Category: Volume 34 – Number 1 – September 2023

  • Notes on Contributors

    Ashwin Bajaj is completing a PhD in comparative literature at UC Irvine on the tricontinental historical novel and is, more broadly, invested in postcolonial and global literature, dialectical thought, environmental humanities, and novel theory. His work has previously appeared in NOVEL and Studies in the Novel.

    Adriana Michele Campos Johnson is Associate Professor of Comparative Literature at UC-Irvine. She is completing a project on visual infrastructures in Latin America and recently co-edited, with Dan Nemser, an issue of Social Text entitled Reading for Infrastructure: Worlds Made and Broken. Recent publications include “Excess of Visibility/Scarcity of Water” (Discourse), “An Expanse of Water” (Liquid Ecologies in the Arts), “In-São-Paulo-Visible” (Revista Hispanica Moderna), “Visuality as Infrastructure” (Social Text).

    Muhsina K K is a PhD student at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences,Indian Institute of Technology Indore, India. Her PhD research focuses on the visualculture of public mourning and its negotiations with the public sphere of Kerala. Her research interests encompass death and mourning, mourning public(s), mourning and media. She has published an article on mourning and contemporary Malayalam cinema in Jump Cut.

    Akshaya Kumar is Associate Professor of Sociology at the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology Indore. He received his doctorate in Film and Television Studies from the University of Glasgow on Screen studentship in 2015 and went on to publish his first monograph, Provincializing Bollywood: Bhojpuri Cinema in the Comparative Media Crucible, in 2021 (Oxford University Press). His ongoing research traverses platform capitalism, comparative media studies, and logistical media. He has published many articles in peer-reviewed journals including Social TextPostmodern CultureSoundings: An Interdisciplinary JournalMedia Industries, and Media, Culture & Society.

    Vinay Lal is a cultural critic, writer, blogger, and Professor of History at the University of California, Los Angeles. He is the author or editor of 21 books including nine volumes from Oxford UP. He has an academic YouTube channel at https://www.youtube.com/user/dillichalo. Lal was a Fellow for 2024 at the Stellenbosch Institute of Advanced Study, South Africa, and is presently holder (in India) of the Fulbright-Nehru Fellowship for Professional and Academic Excellence.

    Gayatri Mehra is completing her dissertation titled Looking Beyond the Wound: Contemporary Feminist Imaginaries of the Global South in the department of Comparative Literature at UC Irvine. Her research interests include Global South Novel Studies, Postcolonial studies, and Marxist-Feminist Theory. Her research is forthcoming in Research in African Literatures.

    Clare Ostroski is a PhD Candidate in Screen Cultures at Northwestern University. She is a multidisciplinary writer in media studies and the environmental humanities. 

    Richard Pithouse is Extraordinary Professor in the Department of Language Education at the University of the Western Cape, Distinguished Research Fellow at the Global Centre for Advanced Studies in Dublin and New York, and International Research Scholar at the University of Connecticut. He is the founder of The Commune, a radical book store, and The Forge, a cultural centre, both in Johannesburg. As the founding editor of Inkani Books, he commissioned an isiZulu translation of The Wretched of the Earth. The translation, by Makhosazana Xaba, was published last year. He is also the former editor of New Frame, described by Achille Mbembe as “one of the most exciting political, intellectual and cultural projects to emerge in Africa” and “arguably the top intellectual media platform on our Continent.”

    Louis-Georges Schwartz has taught Film Studies at Ohio University, The University of Iowa, and San Francisco State University. He is the author of Mechanical Witness, Moving Testimony: A History of Motion Picture Evidence in United States Courts (Oxford University Press, 2009).

    Erin Trapp lives in Minneapolis and is a therapist in private practice. She has published essays on poetry, psychoanalysis, and the environment in journals such as Social TextPostmodern CultureROOM: A Sketchbook for Analytic Action, and Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society

    Susan Vanderborg is Associate Professor of English at the University of South Carolina. Her research fields are contemporary experimental poetry, book art, bio art, comics, and speculative fiction, with articles in Journal of the Fantastic in the Arts, Inks, Postmodern Culture, Contemporary Literature, and Science Fiction Studies.

    Copyright © 2025-1990 Postmodern Culture & the Johns Hopkins University Press.

  • Mediatization via Mourning and Vice Versa: Television, Mass Grief, and Liveness in Kerala

    Muhsina K K and Akshaya Kumar

    Abstract

    This article engages with the corporeal and mediated intensities of mourning publics at celebrity funerals in Kerala, attended both in person and via TV and other live-streaming platforms. Live coverage transforms discrete emotional valences of these events into monumental media spectacles, consolidating an affective economy of grief based on the expression of “liveness” in all its urgency. This urgent expression results from the historical transition from traditional to new media in digital environments over the last two decades. Spectacles of “liveness” are key to understanding the cultural dynamics of mass participation in Kerala, which often abjures the general South Indian public’s enthusiasm for celebrities. Emotional eruptions at mass funeral processions form a melodramatic counterbalance to the “rational,” realist Malayali public sphere, which is proved, by such displays, to be an inadequate lens for viewing cultural self-definitions within popular discourses in Kerala.

    In 2004, Kairali TV, a Malayalam-language[1] general-entertainment television channel owned by Kairali TV Network and the mouthpiece of the Communist Party of India Marxist (CPIM) in Kerala, live telecast the six-hundred kilometre long funeral procession of E. K. Nayanar, a popular leader of CPIM.[2] The channel covered his funeral procession from Thiruvananthapuram to Kannur to reach the designated resting place, with the dead body kept in a glass coffin covered by a communist party flag in a Kerala state transport bus, and accompanied by thousands of people. The time of Nayanar’s demise coincided with a significant shift, marked by the rise of satellite channels and the Indian government’s new permission to directly uplink programs from within the country. The channel team and officials of Kairali TV who accompanied Nayanar’s funeral procession documented and aired the emotional responses of thousands of Communist Party leaders, workers, followers, and ordinary citizens across the route.[3] In addition to the general Malayali audience and the political public, the main audience for the live broadcast was the Malayali diaspora, particularly in the Gulf.[4] The live streaming afforded them a sense of ceremonial participation in the occasion. Kairali’s extensive live broadcasting of Nayanar’s funeral procession inaugurated a popular media practice in the state; it turned certain public figures’ funerals into grand televisual spectacles.[5]

    The death and funeral of a public figure, whether a monarch or a statesperson and the emotional responses exhibited by their subjects, constitutes a site of public interest due to the spread of recording devices. This essay focuses on the monumentality of the mourning public at the funerals of public figures in Kerala and their emotional valences, which have turned into media extravaganzas post-2000s. By critically engaging with the funerals, covered on live television, of Kalabhavan Mani, an actor; Panakkad Sayed Hyder Ali Shihab Thangal, a spiritual leader; and Oomen Chandy, a political leader, the essay offers a line of argumentation for the importance of the corporeal and mediated intensities of public emotion for the state.[6]

    Over a decade after Nayanar’s death, the 2016 funeral of Kalabhavan Mani (hereafter Mani), a popular Malayalam actor and singer, saw a congregation of tens of thousands of mourners and garnered extensive media attention. The extensive media coverage of Mani’s funeral was shaped by a highly competitive and dynamic television landscape that developed in Kerala as the first decade of the century drew to a close, marking a stark contrast to the media environment surrounding the deaths of Nayanar. The emergence of a vibrant news television industry, the expansion of satellite television, and their convergence with internet-driven media and platforms like YouTube were central to the state’s media landscape during this period. Mani’s funeral was broadcast live on nearly all major Malayalam TV channels, including Manorama News, Mathrubhumi News, Media One, and Jai Hind TV, and was also streamed live on their respective YouTube channels. The coverage began at the Thrissur Medical College, where Mani had passed away, and continued with live streaming of the emotional reactions of the public, tributes from various public figures at different locations, and the family’s private moments during the cremation at his residence.

    Similarly, the spectacular turnout in the 2022 mourning procession of Panakkad Hyder Ali Shihab Thangal (hereafter Thangal), a reputable politician who served as the state president of the Indian Union Muslim League (IUML), Kerala’s third-largest political party, and a highly revered Muslim spiritual leader, garnered a massive display of public affect that spammed the television screens and social media for days. Although most prominent Malayalam channels telecast the funeral of Thangal, Media One TV—owned and run by the Kerala unit of Jamaat-e-Islami Hind and one of the few Indian news channels owned by an Islamic organization—telecast the events live for two consecutive days. In a breaking news bulletin around 2:00 p.m. on March 6, 2022, the channel announced the death of Thangal. It started the live coverage from the hospital where Thangal died, where many party leaders and followers gathered soon after the news was released. The channel live-telecast the emotional responses of a colossal mourning public until his mortal remains were laid to rest, while on split screens, the police struggled to maintain order as people crowded the streets. Many party workers of the Indian Union Muslim League from the Gulf countries publicly commended Media One channel on Facebook, tagging the reporters behind the extensive live coverage of Thangal’s final journey, and expressed that the live stream provided them with a sense of ceremonial participation in the event, despite their physical absence.

    Exceeding these broadcast events, the media coverage of Oommen Chandy’s funeral, a former chief minister and one of the most popular political leaders of the state in 2023, was unprecedented, with nearly all major television channels providing continuous live broadcasts for seventy-two hours, capturing the immense public outpouring of grief as his funeral procession made its way across south Kerala. Almost all prominent Malayalam TV channels, including DD Malayalam, live-telecast his funeral for three consecutive days. An even bigger audience watched the procession live on television, and the event was also trending on news websites. The live telecast commenced with the announcement of Chandy’s passing through his son’s Facebook post, revealing that he had succumbed to cancer, and continued telecasting the emotional responses to his death for three days, marking a grand spectacle both in the cultural and media memory of the state. As the procession following his hearse from Thiruvananthapuram to Kottayam, where he was laid to rest, which spanned 150 kilometres, took twenty-eight hours to complete, most news channels suspended their regular programming to televise it and the final tributes paid by thousands of people, including elderly women and children, who waited along the roadside as the vehicle carrying Chandy’s remains inched forward.

    This essay asks how the cultural dynamics of live-streaming celebrity funerals unravel the engagements of the state’s public sphere with public affects. The monumentality of this mourning public contradicts the crosscutting discourse of Kerala’s progressive public sphere built on the plank of a “reasonable” public, deviating significantly from the character of the South Indian public sphere at large.[7] Even if one disregards the discursive intensity of such a projection, it is important to ask why the monumental mourning public is triggered by death so much more than by the landmark life events of celebrities. To grapple with these colossal mourning publics, it is essential to examine their interplay with the cultural politics of mass participation in the VIP funerals of South India and their lineage in the culture of star worship within the context of cine-politics.[8] The cine-political formations in the South Indian states of Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, and Andhra Pradesh, characterized by the conversion of star power into political power, primarily manifest through fan devotion to legendary matinee idols (Prasad). Such formations not only transform celebrity deaths and subsequent mourning into events of monumental public attendance and frenzied public behaviour but also display the power to convert citizens into fans (or devotees), through all the landmark events of cine-political significance. The public outpouring of emotions at celebrity funerals is then shaped by the mourners’ imaginary identifications with the star charisma of the deceased and their political aspirations for a virtual political order, which is reinforced by the quasi-religious meanings accorded to stars’ cinematic roles. This process, in turn, is retained in and reifies the public legitimacy of star personas and reflects the visceral intensity of public emotions upon stars’ deaths.

    What sets apart the corporeality of the mourning public in the funerals of public figures in Kerala is that neither their personal lives nor their civic engagements commanded substantial public validation or massive media attention during their lifetimes, except for Kalabhavan Mani’s cinematic roles. The massive display of public emotion and monumental scale of media attention at these figures’ funerals signify a marked disjuncture from the relatively subdued public lives of the icons.  A newly emergent media ecology has fostered the growth of attention economy over the urgent expressions of liveness facilitated by internet-driven media. The rapid multiplication of devices with screen network connectivity in the last four decades is crucial to this new media habitus. This thriving televisual economy has also been amplified by YouTube, which became a significant cultural infrastructure in India and a decisive digital intermediary for legacy television by 2010 (Lotz). The parallel live streaming of these funerals on YouTube channels, owned by respective TV channels, hence augmented the creative possibilities of legacy television in consolidating the economy of grief and expanding their audience demography.

    The mourning public gathers not only in person to join the funeral processions but also in front of TV sets and, more recently, via live streaming to participate in the moment of spectacular grieving. The phenomenon of mass grieving stands at a curious historical-theoretical cross-section. On the one hand, there is a monumental crowd in physical attendance, paying last tributes. This crowd, ephemeral in its lifespan, forms the fulcrum of the media extravaganza. On the other hand, the moving and still images of this monumental live attendance, available via electronic media, precipitates the wider arena of the mourning public that joins the crowd via their private screens. As they watch the mourning event live, they mark their “attendance” at the funeral procession in (physical) absentia. As we further illustrate attributes of funereal mediatization and the mourning public, we will encounter the core contradiction of a monumental live attendance facilitated by the spread of media. In making sense of this public that really “need not be there,” we grapple with communication systems designed to harvest attention at the cost of corporeal attendance; in this brief moment of monumental live attendance, though, the live attendees set aside the explicitly mediated experience of the funeral procession.

    The intensely affective and networked publics formed around these visual spectacles in Kerala disrupt the state’s claim to a rational mediation of public affect, the very underpinning of its further claim to a progressive public sphere. While Kerala appears relatively immune to star power and maintains a more rational stance vis-à-vis monumental expressions of public emotion during VIP funerals, it remains deeply embedded in star politics, albeit through the distribution of star value beyond the institutions of cinema. The melodramatic outpouring of emotion in mass grieving destabilizes Kerala’s claim to “rational” exceptionalism, particularly in terms of its progressive citizenry.

    Kerala vs. South India: A (Melodramatic) Rain Shadow Region?

    The personas of certain legendary South Indian icons who managed to convert their star power into political significance engendered vital imbrications in popular culture, celebrity politics, and broader socio-political mobilizations. Unsurprisingly, their deaths—M. G. Ramachandran (hereafter MGR, 1987), Jayalalitha (2016), M. Karunanidhi in Tamil Nadu (2018), N. T. Rama Rao (hereafter NTR, 1996) in Andhra Pradesh, and Rajkumar in Karnataka (2006)—triggered frenzied collectives of mourners. Following MGR’s demise, many Tamil people even resorted to acts of self-harm, such as self-immolation, wrist-cutting, and ingestion of poison, which resulted in thirty-one deaths in two days (Venkatramani). Many young men tonsured their heads, a customary Hindu practice typically observed following the death of a family member.[9] The more shocking incidents established associations between public grief over the deaths of political icons, particularly matinee idols in these South Indian states, and suicide and violence.[10] The hysterical mourning of the public was identified as a feature of fan bhakti [devotion] (Prasad). In informal public discourse, the adulation of these celebrity politicians made them individuals with quasi-divine personas. Prasad argues that fan bhakti as a cultural practice derives from the historical phenomenon of cine-politics, manifesting in virtual political sovereignty, whereby the marginalized population achieves a surrogate political existence in the shadows of the new nation. As Prasad shows, this history took shape in the wake of regionalist assertions of linguistic nationalism by South Indian states. The public enthusiasm surrounding star bodies thus signifies a sense of political community forged between a star and his fans. It becomes a locus of imaginary identification for individual fans amid conflicts over national identity at a specific moment in Indian history. This is the political enthusiasm that later extends to dead bodies in public view.

    The adulation of celebrities and enthusiasm for their funerals in Kerala nevertheless shies away from “irrational” bursts of public emotion. The disproportionately large farewells given to public figures such as literary and cultural practitioners, spiritual leaders, and small-time film actors need to be understood as part of the cleavages between the political and cultural spheres in Kerala, as opposed to the relatively smooth translation of star power into the political domain in South India (Radhakrishnan, “What is Left?”). The cleavages are built upon the state’s relatively subdued and stoic star-fan relationship. The influence of social and political movements—particularly the stronghold of communism in public life—as well as the role of religious communities in contestation with the distribution of development metrics across Kerala’s linguistic community, have made it less cohesive around a small number of cultural-political icons but more accepting of a wide array of social leadership. What makes the Kerala case particularly curious is how this cultural media economy of grief permeates into the rational, progressive premises upon which the popular discourses of the state’s public sphere are mounted. The corporeal intensity of the mourning public disrupts the historical tension between realism and melodrama which is vital to the fashioning of the state’s rational, progressive self-disposition. This Malayali self-image is built upon the spatial reconfiguration of the inside and outside as distinct realms of melodrama and realism, which posits melodrama as an irrational remnant of realism and its cultural authenticity. As we have argued elsewhere, this split mandate undergirds the privileging of secular rationality around which the public sphere has been imagined and manifests in the repression of public mourning from Kerala’s visual culture (KK and Kumar).

    The claims of the Malayali public as an enlightened reading public, a by-product of rational modernity’s formation of the state’s public sphere, significantly shape the cultural authenticity of realism in the state (Radhakrishnan, “‘Worlds’”; Varughese). The progressive credentials attributed to this reading public have nonetheless engendered cultural disdain towards Kerala’s neighbouring states, manifested predominantly in perceiving its public within the affective economy of melodrama and the populist idioms of mass cinema. Condescension toward the “irrationality” of the mass audience of neighbouring states, particularly Tamil people, has emerged from the hyper-visible fandom around South Indian male stars (Srinivas), and popular cinema being adopted as a medium for linguistic mobilization (Pandian). Such irrationality is, in turn, positioned against the predominance of social realism in Malayalam cinema that endorses a “developmental aesthetics” (Prasad 189) and a claim to the rational credentials of the state’s cultural industries and its audience.

    The interventions of culturally progressive movements, such as the library movement and literacy movement,[11] along with rational, progressive movements, such as the Kerala Sastra Sahitya Parishad (People’s Science Movement) and the rationalist group Kerala Yukthivadi Sangham, which sought to transform popular spheres into rational political space, consolidated the discourses of secular rationality by building a progressive and scientific temperament around the public sphere. These movements, strongly supported by the Communist Party, served as the primary vehicle for Malayali engagements with scientific discourses from the 1960s to the 1980s, promoting a secular understanding of science through mass education and numerous campaigns for civil action and community development (Bijukumar). These initiatives are an extension of the broader communist project aimed at constructing a public sphere through engagement with popular domains such as cinema, folk songs, and theatre, which enabled it to bridge the gap between the nationalist elites represented by the Indian National Congress and the common masses (Mannathukaran 2013). While it allowed the Left to consolidate and mobilize a public sphere, expanding its base among marginalized and working-class populations, their appropriation of key public spaces—such as libraries, reading rooms, tea shops, and village squares—were projected as emblematic of the rational, progressive credentials of these spheres, emphasizing the importance of reading in the regional public culture. Ratheesh Radhakrishnan argues that the narratives of Kerala’s exceptionalism are claimed through the credentials of an enlightened reading public, a distinctive history of communist mobilizations, and a model of social development that obscures its reliance on remittances from the Persian Gulf (“‘Worlds’”).

    Even as they contributed to the formation of the state’s public sphere, these interventions have been instrumental in fashioning the narratives of its genealogy through literary and cultural modernity and its translations into the Malayali rational self-definition. It is within the valences of a rationally modern public sphere in the cultural politics of the state that the inquiry into what drives an affective economy on the monumental scale of public emotion during these funerals emerges. Key to this conflict is the way Kerala, while being facilitated by the state and other democratic edifices, situates itself within the broader context of star worshipping and its populist dynamics in South India. For instance, unlike the frenzied collective of mourners discussed earlier, the funerals in Kerala drew a relatively disciplined and self-restrained public in grief. Attending these events in person held great importance in recognizing and installing people’s respective leaders in public memory as mass heroes. The heroes’ cultural sovereignty is translated into political sovereignty, however ephemeral. While Kerala may be different in handling the tensions, it firmly inhabits South India in terms of the conflicts and anxieties that divide cultural and political domains. Celebrity funerals are occasions when we witness a public reclaiming of the political by the quasi-monarchic splendour accorded to cultural icons of smaller constituencies.

    The state retreats and allows this public reclaiming of the political by way of the dead body of the cultural sovereign, partly because it poses no threat, but also to acknowledge the abrupt and incomplete transition from monarchic rule to constitutional democracy that characterizes much of South Asian politics. While the abruptness of this unstable transition is owed to the period of colonial rule, the post-independence cultural realm of South India has had to bear the burden of “serving as a shadow structure of political representation” (Prasad 19). The monarchic monumentality of celebrity funerals—even if ephemeral, since it is triggered only by mass public attention to events surrounding death—is, therefore, ironically facilitated by the state functionaries and procedures that represent the democratic artifice. It is important to note, however, that the growing public interest in these televisual spectacles has not replaced the newspapers’ coverage of VIP funerals in the state. Yet both television and newspapers have prospered and proliferated due to the endorsement and public validation offered in reciprocation. Hence, the genealogy of the state’s visual media, particularly its transition from traditional to new media through the convergence of legacy television with internet-driven platforms, is key to understanding the emergence of media practices that facilitate the spectacles of mass grieving. This shift has been pivotal in the proliferation of news television in the state. To explore this further, let us examine how satellite television laid the foundation for this phenomenon, particularly through the proliferation of live-streaming.

    Satellite Television and the Proliferation of News Channels

    The surge of private satellite television channels during the early 2000s broke the long-standing dominance of DD Malayalam (the regional arm of the national public broadcaster, Doordarshan) as well as Asianet and Surya TV, which had been the only private channels in Malayalam until 2000. Apart from the newly acquired functional freedom of the private sector following the economic liberalization, which resulted in a deregulated broadcasting market (Mehta 2008), the widespread popularity of private cable TV networks by the late ‘90s also precipitated the expansion of satellite channels.

    The first Malayalam satellite channel, Asianet—also one of the first private satellite television channels in India—was introduced in 1993 as a current affairs and entertainment channel using a Russian satellite.  It appealed to the Malayali audience through entertainment shows, news, and serials. It was well received in the wake of mounting anti-establishment political energies and the “neoliberal global market’s promises of the avenues to gratify one’s desires that were hitherto forbidden within the moral economy of the welfare state” (Joseph, “Contemporary Television” 4). Asianet’s popularity grew quickly and was followed by the 1998 launch of Surya TV, owned by the Sun Network, one of the largest media conglomerates in the country. The subsequent rise of multiple satellite television channels like Kairali TV, Jeevan, Amrita, Kiran TV, Jai Hind, Kairali We, Mazhavil Manorama, and Flowers led to a significant change in the state’s mediascape in the 2000s. Most of these channels, including Asianet, Surya, and Kairali, have also launched more channels exclusively for movies, musicals, and phone-in programs.

    The idea of liveness, mobilized on the claim of providing direct access to the distant “now”—the mainstay of live television broadcasting—has been crucial in expanding the audience demography of these channels. They built substantial popular interest in the live telecasting of various major events, including VIP funerals, election results, and so on, by providing immediate access to the distant. These channels broadcast live the football World Cup, cricket tournaments of the Indian national team, highlights of state annual budget sessions, beauty pageants, award shows, and some of the festivals and game shows that are popular in the region, and gained these channels substantial domestic and diaspora audiences.[12] The last two decades also witnessed the emergence of niche Malayalam channels. For instance, most of the prominent political parties in Kerala launched their TV channels—either party-run or owned by individuals or firms affiliated with political parties. These channels, including Kairali TV, Jai Hind TV, India Vision, and Janam TV, helped their parent body to consolidate their base and reach a wide audience by spreading their ideologies or fashioning the public image of many regional political leaders.[13] The media establishments run or owned by political parties have not only thrived but dominated the media ecosystem of Kerala, which was shaped as much by neoliberal economic policy as by Delhi media. Regional politics has, therefore, superseded what was effectively a political move toward the “free” flow of information.

    This assertive cultural multipolarity has expanded the media industries manifold. The key breakthrough for the purpose of this essay was the introduction of around-the-clock news channels such as India Vision, Asianet News, Reporter TV, Manorama News, Kairali People, Mathrubhumi News, Media One, and 24 News TV. They significantly augmented the Malayali television audience’s exposure to news, particularly primetime news. Since most of these news channels are extensions of popular newspapers in Malayalam, the televisual economy operates as an overlay upon the newspaper-reading public. This newspaper-reading public has been at the heart of Kerala’s literary and political public sphere.

     

    In the competitive media ecosystem of official media partners and broadcasters, news channels recognize the potential of the live coverage of VIP funeral processions. Around 2015, with the launch of Reliance Jio with predatory pricing (Athique and Kumar), the eruption of a strong digital video ecosystem resulted in most news channels starting an official YouTube channel. Proliferating mobile screens began to overwhelm television viewing behaviour. Nevertheless, it is important to understand that digital disruption has not replaced television; it provides another interface for legacy media, particularly to channel public attention towards VIP funerals animated by urgent expressions of “liveness.”  Despite Derrida’s critique of “televisual artificiality,” which highlights the live broadcast as an inherently constructed event that mediates, interprets, and often distorts reality, the live coverage of grand funerals holds the potential to evoke powerful spectacles of public emotion, marking the collective cultural memories of the state.

    The Affective Public(s)

    In The Cinematic Mode of Production: Attention Economy and the Society of the Spectacle, Jonathan Beller explains how capitalism transformed the act of looking into value-productive labor with the emergence of cinema and its succeeding formations, particularly television, computers, and the Internet. He argues that capitalism began monetizing attention, which resulted in many media platforms operating within the computational logic of capital. Indeed, the most well-known case in which the media spectacles around an individual’s personal and public life found its logical extension in their death was the live coverage of the death and funeral of Princess Diana (1997), one of the most-watched live broadcasts to date (Rigney). The extensive live coverage of her funeral that turned into a global event of seemingly epic proportions is founded upon the scandalous value of her life as an object of global fascination and obsessional documentation, both in the tabloid industry and across the spectrum of mass media. The heavily dramatized televisual spectacle of mass hysteria around Diana’s death was the cloyingly sentimental effect of media manipulation and populist reaction, anchored by the royal figure rich in cultural themes and fantasies (Kear and Steinberg; Hay). Analyzing the role of photographs in constructing the image simulacrum of Princess Diana, Jill R. Chancey posits that the global reaction to her death is propelled by photographs fostering a perceived intimacy with the public, thereby contributing to the worldwide outpouring of grief upon her death. Diana lived under great media scrutiny fuelled by an insatiable hunger for sensationalism. It quite literally chased her to a violent death. The funerals under discussion here, by contrast—those of Kalabhavan Mani, the Dalit Malayalam actor, in 2016; of Panakkad Hyder Ali Shihab Thangal, in 2022; and of the former chief minister of Kerala, Oommen Chandy, in 2023—which are detailed earlier in the essay, were preceded by relatively sedate public lives. The massive emotional outpouring registered at these figures’ funerals did not merely follow from a life lived in the fast lane of media attention.

                How do these spectacles manifest affective publics? How can their emotional valences be engaged in relation to the affective qualities of the public sphere, and counterposed to rational modernity’s claims of public reason? The dominant imaginaries regarding Kerala’s public sphere are predicated upon a rational modernity paradigm, materialized in the discursive terrain of rational debates in the public domain (Bijukumar 2019; Harikrishnan 2022; Joseph, “Contemplative Spectator”).[14] This paradigm has excluded and delegitimized a wide range of emotional expressions and “irrational” outpourings, prompting the rise of multiplicities of public spheres, particularly of counter-publics (Warner) that disrupt this rational cleansing. As Michael Warner suggests, these counter-publics have emerged as distinct subgroups that challenge or diverge from dominant publics, giving voice to marginalized groups often excluded from mainstream discourses. Communication technologies play a crucial role in facilitating interactions between these publics and counter-publics. Televisual networks have maneuvered the potential of live broadcasting to mediate and amplify spectators’ affective sensibilities and visceral responses to loss. Analyzing live broadcasting as the semantic specificity of television, Jerome Bourdon argues that live broadcasting, which is valorized as a means to transcend temporal and spatial constraints, facilitates the convergence of vast groups of people in a distinct collective experience. Mapping out the implications of “liveness” both as material and as affect in the convergence of news narratives in Indian television, Akshaya Kumar writes:

    liveness is audio-visually composed as much of live handheld footage as it is of dramatic soundtracks, of animated movement across images or screens, of animated texts and scrolls, of still images dramatically zoomed into, and of old live footage referring to new subjects. When news subjects walk away from a sea of journalists and cameras, the new media screens split between them and the newsroom, combining live action and sensational text with the high-pitched enunciation of urgency. Liveness within news media collapses the wall that separates us—the audience—from the substance rendered in live coverage, seemingly dismantling media’s critical role in connecting news content and the audience. The problems of liveness then are twofold: (1) the analytical gap between content and audiences collapses, and (2) the news media works out a convenient exceptionalism by which spaces away from the newsroom are further removed. (539)

    Similarly, the live coverage of celebrity funerals blurs the distinction between content and audience since it unfolds in real time, directly from actual locations. This distance from newsrooms and media studios generates an illusion for the audience of active participation in the unfolding events. Moreover, the news anchor’s presence is limited to a voiceover, guiding the spectators through the series of events displayed on the live television screen. Live telecasting intervenes in the usual formulas or genres of broadcasting that are either suspended or preempted, followed by special announcements or preludes. The live coverage of funerals thus commences with a breaking news bulletin that announces the death to the viewers and thereby removes them from the routines of the daily news by locking them into liveness for hours or days. Contrary to the television programs intended for an undifferentiated audience assumed to be passive and with a short attention span, the live streaming of celebrity funerals runs for hours and is envisioned primarily for a specific audience. This visual and live evocation triggers a sense of ceremonial participation among the viewers.

    For instance, in the animated voice-over that accompanies the images of Chandy’s funeral, he is constantly addressed as Kunjoonj or Puthuppalli’s Kunjoonj, a constituency he represented for more than five decades. The telecast is filled with emotionally charged testimonies from people who reiterate his phenomenal presence among them. The channels present the crowd thronging the roadsides, people running behind the funeral cortege, and the public waiting patiently for hours to meet the leader one last time, much like they did during his Janasambarka paripadi, a mass contact program[15] lauded as a unique democratic experiment under which the chief minister would go to the public to hear their grievances and ensure relief, short-circuiting the bureaucratic procedures. By comparison, channels extol Mani’s working-class origins while celebrating how he remained an integral part of public life in Chalakkudi, his native place. The channels continuously state that the mass grief around his death resulted from the warmth he exuded as a performer and a human being, which endeared him to thousands. Similarly, Media One’s narrative highlights Thangal’s ability to maintain cordial personal relations despite political differences.  One of the key recurring motifs in the live coverage remains that of historicity—in the sense that the events on the screen are unique and that participants and commentators are privileged to be a part of this history. The telecast also features live coverage of eulogies and speeches delivered at the funeral, allowing the audience to witness heartfelt tributes from close associates, loved ones, and the public. Numerous camera angles capture poignant moments of grief, including close-ups of reactions from attendees. High-pitched background scores, insertion of images, and live videos from multiple locations within the same arena uphold this intensity.

    These spectacles thus contribute to the “affective economies” of grief (Ahmed) by recruiting televisual and social networks to shape the process of mourning, even as these networks retain an economic force that significantly affects social relationships. Echoing Sara Ahmed’s views on the role of emotion in forming subject alignments within collective bodies, a robust economy of grief has consolidated around public mourning, revealing how public affect intersects with social and political structures while being shaped by broader economic and cultural forces (“Affective Economies”). Live media events spread across various platforms, leading to the revival of live television that reimagines and reinvents liveness itself; however, it confers a distinct competitive advantage upon TV networks over streamed content services (Sørensen).[16] Boyd understands networked publics as both the space constructed through networked technologies and the imagined collective that emerges as a result of the intersection of people, technology, and practice. The swift dissemination of short video clips from live-streamed funerals, which may span several days, leverages the immediacy and extensive reach of these platforms to cater to users seeking brief updates.[17] This contrasts with television and YouTube, which serve audiences accustomed to more prolonged and detailed content. Additionally, the broad reach of social media facilitates the content’s accessibility across various languages, though this expansive reach frequently emphasizes the spectacle and visual grandeur of the event over deeper engagement with the content.

