Category: Volume 30 – Number 1 – September 2019

  • Notes on Contributors

    Kevin Cooley is a PhD Candidate in the English Department at the University of Florida, where he works with animation, visual culture, and queer media. He is managing editor of ImageTexT: Interdisciplinary Comics Studies, guest editor for Synoptique‘s special issue “Animating LGBTQ+ Representations,” and the 2020 recipient of the Lucy Shelton Caswell Award from the Billy Ireland Cartoon Library at Ohio State University. His work has appeared in Modernism/modernity, Animation, Horror Studies, and elsewhere.

    Walter Johnston teaches in English and Comparative Literature at Williams College. His recent publications include “Land and See: the Theatricality of the Political in Schmitt and Melville,” in Handsomely Done: Aesthetics, Politics, and Media after Melville (Northwestern UP, 2019), and “Critique of Populist Reason,” Diacritics Vol. 45, No. 3, 2017. He is completing a monograph entitled Political Romanticism Now: the Power of Judgment in Times of Dissent, which traces the anarchic horizontalism, open-endedness, and ephemerality of contemporary protest culture back to the tradition of “political romanticism.”

    Nathaniel Likert is a PhD candidate in English at Cornell University, specializing in early modern literature, the history of science, and the philosophy of mind. His essay on Margaret Cavendish is forthcoming in ELH.

    Margherita Long teaches Japanese literature and environmental humanities in the Department of East Asian Studies at UC Irvine. Her first book was a study of Tanizaki Jun’ichiro (1886-1965) called This Perversion Called Love: Reading Tanizaki, Feminist Theory and Freud (Stanford 2009). Her current project is a study of literature, activist narratives, and documentary cinema, Care, Affect, Crackup: Literature and Activism after Fukushima. The book discusses novelists Kimura Yūsuke, Kobayashi Erika, Ōe Kenzaburō, Tsushima Yūko, Yū Miri and Kawakami Hiromi, activists Mutō Ruiko, Sasaki Keiko and Sato Sachiko, and filmmakers Kamanaka Hitomi, Doi Toshikuni and Iwasaki Masanori.

    Chris Malcolm received his Ph.D. in Comparative Literature from UC Irvine in 2017. He is Assistant Professor of Environmental Humanities and Coordinator of the Minor in Sustainable Ecosystems: Art & Design at Maine College of Art. His book project, Ecological Concessions: Environmental Damage and the Management of Harm, focuses critically on moments when environmental discourse seems preoccupied with conceding, admitting, confessing, and apologizing for its involvement in causing harm.

    Joanne Randa Nucho, an anthropologist and filmmaker, is the author of Everyday Sectarianism in Urban Lebanon: Infrastructures, Public Services, and Power (Princeton University Press 2016) and Assistant Professor of Anthropology at Pomona College. Her films have been screened in various venues, including the London International Documentary Film Festival.

    Mark Steven is the author of Red Modernism (Johns Hopkins) and Splatter Capital (Repeater). He teaches literature at the University of Exeter.

  • Earth on the Frontier: the Environment as Consistent Relation

    Chris Malcolm (bio)

    A review of Neyrat, Frédéric. The Unconstructable Earth: An Ecology of Separation. Translated by Drew S. Burk, Fordham UP, 2019.

    Frédéric Neyrat’s The Unconstructable Earth: An Ecology of Separation is a wide-ranging study of what Neyrat calls “geo-constructivism” (the French subtitle is Critique du Geoconstructivisme): his term for the scientific, economic, and philosophical assumptions that underlie the contemporary engineering of Earth. Composed of thirteen chapters across three sections, Neyrat argues that there is significant overlap between the responses of engineers, architects, biologists, geographers, anthropologists, philosophers, and ecologists to the climate crisis. What they all share, knowingly or unknowingly, is a commitment to an idea of the Earth as malleable. In the first of the book’s sections, “The Mirror of the Anthropocene,” Neyrat covers the more properly scientific discourse of those who, in response to climate collapse, would terraform the Earth and manage or “steward” (57) its damaged state. In the second section, “The Future of Eco-constructivism,” he focuses on the convergence of a major strand of political ecology with contemporary eco-materialist philosophy. These modern environmental discourses are tied together by a techno-fetishism that projects an absence of limits in order to argue for increased access to the management of the world. The logic is one in which the right to damage the environment and the right to manage the process of damage, legitimate one another. The book’s final section, “An Ecology of Separation,” positions itself against these discourses to argue for a nascent anti-capitalist and anti-colonial separation, one latent to the Earth itself, in which nature can neither be controlled nor dominated. The ambitious scope of the text, its unusual form, and its creative object selection allow one to see how long-held relations with nature reappear in contemporary discourses that continue to disavow their own violent character.

    The notion that the Earth is dying has been a gift to contemporary thinking on the environment. As the climate crisis enters its emergency phase, the contours of what this death might mean for the planet, and—just as crucially—for its killers, is becoming clearer and clearer. The UK-based activist movement, Extinction Rebellion, embodies this idea, voicing sentiments that include: “our governments have failed to protect us,” “we are facing an unprecedented global emergency” (“Climate Emergency”) that is “beyond politics” (“The Truth”), “we need a mass mobilization on the scale of World War II” (“Rebel Starter Pack”). Read alongside The Unconstructable Earth, we can see what the war of the world for the world is already beginning to look like and in whose interests it is being fought. Nourished by the scientifico-cultural Anthropocene thesis, Neyrat writes that the planet’s apparent terminality has allowed for Earth “[to] become the object of a technological colonization project” (8). The geo-constructivist program is, as Neyrat terms it, “anaturalist” (4), figuring “nature as nonexistent” (4) and, therefore, establishing the “condition for the ontological possibility of technologies whose goal is to replace nature” (5). The moment of the Blue Marble (NASA), according to Neyrat, more properly furnished the conditions for the whole Earth to be considered, paradoxically, as the final frontier: a total object unto itself, one that can be repaired, renovated, improved, and, ultimately, reconstructed.

    Like all frontier projects, geo-construction is presented in the rhetoric of development and improvement.1 And, like all frontier projects, what is to be improved is thought of as already dead in principle, so the improver or developer must also be dead. As Neyrat has it, “humanity is [imagined as] external to Earth not simply because humanity considers itself as some kind of nonliving entity but also because the Earth is considered as being nonterrestrial” (49). In its attempt to develop and improve the Earth, geo-constructivism inherits the ideology of the Space Age and combines it with the aftermath of the nuclear imaginary. We read its ideology as one of techno-fantasy that relies on the apocalyptic investments adopted by environmental discourse, and whose endpoint is the kind of post-raciality in which groups like Extinction Rebellion participate. However, geoengineering, says Neyrat, is a “firefighter technology” acting “after the fact, on the consequences [of our actions]” (33). This belated activity ought to be understood not simply as action that comes too late and is in denial of its own extractive capitalist drive, but as activity that, equally after the fact, aims to reinterpret what counts as life, what losing life has looked like historically, and what it looks like now. The narrative of urgency and threat that characterizes much environmental discourse—the belief that violence like this really is unprecedented, against which Neyrat usefully pushes back—accepts the terms by which geo-constructivism functions and naturalizes its effects. “Climate engineering,” writes Neyrat, “considers itself as ready to save the planet—even if we have to pay for it by way of some collateral damage, such as with periods of severe drought in equatorial Africa and certain parts of India” (32). I found Neyrat’s book to be most useful when it helped me better see how that collateral damage is figured as a necessary cost—not just by geo-constructivists but by environmental discourse in general—and the pervasiveness of the kinds of relationality that sustain those conceptions.

    Under the horizon of the nonliving geo-constructivist who rearranges the non-terrestrial Earth, the bulk of the book’s project is to trace how relationships to nature are formed. But hasn’t the Earth, or at least its grounded image, nature, been dying for a while? As critics like Raymond Williams suggest, the concept of nature emerges, dialectically, just as it starts to disappear on entering the modern period, if not before.2 Unconstructable Earth chooses to stick with nature as a concept and, thereby, partially stick with the Western dialectical schema occasioned by the nature/culture distinction. It thereby begs the question prominent at least since the time of Marx, and central to, for example, Dialectic of Enlightenment: is a non-dialectical conception of nature, which can also register loss, possible? It’s a simple question, but one from which most studies of this kind fail to escape.3 This is a particular problem, especially when, as Neyrat argues, in almost all environmental thought, “relation takes precedence and must be protected against what ravages it” (148). However, the humanist critique of environmental destruction all too often inaugurates a grieving, rueful and urgent subject and, in so doing, re-substantiates the notion of the “others of Europe” as those who either bear the effects of this destruction or were simply not mourned in time (da Silva 250).4

    The tendency to reject the nature/culture distinction altogether has, of course, become prominent in posthumanist environmental thinking. Neyrat quotes Deleuze as emblematic of this approach: “It should be clear that the plane of immanence, the plane of Nature that distributes affects, does not make any distinction at all between things that might be called natural and things that might be called artificial” (140). However, this position also resubstantiates Western universality via the nonsubjective backdoor, so to speak, and Neyrat complains it “[liquidates] the possibility of existing for the beings that populate the world” (140).5 Indeed, much of new materialist thinking on the environment makes ontological claims about the status of relations between humans and non-humans as repressed historical arguments that are concerned with attempting to resolve culpability and reverse historical damage.1

    Unconstructable Earth faces the problem of the nature/culture distinction head on by suggesting that the two most prominent Western conceptions—that a difference must be affirmed and that a difference doesn’t exist—actually merge. A more humanistic and dialectical claim like “everything is connected” converges with a techno-modernist claim like “everything is uncertain.” Likewise, a more traditionally ethical idea like “nature must be preserved” can be read as the other side of a more contemporary one like “there is no such thing as nature.” This is because, as Neyrat has it, both conceptions imagine as consistent a notion of relation between things and therefore figure relation as “more permeable, more contagious—than we would ever have thought” (12). With this idea, Neyrat arrives at what texts in Indigenous Studies take as a starting point. His claim here would match up with a book like Glen Coulthard’s Red Skin, White Masks, which holds that relations of access characterize settler-colonial extraction and that maintaining those relations is and has been the historical work of the State and of capital.

    Before concluding the book with more straightforwardly philosophical arguments, Neyrat spends most of his time on the second of the two nature/culture conceptions and those who think that there is no longer—or never was—a self-sufficient nature: post-environmentalists, geo-constructivists, and eco-modernists. Although varied, this grouping broadly follows a conception of nature as “naturing nature (natura naturans)—that is, the permanent genesis of things, nature as process, as productivity” (135). They consist of resilience ecologists—those who figure a political economy which requires that its subjects adapt themselves to “programmed uncertainty” (71)—as well as all agencies that demand more and greater intervention into the ecosphere. One of the tasks of this group is to define the relational field through the terms of movement and stasis, as well as to “insist on the fact that the environment is not separate from human beings” (86). Post-environmentalists like Ted Nordhaus and Michael Shellenberger, for example, sound similar to Bruno Latour because they understand that “showing that everything is connected is the best way for affirming the idea that the entirety of nature has been anthropomorphized” (93). They therefore find it possible to direct their desire to de-extinction and re-wilding projects in order to more emphatically “resuscitate a nature that was already dead and buried” (53). This discourse suggests that loss is, paradoxically, as irreversible as it is recoverable. “It’s as if the numbing of the Earth,” writes Neyrat, “was one of the necessary conditions for allowing geoengineers to justify their mode of intervention” (56). Only a dying world—whoever caused it to be so hardly matters—would be in need of the kind of management that these thinkers conceive: “it’s this administration a posteriori that they call ‘ecology’” (127). Of course, it turns out that such a position is not possible to maintain. While reconstructing the Earth, “the anaturalist drive of the West will be in need of an ecosphere in order to continually revitalize itself” (115). Therefore, anaturalism requires both a position outside the Earth—Neyrat names it “off-planet” (8)—as well as a concept of nature itself.

    So, are we back within the matrix of an ethical humanism that would show that geo-constructivism must construct the notion of nature it then claims it has the legitimacy to manipulate? Not quite. What Neyrat argues throughout is that the nature/culture divide is both rejected and maintained, not only by post-environmentalists but also by older versions of environmentalism. Neyrat quotes John Muir to say that “when we try to pick out anything by itself, we find it hitched to everything else in the universe” (147). Again, what we discover as we follow Neyrat through each different position is the insistence on what he calls the “principles of principles”: that everything is connected. “Resistant to any sort of Romanticism [of the Muir type] as much as to any kind of deep ecology,” he writes, “Latour nevertheless founds his ecological political thought on the concept of ‘attachments’; and Stengers speaks of ‘entanglements’ […] Alaimo maintains that the substance of the human being is ‘inseparable’ from its environment” (147). What Unconstructable Earth shows is that the ontologization of relation—its reliability and everywhere-ness—provides the philosophical grounds for the permanence of a principle of accessibility that we can read as colonial and violent. “If the battle against the great divide of nature/culture means to do away with any sort of separation, then this battle will do nothing but nourish a globalized anaturalism” (149), he suggests. For this reason, the final part of the book turns toward a theory of that separation, “without,” he adds, “wholeheartedly agreeing with the Cartesian and post-Cartesian denial of relation (object-oriented thinking and speculative realism)” (149).

    Broadly, I am in support of what Neyrat theorizes in the book’s final sections but feel like they perform a certain kind of methodological rigor and philosophical sophistication in a way that produces familiar philosophical modes and thereby avoids more complicated questions of self-positioning and reflexivity. I think it is important, as Neyrat does, to clarify that some relations exist as unknown and remain separate, even if decolonial theorists consider this a given.6 And as I suggest above, I also think it’s important to show the theoretical and structural assumptions of the productivist thrust of much post-humanist theory, which can appear to coincide with the politics of a post-racial extractivism. But if I were to be critical, I would wonder whether or not it has become part of the ideology of philosophical method to search for a quasi-transcendental figure that does not fall prey to the errors and mistakes of previous positions. Neyrat writes,

    we must then consider as unconstructable that which escapes all construction—whether past, present, or future—and, as a consequence, precedes the primordial… The unconstructable does not escape destruction because it is indestructible, or because it is fleeing from death, but because destruction itself requires the unconstructable. Every action—whether constructive or destructive—requires a contraction, a subtraction, an antiproduction that precedes it as its dark side or counterlining (revers). The unconstructable is the inaccessible transcendental of production, which we will call its transcendental dark side or counterlining. (163)

    By holding to this kind of familiar philosophical movement, the book leaves me wondering whether the limit of philosophical critique is to show the failure of a method to account for itself, and to create one that doesn’t. I raise this question—the question of this search, and the rhetoric of its creation—because the book is, avowedly, in the service of what Neyrat calls, in two fleeting sections (one at the end of the introduction and one at the end of the first chapter), “the minoritarian bodies of the Anthropocene” (65). What would the book have been like had these bodies been more central to it? Without this, concluding with the ethic of separation departs from an articulation of violence and moves toward a universalist ethics that doesn’t sit well in this context. As Neyrat writes, “I am connected to others because I am separate, because I bear within me alterity” (150). This is, of course, a question of tradition, archive, and discipline. But for a text that largely breaks with convention on what can count as an object of study in a way that is helpful for environmental inquiry, it’s important to keep in mind that disciplines are also formed as new texts reassert what literatures and cultures are valued. According to Unconstructable Earth, those literatures and cultures still center on the likes of Latour, Spinoza, Deleuze, Schelling, and Meillassoux, which appear not simply as projects to be supplemented by a philosophical addition. But if one of philosophy’s problems is the ability to dream up relation when there is none, as Neyrat convincingly argues, I wonder what it would mean to really write philosophy and to conceive of academic projects with that in mind.

    Footnotes

    1. For such an argument, see Bhandar’s Colonial Lives of Property.

    3. For a symptomatic example of this problem, see Heise’s Imagining Extinction.

    4. On the former, see Affective Ecocriticism. Risling-Baldy foregrounds the concept of “survivance” in order to insist upon the parallel acts of survival and resistance by Native peoples. See her We Are Dancing for You.

    5. For more on how this resubstantiates Western universality, see Spivak’s “Can the Subaltern Speak?”

    6. For two of the influential texts of the type, see Morton’s Hyperobjects and Bennett’s Vibrant Matter.

    7. The idea that colonial, visual, and epistemological regimes cannot see, comprehend, or understand colonized peoples, and that these peoples have their own non-colonial regimes, is commonplace in decolonial thinking. In this context, therefore, the idea of “separation” is assumed. See, for example, Gomez-Barris’s The Extractive Zone.

    Works Cited

    • Bennett, Jane. Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things. Duke UP, 2010.
    • Bhandar, Brenna. Colonial Lives of Property: Law, Land, and Racial Regimes of Ownership. Duke UP, 2018.
    • Bladow, Kyle, and Jennifer Ladino, editors. Affective Ecocriticism: Emotion, Embodiment, Environment. Nebraska UP, 2018.
    • Coulthard, Glen. Red Skin White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition. Minnesota UP, 2014.
    • Da Silva, Denise Ferreira. Toward a Global Idea of Race. Minnesota UP, 2007.
    • Extinction Rebellion Massachusetts. “Climate Emergency.” 2020. https://www.xrmass.org/climate-emergency. Accessed March 27, 2020.
    • Extinction Rebellion. Rebel Starter Pack. 2019. https://rebellion.earth/wp-content/uploads/2019/09/Rebel-Starter-Pack-4-September-2019.pdf. Accessed July 15, 2019.
    • Extinction Rebellion. “The Truth.” 2020. https://rebellion.earth/the-truth/demands/. Accessed March 27, 2020.
    • Gomez-Barris, Macarena. The Extractive Zone: Social Ecologies and Decolonial Perspectives. Duke UP, 2017.
    • Heise, Ursula. Imagining Extinction: The Cultural Meanings of Endangered Species. Chicago UP, 2016.
    • Morton, Timothy. Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology After the End of the World. U of Minnesota P, 2014.
    • NASA. Blue Marble-Image of the Earth. 1972. https://www.nasa.gov/content/blue-marble-image-of-the-earth-from-aapollo-17. Accessed March 8, 2020.
    • Neyrat, Frédéric. The Unconstructable Earth: An Ecology of Separation. Translated by Drew S. Burk, Fordham UP, 2019.
    • Risling-Baldy, Cutcha. We Are Dancing for You: Native Feminisms and the Revitalization of Coming-of-Age Ceremonies. Washington UP, 2018.
    • Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. “Can the Subaltern Speak?” Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, edited by Cary Nelson and Larry Grossberg, Illinois UP, 1988, pp. 271-313.
    • Williams, Raymond. Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society. Oxford UP, 1976.

  • A Quiet Manifesto

    Nathaniel Likert (bio)

    A review of Kramnick, Jonathan. Paper Minds: Literature and the Ecology of Consciousness. U of Chicago P, 2018.

    Literary studies has recently seen a sharp uptick in interest in all things broadly “empirical:” from the influx of cognitive approaches (Lisa Zunshine, Alan Palmer) to sociological methods (Heather Love) to science studies (Bruno Latour). This scholarship attempts, on the one hand, to walk back the discipline’s longstanding skepticism of empirical approaches as theory-laden political positions in disguise (a poststructuralist legacy) without, on the other hand, naïvely embracing the merely given. Jonathan Kramnick’s new book, Paper Minds: Literature and the Ecology of Consciousness, weighs the stakes of empirical approaches for literary criticism, and expertly cashes out a version of this approach in particular readings. Broadly conceived, the book does two things. Its first third assesses the potential for literary study to intervene in extra-disciplinary debates. To do so, it combats various reductionisms—those of many of Kramnick’s empiricist forebears—that would situate the literary as little more than a data set for the methodologies of other disciplines. Against this, he proposes a version of form that presents the subject matter (or content) of other disciplines in a unique way, allowing literature to reframe those disciplines’ questions and thereby make new answers possible. The rest of the book fleshes out this new formalism by reading a clutch of literary works, from the eighteenth century to the present day, with the help of recent cognitive-scientific work on embodied perception. These works present, at the level of form, a picture of mind as enmeshed within rather than floating above the world. The book’s primary achievement, to my eye, is that it advocates a rapprochement between literature and cognitive science that, unlike other recent calls for this sort of détente, preserves the special status of the literary artifact (as form) without romanticizing it.

    Most centrally, the book aims to carve out the precise niche of literary contribution to two current questions in the philosophy and science of mind. The first concerns consciousness. In Kramnick’s telling, there are two basic accounts of the origin of conscious experience. In the first, consciousness is an emergent property of inert, unfeeling matter. In the second—called panpsychism—emergence is unnecessary because matter already enfolds consciousness as an inherent property of the universe at large. This debate links up with the second question, a related puzzle about perception: is consciousness ultimately an internal “bringing the world to mind” as mental representation, thus prioritizing mediation and skepticism? Or is it a direct “[reaching] out” (10) to things in the world as they lie and as they invite the perceiver, like a kind of touch? The latter answer to this second question forms the book’s moral heart. Kramnick champions “direct perception” (8) as “ecophenomenological” (3) or a “dissident [strain] of empiricism” (9) that brokers mind and world without positing either as the determining ground of the other.1 Because direct perception dissolves the internalism of the representational view, mind has a commonsensical access to world, and yet, because that world is still phenomenal—an “affordance” (5) enabling certain kinds of action for certain creatures with certain physical makeups—we aren’t forced to do away with the subject altogether. The world, in this view, invites action rather than contemplation—an ecological engagement whose watchword for Kramnick is “skill” (6). 2

    One could object that this account courts scientific reductionism by positing a way of life grounded in a morphological feature of the human body, but Kramnick parries this attack through an account of literary form. For Kramnick, literature helps historicize our perceptual apparatus by encoding, in its formal features, various stances about both the nature of perception and the kinds of environments that prompt it to act in different, contingent ways: “The emphasis on motion, skill, and environment broadens the discussion from the ostensibly unchanging nature of the brain to the historically variable conditions of circumstance” (6). If direct perception syncs up mind and world, and world is historical, then mind is historical too and literature helps shape for us its (local) contours. The argument is a series of nested analogies: the direct perception of represented characters or speakers is like the craft aesthetics of the writer which, in turn, is like the skill of the critic. Seeing is writing is reading. Each draws on the perceptual attunement of the others.

    In the first two chapters, Kramnick tackles directly the way we read now. Many claim that literary studies are in crisis. While blame teleports between external (the neoliberal university and its bottom-line agenda, frowning at declining majors and uneasily quantified research output) and internal factors (our critical methodology, balking at value judgments), the prognosis is the same: the continued decline of the humanities’ relevance in the academy. One answer to this bleak forecast has been an ever-more-insistent borrowing from disciplines more firmly vested with public confidence (like the sciences), and Kramnick’s twin chapters address this move (and its underlying cynicism). The first mounts the paradoxical case that “the best way to be interdisciplinary is to inhabit one’s discipline fully” (17). This case depends, crucially, on what Kramnick calls “ontological pluralism” (18) or the idea that each “corner of the world” (51) is not reducible—that is, fundamentally explicable—in the terms of any other area of study. This model is explicitly drawn from Jerry Fodor’s well-known argument about “special sciences” (i.e. all those that are not physics) which resists the idea that these can be reduced to physics (or any to a level more granular than itself) on the grounds that their phenomena are all multiply realizable. That is, they can be instantiated by any number of physical systems—for example, silicon could conceivably give rise to brain function as well as organic matter does—and, thus, cannot be reduced. This view would establish literature as an autonomous field of study, prompting reflection on what Kramnick calls “explanatory pluralism” (18): the idea that a nonreducible panoply of objects in the world requires the same plurality of disciplines to study them, and that each must therefore cultivate its own garden of explanatory terms, definitions, and methods of study. For Kramnick, that particularity lies in form itself, which is the mode of presentation of any phenomenon in a literary text (21); to restate these phenomena as propositions in the language of another discipline is to dissolve the mode of presentation—the form—that makes them unique. Form simply is literature, with the caveat that form is itself beholden to disciplinary norms of explanation, and these remain “inquiry-relative” (38) and context-specific. Even within a discipline, one cannot posit a unifying notion of form that would foreclose others.3 This reductionism (by literary critics themselves) is the target of the next chapter—previously a much-discussed article in Critical Inquiry written with Anahid Nersessian—which argues against the “polemic” of wielding a single notion of form to the exclusion of others (52), defending both the separation of literature from other disciplines and the necessity of ongoing pluralism and debate within its confines.

    The remainder of the book puts this capacious notion of form to work by reading a selection of literary texts from the eighteenth to the twenty-first centuries, all of which foreground the two key debates in the philosophy of mind: consciousness and embodied perception. These chapters divide into two sections. Chapters three and four examine eighteenth-century locodescriptive and Georgic poetry to excavate an aesthetic “counter-tradition” that privileges tactile immediacy over the classic conception of disinterested, distanced contemplation. Kramnick shows how these poems, through the “homely style” (60) of formal elements like apostrophe, ferry the world to the speaker for active engagement. The remaining chapters turn to the novel, and primarily concern consciousness while keeping hold of embodied perception. The fifth chapter compares eighteenth-century and contemporary theories of mental representation, arguing that literary scholars can’t assess which theories are right, per se, but can only trace historical change. The eighteenth-century representational view helped produce the epistolary novel, whose sequence of letters resembles the association of ideas in the mind. This chapter also takes up contemporary cognitive scientific approaches to literature, arguing that attempts to posit the biologically essentialist structure of mind that novels approximate miss the historical warp and woof of empirical theory. The sixth chapter suggests that the so-called “hard problem of consciousness” is only a problem because it defines consciousness as purely private experience.4 Kramnick takes up two contemporary novels—Ian McEwan’s Saturday and Tom McCarthy’s Remainder—which illustrate two distinct ways to rethink this “hard problem,” encoded in the structure of their sentences. The final chapter turns to panpsychism, tracing its fortunes from Margaret Cavendish’s 1666 speculative romance The Blazing World to the recent novels of Marilynne Robinson. Both Cavendish and Robinson respond to reductionist orthodoxies of their day (the Royal Society, New Atheism) that believe grasping the structure of matter will provide the key to experience. Panpsychism holds that since all matter is experiential, the form of that experience will vary infinitely based on the material structure of any given organism. Kramnick teases out this variety in each author’s nested layers of narration.

    Paper Minds takes a decidedly hopeful bent toward the future of literary study. The critic seeks to cultivate habitable lifeworlds: both literary texts and a sense of dwelling in a world partially made by one’s own skilled activity aid in and aesthetically christen such work. This is all quite apart from the literary-critical mainstream’s gloomy cultural determinism, descended at least from Saussure, for whom langue showed up precisely in the unconscious moment when one heard a word and automatically supplied its meaning—language preceded the subject, and the signified dangled always out of reach. Not so here. This constructive, realist, optimistic stance shares much with contemporary postcritical thought in its refusal to allegorize texts as symptoms of discursive forces and structures. Critique’s “disputing of ‘common sense’” (Anker and Felski 3) as insufficient to grasp the gears of power behind the curtain has been supplanted by a trusting, even loving attention to the immediately present. What shows up for us in sensory experience is accepted as the given.5 Kramnick makes good on this commitment in his prose style, which limits complicated clauses and jargon while adopting a comfortable, good-naturedly modest tone. There is a politics to this style, of course: assent is all but guaranteed by the very simplicity Kramnick claims for his points. To take one example, he constantly uses “just” or “just so” to describe the inviting presence of a three-dimensional object calling out to be handled—as in “a pail placed just so” (65) or “when positioned just so” (146). Similarly, Kramnick uses “just” to discuss both an object being addressed—”a creature who is just here” (95)—and the perceiving subject who is addressing it: “when the head turns just so” (5). The word most obviously means “precisely,” emphasizing the nuanced skill of the perceiver, but it means also “simply” or “merely,” suggesting a plainly available rather than a deviously occluded world.

    While launching plenty of critical salvos against reductionism, Kramnick doesn’t have much to say about the position of his positive claims vis-à-vis other contemporary theorists. In fact, at both the theoretical and historical levels, Kramnick comfortably perches his claims beside the standard ones without saying that they’re wrong. A non-interventionist pluralism has been gathering steam for a few years now, against what Jason Potts and Daniel Stout call our “theory-as-wholesale-transformation model” (8), which serves to “effectively linearize the intellectual landscape” (9). In its refusal to figure heroic reinvention as the only way to play, Kramnick’s work doesn’t ask “what’s next,” but rather “what else?” (“Theory Aside”). This is hardly a radical move in the sphere of theory, of course, as fewer scholars would claim today to profess allegiance to, say, poststructuralism or Marxism as the orienting lens of their work. It’s much more of an intervention in historical scholarship, though, which remains relatively committed to the “replacement” model (9). Kramnick emphasizes dissident strands that aren’t the period’s real story but merely a forgotten subplot. He doesn’t deny the dominant representational theory of perception or the importance of the distance aesthetics it subtends—the fifth chapter makes the former’s importance quite clear for early eighteenth century novels, and the latter is so ubiquitous as to almost go without saying—but reintroduces its forgotten double, troubling the self-evidence of the representational account’s progress while adding to, rather than clearing up, our sense of the period’s (and the questions about the nature of mind’s) complexity.

    This brings us back to Kramnick’s main achievement in Paper Minds: the deployment of formalism as literature’s key offering to extra-literary debates. On one side of the text, this justifies literary study as an enterprise without lapsing into sentimental claims about improving our moral receptivity or reifying literature itself as some kind of special site that triggers this sort of thing. On the other, it frees literature from its status as either symptom or romantic critic of other discourses, since its formal mode of “presentation” of extra-textual questions reframes rather than merely denouncing or reflecting those questions. Certain speaker-communities (disciplines) are stable enough to broker formal definitions of certain texts that hail them as literature within the context of literary study. Literature, in other words, is what literary critics talk about. And yet, Kramnick also holds that literature is an object with its own “corner of the world” (51), pre-existing our use. It’s therefore an affordance: it has certain properties that invite responses and a certain kind of response coaxed from a certain kind of reader with certain training would be called literary criticism.6 Kramnick thereby offers a defense of professionalism without making it disdainful toward or categorically distinct from non-specialist reading.

