Category: Volume 31 – Numbers 1 & 2 – September 2020 and January 2021

  • Coming Down

    Tyler T. Schmidt (bio)

    A review of Montez, Ricardo. Keith Haring’s Line: Race and the Performance of Desire. Duke UP, 2020.

    I keep thinking about Juan Dubose crashing in the hallway while his boyfriend, artist Keith Haring, soldiers through a dinner at the poet John Giorno’s house in January 1985. The event, peopled with gay stars of the art world, was in honor of William Burroughs. The couple had been partying the night before at the Paradise Garage, the iconic club at 84 King Street in SoHo. Dubose spent the evening at Giorno’s on the hallway stairs, reportedly with his head in his hands. For all their interest in queer nightlife as utopian possibility and the sexy hedonism of Paradise Garage, where legendary DJ Larry Levan turned vinyl into magic, students of queer culture have paid little attention to the “come down”—that treacherous, often shameful journey when the drugs wear off. “Shattered,” as I’ve heard some Brits describe these states of extreme fatigue or excessive partying, always strikes me as a perfect encapsulation of that fragile, queasy undoing. In his revelatory Keith Haring’s Line: Race and the Performance of Desire, Ricardo Montez keeps company with Dubose in the hall. Quiet companionship, in fact, is often what we need when we’re coming down from the party. Montez is the sort of thoughtful critic who gives theoretical weight and respect to those too undone from the night before to endure the dinner party banter. Returning to Giorno’s self-satisfying account of sex with Haring in the Prince Street toilets in his collection You Got to Burn to Shine (1994), Montez questions the way Dubose is both hailed and marginalized in most accounts of Haring’s cross-race desires, energies that profoundly shape both his life and art:

    Giorno’s deployment and disregard of Dubose echo many of the ways in which Dubose exists as a defining and necessary figure in the romantic view of Haring as transcendent interracial lover, while being ignored and somewhat disposable in the setting of valued exchange between those in an esteemed gay artistic circle. (52)

    As Montez demonstrates persuasively in Keith Haring’s Line, the “deployment and disregard” of racial difference are central features of Haring’s creative practice. His relationships and artistic collaborations are marked by both a still-rare self-critique of whiteness, and an obliviousness to—if not a downright dismissal of—the exploitative power dynamics within these cross-racial encounters.

    My own return to Dubose in the hall admittedly risks sliding into the sentimental mythmaking and sloppy identification with blackness by white gay men that Montez interrogates. Dubose has become “a brown and black sign that is an amalgamation of projections” (16), not only in Giorno’s account of the dinner party, but in much of the scholarship on Haring’s art. A DJ and car-radio installer, Dubose was the first of several Black and Latino men with whom Haring was romantically and artistically involved. The thorniness of these relationships, in all their ethical and aesthetic complexity, is central to Montez’s book. Some will recognize Dubose from Polaroids taken by Andy Warhol in 1983—the source material for the ghostly silkscreens of varying hues that he made of Dubose and Haring. Montez confronts the material complexity of these images in the archive to see them differently. Now alight with intimacy, the images of Haring and Dubose intertwined refuse “narrative coherence” (18); they are what Montez calls “temporal freezes that index Haring’s notion of becoming other,” a fantasy of racial erasure that Haring believes interracial relationships might make possible (16). In returning to the archives to see what’s been missed or misread, Montez is not interested in historical rescue or corrective. In fact, he says such a project would be impossible in the case of Dubose, for whom no self-composed counternarrative exists. Rather, the book interrogates the ways in which narratives—particularly heteroheroic accounts of Haring’s life—invoke cross-racial desires but avoid any meaningful discussion of the very real humans hailed within these gestures and then fetishized, marginalized, and cast aside.

    Montez’s book is a welcome addition to a constellation of projects—some foundational, others newer—that pay fuller, much-needed attention to the exchanges between race and queer desire in New York City’s “Downtown scene” of the early 1980s: for example, José Esteban Muñoz’s “Famous and Dandy like B. ‘n’ Andy: Race, Pop, and Basquiat” in Disidentifications (1999); Arnaldo Cruz-Malavé’s Queer Latino Testimonio, Keith Haring, and Juanito Xtravanganza (2007); Dagmawi Woubshet’s treatment of Haring in The Calendar of Loss (2015); Joshua Chambers-Letson’s recent work on Tseng Kwong Chi in After The Party (2018); and W. Ian Bourland’s Bloodflowers (2019), a brilliant study of photographer Rotimi Fani-Kayode. While Haring’s sexual and artistic interest in Black and Latino men is well-documented, Montez is up to something deeper; he interrogates Haring’s desire for these men as part of a creative practice often animated by racial fantasies, including an “unfulfilled desire to have and be something other than white” (5). Drawing from the worlds of graffiti and the dance culture of the city’s B-Boys, Haring believes he can access “a nonwhite interiority” through his art (14). “I’m sure inside I’m not white,” the artist writes in his journal. This “remarkable claim,” as Montez describes it, is one of the theoretically rich spaces he explores in the book (119). Haring’s fantasy of racial transcendence remains relevant to our current moment when many white Americans are eager to distance themselves from whiteness, arriving late to the idea that racism is systemic.

    Montez’s deep dive into the meanings of Haring’s line, his signature strokes, seeks to disrupt restrictive narratives about racialized desire. Chapter One, which includes the critique of Giorno’s questionable commentary on Haring’s erotic life, begins with a discussion of the ways in which Haring’s bold, carved lines are problematically described as “primitive,” a discourse always burdened with Western supremacist ideology that seeks to contain “the Other.” In a moment of jargon-studded prose, Montez explains: “Haring’s citational line embodies the condition of the Western self that can only be recognized through a dialectical relationship with a premodern tribal other” (37). He links this re-evaluation of Haring’s primitivism to narratives of queer alterity, including Giorno’s. Placing Haring’s journals within a tradition of urban writing rooted in the “dark places of ordinary men” (50), Montez resituates Haring’s lines (on paper and concrete) within “a legacy of queer performative writing experiments” that are almost always marked by a romance with the “other” (34). Haring’s writing about encounters in the bathhouse documents feelings of “isolation and rejection” that also define these spaces of sexual promise (57).

    Haring’s collaborations with graffiti artists and hip-hop dancers strengthen his street credibility while his whiteness neutralizes the rhetoric of criminality associated with these subcultures. Chapter Two begins with the work of Angel Ortiz, the graffiti artist known as LA II. Like Dubose, Ortiz is relegated to “a secondary timeline” in Haring’s biography (15). LA II, it becomes clear, had to be strategic in order to prevent his art from being eclipsed by the celebrity artist he worked alongside. He had to reclaim his lines repeatedly.

    Montez scrutinizes Ortiz’s collaborations with Haring—which include a golden, graffitied sarcophagus—through an original analysis of power negotiations and aesthetics within a “queer economy of exchange” (63). Their relationship is read through discourses on public sex and rethinks the ethical complexities between gay men and “trade.” Montez is careful to draw out the nuances of the term, whose meanings include straight men who have sex with gay men, often for money. The chapter explores “narratives of queer urban contact” (67)—including those by John Rechy and Samuel Delany—in order to offer “trade aesthetics” as “a framework for thinking through the visual discursive field that both artists [Haring and LA II] come to occupy in the press and the reception of the work they created together” (72). This instructive analysis illuminates the ways an economy of desire also marks Haring’s lines, emerging in “friction of complicity, desire, and inequality” (82).

    In a discussion of some of the more troublesome moments in Samuel Delany’s now canonical treatise on sex and public space (Times Square Red, Times Square Blue), Montez asks us to think more fully about the racial and class dynamics that shape these encounters, and the ethical questions that are often missing or glossed over in cultural studies of public sex. For example, he uses Delany’s account of stymying a pickpocket at the theaters to explore ways in which this murky “moral imperative” (70) has more in common with the policing of queer and Black bodies than many would care to realize. This instructive re-reading describes and questions a “john subjectivity,” one that celebrates interclass contact but prefers that it “remain unsullied by the money he [Delany] pointedly wants to protect.” And Delany evidently doesn’t like to tip a go-go boy. Montez argues that such moments reveal the way “trade as an object of desire is often denied care through the very operations of desire” (71). While acknowledging that none of us can exist outside of these economies of desire (this too is a racial fantasy), Montez’s reflections on LA II and Delany urge us to think more deeply about the incidents of mistreatment and stances of moral superiority behind these supposedly liberatory encounters and sites. Montez’s discussion of cruising culture demonstrates the sort of nuanced critique often absent in scholarship on public sex, despite increasing interest in pre-AIDS sexual practices that animated sites like New York City’s West Side piers, bathhouses and discotheques.1 Given the longing within a younger generation of queers for the “good ol’ days,” queer scholars should continue to interrogate the limits of the utopic, liberatory possibilities that these forms of public sex and communal eroticism are said to offer (and sometimes do).

    Chapter Three, “Theory Made Flesh,” makes a satisfying pivot to consider Haring’s collaborations with the singular artist Grace Jones. With her hula-hoop antics and much-cited androgyny, Ms. Grace has become a patron saint of queer performance studies, and is deservedly fawned over by queer radicals. Montez’s reading highlights the way acts of “white male authorship” turn to Jones’s body “for the production of truth,” to realize creative plans rooted in an aestheticization of blackness (104–5). Critical of photographer Jean-Paul Goude for his manipulation of Jones’s physical form and personas to suit his own primitivist vision, Montez shifts our attention to the singer’s independent projects. Jones’s self-directed video “I’m Not Perfect (But I’m Perfect for You)” (1986) is dissected as a narrative of excess, an unraveling (or perhaps redirecting) of the pop primitivism foisted upon her by Haring, Goude, and other male collaborators. Ever-attentive to the nuances of creative collaboration, Montez does not position Jones as a victim of simplistic objectification or as a radical warrior dismantling the racial imaginary. He claims, rather, that Jones’s comments in her memoir about her decades of image (re)making express an “awareness of the impossibility of rescuing a prediscursive truth of black flesh” but also “her excited sense of complicity in the making of the Grace Jones myth,” working with and through the racist fantasies that animate many of her collaborations (87). This analytical move to recognize and value complicity as a form of artistic agency counters the eagerness of queer scholars to find a radicalism, a promise of subversion, an unsullied agency or just some redemptive breathing space for the artists we admire, even adore, but whose political and aesthetic flaws make unqualified reverence impossible. Jones approaches her performances—including one at the Paradise Garage in which she dresses in Haring’s lines—as “a space of constant uncertainty” (90). Rather than evade white male authorship, Jones conspires with it as part of a “continual attempt at rewriting the possibilities of her flesh” (105). In our now, students of queer studies should welcome a similar critical and political uncertainty into their work; otherwise, the field’s fixed attention on the “transformative” and “disruptive” reduces the expansive ways radical politics and progressive artmaking engage both dissent and complicity.

    The book’s final chapter shifts in structure and approach. Describing the chapter as a “subjective journey” into a cluster of Haring ephemera (112), Montez pushes against the confines of more traditional, chronologically bound artist monographs and the “heteroheroics” that often animate them. Placing himself within a lineage of queer critical writing, Montez uses “alternative modes of historical imagining” (111) to disrupt simplistic claims about Haring’s racial aesthetics as well as the staid forms often used to write about queer art. The chapter moves briskly and poetically through a range of objects, from Haring’s mural in the former men’s room of New York’s LGBT Community Center to his triptych at St. John the Divine to Rosson Crow’s radiant, drip-filled painting, a reinhabiting of the Pop Shop. While I am a fan of the collage format with its quick turns of poetic insight (haven’t we all spent more time than we wanted with an artifact in a monograph as a scholar’s close reading becomes microscopic?), these objects call for greater attention. Even as a “performance of ambivalence” (112), Montez’s fragments, observations, and refusals to make authoritative claims are too rapid, associative, and less satisfying than the careful, needed, and often surprising insights about Haring and his interlocutors offered in the previous chapters. However fleeting these object studies, I must admit that reading Keith Haring’s Line during this stay-at-home season made the textual visits around New York extra sweet, from the St. Marks Baths to the Whitney Museum of American Art to the LGBT Center to St. John the Divine. Despite the staggering amount of international travel that Haring did as his celebrity and commissions exploded, New York City was his home.

    Like Haring’s line, Montez’s prose is crisp and decisive. In this final chapter and throughout his readings, his beautiful writing invites readers to rethink our scholarly machines, to reimagine what critical writing and our theory-laden prose can do. Keith Haring’s Line places its author’s affective investments on full display. Reading (which is to say feeling) a set of photographs of Haring and Dubose at a beach in Brazil, Montez admits that one photo, lovingly dissected, “forces me to a state of intimacy that is more turbulent than a general ‘research’ interest” (128). I admire such projects for their permission to write differently, to feel “our” art differently, to imagine an embodied, affective criticism that takes seriously the feelings we have for the subjects we write about. So much critical writing is after all a gussied-up version of our admiration and irritations, and this work attempts to square deep affection and thorny ambivalence. In writing differently, Montez also encourages us to read differently: outside of standard conceptions of time, outside of rote narratives about Haring or any queer, canonical artist (from Basquiat to Mapplethorpe to Baldwin), and outside of the “celebrity artist” industry with its tote bags and lapel pins.

    This thoughtful journey into the thicket of Haring’s racialized desire got me wondering about his broader responses and commitments to racial justice and social change. I knew about his Free South Africa poster (1985) and Michael Stewart–USA for Africa (1985), his response (one can’t call it a portrait) to the graffiti artist’s murder. The latter was recently on display as part of a Jean-Michel Basquiat exhibition at the Guggenheim.2 His journals make few references to politics in general and even fewer comments on current events related to race, racial justice, or activism; the murder of Michael Stewart and the acquittal of the officers who killed him are the exception. He writes of giving Stevie Wonder, whom he met backstage at a concert in Rome in June 1989, some Free South Africa buttons and a T-shirt (Journals 356). The year before he asks: “How can it be possible that apartheid still exists? Dr. King was speaking against it 20 years ago. The world knows it’s wrong: journalists, protests, books, songs, movies–no matter how many oppose it, it exists now in 1988 and it is as strong as ever” (289). This rare comment on the historical sweep and structures of racism is part of a larger reflection on elitism and “manipulation” in the art world in which Haring draws connections between art, race, and “Big Control”: “The art world is just a small model or metaphor of the Big Control.” He goes on to say that “things are changing faster and faster.” And at the end of the journal entry, he quotes (and I cringe) Fanon’s rallying cry: “By any means necessary” (Journals 289–90).

    Montez’s project, in contrast, urges us to look at “Little” control: the daily workings of power that include the quotidian, interpersonal forms wielded by white gay men, and that Haring isn’t quite able or willing to engage. One of the great strengths of Keith Haring’s Line is its nuanced attention to the “various ways in which race is reified through often contradictory narratives” (5). The complexities of racialized desire are scrutinized in Haring’s art and journal writing, but Montez also composes a critical narrative that welcomes similar contradictions, neither condemnatory nor effusive about Haring’s creative engagement with racial difference. Haring’s fetishistic practices are laid bare, as are the murky violations of intimacies across race, but readers are also shown the ways Haring’s queer sensibility changed over time, though it can never be cleaved from racial eroticism and racial aesthetics. This sensibility was both (over)crafted and, most importantly, collective and collaborative. Montez insists that we pay attention to those collaborators and wrangle with the dubious ethics and problematic racial fantasies that emerge in our collaborations, both artistic and sexual.

    Whether in Juan Dubose’s mixtape or the blurred lines Haring painted on Grace Jones’s performatively defiant body, Keith Haring’s Line: Race and the Performance of Desire engages both loss and excess to imagine a history always slightly out of reach. At one point, in his reading of Haring’s journal entry about a snub at the bathhouse, Montez suggests poignantly that love is a kind of “waiting to possess” (56). Juan Dubose is crashing in the hall, but he is also waiting for Haring. A history of intimacy is made in such minor moments. But a waiting love can be agonizing and undoubtedly exacerbated by the come down, that woozy space that remains when earlier joys take leave.

    Tyler T. Schmidt is Associate Professor of English at Lehman College, City University of New York (CUNY) where he co-directed the Writing Across the Curriculum for nearly a decade. His essay “Lessons in Light: Beauford Delaney’s and James Baldwin’s ‘Unnameable Objects’” was published in the collection Of Latitudes Unknown: James Baldwin’s Radical Imagination (2019). The author of Desegregating Desire: Race and Sexuality in Cold War American Literature (2013), he is currently at work on a book about a group of Midwestern writers and visual artists who collectively reimagined queer portraiture in the 1940s and 1950s.

    Footnotes

    1. Examples of recent engagements with New York City’s architectures of public sex include: The Life and Times of Alvin Baltrop exhibition (2019) at the Bronx Museum of Art; W. Ian Bourland’s brilliant Bloodflowers (2019); Jonathan Weinberg’s Pier Groups (2019); The Queer Space Studies Initiative; Jack Halberstam’s “Unbuilding Gender: Trans* Anarchitectures In and Beyond the Work of Gordon Matta-Clark” (2018); and Fred Moten’s “Amuse-bouche” (2017).

    2. The exhibition, Basquiat’s “Defacement”: The Untold Story, at the Guggenheim from June 2019 to November 2019, centered on Basquiat’s visual protest, initially rendered on the walls of Haring’s studio, of Stewart’s death.

    Works Cited

    Haring, Keith. Keith Haring Journals. Viking, 2010.

  • Self-Reflexivity as Infra-Structure

    Jens Andermann (bio)

    A review of Benezra, Karen. Dematerialization: Art and Design in Latin America. U of California P, 2020.

    Over the course of little more than a decade, from the late 1950s to the early 1970s, Latin American art experienced a wholesale transformation. As evidenced by the diverse group invited to participate in the Museum of Modern Art’s landmark 1970 survey exhibition Information (Marta Minujin, Carlos D’Alessio, Cildo Meirelles, Hélio Oiticia, and Artur Barrio, among others), Latin American artists increasingly challenged earlier neo-avant-gardist references such as Concrete, Informal, or Minimalist art, embarking instead on a process of homegrown conceptual and political radicalization. Argentine artist Roberto Jacoby—then a leading proponent of arte de los medios (media art) with Raúl Escari—succinctly describes the sentiment at the time, reflecting on how he and his fellow artists around Buenos Aires’s trend-setting Instituto Di Tella art school

    entered a crazy race which, in just a few years, brought plastic artists to move from the bidimensional space of the painting to the object, in its multiple variants, and from there to concept-based works, to messages that reflect on themselves, and on to the dissolution of the very idea of work and its extension to the transformations operated by the mass communication media as well as to the framings of their context and to signposting social life, etc. All these approaches removed painters from their relationships with traditional materials, and brought them to reflect on their positions vis-à-vis the cultural institutions of the bourgeoisie, on the possibilities of carrying out a transformative practice, and on the best ways of taking it forward: the avant-garde became politicized.(qtd. in Longoni and Mestman 58; my translation)

    Writing in 1966 on Hélio Oiticica’s early “ambientations,” Brazilian critic Mário Pedrosa notes that this new cycle is “no longer purely artistic but cultural”; instead of the isolated, self-referential work, “what is dominant is the perceptive-sensory ensemble.” He speculates that this shift might also herald a broader turn towards an altogether new social and political role for the aesthetic, one he tentatively proposes to call “postmodern art” (Pedrosa 205).

    Recent art-historical scholarship and curatorial proposals reflect a re-ignited interest in Latin American late modernism, exemplified by recent shows such as the Hammer Museum’s 2019 Radical Women: Latin American Art, 1960–1985 and the Migros Museum’s 2016–2017 Resistance Performed: Aesthetic Strategies Under Repressive Regimes in Latin America. In her in-depth study of the period, Karen Benezra argues that scholars and curators have too rapidly glossed over the years separating the conceptualist moment from a fully-fledged “political art” that began with the landmark 1968 Tucumán Arde (Tucumán Is Burning) in Argentina or the ground-breaking 1970 Brazilian show Do Corpo à Terra (From Body to Ground, curated by Frederico Morais, who coined the concept of guerrilla art in the same year). On today’s global museum circuit, Benezra suggests, “Latin American modernism” is coded as always already incipient political intervention, something other than purely art in a way that “implies its fusion with life within the closed historical horizon of the short twentieth century” (166). By contrast, Benezra refuses to take the dissolution of the work-as-object—and its gradual replacement by self-reflexive stagings of artistic practice (in its double relationship with the art system and everyday social life)—as an interstitial moment en route to an avowedly political art practice. Instead, her book zeroes in on the moment of dematerialization itself. Rather than using the term in a descriptive and historicizing sense, Benezra endows dematerialization with conceptual and analytical valences, allowing us “to reconsider the relationship between antiformalist art and sociopolitical transformation” (2). She argues that, insofar as “the ‘material’ at stake in art and design’s dematerialization is not only that of the physical, tangible object, but also the objective, historical specificity of the intertwined logic and ideology that produce and reproduce social relations” (4), dematerialization can serve as “a certain kind of operational self-reflexivity” (167) present both in artistic practice and in the critical reflection that responds to it (and which becomes increasingly enmeshed with and indistinguishable from that artistic practice as it becomes more “dematerialized”). In current American artistic and art-historical circles, dematerialization is deployed as a means to an end, a way of naming the move away from the self-enclosed “work” and towards open-ended, propositional “practices”; Benezra cites Lucy Lippard’s landmark 1968 essay “The Dematerialization of Art” as a key example. But in the usage of Latin American artist-intellectuals—such as the Argentine psychoanalyst and semiotician Oscar Masotta or his compatriot, the designer, painter, and theoretician Tomás Maldonado (the subjects of chapters 1 and 4, respectively)—the term comes to stand for art’s problematic relation to social totality. Art can neither claim autonomy (in terms of its regime of production and circulation) from this whole, nor can it blend immediately into it as yet another instance of “resistance performed” (to quote the title of the Migros Museum’s recent retrospective).

    Her book’s subtitle is something of a misnomer; in truth, and contrary to what we might expect, Benezra’s study is not a survey of art and design in Latin America, or even of the relations between the two. Rather, it offers a series of punctual engagements with key instances of critical self-reflexivity on the part of selected artists and writers, all of whom are situated on the uncertain boundary between artistic practice, politics, and theory. Chapter 1 charts the work of Oscar Masotta, in particular his book-length essay El “pop-art” (1967) and its shorter sequel, “Después del pop: nosotros desmaterializamos” (“After Pop: We Dematerialize”), collected in Conciencia y estructura (Consciousness and Structure, 1968). Benezra discusses Masotta’s production of “anti-happenings,” including El helicóptero (The Helicopter, 1966), a parallel staging of different events under the same name that drew attention to the regime of producing representations and its structuring ideological matrices as audience members discussed and disputed their experiences. She also considers El mensaje fantasma (Phantom Message, 1966), which set up a feedback loop between a street poster and a TV ad in a kind of mass-medial Moebius strip. Both actions resonate strongly with Grupo Arte de los Medios’s conceptualization of media art, particularly their seminal non-event Happening para un jabalí difunto (Happening for a Dead Boar), produced the same year.

    Chapter 2 leaps to the opposite end of the subcontinent and Mexican poet-philosopher Octavio Paz’s series of engagements with the work of Marcel Duchamp. Benezra asserts that Paz’s engagements “articulate a theory of art after modernism and a theory of communality or social being after modernity” as well as offering “a theory of art’s dematerialization” (65). Rather than as shock-like ruptures of medial circuits that could produce critical and consciousness-raising effects, as for Masotta and the Arte de los Medios group, Paz

    tends to view non-object-based works like happenings as immediately ritualistic and communitarian in nature in that they have left behind both the modernist emphasis on the hand of the artist and the self-critical mythological symbolism that he imputes to [Duchamp’s] The Bride. (97)

    “Dematerialization,” in the Mexican poet’s hands, comes to underwrite a “peculiarly postmodern Romanticism” (79). In Chapter 3, we are taken to the opposite end of the Mexican cultural spectrum for a discussion of the loosely interconnected artistic collectives known as Los Grupos (The Groups). Through the 1960s and 1970s, they advanced “the collectivization of artistic practice” as a way of making “the crisis of art’s social authority” conversant with “the social form of labor” and its transformations in the advent of neoliberal modernization (104–5). Benezra references the work of artist-theoreticians Alberto Híjar Serrano and Felipe Ehrenberg, specifically the latter’s 1970 London show Seventh Day Chicken.

    Chapter 4 pivots from artistic practices to industrial design, focusing on Gui Bonsiepe, German designer and disciple of Maldonado at the Ulm School of Design (Hochschule für Gestaltung, HfG). Benezra considers his role in the short-lived Chilean Cybersyn project: the computational planning of socialized industrial production under Salvador Allende’s Unión Popular government. Bonsiepe’s retro-futuristic Operations Room—with its Star Trek-like swirling chairs and datafeed screens—provides the central nexus for a sweeping reading of the HfG Ulm’s controversies on functionalism, of the politics of cybermanagement in its complex and ambivalent relation to Chilean domestic politics, and of global political and socio-economic constellations during the final years of crisis of the post-WWII welfare state.

    Benezra’s criteria for selecting this corpus over others are not always clear, and the absence of any substantial discussion of Brazilian post-Concretist art is somewhat mystifying. Yet her in-depth engagement with Masotta, Paz, Híjar, Ehrenberg and Bonsiepe—not just as producers of artworks but as authors of art and design theory and criticism—offers an important corrective to art history’s common approach to the Global South as a provider of aesthetic “raw material” to be processed and refined by Northern metropolitan curation. The downside of giving over large parts of the book to the artists’ and theorists’ critical writings on dematerialization (as opposed to the artworks themselves) is that the feedback loops between ‘art theory’ and ‘practice’ they set in motion remain at times more abstractly implied than concretely illustrated. The chapter on Masotta, for instance, would have benefited from a more extensive discussion of the Grupo Arte de los Medios and of the trajectory of Jacoby in particular; Jacoby’s subsequent interaction with the Rosario-based group around Graciela Carnevale and Juan Pablo Renzi produced the legendary Ciclo de Arte Experimental and ultimately the counter-informational circuit of Tucumán Arde. This context would have added depth to the discussion of Masotta’s work.

    Benezra argues that Masotta’s writings on art occupy a crossroads where “the theoretical and practical imply each other and become legible together” (36). This claim could be extended to the other authors under study, and in fact constitutes one of the main tenets of her analysis as a whole. For Masotta, the artwork itself is already conceptually productive in its own right “at the disjunctive point between consciousness and structure” (31). In a detailed archaeology of its successive iterations, Benezra shows that Masotta’s notion of dematerialization—“as an interrogation into the logic or structuration of structure as such” (36)—comes into being in response to the controversy around the 1964 Di Tella prize. International jurors Clement Greenberg and Pierre Restany presented rival accounts of modernist art, the former praising abstract expressionism and the latter advocating for an object-based new materialism. In contrast, Masotta’s preference for pop must be read as “a metacritical polemic” (40) that seeks out the real as a structuring absence in the symbolic codes of mass culture that pop art brings into relief. Pop art “both describes and performs the experience of apperception” of the code (47), which the ideological work of mass-cultural apparatuses renders otherwise inaccessible. Thus, Benezra concludes,

    Masotta’s proposal for art’s dematerialization addresses the genesis of structure on two levels: both as a philosophical problem for materialism and as practical artistic response to the historical novelty of a society formally subsumed under the mass media. (47)

    Conversely, for Tomás Maldonado (in his almost simultaneous polemic with Max Bill over the transformative properties of functionalist design), dematerialization names a critical inflection; the earlier trust in design’s capacity to supersede the consumer object’s (mis)appropriation of use value gives way to an idea that style exceeds (social) function, at the same time pointing to the transformative potential latent in the design object’s own formal excess. During Maldonado’s time at the Ulm School of Design, and prior to its closure in 1968, the school’s focus gradually passed from the material object to the machinic patterns and cybernetic management of its production, into which “design planning” would intervene in an attempt at “expanding the field of applications for industrial design from household consumer objects to technological and information systems” (140). Bonsiepe attempted to bring this notion of design planning to the project of rationalized industrial production (itself cybernetic) under the umbrella of the Chilean Social Property Area, aiming to “find a new social outlet for the spiritual significance of form”: “the implementation of design planning in the Third World would transcend the rationalist impetus for modernization that had motivated the previous generation and transform it into a tool of social emancipation” (142). Benezra reads the ambivalent role of “stylistic excess” (147) in Bonsiepe’s Operations Room as at once standing in for and exposing the absence of technological infrastructure that would have enabled the project to make good on its promises. The example is fascinating insofar as she is able to show, through close analysis of its design operations, how “Cybersyn reveals the historical context and limitations of both the Popular Unity’s accelerationism and the utopian underpinnings of the HfG Ulm’s embrace of technique” (148). On Benezra’s reading, dematerialization becomes a methodology for investigating late-modernist Latin American art and design’s proleptic or anticipatory capacity: the ways in which it exposed and forecast an epochal transformation in social regimes of production that were only beginning to take hold at the time.

    Jens Andermann teaches at NYU and is an editor of the Journal of Latin American Cultural Studies. He is the author of Tierras en trance: arte y naturaleza después del paisaje (2018, forthcoming in English from Northwestern), New Argentine Cinema (2011), The Optic of the State. Visuality and Power in Argentina and Brazil (2007), and Mapas de poder: una arqueología literaria del espacio argentino (2000). His current work explores unspecific aesthetics as modes of survival in the inmundo, or earthwide precarity.

    Works Cited

    • Longoni, Ana and Mariano Mestman, eds. Del Di Tella a “Tucumán Arde”: Vanguardia artística y política en el 68 argentino. Eudeba, 2008.
    • Pedrosa, Mário. “Arte ambiental, arte pós-moderna, Hélio Oiticia.” (1966) Dos Murais de Portinari aos Espaços de Brasília. Perspectiva, 1980.
  • Afterword: Across Difference, Toward Freedom

    Keguro Macharia (bio)

    Invitation

    I was delighted when SA Smythe invited me to write this Afterword. It extended an earlier invitation issued in 2018 to participate in a symposium, “Troubling the Grounds: Global Figurations of Blackness, Nativism, and Indigeneity,” held in May 2019. My response to Dr. Smythe was short: “My mother has cancer—not a secret—and I’m her primary caregiver. I’m unable to travel out of the country.” It was more curt than I’d have liked; the schedule of doctor’s visits and regular tests and intermittent hospitalizations and homecare left me too exhausted to think with others, even too exhausted to write more elegant emails. Some tethers are more weighted than others. I am so grateful that the invitation remained open, and returned, and that I could accept it this time.

    This invitation arrived during a global pandemic, at a time of unrelenting grief and exhausting carework, a time of compounding losses and inventive mutual aid. A time when those vulnerable to premature death have been made even more vulnerable, while others have been made newly vulnerable. A time when thinking and writing have felt clotted: urgent in the face of ongoing devastation and impeded by the halting rhythms of fear and mourning. Time has felt interrupted and unending, labyrinthine and borrowed. We—I?—have struggled to document what it feels like to try to live now, and wondered what forms of analyses and invention can suffice to name our present.1 We—I?—have wondered if all writing is useless unless eulogy and obituary, and know that, in some way, every piece of writing is infused with the sound and feeling of loss.

    Interruption and truncation have become rhythms of living and thinking, ways of marking the impossibility of time. Rest in Peace (RIP) and pole saturate the air:2 grief thickens, as does rage. And these mark the sayable—often choked out, always necessary, especially when survival and freedom are at stake, and especially when survival and freedom are framed as antagonists by those who want our survival, but not our freedom. I am not trying to be abstract—it is simply that geohistories stack against each other, and over and over we tell each other that India feels like Kenya feels like South Africa feels like Canada feels like England feels like the U.S. feels like Uganda feels like . . . : minoritized lives are at stake; minoritized lives are considered disposable; and minoritized lives are further minoritized by state neglect and abandonment. Everything is not everything—sometimes, it feels like it is.

    And still, there is invitation: to think with and along, to imagine from where we are toward freedom, to see with clarity all the ways we are assembled as the undone and the unmade and to know with certainty all the ways we make ourselves possible as we pursue freedom. I can do no better than to echo and amplify the invitation that was extended to me. I invite you to read and reread the assembled writing, as I have also been invited to read and reread, to learn and to imagine toward freedom.

    Geohistories

    I am writing from Nairobi, Kenya. The name Nairobi is derived from the Maasai phrase Enkare Nyrobi—place of the cool waters. A wandering nation, a nation of people who pursue life on the move—contact, pleasure, trade, food, adventure—the Maasai model ways to think about ancestral naming that do not privilege ownership. Not “I name this and so it belongs to me,” but “I passed here, noticed my experience of it, named that experience, and in that naming created dreams that might shape how others experience it.” Against the press of dangerous, ongoing ethnonationalisms in Kenya, where certain ethnic groups claim specific lands and attempt to expel others from those lands, I have been trying to imagine relations to place and space that are not based on exclusionary ownership. It might be that some names invite us to share experiences—a club named bliss, a bar named happy, a mountain named cold, a food named delicious—and that place is an invitation, not a boundary.

    Geohistories: Where we call from and are called to assemble so that we may think together, dream together, imagine freedom together, practice freedom together.

    From this particular geohistory, the term “indigenous” resonates differently. The history of what was first named part of British East Africa in the 1890s and then Kenya in 1920 is often taught as a history of migration by diverse people into this region. When they arrived—from western Africa or northern Africa or central Africa or southern Africa or from the Indian Ocean coast—they mixed in a range of ways, sharing some resources and fighting over others, trading with and raiding from each other. They borrowed names and rituals, ways of living and loving, forms of being legible and gendered. Perhaps I am being romantic about this. Yet Kenya’s historians teach us that what we now know as fixed ethnic groups with discrete characteristics took shape during colonialism: laws restricted movement, insisting that particular people came from and inhabited certain areas. Groups were described as “agricultural” or “martial,” as “traders” or “nomads,” as “sedentary” or “mobile.” Colonial laws insisted on genealogy and identity: colonized Africans needed to carry identity cards that named an ethnicity, a bounded region named “origin,” a white employer’s name, and an African father’s name.3

    I am burying a story.

    Those who migrated to what became Kenya found other people living here: the Ogiek and the Sengwer, among others. The Maasai described some of these people as “Dorobo,” which means people without cattle, poor people. In the Coastal areas, the Somali named them “Boni,” which means people without possessions (Schmidt-Soltau 15).4 Difference precedes colonial naming, even as colonialism shadows what we know as knowledge, and it’s difficult to know how the Maasai and Somali intended these terms. It’s easy to hear contempt in what might simply be a way to describe difference. In the colonial languages we have inherited, members of these groups were called “hunters-gatherers”; contemporary official documents still use the term. This designation erases the ways in which these groups tended to and were tended by the lands they traversed, how they named place and space, formed maps of experience and intimacy.

    Those who moved to Kenya interacted with these indigenous groups. At a benign level, they exchanged goods and practices, and were intimate in a range of ways. Less benignly, some migrating groups dispossessed indigenous groups, snatching lands and other resources. There might have been attempts at ethnocide. During the colonial period (1895–1963) and post-independence (1963 to the present), successive governments continued to dispossess indigenous groups, primarily by evicting them from traditional forests they inhabited and tended. As elsewhere around the world, indigenous people in Kenya—and Africa—are subject to state violence.

    Per the 2005 Report of the African Commission’s Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities, the term “indigenous” is contested.5 All African people are indigenous to the continent, the Report specifies, but “African people have for centuries been migrating from various parts of the continent and there have been wars of conquest, which shaped the character of nationalities” (12). I appreciate the report’s attention to movement and experience, to an Africa of migrating people who lived with difference and conflict, war and conquest. Yet as the Report notes, those who moved found other people living where they settled, people who had relations to their spaces, including the Hadzabe in what is now northern Tanzania; the Batwa who live in the equatorial forests of Central Africa and the Great Lakes region; and the San of Southern Africa. I find useful this general description from the Report:

    To summarize briefly the overall characteristics of the groups identifying themselves as indigenous peoples: their cultures and ways of life differ considerably from the dominant society and their cultures are under threat, in some cases to the extent of extinction. A key characteristic for most of them is that the survival of their particular way of life depends on access and rights to their traditional land and the natural resources thereon. They suffer from discrimination as they are being regarded as less developed and less advanced than other more dominant sectors of society. They often live in inaccessible regions, often geographically isolated and suffer from various forms of marginalisation, both politically and socially. They are subject to domination and exploitation within national political and economic structures that are commonly designed to reflect the interests and activities of the national majority. This discrimination, domination and marginalisation violates their human rights as peoples/communities, threatens the continuation of their cultures and ways of life and prevents them from being able to genuinely participate in deciding on their own future and forms of development. (89)

    As might be expected in an official document from the African Union, terms such as “dominant society” and “national majority” obscure the role of the state in harming indigenous groups. Moreover, the human rights frame used to address ways in which these groups are minoritized relies on definitions of the human that must exclude these groups, given that rights discourses and practices are subtended by white supremacist definitions of those humans who are eligible for rights. And let me emphasize one final point: these groups have been victimized by extractive practices that steal and poison their lands, on the one hand, and by conservation practices that purport to save forests and other natural resources on the other.

    I am still trying to work the seam between indigenous and African, to trouble the idea of indigenous African by pointing out that it must hold at least two meanings: to name the rupture of colonial modernity that deracinates through slavery across all African oceans—the Atlantic, the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean—and to name various groups whose practices of living and tending to the earth are disrupted by European colonialism and the extractive practices it bequeaths to Africa’s nation-states. Indigenous African sounds and means differently depending on who says it and where they say it from and what forms of relation they want to name and foster.

    In a remarkable conversation with Dionne Brand, Michi Saagiig Nishnaabeg writer, artist, and scholar Leanne Betasamosake Simpson provides a way to think about indigenous relations to land and the ongoing work of dispossession by the Canadian state. She states:

    Land is very important to Indigenous Peoples, but we think of land quite differently from the colonizers. For us, land is not an enclosure that is protected by a border. Land is not a natural resource to exploit. Land is not a commodity. It is a particular space full of relationality to which we form very deep attachments over very long periods of time. Nation-states need to remove Indigenous bodies from land in order to commodify land and exploit natural resources.

    Simpson’s thinking gives flesh to a common understanding in Kenya: indigenous communities tend forests and waterways, as they are also tended by those forests and waterways. Despite knowing this, the Kenyan state is determined to dispossess these communities. And it might be that the very idea of Kenya depends on dispossessing indigenous communities, repeating and extending the violence of dispossession through which Kenya came into being.

    Listening

    I am listening to and listening for.

    Listening to attempts to suspend those habits of interruption that would demand context and theory and justifications and persuasion and evaluation. It is difficult and necessary. Listening for attempts to catch those difficult registers, barely audible in the noise of the quotidian. It is ongoing training in working across difference. Listening for has no interest in mastering what is heard, nor in deferring ethical and moral questions. It knows that much is missed, but hopes that what is caught enables the shared work of pursuing freedom.

    Listening to and for.

    Drawing on the practices and histories of our ancestors and our interactions with the indigenous peoples of these lands, scholars within western hemispheric Black Studies continue to ask ourselves, how does black life fit into (or not) the histories and ongoing conquest and colonization of peoples and their homelands? (Sandra Harvey)

    Listening to and for.

    We cannot want witchcraft—even as we might want its heresy—and yet it remains, producing spectacular violence and spectacular objects that unsettle the social. And yet, there is something seductive about witchcraft, about the power it possesses and can transmit. This power is not just a discursive referent to things that have actual power. In this sense, witchcraft is not merely a critique of capitalism or of the particular workings of any given African nation state, but of sovereign power and those who wield it. (Alírio Karina)

    Listening to and for.

    What does it mean for African-descended and Indigenous communities to farm alongside one another in the urban Bay Area?

    . . .

    The vegetable beds tended by Sogorea Te’ Land Trust and Black Earth Farms offer an existing model of co-constituted, land-oriented care between Black and Native communities. This site of growth and abundance – fed by and illustrative of Black and Indigenous political imaginaries that diverge from the model of nation-making predicated on exploitation, dehumanization, and dispossession – pushes against prevailing white settler geographies that imagine African-descended and Indigenous peoples as placeless. (Sarah Fong)

    Listening to and for.

    Sonja Larson, Camari Serau, and Mere Tuilau are all born out of a Blackness whose lineages of resistance and liberation anchor and overlap in Papua. . . . This essay bears witness to the clarity and courage of Melanesian women and gender nonconforming people.

    Black is the color of solidarity. (Joy Enomoto)

    Listening to and for.

    My Central America is Caribbean. My Central America is a Caribbean Coast whose natural resources and peoples have and continue to be exploited by US imperialism. My Central America is Black, Black Indigenous to be exact, whose descendant’s survivors of the transatlantic slave trade and Carib-Arawak indigeneity on the Antillean island of St. Vincent and whose marronage and exile call Central America’s Caribbean Coast: home. To be Garifuna is to be Caribbean and Central American simultaneously. I am the grandchild of banana workers from Tela and Balfate, Honduras whose transmigrations to Harlem, New York, in 1964 was made possible by the political mobilization of Garveyism and whose parents met in Bedford-Stuyvesant, Brooklyn in 1982. My Black Central America is also New York City. (Paul Joseph Lopéz Oro)

    Listening to and for.

    In 2015, we began assembling a dialogue among Black identified scholars committed to research focusing on Black diasporan people about how Black Studies might approach Native and Indigenous Studies. (Chad Infante, Sandra Harvey, Kelly Limes Taylor, Tiffany King)

    Listening to and for.

    The recognition of genocide is caught in a double bind. Where acknowledgement of an ongoing genocidal process unfolds before a spectatorial international community, or where retrospective recognition is circumvented because of its political inconvenience and unsettling potential, inaction is tantamount to denial. But limiting our understanding of victimization by framing it according to the western episteme is also a kind of a denial. It renders and interprets history solely as an attempt to reassert the primacy of imperial humanity: the reinscription of the power to demarcate the killable from those who must not and should not be killed (and the mutable boundary between these non-discrete categories). Whether this is a product of our limited socio-political imagination or of the legal structure’s limited capacity for redress (and the destabilizing potential of reparations, particularly if recompense were to be defined by the harmed parties in question), it is certainly reflective of the pitfalls of endeavoring towards “the human.” (Zoé Samudzi)

    (At this point, every single part of me that has ever taught is telling me I have over-quoted and I need to summarize and synthesize so the reader can grasp my main point. I am still listening to and listening for.)

    For several years, Christina Sharpe has posted two or more images simultaneously with the tag, “Thinking Juxtapositionally.”6 From this practice, I have learned to ask what kind of thinking happens when synthesis is not the goal, when there is no single position to stage or oppose, when we are told to hold multiple things together. To be against synthesis? Yes, when such synthesis overlooks the textures of difference, misses the accents and demands of geohistories. Placed alongside, some things may desire contact, inch toward a seam, perhaps tight, perhaps gaping. Other things may desire touch but know that it cannot be sustained, and so they approach each other carefully. Longing is the name of the gap. And yet others fold into each other, forming a sharp crease—the join is visible, and difference remains. Freedom is a practice of and across difference. I will return to this.

    Difference & Freedom

    Freedom is a practice of difference.

    Increasingly, I am convinced that difference must subtend and sustain freedom dreams and practices, and that in starting with and staying with difference, those of us interested in pursuing and practicing freedom might avoid the disappointments that come with demands for unity. I am guided in this by Audre Lorde:

    Within the interdependence of mutual (nondominant) differences lies that security which enables us to descend into the chaos of knowledge and return with true visions of our future, along with the concomitant power to effect those changes which can bring that future into being. Difference is that raw and powerful connection from which our personal power is forged. (111–112)

    By way of closing, and by closing I mean to extend the invitation with which I started, let me return to thinking in this issue. Chad Infante writes, “The Black diaspora in the Americas need not claim indigenousness or nativeness to the Americas—or even to Africa for that matter—to make political and long-lasting connections with the Indigenous peoples of Africa or the Americas.” And I nod: freedom is a practice of difference. Tiffany Lethabo King writes, “I tend to find that much of the literature and critical theory in Black diasporan studies that addresses the Middle Passage and the enslavement of Black people lacks a robust grammar for talking about land. I think it is very difficult for descendants of the middle passage to have a discussion with Indigenous people in the Americas, Africa and across the globe about land.” And I nod, and I wonder what relations to earthliness might sustain engagement across difference. And perhaps the experience of space to which I gesture in the brief discussion of Maasai cosmologies is useful: not ownership, but an experience of place, an expectation of place. I garden—badly, amateurishly—and so I was drawn to Sarah Fong’s writing about how Black and Native communities farm alongside each other, tending the earth as it, in turn, tends them. What might it mean not simply to attend to each other, as is now common to say in an academic vernacular, but to tend to each other? To tend to each other in how we tend to the earth? How might grammars and practices of care and repair be central to inhabiting the seam of difference between and across Black and Native in shared quests for freedom?

    I am listening to and listening for the registers in which freedom is sought and practiced, across difference. And I am grateful for the care with which the contributors to this issue have listened to and listened for each other, across geohistories, daring to imagine that the difficult is not the impossible, and that we can imagine and tend a more shareable earth. We dream freedom as we practice it every day.

    Keguro Macharia

    Nairobi

    January 2021

    Keguro Macharia is from Nairobi, Kenya. Author of Frottage: Frictions of Intimacy across the Black Diaspora, Keguro blogs at gukira.wordpress.com.

    Footnotes

    1. Repetition has become one of those forms. I repeat myself constantly in this writing. It mirrors how often we now express condolences. It is deliberate.

    2. Pole is a Kenyan term to share grief. See Macharia, “Pole.”

    3. For more, see foundational works by Bethwell A. Ogot, A History of the Southern Luo (East African Publishing House, 1967) and Godfrey Muriuki, A History of the Kikuyu: 1500–1900 (Oxford UP, 1974).

    4. Also see http://www.ogiek.org.

    5. I dislike reading and citing from such reports very much—I use them to track official narratives by state and extra-state bodies.

    6. Much of this practice is archived on a tumblr space https://hystericalblackness.tumblr.com

    Works Cited

    • African Commission on Human and People’s Rights. Report of the African Commission’s Working Group of Experts on Indigenous Populations/Communities. Banjul, 2005.
    • Lorde, Audre. “The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House.” Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches, Crossing P, 2007, pp. 110–114.
    • Macharia, Keguro. “Pole.” Popula, 20 Dec. 2018. https://popula.com/2018/12/20/pole/. Accessed 9 Jun. 2021.
    • Schmidt-Soltau, Kai. Indigenous Peoples Planning Framework for the Western Kenya Community Driven Development and Flood Mitigation Project and the Natural Resource Management Project.
    • Final Report, Republic of Kenya, Office of the President & Ministry of Water and Irrigation & Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources, Dec. 2006. https://documents1-worldbank-org.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/curated/en/117131468091477136/pdf/IPP199.pdf. Accessed 9 Jun. 2021.
    • Simpson, Leanne Betasamosake and Dionne Brand. “Temporary Spaces of Joy and Freedom: Leanne Betasamosake Simpson in conversation with Dionne Brand.” Literary Review of Canada, Jun. 2018. https://reviewcanada.ca/magazine/2018/06/temporary-spaces-of-joy-and-freedom/. Accessed 3 Jun. 2021.
  • Paradox of Recognition: Genocide and Colonialism

    Zoé Samudzi (bio)

    Abstract

    The recognition of and desire to prevent genocide are unquestionable social and political necessities. But despite genocide’s standardization and codification in international law, understandings and applications of its meaning are still contested. Using Germany’s response to the 1904–1908 Ovaherero and Nama genocide and Raphael Lemkin’s response to the Civil Rights Congress’s 1951 “We Charge Genocide” petition to the United Nations, this paper argues the necessary existence of an anti-Black exception to acknowledgements of genocide, yielding a paradox in our understandings of recognizing genocide that renders Black death necessary.

    I

    Paul Gilroy offers “paralyzing guilt” and “productive shame” as two approaches to state and community engagement after genocide (99). He confers upon shame positive political and psychological qualities, including the collective impulse to repair historical harm. Yet it is paralyzing guilt that compels Germany to commemorate in perpetuity the genocidal wrongdoings it perpetrated against German and European Jews in the Second World War to the preclusion of proper recognition of and restitution for other genocidal crimes for which it is responsible. The specter of the Nazism rightfully drives both national and continental commemorations of lives taken so that such horrors might not be repeated: “Never again, goes the maxim. The Nazi Holocaust provides the framework for the definition of genocide under international law. The 1951 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide formalizes Raphael Lemkin’s definition of mass eliminatory murder first published in his 1944 landmark text, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe. The term combines the Greek génos (meaning “race” and denoting a group of people with a common origin or descent) with the Latin suffix –cide (meaning “killing”). Lemkin’s definition revolves fundamentally around colonialism, emerging from his study of the collective annihilation of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and colonial projects in the Americas. The Convention posits a standard definition for prosecuting “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group,” and its passage in 1951 formally criminalizes genocide while implicitly codifying who can and cannot be killed.

    In a recent iteration of the enduring debate about historiographic considerations of German genocide (i.e. whether Nazi genocide was a singular phenomenon as opposed to part of a historical arc or relational framework of German racial statecraft), historian Dirk Moses offers a provocation that analogizes dominant German memory culture as religious orthodoxy. This political catechism is governed, most critically, by the twinned ideas that, first, the uniqueness of the Nazi Holocaust arises from the hate-motivated desire to eliminate European Jewry: that “it was the unlimited Vernichtung der Juden (extermination of Jews),” which is distinct from the “limited and pragmatic aims of other genocides.”1 Second, the attempted racial annihilation driven purely by this antisemitic ideology thus represents a politically foundational “Zivilisationsbruch (civilizational rupture)” for which Germany has a responsibility to atone (Moses).

