Category: Volume 22 – Number 2 – January 2012

  • The Art of Everyday Life and Death: Throbbing Gristle and the Aesthetics of Neoliberalism

    Gregory Steirer
    University of Pennsylvania
    steirer@english.upenn.edu

    Abstract

    This essay examines the influence of Situationist thought on aesthetics in postwar Britain through a close analysis of Throbbing Gristle, a fine-arts-cum-pop group responsible for the invention of the dystopian subculture Industrial Culture. Framing the group’s work as a response to the politics of 1970s Social Art, the article argues that Throbbing Gristle’s techno-libertarian aesthetics represent a deliberate effort to foreground and maintain deep-seated contradictions within the concept of the art of everyday life. By emphasizing the aesthetic side of Situationist thought, the article also offers a new framework for understanding and interrogating the legacy of the Situationists after 1968.

     

    In Leaving the Twentieth Century (1974), the first English-language edition of Situationist writings, adventurous readers fortunate enough to find a copy would have discovered a blueprint for an unusual new city. Espousing a radical form of city planning driven by an imaginative and technically impossible architecture, editor and translator Christopher Gray, rendering into English Ivan Chtcheglov’s “Formula for a New City,” describes a city whose buildings and quarters are each individually designed to produce in the inhabitant or pedestrian a specific emotional effect: “There will be rooms awakening more vivid fantasies than any drug. There will be houses where it will be impossible not to fall in love” (17).1 Though most of the emotions to be elicited stem from familiar ethical and poetic humanist traditions—Gray mentions, for instance, the Gothic-Romantic Quarter, the Happy Quarter, the Noble and Tragic Quarter, the Historic Quarter, and the Useful Quarter—near the end of the essay Gray conjures up a vision of a different tradition altogether, the Sinister Quarter:

    The Sinister Quarter, for example, would be a distinct improvement on those gaping holes, mouths of the underworld, that a great many races treasured in their capitals: they symbolised the malefic forces of life. Not that the Sinister Quarter need be bristling with traps, oubliettes or mines. It would be a Quarter difficult to get into, and unpleasant once one succeeded (piercing whistles, alarm bells, sirens wailing intermittently, hideous sculptures, automatic mobiles with motors called Auto-Mobiles), as ill-lit at night as it glared bitterly during the day.

    (17)

    If the other quarters, taken together, can be seen as a product (albeit a strange one) of a familiar and longstanding utopianism directed towards the rational design of a perfectly functioning social organization or place, Gray’s Sinister Quarter indicates a perverse expansion of the content of perfection itself. For the first time in utopian fantasy, the City’s human and technological failings—the very features previous utopias had been imagined to extinguish—are preserved and incorporated as an integral part of the utopia itself. By maintaining the “malefic” as a loud, ugly, and technologically choked Quarter designed to cause injury and displeasure to those who enter, Gray preserves the form of utopia but so dramatically expands utopia’s content that his City appears to lack a supra-rational principle (peace, equality, faith, utility) dictating what the application of rational design is meant to accomplish.

     
    The problem of the Sinister Quarter (if we can call the provocation of its utopian existence a problem) can be seen as a concise illustration of a much larger problem that beset Britain’s art world in the 1970s as the Situationist-inspired “revolution of everyday life” gradually infiltrated the practices and theories of a new generation of artists and critics. On the one hand, this revolution anarchically embraced all experience. Aesthetic pleasure, the artists-cum-revolutionaries discovered, was to be had everywhere and in everything—even in things normally held to be boring or bad or sinister. Its reception depended only upon the perceiver freeing him- or herself from his or her socially conditioned expectations so as to receive it. If taken too far, however, the dismantling of socially conditioned expectations—embodied institutionally by the museum and gallery—liberated art from the disinterest (first put forth by Kant) and formal hermeticism (enthroned in the 1950s by Clement Greenberg) upon which the new, revolutionary conception of art-as-anything depended in the first place.2 If anything was to be art, Art itself could not be anything, but had to maintain its unique position as ahistorical, apolitical, and rooted in aesthesis.
     
    On the other hand, the same artists-cum-revolutionaries discovered that if the revolution was extended so that it overturned the concept of Art itself, the prize of Art-as-anything was that Art could now finally be and do something. Free of the restraints of Kantian aesthetics, Art could re-enter history as useful work and join the politically disenfranchised in their struggles against capitalism, imperialism, and fascism. No longer providers of sensuous pleasure or creators of Culture in the aristocratic sense, artists could now join their social brethren as comrades in the battle for control of the everyday and thus work to repair Britain’s many social failings. Art could become social work, artists social workers.
     
    Though most British artists in the 1970s ignored the contradiction at the heart of the everyday by cleaving to only one of these revolutionary perspectives—the anarchic or the socialist—Gray’s Sinister Quarter results from the uneasy combination of both. Essentially an imaginative work of social engineering in which the modern City is “fixed” so that it induces desired emotions and behaviors and provides an ideal existence, Gray’s Situationist-inspired City refuses to discriminate among emotions and behaviors so as to identify which are in fact desirable. Not only does Gray, following Chtcheglov, seek to include them all, but by way of imaginative compensation he devotes the most explicit planning to what would traditionally be labeled the least desirable (only the Sinister Quarter is described in detail). The secret moral connotations normally structuring the art of everyday life are revealed as the concept is stretched to include maleficence, danger, and fear—an art of everyday death.
     
    Whether or not Genesis P-Orridge, Cosey Fanni Tutti, Peter “Sleazy” Christopherson, or Chris Carter read Gray’s Leaving the Twentieth Century is unknown, but in 1976 when they debuted as the band Throbbing Gristle they seemed—with their ear-splitting sounds, repulsive lyrics, offensive imagery, and mechanical rhythm section—to have stepped right out of the Situationists’ Sinister Quarter. MP Nicholas Fairburn, outraged at what the group, operating previously under the name of COUM Transmissions, had fashioned out of public money (it had received an Arts Council grant), decried its members as “the wreckers of civilisation,” thus positioning them publicly as dangerous dystopians whose art threatened—if not actually wrecked—the hard-earned achievement of British civilization. Fairburn, of course, exaggerated (and did so partly in order to pin the disintegration of Britain’s postwar political consensus upon the ruling Labour government), but his description of P-Orridge, Tutti, Christopherson, and Carter as art-terrorist dystopians astutely identifies the group’s aesthetic strategy. Simultaneously anarchic aesthetes and hyper-rational technocrats, facilitators of the everyday and demonic social workers, Throbbing Gristle uncomfortably straddle the two different understandings of the revolution of everyday life that the Situationists, through Gray’s anthology and the works of their English members Ralph Rumney and Alexander Trocchi, had bequeathed to the British art world. In doing so, Throbbing Gristle invented a disquieting new subculture, named Industrial Culture, which was determinedly dystopian and anti-progressive—while simultaneously revolutionary and anti-conservative—in its approach to contemporary society, artistic production, and political action.
     
    Whereas different branches of British art in the 1970s developed out of single sides of Situationist thought—on the one side British happenings, performance art, and Fluxus; on the other “social art” and Art & Language—Throbbing Gristle and the Industrial Culture it created are unique for their rootedness within the contradictions of Situationist thought. Their dystopian aesthetic was thus in large part an effort to maintain these contradictions in an artistic and social space that sought to ignore or suppress them. Though I have described these contradictions in terms of the incommensurable practices arising out of the notions of “anything as art” and “art as political work,” the split in Situationist thought can also be mapped (with identical results) upon the differences between the two canonical Situationist ur-texts: Guy Debord’s The Society of the Spectacle (1967) and Raoul Vaneigem’s The Revolution of Everyday Life (1967). Though frequently grouped together in accounts of the Situationist project, the two represent vastly different visions of what Situationist thought should be and do. Whereas Debord’s book presents a highly critical, theoretically dense analysis of the spectacle, venomous and pessimistic in tone and rooted in Marxist thought, Vaneigem offers a more lyrical and optimistic meditation, rooted in Kierkegaard and the metaphors of alchemy, on the potential of radical subjectivity to reshape individual and social experience. To the problems of alienation and spectacular consumerism, Society of the Spectacle offers the abstract solution of critical consciousness, realized by the working class through councils that achieve real democracy by transcending the “isolated individual” and the “atomized and manipulated masses” (thesis 221). By contrast, The Revolution of Everyday Life identifies revolution with a non-alienated, passionate form of individual subjectivity, one that reconfigures relationships to everyday life so to as release their subversive dynamism. The two books, themselves representative of the two major modes of Situationist art and writing, thus constitute an aporia within Situationist thought. Because most academic and popular scholarship on the Situationists has ignored Vaneigem in favor of the more theoretically sophisticated Debord, such scholarship has repeatedly failed to register this aporia. As a result, the cultural legacy of the Situationist movement has been constructed in a manner that over-emphasizes critical theory, overt political action, and the spectacle of commodity capitalism. In tracing the contradictory approaches to the everyday that organized Throbbing Gristle’s work, I am thus offering a more complicated—and, I believe, more accurate—framework for approaching both Situationist thought and its legacy within the cultural sphere.
     
    Throbbing Gristle is not, of course, entirely sui generis in its relation to Situationist thought—and indeed its aesthetic approach to social work is especially indebted to J.G. Ballard’s late-1960s writings (specifically those collected under the title The Atrocity Exhibition [1970]) and the work and performances of William Burroughs (who lived in Britain during the late 60s and was a friend and collaborator to P-Orridge).3 Situationist thought had an especially vibrant afterlife in Britain in the 1960s and 70s, with countercultural groups like King Mob and the Angry Brigade basing themselves explicitly upon Situationist theory, and artists and musicians/performers such as Art & Language and The Sex Pistols borrowing key elements of Situationist practice or critique.4 Throbbing Gristle’s work, however, is arguably the most useful of these artists and groups for highlighting and tracing theoretically the two different valences of Situationist thought, for, more so than the other figures’ works, Throbbing Gristle’s resists easy identification with either Debord or Vaniegeim’s theoretical model alone. What is more, Throbbing Gristle and the Industrial Culture it inaugurated serve together, chronologically, as a kind of endpoint to the post-1968 adventure of Situationist thought within the popular and/or subcultural spheres. They thus also enable us to better understand how changes to information technology and the Western political order, both beginning in the 1980s, served to strip Situationist practices of most of their critical bite.
     
    It should be noted that Throbbing Gristle, like other Situationist-influenced groups within the British art world, was more than a mere attempt to realize Situationist theory. Throbbing Gristle was born in 1969 as P-Orridge’s COUM Transmissions, a performance-art enterprise that grew to include Tutti, Christopherson, and Carter before transforming into Throbbing Gristle and leaving the gallery/museum scene for that of the concert and record shop. As COUM, the group experimented with Cage-inspired approaches to art, primarily via happenings and Actionist-style performances, and participated in the burgeoning European avant-garde performance art scene of the 1970s.5 Although internationally recognized for its art at the time, COUM has come to be remembered almost entirely for its October 1976 Prostitution show at the ICA, which featured (among other things) framed clips from Tutti’s work as a professional model for the British and European porn industries. When it was discovered by a scandal-hungry press that COUM had received a small Arts Council grant for the show, a storm of protest developed, with Conservative MPs, museum-goers, and newspapers attacking the Arts Council and the ICA for having funded obscenity.6 Following so quickly upon the heels of similar ICA “scandals”—including the funding of Mary Kelley’s 1976 Post-Partum Document show and the purchase of Carl Andre’s Equivalent VIII (purchased in 1972, but not attacked by the press until 1976)—COUM’s Prostitution was partially responsible for ensuring that avant-garde and experimental art would no longer receive government funding once Thatcher came to power.7
     
    Though the work of COUM Transmissions is an interesting subject in its own right and deserves more scholarly attention than it has yet received, its major artistic preoccupations situate it well within the anarchic or Vaneigem side of Situationist aesthetics. In the spirit of John Cage (whose book Silence helped inspire the young P-Orridge to become an artist), COUM used performance art to challenge the distinction between art and non-art, disrupt passive modes of interacting with the world, and re-invest everyday life with beauty and aesthetic free play.8 The group’s transition to Throbbing Gristle and its development of an explicitly techno-dystopian aesthetic can thus be seen as the repudiation of aesthetic anarchy as a self-sufficient strategy for reconfiguring the relationship between art and the everyday and re-humanizing post-war Britain. Rather than advocate a liberatory and institutionally liberated approach to art, Throbbing Gristle sought to bring art into the everyday by re-conceptualizing art itself, paradoxically, as a libertarian form of behavioral science—a dystopian techno-politics. In what follows, I provide a close analysis of this paradoxical approach to aesthetics—its style, its politics, and its philosophical premises—by situating it within the context of both 1970s social art, a short-lived aesthetic movement that developed an aesthetic explicitly modeled after behavioral psychology (but rooted in a Marxist approach to alienation and critical consciousness), and postwar impediments to research and the exchange of information. I conclude by returning to Situationist thought and offering a re-conceptualization, based upon Throbbing Gristle’s work, of the aporia at its heart, and the promise it may—through this aporia—yet hold.
     

    From Social Art to Industrial Culture

     
    Though Throbbing Gristle originally debuted at the ICA’s opening party for Prostitution—and thus announced itself to the public under the auspices of Britain’s foremost contemporary art institution—scholars and fans have long considered Throbbing Gristle an extra-art-world affair. Exemplary in this regard is Simon Ford, who writes in Wreckers of Civilisation: “The art world, they [P-Orridge et al.] concluded, was elitist, hypocritical, and out of touch, and the music industry promised a more relevant context for their work” (6.26). Even more cautious critics such as Neil Mulholland, who concedes the importance of art-world concerns to Throbbing Gristle, persist in identifying Throbbing Gristle primarily as a commercial music endeavor, thereby placing it outside the bounds of their discipline (Mylholland 61). In doing so, these critics reaffirm the very discursive boundaries both COUM and Throbbing Gristle sought to challenge.9 Art History’s rejection of Throbbing Gristle, fitting though it may be given the group’s strong anti-institutional bent, has nevertheless had two particularly pernicious effects on our historical understanding of the group. First, this rejection has effectively written Throbbing Gristle out of professional scholarship since the discourse to which Art History has assigned the group (“rock music”) has until quite recently been treated by most of academia as extra-academic. At the library of an American research university like the University of Pennsylvania one will thus search in vain for an indication that Throbbing Gristle ever existed, let alone exerted an influence on par with the Sex Pistols on the development of popular music in the 1980s and 1990s. Second, fan or underground scholarship, though working to reconstruct the band’s history, has, in following Art History’s lead, positioned as extra-artistic what was in fact an essentially artistic undertaking, rooted in art-world concerns and contexts and dependent upon the specific category of 1970s social or behavioral art for its seemingly novel approach to Situationist aesthetics. Indeed, to fully understand Throbbing Gristle’s dystopian aesthetic—both its origin and its aims—it must be placed in the context of this short-lived leftwing art movement.
     
    What was social art? Unlike most other art movements of the 1960s and 70s, social art lacked both a specific formal style (though, as we will see, the various styles tended to produce a single, common effect) and a committed association of practitioners. It was rather defined by a particular approach to the idea of art and the role of the artist in contemporary society. Nicholas Serota, former Director of the Whitechapel Art Gallery—the venue for Art and Society (1978), one of the two big social art exhibitions of the 1970s—described such art as “motivated by a belief in the need to change the social and political framework and, in some cases, the generally accepted role of artists in our society” (5). Richard Cork, curator of the other big social art exhibition of the decade, The Serpentine Gallery’s 1978 Art for Whom?, claimed more generally that “[t]he only valid criterion would…be whether the artist enlarges everyone’s capacity to live, with the fullness which should be his or her equal human due, in the world today” (10). Invitations to Cork’s show, however, included a ten-point manifesto, presumably endorsed by the exhibiting artists (though written, it would seem, by Cork), in which social art’s goals were laid out in clear, albeit still somewhat general-sounding, prose. The two most distinctive points were numbers four—”We are convinced that art must be transformed into a progressive force for change in the future”—and nine—”We would like society to regard artists as having an active part to play in dealing with the human, social and political issues which affect everyone’s existence” (qtd. in Levin 16). In other words, social art was to be an art of everyday life in the sense that it would function to improve the lives of the poor and working class (“society”) by addressing basic problems in the organization of modern life: rundown cities, alienation (either too little or too much), industrial pollution, the uniformity of modern housing developments, etc.
     
    Different artists pursued the goals of social art in different ways. Formally speaking, the various examples of work on display at the two big shows exhibited a wide variety of artistic media and production techniques, though such works tended to exclude traditional fine arts categories such as canvas painting and sculpture. Conservative critic Bernard Levin provided the following accurate (though hostile) account of such variety for readers of The Times after visiting the Art for Whom? show:

    It contains some strikingly attractive brightly-coloured designs by children for the facade of a school; the adult work, on the other hand, consists of things like sheets from the Family Allowances Act torn out and pasted on the wall, similarly displayed notices from the Asbestos Information Council, an advertisement for the products of the Distillers’ Company, annotated to draw attention to the company’s connexion with the thalidomide tragedy, and—this is the contribution of Peter Dunn and Lorraine Leeson—an account of a campaign against the proposed closure (on economy grounds) of Bethnal Green Hospital.

    (16)

    Two important observations on the nature of social art can be drawn from the above description. First, social art greatly resembled what has come to be called social work, its artists independent social workers. Such artists advocated for change by using art to address what were traditionally seen as either political or (increasingly after World War II) sociological/technocratic problems. By acting as community organizers and socialist propagandists (a word they preferred to “advertisers” or “marketers”), they sought to re-define artists as servants to the people and thus re-situate art as a fundamental aspect of everyday life by transforming it into politics. As Andrew Forge predicted in a 1971 piece for Studio International describing the decline of gallery-based art, “Art utterly democratized becomes politics” (34). Such was the goal of social art. Second, such art, despite its wide variety of styles and media (and excepting the occasional public mural), was formally predicated on the denial of aesthetic pleasure, traditionally defined. Cheaply printed photographs, torn sections of newsprint annotated with marker, columns of figures and statistics, typewriter fonts and sloppy textual blocking—social art deliberately sought to replace the vertical dimension of aesthetic free play with the horizontal dimension of historical materialism. Aesthetic contemplation would no longer be modeled on religious worship but on the practice of reading a Marxist pamphlet or socialist newspaper.

     
    As a form of community-centered socialist politics, social art staked out an ostensibly anti-professional position within the art world. Despite the exhibition of work in shows like Art for Society and Art for Whom?—what Dunn and Leeson name “gallery socialism”—working-class (and usually urban) community centers such as town halls, libraries, schools, and tower blocks were deemed the proper place for art, which was itself frequently defined in terms of collective action rather than art objects (43). Social art rhetoric, through variations on phrases like “art for all” or “art for the people,” thus frequently positioned “real” art in opposition to the art of the museum and professional artist. Such institutional art was faulted both for its participation in the capitalist class structure and for the restricted population (educated and supposedly wealthy) it served. Indeed, the role of professional artist was itself attacked for its elitist monopolization of the title. As Ken Sprague, an exhibitor in Art for Society asserted, “It is not a question of every artist being a special kind of man but of every man, woman and child being a special kind of artist” (30). Returned to the people, art would become a progressive force, an invigorating social energy through which communities could fashion their own modern-day utopias. As for the social artists themselves, following a suggestion Justin Schorr made in Toward a Transformation of Art, they re-imagined themselves as therapists, community organizers, and social workers. As Schorr wrote, “My suggestion is that artists should redefine the art enterprise…so that it is no longer considered an economic endeavor but rather is considered a service profession, one that is to be subsidized” (89).
     
    In re-imagining the artist as social worker, however, the division between artist and community member that social art had supposedly wished to mend was re-asserted in technocratic terms. The artist, though no longer possessing skills necessary for the creation of art, possessed an understanding of art as politics and an ability to organize under its name that placed him in the position of artist-administrator or -bureaucrat. Thus the drive to create social art resembled in its professional ideology the contemporaneous movement by artists to market themselves to the business world (best realized by the Artist’s Placement Group or APG).10 Indeed, the function of the social artist was almost identical to that of the new, business-friendly corporate artist, as summarized by Tom Batho of Esso Petroleum in a discussion of APG: “To some extent the artist is a bit like the business efficiency man who goes through the company. It’s not so much what they find wrong but what they release in suggestions from the personnel of the company they’re examining” (qtd. in Lucie-Smith 160). Like these corporate artists, social artists acted as community managers, identifying problem areas and inefficiencies and utilizing organizational skills to spur “every man, woman and child” on to more productive or progressive work (Sprague 30). The social artist, precisely in his or her capacity as social worker, was also a species of technocrat: a manager or human administrator. Stephen Willats, a prominent social artist who continued to produce art according to its principles into the 1990s, thus preferred the term “behavioural art”—highlighting as it does the goal of modified behavior (and the modified consciousness it produces) within communities—to that of social art. (For similar reasons he named his journal “Control”).11
     
    With the technocratic aspect of social art in mind, the ugliness of its actual aesthetic productions should appear less surprising. In a market over-saturated with institutionally certified artists and lacking a consistent method of appraising ability, social artists look longingly to professional labor markets that ranked employees based upon specialized knowledge and skill. Because the Romantic ideology underpinning popular, governmental, and educational understandings of art recognized individual genius in place of measurable skills, artists qua artists in the 1970s competed in an anarchic labor market in which one’s individual labor could not be meaningfully compared with another’s; in the absence of a determinable hierarchy, artists thus depended upon patronage, nepotism, and what was sometimes known as “professional incest” (serving on grant-awarding boards to which one later made application).12 As much then as social art’s “art for everyone” democracy could be explained by the socialist politics of its practitioners, it was just as much a logical response to the devaluation of art as a specialized kind of labor. By inflating the supply of artists so greatly that their market value was zero (everyone is an artist), social artists sought to damn their professionally-trained brethren while re-classifying themselves as technocrats: a new, creative version of scientist, scholar, and administrator. The resulting aesthetic style was thus anti-expressive, anti-Romantic, and anti-Heroic. It was, fundamentally, what a group of German student protestors named in 1968 “information-aesthetics,” in which fact, figure, and technical language approximate dthat of the corporate spreadsheet, governmental paper, or law review (Clay and Kudielka 64). Black and white photography, pay slips, and newspaper articles functioned as mere documentation, what Les Levine called in an early article on information-aesthetics “evidence-creating,” the raw material upon which sociological theses (usually produced under the title of “artist statements”) might be based (264). In the end, social art was ugly because it sought not to be art at all but rather the science and politics of producing changes in human behavior; the aesthetic dis-pleasure of social art was thus premised upon the technocratic pleasure of science.
     
    Taken by itself, social art was an extremely short-lived art world phenomenon that (aside from the popularization of community murals) had little direct lasting effect upon either the art world or the everyday of the working class. Indeed, with the sudden profitability of British Art in international art markets under Thatcher (thanks both to the new finance economy of London and the aesthetic innovations of the YBAs) the financial impetus for turning to social art in the first place had vanished. But though 1970s social art remains today little more than a footnote in the history of Fine Art and socialist political activism, it yet must be recognized as the peculiar (and unwitting) progenitor of one of the most vibrant Western subcultures of the late twentieth century: what Throbbing Gristle christened “Industrial Culture.” For the members of Throbbing Gristle were, if not social artists themselves, then the bastard children of social art, produced through the profane dalliance of social art’s fundamental aesthetic principles with the politics (or anti-politics) of extreme libertarianism.
     
    The members of Throbbing Gristle were not classified as social artists by art critics in the late 1970s (they were not in fact classified as artists at all), but the band’s artistic production (encompassing not only music, but performance, prose, and a significant amount of visual material) greatly resembled social art’s in terms of its deliberate pursuit of what most would call sensuous dis-pleasure. Visually speaking, the means through which Throbbing Gristle solicited such dis-pleasure were nearly identical: degraded black and white photographs were common, color was generally absent (except for the occasional bit of red), poorly clipped newspaper articles served as backdrops or (in written documents such as Industrial News) the artistic subject in its entirety. Perhaps most exemplary—and extreme in its banishment of visual pleasure—is the cover to the band’s first album, confusingly titled The Second Annual Report of Throbbing Gristle (released in 1977). Lest the entirely blank white cover evoke the minimalism of Richard Hamilton’s White Album (designed for the Beatles in 1968), a single plain sticker containing the corporate sounding title, the production date, and the label’s address in an unremarkable black font is affixed to the top right corner. The back of the LP’s sleeve is similarly blank, save for a much larger sticker, pasted in the sleeve’s center and containing what resembles a poorly photocopied reproduction of the first page of a shareholder’s report. The text, written in corporate-speak, describes the band’s activity in thoroughly un-artistic terms:

    This second year of production has shown a definite move towards establishment of a sound business foundation on which further work involving greater capital expenditure can be based. Considerable progress has been made in the fields of research and development which have enabled us to give live demonstrations in five locations.

    (Throbbing Gristle, The Second Annual Report)

    Though some commentators have read the industrial language here and in other areas of Throbbing Gristle’s oeuvre as a means of mocking the industrial dimensions of the music business, the dimensions mimed are not those of the music industry, the major companies having decades earlier adopted cooler corporate identities.13 The aesthetic blandness rather suggests in-house administrative reports of the kind produced by government agencies or scientific/technical R&D departments. In fact, despite occasional music industry gags (particularly with its fourth album, Twenty Jazz Funk Greats), the group’s Industrial Records functioned like a typical late 1970s independent record company; the target of its aesthetic was thus not the record industry at all (of which Industrial Records was in fact a part), but the postwar valorization of techno-rationalism and the authoritarian regime of the expert it supported.14

     
    Before I turn to Throbbing Gristle’s critique of technocracy, let us take a brief look at how the band translated social art’s emphasis on sensuous dis-pleasure into sound. Certainly the music they produced (much of it, especially at its live concerts, might better be classified as noise) was unpleasant by traditional aesthetic standards. With screeches of high-volume feedback, squelches of over-amplified guitars, and the whining improvisations of P-Orridge’s electric violin, Throbbing Gristle’s music seemed crafted on the assumption that even Punk’s three chords were unnecessary for forming a band. Because of the band’s “industrial” label, critics and fans have regularly interpreted such music in mimetic terms, hearing it as a recreation of the postwar industrial soundscape. In an early version of a 1978 review for Sounds, Jon Savage thus observed, “TG take up all the machine made noise in our industrial decline and throw it back in your face. Like PA hum, feedback, static, sonic accidents” (qtd. in Ford 7.12).15 Savage’s observation is typical for its easy correlation of musical noises with the sound of industrial-age machines, but the particular noises he cites are difficult to identify in the 1970s soundscape, industrial or otherwise—with the single exception of a rock concert sound check. Certainly the loose and often skittery electronic beats (Throbbing Gristle lacked a live drummer) sound nothing like the mechanized rhythm of the factory floor to which they’re often compared. The noises of much of Throbbing Gristle’s songs thus no more belong to a realist or representational aesthetic tradition than they do a recognizable musical form.
     
    The band’s sounds were not, of course, entirely without precedent (though some effects, particular those run through Carter’s homemade “Gristlelizer” could not be heard elsewhere). Indeed, they were what sound technicians would readily label noise: excessive or undesired audio information that obscures the primary or desired musical message.16 For the sound technician (or the musician), such sounds in fact cancel out the expressive and emotional aspects of the music (the jam or the groove), replacing its participatory or subjective effect with a purely informational one: the speaker is too close to the mic, the levels on the bass are too high, the samplers are improperly sequenced, etc.17 Thus where Punk rock’s noise stemmed from a DIY amateurism that one could ignore in appreciation of the rock music behind it (and which vanished as the bands improved over time), Throbbing Gristle’s noise frequently came off as alarming sonic information behind which no music or meaning could be discerned. In these early days, Throbbing Gristle’s music thus presented its audience with a question: What do I do with this?
     
    As the cognitive effects of Throbbing Gristle’s brand of noise should suggest, the band did not pursue sensuous dis-pleasure or what Drew Daniel calls “anti-pleasure” for its own sake (12). As with social art’s annotated newspapers and Xeroxed pay slips, the unpleasant productions of Throbbing Gristle were a corollary of the band’s efforts to construct a popular information-aesthetics; unlike social art, however, Throbbing’s Gristle’s information-aesthetics sought, through the détournement of information itself, to aestheticize information rather than to politicize art. Industrial Records supported this goal or (in the language used by the label) “mission” through the semi-regular publication of Industrial News, ostensibly a newsletter/catalogue produced by the band and its collaborators (such as Monte Cazzaza) and distributed to fans, or “Control Agents” (the term is borrowed from Burroughs), who had joined the label’s mailing list. In place of the official fan club publications of other labels, which feature pin-up photographs and teen-oriented interviews with musicians, Industrial News consisted primarily of quasi-scientific news: descriptions of venereal disease, reports on abnormal psychology, technical instructions for survivalists, illustrations of medical procedures (of the kind J.G. Ballard and Martin Dax had celebrated earlier in the decade via Ambit), studies on the effects of radiation, and numerous articles on serial killers.18 The band’s songs were similarly loaded with arcane references and free-floating bits of de-contextualized information; Christopherson in particular regularly mixed in sampled snippets of BBC news programs and documentaries as well as his own field recordings—illicitly captured, according to Ford, with “powerful surveillance equipment” (Ford 8.25). In conjunction with Industrial News and the reference-laden interviews given to the underground music press, these informational snippets frequently served as prompts for further research/aesthetic exploration by fans. They thus functioned as the musical equivalent of scholarly footnotes.
     
    This emphasis on research eventually came to be one of the dominant features of Industrial Culture itself. As P-Orridge explained to Ford: “You can often trace the songs back to my book shelves. 50% to 60% of the songs were conceived after reading books…. I often ended up with an entire drawer of a filing cabinet of documentation in order to come up with just three or four minutes of lyrics” (7.12). As fans increasingly hunted down these texts and those cited by later industrial bands, various reading lists began to circulate. Re/Search Publication’s volume on Industrial Culture thus appends to each interview with an individual band a long list of important texts and recommended readings. Throbbing Gristle’s entry contains over 150 book references, the titles of which include Post-Mortem Procedures; History of Magic, Witchcraft and Occultism; The Scourge of the Swastika; and Nuclear Survival Handbook (“Throbbing Gristle” 18-19). As Daniel, reflecting upon his own initiation to Throbbing Gristle, observes, “Industrial culture had to be sought out through deliberate research and slow archival accumulation, consumed on record and in print at a scholarly remove” (12).
     
    Of course, what Throbbing Gristle and Industrial Records presented as research would probably strike us today as informational trash: no more authentically “research” than the pornography of the 1970s and 1980s whose credits frequently announced the film’s scholarly relevance in an effort to avoid prosecution for obscenity. Indeed, information on serial killers and pictures of medical atrocities (such as the surgically mutilated penis on the cover of Surgical Penis Klinik’s Meat Processing Section, released on Industrial Records in 1980) are today easily accessible via the internet by anyone who is interested (and many who are not). Throbbing Gristle’s information-aesthetics thus imitated the style of social art, but replaced the progressive and often moralistic purpose of the latter’s socialist aesthetics with an anarchic commitment to non-purposiveness and Kantian disinterest. The socialist project of radical left-wing artists, who hoped by their art to remake the social world for the sake of the working class and poor, was transformed into an obsession with information—often disgusting or inscrutable, though nevertheless sometimes strangely beautiful—for its own sake. But just as COUM’s art for art’s sake was also for the sake of a virulent anti-institutionalism, Throbbing Gristle’s emphasis on information for information’s sake was in service to two specific politico-aesthetic principles.
     
    First, Throbbing Gristle sought via the valorization of research and information to affiliate and empower non-professionals who, by definition, lacked institutional accreditation as scholars. The band’s earlier efforts as COUM to liberate art from artists was thus transposed into the professional sphere of science and sociology; information was to be “liberated” from the experts who produced and managed it. As P-Orridge argued in a 1979 manifesto (usually) titled “Nothing Short ov a Total War”: “Thee power in this world rests with thee people who have access to thee most information and also control that information” [sic] (24). As the management of human beings (particularly by government) occurred through the manipulation of information, the key to individual power, P-Orridge concluded, lay in the reclamation by everyday people of the ability to direct and produce information. Throbbing Gristle’s “Control Agent” fans were thus those who had achieved individual agency by taking control over information’s form.
     
    Of course, P-Orrdige’s emphasis on the dangers of managed information may seem over-stated and paranoid to us today. Thanks to the internet, information of almost all types has become readily accessible to all (or at least all those with internet connections) in virtual form. And when particular information is not, its material incarnation is generally easy to locate thanks to online libraries, storefronts, and auction sites. Research, in fact, has become effectively de-institutionalized through the web; today’s budding researcher can pursue his or her project (whatever it might be) independently—with neither authorization nor assistance. (Of course, the availability of online resources assumes a complicated web of production in which multiple individuals participate; these individuals, however, need not interact formally or be institutionally affiliated.) But in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, information was more rigidly organized and demarcated—perhaps, thanks to new technology (which greatly increased both the quantity of recorded information and the possibility of illicit surveillance), even more rigidly so than at any time since the Enlightenment successfully challenged the censorship of religious authority. The Cold War created an atmosphere of secrets, where the open movement of information risked triggering nuclear annihilation. In such a climate, the spy, glamorized by 007, became for much of the early postwar period the ultimate fantasy profession—while the State, guarding its secrets even from itself (witness Nixon, but also serious CIA and MI5 scandals), bred an atmosphere of fear and paranoia. Censorship and obscenity laws were increasingly enforced as cheaper production costs lowered the barrier to publication.
     
    To do independent research at such a time was not easy, especially if the subject of that research was controversial or out of the mainstream. Such research—say, for example, into Nazi occultism or nuclear radiation—required a network of individuals with whom to exchange primary and secondary texts that were often rare and/or prohibitively expensive. It also required some alternative means of publication or information-exchange (as simple as the exchange of letters or as complicated as independent publishing) if the research were going to exist as anything but self-education. Information, as an object, was thus quite a different entity from information today, precisely because information in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s was still constituted by an object. And, as an object, it produced aesthetic communities—cultures or sub-cultures, depending upon the perceived value of the information—that revolved almost entirely around its circulation. Because information cannot exist as such without being potentially accessible (it must, that is, contain the capability to inform), different kinds of information in the post-war period became ontologically identified with the different communities that kept them circulating. Most of these communities were organized in the form of professional institutions, which served to limit access by carefully managing membership. But the aesthetic community that has come to be known as Industrial Culture tended to maintain an open network in which any person could participate by producing or exchanging information (as with the first generation of Punk, passive consumption seems to have been rare). Supported by Industrial Records (and later by other labels such as Tesco, World Serpent, and Cold Meat Industries), participants in Industrial Culture fashioned themselves into DIY experts, anarchic technocrats colonizing the extreme borders of science, sociology, and psychology.19
     
    Whereas liberating art from artists produces, in theory, the dissolution (or total expansion) of the concept of art, separating technocracy from professional technocrats does not produce a similar conceptual collapse with regard to technocracy. For even if technocratic science is wrenched from the hands of professionals and opened to all, Throbbing Gristle’s fundamental problem with technocracy—that it works to control people—remains unresolved. The name given to the band’s fans, “Control Agents,” thus conveys a disturbing double-sense: though meant to signify people who had taken control of the information stream that had previously manipulated them, it likewise suggests guerilla practitioners able to use information to control others. In other words, though lacking the institutional validation of the real thing, DIY technocracy still functioned and felt like the professional version it challenged. As P-Orridge advised listeners on Heathen Earth (1980), “You should always aim to be as skillful as the most professional of the government agencies.” Not surprisingly then, the area of research encouraged most by Throbbing Gristle was behavioral psychology—books such as Wilhelm Reich’s Mass Psychology of Fascism, J. Delgado’s Physical Control of the Mind, and J. P. Chaplin’s Rumor, Fear and the Madness of Crowds featured prominently in reference lists, their subjects translated into songs with names such as “Convincing People” and “Persuasion.” Such songs often exhibited a schizophrenic logic, reveling in the very acts of manipulation they seemed to decry. Daniel, for example, observes that though “Persuasion” “functions as an analysis of mechanisms of control, a critical unpacking of the personality that needs to control others…it also permits a pleasurable identification with that controlling position, a fantasy scenario in which the affective charge experienced through having power over others is gloated over, wallowed in and recirculated” (105). By identifying its critique of manipulation with manipulation itself, Throbbing Gristle substituted for social art’s hypocritical denouncement of false consciousness (a diagnosis that establishes the diagnostician’s freedom at the expense of the person or group diagnosed) the disturbing admission that the freedom to critique another’s lack of freedom creates and/or reifies the very lack it critiques.
     
    If one important effect of Throbbing Gristle’s information-aesthetic was the formation of a DIY research community whose existence challenged both the monopolization of research and the progressive use to which it was put by professional technocrats, the other was a clever recovery of the Vaneigem-inspired revolution of everyday life towards which COUM had originally been directed. Indeed, with Throbbing Gristle and Industrial Culture the very concept of the everyday was expanded, in a direction that seems to have left Cage behind by more fully embracing Vaneigem, to include events and experiences (murder, radiation, pollution, boredom, etc.) that are usually seen as waste products of industrial society and thus out of bounds to art’s distinction-granting gaze. As waste products, such objects resisted appropriation by both progressive causes (which usually cited them only as negative examples) and traditional notions of beauty, which generally associated beauty with morality (the latter often identified with the concept of nature or the natural).
     
