” (Selected II 597). Benjamin can name them only through metaphor, as the veil, the corridor, the passageway, the maze, and the labyrinth. Their cognitive function is subsidized by the visual metaphor of the gaze. To the gaze, experience is an exteriority whose meaning depends on whether objects return, or “withstand,” the gaze (Reflections 144). This peculiar idea recurs throughout Benjamin’s writings. In it, the gaze renders the city purely in terms of space, in which the materiality of objects is always experienced as an aspect of visual experience. The commodification of objects also gets mediated in space. Even persons are liable to get assimilated as objects in space. Sometimes they disappear altogether, as when Benjamin cannot remember anything about the aunt who used to live with his grandmother, but “a good deal about the room that she occupied in her mother’s apartment” (Selected II 621). Objects and persons get constellated through their interactions within the magnetic field of space, which tells us “what kind of regimen cities keep over the imagination, and why the city …indemnifies itself in memory, and why the veil it has covertly woven out of our lives shows images of people less often than those of the sites of our encounters with others or ourselves” (Selected II 614).

     

    The City as Rune

     

    The Asian city is a text that can be read in Benjaminian terms. It presents an inscrutable aspect which resonates with Benjamin’s treatment of urban experience as rune or hieroglyph. As space, a city is emblematic; in time, it is an allegory (Origins 176). One way of recognizing how the city transmutes time into space is to consider the consequences of metropolitan transport systems as they pull and drag traffic through the packed overground and underground densities of civic space. Benjamin elaborates on an observation made by Georg Simmel, that the city creates a new kind of uneasiness because the experience typical of public transport systems is that they split the visual field from the auditory field. People are constantly placed “in a position of having to look at one another for long minutes or even hours without speaking to one another” (Baudelaire 38). In Bombay this experience is aggravated by the city’s elongated geography and the arterial role played by local trains that ferry a workforce of several millions between home and the workplace every day. Life becomes a piecing together, and what is pieced together by memory in such situations are moments measured as space, because while “autobiography has to do with time, with sequence and what makes up the continuous flow of life,…here, I am talking of space, of moments and discontinuities” (Selected II 612).

     

    Figure 1: Waiting for a Train in Bombay
    Copyright © Mumbai Central.

     

    The Asian experience of the urban affirms a second Benjaminian recognition of discontinuity regarding the names we attach to civic spaces. Political exigencies bring about frequent changes of name that might leave a place unchanged, but unsettle associations and dislocate memory. This is true of every city, and never more true than of Bombay–now called Mumbai. Here are two members of the city’s Parsi minority–from Rohinton Mistry’s Such a Long Journey –reacting to a right-wing municipal administration intent on erasing familiar street names because they trace the city’s colonial past.

     

    “Why change the names? Saala sisterfuckers! Hutatma Chowk!” He spat out the words disgustedly. “What is wrong with Flora Fountain?”

     

    “Why worry about it? I say, if it keeps the Marathas happy, give them a few roads to rename. Keep them occupied. What’s in a name?”

     

    “No, Gustad.” Dinshawji was very serious. “You are wrong. Names are so important. I grew up on Lamington Road. But it has disappeared, in its place is Dadasaheb Bhadkhamkar Marg. My school was on Carnac Road. Now suddenly it’s on Lokmanya Tilak Marg. I live at Sleater Road. Soon that will also disappear. My whole life I have come to work at Flora Fountain. And one fine day the name changes. So what happens to the life I have lived? Was I living the wrong life, with all the wrong names? Will I get a second chance to live it all again, with these new names?” (73-74)

     

    Figure 2:
    A Landmark, Once Known as “Flora Fountain,” Now Called “Hutatma Chowk”

    Copyright © Mumbai Central.

     

    Mistry’s novel renders an unsettling experience in the register of comic indignation. Benjamin offers a very different perspective. His early writings are rooted in the quasi-theological belief that “The absolute relation of name to knowledge exists only in God” (Selected I 71). If that notion is transposed to the civic travails represented in the Mistry novel, the succession of namings in the political history of a city like Bombay would have to be seen as a sardonic procession of false Gods, leaving any idea of an absolute concord between place and name an ever more opaque and hopeless mystery. The alternative to the Benjaminian hope of a divine resolution is to abandon the idea of any such conjunction of the secular and the prophetic, and to accept the city as a figure for the historicity of the struggle over names in a contestation for mere civic power, including the power over knowledge as personal memory.