    In the case of the Ovaherero and Nama genocide during and after the 1904–1908 Herero Wars in German South West Africa (present-day Namibia), inertia has forestalled productive shame or even the complete acknowledgement of violence. We may understand the roots of this denialism—the relative lack of public recognition and acknowledgement in Germany and around the world—as a coupling of anti-blackness with a hesitation to frame the processual and destructive violence of coloniality as genocidal. To recognize it as such would negate the dominant idea that collectivized punishment and community destruction are rare and preventable as opposed to a common aspect of colonial projects. Instead, genocide is understood as singularly event-based per jurisprudential precedents set by post-war prosecutions of Nazi perpetrators at Nuremberg. Culpability for genocide is also informed by the ideological genesis of property rights: a legal subjecthood centered on the singular citizen-subject. It is, therefore, part of the Eurocentric framing of genocide that responsibility for perpetrating acts of mass atrocity resides with guilty individuals and political regimes rather than with entire nation-states and the logics that animate and sustain them. The precedent set by Nuremberg adjudicates that “crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, [and] ‘only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced’” (Nollkaemper 621). But in the wake of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, and in a jurisprudential moment shaped by subsequent ad hoc tribunals (e.g. the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda) and the creation of the International Criminal Court, new legal attention has been paid to hybridized individual-structural notion of responsibility where acknowledging state responsibility does not preclude that of the individual (Milanović 554; Gaeta 643). In asking about complicity, international law grapples with the question of whether the real agent of genocide is the state itself or those working on its behalf:

    What is the role of each? . . . There is no question that the state can act only through its agents. On the other hand, the agents, if acting within their powers, are acting only for and on behalf of the state. When genocide is committed, upon whom then must the curtain fall? Is the responsibility of one dependent on the other? (Asuncion 1218)

    Many of the machinations of the Nazi Holocaust were founded in Germany’s colonizing of South West Africa (Madley 430). Where genocidal antisemitism is an attempted extermination of European Jews following the molecularized distillation of Jewishness to an essential racial quality, Germany’s genocidal practices were first enacted outside of the European continent; necropolitical organizing forms in the metropole were first attempted in the colony, the “site where sovereignty consists fundamentally in the exercise of a power outside the law” (Mbembe 23). After all, Hitler “applied to Europe colonialist procedures which until then [had] been reserved exclusively for the Arabs of Algeria, the ‘coolies’ of India and the ‘niggers’ of Africa” (Césaire 36). Before the Nazi campaign embarked on its “struggle for space,” imperial Germany materialized its conquest of German South West Africa in similar ideological terms (Giaccaria and Minca 20). It strove to create an outpost in its southern African colony “that did not have to shy away from a comparison with the German homeland,” exporting the notion of Lebensraum that had captured the German geopolitical imagination to actualize it via a careful “‘scientific method’ in ‘indigenous policy’” (Zimmerer, “In Service of Empire” 69). While “scientific method” may be a metaphor for methodically crafted bureaucracy and policy directed toward the native inhabitants of this conquerable African land, it can also allude to the methodological crafting of spatial management administration: a part of what Bench Ansfield describes as “the spatial and bodily purification of blackness and the environmental conditions associated with this racial classification” (127). The logics for racial management in both German genocides are rooted in colonial claims to land-based sovereignty defined by bounded territorializations of identity. In considering these two genocides the results of that racial policy, it becomes unnecessary to assert singular causality (i.e. the Nazi Holocaust was motivated solely by antisemitic animus, though it was an overwhelming and significant motivation) or exceptionalism of either event (i.e. the unprecedentedness of Nazi antisemitism, German genocide, or Nazi race science). The varying contexts of genocidal crimes make all genocides unique, but the layered and processual governing logics of race-making co-constitute anti-Black and antisemitic racialization. The horrors enacted in German South West Africa provided the ideological and material scaffolding through which German statecraft unfolded itself in Europe in its management of populations perceived to present existential threats to German sovereignty. Rather than competition for primacy in historical memory, we can recognize how the genocide of the Ovaherero and Nama brought race war and mass extermination into the arsenal of future German necropolitical possibility and the state’s brutal attempt to resolve the ongoing “Jewish question” once and for all.2

    The social Darwinist paradigm of the time informed an organismic view of community interactions within nation-states rooted in the concept of purity. These ideas underpin Lebensraum, in which Raum (“room”) contours oppositional definitions of the self and the other within a regime of biologized state-making that is always already racialized (Heffernan 45). Skirmishes over land and resources were formalized into military strategies like the Herero Wars. General Lothar von Trotha’s declaration in October 1904 was decidedly genocidal; in threatening all Ovaherero peoples who did not cede their land with certain death, all indigenous people were transformed into enemy combatants by the mere nature of a blackness that presented an obstacle to German claims to land. War extracted indigenous Namibians, now enemies of the state, from German subjecthood and from any proximity to the realm of the human; “savage life [was] just another form of animal life,” and this animalization of native Africans through eugenicist racial science further nullified African land claims and social orders and enabled Europeans to impose their own notions of ownership and personhood/subjecthood (Mbembe 24; Nhemachena and Dhakwa 73–6).

    Von Trotha’s “race war” produced racialized and gendered geographies by coupling premeditated extermination with “cleansing” space through internment and labor/prison camp structures (Zimmerer, “The Model Colony” 51). The notion of Lebensraum (“living space”) is incomplete without a corresponding Entfernung (“removal”) in whatever manner the specific racialized nation-state project dictates. The shared logics of German racial production within both imperial and Nazi moments are striking. Rather than being unique to the Nazi regime, biologizations of citizenship and territorializations of a racialized nation-state identity are fundamental to the European liberal project that contoured relationships between the [unenslaveable] white European and the racialized and enslaveable non-European “Other.” The racial “Other” exists, foundationally, in a subjugated master/slave symbiosis with the dominating force of whiteness grounded in the social death of an African native recognized solely through its subordination by European coloniality. The natives were alienated and socially-dead persons whose own social orders were delegitimized (and eventually destabilized and destroyed), and so had “no socially recognized existence” outside of European subjecthood. This social death of the native—one rooted in eugenicist explanations of inferiority—justified segregation and a ban on racial mixing. The socially-dead person is a polluting person, and mixing would compromise racial purity (Patterson 322).

    Since Namibian independence in 1990, the question of reparations has been actively engaged by survivor communities, complicated by the fact that all the perpetrators have long since passed away (Sprenger et al. 132). In 2017, an American federal court heard the first arguments of the descendants of surviving Ovaherero and Nama peoples in a class action lawsuit brought against the German government. A previous suit was filed in 2001; the Herero People’s Reparations Corporation made an unsuccessful legal claim, which nevertheless widened the forum of public debate about Germany’s obligations for victims of its colonial past. Though the Minister for Economic Development and Cooperation stated in 2004 that the nation accepted its “historical and moral responsibility,” Germany has also stated publicly that any court settlement would not include reparations to the communities of survivors even if Namibians were successful in their legal claims. The longstanding line taken by the German state is that only historical events committed after 1951—when the convention went into effect—can be classified as genocide. Yet in 2016 the German Bundestag passed a resolution describing the Ottoman massacre of Armenians (in which Germany was complicit) as a genocide, even jeopardizing diplomatic relations with Turkey in doing so. In May 2021, the German government announced it would officially recognize the atrocities committed in Namibia as genocide. The German government additionally but separately pledged €1.1 billion (USD $1.3 million) towards existing Namibian development programs to be disbursed over the next thirty years, but has been adamant that this payment should not be understood as reparations for fear that a successful reparations claim would set a precedent for similar demands by other formerly colonized peoples (Oltermann “Germany Agrees to Pay”). Ovaherero and Nama communities and leaders were insulted by the diplomatic gesture: not only were negotiations conducted in their absence (the deal is a bilateral agreement between the German and Namibian governments), but it is unclear whether any of the pledged aid will be allocated to them. Part of Germany’s justification for refusing reparations is the unprecedentedness of restitution being paid more than a century after the event, yet how is it possible to atone for a genocide without pointedly addressing the demands and/or material conditions of affected communities?

    The 2017 lawsuit involved Germany’s claim to sovereign immunity, which the Ovaherero and Nama delegation contested (as plaintiffs). In appellate court following the original filing, the delegation argued that the human remains included in the sale of Felix von Luschann’s teaching collection to the American Museum of Natural History (AMNH) constituted commercial rather than sovereign activity, because “Germany packaged, shipped, traded, and trafficked its genocide victims to New York in 1924, within a ‘[p]urchase’” and that “the skulls were ‘[r]eceived [f]rom’: the ‘Museum für Völkerkunde, Berlin, Germany,’ the Museum of Ethnology, a German agency and instrumentality” (Plaintiffs-Appellants’, Rukoro). The international nature of the acquisition, transfer, and sale of the remains underscores the internationalism of geographies of domination, which are “conceptually and materially bound up with racial . . . displacement and the knowledge-power of a unitary vantage point” (McKittrick xvi). Despite having previously acknowledged responsibility for these colonial acts of violence, Germany’s legal rebuttal describes the “alleged. . . genocide of Ovaherero and Nama civilians and unlawful taking of their property in violation of international law in 1884–1915 in Hereroland and Great Namaqualand, sovereign polities now part of the Republic of Namibia” (Brief for Defendant, Rukoro; emphasis added). But while genocide was not specifically a crime until its formalization in the Convention, international customary law nevertheless criminalized “wars of extermination and annihilation against peoples and tribes capable of life and culture” (Plaintiffs-Appellants’, Rukoro). The plaintiff brief goes on to state:

    Germany’s logic was that, as the Ovaherero and Nama faced extinction by genocide, samples of these two peoples must be preserved for science and posterity. These takings were thus the souveniring of genocide and so a continuation of the same, which makes the AMNH as much a locus of Germany’s crime as [the] Shark Island [concentration camp] itself.3 [The nature of the taking of human remains] is also reflected by its methods; here, for example, forcing women prisoners to remove the flesh from boiled heads of their own kin. . . . Germany sought to cause maximal loss, extract all profit from its slaves (down to their skulls), and reinforce white supremacy through dehumanization. By taking these skulls, Germany’s message was not only that Herero and Nama lives did not matter, but that they were not really human lives at all. (Plaintiffs-Appellants’, Rukoro; emphasis added)

    The lawsuit came to a close in 2020 when the United States Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit dismissed the Ovaherero and Nama delegation’s appeal, affirming the reality and legitimacy of claims of genocide but finding the “plaintiffs’ allegations insufficient to trace the proceeds from property expropriated more than a century ago to present‐day property owned by Germany in New York” (Ruling on Appeal, Rukoro).

    In returning to the idea that the definition of “genocide” effectively codifies who can and who cannot be killed, it is imperative to understand that the application of this international law is constrained by the ideology of the global political system that constructs it. Central to European subjecthood is the idea of property rights and individualism: a racialized regime of ownership that renders some citizens, and others property (Bhandar 3–7). Per Walter D. Mignolo, “the concepts of ‘man’ and ‘human’ went hand in hand with the emergence of the concept of ‘rights,’” imagined in service of the construction of a colonial world, and so were inextricably linked to state/nationhood (“Who” 7–8). “Human rights law . . . aspires to name, define, call into being, [and] redeem the human” through the transformation of what should be some innate or inalienable condition to a legally informed social-political status, or what Esmeir names “juridical humanity” (1544). The codification of humanity established by human rights conventions is an institutionalization of racial hierarchies and a “narrative privileging of white life/death as the instance through which other peoples’ encounters with Western modernity’s logics of racial extermination/terror…are to be apprehended, calibrated, and conceptually qualified” (Rodriguez 20). Discussions of African genocide in relation to colonial violence become paradoxical because “the African anthropos who exist (not live) in the zone of nonbeing cannot suffer human rights abuses when they are in fact regarded as ‘non humans’. Non-humans cannot suffer human rights abuses” (Benyera et al. 190). Foucault usefully shows that the emergent biopolitical regime equates corporal punishment with a political anatomy: the body is understood as a malleable and manipulatable “docile body” that can be maximized and transformed and treated as a means of social and economic production through racial capitalist systems of enslavement (135). He also describes a modern disciplinary regime inextricably linked to medicalization, demonstrating the emergence of the panopticon from strategies of medical containment during the bubonic plague (195). But he notably fails to account for the centrality of colonization and racialization in this genealogy of Man4: he does not connect racial production in the colonial elsewhere to the violence within and by the modern European state, yet this violence animates what Frantz Fanon describes as the “epidermalization of inferiority” (xv), and inscribes the schema of anti-Blackness upon the bodies of people racialized as Black. Race-making is a part of a sociogenic5 process through which racialization acts as a “biocultural stigmatic apparatus,” where desires for dominance are justified through scientific articulations and “assemblages of human flesh that invest human phenomenology with an aura of extrahuman physiology” (Weheliye 51). The scientific logics that justify race, equivalent to biological life itself, become “a master code within the genre of the human represented by western Man,” yoked to “species-sustaining physiological mechanisms in the form of a global color line” (Weheliye 27). There is no a priori or autopoietic6 existence for blackness within the realm of humanity: the “human” emerges only through material articulations constructed and propagated by sovereign and other powerful entities able to project their own notion of the “human” and of the “self.”

    In considering these non-recognitions or even articulated recognitions that attempt to minimize or circumvent responsibility for harm,7 we find that denial acts not simply as a refusal to acknowledge an event, but also in the truncation of the event’s historicization (Moses, “Conceptual Blockages” 9, 12). This form of denial coheres around discursive attempts to put forth a particular kind of legitimate claim to victimhood ultimately rooted in anti-blackness. The Nazi Holocaust was not simply an event carried out by a fascist regime whose genocidal actions were mobilized solely by a contempt for European Jews.8 The exterminatory process, rather, was part of a trajectory of German coloniality multiply marked by social Darwinist attempts to “purify” its population and its claimed territory.9 Germany’s failure to confront its colonial conquests in Africa, and therefore to contextualize the Holocaust and German antisemitism within this trajectory of racial citizenship, amounts to a kind of genocide denialism.

    II

    What exactly does it mean to attempt to recognize a genocide? Is recognition the ultimate practice of empathy, of seeing the humanity of an oppressed and long-suffering people and responding in kind? In a world where our own subjectivity is defined by hierarchal relations—a defining of the self through “Others”—we are individually and collectively able to overcome urgent self-fashioning as dominant in order to truly feel with others. The actualization of empathy demands an equal capacity to humanize, and our performances of empathy through imagined embodiment deny the reality of a moral-material world defined and ordered by those understood to be “fully” human against those for whom full humanity is foreclosed. This reality produces legibility, using testimony via the model of recognition to produce a subject deserving of acknowledgement and maybe even restitution. Ultimately, this so-called empathy demands assimilation into a framework of sameness: one that enables a relation through similarity (or hypothetical similarity) to some fully humanized self. It is a perverse ubuntu, a colonial seeing/locating/understanding of the self through others. Recognition by the western episteme is positioned as universal because western-ness is exported as universal. The “human” emerges only through articulations and “enunciations” of humanness constructed and propagated by those with the power to project and impose their own selves onto a universally accepted notion of what is human (Mignolo, “Sylvia Wynter” 108–9).

    The commonly-held framework for defining and understanding genocide—both popularly and within international law—describes the act as a “predictable but not inexorable” singular event. But rarely does the idea of culpability or prosecutability for the act of genocide intersect with the fact that the destruction of an indigenous population (whether through forcible assimilation, ethnic cleansing, violent depopulation and killing, or some combination of acts) is by definition part of establishing and maintaining settler states (Wolfe 388). The understanding of genocide as an anomalous, aberrational, and avoidable act forecloses understandings of the ways in which coloniality and state domination require the management and/or destruction of populations (whether through killings or forced assimilation) as a part of the articulation of a state apparatus and its (biologized) definitions of citizenship and belonging. To recognize is to acknowledge the validity, legitimacy, and legibility of a thing; to bring it into the fold of experience and understanding so that it too can become universal (no matter the particular trajectory or consequences of the event). Inherent in the politics of genocide recognition is some ushering into whiteness: the affirmation of genocide is, functionally, an extension of and assimilation into humanity through a frame of uniqueness. The existent discourse of recognition as legibility—as making genocidal process clear enough to morally and ethically grasp and enclose —is antithetical to a Glissantian embrace of difference, which engenders solidarity in opacity as opposed to translation, transmutation, and ordering into hierarchy (Glissant 191, 193–94). To recognize a genocide is not to humanize in any altruistic sense, but to dictate that the goal of any indigenous community is to become assimilated into the anthropocentric project of Man as “human,” as opposed to attaining a recognition that strengthens their own sovereign claims and/or begins to attempt to offer whatever kind of restitution might compensate for the human capital lost to genocide.

    The Ovaherero and Nama genocide is unique in its firstness: historians largely agree it is the first genocide of the 20th century. But even this uniqueness or firstness is insufficient to unsettle the foundational nature of indigenous African genocide on the continent (including the transatlantic trafficking and trade in enslaved indigenous African peoples foundational to modernity itself). How can a necessary death constitute an acute crisis of recognition? The Black/Afro-diasporic/African subject suffers the “ontological ‘flaw’” of non-being that bars entry into any dialectic in which it could be recognized as “human” (Ciccariello-Maher 55). The Hegelian dialectic presumes a reciprocity and universality in recognition, and only nurtures the ontological inferiority of the Black/African subject by continually forcing them to self-define through a discursive framework of domination within which it has no epistemic authority. Blackness exists within the sub-ontological realm where being human is impossible to claim. Attempting to recognize the subject—and to understand the trajectory from full indigenous personhood and sovereignty to “native” colonial subject to post-genocide indigenous subject within a postcolonial “native”-ruled nation-state—means we must refuse this presumed universality and an Africanness (as opposed to blackness) that exists solely in its relationship to European coloniality.10

    It’s useful here to examine the response to the Civil Rights Congress (CRC) petition presented to the United Nations meeting in Paris at the end of 1951. In We Charge Genocide: The Crime of Government Against the Negro People, the CRC and its signatories “charge their own government with mass murder of its own nationals, with institutionalized oppression and persistent slaughter of Negro people in the United States on a basis of ‘race,’ a crime abhorred by mankind and prohibited by the conscience of the world” and indeed criminalized by the Genocide Convention (3). There are two main arguments for this charge of genocide. The first is “killing members of the group,” a violation of Article II of the Genocide Convention. As evidence, the CRC offers “killings by police, killings by incited gangs, killings at night by masked men, killings always on the basis of ‘race,’ [and] killings by the Ku Klux Klan,” despite the universal citizenship that ought to have been afforded by the constitution (4). The second is economic genocide or, per the Genocide Convention’s language, “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its destruction in whole or in part.” The petition outlined the creation and maintenance of conditions so egregious that the “American Negro is deprived, when compared with the remainder of the population of the United States, of eight years of life on the average.” It described how the violence of the transatlantic slave trade and the indignity of the Southern planation system begot exploitative sharecropping, while Jim Crow segregation forced Black Americans into “city ghettos or their rural equivalents” and “filthy, disease-bearing housing, and deprived [them] by law of adequate medical care and education.” These combined acts of violence are made possible by the “emasculation of democracy,” the structural prevention of Black Americans from voting and organizing, and by “dividing [of] the whole American people, emasculating mass movements for democracy and securing the grip of predatory reaction on the federal, state, county and city governments” (CRC 4–6).

    The CRC’s petition was a seminal articulation of the Black freedom movement’s use of the then-new anti-genocide norm,11 and serves as a useful example of the ontological and analytical limitations of the international definition of genocide (Solomon 130–31). Crucially, the petition used the criminalization of genocide—a crime targeting individuals and communities explicitly because of their group membership—to contest the maintenance of racial hierarchies: “accusations of genocide reprised a vocabulary designed to challenge the suppression and destruction of minority life,” which of course presented the particular concern “that an international law against genocide would challenge existing state and nonstate practices designed to maintain white supremacy” (Meiches 23). The petition also had disconcerting international implications (disconcerting to hegemonic powers, at least) because it offered the possibility that the Genocide Convention could contest racial discrimination internationally, a frame articulated by the petition’s “solemn warn[ing] that a nation which practices genocide against its own nationals may not long be deterred, it has the power, from genocide elsewhere” (CRC 7). The invoked Du Boisian “problem of the color line” was politicized in such a way that it “link[ed] the racial terror of the lynch mob directly to more organized campaigns of colonial warfare”; a critique of imperialism is conspicuously absent from the United Nations’ 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Meiches 24).12

    Unsurprisingly, the petition was poorly received in the United States, but the most notable rejection of its legitimacy came from Lemkin himself. In a 1953 letter to the editor of the New York Times, Lemkin re-emphasized the rarity and socio-political magnitude of genocide, describing not only the tens of millions of lives lost in the 20th century, but also the gravity and necessity of the “serious mental harm” provisions of the Genocide Convention. Characterizing the petitioners as “opponents of the Genocide Convention” (rather than individuals seeking to broaden its scope beyond its original intent), Lemkin questioned whether “one can be guilty of genocide when one frightens a Negro”; “fear alone cannot be considered as serious mental harm,” and the acts of intimidation are not “directed against the [entire] Negro population of the country” (“Nature of Genocide”). In response to Lemkin’s op-ed, Oakley C. Johnson, social activist and member of the Communist Party of America, wrote that his characterization of “fright” is insufficient to describe actions intended to incite race hate, terrorize an entire racial group, and maintain the existence of anti-Black racial hierarchies (Elder 42). Lemkin concluded that the conflation of genocide with the injustice of discrimination besmirches “the good name of some democratic societies which might be unjustly slandered for genocide” (“Nature of Genocide”).

    We can understand Lemkin’s trivializing response to the petition primarily through a prevailing anti-blackness, consistent with his writings about the Ovaherero and Nama genocide. While colonialism was foundational to his theorizations of genocide, his writings on African colonization contain substantial contradictions that undermine his ideas. Writing about the genocidal violence against the Ovaherero, Lemkin attributed state cruelty to Germany’s improper practice of colonial rule; the British system of “indirect rule,” which allowed for indigenous cultural maintenance and complementary administration, would have been more suitable and humane. In line with other historiographic theses that emphasize exceptional German cruelty, brutal suppressions of Ovaherero rebellions were understood as a result of “Prussian militarism,” which actually overstates the function and efficiency of the imperial German administration prior to the 1904 war (Schaller 89). While Lemkin does not retroactively apply his neologism “genocide” to the Ovaherero context, his description of the Herero Wars would undoubtedly have fit his own criteria.13 Yet his analysis of the violence does not hold European colonialism sufficiently responsible for the production of genocide-making/justifying epistemes and practices. Further, he perpetuated the racist myth that the Ovaherero were committing “race suicide,” a popular theory promoted by Willem Petrus Steenkamp who claimed the Ovaherero “could not reconcile themselves to the idea of subjection to Germany and thus loss of independence” and so, “having nothing left to exist for as a nation,” proceeded to commit “national suicide” (qtd. in Schaller 90). Lemkin believed (and wrote) that Ovaherero women and men alike consumed a particularly strong beer called Kari —“the drink of death” —that “had a most weakening and exhausting effect on their [re]productive powers” (qtd. in Schaller 90). This theory was forwarded to hold the Ovaherero people, especially women, responsible for their declining birthrates rather than the genocidal conditions imposed by imperial Germany. With regards to the petition, Cold War-era McCarthyism was also a means of discrediting the CRC’s claims. Lemkin often discussed the “Russian practice of genocide” saying that antisemitic propaganda under Stalin “matched the efforts of Streicher and Goebbels”; he asserted that Paul Robeson and William L. Patterson, prominent African-American communists and signatories of the petition, were “falsely accusing the United States of genocide to divert UN attention from true genocidal crimes being committed against Soviet-dominated people” (“UN Asked”; Weiss-Wendt 108–9). Lemkin’s understanding of genocide complemented the Nuremberg precedent, set just a few years before: genocide was not to be understood as a long-existing structural phenomenon, but rather as an acute flare-up of violence perpetrated by a prosecutable group of people.

    The recognition of genocide is caught in a double bind. Where acknowledgement of an ongoing genocidal process unfolds before a spectatorial international community, or where retrospective recognition is circumvented because of its political inconvenience and unsettling potential, inaction is tantamount to denial. But limiting our understanding of victimization by framing it according to the western episteme is also a kind of a denial. It renders and interprets history solely as an attempt to reassert the primacy of imperial humanity: the reinscription of the power to demarcate the killable from those who must not and should not be killed (and the mutable boundary between these non-discrete categories). Whether this is a product of our limited socio-political imagination or of the legal structure’s limited capacity for redress (and the destabilizing potential of reparations, particularly if recompense were to be defined by the harmed parties in question), it is certainly reflective of the pitfalls of endeavoring towards “the human.”

    Zoé Samudzi has a PhD in Medical Sociology from the University of California, San Francisco where her dissertation research engaged German imperialism, colonial biomedicine, and the Ovaherero and Nama genocide. She is currently a Postdoctoral Fellow at the ACTIONS Program in the UCSF School of Nursing where she is working on research around transgender health, reproductive justice and autonomy, and material-epistemic violences.

    Footnotes

    1. On the relationships between genocide and permanent security, see Moses’s The Problems of Genocide: Permanent Security and the Language of Transgression, Cambridge UP, 2021.

    2. With regards to “the tendency of racializing logics to change scales in an effort to resolve contradictions internal to the logics themselves,” see Dorian Bell’s Globalizing Race: Antisemitism and Empire in French and European Culture, Northwestern UP, 2018.

    3. On the militarized science produced in/by concentration camps and the exploitation of the war as an opportunity to access human remains for ethnological and anatomical study, see Reinhart Kößler’s “Imperial Skullduggery, Science and the Issue of Provenance and Restitution: The Fate of Namibian Skulls in the Alexander Ecker Collection in Freiburg,”Human Remains and Violence, vol. 4, no. 2, pp. 27–44.

    4. Mbembe’s “Necropolitics” is instructive as a rebuttal to this end as he notes that the social death to which the colonized and enslaved were subjected and that configured hierarchal racial relations “could be considered one of the first instances of biopolitical experimentation.” With the plantation at the core of necropolitical formations, the tripled losses of “domination, natal alienation, and social death” comprise the logics of imperial world-making (21).

    5. Sociogeny refers to a Fanonian understanding of socio-historical development. Fanon demands that any naturalization of racial formations as biological reality be grounded in an understanding of social orderings that cast the Black “other” into subjugated relation with the white standard of humanity—this is a central analytical feature of Black Skin, White Masks (1952).

    6. The term “autopoiesis” refers to a system able to create, reproduce, and maintain itself. The term was introduced in 1972 by biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela, who used it to describe the self-maintaining capability of living cells.

    7. An example of this is the language utilized by state officials. In its motion to dismiss the eventually dismissed legal case, the German state asserted that the “legal concept of genocide does not apply in this case.” Despite acknowledging that such violence constitutes genocide over the past several years, the state nevertheless refuses to entertain any legal rebuttals to Ovaherero and Nama accusations because the alleged genocide occurred before the passage of the 1951 Genocide Convention.

    8. There is a necessity to use the phrase “racialized as white” as opposed to “white” because of a contemporary conditionality of whiteness (as opposed to unequivocal absorption of white Jewish people) into the category of whiteness. Despite many Jews’ phenotypical presentation as “white,” the racial logics of whiteness have constructed Jewishness as an essential racial identity. This is the enduring nature and function of antisemitism it is the desire to legitimize centuries of hegemonic Christian Judenhass (“hatred of Jews”) by using the racist pseudoscientific convention of the mid- to late-19th centuries and designating/derogating Jewish people as a unique and inferior discrete Semitic race (in contrast to the allegedly superior Aryan race). See David Nirenberg’s “Mass Conversion and Genealogical Mentalities: Jews and Christians in Fifteenth-Century Spain,” Past and Present, no. 174, pp. 3–41.

    9. Michael Rothberg offers “multidirectionality” as a syncretic framework for understanding “the significance of both genocidal imperialism and the totalitarian Holocaust,” which transcends the analytical debate pitting exceptionalism/uniqueness against the idea of genocide continuity; see Rothberg’s Multidirectional Memory: Remembering the Holocaust in the Age of Decolonization, Stanford UP, 2009.

    10. About the limitedness of this binary, Édouard Glissant writes that where “the Western nation is first of all an ‘opposite,’ for colonized peoples identity will be primary ‘opposed to’—that is, a limitation from the beginning. Decolonization will have done its real work when it goes beyond this limit” (17). Wilderson writes, about the Middle Passage’s ontological transformation of the racialized figure of “the African,” that “Jews went into Auschwitz and came out as Jews. Africans went into the ships and came out as Blacks. The former is a Human holocaust; the latter is a Human and a metaphysical holocaust. That is why it makes little sense to attempt analogy: the Jews have the Dead (the Muselmann) among them; the Dead have the Blacks among them” (38).

    11. Solomon describes the anti-genocide norm as “an individual or organization’s explicit or implicit expressions of opposition to the past, present, or future occurrence of genocide” where “implicit expressions consist of analogies between instances of violence or repression and canonical genocidal events, in particular the Nazi Holocaust” (131).

    12. Keguro Macharia, (2019) in contrasting the 1945 Pan-African Congress’s Declaration to Colonial Workers, Farmers, and Intellectuals with the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, describes how the latter “refused to acknowledge (or contradict) the contemporary distinction between colonizer and colonized,” a history of domination that was central to the former. The United Nations and the structure of international [criminal] law was not only “understood to be compatible with imperial ventures,” but the anti-Black regime of racialized humanity is an enshrining of racial hierarchies within and through the very structure of human rights. See Macharia’s “1945 & 1948,” as well as Mignolo’s “Who Speaks for the ‘Human ’in Human Rights?” and Esmeir’s “On Making Dehumanization Possible.”

    13. In his unpublished and uncompleted manuscript, Lemkin writes about the Ovaherero: “After the rebellion and von Trotha’s proclamation, the decimation of the Hereros by gunfire, hanging, starvation, forced labour and flogging was augmented by prostitution and the separation of families, with a consequent lowering of the birthrate” (qtd. in Schaller 90).

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  • Black is the Color of Solidarity: Art as Resistance in Melanesia

    Joy Enomoto (bio)

    Abstract

    This essay centers on three Melanesian women artist activists who use art as a tool for social justice and as visual archive: Camari Serau and Mere Tuilau both of iTaukei descent living on the island of Viti Levu, Fiji, and Sonja Larson of Papuan Tolai descent living in New Mexico. This essay adds to Black/Indigenous Studies in conveying a more nuanced understanding of Blackness from within the Pacific. In this context, Black Oceania is not merely a conceptual counterpoint to the Black Atlantic but a center point of political and artistic solidarity that recognizes the sacredness of Black lives in unexpected and unpredictable ways. Drawing upon the activism and mentorship of the late Dr. Teresia Teaiwa, this essay also illustrates the necessity of highlighting and acknowledging the work of Black/Pacific women artists engaged in West Papua’s struggle for self-determination and collective liberation.

    The first people to settle the Pacific were Black.
    —Teresia Teaiwa, “Mela/Nesian Histories, Micro/Nesian Poetics”

    The late I-Kiribati, African American scholar and poet Dr. Teresia Teaiwa poetically reminds us that Blackness not only exists within but is rooted in the Pacific. Black women of Oceania are often left out of the frame in discussions about global Black liberation struggles, and ironically they are left out of many conversations of Black indigeneity, even though they remain central players in movements for Black self-determination. Perhaps this is because indigeneity in the South Pacific takes precedence over Blackness, or because the Atlantic and the Caribbean have stood for the entirety of the Middle Passage and the motion of Black bodies. Whatever the reason, beyond the South Pacific, Melanesia—and particularly the activism of Melanesian women—remains largely ignored in Black, Indigenous, and diaspora studies. In recent years, several contemporary scholars have developed significant scholarship on the so-called Black Pacific. The work of Quito Swan situates Melanesia in relation to the Pan-Africanist movement and draws out the rich complexities of the rise of Pacific Feminism, particularly in Melanesia during the 1975 Pacific Women’s Conference in Suva, Fiji. Historian Gerald Horne delves deeply into the impacts of the slaving practice of blackbirding in the South Pacific following the US Civil War. Post-colonial scholar Robbie Shilliam examines the conceptual space of diasporic kinship across space and time shared by the African Diaspora and the Maori. Other scholars, such as Joyce Pualani Warren, Maile Arvin, and Nitasha Sharma, interrogate how conceptions of white supremacy and eugenics leeched into the Pacific, effectively ranking its inhabitants according to their “proximity to whiteness,” and also examine the ways that Pacific peoples view themselves (Arvin 4). While the contributions of Shilliam, Warren, Arvin, and Sharma are important, they focus primarily on Hawaiʻi and Polynesia, hence their writings are not considered in this essay.

    This essay is part of a continuing dialogue regarding the interventions into Blackness and anti-Blackness in Oceania that began at a performative roundtable entitled “Afro-Diasporic Women Artists on History and Blackness in the Pacific” at the Pacific Histories Association (PHA) Conference in 2016 (“Afro-Pacific Women”). During the first iterations of the Black Lives Matter movement, Pacific scholar Dr. Teresia Teaiwa felt compelled to bring together a small collective of women artists and scholars of Black and Pacific Islander descent to address the rarely-discussed but deeply-felt issue of anti-Blackness among Pacific Islanders. I take my title, “Black Is the Color of Solidarity,” from Teresia Teaiwa’s poem “Mela/Nesian Histories, Micro/Nesian Poetics” (171), in memory of Teaiwa as an artist and to honor her unwavering commitment to placing Black Indigenous and Pacific feminism at the center of her work toward our collective liberation. The roundtable participants included Dr. Teaiwa, Samoan ethnomusicologist and musician Dr. Courtney Savali-Andrews, CHamoru performance artist Ojeya Cruz Banks, and me, a Kanaka Maoli visual artist. Our discussant was ethnomusicologist and assistant professor Dr. Alisha Lola Jones. The design of the roundtable, which combined performance, visual art, poetry, and music alongside presented papers, was unique for a conference, and especially for a history conference traditionally dominated by white male scholars. We opened the space by building an altar and singing a collective song. Each of us in turn shared both art and scholarship on what it means to live as “Afro-diasporic children of the Pacific” (Teaiwa, “Introduction” 145). The forum raised the question, “how have we addressed these culturally and historically complex conditions in our work as artists?” (Teaiwa, “Introduction” 145). Although our experiences have been vastly different, we share the particular experience of being both Black and Pacific Islander but not Melanesian. Our Blackness has remained somehow outside of Oceania. Even though Teaiwa and her sisters were raised in Fiji, their Blackness was still somehow set apart from that of the iTaukei (indigenous) Fijians. What has become clear since the PHA is that there are solidarities that exist within Melanesia that are in alignment with the liberation struggles of the African Diaspora, yet those solidarities remain distinct. As a Black and Kanaka Maoli artist and organizer committed to international liberation, part of my intention in this essay is to honor and center the contributions of Black / Indigenous liberation struggles within Melanesia. This remapping, I argue, has the potential to reorient how we understand Blackness, Indigeneity, and the intersection of the two.

    For several scholars writing outside of Oceania, the Black Pacific is a “sort of imagined community” (Taketani) that must somehow be in relationship with Paul Gilroy’s “Black Atlantic” in order to be considered a valid Black space, and its Blackness one that does nothing more than expand African American or Afro-Caribbean geographies. It is difficult for scholars outside of Oceania to disentangle a Blackness rooted in Africa from a Blackness rooted in the Pacific because of its long entanglement with the violence of European colonization and the mid-nineteenth century enslaving practices of South Pacific Islanders by Australians, Europeans, and Americans known as blackbirding (Horne). Yet it is important to acknowledge the very real Black Indigenous geographies, complexities, and lived experiences that exist within Oceania. There are more than ten million people living throughout Kanaky (New Caledonia), Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Fiji, the Solomon Islands, the Torres Straits, and Aboriginal Australia who speak over 1,300 languages and who were the first to navigate and settle the Pacific nearly fifty thousand years ago. Engaging with the Black Pacific and Black solidarity requires a deeper interrogation into the ways in which conceptions of Blackness in the Pacific overlap with the struggles of the African Diaspora and Black Power movements as well as examinations of those ways in which they remain independent from each other.

    Like the term “Black,” “Melanesian” is a complex term rooted in European colonialism and anti-Black racism. During the rise of the Black power movement in the 1970s, embraced as a term of empowerment, referred to as Melanesianism (Kabutaulaka 134). However, the term “Wantok”—a linguistically unifying term referring to a common pidgin spoken across the region (Kabutaulaka 131)—is more commonly used. In 1832, Jules Dumont dʻUrville labeled the islands of so-called Melanesia based on the darkness of the islanders’ black skin and the wooliness of their hair, labelling the men savages and the women undesirable (Tcherkézoff). This description essentially erased the millennia it took Wantok countries to learn the winds and rains, birdsong and plants of two thousand islands, erased the time it took to develop trade relationships, forms of governance, epistemologies, cosmographies, and ontologies that were centered in the Pacific. Although, the identities and cultures of ni-Vanuatu, Kanaky, Papuans, iTaukei, and Solomon Islanders developed completely disconnected from an African homeland and they are not a part of the African Diaspora, Wantoks are bound to the diaspora through shared subjugation, but more importantly through solidarity .

    While not African, Melanesians were also enslaved by Europeans, sometimes on their own land, other times kidnapped and displaced permanently. Between 1863 and 1904, 62,000 Pacific Islanders were kidnapped, tricked into servitude, or “blackbirded” from 80 Melanesian Islands, primarily within the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Fiji, New Caledonia, New Ireland, and Milne Bay Provinces in Papua New Guinea, but also Tuvalu and Kiribati, to work in the sugar and cotton plantations of Queensland, Australia, Fiji, and Sāmoa (“Plantation Voices”). Thousands of men, women, and children died in the plantations, while their homelands were depleted. By 1908, these same people faced compulsory “repatriation” to the islands under the White Australia Policy and the Pacific Island Labourers Act of 1901. Those who remained often suffered harsh treatment and discrimination. Their descendants, known as Australian South Sea Islanders, are now considered “not indigenous to any one place or land” (“Plantation Voices”). They became a diasporic identity unto themselves, and as fourth generation South Sea Islander artist Jasmine Togo-Brisby explains, “it is still so hard for our people to identify, that sometimes our people choose not to identify, because it is such a struggle. You can’t just say, ‘I’m Australian South Sea Islander’ and expect that the person on the receiving end knows what you’re talking about” (“Unfurling Tākiri”). The failure to honor the trauma of blackbirding is not unique to white Australians. Here in Hawaiʻi, we are only beginning to recover and collect blackbirding stories through scholarship, activism, and art. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Black women artists like Togo-Brisby are taking leadership in bringing these stories to light.

    Blackbirding is a painful memory specifically held in the bodies and memories of the peoples across Oceania. The rise of blackbirding throughout Oceania coincided with the rising demand for new sources of sugar, cotton, and guano as slavery was coming to an end in the US and the Caribbean. Between 1862 and the 1870s, other Pacific Islanders, such as the Rapa Nui, Tokelauans, Tuvaluans, Niueans, Tongarevans, and Marquesans were blackbirded to the Chincha Island guano mines of Peru (Maude). Because these populations were considerably smaller and easier to kidnap, they were devastated both through the extraction of laborers but also by infectious diseases brought back by those very few who were repatriated. It is clear that American and European enslavers were not content with the trans-Atlantic slave trade but pillaged further into the Pacific. Their voracious greed subjected Melanesians and other Pacific Islanders into the violence of plantation slavery, displacement, depletion, and disease, all predicated upon a notion of Black bodies, Pacific bodies, and especially Melanesian bodies, as enslavable. Confederates left the American south and started new chapters of the KKK in Fiji and Queensland, Australia, joining British settlers to form “a kind of White Pacific/White Atlantic of planters” (Horne 5) to expand slavery into the Pacific just as the trans-Atlantic Slave trade was ending. The legacy of blackbirding is therefore one of the points of entry when considering the solidarity of Black Oceania with the African Diaspora.

    During a panel discussion at the Sundance Film Festival 2021, entitled “Black Visuality and Solidarity in Oceania,” iTaukei scholar Dr. Ponipate Rokolekutu stated:

    When I talk about blackness, as an iTaukei and as a Melanesian, my notion of blackness is intertwined with my identity as an indigenous Fijian. And as an iTaukei, I come from the clan of the Mata ni Vanua . . . So when I think of blackness, It is not only former slaves through the trans-Atlantic slave trade or blackbirding, but someone who is also dispossessed of their lands. So my notion of blackness is complicated, because of the complexity of where I am situated as an indigenous Fijian and as a Melanesian. (“SFF21”)

    Rokolekutu conveys that Oceania enters the conversation on Black solidarity not just via blackbirding, but through the dispossession from our ancestral lands. Here the Pacific Diaspora and the African Diaspora flow into each other.

    The use of the term “Black” as it relates to Black Power and solidarity was not taken up until the mid-twentieth century, when it became a “rallying cry of Pacific Islanders under European occupation” (Elnaiem), appealing not only to Melanesians and Australian aboriginals, but also to other Pacific Islanders across the region, either because of their historical relationship to blackbirding or because they were often called black and treated in derogatory ways by white settlers. In this context, to identify as Black is politically strategic, aligning Oceania with what Rokolekutu calls the “collective Black experience of marginalization, exploitation, slavery and denigration” (“SFF21”) and the global struggle for decolonization, self-determination, and liberation. However, this type of expansion of Black identity can and does continue to render invisible the anti-blackness that is particular to Melanesians, Australian Aboriginals, and Torres Strait Islanders. Blackness is not only a tool with which to fight white supremacy, but also to fight the anti-blackness that comes from other Pacific Islanders. Dr. Tarcisius Kabutaulaka reminds us that because Western discourse has produced over two centuries of negative representations of Melanesia and its peoples, these perceptions have become internalized by Pacific Islanders, including Melanesians themselves, and used to “perpetuate relationships with Melanesia that have racist, essentialist, and social evolutionary elements” (110). Hence by taking up the call for Black Power, Pacific Islanders did not necessarily undo anti-blackness toward Melanesians.

    It is perhaps because of all of these complex positionings and embodied relationships to Blackness that Melanesians and Australian Aboriginals were among the first to rise up when cries for Black Power echoed across the world in the late 1960s. They began to reclaim the term Melanesian and to develop the ever-evolving process of Melanesianism, as described by Kabutaulaka: “Melanesianism is rooted in and draws strength from the past but is not confined by it. It exists and is ‘real’ because it is talked about, lived, and experienced, not because it is defined” (127). By asserting the “Melanesian Way” (111), Melanesians determine for themselves with whom and where their solidarities lie. Even today, when they lift their voices for Black Lives Matter, it is not for a Blackness in the US, but to uplift the peoples of West Papua, the Kanaky of New Caledonia, the Aboriginals of Australia, the Torres Strait Islanders, and to support all other powerful Black struggles of the Pacific by people who remain under the yoke of white settler repression. It is on this multi-layered foundation that Black lives matter in Oceania.

    To interrogate these complexities even further involves centering Black women and Black gender nonconforming people at the heart of both historical and contemporary black international solidarities. The works of Camari Serau, Mere Tuilau, and Sonja Larson are among the many important interventions that I have had the good fortune to witness. Each uses art as a tool for resistance, storytelling, and solidarity in relation to what Katherine McKittrick calls “geographies of domination” across the solwara.1 Through the use of photography, poetry, stitching, cowrie shells, and their presence in unexpected spaces, these women push the limits of Black women’s geographies and open up new imaginings for Black diasporas.

    Fig. 1.
    Camari Serau with Morning Star flag at Melanesian Arts Festival 2018. Photograph courtesy of the author.

    We Bleed Black and Red

    The first people to settle the Pacific were Papuan.
    —Teresia Teaiwa, “Mela/Nesian Histories, Micro/Nesian Poetics”

    To understand how anti-Blackness works in Melanesia, a critical understanding of the history and presence of the West Papua freedom struggle is imperative. On December 1, 1961, the people of West Papua raised the Morning Star flag as a symbol of their independence from the Dutch. But Indonesia, which had gained its independence from the Dutch in 1949, desired all of the former Dutch colonial holdings and invaded West Papua in 1963. Unable to secure support for its invasion, Indonesia turned to the Soviet Union for help. US president John F. Kennedy wrote to the Dutch prime minister, urging him to support Indonesian occupation over West Papuan plans for independence. The US orchestrated a meeting between Indonesia and the Dutch, known as the 1962 New York Agreement, which “effectively signed West Papua over to Indonesia (West Papuans were completely excluded from the agreement negotiations)” (Webb-Gannon 354). In 1967, West Papua was transferred to Indonesia, and the American-owned mining company Freeport McMoRan was given consent to begin open-pit mining for gold in the formerly Dutch owned Grasberg gold and copper mine. White supremacy colluded with the postcolonial Indonesian state to advance capitalist mining interests, a devastating blow to West Papuans.2 Two years later, in 1969, under the guise of democracy, 1,026 Indigenous West Papuans were held at gunpoint and forced to vote for Indonesian rule. This so-called “Act of Free Choice” was rubber-stamped by the United Nations and the United States. Grasberg is now the largest open-pit gold mine and the second largest copper mine in the world.

    As West Papuans try to protect their land from this colonial and corporate violence, they face genocidal tactics, media censorship, and near silence from the international community. The Amungme people of West Papua refer to Grasberg as Nemangkawi or “the womb” (“Nemangkawi”). They believe that Nemangkawi is the place of their creation and that when their spirit dies it goes to Nemangkawi to dwell with their ancestors and other supernatural beings. For this reason, the tops of their mountains are considered sacred (“Amungme”). If we consider Nemangkawi a symbol of the Amungme mother, then its carving out through open-pit mining is akin to the desecration of the Amungme woman. Today the Grasberg mine produces 700,000 tons of toxic tailings per day, which wash into the Aikwa River system and the Arafua Sea, killing nearly all aquatic life. It is also estimated it will generate about 6 billion tons of waste in the course of its existence (Perlez and Bonner). Acid mine drainage is leeching into groundwater and surrounding farmland. If, as Teaiwa claims, the first people of the Pacific were Papuan, then Indonesia, the US, Australia and other foreign interests are imposing complete control over the lives of peoples of West Papua and attempting a total annihilation of Black lives at the very center of where Blackness originates in the Solwara.

    Given the significance of Nemangkawi to the Amungme and the peoples of the Papua highlands, it comes as no surprise that the Indonesian government faced strong resistance when, funded by Freeport McMoRan, it chose to militarize the mine in 1977. Members of the Free West Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka or “OPM”) attacked the mine, and Indonesia responded with several military operations near Wamena, resulting in anywhere from 5,000 to 10,000 deaths between 1977 and 1978 (International Coalition). Deaths caused by the Indonesian military have continued to mount since the 1970s. Today, the 250 indigenous tribes of West Papua are still subject to systematic torture, rape, and genocide by the Indonesian military, but they continue to fight for self-determination. Having no legal protection, women feel the violence of this constant military occupation most severely. The widows and children of former OPM members are consistently discriminated against. They are denied access to support services, education, and employment (International Coalition). Their husbands, brothers, and sons are often imprisoned or killed, so that women must carry on the struggle for liberation and the care of the family. Their resilience is the inspiration for pan-Melanesian solidarity and solidarity throughout Oceania.

    Indonesia’s aggressive censorship of the media regarding its human rights violations means that the people of West Papua must often rely on its allies to tell their story. Activists, artists, performers, poets, and musicians must constantly find new and creative ways to outsmart Indonesia’s attempts to silence the demands to end the genocide. I have found the courage of developing young women and gender non-conforming Melanesian activists to be particularly inspiring. From marches to social media campaigns to concerts and live paintings, they use whatever is available to them to stand up for West Papua. These activists know that they will not be free until West Papua is free. The murdered West Papuans are the Black lives they will not let us forget. They are teaching us what it means to defend Black life and land in the solwara.

    West Papuan solidarity among young Melanesian activists is not surprising given the strong Pacific feminist tradition that is particular to the women of Fiji, Kanaky, Vanuatu, and Papua New Guinea. In the mid-1970s, scholars and activists such as Claire Slatter, Vanessa Griffen, Amelia Rokotuivuna out of USP, Fiji, and Kanaky activist Dewey Gorodey, situated mainstream feminism’s engagement with issues of gender and culture in the “context of imperialism, colonialism, and liberation” (Swan). The radical stance of Melanesian women stood out among Pacific feminists, because they often looked beyond the customary and familial roles of women toward internationalist issues (George 63). These feminists directly informed the work of Teresia Teaiwa, who went on to mentor the iTaukei organizers Camari Serau and Mere Tuilau, who are continuing the anti-colonial Pacific Feminist tradition developed over the past forty years in Fiji.

    In 2014 in Madang, Papua New Guinea, a youth activist organization called Youngsolwara Pacific was developed out of a workshop called the “Madang Wansolwara Dance.” Wansolwara (“one salt water”) means “one ocean, one people.” The gathering brought together community-based organizations, activists, artists, academics, and theologians in order to re-ignite a movement of solidarity across the Pacific with the motto Teaiwa, “One Ocean, One People.” The following year, Youngsolwara Pacific organized its first campaign to build regional awareness about West Papua. The “We Bleed Black and Red” campaign included several marches and events that gained attention on social media, despite the violent threats and intimidation of the Indonesian government. But there is one event I witnessed that I must recount in its entirety in order to communicate its significance.

    Between July 1 and 10, 2018, the Solomon Islands hosted the 26th Melanesian Arts and Cultural Festival (MACFest) in Honiara, Guadalcanal. MACFest is held every two years and brings together over 2,000 participants from throughout the region. The purpose of the festival to celebrate the dance, song, and arts of Melanesian countries. Although the Festival of the Pacific Arts began in Suva, Fiji it quickly became a more Polynesian dominated event, making it difficult for several Wantok delegates to attend. MACFest, was created in direct response to this and while open to delegates from other Pacific countries, remains governed by Wantok delegates, centering Melanesia. When Solomon Islands Prime Minister Rick Houenipwela allowed Indonesia to participate in the festival, he departed from the longstanding pro-West Papuan independence position of previous governments. This decision was considered an insult by many of the festival participants, most especially Solomon Islanders. Houenipwela demonstrated a blatant complicity with genocide and willingness to provide a venue for Indonesia’s self-serving narrative of colonial innocence.