    The anti-progressive aspect of Throbbing Gristle’s aesthetic was achieved, in a manner that resembles Gray’s representation of the Situationist City, primarily through the selection for representation of objects that cannot rationally be accounted for by any functioning utopia. Exemplary in this regard was the band’s handling of murder, which (especially in its early days) was a frequent topic of its music, writing, and performances. Songs like “Urge to Kill” and “Slug Bait” reported the activities of serial killers like Edmund Kemper and Charles Manson not as calls for moral outrage (and subsequent corrective action), but as aesthetic phenomena. Through such songs and reports in liner notes and Industrial News, the band endorsed the desire to commit murder as a legitimate form of radical human subjectivity and sought to encourage such subjectivity in its audience.20 Sometimes this encouragement even assumed the form of a direct imperative, as at the band’s 1977 “Rat Club” gig, during which P-Orridge wrapped up one song by repeatedly shouting at the audience, “All I want you to do is go out and kill” (Ford 7.11-7.12). Certainly the band did not actually hope to incite murder, but wished instead to open up modes of experiencing murder and the fantasy of committing it that are not wholly determined by the familiar problem-oriented discourses of sociology and psychology. In a June 1976 piece for Studio International titled “Annihilating Reality,” P-Orridge and Christopherson explained:

    Edeward Paisnel, known as the Beast of Jersey, was found guilty of thirteen charges of attacks on six people on Monday 13 December 1971. On 13 September 1440 Gilles de Rais was found guilty of 34 murders, though it is believed his victims numbered over 300. Rais, Prelati, Poitou made crosses, signs, and characters in a circle. Used coal, grease, torches, candles, a stone, a pet, incense. Words were chalked on a board. Could these rituals preceding child murders, in another context and properly photographed, become Beuysian performance?

    (45-46)

    Such musings would come back to haunt P-Orridge during his later investigations by Scotland Yard for producing, along with Derek Jarman and the members of Psychic TV, what looked like a snuff film, but “Annihilating Reality” does not actually advocate murder; rather it argues for the separation of the act’s formal qualities from its social effects and moral value.21 Instead of immorality, murder, the band argued, can be seen as an aesthetic event, as art. Furthermore, when the concept of art was thus expanded so as to include murder as a paradigmatic example, it shed the need to reflect what ought to be and contribute to that ought’s utopian realization.

     
    Though murder appeared frequently as an object of aesthetic contemplation in Throbbing Gristle’s work, a more common figure of anti-progressive desire for the band is that of thwarted biological reproduction. The mutilation of sex organs, abortion, rape involving murder, and (male) masturbation appeared frequently in its lyrics and imagery.22 A regular video backdrop for early Throbbing Gristle concerts, for instance, featured a highly realistic simulated castration. The image of wasted semen, however, received some of the most sustained attention.23 The cover for the “Something Came Over Me” side of Subhuman/Something Came Over Me (1980) featured a laboratory photograph of Christopherson’s semen suspended in water while the song’s lyrics celebrated the anti-social pleasures of male masturbation. A single line, “something came over me,” is repeated incessantly in a regular rhythmic pattern by P-Orridge, who occasionally substitutes for it additional lyrics (“Was it white and sticky?” “I think I kind of liked it,” and “Mommy didn’t like it”) that reveal the title’s sexual significance. The final refrain, “And I’m do-do-do-do-doing it again” communicates a triumphant dismissal of the mother’s censure, the extended staccato of the word “doing” signaling not only the speaker’s defiance of social expectation, but the excessive jouissance achieved by doing so. In its 1980 performance of the song at Oundle School, then an all-boy’s boarding school near Peterborough, the band further expanded the song’s significance by using a greatly extended version as the center-piece for its entire performance.24 For the audience of adolescent schoolboys, P-Orridge shifted to a didactic register, transforming the final lyric (repeated again and again for minutes) from committed avowal to militaristic imperative—”Do-do-do-do-do it anyway!”—thereby hijacking the educational discourse of the institution for non-productive and socially harmful instruction. Through such careful undermining of the progressive ideology governing the production and reception of art, Throbbing Gristle offered an art that deliberately countered the moral desires of socially conscious citizens.
     
    Of course, the vast majority of the band’s music and visual production was unconcerned with desire at all, moral or otherwise, and there was little of it that directly attacked specific moral values. Indeed, as described earlier, much of Throbbing Gristle’s work was concerned with what was generally perceived as informational trash. The band took functionless research and discredited or fringe science and, refusing to render it “art” by translating it into a fine arts language of visual pleasure, presented it as research. Because such research lacked functional value, however, it simultaneously served as a successfully realized expression of what could be called “pure information”—information, which through a process resembling détournement, had been removed from any particular function or purpose. As a material phenomenon, pure information maintains the form of science or purpose (it looks like data) but cannot be meaningfully identified with either a professional research institution or a particular project or purpose. It thus lacks a rational cause, but looks like it has one; and this odd conjunction—the appearance of purposiveness in general—is precisely (and not incidentally) the definition of beauty offered by Kant and the tradition of aesthetics to which he gave rise. Ultimately, Throbbing Gristle’s strongest weapon against the colonization of art by experts was thus to adopt the form of expertise while emptying it of reason. For data denied function can communicate to its receiver only as pure form: a discarded recording of computer sounds (“I.B.M.”) becomes music; a medical textbook illustration of a surgical procedure becomes a drawing. Furthermore, by creating its own non-professional research communities in which all could produce such research-cum-art, Throbbing Gristle likewise created a host of un-trained (even inadvertent) artists. Throbbing Gristle thus turned the form of social art against social art itself; the expertise of the social artist, secured by his superior progressive vision, was undone by divorcing expertise from reason both pure and practical (to use Kantian language) and thus opening it to all. If anyone could produce research without rational aim or direction and communicate that research, then anyone who did so was simultaneously producing art.
     
    Throbbing Gristle “ceased to exist” (to use the group’s own language) in 1981, but its influence was felt throughout the eighties and much of the nineties as a host of new bands and subcultural artists adopted the “mission” of Industrial Culture. Though the bands and labels started by the original four (Tutti and Carter’s Chris and Cosey, P-Orridge’s Psychick TV, and Christopherson’s Coil) still set much of the research agenda, new experimental groups such as Whitehouse, Current 93, Nurse with Wound, SPK, Test Dept, Cabaret Voltaire, Einsturzende Neubauten, Boyd Rice, and Der Blutharsch, introduced their own aesthetic tweaks and produced their own “scholarly literature.”25 By the 1990s, Industrial Culture had even had limited mainstream success as bands like Skinny Puppy, Ministry, and Nine Inch Nails translated Throbbing Gristle’s “musical” style into more familiar song structures (most featuring recognizable choruses and stable electronic rhythms).
     
    Despite Industrial Culture’s longevity, however, information technology and the social reality undergirding the subculture has changed so significantly as to render unviable the subculture’s aesthetic. The personal computer and the internet have created a new kind of de-hierarchized social sphere, very different from that of “everyday” Britain during the post-war period, in which communities could function outside the bounds and without the remit of law, social mores, and professional institutions; indeed, the internet seems even to have freed communities from the limitations of geographic space. On the face of it such open access to the exchange of information might appear to be the realization, on a global scale, of the kind of DIY research/aesthetic community on which Industrial Culture was based. In practice, however, the mode of community enabled by computers and the internet privileges postmodern—or, as Alan Kirby has called them, “digimodern”—communication practices and social values that are incompatible with the essentially modernist values of Industrial Culture and the Situationist aesthetics it inherited.26
     
    Although, as Mitchell Waldrop has recounted in his authoritative history of personal computing, both the computer and the internet were originally designed to aid scientists and researchers in the processing of scientific data, even before the launch of the early internet (as ARPANET), they were already serving an important secondary function: personal communication—or what most communication scholars call Computer-Mediated Communication (CMC). In CMC, multiple computers, connected via the internet, enable through special software new forms of communication platforms (the newsgroup, the email, the instant message) that privilege direct or low-latency communication between distinct individuals. Though there has been a continuous debate over the value of the communities produced through CMC, both its proponents and its detractors typically support their judgments by comparing these computer-mediated communities to traditional, communitarian notions of inter-subjective belonging derived from Romantic or anti-modern notions of what a community is.27
     
    The model of community put forth by Throbbing Gristle, by contrast, rejected communitarian values (which the band viewed as both overly conservative and excessively utopian) in favor of those stemming from aesthetics and radical subjectivity. In place of personal communication, Industrial Culture privileged the exchange of useless information: of non-purposive texts (informational trash), citations, and prompts for research. Such exchange, though occasionally also leading to the formation of personal relationships premised upon intimacy or inter-subjective familiarity, was directed primarily towards the enabling of aesthetic experiences and DIY (a practical ideology whose name itself is at odds with traditional notions of community) activities that are fundamentally individual or mono-subjective in orientation. Whereas Industrial Culture was premised from the start upon a Modernist notion of the text—non-responsive, impersonal, self-sufficient (or endogenic) with respect to meaning—CMC substitutes for the thick mediation of the text the transparent mediation of software (offering direct, often immediate exchange). On the newsgroup rec.music.industrial, started in 1991 and still operative today, one finds virtually no aesthetic texts (and few links or citations to such texts), but rather personal exchanges about favorite and least favorite music, requests to meet up at concerts, advice on which CD to purchase, and a small degree of personal name-calling and invective (“flames”). Though by some criteria this may very well constitute informational trash, it offers little potential for “art as anything” détournement nor the radical aesthetic experience such détournement seeks.
     
    The development of CMC alone, however, was not responsible for the finished viability of the kind of détournement practiced by Throbbing Gristle and Industrial Culture; the rise of new media (beginning in the early 1990s) brought with it a change in the ontology of media itself that robbed détournement, in virtually all its modes, of critical power. Lev Manovich explains this change in terms of variability:

    Old media involved a human creator who manually assembled textual, visual, and/or audio elements into a particular composition or sequence. This sequence was stored in some material, its order determined once and for all. Numerous copies could be run off from the master, and, in perfect correspondence with the logic of an industrial society, they were all identical. New media, in contrast, is characterized by variability. (Other terms that are often used…are mutable and liquid.) Instead of identical copies, a new media object typically gives rise to many different versions.

    (36)

    Lacking an ideal (in the Platonic sense) or proper form, the new media object is too mutable, too unfinished and open to change to serve as a fitting target of détournement. As strings of 0’s and 1’s meant to be decoded by software (in contrast to the hardware needed to access old media such as film or vinyl), new media objects lack the very qualities previously taken to constitute an object. They have content, but no essential form—and lacking such form, they lend themselves more to use than to study or beholding. Indeed, the eminent usability of the new media object has given rise in recent years to the dual ideologies of Web 2.0 and “prosumption,” each advocated by technophiles, media journalists, and marketing gurus.28

     
    In the face of such an object, which not only allows itself to be changed/mis-used but seems to positively invite it, what is a twenty-first-century Situationist to do? Détournement in the style of Debord—meant through the collage of plagiarized texts to short-circuit the spectacle in order to raise the spectator’s critical consciousness—loses its critical purchase in a world of re-mixed and mashed-up content. But so too does the détournement of Vaneigem, which aims to revitalize the revolutionary potential of the everyday through what he sometimes called the pre-analytic “consciousness of immediate experience” (195). No longer is it possible to restore an object’s lost aesthetic surplus by reframing it as pure information, for the ontology of the object within a cultural sphere dominated by new media is no longer objectivity in the traditional sense at all, but rather customization, personalization, and mis-use.
     
    Because of the twin problems of CMC and new media ontology, Industrial Culture deliberately resisted adapting to the internet. Throughout the 1990s, few of the bands and artists associated with the subculture had any web presence at all, while today the key living practitioners make little use of it other than for advertising and sales.29 Unusual for contemporary pop musicians, many of these sales revolve around limited edition, physical objects (usually vinyl, but sometimes CDs) in handcrafted packaging or bundled with special art objects. While it would be easy to criticize such a practice as a conventional form of commodity fetishism, it might be better seen as a form of object fetishism—that is, an insistence, under the dominance of new media, on classical objectivity, textual closure, and aesthetic disinterest. Those industrial musicians who have adopted digital production techniques have done so in ways that seek to undermine or challenge the ideology of free-form variance and mutability, most often by relying upon alchemical or magical working methods (which emphasize continuance and development rather than dissonance, plagiarism, and customization).
     

    From the Art of Everyday Life and Death to the Aesthetics of Neoliberalism(s)

     
    What, ultimately, were the political valences of Throbbing Gristle’s aesthetic productions and the subculture that formed around them? Politically speaking, their commitment to what we can call (paradoxically) a technocratic libertarianism maps poorly onto traditional schemas of political affiliation. As P-Orridge (writing as David Brooks) told Sounds in 1978: “It is very important that TG be allowed to point out that they have absolutely no political stance of any kind. Throbbing Gristle are apolitical…. Long live the Industrialists!” (qtd. in Ford 8.15). Though such an apoliticism can to some degree be read as anarchic resistance to the post-war political order, the silliness of the concluding exclamation indicates Throbbing Gristle’s distance from the usual forms of (leftwing) anarchism, which see the State and the warring political groups to which it gives rise as one of the central problems of the modern political order.
     
    Because Industrial Culture (like the tail end of the first wave of Punk) was at its peak during the period of Conservative rule under Margaret Thatcher, the ugliness of Throbbing Gristle’s art has (again, as with Punk) sometimes been interpreted as leftwing resistance to modern capitalism and the Conservative Party under Thatcher.30 As my discussion of the group’s relationship to social art should suggest, however, its commitment to dystopian models of social (dis)organization actually locates it closer to Thatcher than her opposition during the late 1970s (recall that the group “ceased to exist” after 1981). As “Sleazy” explains in an interview with Daniels:

    [A]t that time I think that the Labour government was seen as the bad guy. They had been the cause of many of the social problems that we had railed against…. So when the conservatives first got into power, nobody really knew who they were aside from the fact that it was a change from the supposed darkness of the past. All the negative things that we ascribe to the Conservative or Republican viewpoint now were unknown to us at the time.

    (78)

    Of course, there are significant ideological differences between Thatcher’s Conservatism and Throbbing Gristle’s libertarianism, but given the social and economic climate of the time, the similarities—particularly their simultaneous suspicion of and attraction to the very idea of government itself—are striking. Indeed, Thatcher’s various efforts to encourage individual self-reliance and private financial markets through the withdrawal of both state support and bureaucratic tinkering resembles in its liberalizing strategies the efforts of COUM/Throbbing Gristle to empower individual non-professionals as artists, researchers, and anarchic technocrats. Both goals squarely opposed the left’s efforts to produce a coherently organized society built upon community and equality through the empowerment of the working class.

     
    For this reason—and for Throbbing Gristle and Industrial Culture’s wry hostility to socialist political ideals such as community, fraternity, and equality—it is tempting to position Throbbing Gristle as a kind of neoliberal vanguard, a libertarian aesthetic project contributing, however minutely (and perhaps even unwittingly), to the disintegration of the postwar social order and the rise of an atomized, individual-oriented political sphere dominated by economic imperatives. Viewed through such a lens, Industrial Culture would bear a strong similarity to Punk, which—though repeatedly hailed by scholars as anti-capitalist and radically (if insufficiently) socialist—shares many aesthetic principles with Industrial Culture: an anti-technocratic or DIY approach to aesthetic production; a celebration of the ugly, violent, and ruined aspects of postwar social life; and a rampant—indeed, uncontrollable (witness Malcolm McLaren and Sid Vicious)—individualism.
     
    Throbbing Gristle’s relationship to Situationist theory, however, suggests problems with this assessment. The first revolves around the difficult and perhaps paradoxical nature of aesthetics as a politics, which we find in Vaneigem’s work—although in a deliberately proto-theoretical mode of discourse. Vaneigem prescribes a politics in the form of aesthetic practice, which through its détournement of the everyday is designed to produce revolution at the level of individual subjectivity. “The work of art of the future will be the construction of a passionate life,” he insists, in one of many similar-sounding formulations (202). This prescription may at first also appear a blueprint for neoliberalism; indeed, aesthetics itself (and with it the Kantian idea of the beautiful) has since the 1980s come to been seen as essentially individualist in orientation, the judgments of taste that underpin it functioning as little more than psycho-social expressions of class difference. This is unfortunate, in that the aesthetic, as first theorized by Kant, is posited as precisely that mechanism that enables human beings to link their individual subjectivity (via sensations or aesthesis) to the universality of a shared social order. As Kant states, “in the judgment of taste nothing is postulated except…a universal voice with regard to satisfaction without the mediation of concepts, hence the possibility of an aesthetic judgment that could at the same time be considered valid for everyone” (101). From a Kantian perspective, the aesthetic judgment directed at everyday life would thus function to lay the ground for a community not based on shared interests, values, or antagonisms, but rather that of sense itself—what Jacques Rancière sometimes calls a communis sensus. This communis sensus is a kind of community persisting through (and indeed because of) separation; it posits a mode of togetherness founded in disinterested, sensual autonomy. As Rancière explains, “aesthetic autonomy is not that autonomy of artistic ‘making’ celebrated by modernism. It is the autonomy of a form of sensory experience. And it is that experience which appears as the germ of a new humanity, of a new form of individual and collective life” (Aesthetics 32). As Rancière notes elsewhere, the aesthetic mode of experience produces for the individual a radical dis-identification with his own social situatedness; and it is precisely this dis-identification (in Vaneigem, immediate experience) that allows one to create new identities, forms of consciousness, and relationships with others (Rancière, Emancipated 73). Ultimately, this is the form of experience that Throbbing Gristle aimed at, and through this experience a communis sensus, which, in contrast to the more traditionally political utopias proposed in the postwar period, would not require co-presence, cooperation, or even direct communication in order to create belonging.
     
    The second reason we might reject the attribution of neoliberalism to Throbbing Gristle stems from a problem with the concept of neoliberalism itself. Humanities and social science scholars use this word to signal a politico-economic order, dominant in Britain and the US since the 1980s, wherein the order of politics has been completely (or almost completely) reduced to that of economics, all in the name of individual freedom and competitive markets. Neoliberalism thus represents an end to community, to distributive notions of justice, to universal ideals; in exchange, it offers what David Harvey has called, “the financialization of everything” (33). For these reasons, it serves as the bête noir of contemporary scholarship, where it is universally attacked or lamented, sometimes even as an “evil” or a “terror.”31 Despite its prevalence within scholarly debate, however, the concept of neoliberalism has managed largely to escape the kind of critical complication that surrounds other key scholarly concepts. Taylor C. Boas and Jordan Gans-Morse, after conducting a survey of the term’s appearance in scholarly articles on development and political economy between 2002 and 2005 (admittedly a far-cry from humanities scholarship, but the comparison is still instructive), find that the term is rarely subject to definition, though surprisingly monosemous in usage:

    Despite its prevalence, scholars’ use of the term neoliberalism presents a puzzle. Neoliberalism shares many attributes with ‘essentially contested’ concepts such as democracy, whose multidimensional nature, strong normative connotations, and openness to modification over time tend to generate substantial debate over their meaning and proper application. In stark contrast to such concepts, the meaning of neoliberalism has attracted little scholarly attention.

    (138)

    Instead of neoliberalisms scholars must thus currently make do with neoliberalism, and with it a surprisingly—and, I believe, unhelpfully—monologic vision of a dominant order unmarked by serious internal difference, contradiction, or conflict at the level of logic.

     
    Throbbing Gristle and the illumination its aesthetic practice offers with respect to the contradictions of Situationist thought, however, point the way to a richer notion of neoliberalism as a concept. For it is clear that what is neoliberal about Throbbing Gristle and Industrial Culture—their individualism, their substitution of aesthetics for traditional politics, and their hostility toward collective social projects—had been inherited from Situationist thought, which, via Vaneigem, celebrated the very same values as a corollary to the revolution of everyday life. This revolution, albeit rooted in individual psychology, nevertheless sought something larger—a reconceptualization of what individuality and community are and can be, a communis sensus in which aesthesis is enough to produce belonging. If it contributed to the ultimate dominance of a neoliberal order, it did so, paradoxically, out of ignorance—for certainly, the content of our contemporary social order is not what Vaneigem imagined—but also deliberateness, in that the form of our social order is as close a realization to what Vaneigem wanted as the West has yet known. By drawing a line from Situationist thought (itself subject to internal contradictions and multiple potentialities), through Industrial Culture, to the concept of neoliberalism, my intent is not to paint the Situationists or Throbbing Gristle as evil, but rather to suggest a deeper, more complicated, and internally conflicted conceptual mapping of neoliberalism. Industrial Culture and its approach to Situationist thought offer us a better understanding of the revolutionary hopes and desires that helped supplant social democracy with neoliberalism, as well as the radical possibility that somewhere hidden within the workings of neoliberalism itself may lie a path to these hopes and desires’ eventual fulfillment.
     

    Gregory Steirer is a scholar specializing in media studies, aesthetics, and digital culture. From 2011-2012, he served as a researcher for the Connected Viewing Initiative project at the Carsey-Wolf Center at UC Santa Barbara. He has taught television, audio culture, film, and literature at the University of Pennsylvania, the New York Film Academy, and UC Santa Barbara. He has published articles on performance theory and comics studies and has work forthcoming in the anthology Connected Viewing: Selling, Sharing, and Streaming Media in a Digital Age (Routledge). He also manages the blog Cultural Production.
     

    Footnotes

     
    1. Chtcheglov’s original piece was published in abridged form under the pseudonym Gilles Ivain in the first issue of the Internationale Situationniste (1958). Because Gray took great liberties with the translations, formatting, and illustrations (some contributed by British artist Jamie Reid), his anthology has been dismissed by most scholarly authorities as a poor translation. Ken Knabb, whose Situationist International Anthology is consistently preferred by academics for scholarly citations, singles out Gray’s work in the 1981 Preface to his own anthology as being “particularly bad,” full of “chummy paraphrases [that] obscure the precise sense of the original” (ix). Because of this dismissal, I treat Gray in this introduction more as an author than a translator. This is in keeping with how he was perceived by the mid-70s British counterculture itself, who associated Gray’s name more with Situationist thought than the names of the original participants—save, of course, for Guy Debord and Raoul Vaneigem.
     

    2. For the best examples of Greenberg’s approach to aesthetics, see Greenberg, “Abstract, Representational, and So Forth”; Greenberg, “The New Sculpture”; and Greenberg, “Modernist Painting.”
     

    3. Though there appears to have been no direct interaction between Ballard and the members of Throbbing Gristle, during the 1980s they were often perceived (and presented) as part of the same cultural and/or aesthetic movement. Re/Search Publications, a publisher specializing in subculture and outsider or fringe work, published works by both of them (as well as work by William Burroughs) as part of the same series.
     

    4. A history of the reception and development of Situationist thought in England can be found in Robertson.
     

    5. For a comprehensive history of COUM, see Ford.
     

    6. For surveys of political and press response to the show see Ford 6.22-6.24 and Walker, Art and Outrage 88-92. Ford uses an idiosyncratic page numbering schema for Wreckers of Civilization, in which each chapter begins a new numbering sequence. My citations thus indicate the chapter number and page number.
     

    7. Mulholland ascribes to COUM too much influence when he argues that “COUM, in effect, helped to justify and popularize the right-wing attack on the Arts Council which took place throughout 1976, and may have been a contributing factor in creating the legitimization crises that ensured a Conservative election victory in 1979” (63). But certainly COUM did help change public opinion regarding the value and efficacy of the Arts Council and was in large part responsible for its withering under Thatcher.
     

    8. The young P-Orrdige’s first album, Early Worm, quotes Cage in its liner notes and features such instruments as “prepared tapes,” “feedback,” and “waste paper bin.” Though never formally published in the 1960s, the album was re-issued in a limited edition as Genesis Breyer P-Orridge and Thee Early Worm by Dais Records in 2008. For more information on this album, see Ford 1.8; P-Orridge, “Biography”; and “Genesis P-Orridge and Thee Early Worm.” For the best published account of COUM’s approach to performance art and the importance to P-Orridge of Cage’s Silence, see Ford, especially Chapters 1 and 2.
     

    9. Not a single scholarly publication that presents itself as Art History mentions Throbbing Gristle (despite the latter’s greater longevity and cultural influence) except as a postscript to COUM.
     

    10. For an account of the APG, see Bishop 163-177. Somewhere in between social art and the APG was the occasionally successful effort by artists to market themselves individually to towns (especially new town corporations) as “town artists.” David Harding, who worked in such a capacity for Glenrothes from 1968 to the late 70s, defined his job in terms of three roles: “The artist as planner”; “The artist working with architects and designers,” thereby “influencing the space between buildings”; and “The artist as community artist,” “creat[ing] opportunities with the town for people to express themselves and create their own environment” (Braden 41-2).
     

    11. Willats recounts in detail one of his 1970s “behavioural art” projects (and includes reproductions of the many forms and surveys it involved) in Willats, Art and Social Function. A survey of his broader career can be found in Willats, Stephen Willats: Between Buildings and People.
     

    12. Despite Romanticism’s seeming incompatibility with government technocracy, a Romantic approach to artistic production dictated much of the British government’s arts education policy in the 1960s and 70s, the most important of which was the creation of the Diploma of Art and Design (or Dip AD) under what is generally referred to as the First Coldstream Report. For full details of the Dip AD and its differences from the degree it replaced (the National Diploma in Design or NDD), see National Advisory on Art Education. An abridged version of the report can be found in Ashwin 95-101. Although the Report enshrined Romantic conceptions of the artist into state policy (for instance, the waiving of entry requirements for applicants “tempermentally allergic to conventional education”), these same conceptions fueled student opposition to the Dip AD (National Advisory 3, par 8). For a concise account of the most famous case of art school resistance, see Tickner.
     

    13. See, for examples, “Throbbing Gristle” 9-11 and Reynolds 130.
     

    14. For an early account of Industrial Records’ publishing activity, including some discussion of their work with Brion Gysin and William Burroughs, see “Throbbing Gristle Biography” 65.
     

    15. The published version was heavily edited, but Savage developed this reading further in England’s Dreaming (Savage 422). Genesis P-Orridge offers a similar interpretation in “Throbbing Gristle” 11. For an example of such a reading by fans, see Scaruffi.
     

    16. As Abraham Moles puts it, “A noise is a signal the sender does not want to transmit” (79).
     

    17. Or, in the case of tracks like “I.B.M.” (from D.o.A.), a “found-recording” supposedly discovered on a discarded magnetic tape in a dumpster outside a computer corporation, with questions about basic production and intention: How were these sounds made, why were they made, and why were they discarded?
     

    18. Pages from Industrial News, no. 2 (1979) have been reproduced in Ford 9.20-9.23.
     

    19. Discussing the significance of the name “Industrial Records” in the liner notes to The Industrial Records Story [1984], P-Orridge (writing under the pen name Terry Gold) explained, “Records meant files and research documents, a library” (qtd. in Ford 7.17).
     

    20. Some later industrial bands, such as Whitehouse (named after either a pornographic magazine, the seat of the United States government, or censorship crusader Mary Whitehouse), developed this interest in murder so that it served as the primary focus of their music.
     

    21. The realistic images of mutilation and death used by the band were primarily the work of Christopherson, who trained as a professional wound simulator—a job intended to help prepare novice emergency and military medics for work in the field. In 1977, Christopherson was also employed to use this training to decorate the storefront windows of Malcolm McLaren’s Sex shop with what resembled the remains of a young man killed in an electrical fire. See Savage 324-325.
     

    22. Although Cosi Fanni Tutti was a leading member of Throbbing Gristle and her sexuality had been a major focus of COUM’s performance art, Throbbing Gristle generally ignored female sexuality except as it is related to reproduction. Later industrial bands tended to maintain this approach, in the process creating a creative environment hostile to women (who, not surprisingly, figure rarely as artists/writers/performers within industrial culture until the latter’s adoption of pagan ideologies in the early 1990s). Important and influential exceptions include the work of Nurse with Wound and Current 93 (especially the latter’s In Menstrual Night [1986]), though both bands were led by men.
     

    23. The obsession with semen carried over into numerous post-Throbbing Gristle industrial culture projects. P-Orridge’s next band, Psychic TV, frequently explored the magical functions of semen; Coil (which included Christopherson) released t-shirts promising “The industrial use of semen will revolutionize the human race”; and Coil adherents Anarcocks sold specially designed vials of their own semen over the internet.
     

    24. The unlikely venue was secured via a series of misrepresentations and lies regarding the band’s sound (P-Orridge presented them as a cross between Pink Floyd and Tangerine Dream). The students, however, loved it (they seem the most enraptured of any of the band’s live audiences captured on video). Concert footage is available on Throbbing Gristle, TGV.
     

    25. Cabaret Voltaire actually began making music before Throbbing Gristle, but their music was not regularly associated with Industrial Culture until after Throbbing Gristle had disbanded. For more information see Fish.
     

    26. On digimodernism, see Kirby.
     

    27. An overview of the debate can be found in Baym. For representative examples of each side, see Rheingold and Lockard.
     

    28. For a brief account of these ideologies, see Han.
     

    29. This lack of use should not be ascribed to any form of Luddism or technophobia, as many of Industrial Culture’s leading artists were at the vanguard of analogue technology (particularly via sampling) and early digital sound processing.
     

    30. See, for example, Walker, Left Shift 110.
     

    31. Note, for example, the titles of Mike Davis and Daniel Bertrand Monk’s Evil Paradises: Dreamworlds of Neoliberalism and Henry A. Giroux’s Against the Terror of Neoliberalism: Politics Beyond the Age of Greed.
     

    Works Cited

     

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    • ———. “The New Sculpture.” Art and Culture. Boston: Beacon, 1961.139-145. Print.
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    • P-Orridge, Genesis and Peter Christopherson. “Annihilating Reality.” Studio International 192.982 (1976): 44-48. Print.
    • Rancière, Jacques. Aesthetics and Its Discontents. Trans. Steven Corcoran. Malden: Polity, 2009. Print.
    • ———. The Emancipated Spectator. Trans. Gregory Elliott. London: Verso, 2009. Print.
    • Reynolds, Simon. Rip It Up and Start Again: Postpunk 1978-1984. New York: Penguin, 2006. Print.
    • Rheingold, Howard. The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier. Revised ed. Cambridge: MIT P, 2000. Print.
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    • ———. Left Shift. London: I. B. Tauris, 2002. Print.
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    • ———. Stephen Willats: Between Buildings and People. London: Academy Group, 1996. Print.
  • Cage’s Mesostics and Saussure’s Paragrams as Love Letters

    Sean Braune (bio)
    York University
    sbraune@yorku.ca

     
    Abstract
     
    John Cage’s poetry is often analyzed in relation to conceptual writing and constraint, making Cage seem particularly absent. This essay argues that the conceptual writing found in “62 Mesostics re Merce Cunningham” is not devoid of emotion. Quite the contrary, the mesostics become the equivalent of a love letter. By employing Saussure’s paragram studies, Foucault’s theory of heterotopias, and chaos theory, the essay shows that there is something in language that renders it as either a constrained vehicle of love (in the Cagean mesostic), or as a nonlinear system that features disequilibria and chance emergences of meaning (in the Saussurean paragram).
     
    John Cage’s “62 Mesostics re Merce Cunningham” fashions text in relation to the chosen “spine-word,” or name, which is, in this case, either “Merce” or “Cunningham.” A “mesostic” is a form invented by Cage that writes through another text using the constraint of a spine-word or name. In mesostics, the spine-word or name moves down the middle of the poem, whereas an acrostic is left-justified. A “paragram” is a term invented by Saussure that denotes an embedded name or theme-word that proliferates within a text. The paragram shares features with a mesostic; however, the paragram is hidden whereas mesostics are typically announced. The paragram proliferates in a text, according to Saussure, in relation to its phonic features that simultaneously saturate the text while at the same time structurally organizing it. Much as Saussure originally defines langue in relation to space, Cage’s practice of naming exists within a space: “For Saussure these words exist at the same time, that is, synchronically, in a purely relational structure, a topological space Saussure called langue” (Saldanha 2085). This essay suggests that the mesostics emerge from a protosemantic field of language via Cage’s chance operations while simultaneously manifesting as a paragram (as an encoded name within language). I will also claim that the mesostics exist within a poetic or syntactic space that signifies the love shared between Cage and Cunningham, who “were lovers, life partners from 1942 until Cage’s death” (Weaver 19). “Love” is a fraught term that may seem rather non-academic; however, Cage’s poetry is often analyzed in relation to conceptual writing and constraint, making Cage seem particularly absent. I claim that the conceptual writing found in the Merce Cunningham mesostics is not devoid of emotion; quite the contrary, the mesostics become the equivalent of a love letter.
     
    This created space of love (in both the mesostics and the paragrams) is heterotopic. A heterotopia defines a space as “other,” typically bridging definitive borders and creating a new space from already existent ones. The term is primarily geographical, but Foucault first defines “heterotopia” in The Order of Things in relation to language and naming:

    Heterotopias are disturbing, probably because they secretly undermine language, because they make it impossible to name this and that, because they shatter or tangle common names, because they destroy ‘syntax’ in advance, and not only the syntax with which we construct sentences but also that less apparent syntax which causes words and things (next to and also opposite one another) to ‘hold together’.

    (xviii)

    This essay emphasizes the definition of a heterotopia as a linguistic space that can “undermine language” and “tangle common names” by destroying syntax. Such a linguistic definition will be used throughout this essay in relation to Cage and Saussure. Peter Johnson avers that “‘heterotopia’, derived from the Greek heteros, ‘another,’ and topos, ‘place,’ is used within a broad typology to distinguish these emplacements from ‘utopia’,” and that “[h]eterotopias draw us out of ourselves in peculiar ways; they display and inaugurate a difference and challenge the space in which we may feel at home” (77, 84). It is difficult not to be tempted by a pun and claim that Cage’s writing also exists in a homotopia (to bring his craft into relation with his sexuality); however, whereas hetero means “other” and homo “same,” I think that this perceived binary of hetero/homo is under the sway of feedback whereby neither signifier holds dominance in the binary.1 Wendy Pearson points out that “the adoption of the prefix ‘homo-‘ with its connotations of invariance, conformity and even normalcy flies in the face of a cultural logic of sex which precisely defines ‘homosexuality’ by its difference” (85). Situating Cage’s art in relation to his sexuality and the heterotopia does not have to be purely biographical. Instead, I find Foucault’s use of the prefix hetero telling in that he uses a prefix that is connoted with hegemonic sexuality (and its attendant institutions of power) to create an “other space” (a topos) that allows and/or welcomes alternative configurations of identity. Both heterotopia and homotopia suggest a space or geography that exists apart from a dominant norm: “homotopia as an at least potential and decidedly illegitimate queer utopia approaches closer and closer to the concept of heterotopia, and vice versa” (Pearson 93). Heterotopias and homotopias are “unthinkable spaces that reveal the limits of our language” (Johnson 85), allowing us to consider Cage’s writing as a welcoming topology of a future heterotopia which embraces syntactic breakdown. Cage defers authorship in favor of chance operations (a point that will be made clear in reference to the Saussurean paragram), opening into an alternative linguistic space where the hegemony of language (as syntax) is undermined by love. The Cunningham mesostics therefore take on the form of a love letter where Cage’s definition of love is one of parataxis and asyntactic play.

     
    Cage claims, in conversation with Richard Kostelanetz, that “when people love one another, they don’t speak so much; or if they speak, they don’t make sense. They tend to make nonsense, when they love one another” (137, my emphasis). Despite the fact that love is typically something felt—an emotion or feeling about someone else – it is better thought of as something spoken. Love is given form in syntactic and linguistic statements that when delivered have the same power as performative utterances. Saying “I love you” to someone is a linguistic event requiring agency; however, love is also, as Cage asserts, almost dissimilar from nonsense. Recent research in neuroscience supports Cage’s claim: endocrine studies have shown that love is a little bit like being on drugs – oxytocin, vasopressin, and serotonin levels, as well as the dopamine reward center in the brain, are each affected when people are in love (De Boer 115-117). De Boer et. al. claim that “early stages of romantic love show similarities to OCD, including symptoms of anxiety, stress, and obtrusive thinking. It is therefore attractive to think of early love as a mild serotonin-depletion-related form of obsessive behavior” (117). Love makes people irrational and a little obsessive, suggesting that love is an experience closely related to avant-garde textual experimentation and nonsense (assuming that love is syntactically announced). If the experience of love is a little like being delusional, then it follows that the syntactic and linguistic experience of love must also be irrational: the mesostics embrace the visual depiction of the sort of nonsense that one sees in Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet when, at the famous play’s end, both lovers, in a fit of frenzied passion, commit suicide because their all-consuming love means they cannot live without each other.
     
    Unlike the mesostics written for Marcel Duchamp or James Joyce (which are all quite readable from a traditional literary critical approach), the Merce Cunningham mesostics challenge readerly temptations toward meaning. Cage’s choice to render the Cunningham mesostics in the form of asyntactic nonsense indicates the veiling of a private sphere or space of love between Cage and Cunningham: a private poetic communication between both, an homage to a devoted lover. Andy Weaver reads the mesostics through the lens of Lyotard’s theory of the differend and Cage’s closeted silence regarding his homosexuality: “Filled with nonce words, lacking punctuation and normative syntax, these silent poems … act as closets-in-view” (26). I agree with Weaver when he asserts: “I believe that ’62 Mesostics’ openly enacts Cage’s love for Cunningham” (30), but I would further insist that the mesostics not only enact a love, but rather encode a love within a particular textual practice that, through the heterogeneous dispersal of letters organized through a strict conceptual rule, erases the binary of homosexual or heterosexual in favor of the experience of love itself.
     