    The massive popularity of digital and social media—and by extension the vast profits to be made by harnessing this popularity— also led to the rise of algorithmic biases of personalized content filtering, including filter bubbles (Pariser) and echo chambers (Quattrociocchi et al.), which tend to isolate users from a range of viewpoints. Nevertheless, the mourning public mobilizes and connects through displays of heightened expressions of emotions and sentiment. By situating monumental spectacles of public affect within the broader context of the public enthusiasm for celebrity figures and star politics in South India, we show how these displays constitute a cultural counterpoint to the state’s otherwise rational self-positioning.

    The Enchantments of Public Grieving

    The public spheres of South India have contested the preeminent, post-independence center of political life in India by negotiating supra-national structures through cultural and political idioms of linguistic sub-nationalism. These negotiations, which intensified in the mid-1950s via acts of self-immolation and widespread public unrest for the linguistic reorganization of states, led to the recentring of popular consciousness on new linguistic-national identities marked by cultural distinctions. The subsequent emergence of multiple and fragmented sovereignties has further amplified social clusters’ public confrontations with the Indian social body (Hansen). The phenomenal star power of celebrities across South India also emerges from this context of political formations cursed with a congenital identity crisis (Prasad). We are, therefore, confronted by virtual sovereignty formations around star figures that supplement the lack of political representation, utilizing linguistic nationality as the basis for popular sovereignty.

    Kerala has remained largely detached from this trajectory of cine-political cultural formations and fan bhakti as a source of popular enthusiasm. The development of cinema and the star system in the region has not fostered fan devotion as a pivotal resource for forging community. The lack of star power’s translation into political power has led to a more stoic relationship between film stars and fans in Kerala and is claimed as a manifestation of the rational, progressive sensibility of the Malayalis. On the contrary, we contend that a primarily televisual economy, which capitalizes on the emotional valences of a monumental mourning public, incorporates Kerala within South India’s star politics. Concurrently, we situate the tableau of monarchic splendour manifested in the public’s emotional outpouring at the funerals of prominent figures in Kerala as indicative of the broader cultural intensities of South India. It also elevates public figures with relatively sedate lives to the status of stars endowed with charismatic authority through the iconization of their deaths. During the fleeting moments of their beloved leaders’ final journeys, the monumental public and their emotional outpourings embody the cultural manifestation of popular sovereignty, which is, remarkably, choreographed in part by democratic functionaries of the state. To illustrate this, the live broadcast of these funerals showcases how the public is granted access to the ceremony in which they stand witness, mourn, pay homage, and actively contribute to the grandeur of the funeral. Also, the state accommodates mourners with a specially modified bus with wide windows for public tributes along the streets. The primary focus of the live media broadcast is thus on the bus navigating through the grieving crowds, along with the close-up shots depicting the scenes inside the bus and the state honors given by the Kerala police. The scenes on these contrasting ends are often displayed side by side via a split-screen.

    The state and its parties also make elaborate arrangements to invite the general public to offer their final farewells at the official residence of party leaders, party offices, community halls, public stadiums, and huge pavilions, all known for their capacity to accommodate large gatherings. The TV channels focus on emotionally volatile audience members in these civic arenas, which become a key site for focusing and galvanizing public attention and sentiment. While the rational self-fashioning of the public sphere in Kerala may be repressive for mourning practices in general, the overwhelming eruption of emotion among the monumental attendees is nevertheless rationalized by a “civic sense.” Not letting the emotions get the better of them, the relatively “orderly” attendees remain aware of and sensitive towards a sense of civic duty to reciprocate the gestures made by the state. Therefore, the visceral outpouring of emotion against the rational stranglehold over the public sphere does not translate into general protestations against the state and its symbolic, order-maintaining power. The civic responsibilities of both state and mourners are wedded in events that enjoin the media and the citizens at large to stand witness, if not participate directly.

    Nonetheless, these spectacles reveal a form of popular sovereignty that publicly deviates from, if not challenges, the electoral basis of sovereign power. Recognizing the heightened media attention and emotional resonance surrounding such occasions, political parties often appropriate funeral processions by embedding their ideology in communications with the grieving public. After all, funerals of public figures provide an opportunity to consolidate cultural, political, or religious ground by plugging into the legacy of the departed figure. Therefore, the attention economy built around mass grieving lies at the crossroads of popular culture and the socio-political context, duly amplified by the affordances of live coverage. Kerala’s contemporary spectacles of mass grieving disrupt the self-definition of the Malayali public sphere by hitting back at the historical repression of melodramatic outpourings in public.[18] The economy built around the affective valences of a monumental crowd not only amplifies and summons populist sentiments but also provides a visual archive of the emotional outpourings that militate against a public sphere historically alienated from the events of public grieving. The mediatization of the mourning public in Kerala restores, to some extent, the reciprocal order at the heart of democratic governance by allowing a breach of the disenchantment central to the emergence of rational modernity; indeed, this long-withheld breach further amplifies the enchantments of public grieving. In effect, public grieving and its mediatization in Kerala has become increasingly overdetermined by the historical- cultural embankments against overwhelming and possibly multiplicative emotional turbulence.

    Conclusion

    We have elucidated the dynamics of a media ecosystem of mass grief in Kerala, exploring how it has consolidated an attention economy around the corporeal intensity of the attendees’ visceral responses at the funeral sites of public figures. This media economy has emerged in the state over the last two decades and leverages urgent expressions of “liveness” to galvanize the crowd around TV sets and other personal screens. The resultant affective economy of grief has birthed a set of cultural practices that reside at the intersections of politics, religion, and popular culture. However, expressions of quasi-monarchic cultural sovereignty at these funerals are not mere effects of media-centric spectacle. The digital monumentality of the live-streamed crowd in mourning supplements the real-time congregation of the mourning public. While televisual networks certainly contribute to a procession’s spectacular effects, the actual event and its material manifestations—that is, the mass culture of mourning crowds—hold more significance for understanding the dynamics of this cultural practice.

    The temporality of the mourning public is in a peculiar self-identification here, because what calls it into existence is death—an absent presence whose quiet durability guides the life of every organism. The ephemeral monumentality of crowds thus punctuates the durable communication between life and death for the chosen few whose deeds managed to affect people deeply. The mourning public, therefore, stands witness to the materiality of death rituals while rendering “heavy” corporeality to the media event. In their workday lives, public figures might not assert the quasi-monarchic popular sovereignty bestowed upon their deaths, but this contrast is broadly indicative of the repression that characterizes the rational self-fashioning of the Malayali public sphere.

                The insistent presence of grand media spectacles—live coverage of events that suspend routine television programming for several days—uncovers the ruptures intrinsic to the public sphere. William Mazzarella investigates the “totalitarian pathology” of the North Korean crowd in an essay on Western media’s disdainful responses to the widely circulated images of people crying at the death of North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il in 2011. He argues that the disdain is derived from deep-rooted liberal anxiety in Western political discourses. The impossibility for Western observers to believe the sincerity of the crowd’s tears, he avers, manifests an itch in the liberal imagination informed by a purported logic of irrationality. The underlying tension between reason and affect, a fundamental conflict in mainstream political discourse, has also been a significant axis of the rational discourses around Kerala’s public sphere. However, a rampant media economy built around the visceral apparatus of a monumental mourning public challenges, if not entirely disavows, the prevailing discourse around the rational, scientific temperament of Kerala’s public sphere. The pervasiveness of mass, melodramatic mourning undermines Kerala’s rational modernity as a cultural singularity by simultaneously situating this modernity within the cultural dynamics of mass politics and star worshipping in South India.


    Notes

    [1] Malayalam is the official language of Kerala, the southernmost state in India.

    [2] Nayanar, also the state’s longest-serving chief minister, died in 2004, at age 85, at the All-India Institute of Medical Sciences in New Delhi following heart failure.

    [3] The channel projected how Nayanar earned the respect and affection of many ordinary people as a stalwart of the communist movement and how his popularity was fashioned largely around his reputation as a charming speaker and witty political entertainer.

    [4] By the late 1990s, Gulf Malayali had become a significant driving force for the satellite TV industry.

    [5] B. R. P. Bhaskar, a noted journalist, also points out that, since Nayanar’s funeral procession, the families of many distinguished Keralites who have lived and died outside Kerala have come under official and public pressure to allow the bodies to be brought home for a funeral with state adulations.

    [6] Even though many other celebrity funerals have witnessed substantial public attention and media coverage, these three could have attracted the most overwhelming emotional outpouring and unprecedented media attention.

    [7] South India, also referred to as Peninsular India, comprises the states of Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and Telangana.

    [8] We use the terms VIP funerals and celebrity funerals interchangeably in this article.

    [9] The grieving masses also resorted to acts of vandalism: hurling stones, incinerating buses, dislodging road dividers, plundering shops, conflagrating statues of opposition leaders, and so on. Whereas, in the aftermath of NTR’s death, a follower committed suicide and many temples sprouted in rural Andhra Pradesh, where he was worshipped as a Hindu deity.

    [10] The funeral procession of Rajkumar in Karnataka, attended by nearly two million people, was also marked by violence, as mourners attacked public property, leading to police intervention involving lathi-charge and tear gas.

    [11] The library movement in Kerala is a grassroots initiative that emerged in the early twentieth century, focused on establishing public libraries to promote literacy, education, and access to knowledge for all, significantly contributing to the state’s cultural and intellectual development.

    The literacy movement is a significant social initiative that began in the 1980s aimed at eradicating illiteracy and promoting education across all demographics, resulting in the state achieving one of the highest literacy rates in India.

    [12] It includes the live coverage of Ranji Trophy tournaments, a domestic first-class cricket championship played between multiple teams representing regional and state cricket associations, and Thrissur Pooram, the largest annual temple festival held in Thrissur, Kerala.

    [13] In addition, many channels were introduced to target specific communities, including Amrita TV by the Mata Amritanandamayi Math; Shalom TV, an Indian catholic Christian TV channel; Darshana TV, the first satellite channel from the Malabar region owned by Muslim community management; and Harvest TV, a Christian devotional channel. These channels are borne out of the newly acquired economic and cultural mobility of their respective communities.

    [14] These imaginaries include an active reading public nurturing the public sphere (Bijukumar), everyday social spaces such as tea shops, public libraries, village squares, and so on forming as discursive arenas of public deliberations (Harikrishnan) and an enduring legacy of secular rationality vindicated by the left political tradition (Joseph, “Contemplative Spectator”). For more on the formatting of the public sphere, see also Calhoun and Habermas.

    [15] Mass contact program was a remarkable innovation, under which he stood on his feet for fourteen to eighteen hours a day in each of the state’s fourteen districts, meeting lakhs of voters in order to address the grievances of the people directly.

    [16] Sørensen examines how the live TV coverage of major events is key to the multiplatform strategy of British public service channels.

    [17] However, newly emergent short video platforms like MX TakaTak and Twitch, which spread content quickly due to their brief format, have little impact here. This is partly because the subjects of televisual and digital streaming are not heavily affected by time constraints; rather, the prolonged and slow-moving temporality of funerals is a fundamental aspect of the visuality of the final journeys of public figures.

    [18] The rational discourses around the state’s public sphere have been built by endorsing realism as the dominant mode of address over melodramatic articulations.

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  • Zoopraxiscope to Nope: A Case for Nonhuman Cinema Historiography

    Clare Ostroski

    Abstract

    This article examines the ontologies of blackness, animality, and technology in Jordan Peele’s Nope (2022). It argues that Nope’s CGI alien both engages and resists canonized film histories of material and discursive humanness, demonstrating the medium’s complex relationships between humanness and not. By tracing interlocking logics of racism, spectacular technology, and animal exploitation, the article seeks to undo notions of cinema as inherently “human,” arguing that Nope’s aesthetic and epistemological collapses of body, machine, alien, animal, and human can open more possibilities for cinematic ontology and historiography.

    Early in Jordan Peele’s Nope (2022), Eadweard Muybridge’s “The Horse in Motion” (1878) is described as “the very first assembly of photographs to create a motion picture.” Simplifying Muybridge’s contribution—one of many prototypic films from the nineteenth century—to the history of American cinema, the line becomes just one of Nope’s many historical citations. The film follows the Haywood family, Hollywood horse ranchers literally descended from the black jockey in Muybridge’s zoopraxiscope. As their animal actors are increasingly supplanted by digitally rendered horses, a UFO starts terrorizing the ranch, evading the family’s attempts to film it.[1] A hybrid between ship and crew, technology and living body, the extraterrestrial named “Jean Jacket” continually disrupts the family’s attempts to cinematically document it by conjuring storms, killing things, or short-circuiting electricity. Not unlike the horses, however, Jean Jacket is only violent when someone looks into its eyes. With Hollywood’s demand for horses in decline, the Haywoods, their animals, and the alien are each objectified and mystified, as the horses are rendered disposable by Hollywood’s use of computer-generated imagery (CGI), and literally disposed of by the digitally composed Jean Jacket. Relentlessly reconfiguring overdetermined histories of capture, evasion, animality, and otherworldliness, Nope approaches canonized ideas of cinematic technologies from perspectives that are anything but canonized.

    Just as history has overlooked the blackness of what it often claims to be “the very first” motion picture, black people become downright invisible when animals, spectacle, and CGI are involved. While it is a blockbuster explicitly citing some of the most naturalized ideas about its medium’s history, Nope defies those processes aesthetically, diegetically, and extratextually. In its engagement with and subversion of aesthetic and economic histories, it serves as a clarifying entry point to radically reimagining how cinematic spectacle and technology necessarily involve and can be co-opted by the people and bodies they have most often discarded. Unpacking these ideas in Nope and beyond, I argue that cinema ontologically complicates human and animal categories, but in so doing also crystallizes their material formations.

    Fig. 1. Horse “Sallie Gardner” ridden by an uncredited jockey. Screenshot from Muybridge, “The Horse in Motion.”

    Muybridge seems to flatten horse and rider, with both playing second fiddle to the main attraction of reproduced motion. Yet this blending of human and animal is further complicated by the rider’s seemingly black flesh, which materializes an otherwise uncredited human star. A simple collapse between human and nonhuman is further problematized by Muybridge’s realization of the film via celluloid, made of gelatin, a product of boiled tendons from real animal bodies. To locate animals and less-than-people in the history of cinema’s spectacular representation of humans is therefore to capaciously understand how nonhumanness has been shaped throughout modern and postmodern histories. In so doing, a historiographic practice materializes that centers animal, laboring, and non-white human subjects in the mechanical representation of images and in the logics by which those images are animated. Cinema also provides a model for understanding how violent histories are formed on a cultural register, as the use of animal death to render the meaning of humanness has changed with the medium’s technological and stylistic developments. People die, too, to reproduce images that denote which bodies have access to the humanness of cinema’s technological and spectacular apparatuses. It is a question of which people die to produce the mediated life of others, however, which fundamentally disrupts the medium’s sense of humanistic technological achievement.

    Richard Dyer has shown that cinema has been “fixed and naturalized” around privileging white subjects, from the inability of cameras to reproduce black flesh to the stylistic and cultural norms those cameras established and reified (103). Nope not only excavates those histories but denaturalizes them by showing how cinema, labor exploitation, and racist objectification are all discursively and materially forged through their interactions. While the medium is constantly in flux between light impressions on filmstock and digital imagery, it always sustains an aura of technological human progress. Those technologies and spectacles also reliably stick to the juncture between animal and machine. While their aesthetic representations might be blurred, in other words, animals and people historically rendered less-than-human are still objectified as threatening or industrially futile, while their differentiations are constantly materialized by specific historic conditions.

    In direct relation to “The Horse in Motion,” Nope emerges from these material-discursive histories to engage explicitly with the representational ontologies of human and animal. On the Haywoods’ uncannily and quintessentially American ranch, “the other” is not one symbol or body, just as the alien is not clearly a technological device or a creature. Instead, the film’s nucleus is itself a kinship forged between black Hollywood laborers, their horses, and Jean Jacket, all sharing in their “alienation” from society or themselves, yet reproducing the medium’s exploitations along species lines. The only way to synthesize the historiographic complexities in Nope is therefore to follow its lead; Nope’s interjections in the medium’s ongoing history and ontology prove a methodologically salient approach to reorienting our study of cinema toward the bodies and subjects it has historically disregarded. This essay unpacks how discursive and material nonhumanness can be understood in the context of spectacular technology, and how a politically productive definition of nonhumanness is forged from cinema’s racist distinctions between animality and humanness. Inspired by Nope’s explicit engagement with the thrust of cinematic history, this approach is marked by the establishments and ruptures of aesthetic and industrial conventions through proto- and post-cinematic eras. By tracking entanglements of differently nonhuman bodies and categories through the development of moving pictures in Euro-America and globalized re-assemblage of exploitative industries and aesthetics during the rise of digital imagery, I argue the flesh and performativities of non- and less-than-humans are foundational to film’s technological and cultural ontologies.

    I use Nope’s contrasts between alienness, blackness, and animality both as research objects and methodological models. Beginning with a citation of the “first” horse and black body in motion, the film is winkingly literal in its complications of technologies and industries of “looking.” Next to the Haywood ranch, for example, an amusement park called Jupiter’s Claim markets Jean Jacket as an all-American attraction, testifying to the exoticism of animality and the greatness of humanity’s domination over primitive violence. This cites a historical link between amusement parks, animal exploitation, and cinematic attraction by comparing the alien and early spectacle of, say, a horse in motion. But the attraction quickly devolves when its spectators gaze too intently at Jean Jacket, who swallows them whole with a mouth resembling a camera’s aperture. Produced and distributed by Universal Pictures, a replica of Jupiter’s Claim was constructed as a permanent attraction in the studio’s eponymous, real-life Hollywood theme park (White). At this attraction, the film’s historical citations conjure spatial tensions between nature and control in the modern otherness of proto-cinematic cities, this time in the overly determined postmodern attraction of real-life movie fantasy.

    Fig. 2. The final encounter between O. J. Haywood, his horse, and Jean Jacket. Screenshot from Peele, Nope

    These collapses between the ontologies of blackness, animality, and technology are not flattening but dynamic; as storm clouds brew and clear, blowing dust and blood over the Haywood Ranch, animals and blackness are put in active, discursive negotiation with the natural and economic environments the ranch materially occupies. It is Nope’s depiction of Hollywood that compares black workers to its animal performers, but the Haywoods exploit Jean Jacket like their horses, whom Jean Jacket spectacularly murders. The film exploits its audience, too, with a promotional facsimile of Jupiter’s Claim. By considering these complexities, I engage a canonized history of cinematic spectacle and technology to reinterpret the medium from a nonhuman perspective, applying that model back onto Nope. Specifically using rubrics of blackness and animality to explore the material-discursivity of spectacular technology, I seek to undo historical notions of cinema as fundamentally, ontologically human, reorienting those canonized histories toward bodies and performances of beings that have not been granted equal power to look and labor.

    While simultaneously analyzing a text and breaking apart its historicity seems unconventional, this essay attempts to animate a sort of epistemological dereliction offered by Nope’s citational and narrative structures. Both perpetuating and rupturing historical patterns of exploitation in film, Nope visualizes both the conditions that led to its existence and the ways cinema can radically break from its exploitative logics. The medium’s consistent refusal to reproduce the flesh of black and laboring people, whose bodies have been otherwise central to its technological and industrial developments, reifies both the social nonhumanness of certain people and the perceived, essential humanness of film technology. Nope’s extra-human creature, on the other hand, demonstrates a divergent potential embedded in cinema’s aesthetic and economic histories, newly imagining the medium’s social future in an age of digital nonhumanness. This essay follows Nope’s rebellious and constant syntheses of body and medium, cinema and not-human, which parallel the epistemological obstacles to using and historicizing cinema—a medium built for and by colonial-capitalist visions of humanness—for radical aesthetic means. After surveying key ontological categories at play, I maneuver between using Nope and the canon it engages to thread an alternatively nonhuman needle through some particularly well-trodden areas of cinematic history.

    Volatile Ontologies of Animality, Race, and Cinema

    John Berger succinctly describes the paradigm articulating animals and media: “The first subject matter for painting was animal. Probably the first paint was animal blood. Prior to that, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the first metaphor was the animal” (7). For Berger, the most salient lens through which to understand these processes is “the look” dominant man gives the marginal animal, thereby performing a human/nonhuman hierarchy (24). Animals are, in other words, culturally and physically marginalized by their mimetic representation and aestheticization as never-human, a discursive necessity for defining, in fact, what a human is. As animal fleshes are used on cinema’s most basically material register, it is important to consider how that “look” intersects with the political and cultural history of its making. Authorized by Nope’s jumps between historical movements and ruptures, I oscillate between the material and discursive, performance and flesh, gazing and reproducing in order to approach cinematic nonhumanness as an ongoing historical condition. Animal bodies, I argue, are used to render their cultural and philosophical selves visible or invisible via their mediation; their visibility or invisibility is an ontological foundation for the way the gazes of cameras and spectators exploit nonhumans.

    Cinema’s aesthetic, industrial, and semiotic extraction of what it deems not-quite-human bodies, that is, racialized flesh and raw animal materials, is crucial to understanding any of its other practices. From uncovering animals in the mechanical representation of images to the logics by which those images are animated, cinema also becomes an entry point for disrupting the white humanism embedded in broader materialist histories of embodied race. An ontology of “humanness” as it relates to flesh, race, and animality is baked into both cinematic technology and its cultural history. Dyer explains that the photographic apparatus and the chemistry of camera stocks were developed with only white skin in mind, “so much so that photographing non-white people is typically construed as a problem” (89). Gazing at those reproduced images, in bell hooks’s words, is thus inherently a “site of resistance” where these overdetermined marginalizations must be renegotiated by black spectators (116).  The exploitation and death of animals has also remained central to the medium’s mimetic attraction, with its ontological and industrial establishments around black subjects developing dialectically with a similar use of or disregard for the labor and bodies of animals.

    My approach to synthesizing these histories specifically takes after Karen Barad’s ontological approach to posthuman performativity, positing that neither physical materiality nor social discursivity be privileged when theorizing how bodies are externally categorized or autonomously performative (823). Applying this model, however, must also look toward the biopolitics of blackness, as its material-discursivity has precluded some bodies from ever being rendered human at all. Zakiyyah Iman Jackson, for example, defines antiblackness as precedential to animality, while also complicating the materiality of both. Because racial categorization and the colonial distinction between beasts and civilized humans were mutually and simultaneously constructed, she argues, the “matter” of blackness, that is, both its corporeal materiality and historical discursivity, has been underdetermined. Bénédicte Boisseron, on the other hand, suggests that blackness is not incomparable to animality, but materially and discursively entwined with it (xvii).[2] 

    If blackness has indeed emerged from industrial colonialism underdetermined, its historiographic rematerialization demands a human ontology that addresses the range of nonhuman interactions from which it arises.[3] In other words, a radical reimagination (or eradication) of humanism demands an explicit and ongoing theory of human and nonhuman bodies and subjects. Jackson’s and Boisseron’s differently calibrated approaches to “the animal question” in material-discursive histories of race suggest a fundamental and dialectical complexity between nonhuman animals and less-than-human people. In this materialist history, otherness, race, and animality are all mutually realized, which produces a sense of violent symmetry and simultaneity in the relation between animals and othered humans.

    Bringing this methodology to the hinge point of flesh, Hortense Spillers’s approach to the “symbolic paradigms” of humanness is imperative, braiding together the discursive ephemera of race and gender with the seen and felt materialities of enslavement (66). Of the relationship between humanness and blackness, Spillers accounts for a historical differentiation between “body” and “flesh,” which also affords the differentiation between “captive” and “liberated” subjects. Black flesh thus invariably materializes the discursive illusions of race, snagging the body in its iconographic interpellations (Spillers 67). Jackson cites this idea in her account of animalized blackness, defining the black woman as an icon around which humanness itself is materialized. The human category, discursively formed in contrast to nonhuman counterparts, does not exist without the performativity of blackness embedded in the racist, and seemingly indexical, animality of dark skin (92).[4] Materialism thereby gives a tactile sense of flesh and bone to the subjective formations of race, gender, and animality that, in Spillers’s words, otherwise “adhere to no symbolic integrity” (66).

    As Laura McMahon and Michael Lawrence argue, “[T]he ontologies and histories of animal life and the moving image are deeply interlocked” (9). When cameras were invented to be technologically blind to black flesh, that flesh of non-white subjects also became indispensable to the cinematic medium’s economic and aesthetic developments. Likewise, as the titular horse in motion went uncredited by name but became iconographic in canonized film history, the fleshes of all kinds of animals were baked into the medium; at the level of filmstock, bodies become gelatin, and in the cultural reproduction of their images, movies of animals running and dying became crucial to the way proto-cinema was understood. These dynamics are not isolated to the proto-cinematic; instead, they highlight how notions of humanness play into the semiotic and visual representations of animals throughout the medium’s life.

    Flesh complexly sutures bodies—human or not—with ideas of “performing” humanness, or not. In cinema, the performativities of flesh are uniquely visualized by its historical intersections of human and nonhuman, death and animation. Its spectacle and reproducibility materialize and dematerialize bodies; just as the dead animals in gelatin are used to represent a horse and jockey, computer animation materializes Nope’s animalistic UFO. Despite its attraction of technological innovation and industrial authority, the medium is thereby always mutually constitutive with the colonial-capitalist hierarchy of humanness. In the post-cinematic context from which Nope emerges, flesh is dangerously abstracted. When the materials of images become ephemeral digital code, we must look toward the political ecology of computer-generated images which involve human death from different industries and historical lineages. Kristen Whissel also argues that CGI figures ontologically and fundamentally involve flesh more literally, composing real-life animals with binary code through the visualization of skin, blood, and bones in a “digital body-building project” (92). As I will discuss in detail, these figures appeal to the medium’s sense of humanness through their perceived ability to kill or die (Whissel). Narratively and aesthetically, Nope tangles all these historical threads in its diegetic and extratextual reliance on nonhuman cinema, and its representation of a deadly, CGI alien.

    Slaughterhouses and Celluloid

    However influential, “The Horse in Motion” came from an already storied tradition of animals in motion pictures. Over two hundred years prior, Athanasius Kircher’s seventeenth-century magic lanterns helped to establish the parameters of cinematic spectacle by using flies as living puppets. A little later, chicken egg whites were used to adhere photos to projection glass. When filmstock began to appear, its celluloid base was made from the viscous byproduct of discarded meat. At the time of the zoopraxiscope, famed animal arbiter P.T. Barnum was using spectacular experiments to help form the disparate mimetic techniques used in phantasmagorias. Meanwhile, scientific demonstrations placed miniature aquariums of living fish or insects inside lanterns, which would screen the animals as larger-than-life shadows.[5]

    Nicole Shukin has flagged these kinds of fetishes across all “modern logics,” using “rendering” to navigate between the way animals are disassembled into resources—“the industrial boiling down and recycling of animal remains”—and reproduced in culture, “interpreting an object in linguistic, painterly, musical, filmic, or other media” (20).[6] Rather than “The Horse in Motion,” this history of movies begins with popular slaughterhouse tours at the turn of the twentieth century, where the moving line of violent sights, sounds, and smells of animal disassembly forged affective and perceptual logics for cinematic spectacle (100).[7] In the momentum of this genealogy, Shukin problematizes theoretical abstraction of the animal outright, contending it risks a collapse of historic, political, and physical differences between animals, humans, and objects.[8] Instead, she argues for a deconstruction of nonhuman fetishization, thereby reinfusing animals with “historical specificity and substance” (38).[9] 

    These marriages between material and sign, presence and representation, illustrate the centrality of animals across industrial developments, emphasizing the value of more broadly materializing nonhumanness. Shukin names celluloid, film, and electricity itself as technologies for the cultural sanitation of animal death, demonstrating a modern dependence on animal sacrifice (158). Deploying Marx’s “mere jelly of undifferentiated or human labor,” she reads analog cinema as an unavoidably visceral medium for the suture between material and symbolic animal violences (Keenan 168).[10] A nonhuman historiography thereby asserts that celluloid did not naturally develop into CGI, but coexists alongside it in an ongoing condition produced by the material relations of history, technology, and spectacle.

    Nope can be used as a contemporary hinge point for these trajectories as it straddles analog and digital technologies and histories. Whenever the Haywoods attempt to document Jean Jacket, electricity on the ranch mysteriously short circuits. When O. J. Haywood’s (Daniel Kaluuya) sister Emerald (Keke Palmer) installs a battery-operated security camera to circumvent the outages, its view is always blocked by a bug on the roof. Seemingly in cahoots with the alien pest, the insect drives the Haywoods to seek out cinematographer Antlers Holst (Michael Wincott) who is skilled at filming wildlife with a hand-crank camera. In the film’s final set piece, O. J. lures Jean Jacket to Holst’s non-electric capture, ending in the demise of the cinematographer and his analog device. To ensure the alien does not get away, Emerald leads it to Jupiter’s Claim’s Old West themed photo-op. As the alien soars overhead, she cranks the still-image camera, whose bright flash seals Jean Jacket’s reproduction in what Emerald calls the “Oprah shot.” Seconds later, the alien chokes on an oversized helium balloon released from the park, disaggregating its body and killing the creature.

    Fig. 3. Emerald Haywood’s non-electric “Oprah shot.” Screenshot from Peele, Nope.

    These composites of digital cinema in Jean Jacket’s aesthetic rendering and the filmic photography necessary for their capture and commodification are also couched by the film’s compositions of animality and nonhumanness; Jean Jacket liminally and literally floats between animal and human, material and discursive worlds. The theme park where Emerald photographically mummifies the alien has, of course, been secretly capitalizing its existence. When its business and patrons eventually succumb to Jean Jacket, terrified horses and tourists slide through the alien’s insides in a series of shots from inside the alien’s prosthetic organs. An aesthetic, historical, and discursive mishmash of corporeality and technology, the practical, digital, animal, human, and alien bodies in this sequence clearly mark the conditions from and in which Nope emerges and intervenes: viscous modernist cinema and more materially abstracted digital production.

    Fig. 4. A tourist being ingested by Jean Jacket. Screenshot from Peele, Nope.

    Calling into question the reliance of attraction industries on animal exploitation, the view from inside an alien also illustrates the violent dialectics between animals and their human counterparts. Jean Jacket acts like a horse at times and a monster at others, but Jean Jacket’s effect on electricity, batteries, and industrialized performance also suggests its categorization as technology. This recalls Shukin’s understanding of cameras and electricity as tools for the naturalization of slaughter, solidifying the perceived reproducibility of animal death as crucial for film. Despite an apparent domination of digital aesthetics, the corporeal violence of proto-cinema is also still prevalent in the era of Nope’s production, as Jean Jacket’s insides are rendered practically with rubber tubes that give its body a sense of material fleshiness.[11] Blended with its entirely computer-generated silhouette, Jean Jacket’s multi-materiality brings into relief how cinema’s reliance on death extends far beyond gelatin; electronics manufacturing necessitates inhumane labor conditions at all levels of resource acquisition and assembly, and CGI rendering requires immense physical spaces and underpaid labor to store and manage data, which then expresses some of the highest volumes of fossil fuel use in the world.[12] Just as Jean Jacket swallows people and horses in its spectacle and money-making exploitation, cinema always relies on the performance, exploitation, and/or death of bodies that are not quite classifiable as human.

    Industrial Nonhumanness in the Digital Era

    As analog photography is joined by digital imagery, the relationship between cinema and the raw materials of nonhuman bodies shifts: celluloid is no longer necessary, and creatures can be brought to life and death from immaterial code. Of course, it is an illusion that immateriality has overtaken the material violences of film, as digitality’s dehumanizing logics and various mechanical exploitations merely continue the historical precedent imperialist humanism. Jean Jacket’s computer-generated slaughter at times likens all people to horses, and at others racialized less-than-humans to all nonhuman animals. When Jean Jacket’s digital body unravels to reveal its proto-cinematic center, Nope serves as a new cornerstone for clarifying these threads of cinematic nonhumanness, especially when considering its context as a blockbuster.

