Category: Volume 30 – Number 3 – May 2020

  • Radical Friends: Botany and Us

    Erin Obodiac (bio)

    A review of Meeker, Natania and Antónia Szabari. Radical Botany: Plants and Speculative Fiction. Fordham UP, 2020.

    In The Groves of Academe (1952), Mary McCarthy begins her campus novel with a Latin epigraph from Horace: Atque inter silvas academi quaerere verum (and seek for truth in the garden of Academe, Epistle II, ii, 45). From its beginning, academia—the grove of sycamore and olive trees in Attica named after its original landowner Academus where Plato later conducted his lectures—thus fuses figures of man, plant, and philosophy. Yet Epistle II, ii, addressed to Julius Florus, is perhaps no less satirical about academia than McCarthy’s novel: having failed, amidst “so great noise both by night and day,” to deliver some florid verses to Julius, Horace observes dismissively that “poets love the grove, and avoid cities.” Apparently, the garden of academe, as well as the truth, is already beside the point in the first century BCE. At this late hour, nonetheless, professors Natania Meeker and Antónia Szabari of USC speculate on the silvas itself, and wager that the classical monoculture of arborescent man and arborescent philosophy has been uprooted by modernity’s radical botany, which engenders both rhizomatic posthumans and rhizomatic philosophies. Bursting through the centuries-tilled exceptionalism of human life and logos, the strange vitality of vegetality—one that is peculiarly inorganic—animates the speculative fruits of modernity’s science, fiction, technology, and art, according to Meeker and Szabari. Radical Botany: Plants and Speculative Fiction is therefore not merely a new academic book,1 but a rear-guard action that mobilizes critical plant studies to re-imagine the cosmos and cosmotechnics of modern life.

    Perhaps more modestly, Meeker and Szabari also envision radical botany as a practice that cultivates new modalities of research and collaboration within academia itself:

    With our book, we affirm that there is a vegetal dimension to the practice of collaboration. While experimenting concretely with that practice, we were forced to accept that our work process and its outcome were no longer tied to an individual sense of self, nor did they affirm our limits or boundaries as individual scholars. (vii)

    Taking up Deleuze and Guattari’s precepts of “becoming-plant,” “rhizome,” and “follow the plants,” Meeker and Szabari pledge their allegiance to vegetal allies whose mode of being is “neither individuated nor autonomous but collective, swarming, multiple” (xi). This distributive, emergent, non-hierarchical assemblage (whether plant, insect, or technology) has become the familiar of many new materialist discourses in their attempt to invoke a mode of being and relation that deprivileges human subjectivity while expanding the confluence of actants. Is this philosophical shift from Academus the man to Academe the grove—which, according to Radical Botany, emerges in (specifically French) seventeenth-century early modernity—simply a celebratory “turn,” or, more soberly, a “catastrophe”?

    The question can be reframed by taking a quick look at this “radical” of botany whereby plants are our allies and collaboration is itself vegetal. The Online Etymology Dictionary tells us that radical is already and originally a botanical term: “Late 14c., in a medieval philosophical sense, from Late Latin radicalis ‘of or having roots,’ from Latin radix (genitive radicis) ‘root’ (from PIE root wrad ‘branch, root’). Meaning ‘going to the origin, essential’ is from 1650s.” We see that the word radical concerns the root, the chthonic origin, the essence; indeed, the radical concerns the essence of the word, “the root part of a word.” Radical botany is therefore botanical to the roots: there are no Persons, only Plants, in the silvas academi. This confluence of speculative substitutions and supplements is already reflected upon by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in 1782. In the Dialogues, he finds himself foregoing human friends for botanical ones, and laments that “he would have left the supplement for the thing, if he had had the choice, and he was reduced to converse with plants only after vain efforts to converse with human beings” (qtd. in Derrida 148). Suspecting the implications of this predicament over the supplement and the thing for Rousseau’s philosophy and philosophy in general—whether writing in lieu of speech or plant in lieu of human being—in Of Grammatology, Derrida writes: “that botany becomes the supplement of society is more than a catastrophe. It is the catastrophe of the catastrophe.” (148). The irrecoverability of the logos is radical; there is always already only supplement. In Derrida’s landmark reading of Rousseau, “writing will appear to us more and more as another name for this structure of supplementarity” (245) and any gesture to “separate originarity from supplementarity” (243 points to an “originary supplement.” That Rousseau has no choice but to supplement the human being with the plant suggests that the plant is an “originary supplement” or a “radical friend,” if we heed the botanical meaning of the word “radical.”2 Although Meeker and Szabari follow Deleuze rather than being led down Derrida’s phyto-deconstructive garden path, they give to the plant a kind of radical priority that retrieves its peculiar vitality and animation from the margins (no longer mere Aristotelian threptikon or nutritive capacity of the vegetal soul) and dislodges the humanistic imperative from its lofty bell tower (the perpetual echo chamber of reason’s sovereignty). Going further, Radical Botany suggests that the “plant turn” is a companion vibrant materialism, one that signals an emergent phytocene in the wake of the anthropocene: “In its approach to the plant as a figure for the animation of matter in general, radical botany allows us to think the calamity (for us) of human insignificance together with the intensity of our desire for recognition and the dream of multispecies attachments and solidarities” (6). Despite the cosmic dimensions of the Plant Turn, Meeker and Szabari remain close to their disciplinary field and begin their account of radical botany thus “in seventeenth-century France with the gradual development of a botanically oriented thought that accords power and vitality to vegetal life in ways that trouble orthodox modes of classification” (1).

    From Aristotle’s de Anima onward, plant life has often been classified as poor in (or entirely without) intelligence compared to human life, and poor in (or entirely without) perception compared to animal life. Even so, this apparent catatonia and anesthesia have incited speculation that plants point to the limits of understanding life in anthropomorphic and zoomorphic terms. Vegetal lives, write Meeker and Szabari, “compel us to imagine an ingeniously animated and animating matter that we are never able to observe in all its operations. Within this framework, the plant becomes capable of unleashing speculative energies for envisioning and indeed participating in the world as other than it may appear to us” (3). The poverty of vegetal life incites our imagination to envision other worlds, or rather, becomes a nonhuman speculum that supplements human imagination. Meeker and Szabari observe both the “tradition that conceives of vegetal life as resisting representability” and the insight that plant life “participates in the production of new representational modes, including the novel, early cinema, and contemporary virtual reality, and new affects, including queer desires, feminist affinities, and ecological solidarities” (2). The birth of a “vegetal subject” hence occurs in arabesque tandem with a vegetal modernity that models a new representational framework for animated matter.

    For seventeenth-century (French) materialist thought, plants offer “a mode of life that is entirely immanent,” that is to say, “without a hidden or transcendent animating principle” (16). Taking as their example satirical narratives (from libertins eŕudits such as Cyrano de Bergerac) that carnivalize the dignity of the human person via plant figures that are both scandalously libidinal and indifferent, Meeker and Szabari see these works as a kind of Copernican turn for the order of life, whereby the plant is the exemplar of an entity “both vibrantly alive and fully material” (16) that “not only works as a tool with which to undermine anthropocentric narratives but as a key figure for the material life of the universe” (29). Yet, in an ambivalent gesture that becomes a strategy for their book as a whole, Meeker and Szabari begin the early chapter “Libertine Botany and Vegetal Modernity” with the works of Guy de La Brosse, who founded the Jardin de Roi, a kind of research garden expanding the (human) knowledge of plant chemistry for philanthropic purposes (botanical remedies for the poor). We see that this garden of the king is not only tethered to the scientific, social, and economic order of its time, but that La Brosse “retains the notion of the soul as an animating force” (ascribed to each individual plant), which leads Meeker and Szabari to the half-hearted concession that his “position is not a materialist one” (34). Attempting to recuperate the botanist’s exuberant assertion that plants, “the daughters of the earth,” are the first living things to receive the cosmic shower of “divine benediction,” Meeker and Szabari insist that “[i]f La Brosse invokes a divine rationality for being, he does so in order to give plants priority over all other forms of life” (36). This priority not only concerns the plant as an animated (ensouled) being but an animating being: the incorruptibility and immortality of the plant soul is made manifest, claims La Brosse, in experiments with palingenesis. The spectral scene of the ghost plant resurrecting itself from the ashes is deftly interpreted and linked by Meeker and Szabari to future technologies of visual materialization: “if this scene looks back to a tradition originating in alchemy, it also looks forward to techniques of animation three hundred years in the making—the time-lapse films of late nineteenth-century science and early cinema that animate the plant in an electric form” (39). Although perhaps no twenty-first century observer would see experiments in pallingenesis as an exhibition of the immortal, incorruptible soul of plants, making them a precursor to cinematic animation poses some questions: does not a (revisionist/retroactive) reading that turns something into a precursor suggest a teleological conception of history (Hegelian unfolding of spirit, etc.)? Does not any regime of visual representation—whether ghost plant rising up from the ashes in a glass vial or electric plant blossoming forth in time-based media—rely on a transcendental signified?

    In order to manage the complications that arise in a materialist reading of the plant as a vegetal subject and the emergence of a vegetal modernity, Meeker and Szabari mobilize speculative fiction as a genre and methodology. They designate “speculative fiction—narratives of life and sociability that go beyond anthropocentric and anthropomorphic limits” (48)—as vital materiality’s genre and the plant “as a key figure for the material life of the universe” (29). Yet Cyrano de Bergerac’s fantastic tale of the talking cabbage, for instance, though it might mock the dignities and illusions of the human person, does not make the “truth” of matter or vital materiality accessible.3 We might also see the peculiar vitality accorded to plants as more properly linguistic: according to Barbara Johnson’s Persons and Things, talking cabbages serve better to demonstrate the way rhetorical strategies like apostrophe, prosopopeia, anthropomorphism, and personification turn things into persons (and constitute human persons, in the first place). Radical Botany‘s chapter 3 sub-section “Plant-Human Analogies in the Eighteenth Century” directly addresses rhetoric by observing that eighteenth-century botany tends to anthropomorphize plants in order to put into question the hierarchies and categorization of various orders of life. The physiology and function of plant parts are likened to those of animals, suggesting “the development of a radical materialism that attacks ontological distinctions among life-forms as contested matters of belief rather than accepted truth” (58). And yet, in order to do so, botanists of this period had to give to the plant what belongs to the animal, particularly movement. This recuperative gesture did not go ignored by eighteenth-century materialists like Denis Diderot. Meeker and Szabari remark that the “tendency to privilege free will and autonomy of movement as sources of superiority is reconfigured by Diderot as a symptom of our inability to ascribe value to life-forms that do not resemble us” (59). In signature fashion, the structural arc of Radical Botany redoubles its own analysis: as early modern (French) speculative fictions turn to plants to explore the material life of the cosmos, they institute, on the one hand, a trajectory that includes cinematic animation as a form of life, and reinstitute on the other the manifest behaviors (primarily movement) of animal life as that which makes plants “alive.” This ambivalent framework helps to account for the disciplinary fractures and sutures of Radical Botany: for Meeker and Szabari, the early modern libertins eŕudits premediate early 20th century avant-garde cinema even as their materialist fictions remediate the philosophical terms and principles of classical philosophy (distinctions between plants and animals, materiality and immateriality, organic matter and inorganic matter).

    What mediates this double premediation and remediation? The chapter on “The Inorganic Plant in the Romantic Garden” tells us, unsurprisingly, that Romanticism provides the mediation, configured as mutuality. The Romantic botanist imagines a “plant life that is vibrant on its own terms yet exquisitely responsive to human interests and preoccupations” (88). Taking Percy Bysshe Shelley’s poem “The Sensitive-Plant” as exemplary, however, Meeker and Szabari suspect that the Romantic plant’s sensitivity may be more of the order of photosensitivity than affective affinity for the human being: the wild and indifferent vitality of weeds runs amuck after the tandem expirations of gentle Lady Gardener and her cultivated garden companions. Vegetal life cares naught for the human person, but shares proximity with “modes of animation and vitality unrelated to and undefined by organisms and the life that they embody” (86). The photon-sensitive-plant will, by the twentieth century, find its true soul mate in the techno-photosynthesis of the cinema. Meeker and Szabari trace this alliance by way of a “detour through a North American tradition of speculative botany. … [Edgar Allan] Poe’s texts in particular will be of inspiration to French symbolism (including the poetic arabesques of Charles Baudelaire) and, through this line of transmission, early avant-garde French cinema” (87). In The House of Usher, Poe takes heed of the dark side of the plant—its creeping excess, its slimy vitality, its evil flowers, its horrifying indifference—which casts an alien shadow on any sense of human temporality, achievement, or society. The crowning glory of human reason is no match for “the sentience of all vegetal things” (Poe, qtd. 98), which invades the human kingdom, penetrating even its inanimate structures and artifacts, engendering a vital mineralogy. In Poe’s macabre view, plants represent not only an inhuman vitality, but an undead or inanimate one as well. The uncannily green luminosity of the swamp bespeaks the electric glow of the emergent cinema and shares in its phantasmatic animations. As the “inorganic life” of the vegetal overtakes the house of Usher, Meeker and Szabari observe that, “[un]like much Gothic fiction,” this villain does not represent a “paternal authority turned cruel and terrifying but a force or mode of life that dissolves this authority altogether. In the process, vegetality is revealed as the agent of the disintegration of genealogies that should otherwise preserve distinctions according to a familial logic” (109). Meeker and Szabari see the fall of the house, the oikos, as ushering in a potential phyto-politics, one with feminist possibilities.

    Like other gestures in Radical Botany, grounding a feminist politics upon the vibrant materiality of the vegetal is pursued with speculative ambivalence. Taking up a short story influenced by Poe—Charlotte Perkins Gilman’s “The Giant Wistaria” (1891)—Meeker and Szabari propose that

    continuities between Poe’s and Gilman’s writings suggest that the materiality of the vegetal can contribute to the speculative invention of feminist topographies that do not necessarily have recourse to the privileging of female or feminine identity. Within the limits of a critique shot through with white supremacism, Gilman nonetheless suggests some of the promise Poe’s vision of vegetal contamination could hold for feminism. (111)

    Attention must be given to this word “nonetheless,” which occurs in Radical Botany 171 times, most tellingly in the title of the final chapter, “Becoming Plant Nonetheless.” The term habituates a recuperative strategy that is rhetorically innocuous in some cases—serving to uncover the compatibility of apparently incompatible alternatives—and politically charged in others. In the above example (the term’s twentieth deployment in the book), “nonetheless” allows for a problematic salvaging. Many readers have learned that phrases like nonetheless, in spite of, or nevertheless mask a more consequential “because of.” We may wonder why Meeker and Szabari’s analysis doesn’t take a different path—perhaps mapping out any link between the materiality of the vegetal and racism—or worry that only a white feminism could ever salvage a critique enmeshed with white supremacy. The “promise” of the transfer of vegetal vitality from the non-human to the human in new materialist discourses is a speculative performance that we should keep both our eyes on. Meeker and Szabari appear to have one eye on the situation when they write:

    The figure of the horrific plant, both supporting and dismantling the house, suggests a feminist rewriting of Poe’s “Usher,” but it is important in this context to acknowledge the racist and classist aspects of Gilman’s corpus, including the fact that her public critique of patriarchy remains imbued with xenophobia. (111)

    If the promise of radical botany has fraught political limits, it (nonetheless?) retains speculative and critical energies with regard to “scientific, technological, and mediatic engagement with vegetal life” (113). Meeker and Szabari regain a note of hope when the final chapters of their book turn to early twentieth-century experimental French cinema (Jean Comandon, Jean Epstein, and Germaine Dulac), which “takes the possibility of a vegetal sentience and transfigures it, suffusing it with transformative affect, to make it once again a joyous and galvanizing object” (113). The sign of this vegetal sentience is plant movement made visible with such techniques as time-lapse cinematography. The cinema not only animates the plant in this fashion, but also shares with it a kind of inorganic life: “[t]he ‘electric plant’ brings to fruition the concept of cinema as a form of pure movement” (115) and “the movement of the plant comes to stand for cinema’s ability to show (and transmit) the liveliness of the universe” (116). The cinema is itself a form of vegetal life, which is paradigmatic of vital materiality for Meeker and Szabari. As we have seen, however, the indifferent vitality of vegetal life can easily take root in politically problematic narratives: indifference is not a condition or consequence of equality. So when Meeker and Szabari deploy another “nonetheless”—this time with a chapter that begins its exploration of “the vegetal moment” in cinema with Abel Gance’s critical and commercial failure La Fin du monde, a film about the Earth’s collision course with a comet that “only features plants tangentially” (115) but is “nonetheless a spectacular exploration of the social repercussions of the impending cataclysm” (114)—readers might be keen on understanding which disavowed narrative or framework embeds this recuperative nonetheless.

    In a strangely passing remark, Meeker and Szabari mention the “deeply eurocentric idealism” (114) of the film “even as” it “harkens back to an Enlightenment universalism” (114). It appears that the void carved out by the cataclysmic impact of the comet enables a “newly universalist political order” that leaves “an Edenic earth from which most human life has been erased” (115) and is, in effect, a eurocentric void. As Meeker and Szabari proceed to their presentation of the vegetal moment in interwar French cinema, they intend “both to embrace and to rethink the social project with which cinema is so clearly invested in La Fin du monde,” stating that “vegetal life often does the work that the comet is meant to undertake in La Fin du monde: bringing about momentous social transformation” (115). Readers may wonder: does the opening up of the vegetal world by early (French) cinema with its delightful time-lapse photography (etc.) happen by way of a racialized excavation? In the case of the electric-plant, the carving out of its life-world might not happen “in spite of” a framing narrative of white supremacy or eurocentrism—more likely it happens as a technological determination of the cinematic apparatus—yet we may recall Walter Benjamin’s observation that cinema prepares the human being for cybernetic relations of all sorts.4 A machinic mode of animation informs the inorganic life of the cinema as well as the plant. For instance, Meeker and Szabari poetically express the way time-lapse techniques “create an ‘electric vegetable,’ a filmic ghost that moves and gesticulates in uncanny but compelling ways. A phantom of the cinematic apparatus is thus born, a stunning animated plant” (120). Making visible the slow movements and temporalities of the vegetal, the cinema does not turn the plant into an animetaphor, but unveils the machinic animism of the cosmos. If the heliotropic opening of daisies, the dandelion blooming, and the germinating grain of wheat—movements performed without volition, perception, or consciousness—share an affinity with the animating movements of the cinematic apparatus, they also signal “the dramatic loss of the world of human experience” (144).

    The penultimate chapter, “Plant Horror: Love Your Own Pod,” attends to the anxieties concerning this plant takeover and a planet absent of the human being. Shifting their focus from interwar French cinema to post-WWII American horror movies set in Southern California (in particular, the Invasion of the Body Snatchers franchise), Meeker and Szabari up the ante with their strategy of the nonetheless: in a world of vegetal and flat ontologies, what does it matter if you are a human being or a pod-person? Bypassing a possible racial allegory in the takeover of suburbia by alien pods, the authors set forth a materialist valuation of the merits of becoming-pod. In a world that is always already capitalist, neoliberal, and global,

    the world of the replicas, or bad copies, is not just alienating or melancholic—a zone of nostalgia for an absent original—but is a fully material world capable of transforming, producing, and reproducing itself. The pods are thus not only representatives of the workings of an increasingly rhizomatic capitalism. The film preserves a materialist aspect, in which matter is not only instrumentalized but also world-making in its own right. (165)

    This vibrant matter releases human inhabitants and

    redeems them from a drab existence. It is the latter experience that our materialist reading of the film underscores. Gradually, the images of flaccid, plantlike humans are reinjected with an excess of life, thanks to the invasion; the alien beings bring with them the promise of not only biological vitality but a vigorous efflorescence that can be substituted for the failed utopia represented by the multiethnic and multicultural but well-policed and ultimately fairly homogenous San Francisco. (165)

    This failed utopia concerns the university as well as the city: in the silvas academi, posthuman and nonhuman materialisms like radical botany promise to reinvigorate dialectical, historical, and other “outdated” humanistic materialisms. Yet if “coanaesthesis” (124) is the modality of collaboration modeled by vegetal life, do we really want to be anaesthetized together, living in synaesthetic oblivion like peas in a pod, Body Snatcher style? Is not this Green Coma or Green Catatonia just as disturbing as the eco-fascist human-plant symbiosis exhibited in the recent Swedish film Midsommar or in the 1973 American film Soylent Green? Doubling down on its speculative optimism, Radical Botany leaves us with the chapter “Becoming Plants Nonetheless,” and one can’t help but wonder from where it derives its amiable buoyancy: as long as it is plant-based, I may want to try some myself.

    Erin Obodiac Erin Obodiac received her Ph.D. in Comparative Literature from the University of California, Irvine and has held teaching and research appointments at the University of Leeds, SUNY Albany, Cornell University, and SUNY Cortland. She currently lectures in the UC Irvine-Dalian University of Technology joint program. Her writings assemble residual questions from the deconstructive “legacy” with emergent discourses in technics and animality, media ecology, and machinic subjectivity. She is completing a book called Husserl’s Comet: Cinema and the Trace, which repositions deconstruction within the history of cybernetics and machinic life.

    Footnotes

    1. As scholars of French literature, Meeker and Szabari don’t mention that the German word Buch comes from the word for beechwood trees.

    2. In The Politics of Friendship, Derrida follows this predicament of the “o my friends, there is no friend” (2).

    3. Catherine Malabou’s recent critique of speculative materialism and new materialism notices that matter is the new transcendental signified.

    4. Benjamin writes: “Film serves to train human beings in apperceptions and reactions caused by the interaction with technology [Apparatur] whose importance in their lives grows almost daily” (qt. in Hansen 314).

    Works Cited

    • Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology. Edited by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Johns Hopkins UP, Fortieth Anniversary Edition, 2016.
    • —. The Politics of Friendship. Translated by George Collins, Verso, 1995.
    • Hansen, Miriam. “Benjamin and Cinema: Not a One-Way Street.” Critical Inquiry, vol. 25, no. 2, Winter 1999.
  • “This book … of traces and tremors, if book it be”

    Cory Austin Knudson (bio)

    Taussig, Michael. Mastery of Non-Mastery in the Age of Meltdown. U Chicago P, 2020.

    In Mastery of Non-Mastery in the Age of Meltdown, anthropologist and ethnographer Michael Taussig confronts the reciprocal problems of theorizing and representing climate change. In this, he joins a popular strain of contemporary environmental humanities literature that examines how modeling the environment analytically or artistically limits or expands the ways we can think about, and perhaps mitigate, climatic catastrophe. Much of the work in this tradition tends to keep its models at arm’s length, using sober, scholarly analysis to master the myriad representational forms of climate change. It straightens out—in theory—the disorder of a world on the brink without letting theory itself become infected by such disorder. Taussig, by comparison, seeks to meld analysis with its object, making his text both product and agent of epistemic meltdown. Mastery of Non-Mastery in the Age of Meltdown (hereafter Mastery of Non-Mastery) in this way combines ecocritical and ecopoetic practices; it attempts to reshape, mutate, and parody the scholarly monograph in a bid to derive a form of expression commensurate with this surreal, volatile age of meltdown.

    Taussig’s correspondingly surreal and volatile text might at first appear a gimmick, where writing erratically mimics erratic weather patterns, as it were. But Taussig insists elsewhere that “while it is hazardous to maintain a mimetic theory of language and writing, it is no less hazardous not to have such a theory” (“Corn-Wolf” 33). For him, the distance assumed between the subject and object of scholarly analysis together with a presumed epistemic stability form the foundations of much traditional academic writing. As such, academic criticism often mirrors and reinforces the ideology of Man’s mastery of nature—or, more academically, of subject matter—while concealing the role of narrative (or what Taussig more approachably terms “storytelling”) in the perpetuation of such a disastrous pretense. Taussig has thus cast his “apotropaic writing” as a “countermagic” to this hegemonic mode of thought and language (“Corn-Wolf” 32–33).1 Mastery of Non-Mastery presents his latest attempt to tap into the meeting point between reality and representation, where the “meltdown of the language of nature swamps the nature of language” (174).

    Thus opposed to what he calls the “crabby and secular language” (56) of much contemporary environmental literature, Taussig variously situates Mastery of Non-Mastery as “somewhere between science fiction, high theory, and the weather” (3), a “book … of traces and tremors” (20), “a firefly moment navigating between light and dark” (57), “a too-late experimental ethnography” (120), and “a threshold between a theater and a book” (180). Nowhere does he employ the language of structuration and utility so normalized in works of theory. This “book that is not a book” (180) does not build anything. Nor does it seek to furnish its reader any theoretical tools. Rather, Taussig’s preferred models are dancing (16) and the meandering flight of a firefly (95). The salience of such images is apparent immediately on opening Mastery of Non-Mastery in the Age of Meltdown, which spans nineteen brief chapters laid out in discrete blocks of text that recall a collection of vignettes composed of aphorisms. The staccato rhythm of its format mirrors the way that ideas and intertexts are made to waltz and flit through the book’s pages, often disappearing suddenly only to reemerge in new combinations ten or fifty pages later. Lines of argument meanwhile cross and re-cross such that the author’s central concepts are gradually fleshed out more through creative patterning—or the layering of textures, or the thickening of an atmosphere—than by way of the gradual construction of a theoretical edifice. How else, he asks, should one write about a planetary condition where “nature turns more surreal each day with ominous green-yellow vistas and bluer-than-blue skies while the snow falls one day, rising the next as mist, stripping us naked as pixies as the cosmos draws close” (19)? Taussig here sets himself the task of philosophizing with the Nietzschean hammer, which resonates with its object so as to first match and then shatter its spell. This form of writing necessitates a way of reading that departs from what one might expect of an academic text. Like the figure on its cover, Taussig’s audience is meant to juggle rather than grasp his many tongue-in-cheek coinages—what he calls “‘shamanic tropes,’ such as ‘knowing what not to know,’ ‘the re-enchantment of nature,’ ‘the skilled revelation of skilled concealment,’ ‘the bodily unconscious,’ and of course the lead dancer itself, ‘mastery of non-mastery’” (34).

    A book devised to put its reader off-kilter leaves the reviewer in a predicament. On the one hand, I can give myself over to Taussig’s circuitous, often baroque style and attempt to do justice to the experience of reading his latest work by recreating it in miniature. On the other, I can set the juggling balls down and soberly attempt to taxonomize the performance at the expense of the intoxicating movement that gives it meaning in the first place. While the reader of this review need not fear (much) indulgence in theatrics, the temptation toward mimicry in this case is hard to resist. This impulse arises in part from Taussig’s compelling case against the ideology of Man’s exception from and dominance over nature and the scholarly mode of analysis that often ends up mirroring and reinforcing it, even for the most eco-conscious of critics. But mostly it comes from how powerfully the text conveys its central thesis on the contagious power of mimesis, which becomes the most enchanting of Taussig’s “shamanic tropes” and forms the gravitational center of his intellectual galaxy in general.

    Mimesis emerged as a theoretical and methodological point of departure early in Taussig’s career by way of his ethnographic studies of the indigenous peoples of the Putumayo River Basin in Colombia. Starting in 1969, the Guna and others whom he lived among during his fieldwork—and to whom he has returned every year since—challenged Taussig’s self-described “western, middle-class life” and destabilized the “moorings that, up to that time, I thought I required for sociological reckoning” (37). Taussig’s life’s work became to understand and convey to those beyond the Putumayo Basin how sympathetic magic formed the foundation for thinking about and managing social, political, ecological, and even cosmic entanglements. Since the early 1980s, he has consistently figured shamanic practices of ritual contagion and duplication in terms of mimesis. Through the metonymic process of taking a part for the whole (e.g., taking blood or hair to represent the person whom a ritual is to affect), or the metaphoric process of fabricating or conjuring a ritual copy (e.g., crafting a likeness of the person whom a ritual is to affect, or taking on that person’s identity via performance or possession), sympathetic magic draws on a deep-seated mimetic faculty that Nidesh Lawtoo described in this journal as an “unconscious that responds viscerally to fluxes of affective contagion that operate on bodies and minds.” Taussig similarly terms this simultaneously intellectual and physical conatus the “bodily unconscious” (11–12, 73). Following the Guna, Taussig casts the bodily unconscious and the mimetic fluxes of affective contagion that operate on and through it as foundational to the very fabric of reality itself.

    Mimesis thus represents for Taussig not only an atomic element of human sociality but also the metaphysical axis of art, technology, religion, language, politics, and nature itself. Its centrality to Taussig’s thought and methodology helps us to understand why his works present themselves as forms of mimetic ritual. Mastery of Non-Mastery is no exception in this regard. However tiresome the reader may sometimes find this cultivated grandiosity—showmanship and shaman-ship for Taussig are, if not identical, then at least inextricably intertwined—Taussig’s perspicacity and style attest to the pervasiveness and self-perpetuating momentum of the mimetic faculty. In reading his work, one can feel that mimesis designates the impulse to copy as well as the impulse to generate copies. Such generative processes naturally “lead to snowballing metamorphoses” (44), including the metamorphosis of his text’s readers (and its reviewer, and the reader of that reviewer, and …) into participants in the ritual.

    “In other words,” Taussig writes, “mimesis has an inbuilt propensity to provoke a chain reaction in which things become other things in a process of mimetic fission … This I call the ‘metamorphic sublime’” (44). Via this “metamorphic sublime,” Mastery of Non-Mastery deftly synthesizes the affective flux of the bodily unconscious with the principle of generalized planetary interconnection now largely taken for granted among environmental scholars, while at the same time literalizing what Taussig elsewhere terms the “re-enchantment of nature” that the recent ontological and nonhuman “turns” in the humanities have called up (40, 42, 144, 176). “Global meltdown amplifies mimetic and animistic impulses as never before,” he declares (5). As such, it becomes reasonable to ask whether “we are now becoming like the soothsayers of old”:

    Are we now becoming like ancient stargazers each night asking the heavens whys and wherefores? Do we not sense our animal selves, our plant selves, our insect selves, all of that and more as an angry sky beats down, our bodies resonant with hitherto unknown liaisons as foreign beings skid in from the unknown? Suddenly we are alive in our bodies as to stellar influence and solar wind when all goes dark once more but for fireflies, epitome of the newly animate world, reminders of chances missed, others to catch, roadside flares of pixilated consciousness.(61)

    In this way, Mastery of Non-Mastery implicitly mobilizes a common criticism in environmental humanities discourse, especially vis-à-vis the colonial trappings of the Anthropocene and the principle of all-pervading planetary interconnection that heuristic has popularized. Bluntly: indigenous people have theorized these kinds of things long before Paul Crutzen and Eugene Stoermer came along. And they have worked out elaborate ways of channeling the mimetic relays that form the warp and woof of human-nonhuman entanglement. “Weather magic,” Taussig reminds us, “is as old as the hills” (125).

    Taussig’s point that we must now come to terms with a broad-based re-enchantment of nature in all its marvels and horrors begs the question: what is to be done? This is where his central thesis on the contagious power of mimesis, its tendency to compound its own momentum, and its entanglement with the bodily unconscious at the intersection of “my body, your body, and the body of the world” really begins to throw sparks (11). With due reference to Nietzsche’s hammer become tuning fork—which, “touching the idols of culture, echoes their hollowness, thereby destroying them” (13)—Taussig gradually fleshes out the notion of “mimetic excess,” that tendency whereby any copy always generates some volatile residue or remainder. This is the true potency of sympathetic magic: the shaman not only mirrors something or someone, but engenders a creative refiguration thereof. Because magic ritual resembles a sort of cybernetic relay where output retroactively affects input, this creative refiguration has the capacity to turn back and affect its original. He explains this process via the 1955 short, quasi-ethnographic film, Les maîtres fous:

    The film concerns migrants of the French colony of Niger enacting in trance the spirits of French officials, seen now in black bodies gesticulating wildly and disjointedly, eyes rolling, spume frothing from their mouths. They enact mini-dramas of transgression and of military discipline. … They eat dog and they carry (toy) rifles. They exult in the exercise of mastery over craven subjects crawling on the ground. The crucial point is that the bodies in trance are and manifestly are not the French officials. The bodies mimic, yet the result is not without parody, and parody (as Steve Feld once pointed out) is mimesis with one aspect accentuated, which is all you need for mimetic excess. Yet even without accentuation, to be mimed is disconcerting. These men and women from Niger, part of the Hauka cult, thus bring out the wildness, the spirituality, and—most important—the sheer bluff their masters enact in the colonial theatricalization of mastery in general. … To mime is to get the power of what is mimed and power over it. (8)

    Les maîtres fous was banned in Niger and then in British-controlled African colonies for its perceived insult to colonial governorship. Taussig’s reading exposes the powerful transgression in this “insult.” The Hauka cult’s performances reveal an uncomfortable truth about the performative nature of colonial governorship itself, namely that it “is a matter of guile, of foxes as well as of lions, [of] what Hubert Murray, a colonial governor in Papua in the early twentieth century called ‘administration by bluff’” (13). This is the showman-shaman magic of political power in general, the magic trick of political power. And yet, because “mimesis exists no less in the actual events than in their depiction, in the reality as much as in its representation” (131), the mimicry of the Hauka practitioners as captured in Les maîtres fous retroactively reshaped the reality it both copied and parodied. It revealed the magic (trick) of colonial governance precisely through the creative refiguration thereof. This, according to Taussig, is the “trick whereby tuning forks become hammers” (15).

    Of course, mimetic excess has both a liberatory and a repressive side. The viral power of those mimetic relays operating in and through the bodily unconscious are just as likely to generate fascistic formations as subvert them. This is all too obvious today, Taussig argues, in the way that Donald Trump has been able to feed off of the visceral, affective power of racial resentment and patriarchal bluff, conjuring a following that would have been close to unthinkable in mainstream American thought even half a decade ago. “Trumpism [is] a shorthand for the sleight-of-hand theatricality of today’s politics” (35) he says, a condensation of “what I have shamanically in mind regarding dodge and feint and a larger-than-large theatrical presence verging on the grotesque that is magical if not sacred” (37), and “all the more impressive for being semi-conscious, at best” (39). Donald Trump indeed looms large over Mastery of Non-Mastery as the fascist showman-shaman par excellence. The nexus of the presidential Twitter account, the right-wing media echo chamber, and the ever more deranged following all feed on one another and give credence to Taussig’s thesis concerning the particular “magic of the presidency” (36) and the dark metamorphic sublimity it has called into being. Taussig here affirms Lawtoo’s point that

    mimetic behavior, just like the mythic tales that incite it, cuts both ways, depending on the model we mirror: if it can potentially turn a specific citizen into a model of resistance at a distance from power, it can also turn a democratic assemblage into a neofascist crowd under the hypnotic power of a leader’s pathos.

    Similarly, David Joselit’s more recent argument in October shows how the viral structure common to both the current pandemic and to the spreading and attribution of fake news (habitually mobilized by Trump) is cancerously mimetic, making COVID-19 so catastrophic in the US. But where Lawtoo gestures toward “what Nietzsche called a ‘pathos of distance‘ to diagnose the spiraling loops generated by the swarming of mimesis” and Joselit calls for a move to “re-authorize information … in the face of our world gone viral” (161), Taussig suggests no such stepping back. The task instead is to “mimetically match the magic sustaining fascism, which, like the fortress, is best tackled not from outside but from within” (16).

    This is a gutsy move that will likely earn him critics, sounding as it does like a call to stem the rising tide of fascism by, in a sense, jumping in and swimming with the current. It therefore doesn’t surprise me that Taussig, an avid student of the works of Georges Bataille, does not explicitly cite that thinker’s attempt to conjure up an antifascism based around the very same sort of détournement of fascist mimesis via the infamous Acéphale secret society and its eponymous, short-lived publication. Bataille’s invocation of a surfascisme that would ritualistically tap into and redirect the affective pull of reactionary forces earned him some of his most resounding denunciations, and remains a source of continuing confusion and misrepresentation today. Turning from politics proper, Taussig’s project makes a more modest proposal. He calls it “art versus art”:

    What sort of art is that, you ask? Well, not to put too fine a point on it, it is certainly not ideology versus truth, nor discourse versus counterdiscourse, but an art of sorcery-speak in a world gone rogue, piling on the negative sacred in which nature speaks through animate impulse and mimetic relays. Whatever the terms, paramount will be the pulse between bodies as America is made again. (144)

    Not putting too fine a point on it, indeed. In any case, there is no direct invitation to congregate in a secret grove around a dead tree struck by lightning to work out the terms of a human sacrifice (though Taussig does enigmatically refer to that acéphalic, lightning-struck tree of legend in chapter thirteen). Rather, a renewed art of “sorcery-speak” takes center stage, exemplified in certain works of Walter Benjamin and the “tremor-writing” that “draws upon and enacts corporeal tumult” (152) embodied in Marcel Proust’s In Search of Lost Time.