    Weaver further claims that “the homosexual differend removes the problem of Cage’s silence. Since he can speak his homosexuality in the impossible idioms, Cage is not a victim. By escaping victimization, Cage undercuts the viability of the standard idioms, those idioms that do not allow homosexuality to be spoken” (34). However, why would Cage need to announce his sexual persuasion from the mountaintops in order to be understood? Why is Cage’s silence about his sexuality still a speaking? Jonathan Katz argues that “[i]n silence, there was instead a wholeness, a process of healing” (52), and Weaver suggests that Cage’s “homosexual silence provides him agency and strength” (25). Unlike both Katz and Weaver, I do not feel that Cage was obligated to announce his sexuality to anyone. Katz’s emphasis on silence’s providing Cage with wholeness and healing is problematic because it implies that homosexuality leads to splitting and illness. On similar assumptions, homosexuality was, until 1975, considered a diagnosable mental illness (Weaver 23). Obviously, Katz would never intend such a reading of his argument because his assertion depends upon a specific historical moment: in the 1950s and 1960s the outing of one’s homosexuality was an invitation to sociocultural, medical, and religious persecution.2 However, my essay is less interested than both Katz and Weaver in Cage’s sexuality per se: if Cage had written the mesostics for a girl, a billboard, a lawn chair, or a parakeet, I would be as interested in the paratactic and asyntactic use of the mesostic as a tool for the formal encoding of names. That being said, I do not want to summarily ignore Cage’s sexuality; instead, I would point out that the Cunningham mesostics, while not blatant or obvious expressions of a homosexual love story, are, nonetheless, still written for a male lover and should be considered politically prescient and culturally important to queer studies. The mesostics therefore simultaneously operate as both love letters and also as closets-in-view that defiantly announce Cage and Cunningham’s queerness against the hegemonic norms of 1960s America. I support Weaver’s claim that “Cage not only calls into question the nature of expression (‘What is it to write?’ or ‘How does one express love?’), he also asks something much more provocative: ‘What is love?’” (34). This question “what is love?” is primarily linguistic and any answer must also take place within the topological space of langue. The linguistic space within which this love letter can be written is heterotopic—a space signified by the nonsense made when two people love one another.
     

    Mesostics and Paragrams: From Saussure to Cage and Back Again

     
    At first glance the paragram and the mesostic are essentially opposites: Saussure finds names/words hidden in texts, while Cage uses a name as a foundation to order a poem/text. I will argue against the obvious differences between them and claim that the mesostic and the paragram are flip sides of the same linguistic coin, so to speak, i.e., both indicate an uncanny agency within language and textuality.
     
    Saussure’s interest in the paragram was a lifelong obsession with finding coded names and words hidden in Vedic hymns, Saturnian prose, and Latin verse. Both Cage and Saussure are concerned with what I call a nominative function: the act of naming. First, to clarify terms:
     
    Saussure wrote 139 notebooks in which he uses several terms for the same idea: anagram, logogram, hypogram, and paragram. Each of these terms reflects various emphases on coded names and words: whether they are para (beside other words), hypo (underneath), logo (formed out of dispersed letters), or ana (the word written anew), each term used by Saussure implies a coded name within a verse line (Gronas 160). I will privilege paragram above the others because Steve McCaffery chooses paragram in his study on the protosemantic in Prior to Meaning: The Protosemantic and Poetics.
     
    The downfall of Saussure’s paragram research is his search for authorial intention: he requires validation that the words and names are knowingly encoded by poets. He even goes so far as to write Giovanni Pascoli to confirm that the poet has encoded the names that Saussure has found (Gronas 162-163). When Pascoli does not respond to his query, Saussure abandons his research. Despite Saussure’s retreat, authorial intention draws the mesostic and the paragram together: Saussure discovers names in texts but wants to know that these names have been intentionally encoded by the authors/poets. Cage accomplishes this, intentionally encoding a selected name within a text. Furthermore, the paragram harnesses the protosemantic elements of language (language’s randomness as a chaotic structure). These forces are then used by Cage to form the mesostics via love and desire. The chance operation that permits the writing of a mesostic renders the mesostics an effect of protosemantic chaos momentarily ordered around a selected name.
     
    The paragram indicates an underlying law within a closed system of language: initial conditions (say the constraint of a 26-letter alphabet) allow for a near-infinite array of combinations and permutations. I would suggest that the initial conditions give way to repeating patterns in relation to an underlying sociocultural and mythographic impulse: “Pertaining as paragrams do to hidden, nonlinear relations within texts, their disposition commits all writing to the status of a partly self-organizing system; they are thus unquestionably not only major agents of linguistic instability and change but also advance a protosemantic challenge” (McCaffery xvi). McCaffery is referencing the nonlinear dynamics and chaos theory of Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers. This analogy can be extended to include one of the other founding fathers of chaos theory, Edward Lorenz, who famously defines a dynamical system as one system featuring “sensitive dependence on initial conditions” (8-9). In the model (or system) of the paragram, the initial condition is the choice of a name. Cage is aware of the aesthetic potential of initial conditions. In his musical theory, Cage sketches out the possibilities offered by three tones in his “Lecture on Nothing”:

    The other day a pupil said, after trying to compose a melody using only three tones, “I felt limited .”

    Had she con-cerned herself with the three tones – her materials – she would not have felt limited.

    (Silence 114)

    Cage understands that rather than promoting a constrained form of minimalism, the use of three tones in the production of a piece of music is akin to a potential maximalism that opens into the chaotic possibility of artistic production. In the example of the paragram, the selected name defines the parameters of a dynamical process within language. The use of procedural constraints allows Cage to negate authorial intention and create a work that is an accidental conglomeration or assemblage of text for which the author functions as bricoleur or catalyzer. However, the mesostics do not fully negate authorship. Rather, the initial selection of the name falls under the purview of Cage the poet. In the instance of the mesostics, the authorial function becomes a nominative function.

     
    The important question to ask about the Saussurean paragram (in relation to Lorenzian initial conditions) is the question of intentionality: were the names that Saussure was finding intrinsic to the compositional process, thus indicating an uncanny nominative function at work within language? Or were the names chance occurrences that contained no internal intentionality (which would still align with the analogy of language as a chaotic system)? I would suggest for the purposes of this essay that it does not matter whether the paragrams were intentional encodings or chance patterns because either option allows that language and semiotic processes are combinatory systems prone to patterns that emerge from chaotic potential.

    On the other hand, what is fascinating about Saussure’s research is the implication of an encoded identity, of a dynamic opposite to the one McCaffery privileges when he writes, “the paragram does not derive necessarily from an intentionality and is an inevitable consequence of Western writing’s alphabetic combinatory nature” (197). Saussure’s original intent with the paragram is one of causality, intentionality, and ontology (literally a Being in language that is placed there according to a sort of intelligent design), but McCaffery repositions the paragram as a concept related to chaos and chance. Saussure is looking for God in language: “Two-thirds of the some ninety names which Saussure finds anagrammatized in the exercises thus far published are those of gods or heroes. They are, then, relatively ‘pure’ names, names liberated from material contingencies, names with universal social power” (Kinser 1119). The “purity” of the name implies the mythological slippage of narrative within a text. Saussure describes his own project in the following way:

    One understands the superstitious idea which suggested that, in order for a prayer to be effective, it was necessary for the very syllables of the divine name to be indissolubly mixed in it: the god was, in a manner of speaking, rivetted [sic] to the text.

    (qtd. in Kinser 1120)

    Saussure’s structuralism can be seen in his preference for intentional design when he, almost like a paranoiac, searches through poetries for clues to this encoding. Instead of seeing chance, as Cage no doubt would have, Saussure sees pattern and intent: “Not only all actual literary texts, but also our very notion of literature might then be at once engendered and circumscribed by a triumphant, though largely unrecognized, ‘archi-anagramme’” (Shepheard 523). The archi-anagramme would be a deistic name, Saussure’s paranoia seems to suggest. This paranoia is geared towards the spoken, towards a conflict between parole and langue, the same conflict that Derrida later implodes with différance, a conflict that encodes either a spoken or written prayer. Saussure is interested in the prayer that echoes underneath the spoken or written word, the prayer that defers to a deity or an arche, a source of signification, sublimity, or religiosity.

     
    Sylvère Lotringer suggests that in this prayer, “the phoné recovers its center, its preferred place, for in every name there is a certain coefficient of presence, a certain guarantee of identity” (5). Lotringer points out that it is the phoné or the spoken over the written that Saussure invokes because the Swiss linguist often finds his encoded names in syllabic diphones and triphones where only the sound conveys the encoded word. The presence (or presumed presence) of the gramme in the paragram is only discovered performatively through parole. Saussure thinks of the paragram as an “especially powerful organizing principle” in language itself (Shepheard 523). I claim that Saussure considers the paragram a law of language that provides an underlying structure or foundation, somewhat akin to the Newtonian laws of physics that structure the natural world.

    Samuel Kinser finds ideological analyses in Saussure’s notebooks (but Kinser denies the same level of chance that McCaffery implies), where the paragram (or anagram) is used as a mnemonic device intended for the memorization of deistic names or phrases: “[a]nagrams repeat names, in order to induce memorization of names,” and “[r]itualization is remembering” (Kinser 1132, 1128). Lotringer maintains that, “[t]he Saussurian anagram constitutes, in other words, the imaginary dimension of all writing” (8). If Lotringer is correct (and his argument is similar to Kinser’s in this regard) then the imaginary dimension of writing tends towards nomination (the giving of a name) either intentionally (as Saussure would have believed) or by chance (as McCaffery implies or, as I would argue, Cage would have as well). Whether this nominative impulse is driven towards mnemonics, prayer, or homage makes little difference because the end effect is one of naming, of signing the name of the other (or another) in the form of a God, a hero, or a lover in a poetic verse or text that acts like an incantation of a memory, an homage, an ideological record, and a love letter.
     

    Mesostics as Paragrammic Emergences

     
    The unpublished Saussure notebooks have been excerpted and compiled by Jean Starobinski in Words upon Words. The theme word of the anagram becomes the spine of the mesostic. As Saussure himself writes: “[the] theme, chosen either by the poet or by the person who is paying for the inscription, is composed of only a few words, either entirely of proper names or of one or two words added to the inherent function of proper names” (Starobinski 11-12). It is not always the proper name that counts; instead, it is the nominative function associated with a name or taking its place. Saussure’s theory of the anagram (or paragram) suggests that: “To write lines incorporating an anagram is necessarily to write lines based on that anagram, and dominated by it” (17). In the case of the Cunningham mesostics, the poems are dominated by the name of Merce Cunningham. Cunningham is then the hero, the god, or the figure of homage in the mesostic. However, as will be shown, I would like to trouble this assumption by pointing out that Merce’s name is very often difficult to decipher. The varied spacing, size, and font-type of the Letraset3 choices encode and hide the spine-word or name in the presentation of the mesostic. For this reason, despite what Saussure may contend (by believing that the name or spine-word dominates the poem), Merce’s name does not dominate the mesostics, but rather exists tenuously and contingently within the experimental structure of the mesostics’ presentation on the page.
     
    McCaffery argues that the paragram can be considered a dynamical structure that maps a space: “Paragrammic programs necessarily manufacture bifurcation points within semantic economies, engendering meanings but at the same time turning unitary meaning against itself” (197). A bifurcation point4 (a term borrowed from chaos theory) is a point in which a once-unified trajectory splits into two different trajectories. A bifurcation point implies a space or, at the very least, a dynamical model or map. Dynamical modeling5 (or the graph of a system that becomes chaotic over a period of time) creates shapes within the model (such as the famous butterfly-shaped Lorenz attractor or the Mandelbrot set) in the same manner as the mesostics create the “shape” of Merce Cunningham.6 Let us consider the first of the 62 mesostics that use Cunningham as the spine (I have included Cage’s original along with a transcribed version in order to clarify the different shapes, sizes and fonts):
     
    Fig. 1. If you are a Project MUSE subscriber click for view of image.
     

    denCe
    sicdUctor
    oNce
    iN
    premIse
    oN
    Gy
    sHort
    steAd
    Mucon

    (M 4)

    The mesostic is a writing-through of the books in Merce’s library, including Merce’s own book on choreography, and the mesostic evokes the shape of Merce the dancer. Cage speaks about his compositional process:

    The poem would then have a spine and resemble Cunningham himself, the dancer. Though this is not the case (these mesostics more resemble waterfalls or ideograms), this is how they came to be made. I used over seven hundred different type faces and sizes available in Letraset and, of course, subjected them to I Ching chance operations. No line has more than one word or syllable. Both syllables and words were obtained from Merce Cunningham’s Changes: Notes on Choreography and from thirty-two other books most used by Cunningham in relation to his work.

    (M n.p.)

    The mesostics are so subject to chance operation and Cagean constraint that the shape of the mesostic appears to mimic the shape of the paragrammic word: Merce Cunningham is physically depicted as in a portrait, sculpture, or etching. The words, taken from books in his library and re-permuted into asyntactic signifiers, take on the form of a private and personal homage that indicates a state of reverence and love.7 The movement (or dynamism) of the mesostic implies the dance of Cunningham, a point more strongly evinced by the second mesostic using Cunningham as the spine:

     
    Fig. 2. If you are a Project MUSE subscriber click for view of image.
     

    danCe
    lUs
    eeN
    (aNthe
    whIch
    calnitioN
    Girl
    rlencHr
    cepAteygrel)
    Mi

    (6)

    Here the word “dance” contains the lettristic echo of the nonce-word “dence” and relates to Cunningham’s artistic talent. The various shapes and spacings of the letters make transcription difficult: for example, “calnition” looks, at first glance, to be “caution.” The “lni” appears to be a “U” because the dot of the “I” melds into the cross of the “T.” In the nonce-word “rlenchr,” the “L” is barely noticeable because it rests on top of the “E.” Why the variety of fonts, sizes and placements? Weaver points out that the physical layout of the poems feature letters that are “often phallic-shaped ‘I’s and ‘l’s” (31). This may be part of it, but why not write the mesostics in the same form as the Joyce8 or Duchamp9 mesostics? These other mesostics are more readable (even the Joyce ones which use words from Finnegans Wake) because there is more text surrounding the spine-word and the Letraset varieties of letters, fonts, and spacings are normalized to highlight the selected name. The Cunningham mesostics are frequently one-word lines. Cage points out that “language controls our thinking; and if we change our language, it is conceivable that our thinking would change” (qtd. in Kostelanetz 149). Cage’s mesostics can potentially change the way “our” thinking – or thinking as a normative model – is structured, making hegemonic thought more capacious and open to lived differences (semiotic, linguistic, sociocultural, gendered, etc.). The mesostics are coded – i.e. the name is occluded in the wide variety of letter sizes and font choices – in order to maintain the privacy of the relationship (to keep the love between Cage and Cunningham strategically hidden from view). Kinser reminds us that, regarding the Saussurean anagram, “the name thus hidden is the center of the passage, the meaning toward which it moves” (1115); in the same way, the non-meaning of the Cunningham mesostics moves towards the relationship between Cunningham and Cage. The first line from “Writing through the Cantos” is written in much the same manner as Saussure’s discovered paragrams (where the mesostic does not appear as a spine but as a horizontal encoding): “and thEn with bronZe lance heads beaRing yet Arms sheeP slain Of plUto stroNg praiseD (X 109). This example from Cage can be contrasted with one of the examples from Saussure’s notebooks where Saussure finds the name of Agamemnon in the following line from the Odyssey. Odysseus tells King Alcinous about the shade of Agamemnon in Hades: “Áasen argaléon anémon amégartos autmé” (qtd. in Kinser 1113). Without raising the question of intention again—the question of how Saussure knows that Agamemnon was the intended head-word—I would like to point out that this essay is interested in definitively known instances of nomination, which is why I focus on Cage’s mesostics. However, if this question is put aside—and, as Kinser points out, the diphones suggest that this Homeric example rules out the alternative names of “Alcinous,” “Odysseus,” and “Poseidon” (1114) – then I think a contrast should be drawn between the Homeric example and the Cage example from “Writing through the Cantos.” Cage’s choice to imbed Ezra Pound within a series of mesostics is certainly a form of homage to the great modernist craftsman; however, I would instead like to claim that the Cunningham mesostics are written in a similar vein as, say, Petrarch’s self-identified (by capitalization) anagram/paragram to Laura:

    When I move my sighs to call you and the name that Love wrote on my heart, the sound of its first sweet accents is heard without its LAU-ds.
     
    Your RE-gal state, which I meet next, redoubles my strength for the high enterprise; but “TA-lk no more!” cries the ending, “for to do her honor is a burden for other shoulders than yours.”

    (qtd. in Gronas 190)10

    Laureta is the diminutive of Laura and the love poem is an homage to Petrarch’s love for her and also a nomination of the object of his love. This Petrarchan example is an antecedent that more closely resembles Cage’s mesostics to Merce (in the form of a love poem). Cage explodes the syntax and hegemony of the heteronormative love poem by using asyntactic words to create a heterotopic/homotopic space for the expression of his love. As Cage himself notes: “I think we need to attack that question of syntax” (qtd. in Kostelanetz 149). Foucault claims that heterotopias “shatter or tangle common names, because they destroy ‘syntax’” (xviii); however, the coordinates of the homo-heterotopic space can be designated by a proper name. At least in the case of Cage, the nominative function is what destroys syntax in the Cunningham mesostics. Cage’s definition of love as signified through nonsense allows the mesostics to make a sort of intuitive and sublime sense as love poem and homage. Even though Kinser points out that “names enclose and control rather than stray from the path of discourse” (1107), Cage’s nominative function strays because Cunningham’s name is very difficult to decipher when looking at the mesostics. The name is obscured in the variety of capitalizations and spacings, thus fulfilling Foucault’s definition of heterotopia in that the name is tangled within the other nonce-words. The other nonce-words that have successfully destroyed syntax. Even though Cage claims that his mesostics can be understood in “the way you understand ‘No Parking’” (Kostelanetz 149), I would instead suggest that the Cunningham mesostics employ a far more complicated dynamic and, even though Cage would want them to seem as simple as “No Parking,” they encode a strong love written within a paragrammic heterotopia.

     
    How does one understand “No Parking”? On the one hand, it is quite literally a sign; perhaps “No Parking” is one of the examples par excellence of semiotics. “No Parking” is a sign on a sign and it contains text that with or without context (i.e., driving on a street or approaching a parking spot) or interpretant requires very little analysis to comprehend. “No Parking” is a directive speech act that implicitly signals a punishment if a driver does not obey the sign’s command (in this case, “No Parking” becomes contingently related to legal discourse, whereby a fine can be issued). Cage’s point is that the directive and its placement within a larger discourse is understood almost immediately. The immediacy of the meaning of “No Parking” can be compared to the immediacy with which one understands the mesostics. However, this is obviously not the case because the mesostics are written with nonce-words and resist linguistic meaning. I would therefore suggest that “No Parking” should be considered a visual composition and not only a textual one. “No Parking” is a sign that drivers hardly need to read to understand: the shape of the sign and the words are familiar because the sign is already neurocognitively primed in a driver’s memory. The mesostics should not, in this sense, be read, but rather, they should be seen or experienced. Despite the procedural techniques Cage uses, the mesostics deny meaning and point to a metaphysic of language. Much as Saussure believes that something uncanny functions structurally within language to order texts and discourses with names, Cage’s mesostics point to a meaning that is protosemantic and beyond language, but still significant. There is still, because of the procedure, some ineffable aspect of Merce Cunningham captured in the mesostics through Cage’s use of Merce’s own library and book on choreography, suggesting that the mesostics cannot be limited to the textual level (because they resist reading) and should also be understood at a protosemantic and visual level.
     
    Mesostic 2, the second mesostic using Cunningham as the spine, ends with the nonce-word “Mi,” a word that echoes the first mesostic using Merce as the spine (Mesostic 3):
     
    Fig. 3.  If you are a Project MUSE subscriber click for view of image.
     

    Mir
    thE
    pRe
    Crown
    wE

    (9)

    I do not want to imply a progression between any of the mesostics. However, I am interested in phonemic, graphematic, and lettristic echoes in the mesostics. Many of the chance occurrences found in the mesostics indicate an uncanny aspect to the randomized ordering of language: such randomness is protosemantic and paragrammic. For example, many words appear in various forms—I would argue that these words appear as themes to the whole piece—”dance” can be found as “dence” (4), “dance” (6), “danc” (62), “dance” (108), “dances” (97), “dancer” and “danc” (130), “dance” (191), and Mesostic 44 ends with the words: “dance / men” (155). Body parts repeatedly appear throughout the mesostics, supporting Cage’s assertion that the mesostics evoke Cunningham the dancer: “legs” (39), “hands” (130), “heads, / arm” (203), and “knees” (193); the movements of dance recur in the words “jump” (62) and “movement” (112) (“movement” reappears in Mesostic 4 [11]). Mesostic 55 self-referentially describes the ways in which the mesostics were composed by highlighting the word “chance” (191) in the top line. The “Mi” (6) from Mesostic 2 sonically suggests “Me” (or a place of singularity) that ends with the word “We” in Mesostic 3. Is the “we” Cage and Cunningham? Paragrammic uncertainty organizes the mesostics via chance, affording the emergence of a particular configuration of letters. Mesostic 28 seems self-referentially aware of the protosemantic and uncanny conglomeration of the chance experiment:

     
    Fig. 4. If you are a Project MUSE subscriber click for view of image.
     

    danCe.
    thoUgh,
    ruN
    oN
    nIr
    Num
    rhiGuage
    Huge
    hAs
    lanzoMe

    (108)

    Despite claims to a mesostic’s randomness (assuming it is constructed according to a chance operation), I would like to highlight the last four lines of Mesostic 28: “rhiGuage / Huge / hAs / lanzoMe.” If the prefixes of the nonce-words “rhiguage” and “lanzome” are exchanged then the lines read: “language / huge / has / rhizome.” Ignoring authorial intention—and ignoring whether or not Cage ever read Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus—I would like to point out that a rhizomatic model of language welcomes a paragrammic reading because a rhizome is a chaotic system11 that promotes chance occurrences and semiotic emergences. Cage’s chance experiment almost desires meaning whereby a rhizome of language peers out from a randomly ordered mesostic that coins “rhiguage” and “lanzome.” Furthermore, I would argue that the nonce-words “rhiguage” and “lanzome” simultaneously signify “language” and “rhizome” alongside their more meaningless iterations, thereby contextualizing the mesostic itself as a paragram of chance and an evocation of Cunningham: a rhizome is circular, spiraling, and involuted much like a dance.

     
    This essay has argued that the Merce Cunningham mesostics signify as a love letter between two lovers that highlights the protosemantic and paragrammic aspects of language and textuality. Following Weaver’s assertion that Cage “removes the presuppositions surrounding love and leaves the mesostics with only the bare elements of love” (34), I claim, after Weaver, that this love is paratactic, experimental, textual and based on paragrammic chance. Even though I focused on some of the more formal features of the Cagean mesostic, love cannot be ignored when discussing the mesostics written for Merce Cunningham. However, this chance (of love and language), when it coheres into a linguistic rhizome, is understood immediately as both a textual and visual sign that the viewer apprehends as quickly as a sign that reads “No Parking.” Both “No Parking” and the mesostics for Merce Cunningham become aesthetic signs that are comprehended as totalities. Despite the fact that the mesostics are paratactic and fractured, with letters dispersed at random around the spine-word or name, the paragrammic aspects of the mesostics become an invisible self-organizing force, an uncanny energy operating within language as a chance operation (much as Saussure imagines) that makes the aesthetic totality of the mesostics cohere into their finished products. A rhizome of language manifests as both territorialization (radicle or root) and as totality or territory (rhizome) in the same way that the mesostics cohere into a final rhizomatic totality (a “No Parking” sign) that contains within it paragrammic roots, permitting the emergence of the overall mesostic.
     
    Much like the nonce-words that Cage conjures from I Ching chance operations (a process of composition in which he asks the I Ching which page in a book he should focus on, and then which word on that page, based on coin flips), love itself is a chance operation that often emerges randomly from events, societies, environments, and geographies. Cage recognizes the asemic, nonlinear and aperiodic signification of love, its inability to be easily reified, predicted, or categorized, and the singular poetry created by two lovers who “tend to make nonsense, when they love one another” (qtd. in Kostelanetz 137).

    Sean Braune is a Ph.D. student at York University and holds a Masters from the University of Toronto. His poetry has appeared in ditch, The Puritan, Rampike, and Poetry is Dead. He wrote the play Leer that was performed at Ryerson University in April 2010 and directed the short film An Encounter (2005), which won the award for excellence in cinematography at the Toronto Youth Shorts Film Festival ’09. He has published in Studies in Canadian Literature, Canadian Literature, and Journal of Modern Literature.

    Footnotes

     
    1. See Pearson 93 for more on the difficulty of differentiating the terms “heterotopia” and “homotopia.”

     

     
    2. Consider, for example, the 1967 ruling by Justice Tom Clark of the United States Supreme Court who claimed that “all homosexuals [are] psychopaths” (qtd. in Weaver 23).

     

     
    3. Letraset is a now outdated method where letters can be rubbed onto a piece of paper. The technique is known as “dry transfer” and happens when the poet places the desired letter overtop the paper and rubs that letter off the transparency and onto the sheet. The Letraset sheets originally came with a wide variety of letters and fonts.

     

     
    4. Put in the simplest terms, a bifurcation point is a moment in a dynamical system where a split occurs, as in how tree branches grow: one branch bifurcates and becomes two, and so on.

     

     
    5. A dynamical model is a computer-generated graph of a system that features chaotic behavior. An example would be modeling the movement of a pinball through a pinball machine.

     

     
    6. Cage himself makes this point: “The poem would then have a spine and resemble Cunningham himself, the dancer” (M n.p.).

     

     
    7. This aligns Cage’s mesostics with the anagrams to Aphrodite or Hercules that Saussure uncovers.

     

     
    8. Such as this one:

     

    Jiccup
    The fAther
    My shining
    thE
    Soft

    (X 1)

    Judges
    Or helviticus
    sternelY
    watsCh
    futurE of his

    (X 1)
     
    9. Such as this one:

     

    reMove god
    from the world of ideAs.
    Remove government,
    politiCs from
    sociEty. keep sex, humour,
    utiLities. Let private property go.

    (M 30)

    the sounDs
    of the bUgle
    were out of my Control,
    tHough without
    my hAving
    Made the effort
    They wouldn’t have been Produced.

    (M 30)
     
    10. The original Petrarch reads: “Quando io movo i sospiri a chiamar voi, / e ‘l nome che nel cor mi scrisse Amore, / LAUdando s’incomincia udir di fore / il suon de’ primi dolci accenti suoi;. // Vostro stato REal, che ‘ncontro poi, / raddoppia a l’alta impresa il mio valore; / ma TAci, grida il fin, ché farle onore / è d’altri omeri soma che da’ tuoi” (qtd. in Gronas 190, trans. by Robert Durling).

     

     
    11. See Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus for references to the rhizome as a chaotic system (6, 70, 312, 337).

     

    • Cage, John. M: Writings ’67-’72. New England: Wesleyan UP, 1972. Print.
    • ———. Silence: Lectures and Writings by John Cage. Connecticut: Wesleyan UP, 1973. Print.
    • ———. X: Writings ’79-’82. New England: Wesleyan UP, 1983. Print.
    • De Boer, A., E.M. Van Buel, and G.J. Ter Horst. “Love is More Than Just a Kiss: A Neurobiological Perspective on Love and Affection.” Neuroscience 201 (2012): 114-124. Print.
    • Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Trans. Brian Massumi. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2005. Print.
    • Foucault, Michel. The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. Trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith. New York: Vintage, 1994. Print.
    • Gronas, Mikhail. “Just What Word Did Mandel’shtam Forget? A Mnemopoetic Solution to the Problem of Saussure’s Anagrams.” Poetics Today 30.2 (2009): 155-205. Print.
    • Johnson, Peter. “Unravelling Foucault’s ‘different spaces’.” History of the Human Sciences 19.4 (2006): 75-90. Print.
    • Katz, Jonathan D. “John Cage’s Queer Silence; or, How to Avoid Making Matters Worse.” Writings Through John Cage’s Music, Poetry, and Art. Ed. David W. Bernstein and Christopher Hatch. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2001. Print.
    • Kinser, Samuel. “Saussure’s Anagrams: Ideological Work” MLN 94.5 (1979): 1105-1138. Print.
    • Kostelanetz, Richard. Conversing with Cage. New York: Limelight, 1988. Print.
    • Lorenz, Edward N. The Essence of Chaos. Seattle: U of Washington P, 1995. Print.
    • Lotringer, Sylvère. “The Game of the Name.” Diacritics 3.2 (1973): 2-9. Print.
    • McCaffery, Steve. Prior to Meaning: The Protosemantic and Poetics. Illinois: Northwestern UP, 2001. Print.
    • Pearson, Wendy. “Homotopia? Or What’s Behind a Prefix?” Extrapolation 44.1 (2003): 83-96. Print.
    • Saldanha, Arun. “Heterotopia and structuralism.” Environment and Planning A 40.9 (2008): 2080-2096. Print.
    • Shepheard, David. “Saussure’s Vedic Anagrams.” The Modern Language Review 77.3 (1982): 513-523. Print.
    • Starobinski, Jean. Words upon Words: The Anagrams of Ferdinand de Saussure. Trans. Olivia Emmet. New Haven: Yale UP, 1979. Print.
    • Weaver, Andy. “Writing through Merce: John Cage’s Silence, Differends, and Avant-Garde Idioms.” Mosaic 45.2 (2012): 19-37. Print.
    • Yeats, W.B. W.B. Yeats: Poems selected by Seamus Heaney. London: Faber and Faber, 2000. Print.
  • From Stenotype to Tintype: C.D. Wright’s Technologies of “Type”

    Jennie Berner (bio)
    University of Illinois, Chicago
    jennieberner@hotmail.com

    Abstract

     C.D. Wright’s engagement with documentary technology—stenography in Deepstep Come Shining and tintype photography in One Big Self—reveals a contradictory impulse in her poetry: to document individualized data while abstracting this data into “type.” Wright uses this contradiction to underline the incommensurability of two literary discourses in Deepstep Come Shining (documentary and lyrical), and of two political ones in One Big Self (neoliberal and materialist). Against the mischaracterization of Deepstep Come Shining as a hybrid documentary-lyrical text, this essay argues that it embodies a renewed commitment to medium specificity; and against the mischaracterization of One Big Self as a testament to the liberating power of self-expression, it argues that the poem shifts attention away from prisoners’ identities and toward material forms of subjugation.
     
    C.D. Wright’s book-length poem, Deepstep Come Shining (1998), includes several facsimiles of long, thin strips of old stenotype paper produced by Wright’s mother, who was a court reporter in Arkansas. On one level, these facsimiles underline what many critics have called the “documentary” mode of the poem, whose stenographic impulse is demonstrated by its recording of the voices and texts that Wright encountered along a road trip through the American South.1 On another level, however, the facsimiles underline a seemingly contradictory impulse of abstracting and obscuring these same voices and texts. The facsimiles are, after all, effectively illegible; we see the wrinkles and folds that mar the letters, the smudged and bleeding ink, but not the courtroom proceedings they once were meant to relate. While certainly not illegible, the voices and texts composing the poem Deepstep Come Shining undergo a similar materialization, insofar as they are persistently fragmented, flattened, and reframed. This materialization discloses, in turn, a remarkably personal, even lyrical dimension of the poem: just as the stenotype facsimiles’ irregularities evidence the hand of Wright’s mother, so too the poem’s idiosyncrasies evidence the hand of Wright herself.
     
    In this way, Deepstep Come Shining stages the convergence of two modes of discourse – documentary and lyric – that have often been deemed incompatible due to the former’s commitment to objectivity versus the latter’s commitment to subjectivity. This convergence has been a hallmark of Wright’s poetry for decades, and has located her in a tradition of poets who have undertaken similar documentary projects (William Carlos Williams in Paterson, Muriel Rukeyser in U.S. 1, and Theresa Cha in Dictee, to name a few). But unlike many documentary poems that have negotiated these two modes of discourse by disturbing the line between objectivity and subjectivity – by insisting that documents are never neutral and, conversely, that the lyric subject is always shaped by material culture – Deepstep Come Shining emphasizes and in fact exploits their incommensurability. To see Wright’s idiosyncratic hand at work in the poem is, after all, to be blind at the same time to the Southern landscapes she has so rigorously documented, just as to see those landscapes is to be blind to her idiosyncrasy. The poem, that is to say, operates according to a unique poetics of vision that allows Wright to embrace documentary and lyric without sacrificing the specificity of either mode.
     
    This poetics of vision emerges again in One Big Self: Prisoners of Louisiana (2003), a photo book of Louisiana prisoners that Wright produced in collaboration with the photographer Deborah Luster. This time, however, Wright’s formal benchmark is the tintype, an early photographic medium most often associated with portraiture, and what’s ultimately at stake is not so much the integrity of the lyric subject as the integrity of all the “selves” she investigates. Like Luster’s tintype-style photographs, Wright’s text simultaneously documents the identities and aspirations of individual prisoners and obscures them in order to reveal powerful abstractions of the prison-industrial complex. Wright’s engagements with these two documentary technologies, the stenotype and the tintype, reveal her ongoing interest in the transformation of highly particularized data into “type.” But whereas the stenotype serves as a figure for Deepstep Come Shining‘s attention to printed “type” and to the people who write or key it, the tintype serves as a figure for One Big Self‘s attention to sociological (and especially criminal) “types” and the institutions that administer them.
     
    From this standpoint, it is not surprising that many critics have described One Big Self as a more explicitly ethical or political project than Deepstep Come Shining.2 To be sure, One Big Self draws on Deepstep Come Shining‘s poetics of vision to confront a corresponding politics of vision. This politics, however, is more complex – and indeed more contentious – than most of Wright’s critics presume. In response to the prevailing claim that One Big Self offers, above all, a compassionate portrayal of prisoners’ individuality, I argue that it is precisely by obscuring and abstracting individuality that Wright achieves her political project. No matter what identities the prisoners of One Big Self perform for the viewer, they are forever subsumed, the poem suggests, by the brute reality of their incarceration. Indeed, if Deepstep Come Shining realizes the incommensurability of two modes of literary discourse (documentary and lyric), One Big Self harnesses this realization to underscore the incommensurability of two modes of political discourse: one that aims to register (and, more importantly, respect) individual interests and identities, and another that aims to evaluate and improve material conditions that exist regardless of individual interests and identities. Although Wright does not endorse one of these political discourses over the other, to her credit her project diverges from – and redresses – the standard postmodern project insofar as it divorces each discourse from the other, strategically shifting our attention away from the contents of people’s unique identities and towards various material (economic, juridical, and carceral) forms of subjugation and inequality.
     

    Deepstep Come Shining’s Poetics of Vision

     
    I should acknowledge at the outset that my emphasis on the stenotype in Deepstep Come Shining may seem disproportionate by some measures. The facsimiles punctuate the poem a mere four times over the course of one-hundred-plus pages and may look mainly decorative at first glance. Critics have largely ignored them, concentrating instead on the poem’s more obvious preoccupation with vision. Without a doubt, Wright reflects on a variety of visual media in the poem (painting, photography, film, etc.), and directly cites texts like Newton’s Opticks and Fry’s Vision and Design.3 I do not mean to downplay the importance of this preoccupation by highlighting the stenotype. On the contrary, I begin my discussion of Deepstep Come Shining with the poem’s treatment of vision not only to ground the subsequent discussion of the stenotype in its broader context, but moreover to argue that the stenotype can sharpen our understanding of the poem’s visual concerns.
     
    Deepstep Come Shining repeatedly conceives of objects that are acutely visible, even luminous. Many objects figured in the poem emanate light: “magnolialight,” “leglight,” “lotuslight,” “cornlight,” “onionlight,” “alligatorlight,” “Formicalight.” These compounds suggest that light is inextricably tied to particular objects. While the poem acknowledges the contrary scientific claim – “It is not that we live in a world of colored objects but that surfaces reflect a certain portion of the light hitting them” (79) – it almost exclusively represents an optics of embodiment, not reflection. The many references to chlorophyll and photosynthesis, for instance, as well as to the tapeta lucida that makes some animals’ eyes shine in the dark, clearly indicate a fascination with the synthesis of light and matter. This synthesis becomes even more pronounced in the many instances of synesthesia throughout Deepstep Come Shining. One passage, for instance, describes a woman who “laid her hand on the deeply furrowed bark, groping for the area of darkest color” (67). Another quotes King Lear‘s Gloucester: “I see it feelingly” (1).
     
    This fascination with embodied light recalls Roland Barthes’s famous meditation on photography, Camera Lucida, and in particular the section titled “The Luminous Rays, Color.”4 According to Barthes, “the photograph is literally an emanation of the referent” (80). Through the photograph, the referent transmits “radiations” to the spectator (80). In this way, he says, “a sort of umbilical cord links the body of the photographed thing to my gaze: light, though impalpable, is here a carnal medium, a skin I share with anyone who has been photographed” (81). It may come as no surprise, then, that Deepstep Come Shining treats photography as a technology of vision par excellence.5 Some lines go so far as to connect human vision with photography by way of a manufactured chemical, silver nitrate, which is not only applied “in the newborn’s eyes” (57) to prevent infection that might lead to blindness, but also used “in manufacturing photographic film” (73).
     