    As Sarah Keller has written, theories of digital film have long hinged on historical anxieties about its colder, less-human quality (5). But digitally rendered images can also be analyzed in terms of their life- and death-giving properties. Kristen Whissel has complicated digital sublimity and its immateriality, necessarily locating the representation of material bodies at the center of digital aesthetics. Among her objects are nonhumans, which complicate any discursive categorization: computer-generated creatures she calls “vital figures.” These images ontologically synthesize animals with code in a “digital body-building project” based on maquettes that are scanned into computers, animated, and “made credibly ‘organic’” (91). It is plausible that gelatin is an important component of those maquettes and their animation, as we should also consider the fleshy death involved in the production of computers, outright. But the “dead” components of digital code more abstractly demand what Nicole Shukin describes as the “reinfusion” of material-discursive nonhumanness with historical substance.[13]

    Evocative of the use Soviet cinema made of film to perfect the radical potential of organic seeing, vital figures embody both the “optimal functioning of technology” at play in the representation of organic beings, and the lifelike aesthetic realism of those beings (Whissel 93).[14] Part of the double-marginalization of animals suggested by Berger, the believability of these creatures also relies on their potential to die and kill. Exemplified in the sickly dinosaurs of Jurassic Park (Steven Spielberg, 1993) and in the tragic demise of one of cinema’s most famous monsters in Peter Jackson’s King Kong (2005), for Whissel biological phenomena like aging, decay, and injury work to visualize their imagined corporealities. However, vital figures also always possess some sort of deadliness to their live-action human counterparts; Jurassic Park’s T. Rex and the titular Kong can easily rip real-life characters to shreds. The separation between life and death in films where vital creatures populate synthetic or fantastical environments is narrow, and their perceived ability to rupture that boundary in order to disrupt the realm of real people is what gives these organisms an “embodied presence” (Whissel 99).

    Despite their sense of hybridity, in other words, vital figures still rely on the medium’s nonhuman exploitation. The aesthetic of “vitality” of images already in ontological limbo can be further scrutinized as creatures like Kong continue to straddle monster, human, and animal identities. Seemingly demanding affection through pet-like behavior and its own death through monstrous frenzy, Jean Jacket can certainly be considered one of these beings. It is not unreasonable, then, to connect the composite aesthetics of vital creatures to the inherent racism of cinematic rendering. Hailing from a mystical and violent “tribe,” for example, it is King Kong’s fetishization of a white woman that leads to his terrorization of all industrialized America. Unlike Shukin or Peele, Fatimah Tobing Rony begins film history with Félix-Louis Regnault’s use of cinema as an anthropological tool. Documenting and comparing the motion of West Africans and Malagasy people with that of French soldiers, Regnault’s proto-cinematic projects—often conflated with the animal-centric series by Muybridge and Étienne-Jules Marey—“sought out the perfect index to measure and classify race” (30), solidifying cinema as a means for colonial industry to fuse science and fantasy in its exploitation of bodies (43). Recalling the suggestion that animals are doubly marginalized by spectacle, Rony reads the double consciousness of race in the “veil” of the movie screen, where racialized people only find images of themselves “reflected in the eyes of others” (4).[15] Regnault’s films, for instance, often render West African participants as shadows, or obfuscated bodies denied the possibility for resistive return gazes toward the camera or spectators (54). Rony reads this practice as a form of taxidermy embedded in the medium, citing the definition of a taxidermic specimen as that which transgresses reality through compositing monstrousness, death, and life (Bann).[16]

    While this connection between a colonizer’s gun and camera is obvious in the case of late-nineteenth-century anthropological filmmaking, the taxidermy effect is just as potent in the original version of King Kong (Merian C. Cooper and Ernest B. Schoedsack, 1933).[17] Rony describes this practical iteration of Kong as a monster embodying the collapse of the “‘primitive’ into the technological, the Ethnographic into the Historical,” encouraging anxieties about an end to imperialism amidst the acceleration of technological achievement (188). In so doing, the spectacle of a beast standing in for the horrors of non-white flesh exemplifies cinema’s entanglements with the complexities of humanness, animality, and violence. Jackson’s Kong was released seventy-two years after Cooper and Schoedsack’s. As Kristen Whissel has shown, however, it sustains the medium’s long-held fusion of monstrousness and death, albeit in a new aesthetic mode and with a new relation to labor.

    Continually churning imperial anxieties through technological spectacle, Jackson’s version is a logical extension of cinema’s racist gazes, fit with an indigenous tribe played by actors in blackface. For each frame of the 2005 monster’s motion, two gigabytes of data were reportedly required to render its fur atop a skeleton, muscles, and skin.[18] Nearly twenty years later, the third installment of a different Kong franchise, Godzilla x Kong: The New Empire (Adam Wingard, 2024), has undoubtedly used even more data, space, labor, and animal motion to render a war fought by two of colonial-capitalism’s most spectacular and canonized monsters. The contrast of Kong’s earthly gorilla with the alien Godzilla perhaps implies a more complicated aesthetic of nonhumanness in the digital era.

    Jean Jacket, in its material-discursive threats to blackness, humanness, and industrial attraction, both subverts and self-referentially perpetuates these patterns of animality. Its complexity demonstrates that deadly, aesthetically and discursively hybrid creatures are where notions of nonhuman spectacle erupt in digital cinema. Digital cinema recalls the sanitation of animal violence cast through the lens of industrial achievement, as defined by Shukin. For, as CG lifelikeness necessitates human innovation, the subjects of its deadliness and of cinema’s power to mediate life and death remain liminally between human and not. CGI is unique with regard to the matter that creates its image, which is seemingly void of boiled mammal tendons. However, in addition to the colonial-capitalist exploitation of non-Western electronic producers, its monstrous depictions of nonhuman life are just as successful in their alienation of non-white and nonhuman fleshes through spectacularizing death.

    Since Muybridge’s horse, spectacular and radical cinema developed dialectically throughout the twentieth century, in part through their continued indulgence of animals and monsters. Post-cinematic bodies are shaped, in large part, by aesthetic and technological practices of 1970s and 80s Hollywood, when black actors like Bolaji Badejo and Kevin Peter Hall literally became Alien (Ridley Scott, 1979) and Predator (John McTiernan, 1987) through practical special effects. Focusing on a later moment in cinema history with CGI affords a clearer trajectory of the medium’s material-discursive formations of nonhumanness through its changing use and aestheticization of bodies; a computer’s ability to materialize and disaggregate creatures raises again the question of how an industrially formed medium can radically intervene in our material world. Digital figures, in other words, flag a distinct rupture in the way film as an industry and practice can and does imagine what people are.

    Synthesizing Proto- and Post-Cinematic Nonhumanness

    These overlaps between proto- and post-cinematic styles and industries accord with Sarah Keller’s “volatile” cinema history and ontology, which describes the medium’s assumed “humanness” as always up for grabs. There is an inherent slipperiness to movies, whose affective and material malleability engender diverse modes of encounter. The cinematic experience began before images could move, and extends beyond their conventional exhibition, with the only ontological commonality among film objects being their “sensuous” appeals (133). This appeal recalls an agential and often resistive relationship between discourse and material, as differently directed agencies and gazes are bound in cinema’s sensorial experience.

    Cinematic devices, experiences, and the medium’s resistive and hegemonic participations therefore all interact to produce the medium’s ontology, suggesting ways in which bodily things and processes shape technology and spectacle. Citing André Bazin’s metaphor for photography as a mummification of “flesh and bone,” Keller postulates “the human element” as a nexus for cinema’s tendencies to produce uncanny or astonishing affects (4). The very premise of moving images relies on a binary between a subject’s living, animated body, and cinema’s mimetic reminder of death’s inanimate destiny. Its unseen black skin and forgotten electronic laborers substantiate this, uncovering a complicated differentiation between human (living bodies) and not (dead objects). Despite its attraction as a human technological feat, the moving image is, in Keller’s words, an “ungraspable nonobject that nevertheless derives from real things and generates real experiences” (133).

    As celluloid shows, those “real things” can be animal materials, and as Mary Ann Doane has argued, “real experiences” are often produced by spectacular catastrophe, or the represented potential for confrontation with death (276). This necessitates differentiation between deaths and lives that are spectacular or disturbing, flagging notions of animal/human categories. The very idea of “confrontation” is also complicated, considering that when audiences encounter the spectacle of dying they are also confronting the mammal tendons and inhumane labor used to capture it. Identifying bodily peril as a central technology for early film, Jennifer Bean clarifies that, like “the capricious antics of animals,” cameras and projectors were also unpredictable; as “vital figures” would be nearly one hundred years later, early movie stars were rendered realistic through their potential to die, and cinematic realism was produced vis-à-vis the “destructive force emanating from within technology’s steely body” (30). This kinesthetic deadliness extends beyond cinema’s appeal to realism. Early movie stars and vital figures differ in the way their perceived humanness serves as a ballast for cinema’s “steely body” when conceptualizing its produced encounters between people and machines. The material conditions that historically form cinematic objects are perhaps most visible at the film/digital horizon, which Keller explains entirely in human terms: “[T]o describe celluloid as kindly, warm, and human but digital cinema elements as cold and inhuman . . . shapes the way media are received and perceived. . . . Celluloid connects to the shape of the world it films, whereas the digital translates the world into numbers” (5). Despite its invocation of humanness, celluloid’s reproduction of nonhuman marginalization through the material composition of animal bodies might make it more “animal.”

    Keller’s attention to humanness in and around cinema points toward the nonhuman hierarchy in technologies of mobile catastrophe. Expanding the idea of bodily violence as crucial to early spectacle, she says the Edison Manufacturing Company’s Electrocuting an Elephant (1903) revealed both the “ontological uncertainty” of cinema and the salience of the depiction of life-and-death throughout its history (45-46). The film shows Topsy the circus elephant succumbing to electric execution, another example of what Shukin sees as the naturalization of animal slaughter and fetishization of technological marvel (161). Its concentrically symbolic and material animal death, where cow tendons are used to reproduce elephant slaughter, means neither the celluloid nor elephant corpse ever completely vanish into spectacular ephemera. For Keller, because the film can be rewound, it also makes Topsy’s death both inevitable and undoable, despite the permanence of her material demise. Like an early film camera, the digitally rendered Jean Jacket is prone to unpredictable “sputters” in its outbursts of violence, cinematic glitches, and unraveling, becoming an animalistic attraction at Jupiter’s Claim through its perceived ability to kill. In its similarity to horses, however, the alien’s defeat can also be compared to Topsy’s, as Jean Jacket’s image is “mummified” by analog photography, and its meaning by the ongoing animation of images and history in Nope.

    A key element to the way these historically sensual relationships play out in this film is found in the theme park, which Lauren Rabinovitz defines as historically intertwined with cinema: both are “‘inventions’” of modernism’s “dichotomy of commercialized labor and leisure” (12), where logics of “looking” are dialectically exchanged (37). In the postmodern world from which Nope emerges, she argues, the ontological connection between movies and amusement parks has shifted to the latter, producing a “fantasy of ‘living inside the movies’” (173). In other words, the contemporary theme park on which Jupiter’s Claim is modeled, in its synthetic and larger-than-life environments, is fundamentally about “Control and Nature” (Rabinovitz 173). Jupiter’s Claim takes this literally, not only in harnessing an animalistic alien for spectacular consumption, but in doing so by stealing the Haywoods’ horses as bait, rendering their bodies and the ranchers’ labor as uncompensated elements of the performance. Like its engagement with Muybridge and the literalism of Jean Jacket’s aperture-like mouth, the Haywood Ranch and Jupiter’s Claim become grounds for more reinterpretations of canonized film history in their untangling of minoritarian and animal bodies, cinematic gazing, and industries of attraction.

    Jean Jacket’s violent outbursts are also borne from more complicated natures and controls, as tensions between the alien and Haywoods literally change the weather. Just as the alien begins performing “unpredictably” at Jupiter’s Claim, its erratic, aerial movements block out sun and kick up sand in swirling clouds. When O. J. angers it with a look, the alien seems to conjure a rainstorm, floating in the deluge while regurgitating blood and guts onto the Haywoods’ home. While O. J. thinks Jean Jacket does this as part of their pet-like territorial feud, the sudden and visceral expulsion of prosthetic and computer-generated flesh appears to distort the straightforwardness of Nope’s canonized historiography. Jean Jacket does not just disrupt business-as-usual for Jupiter’s Claim and the Haywoods’ strained place in the film industry. By aesthetically synthesizing different historical threads, spitting them back out in narrative re-engagement with the Haywoods’ participation in cinema, the alien challenges a posterity of technological and economic racisms put forth by “The Horse in Motion.” Nope itself extratextually parallels the engagements of and resistances to Hollywood and film history made in Jupiter’s Claim and on the Haywoods’ ranch. While consistent with Rabinovitz’s definition of theme parks’ desire to immerse tourists in “the movies,” when real-life tourists explore the “fantasy” of Jupiter’s Claim in Universal Studios, they are also inadvertently engaging with Nope’s destruction of that fantasy in its constant and simultaneous reverence for and rejection of the most canonized versions of cinematic history. Jean Jacket is not reproduced with any visual tricks or animatronics in Universal Studios, but with glitching TVs, the sudden absence of ambient wind machines, and disembodied gurgling sounds.

    Fig. 5. A storm of rain, blood, and flesh on the Haywood Ranch. Screenshot from Peele, Nope.

    In the film, Jean Jacket’s aperture terrorizes black life, but its CG tendrils connect the Haywoods to a nonhuman, environmental otherworld, consistently symbolized by clear skies and storm clouds. The alien’s seemingly inevitable death also breaks that link, ironically reinstating the capitalist hierarchy of humanness which otherwise excludes the Haywoods from cinematic participation. When a non-electric camera nearly shatters the alien’s digital composition, history is rendered an impenetrable loop of colonial discursivity and capitalist production. Nope’s tensions between disruption and continuation demonstrate a broader potential for cinema to rupture its own nonhuman history, citing capitalist and radical aesthetics in a fundamentally black movie produced and promoted by a legacy studio. Relentlessly citing Muybridge, the invisibility of Hollywood’s black Westerns, and a historiographic slippage between organic and technological seeing, the film takes an American canon of film history seriously as often as it rips it apart.

                If cinema is an ontological non-object, then, perhaps, so is its history. Jean Jacket’s consumption and regurgitation of teleological technology and industry seem to assert just that, while also defining nonhumanness as its own ontological category: in the context of cinema, slippery and potentially radical. Yet, the specifics of the alien’s aesthetic and material negotiations, like the violence at Jupiter’s Claim, are also narratively and affectively introduced by more conditional murkiness. Its animalistic, machine-like, and marginalized body is like a camera—a monster of looking with the potential to kill or economically advance the Haywoods—and also a less explicable historical force.

    In the spirit of tensions between nature and control, Jean Jacket’s storm of blood also recalls Christina Sharpe’s definition of American black death as a kind of weather; produced from the tension between colonial-capitalist racism and the insistence of black survival, racism is a historical, affective, and ongoing condition. Borne from friction between racist industries and technologies, oppositional gazes and aesthetics, Nope uses canonized ideas about cinema to ontologically and historically stretch the medium between and across ideas of humanness. The conditionality of these “storms” becomes even more complex considering the specific tensions between Jean Jacket’s rubbery insides, practical vomit, real-life theme park spin-off, and computer-generated silhouette. Not unlike Shukin’s slippery definition of the “rendering” of flesh and images, there is also a tautological connection between the “capture” of images and of animals, and the “storminess” of condition and industry.

    Conclusion

    Nope is primarily organized around the Haywoods, narratively unfolding chronologically with Jean Jacket’s intrusion. But it is also interrupted by flashbacks to what we learn is the backstory of Jupiter’s Claim’s owner. The film’s very first shot is of a bloodied chimpanzee on a live TV set, what we later learn to be a diegetically infamous event. Like Jackson’s Kong breaking from chains in violent reaction to a camera flash, during taping of a sitcom in 1998, the show’s chimpanzee actor reacted to the sound of popping balloons by murdering his human co-stars. Future theme park arbiter, Jupe (Steven Yeun), was a child actor on Gordy’s Home who was left unharmed by the titular Gordy even after they lock eyes in Nope’s opening sequence. The scene that later interjects the Haywoods’ story is grotesquely violent: Gordy extends a paw dripping in blood to Jupe after his animalistic rage has settled. Seemingly concerned for Jupe’s safety, the entirely computer-generated ape is narratively anthropomorphized in a matter of moments, transforming from monster to person. As the camera embodies Jupe’s gaze at Gordy attempting to make physical contact, Gordy is shot by law enforcement, blood and guts spreading toward the camera.

    M. Shadee Malaklou has identified similar relations in Jordan Peele’s Get Out (2017) and Us (2019), where she sees an animal gaze as a black gaze in the rhythmic looking toward, away, and between cameras, creatures, and black bodies. By contrasting and intersecting rabbits, deer, slaves, and other structurally erased people, Malaklou argues, these films challenge the onto-episteme described by Spillers, suggesting a kinship between all bodies and subjects objectified as nonhuman. As Joshua Bennett has argued, both black persons and animals are “readily available as fetish, floating signifier, scapegoat, ghost, corpse,” rendered such in part, according to Malaklou, through an objectifying look (Bennett 28).[19] Produced and shaped by a cultural and political moment obsessed with a “decaying Anthropocene”—in Nope’s case, perhaps, also signified by random storms of blood—Malaklou suggests Peele’s filmography theorizes a future blackness specifically in the material-discursive conditions of the 2010s and 2020s (87). Get Out and Us are radical, in other words, not necessarily because of their material resistance to white film labor and representation, but because of how they imagine blackness and animality to emerge from the same history, teaching “even the most human among us how to live in common-unity with nonhuman sentient life, and thus, how to survive the ends of Man” (72).

    It might still be true that, in Rony’s terms, film taxidermizes black bodies. Malaklou suggests, however, that it does not have to be a bad thing. Albeit in an opposite political mode, this context of the “decaying Anthropocene” is strangely reminiscent of the historical context of King Kong (1933) as Rony defines it, with its cultural anxieties about the end of white empire. Although complex, Peele’s prior films rather explicitly intersect the deaths and gazes of roadkill and a black character being pulled over by police (Get Out), or rabbits in cages buried alongside black characters who comment, “we’re human too, you know” (Us). Nope reinstates many of its director’s previous looks at and between nonhumans, comparing and muddying distinctions between horses and a black family. Gordy aesthetically and narratively falls in line with these animal kinships, too, but his humanoid movements and narrative anthropomorphism fit more neatly in an ontological genealogy of apes, race, and cinematic aesthetics; he moves and acts like King Kong. In those scenes on the set of Gordy’s Home, rote emotional beats and aesthetics are interpolated within a different ideology, one seemingly at odds with the cinematic medium. While this demonstrates an ideological animation of cinematically taxidermied blackness, as Malaklou says about Peele’s earlier work, Nope fundamentally differs from Us and Get Out in adding the extra-human Jean Jacket. Gordy is exploited on a film set, becomes enraged, and is shot by police, only for his story to be misinterpreted in Jupe’s continuation of exploitation at his theme park. While this thread narratively clarifies some of Nope’s commentary on blackness in American entertainment, paralleling O. J.’s horses’ and Jean Jacket’s own reactions to camera flashes and gazing, Jean Jacket is what elevates the film’s interventions to be both aesthetic and historiographic. In rendering this otherworldly being, Nope stakes a nonhuman history of cinema by suggesting that co-opting the death of black bodies, by gaze or alien consumption, is not unlike co-opting an industrial medium of colonial-capitalist spectacle for radical means.

    The alien materially-discursively synthesizes the many ways black people are dehumanized, made other, in film, and suggests how they can use cameras and eyes to undo those things. Its movements are not merely humanistic or animalistic, blending technology and corporeality to concentrically redress relationships between monstrousness, labor, race, and cinema. By bringing together cultural icons of alienness and real-life animals, Jean Jacket is also materialized from another synthesis between abstracted code and material political ecologies. Despite its aesthetic and ontological fantasies, the alien’s death is still easily marketed by the Haywoods in their rightful reclamation of Hollywood’s spectacular looking. Much as many people have refused, resisted, and renegotiated cinematic gaze, Jean Jacket also refuses to become an attraction of motion. It is inevitable, however, that it becomes a spectacle of slaughter; just as “The Horse in Motion” privileges spectacle over its black and animal stars, Nope elegantly privileges the Haywoods over all else, including the awesome imagery of Jean Jacket. When the alien’s digital image and symbol of synthetic nonhumanness is ironically destroyed by the interruption of film history, Emerald and O. J. still disrupt cinematic conventions by capitalizing on their own exclusion and terror.

    What remains underdetermined in Nope’s complex and pointed reorientation of film history is the materiality and subjectivity of its horses, whose bodies are seemingly disaggregated by the computerized presence of an extraterrestrial beast. Nope’s materialization of blackness, in other words, still relies on animal exploitation. The material-discursive entanglements of nonhumanness that lead those horses to Jean Jacket are partially and purposefully undone in the alien’s fantastical mummification and death by a resistive cinematic eye. As Peele’s camera, the Haywoods, Jean Jacket, and Nope’s audience intersect gazes and the material conditions that formed them, eyes also turn to the future of cinema, whose intersecting lenses might begin to incinerate the nonhuman exploitations on which the medium has historically depended.


    Notes

    [1] While apparently black, the jockey in “The Horse in Motion” is uncredited and was only later identified as “jockey Domm” in an 1878 article in The Photographic News and by a student lecture delivered sometime between 1876 and 1882. No other specifics are known about the athlete (“Automatic Electro-Photography” 352; Armitage 176).

    [2] Boisseron argues that “The black condition is without analog except for the animal” (xvii), citing Wilderson, “Gramsci’s Black Marx” (238).

    [3] For more on the necessary interactions between critical animal and race studies, see Malaklou.

    [4] This is also in dialogue with Donna Haraway’s investments in “making kin” by the meeting of animal and human fleshes; she argues that the formation of “species” itself is inherently racist and sexist (When Species Meet, 105).

    [5] Charles Musser outlines these intersections in the first chapter of nonteleological proto-cinema history, “Toward a History of Screen Practice,” pp. 15-54.

    [6] This idea is also, in large part, a response to Akira Mizuta Lippit’s theory that animals are discursively salvaged by technological media after “vanishing” from historical modernity (Shukin 40).

    [7] Salomé Aguilera Skvirsky has triangulated histories of labor, animal slaughter, and cinema by defining the cinematic “process genre” as “the sequentially ordered representation of someone making or doing something” (2). These sequences, according to Skvirsky, involve waged and unwaged labor which restore practical activity to an aesthetic dimension and impart a haptic sense of material consciousness to the labor depicted (40).

    [8] For Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, human and animal categories have been altogether eradicated, as each “deterritorializes” the other amidst postmodernism’s annihilation of form (22). Animals and art, they argue, function to free the human from identity and destroy taxonomies that distinguish between human and not (187). Shukin is also directly engaging with Jacques Derrida’s use of “looking” to philosophize how animal specters relate to humans from their realm of discursive suspension.

    [9] Shukin takes up Michel Foucault’s biopolitical critique of the Marxist superstructure to analyze “an economic reality underlying the ideological smokescreen of animal signs,” rather than taking up a strictly essentialist materialism or post-structuralist “economy of signifiers” (26). Combining economic and discursive meanings in this way forges an ontological biopolitics of animals without also eradicating connections between ideology and structure.

    [10] Cited by Shukin (75).

    [11] In a behind the scenes feature, Jordan Peele shows how the sequence inside Jean Jacket was filmed with a prosthetic “tube” through which real actors were “intimately” filmed (“How Nope’s Scariest Scene Was Made”).

    [12] For surveys on the labor and environmental exploitations of the computing industry, see Ceruzzi; Cubitt; and Kara.

    [13] For example, microchips and batteries needed to build computers and data centers used to produce CGI require cobalt, mined by child laborers and other modern-day slaves primarily in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Kara). The computing industry produces toxic waste dumped across the world, primarily in indigenous communities, where rates of civilian illness and death are high (Cubitt).

    [14] Films like Strike (Sergei Eisenstein, 1925) aesthetically contrast and discursively blur human exploitation and animal slaughter, comparing, in Mikhail Larionov’s words, the “imperfect apparatus” of human and animal gazes to the more effectively defamiliarizing “eye” of a camera (qtd. in Nesbet 26; 28).

    [15] This is a citation of W. E. B. Dubois’s idea of double consciousness, wherein black people are always forced to look at themselves “through the eyes of others” (3).

    [16] Originally cited by Rony (101).

    [17] Donna Haraway notes that this comparison between cameras and guns occurs throughout “natural history” more explicitly in Primate Visions (42).

    [18] In a widely cited, now-defunct online article, Studio Daily apparently reported the digital size of Kong’s fur in 2005. Ian Failes speculates about the probability of the large data usage again in 2020, explaining the cost of network bandwidth to build the fur by frame was likely the cheapest option.

    [19] Originally cited by Malaklou (81).

    Works Cited

    Armitage, Edward. “Lecture VI.” Lectures on Painting: Delivered to the Students of the Royal Academy, G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1883, pp. 151-81.

    “Automatic Electro-Photography.” The Photographic News, vol. 22, no. 1038, 1878, pp. 351-52.

    Bann, Stephen. The Clothing of Clio: A Study of the Representation of History in Nineteenth-Century Britain and France. Cambridge UP, 1984.

    Barad, Karen. “Posthumanist Performativity: Toward an Understanding of How Matter Comes to Matter.” Signs, vol. 28, no. 3, 2003, pp. 801-31.

    Bazin, André. “The Ontology of the Photographic Image.” What is Cinema? Vol. I, translated by Hugh Gray, U of California P, 2005, pp. 9-16.

    Bean, Jennifer M. “Technologies of Early Stardom and the Extraordinary Body.” Camera Obscura, vol. 28, no. 3, 2001, pp. 8-57.

    Bennett, Joshua. “Buck Theory.” The Black Scholar,vol. 49, no. 2, 2019, pp. 27-37.

    Berger, John. “Why Look at Animals?” About Looking, Vintage Books, 1992, pp. 3-28.

    Boisseron, Bénédicte. Afro-Dog: Blackness and the Animal Question. Columbia UP, 2018.

    Ceruzzi, Paul E. “The Cloud, the Civil War, and the ‘War on Coal.’” Interfaces, vol. 2, 2021, https://cse.umn.edu/cbi/interfaces-volume-2-2021#The%20Cloud.

    Cooper, Merian C. and Ernest B. Schoedsack, directors. King Kong. RKO Radio Pictures, 1933.

    Cubitt, Sean. Finite Media: Environmental Implications of Digital Technology, Duke UP, 2017.

    Deleuze, Gilles, and Félix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Translated by Brian Massumi, U of Minnesota P, 1987.

    Derrida, Jacques. “The Animal that Therefore I Am (More to Follow).” Translated by David Wills, Critical Inquiry, vol. 28, no. 2, 2002, pp. 369-418.

    Doane, Mary Ann. “Technology’s Body: Cinematic Vision in Modernity.” differences, vol. 4, no. 2, 1993, pp.1-23.

    Dubois, W. E. B. The Souls of Black Folk. Bantam Books, 1989.

    Dyer, Richard. White: Essays on Race and Culture. Routledge, 1997.

    Eisenstein, Sergei, director. Strike (Стачка). Goskino, 1925.

    Electrocuting an Elephant. Edison Manufacturing Company, 1903.

    Haraway, Donna. Primate Visions: Gender, Race and Nature in the World of Modern Science.Routledge, 1990.

    –––. When Species Meet. U of Minnesota P, 2008.

    hooks, bell. “The Oppositional Gaze: Black Female Spectators.” Black Looks: Race and Representation, South End Press, 1992, pp. 115-31.

    “How Nope’s Scariest Scene Was Made.” IGN, 30 Dec. 2022. YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=79KzV8YEkME.

    Jackson, Peter, director. King Kong. Universal Pictures, 2005.

    Jackson, Zakiyyah Iman. Becoming Human: Matter and Meaning in an Antiblack World, New York UP, 2020.

    Kara, Siddharth. Cobalt Red: How the Blood of the Congo Powers Our Lives. E-book, St. Martin’s P, 2023.

    Keenan, Thomas. “The Point is to (Ex)Change it: Reading Capital, Rhetorically.” Fetishism as Cultural Discourse, edited by Emily Apter and William Pietz, Cornell UP, 1993.

    Keller, Sarah. Anxious Cinephilia: Pleasure and Peril at the Movies. Columbia UP, 2020.

    Kircher, Athanasius. Ars magna lucis et umbrae: liber decimus. Apud Joannem Janssonium a Waesberge & Heredes Elizaei Weyerstraet, 1671.

    Malaklou, M. Shadee. “Surviving the Ends of Man: On the Animal and/as Black Gaze in Jordan Peele’s Get Out and Us.” Journal for Critical Animal Studies, vol. 18, no. 2, 2021, pp. 70-99.

    McMahon, Laura, and Michael Lawrence. “Introduction: Animal Lives and Moving Images.” Animal Life and the Moving Image, edited by Michael Lawrence and Laura McMahon, Palgrave, 2015, pp. 1-19.

    McTiernan, John, director. Predator. 20th Century Fox, 1987.

    Musser, Charles. The Emergence of Cinema: The American Screen to 1907. U of California P, 1990.

    Muybridge, Eadweard. “The Horse in Motion. ‘Sallie Gardner,’ Owned by Leland Stanford; Running at a 1:40 Gait Over the Palo Alto Track, 19th June 1978 / Muybridge.” Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division, 1878, https://www.loc.gov/item/97502309/.

    Nesbet, Anne. Savage Junctures: Sergei Eisenstein and the Shape of Thinking. I. B. Tauris, 2003.

    Peele, Jordan, director. Get Out. Universal Pictures, 2017.

    –––. Nope. Universal Pictures, 2022.

    –––. Us. Universal Pictures, 2019.

    Rabinovitz, Lauren. Electric Dreamland: Amusement Parks, Movies, and American Modernity. Columbia UP, 2012.

    Rony, Fatimah Tobing. The Third Eye: Race, Cinema, and Ethnographic Spectacle. Duke UP, 1996.

    Rubin, Rebecca. “Jordan Peele’s ‘Nope’ Hits $100 Million at Domestic Box Office.” Variety, 10 Aug. 2022, https://variety.com/2022/film/box-office/jordan-peele-nope-box-office-record-1235337966/.

    Scott, Ridley, director. Alien. 20th Century Fox, 1979.

    Sharpe, Christina. In the Wake: On Blackness and Being. Duke UP, 2016.

    Shukin, Nicole. Animal Capital: Rendering Life in Biopolitical Times. U of Minnesota P, 2009.

    Skvirsky, Salomé Aguilera. The Process Genre: Cinema and the Aesthetic of Labor. Duke UP, 2020.

    Spielberg, Steven, director. Jurassic Park. Universal Pictures, 1993.

    Spillers, Hortense J. “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe: An American Grammar Book.” Diacritics vol. 17, no. 2, 1987, pp. 65-81.

    Whissel, Kristen. Spectacular Digital Effects: CGI and Contemporary Cinema. Duke UP, 2014.

    White, Abbey. “‘Nope’ Fictional Theme Park Becomes Permanent Attraction on Universal’s Studio Tour.” The Hollywood Reporter, 7 Jul. 2022, https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/movies/movie-news/jordan-peele-nope-theme-park-universal-studio-tour-1235176829/.

    Wilderson, Frank B., III. “Gramsci’s Black Marx: Wither the Slave in Civil Society?” Social Identities, vol. 9, no. 2, 2003, pp. 225-40.

    Wingard, Adam, director. Godzilla x Kong: The New Empire. Warner Bros. Pictures, 2024.