    An especially successful example can be found in the book’s penultimate chapter. There, Kramnick reads Tom McCarthy’s novel Remainder not as either a rejection of or a straightforward answer to Chalmers’s “hard problem of consciousness” (the inexplicable way in which non-conscious matter gives rise to conscious experience)—as though literature itself simply made propositions—but instead as a way to ask the question differently by presenting it formally in a particular way. Discussing Thomas Nagel’s related conception of consciousness as “what it is like” to have a certain experience, Kramnick notes that “Asking what it is like to be a bat therefore defined consciousness in a specific way merely by posing the question in a certain manner” (121, emphasis mine). In other words, the emphasis on qualia—subjective experience—automatically builds a notion of consciousness as interior into the very fabric of the question, determining in advance the kind of answer possible (or in this case, precisely not possible). Remainder doesn’t so much answer this question as pose it differently, suggesting a very distinct sort of answer without forcing one: McCarthy’s “deadpan, uninflected first person… does not attempt to represent a thing, so much as to be that thing, to make it present” (Kramnick 134-5). In this way, the formal layout of the sentences themselves—with their affectless presentation of objects as cues for action—suggests that consciousness cannot simply be equated with interior qualia. Crucially, the novel (again, anti-polemically—this is perhaps another reason Kramnick likes literature) never states that position directly: “McCarthy’s innovation in any case lies more in the way his novel presents things than in the content of its ideas” (Kramnick 136), leading us to “wonder whether even the hardest problems posed by the sciences have been phrased or shaped in the right way” (137). This reading is a perfect illustration of Kramnick and Nersessian’s claim that all explanations “are relevant only insofar as they respond to a question in a way that actually answers what is being asked” (51); those questions are in turn the stock-in-trade of disciplines, revisable by “consensus judgment” (51). Positioning questions as discipline-dependent and answers as question-dependent recovers agency for both the critic—whose “workaday interpretive habits” (50) can tweak the questions being asked without tipping over into the mastery of critique—and for the literary text itself, without recourse either to dilettantish cribbing from other disciplines or nostalgic appeals to empathy-training or the undecidability of language.

    All of this said, Kramnick’s commitment to the immediate and self-evident experience of the individual also presents the book’s greatest shortcoming: its lack of attention to large-scale, systemic conditions. This is partly a simple consequence of the subject matter and archive, because analytic philosophy of mind deals in minds and persons rather than in subjects and structures. Moreover, on a modular view of the self (again with an eye towards the pluralism so alive in Kramnick’s work), there need not be anything inherently political or apolitical about either one’s disciplinary commitments or one’s conscious experience; one could leave one’s apolitical scholarship at the end of the day and head straight to the union rally, or feel the affordances of a voting booth. Still, this reader couldn’t help but feel, while gliding across Kramnick’s satisfied, warmly reasonable prose about how good it is to take pleasure in, say, apple-growing, that broader political issues—so obviously the context of Kramnick’s bracing call for disciplinarity—simply don’t register to trouble individual pleasure. This attitude actually characterizes quite a bit of recent theory, much of it in the postcritique line, in what Carolyn Lesjak calls an “accommodation to the given” (249). For Lesjak this is a defeatist surrender of Marxist utopian hopes for the blinkered consolation of the good-enough: the jobs we have, the circumstances we find ourselves in, the now rather than the future.

    To give Kramnick his due, he is at least committed to a kind of immediate material agency of the perceiving mind. In a passage crucial to the book’s politics characteristically buried in the middle of a close reading of Robinson Crusoe, Kramnick remarks that

    What Defoe adds to the Gibsonian picture is the emphasis on how skilled action alters the encountered world. The aesthetics of the handsome is not just a kinetic adjustment to something that is, in Gibson’s preferred word, ‘invariant’; it is a way of adjusting or varying things in turn.(77, emphasis mine)

    No mere psychological coping, direct perception presents the world as a set of affordances for action, and that action brings yet more affordances into being in an evolving kinesis of action, reaction, and imbrication. Mind is world is mind, tumbling over each other such that neither enjoys a fully deterministic edge, and the perceivers’ aesthetically-pleasurable skill confirms them as agents in a sort of ongoing homemaking. Still, as a long line of theorists have argued (Foucault is the most obvious example), spatial arrangements call forth certain kinds of actions and the self-perceptions that are their epiphenomena; direct perception, in this account, would be one of the most useful tools of normative social arrangements. Feeling at home in my corporate cubicle, in other words, may be rather more constraining than liberating.

    These problems are only exacerbated by an unfortunate tendency to leave out rather vital bits of information in some of the textual readings—specifically political contexts that complicate Kramnick’s soothingly smooth account. Here, for example, is his rendering of a passage from Sterne’s Sentimental Journey:

    I own my first sensations, as soon as I was left solitary and alone in my own chamber in the hotel, were far from being so flattering as I had prefigured them. I walked up gravely to the window in my dusty black coat, and looking through the glass saw all the world in yellow, blue and green, running at the ring of pleasure. . . . Alas poor Yorick! cried I, what art thou doing here? (qtd. 47)

    Kramnick very cleverly reads Yorick’s cloistering in the hotel room as a critique of Locke’s camera obscura: the locus classicus of the alienating representational view of perception. For Sterne, “The world does not project to a point” (72). Yet Kramnick’s ellipsis erases a part of the passage that turns the screw a couple more times: “—The old with broken lances, and in helmets which had lost their vizards—the young in armour bright which shone like gold, beplumed with each gay feather of the east—all—all tilting at it like fascinated knights in tournaments of yore for fame and love—” (47). The aggressively figurative language here cannot be assimilated to the specific objects of Yorick’s perception; they are imagined, not perceived. Farther still from the simply-available real, the lines are satirical in their use of stately chivalrous language to describe ribald chaos. The same holds for the Hamlet reference: the Prince’s existential carpe diem musings as he stares at the jester’s skull receive a mocking echo here in Yorick’s desire to get out there and get laid. In other words, a vertical gulf of textuality yawns in the horizontal gap between Yorick and the street. It isn’t surprising, then, that Kramnick would banish these lines from his account, committed as it is to the empirical: to what literally shows up before us.

    None of this discredits Kramnick’s achievement or the often brilliant formalist insight of his readings. Again, one of the most valuable takeaways of his approach is that realms of human experience always retain at least a partial Venn diagram-separation from each other; my direct perception of a rabbit doesn’t stop me from imagining his kin being harvested at a Smithfield processing plant and acting accordingly. All I’m saying is that the hyper-local focalization necessitated by Kramnick’s topic and the snapshot layout of his readings often doesn’t explicitly acknowledge itself to the extent that it could, such that mere differences in method and emphasis end up looking like willful exclusions.

    Literary studies has ridden for some time now on the wave of the manifesto. While the content of these trumpet blasts varies drastically, the overall sense is clear: a change is needed. How we define the status quo of what we do—critique, symptomatic reading, antinormativity, et al.—and what we think is wrong with it—its remove from public life, its dismissal of care, its denial of the “real,” etc.—may matter less than the shape of whatever we think should come next. As I have tried to show, this is where Kramnick’s Paper Minds makes such a timely intervention. We need not accept his answers to appreciate the formal presentation of disciplinary precision as a means to ask better questions. Our profession is by nature interdisciplinary—literature represents the world in all its extra-textual richness—and treating it at the level of representation is necessarily to brush up against other silos of knowledge. But Kramnick shows that, in so doing, we need not play the zero-sum game of getting closer to what “really matters” at the expense of what we already have: literary texts, and specialized if constantly-changing angles of approach to them. Paper Minds thus stands as a quiet manifesto for several bugbears of literary study: the normative (insisting that definitional criteria for disciplines and their objects are useful), the constructive (touting the pleasure of world-building rather than the subtractive impulse of critique), and the distinct (refining our vocabulary to better focalize our critical objects). Mind is bound to world, world is bound to mind, but literary study—minding and binding both—is bound to the future it makes for itself, nothing less.

    Footnotes

    1. The key figure drawn on here (and arguably the éminence grise of Kramnick’s book) is James J. Gibson, with his influential theory of “affordances,” which are features of a natural or designed environment that enable particular actions for creatures with particular bodily makeups.

    2. As opposed to “knowledge,” with its subject/object split. Another of Kramnick’s favorite words is “naïve.”

    3. Kramnick holds elsewhere that “any explanation that literary studies can provide of any phenomena of interest must rely in some sense on form and that we ought to be generous and flexible in what we understand the meaning of ‘form’ to be” (12). The trick, here, is that, as with mental states, literary explanations are “multiply realizable” by different kinds of form. Form, thus, is the literary but not in any reductive sense because there are many (perhaps infinite) varieties of form.

    4. See David Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness.”

    5. Anker and Felski provide a good overview of critique and its discontents in their introduction to Critique and Postcritique.

    6. The concept of “affordance,” thus, does a lot of work for Kramnick, whose argument (with Nersessian) about the explanatory work of form may, otherwise, court circularity; form is in a “corner of the world” which, itself, only comes into being through our corner-talk.

    Works Cited

    • Anker, Elizabeth S. and Rita Felski, editors. Critique and Postcritique. Duke UP, 2017.
    • Chalmers, David J. “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness.” Journal of Consciousness Studies, vol. 2, no. 3, 1995, pp. 200-219.
    • Fodor, J.A. “Special Sciences (Or: The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis).” Synthese, vol. 28, no. 2, 1974, pp. 97-115.
    • Kramnick, Jonathan. Paper Minds: Literature and the Ecology of Consciousness. U of Chicago P, 2018.
    • Lesjak, Carolyn. “Reading Dialectically.” Criticism, vol. 55, no. 2, 2013, pp. 233-277.
    • Potts, Jason and Daniel Stout, editors. Theory Aside. Duke UP, 2014.
    • Sterne, Laurence. A Sentimental Journey Through France and Italy. Ed. Paul Goring. Penguin, 2005 [1768].
    • “Theory Aside.” Duke University Press, https://www-dukeupress-edu.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/theory-aside. Accessed 16 Mar. 2020.
  • Acting Otherwise: Literary Justice and the Politics of Compassion

    Walter A. Johnston (bio)

    A review of Weber, Elisabeth. Kill Boxes: the Legacy of Torture, Drone Warfare, and Indefinite Detention. Punctum Books, 2017.

    In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Hannah Arendt argues that the distinctively totalitarian strategy of absolute mobilization produces among the ruled not only the feeling of constant motion, but—by virtue of the inscrutable principle guiding the tumult to which they are subjected—of a chaos that legitimates authority by conferring the combined irrationality and inexorability of the natural event upon its decree. However farcical its repetitions appear, the current executive branch of the United States government has arguably achieved something of that effect, which makes it difficult to establish meaningful continuity between this government and even its most proximate antecedents: the mutations of United States national and international policy during the H.W. Bush and Obama administrations. Elisabeth Weber’s Kill Boxes: Facing the Legacy of US-Sponsored Torture, Indefinite Detention, and Drone Warfare analyzes a set of political phenomena that may appear to be yesterday’s news in the presentist atmosphere produced by today’s executive caprice. First and foremost, Weber focuses on the military use of “kill boxes” that allows for targeted drone strikes where no war has been declared, which exemplifies for Weber the blurred boundary between norm and exception within which US-sponsored torture, indefinite detention, and drone warfare all operate. Although Weber restricts her analysis to the pre-Trump era, her book helps to overcome the stunned fatalism that authoritarianism induces by sensitizing us to a logic that links the deliberate stupefaction of contemporary public discourse with the organized traumatization of the victims of US military practice in the pre-Trump era.

    Weber issues a sustained plea for a notion of “compassion” she draws from Jacques Derrida’s “Avowing—the Impossible: ‘Returns,’ Repentance, and Reconciliation,” and which she posits as an antidote to the “contempt” that inspires torture, indefinite detention, and drone warfare at the turn of the millennium.1 According to Weber, compassion is not merely one feeling among the many that already comprise our relations to others in the world. Rather, it is a “fundamental mode” of “living together” (these terms are borrowed directly from Derrida) that conditions relationality from the ground up, and obligates us, as witnesses to the suffering of others, to heed an unavoidable “call to action” (162). Though Weber does not specify the actions to which we are called, her book exemplifies the response and the responsibility she theorizes; and one of her central claims is that the humanities have a crucial role to play in addressing a set of phenomena that might more traditionally be confronted by political science or international law. According to Weber, compassion involves a “shock of recognition,” and “to initiate and explore such shocks of recognition is . . . one of the major responsibilities but also one of the major promises of the practice called ‘the humanities’” (13). Weber’s collaborator Richard Falk is more direct about the resulting calls to action in his afterward; he argues that “at the very least, the challenges posed throughout this book point to an urgent need to reconstruct international humanitarian law in light of the realities of [the] non-territorial patterns of transnational conflict” (241). Though trained in international law, Falk concurs with Weber “that the humanist sensibility poses a real challenge, if not a threat, to the militarized mentality that allows the modern forms of cruelty to pass undetected through the metal detectors of ‘civilized societies’” (241).

    But how or why might that be? What is the link between the “humanist sensibility,” “compassion,” and resistance to such a “militarized mentality” (241)? Weber’s answer is performative rather than constative. Her book is valuable primarily for the way in which it brings the humanistic practice of close textual analysis to bear upon discourses that might not traditionally receive such attention. With some help from W.J.T. Mitchell, this approach allows Weber to read the “shock of recognition” produced by the Abu Ghraib photographs, which relies on their legibility as images of crucifixion, and to suggest some consequences for our understanding of the mode of universality that they convoke (21). Later on, it gives rise to an illuminating analysis of military naming practices—in particular the shocking designation of the victims of drone strikes as “bug splat”—in light of Kafka’s The Metamorphosis (203). That reading makes more vivid and consequential one of her book’s main political-theoretical suggestions: that the “kill boxes” that allow drone strikes where no war has been declared blur the distinctions between norm and exception established by Carl Schmitt as the foundation of political sovereignty. Throughout Kill Boxes, Weber’s attention to the poietic and para-literary dimension of military and governmental practices goes far toward accomplishing the book’s main objective: Whereas state-sanctioned contempt ensures the victim’s “absence from public space and discourse in the US,” she suggests, a “shift in awareness” associated with compassion “will reveal this absence as overwhelming presence” (39).

    The object of Weber’s critique is not the paucity of publicly available information about torture, drone warfare, and indefinite detention, but the way in which state-sanctioned representation “ghosts” the tortured individuals to whom it appears to grant access. The difference between contempt and compassion—and, implicitly, between the ways of knowing proper to state power and humanistic research—is qualitative rather than quantitative. It is the difference between what one might call two regimes of the sensible, which is crystallized in Weber’s analysis of an anonymous art collective’s work, titled “#Notabugsplat.” This 90 X 60 foot piece of Martha-Rosler-esque didactic photomontage superimposes journalist Noor Behram’s disarmingly intimate portrait of an unnamed Pakistani girl projected atop drone footage of the village where she lived before the strike that killed her parents and seven-year-old brother. Weber devotes the following words to the image:

    Facing directly up from the giant reproduction of the photo, cropped to feature only the girl, her eyes are “squarely trained on the lens of the camera.” She frontally addresses, literally con-fronts the drone operator, thousands of miles away, and with him or her all those in whose name the attacks are carried out, with nothing but the vulnerability of her face, thereby, to quote Mitchell’s formulation again, “hailing the viewer as the ‘you’ who is addressed by an ‘I’.” The result, I would argue, is not so much “empathy,” which, “in the context of empire,” as Keith Feldman cautions, “has the capacity to exacerbate a liberal divide between the civil enlightenment of Euro-American nations and the objects of former colonial rule.” Rather, belying the official discourse replete with words like “the enemy,” “collateral damage,” “targets of opportunity,” a “shadowy foe” to be eliminated in a “signature strike” (in which the killed person’s name is actually not known), the girl’s face is inescapable, and with it the realization that what occurs in a drone strike cannot be called by any other name than murder. For Emmanuel Levinas, the “alterity that is expressed in the face provides the unique ‘matter’ possible for total negation.” What “resists” in the face is precisely the face, “the primordial expression, […] the first word: ‘you shall not commit murder.’” Behram’s photograph reintroduces a face into a war zone where a death sentence can be executed on the basis of fitting the target demographic alone: all males aged 18 to 65, since the United States deems these men to be combatants “unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent”—again: “posthumously.” The photograph might puncture what Peggy Kamuf has called in the context of the acceptability of the death penalty in the US the “wholesale anesthetizing of public sensibility.” The image contrasts and confronts the fatal “kill boxes,” into which suspected combatants and everybody else in their vicinity are trapped for extrajudicial assassination, with the wide-open field of a face. (43-44)

    I quote Weber at length because the work she describes is clearly a version of what she aims to accomplish in her own text and identifies as the promise of humanistic research more broadly. The “overwhelming presence” she aims to restore is that of the Levinasian face as she understands it. The face inspires a compassion that undoes the demographic categories and conceptual distinctions underwriting US government discourse and the murderous violence it unleashes. In the context of such violence, this undoing is tantamount to “a call to action” for Weber—in this case, the act of halting drone warfare.

    The sheer scale of #Notabugsplat and its citation of military jargon leave little doubt that the collective was inspired by similarly ambitious (and laudable) goals. Yet taken as an oblique description of the aims and orientation of Weber’s project, her account of the image poses several difficulties, particularly concerning her concept of action and the forms of experience that, she suggests, enable or are even equated with such action. Weber wants an experience hardwired to produce certain effects: “the girl’s face is inescapable, and with it the realization that what occurs in a drone strike cannot be called by any other name than murder,” such that one is immediately compelled by the commandment “you shall not commit murder.” Compassion is the name of this compulsion, which is why Weber consistently positions it as both an experience and an action. According to Weber, while the spectral object of state representation “anaesthetizes” and leaves us unmoved, the present object of compassion moves us infallibly—so infallibly that to experience others in a compassionate mode is somehow already to act toward their just treatment.

    Weber elaborates this concept in a reading of the tension between the Quranic notion of compassion and the prohibition of mutual aid among inmates at Guantanamo Bay:

    Rahma is a compassion that cannot but act, because one’s “womb” commands it and because God commands it. As Mouhanad Khorchide explains, the “straight road” or the “right path” consists in “accepting God’s love and compassion and to give it reality in one’s actions.” Sells writes that “holding or keeping the faith […] includes not only intellectual assent to certain propositions but also engagement in just actions,” such as “protecting those who are disinherited or in need.” By contrast, “those who reject the reckoning [the final judgment]—which, in early Meccan revelations, is the foundation of religion—are those who abuse the orphan, who are indifferent to those suffering in their midst, and who are neglectful in performing the prayer.” Not helping the orphan and the widow, or worse, preventing others from helping the orphan and the widow is a fundamental rejection of the oldest and most ingrained obligation towards the other. (160)

    Weber reads this tension in poems written by detainees at Guantanamo Bay. For Weber, the state censorship of these poems and its prevention of practices of compassionate mutual aid among inmates are deeply intertwined because compassion is linked to what she, following Shoshana Felman, calls “literary justice” (130). Literary justice is associated with access to the face in its singularity and is opposed to “legal justice,” which relies on preexisting abstract concepts or categories under which the other is subsumed (130). The censorship of the Guantanamo Bay poems is thus emblematic of a larger strategy that invokes legal categories to justify indefinite detention of prisoners and, conversely, to explain the impossibility of determining their legal guilt or innocence (a strategy akin to what Giorgio Agamben has called the inclusive exclusion of life in the juridical).

    The association of compassion and literary justice brings to light a further link between compassion and aesthetic experience in the Kantian sense. I would suggest that this notion tacitly subtends Weber’s understanding of the distinctiveness of humanistic modes of inquiry. For Kant, scientific knowledge is the subsumption of a singular intuition under a general concept, while aesthetic experience is the singular judgment of an intuition for which one lacks an adequate concept. Kant famously links aesthetic experience to seeing “as the poets do,” and associates it with the reflective capacity to disrupt and transform the conceptual matrix that governs knowledge. Similarly, for Weber, a compassionate reading of the Guantanamo poems challenges contempt by interrupting the application of prefabricated concepts used by the state to represent the detained, thus enabling an encounter with their testimony in its singularity. Yet for Kant, in contrast to aesthetic judgments, practical judgments capable of providing the basis for action must determine the object or end in relation to which one acts. Here a difficulty emerges for Weber’s understanding of compassion as the singular judgment of the face of the other, and as action. The claim that compassion entails action is based on Levinas’s association of the face and the commandment interdicting murder. Like aesthetic experience in Kant, the relationship to the face and the prohibition it entails are not for Levinas instances of moral cognition in the traditional sense. Instead, they involve insight into the phenomenological irreducibility of a relationship to the other that precedes and destabilizes all possible object relation. Murder is prohibited by the face because murder presupposes a cognitive relation to a known other, whereas exposure to the face is pre-conceptual for Levinas. The face intervenes before I perceive the other as a known object (an “orphan” or a “widow”) that I can murder or not, and expresses the way in which the knowing subject is always already related to others in advance of him or herself by virtue of the immediate mediation of experience via forms that are socially and temporally disseminated (194). This is why, for Levinas, the relationship to the face must be conceived not as an immediate visual or sensory relation, which would position it as a form of knowledge, but rather as a relation to the “speech” through which the other “dawns forth in his expression” in a manner that remains productively “incomprehensible.”

    The face . . . cannot be comprehended, that is, encompassed. It is neither seen nor touched—for in visual or tactile sensation the identity of the I envelops the alterity of the object, which becomes precisely a content. (194)

    Speech cuts across vision. In knowledge or vision the object seen can indeed determine an act, but it is an act that in some way appropriates the “seen” to itself, integrates it into a world by endowing it with a signification, and, in the last analysis, constitutes it. In discourse the divergence that inevitably opens between the Other as my theme and the Other as my interlocutor, emancipated from the theme that seemed for a moment to hold him, forthwith contests the meaning I ascribe to my interlocutor. The formal structure of language thereby announces the ethical inviolability of the Other. (195)

    If compassion is the relationship to a face in this sense, how can it constitute either action or a call thereto? Levinas seems to withdraw precisely that possibility on the eminently Kantian grounds that although “in knowledge or vision the object seen can indeed determine an act,” this action presupposes the reduction of the singularity of the other through conceptual subsumption, which “integrates it into a world by endowing it with signification” only by foreclosing the appearance of the face together with the possibility of compassion.

    This difficulty is intertwined with another. Weber frames the “shift in awareness” from contempt to compassion as a transition from “absence” to “overwhelming presence,” and this transition brings about the compulsion to act that Weber associates with Derrida’s notion of compassion. Yet as Weber herself notes, Derrida’s work has always critiqued the traditional metaphysical valorization of presence over absence, and the preference for a fully present other over the traces or ghosts of the departed (166). For Derrida, then, to welcome the written ghost of the Guantanamo Bay detainee could never amount to making him fully or indeed overwhelmingly present. Weber’s desire to do so is linked to her desire to defend the “shadowy” others produced by US military practice from the horrifying spectralization to which they are subjected. In contrast to US military practice, which anaesthetizes and thus disables the intended addressee of the testimony of the tortured, compassion would restore the “ghosted” other to an overwhelming presence that compels their just treatment. Restored presence is thus linked to infallible communication—a form of address that cannot fail to hit its mark and compel its addressee to act. Yet this too stands in tension with the deconstructive reading of address, which associates the possibility of political resistance to the cognitive status quo that reinforces state power with the fallibility or waywardness of address. In a passage on the divine call received by Abraham that Weber quotes in her introduction to Living Together, Derrida writes that the call

    conjures up more future to come than many others . . . by calling us to this truth . . . that anyone responding to the call must continue to doubt, to ask himself whether he has heard right, whether there is no original misunderstanding: whether it was in fact his name that was heard, whether he is the only or the first addressee of the call . . . . It is possible that I have not been called, me, and it is not even excluded that no one, no One, nobody, ever called any One, any unique one, anybody. The possibility of an originary misunderstanding in destination is not an evil, it is the structure, perhaps the very vocation of any call worthy of that name, of all nomination, of all response and responsibility.(34)

    Applying the consequences of Derrida’s insight to instances of humanitarian crisis, Thomas Keenan interrogates the equation of address, knowledge, and action that informs Weber’s notion of compassion. For Keenan, this notion also informs the understanding of the public sphere operative within humanitarian discourse. Responding to the coincidence of overexposure and inadequate response during the Bosnian genocide, Keenan writes that “Humanitarian action seems . . . to depend on . . . a fairly limited set of presuppositions about the link between knowledge and action, between public information or opinion and response” (22).

    What failed in Bosnia? We often say that we failed and imply that “we” means this well-known public of the so-called Enlightenment project. But the more we rely on and retreat to the idea that the public sphere has collapsed, the more we shore up a notion whose apparent solidity may be implicated in the disaster. What if belief in this public was part of the failure? What if the faith in the obviousness—the evidence or self-evidence of the pictures and the automatic chain of reasoning they inspire—was not what failed, but was the failure itself? The conceit or fantasy of this kind of public sphere must, after Bosnia if nowhere else, contend with what we could call the rule of silence—no image speaks for itself, let alone speaking directly to our capacity for reason. Images always demand interpretation, even or especially emotional images – there is nothing immediate about them. This implies a second rule, that of unintended consequences or misfiring – the story of Bosnia is that images which might have signified genocide or aggression or calculated political slaughter seemed for so long to signify only tragedy or disaster or human suffering and hence were available for inscription or montage in a humanitarian rather than a political response. So what failed in Bosnia is an idea or an interpretation—and a practice—of publicity, of the public sphere as the arena of self-evidence and reason, an idea which now must be challenged, not to put an end to the public sphere but to begin reconstituting it. (34-35)

    Though Keenan’s critique of the operative notion of the public sphere hinges on its faith in reason rather than compassion, reason, for him, like compassion for Weber, is nothing more than the name of what articulates experience and appropriate response. To the extent that we take this articulation for granted, we often help to ensure that it will fail. This is what demands the rethinking of address along Derridian lines: “The public, we could say in shorthand, is what is hailed or addressed by messages that might not reach their destination. Thinking about the images at hand, we could even say that what makes something public is precisely the possibility of being a target and of being missed” (25).

    Later Keenan continues:

    Hypothesis: to the extent that we imagine or take for granted the articulation between knowledge and action, which seems to define the public sphere, it is bound to fail. But what can only be thought of as a failure in those terms is, in another sense, the success of a political strategy, and if we continue to think that images by virtue of their cognitive contents, or proximity to reality, have the power to compel action, we miss the opening of ‘new fields of action’ (Benjamin) that they allow.(34)

    For Keenan, then, deconstructing the Enlightenment identification of knowledge and action does not imply an abandonment of action or of the public sphere, but rather their joint reconceptualization. To do so, we must relinquish the fantasy of moral obviousness, whether at the level of the meaning of the address or of the identity of the public hailed by it. Relinquishing that fantasy shifts us from a humanitarian to a political optic: from an optic that sees in the image only the self-evidence of a suffering we wish to alleviate to one that apprehends political struggle as the ongoing modification of processes of mediation that continually constitute, deconstitute, and reconstitute ontologically intertwined objects and agents, redefining the public as merely the “possibility of response to an open address” (25).

    Keenan’s shift from certainty to possibility also shifts from a cognitive to a reflective approach to politics. While it would be easy to understand this shift as a subjectivist abandonment of objectivity and of the concrete political action that depends upon it (Hegel was the first to do so), it may also redefine concrete political action as the reflective modification of modes of mediation rather than a struggle over pre-constituted objects. To the extent that Weber associates compassionate action with the disruption of conceptual subsumption by the singularity of the face and with the reflective reading practices fostered by humanistic research, she also points politics in this direction. Still, if one takes compassion and contempt not merely as two different ways of orienting oneself toward a pre-constituted object world but as events that give rise to fundamentally different worlds, more remains to be done to specify how these modes of emergence differ.

    By designating compassion as a “fundamental mode” of “living together,” Derrida points us toward such analysis. His formulation invokes the Heideggerian relationship between “fundamental attunement” and “being-with,” and thereby the differential analysis of modes of collective worlding or different ways of apprehending one’s unavoidable entanglement with the world in its facticity. These modes refer not to the world’s objective presence to a knowing subject, but rather to the process of its ongoing “disconcealment,” which is always-already technologically or linguistically mediated and socially distributed. When action is conceived only as actualization and thus as immediately bound to a subject’s univocal relation to the presence of a compelling object, this other strangely diffuse and yet world-forming activity disappears from view, and with it, the possibility for the reflective opening of a future that could be other than a repetition of the same. If that opening is what apprehending the face of the other is about, then this apprehension cannot take the form of restoring the ghosted other to full or overwhelming presence; to do so would be to obviate the possibility for a reflective transformation of the way in which the present presences. Yet while Weber sometimes seems to call for such a restoration, the overall effect of her work is quite different. State-sponsored spectralization produces a desire for restored presence that in fact enhances the power of those who exploit the fear of living death. This effect parallels Arendt’s observation that state-induced chaos and the promulgation of incompatible falsehoods generate a desire for normalcy that reduces the possibility of resistance to a presentist grounding of politics in matters of fact, which may inadvertently enhance the power of those who exploit the desire for normalcy through its strategic withdrawal. To the extent that Weber helps to release us from the stultifying effects of today’s chaos-induced presentism, her book moves its reader not to action per se, but to the possibility of acting otherwise.

    Footnotes

    1. Derrida delivered this essay as the keynote of a conference Weber co-organized at UC Riverside in 2003, the proceedings of which appeared in her edited volume Living Together: Jacques Derrida’s Communities of Violence and Peace.

    Works Cited

    • Derrida, Jacques. “Abraham, the Other.” Judeities: Questions for Jacques Derrida, edited by Bettina Bergo, Joseph Cohen, and Raphael Zagury-Orly, translated by B Bergo and Michael Smith, Fordham UP, 2007, pp. 1-35.
    • Keenan, Thomas. “Publicity and indifference: Media, Surveillance, and ‘Humanitarian Intervention.’” Killer Images: Documentary Film, Memory, and the Performance of Violence, edited by Joram ten Brink and Joshua Oppenheimer, Wallflower P, 2012, pp. 15-40.
    • Levinas, Emmanuel. Totality and Infinity. Translated by Alphonso Lingis, Kluwer, 1991.
    • Weber, Elizabeth. Living Together: Jacques Derrida’s Communities of Violence and Peace. Fordham UP, 2012.
  • Pygmalion Punks:The Shared Stitches of Puppetry and the Sex Pistols

    Kevin Cooley (bio)

    Abstract

    The essay turns to a rarely acknowledged but rich contextual overlap between puppetry, on the one hand, and punk sartorial and musical cultures, on the other. Through readings of two texts that present this overlap most clearly, namely, the film Labyrinth (1986) and the sitcom The Young Ones (1982-84), it shows that both the punk and the puppet challenge the domestication of specific materials as unified sites of meaning.