    In fact, Wright treats photography as not only an exemplary technology of vision, but moreover as an exemplary poetics of vision. Photography, that is to say, emerges as a remarkable kind of “writing of the light” to which the poem aspires (3). This analogy, of course, is largely figurative: poems do not actually capture or radiate light. As Barthes explains, the peculiar ontology of the photograph makes it capable of transmitting the referent’s radiations in a way that a text (or, more specifically, a poem) cannot. The “photographic referent,” after all, is “not the optionally real thing to which an image or a sign refers but the necessarily real thing which has been placed before the lens, without which there would be no photograph” (76). The photograph confirms that its referent existed in a particular place at a particular time. It is a “certificate of presence” (87). The light it gives off, in turn, physically corresponds to the light its referent gave off at the moment the photograph was taken. In this way, a photograph maintains an essentially indexical relationship with the thing it is of.6
     
    This conception of vision as indexical comes at a cost, however: it threatens to reduce the eye to “a mere mechanical instrument” and “image-catching device,” as Deepstep Come Shining puts it (78, 73).7 Yet photography’s indexicality – however unattainable for poetry – is precisely what seems to appeal to Wright as a horizon for Deepstep Come Shining. The poem’s title can be read, in fact, as a reduplication of indices. “Deepstep Come Shining,” the poet repeats, encouraging Deepstep – which not only refers to a town in Georgia, but also evokes another kind of index, the footprint – to impress her with its light. Indeed, although Wright cannot achieve formally what she figures (i.e., a poem comprised of luminous objects that have autonomously imprinted themselves on her eyes and, in turn, on the page), a corresponding formal project does emerge as long as we broaden our purview to include other varieties of indexicality. The poem emerges specifically as an index of language, if not light.
     
    This formal project is announced, in part, by Wright’s inclusion of the stenotype facsimiles mentioned earlier. Stenotype is a kind of shorthand machine most often used by court reporters that allows the operator to type spoken dialogue quickly, theoretically in real time. It is designed as a recording device, not a compositional tool, and as the term “operator” suggests, the individual who uses the stenotype is considered to be a part of its machinery. In short, the operator is no writer. In this light, the stenotype serves as a fitting emblem for indexicality in writing and thus plays a crucial rather than merely decorative role in the poem. The stenotype, that is to say, formalizes for the poem what photography can only figure.8
     
    In keeping with this stenographic model, Deepstep Come Shining comprises actual voices, texts, and other media Wright encountered on a Southern road trip (many of which are listed at the end of the poem, under the heading “Stimulants, Poultices, Goads“). Some voices evoke the locale. For instance, the expression, “All around in here it used to be so pretty” (8) and the adjective “yonder” (7) hail from the South, as does the old grammar joke: “Where do you folks live at. Between the a and the t” (23, 47). At least one voice in the poem speaks in Spanish. Still others suggest a particular speaker’s occupation: the waiter’s “Are you still working on that drink” (84, 87) or the DJ’s “Don’t touch that dial” (43, 58, 96, 97). The poem even records lyrics from artists, like Bob Dylan, whom one might hear on the car radio. Advertisements for events such as fiddle contests and products like Gold Bond Medicated Powder populate the poem, as do posted rules like “no-shoe-no-shirt-no-service” (79). Other signs adopt a more intimate register: “Note on the fridge: Vanilla yogurt inside. See you in the morning, girls” (10). Citations from academic or scientific texts underline the more conceptual work that has influenced the poem.
     
    From this standpoint, Deepstep Come Shining belongs to a long tradition of documentary poems that appropriate different voices, texts, and other media in order to challenge the narrow identification of poetry with subjective lyric expression. Wright’s determination to create a poetic record of a particular region, for instance, aligns her with poets like William Carlos Williams – whose Paterson (1946-1963) draws from historical letters, advertisements, and geological data to capture the local history of Paterson, New Jersey – and Hilton Obenzinger, whose New York on Fire (1989) draws from newspapers, interviews, and history books to recount the many fires that have ravaged New York City since 1613. Wright’s geographic paradigm, the road trip, has its precedent in Muriel Rukeyser’s U.S. 1 (1938), a book-length poem that employs Depression-era literary and photojournalistic techniques to represent Rukeyser’s travels along East Coast highway Route 1.9 In particular, Deepstep Come Shining recalls the sequence of U.S. 1 titled “The Book of the Dead,” which documents a deadly industrial disaster in West Virginia via interviews, descriptions of medical photographs, letters, and hearings in the U.S. House of Representatives. Wright’s engagement with court reporting similarly invites comparison to poems like Charles Reznikoff’s Testimony (1934-1979), which uses court records to attest to various acts of violence and injustice in the United States during the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
     
    At the same time, however, Deepstep Come Shining seems to resist this documentary tradition by systematically obscuring and abstracting the very texts and voices it contains. Aside from Wright’s occasional use of quotation marks, all-caps, and italics to indicate citation, there are very few cues in the text that mark the beginning and end of any utterance. The relentlessly end-stopped lines obfuscate not only the difference between one speaker’s statement and another’s question, but also the variations in intonation. As a result, many utterances flatten out, and idiosyncrasies of voice and text collapse into regularities of type. At several points, the poem explicitly acknowledges the difficult task of determining intonation: “Which is pitched higher crepe or crape,” it asks (37); “Which is brighter g-r-a-y or g-r-e-y. Which is pitched higher” (77). Furthermore, the unusual juxtaposition of lines and the frequent use of non sequitur frustrate the expectation that utterances in close proximity (grouped together in a paragraph or stanza, for instance) will speak to one another. Although the poem alludes to actual conversations and narratives surrounding numerous characters who populate the text – the floating host, the boneman and the snakeman, the Veals of Deepstep, Pattycake, Clyde Connell, and Aunt Flora, for instance -, more often than not these conversations and narratives are dispersed throughout the poem in nearly irreconcilable fragments.
     
    Indeed, Deepstep Come Shining alternately locates and dislocates its component parts (not to mention the reader) both temporally and spatially. The poem is clearly set in the rural South, and often mentions specific spatial coordinates: towns such as Deepstep, Milledgeville, and Vidalia; and businesses such as Motel 6, Chuck’s Dollar Store, and Scatters Pool Hall. It even offers directions: “Ripcord Lounge is up on the right. . . A little past the package store”; “Make a left just beyond Pulltight Road” (8). Yet these coordinates do not form a cohesive map; or if they do, it is a map that folds in on itself at various points. In the poem’s own words, “the genesis of direction breaks and scatters” (35). Interiors become exteriors, north leads to south, and ultimately, the promise of location turns out to be illusory. References to popular news stories about the Unabomber and the murder of Michael Jordan’s father place the reader in a general era. The more mythical temporality of the boneman and snakeman stories, however, resist being plotted on a historical timeline. Insisting that “no one should know the hour or the day” (10), the poem enacts a kind of textual “Time lapse” that disorients the reader (3, 93). Its refrain, “Now do you know where you are,” only underlines this sense of temporal and spatial disorientation (8, 22, 37, 89). In effect, the only time and space the reader can be sure of occupying is the time and space of the poem itself. The poem, from this standpoint, is not simply a second-hand transcript of what Wright has seen, but moreover a record of what she literally makes visible in poetic form.
     
    The stenographs in Deepstep Come Shining further underline this project of dislocation and abstraction. Despite their nod to indexical writing, the stenographs do not transparently point to the courtroom dialogues they index. In fact, to the reader who is unfamiliar with shorthand, they seem virtually illegible. Although Wright potentially could have remedied this situation by having the stenotype transcribed into longhand, she chose not to, presenting them in facsimile instead. As a result, the formal arrangement of the stenotype contrasts sharply with the poem, and its material features, such as the darker tone of the paper and the irregularities of the ink, come to the fore. The abstraction of the actual courtroom proceedings, that is, reveals the stenographer’s mark – in this case, the mark of Alyce Collins Wright, C.D.’s mother. The stenotype facsimiles ultimately serve both as a site of documentation and as a site of abstraction. They gesture towards a trial while simultaneously obfuscating that trial to register the presence of the one person there who is meant to embody absence: the stenographer.
     
    Deepstep Come Shining not only yields this dialectic of documentation and abstraction on a formal level, but also figures it thematically. If, as detailed earlier, the poem betrays an attraction to objective, mechanical vision in many passages, it also celebrates a more abstract, metaphysical kind of vision in others. Many passages ascribe greater visionary powers to people whose eyesight has been compromised in some way. “A synergism of cancer and dwelling in musical extremis” allows Coltrane, for instance, to see angels (59). An iridectomy gives way to vivid metaphor:

    A shirt on the floor looked like

    the mouth of a well

    Spots on a horse
    horrible holes in its side

    The sun in the tree
    green hill of crystals

    Moon over Milledgeville
    only a story

    Saucer of light on the wall
    the hand of god.

    (51)

    The poem’s ongoing punning between “whole” and “hole,” as well as the many references to focusing and refocusing, blurring in and blurring out, only reiterate Wright’s concern for this oscillation between vision and blindness, positive and negative space, figure and ground.

     
    Wright does not regard this kind of oscillation as merely interesting, however, and instead repeatedly associates it with violence. Light must be “murdered” so “the truth [can] become apparent” (75). An almost apocalyptic version of this oscillation is figured on the last page of the poem, when the speaker vows to “offer a once-and-for-all thing, opaque and revelatory, ceaselessly burning” (107). Like the devastating fire to which the speaker alludes – a fire that destroyed the very objects the text incarnates – this “once-and-for-all-thing” (presumably the poem itself) simultaneously radiates with and obliterates the objects to which it points. It is as if the poem promises to illuminate and immortalize, yet at the same time extinguish, the very objects and bodies it points to or marks. Wright, in other words, emphasizes the precarious and potentially self-destructive nature of the model of light-writing that so fascinates her.
     
    Deepstep Come Shining is certainly not the first poem to abstract documentary material. On the contrary, all documentary poems, including those mentioned earlier – Williams’s Paterson, Obenzinger’s New York on Fire, Rukeyser’s U.S. 1, and Reznikoff’s Testimony – arguably demonstrate an impulse towards abstraction. After all, the very strategies poets often use to adapt documentary material to the form of poetry – selection, fragmentation, repetition, lineation, and so on – paradoxically divert attention away from the voices, places, and events being documented and towards more formal aspects of their poetry.10 Without some degree of abstraction, in fact, it would be difficult to distinguish a documentary poem from a mere mechanical exercise. Abstraction serves, in other words, as a response to the central question that, as Marjorie Perloff notes, inevitably arises for the documentary poet: “If the words used are not my own, how can I convey the true voice of feeling unique to lyric”? From this perspective, abstraction does not simply entail a lapse or distortion of the documentary impulse. Rather, it generates a crucial dialectic that allows documentary poets to negotiate their relationship to lyric.
     
    The history of this dialectic of documentation and abstraction coincides, to a large extent, with the history of lyric. Although a detailed account of this history is beyond the scope of this essay, a couple of broad trends are worth sketching out. In the first half of the 20th century, documentary projects appealed to many poets as a way of counteracting the individualism of the lyric and bringing poetry closer to everyday realities. Rukeyser, for instance, gravitated towards documentary material because she believed that “the actual world, not some fantastic structure that has nothing to do with reality, must provide the material for modern poetry” (qtd. in Dayton 226). Documentary material offered her a broader foundation on which to “build” her poems – a foundation that went beyond “those personal responses which have always been the basis for poetry” (qtd. in Dayton 146). Like other modernist poets, Rukeyser tends to use abstraction as a means of reinforcing, interrogating, commenting on, or elucidating the messages already inherent in documentary material. Later in the 20th century, however, a number of poets turned to documentary not as an alternative or supplement to lyric, but as a way of challenging the very coherence of the lyric self. In her book-length poem Dictee (1982), for instance, Theresa Hak Kyung Cha stitches together historical, autobiographical, journalistic, epistolary, and visual texts in order to complicate the idea of a Korean voice or identity. For postmodern poets like Cha, abstraction does not clarify or unify disparate materials; instead it underlines the extent to which the lyric speaker is constructed (or, more to the point, deconstructed) by disparate materials.
     
    Although both of these trends inform Wright’s work, Deepstep Come Shining‘s use of abstraction sharply diverges from that of many earlier documentary poems and indeed marks a new approach to lyric. As mentioned above, Wright figures the movement from mechanical to metaphysical vision as an act of violence. This act of violence, in turn, echoes her transcription of individual voices and texts into typographic form. Abstraction, that is, does not serve as a means of deriving meaning from the voices and texts Wright collected on her road trip; on the contrary, abstraction destroys meaning by radically materializing these voices and texts to the point of impenetrability. In this light, the poem’s use of abstraction reveals the strong influence of language poetry on Wright’s work, an influence remarked by critics like Lynn Keller. As Keller points out, however, Wright draws upon strategies of language poetry to resist “the kind of personal lyric that had become the sanctioned form for feminist expression,” at the same time that, in keeping with a number of other contemporary women poets, she distances herself from the exclusive, “male-dominated Language scene” (28). This distancing is particularly apparent in her efforts to re-embody the voices and texts she so radically materializes. Just as the Arkansas court proceedings that underlie Deepstep Come Shining‘s stenotype pages ultimately bear the mark of Wright’s mother Alyce, so too the Southern voices and texts composing the poem ultimately bear the mark of C.D. The poem indexes not only the events of Wright’s road trip and the court where her mother worked, but moreover Wright and her mother’s sheer presence as witnesses.
     
    It might be tempting to assume here that Deepstep Come Shining is proving a general point about the ease with which language can be appropriated or re-embodied by various subjects (a point that would largely accord with Language poetry). But there is nothing general about Wright’s decision to index herself and her mother. Indeed, by deliberately choosing to include a set of stenotype facsimiles her mother produced, Wright gestures towards a very personal relationship that motivates Deepstep Come Shining‘s poetics of vision. By aligning stenography with poetry, Wright specifically aligns her mother’s career as a court reporter with her own career as a poet. Unlike Wright’s father’s job as an Arkansas judge, which required him to evaluate testimony and intervene in the lives of those he encountered in the courtroom, Wright’s mother’s job as a court reporter barred her from evaluating or intervening in any way. Amidst the noise and activity of the courtroom, her mother would have been an essentially passive and silent presence, revealing nothing of herself as she typed. Wright, however, challenges this dichotomy between the activity of judging and the passivity of recording by attempting to salvage something meaningful from her mother’s stenotype facsimiles.11 Realizing that no translation or reading of the stenotype pages will yield any insight into her mother, Wright opts instead to abstract the pages, thereby emphasizing the beauty and craft of the physical traces her mother left behind (and, by extension, of the traces she leaves behind in the poem). Abstraction, in other words, gives rise to an unexpected locus of intimacy and of lyricism in Deepstep Come Shining. If the poem’s documentary material manifests an appreciation for the Southern landscapes and soundscapes that shaped Wright’s childhood, its abstractions manifest an appreciation for the peculiar legacy of type-writing that Wright inherited from her mother.
     
    Wright’s use of abstraction not only distinguishes Deepstep Come Shining from earlier documentary poetry, but also anticipates a kind of appropriative poetry that has gained popularity in the new millennium. As a number of critics have noted, many contemporary poets – among them Vanessa Place, Katie Degentesh, Kenneth Goldsmith, and Noah Eli Gordon – have recently pursued projects that involve various forms of citation and transcription. Granted, many of these projects gain inspiration from modern digital media and communication technologies that are a far cry from Deepstep Come Shining’s antiquated stenography, but they also echo the ideal of nonintervention that stenography embodies.12 In fact, although this poetry incorporates documents and source material, I hesitate to call all of it “documentary” insofar as its commitment is not always to the events and objects to which the documents point. In some cases the documents are almost incidental to the larger project of substantiating – indeed, indexing – the poet’s encounters and interactions with them. For instance, Kenneth Goldsmith’s Day (2003), a word-for-word transcription of the September 1st, 2000 edition of The New York Times, is less about the specific news events of that day, and more about the painstaking and tedious labor the poem required for its production. Likewise, Flarf (a genre of poetry generated by internet searches) often foregrounds the poet’s process of navigating the Web as much as the specific content generated by it. The documented voices and texts of Deepstep Come Shining, by contrast, are in no way incidental. While the poem’s lyric and documentary modes are mutually exclusive (to see one is to be blind to the other), they nevertheless converge upon a similar set of preoccupations and concerns. Wright’s poetics of vision nevertheless paves the way for the appropriative poetry of the new millennium, insofar as it shows that poets can extract something personal, even lyrical, from second-hand documents and information without having to resort to older confessional or expressive modes of writing to do so. Indeed, in light of Wright’s work, poetic projects that may have appeared to embody the culmination of anti-lyrical tendencies re-emerge as sites of renewed engagement with lyric, and, more generally speaking, of renewed commitment to the specificity of various modes of literary discourse.
     
    To be sure, Wright demonstrates an intense desire to capture – and even radiate with – the voices and texts she literally encounters over the course of Deepstep Come Shining‘s composition. Abstraction, however, is just as crucial to the poem because it allows her to forego some of the more expressive conventions of lyric poetry, while at the same time advancing the poet’s role as a remarkably complex seer or poeta vates. Although many critics have examined Deepstep Come Shining‘s preoccupation with vision, by overemphasizing the poem’s documentary mode and underemphasizing its corresponding abstractions they have, not insignificantly, overlooked Wright’s efforts to formalize her own role as a visionary. On the one hand, Deepstep Come Shining‘s poet-as-seer is merely an “operator,” a technology for faithfully capturing and making visible certain sights. On the other hand, she is a dangerously blinding force. She makes the reader look away from what is most transparent in order to see what else might be revealed: “We see a little farther now and a little farther still / Peeping into the unseen” (9).
     

    One Big Self’s Politics of Vision

     
    On the surface, One Big Self manifests a dialectic of documentation and abstraction reminiscent of Deepstep Come Shining. A collection of voices and texts accumulated over the course of another trip through the South, One Big Self abounds with road signs, crime reports, confessions, statistics, radio broadcasts, and inmate questionnaires. Like Deepstep Come Shining, One Big Self also features a list of sources Wright researched and in many cases cites (a list titled “Why not check it out and lock it down”). In some cases, Wright directly identifies the source, speaker, and/or addressee of a given line or stanza, but in most cases the task of identification is not so straightforward.
     
    Some lines imply particular speakers and addressees (prisoners, guards, the poet); some carry double meanings or vary in meaning depending on the context. As she did in Deepstep Come Shining, Wright further complicates the task of identification by often omitting crucial punctuation and thereby flattening the tonal register. As John Cotter remarks, “abstract, a lot of the lines can be read in more than one way, or read as true for more than one inmate, or an observer, or apply equally well to victim or visitor.” One Big Self also frustrates narrative expectations with its play of associative logic, non sequitur, parataxis, and circular questioning. It furthermore participates in the kind of simultaneous location and dislocation observed earlier in relation to Deepstep Come Shining. Although one section is headed “On the road to St. Gabriel” and another “On the road to Angola,” for instance, the poem most often interweaves and even collapses different times and spaces.
     
    To notice similar processes of documentation and abstraction and of location and dislocation at work in both Deepstep Come Shining and One Big Self is not to say that the poems share the same overall project or agenda. To begin with, in One Big Self the document or record enters the more menacing realm of evidence, a realm where sentences potentially incriminate. Wright explicitly identifies “the resistance of poetry to the conventions of evidentiary writing” as a challenge that shaped her project; and, as the subtitle of the 2007, poem-only edition of One Big Self—One Big Self: An Investigation—announces, the poem proceeds via a gathering of evidence (ix). As R.S. Gwynn points out, however, it is not entirely clear “what’s being investigated” (685). The thing about evidence, after all, is that it implies a crime (or, at the very least, an event that requires adjudication). Yet Wright makes it clear that she does not want to criminalize or determine anything, even though (or perhaps because) her subjects’ guilt has been, in some cases, predetermined. She lays out her aims in the preface: “Not to idealize, not to judge, not to exonerate, not to aestheticize immeasurable levels of pain. Not to demonize, not anathematize. What I wanted was to unequivocally lay out the real feel of hard time” (xiv).
     
    Indeed, lacking a definite criminal event, the poem often investigates its own composition, with all the prison visits, correspondences, and research that went into it. The relative amorphousness of this event, in turn, leads Wright to continually interrogate – and push the boundaries of – what exactly counts as evidence. “Counting” thus serves as a crucial term in One Big Self. “Count your fingers / Count your toes / Count your nose holes / Count your blessings…” the poem begins, establishing counting as a device that will return again and again (3). The poem is nevertheless by no means all inclusive, and it acknowledges many more impasses than Deepstep Come Shining does. In some cases a voice warns “Don’t ask,” or a speaker notes “I don’t go there,” as if some lines of investigation are too loaded. In other cases the poet resorts to more impersonal forms of research such as the search engine “Ask Jeeves.” The poem, in sum, betrays an unusually agonized relationship to its own contents – to what it will or will not allow in – that contrasts with Deepstep Come Shining‘s sense of ease (Wright describes the latter poem as her “rapture” (“Looking”).
     
    Perhaps it should come as no surprise to find this level of self-consciousness in a poem titled One Big Self. The project, after all, demands that Wright consider the very nature of “selves,” and not just her own, but also the prisoners’. As she explains in her preface to One Big Self, her objective was to view “prisoners, among others, as they elect to be seen, in their larger selves” (xiv). Deborah Luster’s preface to the collaborative photo-book edition, titled “The Reappearance of Those Who Have Gone,” similarly stresses the prisoners’ disclosures of their “very own selves… before my camera.”13 Both editions of One Big Self demonstrate not only an awareness of the problem of how to get other “selves” into the poem (i.e., not as “others” in relation to Wright’s and Luster’s selves), but moreover a level of circumspection about what constitutes a “self” in the first place. Consider, for instance, the inmates’ attire in Luster’s photo-book portraits. Some pose in prison stripes, others in chef hats and uniforms; some wear Mardi Gras beads and feathers, others, grisly Halloween costumes. Are these really the subjects’ “very own selves”? Does the fact that the inmates choose how to dress and pose themselves necessarily ensure that their “very own selves” are being presented? More to the point, what does that phrase even mean?
     
    The question of how to capture a subject’s true self has been central to the practice of portrait photography – and of portraiture more generally – for years. As Michael Fried points out in Why Photography Matters as Art as Never Before, there is something inherently theatrical about portraiture, about the idea of a subject posing for an artist. And if the artist’s ambition is to capture the subject’s true self, and not a false performance, there is something consequently problematic about portraiture. (Here again, the difference between documenting and evidencing comes into play: all photographic portraits in some sense document their subjects; but only the select few succeed in evidencing their subjects’ true selves.) Some photographers have attempted to sidestep the portrait’s theatricality by experimenting with hidden cameras and candid shots, but these experiments often entail forms of manipulation and intervention in their own right. Fried thus maintains that for portrait photography to be genuinely anti-theatrical it must not avoid, but must directly contend with the frontal pose.
     
    This question of how to capture a subject’s true self even when that subject is posing under the most theatrical conditions is clearly a question that Luster, as a portrait photographer, has not only inherited, but moreover embraced. While her portraits may seem strikingly theatrical, they also evidence an anti-theatrical impulse. More to the point, they risk theatricality precisely in order to earn a kind of anti-theatricality. Luster’s anti-theatrical impulse is perhaps most obvious in her comments about wanting to be as unobtrusive a photographer as possible. She claims, for instance, that she did not conduct research on prison life as part of the project. In “The Reappearance of Those Who Have Gone,” she implies that research would have interfered with her ability to make the portraits “as direct a telling as possible.” Clearly, Luster’s methods of documenting selves contrast sharply with Wright’s methods. The assumption here seems to be that photography, by its very nature, neutrally captures its subject (in this case, the prisoners) – and that whatever Luster learned about prison life could have distorted the subjects’ disclosures of their “very own selves… before my camera.” Wright, by contrast, had to immerse herself in research to get other “selves” into her poetry to begin with.
     
    Luster’s decision to print her photographic portraits on sheets of metal, in the style of tintypes, also underlines her anti-theatrical impulse. As Michael Carlebach observes, tintypes are known for resisting some of the formalities associated with traditional portraiture. When they were first introduced in 1856, tintypes were cheap, durable, and – compared to daguerreotypes and other early processes – relatively fast and easy to print. This made them popular not only with studio photographers who wanted to make a quick profit from working-class customers, but also with itinerant photographers who worked concessions at carnivals and fairs. It also made them unpopular with photographers who hoped to elevate photography to an elite profession or art form.
     
    Tintypists tended to prioritize business concerns over aesthetic concerns. They used plain backdrops and did not deem it cost-effective to outfit their studios with elaborate props or sets. In fact, one of the only props many tintypists did use was a clamp (sometimes called a “head rest”) to immobilize the subjects’ heads and thereby prevent blurring. While these clamps contributed to stiff, unnatural poses, these poses stem from a technological rather than an aesthetic formality. The subjects appear stiff, in other words, not because they are trying to perform certain formalities associated with portraiture, but because they are simply trying to prevent the shots from being ruined.
     
    This is not to say that the subjects were oblivious to aesthetic concerns. On the contrary, tintypists’ relative indifference to the aesthetics of their work enabled subjects to take more active roles in the composition of their portraits. Subjects often chose how to pose, where to look, what expressions to have, and what to wear. Many brought personal props to the shoots. During the Civil War, in fact, when tintype trade flourished, many soldiers posed in uniform with weapons, and this fashion of posing with the tools of one’s trade then continued after the war. What was different about the conventions associated with tintypes, however, is that they were developed and perpetuated to appeal not to professional magazines or artists, but to subjects’ friends, coworkers, and family members.
     
    This history of more informal tintype portraiture has appealed to a number of contemporary portrait photographers who use tintype to document and in many cases dignify individuals from more or less marginal social groups: cowboys in Robb Kendrick’s “Revealing Character” (2005), for instance, or soldiers in Ellen Susan’s “Soldier Portraits” (2007-2010). Luster’s photographs – and her determination to give inmates control of their own images – clearly gesture towards this history too. Notwithstanding the occasional prison stripe, however, the costumes, masks, and occupational props wielded by Luster’s subjects do not divulge – and often conceal – their identity as prisoners. In fact, Luster’s photographs manage to give even the prison stripes a costumey feel. And unlike a number of other prison photography projects such as Danny Lyon’s “Conversations with the Dead” (1971) and Taro Yamasaki’s “Inside Jackson Prison” (1980), which offer glimpses of penitentiary life, most of Luster’s photographs employ black backdrops that block out the broader prison environment and allow the inmates themselves to take center stage.
     
    Luster’s portraits, in other words, do not overdetermine her subjects’ identities as prisoners. On the contrary, they enable her subjects to express a wide range of identities and aspirations, some of which seem deeply sincere, others deeply ironic, and others so fantastical that they are difficult to reconcile with the realities prison life. Inmates who participated in One Big Self understood that they would both appear in a photo book and get a dozen wallet-sized prints for themselves. The inmates’ poses thus express a variety of intentions: to generate sympathy from estranged relatives, develop a portfolio, become famous, add to their possessions, and communicate with loved ones. So although the resulting photos resist the formalities of the mugshot (the quintessential prison photograph) and of photographs once used by eugenicists to diagnose criminals, they are highly formalized in their own way. Luster’s photographs do not ultimately solve the problem of how to overcome theatricality, and thus capture the inmates’ “true selves” or individuality; but in the process of attempting to solve this problem, they also redirect the viewer’s attention onto competing forms of portraiture that, for better or worse, condition subjects’ social legibility. They clearly suggest that their subjects are more than anonymous prisoners; but the viewer’s search for particulars leads only to a host of abstractions – of performed “types.”
     
    The two cover photographs selected for the poem-only edition of One Big Self suggest that Wright may be just as interested as Luster (if not more interested) in the problems of self-expression that portraiture raises. The majority of Luster’s portraits show subjects directly facing the camera in theatrical poses and clothing that, as suggested above, frequently pastiche conventional portrait photography. The two cover photographs in the poem-only edition, however, present an even more tenuous notion of facingness. The front cover depicts a woman wearing a dark mask over her eyes, a tall light-colored hat, and a baggy Halloween costume with bells on the collar and wrists. Her hands rest on her lap as she stares directly into the camera, unsmiling. The back cover shows an arm extended, palm facing the camera, bearing a tattoo of a woman’s face. What is remarkable about both of these cover photographs is that they exemplify the tension between being “all there” in a portrait, and yet not quite all there. The presence of the mask and the tattoo suggest exhibitionism, on the one hand, and a kind of concealment or holding back, on the other.
     
    Like the women in the cover portraits, Wright expresses a desire at once to exhibit and to conceal what she has evidenced in One Big Self. This desire recalls the dialectic of documentation and abstraction explored earlier in the context of both Deepstep Come Shining and One Big Self. But whereas Deepstep Come Shining obscures actual court proceedings with an embodied (and deeply personal) stenotype, One Big Self obscures the actual bodies of those who have been “sentenced” in order to bring to the fore various formalities, especially those of the criminal justice system. One Big Self‘s abstractions do not shift our gaze onto type-writing per se (as in Deepstep Come Shining), but rather onto the “types” portrayed – and in some cases enforced – by the prison-industrial complex and other institutions. One Big Self documents very specific utterances while paradoxically inviting us to ask what “types” of people these utterances imply: inmate, victim, or visitor. Whereas the “Stimulants, Poultices, Goads” list at the back of Deepstep Come Shining stokes (and frustrates) a desire to see what the poet saw, One Big Self‘s “Why not check it out and lock it down” more pointedly invites (and renders futile) a kind of matching game with the poem’s constitutive parts (65, 83).
     
    Considering these typological leanings, it is not surprising that One Big Self pays significant attention to forms of address. The poem’s pseudo-letters, with salutations like “Dear Child of God,” “Dear Prisoner,” and “Dear Affluent Reader,” for instance, highlight the roles that people assume in the process of writing to one another. According to Martin Earl, “The repeated letters enable the poet … to stress one of the remaining formalities left to people living in the alternative world of incarceration. Language, after all, is the one thing that can’t be taken away from them.” But rather than treating letters as rare formalities permitted in prison, Wright treats them as sites where some of the many formalities of prison life – and of life beyond prison – get articulated. She does not depict the letters as a unique privilege, like Earl suggests, insofar as they absolutely do not enable prisoners to freely express themselves. Instead, the letters raise problems similar to those examined earlier with respect to portraiture: how can writers reveal their true selves when the relationships between writers, texts, and readers are so fraught?
     
    Wright’s formal interest in the transformation of individuals into types also expresses itself via the content of the poem, which frequently notes the idiosyncrasies of bodies, in particular tattoos and scars. It plays with the notion that a face is something you earn in prison, that inmates eventually “get a face on them” (23). At the same time, the poem attends to the generalities into which faces or people can disappear. For example, “Black is the Color” broaches discrimination within society and/or the criminal justice system, as does the recurring question of whether people “run to type” (17). The poem underscores the many, more trivial ways people are typed too: one can be “a budget person,” for instance, or “a night person,” a sign of the zodiac, or an administrative number (67). Quotes from a board game called “The Mansion of Happiness” further accentuate the ease with which individuals can be classified, evaluated, and rewarded (or punished) according to arbitrary rules. Even the title One Big Self alludes to the relationship between individual and type; as the quote of film director Terence Malick elaborates, “Maybe all men got one big soul where everybody’s a part of – all faces of the same man: one big self” (qtd. in Gilbert).
     
    By reframing the dialectic of documentation and abstraction established in Deepstep Come Shining in terms of individual and type, One Big Self manages to adapt Wright’s poetics to a corresponding politics. A couple of examples from the poem are useful here. Consider, first, the campaign to “Restore the Night Sky” by reducing the light pollution caused by surrounding prisons (27). The image establishes a basic conflict between two levels of vision: earthly lights obscure celestial ones. On another level, however, this conflict is loaded with sociological significance: some people can’t enjoy clear views of the sky because the state is keeping its eye on prisoners. This example, in other words, exposes the fact that some types of people have (or at least believe they ought to have) access to various sights, while others don’t – and, conversely, that some types of people get subjected to surveillance, while others don’t. Wright also uses mirrors in One Big Self to elaborate a similar politics of vision. She explains, “Your only mirror [in prison] is one of stainless steel. The image it affords will not tell whether you are young still or even real” (38). Once again, the poem not only acknowledges two competing levels of vision (i.e., the literal substance of the mirror, on the one hand, and the fleeting images of inmates who appear in it, on the other), but moreover implicates the mirror in a broader system of isolation and control. Chosen above all for its durability, the prison mirror ultimately serves to detemporalize and dematerialize, rather than individuate, the inmates who approach it.
     
    On the one hand, Wright wants to imagine that she and Luster might remedy this situation by improving the inmates’ access to clear images of themselves. She explains that many inmates agreed to have their pictures taken because they were eager to get copies of the prints, to see themselves better than the regulation mirrors allowed. Here the distinction between self-expression and self-reflection breaks down: the photographs function not as sites where inmates reveal their true selves to others, but rather as sites where they become conscious of themselves as such for the first time in potentially years. The photographs allow inmates to read the otherwise elusive passage of time on their own faces and to verify the reality of their own bodies against a dozen wallet-sized prints. On the other hand, Wright seems quite aware that Luster’s photographs are just as entrenched in a politics of vision as any other set of images. Taken as a whole, the tens of thousands of photographs Luster took of Louisiana prisoners merge into patterns and generalities. In particular, they present an overwhelmingly racialized image of prison: a large majority of Louisiana prisoners are black. As the poem confirms, “Black is the Color” “Of 77% of the inmates in Angola,” and “Of 66% of the inmates at St. Gabriel” (34). Luster’s tintype-style photographs, which have an antique look to them, further underline the historical significance of these statistics. They show that despite the time that has elapsed since the Civil War, when tintypes reached the height of their popularity, the status of African Americans still looks bleak by some measures.14
     
    While many other critics have noticed a politics of vision in One Big Self, they have frequently misconstrued it. The primary mistake they have made resembles the one mentioned earlier in the context of Deepstep Come Shining criticism. By concentrating on the presence of documentary subject matter, they have concluded that Wright’s poetry and Luster’s photographs are mainly about allowing outsider voices to speak and be seen. Nadia Herman Colburn, for instance, insists that Wright’s poems show a “commitment to understanding other people.” “To read her poems,” Colburn observes, “is to enter into the lived experience, not only of Wright herself, but of her characters.” According to Suzanne Wise, “what dominates Wright’s account are the voices of the prisoners themselves, shifting power away from the poet-witness as the arbiter of experiences” (405). Grace Glueck claims that by “patiently” shooting inmates “in a neutral way,” Luster “honors their identities” (29). And Stephen Burt goes so far as to claim that “for Wright and Luster, the project of portrait photography… becomes a project of releasing people from bondage” (50).
     
    These claims tend to rely on the assumption that there is something liberating about expressing oneself and, in turn, being seen or heard. This assumption is, of course, a popular one. It motivates a broad range of creative projects that aim to provide spaces of expression behind prison walls and/or to share the work of incarcerated writers and artists with a broader audience.15 What is not clear, however, is that Wright and Luster share this assumption. By no means did they enter the prisons they visited as activists, educators, or publicists. (On more than one occasion, Wright has acknowledged the ethical precariousness of these visits.) Neither the questionnaires Wright distributed to prisoners as part of her research nor the photographs Luster took were meant to be outlets of creative expression for the inmates. And although Wright and Luster did discover that some inmates appreciated the opportunity to pose for the camera and share their stories, the images and text of One Big Self depict as many—if not more—moments of foreclosure as moments of disclosure. The poem in particular deploys a kind of abstraction that violently wrenches readers from lived experience and locates them in a formal space. Like the two cover photographs for the poem-only edition of One Big Self, it simultaneously solicits and forbids the viewer’s identification with its subjects. On one level, the poem aims at an anti-theatrical ideal: readers, Wright hopes, will see the prisoners for who they are, without the distortion of various lenses. On another level, the poem foregrounds these lenses themselves.
     
    Abstraction allows One Big Self to generate some skepticism about the assumption that expressing oneself, and being seen and heard, is in itself liberating. As mentioned earlier, the poem’s exploration of forms of address, for instance, implies that “free” expression or communication is an impossible ideal. Moreover, by abstracting individual voices into types, the poem asks us to consider the many other forms of subjugation and inequality that exist—some serious, some trivial. It reminds us that no matter how liberating it may be for prisoners to be heard and respected, respect and attention will not release them from prison; no matter what kind of windows One Big Self might open, the walls that separate prisoners from the rest of society remain very real. In fact the one identity category that encompasses all the subjects portrayed in One Big Self—the category of prisoner—never really has to be acknowledged, performed, or represented there, because no matter what they say or how they look, the subjects are admitted to One Big Self only insofar as they are prisoners. If there is no escaping the prison literally, there is no escaping it figuratively (i.e., via One Big Self) either. This, again, is why the prison stripes worn by some of the subjects in Luster’s portraits seem almost incidental. Granted, Wright’s preface acknowledges the lofty-sounding ambition to reunite “the separated with the larger human enterprise” (xiv). If the poem stages a reunion, however, it is decidedly not a reunion where individual people freely honor, sympathize with, or refine their views of each other. Rather, it is a reunion that exposes the existing social and political forms that contain people.
     