  • Political Remediations in Interactive Fiction: Emily Short and Liza Daly’s First Draft of the Revolution

    Susan Vanderborg

    Abstract

    This essay reads Emily Short and Liza Daly’s First Draft of the Revolution (2012) as a leading example of recent digital interactive fiction that uses remediations for political critique. The clashes and contradictions in First Draft’s remediations of paper texts are where the piece discloses the propaganda of a suppressive regime as well as challenges the idea of a new medium’s immanent revolutionary potential. The essay briefly traces interactive fiction’s development as a genre grounded in remediation and concludes by placing First Draft in context of related interactive “complicity” texts and other political directions for the genre’s future remediations.

    In their classic monograph Remediation (1999), Jay David Bolter and Richard Grusin discuss the many methods programmers use to rework previous media: archiving pre-digital texts, simulating their authority, contesting them, or pledging extravagantly to “revolutionize” earlier information structures, as well as civic involvement, for greater “democracy” (45-46, 15, 59-60). But few digital remediations combine a would-be revolutionary world with a sensuous tribute to older means of writing as dramatically as author Emily Short and programmer-designer Liza Daly do in their 2012 interactive fiction First Draft of the Revolution. Amid plans for a new edition of the piece, this article reexamines the brilliant remedial play that made its own first release so impactful. First Draft has been hailed as “advancing the form of interactive fiction” (Boluk et al.); arguably it does so by probing the most chaotic aspects of remediations—the inconsistencies and historical distortions under their surface appeal to the past—to critique both ruling-class propaganda and claims of revolutionary media.  

    At the plot level, First Draft’s story remediates one of the most iconic political revolutions, writing “an alternate version” of the onset “of the French Revolution” (Short and Daly, “Statement”).[1] It opens in July, 1788, twelve months prior to our world’s Bastille assault, with one character predicting “a great and cataclysmic change” in the country, “now very near” (FDR 20). Marked an “epistolary novel” (Short and Daly, “Statement”), it is praised for depictions meshing “the personal and the political” in class-inflected marital disputes (Joyce). Juliette, the slightly lesser-ranked wife of an elite aristocrat, Henri, gets “banished” to the outskirts of Grenoble in his home province (FDR 2) for her faux pas toward the top Parisian nobility.[2] Her letters plead to be invited back to that world even as she criticizes its immorality. Henri’s missives deploy Juliette to verify whether a certain poor village boy is the result of his prior liaison with a peasant woman. Meanwhile, a rebel friar, whose words register only in secondhand accounts, tries to exploit Juliette and the boy in order to stage assassinations of the nobility.

    The biggest difference in this “alternate” history, and what announces remediation as a crucial diegetic praxis, is that socioeconomic status in its France depends on being actual wizards at media translations. Only the most preeminent aristocrats here have the biological capability to do a magic of “correspondence[]”-derived “links,” where “models” and imitations relay information, seemingly with no data lost (FDR 8, 26, 3). Connected “mirrors,” for instance, can display “rooms in another province” for a viewer (3). In the story’s letter correspondence, a pun that indicates how essential epistolary media are to the world’s class structure, the user writes on one piece of noble-magicked stationery and those sentences materialize on a “linked” piece in the recipient’s home (2-3). A lynchpin of the friar’s “revolutionary” scheme is the desire to make “highborn” correspondence magic available to commoners (9, 20). The rebels, in other words, already combine disparate senses of revolution, the supplanting of a regime and its social framework with the medial “‘revolution’” Elizabeth Eisenstein defines: an “abrupt and decisive change” in their “communications technology” that would have “long-range irreversible” outcomes for information acquisition, labor, and communal relations (Printing Revolution 333, 314, 334) if the rebels could use it.[3]

    In the smaller scope of textual form, First Draft’s own structure could be considered a revolutionary turn in interactive composition. Every lexia shows the remediated image of a character’s letter on stationery; the reader finishes the page by emending several sentences. For each indicated line, we click on the mental writing prompt that we want out of the ones proffered, as when we can make a character ponder etiquette (“‘I should hint more delicately’”), defend candor (“‘Perhaps he will tell me why I am here’”), or despair of a response (“‘It’s no use asking again’”) (FDR 4). Each of the prompt-links takes us to a separate phrase in place of the old line or excises it. This process, Short notes, was game-changing at the time, “credited with influencing the text-replacement mechanic of many subsequent games in Twine” (“Games”). The piece took “Best Use of Innovation” in the 2012 XYZZY Awards for interactive fiction. There have been extended discussions, too, of how its line rewriting creatively remediates epistolary literature or challenges filmic depictions of letters (Gold; Ng).

    But there is less discussion of an equally inventive remedial device: the deliberate aporias within First Draft’s remediations as the letters ambiguously evoke two distinct eighteenth-century media at once: manuscript and print. First Draft’s remedial inconsistencies, examples of what Bolter and Grusin describe as “hypermediacy” (5), are not a sidebar, but the key vehicle for interpreting the political revolution plot.[4] They convey the power of the aristocratic regime even while divulging its machinations and lies, suggesting how beguilingly persistent its public fictions can be. The inconsistencies focus attention on the work and workers excised from noble stories, but also raise questions about the revolution’s outcome and whether, or how, a formally revolutionary communications medium might impact political struggles. In The Gutenberg Revolution, John Man argues that a groundbreaking technology can render sovereign power more efficient, but can also give suppressed populations “a lever with which to organise revolts” (14). In First Draft’s mix of accurate, expunged, and speculative historical references, the effect of that lever is unclear; the rebels have trouble reappropriating the nobles’ correspondence medium for their own purposes, and the shifting verbal and visual remediations force readers to reconsider their own support for one side or the other in the political conflict.

    Interactive Fiction Definitions and Remediation Scholarship

    Narratives embedded in remediation aporias are a growing part of a genre that has always pioneered new forms alongside previous media. Even if considering electronic formats only, “interactive fiction” is a generatively flexible grouping, tied to its remediations of many other genres. Nick Montfort, in the preface to Twisty Little Passages (2003), the initial monograph on digital interactive fiction, cites descriptions by Short, among others, for his definition: “computer programs that display text, accept textual responses, and then display additional text in reaction to what has been typed,” with a “parser” for user language and the invention of “a simulated world” as the most crucial constituents, going back to games like Adventure and Zork (vii-viii, 1).[5] He also traces traits linked to chatbots such as ELIZA (82-83) and to riddle poetry, whose language is still “‘mysterious’” and enticing to readers after the riddle is unraveled (61-62). That poetic complicacy, however, makes him acknowledge “more expansive” definitions of the field as well, including hypertext or crossover works splicing parser and hypertext features; as he points out, Bolter in Writing Space (1991) describes hypertext compositions as “‘Interactive Fiction’” (Montfort, 8, 12-13). In a 2007 essay, N. Katherine Hayles cites Montfort’s beginning definition of interactive fiction, while also discussing “variant” compositions like the phantasmagoric pictures springing from selected scenery in Donna Leishman’s Deviant (sec. 2). Hayles notes the continuity between games and interactive fiction, but argues that the latter fosters deeper “interpret[ation]” with “clever modifications of traditional literary devices” (sec. 2). Short’s own 2014 entry for interactive fiction in The Johns Hopkins Guide to Digital Media addresses the genre ambiguity by starting with two “common usages” of the phrase: one, “any story that allows reader participation to alter the presentation or outcome of the narrative,” prioritizing that “narrative development over gameplay”; and the second, which she dates from the 1980s, is the “parse[r]” and “world model” Montfort cited (Short, “Interactive” 289). First Draft itself fits best with her flexible first definition. It is listed in her “Games” portfolio under “Literary Interactive Fiction” and relies exclusively on writing prompts for its world progression, but is composed in hypertext.  

    First Draft also appears in the Interactive Fiction Database, whose offerings from multiple countries include games, prose, and poetry in parser programs, hypertext, crossovers, and other formats, some entries mainly verbal but others extensively multimedia, each remediating different sources.[6] While all-verbal text programs may take on the paragraph layout of print stories, the IFDB offerings for 2021-22 alone also include a piece with Wiki pages for an apocryphal telecast program (Guest et al.), an imitation of a phone “texting adventure” (Willson), a chess game tale (Schultz), a cacotopia’s psychological support bot (Riemer), a space disaster game with NASA photographs (Sarikhani), and a source-cataloguing game with emails, newsgroup posts, diaries, a Wikipedia overview of a food program, and early computer monitor images, alongside a premise of translating reports enciphered in DNA (Chen). The pieces’ politics are equally varied, from less overtly political puzzle games to the omnipresent politics in Autumn Chen’s The Archivist and the Revolution, a title invoking both remediation and rebellion; the game opens in a tyrannical city marked by “transphobia” and poverty, the site of prior and possibly new “[u]prisings” and “[c]oup announcements.”

    The gamut of intertexts in these field-opening interactive fictions—indeed, the fact that their innovation follows from their conflicting references to several previous media—fits well with recent remediation scholarship that cautions against studying a “revolutionary” medium only on its own, and reexamines what that adjective means in form or politics. Rather than focusing on “the revolution[ary]” nature of one technical breakthrough, as in Eisenstein’s targeted focus on “the printing press as an agent of change” in social and conceptual spheres, medievalist Jessica Brantley supports analyzing a “multiplicity of . . . media and their complex intermedial interactions” within a specific time (Brantley 201-03). In later contexts, Brian Reed in Nobody’s Business (2013) discusses “avant-garde” poetic “remediation” texts that question the myths and forms of a “digital revolution,” preferring instead “obsolescen[t]” media styles, many in print, to counter commercial electronic patterns and explore “aporias” in “existing institutions” (74, 26, 2-3, 48). Jessica Pressman in Digital Modernism (2014) similarly redefines “revolutionary” texts as ones that decline digital models of superficial “interactivity” in favor of an electronic reworking of modernist media to attack, from the inside, “technologies of global capitalism” (8, 7, 105, 9). While not discussing First Draft, she does mention “intentional dissonance” through “remediation” breaks, as when a Flash text frustrates audience surmises by imaging presswork sheets with weblink markers (107-08). Her approach utilizes Marshall McLuhan’s base work for remediation theory, media archeology, Hayles’s theory of “‘intermediation’” with “cyclical and recursive interactions,” and historical studies by Lisa Gitelman and Bonnie Mak of “overlapping and often mutually dependent usage of old and new technologies” (Pressman 28-55, 58-60, 158-62). Reed and Pressman both suggest political effects for remedial forms, but in terms of “bringing about revolutionary social transformation,” as Reed notes, a text’s political “critique of language and literary form in the context of class struggle” is different from fostering “a violent revolution” (xiii, 48). 

    A reluctance to theorize “newer media” solely as “revolutionary” shapes James O’Sullivan’s own arguments about “aporetic” digital literature, with its denotative “inconsistencies,” in his 2019 Towards a Digital Poetics (3-4, xvii, 99). Looking at how media as well as discrete e-texts “are consciously evolving and remediating,” he asserts, could reframe debates about the politics of medial forms, since “[t]echnology is inherently political, and thus simultaneously heralded as being as oppressive as it is liberating” (121, 16, 97). O’Sullivan lauds electronic literature for setting up more markers of “semantic intent” than print paratexts do, he agrees with Pressman that some digital styles might “perverse[ly]” remediate mass-sold programming, and he discusses two political pieces, one documenting public rallies (100-03, 53, 107). But he remains dubious about broader revolutionary claims for digital literature in either form or politics, reiterating that the “liberation” and “upheaval” in “the established order” advertised for “seductive” electronic texts are still circumscribed by the companies selling the ostensibly “revolutionary tools,” which are “embedded within systems designed to reinforce the status quo,” coaxing artists and their audience to accept those conditions (14, 12).

    The Path to Revolution? First Draft’s Remediation Plots

    First Draft’s own remediations skillfully play out the tension between the dream of a revolutionary medium and the pull of older forms at every level of structure and plot. The player’s independence in First Draft’s innovatory digital line-rewriting strategy is curtailed, as reviewers note,in ways that echo less flexible aspects of conventional stories on paper.[7] While the text may prompt us to “[r]ewrite” specific letter sentences (FDR 4) with preset substitutions, it is only to better “expose[]” the letter writers’ psychological traits, as Short says in her often-cited author notes, stating that we won’t derail those traits or the letters’ purposes, and that several of the verbal amendments “are required” in every lexia to get to the following page (“First Draft” sec. 4, 5). Nor does our input shift the story’s closing, in which First Draft differs from Short’s earlier interactive fiction Galatea (2000), which one dedicated researcher logs at 70 variant resolutions (Palop), some recasting not only the title character’s fate but her basic identity.[8]First Draft’s one endgame remediates the single closing of conventional paper narratives, and the end is “lightened,” as Short says, in its lack “of consequences for” the Ancien Régime (“First Draft” sec. 3). In this respect it is less provocative than the paper epistolary novel it resembles, Pierre Choderlos de Laclos’s Les Liaisons dangereuses (1782). Instead of Laclos’s exposé of French nobles’ turpitude leading to duels, deaths, and public ignominy, all the noble characters survive and thrive in First Draft, with the convent-educated ingénue just becoming more agile at out-maneuvering her new relations.[9] The aristocracy also seems to thwart the friar’s revolutionary menace—or this instance of it—easily by the end.

    Rochelle K. Gold, who discusses First Draft in an excellent dissertation chapter on electronic correspondence literature by women, does see qualified rebellions within the plot, despite the forced or demarked line amendments, set ending, and need to replay to recover or modify a page draft after it’s rewritten (99, 90, 92-93). Noting “literacy” qua “magic” in this France as the basis of “political and social power” (94), she argues that the rewritings redefine literacy, undermining premises of a letter’s “truth-telling” or the “fixity of print” codex pages versus the “variations” of e-books (85, 88-89), while the eighteenth-century remediations subvert “progress” truisms that communication machinery is “always improving and that newer is usually better” or “equali[zing]” (86, 130, 215).[10] Yet her chief focus is less on the details of First Draft’s paper images per se than their digital allegory. The note seen by sender and recipient at nearly the same moment, she points out, is a metaphor for digital mail, and the characters’ anxieties about “magical literacy” suggest alarm about the modern “digital [literacy] divide” (94-96). If this world’s wizardry symbolizes programming aptitude, it also has “limits,” she argues, “joints and gaps,” shown in the emendations, “that characterize the entangled subjectivities and materialities of networked reading and writing,” as when spellcaster Henri feels “control . . . slipping away” in his frantic “‘translation’” of the friar’s phrases (98, 86-87, 96). Juliette, with no software-spells, still shows “agency,” Gold contends, though in a “highly constrained” form as she “strategically navigate[s]” the chauvinist media culture’s “censorship” and its drive to make subjects police themselves; so too the player can do “a reparative reworking of the text and of history” that valorizes “surprise” and “multiplicity” (92-93, 99, 95, 100, 98, 86). While Gold acknowledges that Juliette’s growth comes at the cost of any allyship with the poor, a plot point that she notes splits the audience’s allegiance, too, Gold sees the political “revolution,” like “the so-called digital revolution” to which it is linked here, being on its way nevertheless (97-100).[11] Even if First Draft’s magic pages anticipate future media, however, we need to explore more deeply the details of its conflicted remediations of paper texts. They remain the crux of the piece’s political satire, grounding its critique of the aristocracy but also creating doubt as to whether the Revolution is truly coming. If, as Nigel Hall contends in an essay on historical pens and stationery, “the materiality of writing,” its tools and effects, “is at its most visible when the technology doesn’t work” rather than when it goes seamlessly (84-85), then we might extend that scrutiny to the fissures in their remediated forms.

    Handwritten

    Noble Stationery

    First Draft’s politicized remediation of the written letter starts with the social aesthetics of its represented paper. The noble stationery fits Johanna Drucker’s description of “auratic” texts that “generate a mystique, a sense of charged presence,” sometimes with “an effect of age—of magical and arcane references” or of the “precious” and “costly” (93-94). Possibly the paper’s linked aspect is always superadded by noble spellcasters, as when the friar makes his pupil “perform some magic on a page of writing” (FDR 14), and any paper could be so transmuted, but Daly’s images celebrate the stationery’s sumptuous veneer, in tints from cream to yellow-green and peach, with detailed, often floral patterns, each page style the cherished property of a single correspondent.[12] These images create the fiction of opulent goods whose “textured, deluxe presentation” only a “privileged” few can savor, as Short describes (“First Draft” sec. 2), with the floral designs symbolically naturalizing the owners’ wealth, leisure, and prestige. Refinement flaunts itself by contrast: Juliette “plans her letters on ordinary pages,” a reminder of her own “ordinary,” or lesser-ranking origins, “but when they are ready, she copies them on” the “enchanted” products (FDR 2). Shadows and position shifts suggest a three-dimensional heft; when we send a letter, it tucks into the holder’s slots like a treasured keepsake or a valuable document framed in a patron’s archive.

    The word “enchanted” tries to elide the effort and workers behind such products. Magic obviates the labor of postal systems, although the sentence “No time is wasted on couriers” (FDR 2) still reminds us of the mail gatherers, assorters, letter tax handlers, and coach drivers overseen by the historical postal tax farms (Vaillé 75-78, 87). “Enchanted” elides, too, the arduous twelve- to fourteen-hour shifts in eighteenth-century “paper mills,” with employees from linen processors to sheet shapers, treaters, and checkers (Rosenband 214, 219) getting out the actual pages pre-magic. The past participial adjective also deflects the identity, time, and effort of the spellcaster, since Short has stated in the source text for another Lavori game that “[l]inking” objects takes “labor” (“Book 3”). Juliette says that “[Henri] chides me about the waste of linking paper” (FDR 10), but cost and “waste” are cloaked to outsiders by noble discourse; “like magic,” after all, denotes something done “with great ease” and “incredible rapidity” (“Magic,” def. 1.e). Even the less physically taxing chore of handwriting is covered up as the letter recipient watches dissociated language effects emerge on a page, the narrator granting instrumentality only to the texts: “The words form themselves on the matching sheaf in her husband’s study” or “Another letter writes itself,” Henri’s impression when he receives a correspondence from his sister (FDR 2, 5).[13]

    But just as the friar denounces the nobles as “tricksters” (FDR 16), so too readers know that the spectacle of sumptuous material goods delivered effortlessly, that lie on which noble authority rests in this world, is magic as more prosaic “illusion” or “trickery” in these remediations (“Magic,” def. 3; 1.d). We aren’t able to finger the screen pages, test their thickness, or hold the designs up to the light.[14] Images and narrative also create conflicting accounts of the paper’s magical form that puncture its noble aura. Within an individual lexia, we edit and “[s]end” the same stationery recto, rather than see images of the two sets of paper the narrator mentions: the “ordinary” stock for brainstorming versus the magicked stationery for a finished letter (FDR 4, 2).[15] The commands to “Rewrite this,” “Erase,” “or write” (FDR 8), centered above a character’s interior monologue lines, do show up on images of smaller, plain note papers with a pin struck through them, but are still attached to the same stationery page. Secondly, the Mother Superior’s non-magicked stationery, dispatched “by a much slower conveyance” (FDR 19), looks visibly similar to the type of stationery the sorcerous nobles use, blurring the distinction between “legitimate noble” versus illegitimate users and media (FDR 8). Finally, while Lavori paper seemingly thwarts mail theft or interception, that familiar plot device in epistolary novels, the names for media magic already suggest covert anxiety over its superior dependability. “Link” and “correspondence” challenge the exactness of message transference; a correspondence is a “[r]elation of agreement, similarity, or analogy” (“Correspondence,” def. 2.a) rather than an identical copy, just as digital lexias and imaged papers remain imperfect analogues of one another in the text’s remediations.

    Lines and Hands

    Like the paper images, the text’s descriptions of written lines and writing tools create an aristocratic façade of social power, but with similar contradictions that subvert the nobles’ claims for their exclusive, occult status. Short explains: “the act and experience of writing is tied to aristocratic identity. These characters belong to a world in which literacy rates are not high, and their ability to write and communicate quickly is part of the magic-based luxury they enjoy in their lives” (“First Draft” sec. 2). First Draft’s narrative links the letters’ lines to the noble families’ bloodlines in combined images of writerly and sexual reproduction, again suggesting the extent to which the aristocrats spread fictions that naturalize and supernaturalize their purported superiority. For writing as inheritance, “Henri gets out a pen that belonged to his grandfather, and begins to write” (FDR 7), his magic inked lines and magic family line both reinforced by this handheld phallic heirloom, on a page with an equally suggestive phallic floral design.[16] God is the ultimate paternal line drafter, Juliette learns at the nunnery: “the Lavori magic was given,” in politicized terms, “to the leaders of men, by God” (FDR 9). Except, the smooth transference of neither written lines nor bloodlines is assured here. There is something wrong or inauthentic about the remediated letter lines from the beginning. The cover’s “A PARIS” (FDR 1) and other place or character names are the only French words (plus the Italian “Lavori d’Aracne” for the noble magic [23]) in the story; the rest is in English. The shift from one lingua franca to a new one is a reminder that words and social beliefs that seem shared, respected knowledge do not always stay that way. A mock-historical tract accompanying an earlier Short interactive fiction piece on Lavori magic, Savoir-Faire (2002), adds subtle political satire to the language shift, since we learn that the English, unlike the French or Italians, are unimpressed by noble sorcerers: “Of the Lavori in England, there is less Noise made. The English, being too stable of Sense and staid of Disposition . . . disdain to laud their Nobility of magickal means with the same Reverence” (4).

    Apart from being in the wrong language, the First Draft letter lines seem easy to disrupt. After Henri’s angry, shifting construals of an enciphered letter sent by the friar, whom he thinks has seduced Juliette and therefore interrupted his bloodline, “‘fears’” of adultery also “‘corrupt’” his written lines’ hegemonic syntax and punctuation (FDR 16). The first draft of a letter line to Juliette, “I have to ask you what is the truth of your relationship to this friar, is it possible that he has already—” is a run-on and cut short at the same time (17). The second trial, “do you take him in place of me” (17), a distorted wedding vow, lacks any capitalization and punctuation, blurring the inception or confirmation of the family. And though Juliette is “‘faithful,’” Henri’s unrevised letter lines about bringing his own illegitimate son into the aristocracy disclose how much their bloodlines’ supposedly inherent powers are faltering: “Few legitimate noble sons now demonstrate so strong a manifestation of the gift” (12, 8). His sister adds chattily in another letter: “I believe I have discovered who is the father of the P— heir,” citing and undercutting that familial inheritance in the same breath, and she warns Henri that legitimate children can just as easily be “disown[ed]” and “disinherit[ed]” by aunts who dislike their marriage alliances (6), further narrowing the gap between lines of authorized and unauthorized magic media users. As the phrase “Lavori d’Aracne” suggests, moreover, the nobles’ mythical lineage, a title the letter lines use to impress inferiors (FDR 23, 8), is just as conflicted. “Lavori” itself means “labor[s]” or “work[s]” in Italian, which can signify acts from physical work to performances (“Lavoro,” def. 1-2, 8, 10). While monastics in a “mystic order of the Weaver” do approach Lavori magic lines worshipfully (FDR 20), the classical Arachne’s lineage and works are far from mystical. Here is Ovid’s portrait of Arachne the artisan, seen through the perspective of a goddess jealous of her ability:  

                                                 . . . The girl was no one
    In birth, nor where she came from; her father, Idmon,
    Was a dyer, steeping thirsty wool with crimson.
    Her mother was dead, a common sort of person,
    With the same sort of husband, but the daughter
    Was famous for her skill . . . (129)

    This is a curious choice of legend for the French nobles to adopt, undercutting the uniqueness of their gifted lines even as Minerva shares their contempt for “common” ancestry. Arachne’s trade gestures toward real workers prior to the Revolution, the “spinners, flax-combers,” and “weavers,” who, as Kathryn Norberg notes, were among “the most impoverished segments of Grenoble society” (179), and back to paper workers as well, since paper was made from old cloth like woven linen. Arachne’s weaving lines are also openly rebellious against the mighty, debasing the gods by limning scenes of their sexual misbehavior (Ovid 132-33). She should be a revolutionary inspiration, or at worst a counsel against social insubordination, given her spider sentence. How was she remediated as the aristocrats’ patron saint so thoroughly that Juliette is infuriated by a child fixing a peasant enclosure with Weaver sorcery (FDR 9)?

    The cooptation of Arachne’s story reveals a larger tension between revolutionary critique and conservative motifs in the remediated lines. First Draft’s letter lines explore the contradictions between the nobles’ exquisite writing forms and regressive ideologies and the grievances of those whose work supports their lifestyle. The Mother Superior herself, presumably noble but not of Lavori status, can, in a revision prompt, describe an individual Lavori representative like Henri as less than “‘trustworthy’” (20), an adjective, interestingly, often applied to textual definitude.[17] She goes further with another line amendment, equal parts daring and qualified, that replaces a remark on the friar’s motivation as “jealousy of his betters” with “[i]n times of trouble we cannot always trust entirely to our leaders and authorities, which may be misguided” (20). Does she consider the mistrust itself “misguided” or rather the “leaders and authorities”? This advice ostensibly warns Juliette about the friar, but he is a lowly advisor; could she be questioning the Lavori nobles, the “betters,” as well? Yet at the same time they register dissent, First Draft’s remediated lines also suggest how readily possible revolutionaries or allies might “trust” in, and be coopted by, the premier aristocrats’ practices. Juliette may “self-silenc[e]” critique in her lines (Short and Daly, “Statement”), but she still relishes penning Henri a magic letter “daily” (FDR 2).[18] Her most independent, consequential act is one of remediation—impersonating the linguistic style and handwriting of Henri’s lines in a letter enticing his son to Paris near the story’s end, after which she speaks of the high aristocrats’ resources as “our strength” (22-24).

    Even from the outset, Juliette’s care for her hands, the primary letter-writing tools, suggests her assimilation to the Lavori cause. Far from Paris, she displays her enhanced position by overbuying fancy Grenoble “gloves” (2) to protect them. Tellingly, the “Rewrite” preference and “Send” pointer for the noble letter lines is a perfectly white, unsullied hand emerging from a ruffled sleeve, the paleness denoting both the writer’s leisure and racialized markers of class status, in contrast to hints at the low-class friar’s swarthier features, “eyes that are almost black” and “black eyebrows” (4, 18). The gloves themselves have historical revolutionary significance. While Grenoble was noted for crafting upscale gloves, glove stitchers saw little of the vendors’ profits; they were “the single largest group of individuals exempted [from taxes] because of poverty in 1789” (Norberg 167, 187, 190). Henri’s grumbling about Juliette “enrich[ing] the merchants of Grenoble” (FDR 8) similarly ignores the workforce. In the run-up to the real Revolution, about a month before Juliette’s first letter, Grenoble saw a skirmish between laborers and royalist servicemen during the “Day of the Tiles” (Popkin, New World 95-96; Sgard), but Juliette’s lines don’t mention this, its absence further questioning a revolution’s likelihood here.

    Printed

    The medial conflict in First Draft’s letters that most openly raises questions about revolutionary history breaks out of one remediation into another one entirely. The narrative gives details about characters’ handwriting—“Mother Superior had learned letters in Alsace and her penmanship bore Germanic quirks” (19)—but the visual letter lines on the stationery pages don’t imitate that handwriting. Instead, they mainly simulate print typefaces. The remedial shift comes right past the frame words. The command “Send the Letter” is in Zapfino calligraphic font, and the narrator’s first few words and concluding “The End” are in Youngblood by Insigne, whose “swirly serifs suggested writers who were committed to beauty” (Daly, E-mail). However, instead of continuing these fonts or copying a cursive letter, as the end of Short’s Savoir-Faire feelie does, Daly picked Hoefler Text for the letter lines, a typeface-modeling font, which in Windows reverts to Times New Roman (E-mail), another type-based font. Even the signatures are typed. The uncertainty about the letters’ media status heightens the narrative clash between discretion and exhibition, opening up a supposed domestic correspondence.[19] But introducing print specifically in a fought-over correspondence medium that rebels wish to access makes it difficult not to interrogate possible links between revolutionary form and politics.

    If print, as Brantley notes, was often seen as the ante-digital epitome of a medial “revolution” (202), Short chooses a historical context where that medium also seemed to aid in advancing a political revolution. Robert Darnton champions the unifying and transmutative work of print texts in the French Revolution: “Without the press, [the rebels] can conquer the Bastille, but they cannot overthrow the Old Regime. To seize power they must seize the word and spread it—by journals, almanacs, pamphlets, posters, pictures, song sheets, stationery, board games, ration cards, money, anything that will carry an impression and embed it in the minds of twenty-six million French people” (xiii). “The printing press,” Darnton concludes, “served as the main instrument in the creation of a new political culture” (xiv). Newspapers especially, a formula molded by letters (Earle 4; Bazerman 23), delineated and “g[a]ve legitimacy to the new lawmaking of the Revolution,” Jeremy Popkin contends in Revolutionary News (3-5), though he acknowledges that “[i]lliteracy and poverty” narrowed their client base (82).

    Yet in First Draft’s alt-history, the use of print for and by the revolutionaries is another historical facet that’s elided. Granted, the story opens in 1788 when French newspapers were more monitored by the regime, but, as Popkin notes, “[i]n practice . . . the government had never succeeded in imposing complete control over the flow of news” (“Gazette de Leyde” 77).[20] First Draft’s characters might expect regime critique, if not in the monarchist press, then in newspapers composed in French from companies abroad (Popkin, Revolutionary News 20-21); “political pamphlet[s]”; or “the first truly revolutionary journal,” the Sentinelle du peuple (25-26). But these resources are never mentioned by the friar, and the hope for timely news in print seems wholly usurped in First Draft by the correspondence pages under the nobles’ proprietary use, the handwriting references in print format suggesting their hand in sending their own account of relevant news within their social circle.

    The promise of swift news itself may be undercut here. After all, the framing print remediation that moves us from the diegetic stationery pages to our own reading act is not a newspaper but a book. Daly describes Hoefler as “a bookish font,” and she was interested in how “the affordances in the EPUB ebook standard” reshaped book metaphors, though the text is currently played on the Internet (E-mail). Short, too, depicts it as “more book-like than game-like” in her portfolio (“Games”), and while the inkle team post notes the fiction of “handwritten letters,” they reinforce print codex allusions with their choice of a framing book image with type on the cover page (see fig. 1). It is prefaced, in the Electronic Literature Collection, by an opening lexia where Daly expands the book frame with replicas of the cover edges (see fig. 2), suggesting a shelf of such volumes.

    Fig. 1. Cover page of First Draft of the Revolution, © Emily Short and Liza Daly with visual design and production by inkle. Used by permission.

    Fig. 2. Cover design of First Draft of the Revolution as a shelf of volumes as shown in the Electronic Literature Collection, © Emily Short and Liza Daly with visual design and production by inkle. Used by permission.

    The showy, collectible book frames for prosperous buyers pull us far away from revolution. Blunting the exigency of the letters, First Draft’s print book icons assert a regally closed, finished text, with all the delay after portrayed scenes that a publication process implies, the blood of the Terror, if it occurs in this world, muted to the tasteful dull red of the inscribed leather. The inkle post foregrounds that remove, its shifting media references invoking “a book of letters that you might find open under glass in a museum” to “bring to mind the voices of the long-dead authors, their characters, personalities and concerns . . . that ghostly feeling.” Or perhaps First Draft’s simulated print lines create another kind of detachment, suggesting the text’s actual status as historical novel, buttressed by the note monologue lines that are both quoted and italicized, like a fusion of a novel’s typographic conventions for speech and thought, the print genre markers again diminishing the need for intervention. Daly’s book cover illustration of printing further heightens the tension between the conservative and the revolutionary. While not probing its origin directly, she selected the picture “because the individual elements conveyed craftspeople at work producing documents” (E-mail). The engraving shop illustration does crucially restore the work of text production that First Draft’s nobles downplay. But the image is taken from the “adresse de l’imprimeur Claude Lercullier,” engraver for the Cabinet des Estampes in the royal library, and the triple coats of arms featured are the king’s, with the fleurs-de-lys at the top, the ship signifying the city of Paris, and the cross design of the Abbé Bignon, the royal librarian (Courboin 160-62), evoking both the power of the ruler and religious sanction for that rule. Here is another tantalizing ambiguity. Is this monarchist imagery remediated seditiously in First Draft to introduce the earliest stages of the Revolution, or are revolutionary impulses coopted by the people the rebels want to depose?