    In laying out how these authors are able to generate their characteristic, almost proprioceptive affect—which Taussig argues is crafted to operate on and through the bodily unconscious—Taussig demonstrates his powers as a reader of literature. Some of the best pages in the book engage his own hypnotic strain of ecocritical textual interpretation. Moving through the final paragraphs of Benjamin’s “On the Mimetic Faculty” or some passage from “Combray” with Taussig as guide is both pleasant and enlightening. Taussig’s language on occasion makes the book live up to its claim of being “a book of traces and tremors.” His prose, however, occasionally becomes as obfuscating as it is illuminating, and is sometimes overblown and clunky. He uses the phrase “they be” and variations thereof—”Shadows of life, they be” (100), “Those eyes, great black holes they be” (173), “Soul mates they be” (116)—with maddening frequency throughout the book. Far from lending the language a kind of sacred weight, this and similar idiosyncrasies end up distracting and frustrating this reader.2 Additionally, and at a less granular scale, Taussig’s rapid shifts in focus and tendency toward digression make even his most profound analyses less effective than they could be. While I understand what he is trying to do with his Nietzschean hammer and apotropaic countermagic, I still wonder what insights a more sustained engagement with his interlocutors would yield. This is exacerbated by the fact that his two favored exemplars of the kind of tremor-writing necessary for “art versus art” are writers who spend hundreds of pages elaborating a single idea or image.

    Then there are the interlocutors themselves. Taussig’s reviewers tend to point out that he appears to refuse, on principle, any sustained engagement with contemporary scholarship, preferring instead to stick with the tried-and-true cast of Benjamin, Proust, Bataille, and select others who, by and large, belong to the intellectual and literary canon of the Global North. He manages to avoid criticism for this pantheon not only because of his almost preternatural ability to generate fresh and audacious readings out of otherwise well-worn texts, but also because his profound investment in the ideas and practices of the indigenous cultures he studies allows him to unsettle the intellectual purview of dead-white-European-dom that often characterizes works of high theory. Mastery of Non-Mastery, though, largely leaves aside the second half of this formula. This is the work’s most significant shortcoming. Taussig makes frequent reference to the people, ideas, and experiences that populate the sub-equatorial half of his life and work, and he conveys a cutting if largely implicit criticism of the often parochial “flood of green books, freshly minted journals, essays, research grants, talk shows, films, fellowships, political campaigns, and endless conferences on the Anthropocene” (56). But Mastery of Non-Mastery itself features no truly sustained engagement with non-Western thinkers or texts, no first-hand testimonies, and not even any direct quotations from those among whom he lives when not in New York City. Walks around New York, in fact, take the place of journeys through the Amazon rainforest, and conversations with East Coast friends take the place of, for example, the conversations with the shaman Santiago Mutumbajoy around which Taussig built his watershed work, Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man (1987).

    One additional absence bears noting: the reader of this review has likely noticed my disappointment at the sudden, precipitous turn from the political point about occupying and redirecting the affective forces driving the current fascist resurgence to the more aesthetic project of crafting a kind of “tremor-writing” à la Benjamin and Proust. Given Taussig’s strident and often crushingly incisive comments on the current political landscape, a more directly political articulation of what is to be done in this “age of meltdown” seems called for. All the more so because Mastery of Non-Mastery is dedicated to “a Green New Deal,” and its first quotation is from the democratic socialist New York congresswoman Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. Taussig seems to indicate—albeit under his breath—that the current fitful growth of a mass politics to the left of the Democratic Party might well be the political embodiment to match—and undo—the magic sustaining fascism. This would be a fascinating, bold, and productive argument against the dominant left-conservatism that sneers at “left populism” and pines for a return to “normal,” that asks us to step back from the flux of the metamorphic sublime and reinvest ourselves in traditional institutions of knowledge and power while fascism gains an ever-tighter grip on the bodily unconscious of the American socius. But alas, all this is only a trace, only a tremor, in Mastery of Non-Mastery in the Age of Meltdown. To its credit, that is precisely what the book claims to offer in the first place.

    Cory Austin Knudson Cory Austin Knudson is a doctoral student in Comparative Literature and Literary Theory at the University of Pennsylvania. His work focuses broadly on modernism and the environmental humanities, with emphasis on the function of decomposition in both literature and ecology. His essay, “Seeing the World: Visions of Being in the Anthropocene,” has been recently published in Environment, Space, Place. With Tomas Elliott, he is currently translating Georges Bataille’s The Limit of the Useful, a preliminary manuscript to The Accursed Share, for MIT Press.

    Footnotes

    1. Taussig writes, “I have long felt that agribusiness writing is more magical than magic ever could be and that what is required is to counter the purported realism of agribusiness writing with apotropaic writing as countermagic, apotropaic from the ancient Greek meaning the use of magic to protect one from harmful magic” (“Corn-Wolf” 32–33).

    2. To be clear, I am aware that this kind of pirate- and/or Yoda-speak is a stylistic quirk that, in general, reviews of scholarly works might gloss over or outright ignore—but in order to take seriously Taussig’s own wish for his language to be “not a tool of representation but a way of being what the writing is about” (170), I feel obliged to make mention of it.

    Works Cited

    • Joselit, David. “Virus as Metaphor.” October, no. 172, 2020, pp. 159–62.
    • Lawtoo, Nidesh. “The Swarming of Mimesis: A review of William Connolly, Facing the Planetary: Entangled Humanism and the Politics of Swarming.” Postmodern Culture, vol. 28, no. 1, 2017.
    • Taussig, Michael. “The Corn-Wolf: Writing Apotropaic Texts.” Critical Inquiry, vol. 37, no. 1, 2010, pp. 26–33.
  • Reasons for Self-Dislocating

    Miriam Jerade (bio)

    A review of Cadahia, Luciana, and Ana Carrasco-Conde, editors. Fuera de sí mismas. Motivos para dislocarse. Herder, 2020.

    This edited collection features contributions by Spanish-speaking women scholars who share the same motif—self-dislocation. The eleven authors seek to question the locus of philosophy and the discourses that frame it. The book is founded on the idea that philosophy has been historically enunciated by a male voice located in an Anglo-American geography. As the editors claim in the introduction, the self-dislocating logos is a loxos, a “taking away,” being mis-placed. This is reflected in the title of the volume, Fuera de sí mismas (Out of Their Minds), a play on words that echoes the language of mania but seeks to redress it as contrary to nonsense. Editors Cadahia and Carrasco-Conde propose that this form of collaboration allows women philosophers to claim back for themselves a voice of their own. The play between title and subtitle is also worth noticing. The title phrase “fuera de sí mismas” leads the reader to think of a judgment from outside—a female “they” who is “out of their mind” or even more literally “out of themselves.” The subtitle can be read as a response. There are indeed “reasons for dislocating” (“motivos para dislocarse”) the self, for making themselves uncomfortable, or self-dislocating. The contributors find themselves in a place where the voices of Spanish-speaking women philosophers are not heard. In response, the authors collectively claim the need to be creative and to dislocate the discourse. As Cadahia and Carrasco-Conde state in the introduction, “Only by being out of our minds/ourselves can we dislocate imposed places of enunciation that have turned aside our way of making philosophy, so we can open up new paths for a new logic” (“Solo estando fuera de sí mismas podemos desquiciar lugares de enunciación impuestos que han relegado nuestra forma de hacer filosofía y encontrar los caminos de una nueva lógica”; 18).1 It is not enough to publish philosophical research conducted by women in Spanish; more significantly, the collection explores a new logic of philosophical discourse through their interventions.

    The volume was not originally conceived as a collection of chapters focusing on feminism or on Latin American philosophy. The editors asked eleven renowned Latin American women scholars to send them texts about their current work. While the volume is not organized thematically, common topics arise in the essays. Anna Maria Brigante and Emma Ingala Gómez explore the image. Laura Quintana and Amanda Núñez García examine the possibility of political thought through aesthetics. María del Rosario Acosta and Rosaura Martínez Ruiz share a concern with the performativity of listening. Rocío Zambrana, Nuria Sánchez Madrid, and Macarena Marey critique liberal and neoliberal policies. In their respective essays, Ana Carrasco-Conde and Luciana Cadahia write about evil and desire.

    The originality of the book lies in the way all the contributors read canonical—and mostly male—philosophers and theorists from a situated standpoint. Zambrana interprets the debt crisis and the resistance of students in Puerto Rico through the lens of Walter Benjamin’s divine violence. Acosta reads political violence as an erasure of voice in Adriana Cavarero and in Ariel Dorfman’s novel La muerte y la doncella, which deals with torture in the Chilean dictatorship. Quintana writes about unburied corpses in Colombia, using Rancière and Mbembe as interlocutors. The contributors do not merely apply male theorists’ ideas to a particular question but take up a particular lens to read theory otherwise. Taken together, the various situations they bring into play question the locus of philosophy. For example, the subversive resistance of students in Puerto Rico allows us to better understand why divine violence is a destruction of history and how it is conceived as an expiation of debt in mythical violence. A character in the work of a Chilean author writing about the country’s dictatorship who has experienced torture in relation to their voice can shed light on the political dimension of listening, the acoustic dimension of violence, the horror produced by silencing, and even the effect of drowning out the voice.

    Fuera de sí mismas is based on modern philosophical-theoretical assumptions that pair with political concerns as a response to injustice. Cadahia reads desire in Antigone as a transgression of normativity. Her reading questions Hegel’s and Žižek’s interpretations of Antigone as well as feminist interpretations by Butler, Honig, and Copjec, which are situated in an Anglo-American context. Cadahia shows the difficulty of thinking about the feminine, taking into account the norms and hierarchy instituted by sexual difference. Cadahia writes:

    If there is something really revolutionary in the feminine, if there is something that capitalism cannot capture, it is precisely the feminine’s place in sexual difference as the discourse of Not-All, a discourse that detotalizes the place of feminine desire when it assumes its own right to materialize in public life. [Si hay algo realmente revolucionario en lo femenino, si hay algo que el capitalismo no logra capturar es justamente su lugar en la diferencia sexual como discurso del No-todo, un discurso que destotaliza el lugar del deseo femenino cuando asume sus propios derechos a materializarse en la vida pública.] (211)

    Sánchez Madrid explores suffering caused by capitalism in the work world. Taking as her starting point a sense of time that tends to a commodification of an “exhausted mind and crushed body” (“mente exhausta y cuerpo molido”; 342), her exploration leads her to question Adorno and critical theory. Marey explores consensus and consent as vehicles of normativity in Kant’s theory of the social contract, and shows, against Rawls, that the social contract is not a covenant made by self-interested pre-political individuals but by political communities with a legal normativity. The social contract is not founded in the individual categorical imperative of an idealized rational agent but in the formation of agency and collective will in the doctrine of law that founds political community. Discussing O’Neill and Darwall, she concludes that theories of social contract become exclusionary structural systems because of their ambition to universality as an ideal consensus.

    Writing from Colombia, Quintana focuses on the topic of corpses. Finding inspiration in the artistic installation “Cadáveres indisciplinados” (“Undisciplined Corpses”) by Colombian artist José Alejandro Restrepo and also in Mbembe’s theory of necropolitics, she assumes that politics masks the corpse because the life of the political body depends on the production of dead bodies. Images play a major role in the way bodies—and corpses—are made visible or invisible. Corpses distress us but they can also help us to think emancipation anew because of their ability to persist, to affect us, to make their testimony audible. In contrast to the virtual or theoretical, corpses possess a very real existence in a country such as Colombia, where missing persons number in the tens of thousands. As Quintana writes, one should “expose oneself to the call of so many defeated bodies, deprived of their possibilities; of so many deaths and lives forgotten here and now, again and again, in Colombia.” (“Exponerse al llamado de tantos cuerpos derrotados, desposeídos de sus posibilidades; de tantas muertes y vidas olvidadas aquí y ahora, una y otra vez, en Colombia” [103].)

    The reader should not look for a single answer to the problem of violence in this book, but a series of responses emerges throughout the chapters. Violence is understood not only as the legitimate or illegitimate use of force by the state but as a force against political, economic, and social injustices, including the structural epistemic injustice in mainstream philosophy that has silenced conversation conducted in Spanish. Writing in Latin America, some authors in the book link the inaudible nature of horror to this epistemological silencing, relating it to silencing that appears as a drowning out of the victims’ voices, their witnessing. Martínez Ruiz, writing from a psychoanalytical point of view, exposes the political dimension of listening and describes how listening to someone who has experienced trauma can subvert or provide healing from that trauma. This form of listening can become a counterpart to the experience of being silenced. As Acosta points out in her commentary on Ingala Gómez’s text, one possibility is “to subvert and question the criteria for visibility and intelligibility through which things (bodies, senses, modes of existence and articulation) appear to us.” (“Subvertir y cuestionar los criterios de visibilidad e inteligibilidad mediante los cuales las cosas (los cuerpos, los sentidos, los modos de existencia y articulación) se nos aparecen” [84].) Acosta’s philosophical point raises the question of whether the conversation, and further publications related to it, should be broadened to include other groups that have been marginalized in these discourses—Black and indigenous women, for example. These voices are badly needed; their absence in academic philosophy is poignant.

    This reviewer is a Latin American woman academic writing from Latin America. Racial and class structures inherent to the region’s research and university system become even more obvious when reading this volume. Fuera de sí mismas fits into the practice of academic writing while questioning the nature of academic structures in our region. Academic culture in Latin America does not expect an explicit, genuine critical exchange; the full weight of the notion of “intellectual authority” falls on the noun rather than on the adjective. Cultural ideas about critique consider it almost akin to a personal insult. Additionally, the expectation is that scholarly work in male-dominated research institutions in Latin America—and elsewhere—will be carried out by an individual, especially in the field of philosophy. This volume goes against those assumptions. Each text comes with a commentary by another woman scholar, and their commentaries take a somewhat careful tone, demonstrating a refusal to engage either in praise or in disdain. The exchanges generally read as a conversation between friends, although a few of the commentaries question or criticize the argument of the chapter they are assigned. The reader is left to wonder whether this reflects academic cultures in which a debate between peers is not expected. The chapters by Zambrana and Acosta, who work in the United States, are distinct in this respect. They seem to reflect a process of extended discussion and rewriting, which may be found in their work environment but is not as characteristic of Spanish- speaking academia. This is a salient feature in other chapters in the book, where the overall argument is not explicit. A different tradition of academic discourse may be at play here. This may also be shown in the use of language in Carrasco-Conde’s chapter, which presents an array of the polysemic and grammatical possibilities that Spanish carries with it.

    Fuera de sí mismas. Razones para dislocarse allows a first encounter with important voices from Latin American and Spanish language philosophy. The approach is explicitly feminist but the standpoint is nuanced. A voice of their own does not result from the space women have won in academic structures but rather from the hard work of questioning frames of intelligibility. As the editors state in the preface,

    The fact that women have broken into the discipline of philosophy gives no assurance on its own that women will develop a voice of their own. This is due, in great part, to the fact that the feminine is not tied to a biologization of our bodies. This is why developing a women’s voice requires a patient labor of thought and language, a labor that consciously makes possible a place of enunciation of our own. [La irrupción de las mujeres en el ámbito de la filosofía tampoco garantiza, de manera automática, la consolidación de una voz propia. En gran medida esto se debe a que lo femenino no está atado a una biologización de nuestros cuerpos. Por eso nos parece que la voz de la mujer es algo que exige un trabajo paciente desde el pensamiento y la lengua, un trabajo que de manera consciente posibilite un lugar de enunciación propio.](18)

    The creation of this discourse requires a new place of enunciation that will let “those historically silenced voices” (18) into academic discourse and thought, and will allow the witnessing of other lives—those marked by suffering, loss, grief, erasure of memory, debt, precarity, and exclusion.

    Miriam Jerade Miriam Jerade is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the Faculty of Liberal Arts, Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez, in Santiago de Chile. Previously, she was an assistant professor at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México and the Ivan and Nina Ross Fellow at the Katz Center for Advanced Judaic Studies in the University of Pennsylvania. Recent works include articles on political readings of speech act theory, Derrida’s reading of the death penalty, and representation and sovereignty in Franz Rosenzweig and Jacques Derrida. Her first book is Violencia. Una lectura desde la deconstrucción de Jacques Derrida (Metales Pesados, 2018).

    Footnotes

    1. All translations from Fuera de sí mismas. Razones para dislocarse are the author’s.

  • Idyllic Visions of the Past and/or the Death Drive? Right-Wing Responses to a Crisis of Futurity

    Adam Dylan Hefty (bio)

    A review of Nilges, Mathias. Right-Wing Culture in Contemporary Capitalism: Regression and Hope in a Time Without Future. EPUB, Bloomsbury Academic, 2019.

    Something is different about time in late capitalism. Whatever this something is, it has intensified with the fall of 20th century communism, the increasing financialization of capital, and the return of anti-systemic, sometimes anti-capitalist social movements. In the pauses between the flashes of these movements, cynicism and hopelessness abound in the intellectual space where a left should be. The canard, “It is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism,” has become a common sense, world-weary truism, while environmental, health, political, and economic stability melt away into a series of crises that render something that feels like an end of the world ever easier to imagine. The last two decades have seen a rising tide of right-wing forces ranging from nationalist governments, fascist street movements, militias and stochastic terrorism to decentralized conspiracy theories. Our moment in history feels all at once sped up, wrung out, in a series of real and spectacular crises, rapidly changing, profoundly stuck.

    In the last several years, a lively discussion has been taking place about the temporality of late capitalism in critical theory and radical political circles, beginning perhaps with Jonathan Crary’s 24/7: Late Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep and Massimiliano Tomba’s Marx’s Temporalities. Some of this work, like Sami Khatib’s The Time of Capital and the Messianicity of Time, has also turned to the Frankfurt School, particularly Benjamin and Bloch. This problem of the temporality of capital is an ongoing theme of Mathias Nilges’s work in essays and in an edited volume, The Contemporaneity of Modernism. His 2019 book, Right-Wing Culture in Contemporary Capitalism: Regression and Hope in a Time without Future is a compelling contribution to this literature. Nilges straddles academic literary theory and a more popular engagement with the contemporary moment, theorizing the way our ability to imagine historical progress (or even a resolution of various quickening catastrophes) seems to be blocked.

    Nilges’s work crosses disciplinary boundaries to engage discussions that have otherwise developed separately. The argument here crosses through Crary’s expansive notion of the drives of capitalism that seem to speed up and compress the experience of time, left debates about the “end of history” following on and in opposition to Fukuyama, the question of imagining an end of capitalism, and debates about the politics of nostalgia. This poses a framework that brings together seemingly disparate aspects of the experience and politics of time in late capitalism. Nilges’s conceptual map of late capitalist time and his unpacking of a Blochian mode of engagement with this moment are vital contributions of Right-Wing Culture.

    Bloch and nonsynchronism

    Nilges mobilizes Bloch to argue for an engagement with contemporary culture that understands fascist tendencies as coopting romantic, anti-capitalist instincts for a program that safeguards capitalism. Under different historical circumstances, these instincts could possibly turn in a different direction. Bloch is a somewhat underappreciated associate of the Frankfurt School; his work has seen neither the steady readership of Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse, nor a Benjamin-type “moment” – though interest has quickened enough that perhaps, the Bloch moment is happening now. Several of Bloch’s works have not been translated into English, and common glosses emphasize his intellectual distance from other Frankfurt School thinkers. Nilges emphasizes Bloch’s influence on and relationship with key aspects of Adorno’s thought, especially the critical nature of Bloch’s concept of utopia.

    One of Nilges’s primary conceptual tools, unpacked in chapter 2, is Bloch’s concept of nonsynchronism. Bloch uses nonsynchronism to analyze a “temporal plurality of the present” in which people in different social locations can have radically different experiences of the same moment. Subjects rendered as consumers in the information age may feel that we are lagging behind a rapidly advancing now that somehow involves endless innovation without any possibility of structural change – the long now of late capitalism. Liberal intellectuals may feel a sense of crisis in futurity itself, in the ability to feel a sense of hope. Others, feeling left behind, may revive a “reactionary attachment to previous moments in history, either by way of nostalgic idealization or by turning toward remnants of prior social, economic, and political structures that continue to exist in the present.” Nilges understands this turning towards the past as the fundamental drive of right-wing thought. Workers whose skills have been rendered obsolete may experience an “objective nonsynchronism,” while personal refusal of the now, in various forms, would constitute “subjective nonsynchronism.” A dialectical understanding of nonsynchronism can also lead us to pay attention to “latent possibilities that lie dormant in the now,” seeing the past not as a time of loss to be redeemed but as a time of “the incomplete, the foreshortened, and the unfulfilled.” This last sense of nonsynchronism provides a critical space for hope in the midst of threats of fascism: the “not yet” (ch. 2).

    The Long Now

    Nilges frames nonsynchronism and shows some instances of it in the introduction / chapter 1, “All We Have is Now,” which uses the story of the 10,000 Year Clock, also called The Clock of the Long Now, to explain this peculiar working of late capitalist time. The Clock is a project, with several prototypes already in existence, to build a huge clock in west Texas designed to keep working for 10,000 years. The makers explain the concept in terms of the common worry, in business and political circles, that short-term thinking has become dominant in our culture; they want to prompt us to consider what it would mean to think long-term about the future, on the scale of a civilization. On the face of it, this may seem like an optimistic, well-intentioned ambition, but the project’s funders, such as Jeff Bezos (who also owns the land designated for the clock), are titans of late capitalism with a clear agenda for the future. Their vision, Nilges argues, is not really a future at all, but a long now stretching ahead indefinitely. It is full of technological innovation and maybe some tweaks to promote sustainability, but it is of a piece with the basic power structures of late capitalism; it is a way of thinking about the future that forecloses fundamental change.

    Another example of this foreshortened futurism is an exhibition that appeared at several North American museums, “Massive Change.”

    Massive Change markets a revolution, yet it is neither a revolution that will take place in the future nor one that requires our participation in order to be actualized. As it turns out, the revolutionary change that the exhibition showcases is not a matter of future possibility. Rather, it has already happened—and we somehow missed it. … We seem to be lagging behind our own now.(ch. 1)

    We just have to get better at interacting with this changed present as consumers and participants in global civil society.

    [T]he present is the time of a long now of free markets and of technological innovation, of a designed world that already contains all of the answers that we need to solve the world’s problems and that is ready to empower us. In such a time, we do not need to look ahead. We just need to catch up. (ch. 1)

    Our recent generations have all experienced this crisis of futurity. Francis Fukuyama’s 1989 gloss of “the end of history” was optimistic about a post-historical, democratic, capitalist now; but the real pivotal moment since then was 2008, which wiped away neoliberal optimism but couldn’t find anything to replace it, placing us in what Peter Thompson identifies as a “Gramscian interregnum.” Another contributing factor here is a financialization of the economy in which risk, and the future itself, are rendered as commodities to be traded in the present, closing spaces for critical analysis and inquiry. Everything in our lives has the potential to be abstracted and monetized, including “leisure time” and intellectual and emotional aspects of our lives (ch. 2).

    Nilges’s readings of cultural trends are often sharp, such as his interpretation of “metime” as a capitalist phenomenon that only seemingly contradicts late capitalism’s valorization of everything. Commentators have recently discovered the value of letting one’s mind wander freely – within certain confines. But “me-time” “is not the opposite of work time. It is the extension of it” (ch. 2) that allows the human participant in the system to recharge, do some rudimentary self-care and self-maintenance, and stay plugged in to techno-capitalism. Taking time for oneself in this fashion turns out to be something like corporate wellness trends – a way of making the social crises of intensified forms of exploitation, insecurity, and the valorization of everything into problems fit for privatized, individualized coping mechanisms.

    Why the right, now? Romantic anti-capitalism

    Nilges develops a Blochian reading of a central paradox of our times in chapter 4, asking “how we can make sense of the fact that a large-scale economic crisis that lays bare the inequality and exploitation on which capitalism rests gives rise more readily to a right-wing turn than to Left critique” (ch. 4). Central to the answer is the right’s ability to grip and exercise the politics of representation. Centrist liberalism (represented here by Francis Fukuyama’s recent work and by Justin Trudeau) takes its own identitarian turn in response, developing an ethos of “larger collectivities” as an answer to the ethno-state nationalism of the right; but this answer is unconvincing. Fascism, while superficially anti-capitalist, is developed as “a crucial aspect of the Right’s function as a safeguard for capitalism,” forming an alternative to a neoliberalism which has clearly lost much of its hegemonic force. Meanwhile, young people turn to fascism instead of Marxism, according to this account, because fascism represents them, even if its anti-capitalism is a cruel lie (ch. 4).

    The right’s ability to dominate these representational debates despite the limited appeal of openly fascist politics is wrapped up in a broader “romantic anti-capitalism” which “rejects aspects of the capitalist present and advocates for the return to an idealized, better past” (ch. 4). (Perhaps we should add “romantic anti-neoliberalism and anti-globalism” as well, since many critiques of capitalism both on the right and on the liberal left criticize its neoliberal form, implying that we might turn or return to a more humane variant.) Bloch describes a program of “backward rejuvenation” floating around, which Nilges sees today in doomsday prepping and off-the-grid living narratives. These notions may seem barely political and mostly benign, but they often stir up notions of racial purity and male primacy. A later section develops the idea that the rise of finance capital has resulted in the full abstraction of (potentially) every sphere of life; nostalgic idealizations of a life that is concrete, in touch with nature, provide a counterpoint. The myths that accompany romantic anti-capitalism frequently provide the grist for reactionary nostalgia and fascist impulses. However, we should not reject myth altogether, for Bloch. Myths also contain what Bloch calls “the utopian light of comprehended futurity” (qtd. in Nilges, ch. 4) – a potentially subversive core that can be recovered.

    Revitalizing the past and/or the death drive

    Nilges develops his most detailed engagement with right-wing thought in chapter 3: the “new paternalism” of Jordan Peterson. Peterson is a good example for this kind of right-wing thought that looks to the past, whether to concrete norms of traditional masculinity or in more vague appeals to ancient wisdom and religious allegories (ch. 3). Nilges offers a persuasive interpretation of Peterson’s attack on postmodernism. Completely uninterested in the history of the concept, he instead “reduced it to ideas of pure relativism,” taking ideas like “pluralism, diversity, and play [as] mere code words for chaos and disorder.” Through a reading of postmodern literature, Nilges shows that what Peterson probably gets about postmodernism, at least intuitively, is that anti-paternalism and an abolition of the father narrative were central aspects of its project. Peterson’s central thrust, on the other hand, is to be a strong daddy figure for a generation of young men who feel lost and adrift. Peterson analyzes this loss and drift as a kind of temporal homelessness, encouraging nonsynchronism via a critique of the chaotic present. Nilges reads novels from the 1980s onward to ground this analysis of the new paternalism in a longstanding cultural narrative about a crisis of fathers and fatherhood.

    This is a compelling reading of Peterson and of one strand of the new right. Nilges’s reading tends to sidestep current left debates over whether current far right forces should count as fascist; he is interested instead in some of the common reactionary moves in “mainstream” right-wing nationalist politicians, right-wing thinkers, and receptions of novels and cultural moves. His use of Bloch suggests that these moves do share something with historical fascism, though Nilges is careful not to overextend the parallel. However, because Nilges engages closely with Peterson and not with other right-wing thinkers, there’s an odd way in which Peterson seems to stand in for the entire cultural project of the right here. As I write this in late 2020, Peterson has been mostly missing for several months, after dealing with months of health problems involving extreme diet, prescription drug addiction, double pneumonia, and COVID-19; he is apparently under the supervision of his daughter in Serbia. Daddy’s not doing so well these days. His erstwhile spiritual sons continue bumbling off in different directions.

    A gesture of recovering the past is common to most forms of right-wing thought; however, that aspect is in tension with others. For example, if we were to look at contemporary eco-fascism, we would find a strand of the right that sees the past as unrecoverable in the present – at least until we have gotten to the other side of a large-scale, in their view historically necessary genocide. This is, of course, an extreme example, but many forms of revanchism understand their own object as a “lost cause.” Many parts of the contemporary right are obsessed with death and destruction – the flip side, perhaps, of educated, liberal cynicism and “doomscrolling.” A current of Trump supporters know that Trump won’t be able to achieve his promises, whether they blame it on capitalism or on a deep state conspiracy; they just want to see him own the libs and fight for them. The emergence of stochastic terrorism has included lone incel-type shootings and the Boogaloo movement’s attempts to accelerate a civil war. There are many variations, but all these figures have to one extent or another given up on Jordan Peterson or at least on the hope of a conservative restoration that he represents. They’ve given up on the idea that straightening their room is going to lead to a more ordered life, or they’ve given up on getting a girlfriend, or they’ve given up on getting policy “wins”; to generalize, there is a desire to see the other suffer before it all ends.

    Nilges perhaps missed an opportunity to discuss this aspect of the right in his discussion, at the end of chapter 4, of right-wing takes on Chuck Palahniuk’s novel Fight Club. The move to lionize traditional masculinity and some images of pre-industrial labor is certainly part of what is going on here – but this is something of a secondary gesture compared to the well-developed practices of blowing stuff up and fighting. Nilges says that fascists have misread Palahniuk’s novel as a celebration, as “frequent references to the making of soap out of the parts of the human body … should be easy giveaways of its critique” (ch. 4). I’m pretty sure the fascist guys who lionize Fight Club noticed the soap and thought it was cool. The smarter ones probably noticed that it might have been meant as a critique and didn’t care. The author is dead, after all, and daddy’s in a coma somewhere in Serbia.

    These variations of the right that are more obsessed with death and destruction than they are with the past pose a problem for Nilges’s argument. There are ways that he could deal with it, and he mentions a couple of them in short asides. However, the general Blochian trajectory of his argument in almost every chapter is that fascism is obsessed with recovering an imaginary past that can’t be recovered; instead, we need to look at what is missing in the present, so that we can find these other incomplete hopes in the past. One can imagine how that might work with reference to a misty-eyed, mythical form of right wing thought that is obsessed with recovering the magical, paternalist past and that believes it is more or less possible. Meanwhile, sections of the right know that the paternalist past isn’t directly recoverable, at least on this side of some apocalyptic event, and some of them are gearing up for a Mad Max death drive, complete with the guns and muscle cars. Of course, this destructiveness can hardly be separated from the paternalism, because the vision of life for the few on the other side of the apocalypse is usually some kind of a small, paternalistic ethno-state with lots of old-timey labor, just as Nilges suggests. One could add a section that would analyze the parallels and differences between right-wing fascination with the apocalypse and the cynical liberal who takes pleasure in the horror of watching it unfold. Still, to the extent that parts of right-wing thought are animated by the death drive more than by hopes of redeeming their culture and manhood in the present, the Blochian move of salvaging something from the wreckage becomes trickier to imagine.

    In addition to the death / destructive drive and the urge to recover the past, we should also consider the basic motivations of conspiracy theory, as QAnon and related formations have become an integral part of the right. Here again, the feeling seems to be that something has gone wrong in the present compared to a simpler, better past. But the drive is less to recover the past or dominate the future with destruction and accumulation by dispossession, more to investigate endlessly “what is really happening” in the present. A rationalist practice of uncovering truths might assume, rightly or wrongly, something about the character of a political change that would follow from knowing those truths. Some critics see QAnon as more akin to an immersive alternate reality game, the purpose of which is not to create change external to itself, but to propagate itself as a mode of living and thinking that uses pseudo-scientific “research” to divorce itself from testable reality. Again, while idyllic images of the past are present in this structure of feeling, they do not necessarily constitute its dominant drive.

    Undoing right-wing thought from within

    Nilges develops the utopian suggestion in Blochian thought in chapter 5, which considers how we might look at the past without nostalgia. His critique of intellectual cynicism was compelling, and I find myself quite sympathetic to the main idea. I wish that he would sketch out more examples of what it would look like to make these moves, not only in novels but in other cultural contexts or political movements. Conceptually, Nilges’s argument seems open to a couple of different interpretations. It might be that romantic anti-capitalism constitutes a broad form of cultural reaction to capitalism. Given certain conditions and stances, romantic anti-capitalism could develop in the direction of nostalgia, paternalism and fascism. A critical, utopian radical might be able to look at the past and find – within some of the same common resources of romantic anti-capitalism but also in different, suppressed sources – stories of resistance and lost dreams that could be revitalized, to different effect, in the now.

    At times, Nilges suggests that Bloch would go a lot further. “There lies positive potential even in fascism [that] may be rescued and turned into a basis for progressive politics. … Blochian thought … seeks to undo fascist thought from within while simultaneously engaging in an examination of the limits and possibilities of Marxist thought and politics” (ch. 5). Nilges doesn’t really unpack what Bloch might have meant by this with respect to historical fascism. Most of his examples of engagement with the common, romantic anti-capitalist source material do not engage directly with right wing thought. Right-Wing Culture approaches the debate over whether we should “listen to Trump / Brexit voters” (and be empathetic towards those voters’ economic grievances rather than understanding these voters and racists and semi-fascists to be isolated and defeated) from something of a meta standpoint. Nilges’s general stance seems to be that we should understand the emotive core and historical resonance of the right-wing move. We should consider the economic grievances that constitute the core of objective nonsynchronism, while understanding the mythology of the right as an enveloping mode of thinking that is very seductive but that is also not historically necessary; it can be resisted culturally as well as politically. While many supporters of the right might be racists and semi-fascists, we need to understand the thinking that is pulling so many people into romantic anti-systemic thought that ultimately shores up capitalism, since racism and fascism are not so easily defeated by logic or electoral numbers.

    This meta-take makes a real contribution to the discussion. However, there are a few places in the text where the argument tends in the direction of a first-order “listen to the economic grievances of Trump and Brexit voters” approach:

    it is precisely because the Right knows to use the widespread rejection of the long now to its advantage that it is able to successfully poach disillusioned voters, including potentially Left-leaning voters who demand a politics that addresses the contradictions of contemporary capitalism and who believe to have been politically abandoned.(ch. 2)

    These passing, foreshortened suggestions of first-order engagements with right-wing grievances feel underdeveloped, especially given the extensive literature criticizing left discourses that start with “listening” and end up taking right-wing starting points for granted. There are other things that “undoing fascist thought from within” might look like, but I am left wondering what they might be.

    Indigenous speculative futurity and thinking with Nilges

    One of the final sections of the book finds resonance for the Blochian, critical utopia in recent indigenous speculative fiction that makes use of non-linear temporalities; this is to me the most compelling of Nilges’s sections of literary analysis. As I write this in late 2020, much of California has been burning, for weeks, in a fire season that seems to have stretched out by several months. Indigenous land management techniques of learning how to live with fire and the forests, long subsumed or forgotten, are becoming lively subjects of inquiry with an eye to something like utopia or at least survival. This seems like an instance where the Blochian move feels promising – reaching into the past, to a way of living with the land that was not allowed to be, to learn what it has to say to the now about creating a future where we could live together.

    Right-Wing Culture offers a conceptual map of temporality and political culture in late capitalism that invites the reader to think with it and consider additional factors beyond those Nilges analyzes. The post-2008 anti-capitalist left and anti-racist upsurges are largely absent from Nilges’s account. Nilges offers good critiques of centrist, liberal discourse. The animating spirit of the book is of course well left of that, and the Occupy movement gets a shout out in a section title, but radical left movements do not appear concretely. As a broad generality, the twenty-first century left has not generated many ambitious, utopian projects comparable to those of nineteenth and early twentieth century lefts; the left is still, now, like the left Bloch analyzes, better at offering a rational critique of society than at engaging with dreams of a better world. Nevertheless, recent social movements have used practices of demandlessness (Occupy) and have generated broad visions that are far beyond next-step proposals—movements, arguably, including Black Lives Matter, the Standing Rock community defense movement, and even Democratic Socialists of America. It would be interesting to examine how these movements engage with visionary, dream-like, immediately unachievable possibilities, and how new left visions of a future relate to defensive battles and piecemeal gains that often seem to be the immediate horizons of possibility.

