Category: Volume 20 – Number 1 – September 2009

  • Notes on Contributors

    Heidi R. Bean is Assistant Professor of English at Bridgewater State University. She is the co-editor of Poetry after Cultural Studies, an anthology of critical essays forthcoming from the University of Iowa Press. Her essays, reviews, and interviews related to the intersections of theater, performance, and poetry have appeared in Text and Performance Quarterly, Theatre Journal, The Iowa Review Web, and Cultural Critique. This essay is taken from her current project on the cultural politics of American poetic theater since the 1960s.

    Timothy Campbell teaches in the Department of Romance Studies at Cornell University. He is the author of Wireless Writing in the Age of Marconi (Minnesota, 2006) and Improper Life: Thanatopolitics and Technology from Heidegger to Agamben (Minnesota, 2011). In addition to his translations of Roberto Esposito’s Communitas: The Origin and Destiny of Community (Stanford, 2009) and Bios: Biopolitics and Philosophy (Minnesota, 2008), he is the co-editor along with Adam Sitze of The Biopolitical Reader (Duke, 2011).

    Laura Hinton is the author of a poetry book, Sisyphus My Love (To Record a Dream in a Bathtub) (BlazeVox Books), and a critical book, The Perverse Gaze of Sympathy: Sadomasochistic Sentiments from Clarissa to Rescue 911 (SUNY Press). She is the co-editor of We Who Love to Be Astonished: Experimental Women’s Writing and Performance Poetics (University of Alabama Press). Her critical essays, poet interviews, and reviews have appeared in Contemporary Literature, Postmodern Culture, Textual Practice, Framework, Women’s Studies, Rain Taxi, Jacket, The Journal of the Academy of American Poets, among other journals and collections. Her poetry has appeared in anthologies and journals including Feminist Studies, How2, and Nth Position, and she has edited several critical article collections for How2, one of which was on the writings of Leslie Scalapino.

    Hinton edits a chapbooks series for Mermaid Tenement Press and publishes reviews on the performance and hybrid arts in New York City on her web log, Chant de la Sirene (chantdelasirene.com). A Professor of English at the City College of New York, Professor Hinton teaches contemporary literature, film, and feminist theory, and also coordinates the InterRUPTions experimental-writers reading series.

    Nasser S. Hussain is a lecturer in English Literature in the Department of Cultural Studies at Leeds Metropolitan University, UK. He has published articles on performance poetry and contemporary poetics and is currently working on a book project about American travel literature and narratives of passing.

    Apple Zefelius Igrek teaches in the Philosophy Department at Seattle University. He has published essays on fiction, cultural theory, Georges Bataille and Michel Foucault. His work appears in such journals as Colloquy, the International Studies of Philosophy, and Comparative and Continental Philosophy (forthcoming, 2010). His current project is entitled “Thinking Through Walls and the Internalized Image in H.P. Lovecraft.”

    Alan Nadel, William T. Bryan Chair of American Literature and Culture at the University of Kentucky, is the author of four books, including Containment Culture (Duke University Press, 1995), Flatlining on the Field of Dreams: Cultural Narratives in the Films of President Reagan’s America (Rutgers University Press, 1997), and Television in Black-and-White America: Race and National Identity (University Press of Kansas, 2005). He is the editor of two books on August Wilson and the co-editor, with Susan Griffin, of Henry James and Alfred Hitchcock, the Men Who Knew Too Much (forthcoming from Oxford University Press). His poetry has appeared in several journals, among them: Georgia Review, New England Review, Paris Review, Partisan Review, and Shenandoah, and he has won prizes for the best essays in Modern Fiction Studies and PMLA.

    James Sherry is the author of more than 10 books of poetry and prose. His new manuscript, Sorry: Environmental Poetics, is forthcoming. He is the editor of Roof Books (www.roofbooks.com) and founder of the Segue Foundation (seguefoundation.com) that has produced more than 10,000 literary and other art events in the New York metropolitan area during the past 30 years.

    Michael D. Snediker is the author of Queer Optimism: Lyric Personhood and Other Felicitous Persuasions (U Minnesota Press, 2008). He is currently at work on a new book, “The Aesthetics of Disability: American Literature and Figurative Contingency.” He is Assistant Professor of American Literature at Queen’s University, in Kingston, Ontario.

    Karinne Keithley Syers is a writer, performer, sound artist, and graduate student in English at the CUNY Graduate Center. In addition to creating her own work, she has performed with David Neumann, Young Jean Lee, Chris Yon, and Sara Smith. She has written about Nature Theater of Oklahoma for Theater Magazine, and is the founder of the 53rd State Press, which publishes new performance writing.

    Christophe Wall-Romana is assistant professor in the Department of French and Italian at the University of Minnesota. He is the author of Cinepoetry: Imaginary Cinemas in French Poetry 1890-2008 (Fordham University Press, forthcoming 2011), and Jean Epstein (Manchester University Press, forthcoming 2011), and recently edited a special issue of the journal L’Esprit créateur on new approaches to contemporary poetry in French. His next project investigates the place of mobile perspective, pre-cinema and cinema, in works of philosophy and literature.

  • Cross-Media Criticism: Postwar American Poetry-With-Cinema

    Christophe Wall-Romana (bio)
    University of Minnesota
    wallr007@umn.edu

    Review of: Daniel Kane, We Saw The Light: Conversations Between The New American Cinema and Poetry. Iowa City: Iowa UP, 2009.

     

     
    Kane’s book partakes of the renewed interest in contemporary humanities for the study of cross-medium exchanges, particularly involving literature, pioneered in the 1970s and somewhat marginalized by the massive turn to language, semiotics, cultural codes and discourse analysis that occupied much of the literary humanities in the 1980s and 90s. We will return to what Kane makes of this further on. Within this new cross-disciplinary field focusing on exchanges between various mediums, poetry and cinema have been especially probed for two significant and interrelated reasons. First, they both share in today’s digital smorgasbord the unenviable distinction of being, or at least seeming obsolescent, in comparison to narrative on the one hand, and post-analog moving image media on the other. At the same time, recent scholarship has shown that poets and filmmakers were at the very core of the vanguard of 20th-century cross-medium practices, which they often theorized as well (as in the work of Susan McCabe, David Trotter, Laura Marcus, and Wall-Romana). Hence, relations between poetry and cinema offer a paradigmatic and relatively bookended span of cross-medium practices that pioneered and, in crucial ways, remain subjacent to and resonant within current interdisciplinary humanities, including new media studies. Such early experiments also explain why studies in the relation of poetry and cinema have tended to concentrate on interwar modernism.
     
    Kane’s aim is in part to complicate this archaeological argument by pointedly ending the book on very recent collaborations between poets and filmmakers: John Ashbery and Rudy Burkhardt; Lisa Jarnot and Jennifer Reeves. More broadly, the book provides a careful revision and innovative exploration of the crisscrossing historiography of the new experimental cinema and new poetry movements (particularly those showcased by Donald Allen in his anthology, The New American Poetry) which took place in the US between the 1950s and 70s.
     
    After describing how postwar filmmakers such as Deren, Mekas, and Markopoulos#relied on poetry as a non-narrative model, both as a general framework for their films and by writing poems themselves, Kane sets up in subsequent chapters a series of pairings of one or several poets with one or several filmmakers: Robert Duncan and Kenneth Anger (chapter 2); Robert Creeley and Stan Brakhage (Chapter 3); Frank O’Hara and Alfred Leslie (Chapter 4); Allen Ginsberg and Robert Frank (with Charlie Chaplin, Chapter 5); Andy Warhol, Gerard Malaga, Allen Ginsberg, John Ashbery and Frank O’Hara (Chapter 6); John Ashbery and Rudy Burkhardt (Chapter 7). This original organization allows Kane to provide joint close readings of specific films and poems and/or poetry collections, and provides illuminating new interpretations of works such as Creeley’s Pieces, Burkhardt’s The Last Clean Shirt, Frank’s Me and My Brother (on Peter Orlovsky and his brother Julius, and of course Ginsberg). Kane couches such joint readings as “conversations,” to suggest we might recover from them as comparably rich and lively exchanges as those from his live conversation with Jarnot and Reeves transcribed in the concluding chapter.
     
    The starting point of We Saw The Light is Kane’s painstakingly documented and convincing sense that, “to a surprising extent, film informed the content and form of much of the postwar American poetic avant-garde” (27). The surprise here is at least threefold, since it concerns first the breadth and depth of cinema’s influence on poetry, second its being overlooked by poetry scholars working until recently within more confining disciplinary purviews, and third, the fact that—contrary to other cases in various cultural areas and times—it is experimental rather than mainstream cinema that most deeply imprinted itself on the new poetry. Kane’s archival recovery of the social and spatial networks that explain how experimental cinema permeated the new American poetry, and his talent for reenacting them in elegant and critical writing are the most valuable aspects of the book. Not only do we get a sense of how local scenes (mostly in underground New York, San Francisco and Los Angeles) shaped cross-genre productions according to a Bourdieu-like logic of a force-field of ideas rather than individual innovation, but we witness the transversal exchanges in which, say, Brakhage met Anger at the home of poet Duncan (and that of his partner, the painter Jess) [52], or Ginsberg and Ashbery meet up on the celluloid of Warhol’s Screen Tests (153). We are not dealing simply with filmic notions migrating to poetry or vice versa, but with a complex aesthetic and sociopolitical circulation involving poets, filmmakers and other artists such as painters and musicians (who are not the primary focus of the book). With other recent works such as Liz Kotz’s Words To Be Looked At (MIT P, 2007), Kane’s book will contribute to renewing and deepening the focus on cross-media exchanges in American art and literature of the 1960s.
     
    Before engaging with some of Kane’s arguments, which in my view he deploys problematically, it is worth giving some idea of the challenges coming from various horizons that face works such as his. Based on archival research, framed historically, analyzing sets of unknown or lesser known works from different disciplines, while offering detailed descriptions and/or citations of many works, such truly interdisciplinary studies often run the risk of being ignored by scholars in either of the two (or more) disciplines they tackle, and seeming too narrow or specialized to a broader academic audience. On the publishing side, highly focused monographs appear to have a diminishing appeal in spite of their trailblazing transdisciplinary criticism. Methodologically, transdisciplinary endeavors must find ways to negotiate the standards and practices of two (or more) fields, in the hope of doing each a modicum of justice, and must develop critical approaches that go beyond their respective limitations. Kane’s book does an excellent job at providing a thick description of the various underground nodes of the 50s and 60s—so precise indeed that it persuasively accounts for the fact that cross-pollination first took place between this and that poet and filmmaker. As to the challenge of publishing, my sense that each chapter comes to a close too quickly, sacrificing the development of some of the book’s stated theses and hypotheses, might result from strictures put on by the publisher, although it might also be due to an overall conception that came a little short. With this caveat, I emphasize that my scholarly sympathies lay squarely with Kane’s ambitious and immensely useful enterprise and that the shortcomings of his book may well be endemic to the pressures put on transdisciplinary work in the humanities today.
     
    Kane’s central argument, that the constitutive role of experimental cinema in the new American poetry has been overlooked by scholarship, is couched polemically:
     

    In a larger sense, analyzing the conversation between film and poetry has led me to wonder if the academy’s dominant use of poststructuralist and postmodern theoretical/interpretive frameworks for innovative postwar art ends up freezing out, ignoring, or at times critiquing unfairly any number of productive sources—hermetic, heroic, mystically macho, religiously inspired—that were crucial to the creation of the various films and poems considered here. To use postmodern interpretative paradigms (particularly as they are linked up with feminist and queer studies to form a progressive triumvirate that more generally celebrates the decentered, denatured self as an ever-evolving site of freedom) results in the reader’s missing out on much of what makes the poetry and film I discuss here so fascinating.
     

    (3)

     

    As a parenthesis, let me say first that despite the alarming targeting of “feminist and queer studies” on behalf of “mystically macho” poets, Kane’s monograph is in point of fact both feminist and queer. He examines, for instance, with great precision the horrendously sexist treatment of Maya Deren by Arthur Miller and Dylan Thomas (13-17), and much of the “mystically macho” sensibility he foregrounds and celebrates comes from gay poets, who form the overwhelming majority of the poets he examines. The problem is not unreconstructed phallogocentrism at all, but indeed why he chooses as a polemical gambit to attack “postmodern interpretive paradigms,” ostensibly in favor of another interpretive horizon—”hermetic, heroic, mystically macho, religiously inspired.” For while assailing “poststructuralist and postmodern theoretical/interpretive frameworks,” Kane’s readings conclude by and large right smack within the vulgate of poststructuralism “that more generally celebrates the decentered, denatured self as an ever-evolving site of freedom.” The last sentence of the last chapter (on Burkhardt’s film about Ashbery’s poem “Ostensibly”), prior to the transcribed interview with Lisa Jarnot and Jennifer Reeves that forms the Conclusion, reads:

     

    The conversation between film and poem takes us further out “Towards one’s space and time,” where both the poem and film urge us to confront our responsibility as interpreters and encourage us to enjoy the process of imagining “so many separate ways of doing.”
     

    (190)

     

    If that’s not a celebration of “decentered” subjectivity and “ever-evolving” freedom of interpretation, what is? Kane’s concluding statement is not a coda that might have been inserted at the behest of a worried editor: it is the crux of his readings in every chapter. Hence chapter 6 on Warhol, Malanga, Ginsberg, Ashbery, and O’Hara ends with the assessment that, “By the late 1960s, the way forward seemed to be an ever more playful, sexually polymorphous, and decentered aesthetic” (163). Also in that chapter, Kane glosses Warhol’s Screen Tests (1965) as “a practically minimalist approach to manifesting the failure of static art to embody presence” (158), the very same target as Jacques Derrida’s critique of presence in philosophy around the same time. Kane even appears to use poststructuralist jargon pointedly when he writes: “Ashbery in his screen test is practically a free-floating signifier” whose poetic persona is “consistently constructed and deconstructed” (155-6). Summarizing his chapter on Allan Ginsberg and Robert Frank, Kane writes that both artists aimed to counter “essentializing moves that would seek to use the discourses of ‘truth’ to impose normative readings of sexuality, family, power” (147). This is straight out of Irigaray or Butler. To take a last example, early on in the book, Kane considers that the key idea for a Robert Duncan poem from Bending the Bow on and around Kenneth Anger’s Fireworks was Anger’s filmic practice of “‘integrality,’ a state in which binaries are reconciled and ultimately synthesized” (34). This Hegelian notion coming out of German Idealism informs both the thought of much poststructuralism that transformed it (Georges Bataille, Derrida, or Gilles Deleuze) and that of the 20th-century avant-gardes, from Breton’s theory of Surrealism in the second manifesto to Peter Bürger’s Theory of the Avant-Garde predicated on the reconciling of life and art.

     
    So what is going on? Kane is not an ironist and although his characterization of poststructuralism is rather hasty, I don’t believe he is unaware that his arguments feed its mill. The problem, in the end, is that the major premise and promise of the book, i.e., “that the material considered here is telling us that much of what we consider to be first-generation postmodern art is grounded in a practically visionary tradition” (4), remains quite sketchy. The telling never becomes a tale. What is the visionary tradition and in what ways could criticism based on it alter the current paradigms of postwar modernist studies? I waited in vain for the case to be built, while keeping in mind Kane’s strong rejection of the current “aggressively secular interpretive approach” (4) of the work of Anger, Brakhage, Creeley and Duncan. We would expect that such a stringent rejection would lead him to shore up his point with many sources: puzzlingly Kane mentions very few such works, and most notably he omits Peter O’Leary’s Gnostic Contagion (Wesleyan 2002), which investigates Robert Duncan’s derivative ties to and conversations with a variety of mystical sources. Kane does engage sporadically with the visionary dimension of his material, particularly with regard to the importance of queer ritual for Anger and Duncan in a context of police repression of queer films in pre-Stonewall New York, or Frank’s film on Ginsberg and Julius Orlovsky’s treatment in psychiatric hospitals. But again, his conclusions either fall in line with the poststructuralist framework they were meant to displace or else merely gesture towards the visionary. Hence Kane’s conclusion of Chapter 2 that “Duncan used the Passages series in an effort to effect, if not successfully or finally, something we can call transcendence” (50), will seem glib to readers who have grappled with Duncan’s multi-faceted poetics anchored in derivation, myth, the sacred, “magick,” modernist history, the figure of H.D., queer militancy, Whitmanian intersubjectivity, linguistics, French poetry, etc. What transcendence might Kane be referring to? The godhead? A sense of the divine? A turn away from immanence? The invisible?
     
    We are left to gather the few clues of what Kane means by “visionary tradition” (as distinct from P. Adams Sitney’s understanding of the term in his Visionary Film: The American Avant-Garde, 1942-2000), which we might reconstruct as follows. First, he understands “revelation” in the sense of physical immediacy (Brakhage’s Two: Creeley/McClure “reflect[s] their practically physiological poetics” [70]) and non-logical thought (“the act of viewing was in the service of revelation independent of reason” [77]). Both point to contingence, corporeality and experience, of which transcendence is usually considered the opposite. Likely because of Brakhage’s allergy to so-called structuralist cinema and postmodern aesthetics (63-4, 79), Kane shies away from using thinkers such as Georges Bataille and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who might have helped to better frame his interesting views on this poetics of corporeal revelation and artistic immediacy. Indeed, Kane’s skillful and exacting analyses of seriality, materiality, and mobility between various perceptual positions (rather than a theoretical ‘subject position’) in Duncan and Creeley’s poems, would seem to warrant some thinking about the foregrounding of sensation in cognition, perhaps as directly informing the “essentially mystical understanding of serial form” (77) he recognizes in both poets. This could also help account for the importance of what he rightly terms the “extreme realism” (38) in Brakhage and Creeley, but which he does not attempt to reconcile with transcendental aspiration. Kane emphasizes the reconciling of opposites in the first part of the book (34, 73), on an axis implicitly linking Coleridge to Jung, but this is replaced in the second part by the foregrounding of mediation and media, particularly in Ginsberg’s shift from an inner prophetic to an outer cultural dictation, and in the ways Warhol, Ashbery and Burkhardt play with the gap between filmic and linguistic representation in the production of meaning. Hence by his own account, Kane appears to reconstruct a progressive shift (if not a continuum) rather than an opposition between revelatory and “postmodern” frameworks.
     
    Take away these two hazards (but also potential rewards) of cross-disciplinary research—polemical bent and theoretical thrust—and what remains is a sharply investigative and very well written book that insightfully proposes new foci for the study of poetry and its relations to cinema from the 1950s onward that may be summarized as follows: conversations and collaborations among poets, and between them and filmmakers, were essential to and cannot be left out of accounts of contemporary poetry; mystical stances among postwar poets and filmmakers must not be sidelined to fit extant modernist models, although the work remains to be done to see how exactly they may alter or inflect these models; gay poets were very active in seeking in both cinema and visionary sources original inspiration for a new poetry reflecting their sexuality and sociality; central notions of poetry studies such as inventiveness, aesthetic pleasure, materiality/immateriality, address, and social/technological autonomy were significantly transfigured by the interactions Kane describes.
     
    Two snippets from the book give a sense of Kane’s elegant critical voice, which made his book a pleasure to read. The first is about viewing Alfred Leslie’s The Last Clean Shirt:
     

    Emphasizing the ethical nature of the film, the final intertitle we read before the second repetition of the car journey reads, “It’s the nature of us all to want to be unconnected.” Yes, we want to be unconnected—free—but the film has already begun to suggest, however lightly and humorously, that perhaps we resist that part of our nature in an effort to be connected members of a community, one which delights in the possibilities of urbane love, laughter, and a casual interracial accord.
     

    (102)

     

    The second is in the chapter on Duncan:

     

    As Duncan conceived of words as a kind of hieroglyphics (in evidence especially in his extensive use of puns), so film too contains within it a hidden language that can potentially be unlocked by the enchanted poet.
     

    (31)

     

    These excerpts show the remarkable range of Kane’s critical ken: from the measured unpacking of an intertitle in a film from 1964 in the context of the Civil Rights movement, to a trenchant reading of Duncan’s punning as directly spliced to the notion of cinema as language—but rather than the old cliché of this language being universal and explicit, it is an esoteric and potential language. Despite its shortcomings, Kane’s is a must-read book for anyone interested in the cross-pollination of poetry and cinema in the 1960s American underground.

     

    Christophe Wall-Romana is assistant professor in the Department of French and Italian at the University of Minnesota. He is the author of Cinepoetry: Imaginary Cinemas in French Poetry 1890-2008 (Fordham University Press, forthcoming 2011), and Jean Epstein (Manchester University Press, forthcoming 2011), and recently edited a special issue of the journal L’Esprit créateur on new approaches to contemporary poetry in French. His next project investigates the place of mobile perspective, pre-cinema and cinema, in works of philosophy and literature.
     

  • Feeling Well

    Michael D. Snediker (bio)
    Queen’s University
    snediker@queensu.ca

    Review of: Sara Ahmed, The Promise of Happiness. Durham: Duke UP, 2010.

    It strikes me as both salubrious and unsurprising that after several decades of theorizing negative affect, melancholy, and trauma, the academy has turned its attention to the likes of positive affect, happiness, and optimism. As I’ve argued elsewhere, happiness and optimism are neither equivalent nor coextensive, but at very least metonymically equivocate around each other’s edges. Recent inquiries into happiness have engaged the latter’s capacity for fungibility and surprise. Often, theorists attached to a rictus model of happiness’s intractability argue for the latter’s ideological perniciousness. For instance, Heather Love has recently intimated that happiness arises as an ontologically risky threshold, the crossing of which threatens the integrity (or more precisely, the weathered lack thereof) of queer persons for whom disappointment and grief had hitherto been constitutive.

    That arguments for or against happiness arise most provocatively in the field of queer theory suggests that queer persons bear an acutely salient relation to happiness as that from which they’ve been excluded, but furthermore, that they bear an exemplary relation to a happiness always requiring sacrifice and compromise, a shady bittersweetness from which no persons are exempt. As Lauren Berlant has noted, “at a certain degree of abstraction both from trauma and optimism the sensual experience of self-dissolution, radically reshaped consciousness, new sensoria, and narrative rupture can look similar” (46). The trauma of happiness resonates all the more acutely in Heather Love’s supposition that “sometimes it seems that the only way for queers to start being happy is to stop being queers” (62). For Love (and implicitly, for Berlant), happiness’s brutality resides in its truculent, incessant demand against being what one otherwise was, even as one flutters, mothlike, to happiness’ ideologically incinerating flame. Love suggests that happiness is non-malleable, that it will be what it always has been; and this perdurability adumbrates the implication that queer persons are far more malleable than the affective desires and constraints by which they are held, seduced, betrayed. Happiness’ danger, then, would depend on happiness existing in advance as a repertoire of what we from outset ought have been wary.

    By contrast, theorists who consider happiness in terms of contingency rather than unrevisable dictum have suggested that one may well enjoy happiness, and even survive happiness, if one is willing to entertain the possibility of a happiness not already imbued with the penal inexorability of ideology. Nietzsche is a case in point: “To finally take all this in one soul and compress it into one feeling—this would surely have to produce a happiness unknown to humanity so far” (190). Or a few pages later in The Gay Science: “Are we perhaps still not too influenced by the most immediate consequences of this event—and these immediate consequences, the consequences for ourselves, are the opposite of what one might expect—not at all sad and gloomy, but much more like a new and barely describable type of light, happiness, relief, amusement, encouragement, dawn . . . ” (199). Following Nietzsche, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s A Dialogue on Love insists that when “the truth comes to you, / you recognize it because / it makes you happy” (207). Sedgwick’s formulation differs starkly from Love’s, to the extent that happiness might (like queerness) only be known in the discovery of it, versus the moribund sense that happiness, as a sort of Lacanian Symbolic, inexorably awaits one’s falling into it. Sara Ahmed’s most recent work argues that one need not choose, in relation to one’s self, either an inexorable happiness or a capricious, contingent one. Rather, Ahmed importantly resituates affective phenomenology as the tension between the inexorable and the capricious, allowing both phenomena to coincide, but nevertheless insisting, even in the severe spider-web of affective ideology, that there are modes of navigation, molecules of surviving happiness, that don’t require one’s queerness, one’s prior ontological commitments, be left at normativity’s (sometimes) perversely alluring altar.

    Ahmed’s pellucid new book pivots on the ubiquitous and overdetermined formulation, “I just want you to be happy.” The familiarity of the utterance only sometimes mitigates its latent perfidia. Less operatically: the utterance’s wish only barely conceals its sometimes brazen ulterior motives, shaped by cultural and political histories in excess of what otherwise might be understood as the idiosyncratic contours of solitary affective reception. Individual happiness, following Ahmed’s careful analysis, isn’t fictive. Its individuality nonetheless clings to and is snagged by larger affective narratives of which it either is willfully oblivious or from which strategically it is sequestered. The Promise of Happiness, with great dexterity and compassion, delineates the cling and snag of this ostensibly innocuous wish.

    I just want you to be happy. Ahmed rightly locates the formulation’s punctum in just, an adverbial indulgence masquerading as diffidence. I just want: conflation of a desire so modest that it might otherwise not be articulated; so severely singular that it might be conceived as a cause, if not the cause, worth fighting for; so abstemious that we might give pause to so nearly a gesture of affective unidirectionality. As though the desire for another’s happiness were so great (and likewise so austere) that other desires, on the part of the speaker, were consolidated into this vitiated narcissism of mimetic felicity. As though in wishing the happiness of another (as opposed to the more Gallic desire of the Other), one’s own happiness or desire or wish were swept out to sea.

    I just: a first person singular on the verge of both itself and the just, as though happiness were invariably, syntactically aligned with simultaneous conceits of self-renunciation and justice (if not ethics). The diminution of “just,” read as “only,” conceals the extent to which I just want you to be happy already circuits through a language of larger juridical pressure. By what are we allowed to feel happy? What is at stake in choosing one form of happiness over another? That there are stakes at all beyond being or not being happy—beyond what one is willing to do for the sake of happiness—intimates the textural complexity of Ahmed’s affective terrain. In querying the very terms by which we approach, contemplate, or refuse happiness, we become Antigone figures. If happiness is synonymous with the Symbolic order from which Antigone drops, then this new distance from happiness makes of us what Ahmed terms “affect aliens.” Alienated from what we might be expected to want (or even want to want), we find ourselves living extradiegetically and diegetically at once. We may or may not feel happy, even as we are interested in the phenomenon of happiness. As happiness shifts in our alineated consideration of it (imagine Maggie Verver’s hand against the beautiful and impenetrable pagoda), unhappiness likewise becomes differently inhabitable. Unhappiness, affectively speaking, becomes less a dominion of grief or disappointment, than the literal experience of being unmoored from happiness; and, as Ahmed illuminates, from the disciplining apparatus by which (even when best-intentioned) happiness is constituted.

    There are many forms of happiness, and as many micro-affective events as there are fundamental-feeling affective horizons. There likewise are many forms of affective horizoning. “Happiness,” Ahmed observes, “might play a crucial role in shaping our near sphere, the world that takes shape around us” (24). In the model of a “near sphere”—as ever, Ahmed’s capacity to envision affect is as vivid, meticulous, and surprising as that of Emily Dickinson—a horizon holds what we do not wish to hold, a hazy landscape of “awayness,” (24) safely, aesthetically keeping from us the things that do not make us happy. To the extent that happiness (despite manifold efforts to the contrary) can be quantified, indexed, experienced only through obliqueness and metonymy, it—like all affects—remains an elusive abstraction. As abstractions, those things that make or do not make us unhappy are barely distinguishable (if at all) from those things we think might make or not make us unhappy. What makes us happy does so because we think it does. Even as we can be happily surprised by an object we previously had thought would not make us happy, an object cannot make us happy if we think it does not. It is partly this interlineation of feeling and intellection that produces affect’s particular temporal conundra—such that Ahmed can imagine an affective relation (happy or unhappy) to an experienced past as structurally analogous to a futural affect about which we can speculate, but haven’t yet encountered. “Nostalgic and promissory forms of happiness belong under the same horizon, insofar as they imagine happiness as being somewhere other than where we are in the present” (160-161).

    Contrary to the horizon of unhappy awayness, this horizonality marks happiness at its most tenacious, in so far as “when happiness is present, it can recede, becoming anxious, becoming the thing that we could lose in the unfolding of time” (161). The near-sphere thus demarcates both the happy objects we’ve cultivated in our vicinity and the unhappy objects which entropically cramp what we imagine as some preferred but distant affective style. The horizon likewise expresses both what we’ve relegated and what, either nostalgically or promissorily, we love (or, again, think we love). We navigate this multiplicity of horizons and nearnesses without realizing it. One horizon seldom countervails the other, even as one horizon might be confused with another one—for instance, as the narrative goes, we intransigently delay and deny what we think will bring unhappiness, when in fact these protests might betray the risky necessity of a happiness so great it can’t yet be reckoned as such. Either too near or too far, affective lucidity requires a keen relation to time and space, even as these latter categories almost never are themselves affectively neutral.

    We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. In her chapter “Melancholic Migrants” (more to follow on Ahmed’s brilliant exploration of melancholy’s interpersonal valences), Ahmed considers the ideology of happiness that complicates and distorts imperialism’s subtle and non-subtle violences against migrants and colonial subjects. Ahmed, in this context, invokes Eric Stoke’s notion of “secular evangelism.” The latter formulation would describe the duplicitous zeal and dubious imperial investments in “giving” non-imperial subjects a life that is better or happier than that preceding the unhappy travails of conquest, assimilation, and multiculturalism. The Promise of Happiness suggests, more generally, that the imbrication of happiness and governance imperils persons no less than past and present theocratic agenda. Needless to say, the Declaration of Independence fosters as many forms of dependence and conditionality as it does independent agency. And we hardly need a twenty-first century optic to feel misgiving toward the self-evidence of any foundational truth. If the Declaration of Independence inadvertently converts happiness itself into a quasi-religious enterprise, then it likewise ominously prognosticates the forms of excommunication experienced by Ahmed’s “affect aliens”—”those who are banished from [happiness], or who enter history only as troublemakers, dissenters, killers of joy” (17).

    The subjects (and titles) of the book’s middle chapters—”Feminist Killjoys,” “Unhappy Queers,” and “Melancholy Migrants”— deceptively suggest discrete taxonomy when in fact these demographics, as Ahmed makes clear, are heuristic placeholders. These categories hypostatically rise and fall for the sake of describing happiness’s discontents from different vantages. The hypostases, that is, might seem fixed from the perspective of an epistemically happy regime; whereas in Ahmed’s readings, the hypostases are saponifying. Ontological positions are unstable in part because affective responses to objects, others, and one’s self are nothing if not quicksilver. Even the least tractable-seeming affective situations prove to have crevices, qualities of light, differently bearable valence structures.

    Ahmed’s exempla, while presented as an archive, more interestingly serve as occasions for the analyses of one of our most generous and insightful affect theorists. At this point I feel like Randall Jarrell waxing ebullient over the poetry of Marianne Moore. Moore’s punctilious, winsome poems thrill Jarrell to the extent that Jarrell is inclined in his review of the former merely to list his favorite formulations from Moore’s collection. Ahmed’s writing, at its most insightful, analogously leaves me happy in ways that feel neither tautological (in the context of a book titled The Promise of Happiness) nor counterintuitive (in the context of a book that critiques a politico-cultural system that affectively evaluates our decisions and cathexes in advance of our making them). In “Feminist Killjoys,” for instance, we find the following observation, no less sentient for its quasi-mathematical precision:

    because I experience happiness in your happiness, I could wish that our feeling of fellowship in happiness amounts to being happy about the same things (a community of happiness), such that x becomes shared as a happiness wish. Of course, if the object that makes you happy is my happiness wish, then this would be precarious basis for sharing something (as wishing to be happy about x can also be an admission that one is not simply happy about x). (57)

    In “Melancholic Migrants,” Ahmed’s reading of melancholy as external assessment seems as powerful as Butler’s earlier reading of melancholy as internal structure:

    Rather than assuming others are melancholic because they failed to let go of an object that has been lost, I want to consider melancholia as a way of reading or diagnosing others as having “lost something,” and as failing to let go of what has been lost. To read others as melancholic would be to read their attachments as death-wishes, as attachments to things that are already dead. To diagnose melancholia would become a way of declaring that their love objects are dead. Others would be judged as melancholic because they have failed to give up on objects that we have declared dead on their behalf. The diagnosis of melancholia would thus involve an ethical injunction or moral duty: the other must let go by declaring the objects that we declare dead as being dead in the way that we declare. (141)

    As the above passage implies, it would be erroneous to imagine The Promise of Happiness, when it admonishes our too quickly acquiescing to certain happiness narratives, as eschewing positive affect for the sake of what elsewhere I’ve imagined as a constellation of pessimistic inquiry. Rather, Ahmed is enough interested in happiness to wish to salvage good feeling from what sometimes passes as good feeling. The promise of The Promise of Happiness is that there are in fact forms of happiness beyond those we presently trust and mistrust. This promissory thinking occurs in both horizon and near-sphere, as variously as Ahmed’s affective geography is various. Perhaps most gratifying, The Promise of Happiness promises not only that we might differently theorize happiness, but that we might wish to be happy, without feeling theoretically unhappy in the wishing.

    Michael D. Snediker is the author of Queer Optimism: Lyric Personhood and Other Felicitous Persuasions (U Minnesota Press, 2008). He is currently at work on a new book, “The Aesthetics of Disability: American Literature and Figurative Contingency.” He is Assistant Professor of American Literature at Queen’s University, in Kingston, Ontario.
     

    Works Cited

       

    • Berlant, Lauren. “Cruel Optimism: On Marx, Loss and the Senses.” New Formations: A Journal of Culture/Theory/Politics 63 (2007-2008): 33-51. Web. 27 Oct. 2010.
    • Jarrell, Randall. Poetry and the Age. London: Faber & Faber Limited, 1955. Print.
    • Love, Heather. “Compulsory Happiness and Queer Existence.” New Formations: A Journal of Culture/Theory/Politics 63 (2007-2008): 52-64. Web. 27 Oct. 2010.
    • Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Gay Science: with a prelude in German rhymes and an appendix of songs. Ed. Bernard Williams. Trans. Josefine Nauckhoff and Adrian Del Caro. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001. Print.
    • Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky. A Dialogue on Love. Boston: Beacon Press, 1999. Print.
    •  

  • Terror, Representation, and Postmodern Lessons in Hitler Studies

    Alan Nadel (bio)
    University of Kentucky
    amnade2@email.uky.edu

    Review of: Karen Engle, Seeing Ghosts: 9/11 and the Visual Imagination. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queens UP, 2009. Print.

    Jeffrey Melnick, 9/11 Culture. West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. Print.

    Marc Redfield, The Rhetoric of Terror: Reflections on 9/11 and the War on Terror. New York: Fordham UP, 2009. Print.

    Phillip E. Wegner, Life between Two Deaths, 1989-2001: U.S. Culture in the Long Nineties. Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2009. Print.

     

     
    Hapless Jack Gladney seems to have wandered into the postmodern world of Don DeLillo’s White Noise directly out a David Lodge novel. The chair of a Department of Hitler Studies in a small Midwestern college, Gladney feels an obligation to remain neutral about Hitler (a position in part facilitated by Gladney’s inability to read German). What makes Gladney a man ahead of his time is DeLillo’s reliance on the fact that “Hitler Studies” is painfully anachronistic, a point illustrated by the way the term “Nazi” seems to have lost its intellectual content. “Nazism: Hitler Studies:: Poststructuralism: Postmodernism” might be the answer to a hypothetical SAT question, but in what year? In 1934, before SAT questions or postmodernism existed? In a non-existent future, after the moment when Hitler Studies will have had emerged as an institutionalized option of the liberal education? Is Nazism the nexus of a potentially renewable intellectual engine, we are forced to ask, or simply a leveling pejorative, the relic of a bygone moment (except in the Vatican) when the word signified—as does today the word Republican (or Democrat, Tory, Liberal, or Socialist)—a viable political movement with issues and agendas? The problem of Hitler Studies, both for Gladney and for DeLillo’s readers, is to construct an imaginary space wherein Hitler Studies attributes to an academic field a vitality and a legitimacy that it denies to Hitler himself. Constructing this space fissures the seam where imagining is cemented to conceiving, for we can certainly imagine Hitler Studies by applying paradigms from other “interdisciplinary” academic programs: conferences and journals clustered around loci of mystery and controversy, requirements of the major, curricula that partition and redistribute privileged topics along temporal, geographic or disciplinary axes (e.g., “Hitler’s Art and Nazi Aesthetics,” “Hitler’s Rhetoric,” “Hitler and Globalization,” “The Semiotics of the Hitlerian,” “The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich,” etc.).
     
    What is so discomforting—in both the best and worst sense of that word—about the plethora of writing on “9/11” is that it evokes the same contradictions as does the (fictive) world containing a place for Hitler Studies. Can we study the event of 9/11 with Jack Gladney’s intellectual and ethical distance, and if not, can we be said to be “studying” it—as opposed to invoking, or denouncing, or mourning, or memorializing it—at all? All four of the books at hand evoke this question, and even more so in conjunction. Jeffrey Melnick (9/11 Culture), treating the destruction of the twin towers and the panoply of its cultural fallout as a series of questions, comes closest to Jack Gladney’s objectivity. Philip E. Wegner (Life between Two Deaths, 1989-2001) resembles Gladney as cultural historian, and Marc Redfield (The Rhetoric of Terror) manifests Gladney’s philosophical doubt. Karen Engle (Seeing Ghosts) resembles Gladney’s haunted aspect in his uncertainty about how to interpret signs and meanings, how to distinguish in his own perceptions between the visionary and the hallucinatory, and in his own conclusions between insight and paranoia. Melnick raises better questions, to be sure, than Gladney, and Wegner is a much better cultural historian. Redfield and Engle, similarly, are more genuinely philosophical than Gladney, and both are a hell of a lot smarter. All four authors, moreover—like those who try to ward off misfortunes by imagining that they are about to occur—express awareness of their awkward positionality in relation to their topic. But it is still hard to shake off the disquieting concern that all these books exist in, or at least are haunted by, the hypothetical space of Hitler Studies, since the very act of imagining Hitler Studies makes its actuality inconceivable.
     
    Herein, we enter an ontological loop where the inconceivability of Hitler Studies is as absolute as is the reality of Hitler’s actions. How is this possible? Or to put it another way, if imagining a Department of Hitler Studies in some way makes the question of Hitler academic and so distances Hitler from reality somehow, is there an ethical dilemma in reducing Hitler to pure simulacrum, or an epistemological dilemma in knowing him only as a representation? At the same time, given that the past does not exist, all we ever know of it are representations: records, photographs, memories, written accounts, relics. In that regard, the emergence of Hitler Studies claims a futurity from the perspective of which our current absurdities merge with our past horrors, and we become the captives of the events we are trying to capture.
     
    Thus history is always captivating, regardless of the terms of that captivity. This insight implicitly connects Redfield, Melnick, Engle, and Wegner, all captives in one way or another of the phenomena clustered around the term “9/11,” for, as Redfield explains, “very quickly the name-date became a slogan, a blank little scar around which nationalist energies could be marshaled” (1). The authors, linked by the illusiveness of that ambiguous name-date, often invoke Derrida to help explain its slippery logistics. “Derrida tells us that mourning and memory are inextricably tied to the proper name” (39), Engle explains in an attempt to analyze the photo image named Falling Man, a figure that in its namelessness she sees as a metonym for the whole 9/11 event: “The work of mourning—for this man, for this day—is permanently disrupted by the impossibility of recognition, the failed identification of the victim. This failure cannot be overemphasized, for it is through this failure that the profundity of Falling Man‘s iconicity begins to emerge” (39).
     
    The failure of the visual, furthermore, complements a failure of the verbal, as Melnick shows in his chapter on the rumors that simultaneously infuse and bracket the event. These rumors interweave, creating a vast non-fabric of threads tugged in every direction: Arabs in a Detroit (or was it Bakersfield?) restaurant cheered when the towers went down, BUT the Jews working at those towers were mysteriously warned not to show up for work that day, BUT a Middle-eastern-looking man in New Jersey purchased inordinately large amounts of candy just before Halloween in order to poison trick-or-treating children, BUT the towers were actually taken down by explosives planted in their base by the Bush administration, AND the Pentagon was actually hit by a missile, BUT the real point of the attack was to control African-American minorities. Significantly, the circulation of what Melnick calls these “wedge-driving” rumors employs the same avenues of public discourse as do the channels of news and music and expressions of community action, memorialization, and patriotism. Therefore, if 9/11 culture is “constituted by the labors of historians, fictions writers, journalists, musical artists, and so on trying to make the tragedy available to the widest possible public as their own story” (35), Melnick notes that it also allows “the illusion of care and community-building to satisfy much more self-absorbed goals” (35).
     
    The snapshot also figures cogently in the tension between official representation and cultural counter-statement. Melnick champions photography, especially the impromptu sort, as “the most valuable form of democratic cultural expression in the months after the attacks” (65). Thus, he implicitly marks the snapshot as a kind of counter-terrorism, one undertaken by an array of agents. Even though he feels that the New York Times‘s “Portraits of Grief” feature efficiently “cornered the market on remembrance” (76), Melnick praises the Times as the “first cultural actor to take note of the ‘snapshot culture’ . . . [and] to reproduce it in a representational economy of scale” (77). He qualifies his praise, however, by reminding us that the Times’s “standardization of the snapshots . . . made it clear that a corporate 9/11 culture was born almost simultaneously with the collapse of the towers” (77). Melnick’s book is full of these ups and downs, with a whole chapter devoted explicitly to the imagery of rising and falling that proliferates in fiction, film, and visual art after 9/11. Notably, Melnick uses the chapter’s title, “Rising,” to foreground the culture’s impetus toward uplift, most powerfully represented by Bruce Springsteen’s blockbuster record, The Rising, a conscious 9/11 memorial, especially to the kind of working people that Springsteen’s earliest music celebrated. As with the Times “Portraits,” it is impossible to separate commercial and corporate interests from the production of public commemoration.
     