    When the political stratosphere’s objectification of people erects walls, condemns refugees, and controls people’s bodies, the language we use to refer to things that exist in liminal spaces between personhood and puppetry becomes especially saturated with critical meaning and political power. During the third US presidential debate of the 2016 election, the Republican candidate held Vladimir Putin’s contempt for Hillary Clinton against her, claiming, “Look, Putin…from everything I see, has no respect for this…person,” with a long pause preceding the word person, during which the W of the word “woman” partially formed on his lips, itching to be pronounced (NBC). Clinton’s response—”Well, that’s because he’d rather have a puppet as president of the United States”—invokes the objectifying power of the word “puppet.” The politician responds with angry, somewhat unintelligible reiterations (two times each), “No puppet…” and “You’re the puppet!” From the thin-skinned president’s distasteful nicknaming of former Miss Universe Alicia Machado as “Miss Piggy” (Barbaro and Twohey), to his writing off Chris Stirewalt & Marc Threaten as “two dumb puppets” just days before the third debate (@realDonaldTrump), calling political adversaries and bullying targets “puppets” seems to be one of his go-to moves. Why is this word such a charged and offensive one to most powerful man in the world? Perhaps the word makes him recall the 2005 Sesame Street episode “Grouch Apprentice,” in which Oscar the Grouch’s toupee’d cousin, “Ronald Grump,” offers a portion of his trash to the winner of his contest. Either way, the tycoon who inspired Grump has himself frequently besmirched his critics as puppets, and has tried to demean women by comparing them to cartoon characters and Muppets. In the process, he contributes to a reductive understanding of what it means to be a puppet.

    The presidential candidates’ negative associations with puppethood are part of a larger tradition. In US politics, to be puppeted is to be objectified and to be cartooned is to be mastered. As Kenneth Gross writes, the word puppet often “gets applied to a thing or person [who is] both insignificant and subjected to the power of others—not a word people will readily apply to themselves” (3). The dominant understanding of “puppet,” one that codes the word s an insult that deprives its target of agency, situates it within master-slave relations. But the kind of complete, stratospheric control that common parlance attributes to the puppet master does not in fact apply to puppeteering. As Henrich von Kleist says of the marionette, “the limbs that function as nothing more than a pendulum, swinging freely, will follow the movement in their own fashion without anyone’s aid,” and “often when simply shaken in an arbitrary manner, the whole figure assumed a kind of rhythmic movement that was identical to dance” (22). For Kleist, the effect of the puppeteer on the puppet’s non-human movement is more like a ripple than a controlled motion, because the puppet is free of self-sabotaging human cognition, a perfect non-being that has “…that has no consciousness at all—or has infinite conciousness—that is, in the mechanical puppet, or in the God.” (26). A (non-)being that telegraphs its artificiality as much as it professes to not practice artifice, the puppet cultivates its own ambiguity for political intervention.

    To exemplify the rebellious potential of the puppet, I argue that contemporary puppetry shares a barely acknowledged contextual overlap with some of the most grandiose and illustrious cultural rebels of the Western world: the English new-wave subcultures of the late ’70s and early ’80s, the most prominent of them being the punk movement. Both puppetry and sartorial punk/new-wave aesthetics deliberately draw attention to the material of their bodies and parody normative bodies. While both draw attention to the artificial construction and adornment of bodies, they paradoxically allow for a glimpse of the adorned or artificial body’s humanity and agency, even if these are only legible through seemingly inert materials. Thus the marked otherness and inhuman material of the puppet operated as a means in ’80s visual culture through which normative populations could seemingly dilute the residual nihilism of punk while covertly preserving the sticky fun of subcultural rebellion.

    The payoff of this argument is a greater appreciation of puppetry as a mode of resistance to (and as marking a space outside) political repression. Jim Henson’s 1986 film Labyrinth and the absurd, 1982-84 sitcom The Young Ones articulate the praxis of the punk-puppet’s simultaneous denial and assertion of its own subjectivity. They arrive in the aftermath of the punk movement and its offshoots, and offer varying approaches to the punk-puppet’s contradictory sense of self (and non-self). Labyrinth relates the otherness of the punk and the puppet by asking a normative, bourgeois figure to navigate the titular labyrinth of the subcultural in order to preserve the domestic unity of her family, while The Young Ones begins with a world in which the puppet has already invaded everyday space and is just as chaotic and disruptive as the humans who inhabit this space. In spite of their different beginnings, both texts end in the same place, with the puppet’s (or materialized other’s) contradictory subjectivity/lack-of-subjectivity tending to do violence upon any fixed semiotic (including, for example, that of a political administration that treats only specific bodies as “American” bodies, and treats historical, racialized, Imperial violence as a hallmark of undebatably all-American virtuosity). The puppet, like the punk whose image it is tangled up in, interrupts the stranglehold that bourgeois ideology maintains on the semiotic understandings of objects and bodies. The puppet endows objects and bodies with a new kind of life, and it erodes the forms of signification around these things that otherwise masquerade as natural and timeless.

    Punks, Puppets, and Persondrag

    As Dick Hebdige explains at length, the punk aesthetic was perhaps more grounded in the anti-ideology that its music championed than in that music itself. It exhibits the totality of its aesthetic ideology in its visual culture, particularly in the cosmetic and fashion designs of its participants. Hebdige describes a kind of “cut-up form” of material anachronisms left over as residual elements of a rainbow of twentieth-century English cultures and subcultures. Like the material body of the puppet, the punk was “kept ‘in place’ and ‘out of time’ by the spectacular adhesives: the safety pins and plastic clothes pegs, the bondage straps and bits of string which attracted so much horrified and fascinated attention” (26). For both kinds of artificially-bodied beings, the striking materiality of the violently rearranged body grounds bodies in the present and, at the same time, stresses the impossibility of their residing in such a present. Angela McRobbie ties the sartorial existence of the punk to the secondhand shopping practices that allowed the items of punk fashion to circulate and become costume elements, practices that “point back in time to an economy unaffected by cheque cards, credit cards and even set prices” (30).

    Among the sources that McRobbie claims were “continually raided by the ‘new’ stylists in search of ideas” were television shows and “even puppet TV shows,” among several other mass culture artifacts. Like the puppet shows from which secondhand fashion entrepreneurs borrowed, television shows promoted styles that were “worn self-consciously with an emphasis on the un-natural and the artificial” (McRobbie 40). This deliberate attention to the artificial trappings of the human-punk subject’s body is paralleled in puppetry by what Paul Piris calls “the particularity of the puppet,” the puppet’s tendency “to present an ontological ambiguity because it is an object that appears in performance as a subject” (30). The puppet asserts that it has a cognitive interior, even while its obviously constructed body asserts otherwise. The puppet is, then, in a static state of unresolved contradiction and pure otherness that it cannot help but generate in its existence as an abstraction. The voice of the puppet may resonate from a being inside it, underneath it, across the room, or in a recording studio across the world. Its movements are propelled by body that is not it but attempts to animate it. . The puppet’s agency is tangled, in many ways, with the suspension of disbelief that the puppet begs from its audience, a suspension that overcompensates for the falseness of the puppet’s pieced-together and (perhaps) felt plastic, or rubber, body. These materials not only adorn bodies, but also adorn and become the same body at the same time, complicating any possibility of understanding the body through its contextualized clothes.

    These attempts to locate the origin of the puppet’s being, which is scattered across time and space, reflect back on what the consolidation of organs, titles, and textiles that make up the human body and are often treated as constitutive of a concrete self. As Barthes puts it, the puppet can state “without any falsehood” that “which is refused to our actors under pretense of a ‘living’ organic unity” (172). The puppet can come closer to depicting the abstraction of a self than a human body because it is (at least, more openly) an abstraction, while the actor’s body struggles to live up to the “living organic unity” we mythologize it as having. Our puppet not only performs, it is performative: it brings a being into existence through the constitutive power of repeated action. It is here, then, in a constitution that occurs through the tangled acts of speech and gesture, that the puppet assaults the performative invention of the actor through an exaggerated parody of that same performativity, a parody that asks an audience to anoint a pile of strings, timber, and fabric with agency. The puppet uses performativity not to subordinate itself to its human referents, but to question the concrete self that is assumed to be intrinsic to the humans it references. This drag performance of human subjectivity, which I find most helpfully abbreviated as persondrag, is the tool with which the puppet pulls back harder on its strings than its puppeteer can, enticing the viewer to read it as human-nonhuman and as an odd object-subject. In this performance of contradiction and violence against the semiotics of being, the puppet not only lays out a procedure for interrogating the subject position of the human, it also tears a rift in the fixity of language categories as a whole, opening the way for the political interventions of charged puppet narratives.

    A Labyrinth of Paradoxical Puppets

    The puppet’s threat of subsuming and delegitimizing everything from specific social codes to the status of the human itself is covertly at play throughout the puppet world of Jim Henson’s Labyrinth. Henson’s film features a young woman, Sarah (Jennifer Connelly), journeying into a sometimes nightmarish dreamland to save her infant brother from the campy, glam-rock Goblin King Jareth (David Bowie) and a wide spectrum of hybrid puppet-humanoids. Forced to stay in and babysit her little brother by her distant and unappreciative parents, Sarah makes the mistake of wishing that little Toby, the very emblem of the future of the bourgeois family, would be “taken away” by the Goblin King character in the play for which she’s rehearsing. In a be-careful-what-you-wish-for scenario, Jareth grants Sarah’s request, and whisks Toby away to his goblin kingdom. Immediately regretting her decision, Sarah’s only way to rescue Toby is to find her way to the center of Jareth’s immense labyrinth. While this labyrinth’s parallel in antiquity hosts in its depths the murderous Minotaur, Jareth’s labyrinth is populated by a host of fantastic puppet creatures patrolling every curve. His private army of armored goblins; a pit lined with arthritic hands, talking tikis, and doorknockers; double-headed dogs bearing shields like people on playing cards; worms living in walls; and the selfish but sympathetic hermit Hoggle are just a few of the puppet characters that help and hinder Sarah’s quest through the labyrinth. More often than not, helping and hindering blur together: most of Jareth’s pawns favor a kind of rambunctious chaos over direct intervention into Sarah’s plans to recover her brother. They swap sides casually or forget that they were working against Sarah to begin with. The film concludes with the materialization of the puppets, goblins and all, back in Sarah’s very real world, shattering any easy assumptions that the puppets might quarantine rebellious desires within a distant, fleeting space.

    While the other’s invasion of the domestic characterizes all the puppet performances in Labyrinth, the most obvious and most viscerally immediate connection between the puppet and the subcultural subject comes in the form of David Bowie’s performance (in several senses of the word) as Jareth. In Bowie, Henson and his team chose a performer who is inseparable from a long history of complicating identity roles through material trappings and performance. Hebdige notes that Bowie “created a new sexually ambiguous image for those youngsters willing and brave enough to challenge the notoriously pedestrian stereotypes conventionally available to working-class men and women” (60). Bowie’s early alter ego Ziggy Stardust dons a vibrant streak of red face paint in the shape of a lightning bolt, dyed hair, silver lipstick, dandyish skintight jumpsuits with vertical pinstripes, and elaborate jackets trimmed with frills. Ziggy’s wardrobe illustrates what Julie Lobalzo Wright calls Bowie’s “lack of a real person to project as a public presence,” which makes him like those puppets he was cast alongside and amongst, and leaves him “without any ordinariness to balance his extraordinariness” (240). Bowie seems to understand the theoretical machinations of his drag-play as intricately as the scholars writing on him (and with delightfully succinct phrasing at that). In an interview with Ellen DeGeneres, Bowie offered the (perhaps only semi-humorous) quip, “Around seventeen I realized I was a mime trapped in a man’s body,” as he attempted to explain his brief involvement with a “revolutionary company” of speaking mimes. When Ellen suggests that their willingness to speak disqualifies them from mime status, Bowie replies, “That’s why they were revolutionary.” The “[‘accurate’ gendered noun] trapped in [an ‘inaccurate’ gendered noun]’s body” aphorism, commonly associated with trans recollections of confusing childhoods, is reworked here to tone down the potential to read any gender identity with which the person associates as “true.” As Bowie lays it out, in the “true” gender and identity expression’s place, we have the mime: a being who is defined by their mimicking other beings. In other words, Bowie positions his gender expression as an imitation by nature rather than something natural in itself, a move that recalls Butler’s assault on gender as imitating its own idealized self.

    Hebdige partially unpacks what Bowie brings to the performativity of both gender and material personhood when he notes that “his entire aesthetic was predicated upon a deliberate avoidance of the ‘real’ world and the prosaic language in which that world was habitually described, experienced and reproduced.” But Hebdige also undersells Bowie’s work by chalking it up to apolitical escapism, claiming that Bowie was “patently uninterested…in contemporary political and social issues” (61). Hebdige’s “‘real’ world” air quotes brush away the decidedly political parody that Bowie performs by spotlighting the performative nature of gender and of the unification of the body’s material into a subject. And yet when Hebdige, in his seminal 1979 volume, describes Bowie’s fans as “exquisite creatures” playing “a game of make-believe” in following Bowie’s visual precedents (60), he unknowingly anticipates the conjunction of the puppeted figure and the fantastic Bowie personality that occurs seven years later. A look at the specific content of Bowie’s performance in Labyrinth almost immediately reveals that it exemplifies the political weight of what Hebdige calls avoidance.

    It’s tempting to suggest that Sarah, Jareth, and the baby are the only human players to appear in the world of the goblins, and to claim that their bodies operate on a different visual register than that of the rest of the denizens of the puppet world. But to divvy the characters into the neat categories of puppets and humans reduces the complexity of the film’s treatment of bodies and subjects. Bowie’s body and its material trappings offer the most glaring complication of a reduction of the cast to puppets and people. His Jareth in Labyrinth is different from his other theatrical characters like Ziggy Stardust only in the degree to which Jareth offers a concentrated dose of his to-be-expected complication of gender. Bowie’s face is somewhere between made-up and painted—there is no attempt to conceal his cosmetic efforts, and every attempt to advertise them. They’re as loud and flamboyant as his choppily layered goldenrod hairdo, flowing somewhere between a messy mullet and a contemporary scene-girl cut. His wardrobe fluctuates between shimmering drag queen capes, leather jackets, heeled boots, Elizabethan ruffled shirts, and medieval armor. Brian Froud, the conceptual designer of the film, admits to sculpting Jareth’s image to evoke the alluring sexuality of the rock star, in the documentary “Journey through the Labyrinth: The Quest for Goblin City.” He says that Jareth’s crystal ball cane (or, as Froud calls it, a “swagger stick”) is meant to stand in for a microphone, and that the fan forum favorite topic of Bowie’s genital bulge “got [the team] in a lot of trouble about maybe how tight his pants were, but that was deliberate” (9:03).

    Every corner of this film and the labyrinth from which it takes its name is populated with bizarre beings whose material bodies and pretensions to agency exhibit and perform persondrag. The “Magic Dance” scene, in which Jareth and his puppet-goblin cronies revel in the plasticity of their bodies inside the king’s throne room to an upbeat and dancy Bowie number, flaunts the powers of persondrag perhaps most openly. Puppet coordinator Brian Henson recalls forty-eight puppets being packed into the room with Bowie, the baby, “eight to twelve little people in costumes running around,” a handful of chickens, and a small pig on a leash (Saunders). The puppets were directed by a brigade of “fifty-one or fifty-two” puppeteers. Instead of imitating gender, the drag show performs a potentially infinite spectrum of genders whose very quantity and campy existence call into question the innateness of the male/female binary. Similarly, the puppet ensemble of “Magic Dance” conjures a spectrum of various levels of personhood, with varying levels of subjectivity and objectivity appearing as concurrent and contradictory and yet still somehow unproblematic.

    The campily clad Bowie/Jareth and the baby made to act as Toby may be played by human actors, but their approaches to performance in this scene are entirely different. Jareth is voluntarily dressed in a bricolage of apparel from across temporal contexts, in an attempt to perform the magical non-personhood of the Goblin King, while Toby, like the puppet-defined-as-powerless, performs only by the proxy efforts of those around him. The happy baby sounds that Toby seems to emit are actually performed by Bowie (according to Bowie’s commentary in “Inside the Labyrinth,” the baby actor “really buttoned its lips, so I ended up doing the gurgles”), and crew members used calming puppets behind the camera in lieu of strings to direct the baby’s attention (Saunders). With Jareth and Toby’s complicated bodies, little people in goblin suits that look indistinguishable from medium-sized puppets, and, of course, puppets operated by hand and radio signal, the musical number hosts a chaotic spectacle of beings that embody different levels of subjectivity. No one being can or cannot claim an organic autonomy as a self grounded in a natural body.

    The chorus “Dance, magic, dance” mingles and mixes the noun form of the word “dance” with the verb, coding the repeated phrase as both an imperative to dance and a description of the kind of dance performed. Our puppet goblins are of course performing a kind of magic dance, not only as dancing goblins, but, more importantly, in the expectation that we believe these material contraptions are dancing goblins, with a kind of semiotic magic animating their artificial bodies and lending them a frenetic being. The only participant in the “Magic Dance” scene that seems to be puppeted is, oddly enough, the only character that the narrative expects us to believe is entirely human: the baby Toby. The song itself is celebratory in nature, and seems to be looking forward to the completion of the theft of Toby after Sarah’s thirteen hours in the labyrinth are up, when Toby will (how, exactly, remains mysteriously unspecified) become one of the denizens of the puppet-populated goblin realm. “In nine hours and twenty-three minutes…,” Jareth whispers in a spoken interlude, “you’ll be mine” (24:55). The number begins with an exchange between Jareth and the goblins, in which Jareth reflects on the traces of the human that exist in the goblin-puppet, and on the puppeted nature of any organic whole treated as human:

    Jareth:
    You remind me of the babe.

    Goblin:
    What babe?

    Jareth:
    Babe with the power.

    Goblin:
    What power?

    Jareth:
    Power of voodoo.

    Goblins:
    Who do?

    Jareth:
    You do.

    Goblin:
    Do what?

    Jareth:
    Remind me of the babe…

    Jareth (spoken):
    Quiet! [pointing at Toby]. A goblin babe!

    (22:55)

    During the song, we see Toby’s transformation (into something Jareth can call “mine”) unfold before our eyes as he flutters between object and subject. Here his body serves more as an object-prop than as a being, tossed around by Jareth and the goblins like a football. At times, this morphing into an object is material as well as semiotic: when Jareth tosses the baby half a dozen or so feet in the air and then passes him off to a goblin henchman, the baby is replaced with either a digital or a physical model (it’s difficult to discern which, especially because the film was released during the advent of CGI, and its blending of the computer-generated with physical puppetry is rudimentary). In the forced performance of this act, Toby performs the kind of jump to which Jareth/Bowie’s lyrics allude when he and his goblins sing, “Put that magic jump on me/ Slap that baby, make him free.” The lyrics function as a kind of plea for some external animator of the body to enable impossible feats of motion, movement, and liveliness, a plea that paradoxically equates the controlled motion of the puppet with freedom, and is answered as the goblins perform wire-assisted jumps. The goblins themselves seem to understand that the baby is not so different from them, in juxtaposing their own ability to move and jump with their reference to the freedom of the baby. In one sequence, two goblins (seemingly costumed performers) use Toby’s arms as strings and puppet the child actor: in other words, two costumed humans posing as puppets that are posing as goblins playact at turning a human body into a puppet. If you’re finding that sentence hard to follow, then you’re in the ideal position to understand it.

    As an artform that deliberately dwells in the hard-to-follow, it’s no surprise that the persondrag of puppetry manifests easily in dreams. Dreamer, in a sense, perform a kind of perfect puppetry, becoming the dupes of their own duplicity in performing/puppeting the real and unreal people they dream of (and all for an audience of which they’re the only member). Shiloh Carroll notes that Labyrinth can be read as a “dream vision” in the tradition of medieval dream poetry; the film “contains many of the same elements, such as the nature of the dreamer, the dream guide, and allegorical figures” (103). The more local example, however, that Labyrinth channels in its play with dreams and reality is the work of Maurice Sendak: its final credits state outright that “Jim Henson acknowledges his debt to the works of Maurice Sendak.” The acknowledgement refers most directly perhaps to Outside, Over There, Sendak’s 1981 picture book from which Henson borrows the core plot in which a girl’s younger sibling is captured by goblins. But it’s also a reference to Outside, Over There‘s prequels, Sendak’s acclaimed picture books Where the Wild Things Are and In the Night Kitchen, both of which appear scattered about Sarah’s bedroom, and are like Labyrinth in that they complicate the line between fantasies of dreamlike childish play and reality. Both picture books rip young protagonists from their domestic lives, reinstall them in an exciting fantastical realm, and, after some chaotic adventuring, allow them to return home, refusing to comment on whether the fantastic body of the story, framed by the quotidian on all sides, was the stuff of imaginative fancy.

    And yet, Labyrinth doesn’t exactly perform the Sendak formula. Whereas Sendak refuses to say whether the fantastical journey was real or imagined, Labyrinth simultaneously confirms that, like the bodies of the puppet-people who populate its world, the journey was both real and imagined. That these are contradictory conditions is not an issue. At the end of the film, after Sarah decides that growing up does not mean abandoning all that is childish and wild, an entourage of partying puppets from Sarah’s adventures appears in her room. She does a double take in response to the visions of her closest puppet companions in the mirror, as if asking the same question that audiences familiar with the Sendak picture-book structure might be compelled to ask: “So did the stuff with the puppets actually happen?” Sarah’s puppeted friends defiantly assert their existence as the film closes, kicking off a dance party in the very real bedroom. The moment seems to resolve the matter of the puppet’s reality: they’re not puppets at all, but indeed, animated creatures with a claim to exist in the film’s world. In a blatant contradiction, however, Sarah’s room is also the site of confirmation for the “it was all a dream” approach that the film paradoxically makes possible. The astute viewer will note that Sarah’s bedroom is littered with objects that are dreamed into an adventure: each major puppet has a corresponding stuffed animal or item that Sarah seems to have dreamed into a breathing being. Jareth has two defining objects. The first, a statue of a campy performer, occupies a prominent spot on Sarah’s nightstand. The statue stands out from the picture books and teddy bears of her childhood, as if it were a recent purchase embodying a liminal, less domestic identity. Jareth’s other symbol is, in a certain sense, not Jareth’s at all. Sarah’s biological mother, who, as a pan over of some collected newspaper clippings reveals, was a Hollywood actress, is featured in one photograph pinned to Sarah’s mirror and in another with none other than David Bowie as her celebrity lover. Not Jareth, but David Bowie, the musician and performer himself.1 The newspaper clipping of Bowie and Sarah’s mother bears the legend “On-Off Romance! Back Together?” injecting a kind of semi-Elektra complex into Jareth and Sarah’s already sexually charged encounters (6:16). As if Sarah understands the photograph’s foreclosure of the reality of the puppets, she examines it and tucks it away in a desk drawer, just before she communes with the specters of her puppet friends in the mirror—who, as mentioned, shortly reveal themselves to be more than specters.

    Sarah is not so different from the masses of children watching the film in 1986: her gradually nuancing sexuality is stimulated by her erratic consumption of the texts around David Bowie, and her exposure to Bowie’s play with gender and personhood seems to have opened the door to a fantastical world. It’s a world where one is always unsure who is the puppeteer and who is the puppeted; who is the creator and who is the perceiver; who is the real, historical musician and who are the identities read onto that body. The dream, in this sense, becomes the ultimate triumph of persondrag: the person pulling the strings is asleep, and the dream-persons that the deeply latent places of the dreamer’s mind breathe life into can hardly be said to be animated by the dreamer as an active agent. But then who is the subject animating them? The first material referent (the real David Bowie), the second material referent (the real David Bowie playing the real David Bowie in Labyrinth’s photograph), the puppeteer intermediary (Sarah), the Bowie-amalgam she puppets in dreaming (Jareth), the armies of puppets that Jareth strings along, or the person at the beginning of this headache of a chain: the first material referent, in our case, David Bowie? Power, life, and agency seem to come from nowhere once the puppet is brought into play, as if an agentless passive voice whispered these things into being. It becomes necessary, then, to perform a simultaneous confirmation that the puppet world is both real and not real, that its inhabitants are both objects and subjects who are not eradicated by this contradiction, but created by it.

    The Plastic Ones, the Flesh Ones, The Young Ones

    Labyrinth draws on the ontological ambiguity of the punk and the puppet by inviting the human into the fantastical realm of the material other. Yet, the unsorted subjectivities of the punk and the puppet demand that we also examine the opposite case: the materially othered being crossing over into the domestic realm. The 1982-84 British sitcom The Young Ones follows a group of four subcultural miscreants living in a London where punk-puppets have made the fear of invasion a reality, shattering the quotidian with spontaneous animation and visual hijinks. Evan Smith describes The Young Ones as “an over-the-top and surreal portrayal of student life” in which we can locate “the zeitgeist of Britain under Margaret Thatcher” (14-15). It’s tempting to suggest that The Young Ones, in throwing the orderly systems of the Thatcher-era English bourgeoisie into disarray, harbors a residual fear of invasion by rebellious youth subcultures, but this fails to acknowledge that The Young Ones treats the invasion as already complete. A seemingly infinite army of costumed figures, hybrid puppets, Eastern European immigrants, men chained to rafts, and musical celebrities populate the teeming liminal spaces between the not-quite private space inside the walls of the young ones’ rundown home and the public space of the world beyond it. Anyone from a sentient broom to an anti-terrorist task force to Buddy Holly hanging upside down as if he were a puppet can freely navigate what would seem to be private space as if were public. Even without the fantastic interruptions by those hybrid and prosthetically-adorned humanoids lurking in and bursting forth from the walls, the titular characters themselves realize the fear that the subcultural would undermine the hegemonic. These “students” mostly stand in for archetypal (and silly) personages associated with subcultures: Neil the hippie, Rick the socialist intellectual youth, and Vyvyan the punk (while their fourth roommate, Mike, is something of a generic cool guy and a semi-straight man). With the extravagant material of their costumes (studded stars, tiny ponytails, wigs, eccentric clothes) and the aimlessness of their pursuits, the boys are just like the puppets that populate their space: angry, angsty, and stomping all over the image of the nuclear family grounded in the home.

    Any household object in The Young Ones reserves the uncanny right to animate itself at any moment, with clever cuts of the camera swapping out models for puppets or humans in wearable apparatuses that reside somewhere between puppet and costume, as if it were useless to try to differentiate between them. At the beginning of the second episode, “Oil,” the young ones move into the rented house where they’ll perform a twisted parody of domesticity for the rest of the series. A dime-store “The Thinker” statue knockoff, perfect for a tiny garden, and a colorful sunflower flank the boys’ front porch, suggesting an odd twist on domestic tranquility that the audience is well aware will be destroyed by their antics henceforward. With no warning, the garden variety statue becomes animate and complains to itself in a vernacular that contrasts with its philosophical pose. “More bloody students?” it grumbles to the sunflower peeking over its shoulder (1:40). The flower’s brown center disc morphs into rough eyes and a mouth, and it snaps back: “Oh, shut up, and put some clothes on!” The domestic objects of the garden have found their voices, and they sound nothing like the signs they’ve been mythologized into by a bourgeois world. Straying out of their symbolic context, time, and space, the material beings resist their status as the never-signifying and always signified; they grow mouths at will to define themselves, and they define themselves as they see fit.

    The mythologies around quotidian objects, then, in a very dramatic sense, immaterialize: without hesitation a carrot heartlessly abandons his lover, a stick of butter, after Vyvyan crushes her with a plate and in spite of her heart-wrenching plea, “Darling carrot? Could you ever love a cripple?” (“Boring,” 19:48). The critters that crawl through these walls aren’t compelled by cheese and definitely don’t sleep in matchbooks like the tame postwar protagonist of Tom and Jerry. They proudly munch on the poetry of high culture as if it were worth nothing more than the material it’s printed on. One rat crudely muses, “I managed to nibble away at a few lines of Hippolytus the other day,” to which the other responds snarkily, “Oh, lucky you! Euripides is my dream poet” (“Demolition,” 6:30). Even the word “Euripides” is stripped of its semiotic stickiness of culture and context and boiled down to its material (in this case, sound), in the form of a punny knock-knock joke whose punch line is “Euripides trousers, you-menda-dese trousers!” by the puppet-rodents. They treat all culture as material substance and all material substance as worthy of disposal down the same digestive system. This is especially evident when one of the rats cannibalizes the body of his recently smashed friend, justifying it by saying that “It’s what he would’ve wanted.” As Kenneth Gross says of Collodi’s original Pinnochio story, the “image of the hunger of the puppet” here “even suggests a hunger that belongs to objects themselves, a desire in objects for voice, for play, for relation and use—though also their being lent a power to devour the humans who make and use them” (105). Here, the physical nonhuman item is not hungered for by the consumer, but is imagined to have a rabid, predatory hunger of its own, and threatens to undo the central tenets of object relations as it eats. Rats are, of course, unwelcome house guests, but the domestic pets are indistinguishable in their (vocally and culinarily) foul-mouthed countercultural bristle. Vyvyan’s often-puppeted hamster, named “Special Patrol Group” after the London law enforcement division, is the constant perpetrator of odor-based humor, flatulating wildly in one bean-related gag and protesting the use of Vyvyan’s deodorant on his body in another. “And was I consulted, pally?” he shouts, now visibly bearing four punky metal stars on his forehead just like Vyvyan, which the hamster has apparently picked up since his last appearance. “How do you think I feel, stinking like a student’s armpit?” (“Bomb,” 3:05). Even a box of generic corn flakes, about as everyday middle-class domestic as it gets, doesn’t hesitate to come to life and speak its mind with a crude countercultural vernacular. The white-bread suburban family branded on the box bicker amongst themselves about the artificiality of their positions; the daughter complains that, “I wish I’d had time for a crap before we started!” and her father scolds her and her brother for the subsequent argument, bellowing, “Would you two shut up and keep smiling! We’re supposed to be the ideal nuclear family!” (“Bomb,” 8:24).