    On July 5, 2018, without announcement or performance, gender non-conforming iTaukei poet Camari Serau quietly stood in front of the “Melanesian Provinces of Indonesia” pavilion on the Panatina Grounds in the middle of the festival and unfurled the Morning Star flag of West Papua (see fig. 1). It is illegal to fly this flag in West Papua, and anyone who does so risks arrest. Even into the fifth day of the festival, the “Melanesian Provinces of Indonesia” pavilion had no crafts or food for sale, no information to hand out, no adornments, no symbols of national pride, nothing and no one to represent it, unlike every other country’s pavilion in the festival. A sign above the pavilion served as a political signifier of power, to assert Melanesia’s place in the region. The barren pavilion stood out as a space uninvested in and unconcerned with its presence as a participant in the festival. Serau’s decision to unfurl that flag was a direct challenge to the legitimacy of the Indonesian government’s presence at the festival and an assertion of West Papuan sovereignty. This courageous act transformed an otherwise predicatable arts festival into a tinderbox of political tension by provoking an unexpected display of Melanesian solidarity for West Papuan Independence throughout the festival, thus denying Indonesia validation on Melanesian soil.

    Serau was joined by fellow poet and media specialist, Mere Tuilau, who photographed her. Serau and Tuilau are both members of Youngsolwara Pacific and two of the founding members of the We Bleed Black and Red Campaign. Together they reclaimed the Indonesian Pavillion for West Papua. At first, a delegate from Vanuatu and Kanaky arrived with their countries’ flags and joined Serau. More people approached the pavilion, and ultimately entire families and children from other island provinces in the Solomons, as well as Australian tourists, Fijians, Maori, Samoans, Tongans, Taiwanese, ni-Vanuatu, and many more joined the crowd, seeking a photograph with the Morning Star flag. Tuilau transformed the moment into a social media campaign. A small crowd of community members and members of the local Free West Papua Campaign Solomon Islands Youth movement also gathered. One man from an outer province of Guadalcanal stated: “I want to fly a big flag over my village for my brothers and sisters in West Papua. The Solomons have a deep love for West Papua.” It was quite an amazing action to witness: this was a moment to protect Black lives in the Pacific, with Black women artists leading the charge. On the surface, their action may not seem particularly extraordinary, but the choice for a young woman and gender non-conforming iTaukei to provoke the Indonesian government and festival officials in the middle of festival grounds is quite radical. The Indonesian government is notorious for harassing and threatening anyone willing to challenge their validity in the region. The Honiara government wants the income generated by tourists and are denying the political implications of Indonesia’s presence at the festival. By instigating an impromptu protest without any consultation or plan for their own protection, Serau and Tuilau were actively putting themselves in harm’s way. Even the local Free West Papua Campaign members were very hesistant and remained on the edges of this action, tentatively waiting to see the end result.

    About a half an hour later, well-known Papuan artist Jeffry Feeger arrived at the pavilion with a painting he had created just minutes before on the main music stage alongside a band from Papua New Guinea (PNG). He painted a portrait of a West Papuan with a Morning Star flag across his forehead. More than aware that his painting may be considered controversial by festival officials, he had received permission from the PNG delegation to show it. The arrival of the painting along with the pop-up photo action created a small frenzy of curiosity and an overwhelming outpouring of solidarity. Over one hundred people waited to have their picture taken with the Morning Star flag, and an announcer for the festival addressed the crowd: “If you would like to show your solidarity with West Papua and take a picture with the Morning Star flag, please go to the West Papua pavilion.” We were there for nearly two hours, and throughout that time the air was filled with beautiful conversations of solidarity. The crowd was made of residents from the islands of Taumotu, Rennel Island, Kanaky, Fiji, PNG, Australia, and Aotearoa.

    Then Indonesian government vehicles arrived. Two military vehicles pulled up beside the pavilion. The Indonesian officials stood by, quietly but visibly angry, taking out their phones to photograph the scene and the crowd. The pleasant atmosphere that had existed for hours before shifted in seconds. The tension was palpable. The lone woman among the military personnel was the designated speaker for the delegation. She asked about those who were in attendance and whether we would be returning to the pavilion the next day, because that is when the West Papuan delegation was expected to arrive. The sudden reclamation of the pavilion as belonging to West Papua and not to Indonesia clearly incensed them. The Indonesian and festival officials let the afternoon pass, but this action would not be the end of it.

    That night, Youngsolwara Pacific members and the Solomon Islands Free West Papua Campaign members danced together waving multiple Morning Star flags and singing songs dedicated to West Papuan self-determination. In a multitude of ways, this moment revealed “the indestructible character of the cultural resistance of the people—the popular masses—in the face of foreign domination” (Cabral and Vale 22). In this case, the masses were the people of Melanesia present on that day, who used the platform of MacFEST – a space for both art and political expression – to protest colonial occupation and genocide. The protest began with the unfurling of a flag, photographs, and a painting. This was all it took to subvert the presence of the Indonesian government.

    The next day, Serau, Tuilau, Feeger, and I were invited to speak at a community roundtable at the Leaf Haus Kava Bar along the coast of Honiara addressing the role of art in social justice movements. The moderator was Joey Tau, co-director of Pacific Network on Globalisation. As the panel opened, Serau and Tuilau each shared a poem of solidarity for West Papua. Participants were local West Papua activists from the Solomon Islands, students from the University of the South Pacific, and young writers, poets, photographers, and singers. The conversation covered many topics, most importantly the role that artists must play in struggles for social justice. It was clear to all those in attendance that art consists not only in artifacts, but also in using artistic skills to actively resist oppression. It was a truly “Wantok” (one talk) (Kabutaulaka 131) conversation: we did not share the same language, but linguistic differences did not prevent anyone from understanding each other. Rather, they worked to deepen the collective understanding that spaces like these are necessary. While this artist dialogue was taking place, the Indonesian delegation staff spent the day painting the Indonesian flag on the exterior walls of the pavilion with no West Papuan delegate in sight. The purpose of our gathering was ostensibly to celebrate art and the beauty of Melanesian culture, but the presence of the soldiers was a reminder of the bitter ugliness of colonial occupation.

    Saturday, July 7, 2018, marked the fortieth anniversary of the Solomon Islands’ Independence from the British. It was on this day that Serau and Tuilau returned to the newly painted, Indonesian flag-draped pavilion. However, this time they returned with members of the Solomon Islands Free West Papua Campaign. Serau did not hold the Morning Star flag, but handed it to West Papuan activist Ben Didiomea. They stood just outside of the pebble-lined border that demarcated the edges of the pavilion from the rest of the festival grounds. Tuilau once again began filming. Didiomea held the flag and began to speak, and almost immediately an Indonesian official tried to take the flag from him. But before the official could do anything, Tuilau ran toward him, camera in hand, and shouted, “Hey, hey, hey! This is your line! This is your fucking line!” Pointing to the rock-lined border on the ground, he shouted, “this is our soil! Melanesian soil! Shut up!” (Tuilau). Somewhat shocked, the Indonesian official took a step back. By this time, a crowd of bystanders had gathered. Didiomea began to shout, “This is Melanesia! What is Indonesia hiding in West Papua? Why are they not letting international media enter West Papua? I am a freedom fighter… International media no enter West Papua.” Meanwhile Serau stood behind him with a handmade sign that read “West Papua Merdeka” (Free West Papua). Once again, she stood in silent protest. Ben Didiomea had been present on that first day when Camari Serau brought out the flag at the empty pavilion, but he did not speak on that day, nor did he lead any actions on the day that the Indonesian officials painted their pavilion the colors of the Indonesian flag. Every action on the festival grounds for West Papua was initiated by Serau and Tuilau. In solidarity and with respect for their Solomon brothers and sisters living in Honiara, they did what they could to carve out a space that allowed the local organizers to speak and be heard. In fairness, Didiomea had more to lose for speaking out in Honiara, because men are often at higher risk for arrest or detention. There remained a high likelihood of arrest for Serau and Tuilau, but they were not afraid. When the Honiara Police department arrived, they stood and challenged the police (Toito‘ona). They did not hesitate to defend Didiomea. But neither the Indonesian officials nor the police wanted to interact with Tuilau or Serau. They only wanted to speak to the men in the movement, and it was the men who were targeted for arrest. Consequently, Didiomea and another Free West Papua campaign member, Maverick Seda, were later temporarily detained by the Honiara police and their Morning Star flag was confiscated. Honiara Police “issued a statement saying the flag was removed to prevent provocation of the Indonesians, reminding the demonstrators that it was not a political event” (RNZ Pacific).

    Serau and Tuilau’s protest at the festival did not go unnoticed by Fiji authorities. When Serau and Tuilau returned to Fiji from Honiara, “[they] were taken in for questioning by the Fiji Border Control Police. [They] were asked questions relating to pro-independence advocacy for Papua and West Papua province” (“Portrait”). Serau and Tuilau have since been told by Fijian police to stop “wearing Papuan activism t-shirts or carrying out any form of protest at public events” (“Portrait”). Serau and Tuilau’s social media accounts and activities concerned with West Papua have come under surveillance, yet they continue to fight. The detention and questioning of Didiomea, Seda, Serau and Tuilau reflects a shifting and regressive landscape in relation to Indonesia among regional governments.

    The political and economic power that Indonesia wields in the region cannot be underestimated. Because Indonesia controls the mineral wealth of West Papua, they are backed by international corporate mining interests and have developed strong military relationships with Australia and the US. Indonesia will often threaten to cut off trade with or other assistance to Melanesian countries that take a strong position against their occupation of West Papua, pressuring governments to take punitive steps toward openly pro-West Papuan Independence activists. Therefore, the acts of Camari Serau and Mere Tuilau should not be taken lightly. It is important to recognize their solidarity with those on the ground in Honiara, to honor their creative and fearless demands for justice, and to mark their intervention against Indonesia’s violence, which otherwise might go unnoticed. Tuilau and Serau use art as a tool for liberation and incorporate multiple genders into Black liberation, expanding the scope of previous conceptions of Black feminism in Melanesia. They may not declare themselves feminist in the same ways as their predecessors, but their relentless demands for West Papuan self-determination and their willingness to directly challenge Indonesian harassment places them in the continuum of radical Black Pacific feminist solidarity. Following their example, I include the people of the Melanesia and their urgent cry for freedom when I say “Black Lives Matter.” The West Papuan freedom struggle has much to teach the rest of us about what it means to demand liberation under militarized occupation, and what it means to push back against corporations that are protected by a government seeking to extinguish the beauty of Black life, land, and self- determination.

    Mourning and Solidarity in the time of COVID-19

    the salt in our veins, the who we are and the who we are not. we have not yet seen the bottom of it, the depth of mourning that birthed us here.
    Alexis Pauline Gumbs, M Archive: After the End of the World

    These words by Alexis Pauline Gumbs’s M Archive capture the deep mourning generated by the loss of so many Black lives due to state violence and now COVID-19. In the spring of 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic sent the world into quarantine as people around the globe began dying at alarming rates. The quarantine revealed cracks in the facade of the health care system worldwide: disparities in wealth, wage protections, and access to healthcare. Reactionary, slow-to-respond governments, particularly in the US, caused many deaths. As of June 23, 2021, 3.88 million people have contracted COVID-19 (World Health Organization). On May 25, 2020, a Black man named George Floyd was murdered by Minneapolis Police officer, Derek Chauvin, who was filmed forcefully kneeling on Floyd’s neck, preventing him from breathing. Floyd’s dying words were “I can’t breathe” (Hill et al.). This recorded murder set the world ablaze overnight. The unbearable sense of rage, pain, and devastation in witnessing in real time the state-sanctioned murder of yet another Black man could not be contained. The murders of Trayvon Martin, Eric Garner, Michael Brown, Philando Castille, Tamir Rice, Sandra Bland, and so many others were still fresh in our collective memory. Uprisings and protest erupted across the US and around the globe. Freeways were shut down and police stations and police cars were set on fire. There were also marches to protest the recent murders of Ahmaud Arbery, Toni McDade, and Breonna Taylor. All of these murders intensified the demands for state accountability and structural change. Organizers such as Patrice Cullors, co-founder of Black Lives Matter, and M Adams of the Movement for Black Lives began shifting the narrative beyond prosecuting the police to defunding the police, moving toward a Black feminist abolitionist praxis that promotes moving funds away from institutions that have historically brought harm to Black communities and toward an economy that could lead to transformative healing and growth.

    Many people in Oceania rose up in solidarity with the movement for Black lives. On June 6, 2020, designated as an international day for marches of solidarity, a march in Honolulu, Hawai‘i led by twelve high school organizers suprisingly drew a crowd of over 10,000 people. The march included many Pacific Islanders and Kanaka Maoli who were kiaʻi o Mauna Kea (protectors of Mauna Kea). Thousands of kia‘i had spent the previous summer on the summit road effectively preventing the multinational Thirty Meter Telescope (TMT) corporation from any further desecration of the summit of Mauna Kea on Hawaiʻi island, which already has thirteen telescopes and is considered to be one of the most sacred mountains in the Hawaiian archipelago. The momentum of this movement, which recognized the value of international solidarity, spilled over into the Hawaiʻi movement for Black Lives march, effectively making it one of the largest marches in Hawaiian history.

    There were also numerous large-scale solidarity marches throughout the Pacific, particularly in Wellington and Auckland in Aotearoa, and in cities throughout Australia. USP students in Vanuatu waved signs, and a group of eighteen Fijians placed flowers in front of the US embassy in Tamavua to draw attention to police violence both abroad and in Fiji. They stood in quiet protest for 8 minutes and 46 seconds, the time it took for George Floyd to pass away from asphyxiation. Fijian police removed the flowers as soon as they left (Boyle), a reminder that threats to freedom of speech exist there also.

    Pacific student organizing has been critical in combating anti-Black racism, and the 2020 global protests strengthened movements calling for global solidarity. A group of anti-racist Papuan students, known as the “Balikpapan 7,” was arrested in 2019 for leading protests in Jakarta that called for an end to racism and to violence against West Papuans (Piersen). Student protestors were called “monkeys” and taunted with racist epithets. The protests calling for the release of the Balikpapan 7 were clearly informed by the resurgence of international support for the Black Lives Matter movement, as can be seen from the social media tag #PapuanLivesMatter. Papuan activist Buchtar Tabuni told the Los Angeles Times that “The government was afraid. Black Lives Matter has triggered support for oppressed Papuans” (Piersen). The Balikpapan 7 all faced the possibility of being sent to prison for up to seventeen years on the charge of treason. As a result of BLM protests, the group was only sentenced to serve eleven months. Tabuni continued: “I extend my sympathies for the passing of George Floyd. We know exactly how it feels. But we also ask Americans for their solidarity; to help us stand on our own two feet as an independent West Papua” (Piersen). Tabuni, while extending sympathies to Floyd’s family, reiterates the need for solidarity with the peoples of West Papua. This solidarity is long overdue.

    I now turn to the important work of diasporic Papuan artist Sonja Larson. Unlike Camari Serau and Mere Tuilau, Larson did not identify as an activist before the summer of 2020. However, it would be a mistake to underestimate the importance of her intervention, entitled BLM Meri Blouse 2020 (see fig. 2). The piece of clothing in the pictures is a handstitched dress known as a Meri blouse, which is worn in PNG. The blouse is covered in both historic and contemporary photographs commemorating Black liberation struggles, social justice activists and those murdered by the state from the United States to West Papua, with delicately placed, sewnin red beads and cowrie shells. This work provides a powerful visual mapping of intersections of Blackness as seen by a Black Pacific woman living in the diaspora in the time of COVID-19.

    Fig. 2.
    BLM Meri Blouse 2020 by Sonja Larson. Photograph courtesy of Sonja Larson.

    Larson descends from the Tolai people of the Gazelle Peninsula of East New Britain in Papua New Guinea, but she has never known these lands. Her only connection to these lands and waters comes from listening to her mother and aunts speaking in Tok Pisin, a language neither she nor her sister speaks. Like many diasporic peoples, Larson has found it difficult to develop a deep connection with her mother’s homeland. Larson was born and raised in Albuquerque, New Mexico, where, she stresses, she is “always read as African American” (S. Larson, Interview). Larson was a student in a Pacific Islands Studies course, “Art, Ritual, and Performance,” that I was teaching at the University of Hawai‘i. Larson was longing to see a reflection of herself at the university, so the opportunity to engage with Melanesian artists opened up new possibilities for her creative expression.

    I introduced Sonja to the work of Australian-based Tolai artist Lisa Hilli, which addresses Black identity and colonial encounters. Hilli curated an exhibition of her work called Trade and Transformation. The purpose of the exhibition was to draw out narratives of the Tolai people and “non-indigenous people to that land—Europeans, missionaries, and colonists” (Hilli, “Trade and Transformation”). Hilli’s exhibition focuses on the small red beads that were ordered by the pound from Europe, which missionaries would hand out to the Tolai inhabitants, initially as a tool to convert them to Christianity but eventually as material with which to acquire land and to extract labor. Hilli ordered twenty pounds of red beads, based on a passage she read in the journal of a reverend who engaged in this trade. She then strung them into rows and hung them from ceiling to floor in multiple strands of varying lengths to display what this payment for labor looks like. At the end of each strand, she added small colonial coins, crosses, or photographs of her ancestors in lockets to represent the unknown history of the Tolai people (Hilli, “Trade and Transformation”). In this same exhibition, Hilli shares a video of green beads being poured into thimbles, invoking workers being paid by German plantation owners “four thimblefuls of beads for every pound of coconut or copra in a coconut pound bag… I wanted to see what that looked like in Black hands” (Hilli, “Trade and Transformation”).

    Inspired by Hilli, Larson stitched in a few small red and green beads at the neck, hem, and sleeves of the blouse, thereby putting Larson into conversation with ancestors she had never known. According to Larson’s mother, Diane Mali Larson, Meri blouses were first given out on the Islands of New Ireland, New Britain, Manus, Louisiade Archipelago, and the Northern Solomons by missionaries in the 1870s to promote humility in bare-breasted Black women. Over time, however, the blouses became a marker of Papuan women’s identity. Women individualized their blouses by embroidering designs or adding different textures or prints. Larson chose to hand-stitch a blouse made of cotton with a faint floral print. Her choice of white cotton was, in part, a practical one, as it is easier to transfer black-and-white photographs onto white cloth, but she chose white cotton also because it was a primary commodity of colonial plantations. It then becomes a material in conversation with the plantations of Fiji and Queensland and the Americas, which are key sites of blackbirding, as Gerald Horne’s work has shown. By hand-sewing the blouse, a craft taught Larson by her mother, she joined a diaspora of Black women artists–from the outer islands of Papua New Guinea to Gee’s Bend–who use cloth and thread to reclaim their identities.

    The materials that Larson chooses transport the viewer across spatial-temporal realms of Black resistance and survival. The cowrie shells stitched into the sleeves of the blouse are particularly relevant from a Black historical perspective. The shells were collected by Larson’s mother from the shores of her home in New Ireland. Larson shared, “By hand-stitching these specific Cowrie shells onto my blouse, it is as though I am bringing a piece of New Ireland closer to me” (“Meri Blouse 2020”). But the cowrie shells are much more than just reminders of her homeland. Cowrie shells or “blood cowries” were ballast on slave ships and a currency for Black bodies (Hartman 205). In this way, Lawson notes that cowries can be both Pacific and Atlantic, both beautiful and bloodstained, gesturing toward an inclusive vision of global Black liberation. As Tolai artists living in the diaspora, Larson and Hilli navigate centuries of anti-blackness and colonialism across oceans. By creating the BLM Meri blouse, Larson hoped to “illustrate the complexity of Black-Pacific identity within the diaspora” (S. Larson). But her decision to incorporate iconic Civil Rights photographs, contemporary photographs of the protests for West Papua, and images of the protests for George Floyd also visually brings to the forefront those intersections and distinctions that define Black Pacific women in the diaspora.

    On the last day of the course, I invited Black Pacific scholars Courtney Savali Andrews, Joyce Pua Warren and Black Maori artist Poata Alvie McKree to critique the students’ final projects. While all of the students in the class shared powerful and moving work, Sonja Larson’s BLM Meri Blouse 2020 produced a collective silence. Larson’s work had marked and made visible the collective pain that we were all holding. This one small garment conveyed colonial violence, our being severed from our ancestors, and the cries for liberation we could not name. In its shells it held the sea and the whispers of those unnamed, carrying all of us to the shores Larson hopes to touch one day.

    Sonja Larson, Camari Serau, and Mere Tuilau are all born out of a Blackness whose lineages of resistance and liberation anchor and overlap in Papua. Their actions and art explore the ways in which Blackness ebbs and flows within the same salt water as the African Diaspora but is grounded in their experience as Pacific peoples. Their work creates a new locus from which to understand Blackness not as an imagined, distant place but instead as a vitally important multi-faceted region that “becomes ‘real’ through pan-Melanesian connections that are manifested in the idea of ‘Melanesia’” (Kabutaulaka 127). From this pan-Melanesian center they build international solidarity. This essay bears witness to the clarity and courage of Melanesian women and gender nonconforming people. Their longings, their suffering, their imagination, and their struggles for liberation provide visionary leadership for Black futures that is so urgently needed.

    Black is the color of solidarity.

    Joy Lehuanani Enomoto is a community organizer, visual artist and lecturer at the University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa in Pacific Islands Studies. Her work on climate justice, embodied archives and demilitarization in the Pacific is featured in Frontiers Journal, The Contemporary Pacific: Experiencing Pacific Environments: Pasts, Presents, Futures, Detours: A Decolonial Guide to Hawaiʻi, Routledge Postcolonial Handbook, and Amerasia Journal. Her current work focuses on anti-Blackness in Oceania/Solwara.

    Footnotes

    1. The term “solwara” is Tok-Pisin word for “salt-water” or “ocean.”

    2. This history stands in contrast to rosy accounts of Indonesia as the host of the infamous 195 Bandung conference, still imagined by scholars an activists as the apex of Third World solidarity.

    Works Cited

    • “Afro-Pacific Women in the Diaspora, Pacific History Association #SayHerName.” YouTube, uploaded by Alisha Lola Jones, 11 Aug. 2016, youtu.be/iAShZYjqSlw. “Amungme: Mountain Papuans Deprived of Their Land.”
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    • Hill, Evan, et al. “How George Floyd was Killed in Police Custody.” New York Times, 31 May 2020, www.nytimes.com/video/us/100000007159353/george-floyd-arrest-death-video.html.
    • Hilli, Lisa. “Trade and Transformation.” Vimeo, uploaded by Blak Dot Gallery, 20 June 2018, www.vimeo.com/276158481. Accessed 12 Oct. 2020.
    • ———. “Trade and Transformation: Blak Dot Gallery Solo Exhibition.” Lisa Hilli, lisahilli.com/papalum-na-lima-practice/trade-transformation/. Accessed 1 Oct. 2020.
    • Horne, Gerald. The White Pacific: U.S. Imperialism and Black Slavery in the South Seas after the Civil War. U of Hawaiʻi P, 2007.
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    • Kabutaulaka, Tarcisius. “Re-Presenting Melanesia: Ignoble Savages and Melanesian Alter-Natives.” The Contemporary Pacific, vol. 27, no.1, 2015, pp. 110–145. Project MUSE, doi:10.1353/cp.2015.0027.
    • Larson, Diane Mali. “History of Meri Blouse.” Interview by Sonja Larson. 28 July 2020 and 20 Aug. 2020. ———. “Meri Blouse 2020.” University of Hawai’i, 2020. Project proposal.
    • Maude, Henry Evans. Slavers in Paradise: The Peruvian Labour Trade in Polynesia, 1862–1864. Australian National UP, 1981.
    • McKittrick, Katherine. Demonic Grounds: Black Women and the Cartographies of Struggle. U of Minnesota P, 2006.
    • MTG Project Banaba. “Project Banaba: Katerina Teaiwa.” YouTube, uploaded by MTGHawke’s Bay, 6 July 2019, youtu.be/hvXe0OabqRg.
    • “Nemangkawi.” Freedom Flotilla, 10. Feb. 2014, freedomflotillawestpapua.org/2014/02/10/nemangkawi/. Accessed 10 July 2020.
    • Perlez, Jane, and Raymond Bonner. “Below a Mountain of Wealth, a River of Waste.” The New York Times, 27 Dec. 2005, www.nytimes.com/2005/12/27/world/asia/below-a-mountain-of-wealth-a-river-of-waste.html. Accessed 9 Oct. 2020.
    • Piersen, David. “George Floyd’s Death Inspires an Unlikely Movement in Indonesia: Papuan Lives Matter.” Los Angeles Times, 2 July 2020, www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-07-02/papuan-lives-matter.
    • “Plantation Voices: Contemporary Conversations with Australian South Sea Islanders.” State Library of Queensland, 16 Feb. 2019, www.slq.qld.gov.au/discover/exhibitions/plantation-voices-contemporary-conversations-australian-south-sea-islanders. Exhibition.
    • “Portrait of an Activist: Camari Serau.” Amnesty International, 30 May 2019, www.amnesty.org/en/latest/education/2019/05/camari-serau/. Accessed 10 Oct. 2020.
    • “West Papua Activists Stopped by Solomons Police.” RNZ Pacific, 9 July, 2018 https://www.rnz.co.nz/international/pacific-news/361417/west-papua-activists-stopped-by-solomons-police
    • “SFF21: Black Visuality and Solidarity in Oceania.” YouTube, uploaded by Honolulu Museum of Art, 3 Feb. 2021, youtu.be/nJTJv4TpSnc.
    • Swan, Quito. “Giving Berth: Fiji, Black Women’s Internationalism, and the Pacific Women’s Conference of 1975.” Journal of Civil and Human Rights, vol. 4, no. 1, 2018, pp. 37–63. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/10.5406/jcivihumarigh.4.1.0037.
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    • ———. “Mela/Nesian Histories, Micro/Nesian Poetics.” Amerasia Journal, vol. 43, no. 1, 2017, pp. 169–178. Taylor & Francis, doi:10.17953/aj.43.1.169-178.
    • ———. “One Ocean, One People: Interview with Teresia Teaiwa on Self-Determination Struggles in the Pacific.” Fightback, 29 Oct. 2014, fightback.org.nz/2014/10/29/one-ocean-one-people-interview-with-teresia-teaiwa-on-self-determination-struggles-in-the-pacific/.
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  • Unsettling Diasporas: Blackness and the Specter of Indigeneity

    Sandra Harvey (bio)

    [T]he wake has positioned us as no-citizen … with no state or nation to protect us, with no citizenship bound to be respected.

    Christina Sharpe, In the Wake

    In her much-celebrated The Transit of Empire, Chickasaw critical theorist Jodi Byrd begins a chapter on colonial multiculturalism with a story about land desecration and grave robbing that has stuck with me for years. As she writes, around the turn of the 20th century, archeologist Charles Peabody hired black workers to excavate mounds within the Mississippian Ceremonial Complex. These were burial sites, sacred land that the Choctaw and Chickasaw tend. The Mother Mound, Ninih Waiya, is the site of creation for the Choctaw who are called to be its stewards (Osburn). The 1830 forced removal of the Choctaw to what is currently called Oklahoma was disastrous not only for the violence enacted on their living bodies but for the violent attempt to sever care between the Choctaw, the land, and their deceased relatives dwelling within the land. One elder described the nightmare of removal in the following way: “We were to cast away the bones of our fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, for the wild dogs to gnaw in the wilderness, our hunters could kill no more meat; hunger and disease would follow; then confusion and death would come … The vengeance of the offended spirits would be poured out upon this foolish nation” (Akers, “Removing” 133). When a Choctaw dies, one spirit holds vigil over their remains to ensure proper care. The other spirit, the shilup, travels west to the “Land of Death.” For the Choctaws, forced removal to the west literally meant being relegated to the land of the dead where they would potentially be unable to reach the afterworld (Akers, “Living”).

    Peabody’s anthropological craft emerged from the American settler colonial and slave owning project and perpetrated this project’s violence simultaneously upon three peoples: he instigated and oversaw the removal of Choctaw and Chickasaw ancestors from their mounds, and he also recorded exploited black workers in song as they carried out the bulk of the grueling physical labor.1 What struck me and continues to weigh on me in this story is the ethical/political relationship of black peoples and, in a more abstract sense, blackness, to the mounds, to the sanctity of the land which we inhabit, and its relatives in this so-called “New World.” This essay represents an attempt at contributing to the many traditions and conversations that try to better understand and enact this relationship, its nuances, and the ethical/political possibilities, both those opened up and foreclosed within its contexts. Drawing on the practices and histories of our ancestors and our interactions with the indigenous peoples of these lands, scholars within western hemispheric Black Studies continue to ask ourselves, how does black life fit into (or not) the histories and ongoing conquest and colonization of peoples and their homelands?2

    The question is salient, in part, because of how foundational ideas of diaspora have come to be for both black intellectual history and black politics. The term often conjures up an existential pull or directionality, a persistent elsewhere that renders black existence, especially but not solely outside of Africa, permanently and always already “unrooted.” In one sense, this has been reduced to a deleterious trope within certain diasporic black political circles that engage a projection of Africa rather than Africa itself as an actual, present constellation of geographies, global capital, colonial ties, and post-colonial struggles. In these balancing moves, an uninterrogated or a carelessly interrogated loss or alienation and desire for or recovering of Africa, mirroring the trope of black colonial “unrootedness,” is paradoxically ingrained in the episteme of what Congolese philosopher and cultural anthropologist V.Y. Mudimbe calls the European project of “Africanism.” Here, Africa as image or object arises only as either completely inaccessible to the descendants of transatlantic enslavement and other black diasporic subjects, or romantically awaiting rediscovery or historical recovery.

    Yet, diaspora has also been the organizing force of Pan African politics, black internationalism, and other black transnational solidarity efforts. It has come to strengthen lateral socio-cultural exchanges between black peoples across Europe, Canada, the United States, the Caribbean, and parts of Central and South America. As Paul Gilroy argues of the Black Atlantic, such ties are manifestations of the “desire to transcend both the structures of the nation state and the constraints of ethnic and national particularity” (19). Despite this productive cross-oceanic pull, Gilroy insists that black existence (outside of one’s so-called original or ancestral homeland) demands a connection to place in its immediate locality. Such a claim frames diaspora in terms of “multi-rootedness” rather than “unrootedness.” He notes, for example, that black Britons are “linked into the social relations” of the UK such that “[b]oth dimensions [the diaspora as transnational and its ties to the nation] have to be examined and the contradictions and continuities which exist between them must be brought out” (156). Gilroy teases out the tensions within the binaristic pull between “home” and colonial metropole that constitutes black life in diaspora.

    Yet, what if we understood diaspora as one point of a definitional web that does not rely on rootedness, however complicated, in the Western nation-state as its counter point? What if we, in addition to diaspora, turn our attention to the condition of indigeneity, which remains undertheorized in most renditions of diasporic Black Studies? How might considering indigeneity and our relationship to it offer insight into who “we” are and what “our futures” can be? I’d like to stage a conversation about the ways in which diaspora has been positioned in opposition to indigeneity, the two reflected as geopolitical poles. I venture that the work of bringing into view the constitutive binary of diaspora and what I argue is its specter, indigeneity, allows us to interrogate the political and cosmological force of its structure as such and the implications for how we might understand our world otherwise. The goal is to pay attention to the multiplicity of ways blackness is coded and recoded in various colonial, post-colonial, and settler colonial geopolitical intersections.

    One of the challenges to posing a conversation between Africanists, post-colonial theorists, migration scholars, Latin Americanists, Black Studies scholars, and Indigenous Studies (including Two Spirit) scholars is not just that each approaches (or dismisses) the idea of “indigeneity” through different conceptual frameworks, different collections of knowledge, and different histories. As scholars, even if we are aware of the work of “other” communities, we have not always taken in their various logics to consider their implications for our own communities. No doubt this article is subject to the same mistakes. However, this failure should not precipitate abandoning the effort. On the contrary, it is indicative of the need for the project itself, given that we are often, as Saidiya Hartman notes, “intellectual strangers” and also—I might add—politically, culturally, epistemically, and genealogically estranged. This article makes an attempt to put into conversation some of these disparate scholarly and political habitus that, while at the level of institution remain siloed, are not so neatly separate in lived experience. I hope it offers additional entryways into thinking about the meanings and relationships between “indigeneity,” “blackness,” and “diaspora.”

    Who “We” Is

    This call also necessarily turns anew to the question of who “we” are, in hopes not of shoring up boundaries but rather of sitting with their necessary and productive porosity and friction.3 The consideration requires attention to the multiple iterations, fault lines, and convivialities within both the “we” of black people (including Indigenous black people) and Black Studies as a field formation that traverses multiple disciplines, area studies, and imperial/colonial institutional power relations.4 In the Western Hemisphere, it is critical to be intentional about these questions, specifically because of the ways that the diasporic / indigenous binary in the Americas has been mapped onto the categories of “black” and “Native” and racialized as such. Tiya Miles, Sharon Holland, and Circe Sturm have contested this reductive demarcation through their work on the history and culture of black members of the so-called Five Civilized Tribes who participated in the chattel slave market, had slaves themselves, and also made kin with Africans and Afro-descendant people. Black peoples (including those enslaved by Indigenous families) engaged in the cultural and kinship practices of the Five Civilized Tribes and many times identified and were recognized as Native peoples. In the United States and Canada, these histories are often understood as exceptional; anti-racist scholars and activists alike in the West often commit the mistake of considering that while black people in these particular cases are Native (“by blood” or “by treaty”), most Natives are not black and most blacks are not Native.5 The consequences of this assumption are severe at the conceptual and thus political levels. The presumption reifies the boundary between blackness and indigeneity such that at present, academic conferences and activist spaces generally take on the interrelations between black and Indigenous peoples and consider these identities as mutually exclusive in attempts to parcel out what solidarity between peoples might look like. In this way, the intra-relationality of black indigeneity becomes unthinkable in a Trouillotian sense (Trouillot).

    I would like to push back on this generalized assumption, and instead to hail as interlocutors black peoples who have no legible (political or cultural) claim to a position of indigeneity. That is, I seek to open up the conversation as a matter of concern amongst black people who are generally identified through the narrative of diaspora. In one sense, this call is anchored in what Tiffany King describes as our conditions as black people “living under relations of conquest” (King, Black Shoals xiii). King prioritizes a conversation amongst black people because, in her words, “I care about Native people’s survival. And I do not care because I have a Native grandmother or ancestor. I care because the Black radical politics that I have inherited cares about Native people … This ethics that eschews and actively resists genocide as an order of modernity and making of the human subject proper is an ethics of Black radical struggle, period” (King, Black Shoals xiii). King attributes this ethics of care not to an identity claim or a claim for political inclusion but to a recognition that the black radical tradition requires a future that wholly ruptures the foundations of conquistador modernity (the modern, Eurocentric and patriarchal idea of the human, the propertization of land, the invention of race and, in particular, blackness as antithetical to freedom) that make black and indigenous life impossible. King hails a black “we” based in a black radical care for the “other” (but not necessarily the other as stranger and even maybe the other as “we”) made possible by her trust in black people and the righteousness of our freedom dreams in as much as they must and do “consider Native freedom” (xiii). One of the most important contributions of this discussion of “we” is that it moves the expectation of concern about colonialism and for indigenous futures beyond the focus on a so-imagined smaller group of black people on Turtle Island who are legally and culturally recognized as also Indigenous. King returns to the Black Studies’ tradition of considering the violence of colonialism as a core component to black freedom and a charge that must be taken up by black scholars and activists in the present.

    This tradition, however, is complicated. Even with trust in (or in other cases, desire for) a black peoples—and not simply those living but our ancestors, if one considers them—“we” are often strangers. I do not mean this only metaphorically or ideologically. Alzheimer’s runs in my family. Many of us are obligated to forget. I am haunted by these doubts: Would my grandmother—as ancestor—recognize me now? Do I or how do I want her to recognize me? Do I have a choice? Here, I invoke recognition in the sense that Fanon through Hegel, Audra Simpson, and Glen Coulthard discuss the term. Yet I also emphasize that recognition is both a political process and an actual material question, whether that be limited by the brain’s grey matter or the emptiness of the National Archives. “Making generations,” as Gayle Jones reminds us in Corregidora, or belonging to generations, is risky and often outside of our control (and perhaps desires). Moreover, alienation is different from unrootedness. One lives estranged within relations of subjection, an almost unbearable circumstance for certain. Yet, almost always, it is that sort of alienation that “we” have in common, even if differently. In mediating on purposefully building relations, Keguro Macharia notes, “Queer studies teaches me to distrust community. From here, (Kenya, personal history, Gikuyu supremacy, heteronormative ethnopatriarchy), family is too toxic to be useful” (“Mbiti & Glissant”). Macharia moves away from the filial as heteronormative and towards what he calls we-formations, and the risky, chaotic, erotic work of relating to one another. To the extent that one desires a “there, there” for blackness, for a black “we,” and for the stability that this might afford particularly in the context of the present task of considering indigeneity alongside, within, rubbing up against blackness, I attempt to take up the opportunity to reckon with these conditions of alienation, to remain open or vulnerable to multiple openings and configurations. To expose oneself to these opportunities and risks is to call for a “we” in which the possibilities of ancestry, in all its queerness and estrangement, confront us. Black Studies is an institutionalized reflection of these silos, investments, desires—one that is beholden to the political economic constraints of an ever more privatized, and US-centric academe. Yet it is also one of the fraught places in which “we” struggle for such formations.

    The Ungeographic

    Black diaspora studies has focused on the Atlantic and its coasts as the points of reference for understanding both black life and black death. Whether it be, for example, through Paul Gilroy’s Black Atlantic, Stephanie Smallwood’s littoral, Saidiya Hartman or Dione Brand’s Door of No Return, Christina Sharpe’s wakes, or Tiffany King’s shoals, these geographical locations, the writers insist, are more than mere positions on a map. They are epistemological and ontological thresholds. That is, the Atlantic and its coasts are not simply borders or boundaries through which subjects of history have passed. Rather, they are people-making (or object-making) geographical constructs that have given form to a key paradox for subjectivity in the soon-to-be-called “New World.” The Middle Passage establishes captive Africans as both objects of commerce and as subjects, but only as pertains to their capacity—if not propensity—for legal or social perversion. The slave trade arranges space and gives meaning by transmogrifying people into commodities.6 Indeed, in Saltwater Slavery, historian Stephanie Smallwood describes the littoral as that place where “a human being could fail to be a person” (63).

    The logic of the market produces place—the littoral—and subject/object together. This was so much the case that within the littoral, even as the enslaved were commonly able to flee particular slavers, they were rarely able to escape enslavement more permanently. Prices for captives were higher closer to the coast, and as such, there was a strong incentive for others to recapture fugitive slaves quickly and sell them back. As Smallwood notes, “sooner rather than later the commercial tide inexorably returned to the water’s edge most of those who had escaped from European captivity” (55). Identified by their emaciated bodies and estrangement from any local kinship ties, they could escape a particular fort or ship but could rarely escape their status as chattel. Thus, the trade altered geographic points of reference for Europeans and Africans (both captive and those who remain on the continent). If prior to the Atlantic slave market the trading centers of west Sudan were a major focal point, once the slave trade increased, the west coast and its logic became a central organizing space (Smallwood). Belying the very definition of the littoral as marginal, slave trafficking rendered the coast a center of West African life.

    The illogic of the periphery-as-center matters for Europe’s projected framing of black and African peoples’ existence in the world as always already detached from origin, and particularly from land as origin. Scholars of the Atlantic, the littoral, and the wake historicize this predicament and yet make sure not to re-claim these geographic configurations as stable ground. On the contrary, it is just this instability, this not fitting into appropriate normative geographies of groundedness, that may serve as a productive force. Leaning into black as ungrounded, as either a geographic non-presence or at least a not fully visible presence, acts as a foil for colonial fantasies of stability, or mastery of space—as do the shoals that disrupt the currents of the Atlantic (King, Black Shoals). Tending to these shoals or the wakes and the understandings of space that they open up is a critical component for a black ethical relationship to land.

    The Atlantic as a point of reference focuses diaspora as a central framing of Black Studies. We have seen, as Stuart Hall insists, “the black experience as a diaspora experience” (253). Yet it is worthwhile to ask whether our existence might be more than “diaspora” as such, or rather if our current understandings of the idea of diaspora obscure various modes of black relating to land. Thus far, our nuanced theorizing of diaspora’s transnationality, uprootedness, and multi-rootedness has often referred back to the colonial or postcolonial nation, even when we believe we are undermining it. This idea of diaspora responds to the ways colonial geography has authorized spatial meaning in the world. The black subject emerges as socially and politically legible as a modern subject in the West through this notion of diaspora and uprootedness. However, despite the complex understanding we have of diaspora, we have generally not paid enough careful attention to whether (or how) this experience is exclusive of indigeneity, which hovers closely by as a specter of black life. For certain, terms such as “indigenous,” “native,” “aboriginal,” and “original peoples” emerge through the making of colonial empire and anthropology as institutions of colonial knowledge production.7 In its attempts to identify and regulate difference, anthropology employs the idea of indigeneity as a place marker of modernity’s boundaries. Many colonized peoples have taken these terms up for resignification. They refer both to various hegemonic colonial designations and to their beyond.8 With this in mind, it is important to look anew at the term and ask after its political (political economic) and ethical and cosmological (or worlding) force. To take indigeneity in relation to diaspora seriously requires rethinking the “point of departure” or “origin” as, instead, multiple points of departure, nodes of movement that of course travel the transits of empire (the Atlantic and the Pacific), but that also exist and make place in excess of colonial logic.9 To exist in such an anarchic way with regard to place, creatively and carefully, isn’t an abstract political choice but the condition of existence (worldly and otherwise) for those of us collectively known as black.

    Part of the reason Black Studies in the West often undertheorizes indigeneity is the prominence of the notion that captive Africans and their black descendants lost all native ties, having passed through the “Door of No Return.”10 Our scholarship recites Orlando Patterson’s observation that natal alienation, or the severing of kinship ties, is a central characteristic of the enslaved. We have given less attention, however, to Patterson’s argument that enslavement also involves a loss of one’s nativeness. He explains that natal alienation has “the important nuance of a loss of native status, of deracination” (7). For Patterson, the idea of the “native” is almost entirely folded into questions of kinship and specifically of lineage. Yet he alludes to the fact that it involves more than genealogy. A loss of native status included severing “attachment to groups or localities other than those chosen for him by the master” (7, emphasis added). Here we see again how kinship and place are related. Note that these violent forms of intertwined alienation seem to be true not just of the transatlantic trade but also more broadly in African and transaharan slave trading societies. For example, Saidiya Hartman offers as a cultural fact that “The most universal definition of the slave is a stranger” (Lose Your Mother 5). In Hartman’s account, with regard to estrangement, place is just as critical as kin. She goes on: “Contrary to popular belief, Africans did not sell their brothers and sisters into slavery. They sold strangers: those outside the web of kin and clan relationships” (5). The stranger was found to be out of their element: their kinship circle and their homeland.

    Hartman’s reflection picks up on a critical point made earlier by Sylvia Wynter regarding the importance of kinship as a logic that protects one from the possibility of enslavement. According to Wynter’s rendition of the “Congolese symbolic-representational system,” men and women who had “fallen out of the protection of their own lineages (in which metaphysically normal being was alone possible)” came to be understood as vulnerable to enslavement (33). Here again, lineage or kinship offers actual existence, and dispossession—or the estrangement of one’s familial relationship to place—engenders an ethics of enslavability. Opposed to “slave,” “native” as an anthropological term holds within it metaphysical consequences. Its designation opens up the possibility of inhabiting the status of personhood or “normal being.” The opposite is also true: to enslave is to sever the captive’s native ties.

    Deracination, at the level of representation and ontology, is intricately tied to colonial geography, and thus comes to describe the condition of blackness after its passage through the so-called Door of No Return or on the shores of Turtle Island. Yet this is not the product of an automatic alchemy that converted captive Africans and Afro-descendants into a complete objecthood. Rather, in the West, it occurs via the logics of trafficking and processes of law making, Christian messianic theologies, and scientific knowledge production, and via the ways each interacts with the others. For example, in seventeenth-century Virginia, the colonial Assembly sought to repress Powhatan-led resistance after Nathaniel Bacon’s rebellion by making a legal equivalence between captured Africans and Powhatans with regard to enslavement. The legislation insisted that “all servants ‘whether Negroes, Moors, Mollattoes and Indians’ were to be considered slaves if their parents and native country were not Christian at the time of their first purchase” (Brown 180). This early legislation is indicative of a series of colonial projections and preclusions. First, by rendering individual Powhatans enslaveable, the Assembly reduced these individuals to the status of captive Africans. In this case, white settler/slave owners surreptitiously projected blackness onto Native peoples as a means of both materially and discursively obviating their threat to settler sovereignty. I say they projected “blackness” because this legislation occurred at the same time that blackness became legally fixed to the position of the slave through the recently passed partus law. This law rendered the black womb as that which produced slaves and not legally recognized and protected kin.11

    I argue that blackness, rather than black people, becomes the signifier of enslavement in order to be precise about the structure of the developing symbolic representational system. Blackness, or what Hartman calls the “figurative capacities of blackness,” becomes an abstract signifier of the slave, the non-being or the oxymoronic being-who-lacks-will (Scenes 22). It refers to the black body and black geographies but also to abstract or projected representations. That is, there is nothing (biologically) essential about the black body that renders it or its person vulnerable to enslavement. Rather colonial imaginaries suture blackness to bodies as an effect of exercising sovereignty over oneself as master/property owner (of people and land). One may read the legislation as projecting blackness onto Native peoples, an ultimate affront to Native sovereign claims.

    Second, and paradoxically, in locating the justification for enslavement in the captives’ non-Christian parents and “native country,” the legislation momentarily recognized a parallel between African and Powhatan experiences of colonialism. The law references both African and Powhatan ties to kinship and place of origin, a place to which they were indigenous, and (at least at one point) a native status. Not yet can these Anglo colonists easily make the argument that enslaved Africans came from nothing, that they had no history. Moreover, the law conceives of a constitutive likeness between relations and place, if not land. These two conceptual nodes point to a slip in the doctrine of the “colonialism that never happened” (Smith), or the disavowal of the colonialism that occurred in West Africa beginning in the fifteenth century and through the transatlantic slave trade and its afterlife. This particular and short-lived law attempted to exclude both Africans and Powhatans from the status of free human based on the argument that they were not of a Christian country. According to this law, we might infer that Africans actually brought with them a specter of their one-time indigenous relationship to place or land and, thus, origin. Africa stubbornly materialized on the shores of what came to be called Virginia. That is, this legal doctrine superimposed lineage and land onto each other; the entanglement of the two determined one’s enslavability.

    The example of colonial Virginia’s attempts to contain both African and Powhatan life exemplifies the ways geography, as a technology of colonial nation-building, works as a practice of subjection with consequences for what is or is not intelligible. Indeed, Katherine McKittrick underscores the importance of this arrangement for the stability of the Western world as we know it. She writes, “Geography’s discursive attachment to stasis and physicality, the idea that space, ‘just is’ . . . not only anchors our selfhood and feet to the ground, it seemingly calibrates and normalizes where, and therefore who, we are” (xi). Yet this sort of “transparent geography,” as McKittrick calls the discipline’s rootedness in positivism, belies the ways conquest and ongoing colonialism as epistemological and material forces shape space. The claim to transparency, then, is a farce that renders illegible or illogical those black relationships to place that challenge the ontological claims of colonial geography and world-mapping. McKittrick argues, thus, that black peoples themselves come to be understood as “ungeographic.” This is because the logic refuses to see the complexities of black relationality or sociality as committed to place in nuanced ways. This nearsighted perspective refuses Africa’s specter on the shores of Virginia.. I am not interested in rendering black life and relationship to space or land legible in any transparent way. Instead, I view transparency’s oversight as a provocation in itself. In other words, what interests me is what it means to be ungeographic. What are the illogical and thus radical possibilities that are opened up for black and African peoples’ relationship to place/space/the world, given our ungeographic rendering? This includes a necessary care for other Indigenous people’s relationships to land (in particular, land as familial relations) and to a worlding that is not loyal to the fantasy of mastery that undergirds the project of positivist geography.

    Indigeneity, Race, and the Secular State

    If early modern colonial legislation located black and Native difference in their non-Christian “souls,” a product of their intertwined country and kinship ties, modern legal-rational knowledge regimes reduced this difference to the body through the idea of “race.” This understanding of the human and its other becomes a building block that makes possible the rational administration of peoples within the bounds of the nation-state and its political economy. The process of racialization is important not simply because it instantiates a hierarchy, but because it summons subjects (or objects) to serve as beings-for-the-nation, as markers of its sovereign, life enforcing and death making boundaries. Western political theorists have observed this dynamic in Europe’s metropoles regarding citizenship and the so-called “Jewish Question.” As part of the formation of the modern state, the anti-Semitic debate across Europe questioned whether Jewish people could be proper citizens. At the center of the debate were the supposedly competing interests for Jewish people between the will of the rational state and the divine law of G-d. Western statists considered secularism and Judaism as two universal claims about the world that necessarily challenged each other’s sovereignty. Wendy Brown writes that by the late nineteenth century racial liberalism attempted to resolve the issue on (at least) a discursive level by privatizing Jewish difference as race and reducing divine law to a religious choice, or the product of (humanist) belief. Liberalism allows for “religion” to be practiced at home or in a temple as private space, and for nationalism to be practiced in the public sphere. As a result, the sovereign conflict between cosmological difference is reduced or privatized to a notion of race and “identity” attached to the body (Brown). This liberal secularist logic is at least in part where the concept of Jewishness as a physiological race emerges.12 In this sense, perhaps the most important component of national racialization processes is the calling into being of the secular human. In the metropole, as Talal Asad explains, secularism “is an enactment by which a political medium (representation of citizenship) redefines and transcends particular and differentiating practices of the self that are articulated through class, gender, and religion” (5). Liberal secularism is a universalist political and epistemological claim that reduces difference to a notion of “identity,” of which race is a part, and relegates this to the private sphere for good political subjects to transcend. It thus splits the subject in two: public citizen and private ethnic, racial, and religious individual.

