Category: Volume 26 – Number 3 – May 2016

  • Notes on Contributors

    Christopher Breu is Professor of English at Illinois State University. He is author of Insistence of the Material: Literature in the Age of Biopolitics (Minnesota, 2014) and Hard-Boiled Masculinities (Minnesota, 2005).

    Judith Goldman is the author of Vocoder (Roof 2001), DeathStar/rico-chet (O Books 2006), l.b.; or, catenaries (Krupskaya 2011), and agon (The Operating System 2017). She is core faculty in the Poetics Program at SUNY Buffalo.

    Robert S. Lehman is Assistant Professor of English Literature at Boston College as well as Co-Chair of the Mahindra Humanities Center Seminar in Dialectical Thinking at Harvard University. His research and teaching focus on the relationship between historiography and literary form, particularly in literary modernism, as well as on the history of philosophical aesthetics. He is the author of Impossible Modernism: T. S. Eliot, Walter Benjamin, and the Critique of Historical Reason (Stanford University Press, 2016).

    James D. Lilley is Associate Professor of English at the University at Albany. He is the author of Common Things: Romance and the Aesthetics of Belonging in Atlantic Modernity (Fordham, 2014). His articles have appeared in such journals as ELH and New Literary History. In his next book, Impersonal Movements: On Literature and Gesture, he turns to Edwards, Poe and Melville in order to explore how voice, movement, habit, and script can function as vital gestures of literary expression.

    Ramsey McGlazer is a Postdoctoral Scholar at the University of California, Berkeley, where he works in both the Department of Comparative Literature and the International Consortium of Critical Theory Programs.

    Adam R. Rosenthal is Instructional Assistant Professor in the Department of International Studies at Texas A&M University. He researches and teaches Romantic poetry, deconstruction, love, and technology. His articles have appeared in Studies in Romanticism, MLN, Nineteenth-Century French Studies, and Pli. He is writing a book entitled, The Gift of Poetry: Romanticism, Poetic Language, and the Allure of Giving, which analyzes the Western discourse of poetic donation and its reception in the Romantic period.

    Lauren Shufran is a PhD candidate in the Literature Department at UC Santa Cruz, where she is finishing her dissertation on the impact of Reformed theology on early modern British love poetry. Her first book, which won the Motherwell/Ottoline Prize, was published by Fence Books in 2013.

    Susan Vanderborg is Associate Professor of English at the University of South Carolina. Her research focuses on contemporary book-poems, artists’ books, and multi-media poetry. She has published articles on Fiona Templeton’s Cells of Release, Johanna Drucker’s artist’s books, Darren Wershler’s the tapeworm foundry, Steve Tomasula and Stephen Farrell’s VAS, and Rosmarie Waldrop’s A Key into the Language of America.

  • Ruined Vitality

    Adam R. Rosenthal (bio)
    Texas A&M University

    A review of Wills, David. Inanimation: Theories of Inorganic Life. U of Minnesota P, 2016.

    Inanimation is the third installment of David Wills’s technological trilogy of the human, which began with Prosthesis (1995) and Dorsality: Thinking Back through Technology and Politics (2008). Like those prior works, Inanimation traces the difficult-to-sound border between life and death, the human and non-human, humanity and animality, and man and machine. In distinction to those first two forays, however, Inanimation‘s focus on figures of inorganic life sets it on a new path, one still concerned with but in no way determined by the human’s technological hang-ups. Instead, it explores the supposed dead-ends of vitality: a search for life in “all the wrong places,” as Wills puts it in his preface, including such unlikely concerns as punctuation, mechanical angels, and plush stuffed birds (x). Inanimation thus emerges out of the rubble of Wills’s now twenty-year long deconstructive project, rising up like a mechanical phoenix whose passage through life’s technicity allows it to speak (and sing) from the other side of this ruinated notion of vitality. As such, its song is both compelling and at times difficult to make out, for like any “new” species that doesn’t conform to traditional taxonomic principles, the foreignness of its cry strains the ear. At its most daring moments, Inanimation takes this risk—which is also that of catachresis—and initiates a re-education of the senses to perceive what “lives” within those inorganic structures whose ostensibly merely nominal claims to vitality Wills forces us to rethink.

    The process of sensorial retraining, and above all of hearing and seeing life otherwise, is a theme that recurs throughout Inanimation, beginning of course with its title. “Inanimation,” Wills reminds us, is not a figure of his own coinage but one born in the early seventeenth century whose verbal form, “to inanimate,” would become largely obsolete by the eighteenth (ix). Before any hint of privation or lifelessness entered its semantic field, inanimation referred to the act of enlivening or animating. Only by the mid-seventeenth century did the privative sense of dis-animation emerge. This key figure, like a Freudian primal word, thus serves to name the interpenetration of the living with the non-living, which is to say the inseparability of animate and inanimate structures that problematizes our most basic and fundamental assumptions about what it is to live. At the same time, the resuscitation of the term “inanimation” from near obsolescence constitutes the first of what we might now consider to be Wills’s acts of necromancy, in which he gives an old word new life. Like Derrida’s practice of paleonymy (the re-inscription of an old word with a new meaning), Wills’s revitalization of certain strategic figures within Inanimation— a practice he repeats with each of the work’s three main headings—alters not only their meanings and conceptual bearing but their historical trajectory, opening them to alternative survivals. It is no exaggeration to say that a kind of vital paleonymy is at the heart of Inanimation, or to note that the metaphorical value of such resuscitative acts has never been more in question. If the concept of life should not be adopted from the natural sphere but instead applied to everything that has a history (as Wills, following Benjamin, suggests), then it is precisely the vital signs of language that must above all be reckoned with, for it is a central tenet of Inanimation that “language itself generates and self-generates as a privileged form, perhaps the privileged form, of inanimate life” (xii). This also means that Inanimation is as much a force of in/animation as it is a strictly theoretical venture, and this ambivalence is inextricable from the project itself.

    What, then, is life? Inanimation enters the contemporary fray surrounding this ancient question by way of three somewhat improbable motifs. For while the prospects of artificial intelligence and androids today pose high-tech specters of the automation of the organic, by comparison Wills’s selection of the topoi of “Autobiography,” “Translation,” and “Resonance” for his work’s three parts comes as an (ostensibly) low-tech surprise. Indeed, turning back in this way to such traditional figures lends this timely work a distinct air of untimeliness, as it shows, time and again, that many of the most compelling sites of inorganic life lie less in the technological reproducibility of the human than in the structure of a textuality that has always been technological and whose performances, in spite of originating in the living subject, nevertheless remain independent of it. On each of these old figures depends a certain conception of the animate and inanimate, and Wills’s project both demonstrates the vital stakes implicit in the conceptualization of each term and rethinks—or revitalizes—the term itself as in-animated/in-animating. As such, the interrogation of each figure becomes a matter of life and death.

    Before I turn to the theoretical stakes of each of Inanimation’s three parts, it is worth noting that the thematic and conceptual links that bridge each of its nine chapters also tell a compelling story—one that, at times, threatens to overshadow these very partitions. From the autobiographical birth of the father of modern philosophy (1) and the origin of life in the father of psychoanalysis (2), to the proto-technicity of the breath that is the ostensibly organic origin of poetic spacing (4) and the spaceless frontier that marks the heartlessness of war (6), to the bloodless beating heart at the origin of love (7) and the mechanical repetition that grounds the sounds of life’s most animated mating rituals (9), Wills’s recurrent attentiveness to the automated yet bodily figures of shame, the heart, breath, and blood generate a second set of citational relations at the border of what we might think of as the organic body of the book. The effect of such underground or unconscious pathways is not so much to contradict Inanimation’s three-part structure (which certainly captures the broadest conceptual interests of the text) as it is to raise certain questions about this structure’s historical and theoretical pertinence. In what, after all, consists the urgency of juxtaposing these three problematics? And what sort of relation do they bear to modernity, or, at least, to post-Cartesian thought? Even if the “autobiography” that concerns Wills will always already have been at work in the writing of life, in reading Inanimation one wonders whether something vital within “autobiography,” or “resonance,” becomes visible only after Descartes and the emergence of the philosophico-theoretical milieu out of which modern biology surfaces.

    Whatever the historicity of these terms, one cannot read Inanimation without sensing that something radical is happening to each in the course of Wills’s meticulous analyses. In what can be classed as his cinematic style of reading, each chapter weaves together its problematic by cutting back and forth between theoretical, literary, visual, and filmic texts. The result is a juxtaposition not only of unexpected theorists and artists but also of unthought connections and constellations among the disseminated senses and conceptual fields of each term. Take, for example, the problem of “autobiography,” whose centrality to the notion of the human orients the first part of Inanimation. The question of autobiography goes straight to the heart of humanity’s claim to species superiority, or the human-animal divide; for Wills it is not merely a form or genre of writing produced by human authors, but one that embodies the alleged human privilege of autodeixis, or self-referentiality. By combining readings of explicitly autobiographical moments within the work of Descartes, Freud, and Derrida with these authors’ theoretical writings on the human and animal, and life and non-life in the Discourse and Meditations, Beyond the Pleasure Principle and Introductory Lectures, and The Animal that Therefore I am, Wills extends the autobiographical beyond its traditional, anthropomorphic sense. As Wills, following Derrida, asks in chapter one: How could we ever rigorously differentiate between the human reliance on a naming language and the organism’s writing of itself in general? The question of autobiography thus becomes not only that of anthropomorphic life writing, but a “minimal autodeictic or autobiographical ‘impulse’” as it may manifest in an organism’s tendency to replicate and self-(re)generate its vital codes in response to environmental factors (44). Such an impulse, although manifest in Descartes’s philosophical project and Freud’s psychoanalytic one, also becomes indissociable from every form of “graphic automation or inanimation that precedes and even gives rise to life” (52). In chapter two such a notion is explored through the question of “instinctual reinscription” as treated by Freud, most notably in figures of the pseudopodium and the lifedeath drive (59). If, on the one hand, the practice of autobiographical writing serves to extend (automatically) the life of the writing subject who lives on in the text and prolongs his life in its inscription, on the other hand, life itself—engaged in the automated practice of autoextension in space and time—must also be read as a form of auto-bio-graphy. Additionally, if life is understood on the basis of autokinesis and autodeixis, then language itself must be included within the living as soon as it is a matter of iteration. Thus, while autobiography may initially be understood to refer to the writing of life or the writing of the self, Wills shows that it must encompass as well something like the life of writing, which is to say, the mechanical positing of a graphic self that constitutes a kind of minimal kernel of vitality, and one that is shared by organic and inorganic entities alike. Autobiography thus comes to name, for Wills, a structural point of contact between the inorganic productions of an organic subject attempting to survive, and the vitality of a textuality whose self-differentiation is no less a marker of autoextension.

    Much of the provocation of Inanimation lies in the absolute seriousness with which it approaches the question of the vitality of text. The figures of “Autobiography” in part one, and “Translation” in part two, present points of access through which to do just this: to ask how the “life” of text, grounded in iteration, can be understood to relate in a nonmetaphorical way to the vitality of organic life. “Translation,” as a figure of transportation, metaphor, and displacement, and of literary as well as non-literary provenance, vehiculates just such an interrogation of the transitions between ostensibly divergent domains: from life into non-life in “Living Punctuations: Cixous and Celan”; from a pre-linguistic divinity into a linguistic mundanity in “Naming the Mechanical Angel: Benjamin”; and from pre-modernity into post-modernity in “Raw War: Schmitt, Jünger, and Joyce.” In each case, Wills problematizes the narrative of a fall (which is to say, of a translation) from a living, ideal, or natural state into a mechanized, automated, or technologized one. Instead, it becomes necessary to think life and afterlife in the same breath, to understand—as Wills suggests through a reading of Benjamin’s “On Language as Such and on the Language of Man” in chapter five—how the absence of “literal transfer,” or the “impossibility of such an uninterrupted passage,” makes life possible in the first place (161). Only once we have rethought the life/afterlife dichotomy through translation will we begin to be able to understand “how an afterlife retains its vital relation to life…[or] to develop an unprejudiced concept of life” (161).

    In “Living Punctuations,” such a translative critique aims at dealing a double blow, by demonstrating both the originary technicity within the organic breath of the poetic voice and the unpredictability of the life of the graphic text that is, through the diacritical punctuation mark, ostensibly tasked with re-inscribing both the presences and absences of the “original” pneumatic flow. No synopsis can do justice to the force of Wills’s considerations of Mallarmé’s and Cixous’s graphic signifiers, or to his expounding of the effects of iterability, which turns “[e]very phoneme, syllable, or word—indeed, every blank space that utters…[into] a homonym of itself, no longer being enunciated a single time but instead resounding within the echo chamber of its own space” (125). Through such iteration, the blank of the page or the point of the period are shown to live no less than the material letter, and their collective survival in literature becomes inextricable from the organic life thought to precede them.

    “Translation” thus ultimately comes to name for Wills less a process of linguistic transcription, or even, more broadly, the process of doubling that turns an original presence into a secondary, artificial representation, than it does an act that betrays the originary technicity that haunts any displacement and that makes displacement im/possible in the first place. Indeed, before there is even any translative “act,” the translatability of life, we could say, renders it always already prosthetic, and thus structurally dependent on an afterlife to come.

    In turning from “Translation” to “Resonance,” the third and final section of Inanimation moves from the problems of borders and thresholds towards those of harmonies and compatibilities. It takes up the assumed synchrony of sonic and bodily couplings to show the impossibility of immediacy within these figures of fusion. In this way, through explorations of Nancy’s “exscription” in chapter seven, Godard’s struggle with music and image in eight, and Descartes’s meditations on animality in nine, Wills asks whether an immediate contact—between bodies, the elements of filmic narrative, or birds in song—could ever be possible. If not, if the natural effusions of the heart and the amorous embrace (like the hand-to-hand combat between enemy combatants explored in chapter six) can never express themselves without succumbing to some degree, however slight, of rhetorical flourish or technical prostheticization, then, Wills concludes, the animacy of the animate will also necessarily be contaminated by inanimacy, automation, and technicity. Resonance thereby turns from a figure of harmonious or organic continuity, into one of originary discontinuity and mediacy, and life, whether cinematic or sexual, begins only on the condition of this disjunction.

    Like both Prosthesis and Dorsality, Inanimation tirelessly draws out the structural parallels between so-called organic life and its inorganic others. Like those other works, its writing betrays an adeptness, sprinkled with playfulness, that culminates in Wills’s distinct, even unmistakable voice. Yet for all that, this voice somehow remains unfamiliar and perhaps even unclassifiable, indistinguishably human and inhuman, autobiographical and auto-bio-graphical. What kind of animal is Inanimation? I proposed, in beginning this review, that its call was that of a hybrid beast: both animal and machine, living and dead, yet also, and irreducibly, fantastic, as any new addition to the bestiary must at first appear. The forms of inorganic life that Inanimation advances lie at the edge of comprehension, and this is its greatest risk and reward.

  • Intimacies of Exile

    James D. Lilley (bio)
    University at Albany

    A review of Agamben, Giorgio. The Use of Bodies. Trans. Adam Kotsko. Stanford UP, 2016.

    At the close of The Use of Bodies, Giorgio Agamben describes a peculiar mode of thinking that is less concerned with any fixed outcome, goal, or particular purpose than it is with the purely formal dimension of its ponderings: a hiatus that thinking installs in the normal operation of the everyday, a fragmentation of the actual through which something (necessarily vague, shimmering at the threshold of possibility) might emerge. At stake in the style of such thought is not only the cogency and coherence of Agamben’s massively influential Homo Sacer series, which The Use of Bodies attempts to conclude in a complex intertextual manner. Such a dimension of thinking also plays a pivotal role throughout Agamben’s varied attempts to reanimate the potentialities of philosophy, politics, ethics, language, the body, nature, art, and love. After all, “Politics and art,” as Agamben avers, “are not tasks nor simply ‘works’: rather, they name the dimension in which works . . . are deactivated and contemplated as such in order to liberate the inoperativity that has remained imprisoned in them” (278). But what does such contemplative deactivation look like, in what ways has “inoperativity” been fettered in the past, and how might this work of thinking ultimately free it from its chains? These are some of the most important questions that drive both the form and the content of The Use of Bodies.

    Before we look at the movement of Agamben’s thought across the three sections of his book, it might be helpful to return—as the author does on several occasions—to the central claim of the work that inaugurated his Homo Sacer series. Here we learned that the history of Western philosophy is rooted in a particular form of relation between two new dimensions of life, zoè and bios, that define for Aristotle in De anima the sphere of politics (196). In the same way that, in The Open, Agamben explores the movement of an “anthropological machine” that obsessively polices the threshold between animal life and its properly human form, we might say that politics in Homo Sacer names the machine that governs the relation between the mere, natural fact of living (zoè) and the particular, political form of life (bios) (29). This form of life can exist only insofar as it is distinguished from bare life; but at issue here is not simply a matter of formal classification and demarcation: what is peculiar and new (even modern) is the way that these two terms relate to each other. Instead of a simple, binary opposition between zoè and bios, Agamben argues that Aristotle relates these conceptual couples in the manner of what he (following Jean-Luc Nancy) calls the “ban.” More akin to a state of exception than to utter indifference or unbridled otherness, “the relation of exception is a relation of ban. He who has been banned is not, in fact, simply set outside the law and made indifferent to it but rather abandoned by it, that is, exposed and threatened on the threshold in which life and law, outside and inside, become indistinguishable. It is literally not possible to say whether the one who has been banned is outside or inside” (28-29). Homo Sacer shows how this paradoxical form of sovereignty has continued to pattern our political destiny in the West, and most famously dwells on the ways in which of the “ban” is transformed by more recent, biopolitical accelerations, where the abandoned homo sacer no longer dwells along the exceptional outskirts of the polis but is instead included among its population. As such, Agamben’s assessment of modern forms of community and politics mirrors the nomos of the concentration camp. Put more formally, then, the “ban is the simple positing of relation with the nonrelational” (29).

    If Homo Sacer offers a genealogy of the ban and shows how it has foreclosed the potential for properly political forms of mobilization and resistance, in The Use of Bodies Agamben offers readers something that his originary text could only gesture toward: a critique of the ban itself. As he anticipated in Homo Sacer, such a critique would “have to put the very form of [the ban’s] relation into question, and to ask if the political fact is not perhaps thinkable beyond relation” (29). For example, Agamben now finds in Plotinus (in many ways the unexpected hero of his text) “a new and more enigmatic figure of the ban. . . . in which bare life is . . . transformed and inverted into something positive, having been posed as a figure of a new and happy intimacy” (236). Plotinus’s reworking of the ban opens onto “a superior politics” insofar as it “no longer has the form of a bond or an exclusion-inclusion of bare life but that of an intimacy without relation” (236).

    Here and throughout the text, The Use of Bodies challenges readers to rethink the potentialities of how we relate to life. The first part is concerned with a specific dimension of that relation, use, and the ways in which a certain mode of use (what Agamben will call “use-of-oneself”) resists capture and escapes the logic of exchange (33). The second part explores our relation to life from a more formal, ontological perspective; in chapters that foreground a dazzling array of different approaches to the relationship between existence and essence, Agamben shows how only a radically new, modal ontology can help Western philosophy avoid its dangerous pitfalls and troubling aporias. In the final, third part, Agamben outlines the particular relation to life that such a modal ontology demands, a “form-of-life” that is not so much “defined by its relation to a praxis (energeia) or a work (ergon) but by a potential (dynamis) and by an inoperativity” (247). It is the same peculiarly inoperative, non-directional effort that we originally located at the heart of Agamben’s challenge to thinking—and that here becomes identified with the task to “think contemplation as use-of-oneself” (64).

    I want to conclude by briefly following some of the major developments of this style of thought over the three parts of The Use of Bodies. If the goal of the book is to “liberate the inoperativity that has remained imprisoned” in the concepts of Western thought, it is hard to imagine a more audacious starting point for such a project than the notion of use itself (278). In what ways is it possible to contemplate, let alone deactivate, a concept that seems so inseparable from the work of praxis and the instrumentality of operation? Even stranger—and destined to stir controversy—seems Agamben’s choice to turn to the figure of the slave in Aristotle as the paradigmatic articulation of a “dimension of use entirely independent of an end” (12). Although ultimately perverted by the institution of slavery, Aristotle’s slave here functions for Agamben as a salutary figure of relation between the master and his world. Whereas the work of the human being is constituted, according to Aristotle, by “‘the being-at-work of the soul according the logos‘,” Agamben argues that the slave is differentiated from his master solely in terms of the “use of the body” (5). With respect to this particular term, however, “use must . . . be understood not in a productive sense but in a practical one: the use of the slave’s body is similar to that of a bed or clothing, and not to that of a spool or plectrum” (12). Thus emptied of productive content and instrumental intent, the slave that remains names an utterly impersonal form of intimacy—an inessential and purely formal possibility for “mediating one’s own relation with nature through the relation with another human being” (14).

    Of course, such an inoperative dimension of the intimacies of life must be repressed and abandoned by the originary “anthropogenic operation” of Western thought, which seeks to capture experience solely in terms of the dialectical opposition between zoè and bios (14). But here, and throughout The Use of Bodies, Agamben insists on the possibility that such a purely formal notion of use still persists, stowed away beyond the spectacle and its myriad commodifications of the relationship between public and private life. This is why he is so interested in the notion of the clandestine in Debord, Foucault, and de Sade—and in seeking out the “political element that has been hidden in the secrecy of singular existence” (xxi). Indeed, Agamben points to Benveniste’s analysis of the Greek verb “to use” (chresis) in order to illustrate that even the word itself, in its refusal to adopt an active or passive form, gestures toward a purely relational mode of language that “does not seem to have a proper meaning but acquires ever different meanings according to the context” (24). Readers of Agamben might recognize here a line of argument reminiscent of the discussion of “whatever being” in The Coming Community. Agamben’s approach to chresis in The Use of Bodies productively extends and develops some of the most provocative insights regarding the ontological and political potentialities of “Whatever” (quodlibet). At stake in his earlier text, as in his most recent work, is a mode of relation both immanently singular in terms of the specific mediations it facilitates and yet purely formal and content-less, what The Coming Community calls “a solidarity that in no way concerns an essence” (18-19). If the style of this earlier work is more suggestive and elliptical, in The Use of Bodies Agamben compliments these mannerisms with a more exhaustive and systematic methodology that mirrors the parts, sections, sub-sections, and thresholds at work in Homo Sacer. The effect is just as impressive, and, for this reader at least, there is a sense that Agamben has managed to bring together threads of argument that had been developed not only in the series of books that The Use of Bodies ostensibly closes, but also in a number of his other important works such as Potentialities, The Time that Remains, Means Without Ends, and The Man Without Content.

    It is not unusual to find Agamben working in the archives of Medieval philosophy and theology, seeking out extremely nuanced concepts that might be capable of deactivating key tendencies and habits of the Western philosophical tradition. In The Use of Bodies more than anywhere else we watch as he mobilizes an array of neo-Platonic, Stoic, Epicurean, and scholastic thinkers in order to adumbrate the contours of a different ontological tradition, a tradition that thinks existence and essence without the aporias and biopolitical impulses implicit in our current approaches to language, history, life, self, and the landscape. It is the sixteenth-century Spanish Jesuit priest, Francisco Suárez, not Alfred North Whitehead, whom Agamben credits with the idea that, “Mode is therefore an affection of the thing” (155); and it is the theologian Bartholomew des Bosses who takes the position, in his correspondence with Leibniz, that “existence is not an entity but a mode of being, which does not add to the essence anything but a modification” (158). In addition to uncovering and connecting a rich vein of thought dedicated to exploring an ontology of mode and relation rather than substance and essence, in the second part of the book Agamben revisits more familiar ontological terrain in the work of Plato, Foucault, and, most extensively, Heidegger and Plotinus. The method here, as elsewhere in the book, is to deactivate certain tendencies within their work and demonstrate their shared commitment to a modal ontology—even if these thinkers themselves, as in the case of Heidegger, were ultimately unable to develop their ideas in such a fashion. It is as if Agamben here plays the role of Levinas at Davos, seeking to “find a way out of the master’s [Heidegger’s] thought” (189) by carefully re-reading “Da-sein . . . not [as] a substance but something like an activity or a mode of existing that the human being must assume in order to approach the truth” (177). At other times Agamben channels Plotinus who, when faced with the aporias inherent in the zoè/bios distinction, “profoundly transforms Aristotelian ontology: yes, there is a unique substance, yet this is not a subject that remains behind or beneath its qualities but is always already homonymically shared in a plurality of forms of life, in which life is never separable from its form and, quite to the contrary, is always its mode of being” (218).

    What this all means in terms of the pressing need to reconfigure the contours of the polis and reconfigure its central political concepts is, perhaps inevitably, rather opaque. The Use of Bodies is unlikely to satisfy those readers of Agamben in search of a specific manifesto for political action; indeed, the final pages declare such a translation of ideas “into act” something “that is not within the scope of this book” (278). The closest Agamben comes to defining explicitly political concepts comes in his discussion of “intimacy” and “destituent power” in the final section of the book. Borrowing Plotinus’s expression of an intimacy in which one is “‘Alone by oneself’”—”We are together and very close, but between us there is not an articulation or a relation that unites us. We are united to one another in the form of our being alone”—Agamben approaches intimacy as “a political concept” insofar as it has the potential to deactivate the dead-ends of our current political and ontological choices, “rendering them inoperative” (236, 239). “What then appears,” Agamben concludes, is “something like a way out” and “if one reaches it and holds oneself there in it, the machine can no longer function” (239). Here, as in his discussion of destituent potential (which “means interrogating and calling into question the very status of relation”), it is hard not to picture Melville’s Bartleby, a character strangely absent from The Use of Bodies but far from alien to the Agamben corpus (271). In Potentialities, this scrivener functions for Agamben as a model for a certain kind of contemplative deactivation: an “idea of thought thinking itself, which is a kind of mean between thinking nothing and thinking something, between potentiality and actuality” (251). “Thought that thinks itself,” Agamben continues, “neither thinks an object nor thinks nothing. It thinks a pure potentiality . . . ; and what thinks its own potentiality is what is most divine and blessed” (251). While undoubtedly lacking from the perspective of political actuality, Agamben’s work has always preferred to make its home in this threshold between the potential and the actual. There is no better example of the blessings of such thought than The Use of Bodies.

    Works Cited

    • Agamben, Giorgio. The Coming Community. Trans. Michael Hardt. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2003.
    • —–. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1995.
    • —–. The Open: Man and Animal. Trans. Kevin Attell. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2004.
    • —–. Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy. Trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1999.
  • The Neoliberal University

    Christopher Breu (bio)
    Illinois State University

    A review of Di Leo, Jeffrey R. Corporate Humanities in Higher Education: Moving Beyond the Neoliberal Academy. Palgrave MacMillan, 2013.

    Academia has been embattled for the last forty years. Uncoincidentally, this same time span has seen the rise of neoliberalism as a cultural ideology, a political practice, and, most devastatingly, as a series of increasingly global economic policies. Given the violence of neoliberalism on US society, from the destruction of the middle-class, to the growth of economic inequality, to the warehousing (in prisons, in schools, and in devastated neighborhoods) of a growing surplus population, it is not surprising that it has had a similarly destructive impact on the American academy. As Jeffrey Di Leo puts it in his timely new book, “academia today resides within a culture of neoliberalism” (133). Perhaps the first manifestation of the impact of neoliberalism on the American academy was ideological and cultural rather than economic. This was the era of the so-called culture wars, beautifully detailed in Andrew Hartman’s recent book, A War for America’s Soul. While the battle, in this context, seemed cultural rather than economic, and seemed to be spearheaded by neoconservatism rather than neoliberalism, in retrospect it was clearly the first of a two-part assault on public education in general and higher education specifically, as Christopher Newfield points out. While humanists seemed to hold their own in the culture wars, as far as the general public was concerned, the war was won by conservatives, who may not have had the argumentative subtlety of many of their academic sparring partners, but knew how to make an effective soundbite (the seemingly evergreen rhetoric of “political correctness”) do their work for them. As Newfield points out, the culture war had the effect of softening up public support for public education, so that when the explicitly neoliberal economic war was launched in the new century, the academy was vulnerable and had few resources, rhetorical or otherwise, to combat it.

    It is into this twenty-first century context—in which economic neoliberalism has savaged the ranks of tenure-line professors, destroyed many of the tenets of shared governance and academic freedom, overseen the concomitant growth of administration and tuition, and undermined the public support for higher education—that Jeffrey Di Leo’s book Corporate Humanities in Higher Education makes its intervention. Di Leo’s stated intent to tackle neoliberalism head-on. Whereas many recent books of institutional critique still seem focused on the culture wars (see, for example, Gregory Jay’s The Humanities ‘Crisis’ and the Future of Literary Studies), Di Leo recognizes and understands the challenges presented by neoliberalism’s transformation of higher education:

    Neoliberalism is recalibrating academic identity. The paradigmatic neoliberal academic is a docile one. He is the product of an academic culture dominated by the recording measurement of performance, rather than the pursuit of academic freedom or critical exchange–an academic climate that renders him risk averse and compliant. Neoliberal managerialism constructs and functions through manageable and accommodating subjects. These docile neoliberal subjects excel when they ‘follow the rules’ regarding say ‘outcomes-based curricula’ and the ‘culture of continuous improvement,’ but risk failure when they begin to question the neoliberal academic practices to which they are subjected. (ix)

    Di Leo’s argument thus importantly engages not only the economic costs of neoliberalism, but more precisely the subjective and institutional effects of such economic costs. While this shift may seem to put the emphasis back onto culture, it is culture with a difference: what Di Leo is most focused on are the institutional and discursive effects of neoliberalism as a political-economic policy and practice on the university and its mission.

    In this sense, Di Leo’s book can be situated in relationship to a distinction that Wendy Brown makes in Undoing the Demos between neoliberalism in its first phase (from, say, 1980 to 2000 or so), in which the neoliberal logics of human capital and homo oeconomicus are applied to the logic of exchange (hence the star system, the commodification of various academic processes in the ’90s); and its second phase, in which the same logics are applied to the financialization of all aspects of human existence (organized in large part via what David Harvey calls “accumulation by dispossession” and operating more by stripping various entities of their assets than by investing in them) (159). Brown’s account pushes past earlier, foundational accounts of neoliberalism by Harvey and Foucault. If the former theorized neoliberalism as both an ideology and a loose set of economic practices, and the latter theorized it as a new form of governmentality organized by reorganizing non-economic life around an economic rationality in which the citizen becomes an entrepreneur of the self, what Brown adds to this discussion is an attention to the self as a site of resource extraction and depletion. Thus, within the logic of financialization, the subject no longer becomes an entrepreneur of self, but a site of resource mining. While in Brown’s model the two modes of human capital overlap, this latter dynamic leaves the worker in an even more precarious state. Di Leo addresses this precarity and its impact on faculty.

    Di Leo emphasizes the depoliticizing impact that neoliberalism has on faculty as a result of manufactured scarcity and austerity. Where liberal arts faculty were once celebrated for ground-breaking research and for relying on the protections of academic freedom to articulate potentially unpopular and often counter-hegemonic positions, they are increasingly being rewarded for adhering to best practices, allowing themselves to be micromanaged via the language of assessment, and sacrificing academic freedom and shared governance to the ideals of political and institutional quiescence. In other words, if the practice of critical pedagogy, as articulated by Henry Giroux, bell hooks, and others, represented the professorial ideal for the politicized 90s, then the practice of adhering to neoliberal managerial dictates increasingly represents the professorial ideal for what I have called elsewhere the “post-political” university (241).