    The language of these material performers rings of the crass vernacular of punk speech, and the puppets’ foul-mouthedness shatters the fragile linguistic safety of domestic space. Their language is the same as the Sex Pistols’ in their infamous 1976 interview with Bill Grundy on the Today show, when Steve Jones called Grundy a “fucking rotter” on live television (ThamesTv). But this language performs a more specific kind of bricolage when erupting from the mouth of a puppet. Hebdige recalls the studies of working-class youth subcultures performed by John Clark and Tony Jefferson, who wrote that “when the bricoleur re-locates the significant object in a different position within [a characteristic form of] discourse, using the same overall repertoire of signs, or when that object is placed within a different total ensemble, a new discourse is constituted, a different message conveyed” (qtd. in Hebdige 104). Grounding this rewiring of sign-systems in examples, Hebdige notes that “the mods could be said to be functioning as bricoleurs when they appropriated another range of commodities by placing them in a symbolic ensemble which served to erase or subvert their original straight meanings” (104). By giving the puppet a lexicon of swear words couched within the cadences of the working class, The Young Ones shatters the friendly-domestic mythology around the puppet in the contemporary Western world—it would be difficult to imagine, after all, Henson’s Muppets, the cast of Sesame Street, or even the puppets of Labyrinth using this kind of language.

    Though the puppets of The Young Ones are certainly bricoleurs, the fact that they are objects that speak at all performs an even more powerful kind of bricolage—especially when they’re domestic objects that barely resemble creatures, as Henson’s creations at least try to do. Though the speech act is so ubiquitous amongst humans that the signification of agency and subject-hood granted to the speaker often goes unnoticed, the should-be inanimate object complicates the authority and subjectivity associated with the speech act by maintaining its object-ness while speaking like a subject. Like the subcultural mod’s use of the capitalist prop of the tie, the teddy boy’s appropriation of Edwardian dress, and the punk’s semiotic sharpening of the domestic safety pin, the puppet re-signifies, but it re-signifies the speech act itself. It does so by dragging speech out of subjectivity and allowing those things that should not have voices to speak (and speak raunchily). As Connor puts it, “the shifting conditions of vocalic space are illustrated…in the curious, ancient, and long-lived practice of making voices appear to issue from elsewhere than their source” (13). The puppet exists out of time, place, and possibility when its material body speaks in this shifting vocalic space, but that same material paradoxically reminds us that the puppet is present and grounded in the present.

    Though the act of speaking by an object may be revolutionary in nature, it does not dictate the content of the puppet’s speech. At times, the objects in The Young Ones that animate themselves into existence do so in an over-the-top eagerness to fulfill their roles as servile objects. Their parroting of the language of servility emphasizes the object’s instrumentality, but at the same time eliminates the grounding for that instrumentality in speech. The declaration of its inherent uselessness and status as an object, as opposed to a subject, presents a message with one specific claim and a medium with a contrasting claim; the language says one thing and the act of speaking in language says another. By hyperbolizing the language of self-denial, the performance of the ability to speak contrasts disarmingly with the self-deprecating words that are said, a kind of bricolage that intersects with the logic of the appropriation of the tie. Both the puppet and the subcultural bricoleur appear as impossible beings, and the contrast between the words of some of these self-denying puppets and the fact that they can speak at all illustrates that The Young Ones‘ puppets live in the contradiction rather than attempt to resolve it.

    The delicate dance between self-denying words and self-assertion through speech is most potently enacted in The Young Ones by those most mistreated of household objects: the cleaning supplies that make their abode in the small cupboard beneath the stairs. A hesitantly rebellious puppet sponge begins the conversation in a broom closet under the stairs, couching the terms of its rebelliousness in apologies and backtracking: “Ah, dear me, ma’am. Our whole job is to serve the young gentlemen and look out for them the best we can. But, I’m sure young master Neil do treat us very rough sometimes” (“Oil,” 19:40). The sponge’s voice is like that of a child’s, but the seemingly wiser and older Broom, who speaks like the patriarch of the cleaning supplies, sets the poor sponge straight. “And so he should, young Lucy,” he corrects the apologetic rebel. “For we love it. The complete negation of our personality, the mind-numbing servility, the eighteen-hour work day. And we expect no reward but a staircase over our heads.” “Oh, dear, yes, Lucy,” a spray can of “Pledge” chimes in. “We love it. The personal abuse is our lot, and the further back you go, the better it gets.” At the sound of Neil and Rick approaching for a “house meeting” in the broom closet, the Broom commands absolute reverence and continued servitude: “Oh, no! The young lads are coming down to beat us. Everyone on your best behavior, or you’ll have me to answer to.”

    The two parental puppets send contradictory messages in their speech, exemplifying the very rebellious behavior they detest by speaking, but speaking to express their disapproval of rebellious behavior. These puppets undermine the subcultural young ones who are their masters by drawing attention to the callousness with which the masters treat them in their pathetic existence. But beneath this seemingly pro-puppet, anti-punk understanding, they embody many of the values of the punk, hippie, and more broadly anarchist movements the boys stand for. Were it not a joke, the puppets’ almost academic precision in explaining the instrumentalization that is regularly performed on their bodies, paired with their decidedly un-critical and comfortable acceptance of their objectification, would make even a lukewarm Marxist cringe. Their bricolage is a strange one that taunts the seemingly stable mythologies of objects into which bourgeois logic shepherded both people and materials, by eliminating these objects’ limits and exaggerating their complacency.

    The puppet’s role as violator and critic of domestic space and domestic material does not prevent those characters who seem to be coded as human from breaking the rules as well as the architectural structures that mirror those rules. The boys in The Young Ones are constantly smashing through the barriers of their own space, so frequently intruding upon one another by crashing through cabinets, walls, and doors that they almost never take notice of the intrusions of puppets and costumed characters. Labyrinth and The Young Ones only seem to differ in the distance with which they hold the domestic and normative world away from the subcultural one. But they share a common ground in their eventual illumination of a spectrum of personhood that ultimately complicates the organic unity of the human being in a spectacle of persondrag. The material otherness of the puppet serves more to complement the material otherness of the young subculturals than it does to distinguish the puppets from them. As if he were made from felt and fur instead of skin and bones, Neil’s body takes an absurd amount of slapstick damage without any real or lasting repercussions. As The Young Ones Production Manager Ed Bye puts it in the show’s twenty-fifth-year anniversary documentary, all of the show’s “cartoon violence actually kind of worked, because in cartoons people get smashed to pieces and then four seconds later they’re alright again, and there was a lot of that going on in the The Young Ones, I mean, well, obviously otherwise they’d all be dead” (“25 Years”). Poor Neil, almost always the butt of the joke and the target of the fist or projectile, was particularly prone to this cartoon violence from which only the non-human body can regenerate. Toward the end of “Boring,” after a demon impales his head with a metal skewer, Neil wanders around unaware of his injury, telling Rick, “I’m just going down to the local paper shop, okay?” When he meanders outside, he notices the long spike and removes it, musing out loud to the camera, in a calm monotone, “that’s funny, I don’t remember ramming this skewer into my head” (30:50). This is a comparatively ordinary incident in Neil’s life. In “Interesting,” Neil takes a drag of marijuana and literally gets high, as visible wires raise him to the moon. He’s puppeted through the cosmos, where two astronauts comment from a rocket-ship model that “it’s like that song by David Bowie,” and jokingly recite lyrics from Bowie’s “Space Oddity,” mumbling, “hey, look…the planet Earth is blue and there’s nothing we can do” (“25:40”). Neil finally arrives at the moon, where two puppeted robot-alien creatures blast him with dynamite. Surprised that it has no effect on his body, one robot laughs out, “Hey, that hippie must be really out of it.” Like Bowie’s Ziggy Stardust and Jareth, Neil is otherworldly, and like the bodies of the puppets in Jareth’s court, Neil’s otherworldly body is animated in ways a normal humans cannot be and, we’re asked to believe, made of materials that are not human. “I’m gonna hide in the wall cavity and pretend to be thermal insulation,” Neil muses aloud in “Demolition,” when the authorities demolish the boys’ first home. His fantasy is really to be human—that his body might finally be destroyed like the human he wishes he could be when the authorities come to demolish the house. Neil fulfills the maxim laid out by Margaret Williams: “the death or suicide of the puppet is a recurring theme in puppetry, since it exposes the problematic nature of the puppet’s ‘life’” (18). The material of his body, which is more text than it is flesh, “remains a human form, able to be empathized with,” as Williams says of the suicidal puppet, “and to be revived and to ‘die’ all over again at the next show” (18).

    As the obvious representative of the punk scene, Vyvyan’s person is also defined by the material his body is adorned in and, in a sense, composed of. The back of his vest, which reads “VERY METAL,” can be understood in more than one way. In addition to the obligatory bricolage of punk memorabilia (the metal studded belt and vest, Doc Martens, three-pointed Mohawk, and dyed hair), Vyvyan wears a lock on a steel chain and bears four metallic stars which seem to be grafted into his forehead. He even makes these stars into a metonym of his body when he whines, “I don’t want my forehead to rust!” as his reason for exemption from grocery shopping duty (“Flood”). Like Neil’s body, his body operates as a performance object and, as such, can take a serious beating and constantly reanimate for the next show. “Oil” sees him taking a pickax to the head with no lasting consequences, but this is not the most gratuitous of injuries performed on his inhuman body. When the group goes by train to do three years of laundry, Vyvyan learns the hard way why the train has a small sign that says “Do Not Lean Out of the Window” and literally loses his head when it collides with a passing object. In spite of the gratuitous blood that jets out of a hole in his neck, Vyvyan is for the most part okay; his headless body wanders around the tracks while his impatient decapitated head plays a frustrated game of “follow my voice” (22:57). When his body finally arrives, instead of picking up the head and holding onto it for safe keeping, it kicks the head along like a child kicking a rock along the street. Next we see Vyvyan, he is, of course, in one piece, as if the accident had been no more severe than a papercut (“Bambi”).

    Even Rick’s absurdly short ponytails, pathetically chalk-drawn anarchy symbol, and menagerie of activist lapel pins emphasize the material elements of his costume as a part of his archetypal personage and physical person. Like his friends, he is immune to human death, only crumpling under the weight of violence to reanimate for the next joke. It is perhaps not a coincidence that the only flatmate who is not immune to death is Mike (the only one who is not immediately associated with a cookie cutter subcultural archetype). While most humans outside the quartet of stooges do not fall victim to the kinds of physical violence that the young ones seem immune to, they also behave like puppets. Alexei Sayle, for example, plays various essentially identical members of the Balowski family (the most prominent member being the faux-Russian landlord of the four young subculturals, Jerzei Balowski, who appears in three episodes). Every Balowski practices a humanity that is as flexible as that of Jerzei’s tenants. The only way to tell which unpredictable and volatile Balowski character he’s playing at any given moment is by the way the other characters refer to him, and what name he identifies with. The expectation that his body could signify so many different beings strips away its claim to being representative of a being and relocates the source of “being” from an innate truth grounded in the body to language and perception. Even as a human in the flesh, his perceived and muddled subjectivity is like that of the puppet: contingent, corralled, and ultimately played for kicks.

    Don’t Cut the Strings—We’re Going to Need Them

    In March 2017, the Trump administration’s proposed budget would have eviscerated funding for the public broadcasting network, which houses Sesame Street. In “Elmo Gets FIRED,” a two-minute-and-eighteen-second viral video created by What’s Trending? in advocacy of PBS, the audience witnesses Elmo sitting alone at a table while an offscreen voice informs him that, due to these budget cuts, he’s being laid off. “It does me no great joy to inform you that, due to recent cuts in government funding to PBS, you are no longer employed by Sesame Street Workshop.” Bewildered and stumbling over his words, the devastated Elmo finally manages to reply (in his high-pitched, singsong, child’s voice): “just like that? Elmo’s been working at Sesame Street for thirty-two years….Elmo doesn’t…Elmo doesn’t, Elmo doesn’t….” After waving away Elmo’s concerns about his rising rent, his access to health insurance, and the impending vacuum of educational content for children, the faceless PBS executive sends Elmo on his way. “Elmo will go bye-bye now,” the puppet concedes, but the executive interrupts him: “One more thing…leave the puppet.” Before Elmo can finish saying “Leave the puppet? What do you [mean?]” a faceless body enters the shot and tears the Elmo puppet off the performer’s hand. The human hand—still curved into a duck’s bill shape, as if it had never stopped operating the puppet now lying dead on the table—bounces offscreen, leaving behind most of the body of the being it is performing into existence. Elmo’s lifeless puppet strewn across the table, the message “PBS is an essential source for preparing children for the future” flashes across the screen, followed by “Support PBS today,” as the video fades to black.

    The Trump administration must rip the puppet off of the human hand because even on Sesame Street the puppet is a punk. This is the case in the puppet’s assault on individual human subjectivity, in its punking of the domestic fabrics and materials of the household occupied by the heterosexualized nuclear family, and in its redistribution of agency collectives (and public networks) instead of individuals (and private corporations). The puppet and its punk tendencies are an ideological threat to that administration. Even in defeat, Elmo’s complicated intersubjectivity performs a rhetorical battle with the Trump administration. As his body falls, the actant network that Elmo was a part of lives on, embodied by the now homeless hand of the puppeteer, able to retreat, rethink, and rematerialize elsewhere. All the while, the limp body of Elmo, in twenty-two excruciating seconds of motionlessness, grates against our usual experience of the frenetic and upbeat puppet, pulling at the heart-/puppet strings of anyone who is attached to Sesame Street. Margaret Williams says that, in Phillipe Genty’s untitled performance in which a puppet commits suicide by cutting its own strings, the puppet’s “reduction to object status is incomplete…it still retains that ‘after-life’ that lingers around any figure with which an audience has emotionally identified” (18). Like Genty’s puppet, Elmo’s body was never charged with a biological life, and yet, as it lies on the table, it has never looked more dead and never been more alive.

    Of course, there is a risk of overstating the comparison here between Elmo’s body and real bodies: the bodies at risk of being owned, mastered, deported, and sanctioned as a result of the political and social turmoil in our very real world are not, unfortunately, like those of the superhumanly regenerating Young Ones stars, which can bounce back from any injury, or like Elmo’s, which can survive, in some state, the fracturing of its operator and its husk. But, like those cartoonish bodies, these real bodies at risk of being made into objects can resist by animating themselves and by speaking. In many cases, resistance is performed by the simple condition of the material presence of their animated bodies that testifies to their status as subject. And when more direct forms of resistance are compromised, the specter of the punk-puppet and its disruptive persondrag suggests an alternate narrative that could inspire any number of plans for resistance—plans that find a power in being puppeted when being the puppeteer is not an option. The puppet’s strings are, after all, not a tool by which some “puppet master” controls the puppet. They are, rather, tethers to lives of levity beyond the physical and its embodied restrictions, lives that, like Kleist’s marionettes, “possess the virtue of being immune to gravity’s force” and, “like elves, the puppets need only to touch upon the ground” as a point of departure, and then “the soaring of their limbs is newly animated through this momentary hesitation” (Kleist 24). Elmo, in communication with a long and nuanced tradition of the contradictory figure of the puppet and its assault on traditionally inflexible configurations of meaning, has shown us just such a point of departure. Our challenge, then, is to learn how to renew that flight during a momentary hesitation.

    Footnotes

    1. Even in the A. C. H. Smith novelization and its tie-in manga series by Forbes and Lie, both of which call the Jareth character Jeremy, the character is very much like Bowie: Sarah swoons at his associations with culture, his European sensibilities, and the degree of fame he enjoys that makes it necessary to dodge paparazzi.

    Works Cited

    • “Bambi.” Directed by Paul Jackson. The Young Ones: Extra Stoopid Edition, series 2, episode 1, BBC Video, 2007. DVD.
    • Barbaro, Michael and Megan Twohey. “Shamed and Angry: Alicia Machado, a Miss Universe Mocked by Donald Trump.” The New York Times. 27 Sep. 2016.
    • Barthes, Roland. “Lesson in Writing.” Image, Music, Text. Edited and translated by Stephen Heath, Fontana Press, 1977, pp. 170-178.
    • “Bomb.” Directed by Geoff Poesner. The Young Ones: Extra Stoopid Edition, series 1, episode 4, BBC Video, 2007. DVD.
    • “Boring.” Directed by Geoff Poesner. The Young Ones: Extra Stoopid Edition, series 1, episode 3, BBC Video, 2007. DVD.
    • Bowie, David. “David Bowie Interview-Ellen Degeneres [sic].” Dailymotion, uploaded by Susan Jobe, 12 Jan. 2016. https://www.dailymotion.com/video/x3lyg53.
    • Butler, Judith. Bodies that Matter. 1993. Routledge, 2011.
    • Carroll, Shiloh. “The Heart of the Labyrinth: Reading Jim Henson’s Labyrinth as a Modern Dream Vision.” Mythlore, vol. 28, no. 1, Fall/Winter 2009, pp. 103-113.
    • Connor, Steven. Dumbstruck: A Cultural History of Ventriloquism. Oxford UP, 2011.
    • “Demolition.” Directed by Paul Jackson. The Young Ones: Extra Stoopid Edition, series 1, episode 1, BBC Video, 2007. DVD.
    • “Elmo Gets FIRED (PARODY).” Written by Alex Firer and Adam Bozarth. What’s Trending, 2017, www.whatstrending.com/video/23876-elmo-gets-fired/. “Flood.” Directed by Paul Jackson.
    • The Young Ones: Extra Stoopid Edition, series 1, episode 6, BBC Video, 2007. DVD. Forbes, Jake T., and Chris Lie. Return to Labyrinth. 4 vols. TokyoPop, 2006-2010.
    • Gross, Kenneth. Puppet: An Essay on Uncanny Life. The U of Chicago P, 2011.
    • “Grouch Apprentice, Episode 4104.” Directed by Kevin Clash, Ken Diego, Victor DiNapoli, Jim Martin, Ted May, Lisa Simon, and Emily Squires. Sesame Street. Season 36, Amazon PrimeVideo, 2005. https://www.amazon.com/Grouch-Apprentice-Episode-4104/dp/B002T33IOG/ref=cm_cr_arp_d_product_top?ie=UTF8
    • Hebdige, Dick. Subculture: The Meaning of Style. Routledge, 1979.
    • Henson, Jim, director. Labyrinth. Lucasfilm Ltd., 1986.
    • “Interesting.” Directed by Paul Jackson. The Young Ones: Extra Stoopid Edition, series 1, episode 5, BBC Video, 2007. DVD.
    • “Journey through the Labyrinth: The Quest for Goblin City.” Directed by Michael Gillis., MogoMedia Inc., 2007. Labyrinth (30th Anniversary Edition), Sony Pictures, 2016. DVD.
    • Kleist, Heinrich von. “On the Marionette Theater.” Translated by Thomas G. Neumiller, The Drama Review, vol. 16, no. 3, Sep. 1972, pp. 22-26.
    • McRobbie, Angela. “Second-Hand Dresses and the Role of the Ragmarket.” Zoot Suits and Second-Hand Dresses: An Anthology of Fashion and Music, edited by Angela McRobbie, Macmillan, 1989, pp. 23-49.
    • “Nasty.” Directed by Paul Jackson. The Young Ones: Extra Stoopid Edition, series 2, episode 3, BBC Video, 2007. DVD.
    • NBC News. “The Third Presidential Debate: Hillary Clinton And Donald Trump (Full Debate) | NBC News.” YouTube, uploaded by NBC News, 19 Oct. 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=smkyorC5qwc.
    • “Oil.” Directed by Paul Jackson. The Young Ones: Extra Stoopid Edition, series 1, episode 2, BBC Video, 2007. DVD.
    • Piris, Paul. “The Co-Presence and Ontological Ambiguity of the Puppet.” The Routledge Companion to Puppetry and Material Performance, edited by Dassia N. Posner et al., Routledge, 2014, pp. 18-29.
    • @realDonaldTrump (Donald Trump). “Every poll, Time, Drudge, Slate and others, said I won both debates-but heard Megyn Kelly had her two puppets say bad stuff. I don’t watch.” Twitter, 15 Oct. 2016, 7:22 p.m., https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/654844831903170560.
    • —. “Megyn Kelly has two really dumb puppets, Chris Stirewalt & Marc Threaten (a Bushy) who do exactly what she says. All polls say I won debates.” Twitter, 15 Oct. 2016, 7:00 p.m., https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/654839227612549120.
    • Saunders, Desmond, director. Inside The Labyrinth: The Making of Labyrinth. Nelson Entertainment, 1987.
    • Sendak, Maurice. In the Night Kitchen. 1970. HarperCollins, 1996.
    • —. Outside Over There. 1981. HarperCollins, 1989.
    • —. Where the Wild Things Are. 1963. HarperCollins, 2012. Print.
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    • Smith, Evan. “‘I hope you’re satisfied, Thatcher!’: Capturing the Zeitgeist of 1980s Britain in The Young Ones.” Agora, vol. 49, no. 4, 2014, pp. 14-22.
    • ThamesTv. “Swearing |Sex Pistols interview |Today Show |Thames TV | 1976.” YouTube, uploaded by ThamesTv, 28 May 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LtHPhVhJ7Rs. “25 Years: Young Ones Silver Jubilee.” The Young Ones: Extra Stoopid Edition. BBC Video, 2007. DVD.
    • Williams, Margaret. “The Death of ‘the Puppet’?” The Routledge Companion to Puppetry and Material Performance, edited by Dassia N. Posner et al., Routledge, 2014, pp. 18-30.
    • Wright, Julie Lobalzo. “David Bowie: The Extraordinary Rock Star as Film Star.” David Bowie: Critical Perspectives, edited by Eoin Devereux et al., Routledge, 2015, pp. 230-244.

  • On Being Worthy of the Event:Four Fukushima Stoics

    Margherita Long (bio)

    Abstract

    This essay reads the testimonies of four Fukushima women interviewed by journalist Iwakami Yasumi in the summer and fall of 2011. At the time, mandatory evacuations had emptied the zones closest to the triple meltdowns, but people in surrounding areas were left to decide for themselves: should they stay at their ancestral homes, or flee to protect their bodies? These four women are inspiring as leaders and as activists because of their ability to think beyond the crippling dichotomy and become worthy of Fukushima as an “event” in the sense explored by Deleuze in The Logic of Sense (1969).

    ________

    After three reactors at the Fukushima Dai’ichi Nuclear Power Station melted down in March 2011, the Japanese government issued mandatory evacuation orders for the twenty-kilometer radius around Futaba, the plant’s host town. In April 2011 the government evacuated two additional towns outside this radius, Iitate and Katsurao, located under the plume that had spread northwest after the explosions.1 People in these zones had no choice but to leave. But what about people living just outside the zones, where radiation readings were also high, yet the government was offering no compensation for relocation? Should they stay or should they go? This essay reads a series of interviews conducted by journalist Iwakami Yasumi in the summer and fall of 2011. Iwakami’s interviewees hail mostly from the cities of Iwaki, Fukushima City, and Kōriyama, which are 40, 55, and 60 kilometers respectively from Fukushima Dai’ichi. A subset of interviewees is from the areas around Kawauchi-mura and Tamura-shi, 30 and 35 kilometers away. In all these places, disagreements about the implications of staying or going were tearing communities apart. Iwakami laments:

    By that summer [. . .] Fukushima was divided [and . . .] elements from both groups had begun quarreling. Among those who evacuated there were many who got called “traitor” (uragirimono) by those who had decided to stay. In turn, many of them were criticized by those who advocated evacuation. “How can you not consider the children?” they demanded. It was a painful sight to behold, these mutual attacks by groups that had both been victimized by the nuclear accident. (5-6)

    Iwakami is the founder of an internet-based independent television station called Web Iwakami, which flourished after the disaster by countering government misinformation in the mainstream media. Collecting testimonies, he wanted to access local truths and give voices to g otherwise merely be managed as a “population.”2 He conducted dozens of interviews and published them as long-form videos on the website of his media organization, IWJ (Independent Web Journal). Then, in 2012 and 2014, he published two bound volumes, titling them Hyakunin hyakuwa: One Hundred People, One Hundred Stories.3

    As an admirer of Svetlana Alexievich’s Nobel-prizewinning Voices from Chernobyl: The Oral History of a Nuclear Disaster, I was interested in reading Iwakami’s interviews as literature. As a feminist, I also wanted to read them for insights into how people were overcoming the split Iwakami describes, between a kind of materialism, namely the physical reality of children’s health, and a kind of idealism, namely the spiritual importance of the family home. To study Fukushima is to see that this split has mapped itself directly onto stark political oppositions between left and right. The left criticizes the government’s failure to acknowledge the real physical danger of radiation. The right insists that what the left calls danger is actually just “harmful rumors” (fūhyō higai) damaging the economic recovery (fukkō) and community bonds (kizuna) they idealize. Arguably, it a version of the same schism that feminist new materialism has been trying to overcome, especially in an age of climate crisis, by insisting on the importance of what Elizabeth Grosz calls “the incorporeal.” 4 The incorporeal is a concept that emphasizes the interdependence of the material and the ideal, the world of things and the world of ideas, and the harm done to both when they are conceived separately. When Iwakami uses his interviews to address the harm done by nuclear victims’ mutual recriminations, is he making a similar point–that the two sides would be better off if they stopped seeing themselves as separate?

    As I made my way through his two volumes, I was reminded repeatedly of a line from Deleuze in The Logic of Sense: “Either ethics makes no sense at all, or this is what it means and has nothing else to say: not to be unworthy of what happens to us” (149). Rather than resent the nuclear disaster as something happening to them personally, many of the people in Iwakami’s books “become worthy” of it by understanding it as something vast and impersonal. They do not put the materialism of contaminated soil, food and bodies on one side, and the idealism of safety and community on the other. Instead, they link them all together by means of what Deleuze would call “the logic of sense,” replacing the on-high moralism of nuclear judgement with an immanent ethics of day-to-day nuclear engagement.

    We see it first in the way Iwakami assembles his interviews. In the introduction to his first volume he cites as inspiration the American journalist Studs Terkel, whose oral histories he had first emulated in the early 1990s when collecting personal narratives about the dissolution of the Soviet Union. After Fukushima, Iwakami says his aim is to debunk stereotypes by means of the authenticity of “ichininshō hitori katari,” “first person singular narrative” (Iwakami, 6). However, the emphasis in the two volumes never becomes a confessional grammar; it is never the individual subjectivity of his speakers. Instead, because Iwakami allows each twenty-page narrative its own logic, the emphasis falls on the relation between the disparate voices. In quick succession we encounter people who are not only on opposite sides of the issue, but often internally conflicted themselves. Paradoxically, we feel affinity for all of them. Like Lewis Carroll’s Alice in Deleuze’s discussion of the paradox from Logic of Sense, everyone in Iwakami’s book asks, “Which way which way?” Iwakami’s point, like Deleuze’s, is that “the question has no answer, because it is characteristic of sense not to have any direction” (77).

    “No obvious direction.” How does this work, philosophically? The second place we see “sense” and “the incorporeal” replacing moral judgement in Iwakami’s volumes is in a subset of fascinating interviews that answer the question directly. These are my favorite interviewees, and the remainder of this essay is devoted to them: Saitō Hideko, Sasaki Keiko, Mutō Ruiko, and Satō Sachiko. All are women,5 all are activists, and all offer narratives that pivot on a series of recurring infinitives—”to be irradiated” (hibaku suru), “to eat” (taberu), “to get sick” (byōki ni naru), “to grow old” (toshi o toru), “to die” (shinu), “to live” (ikiru). The four women push themselves to understand both how these verbs connect the people of the event, and how they can be used to extract something useful from it for activism.

    In Deleuze, the reason “sense” has no obvious direction is that it is incorporeal: it belongs to the enigmatic but crucial philosophical category that proves the inherence of the material in the ideal, and vice versa. Deleuze acknowledges that using “sense” and the “the incorporeal” as concepts is difficult. To understand them, he says, we have to go all the way back in the history of Western philosophy, past the Platonic dichotomy between the material and the ideal, to the pre-Socratic Stoics, who put both on one side of a conceptual divide, and opened another side for what explains their relations. That is, the Stoics put both bodies and souls, both substances and qualities, on one side, and saved the other for what operates by the incorporeal “logic of sense.” Deleuze explains:

    The Stoics’ strength lay in making a line of separation pass—no longer between the sensible and the intelligible, or between the soul and the body, but where no one had seen it before—between physical depth and metaphysical surface. Between things and events. Between states of things and compounds, causes, souls and bodies, actions and passions, qualities and substances on the one hand, and, on the other, events or impassive, unqualifiable, incorporeal Effects, infinitives which result from these amalgams. (Dialogues II 63)

    What is interesting about Saitō, Sasaki, Mutō, and Satō is the way they make using “impassive, unqualifiable” infinitives seem not enigmatic and ancient but obvious and modern. Theirs is nuclear-induced Stoicism that has much to teach not only fellow Fukushimans, but everyone looking for new ways of being worthy of environmental catastrophe.

    To take the most obvious example: both within and outside of Japan, intellectuals have responded to the nuclear accident with angry incredulity toward the Japanese government’s two main responses. The first was a safety campaign, legitimized by a group of “government scholars” (goyō gakusha) who insisted raising the annual legal radiation exposure limit from 1 to 20 millisieverts in Fukushima was fine, even for children, and that increased rates of juvenile thyroid cancer beginning in 2012 and 2013 were due solely to increased screening rates.6 The second was a decontamination (josen) campaign, which allocated the lion’s share of national disaster money not to evacuations but to collecting the top six inches of soil, leaves, branches, and other organic material from all “special decontamination zones” in one-ton plastic bags that were then be stacked near the crippled reactors.7 With both responses, the government’s willful denial of radiation’s actual material properties was truly staggering. As intellectuals, should we not insist on a materialism that would take radiation seriously?