     

    The City as Trace

     

    Dislocation implies the erasure of connections and relations. Benjamin is useful in bringing out another aspect of metropolitan experience–the estrangement of its urban bourgeoisie. Estrangement can be seen to cut both ways in the modern city: one can have a home where one is not at home, and one can feel at home where one has no home. One can also be turned out-of-doors by disgust at the cozy fetishism of bourgeois interiors. In Benjamin’s materialist terms, the very idea of home is transfigured by the city into interiors where the owner leaves traces that create habits out of habitats. In the Asian metropolis, estrangement is intensified. It provides a series of startling variants to how material traces can get deposited as signs of inhabitancy. In the Asian metropolis, the Benjaminian notion of the trace is rendered into the grotesque. From the fundamental deposit of feces (because the city lacks latrines), to the forest of television antennae that festoons the meanest hutment colony (because people must have entertainment), the city is proof of how the trace makes strange (and estranging) habits out of habitats. Bombay confirms Benjamin’s description as apt. It also obliges one to reconsider what it means to have the disconcerting interpenetration of habits and habitats separated by the most gaping differences. Here–from Anita Desai’s novel of that name–is poor Baumgartner in Bombay:

     

    Even when he had parted these curtains, entered the house, mounted the stairs, careful not to step on the beggars and lepers and prostitutes who inhabited every landing, and at last achieved the small cell that was his room, he had no sense of being walled away from the outer world…. (Desai 175)

     

    The interiority of space always threatens to get turned inside out. If we cannot wall ourselves in, we can yet mark a place as ours through the silt of our deposits. Moving upmarket in “One-Way Street” (1928), Benjamin has nothing but scorn for “the soulless luxury of the furnishings” captured accurately in the genre of nineteenth-century detective fiction: “On this sofa the aunt cannot but be murdered” (Selected I 447)! “Erase the traces” was Brecht’s refrain precisely because

     

    here, in the bourgeois room the opposite behavior has become an ethos in the strictest sense–that is to say, a habit. Indeed, leaving traces is not just a habit, but the primal phenomenon of all the habits that are involved in inhabiting a place. (Selected II 472)

     

    The material cause that defines the modernity of urban inhabitancy is the post-Bauhaus preference for glass and metal as the building materials of our era (Selected II 473). Benjamin’s stance is characteristically ambivalent between welcoming them as mimetic images of the urban transparency of a classless apocalypse, and regretting the loss of individualism entailed in this metal-and-glass Utopia.1 One would have to add cement and concrete to glass and metal to describe Bombay’s architecture; the ghastly dullness of this material lends its aura of drabness to whatever is immured within its walls. It becomes the veritable substance from which modern cities are made because of the ease with which it sinks into the souls of its inhabitants. It also encourages the reproducibility of housing conditions on the most massive scale of homogenizing anonymity, thus making the struggle for individuation more tragic.

     

    What gets forgotten, or repressed, in the efficient deployment of such materials is the recognition that “technology is the mastery of not nature but of the relation between nature and man” (Selected I 487). If Bombay represents a relatively unplanned variant of this development, we can glance briefly at another Indian city, Chandigarh, for a more planned version of homogenizing anonymity. When, shortly after gaining independence from British rule, the Indian government invited Le Corbusier to devise an ideal city for the new republic, the best he could come up with reduced the urban idea of Utopia to the most boring trace of bourgeois idealism.

     

    Figure 3:
    Le Corbusier, Holding a Map of the Indian City of Chandigarh

    Copyright © Fondation Le Corbusier

     

    Benjamin took a different tack. In a fragment from 1930-31, he asks the critic to practice “deconstruction [Abmontieren]” with reference to Adorno’s “theory of shrinkage [Schrumpfung],” and his own “theory of packaging [Verpackung],” and “the theory of the ruins created by time” (Selected II 415). Shrinkage and packaging are metaphors whose application to urban housing is self-evident. The application of “deconstruction” to housing can be said to have been accomplished, in the specific case of the city slums and hutment colonies that mark Bombay, by the tragic-ironic relation they set up between their own manifest existence as urban ruins on the slope of time and the repression of their cheek-by-jowl coexistence by up-market equivalents.

     

    The City as Kitsch

     

    Another dimension in which Benjamin and Bombay can be made to offer mutual illumination is in how they point up the role of kitsch in modern urban experience. It is almost a surprise to recollect that Bombay is not entirely constituted of slums and government housing. It is also the city of kitsch–for instance, in the eclecticism of its architecture, and the energetic vulgarity of its entertainment industry. V.S. Naipaul captures the public visage of the city quite accurately for the 1970s:

     

    The Indian-Victorian-Gothic city with its inherited British public buildings and institutions–the Gymkhana with its wide veranda and spacious cricket ground, the London-style leather-chaired Ripon Club for elderly Parsi gentlemen…the city was not built for the poor, the millions. But a glance at the city map shows that there was a time when they were invited in. (59)

    Figure 4: Rajabhai Tower, Bombay
    Copyright © Mumbai Central.