    Nilges says that the time of the long now of late capitalism generates a feeling that we are behind our own now and must catch up. How it does so may be very uneven, and this is a rich area for further analysis. Particularly, colonialism and post-colonialism have long generated feelings in their subject populations that they are behind and must catch up (or, in some instances, that they are behind and can never catch up). This dynamic can be found in the whole of modern colonialism, long predating finance capital and the speed-up of a technological innovation. It has taken on new dynamics in this era, as some postcolonial elites embrace the idea that a long now of innovation and capitalism potentially levels the geographic playing field while other populations seem more resolutely excluded than ever.

    The conceptual map of Right-Wing Culture contains some coordinates that remain fuzzy and invite debate, but these do not detract from the rich and suggestive nature of the project. Nilges’s efforts to sketch out the moves of a Blochian critique for the current moment and his way of schematizing late capitalist temporality in relation to political and cultural practices are well worth thinking with. His call to recognize the “end times” feelings of our moment as perhaps in fact the death throes of capitalism and to find the lost threads of hope in the midst of reaction and the sense of being stuck are worth heeding.

    Adam Dylan Hefty Adam Dylan Hefty is an Assistant Professor in the Core Curriculum program at Prince Mohammad Bin Fahd University (Al Khobar, Saudi Arabia). He holds a Ph.D. in History of Consciousness from the University of California, Santa Cruz. Recent works include essays on right-wing responses to climate change and on the history of mood disorders. He is working on a manuscript that traces a genealogy of the connection between practices of managing work and mental health.

  • Fictionalizing Marx, or Towards Non-Dialectics: Baudrillard and Laruelle

    Jonathan Fardy (bio)

    Abstract

    This essay offers a comparative reading of the post-Marxian work of Jean Baudrillard and François Laruelle, arguing that both thinkers seek to establish a way forward for theory that remains faithful to the spirit of Marxism without reaffirming dialectics. In order to do so, both turn to the concept and strategy of “fiction.” Their fictionalized Marxian theory intervenes in reality in the form of writing without reaffirming the dialectical presumption that the Real and concept can be exchanged. To fictionalize Marxism in non-dialectical terms repudiates the logic of exchange, enabling us to think against capital in non-capitalist terms.

    This essay offers a comparative reading of the post-Marxian work of Jean Baudrillard and François Laruelle to argue that these thinkers are linked by two elective affinities. First, both seek to establish a way forward for theory that remains faithful to the spirit of Marxism without reaffirming dialectics. Second, both turn to the concept and strategy of “fiction” in order to accomplish this task; Baudrillard names his work “theory-fiction,” and Laruelle names his “non-philosophical” approach to theory “philo-fiction” (short for “philosophical fiction”). I argue that their turn to fiction grows out of a shared conviction that theory must forge ahead without reference to the Real. I capitalize the Real, as does Laruelle, because it names what both thinkers conceive (in different ways) as the transcendental horizon that can never be encompassed by the signs and simulacra of theoretical concepts. This axiomatic starting point organizes Baudrillard’s and Laruelle’s approach to non-dialectical theory. For them, no dialectical exchange between concept and the Real ought to be assumed and enacted in the space of theoretical writing. The model of “fiction” does not make claims on the Real or the essence of reality, but takes place as an event in reality itself. The aim of their fictionalized Marxian theory is to intervene in reality without reaffirming the dialectical presumption that the Real and concept can be exchanged. Rather than leading either thinker to despair or to turn away from Marxism, fictionalization enables both to rethink the practice of Marxian theory in non-exchange-based terms or the terms of capitalist logic. To assume that the Real can be exchanged for concepts—which, for Laruelle, is the fundamental presupposition of all philosophies—affirms the primacy of the principle of exchange that underwrites capitalist abstraction. To fictionalize Marxism in non-dialectical terms repudiates the logic of exchange in order to think against capital in non-capitalist terms.

    I want to first begin by very briefly opening up the concept of dialectics as it has been historically understood. Fredric Jameson argues in Valences of the Dialectic that the term “dialectics” historically has had two distinct but interrelated meanings. “Traditional presentations have tended to stage the dialectic,” writes Jameson, “either as a system on the one hand, or as a method on the other—a division that faintly recalls the shift from Hegel to Marx” (3). He suggests that both presentations are increasingly untenable today because the idea (or ideal) of philosophical systematicity has been dethroned. Marxist dialectics—dialectic as method—is beset by debate and division over the philosophical question of Marxism’s applicability, which inevitably leads back to affirmations or repudiations of the idea that Marxism is a system. Whether taken as method or as system, dialectical philosophy attempts to temporalize philosophical concepts: to think in time. A properly dialectical concept is self-reflexively defined by the contradictory conditions that establish the possibility of its own conceptualization. Dialectics repudiates the idea that timeless concepts make reality thinkable. For the dialectician, reality itself is an historically contingent (if not determined) concept. However, as Jameson shows, the argument over whether dialectics is a method or a philosophy presupposes a thoroughly “undialectical” conception of method and philosophy (49). At the same time, if one does not in some way lend the concept of dialectics “structure,” it cannot be conceptualized apart from the visisitudes of its history. One is then faced with the problem or the tension – perhaps a dialectical tension – between structure and event.

    Dialectically speaking, there cannot in principle be something called “the dialectic,” which assumes a singular mode of thought that isn’t subject to history. But if there is no such thing as “the dialectic,” then there are only competing dialectical methods. While one could compile a list of examples of dialectical methods, the list would itself imply some structural invariance that binds the examples to one another: a law that would be the dialectical other of contingency. “Examples are the arbitrary cases that rattle around inside the impossible abstraction called a law,” writes Jameson, and this “law” of the same that identifies examples of thought as truly dialectical would be but the displaced name for “the concrete universal” (50). For Jameson, pluralizing and temporalizing the concept of the dialectic will not enable us to escape the binding claim of universality that conditions the possibility of the concept of “the dialectic” as the foundation of dialectics. Dialectics is either the method for gaining access to the Real movement of history or the unsurpassable philosophy of history itself. Either way, it appears to many contemporary thinkers as a dangerously totalizing mode of thinking.

    Defenders of the dialectic maintain that it offers a means (if not a system) for reconciling thought and history – idea and time – and that this reconciliation to reality tempers theory by subordinating it to the historical conditions of its own possibility. The ideal dialectical reconciliation for Marxism is the ultimate unity of theory and practice, whereby the Real of history will at last be changed forever through a theory that correctly captures the Real and by a practice that transforms the Real by dissolving the necessity for theory itself though its very realization. As Lenin once put it: “Philosophy cannot be abolished without being realized” (Korsch 97). This drive to go beyond theory and transform reality marks the Marxian dialectical tendency to “distinguish itself from purely philosophical systems … by positing itself as a ‘unity of theory and practice’” (Jameson 321). But in order to realize itself in practice, Marxism (as philosophy or method) must first capture the Real of history in dialectical concepts using the dialectic itself. Baudrillard and Laruelle intervene on this question of the capture of the Real. Hence, their non-dialectical modes of fictionalized theory turn on the problem of the Real itself to which we now turn.

    In Principles of Non-Philosophy, Laruelle spells out his axiom of the Real. The Real is nothing less than the radicality of immanence prior to any concept of the Real, or what Laruelle calls “Philosophical Decision” on the Real. The Real is always already the prior condition for the possibility of philosophy and all its decisions. Laruelle writes:

    Immanence of the Real, … without a single morsel of transcendence (of the World, language, movement, topology, set theory, etc.)—of philosophy. It is what it names, … an autonomy through radicality in relation to every form of transcendence. Phenomenally, it is a “Given-without givenness.”(18)

    Laruelle’s point here is relatively simple. The Real is not a philosophical concept. The Real transcends philosophical reason only by reason of its immanence. As Ian James notes in The New French Philosophy:

    [T]he real is transcendental … insofar as it is its own condition. The real does not need anything other than itself and its own indivisibility in order to be what it is: this is its absolute autonomy and self-sufficiency. Yet since the real is real (a lived, “unreflective” experience), it is also the condition of all being, existence, thought, consciousness, transcendence, and so on since all these are (in) the real, or put differently, the real is always immanent to them. (169)

    Laruelle criticizes “standard philosophy” for presuming itself sufficient to determine or decide the Real. In Laruelle’s view, the Real is decisive and determinant for all thought in the last instance. Non-philosophy opts inventively to resign the authority of “standard philosophy” to decide the Real. It reworks philosophical concepts via aesthetic strategies of fictionalization in order to think through philosophy without presuming to know or decide what is decisive (the Real). Laruelle writes, again, in Principles of Non-Philosophy:

    non-philosophy holds to: 1) the destitution of [philosophy’s] sufficiency and its authority (of the “Principle of Sufficient Philosophy”); b) the affirmation of the equivalence of every philosophical position before the Real; c) a reevaluation of the identity (if not the “whole”) of philosophy as simple … “field of phenomena” or objects for the new discipline [of non-philosophy]. (19)

    The objects of non-philosophy consist of what Laruelle calls “clones,” which look like standard concepts but are used in non-decisionist ways. Laruelle assembles these clones into fictional texts or “philo-fictions.” Fiction should be understood here in Laruelle’s special sense. As he explains in Philosophy and Non-Philosophy, philo-fictions have two “surfaces.” “On one of their surfaces,” writes Laruelle, “they [philo-fictions] will be scientific representations … that utilize philosophical elements,” which is to say philo-fictions represent a certain open-minded, experimental approach to the raw materials of philosophy; but, “on the other surface, they will be philosophical fictions, fictions ‘for’ philosophy” (239). Philo-fiction uses the raw materials of philosophy experimentally precisely by taking them as raw materials rather than as elements of a systematic set of coordinated decisions on the Real. This experimental or “scientific” approach yields a fictionalization of philosophical systems.

    Philo-fiction thus occupies a parallel space to that of standard philosophy. As Anthony Paul Smith observes in Laruelle: A Stranger Thought, “the purpose of [Laruelle’s] fiction is a kind of counter-creation to that of the world” (119). By refusing to legitimize the gesture of philosophical decisionism, philo-fiction effects an auto-critique of philosophy’s a priori assumption that it is sufficient to know the Real and decide the question of its essence. “The act of creating fiction or ‘fabulating’ is the goal of a non-philosophy,” writes Smith, “in order to relativize and disempower what presents itself as sufficient and absolute,” namely philosophy itself (119–120). Philosophy valorizes itself by establishing a sovereign discourse over the Real. This presumption to mastery over the Real takes the form of a discourse on the world in most materialist philosophies, where the aim is not to seek a metaphysical truth, but to lay claim to the truth of the world as it is. But this too Laruelle rejects. This is why he always capitalizes “world,” because, like the Real, world is a transcendental signified invented and operationalized by philosophical reason.

    In his critique of the concept of “world” Laruelle aligns himself with others of his generation, especially Alain Badiou. Familiar concepts of world tend to function as alibis for pragmatism and reformism. “Be practical!” “Get real!” “This is the real world.” For Badiou, these are colloquial versions of a philosophy of subjugation that prizes reconciliation with a hollow and hopeless concept of the world. But the world operative in such instances is not the Real. The Real is what can always be punctured and broken in two by the “event.” Badiou polemically and critically refuses what Peter Hallward calls “the worldly condition” (25). Badiou will not accommodate his thought to a concept of world that refuses to recognize its potential for eventual ruptures. “Badiou’s philosophy,” writes Hallward, “is infused with that same contempt for worldliness characteristic of the great antiphilosophers, most obviously Saint Paul and Pascal. The world, as such, is defined for Badiou by imperatives of communication and interest” (25). The concept of the world (or World, in Laruelle’s language) is an alibi for conformist thought that disavows eventual possibility. However, despite a degree of convergence between Laruelle’s and Badiou’s critiques of the commonsense concept of world, their projects are in detail entirely opposed. Badiou remains committed to concepts like Being and Truth, whereas Laruelle suspends these concepts—in a kind of radicalization of the Husserlian epoché—in order to treat philosophical texts as raw material for thinking otherwise than that demanded by the decisionist imperative. Laruelle’s inventive skill at disempowering and defetishizing philosophy comes to the fore in his book-length critique of Badiou. In Anti-Badiou, Laruelle clones Badiou’s concepts in order to produce a parodic representation of Badiou’s political philosophy that challenges what Laruelle sees as the authoritarian dimension of his thought. Laruelle zeroes in on Badiou’s axiom that mathematics equals ontology: Badiou “manages to divest us of all our predicates and reduce us,” writes Laruelle, “to the state of a proletariat at the service of a mathematico-philosophical dictatorship” (xxxvi). Laruelle resits, however, any overt “philosophical” challenge to Badiou’s philosophy on the grounds that this would merely aggrandize philosophy itself. Laruelle writes that his aim is

    not a dialogue, it is … an ultimatum, but emitted this time from an acknowledged position of weakness, in an encounter with a position of acknowledged force. … An ultimatum signifies that we are not the mirror of the other. Very precisely, Badiou is a means for non-philosophy … [thus] this book is, above all, finally … a book in which non-philosophy explains itself to itself, but with the aid of a counter-model that it falls to us to transform. (xxxix)

    Laruelle’s text on Badiou is a model of fictionalized Marxian theory. Laruelle voids Badiou’s “system” of its imperatives and decisionist valences. He reweaves, reworks, and re-produces Badiou’s terms into a “clone” of Badiou’s system. He treats Badiou’s concepts as “raw materials” to critique his mathematico-political “dictatorship.” Laruelle’s critique of his system via fictional strategies of parody, exaggeration, and juxtaposition constructs a counter-theory that implicitly calls for the “liberation” of theory from philosophical claims on the Real. He thereby indicates a path forward for theory that neither reifies nor aggrandizes philosophy’s stature. Laruelle’s fictionalization rebels against the authority (and authoritarianism) of philosophy. The fiction that interests Laruelle cannot be constrained by any theory or philosophy of fiction or tied to any conceptual apparatus that would decide its epistemic status in advance. As John O’ Maoilearca astutely observes in All Thoughts Are Equal:

    If the Real is experienced as “nothing-but-real,” then fiction, commensurately, must no longer belong to the “order of the false”. … such a reconfiguration of fiction requires a rebellion against “philosophy’s authority” over it: fiction must no longer be subordinated to the judgments of philosophy. Instead, philosophy will be made to “reenter” through fiction and be conceived as a mode of fabulation. … an avowedly utopian form of thought. (99)

    One does not “apply” non-philosophy any more than one would “apply” fiction. Rather, one non-philosophizes philosophy in the name of liberating thought from its addiction to dominate and decide the Real. Such liberation aims to repurpose philosophemes (voided of their decisionist character) within a fictional ensemble that maps out a theoretically utopic position free from the closed dialectic of the Real.

    Here Laruelle’s position intersects with Baudrillard’s. Although their concepts of the Real are by no means identical, Baudrillard’s axiomatic starting point yields a similar mode of utopic theorizing that he calls “theory-fiction.” The central axiom of Baudrillard’s best-known work is the disappearance of the Real. “On the horizon of simulation,” writes Baudrillard, “not only has the world [or the Real] disappeared but the very question of its existence can no longer be posed” (Crime 5). For Baudrillard, this disappearance “defines the irresolvable relationship between thought and reality,” inasmuch as “a certain form of thought is bound to the real” (96). That “certain form of thought” is none other than dialectics, which “starts out from the hypothesis that ideas have referents and that there is a possible ideation of reality. A comforting polarity, which is that of tailor-made dialectical and philosophical solutions” (96). Opposing dialectical thought, which presumes a critical interface with a preexistent concept of the Real, Baudrillard advocates for the writing of “theory-fiction.” As he notes in an interview with Salvatore Mele and Mark Titmarsh:

    My way of reflecting on things is not dialectic. Rather it’s provocative, reversible, it’s a way of raising things up to their ‘N’th power, rather than a way of dialectizing them. It’s a way of following through the extremes to see what happens. It’s a bit like a theory-fiction.(82)

    For good reason, Baudrillard never spells out exactly the form that fictionalized theory is supposed to take; theory-fiction is not a systematic theory, but a process of invention that “challenges” the Real as well as the style and substance of dialectical theory. One may say that theory-fiction represents what Laruelle would call a mode of “non-analysis,” which parodically deflates and defetishizes the typical subjects of critical theory: power, domination, political economy. His search for a theoretical topos unencumbered by a concern for the Real marks the late Baudrillard as a thinker of utopia in theory, which also links his project with Laruelle’s non-philosophy. As Mike Gane notes in Baudrillard’s Bestiary, Baudrillard’s later work evinces an “undeniable vitality and creativity coupled with an undying fidelity not to a utopian vison in a passive sense, but to a passionate utopian practice in theory” (157). In Baudrillard’s earlier Marxian phase and in his later writings, theory-fiction is a means of theorizing that maintains an analytic indifference from the Real.

    With the publication of For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign in 1972, Baudrillard seeks to augment and critique bourgeois and Marxian political economy alike. He argues that both traditions err by theorizing a restricted conceptual economy or closed conceptual system in which production, exploitation, and consumption cycle predictably through the matrix of “use value” and “exchange value.” He shows that under late capital, exchange value is complexified by the exchange and circulation of signs and offers the art auction as an example; wealthy people buy blue-chip art at the auction not merely to purchase art, but also to show that they have the financial power to do so. Baudrillard acknowledges that his reading builds on the work of the late nineteenth-century economist Thorstein Veblen. In Theory of the Leisure Class, Veblen argues that the principal labor of the wealthy or “leisure” class consists of social acts of “conspicuous consumption.” The “process of consumption considered as a system of sign exchange value,” writes Baudrillard, is “not consumption as traditional political economy defines it … but consumption considered as the conversion of economic exchange value into sign exchange value” (For 107). Bidding at the art auction is not simply an economic transaction; it is a system through which the bidders exchange social signs of wealth and leisure. Baudrillard contextualizes his project in For a Critique as part of an “exiled” and marginalized tradition of political economy:

    Critical theorists of the political economy of the sign are rare. They are exiled, buried under Marxist (or neo-Marxist) terrorist analysis. Veblen and Goblot are the great precursors of a cultural analysis of class which, beyond the “dialectical materialism” of productive forces, examines the logic of sumptuary values which assures and perpetuates through its code the hegemony of the dominant class.(109)

    Baudrillard argues for the analysis of, and critical resistance to, not only the cycle of economic production and exploitation, but the social “code” that valorizes and thereby perpetuates the perceived power of the dominant class. Traditional political economy does not account for the process of sign production and thus cannot resist it. A critical theory of consumer society must then begin by integrating the analysis of sign exchange “into the very structures of political economy” (108). But as he notes, this is strongly resisted by bourgeois and Marxian theorists alike:

    [T]he traditional boundaries of political economy, canonized by bourgeois economic science as well as by Marxist analysis, should be disregarded. And the resistances to this are strong, for they are of all orders theoretical, political, phantasmagorical. Yet today only a generalized political economy can define a revolutionary theory and practice.(108)

    Part of the resistance to integrating sign analysis into theories of political economy is that sign systems produce open and contingent meanings (or values) rather than fixed and predictable ones. Bourgeois and Marxian political economy alike traditionally relied on models of economic production that cycle through logically fixed circuits. But the meaning or value of a sign is contingent and mutable. Baudrillard thus challenges traditional semiotic theory (Saussure) because he rejects the anchoring force of the “signified” as a metaphysical mechanism designed to restrict the contingent economy of meaning. He also rejects Marx’s anchoring concept of “use-value,” which he sees as incompatible with the social labor of conspicuous consumption. For a Critique articulates a “general” conceptual economy in Georges Bataille’s sense. In The Accursed Share, Bataille famously distinguished between “general” and “restricted” economies. The former names economies in which some expenditure remains expended and does not return in another form; the latter names economic systems, like capitalism, premised on the belief that everything can be exchanged for its equivalent in another form. Baudrillard’s “critique” is in this sense a general economy in theory inasmuch as it is organized around “general principles” of sign exchange anchored neither in the Real of classical exchange, nor in the transcendental signified of classical semiotics. The theoretical economy of For a Critique is open and general in Bataille’s sense because it turns on the contingency of economic and sign-exchange.

    Baudrillard’s insistence on the difference and distance between theory and its supposed referent—the Real in the last instance—also links him to Althusserian Marxism. Althusser’s work of the 1960s stresses the non-equivalence between theoretical concepts and the Real via the Spinozist distinction between the “real object” and the “object of knowledge”: “Spinoza warned us that the object of knowledge or essence was absolutely distinct and different from the real object” (Reading 40). Althusser claims that objects of knowledge (like the concepts that comprise Marx’s Capital) must be distinguished from “real objects” (like actually existing capitalism). He sharpens his point in “Theory, Theoretical Practice and Theoretical Formation” (1974):

    [T]heoretical work is not an abstraction in the sense of empiricist ideology. To know is not to extract from the impurities and diversity of the real the pure essence contained in the real, as gold is extracted from the dross of sand and dirt in which it is contained. To know is to produce the adequate concept of the [real] object by putting to work means of theoretical production.(15)

    “Theory” for Althusser is a relatively autonomous practice that does not “reflect” the Real, but is rather a concept production process through which economy, society, politics and so on are made conceptualizable. On this account, one does not think the “real object.” Instead, one is tasked with producing concepts that make the Real thinkable as a model. Baudrillard further radicalizes the Althusserian split between concept and Real by theoretically letting go of the entire concept of the Real (and with it the reality-principle).

    Here too Laruelle’s perspective is clearly aligned with Baudrillard’s inasmuch as both thinkers reject any prior decision on the relation between Real and concept. Both refuse to enact what Laruelle has named the Philosophical Decision, which he defines concisely (if elliptically) thus:

    Philosophical Decision is an operation of transcendence that believes (in a naïve and hallucinatory way) in the possibility of a unitary discourse on the Real. … To philosophize is to decide on the Real and on thought, which ensues from it, i.e. to believe to be able to align them with the universal order of the Principle of Reason (the Logos), but also more generally in accordance with the “total” or unitary order of the Principle of sufficient philosophy. (Dictionary 117)

    Philosophical Decision encloses the Real within a restricted theoretical economy dialectically hinged on a hallucinatory concept of the Real. Dialectics then presupposes a principle of exchangeability of concept and Real, which formally aligns dialectical philosophy with the logic of capitalist abstraction. As Katerina Kolozova notes in her study of Laruelle’s “non-Marxism,” philosophy “is constituted in a fashion perfectly analogous to the one which grounds capitalism” because it “establishes an amphibology with the real (acts in its stead, posturing as ‘more real than the real’)” (2). Kolozova does not cite the phrase “more real than the real,” but this is, of course, Baudrillard’s master formula for “hyperreality.” Kolozova (perhaps unwittingly) suggests a common conceptual space between Laruelle and Baudrillard. For Laruelle, philosophy proposes to be “more real than the real” inasmuch as it claims to have the key to the Real, but Kolozova (via Laruelle) sees this as a simulation of the Real. To put the matter in Baudrillard’s terms, philosophies of the Real are conceptual and analytical instances of the hyperreal. Just as capitalism is grounded on the fetish character of value abstracted from the social sphere, so too is philosophy constituted through a fetishization and reification of thought itself empowered by the hallucinatory force of Philosophical Decision. The image of the Real captured in philosophical “reflection” is never the Real for Baudrillard or Laruelle. Rather, what appears in the mirror of philosophy is a hyperreal phantasm of philosophy itself.

    By the late 1970s, Baudrillard and Laruelle come to see that the problem is how to escape the auto-valorizing force of dialectical philosophy and to open anew the problematic of the politics of theoretical critique itself. Neither thinker seeks to overthrow or overcome dialectics, which would only reaffirm it. Instead, each seeks to invent strategies and aesthetics of theoretical writing that intensify the potential for emancipatory thought immanent to the ethics of Marxism without getting ensnared in the dialectic of exchange (or the rhetoric of production, as we will see). This project shares some affinity with Lyotard’s post-Marxist work of the same decade; Lyotard’s Libidinal Economy of 1974 taps into and exploits what he calls the “intensities lodged in theoretical signs” (102). However, in the same text he rebukes Baudrillard for his conceptual privileging of symbolic exchange. A brief detour though Lyotard’s critique of Baudrillard will spell out the difference between the fictionalized Marxism of Baudrillard and Laruelle and the libidinalized writing of Lyotard’s post-Marxism: a theoretical indifference to the Real (Baudrillard and Laruelle) versus the continuation of dialectics in a new way (Lyotard).

    Lyotard’s major statement of post-Marxism is Libidinal Economy. The text stems from the tradition of Freudo-Marxism, albeit in a form that challenges that tradition. Lyotard argues that Marxian political economy is torn between two warring poles, which he names (somewhat regrettably) the “prosecutor Marx” and the “little girl Marx.” The “prosecutor Marx” names the Marx who sat in the British Museum day after day toiling away at Capital but never completed it; the “little girl Marx” names the one who did not complete his master text because he was too attracted to, and fascinated by, the polymorphous perversities of capital. Lyotard sees Marx as trying to engineer a theory to close and contain industrial society’s “erotic” fascination with the object (capital) he was trying to prosecute theoretically. Lyotard’s corrective is to explode political economy via a libidinalized textualism:

    we are not going to do a critique of Marx, we are not, that is to say, going to produce the theory of his theory: which is just to remain within the theoretical. No, one must show what intensities are lodged in theoretical signs, what affects within serious discourse; we must steal his affects from him. Its force is not at all in the power of its discourse, not even in inverse proportion to it, this would still be a little too dialectical an arrangement.(102)

    Lyotard explicitly targets Baudrillard’s work for continuing the tradition of prosecuting a critical theory of political economy and for its apparent valorization of what Lyotard sees as a thinly disguised figure of pre-lapsarian time: the time of “symbolic exchange,” before contact with the Real disappeared into the play of signs. Moreover, he points out what he sees as the racist and imperialistic legacies lurking in Baudrillard’s conceptual privileging of “primitive societies”:

    When Baudrillard says: “There is neither a mode of production nor production in primitive societies. There is no dialectic and no unconscious in primitive societies,” we say: there are no primitive societies. First of all, methodologically… this society of the gift and counter-gift plays, in Baudrillard’s thought, the role of a reference (lost, of course), of an alibi (which cannot be found), in his critique of capital. … How is that he does not see that the whole problematic of the gift, of symbolic exchange … belongs in its entirety to Western racism and imperialism—that it is still ethnology’s good savage, slightly libidinalized, which he inherits with the concept? (106)

    Lyotard believes his approach evades the traps of dialectical Marxism and the imperialistic fantasies of Baudrillard’s theoretical alternative by exiting the discourse of standard political economy via a libidinalized mode of writing that aims not to diagnose, but to actualize “intensities lodged in theory” or what Geoff Bennington interestingly calls “writing the event.” Lyotard’s writing aims not to theorize capital, but to write the dissolution of political economy (and of theory more broadly) and to actualize this event of dissolution through what might be called the jouissance of the signifiers of theory. Lyotard seeks to “demonstrate that the cold serious discourse of political theory is also a set-up of libidinal economy” (Bennington 34–35). He damns Baudrillard’s concept of “symbolic exchange” qua a lost form of “primitive” exchange as the symptomatic sign that Baudrillard cannot relinquish his own desire for the Real, if only as a lost sign or lost time. Baudrillard remains committed to political theory dialectically hinged on the (lost) Real prior to capital. In short, he is still much more concerned with the Real and with the critique of capital than his prose suggests. But one could say nearly the same of Lyotard’s post-Marxist work. Lyotard’s desire to escape theory via a libidinalized textual free-play is itself a highly speculative if not “theoretical” project. In working through the tensions between theoretical analysis and an inscriptive desire to exceed analytic limits, Lyotard reproduces dialectics as he shuttles between what one is tempted to call a prosecutorial Freudo-Marxism and a polymorphous and perversely polysemic excess of writing. Without this background tension, the book would hardly have the charge it does. Lyotard can make the apparent dissolution of these theories an exciting literary event precisely because he is working against the backdrop of Marxism and psychoanalysis. Libidinal Economy is squarely situated within the dialectics of theory and practice: the practice of theorizing the end of theory.

    Contra Lyotard, I want to suggest that the escape from dialectics lies not in the direction of a libidinalized writing, but in a form of thought structured by a radical indifference to the Real. Baudrillard’s indifference to the Real—although far more pronounced in his later “theory-fictions”—is already forming in For a Critique, which is organized around the thesis that a culture of sign-exchange is symptomatic of the loss of contact with the Real. Baudrillard further radicalizes his theoretical indifference to the Real in The Mirror of Production. In his landmark statement on Marxism, Baudrillard suggests that the concept of “production” has morphed into a “strange contagion” in post-1960s Left theorizing (17). Baudrillard detects symptoms of this “strange contagion” in everything from the “unlimited ‘textual productivity’ of Tel Quel to Deleuze’s factory-machine productivity of the unconscious” to Lyotard’s libidinalized writing; “no revolution,” he writes, “can place itself under any other sign” (17). He traces the problematical theoretical valorization of production back to Marx:

    Marx did not subject the form of production to a radical analysis any more than he did the form of representation. These are the two great unanalyzed forms of the imaginary of political economy that imposed their limits on him. The discourse of production and the discourse of representation are the mirror by which the system of political economy comes to be reflected in the imaginary and reproduced there as the determinant instance.(20)

    Marx’s axiomatic decision on the nature of “man” as “productive animal” was never submitted to a radical analysis, according to Baudrillard. As Mike Gane notes in Baudrillard: Critical and Fatal Theory, Baudrillard argues that “Marx never gets to the position where he can challenge the thesis that the human is characterised by the capacity to produce” (98–99).

    Marx adopts his concept of the human as productive animal from the classical texts of political economy as truth, which for Baudrillard determines and limits Marx’s thought. As Gane puts it, “What is necessary, Baudrillard reiterates, is to see that a generic definition of man as productive animal, homo faber, is actually caught within the effects of [the] rationality of capital itself” (Baudrillard: Critical 97). Production, and its human correlate of labor power, constitutes a closed circuit of philosophical decisionism that reproduces the image of the human qua producer in the mirror of bourgeois and Marxian political economy alike. Baudrillard sees Marx as having established a set of concepts—use-value, exchange-value, commodity-fetishism and so forth—whose analytic value is pegged to a concept of the Real given under the sign of “production.” Marxism never escaped this dialectical economy of knowledge qua production organized by the theses and assumptions of classical political economy. “Marxism was not the revolutionary breakthrough that had been hoped for,” writes Gane, “but catastrophically, it was a particular elaboration of capitalism’s own principles” (Baudrillard: Critical 94). As Baudrillard argues in Mirror, the system of political economy “rooted in the identification of the individual with his labor power” is naturalized in the theoretical mirror of classical political economy (31). “Between the theory [of capitalism] and the object [of capitalism],” writes Baudrillard, “there is in effect, a dialectical relation, in the bad sense: they are locked into a speculative dead end” (29). He thus concludes that Marx’s concepts of labor and production “must be submitted to a radical critique as an ideological concept” (Mirror 43). This is a clear shot across the bow of Althusserian theory. Althusser aims to save the “science of history” by distinguishing “science” from humanist (and Marxist) ideology. For Baudrillard to claim that the “science of history”—the science of the history of modes of production—is an ideological concept inherited from classical political economy is to say that Althusserian Marxism must be liberated from its symptomatically self-imposed ideological limits. In Gane’s description, “The analysis, in Althusser, of theory as a productive process … becomes modelled on capitalist processes, and, as a system of thought, only reduplicates its object as separated and alienated: theory and revolutionary practice are neutralized by this failure” (Baudrillard: Critical 98).

    The Mirror of Production marks Baudrillard’s break with ideologically rigid Marxism (if not with Marx) and with critique and all critical theories of the Real. His break with Marxism specifically marks a turn from critical to fictive theory: a break not only with Marxist productivism, but with a theoretical mode of production that produces the Real in its “mirror” of critical reflection. This break links his dual “provocations” (as Kellner calls them) against Marx and Foucault. Two years after Mirror, in 1977, Baudrillard publishes his “broadside attack, Forget Foucault, at the time when Foucault was becoming a major figure in the pantheon of French theory” (Kellner 132):

    In many ways Forget Foucault marks a turning point and point of no return in Baudrillard’s theoretical trajectory. In this text he turned away from his previous apotheosis of a politics of the symbolic, and moved into a more nihilistic, cynical and apolitical theoretical field.(132)

    While Baudrillard’s later work does not often engage political questions directly, it does engage inventively and critically with the politics of theoretical critique itself. Forget Foucault is an indictment of the valorization of power by Foucault and of desire by Deleuze and Lyotard. For Baudrillard, “Foucault,” “Deleuze,” and “Lyotard” name patterns of theory that reify the desire of power and the power of desire. This he sees as theoretically complicit with the values of consumer capital:

    This compulsion towards liquidity, flow, and an accelerated circulation of what is psychic, sexual, or pertaining to the body is the exact replica of the force which rules market value: capital must circulate; gravity and any fixed point must disappear; the chain of investments and reinvestments must never stop; value must radiate endlessly and in every direction. (Forget 25)

    Baudrillard damns the libidinal turn in theory as simply the reflection and reification of what might be called (in Deleuzian terms) the desiring machine of capital itself.

    The question for Baudrillard is: how to escape the “spiral” of critical theory whose models turn into alibis for the domination of bodies, desire, and libido by consumer society? What then is theory to do? In what form might anti-capitalist theory continue? Fiction is Baudrillard’s answer. In a brief essay titled “Why Theory?” he writes:

    To be the reflection of the real, or to enter into a relation of critical negativity with the real, cannot be theory’s goal. … What good is theory? If the world is hardly compatible with the concept of the real which we impose upon it, the function of theory is certainly not to reconcile, but on the contrary, to seduce, to wrest things from their condition, to force them into an over-existence which is incompatible with the real.(129)

    Strategies of fiction—such as exaggeration (forced over-existence), seduction, and wresting things from their conditions—are ultimately aesthetic solutions to the problem of theory’s relation to the Real in the age of its disappearance. Now it is no longer “enough for theory to describe and analyze, it must itself be an event in the universe it describes” (129). “Theory pays dearly” for this fictional transformation, because theory as fiction can no longer innocently critique its object as if that object exists in a certifiably distanced space designated as the Real (129). This is, however, not a mode of theory that merely ratifies defeatism, as Baudrillard’s critics often suggest; theory-fiction can still “challenge” the economic, the social, the political, the aesthetic.1 But as Baudrillard notes:

    Even if it speaks of surpassing the economic, theory itself cannot be an economy of discourse. To speak about excess and sacrifice, it must become excessive and sacrificial. It must become simulation if it speaks about simulation, and deploy the same strategy as its object. … If it no longer aspires to a discourse of truth, theory must assume the form of a world from which truth has withdrawn.(“Why” 129)

    Just as literature creates a world, and that creation is an event in the world, so too does theory-fiction create a world of its own with the capacity to think in ways unconstrained by any pre-given concept of the Real. Baudrillard’s post-Marxist theory-fiction, styled in a self-consciously avant-gardist manner, strategically reanimates utopian thought. Theory “must tear itself from all referents and take pride only in the future” (“Why” 130). Baudrillard’s theoretical posture post-Mirror is to regard the Real with the same indifference with which the Real regards theory.

    Here too Baudrillard’s project intersects theoretically with Laruelle’s non-philosophical project. Non-philosophy is founded on two axioms: 1) Standard philosophy is defined by the decisions it makes about the Real; 2) The Real is foreclosed to the philosophical grasp. Yet all thought (philosophical and non-philosophical) is immanent to the Real, which is determinant and decisive in the last instance. Laruelle identifies standard philosophy with what he terms the Principle of Sufficient Philosophy: to decide on the Real rests on the presupposition that philosophy has sufficient resources to decide it. Philosophical Decision creates a conceptual “world” in its own image. What philosophy “sees” as the world of the Real is a projection of what philosophy decides concerning the Real. And because this image is always partial, it is also always false, for the Real is not partial. Rather than produce a false image of the Real that denies its falsity, Laruelle turns philosophy into fiction because fiction knows itself to be other than true. The non-philosophical practice of Marxism (non-Marxism) is a form of philo-fiction composed of the “raw materials” of Marxism in a non-dialectical and non-exchange-based mode of theorization. The “non” of “non-Marxism” is thus not a negation of Marxism as a whole, but only a negation of its dialectical pretense to exchange the Real for concepts. As Laruelle notes in Introduction to Non-Marxism:

    The non– cannot have any other “content” except that of the radical immanence of the Real or strictly following from it, without being a relation of negation to philosophy itself. … We will invert—at least—the usual approach of a philosophical appropriation of Marxism. Rather than completing Marxism through axioms drawn from the tradition … from thought-as- capital, we will instead disappropriate every constitutive relation to philosophy (but not its materials, symptoms, and models), i.e., every relation to it that is itself philosophical.(36)

    Introduction to Non-Marxism is a fiction or a fictionalization of Marx and the Marxist heritage, less in the avant-gardist style of late Baudrillard and more the cold and anti-humanist rationality of the early Althusser. But whereas Althusser sought to save Marx’s science of history via philosophy, Laruelle seeks a “scientific” examination of standard philosophy.