    Minimizing or questioning printing’s part in the French Revolution in these clashing, polysemic remediations anticipates O’Sullivan’s argument that it is not a medium itself that is “revolution[ary],” but rather that its divergent uses and impacts are better evaluated as they augment or contend with other formats (5, 16). The friar’s media takeover revolution fails, in part, because it lacks such dialogue. He wants to “kill every Magician,” but takes the same writing technology the “oppressors” do without détourning their usages or intermixing populist forms, and he often reproduces noble logic despite his cruder language (FDR 16). The letter he sends on magicked paper, like First Draft’s cover image, has a façade of royal and religious authorization, the lines cryptographically tied to “a psalm” by “King David,” and a contempt for those who “do not know their place” (15-16), simply flipping classism’s targets. His audience is equally unexpected. Though “he does not seem the kind to conspire with lords and counts” (14), his correspondent, Juliette speculates, is probably an aristocratic woman he has successfully enticed—“seductive and dangerous” are the Byronesque traits Juliette attributes to him (14, 24)—even as the story suggests he is the one seduced by noble forms. Juliette conjectures that the friar is another illegitimate son of an aristocrat, hinting that he “is angry” less at their regime than at being denied a “place” in its exchanges (9, 16). The upshot is disastrous; Juliette memorizes his letter from a “copy” (14), the word suggesting his social and medial mimicry, to send her husband. As patrician Henri, we can “‘[d]ecrypt’” the friar’s letter (16), but have no opportunity to amend it as the friar, underscoring the latter’s entrapment within noble communications. Never dignified with a name, the friar speaks only from reported dialogue and this letter, both remediated with unknown accuracy in Juliette’s writing.

    The friar’s media prodigy tutee is assimilated even more quickly into aristocratic exchanges. Despite his revolutionary training, Juliette notes, “at other times he is an ordinary young man, pleased to be served his breakfast chocolate, and to be winked at by serving girls, and to have coin for gambling with. In the end I think these motives will pacify him” (26). Here, “ordinary” shifts from its earlier sense of media resources for those of lesser rank; the “ordinary” condition now is to take delight in “our” top aristocratic comforts, which others “serv[e]” up obligingly (26). First Draft’s remediations betray a pessimism about how much our media messages or politics truly evolve. “In the end,” Juliette writes (26), and First Draft’s own end page (27) gives another meaning to revolution, since in clicking beyond it we pivot back to the opening title page’s Ancien Régime coats of arms, our final remediating glance inviting us to play the same game route again.[21] First Draft’s gesture of return may itself be sardonic political commentary, a closer analogue to real history than it seems, evoking the French Revolution’s aftermath with the repressive Terror, and then Napoleons, new monarchs, and new revolutions before France’s final republic.[22]

    First Draft makes us ask why we create specific politicized fictions of previous media. Is this pre-Terror letter remediation, genteel in tone despite its subject matter, or else enciphered, a respite from our own millennial traumas—economic inequities, a planet in crisis, the brutality of a war ostensibly waged on terror itself? Does First Draft, as Gold suggests (130), deconstruct the Enlightenment metanarrative, expressed in texts like Condorcet’s Progress of the Human Mind, of humans moving toward fresh discoveries and political disenthrallment?[23] Or does it address that metanarrative’s afterlife? What makes the discourse of revolution and magical technology so wrenching in this 2012 piece is perhaps less an e-mail analogue than the reminder of the social media forums and cell phone texts used in 2011 movements like the Arab Spring revolutions or the Occupy Wall Street protests in the United States. Even given subsequent questions over how transformative or curtailed the technology was for the movements, and our awareness, as O’Sullivan notes, of the companies behind the machinery and programs (14),[24] it is still frightening to see Short and Daly’s alt-history with its possible revolutionary forms so tightly locked down to service only noble ideology. That’s the catch. Any of the above interpretive possibilities might be part of First Draft’s remediations, but the one constant is that we always play as nobles. Short describes our own captivation by, and naturalization of, the “deluxe” writing tools she remediates: “It encourages [the reader] to identify and feel complicit with the aristocratic characters, and their natural desire to protect the advantages they have” (“First Draft” sec. 2). The text’s “aesthetic pleasure” (Short, “First Draft” sec. 2) echoes Montfort’s idea of interactive fiction’s “pleasure” (3), but is also hijacked as a warning. If First Draft’s narrative does not confirm an approaching revolution, it nevertheless insists that readers examine their roles in maintaining real-world political and economic exploitation, whether by demonizing would-be rebels as “villain[s]” (Short, “First Draft” sec. 3), trying to placate or coopt those injured by our choices (FDR 26), ignoring the conditions of workers and other disempowered communities, or simply consuming enjoyable products each day without examining their hidden costs.

    Remediations for Interactive Fiction’s Future

    First Draft’s political remediation strategies place it within a type of interactive fiction that Short describes as turning the genre’s participatory structure into a measure of conscience, “confronting the player with a situation in which a morally dubious action is necessary to make narrative progress” to see if they would “be complicit” in the supposed “progress” (“Interactive” 291). Aaron Reed’s 2011 text maybe make some change, which Short cites as an exemplary “complicity” fiction (“Interactive” 291), has some nightmarish analogues to First Draft’s subtler language games and remediations. Here, too, are unexpected definitions of “ordinary people”—but the context is grimmer; they are U.S. troops in court for the “killings of Afghan civilians,” referencing army crimes in Maywand in 2010 (Reed, “Statement”). While the project remediates news features, combat videogames, and soldiers’ declarations, the main text’s font in the browser edition chiefly mimics handwriting, here as a signifier of “confess[ion]” and “accus[ation]” (Reed, “Notes”; “Statement”), revising its pronoun from “you” to “any one of you,” “he,” and “we,” before a final typed “i,” to implicate the shooters as well as a national culture that inculcates violence (maybe). The remediations visually reinforce the game’s charge that we do not easily escape past training: “you will only do what you know how to do and you only know how to shoot” (Reed, maybe), as our keyboarding hands double with the shooting hands.[25] Attempting to write other commands—“calm,” “hug,” “warn”—when they appear later often spurs a team member’s objections or the rejoinder that this choice is falsifying history: “that’s not what these reports say” (Reed, maybe). The hesitant, lowercase, less-than-revolutionary title, further ironized when we find out that the words express a sentenced soldier’s original desire to help in Afghanistan (Reed, maybe), recalls First Draft’s ambivalence about whether individuals and communities can reverse course.

    Mark Marino’s 2012 Living Will is equally trenchant, using remediations and verbal/family lines to depict “the long shadow of colonialism” that its players “profited from” (“Author Statement”; Clause III). Advertised as a modern entrepreneur’s “telematic testament,” it also represents itself as a “paper” composed with Thackeray-style mockery, the remediations pulling us into a history of Congolese oppression from “King Leo[’s]” Force Publique to recent pacts with warlords for mining cellular phone materials, a reminder that “[y]ou hold in your hands” oppression’s payoffs in machines more tangible than the ersatz paper (Clause I, “Preramble,” Clause III, opening page).[26] We enter as the mine’s corporate “heir” (opening page) with little hope of revamping its practices, simply settling if the proprietor survives or someone else—often us—takes over. The patriarch’s garbled remediations—“I lift pen to lips, pen to tongue, pen to parchment”—suggest his justification that profiteering and human rights crimes span media history, even as his initials, “E R,” condemn that erring attempt at exculpation (“Preramble,” opening page).

    micha cárdenas redirects player politics in Redshift and Portalmetal (2014), arguing that remediations can be a “Spell for Decolonial Time Travel” (“Intra-Retinal Texting”), opposing imperialist and cisgender biases in canonical historiography. The “portalmetal” assisting “travels” to planets despite policed barriers in her speculative cosmos is remediated cultural ornaments: “We have found the power in these / necklaces, bangles, hoops, nose rings, / that connects us to our ancestors, / our communities” (“Finding: Portalmetal”). The video images of “these” decorations in curves and iridescent wreaths like calligraphy swirls, shown off proudly by the character Roja, signify another type of communicative “power,” reinscribing histories of emigrants, Indigenous populations, and trans collectives after “diaspora” (“Redshift and Portalmetal,” “Living on the Ice Planet”). cárdenas’s eco-fable about fleeing a polluted Earth gives a wry turn to the idea of drafting revolution, implying that we will devise a “new home” world (“Back Home”) less from revolutionary striving than because we have made our first one unlivable. Remediating current site videos for the fantasized planets, natural spaces described as fouled with toxins (“Desert: Damaged Environment”) or long corridors of industrial smoke, scaffolding, and street lights by the terrorizing “border checkpoint[s]” (“Stopped by the Border Patrol,” “Dreaming of Running”), emphasizes the exigency of using other bequeathed narratives and protocols than the ones devastating the world now (“Statement”).[27] 

    The next wave of remediation-focused interactive fiction may continue to challenge official media or celebrate marginalized ones. They may give readers more rewriting options for remediated genres as interactive fiction adapts AI, emulating a game like AI Dungeon, where the player can not only type instructions but also rewrite the program’s responses to pivot the plotline, or “Custom” develop a new narrative universe (Walton).[28] Other interactive fiction may follow First Draft’s friar in inciting players “to break the bonds of magic” (24), taking apart the linked media in a composition to examine the politics of aporias within each remediation. Kentucky Route Zero (2013-2020) lines up that analysis, its narrative well-noted for remediations of antiquated equipment, symbolically “starved for power” or parts to represent the characters’ entrapment in dying jobs and losing battles against monopolies, becoming “ghosts in the static” of a message of national growth (Act I).[29] At the same time, more players, too, “learn the art of the magicians” (FDR 23), writing their own interactive fictions of rebuilding or preserving through remediations. While expanding the dungeons of interactive formats may not lead to the liberation of a real Bastille, these remediation texts can make us better readers of our media histories and their political backgrounds, help explore the rhetoric of protest movements, or test out new audiences for old subversion strategies. First Draft’s own remedial surfaces, I have argued, succeed in undermining noble messaging where the friar failed; the incongruously linked forms project a different account, and accounting, of media “heritage” (FDR 20), yoking together the struggles of disparate historical workers, the demands and misconceptions of users, and the cost of production techniques and the ideologies that supported them. New artists investigating “[h]ow to create” their own aporetic remediation narratives “and the value of doing so” (FDR 24) will be indebted to Short and Daly’s production.


    Acknowledgments: Thanks to my stellar research assistant, Mary Elizabeth Smith, for tracking the Youngblood font and Lercullier’s adresse.  

    Footnotes

    [1] Quotations and image reproductions, used with permission from Emily Short, Liza Daly, and inkle, are taken from the online edition of First Draft of the Revolution in the Electronic Literature Collection’s third volume, Windows format, cited as FDR. Punctuation and italics are reproduced from that format.

    [2] Juliette’s convent instruction suggests noble lineage, but she is below Henri’s Lavori tier. Deirdra Kiai, too, notes that the nuns have not furnished Juliette with the “social graces” demanded by Henri’s “privileged” peers.

    [3] Eisenstein herself, in “On Revolution and the Printed Word,” apposes the medial and civic denotations of revolution, examining “possible connections between the advent of printing and those political upheavals” in the English, American, and French Revolutions (190). 

    [4] Bolter and Grusin define “hypermediacy” as “[a] style of visual representation whose goal is to remind the viewer of the medium,” stressing “‘fragmentation, indeterminacy, and heterogeneity’” as they quote William J. Mitchell, in contrast to “immediacy,” where audiences are “immersed” in a text, with its “information made visible and almost tangible,” while “the interface” seems “transparent” (272, 29-31).

    [5] Andrew Plotkin adapts Montfort’s parameters, especially the “immersion” in the constructed “world,” from “‘text adventures’” to “‘graphical adventures’” like Myst as well, correlating the assorted effects of mouse taps with keyboarded “verbs” (62-65).  

    [6] Many IFDB works are in English, from various countries, but some are in Japanese, Chinese, Spanish, Korean, French, Portuguese, Italian, German, and other languages. The Electronic Literature Collection similarly includes a growing number of works by international authors in multiple languages across its volumes. In terms of the multimedia nature of certain interactive fiction, see Short (“Interactive” 291); Hayles (sec. 2); and the annual XYZZY award, since 2014, for “Best Use of Multimedia” in the genre.

    [7] Aaron Reed praises First Draft’s possible adaptations of the letters’ “tone,” demonstrativity, “phrasing,” and degree of news, while echoing Short’s description of how the plot and tempo are not amendable, or, he adds, letters after the initial rewriting (“What I’m Playing”); see, too, similar assessments by Porpentine and by Nick Keirle, who ties the textual “limitations” to Juliette’s suppression by Henri’s family. Jenna Ng also concedes an “illusion of choice” within the “offered options,” compulsory or not, the incommutable sent letters, the preset plot, and the inability to play as the friar to rework his phrases (178-80, 184-85). More broadly, as she and others note, the “‘[i]nteractivity’” of interactive literature has long been debated (Ng 179). O’Sullivan contends that “no medium can transcend fixity,” since the creator still “dictate[s] the architectural path” (81), and an electronic milieu is a delimited “technical, cultural, and literary space” (120). He praises Mark Marino’s a show of hands for circumscribing player options so as to guarantee “narrative coherence” (O’Sullivan 108-09). Bolter imagines presswork advocates contending that when hyperfiction “authors prescribe links, they deny the reader the choice of making her own associations, so that a printed novel or essay actually gives the reader greater freedom to interact with the ideas presented” (43). Hayles cites Espen Aarseth’s assessment, too, that hyperfiction confines selection more than paper volumes do (Hayles sec. 3). Lynda Clark, after redefining interactive fiction as “any story in which the reader alters the course of, or is left with the impression of having altered the course of, the story through their interaction,” uses the familiar trope from the Lavori world of a “magic trick” or an “illusion” with studied “‘showing and concealing’” to talk about interactive fiction’s semblance “of agency,” which is debunked in First Draft, she notes, through repeat play that betrays the one finale and compulsory emendations (55-59). Short explains that certain interactive texts “sharply constrain player agency . . . to make that constraint an important part of the message” (“Interactive” 290).

    [8] Montfort states that Galatea’s identity switches “reveal different, even contradictory assumptions that the IF world was founded upon” (219).

    [9] Anthony Hope, referencing a movie adaptation of Laclos’s novel, likens the Marquise de Merteuil to Henri’s sister. I would add, in keeping with First Draft’s more lenient tenor, that Alise does not get to devastate other characters as Merteuil does. See, too, in Joanita Baú de Oliveira’s dissertation on “interactivity” and characterization in presswork and digital letter fiction (7), comparisons between First Draft and Liaisons, Juliette and Cécile (113, 210-12, 230, 223-24).  

    [10] Ng, too, states that the idea of “fixed or stable messages” is undercut by First Draft’s amendment stages (183), and see Agnieszka Przybyszewska on its pre-amended lines (69).

    [11] Gold agrees with Bolter and Grusin, whose ideas of “‘immediacy’” and “‘hypermediation’” she mentions in the context of parser interactive fiction, in regarding with some skepticism the thesis that forums such as “social media can revolutionize or democratize hyperindustrial society” (Gold 105, 5).

    [12] For the “distinctive stationery,” Daly writes, “I loosely tried to match the paper textures and watermark designs with how the characters made me feel” (E-mail).

    [13] Downplayed work may refer to First Draft’s composition as well. Martin Paul Eve sees the tendency to elide the price of work put into digital texts as an outgrowth of “commodity fetishism” (386-87). Eve states that although there is no fee for running First Draft and “the source code . . . is openly licensed,” the story’s paratexts recall the effort of Short’s composing and Daly’s and inkle’s programming and visual layout (387). Darren Wershler(-Henry) discusses strategies for compensating writers’ work when a press posts digital formats of its paper texts, and the needed work of advocacy and publicizing (100-02). Rieke Jordan analyzes the user’s “curatorial labor” as “she selects text options and sifts through databases” in an electronic game (xiii-xiv), and Gold examines how a piece such as Digital plays up “the mechanical labor of correspondence” (106), though she does not analyze ignored authorial or diegetic work in First Draft. Ng argues, too, that First Draft’s stress on the “laboriousness” of composition or text “decryption” complicates the story’s “‘magic’ of instantaneous transmission,” which she sees as a reference to the apparent ease of tapping through “hyperlink[ed] . . . webpages” (182-83, 185-87). She observes that it “take[s] time to refresh the webpage for the next letter draft” in First Draft, mentions the length of regular 1780s postal transport “by foot, horseback, or stagecoach,” and notes the methods and sparsity of enspelled sheets in-story and the “anachronism” with “elaborately embellished pages” of stationery in a digital text, though more to suggest the persistence of “time and distance” within “the ghost[ly]” epistolary style (184-86). In contrast, see Daniel Punday on the piece’s “aesthetics” of “waiting” troped as “idleness,” deepened by the letter story’s generic “urgency” dilemma of telling addressees about “suspenseful events . . . in the past” (87-88). 

    [14] See Daly’s comments on early criticism about “what you can’t do” using e-texts, a result, she states, of misinterpreting them as “mere simulacra of” paper forms (“What We Can Do with ‘Books’” 35-36). First Draft remediates that misinterpretation with its disjunctive paper simulations. Przybyszewska discusses the loss of palpability in a different “digital remediation,” but also finds gradations of that loss in some paper epistolary remediations, while others foreground “sensualnej” [sensual] characteristics and affective “‘wysilku’” [effort] (60, 64-68).

    [15] Timothy Wilcox also notes the discrepancy between the antique “medium simulated” of “drafts” before “a finalized version” and the rewrites “on one fixed page,” which he describes as operating more like “a word processor” screen, an instrument Punday cites too (88).

    [16] Carolyn Steedman, analyzing “sexuality and textuality” in letter writing, sometimes with “an erotics of class,” remarks that “Gilbert and Gubar famously asked whether the pen was a penis” (122-26). See, too, their research on the conceit of the litterateur who “‘fathers’ his text just as God fathered the world,” the “‘gift’” touted despite “paternity[’s]” unpredictability (Gilbert and Gubar 3-5).

    [17] “[I]nformation believed to be accurate,” Adrian Johns states, is part of the fashioned premise that contemporary books are “trustworthy” (1, 34).

    [18] Barbara Maria Zaczek describes a progression in eighteenth-century epistolary literature from kinspersons overseeing women’s letters to characters learning to compose “with caution” on their own (16-17). Juliette’s circumspect monogamy, too, may offer a different spin on her English letter lines. If, as Nicola Watson argues, English authors after 1789 correlated epistolary fiction’s “seduction” storylines of “marital infidelity” with “French liberty,” an “excessive,” “revolutionary sensibility” that was “gendered female” (8-9), does Juliette’s constancy indicate the Revolution’s prevention in this world?

    [19] Ng observes “conflicts between the private and the public” in the early letter lines versus the “self-censorship” of the last stage, “polished and smoothed over as if—indeed—for public display,” noting briefly Henri’s issued note about the friar as an exception that remains “draft-like” (175, 177, 181, 183); Oliveira also observes his fractured or choppy lines there, as well as Juliette’s adoption of Henri’s previous public mode (211). Joe Bray’s monograph on epistolary fiction, some with revolutionary staging, ties letters to Habermas’s “‘public’ and ‘private’ spheres,” citing Elizabeth Heckendorn Cook on novels’ depicted “‘personal letters’” being “‘brought into the public sphere’” by “‘the printing press, the post office, the periodical’” (Bray 41-43). Cook’s book adds that this overlap “of private and public,” enacted via alternating references to “script and print,” is “[t]he indispensable fiction of the letter-narrative . . . that behind the volume you are reading, almost visible through the bars of print on the page, are the original, personal documents from which the printed text has been impersonally, typographically transcribed: handwritten letters, bearing traces of the body that produced them” (12, 2). Oliveira mentions this ruse as well in discussing epistolary fiction “remidiação” [remediation] (25, 27, 37).

    [20] Keirle compares First Draft with another 2012 revolt game, The Republia Times, that remediates print newspapers; we play “a newspaper editor serving an autocratic and potentially violent, unstable political power.” But in line with Popkin’s history, there are chances to “Place negative articles!” (Pope) about the dictatorship’s flaws.

    [21] Pressman finds a comparable play on “‘revolution’” in Only Revolutions by Mark Z. Danielewski, a “returning” that “simultaneously suggests circularity and wholeness” as much as “rebellion and change,” where “we read” the book “by rereading” (159, 161). See, too, Eisenstein (Printing Revolution 333).

    [22] Short looked at Delphine for “period research” while creating First Draft; Germaine de Staël’s letter novel, though describing revolutionary France, as Short notes (“First Draft” sec. 3), also speaks to her contemporary society under Napoleon’s dictates.

    [23] Condorcet heralds “[t]he progress of the sciences” and “the multiplication of printing presses” as furthering “liberty” and “equality” within and beyond states (360, 308, 323, 317).

    [24] Philip N. Howard et al. argue that “social media played a central role in shaping political debates in the Arab Spring,” disseminating “democratic ideas across international borders” (2-3). In contrast, Evgeny Morozov describes social media as “playing an important mobilization role” in Tunisia or Egypt largely since other “favorable political, social, and cultural factors” were in place previously, and points out that “Western firms” stock “the most heinous regimes” with “surveillance and censorship technology” (324-25).

    [25] “There’s something about typing out each of the commands that cements complicity,” Short writes in a review (“‘maybe make some change’”). Sam Kabo Ashwell comments on the text’s strictures: “Most actions are invalid, either denied by the narrators or self-censored by the protagonist,” remarking that one participant in a prior form of the game “stop[ped] playing, refusing to enter the commands,” to which Reed replied: “‘That’s a totally legitimate response.’”

    [26] Stuart Moulthrop, who discusses the game’s “aesthetic opposition,” describes coltan as “a notorious signature of rapacious globalism in which the digital world is deeply implicated” (448). See, too, Short, on the audience’s “real-world” product “complicity” and one character’s inability to thwart the founder or reject “benefit[s],” despite “crises of conscience” (“Living Will”).

    [27] For Roopika Risam, the text has readers “envision new sets of practices that resist settler colonialism”; it also fits the prioritizing of “local context” and “digital cultural heritage” via “practices of Indigenous communities” (81-83). Finley Coyl, too, notes the game’s “future” vistas retrieving “memories” of communal emigration to “‘hack[]’” imperialist barriers or plotlines that might “repeat or relive injustices of history” (23). cárdenas details the piece’s “acts of shifting”—including donning ornaments in the e-text and performed renditions—as “trans of color” and “culture of family” preservation measures (Poetic Operations 121-22, 113-15). Thea Pitman underlines the ornaments’ “‘stitching’ together distributed communities of care” across lifespans and persecuted populations in the game’s calls to “allyship” against “the route of colonizations past” (14-15).   

    [28] That does not mean complete freedom in playing/authoring. As Tom Simonite observes, the program’s responses draw from a set lexicon of network subject matter.

    [29] Jae Sharpe reads game descriptions of “‘broken’” and “‘discarded electronics’” as “stand-ins for the problems of structural decay in Appalachian communities” and a rebuke to uncritical “beliefs in technology as redemptive and democratizing” (146, 141, 155). Aubrey Anable follows the piece’s “remediat[ions]” of cybernetics, games, and appliances, where “broken” equipment and “humor” show “the limitations of computational systems” and game research’s sexism (31, 16, 27, 29). For Jordan, the game’s “broken computers and slow machines” invoke not only the despondent subjects but also “societal and medial instability” (127, 131, 135), causing programs, economies, and toiling “bodies” to be more “visible” (138, 148) in a critique “of technological progress,” while “remediation processes” generate “something new” from mechanical wreckage (140, 135, 141).

    Works Cited

    Anable, Aubrey. Playing with Feelings: Video Games and Affect. U of Minnesota P, 2018.

    Ashwell, Sam Kabo. “This Machine * Fascists.” Interactive Fiction Database, 20 Dec. 2012, https://ifdb.org/viewgame?id=gugrcz22ghdljosu#memberReviews.

    Bazerman, Charles. “Letters and the Social Grounding of Differentiated Genres.” Letter Writing as a Social Practice, edited by David Barton and Nigel Hall, John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2000, pp. 15-29.

    Bolter, Jay David. Writing Space: Computers, Hypertext, and the Remediation of Print. 2nd ed., Routledge, 2001.

    Bolter, Jay David, and Richard Grusin. Remediation: Understanding New Media. MIT P, 1999, 2000.

    Boluk, Stephanie, Leonardo Flores, Jacob Garbe, and Anastasia Salter. Editorial Statement on First Draft of the Revolution. Electronic Literature Collection, edited by Stephanie Boluk, Leonardo Flores, Jacob Garbe, and Anastasia Salter, vol. 3, Electronic Literature Organization, 24 Sept. 2012, https://collection.eliterature.org/3/work.html?work=first-draft-of-the-revolution.

    Brantley, Jessica. “Medieval Remediations.” Comparative Textual Media: Transforming the Humanities in the Postprint Era, edited by N. Katherine Hayles and Jessica Pressman, U of Minnesota P, 2013, pp. 201-20.

    Bray, Joe. The Epistolary Novel: Representations of Consciousness. Routledge, 2003.

    cárdenas, micha. Poetic Operations: Trans of Color Art in Digital Media. Duke UP, 2022.

    –––. Redshift and Portalmetal. Electronic Literature Collection, edited by Stephanie Boluk, Leonardo Flores, Jacob Garbe, and Anastasia Salter, vol. 3, Electronic Literature Organization, 2014, https://collection.eliterature.org/3/work.html?work=redshift-and-portalmetal.

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    Cook, Elizabeth Heckendorn. Epistolary Bodies: Gender and Genre in the Eighteenth-Century Republic of Letters. Stanford UP, 1996.

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  • Resisting Antiblackness Without Imperial or Progressive Institutions

    Louis-Georges Schwartz

    A review of James, Joy. New Bones Abolition: Captive Maternal Agency and the Afterlife of Erica Garner. Common Notions, 2023.

    In New Bones Abolition, Joy James presents a collection of ten essays on the politics of abolition organized around Erica Garner’s political life. Erica Garner was the daughter of Eric Garner, who was lynched by New York City police using a prohibited choke hold on Staten on July 17, 2014. Eric Garner’s murder was one of a series of police lynchings across the US that led to months of nationwide popular resistance against the war waged on Black communities by the state and capital. In addition to demanding the elimination of racist police, or carceral society, or even racial capitalism, James’s abolition seeks the end of Antiblackness, full stop. Erica Garner’s work around her father’s death went from seeking justice for the family via the justice system to organizing the streets and voters against police lynchings of Black people. James understands Garner as a “Captive Maternal,” and articulates a network of supplementary analytic concepts such as “maroonage,” the “doula” function, “agape,” and “war resistance.” She uses these concepts to reveal Garner’s passage from caregiver to a rebel seeking full-spectrum social transformation over the course of her short career as a public figure. In James’s account, Garner does not give up care giving as she develops, she turns care into a praxis on a national scale. New Bones begins with three chapters on various kinds of contemporary abolition in the academic context, which James knows well: she is the Ebenezer Fitch Professor of the Humanities at Williams College. The middle three chapters focus on Erica Garner’s political activity and death. The final three chapters deal with federal and international legal action against the police lynching of Black people in the US in the context of a broader movement to abolish Antiblackness and its world.

    Throughout New Bones, James locates meaningful politics, collective activity capable of bringing about the social transformation necessary to end Antiblackness, outside of the state, outside of the institutions of racial capitalism, and the beyond the walled garden of the statist university. Bourgeois institutions structurally reproduce Antiblackness, and hold Captive Maternals in bondage. ‘Captive Maternals’ is James’s term for caregivers in proletarian communities suffering the acute contradictions of racial capitalism. Captive Maternals transform ethical and often familial projects of ministering, protecting, educating, and providing into political projects aimed at changing the conditions that put communities in harm’s way and overturning the system that dispossesses them. James emphasizes the complex metamorphoses in the careers of captive maternals through a set of examples which includes Martin Luther King, Malcolm X, and Mamie Till-Mobley. She shows the ways that love for family and immediate community can be turned into agape, which she defines as “political love,” radicalizing, and to a certain extent secularizing Dr. King’s development of the term’s classical Greek and Christian-theological meaning, transmuting it into a radical form of racial solidarity that transcends the sympathy of radicalized individuals for their group, and becomes the very bond through which the beloved community elaborates itself. Although it is not a major theme in the book, the paradigm of agape might be used to explain Till-Mobley’s decision to have an open casket funeral for her fourteen-year-old son, Emmett Till, and allow Jet magazine photographers to take and publish photographs. In so doing she created an image event out of love and grief for her son that garnered global solidarity for resistance against the war on Black people in the United Sates (209-10).

    The phrase “captive maternal” suggests the ethical difficulties of enslaved mothers played out in Toni Morrison’s Beloved and developed by Afropessimist scholars such as Hortense Spillers, and Saidiya Hartman, among others: enslaved people were forced to reproduce, with their children forced into bondage. Their work of maternity was structurally linked to the reproduction of chattel slavery. Against the excruciating contradiction connecting the generational reproduction of a people to the reproduction of their enslavement, James proposes “maroonage,” the construction of a community premised on self-liberation, which enables Captive Maternals to both provide care in a way that does not reproduce Antiblackness, and to resist colonial capitalism. Maroonage distances Captive Maternals from the world of Antiblackness which confines them, and enables them to transform the maintenance of communities harmed by exploitation and racism into militancy. 

    The reproduction of capitalist societies operates through a contradiction: the labor power of the proletariat is necessary to the continuation of the everyday life of class domination, but capital supports neither the daily reproduction of the worker’s capacity to work nor the reproduction of new generations of laborers. It abandons the proletariat to care for itself. That contradiction is even more intense for Black and otherwise racialized layers of the proletariat. Some are condemned to social death by being permanently excluded from the pool of labor necessary to the valorization of capital. The assault on Black communities James’s “war resisters” defend against can be understood as a capitalist project: the ruling class sees the populations it has dispossessed as absolutely unnecessary to their own economic needs and therefore as disposable, and seeks to liquidate them—an eliminationist drive expressed in, for example, police lynching in the United States, and genocide in Palestine.  One can see the ways capital fragments the proletariat through differential abandonment in James’s account of Erica Garner’s death.

    New Bones Abolition proceeds through a series of analytic narratives instead of a set of classical arguments. Captive Maternals and the rest of James’s theoretical figures name the political actions and formations that oppose the brutal war the bourgeoisie wages on Black people through violence, social fragmentation, and abandonment. Concepts such as Captive Maternals and war resisters name types of agents or characters in James’s social stories, while others, such as maroonage name collective organizations of care. All of these figures arise as responses to social divisions between Black communities and white supremacist bourgeois society, and to social divisions within Black communities themselves, whence their tremendous force within analytic narratives wherein the possibility of politics arises from fragmentation.

    After three years of activism following her father’s murder in 2014, Garner died of a heart attack in December of 2017. James points out that that was Garner’s second known heart attack, the first came during or just after the birth of her son, Eric, earlier in 2017 (161). Because the general medical crisis in the United States is unevenly distributed, Black women are almost twenty-five percent more likely to have a pregnancy related heart attack during childbirth (“Black Women”) and more than twice as likely to die of complications around childbirth (Johnson). 

    Garner’s activism began with petitioning the court for more information on her father’s death, calling for state legislation banning choke holds, and demanding the formation of investigative committees in the house of representatives, along with attempts to ensure that Daniel Pantaleo, the officer who murdered her father, was fired and prosecuted. From the beginning, Garner sought to keep the focus on ways to prevent police violence. She moved from mainstream abolitionist tactics that operate within the apparatus of liberal democracy to forming collectives that operated at the system’s margins, organizing die-ins on Staten Island, and participating in actions for Black victims of police lynchings in other cities. James understands Garner’s campaign work for Bernie Sanders in the 2016 democratic primaries as an attempt to take a radical abolitionist point of view onto the empire’s biggest political platform: presidential elections. Garner refused to acquiesce to bourgeois society’s demand that all politics be electoral, and refused to adhere to certain norms of decorum. At the end of the summer of 2016, Garner would leave a nationally televised town hall on police lynchings when she found out that she would not be able to address then President Barack Obama directly. On her way out, she confronted Obama offstage. He responded by criticizing her unwillingness to hew to the rules of respectability and deference the liberal mainstream demands. Garner insisted she had been “railroaded” (129-32).   