     

    In a gloss on Surrealism, Benjamin defined kitsch as “The side which things turn toward the dream” (Selected II 3). In Bombay, the dream is constituted by the ahistoricity of anachronism and the randomness of miscellany. The public landmarks–e.g. the Victoria Railway Terminus, the Rajabhai clock tower, the Gateway of India, the Haji Ali Temple, Flora Fountain, etc.–can appear striking so long as one is willing to ignore the clash in styles, and one takes each on its own terms. When taken together, as the city forces one to do in its synchronicity, they constitute a medley of accretions accidentally thrown together in a form of tropical Surrealism, with a dream’s capacity to sustain vividness independent of a context of stylistic tradition that is either indigenous or coherent. The mere fact that they happen to have been piled up in a particular arrangement becomes the “logic” of their occurrence in space and time. Benjamin described the Surrealist quest as a search for “the totemic tree of objects within the thicket of primal history” (Selected II 4). In Bombay, not only does the surreal imagination come up against totemic objects within plural histories, it also gets the opportunity to hunt for the tree of history amidst a thicket of totemic objects. Of each such excrescence, one may well echo his remark, “It is the last mask of the banal, the one with which we adorn ourselves, in dream and conversation, so as to take in the energies of an outlived world of things” (Selected II 4).

     

    The second form of kitsch unique to Bombay–its khichadi (local word for a kind of dry porridge)–is the entertainment industry, which gladly recognizes itself as India’s Bollywood, its equivalent to the U.S. movie industry in an age of rapidly globalizing markets and consumer interests. Its grossness is as deep as its popularity is wide. Here, the capacity to reach a mass audience is the perfect evocation of Benjamin’s hope that mechanical reproducibility would disseminate the auratic more widely. What Bombay shows is that this dream can indeed be realized, but only as the most tasteless of nightmares. The Bombay film industry combines fantasy and stereotypes with cheerful cynicism into what it supplies to the masses as the auratic. In being disseminated as a socially permitted drug and anodyne, the auratic is not diluted, but contaminated. Anyone who has been even a little appalled or embarrassed by the average Hindi movie will also have wondered at the economic sustenance that keeps the industry churning out more films than Hollywood, while basing them, decade after decade, on the same jaded formulas. Benjamin wanted the aura to lose its elitism, and spread to the masses. But there was no reason to suppose that the auratic would be made an historical exception to the law of consumption, which dictates that the consumers get what they think they want, which is cliché, not critique. The sociologist Ashis Nandy observes, “most Indian movie-goers prefer even an unrealistic defence of the right values to a realistic refusal to take notice of them” (223).

     

    Figure 5: Poster for Mani Rathnam’s Bombay (1995)

    The City as Labyrinth

     

    If we return to Benjamin’s cities at the level of the street, we enter the labyrinth or maze (Selected II 614) as Ariadne (Selected II 595, 598, 677). The personification enables the development of a mythology surrounding the condition of being lost, fearful, or anxious that a city can induce even in those who may not be inept at finding their way, or themselves. In Benjamin’s case, he confesses that he had “a very poor sense of direction” (Selected II 596). It is amusing to see how this handicap–unpropitious and yet apt for someone who would one day fancy himself as an Odysseus of cities–converts the banality of “Not to find one’s way in a city” into the art of knowing how “to lose oneself in a city,” although it took him most of a lifetime before he could claim that “Paris taught me this art of straying” (Selected II 598), whereas in Berlin, “my legs had become entangled in the ribbons of the streets” (Selected II 612). Benjamin would have been appalled at Chandigarh–Le Corbusier’s ambiguous gift to India, a city in which it is nearly impossible either to stray or to get properly lost.

     

    Figure 6: Grid Map of the city of Chandigarh
    Copyright © Chandigarh Administration
    Click for a larger image

     

    Both maze and labyrinth suggest that knowledge is not to be accessed directly in a city. The figure also implies that walking, rather than a mechanical means of transport, is the pace at which to take in a city. It requires no traversal to be complete. However, the metaphor also implies that there might be a center to the labyrinth. Benjamin’s practice acts as dissuasion to any such notion. His idealization derives from Baudelaire’s Parisian flâneur, who is “A passionate lover of crowds and incognitos” (Baudelaire 5). There is an entire frame of mind to which the urban jungle is not merely acceptable, but welcome. Benjamin uses Baudelaire’s reading of Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Man in the Crowd” to identify the city dweller as “someone who does not feel comfortable in his own company…. He refuses to be alone. He is the man of the crowd” (Baudelaire 48). The choice converts the defensive into the opportunistic, as in Bertolt Brecht’s sardonic presentation, “Of Poor B.B.”:

     

    In the asphalt city I’m at home. From the very start
    Provided with every last sacrament:
    With newspapers. And tobacco. And brandy
    To the end mistrustful, lazy and content.