    Yet what Saitō, Sasaki, Mutō, and Satō teach us is not only that compassion for people who cannot leave is crucial, but also that the innovative thinking needed to address the disaster may require the refusal to separate reflecting on the world from living in it. Interested less in critique than in affirmation, they each find impetus in the circumstances themselves, responding not to the enormity of the disaster but to the possibility of extracting something immanent to it: something lighter and less personal, something “incorporeal.” Each manages to orient her creativity along lines of sense already traced by the event itself. Explaining how this can work, Elizabeth Grosz notes that Deleuze returns to the Stoics because it is precisely their concept of the incorporeal that allows them to locate the force of idealism within materiality:

    We think only because we are forced into invention by external exigencies on which we must rely to live, let alone prosper. Thinking does not come easily and is wrenched not only from the living being’s interior but above all from the capacity for sense that the alignment of events—these external exigencies—make possible. (149)

    Modeling the ability to wrench thought from the capacity for sense after 3.11, Saitō, Sasaki, Mutō, and Satō become worthy of the event not just to keep from resenting it, but to find out what it will allow them to think if they acknowledge their place within it, and its place within them.

    SAITŌ HIDEKO

    Let’s start with Saitō Hideko, the director of a daycare center affiliated with a hospital complex in Iwaki. Speaking about what it has meant to “take responsibility” after 3.11, Saitō objects to a recent op-ed in the local newspaper with the headline, “Now More than Ever, Let’s Eat Fukushima Produce.”8 The op-ed complains that even local customers in area restaurants are reluctant to eat food raised in Fukushima. “If the people of the prefecture don’t take the initiative [and eat it],” the op-ed asks, “what kind of thanks are they offering their supporters elsewhere in Japan” who do? (Iwakami, vol. 1: 157). This is a central controversy surrounding economic recovery in a heavily agricultural area. Saitō counters that not only do outside supporters not expect Fukushima residents to eat contaminated food, it is also not the role of ippan shimin, the general populace, to take responsibility for an accident wrought by national policies and the Tokyo Electric Power Company. She sounds full of anger and resentment, and at this moment, not particularly Stoic. Yet even though she has sent her own children to live with relatives in western Japan, she herself remains in Iwaki, which we come to realize she does to model her own version of responsibility.

    Deleuze calls events “impersonal” because they correspond to a part of the present that exceeds one’s own particular “now.” When he suggests, for instance, that every event is “a kind of plague, war, wound, or death” (Logic 151), he does not mean simply that events always happen to more than one person or entity, but rather that they never inhere in the personal, actualized moment of “I get sick,” “I shoot the enemy,” “my body is cut,” or “I die.” They inhere instead in the unlimited set of other possible actualizations or self-structurings to which this same set of conditions could give rise: to sicken (or not), to shoot (or not), to be cut (or not), to die (or not). Deleuze calls these “counter-actualizations” that are “grounded in me” but also have “no relation to me at all” (Logic 151). This is why, in Stoic thought, the bodies and passions that are causes can be described with nouns and adjectives, but the events that are their effects are always described with verbs (infinitives). One of the main arguments in The Logic of Sense is that to be worthy of the event is to attune oneself to the simultaneity of these different temporalities, one personal and the other impersonal. As Deleuze scholar James Williams explains, “We have to express the event in its eternal significance and we have to represent it in its present happening” (144).

    In Saitō’s narrative we discern at least three separate events: “to feed,” “to irradiate internally,” “to sicken.” She relates that, as a daycare director, she “can not take responsibility for other people’s . . . children based on government assurances of ‘no immediate health effects’” (158).9 So she proposes that the daycare forego local produce, even though it meets national radiation standards, and secure a regular supply from Nara Prefecture in Western Japan. This, however, results in yet another dilemma. Hearing about the daycare’s dietary precautions, and also that it has removed contaminated soil from its play area, a number of parents who never left Iwaki move their children to Saitō’s school. They also telephone friends who have evacuated and convince them to return and enroll in Saitō’s school. Saitō worries that this makes her a hypocrite. “Right here, right now,” she says, “I’m proud to be taking some degree of definitive action. But when I think about looking back at myself in five or ten years to ask whether what I did was right or wrong, I worry” (Iwakami, vol.1: 159).

    The phrase “right here, right now” hints at Saitō’s investment in “representing the event in its present happening.” But what does it mean to “express it in its eternal significance”? At first Saitō seems to be judging herself; she tries to solve her dilemma by imagining herself looking back with the understanding of hindsight. Yet her gesture of splitting time into two categories can also be said to correspond to a key gesture Deleuze admires in the Stoics: their division of time into Chronos and Aion, the corporeal present and the incorporeal past-future.10 When parents phone their friends to say the Iwaki daycare is safe, and when op-ed writers say the same about Fukushima food, they are seeing, in Saitō’s words, “only what is right in front of their eyes” (158)—the immediacy of Chronos. The Stoic trick, and indeed the trick that Saitō exhibits, is in addition to cultivate an appreciation for the way the present never exhausts events because, as Deleuze says, “there is a part of them which their accomplishment is not enough to realize, a becoming in itself which constantly both awaits us and precedes us” (Dialogues II 65). This becoming awaits us in the eternal past-future of Aion, an immaterial well of difference to which Deleuze says we can only gain access if we constantly replay the event, like an actor who knows her role is always there to be played differently by others.

    In Saitō’s narrative, these others appear at two key moments. She says, first:

    Four years ago we went to Hiroshima, visiting the Genbaku Dome and Museum, and having the opportunity as a family to talk about what took place there. If not for that experience, I think I would have been much more resistant to acknowledging my fear of radioactive contamination. (155-156)

    Saitō traces her ability to stay in Iwaki and lead the daycare creatively to having pondered the photographs and exhibits of the Hiroshima Peace Museum. There, she saw firsthand how the infinitive “to be irradiated” was played out in hundreds of lives before hers. We sense her thinking about a similar impersonality of events in the future when she then relates:

    During Golden Week in May my son and I were eating okonomiyaki in Himeji [where he is living with my relatives when] the conversation turned to whether we should sprinkle it with aonori (shredded seaweed). We decided on just a little, since it tends to stick to your teeth. But then quite a lot stuck to our teeth, and we laughed that this must be exactly what’s meant by ‘there is no particular threshold’ (shiki’ichi ga nai), just like with radioactivity. Sometimes you use lots of aonori and none sticks, and other times you’re careful to use only a little and your teeth get covered.11

    The metaphor gives voice to a Stoic insight easily lost in polarized post-3.11 thinking, namely that the relations between “to ingest,” “to be irradiated,” and “to sicken” will be actualized differently in every body that performs them. This is what it means for Stoic thought to find its origins in what Grosz calls “the capacity for sense that the alignment of events—these external exigencies—make possible” (149). Depending on this alignment, sense, in both of its senses, as meaning and as material orientation, will direct itself differently, and outcomes will change. The crucial difference between this insight, and the much crueler biopolitics of “letting die” a small but inevitable percentage of the irradiated population, is positionality. As Deleuze writes, “[t]he eternal truth of the event is grasped only if the event is also inscribed in the flesh” (Logic 161). He continues, introducing the keyword “counter-actualization”:

    But each time we must double this painful actualization by a counter-actualization which limits, moves, and transfigures it. . . . Counter-actualization is nothing, it belongs to a buffoon when it operates alone and pretends to have the value of what could have happened. But, to be the mime of what effectively occurs, to double the actualization with a counter-actualization, the identification with a distance, like the true actor and dancer, is to give to the truth of the event the only chance of not being confused with its inevitable actualization. (161)

    When Saitō and her son act out the statistics of “sticking” and end up with their teeth covered, it is a painful actualization of the way in which their exposure may already be wreaking havoc on their health, and even more so on the health of friends who have not evacuated. But when they double this possibility with its non-stick inverse, they also connect it to the variability of what is “effectively occurring” in Fukushima: a counter-actualization in which many are also not getting sick. In a single performance they manage to maintain both intimacy with and distance from the inevitability of cancer and all the other illnesses caused by long-term internal exposure to radiation. To borrow James Williams’s language, Saitō and her son are “willing the event” by “conduct[ing] [its] intensity . . . while resisting [its] . . . compulsion to confirm injuries, ideas and values as final and inevitable” (140).

    SASAKI KEIKO

    Let’s turn next to retired teacher and activist Sasaki Keiko, a native of Fukushima City. Now in her sixties, Sasaki might be said to have been grasping the eternal truth of the event “to be irradiated” for four full decades.

    In her twenties, she marched in the streets to protest the construction of the nuclear plant at Futaba. It was built. Ten years later, she rallied anti-nuclear study groups and lectures. Nevertheless Fukushima elected a pro-nuclear governor, Satō Eisaku. After Chernobyl, when Governor Satō agreed to allow the Futaba plant to add an even riskier “fast breeder” reactor to burn reprocessed mixed-oxide fuel, Sasaki and her comrades picketed the prefectural government. This time, to their delight, Governor Satō changed his mind. But his refusal angered the nuclear industry and the national government so much that he was arrested on politically motivated bribery charges, and his successor quickly acquiesced.12 At this point Sasaki herself ran for prefectural assembly, lost, and then helped form an activist group for peace and the environment.13 At the time of the earthquake, her group had begun staging daily silent vigils at the prefectural capital to protest the 2010 implementation of the fast breeder plan, holding giant banners that read “No Second Chernobyl” and “Don’t Make Fukushima a Nuclear Dumpsite.” After 3.11 she continued these vigils.

    In her interview with Iwakami, Sasaki invokes the politician Hachiro Yoshio, who had recently lost his job because he referred to the specter of evacuated hometowns as shi no machi—towns of death.14 Having been appointed Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI) by incoming Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko on 2 September 2011, Hachiro made his fateful remarks during a visit to the towns of Futaba and Namie on 9 September. Upon his return to Tokyo, he is also said to have joked to an Asahi Newspaper reporter that he would “share the radiation” emitted by his clothing. Within the week he had tendered his resignation. Yet Sasaki notes that she embraces the term “town of death.” Speaking about her own town, Fukushima City, she says she thinks families with young children should leave, and seniors, who are “dull” (nibui) to the effects of radiation, and whose generation is responsible for the disaster, should stay. Where her definition of shi no machi parts company with Hachiro’s is in its insistence on the ability of death’s impersonal, incorporeal dimension to generate new ways of thinking about how to live:

    I myself have appealed to seniors to be the first to do what they can, and have drawn up a proposal called “Senior Paradise Fukushima Plan,” calling for the cooperative creation of a safe environment with sponsored employment and community policing, to be paid for primarily by a self-governing body. I want to build a system that would give seniors a reason to live, and on which they would want to stake those lives, and live them out. It would be like a special development zone, a hometown so unique that seniors from other prefectures would want to live here too. (179-180)

    Sasaki’s plan to convert her “town of death” into a paradise that would draw seniors from other prefectures is wonderfully absurd. Repurposing the neoliberal idea of a “special development zone,” she imagines Fukushima City as a site for counter-actualizing death with life. Here, growing older and slower will mean growing more purposeful and more lively. How is she able to imagine this?

    Deleuze would say she can do it because she knows how to be “led back to the surface” – how to reject both philosophical heights and philosophical depths (136). In The Logic of Sense, the term “philosophical heights” refers to the idealism of Plato, “he who leaves the cave and rises up” (127). The term “philosophical depths” refers to Plato’s predecessors, the pre-Socratics, who never left the cave—who “sought the secret of water and fire [and] philosophized with a hammer” (128). In Fukushima in 2011, Hashiro Yoshio strikes us as something of a pre-Socratic, his humor (“Contamination!” “Certain Death!”) not only falling flat but swiftly censured by on-high Platonic officialdom. In contrast, when Sasaki sets out to think “what we can do as seniors,” her humor succeeds by tracing its way to the surface of the same state of affairs. Interested neither in relegating death to a safe outside, nor in immersing herself in it, she thinks rather about all the ways it might be played out by people already oriented along its axis: already sensing it. Given that, for “us seniors,” “to die” is both immanent and limitless, why should it not include sponsored employment and community policing? This is her utterly original question, and she answers it in the affirmative. Certainly! Why not? It is a good example of what Deleuze means when he says it is “characteristic of sense not to have any direction” (Logic 77). “To die” means both to grow older and younger at the same time. It also shows why Deleuze says Stoic thinkers are funny: “humor is the co-existence of sense with non-sense” (Logic 141).

    It is interesting to imagine what Sasaki would make of the fate of her city four years later. On my way home from a conference in September 2015, I got off the bullet train in Fukushima City, moved to visit some of the places Sasaki mentions in her narrative. I started by googling her organic-yeast bakery Papa Gēna, but an online review noted it was “closed due to the disaster.” Then I took a taxi to a residential neighborhood to find her favorite natural food cafe, “Wind and Wood” (Fū to boku), but it was shuttered. Finally at her favorite art-house cinema, Fukushima Forum, I found friendly faces. While those I met were willing to list several films that dealt with 3.11 in thought-provoking ways, they said those films were only of interest to tourists because local people cannot afford to think about radiation, especially if they have young children. In the taxi on the way to the theater my driver said the population of Fukushima City hadn’t changed much since 3.11. Right after the disaster, it dropped from 310,000 to around 250,000, but many people moved back, and the population was now around 290,000. Wikipedia corroborated his numbers. To the naked eye, the city was bustling. It was in no way the “city of death” peopled by a small but revolutionary group of seniors that Sasaki had envisioned four years earlier.

    On my walk from the theater back to the station I stumbled upon the Fukushima Office for Environmental Restoration (Fukushima kankyō saisei jimusho), funded by the Ministry of the Environment (Kankyōshō). Near the entry were a series of wide-screen displays with interactive features for answering questions and quelling fears. In low-tech contrast, the inner walls were covered floor to ceiling with painstakingly updated handwritten charts of the progress of soil decontamination (josen) in every city, town, and village in the prefecture. Many boasted “100% decontamination.”15 Given my itinerary, I couldn’t help thinking that the minority who would contest such reassurances—those who bake organic-yeast bread, for instance, or eat at natural food cafes—had long since evacuated. Historically speaking, had Sasaki’s revolutionary plan for “Senior Paradise Fukushima” not ended in colossal failure?

    This question resembles one Antonio Negri puts to Deleuze in their 1990 interview, “Control and Becoming.” Pushing Deleuze to explain how we can get from minority “becoming” to full-scale political insurrection, Negri admits, “[R]eading you, I’m never sure how to answer such questions” (Negotiations 173). Deleuze’s reply is remarkable for the way it repeats a line from Logic of Sense, in which he quotes the French poet Charles Péguy on the difference between “history” and “event”:

    What history grasps in an event is the way it’s actualized in particular circumstances; the event’s becoming is beyond the scope of History. History isn’t experimental, it’s just the set of more or less negative preconditions that make it possible to experiment with something beyond history. […] In a major philosophical work, Clio, Péguy explained that there are two ways of considering events, one being to follow the course of the event, gathering how it comes about historically, how it’s prepared and then decomposes in history, while the other way is to go back into the event, to take one’s place in it as in a becoming, to grow both young and old in it at once, going through all its components or singularities. […] They say Revolutions turn out badly. But they’re constantly confusing two different things: the way revolutions turn out historically and people’s revolutionary becoming. (Negotiations 170-71)16

    The passage invites us to consider whether we can say that Sasaki’s revolutionary becoming, as narrativized in Iwakami’s book, outlives its positive or negative actualization in Fukushima City. In other words, although Sasaki’s historical, material now is very much the starting point for her experiment, very much its source and location, there is also something immanent in that same history, something incorporeal, which history is not equipped to address and that she herself exploits. Is this not how she manages to be in the middle of a great failure of politics and thought—a massively depressing historical now—and still to practice an affirmative philosophy? Speaking with Iwakami, she jokes about converting her husband to an anti-nuclear stance (“It required a long-haul battle plan, but that’s my style!” [174]) and reminisces about when Satō Eisaku changed his position to anti-nuke (“We sent him flowers!” [173]). Her levity and joy are infectious. For her the event “to be irradiated” is ongoing, so she can always take her place in it anew.

    MUTŌ RUIKO

    Let’s meet another woman activist for whom the event “to be irradiated” began long before 3.11. Mutō Ruiko is a long-time antinuclear activist in Fukushima whom Negri would likely love for her concrete political victories. In 2012 she co-headed the “Complainants for Criminal Prosecution of the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster,” a group that in 2015 successfully petitioned Tokyo district court to hold TEPCO executives responsible for the professional negligence that led to the disaster. As Norma Field and Tomomi Yamaguchi emphasize, the resulting “Fukushima Nuclear Plant Criminal Proceeding” (Fukushima genpatsu keiji soshō) is not a civil lawsuit, of which there have been many, but an unprecedented criminal prosecution.17 Since June 2017, five court-appointed attorneys representing the state have extracted 31 days of testimony from three retired executives representing the nuclear industry. Mutō and her comrades attended all these testimonies as members of an organization they founded, Supporters of the Fukushima Nuclear Plant Criminal Proceeding (Fukushima genpatsu keiji soshō shiendan).18 If found guilty, the executives face up to five years in prison, and Mutō’s political, historical revolution will have turned out well.19 But what about her revolutionary becoming? Back in October 2011, when Mutō spoke with Iwakami, she was still in the early stages of thinking through her dilemma, and she did not mention criminal charges or TEPCO executives. Instead, we see her deep in the process of trying to grapple with the events directly, to extract what she will need to play her role.

    Mutō Ruiko’s parents were educated Marxists who grew up in Fukushima. They moved back after her father attended Waseda University in Tokyo and served in the Pacific War on Karafuto (the Russian island of Sakhalin, colonized at the time by Japan). She went to university both at Wakō Daigaku in Tokyo and in nearby Miyagi Prefecture, where she earned a second degree in special education. After twenty years as a teacher of children with intellectual disabilities, she inherited land from her grandfather in Miharu. She then worked for three years to clear the land, built an energy efficient house, and opened a small cafe. At the time of the earthquake she was living with her mother, her partner, and her dog. They had been running the cafe for eight years, experimenting with ways to use as little energy as possible, serving tea made from their own herbs and grasses and curry made from their own acorns. For light they used a kerosene lamp and for heat a wood stove. Both home and cafe were active workshops for living lightly on the earth.

    Mutō’s investment in the ethics of energy production and consumption recalls Deleuze’s assertion in The Logic of Sense that Stoicism is “a concrete [and] poetic way of life” (148). Mutō traces these ethics to the shock of Chernobyl and the subsequent books of Fujita Yūkō, which prompted her to join a group called Fukushima Network for Denuclearization (Datsugenpatsu Fukushima nettowāku). If the “eternal” side of the nuclear wound became clear for Saitō Hideko during a visit to Hiroshima, for Mutō that same vastness of temporal scale impressed itself as she attended more lectures and study groups about a massive precariat of uranium miners, plant workers, and waste haulers. In 1991 Mutō lay down in the road with 300 other protesters to stop uranium from being delivered to the Rokkasho-mura reprocessing plant in Aomori Prefecture. She was adamant that spent fuel from the two nuclear plants in her own backyard not spread its misery any further.

    In scenarios like this, what Deleuze calls Aion, the impersonal past-future of the event, is easier to discern than in Deleuze’s own examples. One of his best-known Stoic portraits in The Logic of Sense is of the WWI-wounded paraplegic and French poet Joë Bousquet, who lived his life in symbiosis with his injury, determined to become its equal. Bousquet wanted his wound to select in him only “what is best and most perfect” (148). Deleuze writes:

    Joë Bousquet must be called Stoic. He apprehends the wound that he bears deep within his body in its eternal truth as a pure event. To the extent that events are actualized in us, they wait for us and invite us in. They signal us: “My wound existed before me, I was born to embody it.” It is a question of attaining this will that the event creates in us; of becoming the quasi-cause of what is produced within us, the Operator; of producing surfaces and linings in which the event is reflected, finds itself again as incorporeal and manifests in us the neutral splendor which it possesses in itself in its impersonal and pre-individual nature, beyond the general and the particular, the collective and the private. (148)

    What does this mean? If for Bousquet the event is the crippling war injury, and if it “existed before him,” it is because he is not the first to embody such a wound, and he will not be the last. It exceeds him in the sense that there have always been and will always be particular weapons and particular wars. These weapons and wars, these bodies, become corporeal causes for all the equally particular, equally personal, equally corporeal soldier and civilian bodies that they wound. But what the Stoic appreciates is not just bodies, not just things, not just causes or passions, but also effects: the incorporeal infinitive “to wound,” which is a relation between bodies, a way of understanding their alignment, and an understanding of their connection.

    The parallel in Mutō’s case might go something like this: There have always been and will always be people who need heat and energy to do work. In an example Deleuze develops from Sextus Empiricus, “the fire, a body, becomes cause to the wood, a body, of the incorporeal predicate ‘to burn’” (qtd. in Grosz 30). What labor harvests the wood? What hands and lungs distill the kerosene? What eyes enjoy the light? What bones soak in the heat? These are particular, personal, material questions, both evoked and exceeded in the infinitive “to burn,” which establishes their relation. Mutō is comfortable with the way these questions get answered in her little cafe. She has thought deeply about what it means to be worthy of the event “to burn” in her daily life.

    In contrast, as we have seen, she is not comfortable with the way these questions get answered at the Fukushima Dai-ichi and Dai-ni nuclear power plants. She tells us that one concession her Denuclearization group did win from TEPCO was a monthly audience for such questions, where, one year prior to 3.11, they learned of a recent thirty-minute power outage. It was at about the same time in 2010 that the significantly more toxic fast-breeder reactor, Reactor Three, started burning mixed-oxide MOX fuel at Dai-ichi, and Mutō’s group had invited journalist Hirose Takashi for a lecture.20 The author of Nuclear Reactor as Ticking Time Bomb, Hirose had cited seismologists’ predictions of major tectonic plate shifts in line with the hundred-year patterns of what is known as the Tōkai earthquake series. Hirose himself had predicted a tsunami and power outage in Fukushima. This is why, when Mutō felt the earthquake on 11 March 2011, her thought as she dove under a table with her dog was, “Will the nuclear plants be okay?” It is also why, when she heard on 14 March that Reactor Three at Dai-ichi exploded, she knew its fallout would be more toxic than that of Reactor One, which had already exploded, or of Reactor Two, which would explode the following day.21 Being worthy of these events, of the infinitive “to burn,” would be much more demanding than any fire in a kerosene lamp or wood stove.

    The point is that Mutō and her friends in the Denuclearization Network were already infinitely more worthy of the events than the Tokyo Electric Power Company, which has maintained ever since that they were completely unforeseeable. What Mutō and her friends understand, and TEPCO does not, is the difference between an accident and an event. In Deleuze, Joë Bousquet says, “My wound existed before me; I was born to embody it” (Logic 148). He apprehends it in what Deleuze calls its eternal truth by thinking through the limitless past-future of war. In Iwakami, Mutō Ruiko never says, “My radiation existed before me; I was born to embody it.” But by having done such a careful job of pondering its implications—by having cataloged so diligently the relations it sets up, its effects far beyond her own body–she understood, like Bousquet, its “neutral splendor.” Was it not in this sense waiting for her, signaling her? Because it was not for her an accident, because it was eternal, she knew resentment would be useless; she knew that 3.11 was not only happening to her. Rather than be resigned to it, she would begin to will it, to replay it, in a series of narratives including the one she provides for us via Iwakami and another she provided one month prior to that interview in front of a crowd of 60,000 at the first major rally of the Sayonara Nuclear Power National Action Group in Tokyo.

    Let’s take a look at her speech on that occasion, which is remarkable because it ends with a listing of infinitives. These infinitives appear just after she has evoked the natural beauty of the landscape of her home prefecture:

    With 3.11 as the threshold,
    that same landscape was flooded with invisible radiation
    and we became hibakusha.
    In the ensuing confusion,
    various things happened to us.
    Our connections to each other were tested and broken
    by stress and [the false promises] of a hastily instituted safety campaign.
    One can only imagine peoples' vast worry and sadness:
    in their communities, their workplaces,
    their schools, and within their own households.
    And every day, the endless, pressing, compulsory decisions:
    To flee, or not. To eat, or not.
    To make the children wear masks, or not.
    To hang the laundry outside, or not.
    To till the fields, or not.
    To say something, or to remain silent.
    
    (Fukushima kara 11-13)

    Mutō prefaced these remarks in Tokyo in September 2011 by asking everyone from Fukushima to stand and to remain standing during her ten-minute performance.22 This meant that her audience could associate the devastating choices she recounted that had been made thousands upon thousands of times with the thousands of people standing. These were the people who had become hibakusha six months earlier, at the same time that they were also torn from one another [hiki sakarete i[tta]], their connections broken. The phrase “broken connections” refers to the effects not only of a safety campaign that asked them to ostracize those who did not believe its promises, but also of a paltry compensation policy that asked them to compete for insufficient state resources. What Mutō accomplishes with her infinitives is the reestablishment of these connections. By attributing the devastating choices to all those standing, she lightens and depersonalizes the individual choices, transforming the heavy moral burden faced by individual parents, farmers, and activists, into a hovering, impersonal event. Her simple poetic infinitives announce that there is no longer any wrong answer to these questions, and their impact is only the force of the sense they evoke, a force that can be extracted and used. The infinitives raise the question of how to think about time. To flee? To eat? To hang laundry? To wear masks? To till land? Mutō converts the question marks to simple declaratives, refusing the isolating neoliberal decisions of 3.11’s “present moment” and affirming the expansive past-future of these ongoing events.

    On the Left in Japan, rallies like the one that brought 60,000 people to Meiji Park in September 2011 (or that brought 170,000 to Yoyogi Park the following July) are themselves considered tremendous victories: collective exercises in democratic free speech not witnessed in mainland Japan since the collapse of the student movements in the 1960s. Yet according to Mutō, such protests are meaningless without significant intellectual work beforehand from each constituent. She tells Iwakami:

    We need to understand the degree to which we are made dependent on nuclear power without even realizing it.

    It’s something you have to think through with your own head. You can’t rely on someone else’s opinion or someone else’s idea. I personally am not that smart. So I have to really wring my brain out, and think hard to make my decisions, and then take action. I think this relates directly to the question of how to change society. [Each individual thinker] must ask from her own perspective, “What is Nuclear Power Really?” (305)

    Rather than speak truth to power, Mutō’s strategy, like Sasaki’s and Saitō’s, is to extract truth, not from those who are named in criminal cases, or from one’s politicians, but from the power of the event itself. “I think the world has changed a lot since 3.11,” she says, “and this change has come at great sacrifice. But we have been able to think about an amazing number of things, to feel them, to experience them. It’s not something for government to do. It’s for us, one by one” (308).23

    CONCLUSION: SATŌ SACHIKO

    Let’s conclude with Satō Sachiko, an organic farmer, social worker, and activist, whose interview with Iwakami is unique because it narrates Fukushima as an event less of radiation than of mental health.

    Satō was born to generations of farmers on both the maternal and paternal sides of her family in the hamlet of Kawamata-town, Iitate-village, 55 kilometers as the crow flies from the Fukushima Dai’ichi plant. At the time of the triple meltdowns she was raising the youngest two of her five children and training interns at “Sea of Mountains Nōjō,” an organic farm she founded with her husband thirty years earlier. She was also running a nonprofit welfare center for elderly and disabled people in Fukushima City, thirty minutes away by car. As she tells her story, readers slowly discern the scope of her accomplishments. In the immediate aftermath of the disaster, having relocated her family 90 minutes to the west in Yamagata Prefecture, she continued commuting to the welfare center. There, she formed a volunteer group to take radiation readings at elementary schools in Kawamata and Fukushima City and, finding the radiation levels three and five times higher than the upwardly adjusted legal limits, she successfully petitioned the prefectural government to monitor all 1400 schools in the prefecture, not just in the restricted zone. The same group supported social media platforms to facilitate communication among worried and angry parents. In April 2011 Satō launched the “Fukushima Network for Protecting Children from Radiation,” a 250-member NGO committed to “refuge [hinan], evacuation [sokai], respite travel [hoyō]” and, for children who cannot leave, “protection [bōgo]” (228). In September of the same year she traveled abroad for the first time in her life, joining representatives of other Japanese anti-nuclear NGOs in New York to address the National Press Club, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the United Nations Human Rights Commission.24 Participating in a street demonstration, she even managed to land a zinger on Prime Minister Kan Naoto as he emerged from a speech at the UN: “It’s cowardly to talk about the safety of nuclear power when you can’t protect the children of Fukushima!” (231).

    If readers discern the scope of Satō’s achievements only slowly, it is because the spotlight is stolen by the family narrative she uses to frame them. The interview begins with her recounting that, as her family fled during the meltdowns, she stopped at her mother’s grave to beg forgiveness for her decision not to endanger her children by returning again: “I want be like you mother; I want to save the children. Please forgive me” (226). We learn that her mother had suffered three major bouts of depression: first when she was in her second year of middle school and her parents both died, leaving her with an infant brother who died in her care; second, when she was a young mother and her youngest daughter almost drowned; and third, when she was a grandmother and the same daughter, pregnant during Chernobyl, gave birth to a child who later developed hydrocephalus. We also learn that Satō has struggled with depression, which she traces to her second year of middle school when she watched her mother rush into their burning house to save a sister she herself had failed to wake. These narratives underscore the pain and conflict at the heart of Satō’s activism on behalf of children. Explaining the scene at her mother’s grave, she reveals, “[Mother] would be out of the hospital for several years, then back in again, but she never recovered, and in the end she committed suicide. Thinking of the lives she had gone so far to protect (sō made mamotta inochi), I knew I had to carry them forward, and live as she had lived” (226).

    Living as her mother had lived, heroic but depressed, protecting children on a journey that threatens to veer toward suicide: this is a trajectory Satō desperately wants to avoid even as she finds herself hurtling along it, committed to its vigilance, its love, and its intensity. By launching the Fukushima Network for Protecting Children from Radiation, she effectively expands the scope of her maternal line from one family to thousands. But what are the stakes for her mental health? It is a question we could ask of all activists in Fukushima. If Deleuze’s concept of “being worthy of the event” is relevant for the triple meltdown it is because he draws a careful distinction between the kind of “crackup” that killed Satō’s mother, and the kind of “crack” we wish for Satō herself.