    When she promoted Sanders, she ensured that no one would interfere with her style of expression or with the content of what she had to say. Garner platformed the needs of the movement she was helping to build in New York City and those with which she worked in Ferguson, MO and Baltimore. Garner’s function in the Bernie Sanders campaign was to draw attention to an emerging, national, Black proletarian political community born in the streets despite the fact that the state and the media-owning class sought to erase that community by masking it with the liberalism of the petty bourgeois Black Lives Matter organization. Garner helped to birth a new political body outside of state institutions, and forced those institutions to recognize it. In this sense James calls her a doula (140-48).

    James clarifies the separation between dispossessed communities and bourgeois institutions when she reflects on an academic conference on abolition at Princeton, where professors and graduate students mainly practiced state feminism and liberal abolition while New Jersey State Troopers gathered at the door of the auditorium as James gave a presentation on Assata Shakur. Shakur is a former member of the Black Liberation Army who escaped from prison and fled the US in 1979 after being accused of killing a New Jersey State Trooper in 1973. The State Troopers Fraternal Association has aggressively opposed any attempts to seek a pardon for Shakur, and actively lobbied to have her extradited from Cuba. Their appearance was clearly meant as an intimidating and silencing show of force, yet James’s colleagues showed her no sign of solidarity, despite the fact that the very integrity of the institution to which they were beholden was being challenged by the violence of empire. Although the topic of the conference was abolition (from a conventional academic perspective), those in attendance refused to resist or even acknowledge a clear example of the war against Black politics that radical abolition seeks to end. 

    Politics did briefly emerge at the conference when, during a Q and A, a professor from a vocational college pointed out that all the papers at the conference were presented by scholars from elite institutions who were shielded from the “vulnerabilities and violence stalking her own students” (44). Other than a prominent professor who chastised the speaker for not being appreciative, James was the only one to answer the woman, affirming her critique, and pointing out abolitionist conferences at ruling-class schools had been normalized. Both James and the professor from the vocational college acted as doulas. The risk James ran by giving a paper that got the menacing attention and attendance of police, birthed a living political moment in the space of the conference, in part by making palpable the other attendees’ unwillingness to respond to anything outside the context of the statist university (the presence of troopers palpable, and the concerns of working-class students). Although academics often style themselves as political, and some from underrepresented groups call their presence in the institution inherently political, university spaces themselves are structured to prevent open confrontation, intellectual or otherwise, deadening any gestures toward social transformation. The conversion of the academic conference into a live political space was completed by the vocational college professor who made the event’s class structure explicit. James begins the narrative of her colleague’s intervention by pointing out that “[d]issonance for the gathering appeared not to stem from police, but from a young Black woman who questioned the function and purpose, the very relevance, of the conference” (44). James goes on to say that she intervened when the woman was chastised by “a prominent Black professor” (44). James pointed out that abolitionist conferences had at elite universities had become the national norm. James concludes the episode by saying that “Captive Maternals … confront homelessness poverty, police violence, and incarceration … within the material realm of struggle and scarcity … realms distanced from or present as abstractions to the elite universities and colleges” (44). It is hard for James’s reader not to read the opening of political space in the solidarity between two Captive Maternals: James and the other woman professor against the conference that failed to show solidarity with James against the police. Although a theory of politics as choosing sides in social rifts remains implicit in James’s analytic narratives, she makes the power of such a theory deeply felt by those versed in contemporary thinking about social transformation.

    As is well-known, US academics tend to mistake solidarity for an affect, and moments when people facing concrete material problems open rifts within groups striving for abstractly defined justice are frowned upon because they give rise to indecorous feelings; yet it is only by working in such rifts that real politics can be born. It is only by insisting on attending to those willing to speak in situations where speech involves bodily risk that theory can become praxis (42-45). 

    New Bones begins by analyzing various styles of Black feminism in terms of their relationship to the social institutions that subjugate Black life: centrist Black feminism seeks equity between Black people, Black women in particular, and bourgeois whites, without necessarily opposing the imperial state and capitalist economy. The feminism of Captive Maternals refuses to let the care work required by feminist politics, or any struggle for liberation, reproduce the very forces that create inequity. James points out certain radicalized Black feminists’ agape in attempts to channel the energy of feminist organizing against the world of oppression instead of seeking accommodation within that world. James notes that there is not necessarily an antagonism between Captive Maternals and other forms of Black feminism. They have different projects. Centrist Black feminism seeks what might be called reform, while Captive Maternals engage in forms of revolutionary struggle. Black feminisms also operate in different sites: more liberal actors operate in places James calls “epicenters,” such as universities, the halls government, and courtrooms, for instance, while Captive Maternals operate in “hypocenters,” such as communal gatherings, and the streets where the state wages war against Black people (39).  Elsewhere, James insists that

    Captive Maternals are a function, not an identity. . . . Captive Maternals are flawed. They/we salvage, but they/we are not saviors. They/we are practitioners. Some practice the art of political alchemy to transpose exhaustion, exploitation, and resentments into protests and rebellions. Some live long lives (rest in peace, Harry Belafonte). Some die rapidly at the hands of others (rest in power, Breonna Taylor). What would and could we do over centuries of frustrations, savage trauma, and outrage through endurance against lynching, state violence, rape, and police murder? Create a womb to push out a mutation that would confront our antagonists and force said antagonists to stop feeding on our lives and deaths. (“Captive Maternal”)

    New Bones makes it clear that part of the captive maternal function is to politicize the central institutions of colonial capitalism by manifesting within them the agency of collective bodies born outside, in hypocenters, on the US street. Although she does not say so in New Bones,James’s insistence on bringing in collectives excluded by both imperial and ‘progressive’ institutions in order to create political situations must be read as a constant attention to the question of what conditions would make social transformation possible. 

    I strongly recommend New Bones Abolition to general readers interested in abolition, to social organizers, and especially to academics and teachers for classroom adoption. We live in a time when radical works are being excluded from high schools and universities, and I cannot think of a book more useful to students of political theory, social science, Black studies, or American Studies. In terms of James’s oeuvre, New Bones seems to be the second in a trilogy beginning with In Pursuit of Revolutionary Love: Precarity, Power, Communities (Divided Publishing, 2022) and ending (?) with the forthcoming The Captive Maternal: Antifascist Renegades, Runaways and Rebels (Pluto Press, 2026), and as such is a crucial step in the articulation of her concepts. The book would be invaluable for the study of contemporary abolition, the movement for black lives, the study of US policing, and contemporary history.

    Works Cited

    “Black Women Have the Highest Risk of Pregnancy-Related Heart Problems in the US.” Journal of the American Heart Association Report, American Heart Association, 16 Dec. 2020, https://newsroom.heart.org/news/black-women-have-the-highest-risk-of-pregnancy-related-heart-problems-in-the-us.

    James, Joy. “The Captive Maternal Is a Function, Not an Identity Marker.” Scalawag, 28 April 2023, https://scalawagmagazine.org/2023/04/captive-maternal-joy-james/.

    –––. In Pursuit of Revolutionary Love: Precarity, Power, Communities. Divided Publishing, 2022.

    Johnson, Akilah. “For Some Black Women, the Fear of Death Shadows the Joy of Birth.” Washington Post, 14 Dec. 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/interactive/2023/black-women-pregnancy-mortality-fear/.

  • Reading as a Way of Dreaming, Dreaming as a Way of Reading

    Erin Trapp

    A review of Sousa Monteiro, João. Bion’s Theory of Dreams: A Visionary Model of the Mind. Routledge, 2023.

    My experience of reading João Sousa Monteiro’s book, Bion’s Theory of Dreams: A Visionary Model of the Mind, was quite ambivalent. This played out in a few ways. One pertained to the very literal process of reading: in one sitting the text might feel frustrating and difficult to move through on the level of language and editing, and in the next, the language might appear less inhibitory and the ideas more immediately transmitted and captivating. The book is at once vivid and blurry, concrete and profound. In this sense, my experience felt something like an idea of Wilfred Bion’s on which Michael Eigen elaborates in Contact with the Depths, describing the “on-off” nature of psychical reality. Eigen writes that “Bion uses the term constant conjunction for images or actions that appear together with some reliability. Like ringing the doorbell-looking away; speaking-fading out; a sense of tension, pain rising, then dissipating and blanking out” (78). This “constant conjunction” represents a “conjoining of tendencies” that perhaps lose the cast of ambivalence as they seem to become a single functioning unit, or as Eigen states, “something like second nature, a chronic state of affairs, a ‘habit’ sequence that runs off by itself” (78). This constant conjunction is above all an experience of contact—contact with the creation of the mind. Others—including Annie Reiner, who notes in her recent book W.R. Bion’s Theories of Mind that Bion’s curiosity began and ended with the “unknowable mystery of the mind”—recognize the centrality of the mind in his theories. The value of Monteiro’s book comes from its immersion of the reader in this ambivalent experience of reading as a way of dreaming, of creating the mind.

    Monteiro says his book reflects on “Bion’s most illuminating and far-reaching intuition: that the most fundamental quality of the human mind is that it pulsates with unreadably complex and yet overwhelming awestruck life beyond the edge of the unknown, the unknowable and the unthinkable” (13). Where others focus on the clinical setting and parameters implied in Bion’s extensive work, Monteiro’s attention is always turned toward this inner dimension, oriented around the experience of “continuously dreaming the human mind into its awestruck structure” (14). The idea that the human mind is continuously “created” rather than merely “existing” is the underlying premise of this argument, which Monteiro expresses in the idea that it is not “consciousness and unconsciousness” that is created, but “the conscious mind and the unconscious mind” (27). This process—which is, however it might be construed or emphasized, the legacy of Bion—is both the work of therapy and the way the mind works.

    Monteiro is not alone in recognizing the “visionary” nature of British psychoanalyst Wilfred Bion (1897-1979). In her appendix to Four Discussions with W.R. Bion, titled “An Introduction to Bion’s Model of the Mind,” Meg Harris Williams lists some of the ways Bion imagines “vision,” including the use he makes of the metaphor of Alpheus, “the sacred river that runs underground (unseen) and then re-emerges in expected places: it is suddenly ‘seen’, but it always existed” (78). This metaphor describes “how an idea tracks or travels, whether or not it is visible,” and it corresponds as well to those parts of Bion’s theory that we might call “post-Kleinian,” an idea that “the mind’s origins extend (beyond Klein) into prenatal life and even further into the evolution of the species” (Harris Williams 67). Following in the tradition of Donald Meltzer, who emphasizes areas of Bion’s work that can be characterized as aesthetic, Monteiro recognizes this origin as “creative.” Monteiro, a psychoanalyst in private practice in Lisbon, worked under the supervision of Donald Meltzer for thirteen years before Meltzer’s death in 2004, and while the first part of the book can be read as Monteiro’s development of Bion’s ideas, of the mind’s being drawn, through language, into being, the second part elaborates Meltzer’s ideas of the “passion” and “intimacy” of analysis, of the mind in the analytic session.

    Monteiro’s figure is of “ripening”: an analysis, he writes, “[S]hould gradually ripen into an awestruck and very mysterious dialogue between internal characters” (194). In the final chapter, he writes, “We all owe Bion the discovery of uncertainty in psychoanalysis, and to Meltzer to have ripened this discovery into a key guiding light through both research and all along virtually every single clinic hour” (243). Others who extend and unfold the complexity of Bion’s thinking and the vastness of the conceptual world that he created—most predominantly James Grotstein, Antonino Ferro, and Michael Eigen, whose rich theoretical writings on Bion feel like troves of therapeutic action—do so, to my mind, via a process somewhat more like construction than “ripening.” While Bion did discover “uncertainty,” he also solidified the language of psychoanalytic processes that encounter and seek to transform uncertainty—the “alpha-function” comes to mind as central here, a name that he gives to the processes of “dreaming” and “thinking,” which transform pre-processed sensory material into bits that can be represented—and these conceptual aspects of his thinking are so evocative and complex that even he, it seems, often gets tied up there. In light of this, Monteiro’s somewhat singular focus on this “awestruck” quality of the mind, its dreaming, and its being heard, is remarkable, as it carries out the process he seeks to describe in the book of the mind “continuously creat[ing] itself into existence” (5). The quality of this “continuous” creation, this ripening, is one of the offerings that Monteiro’s book makes and what makes it worth reading. In the text, we encounter this aesthetic dimension in its language and in the experience of reading itself, and this feels like a somewhat humble reminder that writing, like dreaming and thinking, carries with it an alpha function; it is also a process through which the mind continuously creates itself. Against the background of this profound dimension to Monteiro’s work, its shortcomings are also evident, as readers may experience it—like many perhaps do Bion’s work—as obscure, hermetic, abstract. It may also speak more to clinicians familiar with Bionian terms and concepts than to those interested in thinking about some of the cultural, social, or political dimensions of dreaming or of Bion’s theories more broadly. However, I propose that the book’s structure—its repetitious progression from the unknowable mind adjacent to Freud’s dream-thoughts, through Bion, into a series of (again, repeated, or iterative) questions about what a dream is, and back out into reflections on the human mind—invites us into and performs the erring, wandering, and confusing process of dreaming. The book is not for readers who want to grasp Bion’s theory of dreams and put it to use; it is a philosophical text, one that develops its own theory about the psyche and about psychical reality. In the context of the present realities of AI and the impoverished landscape of managed care and mental health, an argument about the existence and uniqueness of psychical reality takes on new significance and meaning. For readers willing to overcome an initial resistance related to the potential unfamiliarity of Monteiro’s language and terms, as well as Bion’s, the book may transmit this experience of psychical reality, not as something to understand but as something to experience.

    At the start of the book, Monteiro proclaims the somewhat controversial undertaking—one that James Grotstein also claims in his tribute to Bion, A Beam of Intense Darkness (2007)—of repeating quotations and phrases when they come to the writer’s mind in writing the text. One effect of this is the uneven, perhaps spoken rather than written quality of the text. The repetition calls to mind “kenning,” a compound word in which two figurative words are used in place of a more concrete noun. This is a feature of medieval literature identified as a “circumlocution” or a form of “roundabout speech,” and, like kennings, these quotations or phrases, purportedly offered for clarity and perhaps for concreteness, also work on the text in other ways. While Monteiro comments on Bion’s use of small particles of language—for example, there is a discussion of the “little protruding ‘so,’ caressingly dropped into the line” (89)—his own language particles make for an ambiguous experience of reading as well. This language signals both the literal, material, concrete aspect—perhaps its bordering on meaninglessness—and its profound, multilayered meaningfulness. We are, then, in the world of Monteiro’s text, dreaming as a way of reading.

    Circumlocution is present in phrases to which Monteiro returns in order to define certain aspects of Bion’s theory and in the effort to develop concepts. “Dreaming” is identified as a “cluster of dreaming functions operating the contact-barrier” (30). This phrase—“a cluster of dreaming functions operating the contact-barrier”—repeats throughout the text. However, Monteiro does not define the terms he uses. The closest we get are the equation and substitution of terms. There are moments in the text where the tone becomes monologic, as in the phrase, “the unknown, the unknowable, and the unthinkable,” whose frequent repetition can feel like roteness or tautology, as if it were used concretely. I take these moments to be expressions of the substrate of the mind—the human mind pulsating “beyond the edge” (13)—that is the particular focus of the book. While there is something somewhat awkward or redundant about these phrases, this “failing” of language is a sign that we are “in it” in some way, in this experience of the mind as if from inside.

    The reading experience is marked by the impression that conceptual language and argumentation are failing. The idea of the “contact-barrier,” that permeable border between consciousness and unconsciousness, is introduced as an equivalent to Bion’s “odd term ‘dream’” (15). What Monteiro presents as “Bion’s theory of dreams” is, then, also a theory of the contact-barrier, insofar as he reads the term “dream,” repeated “ten times in pages 15-17 [of Learning from Experience],” as being “converted into what Bion called contact-barrier” (15). In the first chapter on dreaming and the contact-barrier, Monteiro seems to move around the term in this way, through substitution and equation, without defining or conceptually “grasping” it. Reading this is a frustrating experience. In the following chapter, Monteiro begins by quoting Bion, as he describes a shift from “dream” to “contact-barrier.” He quotes from Bion’s Learning from Experience:

    My statement that a man has to ‘dream’ a current emotional experience whether it occurs in sleep or in waking life is reformulated thus: the man’s alpha-function whether in sleeping or waking transforms sense impressions related to an emotional experience into alpha-elements, which cohere as they proliferate to form a contact-barrier. This contact-barrier, thus in continuous process of formation, marks the point of contact between the conscious and the unconscious elements and originates the distinction between them. (qtd. in Monteiro 28)

    Monteiro focuses on Bion’s “misleading and unclear,” “unfortunate” use of words, but one of the things to which he does not attend is the fact that Bion’s term “contact-barrier” is taken from Freud, who uses the term Kontaktschranke in his 1895 Project for a Scientific Psychology. The German term “Schranke” translates the figure of “crossing” or “folding” and is used by Freud in the sense of describing not only “barriers” but also gates that are perhaps specifically concerned with passage or permeability, as in “toll gates,” “lattice gates,” or grating. (We are not far here from Bion’s grid.) Monteiro is less concerned with whatthe contact-barrier isand more concerned with its effects or workings, both textually and in the world. While there is something lost in not explicating the terms of the contact-barrier—something that makes me think that the repetition of phrases is not driven by a desire for clarity but by some other force—we can also say that the text, as it is written, works on a different level. It brings the reader into the process of dreaming, which at times threatens logic and readability and moves via repetition.

    The value of reading Monteiro’s book lies in its emphasis on the generative and creative aspects of this process, and it is hard not to be buoyed by the passion of this approach to thinking about clinical work, especially given the impoverished, pathologizing frameworks of contemporary mental health. Monteiro’s book invites thinking about the difference between the work of psychoanalytic therapy and the way the mind works. And yet Monteiro does not say enough about what is afforded by this difference, itself a product of the constant conjunction of dream and dreaming. I would like to take up two of the main themes of Monteiro’s book in order to extend his thinking about this difference between the work of therapy and the way the mind works. The first pertains to a distinction that Monteiro makes between the work of the mother and that of the therapist, a distinction that seems to underlie more explicit statements about the congruence of these roles or their analogous nature. The second pertains to experiences of failure in therapy: failed dreaming, failed containing, interrupted processes, failures of passion on the side of the therapist—failures that point to the analytic process as a site of falling short, of not hearing, not dreaming, not tending to dreaming.

    Mother’s Reverie, Therapist’s Reverie

    Bion’s concept of reverie, which begins as an expression of the mother’s love for the infant, has certainly contributed to the predominant association of the work of the mother and the work of the therapist in psychoanalysis. The mother’s love, Bion writes, “is expressed by reverie” (Learning from Experience 36). “Even the foetus’ and the infant’s earliest experiences of joy and excitement have to be lovingly dreamed by the mother back into them,” writes Monteiro in a chapter titled, “Mother’s Reverie” (52). While Monteiro does not reject—and in many ways extends—this model, he also opens up spaces for thinking about how this analogy functions and for considering its limits.

    To dream “the human mind into existence”—who if not the mother, to take on such a task? And reverie seems to imply as much. Yet, for Monteiro, reverie consists both of “dreaming her babies [sic] projections back into them” (56) and of the fetus’s and infant’s capacity to “introject mother’s own dreams into new qualities of their own personalities as well as new qualities of their thinking” (57). While one may assume that this work of dreaming falls within the purview of the mother, Monteiro places the larger share of this process of introjection and on the “creative strength of the unreadably complex dynamic of psychic reality” (136). This emphasis on introjection begins with Monteiro’s ideas about projection:

    So nothing seems to support the widely spread assumption that projection is a straightforward psychical move naturally travelling from foetus and the infant to the mother—from the couch to the chair. Without projection, mother’s reverie would hardly become as busy as it normally would be, and I believe the human mind might have been deprived of one of the most mysterious and most extraordinary process [sic] that it has been possible to identify and tentatively examine so far. (56)

    In setting projection out as an “unnatural” process—or one, we might say, that is threatened by the very real demands of reality—Monteiro suggests that reverie and introjection might become increasingly complex, nuanced, or indeed, “busy,” in response to the activity of projection. If projection does not “move naturally,” it can be seen as a process that is influenced by—as well as influences—the reality of the world. We can imagine the turns this process might take in a world that is “too much with us,” especially as we move in the ever harsher realities of climate change, environmental destruction, racism, genocide, rising right-wing nationalism, and fascism. In this sense, the “busy” world—a public sphere full of violent rhetoric, stories of destruction, and atrocity—overloads the mother’s capacity for reverie, for sensitivity, while the projecting baby also responds to, say, increasingly more hostile environmental conditions, with either increasingly complex or increasingly empty projections. These harsh realities imply physical violence, destruction, and deprivation, which threaten to overload the projective processes in a direct way because the projective processes are also tasked with managing an individual’s destructive urges and experiences of deprivation.

    The term that Monteiro associates with projection is “sensitivity”: “the sensitivity of projecting.” He writes, “[P]rojection is believed in this book to both be a vital and yet highly demanding task that may dramatically fail in several different ways and is indeed to actually very often miss its crucial psychical function” (53). In his discussion of projection and projective identification in A Beam of Intense Darkness, Grotstein explicates the necessarily “internal” aspect of the process. He writes, “Bion, while formulating the realistic communicative aspects, never considered projective identification as actually taking place in the object—only that the object was affected” (178). I read the “sensitivity” proposed by Monteiro in a similar vein. There is not solid ground for receiving these projections of unconscious phantasy. In part, a need or desire for this ground, and the certainty of knowing that “something” is there, seems to inform the appeal of trauma models. For the “affected object,” which Grotstein implies is the mother, pertains to the child as an object of projections as well. In Monteiro’s phrasing, we might wonder on whose shoulders projection falls as a “demanding task”—the mother who receives it or the child who produces it? As he sets it up, it seems constructed as a two-part process, in which the projections of the child are received and dreamt by the mother, and then the child dreams those qualities “into themselves.” If introjection is in turn identified with sensitivity, it reflects the tenuousness of a process that can feel like dreaming: the construction and dissolution of worlds in the dream equates to the experience of receiving and transmitting projectively.

    This emphasis on the power, autonomy, and the significance of the introjective moment contributes to a dis-aggregation of the roles of mother and therapist. Monteiro writes:

    The classical analyst is certainly not inclined to offer the analysand the concrete experience of a thinking mind in the room, nor the inspiring experience of uncertainty, nor the truth of his own feeling the need to convert his experiences into new dreams, nor his being uncertain about the meaning of being human strongly advising him to hold up conclusions, but the unhearing mother always being sure about the sea of enigmas and unknowns defeating her foetus’ and infant’s minds. (135)

    It is the “hearing” and “thinking” of the analyst that allows a therapeutic experience for the analysand. This dimension carries within it a recognition of a failed dreaming experience by “the unhearing mother.” There is a key difference between the mother’s and the therapist’s work: the therapist has to listen for this failed dreaming at the same time that they have to dream. They must have a concept (a thinking, a caring, an attending) that informs their dreaming, a concept that is sensitive to the projections and the capacity for introjection of the patient.

    In a chapter titled “What is Hearing?” Monteiro describes this particular capacity, citing Bion’s Cogitations: “Drugs are substitutes employed by those who cannot wait. The substitute is that which cannot satisfy without destroying the capacity for discrimination [of] the real from the false. Whatever is falsely employed as a substitute for real[,] is transformed thereby in[to] a poison for the mind” (qtd. in Monteiro 153; brackets are in the original text quoted from Bion, Cogitations 299). What is healing may therefore be considered as that which satisfies without destroying the capacity for discriminating real and false. It is not the distinction that the therapist tends to but a “capacity” for discrimination. Monteiro traces out this distinction in Meltzer’s work. Meltzer, who is the main interlocutor of the text and to whom the text pays tribute, theorized this “hearing” in terms of “internal characters,” which seem like an extension of the importance and sensitivity around projection. Monteiro writes:

    This shift from listeningto hearing in virtually every session, this shift from the person of the analyst to his own internal characters, and from the person of the analysand also to his internal characters so that the analyst would perhaps be at last prepared to meet the analysand’s meaning, may perhaps take quite a long time or even never happen. This crucial shift may also be formulated as the shift from psychotherapy to psychoanalysis. The former runs between persons—the patient and the analyst. The latter between internal characters. (157)

    We might understand this dimension as a further disarticulation of the analogous actions of mother and therapist. For mothers, I would guess, are at their very best only capable of “listening.” They are structurally prohibited—and I would imagine for good reason—from being able to “hear.” In this sense, the work of the therapist tends to something that “feels like” or is affectively experienced as the mother’s failure. Monteiro makes a much-needed contribution, with this emphasis, to a vision of the roles of mother and therapist as constantly differentiated rather than as analogous or as one and the same.

    Failures in Dreaming

    The second part of the book considers the work of the analytic session, situating the “mind” in the session. In this discussion, there is a vacillation between a more “positive” model of the work of analysis and an awareness of its potential failures, specifically the danger that the therapist might lose their “passion” by becoming caught up in the idea of “understanding.” Monteiro writes, “The measure of our illusion of understanding is given by the measure of our lack of passion” (203). The analyst must be able to “hear” the “music” of the failure of the mother, both “mother’s reverie, as well as of foetus’ and the infant’s failures in introjecting her qualities” (65). What the therapist does with this “hearing” and this “failure” leads Monteiro to discuss the limits of “understanding” and the concept of “knowledge.” For to understand the mind, “we must warp the awe-inspiring mystery of the human mind down into a mere object of knowledge, understanding and reason” (202). What compels the therapist toward understanding? One implication that can be drawn from Monteiro’s writing is that we do not knowthe difference between understandingand knowing, and that we gravitate toward understanding because we do not know we can wait for knowing. Understanding, in this sense, can be seen as a drug. It administers a dose of what Bion calls -K (anti-knowledge)—also known as a beta-blocker—which Bion claims, “could be more fruitfully, though more vaguely, described as column 2 categories, that is to say, psycho-analytical objects feared as liable to trigger off developments of a catastrophic nature, to initiate ‘catastrophic change’” (Bion, Two Papers 16). We might imagine that understanding functions to destroy a capacity “to discriminate between real and false,” which, for Monteiro, might amount to a failure of passion.

    This difference stands out to me in thinking about an idea of failure articulated succinctly and yet profoundly by Susan Sands in her review of Philip Bromberg’s Awakening the Dreamer, “Dissociation, the Analyst’s Vulnerability, and the Body.” She describes how in cases of a patient’s severe trauma, the therapist may subjectively experience an “actual, temporary, traumatization” that is also “intensely personal”; this may result in the “failure of the containing function of the analytic pair” (743). This failure of containing is to be differentiated from a failure to understand or a failure to empathize. The failure of containing comes from the presence or emergence of “knowledge” (K) into the analytic pair, knowledge that arrives in the therapist’s own mind. Monteiro discusses Bion’s statement about seeing Monet’s painting of a field of poppies: “If you walk into the Jeux de Paumes (sic) in Paris and see the painting itself, you think ‘I never saw a field of poppies until now; now I know what it looks like’—it is an emotional experience, not a report on one” (qtd. in Monteiro 209-10). Picking up the phrase, “now I know,” Monteiro writes,

    What exactly is it that he claims to know although he has no means to know what exactly he believes he knows? Can we ever put it into words? Hardly, I would believe. For we now seem to hurt ourselves against a few barriers which we can neither ignore nor dodge. The transformations that seem to have occurred in Bion’s psychical world while watching Monet’s painting prompting him to claim now I know is believed to essentially run beyond the edge of the unknown, the unknowable and the unthinkable. (211)

    As Monteiro notes, “we seem to hurt ourselves on these barriers.” Sands would add to this: we hurt ourselves on this“contact-barrier.” The therapist will feel it as her own, and she must have retained the capacity herself to discriminate real from false: her suffering from her failure. This moment of failure contains an experience of the therapist’s knowing, as if Sands were uttering here, “now I know.”

    It is this knowing that, like dreaming, is an unending process, interrupted by understanding as well as “nightmaring.” Monteiro stresses that “this is an unending process, except if this most extraordinary and mysterious creative process is severely hindered by pathology, that is, by any nightmaring processes” (213). “Psychoanalysis,” he elaborates, “is about passion and its failure, not about symptoms. The epitome of pathology is seen in this book to be what in us severely damages our sweeping drive to keep making life and the world glittering with ever new insight and meaning and destroy the capacity for endowing things with the shining experience of awe and mystery” (218). Pathology is not seen in the presence of symptoms but emerges in the termination of this K process, which is what Monteiro calls “nightmaring.” What comes into the scene to constrain, limit, and degrade this relation is a relation to knowledge (K) that puts an end to this unending process. Monteiro takes up O’Shaughnessy’s line, “each patient has a point beyond which he does not extend his K” to query whether and to what extent analysis works on “ending the analysand’s K-link” (qtd. in Monteiro 216; 218). We could consider this “ending” the failure that is threatened by the therapist’s own experience of traumatization, as Sands indicates. Monteiro in turn wonders: “When, in his own analysis, even in his own life has the analyst himself ended his own K-link?” (219).

    One of the contributions of Monteiro’s argument is this consistent turn to the work that the analyst needs to do in order to continue to dream, given that at every moment, its ending is present. We might consider these moments in which dreaming is interrupted as structural failures, or limits, or perhaps fault-lines, as failures of the contact-barrier. One of the places where this formulation turns up is in Monteiro’s discussion of dreaming. In the chapter “What Is a Dream?” he suggests that “what we are all used to call a dream is, to begin with, not a dream . . . a dream, in Freud’s sense, is, in Bion’s, an undreamed emotional experience, that is, an interrupted dream . . . in the eyes of Bion’s contact-barrier, dreams, in Freud’s sense, are of a failed dream” (72). In the later chapter, “What, Then, Is a Dream,” he again queries dreaming:

    In the light of Bion’s theory of dreams, therefore, a dream, in Freud’s sense, is, in Bion’s, a failure of the workings of some dreaming functions. In other, hopefully clearer terms, a dream, in Freud’s sense, is an interruption of the workings of the dreaming functions in converting some elements, whatever their nature, into new, hopefully more creative psychical elements. What exactly is the nature of this failure? Is this failure coming from the couch, the chair, or from both? If the failure comes primarily from the chair, it may stir, and even deepen, the one primarily coming from the couch. (134-35)

    In this passage, dreams are regarded as premature or substitutive processes. Perhaps like the process of substitution described above as the use of drugs, these “dreams” represent something that is still false (-K), something that is not “waited for,” something that is like a “poison for the mind.” Monteiro uses the term “nightmaring” to describe this “use” of dreams for something other than dreaming: the interruption of dreaming. He writes, “[T]he analysand’s dreams may be usefully seen as evidence that the analysand has nightmared some of his own dreaming processes” (137). This idea of nightmaring as a negative version of dreaming compels us to think about the nightmare in its etymological sense as well, as “oppressed sleep” (literally, “an evil female spirit afflicting men (or horses) in their sleep with a feeling of suffocation”), indicating this aspect of violence or destructiveness attributed to the external world, seeming to exist “outside” of a person’s head, or requiring this figure of “visitation” or “affliction” (“Nightmare”). Here we are at the contact-barrier, encountering it as a substantial or material entity rather than as a passage or continuous space of transition, and it is contact with this in a substantial way that makes this experience not just awe-inspiring but painful as well. In this way, the introjective processes that Monteiro describes are also seen to be interrupted. From a point of view that holds regard for the patient above all, this pain must be tended to as the edge of the unknowable, unknown, unthinkable—there it may yield the “shining experience of awe and mystery.” But contact with pain must also be made, and remade.