     

    I’m polite and friendly to people. I put on
    A hard hat because that’s what they do.
    I say: they are animals with a quite peculiar smell.
    And I say: does it matter? I am too. (107)

     

    Benjamin’s temperament prefers a less hard-nosed attitude, more preoccupied with solitariness than abrasion. He regards the flâneur as someone “who goes botanizing on the asphalt” (Baudelaire 36).2 The characterization is both attractive and fanciful. The flâneur becomes a dialectical image that evades resolution, though it provides amelioration (N 50). The tension between its panache and its defensiveness is balanced on a cusp. Benjamin has to invoke Bergson, Freud, Proust, and Valéry to interject the mémoire involontaire between the capacity of metropolitan experience to induce “a poetics of shock” and the psychological mechanisms evolved for the purpose of dealing with it (Baudelaire 111-16). The flâneur becomes a figure for the resistance offered to what is found irresistible–the city as a medium for realizing the self. He will eventually lose himself to it, so he makes a concession by appearing to join the crowd, but only as a stroller, someone uniquely individual, and therefore no part of its homogenizing impulse (cf. Baudelaire 170). Benjamin wrote about Kafka, “Strangeness–his own strangeness–has gained control over him” (Selected II 806). One has only to replace “strangeness” with “estrangement” to give us a wider application for which Kafka, Benjamin, and Baudelaire serve as emblems.

     

    This poetry is no local folklore; the allegorist’s gaze which falls upon the city is rather the gaze of alienated man. It is the gaze of the flâneur, whose way of living still bestowed a conciliatory gleam over the growing destitution of men in the great city. (Baudelaire 170)

     

    What is the source of the conciliatory in the gleam bestowed by the poet on the destitution of the city? Benjamin answers, “He is for art what the dandy is for fashion” (Baudelaire 172). Likewise, he notes that Baron Haussmann’s “urbanistic ideal was one of views in perspective down long street-vistas.” For Benjamin, this represents “the tendency to ennoble technical exigencies with artistic aims” (Baudelaire 173). This may well have been the antidote to Fascism’s introduction of aesthetics into politics (“Work” 241). However, one might just as well call it autism dissembled as art. It does not cope with the dehumanization produced by urbanization; it layers it over with the gleaming patina of the aesthetic. This tendency–to retain objects vividly in memory while completely losing sight of the human figures for whom they are supposed to be the context–has an odd kind of counterpart in Benjamin’s remark that “Kafka’s entire work constitutes a code of gestures which surely had no definite symbolic meaning for the author from the outset” (Selected II 801). Benjamin becomes the locus for the problem encountered by the aesthetic impulse to recuperate from the shock of the urban, also wanting to ameliorate the impact of technological change on the quality of individual experience while remaining profoundly unconvinced of the equivalence between change and progress.

     

    A Poetics of Shock

     

    Benjamin was never at home even in the Berlin of his birth, where his mother used to take him for walks. Little Walter always kept two steps behind her, appearing more näive than he felt he was, just as later he was to appear more knowing than he felt himself to be, always capable of getting lost, whether out of choice or necessity (Selected II 596). In his last years, in Paris, he acknowledged that the condition of aloneness had to be accepted, since he would neither mix with the German émigrés, nor could he bring himself to join the Jewish exiles, nor did he hope to find acceptance among the local French. His solitude was thus involuntary and wretched. What is remarkable is that the desolating aspect of the predicament almost became a method. He taught himself to prefer streets to houses, suburbs to the city center, the amble of the stroller to the diligence of the tourist, and “the architectonic function of wares” (II 25) in markets to the interiors of museums or the exteriors of architectural monuments. He even insisted that only the foreign eye saw about a city what escaped native recognition (II 142, 262).

     

    His recollections of Berlin are particularly revealing about the enabling as well as the disabling powers of the flâneur as figuration.