    In this light, Wright and Luster’s efforts to avoid criminalizing anyone are particularly significant. They show that Wright and Luster are less interested in what people have done in the past, and more interested in the social and political forms that condition what they can and cannot do in the present. The questions their project raises are not about who deserves to be criminalized – or who deserves to be “typed” in any way, for that matter – but rather about what function certain categories and formalities serve in the first place. Is it possible that some “types” precede – and indeed even produce – the individuals who exemplify them? Is it possible, in other words, that being a criminal type is not wholly a matter of personal responsibility? Do the social and political forms we perpetuate bear some responsibility as well?
     
    Although few may admit it, the prison itself is a form that many people have a stake in maintaining. Wright claims that One Big Self originated from one troubling observation – that prison was the central industry of certain areas of Louisiana. And in sections like “Dialing Dungeons for Dollars,” she interrogates privatization, prison realty, and the corporate revenue it generates (28). Admittedly, One Big Self is not exactly a polemic against the prison-industrial complex, and Wright’s point is not to offer concrete alternatives to current social and political formations. By periodically blinding our view of individuals, however, she succeeds in illuminating the formal sites where social and political change may occur. These sites, like the prisons Wright and Luster visited, may be places where our vision often falters, and where we cannot properly or fairly see the individuals contained. Still, Wright implies, there is a limit to how far better vision alone will get us. After all, as important as it may be to see individuals for their “true selves,” if we want to interrogate a form like the prison as such – and not just who deserves to be in it or how they are regarded once they are there – we must overlook these selves for the sake of the system of which we are all a part.
     

    Jennie Berner is a Ph.D. candidate in the Program for Writers at the University of Illinois at Chicago, where she teaches English and fiction writing. Both her scholarly work and her creative dissertation – a collection of short stories – interrogate the relationship between literature and visual technologies. Her poetry and fiction have appeared in Crazyhorse, Boston Review, The Journal, and The Coachella Review.
     

    Footnotes

    1. See, for instance, Burt, Wise, and Keller.
     
    2. Most notably Gilbert and Burt.
     
    3. According to Wright, the poem is “as close as I have ever gotten to a conceptually visual work” even down to her “method of composition – on the wall” (Wright, “The Wolf Interview”).
     
    4. Although Wright does not include Barthes as one of the “Stimulants, Poultices, Goads” listed at the back of Deepstep Come Shining, the striking similarities between the two works, as well as the poem’s reference to the camera lucida, make it difficult to rule out the possibility that these echoes might be more than coincidental.
     
    5. It is worth noting that Deborah Luster accompanied Wright on the road trip that helped generate Deepstep Come Shining. Their common research and travel during this period led, in fact, to a series of photo-text retablos, one of which appears on the cover of Deepstep Come Shining. Prior to Deepstep Come Shining, Wright and Luster also collaborated on Just Whistle: A Valentine (1993).
     
    6. For more on the the photograph’s status as index, see Rosalind Krauss’s “Notes on the Index” parts I and II in The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths (1985).
     
    7. Hence the longstanding debate about whether photography – which can be produced with the mere click of a button – counts as an art.
     
    8. Granted, the operator could intervene as a writer. The court system attempts to safeguard against this possibility by requiring its reporters to swear that they will faithfully record what they hear. Still, the human operator has a kind of agency, and for this reason, the stenotype pages are not indexical in the strictest sense of the term.
     
    9. It is also worth noting that Rukeyser, like Wright, travelled with a photographer, her friend Nancy Naumberg.
     
    10. It might be tempting to generalize even more, and state a commonplace: no matter how directly or dispassionately it is presented, and no matter what genre it is presented in, documentary material inevitably bears the mark of the documentarian. What gets lost in this generalization, however, is any sense of the specific challenge that documentary material presents for poetry. This challenge, of course, is precisely what has motivated many poets to pursue documentary projects in the first place.
     
    11. There is a gender dynamic at work here too, judging being a historically male domain and court reporting a historically female one, particularly in the 1960s and early 70s, when Alyce Wright was working.
     
    12. A number of critics argue that digital and communication technologies are in large part driving the recent impulse to appropriate. According to Marjorie Perloff, for instance, appropriative poems tackle the question of poetry’s role “in the new world of instantaneous and excessive information.” Brian Reed similarly insists that these poems “tell us something profound about psychology and sociality in the new millennium. Even in fantasy it might no longer be tenable to separate ourselves from the information that we take in – or the manner in which we do so” (760). There is something to be said for this notion that the hypermobility of language and information in the new millennium and the expansion of virtual space have sparked efforts to relocate and ground the poet. At the same time, Deepstep Come Shining – published in 1998, just prior to the massive surge in texting, social networking, and other forms of digital communication – suggests that the interest in locating or indexing the poet via appropriated material is not wholly dependent on these technological developments.
     
    13. From this standpoint, the model of photography invoked by One Big Self requires more than just indexicality. Any photograph, after all, can index a subject. But only some photographs can capture his or her essence.
     
    14. In this light, Luster’s work invites comparison to that of other contemporary photographers (most notably Sally Mann) who use different varieties of 19th-century wet-plate photography to broach issues of time and history. But whereas Mann, for instance, takes advantage of the long exposure times of wet plate processes to literally capture the passage of time, Luster prints her images on aluminum plates after-the-fact to create an antique look that effectively collapses past and present.
     
    15. Arts-in-prison programs are a good example: proponents like Janie Paul insist that workshops offer prisoners “an opportunity to transcend their situation” (“Prisons” 551).

    Works Cited

    • Barthes, Roland. Camera Lucida. Trans. Richard Howard. New York: Hill and Wang, 1981. Print.
    • Burt, Stephen. “Lightsource, Aperture, Face: C.D. Wright and Photography.” Close Calls with Nonsense: Reading New Poetry. Minneapolis: Graywolf Press, 2009. 41-59. Print.
    • Carlebach, Michael L. Working Stiffs: Occupational Portraits in the Age of Tintypes. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2002. Print.
    • Colburn, Nadia Herman. “About C.D. Wright: A Profile.” Ploughshares. Emerson College, n.d. Web. 30 Nov. 2012.
    • Cotter, John. “The Damage Collector.” Open Letters Monthly. Open Letters LLC, n.d. Web. 30 Nov. 2012.
    • Dayton, Tim. “Lyric and Document in Muriel Rukeyser’s The Book of the Dead.” Journal of Modern Literature 21.2 (1997/98): 223-240. Print.
    • Earl, Martin. “One Big Self: Finding the Noble Vernacular: C.D. Wright/Deborah Luster” Harriet the Blog. The Poetry Foundation, 2 Apr. 2009. Web. 30 Nov. 2012.
    • Fried, Michael. Why Photography Matters as Art as Never Before. New Haven: Yale UP, 2008. Print.
    • Gilbert, Alan. “Neither Settled Nor Easy.” Boston Review Jan.-Feb. 2008. Web. 30 Nov. 2012.
    • Glueck, Grace. “Deborah Luster and C.D. Wright – ‘One Big Self: Prisoners of Louisiana.’” The New York Times. 18 Jun. 2004. Print. 29.
    • Gwynn, R.S. “Lost Roads.” The Hudson Review 60.4 (2008): 683-690. Print.
    • Keller, Lynn. Thinking Poetry: Readings in Contemporary Women’s Exploratory Poetics. Iowa City: U of Iowa P, 2010. Print.
    • Krauss, Rosalind. “Notes on the Index.” The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985. 196-220. Print.
    • Luster, Deborah, and C.D. Wright. One Big Self: Prisoners of Louisiana. Santa Fe: Twin Palms Publishers, 2003. Print.
    • Luster, Deborah. “The Reappearance of Those Who Have Gone.” Introduction. One Big Self: Prisoners of Louisiana. Twin Palms Publishers, 2003. Deborah Luster. Web. 12 Dec. 2012.
    • Perloff, Marjorie. “Poetry on the Brink: Reinventing the Lyric.” Boston Review. May/June 2012. Web. 12 Dec. 2012.
    • “Prisons, Activism, and the Academy – a Roundtable with Buzz Alexander, Bell Gale Chevigny, Stephen John Hartnett, Janie Paul, and Judith Tannenbaum.” Editor’s Column. PMLA 123.3 (May 2008): 545-567. Print.
    • Reed, Brian M. “In Other Words: Postmillennial Poetry and Redirected Language.” Contemporary Literature 52.4 (2011): 756-790. Web.
    • Wise, Susan. “The Border-Crossing Relational Poetry of C.D. Wright.” Eleven More Women Poets in the 21st Century. Ed. Claudia Rankine and Lisa Sewell. Middletown: Wesleyan UP, 2012. 399-425. Print.
    • Wright, C.D. Just Whistle: A Valentine. Berkeley: Kelsey Street Press, 1993. Print.
    • ———. Deepstep Come Shining. Port Townsend: Copper Canyon Press, 1998. Print.
    • ———. “Looking for ‘One Untranslatable Song.’” Interview with Kent Johnson. Jacket 15 (Dec. 2001). Web. 12 Dec. 2012.
    • ———. One Big Self: An Investigation. Port Townsend: Copper Canyon Press, 2007. Print.
    • ———. “The Wolf Interview: C.D. Wright.” Interview with Lynn Keller. The Wolf 19 (2008). Bloodaxe Blogs. 20 Apr. 2009. Web. 12 Dec. 2012.
  • The Most Dangerous Place: Pro-Life Politics and the Rhetoric of Slavery

    Lisa Guenther (bio)
    Vanderbilt University
    lisa.guenther@vanderbilt.edu

    Abstract

    In recent years, comparisons between abortion and slavery have become increasingly common in American pro-life politics. Some have compared the struggle to extinguish abortion rights to the struggle to end slavery. Others have claimed that Roe v Wade is the Dred Scott of our time. Still others have argued that abortion is worse than slavery; it is a form of genocide. This paper tracks the abortion = slavery meme from Ronald Reagan to the current personhood movement, drawing on work by Orlando Patterson, Hortense Spillers, and Saidiya Hartman to develop a discourse of reproductive justice that grapples with the wounded kinship of slavery and racism.
     
    In 2011, a series of billboards began to appear in urban areas across the United States.

    February, New York City: “THE MOST DANGEROUS PLACE FOR AN AFRICAN AMERICAN IS IN THE WOMB.” The image is a young black girl in a pink dress.1
     
    April, St. Louis, Missouri: The same slogan on a baby blue background, beside the face of a young black boy.2
     
    March, Chicago’s South Side: “Every 21 minutes our next possible LEADER is ABORTED.” The image is a stylized version of President Obama’s face.3
     
    June, Atlanta, Georgia: “THE 13TH AMENDMENT FREED US. ABORTION ENSLAVES US,” against the backdrop of a tattered American flag. Another reads: “THE 14TH AMENDMENT MADE US MEMBERS. ABORTION DISMEMBERS.”4
     
    June, Oakland, California: “BLACK & BEAUTIFUL,” above the image of a sleeping black baby. “BLACK & UNWANTED,” above the face of a black toddler. “BLACK CHILDREN ARE AN ENDANGERED SPECIES,” beside the face of a black toddler, apparently on the verge of tears.5

    These billboards were designed and marketed by two different pro-life groups: Life Always and The Radiance Foundation. Life Always was founded by Stephen Broden, an African-American pastor and political commentator on FOX News; the board of directors consists of two black men (both pastors), a white woman who used to work for Planned Parenthood but is now a pro-life activist, and a white man “looking to give back blessings” (“About Life Always”). The Radiance Foundation is the brainchild of Ryan Scott Bomberger and Bethany Bomberger. Ryan – who presents as black – describes himself as the son of a woman who “was raped yet courageously chose to continue the pregnancy, giving him Life. He was adopted as a baby and grew up in a loving, multi-racial Christian family of 15. . . . His life defies the myth of the “unwanted” child as he was adopted, loved and has flourished” (Radiance, “Ryan”). Bethany – who presents as white – describes herself as “an educator – encouraging and empowering others to pursue their life goals” (Radiance, “Bethany”). Both groups represent Planned Parenthood as the central instrument of an ongoing black genocide.

     
    While Life Always and the Radiance Foundation were putting up billboards in cities from Oakland to New York, the personhood movement was picking up steam in states across the South and Midwest: Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Mississippi, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Virginia, and Wisconsin. The personhood movement seeks to abolish the right to abortion, not through the courts but through a constitutional amendment. As I argue at some length in this paper, this strategy is based on an implicit, and sometimes explicit, but inherently opportunistic and misleading comparison of the struggle to ban abortion with the (apparently successful) abolition of slavery through the Thirteenth Amendment. The first formulation of a personhood amendment at the state level was Mississippi’s Proposition 26, which sought to redefine personhood to “include every human being from the moment of fertilization, cloning or the functional equivalent thereof” (Wedgeworth). Proposition 26 was defeated on November 8, 2011, with a vote of 58 to 42, but three months later, on February 14, 2012, Virginia’s House Bill No. 1 passed in the General Assembly (66 to 32). This bill declared that the “life of each human being begins at conception,” and ensured that “unborn children at every stage of development enjoy all the rights, privileges, and immunities available to other persons, citizens, and residents of the commonwealth” (“HB1”).6 A similar bill was passed by the Oklahoma senate on February 15, 2012, with a vote of 34 to 8 (Hoberock).
     
    The leaders and spokespersons of the state-based personhood movements are almost invariably white and male. But this does not prevent them from connecting their cause to the liberation of black people. In a video posted on the Personhood USA Web site, called “A Day to Advance,” a white-sounding male speaker declares that “Personhood is the new civil rights movement for the twenty-first century,” while a video image of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. flashes onto the screen; an audio track of Dr. King’s voice murmurs in the background, almost indiscernible. After the first Personhood Amendment was defeated in Mississippi, the founder of Personhood Mississippi, Les Riley, compared his own struggle to extinguish women’s reproductive choice with William Wilberforce’s struggle to abolish the slave trade in the British Empire:

    For nearly twenty years, [Wilberforce] fought against bigotry, financial interests, personal illness, legal maneuvering, apathy and global politics until the slaved [sic] trade was abolished – and even then, it wasn’t until 1833 that slaves were emancipated [in the British empire, we should note – although Riley does not; slavery would not be abolished in the US until 1865]! The fight for the right to life is not over – neither in Mississippi, nor in the USA, nor in the world at large.

    Riley is not the only leader in the personhood movement to compare their struggle to ban abortion with a white man’s struggle to abolish slavery. In an interview with the Huffington Post, Bryan Longworth, the director of Personhood Florida, also compares himself to Wilberforce, adding: “Slavery is virtually ended around the world now. Where do you go to buy a good slave today? You can’t get one. Why? Because people now see slavery as abhorrent, and one day people will see abortion as equally abhorrent if not more abhorrent.”

     
    What is going on here? For decades, conservatives such as Ronald Reagan, Supreme Court Judge Antonin Scalia, and pro-life legal scholars George Swan and Charles Rice have compared the abolition of slavery with the proposed abolition of abortion.7 The argument goes something like this: If we respect and defend the civil rights of all persons, black or white, then we should respect and defend the sanctity of all human life, from the fertilized egg to the patient on life support. But since the election of a black president in 2008, comparisons between abortion and slavery have both intensified and mutated from “the struggle to end abortion is like the struggle to end slavery” to “abortion is like slavery” and “abortion is worse than slavery.” Moreover, this meme has been taken up by black pro-life groups who compare abortion not only to slavery, but also (with reason) to the eugenics movement and (beyond reason) to a new black genocide. And it has entered mainstream American political and media discourse – with some hiccups – through remarks made by would-be presidential candidates such as Mike Huckabee and Michelle Bachmann. What are the implications of the abortion = slavery meme for the politics of race, gender, sexuality, and reproduction in the US? How did the fight against slavery become intelligible as a fight for the right to life? Where are the battle lines being drawn in this fight? Who is the enemy, and what is the prize?
     
    In what follows, I track the abortion = slavery meme from Ronald Reagan to the current personhood movement, drawing on critical resources from Orlando Patterson, Hortense Spillers, Saidiya Hartman, and others. My argument, in a nutshell, is that we cannot understand current pro-life discourse without situating it within a history of slavery that it both invokes and disavows. In the end, what we need is not a return to the liberal feminist pro-choice politics of the 1970s and 80s, but rather a discourse and a practice of reproductive justice that takes the wounded kinship of slavery and racism not just as a related concern but as a serious, central issue – perhaps the central issue – in American reproductive politics today.
     

    Ronald Reagan, Father of a Meme

     
    Ronald Reagan’s text, “Abortion and the Conscience of the Nation,” was published as an article in The Human Life Review in 1983, republished as a book in 1984, and republished again as an article in 2004, on the occasion of Reagan’s death. Like the leaders of Personhood Mississippi and Personhood Florida, Reagan compares the pro-life movement to Wilberforce’s fight to end slavery, attributing to the latter an anachronistic belief in “in the sanctity of human life.”8 He also compares the exclusion of blacks from constitutional protection in Dred Scott v. Sandford (1857) to the exclusion of the fetus from (what he takes to be) this same sort of protection in Roe v. Wade (1973).9 What is at stake in this comparison?
     
    Dred Scott was a slave who sought legal redress when the wife of his deceased master refused his offer of three hundred dollars for the manumission of himself, his wife, and their children. Scott argued that, since he had lived with his former master in states where slavery was illegal, such as Illinois and Minnesota, he could not be considered the legitimate property of his master or his master’s widow. Scott lost the case – not because the court decided against his claim, but because it decided that, as a negro and a slave, Scott was not a citizen, and so he did not have the right to bring a legal claim to court. Chief Justice Roger B. Taney argued that blacks “had no rights which the white man was bound to respect;” they were “not included, and were not intended to be included, under the word “citizens” in the Constitution” (“Dred Scott Case”). This decision was eventually overturned by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, which abolished slavery and revised the terms of citizenship, due process, and equal protection under the law.
     
    What does the Dred Scott decision have to do with the politics of abortion? Or rather, how was this decision taken up by the pro-life movement in such a way that it became relevant to abortion politics in the 1980s, and again in 2011? At issue in Dred Scott was not the slave’s humanity, nor even the slave’s legal personhood, but rather his or her inclusion or exclusion as a citizen of the United States, with the rights that citizenship entails. But in spite of this explicit reference to citizenship, Reagan invokes the Dred Scott decision, as he also invoked Wilberforce’s speech, as a contribution to the debate over the value of human life:

    This is not the first time our country has been divided by a Supreme Court decision that denied the value of certain human lives. The Dred Scott decision of 1857 was not overturned in a day, or a year, or even a decade. At first, only a minority of Americans recognized and deplored the moral crisis brought about by denying the full humanity of our black brothers and sisters; but that minority persisted in their vision and finally prevailed. They did it by appealing to the hearts and minds of their countrymen, to the truth of human dignity under God. From their example, we know that respect for the sacred value of human life is too deeply engrained in the hearts of our people to remain forever suppressed. But the great majority of the American people have not yet made their voices heard, and we cannot expect them to—any more than the public voice arose against slavery—until the issue is clearly framed and presented.

    (2)

    We know that a respect for “the sacred value of life” is engrained in the hearts of Americans. And yet, the American heart and the American mind are not always connected to the American mouth. A majority declaration of the sacred value of life was still at an embryonic stage in 1983. Like a fetus in utero, the American people lacked a public voice with which to declare the sanctity of life, and it would continue to remain silent “until the issue [was] clearly framed and presented.”

     
    By framing the issue of citizenship in Dred Scott as an issue of personhood, and framing personhood as (sacred) life, Reagan exploits the emancipation of the slaves – by a Republican president, no less – as an “example” of how a “minority” can appeal to the hearts and minds of Americans in order to secure “the truth of human dignity under God.” Reagan elaborates this example with a quote from Abraham Lincoln’s own reframing of the framers’ intentions in the wake of the Dred Scott decision. In a speech delivered in Lewiston, Illinois, on August 17, 1858, Lincoln argued that blacks were included in “the whole great family of man” (qtd. in Reagan 4). This is clearly a reference to the language of the Dred Scott decision, which excluded blacks from “the whole human family” on the grounds that the framers of the Declaration of Independence would have been “utterly and flagrantly inconsistent with the principles they asserted” if they had continued to practice slavery while recognizing blacks as “men” who were “created equal” and so endowed by their Creator with “certain unalienable rights” such as “life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness” (“Dred Scott”). Blacks could not be considered citizens, and the framers could not have intended to include them as citizens – not because of anything present or lacking in black people as such, but rather because the Founding Fathers would not be worthy of the respect that we citizens grant them, if they were found to act in such flagrant contradiction with their own principles. The integrity of “the whole human family” – or at least, the “family” of citizens of the United States of America – depends on the integrity of its Fathers, and if some of our brothers and sisters must be excluded from the family in order to show that Father was right, then so be it.
     
    Abraham Lincoln took a different approach to the founding document of the United States, which Reagan cites approvingly:

    I should like to know if taking this old Declaration of Independence, which declares that all men are equal upon principle[,] and making exceptions to it[,] where will it stop. If one man says it does not mean a Negro, why not another say it does not mean some other man?

    (qtd. in Reagan 4)

    This is the example provided by the negro: it’s the classic example of “the thin edge of the wedge.” If you refuse to admit the negro into the family of man, then why not also exclude some other man? And if you exclude some other man, then how will you prevent yourself from being excluded at some point? If you – a (white) citizen – respect yourself, then you must also respect the negro.

     
    Reagan reframes Lincoln’s claim about dignity of “man” as a warning “of the danger we would face if we closed our eyes to the value of life in any category of human beings” (4). With the shift from “man” to “life,” the example of slavery becomes useful to pro-life politics in the ’80s: If you refuse to admit that the fetus is a person, then why not also the newborn, the three-day old infant, the toddler – or the adult African American, for that matter? If you respect the personhood of “our black brothers and sisters,” and if you respect Lincoln as the Great Emancipator, then you must also respect the personhood of the fetus.10
     
    In current pro-life discourse, however, the logic of exemplification becomes more complicated. On one hand, the pink fetus provides the example for African-American personhood via the black fetus (who, as if testifying to his membership in universal humanity, appears pink in the womb). We know in our hearts that the (white) pink fetus is a person, so we must extend to unborn African Americans the same enthusiastic protection as unborn white Americans, lest the black fetus become the thin edge of the wedge for pro-life politics. White pro-life activists must reach out to their “black brothers and sisters,” and to join forces in the battle to defend the sacred value of human life.
     
    But on the other hand, and at the same time, the African-American adult provides the example for the pink fetus, again via the (pinkened) black fetus. We all know – if not in our hearts, then at least in our minds and in our mouths – that African Americans are persons. We have proof of this in the form of a black president. If you respect the personhood of African Americans – if you would even go so far as to vote a black man into the presidency – then you must extend this respect to the black fetus, and through it, to the fetus as such, the pink fetus.
     
    Either way, the pinkened black fetus – or the blackened pink fetus – becomes the middle point through which the personhood of the pink fetus and the personhood of the black adult is secured.11 It functions not as the limit case of personhood, but as the point of intersection between two of its most powerful examples. The black fetus is both a beautiful, desirable, valued member of the “whole great family of man” and a victim of legalized child abuse and murder, a life threatened with extinction, an “endangered species” (the title of the first campaign launched by toomanyaborted.com).
     

    Not All in the Family

     
    Who will protect the sacred life of the black fetus? And against whom must the Lincolns and Wilberforces of today defend it? Already in a 1976 speech, Reagan provided a “clear framing and presentation” of this threat:

    She has eighty names, thirty addresses, twelve Social Security cards and is collecting veteran’s benefits on four non-existing deceased husbands. And she is collecting on Social Security on her cards. She’s got Medicaid, getting food stamps, and she is collecting welfare under each of her names. Her tax-free cash income is over $150,000.

    (qtd. in “Myth”)

    If the welfare queen did not exist, she would have to be invented – as it seems she may have been, since Reagan never names the woman, and no one matching that exact description was ever found (Krugman).

     
    Like the fetus, the welfare queen is dependent on others for her survival and her flourishing. But unlike the fetus – whom, thanks to Lennart Nillson’s photographs in “A Child is Born,” we are able to imagine as an autonomous being floating in the impersonal environment of the womb – the welfare queen is exorbitantly, improperly dependent. She’s like a vampire feeding from the open veins of the state, taking more than her fair share, exploiting the generosity of those who pay their taxes and play by the rules. She is an ungrateful child, a spoiled brat in the family of man – and even worse, she has the capacity to reproduce herself.
     
    As Andre Bauer, Lt. Gov. of South Carolina from 2003 to 2011, explained in a town hall meeting in January 2010, during his unsuccessful bid for the Republican nomination for state Governor:

    My grandmother was not a highly educated woman, but she told me as a small child to quit feeding stray animals. You know why? Because they breed. You’re facilitating the problem if you give an animal or a person ample food supply. They will reproduce, especially ones that don’t think too much further than that. And so what you’ve got to do is you’ve got to curtail that type of behavior. They don’t know any better.

    (“Bauer”)

    Bauer offered this anecdote in support of his view that the parents of children receiving free lunches or lunch subsidies should be subject to mandatory drug testing and required to attend PTA meetings and parent-teacher interviews. He added: “I can show you a bar graph where free and reduced lunch has the worst test scores in the state of South Carolina” (qtd. in Montopoli). Feeding leads not only to breeding, but also to stupidity, which leads to even more breeding – and so on. When the scandal broke nationwide, Bauer insisted that he did not mean to imply that people who receive social assistance “were animals or anything else.” He clarified that “he would penalize only adults and that he never advocated taking away a child’s free or reduced-price lunch” (Montopoli).

     
    The child – like the fetus who is interpellated as already-a-child, already-a-person, already-a-citizen or even (as in Lauren Berlant’s analysis) the ideal American citizen – has a right to be dependent.12 It is an innocent victim of its family’s own failure to provide the basic essentials of life. In the child, as in the fetus, we can recognize “the sacred value of human life.” But the grown woman – the grown black woman – the grown, economically unproductive, and hyper-reproductive black woman who fails to attend PTA meetings: Is she a person? Is she an example of sacred life, or is she an example of the threat posed to sacred life by a sovereign master with the power to kill or let live? Like the slave whose personhood was recognized in law first and foremost when she committed a crime, the welfare queen was born to be punished. Was she ever a child? Can we imagine her as a fetus? At what point does the member of an endangered species become a breeding stray whose overpopulation threatens the sanctity of life and the whole human family?
     
    The black woman, understood as an emancipated slave, as one of “our black… sisters,” is a useful example for the personhood of the fetus. But the black woman, understood as a welfare queen – as a big baby sucking at the teat of the state and breeding like a stray animal – offers a different kind of example: not of the sacred value of life, but of both the degraded powerlessness of the slave and the sovereign power to kill and let live. She is not an example to follow, like Lincoln and Wilberforce, but rather a site of inversion and of convergence between illegitimate dependence and illegitimate sovereignty. She is a welfare queen.
     
    This image of the welfare queen sets the stage for a new set of Great Emancipators: a generation of Mike Huckabees, Rick Santorums, and Michelle Bachmanns who are poised to liberate the black woman from her own grotesque power.13 For example: in a March 2009 fundraiser speech in Jackson City, Missouri, Mike Huckabee, former Governor of Arkansas and one-time frontrunner for the 2008 Republican presidential nomination, warned his audience that civilization might come to an end if “one group of people have life and death control over another for no particular reason other than their own conveniences and, in that case, prejudices” (qtd. in “Hucakbee”).14 Huckabee asked:

    What are we saying to the generation coming after us when we tell them that it is perfectly OK for one person to own another human being? I thought we dealt with that 150 years ago when the issue of slavery was finally settled in this country, and we decided that it no longer was a political issue, it wasn’t an issue of geography, it was an issue of morality. That it was either right or it was immoral that one person could own another human being and have full control even to the point of life and death over that other human being.15

    He continues: “Before laws get changed, we have to change minds and hearts of all the American people, but especially those who will ultimately make the decision as to whether or not they will give an unborn child life or whether they will give it a death sentence” (“Huckabee”).

     
    What does it take to imagine the pregnant woman as a sovereign “owner” of the fetus, her quasi-slave? What sort of “conveniences, and in that case prejudices” must we attribute to this slave-owning woman in order to understand abortion as a “death sentence” – in the only Western democratic nation still to practice capital punishment? What must be happening in my heart and my mind for these comparisons to make sense to me? What must I know, and what must I forget? In order to engage with these questions, we need to reflect more carefully on the personhood of the slave and on the slippages between person, citizen and “life” that have greased the joints of the “Abortion = Slavery” meme from Ronald Reagan to the Personhood Movement. What is a person? What is a citizen? What is sacred life?
     

    The Trauma of Natal Alienation

     
    In Slavery and Social Death, Orlando Patterson argues that the slave is defined not by the denial of personhood but rather “the permanent, violent domination of natally alienated and generally dishonored persons” (13). Natal alienation is the systematic isolation of the slave from its kin – in other words, from a network of others who are socially obliged to come to one’s defense. Without kin, the slave is confined to a single (legitimate) social relation: to the master who owns her, and to whose arbitrary violence she remains exposed, even if the master happens to be kind or even fatherly. For this reason, the fictive kinship of slave ownership – however sincerely felt by the master or even by the slave – is not enough to compensate for the social death produced by natal alienation. If the master chooses to sell a slave’s parents, children, lovers, or friends, they will be sold; if the master chooses to recognize a slave’s claim to kin, this claim will be recognized – for as long as he chooses to recognize it. All of the slave’s social relations hang in suspension from this single legitimate social relation, and they remain in suspension at the pleasure of the master.16 In effect, the slave is “born” or “reborn” as the dependent of the master: as a permanent minor or child, excluded from the inheritance of the father’s name but bound to the inheritance of the mother’s slave status. Patterson calls this relation “a peculiar reincarnation on the margin of his master’s society” (66). Claude Meillassoux goes even farther, describing the natally-alienated slave as “non-born” or “born outside birth” (40, 107, 121).
     
    Far from excluding slaves from personhood, then, every slave society has carefully inscribed the personhood of the slave within the law as a way of foreclosing their claim to the rights of a citizen.17 How did natal alienation shape the scene of American slavery? In his 1858 Inquiry into the Law of Negro Slavery, Thomas Cobb describes the peculiar “birth” or “rebirth” of the slave:

    When the law, by providing for his proper nourishment and clothing, by enacting penalties against the cruel treatment of his master, by providing for his punishment for crimes, and other similar provisions, recognizes his existence as a person, he is as a child just born, brought for the first time within the pale of the law’s protecting power; his existence as a person being recognized by the law, that existence is protected by the law.

    (qtd. in Dayan 13)

    Colin Dayan offers an insightful commentary on this passage:

    The slave, once recognized as a person in law, becomes part of the process whereby the newborn person, wrought out of the loins of the white man’s law—in a birth as monstrous as that of Victor Frankenstein’s creature—can then be nullified in the slave body . . . [W]e begin to see how the law, invoking the double condition of the unborn and the undead, can eject certain beings from the circle of citizenry, even while offering the promise of beneficent protection.

    (13)

    The slave is “born” in law as a person who is natally alienated and socially dead. She lives, she works, she breeds – and yet she has “no rights which a white man is bound to respect” (“Dred Scott”). Even the right to a family – to a lineage of ancestors and descendants in relation to whom one’s own life gains meaning beyond the trajectory of fertilized egg to corpse – is undermined by the fictive kinship of slave ownership. The slave is born to be punished: not as a citizen with rights, but as a person whom the law holds criminally responsible and for whom it makes certain “provisions.” Even the “law’s protecting power” exposes the slave to natal alienation and social death; even when it includes him in the “family of man,” it is as a child of the master rather than the kin of her kin. As such, the slave is neither a full person nor a non-person, but a remnant of personhood, or what Dayan calls “a negative personhood” (23). We could put this in the language of Agamben’s biopolitics: the slave is inclusively excluded in the law as bare life or sacred life, as life that can be extinguished without consequences. He has not been “raised up” by the father and recognized as a legitimate heir. Rather, the slave’s bios or biographical life is suspended, while her zoe or biological life – including her productivity and reproductivity – is inscribed into law as the object of sovereign power (Agamben 17-29).18

     
    I have used the pronouns “he” and “she” interchangeably to refer to the slave, and yet it is not clear that this grammar applies. In “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe: An American Grammar Book,” Hortense Spillers argues that the standard grammatical distinctions, as well as standard psychoanalytic stories about the psychic investment in grammars of kinship, desire, and gender identity are rendered incoherent by the practice of antebellum slavery. Consider, for example, the white slave master who rapes a black female slave. A child is born, but who is the father? The child is sold as a commodity: So who is the mother? The child is a good, strong worker: Is it therefore a man? The child gives birth to more children: Is it therefore a woman? What is the grammatical, social and psychic framework that will make sense of this child, and in relation to which the child may make sense of itself, himself, herself, themselves?
     
    For Spillers, the slave is ambivalently feminized and ungendered. He cannot be a man because, like a woman, he is barred access to the name of the father; he has nothing to inherit and nothing to pass down to his kin. And yet she cannot be a woman because she is not exchanged in the way that (white) women are exchanged, passing from the protection of a father to the protection of a husband who, in turn, becomes the father of her children.19 The commodification, rape, torture, forced labor, and forced reproduction of slave women produces a “materialized scene of unprotected female flesh – of female flesh ‘ungendered’” (68). And yet this flesh remains irreducible to the body of the slave, which is stolen and divided into parts – legs for ploughing, arms for hoeing, hands for picking cotton – each part to be used and used up. The stolen body is interchangeable with any other body; it can be sold, traded, and discarded without regard for particular differences between bodies or for the singularity of each body’s experience. But the flesh is different; it remains in the “vestibule” of the history of stolen bodies, neither outside of history nor captured wholly within its terms. Flesh is “that zero degree of social conceptualization that does not escape concealment under the brush of discourse, or the reflexes of iconography” (67). The wounds inflicted by slavery’s “high crimes against the flesh” leave durable marks on the body, literally tearing into the skin and ripping out bits of flesh. “These undecipherable markings on the captive body render a kind of hieroglyphics of the flesh whose severe disjunctures come to be hidden to the cultural seeing by skin color” (Spillers 67).
     
    Black skin, as the mark of racialization in the wake of the Middle Passage, does not disclose the violence against the flesh of slaves, but conceals it behind a permanent essence, an inferior type of being, a brute body that may or may not feel any pain. To “see through” the cultural meanings of black skin after slavery is not, however, to grasp the simple truth of slavery and the violence that it inflicted on captive bodies. Rather, the scars left by the whip – by the literal and symbolic whips of slavery, which include natal alienation – remain “undecipherable markings,” “hieroglyphics” readable by an ancient African culture for which we have no Rosetta stone. And yet, these markings call out for interpretation, if only as the zero degree of social conceptualization.
     
    Spillers asks “if this phenomenon of marking and branding actually ‘transfers’ from one generation to another, finding its various symbolic substitutions in an efficacy of meanings that repeat the initiating moments” (67). In order to respond to this question – or even to ask it – we need to find a way of talking about “flesh and blood” entities in a different way, not as carriers of racial essence, but as affective, material, relational beings who are not outside of history, but not quite inside history either. Flesh is the least remainder of a corporeality that can be understood as that which resists understanding. Any “theory” of the flesh would have to trace the resistance of the flesh to the theft and violation of bodies, without pretending that the flesh does not hurt or is not marked by that violence. The zero degree of social conceptualization that the flesh imposes on discourse promises to hold open a site of resistance to the inexorable, irreversible terms of history and biology, nature and culture.
     
    Spiller’s critical concept of the flesh helps to shed light on the psychosexual dimensions of the current slavery = abortion meme. As Spillers notes, the legal principle of “partus sequitut ventrem” attaches the “condition” of the mother to her children, such that her status as free or enslaved is “forever entailed on all her remotest posterity” (qtd. 79). To be born to a black woman, even today, is to be branded with the sign of illegitimate parentage and perverse sexuality; the flesh of the mother sticks to the child, while the name of the father slips off, refusing to take hold. Even in Dred Scott, Justice Taney cited laws against miscegenation, and the asymmetrical punishment of mulattos born to white women and to black women, as evidence that the founding fathers never intended black slaves (implicitly understood as children born to black women) to be citizens, and permanently disinheriting them from “the whole human family.” The rape of black slaves by white masters was not only permitted by law, it was underwritten and even institutionalized by laws that affirmed both the white slaveholder’s sovereign power over the black slave – a power to kill or let live – and also his biopolitical power over the black slave woman – a power to make live and let die, a power to reproduce his own property through the bodies of black women and, to a lesser extent given miscegenation laws, black men. Take, for example, the 1705 Virginia Code:

    XXXIV. And if any slave resist his master, or owner, or other person, by his or her order, correcting such slave, and shall happen to be killed in such correction, it shall not be accounted felony; but the master, owner, and every such other person so giving correction, shall be free and acquit of all punishment and accusation for the same, as if such accident had never happened.
     
    XXXVI. [A]ll children shall be bond or free, according to the condition of their mothers.

    (“Laws”)

    How does this psychosexual legacy of slavery continue to haunt American politics and American grammar, particularly in the current reanimation of the abortion = slavery meme? In “Whiteness as Property” and “Finding Sojourner’s Truth,” Cheryl Harris explores the implications of these laws for the continuing fusion and confusion of whiteness with property in the US today, arguing that “the law’s legitimation of the use of black women’s bodies as a means of increasing property” both incentivized the rape of black women and “facilitated the merger of white identity and property” that continues to structure the intersecting meanings of race, class, and gender in the US (“Whiteness” 279).20 Given this fateful merger, it seems impossible to make a coherent connection between the personhood of the slave and the personhood of the fetus, or between the slavemaster’s sovereign power to kill or let live and the woman’s right to terminate or continue a pregnancy.
     