    Nonetheless, Melnick highlights the value of rising as a counter-imagery to what he calls “the central visual reality of 9/11: falling” (78). Claiming simultaneously that it is the central image and also the taboo image in the wake of 9/11, Melnick makes falling both center and margin in 9/11 culture. From 2001 to 2005, the taboo against falling is generally observed; Clear Channel’s list of banned songs included “a number of ‘falling’ songs” (80). In its place, Melnick contends, “rising” imagery prevailed. (The film Chicken Little and the novel Extremely Loud and Incredibly Close, he feels, typify this trend.) By 2006 we find images of paper falling and in Oliver Stone’s World Trade Center the sound of bodies hitting the ground, which created cultural permission for the representation of falling bodies. Except that, Melnick points out, the 2004 novel Windows on the World ends with “a man jumping out of the titular restaurant with his two kids” (89); except that a significant Esquire article discussed falling imagery as early as 2003 and addressed Richard Drew’s earlier well-circulated photo of the anonymous falling man; except that Eric Fischl’s Tumbling Woman sculpture was mounted in Rockefeller Center in 2002, on the first anniversary of 9/11. Even though the sculpture was renounced as tasteless and quickly covered up, its subsequent removal as much disproves the falling taboo as demonstrates it, as does Melnick’s decision to hold these earliest details to the end of his chapter, such that we read backwards, from the absence of an image to its appearance, to its presence and disappearance during the period of its absence.
     
    To the extent that Melnick is correct about his details, then, the rising imagery that celebrates the nation’s (and its corporate interests’) response to the collapse of the towers (and the falling bodies that preceded the collapse and the fallout that proceeded from it) continuously marks the falling that it excludes. Melnick’s analysis thus turns The Rising into a sign of falling. What, after all would be the point of Springsteen’s relentless insistence on rising—the words “rise” or “rising,” Melnick points out, appear in more than half the songs on the record—if nothing had fallen, if this music did not come after the fall? And how are we to interpret Melnick’s linking of the public’s revulsion at Tumbling Woman with his claim that the jumpers, like the snapshot phenomenon, were “a tragic expression of American democracy: a racially and economically diverse mix of bond traders, restaurant workers, and administrative assistants waited at those windows” (emphasis added, 92)? Melnick thus provides many examples of the way that 9/11’s up/down dichotomy is a version of the symbiosis, in Derridean fashion, of inside and outside. This loop of symbiotic inversion pervasively structures our representation of the event, which—like the site called Ground Zero—comprises an open space that is too full.
     
    By contrast, consider how Engle, whose debt to Derrida is explicit, deals with some of the same details: “As Derrida writes, the desired demarcation of insides and outsides has never been fully realized” (14). Engle points this out in order to explain how the covering up of Tumbling Woman, prior to her removal, manifests the obscenity it tries to obscure: in exactly the way, I have suggested, the imagery of rising and Melnick’s celebration of it marks the taboo, and then the not-taboo, and actually the always-already of a taboo-being-violated.
     
    Seeing Ghosts, Engle’s provocative examination of 9/11’s engagement by what she calls “the visual imagination,” starts with a series of contemplations on Tumbling Woman to illustrate how, as “Derrida so eloquently argues, that which is associated with the graphic is fundamentally associated with the improper—that condition or state of exteriority and distance from the truth, self-presence, and Being” (13). And yet in Tumbling Woman‘s incompletion—her removal from the narrative of her fall, her removal from the history of events that inform that fall, her removal from the completion of her fall, her removal from visual display, her removal from Rockefeller Center—the sculpture restages the displacement of 9/11 in the visual imagination. This may not point us to a narrative of democracy, as Melnick would have it (either directly or metonymically), but rather to the horror of our own historicity: “She has not yet finished dying and the future between her impact and her death remains open. This is the history,” Engle writes, “we cannot yet begin to imagine” (18).
     
    Similarly, Engle implicitly interrogates Melnick’s praise of snapshots when she looks at the array of photographs surrounding 9/11 in juxtaposition with Richard Drew’s photograph, Falling Man, an eerily singular shot of a man in mid-drop, head pointed directly down, almost in an acrobatic pose. The man has never been definitively identified, and the photo was decried and subsequently pulled from circulation while at the same time circulating as an image of public discourse, the ultimate example of the falling taboo in violation. Some felt that the image was “pornographic,” presumably in that invited a prurient engagement with the intimacy of this man’s death. At the same time, Engle points out, the remains from Ground Zero were transported to Fresh Kills, Staten Island, where they were meticulously sorted and classified, then photographed and exhibited:
     

    An exhibition, Recovery: The World Trade Center Recovery Exhibition at Fresh Kills, emerged out of the documentation of the Fresh Kills operation. Whereas Drew’s photograph was decried and condemned, images of a recovered tooth in a test tube, frozen tissue samples, and workers sifting through remains were framed and hung on museum walls.
     

    (44)

     
    Postcards and faces too haunt 9/11. Not just as ghosts but as composites with proscriptive messages, the postcards provide templates for imagining and historicizing the event. And yet, along with their imagery and iconography, they also circulate news of instability and uncertainty. “From technical reproductions of images on postcards,” Engle explains,
     

    to the mass production of cards featuring the same images, to the millions of cards with their infinity of messages and images circulating around the globe, postcards operate simultaneously according to logics of reduction, replication, and multiplication. Bearing an uncanny resemblance to the movements of viral transmission, postcards expose a fundamental instability within the system of language and the tradition of linear history.
     

    (62)

     

    One constructed postcard image features Uncle Sam standing Paul Bunyan-like above the New York skyline, his fist clenched, his forearm bulging, his arm reared back as though he were about to land a powerhouse punch on the nose of the next incoming plane. Many postcards present a collage of shots of the towers aflame superimposed on the broader skyline of lower Manhattan full of vast black smoke. In one example, the words “Attack on Manhattan” appear across the upper right quadrant of the picture, just above smaller words, in a more uneven typeface: “The Unthinkable.” Another shows a waving American flag superimposed on a close-up of the rubble at Ground Zero, and some cards inscribe bits of texts such as the Pledge of Allegiance or the song “You’ll Never Walk Alone” against an array of 9/11 backdrops. While intending to create a sense of national unity, a message from an “I” to a “you” comprising an “Us,” these cards communicate ambiguous messages, perhaps the most troubling being that they gesture “toward a myth of national community that obscures the everyday violations of individual rights enacted against the apparently self-evident and protected group: the American people” (Engle, 76).

     
    Extensively detailing the sense of national unity that crossed racial divides to create a post-9/11 “Us,” particularly in popular music, Melnick too shows how fragile that unity was, evoking as much critique as assertion, which only accelerated with the assault on Iraq. Both Engle and Melnick explain convincingly how the culture reflects the contradictions in the claims that 9/11 united the nation against a common enemy, and Engle is particularly astute in her analysis of the imagery representing that “enemy,” especially the use of homoerotic images to demean bin Laden. If Engle is insightful about the way this imagery questions American masculinity in the process of asserting it, both she and Melnick make clear that the gender politics of 9/11 re-masculinize the national imaginary by assigning women to a subordinate role, a trait that the film World Trade Center shares with the stories spun around rescued soldier Jessica Lynch and Abu Ghraib prison guard Lynndie England. Engle and Melnick also explain that what Melnick calls “shout outs” merge and muddle the acts of mourning and the attempts at memorializing.
     
    “Virtual trauma,” the first of two concepts produced by the events of 9/11 that Marc Redfield insightfully contemplates, bears directly on the points made by Melnick, and even more so by Engle. If one might describe Melnick’s book as surveying the spectrum of media that represent 9/11 and the array of mediations they produce, Redfield examines how those mediations structurally connect to the commemorative and the traumatic, to our ability to name and to mourn. In every aspect of its meaning, the name-date 9/11 depends on a time mediated by the futurity that makes commemoration possible as well as by a present that makes repetition immanent. This tension between temporalities in effect drains the name-date and empties it out, as Redfield shows: “Imperatively and imperialistically, the empty date suggests itself as a zero point, the ground of a quasi-theological turn or conversion: everything changed that day, as the U.S. mainstream media so often tells itself” (17). As it mediates time, 9/11 produces mediated space: “Just as there is now only one ‘September 11,’ there is now only one ‘Ground Zero,’ capitalized. But the latter term has been torn not out of the calendar but out of the lexicon of atomic warfare” (23). As such, the term “both calls up and wards off the ghost of Hiroshima” (23) at the same time that it effaces the future by suggesting a site of survival rather than of nuclear annihilation, connoted by the non-capitalized uses of “ground zero.” Steeped in the rhetoric of targeting, the name “stokes a fantasy of omnipotence that is inseparable from vulnerability and exposure” (25).
     
    Drawing on the recent work of Donald Pease, Redfield elaborates the relationship between this fantastic space and many confused claims of innocence: “The zero is a ground, American ground, the virgin space of a new beginning (‘everything changed’), the guarantee of a wounded innocence and a good conscience” (24). The site Ground Zero both evokes and deploys competing narratives of innocence. To the extent that “zero” becomes the baseline for culpability, the litmus test of innocence, its appropriation as a national site produces the troubling question that nearly got Professor Ward Churchill expelled from the University of Colorado, in effect: how innocent were the people whose occupations centered on world trade and who worked in the lap of Wall Street? Similarly, some African Americans expressed discomfort over being identified as part of the power system which bin Laden held accountable for what he saw as U.S. imperialism, while others saw the event as transcending racial divides (at the same time, of course, that it was erecting new ones).
     
    Like racial and national identities, like the significations attached to “ground zero,” the notion of innocence does not so much describe a fact as initiate its contestation. If all of these books demonstrate anything, it is that nothing about 9/11 is innocent. At the heart of the conflicts over innocence, these books suggest to me, is the unacknowledged fact that the term can refer to radically different realms of reference. Innocence can entail issues of law, evidence, procedure, and (potential) punishment. The word can also refer to the disposition of the soul. Yet a third type of innocence denotes lack of experience, often but not necessarily sexual. Slippage among these meanings, however, seems almost inevitable, as they circulate in a slippery chain of cultural substitution. The loss of sexual innocence can entail an illegal act and/or can affect the disposition of the soul, depending on the legal, social, or spiritual referents one invokes. Innocence thus activates some entrenched confusion connected to, if not partially caused by, the infusion of secular life with theological myths, meanings, attributes, or wants. In what ways was 9/11 an attack on the innocent? In a purely criminal context, the victims were innocent and the perpetrators guilty, but as these books show, 9/11 is transcendent in issues of law because it put U.S. retaliation above the rule of law. The U.S., holding itself innocent in the eyes of God as well as the eyes of the law, set out to seek God’s revenge–a point President George Bush II made in his famous post-9/11 speech, and which he and numerous of his supporters have reiterated frequently. God is on the side of the United States because it was innocent, as innocent as the innocent people in the World Trade Center whom God chose not to protect. This argument uses evidence—9/11, Ground Zero—to transcend the need for evidence: doing God’s work makes evidence irrelevant, because it is hubris to try to prove anything to God, something that would of course be clear to someone such as George Bush II, who believes God had chosen him to run for President.
     
    But when innocence is debated on spiritual grounds rather than forensic, it is glossed—or outed—by the actions of the terrorists whose claims to spiritual innocence warranted their actions; that innocence was epitomized by the virgins promised them in heaven. The terrorists’ innocence gave them access to innocent young women, who, under heavenly auspices, would lose their innocence by surrendering it to the oxymoronically innocent terrorists. The forensic guilt for their attack on the secular nation and on secular institutions was thus the reciprocal purchase of innocent victims. Evaluated in such a spiritual economy, they could neither feel guilt for what they were about to do, nor be guilty for what they had done. In the end, it was all very innocent: innocent victims, innocent victors. In this context, post-9/11 stages a struggle for the rhetorical position from which to ascribe the guilt.
     
    Although Redfield does not address the concept of innocence in these terms, its specific dualities are consistent with those he ascribes to “September 11” and to “Ground Zero”:
     

    Both terms move beyond themselves, as it were, and in a double sense: on the one hand, by emphasizing survival and encouraging all the phantasms of power—of picturing, targeting, annihilating, and consuming—that drive the “war on terror”; on the other hand, by surreptitiously exploiting an iterability and finitude conditioning of all life, technology, and mourning . . . . The more the world superpower dials the 9-1-1 emergency number, gives a name and a face to evil and goes to war, the more haunting September 11 becomes. Overwritten by atrocity after atrocity committed in its name, its afterimage persists.
     

    (47)

     
    The geographical and temporal dislocations involved with name-date and site-name also help explain why the event of 9/11 was often compared to a movie, illustrating once again the way visual paradigms, in their failure, continue to haunt representation. If most people who saw 9/11 or saw news of it did so via television, what they saw was already a movie, an event viewed through the contrivance of cinematic conventions that inform traumatic spectatorship. In this way, the event was a form of reverse engineering in that the movie conventions that mediated its reception also informed its production:
     

    On the one hand, the phrase “it was like a movie” conjures up not just an excess of event over believability but a sense that this event is to be mediated, would have no sense, perhaps would not even have occurred if it were not being recorded and transmitted. . . . On the other hand, the cameras and transmitters repeat the terroristic violation of human dignity itself, reducing someone’s pain and death to an image, stripping away the soul in capturing a representation of the body.
     

    (30-31)

     

    Here Redfield usefully evokes the Burkean idea that the sublime enables the spectator to imagine surviving his or her own death, to suggest that “in being ‘like a movie’, in soliciting the spectator to identify with the inhuman camera, the spectacle-transmission renders the spectator part of a process of mediation in which time and space suffer dislocation” (35). Thus, the rhetorical import of the name-date and the site-name, the language of targeting and of televisualizing simultaneously demand and obstruct mourning, a conclusion that Redfield shares with Melnick and Engle, although he demonstrates it with arguments of a different register (except when he discusses the films World Trade Center and United 93).

     
    In turning to his second scrutinized term, “war on terror,” Redfield draws heavily on Agamben to argue that “at the heart of modernity’s rudimentarily secularized idea of sovereignty lies terror: a terror proper to sovereignty itself” (54). Explaining how the “terrorist” is essential to the constitution of the modern state, Redfield demonstrates forcefully and effectively that “the declaration of war on terror is at once the most obvious, overdetermined, and obscure speech act of our era” (91). Just as Redfield ends the first half of the book with a sentimental gesture toward the possibility of “true mourning, if we achieve it” (47), the deconstructive energies of the second half evoke the utopian possibility of moving from the paradigm of perpetual war to that of perpetual peace: “as ‘peace’ becomes the site of a certain excess within language and thought, a nonapocalyptic openness to the future may be said to emerge” (94).
     
    Redfield’s move connects the examinations of cultural representation produced by Melnick and by Engle to Phillip E. Wegner’s reading of cultural allegories between 1989 and 2001—what Wegner calls “the long nineties”—so as to periodize the cultural history that culminates with 9/11. Quoting the final lines of Don DeLillo’s Underworld, a meditation on the possibility of a word becoming a thing in the world, a word identified at the end of the novel as “peace,” Wegner shares with Redfield a desire to summon the possibility of peace as the utopian impetus of 9/11’s apocalyptic narratives. To this end, Wegner pursues a historical analysis based on identifying and tracing cultural allegories. In other words, telos rather than scope of content connects Wegner to the other 9/11 books in this group, in that they all are attempting to ask what comes after 9/11. The details of the haunted space that Engle sees there and the contradictions implicit in its cultural artifacts, delineated by Melnick, are consistent with the logic traced by Redfield. When that logic yields authority to utopian desire, Redfield is in effect willing an after-9/11-ness that fills the implicit void articulated by Melnick and Engle. Using a logic of historical dialectics—grounded in what led up to 9/11—Wegner attempts, similarly, to replace the haunted void with a utopian vision.
     
    For him, 9/11 marks the end of a period initiated by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of Soviet Communism. In that period, as Wegner describes it, neoliberal energies consolidate around the triumphalism associated with Francis Fukuyama’s declaration that history had come to an end. In the context of this pseudo-utopian vision of a world order in which American power, influence, and values flourish uncontested, Wegner identifies the dystopian strains to which, at the end of this period, 9/11 gives visibility. To put it another way, if 9/11 marks the end of the end of history, the nightmare of history that was always there announces itself—as all nightmares do—at the moment of awakening. For Wegner, 9/11 is a wake-up call that makes visible the fact that historical possibility is open-ended.
     
    Underworld thematized this historical possibility as a retrospective allegory of the long Cold War period that preceded Wegner’s “long nineties.” In those long nineties, Wegner demonstrates, the three films of The Terminator series “form a dialectical sequence . . . as each film reworks the ideological and political raw materials of its predecessor” (62), sequentially reflecting the world-views of the three previous Republican Presidents. About the two versions of the film Cape Fear and the novel on which it was based, Wegner fruitfully asks, “what are the fears, the ‘real life’ to which the figure of [the villain] Cady has given form?” (87). With finely nuanced readings, Wegner shows that each version of the Cape Fear narrative reflects the anxieties of its historical moment: the novel reflecting Cold War gender anxieties, the first version of the film reflecting late 1950s racial conflict, and the Scorsese 1991 remake manifesting “the explosive reemergence . . . of anxieties about new forms of class conflict” (88).
     
    These chapters, which constitute the first half of the book, historicize the cultural possibilities that provide Wegner’s raison d’être. They illustrate, as well, how he develops his allegorical readings and the historical purposes to which he puts them. His larger goal, as he makes clear from the beginning, is not just to historicize but to construct the conditions of utopian possibility. Thus he examines the films Ghost Dog and Fight Club to demonstrate the relationship between the naturalist tradition and dystopian narrative, and to explore “the way they adapt the formal strategies of the dystopia, as well as its precursors in naturalist fiction, to the new situation of what has been variously described as an emergent global postindustrial, post-Fordist, or service economy” (124). The final third of the book looks at works that provide what Wegner identifies as a way out of the dystopian: the film Independence Day (read alongside Derrida’s Specters of Marx in order to tease out an allegorical conception of the messianic), the Forever novel trilogy, Octavia Butler’s Parable novels, and the television show Buffy the Vampire Slayer.
     
    For Wegner, 9/11 thus creates the occasion for the shift into a new cultural stage, a way out of life caught between death’s rehearsal and its restaging. The first sentence of the book’s final paragraph tells us that we have arrived “at the most significant lessons that we can take away from these extended narratives” (216-17). In articulating the tension of the two deaths that impel his periodizing, Wegner thus constructs an argument caught between an informing moral teleology and specific cultural anxieties. These works teach Wegner more than something about the conditions of their production, the complexity of those conditions, and the layers of displacement that those complexities produce; they also teach him how we should envision the future, how we should live in historical time. In Wegner’s reach for the utopian, one is reminded of the end of The Political Unconscious, where Jameson argues that religion, as a utopian discourse, is a form of Marxism. This move may be glib or optimistic or admirable, and from my perspective, at least, only a curmudgeon—or worse, a libertarian—would be completely unsympathetic to Jameson’s (and hence Wegner’s) objective, which is progressive, reconciliatory, and social-minded. It is similarly hard to object to a methodology that is detailed and clever.1
     
    To what extent, however, does Wegner’s utopian tale wag the postmodern dog? If the idea that everything is narrative is a postmodern concept amenable to the allegorizing methodology used here to contextualize the postmodern condition within a progressive teleology, perhaps the allegorical method succeeds not because of the trajectory it reflects but simply because everything is narrative. From my perspective, the meaning of the term culture and the value of cultural criticism derive from the fact that at any historical moment, specific narratives acquire cogency. That value lies, however, not in subsuming narrativity to the interests of metanarrative, but in demonstrating that cogent narratives do not constitute a coherent whole, because at the moments of conflict and contradiction, at the sites where competing or self-contradictory narratives are sutured, ideology becomes most visible. The allegorical aspect of culture follows from the idea that culture is the product of narratives.
     
    But what follows from all of this? Although Wegner appropriately uses the name-date to mark an end to historical opacity, if one is to build on his work, it is necessary to go beyond the position contra Fukuyama. If 9/11 creates the rupture through which the signs of history must be acknowledged, by what process do those signs enter the flow of historical representation, the flow upon which 9/11 has returned our focus? The dilemma of inside/outside, the power of enfoliation that torments the capacity to represent 9/11 (as Engle and Redfield so convincingly demonstrate), makes us ponder not only what 9/11 was and what it means, but what follows, in the light of which allegorical thinking—as the juxtaposition of these other books with Wegner’s makes a little more clear—is a form of wishful thinking. This troubling issue confronts the stasis implicit in 9/11 souvenirs, those mementoes that replace the flow of history with the reification (and, Melnick emphasizes, the commodification) of memorials.
     
    The next step, these books taken together remind us, is as uncertain as it is necessary. Dare we not consider what comes after bin Laden? While American military forces and intelligence operatives are going after him, so long as he escapes their capture, we remain his unwilling captives. Whether we consume with alacrity the souvenirs of his greatest triumph or critique with a vengeance the way that triumph is represented, whether we grouse at the humiliation of full body scanners at airports or support whole-heartedly the PATRIOT Act, we remain bin Laden’s captives. Until he is captured, he is free from facing any consequences or acknowledging any restrictions. This makes him the veritable leader of the free world, with everyone else his follower, in lockstep or in pursuit, however deceptive his trail, however hard it is to follow. No one can deny that crashing a plane into a tower of the World Trade Center is a hard act to follow, except by some of bin Laden’s followers, who crashed a second plane into the World Trade Center twenty minutes later. What followed is history. If that was the same history to which Fukuyama proclaimed an end, the reason may be that Fukuyama’s argument is harder to follow than bin Laden’s, which is simple almost to the point of being innocent: bin Laden represents the victims of Western imperialism. The U.S., he believes, has designs on the Muslim world that entail following cultural infiltration and economic coercion with military invasion. Because U.S. coercive power is directly connected to its wealth, the only way to combat its designs is to destroy its economy by luring it into a multi-trillion-dollar revenge fest.
     
    The validation of his argument was marked in the U.S. by a return to displaced historical narratives that followed a logic of associating 9/11 and Ground Zero with Iraq, hinging particularly on the idea that Saddam Hussein was the next Hitler. As each of these books demonstrates, in the wake of 9/11, the impossibility of representing 9/11 within historical time is a course-offering from the postmodern Department of Hitler Studies.
     

    Alan Nadel, William T. Bryan Chair of American Literature and Culture at the University of Kentucky, is the author of four books, including Containment Culture (Duke University Press, 1995), Flatlining on the Field of Dreams: Cultural Narratives in the Films of President Reagan’s America (Rutgers University Press, 1997), and Television in Black-and-White America: Race and National Identity (University Press of Kansas, 2005). He is the editor of two books on August Wilson and the co-editor, with Susan Griffin, of Henry James and Alfred Hitchcock, the Men Who Knew Too Much (forthcoming from Oxford University Press). His poetry has appeared in several journals, among them: Georgia Review, New England Review, Paris Review, Partisan Review, and Shenandoah, and he has won prizes for the best essays in Modern Fiction Studies and PMLA.
     

    Footnotes

     
    1. The specter of Jameson looms extremely large in this book. The Index notes references to Jameson 67 times in Wegner’s text and an additional 42 times in his footnotes. Nor are the text citations brief; many contain quotes several lines long, and 22 of the Index items cite references that exceed one page. Jameson–cited, quoted, or discussed, on the average, once every two to three pages–provides the trajectory of the book’s argument, the methodology that supports it, and the objectives that inform it.
     
  • Modes of Luxurious Walking

    Apple Zefelius Igrek (bio)
    Seattle University
    igreka@seattleu.edu

    Review of: Allan Stoekl, Bataille’s Peak: Energy, Religion, and Postsustainability. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2007.

     

     
    If there is a single, obsessive object of thought in Georges Bataille – from Guilty (1944/1988) and Blue of Noon (1957/1978) to his magnum opus The Accursed Share (1949/1988) – it is the expenditure of wealth and energy. The very object of study, despite the rigid and calculated necessity of knowledge, transcends everything productive. Expenditure is at the core of human acquisition (in terms of knowledge, economy, and moral restraint), which implies that there is an irresistible violent force at work in all of our attempts to furnish subjectivity with some measure of concrete stability. This is precisely why Allan Stoekl writes in his introduction to Bataille’s Peak that the meaning and survival of the community is nothing else than an aftereffect of what is sacred, i.e., “the drive to spend without counting, without attempting to anticipate return” (xvii). The ethical, in a similar vein, cannot be separated from an incessant flash of energy that is itself only ever partially reducible to human needs and projects. In just this way, it is a radically heterogeneous form of religious experience which, for Bataille, provides us with an unknowable basis for thinking through our social and ethical relationships. This kind of experience is provocatively self-contradictory: it returns us, through ritualistic forms of sacrifice, to a kind of intimacy with the world which destroys its own conditions of knowledge.
     
    Keeping to this paradox of atheistic mysticism, Stoekl ably crafts a unique position in current environmental debates. These debates almost always privilege human subjectivity.1 A Bataillean model of energy and religion, by contrast, affirms no such humanistic principle. Stoekl’s position, then, is one which will emphasize expenditure both within and against the closed economies of utility and personal satisfaction (191). This in turn will expose a blind spot in contemporary theories of Empire which posit the “end of nature,” as such an end requires the very energy which it repudiates. Doubtless, this is a provocative undertaking; and Stoekl, who is highly regarded for his 1985 publication of Visions of Excess, brings it into focus with passionate writing and methodical expertise.
     
    Privileging excess and expenditure rather than conservation and self-interest, Bataille reverses the usual order of economic thinking. Such a reversal, as Stoekl reminds us, can be traced back – in certain respects – to Bruno and Sade. In the first, matter is equated with a kind of energy which is concomitantly active and passive. The formless, infinite nature of God, according to Bruno, cannot be separated from that which passively receives its concrete shape and reality. In this heterodoxical Christian position (for which Bruno was burned at the stake), matter is movement and movement is corruption and corruption, in turn, is regeneration. Physical barriers are thus broken down by the very action of nature through which God is immanently identified with both creativity and destruction. In a similar way, albeit from a violently atheistic perspective, Sade affirms an underlying principle of nature associated with sheer transformation. Contributing to this process is the manifestation of movement and the stimulation of senses via sovereign crime. The Sadean hero is indifferent to morality, and overthrows it by way of an extreme form of selfishness. Bataille, however, retains the paradox of a limit to be perpetually crossed: the death of God must be lived, otherwise we have returned to an apathetic transgression which destroys itself in its own egotistical assertion. For this reason, Stoekl rightly observes that Sade needs the human, and needs God, without which there is no criminal defiance (16). Bataille’s theory of expenditure begins with such a paradoxical formulation: moral awareness mustn’t be eradicated or toppled, but affirmed through its very destruction. The excess of God and human morality is to be discovered in a revision of Sadean crime which opens up the self to an immeasurable experience: “[A]n extreme devotion to crime—to, as the prewar Bataille would put it, the production of heterogeneous objects—leads, surprisingly, to a self-sacrificing generosity. The self is not simply destroyed in a whirlwind of energy; the self is destroyed through an excess of energy entailing a mortal gift of oneself in love, in crime, to the other” (28).
     
    Any discussion of Bataillean waste, excess, and profligacy invites the question as to whether this general economy should be distinguished from modern capitalist societies in which blind, ruinous extravagance seems to be the predominant moral imperative. If anything, modern industrial economies are built on extraordinary waste and extreme ecological devastation; thus one could plausibly argue, as Jean-Joseph Goux has, that the risk-taking ethos of transnational capitalism is the quintessential post-bourgeois embodiment of Bataillean expenditure (Stoekl 137). There is, of course, an all too obvious blind spot to this eternal perpetuation of cultural and economic excess: it cannot be sustained. As demand for energy dramatically increases over the next few decades, we will surely witness, as predicted by the petroleum geologist M. King Hubbert (in what is called, alluding to a bell-curve graph, “Hubbert’s Peak”), a vast and imminent depletion of our fossil fuel resources. Stoekl draws the discomfiting but probable conclusion that “the more or less constant growth in productivity, production, and profits the world experienced over the last century, tracked with a commensurate population increase, based as both were on increases in energy production, is nearing its end” (119). If we will soon reach a point where we can no longer rely upon large quantities of highly concentrated sources of energy, without which the very essence of modern consumerist subjectivity will be thrown into disarray, then a call to personal sacrifice must not be far behind. Thus, Lisa H. Newton, in direct response to the problem of scarcity, argues for a simpler and more authentic life in contrast to the currently unsustainable levels of status-driven consumption (Stoekl 120). Sustaining our globalized economy at a more appropriate, more rational level will necessarily require a fundamental change in our approach to natural resources. This implies the conservation of energy, to be sure, but Newton also links this approach to a moral and religiously inspired perspective, one which renounces easy pleasure and artificial consumerism. The new self – simple, austere, rational – seems to be absolutely crucial to the survival of the planet. In this context, Bataille’s theory of excess life and wild expenditure would appear to be deeply problematic.
     
    Without falling back on eco-religion, evangelical environmentalism, or various strands of consumerist humanism, Stoekl makes the radically innovative argument that Bataille’s theory of expenditure, when properly modified and updated, helps us to carve out a post-sustainable ecological perspective. The critics Stoekl draws on, by contrast, all rely upon some version (hidden or otherwise) of anthropocentric ethics. They are based upon human instrumentality, and thus they cannot be severed from a project-oriented subject. If we think back to Newton, we are reminded of the need to cultivate an “authentic self,” one sustained by its rational interdependence with nature. It follows that the simple, honest self is the self that survives. Likewise, Gary Gardner invokes religion as a means of fostering ecological awareness through ritual, tradition, and community bonding (Stoekl 153) — not an inherently bad message. Nevertheless, Stoekl questions whether this is simply a religious pretense: “If we reconfigure religion only to ‘foster and sustain’, then to what extent can we continue even to believe in the independent power and validity of religion? Doesn’t it simply become one more tool, suited to the accomplishment of a task?” (155). Even the irrationally self-destructive individualism of David Brooks falls into this camp: the future of the happy, anti-conventional American subject is predicated upon an elusive but ideal wholeness which is the highest aim and accomplishment. In Bataille, the highest point justifies nothing. The summit – or peak – is always already equated with a sacrificial leap. Stoekl refers to this as the “good duality” in Bataille: there is a presupposition of limits, language and self-consciousness, as well as the infinite movement of loss and death which can never be contained by those evanescent boundaries. In consequence, there arises a sovereign form of life, self-consciousness, and history: “A self-consciousness . . . that grasps ‘humanity’ not as a stable or even dynamic presence, but as a principle of loss and destruction. A history not of peak moments of empire, democracy, or class struggle, but as exemplary instances of expenditure” (53).
     
    Stoekl’s appropriation of Bataille, in light of the above quote, will strike many readers as counter-productive—to put it very politely. The only feasible solution to an ever-growing energy crisis, it will be said again, includes an ethics of self-restraint and a politics of ecological sustainability. Stoekl, however, reminds us that if Hubbert’s model is indeed correct, as it appears to be, then the very idea of sustainability is itself unsustainable. A permanently sustainable economy defies the same material and historical conditions that would otherwise make it seem so urgently necessary. Furthermore, to the extent that we are moved by irrational, excessive desires, it may be nearly impossible to convince the masses to follow a simple, austere, and authentic life (122). A more reasonable adaptation, Stoekl argues, taps into the same expenditure which most of us already pursue in a minor, attenuated form. Consumer spending, in fact, may itself be a response to this desire which is more primordial than our moral constructs. But now it would seem that we have come full circle: how is this desire for excess experiences to be distinguished from the same economic activity which apparently brought us to our present catastrophic situation?
     
    The multi-layered, complex, book-length answer elaborated in Bataille’s Peak cannot be given here. The shorter answer, however, can be stated in two parts. First, Bataillean expenditure should be modified by taking into consideration qualitative differences between docile and insubordinate forms of energy. The fact that the former is a finite, quickly disappearing resource implies that we can no longer afford to ignore, as Bataille could, the issues of energy depletion and cultural decline (Stoekl 42). Drawing from two Heidegger essays, “The Question concerning Technology” and “The Age of the World Picture” (1977), Stoekl contextualizes weak, mechanized forms of expenditure by reference to fossil fuel consumption. Because we assume the world exists for us in a quantifiable way – to be conquered, stockpiled, and used up – we ourselves become a disposable thing or object: “Man the subject for whom the objective world exists as a resource is quickly reversed and becomes man the object who, under the right conditions, is examined, marshaled, and then releases a specific amount of energy before he himself is definitively depleted” (131). Docile energy, Stoekl surmises, makes for docile subjects. Only after we have acknowledged this contemporary fact are we able to complement the first part with a second: insubordinate forms of energy are essential to insubordinate forms of action. In the general movement of social ecstasy and expenditure, by way of which we transgress ourselves in moments of physical intimacy, we open the isolated self to an immensity which can be neither measured nor stockpiled. Nor can it be experienced through the timeless efficiency of the car: “As the ultimate common denominator, the car brings together, in the isolation of vapid subjectivity, social classes and identities. All are one on the freeway, mixing while not mixing, moving around the empty circuit of gutted urban space” (184). The simulacrum of freedom is achieved through speed, empty signifiers, and the indifferent reproduction of subjectivity. Excess is thus transformed into pure stream of consciousness, and our “cursed flesh” disappears as an abstract, useless obstacle to absolute technological freedom. By contrast, the inefficient movement, the clumsy and death-bound use of time, holds out the best promise for a post-sustainable future: walking, dancing, cycling, and spending oneself in a wounded but effervescent fusion of the self with the other (190). Passion and ecstatic movement in the post-fossil fuel era will therefore “be one of local incidents, ruptures, physical feints, evasions and expulsions (of matter, of energy, of enthusiasm of desire)” (190). As opposed to a closed economy of the useful, practical self, in which every moment of loss is immediately sublimated as a higher purpose and function, Bataille’s affirmation of an intimate relationship with the world and others necessarily subordinates the higher truth – and every mode of instant communication – to a formless substratum or base matter that will forever escape human domination.
     
    This twofold response helps Stoekl to resituate contemporary arguments on both Empire and the totalized city. Drawing from Michel de Certeau’s “Walking in the City” (1980), Stoekl traces the historical loss of the body through the creation of a universal, albeit anonymous, modern subjectivity. The automobile, as already put forth, reframes reality so that everything is construed according to an “always but never changing image on the (wind)screen” (184). The car thus becomes a grand historical symbol of speed, freedom, transcendence, and the conquest of nature. But at the same time, none of this is possible without fuel. The same subject that manifests itself as pure movement and pure sovereignty is also a function of certain finite resources. Insofar as de Certeau fails to consider the role of cheap fossil fuel inputs in connection with the utopian and totalized city, he is unable to rethink the expenditure of energy as a mode of resistance to modern networks of conformity and surveillance. Stoekl, however, sees in de Certeau’s walker an intimation of another kind of energy subversion. What is crucial at this historical juncture isn’t only the unusual and peculiar connotations of the walker in contrast with the commodified autonomy of the driver, but furthermore the “spectacular waste of body energy” (188). This movement of intimate corporeal existence, wasting itself on a “grossly inefficient” effort (192), gestures toward something beyond the virtual reality of today’s Empire. As the universal city is no longer restricted by space or time, even the speeding car is being outpaced and outdistanced by the ubiquitous circulation of signs, images, and capital. And as the global scale shrinks to the size of instantaneous communication, the old dualities of private and public, society and nature, real and artificial, are quickly vanishing. Yet this very dialectic, which seemingly overcomes itself in a new, bland form of media domination, cannot possibly exist without a specific relationship to labor. Stoekl observes that in this respect Hardt and Negri, who would reduce all natural phenomena to moments of history (196), remain firmly tethered to Marx and Kojève—at least inasmuch as the historical returns us to a concrete function of labor. But even human labor has its limits. It is no more autonomous than the myth of Man which it intermittently supports, for it produces nothing in the absence of fuel (x). And fossil fuels are a natural fact: “Labor power discovered these fuels, put them to work, ‘harnessed’ them, transformed their energy into something useful. But labor power did not put the fuels into the earth” (197). There are, consequently, limits to Empire. And one of the most crucial limits, for us, is the imminent depletion of highly concentrated forms of energy. If the global spectacle is slowing down and a sustainable response is hardly sustainable (as Stoekl previously argued), it seems that we will have to rethink excess expenditure. Bataille’s Peak performs this task on every page, and does so in the most formidable, difficult terms—by reminding us of the general finitude, exertion, madness, and jouissance of bodily economies.
     

    Apple Igrek teaches in the Philosophy Department at Seattle University. He has published essays on fiction, cultural theory, Georges Bataille and Michel Foucault. His work appears in such journals as Colloquy, the International Studies of Philosophy, and Comparative and Continental Philosophy (forthcoming, 2010). His current project is entitled “Thinking Through Walls and the Internalized Image in H.P. Lovecraft.”
     

    Footnotes

     
    1. Celebrants of car culture and suburbia, such as Loren E. Lomasky, do so most blatantly when they defend autonomous freedom without seriously taking up questions of waste and resource use (Stoekl 124). Proponents of eco-religion, however, are no less anthropocentric: Gary Gardner and Mary Evelyn Tucker continue to place man and soul atop the same matter/spirit hierarchy which Lynn White Jr., in his seminal 1967 essay “The Historical Roots of Our Ecological Crisis,” already critiqued as the religious underpinning of environmental degradation (Stoekl 155).
     
  • Living Antagonistically: Lorenzo Fabbri’s Domesticating Derrida

    Timothy Campbell (bio)
    Cornell University
    campbell@cornell.edu

    Review of: Lorenzo Fabbri, The Domestication of Derrida: Rorty, Pragmatism and Deconstruction. Trans. Daniele Manni, London: Continuum, 2008. Print.

     

     
    To choose security is to choose death. That such a lesson comes at the expense of Richard Rorty in a book on the relation of French deconstruction to American pragmatism is only one of the more compelling paradoxes in Lorenzo Fabbri’s impressive The Domestication of Derrida: Rorty, Pragmatism and Deconstruction. At first glance Fabbri, a young Italian academic, appears to be working within the tradition of continental critiques of American pragmatism and in particular the work of Richard Rorty, a critique begun almost three decades ago first by Michel Foucault and then by Derrida himself.1 The title of Fabbri’s book is drawn from Wlad Godzich’s important reading of de Man, “The Domestication of Derrida,” which appeared in the 1983 volume The Yale Critics. There Godzich describes (and circumscribes) the intellectual encounter between Derrida and de Man in ways that inform Fabbri’s own take on Rorty. Building on and diverging from Godzich’s essay, Fabbri recounts his own coming to terms with Rorty’s reading of deconstruction as an anti-philosophy in an itinerary that moves from contingency, to irony, to—and in my view most decisively—a final engagement with Foucault and the implicit question of biopolitics. Fabbri’s concluding chapter on modernity, politics, and monstrosity registers the fundamental break between deconstruction and pragmatism, one centered on the features of a truly political form of life. On Fabbri’s read, deconstruction brings in its wake radical possibilities for “favouring new possibilities of existence and of being-together” (4).
     
    To get at those radical possibilities, Fabbri naturally begins where one would expect him to: with a cogent summary of Rorty’s reading of deconstruction across well-known texts like Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature and Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. In a series of marvelous close readings, Fabbri brings his own profound knowledge of Derrida’s works to bear on Rorty, laying out in convincing fashion the real strengths of Rorty’s interpretation of deconstruction, and examining point by point the areas of contact and contamination between contemporary American pragmatism and deconstruction. Fabbri is always attentive in these comparisons to the role writing plays for both Derrida and Rorty, a writing that skirts in and out of the ironic. The place of writing becomes decisive in the second chapter, when Fabbri puts to the test his earlier readings of Rorty’s supposed alliance with deconstruction by taking up the question of the doubly “private” in Rorty’s understanding of the political. Of particular interest for Fabbri is the function of autobiography in Derrida’s thought and more generally the relation between theory and the “person” espousing it. In the final chapter Fabbri pivots from the private and the philosophical to the question of forms of life and their relation to political solidarity. Fabbri’s damning if familiar conclusion is that Rorty remains, alas, a stubborn liberal who cannot see how easily pragmatism allies itself with normalizing strategies meant to contain radical political possibilities for life. When Rorty, in Fabbri’s gloss, chides Derrida for not having been decent enough to keep philosophy within the boundaries of private life, it is precisely with a view to denying philosophy’s vocation as a practice of civil disobedience, a possibility Derrida himself puts forward in a series of essays from the 1980s and 1990s.2
     
    There is much of interest in Fabbri’s account of the limits of linking pragmatism and deconstruction too closely, but I’d like to focus especially on two areas. The first becomes visible in the margins of the introduction and the opening chapters but really comes into view in the book’s final pages. Drawing on the work of Giorgio Agamben and Jean-Luc Nancy in particular, Fabbri speaks of an underlying anxiety on Rorty’s part when the topic moves to thinking community. He writes that Rorty “is locked within the boundaries of a given theoretical and political community, confiding in narratives and philosophy to prevent the coming of monsters. Deconstruction, instead, plays in blindfolds. It bids on possibilities for an existence to come” (127). In this insistence on political and theoretical communities, Fabbri is able to track, in a way others before him have not, how the dispositifs of Rorty’s pragmatism—principally tolerance and the private—align Rorty again and again with a liberal form of community. Fabbri is nothing short of devastating here. Making great use of Foucault’s essay “What is Critique?” to buttress his claims against Rorty, as well as of Derrida’s seminal readings on the university in “Eyes of the University,” Fabbri offers a ringing defense of an ontology of actuality, making the case for “doing theory” as a way of de-anchoring the “presence of the present” (114). His reading of “the presence of the present” as that which undergirds the liberal form of community becomes the privileged site for deconstruction (4). It is by adopting deconstruction that unexpected futures become visible, ones sacrificed by Rorty’s incessant policing of the private and public. Indeed, Fabbri speaks of Rorty as proffering a sort of “reductive vitalism” (74). This seems exactly right: a vitalism addressed to fencing off private lives from community is one not only reductive but also destined to wither. In other words, what Rorty fails to see in Derrida’s work is how deconstruction raises truly important questions for a future radical politics. On that note, I couldn’t help thinking when reading The Domestication of Derrida that what Fabbri has done essentially is to have Rorty play Sterling Hayden’s brigadier general Jack D. Ripper to Derrida’s Group Captain Mandrake (as played by Peter Sellers) in a theoretical remake of Dr. Strangelove. The difference would be that in the new version vital communities are substituted for vital bodily fluids.
     