     

    Berlin had provided meager opportunities for “The child’s first excursion into the exotic world of abject poverty.” (Selected II 600)

     

    I never slept on the street in Berlin. I saw sunset and dawn, but between the two I found myself a shelter. Only those for whom poverty or vice turns the city into a landscape in which they stray from dark till sunrise know it in a way denied to me. (Selected II 612)

     

    If we jump from Berlin to Bombay, no one who has walked the pavements of Bombay would use the word “exotic” to refer to “abject poverty.” Well over half the twelve million inhabitants of Bombay meet every sunset and dawn on the pavement, and not by choice. In Paris, Benjamin could afford to poeticize bazaars and arcades:

     

    I am pursuing the origin and construction of the Paris arcades from their rise to their fall, and laying hold of their origin through economic fact. These facts … construed as causes … allow the whole series of the arcade’s concrete historical forms to emerge, like a leaf unfolding forth from itself the entire wealth of the empirical plant kingdom. (N 50)

     

    The Crawford Market in Rohinton Mistry’s Such a Long Journey, however, is a bazaar seen from the other end of the telescope. When economic facts are treated as effect instead of cause, they become a slippery floor, “and smelly air abuzz with bold and bellicose flies” (21). Benjamin’s flâneur is not taken in by the commodification of value symbolized in the bazaar, though he consumes it avidly with his eyes. In being the remote ancestor to today’s addicted window-shopper, he remains a disinterested student in the temple of consumerism. He resists the commodity as fetish only by consuming it as an object of study. Goods need not be bought for their availability to the gaze to become a good in itself.

     

    The bazaar is the last hangout of the flâneur. If in the beginning the street had become an intérieur for him, now this intérieur turned into a street, and he roamed through the labyrinth of merchandise as he had once roamed through the labyrinth of the city. (Baudelaire 54)

     

    Exact equivalents to such arcades and bazaars are easy to find in the Fort area of Bombay. There, the poetry of the commodity and the poetics of abject poverty jostle each other rudely. For the majority of inhabitants–if a squatter can be said to inhabit what he infests–the pavement is interiority pulled inside out with a literalness that places Benjamin’s figure in a harder, clearer light. The flanneries of Bombay are as convoluted as those of any European city, but a stroll there is more reliably fraught with unpleasant discovery, as in Gieve Patel’s “City Landscape.”

     

    I pick my way
    Step by ginger step between
    Muck, rags, dogs,
    Women bathing squealing
    Children in sewer water,
    Unexpected chickens,
    And miles of dusty yellow
    Gravel straight
    From the centre of some planet
    Sucked dry by the sun… (Patel and Thorner 143)

     

    The point need not be labored: cities like Bombay show the limits beyond which the Baudelairean figure can stroll only with extreme discomfort to the figuration. The limitation separates the Asian from the European metropolis. Radical economic asymmetry, when combined with the close contiguities in space that are enforced by a city, distort human experience to a point where the imagination has to access the violence of the surreal, as an energy from within, if it is to resist the violence from without represented by the city.

     

    The Surreal City

     

    The surreal is never far from the metropolitan. Benjamin saw this as tonic, but Bombay provides an obverse experience of the surreal as discomfiting. The migration of rural populations to the metropolis is an aspect of societal modernity of which Bombay serves as one gross index. The influx from the agrarian hinterland has been poorly matched by land reclamation, which has only augmented the city’s problems and its politicians’ pockets. In this context, the feature that characterizes Bombay, the way scars disfigure a face, is its beggars. To beg is to have shed self-respect as the least price paid to appease need in the sharp form of hunger. But the Bombay variety of begging is something else altogether: the number, the deformities, and the persistence of its beggars add up to a surreal experience because all their deprivations are part of a gruesome economic organization. Benjamin, for the most part, internalizes the notion of poverty as a form of inward lack. In Moscow, however, he notes, “Begging is not aggressive as in southern climes, where the importunity of the ragamuffin still betrays some remnants of vitality. Here it is a corporation of the dying” (Selected II 27). Begging, he recognizes, is more effective when it preys upon “the bad social conscience” of the bourgeoisie (Selected II 28) than when it solicits pity. The same recognition animated Brecht’s adaptation of John Gay, and it should come as no surprise that when the Marathi author P.L. Deshpande adapted the Three-Penny Opera to a musical satire featuring a Bombay Beggars’ Union (Teen Paishyacha Tamasha), the burlesque proved even more savagely funny when transposed from eighteenth century London via 1920s Germany to 1970s Bombay. Thus Benjamin’s observation–“They have developed begging to a high art, with a hundred schematisms and variations” (Selected II 28)–applies equally well to any city in which the Surreal comes into play in collating penury and crime as a form of the metropolitan macabre. The Dalit poet Namdeo Dhasal remarks,

     

    Who hadn’t thought that fees could be claimed
    for singing songs of hunger. (Dangle 42)

     

    In Benjamin, the figure of the beggar transposes into yet another economic transposition–the ragpicker–who fascinates his epoch, creates a cottage-industry out of destitution, and invites identification from the littérateur, the conspirator, and the bohème (Baudelaire 19-20). Thus we can show that Benjamin was aware of the economic potential to the city’s exploitation of poverty, but for the private economy of those who meet their sunsets on the pavement, he would have to turn to lines like these from a Marathi poem by B. Rangarao:

     