    In a key section in his discussion of the Stoics, Deleuze identifies alcoholism and schizophrenia as some of the modern psyche’s most devastating events, and advocates not that we cure them but that we draw a line of separation between their weighty physical and intellectual burdens and the whisper-thin, incorporeal crack that runs across their surface. This crack, Deleuze insists, is the source of crucial resources:

    If one asks why health does not suffice, why the crack is desirable, it is perhaps because only by means of the crack and at its edges thought occurs, that anything that is good and great in humanity enters and exits through it, in people ready to destroy themselves. (Logic 160)

    In March 2018, when several Fukushima activists came to Washington D.C. for a round-table at the Association for Asian Studies, I had a chance to ask after Satō Sachiko and her NGO, Fukushima Network for Protecting Children from Radiation. The activists replied that they and Satō had fallen out of touch after Satō violated an unwritten rule of grassroots activism in Japan and accepted money from a Marxist sect called Chūkaku-ha. I will end with some observations about this choice, which returns us to the problem with which we began: community division.

    Formed in 1957 during the heyday of Japan’s New Left, Chūkaku-ha is still associated with the excesses of its 1960s and 70s rivalry with another sect, Kakumaru-ha. After Fukushima, Chūkaku-ha established a network called NAZEN, short for “Subete no genpatsu ima sugu NAkusō ZENkoku kaigi” (Nationwide Association to get rid of all nuclear reactors right now!). Collaborating with NAZEN, Satō drew criticism from those who agreed with the Japanese police, which continues to classify Chūkaku-ha as a terrorist organization.25 What we appreciate from Satō’s interview with Iwakami, however, is that if there is money to help children, she does not care whether it comes from Chūkaku-ha, because the fraught history of Japanese Marxism is not the event of which she is striving to be worthy. What both fuels her activism and imperils her mental health is a different event, that of ongoing threats to children’s bodies in Fukushima, and mothers’ attempts to intervene. Reading her story we can see that what makes her special as a human being and powerful as a thinker is her ability to sidestep moral judgment and pursue an ethics immanent to the intensive care-work of parenting in a prefecture where radiation is only the most recent in a long series of challenges. In its enormity this event threatens to crack her up. Yet she strives to make it select in her something equally powerful and impersonal, maintaining her sanity by raising it up and bringing it out to the surface, to the infinitive “to care.”

    Footnotes

    1. In March 2011 the Japanese government designated the 20-kilometer radius of the plant a “restricted zone” (keikai kuiki). In April 2011 it extended the designation to include more places where annual exposures were also expected to exceed 20 microsieverts (mSv). For a timeline of these and other key policy dates, see Iwakami, Dai ishū, 341-349.

    2. For a comprehensive Media Studies account of Japan’s two main post-3.11 citizen-based online news initiatives, Web Iwakami and Our Planet TV, see Liscutin..

    3. Iwakami’s videos can still be viewed at the IWJ site for a small membership fee. See “Hyakunin hyakuwa.” Iwakami edited the final video and print versions of One Hundred People, One Hundred Stories to 59 interviews: 25 women and 34 men. The print versions are divided into two volumes published with San-ichi Shobō, the first of which is the source of the four interviews I analyze here. Translations are mine unless otherwise noted.

    4. Grosz takes the title of her most recent book, The Incorporeal: Ontology, Ethics and the Limits of Materialism, from the Stoic concept of the incorporeal as developed by Deleuze in The Logic of Sense. One of her aims is to encourage the “new materialist” feminism with which she is often associated to avoid swinging from the idealism of cultural constructivism to the vitalism of new materialism, and instead to understand materialism and idealism as mutually constitutive, each “the implicit condition for the other” (13).

    5. For additional studies that theorize women’s responses to Fukushima, see 1) Kimura, on citizen radiation-monitoring organizations both in and outside of Fukushima (sociology), 2) Slater, Morioka and Danzuka, on young mothers from Fukushima (anthropology), and 3) DiNitto on gender and nuclear containment in post-Fukushima fiction films (literature/film). All three emphasize women’s positions as arbiters of competing social/discursive and scientific/material claims.

    6. Until April 2011, the Japanese government followed standards set by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) allowing a maximum external exposure of 1 millisievert (mSv) per year for the general public and 20 mSv per year for nuclear workers. One month after the triple-meltdowns, the government raised the maximum to 20 mSv per year for the general public, including children, and 250 mSv over five years for nuclear workers. Two “government scholars” responsible for promoting the new standards were Yamashita Shun’ichi and Takamura Noboru, whose names are cited repeatedly and often angrily by Iwakami’s interviewees, many of whom attended Yamashita’s and Takamura’s public lectures in the spring and summer of 2011. Yamashita’s assurances were difficult to rebut because he had done research in Chernobyl and co-authored World Health Organization studies on its epidemiological legacy. In 2011 he was also chair of the Japan Thyroid Association. For a concise account of Japan’s shifting safety standards after Fukushima, see Normile, 909. For a discussion of how Yamashita put politics over science, see Kamanaka, 7.

    Official post-disaster thyroid cancer screenings have been conducted by Fukushima Prefecture’s “Health Management Survey” (Fukushima kenmin kanri chōsa, or FHMS). In his introduction to the second volume of “One Hundred People One Hundred Stories,” published in April 2014, Iwakami explains that in November 2013 the FHMS examined 254,000 children and found seven “definite” and nine “probable” cases of thyroid cancer. By early 2014 the numbers had risen to 33 “definite” and 41 “probable” cases. Nevertheless, the FHMS maintained that it was “difficult to think” (kangaenikui) that the increase was the effect of radiation (Dai nishū 9).

    7. In March 2012 the “restricted” zones outlined in note 1 were reclassified and subdivided by the Ministry of Environment into 1) areas expected to receive more than the allowable 20 mSv of external radiation annually, which became “difficult to repatriate zones” (kikan kon’nan kuiki), 2) areas expected to receive around the limit of 20 mSv, which became “residence-restricted zones” (kyojū seigen kuiki), and 3) areas expected to receive less than the maximum legal 20 mSv, which became “zones in preparation for the cancellation of evacuation” (hinan shiji kaijo junbi kuiki). As levels fall, the zones are recalibrated in keeping with the extension of the 20 mSv air-dose limit (see note 5). Meanwhile, the centers of the “difficult to repatriate zones” are not expected to be opened in the foreseeable future. As Iwakami notes in the 2014 introduction to his second volume of interviews, these zones, which include the seaside towns of Futaba-machi, Ōkuma-machi, and Naraha-machi, have become the primary storage site for the organic material scraped from the surface of the rest of the prefecture. One interviewee notes with sadness and irony, “They couldn’t have dreamed of a better solution to the problem of having nowhere to dump nuclear waste than an actual nuclear accident. We should have seen this coming when they chose our towns for the plants to begin with” (207).

    8. The two major local newspapers are Fukushima Minpō and Fukushima Minyū. In a recent interview, documentary filmmaker Kamanaka Hitomi explains that both papers, together with local radio and television stations, had long since abandoned investigative reporting on the prefecture’s nuclear plants because the nuclear industry had been their biggest advertiser since the plants were first constructed in the 1960s and 1970s, and negative press was taboo (Kamanaka 11).

    9. Saitō is parroting the words of Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano Yuiko, who first used the phrase “tadachi ni kenkō ni eikyō wa nai” (no immediate health effects) on 16 March 2011 after the third reactor, Reactor Two, blew up. Noriko Manabe notes that Edano “would repeat this infamous phrase on seven occasions” thereafter (49). Iwakami’s interviewees cite it frequently.

    10. As John Sellars notes, Deleuze derives the terms “Aion” and “Chronos” more directly from Victor Goldschmidt’s (1953) reading of the Stoics than from the Stoics themselves (161).

    11. P. 155. With the term “shiki’ichi ga nai” (no threshold) Saitō and her son refer to the “linear no threshold” (LNT) model for calculating risk, according to which the long-term biological damage from radiation is proportional to dose, with no dose low enough (“no threshold”) to pose zero risk. LNT has long been the dominant model used in Japan and globally to set safety standards, although competing models exist. For a history of the LNT model from a Japanese perspective, including that of the geneticists who collaborated with the US-led Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC) after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, see Onaga.

    12. Satō Eisaku served five terms as governor of Fukushima from 1988 to 2006. He suspended the MOX (Mixed Uranium-Plutonium Oxide Fuel) program in 2000 after filing a number of unheeded safety complaints, then was forced to resign in 2006 amidst charges that he had misappropriated public funds for a dam project. After the triple meltdowns, his June 2011 book The Truth About Nuclear Power in Fukushima (Fukushima genpatsu no shinjitsu) became a best-seller, as did his September 2009 book, Expunging the Governor: False Charges of Corruption in Fukushima (Chiji massatsu: Tsukurareta Fukshima-ken oshoku jiken). For the specifics on the numerous safety complaints that Satō submitted to TEPCO, see Onuki.

    13. Sasaki ran as an independent. The group she formed is called “Fukushima Wawawa no kai” (Fukushima Wawawa Association), where “wawawa” corresponds to characters meaning “environment” (環), discussion (話), and peace (和). The group’s website is www.wawawa1210.blog.fc2.com/. It was last active in 2015.

    14. On Hachiro’s gaffe see Mochizuki and Oribe; see also “Hachiro Yoshio.”

    15. The information is also kept online at http://josen.env.go.jp/plaza/. The address of the “Decontamination Information Plaza” (Kankyō saisei purazā) is ₸ 960-8031 Fukushima Prefecture, Fukushima, Sakae-machi, 1-31.

    16. Here Deleuze repeats what he says about Péguy in the ninth series of The Logic of Sense when he is talking about the difference between history and event: “Péguy clearly saw that history and event were inseparable from . . . singular points” (53) but that “singularit[ies], unlike history, are not discursive and not realized in the present: the singularity belongs to another dimension than that of denotation, manifestation, or signification. It is essentially pre-individual, non-personal, and a-conceptual” (52).

    17. Field explains, “Citizens can file a criminal complaint with the police or prosecutors when they believe that a crime has been committed but has not been pursued by the police or prosecutors. To do so is to insist that responsible parties be identified by public authorities and not just by private citizens who feel they have sustained injuries” (3). Given that neither TEPCO nor the Japanese government has acknowledged their role in causing the disaster, the criminal prosecution was not expected to go forward. For coverage in English, see Negishi and McCurry.

    18. The group’s website (https://shien-dan.org/) provides analysis of each day of testimony.

    19. The three executives were found not guilty on 19 September 2019. See Sheldrick and Kelly.

    20. This is the same MOX fuel that Sasaki Keiko and her group petitioned Governor Satō Eisaku to stop allowing. His successor allowed it after he was driven from office in 2006.

    21. The reprocessed MOX fuel in Reactor Three was more dangerous because it contained both plutonium and uranium. As science writer Natalie Wolchover explains, unlike the all-uranium fuel used in the other reactors, “Plutonium emits alpha radiation, a highly ionizing form of radiation, rather than beta or gamma radiation. External exposure to alpha particles isn’t much of a health risk, because they have a low penetration depth and are usually stopped by skin. When alpha-emitters get inside cells, on the other hand, they are extremely hazardous. Alpha rays sent out from within cells cause somewhere between 10 and 1,000 times more chromosomal damage than beta or gamma rays. According to the Environmental Protection Agency, plutonium enters the bloodstream via the lungs, then moves throughout the body and into the bones, liver, and other organs. It generally stays in those places for decades, subjecting surrounding organs and tissues to a continual bombardment of alpha radiation and greatly increasing the risk of cancer, especially lung cancer, liver cancer and bone sarcoma.”

    22. The performance is on Youtube. See Mutō “9.19.” The speech was published in Mutō’s 2012 book, Fukushima kara.

    23. In a recent essay about Mutō, Katsuya Hirano also emphasizes her role as a thinker: “For Mutō, to despair properly (kichinto zetsubō suru) is to fix one’s gaze firmly on the outrage of the nuclear disaster and continue pondering it, resolutely.”

    24. Satō recounts the journey in her 2013 book Fukushima no sora no shita de (Underneath a Fukushima sky, 128-135). Her collaborator Aileen Miyoko Smith writes about the same trip in “Bridging the Plight.”

    25. For an account of activist groups’ attempts to steer clear of a newly revived anti-nuclear New Left after Fukushima, see Kimura, 116-120.

    Works Cited

    • Alexievich, Svetlana. Voices From Chernobyl: The Oral History of a Nuclear Disaster. Translated by Keith Gessen, Picador, 2005.
    • Deleuze, Gilles. Essays Critical and Clinical. Translated by Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco, U of Minnesota P, 1997.
    • Deleuze, Gilles. The Logic of Sense. Edited by Constantin V. Boundas and translated by Mark Lester, Columbia UP, 1990.
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  • Garbage Infrastructure, Sanitation, and New Meanings of Citizenship in Lebanon

    Joanne Randa Nucho (bio)

    Abstract

    In 2015, protestors south of Beirut, Lebanon, blocked the road to the landfill in Naimeh, an improperly prepared and overflowing dumpsite that serves as a collection point for Beirut’s garbage. As piles of garbage grew on Beirut’s streets, so did a massive protest that was not defined or organized by either of the major political factions or any of the sectarian political parties in Lebanon. Why were the 2015 protests not organized along the dominant sectarian political lines? This article analyzes the protests and their aftermath to understand how a relation to shared infrastructures plays a role in the emergent forms of citizenship brought about in the protest movement.

    Naimeh, Lebanon had long borne the burden of the capital city’s trash. The local landfill, an improperly prepared dumpsite in use since 1997, was supposed to have been temporary (Abu Rish, “Garbage Politics”). Complaints about the overflowing and poorly managed site went unheeded for years. In the summer of 2015, residents of the town blocked the road leading to the landfill. This was not the first time that protestors had blocked the road, but years of broken promises by government officials made this protest more serious (ibid). Garbage throughout Beirut remained uncollected. During those weeks, mountains of garbage piled up on Beirut’s streets. Sukleen, the private company hired to carry out sanitation services, was unable to haul the garbage off to Naimeh. Out of desperation, people started burning it on the streets, releasing noxious fumes and odors into the humid summer air.

    The protests that accompanied the accumulation of garbage in the city streets were aimed at the state’s inability and unwillingness to manage public goods and services, and at the illegal extension of parliament, the subsequent deferral of the 2014 elections, and the absence of an acting president. By August, an estimated 20,000 protestors had gathered in downtown Beirut, a site that was rebuilt during post-civil war reconstruction in the 1990s as a luxury shopping destination inaccessible to most Lebanese (El Deeb and Karam). This was the largest protest in years that was not organized or backed by one of the prevailing political factions (the Sunni dominated March 14 coalition and the Shi’a dominated March 8 coalition) or by any of the sectarian political parties. The broad spectrum of protestors in attendance, presumably from different political factions, was rare in recent years. Since the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in 2005, the polarization of political factions had deepened. However, this protest defied the narrow framework that positions Lebanese politics as a binary of Sunni and Shi’a dominated politics (often reductively mapped onto regional disputes between Saudi Arabia and Iran). The protestors did not direct their critique against any particular political faction. Instead, the protestors’ critique took as its central defining feature the failure of infrastructure and thus the failure of the government itself, rather than the failure of a particular political faction. Because sect is a salient and important political category in Lebanon, it was all the more remarkable that the protests were not attached to sectarian political formations. In Lebanon, each political party is affiliated with a religious sect, and representation in parliament is based on a sectarian quota system. Aside from formal political representation, Lebanese religious courts have jurisdiction over personal status laws regulating marriage and divorce. Furthermore, many Lebanese people rely on sect-affiliated institutions for access to basic services and infrastructures.1

    What is it about coming together around the buildup of failure that compels thinking about collectivity outside of the usual ways of conceptualizing sociality through belonging or exclusion? We can approach this question using Lauren Berlant’s framework of breakdown as a “transitional” moment, a moment when new forms of being together might come into view without an insistence on sameness as the starting point for politics (Berlant, “The Commons”). The garbage crisis represents a moment in which, as Berlant writes, “just because we are in the room together does not mean that we belong to the room or each other” (“The Commons” 395). The protests that ensued when garbage collection broke down created an opening in the highly fragmented, privatized identitarian political framework. This political framework is constituted by infrastructure channels that form what Paul Kockelman might call “sieves” that produce belonging and exclusion not in terms of religious belief, but in terms of sectarian identity and identification. The protests provide an opening to a way of thinking about the terms of citizenship that does not rely on likeness, but is articulated in relation to the demand for functioning infrastructures.

    While no single coherent movement emerged from Beirut’s garbage protests, they did present the possibility for a form of collective action that neither required nor denounced a sectarian discourse of belonging, which is important, given that many of those involved presumably had attachments to sectarian identification and even to sectarian institutions. The result was that an ambiguous space opened, one of being together in opposition to the privatization and state neglect of vital infrastructures. In and through their focus on infrastructure, the Beirut garbage protests of 2015 staged new forms of relation and even demands for citizenship outside of likeness as belonging. These forms of citizenship are important to think about not only within the context of Lebanese politics, but more conceptually as well. The protestors performed something akin to what Kyle Shelton calls “infrastructural citizenship” in his work on the collaborative activism against highway construction by residents of a mainly affluent white suburb and a lower class black suburb of Houston. For Shelton, this citizenship is not defined by national belonging or by belonging to a certain community, but “by the quotidian acts residents used to construct themselves as political actors” (422). In Beirut, a new imaginary of citizenship was forged through acts of protest and civil disobedience and in the face of violent state suppression of the protestors. This connection between Houston, an American city built on histories of violent racist exclusion, and Beirut, a city that is still recovering from civil conflict and ethnic cleansing, illuminates the importance of shared infrastructures to the determination of citizenship beyond the framework of the nation-state.2

    While the 2015 protests ended without resolving the sanitation crisis in Lebanon, I take up Julia Elyachar’s provocation in “Upending Infrastructure” not to read an uprising in terms of success or failure. In what follows, I argue that the 2015 protests present the possibility of non-teleological citizenship, citizenship that is still unfolding and that does not necessarily lead to the emergence of a secular national identity, which Lebanon has allegedly “failed” to develop owing to its underlying sectarianism.3 Instead, the protestors articulated an emerging notion of citizenship attached to shared, equitably distributed and well-functioning infrastructures and services. In some ways, the idea that public goods and infrastructures can play a role in bringing people together and in creating a sense of belonging is very old.4 The difference in the Beirut protests is that this demand for functioning universally accessible infrastructure was not made in a top-down nation-building moment, but in and through a moment of protest against infrastructural failures and the failure of the state to provide adequate infrastructure. While the implication of these protests remains unknown, they hold potential and promise for everyone living in an era when privatized and fragmented infrastructures differentiate access and perpetuate vast inequalities.

    How Did We Get Here?

    Access to infrastructures in Lebanon is often facilitated through private or sectarian channels. In fact, there is little distinction between the “state” and sectarian and private channels in Lebanon. Actors occupy multiple positions or navigate through their connections to others who may also occupy multiple positions. In many contexts, accessing services depends upon the ability to make a claim to belonging to a sectarian community, determinable through birth or marriage and further dependent upon class, neighborhood belonging, and the capacity to demonstrate social and gendered notions of propriety. For example, in the Beirut suburb of Bourj Hammoud, low-income housing, managed and maintained by an Armenian political party, is available to men who marry out of sect, but not to women who marry men from another sect.5 Getting access or connection usually involves the mobilization of classifications and their “attendant […] moral dimensions,” as is apparent for example in the different gendered dimensions of what would be considered a correct marriage (Bowker and Star 5). The process of connecting is not always seamless for those who navigate these channels, which is why they recalibrate and negotiate sectarian belonging through infrastructure.

    The broad coalition of protestors in 2015 is a remarkable achievement in the Lebanese political context where every major political party is affiliated with a religious sect. Lebanon’s political sectarianism does not stem from an ancient system; it is the result of modernizing reforms that started in the late Ottoman empire and extended into the French Mandate period, essentially from the mid-19th century to Lebanon’s independence in 1943 (U. Makdisi). In Lebanon, there are eighteen officially recognized religious sects (including Shi’a Muslim, Sunni Muslim, Maronite Christian, Druze and others), and even among non-observant people, sectarian identity cannot just be “opted” out of, as sectarian identity does not always equate with religious belief. While religious belief and piety certainly animate some political movements in Lebanon, as Lara Deeb argues, sectarian politics and conflicts are not reducible to religion as theology and have continued to evolve and change in the years since independence in 1943.6 As Maya Mikdashi reminds us, the state itself is secular, and that state secularism is produced in and through its regulating and managing “both sexual and sectarian difference” (281).

    During the Lebanese Civil War of 1975-1990, sect-affiliated militias carried out ethnic cleansing in the city and divided it into zones that were dangerous or inaccessible to members of certain groups. But conflict is not entirely a thing of the past. Particularly since the assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in 2005, Beirut has seen the resurgence of street battles and car bombs. These conflicts are not the same as those of the Civil War era: they are fought along different lines and between different factions. Still, the continuity of violence keeps the memory of the war alive and present for many people who face ongoing insecurity and unpredictability.7 Many of my Lebanese interlocutors born after the end of the Civil War avoid visiting neighborhoods dominated by certain sectarian political parties where they feel the people would be hostile towards them because of their own sectarian affiliation.

    Sectarian parties and affiliated organizations play a critical role not only in formal political life but in the provisioning of infrastructures, urban planning, and services, as I have argued elsewhere. In most areas, the Lebanese state does not provide sufficient services like water, electricity, or medical care, though infrastructure failure in Lebanon today is not a direct result of the Civil War of 1975-1990. Electricity infrastructures were never fully functional and available to all Lebanese, even before the war years (Abu Rish, “On Power Cuts”). Electricite Du Liban, a public electricity utility, is subject to frequent electricity cuts, especially outside of the Beirut municipal district. Private generator subscription systems have cropped up all over the city and are especially needed in the city’s peripheral suburbs where electricity cuts can go on for several hours each day, while in Beirut cuts average three hours. These generator subscription systems are often owned by wealthy patrons, some of them connected to important political figures or officials, or at least to officials presumed to be important by residents in the neighborhood. Many of my interlocutors believe there is no real distinction between the “state” and the patrons and important families that monopolize the provision of some of these goods, and they do not express distinctions in these terms. Rather, these relationships are described by invoking the term wasta or “connections”—the idea that knowing people in power allows certain individuals access to ownership, political power, or exceptional treatment. As Kristin Monroe writes, this notion of the power of wasta extends even in dealings with traffic police, who must think twice about issuing a ticket to someone who might be well-connected.

    In 1994, the private company Sukleen was contracted to handle Beirut’s sanitation services, an arrangement that only ended in 2018, owing partially to the controversy over the garbage pileup of 2015.8 Even before the 2015 protests began, the growing problem of improperly prepared landfills prompted the state to come up with a comprehensive system for sanitation. The plan was to allow the private sanitation company Sukleen to negotiate the disposal of garbage regionally with “local power brokers” (Abu Rish, “Garbage Politics”). The sectarian political actors and patrons that run most of the patchwork shadow infrastructure services, like electricity, are precisely the people with whom Sukleen would have needed to negotiate. Municipalities that are dominated by members of one sectarian political party can make planning decisions that have profound impacts on urban development for all residents in their jurisdiction.9 While the pileup of garbage on Beirut’s streets might be called a “crisis” in media shorthand, those solutions that propose to pick up garbage alone will not address the larger framework that has produced the broken sanitation system and the numerous failed infrastructures.

    Failure in itself does not prompt transformation. In fact, infrastructural failure can serve to reinscribe existing relations of power as sectarian patronage networks use instances of breakdown to enrich themselves or consolidate their political positions. Sectarianism is more than just a divisive discourse manipulated by elites, it must also be understood as a material process rooted in service provisions, urban planning, and development. In the lead-up to 2015, there was a growing sense of frustration with the ways neoliberal ideologies “as translated through Lebanon’s sectarian‐clientelist regime on the ground” put further pressures on low income people and their “right to the city,” especially in relation to housing (Fawaz 828). In other words, over the years people have realized that the channels available to them through which to secure resources, through affiliation and sectarian political parties, were far from stable or guaranteed.

    The garbage pileup represented a breaking point partially because of the uniqueness of sanitary infrastructure. It does not have an analog in water or electricity infrastructures, both in terms of its material qualities and attendant modes of management, and these differences matter. As Brian Larkin argues, the aesthetics of infrastructures are just as vital as their technical function, because they “produce the ambient conditions of everyday life” (“The Politics” 336). The pileup of garbage presents a unique disruption to the everyday conditions of a city, in contrast to shortages of water or electricity, which do not play as significant a role in a city’s ambient conditions – things like everyday smells or sounds and how people think about them. Electricity in Lebanon, which suffers frequent timed cuts, does not work in the same way. People with the money to do so can keep their supply of electricity going during the frequent public cuts by subscribing to privately owned electricity generators. Some people may share expenses in order to buy a generator for their building, and wealthy individuals may buy a generator for their building. The pileup of garbage does not really have an individual solution, payout, or workaround, and it must be collectively managed. Even if wealthy individuals could hire private trash collectors to remove their own garbage, the smells and physical obstacles produced by the trash bags piling up on sidewalks and streets and the clouds of smoke from burning trash would be inescapable. Trash in the streets, unlike electricity cuts or water shortages, produces a different urgency for collective action. While by no means inevitable (or sustainable without a considerable long term strategy), the pileup of trash in Beirut quickly brought protestors to a breaking point.

    The circulation of trash, including its disposal, transport, and removal, crystallizes and makes visible certain relationships and relations (Moore). The removal of trash from Beirut and its relocation in the Naimeh landfill are of course not accidental, even when they are poorly planned and executed. That is why the accumulation of trash on the streets of Beirut, the capital city of Lebanon and the privileged beneficiary of services, resources, transportation, electricity, and water, is political: it “makes visible that which had no reason to be seen, it lodges one world into another” (Rancière). Naimeh had always lived with Beirut’s trash, and suddenly Beirut had to do it.

    It is not only the visibility of trash that matters here, however. Christina Schwenkel reminds us of the need “to move beyond the primacy of vision and visuality” and to be attentive to the other senses and the experiences they produce in relation to infrastructures (“Sense”). In some of the worst months of summer heat and humidity, Beirut was smothered with terrible odors and with smoke rising from burning trash. Air travels unfettered between Beirut’s neighborhoods and its suburbs, and with it the stench of rotting trash. The meaning of garbage is produced in relation to its physical qualities, its nauseating smell and the health risks it brings. Trash is dirty, and as Rosalind Fredericks writes, “its associations of filth govern its management and its sociopolitical power” (“Vital Infrastructures” 532). Garbage carries social and even moral meanings and interpretations, hence the emergence of the “You Stink” hashtag lobbed at the politicians involved in what protesters deemed “dirty” political games.

    Anatomy of the 2015 Protest

    As garbage piled up on the streets of Beirut, anger and disgust grew. As Ziad Abu Rish writes in “Garbage Politics,” the protests were started by a movement calling itself “You Stink,” which also created an online presence documenting the garbage pileup with photos and videos. These initial protests were small, but eventually they became more popular, drawing in people from outside the initial circle of activists. However, the You Stink organizers were not at the helm of the more popular protests; in fact, You Stink at one point tried to withdraw from the ongoing protests, claiming provocateurs had infiltrated them after a particularly violent clash in August (Abu Rish, “Garbage Politics”). While they later reversed their position and continued to participate in the protests, this account demonstrates that most of the protestors were not represented by this initial group of activists. The protests had the force of a truly popular demonstration, which was also ignited by the violent state reaction to the protestors. Soon “You Stink” appeared all over social media, referring to the politicians and government actors the protestors found responsible for inefficiencies in all utilities and services (and, of course, for the garbage).

    It is no accident that downtown Beirut ended up as the site and setting for protests demanding better public infrastructure and services. The downtown has always been the spatially privileged recipient of infrastructures and resources, not only in relation to its larger urban metro area but also compared to other parts of Lebanon. As Rosalind Fredericks argues in Vital Infrastructures of Trash in Dakar, in Senegal the capital city plays a major role in the imaginary of Senegalese citizenship, and the same can be said for Beirut, where the pileup of garbage in the capital of this small country represents the “trashing of the nation” (6). For many Lebanese, the downtown is a symbol of the many unpopular postwar investments that privatized public space and resources. In 1997, Saree Makdisi presciently wrote that the battles over the narrative of Lebanese national identity would be fought over the image of downtown Beirut. The battles over the rebuilding and redevelopment of the downtown had already been fought in the 1990s, and for the vast majority of people who hoped the downtown would regain its prewar glory, they were also lost. After the end of the civil war, Lebanon faced the challenge of recovering from the destruction of most of its institutions and many of its urban spaces. The controversial overhaul of downtown Beirut by former Prime Minister Hariri’s company, Solidere, turned the downtown into a space for luxury consumers. The overhauled area has little connection to the downtown of the prewar years, with its popular markets and major transit hub. In fact, today’s downtown is designed to exclude most Lebanese people who are not wealthy enough to consume within its spaces. Its shopping mall boasts international luxury chains that cater to wealthy tourists and to Lebanese elites and expats. The downtown is not easily approachable on foot and feels cut off from the neighborhoods around it. For many, the overhaul of the downtown was one of the postwar era’s most searing betrayals of an implicit promise to restore or to rebuild public spaces in the country’s capital.

    Of course, infrastructure and urban planning are often used to create and entrench forms of exclusion. As Antina von Schnitzler writes in Democracy’s Infrastructure: Techno-Politics and Protest after Apartheid, infrastructures were not primarily used to “produce or to maintain a public” (15). She recounts that townships in South Africa lacked services and basic infrastructures like electrification. White wealthy neighborhood residents retreated to private gardens or country clubs and did not demand public parks. Von Schnitzler makes the keen observation that “apartheid infrastructures were deployed to prevent a public from coming into being” (15), inverting the presumed relationship between infrastructure and its powers to constitute a sense of being part of a public. Infrastructures can also alienate.