    The second point follows closely on the question of community and concerns how Rorty responds to the vulnerability of public space. In Fabbri’s view, his response really comes down to security measures. Why the recourse to the police? Fabbri writes that Rorty “needs to have assurance that at the end of the day he will return to the exact same form of life from where he moved in the morning. And when such a happy ending cannot be guaranteed, the fear of the unpredictable makes him create protective barriers that ensure the security of his home” (126). On this score, Fabbri deploys to great effect a Nietzschean reading of security, which resonates especially with those pages from Daybreak in which Nietzsche recognizes how easily security comes to dominate society, creating those who can do nothing else except worship security “as the supreme divinity,” who can judge their actions according to one criterion alone: whether these actions tend “towards the common security and society’s sense of security” (105-106). Fabbri is relentless in the final chapter in keeping a ledger of the high price Rorty pays to have his home protected and his security maintained, measured in a missing politics and an absent philosophy to come, in a normalized and normalizing form of political life that Foucault critiqued so deeply in The Birth of Biopolitics. In this, Rorty’s perspective on deconstruction becomes a window on how extensively he nullifies the political generally, neutralizing the capacity of critique—deconstruction is the privileged critique though implicitly others are included in Fabbri’s analysis—to uncover the history of normalization, and what in turn links normalizing strategies to citizenship and to the state. Worse still, Rorty’s hopes for securing public space from unexpected (and therefore dangerous) forms of life produce, through Derridean auto-immunity, monsters that pop up repeatedly in Rorty’s work. In a series of strange doublings, it is a monstrous Derrida who comes to stand in metonymically for other monstrous forms of collective life when security has failed and vulnerability comes to characterize all human groupings. Fabbri suggests something else here too: that in the coming together of security and community—community as the subject and object of security—Rorty’s pragmatism is disclosed as a biopolitical machine whose function is to produce nothing short of a liberal form of life as a political form of being-together that wants (and ultimately fails) to secure its citizens. Fabbri instead insists repeatedly on the possibility of liberating all forms excluded from such a secured space by emphasizing “those struggles which aspire to favour antagonistic ways of living the now” (124). In this combination of antagonism and life, Fabbri echoes in important ways the recent work of the Invisible Committee’s The Coming Insurrection.3
     
    In refusing Rorty’s reading of Derrida, which transforms “philosophical reflection into a private matter,” Fabbri sees possibilities for future antagonistic forms of life (50). Deploying a reading of Derrida’s other writings—not only Specters of Marx, as one might expect, but The Post Card as well—Fabbri shows how deeply Derrida was aware of the impropriety of the private and of the possibilities the private offered for future antagonisms. Although others, especially Geoffrey Bennington, have repeatedly focused on the centrality of contamination in Derrida’s work, Fabbri’s reading of Rorty reminds us again of its importance and of Rorty’s continued failure to come to grips with the concept.4 Not surprisingly, given his deconstruction of the political malfeasance of Rorty’s private/public divide, Fabbri doesn’t shy away either from including his own private moments of reading Rorty. Say what you want about this choice, it’s undeniable that Fabbri takes Rorty seriously. In fact Fabbri essentially offers a model for how to take thought seriously by weaving narratives of a private nature with his literal “coming to terms” with Rorty. This fearless attempt to bring deconstruction and pragmatism together through the inclusion of the private is one of the best things about the book, as it progressively dawns on the reader that the bridging between the private and the political happens thanks precisely to the critique offered by deconstruction. There’s also something compelling about Fabbri’s insistence on the shared vulnerability of the private and the public; it is as if the ruins of public space are created precisely by bracketing the private from contact and potential contamination. Fabbri’s is an urgent call to return deconstruction to its rightful place in public debates.
     
    There are many other eloquent pages here: Fabbri’s deconstruction of metaphor in the first chapter as reinforcing the rule of the transcendental; the implicit third person perspective in Derrida’s Monolingualism of the Other; the taking up and elaborating of Caputo’s perspective on Derrida for his own political reading; and Fabbri’s wonderful discussion of the potentiality that inheres in any deconstruction of actuality as “suspending” the way in which we are directed towards an object. With that said, Fabbri does move quickly and sometimes misses opportunities. For instance, I would have loved to read more on the differences between Derrida and Rorty over the function of the intellectual. Certainly Fabbri’s discussion recalls Gramsci’s famous notion of the organic intellectual and might have made for another point of contact between Derrida and Rorty (as well as their divergence). One might also wish that Fabbri had discussed at greater length the relation of political indocility and critique in that other figure who today so dominates discussions and critiques of governmentalization, namely Giorgio Agamben. But these are quibbles. What Fabbri has done is to offer the reader a map of the long-standing differences not simply between Rorty and Derrida, but between a kind of liberal politics that only knows how to secure itself and its “we” from threats to its position of dominance, and another more anarchic possibility in which one attempts to imagine an “alternative we.” In short, Fabbri’s important book demands serious attention not only from those interested in the relation between Jacques Derrida and Richard Rorty, but from those interested in thinking together a future radical politics.
     

    Timothy Campbell teaches in the Department of Romance Studies at Cornell University. He is the author of Wireless Writing in the Age of Marconi (Minnesota, 2006) and Improper Life: Thanatopolitics and Technology from Heidegger to Agamben (Minnesota, 2011). In addition to his translations of Roberto Esposito’s Communitas: The Origin and Destiny of Community (Stanford, 2009) and Bios: Biopolitics and Philosophy (Minnesota, 2008), he is the co-editor along with Adam Sitze of The Biopolitical Reader (Duke, 2011).
     

    Footnotes

     
    1. See the interview with Foucault, “Polemics, Politics, and Problematizations,” as well as Derrida’s far-reaching “critique” of pragmatism in his “Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism.” For Rorty’s perspective on Foucault, see “Foucault and Epistemology.”

     

     
    2. See Derrida’s “Mochlos, or the Conflict of the Faculties” and “The University without Condition.”

     

     
    3. “He [the good citizen] can’t help envying these so-called ‘problem’ neighborhoods where there still persists a bit of communal life, a few links between beings, some solidarities not controlled by the state, an informal economy, an organization that is not yet detached from those who organize themselves” (Invisible Committee 36-37).

     

     
    4. See the recent special issue of diacritics titled “Derrida and Democracy,” in particular David Wills’s essay on the secret.
     

    Works Cited

       

     

    • Bennington, Geoffrey. “Derridabase.” Jacques Derrida. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1993. Print.
    • ———. Interrupting Derrida. New York: Routledge, 2000. Print.
    • Caputo, John D. “Beyond Aestheticism: Derrida’s Responsible Anarchy.” Research in Phenomenology 18 (1988): 59-73. Print.
    • Derrida, Jacques. Eyes of the University. Right to Philosophy 2. Trans. Edward Morri et al. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2004. Print.
    • ———. “Mochlos, or the Conflict of the Faculties.” Logomachia: The Conflict of the Faculties. Edited by Richard Rand. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1992. 3-34. Print.
    • ———. Monolingualism of the Other: Or, The Prosthesis of Origin. Trans. Patrick Mensah. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1988. Print.
    • ———. The Post Card: From Socrates and Freud to Beyond. Trans. Alan Bass. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1987. Print.
    • ———. “Remarks on Deconstruction and Pragmatism.” Deconstruction and Pragmatism. Ed. Chantal Mouffe. New York: Routledge, 1996. Print.
    • ———. Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International. New York: Routledge, 2006. Print.
    • ———. “The University without Condition.” Without Alibi. Ed. and trans. Peggy Kamuf. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2002. Print.
    • Foucault, Michel. The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978-1979. Trans. Graham Burchell. New York: Picador, 2010. Print.
    • ———. “Polemics, Politics and Problematizations.” The Foucault Reader. Ed. Paul Rabinow. Trans. Lydia Davis. New York: Pantheon, 1984. 383-385. Print.
    • ———. “What is Critique?” The Politics of Truth. Ed. Sylvère Lotringer. Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2007. Print.
    • Godzich, Wlad. “The Domestication of Derrida.” The Yale Critics: Deconstruction in America. Ed. Jonathan Arac, Wlad Godzich, and Wallace Martin. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1983. 20-40. Print.
    • The Invisible Committee. The Coming Insurrection. Los Angeles: Semiotext(3), 2009. Print.
    • Nietzsche, Friedrich. Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality. Ed. Maudemarie Clark and Brian Leiter. Trans. R.J. Hollingdale. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997. Print.
    • Rorty, Richard. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989. Print.
    • ———. “Foucault and Epistemology.” Foucault: A Critical Reader. Ed. D. Hoy. Oxford: Blackwell, 1986. 41-50. Print.
    • ———. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1979. Print.
    • Wills, David. “Passionate Secrets and Democratic Dissonance.” diacritics 38.1-2 (Spring Summer 2008): 17-29. Print.

     

  • The Poet’s Theater of Fiona Templeton: An Environmental View

    James Sherry (bio)
    jamestsherry@verizon.net

    Abstract
     
    Fiona Templeton’s play YOU-The City was originally produced for an audience of one in the Times Square neighborhood of New York City. The theatrical event presents an ecosystem where connections and logistics predominate over character and plot. It establishes a peer relationship between actors, audience, and their interactions that finds expression throughout the work in its theatrical components such as character, staging, and text. This environmental social structure links the play to a broader epistemology that reconstitutes the concept of identity in the arts. To support an alternative way of looking at ourselves, this essay brings in several concepts from other disciplines, notably extended cognition and q-analysis, a hierarchic model that functions by inclusion rather than like a system of separate castes. These tools are helpful in showing how cross disciplinary thinking supports an environmental model and are also useful because canonical culture remains fixated on the individual.
     

     

    I was sat with a malevolent question… but now I am more or less riotous and bounded, because, well duh, the encounter between spectator-subject and image-object is a process of frivolous interference or mutual indignant mutation! I hope this doesn’t sound too confrontational.
     

    –Nada Gordon, Scented Rushes

     

    1. Environmental Theater

     
    Fiona Templeton’s YOU—The City is an intimate play for an audience of one initially staged in 1988 in the mid-town neighborhood of New York and later published by Roof Books as a script along with photographs of the performance event.1 In its original performance, on keeping an appointment at an office in Times Square, a “client” (the sole member of the audience) is passed through a series of mainly scripted encounters at both indoor and outdoor locations, including a church, an apartment, and a gypsy cab ride. The action reaches a climax when the client realizes that she has become the object of one of the transitions or hand-offs in a Hell’s Kitchen playground. The narrative of YOU—The City is therefore not a story but a sequence of separate scenes, linked by one or more of the actors guiding the client from one event to the next. Each of these encounters takes place in a separate, typical city niche: an office with a secretary and an executive, a church with a defrocked priest, a sidewalk worked by a prostitute, a gypsy cab, a tenement apartment in which two lovers argue. Throughout the play’s 15 different scenes—each in its own local ecosystem—Templeton established, in a guided tour of over two hours, a work of environmental theater. The client’s encounters are environmentally linked by their location in the same neighborhood and as part of the continuous experience of any city dweller. The play focuses on environmental issues also in the way that the sequence of encounters changes the client’s idea of the self from that of an isolated individual in an unfamiliar and unsettling situation to someone who has become acutely aware of how he or she shares identity as well as space with the actors. The client realizes she is a component of a larger environment.
     
    This use of real-life surroundings, the loosely coupled relationships of one scene to another, and the way performers, both actor and client, identify with each other are the means by which Templeton realizes an environmental theater. By using theatrical strategies that extend the stage and the play into a living, diverse surrounding, Templeton has created interactive associations among actors, audience, settings, and text. I call this environmentally aware theater where the audience’s consciousness of its participation in the play overrides the artifice of the theatrical experience in some important ways. Environmentally aware theater presents an alternative to an absorptive theatrical experience that usually presents its artificiality intra-textually. YOU—The City transforms dramatic theater’s emphasis on the individual (going back to Aeschylus) into an awareness of one’s collaborative engagement in a network of beings. By extension, environmentalism (individual and network in dual agency) reinforces culture, in this case a poetics, in helping society to understand the interrelated conditions of the planet threatened by climate change. In this essay, I suggest that YOU—The City shows how Templeton’s poet’s theater contributes to an environmental poetics that proposes a significant modification of our engagement with the world. Understanding poet’s theater environmentally also allows us to link effectively with other disciplines to reveal an environmentally informed epistemology.
     

    2. Environmental Perspectives

     
    There is a growing literature around the practice and definition of ecopoetics that debates and enacts writing in relation to ecology, broadly conceived. One of the goals of ecopoetics is to engage with other disciplines. The relative weight granted language, and what is meant by ecosystem, varies greatly depending on the point of view of the writer. No single definition of ecosystem has emerged from ecopoetics. Further, Jonathan Skinner asks in his editor’s notes to the latest issue of ecopoetics “that the term [ecopoetics] continue to be used with uncertainty and circumspection. That it ask and be asked the hard questions about language, representation, efficacy, ethics, community and identity . . . .That it entail some real effort at interdisciplinary thinking” (ecopoetics 06/07 9).2 For these reasons and for the purposes of this essay, I apply the McGraw Hill life sciences glossary definition of ecosystem to Templeton’s work: “A unit of interaction among organisms and their surroundings, including all life in a defined area.” I use this definition because it comes from outside literature and extends the connections from poetics beyond the discipline of poetry. Such extension to multiple disciplines is consistent with most of the diverse perspectives around ecopoetics, environmentalism, and systems theory. Further, using the McGraw Hill definition supports my aim to connect poet’s theater to other disciplines. Finally and most importantly, this definition helps to clarify Templeton’s environmental work and encourages us to think of the play as a series of linking mechanisms both between actor and audience (self and other) as well as linkages among scenes.
     
    In YOU—The City the environmental perspectives among these 15 urban “unit[s] of interaction among organisms and their surroundings” are shaped on many levels of the theatrical experience. From the characters played by the actors or the audience to subject positions within the system, the audience member experiences an oddly disjointed and re-hinged experience of the self. For example, the Manhattan neighborhood becomes an objectified space (ecosystem) in which actors appear and reappear, sometimes changing character between appearances. Many of the actors are seen only once. This continuous variation among actors’ appearances and reappearances in the environmental setting, and on a smaller scale within the various scenes, allows Templeton to treat the individual—actor or performer or accidental neighborhood onlooker—as a metaphor for how the individual organism operates in any ecosystem. The play’s focus on connections helps one understand how an environmentally aware culture that objectifies our interdependence with other organisms and processes might differ from the human-centered perspective that dominates intellectual life. In order to establish a culture for environmentalism, to view our world environmentally, such a poetics can establish a framework in which humanity and nature are understood as a single complex system, a social model of environment. The individuals in Templeton’s play are engaged not just in their own dramatic action; they also “perform” their status as organisms situated as part of complex sets of relationships (human and non-human, subject and object). While this social model of environment may be said to be part of a systems approach to our condition, I only tangentially engage systems theory here in order to prevent a systems view from overdetermining poet’s theater’s environmentalism. YOU—The City reveals and focuses us on the qualitative events that emerge from these complex quantitative interactions within urban ecosystems. Templeton uses these quantities to build a framework supporting multiple cultural practices rather than any one monolithic culture. Her metaphor of the city and the city as content thrive in the structure of the play, engaging diverse relationships among audience and actors, and allowing us to understand, repeat, and adjust our relationships with the ecosystems that the play presents. Templeton avoids the doctrinaire by treating rhetorical positions as aspects of a larger continuity rather than as ideals to be guarded. Inclusiveness is paramount, attending to what is, if the environmental metaphor is to be successful in representing the similarities of organisms, places, and things at different scales.
     
    In this essay I look at how YOU—The City and some of Templeton’s other works of poet’s theater address issues of environmental inclusiveness and ideological balancing. These issues include the integrity of the individual organism, subject/object relations, the definition of cognition as taking place only within the mind, and the status-oriented hierarchies of literary judgments. Instead of a binary kind of hierarchy, subject over object, Templeton traces subject/object relations through the non-status-oriented matrix of set theory. Templeton builds perspectives through a diverse set of issues rather than striving for a singular objective. Her scenes are structured as sets of encounters and modeled so that the themes mentioned above can be understood as they occur. Finally, I turn to set theory to demonstrate the interdisciplinary poetics sought by both ecopoetics and environmentalism. Set theory links disciplines and helps differentiate poet’s theater from other theaters by showing how to model communication between genres, depicting where connections are facilitated and where communication becomes more difficult.
     

    3. Poet’s Theater

     
    Templeton is not alone in her attempt to rework the shape of theater. Many works of modern theater have addressed non-environmentally aware theater’s over-simplification of relationships and have sought a structurally more realistic stage. Jean Genet’s The Maids plays with the hierarchy of the domestic relationships between a madam and her two maids as they vie for control of the roost. The Living Theater and other theatrical troupes poured off the stage into the audience and then invited the audience onto the stage in order to undercut an unproductive separation of actors and audience. Alan Kaprow’s “Happenings” proposed an integrated environment that was inclusive of subject and object in an event-driven model that helped renew relationships between the actors and audience. Jerzy Grotowski’s “Poor Theater” used actors as props in The Tragical History of Doctor Faustus, exposed culture as a disguise for genocidal architecture in Akropolis, and created an integrated “total act” of components in his final work Apocalypsis cum Figuris. These and many other efforts have attempted to reformulate subject/object relations in theater, but mostly in the context of an experience related to the stage and encapsulated in a building. Centralizing the action on the proscenium stage requires suspension of disbelief that takes us away from daily experience. YOU—The City addresses this subject/object problem by taking the theater to multiple locations, disturbing the action to create quotidian stresses and make us question our surroundings. Rather than showing expected relationships between characters ensconced in different locations as happens in the movies, Templeton multiplies the idea of subject in the way the characters relate to each other and to the audience depending on location—that is, relations are ecosystem dependent.
     
    Poet’s theater explicitly calls attention to this relationship between the audience and the performers as a structure of its own (a common poetic device, which will be seen below in the discussions of actors and audience). While much innovative theater uses some poetic practices, Templeton’s effort tightly binds theater and language-oriented poetics. I use the term poet’s theater to link Templeton’s theatrical and poetic work in YOU—The City. I also treat Templeton’s work as a special case of an environmentally oriented poet’s theater because environmentalism can contain many other ideas of what poet’s theater can be; its taxonomy is dynamic. Further, I use the term environmental with respect to poet’s theater to emphasize the mechanisms by which components of the theater are linked rather than the stories of each scene. Concepts and practices like staging, characterization, and plot are not supplanted by environmental horizontality. Their connections map the ecosystems of poet’s theater and open a window onto how the larger culture can begin to take an environmental perspective into account. Poet’s theater’s inclusiveness retrieves the larger context of theater as a ritual connected with actual social structures (as in Greek theatre), not simply an artifact of culture commenting on society. The context of Templeton’s poet’s theater is structured with a comprehensive set of social concerns and constituencies: the workplace, the family, and the way individuals and roles outside the mainstream are understood and addressed. Like other theatrical experiences, it includes the stage, actors, text, props, but it also includes a range of technical components and ideas about environment in a way that throws into contrast our own propensity for understanding our lives environmentally. While this environmental propensity is constantly undermined by specialist claims of individual uniqueness, adaptive solutions must be recognized as the driving force behind our construction of social life and society itself.
     

    4. The Environmental Construction of Poet’s Theater

     
    In YOU—The City, Templeton puts the audience in direct one-on-one contact with the actors in their surroundings. Each audience member either travels alone or is escorted from location to location, meeting each actor in a series of mainly scripted encounters in and around Times Square, New York. The audience-of-one participates in the play according to a general set of rules and logistics established for the performance as a whole. Appendices to the play specify the instructions given to the actors prior to performance on such topics as client flow through the scenes, shuttling performers back and forth between the scenes, a gender alternation chart when performers must stand in for other performers, the role of monitor performers who track the flow, and how to handle fake clients, standby appointments, and blanks if a client fails to show up for an appointments. The addenda read like a battle plan: everything accounted for including chance. A more detailed map can be drawn over Templeton’s work by listing and describing some of the components of the ecosystem of YOU—The City, beginning with the role of cognition through to the play’s text, its stage, its performers, its audience, and its criticism. This map will represent its construction and performance in a way that highlights the work itself as an ecosystem participating in an environmental poetics. Once we have a clearer idea of what is inside each of these components, I will show how to rebuild them into a loosely coupled whole with set theory.
     
    One of the primary problems for the environmental movement in general to solve is how we overcome the way that ideologies isolate and separate people who actually may have many related interests and intentions. Theater’s traditional distance between stage and audience reifies this alienation as well. Identifying all participants and relationships in a performance event except oneself as the other in the structure of theater (audience to actor and by extension actor to actor) accents difference in a way that does not reflect the essential symbiosis and cooperation required to create and produce theater and to manage its resources. It also fails to reflect the social cohesion that frequently results from these experiences. Artists of all persuasions have often supported such ideological thinking by focusing on the differences between individuals, between schools of art or poetry, and by treating the work as the production of an individual. The problem is rooted in Descartes’ cogito where comprehension takes place all at once in the mind as if on a mental stage.
     
    In the environmental model of poet’s theater, mind participates in a more integrated manner with bodily activities. Environmental cognition shows thought extending, in certain instances, beyond the organism. Mark Rowlands, professor of philosophy at the University of Miami, suggests that cognition can be said to take place inside the body and also the “manipulation and transformation of information bearing structures” (16).Several functions, especially the function of memory, take place externally, like an external disk array on your computer. “In certain circumstances,” Rowlands writes, “acting upon external structures is a form of information processing” (19). For example, in non-environmental cognition when we want to find something, what we call thinking takes place. Then with the idea constituted in the mind and our thought completed, we look for the thing, i.e. we act, while presumably thinking about something else or repeating the initiating thought, “I want thyme,” obsessively as a litany or mantra to confirm our belief in the thought. Our actions are detached from the thought process. Moreover, the very distinction in question is that between thought and action. In the environmental model, thinking extends to the process of looking as well as creating the image (signified) of what we want to look for. Thinking and acting are symbiotes. Let’s say you want to find the thyme. You think of the thyme and open the spice rack. To paraphrase Rowlands’ description of the process: You run your finger along the bottles until you find the label that matches the image that you have in mind: thyme. The matching process is as much a part of environmental cognition as conceptualizing thyme in the first place or, in a more complex situation, as reading the word thyme in the recipe. The thinking process extends throughout the event, beyond the mind and into action. We can also cite language as a relevant cultural example of external cognition that we are using together now as I write and you read these words asynchronously. Thus thinking also takes place over extended time, establishing a four-dimensional topology for thought. Extending thought to language, to its uses, and to the external world, we can think about our environment in the process of acting on it. Defining cognition environmentally, we can value the external world in a way that’s consistent with how we value ourselves.
     
    Setting appropriate initial conditions, such as environmental cognition, for a self in relation to another component of the environment moves us toward establishing the sustainable interactions idealized by environmentalism. Extended cognition also helps avoid the trap of subject/object relations that separates the self from its surroundings in a way that allows us to detach ourselves from where we are, a detachment that can lead to such counterproductive behaviors as throwing a candy wrapper on the street or failing to secure a deep water drilling rig to improve profitability. The assumption that we can select a single perspective, either our own or that of the things we’re talking about (our discipline), from which to view the world and then apply that perspective to all events exemplifies the inflation of the subject, driven by the ego, from which humanity is environmentally suffering. Without extended cognition, we are conflicted every time we see a situation that presents more than one perspective. The mind-centered approach colors our entire world view even in its consideration of the body. Non-environmentally aware theaters model the theatrical experience as a set of unidirectional and sometimes bidirectional connections between actor and audience, between actor and actor on the stage, between author and audience, between director and actor. We often talk about these connections separately and analyze them within our specialized disciplines, because our assumptions about thinking inhibit a more inclusive approach. These point-to-point connections become confused as the assignment of a central perspective shifts between author, actors, and audience. The simplification that seems so effective in its first instance builds unnecessarily complex models as we proceed from one use case to another.
     
    As an alternative to these point-to-point communications, we might construct sets of perspectives. In the case of YOU—The City, the scenes represent multiple perspectives for the audience. Individual processes such as character and thematics can be traced through the sets showing the accessibility of paths with greater or lesser difficulty of communication. These paths become narratives of relations that are dynamically inter-subjective and so model our world more effectively (an approach I will revisit at the end of the essay in a consideration of q-analysis). Templeton questions traditional ideas, conventions, and standards of theater in ways that model environmental cognition and sustainable interactions, as when she writes:
     

    Well, who goes to the theater to sit and have catharsis any more, but this very experimental form provided you with the kind of rush the conventional theater no longer does. The only difference between that and catharsis is the distance issue. But whilst problematizing the relationship between performer and performee, and between theater and reality, YOU does this by indulging you. It’s like Genet’s Balcony; it’s a place of your own enactment. What if somebody doesn’t get it that there’s a distance and takes it for real? Well, some people almost did. And the performers had to see that and play.
     

    (YOU 133)

     

    The distance between actor and client in YOU—The City becomes proportional to the distance between performers, sometimes nearer, sometimes farther, but always interactive. Catharsis is no longer a characteristic of the audience; it is a performance in itself, another interaction on the stage. In another example, Templeton attenuates the distance between the actor and client. “If the client picks up the telephone, the monitor performer should be aware of the name of the client who is in that scene at that point and should ask: Are you [client’s name]? Sorry to bother you” (134). By now the client has clearly joined the cast. This process expands the idea of intention to a matrix and introduces extended cognition, a key concept of a culture that supports environmental change.

     

    The Text / Documentation as Ecosystem

     
    In the published book, the text of YOU—The City is divided into three columns, a collaborative design between Templeton and myself (in my role as press editor for Roof Books) that treats the writing as an ecosystem. The left-hand page is divided into two columns, one offering documentation of the event including photographs, and the second listing the instructions to actors (see Fig. 1 below). On the right-hand page, the play’s “dialogue” stands more or less alone. This architecture differs from the organic compound that most published plays use, for example, in the French’s editions where all text is printed in a linear format that accumulates over time.
     

     
    Page layout from YOU—The City (New York: Roof, 1990). 32-33.

     

    Click for larger view

    Fig. 1.

    Page layout from YOU—The City (New York: Roof, 1990). 32-33.

     

     
    By separating the components, this publication attempts to make the reader aware of separate species of text, to treat them both independently and together, and at the same time to make it really easy to read the spoken words without interruption, as a kind of poetry. Templeton was forceful in her insistence that the performers speak poetry, a subset of the textual materials in the book. In some sense, then, I have begun to think of the other material and the connections among them as its poetics. By highlighting this textual taxonomy we can see both the independence of the components and the necessity of their interaction to complete the performance. In theatrical texts that are not environmentally aware, this interaction is assumed, thus glossing over the interactions of the various species of text—spoken word, directions to the actor, and documentation of the performance, including pictures and comments. In contrast, the divided text of YOU—The City highlights how our thinking extends beyond the spoken word to location to comment to a wide variety of components of the ecosystem.
     
    Environmental poetics is inherent in Templeton’s text as “you” is repositioned through constant repetition and continuous presence in the same way that nature appears to dissolve through our manipulation of it. The self dissolves, and second person and first person comingle. Integrating the ego into the world helps us treat humanity and nature together as a single complex unit. The notion of externalized cognition, where thinking takes place not only in the mind but extending beyond it as a connection between the world and the mind, reveals, Templeton asserts, the fundamental social condition of the person:
     

    Because the text on the page is not actually being addressed to you, it may be read as though something were missing, which it is, because you have to add your subjectivity, in a more active sense than the page usually demands … the you disappears from the text. Because you is passed on. The word you changed from being egoistic to being social. You had learned the second person.
     

    (YOU 135)

     

    Environmentalism implies that we model events as relationships between entities (actors, client, props) rather than as isolated nodes operating via communication to each other. Templeton moves back and forth between the performers, sometimes equating them, sometimes separating them until that path is well defined, the relationship materialized. Templeton takes the notion a step further by pointing out that the primary objects of an ecosystem (as in the McGraw Hill definition) may be those interfaces between two organisms as much as the organisms themselves. And YOU attempts to show precisely that, for as Templeton writes:

     

    The experience of art is in relationship, meaning being born where intention and interpretation meet. Theater is the art of relationship. A performance is the product of as many points of view as there are creators; a realized moment of performance is the meeting of as many as are present, performers and audience … ‘you’ assumes and creates relationship.
     

    (YOU 139)

     

    But lest the inveterate traditionalist slip into a state of terror at having her identity stolen by forces akin to the Soviet threat or Invasion of the Body Snatchers, YOU reassures the reader that

     

    since YOU deals with relationship, it also evokes privacy. But not the privacy of reaction of the individual in one of a thousand theater seats, protected in anonymity and in numbers . . . the gaze is returned, client and performer sustain between them the performance of the performance, because there is only them—a deflection of the attention of either and reality is redefined . . . The performance is a relationship, “you” is a relationship, meaning is made between speaker and hearer. You‘s privacy is that of the individuality of any relationship.
     

    (YOU 139)

     

    YOU takes exception to theater’s separation of performer and audience by creating a renewed relationship between them. Furthermore, Templeton argues that “[t]he relationship [between performer and audience] was located in the same place where the meaning of the text was made” (140). The question of difference, of uniqueness in the arts, does not disappear. Differentiating features remain within the larger context of relationship. But the contours of the self blur, and environment, instead of being defined as the place where the subject resides, becomes ecosystem inclusive of the self.

     
    The energy created by the edges of selves in contact replaces the reality of the self in situ with an environmental set of relationships. Templeton notes that this change can present difficulty for performers: “The performance defined itself close to the edge of the real, but in order to use and to make visible the chosen side of it. For one performer, the edge was not clear enough in that his performance spilled into his life, and so the clients’ lives, our lives, mine” (YOU 140). Here is a clear representation of an environmentally defined world where the edges of the different selves in contact with each other become the bodies of the ecosystem. The performers did not find it quite so easy to return to the imaginary world that humanism creates of bodies moving through space. Seen in this light of fricative edges, the edges of the text run off the page, “the Aristotelian unities became logistic rather than narrative concerns” (YOU 141). And this textual logistic is represented by staging as well as by a schedule of performers and performees interacting. YOU—The City documents the text, the action of the events, and commentary about both. Providing a more complete document of the work than the usual publication, the book published by Roof attempted to prevent the reader from becoming lost in the text, hypnotized by artistic technique. The text itself is one stage of meaning among others, not the whole meaning. For example, Templeton comments that “the cab ride not only separates the play’s two geographical sets of locations, but also separates the introductory linear series of scenes from the loop of the rest of the piece” (YOU 149). Meaning in poet’s theater is located repeatedly at every level of scale and in each facet of the text.
     

    The Stage

     
    The staging of YOU—The City has received more attention than most of the other parts of the performance because it is the distinguishing feature of the work. Yet viewed in parallel with the other components of the theater, its unique values also contribute to a comprehensive environment. YOU—The City moves from the usual closed space of theater to the streets. Templeton made the city like a movie set, sans cameras, in order to “switch from close up to long shot to a level of reality—because it was so completely site specific. And not just site specific, but without the feeling of other people watching—it was just your experience” (“Presence Project”). These sites are a distraction from the work’s themes and disarming at the same time, because the client is constantly trying to understand what to do, how to behave. If it were located in a theater, with its familiar conventions of audience behavior, the presence of other audience members would likely encourage you to sit quietly. If you were alone in the city and contacted some strangers, you would also likely follow behavioral conventions, interacting according to the needs of the exchange, whether someone is asking directions or stealing your purse. But in this case, where audience and performers are constantly negotiating the space between them, audience-performer interaction both unsettles familiar behaviors and suppresses normal protective instincts because the safety of the performance remains operational, even on the mean streets. Standing in a scene, if you are only in the role of watching performers, you might be able to separate yourself from the action. But if the performers are constantly telling things to “you” while you are watching the scene, saying “you” over and over, inviting your engagement, but not indicating in any clear way how to react or even whether to react, your sense of self begins to break down. In that chaotic moment, more and more information is exchanged between audience and performers, which increases your understanding of what is going on–not just in your mind but around you, through the transmission of language and bodily cues taking place between you and the performers. However, most clients become confused because of this chaotic plethora of data (although I spoke to one woman who found it perfectly natural).
     
    The staging of Templeton’s poet’s theater also poses questions about the impact of structure, because “framing the artificial makes it seem real,” as Nick Kaye says in one interview (“Presence Project”). Templeton thinks “it’s a question of whether you can take it that far,” which I take to mean that whether framing the artificial actually goes so far as to change the perception of reality, or whether it simply highlights the fact of artificiality, is a matter still open to debate. Templeton’s incredulity about the easy identification of framing with transformation extends to human interaction by making it difficult for the performers to find a consistent frame:
     

    I talk about framing to the performers a lot. And often you think about framing as something you do when you observe, but I talked to them about framing as something that they had to do to themselves. For example, when they were, in fact, saying a script, they had to present it in such a way that it seemed natural—yes, as acting, which was to do with the way in which they set up their relationship with the other person [client].
     

    (“Presence Project”)

     

    In this sense the performers use the confusion of location to confuse the idea of role. Enacting the frame is actually breaking the frame as it makes us aware of the frame and drags us into it. External cognition re-establishes a larger frame, making the relationship both less confusing and more comprehensive. Like the performers and audience, the stage is mutable and not entirely under control. People from the street intrude into the set and participate in the performance. As Kaye points out in his interview with Templeton, “There seems to be a very close link between this attention to site and an overlaying of these roles and positions. I wonder if you think of those things as being indelibly intertwined” (“Presence Project”). The stage becomes an unpredictable environment, or nearly so, because Templeton continues the distinction between real and artificial even while questioning it.

     
    The environmental aspects of the piece are revealed in its symmetry and complexity, as opposed to the dramatized asymmetry of modernist and postmodern productions. Actors enter at alternating symmetrical points and leave in the same alternative symmetry, but the entries and exits do not coincide. Thus there is a perceivable order but it is not predictable for the audience; the performers are only kept on track by a series of complex instructions and schedules documented in the book, but not readily apparent to the client. As Templeton has already pointed out, here logistics replaces the narrative and hence informs the theatrical structure. Whereas narrative is often associated with the story of an individual or the collective story of multiple individuals, by using logistics to replace a story line that runs from the beginning of the play to its end, Templeton again points out that relationships rather than individuals lie at the core of any understanding of our environment. How we feel about a specific interaction with the environment is not as important as understanding the results of that relationship. Of course ignoring human behavior would be impractical, but its psychological aspects must be balanced with the effects of our relationship to the environment. Logistics points out one way of dealing with the incredible complexity of environmental changes or problems, be they climatic or social; within YOU—The City, it also reduces the effects of individual psychology and emphasizes the interactions between multiple performers and the audience of one. These interactions are visible in the diagram below (see Fig. 2), which shows the logistics of the shuttles that performers have to follow in staging the work. Out of this schedule a temporal aspect of the work emerges, besides its duration or the duration of its scenes; here again the performer becomes a metaphor as well as the carrier of the text to the audience. The systematic and external sense of timing in logistics is not arbitrary but is, instead, required to move people to the right place at the right time. Essentialism in narrative–the plot, if you will–is replaced by the necessity of logistics.
     

     
    Diagram of Performer Shuttles for YOU—The City (New York: Roof, 1990). 164.

     

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    Fig. 2.

    Diagram of Performer Shuttles for YOU—The City (New York: Roof, 1990). 164.

     

     

    The Performers

     
    The relationship between the performers and the other components of the theater displays an environmental bias to Templeton’s work. As Templeton writes about the process of realizing the play again and again in situ:
     

    While re-creating YOU—The City in various versions, I became interested in further layers of participants besides official audience and performers—the inhabitants of the various neighborhoods, who gradually knew what was happening as pairs of audience and performer passed many times daily. These layers became both audience and performers themselves, either choosing to watch, simply to appear, to offer comments, or to intervene. This inspired how L’Ile (The Island [2003]) works, using multiple layers of audience and performers as its base and structure.
     

    (“A Poetics” 7)

     

    This evolving approach to structure contrasts with a structure where complex frameworks are stripped of components until they can be modeled in a linear fashion. Care is usually taken in scientific and artistic endeavors to assure that the components eliminated do not significantly alter the net value of the materials or calculation.3 Nevertheless, complex layering produces emergent properties that can change the results and certainly change the tone and atmosphere of those results. In Templeton’s case those interactions resulting from complexity tend to be the content of the work as much as its presumed theme. I would hazard that even the term “poet’s theater” titles the genre as a complex layering of roles, and in fact, the very title YOU—The City implies a dual agency that rapidly develops beyond the usual subject-object relations in theater.

     
    This technique of dual agency is modeled most famously perhaps in The Living Theater’s late 1960s productions. Presenting inter-subjectivity as an action highlights the set of relationships between audience and performer so that the self is extended into the surroundings. This extended performer is tough to define and behaves more like a performer in an ecosystem, taking on different attitudes depending on what role she takes with respect to others in the niche: performer, guide, client, or monitor. A tree, for example, can provide shade for a ruminant, a home for a sparrow, flowers for a bee, block nutrients from smaller plants, and act as a landmark for a human. The performer, too, is mutable and defined by his/her role within each context. In one case, an actor changes roles from one scene to the next. In another example, an actor in one scene becomes a client in a subsequent scene. In YOU—The City, the larger ecosystem, the city, becomes an actor as well, causing many difficulties for the performers and the audience. The character designated in the text as the “46th Street Person” says
     

    I have to be polite to you, when what I really want to do is rip you apart. No, of course not, because then you wouldn’t be you anymore, and anyway, no, I don’t want to see your insides. . . . So you can’t be what? Be you? Let me be you. Let me be you to you? Or see yourself for him?
     

    (YOU 29)

     

    This speech suggests that humans are not all of one sort. Some operate independently while some are capable of only acting within a well-defined context. Changing roles change people’s values. In another case, the Excommunicado Confessor chastises the audience: “Fearless invention before a crowd of madmen and scared to say it. Your own forged bills pour in. Forge a presence an absence can quench. . . . You’re spun to face yourself. Don’t say yes” (35). Here is a man who has intentionally stepped out of his role, reinvented himself in opposition to his prior role and in opposition to the vagrant in the prior scene. The priest points to the forgery/forging of the self in a reflexive mode. Ultimately, the anti-deistic diatribe focuses on resistance (“Don’t say yes”) to being one person, but being many, a truer relationship with the world.

     
    In her “Notes to the Directions (On Performance)” Templeton describes the actor’s method as changing from pretending to be a different person than you actually are to an unspecified something else which I assume is accessing multiple roles together. Templeton’s process structures Puckishness. The linking of the actor and audience makes the distinction even more difficult to deal with when Templeton says to the actor, “Where does you live? This guy lives somewhere between the speaker and the hearer” in the connector (YOU 145). And this thought takes us from the topic of the performer to that of the audience.
     

    The Audience/Client

     
    Poet’s theater questions the self as it rewrites the relationship between performer and audience. This characteristic mechanism of modern poetry becomes a cause célèbre in postmodernism. Arthur Rimbaud used the second person to mean the first person. In John Ashbery’s “Pyrography,” the postmodern speaker shifts from I to they to we to you and all are conflated to describe the present tense where our existences are structured together in an ecosystem of selves (8-11). YOU—The City keeps the social being, the person, in flux as a client moves through the locations confronting different performers, taking a different role with each while trying all the while to retain a consistent picture of the self to align with her overall impression of the event. In some cases the client is an observer with the scene going on around her, as in the apartment. But suddenly the client is called to the phone, injected into the action. The client also revisits the apartment, taking on a different role. In other locations, the client is addressed but not told what to do. She is left to her own devices, freed to act according to her interest. In some scenes, like the playground handoff, the client becomes part of the scene and cannot avoid participation. These different roles do not create a conflict so much as they identify the person as a conglomerate of intentions and relations with the other participants of the action. It took me many days to realize that what I had experienced as a client myself was not conflict but transformation from one to many.
     