    … sleep quarrels with my eyes
    then sits apart sulking in corners…. (Dangle 46)

     

    As for the dawn in Bombay, this is Nissim Ezekiel, in “A Morning Walk”:

     

    Barbaric city slick with slums,
    Deprived of seasons, blessed with rains,
    Its hawkers, beggars, iron-lunged,
    Processions led by frantic drums,
    A million purgatorial lanes,
    And child-like masses, many-tongued,
    Whose wages are in words and crumbs. (Patel and Thorner 129)

     

    This ironic and repulsed voice is still that of the poet as citizen who will walk home to his four walls. The Marathi poet Narayan Surve speaks from a blind corner, from where

     

    We know only two roads one which leads to the factory
    And the other,
    Which leads to the Crematorium. (Patel and Thorner 149)

     

    The plight understood by Benjamin is dull and sordid. That evoked by the Dalit has the edge of desperation, as in Namdeo Dhasal’s Marathi poem “Hunger”:

     

    Hunger, if we cannot mate you
    cannot impregnate you
    our tribe will have to kill itself
    Hunger we have all the aces
    Why talk of the songs of the half-sexed jacks? (Dangle 44)

     

    Bombay requires that the flâneur not walk the road, but become the road, as in the urban ballad of the Gujarati poet Suresh Dalal:

     

    I am a road
    Neither sleeping nor awaking,
    And a collapsed hand-cart
    I am beer and whisky
    And country liquor
    I am, yet nobody:
    I am an extinguished lantern.
    Living in Bombay
    I am a terribly tired person.
    I am a newspaper and a phone
    And a telex and a rumour
    I am a radio, T.V., Airport
    And a slum…. or I am an alternative.
    I am an actor without a drama
    And I am an impotent heir.
    Living in Bombay
    I am a terribly tired person. (Patel and Thorner 158)

     

    In brief, the individual living in an age of metropolitan pressure becomes the subject of a massive displacement.

     

    We now approach that aspect of metropolitan experience, as refracted by an Asian metropolis, to which Benjamin may be said to be an Horatio. Moving from the divisions enforced by economic lack to those imposed by society, we note, in passing, that the class structure in Moscow reminded Benjamin of the caste system in India: “Russia is today not only a class but also a caste system” (Selected II 35). He linked class to caste because both bring “terrible social ostracism” to their victims. Benjamin’s analogy has a counterpart in Max Weber’s equation, made in 1922, between the Jew and the Indian “untouchable” (184-85). Weber claimed that ostracism built up caste solidarity. In this context, it is ironic that Benjamin suffered the fate of a Jew though he did not think of himself as defined by his Jewishness. There is an interesting correspondence between the views of Benjamin and B.R. Ambedkar, the principal theorist of the Dalit cause. Benjamin described the angel of history as one who would make that which had been smashed whole, except that the catastrophe called progress kept blowing it backwards into the future (“Theses” 257-58). Ambedkar hoped, at about the same time, that the European angel of equality would heal an India split into fragments by caste (170).3 In the event, he found that the splinters of self-division riddled the wound of history, and a catastrophe called communalism kept blowing the nation backwards into the future.

     

    Figure 7: Paul Klee, Angelus Novus (1920)
    Source: The Israel Museum, Jerusalem

     

    Since stigma, like beauty, also resides in the eye of the beholder, Ambedkar asked for an education of the mind. He argued that to educate the ostracized would not suffice until those who did the ostracizing had been educated out of their prejudice. If the contemporary Dalit writer from Bombay has cause for anger, it is because that dream of Enlightenment gets ruined in the city of modernity. The Dalit acts as the social conscience, which demands that the city as a modern polity deliver its promise of freedom and equality.4 His aim shares a common cause with the Marxist ideal of a proletariat revolution, to which Benjamin lends some support. But the Dalit call for justice is redemptive, whereas Benjamin’s hope mixes the redemptive with the utopian. The Dalit frustration with redemptive justice brings their political struggle close to the despair of Benjamin’s theological preoccupations, in which history partakes of the decadence inherent to material nature, where even criticism is only the “mortification of the works” (Origin 182), and the aspiration to harmony and closure is appropriate only in the new Jerusalem.