    What Brown makes less clear is what relationship these processes of liberal secularism and racialization might have with Europe’s own concurrent colonial and slave management projects. To return to these regimes, we can trace the ways racialization is a core component of the Western nation-state’s sovereignty, which depends on a civilizing mission to create new colonial subjects or tributes. We cannot say that the sixteenth or seventeenth-century captive Africans or their European traffickers inhabited the world through a liberal secular subjectivity. Instead, as argued above, subjection occurred through the enslaved’s loss of native status, natal alienation, and the removal of Africans across the Atlantic. Stephanie Smallwood describes the way some made sense of this commodification and removal: “In some Atlantic African communities it was believed that persons who departed in this way did in fact return but traveled not on the metaphysical plane of the ancestors but rather, transmuted as wine and gunpowder, on the material plane of commodities” (61). This is not simply “social death” as understood in various indigenous cosmologies, but a “kind of total annihilation of the human subject” (61). Emancipation in theory, then, required not simply the removal of chains but a further alchemy of the commodity/subject to a sort of liberal, secular individual able to take up citizenship.13 A bad faith liberal order discursively incorporates the black subject as citizen to the extent that blackness as difference is reduced to and contained within the body, and cosmology is reduced to the private realm of culture. It further disavows any ontoepistemic consequences of slavery’s afterlife for Afrodescendents. Within such a logic, to move blackness from the private sphere to the public is to introduce the unwieldy specter of non-sovereignty into the heart of the sovereign national body politic.

    This is understandably one reason Indigenous peoples have argued against a designation that reduces them to “an additional special (ethnic) group or class” within the multicultural state, as Eve Tuck and Wang Yang write (2). Yet, herein lies an assumption that has not been scrutinized sufficiently by those making such an argument against the violence of inclusion. This assumption, which pushes back against racialization for those recognized as Indigenous, takes for granted and shores up the racialization of Afrodescendents. This may be the gravest of epistemological violences for the colonized: the invisibilized work of deracination. It isn’t about a loss of identity. On the contrary, it is the creation of the very idea of identity and one’s access to it. Being called into “being” as black within the modern secular liberal world is 1) to maintain a loss of native status, including access to a possible multiplicity of West African cosmological differences with regard to land and kin; and 2) to re-emerge as a subject whose difference is only legible through the language of privatized and minoritized racial identification.

    I wonder, too, if this is what is at stake for the white settler state in the marking of “indigeneity.” It is not simply an indicator of time and space—one’s presence in one’s homeland prior to European colonization—but the sovereign threat of a competing universal claim about the very way time and space (place) work together. The onto-epistemological violence that liberal secularism authorizes involves viewing any other cosmology or way of being in the world as a threat to the sovereignty of the nation-state and, therefore, relegating it to the status of nonsense. The making of the liberal, secular state is rooted in the business of colonization and chattel slave ownership, in large part through racialization. Indigeneity as a concept, then, is partly a marker of the way colonized peoples have of inhabiting the world (and beyond) that otherwise is not able to be fully incorporated into the modern, liberal, secular state. This, at its very core, is necessarily in competition with state sovereignty. For Afrodescendants, the stakes of experiencing a loss of native status, then, must be understood in this way—as a forced cosmological transformation that demands the new modern subject’s total fidelity to the secular New World.

    The term ontoepistemic signals the conceptual level upon which indigeneity is made to disappear. Shona Jackson uses the term to describe a similar dynamic in post-colonial Guyana. She highlights the bad faith manner in which black nationalist belonging uses indigeneity to make a claim to power through the state. She clarifies that

    the term ontoepistemic is used to signal the link between Creole being and the production of discourses that support social being by narratively instituting Creole subjectivity as indigenous. In these discourses, the repetition of indigenous disappearance emerges as a significant epistemological component. (28)

    For Jackson, the legibility of post-colonial Creole nationalism depends on the trope of Amerindian disappearance. Particularly problematic is the claim that black Guyanese are the rightful inheritors of the state because they and their ancestors built the state up through their forced labor on plantations. According to Jackson, this claim depends upon a relationship to land through labor that is made legible within a modern capitalist episteme. The claim “makes sense,” as she argues, because black labor produced commodities bought and sold on the market, and its profits contributed to the development of the colonial and post-colonial state. In contrast, Amerindian relations to land are rendered illegible precisely because they do not register within modern labor and commodity market representational systems. Black Creole claims to the state traffic in settler discourse, she argues, as it disappears Amerindians while simultaneously making its own indigenous claims.14

    My interests in this important critique are twofold. First, Jackson raises the critical question of whether the post-colonial state—even when taken over by black people—is capable of being exorcised from colonial relations. The question is critical because the state’s claim to sovereignty renders any other claim, including others’ sovereign relations with land, dependent or disappeared. This move has real and violent ontoepistemic and political-economic consequences for the disappeared. Thus, one must ask how we can act ethically within the so-called post-colonial space/time in a way that does not reify colonial or slave trafficking geographies and claims to humanity. That includes narratives that commit colonized peoples to a hinterland or, I might add to a permanent status as stranger. Second is Jackson’s reading of blackness as the racial identity vulnerable to creolization.15 It raises the question, not only of the possibilities for subjectivity for black peoples in the post-colony and/or post-emancipation moment, but also for those recognized as Indigenous. Ugandan theorist Mahmoud Mamdani reads each of these positions as political identities in particular because of the ways colonial governance identified and categorized indigenous “ethnic groups” as part of a colonial structure of governance (658). Yet he does not duly consider the ways in which identity, as a form that a subject must inhabit, has been itself the product of a violent transformation. We find ourselves in the post-colonial conundrum, that we are both rightly suspicious of ideas of “primordial” culture or static “tradition” and compelled to tend to the real consequences of ontological and cosmological difference and their consequences.

    We the Estranged

    We are thus confronted with an impasse that is anchored in the epistemological demand for the modern and its outliers, which have been made possible through blackness’s loss of native status as a condition of both colonialism and enslavement. After the archival turn in particular, many black scholars decried our “stuckness” in a dichotomy of existential and epistemological loss and recovery. Once again, questions emerge about who “we” are, how we might know us, and also what sort of ethics guides our orientation to and amongst each other.

    In contrast to this consolidation of Black Studies under the metaphor of the trans-Atlantic, or of proximity to the Atlantic and the abandonment of the need to claim a native life, some Afrodecendents in Abya Yala, or what is currently called Latin America, have been forging a different sort of relationship to the place that they inhabit and the peoples to whom they belong. This is true, for example, for black peoples of the Costa Chica in Guerrero and Oaxaca, México. Here I raise this example because in considering it seriously, I believe their interaction with conditions of indigeneity in Mexico might allow us to think the relationship of indigeneity to diaspora and the Atlantic differently. Black people from the Costa Chica have much less access to the cosmopolitan worlds of Paul Gilroy’s Black Atlantic, which, as several scholars have pointed out, almost exclusively focuses on the Global North and the Caribbean.16 Instead, black people in Costa Chica have moved with rather than away from indigeneity in a way that cannot and should not be reduced to “recovery” or fully explained through the language of citizenship. According to the 2015 Intercensal Survey, 64.9 percent of Afrodescendent respondents self-identified as “indigenous.”17 Their claims challenge long-standing ideas about what the term means, and what politics are made possible by inhabiting the position. First, they challenge the de jure racialization of the category in the Western Hemisphere. They betray any claim to a local homeland on Costa Chica prior to colonization, and they demand that we consider a different temporal organization. Second, the newness of being considered “original peoples” pushes back on the relationship that modernity has with indigeneity as a prologue to the Western State.

    Black mobilization in Costa Chica has not been organized around the idea of indigeneity. Instead it initially responded to the consequences of broad erasure of black existence in the modern nation. Anti-black, post-colonial Mexican nationalism celebrates the Indigenous nations in its territory (even if condescendingly) and the mestizo (as a modern resolution of a colonial past settled through a white supremacist best-case scenario of the Casta racial framework). Critical theorist Ricardo Wilson characterizes Mexican post-colonial nationalism as dependent on a “psychic vanishing of blackness,” in which national consciousness seeks to contain a secret of black existence within a psychic crypt or “gap,” denying its presence within the country’s contemporary borders. Blackness itself, in México, is either relegated to a past and forgettable slave economy or externalized as emanating from Central America or the Caribbean. Black Mexicans, as a result, exist in a paradoxical situation of active state neglect and surveillance, that is, of both invisibility and hypervisibility. While their movement cannot be reduced to a call for state recognition—in fact, the rallying demand was for an end to the anti-black violence and erasure they face daily—the push for recognition became in large part a strategy for securing state resources (Hernández-Díaz).

    In this instance, it was perhaps at least in part because of the cultural and institutional erasure of blackness in México that the state ultimately recognized black people of the Costa Chica as “original peoples.” The states of Guerrero and Oaxaca responded to black mobilizations through what was available to them: existing legal statutes or dominant discourses aimed at tending to the relationship between the state and conventionally recognized Indigenous nations. For example, to Oaxaca’s preexisting Law for the Rights of Indigenous Communities and Peoples (Ley de Derechos de los Pueblos y Comunidades Indígenas), officials added a clause recognizing “Afromexicans” and “Indigenous peoples belonging to any other community of another state in the republic” (Secretaría de Asuntos Indígenas de Oaxaca 2005; qtd. in Quecha Reyna 163; my translation and emphasis added). Following suit, officials from the Secretary of Indigenous Affairs in Guerrero changed the state’s constitution to include the following language: “This constitution recognizes and protects the ‘Original Peoples’ of the state” including “the Indigenous nations of Naua, Nuu savi, Me’phaa and N’ancue N’omdaa, the communities belonging to them and the Afromexican peoples” (Quecha Reyna 162; my translation). While the dominant narrative celebrates this “multicultural” nationalist move to recover and recognize black Mexicans as the nation’s tercera raiz (the other two are Eurodescendents and Indigenous peoples), it is clear from the state’s response that understanding black difference at the level of a “peoples” or pueblo emerges from the same conceptual and institutional framework it uses in response to Indigenous peoples writ large.

    The words indigenous and original are provocative. There is a slippage between the two, which otherwise are used as synonyms in México and in Spanish in general. It is not clear how or if these denominations imply different relationships to land. For example, indigenous has almost always referred to a peoples’ particular relationship to homeland, while original might leave its object open for interpretation. This ambiguity allows for the state to claim “original peoples” as part of the cultural and political project of the nation state. However, the word also connotes a relationship to authenticity, stasis, or that which has not or never will change. This sort of existence, tied to prologue, is legible to the state, particularly in its multicultural formulation (Povinelli). For black peoples, who in their existence in the “New World” become the symbol of the modern and new subject, claiming original status within that so-called New World might come off as illogical or illegible. I want to entertain this illogic as a possible example of the ungeographic nature of what McKittrick has called “demonic grounds.” The term demonic, borrowed from Sylvia Wynter, denotes evil but also describes those troubling locations “outside the space-time orientation of the humunucular observer” (Wynter qtd. in McKittrick, xxv). This consideration also follows Wilson’s question about how “what emanates or escapes from” the racial psychic gap of the Mexican nation can be made “visible in order to activate anxieties that give a slight sense of the contours of the unthinkable intrapsychic gap” (31). To consider a black claim to indigeneity in this way opens up the possibilities of a relationship to place that troubles the stagnation of the label “arrivant,” which Settler Colonial Studies and some Native Studies scholarship demand of black people on Turtle Island. In one sense, it is true that black mobilization in the Costa Chica can be read as falling into the relationship that Gilroy describes as characteristic of the black diaspora: a simultaneous relationship and political/identitarian commitment to México and to Africa; after all, many black people on the Costa Chica refer to themselves as “afromexicano.” However, the community’s designation as “original,” which places them alongside other Indigenous peoples, exists in an ungeographical sense, and perhaps in its reference to Mexico’s black psychic gap, in excess of the state.

    Additionally, the origin story black peoples of Costa Chica hold onto contests the accepted narrative produced by Mexican anthropologists, who attribute their beginnings largely to what was made possible through state-sponsored emancipation of slaves and small-scale instances of fugitivity. In an article on “afro-descendant ethno-political mobilization” in the Costa Chica, Mexican anthropologist Citali Quecha Reyna quotes an elder interlocutor who recounted: “Well, there are lots of stories, but one that the oldest elders told me was that there, in front of Port Minizo, there was a shipwreck. They said it was huge and all of the broken pieces of the ship remained there and that a lot of black peoples came down from there. That’s what they told me about how we got here. And it might be why we, here, love life by the sea” (Quecha Reyna 163; my translation). The anthropologist highlights their insistence in telling their children they “come from ships” even as she scrutinizes them, noting that “their origins are diverse, and certainly shipwrecks existed, but they were uncommon” (Quecha Reyna 164; my translation).

    We are presented with two questions. First, within the context of blackness and indigeneity in the “New World,” how might we understand the elders’ insistence that they originate from a shipwreck? Second, how must we read the anthropologist’s explanation of this insistence? One aspect that jumps out is the elder’s description of her people’s relationship to place, and in particular, to the littoral instantiated not by a “Door of No Return” but by a shipwreck, ostensibly a mutiny of captives. The origin story speaks of refusal and destruction as a celebratory source of pleasure for its people. It is why they “love life by the sea.” It is also a moment that troubles the sovereignty (or mastery) of the slave owning colonizers. On the one hand, the origin story indicates a living relationship between a people and the ground upon which they emerged as defeating the power of the sovereign. On the other hand, it is questionable whether this new relationship claims sovereignty itself in as much as sovereignty seeks to police and is successful at policing the boundaries of such a stable ground.

    The anthropologist explains her interlocutor’s story within the discourse of social construction. She attributes the creation of the “myth” to the group’s needs given the experience of the “first slaves” of the “violent,” “cultural and geographic” “transformation” of the transatlantic slave trade. On the one hand, social construction as a concept indeed counters the multicultural desire for “authenticity” and “timelessness.” For example, Quecha Reyna cites anthropologist Ana Rosas Mantecón who explains, “The construction of heritage is a dynamic operation, rooted in the present, from which the past is reconstructed, selected, and interpreted. It’s not about preserving an immobile past, but inventing a posteriori, social continuity, in which tradition has a central role” (qtd. in Quecha Reyna 164). This is a valuable intervention in that it pushes back on the dichotomy of loss and recovery. Yet it is also a secular humanist reading of the origin story, which otherwise might not be legible within the bounds of transparent geography or linear history. This is to say, what if we did not insist on the exclusivity of the power of humans to shape their own relationships to land (or moments) as inanimate objects or events on a linear timeline? What if we took the origin story at face value?

    This does not mean reading the elders as completely outside modernity’s episteme, but it does mean becoming open to the possibility that this grid of intelligibility is not all-encompassing or totalizing. That is, black peoples’ existence straddles both Western modernity and the undoing of its hegemony. The demonic grounds that condition black existence, as McKittrick has argued, are unpredictable, animate, and unstable. Here then, rather than understanding black existence as having “no ground” upon which to stand, we might understand it as an orientation that emerges through ungeographic grounds upon which modern conceits of sovereignty are unsustainable. To insist on the primacy of anthropology or geography’s reading of social construction, as Native feminist Mishuana Goeman charges, “obfuscates the power of land to possess us” (27). Goeman recounts that Indigenous scholar Leslie Silko “reminded us that the earth pushes through the pavement … where no sacred sites are thought to exist, and a sacred stream may still trickle waiting to heal again” (27). Indeed, we may not be the only agential creatures in this world or its otherwise.

    Some Opening Remarks

    By way of participating in this conversation, I’d like to submit that considering head-on black relationship to, desires for, existence in, and alienation from indigeneity provides us with an opportunity to better articulate both the epistemological force of colonialism, chattel slavery, and post-coloniality, and our desires for a “we” in their eventual destruction. Saba Mahmood clarifies: “Indeed, if the religious [or, I might add, other cosmologies] and the secular are indelibly intertwined in the modern period, each conditioning the other, then the question is not so much how modern society can expunge religion from social life (as Marx envisioned) but how to account for its ongoing power and productivity in material and discursive terms” (15). Likewise, we would do well to account for the power and productivity of the colonial episteme’s dichotomous logic of diaspora and indigeneity and the ways race (and blackness in particular) is mapped onto each.

    To push back or decenter a secularism as a total logic regime also has implications for who we are and how we relate to our various origin stories, space/place, time, our ancestors, and each other. Romanticizing this relationship is unproductive, at best, and an act of violence in bad faith, at worst. To take seriously the years of critique from feminist, queer, and trans scholars as well as those coming from critiques of class and multiple geopolitical positionalities, our relations are not always benevolent; they do not always have “our” best interests at heart. In an anecdote she presents in The Transit of Empire about black workers, the colonial anthropologist Charles Peabody, and the Choctaw and Chickasaw peoples and their mounds, Jodi Byrd speculates that black workers understood and took seriously the metaphysical consequences that grave robbing would incite and for which Peabody himself was responsible. She writes,

    There is evidence within the evocations [the workers sang] of corn and fire on the one hand, and a critique of the preachers in the cornfield digging up “taters row by row” on the other, that those laborers and their songs provide resistant traces that acknowledge the desecration that is occurring—and a positioning of themselves as tied to the people buried in the mounds. The corn and potatoes reveal the bundles of bodies and skulls of those Choctaws buried at the site. As Peabody forced the laborers to disinter the mounds through terraced rows, each blow of the shovel exposed the dirt-encrusted whiteness of human bones that are evoked so provocatively by these singers as the white flesh of shovel-scored potatoes in the ground. (121)

    Such a laborers’ song certainly evokes an ethics of care concerned with the Choctaw and Chickasaw responsibility towards both the land and its inhabitants. This ethics also calls the workers to support the land’s caretakers in their duties. This is a relationship to land, not as visitors, not as always elsewhere, but one that questions and wrestles with the designation of black totalizing rootlessness. It asks, how might we turn our attention to the animacy of alienation in a way that straddles Western modernity and its other, such that being beholden to our relations includes contending with their force and refusing (our or their) possession?

    Sandra Harvey is Assistant Professor of African American Studies at the University of California, Irvine.

    Footnotes

    1. In this essay I purposely do not capitalize “black” or “native” as a reminder that the ideas of blackness and nativeness are contested and refigured grounds. In contrast, I capitalize “Indigenous” or “Native” at times to differentiate between ideas of nativeness or native peoples and Native people as recognized by the U.S. federal government.

    2. These conversations have also drawn on moments of academic work and histories of political organizing. Regarding activism, for example, the American Indian Movement (AIM), the Brown Berets, and the Red Guard of the late 1960s and 1970s modeled police patrols after those of the Black Panther Party (BPP), and like the BPP implemented social support actions including food programs, legal support, and health clinics. Activists formed coalitions to demand a Third World College at San Francisco State and University of California, Berkeley. These efforts brought forth Ethnic Studies programs in California and across the United States. The Third World alliances emerging during a time of colonial resistance in Africa and Asia focused attention on the importance of a critique of colonialism even within the metropole. Also, black historians and literary scholars have documented the experiences of black Indigenous peoples in the United States. See for example Tiya Miles, Ties That Bind; Sharon Holland and Tia Miles, Crossing Waters, Crossing Worlds; and Andrew Jolivette, Louisiana Creoles. More informally, the open access journal Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society frequently showcases scholarship focused on the intersections of anti-blackness and settler colonialism. This scholarship seldom has drawn on black and indigenous scholarship focused on Latin America.

    3. I am prompted to think through the term “porous” in Tiffany King, The Black Shoals; the idea of “fault lines” in SA Smythe, “Can I Get a Witness?”; and the term “frottage” in Keguro Macharia, Frottage.

    4. I use the term “fault lines” following SA Smythe. I also thank them for the multiple conversations we have had about the need for this article to consider, once again, the “we” of both black peoples and Black Studies.

    5. Even this argument is called into question by those who assert that the descendents of Indigenous people’s black slaves should not be considered citizens of their nations and that they should not benefit from rights and privileges of citizens. Their very inclusion, so goes the argument, is the result of colonial treaties that undermine the sovereignty of Indigenous nations.

    6. In using this term, I call attention to the various dimensions embedded within it, as explored by Saidiya Hartman. First, the insistence on the word scene refers to a spatialized representation of a moment of subjection. Second, the subjection of the slave involves a calling into being as subjected to the terror of the master’s violence at the master’s will. Hartman describes such scenes as “inaugural moments” and the “primal scene,” by which she means “that the terrible spectacle dramatizes the origin of the subject and demonstrates that to be a slave is to be under the brutal power and authority of another” (Scenes 3).

    7. See Braun and Hammond (Race, Populations, and Genomics) on anthropological and linguistic practices that give rise to the idea of “native” or “indigenous” as indicating exclusive “ethnic” groups. The practices upheld Western science as the authoritative system of knowledge production and led to understandings of ethnic groups as populations and later distinct races.

    8. Here I am not referring to a beyond that transcends the colonial but to a beyond in the sense that the colonial is not successful in its totalizing attempts at mastery. One engages in ways of being that exceed colonial containment. These include otherwise cosmologies but also those ways of being that are produced and yet disavowed through colonial symbolic orders.

    9. I draw on Jodi Byrd’s term “transit of empire.” She argues that “Indianness” constitutes a transit of empire, “a site through which US empire orients and replicates itself by transforming those to be colonized into ‘Indians’ through continual reiterations of pioneer logics, whether in the Pacific, the Caribbean, or the Middle East” (xiii).

    10. There are two bodies of literature that focus more directly on the idea of black indigeneity. They include scholarship of Africa and the politics of autochthony and Caribbean creole culture. In the interest of space and due to the author’s limited expertise, this article does not address the latter form. I do, however, welcome conversations about its intersections with the fields of Black and Native Studies in the Americas. The article briefly engages the latter work on creole ways of being but recognizes further attention is needed.

    11. This is interesting to think about given the ways settler and slave owning political thinkers continued to project blackness onto Native peoples in Virginia. See Thomas Jefferson’s differentiation between the “noble” natives beyond the borders of the United States and those within the sovereign borders of Virginia who, he argues, are mostly black.

    12. Even the socialist critique of liberal secularism, which calls for the abolition of even privatized “religion,” emerges within the metaphor of skin. In “On the Jewish Question,” Marx calls for the birth of the truly free “man” by shedding religion “as snake-skins cast off by history” (Marx 213).

    13. Saidiya Hartman writes, “The transformation of black subjectivity effected by emancipation is described as nascent individualism not simply because blacks were considered less than human and a hybrid of property and person prior to emancipation but because the abolition of slavery conferred on them the inalienable rights of man and brought them into the fold of liberal individualism” (Scenes 117). Given this legal legibility, it was the civilizing mission of certain abolitionists and the Freedmen’s Bureau to make proper subjects out of the emancipated.

    14. Tiffany King critiques the centrality of labor for understanding black life during formal slavery and post-emancipation. See “Labor’s Aphasia.”

    15. Jackson also describes East Indian claims to state power through creole identity. Yet, she argues, in this case, creole is almost always used as adjective rather than noun. Further, the Caribbean cultural archives Jackson reviews contain predominantly black authors.

    16. See Feldman Black Rhythms of Peru; Walsh “Shifting the Geopolitics”; Greene, “Entre lo indio”; and Anderson, Black and Indigenous.

    17. 2015 Encuesta Intercensal (Intercensal Survey) cited in Wilson II, The Nigrescent Beyond.

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  • Garifunizando Ambas Américas: Hemispheric Entanglements of Blackness/Indigeneity/AfroLatinidad

    Paul Joseph López Oro (bio)

    Abstract

    Central Americans of African descent are in the margins on the histories of transmigrations and political movements in the isthmus and their diasporas. The absence of Black Central Americans in Latinx Studies and Central American Studies is an epistemological violence inherited from Latin American mestizaje. The insurgence of Afro-Latinx Studies is an intellectual and political response to the erasure and negation of Black people and Blackness in the field of Latinx Studies. In this essay, I map out the political urgency to call for a refashioning of Afrolatinidad that dismantles the dangerous allure of ethno-racial nationalism (i.e., Afro-[insert nation-state]) and mappability of Blackness into exclusionary geographies of Spanish-speaking Americas (i.e., “you must be Dominican, because you don’t look Guatemalan”). Drawing on oral history interviews, visual cultures, and social media analysis, I demonstrate how transgenerational Garifuna New Yorkers of Central American descent histories and politics of self-making, beginning in the late 1950s to the present, highlight their negotiations and contradictions as they perform their multiple subjectivities as Black, Indigenous, and AfroLatinx.

    When I am challenged or questioned about my identity, I respond by saying that Black people exist in Central America. Some are descendants of enslaved peoples; some are not. Some speak Spanish; some do not. Some are Catholic; some are Rastas; some are Garveyites. Some are immersed in hybridized identities that include native, Asian, and African nations. And when these Black people come to the United States, they continue to be Black people from Central America, negotiating among invisibilities.—Vielka Cecilia Hoy, “Negotiating among Invisibilities”

    In the United States, the invocation of Central America conjures a set of racial and political imaginaries that centers mestizos, Indigenous cultures, revolutionary movements, civil wars, and US occupations, eclipsing a discussion of race and racism in the region and its diasporas. Within Central American mestizaje, Blackness is relegated and ascribed to the Caribbean Coast, erasing centuries of Black folks in the interior and Pacific Coasts. By ascribing Blackness and Black people to Central America’s Caribbean Coasts, mestizaje constructs its imaginary in opposition to and as a negation of Blackness, especially when the Caribbean Coast is understood to be removed from the national public spaces of mestizo governance, for example with Managua or Tegucigalpa. Moreover, this imaginary renders Central American Blackness as Caribbean, as coming from elsewhere and not always already present prior to the formation of the Republic. More recently, Central American neoliberal multiculturalism (Hale) constructs Blackness as a folkloric caricature for tourist and popular culture consumption (Loperena). Black Central Americans doubly negotiate their invisibilities on the isthmus and in their diasporas in the United States. Despite the extensive and rich history of Africans and their descendants in the isthmus, especially their presence and contributions centuries prior to the 1821 Wars of Independence, Black history and Blackness remain alien to Central American nationhood in and outside of the isthmus (Gudmundson and Wolfe 5). This negation and erasure of Black Central Americans is produced and preserved by the dominant nationalist racial project of racial mixture or mestizaje. Black Central Americans transgenerationally carry with them when they migrate to the United States centuries of embodied histories of anti-black racism and violence.1

    Vielka Cecilia Hoy’s essay “Negotiating among Invisibilities: Tales of Afro-Latinidades in the United States” appeared in the trailblazing volume The Afro-Latin@ Reader: History and Culture in the United States. Vielka’s essay is one of three essays in the 584-page volume that is written from and about a Black Central American worldview. Born in Brooklyn, New York, Vielka Cecilia Hoy was raised in Oakland, California, by immigrant parents. Her mother is a Creole Nicaraguan woman from Bluefields and her father is an Afro-Panamanian man from Colón and a descendant of West Indian migrant workers. Her essay powerfully illustrates the nuances and complex ways her Black Latinidad is in perpetual conflict in a space like the West Coast, where the dominance of mestizo Mexican identities and cultures shapes the Californian imaginary as a Mexican/Chicanx/Mexican-American space of Latinidad. In similar ways on the East Coast, specifically in New York City as a Caribbean Latinx city, AfroLatinx peoples are often assumed to be Dominican, whereas Black Central Americans tend to be racialized as African Americans or West Indians. Hoy’s essay is striking because of the multiplicity of invisibilities and contradictions it engages. It is here, in the space of negotiations, contradictions, and articulations that I consider the ways transgenerational Garifuna New Yorkers exist, live, and articulate their multiple Black, Indigenous, and Latinidad subjectivities.

    Garifuna are Black Indigenous peoples who are descendants of shipwrecked enslaved West Africans and autochthonous Carib-Arawak on the Caribbean island of St. Vincent. Their exile by British colonial powers in 1797 to the Bay Islands of Honduras and their subsequent migrations to Belize, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and mainland Honduras script their ethnogenesis in the lesser Antillean Caribbean and mark their multiple diasporas: African, Caribbean, and Central American (England). With the economic collapse of the United Fruit Company in the mid-twentieth century, Garifuna Central Americans commenced multiple waves of transgenerational migration to major US port cities such as New York City, New Orleans, Miami, Chicago, Boston, and San Francisco. This migration continues today, as gang violence, government corruption, and economic instability dominate the Central American region. A diasporic multiplicity informs the complex ways in which Garifuna negotiate their multiple subjectivities in Central America and in the United States, as Central America’s Caribbean Coasts become nostalgic sites of home whose Black Indigeneity imagines St. Vincent as homeland.2 Garifuna Black Indigeneity unsettles racial formations in the Americas that understand Blackness, Indigeneity, and Latinidad as mutually exclusive.

    In the context of Belize, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, where Garifuna and Creole communities have lived prior to 1821, mestizaje discursively emerges as an ideological project of nation-building, violently negating Blackness and the existence and contributions of peoples of African descent in its construction of a racially mixed harmonious mestizo subject. The absence of Black Central Americans3 in Latinx Studies and Central American Studies reflects an epistemic violence inherited from Latin American mestizaje. The insurgence of Afro-Latinx Studies is an intellectual and political response to the erasure and negation of Latinxs of African descent in the field of Latinx Studies. I call for a refashioning of AfroLatinidad that dismantles the dangerous allure of ethno-racial nationalism (e.g., Afro-[insert nation-state]) and that refuses cartographies of Blackness that map exclusionary geographies of Spanish-speaking Americas (“you must be Dominican, because you don’t look Guatemalan”). Drawing on oral history interviews, visual cultures, and social media, I demonstrate how, from the late 1950s to the present, transgenerational Garifuna New Yorkers’ histories and politics of self-making highlight their struggles to negotiate, perform, and articulate their multiple subjectivities as Black, Indigenous, and Latinx. In the following section, I begin with a mid-19th century and early 20th century history of anti-Black racism on Central America’s Caribbean Coasts to argue that hemispheric travel from South (Central America) to North (United States) shapes how Garifuna New Yorkers negotiate and articulate their Blackness, Indigeneity, and Latinidad in the United States.

    Central America’s Caribbean Coasts: Racialized Geographies of Anti-Blackness

    In Central America, Blackness and geography are intrinsically entangled with histories of Spanish colonialism, mestizo governance, and the alienation of Blackness to the Atlantic Coast (Gordon 133). Mestizaje as a racial discourse emerged in the early twentieth century in response to a larger hemispheric critique of US imperialism, which grounded Latin American’s myth of racial democracy as a distinct marker of racial egalitarianism in the face of Jim Crow apartheid in the US (Hooker, Theorizing Race 158). Central American ideologies of mestizaje emerge in distinct geographies and historical moments. I turn to Honduras and Nicaragua in particular because the Caribbean Coasts become an explicit demarcation of Black geography’s detachment from the mestizo nation-state both discursively and geographically. In “‘Beloved Enemies’: Race and Official Mestizo Nationalism in Nicaragua,” political theorist Juliet Hooker charts the absence of costeños (Creole/Afro-Caribbean and Indigenous Nicaraguans) in Nicaragua’s formulation of mestizaje. She coins the term “mestizo multiculturalism” to highlight the contradictions of Nicaragua’s 1987 move to become one of the first Latin American countries to adopt multicultural citizenship reforms. These reforms assigned special collective rights to Black and Indigenous communities on its Atlantic Coast, while maintaining mestizo culture as the hallmark of national identity in the company of racial and cultural diversity.

    The Atlantic coast of Nicaragua is marked as geographically distinct in the landscape of Nicaraguan mestizo nationalism. British colonialism on Nicaragua’s Caribbean Coast produces an alterity that marks a religious, linguistic, and racialized culture different from the afterlife of Spanish colonialism in Nicaragua’s mestizo nationalism. Following independence from Spain in 1821, Nicaragua underwent a wave of domestic civil wars and governmental regimes that aimed to bring forth national unity and state formation. One of the best-remembered state-building efforts was the forcible “reincorporation” of the Atlantic Coast in 1894, an act of internal colonization on Black and Indigenous communities to assimilate into mestizo culture. 1894’s forcible annexation made Spanish the official language and Catholicism the official religion on the Atlantic Coast. This legacy informs the vexed relationship Creole and Indigenous communities have with the mestizo nation-state; therefore, the shift to multiculturalism has been greeted with much-deserved skepticism. Despite the constitutional shift toward a multicultural paradigm, peoples of African descent remain geographically and politically marked as alien and foreign, and only exist on the Caribbean Coasts removed from the interior (Pacific Coast) of mestizo political power.

    Historian Darío A. Euraque argues that the Honduran Congressional Act of 1926, which officially titled the national currency the Lempira, was an explicit response to the threat of Blackness by the growing banana economy on Honduras’s Caribbean Coast. Euraque argues:

    In the 1920s the notion of an Indo-Hispanic mestizaje represented only an emerging elite discourse. However, the 1920s effort to officially designate Lempira as the “representative” of the “other race” in “our mestizaje” involved a local racism that drew on a postindependence rejection of blackness, and especially a rejection of Garifuna blackness as a more local and immediate racial threat. (243)

    Black Hondurans were a great source of anxiety at a time when the Caribbean Coast was gaining financial and political independence from the capital city of Tegucigalpa through the presence of US-owned banana companies. This anxiety also fueled the deportation of thousands of West Indian migrant laborers, mostly from British Honduras (present-day Belize) and Jamaica. Honduran anti-Blackness made Garifuna and Creole communities on the Caribbean Coast vulnerable to border patrol harassment and increased their risk of deportation (Chambers 74). At distinct moments of nation-building in Nicaragua, Honduras, and the rest of the isthmus, Blackness was a great source of discursive and economic anxiety.4 This continues to be the case to this day.

    Anti-black racism in Central America informs the political mobilization and self-making processes of Garifuna New Yorkers. Anti-black racist histories are embodied memories that are transmitted generationally through oral histories. Garifuna New Yorkers negotiate and contradict their Blackness, Indigeneity, and Central Americanness based on that historical legacy, which shapes contemporary racial and racist discourse on the isthmus and in its diasporas. The political and cultural histories of Central America’s Caribbean Coasts are present in New York City and throughout the rest of the Garifuna diaspora in the United States, directly shaping how US Garinagu engage and mobilize alongside other Black Caribbean, African American, and Latinx communities.5 In the following section, I turn my attention to Garifuna of mostly Honduran and Guatemalan descent born and raised in New York City (Eastern Brooklyn and the South Bronx) and analyze their diasporic processes of self-making Garifunaness in the company of African Americans, Dominicans, Jamaicans, Puerto Ricans, and Ghanaians. Afro-Latinx Studies is a political project whose origins stand outside of the disciplinary boundaries of the academy and whose intellectual impulse is to disrupt the absence of Latinxs of African descent in the field of Latinx Studies.6 I therefore ask how transgenerational Garifuna New Yorkers negotiate and articulate their Central Americanness and Garifunaness simultaneously. How does an explicit politics of rejecting AfroLatinidad for Garifunaness reinscribe Garifuna exceptionalism and ethno-racial nationalism?

    Before turning to these questions, a brief note on Garinagu Indigenous Blackness is necessary to establish a conceptual framework. Blackness and Indigeneity remain codified and ascribed as mutually exclusive racial categories and identities in the Americas. Garifuna folks are persistently constructed as an anthropological puzzle because their contradictory and choreographed negotiations as simultaneously Black Indigenous peoples present a richly compelling conundrum (see Anderson). However, as we deepen our historical and contemporary understanding of Black and Indigenous peoples throughout the Americas, we can begin to dismember these colonial logics of racial compartmentalization and excavate multiple Black Indigenous histories, cultures, and politics. Garinagu articulations and self-makings of Indigenous Blackness are not unique to Garifuna, as there are several communities of African descent throughout the Americas whose Indigenous ancestry and lineage shape their political consciousness as Black Indigenous, such as Gullah/Geechee, quilombos in Brazil, Jamaican maroons, palenques in Colombia, and Seminoles, among others. Furthermore, it is important to note that my interlocutors—who mostly find themselves living or having lived in New York City—understand their Garinagu Black Indigeneity as rooted in the Caribbean, Central America’s Caribbean Coasts, and the United States. The terms used are multiple, and include: negro indígena [Indigenous Black], afroindígena [Afroindigenous], Black Indigenous/Afro-Indigenous, and Black Carib. These variations point to the multiplicity of geographies, spaces/places, and racial identity formations that Garinagu engage. In the context of Honduras and the rest of Central America’s Caribbean Coast, for example, Garinagu articulations and self-makings of Black Indigeneity are performed, negotiated, and lived in distinct ways from U.S.-based Garifuna folks. In Central America, Garinagu notions of (Black) Indigeneity are bound to land and cultural traditions: claiming indigeneity is a political move to claim land rights, tenure, and titles. In the United States, and more specifically in New York City, Garifuna folks use Indigeneity (read: Carib Arawak lineage) as a marker of cultural alterity within Blackness. To claim Indigeneity is thus to perform different political subjectivity labor in these different geographical racialized spaces.

    My framing of hemispheric Indigenous Blackness thus comes directly from my interlocutors. In the context of Central America’s Caribbean Coasts, Garinagu communities articulate their Caribbean Indigeneity as one bound to land rights; this is why Garifuna Settlement Day originates on the Atlantic Coast of Central America (Belize to be precise) as an Indigenous articulation of land tenure and rights. Garifuna Indigeneity in Central America is used to gain discursive, ontological, and material land/territory vis-à-vis an articulation of indigeneity as an ancestral heritage and a contemporary identity. Ancestral land/territory is the epicenter of the way in which Garifuna Indigeneity is articulated materially on Central America’s Caribbean Coasts. However, in the United States there is a shift in how Garinagu articulate and invoke their Indigeneity, which is rooted in St. Vincent. In the United States, Garifuna Indigeneity is articulated, invoked, and performed as an Othered formation of Blackness. Garifuna Indigeneity in the United States is constructed and performed as a signifier of Caribbeanness, of exceptional marronage, and locates a Caribbean geographical site of Garifuna ethnogenesis: St. Vincent. Therefore, in the United States Garifuna Indigeneity finds an imaginary homeland in St. Vincent as not solely a site of ethnogenesis but of nostalgia for marronage and Black Indigeneity. Garinagu articulations and performances of Black Indigeneity are not universal. They are distinct based on the specific geographies in which Garinagu folks find themselves. Garifuna communities in Los Angeles, Houston, Chicago, and New York City have different expressions of and relationship to their Indigeneity based on the racialized geographies of those spaces, while retaining commonalities. Black Queer Feminist theorist Tiffany Lethabo King notes that:

    genocide and slavery do not have an edge. While the force of their haunt has distinct feelings at the stress points and instantiations of Black fungibility and Native genocide, the violence moves as one. To perceive this distinct yet edgeless violence and its haunting requires a way of sensing that allows moving in and out of blurred and sharpened vision, acute, and dulled senses of smell. It requires that taste buds at the back of the throat and the pinch of the acidic in the nerves of the jawline. Edgeless distinction is a haptic moment, shared, and a ceremonial Black and Indigenous ritual.

    King’s provocation to pay attention to the edgeless colonial hauntings of Blackness and Indigeneity is generative as we think about the ways in which Garifuna folks negotiate and contradict their articulations and self-makings of Black Indigeneity. The Black Indigeneity of Garifuna folks is a significant marker of distinction on Central America’s Caribbean Coast (and in the United States). In the context of Honduras, Garifuna have politically mobilized with the nation-state to gain constitutional rights to ancestral lands and inclusion into the polity through a politics of Afro-Indigeneity, pointing to a political subjectivity of Black Indigeneity tied to land rights and cultural heritage.

    The Insurgency of Black Latinidad: Unsettling Hemispheric Mestizaje

    “No matter your race because you know you’re Latino” N.O.R.E. (October 2004) “Si tú eres Latino, saca tu bandera.” Gente de Zona(April 2015)

    Latinidad in the United States is built on, travels, and performs the ideological legacies of Latin American mestizaje as a political project of racial mixture that seeks to distance itself from its northern imperial neighbor: Jim Crow apartheid (Hooker, Theorizing Race). Mestizaje also romanticizes Spanish colonialism and the caste system in its national memory of a past Indigenous culture and civilized Spanish conquest, omitting the gendered and sexualized violence of Spanish colonialism in the Americas from this historical memory (Mendoza). The negation of Blackness within the project of mestizaje or the recovery of it, as in the example of Mexico’s Third Root, problematizes mestizaje as a racial project that imagines racial mixture as the solution to racism and racial inequalities. It is precisely in the struggle with the negation and erasure and for the recovery of Blackness in Latin America and US Latinidad that Afro-Latinx Studies insurgency becomes a necessary political and intellectual project of Black political mobilization.

    In her New York Times article “For Many Latinos, Racial Identity Is More Culture Than Color,” Mireya Navarro writes that, in the context of the United States,

    the census categorizes people by race, which typically refers to a set of common physical traits. But Latinos, as a group in this country, tend to identify themselves more by their ethnicity, meaning a shared set of cultural traits, like language or customs. So when they encounter the census, they see one question that asks them whether they identify themselves as having Hispanic ethnic origins and many answer it as their main identifier.

    Here we see a persistent dilemma within hemispheric constructions of Latinidad: its “ongoing production” (to borrow from Stuart Hall) is rooted in ethnic signifiers in hopes of evading racial discourse for a raceless imaginary of ethnicities. The problematic news story argues that Latinos are so racially mixed that their ethnic differences mark them much more deeply than race in the United States. This is a narrative supported by the general notion that racial discourse and racism do not exist in Latin America and the Caribbean the way they do in the United States, and that any inequalities that do exist result from class and ethnic differences. This trope of Latinx racial exceptionalism as simply not fitting into US racial categories is based in a hemispheric project of mestizaje that is haunted by the mythical illusion of racial democracy (read: racial paradise) in the shadow of Jim Crow’s black/white binary. In the United States, non-Black Latinx peoples mobilize for a census category that transcends US racial categories, distancing themselves from and opposing the histories of racial formation by aspiring to racialized sameness (read: Hispanic/Latino) vis-à-vis ethno-racial nationalist identities (read: Puerto Rican, Mexican-American, etc.) in a continued negation of Black and Indigenous Latinx peoples.

    While scholarly production on Black Latin America has enjoyed a long tradition since the nineteenth century, equivalent scholarship on Black Latin Latinxs in the United States and their descendants remains absent. It is this absence that highlights the political and intellectual necessity of Afro-Latinx Studies, which involves the lived experiences of Latinxs of African descent whose transgenerational migrations, routes, and lineages are located south of the US border, as a means to disrupt homogenized Latino racial exceptionalism. Afro-Latinx Studies opens a space to analyze how Black Latinxs born and raised in the United States can potentially unsettle the media-infused narrative of African American and Latinx conflict, which foments a divisive majority-minority dichotomy.

    In their groundbreaking edited volume The Afro-Latin@ Reader: History and Culture in the United States, Miriam Jiménez Román and Juan Flores give us a useful introductory definition of Afro-Latin@s as “people of African descent in Mexico, Central and South America, and the Spanish-speaking Caribbean, and by extension those of African descent in the United States whose origins are in Latin America and the Caribbean” (1). Building upon this definition, AfroLatinidad emerges as an insurgent analytic that dismantles centuries of discursive and scholarly erasure and negation of Blacks and Blackness in Latin America and unsettles US Latinidades’ investment in an imagined racially harmonious project that reinscribes ethnonationalism as exceptional transcendence of US racial formations (López Oro 62). AfroLatinidad complicates Blackness as a site of rupture in the United States by taking a hemispheric turn to deepen our understanding of the histories, politics, and transmigrations of Blackness in the Americas.

    I now turn to three moments in which transgenerational Garifuna New Yorkers negotiate and articulate their multiple subjectivities as an act of refashioning AfroLatinidad.

    Garifunizando AfroLatinidad: The Politics of Self-Making Garifuna New Yorkers

    Many of the terms, including Latino/a, we use today were created (or influenced) by those who’ve colonized us. In using the term negra, or afrodescendiente, I’m choosing to without a doubt center Blackness. Identity isn’t clear cut. It’s complex and multilayered. As I journey through life, just as my current experiences influence how I identify, new encounters and knowledge will further shape it. No matter which term I use, my pride in my African roots will forever be a constant. Let there be no confusion as to who I am: a Black woman. In the eternal words of Victoria Santa Cruz, “Sí, soy negra. Negra soy.”—Janel Martínez, “‘Negra Soy’: Why I’ve Moved Away from the Term Afro-Latina”

    New York City is home to the largest Garifuna community outside of Central America’s Caribbean Coast. This geographic and demographic distinction matters for many historical and political motivations. It highlights an understudied history of Garifuna Central American transmigrations to New York City that begins in the late 1950s with the economic collapse of the US-owned Fruit Companies, which ignited a Great Migration of Black Central Americans from South of the US South.7 In other words, Garifuna folks are US imperial subjects before arriving at the shores of the United States. Within the broader racialized geographies of US Central Americanness, New York City is not imagined as a US Central American space due to the dominance there of Caribbean Latinx communities.

    On February 23, 2014, the image below was posted on the popular Facebook page “Garifuna TV Page,” where news on gatherings and community events in the US (New York City, Chicago, Houston, New Orleans, Miami, and Los Angeles) as well as in Central America are shared. The Facebook page also promotes Garifuna culture and music, giving publicity to local Garifuna musicians, artists, and activists.

    Fig. 1.
    Facebook post on Garifuna TV page, February 23, 2014.

    The posting was in response to an ongoing debate in Garifuna social media spaces about Afrolatinidad. The statement, “Do not call me Afro Latino!! & Do not call me an Afro-Descendant because I am a Proud Garifuna,” is accompanied by visuals of Garifuna culture and traditions, including the symbolic Garifuna flag and its colors (yellow, white, and black) and activities such as mashing plantains for a plate of machuca (hudutu), rasping coconut on a board to make either bread or stew, and carrying baskets. These are all images of labor done by Garifuna women; the only male presence in the image is the young boy being carried on his mother’s back. The Garifuna tropes invoke nostalgia for Central America’s Caribbean Coast and bestow historical weight onto diasporic Garifunaness.

    The image was created by Ana Castillo, a US-based Garifuna poet from Honduras. The loss of Garifuna culture and language to American culture, specifically African American culture, has been an ongoing concern of the generation of Garifuna Central American immigrants of the 1960s. The clear rejection of AfroLatinidad and Afrodescendants in this image is a deeply significant assertion that points to the centuries of anti-black racism and violence experienced by Garifuna Central Americans in the isthmus. The assertion of an exclusively Garifuna epistemology matters here as a point of disruption into a category that does not capture Garifuna Black Indigeneity, and it also reveals the political mobilization of Garifuna communities in Central America and in the United States in the effort to preserve their culture, language, and history. There is a generational concern here that something is lost in the United States, that values, customs, language, traditions, and music are slowly being erased because of American assimilation and because families are no longer living in their hometowns on the Caribbean Coasts. It is interesting that the categories of Afro-Latino and Afro-descendant are presented together; their conjunction conveys a reinscription of Garifuna pride throughout the Americas. “Afro-Latino,” a term mostly used in the United States, and “Afro-descendant,” which is mostly used in Latin America, have parallel political projects of insurgency that respond to the erasure and absence of Blacks and Blackness in Latin America and US Latinidad. However, here Garifuna folks are not interested in investing into a project that from its inception has erased, excluded, and voided their existence. The phrasing “Do not call me Afro Latino and Do not call me Afro-descendant, I am a Proud Garifuna” is an effective political affirmation of visibility and recognition at a moment when AfroLatinidad and Afrodescendant have taken center stage as all-encompassing umbrella terms. Garifuna folks are uneasy about the way both terms erase/silence/footnote the specific histories of Blackness in Latinx Americas. More importantly, the phrase “I am a Proud Garifuna” builds on the political genealogies of the US Black Power Movement of the 1960s and 1970s, echoing James Brown’s iconic vocals in “Say It Loud, I’m Black and I’m Proud.” “I am a Proud Garifuna” is an explicit response to the historical and contemporary manifestations of mestizo supremacy and anti-Black racism in Central America, which remains present today in spite of a multicultural shift. The echo of the US Black Power Movement here unearths the hemispheric influences of African American political thought and formations. It also exemplifies how Garifuna New Yorkers and those throughout the rest of their diaspora in the United States engage directly with US Black history, culture, and politics.

    Janel Martínez’s invocation of her Blackness quoted in the epigraph of this section is of great transgenerational diasporic importance. Her rejection of the term “AfroLatinx,” especially at a moment of hyperawareness, points to her desire to center her Blackness as something other than a racial fetish. It speaks to the broader politics of the way Garinagu New Yorkers and those in Central America negotiate and articulate their Blackness as a political project of membership to the larger African diaspora, rooted in the racialized lived experiences of being Black. Indigeneity, although it is a simultaneous Garifuna identity in these instances, takes a back seat to a politics of Blackness that highlights an interpellation as always already Black.