    Fortunately, however, there are many dissenters from the post-political university, and it is clear that Di Leo writes Corporate Humanities in Higher Education for them. For this reason, it is not surprising that the volume appears in Henry Giroux and Susan Searls Giroux’s series, Education, Politics, and Public Life. Yet Di Leo occupies a distinctive position for someone practicing critical pedagogy: he is the Dean of Arts and Sciences at the University of Houston, Victoria and the editor of both the theory journal, Symplokē, and the American Book Review. He has an insider’s perspective on the business of academia, including the business of ensuring that academia means more than just business. This insider’s perspective might suggest why, in the book’s opening two chapters, he argues for a partial embrace of the language of the market in reconceptualizing both literary studies and the humanities. For Di Leo, we cannot merely bemoan the demise of the liberal arts, we need to get our hands dirty and take risks in working to save and transform them: “No one is better qualified to make the case for the humanities amidst the remonstrations of the corporate university than we humanists. But with this qualification comes responsibility–a responsibility to not just reveal the nature of the crisis, but also to strive for solutions to it” (2). Di Leo asserts the need to move beyond the work of critique to produce workable solutions to the depoliticization of the academy. Both the possibilities and the problems of such a position are captured in the book’s first chapter, “Corporate Literature,” which is not the name of an object of criticism but of a curricular and pedagogical practice that Di Leo supports. He defines it as a series of “curricular and pedagogical compromises,” which combine the critical with the vocational in order to secure a place for the liberal arts in the new university (12). Thus literature classes, writing classes, and philosophy classes would teach students both the forms of critical citizenship that will help them be politically engaged and vocational skills that will help them navigate the corporate world in which they find themselves post-graduation.

    I think Di Leo’s argument for the mixing of the critical with the vocational, the political with the practical, makes sense. A purely liberal humanist approach not only seems outmoded by both the theory and practice of the humanities in the present—with its emphasis on posthumanism, the interface of the digital and the human, and yes, critical vocationalism,—but often exists as an implicitly nostalgic and class-bound fantasy for a period when the academy was imagined to be made up of gentleman scholars. Writing from the position of a satellite campus, Di Leo knows the populations that are excluded from this older, gendered, and genteel version of the academy. An emphasis on the combination of the critical, the literary, and the vocational emphasizes the political stakes that neoliberalism wants to silence while engaging the very real desire of students to get a job. At its best, such a vision might be part of a new “laboring” of the U.S. academy, to borrow a term from Michael Denning (xvi). However, writing this transformation under the sign of “corporate literature” seems unfortunate. The emphasis on the corporation rather than on the critical worker cedes too much to the language of neoliberalism and its specifically corporate transformation of the university.

    Other chapters are more incisive in their criticisms of neoliberalism. One of the most powerful arguments in Di Leo’s book addresses the way in which neoliberalism erodes debate and dissention. In place of the forms of parologism advocated by Lyotard and affirmatively cited by Di Leo, much of the neoliberal academy is organized around a kind of corporate groupthink and risk adversity that represents a destruction of the principled conflict that has been at important to the humanities as a critical enterprise, “a method aimed at dissent and justice” (35). Di Leo argues for paralogism as “a model of dialogue” that “calls for academics to become emotionally involved in the university dialogue and encourages tough metaprofessional criticism (41).” He links this practice to the Kantian vision of the modern university that represents the critical impulse that fostered its genesis and continues to be part of its most powerful contemporary realizations.

    Another standout chapter considers the work of editing both a cutting-edge, scholarly journal and an independent book review. Much can be made of the present composition of the humanities by noting that the theory journal has much more international and professional recognition than the book review. While many academics have defended the centrality and importance of theory, it is striking that the book review is treated, according to Di Leo, almost as an afterthought. Rather than a defense of either older, more humanist values or of the contemporary rigors of the posthumanist, theory-saturated contemporary academy, the chapter nicely argues that scholarly publishing needs to change as the context for the production of scholarship changes. The central work of critique needs to persist even as the academy changes. This chapter manifests what is best about Di Leo’s vision. Neither hand-wringing nor cynical, nostalgic nor disparing, Di Leo’s book reflects the role of an administrator who enables and supports the provocative and political work done in the academy. Other chapters address the effects of neoliberalism on the publishing market, on conceptions of the author, and on the production of scholarly knowledge itself.

    All the chapters represent valuable interventions into the neoliberal academy of the present, but the last one on scholarly knowledge is particularly rich. In it Di Leo argues for a two-pronged approach in which we both continue to value conventional scholarly publication but also embrace “alternative modes of publication such as blogs, Twitter, chatrooms, websites, documentary video, and magazine and newspaper articles” (131). While such a development is already happening, it is heartening to see an administrative vision that values diverse forms of scholarly production. Di Leo argues powerfully against typical metadata understandings of academic impact (such as “mentions”) as well as traditional understandings of productivity, represented by scholarly publication in isolation, and instead places an emphasis on the cultural and scholarly impact ideas have, whatever the form of their dissemination. At its most visionary, the chapter argues for a renewed and revitalized conception of the public intellectual, one enabled by social media.

    While the unchecked growth of administration has been one of the problems of the contemporary academy and one wishes, occasionally, that Di Leo were more attuned to the specific dimensions of academic labor in the present (especially precarious labor), his challenge to neoliberalism is a necessary and important one. Administrators who want to see the humanities continue to exist as part of a critical and utopian enterprise in the twenty-first century could do much worse than reading Di Leo’s book.

    Works Cited

    • Breu, Christopher. “The Post-Political Turn: Theory in the Neoliberal Academy.” Capital at the Brink: Overcoming the Destructive Legacy of Neoliberalism. Eds. Jeffrey Di Leo and Uppinder Mehan. Ann Arbor: Open University Press, 2014. 241-258.
    • Brown, Wendy. Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution. New York: Zone Books, 2015.
    • Denning, Michael. The Cultural Front: The Laboring of American Culture in the Twentieth Century. London: Verso, 1997.
    • Foucault, Michel. The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979. Trans. Graham Burchell. New York: Picador, 2008.
    • Hartman, Andrew. A War for the Soul of America: A History of the Culture Wars. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 2015.
    • Harvey, David. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2005.
    • Jay, Paul. “The Humanities ‘Crisis” and the Future of Literary Studies.” New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.
    • Newfield, Christopher. Unmaking the Public University: The Forty-Year Assault on the Middle Class. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2008.
  • From “Walt Whitman’s Inscriptions”

    Lauren Shufran (bio)
    UC Santa Cruz

    Recording 1“To Thee Old Cause.”

    “To Thee Old Cause”

    Walt Whitman is on Tinder in India. He can't
    Stop swiping right; everyone is divine. His lone
    Grievance is with the screen, the absence
    Of bodies, of embodiments. The body is where Walt's poems
    Begin, after all; like when he claims, in "Song of Myself,"
    That beggars "embody themselves in me and I
    Am embodied in them"; and because of that reciprocity,
    Suddenly Walt can write a poem
    About what it's like to hunger. Walt's trouble with Tinder
    Is the avatar, is that he can't sympathize
    With an image. Turning formlessness
    Into form, Walt announces, is the first step
    To increasing intimacy.
    In the Bhagavad-Gita, Krishna demonstrates
    This affinity between form and intimacy
    When he assumes the shape of a man and meets Arjuna
    On a battlefield, where they dialogue like two men
    On the verge of warFor whom war is not the nearest priority,
    About duty, illusion, and reality. This is what the word avatar
    Initially meant: the descent of a deity
    Into terrestrial form. Everyone is divine
    Walt's repeating like a mantra as he sweeps his thumb repeatedly
    Across the screen–a modern mudra of omni-reverence;
    But in the Gita, Arjuna actually gets to witness
    Krishna's theophany–beginningless, boundless,
    Performing unending miracles with numberless parts
    And infinite expressions
    On infinite faces–and is obliged to apologize
    For ever treating the god,
    In his finite human form, too casually. Oops,
    Says Arjuna; I carelessly lunched and lounged in beds with you.
    Except really Arjuna says nothing;
    Because when Krishna exhibits the infinite,
    Arjuna is mute with awe.
    Awe is not
    Intimacy. The avatar occasions–embodiment occasions–
    Both intimacy and a kind of heedlessness. Krishna
    Is forgetful even of his own godhead
    To facilitate this intimacy, to dialogu
    eAbout devotion, which is what men examine
    At the threshold of war. He returns
    To the body when he discerns Arjuna's fear, Arjuna's art
    And Arjuna's artlessness
    When coming into contact with the Absolute.
    
    My lover is afraid of the similarities
    Between our bodies. Does this make her more
    Or less my lover. It is dawn in India;
    We are in bed and Walt is in the room
    Next door; I do pranayama
    While my lover sleeps. It is a filling and emptying
    Of form; it is control
    As a kind of intimacy, intimacy as a byproduct
    Of control as practice. I think
    This discipline of the breath, this witnessing
    The rise and fall of my own chest is my temporary joy.
    The Bhagavad-Gita says it is my temporary problem;
    That form is but one expression
    Of a myriad of possibilities and thus a limitation;
    That attachment is a byproduct of embodiment,
    Which is form.
    It is easy to ignore
    One's attachments to one's lover
    When it is dawn, and there is togetherness
    And synchronous breath.
    I think, if I were more like Walt,
    I would also be able to celebrate my lover's lovers.
    That I would respond with more grace
    When the razor in her shower has a fresh blade on it,
    When she steps out
    On an evening
    In lipstick one shade darker
    Than the shade she usually wears.
    Lovers no longer fail–if they ever did–
    Because of the animosity
    Of gods or fathers; though they've always failed
    Because of form
    And its attendant attachments. Because one time
    Your lover will lose a friend
    And will need to grieve alone;
    And you won't justly be able to gauge her grief
    Against your sadness
    That you are not the object of her consolation.
    Because sometimes you tell your lover
    About rush hour traffic on the 280, emphasizing
    How you must endure it each time you come to her,
    And while neither of you would call it this,
    Each of you senses some small manipulation
    In what fronts as a grievance about movement.
    Because sometimes
    You are on a battlefield
    Because it is your dharma to fight a war, and your lover
    Appears before you, at the forefront
    Of the enemy lines
    With images of all your epic failures on her shield.
    All of these are problems
    Of embodiment. And yet love
    Demands difference. And yet difference
    Is one thing embodiment makes.
    
    Walt's got precisely 500 characters
    In which to write his Tinder tagline. He starts typing in
    His poem called "To Thee Old Cause"
    Because Walt wants Tinder users to know he's passionate;
    But he can only fit
    The first twelve lines in. What you read
    Before you swipe right on Walt–
    Because you are in India, trying to find yourself,
    And you think Walt might have your answer–
    Is some lavish adulation for a "good" and "peerless" cause,
    A "deathless" and "sweet idea" for which, Walt claims,
    Every war in every age has been fought.
    The trouble is, Walt's poem
    Fails to specify
    Precisely what this cause is; and all the critics are right-swiping
    To inquire. Read the scholarship
    On this poem; there's no consensus
    On what Walt means by "cause." Consider that later in the poem–
    The part that won't fit
    Into Walt's Tinder profile–Walt claims
    That "my book and the war are one": a claim
    That might strike you as odd,
    Since the first three editions of Leaves of Grass
    Were written before the Civil War had even begun. Consider
    How, retrospectively, Walt saw no difference
    Between his book and the War,
    The cause of which he won't name.
    That the cause of the War–which is the cause
    Of all wars–is also the cause
    Of Walt's book. And because Walt doesn't indicate
    The cause of all wars in his book which is also a war,
    The cause of Walt's book
    Remains indeterminate.
    
    The cause of the Kurukshetra War
    In the Bhagavad-Gita is a matter
    Of dynastic succession. That's
    The easy answer, anyhow. The more complex answer
    Derives from the fact that the Kurukshetra War has no
    Historical basis; it is a fiction upon which
    A man's dialogue with the divine is built;
    It is a fiction to show
    How devotion resolves
    The fiction. The cause
    Of the Kurukshetra War, that is, is devotion
    To Krishna, is love
    Of Krishna. The cause
    Of the fiction of the war
    Is the wish to cause
    The audience of the fiction
    To love the divine figure
    At its center. Which is another way of saying
    That love
    Is the cause of Kurukshetra War
    In the Bhagavad-Gita.
    
    My lover
    Is at the center of the bed, where she's moved
    To place her hand heavy on my chest,
    A way of proposing my pranayama practice
    At dawn
    Be less vigorous. If I were Walt, I would write:
    "My lover embodies herself in me and I
    Am embodied in her"; and because of that reciprocity,
    I could suddenly write a poem
    About what it's like
    To be my own lover
    And to suffer sleeplessness because of it.
    The trouble with the avatar
    Is it affords the illusion of sympathy.
    The beauty of the avatar
    Is it affords the illusion of sympathy. Oops,
    I say; I took for granted we were breathing together.
    Except really I say nothing,
    Because touch is the next best thing to theophany,
    Because this touch appeals to silence,
    And so I am mute with some combination
    Of awe and petition.
    My lover has been in two cars, in one lifetime,
    That have rolled over on the road.There's no device
    That puts the body back together
    At the end of the war, or of the book,
    Or of the experience.
    All of these
    Are problems of form, but one of them
    Is a reason Arjuna did not want to fight the battle
    At Kurukshetra.
    
    I cannot write the poem containing the forms
    My lover's desire takes. I can only
    Take up her razor in the shower
    And employ it to its purpose, which entails
    Tracing the surface
    Of this–my–particular form,
    Again and again, without grasping.
    My lover and I share some suspicion
    Of embodiment; does this make us more
    Or less
    Embodied. When Walt knocks on our door after dawn
    It is too late for an aubade; he wants to know
    If it is possible to search for someone specific
    On Tinder. He's looking for Krishna, the boy
    He met on the beach last night; he's looking
    For a practical application
    Of epics. Walt is afraid
    Of separation. He wants a thread
    Of teleological unfolding;
    He wants a single cause to turn a book upon;
    He wants that cause to be eternal; he wants it
    To be war which is also maybe love; he wants
    To borrow my lover's razor for just ten minutes
    Because his is somewhere on Mandrem Beach
    In the hands of a boy who is pacing the water, who is breaking
    Walt's heart with his beauty.
    When I hand the razor to Walt
    I don't tell him how laden its blade is
    With fictions.
    Poems no longer fail because of the animosity of gods
    Or fathers. They fail because of form;
    Because I cannot say "my book and my love are one"
    And write my love, my book, into a state of unfailing.
    Everyone is divine, claims Walt, who is now beginning to feel
    Repetitive stress injuries
    In his pointer finger. Awe is not intimacy,
    Claims the first stanza of this translation
    Of Walt Whitman's "To Thee Old Cause"–
    But if awe occasions reverence, and reverence
    Devotion, and devotion occasions dialogue
    Before gods and before wars, then maybe this poem,
    After all, gives Walt and me permission
    To experience both in synchronicity,
    Even in the fictions we make
    Of ourselves and our lovers–
    Like there was ever a boy on the beach named Krishna
    Whom Walt gave more to
    Than he made a poem from.

    “For Him I Sing”

    Recording 2 “For Him I Sing.”

    Walt pays two hundred rupees for a foot rub
    On the beach in Goa. He's undeterred by accusatory
    Trip Advisor reviews–
    Metatarsals fractured by prepubescent masseuses,
    Hundreds of holidays
    Whose temple visits were tainted
    By debilitating ankle bruises. Walt's undaunted 'cause
    He knows
    How to genuflect
    In contempt of an injury.
    He's knelt to test the steel nib of his fountain pen for sharpness;
    He's knelt at makeshift altars, rubbed
    His hands upon the brows of dying boys on beds
    At wards where he has knelt while
    Planting flags as thick as trees in potted plants on windowsills
    While fashioning the line:
    "I will plant companionship thick as trees along all the rivers of
    America," which Walt will later use in his poem called
    "For You O Democracy"
    Which is not the poem this poem is a translation of.
    He has knelt between the wheels of Arjuna's chariot
    And Arjuna's adversaries who are also Arjuna's teachers,
    Glaring in the direct face of Drona
    Who taught Walt how to kneel into the bow
    While stringing it; and indeed Walt kneels into the bow each time
    He strings it–
    Though he will not kneel beside Colin Kaepernick
    As the National Anthem plays, because that
    Offends American patriotism
    Like it briefly offends Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
    "Notorious RBG,"
    Who tells Katie Couric that she wouldn't arrest Colin for kneeling,
    She'd just opine on Yahoo! News about
    The facets of its disrespect. But if Ginsburg won't, then Walt
    Will take you through
    The logic of that kneeling's illegality,
    Which Walt now rehearses to the boy whose hands
    Are clamped around Walt's arches. It's a matter
    Of synonyms, which is a synonym
    For forced equivalence. It goes:
    "A directive
    Is almost a code, and a code
    Is roughly a statute, and a statute
    Is nearly a law; thus Kaepernick
    Is taking the law into his own hands, that is,
    The law in his own knees, thus
    Breaking both in bowing, thus
    A law unto himself–which only
    The law's allowed to be." Walt can logic like this
    Because he's writing a poem called "For Him I Sing,"
    In which Walt claims he is going to make the man for whom
    He sings–and who remains unidentified
    For all five lines of the poem–
    A law unto himself
    By singing him into expansion
    And then "fus[ing] the immortal laws" to him.
    
    If Walt's poem as I have summarized it creeps you out at all,
    I'd say that's a legitimate response. Ruth Bader Ginsburg
    Is a little disturbed: what's precedent
    To an immortal law? What's a law
    Immune to overrule? But the Bhagavad-Gita has the answer
    To those questions; and Walt's poem
    "For Him I Sing" may be the first reference Leaves of Grass makes
    To Sanatana dharma, the absolute set of duties
    Incumbent upon all Hindus. These "immortal laws"
    Include things like ahimsa (non-violence) and satya (truthfulness),
    But they don't include standing for the anthem,
    Which I'm not even sure there is a Sanskrit word for.
    Patriotism is, after all, a form of attachment.
    But so is the act of writing Trip Advisor reviews,
    Walt thinks; and he knowsThose reviewers
    Of ostensibly distressing massages didn't
    Perceive the "whole"–by which Walt means, the body
    Historical. As a poet, Walt knows a little something
    About autopoiesis–
    And not only because each poem Walt writes
    Generates the very laws by which
    The next poem he writes is written; not only because
    Each poem of Walt's
    Participates in engendering
    The very nation that his next poem is nourished
    By the soil of. As a poet,
    Walt also knows more about the human body
    Than all the non-poets getting massaged, right now,
    In Goa. This is because every poem
    Is like a nervous system:
    A self-referentially enclosed recursive network of signals
    That self-creates and self-perpetuates
    With every sensory experience, adapting itself–
    Through a history of perturbations–
    Toward broader interactions within the sphere
    Of self-consciousness. That's what a poem does:
    Self-creates and self-perpetuate
    sThrough a history of perturbations. This occurs over a course
    Of centuries, of millennia; but Walt is a poet; he thinks
    Expansively. Prick him with a pin–one time, a thousand
    Times a day–and Walt will respond by audibly celebrating
    How this pricking is sharpening the nervous systems
    Of his poetic progeny.
    So on the beach, Walt's all:
    Whatever about a swollen ankle; whatever if no one notes
    For years my Hindu gravitations. He orders another
    Banana lassi; he takes a sweeping gaze
    Of the Arabian Sea which is also
    The Indian Ocean; his gaze sweeps until it lands
    Back on the boy
    Going hard in at Walt's feet.
    
    "If they can insist that he respect a yellow flag,
    They can insist that he respect
    The American flag," says the boy,
    Who has been seduced by Walt's logic
    About the criminality of Colin Kaepernick.
    That's because, while we never discover who Walt sings for
    In his poem called "For Him I Sing," we do find out
    That the boy massaging Walt's feet is Bryan Fischer
    Of the American Family Association, who holds
    Such conservatively hateful views that even the AFA
    Has repudiated
    Much of what he's said. While this poem
    Which is making a problem of Walt's patriotism
    While reflecting on the possible Hindu influences
    Of his poems
    Hardly thinks itself precious,
    It won't provoke you with the specifics
    Of Fischer's beliefs: they're out there
    For the finding. On the beach in Goa
    Even the cheerleaders are kneeling
    For the pre-game anthem, teens and tweens
    Whose photos get posted on websites
    Tracking the "Kaepernick Effect," the honors band
    Whose business is to play the National Anthem
    Kneeling behind their cellos as they play
    The very song for which they kneel in a defiance
    That can only be perplexingly partial.
    Colin Kaepernick
    Is running the beach
    Wearing socks depicting cartoon pigs in police caps.
    This ignites a second controversy, as though
    The kneeling and the socks weren't
    One and the same protest. But when the meta-commentary
    Is already present on Colin Kaepernick's ankles,
    There is no room to write a narrative
    About Colin Kaepernick's kneeling, which is a narrative
    About Colin Kaepernick's Patriotism.
    
    There is no meta-commentary
    In Walt's poem "For Him I Sing,"
    So I don't expect you to know that the song
    Walt sings in this poem
    Which you thought was also maybe
    The very song he claims to be singing
    In his poem called "For Him I Sing,"
    Is, in fact, the National Anthem. I only know this
    Because I was in India with Walt Whitman
    The day the two-hundred-and-third black person
    To be fatally shot by police in 2016
    Was killed; and on the following day,
    When RBG–who has been called "a law unto herself,"
    And in many ways this is not
    Figurative–notoriously called
    Colin Kaepernick "arrogant,"
    I was still in India with Walt Whitman. We were in
    Meditation
    During the two-hundred-and-third
    Shooting, and again during the opining
    Of Ruth Bader Ginsburg; I was being asked
    To dilate my third eye chakra by tapping it
    Steadily with the pointer finger of my right hand;
    I was being told
    This dilation would make me susceptible to the spirit
    In sleep and in waking;
    I was then susceptible to the spirit
    Of interpretation; I was asking Walt:
    Why use the word "dilate"
    In your poem "For Him I Sing"; is there not something
    Intrinsically vulgar in the desire
    To dilate a man; you can't ever make a man wide enough
    To encompass all laws; even Ruth Bader Ginsburg
    Has no such girth. You'll notice how quickly my query
    Turns into objection; sometimes pranayama
    Riles me. Walt's third eye is now a sight
    Unto itself; his vision making more vision; it's
    Autopoeitic but okay it's also Biblical; Bryan Fischer
    Is gripping Walt's big toe mounds
    Where Walt presses into the yoga mat
    Every morning
    In samasthiti,
    Not only because Walt is a yogi but because
    He is a poet; and he loves the zeugmatic impact
    Of the phrase: "ground your big toe mounds
    Along with your ego." Bryan Fisher quotes
    The Book of Matthew: "For whoever has,
    To him
    More shall be given." It's autopoietic possession, if you ignore
    The part about grace. It's autopoietic–law–
    Whether or not you ignore it:
    A self-referentially enclosed network
    Of enforcers of law who are also
    Laws unto themselves,
    Extra-legal bodies that the law ingests and transforms
    Into legal forms
    That self-create and self-perpetuate,
    Reproduce and validate the very law that's made them legal.
    
    The sound Walt hears in the background
    As his toes begin to crack
    Is not the Adriatic Sea
    Of the Indian Ocean; it's the gentle hum
    Of the legal system reproducing itself.
    The sound you hear in the background
    As you read this poem
    Is not the gentle hum of the legal system's
    Autopoietic being; it's the gentle hum
    Of Walt Whitman, who will hum
    His poem "For Him I Sing" until Colin Kaepernick
    Gets off his knees and puts less offensive
    Socks on. Here is Walt's description
    Of what he feels like
    When he hears "Notorious RBG" express regret
    For her statements about Colin:
    
    My limbs sink,
    my mouth is parched,
    my body trembles,
    the hair bristles on my flesh.
    
    The magic bow slips
    from my hand, my skin burns,
    I cannot stand still,
    my mind reels.
    
    Except that's not Walt; that's Arjuna–
    As translated by Barbara Stoler Miller–standing
    Before his kinsmen
    On the field at Kurukshetra. "Krishna,"
    Arjuna says, "I see my kinsmen
    Gathered here, wanting war"; Krishna, "I see no good
    In killing my kinsmen." The first chapter
    Of the Bhagavad-Gita generally gets translated
    As "The Depression of Arjuna" or
    "The Dejection of Arjuna" or
    "The Despondency of Arjuna": vishada yoga, the yoga
    Of despair. What's Arjuna so stressed about? you ask.
    What is the object of Arjuna's fear? Walt asks,
    Because Walt knows I am writing poems about him,
    And so he poses his questions more formally than you do
    These days. Arjuna's got Krishna–
    Who is otherwise a god–subordinated by love and driving
    His chariot; he's got KrishnaMassaging his feet on the beach
    At Kurukshetra; like Walt, Arjuna
    Is taking the pain in stride; he knows
    How to genuflect
    In contempt of an imminent injury; he has just blown
    His conch shell and the sound has torn
    The hearts of Walt Whitman
    And Arjuna's every opponent. It has torn
    Their hearts because each time Arjuna blows
    His conch shell, Hanuman also roars; and the sound
    Of Hanuman's roaring alone is the thunder
    Of every stadium riot; and the sound alone
    Is terrifying if you are not already
    On Hanuman's side. And Arjuna has the flag
    Of Lord Hanuman in his hand, with the emblem
    Of Hanuman upon it… and still, Arjuna cannot bring himself
    To sing the National Anthem.
    
    Patriotism is, after all, a form of attachment.
    Krishna–who is, after all, both a god and a black boy–
    Is not a little teasing Arjuna
    When he drives him between the two armies
    As Arjuna commands his Lord who is also his driver, and says:
    "See, it is only your family–on both sides–
    Who are assembled." Arjuna is not a little
    Dropping the bow in a justifiable war
    When he slumps in his chariot like Colin Kaepernick,
    Whose knee is down like a poem with a nervous system
    Which reads like a nation
    That continues to be formally shaped
    Through a history of perturbations.
    
    Among the list
    Of Arjuna's symptoms as described
    In the chapter of the Bhagavad-Gita
    Called vishada yoga–and as described
    By Walt Whitman of his own response to Ruth
    Bader Ginsburg's regret–is romaharsha.
    Romaharsha often gets translated as "hair standing
    On end"; but it is actually a bristling
    Of the hair that is caused by delight. The men
    Standing before Arjuna on the field
    At Kurukshetra are the very men who define him; thus
    To kill them is to kill himself. The men kneeling
    Before Walt Whitman on the football field in Goa–
    Who are Bryan Fischer and Colin Kaepernick
    And Krishna and myself–are the very men
    Who cause this poem to ask about the difference
    Between taking the law into your own hands
    And having the law in your own heart
    And being a law unto yourself. RomaharshaIs one symptom of realizing
    You are subordinated by law; romaharsha
    Is one symptom of realizing
    You are subject to none. Walt writes a poem called
    "This Poem is a Law unto Itself";
    It is about the Baltimore police and the Ferguson
    Police and the Oakland and Cleveland
    Police and the SFPD and the LAPD and the NCPD;
    And it is a poem that dilates to encompass all the PDs
    But it is also a poem about
    Ruth Bader Ginsburg and about Walt's poem
    Called "For Him I Sing" and it is about
    Romans 2 where Paul calls the Gentiles "a law
    Unto themselves" because who needs
    A stone tablet when someone already inscribed the law
    On the tenderest spot in your heart. Bryan Fischer
    Is particularly fondOf this last reading until he trades out
    His King James Version for an English
    Standard Version of the Bible,
    Where he reads "God shows no partiality"
    Instead of "God is no respecter of persons,"
    The latter of which Bryan Fischer preferred
    Not only because he is a foot masseuse in India
    And a Christian in Oklahoma, but also because
    He is a poet; and he loves the assonant impact
    Of the phrase: "respecter of persons"
    Because it lets him privilege
    The sound of the phrase to its content.
    
    To include more assonance
    In his poem called "For Him I Sing," Walt writes,
    Or I write:
    "An existence of self-sustaining autopoiesis is such
    That vision occasions more vision and practice
    Occasions more practice." There's
    A tautology there; but to dispense with it
    Would unsettle the pleasure Bryan Fischer
    Gets out of sameness of sound,
    The pleasure he gets
    From resemblance. Walt takes his pointer finger
    From his third eyeSo he can put his right hand over his heart
    While the anthem plays; his logic
    Is that "should" is an obligation, not a suggestion–
    As though every imperative
    Were an indicative, as though the "immortal laws,
    "The dharmyamrtam–all thirty-six qualities
    Of a true devotee listed in the Bhagavad-Gita–
    Could be reduced to the temporal laws,
    Or statutes,
    Or codes,
    Or directives
    Of a nation. That shift from dilation
    To constriction in the third eyes, and in the first
    And in the second eyes of this poem's men, its poet
    And Walt's translator
    Is the screech you hear in the background
    As you read this.
    

    “To The States”

    Recording 3: “To The States.”

    There are also the things I have failed to include in the poem
    Until now: the vultures circling straight overhead
    At the retreat center, the scarcity of rain
    Before the exorbitance of rain, then the snakes
    Strewn deranged across the roads after the surplus. How the waves
    Afterward come so hard that even the plovers,
    Who have evolved to elude the whitewash,
    Get swept up in them. All the knocks
    On all the doors I wasn't prepared for, the lists of reasons
    The lovers I meet give for why they no longer sleep
    In the same bed together. Plus other things that are not mine
    That I weep for nonetheless,
    Like licking the outside of a bottle of honey,
    Which is also a metaphor for watching kirtan
    Without participating: no taste.
    
    At the Ayurvedic center in Kerala, Walt Whitman
    Is getting a four-handed massage. The point
    Is to lengthen Walt's trapezius so his shoulder is less vexed
    In adho mukha savasana. The point
    Is Walt's experience of synchronicity. The masseurs
    Tell Walt: "We want you to remember your reptilian origins.
    "They are referring to the facility of Walt Whitman's spine;
    But all Walt's contemplating are the parts of him
    That he perceives as untouchable: the cellulite on the backs
    Of Walt's thighs, the tops of his feet where the sand flies
    On the beach have assaulted him. Walt's stomach
    Which could be tighter at the abdomen,
    But isn't. The dosha test Walt Whitman and I took online
    Before traveling to India identified Walt
    As Pitta. The Ayurvedic center confirms
    Our diagnosis, reducesWalt's intake of spices to balance him. Signs
    Of a Pitta imbalance include anger and irritability,
    Frustration and fitful sleep, willfulness, bad breath,
    Penchants for platitudes in italics, bloodshot eyes.
    All of these symptoms are unmistakably present
    In Walt Whitman's poem "To The States,"
    Which, in earlier editions of Leaves of Grass,
    Was called "Walt Whitman's Caution" and included
    In a sub-sequence of Leaves called "Songs of Insurrection.
    "In the poem, Walt addresses the States United and then
    The states individual, challenging it and them
    To "Resist much, obey little." Those are Walt's italics,
    Not mine. The syllogistic force
    Of the poemIs that unquestioning obedience
    On the part of a state leads to enslavement;
    And a state once enslaved"
    [N]ever afterward resumes its liberty." That's Walt's
    Platitude, not mine; but the excess
    Of Pitta is our common condition, and the downward spiral
    Of Walt Whitman's caution belongs–
    The poem assures me–to both of us.
    
    It's a fiery miniature of a lyric, full of agni.
    Give the poem some oatmeal, a cucumber,
    An avocado, the Ayurvedic doctors would say.
    Give it a moment, the historians would say,
    Because they recognize the paradigm it warns of.
    Give it a rest, our autocrat-elect
    Would insist
    Though he would only insist it
    Over Twitter; Give it a break, Walt Whitman's boss
    At the Brooklyn Daily Eagle, at the Department
    Of the Interior; Give it a handle
    And make it a sign, the protesters everywhere
    While the crime of protest holds its breath
    At the threshold of further criminalization. Give it
    To me, Richard Spencer would say,
    Before making contact with the microphone
    In the Ronald Regan Building, Washington, D.C.,
    To conclude the speech my poem
    About Walt Whitman's poem "To The States" has been deferring
    With: "Hail Trump, hail our people, hail victory!"
    
    With his face in the cradle and an ocean
    Between himself and Richard Spencer,
    Walt Whitman hears "hail" and not "heil."
    But since Spencer's "hail victory!"
    Is a straightforward translation
    Of Hitler's "sieg hiel!"
    And since Spencer has advocated
    For a thoroughly white America
    Through "peaceful ethnic cleansing"
    And since the audients' response
    To Spencer's closing words
    Is to raise flat hands in a Nazi salute,
    The pronunciation - "hail" or "heil" -
    Is no matter. Walt Whitman is grinding his teeth
    On the sheets of the massage table,
    His drool trailing through the headrest
    And pooling on the floor. What
    Is this here? This here? the masseur
    Keeps asking, as though Walt could justify
    Each of his trapezial adhesions
    Through description.
    The German word "heil" signifies more
    Than salutation. It carries connotations of healing
    And health, as in: good health to you, dictator;
    Take care of yourself, noble subject
    As in: here's to your welfare,
    Walt Whitman.
    By 1937 in Germany, it was illegal
    For Jews to use the phrase with each other.
    Juridically speaking, that is, only Aryans
    Could wish each other well.
    