    Laruelle’s sense of “science” is as an attitude open to experimenting with the raw materials of a philosophical text or tradition. This experimental attitude is registered in syntactical and rhetorical constructions “cloned” from dominant philosophemes. Laruelle sees the fictionalization of Marxian theory as a means of rescuing or even redeeming it: “Rescuing Marxism from metaphysics is effectively an illusion as long as it is not rescued from philosophical sufficiency itself, belief in the Real and desire for the Real” (Non-Marxism 34). This is the first meaning of “fiction” for Laruelle: escape from belief in, and desire for, the Real. He defines his approach to writing (and reading) non-philosophical fiction thus:

    To under-practice [sous-pratiquer] philosophical language, indeed to under-understand it … is to think in a more generic manner without exceptions. All this can appear too moral, but this would be forgetting that thought is not uniquely subtractive, it is insurrection. (Photo-Fiction 62)

    This passage performs what it describes, rendering philosophical language in a style that subtracts the value of immediate understanding for an “under-understanding.” At issue (and in the “generic” practice of non-philosophy) is the disruption of the standard philosophical economy whose master formula is thought-for-the-Real. Non-philosophy aims to take philosophy out of circulation with any dialectically-conceived concept of the Real. This subtractive gesture ethically refuses to participate in the reification of the principles of exchange and equivalence that regulate standard philosophy or “thought-as-capital.” As Alexander Galloway notes, “exchange is not simply a philosophical paradigm for Laruelle, but the philosophical paradigm. There is no philosophy that is not too a philosophy of exchange” (117). Standard philosophy, insofar as it presupposes an operative principle of equivalence or exchange with the Real, is formally identical to the logic of capital according to Laruelle.

    His work attempts to break this bond between theory and the Real through an insurrectionary use of language that scrambles the codes and coordinates of standard philosophy: “No synthetic portmanteau, but non-localizable indeterminations in the philosophical sense, a language brought to its simplest status and sufficiently disrupted in order for the superior form of expression certain of itself in the concept to be rendered impossible” (Photo-Fiction 62–63). Philo-fiction disrupts the syntax and operativity of standard philosophical prose to render the equivalence and exchange principle (or the capitalist principle) of standard philosophy inoperative. Laruelle continues:

    Philo-fiction is a gushing [jaillissant] and subtractive usage of the means of thinking, of philosophemes-without-philosophy, of mathemes-without-mathematics, and from here, all of the dimensions of philosophy [are] rid of their proper all-encompassing finality, an insurrection against the all-too great superior finalities. (Photo-Fiction 63)

    Laruelle’s fictional approach to Marxian theory uses insurrectionary language—an insurrection within and against philosophy—that operates on the immanent terrain of thought. “There is, for Laruelle, a way of valorizing fiction,” writes Anthony Paul Smith, “as a force of insurrection that disempowers the world and operates without concern for its parameters” (120). This disempowerment of the philosophy-Real dialectic radically defetishizes philosophy and devalues the whole schema by which the Real is reified and reproduced in the cultural capital of critique.

    To conclude, in their fictionalizations of Marxian theory, Baudrillard and Laruelle attempt to “disempower” the concept of the Real. They answer the implacableness of the Real with a non-exchange-based form of thought, or what I would hazard to call “non-dialectics.” For theory to remain relevant, they posit that it has to become fiction (but not unreal). By an insurrectionary and non-dialectical mode of writing and thinking, they open places within the Real unbounded by standard philosophical thought monopolies. My task here has been merely to indicate the path they suggest for non-dialectical thought. In good non-philosophical fashion, I have attempted to avoid Laruelle’s and Baudrillard’s supposed “philosophical” differences and recast both thinkers as raw materials for a non-dialectical and non-capitalist mode of thought. By way of their fictionalized forms of theorizing, Baudrillard and Laruelle attempt to create the conditions of possibility for a non-Marxist mode of theorizing in a non-dialectical framework. This framework contains a meta-theoretical recitation of utopian thought. It creates a space—a no-place—outside the dialectical bounds of capitalist critique and the reproduction of capitalist logic as theory (or “thought-capital”). We need a non-dialectical theoretical countermeasure to the persistent illusion of the Real as a “world” where everything is subject to exchange under the rule of general equivalence and which justifies the continued destruction of all that is humane in human life.

  • Negative Ecology: Robert Smithson’s Spiral Jetty at 50

    John Culbert (bio)

    Abstract

    This essay reassesses the significance of Robert Smithson’s land art for environmental politics in a time of climate crisis. Drawing on analyses of fossil capital and petrocultures, it argues that Smithson’s aesthetics of entropy—particularly as conveyed in the 1970 earthwork Spiral Jetty—provide a valuable dialectical methodology for critical theory in the Capitalocene. The essay proposes a “negative ecology” that can challenge logics of resilience and survival shared by ecologists and extractivists alike.

    Contretemps (n.): a minor dispute or mischance; from the French contre-temps, “against time.”

    Against the Ages

    Robert Smithson broke ground on his visionary sculpture Spiral Jetty in April 1970, the month of the first Earth Day demonstrations. A petroglyph in rubble, a gnomic symbol in a desert sea, Smithson’s most celebrated artwork is indelibly linked by that shared date to a formative moment in modern environmentalism. The historical convergence is significant, if somewhat ironic. Like the broader Land Art movement of the 1960s, Smithson’s sculptural work reflects the social ferment and ecological consciousness that would lead, within a few months of the inaugural Earth Day, to the founding of the US Environmental Protection Agency. And yet Smithson’s aesthetic vision was largely at odds with environmentalist discourse. To ecology Smithson opposed the dispiriting concept of entropy; to political activism he advised suspending the will; and, to Earth Day protesters who seized the occasion, Smithson might have suggested dwelling in the “arrested moment” of geological time (“Four” 228). Fifty years after the building of Spiral Jetty, the significance of Smithson’s contretemps with environmentalism has come into focus. At stake, precisely, is the question of time in ecological consciousness.

    Like a turn in Smithson’s diminishing, self-consuming spiral in Utah’s Great Salt Lake, the returning date of this half centenary brings stark new threats and a powerful urgency to environmentalism. New and newly energized movements in ecology and climate justice (such as the climate strike movement and Extinction Rebellion) have significantly broadened public awareness of global heating even as local policies and international accords fail to stem the frightening growth of so-called “negative externalities,” from rising sea levels and ocean acidification to secular drought and mass extinctions. In the midst of a cataclysmic wildfire season in Australia, a firefighter suggested that the start of the new decade could mark “year zero” for environmental politics (Goldrick). The equivocal phrase neatly captures a paradox of this historical conjuncture, its odd combination of terminal and inaugural time, when public consciousness reaches a peak at the same moment that climate fatalism begins to take hold in liberal and progressive discourse.1

    The grand, purposeless spiral of Smithson’s self-defeating Jetty evokes the contradictions of his time, its heady ambitions and wicked defeats. Yet the sculpture is perhaps an even more apt reflection of today’s calamitous political-ecological moment. Its coiling form conveys no stable system or desirable order but instead a threatening vision of tumult and disintegration, a destructive “whirlpool,” as Smithson suggests (“Four” 227). Importantly, Spiral Jetty inverts a drain’s natural flow, its counterclockwise spin opposing natural order and historical progress alike. Smithson’s earthworks wager with time, though the artist refused any claim to posterity or monumental ideality of form—a vision of destructive temporality best conveyed as retrogression. Like the sculptures he describes in “Entropy and the New Monuments,” Spiral Jetty is a monument “against the ages” (11). Environmentalism would seem to gain little from this negative ecological vision. Smithson’s essay on the Jetty suggests as much: “These fragments of a timeless geology laugh without mirth at the time-filled hopes of ecology,” Smithson mockingly says (“The Spiral Jetty” 13). And yet Smithson’s aesthetic vision of entropic time has a great deal to offer to the challenges we confront in an overheating world, provided we amend the artist’s framing of ecology.

    “An epic case of bad timing” is how Naomi Klein describes the fateful irony that the scientific consensus on climate change emerged at the same time as globalized, deregulated capitalism (This 73). The current breakdown of liberal democratic systems and interstate governance adds daunting hurdles to these challenges precisely when a swift and decisive collective intervention in the world economy appears necessary to avert climate collapse and social chaos. On this front, the “economy-killing measures” imposed at the start of the coronavirus pandemic—to quote Bloomberg Businessweek—hardly provide environmentalists reasons for cheer (Robison et al.). To climate activists who have long called for a halt to “business as usual,” the COVID-19 crisis serves as a bitter reminder that governing bodies only act with urgency—however briefly or ineffectually—in the face of immediate, not future, threats. Even the alarming phenomenon of government-sanctioned medical disinformation follows a pattern familiar to environmentalists; top-down science denialism was normalized by energy lobbyists long before the politicization of the new coronavirus. And as the pandemic wreaks disproportionate damage along the fault lines of race, gender, age, and class, current investments in health care and social support continue to widen a morbid generational divide between today’s populations and their unlucky inheritors, rehearsing the “temporal antagonism” we can expect to play out in an overheated future (Taylor).

    Many will likely remember the clear skies and birdsong that accompanied the outbreak of COVID-19 as pollution and traffic were swiftly curtailed. But early in the crisis, ostensibly positive reports of declining greenhouse gas emissions were already outweighed by larger trends: a projected seven percent annual drop in CO2 emissions in 2020—a high estimate, and bought at the cost of extraordinary human suffering—would barely match the amount the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) says is needed every year of this decade in order to keep global warming within the catastrophic threshold of 1.5 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels (Le Quéré et al. 647). Earth Day’s fiftieth year was celebrated under the threat of this fast-approaching limit, a mere ten years away. Meanwhile, as the anniversary was marked under lockdown, fossil fuel interests can celebrate a milestone in what Naomi Klein calls a “half-century long ideological project” of deregulation; citing the challenge of COVID-19 to the economy, the EPA bowed to industry lobbyists and waived environmental rules for major polluters during the crisis, effectively suspending its role as a regulatory agency (“Care” 99).

    “Bad timing” indeed. However, Klein’s observation reflects another fateful contretemps, more fundamental and historically consequential. “Fossil capital,” to adopt Andreas Malm’s expression, is more than a source of increasing power and mobility, the well-known “time-space compression” of industrialized economies; it cleaves modern history with a profound temporal disjunction (240). Climate change is nothing if not the intrusion of another temporality into the timeline of history. The vitality of industrial modernity would be unthinkable without the mute compact energy of past photosynthesis, the unearthed daylight of numberless dead noons. Whence the inordinate force of fossil capital, so too its terrible cost. To the English capitalists who struck upon the notion of exploiting the coal of the smiths for large-scale industry, fossil capital offered a power source that was unbound from the seasons and so appeared to stand “outside of time,” Malm says (42). Likewise, as distinct from energy sources growing on the land, coal’s stored energy was independent of the lived world and existed seemingly “outside of the landscape.” The latter proved a crucial strategic advantage of mobile capital over the laboring class, as Malm’s meticulous history demonstrates (41). Climate change can be seen as the delayed effect of the fundamental disjunctions installed by fossil capital into the historical present, “a now that is non-contemporaneous with itself” (8).

    Carbon economies, as a result, inhabit a spatiotemporal conundrum. Timothy Mitchell argues that the energy unlocked from prehistoric petrocarbon has lent modern societies “a peculiar orientation towards the future,” conceived as “a limitless horizon of growth” (142). “Petroknowledge” arises from these circumstances as a phantasmatic political-economic discourse that seemingly triumphs over metabolic space-time; whereas previous ideas of wealth and property “were based upon physical processes that suggested limits to growth,” petro-fueled GDP “could grow without any problem of physical or territorial limits,” Mitchell observes (139). The impression of limitlessness yields a paradoxical object—the “economy”—that “could expand without getting physically bigger.” The current pace and scope of virtual experience, internet connectivity, and electronic stock market trading may have accustomed us to the notion that “practically infinite values are reached in finite time” (129), though this economic condition remains fundamentally disparate from the lived circumstances inhabited by a biophysical organism. This predicament highlights the stakes of environmental art, because the figuration of natural processes must be reclaimed from fundamentally distorting spatiotemporal representations of the given world.

    If fossil fuels are the sine qua non of capital accumulation, fossil capital appears not only incompatible with a sustainable biosphere, but radically asynchronous with life. As Rob Nixon argues in Slow Violence, the delayed, microscopic, and incremental nature of much ecological damage eludes the conventions of narrative and representation, based as they are in the parameters of lived experience and the affective gratifications of a sensationalistic mediascape. The discrepancies between lived time and temporalities of ecological disruption increase the need for climate science communication even as the resources of rhetoric, narrative, and the arts are sorely tested by atmospheric data measured in parts per million, temperature variations logged in tenths of a degree, and radioactive half-lives calculated in billions of years. In spite of the increasingly sensational and spectacular evidence of human impact on Earth systems—evidence that would appear to challenge Nixon’s thesis—climate change reflects causal processes occurring at scales that defy conceptual framing and whose delayed or incremental effects pose an ongoing challenge to representation.

    During the Cold War, questions of communication on ungraspable time scales were posed in terms of the challenge of relaying threats of nuclear contamination to future generations. “Nuclear semiotics” was born with a Reagan-era task force that drew up guidelines for an information system that could deliver messages to recipients unknown up to 10,000 years in the future. Linguist Thomas Sebeok’s account of this project stands as a cautionary example of the co-optation of scholarship by a military-industrial state apparatus. Working with the construction and engineering behemoth Bechtel Corporation and under the authority of the National Waste Terminal Storage Program, Sebeok proposed a symbolic system that could survive all foreseeable circumstances in order to keep the US’s vast and growing store of radioactive waste safe from tampering yet still available for potential future employ. The fearsome extent of power and authority involved in this project is perhaps no more audacious than the linguist’s reasoned effort to account for all possible future eventualities. Indeed, nuclear power is rivaled by the breathtaking “all” of Sebeok’s totalizing formulations; he excludes all exteriority with the idea of a fully encompassing “context” according to which signification is boxed by a container, much as waste is supposedly confined to storage—”semiosis,” the linguist ingenuously says, “takes place within a context” (452)—, and he summarily discounts the role of difference by confining it to the category of noise. “Differences between input and output,” he asserts, “are due to ‘noise.’” Far from troubling any concept of system, “difference” in this account amounts to a mere variation on self-identity and presence—a metaphysical claim that makes common cause with larger systems of order and control. Like structuralist linguistics, then, Sebeok’s notion of signification “compels a neutralization of time and history,” as Derrida puts it (“Structure” 291). Through his reductive framing, Sebeok feels authorized to invoke the idea of a permanent “natural message” of warning that has “the power to signify the same things at all times and in all places” (453).

    Rather than encompassing all of space and time, as Sebeok claims to do, we might instead propose that his work for the National Waste Terminal Storage Program reflects a specific rationale standard in late capitalism. As defined by Eric Cazdyn, the “new chronic” of our present political-economic order is characterized by a stagnant maintenance of ongoing damage and a corresponding recoil from terminality, whether in the management of incurable disease or the perpetuation of broader conditions of economic crisis (6). By placing terminality under embargo, the new chronic disables the transformative prospects of political endings and existential exits. As such, like Sebeok’s plans for “Terminal Storage,” the new chronic mode of symptom management “effectively colonizes the future by naturalizing and eternalizing the brutal logic of the present” (6). The perpetual “meantime” of Cazdyn’s “new chronic” is akin to the delusory futurity of Mitchell’s “petroknowledge”: both extend themselves into the time made available by their own powerful destructiveness. Here, for all its supposed concerns about the welfare of distant generations, Sebeok’s linguistics of “Terminal Storage” appears both deeply ironic and sadly misguided. In working with military contractor Bechtel, Sebeok projects the maintenance of some of capitalism’s deadliest by-products into a near-infinite future even as his collaborators deepen the ruts of petroculture. Notably, Bechtel is the largest US construction company and provides key infrastructure for worldwide petroleum interests. In contrast to the horizonless engineering mentality of Bechtel and Sebeok’s interminable storage, one especially urgent task of a critique of petroknowledge is to foster a sense of desirable terminality, as Cazdyn suggests, while understanding how phenomena on a geologic scale are imbricated in the ordinary maintenance of our fossil-fueled “meantime.” But if petroknowledge articulates a dominant spatiotemporal condition of illimitude, critical ecological theory must confront that horizonlessness as a conceptual and aesthetic obstacle that inhibits viable endings. In the argument that follows, I propose “negative ecology” as a challenge to the reifying conditions of fossil capital by critiquing the spatiotemporal confines of petroknowledge on the near side of its terminal illimitude.

    In retrospect, Robert Smithson seems the artist most attuned to these political-ecological predicaments and their emerging threats. With his insistent focus on prehistory, paleontology, and long-term natural processes, Smithson locates cultural production in timeframes and spatial scales indispensable to our understanding of climate change. The artist’s late unrealized projects for art reclamation in large-scale mining sites appear ever more pertinent to ecology conceived on such scales. And in light of the urgency of climate disruption and the merging of aesthetics and activism in environmental art, it seems increasingly fitting that Spiral Jetty should stand as an emblem of Smithson’s work and indeed of Earth art in general. More than any other piece in his body of work, Spiral Jetty is strongly suggestive of a symbol, glyph, or pictograph. Granted, the sculpture’s coiling form hardly presumes to be a “natural message” that could “signify the same things at all times and in all places,” as Sebeok puts it (453), or even aspire to leave “some faint, enduring mark on the universe,” in Alan Weisman’s ambiguous phrase (4). And yet Spiral Jetty belongs as much to the domain of semiotics as it does to sculpture.

    This semiotic dimension is underscored by the original reception of Spiral Jetty; photographs of Smithson’s sculpture were first mounted in the summer of 1970 at the Museum of Modern Art’s (MoMA) conceptual art exhibition, titled “Information.” The show emphasized data, documentation, installations, instructions, protocols, mathematical permutations, and audience-response performance. Like the black asphalt poured down a Roman quarry slope in his 1969 Asphalt Rundown—also mounted at MoMA—Spiral Jetty presents itself as a high-contrast graphical sign in the landscape. Arguably, however, the most enduring piece of graphical “information” from the time of MoMA’s exhibition is the now ubiquitous international recycling symbol. Like Spiral Jetty, the symbol was designed on the occasion of the original Earth Day, and the parallels between these two iconic graphical forms are as illuminating as their differences. Each conveys a vision of natural cycles while deliberately exploiting a sense of paradox. In the case of the recycling symbol, however, this enigmatic dimension has had some inadvertent effects. By evoking a Möbius strip, the recycling emblem implicitly links eco-conscious consumer behavior to a strange topology without real pertinence to actual space, an illogic confirmed by the political-economic reality of post-consumer recycling. A recent Greenpeace investigation of the “recycling exports system”—an expression itself rich in irony—reveals that much waste supposedly recycled by first world consumers instead ends up burned or simply discarded in vulnerable zones of the Global South (Ross). Smithson can hardly be credited with anticipating the flaws of post-consumer waste treatment, of course. And yet the artist’s entropic vision of spiraling disorder proves a vital corrective to any pretense of sustainability under fossil capitalism. There is no viable return in Smithson’s spinning Jetty beyond the troping of entropic recurrence. Smithson’s negative ecological vision—his “geopolitics of primordial return,” as he put it (“The Spiral Jetty” 12)—is based instead on an abiding sense of the untimeliness of petrocultural space-time. This aesthetic sense of geological time impelled the artist to map a “double world” that, he said, could “show the prehistoric world as coextensive with the world I existed in” (11).

    Smithson’s “double world” is more than an attempt to add new material to art history’s stock of subjects or even to present an innovation in artistic form. It suggests nothing less than the “collapse of the age-old humanist distinction between natural history and human history,” as Dipesh Chakrabarty puts it (201). Indeed, Smithson strikingly anticipates the onset of the Anthropocene in speaking of “the artist as a geologic agent” (“Four” 217). The phrase is uncannily apt; while the Anthropocene encompasses all human effects on Earth systems, its definition lies specifically in our measurable impact on rock strata (Walters et al. 317), the lasting trace of “man as a geological agent” (Fernàndez-Lozano et al. 2). Such expressions may seem grandiose, and indeed critics have faulted Smithson for a supposed machismo out of keeping with sustainable ecological stewardship. But to make such a critique is to commit an error of scale. If anything, the idea of a “geologic agent” dwarfs any particular human action by framing it within a dissipating process beyond all reckoning. This confounding mismatch between individual acts and their general effects is a central conundrum of environmental politics in an age of global warming. The building of Spiral Jetty is just such a vain act, its momentous gesture less heroic than ironic.

    Most importantly, perhaps, Smithson’s site/nonsite dialectic makes Malm’s dual “outsides”—disjunct time and distant space—the essential coordinates of aesthetic experience. While insisting on a given artwork’s site-specificity, Smithson always emphasizes its spatial and temporal dislocation; the gallery object, in Smithson’s terminology, is demoted to a negative “nonsite,” the mere index of an absent site. This dialectic involves no mere exercise in aesthetic estrangement, that familiar topos of twentieth-century art; the primary materials of Smithson’s sculptural nonsites—coal, tar, and asphalt, for instance—confront the viewer with an unassimilable, deeply alien prehistoric substance. If the nonsite’s reference to waste zones and industrial extraction sites seems to illustrate the general “centrifugal movement” of industrial modernity, as Nicolas Bourriaud would have it (ix), Smithson’s dialectics speak to a violent expulsion of art that defies any recuperation.2 Fossil capital makes this dislocation the fundamental dialectic of our disrupted present. Accordingly, progressive political ecology in an age of climate change can only be realized by confronting the spatiotemporal conundrums generated by fossil capital. This in turn requires a critical shift from the fuzzy humanist causality of the Anthropocene to the Capitalocene, understood as an epoch of climate disruption midwifed by capital accumulation.

    Smithson’s focus on prehistory provides a temporal framework that dwarfs cultural chronologies and undermines the dominion of the present, from capitalist clock time to the latest breathless avant-garde. The disjunctive unmodernity he discerned in modern fossil economies provides a way to visualize other temporalities hidden by the “homogeneous, empty time” of capitalism (Benjamin, “On the Concept of History” 395). Indeed, if capitalism’s greatest triumph lies in its seeming homology with the remorseless, unstoppable advance of linear clock time, Smithson’s work testifies instead to fossil capital’s disruptive, entropic temporality. This in turn exposes built-in contradictions and prospects for resistance that can make common cause with sustainable social formations and supposedly atavistic life-rhythms branded “pre-modern” and “archaic” (Chatterjee 4–5). The fiftieth anniversary of Spiral Jetty is an opportunity to consider the environmental promise of Smithson’s aesthetics, its implicit “revolution against history” (Malm 10).

    Against Survival

    For thirty years Spiral Jetty was largely invisible, the Great Salt Lake’s rising water levels having unexpectedly swallowed the sculpture soon after it was built. Arguably, the Jetty‘s increased remoteness in an already remote place accentuated its dialectical relationship with Smithson’s accompanying film and essay. But if this mediation in text and image reinforced the Jetty‘s conceptual aspect—”dematerializing” the artwork, as Lucy Lippard puts it—the sculpture’s disappearance also added to its mystique (xxi). Biography laid claim to the Jetty. In Gianfranco Gorgoni’s monumental photographs of 1970, the Jetty already seems an artifact frozen in time, a stark, graphic emblem planted in weatherless still waters. Following Smithson’s death in 1973, Gorgoni’s portraits of the artist at the site reinforce a pathos-laden identification of the lone creator with his signature work, an enduring ideal of the Jetty as “the individual vision of a single artist” (Flam, “Biographical” xxvi). Ironically, every look back at Spiral Jetty becomes a memorial to this “individual vision.” At the turn of the millennium the reemergence of the Jetty from the Great Salt Lake prompted the Dia Art Foundation’s publication of a volume on Spiral Jetty. Somewhat misleadingly, photographs by Gorgoni, Nancy Holt, and Smithson, along with more recent images, largely confirm the sculpture’s appearance during the artist’s lifetime. In recent years, however, the Jetty has become fully stranded on the shore. This entropic, wholly useless aspect of the Jetty encourages a renewed view of the sculpture as subject to the impersonal forces of time, weather, and seasonal variation—and the historical processes behind climate change.

    James Benning’s 2007 film Casting a Glance highlights the challenges and pitfalls of a retrospective look at Smithson’s work. The feature-length documentary evokes Spiral Jetty‘s history in long, static shots that portray the sculpture in different seasons. Fifteen chapters, each named with a date, span the sculpture’s completion on April 30, 1970 to May 15, 2007. By the film’s fifth chapter, dated March 5, 1971, the viewer sees the Jetty begin to sink. The sculpture’s black basalt rocks stand half submerged in the flat, mirroring waters of the lake under an imposing background of snow-covered mountains. In the chapters dated 1984 and 1988, the jetty has fully disappeared. Likewise for the entire span of the 1990s, as the next chapter jumps another fourteen years to 2002, at which time the first rocks of the jetty have just begun to reemerge from the lake.

    Benning’s framing and editing foreground the anonymous natural processes of the vast desert landscape and promote an immersive sense of duration, an insistent feature of the filmmaker’s work. And yet in a film that cedes the initiative to nature, significant narrative features still obtain. On May 24, 1973, as the lake’s waters are swallowing the jetty, only a dotted outline of rocks can be seen; stormy surf beats the stones, and waves race across the sculpture’s concentric bands. An intrepid visitor is seen standing far out at the first bend of the jetty, and a dog tries to join him but the man calls it to go back. The lone man and his companion’s exit from the scene take on meaningful resonance when we realize that the following black frames skip over the year of Smithson’s death, as signaled by the next chapter’s intertitle: July 20, 1984, the eleventh anniversary of the artist’s passing. This gesture is underscored by the film’s concluding shot; before the film cuts to black, we hear the faint ambient noise of a single-engine plane, evocative of the crash that ended Smithson’s life in Amarillo, Texas at the site of his final earthwork.

    These narrative elements lend Benning’s film a hagiographic tone not uncommon among Smithson’s commentators. Lynne Cooke goes so far as to guess what Smithson “must have” felt upon completing the Jetty, conflating her own admiring hindsight with a nostalgia she imputes to the artist. “In retrospect,” Cooke proposes, “the moment of the Jetty‘s completion must have seemed golden; it must have been tinged with nostalgia” (64). While anniversaries always involve some retroactive fabrication, the Spiral Jetty, a monument in time, raises the stakes of such historical returns. In celebrating Smithson’s work and commemorating his untimely end, we risk giving narrative meaning and thereby a redemptive significance to a body of work that radically challenges our frameworks for understanding the natural processes in which our lived lives are embedded. Benning’s film is especially interesting in this regard, because the overarching story of the Jetty‘s submergence and reappearance is, in fact, the director’s willful fabrication. Having filmed during a span of time when the Jetty began to reappear, Benning used his footage of this more recent time period to reconstruct the Jetty‘s earlier history, matching the water surface levels from his film footage to the lake’s recorded levels at corresponding months in the past. The chapters relaying the Jetty‘s submergence have thus inverted the arrow of time, for Benning filmed during a period when the opposite process was underway. Accordingly, the chapter dated 1970 corresponds not to the earliest but instead to Benning’s most recent footage of the Jetty.

    In this regard, perhaps the most telling narrative moment of Casting a Glance involves no human agent or ambient sound. In the chapter that briefly shows the man and his dog, the Jetty‘s impending submergence is portrayed with images of stormy waves that render the incremental process of slowly rising water as a dramatic event: a flood, perhaps, or even a deluge of biblical scale—an impression reinforced by the film’s long middle sequences of horizonless waters under infinite skies. The return of the Jetty thus carries connotations of supernatural creation and divine redemption, motifs quite alien to Smithson’s aesthetics. Benning’s film ends up an all-too-human homage, ironically confirming Smithson’s damning judgment that “cinema offers an illusive or temporary escape from physical dissolution” (“A Tour” 74).

    As we have noted, Rob Nixon argues that one of the most pressing tasks of environmental justice is to represent dilatory social and ecological catastrophes whose delayed effects defy conventions of narrative and representation. If this is so, slowness and violence themselves would seem to call for critical reassessment. Gayatri Spivak provides the means for such a critique, arguing that to access “the rhythm of the eco-biome” requires that we not only focus on violations that are “pervasive rather than singular and spectacular” but also question and reevaluate the metaphysical grounding of the notion of violence itself (529, 533). The transcendental and humanist aspects of Benning’s film can be faulted on these counts. Even more significant, however, is the story arc that relates the Jetty‘s long process of submersion and reappearance. While the filmmaker’s recreation of that history is a deliberate artifice, his filmic construct is itself premised on an erroneous perception of natural rhythms. Climate science suggests that from the early twentieth century to the present, the surface level of the Great Salt Lake has been in general decline (Meng 7, 9). If, viewed on this timeline, the average surface level tends progressively lower, this poses a baffling conceptual challenge: we must be able to picture the lake constantly diminishing, its surface level perpetually dropping, even during the decades-long period when rising waters submerged the Jetty.

    This kind of long view is characteristic of Smithson’s aesthetic vision, and the artist was well aware that the Great Salt Lake is the remnant of a much larger inland sea that would likely shrink further. Smithson fully anticipated his sculpture’s eventual dissolution, its inevitable “dedifferentiation” (“Four” 207). But today the Jetty‘s fast-shifting elevation cannot help but evoke two related ecological threats quite specific to our age of global heating: sea level rise and the desiccation of desert lakes. As Elizabeth Rush documents in Rising: Dispatches from the New American Shore, the United States is poorly prepared for the drastic changes already being felt on shrinking shorelines everywhere. Perhaps the most valuable aspect of Rush’s book is its challenge to climate-change adaptation, an emerging political and economic dogma that takes the logic of “creative destruction” beyond its terminal limit by capitalizing on future unlivability. In contrast to technocratic plans for the profitable management of catastrophe, Rush suggests avowing “defeat” in the face of indomitable natural forces; she advocates an organized retreat from the shoreline and a shared embrace of “vulnerability” as a lived practice of egalitarian, intersectional, coalition-building politics (249). As with Benning’s film, however, Rising ultimately offers a redemptive vision that undermines Rush’s most important claims. The book closes with descriptions of landscapes in states of decay that evoke Smithson’s entropic art: a “crosshatch of levees,” a disintegrating berm, and walkways leading out into salt ponds, where an art installation of ambiguous purpose leaves Rush baffled (250). But this bafflement does not last; inspired by signs of persistent life in the tidal zone, she settles on an ecological vision of “a living system so complex the sole word to describe it is divine” (251). The author’s metaphysical flourish is worth noting, as her conclusion betrays a number of recuperative moves that allay her message of vulnerability with an implied claim to all-encompassing immunity from physical decay. This could explain why her language swerves from an avowal of “defeat” to a claim of “resiliency” and ultimate “survival” (249)—ideas that arguably undergird all the World Bank’s ominous investments in so-called adaptation. Tellingly, Rush conscripts art too into this project of survival: she appeals to the art installation in the marshland as a supposed conduit of stable “meaning” and clear “purpose” (250), where the cultivation of Smithsonesque irony might serve better.

    If the continued use of fossil fuels condemns the world to unlivability, a transition to a post-carbon future is crucial to the world’s survival. But this task would involve extricating “survival” from the extractive economies that have defined the terms of livability. Building on Timothy Mitchell’s influential work, a collective of activist petrocultures scholars offers tools for such a critique by asserting that the influence of fossil fuels extends even into the immaterial realms of our values, affects, and desires. Accordingly, they argue that art can dismantle those deeply embedded traces of the carbon economy and help to envision alternative futures “after oil” (Petrocultures). But in observing that “art can be put to purposes other than corporate interests,” the scholars take art’s purposefulness as a given—a construal of artistic practice that aligns broadly with carbon economy’s instrumental rationality (Petrocultures 47). This framing of art practice suggests that art’s purposeful aims may be complicit in petroculture even in works that engage in ostensible critique, which would ironically confirm the scholars’ own sobering dictum that “life has been limited to life within a petroculture” (47). Here it may be worth recalling Adorno’s evocation of the “purposeless activity” of play, which allows children to defeat the usefulness of things and forestall their capture by market logic (228). In his description of child’s play Adorno evokes trucks, those stalwarts of petroculture, deprived of any practical function by the child’s creative improvisation: “the little trucks travel nowhere,” Adorno says, “and the tiny barrels on them are empty” (228). Smithson employed dump trucks and earth-moving equipment in his major late works, including Asphalt Rundown, Concrete Rundown, and Spiral Jetty. A barrel of viscous glue served as Smithson’s art medium in his Glue Pour of 1970. Childhood play as described by Adorno allows us to glimpse how these seemingly grand gestures of Smithson’s are belittled by the ludic purposelessness of the artist’s entropic sensibility. At stake in each is not simply a difference in size but in disparities of scale; in other words, artistic practice, like play, involves the creative engagement with another order of measurement and correspondingly disparate values. “Size determines an object,” Smithson pointedly observes, “but scale determines art” (“The Spiral Jetty” 9).

    This suggests that ecological aesthetics requires a critique of art’s complicity not only in dominant values and interests but in its representational and communicative functions. Far from merely espousing political aims and expressing social engagement, art’s political promise lies in materializing what lies at the bounds of aesthetic and political representation alike. After Oil‘s own examples of activist art, while laudably committed to social justice, tend to reinforce positivist ideals of mimetic representation and full disclosure. In a particularly bald assertion of reductively instrumental logic, artists are enjoined to “make the unconscious conscious” (Petrocultures 48). In a similar way, Adrian Parr’s Hijacking Sustainability calls on an inspiring, if didactic, example of art to illustrate the stakes of anti-capitalist ecology: Spencer Tunick’s photograph of a mass of vulnerable naked people lying huddled on a receding Swiss glacier (162). For all their radical commitments, Parr’s theory of sustainability and the petrocultures scholars’ bid for survival “after oil” largely depend on an idea of art grounded quite safely in a metaphysics of denotative representation.

    To argue for Smithson’s relevance to contemporary political ecology is to read against the grain of his pronouncements on environmentalism. Smithson was openly critical of ecologists and considered their vision of natural processes moralizing and sentimental. But the artist’s impatience with environmentalists goes to the heart of ecological illusions of survival. Crucially, this critique implies an entropic theory of language and representation; as a wholly material activity outmatched by processes of erosion and dissolution, signification is inherently self-undermining for Smithson, its claims of enduring presence delusory.3 Ecology, then, cannot evade the question of entropic signification without falsifying the nature it purports to represent. He makes this point quite strikingly in the short and acerbic piece titled “Can Man Survive?” Smithson’s essay savages an exhibit by that name at the American Museum of Natural History, scorning the “superstition” and “religiosity” of the show’s portrayals of nature (367). The show’s all too wondrous visions of calamity betray aesthetic raptures that ultimately fall prey to the familiar recuperative sleight of mind of sublime experience: images of “pretty filth and elegant destruction,” Smithson says, imply “a transcendental state of matter, that is uncanny, grotesque, and terribly attractive” (368). The artist concludes that “Ecology arises from a need for deliverance and a deep distrust of science,” and as such, its “weird faith” (367) offers no viable alternatives to its grim visions of the “apocalypse of ecology.”