    The 2015 Beirut trash protest was both about reclaiming the downtown and performing a different kind of sociality and collective action in the wake of a hitherto unseen form of infrastructural failure: garbage piling up in the streets of the capital city. However, to imagine that the crisis only begins when garbage is left on the streets of Beirut is to maintain the hierarchy of geographies in terms of infrastructure provisioning in Beirut and its peripheries. As Janet Roitman argues in Anti-Crisis, the crisis framework prevents certain questions from emerging, particularly in instances where breakdown is not exceptional, but part of an ongoing continuum. Describing the events in Beirut as a garbage “crisis” implies a framework of mutually exclusive problem and solution, where solutions involving the removal of garbage in Beirut may leave unexamined the impact of this removal on Beirut’s peripheries or rural areas. This notion of crisis implies the normalcy of the preceding period, which is understood as having been interrupted by a deviation that led to the current situation. The protestors demanded much more than better sanitation infrastructure, demonstrating their understanding of the garbage pileup of 2015 beyond the terms of crisis. We can understand the pileup of garbage as the materialization of the trash politics of the state, an emblem of the layers of theft and political patronage systems that keep systems patchworked together and broken, partially privatized for the benefit of a small elite.

    The 2015 protests expressed frustration with the failure of the Lebanese government to provide and maintain state infrastructures, including electricity, water, and management of public services. Failing infrastructures, however, can still create the conditions of possibility for imagined futures, for the promise of modernity. As Brian Larkin writes, “It is precisely because infrastructures are invested with promise and because that promise is reflexively foregrounded that—when they work or when they fail—they bring into visibility the operation of governmental rationality and offer that rationality up for political debate” (“Promising Forms” 183). The infrastructure of sanitation contains within itself a kind of promise, at the very least, to move trash out of the city streets and into landfills, out of sight and out of senses, at least for the residents of the city.

    The protesters’ appeal was not for the fall of the state, but rather a demand for the state to provide. Perhaps this demand for reform should not come as a surprise since the state can be understood, according to Lauren Berlant, as “a resource as well as a site of domination” (Berlant “On Citizenship”). When the police and military attacked protestors, social media users began to post photos of the violence. Artist Jana Traboulsi created iconic graphics juxtaposing these photos with phrases like “Kif ma fi dawleh? Hon al dawleh wa hek shekleha!” (What do you mean there is no state? Here is the state and this is what it looks like!).10 The phrase “here is the state,” which appeared all over social media sites, was a reference to the often-repeated wayn al dawleh? (Where is the state?), a common Lebanese saying used to locate responsibility for failing infrastructure in Lebanon. As James Ferguson writes, “infrastructure does its violence in ways that make it peculiarly hard to ascribe responsibility” (559). Indeed the violence of infrastructures and the pervasive inequalities it produces are often naturalized and made to seem inevitable. The dawleh, or “state,” in wayn al dawleh? does not point to one faction or sectarian political organization; it points to a “state” that has failed to live up to its normative promises. The protestors’ demands are not nostalgic and do not necessarily have precedents. Still, everything from electricity cuts to water shortages and traffic jams could be an occasion for someone to ask wayn al dawleh? as a way of assigning accountability to a state that has left the provisioning of certain utilities to a patchwork of private entities that skim profits for themselves and deliver goods that are both expensive and low in quality. These private entities include wealthy patrons who sell a few amps of electricity via private generator systems and water from privately owned water trucks that fill tanks atop apartment buildings when water supply runs low.

    In 2016, state officials responded to the infrastructural breakdown with a familiar makeshift solution: the garbage was dumped in other improperly prepared landfills. One of the places where the garbage ended up was the working class municipality of Bourj Hammoud (see fig. 1). If we are to pay attention to the aesthetics of infrastructure, it is meaningful that a disused and informal Civil War era landfill in Bourj Hammoud, a working-class suburb of Beirut, was one of the sites chosen in 2016 to take Beirut’s garbage. Most of the residents who live in Bourj Hammoud earn little or are precariously employed. It is a relatively affordable area near Beirut that is home to many migrant workers and to displaced people from Syria. In recent years, the number of displaced Syrians in Lebanon has grown, due to ongoing conflict in Syria. The UNHCR estimates that there are almost one million Syrian refugees in Lebanon, but it is likely these figures are low, as they only include registered refugees (“Refugee Situations”). The Bourj Hammoud municipality was reportedly offered 25 million US dollars to reopen its landfill to Beirut’s trash for a five-year period (“Lebanon’s Trash Crisis”).

    The reopening of the informal landfill in Bourj Hammoud was met by protests, but they did not draw the crowds that Beirut’s protests did, partly because their choice was cast within a sectarian framework. While Bourj Hammoud is a diverse working-class district in terms of its population, the municipality’s leadership is Armenian, and most of the city’s social welfare institutions, medical facilities, and schools are run by Armenian political and religious organizations, namely the Armenian Tashnag party. It was the Maronite Christian Kataib party that organized a protest opposing the municipality’s decision to accept the garbage deal (El Amine). While valid environmental concerns motivated the protest, it did not draw the broad coalition of protestors that Beirut’s trash pileup did. The Bourj Hammoud protest was reminiscent of other political mobilizations against failing infrastructure, which remain within sectarian frameworks. Éric Verdeil describes earlier protests against the dysfunctional electricity distribution system, which “never coalesced into a unified movement; instead, they have served sectarian and local political agendas, reinforcing the city’s current political fragmentation” (162). In Bourj Hammoud, protests against the informal landfill’s reopening ended up looking like a dispute between two political parties with sectarian overtones. It was far more difficult for Armenians in Bourj Hammoud to join in local protests than it was for them to protest in Beirut because in Bourj Hammoud it would have been regarded as a protest against the Armenian Tashnag party-dominated municipality rather than against the Lebanese “state” and its actors, which everyone could (and frequently does) justifiably critique. Given that they were not promoted by any particular sectarian political party, the protests in downtown Beirut had more legitimacy in their call for a new form of citizenship attached to a demand for functioning infrastructure.

    Fig. 1. Bourj Hammoud’s landfill (on the left) as seen from the Mediterranean Sea. Photo by Laleh Khalili. Used by permission.

    For many of my Armenian interlocutors living in Bourj Hammoud, affinities emerge from feeling part of a community. This community is often defined in sectarian ways and reproduced through everyday transactions and exchanges in medical clinics, microlending facilities, and social welfare centers (Nucho). In 2015, people were deeply frustrated with the patchwork systems that kept electricity erratic and expensive and the water supply unpredictable. The ambivalence that many felt between their affinities for sect-affiliated organizations and resentment towards a state that seemed to provide very little in the way of infrastructure left an opening. In the 2015 protests, people said, the object of their ire was not the failure of specific parties or factions but rather their totality in the state. It was wayn al dawleh? that activated the garbage protests in 2015 in the capital city. It was this stage that provided for the emergence of a broad-based coalition and an emergent citizenship imaginary.

    The Protest and New Meanings of Citizenship

    In the postwar era, the Lebanese state did not mobilize infrastructure as a mediator to state institutions. In fact, the intentions of the state are not always important for understanding, experiencing, and apprehending infrastructures. Nikhil Anand’s provocation to think about human relationships formed in and through urban water pipes and distribution systems that “exceed human intentionality, thought, and action” (7-8) is useful here. What he calls “hydraulic citizenship” is a process worked out incrementally through relations between residents, city officials, plumbers, and the pipes themselves; it is not a teleological project but can be reversed, pushed back against. In Lebanon in 2015, everyday relations to infrastructure were instructive: people were tired of having to pay two electricity bills (one to a private generator owner and another to the state grid) or of asking well-connected people for favors in order to secure a hospital bed. These accumulated experiences of breakdown and lack provided for an alternative vision of politics and political action, one that imagined a right to infrastructure that could be guaranteed to citizens, rather than being a privilege. In that sense, the protests were built on a citizenship imaginary unintentionally shaped through infrastructural failure rather than its even provision.

    A citizenship imaginary based on the demand for equitable, functioning infrastructures is nothing less than a new kind of public imaginary. Abdoumaliq Simone’s notion of the formation of publics is instructive: “Instead of people coming together to consensually decide the markers of identity and common rules necessary to recognize common participation, the public is a matter of projecting a way of talking and regarding that goes beyond the specificity of one’s life situation” (119). Material infrastructures provide that possibility, as what is shared between protestors is the experience of brokenness, of patchwork systems, even as they are left vulnerable to these breakdowns quite differently, especially those with the least resources. In 2015, the citizenry insisted that the starting point for assembly would be the experience of infrastructural breakdown. Many contemporary infrastructures divide territories and populations both through uneven accessibility and privatization (Graham and Marvin). In Lebanon, infrastructure did the inverse of what it is often presumed to do; the shared sense of brokenness allowed people to unite around its failure. The failure of sanitation infrastructure created the conditions of possibility for a shared project, a shared hope, and a shared sense of belonging and citizenship. Of course, what happened in Lebanon is not the first or only case in which the brokenness of official or state infrastructures mobilized alternative forms of solidarity around both the critique of state failure and the development of ways to cope with infrastructural inadequacies.11 Julia Elyachar’s concept of the social infrastructures of communicative channels is helpful here (“Phatic Labor”). We can think about these “social infrastructures” as resources that are not entirely subsumed by sectarian political organizations. As Diana Allan reminds us, moments of collaboration that come from experiences of “shared marginality” and that exceed both nationalist frameworks and sectarian divisions are often overlooked in the context of Lebanon. These moments emerge through mundane or even illicit activities that are rendered somehow outside of politics, even by the participants themselves (Allan 94-95). As Elyachar argues, moments of breakdown might make these pathways and channels more visible (“Upending Infrastructure”).

    The fact that this starting point for a new citizenship imaginary had been a potential for a long time not only dispels the “crisis” framework, but also explains why many of those who joined the protest later were not only residents of Beirut fed up with a local garbage problem. The protest was instead an opportunity to express disgust with the rampant “theft” of state actors across sectors and sects. The fragmented infrastructures of Beirut and its urban periphery can tell us something about the contours of a particular political process, given that “they represent long-term accumulations of finance, technology, know-how, and organisational and geopolitical power” (Graham and Marvin 12). The incidents of 2015 represent the possibility of a still-emerging “infrastructural citizenship” (Shelton).

    In contrast to the popular garbage protests of 2015, in which a large and diverse group of people took part, a smaller 2011 protest organized by a movement called “The people want the fall of the sectarian regime” was not as popular (Abu Rish, “Garbage Politics”). The latter protest did not foreground material politics, though it held up the sectarian system itself as the object of protest. What is notable here is that the garbage protests did not explicitly call for the “fall” of the sectarian system. According to Abu Rish, some of the original organizers considered broaching the topic of a larger critique of the political order, but they backed off, fearing they would lose public support. The popularity of the 2015 protests was due in part to the fact that they provided an opportunity to enact a citizenship imaginary that did not require the denouncement of or recourse to sectarian attachments. The protestors made a claim for better sanitation as citizens, not as members of a “community.” This change in the citizenship imaginary was precisely what made the protests so notable.

    Despite the fraught nature of Lebanese narratives of national identity, protestors in 2015 waived the Lebanese flag. Still, the protestors’ demands do not explicitly attach themselves to an already articulated Lebanese nationalist project. The presence of the Lebanese flag can be read as insisting on a collectivity outside of sectarian affiliation or likeness. This idea of citizenship involves ideas of belonging as enacted in and through functioning infrastructures that link all parts of the city (and the wider metropolitan region and beyond) in relations that could produce a new kind of “imagined community” (Anderson). According to Abu Rish’s compelling account, the protest movement fell apart in the wake of violent police responses and of internal disagreements (“Garbage Politics”). However, the protests and their ability to stage a mass political movement around the question of infrastructure are still unfolding in Lebanon today.

    Citizenship Imaginaries and Futures

    While the 2015 protests were ultimately dispersed, the memory of that moment where wayn al dawleh? was no longer a hopeless curse mumbled under one’s breath, but a rallying cry to reimagine a new way of relating to infrastructure and to each other, is still animating protests in Lebanon today. In Lebanon and elsewhere, a plan to make these infrastructures a point of departure for new forms of citizenship and belonging that are not based on likeness will take the sustained commitment of new and emergent forms of organizing.12 As I write these words, protests are again taking place, but this time all over Lebanon and quite beyond any specific infrastructural demand. The situation is evolving, and it is too soon to draw any conclusions about the protests. However, it is clear that the organizational efforts of political platforms like Beirut Madinati, or Beirut My City, while focused on the municipality of Beirut, have pushed forward the demand for equitable social processes through their focus on material infrastructures.

    In Lebanon and elsewhere, demands for even provision of services and infrastructures are dominating political discussions. Protestors in Beirut in 2015 gathered in the hope of articulating a different citizenship imaginary out of the frustrations of dealing with infrastructural fragmentation and disrepair. Lebanon is not unique or exceptional in this regard. The American Society of Civil Engineers issued US infrastructure a D+ rating on its 2017 Report Card (“American Infrastructure Report Card”). Does this moment allow for imagining infrastructural solidarities and forms of reciprocity that reach beyond the current geographic and conceptual frameworks of nation states? Given the global and yet unevenly distributed risks in the era of rapid climate change, it is not an unimaginable idea.

    Footnotes

    1. For further details on access to services, see Cammett, Compassionate Communalism, and Nucho, Everyday Sectarianism.

    2. On forms of citizenship beyond the nation-state, see Seitz, A House of Prayer.

    3. Below I discuss this idea of sectarianism, which is a problematic and frankly inaccurate framework.

    4. See Elyachar, “Next Practices,” and Graham and Marvin, Splintering Urbanism.

    5. For more on various aspects of belonging, see Nucho, Everyday Sectarianism.

    6. For an excellent discussion of religion and sectarian identity, see Joseph, “Pensée 2.”

    7. On the past and present of war, see Hermez, War is Coming.

    8. See “Sukleen Ends Services in Beirut.” Another private company, Ramco, now collects Beirut’s trash; see “Ramco Wins Tender.”

    9. See Bou Akar, “Contesting Beirut’s Frontiers,” and Bou Akar, For the War Yet to Come.

    10. For more on these graphics, see Abu Rish, “What Do You Mean.”

    11. See Schwenkel’s discussion of the Vietnamese example in “Spectacular Infrastructure.”

    12. See for example Mona Harb, “New Forms of Youth Activism.” Harb identifies the growing importance of new forms of youth activism in Beirut who work outside of the frameworks of sect-affiliated identities or professional NGOs.

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  • Cinematic Masculinity in the Age of Finance

    Mark Steven (bio)

    Abstract

    This essay shows how popular cinema represents financialization and finance capitalism by leveraging male stardom as an allegory for superannuated forms of productive labor in Cosmopolis (2012), Dark Knight Rises (2012), Magic Mike (2012), The Wolf of Wall Street (2013), The Lego Movie (2014), and The Big Short (2015). Building on recent film history and scholarship about financialization and the 2008 banking collapse, it illustrates that popular cinema remains committed to the representation of finance even as the credit crisis recedes from view in the mass media, and that it recalls large-scale productive industry while contributing to racialized and gendered myths of labor and value.

    … money has taken a turn. All wealth has become wealth for its own sake. There’s no other kind of enormous wealth. Money has lost its narrative quality the way painting did once upon a time. Money is talking to itself. (DeLillo 77)

    The Market Without Us?

    The epigraph—lifted from Cosmopolis, Don DeLillo’s minor masterpiece of 2003—announces a unique moment in the passage of late capitalism. While money’s personification might speak to the ongoing process of capitalist reification, through which things become human and humans become things, what remains singular to this claim is its emphasis on the here and now, on the present tense. Money has “lost its narrative quality,” but that loss is very recent, or at least more recent than painting’s supersession by photomechanical reproduction. Which is to say, money is now post-industrial in the most literal sense of that phrase, following the historical transformation of industrial capitalism into something else. This is consistent with Fredric Jameson’s description of the advent of finance capital in his seminal essay from 1997: “Speculation—the withdrawal of profits from the home industries, the increasingly feverish search, not so much for new markets (those are also saturated) as for the new kinds of profits available in financial transactions themselves and as such—is the way in which capitalism now reacts to and compensates for the closing of its productive moment” (250-251).1 Finance means sourcing profits through speculative claims to wealth that has become untethered from the traditional sites of industrial manufacture and resource extraction, and that might exist elsewhere and in the future. The ongoing process of financialization has rendered money non-productive, fictitious, or immaterial in a more absolute sense than ever before. For capital to transition from mercantilism into manufacture and then through finance is to shift the privileged sites of accrual from the humanly populated zones of interpersonal trade and heavy industry to the abstract and impersonal space of what DeLillo calls in Cosmopolis “cyber-capitalism,” a cool-sounding neologism used to describe the world of futures markets as mediated by high-tech computers that deliver revenue but produce naught.

    Within the frame of narrative, it would be tempting to say that it is much easier (or at least more familiar) to describe personal loans and production lines than it is to account for the inhuman calculus of high-speed derivative trading. In Annie McClanahan’s account, the development of finance maps onto the evolution of literature: “the emergence of modern credit markets enabled the development of the realist novel. In the nineteenth century, likewise, literature responded to the expansion of finance by asserting its own figurative economies, and early-twentieth-century modernism used formal abstraction to register new kinds of monetary abstraction” (“Financialization” 239).2 But, from the late twentieth-century on, we have been forced to apprehend what Alison Shonkwiler defines as “the financial sublime,” an economic matrix comprising “the full range of mystifications of capital—technological, political, and otherwise—that make it difficult or impossible to distinguish the actuality of money from the increasing unreality of global capitalism” (75). The important distinction is not that capital’s narrative has become altogether more bewildering; it is, rather, that capital’s already bewildering narrative wants to secede from its human predicate. What money has lost in its progression through finance is lost because capitalism claims to no longer need people to deliver profits, ostensibly divesting itself from the immemorial bearers of both living labor power and something like narrative vitality.3 Here it must be emphasized that this divestment is not absolute or even material actuality; it is, rather, part of the ideology capital promotes, a means of distancing itself from its vast systems of exploitation. Rather than being independent of materiality, finance is still very much grounded in the way it organizes social relations. We encounter the truth of this claim in such forms as industrial monetization and collateralized debt but also more generally, at the level of everyday life, in the recasting of stability as risk and in what Marx once called “secondary exploitation,” the extension of credit to workers so as to ensure both subsistence and subservience (Capital, vol. 3, 596).

    Building on these preliminary remarks, my thesis is that cinema, and specifically popular, commercial cinema, has been seriously intent to meet the task of narrating financialization—to show us the force and the flux of money’s specious dematerialization in real time—and that it has been doing so via an emphatically patriarchal manipulation of what is commonly theorized as the star system.4 After the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, white male stars in their 30s and 40s have been performing as characters that internalize a culture of financialization and its speculative risks and algorithmic abstractions, but in ways that emphasize the work of both characters and actors. I will try to demonstrate that these performances of what Jane Elliott calls “neoliberal personhood” have given rise to an historically unique tension between financialization as thematic content and the eminently recognizable and ultimately physical labor that goes into acting. The material presence of the white male star thus becomes an allegory for work and value in the culture of financialization, in ways that recall large-scale productive industry whilst simultaneously contributing to racialized and gendered myths of labor and value. Before explaining this thesis, it should be stated categorically that numerous films have consciously taken finance capital as a formal challenge, and it almost goes without saying that all of this must be driven, in part, by the fact that motion picture production is materially entangled in finance markets. It is in these terms that cinema parallels literature, as Rachel Greenwald Smith argues, comparing contemporary fiction to a literature assessed on social value or its capacity to entertain. “The growth of neoliberalism,” she writes, “has meant that these systems of valuation have undergone a transformation to conform to an economic matrix of investment and return” (32). Not only is film finance its own kind of speculation, a wager that might or might not turn investments into profit and that is often discussed using a lexicon borrowed from stock trading, it is also a business model that attracts real speculators. For instance, Walt Disney is a publicly traded company, and America’s largest cinema chain, AMC, has the majority of its share controlled by the Wanda Group, a media conglomerate from Mainland China. Indeed, financialization is what the studio system’s most perspicacious historian, Thomas Schatz, seems to have been sensing in 2008, on the eve of the market crash, when he described the transition from New Hollywood into Conglomerate Hollywood during the early 2000s: “a period that in my view,” he claims, “has proved to be quite distinctive, due particularly to the combined impact of conglomeration, globalization, and digitalization—a veritable triumvirate of macro-industrial forces whose effects seems to intensify with each passing year” (19). It is in the films born of this conjuncture that we encounter some of the most aesthetically adept and ideologically noxious narratives of financialization.

    This essay is in conversation with a growing body of research on the imbrication of popular cinema and finance capital, and especially on cinema in the wake of the global financial crisis. My contribution illustrates some of the ways in which cinema approaches finance as both an impetus and impediment to the animation of characters “as living and moving before us,” primarily via recourse to stardom. Through the relationship between finance and stardom, popular cinema engages critically with and produces new visual narratives of the changing mode of production. In what some formalists call a “motivation of the device,” the star has become a phenomenon through which a film’s audience might be encouraged to grasp the interactions between a speciously inhuman market and the human biopower that remains, despite whatever abstraction is taking place, an originator of surplus value and so of profit. When it comes to film, the actor’s performance is a commodity whose embodied labor is captured at the point of delivery, preserved before the camera lens, so as to circulate in the market as a spectral trace of work undertaken elsewhere and in another time. Danae Clark explains acting and stardom in these terms. “Even though,” in the process of mechanical reproduction, “the image or star icon was dislocated from the sphere of production, its representational form appeared to capture ‘the real thing,’ thus providing a strong source of fetishistic attachment with which to link the consumer to the actor’s body in the sphere of circulation” (13). Stars, as exceptional actors, therefore inhabit a kind of paradox, whereby the labor of their iconicity is never entirely conjured away by commodity fetishism. “Stars,” explains Paul McDonald, “have a place in the film industry both as a category of labor and a form of capital: a star becomes a form of capital because in the commercial film industry, he or she is a valuable asset for a production company” (10). The star system emerges as the market consolidation of these becomings, guaranteeing not the believability of a role but instead the personality of an actor or actress performing that role. While leading men obviously occupy a compromised position in cinema’s hierarchies of production (different from character actors, supporting players, extras, and in addition, cinema’s vast pool of feminized non-screen labor), their presence on screen is a reminder of the labor power that underwrites all cinematic value—a reminder that, in the prominent examples cited here, assumes labor is both more white and more male than it really is.

    Wall Street’s Libidinal Thrust

    Since its inception, cinema has been lauded as the one medium superlatively capable of speaking to the masses. As capitalism’s medium of choice, it has always had a vested interest in translating the otherwise incomprehensible or even uninteresting language of the economy into readily accessible narratives.5 But outside of explicitly communist cinema, this translation has often taken place in the liberal-cum-libertarian imperatives of individual responsibility. Perhaps this is why, during the American economy’s transition from large-scale industry to credit-based finance, Hollywood delivered a rash of films whose collective attainment was to normalize, humanizing in however grotesque form, the beneficiaries of this newfound strategy for monetary accumulation. As a unique breed of capitalism, finance would require a different kind of embodiment—an update on the robber barons and demiurgic industrialists that populated cinema during the first half of the twentieth century, a shift away from the magnificent Ambersons and the Citizen Kanes.

    While films made during this period announced the arrival of finance through star-bloated productions—as with Trading Places (1983) and Working Girl (1988)—its full-blooded embodiment as an individual character is what we encounter, most explicitly of all, in the figure of Gordon Gekko. First appearing in Oliver Stone’s Wall Street (1987), Gekko is a composite character based on several real life financiers amalgamated into something like Ayn Rand’s wet dream. Gekko is played by Michael Douglas—the screen embodiment of wealthy white licentiousness—who starred in Fatal Attraction the same year. Douglas infuses the character with a weird virility, the unmistakably physical form of finance: that of a vaguely threatening middle-aged man stuffed into an expensive suit. Linda Ruth Williams reads Gekko in relation to the fundamentally deficient masculinity Douglas brought to numerous sex thrillers. “Michael Douglas is the leading man of the erotic thriller,” she claims, “the initially hapless and sometimes revengeful dupe of femmes fatales from Glenn Close through Sharon Stone to Demi Moore” (177). As an image of what Williams calls “sovereign power” (177), Gekko represents the compensatory inversion of Douglas’s star icon, and yet the fact that Gekko is performed by Douglas surcharges the character’s apparent power, drawn from his occupation in corporate finance, with psychosexual deficiency, itself a kind of impotence or flaccidity. Similar things can be said of more niche characters, like the investment banker Patrick Bateman or the holdings CEO Christian Grey, whose sociopathic perversities are linked, by a logic of reversal, to their seemingly disembodied source of income, and whose actors, if not yet stars at the time of casting, nevertheless supplement the roles with an undercurrent of embattled fragility (the young Christian Bale) or sexual menace (Jamie Dornan, best known as the serial killer and rapist Paul Spector in The Fall).

    Within the frame of individuation, the psychosexual pathology of financial labor finds its visual apotheosis with Martin Scorsese’s The Wolf of Wall Street (2013). Released after the relative success of several other big-budget finance films—Moneyball (2011), starring Brad Pitt; Margin Call (2011), with Kevin Spacey, Jeremy Irons, and Demi Moore; and Arbitrage (2012), with Richard Gere and Susan Sarandon—The Wolf of Wall Street is adapted from the autobiography of Jordan Belfort, a corrupt stockbroker. It shows Belfort and his crew establish a boiler room outfit selling penny stocks in Long Island and then shift their operations to Wall Street. On the whole, this film derives its comedy from aristocratic decadence, with Belfort, played by Leonardo DiCaprio, firmly committed to every known vice. “On a daily basis,” we are told in an opening monologue, “I consume enough drugs to sedate Manhattan, Long Island, and Queens for a month. I take Quaaludes 10-15 times a day for my ‘back pain,’ Adderall to stay focused, Xanax to take the edge off, pot to mellow me out, cocaine to wake me back up again, and morphine… Well, because it’s awesome.” As the hyperbole suggests, this is far from a morality tale of depravity and corruption; instead, the drug abuse, the sex addiction, the casual racism, and the rampant misogyny are played almost exclusively for laughs. What it all amounts to, however, is the same kind of compensatory reflex encountered with Douglas’s seminal performance as Gekko, which might well signal an aesthetic desire to supplement the world of finance with some human form, a libidinal complement to the money-commodity, which might also explain why the dominant mode of humor on display in this film is physical comedy. If episodes of herculean drug intake render financial labor an altogether more physical enterprise than is otherwise expected—witness DiCaprio massaging the name of a potential IPO, “Steve Madden,” out of Jonah Hill’s catatonically-stoned face—sex is what conjoins that physicality with money (though, of course, cocaine is always inhaled through hundred dollar bills).

    Here DiCaprio’s inestimable star power becomes significant to the presentation of finance. Since his ascent to fame in the 1990s, DiCaprio has been infamous for his sexual voracity in a way that might read as the immoral counterpoint to his branding as the monogamously romantic heartthrob. A well-known profile from 1998 describes DiCaprio and his closest friends, Tobey Maguire and David Blaine, as the “Pussy Posse,” a group that, we are told before a list of DiCaprio’s sexual partners, “didn’t get its name for nothing” (Sales). While many of the roles DiCaprio has taken since the days of the Pussy Posse, beginning in 2002 with Gangs of New York (another Scorsese film), might be linked by a certain type of masculinity (psychically damaged and socially isolated yet physically powerful), the off-screen persona of the sexed-up playboy has followed him into the subsequent decades. The Wolf of Wall Street, unlike any of DiCaprio’s other mature roles, seems to bank on the star’s personality and predilections as much as it does on his expertise at playing a type. Indeed, DiCaprio notes the unique personal commitment, a kind of method acting, he brought to the role. “It was all me,” he claims. “There were no doubles. Hey, man, I’m playing a modern-day Roman emperor and I’m going to play the hell out of this guy, and anything goes” (Bamigboye). In this way the star supplements financial abstraction with a base physicality. That these two aspects of the film, narrative and character, intersect through the libidinal codification of money is confirmed in a scene where Belfort and his trophy wife Naomi rut vigorously atop a Scrooge McDuck-esque bed of cash—a scene shot from overhead, with Naomi obscured beneath him as he gazes lustily into the eyes of Benjamin Franklin. Clint Burnham is surely correct to interpret this “gendering of money” in the terms I am suggesting here: “the film offers that money,” he says, “as an analogy for finance capitalism’s materiality, an objectness or thingness that is still a matter of exploitation. This is why it is crucial that Belfort fucks on his money” (111).

    This jockish masculinization of financial labor and the codified feminization of money read as an attempt to mount an almost Keynesian critique, suggesting that individual psychology, however perverse, is necessary to the system. But, aesthetically, at stake here is a gulf opened up between people and money, between the subjects of narration and the exigencies of the market, namely, the abstraction of finance. This is revealed in an early scene that serves as an interpretive key to the film’s aesthetic: here market guru Mark Hanna, performed by a jittery and emaciated Matthew McConaughey (yet to regain weight after his role as an AIDS patient in Dallas Buyers Club), offers sage wisdom to Belfort, his young protégée. After endorsing a regime of daily cocaine and explaining the immateriality of financial labor—”It’s fairy dust. It doesn’t exist. It’s never landed. It’s no matter. It’s not on the elemental chart. It’s not fucken real. Stay with me. We don’t create shit. We don’t build anything”—he suggests a novel corrective:

    Hanna:
    You jerk off?

    Belfort:
    Do I…do I jerk off? Yeah. Yeah, I jerk off, yeah.

    Hanna:
    How many times a week?

    Belfort:
    Like, uh… three… three, three, four… three or four times, maybe five.

    Hanna:
    You gotta pump those numbers up. Those are rookie numbers in this racket. I, myself, I jerk off at least twice a day.

    Belfort:
    Wow.

    Hanna:
    Once in the morning, right after I work out, and then once right after lunch. Mm-hmm. Why? I don’t want to. That’s not why I do it. I do it because I fucking need to. Think about it, you’re dealing with numbers all day long. Decimal points, high frequencies, bang, bang, bang. Eh-eh-eh-eh. Fucking digits. Kick, kick, kick. All very acidic above the shoulders mustard shit. Kinda wigs some people out. You gotta feed the geese to keep the blood flowing. Keep the rhythm below the belt.

    To insinuate that all finance operators are chronic onanists is not so much to miss the point as it is the point itself. Precisely this, the disconnection between an immaterial kind of money, taking the form of numbers as such, and its human counterparts, is what underwrites the film’s exorbitant and isolating libidinal economy. The only way to experience the stock market affectively, to retain a sense of self against all this “very acidic above the shoulders mustard shit,” is through atavistic chest-thumping and rampant masturbation. This is one way that money regains some of its errant narrative, by answering the disarticulation of human industry from the profit nexus with a fragile masculinity that mistakes itself for virility. “Pop off to the bathroom,” Hanna rounds off the advice, “work one out anytime you can, and when you get good at it you’ll be stroking it and you’ll be thinking about money.”