    The Bhagavad-Gita is one of the most ancient textual sources
    Of the word ārya. The word occurs in the second chapter,
    Which is called "Sankhya Yoga,"
    And which is the reason Walt Whitman and I
    Are at the Ayurvedic center: to prepare ourselves
    For asana, which is to prepare us
    For meditation. When Krishna first speaks to Arjuna
    In the second chapter of the Gita,
    Arjuna is still slumped in his chariot which remains parked
    Between the armies. Still
    Arjuna is frozen with pity for his frenemies
    Who are his fathers and teachers and lovers
    On the other side of civil war; but his pity has nothing
    In commonWith divine compassion. That's why Krishna says:
    How un-Aryan of you, Arjuna; how cowardly
    And unbecoming, this pity. The word
    Krishna uses
    Is anārya. In Sanskrit, the word ārya
    Means "noble" or "advanced";
    Anārya means: "those who do not know
    The value of life." That's one translation, anyhow. What Krishna
    Spends the rest of the second chapter
    Asking Arjuna to remember is the difference in value
    Between body and soul, material nature
    And spirit, prakriti
    And purusha. This is the frank dualism
    Of Sankhya yoga. "When you go low,
    I go high," Krishna says to Arjuna,
    Because he thinks Michelle nailed it
    At the DNC, not to mention her sentiment
    Is wholly apropos the Gita's message.
    "Nothing of nonbeing comes to be,
    Nor does being cease to exist," writes Barbara
    Stoller Miller, who's translating Krishna.
    "So we better get used to each other"
    Says Swami Tripurari; and the Ronald Regan Building
    In Washington, D.C.
    Where his podcast on the Gita is being recorded
    Erupts in laughter. How unbecoming,
    Cringes Walt Whitman, as four hands bump over
    The excess flesh above his serratus posterior.
    There is no unbecoming, says Krishna;
    Only manifestation, then non-manifestation,
    Then manifestation again.
    
    Heinrich Himmler, the Aryan,
    Had these lines from the Gita memorized. Heinrich Himmler
    Carried the Bhagavad-Gita in his back pocket
    As he engineered the murders
    Of millions of Jews, Slavs, Romanis, queers,
    Persons of color, leftists, socialists, anarchists,
    Communists, the disabled. Himmler studied
    The Bhagavad-Gita at bedtime,
    Marking comparisons between Hitler and Krishna,
    Himself and Arjuna,
    While he fantasized the many deaths
    Of Walt Whitman. The SS called the Gita
    A high Aryan canto. "You must remember
    Your reptilian origins," say Walt's masseurs,
    Says Heinrich Himmler
    As he presses his index fingers
    Directly into Walt Whitman's spine.
    Except the word Himmler uses
    Is untermensch: sub-human.
    What is this here? This here? Himmler keeps
    Interrogating Walt, now punching the parts
    That the poet perceives as untouchable.
    In Kerala, where the call to prayer
    From the nearby mosque wafts
    Above the town's Hindu temples, where in the open shala,
    Our yoga teacher plays something
    That sounds like electronic church music, the vultures
    Drop lower in their spiraling
    As if to signalize the strain of coexistence.
    One thing about a vulture is its spine extends all the way up
    To its tongue. Which means that when a vulture pulls
    The meat from the bone, it is not the beak
    Or the tongue,
    But the spine
    That is doing the work of separation.
    
    If Arjuna
    Were to write a poem called "To The States"
    From the early chapters of the Bhagavad-Gita,
    The "states" he addressed would not be nation-states
    Or constituent states or federated states. They would be states
    Of feeling. In an early draft, the poem
    Would be called "Arjuna's Caution," because Arjuna thinks
    Walt nailed it in 1860. It would arise
    From Arjuna's state of fear, which has to do,
    In part, with the mixing of castes. Here
    Is why I cannot fight, Arjuna says to Krishna:
    Civil war corrupts a family; and when a family
    Is in disorder, its laws collapse; and when
    Its laws collapse, its women
    Are debauched; and debauchery causes
    A confusion of caste; and a confusion of caste
    Is the road to hell that is paved
    With impure cementing.
    
    How un-Aryan of you, how unbecoming,
    Krishna answers. But his Aryanism is precisely
    What Arjuna is worried about: I will unbecome us
    If I fight. Both figures appeal to dharma; and this
    Is where the tension lies: Krishna says,
    You are of the kshatriya, the warrior, class;
    It is your dharma to fight; Arjuna says,
    I am of the kshatriya, the warrior, class
    ;It is my dharma to keep the caste system intact,
    Which means it is my dharma not to fight.
    But Arjuna is in a state of studentship, like Walt Whitman,
    On the massage table,
    Is in a state of bliss. Like all the snakes
    On the road after the rain, the vultures even, their reptilian
    Origins, their tongue-spines. The ideas I have
    About Walt Whitman's body
    That give me permission
    To take an online dosha test for him. Walt looks down
    At the puddle of drool beneath his face.
    One thing about vultures is they vomit defensively.
    One thing about licking the outside
    Of a bottle of honey
    Is that it is a metaphor for witnessing subjection
    Without participating in its containment: no taste.
    
    "Also above India
    Hovers the sun-sign of the Swastika": that was one
    Nazi slogan. Also above Washington D.C.,
    Above the States, hovers the sun-sign
    Of the Swastika. Who in the SS could prove
    That his ancestry went back
    To Arjuna? It was Arjuna's warrior class,
    That so fascinated Heinrich Himmler. If you read
    Himmler's 1943 Posen Speeches
    Alongside the Bhagavad-Gita, you'd be struck nauseous
    By their ideological similarities:
    How if the destiny of a nation calls for it,
    Each man has a duty to conduct drastic measures
    Without pity
    Or regard to kinship, to friendship.
    How the deeds we do in prakriti inflict
    No damage on purusha; how the higher self is not polluted
    In the lower self's murderous acts, so long
    As those acts are consonant with dharma. And who
    Determines consonance? But this is no place
    For sentiment, says Krishna in the Bhagavad-Gita.
    This is no place
    For emotionalism, says Heinrich Himmler.
    
    It is not for Walt or I to surmise
    About the justice of using the Gita
    As an ideological blueprint.
    We are anyhow too busy dripping with abhyanga oil,
    Cutting the spices, one by one,
    Out of our meals. We are busy
    With the blood bubbling forth from our dinners,
    Which Arjuna never had to witness. What is this here?
    This here? Walt asks, as he pokes at the ghee floating at the top
    Of his fennel tea. We wish each other health
    Before clinking ceramic cups: hail,
    Walt Whitman; hail, Lauren Shufran. Then Walt Whitman is back
    In adho mukha savasana, downward-facing dog, thinking
    Can one disprove the untouchable
    Simply by virtue of touching?

  • Lauren Shufran’s “Walt Whitman’s Inscriptions”

    Judith Goldman (bio)
    SUNY Buffalo

    Passage to more than India!
    Walt Whitman, “Passage to India” (line 224)

    It is not an obvious time to return to Walt Whitman’s Leaves of Grass (1855-1892).1 Though, as we witness the United States venture ever closer to what seems like civil war and/or the dissolution of a nation, taking insistent strides, in Ibram X. Kendi’s formulation, in our “racist progress,” perhaps a serious quarrel with Whitman will get us to the heart of matters.2 Or so wagers Lauren Shufran’s searching, poem-by-poem entanglement with the “Inscriptions” section of Whitman’s magnum opus, a project that reckons not with what we could more comfortably call contradictions borne of his containing multitudes, but with his repressed racist legacy. Yet rather than turn to the direct expression of racism in his lesser-known white nationalist journalism (such as his Free Soil writings of the 1840s3), or to various of his odes to Manifest Destiny (such as “Pioneers! O Pioneers!,” first appearing in the 1865 edition of Leaves of Grass), Shufran chooses to interrupt our familiar, homey sense of Whitman’s cosmic, absorbent self-dilations by digging into the logical underpinnings of the brief lyrics, mainly on nationhood and democracy, that open his American epitome, and challenging their semblance of political universality.

    Yet it is the particular intertextual angle of Shufran’s exposure that adds a crucial complexity to her work, as she joins a long tradition of commentary on Whitman vis-à-vis his adaptations of Vedantic thought. That is, her queer but partial and critical identification with Whitman specifically takes on both the poet’s work and the Whitmanian dimensions of the robust racism current today in the U.S. by attending to a triangulation that haunts Leaves of Grass: its relation to the 700-verse, synthetic Hindu scripture the Bhagavad Gita. In “Walt Whitman’s Inscriptions,” Shufran engages in rigorous commentary on one of her chosen spiritual tradition’s core texts, its parallels and contrasts with Whitman, and its potential capacity to illuminate our racist predicament, while, resurrecting Whitman as a 21st-century companion practitioner of yoga who joins her on a journey to India, she also gently reflexively mocks Western tourism on the subcontinent and its consumption of yoga and related services.

    Direct self-satire enters Shufran’s portrayal of Walt availing himself of the amenities India has to offer the queer Western spiritual traveler from the opening premise of the first poem featured here, “To Thee Old Cause”: “Walt is on Tinder in India.” Noting that only the first twelve lines of Whitman’s “To Thee Old Cause” can be fit in his 500-character Tinder tagline, her persona dangles the scenario that she herself (and given the uncertainties of deixis, the reader too) is in turn cruising the website and finding appeal in Walt, “Because you are in India, trying to find yourself.” As this exemplary burlesque in which Americans leave home to find the self in India only to have Whitman then stand in some wise as India’s essence might suggest, what Shufran’s layered reading and positioning throughout these poems makes evident is that the cultural traffic in Whitman goes both ways. “Whitman has been read in other cultures and into other cultures,” as Ed Folsom writes, “looping into other traditions and finding its way back.”4 Whitman’s most intensive cross-cultural intersection is with Hindu thought, and Shufran’s “Walt Whitman’s Inscriptions” in part responds to the tendency of past and present yogic teachers and followers of every nationality and ethnicity to idealize Whitman in their frequent citation of him as Vendantic seer to forget his racism, his jingoism, his white supremacist thought, in turning to Whitman at just those moments, ironically, when poetry is called on to heal or transcend political rifts and their violence. If contemporary Hinduism often uses Whitman not only as Whitman himself envisioned his cosmo-political-poetical role, but also as Whitman had made use of the Bhagavad Gita, Shufran gives the dialectic another turn, reading and troubling that return circuit while cannily setting up Whitman as a double and foil for herself as a white, queer, American poet and spiritual practitioner even as she recommits to her beliefs.

    One might refer not to Whitman’s racism but to his complexly interwoven racisms. In “Song of Myself” Whitman models white humanitarianism towards fugitive slaves and figures a (problematic) merging of the self with black persons, while in works such as An American Primer (1904) as well as in his notebooks he romanticizes “the American aborigines,” throughout his corpus preferring their toponyms (“Paumonok”; “Mannahatta”). Whitman’s homegrown social Darwinism nonetheless leads him in a number of poems speculatively to depict the dying out of these putatively inferior races, African Americans and Native Americans.5

    “Passage to India” (1870) offers a more sanguine (if no less exoticizing) outlook on the other Indians he valued. In this rhapsody on the completion of the Suez Canal, the undersea transatlantic cable, and a transcontinental railway in the US, Whitman portrays contemporary physical linkages between East and West as achieving a performative “rondure of the world” (line 81).6 In Whitman’s peculiar anachronism “Lo, soul, the retrospect brought forward” it is only now that Western technological accomplishment has caught up to the spiritual destiny of humanity laid out long ago in “the Sanscrit and the Vedas” (128, 139). Columbus’s deferred goal (e.g., to find a passage to India) has been fulfilled, but, more importantly, conditions have been made ripe for “The flowing literatures, tremendous epics, religions, castes” of India to reach their apotheosis (135). “[T]he past lit up again,” modern science may thus “Eclaircise the myths Asiatic—the primitive fables,” because the real passage at stake has always been the one central to (Whitman’s version of) Vendantic mysticism, the soul’s communion with the divine (127, 17). It is perhaps not surprising that, in turn, a filiated anachronism of past-made-present might be mirrored in a Hindu perspective on Whitman: as V. K. Chari notes, “Sri Aurobindo, the sage of Pondicherry,” in The Future Poetry (1917-1920), saw Whitman’s poetry as that “in which ‘one of the seers of old time reborn in ours might have expressed himself’” (396).

    Whitman’s writing has been read as closely paralleling the philosophy in the Bhagavad Gita and the Upanishads, and has been used in different parts of the globe to explain those texts or to emblematize them, though it has remained a point of scholarly contention for over a century just how well acquainted he was with these and other Indian sources (in part because Whitman both protested the autochthony of his poetry and attested to the influence of Eastern religion and philosophy7). Transliterations of a few Sanskrit terms appear even in the first edition of Leaves of Grass, but these were likely gathered from digests and reviews of Eastern religion and philosophy in contemporary periodicals.8 In a footnote to Walt Whitman: His Life and Work (1906), Bliss Perry writes, “Emerson once remarked smilingly to F. B. Sanborn [a journalist and a biographer of the American Transcendentalists] that Leaves of Grass was a combination of the Bhagavad-Gita and the New York Herald,” yet, early on, Whitman seems mainly to have absorbed the concepts of Indian thought into his poetry through reading Emerson and other American Transcendentalists scholars (276).9 As Nathaniel Preston writes, “H. D. Thoreau, in a letter to Harrison Blake from December 1856 [right after the publication of the first edition of Leaves of Grass] recounts his first meeting with Whitman. Thoreau remarked that Whitman’s poems were ‘wonderfully like the Orientals’ and asked Whitman whether he had read them. Whitman’s reply was ‘No; tell me about them’” (253). However, in his own essay A Backward Glance O’er Travel’d Roads (1888), where he recounts “some…embryonic facts of Leaves of Grass,” Whitman states he read “Shakspere, Ossian, the best translated versions I could get of Homer, Eschylus, Sophocles, the old German Nibelungen, the ancient Hindoo poems, and one or two other masterpieces, Dante’s among them,” prior to first composition (577-78). No doubt the study of Hinduism was a lifelong preoccupation for the poet. His copy of J. Cockburn Thomson’s 1855 translation of the Gita, thought to have been sent him by his English friend Thomas Dixon at Christmas in 1875, was well used and annotated (Hendrick 13). “When Whitman died,” Richard H. Davis writes, “it was reported, a translation of the Gita was found lying under his pillow” (74).

    From the late nineteenth- through the twenty-first century, most scholars tracing the Vedantic influences and similitudes in Whitman (or refuting them) have focused on his mysticism without examining its political implications.10 By reading the Bhagavad Gita “with” Whitman to produce creative translations of his “Inscriptions,” Shufran not only traces the “elsewhere” in that most homegrown, all-American text Leaves of Grass but also closely examines, for instance, the dialectics of particular and universal, multiplicity and unity, self and other, so obsessively staged by Whitman that draw on, as well as skew and distort, Hindu mystic thought, in order to discern his poems’ deep political architectonics.

    “To Thee Old Cause,” already mentioned above, which finds Shufran and Whitman at Mandrem Beach (a tourist site in North Goa, India), creates and explores a set of parallels between Whitman’s eponymous poem, which proclaims the necessity of fighting “a strange sad war, great war” (39) the American Civil War for a “cause” that remains unnamed throughout, and the first eleven chapters of the Bhagavad Gita, in which the god Krishna, in the form of a man, argues with Prince Arjuna about the necessity of fighting a civil war, finally appearing to Arjuna in a divine vision of “universal form.” In what becomes an ingenious meditation on tropology, modes of causality, embodiment, difference, and desire, Shufran playfully analyses Krishna’s various manifestations by adventitiously introducing Whitman as obsessed with Tinder: thus, Krishna both as “avatar,” a Sanskrit word that, as she explains, “initially meant: the descent of a deity/Into terrestrial form,” and as “theophany,” divine unity revealed immediately as infinite multiplicity, meets a match in dating avatars that are not directly bodies, but images, and that together amount to a secular theophany. (As Whitman, a continuously-swiping-right Arjuna, remarks, “everyone is divine.”) Shufran’s poem’s persona continues further to parse the erotics and micro-politics of figurative relation through reference to interactions with her own lover and their ensuing affects, involving shifting senses of sameness and difference in homoerotic liaison, the pitfalls of gauging the reality of intimacy, and the contradictory, self-thwarting aspects of attachment.

    If, in her version of “To Thee Old Cause,” Shufran questions Whitman’s statement in the 1871 poem, “my book and the war are one” (39), she again expresses skepticism towards Whitmanian tropology as tending towards “forced equivalence” in her translation of Whitman’s poem “For Him I Sing.” As Whitman there declares regarding his unnamed dedicatee: “With time and space I him dilate and fuse the immortal laws,/To make himself by them the law unto himself” (43). Whitman’s poem seems faintly to be derived, Shufran finds, from the concept of “Sanatama dharma,” “the absolute set of duties/Incumbent upon all Hindus” elaborated by the Bhagavad Gita (and other Vedic texts), a connection Shufran refutes by detecting in Whitman’s juridical organicism a key metaphor in his “For Him I Sing” is a tree growing from its roots a neo-fascist whiff of corporatist nationalism, her suspicions crystallized in her comment that these “immortal laws” are not reducible to “the temporal laws…of a nation.” Augmenting Whitman’s organic figures, Shufran then ventriloquizes for Whitman an ideology of poetic and legal form as “autopoiesis” (a theory of biological life co-developed by the Buddhist neuroscientist Francisco Varela).11 While autopoiesis proposes a long evolutionary cycle of adaptation through recursive self-generation as organisms interact with their environment, in Whitman’s corrupted version as applied to the law and to poems that articulate the logic of the law the process is accelerated and twisted such that the autopoietic incorporation of authority involves not a millennia-long “history of perturbations,” but rather a single compound synecdoche, as the law authorizes what is outside or above the it in its own name, as its own authority. What Shufran’s “For Him I Sing” goes on deftly to argue is that Whitman’s distorted model of sovereignty, in which someone might function as a “law unto himself,” becoming the law incorporate, is precisely that of the American police state. As Steve Martinot and Jared Sexton argue in “The Avant Garde of White Supremacy”:

    If the spectacle of police violence does, in fact, operate according to a rule of its own …, what does this suggest about the social institutions that generate it and which it represents despite persistent official disavowals? [T]he cultural content of the actual policing that we face is to be a law unto itself, not the socially responsible institution it claims to be in its disavowals…. They [the police] make problematic the whole notion of social responsibility such that we no longer know if the police are responsible to the judiciary and local administration or if the city is actually responsible to them, duty bound by impunity itself. To the extent to which the police are a law unto themselves, the latter would have to be the case.(n.p.)

    “I was in India with Walt Whitman/The day the two-hundred-and-third black person/To be fatally shot by the police in 2016/was killed,” Shufran writes. And later: “Walt writes a poem called/ ‘This Poem is a Law unto Itself’;/It is about the Baltimore police and the Ferguson/Police and the Oakland and Cleveland/Police and the SFPD and the LAPD and the NCPD;/And it is a poem that dilates to encompass all the PDs.” Yet further layers accrue to Shufran’s conceit through her engagement with the figure of Colin Kaepernick, the San Francisco 49ers quarterback who in the 2016 season at first stayed seated and then knelt during “The Star Spangled Banner” to protest the barrage of killings of people of color by the police. (Kaepernick stated he would continue to kneel until the American flag “represents what it’s supposed to represent” [qtd. in Hafner].) Framed by Shufran as a correlative of Arjuna on the battlefield at Kurukshetra, at war with his own family and teachers, Kaepernick enacts self-critical patriotism as a salutary form of autopoietic feedback: he does act as a law unto himself but rather performs a corrective dissent that draws an entirely self-estranged law back towards itself.

    We find Shufran’s persona and Whitman in Kerala at the Ayurvedic center (Walt is receiving yet another massage) in the third and final poem selected here, a translation of Whitman’s “To the States.” Despite jibes at the poem’s platitudes and her reflexively counter-organicist use of the poem to diagnose Whitman as having a Pitta dosha imbalance, the speaker admits, “It’s a fiery miniature of a lyric.” Composed in the late 1850s and initially entitled “Walt Whitman’s Caution,” “To the States” in its entirety reads as follows:

    To the States or any one of them, or any city of the States,
         Resist much, obey little,
    Once unquestioning obedience, once fully enslaved,
    Once fully enslaved, no nation, state, city of this earth,
         ever afterward resumes its liberty. (44)

    But Whitman’s miniature, with its strident message, functions in Shufran’s poem mainly as a cautionary backdrop to the aftermath of the 2017 US presidential election, emblematized in the poem by the triumphant, interactive ending of a speech given by white nationalist Richard Spencer at an Alt-Right conference convened shortly after Trump’s win. As reported in the New York Times, “As [Spencer] finished, several audience members had their arms outstretched in a Nazi salute. Mr. Spencer called out: ‘Hail Trump! Hail our people!’ and then, ‘Hail victory!’—the English translation of the Nazi exhortation ‘Sieg Heil!’ The room shouted back” (Goldstein n.p.). Shufran weaves a connection between this grotesque but by now clearly all-too-likely episode and the Bhagavad Gita by focusing on the moment in its second chapter when Krishna remonstrates with Arjuna for his reluctance to fight, out of pity for the family and friends who are his adversaries: (in Shufran’s rendering) “How un-Aryan of you, Arjuna; how cowardly/And unbecoming, this pity.” She further explains that “In Sanskrit, the word ārya/Means “noble or advanced”;/Anārya means: “those who do not know/The value of life.” For Heinrich Himmler—who, Shufran also informs us, daydreamed about himself as Arjuna to Hitler’s Krishna, had these lines memorized, and carried the Gita in his back pocket—what seems to have resonated in this scene beyond that term was the idea of the “kshatriya, the warrior, class,” as well as Arjuna’s concern about his mandate “to keep the caste system intact.” Part of the larger point of this poem is the flexible conscription of texts to ideologies. But, throughout, Shufran’s ingenious play on the word “unbecoming” is also key: Arjuna is worried about the dissolution of the social order, “I will unbecome us/If I fight,” while Krishna argues that such apprehensions, if they keep one from fighting, are unbecoming a warrior. Though the poem doesn’t mention it, Krishna also accuses Arjuna in this chapter of impotence and unmanliness. Is he calling Arjuna gay? As the poem does directly say, Himmler “fantasized the many deaths of Walt Whitman.” Another of its turns on the unbecoming is the most un-Whitmanlike but recognizably queer way in which Walt waxes self-conscious about his chubbiness: “How unbecoming,/Cringes Walt Whitman, as four hands bump over/The excess flesh above his serratus posterior.” It is with this tenderness towards the vulnerable queer body as it embarks on a cross-cultural regime of wellness and self-care, and with an absolute repudiation and despairing at the notion of caste with which the poem ends: “Can one disprove the untouchable/Simply by virtue of touching?

    Footnotes

    1. See, however, CAConrad’s scathing critique of Whitman’s racism in “From Whitman to Walmart.” See also Rob Halpern, Music for Porn, especially the section, “Notes on Affection and War,” a piece focusing on the Civil War-era American eros elaborated by Whitman that would “bind the community in the figure of a dead soldier” (60).

    2. Ibram X. Kendi, “Racial Progress Is Real. But So Is Racist Progress.”

    3. See Klammer 105.

    4. See Folsom, “Database as Genre.”

    5. I draw on leads from Folsom’s “Native Americans [Indians].”

    6. My reading here draws a bit on Ahluwalia.

    7. In “Walt Whitman’s Use of Indian Sources: A Reconsideration,” Nathaniel Preston notes: “Walt Whitman’s insistence on the absolute originality of his poetry often led him to deny or obscure the intellectual and literary influences on his work. He began promulgating the myth of himself as a ‘natural’ poet of America as soon as he published the first edition of Leaves of Grass in 1855. In an anonymous review of his own book, published in September of 1855, for instance, Whitman asserts that he ‘makes no allusions to books or writers; their spirits do not seem to have touched him.’ Whitman’s continuing assertions that his poems were the result of untainted inspiration have provided critics with the challenge of deciphering the real influences which shaped the poet’s art” (256).

    8. See Preston, 253-55.

    9. Perry goes on to say, “Compare, for example, Whitman’s well known use of the communal ‘I’ with Krishna’s speech in the ninth chapter of the Bhagavad-Gita: ‘I (ego) who am present everywhere in divers forms. I am the immolation. I am the whole sacrificial rite. I am the libation offered to ancestors. I am the drug. I am the incantation. I am the sacrificial butter also. I am the fire. I am the incense. I am the father, the mother, the sustainer, the grandfather of the universe—the mystic doctrine, the purification, the syllable “Om!’” etc. etc.” (276-77).

    10. Reviewing Indian scholarship in particular, Chari writes, “Thus it is the spiritual aspect of Whitman’s poetry that attracted most Indian thinkers of the early generations and that still continues to engage the attention of Indian academics, rather than his democratic or purely humanitarian message or his futuristic vision of the New World apparent in poems such as ‘Passage to India” (397).

    11. For a synopsis of Hugo Maturana and Varela’s theory of autopoiesis, see Luisi and Houshmand.

    Works Cited

    • Ahluwalia, Harsharan Singh. “A Reading of Whitman’s ‘Passage to India.’” Walt Whitman Quarterly Review vol. 1, no.1, 1983, pp. 9-17.
    • CAConrad. “From Whitman to Walmart.” Harriet: A Poetry Blog. The Poetry Foundation. 8 June 2015. https://www.poetryfoundation.org/harriet/2015/06/from-whitman-to-walmart/.
    • Chari, V. K. “Whitman in India.” Walt Whitman and the World. Ed. Gay Wilson Allen and Ed Folsom. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1995, pp. 396-405.
    • Davis, Richard H. The Bhagavad Gita: A Biography. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2015.
    • Folsom, Ed. “Database as Genre: The Epic Transformation of Archives.” PMLA vol. 122, Oct. 2007, pp. 1571-79.
    • — “Native Americans [Indians].” Walt Whitman: An Encyclopedia. Ed. J.R. LeMaster and Donald D. Kummings. New York: Garland Publishing, 1998. Reproduced by permission in The Walt Whitman Archive.
    • Goldstein, Joseph. “Alt-Right Gathering Exults in Trump Election with Nazi-Era Salute.” The New York Times. 20 Nov. 2016, n.p. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/21/us/alt-right-salutes-donald-trump.html
    • Hafner, Josh. “Why Kaepernick is honoring, not dishonoring the flag.” USA Today 30 Aug. 2016, n.p. http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/nation-now/2016/08/30/why-kaepernick-protest-flag-troops-military-column/89582194/
    • Halpern, Rob. Music for Porn. Calicoon: Nightboat, 2012.
    • Hendrick, George. “Whitman’s Copy of the Bhagavad-Gita.” Walt Whitman Review vol. 5, Mar. 1959, pp. 12-14.
    • Kendi, Ibram X. “Racial Progress Is Real. But So Is Racist Progress.” The New York Times. 21 Jan. 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/21/opinion/sunday/racial-progress-is-real-but-so-is-racist-progress.html?_r=0
    • Klammer, Martin. “Slavery and Race,” 105. A Companion to Walt Whitman. Ed. Donald D. Kummings. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2006, pp.101-121.
    • Luisi, Pier Luigi, with Zara Houshmand, Discussions with the Dalai Lama on the Nature of Reality. New York: Columbia UP, 2009.
    • Martinot, Steve and Sexton, Jared. “The Avant Garde of White Supremacy.” Social Identities vol. 9, no. 2, June 2003, n.p.
    • Perry, Bliss. Walt Whitman: His Life and Work. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1906.
    • Preston, Nathaniel. “Walt Whitman’s Use of Indian Sources: A Reconsideration” Ritsummeikan bungaku vol., 627, July 2012, pp. 1-12. http://r-cube.ritsumei.ac.jp/bitstream/10367/4575/1/L627Preston.pdf
    • Whitman, Walt. A Backward Glance O’er Travel’d Roads. Walt Whitman: The Complete Poems. Ed. Francis Murphy. London: Penguin, 2004, pp. 569-84.
    • —. “For Him I Sing.” Leaves of Grass. The Complete Poems. Ed. Francis Murphy. London: Penguin, 2004, P. 43.
    • —. “Passage to India.” Leaves of Grass. The Complete Poems. Ed. Francis Murphy. London: Penguin, 2004, pp. 428-437.
    • —. “Pioneers! O Pioneers!” Leaves of Grass. The Complete Poems. Ed. Francis Murphy. London: Penguin, 2004, pp. 257-261.
    • —. “To Thee Old Cause.” Leaves of Grass. The Complete Poems. Ed. Francis Murphy. London: Penguin, 2004, pp. 39.
    • —. “To the States.” Leaves of Grass. The Complete Poems. Ed. Francis Murphy. London: Penguin, 2004, p. 44.
  • Beautiful Things: Bruce Nauman’s Carousel

    Robert S. Lehman (bio)
    Boston College

    This essay examines the relationship between beauty and violence in the taxidermy sculptures of the contemporary American artist Bruce Nauman. It addresses how these sculptures, specifically Carousel (Stainless Steel Version) (1988), succeed in bringing together two incompatible models of the beautiful: the neo-classical beauty of well-ordered bodies, and the beauty of irreducibly particular things. The aim of this project is, first, to make sense of Nauman’s intervention by locating it in a longer history of reflections on the politics of aesthetics; and, second (and more speculatively), to suggest the continued relevance of “beauty” as a political-aesthetic category.

    Bruce Nauman’s Carousel (Stainless Steel Version) (1988)1 is made up of four large, stainless steel arms that extend out from a central motorized pillar to form a rotating cross (Fig. 1). Suspended from the arms by their necks are a taxidermist’s polyurethane molds of an assortment of animals: two small coyotes; a large lynx and a smaller version of the same; the front half of one deer and the head of another. All animals appear to have been skinned. As Carousel rotates and the molds drag along the floor (only the deer are fully suspended), the casts recall the bodies of animals hung awkwardly in a slaughterhouse, particularly if one focuses on the dismembered deer. But for all that, the continual circular movement and low scraping of Carousel‘s passengers is eerily peaceful. If the piece were dangled from the ceiling rather than set upon the floor, it might resemble an uncanny mobile, turning above some monstrous infant’s crib. Nauman has stated, not of the piece itself but of the molds from which it was made, that, “They are beautiful things. They are universally accepted, generic forms used by taxidermists yet they have an abstract quality that I really like” (374). So there lies in Nauman’s Carousel—at its origin if not necessarily at its end—an aesthetic pleasure, an old-fashioned pleasure in beautiful things.

    Fig. 1 Bruce Nauman, Carousel (Stainless Steel Version) © 1988 Bruce Nauman / Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York.

    In the essay that follows, I want to concentrate on the interaction—in Carousel as well as in some of Nauman’s related works—between beauty, on the one hand, and violence, on the other. Nauman’s artistic fascination with violence has already received a good deal of attention from critics. In a 1987 interview with Joan Simon, Nauman himself describes his aim to produce art that is “just there all at once. Like getting hit in the face with a baseball bat. Or better, like getting hit in the back of the neck. You never see it coming; it just knocks you down. I like that idea very much: the kind of intensity that doesn’t give you any trace of whether you’re going to like it or not” (320). Like getting hit with a bat…. It is unusual to find a critical appraisal of Nauman’s work that does not quote (or at least paraphrase) this remark and spin an interpretation out of it. Jerry Saltz describes Nauman’s art as “a deliberate assault on the senses, aesthetic and otherwise” (198); Michael Kimmelman writes, “Mr. Nauman’s goal seems to be to knock you out rather than win you over” (207); and in a review titled, “Watch Out! It’s Here!,” Paul Richard warns potential spectators that “Nauman… distrusts the ‘lush solution.’ His sculptures… never let you bask in transcendental loveliness. He’d rather show up in your thinking space—and club you from behind” (217). These responses to Nauman’s art treat its status as art as more or less incidental to its intended (and achieved) effect. Nauman’s is not an art that one lingers over, in the canonical Kantian sense that we “linger [weilen] over the consideration of the beautiful” (107); it is, rather, an art of immediacy, an art that hits you all at once and that you hurry to escape. This assaultive immediacy, Nauman has suggested, is both antithetical to “beauty” and integral to his art’s “moral function”: “I know there are artists who function in relation to beauty […] I don’t work that way…” (332).