    While he suggests this dimension of pain or failure, Monteiro remains situated in an abstract and perhaps ideal conceptual world, in these final chapters more critical of the analyst’s “dull, discolored mind” (218) and absence of passion than curious about this dullness and how it might be understood. This seems to be a potential impasse in Monteiro’s otherwise capacious argument. We could compare his terms with those of Marion Milner, who draws attention to the ongoing nature of the creation of the mind in her detailed account of nearly two decades of working with a schizophrenic woman. In The Hands of the Living God, she writes,

    We could see how all the nailing-up, in those early pictures, could have partly expressed her dread of the fantasy of tearing out my eyes with her finger-nails, which would be like robbing me of my power to see, to understand her, robbing me of insight; a secret fantasy act which was liable to occur, as I saw it, in response to a special failure on my part; in fact, whenever I failed to manage our relationship well enough to enable her to feel that whatever understanding we achieved really came from her; or rather, from a kind of unity between us that made it not matter whether she said it or I said it. (455)

    Milner’s description of this “special failure” feels like one of the highest expressions of therapeutic work, expressing something that must actively work against the pathologizing process that amounts to nightmaring or suffering. Monteiro might see Milner’s “special failure” as one of “neglect and indifference.” Whether or not this type of nightmaring or failure is workable seems increasingly important in our present world, in which destructive social forces are poised to impinge upon the capacity to dream and the capacity for reverie.

    And while this kind of neglect or indifference might exist as a characterization of an analyst, as Monteiro seems to think, its more insidious forms are subtle and within us all, a part of nightmaring that arises in an instance where the creativity of one’s mind is missed. While Monteiro is not ignorant of this psychical dimension, he does not address some of the more difficult and debilitating aspects of this encounter between the patient’s nightmare and the analyst’s ability to dream. Reflecting on Bion’s phrasing of the “the felt need to convert the conscious rational experience into dream” (qtd. in Monteiro 143), Monteiro imagines the experience of an “unfelt need” (144):

    Perhaps the worst form that the unfelt need to dream conscious or rational experiences into psychical life may take is the frightening form of neglect and indifference. Who would ever be prepared to guess the damages inflicted upon one’s own internal life as well as upon so many others’ by responding with neglect and indifference to the wonder of creative thought, to the discovery of the inspiring experience of uncertainty, to the merits of living beyond the edge of the unknown, the unknowable and the unthinkable? How often such response to the world has emerged in the course of an analysis evading the analyst’s eye who may himself never have been touched by the experience of passion? How often has this unfelt need to dream conscious and rational material slipped away unnoticed throughout the many years of an analysis? How often have such clinically critical phenomenon [sic] travelled, unseen, throughout the many years of an analysis? (144) While this scenario may very well play itself out continuously in the therapeutic session, the kind of “attending” that I am imagining should have the therapist stopping at their own dreams, at their own interrupted moments, in which the contact-barrier, which seems otherwise perhaps barely perceptible, can be felt. That this can happen in ways that are personal, bodily, and might otherwise be dismissed by the therapist indicates for Monteiro a point of inflection where the therapist encounters their own pathology. Here the therapist has a challenging task, one that Monteiro regards critically in other therapists, denouncing their dullness and absence of passion. “One would expect analysts to attempt to closely read the evidence of the nightmaring processes at work in themselves,” he writes, since doing so would “lead them into the drama of neglect and indifference about the unending enigmas and marvels the human mind is teaming with” (220). How one is led into this “drama of neglect and indifference” matters, for the language of such nightmaring is at once off-putting, illogical, missing significant parts and repeating others, barely intelligible and also indelible, vivid, concrete. Monteiro notes that “Bion keeps warping language down into many pages that constantly defeat readability. He again and again walks us all along an odd, uncertain edge between intuition, evocation, perplexity and incomprehension. Words are often seen running out of his own grip, this seeming at times the realm he may feel closer to, even deeper into” (238). The same could be said of Monteiro’s writing. While I don’t experience Bion’s writing as a nightmare, my experience with Monteiro’s writing made it possible to grasp language as a nightmaring process. I write this not as a judgment of value but rather as a statement of fact. Perhaps every process of dreaming that is worth the name must also include not just the possibility of interruption—“look, a dream!”—but the more oppressive impossibility, or failure, of a nightmare. Do we stop dreaming when we encounter another person’s nightmare? Monteiro does not theorize this but allows the reader to experience it firsthand, and that is the feat of this book.

    While this scenario may very well play itself out continuously in the therapeutic session, the kind of “attending” that I am imagining should have the therapist stopping at their own dreams, at their own interrupted moments, in which the contact-barrier, which seems otherwise perhaps barely perceptible, can be felt. That this can happen in ways that are personal, bodily, and might otherwise be dismissed by the therapist indicates for Monteiro a point of inflection where the therapist encounters their own pathology. Here the therapist has a challenging task, one that Monteiro regards critically in other therapists, denouncing their dullness and absence of passion. “One would expect analysts to attempt to closely read the evidence of the nightmaring processes at work in themselves,” he writes, since doing so would “lead them into the drama of neglect and indifference about the unending enigmas and marvels the human mind is teaming with” (220). How one is led into this “drama of neglect and indifference” matters, for the language of such nightmaring is at once off-putting, illogical, missing significant parts and repeating others, barely intelligible and also indelible, vivid, concrete. Monteiro notes that “Bion keeps warping language down into many pages that constantly defeat readability. He again and again walks us all along an odd, uncertain edge between intuition, evocation, perplexity and incomprehension. Words are often seen running out of his own grip, this seeming at times the realm he may feel closer to, even deeper into” (238). The same could be said of Monteiro’s writing. While I don’t experience Bion’s writing as a nightmare, my experience with Monteiro’s writing made it possible to grasp language as a nightmaring process. I write this not as a judgment of value but rather as a statement of fact. Perhaps every process of dreaming that is worth the name must also include not just the possibility of interruption—“look, a dream!”—but the more oppressive impossibility, or failure, of a nightmare. Do we stop dreaming when we encounter another person’s nightmare? Monteiro does not theorize this but allows the reader to experience it firsthand, and that is the feat of this book.

    Works Cited

    Bion, Wilfred R. Cogitations. New Extended ed., edited by Francesca Bion, Karnac Books, 1994.

    –––. Learning from Experience. Maresfield Library, Karnac Books, 1984.

    –––. Two Papers: The Grid and Caesura. 1977. Routledge, 2018.

    Eigen, Michael. Contact with the Depths. 2011. Routledge, 2018.

    Grotstein, James. A Beam of Intense Darkness: Wilfred Bion’s Legacy to Psychoanalysis. 2007. Routledge, 2024.

    Harris Williams, Meg. “An Introduction to Bion’s Model of the Mind.” Four Discussions with W.R. Bion, Harris Meltzer Trust, 2018.

    Milner, Marion. The Hands of the Living God: An Account of a Psycho-analytic Treatment. Routledge, 2010.

    “Nightmare, N.” Online Etymology Dictionary, https://www.etymonline.com/word/nightmare.

    Reiner, Annie. W.R. Bion’s Theories of Mind. Routledge, 2023.

    Sands, Susan H. “Dissociation, the Analyst’s Vulnerability, and the Body: Review of Awakening the Dreamer: Clinical Journeys by Philip M. Bromberg.” Psychoanalytic Dialogues, vol. 17, no. 5, pp. 741-51. Taylor & Francis Online, https://doi.org/10.1080/10481880701632640.

    Winnicott, D.W. Playing and Reality. Routledge, 2005.

  • The Deep Futures of Subaltern Studies

    Introduction by Ashwin Bajaj and Gayatri Mehra
    Reviews by Vinay Lal, Adriana Michele Campos Johnson, and Richard Pithouse

    Three reviews of Milinda, and Jelle J. P. Wouters. Subaltern Studies 2.0: Being Against the Capitalocene Banerjee. Prickly Paradigm Press, 2022.

    Introduction
    Gayatri Mehra and Ashwin Bajaj
    University of California, Irvine

    The following contributions comprising an extended review of Milinda Banerjee and Jelle Wouters’s Subaltern Studies 2.0 emerge out of a symposium on “Globalization or Global Apartheid” held at University of California, Irvine, which culminated in a roundtable discussion of the book by contributors Adriana Johnson, Vinay Lal, and Richard Pithouse. The symposium sought to raise problems of methodology, engage questions pertaining to disciplinary specificity, and debate the necessity and limitations of conceptual and theoretical translation across regions. In addition to advancing those discussions, Banerjee and Wouters’s anti-disciplinary text—drawing on Marxism, Western and non-Western philosophy, Subaltern School, poststructural theory, historicism, ecology, and anthropology, among others—also prompted the symposium to consider the proverbial question, “What is to be done?” Different approaches to the book—showcasing its broad disciplinary and theoretical range—are reproduced in the three reviews, which are grounded (though by no means exclusively) in questions of history and historical vision (Lal), problems of translatability, negativity, and legibility (Johnson), and the question of political relevance (Pithouse).

    As the title suggests, Banerjee and Wouters invoke the original Subaltern School as a starting point of their own endeavor. Yet, the project inaugurated by Ranajit Guha—who passed away only days before the symposium was held—in the early 1980s is implicitly deemed to not have been radical enough. According to the book, the “fall” of Subaltern Studies must be plotted onto the triumph of neoliberalism which definitively proved that the “subaltern” hailed by the earlier project could not resist the onslaught of state and capital (33). The shrinking faith in the transformative potential of the subaltern led to the gradual subsumption of Subaltern Studies into cultural studies (33). Inevitably, as signaled in the work of Dipesh Chakrabarty, Andrew Sartori, Vivek Chibber, and the later writings of Partha Chatterjee, the political merit of the figure of the subaltern is revised and it ceases to be held up as a potentially radical “Other” (33-34). In their broader critique of contemporary knowledge production, Banerjee and Wouters go so far as to suggest that the felicitous collaboration between historians and anthropologists that had impelled the project of Subaltern Studies has now given way to “anthropological knowledge [that] has become darkened by despondency, dystopian, and extinction theories,” whereas history has relegated “decolonization as a phenomenon of the past, [and] not as an ongoing struggle” (35). In the face of such defeatism, in which scholars from the “neoliberal academia” have been reduced to merely “describ[ing] the world” or “lament[ing]” it cannot be transformed, the authors want to revitalize knowledge and politics via “the dethroning of Anthropos as earth-monarch, solitary species-sovereign” (37). The authors aver: “Nonhuman beings shall inspire us to transhuman ourselves. We must stream into other beings, share intelligence, be-in-common” (37). Hence, their concerns lie not in solely addressing whether the subaltern can speak or considering the ramifications of the historical erasure of subaltern struggles, but in accentuating the ontological category they propose should supplant the earlier varieties of the subaltern. If one is to follow the logic deployed by Banerjee and Wouters to its end, one may infer that even in producing alternative trajectories of historical change and consciousness, the original project of Subaltern Studies too unwittingly glosses over political possibilities engendered by other subject positions. Focalizing standpoints such as the peasantry, “lower castes,” and tribal communities ends up ignoring the potency of non-human ontological complexes, such as the version of “multispecies” being or “multibeing communities” that Banerjee and Wouters celebrate. In spite of its radical and inclusive intent, by confining itself to the realm of “human communities,” the earlier project inadvertently elides “the interdependence between human and nonhuman” (5)—which Banerjee and Wouters attempt to correct. Thus, while the authors think the original project’s emphasis on “community” offers the “best chance to resist state and capital” (4), their own project departs from Subaltern Studies 1.0—including in how they conceptualize community—in significant ways.

    That we are now in a vastly different political moment from the former project’s is clear. This may be gauged by the scant attention devoted to the “nation,” especially given its place in the imaginary of the decolonizing world and the influential critiques offered by the Subaltern School of this collective category. While Banerjee and Wouters reiterate the prerogative to negate “capital” and “state” in any number of pages of their provocative pamphlet, the third leg of the trifecta of capital-state-nation is conspicuously missing. In this respect, the authors fuse nation with state (“nation-state”) as if to suggest that any distinct consideration is otiose in light of global politics today. However, the communitarian dimension of the “nation”—in either of its progressive or regressive avatars—cannot simply be understood as conjoined to the power mechanisms of the “state apparatus.” The omission is especially puzzling because any fruition of the kinds of macrocosmic alliances and communities (“communities in solidarity”) that the authors advance would need to contend for the very space that the nation currently occupies in the collective imaginary.

    We end by returning to the theme of the symposium: “Globalization or Global Apartheid.” In our view, contrasting the homogenizing impulse of globalization with global apartheid cottons to a newer problem than those underlined by discourses either of difference or of uneven development. The emphasis placed on global apartheid suggests that classic formulations about the “identity of identity and difference” need to be reconsidered once the homogenizing imperative of capitalist globalization has itself begun to produce large enclaves, akin to fully marginalised spaces of absolute difference. The authors appear to repurpose considerations of communitarian, regional, and national difference—staples of Subaltern and Postcolonial Studies—for the terrain of ontological difference between the human and the non-human. To that end, one can read their assertion of a continuum of being (“the Being that pervades us all”) as bolstering the increasingly common interest in philosophical monism, which rejects older dualisms that had drawn an ontological distinction—however tentative—between nature and the freak of nature capable of modifying its surroundings to meet its own ends, i.e., the (hu)man. The contemporary political climate marked by a vacuum on the Left, right-wing ascendency in parliamentary institutions across the world, and growing immiseration and ecological catastrophe, demands brave intellectual experiments and newer political imaginaries. Whether the book’s turn to extra-human agency intimates such endeavors or capitulates to a newer form of political quietude is the point of torsion: readers must draw their own conclusions.

    Capitalocene, Anthropocene, or Just Obscene: A Few Stray Thoughts on Subaltern Studies 2.0
    Vinay Lal

    It is now more than a decade since the twelfth and final volume of Subaltern Studies was published. Who is to say whether the collective, having thought that its work had been accomplished, or perhaps suffering from the inertia that over time afflicts most intellectual enterprises, disbanded or went into a hibernation from which it never emerged? A few short observations on the collective might be in order—all by means of furnishing something of a background to the present initiative, Subaltern Studies 2.0, and attempting to understand how its authors locate themselves vis-à-vis their predecessors. When volume one of Subaltern Studies appeared in 1982 from Oxford University Press, it came not merely as a whiff of fresh air, but as a jolt. It came as a jolt not only because of its intellectual promise but also because it dared to dethrone nationalist discourse as fundamentally aligned to colonial discourse, characterizing both as complicit in the writing of a history which did not deign to recognize the autonomy of the subaltern and only conceded the absolute sovereignty of the principle of the nation-state. Today, that far-reaching critique of nationalist discourse may not seem altogether novel, and some might question why it had been so long in the coming. The dream of independence had long soured: thirty years after that “tryst with destiny,” to invoke the phrase made memorable by Jawaharlal Nehru at the stroke of the midnight hour when India became free, a significant portion of the population remained mired in deep poverty, unemployment was rife, the project of secularism was beginning to show wide cracks, and India was barely present on the international stage. To cap it all, an internal emergency was imposed between mid-1975 and early 1977, and India had finally joined the ranks of the countries in the global South that had decolonized and gone the way of authoritarianism, military dictatorship, or intense civil strife. Mohandas Gandhi’s assassin and his many supporters among the elite had already declared the Mahatma obsolete just months into independence, but the specter of Gandhi lingered on—not least because, once in a while, Nehru was there to remind everyone that India’s struggle for freedom, for all the critique of it, had been inspired at least in part by a different moral vision. Now, in the mid-1970s, the traces that remained of Gandhi and Nehru were slowly disappearing when they were not being eviscerated, and the clarion call for intellectual autonomy to which Gandhi and Nehru remained committed, each in their own fashion, was similarly destined for cold storage.

    Thus, when Subaltern Studies did arrive, it was least expected. A mere three to four years into the project, a leading American scholar of Indian studies could declare, apropos of the work of the collective and the programmatic statement by Ranajit Guha with which volume one commenced (Guha), that “Indians are, perhaps for the first time since colonization, showing sustained signs of reappropriating the capacity to represent themselves” (Inden, “Orientalist” 445). The sheer audacity and apparent condescension—and that from a scholar whose own work on decolonizing the colonial framework of knowledge has been of signal importance (Inden, Imagining)—of the author are breathtaking, not least because of the long span of time—“since colonization”—that is invoked, but the remark is instructive if only because it suggests just how important Subaltern Studies would become, though ironically more in the Western academy than in Indian universities, in suggesting that Indians were now likely to become at least minor players in the global political economy of knowledge production.

                Subaltern Studies 2.0—for the present, it exists as a volume, even if the idea of a long-term project is perhaps incipient in itsuggests that the subaltern studies project has been reincarnated. (It is, I suppose, unavoidable that in writing or thinking of India, the idea of reincarnation is going to rear its head.) The Subaltern Studies Collective, in its inception and through the early years, until at least into the early 1990s, carried the impress of Ranajit Guha’s style of thought. One must, nevertheless, not fall into the error of thinking that the collective always spoke in one voice: though Guha served as mentor to the group, its members would soon establish themselves as eminent scholars in their own right. Some, such as Sumit Sarkar and Partha Chatterjee, were already scholars of repute. Sarkar’s The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal, 1903-1908 was a landmark book in Indian history and had been published in 1973, while Partha Chatterjee had signaled his arrival on the Indian academic scene with works both in political theory and on the agrarian structure in Bengal. It is unnecessary to recount at this time the history of the collective, and more particularly the declared and undeclared fissures with which it would be afflicted. But suffice to say that the “authors” of Subaltern Studies 2.0, Milinda Banerjee and Jelle J. P. Wouters, are not entirely unmindful of the legacy bequeathed by Guha and company. There is deference towards Guha and perhaps Chatterjee, less so towards others. They write with approbation of Chatterjee whose work from the outset correctly “counterposed subaltern community against elite capital,” and they describe the subtext of his work, The Nation and Its Fragments (1993), as clear: “community was not just the anterior of capital and the state but the future beyond them” (29-30). It is in this fundamental respect that they find the (especially later) work of Dipesh Chakrabarty wanting: though in Provincializing Europe (2000) he holds on to the view that the universal history of capital (which Chakrabarty designates as History 1) could not subsume the community life of workers (including those who, through their tools and the relations of production they had entered into, were themselves caught in the swirl of capital), what Chakrabarty designates as History 2 (Provincializing 47-71), in The Climate of History (2021) he appears to have become incapable of envisioning “community life” as such. For Banerjee and Wouters, we are not merely still eminently living in an age of Capital: the labor of all, humans and nonhumans alike, is a commodity and “we are the bondsmen of King Capital” (26); but, still, History 2 prevails in its own way and has shown that it cannot be subsumed by History 1. From Chakrabarty’s standpoint, his own distinction between History 1 and History 2 does not reflect the fact, which had escaped him when he wrote Provincializing Europe, that humans are now, for the first time in history, geological and not just biological beings. Perhaps the distinction between History 1 and History 2 still serves a purpose, since in the here and now we must still wrestle with the oppressiveness of Capital, but the geological scales of time have put into question the usefulness of the scales of historical time that are the bread and butter of the historian’s work. Banerjee and Wouters will have none of this hierarchy of the Anthropocene over the Capitalocene: global warming and the scorching heat of capitalism feed into each other, militate against Being, and oppress humans and nonhumans equally.

                In what respects does Subaltern Studies 2.0 merely provide an answer to the query that was always lingering in the air, “what next after subaltern studies?,” and to what extent does it both partake in its predecessor and forge new paths of inquiry?  Both are questions to which I will only advert in passing rather than addressing them frontally. But let me state at the outset that nothing I will have to say by way of a critique of Subaltern Studies 2.0 mitigates my appreciation of the moral daring and the intellectual risk-taking that Banerjee and Wouters bring to their task. We should perhaps use the word “author” advisedly, taking our cues from those to whom the book is credited: as they note, “in the history of humanity, the author is a recent invention,” a process akin to the “usurpation of community by private ownership” (1). One of the book’s many virtues is its mellifluous blend of prose, poetry, and polemics: as they take inspiration from philosophers and singing minstrels across centuries and equally across expanses of land transgressing nation-state boundaries, the authors proclaim themselves “less as author-owners of words / And more as bards singing about a war” (3). Still, I wonder if the gesture on their part to eschew the author’s authority, to celebrate the principle of collective authorship, is not somewhat rhetorical: every human has a name, albeit a name that perforce is not of their own choosing, but animals exist as species-being and are not individuated through names, except of course when they are our pets, or have in some other fashion been domesticated, as when the zookeeper gives a lion, a panda, an elephant, or a chimpanzee a name. 

                That Banerjee and Wouters think of themselves as “singing about a war” tells us that they would readily differentiate themselves from scholars placed in war studies departments, the retired generals with comfortable sinecures at universities, the mandarins who stalk the corridors of military department offices, and the myriad others involved in the gargantuan military-industrial complex. When I think of the mostly dreary work that generally passes for “research,” or of yet another book reeking of some procrustean conception of “identity,” this book jumps at me as something out of the ordinary. The authors know very well that they will likely be mocked for speaking of fungi and fungal democracy, yak studies and “multispecies demos.” It is not only the likes of politicians such as the present governors of Texas and Florida who, merely at the mention of “fungal democracy” (122) or a “yak polity” (152) where “yaks shall vanguard the overthrow of state borders” (153), will throw a fit and announce the authors as specimens of a “woke culture” gone mad, but even readers of a liberal or left disposition who, one can readily imagine, will sigh and pronounce the authors to be hopelessly enmeshed in a worldview that romanticizes the pre-modern past and is either naïve or indifferent to the complicated histories of the human-animal nexus. It is all well and good to suggest the continuum between humans and animals, to critique the anthropocentric telos that has allowed for the unquestioning dominion of humans over the lesser species—indeed, to construe them, in the first instance, as “lesser” species since their speech is incomprehensible to us and they lack the vast range of human emotions and expressions—and even to celebrate those pasts that permit a more capacious reading of a time when animal democracy was not unknown and the notion of a multispecies Being could be more easily countenanced. But what of those histories, if anything more pervasive, which enabled the brute animalization of black, colored, indigenous, and colonized people? Have Banerjee and Wouters faced up to the corrosive rather heinous implications of the innumerable instances of dehumanization of people placed at the lower end of racial, ethnic, and sexual hierarchies?

                With all that said, I like very much the energy, exuberance, and ecumenism that “the authors” of this manifesto bring to their task. The commentators who share in the collective enterprise register their own appreciation and sometimes dissent from the views of the authors. Gayatri Spivak, while applauding the efforts of the two principal writers, expresses her unease, to take stock of one of her minor criticisms, at the South Asia-centric focus of the book and of the texts from that cultural milieu that make their way into the book; she is in some respects right, but nevertheless there is an ecumenical spirit that informs this book. This brings me back to the question that has been lurking in the interstices of my remarks: What is the book trying to do? Banerjee and Wouters construe as the heart of their enterprise one of Marx’s better-known aphorisms, in The Eighteenth Brumaire: “The philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.” They take to task the two disciplines with which they are most closely associated, history and anthropology, and their practitioners are indicted for at some point being the “high priests of imperialism” and abdicating their public responsibility (36-38). But this is much too easy. If they were working only within the realm of the human, then we might say that they deploy the metaphor of the future—imagined utopias, conceptions of cultural possibilities, social critiques of things to come—to redefine the present. But the Anthropocene is upon us: is it enough to affirm a social ethics and envision a more humane society in a world dominated by narrow and often reprehensible ideologies, and seek different grounds than those furnished by the experience of the last 250 years that had the calculated effect of flattening the world and diminishing the possibility of diverse and more ecumenical futures? The authors feel emboldened to enter into a critique of the course of human history, from around the time of the banishment of nonhumans from Being to the time when they began to divide from each other, and from there to the silencing of women and to the subjugation of all community speech—and to this extent they go much further than those who have been riveted on the Enlightenment and the limited ideas of “reason,” “progress,” and “development” that were first given shape in Europe before they were adopted in the rest of the world (48-50). The task at hand then becomes easier: How shall we reimagine Being in the era of the Necrocene, in an age when species are dying out and planetary life is at stake?

                While I applaud the authors for their learning, exuberance, and broad-mindedness, I also have some reservations and criticisms of specific points. My reservations generally are not those that I anticipate will be held by others, since I think it is all too lazy to dismiss this book as an explosion of half-baked ideas or as a naïve if not silly invocation of the alleged multispecies enactments of democratic practice. As I have already suggested, it is, in part, the book’s playfulness that I find rather endearing—a playfulness that allows the writers to roam around, taking in whatever they find useful or inspiring from across cultures, and transgressing the often-tiresome and frequently pretentious protocols of scholarship. But playfulness and risk-taking also have some relationship to the democratic sensibility, and the reader who is familiar with The Climate of History in a Planetary Age, one of the more influential works of humanistic inquiry about climate change, will at once perceive the sharp contrast between the two books. Chakrabarty is unequivocally clear that he is willing to accept the authority of the scientists, among whom there is, as he rightly submits, a near consensus that global warming is now upon us and that we are living in an age where humans are for the first time in history geological rather than just biological agents. He notes that some scholars in the social sciences, who are by no means climate deniers, are uneasy about the power and authority that scientists are able to claim for themselves “in defining the Anthropocene.” These social scientists, who “oppose handing full powers to the experts and losing the specific resources that every community has,” have raised the specter of “a geo-government by scientists”; and though Chakrabarty describes such a concern as “legitimate,” his response effectively is to sweep it under the rug (175). Banerjee and Wouters, in contrast, seem deeply committed not only to democratic outcomes but to the true sense of the demos as a polity that allows for a radical devolution of power. There is little recognition in Chakrabarty of the myriad ways in which experts, while purporting to act in the name of science and rationality, have undermined democracy.

                What, then, are some of my own reservations? First, the authors seem incapable at times of moving beyond rights-talk. In discussing recent developments that have led to personhood being conferred on nonhumans, they advert to an act of parliament in New Zealand, and a decision by the Supreme Court of Colombia, conferring the “rights” of personhood on the Whanganui River and the Colombian Amazon (107).  The High Court of Uttarakhand, a state in northern India, passed a similar decision some years ago, declaring that the Ganga and Yamuna rivers each has “the status of a legal person with all corresponding rights, duties and liabilities of a living person”; however, as supposed “minors,” the rivers were, the court affirmed, in need of guardians who would stand in loco parentis (High Court). It is another matter, one which I will not take up here, that the modern rights discourse has been framed with nearly supreme indifference to the conception of duties with which it was indelibly linked until comparatively recent times: it will not do to submit that the court decision places duties in apposition to rights, because this gesture appears to be dictated by legal protocol rather than by any appreciation of what is signified by a discourse of duties. The more germane consideration is that we live in an ever-expanding world of rights: to the liberal conception of the rights of freedom of speech, expression, religious worship, and mobility have been added our purported rights to housing, clothing, clean air, water and soil, minimum income, banking, ad infinitum. The greater the number of rights, the greater the role of the state: though the authors are vigorous critics of the state and its violent behavior, and advocate for the dissolution of the nation-state, there is little thought given to the fact that rights are generally conferred by the state. That has always been the dilemma for human rights activists, one that they have been slow to face up to: though rights are demanded of the state, the state is almost always the most egregious violator of rights. As Gayatri Spivak puts it cryptically in her exhortation, which she calls “The Next Steps,” “[t]he state is both medicine and poison” (165). I’m only gesturing here at a longer history that the writers would have to contend with: the very document that inaugurates the modern regime of rights, sounding a clarion call to overthrow the old order, “Of the Rights of Man and Citizen,” is itself a charter document for the suppression of nonhuman species. And I leave aside another related consideration: the activists in India who have called for legal status to be conferred on rivers, mountains, or trees conflate the juridical notion of personhood and the rights that are attendant upon persons with the sovereign nature of deities as understood in Hinduism.

                Secondly, the authors do not always understand or follow the implications of their own findings. Their discussion of the Nagas is a case in point. In the interest of brevity, I will discard the criticism that their invocation of the Nagas overlooks the violence committed by the Nagas and the patriarchy endemic to the community. Banerjee and Wouters admit that women were excluded from the Naga assembly, and their own discussion of headhunting among the Nagas should disabuse anyone of the notion that violence was foreign to the Nagas. Nevertheless, they suggest that something is to be learned from an intensive study of Naga headhunting: “Unlike state warfare, Naga headhunting remained local in scale. . . . Headhunting quite literally kept the Nagas politically acephalous” (19-20). This is a crucial point: there is no romanticism here, only the awareness that the Nagas engaged in headhunting for a purpose, not for sport, and placed limits to the exercise of their power. The colonial state in British India abolished headhunting, all in the name of “civilizing” the “savages,” but they “consolidated their rule through the violent sacrifice of many more Naga lives than had been required by the nonstate economy of soul force” (20). As an aside, I might add that, under the British dispensation, the abolition of sati, the immolation of widows, was to the plains what the abolition of headhunting was to the hills: varieties of the colonial discourse on cannibalism, one might say.

                So far so good. Banerjee and Wouters have established that one cannot speak of a Naga state, and thus one cannot speak of linguistic unity or comparatively centralized forms of communication: as they elaborate, in the Naga world, “language varied from village to village, and often across khels (wards) within the same village. There was no uniform grammar, script, epic, or song that would transcend village frontiers and connect multiple localities” (18). In this observation lie the seeds of a more radical argument that they, and everyone else, might wish to disavow but which, from my standpoint, must be pursued vigorously if one is to seek the grounds for a more just world. Just how did these villages communicate with each other? Or did they communicate at all? They seem to have done well enough without a common or uniform grammar, epic, and so on: here is the very antithesis of the modern nation-state, which cannot be wrought except through force and bloodshed, except through forcible homogenization typified by the flag, the national anthem, the school system, and much else. Even more pointedly, pluralism thrives when there is less of the so-called dialogue or exchange that has characterized the modern world: in the present conditions of gross inequality, massive disequilibrium of power, and a wholly skewed political economy of knowledge production that has rendered the universities in the United States and the West the paragons of knowledge, we should strive for less rather than more dialogue and exchange. This pervasive idea of more dialogue across cultures and nations is one of the supreme and nearly unquestioned liberal shibboleths. All such dialogue is an invitation to smaller communities to surrender the little autonomy that they have.

                Thirdly, speaking as a historian, some of Banerjee and Wouters’s judgments on the Indian past are questionable. For example: “Agrarian Indian militancy, embodied in fierce and continuous rebellions from the late eighteenth to the mid-twentieth century,” they write, “has been the single biggest factor responsible for the collapse of the Raj” (28). There is but one word for such a claim: preposterous. This is what comes of reading Ranajit Guha’s Elementary Aspects of Peasant Insurgency in Colonial India uncritically, though the initiator of the Subaltern Studies Collective was himself a little too giddy in thinking of the revolts of subaltern classes. Guha’s book is doubtless a magisterial work of history, but one might be forgiven for thinking that all subalterns do is revolt, when in fact the preponderant portion of their lives was spent in toiling on the soil, sleeping, eating, and carrying out those mundane chores that take up much of our lives. There is, of course, a history of mass movements that we need to be aware of, but what surprises is just how little agrarian militancy there was in colonial India. As one savant put it, the question is not why men revolt, but rather why they do not revolt.