    In this way YOU materializes the person as a sequence of roles and the self as one’s collective awareness of those roles. Brevity in poetry (its ecology)–or condensation, as Pound would have it–is insufficient at this point. Environmental culture cannot be reduced to conservation, although that role is relevant. The poet aligns her role with the others that she takes on in writing, directing, and producing the work. In this way environmental poetics is expansive as well as conserving of resources. The role or the job of the poet does not scale out as in mass media, but upward in sets at every level from poetry writing, to poetry reading, to poetry publishing, to poetry community… Each set of activities includes the prior one so that the hierarchy implied is inclusive rather than oriented to the status of the set or person. The boundaries of a work of poetry are extended in the way the self has been shown to be mutable. The common artistic assumption of uniqueness does not scale up and so needs to be augmented by these common elements. Together these elements create the network context that we have described as an ecosystem, the plane of our poetic geometry. That plane is then juxtaposed to the person for the purpose of establishing value in the space between them. In her essay “A Poetics of Performance Relevant to a Particular Definition of the Word,” Templeton says,
     

    executing something, doing what the thing is supposed to do, but specifically in relation to a standard of measurement, efficiency. . . . Performance is doing something, but there is still a standard involved. Not simply how well someone plays the flute, or acts in a character, in terms of efficiency (how would that be measured anyway), but in terms of its effect. Performance in the arts is not simply knowing all the notes, but the context in which it happens. Performance necessarily has a context.
     

    (1)

     

    Templeton is well aware of the western tradition of “the individual as the unit of thought” (“A Poetics” 5), and intentionally extends the self beyond the individual through the context of performance. Thinking in poet’s theater is externalized in an environmental way and extends between the performer and the audience, not simply as communication of messages, but as a transformation that modifies both the original work and the people who attend the presentation. “You” become part of the larger whole. The spiritual notion of uncontaminated purity, theatrically represented in a monologue, disappears. Communication exchanges text and presence with the audience rather than speaking at the audience. But dialogue with the audience is continuous to the point of exhaustion in YOU—The City.

     
    In the apartment scene of YOU—The City, Templeton exhibits this complexity of self and relationship. She calls this scene “the most distancing Act” (YOU 142), while for me the space is more easily seen as an ecosystem of relations.
     

    Suddenly there is more than one performer, and costumes, and dialogue, and distance within enclosure, and more than one client, them and us now as well as you and me, these objectifying signs are undermined in their very theatricality. The performers are not speaking to each other, though the dialogue replies to itself, but they are looking at each other’s clients in a schema of deferred otherness.
     

    (1)

     

    The niche defined by the apartment enclosure exposes an environmental way of thinking. Templeton’s version of environment is oddly resonant: “Meaning is not an answer but an apprehension of successive forms, their retention, protention and compatibility for coexistence in the mind” (YOU 143). The mind space is getting rather crowded in her formulation and it might be easier to open outward to include those external elements. Poet’s theater participates in externalized cognition by the interaction between the performer and the audience. By breaking down the separation between audience and performer, by changing the ratio from many-to-many to one-on-one, YOU enables cognition to take place between the audience of one and a performer in the first part of the event. In the second part, interactions of one to many are explored. Looking at these multiple ratios emphasizes a dynamic structure for the performance that addresses the matrix of environmental poetics. In both cases, the thought process takes place via interaction between audience and performer as well as by comparison between scenes. Templeton uses these philosophies of relationship in her work as well as in her personal experience: “a moment of hesitation I experienced as a child on realizing that the bus driver could be called by the same name as my mother, ‘you’. It is the pronoun of recognition, of exchange . . .” (“A Poetics” 3).

     
    YOU—The City frequently addresses the dissolving ego of environmental poetics to make citizens less apt to despoil the nest. The Meterless Charioteer (gypsy cab driver) looks over his shoulder at the audience, “I can look back at you. Of course you can see through me. I have to be an impostor, though you don’t know of what. But you do. And where do you fit in?” (39). The gypsy cab driver is a three-in-one imposter: one person posing as another and then acting in that role. The client is then asked directly by this poseur how she fits into the role-playing, highlighting the client’s desire to retain a singular identity (“you”) throughout this stretching and fragmenting process of self. The stage instructions in this scene add to the dissolution; “Your ‘you,’” Templeton writes, “is often ‘one’, so sometimes ‘I’, meaning you” (YOU 40). These instructions not only reinforce the shifting roles by using the pronouns, but they also point to how pronouns shift in grammar. This cascading of similar shapes at different scales, the person in the cab and the play with grammar, reinforces the play of dynamic systems so important in understanding the complexity of environment. With such self-shifting, Templeton turns locations inside out. The cab driver looks over his shoulder at you and says, “Watch where you’re going. I don’t want to be stuck with you forever. Aren’t you hungry to move on? If I look away are you free? Now you can see more than two sides of life, like leaning into the mirror after your night on the tiles. What’s in it when you’re not? Out there is your way in” (41). Now at the nth case the driver suggests a view of the action beyond the usual polarity of self and other. “Out there,” outside the cab, outside the self you find a method of understanding the world as a series of relations. The organism, you, exists. It doesn’t dissolve but exists in its relations rather than in the fixed role where our culture tends to place it. As the Coca Cola commercials opine, “You’re the one.” Templeton provides an alternative.
     
    In some ways the metaphor of Templeton’s work and the metaphor of poet’s theater get carried too far and aren’t successfully restructured. In/out, you/me, the shifting dissolves and you’re lost: “I know you’re not me. Who am I, you want to know? I’m who’s talking to you. Oh, of course, I always change, I change toward you. . . . From who you are or seem to be to me… You’re not discussed” (YOU 41). But even these confusing identities are entertaining if they are not too threatening. The replacement of plot by logistics isn’t carried through to a more complete definition of self, although we realize it as we negotiate our passage through the event. Simply reading the text it is somewhat difficult to imagine.
     

     
    Act II.ii from YOU—The City (New York: Roof, 1990). 55.

     

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    Fig. 3.

    Act II.ii from YOU—The City (New York: Roof, 1990). 55.

     

     
    As the expected notion of self transforms Templeton emphasizes presence as much as person. As she explains, “I am actually very happy to watch shows that are nothing but attention to the moment—whatever that is—but . . . attention for me is what creates presence—and that’s what’s evoked in audience transaction” (“Presence Project” 5). Such a commitment to presence approaches Robert Wilson’s austere presentations of a person and a vegetable on stage and may be said to be about negotiating the moment. And beyond that, we must include memory in poetry.
     

    And Criticism (post-event activities of writing and publishing)

     
    Establishing an environmental poetics would be incomplete without positioning the work you are reading now in the ecosystem of the play. While this may be a separate topic in its own right, our ecosystem of poet’s theater includes talking about it. In the published performance of YOU—The City, a wider context is already established by including photographs and comments, as discussed above. While each of the sets we have discussed is incomplete, the focus remains on the relationships between them. And what establishes that relationship more than critical writing about the play? Environmental poetics focuses attention at every point in the process, from intention through critical interpretation. Additional meaning is imparted in the formats of publication and venues where the work is distributed. As already cited, Templeton points out that “Meaning is not an answer but an apprehension of successive forms . . . The movement of the mind through meaning after meaning, the series of their landscapes, is meaningful. For example, here the meaning is clear, here obscure, here conclusive . . .” (YOU 143). One of the forms included in the performance is writing about it; the published performance includes columns of comments and contextualizing remarks. Interestingly, this environmental approach of including its own commentary has a precursor in Dante’s Vita Nuova, where each poem about Beatrice is followed by a commentary on the poem in its context with prosodic notes and biographical information. In this sense Templeton’s poet’s theater and environmental poetics present themselves as species of criticism, a horizontal force across the silos of epistemology.
     

    5. Set Theory and Environment: What’s Different About Poet’s Theater

     
    By changing the relationship between actors and audience, Templeton increases our awareness of each of them. By increasing the amount of detail through heightened awareness she helps us see how the components can be modeled both independently and together. By arranging the text in several columns, our collaborative publication defines another set of components that can be modeled together rather than seen as an indissoluble organic unit. We need an interdisciplinary tool to allow us to look at both the similarities and differences in a relatively value-free structure. Set theory provides such a modeling process; as a tool, it is specifically suited to depict both what distinguishes poet’s theater from other theaters and their common elements. Through the use of set theory we can compare poet’s theater to non-environmentally aware theater. We approach the problem of differentiation by defining the sets of components of YOU—The City so that they may be compared to other forms of theater–Shakespeare, for example–or even to non-art events, like social structure. Whereas most art writing thrives on differences reinforced by self-interest and contemporary culture, set theory models both common and unique elements. If we apply this tool to poet’s theater, I think we may also establish a method that can be carried forward to other disciplines. My aspirations for this theory exceed somewhat the scope of poet’s theater, but the ethos of using poetry to create an environmental culture is equally unreasonable.4
     
    Set theory is that branch of mathematics that treats collections of things. The physicist Ron Atkin, through what he calls q-analysis, uses set theory to create non-evaluative hierarchies that show how components of a system like theater can be linked and how they communicate.5 If we structure poet’s theater using the approach that we took in the prior sections–that is, as text, performers, audience, etc.–we can represent it as a hierarchy of levels. Hierarchy here does not mean superior and inferior like castes, but rather higher levels that include lower levels like a garden includes flowers, shrubs, trees, and lawn: a hierarchy of scale. This kind of precision may seem obsessive to the poet and fuzzy to the mathematician, but taking a line of reasoning from the political realm, the fact that both disciplines find difficulties with it makes it a potentially useful tool. Q-analysis helps us to look at different disciplines in relation to each other, and set theory fits well with many modes of discourse. Q-analysis engages methods from algebraic topology to help understand metaphoric structures such as theater and poetry and as a cross disciplinary tool readily aligns with environmental poetics. Using q-analysis we have organized Templeton’s work to show how poet’s theater is both like and unlike its non-environmentally aware counterparts. Q-analysis also helps us understand how communication is achieved. In poet’s theater the stage, the actors, the audience, the text are all in place; only their positions are somewhat shifted from where they would be on, for example, the Shakespearean stage.
     
    To apply set theory to YOU—The City, start with the level of the play or work of poet’s theater as the most inclusive level of our hierarchy. (We might also conceptualize more inclusive levels such as Templeton’s entire oeuvre or the even more inclusive category of poet’s theater. It is immediately obvious that q-analysis is a flexible analytic tool.) At this level we also include the neighborhood of Times Square or a neighborhood of London, or of any other city where the event has been performed, since the play itself does not encompass the physical location. We include these at the same level because together they cover all aspects of the physical and conceptual work. Call this level N+2. In the ways they connect, the play and the neighborhood together comprise the ecosystem of the work.
     
    At the level included in level N+2, call it N+1, and including all levels beneath, is the sequencing of scenes and characters. We find at the same level a single member of the audience, the client, who moves through all scenes from first to last. Also at the N+1 level are the transits between scenes, the logistics, where the audience/client is conducted or moves alone from scene to scene. This N+1 level also includes general instructions to the performers and other textual components described above. (See Fig. 2‘s diagram of transits above.)
     
    At level N are the individual scenes and their narratives. For YOU—The City the scene is the primary niche in its ecosystem. (We can easily recall many pieces of poet’s theater where actors and locations extend beyond the scene, but that is not the case here.) The play as described earlier was actually generated from a set of relationships between a client and a performer. These relationships were later constituted as scenes. Here we can see how the matrix of intention (described earlier in this essay) more accurately describes the net result of the completed event even though it differs from the initial intention. These relationships construct the scenes. At this level we also have the specific locations where each scene is being performed—the apartment, the office, the cab.
     
    At the N-1 level are individual locations, actors/characters, and text within each scene. Actors in this play are usually only in one scene and only present in a scene one at a time. The first five scenes establish this standard. After the taxi ride a more complex mixture of ingredients is applied. After the cab rides actors extend across two scenes, and including one case where an actor appears in scenes that are not sequential. At one point in the apartment scene, several actors appear together and in that scene two audience members are together and may relate to each other. At this level several important differences between poet’s theater and non-environmentally aware theater are evident. First the plots and subplots all take place within a scene; they rarely cross even as themes, except the theme of identity, of course. In fact YOU—The City isolates themes within a scene; they don’t survive outside the borders of the niche of the scene, another biomorphic metaphor. The characters too, with the exceptions listed above, do not survive the limits of the niche of the scene. This is not true in the apartment which is visited twice.
     
    At the N-2 level we can place the details of the text for each scene, how the performers speak their lines, how they relate to the client. These performative aspects of the piece are isolated as well within the scene. Intention for the author, as pointed out, began here, but is not readily visible in the performance where the structure of the scenes commands our attention.
     
    Here is a summary of the levels for YOU—The City. The play offers three groups of sets, somewhat simplified:
     

    Group A represents the theater: the play, the scenes, the transits, the neighborhood and specific locations.
     
    Group B represents the participants: the characters/actors, the audience/client, neighborhood people who intrude into the scenes.
     
    Group C represents the text: the commentary in the play, the spoken text, the narratives in each scene, the speeches.

     

    Leaving out the commentary for the time being, although we have seen above how it participates, we can fit the groups into a hierarchical schema where each level contains the level below it:

     

    N+2 The play as in groups A and C, the neighborhood as in group A
     
    N+1 The audience/client as in group B, transits and logistics as in group A
     
    N The scenes as in group A, the narratives as in group C, the characters in more than one scene, the specific locations of the scenes
     
    N-1 Locations, text, and participants of each scene (characters and client).

     

    We could go on from here to show textual and performance details, but for the purposes of this analysis, we have probably gone far enough to clarify how q-analysis might organize the theater. Ron Atkin uses a similar approach to Midsummer Night’s Dream (131-141). Here, for comparison, is Atkin’s q-analysis of Midsummer Night’s Dream. The groups have a similar structure with different and similar contents:

     

    Group A: the play, the acts, the scenes, the subscenes
     
    Group B: the characters
     
    Group C: the commentary, the play, the plots, the subplots, the speeches…

     

    And here is the schema:

     

    N+2 The play (as in group A), and also the play (as in group C)
     
    N+1 The acts (A), the plots (C) [plots refer to the different strands of the story the lovers, the faeries, and the workingman’s theater troupe]
     
    N The scenes (A), the characters (B), and the subplots (C)
     
    N-1 The sub-scenes (A), the speeches (C)
     

     
    The differences and similarities are immediately apparent. Templeton simplifies the narrative structure but adds location-specific information that Atkin with his more traditional aesthetics assumes. Rather than multiple scenes within the narrative, and plots and subplots, Templeton’s poet’s theater focuses on how the stories are played out within each scene or niche. Templeton separates narrative, the sequence of scenes, from the stories within each scene. If we identify story with the self, then poet’s theater becomes a critique of the identification of narrative (structure) with story (self) in prior theaters. Narrative becomes logistical. Although not all poet’s theater has this specific structure, poet’s theater as a general case revises the structure of prior theater. Poet’s theater changes the idea of self; the subject/object problem is also dealt with differently as discussed above. Now it is easier to see the power of the structure assumed in prior theater and what results by changing that structure in poet’s theater. The top level contains the play in both cases, but in YOU—The City the location becomes an active participant whereas in the prior theater the locations are assumed as the stage. The transits exist as blocking in Shakespeare but are not considered in Atkin’s hierarchy, because they are assumed by humanist culture as Atkin sees it. Shakespeare’s is a human-centered approach in that it avoids a narrative of logistics, preferring to focus on character. If we look closely at Shakespeare we see that relationships are often established by logistics–who is where when–and happenstance is a key player in the narrative. But Shakespeare primarily sequences the narrative using stories or plots. Also different between environmentally focused poet’s theater and prior theater is the active presence of the audience or client as a dynamic contributor to the action. While scenes and plots are present in both, their locations are somewhat different. The details of each scene show a similar structure between Templeton and Shakespeare but in Templeton’s poet’s theater there are no sub-scenes, and plots are encapsulated within scenes. From another viewpoint the plays are similar. We still have the play, the text, the actors, and the audience. They have different roles in each type of theater, but the components are quite the same. Consider the biological analogies. What separates environmentalism from humanism in part is how environmental poetics treats both similarities and differences in identifying the two theatrical structures. Environmental poetics allows interactive positioning rather than taking an ideological stance that isolates different perspectives. Humanism’s fixed hierarchy is still defined in Genesis.
     
    When looking at these similarities and differences together, notice the balance between them. While we continue to distinguish one part of the modeling tool from another as in any hierarchy, we are also confronted with large-scale similarities between the plays. Looking at this contextualized set of factors forces a comparative view of these plays. Again, as in Templeton’s blurring of the borders of the individuals, the reader is driven to value a larger sphere than the self, and we begin to identify with the structure of the environment as well as the self as part of it. Q-analysis would allow us to go further, too, in mapping the topology of the play, as Atkin does in his book-length treatment. Doing so would show the specific communications that are facilitated by being in the same dimension of the ecosystem. It would also show those that are made more difficult by being in another level or dimension, such as the difficulty of understanding the entire play at level N+2 from the point of view of the client moving consecutively through the scenes at level N+1. The client has to go through all the scenes and debriefing by the director in a café at the end before having enough information to grasp the concept even though the client is constantly trying to understand her situation. In Templeton’s poet’s theater the location varies from scene to scene and locations recur only once with the client in a different role, whereas in proscenium theater almost all action takes place on the same stage with some action understood to have taken place offstage. Props and actors are treated as resources to be moved on and off the stage as the action directs. The distributed architecture of poet’s theater is used even where there is only one location as poet’s theater frequently re-orients the coordinates of the audience and the staging.
     
    But what does this analysis do for us that justifies extending the creative impulse to the structure of set theory? What do we learn from applying topology to art? In the environmental model, human biological and mechanical systems as well as systems of ideas can be considered ecosystems, i.e., as we have said, a set of relationships and as such can be treated together. Q-analysis organizes any of these complex structures in an unambiguous way that is expected in science and politics, but remains unusual, even difficult, for art. In fact, this method can be said to restrict one of the primary values of poetry–ambiguity–replacing it instead with several well-delineated logistical processes. But there’s plenty of ambiguity left to go around; it occurs at different points in the artistic process. We learn to accommodate change and dynamism in our actions and thoughts. Q-analysis supplies a structural description of the linkages among these components, allowing us to see that our environment is not simply an extension of our will. It separates the semantic relationships from the syntactic (ordering, logistic) relationships but treats them at the same level so that they communicate. And I mean to use it and external cognition as levers to change our view of environment from a bucket into which we can throw objects and ideas with predictable results to a set of relationships with edges defining events. We learn how components of our lives communicate or distance themselves, both human and non-human entities.
     
    How can we establish an environmentally oriented methodology by mixing mathematical and literary tools as Templeton implies and I have made explicit here? One goal is to establish that independent modes of discourse separated by great intellectual distances can live side by side, even thrive symbiotically and consequently encourage environmental thinking in the arts. Q-analysis shows that difficulty in communication across dimensional boundaries appears even among related ideas such as understanding the whole play while in it. In its method of construction, q-analysis works environmentally. Its complex structures are focused on linkages, as in Templeton’s work, where a system has “considered parts standing in interaction because the state of each part is dependent on the state of other parts via a directed influence/dependence linkage” (Legrand). The topological process of connectivity in q-analysis allows the data to be inspected with less distortion than with a narrative. Again, I point to the need for artists to consider how non-evaluative hierarchy can exist alongside narrative and tone in a normally ambiguous text or even in a polysemic innovative text. Q-analysis is useful in diagnosing the failure of large-scale systems like works of art or social structures. We can see where communication works, where it breaks down, and where it is duplicated (Ishida). For example, communication works easily where the levels are connected downward. It’s easy to understand grass and flowers in the garden. Going upward levels of greater inclusiveness are more difficult to communicate in that it’s harder to understand the garden from the point of view of one flower. It’s difficult to understand the relationship of the individual in society if relationships are not emphasized. The individual doing the thinking becomes easily confused and marginalized. Q-analysis’ value as a social science tool makes it an appropriate linking agent between arts and sciences.
     
    Atkin’s q-analysis is known for showing the limits of communication. By applying it to poet’s theater, an art often concerned with the indefinable and personal analogy, we are able to show that things we expect to combine in a specified way might combine differently, and that they don’t successfully combine in yet other ways. Q-analysis emphasizes the experimental aspect of poet’s theater; things don’t always work as planned, and events in the performance are highlighted as tentative and provisional. Atkin shows this through a geometrical analysis of a hierarchical environment, inclusive of subject and object and capable of becoming a lens through which to view across disciplinary lines. Templeton’s work enables us to view ecosystems similarly by establishing a concrete structure where all the parts are defined in the poet’s theater semantically, and are then structured syntactically in such a way that the hierarchy works to direct the audience’s path through the ecosystem. In this process, Templeton’s work is both exploratory as a kind of trial and error process, and produces artistic and ambiguous results (although this process is not unique to art). Social structure can now be read as an ecosystem of relationships.
     

    James Sherry is the author of more than 10 books of poetry and prose. His new manuscript, Sorry: Environmental Poetics, is forthcoming. He is the editor of Roof Books (www.roofbooks.com) and founder of the Segue Foundation (seguefoundation.com) that has produced more than 10,000 literary and other art events in the New York metropolitan area during the past 30 years.
     

    Footnotes

     
    1. YOU—The City was first produced in New York City (USA), 1988; London (England), 1989; Ljubljana (Slovenia), 1990; Den Haag, (Netherlands), 1990; Zurich (Switzerland), 1990; Munich (Germany), 1991; Hamburg (Germany), 1999; Rotterdam (Netherlands), 2001.
     
    As editor and publisher of Roof Books I consider this essay a conflict of interest. It may also be that few people besides the actors themselves have gotten as close to the work as I did as editor. As a result I have taken on the risk of conflict of interest in order to pursue the environmental perspectives of material I know quite well. The conflict has prevented me from writing about it for 20 years. It has also impelled me to take a non-evaluative view of the piece, since I clearly like it, having put a lot of energy into it and being shy of praising it too highly. Finally, my conflict of interest is exacerbated by the fact that I have emphasized certain aspects of Templeton’s work to support my own interests.
     
    While an environmentalist as I have been describing, Templeton’s intention from the author’s point of view was not focused on creating the environmental person I have described in this essay, but rather on a socially constructed person, an alternative to that monadic organism often critiqued by postmodernism. That alternative derived from the thrust of critical thought turns out to have been environmentally oriented. And in the intervening years environment and planetary considerations have overwhelmed the issue of personal identity. The critic’s intention merges with the proto-environmental alternative Templeton created as I have described in paragraphs about intention above. As publisher and critic I am at once spectator and creator in this essay and by extension publisher and actor in YOU—The City. The extended environmental person appears everywhere.
     
     
    2. Jonathan Skinner, founder and editor of the journal ecopoetics, refers to ecosystem in similar terms to the McGraw Hill definition in a recent email to me. “You use the term ‘ecosystem’ in the essay in a way that certainly fits in with a lot of what ecopoetics has proposed (and in a way that is neither more nor less defined than ‘ecopoetics’).” But Skinner thinks we need to be careful in the metaphorical use of the term ecosystem. He suggests putting “energy into a critique of the metaphorical use of . . . “ecosystem” which is a core work of ecopoetics.” While this subject is a bit outside the scope of this essay on poet’s theater, ecopoetics is consistent with the thrust of this essay. Each effort to transform a metaphor for poet’s theater across disciplines has to be carefully undertaken. Images arise in the mind from a breakdown in linguistic logic and hence are a biological outcome of uncertainty and problematic conditions. Poetry has long established this link to biology. And in some ways the obviousness of our effort increases its difficulty. A discussion of the differences between ecopoetics and my view of environmental poetics would focus on how ecopoetics presents a new nature poetry while environmental poetics focuses more on using natural methods to create innovative writing that may not have nature as the subject.

     

     
    3. Of course, many recent writers (such as language poets) and scientists (such as those seeking to solve real world problems of turbulence) also address complex systems directly without simplifying to linear problems.

     

     
    4. As an aside, considering how these imbalances work through the theory of complexity, we can see how nature uses similar structures at all scales of the environment, from a thought to a planet.

     

     
    5. The impulse behind using set theory to talk about different disciplines comes from Atkin’s Multidimensional Man.
     

    Works Cited

       

     

    • Ashbery, John. Houseboat Days. New York: Penguin, 1977. Print.
    • Atkin, Ron. Multidimensional Man. New York: Penguin, 1981. Print.
    • Ishida, Y., N. Adachi and H. Tokumaru. “A topological approach to failure diagnosis of large-scale systems.” IEEE Transactions on systems, man, and cybernetics 15.3 (1985): 327-333. Print.
    • Kuhns, Richard. “Criticism and the Problem of Intention.” Journal of Philosophy 57 (1960): 5-23. Print.
    • Legrand, Jacky. “How far can Q-analysis go into social systems understanding?” Res-Systemica. Special issue: Proceedings of the fifth European Systems Science Congress. 2 (2002): 1-10. Web. 24 Oct. 2010.
    • McGraw Hill Life Sciences Glossary. n.d. Web. 23 Nov. 2008.
    • Olson, Charles. Collected Prose. Berkeley: U of California P, 1997. Print.
    • Rowlands, Mark, “Environmental Epistemology.” Ethics & the Environment 10.2 (2005): 5-27. Print.
    • Skinner, Jonathan. “EcoPoetics Question Mark.” Message to the author. 1 Dec. 2009. Email.
    • Taylor, Diana. The Archive and the Repertoire: Performing Cultural Memory in the Americas. Duke UP, 2003. Print.
    • Templeton, Fiona. “The Presence Project Interviews Fiona Templeton.” Interview by Gabriella Giannachi and Nick Kaye. The Presence Project. 24 May 2006. Web. 24 Oct. 2010.
    • ———. “A Poetics of Performance Relevant to a Particular Definition of the Word.” Birkbeck College at Royal Holloway University, University of London. Apr. 2007. Talk and TS.
    • ———. YOU—The City. New York: Roof, 1990. Print.

     

  • Performing Ketjak: The Theater of the Observed

    Nasser S. Hussain (bio)
    Leeds Metropolitan University
    nassershussain@gmail.com

    Abstract
     
    This essay takes as its focus Ron Silliman’s 1978 marathon street-side reading of his long poem Ketjak in San Francisco, and examines the “special effects” of a poet’s theatre when it is extended beyond the physical and ideological boundaries of the traditional, contemporary poetry reading.
     

     

    When in the spring of 2005 the moderators of the Buffalo Poetics listserv banned posting poetry to the board, poet Mairead Byrne asked, “How will you know it’s a poem and is there an honor code?”–an inquiry that points out the elusiveness of the poetic itself. In order to appreciate fully the thrust of her argument, it is necessary to reproduce her entire letter:
     

    Dear Editors,
     
    With regard to your recent decision that poems will no longer be allowed on the Poetics List, I realize you do not intend to address this matter further but I have a question. How will you know it’s a poem and is there an honor code?
     
    For years I have been trying to free myself of conversation in favor of conversing only in poetry. I have made major strides towards this goal. I feel success is within my grasp. The answer is not to import found language into poetry but to send poetry out into everyday discourse like so many platelets or Frisbees or oases of calm government. To that end I have produced thousands of poems. I am close to having at least one for every eventuality. They can be quite subtle. Almost indistinguishable from real conversation (to me of course they are much realer than conversation, hence my endeavors to begin with).
     
    How will you know if my messages are poems? How will you know they are not poems? Do you want me to self-declare? Do you want me to throw away years of work and start ham-fistedly attempting to communicate “normally” again?
     
    What is the power of *about*? Why is it alright to talk *about* poetry but not alright to talk poetry? How will you know? What will you do?
     
    Are there grey areas? Will you notice if too much attention is paid to spacing or a bit of alliteration creeps in? Even avoiding the obvious, what if a piece has all the devil-may-care casualness of prose but the bold gestalt heart of pure poetry? Even impure. Is your rule enforceable?
     
    Why would you want it to be?
     
    I will sign this so you know it’s not a poem. Next time I may be trickier. Or maybe I’m being really tricky now.
     
    Mairead
     

    (“How will you know”)

     

    According to Byrne, her experiments have led her to a point where she can converse in poetry, rendering her poems “indistinguishable” from everyday conversation. Far from the hushed and sacred space of the poet’s reading, poems circulate, for Byrne, like vital “platelets” in the bloodstream. They are playful “frisbees” flung outward from the poet in the game of life. Considered as such, Byrne’s work in language (suddenly “poetry” seems too narrow a word) is an unrepeatable and continuous performance, a Heraclitean flow of utterance that is constantly dancing with and determined by the particularities of its context. For Byrne, poetry is a sustained and sustainable mode of being in the world, and not an occasional irruption of aesthetic language into an otherwise dull and alienated existence in which words exist as mere instruments, tools we use to chisel out our desires.

     
    If we take Byrne at her word (and there is no reason not to), then the boundary between the poetic and the non- is not merely blurred, but dismissed utterly. There is no difference between the vernacular and the poetic: Wordsworth, Whitman, Eliot and O’Hara have all found their apotheosis here. We needn’t even look to Byrne’s published work, nor subject it to close reading or analysis in one of a hundred theoretical frameworks; rather, all we need to do is have a chat with the poet about any subject we wish, and in so doing, we will be bathed in a poem crafted for just the occasion, customized to work in that particular context. Such an attitude towards artistic production and reception resonates with much of the thought expressed in Continental European modernisms, inaugurated by the Futurists, and culminating in Marcel Duchamp’s readymade sculpture. This dynamic interplay between the average and the aesthetic came to the fore in North America in the 1950s with the Black Mountain experiments in performance, where events like the carnivalesque productions orchestrated by John Cage (like the “untitled event” that took place in 1952) formed the crucible from which sprang Allan Kaprow’s Happenings, Guerrilla theater, and the catalogue of Fluxus and Conceptual art in the last three decades of the twentieth century.
     
    This is a brief sketch of a renegade band of practitioners in the history of sculpture, art and theater. Their exploits and repercussions have already been well documented.1 Rather than retread these avenues, it is my concern in this essay to examine the point at which the theatrical avant-garde intersects with the poetic, specifically in the case of Ron Silliman’s public reading of his long poem Ketjak in 1978. Given Language poetry’s insistence on the material status of the word–those “language particles” that, when manipulated, result in “new aggregates of meaning,” which in turn allow for the perception of “(as yet unseen?) physical states of matter” (Coolidge 502)–it becomes possible to inquire into the activities that those language particles manifest in the world. Under the special circumstances of Language poetry, reading a poem is not simply a recitation or re-hearse-ing of the words on the page, but a loosing of matter into the plane of experience: it is a rare opportunity to watch language perform independently on the stage of everyday life.
     
    One of the dominant critical tropes of Language poetry lies in the dialogic character of the work. Of Steve Benson’s early work in the 1970s, Geoff Ward writes that the poem (“As is”) “may be on permanent vacation from literature’s traditional functions,” and that the resultant hash of language–which mixes images of pubic hair, a freeway accident, unidentified shards of metal, dictionary definitions of “adjudicate,” and “treetop birds swing[ing] out from/ nylon hose flung out the window in mild abandon”–is Benson’s call to the reader to “sort it out – if you want to” (Ward 9-10). Language poetry teases the reader out of a passive readerly stance, and demands a more active approach to the invisible and assumed processes of interpreting words on a page. This is not to say that reading work other than Language poetry does not require such an “athletic” approach, but in the specific case of Language poetry, soliciting the reader’s participation is an explicit part of the work. The text is designed to achieve this effect as an end in itself. Silliman’s street rendition of Ketjak carries on this participatory dynamic, but transmutes it into a performance. In print, the Language poem challenges the aesthetic codes of reading; gone from the poem are the familiar markers of sustained narrative, meter, rhyme, and often (especially in the early Language experiments) words themselves, as the text explores the limits of “diminished” or blatantly “non-referential” language. When language’s obligation to represent an exterior reality transparently is thus abdicated, the reader becomes a co-conspirator in the production of meaning, and must improvise a series of responses to the text as it continually undercuts and complicates its status as a “representation.” In short, Language poems tend to foreground the experiential nature of reading, above and beyond any nominal content that may (or may not) appear in the work itself.
     
    This much is clear: we are to read as though we are writers. But how, then, should we listen? Instinctively, we might hew to the traditional format for public performances of poetry:
     

    A person stands alone in front of an audience, holding a text and speaking in an odd voice, too regular to be conversation, too intimate and too lacking in orotundity to be a speech or a lecture, too rough and personal to be theater. The speaker is making no attempt to conceal the text. Signs of auditory effort in the audience are momentarily lost in occasional laughter, tense silences, and even cries of encouragement. Sometimes the reader uses a different, more public voice and refers to what it is being read, or to some other information of apparent interest. No one talks to the reader. No one proposes a second take. No one reflexively discusses the ritual itself.
     

     

    This ritual is also the form preferred by the print poet, as a kind of advertisement for poetry disseminated via the “book tour.” (Margaret Atwood has even gone so far as to develop the LongPen, a device that allows her to avoid the tedium and effort of physically travelling to book readings, and instead allows her to autograph her fans’ copies from the comfort of her home.2) Anyone who has attended even a single such contemporary poetry reading will be immediately familiar with the milieu of silent reverence and repressed coughing that Middleton describes in the passage above. It is my sense that Middleton has isolated a kind of metanarrative built into the poetry reading itself. The subject of this metanarrative is not so much the structure of the poetry reading as it is the model it provides for the consumption of poetry: a blueprint for the audience members when they leave the event and “perform” the poem for themselves, silently, internally, and alone. The poetry reading is a metanarrative that provides the reader with an “insider’s” perspective on the poem; it points up the gravity of a specific line break, it gives the silent reader cues to the varieties of tone and voicing implicit in the words, and most importantly, it highlights an awareness that the poem on the page is being directed (always and already) at an audience, that is, the reader. In this sense, the poetry reading trains the audience to bifurcate itself, to be both the performer and the listener at the same time, to mime the “original” author’s initial performance of the poem for her own entertainment/edification/education later. The event of the poem performed by the author hovers over any subsequent interaction with the poem, informing its interpretation and reception.

     
    This is not an unbreakable cycle, however. Current practitioners have reacted against the structural metanarrative of the poetry reading and its disabling corollary of trained consumerism, as we saw above in Mairead Byrne’s effort to actually talk poetry rather than talk about it. David Antin’s work since 1972 is one historical precedent for Byrne’s model. Essentially, Antin’s chosen form (the “talk-poem”) leverages the sacred space of the poetry reading and declares that, if the contemporary poetry reading is the space-for-poetry, then whatever is said on this platform must, by extension, be poetry.3 The collected body of Antin’s work, both in print and in performance, can be read as a sustained effort to answer the question that stands as the epigram to his first book, Talking: “If someone were to come up to you and start talking a poem at you, how would you know?” Like Byrne’s poetry for every situation, the act of talking (at least in the protected sphere of the “event” of an Antin performance) is co-extensive with poetry.
     
    Somewhere between Middleton’s model and Byrne and Antin’s avant-garde interventions lies Ron Silliman’s performance of Ketjak in San Francisco in 1978. In a written reflection on his performance, Silliman succinctly summarizes “the act”: “On Saturday, September 16, 1978, between noon and 4:30 pm, I read, without amplification or intermission, the entirety of Ketjak, at the corner of Powell and Market streets in San Francisco” (“Reading” 195). A four and a half hour long performance might exhaust even the most avid connoisseur, but the simple reason for the amount of time required is the length of the text. Ketjak proceeds from its initial line whose duration is a single two word sentence–“Revolving door”–and roughly doubles the number of sentences per line until the twelfth line, which in its original printing appeared as a line “45 pages long, containing more than 10,000 words” (“Reading” 194). Not only does the poem double in length from one line to the next, but it maintains the order of sentences from line to line. The best way to describe this technique is to watch it happen in the poem directly. For instance, lines three and four of Ketjak read as follows:
     

    Revolving door. Fountains of the financial district. Houseboats beached at the point of low tide, only to float again when the sunset is reflected in the water. A sequence of objects which to him appears to be a caravan of fellaheen, a circus, camels pulling wagons of bear cages, tamed ostriches in toy hats, begins a slow migration to the right vanishing point on the horizon line.
     
    Revolving door. First flies of the summer. Fountains of the financial district spout. She was a unit in bum space, she was a damaged child. Dark brown houseboats beached at the point of low tide – men atop their cabin roofs, idle, play a Dobro, a jaw’s harp, a 12-string guitar – only to float again when the sunset is reflected in the water. I want the grey-blue grain of western summer. A cardboard box of wool sweaters on top of the bookcase to indicate Home. A sequence of objects, silhouettes, which to him appears to be a caravan of fellaheen, a circus, dromedaries pulling wagons bearing tiger cages, tamed ostriches in toy hats, begins a slow migration to the right vanishing point on the horizon line.
     

    (Silliman, Age 3; my emphasis)

     

    I have italicized the four “new” sentences in the fourth line to make clear the additions that Silliman has made, and to show that he maintains the order of the sentences that previously made up the third line. The sentences of the third line are (with minor adjustments) recognizably and sequentially preserved in the fourth line. This new line, now eight sentences long, is created by inserting sentences into the spaces between the sentences of the line previous. The fifth line will repeat this technique, and so on until the gargantuan twelfth line (which in the 2007 edition of the poem runs almost fifty pages in length).

     
    One effect of this form on the reader is a constant renegotiation of the syllogistic connections among sentences. For instance, the sixth line of the poem ends with these two sentences: “Look at that room filled with fleshy babies. We ate them.” This “couplet” (so to speak) coerces the reader into imagining a horrifying tableau of cannibalism. But by the eighth line, now 108 sentences long, these same elements recombine into a different and disjunctive narrative and reads as follows:
     

    Look at that room filled with fleshy babies, incubating. Points of transfer. A tall glass of tawny port. The shadows between the houses leave the earth cool and damp. A slick gaggle of ambassadors. We ate them.
     

     

    Where earlier we ate the babies, now they incubate peacefully, removed by a distance of four sentences from our threatening teeth. In fact, several new “points of transfer” have been placed in our way, shuttling us between appreciating a glass of port, the space between two houses, and leading to the prospect of eating a “slick gaggle of ambassadors” (perhaps a bit more palatable menu than a room full of innocent cherubs, but disturbing nonetheless). As Barrett Watten observes, the text “makes for an evaluative mode of thinking – values of the sentences are revealed in how they interact with those around them” (271). But these subtleties are best available to the reader of the poem, and are accessible through a sustained act of scanning the text, all the while flipping back and forth in the book in order to register the shifts and consistencies between lines. They are also partially present to the listener, as the text echoes itself from line to line–however, as the lines grow and the interstitial additions from one line to the next grow in number, the real time that passes between the echoes might diminish the effect. Yet the “listener” that I have invoked is a very special person–she is a dedicated, knowledgeable and motivated audience member who has chosen to attend the “event” of Ketjak, and most likely brings with her a set of expectations (of varying levels of accuracy: she may find that this reading is entirely not what she expected at all, feel disappointed, and leave).

     
    These are precisely the special category of listeners that Silliman attracted to his outdoor reading of Ketjak. In his report on the reading he writes:
     

    A lesson I’d learned from a year’s work at the Tenderloin, which served well during the reading, is that psychotics & most street alcoholics respect an aggressive assertion of presence. Only one person tried to jam a toothbrush down my throat as I read.
     
    I did want the presence of some support, not only for such contingencies as that & to combat the general alienation of any streetcorner speaker (I after all was hardly to see anything beyond the borders of my page), but because I intended the event as a communication to other poets, concerning their work as well as mine. I sent out a flyer & listed the reading in Poetry Flash.
     

    (“Reading” 198)

     

    In the cloistered space of the contemporary poetry reading, the poetic is readily and easily distinguished from the chatter and white noise that bookends the “event” itself. The presence of an emcee who “introduces” the speaker, a publicized starting time, dimming the lights–all of these are rituals designed to focus our attention on the specialized use of language that is, after all, the reason for gathering in the first place. Middleton writes elsewhere that the poetry reading is “awash” with precisely those “distracting noises” that are forbidden from, say, the cinema. This may appear contradictory, especially given the “ritualized” atmosphere of the contemporary reading that I described earlier. A gathering of film-goers for even the worst Hollywood dreck is ostensibly spared the conditions of the poetry reading, a scene endlessly compromised by “[p]oor acoustics, outdoor noise . . . comings and goings of drinkers, coughs due to poor ventilation, encouraging remarks and heckling, lack of sight-lines”–in short, a relatively poor forum for the appreciation of the spoken word (“How” 14). Middleton argues that there is a miniature drama being staged in the contemporary poetry reading, as poets in smoky loud bars all over the world raise their voices to be heard over the collective clinks of bartenders mixing drinks and the clatter of coins as they make change for a clientele immune to the charms of art. He calls it “a drama of poetry’s struggle against the conditions of a modernity that does not value poetry much alongside many other arts, especially those of advertising or with enormous commercial potential” (14). Up to a point, Middleton is accurate, and his interpretation of the poetry reading as a beleaguered art-form should be welcomed by those artists and audiences who labor for “poetry’s promotion to a position of importance” (14). But I am tempted to ask: why should poetry be so visibly and surgically separated from the rest of language? Would a model for poetry reading that resembles the kind of silent attention we give to productions “with enormous commercial potential” actually be a salutary state of affairs compared to Silliman’s street corner?

     
    Silliman’s motivation for performing Ketjak on the street becomes quite clear. He writes that he intended
     

    to give a typical poetry reading, a normal presentation of a text of unusual length. This required enabling (empowering) the audience to move freely, even to come & go, without disrupting the event. The architectural tradition of such readings tends toward enclosed sites of intimate dimension. While this might be ideal for most readings, it nevertheless imposes limitations which have nothing to do with the text itself. Like the so-called little magazine, most reading spaces militate for the short poem, the eminently discrete (& disposable) affective experience.
     