    The threat of a population explosion looms large in the exhibit “Can Man Survive?” A photograph showing “piles of birth control devices rotting in India” (368) alludes to Paul R. Ehrlich’s alarming prediction in The Population Bomb (1968) that overpopulation would soon lead to global mass starvation events, notably on the Indian subcontinent. One might wish that Smithson had given more than a passing attention to the topic. His scorn at least cuts through the discourse of population control, whose pieties have long given cover to colonial dispossession and free-market rationality, from the Irish Famine to NGO interventionism. This discourse has lately emerged in posthuman environmentalism, where a prominent strand of first-world eco-feminism endorses population control in language that revives the eugenicist strain of ecological demography.4 Needless to say, Ehrlich’s predictions ultimately proved wrong, though not for reasons that economists can adequately explain even today. To self-avowed economic “optimist” David Lam, for instance, a look back at fifty years of recent demographic history prompts the cheerfully incurious question “how did we survive?” (10). Citing Ehrlich’s warning of 1968 that “the battle to feed humanity is already lost” (6), the economist points to global statistics that seem to imply the opposite: at the very same time that the world population doubled, per-capita food production increased, commodity prices remained stable, and poverty declined—feats “surely worth marveling at” (10), Lam says. Notably, however, Lam minimizes the role of Cold War geopolitics in these equations; during the period in question, US-funded aid programs promoted large-scale industrialized agribusiness which, touting the virtues of self-sufficiency in developing countries, in fact aimed to undermine local autonomy and stem the tide of socialism. Likewise, ecology gets short shrift in Lam’s account of this history. A more holistic view of agriculture plainly shows that the so-called green revolution has had long-term deleterious effects, chaining emerging economies to the corporate monopolies that provided machinery, petrochemical fertilizers, pesticides, and new strains of seeds for large-scale monoculture farming, with well-known negative consequences for food security, sustainability, and biodiversity. This long-term damage is now taking its toll; indeed, even before the global pandemic, the IPCC issued a grim warning that famine is making a comeback, its threats magnified by the multifarious effects of climate change.5

    The apparent “marvel” of our survival is contradicted by the economist’s own sunny data. In a graph plotting commodity prices from 1960–2010, two major price increases stand out. The first, in 1974, corresponds to the OPEC oil embargo, and the second, in 2008, to the global financial crisis. The parallel is enlightening. We may consider the OPEC embargo as a “true cost” experiment conducted on US Cold War geopolitics and the consumer economy it sustains; oil shortages and general unaffordability provide a rough idea of fossil fuels’ prohibitive price tag once their damage is factored in. As for the second spike in affordability, we might have only survived that crisis in a state of “non-death,” as Colin Crouch puts it, neoliberal dogma having paradoxically outlived the crisis that should by all rights have fully discredited it. Expanding on Crouch’s analysis of the 2008 crisis, we can posit that the OPEC crisis similarly discredited the fundamentals of the fossil economy by exposing its hidden costs. If this is so, a “non-dead” fossil economy renders retrospectively implausible our survival of the population explosion. Like apocalypse, the “extraordinary resilience”6 of zombie capitalism seems anchored in an unbudgeable metaphysics of enduring life, though a materialist analysis can trace that delusory claim of survival back to the fossil infrastructures that removed the “natural limits to growth” (Mitchell 141). If we include the delayed consequences of carbon emissions and synthetic pollutants in the green revolution’s cost ledger, we will only have survived the population bomb in a state of fossil-fueled “non-death.”

    This predicament implies a temporal paradox: “the new chronic,” as Eric Cazdyn puts it (5), is characterized by the stubborn persistence of late capitalism in a sick ongoingness of constant crisis management. Cazdyn argues that the perpetual denial of capitalism’s end-time converts terminal states into an uncanny suspension of history, a borrowed time in which we are “already dead.” Taken together, Crouch’s and Cazdyn’s analyses suggest a highly paradoxical historical moment in which the not-yet and the already coincide or overlap: a time without the present. As such, fossil capital’s uncanny temporality seems to offer a chance to deconstruct survival’s unhealthy grip on ecological consciousness. Here, Cazdyn with his sense of the “already dead” has perhaps an advantage over Crouch, who frames his sobering analysis of our contemporary “non-death” as an implicit survival guide for “coping,” as he puts it, with the impending end of democracy (2). In contrast, Cazdyn’s critical optic disallows any crisis management that would fudge accounts with negativity, not only in the economic realm—Crouch’s field of study—but in a symbolic general economy. This meshes with a deconstructive theory of representation congruent with Smithson’s materialist aesthetics of “dedifferentiation”: the “always already” of différance requires that we understand survival as inherently self-defeating, life’s persistence in “auto-immunity” being indistinguishable from the material supports that negate it.7

    Because the “new chronic” perpetuates capitalism in a state of crisis, ordinary activities of coping and triage can be judged as largely complicit in its maintenance. A critique of this low-grade complicity in survival has radical implications for environmentalism, whose primary focus in all areas of conservation involves “saving” species and ecosystems from economic overexploitation, even when they presume nature functions as a “natural resource” or “ecosystem service.” Elizabeth Kolbert’s The Sixth Extinction provides a subtle critique of the implicit eschatology of such ark-like preservation efforts, suggesting a need to save ecology from the logic of salvation (10). To cite only one example from the catalogue of failed preservation efforts, a recent study found that insect populations have declined twenty-five percent in the past thirty years (Klink et al.), confirming an earlier report that warned of “catastrophic consequences for the survival of mankind” should those trends continue (Carrington). Notably, insects in nature reserves were not found to be significantly more abundant than in farmland and urbanized areas. The “new chronic” appears here as ecology’s managed diminishment of existence under a general condition of perpetual decline. With such failures in mind, an exit from the “new chronic” might entail a reassertion of history by revolting from the merely endurable and confronting our political-ecological reality as “already dead.” Environmental politics would be converted into negative ecology; to conceive of the environment as “already dead” is to depart from the radical position of having nothing to save, as saving can only preserve within the terms of capitalism’s death-dealing survival.

    Survival is to climate change as resilience is to precarity. In the one we may already glimpse the incalculably worse implications of our gradual slide into the other. After all, plans for adaptation to climate change are unfolding in a context that already demands continuous adaptation to ever more precaritizing social and economic conditions—in which an enforced condition of maximal insecurity requires self-maintenance through a paradoxical “self-precaritization” (Lorey 70). Frantz Fanon speaks compellingly of the way colonized populations are subjected to a “continued agony” that degrades and diminishes their culture without definitively ending it (34). Colonialism casts the shadow of this “continued agony” well beyond the present. A preview of general militarized survival under climate collapse may be seen in the colonial security apparatus in occupied Palestine, a uniquely brutal system of “necrocide” in which “unauthorized death is banned,” as China Miéville aptly puts it (302). In this light, one of the major political ramifications of the 2020 protests against racism and police brutality in the United States is the growing recognition of the militarization of policing. Occurring as it did amidst economic calamity and social upheaval, the mass movement to defund the police speaks as much to the urgency of the present as to the prospects of social and environmental justice in an unlivable future. As a resistance movement against enforced survival, negative ecology can help sustain critical focus on the brutalizing control systems that foreclose “unauthorized death.”

    At the same time, such a negative ecology would simply reconnect with the scope of environmentalism as defined by Rachel Carson. In Silent Spring, her excoriating critique of synthetic pesticides, Carson insists that ecology involved grasping time measured “not in years but in millennia,” and events “totally outside the limits of biologic experience” (7). Carson strikes an entropic, Smithsonesque tone in saying that damage from pollution already appeared “irrecoverable” and “irreversible” in 1962. Significantly, Carson finished writing her book under the shadow of her own impending death from cancer, though environmentalism has not fully embraced the negative ecological implications of her judgment that “there is no time” in the modern world for ecology (6). From an aesthetic standpoint, neither does Carson herself; the author’s empathic lyricism, so important for the book’s popular reception, nonetheless reinscribes geological time within the familiar biological patter of iambic and dactylic meter, as when she evokes “the heedless pace of man” and “time on the scale that is nature’s” (7). Challenging the dominance of the lyric mode in environmental humanities has emerged as a significant front in recent scholarship as ecocritics turn to experimental poetry to grasp the contours of the climate crisis in subjective apprehensions of the non-human temporalities of the Capitalocene.8 Smithson’s work speaks to this challenge to lyrical subjectivity in his deliberately impersonal, paratactic prose style, which eliminates the speaking “I” and renders actions in the passive voice in order to convey the ecological temporality of the “already dead.”9

    Silent Spring is often credited with galvanizing the movement that led to the founding of the EPA, which in its first year was tasked with setting regulatory standards for pollution under the 1970 Clean Air Act. With its focus on human respiratory health, however, the history of the Clean Air Act’s piecemeal regulations (and their subsequent dismantling) might be seen as fatefully confined within Carson’s “limits of biologic experience.” Fossil capital’s deep imbrication with extractive and despoiling processes imposes the recognition that the necessary objective of climate ecology is not pollution, narrowly defined, but carbon emissions. Accordingly, if the target of climate activism is the fossil economy, then the field of political action requires the kind of leap in scale we see in Smithson’s aesthetics. Such a scalar leap is memorably captured in the poster for Al Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth, arguably the most culturally influential ecological statement since Silent Spring. The image shows smoke spewing from smokestacks and curling into the threatening shape of a hurricane’s gargantuan spiral—an “immobile cyclone,” as Smithson might put it (“The Spiral Jetty” 8).

    Terminal Dialectics

    In times of crisis, spirals are often invoked as emblems of catastrophe, of things spinning downward and out of control; we speak colloquially of death spirals and of spiraling crises and inequality. Symbolically resonant as it may be, particularly in a year of manifold calamities, Spiral Jetty is perhaps above all a formal achievement. The absurd “pointlessness” of an art pilgrim’s trek into the Great Salt Lake is no metaphysical voyage or journey into an allegorical labyrinth.10 Rather, we should see it as Smithson’s full-scale demonstration of the optical vanity of linear perspective, his “terminal view” of art, as Ann Reynolds puts it (134). The Jetty‘s sinuous curl may be suggestively organic, but Smithson modeled its shape on the geometric spiral formations of inanimate crystalline structures. Likewise, the spiral’s dynamic spin should be considered a “gyrostatic” form, no less threatening for being immobile.11 Viewed this way, the Jetty evokes the formal language of Smithson’s nonsites, which set up a play of dialectical tensions between container and contained, presence and absence, visibility and invisibility, proximity and distance. This formal correspondence is brought out most strikingly in comparing the Jetty to Smithson’s crate-shaped sculptural installations: the nonsites’ horizontal slats are mirrored in his Great Salt Lake sculpture’s alternating bands. In the 1968 Non-site (Palisades-Edgewater, N.J.), for instance, a slatted steel box displays a jumble of rocks from a disused trolley line, with an accompanying text that seems to anticipate the Jetty‘s winding itinerary: “what was once a straight track has become a path of rocky crags—the site has lost its system” (Hobbs 110).

    In their conceptualist aspect, Smithson’s nonsites undermine the art object by emphasizing distance and disintegration, their displacement in “networks of interconnection” (Baker 107). As non-representational interventions in the pictorial tradition of landscape art, they challenge perspectival vision by undermining the characteristic “fantasizing distance” of the appropriative viewer who claims the admirable scene of nature without belonging to it ecologically (Kelsey 209). Such a distant claiming has an underlying economic rationale: the conventions of modern landscape art, including mapping and optical perspective, arguably came into dominance with a fourteenth-century need to rationalize a world picture for long-distance trade (Baridon 283). In contrast, Smithson’s nonsites are neither here nor visible, as their name implies, and thereby evade the conventional features of landscape art and more broadly of the art object as commodity. In so doing, however, the nonsite captures a crucial aspect of the commodity fetish: its profitable removal from the occluded site of production. The site from which Smithson draws his raw material is typically a postindustrial landscape. By insisting on that place’s connection to the nonsite, Smithson makes its dirty history cling to the gallery object. The nonsite, we might say, becomes the site’s impossible alibi. As such, we can think of the nonsite’s distant reference point as either source or destination in a cycle of economic production: the scene of exploitation, tainted provenance of the gallery object, or site of violent expulsion, a place where the commodity’s cost is measured in waste, ravage, and abandonment.12 By favoring the remote site over the humble gallery object, Smithson’s spatial dialectics implicitly challenge what Bruce Robbins calls “the tyranny of the close over the distant” (97).

    The dialectic of site and nonsite thus resonates significantly with environmental justice work that targets the invisible and distant sites of offloaded waste, outsourced labor, and offshored profits. Indeed, as Nixon frames it in Slow Violence, environmental justice hinges on a Smithsonesque politics of the ecologically distant and unseen; a critique of the “unsightly,” the “out-of-sight,” and the “remote” requires a practice of environmental justice as much aesthetic and representational as it is political (2). Presumably, then, a politics of environmental justice would bring closer what is remote and render visible what is out of sight. Like a nonsite, the first-world consumer’s home should become unsightly and uncanny; to recognize the taintedness of products sourced in places of unregulated exploitation would be to “de-alienate” them and realize their ubiquity in our domestic space.13 As with ivory in the days of the Belgian Congo, these commodities are “everywhere at home” (McCarthy 621). Smithson’s nonsites deliberately challenge such a politics of corrective vision. As Smithson insists, the seemingly indexical referentiality of the site/nonsite dialectic is fraught with hazards.14 The site may be a real referent, but it is prone to disturbance; it endures, but only as a mock eternity. This temporal dimension ultimately undermines the nonsites themselves; as Smithson explains, one of his final nonsites points to no definite place, the referent being lost in measureless time and therefore invisible and unlocatable. Significantly, the contents of Nonsite, Site Uncertain (1968) are fossil fuel: chunks of black cannel coal.15

    This shift from the relatively bipolar and spatially organized structure of the nonsites to Smithson’s later work fulfills the entropic orientation of the artist’s vision. At the extreme point of Smithson’s site/nonsite dialectics, the demise of the nonsite also relates in a concrete way to the impasse of environmentalist consumer ethics in an age of climate crisis. While the discourse of consumer responsibility often invokes simple polarities of source and destination, such an “individuation of responsibility” can only misrepresent the scale and complexity of global production and consumption networks (Monbiot). As outsourcing and subcontracting often involve multiple sites of production, any attempt at pointing to the commodity’s many extraction points would imply innumerable referents—seemingly “faraway sites” that keep exerting their influence on the local object, as Bruno Latour keenly demonstrates (200). Patrick Bond puts the problem succinctly: “capitalism intrinsically externalizes costs” (65). Consumer-choice ethics can be seen, then, as corporate capitalism’s ultimate alibi; customer behavior hardly affects the overriding motive of capital to seek cheaper and more exploitative sources of goods and labor and to hide profit’s collateral damage, its so-called externalities. David Harvey has persuasively shown how capitalism survives its crises by buying time and shifting ground: so many “spatial fixes” and “temporal fixes” to its intractable contradictions.16 Crucially, however, a political critique of capital’s shifting alibis must pursue the logic of extractivism to the “uncertain” sites where dialectics meet entropy.

    “An inferno rages in the soul of the commodity,” writes Walter Benjamin (Arcades 369). Brooding on the deceptive innocence of the commercial object, Benjamin considers its “price tag” akin to allegorical meaning: arbitrary and illusory, a significance far removed from its signifier. His “inferno” challenges such alibis by evoking the monstrous realm of cruelty, suffering, and exploitation hidden behind the commodity—by insisting, in other words, on “how it came into being” (Adorno qtd. in Arcades 669). As such, the metaphor evokes real sites of blazing heat, the blast furnace of a steel factory, perhaps, or the stifling “underground workshops” of coal miners described in Benjamin’s essay “The Storyteller” (95). Here as elsewhere Benjamin insists on framing labor history within the death cycles of what he called “natural history.” And yet, even as he broods over his “indiscriminate mass of dead lore” (Arcades 368), the allegorist likely did not mean his “inferno” to evoke fossilized biomass, the product of chthonic heat and pressure. Nor did he intend to describe that fuel’s profitable destruction in an internal combustion engine. This shift of focus, however, is precisely the target of a political ecology of fossil capital. But as with Smithson’s 1968 nonsite, that target is profoundly elusive; site and nonsite appear “intimately coupled yet strangely disconnected from each other,” as Malm puts it (4), or “widely separated both in space and time,” in Rachel Carson’s words (189), a distance that imposes an ever more imperative dialectics. The commodity as nonsite demands that we grasp it in relation to a site expanded to the dimensions of the globe, a dialectic that bridges the fossil-fueled fetish and its emissions’ incremental contribution to anthropogenic climate change. Crucially, Smithson’s dialectics trouble the commodity’s trajectory from raw material to fetish. In so doing they invert capitalism’s overall “transmutation of processes into entities” (Rose 18). In this sense we might understand the world-girdling implications of the commodity owner’s enmeshment in “the metabolic process of mankind,” as Marx puts it: by assuming the ecological cost of his infernal wares, “the commodity-owner becomes a cosmopolitan” (384).

    Benjamin’s infernal commodity aligns with Lukács’s theory of reification, which assumes its most stringent and unforgiving definition in Adorno’s negative dialectics. Reification for Adorno defines the all-encompassing and inescapable condition of a world wholly subjected to the rule of exchange-value. The infernal economy of fossil capital, to borrow Benjamin’s flash of insight, is perhaps the most persuasive confirmation of reification’s total dominion over life. What is hidden by each “price tag” on every commodity is the fossil economy that propels it into circulation and whose carbon emissions add to the atmosphere’s degradation. The contemporary subject is inextricably linked to that pervasive fossil economy, whose material network makes our local self a nonsite of that other, infrastructural body. As Daisy Hildyard puts it in The Second Body, “You are always all over the place” (8).

    Smithson’s death spiral in the Great Salt Lake might be seen, then, as an exploded nonsite that materializes the terminal dialectics of fossil capital. “My dialectics of site and nonsite whirled into an indeterminate state,” Smithson says of his first encounter with the inspiring location at Rozel Point (“The Spiral Jetty” 8). Site and nonsite swirl into oblivion; externalities overwhelm the landscape. To grasp the political implications of this predicament requires envisioning a totality more extensive than globalization and more materially specific than the all-too-human Anthropocene. On the model of Adorno’s unforgiving dialectics, negative ecology describes the grip of fossil capital on the entirety of the biosphere. Decarbonization surely requires “system change,” as many slogans demand, but ecology lies beyond a horizon turned dead end; as an alternative to capitalism it appears only in the negative, from within the scope of structure and system. A crucial advantage of viewing ecology from the perspective of Adorno’s “damaged life” is that it sustains focus on the obstacles we face. Petrocultures scholars are no doubt right in emphasizing that any transition to a post-carbon society is “stalked by the experience of impasse” (Petrocultures 16).17 Ironically, though, the war on nature waged by fossil capital materializes a collateral knowledge of the ecological in a way that consciousness-raising environmentalists have failed to achieve. Indeed, the all-encompassing condition of climate change may be the ultimate validation of nature as “environment,” even as this predicament indicates our entrapment in the negative ecology of fossil capital’s total reification of life.

    Environmental art often engages with this ecological predicament by connecting sensory experience in the here and now to the supersensible processes driving climate change. Olafur Eliasson’s Ice Watch is perhaps the paradigmatic recent effort to link tactile, visual, and auditory experience to phenomena occurring on geological scales. To coincide with the United Nation’s historic Climate Change Conference in Paris in December 2015, the artist installed twelve massive blocks of glacial ice on a street in the French capital. Evoking both a clock-face and a compass, as Eliasson notes, the circular installation allowed visitors to hear and feel the melting of ice dating back 15,000 years (Zarin). In contrast, Smithson’s approach to such challenges is to question the ability of the sensorium to encompass objects of any kind, and—inverting a hoary dictum of liberal politics—the artist implies that the impersonal is political.18 Literally uncontainable, Smithson’s museum nonsites evade both the grasp of the senses and the would-be comprehending mind, while his critique of optical perspective discredits the eye’s claim to attain the infinite. This challenge to “the illusion of infinite spaces” perhaps best allows us to gauge the dialectical significance of Smithson’s aesthetics for a politics of fossil capitalism (“Pointless” 358). Two main implications stand out: on the one hand, the illusory limitlessness of carbon democracy’s propulsive futurity must be pared back to its metabolic bounds; on the other, a sense of the illimited is needed to grasp fossil capital’s unaccountable inheritance from geology.

    Art historians understand Smithson to have debunked visual perspective as an anthropomorphic optical construct and demoted it to a useless, outdated artifact. In the sculptures Leaning Strata and Pointless Vanishing Point, for instance, Smithson renders what he calls perspective’s “mental artifice” as inert geometrical forms, their converging lines lopped off as if to castrate the scopic gaze (“Pointless” 358). Framed more broadly, we can understand this aesthetic intervention as a critique of masterful knowledge in general, especially with regard to its intimations of infinity. This has inherent political ramifications, given that the democratic notion of freedom itself is fully entangled in carbon democracy’s propulsive futurity. To put this in Jacques Rancière’s terms, a sense of limitlessness is part of what we have in common, and Smithson draws on this horizon to reinscribe finitude at that limit and foster a new aesthetic “distribution of the sensible” (12). Smithson’s critique of the would-be progressivism of the avant-garde then makes sense not merely as a contrarian’s cynicism but as a rigorous attention to what is shared and parceled out at its limits—at the territorial bounds of the horizon and on the vanishing line of fossil capitalism’s evanescent present. This is not to deny the vital role of pessimism to a critique of fossil capital, given that petroknowledge is characterized by its overweening “optimism” (Mitchell 141). Alarmingly enough, as Mitchell pointedly notes, the IPCC may be complicit in this affective posture; the likely impacts of negative feedback loops on the climate “make even the dire warnings from the IPCC look absurdly optimistic,” he says (7). In contrast to the sanguinity of climatologists and the rash positivity of petrocrats, Smithson sees the inheritance of prehistory as implying an insuperable limit to understanding, even as it impels the mind toward the infinite. Smithson only ever offers us visions of excess on the near side of infinity: “quasi-infinities,” as he puts it (“Quasi-Infinities” 34), or images of “infinite contraction,” in Robert Hobbs’s pithy phrase (98). Smithson’s is a claustral sublime, as rendered in his film on the Jetty, where the artist is seen running toward the sculpture’s center while his voiceover intones an identical view of “mud, salt crystals, rocks, water” from every compass-point (Spiral Jetty). This blocked view is a challenge to any claim of metaphysical survival or fossil-fueled inheritance. Rigorously materialist, the view from Spiral Jetty is at the same time a framing of infinitude, without which environmentalism can hardly foster a sense of the “double world” of the geological present.

    Contretemps

    It was in Vancouver, British Columbia, that Smithson spoke of “the artist as a geologic agent.” During the same three months he visited the area, he also had his most consequential dispute with ecologists. Public controversy over the environmental impact of Smithson’s proposed Island of Broken Glass forced the artist to abandon what would no doubt have been one of his major sculptural works. The inconclusive project for an Island of Broken Glass led Smithson to seek an alternate site at the Great Salt Lake. This episode is more than a detail of biography. As a project born of failure, Spiral Jetty can be seen as the sculptural enactment of a contretemps between environmentalism and negative ecology.

    In a particularly striking instance of Klein’s bad timing, Smithson’s stay in Vancouver coincided with the founding of one of the world’s most influential and enduring direct-action environmental organizations. Smithson visited Vancouver between November 1969 and February 1970 to develop the Island project on Miami Islet (a barren rock in the Strait of Georgia), and to participate in Lucy Lippard’s exhibition 955,000 at the Vancouver Art Gallery. After the Ministry of Lands, Forests and Water Resources denied the artist permission to build the Island of Broken Glass, gallerist Douglas Chrismas, Smithson’s local dealer, penned a letter making the case for a revised project at the site. Smithson’s idea for a new island earthwork made various concessions to public concerns and envisioned a welcoming “habitat” for sea birds, though his description of the Island of the Dismantled Building betrays the artist’s characteristic droll irony; as Chrismas says, quoting Smithson, the new work was intended as a “‘monument to ecology’” (Arnold 25). This second project met with a definitive rejection. Chrismas’s ill-fated missive to the Ministry is dated February 13, 1970. Two days later, in an article in the Vancouver Sun, the name Greenpeace appears for the first time in print (Weyler 68).

    One can hardly imagine a less propitious moment for Smithson to conceive his island project. The newly formed Vancouver chapter of the Sierra Club was instrumental in stopping the Island of Broken Glass; it was that group’s first environmental campaign. Meanwhile, as reported in the Vancouver Sun, a more radical faction was plotting to sail a boat dubbed Greenpeace to the Alaskan island Amchitka where the US was preparing a nuclear test. To activists fighting the “insane ecological vandalism” of the United States, Smithson’s island project appeared a similar American desecration of nature (Weyler 66). The opinion persists. In Rex Weyler’s account of this history thirty-four years later, the cofounder of Greenpeace still views the episode as an unalloyed triumph for environmentalism. His description of Smithson’s earthwork is shockingly garbled, if not defamatory: according to Weyler, Smithson’s intent was “to pave the islet with toffee-colored glue and shards of broken glass” (60). Aside from its inaccuracy—Weyler conflates Smithson’s seminal Glue Pour with the island project—the ecologist’s version of events betrays a glaring mismatch between environmentalism and geological consciousness. As Dennis Wheeler put it in his conversations with Smithson, the island project would be “making geologic time available” to the viewer with its heaped and jumbled plates of glass, evocations of earth strata shattered out of linear time and scattered into disorganized space (“Four Conversations” 226). The effect would be a “visual overload” that defies the viewer’s grasp (Grant 14), or, as Smithson suggests, a Bataillean “spiral” connoting “irreversible” expenditure (“Four” 230, 200).

    In spite of its apparent grandiosity, Smithson conceived the Island of Broken Glass as a highly bounded work concerned with issues of framing and containment, enclosing processes that occur on utterly different scales. As such, it exemplifies what Jack Flam calls “compressed hyperbole,” Smithson’s characteristic trope (“Introduction” xiv). This controlled rhetoric was sorely tested by Smithson’s disappointment in Vancouver. In a text penned after the final rejection of his island project, Smithson forcefully asserts that his vision of entropic loss is incompatible with any environmentalist logic of “salvation”: “The island is not meant to save anything or anybody but to reveal things as they are” (qtd. in Arnold 25). The artist casts himself as the “scapegoat” of environmentalist “cowards” and “hypocrites,” and concludes that “the phony ‘salvation’ put forth in so much ecological propaganda, has less to do with ‘saving the land’ than losing one’s mind” (qtd. in Arnold 25). Smithson may have misjudged the impression of “ecological vandalism” that his Island of Broken Glass would provoke, and his aesthetic intervention on Miami Islet could appear politically antithetical to a major protest action unfolding concurrently on another rocky island on the West Coast: the American Indian occupation of Alcatraz, a turning point for Indigenous rights in North America. Yet Smithson’s inexistent island remains strangely evocative for a negative ecology beyond the politics of “rich-nation environmentalists.”19 In E. Pauline Johnson’s short story “The Lost Island,” the author relates a tale told to her by Sahp-luk (Chief Joseph Capilano), in which a powerful medicine man, “the strongest man on all the North Pacific Coast,” is tormented by a dream that foretells the coming of White settlers to Vancouver and the resulting loss of his people’s lands and traditions (74). When the medicine man dies, he instructs his people to search for a mysterious island on which his powerful spirit will reside forever. In local Vancouver lore, then, an elusive island contains all the hopes of a return to the former lifeways of the Squamish and the restoration of a natural habitat “where the salmon thronged and the deer came down to drink of the mountain-streams” (75). One local author seems to have channeled Smithson’s “lost island” as the unwritten subtext for an insurgent Indigenous counter-history of art activism in Vancouver.20

    When Smithson visited the Great Salt Lake in March 1970 to scout locations for an earthwork, he initially pictured building an island in the lake (“The Spiral Jetty” 7). This echo of the Island of Broken Glass suggests that Smithson brought the bitter concept of a “monument to ecology” to Utah’s “dead sea.” By April, the site he chose at Rozel Point had inspired a different project. Intriguingly, the Jetty as originally constructed appears half-formed, as if caught midway between his Vancouver project and the Great Salt Lake: extant photos of his first Jetty show an arc terminating in a small bulbous form, like a tether linking an islet to the mainland.21 Smithson was unsatisfied with this solution. He returned the construction crew to the site a few days later to dismantle the island and give the Jetty its present shape.22

    Fifty years on, Miami Islet remains undisturbed. Though it is hard to judge the hypothetical impact of a planned forty tons of broken glass on the site, it would likely have had minimal effects on the surrounding ecosystem. Local preservation efforts, meanwhile, are outpaced by climate change. In the Strait of Georgia, salmon stocks are in steep decline and the resident orcas threaten to vanish. Dungeness crab, a local delicacy, can be found at Miami Islet, but as recently reported in the Vancouver Sun (Shore), their shells are showing developmental damage due to the global phenomenon of ocean acidification.

    John Culbert John Culbert is a Lecturer in the Department of English at the University of British Columbia. He is the author of Paralyses: Literature, Travel and Ethnography in French Modernity (Nebraska 2010). His article “The Well and the Web” appeared in Postmodern Culture 19.2.

    Footnotes

    I would like to thank Dina Al-Kassim, Dan Katz, Jaleh Mansoor, Kavita Philip, and Madeleine Reddon for reading earlier versions of this essay.

    1. See especially Nathaniel Rich, “Losing Earth”; David Wallace-Wells, The Uninhabitable Earth; Jonathan Franzen, “What If We Stopped Pretending?”; Catherine Ingram, “Facing Extinction.”

    2. In his treatise on the role of waste in modern aesthetics, Bourriaud performs a peculiar domestication of Bataille’s theory of excess, proposing instead a recuperative vision of the excluded remainder and casting the role of the modern artist as laboring “to bring those expelled by ideology, deported from symbolic power, back to the centre of life and culture” (172). In this account, nothing resists reassimilation – even if, confusingly enough, art itself reserves the right to “refuse” expulsion: “a realist mode of conceiving art,” Bourriaud asserts, “has refused the existence of the inassimilable.” In contrast, Smithson proposes that the artwork “evades our capacity to find its center,” and this decentering propels the viewer outward without prospect of return. “Where is the central point, axis, pole, dominant interest, fixed position, absolute structure, or decided goal? The mind is always being hurled towards the outer edge into intractable trajectories that lead to vertigo” (Smithson, “A Museum” 94).

    3. See especially Smithson, “A Museum of Language in the Vicinity of Art” and “A Sedimentation of the Mind.”

    4. See Sophie Lewis, “Cthulhu Plays no Role for Me.”

    5. See Natalie Sauer and Chloé Farand, “IPCC: Urgent action needed to tackle hunger alongside climate crisis.”

    6. I borrow the phrase from Frank Kermode. “Apocalypse can be disconfirmed without being discredited,” Kermode asserts. “This is part of its extraordinary resilience” (8). See The Sense of an Ending.

    7. For a uniquely personal treatment of this motif so crucial to his thought, see Derrida, Learning to Live Finally.

    8. See Lynn Keller, Recomposing Ecopoetics; Margaret Ronda, Remainders.

    9. See especially “Strata: A Photogeographic Fiction” and “Incidents of Mirror-Travel in the Yucatan.”

    10. We could say that Smithson “out-labyrinthed labyrinths,” as he remarks drolly of Frederick Law Olmsted (Smithson, “Frederick” 169).

    11. “Gyrostasis” is the name of Smithson’s triangulated spiral sculpture of 1968, which he subsequently described as a “map” to the Spiral Jetty. See Hobbs, editor, Robert Smithson: Sculpture, 95.

    12. See Saskia Sassen, Expulsions.

    13. On contemporary artistic strategies of “de-alienation,” see Heather Davis.

    14. The space between site and nonsite conveys a “new sense of metaphor,” Smithson says, that challenges expressive and realistic representation with a conceptual, analogic, and abstract dialectic (“A Provisional,” 364). Smithson specifies that because the nonsite directs the viewer into unbounded space, the indexicality of the metaphor opens onto no defined reference point: “Although there’s a correspondence, the equalizer is always in a sense the subverted or lost, so it’s a matter of losing your way rather than finding your way” (“Four” 218).

    15. As Smithson says, “The last nonsite [Nonsite, Site Uncertain, 1968] actually is one that involves coal and there the site belongs to the Carboniferous Period, so it no longer exists; the site becomes completely buried again. There’s no topographical reference. … That was the last nonsite; you know, that was the end of that. So I wasn’t dealing with the land surfaces at the end” (“Interview,” 296). Though Robert Hobbs points out that this nonsite was not, in fact, Smithson’s last, the artist’s account of his aesthetic trajectory reveals his sense of the nonsites’ conceptual evolution into geological time. See Hobbs 115 and Smithson, “Four,” 223.

    16. See David Harvey, The Limits to Capital, and “Globalization and the ‘Spatial Fix.’” While “spatial fix” is a focal term in Harvey’s work, its temporal correlative has largely been elaborated by his commentators. See Jessop, “Spatial Fixes, Temporal Fixes, and Spatio-Temporal Fixes.”

    17. In specifying “what blocks us from transitioning to other forms of energy,” the petrocultures scholars seem to draw implicitly on Malm’s sobering analysis of the “obstacles to the transition” (367). “The only historical transition that gives us insight into what is on the horizon (i.e., the scale of infrastructural and social shift) is the transition into the energy and economic system we’re on the brink of exiting” (Petrocultures 15). I have been arguing that any insight into such a horizon would have to pass through the obstructive entropics of Smithson’s terminal sightlines.

    18. A signal failure of environmental dialectics is demonstrated by would-be liberal thought leader Robert Reich. “It’s one thing to understand climate change in the abstract,” Reich observes. “It’s another to live inside it.” According to Reich, this supposedly unbridgeable disparity requires that we regain a sense that “the personal is political” in the lived experience of climate-fueled disaster. Such advocacy for a personal, experiential rapport to climate change can only promote a politics of adaptation to changes, which, if large enough to be commonly observed, can hardly be prevented.

    19. World Bank president Lawrence Summers notoriously employed the phrase. See Nixon 1; see also Bond 55.

    20. Wayde Compton’s short story collection The Outer Harbour relates the unexpected emergence of a volcanic island in Vancouver harbor that is targeted by First Nations militants for native occupation but is subsequently turned into a migrant detention facility. Smithson’s unbuilt island appears to be the tacit intertext between “Pauline Johnson island” and the various insurgent and artistic movements described in Compton’s fictional Vancouver. Indeed, as imagined by Compton, radical political action extends Smithson’s vision for the Island of Broken Glass to all of urban space and no doubt beyond; evoking “the so-called City of Glass” littered with the shards of broken windows, one militant group proposes, “Let those who smash, smash,” urging local residents “to crack every last antiseptic condo tower window, coating the sidewalks with so much shining rime” (Compton 79–80).

    21. On the logistics of construction and Smithson’s change of design, see Bob Phillips.

    22. Interestingly, the final version of Spiral Jetty may itself bear the traces of Smithson’s failed Vancouver project. When Smithson visited Vancouver in 1969, he may well have seen the large advertising billboards mounted across the city that year by Ben Metcalfe, a founding member of Greenpeace. The billboards featured the word “Ecology” in large letters, and the suggestion: “Look it up! You’re involved.” Notably, the accompanying image was of two large spirals, each nested in the other. See “The Fight to Save Earth.”

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  • Choreographies of Consent: Clarice Lispector’s Epistemology of Ignorance

    Rocío Pichon-Rivière (bio)

    Abstract

    This essay argues that, after studying law, Clarice Lispector never abandoned her engagement with political theory, and shows that her fiction and chronicles were a continuation of her philosophy of law by other means. Lispector developed an epistemology of ignorance through the analysis of two key social practices: “choreographies of consent” and “orchestrated oblivion.” In light of a 1941 article published in a law school journal, the essay traces the development of Lispector’s increasingly complex conceptions of law and examines how she adapted them when historical events forced her to confront willful ignorance as a pervasive condition of possibility for the social reproduction of injustice.

    Introduction

    Scholars rarely mention that Lispector—one of Brazil’s most prominent modernist writers—was a lawyer. This frequent omission suggests that her relation to the law was external to her literary work. This essay argues the opposite: I claim that Lispector’s literature was a continuation of her philosophy of law by other means precisely because it allowed her to narrate the gestures and feelings that constitute the outside of legal discourse.1 In doing so, she enticed her readers to see what remains unspoken in the language of the law as its implicit historical conditions of possibility.2 Whether the law is sanctioned by a secular State or enforced in religious communities through moral consensus, her concern had to do with the legitimization of such law in social rituals of consent and approval. In an early essay published in 1941when she was a student in law school, titled “Observações sobre o fundamento do direito de punir” (“Observations on the foundation of the right to punish”3), Lispector explores the continuities between moral and secular law. She makes the case that historically one institution leads to the other and that moral law and positive law share a common genealogy in the invention of the right to punish (“Observações”). The essay exposes the lack of foundation of the right to punish and hoped to prove that punishment was a dubious ritual that served to conceal rather than heal injustice. With the exception of this essay on crime and punishment, which makes analytical arguments against the letter of modern philosophies of right, Lispector developed her philosophy of law mostly in her fiction. Literature provided her the freedom to describe and narrate the spaces of law rather than replicating the language of the law in its redundant abstraction. In the ambivalent spaces of law, silent yet efficient gestures can be grasped or imagined as an outside to its scripture, thereby challenging and subverting its (often) well-intended meaning. I argue that the underlying phenomenological analyses of affective moods in the spaces of law in Lispector’s writings articulate a progressive series of theses that together compose an epistemology of ignorance. Simply put, an epistemology of ignorance examines the structural mechanisms through which society lies to itself.4 Lispector’s fiction focuses not only on what is said and what remains unsaid, but also observes with an anthropological gaze the choreographies of heads bowed down in shame or denial. Lispector’s engagement with these and other performances of powerfully constitutive forms of ignorance delineate the social and material conditions of possibility for the criminal justice system as we know it.