                Banerjee and Wouters take such liberties often. We are assured, and they offer this remark as a parenthetical aside, perhaps in the hope that it will elicit little attention, that there “would be no Gandhi or Tagore without the forgotten Dalit-Bahujan-Adivasi villagers of India, whose consciousness—about nonviolence towards beings, about the commonness of the divine—they publicized” (119). I will largely ignore, though it is not without grave problems, the ease with which they, much like many modern commentators, think of the Dalit-Bahujan-Adivasi as a complex: there are acute internal differences, and of course subalternity is a relational concept, particularly in India where, no matter how far down one is on the ladder, one is adept at finding someone who is still lower. Moreover, in colonial India, the Dalits and Bahujans (neither term was very much in use then) were treated as part of the “caste” complex, whereas the Adivasis were dealt with differently, and I should say more brutally, as part of the “tribal” complex towards which the British had a purely extractive relationship. My objection here is to their claims about just exactly what it is that both Tagore and Gandhi imbibed with regard to the notion of ahimsa from their respectively long associations with Indian villagers. It is true, and I have often written on this, that Tagore entertained capacious ideas about the Indian villagers’ adherence to the idea of dharma, an idea that, in his thinking, made it possible for villagers to be uncommonly hospitable to the other.[1] We may also concur with the notion that Gandhi harbored, to use an expression once shared with me by the late Sunderlal Bahuguna, that “Bharat ki atma gaon mein hain’” (“The soul of India resides in its villages”). But both Tagore and Gandhi had a far more complex relationship with Indian villagers than is suggested by our authors. Indeed, contrary to the common dismissal of Gandhi as someone who rather foolishly sought to “take back” India to the villages, he unhesitatingly described the Indian village, which he knew better than any of his contemporaries on the national stage, as a “dung heap.” The nonviolence of the weak, moreover, is no nonviolence—this is a cardinal concept of Gandhi’s worldview.

                Further, Banerjee and Wouters’s discussion of being rooted and rootlessness is unsatisfactory in the extreme (120-21). The critique is carried out in a section that tellingly bears the title, “Enough of ‘Postmodern’ Suspicion of Being” (54-56), though their articulation of what it means to be either “rooted” or “rootless” is inked everywhere in the book. One sees here the common Marxist suspicion of postmodernism as corrosively anti-foundational: among Indian Marxist scholars, Sumit Sarkar, who signaled his departure from the Subaltern Studies Collective with a polemic against the Saidian framework, and Achin Vanaik readily come to mind as critics who had had “enough” of postmodernism and a culture of “rejection.” Many others, including Lyotard and Derrida, are but cannon fodder for our authors, but they reserve their greatest ire for Deleuze and Guattari for their “glib championing of the rhizomatic society against the rooted one” (56). One could say that this leads them to an excess—well, another idea deriving from the diseased postmodern condition—for how else is one to understand the claim that “settler colonialism of the American frontier” is being “celebrated” as a “model of the rhizomatic society” against the rootedness of Native Americans, Maori peoples, Indigenous Hawaiians, Adivasi and Dalit communities, Kashmiris, Palestinians, Kurds, Uyghurs, Nagas, and Tibetans” (56). What follows is altogether predictable: “The celebration of the rhizome is an apologia for the rootlessness of capital.” The purported rootlessness of capital is the very condition of its rootedness in every ideology that opposes capital: the poor are but those who either do not have the capacity, or have not yet learnt, to be good consumers. But that is perhaps too wicked an argument—besides being one that celebrates the onward march of capital against Being. There is merit in their argument that the experience of European history too often serves as the template for the work that has emanated from European theorists, but the authors would need a more sustained critique than is on offer of the politics of knowledge systems to carry the day. But I am animated by another thought: what the authors describe as the opposition of the rooted to the rootless, which they mistakenly attribute only to the experience of “post-Holocaust, postwar Europe,” can be more fruitfully thought of as the opposition of the moved to the unmoved. More people are displaced today than at any point in the past; the condition of being on the move is preeminently the modern condition. By a curious twist of fate, or perhaps not, the moved remain unmoved by the sufferings of others; and it is the moved who are called to bear the sufferings of the unmoved upon their shoulders.

                Lastly, it is surely a matter of some concern how some of the ideas voiced by Banerjee and Wouters effortlessly feed into and conform to militant Hindu nationalist ideology. It seems wholly unreasonable, given the tenor of their work, to suppose that they have any brief on behalf of Hindu ideologues. Nevertheless, their oft-repeated pronouncement about the pre-colonial indigenous roots of democracy must be, if the cliché may be excused, music to the ears of Hindu nationalists. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has on more than one occasion pronounced with great pomposity that Bharat “is the mother of all democracies” and thus Vishwaguru, “Guru to the World,” and the Indian middle class and the country’s gargantuan army of trolls who have embraced Modi as a modern-day Vishwaguru leviathan are wholly convinced that India has nothing to learn from any other country. Not, perhaps, coincidentally, al-Biruni had quite the same impression a thousand years ago when he wrote of the Hindus that “according to their belief, there is no other country on earth but theirs, no other race of man but theirs, and no created beings besides them have any knowledge or science whatsoever” (Sachau 6). One would have hoped for some self-reflexivity on the part of Banerjee and Wouters, or, to deploy a key idea of Indian philosophical reasoning, some demonstration of their intent to adhere to the purvapaksa. The fact that their assessment is not partial to India may give them some reprieve: the “acephalous polities in Aboriginal Australia and the Indigenous Americas,” alongside “ancient Indian gana polities and Greek city-states,” not to mention scores of Dalit-Bahujan and Adivasis communities, are all equally summoned as instances of “participatory democracy” (60-61). This flattening is characteristic of some of Banerjee and Wouters’s scholarship: what relationship the development of democracy in the Greek world had to the presence of a large number of helots aside, there is ample evidence to suggest that pre-modern democratic polities, if one wants to call them such, could at the same time be deeply hierarchical. That should not surprise us in the least, not if the modern democracies on witness offer any insight into this matter.

                In closing, let me first return briefly to their discussion of the Naga worldview. As I have pointed out, I do not agree with the criticism that has been voiced of their understanding of Naga society, and it is possible to share the sentiment they have expressed in speaking of the “Naga grammar of assembly and agreement making that can provide us a pathway to overcome state and capital” (68). And it is also true they sometimes moderate their enthusiasm, as in their acknowledgment that the Naga world “contains a majestic grammar of democracy that can transform our world, if the flaws can be overcome” (73). That they have the temerity to invoke the examples of Naga, Bhutanese, or Mizoram societies as praxis-generating entities is what makes their intervention so laudable and an advance, not merely an incremental one, on the project known as Subaltern Studies. The global South is not merely a field to be mined by the mind of the West. The South can generate theory, it can generate transformative practices that long preceded what in the academy is fetishized as theory– practices of community, practices that allowed for animal democracy and fungal democracy, for the coexistence of human and non-human species, and so on. Some, in thinking of this present juncture, would like to speak of the Capitalocene; others are struck by the Necrocene; and still others are now gravitating towards the Anthropocene. Meanwhile, the world is hurtling forward, in all domains of life, towards the Obscene. We are all increasingly engulfed by the obscenities that mark the modern: the dehumanization of countless lives, and that too after several hundred years in the aftermath of what is called the Enlightenment; the ravenous, famine-inducing appetite for riches; the immeasurable and still growing gap between the haves and the have-nots; the loss of tens of thousands of nonhuman species; the merciless assault on the notion of the commons; the utter debasement of language; and what not. The “Age of Enlightenment” as the now old-fashioned historians put it had a love for the encyclopedia. Our present-day scholars and savants should now put together an encyclopedia of the Obscene. It is to of the credit of the authors that they are, to borrow a thought from Marx and expropriate the expropriators, perhaps the unwitting agents in making us think of the Age of the Obscene.

    Reflections on Subaltern Studies 2.0
    Adriana Michele Campos Johnson

    The first words of Subaltern Studies 2.0: Being Against the Capitalocene (2022) are “Who Speaks?” Speech speaks in community and in assembly, is the answer. Subaltern Studies 2.0 is such assembly, a gathering of words that will include Naga elders, Bhutanese herders and yaks, Greek and Roman seers, Indian poets, cranes, and fungi (1-2). Milinda Banerjee and Jelle Wouters offer in this way a rejoinder to Spivak’s famed “Can the Subaltern Speak?” and a clue to their very different starting point. In the place of the vernacular insurgencies of communities in India that figured as the starting point for the theoretical reflection of the original subaltern studies project, this volume calls for heterogeneous social coalitions between the human and nonhuman in order to “overcome state and capital and revitalize being” (3). This project is said to be a new anticolonial struggle, an effort to complete what has only been a partial decolonization thus far, and it proceeds from the assumption that alternatives already exist, have always existed, in revolutionary communities as well as in other species. It is a matter of recognizing and hearing that which might otherwise register as noise. The book moves first through an inventory of what needs to be undone­—to understand the failures of certain knowledge formations such as history, anthropology, and Marxism, to dismantle the modern sovereign state form, to overthrow capital, to reverse the exile that has relegated nonhuman beings to unbeing, to counter abstraction, hierarchy and inequality—and then shifts into alternate ways of imagining being, community, connection and politics that already exist in subaltern actors (like the Naga), animals, plant and fungal life.

    The difference in genre, the 2.0 that signals a reboot, the different relation to language and to words, might be said to change everything. Subaltern Studies 2.0 calls itself a pamphlet. It lays claim to a minor genre, one that circulates in a public sphere and intends to mobilize political affects. Indeed, the text is as clear-sighted as the original Subaltern Studies historians on the provincialism of genre, the way reality has been cramped into certain formal rules of recognition and plausibility. Under capitalism, it says, “The Jakata is regarded as fable, Virgil reduced to a work of literature. Species reality becomes myth” (106). To some extent the book strives to reverse this: to transform what seems fable, literature, myth into realism, into what may be possible. The deliberate torsion of words, the creative re-use of language in what is both a poetic and political project is one the more generative aspects of the text and produces some startling connections: “Human woman clean bovine women with water, anoint their horns with oil” (141); “Plantation agriculture is multispecies slavery” (142); “Animism is rooted nomadism” (147); “A supermarket is a morgue” (106). As evident here, the fundamental speech act in the book is a declarative mode. It affirms, commands, acclaims, conjures. Like a manifesto, like “bards singing about war” (3). Thus: “Nomadism is the original nomos” (136); “The yak polity must be decolonized” (152); “Avianize territory” (134); “Humans shall vegetalize” (148); “Reanimalize the map” (134).

    The effort of conjuring into being new realities is tied to a project to excavate and resurface buried and silenced knowledges, to gather them back into the chorus. One of the most interesting of these is the recounting of older intellectual traditions that recognized different social organizations and politics among animals (the behavior of wolf packs, bee colonies, or friendships among birds). In Indian languages, write Banerjee and Wouters, “There is no linguistic sense that animals have a different social form than humans” (104); words like “collectivity” and “leader” are used both for humans and for animals. In English, in contrast, if a word like “herd” is used for humans it is only done so disparagingly. Subaltern Studies 2.0 considers traditions (such as manuals of statecraft in India) where the behavior of animals was observed in great detail and used to elaborate political conclusions, for both democratic as well as more hierarchical forms: “understanding the political functioning of elephant collectives . . . [both the leaders and those that are expelled] . . . lay at the heart of human monarchic military state building” (96). The book proposes in this sense not just a new way of doing politics that would integrate animal kin, but a recognition that the observation of animal behavior and practices is infrastructural to political theory, baked into early conjectures around collective behavior and forms of power, such that humans and animals can be understood as essentially co-creating politics. Not only is this genealogy or relationship largely forgotten in Western political theory, but to the extent that this study of animal socialities by humans was often intended to better manage them (think beekeepers, herders, fisherman), the colonization of animal politics could be considered the first imperialism. Capitalism then “transforms animals from political actors to commodities. . . . Only in this landscape can the political be thought of as a human monopoly, a transition from animal nature to human polity” (106).

    In her own response to the volume, “The Next Steps: A Preface,” Gayatri Spivak characterizes the book as a rewriting of the work of the Southeast Asian Subaltern Studies Working Group. That is, there is a fundamental break, and not just an updating at stake. Banerjee and Wouters state that: “We draw from the Subaltern Studies tradition the central insight that community offers our best chance to resist state and capital” (4). But this is hardly an insight exclusive to Subaltern Studies, much less their central insight. The lesson I learned from Subaltern Studies was not just that alternate and rebellious forms of sociality manifest in peasant insurgencies under the British colonial state and after—not just a triumphant claim that the subaltern can resist state and capital—but the thorny questions of intelligibility and how such rebellions were being translated into other terms. The starting point, after all, is a critique of the way Marxist historians were reading such rebellions, according to an unquestioned matrix (including certain notions of agency and political consciousness), and how this produces fundamental misreadings of what was happening even as it excludes peasant rebels as subjects conscious of their own history, incorporating them as contingent elements in another history with another transcendental ideal subject (Worker and Peasant). Spivak’s point is not that the subaltern cannot speak, but that there is no structure of reception in place for such speech acts.

    Subalternity is a category marked by negativity: it is the negation of an imposed identity, marked by falsification and distortion, in Ranajit Guha’s words. As it was developed by the Subaltern Studies historians, subalternity manifests as a semiotic break (a rebellion), but one in which peasants speak in a “borrowed language”: violating the semiotic code of power (Elementary Aspects 36). As Guha points out, one only has access to subalternity through a prose of counterinsurgency, hence the need to read it as a “writing in reverse” (Elementary Aspects 333). One has to read it, in other words, with an ear attuned to the places where intelligibility and sense strained under challenge or pressure and to understand that there was something beyond or outside, that doesn’t fit the categories, optics, or languages being used to grasp the phenomena.

    In reading the book, I couldn’t help thinking of Spivak’s critique of the interview with Foucault and Deleuze in which they seem to unproblematically express what workers, delinquents, and prisoners want and say. In saying that “the masses know perfectly well, clearly,” Foucault and Deleuze are making a claim about what the speaking subaltern is: they are speaking for them; hence Spivak’s remark that “[t]he ventriloquism of the speaking subaltern is the left intellectual’s stock-in-trade” (Critique 265). Banerjee and Wouters write, for example: “Some yaks emit a special grunt to communicate with other yaks and disseminate insubordination. Often, yaks organize into a collective hard gaze, directed toward cruel herders” (150). Spivak’s point is that such comments erase the question of representation. To enchain words as a gathering or chorus, as emitted simultaneously, forgets the temporality of the relay race, the question of how transmission occurs, and the disjunction lodged within.

    The erasure of time and what some want to call historicity is there too in the reaching towards a reversing which is also an unforgetting: “Truth is unforgetting, reversing the great oblivion that has made us forget what our ancestors knew” (5). The emphasis on unforgetting and reversing, a turning back of the clock, is also an erasure of everything that came in between, like a return to an original text as if there had never been a translation. And too: “We shall remember and globalize the animist social contract” (144). But what kind of remembering is this and what might be lost in it? I keenly felt the absence of the negativity—the probing of limits to intelligibility—that was so central to the Subaltern Studies project.

    For this reason, I appreciate Marisol de la Cadena’s response to the volume, “The Gift of the Anthropo-Not-Seen,” because she brings together what is valuable in the intellectual and speculative challenges posed by the volume precisely with the question of negativity, limits, excess, and language. In earlier work, “Indigenous Cosmopolitics in the Andes: Conceptual Reflections Beyond ‘Politics,’” de la Cadena posits the idea of an “indigenous-mestizo aggregate” that is, borrowing words from Marilyn Strathern, “neither singular nor plural, neither one nor many, a circuit of connections rather than joint parts” (348, 347). De la Cadena characterizes the very notion of “indigeneity” as emerging through collaborative friction with practices and institutions other than itself. Indigeneity is a result of colonization. There is no “pure indigenous person,” therefore, as it is a category created by European expansion and one that remains partially connected to nation-state formations. Still, although indigeneity appears on the public stage through discourses such as class/ethnicity/confrontation with neoliberalism, it also exceeds such discourses to the extent that it includes “other than humans.” De la Cadena wants to think a pluriverse, but one that is constituted by a fractured, fragmented, or fractal set of relations. It is something other than a simple commons, because partial connections create no single entity; or “the entity that results,” de la Cadena writes, “is more than one, yet less than two” (347).

    One of the sites of partial connections between the more than one and less than two is the notion of “equivocation” that de la Cadena takes from Brazilian anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro. In equivocation, homonymic terms refer to things that are not the same. “Water” or “agua” are seemingly equivalent to Quechua or Yanomami words, and as such they allow for conversation, for partial connections to happen. But ultimately the terms (yaku, water, agua) do not refer to the same thing. There is no singular thing in the world that simply has two names in different languages. Why? Because in one of those languages it is something other than H2O. De la Cadena cites Viveiros de Castro, writing that equivocation “is not a simple failure to understand, but ‘a failure to understand that understandings are necessarily not the same, and that they are not related to imaginary ways of “seeing the world” but to the real worlds that are being seen. . . . [R]ather than different views of a single world . . . a view of different worlds becomes apparent’” (350-51; de la Cadena’s emphasis). Verisimilitude or resemblance functions as a juncture, but also partly conceals the gap.

    This fissure can be seen in the words of Yanomami shaman Davi Kopenawa, cited both by de la Cadena as well as Banerjee and Wouters. In the “written/spoken textual duet” Kopenawa produces with anthropologist Bruce Albert (The Falling Sky 446), he notes that he does not like the word “environment” and that, for the Yanomami, “what the white people refer to in this way is what remains of the forest and land that were hurt by their machines. It is what remains of everything they have destroyed so far” (397). Environment may approximate what the Yanomami call “forest,” but it is a fundamentally different phenomenon, a broken or severed thing. Kopenawa also says: “What the white people call ‘minerals’ are the fragments of the sky, moon, sun, and stars, which fell down in the beginning of time” (283). Although the word “mineral” may function as a connector and allow a Yanomami and white Brazilian to point to the same gold nuggets in a riverbed, there is more than one thing being indicated by that partial designation. One may say that in Guha’s analysis of peasant rebellions, the terms “peasant” and “rebellion” are also equivocations.

    But relation coexists with the gaps between worlds. Upon seeing the Eiffel Tower, in a passage that Latinamericanists might want to call a reverse transculturation, Kopenawa finds it similar to the image of a spirit house:

    [T]he people of the place must tell themselves: “Ha! How rich and clever we must be to have built such a beautiful thing!” That’s all. No one thinks beyond that. Yet though no one knows it, this construction is in every way similar to the image of our xapiri’s houses, surrounded by a multitude of paths of light. It is true! This sparkling brightness is that of the spirits’ metal. The white people of this land must have captured the light of the Yãpirari lightning beings to enclose it in this antenna. As I looked at it, I told myself: “Hou! These outsiders do not know the spirits’ words, but they imitated their houses without even realizing it!” It baffled me. Yet despite the resemblance, the light from this house of iron light seemed lifeless. It was without resonance. If it were alive like a real spirit house, the vibrant songs of its occupants would unceasingly burst out of it. (344)

    This passage is a lesson in more than one and less than two: “spirit” is not really “xapiri” just as “light” and “lightning” are not really light, and lightning and the Eiffel Tower is not really a spirit house: what Kopenawa considers the lack of resonance and resemblance marks the distance between heterogeneous worlds. Yet those very words are also partial connectors, a place for touching, just as “the outsiders . . . imitated their houses without even realizing it.”

    Like Banerjee and Wouters, Kopenawa denounces the avalanche of violence and destruction wrought upon the world by white modernity. But Banerjee and Wouters lay out a reversed world–which is also a non-world–in which the elimination of capitalism and the state would eliminate antagonism, conflict, negativity and inequality. Their manifesto is also a prayer, calling into imagination and being the possibility of a plurality of human and nonhuman beings “rooted in unity in Being” (117) governed by duty, care, and joyful hospitality to other beings, like roots and fungi that “cling to each other, cooperating and nourishing together” (115). To say that “Humans will co-create vegetal politics with plant, with plant well-being co-determining public policy” (122) so that “each being shall find their roots in another” (122) is to redefine what politics and public policy can mean, and to achieve in some measure the cognitive estrangement of fable or science fiction. But their words have the quality of declarations, where things mean what they say, and where there is no room for excess or non-coincidence, for impossible or encrypted meanings, for mistranslations or equivocations. A world as flat as paper.

    Kopenawa’s words, on the other hand, reach us like a fragile junction between partially connected worlds, traversed by difference, opacity, and an elsewhere behind it. Epidemic beings, like the xawarari, he tells us,

    [C]ook their dismembered prey’s bodies in big metal basins, like a pile of spider monkeys, sprinkling them with boiling oil. This is what makes us burn with fever! Finally, they store this cooked human flesh in big metal cases to eat them later. In this way they prepare a great number of human meat cans, like the white people do with their fish and their beef. Later, when they start to lack victuals, they send their employees to hunt new victims among us: “Go get me nice and fat human children! I am so hungry! I would happily eat a leg!” (292)

    A Failed Manifesto
    Richard Pithouse

    Frantz Fanon observes that colonialism “dehumanizes the colonized. Strictly speaking, it animalizes him” (Les Damnés [2002] 45, my trans.). As this review is being written, people in Gaza are being referred to as “human animals” while being subjected to murderous assault by the Israeli military, backed in various ways by the major Western powers.

                The line between the human and the animal is not only deliberately blurred or undone by colonial ideology. This ideological maneuver has an ancient, enduring, and promiscuous history and was as available to the Interahamwe as to the Nazis. Nonetheless, excluding racialized people from the full count of the human via animalizing discourses has always been central to colonial ideology. In the Cape, the organized mass murder of the people now known by two unsatisfactory terms, “Bushmen” and “San,” largely perpetrated in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was, in part, legitimated by referring to people as “schepsels” (“creatures” in Dutch).   

    The last permit to hunt “Bushmen” was issued in Pretoria in 1936, but by the 1950s the white South African writer Laurens van der Post was winning great acclaim, including within mainstream white South Africa, for his significantly fabricated writings presenting the “Bushmen” in the now standard tropes of Hollywood films, New Age cults, and self-optimization and health podcasts in which people determined to be indigenous are revered while remaining oppressed. A central element of these tropes is that people determined to be indigenous are remnants of the few humans deemed to have escaped the fall from a primordial relation to nature and understood as simultaneously innocent and wise, as chronologically in this time but ontologically out of it while carrying important and often ultimately redemptive lessons for those deemed fully of this time. For Van der Post, and many more to come, we—modern people living after the fall—have much to learn from this wisdom. This can range from having one’s first meal later in the day to trying in some ultimately ineffable way to spiritualize the natural world and reanimate our being. Fanon would not have been surprised by Van der Post, or by his reception among many white people as a guru. After all, Fanon writes, noting the attitude of “metropolitan anthropologists and experts,” it is the colonialists who “rush to the rescue of indigenous traditions” (Wretched [2004] 175).

                In 1980, The Gods Must Be Crazy, an entirely racist film about “Bushmen” in the Kalahari intended to be comic for white audiences, was a massive success in white South Africa. It repeated some of the standard themes important to the way “Bushmen” had come to be understood in the white world in South Africa and elsewhere, including the understanding that they were part of the natural world in a way that other humans were not. They were depicted as wholly non-threatening to white supremacy, while guerrillas understood to be of Bantu descent were demonized. A year or two later the oil company Shell ran a promotion in South Africa that gave motorists a book for children in which cards, with photographs of African animals collected at Shell garages, were to be pasted in the appropriate places. The cards were referred to as “animal cards.” The photograph on one those cards was not that of an animal; it was of a person, a “Bushman.”

                White attitudes had shifted from genocidal desires to, after an effective genocide, desires to “preserve” and learn from what was thought to be an “ancient” way of life. Although the meaning ascribed to the idea that “Bushmen” are part of the natural world in a way that other people are not had changed, the idea itself endured. These kinds of continuities require very careful thought, something that is absent in Milinda Banerjee and Jelle Wouters’s manifesto, in which indigeneity and the idea of a set of falls from primordial being are central but never fully defined or examined concepts. There is no attempt to make sense of the points at which their conception of the indigenous intersects with that of a figure like Van der Post, and a set of views common among white people around the world. Of course, they are not obligated to accept Fanon’s modernism, but simply ignoring what to some readers may seem like echoes of key colonial tropes in their own work seems rash.

                They also fail to offer a clear sense of who is to be counted as indigenous. This question may be clear in Australasia and the Americas where the basis for who counts as indigenous and who does not is clear. This is not the case in South Africa, where dominant conceptions place a person who claims Khoi or “Bushman” descent as “indigenous” but exclude a Zulu or Xhosa person deemed to be of Bantu descent. The migration of Bantu people to what is now South Africa, thought to have begun around 300AD, is hardly the same thing as the arrival of European settlers in Australia in 1788. Across Africa the term indigenous tends to refer to minorities such as the Basarwa in Botswana or the Batwa in the Congo while excluding most people. Some sort of conceptual clarification is required, but this is not provided by Banerjee and Wouters.

                The idea that white people and other elites in terms of class, race, caste, etc., can be ontologically enriched by learning from often materially dispossessed and politically oppressed people deemed to be indigenous does not generally include the view that those who should learn from others understood to have a more “primordial” relation to the natural world should abandon their privileged place in colonial and capitalist modernity. Health and self-optimization podcasts, with their breathless claims about the wonders of “African tribes” (“They don’t have smart phones!”) do not call for the overthrow of global capitalism or reparations from colonial states.

                Banerjee and Wouters radically divert from the views that have a degree of genealogical entanglement with the sort of ideas made famous by Van der Post in that they call for some sort of absolute revolution which, following indigenous examples, undoes the line between the animal and the human and establishes a global interspecies democracy, marked by a new and magnificent plenitude of being. This revolution is overwhelmingly understood in ontological rather than political terms, with exclamation marks (‘Being!’) that substitute for conceptual clarity. This places the manifesto in the broader turn from politics to ontology that includes new schools of thought such as Afro-pessimism and some forms of decoloniality. It generally lacks any credible sense of the political, of the actual mechanisms of building alliances and power. The few scattered and always trite lines here and there asserting the need to connect different forms of politics do not do the required work.

                The problems that arise from the sublimated religiosity that so often marks the ecstatic substitution of ontology for politics extend beyond an incoherent conception of being. In a manner that is in some respects analogous to the way that the idea of social death has been reworked by Afro-pessimism, a complete annihilation of being is summarily declared, although in this case it is announced for the rich and powerful, the people whose lives have not been devastated in material terms by the accumulated weight of colonialism, racial capitalism, and imperialism, people who are not politically oppressed. Here it is the people who are among the most oppressed who will restore the vitality of being of those from the dominant groups. The many Black critiques of white fantasies about the redemptive ontological possibilities imagined to be offered by the consumption of Black culture are not noted.

                There are many problems with all this. One is that while bullshit jobs, crap TV, mindless scrolling, stultifying education, afternoons at the mall, and much more are all dispiriting and depressing, we are hardly ontologically dead when experiencing recognition by a lover, the birth of a child, driving into the sunrise, listening to great music, hearing a snatch of an anodyne but seductive pop song on the radio, reading Mahmoud Darwish or—as Darwish often affirms in the midst of catastrophe—taking our morning coffee. No humans are entirely ontologically dead, nor is ecstatic plenitude at the level of being possible outside of certain moments in certain situations. Another is that forms of radical theory that—like that of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri in the conclusion to Empire—promise dissidents from among the dominating classes who identify with the oppressed unimaginable ontological wealth inevitably end up producing ontologically predatory forms of politics. It never ends well when people from the dominant classes expect oppressed people to renew their being in mystical and wonderful ways. All forms of politics that offer people from the dominant classes ontological pleasures or even redemption from the dominated classes must, without exception, be opposed.

                Of course, Banerjee and Wouters are right to reject the idea that the people and polities they discuss are, in Eric Hobsbawm’s phrase, “prepolitical,” and of course there are things that can be learned from all people, polities, and cosmologies. It should be equally obvious that everyone living in the present is of the present and that we must wholly abandon the idea that some people have a greater claim to the present than others. It is also clear that people living in the territories that became settler colonies have urgent and entirely legitimate political claims to all kinds of restitution. It is a plain fact that understandings of the natural world with pre-colonial origins can, as with the idea of Pachamama in Bolivia, become powerful and productive political ideas and material forces. But where does the claim, even if implicit, that largely rural people deemed to be indigenous have a special claim on the politics of the future leave, say, African Americans, Africans not deemed indigenous, or the huge proportion of impoverished humanity living in often very cosmopolitan shanty towns? In several countries in the Global South, these shanty towns are very significant sites of political innovation and, at times, popular counter-power.

                The ideas that are brought into these kinds of politics are frequently hybrid. They can simultaneously draw on pre-colonial ideas and practices, Marxism, and liberal ideas of rights. A dogmatically Eurocentric view of the political that sees precolonial ideas and practices as “prepolitical” is wholly inadequate to making sense of this. Here we could, at a stretch, suggest that Banerjee and Wouters’s insistence that ideas with precolonial roots can be important has value, but the point has been made much better by others, including Fanon and many Latin American theorists. And when they go beyond productive metaphors, such as, arguably, talking about animal politics, and speak of things like python collectives and assemblies, the abandonment of reason takes us onto the terrain of farce and undermines this important point.

                In some parts of the world, including Haiti and South Africa, popular urban politics is often fundamentally centered on a defiant affirmation of a universal humanism. In Haiti the declaration “Tout moun se moun” (sometimes translated as “Every person is a human being”) has long been an axiom around which popular politics is organized. Very similar declarations are made in South Africa, and it is common for people to assert a claim on humanity by explicitly rejecting animalization, making statements such as “We are human beings, not dogs.” There is, of course, a long history of an affirmation of humanity in the wider Black radical tradition, and many of its leading thinkers are radical humanists. If one wishes to make an argument for abandoning humanism and breaking down the separation between the animal and human, it needs to be done with an awareness of all this, and with great care. Certainly, if people are to be presented as close to animals, or part of an animal world, we should start with people whose humanity has never been in question, and not with those for whom it has long been in question.

                It is simply irresponsible to write, in rapturous terms, about borders being opened to animal migrations without noting that in Africa “trans-frontier” parks have led to Western-funded militarized violence against people living in or adjacent to these parks. It is careless to talk about rewilding without addressing the fact that the idea of reintroducing bears and wolves to England is seen as outrageous while Africans who do not wish to live with dangerous predators are criminalized and subject to organized violence.

                Manifestos are not required to have the same standards of evidence, argument, or nuance as other kinds of texts. And although the attempt at poeticism in this manifesto fails (Banerjee and Wouters do not have the poetic gifts of, say, Aimé Césaire), some latitude can be granted on the question of style. Nonetheless, the fact that a text is written in the genre of the manifesto does not mean that everything is permitted. This manifesto does not just largely leave out the well more than a billion people (some figures are much higher) living on occupied land in the cities of the Global South. It does not just leave out workers in Chinese factories. As Gayatri Spivak notes, it uses claims about South Asia to issues global declarations. It follows so many texts produced from within the Euro-American academy in largely leaving out Africa. It does not engage seriously with Latin America, the one part of the world where political claims made in part in the name of indigeneity have accumulated enough power to mount sustained and at times effective challenges to states and capital. This parochialism is wholly unacceptable. A proper examination of Bolivia would be essential for a credible political manifesto for the future that centers indigeneity.

                A manifesto that announces a new global politics must be global. A manifesto that announces a new politics must have a clear sense of the political. A manifesto that announces an end to the separation between the animal and the human must address the long and ongoing history of the ways colonized and other oppressed people have been animalized, excluded in full or in part from the count of the human. It must also address the fact that oppressed people have built and sustained movements in the face of murderous repression in the name of the human.


    Works Cited

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    –––. “Orientalist Constructions of India.” Modern Asian Studies, vol. 20, no. 3, 1986, pp. 401-46.

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    Lal, Vinay. “India and the Challenge of the Global South: Some Thoughts on Pluralism, the Categories of Knowledge, and Hospitality.” India and Civilizational Futures: Backwaters Collective on Metaphysics and Politics II, edited by Vinay Lal, Oxford UP, 2019, pp. 1-32.

    Sachau, Edward C., editor. Alberuni’s India: An Account of the Religion, Philosophy, Literature, Chronology, Astronomy, Customs, Laws, and Astrology of India about A.D. 1030. Trubner & Co., 1888; reprint ed., Rupa & Co., 2002.

    Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. A Critique of Postcolonial Reason: Toward a History of the Vanishing Present. Harvard UP, 1999.

    Notes

    [1] See, for example, my “India and the Challenge of the Global South.”