    Despite the claims of Nauman’s critics, and despite some of Nauman’s own claims, I am interested in holding on to the notion that Carousel is not only an ugly, violent work that happens to be made up of “beautiful things,” but that it is also—in a sense on which I will elaborate—a beautiful thing. Now I recognize that “beauty,” beyond its being a questionable term for evaluating Nauman’s artistic project, seems an ill-suited word to describe most contemporary art, and that even those critics who admit the continued relevance of philosophical aesthetics have tended either to avoid making reference to beauty altogether or to replace it with other categories—whether drawn from tradition (as in the category of the sublime) or newly invented (as in the categories furnished in Sianne Ngai’s recent work).2 Indeed, about a decade ago, Arthur Danto “attach[ed] to what has been epidemic in avant-garde circles since the early twentieth century [a] needed clinical term” (25): “Kalliphobia,” meaning literally, “fear of the beautiful” (from κάλλος, the Greek term for beauty).

    I want to insist on beauty, though, not because it does the best job of explaining the affective response one is likely to have to Nauman’s works—Nauman’s works are unpleasant and assaultive—but because it helps us to appreciate in these works the struggle over a set of aesthetic questions that reaches back at least as far as the eighteenth century, a set of questions pertaining to the relationship between, on the one hand, this or that particular physical body, and on the other hand, the technological or political or conceptual structures in which this or that particular physical body finds itself enmeshed. Nauman’s Carousel is a beautiful thing—this will be my claim in what follows—and its beauty is indissociable not only (though somewhat paradoxically) from its ugliness and its expression of violence, but also from whatever critical potential it possesses—from its “moral function.”

    Before I go any further, I should note that the same thing that has made Nauman perhaps the most consistently exciting American artist of the last fifty years also makes it difficult to say much of anything about his work in general. Here I am referring to the diversity of his oeuvre, which spans drawing, sculpture, photography, performance, and video. I have decided to focus on Carousel, then, as a way to tie to a specific work and its effects claims that might seem questionable if applied to Nauman’s project as a whole. Nonetheless, as will become clear, I believe that Carousel can also function as a kind of lodestone, drawing Nauman’s other works toward it and thus helping us to develop some coordinates for an idiosyncratic mapping of Nauman’s oeuvre.

    1

    Let us return to Carousel. Built in 1988, after more than a decade of work focused principally on time-based media, Carousel is part of Nauman’s return to casting (though here the molds are readymade, not Nauman’s own, purchased from a taxidermy supply store near the artist’s New Mexico residence) (Benezra 136). With its endless rotations, Carousel continues Nauman’s interest in the coupling of violence and repetition, an interest also on display across his video pieces—in the repeated bodily movements of Pulling Mouth (1969), the looped escalations of brutality of Violent Incident (1986), and the incantatory demands of “Anthro/Socio (Rinde Spinning)” (1992). With its taxidermist’s molds, however, Carousel is more obviously of a piece with the (roughly) contemporaneous works Hanging Carousel (George Skins a Fox) (1988), a suspended “carousel” featuring four hanging animal molds and a television playing a video of the artist’s friend, George, skinning a fox (Fig. 2); Two Wolves, Two Deer (1989), in which the eponymous molds have been cut up, reassembled, and suspended (Fig. 3); and Animal Pyramid (1990), a twelve-foot-high pyramid of seventeen taxidermy molds (Fig. 4). The last of these, Animal Pyramid, differs from Nauman’s other taxidermy sculptures insofar as its molds are neither suspended nor dismembered. In its difference from the slightly earlier works, however, Animal Pyramid sheds light on what these previous pieces accomplish.

    Fig. 2 Bruce Nauman, Hanging Carousel (George Skins a Fox), © 1988 Bruce Nauman / Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York

    Fig. 3 Bruce Nauman, Untitled (Two Wolves, Two Deer), © 1989 Bruce Nauman / Artists

    Fig. 4 Bruce Nauman, Animal Pyramid, © 1990 Bruce Nauman / Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York

    Animal Pyramid diverges from Nauman’s other taxidermy sculptures by virtue of what it does not suggest. While the suspended and mutilated animals of the “Carousel” sculptures may at first seem to imply violence accomplished for practical reasons (for food, for example, insofar as it is hard not to see in these pieces animals hung in an abattoir) or for theoretical reasons (for the good of science, which, as we know, must murder to dissect), the stacked molds of Animal Pyramid bespeak neither use nor knowledge. What remains? Registering his dissatisfaction with the piece, John Miller sees in it “allusions to totemism and blood sacrifice,” a “nostalgia for primitive sacred art” (128). I disagree. I have tried to see the piece in this light, to find in it an updating of the sorts of myths that fascinated Bataille and Masson and Picasso in the 1930s,3 but I cannot. If one sees in Animal Pyramid a sacred quality, this vision is soon overwhelmed by the suspicion that one is viewing a performance, a kind of circus trick or a distant cousin of the Catalonian castell. I do not mean to say that there is no trace of violence. The animals’ positioning is unnatural; they still seem to have been flayed. I do, however, want to claim that the source of this violence is, here, merely aesthetic. The animals have been stacked into a pyramid for no other reason than that it is visually interesting to see animals stacked into a pyramid. The piece thus comments, aptly, on the taxidermist’s art, an art for which it is acceptable to kill not out of the desire for food or knowledge, or to honor the gods, but for the purpose of decoration. More obscurely, Animal Pyramid comments on the violent potential of any artistic depiction, present in the simple act of imposing a beautiful order on particular bodies. Finally, this piece helps us to see how Carousel might make the same gesture.

    Carousel does not exactly share in the articulation of solidity and precarity exemplified in Animal Pyramid. But neither does it allow its passengers to achieve the weightlessness of the molds that make up, for example, Two Wolves, Two Deer. Thus while it antedates these two pieces, in another way Carousel might be said to occur between them, to present the viewer with a representation of a grounded sculpture’s becoming airborne—albeit without ever quite leaving the ground, such that its rotations would figure a kind of frustratingly endless taxiing on the runway—or maybe more accurately, becoming-mobile. The latter, the notion that what Nauman’s Carousel proffers is an instance of a sculpture’s becoming (or struggling to become, or perhaps failing to become) something like a hanging mobile, locates Carousel in a tradition that reaches back to the Quattrocento—for a hanging mobile is depicted already in da Vinci’s 1498 drawing Duodecedron Planus Vacuus)—but which is not codified until the early twentieth century, with the construction of hanging mobiles by Aleksandr Rodchenko, László Moholy-Nagy, and most importantly the American sculptor Alexander Calder (whose works Marcel Duchamp deemed “mobiles” in 1932; see, for example, Calder’s Antennae with Red and Blue Dots).4 A comparison of Nauman’s not-quite-mobile with Calder’s works is, therefore, instructive. Calder explains his artistic aims in constructing his mobiles as follows:

    [T]he underlying sense of form in my work has been the system of the universe, or part thereof. For that is a rather large model to work from. What I mean is the idea of detached bodies floating in space, of different sizes and densities, and perhaps of different colors and temperatures, and surrounded and interlarded with wisps of gaseous condition, and some at rest, while others move in peculiar manners, seems to me the ideal source of form. (8)

    Calder describes not only the feeling of lightness or delicacy that is the hallmark of his mobiles—what he goes on to characterize as his attempt to approximate “freedom from the earth” (8) and what Jean-Paul Sartre would, in a 1948 appreciation of Calder’s work, liken to “a little hot-jazz tune, unique and ephemeral, like the sky, like the morning; if you miss it, you will have lost it forever” (79)—but also an enabling sense of the orderliness of things, a sort of cosmic balancing act that allows the movement of painted sheet metal hung carefully from wires to double the movement of heavenly bodies: “A very exciting moment for me was at the planetarium…” (Calder 8).

    It is not only the lightness or delicacy or freedom from the earth that Nauman’s Carousel refuses but also the cosmic balance—the as-above-so-below-ness—that allows Calder’s mobiles to both reflect and participate in the movement of the spheres, to overcome their own secondariness as representations and attain the status of natural things. While Calder himself initially worked with small, usually hidden motors, his mobiles were eventually exhibited near a window or in the open air, where they could “vibrate in the wind like Aeolian harps” (Sartre 79). In Carousel the molds hang gracelessly, thanks to the wires looped around their necks; their movements appear coerced, thanks to the motor that makes the whole contraption turn; and while polyurethane is neither a particularly heavy nor a particularly sturdy building material, the molds’ being not quite suspended from reinforced steel posts makes the whole structure seem unusually substantial. We are far from “a little hot-jazz tune.”

    Even so, there may still be a point of contact between Carousel and Calder’s fragile constructions. In the same piece of writing I cited above, after stressing the impossible delicacy of Calder’s mobiles—”fed on the air, they respire and draw their life from the tenuous life of the atmosphere” (79)—as well as their affinity to natural forms—”their marvelous swan-like nobility” (80)—Sartre concludes with a litany of associations. “Calder’s mobiles,” he writes, “are like aquatic plants bent low by a stream, the petals of the sensitive plant, the legs of a headless frog, or gossamer caught in an updraft” (81). So: aquatic plants, flower petals, and wind-blown gossamer…but also the still-twitching legs of a decapitated frog. What are we to make of this list? At the very moment that Sartre seems most intent on connecting Calder’s mobiles to the beauty of the natural world, he resorts to an image of the latter in pieces, to a mutilated animal body that recalls his reader to the dissecting room, or, ultimately, to the flayed or hacked-apart forms that make up Nauman’s Carousel. What explains this movement from the nobility of the swan to the (apparently still beautiful) death throes of the frog?

    2

    Here we need to step back for a moment, in order to give this relationship between aesthetic order and physical violence a slightly larger historical frame. Consider Johann Winckelmann’s famous 1759 description of the Belvedere Torso (Fig. 6), believed by Winckelmann to depict Heracles at rest:

    I direct you now to the much praised, but never sufficiently glorified, mutilated statue of Heracles—to a work which is the most beautiful of its kind and is to be counted among the highest creations of art which have come into our time. How will I describe it to you, since it has been robbed of the most charming and significant parts of nature? Just as from a mighty oak, which has been felled and stripped of its twigs and branches, only the trunk remains, so sits the mutilated image of the hero; head, breast, arms, and legs are missing.(xiv)

    Having set for himself this challenge—”How will I describe it to you…?”—Winckelmann goes on to reconstruct from the trunk and what is left of the legs not only the ideal form of the statue, which he likens to the motions of the sea and the rise of the mountains, but also the hero’s world and labors: “At this moment my mind travels through the most remote regions of the world through which Heracles passed, and I am led to the limits of his labors…by the sight of thighs of inexhaustible force (and of a length appropriate for one of the gods) which have carried the hero through hundreds of lands and peoples into immortality” (xvi). Winckelmann concludes by lamenting that this singular work, “which is perhaps the last one to which art applied its utmost powers” is now “half annihilated” (xviii). Nonetheless, one has the impression, reading his ekphrastic reconstruction, that the statue’s having suffered dismemberment is a condition of, not an obstacle to, its claim to transcendence—that “the strength of his arms” and the “head full of majesty and wisdom” can only appear before us in all their splendor because they are not weighed down by the heaviness of stone. This promotion of the partial or the broken is realized more explicitly in the later cult of the fragment, as we encounter it in the writings of the Jena romantics, the sculptures of Rodin (Fig. 7), and indeed, in some of Nauman’s own works. In each instance, the fact of fragmentation somehow points toward a more perfect whole—even in the case of a work like Nauman’s Five Pink Heads, which, from the right vantage, ends up evoking an abstract ideality akin to that attained by Brancusi’s Endless Column (Fig. 8 and 9).5

    Fig. 6 Belvedere Torso, 1st century B.C.

    Fig. 7 Auguste Rodin, Torso, ca. 1877 or 1878.

    Fig. 8 Bruce Nauman, Five Pink Heads in the Corner, © 1992 Bruce Nauman / Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York

    Fig. 9 Constantin Brancusi, Endless Column, © 1918 Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York

    It would appear that none of this fascination with the fragment is present in the writings of Friedrich Schiller, the modern figure who, more than any other, labored to align the notion of classical beauty adumbrated by Winckelmann with what is morally or politically desirable, and who, along with J. G. Herder, moved German thought in the direction of an aestheticized holism.6 In his theoretical writings on aesthetics from the last decade of the eighteenth century, Schiller decries a modern form of life in which, “[e]verlastingly chained to a single little fragment of the whole, man himself develops into nothing but a fragment” [Ewig nur an ein einzelnes kleines Bruchstück des Ganzen gefesselt, bildet sich der Mensch selbst nur als Bruchstück aus] (Aesthetic Education 35). Man is fragmented insofar as he is given over one-sidedly to his sensual desires or to his calculating reason. With his notion of the “play-drive” [Spieltrieb], Schiller proposes a holistic alternative: “Man only plays when he is in the fullest sense of the word a human being, and he is only fully a human being when he plays” (Aesthetic Education 107). To be fully human, to play, is to find balanced in oneself sensuality and rationality, animal and god. The harmonization of these seemingly opposed tendencies, in the individual as well as in the collective, is an aesthetic task, but one that reaches far beyond the traditionally delimited domain of the aesthetic. Man in play is man in his “aesthetic state,” a term that has to be maintained in its rich ambiguity as both a state of consciousness—ästhetischer Zustand—and a political formation—ästhetischer Staat. Here are two passages in which Schiller helps us to understand what this means. The first is from the 1793 letters to Gottfried Körner, Kallias, or Concerning Beauty:

    I know of no more fitting an image for the ideal of beautiful relations than the well danced and arabesquely composed English dance. The spectator in the gallery sees countless movements which cross each other colorfully and change their direction willfully but never collide. Everything has been arranged such that the first has already made room for the second before he arrives, everything comes together so skillfully and yet so artlessly that both seem merely to be following their own mind and still never get in the way of the other. (Schiller 174)

    The second is from the better-known Letters on the Aesthetic Education of Man of 1795:

    Uncoordinated leaps of joy turn into dance, the unformed movements of the body into graceful and harmonious pantomime; the confused and indistinct cries of feeling become articulate, begin to obey the laws of rhythm, and to take on the contours of song. If the Trojan host storms on to the battlefield with piercing shrieks like a flock of cranes, the Greek army approaches it in silence, with noble and measured tread. In the former case we see only the exuberance of blind forces; in the latter, the triumph of form and the simple majesty of law [den Sieg der Form und die simple Majestät des Gesetzes].(136)

    The aesthetic state is, ideally, like a dance, but a dance that models or is modeled on the behavior of an army on the battlefield, on the “noble and measured tread” of Homer’s advancing Greeks.

    So, from the dance to the battlefield: with Schiller, we do not take as our starting point the violence of mutilated frogs or half annihilated torsos, but do we end up there? In 1939, reflecting on the same text in which Schiller had found “graceful and harmonious pantomime,” Simone Weil writes that “for those dreamers who considered that force, thanks to progress, would soon be a thing of the past, the Iliad could appear as a historical document; for others, whose powers of recognition are more acute and who perceive force, today, as of yesterday, at the very center of human history, the Iliad is the purest and the loveliest of mirrors” (6). Weil refers here to the seductiveness, the aestheticization, of violent force. The latter, rather than any particular character, she treats as “the true hero, the true subject, the center” of Homer’s epic (Weil 6).

    And for what in our modern history does Schiller’s depiction of the aesthetic state, modeled as it is on the “measured tread” of the Greek army or the “arabesquely composed English dance,” provide the purest and the loveliest of mirrors? The implications of this question may seem excessive. The legacy of Schiller’s idealized aesthetic state, principally its prefiguring of National Socialist ideology, has no doubt been overstated in the past.7 Returning to Schiller’s own writings, we find simplifications of Kant, anticipations of Hegel, ubiquitous Hellenophilia—but fascism? The relationship of Schiller’s Weimar classicism to what the next two centuries would bring is, in any case, a topic far too large for this essay. We can at least admit, though, that the aestheticization of the political, whether or not we follow it back to Schiller, has been one of the twentieth century’s controlling operations (a fact noted by critics from Benjamin and Brecht to Boris Groys and Eric Michaud). At stake is the conception of the state as somehow like a work of art (and consequently of the statesman as somehow like an artist), as well as the possibility of finding something beautiful in force.8

    Back to Carousel. Viewed in light of Schiller’s conception of the aesthetic state, which, even at war, “obeys the laws of rhythm” as though it had adapted itself to song, Carousel can be read as figuring a violence that is learning to dance. The steps are heavy and dragging at first, but once the legs are removed (as they are in the molds of the two deer), transcendence should be easier. If the classical beauty of well ordered bodies is secured at the cost of dismemberment—the same fortuitous dismemberment that inspired Winckelmann and Rodin (and that is evoked by Sartre’s unexpected likening of the swaying of Calder’s mobiles to the twitching of decapitated frogs)—the critical power of Carousel is to let this violence, which aestheticization ought to conceal, shine forth. And so, against Winckelmann’s sublime torso or Schiller’s aesthetic state, we might position Carousel alongside Heinrich von Kleist’s marionette theater, where the very possibility of the most beautiful dance is revealed to depend on the replacement of all-too-human limbs with “what they should be—dead, pure pendulums following the simple law of gravity” (24).9 Whatever trace of beauty remains in Nauman’s sculpture—the beauty of the “beautiful things” of which it is made, or the eerie beauty of its passengers’ slow, dragging motions—is only there to remind us that beauty can and does disguise violence. Carousel is only as beautiful as it needs to be, no more.

    3

    The preceding sketch serves as a first approach to the place of beauty in Carousel. The sculpture, revealing and reveling in ugliness and violence, presents an artistic challenge to beauty qua aestheticization, to the same sort of aestheticization that gives rise to what we can call, after Schiller, the aesthetic state. To affirm this approach, wherein the challenge to a certain aesthetic-political formation is of key importance, is also to associate Carousel with some of Nauman’s earlier and more openly political work from the 1980s, such as South America Triangle (1981), an inverted cast iron chair suspended inside a large, steel triangle (Fig. 10). Nauman has described South America Triangle as his attempt to address political torture. Having recently read works dealing with the repression of political dissent in South America—”I was reading V. S. Naipaul’s stories about South America and Central America, including ‘The Return of Eva Peron’ and especially ‘The Killings in Trinidad.’ Reading Naipaul clarified things for me and helped me to continue. It helped me to name names, to name things”—he decided to create a piece depicting the “torturing of a chair…hanging it up or strapping it down” (299). As in Carousel and related works, suspension is here associated with violence10—sadistic violence, I would argue (against Deleuze, who associates both literal and figurative suspension with masochism).11 In South America Triangle, the suspended chair is itself the victim of this violence but, empty, it is also an indication that something more terrible has already occurred. As surely as ships go missing in the Bermuda Triangle, someone has (been) disappeared. Such is the force of Nauman’s sculpture.

    Fig. 10 Bruce Nauman, South America Triangle, © 1981 Bruce Nauman / Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York

    And yet, there is something dissatisfying about aligning the “moral function” of Carousel with that of South America Triangle, such that each work suffers from the comparison. First, in light of the rich suggestiveness of the later sculpture, South America Triangle starts to appear frustratingly didactic, a testament to the artist’s justifiable horror concerning events in Latin America (though not U.S. policies, interestingly, which Nauman would not have been aware of), but limited as art. Carousel also suffers; along with Nauman’s other taxidermy sculptures, the piece was constructed and first exhibited concurrent with the slow collapse of what was then the world’s most high profile totalitarian regime, the Soviet Union, which was, if Boris Groys is to be believed, intended to be built as a kind of aesthetic state, “as a total work of art that would organize life itself according to a unitary plan” (23). At the time of Nauman’s creation of Carousel, it had already become clear that this plan had failed, that the Cold War was all but over, and that some version of Western liberal democracy had, for the time being, won. Moreover, Germany’s Nazi parenthesis had already been closed for nearly fifty years. What could it mean, then, to produce in 1988, 1989, or 1990 a work critical of the dangers of an aestheticized totalitarianism? If, looking back to Schiller and forward to the events of 1991, Carousel presents an oblique commentary on the aesthetic state, it does so at the risk of tying itself to some version of American triumphalism (or to a version of the sort of anti-totalitarian leftism that would come to be associated with the writings of André Glucksmann or Christopher Hitchens). Set alongside South America Triangle as a more or less straightforward challenge to an aestheticized totalitarian politics, Carousel seems rather dated.

    I do not want to reject this reading of Carousel—the reading of it as a challenge, by way of its own ugliness or violence, to the beauty of the aesthetic state—but I do not want to rest with it either. For I am not so sure that beauty, as it operates in Carousel, is finally identical to whatever historical role it has played in the aestheticization of the political. In a handful of recent essays (and taking his cue from the later writings of Theodor Adorno), Robert Kaufman has argued that it may be useful to distinguish aestheticization, on the one hand, from the aesthetic, on the other, and to recognize, moreover, that “pace today’s critique of aesthetic ideology…the aesthetic is anti-aestheticist” (684). While in Kaufman’s argument, aestheticization describes something like the beautification of the status quo, or the means by which a brute physical violence (and paradigmatically, the violence of the statu itself) comes to appear well-ordered or natural, the aesthetic resists this ordering by insisting on the irreducibility of the concrete, sensual particular in the face of any conceptual articulation or practical recruitment. Beauty, in this formulation—”the aesthetic is anti-aestheticist“—would, then, be an especially fraught term; indeed, it would be divided between two incompatible roles. It would be, first and still, the tool or the telos of aestheticization, but it would also be another name for a (still aesthetic) resistance to aestheticization’s deleterious effects. Unlike the sublime—the experience of which, at least in its Kantian form, should raise the subject above the limits of his own sensual existence12—the anti-aestheticist beautiful would maintain itself as well as the subject who experiences it on the ground. To understand how the doubleness of beauty is mobilized in Nauman’s work, we need to follow Carousel on another rotation.

    4

    Above, I cited Nauman’s remark concerning the molds from which Carousel is made. Here it is again: “They are beautiful things. They are universally accepted, generic forms used by taxidermists yet they have an abstract quality that I really like” (374). Now, for reasons that I will explain in a moment, I do not think that Nauman can mean quite what he says here. He certainly may be serious when he states that he finds the molds of whole or broken forms of coyotes, lynx, and deer beautiful. This would be bizarre, but I cannot deny him his taste. I doubt, however, that it is really possible that he finds these forms beautiful for exactly those reasons that he provides—that they are “abstract,” “generic,” and so on.

    Consider a similar remark that Nauman makes about his interest in clowns, and his use of them in what is by now probably his best-known work—his “masterpiece,” according to The New Yorker‘s Peter Schjeldahl, a longtime supporter of Nauman’s art (qtd. in Perl 56)—the 1987 installation Clown Torture (Fig. 11). The latter presents the viewer with four distinct video feeds: one featuring a clown lying on the ground, kicking his feet, and shouting “no” over and over again; another featuring a clown becoming agitated as he repeats the same joke; a third featuring clowns trying unsuccessfully to balance a goldfish bowl and a bucket of water; and finally, a fourth video featuring what seems to be security footage of a clown sitting on a toilet in a public restroom. Reflecting on the clown’s allure, Nauman states that he “got interested in the idea of the clown first of all because there is a mask, and it becomes an abstracted idea of a person. It’s not anyone in particular, see, it’s just an idea of a person. And for this reason, because clowns are abstract in some sense, they become very disconcerting. You, I, one, we can’t make contact with them. It’s hard to make any contact with an idea or an abstraction” (335).

    Nauman could not be clearer. Clowns are “ideas,” “abstractions.” So why torture one? Or is the point that the clowns who make up the cacophonous installation are supposed to be torturing us with their pained demands? As one critic has characterized the piece, “With both clown and viewer locked in an endless loop of failure and degradation, the humor soon turns to horror” (Rondeau 82). Rather than choose who is most tortured in this dynamic—us or the clowns—we might suggest a third option: “clown torture” describes a relationship of identity. That is, to be a clown, to be an abstraction or an idea, is to be “tortured” by having one’s particular personhood effaced, having one’s self replaced by a mask or a more or less familiar set of features: white greasepaint, red nose, oversized shoes, squirting flower, and so on. Again, clowns are abstractions. Consequently, we can no more torture one than we can “grow grapes by the luminosity of the word ‘day.’”13 If we take pity on Nauman’s clowns, if their “failure and degradation” provokes horror rather than humor, it is because they are not quite yet clowns, because the elimination of their particular personhood is still a work in progress. They are still sufficiently individualized—sitting on the toilet or begging for it all to stop—and only individual things can suffer; ideas, abstractions cannot. In the not-yet-clowns’ suffering, the humanity that has not yet been entirely abstracted, erased by the mask or the greasepaint, is recalled. You, I, one, we make contact, and this contact, which persists in the face of an incomplete but perhaps still ongoing abstraction, is what is so disconcerting.

    Fig. 11 Bruce Nauman, Clown Torture, © 1987 Bruce Nauman / Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York

    Something comparable is going on in Carousel. Now admittedly, despite its evocations of violence, the piece itself is bloodless; the molds seem generic, abstract. One would never mistake them for the real creatures whose stretched skins they are supposed to occupy. They are, again, “universally accepted…forms.” But somehow their suffering still comes through. It comes through in the mold of the small coyote, which was probably designed to appear as though it were howling at the moon, but which now seems to be straining painfully against its leash, tipping back on its haunches as it is pulled along (Fig. 12). It comes through in the molds of the two lynx, where the smaller appears to be holding on to the larger for dear life, or perhaps trying to prevent its friend or parent from being lifted away (Fig. 13). There is of course not much hope for the dismembered deer, but what remains serves as a presentiment of what is sure to befall the other animals. When we view Carousel, we still encounter some trace of the suffering animal body. This encounter, like our encounter with Nauman’s clowns, is disconcerting.

    Fig. 12 Bruce Nauman, detail from Carousel (Stainless Steel Version), © 1988 Bruce Nauman / Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York

    Fig. 13 Bruce Nauman, detail from Carousel (Stainless Steel Version), © 1988 Bruce Nauman / Artists Rights Society (ARS), New York

    Here the fact that Carousel is made up of molds of animal forms—putting contemporary art in dialogue with the para-aesthetic practice of taxidermy—takes on a wider art historical significance. For what is the place of the animal in the history of art? In a section of his Lectures on Fine Art, written very much in the spirit of Winckelmann and Schiller and dedicated to the “ideal of sculpture,” Hegel—whom E. H. Gombrich deemed “the father of art history” (51)—notes of the head of the animal, and of the animal’s body more generally, that it “serves purely natural purposes and acquires by this dependence on the merely material aspect of nourishment an expression of spiritual absence” (2:728). This characterization of the animal’s head he opposes to the human’s face,

    in which the soulful and spiritual relation to things is manifested. This is in the upper part of the face, in the intellectual brow and, lying under it, the eye, expressive of the soul, and what surrounds it. That is to say that with the brow there are connected meditation, reflection, the spirit’s reversion into itself while its inner life peeps out from the eye and is clearly concentrated there. (2:729)

    We glimpse in the face of the human—and Hegel is thinking particularly of its appearance in Greek sculpture—the passage that the human is destined to make from the lower to the higher, from the sensuous to the spiritual. And we glimpse as well the passage that art itself must make—it must “[transcend] itself, [forsake] the element of a reconciled embodiment of the spirit in sensuous form and [pass] over from the poetry of imagination to the prose of thought” (1:89).14 The animal, condemned to sensuous nature, cannot make this passage. It is, not only as itself, but also as a figure for that aspect of man that is merely sensuous—which Hegel, in the above passage, localizes in the lower part of man’s face, where the denigrated, animal senses of smell and taste can be found—precisely what is carved away, left behind, and finally forgotten in the movement of spirit, which lifts itself out of nature and then beyond even the sensuousness preserved in beautiful art.15

    In its slow rotations, in its failure to lift itself out of nature and become something spiritual, in its partial preservation of its passengers’ suffering bodies, Carousel allegorizes the incompleteness of the process that Hegel describes. The animals remain animals. And so, to Nauman’s remark about the beautiful things from which Carousel is made, we might offer a small but important corrective: the animals, like the clowns of Clown Torture, are almost, but not quite, generic; almost, but not quite, abstract. As animals, they remain particular, and they suffer because of it. They pull against the leash or fight to keep (at least) one foot on the ground. They resist becoming something other than what they are: recalcitrant bodies, sensuous-particular things.

    And their resistance is beautiful. At stake here is not the beauty of Schiller’s aesthetic state, with its well-ordered bodies abstracted from their particular needs or desires; it is, rather, the beauty of this or that finite, particular thing as it appears to this or that finite, particular observer—as it resists, by its very particularity, its own becoming exemplary, ideal, conceptual, generic, abstract. Unlike his epigones, Kant, at least, saw this clearly, observing that judgments of taste, judgments of the sort, “this or that is beautiful (or not),” are singular judgments. “This flower is beautiful” is a judgement of taste; “flowers (in general) are beautiful” is not.16 And Kant concluded from this singularity the impossibility of a “science of the beautiful” [Wissenschaft des Schönen] (184), the impossibility of ever compiling a list of principles that could tell us, in the absence of any encounter with a particular thing, whether or not that thing is an instance of beautiful nature or successful art.

    We encounter in Carousel an instance of beauty no more compatible with the aestheticization of the political than with the ultimately “prosaic” goal of Hegel’s history of art, an instance of beauty as the persisting as nothing else than what they are of these particular things. And we encounter here as well the continued relevance of the supposedly outmoded concept of beauty to Nauman’s project and perhaps to contemporary art more generally. This is beauty neither in its synonymy with the superannuated ideals of unity, harmony, and proportion, nor as a hazard with regard to which the really modern artist must remain vigilant, but as a (catachrestic) name for the non-conceptualizability of the irreducibly particular. It is this notion of beauty that is too often missed by contemporary critical discourses on “art after the beautiful” (a designation that Nauman’s works should help us to see beyond), and it is, moreover, what makes the term beautiful preferable to “sublime,” “grotesque,” “monstrous,” or any of a number of aesthetic or para-aesthetic designations for Nauman’s project.

    Two coyotes, two lynx, parts of two deer. They have suffered on the slaughter-bench of (art) history, where bodily particulars are hacked away and the poetry of imagination is transformed into the prose of thought. But if Carousel seems to us ugly, violent—if encountering it is like stumbling into an abattoir or getting blindsided with a bat—the reason is not that it lacks beauty. Just the opposite. Carousel is too beautiful altogether; more exactly, it mobilizes within itself what I have been describing as two incompatible models of the beautiful. On the one hand, there is the neoclassical beauty of well-ordered bodies. This is the beauty of Schiller’s English dance and aesthetic state—what Paul de Man and so many others alongside him have condemned as a component of “aesthetic ideology.” And on the other hand, there is the beauty of irreducibly particular things, things that maintain their beauty only so long as they resist the dance. Sometimes these two models of beauty can be hard to tell apart, but they are different. Their disharmony, their tense coexistence, is what makes Carousel move.

    Footnotes

    1. Throughout this essay, all references to Nauman’s Carousel refer to this version of the sculpture.

    2. The attempt to replace the beautiful with the sublime as a category of aesthetic analysis was central to the writings of Jean-François Lyotard in the 1980s. See especially the essays “Newman: The Instant” and “The Sublime and the Avant-Garde,” both included in The Inhuman: Reflections on Time. Sianne Ngai imagines new aesthetic categories in Our Aesthetic Categories: Zany, Cute, Interesting. In his recent essay, “The Aesthetics of Singularity,” Fredric Jameson rejects not only the category of the beautiful but of philosophical aesthetics tout court: “There are two ways of grasping the meaning of aesthetics as a disciplinary term: either as the science of the beautiful, or as the system of the fine arts. The beautiful, which was able to be a subversive category in the late nineteenth century—the age of the industrial slum, in the hands of Ruskin and Morris, Oscar Wilde, the symbolists and the decadents, the fin de siècle—has in my opinion, in the age of images, lost all power either as an effect or an ideal. As for the system of fine arts, it has in postmodernity imploded, the arts folding back on each other in new symbioses, a whole new de-differentiation of culture which renders the very concept of art as a universal activity problematic, as we shall see; my title is therefore pointedly ironic” (107).