    In what follows, I focus first on what I call “choreographies of consent”: the narration of the gestures that performatively organize the social practice of moral justification regarding a decision. Choreographies of consent are the link between Lispector’s philosophy of law and her epistemology of ignorance, and involve cognitive processes in a dance of agreements and omissions regarding the validity or applicability of a law. The short story “The Crime of the Mathematics Professor” (1960) serves as an example of this literary device that reappears in other texts as well. The second section examines Lispector’s critical phenomenology of ignorance as it is fleshed out in a chronicle about a case of police brutality titled “Mineirinho” (1962). In light of the epistemology of ignorance articulated there, this section proposes a reading of her novel, The Passion According to G.H. (1964), to introduce the concept of the entbildungsroman.5 The entbildungsroman is a literary genre that parodies the traditional bildungsroman and in doing so advances a theory of the place of ignorance within the processes of ideology reproduction.

    Choreography of Furtive Consent

    A study of the notion of injustice lies at the center of Lispector’s phenomenological descriptions of the spaces of law as they appear both in her fiction and in her non-fiction. Biographically, this concern goes back to her first political intuitions when she was a child living in Recife, a city in Brazil’s Northeast region—one of the poorest and most State-abandoned areas of the country. In contrast to Lispector’s glamorous public image as a sophisticated diva of literary modernism, her upbringing was quite humble. Her father—a Jewish student of the scriptures forced to migrate from a violently racist Russia, where his wife was unspeakably maimed—had to take manual work to feed his family upon arriving in Brazil. In a chronicle from 1968, Lispector recounts her first experiences of political rage that inspired her to become a lawyer. She visited the mocambos in Recife—the poor Black neighborhoods where the formerly enslaved lived—just a few decades after the abolition of slavery, where she had the opportunity to hear the inflamed speeches of social leaders calling out their unjust conditions. Lispector wrote that she “vibrated” as a child with the heat of those discourses and promised herself that when she grew up, she would become a defender of the rights of the most vulnerable.6 Yet after graduating from law school in 1943, she did not follow through on that promise. Instead, she followed her new husband on his diplomatic missions in North Africa, Europe, and finally Washington, D.C., where they spent seven years. In a letter to her sisters written in Paris in January 1947, Lispector confesses her disgust with the hypocrisy that had become her new way of life. She recognizes that the lies hidden in the excessive cordiality of diplomatic conversations are a type of drunkenness—one in which she can no longer see her best self.

    Com a vida assim parece que sou “outra pessoa” em Paris. É uma embriaguez que não tem nada de agradável. Tenho visto pessoas demais, falado demais, dito mentiras, tenho sido muito gentil. Quem está se divertindo é uma mulher que eu detesto, uma mulher que não é a irmã de vocês. É qualquer uma. (Correspondências 115)

    In such a life it seems as if I am “another person” in Paris. It is a drunkenness that brings no satisfaction. I have seen too many people, talked too much, told lies, have been too gentle. The one having fun is a woman that I hate, a woman who is not your sister. She is a nobody.

    The delicate drunkenness of diplomacy suggests sophisticated choreographies of politeness that worked as a sedative for the rage of her youth. In her letter, Lispector seems to have surrendered to this intoxication with the sweet shame of an addict. Her being muito gentil—excessively gentle and gentile—begins to describe the tone of the choreographies of social oblivion that eventually became the theme of her fiction as well as of some of her chronicles. All her writings explore insistently how it is cognitively possible to forget what one used to know well.

    In an autobiographical essay, “Literatura e justiça” (“Literature and Justice”), Lispector comments on the reason she never wrote under the guise of engaged literature, like so many of her contemporaries in the Latin American Boom. Her essay explains her intellectual motives to produce instead an epistemology of ignorance:

    Desde que me conheço o fato social teve em mim importância maior do que qualquer outro: em Recife os mocambos foram a primeira verdade para mim. Muito antes de sentir “arte”, senti a beleza profunda da luta. Mas é que tenho um modo simplório de me aproximar ao fato social: eu queria era “fazer” alguma coisa, como se escrever não fosse fazer. … O problema de justiça é em mim um sentimento tão óbvio e tão básico que não consigo me surpreender com ele—e, sem me surpreender, não consigo escrever. E também porque para mim escrever é procurar. O sentimento de justiça nunca foi procura em mim, nunca chegou a ser descoberta, e o que me espanta é que ele não seja igualmente óbvio em todos.(Para não esquecer 25)

    Ever since I knew myself the social fact had in me an importance more prominent than any other: in Recife the mocambos were for me the first truth. Long before feeling “art,” I felt the deep beauty of political struggle. But I have a simplistic way of approaching the social fact: I wanted to “do” something, as if writing was not doing. … The problem of justice is in me a feeling so obvious and so basic that I cannot manage to be surprised by it—and, without being surprised, I cannot write. And also because for me writing is seeking. I never had to seek for the feeling of justice within me, it was never a discovery, and the thing that terrifies me is that it is not equally obvious to others.

    This passage resembles the beginning of Aristotle’s Metaphysics: without surprise and a certain lack of understanding there can be no thinking, because thinking begins as a search with an unknown destination. That certain circumstances are unjust is so obvious for Lispector that injustice does not require redundant representation. What remains a mystery is the willingness of others to remain ignorant about injustice despite its obvious presence.

    Lispector best parodies redundancy as the structure of engaged literature in her posthumous novel, A hora da estrela (1977). There the narrator (a novelist whose words we read as he struggles to convey social facts) says he is interested in facts because they are “pedras duras” (hard rocks) and therefore inescapable (25). While some read in this a naturalization of poverty (Peixoto), the pleonasm in the expression “pedras duras” might rather be a reference to the redundancy inherent in the enterprise of representing the inescapable as such.7 If this is correct, the thesis is not that social injustice is itself inescapable, but that the truth about existing, contingent social injustice cannot be dissimulated effectively and should require no additional help to be visible unless something is cognitively off—something that I call here “ignorance.”

    Lispector’s fictional inquiries both ask and seek to answer this fundamental question: how do people escape the inescapable truth of social injustice? And yet I want to challenge the simplicity of this distinction between herself and others, between those who can see injustice and those who remain ignorant. I want to foreground the tense subject position that Lispector articulates elsewhere, when she represents those whose lives perform a drunken ignorance despite showing glimpses that they know better. As we shall see in the chronicle “Mineirinho,” Lispector eventually self-represents as a subject defined by this dynamic contradiction, blurring the line that separates ignorance and knowledge.

    After they left Europe, her husband took on a diplomatic position in Washington, D.C., where they stayed for seven years during the dawn of the civil rights movement in the late 1950s. One can only imagine the conversations among the white diplomats as the orchestrated oblivion of racial injustice was interrupted by an increasingly organized movement and its public cry for justice. Lispector’s epistemology focuses on the ways in which it is cognitively possible to ignore what everybody knows. The drunkenness of diplomatic hypocrisy would become the examined subject of a theory about the orchestrated oblivion of injustice that organizes society despite the occasional glimpses of just political anger.8 In 1959 Lispector divorced her husband, left Washington, D.C., and returned to Brazil with her two children. In the following years, she published two texts that develop the question of the oblivion of injustice: a short story, “O crime do professor de matemática” (“The Crime of the Mathematics Professor”) (1960) and a chronicle about a case of police brutality, “Mineirinho” (1962), titled after the nickname of a man murdered in cold blood by a pack of policemen. In what follows, I read these together, next to the essay from 1941. In these works, Lispector shows links between punishment and oblivion and thereby ties the philosophy of law to the epistemological inquiry of a social production of ignorance.

    The short story “The Crime of the Mathematics Professor” starts in medias res with the professor carrying a heavy bag of unknown contents, which represents an unspoken crime he has committed. He is trying to find redemption through a punishing ritual that he first has to design because “they hadn’t yet invented a punishment for the great crimes in disguise and for the profound betrayals.” (“Pois ainda não haviam inventado castigo para os grandes crimes disfarçados e para as profundas traições.” 83) If there is a crime in the story, the avowed crime of the mathematics professor was abandoning his dog, José. What this crime means as a metaphor is not fully revealed at first, except to the extent that it suggests an action (or inaction) not considered a crime or a sin in hegemonic culture that can still burden a conscience. The question of improving existent social norms, whether through mild reform or radical change, is ciphered here. To borrow Derrida’s expression, this story points to the problem of “a democracy to come.”9 What our current democracy tolerates can burden the conscience of someone who might dare to imagine a higher standard. Yet such a standard to come cannot be expressed in the idiom of present norms. Abandoning a dog is an inaction or oversight that can go unpunished, but some time after the fact, the professor begins to find this lack of punishment unbearable. Readers soon learn that there is a dead body of another dog in his bag that he wants to bury with full honors in order to redeem himself for the wrongdoing committed against his own dog. The moral release that he craves is a curious theatre of confession, punishment, and absolution: “tratava-se de tornar o fato ao máximo visível à superfície do mundo sob o céu. Tratava-se de expor-se e de expor um fato, e de não lhe permitir a forma íntima e impune de um pensamento” (80). (“It was a question of rendering the fact as visible as possible on the surface of the world beneath the heavens. It was a question of exposing himself and exposing a fact, and not allowing the intimate and unpunished form of a thought.”) The fact that not even the church—as his inner monologue states with mild desperation—would consider his behavior a sin leaves him without a ritual of punishment and divine grace that would allow him to forget that dog’s face.

    From the story’s first sentence, the narrator contrasts the orderly entrance of Catholics into the church down below with the mathematician’s improvised and erratic dance of absolution up on the hill: he swings his heavy burden in search of the geometrically logical spot to bury his crime. His stream of consciousness follows the impromptu choreography of his feet meandering in the desert. In the distance, he sees the last tiny Catholics walking hastily into the church as “joyful bells peal once more summoning the faithful to the solace of punishment” (“Os sinos alegres tocaram novamente chamando os fiéis para o consolo da punição“) (80). This choreography of punishment brings solace to the faithful, and the professor tries to invent a new amendment to this kind of liturgy, to acknowledge his presumed crime and, by way of a gentile alchemy, to allow himself to release his guilt at last and forget his dog’s eyes.

    The question of why he abandoned his dog vaguely haunts the professor’s stream of consciousness. Whether such a question could ever be answered, however, is not made clear in the story. At some point he remembers the excuses he had given himself when he made the decision. Trusting their validity no longer, he unveils the full scene of consent:

    Abandonou-te com uma desculpa que todos em casa aprovaram: porque como poderia eu fazer uma viagem de mudança com bagagem e família, e ainda mais um cão, com a adaptação ao novo colégio e à nova cidade, e ainda mais um cão? ‘Que não cabe em parte alguma’, disse Marta prática. ‘Que incomodará os passageiros’, explicou minha sogra sem saber que previamente me justificava, e as crianças choraram, e eu não olhava nem para elas nem para ti, José. (Laços 83)

    [I] abandoned you with an apology that everyone at home approved of: since how could I move to a new house with all that baggage and family, and on top of that a dog, while adjusting to a new high school and a new city, and on top of that a dog? “For whom there’s no room,” said Marta being practical. “Who’ll bother the other passengers,” reasoned my mother-in-law without being aware that she was preemptively justifying my plan, and the children cried, and I looked neither at them nor at you, José.

    The universal claim in the first line (“with an apology that everyone at home approved of”) is immediately contradicted when we learn that the children were crying and that he avoided their gaze as well as the dog’s. This is a classic choreography of consent: the dance of rhetorical cooperation among those whose opinions are admitted in the consensus while their eyes follow rehearsed movements to avert excluded gazes. This kind of consent, which I would call furtive, is tautological: it averts precisely those gazes that presumably express a dissent.

    As the professor directs his silent speech to the presumed victim of his crime, the verb in the second person singular points to another gesture, even if imaginary and belated: that of finally looking into the dog’s eyes, so to speak, acknowledging at last his formerly effaced interpellation. The universal predication at the beginning of the sentence contrasts with the direct address at the end: the first one legitimizes the act of abandonment, as hyperbolic (“everyone”) as it is false; the latter comes retrospectively and seems to open up the old wound of a truth that had been awkwardly averted. The falsity of the first is the truth of the second. The first follows the universality of the law; the second opens up the intimate interpellation of an ethics of the other.10 The first one soothes the angst of decision-making with the fantasy of final approval; the second haunts the decision-maker—from outside their discourse—with the uncanny temporality of an eternal recurrence that resists the attempted closure. This contrast between the linear temporality of erasure and the haunting, enduring truth of what happened is emphasized again when the professor realizes that he had done with the dog something that will last “forever,” with impunity evermore (“Só agora ele parecia compreender, em toda sua gélida plenitude, que fizera com o cão algo realmente impune e para sempre” 83).11 With this realization, the theater of punishment that he had been staging reveals its vanity. He notices, “more mathematical still,” that the logic of his redemption is no better than the logic of his previous excuses and so he dramatically unburies the dog, under the heavens:

    Olhou a cova coberta. Onde ele enterrara um cão desconhecido em tributo ao cão abandonado, procurando enfim pagar a dívida que inquietantemente ninguém lhe cobrava. Procurando punir-se com um ato de bondade e ficar livre de seu crime. Como alguém dá uma esmola para enfim poder comer o bolo por causa do qual o outro não comeu o pão.

    Mas como se José, o cão abandonado, exigisse dele muito mais que a mentira … agora, mais matemático ainda, procurava um meio de não se ter punido. Ele não devia ser consolado. … E assim o professor de matemática renovara o seu crime para sempre.(84)

    He looked at the covered grave. Where he had buried an unknown dog in tribute to the abandoned dog, attempting at last to repay the debt that distressingly no one was demanding. Attempting to punish himself with an act of kindness and be free of his crime. The way someone gives alms in order at last to eat the cake for which another went without bread.

    Now, more mathematically still, he sought a way not to have punished himself … as if José, the abandoned dog, demanded much more from him than a lie. He must not be consoled. … And so the mathematics professor renewed his crime forever.

    This final unearthing of the corpse of the anonymous dog that he no longer wants to bury coincides with the revelation of what his crime represents, as it bears the weight of a newly-introduced metaphor. The narrator compares the professor’s desire to be forgiven with the act of giving spare change as a way to seek absolution for being complicit with (and benefiting from) social inequity. Social injustice is also “the debt that distressingly no one was demanding.” As this passage suggests, the abandoned dog might represent those whose lives are treated as less than human with impunity, even if it might also evoke the position of non-human animals before the law.

    In the profound arbitrariness of the self-inflicted penalty of burying a “strange and objective” dog, in relation to the crime of abandoning a different dog, one can read Lispector’s take on the modern notion of punishment: too impersonal and abstract to be a debt paid to the actual victim or to offer restorative justice and, as a matter of general principle, completely useless insofar as it does nothing to prevent similar events from taking place. As the young Lispector argues regarding positive law in her 1941 essay, the concept of punishment implicit in the criminal justice system is scientifically invalid for similar reasons: it does nothing to address the root of the problem, hence nothing to prevent the repetition of such acts in new generations; and it does not heal the wounded parties (healing being the only real form of addressing the hurt at the root of such conflicts). There she compares punishment with morphine: a mere palliative, rather than a cure, for society’s condition.12 The 1941 essay states that there is no such thing as a right to punish, only a power to punish, and that the concept of a right to punish is the labor of “the first intelligent men.” (67) In her narrative, the genealogy of the right to punish goes back to “the first intelligent men” who lacked power individually (in a state of nature) and yet managed to build power by rhetorically claiming and physically executing a right to punish.

    Though this short story explores the trope of punishment from the perspective of self-examination and religion, the professor’s mathematical method of reasoning works as a parable of the role of intelligence in both the concept and the institution of punishment. The arbitrary and cruel nature of punishment is sanitized and presented as a scientific necessity and considered just by a too-intelligent rhetoric that ultimately serves to distract attention from the real issue: “the crimes in disguise” (Laços 83) that are not listed in the penal code precisely to protect the status quo. The mathematics of the professor speaks to the loop of tautological reasoning in an institution concerned with conserving rather than eliminating injustice. This form of ignoring a crime in disguise is a kind of “ignorance that presents itself unblushingly as knowledge,” to borrow Charles Mills’s words, and its most complex and non-appealable expression is positive law (13). In the sphere of self-examination, as represented in this story, ignorance takes the form of a too-pristine rationalization that seeks to avert feeling—hence its morphine-like sedative effects.13

    Immune to Knowledge: The Sonsos Essenciáis and the Entbildungsroman

    In Lispector’s last interview, the interviewer asks her about which text she is most proud. From among her numerous novels and pitch-perfect short fiction, she mentions a chronicle titled “Mineirinho” that denounces police brutality (1977). The choreographies of averted gazes reappear in this text, which explicitly addresses an assassination that shook Rio de Janeiro in 1962. José Miranda Rosa, a.k.a. “Mineirinho,” the man executed in cold blood by the police, was already famous for his robberies, had been sentenced for murder, and later managed to escape the psychiatric detention center where he was imprisoned. After a manhunt that lasted several days and involved dozens of policemen, he was gunned down by a group of police officers. The morning after his death, the newspapers enumerate in gory detail the limbs and organs where each of the thirteen bullets had entered, intensifying the spectacularized horror of an assassination that was also a message for inhabitants of the slums in Rio. The day of his murder, many gathered to honor his body, choreographing an impromptu ceremony that the police dispersed with violence.14 Mineirinho’s notoriety was not due to his lawlessness; paradoxically, he was famous for his generous heart. He had earned the reputation of being the Robin Hood of the favelas in Rio. The people from the favelas seemed to love him despite his violence because of the redistributive justice he enacted. He was no ordinary criminal: his work was a mise-enabîme of the concept of crime, for his crimes were exercises of justice. They expressed his dissent from the social system that had marginalized and racialized him and others. The obscenity of his public death seemed to aim at punishing his redistributive justice efforts more than his crimes. It was an authoritative statement about the police force and its unconstitutional yet very real power to kill at gunpoint—and more, to control any revolt of the poor. This was sheer expressive violence as a sovereign act (Segato), and the violence of that expression shocked the public more than its message.15 The newspaper A Noite observed that the police disposed of his body “as if he were an animal” (“Polícia”) and reported that, after being wounded by the first gunshots, José Miranda Rosa had the strength to murmur, “Estão matando um homem” (“You’re killing a man”).

    A month later, Lispector published a text about this execution in the cultural magazine Senhor at the request of the editor. It begins with an interpellation of its readers, as she claims to speak “como um dos representantes de nós” (“as a representative of us”):

    É, suponho que é em mim, como um dos representantes de nós, que devo procurar por que está doendo a morte de um facínora. E por que é que mais me adianta contar os treze tiros que mataram Mineirinho do que os seus crimes … não matarás … Esta é a lei. Mas há alguma coisa que, se me fez ouvir o primeiro e o segundo tiro com um alívio de segurança, no terceiro me deixa alerta, no quarto desassossegada, o quinto e o sexto me cobrem de vergonha, o sétimo e o oitavo eu ouço com o coração batendo de horror, no nono e no décimo minha boca está trêmula, no décimo primeiro digo em espanto o nome de Deus, no décimo segundo chamo meu irmão. O décimo terceiro tiro me assassina—porque eu sou o outro. Porque eu quero ser o outro.(“Mineirinho” 112)

    Yes, I suppose it is in myself, as one of the representatives of us, that I should seek the reasons for the pain felt after the death of a thug. And why does it make more sense to me to count the gunshots that killed Mineirinho rather than his crimes. … Thou shall not kill. … That is the law. But there is something that, if it makes me hear the first and the second gunshots with relief brought by a feeling of safety, at the third puts me on the alert, at the fourth unsettles me, the fifth and the sixth cover me in shame, the seventh and eighth I hear with my heart pounding in horror, at the ninth and tenth my mouth is trembling, at the eleventh I say God’s name in fright, at the twelfth I call my brother. The thirteenth shot murders me—because I am the other. Because I want to be the other.

    Lispector signals that the form rather than the content of his assassination seemed out of place, as she witnessed the first two gunshots with relief: safe at last from the threat of him. She explains in that last interview that this text is constructed around the excessive shots that were not necessary to kill him. If, in retrospect, after the last bullet was shot, the first one can be resignified as unjust, this does not erase the fact that the first impression was relief. This admission is essential to understanding who is speaking. The morphine of punishment in this case has to do with numbing the fear of insecurity. Two precise shots would have provided that without conflict, but this should not be mistaken for peace.

    Lispector’s chronicle finds its rhetorical power in its use of the first-person plural. Rather than accusing others in a blame game that could have implied her own innocence, the narrator does not disguise her complicity in a system that kills with predictable, unblushing regularity.16 Epistemologies of ignorance study the ways in which privileged social groups collaborate to assure that ignorance will prevail despite occasional encounters with knowledge of the perspectives and predicaments of the oppressed. Lispector’s inclusion of herself in the social group whose consciousness she condemns quite boldly implies that no amount of critical knowledge in and of itself will suffice to subtract her from that group.

    The question of who exactly belongs to “us” is structured as an anaphora in both senses of the term: an insistent repetition and a pronoun whose reference in this case is not antecedent but oddly postponed. The device itself replicates the initial interpellation of the ominous death and works almost as an invitation, too polite to be explicit; the readers are welcome to decide whether they identify with this “us.” Chantal Mouffe—reading Carl Schmitt—says that any “us” presupposes a “them” (43). Here, “us” could name the readership of the magazine Senhor, an elite publication dedicated to the dissemination of modernist art. If “us” names the social class this audience represents, the contrasting “them” would then be the favelados. And yet there is no mention of “them” in this text. Quite on the contrary, this problematic word is avoided with care, and “us” is only juxtaposed with “him.” “Us” then could name the living—such is its initial vagueness. Or, in light of the story about the mathematics professor, the “us” might connote the universality of the law (as it is often proclaimed in constitutions or declarations of independence) in contrast to “him.”17 As in Lispector’s short story, the echo of one absent gaze interpellates the narrator, haunting the universality of a furtive consent and showing it to be false.

    Later in the text—only after the last of the thirteen shots elicits an epiphany—a name for “us” is finally revealed. The chronicle defines “us” with a suggestive epithet: “os sonsos essenciais” (“the essential phonies”) (114).18 This translation is imprecise as the word “phony” does not fully capture the Portuguese “sonso,” a term that one would also use to translate the expression “playing dumb.” A sonso is someone who pretends to ignore something that he knows all too well. And yet it also connotes plain stupidity. The essential phonies, os sonsos essenciáis, are the political agents of a social charade. An intriguing question arises: why are these sonsos essential? They could be essential in the Aristotelian sense of being the principle of movement, just as in Hobbes’s Leviathan, where the sovereign State and its laws are the principles according to which the social body moves. The phonies would be essential, in this sense, as the political class with enough agency to decide what constitutes a crime and who gets to be executed while others stay safe. The term sonsos essenciais seems to imply as well that there are more sonsos, yet they are not essential: these would be the inessential, disposable sonsos.19

    Lispector ciphers the difference between “us” and “him” in a formula: “Tudo o que nele foi violência é em nós furtivo” (“Everything that was violence in him is furtive in us”) (113). The adjective furtivo (in English, furtive, secretive) means something surreptitious or clandestine, done in a quiet and secretive way (Dicionário; Merriam Webster). There is again something untranslatable in this formula because the root of this word is also at play in the word furto, which means theft in Portuguese. Furto in legal terms is emphatically different from latrocínio; the latter means robbery as opposed to theft precisely inasmuch as violence is involved, and the punishment for it is therefore much harsher. “Tudo o que nele foi violência é em nós furtivo” means that we are also thieves, but the kind of theft at stake is one without violence, or a violence with no visible author in the eyes of the law. A more untranslatable notion that exists only in Portuguese reverberates in this sentence as well: the verb furtar has a pronominal form, furtar-se, which means to avoid or to pretend to ignore, that is to say, to play dumb. For example, one can say: “V. Exa. Furtou-se a responder àquela que é a mais crucial das questões” or “É preciso que as pessoas deixem de furtar-se a responsabilidades.” (“Your majesty refused to respond to the most crucial question” or “People need to stop avoiding their responsibilities.”) The connections between the adjective furtivo (secretive), the verb furtar (to steal), and the pronominal verb furtarse (to play dumb) are not at all obvious in Portuguese, because these words evolved to mean discrete concepts. Yet Lispector’s full sentence brings the philological connection together:

    Tudo o que nele foi violência é em nós furtivo, e um evita o olhar do outro para não corrermos o risco de nos entendermos. Para que a casa não estremeça. (113)

    Everything that was violence in him is furtive in us, and we avoid each other’s gaze so as not to run the risk of understanding each other. So that the house doesn’t tremble.

    What began as theft is followed by a secret that becomes a form of self-evasion from responsibility. What begins as playing dumb can result in becoming dumb—or ignorant—if this active ignoring of each other’s gaze can indeed protect the subject from “the risk of understanding each other.” When the playing dumb is choreographed at a structural level, with the complicity of the most powerful subjects, it produces faked stupidity at the level of institutions, or, as she calls it, “a stupid justice” (justiça estupidificada) (114). This is the secret that lies at the foundation of the republic.

    From Lispector’s discussion of a furtive consent that forms around a justice filled with stupidity, the pair friend/enemy appears at last. Yet it appears in a way that defies Schmittian logic and the paradox of liberal democracy: the enemies are “us,” the essential phonies trying to justify a form of living with the blessing of “a god invented at the last minute”; the friends are those who interrupt the choreography of consent by refusing to find excuses:

    [Mineirinho] foi fuzilado na sua força desorientada, enquanto um deus fabricado no último instante abençoa às pressas a minha maldade organizada e a minha justiça estupidificada: o que sustenta as paredes de minha casa é a certeza de que sempre me justificarei, meus amigos não me justificarão, mas meus inimigos que são os meus cúmplices, esses me cumprimentarão; o que me sustenta é saber que sempre fabricarei um deus à imagem do que eu precisar para dormir tranqüila e que outros furtivamente fingirão que estamos todos certos e que nada há a fazer. Tudo isso, sim, pois somos os sonsos essenciais, baluartes de alguma coisa. E sobretudo procurar não entender. (114)

    [Mineirinho] was gunned down in his disoriented strength, while a god fabricated at the last second hastily blesses my organized cruelty and my justice filled with stupidity: what upholds the walls of my house is the certainty that I shall always justify myself, my friends won’t justify me, but my enemies who are my accomplices, they will praise me; what upholds me is knowing that I shall always fabricate a god in the image of whatever I need in order to sleep peacefully, and that others will furtively pretend that we are all righteous and that there is nothing to be done. All this, yes, for we are the essential phonies, bastions of something. And above all of trying to not understand.

    As the words furtar (theft), furtivo (secret), and furtar-se (playing dumb) branch out from their common root, they indicate the three stages of oblivion through which the epistemological labor of actively ignoring takes place. Social injustice—the furtive theft of the land that left Mineirinho in a state of nature fighting for survival in a hypocritical society marked by extreme inequities—suddenly becomes apparent, as a first truth previously averted. The chaos resulting from Mineirinho’s brutal and public execution ultimately reveals the secrets that surround injustice as well as the irresponsibility protected by such secrecy.

    Living a life of diplomatic dinner parties in Europe and Washington, D.C., after law school, must have been an invaluable source of inspiration for Lispector to think about white ignorance, hypocrisy, and the potential—though quite infrequent—interruption of choreographed oblivion. Lispector was in the U.S. when Emmett Till was murdered in 1955, and his mother’s decision to leave the coffin open for everyone to see was one of the triggers for the Civil Rights Movement. Perhaps this event was a first occasion for her to think about how an entire system of furtive violence can explode in the flesh of one man. The crime revealed in that coffin was not just a child’s horrific murder but an entire way of life that Jim Crow made possible. Likewise, the crime revealed in Mineirinho’s wrecked flesh was not the manhunt for one person but the violence against favelados altogether. In the Brazilian case, however, the murder did not fuel a social justice movement, and ultimately nothing changed. As much as Lispector’s dramatic rhetoric tried to turn the event into an earth-shattering revelation, the public’s indifference only confirmed one of the most cynical theses of her epistemology of ignorance, which she formulated in the years immediately following: the kind of ignorance discussed here cannot be simply overcome by knowledge. Having an epiphany—by way of finally looking into previously averted eyes—is not enough to change a thing.

    While the bildungsroman is a narrative of overcoming ignorance and so may seem suited to Lispector’s thinking on social justice, her fiction in fact often mocks this genre. In novels such as A Paixão segundo G.H. (1964), Lispector subverts the bildungsroman, developing instead what I call an entbildungsroman: a novel that shows how ignorant a character can remain in the face of blatant truth in order to avoid ethical or emotional consequences that might follow from acknowledging that truth. Much of Lispector’s fiction is populated by upper-class characters who one day encounter the eyes of their social other (a Black maid, a beggar, a young brown woman from the northeast, etc.) and suddenly have a disarming epiphany. Lucia Villares claims that Lispector used novels such as this to make visible racial inequality in Brazil. I would take that observation a step further and say that Lispector’s thesis is more subtle and less optimistic: she narrates the uselessness of “making visible” as a political strategy or as the politics of literature. The politics of making visible forgets that what needs to be “made visible” is already bluntly visible.

    The narrator of A Paixão segundo G.H. parodies the bildungsroman (and the modern project that it ciphers) by elevating the character of G.H. to the highest peaks of existential revelation, inviting the reader to follow her to the climax of so-called indescribable (yet passionately verbalized) epiphanies, only to let her fall comically and brutally back into her old, secure ignorance. Toward the end of the novel, the narrator describes this ignorance—so almighty that it can survive the event of knowledge untouched—as “sacred” (120). Like Christ’s resurrection after his gory series of punishments, G.H. punishes herself with the thought of racial injustice, only to be reborn again from the ashes of that revelation, as innocent and as ignorant as ever before. The first pages signal in advance that ignorance is the ending of the novel, as the narrator struggles to remember and put in writing the revelation that she just experienced in silence:

    Talvez me tenha acontecido uma compreensão tão total quanto uma ignorância, e dela eu venha a sair intocada e inocente como antes. … Pois ao mesmo tempo que luto por saber, a minha nova ignorância, que é o esquecimento, tornou-se sagrada. (8)

    Maybe what happened to me is an understanding as total as an ignorance, and I am going to come out of it untouched and innocent like before. … Because at the same time that I struggle to understand, my new ignorance, which is oblivion, has also become sacred.

    While the novel is structured around the event of an epiphany—as a classic bildungsroman—the ending sings the praise of an ignorance that challenges the Enlightenment project of modernity. G.H.’s stream of consciousness, like that of the narrator in Lispector’s posthumous novel A hora da estrela, can be read as a search for punishment and forgiveness. Her passion is precisely the experience of seeing at last, through her window, the lights of the favelas in the far distance and thinking that those precarious structures could have been palaces—echoing the realization of her former maid’s Black beauty and dignity, until then anxiously denied. The passion of G.H.—defined as a series of realizations hurting her fragility—ends up making her stronger, not because she reaches enlightenment but because she develops a sort of immunity to knowledge. Her ignorance becomes sacred. Read in light of Lispector’s philosophy of crime and punishment, this novel characterizes engaged literature as a ritual of moral punishment in the hands of those readers who are willing to face the painful truth but only to become invulnerable to it. Instead of being moved by truth toward restorative justice efforts, these imagined readers use the pain of truth as a ritual of performative remorse and furtive absolution, as they continue to uphold the status quo with their powerful ignorance and inaction.

    Rocío Pichon-Rivière Rocío Pichon-Rivière is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Hispanic Studies at the University of California, Riverside. Previously she was a postdoctoral fellow at New York University and a visiting scholar at the Pratt Institute. Recent works include essays on hemispheric trans theory, Latin American women’s political thinking, and phenomenologies of shame.

    Footnotes

    1. Foucault in “La pensée du dehors” (1966) defines a notion of an “outside” of discourse as the element around which much literature was already doing its work, pointing toward what exceeds its intentional representation. “The reason it is now so necessary to think through fiction—while in the past it was a matter of thinking the truth—is that ‘I speak’ runs counter to ‘I think.’ ‘I think’ led to the indubitable certainty of the ‘I’ and its existence; ‘I speak,’ on the other hand, distances, disperses, effaces that existence and lets only its empty emplacement appear” (page number needed). Taking Foucault’s argument a little further, one can say that the outside of the law points to the level of the performativity of language and the institutions in which such discourses circulate. The narrated “presence” of the speaker’s body and their actions in a literary scene shed light and cast a shade over the content of their speech, a shadow drawn with the direction and intensity determined by their positionality in broader power structures that become keys to understanding not just what the discourse intends to say but also what it performs in terms of such structures. By challenging the purity of the abstract ‘I’ or the ‘we’ that seems to enunciate the law, fiction begins to point outside of its interiority. This outside can be defined as the realm of the unspoken injustice that the law fails to name while silently becoming a vehicle for its reproduction.

    2. This essay is part of a larger project that studies the thought of Latin American women, who often wrote in minor genres, in the margins of professional philosophy. I take the risk of presenting ideas through storytelling around the figure of the author, knowing that in the field of literary studies many have been disciplined by formalist methods and might have a visceral reaction against this type of narrative: bear with me. Indeed, many thinkers have convincingly established that a text should be studied in and of itself, regardless of the presumed, unverifiable intentions of the human who penned it, for a text has a life of its own. While I agree with this argument, I claim that it is necessary to narrate rather than describe systems of thought. In the field of philosophy—where I was most disciplined—quite paradoxically storytelling is often more favored than mere conceptual analysis and the figure of the author often lives in ways that literary critics might struggle to accept. To think is to think otherwise. And precisely that movement of thought advancing against the grain of previous limiting ideas creates a moment that is irreducibly dramatic and demands to be narrated before conceptual analysis can begin. In other words, non-tautological thinking has a narrative arch. Where—if not in time—can contradictions play a more interesting game than the impossible? In What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari wrote that we would not be able to understand a philosophical system of thought if our imagination had not first drawn the figure of the philosophical character who thinks the ideas presented. Such character is needed to breathe the pauses of any thought that is not tautologically foreclosed to external examination. The character performs, so to speak, the clumsy possibility of change. Narration favors contingency over necessity.

    This essay studies the works of Clarice Lispector and observes her philosophical character as a changing rhetorical trope in her writings. This figure of the author—however evanescent and filled with contradictions—is a necessary logical step to address questions of epistemic injustice, the main theme of this article, for the social drama of knowledge production can only be fleshed out through the figure of the thinkers. Inasmuch as she was addressing her own epistemic privilege and limitations, such argument necessitates the figure of the author to be predicated upon. Historically, Lispector only began to include herself as an explicit subject of enunciation in the 1960s as she became an increasingly public figure. This article analyzes one of the first times in which she pointed at herself in the text that she was writing, “Mineirinho.” Additionally, this essay ends with a commentary on novels that seem to be parodies of the figure of the engaged writer, further advancing an argument about her characterization of this type of figure.

    3. All translations are the author’s unless noted otherwise.

    4. Linda Martín Alcoff writes in “Epistemologies of Ignorance: Three Types” that “in mainstream epistemology, the topic of ignorance as a species of bad epistemic practice is not new, but what is new is the idea of explaining ignorance not as a feature of neglectful epistemic practice but as a substantive epistemic practice in itself. The idea of an epistemology of ignorance attempts to explain and account for the fact that such substantive practices of ignorance—willful ignorance, for example, and socially acceptable but faulty justificatory practices—are structural. This is to say that there are identities and social locations and modes of belief formation, all produced by structural social conditions of a variety of sorts, that are in some cases epistemically disadvantaged or defective” (39–40).