     

    The City of Violence

     

    Benjamin’s allegorical treatment of the materiality of experience sharpens our sense of metropolitan experience as fragmented and discontinuous. But he also retains a vision of the coherence that ought to be gathered from its splinters. He does not know how this is to be done. To him, it is an intimation that does not deliver the promised disclosure. The lesson Bombay has to offer is that the one specific way adopted in recent history of realizing the city and its citizens as a totality has caused the vision of the city as a polity to suffer a brutal denudation. In the Bombay riots of December 1992 and January 1993, more than 700 people were killed by their fellow citizens, mostly by arson. Millions of dollars’ worth of property was destroyed. The economic productivity of the city was brought to a standstill. More than 60% of those killed were Muslims. They had either been victimized, or induced into counter-violence, by a right-wing Hindu party known as the Shiv Sena (Shivaji’s–or, the Lord Shiva’s–army). The police remained passive. The central government did not dare intervene.5

     

    Figure 8: Cartoon by Laxman
    (rpt. Padgaonkar 173)

     

    The city was appropriated on behalf of a narrow vision of recovered wholeness by the militant essentialism of Bombay’s Brown Shirts. The party was founded in 1966 by a man called Bal Thackeray, who had had a reasonably mediocre career until then as a cartoonist.

     

    Figure 9: A Victim of the Bombay Riots, December 1992
    Copyright © Times Relief Fund

     

    Bombay as a city has always been ethnically diverse, comprising, among the mercantile class, Gujaratis, Parsis, and Muslims, whereas the economically less productive middle-class has always been Marathi-speaking. It was the most industrialized city of India from as far back as the middle of the nineteenth century. It had metamorphosed from a textile-manufacturing center to a vastly diversified manufacturing economy, in which the incentive of economic benefit had acted as a disincentive for communal and religious friction.6 The Shiv Sena sought to control the hybridized entrepreneurial behavior of the city under the invocation of communalism. The 1960s had seen an influx from the southern states. That gave the Shiv Sena its first agenda: recover Bombay for the Marathi-speaking Maharashtrians. More recently, in the aftermath of Hindu-Muslim riots in the north of India, the Shiv Sena turned its attention towards the Muslims, who comprise about 15% of the city population. Benjamin had wished for a recuperation that was centered on the individual in a perspective that treated all experience, and especially metropolitan experience, as postlapsarian. The ideal served a function by showing a horizon beyond the limit of what is realizable in time or space. The recent history of violence in Bombay shows what happens when this dream of recuperation is dragged across that limit–it is realized as xenophobic intolerance. In his “Critique of Violence” (1920-21), Benjamin had said, “If justice is the criterion of ends, legality is that of means” (Selected I 237).

     

    Figure 10: Counting the Dead, Bombay (Worli), December 1992
    Copyright © Times Relief Fund

     

    The Shiv Sena has shown how illegal means applied to unjust ends can yet dissemble justification as justice by legitimizing force through communal sanctions. Its policies represent a form of aggressive retreat from the egalitarianism of opportunity practiced by capitalism, of which an industrial city like Bombay has been the primary conduit for the national economy. The logic of capitalist expansion had de-territorialized the city; the Shiv Sena re-territorialized it on sectarian principles, turning its back on the logic of industrial capital. Richard G. Fox adapts a Frankfurt School thesis–that the idea of progress has had a bittersweet history of disenchantment with modernity–in order to develop a multiple analogy for communalism based on the notion of “hyperenchantment,” which bears the same relation to modernity that hyperconsumption has to greed, and hypermanagement to bureaucracy.

     

    Communalism is the hyperenchantment of religion, racism is the hyperenchantment of biology, sexism is the hyperenchantment of gender, and ethnic prejudice is the hyperenchantment of culture. Each of these builds new forms of identity, allegiance, and loyalty that are formally inconsistent with modernity, but that are, in fact, its own creations. Each of…them creates social boundaries based on ascription rather than achievement, yet each of them sustains social orders (the family, the community) and occurs in institutional settings (the state, the workplace) ostensibly based on modernity. (239)

     

    Each of these generalizations has a double validity: for the forces at work in a city like Bombay, and for the Europe that was to disenchant Benjamin’s treatment of it as a civil society. In his death he acknowledged that he had written for a community that had failed to materialize. In its place arose an ashen phoenix. The same is true of Bombay. The city of India’s belated modernity showed how it could readily become the site of self-divisive violence. The political right appropriated the city for an aestheticised politics (Illuminations 241). The correspondences between Fascism and Asian varieties of fundamentalism are numerous, and all of them are ominous. If the conjunction between Benjamin and Bombay has any validity, it is in the troubled ambivalence with which each mediates this modernity. In each, the depredations and the opportunities of modernity are delicately poised between despair and hope, with nothing to alleviate the angel of history in its backward trajectory–into the future called progress–except the vigilance of critique.

     

    Notes

     

    1. For a reading that sees Benjamin in an altogether more sanguine spirit about Utopia and materials like glass and iron, see Heynen 95-118.