    3. For a good treatment of the role of the sacrificial in modernist art, with which Nauman’s project in the taxidermy sculptures is usefully contrasted, see Lisa Florman’s Myth and Metamorphosis: Picasso’s Classical Prints of the 1930s.

    4. For a brief discussion of the development of the hanging mobile, see Henri Gabriel’s “The Hanging Mobile: A Historical Review.”

    5. Jorg Zütter observes that, “Nauman’s dismemberment and reconstruction of the human and animal body, in defiance of the laws of anatomy, also cast a contemporary light on the sculptures of Auguste Rodin” (87).

    6. For a survey of these matters, see Daniel Dahlstrom’s “The Aesthetic Holism of Hamann, Herder, and Schiller.”

    7. I am thinking here of Paul de Man’s reading of Schiller’s (mis)reading of Kant, and the reception of de Man’s reading by his own readers. Quoting a passage from Joseph Goebbels’s Michael, Ein deutsches Schicksal in Tagebuchblattem, in which Goebbels writes that, “the statesman is an artist, too. The people are for him what stone is for the sculptor. Leader and masses are as little of a problem to each other as color is a problem for the painter. Politics are the plastic arts of the state as painting is the plastic art of color,” de Man admits that Goebbels’s “is a grievous misreading of Schiller’s aesthetic state.” “But,” de Man continues, “the principle of this misreading does not essentially differ from the misreading which Schiller inflicted on his own predecessor—namely, Kant” (155). Some essays that think through the implications of this claim can be found in Barbara Cohen, Tom Cohen, J. Hillis Miller, and Andrzej Warminski’s Material Events: Paul de Man and the Afterlife of Theory. For evidence that de Man overstates the case and for a more balanced reading of Schiller’s project, see Josef Chytry’s The Aesthetic State: A Quest in Modern German Thought.

    8. Walter Benjamin, to whom we owe the phrase “the aestheticization of the political,” has described this state of affairs in the most striking terms: “Humankind, which once, in Homer, was an object of contemplation for the Olympian gods, has now become one for itself. Its self-alienation has reached the point where it can experience its own annihilation as a supreme aesthetic pleasure” (42).

    9. I am indebted here to Paul de Man’s reading of Kleist’s “aesthetic formalization” alongside Schiller’s aesthetic state in The Rhetoric of Romanticism.

    10. Charles W. Haxthausen notes the relationship of suspension to torture in Nauman’s art in his review of a 1994 exhibition at the Los Angeles Museum of Modern Art, “Bruce Nauman. Los Angeles.” This relationship is still present in Nauman’s most recent art. At a 2015 exhibition of Nauman’s work at the Fondation Cartier pour l’Art Contemporain in Paris, Carousel was exhibited in the basement (along with “Anthro/Socio (Rinde Spinning)“). Upstairs was Nauman’s 2013 video piece Pencil Lift/Mr. Rogers. In the latter, Nauman recreates a version of the “floating finger” optical illusion by using two sharpened pencils to lift a third that has been sharpened at both ends while his cat, Mr. Rogers, paces around on his desk. A long way from the more explicit violence of his earlier work, Pencil Lift nonetheless seems ominous and even a little painful once one has returned from a viewing of Carousel—the awkwardly suspended pencil recalling the suspended molds—and one cannot help but fear for Mr. Rogers’s safety.

    11. Deleuze associates suspension with masochism in Coldness and Cruelty, insofar as “the masochistic rites of torture and suffering imply actual physical suspension (the hero is hung up, crucified or suspended), but also because the woman torturer freezes into postures that identify her with a statue, a painting or a photograph. She suspends her gestures in the act of bringing down the whip or removing her furs” (33). The question of Nauman’s own relationship to either sadism or masochism is difficult to answer. A number of his works find him “torturing” others (or other things) and a few find him torturing himself—this would, I suppose, be one way to read Pulling Mouth. In distinguishing sadism from masochism, Deleuze positively cites Georges Bataille’s reading of Sade’s own complicated relationship to sadism: “the language of Sade is paradoxical,” he notes, because it is essentially that of a victim. Only the victim can describe torture; the torturer necessarily uses the hypocritical language of established order and power” (17). These remarks might provide us with a point of entry into Nauman’s own treatment of sadistic violence. Again, as Nauman states of Naipaul’s stories, they helped him to “to name names, to name things,” and thus to contravene what Deleuze following Bataille calls the “hypocritical language of established order and power.” The specific focus of my argument prevents me from pursuing these matters in detail here. I am grateful to Eyal Amiran for suggesting to me a possible connection between Nauman’s art and Deleuze’s comments on sadism and masochism.

    12. See, for example, Kant’s remark in the “Analytic of the Sublime” in the third Critique that, “it is a law (of reason) for us, and part of our vocation, to estimate any sense object in nature that is large for us as being small when compared with ideas of reason; and whatever arouses in us the feeling of this supersensible vocation [übersinnlichen Bestimmung] is in harmony with that law” (115).

    13. I borrow this phrase from Paul de Man, who uses it in The Resistance to Theory to call attention to the problem of confusing linguistic idealities with the real-world situations that they are supposed to describe (11).

    14. Compare to Hegel’s discussion of the relationship between the heads of humans and those of animals the following observations by Schopenhauer, which in their own way suggest a link between abstraction and violence (here the violence of decapitation): “This distinction between humans and animals is expressed outwardly by the differing relationships between the head and the trunk. In the lower animals, the two are still completely united: in all of them, the head faces the ground where the objects of the will can be found: even in the higher animals the head and trunk are still much more unified than in humans, whose head seems to be placed freely on the body, borne by it without serving it. This prerogative of humans is displayed by the Apollo Belvedere to the highest degree: the far-seeing head of the god of the Muses sits so freely on its shoulders that it seems entirely wrenched away from the body and no longer subject to its cares” (200; my emphasis).

    15. See also Hegel’s well-known characterization of art as, for the modern world, “a thing of the past” [ein Vergangenes] (1); see as well his remark from the conclusion of his lectures that “in art we have to do, not with any agreeable or useful child’s play, but with the liberation of the spirit from the content and forms of finitude, with the presence and reconciliation of the Absolute in what is apparent and visible, with an unfolding of the truth which is not exhausted in natural history but revealed in world-history” (2).

    16. Kant discusses the “singularity” of judgments of taste in Critique of the Power of Judgment (100). For a discussion of the history of the notion of the singularity of judgments of taste, and of what this means for some recent developments in criticism and the arts, see Robert S. Lehman’s “The Persistence of the Aesthetic.”

    Works Cited

    • Benezra, Neal. “Surveying Nauman.” Bruce Nauman, edited by Robert C. Morgan, Johns Hopkins UP, 2002, pp. 116-45.
    • Benjamin, Walter. “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility.” Translated by Edmund Jephcott and Harry Zohn. The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility and Other Writings on Media, edited by Michael Jennings, Brigid Doherty, and Thomas Levin, Harvard UP, 2008, pp. 19-55.
    • Calder, Alexander. “What Abstract Art Means to Me.” The Bulletin of The Museum of Modern Art, vol.18, no.3, 1951, pp. 2-15.
    • Chytry, Josef. The Aesthetic State: A Quest in Modern German Thought. U of California P, 1989.
    • Cohen, Barbara, Tom Cohen, J. Hillis Miller, and Andrzej Warminski, editors. Material Events: Paul de Man and the Afterlife of Theory. U of Minnesota P, 2001.
    • Dahlstrom, Daniel. “The Aesthetic Holism of Hamann, Herder, and Schiller.” The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism, edited by Karl Ameriks, Cambridge UP, 2000, pp. 76-94.
    • Danto, Arthur. “Kalliphobia in Contemporary Art.” Art Journal, vol. 63, no. 2, 2004, pp. 24–35.
    • Deleuze, Gilles. Coldness and Cruelty. Masochism. Translated by Jean McNeil, Zone Books, 1989, pp. 9-138.
    • de Man, Paul. Aesthetic Ideology. U of Minnesota P, 1996.
    • —. The Resistance to Theory. U of Minnesota P, 1986.
    • —. The Rhetoric of Romanticism. Columbia UP, 1984.
    • Florman, Lisa. Myth and Metamorphosis: Picasso’s Classical Prints of the 1930s. MIT Press, 2002.
    • Gabriel, Henri. “The Hanging Mobile: A Historical Review.” Leonardo, vol. 18, no. 1, 1985, pp. 39-44.
    • Gombrich, E. H. “The Father of Art History.” Tributes: Interpreters of our Cultural Tradition, edited by E. H. Gombrich, Cornell UP, 1984, pp. 51-69.
    • Groys, Boris. The Total Art of Stalinism: Avant-Garde, Aesthetic Dictatorship, and Beyond. Translated by Charles Rougle, Verso Books, 2011.
    • Haxthausen, Charles. “Bruce Nauman. Los Angeles.” The Burlington Magazine, vol. 136, no. 1098, 1994, pp. 646-47.
    • Hegel, G. W. F. Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art. Translated by T. M. Knox, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1975, 2 vols.
    • Jameson, Fredric. “The Aesthetics of Singularity.” New Left Review, no. 92, 2015, pp. 101-32.
    • Kant, Immanuel. Critique of the Power of Judgment. Translated by Paul Guyer, Cambridge UP, 1999.
    • Kaufman, Robert. “Red Kant, or The Persistence of the Third Critique in Adorno and Jameson.” Critical Inquiry, vol. 26, no. 4, 2000, pp. 682-724.
    • Kimmelman, Michael. “Space under a Chair, Sound from a Coffin.” Bruce Nauman, edited by Robert C. Morgan, Johns Hopkins UP, 2002, pp. 208-11.
    • Kleist, Heinrich von. “On the Marionette Theater.” Translated by Thomas G. Neumiller, The Drama Review, vol. 16, no. 3, 1972, pp. 22-26.
    • Lehman, Robert S. “The Persistence of the Aesthetic.” Frakcija: Performing Arts Magazine, no. 68-69, 2013, pp. 76-83.
    • Lyotard, Jean-François. The Inhuman: Reflections on Time. Translated by Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby, Stanford UP, 1992.
    • Michaud, Eric. The Cult of Art in Nazi Germany. Translated by Janet Lloyd, Stanford UP, 2004.
    • Miller, John. “Dada by the Numbers.” October, no. 74, 1995, pp. 123-28.
    • Morgan, Robert C., editor. Bruce Nauman. Johns Hopkins UP, 2002.
    • Nauman, Bruce. Please Pay Attention Please: Bruce Nauman’s Words, edited by Janet Kraynak, MIT Press, 2005.
    • Ngai, Sianne. Our Aesthetic Categories: Zany, Cute, Interesting. Harvard UP, 2012.
    • Perl, Jed. Eyewitness: Reports from an Art World in Crisis. Basic Books, 2000.
    • Richard, Paul. “Watch Out! It’s Here!” Bruce Nauman, edited by Robert C. Morgan, Johns Hopkins UP, 2002, pp. 217-20.
    • Rondeau, James E. “Clown Torture, 1987 by Bruce Nauman.” Art Institute of Chicago Museum Studies, vol. 25, no. 1, 1999, pp. 62-63, 101.
    • Saltz, Jerry. “Assault and Battery, Surveillance and Captivity.” Bruce Nauman, edited by Robert C. Morgan, Johns Hopkins UP, 2002, pp. 198-202.
    • Schiller, Friedrich. Kallias, or Concerning Beauty. Translated by Stefan Bird-Pollan. Classic and Romantic German Aesthetics, edited by J. M. Bernstein, Cambridge UP, 2002, pp. 145-83.
    • —. On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters. Translated by Elizabeth M. Wilkinson and L. A. Willoughby, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1967.
    • Schopenhauer, Arthur. The World as Will and Representation, vol. 1. Translated and edited by Judith Norman, Alistair Welchman, and Christopher Janaway, Cambridge UP, 2010.
    • Weil, Simone. “The Iliad, or the Poem of Force.” Chicago Review, vol. 18, no. 2, 1965, pp. 5-30.
    • Winckelmann, Johann Joachim. “Description of the Torso in the Belvedere in Rome.” Translated and edited by Curtis Bowman. Essays on the Philosophy and History of Art, Vol. 1., Thoemmes Press, 2001, pp. xiii-xviii.
    • Zütter, Jorg. “Alienation of the Self, Command of the Other.” Bruce Nauman, edited by Robert C. Morgan, Johns Hopkins UP, 2002, pp. 86-89.

  • Salò and the School of Abuse

    Ramsey McGlazer (bio)
    University of California, Berkeley

    Abstract

    Repeatedly, Pier Paolo Pasolini’s last film, Salò o le 120 giornate di Sodoma (1975), has been read as prophesying later political realities. This essay instead analyzes Salò‘s insistent backwardness: its interest in dated rituals, fascist politics, “regressive” sexual practices, and outmoded pedagogical forms. By these backward means, the essay argues, Salò schools its spectators in what Ernesto De Martino calls the salience of the “bad past that returns.” Such a return structures the film, which thus refuses the progressive imperative to disavow or forget the fascist past. Rather, for Pasolini reenacting this past becomes an alternative to fascism’s remaining “real.”

    Salò Our Contemporary

    There are two stories that are often told about the very end of Pier Paolo Pasolini’s career. According to the first, he went too far. According to the second, with Salò o le 120 giornate di Sodoma [Salò or the 120 Days of Sodom] (1975), he predicted the future that is our present. In this essay, I will be telling a different story, one about what I will call Pasolini’s pedagogy and its relation to the past. This will also be an effort to make sense of the filmmaker’s claim that Salò was “conceived as a rite” (Bachmann 42). For, as I will show, the kinds of teaching that organize Salò are associated with ritual and repetition rather than with advancement and innovation. They are pointedly backward, characterized by coercion, constraint, and corporal punishment rather than with their progressive alternatives. By such outmoded educational means—by administering a version of the instruction that it thematizes—Salò invites resistance, or sets resistance to work, as it seeks to redress a present marked by disavowal. But before beginning this account of the film, I will distill those other two stories to offer a sense of the critical conversation to which my reading responds, and in which it participates.

    The first story is pathologizing, and although it doesn’t prevail the way it used to, versions of it still persist. Those who tell this critical story argue that Pasolini went too far, not only because he got himself killed the same year Salò was released, but also because he showed what shouldn’t be shown.1 He made us see—or tried to make us see—what we didn’t want to see. He lingered with what we would and should leave behind. Salò stages an adaptation of the Marquis de Sade’s 1785 text, The 120 Days of Sodom, transposed into the short-lived fascist Republic of Salò in northern Italy (1943-45). The film is famously graphic, including sequences of torture, killing, and various kinds of sexual violence that are exquisitely precise and consistently painstaking.

    According to the late Pasolini’s detractors, it’s precisely this precision that’s perverse, or worse, because it’s as if the camera had been recruited to participate in the process its director claimed Salò had set out to decry: a process that is aestheticizing even as it is exploitative and destructive. Consider the early sequences in which the film’s four fascist libertines—representing the nobility, the church, the state, and finance—audition young victims of both sexes with scrupulous care, casting only the camera-ready for their orgies, orgies that are also lessons, this being a “School for Libertinage” (Sade 255). Or consider the awful series of tortures that unfolds in the film’s penultimate sequence. These tortures, too, are stage-managed with the utmost care, proving that even when they’re administering fatal punishments, Pasolini’s libertines do not give their desire free rein, but instead remain bound by the regolamenti, the regulations, that bind them together. So too does Salò‘s camera remain, atypically for Pasolini, controlled, quiet, and methodical in its movements.2 Registering the rules’ continued force with its formal precision and fixity, the camera is also committed to heightening the libertines’ choreography, to framing their already painterly compositions to good effect, as when we look with one of the libertines through his binoculars (held backwards) at the courtyard in which the tortures are taking place, where victims’ bodies have already been carefully and symmetrically arranged. Because the binoculars are held backwards, this is a strangely distancing subjective shot, but a key example all the same of the camera’s aestheticizing work.3 Through this work, Pasolini’s film mimics—takes its cues from and assists—the men who oversee the tortures. And for this irresponsible aestheticization, the story goes, for Salò‘s sustained, tasteless, and politically dangerous intimacy with power, the late Pasolini should never be forgiven.4

    Fig. 1 Salò‘s courtyard, seen through inverted binoculars

    But there is, as I have indicated, another account according to which Pasolini has not only been forgiven many times over but recast as a prophet of current political or biopolitical realities. This second story is hagiographic, and it has been widely disseminated over the past two decades. Those who tell this story counter the late Pasolini’s detractors by noting that if Salò is hard to see, so too is our world of bare life and resurgent sovereignty, of unabashed exploitation and the end of the citizen-subject’s autonomy.5 Indeed, Salò‘s defenders have argued cogently and often compellingly for the film’s lasting relevance. They have shown that Pasolini’s late work speaks to a range of urgent contemporary debates. Seldom, though, have these critics lingered on Salò‘s images or tarried with the uncomfortable question of complicity. There is instead a rush to bypass, an effort to look through rather than at the film in these accounts, which frequently refer not to the film’s images but to what they signify.6 And they have been seen to signify everything from “the eclipse of desire” in the present to “current methods of biopower,” where the operative word in the last phrase is “current.”7 By this account Salò looks forward-looking, like our contemporary. Made just over forty years ago, the film uncannily anticipates our politics and our predicaments, today.

    To be sure, critics who make arguments like these—including, most forcefully, systematically, and instructively, Alessia Ricciardi—follow the lead of the allegorizing cover story that the director himself provided when he said that sex in the film was merely a “metaphor for power” (“Il sesso” 2063). Indeed, Pasolini claimed repeatedly that he had sought, in Salò, to expose contemporary capitalist power at its purest, its most “anarchic” (“Il sesso” 2065-6). But if we take Pasolini at his word here—or if, forgetting that a metaphor asks to be read, we take him to mean that the film’s images are so many veils to strip away or see through—then it becomes difficult to account for the film’s painstaking construction, and even more so for its insistent backwardness: its fascination with fascism and its fixation on Sade, its staging of ritual tableaux and its retrograde interest in “sodomy.” This interest contrasts starkly with the liberated—and still celebrated—sexual exuberance of the director’s previous three films, his Trilogy of Life. Some of the films he made before the Trilogy, ranging from La rabbia (1963) to Teorema (1968), had indeed shown postwar capitalist power recognizably—that is, in images in which spectators might have recognized themselves readily. Salò is instead set in a past that, by most accounts, was never to be repeated, that was supposed to have been left behind. It was therefore easy for Salò‘s spectators to regard the film as if it were not about them at all. For Salò is first and foremost about fascist and Sadean power—forms of power whose apparent remoteness from the present might have reassured viewers who tended to relegate fascism and Sade to pasts long since superseded. These same spectators might have tended to imagine sadistic sexual practices as confined to present worlds that they chose not to enter. Thus if the film was meant to force spectators to recognize their present, then it is not clear why the film itself placed so many obstacles in the way of recognition, why it provided so many alibis, rendering power in such spectacular and patently past forms when its goal was to decry a type of power that was all too present and banal.

    Again, recent readings have more often praised Salò for its “proleptic insight” than they have attended to such obstacles and alibis (Ricciardi, “Rethinking Salò“). That is, critics have insisted on Salò‘s prescience and defended the film on precisely these grounds—so much so, I would argue, that the film’s pastness has been all but forgotten, and its pedagogy all but forfeited.8 The film’s backwardness has been understated, overlooked, or obscured in many recent analyses. But it is only by staying with this backwardness that we can begin to learn Salò‘s lesson. This means looking at—as well as reading—the film. Rather than labeling the late Pasolini either prophetic or apocalyptic, either “saving” or simply pathological, it means responding to Salò‘s specificity, and refusing the ostensibly politicizing but effectively pacifying claim that sex in Salò is a mere “metaphor for power.” This claim sanitizes, desexualizes, and de-aestheticizes. It reassures us by giving us permission to feel that we are not implicated in, or at all ambivalent about, the film’s brutality. But that we are thus implicated and ambivalent becomes clear if we look long enough. In this sense, Pasolini’s detractors are on to something.9 I say this despite the fact that I will not be joining them in dismissing Salò. Nor, to be clear, will I be joining other critics who, adhering to neither of the two sets of views that I have sketched so far, defend the film but declare Pasolini’s “political analyses” altogether “failed” (Maggi 5). Although I build on Armando Maggi’s claim that “Pasolini’s works teach us a method of reading reality, not a set of historical beliefs” (5), I do not think that this “method of reading” can dispense with Pasolini’s critique of progress.10 On the contrary, this critique motivates my reading of Salò, a film that is nothing if not backward: “behindhand in progress” sexually, politically, and, as I will show, pedagogically (OED). Following the film’s own (backward) movement from text to image,11 then, I contend that Salò‘s force derives from its ways of implicating us through a range of formal means. These are also ways of instructing us, where “instruction” does not refer to content delivery.

    Pasolini in Detention

    In the Italian context in particular, “instruction” was often, in the discourse of reformers leading up to and including the philosopher Giovanni Gentile, a disparaging name for what the old school was good for: nothing. A waste of time and talent, “instruction” stood opposed to the real education that, reformers argued, only the new school could provide. “Material, mechanical,” repetitive and ritual, rote and redundant, coercive, contentless, useless, merely outward, and, most emphatically, “dead,” like the Latin language that it privileged—instruction was what progressive educators wanted to replace.12 They called for an education centered on inwardness and individuality, one that was Northern European in its provenance and that would therefore be capable of equipping Italian students for modernity, finally.

    Two sets of facts are worth underscoring in this connection. First, while he was at work on Salò, Pasolini was also composing a text that he called a “trattatello pedagogico,” or “little pedagogical treatise” (Gennariello 15). In this text, without addressing instruction directly, Pasolini calls Rousseau—whose Émile inaugurates the modern critique of the old school—”monstrous,” and says that he prefers to dedicate his treatise instead to the “shade of de Sade,” as if the latter figure could counter the former (Gennariello 33). Second—and this is key but ideologically counterintuitive—in Italy the ranks of self-styled Rousseauists, that is of ostensibly progressive educational reformers, included fascists, chief among them Gentile. Gentile’s own pedagogical treatises speak scathingly about “instruction” but soar rhetorically when calling for the modernization—and indeed the “liberation”—of Italian public education (La riforma 176). Gentile in fact became Minister of Education under Mussolini, and oversaw the implementation of a broad set of educational reforms in Italian public schools. (These reforms included the abolition of compulsory Latin for all students, and the surprising, instruction-advocating response from Antonio Gramsci that this measure prompted paves the way for Pasolini’s radical repurposing of the old school, though only indirectly.13) The framework that the Riforma Gentile put in place was one of the structural features of the state that persisted after the end of the war and the fall of the fascist regime (Wolff 81-2).14

    These reforms were continuous with a whole strand in Italian educational discourse in both the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—a long series of pedagogical theories that tried to yoke education to modernization, and that made schooling a matter of catching up, of overcoming the national predicament known as arretratezza, or belatedness (Stewart-Steinberg, The Pinocchio Effect). Such catching up was still compulsory in the postwar period. Indeed, as Paola Bonifazio shows in Schooling in Modernity, her book about the state-and corporate-sponsored deployment of documentary film in postwar Italy, in this context the demand to catch up intensified. This demand accompanied another that has been a central concern in recent scholarship in both Italian historiography and film studies: a postwar imperative to paper over the fascist past, to render it a closed “parenthesis” in Benedetto Croce’s infamous formulation, and to do this in order to reconstitute the nation as good object.15 Even or perhaps especially among mainstream communists, the need to lay claim to and enshrine the antifascist resistance trumped any real reckoning with the recent past or attempt to work through it.16 Forward-thinking, sponsored filmmakers like those Bonifazio studies and politicians on the left alike thus shared in a consensus that pretended to leave the regime behind, that preserved “distinctions between the fascist past and the democratic present” (Fogu 156), and that trained the national gaze on the present and future of progress defined as economic growth.17

    Against this consensus, Pasolini loudly protested. He came to associate modernization with monoculture—with “homogenization,” “cultural genocide,” and what he calls, in a beautiful, lyrical, proto-ecocritical essay, “the disappearance of the fireflies” (“L’articolo delle lucciole”). For Pasolini, capitalist modernity, far from delivering the freedom it promised, entailed the destruction of older forms of life and led to the foreclosure of possibilities for thought and action, imagination and memory. Indeed, the essays that Pasolini wrote during the last years of his life go so far as to claim that what he alternately names neo-capitalism and neo-fascism—that is, capitalism in its post-war, consumer-driven guise—is more totalizing, more pernicious, and in fact more fascist than fascism itself. Whereas the regime had ruled through an “irregimentazione superficiale, scenografica” [a superficial, scenic form of regimentation], Pasolini claims that under the new dispensation, which both is and isn’t new, regimentation has become “real,” an accomplished fact and no longer an aspiration (“Fascista” 233). Power now lays claim to hearts and minds as well as bodies, and power thus internalized can level whole forms of life, including the forms of life of fireflies.

    These are the forms of life that Pasolini’s other films are famous for rendering. And the Pasolini we know how to love traveled everywhere—first all over Italy, then all over the world—in search of cultures not yet conquered by modernity. This effort took him from the subproletarian borgate, or suburbs, surrounding Rome, where he began his film career in the early 1960s, to Yemen in the early and mid-1970s, where he filmed both a documentary on the modernization of the city of Sana’a, Le mure di Sana’a (1971), and Il fiore delle Mille e una notte [The Thousand and One Nights] (1974), the last film he made before Salò, other parts of which were filmed in Ethiopia, Iran, and elsewhere. Such were the lengths to which the filmmaker had to go, he noted, to find even momentary escapes from a capitalism and a conformism that now covered and stultified all of Italy and most of the rest of the world. So it was bound to feel like a betrayal when Pasolini announced that he would stop this travel, because “integrating power” had become altogether inescapable (“Abiura” 71). This power left him with no alternative but to retreat, return, stay in.

    Staying in, at least, is what he claimed to be doing in a text called “Abiura dalla Trilogia della vita,” the “Abjuration” or “Repudiation of the Trilogy of Life.” In this short essay, Pasolini distances himself from—indeed, renounces—the three features that he made before Salò, all of which had staged exuberant if not uncomplicated celebrations of youthful bodies and pleasures. No longer able to believe in the “lotta progressista,” the “progressive struggle,” for sexual liberation, Pasolini finds that the films in the trilogy have been co-opted by capitalism operating through a “tolerance as vast as it is false” (“Abiura” 72). In the “Abiura,” Pasolini writes that he has come to realize that any affirmative handling of bodies and pleasures would be similarly coopted, which is why he is herewith—in and through the “Abiura”—giving up the search for alternatives to what he finds in his immediate world. I cite his conclusion in the original as well as in translation, because it is truly a text over which to weep:

    Dunque io mi sto adattando alla degradazione e sto accettando l’inaccettabile. Manovro per risistemare la mia vita. Sto dimenticando com’erano prima le cose. Le amate facce di ieri cominciano a ingiallire. Mi è davanti—pian piano senza più alternative—il presente. Riadatto il mio impegno ad una maggiore leggibilità (Salò?). (Pasolini, “Abiura” 76, original emphasis)

    [Therefore I am adapting to degradation and am accepting the unacceptable. I am maneuvering to rearrange my life. I am forgetting the way things were before. The beloved faces of yesterday begin to yellow. In front of me is—little by little without any more alternatives—the present. I re-adapt my commitment to a greater legibility. (Salò?)]

    These are the essay’s last sentences: six declaratives whose finality is finally if only subtly undermined by the question mark that hovers in the concluding parenthesis.

    These words, and the whole essay, are by now well known. Roberto Esposito, Suzanne Stewart-Steinberg, and Rei Terada are just some of the many critics who have recently considered its relevance to contemporary conditions of impasse. To my knowledge, though, no one has yet undertaken to read the text’s weird parenthesis as a corrective to Croce’s. Recall that, for Croce, a parenthesis names what’s over and done with, a case that’s closed. Here instead Pasolini’s question about his own film hangs in the air and makes us hesitate before turning the page; it forces us to revisit the last sentence to be sure we’ve understood. Which we haven’t quite, since neither, by his own indirect, interrogative admission, has the “I” who signs the declaration. The parenthetical question in the “Abiura” lingers, remains unresolved; far from effecting, it enigmatically prevents the achievement of closure and the abandonment of what’s come before.

    This is striking not least because Pasolini’s avowed goal in the “Abiura” is to announce that he’s abandoning the past in two senses: he is repudiating his own past projects, and, since these were themselves projects of filmic recovery, he is also renouncing the whole impulse to look for ways out of, and for life-giving alternatives to, the postwar capitalist present. But let’s return to the sentences that I have been reading. They are at once deliberative and affect-laden: the verb manovrare, recalling as it does the Gramscian guerra manovrata or “war of maneuver,” and the calculating notion of risistemare, rearranging or more literally re-systematizing, one’s life—these grate against the “beloved faces of yesterday” that are now beginning to fade. It thus becomes impossible to tell whether accepting the unacceptable is a matter of pathos or of resignation. Which suggests, of course, that it is both: the “Abiura” depicts a world in which all passion is spent, but it does so passionately rather than dispassionately, as when, in his penultimate sentence, Pasolini considers the present that he sees before him “little by little without any more alternatives,” where these phrases—suspended between dashes that sustain the hopes soon to be dashed—postpone the inevitable.

    To postpone the inevitable is to do something other than simply accept it. This is Pasolini in detention, for “detention” also names “a keeping from going or proceeding; hindrance to progress; compulsory delay” (OED). In this sense, the phrases “pian piano senza più alternative,” phrases that are dilatory, detaining, even while they usher in the end, emblematize the “Abiura” as a whole. For the text protests too much, encircling the faces that it pretends to leave behind, and remembering the forms of life that it claims to be forgetting. The “Abiura” everywhere betrays an ongoing attachment to all that it says it forswears. In this way, Pasolini’s essay, like his late poetry, looks to “schemi letterari collaudati [proven or time-tested literary schemas]” (Trasumanar 66), drawing on what Anne-Lise François calls poetry’s peculiar “power to conjure and linger with what it claims not to mean and not to have” (“‘The feel’” 462). Indeed, the “Abiura” is a poetic text in this specific sense: the essay participates in the lyric mode that involves continuing the very thing that one claims to be discontinuing—as when Petrarch, of all people, announces at a particularly low point in his love life: “Mai non vo’ più cantar com’io soleva [I never want to sing the way I used to anymore]” (209). But here the point is that the poet makes this announcement in a canzone, that is, precisely by singing the way he used to and the way he’ll continue to for many, many poems to come. Recanting remains a form of cantar, of singing. The palinode—the kind of poem whose speaker says, “I take it back”—remains an ode.18 So too does Pasolini’s “Abiura,” I am claiming.

    Reading Salò

    This way of reading—a lectio difficilior or reading in detention—has important implications for understanding Salò, and in what’s left of this essay I will indicate the difference it makes. That it is indeed reading that’s at issue for any viewer of Salò the “Abiura” already suggests in its last sentence: “I re-adapt my commitment to a greater legibility (Salò?).” But what is “legibility”? And how does it organize Salò? The film offers a first answer in the form of an “Essential Bibliography,” which appears near the end of the film’s opening credit sequence. If the “Abiura” is one text that mediates our access to Salò‘s images, this list of sources is another. The frame signals the film’s aspiration to participate in, and perhaps to complicate, a French philosophical conversation.19 James Steintrager has also compared the “Bibliografia” to the legitimating forewords that appeared before translations of Sade’s works, some of which are in fact named here by Pasolini (357). (De Beauvoir’s essay “Must We Burn Sade?” and part of Klossowski’s Sade My Neighbor, for instance, both still appear before the Grove Press English translation of The 120 Days of Sodom.) These prefatory gestures were meant to preempt censorship by establishing the high seriousness of the novels they introduced. If these novels were worthy of the attention of French philosophers, the thinking went (at a time when French philosophers had not lost prestige), then obscenity charges would be defused in advance. “[R]edeeming social value” would be guaranteed (qtd. in Steintrager 356).