    (“Reading” 195)

     

    Just as the “little magazine” (and its attendant market) prohibits the production of long poems, so too does the typical (or “contemporary”) poetry reading impose a problem for the poet interested in the kinds of experience that only a longer form can provide. It is certainly possible for a short poem to relate (or represent) an experience that might take four hours of time, but it is an entirely different matter to live through four hours directly. In this manner, again, the poetry reading provides a blueprint with which we might (mistakenly) determine the poetic from the non-poetic; poems appear (both in print and in performance) as short, three minute bursts of specialized language, quick epiphanies that we can consume and just as quickly dispose of before moving on to the next. By pushing the poem out of the private theater of a silent reader, and beyond the relatively more public space of the poetry reading, and instead injecting it wholesale into the experience of everyday life, Silliman’s performance strikes at the heart of these issues. What is poetry meant to accomplish? Is the oral transmission of a poem finally degraded into nothing more than an advertisement for the author, or an instruction manual on how to read the poem without the aid of the author’s voice? Is a three-minute poem (or any “eminently disposable” chunk of time) long enough to say anything significant? And finally, what might poetry look like if loosed from the arbitrary physical and temporal limits of the contemporary poetry reading? Silliman proposes that the fragmented, disjunctive world-view produced by just such consumer-friendly snippets of poetry is actually subject to a much larger unity, one that takes into account the co-extensivity of language with the world that it names, but does not imagine that it can ever reach a point when the two comfortably and finally overlap. When Silliman writes that this particular performance was a “test of his own belief in [his own] work,” he is not only addressing contemporary critics, but he is also committing to a unification of the act of poetry to the life of the poet (“Reading” 198). Reading the entirety of Ketjak is a demonstration of the inseparability of the two, in a manner that Byrne and Antin might appreciate.

     
    In the photo that accompanies Silliman’s report on the event, the poet is framed in a manner that makes the task of picking him out of the tableau, if not particularly difficult, at least inconvenient (see Fig. 1 below). At the left edge of the photo is a man shielding his eyes in a manner that might seem dramatic and “pronounced.”4 The Mickey Mouse balloon, clearly visible in the foreground, highlights the tourist and transient nature of the capitalist setting Silliman has chosen, a context inflected by a monolithic, highly commodified and easily consumable representation of “play.” The central figure of the photograph, the man with the flowers and rolled-up paper, striding through Silliman’s sphere, is a perfect encapsulation of what Silliman intended to accomplish with his performance: to expose the illusion of aesthetic experience as somehow transcendent by placing it in a context of everyday experience. The man with the flowers, unaware that he is being recorded in the moment of Silliman’s poem, functions exactly like any one of the sentences that make up Ketjak; he is physically “present” and thus connected to the entire mise en scène that is the event, but his trajectory and his relationship to the moment is at the same time separate and disconnected.
     

     
    Photograph by Alan Bernheimer. Used by permission.

     

    Click for larger view

    Fig. 1.

    Photograph by Alan Bernheimer. Used by permission.

     

     

    If, as David Antin suggests in one of his talk-poems, we are always “standing somewhere […] in this semantic space,” then one corollary of his proposal would cast our bodies as linguistic units within the semantic landscape (tuning 119). The disjunctive relationship between Silliman’s sentence units is then a trope for how our bodies interact with one another in the world–rubbing shoulders, jostling in crowds, sidestepping one moment and impeding a fellow citizen the next, always with varying degrees of orientation as we navigate the ever-changing flux of human traffic. Silliman deploys his lines in a manner that cites reality rather than mimes it.

     
    The tool Silliman uses to cut through representation and engage with “reality” more directly is the “New Sentence.” The New Sentence is the basic unit of Ketjak (and characteristic of Silliman’s poetry in general), and is his particular contribution to Language poetry. The need for a New Sentence in the first place is born from the shortcomings of writing under capitalism. In his essay “Disappearance of the Word, Appearance of the World,” Silliman argues that
     

    [w]hat happens when a language moves toward and passes into a capitalist stage of development is an anaesthetic transformation of the perceived tangibility of the word, with corresponding increases in its expository, descriptive and narrative capacities, preconditions for the invention of “realism,” the illusion of reality in capitalist thought.
     

    (New Sentence 10; my emphasis)

     

    Realism, “realistic,” “realist”–all such modes of representation in art (visual or verbal) are participating in a capitalist pattern. Capitalism effaces the human labor and materials that go into creating a “good” for the marketplace, and instead assigns value according to a process of fetishization. Commodity fetishes then operate to stratify society: for instance, by marking the people who can afford highly valued goods (regardless of the product’s functionality) as “upper” class, the fetishized consumer good somehow “represents” and references something authentic about its bearer in a highly codified but tacit discursive web that presents the illusion of an ordered world. Silliman posits that the same process applies in language. I do not wish to rehearse Silliman’s entire argument, but the following passage is worth consideration:

     

    “Correct grammar,” which has never existed in spoken daily life save as a template, is itself thus predicated upon a model of “high” discourse . . . “Educated” speech imitates writing: the more “refined” the individual, the more likely their utterances will possess the characteristics of expository prose. The sentence, hypotactic and complete, was and still is an index of class in society.
     

    (New Sentence 79)

     

    In this sense a subject can possess language in the same manner that she can possess a consumer item, and the same illusory economy of reference will apply. Being able to speak “like a book” implies that the speaker belongs to a higher strata or order of society than does someone who cannot. The strategy for the avant-garde writer is now clear: she must write a book that doesn’t operate in an economy of reference, and cannot possibly operate as an index of class–a tactic that will liberate both parties (reader and writer) from the pitfalls of commodity fetishism.

     
    Silliman claims that “[u]nder the sway of the commodity fetish, language itself appears to become transparent, a mere vessel for the transfer of ostensibly autonymous referents” (New Sentence 11). The model for his antidote comes from pre-literate cultures. He writes that
     

    within tribal societies the individual has not been reduced to wage labor, nor does material life require the consumption of a vast number of commodities, objects created through the work of others. Language likewise has not yet been transformed into a system of commodities, nor subjected to a division of labor in its functions through which the signified overwhelms the signifier.
     

    (New Sentence 11)

     

    The main culprit in the fetishization and commodification of language, the form most responsible for diminishing the opacity and tangibility of language, is the realist novel, which delivers a “hypotactic and complete” worldview between its printed covers. Its arrangement of words

     

    derives from the narrative epics of poetry, but moves toward a very different sense of form and organization. Exterior formal devices, such as rhyme and linebreak, diminish, and the structural units become the sentence and paragraph. In the place of external devices, which function to keep the reader’s or listener’s experience at least partly in the present, consuming the text, most fiction foregrounds the syllogistic leap, or integration above the level of the sentence, to create a fully referential tale.
     

    (New Sentence 79)

     

    In other words, the prose novel dissociates the reader from her presence in the act of reading by turning what was previously an external and tangible formal device into a system of internalized assumptions about the author’s intent: specifically, the assumption that the sentences being read, formed into paragraphs that integrate into the larger structures of the novel, are cohesive, coherent, and universally directed toward the overall monolithic (and highly ordered) “meaning” of the work. It is through the reader’s internalized faith in the hypotactic structure of the prose novel that “capitalism passes on its preferred reality through language itself to individual speakers” and readers as well (New Sentence 8).

     
    In contrast, the New Sentence provides an antidote to the alienated reader, lulled into a false picture of reality-in-print. It makes the sentence itself an “exterior formal device” by limiting the syllogistic play between sentences to its immediate context. In his list of the eight qualities of the New Sentence, four are directly concerned with the dynamics of syllogism in print. The list is as follows:
     

    1. 1. The paragraph organizes the sentences;
    2. 2. The paragraph is a unit of quantity, not logic or argument;
    3. 3. Sentence length is a unit of measure;
    4. 4. Sentence structure is altered for torque, or increased polysemy/ambiguity;
    5. 5. Syllogistic movement is: (a) limited; (b) controlled;
    6. 6. Primary syllogistic movement is between the preceding and following sentences;
    7. 7. Secondary syllogistic movement is toward the paragraph as a whole, or the total work;
    8. 8. The limiting of syllogistic movement keeps the reader’s attention at or very close to the level of language, that is, most often at the sentence level or below.
    (New Sentence 91)

     

    Or, as fellow Language poet and theorist Bob Perelman writes, “[a] new sentence is more or less ordinary itself but gains its effect by being placed next to another sentence to which it bears tangential relevance” (61).

     
    I have already discussed some of the formal properties of Ketjak, but the significance of Silliman’s New Sentence form requires elaboration. It is my argument here that the ordered (though modulated) repetition of sentences from one line to the next suggests a parallel relationship between sentences and subjects. The clue that has led me to this conclusion is coded in the title of the poem itself; Ketjak is not only the name for the poem that marked Silliman’s “adulthood as a writer” (Interview 255), but is also the umbrella term he has given to the very large output of poetry that he has produced and continues to write. In this sense, then, Ketjak includes The Age of Huts (compleat), the twenty-six books of The Alphabet, the book length poem Tjanting and his current work in progress, Universe. This entire stack of radical text is Ketjak, and as he admits in the preface to the 2007 edition, Silliman does have a penchant for “Russian-doll structure[s],” so it should come as no surprise (as well) that at the center/beginning of the project, we find a poem with the same name as the entire collection (Age ix). Now that Silliman has openly declared his super-title for the project, the time has come to explore the term Ketjak more closely.
     
    A Ketjak (or ‘tjak, or Kechak) is a Balinese version of the Ramayana myth in the form of a ritualized dance, performed by troupes that can reach hundreds of members who replay part of an epic battle between the story’s hero, Rama, and the villain, Ravanna. R.K. Narayan’s prose translation of the Ramayana provides us with an interestingly “ordered” portrait of the evil Ravanna. In his court, where the “reigning gods…perform menial tasks,” each is left to employments that suit their particular skills. Vayu, the wind god, sweeps the floors clean with his breath; the god of fire is in charge of domestic illumination, and Death itself is enlisted to toll the passing hours of the day (Narayan 79). Ravanna’s court appears as a nearly perfect image of order. This might seem slightly at odds with Western invocations of the seat of evil (a tradition stretching from Milton’s portrait of Pandemonium in Paradise Lost to Hawthorne’s menacing and tangled forest in “Young Goodman Brown”), where disorder and chaos are the hallmarks of the demonic. The Ramayana neatly flips this dynamic on its head: to defeat the overly ordered Ravanna, Rama and the monkey horde invite and wield confusion as a weapon for justice. The ‘tjak performs this moment in the conflict when the monkey-god Hanuman enlists the help of a horde of monkeys to ward off Rama’s enemy (see this image of a ‘tjak). While the dance and chant retain many of the formal features of the original narrative, it has been decontextualized somewhat to serve now as a generalized rite of exorcism. As Walter Spies and Beryl de Zoete note, the aggressive and discordant sonic value of the chant is paralyzing to the rather straightforward demons against whom it is directed (“Indonesian”). The possessed subject, encircled by hundreds of chanters, all repeating the syllable “‘tjak!” eventually has the demon within driven out by the sheer noise of the chant.5 This is the source–combined with Steve Reich’s experiments with percussion and taped voices as well as an interest in the possibilities of “choral” arrangements in poetry–that led Silliman to write (and continue writing) Ketjak.6
     
    The sentences in Ketjak are deployed in the same manner as dancers in a ‘tjak: each member of the crowd is “more or less ordinary” (a circumstance highlighted by their uniform dress), and they only achieve the goal of exorcism by sheer numbers (the bigger the horde of “monkeys” the more confusion they generate for the linear demon). The sentences of Ketjak hover between fixity and flow; the repeated sentences appear to move apart from one another, but their sequential relationship remains, by and large, intact.7 In the same fashion, adding more chanters to the ‘tjak would simply be a process of shouldering one’s way into the group, severing any previous contiguity between chanters while simultaneously establishing two new ones (that is, between the new chanter and the two people on either side of him) and all the while increasing the volume and confusion for the malevolent spirit. This much is clear in the mystical economy of the Balinese dance, but if we follow Silliman’s translation of dancers into sentences, what is being exorcised by Ketjak? The demon that is symbolically being driven out by Silliman’s sentences is the commodity fetish in language. Bruce Andrews and Charles Berstein’s comment is pertinent here: the “bothersome and confusing” insistence on a monolithic linguistic economy of one-to-one (word to thing) reference presents a world not unlike Ravanna’s court, where the gods perform their speciality over and over again, mere domestic instruments (ix). To the Language poet, forcing words into such narrow confines is tantamount to the same thing, leaving us in a world ruled by consumption rather than by creativity. Again, Ravanna’s court is best understood through Silliman’s notion of commodity fetishism in language: the moment when “the word – words – cease to be valued for what they are themselves but only for their properties as instrumentalities…so that words…disappear, become transparent, leaving the picture of a physical world the reader can consume as if it were a commodity” (Andrews and Bernstein x). When we replace “word” with “god” and “the reader” with “Ravanna” in the passage above, Silliman’s motivation for Ketjak comes into focus: if commodity fetishism is the malevolent spirit, then the possessed subject in need of purification by ‘tjak is language itself.
     
    What is the nature of this purified subject, this restored language? If we assume that the demoniacally possessed subject is initially diagnosed by his penchant for linearity, then the healthy subject must, by extension, be comfortable in a crowd. Where the possessed reader would insist on a one-to-one exchange value in his linguistic economy, the exorcised reader is looser, less rigidly defined. He would be anonymous, multi-pronged, capable of coupling successfully with a variety of people, assemblages. He would be a nomad within himself, continuously in flux, “fitting in” only provisionally, as he goes. His personality, his fixity, his distinguishable singularity in the tribe would only ever be an effect (temporarily and repeatedly) produced by the context in which he finds himself. The successfully exorcised subject, then, is less about returning him to some essential, singular identity, and more about making him better able to deal with the polymorphousness of everyday life. So too with language. In the hands of the Langpoet, language becomes less referential (read: linear) and more experiential; the rebarbative effects of the poetry are meant to remind the reader of the essentially dis-organized nature of organic life. The possibility for confusions, multiple readings, and a lack of closure are not mere poetic innovations, but are fundamental features of existence as we directly experience it. Language poetry, in this sense, is realist. A contingent, environmental language.
     
    This is the moment of the poet’s theater. We might cast Silliman’s reading in the terms of guerrilla theater, or draw parallels with Allan Kaprow’s Happenings, Fluxus, or any variety of site-specific works of performance art, but Ketjak carries a special valence. It dramatizes the presence of the poet and the poem in the world. Reading Ketjak is more than an advertisement for the poem and the author: it is a staging of the difficulties and successes of poetry-in-action. Steve Benson remarked in a review of Silliman’s performance that he was “reading the reading of his poem” (272), but if we take for granted the Langposition that casts the reader as a collaborator in the work, it is just as reasonable to see this event as a performance of the act of writing. Where the poem manages to grip some aspect of reality, those moments when the poem and the world overlap, when it fails or is ignored as the poem and the poet and the event itself all recede into the white noise of the marketplace in San Francisco–these are the special effects of a poet’s theater.8 In these poems and performances, we awaken, like Byrne, to the fact that poetry cannot and should not be bracketed away from the rest of life, relegated to an economy of representations and epiphanies, but is instead a form of art indistinguishable from life. The twelfth line of Ketjak, all fifty pages and ten thousand words of it, is an arbitrary stopping point. It is not the ending of a poem; it is a prolegomenon, an opening flourish that encodes a much larger gesture toward a literature that seeks to encompass a street corner, a city, a world. A theater of the observed.
     

     

    Nasser Hussain is a lecturer in English Literature in the Department of Cultural Studies at Leeds Metropolitan University, UK. He has published articles on performance poetry and contemporary poetics and is currently working on a book project about American travel literature and narratives of passing.
     

    Notes

     
    1. The best survey on the topic of performance art and its history remains Rose Lee Goldberg’s Performance Art:From Futurism to the Present.

     

     
    2. For a sense of the corporate face of this invention, see www.longpen.com, where the main argument in favour of this technology seems to be about reducing the carbon footprint of people who, rather ironically, depend on the forestry industry for the raw materials to produce their books in the first place.

     

     
    3. One such moment is observable in Antin’s piece “how long is the present.” Here, the occasion is a performance at a book fair, and Antin indulges the audience expectation for a “reading” by opening one of his books and reading from it aloud. Of course, Antin closes the book after a few lines and says that what he’s done isn’t “reading” but “reciting” a pre-written text.

     

     
    4. In a subsection of “Reading Ketjak” entitled “Lessons, If Any,” Silliman writes that in the process of reading the poem, his “physical movements became more pronounced” (199). While this may be true, it is interesting to note that in the shot, he appears to be in a traditional “reading” stance—holding the book open with both hands, head and eyes bent toward the open page (and it is also impossible to determine whether he is performing aloud or engaged in a silent, internalized act of reading)—while the man on the left edge looks more the part of the thespian.

     

     
    5. Ironically, this is a tactic that even the US military have employed; to flush the dictator Manuel Noriega from the Vatican Embassy they played heavy metal and rock music incessantly until he surrendered. See Westcott’s “Is Noriega too hot to handle?”

     

     
    6. For a dramatic staging of the Ketjak, see Ron Fricke’s 1992 film Baraka. Choreographically speaking, the dance is very organized, but sonically, apart from a rough call-and-response structure, the chant is certainly discordant to the point of frightening. These days, however, it seems that in the wake of Fricke’s film (although it is difficult to pin the blame solely on the director) the dance has become a popular tourist attraction, performed now in hotels as a kind of degraded indigenous dinner theater. In his interview with Sinda Gregory and Larry McCaffery, Silliman details Steve Reich’s influence and the possibilities of choral arrangements in writing (252).

     

     
    7. The sole exception to the sequential arrangement that I have detected is the sentence “first flies of the summer,” which appears only in the fourth line of the poem, never to be repeated again—and I believe that by doing so, Silliman is enacting the brief life span of those flies, rather than, say, referring to it (AH 3).

     

     
    8. Of course, the infinite particularities of the performance are lost to us, but Steve Benson observed at least one possible moment when a passerby might have thought that a particular line was addressed directly to her (272).
     

    Works Cited

       

     

    • Andrews, Bruce and Charles Bernstein, eds. The L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E Book. Carbondale: Southern Illinois UP, 1984. Print.
    • Antin, David. Talking. Champaign, Illinois: Dalkey Archive Press, 2001. Print.
    • ———. tuning. New York: New Directions, 1984. Print.
    • Baraka. Dir. Ron Fricke. MPI Home Video, 1992. Film.
    • Benson, Steve. “Ketjak in San Francisco.” Andrews and Bernstein. 270-71. 272-73.
    • Byrne, Mairead. “How will you know it’s a poem and is there an honor code?” Buffalo Poetics List. University of Buffalo, SUNY, 2 May 2005. Web. 3 May 2005.
    • Coolidge, Clark. “from A LETTER TO PAUL METCALF (jan 7 1972).” In the American Tree. Ed. Ron Silliman. Orono, Maine: National Poetry Foundation, 1986. 501-02. Print.
    • Goldberg, Rose Lee. Performance Art: From Futurism to the Present. London: Thames and Hudson, 1995. Print.
    • “Indonesian Ketjak.” Ubuweb Ethnopoetics: Soundings. UbuWeb, n. d. Web. 14 Sept. 2010.
    • Middleton, Peter. Distant Reading: Performance, Readership and Consumption in Contemporary Poetry. Tuscaloosa: U of Alabama P, 2005. Print.
    • ———. “How to Read a Reading of a Written Poem.” Oral Tradition 20.1 (2005), 7-34. Print.
    • Narayan, R. K. The Ramayana. New York: Viking, 1972. Print.
    • Perelman, Bob. “Parataxis and Narrative: The New Sentence in Theory and Practice.” The Marginalization of Poetry: Language Writing and Literary History. Princeton: Princeton UP 1996. 59-78. Print.
    • Silliman, Ron. The Age of Huts (compleat). Berkeley: U of California P, 2007. Print.
    • ———. Interview. Alive and Writing: Interviews with American Authors of the 1980s. Eds. Sinda Gregory and Larry McCaffery. Urbana: U of Illinois P, 1987. 240-56. Print.
    • ———. The New Sentence. New York: Roof Books, 2003. Print.
    • ———. “Reading Ketjak.” Eds. Ellen Zweig and Stephen Vincent. The Poetry Reading: a Contemporary Compendium on Language and Performance. San Francisco: Momo’s Press, 1981. 194-199. Print.
    • Ward, Geoff. Language Poetry and the American Avant-Garde. Keele: British Association for American Studies, 1993. Print.
    • Watten, Barrett. “Mohawk and Ketjak.” Andrews and Bernstein. 270-71.
    • Westcott, Kathryn. “Is Noriega too hot to handle?” BBC News. BBC, 6 Sept 2007. Web. 13 Sept 2010.

     

  • Carla Harryman’s Non/Representation and the Ethics of Dispersive Performance

    Heidi R. Bean (bio)
    Bridgewater State University
    heidi.bean@bridgew.edu

     

    Contemporary poet’s theater audiences might best be characterized by community rupture: each member experiences an individual identification in the collective space of the theater. This essay takes a closer look at this audience formation through the work of Carla Harryman, a poet-playwright associated with the San Francisco branch of what has become known as L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E writing. Harryman’s 2008 work Mirror Play weaves together poetic experimentalism with references to the U.S.’s role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to the Gulf War, and to the 1968 campy intergalactic anti-war movie Barbarella. She employs poet’s theater conceptually as a means of rethinking our engagement with political narratives. The result is an interpretive “community” marked, paradoxically, by discontinuity and dispersion. Portraying an America defined not by physical borders but by complex military, economic, cultural, and political relationships, Harryman’s work plays through the ways in which these relationships are constructed and maintained. What emerges is not an interpretive free-for-all but rather an embodiment of the ethical dilemma in the postmodern era–the contradiction, as Geoffrey Galt Harpham puts it, between “How ought one to live?” and “What ought I to do?”, between generalizable norms and individual acts in actual (and unique) situations.
     

     

     

    I live in a fabrication near something I have never said before.
     

    –Carla Harryman, “Property”

     
    In “The Ear of the Poet in the Mouth of the Performer,” an essay-play that works through the politics of poetry-performance in the post-9/11 U.S., Carla Harryman recalls a performance in which she participated in the early 1990s: the wearing of a pin designed by artist Daniel Davidson that bore the deceptively simple message “Iraqi.” Responses to Harryman’s wearing the pin oscillated between “largely friendly looks and pleasantly unanticipated conversations from mostly Arab immigrant and Arab American shopkeepers of various religions and nationalities,” and the confusion of “literal minded American types” who took the pin as a confession, as a “coming-out as Iraqi.” As a performance, wearing the pin was not simply a personal expression of solidarity; it was also a demonstration of the ways in which meaning can mutate in different contexts and for different audience members. Significantly, the power of the performance came just as often in the moments of confusion and misrecognition it created: while the Arabs and Arab-Americans in Harryman’s account may have gotten it “right,” the more “literal minded” observers too found ways of identifying with the performance, though not perhaps in expected or intended ways. Harryman recalls, for example, that one woman took the pin as “an invitation to exchange confidences, hers being that she had an excess of facial hair and that she was terrified that her husband would find out about it.” While the woman was mistaken in her assumption, the identification makes some sense to Harryman, who points out that in this interpretation both women “had something to hide until this private moment of mutual outing, even if I hadn’t been deliberately hiding something like she had” (“The Ear”). Although the woman was interpellated by the performance, the performer was not in control of that interpellation.
     
    As wearer of the pin, Harryman felt a political responsibility to the responses it provoked. The purpose of the performance, she explains, was:
     

    to diffuse the theater of war and to dramatize the real life conflations that lead to the targeting of Iraqi subjects as enemies. As a performer of the pin, one becomes responsible in a local context to major world events. The performer citizen engages in a dialogic meditation that exceeds the limits of conventional narrative and argumentation as she becomes aware of her personhood stripped of reductive theatrics and narratives of identity. As with much performance art of the 70’s, Davidson’s work is partly about the performer’s experience itself; and like the performance values of the modernist avant-garde, it assertively provokes a response to emerging states of affairs.
     

    (“The Ear”)

     

    The performer of the pin circulates, but is not in control of, the meanings of language already embedded in social and political narratives. In this sense, I would argue not that the performer’s “personhood [is] stripped of . . . narratives of identity,” as Harryman puts it, but rather that the pin clasps the performer to already-circulating narratives, which may then be embraced or rejected, identified or disidentified with. Harryman is wearing not a pin that states “I claim solidarity with Iraqi victims of war,” which would be a speech-like assertion of her political beliefs and identity–a self-narration–but rather a pin that appears to declare an identity that is not self-evident. In order to make sense of the pin, observers must interpret it within the range of their own experiences and understandings. And in subsequently interacting with the performer, they project those identifications onto her body in social exchange, thereby enacting new narratives. The performance event therefore takes place in the interaction between the performer and the audience, or, perhaps more accurately, in what the audience does with the performance. The wearing of the Iraqi pin is a speech act with unpredictable effects, and in this sense, both Harryman and her observers become performers of its meaning. Harryman’s role in the performance is one of responsibility to her interlocutors, but it is, in some respects, a non-normative responsibility carried out as listening generously to and considering a range of possible identifications. While she mobilizes the structures, Harryman does not lead the interpretations. And although she hints that the Arab and Arab-American observers got it right, she does not accuse others of getting it “wrong,” but rather of getting it different. In wearing the pin, the performer becomes responsible to this difference.

     
    Significantly, the performance must remain peripatetic in order to succeed, since success relies on individual responses not subject to the social pressure of the collective space of the theater. One of the ways Harryman tries to retain this peripatetic quality in the space of the theater is to construct a dispersive theater in which meaning is allowed to oscillate rather than being tied to a single correct interpretation. The oscillation of meaning, Una Chaudhuri reminds us, is “an open space or aporia in the political ‘known’”–the space of revolution (163). Harryman suggests that the ear of the poet is tuned to the oscillation, and in her poet’s theater, it is the job of the performer to keep this oscillation alive. In “The Ear of the Poet,” for example, Harryman juxtaposes the discussion of the Iraqi pin performance with an excerpt from a Gertrude Stein play, leaving the audience to interpret for themselves the relationship between the pieces. While Harryman acknowledges that “the discussion [of the Iraqi pin performance] preceding the extract from [Stein’s] play would infect the semantic meaning of [Stein’s] work–an inference would be brought forth that at this present moment a poet behind a locked door, a no longer living poet, Iraqi, and people are connected and that there is a simultaneity made between the word ‘Iraqi’ in my exposition and the word ‘people’ in Stein’s play”, this is not the “right” or even intended interpretation but rather the result of habituated interpretive practices themselves. Dispersive theater places under scrutiny both the structure of interpretive practices and the very impulse to interpret. The space of dispersive theater is therefore an ethical space; it is a space “where thought itself experiences an obligation to form a relation with its other–not only other thoughts but other-than-thought” (Harpham 37).
     
    I discuss this example here at length because it offers a relatively self-contained way into thinking about some of the strategies and preoccupations of Harryman’s poet’s theater, which is both like and unlike Davidson’s performance art piece. Harryman’s use of Davidson as an element in her own essay-play demonstrates her ongoing engagement with intertextuality, hybrid genre, and art as/and analytic discourse, but she also uses Davidson to think through her own artistic practice. Davidson represents the use of performance not merely as a provisional testing ground in moments of impasse,1 but as a permanently provisional space, “one that in part fulfills an open-ended, non-objective mobile role that is exploratory, improvisatory, and that takes language as a medium as seriously as it does the other mediums of innovative theater that have superseded language” (“The Ear”). Like Davidson, Harryman is interested both in the relationship of narrative to non-narrative and in the way this relationship figures and is figured by physical bodies. Also like Davidson, much of Harryman’s performance is conceptual, though it is usually written as scripted dramatic theater. Moreover, as Harryman’s own commentary above makes clear, in recent years, she too has become interested in the social and political consequences of her artistic experiments. For Harryman, this shift in interest from her own “art activity and its genre excesses” to something else not clearly identified but characterized by “a loss of a sense of form-desire” is precipitated by U.S. militarization against Iraq as a response to 9/11. Viewed through this prism of art-activism, Harryman’s poet’s theater becomes, like the wearing of the Iraqi pin, “a kind of homework assignment” that allows both artist and audience to think through their relationships to form, media, discourse, embodiment, and identity (“The Ear”). Harryman’s discussion of the Iraqi pin project reveals the ways in which discursive conventions and performing subjects sometimes collide and sometimes collaborate. What Harryman demonstrates is that the real and the symbolic are not locked in a unidirectional relationship of mediation, but rather that they influence each other and this influence is site-specific. The Iraqi pin performance, Harryman’s plays, and indeed poet’s theater in general investigates the uses to which meanings are put. While such an investigation recognizes that language is neither stable nor univocal, this recognition is not its conclusion but rather its jumping-off point. Poet’s theater is not therefore deconstructive, as much as it relies on a deconstructive understanding of language.
     
    Asking what comes first, the poetry or the theater, narrative or non-narrative, subject or object, muscle or skeleton, Harryman muses, “I would prefer to emphasize the skeleton. I would prefer the movement to be the movement of the muscles lifted by the skeleton. When the muscles are not lifted by the skeleton they become athletic. One becomes aggressive and competitive. The theater becomes a theater of conflict. And somebody has to win” (“The Ear”). While I want to be careful not to tie Harryman’s ideas down to a simple metaphor, part of what she is suggesting here is that bodies are inseparable from the social forces that animate them. While both muscles and skeleton are components of bodies, they serve distinct but overlapping purposes: one mainly structure, the other mainly force. An illustration accompanying the essay depicts a knife held between teeth and lips, a cooperation of skeleton and muscle that can be read, simultaneously, as both defensive and aggressive. This is a depiction not of an oral weapon but of an aural weapon, both spoken and heard, suggested by the ear-in-the-mouth of the work’s title. In the historical moment of the post-9/11 U.S. “War on Terror,” Harryman implies, muscle-force has been recruited into insidious service, sculpting language and narrative into weapons of social conflict. Yet just as both muscles and skeleton are necessary to movement, so narrative is necessary to communication. The solution, Harryman writes in “Toy Boats,” is “to distribute narrative rather than deny it” (107).
     

    Language Poetry, Poet’s Theater, and the Body

     
    Harryman’s theater practice grows in part out of her participation in the Bay Area poetry community commonly known as “Language” writers, many of whom rework narrative as a political principle. One of the tactics of Language writing is to foreground the conventionalized function of the “I” and of other narrative tools. Such tools mark relationships of location, antagonism, causality, intention, and emphasis and “provide the illusion of movement, direction and location for the reader,” Michael Davidson points out, “but when they lose their indexical function, they point at the conventionalized nature of writing itself” (79). When “I” tell a story from memory, who is the “I” that speaks, and who is the “I” that is spoken of? What is the overlap between the two and in what way does each help to constitute the other? Bringing these questions into the space of embodied performance, Harryman puts further pressure on the conventionalized function of linguistic markers as indicators of identity presumed to be natural.
     
    Harryman’s Memory Play (1994) explores the narrative and performative construction of the “I” via memory, played out differently by the play’s three main characters, Pelican, Fish, and Reptile:
     

    Reptile:

    If I tell you one thing that I remember, you will think I’m an idiot for remembering only one thing. This is one thing that makes theater different from real conversation. If I provide you with several of my most esteemed memories, you will probably believe there are more where those came from, and I will have earned your respect. This will make theater a little more like real conversation.
     

    Pelican:

    I have a job and it is virtually all I can think about; however, I think this: memory is nothing but words stored up in an inefficient computer. What you will remember of this conversation will be nothing like what went into its construction. Such understanding promotes success in business.

    ……………………………………………………………………………….

    Fish:

    I had suffered for a long time from the illusion that remembering inhibited one’s experience. Now the illusion is almost my only memory. . . . [Later,] I will remember something else and not this. I will have forgotten the story to which I currently refer. Each person has his or her own theater. I propose this as an exhibit or a symptom of my personal stage.

    (7-8)

     

    Reptile is a chameleon, disguising himself in the camouflage of social discourse. And yet his disguise is not aimed at deception. Although Reptile suggests that whether or not we are respected or maligned depends on the strength of our (storytelling/conversational) performance, he seems to move beyond Erving Goffman’s notion of impression management to suggest that social discourse is all the truth there is.2 Pelican, on the other hand, focuses on the misinformation that occurs between what one says and what another hears, and promotes a notion of performance as information processing, mechanical and morally indifferent. Meanwhile, Fish appears to recognize the necessary relationship between discourse (remembering) and experience while at the same time acknowledging that the back story of identity is often forgotten, that identity is assumed without realizing what that identity is built upon. Fish might be taken as an example of contemporary performance studies’ notions of identity and performance: while we may understand that identity is performative, we experience it as natural. Despite their differences, what Reptile, Pelican, and Fish share is a notion of memory as performative, produced by and in narrative.

     
    Memory relies, then, on the doubling of creative narrative and social discourse, a doppelgänger which first appears in the stage directions with which the prologue opens: “A bedtime story/conversation in a little tent town out in the salt flats” (7). What one first notices about this direction is its generic ambivalence. While there would be little difficulty producing the visual elements of such a scenic design in performance (a small tent town, salt flats, bedtime), how would the difference-and-sameness indicated by the phrase “story/conversation” be performed? The slash is itself a radically textual performance that suggests the imbrication of social discourse with storytelling, with narrative, and indeed this relationship is the play’s central investigation. W. B. Worthen has argued that “modern drama in print typically frames a dialectical tension between the proprieties of the page and the identities of drama” (62). Harryman’s slash turns this page-stage tension outward, toward social life. Art (story) is different from, but inextricably bound to, social discourse (conversation). Storytelling is both oral and literary art. Harryman’s printed play alludes to the chiasmus of literary textuality and social discourse by putting the play’s status–as literary artifact, as embodied performance–into question. While Harryman makes use of what Worthen has called the “accessories” of modernist dramatic publication–“page design, typography, act and scene numbering, speech prefixes, and stage directions” (13)–she does not do so in order to control the stage performance from the page. Despite Chris Stroffolino’s assertion that Memory Play “works at least as well as a closet drama as it does in theater performance,” the page and stage versions of the play are not correspondent but collaborative, together investigating the performativity of memory (177). While each version can of course stand on its own, the play’s textual-theatrical ambivalence proliferates its identity across genres and across forms of reproduction, undermining the final authority of any single version.
     
    In bringing the language of the text out into the space of performance–performing “as language event the fluidity between public and psychological spaces,” as Harryman puts it (“Site” 158)–her plays investigate the social activities of language within a context of actual human relations, of the audience members and performers within a specific social space (that of the performance at a particular moment in time) and in relation to specific objects. Language writing on the page explores language in individual interaction with readers, while the performance of Language writing in poetry readings is bounded by the conventions of a touring authorial performance that rhetorically position the event (albeit falsely) as site- and audience-nonspecific, if not actually transcendent. In contrast to this, Harryman’s poet’s theater emphasizes embodied identities at the same time it deconstructs them. These identities are not incidental, and they are not nonspecific; rather, they are fluid. The character list of Harryman’s play Performing Objects Stationed in The Sub World, for example, specifies a “White woman,” “Child,” and “Black man,” but the author’s notes for performance explain that “[t]he categories of gender and ethnicity are mutable in this play, based on whatever circumstance of the performance” (qtd in “Site” 158). This is accomplished in part by having multiple actors play each character but also by leaving the gap between character and actor visible: “For instance C3, the Black Man, reads the newspaper but that doesn’t mean that C3 becomes a Black Man who reads the newspaper, but rather C3 performs a reading of the newspaper: his identity or identities such that it is or they are, migrates through activities” (“Site” 162). In this way, the objects with which the actors interact “do not serve as extensions or illustrations of subjectivity nor do they appear with autonomous luminosity”; instead, they are “constitutive of an instability of social encounters and uncertain boundaries between interior fantasy and exterior fact, whether they are sentient or inert” (162). This does not, however, preclude psychological depth. Rather, characters are defined not by the moral challenges they face but rather by the communication they perform and are performed by.
     
    In Memory Play, the playing through of multiple discursive and gestural registers in the formation of identity drives the action. As bodies and spoken language self-consciously jostle one another in performance, the relationship between discourse, identity, and embodiment takes center stage. Reptile’s lines quoted above appear to interpellate audience members into a self-conscious suspension of disbelief: he explicitly acknowledges our tacit agreement to let one memory in “art” stand in for the multiple memories of “real” conversation.3 In art, he suggests, a single story or image (memory) can take on a variety of symbolisms and resonances; in conversation, however, we may question such overdetermination of a single moment in one’s life. But the “I” who speaks this line is shifty, posing as a social interlocutor and literary-dramatic character simultaneously. On the page, Reptile’s “I” seems to remain consistent, a distant observer of the relationship between theater and conversation. Spoken by an actor onstage, however, the “I” oscillates between actor and dramatic character. Is this line a rehearsed but direct address to the audience by an actor who will soon become a character in the play, or is the actor already in character? And how does this ambiguity position audience members in relation to the play?
     
    This last question raises the issue of what poet Joan Retallack has called “reciprocal alterity,” which she conceptualizes as an equilibrium between, on the one hand, the “ethical and epistemological destabilizing principle” that we are never fully knowable to one another or to ourselves and, on the other, community, receptivity, and intention (5). Is the “I,” who–according to Reptile–can earn “your” respect, a “fictional” character or a “real” actor? Either way, of course, the “I” is a construction based in part on the speaker’s performance and in part on the audience’s conclusions in relation to that performance–making both intention and reception important matters to consider. The construction is simultaneously grammatical and epistemological, since pronouns are a necessary part of communication despite their radical insufficiency and contingency. Pronouns suggest independent subjectivity, and in doing so contribute to a model of individualism. In order to “move away from models of cultural and political agency lodged in isolated heroic acts and simplistic notions of cause and effect,” as Retallack urges, we must therefore think through our tools of communication at their most basic level (3). Both Retallack and Harryman propose “a fine new kind of realism,” to quote William James’s remark in a letter to Gertrude Stein about her writing (qtd. Mellow 147). Retallack approaches this version of realism by appealing to the essay form, because, she argues, the essay writes from the position of an “I” understood as selfsame, whereas the lyric “I” of poetry is already understood to be a persona. The theater, however, presents an unusually apt arena for an investigation of representation, for the presence of bodies on stage always simultaneously evokes both the characters being portrayed and the actors “themselves.”

     
    If the Humanities have emerged from the “turn to language” only to enter the “turn to the visual,”4 then Harryman’s work provides an apt vehicle for exploring our negotiations of these turns. Language writing arose simultaneously with the rise of linguistic theory in the 1970s, and the relationship between the two has always been seen as collaborative–Language writing as theory. Some saw Language writing as the perfect object of the new theory and saw developments in theory as supporting the sense that Language writing had a cognitive and social use. But not everyone agreed on the role of theory in Language writing.5 In There Is Nothing Better Than a Theory (given its first full performance in 1989), Harryman satirizes what she sees as a tendency toward theory fetishism. In Memory Play she similarly pokes fun at theory’s drive to dominate, this time in the figure of a child’s toy, humorously named the Miltonic Humiliator. Meanwhile, recent productions of Mirror Play seem to indict theory as the production of knowledge removed from lived experience; in debates about representation and gender, the body becomes the vanishing point of theory.
     
    Although San Francisco poet’s theater emerged along with what has become known as “Language” writing, it has not figured into those historical accounts until recently.6 Nick Robinson and Eileen Corder founded the San Francisco Poets Theater (SFPT) in 1979, and by the time the final SFPT play was produced in 1984, nearly a dozen plays had been produced, involving a wide range of “Language” and associated poets in a variety of roles (from playwright, actor, set designer, and director to publicist and poster/program designer), including Harryman, Corder, Nick Robinson, Kit Robinson, Steve Benson, Alan Bernheimer, Johanna Drucker, Lyn Hejinian, Tom Mandel, and Bob Perelman, among others.7 While some of these play texts have been published (almost exclusively in small journals), there are virtually no sustained examinations, let alone theorizations, of this performance work.8
     
    One of the reasons for this neglect has to do with Language writing’s almost exclusive focus, in the 1970s and 80s, on material textuality. In a 1986 review of Harryman’s Percentage and Property, for example, Jean Day explains the dramatic form of these hybrid works metaphorically, as a theatrum mundi in which “‘We’ are acting out aspects of a common drama through language, not just in the sense that we’re using the same tools, but in the sense that it is language which makes the private public, makes the passion of the revolutionary charge” (120-121, emphasis in original). Steve Benson–Harryman’s close friend, fellow performer, and frequent theater collaborator–refers to the published text of Harryman’s play La Quotidienne as “the play itself,” folding the entire work under an umbrella of textual interpretation when he argues that “[t]he lack of any stable context or prescribed behavior indicates no means or property other than discourse by which the figures can gain leverage in the struggles for authority and autonomy” (24, 23). Focusing exclusively on discourse, such an interpretation ignores the ways in which the actor-characters give the play’s figures an authority and autonomy outside of discourse, in the presence of live bodies on stage.9 Similarly, in an essay published in Poetics Journal, Alan Bernheimer suggests that poet’s theater consists of works “written towards production . . . work[s] with then two lives to lead, one self-evident and the other potential” (70). But what is “self-evident” about a poet’s theater text like Memory Play? Bernheimer sees words as agents, which “[l]eft to their own devices . . . tell stories by themselves, resolute (resonant in the evolving history of their use)” (70), but of course it is this latter assertion–that words are “resonant in the evolving history of their use”–that points out the falsehood of the former suggestion that words have their own agency, for the “stories” of words are constituted in their social use. Certainly, unintended meanings and histories can (and often do) arise when we use language, but to characterize this as an act of words “by themselves” obscures the ways in which meaning both constitutes and is constituted by bodies and embodied identities both on the stage and in social exchange.
     