    “Ain’t I Latina?”: Negotiating Central Americanness vis-à-vis AfroLatinidad

    Aida Lambert, a Garifuna woman born and raised in Honduras, came to New York City in 1964 at a time when Central Americans, especially Garifuna folks, did not have much visibility in the ethnic pantheon of New York City’s Latinidad. Aida Lambert forms part of the second largest wave of Garifuna New Yorker transmigrants who arrived a few years prior to the economic collapse of the United Fruit Company. She first lived in Eastern Brooklyn and later, when she married, moved to East Harlem with her husband and children. In her autobiographical essay “We Are Black Too: Experiences of a Honduran Garífuna,” Lambert illustrates the nuanced relations between African Americans and Spanish-speaking immigrants. Lambert was a founding committee member of Desfile de la Hispanidad [Hispanic Parade]. The Annual Hispanic Parade in October emerged mid-1980s when NuyoRicans and recent migrants from Puerto Rico wanted to exhibit their culture, work ethic, and racial differences from their African American neighbors. Lambert’s involvement developed out of her language barriers with other English-speaking Blacks and her cultural and linguistic bond with Puerto Ricans and Dominicans:

    I have found that even though you are Black, the fact that you are Latina means to them [African-Americans] that you are of another race … even at home, in Honduras, our Garífuna culture, and our language, is losing ground and becoming less and less familiar. And here it is even more so.

    My own children, as much as I try to keep the culture alive, they have their own lives and often forget whatever they learn. Not to mention my grandchildren, who were born here. I warn them about my experiences with African Americans, but they play with them, are influenced by them, and join them. They make friends with them, they identify with them, in the way they dress, and talk, and the music they listen to. And what can I do, I have to let them choose their own cultural preferences. (433)

    Lambert’s testimonio is telling of her generation of Garifuna Central American immigrants and their engagement and inclusion with Puerto Rican and Dominican aspirations of social mobility. The generations of Garifuna New Yorkers following Lambert’s arrival to Brooklyn and Harlem negotiate Latinidad in multiple ways that simultaneously reject and interject into Latinidad as a marker that makes Garifuna Blackness distinct from the Blackness of African Americans, while simultaneously using Garifunaness as a means of distancing from mestizo Latinidad and AfroLatinidad. Her feeling of being rejected by Black Americans and accepted by Puerto Ricans is a significant act of remembrance for a number of reasons, particularly because Garifuna Central Americans migrate to the United States at the intersections of anti-Black racism, non-democratic governments, and economic instability. Lambert’s remembering of solidarity and support from Puerto Ricans is not a universal narrative according to Spanish-speaking Black immigrants, who continued to experience anti-Black racism from their own countrymates in the United States. The best-known example is Arturo Alfonso Schomburg, a Black Puerto Rican who migrated to Harlem in 1891 but, in contrast to Lambert, felt rejected by other Spanish-speaking immigrants and embraced by African Americans and Afro-Caribbeans (Hoffnung-Garskof). Aida’s generation resisted being labeled African American and maintained the household mantra, “somos negros pero no como aquellos” (we are Black but not like them), “them” being African Americans. This narrative does not remain true for second and especially third generation Garínagu, as their interpellation as Black Americans creates interstitial spaces between their Blackness, Garifunaness, and Latinidad. They never fully belong in any of these categories because the United States is a dislocation of birthplace, citizenship, and a fragmented home.

    Fig. 2.
    Aida Lambert in the center being honored in the 2014 Central American Parade & Festival in Crotona Park, Bronx as Madrina de Festival Centroaméricana. Photo courtesy of the author.

    Janel Martínez is a Garifuna woman of Honduran descent, born and raised in the Bronx, and daughter of Garifuna Honduran immigrants from the 1970s generation. She is the creator of “Ain’t I Latina?” an online destination created by an Afro-Latina for Afro-Latinas, inspired by the lack of representation in both mainstream and Spanish-language media. Martínez is a multimedia journalist whose work has been featured in both African American media sites, such as The Root, Black Enterprise, Madame Noire, and in Latinx media sites, such as Cosmopolitan for Latinas, Remezcla, and NPR’s Latino USA. The very question that inspires Martínez’s online site, and which provocatively connects her to Sojourner Truth’s “Ain’t I a Woman?” shows the importance of disrupting mestizo Latinidades which erase peoples of African descent. Martínez’s Black Latinidad is articulated not as separate from the Black identity of African Americans but very much in the company of African American and other non-US Black lived experiences in the United States. Her travels to her parents’ hometown communities on the Caribbean Coast of Honduras in Ciriboya and Irionia deepened her Garifuna political identity. She notes, “Garifuna was never an identity I had to unearth; it was a culture and way of being I experienced within and all around me” (Martínez, “This is What it’s Like”). Martínez points to her home life as a site of Garifuna self-fashioning where food, language, and traditions are preserved in the intimacies of her mother’s kitchen and in family gatherings in her parents’ living room. After her grandmother’s passing and the ensuing beluria, a Garifuna spiritual tradition to celebrate life in and after ancestral deaths, Martínez’s interest in learning about Garifuna life and history continues.

    Martínez’s journalistic work has examined the complexities of being raised Garinagu in the United States, where one’s identity is frequently demeaned or marginalized. Grounded in her identities as Garifuna and Black Latina, Martínez explores the complexities and multiplicities of diasporic linkages with other Black Latinxs and the intersectionality of race, ethnicity, country of birth, and nationality. While Martínez acknowledges that presuming a common AfroLatinidad, especially one that does not center Blackness (Martínez, “‘Negra Soy’”), runs the risk of homogenizing Latinxs of African descent, her work still notes that refashioning AfroLatinidad calls for an expansive and hemispheric Blackness in the Americas instead of simply relying on a politics of inclusion into Latinidad.

    Fig. 3.
    Janel Martínez on April 12, 2018 being awarded a Proclamation by New York City Council Member Vanessa L. Gibson for her activism and cultural work in preserving Garifuna history and culture in New York City. Photo courtesy of the author.

    Hemispheric Black Latinidades: Garinagu New Yorkers Presente

    On July 13, 2018, I was invited to participate in a Presidential Plenary titled “US Central Americans, Invisible, and Silent No More” for the Latina/o Studies Association biannual meeting. I began my comments with the following provocation to problematize the absence of Black Central Americans in the scholarship on US Central Americans:

    My Central America is Caribbean. My Central America is a Caribbean Coast whose natural resources and peoples have and continue to be exploited by US imperialism. My Central America is Black, Black Indigenous to be exact, whose descendant’s survivors of the transatlantic slave trade and Carib-Arawak indigeneity on the Antillean island of St. Vincent and whose marronage and exile call Central America’s Caribbean Coast: home. To be Garifuna is to be Caribbean and Central American simultaneously. I am the grandchild of banana workers from Tela and Balfate, Honduras whose transmigrations to Harlem, New York, in 1964 was made possible by the political mobilization of Garveyism and whose parents met in Bedford-Stuyvesant, Brooklyn in 1982. My Black Central America is also New York City.

    My articulations of Black Central America on the isthmus and in its diasporas builds on centuries of anti-Black racism and erasure of our existence. Aida Lambert, Janel Martínez, and Vielka Cecilia Hoy all articulate a politics of Black Central Americanness that is made and remains invisible in the face of a mythical all-inclusive Latinidad. Lambert’s political mobilization alongside Puerto Ricans, Dominicans, and other mestizo Latinx New Yorkers animates her desires to negotiate her Black Honduranness in the Desfile de la Hispanidad, where her activism allowed a Garifuna Honduran woman to win the beauty pageant contest in 1994. Martínez’s negotiation and articulation of her Black Latinidad engages a hemispheric project that centers Blackness in the Americas with an inclusionary praxis into Latinidad. Garifuna New Yorkers of Central American descent are marked by their transgenerational differences and bounded by a Garifunaness that disrupts hegemonic racial and ethnic subjectivities.

    Paul Joseph López Oro is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Africana Studies at Smith College. His research and teaching interests are on Black Latin American and U.S. Black Latinx social movements, Black Feminist & LGBTQ activism, and Black Queer Feminist ethnographies in the Américas. His in-progress manuscript, Indigenous Blackness in the Americas: The Queer Politics of Self-Making Garifuna New York is a transdisciplinary ethnography on how gender and sexuality shapes the ways in which transgenerational Garifuna New Yorkers of Central American descent negotiate, perform, and articulate their multiple subjectivities as Black, Indigenous, and AfroLatinx.

    Footnotes

    1. I refer to a violence that is both physical and epistemic, pointing to the centuries of land dispossession, US imperialism, and erasure from national subjecthood. Central Americans of African descent are in the margins of the histories of transmigrations and political movements in the isthmus and their diasporas.

    2. Garifuna epistemology is rooted in Black Indigeneity, where Blackness is marooned in the Americas, as the collective memory of ethnogenesis on St. Vincent: being descendants of shipwrecked slaves, an important marker of alterity and problematic divorcing of plantation slavery in the Americas. The Garifuna notion of maroonage is foundational to Garifuna Black Indigeneity as it invokes an act of shipwreckedness and eventual hybridity with Carib Arawak Indigenous peoples on St. Vincent in the 15th century.

    3. I reference the homogenized term Black Central Americans or Central Americans of African descent, which does not detail the multiplicity of Black Central American communities. I do this with the political intent of affirming Blackness in a region of the Americas that is racialized as a non-Black space.

    4. This is the case even during the multicultural era, especially as Creole, Garifuna, and West Indian communities continue to fight for autonomy and inclusion.

    5. Garinagu refers to the collective and diasporic identity of Garifuna peoples that extends beyond Central American nationalism or regional specificity. It is in use particularly in Garifuna linguistic spaces.

    6. I only use the hyphen when referring to the field of study of Afro-Latinx Studies. I explicitly use Afrolatinidad and AfroLatinx to refer to peoples, histories, and cultures, because the hyphenation of Afro-Latinidad/Afro-Latinx is a continued violence of erasure. A hyphen reinscribes the notion that “Black” and “Latinx” are mutually exclusive to each other. Here I build on conversations with Omaris Z. Zamora and Yomaira C. Figueroa about the idea that Blackness is always already present in our Latinidad. Hyphenation is a dislocation of Blackness in distancing from Latinidad and in this context more specifically from US Central Americanness.

    7. I refer to this understudied transmigration of Garifuna and Creole folks to the United States as a “Great Migration of Black Central Americans from South of the US South” to point to the various hemispheric Black migrations and to disrupt the grand narrative of a US-centered Great Migration. Throughout the Americas, there have been and continue to be “Great Migrations” of Black communities fleeing anti-black racism.

    Works Cited

    • Anderson, Mark. Black and Indigenous: Garifuna Activism and Consumer Culture in Honduras. U of Minnesota P, 2009.
    • Chambers, Glenn A. Race, Nation, and West Indian Immigration to Honduras, 1890–1940. Louisiana State UP, 2010.
    • England, Sarah. Afro-Central Americans in New York City: Garifuna Tales of Transnational Movements in Racialized Space. UP of Florida, 2006.
    • Euraque, Darío A. “The Threat of Blackness to the Mestizo Nation: Race and Ethnicity in the Honduran Banana Economy, 1920s and 1930s.” Banana Wars: Power, Production, and History in the Americas, edited by Steve Striffler and Mark Moberg, Duke UP, 2003, pp. 229–250.
    • Figueroa, Yomaira C. Decolonizing Diasporas: Radical Mappings of Afro-Atlantic Literature. Northwestern UP, 2020.
    • Gordon, Edmund T. Disparate Diasporas: Identity and Politics in an African-Nicaraguan Community. The U of Texas P, 1998.
    • Gudmundson, Lowell, and Justin Wolfe. Introduction. Blacks and Blackness in Central America: Between Race and Place, edited by Lowell Gudmundson and Justin Wolfe. Duke UP, 2010, pp. 1–23.
    • Hale, Charles R. “Neoliberal Multiculturalism: The Remaking of Cultural Rights and Racial Dominance in Central America.” PoLAR, vol. 28, no. 1, 2005, pp. 10–28. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/24497680.
    • Hoffnung-Garskof, Jesse. “The Migrations of Arturo Schomburg: On Being Antillano, Negro, and Puerto Rican in New York, 1891–1938.” Journal of American Ethnic History, vol. 21, no. 1, Fall 2001, pp. 3–49. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/27502778.
    • Hooker, Juliet. “‘Beloved Enemies’: Race and Official Mestizo Nationalism in Nicaragua.” Latin American Research Review, vol. 40, no. 3, 2005, pp. 14–39. Project Muse, doi:10.1353/lar.2005.0051.
    • Hooker, Juliet. Theorizing Race in the Americas: Douglass, Sarmiento, Du Bois, and Vasconcelos. Oxford UP, 2017.
    • Hoy, Vielka Cecilia. “Negotiating among Invisibilities: Tales of Afro-Latinidades in the United States.” Jiménez Román and Flores, pp. 426–430. Jiménez Román, Miriam, and Juan Flores, editors. The Afro-Latin@ Reader: History and Culture in the United States. Duke UP, 2010.
    • King, Tiffany Lethabo. The Black Shoals: Offshore Formations of Black and Native Studies. Duke UP, 2019.
    • Lambert, Aida. “We Are Black Too: Experiences of a Honduran Garifuna.” Jiménez Román and Flores, pp. 431–433.
    • Loperena, Christopher. “Radicalize Multiculturalism? Garifuna Activism and the Double-Bind of Participation in Postcoup Honduras.” The Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Anthropology, vol. 21, no. 3, 2016, pp. 521–522. Wiley, doi:10.1111/jlca.12222.
    • López Oro, Paul Joseph. “Ni de aquí, ni de allá: Garifuna Subjectivities and the Politics of Diasporic Belonging.” Afro-Latin@s in Movement: Critical Approaches to Blackness and Transnationalism in the Americas, edited by Petra R. Rivera-Rideau, Jennifer A. Jones, and Tianna S. Paschel, Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, pp. 61–84.
    • Martínez, Janel. “‘Negra Soy’: Why I’ve Moved Away from the Term Afro-Latina.” Remezcla, 17 Sept. 2018, remezcla.com/features/culture/negra-vs-afro-latina/.
    • Martínez, Janel. “This is What It’s Like to Grow Up Garifuna.” 12 Apr. 2018, Mitú, fierce.wearemitu.com/identities/as-garifuna-woman-come-from-lineage-black-female-fighters-but-didnt-always-know/.
    • Mendoza, Breny. “De-Mythologizing Mestizaje in Honduras: A Critique of Recent Contributions.” Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Ethnic Studies, vol. 1, no. 2, 2006, pp. 185–201. Taylor & Francis, doi:10.1080/17442220600859361.
    • Navarro, Mireya. “For Many Latinos, Racial Identity Is More Culture Than Color.” The New York Times. 14 Jan. 2012, www.nytimes.com/2012/01/14/us/for-many-latinos-race-is-more-culture-than-color.html.
    • Zamora, Omaris Z. “(Trance)forming AfroLatina Embodied Knowledges in Nelly Rosario’s Song of the Water Saints,” Label Me Latina/o, Special Issue: Afro-Latina/o Literature and Performance, Vol. VII, (Summer 2017): pp. 1–16.

  • The Politics of Witchcraft and the Politics of Blood: Reading Sovereignty and Sociality in the Livingstone Museum

    Alírio Karina (bio)

    Abstract

    Thoroughly entangled in the legacies of colonial anthropology, witchcraft is often presented as evidence of primitiveness or superstition, or as a metaphor for reality. This paper examines a set of witchcraft objects held at the Livingstone Museum in Zambia, reading them against anthropological and political-theoretical efforts to treat witchcraft as a metaphor—for the African nation-state, capitalism, and ethnic violence, or for African ingenuity, modernity, and liberation. It argues instead that the materiality of witchcraft invites a reconceptualization of ideas of postcolonial agency and points to the limitations of liberatory politics organized around the pursuit of sovereignty.

    There looms, within abjection, one of those violent, dark revolts of being, directed against a threat that seems to emanate from an exorbitant outside or inside, ejected beyond the scope of the possible, the tolerable, the thinkable. It lies there, quite close, but it cannot be assimilated.—Julia Kristeva, The Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection

    In her 1975 review of Keith Thomas’s Religion and the Decline of Magic, Hildred Geertz identifies a problem with Thomas’s sweeping history of ideas: he fails to define “magic” outside of the terms his other ideological protagonists use to criticize it. The borders of the magical come to be delineated by that which should be, but is not, there—reason, practicality, religion.

    According to Geertz, Thomas reduces all systems of magical belief to wholly psychological phenomena, which cease to be important in the 17th century as Thomas identifies a reduction in need for supernatural aid and an increase in practical self-reliance. But, for any such psychological effect to exist, magic must be reasonable, and must too be something exceeding negative definition—so under what terms does it make itself such? What, actually, is magic? I am not interested in fleshing out Thomas’s psychological account of magic, though I will explore a related psychological-rationalist reductionism in contemporary and classical anthropological accounts. Instead, I contest Geertz’s challenge. What if there was a form of “magic” that was not framed as existing on the outside of normative knowing and being, but that sought to be the frame of that outside, to become that outside? To exist willfully outside of juridical and ecclesiastical law and logic, of scientific rationality—to exist, perhaps, against it, as a sovereign without obligations?

    Such a form of magic would present a radical threat to the knowable and governable and livable world. It is such a form that we find in the news reports and rumors of witchcraft that seem to orbit the African and Afro-diasporic world. This witchcraft kills, maims, and terrorizes innocent and marginal Africans.1 It remains a threat even after more than a century of colonization brought about its criminalization, after the refusal of the traditional and a new Christian antagonism to (non-ecclesiastical) magic, and after post-colonial African governments sought to unite despite the traditionalisms of tribe. In the process, it became overwhelmed by racial and ethnographic phantasm, a sign of the most shamefully savage, of the threat of an at-once racial and ethnographic Blackness, of the utmost impossibility of desiring the non-colonial, and thus it became a site of crisis for a reimagined African Studies. While in some ways specific to African Studies, this problematic has broader ramifications, as it is the result of the naturalization of ethnographic habits in the discipline that cast African witchcraft as a peculiarly and perniciously Black and indigenous practice. This paper does not seek to “apply” Black Studies or Indigenous Studies to consider this question. Instead, it thinks through the figure of witchcraft—at once burdened by the representational weight of both fields, by the weight of aspiration—in order to explore how both contribute to its understanding as a sign of sovereignty rather than as merely a nativist symbol of the return to a pure past or a liberal symbol of an always-already modernity.

    Fig. 1.
    Witchcraft display in the ethnographic gallery of the Livingstone Museum. All photographs were taken by the author and are used by permission.

    The contours of this story are drawn out in the galleries and collections of the Livingstone Museum, in Livingstone, Zambia (see fig. 1).2 In the ethnographic gallery,3 at the very beginning of a series of displays that travel from TRADITIONAL MEDICINE, through WITCHCRAFT, to DEATH (and BEYOND…), a small label informs the viewer that there are three kinds of traditional medicine items: herbs, which are prepared ointments and oral medicines of predominantly plant origin meant to cure various ailments; stimulants and depressants, which amplify or diminish a person’s (sexual, reproductive, psychological) capacities; and charms and talismans, which confer power to the wearer. Following in the footsteps of foundational English anthropologist E. Evans-Pritchard’s work on magic, the museum builds a careful distinction between objects that belong to the realm of the “magical” and those that pertain to “witchcraft.” This distinction marks not only a difference in what these objects are capable of, but—perhaps more importantly—a difference in how these objects should be related to.

    In this paper, I examine these objects as material things critically embedded in modes of ethnographic interpretation that are signaled by both the museum’s taxonomy and the writing of anthropological monographs that seek to understand “belief” and its associated material culture. These objects are caught up in an ethnographically entangled process of missionary evangelism on the African continent and in other legal and political moments of the colonial encounter. Reading these moments together with the sociopolitical threat posed by witchcraft and its associated material, I argue that the museum’s framing of these materials works (symbolically) to mediate their sovereignty, while nevertheless ceding to their power. When read against theories of postcolonial politics that rely upon an analogy to witchcraftness, these violently heretical objects demonstrate the necessity of thinking witchcraft not merely via circulated objects of belief or superstition, but as a practice that poses real challenges to the authority of postcolonial African states. This paper develops ideas about the sovereignty of witchcraft in relation to Achille Mbembe’s “Provisional Notes on the Postcolony” and considers the questions witchcraft poses for scholars concerned with valorizing African practices that exceed the command of the colonial.

    The witchcraft objects held by the Livingstone Museum were accessioned between the 1940s and 1960s, primarily following witch-trials, and were studied by Barrie Reynolds, then the Keeper of Ethnology at the Livingstone Museum.4 The objects fall into a few categories. Many are power sources in the form of containers; others are kaliloze guns used both by witches to kill their enemies and for witch-hunting (see fig. 2); a few are large ceremonial brushes; several are ilomba, snake familiars whose form the witch would adopt on night missions; others are various kinds of familiars, divining baskets, and associated objects. Among the objects is a magical telephone for communing with the otherworld and at least one magical aeroplane for traveling large distances and conducting night missions. Many are made from common materials that signal they were likely made by the same person. But many of them share other material traits. Several objects use seeds of the Lucky Bean Creeper (poisonous shiny red seeds that are black when dried), which are embedded in the object using dark resinous wax (another feature of many of the objects, across makers), while others featuring strings of small beads embedded in the same way. Many are shrouded in layers of fabric (at times signaling that the object was a snake, at times to hold a precarious object together, at times both) that have clearly been darkened on the surface by burial. Many combine parts of animal bodies—hooves, hides, tails, turtle shells, feathers—with wooden and other natural and crafted materials. Several too—especially the kaliloze guns, but also a skull-shaped object and a necklace of teeth—involve human remains, either teeth or large pieces of bone.

    Fig. 2.
    A kaliloze gun, made to look like a rifle. Its barrel is one end of a hollowed human femur, partially filled with soil. This is attached to a wooden stock and wrapped with leaves. Aimed through a hole in a wall, or at the sun, it can kill its target at any distance. Acc. 6580.

    These objects are composites, crafted from a variety of different (primarily natural) materials that do not seem to fit, usually held together with dark resin that appears equally unsuited to the object’s components. A significant subset of the objects seem to employ impossible taxidermy. The most striking is crafted to look like a zebra’s leg filled with a zebra’s tail, made from a zebra hide, a hoof (likely equine), a combination of multiple animal tails for the tail, and wood and thread. Even non-taxidermic objects combine these forms in similar ways. While most of the kaliloze guns are made simply of wood, a sawed-off human bone, fabrics wrapped around them, and beads attached with wax (already an extraordinary and unsettling combination), some are more extravagant. One has a purple glass or semi-precious stone attached, with an inverted pound coin beneath it; the handle of another is formed from a warthog tusk and a claw. The magical telephone is a small animal horn with thick, soft fur stitched all around it and a jar lid with sticks, wax, and lucky beans that forms the “earpiece.” The “receiver” is a painted plastic cylinder filled with things that rattle (see fig. 3). In many of these cases, the objects come to look magical through the internal consistency of a mode that relates disparate forms, objects, and components, whose combination undermines any norm by which the viewer might expect to relate to it.

    Fig. 3.
    A witch’s telephone. The earpiece comprises animal horn, hide, metal, wood, seeds, and a shell. The receiver is metallic (possibly a jar lid) and coated in dark wax; Lucky Seeds dot the perimeter, with a cowrie shell on the top. The mouthpiece is a plastic canister filled with black powder, covered in fabric, resin, and strings of beads. Acc. 064 A/B.

    Even objects with aesthetic value—well-crafted, referential of the familiar, or intricate in their form and decoration—are jarring. The intricate ilomba—whose carved faces recall the more mundane carvings found in the tourist market a few minutes from the museum—are deliberately frightening to look at. Their wooden heads, carved in the likeness of the witch whose snake form they would become, have exaggerated facial features that bulge out and are often decorated with materials that augment both their power and their visual menace. One such object has both seeds of the Lucky Bean Creeper affixed to the center of each eye and human hair (likely from the head of the witch himself). The heads form the tops of otherwise uncarved slabs of wood. The “bodies” are wrapped with a tremendous amount of murky-colored fabric, often with other objects (like scissors and animal claws) slipped inside and around these layers. This wrapping recalls a straitjacket and a snake at once, while the tone of the fabric indicates the ilomba’s hiding by burial. Another object is a necklace made entirely of human maxillary incisors, attached by coils of wire to a copper choker. This necklace, containing at least ten sets of front teeth, seems to come alive when moved (see fig. 4). The teeth, loosely connected to the copper core, shift very slightly. All of these objects are crafted with a great deal of attention to their form and aesthetics, echoing the familiar while using materials that render this reference to the beautiful quite frightening.

    Fig. 4.
    An item of witch regalia, worn around the neck. It comprises 43 adult maxillary incisors affixed to a loop of copper wire. The teeth move slightly when the piece is held. Acc. 10699.

    The necklace, the kaliloze guns, and the ilomba are especially unsettling because of the way they inhabit death. Objects involving human body parts and remains become inescapably entangled with questions of how they were obtained (the morbid hope that they were stolen from graves) and, in the case of the guns, an awareness that the death that was necessary to build the object is a death that comes to generate death. Each of the objects with Lucky Bean seeds signals a relationship to the world of the dead—as well as the dangers of crossing the witch who has that relationship and the dangers of an object decorated with poison, a death-bringer. The shrouding and burial of the guns and the ilomba are reminders of precisely what these objects have the power and intention to do.5

    Despite the ways in which these objects invoke and inhabit death, the ordinariness of Zambian belief in and fear of witchcraft is often treated as puzzling. Zambia—seen as modern, urban, educated, distant from “tradition”—would not then make sense as a home for indefensible superstitions from a forgotten past, while its predominant Christianity allows visitors to assume magic belief would have been replaced, as in Europe, by religious faith (Thomas). But that is not what witchcraft is. Witchcraft is a thoroughly modern practice and it has adapted in turn to the conditions of colonial and postcolonial Africa and assisted African subjects in adapting to these changes themselves.6 Zambian witchcraft is also invariably colored by colonial influence. Distinctly European magical fears—of black cats or walking under ladders—came to form the language for talking about a local “witchcraft” (which itself earned its name through the colonial encounter) and became the basis of a reckoning with this form as equivalent to what was historically present in Europe. This connection may have been tenuous in the early encounter—indeed, it was still complicated in 1930s Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, where Evans-Pritchard used the terms “witchcraft,” “magic,” and “oracles,” which he recognized as inadequate to the task of describing the capacious modes of the social theory he was capturing. However, the question of “mistranslation” becomes murkier when we return to postcolonial Livingstone, a place where European missions and their postcolonial American counterparts have been entrenched for centuries. Zambian witchcraft was changed by its framing with European logics. Some of this involved the appropriation of European symbolism, as both Barrie Reynolds and Friday Mufuzi argue. The kaliloze guns again provide an immediate reference here, both in their form (referencing guns, with some quite distinct references to revolvers and rifles) and in the materials that decorate them.

    But this shift is perhaps most clear when we consider the medicinal objects in the Livingstone Museum collections. Unlike the objects considered witchcraft objects, which traffic in and produce death, the objects that the Livingstone Museum frames as medicinal were built around magically or medically refusing the death that the witchcraft objects created, refusing the decay of the body and healing it instead. The herbal materials are catalogued as botanical clippings, occasionally with notes indicating the appropriate methods for usage and the illnesses these materials would aim to heal. This pharmacological collection strategy grants these materials a scientificity that allows them to be read as a valued form of “indigenous knowledge.” But what brings these herbal materials and charms together is the peculiar way in which the museum comes to define the category they do not form a part of: witchcraft. Where the magic of protective charms is a magic that heals or does no harm—and a magic that, perhaps as a result, needs little justification for even a very Christian Zambian to recognize—witchcraft is the magic that is about doing violence. In the case of the needle charms that protect against kaliloze gun attacks, witchcraft is also about surviving the reflection of violence you have attempted. This distinction seems solid enough until one remembers that the most common supernatural-related violence that the region sees takes the form of the killing of marginal subjects for body parts, which can then, medicinally, assist in the production and sustenance of power. These medicinal killings and maimings continue to be a problem in the region, with the market for body parts thriving especially in electoral periods. By delimiting violence of this kind to the world of witchcraft, the museum creates a neater division between different modes of vernacular practice than seems to really exist; this move may reflect a deliberate attempt to cleanse the “medicinal” of its more horrific components, such that “medicine” as a whole—not only in its pharmacological form—can remain an indigenous form immune to moral critique.

    Due to the museum’s taxonomy and the way it is reproduced by Christian responses to witchcraft and medicine materials, these objects come to be inscribed by a very European binary: they are either white or black magic. This idea is now hard to unravel from these materials. The white magic, which is beneficial and socially acceptable, becomes “medicine” or “divination”; the black magic, which is anti-social and violent, is “witchcraft” (Mufuzi, “Practice of Witchcraft”). This distinction between social benefit and anti-social violence mirrors the origin mythology that animates tourist life in Livingstone. Livingstone the town is named after Livingstone the man, who is memorialized as the uniquely goodhearted missionary who brought both salvation and abolition to the region. The ultimate anti-social black magic would then be the violence of slavery, and its abolition is understood to be of material and moral concern—a concern both with the end of raids that brought upheaval to the north of what is now Zambia (and the danger of being abducted into slavery through these raids) and with the wrongness of the enslavement of African kin. Its counterpart is the healing force of Christianity spread by Livingstone. Indeed, contemporary Christianity in Zambia—even after excluding the more willfully syncretic African Independent Churches—is a thoroughly magical phenomenon. Ordinary and spiritual life is expected to be structured in profoundly supernatural ways, from the transubstantiation in Catholicism and consubstantiation in Anglicanism to the more recently imported Pentecostal and Charismatic churches, where locals find themselves possessed, speaking in tongues, gaining special powers, and being healed by the word of God and the hands of their preachers. More, these supernatural modes are amenable to those governing local ideas of magic, and the commensurability of religion and witchcraft in Zambia produces local witchcraft practices not as impossibilities but as evil presences in the world. It follows that the fear of witchcraft and of its objects comes to be central to conversion in the region.

    To Western audiences, these witchcraft objects appear to manifest their power and intention through supernatural means,7 a fact that presents a scholarly problem. In the most notable early attempt to resolve this problem, Evans-Pritchard’s Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande (1937) works to find a way to rationalize witchcraft’s excess from the natural. In the text, Evans-Pritchard argues that Zande cosmology seeks to explain and respond to that which is left out of Western analyses of cause and effect—instead of the how questions, the why questions: why then, why there, why them. These beliefs in turn produce practices that help the Zande social structure retain stability in light of potentially destabilizing accidents and deaths.8 Evans-Pritchard produces a psychological account of witchcraft, describing it as a way of dealing with the inexplicable misfortunes of everyday life. In its effort to be sympathetic to magic, this mode imagines magic as the exceedingly rationalist counterpart to Western naturalist modes of inquiry (Mills). This witchcraft is not truly agential; not only does it not actually harm anyone, but it doesnt’ actually act. Instead, for Evans-Pritchard, witchcraft is a discourse applied after the fact and it produces the sense that the world it describes can be correctly understood through Western science.

    In postcolonial scholarship on witchcraft, this problematic is often addressed by studying experiences of witchcraft or witchcraft accusations through a set of concrete harms that witchcraft is understood to provide psychic or critical commentary upon. Many scholars extend Evans-Pritchard’s “misfortune” to its structural conclusion that witchcraft is the manifestation of the lived social violence of capitalism. This mode of thinking witchcraft as part of an “occult economy” hopes to take seriously the modernity of practices that are otherwise situated in the traditional past in an uncomplicated way. In Modernity and its Malcontents, Jean and John Comaroff attempt to rethink all ritual on the African continent as forming the “efforts of people to empower themselves, [and] thus to assert a measure of control over worlds often perceived to be rapidly changing” (xiv) and assert the importance of thinking ritual as symbolic action. Thus, they replicate Evans-Pritchard’s psychological dismissal of the occult. However, where for Evans-Pritchard magical practices have a stabilizing function, for the Comaroffs, they figure “in a moral economy capable of addressing the raw realities of misfortune and inequity” (xvii). The occult here is transmuted into a form of ritualized social criticism, which may come to have tangible effects. This speaks to an idealized occult world, in which the eminent adaptability of witchcraft (Geschiere) uniquely positions it as a resistant force to those geopolitical changes that affect everyday life in harmful ways (Moore and Sanders 11). But the practice of witchcraft that the Comaroffs identify routinely becomes subordinate to the moral critique that witchcraft is seen to enable. They write:

    African witches have a long legacy. Their signifying potential, moreover, has proven to be unusually dynamic and versatile. They travel across broad horizons, take up residence in towns, become mistresses of money, markets, and motorized transport, wear makeup and modish attire. They also become the personification of capricious commodities, the sirens of selfish desire. Thus Schmoll shows that Hausa “soul-eaters” in rural Niger consume the life essence of their fellows out of insatiable, uncontrolled craving. Theirs is an antisocial lust that finds its “meat” in the bodies of children, and hence subverts the process of social reproduction itself—this, Austen reminds us, being a very general motif in African witchcraft. (xxv)

    This brief historic analysis of the doings of witches is subsumed into an account of the soul-eater as a commodity that comes to threaten Hausa heritage, revealing the shifting moral margins of society. The Hausa witchcraft accusation is a quasi-Marxist critique from which we might better come to understand the economic violence of African modernity. It should come as little surprise that the discussions of magic in Modernity and Its Malcontents are animated by the idea of the fetish. This is a layered reference. The feitiço gives “fetish” its name—the enchantment, the magical object, the product of sorcery, the supernaturally animate—just as the Marxian commodity fetish describes the magic whereby circulation hides the social, becoming a veil that masks what is real. This is not just a rhetorical parallel; for the Comaroffs, much of what witchcraft appears to veil is capitalism. Despite their stated concern with taking non-Western forms seriously in their own right instead of as reflections of the West, Comaroff and Comaroff present an unveiling of the occult that is “truly” a criticism of newly entrenched forms of accumulation (xiii). Witchcraft becomes simply a metaphor for capitalism.

    For Sean Redding, witchcraft is the sign of colonial power in Union-era South Africa. Redding quotes a passage from Monica Hunter (Wilson)’s 1936 Reaction to Conquest, in which she presents an argument about the witchcraft done to the Pondo by Europeans:

    Quoting an unnamed informant, [Hunter] elaborated: “All ubuthi [material for sorcery] comes from Europeans. They are the real amagqwira (witches or sorcerers).” . . . Informants, when asked, replied that store-keepers and individual Europeans in Pondoland did not kill Pondo by witchcraft or sorcery, but “It is that European, the Government, who ukuthakatha [does harm by witchcraft or sorcery].”(10)

    For Hunter’s Pondo informant, the Union of South Africa is a witch, and colonial rule takes place by means of witchcraft. As Redding elaborates, the most frequent target of this mode of witchcraft accusation was the colonial tax, which demanded a fundamental and immediate restructuring of local forms of life, and whose authority (however illegitimate) could not be ignored. For Redding, this reading of white power as witchly is entangled with early evangelism. Christian missions and their associated civilizing projects—training grounds for appropriately proletarian, though at least initially elite, African subjectivities—were aligned with the colonial administration and colored local understandings of what the supernatural could do and for whom. The social disruption and violence of the sorcerer—the colonial administration, broadly construed—operated through the fetish of British currency, entrenching and facilitating the colonial government’s power at the cost of indigenous lives and life. Redding is concerned less with witchcraft, however, than with the witchcraft accusation. As a result, witchcraft is a metaphor and witchcraft accusations are indices of social anxiety, and thus critiques of the decidedly not supernatural operations of the colonial and postcolonial market and state.

    Henrietta Moore and Todd Sanders offer a rejoinder:

    Is witchcraft, or the occult more generally, offering a critique of globalization and modernity? Must it do so? Is witchcraft really about symbolic politics? Could it be that anthropologists are telling a popular liberal tale through “others” and, in the process, inadvertently reinscribing the very “us”-“them” dichotomies we seek to dismantle? It seems most unlikely that, in all cases and places, people are resisting or critiquing the technologies and conveniences of modernization, and they are certainly not shy of the capitalist relations needed to acquire them. (13)

    Why should allegations about occult harm so neatly mirror a left-centrist critique of capital and the modern world? Why should witchcraft be fundamentally about any such critique—why should it be reduced to discourse? By failing to think witchcraft as a practice with a social life, this scholarship cannot account for the way that the language of witchcraft in particular works to track changes in processes of “consumption, production and political control” (Moore and Sanders 9) on the African continent. This trajectory of witchcraft scholarship is well-meaning, reflecting the desire to dismiss concoctions of racist imagination, to valorize African social practices, and to retain a sense of (radical, or even revolutionary) political optimism about a continent that is often refused it. But witchcraft is not only a discourse; it is a living practice. To understand it, one must first be willing to take witchcraft as real. On one level, this might mean taking a more “rounded picture of reality, one that provides for both the visible and invisible dimensions of our world” (Nyamnjoh 47). But even if one is unwilling to countenance the agency of an invisible world, witchcraft is nonetheless agential and real. The ilomba of the Reynolds collection are especially suggestive here. These objects are crafted in ways that emphasize their identification with ethnographic Blackness, using racialized caricature to heighten the work of fear, and they are understood to be fundamentally entangled with the life of the witch. The ilomba must eat just as the witch must eat, and blood must flow through the ilomba just as blood must flow through the witch, or the ilomba and the witch will both die. This materiality does not so obviously reflect a structure of anti-social violence. But such a violence characterizes the evidently material practices that come to be excluded from the realm of the medicinal—the medicine murders and maimings of children, the elderly, and people with albinism. By failing to reckon with these, and with the convenience mapping of witchcraft accusations onto critiques of capitalist modernity, witchcraft is wholly excised from the material and social world.

    Francis Nyamnjoh’s analysis of magic in the Bamenda Grassfields of Cameroon offers a direction for resolution. Here, sorcerers are at once estranged from social life and possessed of an “undomesticated agency” (Nyamnjoh 44). This “undomesticated agency” is not only the malevolent power of sorcery, it corresponds too to the greed and pride of the economic and political climber, as part of a world in which everything—all resources, including life itself—is understood to be finite and in need of balancing. In both cases, close and distant kin are sacrificed—their lives traded at the market of a shadow world, Msa—to attain position and power. While this certainly appears to be a vernacular criticism of capitalist accumulation, it also seems to make a broader claim: witchcraft has a wild power and this power is absolute, free of the influence of any but the witch, and if left undomesticated—or at least unchallenged—it will continue to consume its kin until there are no spirits left.

    What does it mean to consume one’s kin? This is an expression of the most antisocial of violences—not only the cannibal consumption of other persons, but the literal eating of the family that grounds one’s presence in the social world. This consumption corresponds to the use of body parts in medicines that aid inattaining power and wealth. But it speaks more broadly to witchcraft as a socially disassembling force. The materials in the Reynolds collection—their aesthetics, materiality, social importance, and magical power—unmoor us and their contemporaries alike from the bounds of the social world as we have been brought to understand it. The witch’s otherworldly knowledge, signaled by the material and aesthetic mismatches in the construction of these composite objects, violently unmakes the boundaries of our worldly knowledge. In other words, witchcraft is abject. This is not as the overdetermined signifier of the horrors of the African primitivity, although an awareness of this may well be incorporated into witchcraft practice. Instead, witchcraft is the deliberate crafting and embodiment of abjection, occupying a position that is both marginal and threatening. This abjection can be seen even in the materiality of the Reynolds objects, with their malevolent superimposition of human remains with craft materials, natural dangers, and animal parts. Instead of merely surviving from a shameful traditional past, witchcraft continues to disassemble the boundaries of social meaning in ways capacious enough to incorporate the iconography and logic of colonialism.

    Whether we are concerned with the witchcraft of the medicine murder or with the way that killing itself operates through more occult means, we find in witchcraft a problem of relation. We cannot want witchcraft—even as we might want its heresy—and yet it remains, producing spectacular violence and spectacular objects that unsettle the social. And yet, there is something seductive about witchcraft, about the power it possesses and can transmit. This power is not just a discursive referent to things that have actual power. In this sense, witchcraft is not merely a critique of capitalism or of the particular workings of any given African nation state, but of sovereign power and those who wield it.

    Indeed, witchcraft is a form that challenges the sovereignty of African states. This challenge is regularly expressed in ordinary life. In one version, witchcraft is an evil obstacle to the salvation of the continent, to be overcome through novel ecclesiastical practices (Asamoah-Gyadu). This point is especially salient in Zambia, whose official Christianity has resulted in explicitly non-secular forms of governance following the 1991 presidential election of Frederick Chiluba, a Pentecostal Christian. This general Christian consensus on witchcraft in Zambia results in the idea that witchcraft is heretical, but not as discourse or representation. Instead, witches are actual combatants in a cosmological war,9 one that Christianity must win (Asamoah-Gyadu). In a somewhat parallel story, witchcraft is a superstitious practice that burdens governance and its potential to provide liberated futures (Okeja). This line of criticism reduces magical beliefs and practices to a backwards misreading of the real that produces frustrating noncompliance with the paternal authority of the state. Here the Zambian state’s position offers a useful conclusion. In the Lusaka National Museum—a fairly empty museum colored by state politics and situated next to a government office building that houses several ministries—the International Museums Day exhibit for 2017 (“Museums and Contested Histories: Saying the Unspeakable in Zambia”) featured panels on witchcraft and albinism, among other topics. The witchcraft panel, while in principle standing alone, provided the context through which to understand the other. Witchcraft and magic—including their medicinal and defensive forms, and especially the forms that enable the accumulation of wealth—are the necessary conditions for the maiming and murdering of albino Zambian adults and children. Tremendous and pervasive violence is incorporated into an illicit economy of supernatural power; superstition, if not evil itself, produces evil. And this violence is of urgent concern not only because it is horrific, but because it persists, spiting national attempts to manage it.10 Its occurrence compels international observers to call for intervention, thus reminding African governments of the subordinate position of their own “sovereignty.”

    In contrast, the heretical violence of and for witchcraft is not trapped by any obligations to appease others—any such death or maiming serves only the witch and perhaps a series of hired hands who willfully do violence to others in order to bring about or maintain the wealth or power of the witch in question. There is no decorum to maintain—no acts of violence that might (need to) be justified—nor anyone to be accountable to. There is opposition from the colonial and postcolonial state, as well as from Christian churches, and the entanglement of their challenge to witchcraft—or rather, of witchcraft’s challenge to both—signals that witchcraft’s heretical position may also be a sovereign one, as Fasolt argues in “Sovereignty and Heresy.” The attempts to criminalize witchcraft and the evangelical framing of witchcraft as an enemy force signal that witchcraft presents a critical disruption of the sovereignty of the Zambian state that, in the transit of the neocolony (cf. Byrd), must somehow be restructured from crisis into a difference that is either internal or external to the workings of the state11.

    Such an attempt was hinted at upon the election of Frederick Chiluba. On the first of November 1991, the results of the Zambian presidential election were announced. Following a staggering defeat, Kenneth Kaunda telephoned Chiluba to concede defeat and congratulate the new president. The Washington Post reported that shortly after this concession in a press conference,

    Chiluba called on Kaunda to remain in the country and help rebuild it. “I want the fears to vanish, to disappear from his mind,” he said. “There will be no witch hunting. Kenneth Kaunda is the father of this country, so we must show him respect.”12

    Chiluba’s declaration that “There will be no witch hunting” is a loaded play on words. More than just referencing the fact that Kaunda was the subject of myriad accusations of witchcraft, it nods to the legitimacy of the accusations against Kaunda. The pronouncement recognizes the growing popular frustration with Kaunda’s singular power, which, together with international pressure, produced the multiparty election in which he was unseated and through which his late autocratic rule became tantamount to witchcraft. Beyond that, Chiluba is declaring his own authority and capacity to control the world of witchcraft and dissuade it from action, perhaps by virtue of this democratic election. These two figures—Kaunda the witch, Chiluba the vanquisher—together tell a story of the success of Zambian sovereignty. The witch’s undomesticated agency is domesticated (subordinated) to the newly Christian state by means of a democratic election. But there is more than one threat of witchcraft in this account; also present are the multitudes desiring occult retribution, the witch-hunters-in-waiting (the rioters who had unsettled Kaunda’s Zambia and led to the election). And where Kaunda’s witchcraft-of-sovereignty is overcome by Chiluba’s electoral victory, this latter witchcraft—which threatened to compete with Chiluba’s role of authorizing violence for the state—is instead comfortably incorporated into Zambian statecraft, becoming part of what confirms Chiluba’s own legitimacy. The witch is dead! Long live the witches!—or so Chiluba, victorious, will tell us.

    Perhaps this signals the incorporation of witchcraft proper into Zambian nation-building. The use of witchcraft by politicians to establish their power certainly suggests as much. Perhaps witchcraft then takes the form of a commodity whose circulation is attuned to the whims of the state or its capitalist corollaries. Or perhaps instead of witchcraft being incorporated into the workings of the Zambian nation, it remains independent of and coextensive with Zambian sovereignty, a font of illicit power engaged by those who desire its legitimate corollary. The idea that witchcraft could be incorporated into governance belies both the utter social disruption it produces and the fact that, even as politicians attempt to access power by means of witchcraft, they can never acknowledge (to locals) that they are witches or (to international observers of multiple kinds) that they are primitive, superstitious, and willing to corrupt social life to attain power. Instead, it seems that witchcraft holds its own. It has become the immediate point of reference when discussing ascension to the kinds of wealth and position whose power is progressively less constrained. This does not seem to signal that witchcraft is equivalent to the tropic, populist witchcraft accusations that follow those who have attained some form of power (not least because they also follow those who have not). Instead, it seems to indicate that witchcraft, as a distinct, independent, unsubordinated sovereign form, is the sign through which power is understood.

    Thinking with Achille Mbembe, we might then be tempted to understand witchcraft as a necropolitical form, characterized by the production of lawless and excessive “death-worlds” (Mbembe, “Necropolitics” 40). In this reading, and in light of the challenges witchcraft poses to the postcolonial state (which it shadows with myth, rumor, and spectacular violence), witchcraft appears to correspond to an expression of sovereign power peculiar to the colony and its postcolonial successor. This is the logic that animates Mbembe’s “Provisional Notes on the Postcolony” (1992), which employs an extended metaphor of the fetish in its reading of postcolonial commandement. In this text, the fetish is the ideal form through which illegitimate authoritarian colonial power operates, as well as the power of its postcolonial successor.

    This fetish appears primarily to be the fetish-as-veil, although Mbembe makes use of the more occult origin of the term. But the fetish is also what structures our relations to the obscene, vulgar, sexual, phallic. Thus this contemporary-politics-as-fetish is not only a veil but a carnival masquerade (and, crucially, one known as such). This reading forces us to reckon with the permeation of political discourse with reactive and chaotic performances that undermine the recognition of political relations. Mbembe offers an account of how the grotesque, excessive, and obscene come to be incorporated into the workings of political power. What initially exceeds the capacities and domains of postcolonial governance comes to form part of what ratifies and enables the workings of the state. These changes can be read as the workings of a state aspiring to the modernity that seems to be otherwise unique to witchcraft, which is possessed of an infinite adaptability and responsiveness to change and external interpretation. As a result, Mbembe’s power-as-fetish—or perhaps, power-as-witchcraft—is capable of internalizing any obscenity or excess that should disrupt it.

    Mbembe writes this power-as-fetish as at once establishing and legitimating the authority of the state. But neither mechanism seems convincing, even within his own reading. Postcolonial potentates do not institute themselves by radical incorporation or any other means—in On the Postcolony (2001), they are instituted by a mere handover of power from a colonial commandement established by routine violence.13 Even considering only the contemporary African nations for which this claim might be held as true, the terms of this transition violently constrain African government policy. What remains relatively unconstrained is a discursive terrain through which power might be legitimated. However, Mbembe goes on to argue forcefully for an African postcolonial drama in which all parties have been radically disempowered, and both the state and the subjects of its regime are locked in a violent powerlessness due to their intimate, unwilling “conviviality” (“Provisional Notes” 10).14 In light of this, it seems odd that a mechanism for legitimation should even be necessary in the postcolony. Regardless of how political discourse might be performed here—with or without the fetish—we are left without a material account of the kind of sovereign power actually possessed by African states and the terms through which that sovereignty might be challenged or dissembled, and are instead offered something very close to an account of total domination. Mbembe reads power-as-witchcraft as a peculiarly African form characterized by excessively and arbitrarily violent state power. This peculiarity seems to be grounded in the seamlessness that Mbembe ascribes to the transfer of power from colonial administration to African government at independence, which appears as the key feature of the continent’s politics after colonialism, and through which theorization post-independence African states are assigned the full power of the colonial administrations that preceded them.

    Reading “Provisional Notes” with his essay, “Afropolitanism” (2007), a further problem emerges with the thesis of a postcolonial citizenry radically disempowered of democratic possibility. In “Afropolitanism,” Mbembe rhapsodizes about the value of an African political-aesthetic practice untethered to Africanism or Blackness (as racial, cultural, or kin-making forms). These latter forms reflect a nativism that Mbembe reads to be the problem at the heart of power-as-witchcraft.

    Partly through the indigenizing character of the African occult, Mbembe reads political claims to lineage and kinship—which he elsewhere equates to a “politics of blood,” both the blood of kin and of bloodshed (“If We Don’t”)—as commensurable with witchcraft-as-power. But, just as African states do not operate through witchcraft-as-power, violence in excess of that required to produce a nation-state can never gain hegemony across the Postcolony due to the quasi-condition of African sovereignty. Moreover, this commensuration misreads witchcraft, imagining it as a politics of kinship instead of a practice that arbitrarily and systemically brings the possibility of kinship into question. Further, and perhaps most troublingly for Mbembe’s project of reclaiming African subjectivity after colonialism, this gesture also forecloses the the affiliative models of political practice that might figure a new politics of solidarity and a new African political horizon.