    Fig. 2 Salò‘s “Bibliografia essenziale”

    There are several other ways to interpret Pasolini’s invocation of these figures in Sade’s reception and postwar “rehabilitation,” and it is interesting to note the figures left off the list, whose readings of Sade are implicitly deemed inessential: Horkheimer and Adorno, Bataille, Lacan.20 In my view, though, what matters most is simply that the film begins by assigning required reading. At the outset, that is, Salò interpellates the viewer as a pupil. But the question then becomes: what kind of student is the viewer enjoined to be or become? I cannot claim to be the only viewer at once ardent and compliant enough to have read, in order, all of the texts enumerated here, but I can attest, after having learned the hard way, that the exercise is a slog and ultimately unrewarding. In fact, I would even call the bibliography somewhat sadistic: it holds out the thrilling if pedantic promise that the texts it lists will somehow disclose Salò‘s significance. But no “essential” insight, no solution to the riddle, is in fact forthcoming. On the contrary, the bibliography constitutes a time-consuming misdirection.21

    This suggests that, whatever else it may be, “legibility” for the late Pasolini is not transparency. Still less is Salò‘s pedagogy a matter of what I have called content delivery. Instead it entails instruction, defined not as education, let alone as edification, but rather, as in the discourse of progressive educational reform, as an experience of often painfully inflicted tasks that impose on students’ time. Here, however, rather than being refused, such instruction is affirmed and even administered. But to what end? In Salò, Pasolini returns to and repurposes instruction to counter the forgetting of the fascist past and its structural persistence. To do this is also to reintroduce temporal contradiction into a context of presentist consensus. Against the progressive claim sanctioned by the state, schools, and films alike that the past is past and closed, parenthesis-wise, Salò brings the bad old news of all that is not abandoned when old eras are declared ended, and old fixations outgrown. In such a context, infliction and imposition become necessary because kinder and gentler teacherly means—respectful of our space and our spontaneity and rooted in a belief in our freedom (the fascist Gentile was, again, a great believer in our freedom)—would not forcefully register the survival of the past from which we are not free.22

    To be sure, there is also an account of our unfreedom in what I have called the allegorizing reading of Salò, a presentist reading authorized by Pasolini’s own claim that sex in his film is only a “metaphor for power.” Yet, if only unwittingly, proponents of this reading imply that we should look through Salò‘s images to what they signify, symbolize, or metaphorize. But imagine reading right past the vehicle in a poem to access the tenor that it “hides,” as if the latter weren’t at all affected by the former. By this account Salò is not about this casting call or beauty pageant but about bare life; not about that whipping but about contemporary sovereignty. This argument, which effectively lets viewers off the hook, runs directly counter to mine. It is obviously not a progressive argument, since it is about how much we have regressed in recent years, but like progressive educational theory from Rousseau to Gentile, it spares us the work and the formative ordeal of returning to the past that Salò repeats. We can better understand the terms of this repetition and the value of the ordeal to which it leads by turning to another category, related to instruction: ritual.23

    Lands of Regret

    Again, Pasolini claimed that Salò was “conceived as a rite” (Bachmann 42). Unlike many recent readers of the film, I take this claim seriously, as a prompt to think through the film’s complex and programmatic engagement with ritual. I also take this claim to be more instructive, because more demanding, than the allegorizing or metaphorizing claim that I have already considered. For if a metaphor can all too easily be treated as a means of content delivery—as a vehicle to be seen through in a search for tenors or referents—a rite, by contrast, is undergone as a process.24 Or it is resisted. Or resistance becomes inseparable from the experience of undergoing it.

    Rites recur in a book that I think can shed light on Salò, more than those listed in the film’s bibliography: Ernesto De Martino’s La terra del rimorso, or The Land of Regret. First published in 1961, De Martino’s book gathers a range of ethnographic and historical reflections on tarantismo, the set of ritual practices associated with the treatment of poisonous spider bites in Puglia, in southern Italy. The text centers on the returns of malignant symptoms among the predominantly female tarantate, those supposedly bitten and re-bitten by spiders, “bitten again” being another meaning of the rimorso in De Martino’s title. De Martino is especially interested in ritual cures for these symptoms, cures that turn out to imitate the symptoms so closely as to be indistinguishable from them.25 These cures were, interestingly in the context of Salò, orgiastic in antiquity. Considering their social role in the present, De Martino reads these rites neither as matters of superstition nor as instances of mental illness, but as ways of responding to what he calls “il cattivo passato che torna,” “the bad past that returns” (13).

    Fig. 3 From Gian Franco Mingozzi, La Taranta (1962), made in consultation with Ernesto De Martino

    A passage from the anthropologist’s conclusion underscores this return’s relevance to De Martino’s present:

    Today we know that the “prick” of remorse is not the attack of a demon or of a god, but the bad past that returns…. But precisely because we know these things—and the contemporary world has procured for us too much of this bitter knowledge—tarantismo activates our interest once again and becomes a live question that concerns us intimately. On the other hand, precisely because our consciousnesses have never been so buffeted by the individual and collective past as they are today, and precisely because our souls are beset by the search for operative symbols that might be adequate to our humanism and to our sense of history…tarantismo is not indifferent to us, but rather almost compels us to measure with it the ensnared powers of our modernity. In this sense, if the Land of Regret is Puglia in that it is the elective fatherland of tarantismo, the pilgrims who visited it in the summer of ’59 [De Martino himself and his team] come from a vaster land that in the end awaits the same name, a land that extends even to the limits of the world inhabited by men [sic]. (272-73)

    What begins as a confident statement about the difference between “us” and those who still believe in gods, monsters, malevolent spiders, and miracle cures thus ends with a virtual erasure of this very difference. Locating the modern researchers, tellingly renamed “pilgrims,” in a land that is also one of regret (though one that doesn’t know itself), and then further widening the boundaries of this land so that it encompasses the whole inhabited world, De Martino all but undoes the distinction that he initially establishes above between the backward and benighted tarantate and the modern, metropolitan men who have undertaken to observe them. Yet on another level this distinction is preserved or sublated, because it is the latter who stand to learn from the former, and it is difference that makes this learning possible.26 Since souls in “our modernity” are tasked with searching for the kinds of “operative symbols” that remain operative in the realm of tarantismo, the remorseful Southerners effectively teach their northern visitors. Measured against—or rather with, as De Martino more forcefully writes—tarantismo, “our humanism” and our “history” cannot remain the same; they cannot, that is, after the lessons of the Land of Regret, remain the possessions of moderns who either claim to have superseded the past, or who rush to catch up with those who have. De Martino’s text thus both thematizes and models a way of relating to the past that resists its subsumption by the present.27

    Pasolini and De Martino clearly share an interest in the ritual resources available in non-modern worlds. Both suggest, moreover, that such resources might still be accessed and set to work to redress an ailing modernity.28 But Pasolini is typically said to have abandoned this hope by the time he made Salò.29 I have shown, however, that the “Abiura,” which purports to announce this abandonment, does something else as well. We can now say that that text dwells in the Land of Regret: it enacts and reenacts the return of the bad past that De Martino traces through the Puglia of the tarantate, only to argue that it happens everywhere, that the return is not regional.30

    This return structures Salò, including at the level of the image. A pair of sequences can illustrate this organizing principle. In the villa’s main hall—where the libertines, their female storytelling assistants, and the guards and victims all gather for assemblies when what Sade calls “school” is in session—Signora Vaccari (who was, incidentally, born in a school) presides over two storytelling scenes. To begin with, the narratrice regales the congregation with an account of her early life. A victim has already disappointed one libertine, and now another victim ineptly masturbates the financier. Seeing this, Signora Vaccari breaks off her story, declaring that something must be done. Prompted by this declaration or by something else, a young curly-haired girl, looking dazed, suddenly runs to the nearest window and tries to jump out. Guards stop her, and we see her struggling as they carry her away—but only for several seconds, because it is mealtime, and after a dissolve the struggle is succeeded by the first of several banquet scenes.

    Lunch is eventful. Victims working as waitresses are (in the film’s language) sodomized, as is the eager and ever idiotic financier. Two other libertines philosophize, and a narratrice reminisces. Out of nowhere, everyone sings a partisan song—pointedly out of place, of course, in this fascist redoubt. After this, a mannequin is brought in, and the masturbation lesson promised by Signora Vaccari is finally given, to the delight of libertines, storytellers, and soldiers alike. At this point the viewer has all but forgotten about the escape or suicide attempt that immediately preceded the meal. But the film provides an aggressive reminder, enacting the return of the diegetic “bad past.” Back in the main hall, the whole group is pictured: signori and storytellers, victims and soldiers, all again gathered silently around the altar, which now has its wings closed. After a sign is given, these wings, painted to look like curtains, open to reveal the would-be escapee, now dead. Two shots show that the girl’s throat has been cut, but Signora Vaccari quickly resumes her storytelling. A crude painting that sits atop the altar, anomalous in a villa famously full of modernist artworks, depicts a haloed Madonna and her Child.31 This painting was shown frontally only once, very briefly in the background during the scene before lunch, its appearance coinciding with the girl’s attempt to escape. Now the Madonna is more prominently visible, since the storyteller positions herself immediately before the painting. She steps aside, then paces back and forth repeatedly, to reveal, then conceal, then reveal again the dead girl, flat on her back, who has become the painting’s extension or its refutation. The girl’s body disappears from view, then reappears, is alternately covered and uncovered by Signora Vaccari’s dress. Now you see her; now you don’t; then again you do. The victim’s intermittent visibility instantiates the return of the bad past that Salò stages. For the viewer, each reappearance becomes a brief experience of what De Martino calls ri-morso: a re-bite.

    Fig. 4 Before

    Fig. 5 After

    Fig. 6 Victim

    Fig. 7 “Another story”

    Fig. 8 “Another story”

    But the static image of the Madonna presides over these reappearances. The painting’s sustained presence onscreen contrasts with the dead girl’s disappearances and returns. The Madonna thus marks one place where Salò reflects on its own status as image, drawing on what Georges Didi-Huberman calls the tradition of “critical images.” These he understands as primarily ritual, rather than representational, in their function.32 More specifically, Didi-Huberman argues that critical images engage in “a perpetual ‘putting to death’” in order to counter “the common desire” or collective determination to forget it (Confronting Images 220). The critical image thus constitutes an answer to, and an effort to undo, collective disavowal. Likewise, as both a rite and what Pasolini more specifically calls a “sacra rappresentazione” (“Il sesso” 2066)—referring backward to a tradition traceable to early modern Tuscany, that birthplace of perspectival vision where, dialectically, Didi-Huberman locates resources for thinking the image otherwise—Salò seeks to counter the progressive wish to abandon the fascist past.33

    All That Behind

    This wish is distilled in Michel Foucault’s response to what he saw as the “sacralization” of Sade in Salò. Foucault objected in particular to the film’s investment in “an eroticism of the disciplinary type”:

    After all, I would be willing to admit that Sade formulated an eroticism proper to the disciplinary society: a regulated, anatomical, hierarchical society whose time is carefully distributed, its spaces partitioned, characterized by obedience and surveillance.

    It’s time to leave all that behind, and Sade’s eroticism with it. We must invent with the body, with its elements, surfaces, volumes, and thicknesses, a nondisciplinary eroticism—that of a body in a volatile and diffused state, with its chance encounters and unplanned pleasures.(“Sade, Sergeant of Sex” 226-7, my emphasis)

    Elsewhere Foucault complicates this understanding of historical sequence, attending to sovereignty’s survival after its ostensible eclipse, its living-on into the era of discipline, and discipline’s living-on into the age of governmentality (Security 8, 107). Still, there is something almost irresistible about the progressive invitation and interpellation, offered here with the poignant assurance of being on the present’s side: “It’s time to leave all that behind.” We can recognize in this response to Salò a version of the impulse to abandon the past that I am arguing the film itself works to counter. In fact, Salò points up in advance the wishfulness of Foucault’s thinking, the utopianism of his search for “a nondisciplinary eroticism.” The film also lets us see—or rather, forces us to see—the progressivism that implicitly underwrites even queer theories inspired by Foucault’s call for reinvented bodies and pleasures.

    Leo Bersani, for instance, famously places complicity at the center of his account of gay male sexuality in essays like “Is the Rectum a Grave?”34 This text takes pains to position its understanding of sex against the “pastoral impulse” that Bersani detects in his contemporaries’ accounts—accounts of sex’s radical potential to establish communal solidarities (22). Seeking to correct what he takes to be the idealization operative in such accounts, Bersani offers instead a theory of gay male sex that sees it as working through the ruthlessness in which it traffics, in order to become a paradoxically “hygienic practice of nonviolence” (30). In this practice, rigorously pursued, being penetrated by the other becomes a form of “self-debasement” (27) or “self-dismissal” (30), in and through which gay men give up their entitlements as bearers of “proud subjectivity” (29), enacting instead a willingness to relinquish the self capable of cleansing this self of other-directed violent drives. Hence Bersani’s description of such sex as “hygienic.” Masochism of a particular kind becomes an answer to sadistic urges; the care of the self through the arrangement of its “shattering” can, in time, stem this self’s impingements on the world.

    Salò offers no perspective whatsoever from which sex could be seen to lead to such a “shattering” or salutary weakening. The film thus makes it possible to see that “pastoralization,” or something like it, lingers in Bersani’s quest for a paradoxical kind of cleanliness. Bersani hopes that intimacy with and even careful contamination by male power can be made to yield a nonviolent and all but uncontaminated result. By contrast, Salò‘s intimacy with its libertines is not finally purgative, but rather repetitive. The film compels us to take insistent if intermittent and uncomfortable pleasure in the old erotics from which Foucault wanted us to graduate.

    Here again, a pair of sequences is illustrative, not least because it flagrantly violates the rule—or indeed the restraining order—that others see as operative in the film, whereby sex in Salò, as a mere “metaphor for power,” can only take the form of “brutal assaults involving no foreplay and no undressing, aimed at the humiliation of naked, defenseless, and otherwise inert bodies” (Ricciardi, “Rethinking Salò“). In the second of the film’s two wedding scenes, an executive assistant named Guido helps the Bishop to officiate. (Salò is evidently a place in which gay marriage has been legalized. So even a “backward” reading of the film, like mine, cannot but find prophecies.) The Bishop chants while the other libertines march in, each beaming and arm in arm with a miserable-looking male victim. Guido, for his part, remains obliging. While the ceremony is in session, the camera frames the Bishop’s briefs, covered by his gauzy red gown, in a sustained close-up that contradicts the common wisdom according to which Salò privileges long and medium shots. After approaching the Bishop from behind, Guido fondles him. A quick cut then follows.

    Fig. 9 Officiant

    Fig. 10 Executive Assistant

    Fig. 11 Fondling

    Fig. 12 Close-Up

    The film has so far trained viewers to expect nothing to follow from fondling in general, for it has never allowed anything resembling a “sex scene” to unfold. Hand job, instead, has been heaped upon hand job—but always interruptedly. The close-up that concludes Salò‘s second wedding scene startles, then, by giving way to an image of coupling that is conventional if contra natura.35 In this next scene, the Bishop and his assistant are shown going at it as the camera engages in an elaborate dance, a back and forth between nearness and medium distance that prompts us to admire, not only to recoil from, this instance of intimacy. Sex is followed by kissing and tender talk that both bespeaks consent and projects that consent into the future. And this from a director who claimed, in the “Abiura,” to be giving up on, and indeed to “hate,” bodies and their sex organs (73). In this scene, the camera gives the lie to that claim: those bodies and organs are shot, and lit, lovingly.

    To be clear, this moment of mutual satisfaction in the midst of “brutal assaults” (Ricciardi, “Rethinking Salò“)—and of consent in the midst of constant coercions—matters not because it renders the other sex acts shown in Salò any less diegetically demeaning or casts any doubt on their cruelty. It matters instead because, if we look at and linger on the moments that Guido shares with the Bishop—rather than assume that sex in the film holds no visual interest but simply allegorizes and anticipates—we begin to learn the lesson embedded in a scene that might at first look like a mere anomaly. Imagining a republic whose ruling elite do anything but “abdicate power” when they engage in same-sex sex (Bersani, “Rectum” 19, original emphasis), Salò also addresses a reality in which disciplinarians are still at large. One does not depose such figures by saying, with Foucault, that it’s high time to leave them behind.

    Fig. 13 Wedding Night (1)

    Fig. 14 Wedding Night (2)

    Fig. 15 Wedding Night (3)

    This path through Foucault and Bersani thus leads, however improbably, back to school. For Salò‘s lesson was not that its viewers simply lived in the “bad past” represented by the film’s Republic of Salò, but rather that they could not merely leave this past and place behind by deciding that, in keeping with progress, it was time to do so. For Pasolini, the old school taught this lesson, as tarantismo did for De Martino.36 This is why Pasolini’s return to fascist “irregimentazione scenografica” (“Fascista” 233), a return “conceived as a rite,” also returns to instruction (Bachmann 42).37 Salò makes Sade’s “School for Libertinage” into an old school that gives ritual form to the “bad past” denied by official discourses of progress. These discourses would have us bypass the experience of rimorso by which alone we might redress “our modernity,” according to De Martino (273). Salò, by contrast, sets such remorse to work, and it is as a remorseful pedagogical ritual that the film still operates most powerfully. “Ci riguarda da vicino” indeed, in De Martino’s words—it looks at us up close and concerns us intimately—because, as the film’s reception shows, the land of regret remains a place that we would abandon, that we pretend to have left behind. This place’s claim on us is what Salò would have us learn the hard way.

    Footnotes

    Unless otherwise noted, all translations from the Italian are my own.

    1. Versions of this pathologizing response range from the early, phobic consensus distilled in Uberto Quintavalle’s memoir Giornate di Sodoma to Georges Didi-Huberman’s recent account of the apocalyptic turn and “the death and disappearance of survivals” in Pasolini’s last works (Come le lucciole). For more on Pasolini’s pathologization see Benedetti, and for a cogent response to Didi-Huberman and defense of the late Pasolini, see Ricciardi (“Pasolini for the Future”).

    2. Pasolini says that he wants Salò to be “a formally perfect film” and contrasts this perfectionist approach to his earlier, messy, “magmatic” procedure in Bachmann (43).

    3. See Bersani and Dutoit, for whom, in the film, “[h]orror is almost constantly forestalled by a multiplication of aesthetic appeals” (29). The binoculars’ framing in this sequence constitutes, in their view, one such appeal, an appeal that is compatible with and even enhanced by estrangement. In contrast, Ricciardi sees these backward binoculars as part of the film’s effort to thwart both aesthetic and erotic enjoyment by ruling out “perverse proximity” in all its forms (“Rethinking Salò“). For an account that differs from Ricciardi’s as well as Bersani’s and Dutoit’s, instead emphasizing the sense of “suffocating nearness” produced by this shot, see Copjec (203). And for a more recent reading of the same sequence that likewise stresses “identification” and complicity, see Annovi (44).

    4. To my mind, the best account of aestheticization in the film remains Bersani and Dutoit. But whereas Bersani and Dutoit associate Salò‘s aestheticization with “saving frivolity” and think that the film thus displays “Pasolini’s refusal to be fixed—better, to be transfixed—by his subject” (29), I see no such saving and no such refusal in the film.

    5. On Salò and bare life, see Ricciardi (“Rethinking Salò“) and on the film as forecasting the end of “the autonomy of the citizen-subject,” see Copjec (229). Other recent readings that value Salò for its prophetic qualities include Recalcati (23-9), Ravetto, and Indiana (90).

    6. For a notable exception, see Rhodes.

    7. See Recalcati (Il complesso di Telemaco 23-9), and on “the eclipse of desire” more generally, see Recalcati (“L’eclisse dei desideri”). On “current methods of biopower” as they figure proleptically in the film, see, again, Ricciardi (“Rethinking Salò“).

    8. For a recent, brief discussion of Salò‘s pedagogy, see Chiesi (132-5). On the pedagogical impulse in Pasolini more generally, see Zanzotto, and also Stone.

    9. There is therefore some truth to the film’s first spectators’ sense that Pasolini must have been symptomatically “fixated” on both the fascist and Sadean pasts. See, for instance, Quintavalle (14, 22). Indeed, Pasolini’s Salò Republic bears more than a passing resemblance to the “province” to which Freud alludes in an early letter discussing fixation: “in a certain province fueros [ancient laws or local sovereignties] are still in force, we are in the presence of ‘survivals’” (208). Freud here maps the political onto the psychic, so that fixation becomes a matter of fueros within. I will be arguing, against Didi-Huberman (Come le lucciole), that we are still very much “in the presence of survivals” in Salò. To repeat this Freudian claim, though, is not to suggest that Salò is a mere record of its director’s psychopathology, as his detractors would contend.

    10. I refer readers who would discount such a critique as inherently “conservative”—or simply counterproductive under current conditions—to recent work in fields ranging from black studies, to queer theory and from visual studies to ecocriticism, and beyond. See, to name only a few, Berger, Dayan, François (Open Secrets), Freeman, Love, and Sexton. For an earlier example, see Horkheimer and Adorno. And for a reading of Salò that both considers and extends this critique, see Terada.

    11. On the movement from word to image as regression, see Bollas (111-12). In the art historical context, see Warburg (8) and Didi-Huberman (Confronting Images 149).

    12. This sentence reworks and adds to the litany of charges against “instruction” found in Gentile (La riforma 186).

    13. For some of Gramsci’s pages on Latin and “instruction,” see the Quaderni, vol. 3 (1544-6) and the Prison Notebooks (37-9).

    14. On other persisting features of the fascist state, see Fogu, who concludes: “Most of the administrative, judicial, and even police apparatus of the fascist state and party was left untouched and effortlessly integrated into the new republican order” (152).

    15. See, for a historiographic instance, De Bernardi, and for an example from film studies see Fabbri. For Croce’s “parenthesis,” see Croce (3), and on the ongoing ideological work of this image, see Fogu (149). Elsewhere Fogu notes that it was not until 1976, when “the famous televised debate between historians Denis Mack Smith and Renzo De Felice” was broadcast, that, “Fascism was suddenly brought out of the representational closet and in such a way that the Crocean image of a fascist parenthesis in Italian history [began to be] thoroughly delegitimized” (158-9). It was thus in the context of this closet—and, I am arguing, in an effort to counter its effects—that Pasolini made Salò.

    16. This is just one of many problems addressed by Fortini, whose essay “The Writer’s Mandate and the End of Anti-Fascism” treats “the anti-fascist myth” mainly as a hindrance to revolution (53). Fortini also reminds readers, however, that such a reckoning would have made it possible to recognize fascism’s relation to capital, rather than grant the “definition of fascism as ‘enemy of civilisation’—including bourgeois civilisation” (45). Seeing fascism as an extension or weapon of the latter would instead mean confronting continuities between the postwar period and the decades that preceded it—which need not entail minimizing the “ruin” to which fascism leads (34).

    17. Here I bracket the ultraleft movements associated with operaismo, or workerism, and Autonomia. But for a luminous recent discussion of these movements and their prefiguration in postwar culture, see Mansoor.

    18. Compare Agamben’s reflections on “revocation” and “re-evocation” in Pasolini’s late work (though not in Salò specifically) (“From the Book” 93-94).

    19. On Salò‘s response to these philosophical debates, see Ravetto (106).

    20. Georges Bataille’s writings on Sade include “The Use Value of D.A.F. de Sade” (1930) and “Sade” (1957). Pasolini also refers to Bataille’s The Trial of Gilles de Rais as a source of inspiration for Salò, but without naming Bataille’s name (“Il sesso” 2063). Jacques Lacan’s “Kant with Sade” (1963) is perhaps more Pasolinian than any of the texts listed in Salò. And conversely: there is already something Lacanian about the performance of aggressive erudition that is the “Essential Bibliography.” Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment (first published in Italian translation in 1966) also includes an “Excursus” on the Marquis that pairs his work with Kant’s.

    21. Gian Maria Annovi reads the bibliography as “a sort of contrapasso for the spectator of the Trilogy, an intellectual punishment” (139-40).

    22. For some of Gentile’s reflections on freedom in education, see his La riforma dell’educazione (e.g. 58-9). And for an earlier account attesting to the centrality of freedom in Gentile’s educational theory, see Gentile (“L’unità della scuola media”). To be sure, statements in favor of progressive-sounding educative freedom can be found in Pasolini’s writings. See, for instance, “Le mie proposte su scuola e Tv” (177). But such statements should be read alongside others that insist that one must not accept progressive pieties but rather learn to be “progressive in another way, inventing another way of being free” (“Due modeste proposte per eliminare la criminalità in Italia” 168).

    23. On forms of repetition inseparable from the resistance that they might seem to block, see Comay. Pasolini considers ritual in his brief but suggestive review of a film to which Salò is heavily indebted: Marco Ferreri’s La grande abbuffata (Blow-Out, 1973) (“Le ambigue forme della ritualità narrativa”).

    24. I am relying on Asad’s account, according to which ritual privileges practice over signification. Galluzzi eloquently describes Salò‘s assault on signification in Pasolini e la pittura (143).

    25. For another account of “the disquieting indistinction between the ill and its remedy,” see Borch-Jacobsen (113).

    26. This is already, then, the shift or “next stage” that Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak locates in the “trajectory of the subaltern”: “Not to study the subaltern, but to learn” (440).

    27. My reading of La terra del rimorso differs from Simonetta Falasca-Zamponi’s in her overview of De Martino’s works (57-60).

    28. For a fuller consideration of Pasolini’s relationship to De Martino, though one that does not address La terra del rimorso specifically, see Subini (26-34). See also Ricciardi (“Pasolini for the Future”). Maggi treats this relationship as well, but he sees Pasolini and De Martino as ultimately opposed (7-8). According to Maggi, Pasolini reductively translates De Martino’s complex, non-dichotomous understanding of history into a neat and naive division between past and present: De Martino’s emphases are thus “at odds with Pasolini’s belief in a sharp dichotomy between the ‘then’ of a premodern condition and the ‘now’ of post-history” (7). I am instead attempting to highlight how Pasolini’s late work attests to the survival and the still-possible return of that which has been declared long gone. This is, in my view, a dynamic rather than dichotomous approach to history, one that does not declare any past over and done with definitively.

    29. See, for instance, Maggi (7-8) and Didi-Huberman (Come le lucciole).

    30. I borrow this formulation from Joan Copjec, who insists that psychoanalysis is “not a regional discourse” in Murray.

    31. Galluzzi identifies this as an imitation of Raphael’s Madonna di Foligno (144 n164). For his part, Maggi emphasizes the Marian dimension of this image, so that Mary becomes one (absent) mother among many others in Salò (108-9).

    32. Thus, according to Didi-Huberman, Fra Angelico “reenacts” “a gesture of unction” when he splashes paint onto a wall, punctuating figurative paintings with non-figurative passages (Confronting Images 202-3). And thus Donatello learns from the makers of bóti, or death masks for the still-living Florentine nobility, that sculpture is a matter of casting as much as truth to life—of process, that is, as much as appearance (Didi-Huberman, Confronting Images 226). Thus, finally, the maker of a painting honoring St. Veronica sets aside his brush, preferring to render the saint’s cloth with cloth rather than realistically.

    33. I cannot engage with the sacra rappresentazione or with Didi-Huberman’s account of the critical image in detail here. I note only that this engagement might complicate critical assertions that the film records the making of what Giorgio Agamben calls “bare life.” Whereas Agamben’s homo sacer can be “killed but not sacrificed” (85), Salò takes pains to render its killings sacrificial in Didi-Huberman’s sense if not in Bataille’s (Confronting Images 220).

    34. On complicity, see also Bersani (Homos 90), and for a later reassessment of the arguments advanced in “Is the Rectum a Grave?,” including its arguments for the radical potential of masochism, see Bersani (“Sociality and Sexuality”).

    35. Gary Indiana memorably calls this “normal love” (83).

    36. That the old school had long since sought to provide ritual forms for responding to the past that survived in the present is shown in Walter Ong’s classic, not to say old-school, essay “Latin Language Study as Renaissance Puberty Rite.”

    37. To be sure, the phrase “conceived as a rite” is a contradiction in terms, for a rite cannot, strictly speaking, be conceived, at least not if it is to be socially efficacious. On the contrary, traditionally, “For ritual to function and operate it must first of all present itself and be perceived as legitimate, with…[its] symbols serving…to show that the agent does not act in his own name and on his own authority, but in his capacity as a delegate” (Bourdieu 115). (For an opposed account that centers on attempts to make the image efficacious from within “the ruins of representation and culture” and in the absence of social sanctioning, see Pandolfo.) There was, of course, no such delegation in Pasolini’s case; or rather, the director himself did the delegating. In this sense, there is a qualitative difference between the rituals observed by De Martino and those imagined by Pasolini: whereas the tarantate studied by the anthropologist had long sought cures in a communal context, even the most devoted of spectators attended a film “conceived as a rite” by its director alone.

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  • Transgenic Poetry: Loss, Noise, and the Province of Parasites

    Susan Vanderborg (bio)
    University of South Carolina

    Abstract

    Transgenic poetry, in which a verbal text is coded as DNA and placed within a life form, has both extended and called into question some of the most basic generic conventions of poetry. This essay uses theories of parasitic language to examine transgenic poetry’s emphasis on noise and loss, focusing on two prominent texts engaged with human reshaping of the environment: Eduardo Kac’s Genesis and Christian Bök’s ongoing The Xenotext Experiment.

    The next step in the evolution of poetry might involve living media. In 2003, Eduardo Kac described an innovative format, that of “[t]ransgenic poetry,” where the poet must “synthesize DNA according to invented codes to write words and sentences using combinations of nucleotides” and then “[i]ncorporate these DNA words and sentences into the genome of living organisms” (“Biopoetry”). Joe Davis, an early transgenic poet, coded the words, “‘I am the riddle of life know me and you will know yourself’”—a phrase used in a mid-twentieth-century conversation between biologists—into DNA and implanted this updated “Delphi[c]” DNA text into E. coli in 1994 (259-60).1

    While transgenic poetry’s living vessels have been the subject of reviews and some extended scholarship, there is significant debate about how to read them as poems: how to examine the ways in which their authors rework the genre and how to assess the environmental arguments these authors make using such poetic formats. Mapping a transgenic poetics becomes all the more difficult because, as Judith Roof argues in The Poetics of DNA, the idea of “read[ing]” DNA as “alphabet,” “book,” or “code”—i.e., as something “transparent,” “accessible,” “translatable,” and “editable” (7, 15-6)—does a disservice to the “complexity” of both genetics and literature (215).2 She concludes, “If, in fact, we actually learned to read—actually understood that language is multivalent, that nothing exists in a stable, secure relation—our abilities to understand and deploy substances such as DNA would in the end be much greater” (215). Roof’s book does not discuss poetry, but the practice of destabilizing reading and metaphors for reading is a hallmark of the most ambitious transgenic poems. The latter are not simply interdisciplinary poems whose signifiers need deciphering, but poems that foreground noise and opacity across multiple signifying systems with fluid sources and repeated interruptions. Such poems’ most excessive displays are sometimes shadowed by forms of loss—the loss not only of familiar genre conventions but of settled content, reliable textual translations, and at times recognizable language itself—as these poems attempt to remap poetry’s structures, responsibilities, and limits within the genetic experiments of the Anthropocene. In this essay, I explore two prominent texts that set out different agendas and formats for the transgenic poem: Eduardo Kac’s Genesis and Christian Bök’s ongoing The Xenotext Experiment.