    While in Scorsese’s film money finds its collusive fantasy and so acquires visual form in Belfort’s wife Naomi, played by Australian actor Margot Robbie, perhaps it is not to be wondered why, in one of Robbie’s subsequent roles—a brief cameo in The Big Short (2015) directed by Adam McKay—her stardom is used to figure the aesthetic problem faced by The Wolf of Wall Street. As a director, McKay has experience with the narratives of finance. He first approached the supersession of traditionally masculine labor in the shift to a finance economy with his buddy comedy, The Other Guys (2010). The Other Guys couples Mark Walberg and Will Ferrell as two cops investigating a conspiratorial web of embezzlement centered on a leading hedge fund manager. Its comedy develops from the incompatibility between explosive cop films and the complexity and the accountancy of monetary crime—from the fact that Walberg’s character cannot grasp that they are pursuing white collar fraudsters as opposed to drug cartels or organ traffickers. “The Other Guys nearly links directly to the crisis at various points,” reflect Jeff Kinkle and Alberto Toscano, “but never quite does so, except in superficial and obvious ways, always falling back on cop-film conventions” (47). By contrast to this self-conscious failure to represent financialization from within the generic confines of the police procedural, McKay’s 2015 film, The Big Short, is about that crisis, and spends its 130-minute runtime following the analysts, investors, and operators that first sensed and ultimately gained from the subprime mortgage bubble and ensuing market crash. Adapted from Michel Lewis’s book of the same title, it serves as a companion piece to the earlier film.

    Whereas The Other Guys was on the laugh-out-loud side of tragicomic, The Big Short pitches far deeper into tragedy—and with that comes an almost moralistic sensibility. “If we’re right,” speculates Brad Pitt as a securities trader, “people lose homes. People lose jobs. People lose retirement savings. People lose pensions. You know what I hate about fucking banking? It reduces people to numbers. Here’s a number—every 1% unemployment goes up, 40,000 people die, did you know that?” What makes this film aesthetically laudable is not so much the moral handwringing—Pitt’s character still turns a profit of $80 million—but the way it translates a sense of moral obligation into populist pedagogy, explaining complex financial instruments in remarkably simple terms. While this film boasts an ensemble cast of stars—Pitt is joined by Christian Bale, Steve Carell, and Ryan Gosling—more striking is that it also features a handful of interjected non-diegetic clarifications that leverage both the screen charisma and star power of figures like Selena Gomez and Anthony Bourdain to render exciting the otherwise specialist material we would expect from the likes of Naomi Klein, Thomas Picketty, or Michel Lewis. The Big Short therefore appears as distinct not only from McKay’s previous effort, The Other Guys, but also from The Wolf of Wall Street, whose antiheroic narrator frequently stops short of explaining financial instruments and monetary operations so as to resume focus on sex and drugs. By contrast, the book from which this film is adapted opens with an epigraph, taken from Leo Tolstoy, that confirms an aspiration to didactic realism: “The most difficult subjects can be explained to the most slow-witted man, if he has not formed any idea of them already; but the simplest thing cannot be made clear to the most intelligent man if he is firmly persuaded that he knows already, without a shadow of doubt, what is laid before him” (Belfort).

    Robbie’s scene is exemplary of this pedagogical impulse. A Michael Moore-inspired voiceover, accompanying a montage of stock footage, complains about the opacity of finance: “Does it make you feel bored? Or Stupid? Well, it’s supposed to. Wall Street loves to use confusing terms to make you think only they can do what they do. Or even better, for you to just leave them the fuck alone. So: here’s Margot Robbie in a bubble bath to explain.” What follows is Robbie—heavily made up, in a bathtub with ocean views, surrounded by candles, sipping champagne, waited on by a butler in a penguin suit—delivering a sharp explanation of the subprime mortgage crisis and its origins both in the structures of credit and in predatory lending:

    Robbie: mortgage bonds were enormously profitable for the big banks. They made billions and billions on the 2% fee they got for selling each of these bonds. But then they started running out of mortgages to put in them. After all, there are only so many homes and so many people with good enough jobs to buy them, right? So the banks started filling these bonds with riskier and riskier mortgages. That way they can keep the profit machine churning. By the way, these risky mortgages are called “sub-prime,” so whenever you hear “sub-prime” think “shit.”

    The genius of this scene is that it clarifies a potentially confusing aspect of the film’s plot and in doing so renders plain and plainly threatening an otherwise complicated financial instrument (not to mention just how easily this clip converts into a sharable YouTube meme). And yet, as the staging makes resoundingly clear, we still face an insuperable distance between the image itself and what that image is saying, between the actor’s body and the object of the monologue. From the standpoint of narrative, these two things—the super-eroticized embodiment of visual beauty and Robbie’s discourse on synthetic collateralized debt obligations—remain worlds apart. But the film seems to know this, and to know it at the level of casting no less than in its ultimately misogynistic fantasizing. Sergei Eisenstein once claimed that “the sex appeal of a beautiful American heroine-star is attended by many stimuli: of texture—from the material of her gown; of light—from the balanced and emphatic lighting of her figure; of racial-national […]; of social class, etc.” (66). The obscene wealth implied by the setting and the economic acumen suggests that the beauty in the bathtub is the payoff for being on the right side of an economic crisis—all of which is confirmed by the particular star, whose Hollywood fame depends on her role in The Wolf of Wall Street. But the scene also foregrounds those additional meanings. “In a word,” Eisenstein concludes, “the central stimulus (let it be, for instance, sexual as in our example) is attended always by a whole complex of secondary stimuli” (66). Note the visual pun: forged here is an undeniable association between the bubbles with which Robbie surrounds herself in the bathtub and in the champagne flute, and the financial bubble she is describing. The pun secures a mediation between central and secondary stimuli, so that financial abstraction acquires bodily form by way of wealth and beauty. These interlocking forms, centered on Robbie’s star, are an expression not just of finance but of financial crisis.

    Class Struggle on Steroids

    Despite the salaciousness of these two films—the way male visual pleasure is used to frame economic operations—the realization of finance as a problem for social class largely stays hidden from the camera’s voyeuristic eye. Be that as it may, the apparent distance between people and money is not just a problem for narration, a challenge to be overcome in the visual regime. It’s also material, a thing we all live and breathe, and in that capacity words like “opposition” and “contradiction” might serve as better descriptors than “distance” and “abstraction.” If there is a narrative distance between people and money, if money seems more abstract than ever before, then that distance and that abstraction are only suggestive of the fact that we are really dealing with a contradiction between the human and finance—or, more precisely, an antagonism between the direct beneficiaries of finance and those who suffer its consequences. The problem, then, is less about market ontology than it is about social class. So write Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin in their history of American capitalism, emphasizing the unreconstructed class antagonisms that enable and are simultaneously reinforced by finance:

    Workers reduced their savings, increased their debt, and looked to tax cuts to make up for stagnant wages; they cheered rises in the stock markets on which their pensions depended, and counted on the inflation of house prices to serve as collateral for new loans, provide some added retirement security, and leave a legacy for their children. All this, along with increasing inequalities among workers themselves, left a working class more individualized and fragmented, its collective capacity for resistance severely atrophied. (192)

    It is thus that finance escalates the polarization between classes and simultaneously worsens collective experience for all but the wealthiest. This contradiction—the way workers in particular are suffocating under a mountain of paper money to which they will never have access—is what more generic cinema seems resolved on staging. It does so, as can be seen in The Wolf of Wall Street and The Big Short, from the standpoint of those increasingly excluded from the profit nexus, namely a working class now trapped in the force of the neoliberal deracination, and the growing class of “frictionless” professionals. If the likes of McKay and Scorsese have attempted to render finance transparent from the top down, other filmmakers are more intent on showing the negative effects of finance from the bottom up—and, again, they do so with recourse to masculine stardom.

    Steven Soderbergh’s Magic Mike (2012) uses its eponymous stripper, played by Channing Tatum, to center a story about aspiration and precariousness in the age of finance capital. Set in Tampa, Florida, this film follows Mike as he works multiple jobs to fund his dream business as a carpenter making artisanal furniture from industrial detritus. While the plot devolves into neoliberal clichés about redemption through self-sacrifice, it nevertheless appeals within the present context because it is one of the most economically intelligent films to be made in recent years. In almost all of the film’s dialogue, Mike’s singular preoccupation with the credit market is made evident; he waits for the banks to introduce what he calls “competitive loan schemes” so as to finally buy himself out of his day job as a construction worker and his night job as a stripper. It is significant that all of this centers on, and revolves around, a hapless everyman played by Channing Tatum, an actor cast because of his star power, having just performed in three movies (in different genres) that collectively made a return on $100 million in six months. “Brad, George, Matt,” claims Soderbergh, “you pick it: nobody’s done that” (Cohen). Tatum’s acting career was launched with his performances in several romantic melodramas, for which he played an archetypal hunk. “Even if you don’t know Channing Tatum’s name,” reads a Vanity Fair profile released in the wake of Magic Mike, “you’ve seen his face—handsome but not too handsome, big, ruddy, a football player enjoying a respite between downs” (Cohen). More germane for his eponymous role in Soderbergh’s film, after his tenure as a high-school athlete Tatum worked the same kind of menial jobs as Mike, in the same location, until he too found himself working as a stripper:

    He was at the clubs a few times a week, getting hammered and dancing like a hip-hop Deney Terrio. One afternoon, he heard an ad on the radio. Dancers wanted. Young men. Big money for those who make the cut. A few days later, he and a friend stood beside a few other stunned rookies in back of Club Joy, a male strip joint in Tampa. Hair gel, body oil, G-strings, gyration. The impresario pushed Tatum and his friend onto the stage, into the jaws of the howling lady mob. It was a human sacrifice, blood entry into a cult. “They were like, ‘All right, ladies, these are our newbies. We’re thinking about hiring ’em. What do you think?’” Tatum said, laughing. “They put on a song, and we danced.” (Cohen)

    Echoing Tatum’s life story, the film’s economic intelligence obtains in the interplay between three different kinds of work—construction, stripping, carpentry—that are all mediated by finance to shape Mike’s status as a working-class subject playing the self-defined “entrepreneur.” In Tatum’s case, stripping is used to leverage between class positions. Here the ironies are manifold.

    Surely, in a 2012 film obsessed with finance, there must be some greater significance to the fact that Mike builds houses in Florida, of all places, a pre-crisis hub of speculative investment at the epicenter of the mortgage default bubble (Florida is also the setting for revelatory scenes in The Big Short and other crisis films, like 99 Homes, from 2014). The houses constructed are the commodities in which the credit market finds its material base, serving as “investment properties,” not homes, which exist primarily because of their exchange as opposed to their use value. Mike only works construction to save toward his dream of working as a self-employed carpenter. The first irony is that construction and carpentry are similar types of labor. The key difference, however, is that carpentry of the sort Mike desires is artisanal and, in that capacity, decoupled from predatory loan schemes. And yet, as Mike is refused bank loans, the second irony is that his day job enables the very market to which he desires entry but from which he is ultimately excluded. For this reason he has to work a second job as a stripper, and here is a third irony: as a stripper he performs, alongside other similar fantasies of masculine labor, as a muscle-bound construction worker. His night job is to enact his day job, and with that comes a fourth layer of irony. The owner of the club and director of the troupe for which Mike dances can (unlike Mike) get a loan, with which he buys up new real estate. He plans to shift the business from Tampa to Miami so as to begin consolidating an “empire” of strip clubs. (Here, too, is contiguity in the star system: this actor is McConaughey, before the weight loss but with the stripper name, Dallas, as a kind of pre-productive premonition of the film for which he would lose weight to star the following year.) The film ends with an anti-climax—how else could it finish?—when a flat broke and unemployed Mike walks away from stripping and into an unknowable future. That everything besides a romantic subplot remains narratively unresolved is testament to the complexity of the film’s economy, vast entanglement that it is. Whereas Soderbergh’s 2009 film, The Girlfriend Experience, handles similar material but in a form calculated to produce dread and alienation, capitalizing on the altogether different star power of porn actor Sasha Grey; and while Side Effects (2013) does likewise from within the suspenseful narrative of an Hitchcockian thriller; Magic Mike, by contrast, uses the market to generate its melancholia and its suspense, but in a goofier, more populist fashion. It wants an audience to side with Mike, identifying sympathetically with him and against the market. Both films have a sense that working- and middle-class desperation would need to be freed from the depredations of wage-labor within an environment where professional mobility is dictated wholly by access to the finance and the vicissitudes of its market.

    Christopher Nolan’s third Batman film, Dark Knight Rises (2012), achieves something similar while deploying the visceral force of action cinema more so than the intimacies of melodrama. This film is thoroughly confused in its political vision—appearing to shuttle between the philosophies of Hobbes, Robespierre, and Schmitt—and offers several suggestions of revolutionary romanticism in the figure of its chief villain. There is, as Mark Fisher rightly says, “at least a suggestion here of an Idea so powerful that it can motivate people to give up their lives” (Fisher and White). If Bruce Wayne is played by an increasingly rickety and affectively alienating Christian Bale, the antagonist, Bane, cuts an altogether different figure. Tom Hardy, the actor playing Bane, is unique in his familiarity. There has been debate in the popular press whether Hardy is indeed a star, counting his apparent versatility against that status. “Hardy,” writes one commentator, “who has made quite a name for himself by vanishing into assorted roles, has a Zelig-like quality. He’s here. He’s there. He’s everywhere. He can do anything, play anybody: a dimwit New York bartender, a Russian copper, a cruel, atavistic London gangster. Make that two cruel, atavistic London gangsters” (Queenan). There is, however, a consistency to all of Hardy’s best-known performances, in that his starring roles seem less about the actor’s personality than they are about sheer physicality and its working-class conditioning. That is what we encounter most powerfully in Nicolas Winding Refn’s Bronson (2008), in Gavin O’Connor’s Warrior (2011), and—subsequent to the release of Dark Knight Rises—in Mad Max: Fury Road (2015) and Dunkirk (2017). In all of these films, Hardy’s face is obscured and his voice is muffled or muted, which makes for a different kind of recognition. Rather than disappear into roles, as might Daniel Day Lewis or even Bale, Hardy appears to be actively self-effacing, the effect of which is to amplify the laborious occupation of a given role and Hardy’s physical preparation which resonates with the work required by other comparable roles.

    That semi-anonymous physicality is what we encounter in the film’s most satisfying action sequence, which takes place in Gotham City’s equivalent to the New York Stock Exchange. The sequence begins with several slow travelling shots in and around the exchange floor, all of which focus on underdressed service workers: a shoe-shine, a delivery driver, a janitor, and a courier. The first three produce automatic weapons, as the fourth—Bane, the film’s masked antagonist—is braced by security. He beats three guards senseless with a red motorcycle helmet and shoots one of them with another’s handgun. The other three “workers” open fire on the exchange floor, gunning down a handful of traders and shooting out the monitors and the electric tickers. The camera tilts down and tracks backward from a large ticker screen, now throwing off sparks and smoke, as Bane enters through the glass doors beneath it. He stalks about the floor, surrounded by cowering traders, and turns to face the only one not yet gone aground. The over-the-shoulder shot focuses in as Bane sizes up his quarry: his predatory gaze locks onto a man we just saw having his shoes polished. “This is a stock exchange,” he blurts, somehow managing to sound smug despite the circumstances, “there’s no money you can steal.” Indeed, the details of what Bane is doing at the stock exchange remain hazy at best, though it has something to do with bankrupting his nemesis. Nevertheless, Bane replies in an impossibly loud and alien voice, like an English Darth Vader—”Then why are you here?”—before dragging the trader to a bank of monitors and beating him unconscious on the desk. The idea for which Bane’s comrades are willing to die is here given full articulation, via a cathexis that rallies around an identifiable working class savagely expropriating from the grand temple of finance.

    What takes place in these two films is a kind of visual prosopopoeia. Money, in its most disembodied form, is counterposed to certain kinds of physicality and, specifically, to physical labor. This is a direct reversal of the cultural ideology that ushered finance into American culture during the late 1970s—when, in Marc Faber’s well-known phrasing, growing debt was figured as “an injection of stimulant, of steroid” (qtd. in Neville 1) or when Arnold Schwarzenegger publicly endorsed the ideology of Milton Friedman. “I have been able,” announced Schwarzenegger in 1980, “to parlay my big muscles into big business and a big movie career. Along the way I was able to save and invest and I watched America change and I noticed this, that the more the government interfered and intervened and inserted itself in the free market, the worse the country did” (qtd. in Neville 12). Unlike that context-specific allegiance of market and muscle, in the second decade of the twenty-first century those two things are counterposed in capital and labor. The market compels physicality, but, in its financialized form, the market can only be that physicality’s antithesis. Finance necessitates Channing Tatum’s strip routines. Or it becomes a piece of software to be stolen by Tom Hardy’s masked terrorist. And this, as might be obvious enough, allows popular film to do what popular film does best: it grants the audience a properly affective relationship to finance. The market thus serves as what Alfred Hitchcock called a MacGuffin, a plot device used to propel the narrative but without any narrative value in itself. It allows those narratives to reflect back on finance, to inscribe it with new meanings, which consistently stimulate opposition in the form of sympathetic stars. Here, in genre cinema, the embodied revivification of narratives about money doubles as an invitation to reanimate class struggle.

    The Voice of Awesome

    Cinema’s favored medium has recently changed from film stock to digital pixels, a move that can be viewed as analogous to the broader shift from a manufacture-based economy to an economy ruled by the seemingly immaterial powers of finance. For this reason, digital cinema will predictably be the site of a redoubled deployment of star power against collapsing regimes of value. Here, for example, is D. N. Rodowick on the virtual life of film:

    In terms of market differentiation, computer-generated imagery codes itself as contemporary, spectacular, and future-oriented; a sign of the new to bolster sagging audience numbers. At the same time, the photographic basis of cinema is coded as “real,” the locus of a truthful representation and the authentic aesthetic experience of cinema. Photography becomes the sign of the vanishing referent, which is a way of camouflaging its own imaginary status. (5)

    This assessment should sound familiar to readers interested in finance, that economic mode initially employed to “bolster” profitability and which seems superficially to leave behind the “real” of capitalism—the insoluble fact that surplus value is sourced in the exploitation of human labor power. Finance, economically comparable to much older modes of imperial speculation, becomes a “vanishing referent” in the foreclosure and offshoring of mines and factories.6 That photographic imagery is, famously, the result of industrial production scarcely requires mentioning here. The same goes for the way that a photograph serves as indexical, documentary proof that an actor labored before the camera. This is to remind us that the medium’s eschewal of photography is a shift from industrial production to a different kind of materiality whose predicate in intellectual labor (as well as displaced material labor) corresponds to the apparent financialization of the economy as a whole. Whereas film stock is said to have borne some fidelity to the human subject and its concrete milieu by way of causal-indexical image capture, micro-indexical digitalism is a claim to human and concrete phenomena that might or might not exist at all. The resulting aesthetic is, like finance, built on speculation, from which stars in their singularity are all but occluded.

    If a single movie knowingly inhabits these historical, technological, and formal dynamics; if it registers the virtualization of its own medium as cognate to financialization; if it understands the materiality of bare life caught in the speciously immaterial unrest of the digital matrix; if it enacts the contradiction between humanity and finance at the level of its shifting medium, as a matter of class struggle, but also addresses that contradiction with a compelling story about the economic structuration of life itself; if it not only experiences but also names the affective comportment of finance capitalism, thus providing the language with which to narrate its complex operations—if a single cinematic production can do all of that, then surely it is The Lego Movie (2014). While this text fires and misfires on all manner of political symbolism, here we can temporarily set that aside and look first at the world it depicts, which is—for all its wild inconsistencies and ideological hypocrisies—quite obviously our own. The opening musical number is emblematic of this. It takes place when the non-heroic protagonist—minifigure construction worker Emmett—drives beneath a John Carpenter-inspired billboard that reads, “Enjoy Popular Music,” an injunction he repeats while turning on the car stereo just in time for a tune to drop. “Oh my gosh I love this song!” A thumping EDM bassline. Vocal track from Tegan and Sara. “Everything is awesome! Everything is cool when you’re part of a team! Everything is awesome—when you’re living on a dream!” The morning proceeds in lockstep to the song’s beat, as Emmett runs through daily rituals and arrives at the construction site, all synced up to the song, which, a time-lapse intertitle tells us, will play out the duration of the working day.

    If the notion of “living on a dream,” with its faint echo of Bon Jovi’s faux-workerism, connects the labor of industrial teamwork with some immaterial promise, the syllogism of the hook—”everything is awesome!”—corresponds to that of capitalism itself in its apparent shift from industry to finance, harmonizing in particular with David Harvey’s account of economic totalization. “Neoliberalization has meant,” for Harvey, “the financialization of everything” (33). Little wonder the rule of law is announced not only on billboards but also via the electric news tickers usually reserved for stock prices. Perhaps the intelligence of this song is to be expected, given the film’s musical design was overseen by Mark Mothersbaugh, the brains behind Devo, an iconic band whose philosophy of human devolution in the onset of neoliberalism is echoed here. So Mothersbaugh has come to reflect on the song: it “was supposed to be like mind control early in the film. It’s totally irritating, this kind of mindless mantra to get people up and working.” As readers of Harvey and fans of Mothersbaugh already know, and as the characters will soon learn, the song is plain torturous. Its tinny dubstep and earworm lyricism are annoying as hell, and that’s the point; everything is indeed awesome, but awesome in the way that Kant might use that term to describe the ever-threatening sublime – or, better yet, how H. P. Lovecraft uses “awesome” to account for the minimal difference between our reality and some vast undersea conurbations of the dead and damned. Awesome is the totalized form of financial terror, the affective comportment of living every second of one’s life in relation to the market.

    With an emphasis on music leading our analysis, we encounter another mobilization of the star system and its coded forms of masculinity. While Emmett and his co-actors are animate commodities in the most literal sense of that term—each is visualized as an assemblage of scanned blocks originally designed in Denmark but manufactured in Hungary, Mexico, and China—the fetishism that attends their wholesale reproducibility would appear to render them antipathetic to the recognition of performative labor requisite for star power. This is not the case. Concluding an essay on cinema’s “vococentric” tendencies in the 1980s and 90s, Michel Chion suggests that star recognition at the level of voice appeared as becoming less and less common. “The voice is ceasing to be identified with a specific face,” he claims. “It appears much less stable, identified, hence fetishizable. This general realization that the voice is radically other than the body that adopts it (or that it adopts) for the duration of a film seems to me to be one of the most significant phenomena in the recent development of the cinema, television, and audiovisual media in general” (174). And yet, it is in CGI movies that the voice reasserts itself, in its accent and its timbre, as an index to a given actor’s identity. While this tendency is closely associated with Pixar Studios and their ilk, originating with Tom Hanks’s and Tim Allen’s performances in Toy Story (1995), with The Lego Movie voice recognition is itself a mode of comedy that demands consideration of the irreducible and altogether familiar human body reincarnate before our eyes as commodity. Chris Pratt, the likeable-but-not-yet-a-leading-man actor, is the everyman construction worker; Will Ferrell is Lord Business, a super-camp supervillain; Liam Neeson is a one-man police force; Morgan Freeman is the wise old wizard; Channing Tatum is superman as well as his civilian cover; and Will Arnett, with a voice both hyper-gravelly and associated with a cast of self-involved characters, is not just Batman but more specifically the hyperbolic parody of Christian Bale’s Batman. In this way, through voice recognition, masculine labor once again haunts the nigh-on absolute formal realization of finance.

    Celluloid Bloodsuckers

    This essay concludes by returning to its epigraph, the claim that “money has lost its narrative quality,” but this time from the standpoint of a medium I suggest has tasked itself with restoring that very quality via appeals to masculine stardom. Adapted in 2012 under the direction of David Cronenberg, Cosmopolis follows Eric Packer, a young man made rich on financial speculation, as he rides through a traffic-jammed Manhattan in a stretch limousine pimped out to serve as a base of operations. The words from the epigraph are recited in a scene where Packer is visited by Vija Kinsky, his Chief of Theory. She delivers her monologue from the back seat of the limousine, with Packer farther forward and to her right and with a bank of computerized monitors to the left. The shot begins in medium close-up on her face and slowly pulls backward, taking in the vehicle’s interior. Her words direct our attention to the mise-en-scène. “Oh and this car, which I love, the glow of the screens, I love the screens, it’s the glow of cyber-capital, so radiant and seductive.” The camera keeps pulling back. The dialogue turns to profits, and the camera frames the two speakers in a series of shot reverse-shots. “Time is a corporate asset now. It belongs to the free market system. The present is harder to find. It is being sucked out of the world to make room for uncontrolled markets and huge investment potential.” The scene cuts to the exterior. Swelling chords on a distorted guitar. Times Square during an anti-capitalist protest. Rioters carry a giant rat effigy. Another, wearing a rat mask, climbs atop a parked car and is shot. A man in a suit and tie chokes a masked protester preparing to hurl a brick. Back to the interior, where Packer fills tumblers of vodka before a glowing screen that tracks global shifts in capital. “This is what the protest is all about. Visions of technology and wealth. The force of cyber-capital that will send people to the gutter to retch and die.” The camera peers through the rear window—a patently digital image—showing two signs, each emblematic of a different kind of capitalism. To the left, in the dim afternoon light, a vertical banner for Hershey’s, a giant chocolate bar suspended above the city; to the right, the red text of electric tickertape glides across a black void: “A SPECTER IS HAUNTING THE WORLD,” it plays on Marx and Engels, “THE SPECTER OF CAPITALISM.” The dialectic of production and finance compressed into a single shot. That Kantian or Lovecraftian sense of awesome applies to “cyber-capitalism,” the kind of economic system that shapes the present with immense force and at imperceptible speeds, but it also applies to a mise-en-scène approaching the surreal and to the conspicuously digital imagery. Unlike The Lego Movie, here is a more palpable dread, or terror, which registers in the dissonance and the darkness of the scene and will only ratchet up as the narrative progresses toward its bloody denouement.

    Giving the game away here is a tendency we have already seen at work that has everything to do with the star system: no matter what social type or unique personality an actor is portraying, the audience will always see the star through the character. As cinema parallels finance in its transition from one kind of materiality to a different kind of abstraction, the medium retains its human actors—embodiments of labor power—as a key source of value. In the films we have considered, specific actors appear and reappear, never quite shedding their previous roles, haunting whatever narrative and whichever marketing campaign with the specter of labor past. Michael Douglas and Leonardo DiCaprio are libido made flesh. Channing Tatum and Tom Hardy are just as much the work of their sheer physicality as they are trained actors. Christian Bale is both Patrick Bateman and hedge fund manager Michael Burry, not to mention Batman. Matthew McConaughey is both the coked-up Mark Hannah and Magic Mike’s employer, Dallas. Margot Robbie is both Naomi Belfort and, well, Margot Robbie. When finance is narrated in the cinema, part of that narrative’s quality derives from the value of the medium’s laborers—the starring actors, and the wealth of other narratives they bring with them—and it serves as a reminder that, no matter the sublime abstractions or the ideologies of immateriality, surplus value is still the stuff of exploited human labor.

    We have tracked cinema’s effort to maintain its stars as material presences and persisting sources of value, and must also remember that these undying titans of the film industry are to that industry what high-ranking workers of the developed world are to the economy as a whole: they form what Vladimir Lenin called—after Jack London and Karl Kautsky—an aristocracy of labor, the working beneficiaries of exploitation and immiseration suffered by the impoverished and dispossessed. We can conclude here by suggesting that Cronenberg’s Cosmopolis mobilizes the star system as a properly vituperative satire on both the film industry as a whole and on its wealthiest beneficiaries. Recall the allusion made on the electric ticker to Marx and Engels, and recall Kinsky’s insistence that capitalism has come to “suck” time out of the world. These two things direct us to a well-known line of thought. “Capital,” writes Marx, “is dead labour, that, vampire-like, only lives by sucking living labour, and lives the more, the more labour it sucks” (Capital vol. 1, 342). This is a film that knows its medium really is the message, that its apparently bloodless digital form is synonymous with the apparently bloodless finance capital it prophesies—but this film also reminds us, with the genius of its casting, that he who identifies with all of this, with post-filmic cinema and with financial accumulation, is an incurable bloodsucker. Robert Pattinson is, as any moviegoer will know, a goddamned vampire—but of course he is, just as finance capital is, after all, still capital.

    Footnotes

    1. For more recent accounts of this tendency, see Costas Lapavitsas, Profiting Without Producing, and Cédric Durand, Fictitious Capital.

    2. My thinking on finance and film is also indebted to McClanahan’s tremendous book, Dead Pledges: Debt, Crisis, and 21st Century Culture, and especially to its chapter on mortgage horror.

    3. To be sure, DeLillo’s line about “narrative quality” should be finessed: money has a narrative in finance, but that narrative is less about human actants. For an excellent take on the relationship between finance and narrative in literature, see La Berge.

    4. The work cited above, especially that of Shonkwiler and McClanahan, includes useful summaries of scholarship dedicated to the relationship between literature and finance, and detailed accounts of ways in which literature parallels film in absorbing an ongoing process of financialization. Several other works have shaped my thinking here. These include Joshua Clover’s writing in general, but especially “Value | Theory | Crisis,” and Jeff Kinkle and Alberto Toscano’s essay, “Filming the Crisis: A Survey.” Two articles published in this journal also make significant contributions to the discussion of financialization by addressing the apparent disconnect between finance capital and human agency: Robert Meister’s “Reinventing Marx” and Melinda Cooper’s “Secular Stagnation.”

    5. This is an idea with a long critical history, from Walter Benjamin through Jacques Rancière in theory and Sergei Eisenstein through Michael Moore in practice, but in this rhetorical formulation I am echoing Sean Cubitt in The Cinema Effect.

    6. This view is indexed to the world-systemic theory of capitalist accumulation, which describes finance as a distinct and recurring phase of an economic cycle and a temporary curative to secular stagnation. See Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century; Braudel, The Perspective of the World; and Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulance.

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