    Mbembe’s criticism of the politics of custom operates within an academic conversation that commonly disparages resurgent African indigenous-coded political claims as nativist. Claims to land and lineage are seen as mired in an attachment to a past that is beyond reasonable access, and thus that is produced in the shape of existing desires, in which the customary comes to exist primarily as a legitimating force. Taking this to reflect truth, the question that follows is then, for what? The seeming answer is that claims to lineage threaten to produce ethnic division, hierarchy, and violence. This threat is in many ways evidenced by aspects of ethnic politics on the continent. But this sense of threat also reflects how the customary exists as a site of anxiety in advance of any actual violence, in ways that elide the banality of its everyday life—and indeed, the banality of the suggestion that an ethnicized context should deal with ethnicity instead of seeking to sweep it away. After all, fictive and affiliative claims to culture, kinship, and the past do not reflect politically convenient artifice, nor—much like witchcraft—are they a holdover from the precolonial. Instead, they articulate experiences with and attachments to non-Western practices, and reflect the vitality and urgency of such practices for the present day.

    The problem of wrestling with the agency and power of kinship—both in its banal and its pernicious forms—is one that the Livingstone Museum takes seriously. Its witchcraft objects are possessed of a deathly power, which is resolved by their deactivation by a witchdoctor prior to their placement on open shelves, and the restriction of access to any active objects accessioned after the last deactivation event. In the process, the museum both builds an archive of materials that can no longer threaten15 and recognizes their threat as real. The structure of its galleries offers another set of remarks; the ethnographic gallery is set up so as to critique colonialism and its effects on Zambian lives. Its entrance is marked by a curved reed fence, with sand on the ground; on the other side of this fence, a sign reads “Our Village.” The next room has several thatch-roofed buildings, sandy floors, and many traditional items meant to communicate how Zambians would have been living in the villages. Many objects, like jerricans and bicycles, signal that this is life under colonial rule. Three-dimensional sculptures of people are living their lives in this environment with these objects. The paintings on the walls continue the scene into the distance. In the next room, labelled “Their Town,” the floor ceases to be sandy, and is instead structured like a street, with pavement along the sides where the visitor walks in the road. Right in front of the entrance is a huge building with a sign labeled “Mirage House” and other signs that identify it as a government office and people’s bank. The story of this transition is clear; the urban promises of colonialism and postcolonial modernity proved mere mirages, and life in the cities and towns of Zambia is no easier than “traditional” life in the villages. Next to the building, there is a pay phone and a street light. Along the wall, extending to the right side of the entrance, a scene shows an industrial project helmed by a complaining European man, people struggling for work, and people debating whether the work—and, by extension, the colonial project—is worth it. Unlike in the scene of “Our Village,” all of the figures are two-dimensional wood cut-outs (or part of the murals). On the right side, we see a church, children walking to school, and a small shop set up in a tin shack complete with dry goods. Walking around the building, a car with wooden cut-out figures inside is being stopped by police and another person is sitting on the corner, begging.

    Fig. 5.
    Entrance to the conventional ethnographic exhibition hall following “Their Town.”

    A sign on the arched wall reading “Museum” marks the end of the installation space and the beginning of the conventional ethnographic exhibits, while also chronologically and critically situating museological knowledge in and after the destabilizing colonial encounter (see fig. 5). Thus, the structure of the ethnographic gallery suggests that the indigenous cosmologies reflected by the witchcraft objects (as opposed to by the museum, or the anthropologists that read the museum, or the colonial administrators who seek to reorganize social meaning for political and economic gain) are an inheritance Zambians cannot abandon. In making this move, the Livingstone Museum both invests in the scientificity of the research museum and challenges the singularity of its authority. The museum, we should understand, does have some (curated, colonial) relationship to truth, and as such is a resource in coming to comprehend anew the Village in the midst of (and after) the Town. Between the affirmations of and attempts to manage the threat of witchcraft and the exalting of forms of life that resist the logics of Zambian modernity without excluding its trappings, the Livingstone Museum does not make any optimistic claims about the potentiality of the future. Instead, it reckons with the problem that these witchcraft objects pose, as potently agential materials fundamentally entangled in indigenous ways of knowing. These objects also become overdetermined signs of primitive savagery and come to take newly harmful forms after colonialism and into the present.

    In its refusal of easy optimism—and even as it asserts the urgency and reality of indigenous knowledges and cosmologies—the museum also refuses a nativist appeal to origin or to a neatly defined sense of the precolonial. But it does so in ways that reflect the absence of anxiety around the power of custom, ethnicity, and the past, in sharp contrast to the scholarly discourses that concern and surround materials of the kind held in the Livingstone Museum’s collections. In the process, the museum is able to treat even the most violently overdetermined signs of cultural life as things possessing a life of their own, even the ones that have been out of circulation for half a century. It presents the idea that regardless of the impulse to authenticate indigenous practices, anthropologized African forms are not paths to the precolonial, nor do they reflect correct modes of timeless relation to the contemporary world. Instead, the Livingstone Museum’s treatment of these witchcraft objects underscores the necessity of simultaneously asking what politics are desired and what forms must be enlivened or reformed in order to ensure the possibility of these politics.

    Asking these questions means emphasizing the kinds of constraints to the quasi-sovereignty of post-independence African states posed by the economically, epistemically, and politically intrusive actions of imperial powers, and acknowledging too that life is made and remade in the midst of this. By taking witchcraft seriously—as practice and rumour and myth, as repulsion and seduction, as an antisocial violence and being-without obligation—we might gain grounds from which to understand the aspiration to sovereignty in African political life. And we might understand its fatal absence even where it is present and, more urgently, its inadequacy as a site of political aspiration whose violence—of jurisdiction, or of recognition—is not society-making but society-breaking. Crucially, witchcraft suggests too a productive inverse: sociality. Perhaps, following Mudimbe, one might instead trace the ordinary—the cultural products, the habits of life, the discourses that needn’t be spoken—and through it find a politics of kin-making that need not also be a politics of blood.

    Alírio Karina is a Postdoctoral Fellow in the Archive and Public Culture Research Initiative at the University of Cape Town, and Associate Faculty at the Brooklyn Institute for Social Research. Their research examines how the idea of Africa is the product of the legacies of anthropology, and what it might mean to do African studies—and to think Africa—in ways autonomous of anthropology.

    Footnotes

    1. Following the Livingstone Museum’s nomenclature, I use the term witchcraft here. The term is itself coherent with a lineage of writing from Barrie Reynolds to Evans-Pritchard, and with the popular terms that typically describe these practices in Zambia and beyond. Accordingly, I refer to the practitioners of witchcraft as witches, whereas practitioners of other kinds of magic might be diviners or witch-doctors. In some scholarship, my use of witchcraft is congruent with sorcery; in other scholarship and social contexts, witchcraft and sorcery are used interchangeably. In doing so, I also am responding to a set of arguments about nomenclature that would avoid the use of witchcraft or sorcery altogether, in favor of terms that speak to indigenous meaning rather than colonial assumption, and that avoid the pernicious connotations that come with witchcraft, sorcery, or witch-doctor. However, this logic falls flat in contemporary Zambia, where witchcraft is called witchcraft and bears the traces of the colonial encounter. Moreover, the attempt to avoid the negative connotations of these terms ultimately reflects a misunderstanding of (or unwillingness to understand) the extent to which these practices produce social violence. Further, in the Zambian case, the term witch, and thus the term witchcraft, is gendered in complex ways. While it is assumed that men and women are equally capable of being witches, male witches are understood to be more powerful (Mufuzi) and witch-hunts predominantly target women (and the elderly).

    2. This museum was founded as the Rhodes-Livingstone Museum, after both David Livingstone and Cecil John Rhodes, the mining magnate who conquered what is now Zambia as part of his personal colony of Rhodesia. It was affiliated with the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute (RLI) and would occasionally accession items collected by anthropologists working under the latter’s auspices. The RLI has since been renamed the Institute for Economic and Social Research (INESOR).

    3. Specifically, this display is in the part of the ethnographic gallery labelled MUSEUM and arranged with conventional museum displays, and not in the preceding part of the ethnographic gallery, a two-room installation work (“Our Village”; “Their Town”) that depicts the subtler violences of colonialism.

    4. The objects are deeply associated with Reynolds, and this collection is generally referred to within the museum as the “Reynolds Collection,” despite the fact that Reynolds is not listed as the collector for any of these materials. I will use this nomenclature in this paper.

    5. As a counterpoint to this now faded (deactivated) power, we see the present material condition of the objects. As many are made of natural materials (especially hide, hair, or dense patches of fiber), almost all of the objects are decaying, with small insect infestations resulting in dramatic shedding.

    6. See Geschiere, The Modernity of Witchcraft; Moore and Sanders, “Magical Interpretations”; Comaroff and Comaroff, Modernity and Its Malcontents; and Mufuzi, “Practice of Witchcraft.”

    7. In Zambia, the operation of witchcraft objects does not exceed the natural, nor do broader witchcraft and traditional medicinal practices.

    8. Evans-Pritchard already recognizes that this does not take the form of the “traditional,” as Anglo-Egyptian intervention had already forced the relocation of the community he studied and would do so again shortly thereafter. In some ways, these moves disabled “traditional” ways of living.

    9. This tale of the war of Christianity versus Witchcraft further complicates the idea of the “occult economy,” which serves as a mode of criticizing capitalist value structures. This is due to the Christian evangelical churches, whose leaders are conspicuous in their consumption and almost as rich in moral authority, and whose members tithe heavily, whose work entangles the capitalist and the moral and supernatural, whose adverts litter notice boards and the walls of buildings, and whose churches can be found on every block.

    10. The most obvious of these are the attempts to criminalize witchcraft, primarily under British rule, efforts that actually served to criminalize witchcraft accusations (see Redding, Sorcery and Sovereignty). But other anti-witchcraft (and anti-magic) sentiments animate African government, most clearly where public health and internal security seem to be at risk. These sentiments share a mixed lineage from both European attempts to produce modern colonies and modes of anticolonial anti-tribalism that were the result of wariness of the threats posed by attachments to ethnicity and to the making of new nationalisms, but that also took the form of a wariness with practices under sign of the traditional past instead of the modern (and in the case of Zambia, socialist) future.

    11. Together with Jodi Byrd, Sylvia Federici’s work is instructive on this point. Though the “witches” in question are altogether different, the “witch” appears as abject, against which—and in whose idealized answer—the maintenance of the Rhodesian and Zambian state as (neo)colonial forms is made possible. Indeed, even as the sovereignty of Zambian witchcraft is grounded in material violences, and responded to with equal materiality, its power is also grounded in its role as political and cultural counter-symbol to the state.

    12. This statement is complicated, as it becomes clear prior to the 1996 presidential election—for which new laws were passed barring non-Zambian born people from candidacy—that Kaunda was not welcome except as a subordinate figure to Chiluba and his political party, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). In the following year, Kaunda was stripped of his Zambian citizenship altogether..

    13. This argument is central to the first two chapters of On the Postcolony.

    14. In “Provisional Notes,” Mbembe offers this as an analytic on the grounds of its superior complexity to the binarism of “resistance v. passivity, autonomy v. subjection, state v. civil society, hegemony v. counter-hegemony, totalisation v. detotalisation” (1).

    15. The absence of threat is limited to when these objects remain deactivated; the object that ceases to be an archival or curatorial object is one that might be reactivated by another witch and used again to cause harm. For this reason, witchcraft objects on open display are sometimes stolen.

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    • Mills, Martin A. “The Opposite of Witchcraft: Evans-Pritchard and the Problem of the Person.” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, no. 19, 2013, pp. 18–33.
    • Moore, Henrietta L., and Todd Sanders. “Magical Interpretations and Mterial Realities: An Introduction.” Moore and Sanders, pp. 1–27.
    • ———, editors. Magical Interpretations, Material Realities: Modernity, Witchcraft and the Occult in Postcolonial Africa. Routledge, 2001.
    • Mudimbe, V.Y. The Idea of Africa. Indiana UP, 1994.
    • Mufuzi, Friday. “The Practice of Witchcraft and the Changing Patterns of its Paraphernalia in the Light of Technologically Produced Goods as Presented by Livingstone Museum, 1930s–1973.” Zambia Social Science Journal vol. 5, no. 1, 2014, pp. 50–71.
    • Nyamnjoh, Francis B. “Delusions of Development and the Enrichment of Witchcraft Discourses in Cameroon.” Moore and Sanders, pp. 28–49. Okeja, Uchenna B. “Magic In African Context.” Magic and the Supernatural, edited by Scott E. Hendrix and Timothy J. Shannon, Leiden, Brill, 2012, pp. 101–106.
    • Redding, Sean. Sorcery and Sovereignty: Taxation, Power and Rebellion in South Africa, 1880–1963. Ohio UP, 2006.
    • Reynolds, Barrie. Magic, Divination and Witchcraft Among the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia. U of California P, 1963.
    • Thomas, Keith. Religion and the Decline of Magic. Scribner, 1971.
  • The Grounds of Encounter: Racial and Colonial Discourses of Place

    Sarah E.K. Fong (bio)

    Abstract

    Bridging Black and Native Studies, this essay juxtaposes the speeches of late-nineteenth century social reformers with Black and Indigenous place-making practices to show that white settler spatial imaginaries depict both Black and Indigenous peoples as placeless within the lands currently called the United States. Moving beyond an analytical separation of Black and Native Studies, it employs a relational approach that reveals how racial and colonial discourses of place are co-constitutive in historical practice. The association of past and present in this essay is an invitation to consider the recursive and repetitive production of white settler spatial practices and imaginaries as ongoing sites of struggle.

    My first introduction to Sogorea Te’ Land Trust came in August 2017 when I attended a panel discussion titled “Living on Ohlone Land.” I had recently been wondering how I, as a non-Native person, could support the work of Indigenous communities in the Bay Area where I live. Sogorea Te’ Land Trust is “an urban Indigenous women-led land trust … that facilitates the return of Indigenous land to Indigenous people” (Sogorea Te’ Land Trust, “Purpose and Vision”). In order to “reclaim parcels [of land] in the midst of an urban setting,” Sogorea Te’ encourages residents and businesses to pay a land tax to the Ohlone people. The organization describes this voluntary financial contribution to the rematriation of Ohlone land as “a small step towards acknowledging the history of genocide on this land and contributing to its healing” (Sogorea Te’). Sogorea Te’ defines rematriation as the restoration of “a people ot their rightful place in sacred relationship with their ancestral land” (Sogorea Te’). Beyond purchasing and placing parcels of land in a trust, Sogorea Te’ engages in a range of place-making practices such as building ceremonial arbors, re-interring ancestral remains in sacred funerary Shellmounds, and growing food and traditional medicines in urban community farms. Through various projects, this intertribal collective aims to “restore reciprocal relationships with the sacred land we live on, and with the plants, animals and other human beings who we share this land with” (“Purpose and Vision”).

    In the summer of 2019, after paying my Shuumi land tax for two years, I began to support Sogorea Te’s work by volunteering at one of their community farms.1 I met Loa on the farm located at the intersection of two major urban thoroughfares. Walking through the lush, green grounds, I could hear the hum of cars, busses, and bikers passing on the street just beyond the fence. As Loa pointed out the tomatoes, kale, lettuce, and marigolds they were raising, she gestured to the neighboring beds. Those, she explained, were tended by Black Earth Farms, an agroecology collective that works to “train community members to build collectivized, autonomous, and chemical free food systems in urban and peri-urban environments” (Black Earth Farms). Black Earth Farms supports food sovereignty through the distribution of community-supported agroecology (CSA) food boxes to communities that face food insecurity. The long and narrow vegetable beds that make up this community farm, separated by a walking path no more than a foot wide, are stewarded by two different organizations – one identified with Ohlone women and another with African-diasporic and Indigenous people. And yet, Loa told me, members of the two communities will, at times, weed and water one another’s beds as seems necessary or prudent.

    Sogorea Te’ Land Trust and Black Earth Farms engage in place-based practices meant to sustain the physical bodies, community relations, and epistemological frameworks of Black and Indigenous peoples in the twenty first century. These embodied place-making practices push against dominant geographies that seek to limit and obscure Black and Indigenous peoples’ relationships to the lands currently called the United States, and to one another. This site of encounter between Black and Indigenous communities raises questions about the significance of the land- and place-based practices that emerge in the wake of slavery and amidst the ongoing conditions of colonization that shape contemporary social and political life in the United States. What does it mean for African-descended and Indigenous communities to farm alongside one another in the urban Bay Area? In what ways do their relationships to land align and diverge? How have dominant settler spatial imaginaries positioned Indigenous peoples and African-descended people in relationship to land and to one another in the Americas? How do Indigenous and African-descended people engage one another and remake these relationships today? I am new to this farm and to the communities that tend to it. I do not presume to grasp fully the philosophies or political imaginaries that animate Sogorea Te’ Land Trust and Black Earth Farms. This essay will not, therefore, undertake an analysis of the relationships between these particular organizations or their respective relationships to the land they farm. Instead, I use the parallel and shared beds of these two communities to open a window into the dynamics of place that preoccupy settler spatial imaginaries as well as the fields of Black Studies and Native Studies.

    US scholars of race and colonization commonly describe the relationship between Black Studies and Native Studies, or between histories of enslavement and colonization, as incommensurable. Frequently, the two fields are positioned at an impasse whereby the body and the land appear as the two poles around which race and colonization orbit. Within Black Studies, the racialized body is often approached as the crux of racialization, marking the limits of citizenship and Western conceptions of the human. Within Native Studies, land is frequently positioned as a primary site of conflict between colonial powers and Indigenous peoples. Native Studies scholar Mark Rifkin summarizes these constructions: “we might quite roughly schematize the distinction between Black and Indigenous political imaginaries as that of flesh and of land, a contrast between a focus on the violence of dehumanization through fungibility and occupation through domestication” (4). Yet as scholars such as Mishuana Goeman and Katherine McKittrick demonstrate, the study of racialized and gendered bodies cannot be so easily separated from considerations of land and place. At the same time, land need not act as an impassable analytical boundary between the intellectual and political projects of Black and Native Studies. Instead, we can approach prevailing discourses of place, which frequently (mis)characterize Black and Indigenous relationships to physical geographies, as the ground upon which to consider overlapping histories of struggle.

    In the twenty-first century United States, Black and Indigenous communities engage in ongoing struggles against the violent enforcement of racial and colonial spatial orders. For instance, federal and state officials have mounted new challenges to the sovereignty and territorial jurisdiction of Native nations. In addition to executive branch challenges to the Mashpee Wampanoag reservation, three recent Supreme Court cases – Herrera v. Wyoming, Carpenter v. Murphy, and McGirt v. Oklahoma – have questioned whether or not reservation lands and treaty rights remain valid from the vantage point of state and federal governments. In Herrera v. Wyoming, the State of Wyoming sought to constrain the Crow Mountain tribe’s treaty-protected hunting rights by arguing that the Fort Laramie Treaty (1868) was invalidated when Wyoming became a state in 1890.2 The state’s argument positioned the Crow Mountain peoples’ movement and its relationships to land as criminal. In both Carpenter v. Murphy and McGirt v. Oklahoma, the State of Oklahoma argued that the Muscogee Creek reservation had been disestablished not through an act of Congress but through allotment, legal precedent, and decades of state administration.3 Although the case specifically addressed whether or not the state of Oklahoma had jurisdiction to prosecute crimes committed on Indian land, its ramifications extend far beyond the prosecution of crimes to ask whether or not the Muscogee Creek Reservation retains any legal validity in the present day. In the case of the Mashpee Wampanoag, the Secretary of the Interior unilaterally moved to take the tribe’s 321 acres of land out of federal trust, thereby dispossessing the Mashpee Wampanoag of their homelands. By taking the land out of trust, the Secretary of the Interior put at risk the tribe’s ability to sustain its own governing and cultural institutions, such as a police force, a language academy, a low-income housing development, and a resource management program.4 These examples demonstrate that state and federal governments continue their assault on Indigenous peoples’ sovereignty and land-based relationships through administrative and judicial maneuvers premised on the enduring notion that Native nations and their citizens, as such, have no rightful or recognizable claims to the lands occupied by the United States.

    At the same time, the police-related deaths of Black citizens of the United States – such as Oscar Grant, Michael Brown, Sandra Bland, Breonna Taylor, and George Floyd, to name but a few – point to persistent conceptions of Black people as out of place within the social and physical geographies of the nation. Oscar Grant was returning home from a New Year’s Eve Party when a public transportation police officer killed him on a train platform in Oakland, California. Michael Brown was killed by a police officer as he walked home from the store in Ferguson, Missouri. Sandra Bland died in police custody in Waller County, Texas after a minor traffic stop resulted in her arrest. Breonna Taylor was killed by Louisville Metro Police officers when they entered her home on a no-knock warrant in the middle of the night. George Floyd was killed by a police officer who kneeled on his neck, holding him down on the pavement outside of a Minneapolis grocery store. These killings, and the countless others not listed here, remind us that the mundane geographies of cities and towns across the US can become sites of racialized state violence. That Black citizens can be killed with impunity in locations of everyday life repeats and enforces the idea that there is no place within the nation that guarantees the integrity, dignity, and futurity of Black lives. Police killings mark train stations, public roads, and private homes as sites that divide lives that are valued from those that are not. They remind all residents of the United States that Black people are disallowed from moving through space without risk of fatal harm.

    The narratives of place and belonging that shape and undergird these flashpoints are not, however, uniquely characteristic of the present moment. Instead, the contested spatial imaginaries that shape these events have persisted over centuries of struggle following the colonization of the Americas and the enslavement of African-descended people. The geographic discourses that explain and authorize these contemporary sites of struggle are part of a recursive spatial imaginary and a set of material geographies premised on the notion that Black and Indigenous people have no place in the lands currently called the United States. In this essay, I argue that white settler spatial imaginaries depict both Black and Indigenous peoples as placeless, making questions of land, place, and space relevant to the study of both race and settler colonization. Moving beyond an analytical separation of Black and Native Studies, a relational approach reveals that racial and colonial discourses of place are co-constitutive in historical practice. Drawing on speeches made by late-nineteenth century social reformers, I examine the narrative and rhetorical moves that position Black and Native people in relation to one another through the language of placelessness. I show how discourse couples placelessness with normative modes of emplacement that work to uphold white settler control over peoples and lands. I gesture to Sogorea Te’ Land Trust and Black Earth Farms as well as to historical examples of Black and Native place-making to point out the lines of flight that necessarily rupture and exceed white settler spatial imaginaries. By juxtaposing archival materials with present-day place-making practices, I do not aim to produce a teleological account of nineteenth- and twenty-first century struggles over place, nor do I mean to suggest that the impact of nineteenth-century discourses on twenty-first century spatial struggles can be clearly or easily discerned. Instead, I aim to illuminate enduring patterns of spatial thought. The association of past and present in this essay is an invitation to consider the recursive and repetitive production of white settler spatial practices and imaginaries as ongoing sites of struggle.

    While I argue that spatial imaginaries and geographic stories are relevant to the study of racialization and colonization alike, I also want to make clear that I do not aim to question or diminish the fact of Indigenous sovereignty over the lands currently called the United States. Indigenous peoples have long stewarded the lands of North America and maintain meaningful relationships to their ancestral homelands in the face of genocide, removal, and war. These relationships must be taken seriously as the basis for ethical relationships between all non-Indigenous peoples and Indigenous peoples living in North America. My point is not that place and space function identically for Indigenous peoples, African-descended people, and other racialized subjects, but rather that examining discourses of place as a site of encounter between racial formations and settler colonialism can produce new insights about how these different processes have unfolded alongside and through one another.

    The Spatial Imaginaries of Mohonk Conferences

    Like the present day, the nineteenth century was characterized by violent conflict over the material and conceptual boundaries of the nation. Legal and extra-legal forms of violence such as lynching and segregation policed the social and geographic boundaries of Black life in the United States. Alongside wars of removal and containment, the US government sought to open Indigenous lands to settlement and commercial use through land policy, boarding schools, and other forms of government administration. These racial and colonial conflicts reveal how the language and practice of displacement are mobilized to assert territorial and political control over peoples and lands.

    Black and Native feminist geographers argue that spatial analysis is critical to understanding the construction and experience of racial-sexual hierarchy and colonial relationships. Rather than analytically separating body, land, and place, feminist approaches to space illuminate how racialized and colonized bodies move through physical spaces that are themselves organized through registers of racial-sexual and colonial difference. Black feminist geographies expand prevailing conceptions and critiques of racial difference as a corporeal phenomenon by considering how racism and sexism are constituted by “spatial acts” (McKittrick, Demonic Grounds, xviii). Since the Enlightenment, the discipline of geography has contributed to the elaboration of racial difference by crafting “racial essentialisms based on place” (Hawthorne 3). Such racialized geographic imaginaries “bound individuals and groups in place, classify them according to their geographical locations, and arrange them in spatio-temporal hierarchy” (3). By designating the where and who of humanity’s apex, as Alexander Weheliye observes, Enlightenment thinking arranges the world through racial, sexual, and economic hierarchy such that some peoples and places are marked as less-than-human and non-human. Thus, the racial and sexual ordering of physical and imaginative geographies shape how racial-sexual bodies move through space. Those bodies marked as racial others are frequently denied access to, segregated from, and policed within the spaces designated as the domain of proper citizens and human subjects.

    By considering physical and imaginative landscapes, Black geographies offer a site of overlap with those elements of Native studies that focus on land and place. Native feminist geographies too explore how land, space, and place are ordered through colonial categories and practices. Mapping and cartography emerge in these approaches as critical practices in the colonial project of accumulating and controlling territory. According to Goeman, cartography is a technology from which conquest flows, allowing colonial powers to rename and reorganize Indigenous lands according to colonial conceptions of gender, nation, and indigeneity. By renaming and reconfiguring Native spaces, imaginative and material settler geographies demarcate between Native and non-Native (or national and non-national) spaces. Importantly, such mapping practices do more than reorder the physical spaces of North America. They also establish “gendered colonial structures” that organize, categorize, and surveil Native bodies such that they are “readable to the state” and appointed to “appropriate” spaces (Goeman 36). When Native people move outside of the spaces designated to them by settler spatial imaginaries, they are criminalized and made vulnerable to violence. In this way, Goeman observes, “colonialism is not just about conquering Native lands … it is also about the conquest of bodies” (33). Considered together, Black and Native feminist geographies reveal the overlapping ways that racial-sexual difference and colonial relations structure white settler spatial imaginaries and geographic practices.

    Black and Native feminist geographies reveal space and place to be simultaneously material (manifested in physical landscapes and infrastructures) and imaginary (rendered through discourse and language). Rather than a static background upon which human social life occurs, geography is a contested site of meaning and a field of encounter between different histories and worldviews. When we take “the language and physicality of geography seriously,” as McKittrick does, we are better able to see place as a site of struggle over racial and colonial power relations (Demonic xiii). Goeman too, in her study of Native women’s literatures and geographies, shows that the geographic structures of colonial governance “rely on tales to lend meaning to nature and ordered space” (35). For example, colonial cartographies seek to overwrite Native peoples’ understandings of and relationships to place through narratives of property law, environment, and nature. I take up Goeman and McKittrick’s focus on spatial imaginaries and geographic stories to explore how discourses of place and placelessness contribute to relational racial formations and settler colonial practices. Below, I explore how the spatial imaginaries of the Mohonk Conferences crafted racial and colonial categories as well as policies that aimed to resolve the so-called Negro and Indian Problems. The records of the Mohonk Conferences provide an opportunity to approach discourses of place as a site of encounter where histories of racialization and colonization meet. This article does not aim to offer a definitive theory of place in relationship to racialization and settler colonization, but rather to point to new avenues of relational analysis that neither collapse colonization into racialization nor hold these sociohistorical processes apart as discrete and separable.

    The Lake Mohonk Conferences—founded in the years preceding the passage of allotment legislation and amidst the solidification of Jim Crow segregation—provide a rich archive from which to discern the spatial imaginaries that narrate and justify Black and Indigenous displacement. Taking place during the post-Civil War era as the nation expanded westward, the Mohonk Conference of the Friends of the Indian (1883–1916) and the Mohonk Conference on the Negro Question (1890–1891) brought together policy-makers, philanthropists, educators, and business leaders who hoped to resolve the so-called Negro Problem and Indian Problem through humanitarian social reforms. Hotelier and social reformer Albert K. Smiley established the Mohonk Conference of the Friends of the Indian in 1883 to call national attention to the policy reforms needed “before a solution of the [Indian] problem [would] be possible” (Lake Mohonk Conference, “Address” 14). By debating the causes of and solutions to the so-called Indian Problem, conference participants hoped to sway public opinion and federal law towards policies such as residential schooling and allotment. Energized by the first conference, in 1890 Smiley founded a second forum to address the conditions of African-descended people. The Mohonk Conference on the Negro Question drew attention to the conditions of Black life in the post-Reconstruction era, focusing on questions of poverty, schooling, and citizenship. Although most conference attendees stopped short of openly advocating for legal segregation, many were careful to explain that they did not support immediate and complete equality for Africa-descended people while making apologies for deepening physical and social segregation. Similarly, many argued that Native people could eventually be woven into mainstream US society, but only after they adopted normative models of domesticity, gender, and property. Thus, although Mohonk delegates largely agreed that Black and Native people would inevitably remain or become part of the US body politic, their imagined and material place within the nation remained open to debate. In line with these material forms of sociospatial control, Mohonk reformers gave voice to spatial imaginaries that denied Black and Native peoples any valid or recognizable place in the lands claimed by the United States. The remarks and speeches made by attendees of both Mohonk Conferences reveal an underlying spatial imaginary that sought to determine where Black and Indigenous people fit into the emerging geographic and social landscapes of the post-Civil War United States. To what physical locations and social positions could or should Black and Indigenous people be assigned? How were these two populations positioned in relation to one another? And to what spaces could white settlers rightfully lay claim? Rather than explore the material impact of the Mohonk Conferences on legislative and juridical realities, I am interested here in the discursive patterns revealed by the records of these conferences.

    In the eyes of many Mohonk Conference speakers, Black and Native people appear to lack any legible or meaningful relationships to the spaces of the United States. Speakers draw on dominant spatial imaginaries that envision African-descended people as ungeographic—a perception that, according to McKittrick, connotes an inability to establish geographic relationships or valid geographic knowledge. By describing African-descended people as out-of-place within the social and material geographies of the nation, Mohonk speakers draw on and extend dominant geographic narratives that “require black displacement, black placelessness, black labor, and a black population that submissively stays ‘in place’” (Demonic 9). According to McKittrick, such depictions are rooted in the spatial imaginaries and practices of chattel slavery and are thus key to the dehumanization of African-descended people in the Americas. Goeman demonstrates how settler spatial imaginaries similarly disavow Native peoples’ geographic knowledges and practices. By attempting to overwrite Native geographies, settler spatial practices and imaginaries contribute to “the violent erasure of alternative modes of mapping and geographic understandings” (Goeman 2). The mischaracterization of Native nations’ relationships to place as non-relationships contributes to dominant spatial imaginaries perception of white settlers as the rightful owners and occupants of the land.

    The remarks of Mohonk Conference attendees link Black and Native people to one another through their mutual dislocation in ways that suit the needs of the racial settler-state, depicting African-descended people as doubly-displaced and Indigenous peoples as improperly in place. In the eyes of late-nineteenth century social reformers, African-descended people in the Americas appear to have no lasting ties to the lands of Africa and no valid claims to the territories of the United States. They craft a category of placelessness that imagines enslaved and, later, freed people as lacking any rightful or recognizable relationships to the physical and social geographies on either side of the Atlantic. By contrast, conference attendees cast Indigenous peoples as improperly in place. Having encountered Native nations on their traditional homelands, settler spatial imaginaries cannot so easily craft a totalizing narrative of rootlessness. Instead, Mohonk Conference attendees suggest that Native peoples exist improperly in place as they do not appear to cultivate or improve land according to the capitalist logics of production and extraction. Narrating multiple forms and histories of displacement, Mohonk Conference attendees contribute to the geographic stories that seek to locate and contain Black and Indigenous bodies and relationships to land. Such spatial imaginaries endure today, as evidenced by ongoing patterns of residential segregation, racialized policing, and the continued erasure of Indigenous peoples’ presence on and relationships to land.

    African-Descended People as Doubly-Displaced

    By arguing that the Middle Passage and generations of enslavement catalyzed a fundamental subjective transformation, Mohonk Conference delegates represent enslaved people and their descendants as placeless in relation to both Africa and the Americas. Their discursive construction of double-displacement relies on a pair of rhetorical moves. First, they sever enslaved peoples’ ties to the places and people of Africa. Second, they describe the captivity of chattel slavery as a benevolent form of emplacement that locates African-descended people in proximity to, yet always apart from, civilized modernity. To men like former US President Rutherford B. Hayes and Reverend A.D. Mayo, the geographies of slavery appear benevolent and humanizing. Narrating what he perceives as racial progress, Hayes describes the ancestors of freed people as “African barbarians and pagans of the lowest type” (Lake Mohonk Conference on the Negro Question, “First Mohonk Conference” 10). They had, he claims, “no moral code,” “no skills of any kind,” and “knew nothing of any printed or written language” (10). Hayes suggests, however, that when these “heathen people” were “brought from the Dark Continent” and subjected to “several generations of bondage,” they began to adopt the habits of civilized people (10). Reverend Mayo adds to this conception of enslavement as a civilizing experience, describing generations of chattel slavery as a “brief period of tutelage” through which African-descended people were “brought into contact with the upper strata of the most powerful and civilized peoples” (38). He celebrates the “prodigious change” resulting from bondage, arguing that as a result of slavery, the Black subject was at the time of emancipation “further ‘out of the woods’ of barbarism than any other people after a thousand years” (38, 39). Hayes and Mayo share a perception of the geographies of slavery as transformative and humanizing. From their perspective, traversing slavery’s geographies produces an irreversible separation between African-descended people in the Americas and their ancestral homelands.

    Hayes’s and Mayo’s remarks articulate a spatial imaginary that designates the “where” of civilized modernity, differentiating “the woods of barbarism” and the “Dark Continent” from the civilizing spaces of bondage. The slave ship and the plantation appear as geographies of transit that move African-descended people across space and time to arrive in physical proximity to the civilized spaces and people of the Americas. Hayes and Mayo emphasize the same material geographies identified by McKittrick as dehumanizing “locations of captivity”: the slave ship, the Middle Passage, and the plantation (Demonic xvi). McKittrick understands these as the sites that underwrite the violences of chattel slavery by claiming to transform people into property. Hayes and Mayo invert the dehumanizing effects of slavery’s geographies to envision them as sites rich with transformative and human-making potential, proposing that slavery’s geographies are essential to the production of modern, civilized human subjects. From another perspective, however, the logics of slavery and the space of the plantation mark African-descended people as existing apart from the peoples and places of the United States. Plantations serve as spatial reminders of the supposed distance between African-descended people and white Americans (construed as the apex of modern human subjectivity). As a material geography, the plantation contributes to dominant racial imaginaries that construe black working bodies as “without land or home” and “without ownership of self” (McKittrick, “On Plantations” 948). According to McKittrick, the plantation not only “legalized black servitude” but also sanctioned “black placelessness and constraint” (948). The spaces, practices, and imaginaries of the plantation underwrite the representation of African-descended people as enslaveable and thus homeless within a nation of ostensibly free-willed and autonomous white subjects. Even after the abolition of slavery, the plantation “provided the blueprint for future sites of racial entanglement” (949), continuing to mark African-descended people as apart from and placeless within the material and social geographies of the United States.

    Reverend A.W. Pitzer articulates this racial placelessness when he insists that, despite their contact with European and American cultures, freed people remain apart from the white societies in which they live and labor. Even as he describes himself as a man who “did not like slavery,” Pitzer perpetuates these racializing and dehumanization logics, remarking “how great the gulf between the Anglo-Saxon and the Negro” (Lake Mohonk Conference on the Negro Questions, “First Mohonk Conference” 70). He calls on the gathered audience to recall that “the wild, naked, man eating savages of equatorial Africa are of the same blood and race as the Negro of this republic” (70). “We must remember,” he continues, “the darkness out of which he comes” and “the fact that he does not belong to our historic race” (70). Through his rearticulation of inherited racial difference, Pitzer casts African-descended people out of the networks of social relations under negotiation at the end of the Civil War. He stages a narrative of racial non-belonging that moves between conceptions of placelessness and efforts to emplace restrictively. The supposedly irreconcilable racial difference Pitzer describes authorized lynching and segregation in the years following Reconstruction. These forms of corporeal violence and geographic constraint send the message that the place of Black citizens is restricted by white Americans. For example, lynching and Jim Crow restrictions sought to emplace Black people in narrowly defined and violently policed spaces. And yet, according to Reverend Mayo, the forms of segregation authorized by these narratives of placelessness have had a beneficial effect on African-descended people. He argues that “the temporary isolation of the Negro in the Southern church, school, and society” is not “an evil” but rather a “providential aid in gaining the self-respect and habit of self-help absolutely essential to good citizenship” (44). He thus holds that the spatial dynamics of slavery (removal) and segregation (confinement) contribute to the progress of the race. Again, the placelessness of African-descended people appears as a path to developmental and evolutionary progress, this time in relation to the dominant geographies of the Americas.

    Despite such narratives of double-displacement, however, Black people have and continue to enact and narrate a “different sense of place” that moves against and across dominant geographic imaginaries. McKittrick offers the story of Harriet Jacobs, an enslaved woman, as an example of the geographies crafted by Black women within and against the dominant geographies that aim to constrain and dehumanize. Jacobs crafted a complex and fraught plan to free her children from slavery and shield herself from ongoing physical and sexual assault, hiding in a narrow attic above her grandmother’s home for seven years. Although this space was too small for Jacobs to stand or even sit comfortably, McKittrick nonetheless characterizes the crawlspace as a “loophole of retreat” (Demonic 41) that allows Jacobs to remake the violent geographies of slavery. McKittrick interprets Jacobs’s spatial imaginaries as evidence of her ability to shape a “different sense of place,” allowing her to “explore the possibilities in the existing landscape.” Although she could not escape or operate entirely outside of slavery’s geographies, Jacobs was able to create a geography that “makes available a place for [her] to articulate her lived experiences and emancipatory desires” (41). Jacobs’s geographic strategies provide an example of Black place-making practices that subvert dominant geographies and create more room for liberation.

    Today, in contrast to the dominant geographic imaginaries that narrate and seek to produce Black placelessness, Black Earth Farms centers Black and Indigenous peoples’ relationships to land as an essential element of Black liberation and decolonization. Growing, harvesting, and delivering “nutrient dense and chemical free food to low-income communities experiencing food apartheid,” this collective works to regenerate Black and Indigenous communities’ “connection to and reverence for land and agriculture” (Black Earth Farms). Arguing that “relationships with soil, plants, food, and medicine are direct lines of communication and connection with our ancestors,” Black Earth Farms engages in a place-making practice not bound by commercial food systems, urban segregation, or racialized violence (Black Earth Farms). By building and sustaining communities of care through sustainable farming practices, Black Earth Farms emphasizes the centrality of place-based practices to liberated futures.

    Indigenous Peoples and Improper Relationships to Land

    The assertion that Indigenous peoples in North America failed to establish valid or recognizable relationships to land was central to social reformers’ discursive construction of Indigenous placelessness. Rather than as doubly-displaced, Mohonk delegates depict Indigenous peoples as improperly in place based on the perception that they do not relate to land through the capitalist logics of acquisition, extraction, and production. Lyman Abbott, a theologian and author, stages this narrative at the 1885 Mohonk Conference of the Friends of the Indian when he argues that “a people do not occupy a country simply because they roam over it.” Abbott holds that Native peoples do not “occupy the coal mines, nor the gold mines, into which they never struck a pick; nor the rivers which flow to the sea, and on which the music of a mill was never heard.” Given their apparent non-use of the land and its resources, he insists that “the Indians can scarcely be said to have occupied this country more than the bisons and buffalo they hunted” (Lake Mohonk Conference on the Friends of the Indian, “Proceedings” 51). Although Abbott tacitly acknowledges the prior relationships of Native people to the lands of North America, he moves immediately to deny their validity. He imposes a colonial geographic imaginary that erases Native peoples’ complex, enduring, and evolving relationships to place. Given their apparent failure or refusal to approach land through capitalist logics, Abbott reduces the status of Native people to that of the buffalo and bison. As Goeman argues, this type of “unjust spatial imaginary” distorts Native peoples’ social worlds such that they “become part of the flora and fauna open to settlement” (18). By re-writing Native peoples’ relationships to place as non-relationships, Abbott depicts the land as open to settlement by those who would use it for production and extraction.

    Such narratives of placelessness have long authorized genocide, forced removal, and other forms of dispossession at the hands of colonial and national governments. In the late 1880s, social reformers used this enduring colonial imaginary to argue for allotment in the 1887 Dawes General Allotment Act. The Act legislated the allotment of tribal lands by individual title rather than as collective holdings, and reformers hoped the policy would facilitate the dissolution of tribal governments and the incorporation of Indigenous lands into US markets. Abbot and his contemporaries perceived the reservation system as a spatial order that allowed Native people to continue living on the land improperly and, by extension, to continue living according to traditional lifeways that were not easily assimilable into settler state politics or capitalist economies. Viewing reservations as vast areas of land “set apart to barbarism,” Abbott argues that the reservation system cannot be reformed (Lake Mohonk, “Proceedings” 52), and must instead be “uprooted, root, truck, branch, and leaf, and a new system put in its place” (53). For Abbott and his fellow reformers, the “new system” would transform Native peoples’ supposedly improper relationships to land into proper and recognizable forms of individual land ownership, and protect Native peoples from being further removed and dispossessed. Abbott maintains that allotment would secure every Indian “in his right to his home, and in his right to free intercourse and free trade, whether the rest of the tribe wish him so protected or not” (53). Individual land ownership and independent economic activity are, he suggests, rights “which no tribe has the right to take from him, and no nation the right to sanction the robbery of” (53). In Abbott’s view, then, properly emplacing Native people on the land through private property ownership would produce them as differentiated and independent individuals, transforming their improper relationships to land, protecting them from further dispossession by settlers, and preventing what he perceived as the violation of individual economic and ownership rights by tribal governments.

    The rhetorical underpinnings and material results of the Dawes Act produced a contradictory cluster of spatial discourses and dynamics. On the one hand, reformers claimed that allotment would protect Native peoples’ connections to land by formally and properly placing them on the land; their supposedly improper placement on the land would become legible through individual land title as a mode of civilizing emplacement. Yet in historical fact, allotment facilitated a new era of dislocation through land sales, land speculation, and tax forfeiture (108). Despite reformers’ claims that the Dawes Act would secure Native people on their land, Native landholdings decreased from 138 million to 53 million acres between 1887 and 1934 (Chang, “Encolsures” 108). By narrating shifting conditions of displacement and emplacement, reformers worked to incorporate Native peoples and lands into US political and economic structures. In the minds of social reformers, the incorporation of Indigenous peoples and lands into the nation state required the dissolution of tribal governments and the disappearance of Indigenous subjects and socialities as Indigenous. These settler spatial imaginaries seek to “incorporate Native people through their disappearance or social death” (Goeman 4). The contradictory discourses and shifting practices of displacement and emplacement surrounding allotment are essential to explaining and justifying this mode of incorporation and/as disappearance.

    Despite reformers’ persistent efforts to narrate and make placelessness a reality, Indigenous peoples continued to enact place-making relationships to land that exceeded the terms set by policy-makers. For example, in the face of forced removal from the regions now known as Georgia and Alabama, town leaders of the Creek Nation strove to establish continuities between their ancestral homelands and Indian Territory. According to David Chang, Hotulke Emarthla, micco of Okichye, “planted the ashes of his town fire in the earth” 600 miles from the Creek homelands (The Color of the Land 26). Rekindling the town fire on the other end of removal, Hotulke Emarthla insisted that this new place, too, was Okichye. In the allotment era, Creek people continued to craft and enact their own relationships to place despite the expectations of US authorities. Although allotment policy re-envisioned land as private property, Chang argues that “Creek people continued to use their land to work toward their own goals” (112). Rather than approaching allotment as the foundation of a new subjecthood as yeoman farmers (as policy-makers had anticipated), Creek people used the new land system to sustain kinship and community ties by selecting plots alongside members of their kin group (144).

    The ceremonial arbors, funerary sites, and urban farms built and stewarded by Sogorea Te’ Land Trust remind us that today, as in the past, Indigenous peoples sustain relationships to place that operate within, but not always in alignment with, the terms set by white settler spatial imaginaries, political systems, and economies. The Ohlone people are not a federally recognized tribe, and so remain landless within settler imaginaries and material arrangements of space: “the lack of access to traditional ceremonial grounds and to land appropriate for multi-day ceremonies is a serious challenge faced by Lisjan people today” (Sogorea Te’ Land Trust, “Lisjan”). However, through the rematriation and stewardship of urban land, the women-led intertribal collective creates pathways for Native and non-Native people alike to affirm Indigenous geographies and establish relationships to land not grounded in settler spatial arrangements. Sogorea Te’ Land Trust has built a traditional Lisjan roundhouse on rematriated land where ceremonies can be held; formed a Himmetka, “a culturally based emergency response hub” (“Himmetka”); and established three urban farms where community members grow traditional plants, medicines, as well as fruits and vegetables.1 In these ways, Sogorea Te’ Land Trust has facilitated Indigenous peoples’ ability to affirm their enduring and evolving relationships to unceded and occupied Ohlone lands. Sogorea Te’ Land Trust invites non-Native peoples too to see and relate to the land outside of settler spatial orders. Paying the Shuumi land tax and volunteering to support the organization’s daily operations rupture settler spatial imaginaries by affirming that before these lands were known as Berkeley, Oakland, or Richmond, they were Lisjan Ohlone land, and remain so to this day.

    Relational Discourses of Place

    Reading the records of the two Mohonk Conferences alongside one another reveals that narratives of Black and Native placelessness are not simply parallel or similar discourses but are relational and co-constitutive. Beyond comparing the perceived placelessness of Black and Native people, conference attendees mobilized the narrative of humanizing Black dis/emplacement as a conceptual resource to justify allotment as a civilizing mode of dis/emplacement for Native people. This relational exchange is evident in both the founding of the two conferences and in the published statements of attendees. The formation of two conferences registers the construction of Blackness and Indigeneity as separate yet related problems in the minds of late-nineteenth century social reformers. As they sought to describe and respond to the problems of racial and colonial difference, the attendees of the conferences presumed that African-descended and Indigenous people are separate groups of people that can be managed and incorporated into the nation by similar means. Buoyed by the apparent success of the Mohonk Conference of the Friends of the Indian in swaying public opinion in favor of allotment and a federal boarding school system, Mohonk delegates mobilized to form a corollary conference to address matters related to Black citizens. The conferences’ founder and host Albert K. Smiley recalled that years prior, President Hayes indicated that he was “so gratified” with the methods and spirit of the Mohonk Conference of the Friends of the Indian that he could not help but hope that someday “that other weaker race” would “have some annual assembly such as this to consider its condition and to aid it to rise to the stature of true American citizenship” (Lake Mohonk Conference on the Negro Question, “First Mohonk Conference” 7). This hope, according to Smiley, was the impetus for the formation of the Mohonk Conference on the Negro Question. Crafting an origin story for the new conference, Smiley recounts the duplication of an institutional model first devised to address the problems associated with settler expansion (the Mohonk Conference of the Friends of the Indian) to craft a corollary institution to address the problems arising from enslavement and its afterlives (the Mohonk Conference on the Negro Question). In this narrative, Smiley alludes to a relational form of thinking that borrowed institutional forms and civic practices oriented towards settler expansion to envision a response to the problem of racial difference.

    Smiley’s duplication of institutional forms – and the exchange of ideas about Blackness and Indigeneity that it facilitates – positions Black and Native communities as comparable problems that might be resolved through similar means. This viewpoint was made explicit in speeches at the Mohonk Conference on the Negro Question, as delegates drew on discourses of Black placelessness to express their support for allotment policy. After the Dawes Act passed, the actual allotment of land proceeded unevenly across various reservations; some – including the Cherokee, Seminole, Choctaw, Chickasaw, and Creek nations – were exempted from the terms of the act entirely. But whether subject to the Dawes Act or not, Native nations persistently resisted the division of tribal lands and thus, reformers and policy-makers had to fight continually for the implementation of the policy. So strong was the resistance to allotment amongst the Five Civilized tribes, for example, that the federal government had to appoint the Dawes Commission in 1893 and pass the Curtis Act in 1897 before their lands were divided (Carlson 15).5 Thus, it is not surprising that in 1890, Mohonk Conference attendees continued to argue for the effectiveness of and need for allotment.

    The ideological underpinnings and material effects of allotment policy have been studied within the frameworks of Native American studies as an extension of earlier practices of removal and dislocation.6 However, examining the arguments made in favor of allotment at the Mohonk Conferences produces new insights into the discursive relationship between Indian removal and chattel slavery. Reformers’ discourse of placelessness and efforts to emplace Indigenous peoples properly on the lands desired and/or claimed by the United States depend on a metaphorical relationship to discourses of Black placelessness. Casting enslavement as a “brief period of tutelage,” this group of reformers argued that increased proximity to white, western society catalyzed racial advancement for African-descended people. In turn, Mohonk attendees suggested that allotment will bring Native peoples into intimate contact with white Americans and thus drive their progress towards modernity.