    But nothing is impossible at the level of what Reagan calls “the heart.” Either the black woman is not quite the person we have in mind when we think about slaves or about women, or she is destined to become the new target audience for a change of mind and a change of heart. Is the black woman excluded from the group of those who, in Mike Huckabee’s words, “will ultimately make the decision as to whether or not they will give an unborn child life or whether they will give it a death sentence”? Or is she its new, and even privileged, member?
     
    In the 1980s, the aborting woman was imagined as a successful, middle-class, masculine, and potentially-emasculating white woman. This is the woman who decides to get an abortion because her pregnancy interferes with her ski vacation. It was her heart that films like “The Silent Scream” was hoping to change.21 But in current pro-life rhetoric, the aborting woman is increasingly imagined as a black woman. She is both a murderous sovereign, a master who wields the power to kill and let live over the fetus who is trapped in her dangerous body, and also a vulnerable ex-slave (for whom the [pinkened] black fetus provides the prime example of humanity and sacred life). As an illegitimate sovereign, the black woman must be punished and controlled; as an ex-slave, however, she is “our black sister,” a valuable part of the “whole family of man.” As such, she must be saved from her own bad choices and ignorance, lest she inadvertently plunge her race back into a condition worse than slavery.
     
    But even when the black woman is privileged as a target for pro-life discourse, this does not necessarily mean that she is the intended audience of this discourse. If she is addressed by this discourse at all, it is as a part of the family of man – a sister, a mother, a wife, a womb. She is the belly that I kiss, the mother of our future leader, the hinge between freedom and slavery, the wellspring of black & beautiful life.22 On the rare occasions that she appears as a speaking subject, such as in a pro-life video featuring Dr. Alveda King, niece of Martin Luther King, it is as a chastised and ashamed woman, eyes lowered as she speaks of her personal knowledge of the horrors of abortion, set against a stark white background (personhooddotnet).
     
    As an emancipated slave and a repentant woman, the black woman offers a unique example for pro-life politics: she is the part that sustains the whole, even while she threatens it; she is both the most perfect object of salvation and the most perfect target for punishment. If you can reach the black woman, if you can change her heart, then you can unite the great struggle against slavery with the great struggle for sacred life. Even better, you can acknowledge the horrors of slavery, without having to bother too much with its economic, political, social and sexual legacies. If abortion = slavery, then you can be a Wilberforce for your own time, rather than an ambivalent inheritor of racial privilege. If abortion = worse than slavery, then even the descendants of slaves are not immune to the criticism that they pose a greater threat to themselves and to their race than slavery or white supremacy ever did.
     
    This is where things get tricky. Because the most enthusiastic disseminators of the abortion = slavery meme are not the white leaders and supporters of the personhood movement, but rather black pro-life groups such as Life Always and the Radiance Foundation.
     

    Lose Your Mother, Punish Your Mother, Mourn Your Mother, Let Your Mother Be

    [I]t is only when you lose your mother that she becomes a myth.

    – Saidiya Hartman

    Why is the fetus such a powerful image in the United States? Without being able to prove this point – without even knowing what would constitute a “proof” in this case – I want to suggest that it has something to do with mothers. It is difficult to imagine yourself at one and the same time as a radically independent individual and as the child of a woman upon whom you were once radically dependent, and without whom you would not be here. The traumatic awareness of dependence on the mother’s body both suggests a (misleading) analogy with slavery and touches the nerve of this other, historical trauma of slavery itself, including the blatant contradiction of practicing slavery in a republic founded on individual freedom. This trauma reverberates differently for black Americans and white Americans, and many white Americans would not recognize themselves as “traumatized” by the shame of having inherited racial and/or economic privilege through slavery; but this may be a case where the lack of recognition offers a more eloquent testimony than its presence.23
     
    How does the trauma of slavery reverberate in the black pro-life movement? As a white woman (a Canadian, no less!) living in a fairly segregated city in the American South, I can only note what I have observed and invite critical feedback. A video produced by The Radiance Foundation and co-sponsored by the National Black Prolife Coalition claims that the number one killer of black persons is not heart disease, diabetes, HIV, homicide, or any other problem related to poverty and systematic racism. It is Planned Parenthood, and the black women who are “targeted” by the “abortuaries” that Planned Parenthood has installed in urban black neighborhoods (“Number One Killer”). The termination of pregnancies by black women amounts to a “genocide” of the unborn, and black leaders who support reproductive choice – and who are named in the video – are guilty of having “sacrificed 15 million babies for political or personal gain.” Another video by The Radiance Foundation, called “Epidemic,” appropriates the image and words of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.: “Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.” It supplements these words with the claim that “Abortion never reduces poverty… It reduces US.” This statement echoes the message on billboards installed in Atlanta in time for Juneteenth: “THE 13TH AMENDMENT FREED US. ABORTION ENLAVES US.” Or “THE 14TH AMENDMENT MADE US MEMBERS. ABORTION DISMEMBERS.”
     
    Part of the affective power of these advertisements is the felt but obscured gap between the freedom promised by the abolition of slavery, by the civil rights movement, and even by the election of Obama, and the ongoing reality of racial inequality, poverty, hyperincarceration, and all the other forms of what Ruth Gilmore calls exposure to “premature death” (28).24 However dubious the claims made in pro-life media campaigns, this is a very real issue, and the pain expressed in videos such as The Radiance Foundation’s “Lies” must be taken seriously, whether or not one agrees with its interpretation of the ethical and political implications of this pain. “Lies” begins with a sequence of “un-” words: unplanned, unintended, unimportant, unloved, unwanted – all of which, a young woman’s voice assures us, are “untrue.” In his bio for The Radiance Foundation on toomanyaborted.com, Ryan Bomberger describes himself as “once considered ‘black and unwanted’ but instead was adopted and loved” (“Meet Ryan”). But there is no room here for the expression of the pain of finding oneself pregnant and not wanting a child, or wanting a child and knowing that you do not have the resources to raise it, such that the most responsible choice may be not to give birth. Bomberger’s song, “Meant to Be,” thanks his birth mother for carrying her pregnancy to term, even though it was the result of a rape:

    I know it wasn’t easy
    I know it changed your life
    I imagine no words could console
    The woman he had defiled
    But somehow you found the courage
    And the grace to carry on
    When everyone around you told you
    This child should not be born.

    (“Beautiful Words”)

    Organizations such as Life Always and The Radiance Foundation express a sense of natal alienation, or what Saidiya Hartman calls “wounded kinship” (“Time” 764), which needs to be acknowledged if we are to get any closer to understanding what motivates the impassioned outcry of pro-life black men (and some women) against the “black genocide” of abortion. But this by no means justifies their political positions or tactics, which are just as misleading and manipulative as the positions and tactics of Wilberforce-identified white leaders of state personhood movements.

     
    From the perspective of The Radiance Foundation, the fight to ban abortion is a way of continuing King’s legacy, where the fetus is invoked not just as an object to be saved by others but as a full person, a citizen, a brother or a sister in the struggle. This appropriation of King’s legacy requires a significant revision of his explicit support for Planned Parenthood. In his acceptance speech for the Margaret Sanger Award in 1966, King wrote:

    There is no human circumstance more tragic than the persisting existence of a harmful condition for which a remedy is readily available. Family planning, to relate population to world resources, is possible, practical and necessary… Negroes have no mere academic nor ordinary interest in family planning. They have a special and urgent concern… Negroes were once bred by slave owners to be sold as merchandise. They do not welcome any solution which involves population breeding as a weapon. They are instinctively sympathetic to all who offer methods that will improve their lives and offer them fair opportunity to develop and advance as all other people in our society.

    (qtd. on “About Us,” Planned Parenthood).

    The Radiance Foundation counters King’s speech, both by suggesting that these were not his own words, but rather those of Coretta Scott King (since she delivered the speech on his behalf), and also by arguing that King was simply wrong on this issue:

    He became enamored with the façade of Planned Parenthood and its glossy cover of family planning and the false assurance of eliminating poverty. Birth control promised equality. It failed. Instead, the divide that King fought so passionately to mend became a chasm filled with communities ravaged by out-of-wedlock births, exponentially high STD/HIV rates, and rampant fatherlessness.

    (“Martin Luther King”)

    There is little doubt that Planned Parenthood under the direction of Margaret Sanger was complicit with, and even enthusiastically supportive of, a racist eugenics movement.25 The question is: what do we do with this legacy? How do we inherit both the pain and the promise of a history that has destroyed so many lives for the direct and indirect profit of others? How do we negotiate the social, political, economic, and psychic legacy of slavery without punishing women for bearing some of the most painful aspects of this legacy, and without repeating the rhetoric of “protection” that exposes the “protected” to almost limitless violence within the law?

     
    Planned Parenthood, and the pro-choice movement more generally, belong to a wounded and a wounding history. One way to respond to this history is to reject reproductive choice as a sign of freedom, and to condemn it as a strategy of coercion and even genocide. This is not an unreasonable response, considering the millions of (fully-born) African Americans who were killed by the slave trade, the practice of slavery, and the violence unleashed against them after the abolition of slavery, and who are killed in the everyday violence wrought by the legacy of slavery. But neither reproductive choice nor its cancellation adequately addresses this legacy or these millions upon millions of deaths. What we need is not a simple commitment to reproductive choice, with its white liberal baggage of self-ownership and the enjoyment of one’s body as one’s own “property,” but rather a commitment to a reproductive justice that involves a more complex set of demands for the social and economic support of women who choose to become mothers, as well as for those who do not. Reproductive justice cannot be accomplished by modifying the white, middle class, heterosexual pro-choice movement of the 1980s to “include” women of color; it must put the concerns of women of color at the center of its analysis and its political program if it is to address these concerns at all.26
     
    Whether the funding source is a black pro-life group or a white pro-life group, and whether the speaker or the author is a man or a woman, the assumed target of the current abortion = slavery meme is the same: a pregnant or potentially-pregnant black woman. It is her heart and mind that must be changed. But who is this woman?
     
    The more passionately the pro-life movement – black or white – invokes “our black sister” as an emancipated slave and a carrier of sacred life, the more it positions her rhetorically as a sovereign threat to life whose personhood is recognizable only insofar as she is targeted for punishment. From this perspective, the comparison of abortion and slavery is quite apt – but not for the reasons that Reagan, Huckabee, or The Radiance Foundation have outlined. It is not the fetus who is put in the position of a slave by the black woman’s right to choose; it is the black woman who is interpellated by pro-life politics as both a threatening slavemaster and a threatened (ex-)slave, and whose personhood is recognized primarily (but not exclusively) to the extent that she is targeted for punishment. The (pinkened) black fetus is put to work on billboards, TV, and internet ads to connect the dots between the black woman as a parasitic sovereign or welfare queen and the black woman as “our black sister,” a valued member of “the whole human family.”
     
    But what if we refused these alternatives?
     
    In “The Time of Slavery,” Saidiya Hartman explores the sense of “wounded kinship” that motivates some African Americans to search for their roots in Africa, in an effort to overcome the natal alienation of slavery by “going home.”

    Slavery denied the captive all claims of kin and community; this loss of natal affiliation and the enduring pain of ancestors who remain anonymous still haunt the descendants of the enslaved… For these reasons, it is crucial to consider the matter of grief as it bears on the political imagination of the diaspora, the interrogation of U.S. national identity, and the crafting of historical counternarratives. In other words, to what end is the ghost of slavery conjured up?

    (762-3)

    This is precisely the question we need to be asking in response to white and black invocations of the abortion = slavery meme. What forms of desire and what forms of shame are mobilized against black women, in the name of black women, for the sake of “protecting” black women – and how do these desires and shames both traumatically repeat the history of slavery and refuse to acknowledge its “high crimes of the flesh”? How do the materially and symbolically different positions of white men and black men affect the feelings of loss and wounding that motivate such impassioned defenses of the vulnerable, unwanted, but lovable fetus – who is threatened not only by Planned Parenthood but also by both the illegitimate sovereign power of black women and the highly-contested sovereign power of a black president?27

     
    Hartman situates the desire to reconnect with a lost or stolen homeland, and to recover broken or foreclosed kinship relations, within a history whose promise of emancipation has not lived up to its name:

    As W. E. B. Du Bois noted a century ago, despair was sharpened rather than attenuated by emancipation. In the face of the freed, not having found freedom in the promised land, could be seen the “shadow of a deep disappointment.” Tears and disappointment create an opening for counterhistory, a story written against the narrative of progress. Tears reveal that the time of slavery persists in this interminable awaiting— that is, awaiting freedom and longing for a way of undoing the past. The abrasive and incommensurate temporalities of the “no longer” and the “not yet” can be glimpsed in these tears.

    (“Time” 769-70)

    The “no longer” and the “not yet” – the vestibule of history, and the site of an affective, material flesh that can be wounded even while it resists, and resists even while it is wounded – this is the opening for a critical counterhistory in which the lost and stolen mother is no longer punished for the violence that has been done to her, but instead is granted the possibility of an afterlife, even in the midst of an ongoing history of natal alienation. The responsibility for holding open this possibility takes different forms, depending on how one’s body and one’s subjectivity has been positioned by this history. But the responsibility is shared among all the ambivalent inheritors of this legacy of slavery.

     
    In the end, Hartman refuses the nostalgia for return, while acknowledging its affective allure. Instead, she affirms “a promise of affiliation better than that of brothers and sisters” (Lose 172), rooted not in legal fictions of kinship, nor in biological kinship, but in a kinship of purpose based on the shared concern for “what we might become together or the possibility of solidarity” (231). This is the coalition we need to be building right now, while states across the South revise their abortion laws and, at the same time, celebrate the onset of the civil war, sometimes without even mentioning slavery (Seelye).
     
    I leave the last word on this issue to the Trust Black Women partnership of the Sister Song collective, a coalition of women with different religious affiliations and different views on reproductive choice, but who are nevertheless committed to reproductive justice – which they define as the view that “every woman has the human right to have a child, not have a child, and parent the children she has” (“Who We Are”).

    There are those who believe they should control Black women’s reproduction like during slavery. They believe in population control and use false compassion for children to disguise a racist and sexist agenda… They claim that Black women can’t be trusted. They accuse us of practicing genocide on our people when we stand up for ourselves…
     
    We don’t need fanatics to tell us what to do. Black women make decisions every day about whether to parent or not, not just whether to give birth. Those who think they should dictate our choices won’t be there when the child is born, to help us fight for better education, increase child care, keep our kids out of jail, send our children to college, or get affordable health care. Black women fight for ourselves and we fight to uplift our people…
     
    In our struggle for reproductive justice, African American women have a unique history that we must remember in order to ensure bodily sovereignty, dignity, and collective uplift of our community. The choices that women of color make are based on their lived experiences in this country and reflect multiple oppressions, including race, class, and gender, and their efforts to resist them.
     
    We affirm that African American women have the human right to parent the children they already have. To ensure the full enjoyment of this right, they must also have access to the social supports necessary to raise their children in safe environments and healthy communities, without fear of violence from individuals or intervention by the government.

    (“Who We Are”)

    This is what we need right now: a politics of the flesh that moves beyond the loss of natal alienation, and even beyond the mourning of this loss, by creating new forms of kinship, and new (or are they old?) forms of power.

    Lisa Guenther is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Vanderbilt University. She is the author of The Gift of the Other: Levinas and the Politics of Reproduction (SUNY Press, 2006) and Solitary Confinement: Social Death and its Afterlives (University of Minnesota Press, forthcoming).
     

    Footnotes

     
    1. See Holloway. Sponsored by Life Always in honor of Black History Month. The billboard was taken down after one day in response to widespread objections, including claims by the mother of the child that her image was not authorized for use in the billboard campaign.

     

     
    2. “Missouri RTL Sponsors Pro-Life Billboard: ‘The Most Dangerous Place for an African American is in the Womb.” Life Always and Missouri Right to Life. The National Right of Life News Today. 7 Apr. 2011. Web. 16 Feb. 2012.

     

     
    3. Thirty billboards in the Chicago area, sponsored by Life Always. “Anti-Abortion Group Features President Obama on Chicago Billboards.” ABC News. 30 Mar. 2011. Web. 16 Feb. 2012.

     

     
    4. Eighty billboards in the Atlanta area, co-sponsored by The Radiance Foundation and Georgia Right to Life. “Juneteenth Billboards Expose.” Too Many Aborted. 17 Jun. 2011. Web. 16 Feb. 2012.

     

     
    5. Sixty billboards in the Oakland area, co-sponsored by The Radiance Foundation and the National Black Prolife Coalition. “Unborn Californians Are Endangered.” Too Many Aborted. 12 Jan. 2011. Web. 16 Feb. 2012.

     

     
    6. The Senate has sent this bill back to the Education and Health committee for further consideration, which allows it to defer making a decision until 2013. See Gabbatt.

     

     
    7. See Threedy for a comprehensive review of this literature.

     

     
    8. There is no mention of anything like “the sanctity of human life” in Wilberforce’s 1789 speech. Rather, Wilberforce paints a picture of human suffering and degradation in the slave trade, and in particular in the transport of slaves, because he was convinced that if investors in the slave trade knew what actually happened to slaves, they would find themselves unable to support it or to remain indirectly complicit with it.

     

     
    9. A Google search for “abortion + ‘Dred Scott’” yielded 678,000 results on November 20, 2011. For example, the Website for Personhood Florida states: Just as the wicked Dred Scot [sic] decision ruled that African Americans were non-persons and could be property, so Roe v. Wade has declared that the pre-born are non-persons and are considered property. As Dred Scott was never “overturned” but amended, that is what we are seeking to do: repent from the wicked decision of 9 people that brought death on our whole nation and amend our way, state by state, appealing to the people’s hearts to simply establish the personhood of the pre-born, the disabled and the elderly to protect their right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness by love and by law. Their right to life, their personhood is self-evident and is inalienable.

     

     
    10. By invoking Lincoln’s argument against slavery as an authority in his own argument against abortion, Reagan exploits the power of “Lincoln” as a master signifier, even while his own active promotion of “states’ rights” discourse directly contradicts Lincoln’s political agenda. The figure of the Great Emancipator functions to stabilize the otherwise chaotic slippage of signs in the Great Communicator’s text. I thank an anonymous reviewer for this point.

     

     
    11. The disabled fetus is arguably the other middle term in this equation. Personhood Florida includes the fetus (or “pre-born”) in a series of other forms of “sacred life”: “the pre-born, the disabled and the elderly.”

     

     
    12. Berlant argues that, in the 1980s and ’90s, fetal personhood or “superpersonhood” became the ideal form of American citizenship and subjectivity. “America follows the condition of the fetus” (173).

     

     
    13. In July 2011, Bachmann, along with her rival for the Republican presidential nomination, Rick Santorum, signed a document called “The Marriage Vow—A Declaration of Dependence Upon Marriage and Family,” drafted by a group called The Family Leader. The vow offers a bullet-point list of evidence for their claim that the “Institution of Marriage in America is in great crisis” (3). The first point refers to the “sad” state of African-American families: “Slavery had a disastrous impact on African-American families, yet sadly a child born into slavery in 1860 was more likely to be raised by his mother and father in a two-parent household than was an African-American baby born after the election of the USA’s first African-American President” (3). For critical responses from the blogosphere, see Tommy Christopher’s “Michele Bachman Signed Pledge” at Mediaite and Jill Tubman (Cheryl Contee)’s “Michele Bakkkman’s Pledge” at Jack and Jill Politics.

     

     
    14. Huckabee had been invited to speak by the Jackson City-based Pro-Life group, Vitae Caring Foundation. He gave a version of the same speech two years later, in February 2011, at an event organized in Knoxville, TN, by the Center for Bioethical Reform. “Mike Huckabee Compares Abortion to Slavery.” Huffington Post. 16 Feb. 2011. Web. 15 May 2011.

     

     
    15. See also the website of Life Always, That’s Abortion:

     

    No mother, black or white, has absolute ownership rights over the child being protected and nurtured in her womb… Abortions reduce the child before birth to an object, a “choice”, a thing of less-than-human status, suspended in a slave-like state between life and death, pending an arbitrary decision by the “owner” to abort or to keep the child. The decision to abort, [sic] robs the next generation of it’s [sic] great potential.”

     
    16. For a critique of this claim, see Brown.

     

     
    17. “No legal code I know has ever attempted to treat slaves as anything other than persons in law” (Patterson 23).

     

     
    18. See Meillassoux for insightful reflections on natal alienation in the context of African slavery.

     

     
    19. See Cheryl Harris’s analyses of the way that laws of inheritance and marriage have shaped the legal and social meanings of white and black femininity, in ways that appropriated slave women’s sexuality and reproductive power, and shored up the boundaries of white women’s sexuality and reproductive power (“Whiteness” and “Finding”).

     

     
    20. Not only did the matrilineal transmission of slave status incentivize the rape of black slave women by their owners, but it also continues – to this day – to put black women in a series of double binds where they must make impossible choices: Are you a woman or are you black? Will you pass as white to feed your family, or will you identify with the race of your kin and risk losing your job? For a black woman to claim ownership of her body – as black, and as a woman – is a radical possibility, unthinkable during slavery, and apparently still scandalous now.

     

     
    21. See Berlant’s brilliant analysis of “The Silent Scream” and other anti-abortion documentaries in “America, ‘Fat,’ the Fetus.”

     

     
    22. See, in addition to the billboards with which this paper began, The Radiance Foundation website and “Our Future,” YouTube.

     

     
    23. For a cogent analysis of the role that feelings of traumatic loss play in Rick Santorum’s appeal to conservative women, see Ferguson.

     

     
    24. Gilmore defines racism as “the state-sanctioned or extralegal production and exploitation of group-differentiated vulnerability to premature death” (28, 247).

     

     
    25. See, for example, Davis, Smith, Roberts.

     

     
    26. See Smith for a more thorough argument for and explanation of this position.

     

     
    27. One of the anonymous reviewers of this essay made an intriguing suggestion which I cite here in full, because they expresse the idea much better than I could recapitulate it:

     

    In a certain imaginary of the family within the black community, women’s choices risk repeating the white slavemaster’s denial of the black man’s self-determination, by proxy through the mother of his children. If she aborts the child – and the meme clearly presumes that she is the aborting agent – then the father loses the opportunity to reproduce a patriarchal system of female dependence, and thus the opportunity to guarantee his position as an authority equal to that of the white man. Are the notional heroes lost to the black community because of rampant abortion (the lost MLKs or Obamas) ever imagined to be women? Admittedly, the semiotic elements and structures involved here are tangled and inconsistent, but I would argue, as variant of the author’s central argument, that what is imagined to be at stake if the black woman too freely exercises choice in her reproductive life is the (re)production of black male authority, and continued black male – or simply male – regulation of women’s bodies. A black woman exerting her choice to not reproduce seems to me less like a slave-master than like a house-slave, viewed with dismay from the field: a potential facilitator or collaborator in the oppression of her people, and in particular the oppression of her father, husband, and brothers.

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    • Smith, Andrea. Conquest: Sexual Violence and American Indian Genocide. Cambridge: South End Press, 2005. Print.
    • Spillers, Hortense J. “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe: An American Grammar Book.” Culture and Countermemory: The “American” Connection. Spec. issue of Diacritics 17.2 (1987): 64-81. Print.
    • “The Marriage Vow—A Declaration of Dependence Upon Marriage and Family.” The Family Leader. The Iowa Family Leader’s Candidate Pledge, July 2011. PDF. Dave Weigel. Scribd. 8 Jul. 2011. Web. 15 Feb. 2012.
    • “The Myth of the Welfare Queen.” iOnPoverty. 22 June 2012. Web. 2 Dec. 2013.
    • Threedy, Debora. “Slavery Rhetoric and the Abortion Debate.” Michigan Journal of Gender & Law 2.3 (1994): 3-25. Print.
    • Too Many Aborted. “Beautiful Words.” Too Many Aborted. 6 Apr. 2010. Web. 10 Feb.2012.
    • ———. “‘Epidemic’ by the RadianceFoundation.Org & NBPC.” YouTube. 15 Jun. 2011. Web. 10 Feb. 2012.
    • ———. “Juneteenth Billboards Expose.” Too Many Aborted. 17 Jun. 2011. Web. 16 Feb. 2012.
    • ———. “‘Number One Killer’ by the RadianceFoundation.Org & NBPC.” YouTube. 4 Aug. 2011. Web. 10 Feb. 2012.
    • ———. “Meet Ryan Scott Bomberger.” Too Many Aborted. n.d. Web. 2 Jun. 2012.
    • ———. “Unborn Californians Are Endangered.” Too Many Aborted. 12 Jan. 2011. Web. 16 Feb. 2012.
    • Tubman, Jill (Cheryl Contee). “Michele Bakkkman’s Pledge.” Jack and Jill Politics. 11 Jul. 2011. Web. 17 Feb. 2012.
    • Wedgeworth, Steven. “An Examination of Mississippi’s Proposition 26.” Wedgeword WordPress. 5 Nov. 2011. Web. 16 Feb. 2012.
    • “Who We Are.” Sister Song. n.d. Web. 19 Feb. 2012.
  • Curbside Quarantine: A Scene of Interspecies Mediality

    Max Cavitch (bio)
    University of Pennsylvania
    cavitch@english.upenn.edu

     
    Fig. 1. Stills from “Pit Bull attacking little dog on streets of NYC.” MissWooHoo11. Youtube. 27 Jun. 2012. Web. 13 Dec. 2012.

    Blogs, news Web sites, and content aggregators of all kinds feed a vast stream of stories about domesticated animals ostensibly “gone wild.” The Huffington Post even has a regular specialty-features page called “Animals” that channels them from various cybermedia outlets. City-focused Web sites like New York’s Gothamist and HuffPost New York also have a keen sense of the newsworthiness of four-leggers implicated in scenes of bad animus. Extreme behaviors occasionally emerge—usually due to humans’ own acts of abuse or irresponsibility—and sometimes with horrific consequences (Freccero). But far more often, behavior condemned as feral tends to consist in some merely human-censured shift within a normal, creaturely behavioral continuum. Fear of such shifts has many sources, from dread of civic disorder to ontological anxiety, and the close-quartered urban lives of companion species are especially prone to entanglements—not only of bodies in close proximity but also of the complex animas that drive them. No matter where humans and their companion species go, we are bound to find ourselves ensnarled, smack in the middle of the unrest that makes good copy.

    Whether tabloid-style or more responsibly journalistic, such stories have a profound effect on how increasing numbers apprehend and manage the shared conditions of interspecies life. The great profusion of these stories can, unfortunately, effectively metastasize our fear of the potential threat posed by nonhuman animals, at the same time that these stories misleadingly exceptionalize the quotidian messiness, excitement, unpredictability, and usually sublethal—indeed at times comical—violence of interspecies encounters. Even for those with relatively limited access to cyberspace, in-the-flesh relatedness has become almost impossible to experience as something separate from digital transformation of the phenomenology of perception and the politics of representation, or as something irrelevant to our own and others’ imperfect apprehensions of how this transformation is proceeding (Poster, Hansen).

    The particular piece of digital ephemera I discuss below exists in the still challengingly new (or newly recognized) crossings of two forms of here-and-now relatedness: that of the pulses and bloodlettings of interspecies sociality’s variously forced and unbidden breakdowns (Haraway, Freccero), and that of radically decentered yet also broadly intensified fusions of sociality through digital modalities and platforms (Massumi). This dialectical relation between the evental and the systematic will prompt some readers’ interest in my remarks and in the video itself. Some will lean toward the evental take and others toward the systematic. Other readers, whom I hope for most of all, will find themselves stuck somewhere in between and will thus have to think for themselves about their own experience of impasse, that “curbing” or “quarantining” for which the man in the video so very dramatically and movingly stands as both subject and object. Could we make better use of that nexus than he seems to do?

    This linked video of a recent big-dog-on-little-dog attack near the corner of New York’s East 10th and Broadway has circulated through a number of cybervenues. It’s a short clip of panic, poor judgment, bewilderment, and the need to locate blame—a drama that plays out a thousand times a day in a country with well over eighty million dogs. More than that, it highlights the uncanniness of suddenly finding yourself in the thick of violence involving an aggressor-animal that belongs to you—an uncanniness erupting here as part of a present history of human-canine relations overwhelmed by breed mythology. Identified rightly or wrongly as a Pit Bull, the aggressor-dog becomes, in the video and in its later circulation and viewing, the focus of a struggle to confirm him as a profoundly impaired form of an otherwise commonly hypervalorized interspecies attachment. Unedited and impersonal, without the coordinated emplotments of more conventional cinematic media, the video captures and refracts the crisis of me/not-me that any dog-identified dog owner might someday have to face. Perhaps most strikingly, it is faced here by a young man who is at the same time also turned, by a breed-specific politics of vulnerability, into a dogged human isolate, an animate but hauntingly suspended figure of uncertain, ruptured, or simply nonexistent solidarities, captured at a distinctly contemporary impasse of embodied exposure and communicative capitalism (Dean).

    Any companion dog’s blazing out into violence forces the question: am I my animal after all? This creature, so full of me and me of him, dander and spit, heart-leaps and resentments, nuzzles and echoes—we’ve crossed ourselves in ways the commonly used word “bonding” doesn’t begin to cover: swapped DNA, merged assets, and projected onto one another all manner of fantasied qualities. Then suddenly an amygdalan click and the taste of blood make him forget me. And even though my whole spirit, along with my sinews and tendons and and limbs, is struggling to keep hold of him, he doesn’t heed me. In this brief moment, his intimate knowledge of me—of my sounds, smells, moods, lymphatic currents, posture of my deepest sorrow, my play triggers, capacity to share, to read his needs—seems to be lifted out of what he considers the realm of necessity, and I’m reminded how little I can claim to understand about our attachment. Right now, as I experience along my arms and shoulders his determination to kill another creature, I get the feeling he’s nowhere near me, and yet I’ve never felt more involuted in the substance of his being.

    Where does that leave me, if I’m the man in the video? Who—among the people on the scene, or watching later on the Internet—reflects upon his isolation in the curbside quarantine tacitly imposed by the other bystanders and in which he seems quietly to have acquiesced, on behalf of himself and his dog, as he patiently awaits their fate amid a flurry of 911 calls? So many phones out. Like the one that shot this video, the overwhelming majority of them being manufactured today have built-in cameras. Of the roughly five billion cell phones currently in use worldwide, almost all take pictures (Richter). For whom are these images destined? Flickr cohorts? YouTube viewers? Civic authorities? The local news channel? Mom? Whomever. But because we can dial and film simultaneously, what might feel like obligation can quickly turn to mediation and deferral. These days, the behavior of witnessing often amounts to an almost unconscious act of pitching what we observe to objects that may offer, at best, dubious prospects for solidarity. We no longer pay attention so much as pass it along. Or even to the extent that we do pay attention, we’re also heavily distracted by the desire to magnetize the attention of our intimate others, including strangers who might share something like our experience or something that is just stirring into experiential form.

    What is passed along now can be recuperated later, and not just by the videographer but also by countless consumers of screen-ephemera. We pass along, in other words, manifold opportunities for networked reflection, communication, and creativity (Manovich, Bruns), such as, for example, my own uptake of the present video. At the same time, though, we may be irrecuperably passing up a foundational ethical experience of the material immediacy of exposure. The videographer’s giggly expletives are a fitting soundtrack to this escalating loss of competence for exploring the precariousness of embodied sociality, and for doing so from a position other than that of anxious self-distancing. All media structure our experience of contingency, of course: this is nothing new. But the accelerated uploading and offloading of our encounters with the kind of visceral, creaturely exposure recorded at East 10th and Broadway seem to offer new opportunities for ignoring or forgetting that mediation itself, even in its most “throwaway” forms, is always structured by material conflict: who assumes control? what expenditures are required? whose exclusion facilitates my access? (Galloway, Dean).

    Multinational-produced DSPs compress disturbing visual data and lossy codecs transmit wisecracks and alarmed cries in the form of VoIP packets to the city’s PSAP, untethering information from its social location. Meanwhile, the man at the curb hasn’t at any point dropped or relinquished his leash—the tether that tells the world this dog is his, and that he’s snapped a kind of existential as well as juridical lock on him. The leash is both a sign and a tool of his dog’s subjection to his rule, however incomplete and subject to breakdown that rule may be. But it can also be the means of giving his dog a way out—out of doing harm or out of harm’s reach, offering him a vector of escape, or a tug toward freedom. Leashes are also called “leads,” and certain dogs—regardless of sex, size, or breed—can lead the strongest human anywhere: out of danger, out of one’s own inclination to submission, even out of oneself. So why don’t these two make a break for it and flee this scene of humiliation and the authorities’ possible retribution? Have they, resuturing companionability, silently agreed to wait voluntarily upon the rule of others? Or have they both failed to find a way out of forced endurance of their curbside quarantine, as everyone mills around, looking askance and asking themselves, just where does this guy end and his dog begin?

    Fig. 2. Still from “Pit Bull attacking little dog on streets of NYC.” MissWooHoo11. Youtube. 27 Jun. 2012. Web. 13 Dec. 2012.

    For reasons that may or may not track consciously in his own mind, the man with the backpack standing in the street holding his dog waits in larger-than-canine awareness of what may be to come (see Fig. 2). But in the meantime no one comes near him, and not just because they might be afraid of his dog. His own quiet distress also evidently strikes others as unapproachable. The unwelcome reminder of the breakdown of human-canine fellowship has also thrown human fellowship as such under the rails of panic. What are we to one another, after all, in moments of lost control and acute, physical vulnerability? What are we to ourselves, when so liable to confusion and self-distancing? Even as they mill around, people look away. Who wants to face the image of one’s own ever-faltering companionateness and inescapable psychic and bodily exposure?

    The dog (a male, by the glimpses of his prick) appears unhurt. His post-attack posture, with his upturned nose and wagging tail, may even indicate pride and pleasure. But how fares his owner? His hand looks injured. His stance suggests he may be in shock, or close to it. Yet no one goes over to talk to him, to ask if he’s OK, to offer some water, or simply to stand with him as he submits to the clamor of 911 calls going on around him; while the owner of the smaller, more aristocratically-stereotyped breed—who is seen first somehow having fallen or been pushed beneath the fray and then helped to her feet and given back her injured dog—shrieks “Help me!” and runs down Broadway with the Pekingese (whose sex is indiscernible from the video) in her arms. In terms of social space, abjection seems to slow him down, whereas wounded entitlement seems to speed her up. His depressive solemnity roots him to the spot, while her concern for the “me” that is both herself and her dog propels her down the cleared path to envisioned succor. Does only one of them have a right to the goodwill of others? Or has only one of them been trained to chase it?

    Violence can have a deceptively shattering relation to social space, apparently allergizing people against physical or psychic contact while actually shoring up certain craved or craven identifications. A man who hits his dog is an iconic candidate for ostracism, not least because he manifests the frustrations that bind up so many companionate couples’ own thwarted or perverse expectations of one another in a generalized political bewilderment. The video shows the Pit Bull’s owner hitting his dog repeatedly, desperately trying to force him to release the Pekingese. Does anyone present know that’s not what you’re supposed to do to break up a dog fight? Does anyone present know or care why one dog attacked another in the first place: whether it was prey drive or play drive, fear or anger, lust or boredom? Besides, wouldn’t we all like an excuse to let loose a fist at the object of our disappointments? Why won’t he obey my command to let go? This dog has spent his entire life hanging on my lips, listening for and puzzling over every word that passes through them, crazily adorning them with licks that might even be kisses. But right now, I’m just a gaping impediment to his overwhelming urge, his anima animated.

    Not incidentally, for some onlookers and viewers there is the damning aspect of the young man’s proletarian togs and shouldered bedroll, contrasted with the lost slipper of the Pekingese’s more bourgeois-appearing female owner, whose shopping bags have been left scattered on the pavement. No one goes near this man, almost as if he were Dickens’s Bill Sikes: that down-and-out rogue contaminated, not so much by association with his Bull Terrier, as by his perennial wariness and fear of the state’s power and vengeance, which he viciously imitates by beating and even trying to kill the dog he nevertheless hopelessly loves. Another man with a hand wounded from the fray gathers up some of the woman’s flotsam of emergency. (The raw video itself is a kind of flotsam or remnant, left for us to pick up online, uncertain as to what and who counts). But which dog was it, the Pit Bull or the Pekingese, who bit this good Samaritan’s hand when he stepped in to help separate them? Is that what 911 will come to investigate, in the interest of restoring a class structure that the scene can barely be imagined to disrupt—vividly framed as it is, thanks to the videographer’s accidental shot/countershot, by the figural crossfire between the branch offices of Chase Manhattan and Wells Fargo that just happen to face one another at this could-be-anywhere intersection (see Fig. 3 below)? It’s uncanny how well these shots of squared-off, brick-and-mortar bank branches conjure the lingering, face-to-face pretense of capitalism’s invisible flows of violence and value, even as a scene of palpable violence—and of possibly other kinds of value—plays out between them. There’s nowhere that disaster capitalism doesn’t delight in hiding itself behind people’s fears of vagrants and of dogs. And, almost everywhere, the cataracts of breed mythology make Pit Bulls the instantly recognizable garb of the dangerous classes.

    Fig. 3. Stills from “Pit Bull attacking little dog on streets of NYC.” MissWooHoo11. Youtube. 27 Jun. 2012. Web. 13 Dec. 2012.