    Acknowledging the work of Language poets such as Ron Silliman, Bob Perelman, and Charles Bernstein, who engage the performativity of material language, Worthen too considers this work as a textual phenomenon, interesting for its similarities to printed drama (which the title of his last chapter suggests is “something like poetry”) but not engaged as drama or theater. But Worthen’s discussion of anti-theatricality in both poetry and theater is an important step in opening the relationship between two fields normally considered to have very little overlap. Most significantly for my purposes here, Worthen observes that
     

     

    the materiality of the mise-en-page, the precise construction of printed words in space, does not operate as a kind of stage direction, an authorized and authoritarian effort to govern subsequent performance (though some authors may intend it that way), nor is it complete in itself, a container or “can” of perfected meanings waiting to be emptied by performance. Instead, Language poetics implies the incommensurability of these two modes of writing’s “thickness.” The poem’s physical design on the page, and its physicalized performance cannot be collapsed into one another so that the script grounds the performance or the performance realizes the script. . . . Language poetics reframes the page as a distinctive field of play, insisting that words can and must be joined in ways beyond the habits of conventional speech.
     

    (138)

     

    Indeed, in “Aesthetic Tendency and the Politics of Poetry: A Manifesto,” a collaborative essay on the political and aesthetic practices of Language writing, Ron Silliman, Carla Harryman, Lyn Hejinian, Steve Benson, Bob Perelman, and Barrett Watten critique the expressivist lyric, institutionalized in literary and creative writing programs in the U.S., as responsible for “the scenario of disinterested critical evaluation reinforcing the alleged moral autonomy of the poem” (269).10

     
    In the last few years, however, the infiltration of performance studies into literature departments has sparked a more performance-oriented interest in hybrid works such as Harryman’s. In the first five months of 2008, Harryman’s play Third Man was staged in San Francisco as part of a SFPT retrospective,11Memory Play was produced in Chicago with the support of the Renaissance Society at the University of Chicago, and a weekend of poet’s theater plays directed by Harryman, including her own Mirror Play, Frank O’Hara’s Try! Try! and an adaptation from Barrett Watten’s Bad History, was presented in Chicago as part of a festival of poet’s theater.12 During this same period, The Grand Piano series–subtitled an “experiment in collective autobiography” and documenting the rise of Language writing in San Francisco–has begun to present Harryman’s work in particular and poet’s theater in general as a fundamental part of the history of Language writing.13
     
    Harryman’s theater adds to Language writing a consideration of how the presence of bodies affects our understanding of language politics, particularly in the different ways language and bodies mark a threshold in interrelated processes of speaking, enacting, and knowing. It may be helpful here to recall Pierre Bourdieu’s conceptualization of the body as a kind of “living memory pad” onto and via which not only behaviors but also beliefs and values are inscribed; childhood learning leads to a kind of automatically enacted belief that is not a state of mind but rather “a state of the body” (68). As practical sense becomes naturalized, the source of the practices becomes obscured; “It is because agents never know completely what they are doing,” Bourdieu argues, “that what they do has more sense than they know” (69). But whereas for Bourdieu acting and theater become ways of recalling these automated, naturalized thoughts and feelings,14 Harryman sees theater as a means of defamiliarizing the social ideologies inscribed onto bodies–ideologies that, for Bourdieu, are obscured by time and naturalization and that, for Judith Butler, must frequently be denied in the necessary construction of subjective autonomy (26).
     
    Poet’s theater is a collaborative performance between generative language and physical gesturality that can help us understand the complex linguistic and embodied performativities that constitute and materialize identity. Gesture is a bodily act that, in the realm of the social, becomes a sign of communication. Martin Puchner, who has written thoughtfully on arrested movement in modernist drama, describes gesture as “the praxis and labor that go into the production of language and linguistic communication, the labor that is more or less erased in the finished, linguistic product” (28). Isolated and disjointed, individual gestures can only be amassed into an aggregate rather than organically connected into a whole.15 Puchner notes that both Nietzche and Adorno maligned gesturality as that which prevents actors on stage from presenting organic wholes.16 Postmodernism’s valorization of the aggregate, however, offers a new kind of pro-theatricalism that celebrates precisely the gesturality disavowed by these theorists of modernism. Harryman’s theater embraces the aggregative quality of gesture by using denaturalized acting to create paratactic (rather than syntactic or hypotactic) structures. In rehearsal for a 2008 production of Memory Play,17 for example, the actor playing Fish needed help slowing down her speech, so she was given an activity to perform: writing a note on a piece of paper. This practical solution to an acting problem soon became an interpretive issue, however. What should the actors then do with the note? Director Catharine Sullivan wanted Fish to hand the note to Child, but Harryman (who was present at rehearsals) was adamant that this was not possible, presumably because it transformed the activity of note-writing into the narrative gesture of passing on instructions. In the end, it was agreed that Pelican would intercept the note without (oral or gestural) comment. In preventing the note-writing gesture from cohering into narrative meaning, Harryman and Sullivan created a paratactic structure–one gesture and another gesture and another gesture that do not bear any clear narrative relationship to one another. At the same time, Sullivan and Harryman’s disagreement over what to do next demonstrates the tendency of aggregating gestures to cohere into character identity and narrative meaning.
     
    As an embodied act with the potential for social meaning, gesture both is and isn’t language.18 Gesture reaches simultaneously inward toward the construction of subjectivity and outward toward the construction of social identity, but it also relies on bodily impulse, understood within a system of discourse but not reducible to it. As both being and representation, gesture reveals what Peggy Phelan has called the body’s metonymic relationship to the subject. While the real exceeds representation, representation also exceeds the real. The identity produced in and through this reciprocal excess is not only a marker, Phelan argues, but an ethics:
     

    Identity emerges in the failure of the body to express being fully and the failure of the signifier to convey meaning exactly. Identity is perceptible only through a relation to another–which is to say, it is a form of both resisting and claiming the other, declaring the boundary where the self diverges from and merges with the other. In that declaration of identity and identification, there is always loss, the loss of not-being the other and yet remaining dependent on that other for self-seeing, self-being.

    (13)

     

    In denying narrative coherence to Fish’s note-writing gesture, the production of Memory Play discussed above places the burden of meaning on audience members themselves. What the body does and what it means do not perfectly correspond. Making meaning out of a gesture necessarily involves a merging of interpreter and interpreted, of self and other. Harryman, like Phelan, is interested in the relationship of representation to being, a relationship she investigates via a strategy she characterizes as “non/narrative” when performed in prose, and which we might modify as “non/representation” in theater. As in Memory Play‘s play of “story/conversation,” the slash here indicates not an opposition but an imbrication of two modes.

     

    Mimesis and Misrecognition in Mirror Play

     
    Harryman’s latest performance work, Mirror Play, revolves around violence perpetrated by nations against other nations or against (its own or other) individuals. Divided into four acts, a prologue, and an epilogue (all appearing in reverse order) but without stage directions or speech prefixes, the stage performance differs widely from production to production. What remains consistent, however, is a web of political and social references–for example, media portrayals of Rachel Corrie, the American peace activist killed defending a Palestinian house against U.S.-built bulldozers operated by the Israeli Defense Forces; images from the second Gulf War of U.S. soldiers raiding Iraqi tombs and Iraqis’ own destruction of Iraqi cultural artifacts; and the 1968 campy intergalactic anti-war movie Barbarella, whose star Jane Fonda was transformed in the 1970s from GI pinup girl to despised anti-war activist and then again in the 1980s to aerobic video icon. Mirror Play portrays an America defined not by physical borders but by complex military, economic, cultural, and political relationships, playing through the ways in which these relationships are constructed and maintained. The play is both radically textual and radically gestural, using paratactic gesture and language as well as architectural space not to reflect the interiority of the subject but rather to help constitute and figure it. In this sense, Mirror Play represents a broad shift in thinking from the concept of an individual subject, seen as a self-sufficient and independent whole, to the concept of the social subject, in which the social (exterior) is a necessary and mutable circumstance of subject constitution (interior). Throughout the play, “wholes”–words, characters, clothes, rooms–are revealed as mere resting points in the ongoing process of meaning-making. What is simultaneously difficult and hopeful about this piece is that it dares to imagine a politics (or ethics) for those who are produced in and by narrative. Mirror Play does not simply reveal or reflect this condition of narrativity; it tries to think a way that we might be active within this condition rather than merely subject to it.
     
    The play opens, in one version (see Fig. 1 below),19 with a simple image of homey domesticity–clothes hanging on a line, blowing in the wind–portrayed entirely in language: “Flying. Clothes flying. Sleeves wrapping / around clouds, cinching them in, dragging / them” (178).20
     
    Scene from Mirror Play by Carla Harryman, with Jon Raskin, John Olson, Roham Shaikhani, Elana Elyce, Abbas Bazzi, Mary Byrnes, and Wolanda Lewis. Directed by Jim Cave and performed at the Susanne Hilberry Gallery in Ferndale, Michigan, August 14, 2005. Filmed by Asa Watten. Used by permission.
     

    Click to view video

     

    The empty clothes are both human products and human forms, registering simultaneously the presence and absence of human beings themselves. As the sleeves first “wrap” around clouds, then “cinch,” and finally “drag” them, the clothes imply a kind of “domestic” violence, most clearly perhaps a reference to the Clothesline Project, which protests against, and memorializes the victims of a private kind of “domestic” violence against women. But it is also perhaps a reference to that which inspired the Clothesline Project: the AIDS Quilt, originally created to memorialize the victims of AIDS and to protest against their neglect by American society and history. As theater and performance critic Elinor Fuchs has pointed out, participant-created AIDS quilts, in their jumbling of Jews, Catholics, Muslims, and New Age Buddhists with sequins, flags, prayers, a measuring spoon, and much more, perform a postmodern breakdown of master narratives–in direct contrast to the hero memorials of “modern imperial politics” (195-196).21 Significantly, in the Detroit production directed by Jim Cave,22 no flying shirts are visually present on stage (see Fig. 1 above); rather, they’re represented as artifacts of language, drawing attention to the ways in which narrative has been inscribed on bodies even to the point of replacing them altogether (as one speaker says in Mirror Play, “Images are crowding. Crowding us out” [207]). If the shirts had been physically represented or staged they might simply have performed an iconic function, but because they are described in language–a reference to a reference–the very textuality of the representation creates not a destruction of visual representation but a recognition of the very condition of representation.

     
    Despite the lack of narrative through-line, the play achieves continuity both by taking as its central focus the investigation of the conditions of representation and by returning again and again to key words and images. Cycling back to the image of clothing after several pages, for example, the text meditates on the perspective created by choosing some descriptors over others:
     

    …This scheme
    Imagines clothing in terms of whole or
    complete entities: a shirt, a hat, a shoe, etc.
    So there is still much that it cannot describe.
    For instance, in the great outdoors, the
    clothes rot and decompose. Birds pull at
    their threads. The threads mingle with other
    things. The thread is no longer a discrete
    thing but part of a unit for which there is no
    name until the nest is complete. Then the
    unit is a nest. I wear a sleeve on my heart.
    Note this also. And other harmless events.
    (note)
    (note)

    echo makes a note (192)

     

    To imagine clothing as a finished object–rather than as a composite of that which went into its making or as decomposed parts to be used in the making of other objects–is, the text asserts, a “scheme” rather than an inevitability. If the object that is no-longer-a-shirt-and-not-yet-a-nest has no name, it becomes subjugated, merely a stage in the creation of an “actual” object and meaningless except in relation to the end product (recalling Puchner’s definition of gesture above).

     
    From this cluster of images and lines, organized thematically around the impact of language use on conceptual thinking (which is hardly “harmless”), the text suddenly shifts paratactically to a reordered cliché–“I wear a sleeve on my heart”–with no apparent relation to the previous lines. One way a reader might approach this shift is simply to give in to the experience of abrupt change, with no attempt to impose meaning. Habituated reading practices are more likely, however, to coerce a meaningful connection. Is this sentence perhaps another example of language that privileges object over process? What is the relationship of the “I” to the objects (clothing, nest) that came before? And what do we make of the shift in tone from material objects such as shirts, hats, threads, and nests, to symbolic objects, such as a heart and, now, sleeve (which can be worn on a heart only metaphorically)? A nest made out of threads is a home (a physical place) and home is where the heart is (a symbolic place). Emotional vulnerability (wearing one’s heart on one’s sleeve) is replaced with emotional self-preservation (wearing a sleeve on one’s heart). What was formerly outside (clothing) moves inward (to “I”). Here the text mimes its meaning through the generation of interpretive possibilities: any single understanding represents a “scheme,” useful perhaps but certainly not inevitable.
     
    But the text quoted above also moves beyond semantic frontiers toward the semiotic border between language and music inhabited by the word “note.” This single word suggests simultaneously a musical sound, different speech modes (command–“note this”–or description), and textual objects (a hierarchical category designator [i.e., footnote] or a casual piece of writing). The use of parentheses on the page–an instantiation which cannot be precisely performed on stage–is a textual convention indicating that the word “note” might be read as a placeholder (as in “I intend to insert a note here”) or as a stage direction (as in “Play a musical note here”). In either case, the note functions as an (explanatory or musical) “echo.” The play’s textual performance on the page, then, is not identical with its performance on stage. The relationship of the text to stage is neither directive nor documentary, neither script nor recording. Reading the text and attending the performance produce experientially distinct plays that nevertheless constitute linked “work” exploring the relationship of textual language to embodied performance. The semantic overdetermination of “note” in the text, for example, is linked but not identical to the overdetermination of the voice, as speech and as instrument, in performance: Both the Detroit and San Francisco productions featured a jaw harp, which produces sound uncannily in between language and music.23 Working with sound and music at the limits of language, these performances in part explored the ways in which sounds morph into and out of meaning.
     
    What is at stake here is an awareness of the multiple processes by which we make experience meaningful. When a speaker asserts at the beginning of Harryman’s play that “the composition of the sky is a matter of knowledge” (178), for example, she suggests both that the sky’s physical make-up (one sense of “composition”) can be scientifically known, but also that this knowledge is itself a matter of narrative construction (a second sense of “composition”). The goal is not to question the makeup of the sky, but rather to suggest that what is known must also take into account how it is known. A few lines later the play suggests that “addicts” to knowledge “suffer atmosphere,” a line which is vocally elongated in performance–“atmosssphhhere”–to suggest both the vaporous air that surrounds a planet and, simultaneously, a fear of the atmos, or vaporosity, perhaps the vaporosity or lack of solidity of knowledge itself. Here, vocalized performance vaporizes our certainty about the meaning of the line, and in doing so, it both mimes and produces its meaning. Mirror Play employs not a poetics of memory as witness but rather a poetics of memory as performative, as productive of the relationships it purports to describe and attend, a strategy that echoes Elin Diamond’s notion of mimesis as the production of truth through a manipulation of the mirroring process.

     
    In the psychological space of Mirror Play‘s collectivity, all aspects of discourse are both positive and negative. The play alludes to the imbricated discourses of health, war, beauty, and pornography, for example, in its repeated references to Barbarella, the title role from the soft-porn sci-fi film that made the actress Jane Fonda famous. In the film, Barbarella is a representative of the Federation of Earth who is sent on a peace-seeking mission to rid the world of a weapon that could mean the end of humanity. Making love not war across the galaxy, Barbarella made Fonda a favorite pinup among GIs. Mirror Play‘s reference to “fa(r)ce and pornography” (198) certainly alludes to Barbarella, but it might just as aptly describe Fonda’s 1980s reincarnation as the aerobic ideal of her wildly popular workout video series. Dressed in form-hugging fitness fashion, Fonda bent over and spread her legs in a model of arrested movement. But in the period between Barbarella and the height of her workout popularity, Fonda also became an anti-war activist, speaking out against the Vietnam War starting in 1970. Though she remained a sexual icon, Fonda’s perceived betrayal of American troops transformed her into a target of overt, if symbolic, sexual violence.24 “At places where soldiers or former soldiers congregate,” Rick Perlstein reports, “there’ll be stickers of her likeness on the urinals; one is an invitation to symbolic rape: Fonda in her 1980s ‘work-out’ costume, her legs splayed, pudenda at the bulls-eye. Every night at lights-out midshipmen at the US Naval Academy cry out ‘Goodnight, bitch!’ in her honour” (3).
     
    Disturbing as this report is, the discourse behind the violence is what interests me here. Ironically, this “symbolic rape” is in part encouraged by the false mirror–the farce/face–of aerobicism misrecognized as athleticism. Johannes Birringer has argued that the image of the aerobic body is structured around a:
     

     

    scene of instruction/mimicry that promotes an exercise of subjective and corporeal self-transformation while masking the ritualized submission of the body to serial, monotonous, and stationary motion. In her willful self-production of an actively new feminine body, the woman participant misrecognizes the mirror structure in this performative exchange, aligned as it is around persistent cultural/hierarchical oppositions between mobility/immobility, seeing/being seen, and so forth. She is drawn into a phantom interaction with the two-dimensional, depthless and absent body of the video image that simulates an actual relation between body model and “real” performance in “real” time.
     

    (215)

     

    The aerobic body, always a feminized body, is immobilized and put on display. In contrast, the military body might be thought of as an athleticized body, masculinized, mobile, and–recalling Harryman’s discussion of the athleticism of muscles acting without the assistance of the skeleton–competitive and aggressive. The discursive oppositions promulgated by the aerobic-atheletic dichotomy contribute to, among other things, both kinds of “domestic” violence suggested in the play’s opening verbal image of flying clothes (violence against women and against discursively feminized homosexual men). Although Mirror Play alludes to physical acts of violence (as in one production at the Hilberry Gallery in suburban Detroit when a hooded male figure claiming “Nobody wanted war” conjured, at least for me, images of torture associated both with American Vietnam POWs and with Iraqi prisoners at the American military prison Abu Ghraib), these are not the focus of Mirror Play. Rather, as I have done in this example of the soldiers’ violence against Fonda, Harryman attends to the discourses that both materialize the body and enable violence–discourses that rely on a range of mis/recognitions. Employing not a poetics of memory as witness but a poetics of memory as performative, as productive of the relationships it purports to describe and attend, Mirror Play plays through and with the notion of national(ist) memory.

     

    Exploring the psychological space of collectivity, Mirror Play offers a counter to mass culture reliance on what Retallack deems “naïve realism” and its attendant call “for intellectual and imaginative resignation, a naturalization of normapathic desire” (5). Such realism is “normapathic” because it works by irresponsibly burying difference, contradiction, irrationality–an irresponsibility that, Retallack notes, “is never benign” (19). Harryman’s work, in contrast, remains open to radical difference. It engages with processes of social learning by rethinking the production and dissemination of knowledge. The realism of Harryman’s work lies not in a normative reenactment of past events but rather in its existence as a thought experiment through which the past and its connection to the present moment are reconfigured. It is characterized by the ability to hold contradictions in interplay and by a willingness to see the overlay of conflicting realities. In Mirror Play Harryman turns this exploration toward social-spatial constructions with material consequences in the perpetuation of national violence. Architecture, like language, always has both a form and a social use.25 Postmodern theorist Linda Hutcheon recalls that Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, the architect of the classically modernist Seagram Building in Manhattan, “allowed only white blinds on the plate glass windows and demanded that these be left in only one of three positions, open, shut, or half-way” (28)–the building’s design quite literally controlling the personal lives that inhabited its space; viewing tenants either as children to be guided or as subjects on whom to experiment, modernist architects positioned themselves apart from the buildings’ interior communities. Postmodernist architecture returns to the idea of community, but now as a decentralized entity with practical needs. And memory is, Hutcheon argues, “central to this linking of the past with the lived” (29).
     
    Mirror Play‘s mise-en-scène is conceptual: as a foyer that has been cut-away from the house, it represents the threshold between public and private, into and out of which “any body” may pass. The “antechamber” is both room and passageway that comes “before” the house, in between the inside and outside. It is a room defined only in relation to other rooms, not as a place in itself (and in vocalized performance the word slides between antechamber and anti-chamber). But in Mirror Play the antechamber has been torn away from the house, destroying the relation that constitutes its identity; here the antechamber is not a room but a moment in the midst of transition from one object (foyer) to another, as yet unknown, resting point. Harryman’s approach to architecture is influenced in part by Denis Hollier’s notion of “anti-architecture” as a means of getting out from under the authoritarian hierarchies with which architecture is complicit, a condition which led Georges Bataille to deem architecture “society’s authorized superego” (ix). Hollier conceptualizes “an architecture that would not inspire, as in Bataille, social good behavior, or would not produce, as in Foucault’s disciplinary factory, madness or criminality in individuals” (x). Anti-architecture is therefore an alternative that leads
     

    against the grain to some space before the constitution of the subject, before the institutionalization of subjectivity . . . [or that] would open up a space anterior to the division between madness and reason; rather than performing the subject, it would perform spacing: a space from before the subject, from before meaning; the asubjective, asemantic space of unedifying architecture, an architecture that would not allow space for the time needed to become a subject.
     

    (xi)

     

    Such anti-architecture works as loss or dismantling of the meaning that is assumed to inhere in architectural structures–such as houses, prisons, and tombs, all of which are implicitly or explicitly referenced in Mirror Play.26

     
    Mirror Play‘s foyer investigates, in part, the penetration of exterior social space into a subject’s interiority. But as a space that has been torn away from the house, presumably in an act of violence, the foyer is also what Hollier labels above an “asubjective” space–a space which defies interpretive coherence. In this way, Mirror Play enters into the discourse of space and place as they figure interiority/exteriority (from the position of the subject) and insider/outsider (as the position of the subject), which is in part a difference between being from/in a place and belonging to a place. In contrast to what Una Chaudhuri has described as modernist drama’s recourse to “a vague, culturally determined symbology of home, replete with all those powerful and empowering associations of space that are organized by the notion of belonging” (xii), Mirror Play is organized around a violated home that is also an opening–a condition that acknowledges both the very human desire to belong and the simultaneous violence and promise of belonging. Whereas modernism’s drama of the home is built around what Chaudhuri has labeled “a victimage of location and a heroism of departure,” which “structure the plot as well as the plays’ accounts of subjectivity and identity” (xii emphasis original), Mirror Play articulates the question its unattached foyer invites: “Can the antechamber lose its meaning, its substance, or is it always the same, even if every aspect of it contradicts its defining characteristics?” (191).
     

    Dispersive Performance and the Theater of Others

     
    According to Jerzy Grotowski, whose efforts to rethink actors’ training have influenced Harryman’s own approach to performance, the defining feature of theater is the performer-audience relationship (15). But in the postmodern era, the audience is notoriously difficult to characterize. In The Audience, theater theorist Herbert Blau discusses the peculiar notion of the postmodern audience, both collective and disparate, joined to one another through a shared experience interpreted in highly individualized ways. Like Harryman, Blau locates the efficacy of postmodernist theater in its challenge to the primacy of ocularcentric knowledge. To position understanding as seeing is, he argues, an ideology that ignores the audience’s original auditory role. Postmodern theater audiences are a product of “the vast seduction of the dispersive media” (14) and marked by division, or what Blau describes as “an ‘original splitting’” that is “not the image of an original unity but the mysterious rupture of social identity in the moment of its emergence” (10). The postmodern audience is therefore not a certainty–not a community to be joined or a position to be occupied–but rather an effect of performance itself:
     

    The audience . . . is not so much a mere congregation of people as a body of thought and desire. It does not exist before the play but is initiated or precipitated by it; it is not an entity to begin with but a consciousness constructed. The audience is what happens when, performing the signs and passwords of a play, something postulates itself and unfolds in response.
     

    (25, italics in original)

     

    Blau historicizes the concept of a “public” as a modernist notion that conceptualizes the audience as uniform, understandable, and authorizing–that is, as something that can be figured out and won over. In contrast, postmodernist audiences are indeterminate, with each member experiencing an individual response, an individual identification. Blau dubs this the “theater of otherness,” as an alternative to the more traditional notion of a theater of essence (94). This “otherness” does not constitute a counterpublic–it is not the disidentificatory community that, for example, José Muñoz discusses in his important study of contemporary minoritarian performance. Rather, it is an interpretive “community” paradoxically marked by discontinuity and dispersion, and formed in spite of (or perhaps because of, or prior to) the foreclosure of normative identification. But while Blau argues that such theater is marked by an oscillation between eye and ear that creates distance rather than identification, I want to propose that in Harryman’s theater this oscillation forms the basis for an ethics of responsibility toward the identifications we form. In this sense, we might think of Harryman’s theater not as a theater of otherness but as a theater of others, others to whom we are, for better or worse, ethically bound–a theater in which, to borrow Harryman’s language, “[m]e talking fuses to you” (“Property” 16).

     
    If the space of performance is, as Harryman argues in “The Ear of the Poet,” a provisional space in which ideas, narratives, and social constructions may be tested, then what’s being tested in Mirror Play is perhaps not only our methods for making sense of a post-9/11 world but also the very idea that making “sense”–a particular cognitive ordering of experience–is the correct goal. If “making sense” is a narrative proposition, then poetry might provide a different paradigm more suitable to the present world’s complex interconnectivities. Poetry might offer, as Retallack asserts, a cognitive alternative to imagining borders and the crossing of lines, allowing us instead to think in terms of fractal geometries and the “swerve,” an unpredictable (form of) change that can defamiliarize, disorient, and even estrange by “radically altering geometries of attention,” resulting in “an unsettling transfiguration of once-familiar terrain” (1). As interruption, digression, and the unexpected, the swerve is produced in and by hybridity, the vitality of which lies in its inventiveness, in its generativity. The swerve is not an abdication of responsibility but rather the recognition that all events are overdetermined, unpredictable, subject to chance. Swerves “dislodge us,” Retallack argues, “from reactionary allegiances and nostalgias” (3). Openness to the unexpected, to generativity, thus becomes a kind of ethics: generosity toward generativity.
     
    Placing such generativity at the heart of an ethics of non-normative obligation takes seriously Geoffrey Galt Harpham’s assertion that ethics “does not solve problems, it structures them” (37). The modernist hero narrative, related to the sense of a universal ethical imperative on which ethical discourse has traditionally been founded, has been denounced in the postmodern era as an “ideological vehicle and the legitimation of concrete structures of power and domination” (Jameson 101). The paradox of a postmodernist ethics of non-normative obligation, then, is that while it does not posit a hierarchy of interpretive values, it does rely on the categorical imperative of obligation itself. This imperative may, Harpham suggests, be at the center of Derrida’s notion of deconstruction itself, seeping into it in the form of the subject who is allowed to
     

    ‘return’ on the condition that it be transformed and modernized–no longer the self-identical, self-regulating subject of humanism, but rather a subject inmixed with otherness. This otherness, Derrida said, would consist not only of the obligation that all people owe to other people, but also of the iron laws, the internal otherness, which we, as speaking animals, harbor within our living consciousnesses.

     

    The paradox of dispersive theater’s non-normative obligation embodies the contradiction Harpham locates in ethics itself: the contradiction between “How ought one live?” and “What ought I to do?,” the contradiction between the distanced laws of generalizable norms and an individual in an actual (and unique) situation (26). For Harpham the key to ethics is not only the obligation but the choice between different ethics (for example, between mercy and retribution). Dispersive theater makes us attentive to these choices, makes us aware that there are choices. This is not to say that all choices are equal, but rather that each choice “violates some law or other, and violates it precisely because it is ‘ethical’” (29). Dispersive theater is ethical, then, not because it offers a moral order but because it reveals the conditions of choice. Mirror Play presents a very postmodern problematic: while the body is materialized through the very act of narrative (including discourse, gesture, and image), narrative is always an imperfect mirror–a necessary framing that inevitably obfuscates, a “view [that] blocks what’s behind it” (Harryman “Animal” 33). This presents a particular obstacle to audience members, who are presented with a range of possibilities for mis/recognition, but it also presents a threat to bodies, for violence–in the form of war, rape, social neglect, and government policy–is justified through such mis/recognitions.

     
    And yet, it is the very vulnerability of bodies that leads to claims of “bodily integrity and self-determination” that are, as Judith Butler has pointed out, “essential to so many political movements” (25). “The body,” Butler continues,
     

    implies mortality, vulnerability, agency: the skin and the flesh expose us to the gaze of others, but also to touch, and to violence, and bodies put us at risk of becoming the agency and instrument of all these as well. Although we struggle for rights over our own bodies, the very bodies for which we struggle are not quite ever only our own. The body has its invariably public dimension. Constituted as a social phenomenon in the public sphere, my body is and is not mine. Given over from the start to the world of others, it bears their imprint, is formed within the crucible of social life; only later, and with some uncertainty, do I lay claim to my body as my own, if, in fact, I ever do. Indeed, if I deny that prior to the formation of my ‘will,’ my body related me to others whom I did not choose to have in proximity to myself, if I build a notion of ‘autonomy’ on the basis of the denial of this sphere of a primary and unwilled physical proximity with others, then am I denying the social conditions of my embodiment in the name of autonomy?
     

    (26)

     

    Here, Butler helps us understand the vulnerability of the body in the public realm, a vulnerability of both its physicality and its identity. This mentally and physically projected “external” body inevitably figures one’s internal subjectivity as well. And yet in figuring this subjectivity as autonomous, Butler argues, we do violence to those others on whose denial that autonomy is based. As Harryman asserts, “I” is not the measure; it is the “interference” (“Acker” 36). But it is necessary interference.

     
    Dispersive theater may, in fact, represent a new chapter in the history of anti-theatricality. Anti-theatricality in the twentieth century has frequently indicated, at least in part, a desire to distance ourselves from the influence of the mass audience, who may pressure us respond differently than we might otherwise do. Mimetic acts are, moreover, repugnant because they allow us to enjoy the suffering of others. But dispersive theater employs what might be called a flexible theatricality, whereby the value of the theater collectivity fluctuates between coercion and responsibility, between the awareness that narrative is, at best, imperfect and that meaning must nevertheless be made. Dispersive theater thus embraces the stage, but in a different way, avoiding spectacle and emphasizing the poetic, not as a direct route to the emotions but as a social tool.

     
    To return to Harryman’s account of the Iraqi pin performance, the woman who interpreted the wearing of the pin as an admission of a secret understood, at least subconsciously, that she was both actor and acted upon. Taking Harryman’s pin as the revelation of a guilty secret was perhaps a conditioned response: the only way she could make sense of the performance within a political context characterized by a nationalist narrative drive toward “mission accomplished.” And yet in responding with a secret of her own, she demonstrated a deeply felt, if unexpected, empathy that operated according to a set of interpretive conditions not determined by borders or even by autonomy. She too felt the vulnerability of her body in public; she too suffered a social policing that ultimately figured her subjectivity.
     
    In avoiding narratives of witness, of moral imperative, of political identity, the Iraqi pin performance was certainly not a call to action. But for the woman who revealed her own secret, and certainly for Harryman as well, it was a moment of unexpected connection. It is probably too much to imagine this moment as a swerve away from terror, as a swerve toward hope, but it may perhaps remind us that there is far more to every event than any story can express. Generosity toward the generativity of imperfect mirrorings and unexpected identifications becomes a way of opening ourselves up to other possibilities of connection beyond explanation, justification, and non-contradiction. Poet’s theater may not result in the dissolution of atmosphere or of atmos-fear, but as it swerves between them, it has the potential to encourage critical discussion and collective interpretation in which no one is “right” but in which difference proliferates.
     
     

     

    Heidi R. Bean is Assistant Professor of English at Bridgewater State University. She is the co-editor of Poetry after Cultural Studies, an anthology of critical essays forthcoming from the University of Iowa Press. Her essays, reviews, and interviews related to the intersections of theater, performance, and poetry have appeared in Text and Performance Quarterly, Theatre Journal, The Iowa Review Web, and Cultural Critique. This essay is taken from her current project on the cultural politics of American poetic theater since the 1960s.

     

     

    Footnotes

     
    1. Harryman finds in RoseLee Goldberg’s Performance Art, for example, the implication that once performance has served its function as a testing ground that can release the art object from categorical or conventional constraints, the art object is reinstated and performance is retired.

     

     
    2. For a discussion of the dramaturgical method for analyzing impression management, see Goffman’s Presentation 238. Notably, Goffman focuses entirely on the performer without any attention to the audience’s active role in the meaning-making process.

     

     
    3. Reptile seems to be recognizing here what Erving Goffman has termed “disclosive compensation”—the theatrical convention of giving the audience what it needs, and only what it needs, in order to construct and maintain the dramatic fiction. See his Frame Analysis 142.

     

     
    4. For a discussion of the “turn to the visual,” see Jay.

     

     
    5. See Vickery chapter 7 for an excellent discussion of, especially, the gendered-ness of theory in Language writing.

     

     
    6. Bob Perelman’s The Marginalization of Poetry was the first book-length historical account of Language writing and remains a key text for understanding this history, but the SFPT receives no critical attention there (despite the fact that Perelman himself wrote for the SFPT). Megan Simpson’s Poetic Epistemologies and Ann Vickery’s Leaving Lines of Gender offer alternative, feminist-inflected histories of Language writing, but both attend to “performance” only in a sense of the performance of social identities. Vickery acknowledges the divisions between visual artists and writers that characterized the Bay Area in the 1970s (33), but despite her interest in documenting the broader range of activities carried out by women in the Language community than has been commonly acknowledged, she too leaves out critical discussion of Harryman’s (or anyone else’s) theater work, choosing instead to focus on Harryman’s and Hejinian’s important collaborative novel The Wide Road (see Vickery final chapter). Recently, The Grand Piano series has started to address some of this history (see in particular vol. 6).

     

     
    7. See the Grand Piano website page on the SFPT for a partial list of plays as well as for links to some program, poster, and production images: <http://www.thegrandpiano.org/poetstheater.html>.

     

     
    8. For play texts, see Hills 9 (1983). For criticism and commentary on the SFPT and related theater, see Kennedy and Tuma, Mantis 3 (2002), and Poetics Journal 5 (May 1985): 122-138.

     

     
    9. Poets and Language writers were not the only ones to downplay key aspects of poet’s theater. The disciplinary divide rendering the SFPT invisible was, if anything, worse on the side of visual artists. As Ann Vickery writes, “the arts were strongly differentiated in the Bay Area during the seventies. Although performance-based poets like Carla Harryman encouraged visual artists to attend readings and talks, poetry was still presumed to be too tied to the page and thus limiting. Harryman recalls a young and prominent artist dismissing Language writings as ‘just a version of surrealism’” (32-33). Harryman’s work was thus trapped in both a practical and a critical disciplinary blind spot.

     

     
    10. It is remarkable how much this critique of poetry scholarship and the expressivist lyric sounds like the critique by contemporary Performance Studies scholars of traditional object-oriented scholarship, in which the objective, disinterested scholar remains separate from the object of study that he (and in this critique, the scholar is usually a he) describes and interprets in terms that place the object easily within the dominant worldview.

     

     
    11. Performed as part of the annual Poets Theater festival, which is produced by Small Press Traffic each January and/or February.

     

     
    12. The showcase, entitled “Returning from One Place to Another,” was produced by Links Hall and curated by John Beer.

     

     
    13. See especially volume 6 of that series.

     

     
    14. Bourdieu argues that “depositories of deferred thoughts…can be triggered off at a distance in space and time by the simple effect of re-placing the body in an overall posture which recalls the associated thoughts and feelings, in one of the inductive states of the body which, as actors know, give rise to states of mind” (69).

     

     
    15. This is because the syntax of gesture and speech are different. Speech builds up its meaning out of independently meaningful parts. Gesture on the other hand becomes meaningful only in the aggregate. Speech is spread out, and each part can be analyzed separately, but a gesture is “synthetic,” compressing its semantic components (actor, action, path) into one symbol: “Thus, when gesture and speech combine, they bring into one meaning system two distinct semiotic architectures. Each modality, because of its unique semiotic properties, can go beyond the meaning possibilities of the other” (McNeill and Duncan 144).

     

     
    16. For more on modernist anti-theatricality and its relationship to gesture, see Puchner chapter 1.

     

     
    17. Dir. Catharine Sullivan. Produced by the Renaissance Society and performed at Experimental Station, Chicago, March 7, 2008.

     

     
    18. Cognitive psychology, incidentally, supports this view. Cognitive psychologists David McNeill and Susan D. Duncan have developed the concept of the “growth point” (GP), originated by McNeill, as an analytical framework for the combination of “imagery and linguistic categorical content” that insists on an understanding of both gesture and speech as “material carriers of thinking” (144, 155). In this view, speech and gesture are not “the packaged communicative outputs of a separate internal production process but rather…the joint embodiments of that process itself” (155). Speech-gesture combinations do not simply reflect already formed similarities, then, but contribute to the establishment a correspondence between the two and are therefore productive of thought. Furthermore, McNeill and Duncan argue, GPs “are a way of cognitively existing, of cognitively being, at the moment of speaking. By performing the gesture, the core idea is brought into concrete existence and becomes part of the speaker’s own existence at that moment” (156). In this view, gesture is not an expression of being but rather constitutive of being, and in this sense, we can consider gesture performative. It is also significant that although a GP is highly synchronous, “strongly resist[ing] forces trying to divide it” (145), this synchrony “is disrupted…if speech and gesture are drained of meaning through repetition; i.e., such that GPS may be circumvented in their production” (145). See McNeill and Duncan.

     

     
    19. The play, which has been performed in San Francisco, Chicago, Detroit, and Tubingen, Germany, has never been published. Each production uses a different version of the script (in some cases bilingual). Some performances have used a full cast (Detroit, Chicago), while others have consisted only of Harryman herself reading the text to live musical accompaniment by John Raskin (San Francisco). All of these versions, however, are formed out of the full-length English text entitled “Mirror Play” included in Harryman’s “Poets Theater Plays” manuscript.

     

     
    20. Mirror Play page references are from Harryman’s unpublished typescript entitled “Poets Theater Plays.”

     

     
    21. Notably, the AIDS quilt grew out of a simple, non-narrative performance as San Francisco marchers carried placards with the names of men lost to AIDS. It was only with the durable AIDS Memorial Quilt that individual micro-narratives began to be incorporated in the form of images, quotations, and other forms of characterization.

     

     
    22. Performed at the Susanne Hilberry Gallery in the Detroit suburb of Ferndale, Michigan, on August 14, 2005.

     

     
    23. In both productions, the jaw harp was played by John Raskin, who also composed all of the music. Harryman comments: “Initially, I had conceived of Mirror Play as a poly-vocal piece for one performer: I liked the idea of one performer working with multiple voices within the conceptual antechamber space. However, that one immediately turned into two as I felt that an instrumental voice needed to be an aspect of the speaking voice. I started working with Jon Raskin, developing the piece for spoken voice (mine) and jaw harps. Now the poly-vocality is being extended to many voices and more instruments” (Hinton).

     

     
    24. Perlstein discusses some of the myths surrounding Fonda’s position on the war.

     

     
    25. See Hutcheon 27-36 for a brief but helpful discussion of postmodernism’s foundations in architecture.

     

     
    26. Hollier notes that there have been “endless arguments over whether the origin of architecture was the house, the temple, or the tomb, etc. For Bataille it was the prison” (ix).
     

    Works Cited

       

     

    • Benson, Steve. “Hooks and Conceit in La Quotidienne.” Jimmy & Lucy’s House of “K” No. 2 (Aug. 1984): 21-24. Print.
    • Bernheimer, Alan. “The Simulacrum of Narrative.” Poetics Journal 5 (May 1985): 69-71. Print.
    • Bernstein, Charles., ed. Close Listening: Poetry and the Performed Word. New York: Oxford UP, 1998. Print.
    • Birringer, Johannes. Theatre, Theory, Postmodernism. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1991. Print.
    • Blau, Herbert. The Audience. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1990. Print.
    • Bourdieu, Pierre. The Logic of Practice. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1990. Print.
    • Butler, Judith. Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence. London: Verso, 2004. Print.
    • Chaudhuri, Una. Staging Place: The Geography of Modern Drama. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995. Print.
    • Davidson, Michael. “Framed by the Story.” Poetics Journal 5 (May 1985): 76-80. Print.
    • Day, Jean. “Two Books by Carla Harryman.” Jimmy & Lucy’s House of “K” No. 6 (May 1986): 118-122. Print.
    • Diamond, Elin. Unmaking Mimesis: Essays on Feminism and Theater. London: Routledge, 1997. Print.
    • Fuchs, Elinor. The Death of Character: Perspectives on Theater after Modernism. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1996. Print.
    • Goffman, Erving. Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1974. Print.
    • ———. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. New York: Anchor, 1959. Print.
    • Goldberg, RoseLee. Performance Art: From Futurism to the Present. New York: H. N. Abrams, 1988. Print.
    • Grotowski, Jerzy. Towards a Poor Theatre. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1968. Print.
    • Harpham, Geoffrey Galt. Shadows of Ethics: Criticism and the Just Society. Durham: Duke UP, 1999. Print.
    • Harryman, Carla. “Acker Un-Formed.” Lust for Life: On the Writings of Kathy Acker. Amy Scholder, Carla Harryman, and Avital Ronell, eds. London: Verso, 2006. 35-44. Print.
    • ———. “Animal Instincts.” Animal Instincts: Prose, Plays, Essays. Berkeley: This, 1989. 33-43. Print.
    • ———. Animal Instincts: Prose, Plays, Essays. Berkeley: This, 1989. Print.
    • ———. “The Ear of the Poet in the Mouth of the Performer.” How2 2.1 (2003). 5 Mar. 2007. Web.
    • ———. “La Quotidienne: An Atmospheric Play.” Animal Instincts. 81-89. Print.
    • ———. Memory Play. Oakland: O Books, 1994. Print.
    • ———. Mirror Play. “Poets Theatre Plays.” 2005. TS. 178-215.
    • ———. “Property.” Animal Instincts. 15-26. Print.
    • ———. “Site Sampling in ‘Performing Objects Stationed in the Sub World.’” Additional Apparitions. David Kennedy and Keith Tuma, eds. Sheffield: The Cherry on the Top Press, 2002: 157-171. Print.
    • ———. “There Is Nothing Better Than a Theory.” Animal Instincts. 90-105. Print.
    • ———. “Toy Boats.” Animal Instincts. 107-110. Print.
    • Hinton, Laura. “To Write Within Situations of Contradiction: An Introduction to the Cross-Genre Writings of Carla Harryman.” Postmodern Culture. 16.1 (2005). Web. 24 Oct.2010.
    • Hollier, Denis. Against Architecture: The Writings of Georges Bataille. Trans. Betsy Wing. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989. Print.
    • Hutcheon, Linda. A Poetics of Postmodernism: History, Theory, Fiction. New York: Routledge, 1988. Print.
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    • ———, and Susan D. Duncan. “Growth-Points in Thinking-for-Speaking.” Language and Gesture. Ed. David McNeill. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000. 141-161. Print.
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  • This Theater is a Strange Hole: Mac Wellman’s Poetics of Apparence

    Karinne Keithley Syers (bio)
    CUNY Graduate Center
    karinnekeithley@gmail.com

     

    Abstract
     
    Mac Wellman’s theater is filled by a weird array of voices that are neither strictly human, nor even strictly material. These pseudosolid voices map a topological obsession with holes, hollows, and the filling up of space by emptiness. This essay explores Wellman’s theater as a “strange hole,” where hollow spaces become receivers, openings for something unfamiliar to happen in our thinking, an event Wellman calls “apparence.” In The Difficulty of Crossing a Field, the extraordinary prevalence of holes bespeaks an intensification of a philosophical strand in his writing: a ceremonial concern with a weirdness that is wild, a weirdness gone feral in math-fictional space. This essay explores his strategies for writing us into these registers of thinking by examining two kinds of holes. The first is a “hole poetics”: the deployment of holey strategies in the poetic line. This holed line functions as both a preparation for thinking beyond the already-known, and as a scalar, fractal iteration of the topography of this beyond-space which is the second hole, a ceremonial, nasty, terrifying place that Wellman calls “Hoole’s Hole,” where the non-Aristotelian, non-Euclidian event of apparence happens.
     