    Drawing a comparison between the history of enslavement and of the reservation system, Mohonk attendees mobilize the material and discursive construction of Black placelessness as a model for how to incorporate Native peoples and lands into the structures of racial-settler capitalism. Where enslavement appears as a civilizing force, attendees of the Mohonk Conference on the Negro Question perceive the reservation system – which enabled Native peoples to maintain collective land holdings, even if limited in scope – as a hindrance to progress. For instance, Reverend A.D. Mayo perceives the reservation system as a spatial arrangement that allows Native people to live in “proud isolation” from civilized society, thus making it possible to repel all the “beneficent changes” experienced by enslaved people living in close proximity to white society (39). He argues that as a result of the ongoing spatial separation facilitated by reservations, “the entire philanthropy, religion, and statesmanship of the republic are now wrestling with the problem of saving [Native peoples] from the fate of the buffalo” (38). Unlike the supposedly humanizing emplacement wrought by enslavement, Mayo construes the reservation system as a mode of spatial organization that renders Native people akin to the buffalo and similarly threatened with extinction. From Mayo’s perspective, the preservation of Native life requires a form a dis/emplacement modeled on that which animated enslavement and its afterlives. Samuel J. Barrows, too, stages this relational spatial imaginary when he contrasts enslavement as a mode of incorporation that draws African-descended people into the sphere of civilized modernity with the reservation system as a spatial order that holds Native peoples apart from the civilizing spaces of the United States. He explains in 1891 that, whereas slavery and its afterlives have “drawn [the Negro] away from his traditions, and absorbed him into the body of our civilization,” federal Indian policy pushed the Indian “outside of our civilization, forcing him back upon his tribal traditions, leaving him free to speak his own language” (Lake Mohonk Conference on the Negro Question, “Second Mohonk Conference” 8). Laying claim to the role of benevolent humanitarian, Mayo and Barrows applaud reformers and policy-makers for working to ensure the continuation of Native life by properly emplacing them on the land via allotment. In this comparative discourse, enslavement is first recast as a civilizing force and subsequently converted into a model for reshaping Indigenous relationships to land and making land available for settler use.

    The remarks of Hayes, Pitzer, Mayo, Abbott, and Barrows illuminate the shifting narratives of placelessness that animate late-nineteenth century social reform. In addition to leveraging displacement to seat themselves at the top of a racial/colonial spatial and social order, late-nineteenth century social reformers sought to delineate the relationship between Black and Indigenous peoples by using slavery as a metaphor for allotment. In actuality, the geographies of slavery attempted to convert Black life into a labor resource and to demarcate the limits of humanity. Similarly, the material effect of allotment was not the “civilization” of Native peoples but rather the capturing of Indigenous lands within the mechanisms of racial-settler capitalism.7 Analyzing the spatial narratives of Mohonk Conference speakers reveals the centrality of Black and Native placelessness to a white settler imaginary that envisions “modern” and “civilized” white subjects as the rightful owners, occupants, and masters of Black and Native peoples and lands. Their discursive acts recall how the conquistador-settler, to borrow Tiffany Lethabo King’s terminology, seeks to determine “the violent terms of … social relations” in order to ascend to whiteness and mastery over peoples and lands (xi). Mohonk delegates exemplify how the self-actualization of the conquistador-settler requires the mediation of Black and Indigenous relationships as well as the death and displacement of racial and colonial others (xi). Through the language of double-displacement and improper placement, social reformers justify the dehumanization of Black and Native people as well as the dispossession of Native nations. Their remarks register an anxiety about the place of Euro-American settlers in the Americas. Asserting their right to live on and govern in the lands called the United States requires the disavowal of longstanding and newly emerging Black and Indigenous geographies.

    Today, the geographic, social, and political dominance of those people racially coded as white continues to rely upon similar representations of Black and Native peoples as placeless. However, the embodied and place-based practices of Sogorea Te’ Land Trust and Black Earth Farms point to fissures in this white settler spatial imaginary. They challenge or operate outside of this framework by asserting ongoing relationships to land despite centuries of thought and action meant to transform or dissolve these relations, and by opening up possibilities for mutual relations between Black and Native people grounded in land and place rather than displacement and dispossession. By enacting and nurturing relationships to land on terms set by their own communities, and by building relationships with one another, these organizations produce other ways of knowing and experiencing place.

    Black and Native Studies: Beyond the Impasse

    Emphasizing the distinctions between processes of racial dehumanization and settler colonial violence is a critical intervention into the tendency to collapse histories of genocide, removal, and territorial dispossession into frameworks of racial difference. However, too neat a division between the signs of “body” and “land” frequently results in positioning Black and Native Studies, or the experiences of Black and Indigenous peoples, as oppositions where entanglements, overlaps, and sites of mutual constitution are obscured. Such occlusion raises questions about methodology and how best to account for the complex interchanges between racialization and colonization in the US. Can we approach Black and Indigenous place-making practices without placing them in opposition to one another? Can we explore how land-oriented practices fit into divergent and overlapping liberatory and decolonizing political imaginaries without establishing hierarchies between them? Can we construct methodological or theoretical approaches that allow for Black and Indigenous relationships to land to emerge as a site of encounter rather than impasse? Can we account for simultaneity and difference? Can we account for vegetable beds tended by Black and Indigenous communities, driven by different political imaginaries, and yet at times tended and watered together?

    In addition to studying the unique histories of African-descended and Indigenous peoples, scholars have increasingly taken up relational analyses that consider enslavement, colonization, and other dehumanizing forms of power alongside one another.8 Building on these methods, I approach land and place as a site of encounter between Black and Native Studies, rather than as concepts that sever these fields. Enslavement and genocide cannot be collapsed as equivalent historical processes, yet both are foundational to the formation of the United States (and Western modernity more generally); Lethabo King describes them as “distinct yet edgeless forms of violence.” Black fungibility and Native genocide proceed along divergent trajectories and yet “the violence moves as one” (x). Ethical analysis of the violences experienced by Black and Native peoples in the Americas thus requires a form of relational analysis capacious enough to account for simultaneity and difference. Troubling the analytical separation of Black and Native Studies via land and body, the proceedings of the Mohonk Conferences demonstrate that, historically, discourses of place structure both racial and colonial imaginaries by producing narratives about how Black and Indigenous people do (or do not) relate to material geographies and the social landscapes of modernity.

    Using this historical instance as an example, we can ask how settler spatial imaginaries continue to occlude and disturb Black and Indigenous relations to self, land, and other. As place continues to be a site of struggle, attending to the ways Black and Indigenous people have been simultaneously yet differently rendered placeless is an important element of liberatory intellectual and political pursuits. Rather than allow the notion of incommensurability to produce seductive notions of irreconcilable difference, attending to simultaneity and difference brings into view the mutual constitution of racial dehumanization and settler colonial relations. This suggests that Black liberation and decolonization require attention to the ways that both Black and Indigenous peoples have engaged in struggle with white settler spatial imaginaries. However, if “many histories and ways of seeing and mapping the world can occur at the same time,” as Goeman argues, we cannot presume that dominant geographies overdetermine the nature of Black and Indigenous relations to place nor their relations to one another. In the face of displacement and dispossession, Black and Native peoples have sustained material geographies and spatial imaginaries that exceed the terms of placelessness. Today, the embodied and land-oriented work of Sogorea Te’ Land Trust and Black Earth Farms point towards “alternate geographic formations” that might “incite new, or different, and perhaps more just, geographic stories” (McKittrick, Demonic xix). These two organizations provide spaces that nurture embodied relations to the land, cultivating a grounds of encounter where Black and Indigenous communities might remake the spatial relations that white settler imaginaries would establish for them. Their subaltern geographies might incite alternative mapping practices that open up “a conceptual arena through which more humanly workable geographies can be and are imagined” (xii). The vegetable beds tended by Sogorea Te’ Land Trust and Black Earth Farms offer an existing model of co-constituted, land-oriented care between Black and Native communities. This site of growth and abundance – fed by and illustrative of Black and Indigenous political imaginaries that diverge from the model of nation-making predicated on exploitation, dehumanization, and dispossession – pushes against prevailing white settler geographies that imagine African-descended and Indigenous peoples as placeless. The collective care shown to the soil, the carrots, the bugs, and the other beings that make place on this farm reveal Black and Native placelessness to be a settler fiction. Within the limits set by racial-settler capitalism, the embodied and narrative practices of Sogorea Te’ Land Trust and Black Earth Farms are a reminder that Black and Native peoples have persistently and powerfully challenged the dehumanization of racialized life and the exhaustive extraction of land.

    Sarah E.K. Fong is an Assistant Professor of Studies in Race, Colonialism, and Diaspora at Tufts University. Her research examines the entanglements of schooling, self-making, and racial-settler capitalism in the late-nineteenth century. Dr. Fong has published work in American Indian Culture and Research Journal as well as Amerasia Journal.

    I would like to express my thanks to the editors and staff of Postmodern Culture for making this volume possible. I am thankful to the organizers and participants of the “Troubling the Grounds Conference” for creating a space in which to develop these ideas. I am grateful, also, to Dr. Rosanne Sia for thinking with me over many months and reading countless drafts of this article. Finally, my deepest gratitude goes to Dr. SA Smythe, for their steady encouragement from the earliest iteration of this piece to its final form.

    Footnotes

    1. See descriptions of all Sogorea Te’ Land Trust’s projects at sogoreate-landtrust.org..

    2. Sogorea Te’ Land Trust defines Shuumi as “a gift.” According to their website, it is a way for “non-Indigenous people who live in traditional Chochenyo and Karkin Ohlone territory to make a voluntary annual financial contribution to this critical community work. If you live on Chochenyo and Karkin Ohlone land, you are inadvertently benefitting from the genocide waged against the Ohlone people and the theft of their land. Whether you know it or not, however you feel about it, this is an inescapable fact. The civic infrastructure, the economic system, the private development and the consumption of natural resources in our society are all connected to and in different ways built upon the colonial occupation of this land and the violent displacement of the Ohlone. Paying the Shuumi Land Tax is a small way to acknowledge this legacy and contribute to its healing.”

    3. See “Herrera v. Wyoming,” Harvard Law Review, 8 Nov. 2019, harvardlawreview.org/2019/11/herrera-v-wyoming/. Accessed 24 Aug. 2020; Olivia B. Waxman, “This Supreme Court Case on Hunting Is Really About a 150-Year-Old Treaty and Wyoming’s Existence as a State,” Time, 8 Jan. 2019, time.com/5494458/treaty-wyoming-herrera-history/. Accessed 24 Aug. 2020.

    4. See Albert Bender, “Supreme Court’s earthshaking decision: Eastern Oklahoma is still Indian Country,” Indianz.Com, 15 Jul. 2020, www.indianz.com/News/2020/07/15/supreme-courts-earthshaking-decision-eas.asp. Accessed 24 Aug. 2020; David K. TeSelle, “Review of McGirt v. Oklahoma – How the Supreme Court and Justice Gorsuch’s Revolutionary Textualism Brought America’s ‘Trail of Tears’ Promise to the Creek Nation Back From the Dead,” The National Law Review, 5 Aug. 2020, www.natlawreview.com/article/review-mcgirt-v-oklahoma-how-supreme-court-and-justice-gorsuch-s-revolutionary. Accessed August 24, 2020.

    5. See Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe, “Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe Threatened with Land Disestablishment, Tribal Leaders Step in to Address Ongoing Land Issues and Threats to Sovereignty,” 30 Mar. 2020, mashpeewampanoagtribe-nsn.gov/news/2020/3/30/mashpee-wampanoag-tribe-threatened-with-land-disestablishment-tribal-leaders-step-in-to-address-ongoing-land-issues-and-threats-to-sovereignty. Accessed 24 Aug. 2020; Carrie Jung, “What’s At Stake In The Mashpee Wampanoag Tribal Land Bill.” WBUR, 13 May 2019, www.wbur.org/news/2019/05/13/edited-whats-at-stake-in-the-mashpee-wampanoag-tribal-land-bill. Accessed 24 Aug. 2020.

    6. In 1893, the Dawes Commission was appointed to negotiate with these five tribes to get them to accept allotment or, if they would not, to force it upon them. In 1897, Congress passed the Curtis Act which dissolved tribal governments and enforced allotment where voluntary agreements could not be reached.

    7. See Emily Greenwald, Reconfiguring the Reservation: The Nez Perces, Jicarilla Apaches, and the Dawes Act, U of New Mexico P, 2002; Frederick Hoxie, A Final Promise: The Campaign to Assimilate the Indians, 1880–1920, U of Nebraska P, 2001; D.S. Otis, The Dawes Act and the Allotment of Indian Lands, U of Oklahoma P, 1973.

    8. See Sarah Fong, “Racial-Settler Capitalism: Character Building and the Accumulation of Land and Labor in the Late Nineteenth Century,” American Indian Culture and Research Journal, vol. 43, no. 2, 2019, pp. 25–48.

    9. See Jodi A. Byrd, Transit of Empire: Indigenous Critiques of Colonialism, U of Minnesota P, 2011; Quynh Nhu Le, Unsettled Solidarities: Asian and Indigenous Cross-Representations in the Americas, Temple UP, 2019; Nada Elia, David M. Hernández, Jodi Kim, Shana L. Redmond, Dylan Rodriguez, Sarita Echavez See, editors, Critical Ethnic Studies: A Reader, Duke UP, 2016; J. Kēhaulani Kauanui, “Tracing Historical Specificity: Race and the Colonial Politics of (In)Capacity,” American Quarterly, vol. 69, no. 2, 2017; Lisa Lowe, Intimacies of Four Continents, Duke UP, 2015.

    Works Cited

    • Black Earth Farm Collective. “Organizational Principles and Manifesto.” Black Earth Farms, blackearthfarms.com/. Accessed 24 Aug. 2020. Carlson, Leonard A. Indians, Bureaucrats, and Land. Praeger, 1981.
    • Chang, David. The Color of the Land: Race, Nation, and the Politics of Land Ownership in Oklahoma, 1832–1929. U of North Carolina P, 2010.
    • ———. “Enclosures of Land and Sovereignty: The Allotment of American Indian Land.” Radical History Review, no. 109, 2011, pp. 108–120.
    • Goeman, Mishuana. Mark My Words: Native Women Mapping Our Nations. U of Minnesota P, 2013.
    • Hawthorne, Camilla. “Black Matters are Spatial Matters.” Geography Compass, vol. 13, no. 11, 2019.
    • King, Tiffany Lethabo. The Black Shoals: Offshore Formations of Black and Native Studies. Duke UP, 2019.
    • Lake Mohonk Conference of the Friends of the Indian. “Address to the Public of the Lake Mohonk Conference.” Report of the Annual Lake Mohonk Conference on the Indian and Other Dependent Peoples, no. 1, 1883, pp. 3–16. HeinOnline, https://heinonline-org.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/HOL/P?h=hein.hoil/ramhonk0001&i=12. Accessed 24 Aug. 2020.
    • ———. “Proceedings of the Third Annual Meeting of the Lake Mohonk Conference of Friends of the Indian.” Report of the Annual Lake Mohonk Conference on the Indian and Other Dependent Peoples, no. 3, 1885, pp. 3–80. HeinOnline, https://heinonline-org.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/HOL/P?h=hein.hoil/ramhonk0003&i=48. Accessed 24 Aug. 2020.
    • Lake Mohonk Conference on the Negro Question. “First Mohonk Conference on the Negro Question.” 1890. Mohonk Conference on the Negro Question, edited by Isabel C. Barrows, Negro Universities P, 1969. HathiTrust, https://hdl-handle-net.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/2027/uc1.b4016739. Accessed 24 Aug. 2020.
    • ———. “Second Mohonk Conference on the Negro Question.” 1891. Mohonk Conference on the Negro Question, edited by Isabel C. Barrows, Negro Universities P, 1969. HathiTrust, https://hdl-handle-net.ezproxy.library.uvic.ca/2027/uc1.b4016739. Accessed 24 Aug. 2020.
    • McKittrick, Katherine. Demonic Grounds: Black Women and the Cartographies of Struggle. U of Minnesota P, 2006.
    • ———. “On Plantations, Prisons, and a Black Sense of Place.” Social & Cultural Geography, vol. 12, no. 8, 2011, pp. 947–63.
    • Rifkin, Mark. Fictions of Land and Flesh: Blackness, Indigeneity, and Speculation. Duke UP, 2019.
    • Sogorea Te’ Land Trust. sogoreate-landtrust.com/. Accessed 24 Aug. 2020.
    • ———. “Himmetka: In One Place, Together.” Sogorea Te’ Land Trust, sogoreatelandtrust.org/himmetka/. Accessed 24 Aug. 2020.
    • ———. “Lisjan (Ohlone) History & Territory.” Sogorea Te’ Land Trust, sogoreatelandtrust.org/lisjan-history-and-territory/. Accessed 24 Aug. 2020.
    • ———. “Purpose and Vision.” Sogorea Te’ Land Trust, sogoreate-landtrust.org/purpose-and-vision/. Accessed 24 Aug. 2020.
    • Weheliye, Alexander. Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human. Duke UP, 2014.
  • Other Intimacies: Black Studies Notes on Native/Indigenous Studies

    Chad Infante, Sandra Harvey, Kelly Limes Taylor, and Tiffany King (bios)

    In 2015, we began assembling a dialogue among Black identified scholars committed to research focusing on Black diasporan people about how Black Studies might approach Native and Indigenous Studies. Tiffany Lethabo King reached out to Shona Jackson, Melanie Newton, Faye Yarborough, Tiya Miles, Chad Infante, Shanya Cordis, Sandra Harvey, and Kelly Limes Taylor to think about how to have this conversation.1 A few of us were able to sustain conversations over email about convening at the American Studies Association (ASA) and Native American and Indigenous Studies Association (NAISA) conferences. Over email and in digital space, we made suggestions about scholars to include, thought about questions that needed to be posed, and set goals for how to sustain a long-term conversation and build a community of scholars.

    In 2019, Shanya Cordis, Sandra Harvey, Chad Infante, Shona Jackson, Tiffany King, and Kelly Limes-Taylor submitted a panel to ASA’s 2019 conference in Hawaii. After a series of emails, we named our roundtable “Other Intimacies: Black Studies Notes on Native/Indigenous Studies.” We thank Sandra Harvey for framing our thinking about the kinds of relationships and conversations we desired to have with Native and Indigenous studies as a kind of “other intimacy.” After careful drafting and redrafting (we are so grateful to Shona Jackson) we submitted the following proposal:

    Recent attention to the ways that anti-Blackness, Indigenous genocide, and settler colonialism shape and inform one another have given rise to generative scholarship, conversations, and political work at the critical juncture of Black and Native/Indigenous Studies. This robust exchange has happened at the same time that settler colonial studies, as a discourse and field, has become the lingua franca in the academy for talking about social relations under the violent conditions of extermination, settlement, displacement, and migration. In reflecting on the unique ways that Black Studies has historically grappled with and continues to engage questions of Indigeneity, sovereignty, settlement, and nation alongside its sustained attention to diaspora, the roundtable participants address the ways in which settler colonial studies has opened up and closed off avenues between Indigenous and Black Studies, both of which have “grammars” that are often overshadowed by it. The participants on this panel discuss ‘what can be learned’ if the specific ways that Black Studies—a geographically, theoretically and politically diverse practice—has engaged and is engaging Native/Indigenous Studies is taken seriously. The panelists seek to engage Black Studies at both its points of entanglement with Native/Indigenous studies, and its points of closure.2

    During the roundtable, the panel sought to reflect on the following questions:

    1. What particular genealogies, methodologies, traditions/practices, and scholars within Black Studies have been generative for engaging theoretical and conceptual concerns within Native/Indigenous Studies?
    2. What are some limitations to the aforementioned approaches?
    3. How has settler colonialism as a theoretical framework shaped discussion between Black Studies and Native/Indigenous Studies? What are the possibilities and limitations of this point of departure?
    4. What can theories of sovereignty that have emerged in Black Studies contribute to a mutual conversation/movement for decolonization and abolition?
    5. How have Black Studies’ conceptualizations and critiques of the “nation” and the “state” been in conversation with Native/Indigenous theorists’?
    6. What might be opened up in Black Studies when we focus attention on the notion and histories of indigeneity as much as we do or in conjunction with the theme of diaspora?
    7. How do Black Studies and Native Studies attend to each other with care? For example, how do we honor Black and Indigenous people particularly when focusing on violence and Black and Indigenous people’s bodies?
    8. How do we move forward/keep momentum?

    We proposed, adjusted, and revised questions as a group. Some of the questions emerged from the intellectual labor and scholarly investments of specific participants. For instance, questions four and six, which inquire about Black theories of sovereignty and a refocus of attention from diaspora to indigeneity, were posed by Sandra Harvey. Harvey responds to these questions in elegant and prodding ways that require deep contemplation. Questions three, five, and seven were offered by Shanya Cordis, and ask the participants to think about what settler colonial studies as a discourse and field has offered and foreclosed, how Black Studies’ critiques of the “nation” and “state” interface with Indigenous theories of the nation, and finally how Black and Indigenous people might attend to one another with care. While not reproduced in the roundtable discussion or in this essay, Cordis’s contributions to this conversation were essential to the groundwork we did as a group. Kelly Limes-Taylor offers thoughtful and eloquent responses to Cordis’s questions in ways that ground readers in the everyday practice of decolonial struggle and of moving toward more promising horizons. Four of us (Harvey, Infante, Jackson, and King) were able to travel to the ancestral homelands and waters of the Kanaka Maoli in November 2019 for the ASA. The four of us hosted a vibrant exchange and discussion with those in attendance. We have tried to reproduce the conversation that took place during the roundtable between Harvey, Infante, Jackson, and King, which also continued in later weeks over email with Kelly Limes-Taylor. This essay will proceed with the edited written responses of the remarks offered at the ASA by Sandra Harvey, Chad Infante, and Tiffany Lethabo King. While Shona Jackson offered remarks during the roundtable, we were not able to include her written comments here due to time constraints and other demands. However, some of the answers below respond to Jackson’s offerings and insights at the roundtable.

    The following are introductory remarks delivered by Tiffany Lethabo King on November 8, 2019 at the 2019 convening of the ASA in Honolulu, Hawaii, titled “Build As We Fight.”

    Welcome to “Other Intimacies: Black Studies Notes on Native/Indigenous Studies.” This afternoon, I have the pleasure of keeping company and engaging three of the six scholars who continue to inform and transform my thinking after every encounter with them. I have been trying to bring us together to have this conversation for the last five years. While we are here on the ancestral lands and waters of the Kanaka Maoli this afternoon, my colleagues and I hope to attend to the ways that multiple Black Studies projects have engaged Indigeneity and Indigenous peoples across the African diaspora.

    As scholars engaged in the practice of Black study, we want to consider “what we can learn” if Black Studies is used as a point of departure for engaging Native/Indigenous Studies. This conversation is not an effort aimed at critique, displacement, or the takeover of more recognized theoretical and disciplinary frames. However, the question “what can be learned if Black Studies is a point of departure?” introduces important theoretical, political, pedagogical, and ethical concerns. As panelists, we seek to engage Black Studies at both its points of entanglement with Native/Indigenous Studies and its points of closure. Black diasporan scholarship, with its attention to African descended people “on the move” as well as indigeneity in Africa, reorients how we think through the field of Native and Indigenous Studies. I have had the privilege of thinking with my colleagues Shona Jackson, Sandra Harvey, Shanya Cordis, Chad Infante, and Kelly Limes-Taylor about this provocation since the winter. In preparation for this much anticipated conversation, I have thought about the following things when I consider what it means to approach Native and Indigenous Studies from shifting and dynamic spaces of Black Studies:

    What new questions and concerns rise to the surface?

    What kinds of texts, objects, artifacts, and encounters do we need to consider?

    Are new periodizations and temporalities in play?

    What are the “unthought” geographies and ecologies that need to be surfaced?

    Should we consider Black diasporan healing practices and modalities as a space to look for deep and or fleeting knowledge of Indigenous peoples and cosmologies?

    Might we consider that some intimate, ceremonial, healing, and erotic work is off limits or considered sacred in Black Studies or by some scholars within Black Studies?

    Instead of imagining that Black Studies is a space of lack and ignorance about Indigeneity, might we consider the silence a site of refusal or a critique of academic knowledge production?

    In line with this posture of refusal, might there be a reticence on the part of Black scholars, due to a shared experience with Indigenous people of being objectified, to “study” Indigenous people?

    Is there an unmappable practice of Black study and ethics that pursues being in relationship with Indigeneity rather than “knowing” it?

    Q1: What particular genealogies, methodologies, traditions/practices, and scholars within Black Studies have been generative for engaging theoretical and conceptual concerns within Native/Indigenous Studies?

    Chad B. Infante:
    My first teacher of Native American Studies is my mother, Lynda Angela Duhaney. Like Sylvia Wynter, she is a teacher of Spanish. For this reason, she has always emphasized the Spanish possession of the island of Jamaica and their colonization of the Indigenous Taino people. To combat the convenient use of the “Black Legend” by the British and the claims that the Taino population on Jamaica was small—estimated at 15,000–20,000—because of its relative distance from the chain of Greater Antillean islands, she constantly reminded me that Jamaica, the Americas, and Africa were colonized and enslaved not only by the Spanish and British but by that minuscule and cold corner of the world called Europe.

    It was only at the end of my graduate career that I realized her significant influence on my scholarship. In those restless dreams before and after submitting the dissertation, I could see the slim white bookcase that held her copies of Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth, De Beauvoir’s The Second Sex, and Van Sertima’s They Came Before Columbus. Her influence and these works propelled me into a love of literature and scholarly inquiry. Her focus on the importance of performance, the spoken word, folklore, and global indigenous practices of storytelling led me to read and appreciate Native American literature. This, in turn, brought me to the work of Sylvia Wynter, Frank B. Wilderson, the debate between Afro-Pessimism and Black Optimism, and to the important work of Sharon P. Holland and Tiya Miles.

    Sandra Harvey:
    Some of the most profound intellectual and political spaces in Black Studies are rooted in radical black feminist approaches to slavery studies. In particular I’m thinking about Toni Morrison, Hortense Spillers, and Saidiya Hartman’s work with the archives of slavery, whether they be the slave ledger, runaway slave advertisements, slave narratives and newspaper articles, or bodies and flesh. What stands out to me in these works is the ethical commitment that, I’d argue, represents Black feminist work at its best. For Hartman, the question has been, “What sort of ethics of care must I sustain with those enslaved Africans whom official archives are necessarily unable to represent?” For Morrison, it is to hold space for the interiority of enslaved black people, to combat a politics of respectability in representing ancestors, and in so doing, she asserts, her “single gravest responsibility,” despite a sort of magic that might guide events in their lives, “is not to lie” (93). In the name of this collective and personal responsibility to the dead and not-so-dead, Morrison’s “literary archeology,” Spillers’s “semiotics of the flesh,” and Hartman’s “critical fabulations” are methods that seek to tell “truth” as opposed to “fact,” or that which undergirds modern science and history’s positivism. I recognize a similar ethical, affective response to the archive (people’s prior lives/practices/cosmologies) in Native Studies.

    Saidiya Hartman’s work is not generally considered to be in conversation with Indigenous Studies and studies of colonialism more broadly. Yet in Lose Your Mother, Hartman’s reflection on her research trip to Salaga and Gwolu, Ghana—places where people fleeing slave raiders and traders attempted to build and defend communities made from new kin—has many parallels with stories Native scholars and elders have told in what is currently called the United States. One of the greatest contributions of Lose Your Mother is the way it calls on Black Americans to consider a fuller picture of the transatlantic slave trade and its place within a larger colonial context shaping West Africa well into the present. Hartman has us consider the experiences of dispossession within Africa. It is a sort of dispossession that encompasses displacement from homelands, from kinship structures, and from one’s own self-determination. She writes of one now disappeared village of fugitives from raiders where

    Newcomers were welcome. It didn’t matter that they weren’t kin or that they spoke a different language, because genealogy didn’t matter (most of them couldn’t go back more than three or four generations, anyway), building a community did. If the willingness to receive new arrivals and foreigners was what it took to make a world different from the one they had left, then so be it. So they put down their roots in foreign soil and adopted strangers as their kin and intermarried with other migrants and runaways, and shared their gods and totems, and blended their histories. “We” was the collectivity they built from the ground up, not one they had inherited, not one that others had imposed.(225)

    Hartman relays the way these ancestors (if we are to call them so) responded to dispossession—not with a melancholic attempt at recuperation but as creative agents of dynamic culture and kin, even through the pain and threat of death.

    Tiffany Lethabo King:
    I value and hold dear so many of the texts and scholars that my colleagues have mentioned. Shona Jackson acknowledged [referring to Jackson’s oral remarks on November 8, 2019] the work of Frank Wilderson and what it made possible in her own work. I agree with Jackson that I don’t think I would have been able to do the work that I have done without Wilderson’s Red, White & Black (2010). While Wilderson and I are headed in different directions with our intellectual and political commitments (he is increasingly unconvinced that Black and Indigenous ontological positions and political commitments are compatible), in my own relentless efforts to make connections with Indigenous communities, Wilderson’s exploration of the ontological positions of the settler, slave, and savage is essential for my intellectual development. Wilderson creates a relational framework from which to think about how the ontological positionings of the settler, slave, and savage are produced in relation to violence and the figure of the White human. While Wilderson gives up on the project called the human and finds no contemporaries for Black people whose existence is overdetermined by slavery and death, Wynter, whose work I also find invaluable, views the praxis of being human an unfinished and revisable project that exists on the horizon. Like Wilderson, Wynter argues that overrepresentations of Man (versions 1 and 2) are formed and shaped through producing Blackness and Indigeneity as external to Man and making Black and Indigenous people “Human Others” (Wynter, “Unsettling” 283). Wynter’s schematic overview of the history of Western Humanism allowed me to think about Black and Indigenous existence simultaneously because she positions Indios/Natives and Negroes/Niggers at the bottom of the hierarchy of being even as Man becomes more expansive (Man1 evolves into Man2) over time. Finally, I would be remiss to fail to mention the Black and Indigenous women who made up the Toronto Chapter of INCITE. INCITE Toronto had such a deep impact on my spiritual and political development from 2006 to 2008. The Black and Indigenous women who were a part of this formation compelled me to confront the work of creating more ethical relations with myself, other Black folks, and Indigenous people as I navigated two settler nation-states that perpetuate genocide, conquest, colonialism and anti-blackness. In 2006 and 2007, professor M. Jacqui Alexander accompanied a few of us in some of this work, and I am so grateful for her legacy as a thinker and person led by spirit.

    Q2: What are some limitations to the aforementioned Black Studies approaches?

    CBI:
    While I find Wynter’s and Van Sertima’s work useful for thinking the connection between Blackness and Indianness, both of their theories rest on flawed and recursive European logics. Van Sertima attempts to found a Black and Native American cultural and political connection by finding a moment of contact before the European colonial context. However, in this attempt, he supplants Native American conceptual worlds with African ones, and takes the European emphasis on phenotype as given. In addition, his work has emboldened unethical “hotep” and vernacular theories that argue that (dark-skinned) Native Americans are really Africans, and that this misrecognition is part and parcel of a colonial subterfuge against Africa. This claim leaves the American Native behind.

    Wynter’s theory of the African in Jamaica as the “New Native of a New World “ has a similar outcome, and leaves Native Americans, once again, unthought. Wynter argues in her unpublished nine-hundred-page tome Black Metamorphosis that the African replaces the disappeared Tainos as the “New Natives of a New World.” The argument too smoothly supposes the colonial narrative of Native extermination and argues too strongly that Blackness is indigenous to the New World and not to Africa. In addition, works that emphasize the figure of the “Black-Indian” rely too heavily on the European hetero-patriarchal matrix of mixture and reproductive sex. Particularly, this narrative indicates that for Black people to have a connection to Native America, that connection must be biological, cultural, or genealogical, leaving politics as a source of connection far, far behind.

    My most significant difficulty with Black engagements with Native America is with the desire to be indigenous to the New World. This is compounded by the ability of Indigenous people in the Americas to name the specific cultural lineage from which they hail, however fraught, and the relative difficulty of such a task for enslaved Africans brought to the Americas. The Black diaspora in the Americas need not claim indigenousness or nativeness to the Americas—or even to Africa for that matter—to make political and long-lasting connections with the Indigenous peoples of Africa or the Americas. Nor do they need to center the heterosexual and reproductively framed figure of the Black-Indian to make this connection. The only ground necessary for Black and Native connection is an unwavering and stern anti-colonial, anti-white, and anti-European politics.

    SH:
    One of the challenges we face in Black Studies in the US is that, institutionally and imaginatively, we are often too North American or even US-centric in our approach to studying black life. Returning to Lose Your Mother, this is exactly what confronts Saidiya Hartman. Her colleagues challenge her with this as she centers her own pain on the past. The South African scholar charges, “You think that the story of those in the Americas is the most important” (218). We must be careful in our approaches to Black Studies such that the transatlantic and “Black Atlantic” don’t become metanarratives that prevent us from engaging black life globally.

    In Lose Your Mother, one woman at the market by the Elmina dungeon, the last place where many captive Africans were held before being shipped off to the so-called New World, offers us a reading of Hartman’s venture, but it could easily be directed at a certain sort of navel-gazing scholarship in the United States: “[Black] Americans come here to cry but they don’t leave their money behind” (Hartman 56). These comments call out the geopolitical position of middle-class Black Americans vis-à-vis global capital in a present where, as some have argued, memories themselves are commodities. The livelihood of Ghanaians through slavery tourism and the preservation of artifacts of the transatlantic slave trade depend on the erasure of their own dispossession.

    At Troubling the Grounds, a conference at UC Irvine in 2019, SA Smythe and I asked attendees to consider the intersections of blackness and nativeness in a global context in order to think through colonial, imperial, and capitalist forces that have interacted with and shaped what blackness and nativeness have come to mean. What was clear is that we—those of us studying Black life in the US, in Europe, in the Pacific, in Africana Studies—are not used to talking to each other. We aren’t necessarily reading each other’s work and so when we want to engage each other we aren’t really prepared. If in the US and Canada we so often speak of Black and Indigenous experiences as mutually exclusive (barring some exceptions), scholars from the Pacific or from South Africa confront these issues as necessarily intertwined. Indigeneity is often but a specter in much of US Black Studies, and likewise we might find that diaspora haunts Native Studies on this hemisphere.

    TLK:
    I tend to find that much of the literature and critical theory in Black diasporan studies that addresses the Middle Passage and the enslavement of Black people lacks a robust grammar for talking about land. I think it is very difficult for descendants of the Middle Passage to have a discussion about land with Indigenous people in the Americas, Africa, and across the globe. Notions of land as a relation/relative, cosmology, sensation, language system, or aesthetic are not as discursively available within much of the theory, literature, and aesthetic practices of Black Studies. To be clear, I do not consider this particular privation a deficiency or failure on the part of Black diasporan people. Land often emerges as something that Black people who survived the Middle Passage are estranged from. They are brutalized by it, and long after, they have to come to terms with it and are forced to relate to it through colonial and nationalist notions of property. The violent rupture of the Middle Passage separated Black diasporan people who would “land in” the Americas from a relationship to other-than-human life forms like “land.”

    I’m so grateful that Sandra Harvey mentioned Saidiya Hartman’s work in Lose Your Mother. In Lose Your Mother, Hartman details the trek from the Northern interior of Ghana through the savannah to the coast. What became clear for me while reading this portion of the book was that the slave route also became a place where African kinship and indigeneity were stripped from the captive. In the chapter “Lose Your Mother,” Hartman describes the way kinship was meticulously stripped from people. Hartman’s evocative retelling of the ways that captors used the land against the captive to produce a “landscape of forgetting” is heart-wrenching (156). Hartman reveals throughout the chapter a longing that is refused writing: “But as I traveled along the slave route, I soon found out about all the elaborate methods that had been employed to make slaves forget their country. In every slave society, slave owners attempted to eradicate the slave’s memory, that is, to erase all the evidence of an existence before slavery. This was true in Africa as in the Americas” (155). Later, Hartman pens, “in Ouidah, a town that had been a significant port on the Slave Coast, a university student told me that slaves were marched through a grove that induced forgetting, or that they encircled a tree of forgetfulness. Women had to circle the tree seven times, and men had to circle it nine times in order to forget their origins and accept their slave status” (156). What Hartman details for the reader is the deployment of land as a weapon against the captive. Continuing to detail the process of forgetting Hartman writes, “Every part of West Africa that trafficked in slaves possessed its own Lethe, rivers and streams whose water made the slaves forget their pasts, dense groves that trapped old memories in the web of leaves, rocks that obstructed entrance to the past, amulets that deafened a man to his mother tongue, and shrines that pared and pruned time so that only today was left” (156). Even sacred parts of the earth, like the leguminous undershrub manta uwa, “which means ‘forget mother’ in Hausa,” were given to the captives to ingest (156). Manta uwa “expunged all memories of a natal land, and it robbed the slave of spiritual protection” (156). Mother Earth itself was used against the captives to make them forget their emergence from it.

    As processes of dispossession and alienation continue in the Americas, so do rituals and processes of resistance and recuperation. I am thankful for my colleague Xhercis Mendez’s question during the roundtable, which posed the possibility—or rather asserted the probability—that Afrodiasporic spiritual practices like Santeria elaborate embodied practices (dances and rituals for Yemeya), and ceremonial song and prayer produce vernaculars of terra and ocean and that are not always legible in academic Black Studies. Diasporan Black people must continue to recuperate and refashion relations, tongues, and embodied grammars for land.

    Q3: How has settler colonialism, as a theoretical framework, shaped discussions between Black Studies and Native/Indigenous Studies? What are the possibilities and limitations of this point of departure?

    CBI:
    I am very, very grateful for the work of Tiffany King because my engagement with settler colonial studies is significantly influenced by her work. I had already read Wolfe’s staple work and that of others in graduate school when I encountered King’s stellar dissertation, In the Clearing. This work presented the white Australian genealogy of the field. More importantly, it challenged the primacy of settler colonial studies over Native Studies (particularly Native feminism) and the idea that settler colonial studies is a mediating force between Black and Native theories and peoples. I am indebted to King because her work taught me how to read settler colonial studies as a white formulation that downplays both Native American and African experiences of conquest and slavery by replacing them with the concept of settlement. She rerouted me away from settler colonial studies squarely into the wide world of Indigenous feminisms. This correction has been foundational to my current work.

    SH:
    Settler colonialism has provided a framework for centering both the structure and temporality of a certain sort of white colonial project. It confronts various resistance discourses—leftist, multiculturalist, and even homonationalist—to take seriously the present and ongoing colonial context in which we work. A critique of settler colonialism confronts the myth that the colonialism of what is currently called the United States has already been settled. This particular colonial project reorganizes our understanding of time and space such that the violence of the initial encounter becomes understood as prologue to the linear timeline of the nation-state. Moreover, we can understand the figure of the settler as another dimension of the figure of the slave owner and vice versa. Black Studies scholars have theorized the project of mastery as one that seeks to stabilize a white subject’s consumption and enjoyment of Black people—and in particular our bodies. Likewise, the figure of the settler allows us to understand the project of mastery in spatial terms, and thus how bodies and land become reorganized. Both Tiffany King and Shona Jackson relate how white settler-slave owners use black bodies within the plantation economy to clear and settle the homelands of peoples indigenous to Turtle Island and Abya Yala. Likewise, Native feminist scholar Audra Simpson explains that “An Indian woman’s body in settler regimes such as the US and Canada is loaded with meaning—signifying other political orders, land itself, the dangerous possibility of reproducing Indian life, and most dangerously, other political orders.… Indian women … transmit the clan, and with that: family, responsibility, and relatedness to territory” (15). There is a libidinal economy to the settler’s project through which the possession of Black and Native women secures sovereignty, or what we most often refer to in Black Studies as mastery.

    Nevertheless, I think we have come up against major limitations with regard to the structural understanding emerging from settler colonial studies. That is, the triad structure comes up short in theorizing Black peoples’ experiences and positionalities in a nuanced manner—especially the way the afterlife of slavery, and anti-blackness in general, give shape to black subjectivity within the settler-slave owning project. It maps colonial racial categories onto various orientations such that, at least on Turtle Island, black must always signify “arrivant,” or in other renditions, “guest.” This category represents captive Africans as either existing in parallel to colonialism or as the bodies that enable colonialism, but never as colonized subjects themselves. The category also runs the risk of containing the descendants of enslaved Africans in an alienated relationship to place and homeland, perpetually tethered to a prior moment of arrival. What is the future that the category “arrivant” makes possible outside of the presumption of “departure”? I think new scholarship at this intersection would do well to explore what is enabled and foreclosed within this structural analysis for Black and Indigenous life. Can we tend to the ways we (in our multiple, varied, and changing forms) have developed or received relationships to land and kin, even in alienation?

    TLK:
    Settler colonial studies has given us a great deal to work with. The discourse, and now field, has grappled in good faith with the ongoing violence of settlement and the colonization of Native/Indigenous peoples and land. I think that the field does some things really, really well, particularly as it concerns forcing nationalist narratives, continental theory, and post-colonial theory to grapple with settler colonial relations. However, remembering my own struggles as a graduate student to square settler colonial relations with Black life, I maintain that white settler colonial studies is limited and to a large extent inhibits or frustrates attempts to bring black presence into view in the Americas. This failure is due in part to some of its conceptual and constituent elements. For example, the ontological premise or dialectic that grounds the antagonism of settler colonial relations is predicated on a settler/native dyad. This binary makes it difficult (damn near impossible) to incorporate enslaved and fungible chattel. Even the rubric of labor used to think about forced and coerced labor fails to fully register the position of Black enslaved people. Adding Black enslaved people into the native/settler dyad after the fact is a cosmetic change that does not address the limits of settler colonialism’s ontological universe, or account for the way that, in Hartman and Wilderson’s terms, Blackness remains a space of the “unthought.” Additionally, settler colonial studies cannot or will not address the ways in which the academy authorizes its displacement of Native scholars and of Native/Indigenous Studies. I tend to make a distinction between white settler colonial studies and Native feminist theorizations of settler colonialism, for example the Native feminist theory of Huanani-Kay Trask, which was introduced before white settler colonial studies gained so much prominence.

    Q4: What may be opened up in Black Studies when we focus attention on the notion and histories of indigeneity as much as we do on or in conjunction with the theme of diaspora?

    CBI:
    While I am sometimes frustrated by the etiological debate between Black and Native Studies about which came first—New World conquest or African enslavement—I appreciate that this debate has produced a greater interest in the long history of antiblackness on the African continent itself and in Africa’s encounter with Europe and the Middle East.

    As we excavate and uncover the history of racism, slavery, and conquest, we come to realize that these concepts are germane to European ideals and forms generally; we learn that they are not unique to the moments following African and New World “discovery” but to the full history of what is called Europe. When Black Studies focuses on indigeneity, we grasp that Black Studies and Native Studies have left African Studies to white anthropologists, and that all these fields in general, Black Studies included, are dominated, if not by white theorists and anthropologists, then by colonial frames, languages, conceptions, and intimacies. The process of reclaiming these fields—along with Early Modern Studies, Medieval Studies, and the Classics—from their white gatekeepers illuminates the long, long history of Greek, Roman, Medieval Western European, and Arabic-Muslim contact with and enslavement of dark-skinned sub-Saharan Africans (Hamel 75). This long and understudied history demonstrates that Black Africa has always been discussed from the outside.

    In his important study Black Morocco: A History of Slavery, Race, and Islam, Chouki El Hamel dexterously explains that, in part, the civilization clash between Christian Europe and the Muslim Middle East facilitated the trade and transfer of concepts of dominance and power between these powers. Although conceptions of antiblackness existed in the European Middle Ages and earlier, the combination of local European and Arabic-Muslim antiblackness helps to create the European global form of African chattel slavery. (It is important to add that the exportation of these local European and Arabic-Muslim conceptions of Blackness to the Native inhabited territories of the Americas creates both Blackness and Indianness as truly global forms.) In the moment of the Moorish occupation of Iberia, Europe takes up particular conceptions of Black slavery developed by Muslim legal scholars in the first and second caliphates (El Hamel 76–77: Spillers 69–70). These Muslim scholars incorporate earlier Bedouin practices of holding dark-skinned Africans as slaves and install these practices into Muslim law despite the absence of any justification of slavery in the text of the Quran itself (El Hamel 18–19). If we focus on moments of contact and conflict between these two theological formulas of conquest around the Mediterranean Sea and on their pre-history, we see that along with certain aspects of Black slavery, the Muslim world transfers the concept of sovereignty and the numeral zero—all of which, to me, are related to indigenous Africanness and Blackness as the nothingness, the zero point, against which theology structures itself.

    In Gomes Eanes De Zurara’s 1441 text The Chronicle of the Discovery and Conquest of Guinea, the historian augments Portuguese Christian conceptions along with Arabic ethnic distinctions from an Arabic nobleman named Adahu who is captured as a slave (48). In order to save and ransom himself, the nobleman offers ten Black Moors in exchange for his own person and two other boys. He informs the Portuguese lords that Black Africans, though Muslim, are converts and “were not of the lineage of the Moors (Mohammedans proper)” (55). They were not People of the Book; they “were Gentiles,” ergo slavable, “the better to bring into the path of salvation” (55). In addition to Adahu’s distinctions, De Zurara presents and combines the Curse of Cain and the Hamitic myth (55). He also cites the work of Jewish historians and other texts such as “the Archbishop Don Roderic of Toledo, and Josephus in his book of Antiquities of the Jews and Walter with other authors” (55). In the progression of the text, De Zurara’s ethnic, racial and theological terms of distinction become more precise, indicating that he learns the European term “Moor” at best describes the Muslim world as an empire but does not account for the conquered peoples of differing ethnic, religious, and racial origins that fall under the rule of Islam. He then begins to use the term “Black Moor” and “blackamoor” (105) to distinguish between captured Arab and Black Muslim slaves.

    When we focus on the history of the circum-Mediterranean we get a broader and earlier context for the relationship between Blackness, sovereignty, and the number zero. This is not to suggest that Europeans simply learn Black slavery from the Arab-Muslim world—especially considering earlier Classical and Roman conceptions of Ethiopian Blackness and dark-skinned Africans as aesthetically unpleasing (Snowden 7–8) and Jewish conceptions of the Curse of Cain and the Hamitic Myth (El Hamel 60)—but to suggest that the Mediterranean world traded in conceptions about sub-Saharan Africa and dark-skinned Africans as slavable long before the advent of the “Age of Discovery.” Rather than suggest that either Europeans or Arab-Muslims created Black slavery in isolation, I contend that their collective descriptions and ideas about sub-Saharan dark-skinned Africanness are key to Blackness as we come to know it today, as an ontological and external description grafted onto the history of Africans and their descendants.

    Most importantly, we learn that it is circulation of ideas about Africa between the European and Arabic-Muslim worlds, and then from Europe to the Americas, that transforms Blackness and Black slavery from its localized Mediterranean form into a global one—which is to say, into its ontological form. Put another way, the encounter between indigenous Africans and indigenous Americans allows for the creation of a global form of antiblackness and Native American genocide. Through their encounter and comparison, they are fashioned as global racial types, both with and against each other.

    SH:
    Native and Indigenous Studies has prompted me to think more thoroughly about the relationship of black people(s) to land and about our own meditative traditions. Here I want to thank Tiffany King for the beautiful recollection of this relationship as it emerges in Hartman’s Lose Your Mother. I want to come back to the “accessibility” of land, of thinking land. I think it is right to say that the question of the relation of black life to land in settler colonialism discourse is not a deficiency within Black Studies. Nevertheless, I do gather that a sustained reorientation towards our relations with land offers us a better understanding of our presence beyond positivist or transparent geography, as McKittrick calls it, and territory as it relates to the state. Land comes up in the stories we tell ourselves. Here I’m thinking about that Clearing where Baby Suggs gathered black folks for revival in Beloved. Morrison describes it as “a wide-open place cut deep in the woods nobody knew for what at the end of a path known only to deer and whoever cleared the land in the first place” (87). The use of the word “cleared” as a past-tense verb brings attention to the violence involved in the act of clearing the land. Yet, Suggs’s move from church buildings to the land becomes an invitation to return black people to their own bodies. Suggs tells the people gathered amongst the trees, “Here . . . in this here place, we flesh; flesh that weeps, laughs; flesh that dances on bare feet in the grass. Love it. Love it hard” (88). I imagine here in the Clearing, amongst the violence of its making, black people are able to relate to land in excess of what settler structures might allow, and in so doing, for at least a moment, find respite from the logic of fungibility.

    Kelly Limes-Taylor enters the post-ASA roundtable discussion via email to extend the conversation. Chad also re-enters the conversation to conclude our engagement.

    Q5: What can theories of sovereignty that have emerged in Black Studies contribute to a mutual conversation/movement for decolonization and abolition?

    Kelly Limes-Taylor:
    First, I want to say I am pleased to have my thoughts on these questions combined with the thoughts of such an amazing group of people. Some time ago, my work as an educational theorist and philosopher moved me from thinking about our world in terms of concrete, definable disciplines, identities, and experiences and into thinking about our world primarily in terms of the stories we tell ourselves for a time—and the stories that we don’t know (yet) and/or that were hidden/taken from us. When thinking about sovereignty, I tend to hover around the work of Sylvia Wynter because of her emphasis on the importance of language in shaping experience. As I note in a recent Curriculum Inquiry article, Wynter (1976, 2000) discusses the Word, a concept that includes not only the denotations of language but the “abstract thought and story systems” with which humans subordinates themselves; humanity, I argue, needs

    to again create a system of abstraction that represents the human being in a whole new way, something completely different from colonial constructions of humanity, and, thus, non-humanity, of which Blackness is the marker in this Western colonial era (as cited in Gagne, 2007, p. 259). In short, the representation would bear no relation to the Western definition of human and humanity that requires Indigenous genocide and Black enslavement/fungibility, two of the three elements Smith (2010) asserts are the foundations of US settler colonialism. (16–17)

    Per my reading of Wynter, we decide, in a shared conversation, what our world is or is not, what it is going to be. We define it, as such defining is the very work of being human. I believe that Wynter’s discussion of our ability to decide and define, and then act on those decisions and definitions—indeed, our ability to be truly human—represents the meaning of sovereignty.

    Shared conversations about decolonization and abolition likely require that we first establish which stories about ourselves, each other, and the world around us are true for us, and true for the world we want to see. Next, we identify the false stories about ourselves and each other that have been forced upon us and under which we still labor. Finally, we start doing our work and living our lives as if the true stories we’ve identified for ourselves are, indeed, true—defending/protecting ourselves against those who want to force false stories upon us, but otherwise not paying them much mind. It feels almost laughable to discuss everything-changing concepts like sovereignty, decolonization, and abolition in terms of a simple, three-part plan, but this is the only thing that has made sense to me thus far. And I’m clear about the difference between simple and easy here; while this is a simple plan, it’s not an easy one.