    Under New York law (AGM, Art. 7, §123), a “dangerous dog” determination can result in a wide range of sanctions, from mandatory public muzzling to special insurance to execution. But whatever might end up happening to the aggressor-dog in this video, it will have been his place, and in one way or another the place of his owner as well, to be evaluated and to have a determination made about him based on a certain moment: a moment that brought two dogs, two dog owners, and a number of other people into direct bodily contact with each other, in a scrambled present of many barely ascertainable, emotional and physical vulnerabilities and agitations on the part of every creature present. Most of this promiscuous, terrifying contact becomes interrupted within seconds, quickly making room for the restoration of a coarse wariness that invites congealing arguments about rights, redress, and—most of all—the putative, class-based truths about a certain kind of dog owner and a certain breed of dog.

    Other more flexible and nuanced, less knowing and defensive orientations to improved solidarities have proven difficult to imagine, and even more difficult to bring to the reshaping of our moral and legal regimes (Hearne, Dayan). These difficulties are dismally underscored by other recent examples, including that of Star and homeless epileptic Lech Stankiewicz just a few blocks away at 14th Street and 2nd Avenue, and that of Lennox and the middle-class Barnes family in Northern Ireland. The difficulty of watching something better fail to unfold is also indicated by the 10th-and-Broadway video’s coming to such an abrupt end, when the camera busy collecting the present is suddenly switched off, or the “raw feed” is deemed by someone to have shown enough. The aggressor-dog’s owner and the videographer either can’t or won’t engage one another’s look. Yet each time it is played, the video helps us to rehearse the scene enacted by its subjects, a scene of indeterminate rather than conclusively failed solidarity: while there are no obvious glances of reassurance or verbal support, there is an inclination or a compulsion on the part of some, at least, to stay in the impasse, despite not knowing what to do (Berlant). The video rehearses the question: whose marginality are any of us, in fact, looking at, and in looking at it, how does any of us apprehend what remains to be seen and to be done both before 911 arrives as well as after the video goes viral? There are so many different circles of isolation and incomprehension that might be breached if we could bring uncustomary attentiveness to bear on the circumstancing of fear and aggression, of projection and dissociation, of frail and errant attachments, of the predatory and the victimized, and, perhaps most of all, of our sheer vulnerability: of the flesh that pulls and tears and can barely hold itself ready for the catastrophes to come, and of the other bodies to which we hold ourselves close, for all the supremely loving and barbaric purposes that transect us and make us neither human nor animal but only incomparably akin to each.

     
    Max Cavitch is Associate Professor of English and Cinema Studies at the University of Pennsylvania, where he is also a member of the Perelman School of Medicine’s Consortium on Bioethics, Sexuality, and Gender Identity. He is the author of American Elegy: The Poetry of Mourning from the Puritans to Whitman (Minnesota 2007) and of numerous articles on literature, cinema, and psychoanalysis in American Literary History, Common-Place, Contemporary Psychoanalysis, Early American Literature, Senses of Cinema, Screen, Slant, and Victorian Poetry. He is a member of the Executive Council of the McNeil Center for Early American Studies and co-edits the Center’s Early American Studies book series, which is published by the University of Pennsylvania Press.
     

    Works Cited

    • Berlant, Lauren. Cruel Optimism. Durham: Duke UP, 2011. Print.
    • Bruns, Axel. Blogs, Wikipedia, Second Life, and Beyond: From Production to Produsage. New York: Peter Lang, 2008. Print.
    • Dayan, Colin. “Dead Dogs.” Boston Review Mar./Apr. 2010: 26-28. Print.
    • Dean, Jodi. Blog Theory: Feedback and Capture in the Circuits of Drive. Cambridge: Polity, 2010. Print.
    • Freccero, Carla. “Carnivorous Virility; or, Becoming-Dog.” Social Text 29.1 (2011): 177-95. Print.
    • Galloway, Alexander. Protocol: How Control Exists after Decentralization. Cambridge: MIT P, 2004. Print.
    • Hansen, Mark B. N. New Philosophy for New Media. Cambridge: MIT P, 2004. Print.
    • Haraway, Donna J. When Species Meet. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2008. Print.
    • Hearne, Vicki. Bandit: Dossier of a Dangerous Dog. New York: HarperCollins, 1991. Print.
    • Manovich, Lev. The Language of New Media. Cambridge: MIT P, 2001. Print.
    • Massumi, Brian. Semblance and Event: Activist Philosophy and the Occurrent Arts. Cambridge: MIT P, 2011. Print.
    • MissWooHoo11. “Pit Bull attacking little dog on streets of NYC.” Youtube. 27 Jun. 2012. Web. 13 Dec. 2012.
    • Poster, Mark. Information Please: Culture and Politics in the Age of Digital Machines. Durham: Duke UP, 2006. Print.
    • Richter, Felix. “4.4 Billion Camera Phones.” Statista. 13 Oct. 2012. Web. 17 Dec. 2012.
  • “Kenosha, WI”

    Rory Ferreira (bio)
    St. Norbert College
    rory.ferreira@snc.edu

    I started writing raps seriously when my friend Robert drowned buck naked in a public pool. Like any self-absorbed, depressed-for-no-reason 19 year old, I was reading Camus, and the absurdity he talks about became, rather suddenly, all too real. This happened a year ago and resulted in the creation of my first mixtape, “I wish my brother Rob was here.”
     
    The song I chose to share is from my debut record, an overly-complicated double-EP titled “things that happen at day // things that happen at night,” which is probably trying too hard to deal with metaphysics, in particular problems of dualism. It’s the sort of armchair philosophy that feels good to me and makes for nice songwriting.
     
    This song is influenced to some extent by white men I don’t know like Bertrand Russell and Richard Linklater and even more so by the folk band Megafaun and their song “The Fade.” That song and this one are about the terrible, creeping darkness that starts to nibble at memories you cherish of people who are dead. And the burden of knowledge. And the guilt that comes with being relieved that you are now incapable of filing through mental rolodexes for mundane details about people who are dead because those rolodexes have deteriorated. At this point the Bertrand Russell bits kick in, and I half-heartedly escape by becoming an android with programmed memories and responses. It seems like a ludicrous way out until you realize that’s all adolescence and high school really is: android programming.
     
    The instrumental was made by my pal Will Mitchell (Pomona College) and it begins with him reading the last lines of our hero David Foster Wallace’s magnum opus, Infinite Jest. “And when he came back to, he was flat on his back on the beach in the freezing sand.” It seemed like the only way to describe surfacing from depression after the death of a close friend. Will possesses the uncanny ability to make instrumental pieces that perfectly mirror the type of bleak machinations running through my head during times of duress. The vague typewriter sounds plodding incessantly, the bombastic broken glass noises, and the bouncing bass drum that seems more at home on the latest Kanye West album—he takes these pieces and makes them fit. It’s easy to work with a guy like that.
     
    The piece concludes with a weird boast that, “If I wrote the greatest rap song, I wouldn’t let you hear it.” Obviously, I’m bluffing. I wrote what is to me the greatest song of my rap career for Robert, and I let everyone hear it. In that way, those lyrics become more and more disingenuous each day, and sometimes I hate myself for that. So I wrote another song to try to reclaim some dignity. Hopefully you enjoy it.
     
    If you are a Project MUSE subscriber click to hear audio:
     
    Track 1.
    “Kenosha, WI”

     

    Rory Ferreira is twenty and loves omelets. He studies philosophy at St. Norbert College and overuses the ethical dative. Lacking the courage to write academic papers, he started writing rap songs as Milo. His debut record, a double-EP titled “things that happen at day // things that happen at night,” will be released via Hellfyre Club on January 1st, 2013.
     

  • 2012 Los Angeles Asian Pacific Film Festival (May 10-20 2012)

    Patty Ahn (bio)
    USC School of Cinematic Arts
    pahn@usc.edu

     
    In May of 2012, Visual Communications hosted its 28th annual Los Angeles Asian Pacific Film Festival (LAAPFF), offering ten days filled with feature-length films, short programs, panels, and social events that formed a cross-section of the current state of Asian American media. Visual Communications (VC), a Los Angeles-based media collective founded in 1970 by four UCLA EthnoCommunications students, launched the festival in 1983 to promote Asian and Asian American cinema in the U.S. Initially offering a program of twenty films, LAAPFF now features more than 150 and has grown into a cultural and intellectual forum where filmmakers, producers, audiences, and critics discuss what they see dramatized on-screen: the challenges and potential futures for a minority media struggling to survive at the margins of a risk-adverse Hollywood. Strikingly, even though the modern studio system is based in Los Angeles, a city that houses one of the country’s largest and most diverse populations of diasporic Asians we have yet to see a significant increase in Asian and Asian American industry workers. LAAPFF thus aims to showcase the work of filmmakers emerging from the local L.A. communities as well within the international arena.
     
    LAAPFF 2012 seemed to portend progress as the West Hollywood-based Directors Guild of America (DGA) and Koreatown’s CGV cinema complex spilled over with excited moviegoers. At the same time, it animated, for this attendee at least, a number of uncertainties and contradictions that inevitably accompany a media environment in the midst of a major transformation around how content is produced and distributed. Abraham Ferrer, who has served as VC’s curatorial director since 1987, notes in an interview that across its name changes-“Asian American International Film Festival” (1983), “The Los Angeles Asian Pacific American International Film Festival” (1987), “VC FilmFest” (2000)—the festival has always aimed to facilitate a variety of production models and cater to multiple audiences.1 He identified three major, sometimes intersecting, trajectories in the festival’s history: one driven by independent artists, a second steered by a steadily-increasing number of filmmakers aspiring to break into the mainstream industries, and a third which emerged in the 1990s when practitioners began to experiment with online digital technologies (Ferrer). Throughout its history, LAAPFF has carefully navigated Southern California and the Asian-Pacific region’s cultural geographies while facing a shrinking pool of state resources, an increasingly cutthroat media marketplace, the differing tastes of the international art cinema circuit and global Hollywood, and the ascendance of affordable digital productions. While these pressures have been present since the festival’s inception, this year’s event highlighted some of the anxieties the neoliberal marketplace has activated within the Asian American media landscape. I offer here a critical review of LAAPFF 2012 that teases out some of these tensions and shares insights offered by VC’s veritable living archive, Abraham Ferrer, about the historical trajectories of VC and its festival.
     
    LAAPFF’s unwavering support of independent filmmakers grows out of the political groundwork paved by its founding organization. VC began in 1970 with the explicit aim of empowering members of the Asian American community to re-represent their own history and experiences. This media collective aligned with the decolonization and Third Cinema movements taking place in Africa, Asia, and especially Latin American throughout the 1960s. The term “Third Cinema,” coined by Argentine filmmakers Fernando Solanas and Octavio Gettino, encompassed a growing international commitment to creating films that would lead to the radical liberation from a U.S.-led first world capitalism, epitomized by Hollywood’s corporatized, hierarchical studio system (Mimura 30). Thus, VC built educational programs aimed at transforming filmmaking into an accessible, self-sustainable, and collaborative process (Mimura 37). These foundational commitments continue to inform curatorial choices made by LAAPFF’s programmers today, such as the decision to spotlight Musa Sayeed’s feature film debut, Valley of Saints (2012, India), at an opening night screening. Shot on location on a shoestring budget, using only DSLR cameras, no script, and non-professional actors, Valley belongs to a filmmaking tradition once embraced by VC and Third Cinema film collectives. Yet, it also stands as one among many examples of the sharp turn Asian American media has taken away from a U.S.-based identity politics once galvanized by VC.
     
    Set in the fall of 2010 against the backdrop of India-occupied Kashmir, Valley‘s story focuses on a small community living around the perimeter of Dal Lake, the region’s main tourist attraction, which now faces severe environmental degradation. The film drops us in medias res into the quotidian world of its protagonist, Gulzar, who cares for his aging uncle while working for a small boat tour business with his closest friend, Afzal. We learn early on that Gulzar and Afzal plan to leave behind their humdrum life on the lake, but Valley’s narrative does not follow a strict three-act linear structure. Rather, the film unfolds into a series of lyrical vignettes that invite us into the callow yet tender bond between these two men who together survive idleness and violence in war-torn Kashmir. Luscious, melancholic images of Dal Lake appear in many scenes, as a sense of nostalgia for pre-occupation Kashmir, when time did not feel imperiled by violently-enforced military curfews and environmental decay, is cast across the water’s reflective surface. In a post-screening Q&A with the largely Kashmiri audience, the American-born Sayeed explained that while his father, who had been a political prisoner in Kashmir, often mused about the unparalleled beauty of his homeland, Sayeed did not learn to speak Kashmiri and had only visited the region once as a child before making this film. However, rather than locating his experience of displacement within a U.S. cultural framework, he shared a deeply personal and unsettling examination of exile and return, reminding us of cinema’s power to bring together diasporic communities.
     
    Positioned from the start as an international festival, LAAPFF invites a complex range of works from its filmmakers, but it also has been inflected by broader political shifts in Asian American media culture.2 Ferrer notes that after the conservative backlash against affirmative action began to shut down academic programs like EthnoCommunications in the late 1970s, newer generations of media practitioners who came of age in the 1980s became increasingly removed from earlier political struggles. In a sense, they benefited from the groundwork built by film collectives like VC and practitioners like Arthur Dong, Christine Choi and Felicia Lowe, whose work remained committed to the struggles and issues of the Asian American community and maintaining an independent media (Ferrer). Media-makers experienced a certain representational freedom to pursue new kinds of stories. On one hand, this has allowed for more imaginative productions, like LAAPFF 2012’s program of queer shorts, I’ve Got It Bad (And That Ain’t Good). Curated by Erica Cho, this collection included pieces from Indonesia, Lebanon, and South Korea that were provocative and moving but not particularly concerned with naming the struggles of queer Asian life in different national contexts. Rather, it culled pieces like Chupachups (Kyung Ji-suk, 2011, South Korea), a story about an ardent relationship between two South Korean women who reunite one last time before one must leave to be married, with Gaysian Dream (Bernie Espinosa, 2011, U.S.), a brief peek into a young Asian American man’s fantasy world in which a chorus of drag queens (played by the Asians of Gay Men’s Chorus of L.A.) sing a version of Katy Perry’s pop single “Teenage Dream.” Another LAAPFF opening night feature, The Crumbles (Akira Boch, 2012, U.S.), narrates the tumultuous friendship between two Asian American women in their early 20s who decide to form a rock band together. Set in the Los Angeles neighborhoods of Echo Park and Silver Lake and made on a small budget with the help of a wide network of friends, family, and fellow filmmakers, the film drew a strong local community into DGA’s screening room that night, though it hardly expresses political ambitions. Rather, it more modestly shows two Asian American women playing strong leading roles in a rock film, a genre historically populated by white men in both mainstream and independent contexts.
     
    The liberalization of the U.S. marketplace throughout the 1980s and VC’s geographical and cultural proximity to Hollywood as a material place, professional network, and aesthetic/economic system partly account for the increase in LAAPFF filmmakers looking to break into the mainstream industries. During his 1981-1989 presidency, Ronald Reagan, a former Hollywood actor, held a vested interest in protecting the institutional and financial power of the major corporate movie studios, effectively gutting government funding for the arts (Holt). In many ways, mainstream avenues became the most, or perhaps only, viable option for many hopeful filmmakers. Since then, the further deregulation of the entertainment industry, the globalization of Hollywood, and the fracturing of audiences into an array of niche markets have only made it more difficult for Asian Americans to find a place in an industry that invests in minority demographics only to the extent that they are attractive for advertisers. For years, corporate executives have remained in a speculative gridlock about whether cultivating a distinct Asian American content market would result in long-tail profit, and whether Asian faces even attract Asian American viewers. Universal Pictures’ purchase of a spot in LAAPFF’s program for a sneak preview of its multimillion-dollar production Battleship (Peter Berg, 2012), underscored this dilemma. Studio executives assumed that the festival’s crowd would find the film relevant because it features a well-known Japanese actor (Tadanobu Asano) in a leading role. Ferrer admits that Battleship, which packed the theater with excited viewers, did not align with the festival’s aims of encouraging Asian American stories and images more complex than those Hollywood has historically offered (Ferrer). However, VC, one of many non-profit media organizations affected by state funding for the arts, was hardly in a financial position to turn down the studio’s offer.
     
    In the last ten years, the industry’s drawn out ambivalence toward Asian American consumers has been countered by an explosive rise of Asian American media productions on the web, fervently re-energizing the question of this community’s so-called market value. LAAPFF’s documentary feature line-up included the world premiere of Uploaded: The Asian American Movement (Kane Diep, 2012, U.S.), a 90-minute history of how YouTube has provided a platform for Asian Americans singers, actors, and comedians who would otherwise have no outlet in the mainstream market. Composed of talking head interviews with a number of online pioneers like Kevin Wu (the comedian known as KevJumba), Mike Song from Kaba Modern dance crew, and the members of Just Kidding Films, the film exudes a celebratory energy about how close Asian Americans have come to building a self-sustaining, autonomous media culture and economy.
     
    Indeed, a disproportionately high number of Asian Americans now earn a reasonable profit by monetizing their YouTube channels, proving that they do not need to go through traditional avenues like pitching to network executives or signing a deal with a major studio or record label. However, as Ferrer notes, the history portrayed in Uploaded does not situate what it dubs as the “movement” within the longer history of independent Asian American media and activism (Ferrer). While the film suggests that privatized online platforms can be used to distribute media, it does not address the limitations around the kind of content (short-form versus long-form, comedic versus dramatic, classical versus experimental, etc.) that draws the subscribers and ad dollars needed to support oneself with online media; it is not yet clear whether the self-promotional culture of YouTube can allow for the communal strategies necessary for sustaining an independent media. Online stardom hardly guarantees an opening or access for other generations of Asian American media-makers. That a group of young, talented filmmakers who have made a documentary about Asian American media must still travel through the film festival circuit to secure a distribution deal proves this. It remains to be seen whether the online media terrain will merely replicate the bottom-line logic of the neoliberal media marketplace or offer a democratic field accessible for those who actively opt to circumvent mainstream institutions like Hollywood or television.
     
    In my final exchange with Abraham Ferrer, he remarks that VC’s goal has always been, and will continue to be, to give filmmakers the tools to make cinema that speaks to its audiences. It is VC’s challenge to observe and support the growth of these artists across all platforms. Ferrer only hopes that people remember the work that this organization has done and the historical contours in which Asian Americans make their media.

    Patty Ahn is a Ph.D. Candidate in Critical Studies at USC’s School of Cinematic Arts. Her research interests include critical histories and theories of U.S. television, transnational media studies with a regional focus on the Pacific Rim, gender and sexuality, and sound and popular music. She has been published in Spectator, European Journal of Cultural Studies, and Discourse, and is currently serving a two-year term as co-chair of the SCMS Queer Caucus.
     
     

    Footnotes

     

    1. The festival initially adopted the name “Asian American International Film Festival” (AAIFF) because it borrowed its program from the traveling edition of Asian CineVision’s festival of the same name.

     
    2. For a detailed history of Visual Communications’ politics of aesthetics in relation to other Asian American film collectives active in the 1970s, see Okada.
     

    Works Cited

  • Digital Theory, Inc.: Knowledge Work and Labor Economics

    Carol Colatrella (bio)
    Georgia Institute of Technology
    carol.colatrella@lcc.gatech.edu

    Review of Katie King, Networked Reenactments: Stories Transdisciplinary Knowledges Tell, Durham: Duke UP, 2011, Rob Wilkie, The Digital Condition: Class and Culture in the Information Network, New York: Fordham UP, 2011.

     
    Over the past year, faculty members in my interdisciplinary department at Georgia Tech responded to the request by an external review for improved descriptions of our programs and department. The process of strategic planning is inherited from the corporate world and is the most obvious way that academic institutions are being pressed to function better (i.e., more like corporations). My colleagues and I struggled to agree on the best description of our research and teaching, because we knew that the reputation and future configuration of the department were at stake. Recessionary university budgets meant that we had to be both accurate and persuasive in descriptions that would be read by various interest groups: our university colleagues; administrators, including our dean, provost, and president; former, current, and prospective students and their parents; employers of our graduates; the citizens and legislators of our state who underwrite part of the budget for our institution; and the various other funding agencies and donors who contribute to our research and curricular programs.
     
    After considering what each faculty member does and relating it to the university’s recently issued strategic plan, we reached a consensus that our scholarship and curricular programs focus on culture and technology, and particularly on building and critiquing technologies, including technologies of representation. While agreeing on our core activities, however, we also recognized diverse affiliations with other disciplinary and interdisciplinary humanistic fields: rhetoric, literary criticism, creative writing, cinema studies, performance studies, and cultural studies of science and technology. Because it is impossible to be both universally transparent and cutting-edge, there are irresolvable, permanent tensions between our department’s general project and individual faculty members’ specific research; these tensions are reflected, furthermore, in the differences between our department’s configuration and those of similar departments in the state system and beyond.
     
    Our experience of strategic planning represents what Katie King calls “networked reenactment” in building community-identity and embodies what Rob Wilkie describes as the necessary, if unpaid, labor to create culture. King’s and Wilkie’s respective books, Networked Reenactments and The Digital Condition, both consider the economic forces affecting the creation, deployment, and consumption of technologies and related representations. Both books explain how macroeconomic processes affect scholarly work and undervalue it in the marketplace. Theoretically rigorous, these books are also highly pragmatic in recommending activism for social justice.
     
    In this way, Networked Reenactments and The Digital Condition have more in common than one might expect from their titles. Both texts explore the ways that media technologies are uncomfortably intertwined with entrepreneurial capitalism and with the emerging global university. Developing interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary arguments about human engagement with technology, King and Wilkie consider the constraints and rewards of recently-developed media technologies that promise empowerment while limiting return on investment. The authors discount unabashed affirmations of individual and social empowerment that appear in other cultural theories of media, and assess expanded opportunities for social networking as a poor substitute for social justice.
     
    Networked Reenactments and The Digital Condition present differently constructed, yet complementary arguments about the insufficiencies of contemporary accounts of technology and the context of global capitalism. Both books critique media’s facile representations of past and present and indict universities for going along with these dominant yet inadequate ideologies. More specifically, each points to engagements of media and “global academic restructuring,” to use King’s phrase. She understands that universities

    are venues packing simultaneous realities in multitemporal histories that interlace, variate, and shift range. Distributive processes of making, sharing, using, and modeling knowledge reach out among networking knowledge economies such that creating a product, addressing readers and audiences, and finding communication styles are all more difficult.

    (223)

    King and Wilkie explain that contemporary humanities scholarship struggles to represent accurate, accessible narratives about our engagement with science and technology. For Wilkie, such analysis must be grounded in historical materialism and should consider who contributes labor and who profits. He argues that literary criticism and theory are mere distractions so long as they do not consider such conditions. For King, representations of the past, particularly depictions of scientific exploration and discovery, are inadequate until they are unpacked by a historical materialist analysis. To teach and to do research in a university in the era of globalization presents an opportunity to consider the workings of capitalism, albeit while being subjected to and replicating its functions. Both texts have strengths and weaknesses, although the imperfections are slight and should not discourage readers. King’s Networked Reenactments interprets different texts and related social circumstances to discuss a diverse range of what she calls “reenactments”; she extends the definition of “reenactment” beyond participation in reenacted military battles and applies the term to media presentations such as museum exhibits, television shows, and Internet sites. King bases her argument on factually dense case studies organized in loose chronological order. Although the organization works well to support historical analysis of a specific period (the 1990s), it can be difficult to follow her argument because it tends to be interrupted by the factual density of the examples. As a result, summarizing the internal logic of King’s argument can result in a collage of related statements (see below), but it is rewarding because her analysis is so trenchant.

     
    Taking a different approach, Wilkie’s The Digital Condition counters the celebratory pronouncements of cultural theorists who see individual and social empowerment as inevitable outcomes of digital technology. A particular strength of Wilkie’s book is that it is clear, succinct, and straightforwardly organized. His application of Marx’s ideas to our digital economy could provoke resistance in readers who are suspicious of what can in places seem to be doctrinaire Marxism. But ultimately both Wilkie and King acknowledge the benefits as well as the costs of the technologies they discuss, share a healthy skepticism about the effects of global capitalism on production and consumption of media technology, and recommend that knowledge workers think skeptically and act beyond self-interest.
     
    Focusing on the 1990s enables King to present recent, still relevant cultural and political issues and to survey how different communities of practice explore similar ideological assumptions and material practices of networked reenactments. Her introduction reviews the general outlines of stories about past and present that are embedded in different types of reenactments, including science exhibits in museums, fictionalized historical television dramas, televised archaeological and historical documentaries, and fictional and reality TV shows that attempt to represent the past or what she calls “pastpresent,” a term referring to the inevitable inflection of present-day thoughts in any reading of the past. These topics are analyzed in greater detail in chapters 1 through 5, as King works her way through the decade with case studies of networked reenactment. The first chapter links the fantasy television shows Highlander and Xena to the political climate surrounding the formation of the European Union in 1992. King connects the reception of these shows to that of Ellen DeGeneres’s situation comedy Ellen and describes them as “examples, in telescoping layers of locals and globals, of . . . global gay formations and local homosexualities” (24). Her point that sexual communities serve as a synecdoche for national and transnational communities rings true, but instead of offering a summative evaluation of the shows’ sexual politics, she follows this point with a set of questions leading to subsequent chapters.
     
    Taking a meandering approach by emulating a walk through a museum, Chapter 2 of King’s book considers issues of national history and disciplinary claims related to the Smithsonian’s 1994 exhibit Science in American Life, which was funded by the American Chemical Society and elicited criticism from some scientists. King acknowledges other controversies that dogged the museum, including the 1991 exhibit on the American West, which critiqued the concept of Manifest Destiny, and the 1995 Enola Gay exhibit, which “the Air Force Association, the American Legion, and veterans’ groups [protested] was not going to express the view that the bombing of Japan had saved American lives” (60). She guides readers through Science in American Life by using narrative description and photos, a method she describes as “modest witnessing” along the lines of Donna Haraway, who wrote the foreword to Networked Reenactments. This witnessing sets the stage for King’s analysis of the exhibit, which exposed the conflicting “self-interests” of scientists, historians of science, and social scientists who engaged in disputes about what counts as science (is social science science?) and about whether public presentation of science should include “anti-science sentiment” (66, 61). King notes the critique of University of Maryland physicist Robert Park, who “characterized the exhibit as ‘technically superb’ but unbalanced, painting science as ‘a servant of the power structure’” (61). Park would prefer a positivist approach, identified by King as “pro-science conservatism”: “What people need to know, and are not told, is that we live in a rational universe governed by physical laws. It is possible to discover those laws and use them for the benefit of humankind” (Park qtd. in King 61). Patient, persistent readers are rewarded if they follow King’s meanderings because she enables us to work through the evidence supporting her generalized claim that the conflicts surrounding Science in American Life were “only a piece of the Smithsonian controversies coming out of the nineties, controversies in which commerce, knowledge work, and national culture are inextricably intermixed” (102).
     
    The next section of the book pursues the question of commerce in educational settings; it responds to academic capitalism, recapitulating arguments advanced by Sheila Slaughter and Larry Leslie about corporate incursions into the university and universities’ reconfiguration of their operations along corporate lines. King reports that her own use of the term “communities of practice” was protested by a student, who recognized its popularization “in the managerial domain” and thus refused to take King’s University of Maryland course that adopted the term to reference feminist practices (104). Another Smithsonian controversy discussed by King concerns Catherine and Wayne Reynolds’ withdrawal of funding for a proposed exhibit that would have contained, in historian Patricia Limerick’s words, American “portraits of individual achievement . . . [and] the obstacles against which those individuals struggled” (114-15). Media outlets reported that the prospective donors made demands incompatible with museum practice, yet the Smithsonian’s Blue Ribbon commission simply recognized inherent complications when private funds support public exhibits. King contextualizes this controversy by describing the changing purview of the museum: “its ‘national’ character and its ‘historical’ character are simultaneously long-term continuities but also relatively refocused priorities in politicized environments of the last half century” (119). This politicized refocusing is reflected in the ongoing transformation of the museum’s name: first known in the late fifties as “the Museum of History and Technology,” in the sixties it became “the National Museum of History and Technology,” in the early eighties it was “the National Museum of American History,” and the late nineties added the designation “the Behring Center” (119). The chapter concludes by recognizing that public history is inevitably “messy” in its attempt to explain competing interests while they unfold: “We cannot mine the terrors of globalization for possibilities unless we act as modest witnesses for what we are becoming” (127). Recognizing these shifts even at the level of museum naming enables King to assert a commitment to developing “relational feminist tools for progressive political work” and a willingness to look at “the limits of debunking” as part of “a critique of critique” (121). When she alludes to a feminism inherent in debunking others’ debunking, however, King does not explain what is particularly feminist about her critique other than careful observation of material practice and sensitive analysis of related ideological claims.
     
    The value of King’s argument depends on how much one appreciates her careful collage of facts as support for her general claims. For example, Chapter 3, “TV and the Web Come Together,” surveys television shows that represent the past and that present investigations of the past, such as a number of History Channel, Discovery Channel, and Nova series and episodes about ancient, medieval, and Renaissance cultures and their technologies. King describes the shows’ development, their assemblages, and their incorporation and reconfiguration of academic scholarship to engage audiences, who are presumed to be interested in

    communities of identity: what we are, what we name ourselves, shifts multiply as what we do variously with different each others connects us to multiple pastpresents. This kind of political possibility offers bits of utopianisms in a very different way than that of telling us who we should be and what we should do; instead it attempts to recognize who we are becoming.

    (159)

    She thus points to our processes of identity formation as evolving through various narrative reconfigurations in diverse media. Referencing the term “repurposing” used by Jay Bolter and Richard Grusin in their book Remediation, her chapter considers “internet repurposings” of television documentaries that are supplemented with Internet sites containing related materials for extended study. This argument can be extended beyond print, television, and Internet sites to include social media such as Twitter, Facebook, Pinterest, etc.

     
    King realizes historians and other experts are sometimes drawn into projects “less to provide interpretation or insight than a fig leaf of authority for a fundamentally anti-historical enterprise” (246), as she puts it in her fourth chapter, “Scholars and Entrepreneurs.” She discusses the 2001 six-part series The Ship, a “BBC reenactment of Captain James Cook’s voyage in the South Seas . . . [that] recruited [academics], reality TV style, to be specialist volunteers and to live on his ship The Endeavour . . . in circumstances the director, Chris Terrill, was to call ‘extreme history’” (247). King reports on critical reactions to the documentary and on the testimony of participants at a 2004 Vanderbilt conference. Noting that “BBC and museum folks felt deeply misunderstood and misrepresented” while her own talk “foreground[ed] the materialities of academic capitalism” (254), King connects the example of the conference to other examples that highlight “knowledge transfer” and thereby identifies the “entrepreneurial ‘products’” shared at transdisciplinary academic conferences as themselves examples of reenactments (257, 266).
     
    In her conclusion, King describes interpreting “science-styled television reenactment” as a way to “experience alternately embodied epistemologies” (274). Looking at the work of Henry Jenkins, King argues that “the materialities of transmedia storytelling are very much intertwined with academic technology infrastructures amid transdisciplinary scholarship amid academic entrepreneurships, some ‘mandated’ and some enthusiastic or ‘evangelizing’ in technology-specific ways” (280). This final move on her part appreciates that narrative, technology, and economy are tied together in a manner that requires continuing analysis of communities of practice and knowledge making.
     
    Such an analysis is offered, happily, by The Digital Condition, which describes the shortcomings of other social theories about culture and digital technologies. Wilkie begins with the premise that “the acceleration in developments in science, technology, communication, and production” has “made it more possible than ever not only to imagine but to realize a world in which the tyranny of social inequality is brought to an end” (2). That goal has not yet been achieved, Wilkie explains, because the contradictions between labor and capital are exacerbated by technology rather than eliminated by it (72). For example, technology provides professors with “more freedom in the classroom” without changing “the relation of productive and unproductive labor,” for “regressive tax policies that favor the rich over the poor” make public universities turn “towards corporate logics as a way of coping with less and less financial resources” (99). Such choices depend on how surplus value is calculated in the capitalist economy, a point that becomes the heart of Wilkie’s argument:

    Instead, these changes are a reflection of the fact that all aspects of life are being turned towards realizing as much of the surplus value expropriated during production into capitalists’ profits as possible. As such, it is not new technologies or control over how one works that will change this. The solution is transforming the economic relations which create these conditions. What is necessary for real transformation, in short, is freedom for all from a system driven by the private accumulation of surplus value.

    (98-99)

    Thus, when others concentrate on the digital enhancement of individual lives and creation of social progress, Wilkie is more disillusioned about achieving these outcomes in a capitalist economy.

     
    His first chapter explains how most cultural theorists have separated cultural from economic concerns: “It is not that cultural theory simply fails to describe the economic inequalities of digital society; it is that in the context of contemporary theories of digital culture—which focus on consumption over production, desire over need, and lifestyle differences rather than class—cultural studies turns class into a safe concept . . . [that] is hollowed out of any explanatory power” (5). Wilkie counters the work of contemporary thinkers such as Nicholas Negroponte, Jeremy Rifkin, and Zillah Eisenstein who see technology, and particularly access to digital technology, as eliminating class differences. Wilkie finds a similar omission of property in Mark Poster’s What’s the Matter with the Internet?, identifying Poster’s argument as “a clear example of the way in which the economic divisions of the digital condition are rewritten as conflicts other than those shaped by the relations of production” (22). The Digital Condition instead “reads” the digital according to “the historical materialist theory . . . that reconnects questions of culture to the objective relations of class, labor, and production” (7).
     
    Stipulating that a worker’s labor is property and that property is a key, albeit underappreciated, factor in a digital economy, Wilkie asserts that “class, in short, is an objective relation,” one that

    is determined not by the consumption of materials—whether, for example, both the lord and the serf eat from the same harvest and thus think of themselves as part of the same community or whether the owner and the workers spend their free time gaming online and consider themselves members of a gaming clan—but rather by the relationship to property that exists between these social groups.

    (27)

    Wilkie succinctly summarizes counterarguments by others, including Daniel Bell, who recognizes “traditions” and not “economics” as determining “the development of society and the uses of technology” (30). Comparing Bell’s ideas about capital with Jean Baudrillard’s, Wilkie concludes that “what both theorists share is the underlying assumption of a soft technological determinism” privileging knowledge as capital (33).

     
    Objecting to the idea that knowledge constitutes capital, Wilkie argues that it is labor that produces technology (36). He writes that Martin Heidegger locates “the alienation of the individual in contemporary society not in capitalism but in the instrumental logic of technology,” noting that what Heidegger “presents as a ‘spiritual’ renewal—creativity—is simply a recognition that it is the labor power of works that creates value” (41). Resisting Thomas Friedman’s characterization of the iPod as an example of technology empowering the consumer, Wilkie recognizes it as technology proceeding from human labor. Similarly, in his second chapter, he points out that

    technological developments produce value only in the sense that they are products of labor and therefore contain an amount of extracted surplus value, and that they are used to increase the productivity of labor within the working day, thereby indirectly contributing to the production of future surplus value. Machines do not produce value in themselves but only as instruments of human labor.

    (100)

    The second half of The Digital Condition links analyses of literary and digital theory and close readings of literary and cinematic texts that comment on human engagement with technology in order to advance Wilkie’s argument about labor and surplus value under global capitalism. He reads William Gibson’s Pattern Recognition and Bruce Sterling’s Mirrorshades in relation to theories of globalization. In chapter 4 (“Reading and Writing in the Digital Age”), Wilkie cites theories of digital text by N. Katherine Hayles and George Landow, among others, to explain “the open ideology of digital textualism” (126). The Digital Condition takes a dim view of “the Platonic theory of mimesis” and “the Derridean theory of nonmimesis,” preferring instead “the historical materialist theory of nonmimetic reflection” (146). In his concluding chapter 5 (“The Ideology of the Digital Me”), Wilkie acknowledges that Dark City and The Matrix take up “the discursively complex theories of writers such as [Antonio] Negri, [Bruno] Latour, and [Donna] Haraway” to popularize their “new ideologies” (180). Unfortunately, these films interpret contemporary conditions in ways “that extend, rather than challenge, capitalist relations” (186).

     
    In contrast, for Wilkie, technological innovation is linked to “the increasing productivity of labor,” which has not enhanced the lives of workers; instead, “the gap between the richest and poorest Americans has continued to grow at an increasing rate” (188). Wilkie disagrees with digital theorists who argue that “the contradiction between capital and labor is one of a residue of living labor that will be eliminated by the automation of production” (189). At the end of the study, Wilkie reasserts his claim that technology, far from liberating workers, “becomes a hindrance to progress” (194). His final recommendation is that cultural theory must “return to the concepts of class, labor, and production so as to be able to understand how the forms of everyday life are shaped by the economic relations and thus how and why the development of technology means they can be transformed in the interests of all” (195).
     
    How technologies, and particularly media technologies, serve the interests of an elite socioeconomic class is the common concern of both books under review. While King provides vivid collations of facts and assertions to demonstrate multiple interests unfolding in the production and reception of 1990s reenactments such as fictional and documentary television series and museum exhibits, Wilkie demystifies lofty speculations about technological empowerment by providing a rigorous account of how the few profit from the labor of the many in the current digital economy. These are complementary rather than contradictory arguments that press readers to think more deeply about the technologies we buy, use, and invent. Both texts enjoin us to develop social actions based on careful analysis rather than on commercial claims. The take-home lessons for me—to indulge in corporate-speak—include that technology constrains as it enables; that its efficiencies represent often unheralded, frequently under-rewarded labor; and that interactions of technology and culture can be tracked but not predicted.