     

    In Infrared, the opening play of Mac Wellman’s recent collection, The Difficulty of Crossing a Field, the unseen narrator, “an ungainly self in search of itself,” reveals itself as some kind of “pseudosolid . . . a hollow within a cube within another hollow” (8). This humanistic self-seeking acts as a translating bridge to Wellman’s much broader, much weirder array of identities that might seek the recursive feedback loop we call self-awareness. If it is convenient to hold onto an old word, self, it is equally important to attend to the fact that the identity of selves, characters, or voices in Wellman’s work has never been strictly human and in fact is not strictly material. His recent work is filled with pseudosolid voices that map their “haunted, topological obsession” with holes and hollows, and the filling up of space by emptiness (Infrared 8). One critical strategy to account for Wellman’s departure from what he calls “Euclidean” character (a designation concerned principally with consistency) has been to highlight his alignment with “language” writing, particularly in relation to the Language poets, the Russian Futurists, and Gertrude Stein’s “landscape plays,” and so to projects that insist on the materiality of language over (or alongside) its signification. These connections are not amiss–indeed they are critical–but they do not fully account for Wellman’s project; they sidestep the heart (to use an old word) of his work (or in his own imagery, they miss the clearing in the woods where the spooky thing happens). To isolate the materiality of language is to neglect Wellman’s concern with multiple registers of thinking, and with theater’s function as a place where something happens in our thinking, something he calls “apparence.” The material surfaces of Wellman’s plays are only pseudosolid; the giving-way of those surfaces constitutes the action of his work, and we find ourselves in a strange hole. In the extraordinary prevalence of holes (both phenomenological and figurative) in Wellman’s new collection, I find an intensification of a philosophical strand in his writing: a ceremonial concern with a weirdness that is wild, a weirdness gone feral in math-fictional space. In this essay I explore his strategies for writing us into these registers of thinking by examining two kinds of holes. The first is what I am calling a “hole poetics”: the deployment of holey strategies in the poetic line. This holed line functions as both a preparation for thinking beyond the already-known, and as a scalar, fractal iteration of the topography of this beyond-space which is my second hole, a ceremonial, nasty, terrifying place that Wellman calls “Hoole’s Hole,” where the non-Aristotelian, non-Euclidian event of apparence happens.
     

    Locating Wellman

     
    Wellman is a node of connection within the New York theater community. A loose assembly of younger writers has formed around him, through his MFA program at Brooklyn College, the ‘Pataphysics workshop series, and his generous presence in the scene.1 His influence is already profound and continues to grow, not as a “school of Mac Wellman,” but as a broadly cast license to think of plays in terms of language, and to value wrongness, ceremony, and a bit of demonism in the theatrical project (contra the overwhelming prevalence of psychological and moralistic drama). The amount of critical writing on Wellman is incommensurate with his place as a thinker within new theater, perhaps because of the communal nature of the theater scene, where ideas are exchanged in person more than through journals or small presses. What has been written about him in theater criticism is largely in response to his denouncement early in his career of “the theater of good intentions,” and his proffering the possibility of what “character” might be beyond the motivation-guided, coherent, explicable figures that populate 20th century realism and its acting methods. On the poetics side, Marjorie Perloff has written briefly on Wellman: a foreword to his collection, Cellophane; and “Harm’s Other Way,” a short piece for The Mac Wellman Journal, a lo-fi volume of essays put together by the DIY Sock Monkey Press for the 1997 Mac Wellman Festival. Perloff name-checks Wellman as one of the many poets whom she might have included in her study, 21st Century Modernism. In that work, she valorizes the transmission of a modernist language project, compositions of a counter-signifying materiality of words, from four great modernists— Gertrude Stein, T.S. Eliot, Marcel Duchamp and Velemir Khlebnikov—to their 21st century inheritors, language poets Susan Howe, Charles Bernstein, Lyn Hejinian and Steve McCaffery. Wellman’s projective affiliation here is in the Khlebnikov transmission: the “charging via neologism, paronomasia . . . [that] defies semantic coherence . . . [inverting] the ‘ordinary language’ aesthetics of Stein and the use of everyday objects like combs and urinals in Duchamp.” For her own formulation of the “strangeness of the ordinary,” Perloff says Khlebnikov “substitutes the ordinariness of the strange” (21st Century 126). In her two short essays on Wellman, Perloff works in this vein of finding strangeness in the close-focus of phrases and neologisms. As with her analysis of Khlebnikov’s etymological play, she attends to Wellman’s investigations in the political and cultural phraseology on the cluttered surface of American English—remember, she asks, the “butterfly” ballots and hanging “chads” of the 2000 election (Foreword x)?
     
    Perloff delights in the critique of American culture that Wellman’s making-strange produces. Cellophane, written out of a two-year self-imposed assignment to write 2 pages of bad American grammar every day, might epitomize this strand of his work, with such formulations as: “Who them alltime lowdown hunch scattershot boys? Who would ought to have done did?” (175). But I would argue that it is not the strange surface of the ordinary that Wellman would have us encounter in his theater, but rather something more dimensionally strange—where things are strange because we have become strangers. His essays on theater describe a shifting emphasis, articulating first a space of resistance (“The Theater of Good Intentions,” 1984), then a statement on the weirdness of the real (“A Chrestomathy of 22 Answers to 22 Wholly Unaskable and Unrelated Questions Concerning Political and Poetic Theater,” 1993), and now a space of ceremony (“Speculations,” 2004). The plays collected in Difficulty are by no means autonomous, material objects. They are more like Swiss cheeses of plays, where strange holes open onto skewed dimensions. The place where poetic language experiment meets the theatrical project is a fold that I hope to address, moving from the line to the ceremony, and so from sound to proprioception. The nature of a theatrical hole has very much to do with the actual space of theater, but as Wellman writes in Bad Penny, “the Way is ever difficult to discover” (148). Part of that difficulty lies in the dual mindfulness that poetic theater requires. Examined only with the analytical tools of a single discipline, whether poetry, philosophy, or theater, the movements of mind that constitute the theatricality of Wellman’s plays become obscured, or rather, they hide like the Black-Tufted Malabar X, the nasty resident of Hoole’s hole. This essay does not seek to uncover what is hiding, but rather to think about how to inhabit the space where we can listen to its transmissions, and to gesture toward writing strategies for finding ourselves strange.
     

    A Theater of Landscape

     
    Wellman consistently takes an inter-genre stance; a novelist and poet as well as a playwright, he began writing plays for the Dutch radio, took a bachelor’s in international relations, and spent time working in a specialty mathematics bookshop. It requires a complex of lineages to place him in a context. His influences and inheritances span theatrical, poetic, and philosophical traditions. Perloff embraces Wellman by drawing him into a poet’s tradition. Although I too want to think about his poetic language, I want to add a theatrical lineage to this context both in order to lay the groundwork for my thinking about topographical holes, and also to emphasize that Wellman, though described in relation to mainstream playwrights as a poet- or language-playwright, is making theater. A judgment of what is theatrical lies at the core of his aesthetic.
     
    The room to explore language (as opposed to character, plot, psychology) as a primary material of theater comes from a “landscape theater” tradition, which I define broadly as the use of space to reorganize compositional structures, and the use of the textual line to create theatrical value. The term “landscape” indicates the recession of character as a central compositional term, a recession historically coincident with cubism’s similarly decentering redeployment of figure within the spatial field.2 The term is associated with Gertrude Stein, although the concern with landscape predates her own description of her plays as “landscapes” of words in relation to other words.3 According to Elinor Fuchs, two compositional modes followed from the development of landscape theater: “field” composition, where nonhuman elements exist in spatial relation, allowing for non-linear storytelling (a kind of antecedent to Projectivist “composition by field”), and the corresponding modes of attention produced by “the faculty of landscape surveyal” that reads “multivalent spatial relationships” in place of the older lines of “conflict and resolution” (Death 106-7). This new drama is environmental and immersive, a shift in thinking that anticipates the recent turn to ecology and limns a zone of transition between modernism, postmodernism, and posthumanism. In ways that anticipate thinkers from Emmanuel Levinas to Judith Butler, landscape plays create space to think of our being in terms of relation instead of fate.4
     
    Hans-Thies Lehmann has defined this line of new performance as “post-dramatic” theater, but it is useful to recall that movements against theatrical habit often invoke an originary theater against whatever stultified replacement the mainstream represents (what Wellman calls “Geezer Theatre”). Twentieth century nontraditional theater has tended to argue for a recalibration of theater values and recuperation of the intensity of theatrical experience through a rethinking of both materials and structures. Field and landscape compositions have been deeply invested in exploring the physicality of the non-narrative aspects of theater, and I would name Antonin Artaud’s theater of cruelty and the pedestrian, chance-driven vocabulary of the Judson Dance Theater as poles of the embodiment of the postmodern landscape theater. From Virgil Thomson’s opera of Stein’s Four Saints in Three Acts to the work of the Wooster Group or Elevator Repair Service or Nature Theater of Oklahoma, theatrical vocabularies of music, sound, movement, and image offer an alternative structural ground to narrative without abandoning text. This recourse to other vocabularies of thinking offers ways to describe the structure of a play in terms other than a process of revealing that unfolds in linear time. Stein, as the original theoretician of the landscape play, laid a still-relevant and provocative groundwork for this means of composition; indeed, her essay “Plays” might be the most important essay on theater writing since Aristotle’s “Poetics.” Though landscape plays do of course progress in time, the temporal experience can be thought as grounded not in linearity, but in inhabitation. This shift from progression to durational inhabitation is a critical transition in 20th century aesthetics, leading toward installation, “relational” work, and emergent transmission-based art forms.
     
    Fuchs emphasizes a predilection for the static that undergirds modernist landscape aesthetics. This present-tense stasis is created either by actual stillness in plot or action (she names Maeterlinck as the writer of stasis, Robert Wilson as the director of stasis), or by forms of recursion and repetition that create the impression of staying in or returning to one place, allowing new information to proliferate in a scene, rather than move a story forward. Certainly Stein uses landscape as an anti-linear model of thinking. Jane Bowers views Stein’s recourse to pictorial terms as serving a twofold purpose: undistracted by the necessity of keeping up with the story, the viewer of a Stein play is available at every moment to a meditative, contemplative experience based on the present-tense stimulus of the performance; further, offered the image and word elements of theater without hierarchy, the viewer is free to find and retry a shifting set of perspectives (131-2, 140). The playwright’s hermeneutic guidance drops away, inviting the viewer to find her own habits of navigation. No single element of theater—script, scene, costume, light, sound—is necessarily foregrounded; the attention is directionally free, resulting in a self-aware exercise of attention, even attentiveness toward attention itself. Thus landscape plays are incomplete without the mind of the audience; the movement of their attention is an equal part of the substance of the play itself.5 Wellman will preserve this sense that the substance of the play is made in part by the mind of the audience; indeed the mind, conceived extensively as thought and proprioception moving over and through time, and into what he calls Wild Time, is where the Wellman play takes place.
     
    Fundamental to Wild Time is the sense that we do not know where we are going. Like Stein, Wellman uses an acute crafting of verbal impedance to disrupt habitual orientation, but he uses unknowingness differently, not as a renewal of seeing and presence but as a means of opening paths into strange spaces. It is an active retaliation against the foreclosure of meaning that Wellman notes in Stein, and if there is a lineage to be drawn between them, it is on the grounds of respect for her production of openness. Speaking at a symposium on Stein’s plays, Wellman emphasized this aspect of her work:
     

    I do think there’s something about the openness of [Stein’s writing], the fact that it is, in a sense, a landscape. . . . Jonathan Lear wrote a book on Freud and Socrates called [Open] Minded, and he develops this notion of what he calls “the tyranny of the already known,” that we live in a society that is dominated by a particular kind of journalism, which has to do with a deadening sense of knowingness that permeates everything, including the theater. Stein is completely free of this. There is a kind of enormous openness to whatever life brings that I think is terrifying to people because it is open in a sense that is even hard to talk about.
     

    (Rosten et al.17, 20; emphasis mine)

     

    Wellman finds in Lear’s “already known” an analogy to what is known as the “well-made play,” the sociological, psychological, journalistic breed of play that dominates mainstream theater. The well-made play conforms to both psychological realism, which unfolds drama as a series of back-story reveals, and the structure of the dramatic arc as the climax and resolution of a central conflict. But beyond the habit of certain kinds of storytelling, what damns these plays for Wellman is their unwillingness to venture beyond already-known conclusions. In his essay “The Theater of Good Intentions,” Wellman attacks this as a form of high-ground moralism. In “Speculations,” his aphoristic landscape essay on theater’s wild spaces, the “Theatre of the Already Known (AK)” (or Geezer Theatre) appears as a kind of arch-dupe-enemy, hanging onto its “re” spelling as a signal of its unwillingness to abandon the boat of high culture. Instead of finding out once again that incest hurts or that racism is bad, Wellman suggests we allow theater to make us venture into spaces where we don’t already know the answer. If the AK, with its moral and emotional conclusions already on hand, requires no actual thinking, an unknown theater would demand it; the experience would be “open in a sense that is hard to even talk about.”

     
    Wellman identifies openness with terror, among other things. Both characters in and audiences of his plays frequently undergo experiences for which there are no adequate existing vocabularies, that is, they find themselves occupying a hole in knowing. Wellman’s dual register of line and plot allows these holes to appear on multiple scales, so that blank spaces in the experience of knowing seem to be systemic. Within the line, impedance, irregular continuities, and unknowable argots disorient the listener. Within the plot, landscape itself becomes unknown as spaces fail to join or follow predictably, as in Second Hand Smoke when a roof gives way to a desert, or when it instantaneously swallows a person up, or more accurately, “disappears” him, as in The Difficulty of Crossing a Field. By repeating a hole effect in both the line and the plot, Wellman joins the listening audience and the figures within the play in unfamiliar and unnamed experiences. These “holes,” I will argue, open up the play both narratively and receptively, and prepare for the possibility of what Wellman calls “apparence.”
     

    Holes in the Line: Rewriting Sophocles

     
    “Speculations: An Essay on the Theater” is Wellman’s extended, aphoristic organon of the practice of being in the space of theater. He begins by locating the play in the present-tense mindfulness of its happening:
     

    The STRUCTURE of a play ought not to be viewed as a fixed thing but as a mutable one.

    I mean, the structure of a play conceived of as a moving point: →→→→→→→→·→→→→→→→→ passing over—or through—time”
     

    (“Speculations” 294)

     

    This mutability undermines the possibility of treating a play as a model of causality and explanation, psychological, social, or otherwise. The difference lies in the relationship of knowing to time: whereas a model eventually completes its own description, the moving point is continuously being rendered anew. This always-moving structure, inscribed in the mutable present tense of the play at the scale of both the sentence and the story, transfers theatrical architecture away from input and outcome, relocating it in the actual space of performance as an active relationship between the perceiver and the play. No longer peripheral to the play as observer or consumer, the mind of each viewer is actually part of the thing itself: “our mindfulness completes the equation” (298). Unclosed, the completion that mindfulness offers is a share in a feedback loop moving “over—or through—time.” The concept of mutable structure suggests that a play should nowhere signal its total form; the parts should not echo an already known (or eventually knowable) whole. Thus Wellman is a playwright of mereology, the mathematical field that studies the relationship of part to whole. Where the classic Aristotelian model of theatrical narrative builds its sequence on a stable base, allowing the rising action, climax, and falling action to progress uniformly toward closure, Wellman presents an anti-conclusive mereology. Instead of compassing a whole, Wellman leads us into holes, holes where theater can finally happen.

     
    If we accept the axiom that a Wellman hole fundamentally removes us from knowing where we are or where we are going, then the holed line prepares this form of disorientation. Paired with abrupt shifts and slips in the plot’s landscape, Wellman performs a smaller slipping away from the recognizable and stable whole operative at the scale of the sentence. These small slips undermine the stable experience of knowing where we are, and so reduce the friction that might otherwise slow us down when the plot too takes us suddenly to a place we don’t recognize. Wellman’s Antigone, written in 2001 for the interdisciplinary company Big Dance Theater, exemplifies and dramatizes this slipperiness. On the page, it looks very little like a play: a 12-page column of text without differentiation of voice or stage direction. This Antigone doesn’t adapt the original text of Sophocles, but rather presents itself as if it preceded its prototype; it takes place in the emergence of storytelling, which in turn betokens the emergence of theater. Antigone begins: “Once, at the beginning of time, the three Fates, unpleasant young girls, enacted the story that was to become that of Antigone. The three girls played all the parts with hats instead of masks, and a whole rack of customary costumery” (105). Without articulating the voices typographically, the play occupies the page as a dense, single column, like an unsorted trunk of costumes and props. All speech flows into all other speech, and often only the shifting grammar of first and third person suggests the possibility of mapping who will say what. The story of judgment and burial is held in thick relation to a description of the activities of three Fates on their way to becoming the three Graces (who will eventually whisper the story into the ear of a puppet named Sophocles). Dances, songs, proverbs, and acts of charm (like balancing an egg on one end) occupy the text’s landscape alongside the emerging story. Wellman preserves something of the choral structure of Sophocles, playing in particular with the chorus Heidegger treats at length in his Introduction to Metaphysics. These three Fates are signally concerned with man’s strangeness, and within the density of the narrative and its intercalated acts of charm, the original chorus’s question—what is stranger than man?—recurs as Wellman’s refrain.
     
    The evanescent effect of Wellman’s holed line becomes apparent in reading his chorus on strangeness against that of Sophocles. The moving point of the play, as it passes through the chorus, does indeed slip “over—or through—time,” impeding any coherent survey. In this way Wellman’s chorus works against the traditional sense of the Greek Chorus as grounded in a stable, common voice. In Sophocles’ play, the first chorus describes the efforts of man against the world by presenting a sequence of images that accrue as contemplative objects embodying the concept of man’s uncanniness. Sophocles offers his audience a series of images that can be held in constellation around the concept of wonder. “Man” as object of thought stands at the center of the picture, with his resources and ambitions drawn in around him. The chorus observes strangeness with great lyricism without, however, enacting it. This observational perspective disappears as Wellman renders the same chorus. He constellates strangeness not with a legible series of emblematic images but with words of similar sound. The relationship of words to other words creates a streaming sense of strangeness by evading any focal point:
     

    A Chorus: Of all things strange, humankind / is the most strange. / The cat’s cradle / is news to the spider, / for all things go round and round; for / I was a stranger and you took me in; for / I was a stranger and you took me not in; for / / straw straw straw, / straw shows which way the wind blows, / and an empty belly thinks the moon is green cheese; for / / (the King of Spiders) / / Up he was stuck /up he was stuck /up he was stuck / and in the very upness of his stuckitude / he fell. / / (Straw, straw, straw, straw.) / / And what I learned from my long / life of spinning string, /life of measuring string, / life of snip snip snip: / / You can’t beat something with nothing.
     

    (Antigone 107)

     

    While the associative manner might at first seem characteristic of schizophrenic speech, Wellman’s chorus is actually controlled through its relentless transitivity as it passes “over—and through” the sound of “st,” pulling us across gaps in sense by an alternative affiliation in sonority. Where the Sophoclean chorus moves in a daisy pattern out into a particular image and back to the central concept of man as wondrously ambitious, Wellman’s chorus returns to the material sound of “st,” “sp,” “sn” prodding a musical sense of focus that slips out of the grasp of a logical one. The spinning of strange with straw, of straw with string, effects the slipping away from the original idea by sliding into focus a new sound displacing the last. This is a curving kind of writing. Each inflection point of that curve is created by a small hole, a gap of sense, in gliding distance.

     
    The poetic work of Wellman’s writing goes beyond foregrounding the transitive. If Stein’s work resituated reading and writing in these flowing spaces in our normal landscapes, Wellman explores the feeling of listening as language veers into a topos beyond the domestic, into spaces punctuated by what I have characterized as holes productive of blank spaces in our present-tense experience of understanding both what we are hearing and where we are. William James, in his gorgeous and still useful description of the experience of language in “the stream of thought,” observes that the usual failure to recognize the transitive feelings of prepositions and conjunctions such as if, and, and but is compounded by the “obverse error” of the supposition “that where there is no name no entity can exist” (“Stream” 246). The refusal to register—to feel—the existence of these “dumb or anonymous psychic states” produces perceived separations in the curve of thought, and so a “greater and greater accentuation and isolation of the substantive parts” (246). If Stein wrote sentences that demanded attention to words of transition and relation, Wellman’s sentences demand attention to these “dumb or anonymous psychic states.” These places are literally dumb, “open in a sense that’s hard to talk even about.” We have no words to compass the gaps, and as the play unfolds in front of us, no time to try to generate any. This is the crux of the holed line—it moves us through spaces we can’t name without giving us time to find new bearings.
     
    In the chorus quoted above, I mark three different strategies for enforcing this attention to “anonymous” spaces. Sliding alliteratively and homophonically from “strange” to “string,” he undermines the isolating tendency James describes by continually iterating a common sibilance, insisting on a relation that might otherwise go unfelt. But what is the feeling of relation in the line, “I was a stranger and you took me not in; for / / straw straw straw”? This strange yet particular interval is the first of three transitive “anonymous psychic states” in this chorus that recur throughout Wellman’s writing in the form of inhabitable absences or “holes.” We are given a transitive word “for,” and so are escorted, as it were, across the gap between “you took me not in” and “straw straw straw.” But the space of relation between “I was a stranger” and “straw straw straw” is illegible; we must absorb the feeling of that emptiness, and keep moving alongside the chorus. Wellman’s critics claim a non-sense in these spaces, but it is the sense of the nothing that we must find. Alongside a willingness on the part of the audience to grapple with spaces of difficulty, staging that uses non-textual senses to ground our sense that we are somewhere (strange and anonymous, but somewhere), and not nowhere, is necessary to the success of these small glides and gaps. The second type of hole is the literal image or mention of one; in this chorus, one that trips us and that we then fall into: “in the very upness / of his stuckitude / he fell. / / (Straw, straw, straw, straw.)” We understand the relation between the two places as a drop. The third type inverts the hole by energizing the anonymity surrounding seeming solidity by temporarily landing in a place of familiarity, creating what Big Dance Theater co-director Paul Lazar referred to as a “rugged island” in a personal interview. The stability of the proverb “[y]ou can’t beat something with nothing” exists as an island surrounded by empty space that offers relief in our disorientation. Wicked proverbs and notations bearing a resemblance to proverbial wisdom are an ongoing resource for this island-building; the sound of wisdom and of age can be soothing and grounding. Fuchs recognizes recursion and repetition as a landscape writing strategy, marking or circling around a place even in the absence of literal landscape elements, a territory-making function that resembles what Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari call the “refrain,” a kind of hybridized musical-topographical event. In one of Antigone’s later choruses, a list of fallacies provides a temporary sense of territory through recursive iteration. Taking a second stab at the question “what is more weird than man,” this chorus tries to ground itself in logic only to find weirdness again underfoot:
     

    The hole and the patch should / be commensurate, as the / dog to his man should be / obedient. It is as if I / ask you to prove this bicycle / belongs to Hector, and you reply / “All the bicycles around here / belong to Hector”; or the / / fallacy of too many questions, the / fallacy of affirming the consequent, or the / fallacy of denying the antecedent, or the / fallacy of hasty generalization, or the / fallacy of irrelevant conclusion, or the / fallacy of misplaced concreteness, or the / fallacy of many questions, or the / fallacy of accident; or the fallacy of bad faith. / / What is more weird what is more weird / than red feather than black kettle / what is more weird.
     

    (113)

     

    This refrain of fallacies provides a temporary perch, but no sooner is it established than the line crumples and reveals that we are still circling the perimeter of the question of weirdness. Antigone is full of these refrains, created through the effect of eddying in the flow of Wellman’s language. These eddies, within the sea of greater strangeness, offer themselves up as perches. Through the territory-making strategy of the refrain, they define a ground and offer a footing. Sometimes he moves on from these spots back into the sea of the story, in which case they function as an index of drifting thought that hovers around the plot. At other times he uses the rest offered by the island to slow down the story so that we become aware of an incoming phenomenon. Though they rarely hold, these islands prevent Wellman’s plays from becoming too oceanic to follow. In our conversation about staging Antigone, Lazar emphasized the necessity of finding every anchor point of familiar sense, both these kinds of aphorisms that sound familiar and concrete descriptions of action. He deployed the image of an island chain to describe the skeleton he and Annie-B Parson used to ground the strange assemblage device of the play’s action, so as to allow the audience a sense of freedom in thinking without passing a degree of lostness from which they were unlikely to return.

     

    Intense Absence

     
    Wellman’s chosen handbook on holes is Roberto Casati and Achille C. Varzi’s Holes and Other Superficialities, a text that attempts a realist description of holes from ontological, mereological, topological, and morphological standpoints.6 Casati and Varzi describe themselves as “hole realists.” The central thesis of the book is that holes do exist as “immaterial bodies” that are always parasitic to hosts, but that “[h]oles cannot be the only things around” (34, 193). A hole cannot be its own host; it must be a hole in something. But within that something, the hole is an absence. To think about a hole, we must “[t]hink negative” (189). William James similarly locates experiences of blank spaces as integral to the experience of thinking, placing the experience of what he calls “substantive” and “transitive” thought alongside the experience of “dumb or anonymous” states in the curve of consciousness. Our vocabulary does not contain everything it is possible to think and feel. Rather, writes James,
     

    namelessness is compatible with existence. There are innumerable consciousnesses of emptiness, no one of which taken in itself has a name, but all different from each other. The ordinary way is to assume that they are all emptinesses of consciousness, and so the same state. But the feeling of an absence is toto coelo other than the absence of a feeling. It is an intense feeling.
     

    (“Stream” 251-52)

     

    Through the skips and gaps of his lines, and the slipperiness and evanescence of territory underfoot, Wellman gives this “intense feeling” of “an absence” an analog in stage time: the pause. His plays abound with variants of the direction: “Pause. Silence. Pause.” Both holes and pauses are repeated figures in his work, standing for each other in a “compact between special instance and wild time” (“Speculations” 301). Never merely a slowed down response in an otherwise continuous action, Wellman’s pause is a drain, a way of evacuating a scene.

     
    If the anonymous relation between things animates Wellman’s poetics at the level the line, as we have seen in the Antigone chorus, it does so as well at the level of the scene. Bad Penny, a site-specific play for Bow Bridge in Central Park, culminates in a pause that so evacuates the scene of its namable sense that it becomes a space of terror, dramatizing the onset of namelessness (the incomprehensible) by evacuating its landscape of certainty. The play has only one actual event in a plotted sense: the Boatman of Bow Bridge comes to take away the man who has picked up the bad penny. Otherwise, the text is a sequence of stream of thought monologues set into the specific landscape of Central Park’s Bow Bridge. Initially focused on actual landscapes slightly askew (of the sky, the park, the fictional near-by gas stations), the poetic imagery becomes increasingly disordered through the addition of a chorus speaking alongside the individual characters. The effect is that of a strange interval, where the relation of speakers to other speakers remains obscure even as it is enforced compositionally by their juxtaposition. As the play nears the happening of its one event, the First Man, who has the bad penny, declares his belief in “cheese. . . crud. . . power. . . bad shoes. . . insects. . . goop. . . gunnysacks. . . tar. . … furballs. . . cardboard. . . ooze. . .” while a chorus hidden in the bushes chants, “Incomprehensible, the bridge. Incomprehensible, the puddles. Incomprehensible, the sky. Incomprehensible, the hats. Incomprehensible, the thumbtacks. . .” (146). When the boatman arrives, all sound stops. The man, after “a blank moment of horror,” climbs into the boat and is taken away by the boatman (146). After a landscape of language, this event is most terrifying in its silence. Bad Penny‘s drama is the experience of the blank place, the hole.
     
    Its chorus resorts to proverbs to cure the silence: “as you sow, so shall you reap; a bad penny always turns up; nature abhors a vacuum; thought is free; the squeaking wheel gets the grease; today you, tomorrow me; there are more ways of killing a dog than choking it with butter” (148). Across the (semi-) recognizable shape of proverbial aphorism, the First Woman layers a last monologue rife with contradiction: “For all things beneath the sky are/ lovely, except those which/ are ugly; and these are odious/ and reprehensible and must be/ destroyed” (148). As the chorus continues to speak their proverbs, the First Woman speaks to uncertainty:
     

    For the Way is ever difficult to discover
    in the wilderness of thorns and mirrors
    and the ways of the righteous are full
    strange and possess strange hats and
    feet. For the Way leads over from the
    Fountains of Bethesda, where the Lord
    performed certain acts, acts unknown to
    us, across the Bow Bridge of our human
    unknowability, pigheadedness, and the
    wisenheimer attitude problem of our
    undeserving, slimeball cheesiness. . .

    (148-9)

     

    The language of the chorus and the First Woman stands in an unnamed and perhaps unnamable relation. There seems to be no reconciliation in the polarity of the choral effort to create solidity and the First Woman’s acquiescence to the strange way that leads us out of these solid places. This relation is not “unnamable” in a Beckettian sense so much as resistant to the possibility of measuring and coding the relationship. Its resistance fosters a sense of human smallness; the “Bow” of the bridge’s name begins to evoke the act of bowing and the environment seems charged with a power that might eclipse the humans trying to orient themselves in it. After the “blank horror” of the First Man’s removal, the play restarts only to hang suspended in strangeness. Submissively respectful to “the Bow Bridge of our human unknowability,” we arrive at an almost abject, tragic tone of “utterly craven, totally lost, desperate and driven incomprehensibility” (149). The feeling of absence is an intensity, and so a presence; phenomenologically, it is a hole.

     
    Wellman also creates the “intense feeling” of “absence” with an inverse process: inscrutable naming in an alien language. His plays abound with technical vocabulary that borders on hoax, creating an intensity tinged with a suspicion that the strangely named thing is in fact an unrecognizable object from a vocabulary we can never hope to know (as with Albanian Softshoe, when the second act reveals that the living room drama unfolding in the first act was a soap opera on the eighth moon of Saturn; what do we call it now?). In the opening scene of The Lesser Magoo, Torque, an office flunky being interviewed for an indeterminate job, is quizzed on his technical grasp of a mysterious trade:
     

    Curran:

    Sir, do you know what Crowe’s Dark Space is?

     

     

    Torque:

    Sure, it’s the place where the One He Refused to Meet encountered the Crocodilian Mahoon and therefore lays an egg. Quite a large egg, in fact.

     

     

    Curran:

    And are you sure of that?

     

     

    Torque:

    Well—that’s what I was taught at Princeton. School of Upper Malabar Philocubist and Macrurous Studies.

    (101)

     

    If these names seem merely goofy, the scene as it progresses replaces play with terror. We do not know the meaning of these words, and so when they give way to something violent and unexplained, the pleasure of their seemingly comic invention is replaced by threat. Torque’s quizzing culminates in his completion of “Presley’s Title One Rogation Exercise” by naming the “tools of the Lesser Magoo”: Whisk broom, Valve trumpet, Tom and Jerry Tongs, Chattahoochie Star-Toothed Harrow, Number six parting tool, tub chair, Klein bottle, Oboe, Hip-boots, Hacksaw, Clothes tree, Plunger, Jigger-chaser, St Louis Double-Hinged Rainbow-Roof, Ramses Motorized Lawn Cable, and Obeah-Man Refluent Bow and Arrow (103-5). Having succeeded, he is allowed to visit the water cooler. After a nearly wordless four minute pause during which his interviewers recline with their eyes covered by handkerchiefs through an epic (in stage time) silence, Torque returns. The stage direction reads,

     

    Something terrible has happened to him. He looks like he has seen a ghost. Perhaps his own. He has vomited, soiling his shirt and jacket. His left shoe and stocking are gone, and the foot is bloody. Tremblingly, he crosses the room, leaving bloody splotches; and quietly sits as before.
     

    (106-7)

     

    The puzzle of what has happened to Torque goes unnamed and unexplained, another hole in the plot, the bodily violence of which dramatizes the intensity of this namelessness. Instead of offering an orienting sense of order, the plenitude of technical terms that has filled up this scene repels the audience away from the surface of impenetrable language. In the increasingly disturbing imagery of the office landscape—a closet door swings open to reveal Torque’s predecessor swinging from a noose—the substantive quality of the argot dissipates, becomes threateningly unknown. In this way the impedance to our smooth understanding of the play’s language aids Wellman’s disturbing and disorienting effects. This impedance that insists on our awareness of the play’s written surface marks Menippean satire as one of Wellman’s writing modes: inescapably, we must consider our own (in)comprehension.

     

    Hoole’s Hole7

     
    I have thus far spoken mostly about the local, line-level effects of Wellman’s prose, a focus I’ve sustained in order to signal two separate relations. The first is the relation of Wellman to concerns outside his own plays: particularly the landscape, or we could say the poetic, tradition in theater. I have shown that the license of a non-linear approach to stage speech, described amply by Stein as the relation of words to other words, is taken up by Wellman to disorient and destabilize, particularly in relation to our ability to know what is going on, and how we should be receiving it. The second and more important reason for my sustained investigation of the Wellman line has to do with the microcosmic environment of his plays as preparation for the effects of the macrocosmic. Recall the opening axiom of “Speculations”: “The STRUCTURE of a play ought not to be viewed as a fixed thing but as a mutable one. I mean, the structure of a play conceived of as a moving point . . . passing over—or through—time” (294). If structure is mutable and not encompassing, then there is no relation of part to whole in which the micro signals and predicts the shapes of the macro, or gradually accretes to fill in a coherent picture.
     
    How, then, is that part-whole relation drawn? The description of a play’s structure as “a moving point” means that the larger environment we inhabit is continuously reconfigured as that point moves in time. If it does not work to fill in the overall structure incrementally, might the line, as the local environment of that moving point, create a condition of thinking rather than indicate a framework? Might the weirdness of the line be necessary to our ability to move alongside the larger action of the play? For only once we are unsettled will we find ourselves available to fall into Wellman’s holey plots. In other words, is it possible that the larger action of the play wouldn’t work without our thinking being primed for more radical disorientation by the small hollows and rebuffs in the lines? “Speculations” supports such a claim. The topographical figure at the heart of that essay is the space surrounding the straight line of the known, a space Wellman variously names “phase space,” the space “perpendicular to the known,” “the strange,” the “radiant,” the “beyond,” “Hoole space,” “Hoole’s Hole,” and the space of “howling.” The space of theater cannot take place along the line of the already known (only theatre can happen there). “Speculations” thus describes the theatrical as taking place beyond our knowing, if not beyond our feeling. I have described this space as a “strange hole,” and at this juncture it is necessary to think more deeply through what a hole is, and in particular how a hole could be something in the first place.
     

    Fields of Emptiness Filled by Strangeness

     
    Wellman takes up Casati and Varzi’s provocative “hole realism” by making holes in the host of known. Leaving the sentence for a larger scale of analysis, we can find this parasitic growth in Wellman’s description of what happens to structure in the course of theater. Wellman differentiates between two kinds of structure, just as he elsewhere claims two kinds of time, clock time and “Wild Time” (“Speculations” 305). These pairs follow the same distinction. In the geezerly theater of “appearance,” where we can only watch passively what we already know going on in front of us, structure is a reference to some other, presumably better, play. In the theater of “apperception,” or in Wellman’s coinage, “apparence” — a theater that cannot take place without our mindfulness, a theater that does not know where it is going — “all [conventional] structures fall down in their folly” (303). It is the event of this falling away of the known that makes possible the appearance, and so the “apparence” of a space beyond convention. After the collapse of the known:
     

    A tear appears.
    (A tear as in air, not a tear as in ear.)
    A tear appears and it is:
    A


    such that a gap, or discontinuity, appear
    ? B
    in the continuum.

    (“Speculations” 303)

     

    This discontinuity is the beginning of a Wellman hole, that parasitic “field of emptiness” that negatively produces itself within the known (Casati and Varzi 177). “Hoole’s hole” seems to take up Casati and Varzi’s mandate to “think negative.” This negative expanse is not necessarily empty; negative within the space of the host, the hole is fundamentally fillable. A filled hole doesn’t cease to be a hole, for some discontinuity still exists between the hole and the “hole-lining,” or the edge surface(s) of its host. (Casati and Varzi consider hole, hole filling, and hole host as separate entities.) Likewise Wellman’s space in the hole of the known is filled, of course, with what we don’t know: the strange. The strange is “perpendicular to the four dimensions of familiar appearance” (“Speculations” 296), a ray that shoots from the known into the unknown. In perceiving the strange, we find that we have somehow gone off our grid and are moving in a space of n dimensions: “So STRANGENESS is what fills Apparence and, thus, is what keeps us there, where we find ourselves” (296). Where we find ourselves is “phase space,” in physics an ideal space mapping all the possible conditions of a dynamic system. In Wellman’s speculative analogy, phase space is seemingly a space where determination of any particular state is impossible. If all possibilities are present, and those possibilities likely exceed the “four dimensions of familiar appearance,” then a drama that “unfolds” in phase space “cannot be told in terms of plot” (295). What happens in phase space is the event of “Apparence,” a showing-forth. “Apparence” is Wellman’s translation of Kantian “apperception” in which something new comes be known, or perceived. Apparence, filled or configured by strangeness,8 is what can happen in a Wellman hole, and the “doing of Apparence” constitutes the purpose of theater (297). That we find ourselves in strangeness, and not merely looking at it, signals the ceremonial function. We are active: “The proposition I do not know what I am doing while in the act of doing I do not know who I am or what is not tautology; this proposition reveals an exchange of charm for strangeness. A supercession of apperception by the force of the square of what lies off; off there, and is radiant (and is the Radiant)” (301). As we do what we do not know we are doing, we participate in the unknown. Wellman thus reveals his theater as a project of open mindedness. Finding ourselves in strange places, we can experience genuine newness in our thinking. This new experience is “crystalline”; it is an event in thinking, and not an idea. The event, rather than producing new knowledge, produces an “epiphany” which is for Wellman an opening, or expanding, of space: “drama is an epiphany, something opens up. Something shows itself” (339).

     
    A variant of James’s “dumb or anonymous” experience, the epiphany is also something beyond vocabulary. Whatever shows itself cannot be absorbed by language and knowing, but rather remains outside of description. In his plays, Wellman traces the contours of that opening up, or in hole-realist terms, the “hole lining,” in a kind of spatial notation. The apparence cannot be scripted, but its space can be prepared and it can be beckoned. In this sense, Wellman’s plays “do” apparence, and in this sense they are ceremony. “Ceremony,” writes Wellman “is the nonlinear optic on the moment. Ceremony is the basic form of the theatrical” (340). Those plays of his, like the Crowtet cycle, that follow a plot—weird but essentially narrative—have characters encountering holey spaces where strange things happen: clearings in the middle of the forest, horror-filled closet doors swinging open, vast open plains. In these plays the plot’s topography provides a figure that is replayed in the space of thinking in the same way that a musical harmonic note also produces “overtones,” or an additional set of frequencies that are multiples of the base frequency sounding simultaneously with the main tone. The overtone series of Wellman’s hole poetics sounds in the line, the plot’s topography, and in the receiving mind of the audience. Who knows what other registers it sounds on? The hole can be thought of as the interior space of a ceremonial bell, “sounded” when “a tear appears.” Not merely spaces or gaps, these holes go beyond the interruption of sense: they produce negative environments, or “immaterial bodies.”
     