    The Noise of Genesis

    Kac first displayed his viewer-responsive transgenic poem, Genesis, at the 1999 Ars Electronica festival in Austria. In his essay for the exhibition catalogue, he explains:

    The key element of the work is an “artist’s gene,” i.e. a synthetic gene that I invented and that does not exist in nature. This gene was created by translating a sentence from the biblical book of Genesis into Morse Code, and converting the Morse Code into DNA base pairs according to a conversion principle which I developed specifically for this work. The sentence reads: “Let man have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moves upon the earth.” This sentence was chosen for its implications regarding the dubious notion of humanity’s (divinely sanctioned) supremacy over nature. (“Genesis” 310)

    Kac also used E. coli as the host for his artist’s gene. The bacterium is prone to mutations, and those viewing the Genesis exhibit in person or on the Internet could engage UV radiation to increase these mutations, rewriting the premises of the biblical sentence (Telepresence 252). As critics have noted, Kac’s project both questions and colludes with human manipulations of nature, self-consciously using its own bioengineering to comment on the uses and perceptions of that science.3 Kac sent the gene model to a laboratory to be manufactured, and his project required substantial exhibition equipment (Telepresence 251). At the first exhibition of the work, a “microvideo camera, a UV light box, and a microscope illuminator” linked “to a video projector and two networked computers” produced stunning visuals from the Petri culture (251). Bacteria with the Genesis gene turned blue under the UV light, bacteria lacking the gene gleamed yellow, and a green hue signified the intermixing of the two types (“Genesis” 310).4 Kac’s website lists forty-one exhibitions of Genesis in different countries through 2015, an exhibition cycle that has incorporated new mutations and text displays, including “Indian black granite tablets” featuring the phrase from the biblical Genesis, its Morse format, and the bases of the artist’s gene (Telepresence 255); gold and glass sculptures about the Genesis gene and protein (257); video art (260); and “giclée print[s]” of the Petri culture bacteria and letter changes (259).

    Why would Kac specifically describe his transgenic art as poetry, and where exactly is the poem? As Kac states in his introduction to the first edition of Media Poetry, he is less focused on composing traditional poetic forms such as “lyric sonnets” via new technology than on discovering entirely different “reading possibilities” suggested by technopoetry (12). He defines poetry broadly as “a profound engagement with language” that also “liberates language from ordinary constraints” (introduction to Media Poetry [2007] 10). His oft-cited definition of the subgenre of “biopoetry,” of which the transgenic poem is one example, takes poetry past the constraints of human language: “the use of biotechnology and living organisms in poetry as a new realm of verbal, paraverbal and nonverbal creation,” whose “possibilities” include “infrasound” poems directed at elephants and poems created by firefly light flashes (“Biopoetry”), neither of which could be paraphrased easily using human signifiers.

    Genesis simultaneously uses, challenges, and supersedes the human word.5 Here, “liberat[ion]” can seem more like diminution; the linguistic segment of Genesis most recognizable to human poetry readers is limited to a single coded sentence and its revisions, which appear in the Petri projection simply as color clusters. However, as the project moves into an analysis of metaphors of language and communication, this sentence might only be part of the poem’s linguistic investigation. Kac’s essays on Genesis and other biopoems, which he sees as extensions of the poems’ language, use the tropes of “dialogue[]” and “communication” to explore “interspecies interaction, ‘biotelematics,’ and ‘biorobotics,’” as well as code “conversion principle[s]” (Telepresence 218, 249).6 These metaphors might seem “reductive” (255) for precisely the reasons Roof outlines. N. Katherine Hayles, for instance, rebukes Kac for using the word “‘translation’” to describe the transition from Morse-rendered letters to DNA in Genesis, because this word falsely implies an “equivalence between language understood by humans and the biological specificity of protein folding” (“Who Is in Control Here?” 84).

    For his part, Kac fully appreciates the usage problem. He calls into question “[t]erms like ‘transcription,’ as well as ‘code,’ ‘translation,’ and many others commonly employed in molecular biology,” because they “betray an ideological stance, a conflation of linguistic metaphors and biological entities, whose rhetorical goal is to instrumentalize processes of life” (“Life Transformation” 183).7 Throughout his descriptions of biopoetry, Kac uses words such as “writable” or “dialogues” as studied provocations (“Genesis” 310-11), reminding readers of the messy “construct[ion]” of each “metaphor” (Telepresence 262), and often challenging the idea of reliable data transmission, i.e., “the very possibility of communication” itself (218). Instead of presenting smooth, clear transitions from one code, medium, or discipline to the next, Genesis foregrounds encodings and “intersemiotic” “translations” (256) that are avowedly incomplete, imprecise, or distorted, from the obvious Petri dish letter changes in the bacterial biblical text to Kac’s speculations that “Morse code,” rather than being a neutral medium for relaying words, might have been formulated as a vehicle for “the bigotry of nativist ideology” that its creator endorsed (261).

    There are subtler breaks, too, in data presentation throughout the project. Kac’s essay in the 1999 exhibition catalogue, for instance, tantalizes readers with another inter-field translation, this time converting genetic material into melody: “DNA music, generated live in the gallery, is synthesized by the use of a complex algorithm that transcribes the physiology of DNA into musical parameters” (“Genesis” 311). Kac’s text does not specify the algorithm or parameters, or explain their complexity (though Kac’s website now offers a link to the composition details). The sheer play of colors and texts at the exhibition—English words, Morse code, DNA base abbreviations on the gallery walls—alongside the supporting machines and music must have felt overwhelming rather than simply informative (Telepresence 251), even before the later addition of the gene and protein art. Sensory overload is part of the point. The noisy poetic site of Genesis, Kac states, expresses “the paradoxical condition of the nonexpert in the age of biotechnology” (Telepresence 252). Surrounded by new genetic specimens, we may not fully understand their manufacture, but we must still interact with them and confront the advertising images and economic rumors broadcast about them.8 “[E]ven inaction,” Kac emphasizes, “implicate[s]” the observer (“Fifty Questions” 40): “To click or not to click” on the textual error-generating UV radiation in Genesis is always “an ethical decision” (Telepresence 252), a map in miniature for thinking about the equally noisy, “unpredictab[le]” results (260) of our environmental decisions.

    There are precedents in avant-garde writing for a poetics that foregrounds data loss, noise, breaks, and distractions. Kac’s celebration of “interfere[nce]” and “noise” (“Fifty Questions” 40) at each stage of Genesis aligns his transgenic art with what scholars such as Craig Dworkin have, adapting Michel Serres’s communication theory in The Parasite, described as a poetics of “‘noise’” (46). Serres’s observation that all information delivery involves the “parasit[ic]” interposition of “noise” within the medium—”we know of no system that functions perfectly, that is to say, without losses, flights, wear and tear, errors, accidents, opacity”—segues into his famous argument that the “noise” we try to “suppress[]” is what enables “communication” (12-13).9 Serres’s own reconstruction of Genesis and John proclaims, “In the beginning was the noise” (13). Approaching noise through literature, Serres locates the themes of “nonsense, pure noise, [and] disorder” in canonical texts (185), reading poetry for “truth statements,” as Marjorie Perloff notes (“‘Multiple Pleats’” 190). Yet Serres’s The Parasite also asks us to imagine new stylistic “system[s]” and texts openly structured around noisy “[m]istakes,” “confusion,” “interrupt[ions],” and “shocks,” instead of “equilibrium” (12-13). His noise model has been used to analyze the semantic and visual distortions of Language poems,10 such as the deliberate “miscommunication[s]” or “malapropisms” in Charles Bernstein’s texts, which reflect the confusion of a contemporary subject trapped “in an increasingly alien technospace” (Perloff, “‘Multiple Pleats’” 194)—a feeling that might resonate with Genesis‘s viewers. Dworkin argues that a poetics of noise might also generate a “[p]olitics of [n]oise,” as he scrutinizes sound and typographic play in Susan Howe’s poems, which elide the “distinction between ‘message’ and ‘noise’” to challenge “received perspectives and centers of power” (31, 48, 38). The “opacity” in noise-based Language poetry, Ming-Qian Ma concurs, can offer a “radical critique of society and culture,” as these forces are shaped by “‘systemic’” devices “of sense-making” in normative “‘communication’” (183, 175).

    These three poetic studies do not mention transgenic poetry, but Kac’s Genesis creates an even broader range of noisy interferences across various formats in its own critique of the human tropes of “dominion” and transmission.11 Genesis not only redefines the poetry book as a showcase for noise to which readers actively contribute, but its unusual bioform can be said to embody Serres’s idea of parasitically noisy language—with the twist that here the human poetic text is interposed in a microbial host. Serres might appreciate the ambiguity, in Genesis, over what the parasite actually is. The Parasite, while it associates “noises” with “[s]ickness, epidemics,” and the “metamorphoses” of “bacteria” (253), also adapts its metaphor to discuss “animals whom we parasite” (78), and to describe humans and their products as parasites on the ecosphere: “Tomorrow,” writes Serres, “we will remember, with some difficulty, our moving and sonorous world, polluted with the unbreathable, stinking air of motors” and their “noise” (141). Serres ties these images to speculations about the birth of “[p]rivate property” in the story of the person who gets to take the item he contaminates (140), a parallel to Genesis‘s focus on claims of owning the planet and its creatures.

    Looking more closely at the textual play of noise helps to explain both the structure of Kac’s poetry and its possible ability to foreground or contest a particular “ideological stance” (“Life Transformation” 183). The final text is never set here; every exhibition of Genesis is at once the primary poem and tangential noise, producing new letter mutations in its iteration of the process. Reviewers generally acknowledge the subversion of the bible premise the mutations can produce, but there are few readings that engage the specific details of the work as noise makes the language less recognizable. By the time the Ars Electronica 99 exhibition had closed, Kac had recorded several letter changes—”LET AAN HAVE DOMINION OVER THE FISH OF THE SEA AND OVER THE FOWL OF THE AIR AND OVER EVERY LIVING THING THAT IOVES UA EON THE EARTH” (Telepresence 254). The changes, more pronounced at the sentence’s end as if symbolically picking up speed, can be seen as systemic stammers or stoppages, part of the process of seeing how long it takes for each letter group to lose its recognizable denotation in English or any other Latin alphabet-based language, with former “typos” transformed “into gibberish,” in Steve Tomasula’s words (“Gene(sis)” 255), so that any search for guidance from this biblical excerpt should conclusively be halted.

    Alternatively, I would argue that these shifts can be read back into flexible new satirical patterns in which they defamiliarize “man” as lord, suggest errors over the span of an “EON,” and transform the detectable movements of creatures into something less decipherable that might evoke a distorted view of “U”/you the manipulator as well. Kac’s The Book of Mutations (2001)—whose prints, which can be viewed on his website, include artistic representations of different sets of sentence letter shifts from Genesis bacteria—proffers other ways to remake and repopulate the original line’s world. It is tempting to see in the third page’s “DEMINION,” for instance, a bid to remove the hierarchy of “minion[s]” and lords that “dominion” suggests—or does its sound play instead accuse us of being infernal “demons” for our misuses of nature? Here we watch the isolated “man” transform into the symbiotically inclusive conjunction “AND,” while “moves” becomes “DOVES” and the “sea” changes to the act of perception marked by “SEE,” as if readers were asked for their own interpretations of the revisions. Imagine an ecopoetry book, Kac’s Mutations suggests, that is not a set artifact of bound pages making arguments about the ramifications of biotech, but rather an ongoing parasitic reinvention of one problematic introductory statement. In Kac’s book, we see multiple ways in which that beginning could be destabilized, while also being reminded of our own insistent desire to order the environment—not only to start an experiment, as in choosing to engage the UV radiation, but to impose human meanings on random outcomes by ordering chaotic letter sequences back into semantic units, or by turning biological events into metaphors for the nature narratives we would like to exist.

    To thwart such ways of reading, Genesis‘s poem occasionally refuses to allow the recuperation of its noise back into letters at all. “The code is not translated back after each and every show,” Kac states (“Trans-Genesis”), which means that in some shows the new textual revisions remain wholly unreadable. Do they still comprise part of the poem, then? Whether it is read or not, the noise has no clear endpoint, unlike the elements in a print text.12 “Genesis does not have a specific duration,” Kac points out; “[s]ome galleries host the show for a few months, others for a few weeks” (“Trans-Genesis”). But these are artificial limits, for any one experiment could run “‘indefinitely’” (“Genesis: A Transgenic Artwork” 19). There is quiet commentary in having a living unbounded poem, a reminder that the effects of bioengineering in the outside world do not often have temporal limits, to say nothing of the careful containment protocols of an exhibition.

    The poem’s language, moreover, does not simply become unrecognizable in its noisy bacterial revisions, but rather reveals a source that was already plagued by noise and loss from its inception. Kac identifies his quoted sentence as taken from the King James Bible, explaining at length the background that made this edition a good target to satirize (Telepresence 261), but a source check will find the noise in his attribution. “‘Let man have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moves upon the earth’” (“Genesis” 310) is not an exact quotation. Kac’s sentence seems to merge similar statements from two verses, 26 and 28, in the King James’s first chapter of Genesis:

    26 And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth.

    28 And God blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it: and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth. (New American Library 9)

    While Kac’s Telepresence chapter on Genesis doesn’t mention his adaptations, it suggests one possible cause: his source was not a print bible, but an unspecified webpage (251), evoking an archive that, like the reinventable book pages, might be more transient or prone to intrusive revisions. Kac or the online citer modernizes the verb into “moves,” as if the source had mutated to accommodate contemporary readers. The fact that verses 26 and 28 have nearly the same phrasing draws attention to the repetition and noisy excess already present in the King James text itself, with the differences subtly subverting the credibility of either verse, making us wonder which one presents the true extent of the granted “dominion.” Nor are these the only problems with the source. The Telepresence chapter delights in mentioning “deliberate and accidental changes” in early print bibles and in pointing out that the King James text—a translation in a strictly linguistic sense—was also deeply collaged and “ideological”:

    I selected the King James English version (KJV), instead of the Hebrew original text, as a means of highlighting the multiple mutations of the Old Testament and its interpretations and also to illustrate the ideological implications of an alleged “authoritative” translation. King James tried to establish a final text by commissioning several scholars (a total of forty-seven worked on the project) to produce this translation, meant to be univocal. Instead, this collaborative effort represents the result of several “voices” at work simultaneously.(261)13

    Kac emphasizes the noise in the King James translation’s flawed human artistry. The king’s most strenuous attempts to ensure a seamless, “‘authoritative’” bible only demonstrated the fictionality of “a final text” that subordinated nonhuman animals as well as rationalized, in Kac’s view, a “fierce British colonialism” on religious grounds (Telepresence 261). There is noisy retranslation and alteration, too, in the very style of Kac’s essays. Part of the Genesis piece that appeared in Ars Electronica is reproduced in the Telepresence chapter on Genesis, which also has several segments that overlap with the essays “Transgenic Art Online” and “Life Transformation—Art Mutation.” Sometimes whole paragraphs are repeated but for small changes that challenge the reader to track them, or else, as in the case of the King James commentary, text is moved from note to main body, further blurring the idea of a central message with parasitical noise. Each essay’s revisions, losses, and reframings make us reevaluate Genesis‘s significance.

    Consider, finally, the contributions of the poem’s vessel. It is a truism that postmodern poetry foregrounds the materiality of its signifiers, and Kac’s later recasting of Genesis‘s sentence, gene, or protein using materials such as granite, gold, and glass, each with its own distinctive appearance and symbolic connotations, simply entices us to reexamine the initial host: the bacterium itself. What additional noise is introduced by the choice of a particular host for a transgenic poem, a host with its own unique biology and history (in E. coli‘s case, the bacterium’s use in genetics experiments), an organism surrounded by cultural myths that we create? Serres’s The Parasite lovingly details the literary mythology surrounding each organic parasite or scavenger he discusses. In bio texts, as David Crandall notes, when one proposes the idea of a transgenic newspaper “archive” located in “the junk DNA of New York cockroaches,” the suggestion provokes humor (114)—or disgust—that distracts us in our reading, even if the source words are coded without error. Such distractions make us more aware of our species biases. Kac’s choice of E. coli is itself a gentle reminder that the bacterium, familiar to most readers from outbreak notices, exists in non-detrimental or even “mutualistic” forms as well as in disease-generating ones (Engelkirk and Duben-Engelkirk 159, 184).14 Consider, too, the reversal of the definitions of message and noise in the bacterium’s self-regulating mechanisms. George Church, who made a DNA recording of a textbook he co-authored, Regenesis: How Synthetic Biology Will Reinvent Nature and Ourselves (2012), explained his decision to work with “standalone DNA” on “commercial DNA microchips” (Leo, par. 10): “We purposefully avoided living cells…. In an organism, your message is a tiny fraction of the whole cell, so there’s a lot of wasted space. But more importantly, almost as soon as a DNA goes into a cell, if that DNA doesn’t earn its keep, if it isn’t evolutionarily advantageous, the cell will start mutating it, and eventually the cell will completely delete it” (qtd. in Leo, par. 10).15 As a trans-species project, Genesis may not make us fully see E. coli and other organisms as “égal” (our equal), as Noury suggests (153), but neither can the poet dismiss the host’s potential resistance to human expectations for a transgenic conversation.

    Training skeptical readers to interrogate each code or narrative, to become attuned to the fine print of corporate advertisements and the noise of their own species preconceptions, and to explore “alternative views” of molecular biology (Telepresence 255)—including approaches that are less results-driven and more focused on the tangled communal and moral effects of transgenic “life” (252, 260)—is one aim of Kac’s poetic emphasis on noise in Genesis. He also concedes the limitations of this strategy. Transgenic or not, no poem can change research protocols; transgenic poets can only use the “ethical tension” in their projects to “stimulate[] reflection and debate” on broader human reconstructions of species and the environment (Telepresence 254-5).16 But within the constraints of the poetry genre, Kac insists on the artist’s responsibility to at least try to broaden the forms taken by such bioethical debates, particularly by taking “language” past “a human-centered form” (“Fifty Questions” 28), even as he acknowledges how hard it is not to fall back on humanistic vocabulary and concepts. Kac describes the slime mold in another one of his biopoems, The Eighth Day, in a “collaborative action” with human input, then breaks down the word to qualify that “amoeba and humans” may “‘co-labor,’ i.e., work in tandem,” but the amoeba doesn’t “‘know’” this (“Fifty Questions” 59).17

    For now, perhaps the best route through Kac’s biopoetry is to read it not simply as noisy or “illegib[le]” in human linguistic terms, as Clüver suggests (184), but as a group of texts whose various components and audiences experience different degrees of noise and loss. Such noise is a reminder of artistic fallibility, foregrounding our fictions about communication more than our dialogic successes, as detailed in this pitch for bee poetry in “Biopoetry”: “Write and perform with a microrobot in the language of the bees, for a bee audience, in a semi-functional, semi-fictional dance” conveying no useful message about the locations of nectar for the insects. Another entry imagines two poem hosts from one microbe strain in a culture, “compet[ing] for the same resources,” leading to the possible loss of one poem in its entirety or to fresh texts via the noise of “horizontal poetic gene transfer.” In Genesis itself, Kac wonders exactly whose noisy intrusions are distracting whom: “am I, through an evolutionary process, a vehicle for [the bacteria’s] will to survive, contributing to the proliferation of bacteria by creating new ones?” (Telepresence 254). This question might be the springboard for Bök’s The Xenotext Experiment, which expands the transgenic poetry of parasitic language to encompass new forms as well as angry indictments of the human pollution of the earth.

    The Xenotext Experiment: Human Elegies

    As do Kac’s essays, Bök’s commentary on The Xenotext Experiment scrutinizes metaphors of speech or inscription such as “writing” and “response,” along with familiar wordplays on existing biological terms such as protein “express[ion]” and RNA “translat[ion]” (North of Invention, ch. 2). Bök is just as insistent as Kac in describing his transgenic texts as poems, even as he agrees that poetic language in the new millennium will not necessarily be confined to human forms and readers. “I often joke that we are probably the first generation of poets who can reasonably expect to write literature for a machinic audience of artificially intellectual peers,” Bök comments (“Poetic Machines”), and he speculates on the possibility of his Xenotext transgenic poems being sent through space as open letters to alien readers (“The Xenotext Experiment” 231).18 Yet the form Bök proposes for his transgenic poetry is different from Kac’s. Where Kac codes one text into DNA, Bök’s goal is to have his first nucleobased text, an original poem about new “life” forms and the poetic “lyre,” produce a second poem within a bacterium’s cellular processes to form two “mutually encipher[ing]” DNA-RNA transcription texts (North of Invention, ch. 2). Currently the paired-poem experiment succeeds with E. coli, though not yet with Bök’s intended final vehicle, the “extremophile” bacterium D. radiodurans (ch. 2).19

    Kac and Bök also seem to have very different genre expectations for what transgenic poetry should do. While Genesis delights in noise and misrecognition as an end result, Bök’s The Xenotext Experiment, despite its defamiliarizing genetic ciphers, still stresses the need to be able to decode “intelligible,” “meaningful sentences” from the poems at its conclusion (North of Invention, ch. 2). And while Genesis is structured around loss and mutation, the Xenotext strives for perpetuity, evoking the much more traditional poetic goal of ensuring the author’s eternal reputation. Bök’s intended host, D. radiodurans, “can repair its own DNA so quickly that the germ resists mutation” (North of Invention, ch. 2), creating a poem that might “last until the sun dies” (Hill) in a “quest for immortality” (Collis), as the review headlines announce. Bök compares his transgenic poems to long-established forms such as “sonnets,” invoking the sonnet’s typical goal of preserving what humans love (North of Invention, ch. 2). His transgenic texts’ duration, if successful, would far exceed the promised reach of Shakespeare’s “So long as men can breathe, or eyes can see” (187). Bök also places his transgenic texts within “the elegiac pastoral tradition” (North of Invention, ch. 2), where stylized constructions of nature help immortalize the subject, a “shepherd-poet” (Harrison 1-2). The elegy form promises that the deceased lyricist “lives on in” some afterlife, providing “an element of reassurance, of consolation” (Norlin 309), which seems a good parallel for Bök’s own artistic rearrangements of nature in service of human commemoration.20

    Yet Bök’s project, perhaps even more sharply than Genesis, turns out to foreground unrecoverable loss and noise. It is not only that Bök extends the bacterium’s role in the poetic process, or that the poem’s translation to its second host is still imperfect. The association of language with loss is integrated into the poem at its fundamental thematic and structural levels. Bök’s study, ‘Pataphysics, references Serres’s parasitic noise (57), but the more direct muse for the Xenotext is William S. Burroughs, the science fiction language theorist who denounced “[t]he word” in The Ticket That Exploded (1967) as “a virus,” something “alien and hostile,” “a parasitic organism that invades and damages the central nervous system,” compelling us to speak (49-50).21 Infected with this noisy parasite, the humans in Burroughs’s texts themselves become increasingly parasitic and invasive. Here there are no gentle shepherds; Burroughs’s Ghost of Chance (1991) tallies instead the species extinctions and environmental havoc that humans cause as macro-parasites on “the planet as an organism” (18) until their violent word “virus” finishes “burning itself out” and most of its “Mad” speakers are destroyed (54). Bök asserts that his own transgenic poems “make literal” Burroughs’s equation of word and microbe (“The Xenotext Experiment” 229), and he mirrors Burroughs’s rage at human assaults on biocommunities. The result is that all stages of the Xenotext enact a very Burroughs-like tension between what the human author can do—”the badassness of poetry,” as Bök puts it in Species of Spaces—and the prospect of the loss of all human language, part of humans’ self-erasure as we poison the landscapes around us.22

    It is the formal prowess of Bök’s poetry that readers notice first. Bök’s goal of producing “a machine for writing a poem in response” (Species of Spaces) echoes Burroughs’s vision of a “writing / machine,” though Bök works at the level of amino acids rather than with Burroughs’s “[g]reat sheets of magnetized print” (Ticket 62). Burroughs was known for his writing procedures, the use of “cut up[s],” “splices,” and “prerecorded” textual “substitut[ions]” to generate new semantics in passages (Ticket 207, 211, 205), but Bök’s poetic constraints in the Xenotext are far more extreme.23 In the transgenic poem pair, he has written the initial poem using only twenty of the letters in the English alphabet, linking each one of those letters to a specific codon, a “genetic triplet[] made by permuting the four nucleotides in DNA” (“Re: Buffalo Conference and Xenotext”; North of Invention, ch.2). Every codon is “an instruction for creating one of twenty amino acids used to make a sequence of protein” (North of Invention, ch. 2). Once the DNA poem is placed within the bacterium, the “DNA sequence” generates a “codependent” “messenger RNA sequence” for another set “of amino acids” (ch. 2). Each of those amino acids is again linked to one of the twenty letters to spell out the words for a second English poem (ch. 2). “[N]o poet in the history of poetics,” Bök states, “has ever actually imagined creating two texts that mutually encipher each other” in a live host (ch. 2). After many computer trials, he selected these letter matches for the double enciphering out of which he created his lipogrammic DNA and RNA poems:

    alphabet: a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y z

    xenocode: t v u k y s p n o x d r w h i g z l f a c b m j e q(ch. 2)

    Other parts of the project could also be described as studying alien codes; Wershler notes that its ciphering challenges are equaled by the “postgraduate level biology,” software experiments, and financial applications needed for the poet’s collaborations (56-7). For readers seeking guidance with the science, Bök prefaces the two transgenic texts with poems in a print volume, The Xenotext, Book 1 (2015), which both explains and makes art from the relevant biological processes by building “modular acrostic” poems from “atomic models for each of the amino acids” or DNA bases, and providing examples of protein folding by “misread[ing]” letters of a poetry line as protein components (154-6). Still other poems, intended for forthcoming companion volumes, catalogue the properties of the transgenic host, humans’ ecological footprint, and our desire for the feedback of another sentient species.

    Bök is equally imaginative in trying to minimize the negative connotations of Burroughs’s parasite. He rereads Burroughs’s language virus as a source of creativity: “If the poet plays ‘host’ to the ‘germ’ of the word, then the poet may have to invent a more innovative vocabulary to describe this ‘epidemic’ called language” (“The Xenotext Experiment” 231). This reframing of Burroughs’s parasite metaphor is partly indebted to Christopher Dewdney. Dewdney’s “ominous conceit,” as Bök’s essay puts it, of “‘language…as a psychic parasite’” actually softens Burroughs’s parasite image (231). In his essay “Parasite Maintenance,” Dewdney briefly quotes Burroughs and states that “language” may not be “necessarily benevolent” (78-9). Yet Dewdney emphasizes that “living language exists in a symbiosis with the human ‘host’” in ways that can be “mutually beneficial” (79), arguing that poets’ brains have the added advantage of containing “the Parasite,” which he defines as “a special neural system” (75-6), “an internal structure generating novel configurations” in language (78) that expands ideas and senses “beyond” their usual constraints (90-1).24 Bök, in turn, insists that his own “‘xenotext’” is an artistic achievement for humans that remains neutral to its bacterial host: “a beautiful, anomalous poem, whose ‘alien words’ might subsist, like a harmless parasite, inside the cell of another life-form” (“The Xenotext Experiment” 229).

    And yet, for all Bök’s claims of coexistence, the destructive valence of Burroughs’s parasite is hard to forget. In Word Cultures, Robin Lydenberg reminds us that for Burroughs the human “language parasite” (18) is neither beautiful nor “‘harmless’” (122); it is a horrible infestation that the author must “expos[e] and exhaust[],” with all formal innovations geared toward that end (137).25 Language is indeed the parasite that transforms its hosts into parasites: “To name, for Burroughs, is virtually to obliterate humanity and individual will, to reduce the individual to a hungry orifice, an empty sucking hole,” and “[r]epresentation” is “a lethal symbiosis which reduces the world to a ‘copy planet,’ a false and lifeless imitation” (Lydenberg 40). The villains in Burroughs’s 1960s Nova trilogy embed noisily dissonant language texts in human hosts in an attempt to blast the earth. The ecological motifs in Burroughs’s post-1980 texts further contextualize his hatred of language. Ghost of Chance depicts language as a synecdoche for everything dangerous about humans, a facet of the murderous “Ugly Spirit” that haunts Burroughs’s texts (48). “Homo Sap,” he writes, “can make information available through writing or oral tradition to other Sap humans” (48), embodying a language tied to “war, exploitation, and slavery” (49), as well as to the eradication of nonhumans, which he describes at length in atypically poignant images. “Bulldozers are destroying the rain forests, the cowering lemurs and flying foxes, the singing Kloss’s gibbons, which produce the most beautiful and variegated music of any land animal,” he writes, as if to underscore the contrast between the lyricism of the nonhuman and the noisy violence of human “enemies of the planet,” whose “name is legion” (18-19).26 Ghost of Chance‘s narrator employs a longstanding catchphrase of Burroughs’s texts: “one is tempted to say, as Brion Gysin did, ‘Rub out the word‘” (49).

    Like Burroughs, Bök finds little to praise in the few human “artifacts” likely to be noted “after tens of millions of years”: the “mass extinction” of other species, “climate change,” and “nuclear waste” (North of Invention, Q & A). When Bök cites the exigency of saving something more of “our cultural heritage against planetary disasters” (“The Xenotext Experiment” 228), he refers not only to the distant prospect of the sun’s death but to nearer possibilities like “nuclear war” (North of Invention, ch. 3, 2) and crop loss due to the harm done to bees by insecticides (The Xenotext, Book 1 23). It is no surprise that Burroughs’s frightening images of human parasites and parasitic language affect both Bök’s encoded poem pair for the bacterium and the accompanying poems Bök writes about that process, texts that include direct rewrites of Burroughs’s virus remarks (e.g., the anagrammatic rearrangement of “Language is a virus from outer space” into “Language tapers our vicious frames” [Species of Spaces]) and which are marked by their own forms of loss and noise, as well as by a sense of the limits of poetry’s cultural critiques.

    Each of the two current texts Bök intends to be generated by “poet” and “germ” has fourteen lines. These “abbreviated Petrarchan sonnets,” as he describes them (North of Invention, ch. 2), are the ghostly foundation text to his first book on the project, since they have been read at lectures but will be published formally only in a later book. Apart from the sonnet structure, he models their pairing on a Renaissance “pastoral” exchange, though one whose opening topic is romance rather than explicit elegy: Christopher Marlowe’s “The Passionate Shepherd to His Love” and Walter Ralegh’s “The Nymph’s Reply to the Shepherd” (ch. 2). As Bök’s use of “abbreviated” suggests, there is metrical and linguistic loss in his elliptical sonnets. The difficulties of double-coding foreclose a sonnet’s iambic pentameter or consistent rhyme, limiting each line to two to four words, and precluding as well the range of wordplay in the Marlowe-Ralegh tetrameter quatrains. Here, too, as in Kac’s Genesis, the poetry is visually reduced to a color marker, this time “cell[s]” that “glow red in the dark” to show the bacterium’s response protein (ch. 2). The fact that Bök’s microbe produces only the match words prompted by the poet’s DNA coding also structurally foregrounds a sense of absence in the response mechanism.

    These absences are thematically echoed as the Xenotext poems, like Genesis, ponder the potential losses incurred by their technical achievement, moving from lyric appeal to elegiac lament for both human artists and manipulated organisms. Where the poet’s sonnet is a “masculine assertion about the aesthetic creation of life,” Bök explains, the bacterium’s sonnet is “a feminine refutation about the woebegone absence of life” (ch. 2). The gender clichés recall the way Mary Shelley’s male scientist violates the feminized “nature” he had “pursued…to her hiding-places” in order to make a new creature (54), with Bök now grafting Dr. Frankenstein onto Marlowe’s shepherd, who reduced nature’s bounty to adornments to seduce a lover.27 Both nature and the human are diminished in the process, Bök suggests, as he cuts down the poet-shepherd-reshaper to a puerile “herdboy,” addressing the bacterium as a lost Nabokovian “nymphet” (North of Invention, ch. 2). At best, the poet is still “‘Orpheus’” to the bacterium’s “‘Eurydice,’” whom he loses, presumably, by his need to scrutinize her too “insistent[ly]” (The Xenotext, Book 1 150, 67). The vision of losing or diminishing other organisms, and of our inability to avoid the noise of cultural stereotypes, reminds us to proceed with caution in developing this new poetic form, and is perhaps another reason that Bök selects such an imperishable host.