    Carol Colatrella is professor of Literature and Cultural Studies in the School of Literature, Media, and Communication; Associate Dean for Graduate Studies and Faculty Affairs in the Ivan Allen College of Liberal Arts; and Co-Director of the Center for the Study of Women, Science, and Technology at the Georgia Institute of Technology. Colatrella’s books include Evolution, Sacrifice, and Narrative: Balzac, Zola, and Faulkner; Literature and Moral Reform: Melville and the Discipline of Reading, and Toys and Tools in Pink: Cultural Narratives of Gender, Science, and Technology. She co-edited (with Joseph Alkana) and contributed to Cohesion and Dissent in America. Technology and Humanity, an anthology she edited and to which she contributed, has just been published. Since 1993, she has served as Executive Director of the Society for Literature, Science, and the Arts and editor of the SLSA newsletter Decodings.
     

  • Political Realism and the Cultural Imaginary

    Graham Hammill (bio)
    University at Buffalo, SUNY
    ghammill@buffalo.edu

    Review of Filippo del Lucchese, Conflict, Power, and Multitude in Machiavelli and Spinoza: Tumult and Indignation. New York: Continuum, 2009.

     

    Filippo del Lucchese’s Conflict, Power, and Multitude in Machiavelli and Spinoza is a welcome addition to the growing collection of scholarly works that firmly place Spinoza in a tradition of radical political thought. This movement began in France in the late 1960s with the publication of Gilles Deleuze’s Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza and Alexandre Matheron’s Individu et communauté chez Spinoza (Individual and Community in Spinoza), and with Louis Althusser’s many courses on Spinoza during those years. This reading of Spinoza was introduced to the Anglo-American academy through the translation of these works and others, including Etienne Balibar’s Spinoza and Politics, Antonio Negri’s Savage Anomaly, and the seminal essays in The New Spinoza. One of del Lucchese’s main contributions is to link Spinoza to Machiavelli. Taking up the line of thinking developed by intellectual giants like Althusser, Deleuze, Negri, and Balibar, del Lucchese persuasively shows that much of what is radical in Spinoza comes from his ongoing engagement with Machiavelli. Machiavelli’s break with humanism and Thomism—his penetrating effort to recast virtue as a combination of force and display—formed the kernel that developed into Spinoza’s profoundly democratic political philosophy. In making this argument, del Lucchese also contributes to contemporary critical discussions concerning justice and violence, multiplicity, power and resistance, and the questions that these issues raise for democratic theory. Exposing and elaborating the lines of affiliation between Machiavelli and Spinoza, del Lucchese offers a version of democracy that stands as an alternative to the liberal model based on security, contract theory, and the transfer of rights to state authority. His book is an excellent contribution to the study of democratic theory and the history of radical political thought.

     

    Del Lucchese’s central premise is that Machiavelli and Spinoza both take dissensus as a political norm. This presupposition distinguishes these two thinkers from the political thought that preceded them as well as contemporary visions of politics that take unity and agreement as desirable ends. What Spinoza learns from Machiavelli, del Lucchese argues, is the idea that power and crisis are not at odds—that crisis is not an exception to the state or to political community but is one of the means by which power is expressed. As he writes, “A crisis that faces people and states, princes and peoples, does not represent an exception to the rule.” Instead, “crisis and power . . . intertwine, overlap, and meld together within the limits of a recursive relationship in which one necessarily refers to the other” (2). Del Lucchese then shows how this insight leads Machiavelli and Spinoza after him to develop political and metaphysical systems in which crisis is not mediated by sovereignty but is productively internal to the systems themselves.

     

    Del Lucchese tends to proceed through finely argued analyses of Machiavelli and Spinoza, but it is also quite clear that he intends his analysis to serve as an antidote to the double romance of the Schmittian decision and bare life, which Giorgio Agamben posits as the “hidden matrix” of Western sovereignty (45). Schmitt conceives of crisis as a break from political norms, and for that reason he argues that it demands an excess of sovereign power. Crisis must be mediated by the personal authority of the sovereign, who alone has the right to return the state to normal operating procedures through his capacity to decide the exception. Agamben’s analysis of bare life begins with a critique of Schmitt but then goes on to develop a complementary account of sovereignty and crisis through the lens of biopower. The excess of sovereignty identified by Schmitt results in an inextricable bond between the sovereign unfettered by law, on the one hand, and bare life stripped of legal protection and vulnerable to the cruelest and most sadistic operations of power, on the other hand. Responding to Agamben’s argument, del Lucchese writes that

    “bare life,” in this sense, is more of a theoretical figure than a real thing. It is a radically negative concept intended to express the lowest possible degree of humanity, reduced to an inert object. Now, the philosophy of Machiavelli and Spinoza denies that bare life can exist at all, negating its “ontological reality,” if you will. The philosophy of resistance and the absolute affirmation of life that emerges from the pages of these thinkers prevents us from thinking about the “bareness” of life; and life is never submitted to the violent actions of power as a purely passive object.

    (45)

    This is not to say that Spinoza and Machiavelli shy away from scenes of raw political violence. This is especially clear in Machiavelli, whose focus on cruelty and terror is well known. Spinoza is less obviously concerned with political violence per se, but del Lucchese makes a compelling case that Machiavellian concepts of violence influence Spinoza’s accounts in the Ethics of finitude, affect, and modes. When del Lucchese argues that that the philosophies of Machiavelli and Spinoza deny bare life, his main point is to insist that resistance, successful or not, can never fully or finally be expunged from political life once crisis is understood to be an expression of power, part of the norms of political operations. In no way does del Lucchese deny the sense of oppression that bare life as a concept aims to capture; rather, he argues that the figure obscures both the conflicts brought about by resistance and the resourcefulness of political agents that for Machiavelli and Spinoza form “the ontologically constitutive dimension of politics” (47).

     

    One of this book’s real strengths is the way that it draws out congruencies between Machiavelli and Spinoza, but this strength also comes at a cost. Some readers might object that the congruencies del Lucchese uncovers obscure a more complex sense of reception history. The version of Machiavelli that del Lucchese presents is clearly Spinoza’s Machiavelli. By the seventeenth century, Machiavelli’s works had become a weapon used across a range of political thought—including Reason of State, Huguenot resistance theory, French libertinism, and English revolutionary writing—in the effort to conceptualize state power, citizenship, and the rights of the oppressed. I think that del Lucchese’s theoretical rigor and penetrating analyses more than make up for this potential shortcoming. Scholars committed to a richer sense of intellectual history will learn much from this book.

     

    Del Lucchese’s argument proceeds in three stages. His first move is to show how Machiavelli and Spinoza develop a realistic approach to politics that displaces classical and theological notions of the common good. Rooted in a natural, ontological order—the natural order of master and slave or of husband and wife—the common good is better understood as a rhetorical ploy used by tyrants and others to justify systems of oppression. As Machiavelli and Spinoza show, once we understand political agents to be motivated by desire, passion, and interest, rather than reason, “there no longer exists a stable, sure perspective from which the common good can be defined. What exists in its place is a plurality, a clash of interests and demands” that only look like “private ambition” from an older, classical point of view (29).

     

    In a second move, Del Lucchese deepens the sense of community implied by this realistic perspective, by discussing the central role of conflict in Machiavelli and Spinoza’s sense of ontology, institutions, and political concepts. Del Lucchese shows how, on one level, conflict has to do with Machiavelli and Spinoza’s sense of political ontology—that is, the sense each has of individuals as internally conflicted, active agents operating in a world of ongoing contestation. On another level, conflict is built into instructional life. In The Discourses, for example, Machiavelli elevates Rome over other ancient city-states because it was able to build conflict between the patricians and the plebeians into its system of government, which for Machiavelli was the strength of the Roman republic. On yet another level, conflict becomes the ground from which received political and juridical concepts can be rethought. In a set of brilliant analyses, del Lucchese shows how Spinoza took up Machiavelli’s analysis of institutional life in order to reconceive terms that seem to be on the side of peace, security, and discipline. Conflict, he persuasively argues, is at the core of Spinoza’s understanding of obedience, natural right, and participation in civic life. In a particularly illuminating set of pages, del Lucchese claims that conflict is also at the core of Spinoza’s understanding of law, which from one perspective is a “sign . . . an effect, taken separately from its cause” (104), but from another perspective is a “battlefield” in which questions of rights and power get played out (105).

     

    Finally, in a third move del Lucchese shows how realism and conflict culminate in a political philosophy of multiplicity. At stake is Spinoza’s thinking about the multitude for democratic theory. Following Negri’s Savage Anomaly, del Lucchese argues that Spinoza takes up the figure of the multitude in response to contemporary contract theorists, Hobbes in particular. Expanding Negri’s arguments, del Lucchese links Spinoza’s engagement with the multitude to Machiavelli’s analysis of the people—as opposed to the wealthy—as a strong foundation for political rule. Following Machiavelli, Spinoza asks how multiplicity can be “affirmed” via the state “in the absoluteness of a democracy” (132). But del Lucchese’s analysis runs deeper than this, arguing that Spinoza’s analysis of multiplicity proceeds along two related lines. Multiplicity shows the need for democratic government, and it also shows the need for a critique of the autonomous individual. Del Lucchese tracks this double questioning—the multiplicity of the common and the multiplicity of the individual—first by producing an ingenious reading of diversity and animality in The Prince and then by showing how Spinoza develops the theme of diversity in the Ethics. In del Lucchese’s intricate and provocative argument, Spinoza suggests a form of political wisdom that emerges out of the multitude in the Ethics, in the well-known and difficult to understand third form of knowledge that goes beyond common notions and is associated with the intellectual love of God.

     

    One of the most surprising aspects of del Lucchese’s argument is that he takes political realism at face value. Realism is, among other things, a genre that encodes rather than simply accesses the real. Machiavelli certainly thought of himself as having a realist approach to politics—what del Lucchese calls “a concrete approach to political themes from a realistic point of view” (8)—and opposed his own emphasis on practical reason to “those who have imagined republics and principalities which have never been known to exist in reality” (Machiavelli 84). Machiavelli’s political realism was part of a broader movement in early modern Europe that included, among other things, the revival of Augustinianism, the recovery of classical writers like Lucretius, and the emergence of an increasingly strong merchant class. One strand of this movement resulted in what C. B. MacPherson has called possessive individualism and aided the explosion of capitalism in the eighteenth century. Machiavelli and Spinoza’s realism may well challenge this trend, but it would be worth understanding realism as itself a conflicted term that responded to and participated in key historical shifts.

     

    For del Lucchese, Machiavelli’s realism has to do with his conception of history as a plane of action on which virtù shapes events. Almost the inverse of Luther, for whom history reveals the inability of the human will to achieve salvation, in del Lucchese’s account Machiavelli conceives of history as the occasion for the will to assert its own shaping authority. (Here, he comes closest to J. G. A. Pocock’s reading of Machiavelli in his magisterial Machiavellian Moment.) Del Lucchese goes on to argue that Spinoza inherits and expands this understanding of history to encompass the whole of reality. But realism also involves Machiavelli and Spinoza in the politics of imagination. If, for example, the common good is not deducible from the natural order of things, for Spinoza this means that the common has to be constructed through the resources of the cultural imaginary.

     

    The politics of the cultural imaginary is one radical component of Machiavelli and Spinoza’s thought that del Lucchese does not take up. But this dimension of politics is central as each theorizes political community. One of the main lessons of the Theologico-Political Treatise is that culture is a powerful mediator of collective life, one that rivals charismatic authority. At the beginning of the Theologico-Political Treatise, Spinoza calls out tyrants for using “the specious title of religion” to “keep men in a state of deception,” so that they will “fight for their servitude as if for salvation” (389-90). Part of Spinoza’s response is to turn scripture into a cultural text—a product of human invention—so that it can no longer be used to justify authoritarian government. At the same time, Spinoza also recuperates scripture as a cultural text through which the common continues to be forged. This is for Spinoza the theologico-political dilemma: because religion can be instrumentalized in the service of oppression, it must be translated into a cultural apparatus that enables democracy. Spinoza would have learned this lesson from Machiavelli who, in The Discourses, supplements his critique of the Church with an argument in favor of Roman religion, which reinforced the norms and values of an expansionist republic. Both Machiavelli and Spinoza’s worry is that the cultural imaginary exerts such a powerful influence that it can lead the people or the multitude to act against their own desires and best interests. And this leads to the insight that the cultural imaginary has to be revised and reshaped again and again toward republican and democratic ends. This line of thinking has been pursued most powerfully by feminist scholarship on Spinoza—in particular work by Moira Gatens, Genevieve Lloyd, and Susan James. In his account of political realism, del Lucchese is paradoxically much more idealistic and utopian about the possibilities of the multitude being actualized without cultural mediation.

     

    It is very much to his credit that del Lucchese’s argument raises vexing problems like these. His rich and substantial account of conflict and multiplicity in the political philosophies of Machiavelli and Spinoza demonstrates the continued importance of these provocative and illuminating writers. In the opening pages of Conflict, Power, and Multitude, del Lucchese explains that his purpose is “to reveal the diversity and complexity of [early modernity] by emphasizing the existence of various, alternative modernities and the various conceptions of politics, law, and the state that were being formulated from the beginning of the sixteenth century to the end of the seventeenth century” (2). The alternative modernity that he reveals will be of great interest to anyone concerned with theorizing democracy today.

     

    Graham Hammill is Professor of English at the University at Buffalo, SUNY. He is the author of The Mosaic Constitution: Political Theology and Imagination from Machiavelli to Milton (Chicago, 2012) and Sexuality and Form (Chicago, 2000), and co-editor of Political Theology and Early Modernity (Chicago, 2012).

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Balibar, Etienne. Spinoza and Politics. Trans. Peter Snowdon. London: Verso, 1998. Print.
    • Deleuze, Gilles. Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza. Trans. Martin Joughin. New York: Zone Books, 1992. Print.
    • Gatens, Moira and Genevieve Lloyd. Collective Imaginings: Spinoza, Past and Present. London: Routledge, 1999. Print.
    • James, Susan. Spinoza on Philosophy, Religion, and Politics: The Theologico-Political Treatise. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2012. Print.
    • Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Discourses. Trans. Leslie J. Walker. London: Penguin, 2003. Print.
    • ———. The Prince. Trans. Luigi Ricci. New York: Penguin, 1999. Print.
    • MacPherson, C. B. The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1962. Print.
    • Matheron, Alexandre. Individu et communauté chez Spinoza. Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1969. Print.
    • Negri, Antonio. The Savage Anomaly: The Power of Spinoza’s Metaphysics and Politics. Trans. Michael Hardt. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1991. Print.
    • The New Spinoza. Eds. Warren Montag and Ted Stolze. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1997. Print.
    • Pocock, J. G. A. The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1975. Print.
    • Spinoza: Complete Works. Ed. Michael L. Morgan. Trans. Samuel Shirley. Indiana: Hackett Publishing, 2002. Print.
       
  • Moraru’s Cosmodernism

    Review of Christian Moraru, Cosmodernism: American Narrative, Late Globalization, and the New Cultural Imaginary. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 2011. Print.

     
    The critical discourse about postmodernism has recently taken a turn toward declarations that postmodernism is dead, finished, past. The aftermath of 9/11 and the trend of American fiction that is grounded in realism have prompted critics into a discussion about the post-postmodern moment that marks our existence.1 Christian Moraru is deeply invested in this discussion; in his Cosmodernism: American Narrative, Late Globalization, and the New Cultural Imaginary, he offers a unique theoretical and ethical framework for analyzing literature created in the late 1990s, after the peak of postmodernism, and raises literary and ethical questions about our contemporary moment. Moraru introduces a term that inventively describes the scope, ambition, and breadth of this period and its cultural practices: cosmodernism.
     
    Cosmodernism is, according to Moraru, a paradigm that is typical of the period after 1989 and whose main characteristic is relationality, or what he calls “being-in-relation, with an other” (2). Such relationality is manifested in American fictional narratives as an identity that is always created in relation to a wider context, surpassing the geopolitical and cultural limits of the U.S. Moraru thus sees cosmodernism as a “rationale and vehicle for a new togetherness, for a solidarity across political, ethnic, racial, religious and other boundaries” (5). Drawing on Levinasian ethics, he argues that cosmodernism’s ethical imperative and its novelty aim to bring us all together. This ethical investment is the main disparity between postmodernism and cosmodernism, and Moraru implicitly draws on the criticism of postmodernism as a socially disengaged practice, although he does not voice that stance in his text.2 Cosmodernism moreover 1) displaces our ignorance “toward returning the ‘I’ to its intellectual and moral dignity by allowing him or her to see things usually hiding in the shadow of his or her egocentrism” (75); 2) makes it possible to develop relationships in difference that Levinas introduced in his writing; and 3) introduces a “historicized argument for a cosmodern ethics” by reading the works of the late twentieth century and early twenty-first century as a “drama of with-ness” (75).3 The main characteristic of cosmodernism is, in other words, its interest in a humanity conditioned by diverse political, social, and cultural elements. Moraru explores this interest mainly by way of its linguistic performance.
     
    In the first part of the study, “Idiomatics,” Moraru examines the way that American cosmoderns treat language, recognizing in this treatment the foundation of an approach to ethics and, therefore, his own cosmodern theory as well. He recognizes a shift from a cosmopolitan view of linguistic globalism toward a multilingual, plurivocal mode. While the cosmopolitan approach was universalist, the cosmodern is idiomatic: “the cosmodern self makes itself, linguistically and otherwise, as it opens itself to the post-1989 Babel; thus, whatever this self speaks about, it speaks in tongues” (9). Using Jacques Derrida’s understanding of linguistic skills and Doris Summer’s critique of Derrida’s concepts, Moraru argues that the linguistic and national identities of this period are formulated in language “outside the stricture of . . . equivalence” (80). Americanness, for instance, fluctuates and depends on linguistic performance; linguistic and national identities are performed and created in relation to the totality of exposure to other linguistic and national identities. The American nation and native speakers are not the only measure of linguistic nationality and fluency, but rather participate in the performative act of creating “nation,” “language,” “American,” “American English,” and “native.” To illustrate this point, Moraru analyses Raymond Federman’s Double or Nothing and Chang-rae Lee’s Native Speaker, claiming that Lee “pins his hopes on the linguistic jumble itself. Set against monoglossic cosmopolitanism, his polyglossic cosmodernism . . . values . . . people’s rights not just to idioms not theirs by birth but also to idiomatic uses of these idioms” (102). In Lee’s novel, which has been celebrated for its linguistic and multicultural optimism, Moraru sees an example of the new, celebratory national and linguistic performativity that versifies and diversifies America. With their “‘Babelized’ English,” Moraru suggests, Lee’s characters acquire a linguistically cosmodern citizenship, while their multilingualism contests solidified political and cultural meanings (107).
     
    In the second chapter, “Onomastics,” Moraru analyzes naming and names in recent American narratives, focusing on the relationship between self and others displayed in the act of naming. He claims that in cosmodernism, the “name employs those others’ names to call the self and tell his or her story” (9). The onomastic imaginary is rooted in the perpetual processes of designation and identification, while it serves as a marker of with-ness. Moraru writes that cosmodern names “reveal us to the world by revealing our ties to others” (123) and that they denote not only the surpassed boundaries of the patronymic but also the boundaries of our communities; names introduce the world to us, and us to the world. Names are “anthropological vehicles of compassion” that allow us to empathize with others (155). Moraru finds typically cosmodern naming in Jhumpa Lahiri’s The Namesake and Lee’s A Gesture Life, in which the characters’ names encapsulate their interconnectedness with their pasts and presents: their histories, nations, and identities. The characters’ names are also a cultural allegory. Moraru’s onomastics is based on Derrida’s understanding of naming introduced in On the Name (1995), which exposes the postructuralist’s interest in the ethics and politics of responsibility. Moraru reinforces Derrida’s argument that a name is simultaneously a sign of otherness and a cultural approximation, as well as a deferral of presence; when a person is not present, her name teaches us about the “presence not present” (126). Moraru sees even more in names, however, namely the “distinctive affinity” that “does not jeopardize the distinctiveness of self and other. The name builds a bridge to the (other)’s side, which the other crosses not to assimilate me but to help me get a purchase on myself” (127). Moraru’s readings are captivating—especially his interpretation of The Namesake—but it is difficult to accept that they reflect the specificity of the period in question, if only because their conclusions can be applied to a vast range of literature. His understanding of onomastics—i.e., his idea that the name is always inscribed by cosmodern togetherness and is a vestibule to with-ness—is also too optimistic, although it cannot be entirely disregarded. Moraru is right to claim that in names we can recognize an attempt to create a new cultural narrative, but naming in cosmodern works, as in the cosmodern world, is often arbitrary. The name Lola in Junot Díaz’s Brief and Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao doesn’t suggest very much, for instance, and neither does the name Bruno in Aleksandar Hemon’s collection of stories.
     
    In the third chapter, Moraru turns to the “translational imaginary” that revolves around the figure of the translator in contemporary American fiction. He finds in translation the prime cultural modality of cosmodernism: “Since relationality is the keystone of the cosmodern and translation is a relational form, translation scenes and, with them, an entire translational way of seeing the world take up a central position in the cultural projections of cosmodernism” (158). Moraru describes a shift in emphasis in translation studies and its recognition that, along with linguistic decoding, translation requires cultural deciphering and therefore “establishes a relation to the other culture” (165). He reminds us of the infamous Umberto Eco example, “Oridinai un caffe, lo buttai giù in un secundo ed uscii dal bar” (“I ordered a coffee, swilled it down in a second, and went out of the bar”), with which the semiotician demonstrates that the meaning of the sentence is different to those who drink espresso and those who drink coffee from large cups. Moraru leaves the sentence in its original Italian, demonstrating that the translation allows us to understand the sentence at the linguistic level, while the meanings of not only “coffee” but also “bar” do not need to be cross-cultural equivalents. Instead of being an objective, one-way linguistic transmission from one language into another that is primarily concerned with textuality, philology, and formalism, translation regarded in this way pushes us “toward questions of identity, cultural politics, hegemony, and a relational and self-relational approach to the translator as meaning-maker” (169). Moraru insists that translation allows us to grasp and re-comprehend our own world if and when we make ourselves familiar with the world of others; the translator makes such an attempt possible. The cosmodern translation that incorporates both interpretation and deciphering thus encourages self-reading, and Moraru finds this exemplified by Nicole Mones’s Lost in Translation and Suki Kim’s The Interpreter. But the works that Moraru analyzes are all written in English, with their characters rather than their authors acting as translators. He still makes the apparently unfounded suggestion that by “translating” (fictional) worlds to American audiences, Mones and Kim also act as translators of both cultures and languages, and thereby demonstrate how the cosmodern author—unlike her predecessors—efficiently interprets linguistic and cultural disparities.
     
    In the fourth and the fifth chapters, “Readings” and “Metabolics,” Moraru pursues these theoretical premises. “Readings” is divided into three parts. The first section discusses the twenty-first century’s new “togetherness” or cohesion across social, political, and cultural differences, while the remaining two sections interpret Pico Iyer’s Abandon, Alice Randall’s Pushkin or the Queen of Spades, and Azar Nasifi’s Lolita in Tehran. These interpretations are particularly successful because of their focus on the politics that emerge between the texts and their readers. When analyzing Lolita in Tehran, Moraru is interested in “situational” reading, where the position of the interpreter marks the interpreted. Nafisi’s aesthetic world is, in fact, highly politicized exactly because “autocracy hyperpoliticizes the world, making everything political while denying political agency to the individuals in this world” (224). The politics of the book, therefore, are cosmodern because they do not stem from the content or theme inside the book but rather emerge in between the text and its readers. Moraru maintains that “The cosmodern reader thus fully ‘creates,’ and this creation honors the other, the ‘You,” and thus the higher ‘Thou,’ as reading arises in relation” (217). In “Metabolics,” an extension of “Readings,” Moraru argues that the cosmodern reading is critically transformative rather than iterative—its components transform the monolithic world into with-ness—, as exemplified by Don DeLillo’s late works and Karen Tei Yamashita’s Tropic of Orange. Moraru is invested in showing that cosmodernism has a global, transformative potential both for culture and for us; its culture “canvasses” a body of texts into which we simultaneously are born and such culture is a posteriori inscribed into us (256). Those gestures are global as well as “mondializing” in nature, since within a mundus, “while touching, mingling, and turning into one another, bodies nevertheless preserve their differential identities” (257). Cosmodernism contributes to our development as human beings by transcending the boundaries of national literatures. It is ethical in nature because relationalism is its main characteristic, not only in the sense that we are formed in relation to others, but also in the sense that those relations improve us.
     
    These postulates culminate in the final and most passionate chapter that reads as a manifesto of cosmodernism. Although the shortest, this epilogue is the most significant part of the book; it summarizes the main arguments and theoretical readings and is vibrant with the urgency of the new. Moraru claims that with Cosmodernism, he does not propose “another grand theory but a textually and contextually minded argument for cultural change in post-1989 American letters” (7). (His cosmodernism implies the recognition of an essential cultural change associated with the post-1989 moment, in spite of his constant insistence that global interconnectivity is nothing new and that cosmodern artists are not the first ones to discuss it.) In fact, Moraru’s “Epilogue: Postmodernism into Cosmodernism” is declarative in nature. He opens with a discussion of DeLillo’s understanding of the future in Cosmopolis and in Underworld and recognizes a crucial question that those two texts introduce: “How should we think about the future, about time broadly?” (300). Of course the answer is in cosmodernism, which he discusses in eight points.
     
    Moraru defines cosmodernism as either a continuation of or a reaction to postmodernism. He sees postmodernism not only as a methodological, philosophical, cultural, and historical predecessor of cosmodernism, but also as a practice that disables us from successfully grasping our immediate present. Moraru claims that postmodernism cannot handle and therefore does not respond to global crisis, primarily because of its tendency to “universalize” and “westernize” non-U.S. cultural spaces. Moreover, Moraru says, postmodernism’s globalization emphasizes westernization, which makes postmodernism “an aspect of the global crisis rather than its solution culturally, philosophically, or otherwise” (309). That is why a new theory needs to be introduced. Although postmodern universality is acquired and not intrinsic—which makes postmodernism problematic at the current historical and cultural moment—postmodernism nevertheless introduced a set of terminologies and methodologies for the project that will be finished well after it: cosmodernism. Unlike postmodernism, which is sensitive to the Other and minorities but reduces the Other to a theme, cosmodernism is centered around “the other’s presence [that] founds, organizes, and orients cosmodern representation rather than merely supplying it with the subject de jour” (313). Postmodernism and its theory indicate, albeit in a limited way, a historicizing move toward relationality, the main cosmodern attribute. Such a move began in the 1980s, when cosmodernism “start[ed] replacing postmodernism’s conceptual unit, the nation-state, with an ever more worlded world” (312). According to Moraru, this process has been transnational, cross-traditional, and intercultural, and although he considers 1989 the year of epochal change that pushed American culture toward “becoming a culture of relatedness,” he is careful to emphasize that cosmodernism is cross-canonical and of “soft” epochality: cosmodern elements can also be recognized in late modern as well as postcolonial works. Since cosmodernism does not have a dominant style but is characterized by relationality, Moraru reiterates that its importance lies in the ethical. Cosmodernism, he says, complicates our thinking about discourse, history, culture, and tradition by always incorporating experiences and cultures of the other, and therefore reducing our self-centrism. Cosmodernism is about others, not about the Other as a literary subject.
     
    Moraru provides a generous, optimistic vision of our contemporary moment (as well as of the future) and introduces a concept that challenges common notions about our time. While the present is customarily critiqued for its ruthless (global) politics and a whole set of questionable relationships (e.g., racial and religious), Moraru’s approach makes it possible to look at the present with admiration and pride, empowers us by emphasizing that we are ethical human beings, and re-establishes a humanism that effortlessly crosses the boundaries of social and cultural constructs. He argues that “literature matters” and that we, as scholars, should act on it. If postmodern politics is apolitical and ego-centric, then the concept of cosmodernism is needed for meaningful interaction with others and for leaving behind the sometimes tiresome discussions about postmodernism’s significance.
     
    If we in the period after the fall of communism are finally able to form our cultural identities in relation to others, however, is that because of global economy, ever-expanding capitalism, or something else? If cosmodernism draws us together, does that mean that postmodernism tore us apart? And if cosmodernism is not merely to supplement postmodernism, as Moraru claims, why is 1989 so crucial for periodization of the contemporary? Why would the ruined Berlin Wall be so important to contemporary American fiction, especially when Moraru’s literary examples include the works of Lahiri, Kim, Mones, Nafisi, Lee, and Yamashita, authors whose relationality can hardly be attributed to the end of the Cold War? Would it not be fair to say that the epochal year for American fiction is actually 2001, as Phillip E. Wegner suggests in his Life between Two Deaths, 1989-2001 (2009)?4 And what about the recent global economic crisis—does it not complicate the notion of unselfish relationality?
     
    These questions, however, do not diminish Moraru’s ambitious concept. His previous books focused on postmodern rewriting of nineteenth-century narratives—the ways in which late twentieth-century fiction writers “rework former texts for ideologically critical purposes” (Memorious 19)—and on the relationship between postcommunism and postmodernism.5 In those monographs and collections, Moraru approached postmodernism as the contemporary of postcommunism, and it is remarkable to see the evolution of his critical thought as it becomes increasingly informed by an interest in representation, intertextuality, and non-American postmodernisms, as well as by a growing interest in global, political affairs. Cosmodernism impresses by its depth and range, and offers a fascinating framework for comprehending our contemporaneity which, it seems, confuses us by its complexity as much as by the legacy of a postmodernism that, as many agree, is dead.
     

    Damjana Mraović-O’Hare is a Visiting Assistant Professor of English at Carson-Newman College. She has published in Criticism, Twentieth Century Literature, Modern Language Studies, and World Literature Today.
     

    Footnotes

     
    1. For a more detailed discussion of postmodernism, see, for instance: Burn, Brooks and Toth, Kirby, Green, Hoberek, McHale, McLaughlin, Murphy, Nealon, and Toth.
     

    2. Neil and Toth, for example, claim that postmodernism ceased to exist—and failed—for two reasons: it celebrated individualism and it was “socially irresponsible” (8). Its fall can be attributed to “its self-affirmation as an anti-ideological discourse” as well as to its function as “a vacuous and in-effectual aesthetic of the elite” (6, 7).

     
    3. Toth calls the period surpassing postmodernism “renewalism,” a term that alludes to the realistic narrative typical of fiction from the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.

     

     
    4. Using Jacques Lacan’s notion of the “second death,” Wegner argues that 9/11 should be understood as an event that repeated an earlier collapse, namely that of the Berlin Wall and, therefore, of the Cold War. He claims that only with the fall of the Twin Towers was the Cold War finally over and a “New World Order” established.

     

     
    5. Moraru’s scholarship includes: Postcommunism, Postmodernism, and the Global Imagination; Memorious Discourse: Reprise and Representation in Postmodernism; and Rewriting: Postmodern Narrative and Cultural Critique in the Age of Cloning.
     

    Works Cited

       

     

    • Brooks, Neil and Josh Toth, eds., The Mourning After: Attending the Wake of Postmodernism. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2007. Print.
    • Burn, J. Stephen. Jonathan Franzen at the End of Postmodernism. London: Continuum, 2008. Print.
    • Green, Jeremy F. Late Postmodernism: American Fiction at the Millennium. New York: Palgrave, 2005. Print.
    • Hoberek, Andrew. “After Postmodernism.” Twentieth Century Literature 53.3 (2007): 233-249. Print.
    • Kirby, Alan. “The Death of Postmodernism and Beyond.” Philosophy Now 58 (2006): 34-37. Print.
    • Lee, Chang-Rae. Native Speaker. New York: Riverhead Trade, 1996. Print.
    • McHale, Brian. “What is Postmodernism.” Electronic Book Review. 20 Dec. 2007. Web. 20 Jan. 2012.
    • McLaughlin, Robert L. “Post-Postmodern Discontent. Contemporary Fiction and the Social World.” Symploke 12.1 (2004): 53-68. Print.
    • Moraru, Christian. Cosmodernism: American Narrative, Late Globalization, and the New Cultural Imaginary. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 2011. Print.
    • ———. Postcommunism, Postmodernism, and the Global Imagination. Ed. and preface. New York: Columbia UP/EEM Ser., 2009. Print.
    • ———. Memorious Discourse: Reprise and Representation in Postmodernism. Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson UP, 2005. Print.
    • ———.Rewriting: Postmodern Narrative and Cultural Critique in the Age of Cloning. Albany: SUNY P, 2001. Print.
    • Murphy, Timothy S. “To Have Done With Postmodernism: A Plea (or Provocation) for Globalization Studies.” Symploke 12.1 (2004): 23-34. Print.
    • Nealon, Jeffrey T. Post-Postmodernism or, The Cultural Logic of Just-in-Time Capitalism. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2012. Print.
    • Toth, Joseph. The Passing of Postmodernism: Spectroanalysis of the Contemporary. Albany: SUNY P, 2011. Print.
    • Wegner, Phillip E. Life between Two Deaths, 1989-2001: U.S. Culture in the Long Nineties. Durham: Duke UP, 2009. Print.

     

  • Notes on Contributors

    Patty Ahn is a Ph.D. Candidate in Critical Studies at USC’s School of Cinematic Arts. Her research interests include critical histories and theories of U.S. television, transnational media studies with a regional focus on the Pacific Rim, gender and sexuality, and sound and popular music. She has been published in Spectator, European Journal of Cultural Studies, and Discourse, and is currently serving a two-year term as co-chair of the SCMS Queer Caucus.
     

    Jennie Berner is a Ph.D. candidate in the Program for Writers at the University of Illinois at Chicago, where she teaches English and fiction writing. Both her scholarly work and her creative dissertation – a collection of short stories – interrogate the relationship between literature and visual technologies. Her poetry and fiction have appeared in Crazyhorse, Boston Review, The Journal, and The Coachella Review.

    Sean Braune is a Ph.D. student at York University and holds a Masters from the University Toronto. His poetry has appeared in ditch, The Puritan, Rampike, and Poetry is Dead. He wrote the play Leer that was performed at Ryerson University in April 2010 and directed the short film An Encounter (2005), which won the award for excellence in cinematography at the Toronto Youth Shorts Film Festival ’09. He has published in Studies in Canadian Literature, Canadian Literature, and Journal of Modern Literature.

    Max Cavitch is Associate Professor of English and Cinema Studies at the University of Pennsylvania, where he is also a member of the Perelman School of Medicine’s Consortium on Bioethics, Sexuality, and Gender Identity. He is the author of American Elegy: The Poetry of Mourning from the Puritans to Whitman (Minnesota 2007) and of numerous articles on literature, cinema, and psychoanalysis in American Literary History, Common-Place, Contemporary Psychoanalysis, Early American Literature, Senses of Cinema, Screen, Slant, and Victorian Poetry. He is a member of the Executive Council of the McNeil Center for Early American Studies and co-edits the Center’s Early American Studies book series, which is published by the University of Pennsylvania Press.

    Carol Colatrella is professor of Literature and Cultural Studies in the School of Literature, Media, and Communication; Associate Dean for Graduate Studies and Faculty Affairs in the Ivan Allen College of Liberal Arts; and Co-Director of the Center for the Study of Women, Science, and Technology at the Georgia Institute of Technology. Colatrella’s books include Evolution, Sacrifice, and Narrative: Balzac, Zola, and Faulkner; Literature and Moral Reform: Melville and the Discipline of Reading, and Toys and Tools in Pink: Cultural Narratives of Gender, Science, and Technology. She co-edited (with Joseph Alkana) and contributed to Cohesion and Dissent in America. Technology and Humanity, an anthology she edited and to which she contributed, has just been published. Since 1993, she has served as Executive Director of the Society for Literature, Science, and the Arts and editor of the SLSA newsletter Decodings.

    Rory Ferreira is twenty and loves omelets. He studies philosophy at St. Norbert College and overuses the ethical dative. Lacking the courage to write academic papers, he started writing rap songs as Milo. His debut record, a double-EP titled “things that happen at day // things that happen at night,” will be released via Hellfyre Club on January 1st, 2013.

    Lisa Guenther is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Vanderbilt University. She is the author of The Gift of the Other: Levinas and the Politics of Reproduction (SUNY Press, 2006) and Solitary Confinement: Social Death and its Afterlives (University of Minnesota Press, forthcoming).

    Graham Hammill is Professor of English at the University at Buffalo, SUNY. He is the author of The Mosaic Constitution: Political Theology and Imagination from Machiavelli to Milton (Chicago, 2012) and Sexuality and Form (Chicago, 2000), and co-editor of Political Theology and Early Modernity (Chicago, 2012).

    Damjana Mraović-O’Hare is a Visiting Assistant Professor of English at Carson-Newman College. She has published in Criticism, Twentieth Century Literature, Modern Language Studies, and World Literature Today.

    Gregory Steirer is a scholar specializing in media studies, aesthetics, and digital culture. From 2011-2012, he served as a researcher for the Connected Viewing Initiative project at the Carsey-Wolf Center at UC Santa Barbara. He has taught television, audio culture, film, and literature at the University of Pennsylvania, the New York Film Academy, and UC Santa Barbara. He has published articles on performance theory and comics studies and has work forthcoming in the anthology Connected Viewing: Selling, Sharing, and Streaming Media in a Digital Age (Routledge). He also manages the blog Cultural Production.