     

    2. “The crowd is his element, as the air is that of birds and water of fishes. His passion and his profession are to become one flesh with the crowd. For the perfect flâneur, for the passionate spectator, it is an immense joy to set up house in the heart of the multitude, amid the ebb and flow of movement, in the midst of the fugitive and the infinite. To be away from home and yet to feel oneself everywhere at home….” (Baudelaire 9).

     

    3. Cf. Ambedkar’s comments in his speech at Mahad in 1938: “If European nations enjoy peace and prosperity today, it is for one reason: the revolutionary French National Assembly convened in 1789 set new principles for the organization of society before the disorganized and decadent French nation of its time, and the same principles have been accepted and followed by Europe…. The road it marked out for the development of the French nation, the road that all progressed nations have followed, ought to be the road adopted for the development of Hindu society….” (qtd. in Dangle 225, 227).

     

    4. In an interview from 1984, Foucault has an interesting comment on the failure of nationalisms to deliver on the promise of modernity:

     

    When a colonized people attempts to liberate itself from its colonizers, this is indeed a practice of liberation in the strict sense. But we know very well, and moreover in this specific case, that this practice of liberation is not in itself sufficient to define the practices of freedom that will still be needed if this people, this society, and these individuals are to be able to define admissible and acceptable forms of existence or political society. (282-83)

     

    5 Cf. Padgaonkar 1 and passim.

     

    6 Cf. Chandavarkar 58.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Ambedkar, B.R. What Congress and Gandhi Have Done to the Untouchables. Bombay: Thacker, 1945.
    • Baudelaire, Charles. The Painter of Modern Life and Other Essays. Trans. Jonathan Mayne. New York: Phaidon, 1964.
    • Benjamin, Walter. Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet in the Era of High Capitalism. Trans. Harry Zohn. London and New York: Verso, 1973.
    • —. Illuminations: Essays and Reflections. Ed. Hannah Arendt. Trans. Harry Zohn. New York: Schocken, 1968.
    • —.”N [Re the Theory of Knowledge, Theory of Progress].” Trans. Leigh Hafrey and Richard Sieburth. Benjamin: Philosophy, History, Aesthetics. Ed. Gary Smith. Chicago and London: U of Chicago P, 1983. pp?
    • —. The Origin of German Tragic Drama. Trans. John Osborne. London: Verso, 1977.
    • —. Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, and Autobiographical Wntings. Ed. Peter Demetz. Trans. Edmund Jephcott. New York & London: Harcourt, 1978.
    • —. Selected Writings. Ed. Michael W. Jennings, Marcus Bullock, Howard Eiland, and Gary Smith. Trans. Rodney Livingstone. 2 vols. Cambridge: Belknap P of Harvard UP, 1997-99.
    • —. “Theses on the Philosophy of History.” Benjamin, Illuminations 253-64.
    • —. “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction.” Benjamin, Illuminations 217-51.
    • Brecht, Bertolt. Poems Part One 1913-1928. Ed. John Willett and Ralph Manheim. London: Eyre Methuen, 1976.
    • Chandavarkar, Rajnarayan. The Origins of Industrial Capitalism in India: Business Strategies and the Working Classes in Bombay, 1900-1940. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994.
    • Dangle, Arjun, ed. Poisoned Bread: Translations from Modern Marathi Dalit Literature. Bombay: Orient Longman, 1992.
    • Desai, Anita. Baumgartner’s Bombay. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1989.
    • Dwivedi, Sharada, and Rahul Mehrotra. Bombay: The Cities Within. Bombay: India Book House, 1995.
    • Foucault, Michel. “Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth.” The Essential Works of Michel Foucault, 1954-1984. Trans. Robert Hurley et al. Ed. Paul Rabinov. Vol. 2. New York: New Press, 1997.
    • Fox, Richard G. “Communalism and Modernity.” Contesting the Nation: Religion, Community, and the Politics of Democracy in India. Ed. David Ludden. Philadelphia: U of Pennsylvania P, 1996. 235-49.
    • Heynen, Hilde. Architecture and Modernity: A Critique. Cambridge, MA., and London: MIT P, 1999.
    • Mistry, Rohinton. Such a Long Journey. Calcutta: Rupa, 1991.
    • Naipaul, V.S. India: A Wounded Civilization. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979.
    • Nandy, Ashis. “An Intelligent Critic’s Guide to Indian Cinema.” The Savage Freud and Other Essays on Possible and Retrievable Selves. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1995. 196-236.
    • Padgaonkar, Dileep, ed. When Bombay Burned. New Delhi: UBS Publishers’ Distributors, 1993.
    • Patel, Sujata, and Alice Thorner, eds. Bombay: Mosaic of Modern Culture. New Delhi: Oxford UP, 1995.
    • Weber, Max. Selections in Translation. Ed. W.G. Runciman. Trans. Eric Matthews. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1978.