    Poet (DNA encoded text)
    any style of life
    is prim
    
    oh stay
    my lyre
    
    with wily ploys
    moan the riff
    
    the riff
    of any tune aloud
    
    moan now my fate
    
    in fate
    we rely
    
    my my
    thnow is the word
    
    the word of life
    
    Germ (RNA encoded text)
    the faery is rosy
    of glow
    
    in fate
    we rely
    
    moan more grief
    with any loss
    
    any loss
    is the achy trick
    
    with him we stay
    
    oh stay
    my lyre
    
    we wean
    him of any milk
    
    any milk is rosy
    (North of Invention, ch. 2. Transgenic poems reprinted by permission of Christian Bök.)

    The language of the poet’s sonnet is indeed self-important and insistent. Despite its reference to “moan[ing],” the octave celebrates human ingenuity as an art of “wily ploys” with an individualized “riff.” The “stay” in lines 3-4, “oh stay / my lyre,” is ambiguous, a call for either lyric persistence or for silence, though the former seems better suited to the delight of making “any tune aloud” invoked in line 8. Where the first line, “any style of life,” evokes the possibility of different living media and lifestyles, the phrase “is prim” in the second line suggests a desire for decorous form. The piece suggests that it is the poet’s form that wins. The sonnet is possessive about “my lyre,” emphasizing the personal form of composition, and the concern with “my fate” in the sestet precedes and overshadows the collective resignation of “in fate / we rely” in lines 10-11. “[M]y myth,” dramatically isolated in the twelfth line, “now is the word” in the next line; that “word,” moreover, concludes the poem as “the” singular “word of life.” This language of dominion recalls Adrienne Rich’s “book of myths / in which / our names”—the names of feminized others or outsiders—”do not appear” (164).

    Both the context and themes of the bacterium’s poem deflate the first sonnet’s masculinist bravado.28 Ralegh’s nymph had already challenged the pastoral notion of a sheltering or humanized nature and indicted poetic “wil[es],” as the DNA text might put it, reminding the shepherd that words can deceive (“If all the world and love were young, / And truth in every shepherd’s tongue” [105]) and that living forms die (“Soon break, soon wither, soon forgotten” [106]), the very antithesis of the lasting text Bök wishes to achieve. The first lines of Bök’s bacterial poem undercut the new shepherd further; the reference to “faery” tales in “the faery is rosy / of glow” acknowledges, but may also critique, the poet’s fanciful creations. The Petrarchan cliché of “rosy” beauty gets reworked as an allusion to the experiment’s intended red hue, but neither human interposition nor nature is necessarily “benign” here (“The Xenotext Experiment” 229). Bök states in his essay that his “‘word-germ’ has only the most miniscule [sic], most negligible, chance whatsoever of producing any dangerous contagion” (231), at the same time the word “rosy” in the bacterium’s poem hints, like ambient noise, at “Ring around the rosy,” the children’s lyric purportedly based on our historical encounter with the bacterium Y. pestis, the cause of the Black Death.29

    “[M]ilk” itself becomes “rosy” in the last line of the bacterium’s poem, as if mingled with blood, creating visions of wounding and nursing in the same image. This poem does “moan more grief,” as the fifth line suggests, focusing on absence and lack at the communal level. There is no personal “my fate” here, only a repetition of the lack of control in “in fate / we rely,” which comes well before the image of “my lyre” in the eleventh line. Artifice is something that costs the artist, becoming an “achy trick” attached to “any loss.” The antecedent for “him” in “with him we stay” in the ninth line is not specified. If it refers to the masculine scientist-poet, does “stay”—followed by a second repeated stanza from the poet’s sonnet—underscore that the bacterium’s “lyre” really belongs to the poet? Or is there some counter-creation in which the bacterium usurps his lyre? Whomever “h[e]” refers to in the bacterium’s poem, he moves from possible lover to child in the three closing lines, where “any milk is rosy,” but “we wean / him of any milk.” Serres asks whether the baby “whom the mother carried, who sucked at her breast” should be considered “a parasite” (78); questions about children who can no longer be nursed, or children who turn against their nurturers, grow more vexed in the Xenotext project as Bök addresses human incursions on the planet.

    Where Kac’s Genesis raises implicit questions about what the nonhuman poetic host signifies, Bök directly uses the physiology of his transgenic texts’ intended host to interrogate human incursions. “The Extremophile,” a companion prose poem intended for a later Xenotext volume, shows D. radiodurans or other extremophiles flourishing not only in the harshest natural environments on “Earth” or in “outer space” (20)—no seductive pastoral charms here—but also in the worst human-polluted landscapes. A sample extremophile in his composite portrait “feeds on concrete,” and Bök’s catalogue of opportunistic organisms expands rapidly, like an avalanche of noisy interpolations of the transgenic poems’ ellipses: “It breeds, unseen, inside canisters of hairspray” (“The Extremophile” 17); “It feeds on polyethylene”; “It thrives in the acidic runoff from heavy-metal mines, depleted of their zinc”; “It eats jet fuel” (18); “It feeds on nylon byproducts”; and “It dwells in a tide pool of battery acid” (19). The organisms’ feedings increase with seeming relish as we move from “byproducts” to more dramatic industrial accidents: “It gorges on plumes of petroleum, venting from the wellhead of the Deepwater Horizon” (19), “It resides inside the core of Reactor No. 4 at Chernobyl” (20), and “It is ideally adapted to eat hot graphite in the ruins of Unit 2 at Three Mile Island” (21).

    Here our pollutants create an alien, synthetic ecology—”acidic runoff” and “tide pool of battery acid” amid “the ruins of” our culture—where extremophiles might “thrive[],” adding entry after entry to the list poem, precisely because they are “totally inhuman” (23). These images go further than Burroughs; they recall Philip K. Dick in “Planet for Transients,” a short story in which the last fully human survivors of a nuclear war realize that they have reshaped the earth into an irradiated “jungle” of evolved creatures, “‘Countless forms adapted to this Earth—this hot Earth,’” whose atmosphere and nutrients are now poison to the prior inhabitants (338).30 This is “wean[ing]” with a vengeance, or with poetic justice. Here there is no coy courtship, sentimental maternity, or vision of transgenic dialogue; an extremophile, as Bök states bluntly in his poem, “does not love you. It does not need you. It does not even know that you exist” (“The Extremophile” 23).

    “The Extremophile” gives a far from “rosy” picture of that human lifestyle even within the human community. Its pictures of eco-destruction also read like a manifest of war crimes and atrocities from the twentieth century and beyond. One extremophile “thrives in the topsoil of battlefields contaminated with toxic doses of lead” (20), and others remain alive in “the firebombing of Dresden” (17), “the conflagration during the collapse of the World Trade Center” (21), “the incineration of Hiroshima” (22), “the crucibles of Treblinka” (21), and “the tornados of hellfire, raging, unchecked, in the oil fields of Kuwait during the Persian Gulf War” (19). For the Xenotext‘s Orpheus, hell is always ignited by humans as we parasite one another. It is hard to read the thundering rhythms of the lists in “The Extremophile” without beginning to root for a nonhuman successor. Perhaps our previous poems, Bök suggests, chose the wrong species to commemorate.

    Such deep ambivalence about poetry’s place and perdurability against this catalogue of wrongdoing continues throughout the text. Bök closes the poem with a statement that seems to inspire human creativity: the extremophile “awaits your experiments” in science or poetics (23). He has argued that the text can be read as an “allegory” for the power “of poetry,” a craft that might survive our destructiveness (Species of Spaces). At the same time, however, the acts of censorship the poem mentions (“the furnaces reserved for The Satanic Verses after the fatwa issued by the Ayatollah of Iran” [20] or “the Nazi bonfires at the Opernplatz in Berlin” [18]) suggest that we have already begun a nightmarish purging of our language and creativity, an appalling parody of Burroughs’s “‘Rub out the word’” (Ghost of Chance 49) or Serres’s image of a text “burnt” to confound the “parasite” (253). “What poetry can we imagine,” Bök asks in “The Perfect Malware,” another poem from an upcoming Xenotext print book, “when poetry itself has gone extinct” and we are left with only noise and ash, “the soot of our burnt books,” to scan (8)?

    Neither Burroughs nor Bök ever fully abandons the word germ in his own texts, a fact that Bök reflects in the sardonic title of “The Perfect Malware,” a piece he describes, only half-jokingly, as the “best poem I’ve ever written in the course of my entire career” (Species of Spaces). Wikipedia defines “malware,” or “malicious software,” as made “to disrupt computer operations, gather sensitive information,” or “gain access to private computer systems” (“Malware,” par. 1). Here poetry becomes deliberately subversive noise, an interruption that might bring down a system entirely—but what is being subverted or rewritten? At times the “it” of the lists in “The Perfect Malware” does seem close to Burroughs’s malevolent language germ, “infecting us, like a virus” (13) and spreading our violence across the ecosystem: “It sings an orison to itself in Hell, calling all thinking machines to embrace its madness. It teaches us to kill…. It is a tombstone for our sentience” (9). But other lines plead for new poetic markers, perhaps in reference to the transgenic poems or to the self-interrogations of this print poem with its repeated queries of “Who am I?” (15), to challenge such a fixed course: “Must we bequeath to the darkness all the bright tokens of what we know?” (11). The “malware” of the poem’s penultimate line (15) is not quite the pernicious language virus that identifies and consumes, nor the vision of language fading “into thin air” at the end of Burroughs’s The Ticket That Exploded (217). If Bök echoes Burroughs’s “silence / to say / good bye” (Ticket 183), it is to give “The Perfect Malware” something more tentatively open, “like the voice of a child, saying goodbye in the dark,” longing for a response, though unsure of whether it will come in the hoped-for form of human acts to stop the loss of species he describes—”the fey imp in all living things” about “to be destroyed”—or only in the form of alien signs after the planet’s “swelling fireball” (14-5). The child’s voice recalls the child abruptly being weaned in the Xenotext RNA poem, and might be an apt figure for the early stages of transgenic poetry itself.

    Bök’s Xenotext, even more markedly than Kac’s Genesis, offers cross sections of a transgenic poetry form in transition, aware of its noise and fallacies. This new poetry chafes against generic and genetic limits (“We were never intended to be tied to whatever made us” [The Xenotext, Book 1 146]) that it is sometimes forced to acknowledge. Kac’s biopoetry battles against the restrictions of human language through projects that are still quintessentially human intellectual experiments, including his theorization of a poetics of noise and genetic mutation. For Bök, the final problem with the transgenic poem may not be its manipulation of nature but its limits as an elegiac vessel. This is not only because his full text currently cannot be read in D. radiodurans. Bök describes his transgenic poems’ “character” in curiously anti-monumental terms, as “very fragile” and different from his usual style (“Teaching myself molecular biochemistry”). His supplementary print poems have to step in to document ecological losses—”the omnicide of the world” and “our own extinction” (The Xenotext, Book 1 17, 74)—in powerfully eloquent sequences too lengthy to be encoded for a DNA-RNA pair structure or perhaps to be encoded reliably at all across generations of a life form. Nor is Bök certain about the existence of alien readers to translate our transgenic messages. “The Perfect Malware” might be addressing those elusive or illusive readers: “I know that nowhere, among these glowing nebulae, do any of you exist” (15). Orpheus’s fierce love letter is written not only to the nature we are destroying but to human poetry itself, giving a passionate look backward at all the older forms whose language games might still be lost as noise after the deaths of their authors and readers. In this fashion, The Xenotext, Book 1 elegizes, in addition to the classical “pastoral,” the “[v]irelay,” the “nocturne,” the Shakespearean and “alexandrine sonnet,” the “acrostic,” the “catalogue” poem (151-6), and concretist-influenced visual typography, as well as Bök’s work in earlier texts like Crystallography (1994, 2003), which also features chemical compound-based generative devices. The noise and toxins of the present actively destabilize the poetic past in “Colony Collapse Disorder,” a “feast” of translation/misreading where Bök gradually “‘transmut[es]’” the verbal nuances of a book of Virgil’s Georgics into a dirge for the “impoverishments” of beehives caused by the latest human “pesticide[s]” (46, 60, 23).

    What is poetry’s role in this “impoverish[ed]” climate? For all their differences, the Xenotext and Kac’s Genesis ask similar questions: is the poet’s job only to mourn or critique in reflecting on the technological state of the art? Can transgenic poetry make any interventions in bioethics or any difference to its readers? Kac sees transgenic poems and other aesthetic gene experiments, despite their noise, as still offering the chance for “healthy” and “beautiful chimeras and fantastic new living systems,” though he insists that unless they are “loved and nurtured,” especially with multicellular hosts, any hope of the poetry’s “Ethical” component will fail (Telepresence 243). Bök wants to believe that poetry’s critiques might offer something “curative” (Species of Spaces), a call to rethink “our only legacy to the future” (North of Invention, Q &A), but he remains more skeptical of our caretaking potential. Despite Bök’s genetic experiments, the speaker in The Xenotext, Book 1 still worries that violence is unchangeably “embedded in our genomes” (19), and that the most vivid elegy for our future losses, or those of the earth, may not stop them from happening. In the Xenotext‘s love poetry, our affections are always insufficient. Bök’s “Virgil greets us at the Gates of Death to tell us that we love our lovers, but never enough to bring them back from Hell,” and that “we have damned our children to leave the fallout shelter” (74). While he insists on the need to keep experimenting with new poetic forms to protest that outcome (“And yet, I must let loose, upon the world, my perfect malware”), the poems also leave open the possibility that transgenic poetry and its print counterparts may simply become a better way of detailing our spoliations, “our excursion from the ovum to the void” (“The Perfect Malware” 15, 11). Instead of Marlowe’s shepherd’s call to “Come live with me and be my love” in a halcyon poetic fabrication of nature (185), Bök offers the reader a starker invitation in bleaker landscapes, quietly dropping the promise of shared “love and life”: “Come with me, and let me show you how to break my heart” (The Xenotext, Book 1 151, 19).

    Notes

    1. Davis describes Max Delbrück’s original puzzle, “a DNA model constructed of 174 toothpicks in four different colors,” in “linguistic” terms, speculating that “scientists” had “waxed just a little bit poetic” when they thought the arbitrary link between signifier and referent mirrored the link between “triplet codon” and “amino acid” (259). For other transgenic texts, see Kac’s Move 36 (2004), which codes the Descartes quotation “‘Cogito ergo sum’” as a “‘Cartesian gene’” introduced into a plant, alongside a gene to make the foliage curve (Kac, “Life Transformation” 177), and Cypher (2009), “a DIY transgenic kit” housing artificially engineered DNA that translates a brief science fiction-themed “poem,”

    “ATAGGEDCATWILLATTACKGATTACA.” The audience can “transform[] E. coli” by adding the poem-DNA (Cypher). Bök describes the “Synthia” bacterium, which Craig Venter implanted with DNA “that enciphered a quote from [James Joyce’s] A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man: ‘To live, to err, to fall, to triumph, to recreate life out of life’” (North of Invention, ch. 1), and notes current and future DNA text projects in plants in The Xenotext, Book 1 (113, 115).

    2. Such tropes, Roof notes, historically have been used to foster the illusion of “a hyperbolic sense of agency and control” and to justify biased “pseudoscience” about “race, gender, and sexual orientation” (3, 13). Megan Fernandes references Roof’s speculation on biopolitics and poetics in an essay that mentions Kac’s Genesis, though she deals more deeply with poetry that uses transgenics at a thematic level, rather than a formal one.

    3. While Genesis seems to allow a nonhuman organism to effect incalculable changes in the bible quotation (Telepresence 252), scholars debate whether the artist does, in fact, truly cede “dominion” in this text. The fact that the “unpredictable” microbes “continue to mutate even when the UV light does not shine,” Hayles states, undermines “human agency” to an extent, although she questions whether the “‘artist’s gene’” implantation ultimately upholds that agency, and whether Genesis “critique[s]” or “reinscribe[s]” the idea “that flesh can be reduced to data” (“Who Is in Control Here?” 86, 83-84). On the issue of control and its ethics in Kac’s bio art, see also Steve Baker, Dominique Moulon (“Fifty Questions”), Mathieu Noury, Matthew Causey, Gunalan Nadarajan, Steve Tomasula (“Gene(sis)”), Fernandes, Yunjin La-mei Woo, and Carol Becker, who also queries whether the debate over dominion Kac provokes will alter our ecopractices (43).

    4. “For subsequent versions,” Kac adds, “I created exclusively green fluorescent bacteria” (Telepresence 262).

    5. Following Kac, Hugues Marchal finds Genesis poetic for its “creation” of new forms with and outside of the “‘verbal,’” as well as its “critical stance” toward scientific praxis (76), while Tomasula compares Genesis‘s processes to OuLiPo poetic generative devices (“Gene(sis)” 255). Claus Clüver sees Kac’s definitions of both media poetry and biopoetry encouraging texts that “approach[] illegibility” (179), yet he still suggests that Genesis is a poem only because of the use of the bible sentence (184), even as he asks whether the E. coli should be considered “transmitters of signs” or “the sign” itself (181). He does note that other Kac biopoetry plans involving “‘language’” in “non-human” species go “beyond” the genre challenges of prior poetic innovations such as Dada texts (184).

    6. Kac insists on the “direct relationship between my books and my artworks” (“Fifty Questions” 78). Since bio installations depend so much on authorial comments to explain their methods to an audience, Jens Hauser argues, their “Paratexts” might be considered examples of needed textual “Parasitism or Biocenosis” of linked organisms (93-4). Noury details Kac’s use of “communication” and “dialogical interaction” in these paratexts (see Kac, Telepresence 218; Noury 132-3), discussing Genesis‘s commercial lab work, Internet use, the relation between the artist’s gene and the information in the rest of the organism, and the Petri culture plasmid exchanges between bacteria with the Genesis gene and the ones lacking it (Noury 131-8), as well as Kac’s analysis of “Telecommunications” and Baudrillard’s “‘hyperreal’” (Kac, Telepresence 141; Noury 142-3). Noury mentions noise in the context of self-organization and second-order cybernetics (149), but looks more at how Kac anticipates the posthuman and transhuman (179) than at Kac’s creation of purposely flawed or nontransparent transmissions.

    7. David Hunt, though he focuses less on details of Genesis‘s language, also finds Kac keenly “suspicious of metaphors” such as “[t]he genome as a book,” especially “reduce[d]” to a seemingly closed print volume (par. 1-2). He praises Genesis‘s “open-ended,” “hypertext”-style “process” (par. 3-4) involving “multiple perspectives through multiple languages,” taking fluctuating, “provisional forms,” and arriving at a “state of perpetual ‘unfinish’” that disrupts the “heavy totalitarian cadences” present in “language as a tool of ideology” (par. 6-8).

    8. Clüver argues that the very abundance of Genesis‘s visual and sound “multimedia” and “intermedia” forums reminds us that we cannot see the bacterial text without “translation,” and that, if we lack the scientific background, we may not know how to interpret what we do see (181-3). Cary Wolfe notes W.J.T. Mitchell’s claim that Kac’s bio texts foreground “‘the invisibility of the genetic revolution,’” but asserts that “Kac’s work also exploits” deliberately “our lust for the visual” to show the limits of “human (and humanist) visuality” (What Is Posthumanism? 162-4).

    9. As Serres scholars point out, “parasite” in French can also denote “static or interference” (Wolfe, “Bring the Noise” xiii). See, too, Wolfe on Serres’s premise that “‘Nonfunctioning remains essential for functioning’” and its effect on his theory of interdisciplinary “‘translation’” and his call to “‘rewrite a system’” based on “‘differences, noise, and disorder,’” so that, as Wolfe notes, “noise is productive and creative” (xiii-xiv). Dworkin’s analysis of noise’s “necessary” role in Serres’s communication theory reminds us, conversely, that the noisiest composition “cannot ever completely escape from the republic of signification” (46-8).

    10. In his introduction to the first edition of Media Poetry, Kac cites “the formal conquests of” Language poetry and related vanguard texts, while still emphasizing the need to leave behind paper-based page art (11).

    11. Darren Wershler’s article on The Xenotext Experiment as a “boundary object[]” in “media art” and “communication studies” (43-4) suggests the need for reading noise in transgenic poems; without citing Serres directly, he mentions the noncommunicative aspects of language (“language is inherently excessive and routinely frustrates any attempts to fix meaning” [58]) when transgenic authors transform “what it means to write poetry” (46). In an effort to show the innovations of Bök’s Xenotext, however, Wershler deemphasizes the noise of Kac’s Genesis, reading it more “as a storage container for pre-existing texts,” and notes Bök’s critique of Genesis as insufficiently transformative of the host (48-9).

    12. Robert Mitchell sees this expansiveness as part of the bio art genre: “though one initially encounters most vitalist bioartworks as though they were discrete and concrete objects with clear borders, many of these same works are designed to produce a subsequent confusion about the precise borders of the work of art and to encourage a sense that both the origin and future of the work of art remain indeterminate and open” (85).

    13. Tomasula also discusses textual “inconsistencies” and “contradictory stories” in the vocal and early written stages of the bible’s Genesis as a “myth” that stayed “open,” “turning into new versions of itself,” a format Kac mirrors, he argues, in letting present-day viewers affect the Genesis sentence (“Gene(sis)” 252-3). Wolfe notes Kac’s subversion of the idea of an “authoritative,” direct “‘voice of God’” by stressing the King James Bible as “‘a translation of many translations’” and observes more generally “the disjunction of meaning” from “language” produced by Genesis‘s switches in “texts/codes” that challenge “the dream of translation” as “complete transparency between one language and another” and the implied “‘dominion’” within “that notion of language”—another argument for focusing on textual noise, though he does not read specific letter changes in the Genesis sentence beyond their “nonsensical” status (244-7). Rebecca Sanchez notes the “embodied” “semantic slippage” of controlling “‘man’” and “movement” in the first Genesis show sentence (150); Kac briefly ponders “the noise” of the “EON”/”AAN” changes in terms of “‘time’” or gender (“Genesis: A Transgenic Artwork” 19); and Anna Gibbs, in an overview of book format “translation[s],” notes Genesis‘s broad focus on “instability and unreliability,” qualities that she sees the Xenotext trying to oppose. In contrast, see Rosemary Lee on Bök’s Xenotext and Kac’s “Biopoetry,” both read under an epigraph of Burroughs’s virus remark. Even if certain Kac experiments “mutate” or are “closed to human reception,” Lee argues, Kac and Bök, as “cross-disciplinary” poets of the “non-human,” still try “to faithfully translate information from one system of coding into another” (1, 3, 6).

    14. Kac’s website essay on Genesis states that its nonpathogenic E. coli type, “JM101,” is “safe to use in public and [is] displayed in the gallery with the UV source in a protective transparent enclosure” (par. 3). Bök’s vessel, D. radiodurans, is also a “nonpathogen[]” (Saier 1129).

    15. Robert Majzels asserts via linguistic metaphor that a transgenic artist “interrupts the [organism]’s speech” (par. 10). Clüver cites Kac’s sense of the bacterium’s “‘internal interests as a living creature’” in Genesis (182) and Hayles mentions the “irresistible mandates” of its “biological processes,” as well as the bio research history of another organism in Kac’s The Eighth Day (“Who Is in Control Here?” 84, 80)—though not in the context of noise. Adam Dickinson argues that the mutations effected by the radiation in Genesis should be seen as “damaging the organism” (141), though he praises Bök’s The Xenotext Experiment as “nonviolent” (145).

    16. Tomasula agrees with Kac that Genesis makes us weigh the “consequences not always foreseen, nor benign” of “interfering with evolution” or of our environmental pollution (“Gene(sis)” 255).

    17. Hayles sees “‘collaboration’” as potentially too anthropomorphic for Genesis as well, because the microorganisms “did not agree to the arrangement,” and she finds the “conversations” in Kac’s other bio art largely “symbolic,” emphasizing differences “between human and nonhuman” perception (“Who Is in Control Here?” 84-5). To depict the relations among “a plant,” “a bird,” and “humans” in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1994), Kac paraphrases Humberto Maturana’s idea of “consensual domains: shared spheres of perception, cognition and agency in which two or more sentient beings (human or otherwise) can negotiate their experience dialogically” (“Trans-Genesis”), though Maturana seems to have adapted the term “consensual” from a human context, describing “a domain of coordinated behavior…that is indistinguishable from a domain of consensus established between human beings” (“Cognition” 42-3). The Xenotext Experiment provokes similar questions about how to describe the bacterium’s role. Wershler refers to it as both “collaborator” and “co-author” (50), while Dickinson calls it “colleague” and “symbiont,” stating that the Xenotext exemplifies, in Don McKay’s terms, “‘an address to the other with an acknowledgement of our human-centredness built in, a salutary and humbling reminder’” (145). Nikki Skillman argues, in contrast, that the bacterial poem is only “ventriloquism” (262).

    18. For a discussion of scientific conjectures that aliens could have tried this previously with genetic data in viruses, see Bök (“The Xenotext Experiment” 228 and North of Invention, ch. 1) as well as Wershler (47-8). “Who is this message for?” Wershler asks of the Xenotext; “Will they ever find it? Does it matter?” (58). “[I]f a poem is written in the vacuum of space and there’s no human there to read it,” Tomasula adds, “is it still a poem?” (“Introduction” 3). Kenneth Goldsmith describes the transgenic poetry as “the most unreadable text of all,” given its microscopic size and “alien” audience (170). Majzels wonders whether the bacteria, “these tiny organisms are in fact the aliens, the xenos who have always been here reciting long strings of generative poems to each other while humans are busy murdering each other?” (par. 10).

    19. Bök writes in June 2014, “I have performed assays on the extremophile, and I have managed to integrate the gene into the chromosome; the organism fluoresces in response, as expected, but it keeps destroying the resulting protein, before the entire mass of the molecule can be detected, meaning that we cannot read the poem before it is metabolized. I have to figure out how to make the poem more stable in this environment. I have managed to get the construct to work definitively in E. coli—but I have promised to get the poem to function in the unkillable bacterium” (“Re: Xenotext”).

    20. Iain Twiddy discusses the “artificial” quality of nature portrayals in pastoral elegies and the adaptation of this quality in modern poems about human ecological impact, whether the focus is on a person or whether an “aspect of nature is itself the subject being mourned” (3-5).

    21. Robin Lydenberg finds strong similarities between the parasite philosophies of Burroughs and Serres, namely the concept of “the parasite” as “‘always already’” found in “language” and society, the undercutting of the “parasite/host” division, the drive “to exorcize the parasite” from “body and writing,” and the belief that “the parasite is the archetype of all relations of power; but it is also the agent of change which disrupts those relations” (127, 130). David Ingram briefly mentions Serres’s theory of “‘one-way relations’” to explain Burroughs’s vision of “media control” and evokes Serresian “noise” to describe Burroughs’s “cut-ups” that can “both subvert and renew that system” (101, 110). Arndt Niebisch also cites Serres’s idea of “feedback as a parasitical structure” (par. 2) to read Burroughs’s “cut-ups” and “recordings” (par. 9).

    22. Douglas Luman notes initially the “hopeless” tenor of the Xenotext‘s “pastoral” transgenic poems that will survive “our own fragility” and “likely disappearance,” yet that cannot reverse that absence or the other “extinction[s]” we have caused (par. 7, 9, 6, 4). He briefly links this eco-“damage” to “systems of action brought into being by our own will in language,” but he sees The Xenotext, Book 1‘s “elegiac” tone, in its last text, as “reassuring” us about poetry’s afterlife with “a new way into creation” (par. 4, 8, 11). I argue that as a group Bök’s Xenotext poems are more qualified about the survival and memorializing effect of poetry. See, too, Eleanor Gold on the book’s imagery of “apocalyptic destruction” for “the Anthropocene” (par. 3), Michael Leong on the text’s multiple “translation[s]” of environmental “Apocalypse” (248-9), and Frank Davey on “Recovery and loss” in a text “doubtful of its political usefulness” (par. 4, 1).

    23. Bök scholarship focuses intensively on the poet’s generative devices. See Brian Kim Stefans’s essays, Perloff (“The Oulipo Factor”), Jean-Philippe Marcoux’s Eunoia articles, and texts by Jerome McGann, Robert David Stacey, Brent Wood, Gibbs, and Sean Braune (“Enantiomorphosis” and “The Meaning Revealed”). Stephen Voyce’s interview with Bök covers numerous stated and unstated guidelines in the poet’s texts, with an extended section on the titular project. See, too, Braune on the attempt to create a Burroughsian “living clinamen” in the Xenotext (“From Lucretian Atomic Theory” 177-8). Wershler describes in detail the codes, computer resources, and models Bök used in The Xenotext Experiment (49-54).

    24. Bök explains that Dewdney’s “Parasite” is a helpful entity combatting another symbiont, “the Governor,” “that regulates” words and ideas: “The Governor unveils the power of language over us; the Parasite reveals the power of language in us” (‘Pataphysics 95, 116).

    25. For Burroughs’s efforts to thwart the language virus, see Priscilla Wald on “his ‘cut-up[s]’” as self-“‘inoculation’” against the otherwise unseen parasite (185-6). Lydenberg traces Burroughs’s stylistic “violence” from his “metonymic” play and “holes” in passages in Naked Lunch (43) to his print intercuts, “experiments with tape recorders and film” (44), “found texts” (105), “fold-in[s]” (43), “simultaneous multiple texts” (45), and, ultimately, his call for “silence” (114). See, too, Ihab Hassan on Burroughs’s “montage,” Dada poetics, and “splice[s]” (9) in “a deposition against the human race” (4) as “‘Virus’” (13), using “desiccated, automatic” phrasing whose “final aim is self-abolition” (8). Timothy Murphy discusses Burroughs’s “elegiac” “(anti-) narrative” in the “‘silence to say goodbye’” (136-7), while Ingram studies the influence of Alfred Korzybski’s semantic theory on Burroughs’s techniques such as “non-linear” glyphs to fight ingrained “verbal controls” (95, 98). Hayles, in How We Became Posthuman, analyzes Burroughs’s use of tape recordings both compositionally and in his descriptions of “‘writing machine[s],’” his fear that his own virus-“destabiliz[ing]” texts might “become infectious in turn,” and his interest in “noise” as well as “silence” (214-6, 219). Todd Tietchen reads the “cut-ups” as “disrupting the signifying chains of ideological language” toward “a liberating silence” (120) in an example of Mark Dery’s definition of “‘Culture Jamming,’” where artists “‘introduce noise into the system as it passes from transmitter to receiver’” (114).

    26. See, too, Chad Weidner on Ghost of Chance‘s images of “‘deforestation, pandemic pollution,’” and “entire species” wiped out by humans (“‘The Great God Pan’” 200-01); on the book as an “Ecological Elegy” (195), “an obituary” for “the earth” (204); and on the book’s “softer,” “more accessible” language (197). See also Weidner’s extended discussion of the book’s indictment of “‘The Ugly Spirit…in Homo Sap, the Ugly Animal’” (The Green Ghost 136-57). Barry Miles also observes the environmentalism of Burroughs’s final texts, quoting the excerpt from Ghost of Chance about “‘the planet as an organism’” being “destroyed by humanity” (253-4), and states that Captain Mission’s interaction with lemurs features “some of Burroughs’s most tender and exquisite writing” (244).

    27. Oana Avasilichioaei juxtaposes similar quotations about “nature”‘s “hiding-places” from Frankenstein with Bök’s descriptions of the Xenotext.

    28. Tony Hill concurs that the RNA poem counters the “machissimo” in the poet’s sonnet (par. 5), Wershler finds the poet’s text/implantation “hubristic” (51), and Alexander Kim also notes “the hubris of the poet’s project” in “Orpheus,” “while Eurydice responds to its arrogance” (par. 10). Gregory Betts sees a “Promethean” pride in the Xenotext‘s bid for poetic “immortality” (50-1). Skillman, discussing the “elegiac” quality of the poem pair, notes “the expressive, improvised ‘riff’ of artistic will” and “ambitious” “boasts” of the first sonnet and the response’s “apocalyptic, melancholy” sense “of human loss” (265-6), though with generally different interpretations than mine of the lines’ wordplay. Dan Disney looks briefly at “homophonic” play in the pair that “proclaims our imminent/immanent absence” (411, 408).

    29. Iona and Peter Opie recognize the widespread, though probably mistaken, idea of the song’s plague roots (221-3). A.M. Juster, perhaps overcautiously, questions the “‘benign’” status of even E. coli experiments.

    30. Wershler also cites Dick as a potential influence on the Xenotext, though he references a different story and premise (58).

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