    In a philosophical play like Antigone, where speech is not always assigned to a character position, the figure of the hole is folded into the descriptive language that carries reports from beyond the events on the ground; the holes and wildness in this imagery help bring the proprioceptive sense of holes and wildness near. Antigone, for example, describes her experience in the wild spaces beyond the coordinates of the basic story. The action of the story is initiated by the appearance of a logical notation “!∃,” which Wellman defines as “there exists a unique situation.” In the notes to the play, Wellman asks that all parts be played by the three Fates–with the exception of this unknown god, who we can verbally account for as “E Shriek” or “the Shriek Operator” (Antigone 105). If all parts are to be played by the three Fates then this unknown god is unplayable; it isn’t a part. E Shriek then is immaterial, a transmission, a figure whose presence indicates the opening up of a communicating tunnel from here to “→ ? B.” E Shriek initiates the play’s possible commerce with wild spaces. The burial of Polyneices is an event beyond attribution, occurring in the company of an immaterial body:
     

    Unknown god as a bodiless shadow approaches. As a swirl of fabric. I am the Shriek Operator. !∃. I am the unique situation. I am the uncanny and have come to this place, place crowded with corpses and the stench of death. I am the Shriek Operator and am very pleased with all this slaughter, this horror, this misfortune. Misfortune out of contrast, sprung hinges, what creaks, what is fundamentally broken. Sand pours without anyone willing it. Pours from above. From the sky. Something is covered. Something mangled and horribly dead.
     

    (106)

     
    !∃Shriek in Big Dance Theater’s Antigone at Dance Theater Workshop, New York City, December, 2002. Used by permission. !∃, “an unknown god as bodiless shadow,” speaks from an intermediate point in space between the two stage agents of its voice: Tricia Brouk, leaning backwards and draped with “a swirl of fabric,” who mouths the words, and Leroy Logan who delivers the text into the microphone. The effect is not that of the appearance of a character, but of the reception of a voice, transmitted into the space of the play.
     

    Click to view video

     
    The Greek drama of incommensurate mandates becomes a ceremony of lost metrics. This initiation of the story as an action unfolding from an unauthored event creates, from the moment this play starts moving, a sense that the world of its setting is permeated by acts that have no cause and seem to come from elsewhere, acts we can neither know or account for. At the crux of the drama it is precisely the presence of the “tear (as in air)” that allows for Wellman’s epiphanic drama of opening to occur. If we have been experiencing strange eruptions of the beyond into the space of the story, now we begin to move out of that space through the same tears. The movement into the space beyond the hole occasions a paradox that unsettles language. Antigone, buried alive, “witness to her own death. . . . [a] stranger in the house of being,” has undone the names of both living and dying; she inhabits a nameless space (114). Both there and not there, she has been buried in phase space. Here Wellman’s description of the opening up of space is quite literal. “I am going deep into a hole,” Antigone announces. “Deep in a hole and come out the other side” (114).
     
    This theatrical moment creates an enveloping tone in describing what cannot be seen in the four dimensions of the room, perceptible only in that space of open-mindedness where we do not know where we are going. “We are peripheral to, to appearance,” writes Wellman. “We are central to the apparence as it enfolds us in Hoole Space” (“Speculations” 303). In this enveloping space, “Night says no to day. Silence. Pause. A small unpleasant animal crosses the cast emptiness of infinite spaces. . . . Silence. We behold, for the first time, the curvature of the earth. Someone looks out and holds and egg.” The play descends into stillness: “Alone and cold. No one to love her. No one to protect her. Nothing but stillness. Stillness laying waste. The laying waste of stillness. Now she is the focal point of stillness” (Antigone 114-15). From this extraordinary compass point Wellman lays down three transitive pulses in the felt direction of thought, their simple repetition typographically isolated on the page:
     

    And
    and
    and
    and the gods are coming. Unknown ones and the unseen.

    (115)

     

    These transitive “ands,” without substantive nouns to offer coordinates, perform a kind of essential “and” function, joining with the possibility of whatever could be beyond it. Steering out into space, in the incredible quiet of this opening, these “ands” open in preparation to receive the strange. What we find, in that space, is a series of hollows, negations, silences, strange appearances, and songs: emptiness laced with charm. Haemon appears in the sky, falling on his own sword while “[t]ime passes unconcerned” and”[n]othing moves us” just as “[n]othing moves Antigone. . . because we are no longer what’s called ‘human’” (116): on the other side of this hole we are somehow negative if not negated. Songs occur as refrains, marking out space:9 “Bubba tubba bubba tubba bubba tubba bup . / / I am the kind of girl tired of always being wise / I am the tin cat tied to my own damn tail. . . . Slow fade to black in which we hear them sing the song over again till they get it right. More right. Over and over. Silence.” Hollows are filled by slow things: “Pause. In which Time becomes a one-legged crow. Crow on a withered bough” (116). Immaterial bodies are perceived without being seen: “One senses the presence of an unknown god. Then another. Then another” (117). From these glides, rounds, and hollows, Antigone reports from the inside of a luminous rock, a radiant space on the other side of that hole. Wellman again makes the topography of the story a figure for our movement of mind:

     

    And I slipped out the back and I made myself very small and I slipped out the back way and when I awoke. I was in a different place, a thin place, as though it were the place of a compass focus. And the lines of force radiated out from my heart in all directions and I could feel these lines of force as though I were a god and not merely a nasty girl, a girl tired of being the wise one. Radiated out from my still beating heart.
     

    (117)

     
    Didi O’Connell in Big Dance Theater’s Antigone, Dance Theater Workshop, New York City, December 2002. Used by permission. The staging’s fluency and its rapid alternation between theatrical vocabularies create, in the sudden shift between dance and text, a thin, tight focus that supplements the text. We find ourselves on an island in the space of the theater.
     

    Click to view video

     

    The language of description and report allows Wellman to fold the topographical models of phase space and Wild Time he describes in “Speculations” into the story itself.10

     
    The reality, or materiality, of the story takes place simultaneously in the space described by the play and in the space of mind produced by giving attention to it, differentiating this work from the theater traditions that precede it. The stage space itself is a magnetizing element, but it is not the only space of action. Stagings of Wellman’s work filled by those elements of theater that do not tend to invite a sense of conclusion—dance, image, song, sound—create an environment for the play to happen that shrugs off the habit of either the model (traditional realism) or the spectacle (which traffics in the commerce of desire and pleasure between the stage and the audience). We need the stage as the hole needs the host. The play needs us; “it is completed by our mindfulness” (“Speculations” 298). These joinings, across genre, across materiality and immateriality, sometimes rather demoniacally across species, across the known and the unknown, constitute Wellman’s pneumatic landscape, a landscape that calls for multiple metrics that communicate through tears in their own surfaces. In our “fundamentally broken” world, ceremony—which is not to grasp but to stop grasping, to find ourselves in the position of a radiant compass point and not just nasty little girls—will save us from so much junk knowledge, “from our own wrath, and the odium of our good intentions” (“Speculations” 341).
     
    This saving ceremony is invoked in Infrared:
     

    FOR all things are Holy to me—see that
    you follow the way of your Y to the
    site of your X, for that hollow will be
    the place of your hallowing;
    For I am called X, and dwell in the holes
    of fire you call Sun and Moon; and in all
    the blazing, starry holes that the night
    is drilled with. . . .
    FOR I am difficult to grasp;
    FOR any natural act, if hallowed, leads to me;
    and nature needs people for what no angel
    can perform—its hallowing—and in especial,
    the hallowing of its hollows and holes.

    (49-50)

     

    Here is a landscape vision concerned with what is beyond our seeing, beyond the horizon. This horizon is composed not of the literally far, indistinguishable edge of our sight, but by the vague edges of our thinking.

     
    At this “live ceremony [that] feeds on dead ceremony” (“Speculations” 340), we are not observers but receivers, tuning in transmissions from beyond our knowing, something only possible if we learn to hallow the hollows and holes. Theater is a crystal radio kit for our thinking. We become aware that our uncontained minds are receptors for signals no one originated and we can’t account for. This conception of mind is both pre-Socratic and post-humanist: a resistance to all forms of closure in our sense of where thinking comes from and where it goes, it implies a strange extensiveness. In this space where strangeness fills apparence, we are asked to practice our own tuning mechanisms, to extend our frequency array. Wellman’s theater, though it might rail, sputter, and denounce, is not a project of critique, neither is it an object or a thing in itself. Removed entirely from whatever lyric moods we might think of when we hear the word “ceremony,” this is a ceremony of bewilderment officiated by nasty things. This is the world where we find ourselves, says Wellman. We have no idea how weird it is. We have no idea how to see. In his workshop at Brooklyn College, when Mac was pleased with the writing, he would sometimes say by way of compliment, “all the characters have wooden hair.” On a very good day, he might say, “we should take her out and shoot her.” And this is, I suppose, the last note of this essay: that the hole where emptiness is hallowed and maybe something is tuned in is dangerous, and this is good. If our thinking doesn’t proceed through passes of terror, something is wrong.
     

    Karinne Keithley Syers is a writer, performer, sound artist, and graduate student in English at the CUNY Graduate Center. In addition to creating her own work, she has performed with David Neumann, Young Jean Lee, Chris Yon, and Sara Smith. She has written about Nature Theater of Oklahoma for Theater Magazine, and is the founder of the 53rd State Press, which publishes new performance writing.
     

    Notes

     

     

    I wish to acknowledge the profound influence of my studies with both Joan Richardson and Mac Wellman on the ideas and attractions taken up in this essay. Additionally I wish to thank Laura Hinton and Heidi Bean, who have generously coached me in the development of this essay over innumerable drafts, and Stefania Heim and Joan Richardson, who combed the later drafts and contributed invaluable refinements to these sentences.
     

    1. I am part of this community. I met Mac in a ‘Pataphysics workshop in 2003, after seeing a production of Hypatia and Soho Rep. I went on to study with him in the Brooklyn College MFA program from 2004-6, and he has remained a mentor and good friend.

     
    2. The emergent landscape tradition in theater and other art movements that rethinks the centrality of the human figure in composition can be read as an internalization and unfolding in the mid-19th century of the Darwinian notion that humans are part of a network of living things, and not a central or separate category of being.

     

     
    3. As Elinor Fuchs and Una Chaudhuri have proposed in Land/Scape/Theater, landscape was an emergent element of modern drama well before Gertrude Stein’s famous assertion that her plays were landscapes. Beyond landscape as setting, Fuchs and Chaudhuri suggest that “at the threshold of modernism, theater began to manifest a new spatial dimension, both visually and dramaturgically, in which landscape for the first time held itself apart from character and became a figure on its own” (3). Stein’s “landscape play” comes after both Henrik Ibsen’s and Richard Wagner’s investment in actual and ideal landscapes, respectively. Stein’s innovations represent perhaps a new technology for writing from and as landscape, a brachiation within a field, rather than a separate tradition. For Fuchs and Chaudhuri, landscape becomes an active element, an energetic center of modernist plays, as in the silent urgency of the disappearing forests in Anton Chekhov’s “Uncle Vanya” and “The Cherry Orchard.” Place becomes, if not vocal, a loud claim on the attention of both the characters and the audience. Both separately and in their coedited volume Land/Scape/Theater, they attend to the natural and nonhuman as important elements of dramatic thinking, elements that have been until lately eclipsed by a critical focus on the subject, and an actor-centered insistence on character and motivation as the foundational elements of playwriting. Fuchs suggests that in the late 19th century plays of Chekhov, Ibsen, Maurice Maeterlinck, Frank Wedekind, and August Strindberg, landscape shifts from a “platform for human action,” a “preconscious” element of the text, to a “conscious” one (30).

     

     
    4. The post-anthropocentric points also toward ecological poetics as described by Angus Fletcher in A New Theory for American Poetry: Democracy, the Environment, and the Future of Imagination.

     

     
    5. Stein’s use of landscape is principally a language tool. Bowers revises Stein’s “landscape” to “lang-scape” to emphasize the cross-disciplinary license Stein derives from thinking about landscape as a compositional modality that can be used in language. Principles of relation derived from thinking about landscape are transposed to language thinking. Stein describes these relational principles as a kind of constant in a natural landscape. This relational abundance is not restricted to pastoral elements, but also includes the scene of writing itself. In Four Saints in Three Acts, alongside the relative positioning of the landscape elements—trees, magpies, saints—the process of writing is also written into the play: “Landscape” after all is made possible by a viewer’s perceptive of a visible field. Bowers claims that Stein allows the “transformative power of the artist’s imagination” to bring forward the artist’s perception as a central object of the composition (129). This enables Stein to “write the actor out of the play and to write the writer into it,” exchanging narrative for the experience of artistic process (133), and so realign sympathetic experience away from the character and toward the experience of thinking.

     

     
    6. In tutorials with Wellman while his student at Brooklyn College, he directed me to many philosophic and mathematic texts that have been resources for his own writing, such as the Casati and Varzi text, and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. He tends to favor nontheatrical texts as resources for writing.

     

     
    7. I once asked Mac who Hoole was. He indicated that he might have been a Turkish mathematician by the name of Huhl, someone who, as far as I can tell, does not exist. Mac’s predilections for the Fez and the hoax assert themselves here.

     

     
    8. Although they share a term, Wellman’s strangeness is not the strangeness of the Russian Formalist “making strange.” Like Stein’s efforts to make new seeing possible in a domestic landscape, the project of “making strange” works to defamiliarize an environment at hand, whereas Wellman’s strange is a space we go to, a space beyond, where we are strangers.

     

     
    9. The song, as an action of charm, territorializes the hole in which the play is gently suspended. In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari describe the work of the song as “organiz[ing] a limited space” within “chaos.” Sound marks a territory, creating through rhythm a temporary and workable limitation that pushes out the phase-space multiplicity of chaos: “For sublime deeds like the foundation of a city or the fabrication of a golem, one draws a circle, or better yet, walks in circles as in a children’s dance . . . . A mistake in speed, rhythm or harmony would be catastrophic because it would bring back the forces of chaos” (311). In the strange hole of Antigone’s living burial, Wellman’s song literally describes a circle: “The devil wipes his tail with Creon’s pride./ Listen to Little Jack fry up an eyeball for an egg./ Bubba tubba bubba tubba bubba tubba bup.// I am the kind of girl tired of always being wise./ I am the tin can tied to my own damn tail” (“Antigone” 116).

     

     
    10. This is especially marked in Antigone; it was written around the same time Wellman was drafting “Speculations.”
     

    Works Cited

       

     

    • Antigone. By Mac Wellman. Dir. Paul Lazar, Annie-B Parson. Chor. Annie-B Parson. Perf. Tricia Brouk, Molly Hickock, Leroy Logan, Didi O’Connell, Rebecca Wysocky. Big Dance Theater. Dance Theater Workshop, New York City. December, 2002.
    • Bowers, Jane Palatini. “The Composition That All the World Can See: Gertrude Stein’s Theater Landscapes.” Land/Scape/Theater. Eds. Elinor Fuchs and Una Chaudhuri. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 2002. 121-144. Print.
    • Casati, Roberto and Achille C. Varzi. Holes and Other Superficialities. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994. Print.
    • Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: capitalism and schizophrenia. Trans. Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1987.
    • Fletcher, Angus. A New Theory for American Poetry: Democracy, the Environment, and the Future of Imagination. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2004. Print.
    • Fuchs, Elinor and Una Chaudhuri. “The New Spatial Paradigm.” Introduction. Land/Scape/Theater. Eds. Elinor Fuchs and Una Chaudhuri. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 2002. 1-7. Print.
    • Fuchs, Elinor. The Death of Character: Perspectives on Theater after Modernism. Bloomington: U of Indiana P, 1996. Print.
    • ———. “Reading for Landscape: The Case of American Drama.” Land/Scape/Theater Eds. Elinor Fuchs and Una Chaudhuri. 30-50. Print.
    • Heidegger, Martin. Introduction to Metaphysics. Trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt. New Haven, CT: Yale UP, 2000. Print.
    • James, William. “The Stream of Thought.” The Principles of Psychology, Vol. 1. New York: Dover Books, 1980. Print.
    • Lazar, Paul. Personal interview. 1 Feb. 2008.
    • Perloff, Marjorie. 21st Century Modernism: the “New” Poetics. Malden: Blackwell, 2002. Print.
    • ———. “Foreword.” Cellophane. By Mac Wellman. x-xvii. Print.
    • ———. “Harm’s Other Way.” The Mac Wellman Journal. Brooklyn: Sock Monkey Press, 1998. Print.
    • Rosten, Bevya, Anne-Marie Levine, Catharine R. Stimpson, Richard Howard, Wendy Steiner, Maria Irene Fornes, Mac Wellman, Al Carmines, Richard Foreman, Charles Bernstein, and Jane Bowers. “A Play That Has to Be Performed: From the Gertrude Stein Symposium at New York University.” Theater 32.2 (2002): 2-25. Print.
    • Stein, Gertrude. “Plays.” Last Operas and Plays. Ed. Carl van Vechten. Baltimore: John Hopkins UP, 1995. xxix-lii. Print.
    • Wellman, Mac. Antigone. The Difficulty of Crossing a Field: Nine New Plays. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2008. 105-120. Print.
    • ———. Bad Penny. Cellophane. Baltimore: PAJ Books, John Hopkins UP, 2001. 123-150. Print.
    • ———. Cellophane. Cellophane. 151-184. Print.
    • ———. “A Chrestomathy of 22 Answers to 22 Wholly Unaskable and Unrelated Questions Concerning Political and Poetic Theater.” Theater 24.1 (1993): 43-51. Print.
    • ———. Infrared. The Difficulty of Crossing a Field: Nine New Plays. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2008. 1-50. Print.
    • ———. The Lesser Magoo. Crowtet 2. Los Angeles: Green Integer, 2003. Print.
    • ———. “Speculations: An Essay on the Theater.” The Difficulty of Crossing a Field: Nine New Plays. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2008. 293-342. Print.
    • ———. “The Theater of Good Intentions.” Performing Arts Journal 8.3 (1984): 59-70. Print.
    • Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. Eds. G.H. von Wright, R. Rhees, G.E.M. Anscombe. Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell, 1967. Print.

     

  • Poet’s Theater: An Introduction

    Heidi R. Bean (bio)
    Bridgewater State University
    heidi.bean@bridgew.edu

    Laura Hinton (bio)
    City College of New York
    laurahinton12@gmail.com

     

     

    This special issue of Postmodern Culture takes up a subject until now only rarely discussed in the annals of academic scholarship: that of contemporary American poet’s theater. But what exactly is a “poet’s theater”? Is it primarily a type of writing done by poets for the stage–trying their hand, so to speak, at a theater genre, as the novelist Henry James once did, winning no public acclaim? Is it any poetry presented in a public space before an audience, thus including, for example, both the modern poetry slam and the classic poetry reading? Recent critical studies devoted to the latter have helped us hear the multiple reverberations of sound and aurality particular to American poetry.1 But what we mean by a “poet’s theater” in the articles of this issue has not been the focus of those writings. Rather, for our contributors here, poet’s theater is a theatrical event that is scripted and preconceived but also open-ended and site-specific. Its meanings unfold not according to some predetermined narrative or social situation, but rather performatively, informed by local contexts, audience makeup, and performance conditions. In their own attempts to define poet’s theater, Kevin Killian and David Brazil, editors of the just-published Kenning Anthology of Poets Theater, 1945-1985, suggest by way of definition simply that we “try and catch it performing its social function” (xiii). We agree with that active assumption.
     
    As we consider what we mean by a poet’s theater, we might also consider why multiple instances of poet’s theater have emerged in such a variety of U.S. regions, performance spaces, and venues in the past six decades, with several adopting some version of the name “Poet’s Theater” as their official moniker: the Cambridge Poets Theatre, founded in 1951 by V.R. “Bunny” Lang; the New York Poets Theatre, a.k.a. the American Theater for Poets, founded in 1961 by Diane di Prima, LeRoi Jones/Amiri Baraka, Alan S. Marlowe, John Herbert McDowell, and James Waring; the Hardware Poets Playhouse in New York, 1962-1964, founded by Peter Levin, Audrey Davis, and Jerry and Elaine Bloedow; the Judson Poets’ Theater, founded in the 1960s by Al Carmines; the Nuyorican Poets Café, founded in 1973 by Miguel Algarín; and the San Francisco Poets Theater, 1979-1984,2 founded by Nick Robinson and Eileen Corder and associated with the Bay Area L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E (or “Language”) writers. In virtually every case, poet’s theater seems to have been not so much a coherent artistic movement as a creative outlet and countercultural community that brought poets, dancers, musicians, visual artists, theater artists, and performance artists into productive collaboration with one another. And yet placing these activities within a longer historical trajectory reveals key similarities from which we might begin to offer a definition.
     
    The cross-pollination of artistic media and political ideologies that fostered postwar poet’s theater was enabled in part by the social and artistic conditions of the 1950s. As Stephen Bottoms explains in his wonderful study of underground New York theaters in the 1950s and 60s, Greenwich Village, and especially the East village, allowed bohemian artists of all stripes to mingle in the smoky haze of its lively bar, coffee house, and jazz-club culture. These provisional spaces hosted poetry readings and theatrical performances outside of the institutionalized structures that, in the economic pinch of the postwar period, hesitated to support anything not guaranteed to be a financial success. Small casts, spare sets, and simple plots made these productions amenable to slim budgets, and they could easily be performed in modest bar and coffee-house spaces. Such aesthetic choices may have been driven by economic necessity, but, as Bottoms notes, they had the additional effect of focusing the audience’s attention on the bodies and speech of the performers themselves, since there was little else to distract from these (16-18, 125). Similar low-budget, performance-centered aesthetics also characterized Action Painting, jazz jams, and poetry readings, and indeed artists, musicians, and poets frequently constituted each other’s audiences.
     
    This proliferation of performance-centered aesthetics coincided with a critical turn to performance that might also be said to have its roots in the 1950s, the decade in which J.L. Austin’s Harvard lectures on the performativity of language (published in 1962 as How to Do Things with Words) and Erving Goffman’s 1959 The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, an analysis of the performativity of social life, commingled with, for example, the Living Theatre’s investigations into both poetic drama and Artaud-inspired presentational theater, as well as Allan Kaprow’s “Happenings.” Part of what is advanced in each of these interdisciplinary uses of the concept of performance is the notion of performance as a constitutive act. In fact, contemporary critics frequently identify performance, as Julia A. Walker aptly notes, as “the postmodern turn” in critical discourse (149).
     
    It was from this fertile ground that postwar poet’s theater grew–not as a definitive practice but as the sharing of ideas and practices across media and ideologies. Following World War II, the politics of Senator Joe McCarthy, the founding of the House Un-American Activities Committee in 1947, and the attack on artists in particular encouraged a separation of art and politics, modeled, for example, in the apoliticality of Abstract Expressionism. But in the 1960s, artists re-politicized aesthetics as they turned to the models, routines, and practices of “everyday life.” The contemporary poet’s theater that is the subject of this issue arises in this transition. Each of the essays included here addresses poet’s theater’s engagement with the politics of everyday life–via, for example, poet’s theater’s model of an environmental poetics (in James Sherry’s essay on Fiona Templeton), via the ethical implications of the audience’s oscillation between individual and collective reception (in Heidi R. Bean’s essay on Carla Harryman), via the political implications of the performed interpenetration of poetry with urban street culture (Nasser Hussain on Ron Silliman), and via a spatialized model of thought that encourages openness to the “holes” in knowledge (Karinne Keithley Syers on Mac Wellman).
     
    Poetic verse drama is, of course, one of the oldest forms of literary activity and culture, including the ritual dramas of the ancient Greeks, and a major genre in English literature certainly since the Renaissance. But contemporary American poet’s theater is not so much grounded in the verse dramas of Aeschylus; or in the so-called “Golden Age” of English theater canonically represented by playwrights like Ben Johnson, Marlowe, or Shakespeare; or even in the stage works of modernist poets like W.B. Yeats, T.S. Eliot, and W.H. Auden. Instead, the scripted performance works of these particular contemporary American poet-playwrights self-consciously examine the relationship between discursive language, performing bodies, and audience members’ interactions and experiences. Poet’s theater is thus indebted as much to the rise of the conceptual arts, with their emphasis on multimedia forms, as it is to the histories of poetry and of drama and theater. Inhabiting, as Killian and Brazil put it, “a charged social space between the disputed territories of performativity, theatricality, and the textual” (xiii), poet’s theater might best be characterized as a self-conscious layering of different modes of representation, from the linguistic to the embodied, that is aimed at an investigation of the conceptual logic that joins representation to human-social experience.
     
    In addressing what poet’s theater is, then, we wish to emphasize not only its formal-aesthetic hybridity and artistic collaborativity but also the critical effects of these exchanges. The recent American poet’s theater that is the topic of our issue here is informed perhaps most crucially by a theoretical dialectic, the perceived “split” between literary textuality and performance. Modernist text-versus-performance debates date back to avant-garde circles beginning as early as the 1870s. In “The Avant-Garde and the Semiotics of the Antitextual Gesture,” Erika Fischer-Lichte writes that, while some German Romantics like Goethe and Wagner may have “considered performance itself a work of art,” most of their contemporaries viewed “the artistic character of performance” as “primarily affirmed through the performance of literature, through the dramatic literary text that was supposed to steer and control performance” (80).
     
    Such anti-theatricalism, particularly in the early twentieth century, was motivated in part by a fear of the public sphere, by a resistance both to theater’s collaborativity and to the perceived risks of collective reception. This version of modernism, theater theorist and historian Martin Puchner writes, celebrated “the figure of the individual artist who withdraws from the public sphere and the allegedly undifferentiated masses” and championed a model of reception that idealized individual contemplation in privacy (9). Both this model of the individual artist producing a highly complex creation as well as the private reception required by such a work “are responses,” Puchner asserts, “to the fear that the theater would actually provide a forum in which the constitution of public opinion might take place” (11). High modernism’s critique of realism and impersonation and its emphasis on the receptive value of absorption therefore work in tandem, as conspiratorial “barriers erected against the possibility of the public role of art suggested by the theater” (11).
     
    In contrast to the anti-theatricalism of high modernism, the modernist avant-garde was decidedly pro-theatrical, even if it was also often critical of the conventions of the traditional theater itself. Puchner credits Wagner and his notion of the gesamtkunstwerk, or “total theater,” with transforming the theater from an art form into a value–a value which places not only the work of art but the conditions of its production and reception at the center of modernist debates (31). The avant-garde’s embrace of theatricalism, writes Puchner, demonstrates its “greater affinity to populism and the masses” and exhibits Andreas Huyssen’s “hidden dialectic” between the experimental or avant-garde and society’s mass culture (9).3 Certainly, the postwar poet’s theater that began to proliferate in living rooms, coffee houses, city streets, open galleries, and other makeshift spaces is indebted to the avant-garde’s embrace of collaboration and collective reception under the sign of theatricalism.
     
    And yet, as much as contemporary American poet’s theater owes a debt to the modernist avant-garde, it should not simply be seen as a pro-theatrical break with modernist poetic drama. Instead, we might better perceive this postwar poet’s theater as a merging of the avant-garde’s theatricalism and literary modernism’s anti-theatrical strategies. Indeed, as Sarah Bay-Cheng and Barbara Cole have compellingly argued in their recent anthology of modernist poetic drama, Poets at Play, the category of modernist poetic drama properly includes both the literary stylings of H. D. and of Wallace Stevens, whose apparently anti-theatrical “closet” dramas resisted the conditions of the material theater, and the pro-theatrical plays of Edna St. Vincent Millay and E.E. Cummings, which incorporate such popular performance practices as vaudeville and minstrelsy. Bay-Cheng and Cole argue that modernist poet-playwrights often employed poetry as an intentionally anti-mimetic strategy that could offer “the hallmark of truth within the theatrical illusion of realism” (21). Thus, although it is conventionally written off both for what is perceived as its less-than-serious engagement with the theater and for its presumed lack of importance in the discourse of American modernism, modernist poetic drama may actually be better understood as an important departure from representational theater. This characteristic is one that postwar poet’s theater both inherits and extends.
     
    It should come as no surprise then that our preferred term here is not drama, indicating a literary production intended to be read, but rather theater and/or performance, a turn that signals the space and relations of enactment as central concern. In re-encoding this text-and-performance “split,” poet’s theater calls its very terms into question: what is a “text,” what is a “performance,” how do these definitions relate to the conditions of their production and reception, and when might one affect, shade, or even become the other? From this perspective, American postwar poet’s theater might be best understood as an inheritor of both literary modernism and the modernist avant-garde, with the term “poet’s theater” itself rhetorically signaling, simultaneously, a disavowal of dramatic realism and an embrace of theatricalism. If realism effaces its own means of production, achieving its sense of “reality” by removing the traces of theatrical mediation, then poet’s theater is decidedly anti-realist, in the sense that it foregrounds, even celebrates, the theatrical event. Yet unlike modernist poetic theater, which structures its staging according to the (absent) verbal text, neither text nor performance over-determines the meaning or effects of postwar American poet’s theater.
     
    As a theater of language, of what some might call poetic language, American poet’s theater grants special emphasis to embodied and performed language. “Poetic” language is imagined by many of the poet’s theater writers and stage-producers here not as a stabilized form of “content”-based meaning or communication but as decentered, slippery, highly active, mobile, and/or conflicted. Language becomes its own performance “act.” As a recuperative re-embracing of the performance practice embedded in any linguistic utterance, poet’s theater articulates language’s internal conflicts between signfier and signified, and it reconsiders the subject-object binary relations implicitly established within any imagistic and/or spatialized art form. Poet’s theater, particularly as embodied performance text, acts as a performance mirror and critique of these conventional linguistic processes. It does so by calling into question the stability not only of semantic “meaning” but also of human social identity–perceived in Emile Benveniste’s concept of the “I” to “be” only that transitory, unstable linguistic “subject,”4 and in the “performance” of identity that Judith Butler has famously described in gender and queer studies.5
     
    As a formal hybrid of often competing discourses and media, poet’s theater is not a “poem,” nor is it even a series of poems, nor merely a script for a play. Instead, postwar poet’s theater is, for our purposes here, an active performance that is centered on, though not confined to, language. And–crucially–in being performed (by reader, actor, or poet) it performs, and revises linguistic-interpretative value. Poet’s theater thus acts upon the very instability of language enunciated in the work of so many post-structural theorists, from Roland Barthes to Julia Kristeva to Jacques Derrida–those ascribed to “writing,” to “degree zero” in poetic writing, to the “borderline psychosis” that Kristeva, at least, believes has been the experiment of poetic language. Thus, alhough this poet’s theater heartily embraces the imaginary of this odd writing scene / written text, it counters the conventions of what performance studies scholar Dwight Conquergood has called “textocentrism” (151)–that is, the sense of the text as authorized and authoritative, as an enduring document that always gets the last word.
     
    A performance art? A conceptual poetics? Any scripted work performed in a designated space that butts against the more academically recognized, canonized literary theaters? Perhaps, we might conclude, that contemporary American poet’s theater is all of the above. Poet’s theater might be seen as a special category of “post-dramatic theatre,” Hans-Thies Lehmann’s influential term for non-characterological, non-narrative, multi-vocal, frequently multi-mediated, unstable “new” theater that “confirms the not so new insight that there is never a harmonious relationship but rather a perpetual conflict between text and scene” (145). In its eschewal of realistic portrayals of character, scene, and temporality, poet’s theater releases performance from regulation by the drama–even while it enhances the complexities, dissonances, and possibilities of its own play of language, especially as it pertains to the theatrum mundi of everyday life.
     
    The poet’s theater that is the subject of this special issue thus trains its awareness both on theatrical processes and on the production of meaning in everyday life, with theatricalized performance frequently functioning as a kind of social and linguistic laboratory. Most of the essays here also focus on the ways in which the play of language and embodied and/or staged performance work together or in relation to one another. Whether in an epic solo reading of a piece by Ron Silliman on a street corner of San Francisco in the 1970s, or in a post-millennium arts space in multimedia collaboration with a range of artists performing Carla Harryman’s Mirror Play nearly three decades later, the concept of performance writ large–encompassing theatrical, social, discursive, and material enactments, as well as their relationships with one to the other–undergirds the conceptual and post-structural means at the heart of these poet’s theater works.
     
    As Nasser Hussain shows in his article “Performing Ketjak: The Theater of the Observed,” Ron Silliman’s 1978 street corner reading of Ketjak in San Francisco was more than simply an open–a very open–“poetry reading.” It was also language in action and a close cousin to Fluxus-style events and “Happenings” of the 1950s and 60s. Silliman’s solo-voice performance “event” constructed a public viewing of “language performed independently on the stage of everyday experience,” as Hussain writes, and it layered the vanguard’s poetic play upon word form, syntactic parataxis, against the daily world of San Francisco’s Tenderloin district. As the latter became, or becomes in Hussain’s essay, an authentic spatialized public arena in which this theatrical presentation was staged, the event addressed the nature of poetic form, audience makeup, and theatrical reception. In Hussain’s analysis, it also calls into question the real and multiple meanings generated–which is to say, performatively available–within a poetics offered in the public space.
     
    Similarly, Fiona Templeton’s YOU–The City (1988) employs an urban-public venue as spatialized public theatrical arena. In the performance analyzed here, the venue is the crazed, hectic, and somewhat seamy environment that was (in the 1980s and 90s, at the time of its staged production) and sometimes still is New York City’s Times Square. James Sherry’s essay, “The Poetic Theater of Fiona Templeton: An Environmental View,” couples poet Sherry’s own commitment to an “environmental poetics” (as opposed to an “eco-poetics”)–which he suggests is a poetics that is fully and philosophically-structurally engaged with its environmental surroundings, whether urban, natural, or both–with a reading of this “event.” Templeton’s play itself proposes a “client,” rather than an actor and/or an audience, who, in keeping an appointment, begins a tour through the city: inhabiting, observing, and also becoming one with a transitory urban ecosystem. An environmental view, writes Sherry, “[s]ignificantly modifies our engagement with the world,” challenging at some fundamental base our subject-object relations as well as humanity’s Cartesian rather than integrated view of its role in the environment. Sherry reveals the way in which Templeton’s poet’s theater creates a theatrical stage as environment, making poetry in performance a conceptually fluid act with political implications.
     
    Audience activity and experience are under scrutiny in the essay by Heidi R. Bean, who, like Sherry, finds ethical implications in poet’s theater’s structuring of audience relations. In “Carla Harryman’s Non/Representation and the Ethics of Dispersive Performance,” Bean examines recent productions of plays by Carla Harryman, who is commonly associated with what has become known as “Language” writing. Harryman’s Mirror Play (2005) is a direct response to recent U.S. militarization as well as an attempt to rethink social and global relations as they are figured in and by language. One of the play’s goals, Bean writes, is to place “under scrutiny not only the structure of interpretive practices but also the very impulse to interpret.” Bean thus proposes the term “dispersive theater” for thinking about the ways in which postwar poet’s theater such as Harryman’s constructs an interpretive “community” marked, paradoxically, by discontinuity and dispersion. Dispersive theater, as it is conceptualized here, is not simply an interpretive free-for-all but rather an embodiment of the ethical dilemma in the postmodern era–the contradiction, as Geoffrey Galt Harpham puts it, between “How ought one to live?” and “What ought I to do?,” between generalizable norms and individual acts in actual (and unique) situations (26). The result is a theater that not only rejects realist narrative theater’s appeal to public morals, which have become increasingly suspect over the last century, but that also offers itself as a relational paradigm better suited to the present world’s complex interconnectivities.
     
    One assumption shared by the essays in this collection is the view that poet’s theater is, at its basis, a critique and rethinking of language’s complicity in the production and imposition of generalizable norms. In “This Theater Is a Strange Hole: Mac Wellman’s Poetics of Apparence,” Karinne Keithley Syers demonstrates poet-playwright Mac Wellman’s demand, via interpretive impediments and non-naturalistic performance, for openness to unknowingness, or what Syers terms a “hole poetics.” “Instead of finding out once again that incest hurts or that racism is bad,” she explains, “Wellman suggests we allow theater to make us venture into spaces where we don’t already know the answer.” Reading Wellman’s Antigone alongside notions of landscape composition, William James’s writings on consciousness and language processing, and classical Greek theater, Syers argues that Wellman’s theater acts both upon and with audience members, making them aware of the mental leaps common to acts of storytelling, and creating in them feelings for new relations. Thus the traditional sight-oriented model of landscape theater becomes, in Syers’s engagement with Wellman, a language-driven “wilderness expedition quite unrelated to any form of conquest”–a field, a hole, a topographical unknown at the edge of thinking.
     
    Given poet’s theater’s essential hybridity, it is perhaps not surprising that the role–and disciplinary home–of poet’s theater in the academy is in flux. Critical attention to poet’s theater (and indeed poet’s theater as critical activity) has increased in the wake of the rise of both Cultural Studies and Performance Studies. The essays here benefit from this broader range of scholarly attention and make use of production and publication histories, performance analyses, cultural contexts, aesthetic ideologies, and artistic practices, even as they stay close to play texts themselves for what they can tell us about the rhetoric and practice of textuality and performance. In the long-overdue intersection of theater scholarship and poetry criticism created by these four essays, we can also identify a shared pedagogical interest: poet’s theater as an alternative, and often innovative, social-experiential model. This is postwar poet’s theater’s activist character, emerging out of the contemporary notion of performance itself as a critical paradigm. And yet this is only a partial account. There are, no doubt, many more critical approaches to be tried on and histories to be fleshed out via closer attention to postwar poet’s theater. Many of the most active critics of postwar poet’s theater are, in fact, new or emerging scholars whose critical facility with poet’s theater has been enabled by training that is increasingly interdisciplinary. We therefore see this collection as an opening, one that perhaps could only become apparent in this critical junction, and we look forward to both a broadening and a deepening of poet’s theater as a space of, and catalyst for, critical activity.
     

    Heidi R. Bean is Assistant Professor of English at Bridgewater State University. She is the co-editor of Poetry after Cultural Studies, an anthology of critical essays forthcoming from the University of Iowa Press. Her essays, reviews, and interviews related to the intersections of theater, performance, and poetry have appeared in Text and Performance Quarterly, Theatre Journal, The Iowa Review Web, and Cultural Critique. This essay is taken from her current project on the cultural politics of American poetic theater since the 1960s.
     

     

    Laura Hinton is the author of a poetry book, Sisyphus My Love (To Record a Dream in a Bathtub) (BlazeVox Books), and a critical book, The Perverse Gaze of Sympathy: Sadomasochistic Sentiments from Clarissa to Rescue 911 (SUNY Press). She is the co-editor of We Who Love to Be Astonished: Experimental Women’s Writing and Performance Poetics (University of Alabama Press). Her critical essays, poet interviews, and reviews have appeared in Contemporary Literature, Postmodern Culture, Textual Practice, Framework, Women’s Studies, Rain Taxi, Jacket, The Journal of the Academy of American Poets, among other journals and collections. Her poetry has appeared in anthologies and journals including Feminist Studies, How2, and Nth Position, and she has edited several critical article collections for How2, one of which was on the writings of Leslie Scalapino.
     
    Hinton edits a chapbooks series for Mermaid Tenement Press and publishes reviews on the performance and hybrid arts in New York City on her web log, Chant de la Sirene (chantdelasirene.com). A Professor of English at the City College of New York, Professor Hinton teaches contemporary literature, film, and feminist theory, and also coordinates the InterRUPTions experimental-writers reading series.
     

     

     

    Notes

     

     

     

    The authors gratefully thank Eyal Amiran, Sarah Bay-Cheng, Maria Damon, and two anonymous reviewers for wise remarks and helpful suggestions at various stages in the construction of this collection.
     

    1. Two outstanding volumes exemplify this recent emphasis on sound in poetics theory: Charles Bernstein’s (ed.) Close Listening: Poetry and the Performed Word, and Adelaide Morris’s (ed.) Sound States: Innovative Poetics and Acoustical Technologies. The essays collected in these volumes attempt to theorize a poetry in performance, if not a scripted form of “poet’s theater” that is the subject of our PMC essays. Bernstein’s Close Listening examines, for example, the “sense” created through sound patterns that sustain harmony or noise, multi-vocality and polyphony, as well as the “aural ellipsis”—the spatialized absence of sound—generated in what Nick Piombino calls “the nature of listening,” which opens up the transitional space of play discussed by D.W. Winnicott in the context of both child’s play and adult art activity. One notable example of the focus not only on sound but on vision in poetic performance is Johanna Drucker’s “Visual Performance of the Poetic Text” (Bernstein 131-161), which examines visual-spatiality in poetry on the visual page.
     

    Morris’s Sound States, similarly—as the title clues us—focuses on poetry’s articulation of sound, mostly in the context of modern technologies. It is interested in radio and audio recordings, and in music, particularly jazz. This volume is notably attuned to ethnic diversity, including such pieces as Nathaniel Mackey’s “Cante Moro” and Fred Moten’s “Sound in Florescence” (on jazz artist Cecil Taylor, who has influenced many poets, like Bruce Andrews, for instance). It also extends the geopolitical coverage of “American” poetry to the Caribbean, in Loretta Collin’s piece on sound performance in the Rastafari reggae tradition.

     

    2. A related but discontinuous San Francisco Poets Theater was founded in 2000 by poet and playwright Kevin Killian, and continues to the present.

     
    3. See Andreas Huyssen’s After the Great Divide for this discussion of different modernisms.

     

     
    4. See, for example, Emile’s Benveniste’s “Subjectivity in Language,” in his Problems in General Linguistics.

     

     
    5. See, for example, Judith Butler’s first book on this subject, Gender Trouble: Feminisms and the Subversion of Identity. Butler’s notion of “performativity,” drawn from political and ethical philosophy and phenomenology, is central to our extended notion here of “performance,” particularly as it becomes a practice undergirding social relations and everyday life.
     

    Works Cited

       

     

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