    TLK:
    I have not spent time tracking and thinking with the key term sovereignty in Black Studies, per se. However, I think that bodily autonomy and the right to self-defense are concepts that are taken seriously within Black social and political thought, spanning the ideologies of Black liberalism and the Black radical tradition. Black people take their lives and those of their loved ones seriously. Black life is sacred and this is the bedrock of Black liberation movements. Critical Black Studies, emerging from abolitionist traditions, troubles the idea of Black sovereignty, or autonomy, and even, in some cases, of a Black body to defend. I see this in the work of Jared Sexton and Frank Wilderson. They question the existence of sovereignty for a Blackness without personhood. In her recent book Becoming Human: Matter and Meaning in an Anti-Black World, Zakiyyah Jackson argues that the notion of sovereignty as absolute freedom is a dangerous idea that stands in opposition to relationality (146). I think that this kind of critique of the liberal human, sovereignty, and the attendant notion of an autonomous and unfettered self is productive and can be a space of resonance with some Indigenous critical theory. For instance, Indigenous feminist notions of native sovereignty in Maile Arvin, Angie Morrill, and Eve Tuck’s article “Decolonizing Feminism,” premised on relationality across species, align with the kinds of critical relationality that Zakiyyah Jackson gestures toward in her work.

    SH:
    What I find so generative in Black Studies—at least various genealogies within what we’ll call Black Studies—is its push to bring freedom into conversation with those calling for sovereignty. This presents a true dilemma for the idea of sovereignty. That is, what has emerged as “sovereignty” in Western traditions is shored up specifically through its juxtaposition with blackness, with Nativeness, and with queerness. Black Studies scholars have thought through the idea of sovereignty or mastery at the level of the subject and against the figure of the “slave,” and thus asked us to think through the meaning of self-determination or autonomy if we accept that the boundaries of the self are constantly in question. I’d say this is also true for nations or peoples.

    Tiffany’s descriptions of black porosity and of the Sycorax wire sculpture in The Black Shoals are perfect examples of this idea of autonomy. In the vulnerability, the gaps between boundaries, intimacy is possible and new ways of being emerge. Tiffany describes the wire sculpture as a co-presence: “The intertwined bends, curls, and unfurlings of the wire memorialize the Black and Native female in the Americas . . . Sycorax is a relational entity . . . In the wire sculpture, Lurch renders Indigeneity and Blackness indistinguishable as they are both represented by the color black or the dark feminine. The copper wire and black wires meld into one another like skin” (186). Tiffany, through Jackson and Arvin, Morrill, and Tuck, describes the sculpture as an instance of critical relationality, where the “self” of self-determination is both questioned (in its ability/desire to achieve full autonomy) and affirmed (in its movement vulnerable to the other that is in the self and without which the self could not be).

    These conversations have me thinking through various acts or actions via sovereignty rather than via bodies. Teaching about the master slave dialectic in our graduate courses, David Marriott would remind us, “There are plenty of slavish masters and masterful slaves.” In part, I take this as a push to think through orientations and/or acts as sovereign. In one sense, orientation or acting is the sort of sovereignty that does not depend on recognition from or against an Other. But it is also about the law-making actions that produce ruptures in the colonial and slave owning symbolic order. I understand Fanon’s reflections on violence in this vein, but I also consider that the way “speaking” (as Kelly has pointed out) and ceremonies, as Tiffany puts it in The Black Shoals, “carry potential for transformation” (199). Rather than foundational, institutional, or grounded sovereignty (nothing that Jared Sexton critiques a certain understanding of sovereignty with land as its basis), this notion of sovereignty is fleeting, emergent, and relational. It is found in Standing Rock, Alcatraz, the Dakota road blocks, and in the defiance of the uprising for Black lives.

    Q6: How have Black Studies’ conceptualizations and critiques of the “nation” and the “state” been in conversation with Native/Indigenous theorists?

    KLT:
    I’m particularly drawn to the concept of nationhood here, because it reminds me of when I first connected Daniel Heath Justice and Saidiya Hartman’s discussions of kinship. I was researching for my dissertation when I first came across Justice’s work. He relates kinship to nationhood in a way that was paradigm-shifting for me, as I’d only been acquainted with colonial notions of kin and nation. Justice defines kinship as the “recognition of some sort of relationship between and among peoples,” and asserts that, in the Indigenous context, nationhood is an understanding of a common social interdependence with the community, the tribal web of kinship rights, and responsibilities that link the People, the land, and the cosmos together in an ongoing and dynamic system of mutually affecting relationships (151).

    From this position, I learned that interdependence, relationship, responsibility, and mutuality define nation, not the dictates of people who couldn’t care less about whether you, your human kin, or the environment around you thrives or dies. Justice further extends the concept of kinship to connection with the living world around us, “from the plants and animals to the sun, moon, thunder, and other elemental forces” (151), and asserts that kinship is something we do (148). I want to also include Shawn Wilson here, who notes that “we are the relationships that we hold and are part of” (80). Both these thinkers helped me redefine what I understood as the concept of nation—namely that nation encompasses our understanding of the relationships we have with the living beings and environment around us.

    When I was brought to Hartman’s Lose Your Mother, I could see the overlap between Black and Indigenous conceptualizations of kinship and, thus, nationhood. More specifically, I was able to see more clearly the ways that Black folks in these lands—most of us descended from Indigenous peoples whose relationships with their environments were violently, devastatingly, and almost-permanently stripped from them—consistently worked to protect and maintain notions of kinship, beginning with their first abrupt removal (and with each subsequent removal). Indigenous peoples in these lands were fighting to maintain their kinship networks at the same time my people were. I believe we both have been struggling to get our nationhoods back to us—in our own ways, as best as we have been able to do over these centuries. This consideration of Black Diasporic restorative practice as response to the intentional and historical separation from indigenous roots can foster solidarity between Diasporic Black and Indigenous decolonization initiatives and movements, as the two histories account for two sides of the proverbial Western colonialist coin.

    Black American life in the US is, among other things, very much the result of Indigenous peoples’ being taken from their land; Indigenous American life in the US is, among other things, very much the result of Indigenous peoples’ land being taken from them. We’ve had our nationhoods taken from us and were then told that those doing the taking represented the real, true nation. But that simply isn’t true. Real nation is responsibility and connection, not dominance and exclusion.

    CBI:
    I think that the best work of Black and Native artists, academics, and activists offers a criticism of the nation-state even when the state is not named as the explicit target of critique. Even those works and actors that might seem to placate the state are attempting to balance the short- and long-term political needs of their communities. This is a difficult balance to strike, and in the face of violence, Black and Native people have often chosen political strategies based on pragmatism and life, and rightly so. The immediate political needs of a community in response to hunger and shelter are weighed and balanced over and against the long-term political goals that might be required for structural transformation. Many Black and Native actors try to balance these needs and goals in a world where they recognize that they have to engage the state to access certain resources in order to live, all the while offering strident critique and imagining new forms of community care. Despite the need for this engagement, both Black and Native theorists and writers continue to question the legitimacy of the nation-state.

    TLK:
    I will speak to the resonances between fields in my response. Like Kelly Limes-Taylor, I am struck by Daniel Heath Justice’s notion of peoplehood, which distinguishes tribal-based understandings of nation from colonial and state-based understandings of the nation. This revision rebukes the Cherokee nation model that requires Black enslavement and antiblackness as a condition of recognition. For Justice, Cherokee peoplehood is a “relational system that keeps the people in balance with one another, with other people and realities, and with the world” (Our 24). This invocation of peoplehood resonates with a notion of Blackhood articulated by Toni Cade Bambara in “On the Issue of Roles” in 1970. Bambara similarly tries to construct Blackness outside of the colonial constraints and violent strictures of gender. Bambara argues that “perhaps we need to let go of all notions of manhood and femininity and concentrate on Blackhood” (Black Woman 126). She calls for fashioning an identity and a self outside of the categories of manhood and womanhood, “perhaps an androgynous self via commitment to the struggle” (126). This revisioning and refashioning of categories forms the connective tissue that brings Black and Indigenous thought and worldmaking together beyond nation, gender, and the human.

    Q7: How do Black Studies and Native Studies attend to each other with care? For example, how do we honor Black and Indigenous people particularly when focusing on violence and Black and Indigenous people’s bodies?

    KLT:
    Unfortunately, those of us involved with the academy often find our writing and thinking bound by academia’s farcical mores of objectivity and emotional distance—even when we’re dealing with topics that negatively affect our everyday lives. This is doubly true when our research is focused on the experiences of marginalized groups; triply true when we researchers also identify as members of those groups. I think that we—marginalized researchers researching marginalized peoples/experiences—often feel obligated to play into this act of distancing so that we can sound reasonable and sober enough to have our work accepted by a White supremacist institution that isn’t really checking for us in the first place, since the academy’s first priority—as with all institutions in this White supremacist conceptualization of a nation—is to uphold the supremacy.

    I begin my answer to this question in this way because, though I’m offered the idea of violence and bodies to use as example here, I believe that the question itself is indicative of the foundational White supremacist violence that Black and Native studies often highlight, particularly in the US context. How do we attend to each other with care? We ask ourselves this question as if truly caring for each other (and, really, for ourselves) within a super violent national context is mysterious or complex, as if we haven’t been doing it all along.

    So, I respond with my own questions: how are we caring for our friends, our comrades (for those that choose that term), right now, in real time? How do we care for our family every day? How do we care for cousins we have not seen in a long time or for those who have long joined us in struggle, often just as nameless or unseen as we? The answers to these questions, I believe, also address how those of us in Black and Native studies can attend to each other with care. I also want to note that, in order to take this out of the realm of abstraction, I read the initial prompt as How do Black and Native people attend to each other with care? within the US context, as hypothesizing about doing something in academia isn’t worth much if we’re not talking about how we just do it in our everyday lives.

    I believe that we must be clear about the context in which we are trying to survive as people. Those of us in the US exist in a nation- and society-making context that is violence: forcing millions of people into ways of life other than those of their choosing for hundreds of years may be a lot of things, but it will always be violent. That means that the institutions emerging from this context will always be violent as well, each in its particular way; the violence, after all, must be multi-faceted and all-encompassing in order to continue. Supremacist academic violence has historically shown up in the forms of objectivity and distance, subsequently allowing for other violences (and justifications for supremacist violence outside the academy) to occur. I’m thinking of Linda Tuhiwai Smith’s groundbreaking discussion in Decolonizing Methodologies in particular here.

    Indigenous and Black folks who find ourselves in the academy may also feel like we have to play into that historically violent objectivity and distance. So, for the most part, we don’t get to be angry in the classroom (for fear of negative student evaluations) or rail as we write up our research (because the infamous reviewer #2 won’t go for that). The pride or passion we feel has to be subdued, contained. We quietly hold the extent of our love for our people behind office doors, or carefully launch it in direct messages to safe colleagues, or keep it safely tucked away during meetings with fellow faculty members who just don’t (or won’t) get it.

    In my opinion, we need to stop that shit. The Western academy isn’t anything holy; in fact, it’s the opposite of that. It is the knowledge-creating and -perpetuating institution established by people who, if alive today, wouldn’t even agree we are human like them. Objectivity and distance don’t serve us and don’t serve anyone. Neither do separations between the disciplines. The violences that Indigenous and Black folks face in the US aren’t separate from each other, but are part of the White supremacist social and economic campaign that began on these lands hundreds of years ago–a campaign that has never stopped. Showing care and honor, then, means that we never stop acknowledging the violence, and that we are loud and unapologetic about caring for ourselves and each other.

    We care for each other just like we normally show care for those we love, both near and far: openly, without shame or pretense of objectivity. We care for each other just like we normally show care for those we don’t know who are experiencing the same things we are: by learning more about their experiences and amplifying them, by reaching out and asking how we can be accomplices. We care for each other in ways that defy the barbarity of White supremacy: by acknowledging, holding, and healing our own pain while making space for the pain of others—including the pain we experience from hurting each other, due primarily to the mind-boggling violence perpetuated upon both of us on these lands.

    We mourn for ourselves and each other. We get loud for and about ourselves and each other. We fight for ourselves and each other. Without apology, without wavering.

    CBI:
    It is important that we read each other’s work and histories and that we show up for each other. Because the relationship between these two disciplines and communities is mediated by a third party, Black and Native people should speak to each other in order to have a more honest account of the relation between the two communities. It also is essential that we read, cite, and defend the work of Black and Native women who are often on the frontlines of activist, academic, and artistic work. From #Sayhername to #MMIW, Black and Native women provide the most important examples of how we can honor people and communities facing violence. Accordingly, I think that it is vital that we return to their work and example again and again and again. More than this, I think we should make a habit of pairing and reading Black and Native women’s work together.

    TLK:
    To some extent I attempted to speak to this issue of care in my 2019 introductory remarks for the ASA panel, which also open this essay’s roundtable discussion. I think that building relationships with each other both outside and inside the academy is essential. Building spaces of connection, healing, and dialogue that are not oriented toward producing a product/commodity can change the terms of our engagements with each other as Black and Indigenous people in the academy. We cease to be objects of study for one another. As I reflect on the rather late entry of the fields of Black Studies and Indigenous Studies in the academy in the late 1960s, I think that this belatedness and marginalization in the university could be a kind of gift. For example, being in a marginalized field means that we have not had the time nor have we developed a desire for the pay-off of developing epistemologies and approaches that objectify and pornotrope one another. While I’m not saying that this does not happen and cannot happen, our fields have not emerged from the violent epistemological formations of colonial projects. We have an advantage in this sense. Many of us come from communities that refuse to make some of our intimate, ceremonial, healing, and erotic work material for knowledge production. We come from communities with good boundaries who practice refusal (Simpson). Our ethics and our political commitments of care (Sharpe) can shape our fields in critically important ways.

    SH:
    I’m grateful already for the attention to care that I’ve received by so many Black and Native scholars and the care with which my colleagues and comrades have carried out this roundtable. Like Kelly, I have serious doubts about the sorts of care possible within our institutions. We are precarious workers (some more than others). Our departments are always the first to be cut. Our students often receive the least amount of institutional support and respect. I have been rereading Fred Moten and Stefano Harney’s Undercommons with my students, and we are constantly taken by the charge that “the only possible relationship to the university today is a criminal one” (26). I say this as multiple institutions are being pushed to account for their accumulation of wealth through slave trafficking. Most universities have not begun to reckon with the truth that their existence is made possible through land grants, which in turn were made possible only by dispossessing Indigenous peoples of their homelands. In the past, Indigenous peoples resisted colonial civilizing missions by burning down boarding schools that sought to separate children from families and peoples from their languages and cultures. We (Black, Indigenous, and other “Third World” students) have also made demands on the university for autonomy in creating departments and research programs that center our work and study. Black and Native scholarship share a tradition that recognizes the many ways we produce knowledge, which can include university settings, but also oral histories, music, dance, practices of care, ceremony, uprisings, and art. These are the stakes of our continued and collective care. That we tend to each other, Black, Indigenous, and Black and Indigenous peoples, that we tend to each other’s relations and each other’s homelands as if our very existence depends on it, because as we know, it has and it does. This includes learning from each other, mourning and celebrating with each other, convening and, when necessary, holding each other accountable and making amends.

    Q8: How do we move forward/keep momentum?

    CBI:
    We must constantly remind ourselves that precisely because the relationship between these two communities is mediated by whiteness and colonial concepts, moments of Black and Native American contact occur in a minor register. They reflect small moments that flit in the corner of the eye, only to disappear when you try to focus on them. These small, mutable, and fragile moments demand not that we walk on eggshells, but that we craft carefully, deliberately, and ethically. Black and Native people must wholeheartedly engage each other and this ethic in their art, music, and literature. And they must do this all while holding at bay those best intentioned “white allies”—if there are indeed such persons—until after Black and Native people have had enough time to commune with each other. Then and only then, if at all, might “white allies” be invited to participate in the conversation.

    KLT:
    Given the current social and political climate in the US, I think that the primary way we can move forward is to continue (or to begin, for some of us) to imagine what our society looks like beyond the mayhem we are seeing around us without getting distracted or dismayed by it. If we believe that we are watching the death throes of White supremacy (whether the beginning or the end throes—I, of course, have no idea about that), I think we can better orient ourselves to the work that is ahead of us, especially when it comes to imagining and thus creating a future in which those of us who have previously been so disastrously oppressed can love and center ourselves while making space safe for others to do the same. The current times may feel particularly heavy for Native and Black folks, especially when the backlash to taking the slightest step forward seems to resound so loudly. We can feel heartened when we remember that under White supremacy, we have never not experienced genocidal extraction, and that our continued existence evinces that we are stronger than it and can and will survive beyond it. As we come to understand that we have a shared struggle, as we continue to link and recognize each other’s struggles, and as we gain more and more confidence in the ways of knowing and being that have carried us through to this time, I believe that we can carry ourselves into a beautiful future. It is hard and can feel so defeating, but I believe we will win.

    TLK:
    Since 2016, the increased visibility of Black and Indigenous liberation movements in the US has created an opportunity to frame social justice issues necessarily as matters of Black abolition and Indigenous decolonization. Additionally, as we navigate our COVID pandemic reality, we have had to innovate and create new modes of connection and communication. As our communities continue to contract the virus and die at alarming and disproportionate rates, I have seen Black and Indigenous people use digital platforms to organize and promote necessary conversations taking place between Black and Indigenous people. I’m both devastated by the losses that we have experienced and also moved and energized by the desire and efforts to talk to one another. We need to continue talking to one another on terms and grounds that we create together.

    Chad B. Infante is a post-doctoral fellow and assistant professor of African American and Native American literature in the English department at the University of Maryland, College Park. Chad earned his doctorate in English from Northwestern University in 2018. Originally from Jamaica, his research focuses on black and indigenous US and Caribbean literatures, gender, sexuality, critical theory, and political philosophy.

    Sandra Harvey is Assistant Professor of African American Studies at the University of California, Irvine.

    Kelly Limes Taylor does many things, including think, mother, teach, and write. She lives in the upper left corner of Georgia, U.S., with her family.

    Tiffany King is an Associate Professor of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at Georgia State University. She is the author of The Black Shoals: Offshore Formations of Black and Native Studies, Duke University Press, 2019.

    Footnotes

    1. Between 2015 and 2019, we considered many other people including Kendra Fields, Robert Keith Collins, Alaina Roberts, Andrew Jolivette, Arica Coleman, and Arika Easley Houser, whose contributions we are deeply indebted to but we lacked time and organization to initiate the conversations. We hope to initiate conversations with these scholars and others in the near future.

    2. This text is copied from the proposal submitted to American Studies Association in January 2019 and appears in the 2019 American Studies Association conference program.

    Works Cited

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  • Introduction: Unsettle the Struggle, Trouble the Grounds

    SA Smythe (bio)

    The interrelated quest to map the unknown—the geographic unknown, the corporeal indigenous/black unknown—sets forth what Neil Smith calls “uneven development,” albeit from a very different analytical perspective: the systematic production of differential social hierarchies, which are inscribed in space and give a coherence to disproportionate geographies. —Katherine McKittrick, Demonic Grounds

    We, to paraphrase [Kamau Braithwaite], can make here, on these broken grounds . . . something torn and new . . . , a communal future of wholeness.—Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o, “Kamau Brathwaite: The Voice of African Presence”

    As Black feminist Barbara Smith notes in Marlon Riggs’s iconic film Black Is…Black Ain’t, “There are as many kinds of Black people as there are Black people to be. There are so many variations on this theme.” And for as many kinds of Black people as there are to be, there are also many kinds of relationships to place and to belonging. The study of the African diaspora—of the practices and experiences that teem across language, histories, and other attachments—points to an origin: to Africa or “the continent.” However, to those not committed to its study, this reference is often reduced and ideologically bound to enslavement and departure. This special issue is instigated and organized around this observation, and wonders: what to the African, Black, and Afro-descendant is indigeneity? What, to the Indigenous, is Black(ness)? We know well that the stakes of considering Blackness and Indigeneity together in epistemological relation are high, and certainly not singular. Nor are they discrete, despite the efforts (be they concerted or a result of ideological neglect) to make indigeneity cartographically and thus epistemologically implausible or unthinkable in a specifically Black African context.1

    This inability to trace landed attachment to places perpetuate the notion of Afro-descended people’s nonbelonging, and the question of sovereignty and self-possession becomes ephemeralized. In this settler imaginary, who owns the land (which is already a white supremacist conceit: many Native authors have argued over generations that relation to rather than possession of land is the deeper intention of land acknowledgments or even Land Back demands) is utilized as a coercive cudgel with which to determine who is made to labor on the land and who can form and maintain knowledge over the land and place writ large as well as let themselves be known/knowable.2 Here we see the connection between racial capitalism and settler colonialism, as epistemological-material projects of genocide, super exploitation, and dispossession are always already linked. The representation of Africans as un-landed in cartographic renderings like Native Land is one of the proliferating examples of how Indigenous belonging has been removed from Blackness and Black people. This informs the tenuous relationship of Africans in the diaspora to Indigenous claims (for example, of Afro-descended peoples in places like the colonial United States where Africans were considered enslaved people and not people with Indigenous identity and the policing of those lines continues to impact our present day perceptions of incommensurability).3 Continuing down the path of unsedimenting the relationship between Blackness and landedness and the delimiting relationship of Indigenous peoples to their lands as the only measure through which to understand and afford or experience sovereignty is to trouble the grounds—to disturb the tasks, the conditions, and the terrain—of understanding and knowledge production on which Blackness and Indigeneity can be thought in multiscale and dynamic relation.

    Situated as the contemporary vanguard of this settler structure of knowledge production, obstruction, and maintenance is the academic industrial complex in the United States in particular, which is founded on genocide, anti-Black racism, and other ongoing modes of dispossession. We see these formations in the land grant institutions built on stolen lands (such as the University of California) and in the fact that across Turtle Island, Black Studies and Native Studies programs and departments are forced to compete for the same scarce resources and encouraged to remain discrete units and bodies of knowledge, despite the realities on the ground and their shared relational histories. The matter of funding and employment also reveals the university’s commitment to racial capitalism, as it claims knowledge and control over Black life, mobility, and labor in multiple ways. As we wrote in “A Statement of Black Solidarity: Cops Off of Every Campus,” “[t]o these institutions, our truest value comes in times of crisis, when we are made to show up in the form of statistics, in the form of alibis, in the form of crisis managers. Diversity regimes and administrative bloat routinely serve as the veneer of Black value.”4

    This special issue is inspired into an ecology of thinking that seeks to dwell in deep relation with the scholars, artists, and visionaries proliferating conversations between Black and/or Indigenous peoples that show an abiding need for tuning into and across difference to name the possibilities for our collective liberation. This inspiration also points to the proliferation of conversations beyond the white settler colonial gaze. Troubling the Grounds: Global Configurations of Blackness, Nativism, and Indigeneity lingers over the perceived incommensurability of Black and Indigenous life, and has emerged as a result of many conversations, explorations, and indeed frustrations about the ways Black and Indigenous life wor(l)ds are taken up, buried, and mystified across various geographical contexts. It was the name of a conference held at the University of California, Irvine, in May 2019, that I co-organized with Dr. Sandra Harvey. The symposium was thus held on the homelands of the Tongva peoples who, in the face of ongoing settler colonialism, continue to act as stewards of their ancestral lands as they have for the past 8,000 years. As Black visitors to the land, we moved with curiosity about the possibilities for connection. The greater Los Angeles area is home to some of the largest Indigenous populations in the United States. It is the ancestral homeland of the Tongva, the Acjachemen, the Chumash, the Tataviam, the Cahuilla nations, the Chemehuevi, the Pipa Aha Macav, the Morongo, the Pechanga, the Yuhaaviatam, and the Soboba among many other peoples. It is also presently home to large communities of Indigenous peoples from the greater Turtle Island, the Pacific Islands, and Latin America, including Zapotec and Mixtec peoples.

    Black people, like Garífuna communities, or like the Miskito people, whether in diaspora or in Central America, continue to claim Indigeneity even when it is regarded as contentious or untenable. The questions of the physical, spatial (landed), and other articulations of sovereignty are interrelated. How can Africanness be thought not alongside Indigenous cultures, communities, and politics, but as itself Indigenous, with all of the rights, freedoms, and unsettling that this might engender? Ultimately, we sought to bring our attention to Black/African Indigeneity and Black/African decolonial solidarity as practiced in various regions of the globe.

    This convening was motivated by a curiosity about theories of sovereignty and Black/African political imaginaries: by shared cosmologies, solidarities, and coalitions across difference between Indigenous peoples and people of the African diaspora and on the continent. We wondered how we might problematize blood quantum or other biological/racial understandings of indigeneity historically and in the contemporary moment, and about the role of indigeneity in Black political struggle in various regions of Africa and Latin America. Panelists and discussants came together to consider how the “idea of Africa” circulates in Native American and Indigenous studies and communities, as well as how and where the continent occupies the Black American imaginary and its own intra-migration stories within its own borders.5 In this generative discursive space, we brought together the study of settler colonialism and postcoloniality to bear witness to trenchant critiques of citizenship and human rights, recognizing the political import of what “native” or “indigenous” might mean in specific geopolitical and geotemporal contexts, and grappling with the unyielding violence of settler colonial white supremacy, racial capitalism, and imperialism.

    The title of our special issue is drawn from the incisive thought of Katherine McKittrick’s Demonic Grounds: Black Women and the Cartographies of Struggle, in which McKittrick sets a foundational course for ways we might think about racialized geographies, temporalities, and modes of political opposition to colonialism. Her work prompted us to rethink the very ideological grounds on which our assumptions, ideologies, and claims to liberation rest. McKittrick urges us to think through how blackness and geography animate new ways of imagining the world; her book, she writes, “is, in its broadest sense, an interdisciplinary analysis of black women’s geographies in the black diaspora. It seeks to consider what kinds of possibilities emerge when black studies encounters human geography” (x). Troubling the Grounds: Global Figurations of Blackness, Indigeneity & Nativism considers what kinds of possibilities emerge when Black Studies, Native Studies, African Studies, and global Indigenous Studies meet. In this volume, writers across various disciplinary formations and geopolitical commitments build upon ongoing intellectual and activist conversations about racism, racial capitalism, and (settler) colonialisms in order to refigure our conversations through a global lens.

    As a point of departure, let us reconsider what happens on a material and epistemological level when we return to Africa rather than to the world of whiteness in these conversations and conflicts. How might centering Africa—with differing and non-syncretic ideas of the continent and its variegated colonial histories, contemporary political struggles, innovative joys—impact narratives of belonging, citizenship, nativism, migration, and indigeneity across Europe, Turtle Island, Oceania, and Abya Yala? Likewise, in what ways do questions around settler colonialism and anti-Black racism in the so-called West help or hinder our understanding of anticolonial or decolonial debates and struggles in various African contexts? Katherine McKittrick’s reading of Sylvia Wynter’s term “grounds” allows us to think critically of diasporic, Indigenous, and nomadic ways of living in the world not as mutually exclusive states of being but possibly as simultaneous spatial and temporal relationships. McKittrick offers us this provocation:

    If these conceptual and political differences are not simply cast as marginal, they do not have to replicate marginality. Demonic grounds are not, then, only reifying and politicizing marginality in itself (black women’s identities = margin/position = difference in/and feminism; or, our present form of life). Rather they are also a projection of what the biocentric human (genres of black womanhood) means in relation to “the normally inhabitable.” (135)

    The grounds have always been troubled, and we wade into the conversation in search of otherwise possibilities for understanding and place.

    Both at the “Troubling the Grounds” symposium and throughout this volume (which also contains essays from scholars who were not involved in those sessions), there is an abiding interest in the ways blackness travels, is mobilized, or is (re)coded within discourses of indigeneity, citizenship, and sovereignty, where recognizable relationships to the state are determined. Of course, overdetermined positionalities (including the triad of the arrivant/diasporic subject/migrant, the native, and the settler/colonizer) are rooted in ideologies that shape all of our political responses. Troubling the Grounds opens with the imperative that we develop and continue strategies of solidarity that carefully and critically tend to the ways our deeply held narratives of belonging are brought to bear on each other. Thus, these essays center Africa, the African diaspora, and Blackness in the collective conversation, while understanding these terms (especially “Blackness”) to be expansive and mutable depending on how they are geopolitically and historically situated. There is attention to the trouble, the tensions, and tautness of ideological and physical relations that we seek to tease out. The volume is an effort to draw out that set of relations and attachments but by no means to totalize the territory. There continues to be a growing body of scholarship about the relationship between Black Studies and/in/of Native Studies that this volume moves alongside and shifts away from, we hope in generative ways.6

    Put differently, this special issue of Postmodern Culture moves with the understanding that indigeneity, diaspora, and migration are racial-ethno-political categories emerging differently across geopolitical contexts. In Europe, for example, the Sámi people inhabiting parts of what is now Scandinavia are readily classified as Indigenous to those lands, whereas the Romani (including Roma and Sinti peoples) are often conflated with nomadic tribes. Rather than being understood as Indigenous, these groups often experience a process of what Alyosxa Tudor calls “migratization.”7 Likewise, “Indigenous” as a political identity is mobilized asymmetrically throughout the continent of Africa, Central America, and various other regions, despite various peoples’ historic claims to tribal or ancestral lands. Given these different geopolitical locations—what Keguro Macharia describes in the afterword to this issue as the attendant geohistories—from Turtle Island to the diasporic homes of the Garínagu to what is today known as Namibia and to Melanesia, the authors in this volume contribute to a discussion about the ways in which race, ethnicity, and history have informed our understandings of indigeneity, blackness, and mobility, as well as the political claims these categories make possible or foreclose in their respective contexts, and for Africa and its diaspora. Not featured here, but also deeply in conversation and present at that Spring 2019 conference were engagements with Palestine, the quilombos of Brazil, migrants and Roma across Europe, and Blackscapes across the Indian Ocean, Asian, and Arab worlds. The grounds of all of these spaces are demonic, and we owe a debt of gratitude to these thinkers and contributors for their offerings as we collectively sought a way out of epistemic and ontological barriers to our knowing one another and ourselves.

    Also not included in this issue is the way that whiteness positions itself as having access to indigeneity in places like Europe. The topic came up for vociferous debate during the conference, and is implicated in these conversations. In recent years, the deadly fever pitch of ultranationalist calls to greatness has taken up a frail form of sovereignty based on a nostalgic act of white return, which is tied to the supremacist narrative of “the great replacement” in France, in particular.8 Take, for example, Donald Trump’s slogan to “Make America Great Again,” which begat ideologically linked global campaigns like Jair Bolsonaro’s “Make Brazil Great Again,” and Matteo Salvini’s “Make Italy Great Again” and “Italians First,” and Boris Johnson’s promise to “make Britain great again” by forcing the United Kingdom out of the European Union. They share a desire to recuperate an originary colonial project of the nation as individualist imperial formation. The discourse retrenches white supremacist iterations of History and Time to harken back to nebulous and fictional moment of ethnoracial purity and coeval peace. When confronting the political and ethnoracial diversity of the present, this of course foments anti-immigrant, anti-Black, and anti-Indigenous movements, in great part because they promote a revisionist history that celebrates white cisheterosexual people as the rightful claimants to the land and therefore to the status of “native.” “Nativism” in this perverse context then refers to a return to whiteness, and thus, a return that renders impossible any other claims to sovereignty in favor of white ethnonationalist politics of recognition and of fantasies of belonging.

    The pieces in this volume should be read as rigorous engagements in their own right, and we are invited to “read as amateurs” to consider a relationship to knowledge and its production as divested from notions of mastery.9 We do this in order to look at our principles and orientations towards diaspora, to name who we are and how we fellowship with one another, foregrounding interrelatedness and our own stories. With this invocation of “we,” these works join Kānaka Maoli scholar Lisa Kahaleole Hall’s moratorium “on talking about ‘them,’ so we can talk about ‘we’s’” from her 2018 Critical Ethnic Studies essay “More than ‘Two Worlds,’” forged with Black feminist activism, scholarship, and poetry about relating across difference (77). She continues, “The violences that we can effectively stop are those that are employed within a “we.” The existence of that “we” is necessary but not sufficient for making change—it is the ground of possibility” (78).

    There was rousing poetry, theory, land blessings, and scholarship presented at the Troubling the Grounds conference and considered for this issue that addressed the relationship between indigenous South Africans and the geocosmogenic waywardness of their ancestry; Black African and Palestinians relations after the Second World War; insurgent knowledges of freedom-making from the quilombos of Brazil; spatial performances of the Indian Ocean Blackness of Ceylon Africans in Sri Lanka; the migratization of Eastern European in the interest of troubling attachments to nativism and whiteness, and so on. There are many limits of a special issue including the number of included essays. However, if we take up the spirit of curiosity and resist exclusionary readings as ones of bad faith and misrecognition, it will allow us to consider where we might deepen our study, stretch our political engagement, and peek beyond the horizon of our struggles, toward what Lisa Kahaleole Hall refers to as “the lateral sharing of difference within multiple consensually constructed ‘we’s’” (81). This work is ongoing. The struggle continues.

    This issue opens with “Other Intimacies: Black Studies Notes on Native/Indigenous Studies,” a grounding conversation between Chad Infante, Sandra Harvey, Kelly Limes Taylor, and Tiffany Lethabo King that stretches across multiple exchanges, continents, and itineraries between Black Studies and Native Studies. After these scholars push beyond the confines of multiple fields to extend our collective investment and to tarry with Blackness as more than an agon for thinking sovereignty, belonging, and indigeneity, Sarah Fong’s “The Grounds of Encounter: Racial and Colonial Discourses of Place” historicizes the ongoing struggle against colonial geographies of separation and extraction in the 19th century United States and 21st century solidarities between Native and Black peoples at the Sogorea Te’ Land Trust on traditionally Chochenyo and Karkin lands in the San Francisco Bay Area. By troubling the temporality of association, Fong resists the cleaving of Black Studies and Native Studies that fuels the settler imaginary and racial illogics to meditate on placelessness as co-constitutive of Black and Native experiences and renderings. In “The Politics of Witchcraft and the Politics of Blood: Reading Sovereignty and Sociality in the Livingstone Museum,” Alírio Karina presents witchcraft as an object and cosmology that troubles the colonial and anthropological tendencies of contemporary African Studies. Examining witchcraft objects held at the Livingstone Museum in Zambia, Karina reflects on indigenous-coded claims to territory, custom, and Africanity, and offers a critique of limited readings of witchcraft that move away from the materiality of its real cosmologies, readings that reflect a colonizing tendency, arguing instead for the agency of Indigenous Africans who exceed their postcolonial containers in pursuit of sovereignty. Where Karina engages Indigenous Africans as disruptive of colonial framings of African identity and belonging, Paul Joseph López Oro’s articulations of Black Central America on the isthmus and its diasporas build on centuries of anti-Black racism and genocidal erasure to argue that Garifuna New Yorkers of Honduran descent are marked by their transgenerational differences and bounded by a “Garifunaness” that seeks to disrupt hegemonic Latinidad and refashion Afro-Latinidad through indigeneity. Sandra Harvey offers another framing of the spatialization of Black and Native life through epistemological, phenomenological, and metaphysical turns. Like Fong’s “placelessness,” Harvey’s notion of unsettling moves us to think about the binary of Black displacement, which Katherine McKittrick refers to as “ungeographic,” in “Unsettling Diasporas: Blackness, Solidarity Ethics, and the Specter of Indigeneity.” As Fong does in her work on Black and Native solidarities and resistance, Joy Enomoto situates the work of Melanesian women artists and activists to push our thinking of material solidarity and political possibility. “Black is the Color of Solidarity: Art as Resistance in Melanesia” articulates Black Oceania and the Black Pacific as bounded sites of possibility that are thought materially, and not merely as conceptual containers for inter-community epistemologies and praxis. Zoé Samudzi’s incisive engagement, “A Paradox of Genocide Recognition,” thinks across solidarity and recognition with another refractive reading of history. Offering a comparatively political assessment of Germany’s legal response to the 1904–1908 genocide of the Nama and Herero indigenous Africans the Civil Rights Congress’s 1951 We Charge Genocide petition to the United Nations, Samudzi names anti-Blackness as the litmus case and limit of modern understandings and acknowledgements of colonial genocide, arguing that the result is a deep paradox of recognition that is not only commensurate with Black death, but renders it a pre-requisite. Concluding the volume is a generous afterword by Keguro Macharia, “Afterword: Across Difference, Toward Freedom,” that furthers the call to listen, to attend, and to dwell in and across these seemingly divergent contexts in order to pull together through-lines and repetitions toward a collective understanding of the anti-Blackness that structures this modern world, the Black livingness that exceeds categorization through independent containment away from “the Indigenous” or “the Native.”

    Engaging with the relational lived experiences and struggles of Black and African people in this way may yield a deepening of conversations in which Blackness and Indigeneity are thought about with a curiosity that is not merely transactional solidarity, is not antagonistic, and is not concerned with incommensurability, but rather pushes us to consider shared access to struggles against and experiences of ontological oppression, dispossession, and erasure. This special issue holds together approaches across and beyond the geopolitical, historiographical, or conjectural analysis, beyond literary criticism, visual art, and performance. It’s an ongoing conversation that resists the overdetermination of form and genre and the imposition of rigid forms. Deep gratitude to Postmodern Culture managing editor Annie Moore for her steadfastness in seeing this volume through to its culmination, delayed many times by racialized responses to COVID-19, American insurrections, demands of the neoliberal university, and ecological disaster that in many ways underscored the importance of attending to the matter of Indigenous and Black belonging deeply enough to forge a world that we can ultimately thrive in. Further gratitude to Postmodern Culture editor Eyal Amiran for supporting this effort since it was a burgeoning idea turned conference, and understanding that what might normatively be said to be “historical” work must be stretched when we think materially about what constitutes “history,” given the unfixed temporality and ongoing colonialisms (settler and otherwise) and ongoing catastrophe of racial capitalism and other racisms on Turtle Island, Abya Yala, Mzansi, Europe and other lands.

    Every iteration of “crisis” affords us the opportunity to reconfigure the grounds. Perhaps the time is nigh for us to ask: what, to young children Tree and Delisha Africa, or to the hundreds of precious Native children whose remains are routinely and tragically being discovered in mass graves around residential schools across Turtle Island, is an institutional land acknowledgment? May we continue to trouble the grounds of discipline/disciplinarity, of ontology, of capital, and of w(h)it(e)ness, by nurturing the shoals of transformation (of fields, of possibility) that refuse to settle. 10

    Dr. SA Smythe is a poet, translator, and assistant professor of Black European Cultural Studies and Black Trans Poetics at UCLA, where they are primarily invested in Black belonging beyond borders. They are the guest editor of Troubling the Grounds: Global Configurations of Blackness, Nativism, and Indigeneity in Postmodern Culture, the forthcoming monograph Where Blackness Meets the Sea: On Crisis, Culture, and the Black Mediterranean, and the full poetry collection titled proclivity, which takes up a familial history of Black migration (between Britain, Costa Rica, Jamaica, and Italy), trans embodiment, and Black liberation. Smythe is a statewide coordinating committee member of the faculty wing of California Cops Off Campus (UCFTP) and organizes with students and other comrades in the broader Cops Off Campus Coalition and other abolitionist/anti-carceral groups across Turtle Island and in Europe. Winner of the 2021 Rome Prize, Smythe is currently based between Rome, Italy and Tongva Land.

    Footnotes

    1. I am thinking here of the many recent projects originating in the West that set about to map indigenous territories with the expressed aim to inform “non-indigenous” people about the surrounding occupied lands and their original and ongoing stewards. At the time of this writing, the app and website Native Land (native-land.ca), founded by self-identified Canadian settler Victor Temprano, “strives to create and foster conversations about the history of colonialism, Indigenous ways of knowing, and settler-Indigenous relations, through educational resources such as our map and Territory Acknowledgement Guide.” The project, which features “indigenous and non-indigenous” people, also boasts an ardent community that crowdsources information across the Americas and Europe, and contains almost no Indigenous representation on the African continent. The site privileges “‘Indigenous way of knowing’ when it comes to the importance and sacredness of land,” which begs the question: what are we to understand about what the Indigenous African knows?

    2. On the Land Back Movement, see https://landback.org/manifesto/.

    3. For more on the history and legacy of racial purity and its impact on the relations between African Americans and Native Americans, see the work of Arica L. Coleman, in particular That the Blood Stay Pure: African Americans, Native Americans, and the Predicament of Race and Identity in Virginia.

    4. See Sarah Haley, Nick Mitchell, Shana Redmond, and SA Smythe, “A Statement of Black Solidarity: Cops Off of Every Campus,” written for the California Cops Off Campus Coalition.

    5. See Mudimbe, The Idea of Africa.

    6. The shift “away” is still ever in relation, and the privileging of “Indigenous” throughout this introduction is meant to indicate a set of entanglements including and beyond Turtle Island, that involve land and temporality, which Native Studies, peoples, and possibilities also attend to.

    7. See Tudor, “Cross-fadings of racialization and migratization.”

    8. The latter anti-Semitic and Islamophobic conspiracy developed by white nationalist writer Renaud Camus argues for the existence of an ongoing plot for “white genocide” that is being carried out by replacing the demographics and culture of white Europeans with non-white people, globalized culture, and transnational ideals.

    9. In “Beyond Incommensurability: Toward an Otherwise Stance on Black and Indigenous Relationality,” the introduction to Otherwise Worlds: Against Settler Colonialism and Anti-Blackness, Tiffany Lethabo King, Jenell Navarro, and Andrea Smith outline three typical articulations of the relations between “Black and Native peoples and, by extension, Black and Native politics” as being articulated “sometimes in terms of presumed solidarity or comparison,” sometimes “in terms of antagonism,” and “nowadays … in terms of incommensurability, which asserts a lack of commonality/relationality between Black and Native folks.” They go on to unpack the Glissantian notion of “relation” to move us beyond a binary formation rooted in a white supremacist settler imaginary that maintains the separation of Black and Indigenous communities from one another, by rendering the Native person knowable in a fixed and erstwhile positionality and the Black person unthought, excessive to the point of obscurity, or utterly present without any historical attachment to the land. The introduction goes on to set the intention for their volume, which is to resist the disavowal of this relation and instead to move toward an “approach that does not presume an ‘answer’ but instead seeks to ask question about the complexities of this relation and hence the political possibilities that emerge” (2). Shortly after the time of this writing (May 2021), ongoing controversy about the claims to Native identity finally punctuated mainstream academic consciousness due to the publication of a longform article on the Native claims of Andrea Smith. In many Native (feminist) spaces, this has been an object of vocal concern for over a decade. We cannot ethically ignore this reality, and the untold harms caused. However, I refuse a politics of public disposability for the Black, Indigenous, and Native scholarship present in that volume, which has been truly generative to my thinking, and whose total refutation would in certain instances compound harm and avoid the key contributions of its arguments. Independent of Otherwise Worlds, conversations about the global effects of settler colonialism and the global materialities forged from racism must continue to unfold and not be dismissed along with one individual’s pretend claims to Native identity. In fact, anti-Blackness fuels the untenability and incredulity plaguing Black/African claims to Indigenous belonging around the world, and as such propel the desire to corral scholarship like the work presented in this volume. Questions about embodied, geographic, and most other forms of sovereignty remain.

    10. See King, The Black Shoals.

    Works Cited

    • Coleman, Arica L. That the Blood Stay Pure: African Americans, Native Americans, and the Predicament of Race and Identity in Virginia. Indiana UP, 2013.
    • Haley, Sarah, Nick Mitchell, Shana Redmond, and SA Smythe. “A Statement of Black Solidarity: Cops Off of Every Campus.” Written for the California Cops Off Campus Coalition. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1YQC9I50KdrsK3tt5cQrWFIPossizQisDCisO57Bhoac/edit. Accessed 3 May 2021.
    • Hall, Lisa Kahaleole. “More than ‘Two Worlds’: Black Feminist Theories of Difference in Relation.” Critical Ethnic Studies Journal Special Issue: The Academy and What Can Be Done, vol. 4, no. 1, Spring 2018, 64–83.
    • King, Tiffany Lethabo. The Black Shoals: Offshore Formations of Black and Native Studies. Duke UP, 2019.
    • ———, Jenell Navarro, and Andrea Smith. “Beyond Incommensurability: Toward an Otherwise Stance on Black and Indigenous Relationality.” Introduction, Otherwise Worlds: Against Settler Colonialism and Anti-Blackness, Duke UP, 2020, pp.1–23.
    • McKittrick, Katherine. Demonic Grounds: Black Women and the Cartographies of Struggle. U of Minnesota P, 2006.
    • Mudimbe, V.Y. The Idea of Africa. Currey, 2005.
    • Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o. “Kamau Brathwaite: The Voice of African Presence.” World Literature Today, vol. 68, no. 4, 1994, pp. 677–682. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/40150609.
    • Tudor, Alyosxa. “Cross-fadings of racialisation and migratisation: the postcolonial turn in Western European gender and migration studies.” Gender, Place & Culture, vol. 25, no. 7, 2018, pp. 1057–1072. DOI: 10.1080/0966369X.2018.1441141

  • Notes on Contributors

    Jens Andermann teaches at NYU and is an editor of the Journal of Latin American Cultural Studies. He is the author of Tierras en trance: arte y naturaleza después del paisaje (2018, forthcoming in English from Northwestern), New Argentine Cinema (2011), The Optic of the State. Visuality and Power in Argentina and Brazil (2007), and Mapas de poder: una arqueología literaria del espacio argentino (2000). His current work explores unspecific aesthetics as modes of survival in the inmundo, or earthwide precarity.

    Joy Lehuanani Enomoto is a community organizer, visual artist and lecturer at the University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa in Pacific Islands Studies. Her work on climate justice, embodied archives and demilitarization in the Pacific is featured in Frontiers Journal, The Contemporary Pacific: Experiencing Pacific Environments: Pasts, Presents, Futures, Detours: A Decolonial Guide to Hawaiʻi, Routledge Postcolonial Handbook, and Amerasia Journal. Her current work focuses on anti-Blackness in Oceania/Solwara.

    Sarah E.K. Fong is an Assistant Professor of Studies in Race, Colonialism, and Diaspora at Tufts University. Her research examines the entanglements of schooling, self-making, and racial-settler capitalism in the late-nineteenth century. Dr. Fong has published work in American Indian Culture and Research Journal as well as Amerasia Journal.

    Sandra Harvey is Assistant Professor of African American Studies at the University of California, Irvine.

    Chad B. Infante is a post-doctoral fellow and assistant professor of African American and Native American literature in the English department at the University of Maryland, College Park. Chad earned his doctorate in English from Northwestern University in 2018. Originally from Jamaica, his research focuses on black and indigenous US and Caribbean literatures, gender, sexuality, critical theory, and political philosophy.

    Alírio Karina is a Postdoctoral Fellow in the Archive and Public Culture Research Initiative at the University of Cape Town, and Associate Faculty at the Brooklyn Institute for Social Research. Their research examines how the idea of Africa is the product of the legacies of anthropology, and what it might mean to do African studies—and to think Africa—in ways autonomous of anthropology.

    Tiffany King is an Associate Professor of Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies at Georgia State University. She is the author of The Black Shoals: Offshore Formations of Black and Native Studies, Duke University Press, 2019.

    Kelly Limes Taylor does many things, including think, mother, teach, and write. She lives in the upper left corner of Georgia, U.S., with her family.

    Paul Joseph López Oro is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Africana Studies at Smith College. His research and teaching interests are on Black Latin American and U.S. Black Latinx social movements, Black Feminist & LGBTQ activism, and Black Queer Feminist ethnographies in the Américas. His in-progress manuscript, Indigenous Blackness in the Americas: The Queer Politics of Self-Making Garifuna New York is a transdisciplinary ethnography on how gender and sexuality shapes the ways in which transgenerational Garifuna New Yorkers of Central American descent negotiate, perform, and articulate their multiple subjectivities as Black, Indigenous, and AfroLatinx.

    Keguro Macharia is from Nairobi, Kenya. Author of Frottage: Frictions of Intimacy across the Black Diaspora, Keguro blogs at gukira.wordpress.com.

    Zoé Samudzi has a PhD in Medical Sociology from the University of California, San Francisco where her dissertation research engaged German imperialism, colonial biomedicine, and the Ovaherero and Nama genocide. She is currently a Postdoctoral Fellow at the ACTIONS Program in the UCSF School of Nursing where she is working on research around transgender health, reproductive justice and autonomy, and material-epistemic violences.

    Tyler T. Schmidt is Associate Professor of English at Lehman College, City University of New York (CUNY) where he co-directed the Writing Across the Curriculum for nearly a decade. His essay “Lessons in Light: Beauford Delaney’s and James Baldwin’s ‘Unnameable Objects’” was published in the collection Of Latitudes Unknown: James Baldwin’s Radical Imagination (2019). The author of Desegregating Desire: Race and Sexuality in Cold War American Literature (2013), he is currently at work on a book about a group of Midwestern writers and visual artists who collectively reimagined queer portraiture in the 1940s and 1950s.

    Dr. SA Smythe is a poet, translator, and assistant professor of Black European Cultural Studies and Black Trans Poetics at UCLA, where they are primarily invested in Black belonging beyond borders. They are the guest editor of Troubling the Grounds: Global Configurations of Blackness, Nativism, and Indigeneity in Postmodern Culture, the forthcoming monograph Where Blackness Meets the Sea: On Crisis, Culture, and the Black Mediterranean, and the full poetry collection titled proclivity, which takes up a familial history of Black migration (between Britain, Costa Rica, Jamaica, and Italy), trans embodiment, and Black liberation. Smythe is a statewide coordinating committee member of the faculty wing of California Cops Off Campus (UCFTP) and organizes with students and other comrades in the broader Cops Off Campus Coalition and other abolitionist/anti-carceral groups across Turtle Island and in Europe. Winner of the 2021 Rome Prize, Smythe is currently based between Rome, Italy and Tongva Land.