    5. I alternatively use the terms epistemology of ignorance (Alcoff) and critical phenomenology of ignorance (Weiss) because both disciplinary frameworks study the same phenomena: the ways in which ignorance is actively produced in society. Epistemology and phenomenology are two traditions that address this question: the first with a historical concern for what constitutes knowledge and how knowledge is produced unevenly depending on social positionality, the second with a focus on the experience of such knowledge production or lack thereof. This later tradition is closer to Lispector’s use of stream of consciousness narratives to convey the messiness of the experience of denial. Yet the conversation between these different traditions is where the complexity of these phenomena can be articulated with most nuance.

    6. “Por que foi o destino me levando a escrever o que já escrevi, em vez de também desenvolver em mim a qualidade de lutadora que eu tinha? Em pequena, minha família por brincadeira chamava-me de ‘a protetora dos animais’. Porque bastava acusarem uma pessoa para eu imediatamente defendê-la. E eu sentia o drama social com tanta intensidade que vivia de coração perplexo diante das grandes injustiças a que são submetidas as chamadas classes menos privilegiadas. Em Recife eu ia aos domingos a visitar a casa de nossa empregada nos mocambos. E o que eu via me fazia como que me prometer que não deixaria aquilo continuar. Eu queria agir. Em Recife, onde morei até doze anos de idade, havia muitas vezes nas ruas um aglomerado de pessoas diante das quais alguém discursava ardorosamente sobre a tragédia social. E lembro-me de como eu vibrava e de como eu me prometia que um dia esta seria minha tarefa: a de defender os direitos dos outros” (Lispector, A descoberta 217).

    7. Since I here affectionately disagree with one of Marta Peixoto’s articles, I feel the need to mention that she read several versions of this essay and gave me invaluable feedback, criticism, and support for which I am in debt to her and deeply grateful.

    8. Audre Lorde in “The Uses of Anger: Women Responding to Racism” (1981) speaks of the political power of anger that stems from its double nature, both epistemic and physical: “Anger is loaded with information and energy.” Sedating it with any narcotic not only diminishes its physical power to elicit change but also obscures the clarity of its content rendering it devoid of its epistemological power to point at a truth that a group seeks to ignore. Lorde writes: “Every woman has a well-stocked arsenal of anger potentially useful against those oppressions, personal and institutional, which brought that anger into being. Focused with precision it can become a powerful source of energy serving progress and change. And when I speak of change, I do not mean a simple switch of positions or a temporary lessening of tensions, nor the ability to smile or feel good. I am speaking of a basic and radical alteration in those assumptions underlying our lives” (127). Marc Brackett, the director of the Yale Center for Emotional Intelligence, defines anger as the emotional response to injustice, while distinguishing it from mere frustration, as a response to unfulfilled expectations (Bracket). If anger points us toward injustice, then the mechanisms at work to sedate it can be seen as functional to the reproduction of injustice.

    9. See Derrida, Spectres de Marx (1993) and Politiques de l’amitié (1994). This note might sound anachronistic insofar as Lispector could not have read Derrida’s texts on a democracy to come, as they were yet to come, for he started publishing them in the 1990s. Incidentally, it is quite possible that Derrida read this story, given his closeness to Hélène Cixous, who introduced Lispector’s works in France. Questions of direct influence aside, these authors were discussing a philosophical problem that predated them both. The fact that this is a mathematics professor points to the calculus that defines the logic within established laws. The professor’s stream of consciousness can be read as a phenomenological exploration of the problem of the incalculability of justice and the experience of trying to think beyond current democratic practices and laws while still struggling to use their logic and idiom. The result is a bit ridiculous, and the story’s ending can be seen as a parody of such enterprise.

    10. See Levinas, Le temps et l´autre (1947) and Humanisme de l’autre homme (1972). Of course, when Levinas writes about the Other, he does not include dogs. The case has been made quite convincingly that he did not even include people of color. For a recent critique of the limited, racist scope of Levinas’s ethics of the other see Moten. Lispector’s implicit reference to the interpellation of the face of the other as an ethical calling was possibly mediated by the Latin American reception of Levinas, which often read the figure of the other through an anti-colonial lens, as was the case most famously with liberation theology.

    11. In the aforementioned chronicle, “Literature e justiça,” where she discusses the question of engaged literature, Lispector writes something that perfectly parallels the mathematics professor’s late logic, this time talking about herself:

    não estou me envergonhando totalmente de não contribuir para nada humano e social por meio de escrever. … Do que me envergonho, sim, é de não ‘fazer’, de não contribuir com ações. … Disso me envergonharei sempre. E nem sequer pretendo me penitenciar. Não quero, por meios indiretos e escusos, conseguir de mim a minha absolvição. Disso quero continuar envergonhada. (25)

    I am not totally ashamed of not contributing with my writing to something human or social. … What does provoke shame in me is not contributing with actions. … Of that fact I will be forever ashamed. I don’t even intend to punish myself. I don’t want, through indirect ways and excuses, to obtain from myself my absolution. Of that, I’d rather continue to be ashamed.

    The enduring temporality of this shame does not seem to capture the duration of actions or inactions as much as it reveals and is itself an epistemological relation to history: no amount of penitence or excuses can change the past. Such is the temporality of truth from a perspective “more divine,” sub specie aeternitatis.

    12. The trope of gazes averted was present in the 1941 essay as well. Though mostly written in the style of abstraction and deduction, as demanded by the academic nature of the journal where it was published, the article ended with a theatrical finale: a gesture—precise, meaningful—and a blackout:

    Só haverá ‘direito de punir’ quando punir significar o emprego daquela vacina de que fala Carnelucci, contra o gérmen do crime. Até então seria preferível abandonar a discussão filosófica dum ‘fundamento do direito de punir’, e, de cabeça baixa, continuar a ministrar morfina às dores da sociedade. (“Observações” 69)

    There will only be a ‘right to punish’ when the term punishment is used to signify the administration of that vaccine about which Carnelucci spoke, against the germ of crime. Until then it would be preferable to abandon the philosophical discussion of a ‘foundation of the right to punish’ and, with head down, continue to administer morphine to society’s pain.

    The suggestion that this excuse for a justice system should be administered “with the head down” might prescribe the gestuality of shame for a broken system or a choreography of consent to avoid the gaze of the victims of this system.

    13. Later on, in the late sixties, in one of her chronicles in the Jornal do Brasil, Lispector would correct someone who said that she was intelligent. Intelligence was not her “strength,” she humble-bragged as she clarified: she did not value pure intelligence as much as this other faculty that she could provisionally call “intelligent sensitivity” (“sensibilidade inteligente”) of which she had more. Though this notion is undertheorized, this provisional name seems to stand for a holistic perception where sensation, emotion, feeling, and the clarity of thought are intertwined in a way that they cannot be abstracted. This, she claimed, was more useful regarding personal relationships and understanding others. People who balance these two forms of clarity follow the guidance of “an intelligent heart” rather than just the blind abstraction of the mind (A descoberta 215–216). The story about the mathematics professor is a parody of the notion of pure intelligence, abstracted from feeling, whose calculations hyperbolically struggle to understand a law that does not yet exist, for it can only be born from feeling.

    14. “Dozens of poor people came to the place where Mineirinho’s body was found. No one could approach the body, since the police, as determined by the chief officer of the 23rd Precinct Agnaldo Amado, was violently pushing everybody aside. In general, the slum residents were upset about Mineirinho’s death, who they considered a Rio de Janeiro version of Robin Hood” (Diário Carioca, May 1st, 1962. Qtd. in Rosenbaun 170).

    15. Lispector herself asserts in the interview just mentioned (1977) that it was not the fact of his death that shocked her and the public, but the additional gunshots that were not necessary to end his life. The chronicle implies this as well. As for the press, even in an article that claims to be horrified by the assassination, they object that the police abandoned the body to avoid taking responsibility for the murder, not so much the murder itself (“Polícia”).

    16. To this day, police regularly kill young men and women in the favelas in Rio without losing their jobs—almost as if that was precisely their job. According to the Jovem Negro Vivo campaign, Brazil is the country with the highest murder rate in the world. Young people between ages 15 and 29 constitute more than half of the total lives lost to this violence; 77% of these murdered young people are Black. In 2015, 1 out of 5 murders were committed by the police. See “Jovem”. Marielle, presente. Agora e sempre.

    17. For the question of who says “we” in declarations of independence and by virtue of what authority, see Derrida, “Declarations of Independence.” In this essay, Derrida discusses the religious nature of a proclaimed authority to declare, in the first-person plural, the independence of a modern state, as it happened in the US and many other countries founded on colonized land. In this essay by Lispector, that “we” is echoed in the first-person plural that proclaims the universality of the law in ways that too often fail to be universal.

    18. “Essa justiça que vela meu sono, eu a repudio, humilhada por precisar dela. Enquanto isso durmo e falsamente me salvo. Nós, os sonsos essenciais. Para que minha casa funcione, exijo de mim como primeiro dever que eu seja sonsa, que eu não exerça a minha revolta e o meu amor, guardados” (112). (“That justice that watches over my sleep, I repudiate it, humiliated that I need it. Meanwhile I sleep and falsely save myself. We, the essential phonies. For my house to function, I demand of myself as my first duty that I be a phony, that I refrain from enacting my revolt and my love, both locked away.”)

    19. How interesting it is to read these passages in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, when the term “essential workers” names many subjects who might be deemed politically inessential, as is unambiguously the case with the undocumented people working in agriculture, care, and the food industry. When it comes to the “we” of the declaration of independence mentioned in the previous note, these undocumented workers are excluded from this State, even though their ancestors were often in the lands in question before colonization.

    Works Cited

    • “Polícia fuzilou ‘Mineirinho’: De luto mangueira chora morte do bandoleiro.” A Noite [Rio de Janeiro], 2 May 1962, p. 8. http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/Hotpage/HotpageBN.aspx?bib=348970_06&pagfis=5363&url=http://memoria.bn.br/docreader# Accessed 1 Oct. 2019.
    • Alcoff, Linda Martín. “Epistemologies of Ignorance: Three Types.” Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance, edited by Shannon Sullivan and Nancy Tuana, SUNY Press, 2007, pp. 39–57.
    • Anistia Internacional. “Jovem negro vivo.” https://anistia-org-br.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/campanha/jovem-negro-vivo/
    • Brackett, Marc. Permission to Feel: Unlocking the Power of Emotions to Help Our Kids, Ourselves, and Our Society. Celadon Books, 2019.
    • Deleuze, Gilles. Foucault. Les Éditions de Minuit, 1986.
    • Derrida, Jacques. “Declarations of Independence.” New Political Science, vol. 7, no. 1, 1986, pp. 7–15.
    • —. Politiques de l’amitié. Éditions Galilée, 1994.
    • —. Spectres de Marx. Éditions Galilée, 1993.
    • Dicionário Priberam da Língua Portuguesa. https://dicionario.priberam.org/
    • Foucault, Michel. “La pensée du dehors.” Critique, no. 229, 1966, pp. 523–46.
    • —. “Nietzsche, la généalogie, l’histoire.” Hommage à Jean Hyppolite, edited by Suzanne Bachelard, Presses Universitaires de France (PUF), 1971, pp. 145–72.
    • Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan or The Matter, Forme and Power of A Commonwealth Ecclesiasticall and Civil. Penguin, 1985.
    • Levinas, Emmanuel. Humanisme de l’autre homme. Fata Morgana, 1972.
    • —. Le temps et l´autre. PUF, 1947.
    • Lispector, Clarice. A bela e a fera. Nova Fronteira, 1979.
    • —. Correspondências. Organização de Teresa Montero, Rocco, 2002.
    • —. A descoberta do mundo. Nova Fronteira, 1984.
    • —. Laços de família. Rocco, 1998.
    • —. “Mineirinho.” Clarice na cabeceira. Jornalismo. Rocco, 2012, pp. 111–115.
    • —. “Observações Sobre o fundamento do direito de punir.” Clarice na cabeceira. Jornalismo, Rocco, 2012, 66–70.
    • —. A Paixão segundo G.H. Rocco, 1964.
    • —. Para não esquecer. Ática, 1979.
    • —. Interview, TV Publica, 1977. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w1zwGLBpULs
    • Lorde, Audre. “Uses of Anger: Women Responding to Racism.” Sister Outsider: Essays &Speeches, Crossing Press, 2007.
    • Merriam Webster Online Dictionary. https://www.merriam-webster.com/
    • Mills, Charles W. “White Ignorance.” Race and Epistemologies of Ignorance, edited by Shannon Sullivan and Nancy Tuana, SUNY Press, 2007, pp 13–38.
    • Morrison, Toni. Playing in the Dark. Whiteness and the Literary Imagination. Random House, 1993.
    • Moten, Fred. The Universal Machine. Duke UP, 2018.
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  • So-Called Indigenous Slavery: West African Historiography and the Limits of Interpretation

    Sara-Maria Sorentino (bio)

    Abstract

    This essay explores the mobilization of so-called “indigenous slavery” in the historiography of slavery in West Africa in order to expose the limits of historiographical interpretation and the tensions between black studies and African studies, which are here constituted around a shared negativity. This discussion provides some context for the debates of historians Walter Rodney and J.D. Fage, while also bringing these concerns into explicit conversation with a line of thought in radical black studies, namely Afro-pessimism. Considering indigenous slavery through the critical analytic of Afro-pessimism exposes the role of the paradigm of racial slavery in determining how slavery comes to be understood in relation to nation building in Africa, with Ghana serving as a particular example.

    Had Rawlings asked, ‘Are we yet free?’ most Ghanaians would have answered with a resounding, ‘No.’ This ‘no’ resonated on both sides of the Atlantic. It was the reminder of what abolition and decolonization had failed to deliver. This ‘no’ was the language we shared, and within it resided a promise of affiliation better than that of brothers and sisters.(Hartman 172)

    In an early essay, W.E.B. Du Bois provides a useful chiasmic formulation for the rebounding effect of slavery: “Instead of man-hunting being an incident of tribal wars, war became the incident of man-hunting” (254). This formulation points to an unresolved difficulty in the historiography of slavery—that of its so-called “indigenous” precursors. Did slavery in Africa exist prior to its transatlantic iteration? If so, what was its character or essence? The answer to the first question has been a resounding yes, if by existence we mean something approximating human ownership. But what that ownership means, and what its implications are for the racialized form that has become slavery’s synonym, is less than clear. Of course, apologist assumptions, extending from the slave traders and theologians of early modernity to the historiographers and ideologues of the present, excavate a prior, nearly naturalized African slavery in order to rationalize (or at least causally explain) slavery’s global expansion. In the 1960s and 70s, Walter Rodney intervened in this circular logic, repurposing and vivifying dependency theory to argue that what had been pathologized as a pervasive domestic slave trade internal to West Africa—slaving figured as an indigenous African mode of being—can be better understood as amplified, if not directly produced in its character, by the methods and metaphysics of trans-Atlantic traffic: the international demand for slaves had long wrecked the coast, moving both inward and radiating out. For Rodney, slavery was “the first stage of the colonial domination of Africa by Europeans” (West Africa 21), and it marked the initiation of a world-system overwhelmingly violent in scope.

    My argument builds from and elaborates a critical black internationalist engagement with the centrality of racial slavery—an intellectual genealogy often lost to the historiography of slavery in Africa, which instead interprets Rodney’s interventions almost singularly in relation to British historian J.D. Fage. Fage is an appropriate enough foil, opposing Rodney by representing racial slavery as the continuation of an indigenous pattern of enslavement, one that, it might be added, did not radically alter the trajectory of African social-political systems. In these cross-hairs are compounded a series of assumptions pertaining to the political-economic function of slavery and the activity of its agents but that, when read with the longer theoretical-political commitments of black internationalism, trouble its general conditions of interpretation.

    In reconsidering how indigenous slavery brings the past to bear on the present, this essay engages an apparent aporia between black studies, African studies, and, in a minor refrain, indigenous studies. From one angle, slavery has been subject to a disappearing trick, hidden in the folds of the colonial, decolonial, neocolonial, and postcolonial. Instead of orchestrating slavery’s reappearance, I am interested in the impact of its absence and the difficulty of its thought—its pre-conditionality. Indigenous slavery, as a problem-field, continuously resurrects a minimal kernel of doubt concerning the form and function of slavery in the political imaginary—a problem exacerbated by the apparent difficulty with discussing slavery in African studies, on the one hand, and the supposedly lopsided over-proliferation of concern with slavery in black studies, on the other. Both perspectives, paradoxically, might be marred by “a global tendency to talk away from slavery and its afterlife in the historic instance” (Sexton, “Affirmation” 101). Indigenous slavery also marks the fault where blackness delinks from indigeneity or becomes affixed to it, as racial slavery represents both a break from pre-colonial African (slaving) cultural practices and the deculturation of diasporic blackness. The opposition between Rodney and Fage—between dependency and agency, between radical breaks and constitutive causes—continues to inform the ocean of disorientation that dictates the diaspora’s origin and the disciplining difference whose currents still constitute it.

    To elaborate this problematic, wherein slavery (and the political culture it supports and sustains) is rendered either ahistoric or so fundamentally new that any connection to a world before it dissolves, my reading of “indigenous slavery” is informed by Afro-pessimism, insofar as its critical analytic is interested in shoring up, from within the wake, as it were, how racial slavery produces radically new concepts of political-ontological organization: the antagonism between the human and the slave. Despite the heterodoxy of Afro-pessimist itineraries, the intervention of political ontology draws them together; slavery’s collision with race forms the passageway to the modern world and does so by generating this world’s ordering principles—its metaphysical orientation to space, time, and subjectivity. While indigenous slavery might offer itself as the prehistory of the human-slave antagonism, the (ever-receding) material that precipitated slavery as we now desire to know it, is also, I argue, a test case for the difficulty of returning to a past, mapping a geography, or unifying around a culture, especially when available methods of analysis and modes of approach are imbricated in (if not coterminous with) the trans-Atlantic trade. What P. Khalil Saucier writes of ethnography doubles for historiography: “The grammar of violence that goes unspoken in the description of ‘how’ race and racism works by ethnographers betrays its aim: to not expose the nature of race and racism, because its existence is testimony to that fact” (52–53). Afro-pessimism might be another name for the risk of exposure.

    This essay represents an overture toward such exposure, staging an encounter that considers the historiography of West African slavery, in its elisions and obsessions, as a genre that invests in anti-blackness and makes durable a dissemination of slavery’s ontological traffic. If racial slavery writes itself by wresting away the possibility of native status, indigenous slavery tethers Africanity and blackness to an immemorial form of violence in order to explain its impossible cause. The role of indigenous slavery in this reversal is catalytic; it reinscribes slaving both as originary and as the historical-logical precursor to the violence of colonialism and capitalism. As a catalyst, indigenous slavery works to organize time (the contextual and ahistoric), space (diaspora and dispersal), subjectivity (agency and collusion), and (international) memory. In refracting diaspora, abolition, and reparations through a political ontological intervention, I make a case for how 1) the debates over the relative significance of indigenous slavery (a repression of a wider web of black internationalism) have presaged the form of current conversations in black studies; 2) Afro-pessimism’s conceptual resources have been articulated, in part, in the distorted influence of these debates; and 3) Afro-pessimism, far from avoiding the scene of African historiography, provides a response syncretic to political and cultural negotiations of method and meaning-making. These moves are made with close attention to the historiography of slavery in West Africa, and in Ghana more centrally, where indirect rule superseded the logic of the settler colony.

    Ahistoric Time

    Like the Marxist distinction between formal and real subsumption, racial slavery’s revalorization of the world accesses local avenues of discrete meaning-making (culture, ethnicity, servitude, power) and cannibalizes them in service of an emergent system of being. The pages of historiography are dotted with the remnants of slavery’s transformation. Akosua Perbi, for instance, asserts that “The European presence on the coast definitely influenced the indigenous institution of slavery” (26), citing the proliferation of war and the sale of people as well as “greater brutality and harshness” (66), and Babacar M’Baye exposes the emergence of a “unique and rigid concept of bondage” not dependent on religious conversion (608). Such sea changes are immanent to historical descriptions of slavery in Africa, but these transformations are rarely themselves thematized. Instead, the frame of time-space is given as the ground upon which indigenous (or African) slave-systems can be compared and contextualized relative to racial (or trans-Atlantic) slavery.

    From this orientation, historiography charges the analytic of racial slavery with conceptual bleeding, making impossible a clear-eyed investigation of other times and spaces. Igor Kopytoff and Suzanne Miers open their influential volume Slavery in Africa with the claim that “Any discussion of African ‘slavery’ in English is necessarily bedeviled by the fact that the word conjures up definite images in the Western mind. Anglo-Americans visualize slavery as they believed it was practised on the plantations of the Southern U.S. and the British Caribbean” (3). This conflation is especially accented, argues Frederick Cooper, in the tradition of Africanists who “regard the social norms governing slaves’ roles as cultural givens rather than as part of historical processes” (111). If the slave role is falsely given, even abstracted into an “epiphenomenon—a universal tragedy oblivious, with the exception of its volume, to historical specificity” (Bennett 47), the labor of historical reconstruction should be akin to a procedure of re-phenomenalization: to access phenomena as part of ongoing historical processes, find the particular buried in the universal, and reintegrate these granular details in their proper contexts, such that slavery as universal form would find itself elaborated by different times and spaces. Historiography, however, does not have internal tools to address how the universal slave figure remains stubbornly fixed to Africa; instead, it conceptualizes indigenous slave practices as transplanted, modified, and perfected in Africa and only later manipulated by proto-capitalists in the Mediterranean and the Americas (insofar as the invention of race is supposed to extend the already existing practice). Indigenous slavery becomes the developmental and anagogical synecdoche of slavery writ large and not, as Kopytoff and Miers worry, the other way around.

    Both Rodney and Fage share the concern that the generic “slave” misleads. For Fage, indigenous slavery is bedeviled by “the indiscriminate use of the single word ‘slave’ to cover a number of social and economic conditions” (History 92). Rodney writes that early Africanist Captain R. S. Rattray himself “ended by referring to the ‘so-called “slaves,’” noting that “though perhaps the label ‘domestic slave’ is meant to express this idea, it carries with it the same associations with the Americas which the pro-slavery interests were at pains to evoke” (“African Slavery” 440). Indigenous slavery is always recovering from the charge of its “so-called” character—its actual life presumably obscured by the faulty transmission of oral histories and its retrieval limited to linguistic traces and the lingering possibility that contemporary forms of slavery are its remnant.1

    Rattray records ɔdɔnkɔ, the Akan term for “bought person,” as one of five operative categorizations of “slave” (the others being akoa “servant,” awowa “pawn,” domum “war captive,” and akyere “sacrificial person”). “Slave,” in this minor tradition in historiography, was not generalized, and chattel slavery indicated only one of a range of conditions. Although akoa “is now often somewhat loosely applied by interpreters to mean ‘slave’ in the degrading European sense,” Rattray writes, akoa “to the African mind meant originally nothing worse than that condition of voluntary and essential servitude in which every man and woman stood in relation to some other person or group” (34). In such a spectrum of dependency, the akoa had rights not unlike “the ordinary privileges of any Ashanti free man, with whom … his position did not seem to compare so unfavourably” (42). While this position, more proximate to limited servitude, has been used to excuse an originary African slavery, it also does rhetorical work to specify what, precisely, the upheaval of racial slavery represented, including inducing the conceptual generalization of slavery.

    Perbi draws from Rattray’s colonial-era reading to disarticulate further how chattel slavery was not essential to those long-standing Ghanain practices in which “the slave was regarded as a human being and was entitled to certain rights and privileges” (4). These rights and privileges included the right to food, clothing, and shelter; protection from discipline and execution; and integration into new societies through marriage, adoption, and naming (112–18). Contrary to colonial-inflected doxa that continues to conflate social status with political positionality, an available reading of West African historiography expresses much more flexibility between ascribed and acquired status. Indeed, in places like south-west Ghana, slaves’ ascension to political office means that “partially unfree origins are often a preferential condition in the politics of succession” (Valsecchi 42). These alternatives open a different narrative: indigenous slavery included practices of deculturation and depoliticization but became, through strategies of incorporation, a structure of re-indigenization and affirmation of degrees of political capacity.2 Racial slavery, meanwhile, indexed the total revocation of access to indigenous or political claims. How and why, then, has the generic slave been used to link practices that may be better thought as disparate?

    If indigenous slavery reveals the political crisis of its category, we can understand the “false” abstractions of the slave to be the project of the present. One of Rodney’s enduring lessons is that the exposure of “writing of the type which justifies the trade in slaves … as racist bourgeois propaganda” is not merely a task for history “but of present-day liberation struggle in Africa” (How Europe 103). Fage does recognize that the position that “both slavery and trading in slaves were already deeply rooted in West African society, was of course a view propagated by the European slave-traders, especially perhaps when the morality of their business was being questioned” and he even nods to ways spectacularizing deep-rooted slavery formed “a principal moral justification for European colonization” (“Slavery” 393). Despite these concessions, Fage insists that foreign trade “across the Sahara or over the seas” should be considered “no more than a stimulus to essentially indigenous processes” (“Slaves” 289). As such, the difficult question of “how much the categories used by the European observers correspond to an African reality, and how much they owe to preconceptions derived from a common European inheritance,” does not raise to the level of challenging the fantasy of indigeneity’s links to slaveness (295). When Fage is framed as the counterpoint to Rodney, the apparent onus confronting Fage and reverberating across historiographical perspectives becomes merely that of modulating cause and effect. Absent is consideration into how the ahistorical abstraction of “slave” relayed by racial slavery makes insight into past modes of slavery tenuous at best and might itself be inextricable from the production of racial slavery.

    Articulating this historiographical dilemma, Achille Mbembe argues that “the slave trade had ramifications that remain unknown to us” (On the Postcolony 13). Following Mbembe, we can discern how slavery produces the conditions of its unknowing and its reproduction. The indigeneity of slavery cultivates freedom as a geographical and racial flight from the determinations of Africa, such that “the slave trade and colonialism echoed one another with the lingering doubt of the very possibility of self-government” (13). When, for example, Ethiopia and Liberia were singled out in a 1925 memorandum from the International Labor Organization as the sole continued purveyors of slavery, the assertion was that “where European powers exercise control of the administration of the territory, the slave trade and large scale raids have diminished and have become practically impossible” (qtd. in Getachew 59). With slavery made indigenous to Africa, “black sovereignty” becomes a threat to freedom and continued domination is ideologically justified. In other words, “the charge of slavery became the idiom through which black self-government would be undermined” (Getachew 59). Blackness doesn’t just represent vulnerability to slaveness; it collides with slaveness insofar as Africa is posed as originally self-enslaving. Africa’s consignment to a negative capacity for self-determination indicates how critiques of colonialism continue to carry with them slavery’s material-symbolic mode of organization. Racial slavery realizes itself in the way it organizes the past, carrying slavery’s indigenous provenance with it to explain away its continued presence. Thinking through how indigeneity has been compressed into service of the generic slave and its attendant modes of domination (and indeed written out of Africanity altogether) opens at minimum the possibility for imagining indigeneity and freedom otherwise.

    The problematic of political subjectivity, of who has access to freedom and how this access shapes not only perceptions of space and time but the materialization of space and time, indents the legacy of the Rodney-Fage debate and radiates outward in a series of methodological imperatives for the historiography of slavery. The best historians recognize that categories are both constructed and relational. Paul Lovejoy, for instance, argues that indigenous slavery is “an analytical convenience that should not be construed as an indication that African slavery developed in isolation” (“Indigenous African Slavery” 25). Although sympathetic to Rodney, Lovejoy understands him to share with Fage the conceit that both indigenous and racial slavery are “static” (26). Wrapping this criticism of stasis into one of “ahistorical” representations, Lovejoy charges that “the gap that is created in this way is in fact wider than the ocean that separated the slave institutions in their American and African settings” (27). A similar criticism has been levelled against Afro-pessimism as a “totalizing interpretation of black experience,” “bound to this historically specific context, all the while disavowing that specificity” (Kauanui 262). This critical conceit—that ahistoricism is a problem of bad intellectual practice—fails to address the materiality of the ahistoric. Despite attempts to historicize the relationship between indigenous and racial slavery, “the dialectical relationship of masters and slaves, ruling classes and kinship groups, remains ‘frozen in time’” (Cooper 10). How can we account for the seeming inevitability of this freezing?

    I am not here talking of the standard story in which African historiography becomes mired in limitations of recognizable archival sources, most of which originate after the abolition of slavery. Interpretations of slavery routinely quibble over how to access and evaluate the past, but because these positions presuppose the past as metaphysical resource, even if barred or lost, they also implicitly introduce the problem that the past is not past at all, which is to say it continues into the present, as well as the more arresting insight that the past is all there is. If it is the case that enslavement in Africa is eternal, no account of history could be possible. With this auto-enslavement, African history, as such, is stalled, hypostasized. Its only value would be the use we make of it in our continued fascination with its failings. Let us not forget that this methodological problem corresponds to the racist Hegelian conceit that shapes Africa’s lack of historical movement.3 But while both traditional African historiography and Afro-pessimist theorizations have been accused of ahistoricism, this charge misses the injection of an element of ahistoricism by racial slavery into the wheels of history. Mudimbe argues that “the episteme of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries … invented the concept of a static and prehistoric tradition” (189). This episteme was preconditioned with ontological significance and sustained by political practice, effecting how Africa is thought and, partially, how its systems come to be organized and its ontologies sorted. With its violent dramas of scale and abstraction, racial slavery seems to put indigenous slavery into relief. It creates the frozen master-slave structure that Afro-pessimism calls the human-slave antagonism. This antagonism, when identified and unleashed into workings of intellectual-political practice, rearticulates the historiography of slavery—and its assumptions of time, scale, and being—into a problem that actively participates in what it seeks to undo.4 Afro-pessimism, I argue, maintains this problem as its horizon.

    The historiography of slavery’s larger frame can account for transformations in “the process of enslavement, the mechanism of slave distribution, and the role of slaves in the social formation” (Lovejoy, Transformations 281), but it cannot account for changes in methods and metaphysics and it cannot identify how racial slavery radicalizes the frame. What we will see critiqued in Afro-pessimism as “ontological absolutism” (Kauanui 263) could instead be conceived as a method of inquiry that has the advantage of recognizing the force of historical universals: the myth of slavery qua universality is one of slavery’s products. Slavery traffics in this myth; its capacity to circulate depends on it, draws its strength from it. Contending with Rodney’s assertion that “slavery as a mode of production was not present in any African society” requires an inversion of priorities: “One of the paradoxes in studying this early period of African history is that it cannot be fully comprehended without first deepening our knowledge of the world at large, and yet the true picture of the complexities of the development of man and society can only be drawn after intensive study of the long-neglected African continent” (How Europe 69). The next section tarries here—between “the world at large” and “the long-neglected continent.”

    Dispersed Space

    Afro-pessimism echoes Rodney’s emancipatory geography of blackness—”black struggle must be universalized wherever black people happen to be” (Rodney, “Black Scholar Interviews” 39)—insofar as it emancipates black struggle from geographical constraint without erasing geographical meaning and measure. From this perspective, black struggle engages blackness through negative space, not to be filled fully with cultural substance or transnational translations, but instead exposing the violent site where tradition breaks and culture is made to meld to being. As Frantz Fanon writes: “Wherever he goes, the Negro remains a Negro” (173). It is in the shadow of this Fanonian formulation that Frank B. Wilderson III argues, “The Black’s moment of recognition by the Other is always already ‘Blackness,’ upon which supplements are lavished—American, Caribbean, Xhosa, Zulu, etc. But the supplements are superfluous rather than substantive, they don’t unblacken” (“Biko” 98). Although the connection between Fanon and Wilderson has been well established,5 the lines that connect broader currents of black internationalism to this ostensibly newer articulation of black studies remain curiously untraced. We can consider, as a prelude to such a project, the overlap between Wilderson’s contention that “Africa has always been a big slave estate. That has been and still is the global consensus” (“‘Inside-Outside’” 9) and George Padmore’s claim that “In Africa, in America, in the West Indies, in South and Central America—to be Black is to be a slave. Despised, humiliated, denied justice and human rights in every walk of life” (qtd. in Edwards 279).6 What V.Y. Mudimbe has famously addressed as the “invention of Africa” is here illuminated as the abstraction of slaveness-as-blackness, indexing a meta-philosophical overlap of concerns long threading West African political consciousness with global freight.

    Though this essay may be a plea to the contrary, it is true that Afro-pessimism has not been taken up directly by the historiography of slavery or by scholars in West Africa (though it has made waves in South Africa and Zimbabwe). Afro-pessimism does, however, share a namesake with a tendency much derided by African social and political theory. This other Afropessimism is an umbrella used to designate non-reflective, defeatist theoretical temperaments and policies that recycle eternal Africa images into the deadlock of a “culture of poverty.”7 These are discourses that, as we will see, a burgeoning Ghanaian national memory sought to avoid, discourses into which indigenous slavery sneaks as a signal flare for African pathology. Doomed by inheritance, “condemned in social theory only as the sign of a lack” (Mbembe, On the Postcolony 8), Africa becomes a place-name barred from self-determination. Insofar as developmentalism thrives on positivism, this nominal gathering of propositions reproduces the problem it identifies: as an “invented ideology” (Momoh 34), its circular reasoning condemns Africa to the pure production of its own lack. Non-regressive movement would come only from those that recognize this circuit as an untenable ideological deadlock. The negative identification and appraisal of Afro-pessimist sensibilities is meant, by contrast, to jumpstart a decided movement beyond the aporetic African recidivism that would revert to centralizing slavery-as-cause.

    For Greg Thomas, contemporary Afro-pessimism is but “Afro-pessimism (2.0).” With the rebuttal that “Africa and Africans bear no naturally condemned status in this world” (284), this 2.0 is derided for its continued naturalization of African negativity. Both iterations of Afropessimism—the one named by its critics as a foreclosure at the register of policy and the other critically claimed as a political-philosophical opening—are, purportedly, invested in the same inertia. The emancipatory alternative to pessimistic reprieves would be to uncover (or simply stylize) positive performances with enough power to combat parasitic dark continent tropes. Other than mirrored names, however, the two Afro-pessimisms share no common body of literature and would be considered autonomous by most standards of disciplinary and discursive lineage. The contingency of their common denomination doesn’t mean they are wholly unrelated: both are compelled to return to lack and both ultimately have their roots in the ways Africa and enslavement are jointly apprehended, including the apprehension of an originary enslaving African culture. But unlike the policy-oriented caricatures of Africa, the Afropessimism of this focus has little interest in developmental futurity. It registers a different order of concern, which is 1) genealogical—how and why blackness became connected with lack; 2) methodological—how to approach the history of negativity; and 3) ethical-political—is negativity something to abhor or does it have its own resources? To these questions comes the speculative innovation of political ontology, in order to interrogate how blackness appears to have emerged, calcified, as negative capacity. In its most abstract terms, Wilderson writes, “slaveness is something that has consumed Blackness and Africanness, making it impossible to divide slavery from Blackness” (“‘We’re Trying to Destroy the World’”). Attentive to a consumptive global anti-blackness, Afro-pessimism the critical analytic shares more with the spirit that has problematized the obsession with African incapacity, insofar as it is interested in articulating the conditions of possibility for Africa’s invention. Instead of avoiding the negative, however, Afro-pessimism asks what is gained by employing it, excavating its history, sharpening its explosive and world-ending edge.

    Critics turn from this opening to craft Afro-pessimism as a culprit in a double sense, arguing that it not only traffics like its nominal twin in a negative Africa but also absents Africa, in citation and substance, from the conversation altogether. Its US-centered interest, detractors note, spuriously compels it to extrapolate “the particularity of the experiences of African peoples in North America to make a universal argument” (Kauanui 262).8 If it is true that certain Afropessimist reading lists do not substantively include African scholarship, as Thomas claims, this does not mean that its wider referential web isn’t concerned with African or Atlantic history. It also does not follow that “there is little if any Africa to this discourse at all, its nominal Afrohyphenation notwithstanding” (Thomas 284).9 Beyond resonance with Padmore or Rodney, we might gesture to how Wilderson’s writing is informed by his political practice in South Africa and how Afro-pessimism’s political horizon is invested in shaping alternatives to redemptive strains of Marxism and post-colonial theory embedded in African studies’ readings of decolonial movements (including Rodney’s insistence that African slaves were captured “for economic reasons, so that their labor power could be exploited” [How Europe 88]).

    Attentive to the attachments of decolonial struggle, Wilderson speculates that if “a political movement must be built and sustained on behalf of someone who has lost something,” then “necessity may have required Black Consciousness to monumentalize the ego of a dead relation” (“Biko” 106). This ego might be a political figurehead, a nation-state, or a pan-African sensibility that represses slavery’s memory, as its recovery tends to reduce Africans to passive victims or complicit agents. Because political movements are predicated on the restoration of loss, they sustain themselves through practices of filiation that engage “Garveyism, Negritude, Pan-Africanism, African Personality, African Socialism, African Humanism, Black Consciousness Movement, and African Renaissance … as imaginations of freedom and recapturing of lost ontologies” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 119). Africanist literary scholar Abiola Irele clarifies the imaginative stakes of Negritude, as it “arose out of a complex of mental images which fulfilled a felt need, and was developed into a systematic and self-sustaining ideology which is, in the last resort, an intellectual projection of this need” (The Negritude Moment 75). This “founding myth” (113) advances a past for the future; it is also at the precipice of such monumentalizing, the political exigencies of which Wilderson recognized, that a conversation toward other inventions might proceed. It might require returning, for example, to the intricate intellectual and nationalist projects Adom Getachew describes as “anticolonial worldmaking,” whose visions “drew on an anticolonial critique that began from the foundational role of New World slavery in the making of the modern world and traced the ways its legacies were constitutive of racial hierarchy in the international order” (5). Such visions remain prophetic because of the ways they exceed the scene of historiography and can rescript its restrictions on indigeneity and freedom.

    These obscured conversations are why, for gamEdze and gamedZe, although the Black radical tradition “has largely been formulated and theorized in and from America, and even as it often falls prey to American exceptionalisms in its quest for forms of Black Universalism,” it nonetheless “holds radical potential for us on the continent” (218). Wilderson might agree: awareness of the limitations of black studies does not preclude it from being “a discipline that seeks to offer the best historical and theoretical framework for questions confronting the Black diaspora. Even though it started in the United States, I consider this to be for all continents” (“‘Inside-Outside’” 4).10 Despite aligning on the potential for radical exchange across oceans, a gulf appears at the (ontological or cultural) register through which such offerings are made—for gamEdze and gamedZe, Afro-pessimism departs, dangerously, from the black radical tradition’s capacious emphasis on “African cultural practices” and the ways African indigeneity has formed “the basis of Black revolt across time and space” (218). Whether gamEdze and gamedZe recognize these cultural practices as political hypostatizations, as concerted myth-making, is not entirely clear. Afro-pessimist theorizations do not wholly object to the work of myth,11 but they wouldn’t suppose African cultural practices to be legible on their own without a shift in the economy of worldmaking of such force that Afro-pessimism designates it as world-ending. Towards this revolutionizing orientation, Afro-pessimism supports an inquiry into negativity, or an engagement with nothingness, to be part of the political potential of the subterranean workings of culture and an alternative articulation of indigeneity.12 Indeed, Afro-pessimism’s rejoinder to strategies that centralize myth-making, but not the conditions of possibility for such myths, should be considered immanent to conversations that spin their wheels in uncovering or refuting the apparent objectivity of a slave-owning African past in ways that don’t entirely foreclose the resignification of the past for positive political purposes.

    Other critical suspicions emanate from the fear of cultural loss: “The manner in which Africanness disappears into Blackness … distorts the conceptual space between the Negro and the African” (Olaloku-Teriba 111). Afro-pessimist analyses, however, represent an invitation to reckon with blackness as the form of this distortion. If writing of diaspora tends to centralize experience, culture, performance, and tradition, it also seems to obscure the workings of race, as when Jemima Pierre writes that “discussions of the ‘Black Experience’ often did not include contemporary Black African experience, even as it is clear that continental Africans have always been and continue to be racialized as ‘Black’ in a global racial order that denigrates Blackness and exploits and dehumanizes Black people” (xiii-xiv). In splitting the difference between modes of “Black Experience” and a global racial order, between performance and the paradigm, this formulation toggles the indecipherability of blackness; the opacity is constitutive of blackness under slavery’s sign. This is why, for Afro-pessimism, blackness seems infinitely fungible, and also why black resistance takes place in fugitive spaces, misrecognized and underground.

    As “abstraction and as anti-abstraction” (Edwards 12), diaspora can be thought to mark the reorganization of a negative space dictated by a global anti-blackness, the enigmatic before and after shared between Wilderson’s “Africa has always been a big slave estate” and Padmore’s “to be Black is to be a slave.” Instead of excavating an African conscience to refute a Western one, posing difference against difference or tradition against modernity, Afro-pessimism engages diaspora through the anxiety around (and inventive potential of) nothingness that is slavery’s precipitate. The concept of the African diaspora might, that is, find itself registered through what Wilderson calls “dispersal,” or the idea that the diaspora “does not rest upon some plenitude in the past” (Wilderson, “Inside-Outside”).13 The question of diasporic meaning, which may or may not be synonymous with diasporic belonging, takes place in the gap between experience and paradigm, but the way the gap is presented globally is through the elaboration of the paradigm itself.

    While the problem of paradigm is only alluded to by historiographical modes of meaning-making that themselves owe coherency to an anti-black order of things, it is often recognized by African scholars. Take Irele: “The colonial experience was not an interlude in our history, a storm that broke upon us, causing damage here and there but leaving us the possibility, after its passing, to pick up the pieces. It marked a sea-change of the historical process in Africa; it effected a qualitative re-ordering of life. It has rendered the traditional way of life no longer a viable option for our continued existence and apprehension of the world” (“In Praise” 207). Irele describes the colonial experience as a paradigm shift for both life and historical processes. The presumptive break between an exceptionalizing black studies and depoliticizing African studies can be examined through the generalized loss of what Irele defines as a “traditional way of life.” If the antinomy identified by Pierre is efficacious, that “where African diaspora studies generally concerns itself with articulations of race and Blackness but not directly with Africa, so African studies generally concerns itself with Africa but not directly with race and Blackness” (xvi), the horizon for a political solution would not be to press too soon for a better synthesis apart from the “no” encountered in the epigraph: the negative response that resounded, “on both sides of the Atlantic,” to the question, “are we free yet?”

    Colluding Freedom

    The most politically weighted expression of spatial-temporal attempts to secure slavery’s status is that of African collusion—the fantastical medium of exchange between innocent non-slaveholding Africans, on the one hand, and warring rapacious slaveholders, on the other. This image of collusion gives rise to questions of the littoral and inland, class and statehood, guilt and innocence, feudalism and capitalism, continuing to call into crisis what slavery actually is. The crisis is provisionally contained by the deflection of responsibility: that Africans have, in certain iterations of public memory, been constructed as willing accomplices seems to interfere with the relative power imputed to European enslavers, the relevance of an African diaspora, the demand for reparations, and the political pertinence of studying slavery at all. The historiographical trend towards contextualization and disaggregation, in its recent revalorization of resistance, has attempted to make African participants actors like any other.

    In a first-order leveling, European merchants, African chiefs, and middlemen are complicit in equal, complicated measure. Their ontologies are made commensurable. A characteristically sweeping statement would have it that “when guilt is apportioned, African chiefs and merchants deserve a large share” (Alpern 57). This share can be numerically measured, as when Philip Curtin disaggregates force to reveal wide-scale African participation: “Europeans bought, but Africans sold; and the number of Africans engaged in the slave trade at any moment was certainly larger than the number of Europeans” (“The Atlantic Slave Trade” 266). But guilt has also been appraised by the origin, quality, and scale of participation—how participants became involved, what they do with that participation, ways they benefit. Here, West African elites take center stage, harnessing power by selling out their supposed own and developing systems of exploitation Walter Hawthorne gathers under the heading of the “predatory state thesis” (9). The elite exploited commoners, the coast raided interiors, and Africa came to cannibalize itself.14

    Certainly, those who traffic in the language of guilt wield the past against the present, in order to amplify or quell the fallout from the mass displacement of peoples and resources. White people have a long history, in Rodney’s indictment, of attempting to “ease their guilty consciences” and throw “the major responsibility for the slave trade on to the Africans” (How Europe 81). The willing participant narrative also informs what Sylviane A. Diouf calls the “black betrayal model” (xiv), posed as a traumatic core for the diaspora. In a widely quoted passage, Henry Louis Gates Jr. narrates learning of African participation at the slave fortresses in Elmina, a narrative that continues to dominate tours today, and propounds on the difficulty of having “to confront the curious ease with which black Africans could sell Africans to the white man” (qtd. in Kaba 8).

    Slave historiography and Afro-pessimist criticism align in critiquing assumptions of filiation underlying the betrayal model. We can see this, for instance, in the correspondence between Lovejoy’s 1983 corrective that “it is inaccurate to think that Africans enslaved their brothers—although this sometimes happened. Rather, Africans enslaved their enemies” (Transformations 21) and Saidiya Hartman’s assertion that “contrary to popular belief, Africans did not sell their brothers and sisters into slavery. They sold strangers: those outside the web of kin and clan relationships, nonmembers of the polity, foreigners and barbarians at the outskirts of their country, and lawbreakers expelled from society” (5). Hartman continues, in a decidedly theoretical advance, to interrogate the problem of race-making: “In order to betray your race, you had first to imagine yourself as one. The language of race developed in the modern period and in the context of the slave trade.” Diouf likewise appears to indict calls of collusion as expressions of “anachronism”: “ethnic, political, and religious differences” were indeed leveraged in the past, but “nowhere in the Africans’ testimonies is there any indication that they felt betrayed by people ‘the color of their own skin’” (xiv).15 As Diouf writes, if it is the case that “concepts of Africa, Africans, blackness, whiteness, and race did not exist in Africa … they cannot be utilized today to assess people’s actions at a time when they were not operative” (xiv). What the historiographical terms of debate miss, however, is how the imaginary zoning of a time before race is nonetheless infiltrated by race in the very movement of apprehension—there is now little conceptual escape. Which is also to say anachronism can only be anachronistic absent a vanishing mediator. If anachronism is, instead, symptomatic of this vanishing mediator—the imperceptible shift from formal to real subsumption that appears after-the-fact, in the form of belatedness—then the collision of Africanness-blackness-slaveness informs interpretations of the past even in attempts to divest from them. Without a reckoning of this order, the conceit of indigenous blackness, excavated by ethnophilosophy in mythic pasts, too easily mystifies the ground of its own articulation.

    Historiography mediates Africanness-blackness-slaveness through tricks of subjectivity: by diffusing the insider-outsider status in order to amplify agency and expand the sphere of African action beyond a reduction to either “trading partners on the one hand and cargo on the other” (Diouf x). While Rodney identifies as structural critique the idea that “any European trader could arrive on the coast of West Africa and exploit the political differences which he found there … It was so easy to set one off against another that Europeans called it a ‘slave trader’s paradise’” (How Europe 79), the ever-widening scope of historiographical intervention metabolizes Rodney’s structural critique into a problem of passive individual subjects. These historiographic conversions have occasioned recalibrations of agency, as focus shifts from the black betrayer to practices of resistance as survival.

    If “agency” in the context of racial slavery “is itself a response to a totalizing and unequal system” (Green xxvii), what does agency mean? What happens to power? Herman Bennett asks in African Kings and Black Slaves, “does the gesture of granting agency not risk giving legitimacy to the very political-conceptual practice that exercised its existence among Africans in the first place?” (25). As African historiography proceeds by incorporating and reclaiming agency, debates over how much agency should be conferred end up stabilizing a subjectivity outside of space and time, inducing a post-racialism at the very emergence of racial thinking. These incorporative calls to agency imply a metaphysics of capacity that underwrites the historiographical state of the field and the political ramifications of its questions (extending to the belief that Africa can be developed, if only the right insight or initiative were deployed). This range of assumptions, as an outgrowth of the terms of slavery itself, works to contextualize the individual but comes at the expense of contextualizing the structure. On the one hand, Rodney’s structuralism seems to absolve everyone, including slave traders and catchers. The view that slavery “was simply ordered and imposed from outside, with the African part in it a purely negative and involuntary one … mirrors a familiar notion of African incapacity” (Davidson 201). On the other hand, historiographers in the tradition of Fage, who assert that African states had vested interests in war and enslavement, “could be accused of trying to shift the burden of guilt for the horrors of the trade from European to African heads” (Curtin, Economic Change 153–54). Celebrations of agency effect a reversal, where the proto-colonial perspective passes, almost imperceptibly, into an avowedly emancipatory one. This is contextualization run amok, the point at which it becomes indecipherable from decontextualization.

    The historiography of African slavery does attend to the ways the trade impacted West African systems—how what we think of as tradition and culture bear the weight of slavery. Of particular interest have been transformations to ritual practices: take the evolution of shrines like the Nananom Mpow from local sites to regional significance (Shumway 134–44); the expansion of asafo militia companies, which protected the Fante’s emergent decentralized coalition from the terror of slave raiding (144–52); and the shifting focus to gods who “crystallize historical processes associated with the Atlantic slave trade” (Shaw 51), from the war god Nyigbla in Anlo-Ewe cosmology (Greene 16–7) to the Talensi god Tongnaab (Allman and Parker 23–71). It is now doxa that African traditions are inventive—paradoxically “not entirely ‘traditional’ in the sense that indigeneity or ‘native’ usually implies”—but it is less well established that these traditions reflect the experience of having been “for nearly fifteen generations … consumers of a foreign culture destructive of pre-existing practices and patterns of thought” (Woods 50), and that these traditions are themselves poetic and political negotiations with destruction.

    This is what Afro-pessimism approaches—not a flashy new theory, but a breaking away from some of the fetters (positivism, Marxism, history, tradition) that have made agency and resistance, victimhood and culpability the restricted markers of slavery’s impact in the world. Afro-pessimist itineraries augment dependency theory, asking whether diffusion of participation removes West African culpability, putting responsibility into the hands of a select few, or whether diffusion in fact identifies a more intensive form of capture. Even along the coast, a Dutch director-general observed in 1714 that “the kidnapping of people is becoming so common that no Negro whether free or slave dares pass without assistance from one place to another” (qtd. in Shumway 60). In this sense, Afro-pessimism draws from Rodney’s political edge and the occasional lessons of historiography, lessons that expand how “all blacks—rulers, traders, and war captives alike—became victims or potential victims” (Kaba 8). Given the extension of captivity across geography and rank, what needs to be raised as a possibility for thematic attention is the way “captivity and social death” might be “essential dynamics which everyone in this place called Africa stands in relation to” (Wilderson, “‘Inside-Outside’” 8–9). Historical models can chart transformations and continued debates can encircle them, but the paradigm that would seek answers only in actions might hide as much as it reveals. If Africa as a place-name has been made to designate a zone of incoherence through which the puzzle of human desire compels itself to find violent answers, then the enduring legacy of slavery can never be decoded through the performance of agency alone (whether participation, refusal, or resistance) and instead needs to be approached through the apparatus by which performance is articulated and appraised. Such a task necessitates, it might be added, that reparations include a global reclamation of meaning.

    Missing Memories

    It is here that the problem of a Ghanaian memory of slavery can be delimited. As a postcolonial collective that marks one (conversely Pan-African, democratic, liberationist, and neoliberal) variant of Africanity, Ghanaian identity has been rendered discrete from the problem of slavery through a foreclosure that designates “slavery and race” as “issues of concern only for diaspora Blacks” (Pierre 3). While Mbembe contends (with some ambivalence) that “there is, properly speaking, no African memory of slavery” (“African Modes” 259), and Hartman writes that “slaves have no place in the myth of empires. There were no drum histories of the captives” (190),16 scholars with an anthropological bent like Rosalind Shaw insist that “there are other ways of remembering the past than by speaking about it” (2). Joachim Agamba calls this other form of knowledge “embedded memory”: his research in Ghana’s Northern region has found echoes of slavery in musical forms, with flute and drum rhythms marking rallying cries warning of incoming raiders. Recent critical ethnography by Emmanuel Saboro continues to excavate resistance to enslavement far before the slave ships ever left shore, recorded in oral histories and on occasions such as the Fiok festival among the Bulsa in Northern Ghana. Similar findings have been documented in Nigerian songs and proverbs.17 What accounts for this tension between unaddressed memory and its saturation (only recently accessed in scholarship) in mythos and culture?

    In one strand of analysis, slavery’s memory is concealed by the demands of a postcolonial present. Nation-building, on the eve of Ghanaian Independence, was caught between the need to retrieve a past positive identity, a “native” or indigenous history of emancipation, and the need to prioritize a certain forward-facing finesse, a finesse that would avoid making Ghanaians passive victims or active agents with respect to slavery. Both positions might, in their own compounding ways, preclude direct paths to either refute European superiority or foster Ghanaian identity. As Ella Keren argues, “It was not just difficult to reconcile slavery and the slave trade with the search for a usable past, which would offer the new nation historical roots, continuity, and unity, but perceived as dangerous insofar as they could be used to support colonial images from which Africans wished to distance themselves” (980). This danger emanates from the racist fascination that links Africa to violence, which is maintained by more overt colonial-era invocations of the “native,” but encrypted by slavery’s supposedly indigenous provenance. The pressure of the postcolonial present, in other words, a collective Ghanaian conversation “shaped by forms of surveillance under colonialism as well as present-day development discourses with its Africa-as-failure mantra and the endless instantiations of Western ideologies of antiblack racism” (Holsey, Routes 8–9), mediates the distinct ways that slavery continues to be repressed and recovered. Cosmopolitan African identities express the eclipse of slavery in Africa by cathecting a triumphant past of indigeneity with the future of independence, but also by potentially ceding to the animating conditions propelling an anti-black present.

    Kwame Nkrumah’s intellectual production engages important precipitates of this national cathexis, navigating a reinvigorated past and revolutionary present through gestures toward self-fashioning. Arguing that African pre-history cannot provide transparent access to a socialist utopia, that “what socialist thought in Africa must recapture is not the structure of the ‘traditional African society’ but its spirit,” Nkrumah unearths the tension that is repeated later in West African historiography, writing both that “slavery existed in Africa before European colonisation, although the earlier European contact gave slavery in Africa some of its most vicious characteristics” and that “before colonisation, which became widespread in Africa only in the nineteenth century, Africans were prepared to sell, often for no more than thirty pieces of silver, fellow tribesmen and even members of the same ‘extended family’ and clan” (“African Socialism Revisited”). Faced with the specter of enduring slavery, with an African preparedness to sell that enabled slavery’s “most vicious” iteration, Nkrumah’s turn to the spirit (not the content) of the past invoked indigenous principles without becoming mired in more insidious practices. Ultimately, this negotiation meant that speeches and political tracts rarely centralized slavery, except as metaphor or brief colonial prelude.18 Self-determination nonetheless become a leitmotif for Nkrumah and his internationalist vision of democracy (Getachew 73–4), a vision whose rhetorical spin indicated that enslavement was ongoing, particularly when leveraged against “neo-colonialist masters” (Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism 33).

    Nkrumah inaugurated the University of Ghana’s Institute of African Studies with explicit exhortation to facilitate “cross fertilisation between Africa and those who have their roots in the African past” (qtd. in Ampofo 11). However, Ghana’s early black internationalist spirit did not translate into scholarship: according to one metric, out of three hundred graduate-level social science dissertations produced at the University of Ghana from 1965 to 1990, only Akosua Perbi’s focused on slavery (Keren 981).19 Since the early 1990s, meanwhile, slave and heritage tourism has been central to the Ghanaian Ministry of Tourism and Diasporan Relations’ 1992 Panafest, the 2007 bicentennial, and now the 2019 Year of the Return. The national response markets shared “brotherhood” based on lost culture. Scholarship and public conversations, however, do not directly engage a continued structuring history that would require negotiating how slavery, racism, colonialism, and capitalism shape Ghana’s position in a global imaginary (a turn that would, perhaps, better reflect the spirit of Nkrumah and Rodney). For Bayo Holsey, this lack of engagement indicates the ongoing impact of the divided world slavery opened: the “distancing from slavery,” which can be seen in gaps in public school textbooks, “and the embrace of slave ancestry encouraged by the state are two sides of the same coin” (“Black Atlantic Visions” 506). Holsey argues that while “narratives about African state-building have exhausted their utility,” those concerning “the slave trade have found a renewed purpose,” including those that link Africa to primordial corruption (“Owning Up to the Past?” 82–83). From the perspective of an Afro-pessimist analytic, this renewed purpose translates into the continued saturation of slavery, not its eclipse. The national containment of slavery both relays global dynamics and mediates how slavery is interpreted.

    Ghana’s Northern regions help exemplify the slave state paradigm. The North first featured in official tourism itineraries in 2001, where a delegation from Panafest traveled to the historic slave-holding town of Paga. The region’s involvement in the slave trade has been represented through 1) the mid-eighteenth century’s Asante-Dagbamba war; 2) the abduction of Yaa Naa Abdallah Gariba leading to the forced payment of 2,000 slaves as tribute or ransom to the Asante; 3) the use of Zambarama peoples as raiders and mercenaries; and 4) the supposition that half a million Northerners were sold into slavery from the mid 1700s to 1897 (Der 29). While the impact of this demographic disruption has been disputed, the gulf dividing Ghana’s North and South remains.20 Indeed, accumulated legacies of slavery and colonialism have all but written the North out of the story of the nation, displacing a geospatial Northern imaginary into a timeless past. The nationalized denigration of the North is intimately tied to the “desires of coastal residents to embrace an ‘imagined cosmopolitanism,’” and the “negative characterizations of northerners, which are at times accompanied by explicit references to their past vulnerability to enslavement, provide an ethnographic illustration of the dreadful depth of African historical interactions with Europe” (Holsey, Routes 100–1). This regional zoning engendered “a spatial reconfiguration of power that eventually led to the emergence of new (breakaway) social formations whose very origins and cultural logic resided principally in the expanding Atlantic complex” (Bennett 35). Such zoning transformed into the now well-known colonial carving of rigid ethnic and tribal lines, reduplicating in the consolidation of coastal power and structuring “non-centralized societies as politically illegitimate and therefore tangential to the political structure of the Northern Territories” (Talton 207).21

    Differently put, Ghana’s Northern regions represent the failed attempt to spatially segregate slavery and its impact. While “During the first phase of the slave trade on the Gold Coast, one’s level of vulnerability to enslavement could be difficult to predict,” after the dawn of the eighteenth-century the North became a primary target for enslavement (Holsey, “Black Atlantic Visions” 510). The containment of slavery was never successful, as the North instead became the zone through which the generalization of slaveness emerged. The Akan term for “bought person,” ɔdɔnkɔ, eventually became synonymous with Northerner (Rattray 34),22 while the symbolic-political strategies that reduced the North to a backwards and stateless people were repurposed and expanded during formal British rule to include all Ghanaians as “native.” The language used by the Northern Territories governor in 1933 echoes that of colonial logic writ large: “When the Whiteman first came to your country you were backward and primitive, a prey to slave raiders from the north and south. You had no cohesion and in many cases no constitution to speak of which was really the root of your troubles” (qtd. in Allman and Parker 72). If slaveness was associated with territorial backwardness that would eventually be engulfed by more triumphant national narratives, then to raise questions about slavery and its legacy may involve, as Emmanuel Akyeampong has argued, a threat to “national integration in recently independent countries” (1). What Akyeampong exposes is the myth of integration, one whose political necessity the history of slavery calls into question and for which it provides new frames.

    An investigation into the phantasmatic construction of indigenous slavery can transform our understanding of 1980s neoliberal austerity measures, which map onto the intellectual-political turn away from critiques of structural underdevelopment and towards positive appraisals of African autonomy and agency. Holsey submits, for example, that “the African slave trader provides a leitmotif of structural adjustment reforms” (“Owning Up to the Past?” 83).23 When the instability represented by the North is both subsumed into the nation and written backwards, its effacement (continuing today in diminished access to resources, infrastructure, and mobility) means having no account of how “the disruption of Africa’s political structures and socio-economic potentials was part of the stagnation of Africa’s technological progress caused by the slave trade” (M’Baye 611). This also means having no longer genealogical route through which to reckon with the failure of development discourses vis-à-vis African political economy.

    Conclusion

    The “afterlife of slavery,” as described by Hartman (6), is usually taken up to interrogate abolition and Reconstruction in the Americas, but it was also written in an attempt to reckon with problems of emancipation in West Africa, and it extends the interrogative frame in this direction. Take the Gold Coast’s 1874 non-interventionist anti-slavery ordinances (coinciding with the colony’s annexation), which formally announced the emancipation of slaves but provided no mechanism for liberation except individual court appeals, permitting slavery’s post-proclamation continuation (Opare-Akurang). The afterlife of African slavery exposes a through-line from slavery to colonialism and post-colonialism, such that, in Rodney’s estimation, “the period of slave trading in West Africa should be regarded as protocolonial” (History 117–18).24 Lovejoy furthers Rodney’s charge to demonstrate that the anti-slave rhetoric accompanying the scramble for Africa employed the very same language and rationale of slavery. For Lovejoy, however, the collapse of slavery provides the key context, as “the imposition of colonialism terminated slavery as a mode of production” (287). This is where Afro-pessimism makes a crucial modification to historiographical orientation, by reframing slavery’s afterlife not as its subsumption into other more contemporary and comphrensive scenes of violence (such as capitalism or colonialism) but as its continuation, not what comes after slavery but how it lives on.

    Slavery isn’t just a past object to be remembered or not—its violent influence shapes how it can be thought. Indigenous slavery, in particular, polices where and when responsibility appears in national discourse and intellectual production; indigenous slavery becomes indigenous slavery because of the way racial slavery transforms the world and rewrites its past. Localizing African practices as slavery’s source interrupts the capacity for critique that would have the Atlantic plantation as the grounding system of modernity and that might reimagine indigeneity otherwise. Racial slavery can instead be demonized as a corrupt (and contingent) “inheritance of wealth and power” and indigenous slavery revalorized precisely as “the inheritance of tradition” (Holsey, “Owning Up to the Past?” 85). Indeed, racial slavery can be said to invest indigeneity with its peculiar anti-black meaning—indigenous not in relation to the land (indigenous studies’ near comprehensive silence on Africa bears this out), but in relation to slavery. In this respect, we need an account of the continuity of the “extraordinary prejudice” that “African and Africans are somehow historically predisposed to violence and savagery” other than mere bewilderment that “it remains still quite widespread one fifth of the way through the twenty-first century” (Green xvi). This is to say that a focus on slavery as the generative condition of modernity, a version of Du Bois’s and Rodney’s positions, refigures the rhetoric of indigenous slavery as a point de capiton for African historiography, national mythology, and global anti-blackness. The legacy of slavery subsists through the displacement of narrative impossibility—shaping spaces and traditions, propelling time forward, securing meaning. If the racial slave is the generation of worldly possibility, the indigenous slave is its impossible effluvia. Every attempt to redeem, reconstitute, or resurrect the proper form of this past object must reckon with the prism through which it appears to us today.

    Sara-Maria Sorentino Sara-Maria Sorentino is an Assistant Professor of Gender & Race Studies at the University of Alabama. Her research asks methodological questions that excavate connections between anti-black violence, philosophical abstraction, and material reproduction. She has work published or forthcoming in Rhizomes, Theory & Event International Labor and Working-Class History, Antipode, and Telos.

    Footnotes

    1. See Kankpeyeng’s summary that “The history of indigenous slavery in Ghana is sketchy, but the oral traditions of present-day Ghanaian ethno-linguistic groups point to the longevity of the institution of slavery” (211), and Perbi’s reiteration of the argument that the Atlantic slave trade “did not supersede the indigenous slave trade. The two systems existed side by side and sustained each other” (62). In many ways, this problem repeats (and could someday clarify) Marxist debates over alternative and resistant sites to primitive accumulation. See Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa 82–9.

    2. See also Du Bois on how domestic African slaves “could and did rise to freedom and preferment; they became parts of the new tribe. It was left to Christian slavery to improve on all this—to make slavery a rigid unending caste by adding to bondage the prejudice of race and color” (251).

    3. Nkrumah writes that of all the “malicious myths” presented by European historians, the most insidious was the denial that “we were a historical people. It was said that whereas other continents had shaped history, and determined its course, Africa has stood still, held down by inertia; that Africa was only propelled into history by the European contact” (Consciencism 61).

    4. On how Afro-pessimism re-scripts the historiography of generalized slavery leveraged by Orlando Patterson’s study Slavery and Social Death, see Sorentino, “The Sociogeny of Social Death.”

    5. Sexton reads Afro-pessimism as “a certain motivated reading or return to Fanon, an attention to Fanon the theorist of racial slavery and ‘negrophobia’ more so than Fanon the theorist of metropolitan colonialism.” See “Afro-Pessimism: The Unclear Word.”

    6. See also Wynter: “What has remained constant is the position of Africa. Although no longer militarily and politically colonised, Africa, nevertheless, as the projected continent of origin as the extreme form of the ‘native Other’ to Man, retains its position as the bottom-most world, the one plagued most extremely by the contradictions that are inseparable from Man’s bourgeois conception of being human” (35).

    7. de B’béri and Louw attend to “this phenomenon of Afropessimism” as “much more complex and its impact much deeper, not only in terms of how Africa is imagined and perceived, but also as regards the ways in which Africans view themselves” (337)

    8. Concern with American exceptionalism is warranted, echoing in the missionary designs of nineteenth-century black nationalists Martin Delany, Alexander Crummell, and Harry McNeil Turner, who grounded their return to Africa in correcting a presumed savage enslaving pre-history (Adeleke), and continuing in a series of diasporic initiatives structured and supported by U.S. Cold War policy. See Von Eschen 176–81.

    9. A parallel criticism is levelled against Paul Gilroy in Gikandi, 1–2.

    10. In Amalgamation Schemes, Sexton extends this argument by centralizing “the qualitative difference between sub-Saharan Africa vis-à-vis the other regions of the global South” as the primary image that is “reflected in the qualitative difference of black positionality in the U.S. racial formation vis-à-vis ‘the colors in the middle’ (not black, not white)” (40–41).

    11. See Wilderson’s support of a multivalent political strategy he calls “Two Trains Running (Side by Side)” in “‘The Inside-Outside of Civil Society’” 18.

    12. See Chernoff’s engagement with Dagbamba music as “perhaps best considered as arrangement of gaps where one may add a rhythm” (113–14).

    13. See also Gilroy’s interview with Tommy Lott on a diaspora “that can’t be reversed” (57).

    14. This internalized consumption narrative takes a politically radical edge, too, as when Rodney converts the well-worn display of “tribal conflict” into a take-down of the ruling class in A History of the Upper Guinea Coast: “When the line of demarcation is clearly drawn between the agents and the victims of slaving as it was carried on among the littoral peoples, that line coincides with the distinction between the privileged and the un-privileged in the society as a whole” (117–18). The class line bears the weight of the acquisitive origin of slaving and has been rendered commensurate with classic accounts of European feudalism. See Diouf: “Aware of these parallels, a king in Dahomey remarked to a British governor, ‘Are we to blame if we send our criminals to foreign lands? I was told you do the same’” (xvi).

    15. As testimony, we can take Cugoano’s confession that he “must own, to the shame of my countrymen, that I was first kidnapped and betrayed by some of my own complexion, who were the first cause of my exile and slavery.” Although referring to racial constructions of difference, Cugoano situates this in slavery’s transformation:

    if there were no buyers there would be no sellers. So far as I can remember, some of the Africans in my country keep slaves, which they take in war, or for debt; but those which they keep are well fed, and good care taken of them, and treated well; and, as to their clothing, they differ according to the custom of the country. But I may safely say, that all the poverty and misery that any of the inhabitants of Africa meet with among themselves, is far inferior to those inhospitable regions of misery which they meet with in the West-Indies, where their hard-hearted overseers have neither regard to the laws of God, nor the life of their fellow-men.(234)

    16. Hartman does record memory inscribed in naming practices (192–96)

    17. See Ojo and Opata for examples of oral history in the Nigerian context.

    18. More broadly, “preferred Africanist topics of engagement” remain “globalization, nationalism, ethnicity, ritual and folklore, the (failed) state” (Pierre xiv).

    19. A similar gap has been noted in black studies, as “the early concrete connections between the lives of Africans on the continent and in the U.S. in the study of the Black experience have all but disappeared” (Ampofo 14).

    20. Haas has recently used his research with Dagbamba drummers and warriors to contest broad swaths of widely received history on the Asante empire and its domination over Dagbon.

    21. Kankpeyeng identifies how Northern “present-day population and settlement patterns” are grounded in slavery (213).

    22. The Dagbamba, meanwhile, tend to avoid dabili (slave) but do sometimes use it as an insult for the “stateless” (MacGaffey 18–19).

    23. Such an analysis can also be extended to current anti-police activism in West Africa. On the colonial history of policing in Ghana in particular, see Tankebe.

    24. See M’Baye and Nunn for recent econometric demonstrations of slavery’s devastating effect on African populations.

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  • Notes on Contributors

    John Culbert John Culbert is a Lecturer in the Department of English at the University of British Columbia. He is the author of Paralyses: Literature, Travel and Ethnography in French Modernity (Nebraska 2010). His article “The Well and the Web” appeared in Postmodern Culture 19.2.

    Jonathan Fardy Jonathan Fardy is Assistant Professor of Art History and Director of Graduate Studies in Art at Idaho State University. His research examines the aesthetic strategies that underwrite the constitution and argumentative structure of contemporary theories of art and politics. He is the author of three books: Laruelle and Art: The Aesthetics of Non-Philosophy; Laruelle and Non-Photography; and Althusser and Art. His current book project, The Real is Radical: Marx after Laruelle, is due out next year.

    Adam Dylan Hefty Adam Dylan Hefty is an Assistant Professor in the Core Curriculum program at Prince Mohammad Bin Fahd University (Al Khobar, Saudi Arabia). He holds a Ph.D. in History of Consciousness from the University of California, Santa Cruz. Recent works include essays on right-wing responses to climate change and on the history of mood disorders. He is working on a manuscript that traces a genealogy of the connection between practices of managing work and mental health.

    Miriam Jerade Miriam Jerade is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the Faculty of Liberal Arts, Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez, in Santiago de Chile. Previously, she was an assistant professor at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México and the Ivan and Nina Ross Fellow at the Katz Center for Advanced Judaic Studies in the University of Pennsylvania. Recent works include articles on political readings of speech act theory, Derrida’s reading of the death penalty, and representation and sovereignty in Franz Rosenzweig and Jacques Derrida. Her first book is Violencia. Una lectura desde la deconstrucción de Jacques Derrida (Metales Pesados, 2018).

    Cory Austin Knudson Cory Austin Knudson is a doctoral student in Comparative Literature and Literary Theory at the University of Pennsylvania. His work focuses broadly on modernism and the environmental humanities, with emphasis on the function of decomposition in both literature and ecology. His essay, “Seeing the World: Visions of Being in the Anthropocene,” has been recently published in Environment, Space, Place. With Tomas Elliott, he is currently translating Georges Bataille’s The Limit of the Useful, a preliminary manuscript to The Accursed Share, for MIT Press.

    Erin Obodiac Erin Obodiac received her Ph.D. in Comparative Literature from the University of California, Irvine and has held teaching and research appointments at the University of Leeds, SUNY Albany, Cornell University, and SUNY Cortland. She currently lectures in the UC Irvine-Dalian University of Technology joint program. Her writings assemble residual questions from the deconstructive “legacy” with emergent discourses in technics and animality, media ecology, and machinic subjectivity. She is completing a book called Husserl’s Comet: Cinema and the Trace, which repositions deconstruction within the history of cybernetics and machinic life.

    Rocío Pichon-Rivière Rocío Pichon-Rivière is a Visiting Assistant Professor of Hispanic Studies at the University of California, Riverside. Previously she was a postdoctoral fellow at New York University and a visiting scholar at the Pratt Institute. Recent works include essays on hemispheric trans theory, Latin American women’s political thinking, and phenomenologies of shame.

    Sara-Maria Sorentino Sara-Maria Sorentino is an Assistant Professor of Gender & Race Studies at the University of Alabama. Her research asks methodological questions that excavate connections between anti-black violence, philosophical abstraction, and material reproduction. She has work published or forthcoming in Rhizomes, Theory & Event International Labor and Working-Class History, Antipode, and Telos.