Category: Volume 7 – Number 3 – May 1997

  • Selected Letters from Readers

     
     

    Editors’ note:

     

    We received many letters addressing our move to Johns Hopkins University Press and to a subscription-based model of recovering our costs. That model in brief: with the January 1997 issue, PMC is published as part of Project Muse of Johns Hopkins University Press. The most current issue of PMC remains freely available on the Web; back issues, however, are now restricted to individual and institutional subscribers.

     

    Many readers wrote to lament the move to a subscription plan of any kind, citing PMC’s accessibility as its single most powerful asset. We also received several letters from contributing authors who felt that restricting access to their work changed, in fundamental and disturbing ways, the terms under which they initially published their work in this journal. Several letters pointed out that, under this model, contributing authors lose access to their own work once the issue in which it appears is no longer current.

     

    Rather than simply represent these letters in this column, the editors sought to foster discussion of the crucial issues these letters raised, issues central not only to the continued health of PMC but also to electronic scholarly publication more generally. In March, we began an electronic mailing list discussion and invited readers, authors, Board reviewers and representatives from John Hopkins University Press to join the discussion. The full archive of the discussion to date is available here.

     

    The discussion has already had one immediate result: the publishers have decided to provide free text-only access to the journal and its back issues. Further details about this plan will be made available on the discussion list and in the September issue. We invite those interested in joining the discussion to send mail to pmc@jefferson.village.virginia.edu. We plan to include an edited version of the discussion in our September issue.

     


     

    Reader’s Report on David Golumbia’s “Hypercapital,” PMC 7.1

     

    Golumbia’s “Hypercapital”, while an excellently written article full of deliciously interesting links, is clearly hoist of its own petard. How can he claim that “The world of corporate capitalism is dominated by actors who do not truly see the play of which they are a part, and dicta whose consequences are themselves beyond the ken of all but the most foresighted of capitalists” with such elitist, self-congratulatory insouciance?

     

    A touch more humility would go a long way to enhancing the credibility of such far-reaching articles. The brightest minds are not all cloistered in academia, and visions of truth are not all granted to the lucky few.

     

    These comments are from: Donald Summers
    dsummers@metrolink.net

     


     

    Reader’s Report on Arkady Plotnitsky’s “‘But It Is Above All Not True’: Derrida, Relativity, and the ‘Science Wars,’” PMC 7.2

     

    Granted, Gross & Leavitt, Sokal, Weinberg, et al may not have properly translated or understood Derrida. Does the same apply to many of the other authors of articles in the issue of Social Textthat published the Sokal hoax? Or do we scientists misunderstand as well what they are saying about science?

     

    These comments are from: Gordon Banks
    geb@cadre.dsl.pitt.edu

     


     

    Arkady Plotnitsky replies:

     

    These are important questions in the context of the current debate concerning the relationships between science and the humanities or the social sciences (the debate that has acquired the rather misleading name of the “Science Wars”), and I am glad to have an opportunity to comment on these questions here. The main question here is double: on the one hand, that of the discrimination between lesser and better work, and, on the other, that of the “ethics of reading” and/as public criticism.

     

    First of all, as I have said in my article, we in the humanities must acknowledge without hesitation that some of the “postmodernist” (using this, often in turn misleading, term for the sake of convenience here) work on science is indeed based on woefully inadequate knowledge and lack of careful thought. It is true, however, that discriminating between what is sense and what is nonsense on science in the current humanities is not always easy, especially because of the unfamiliar (to most scientists) critical idiom accompanying such arguments. Nor, in part for the same reason, is it easy to discriminate among the secondary commentaries on Derrida and other key postmodernist authors, commentaries on which scientists often rely in forming their views and which they have often used in their critical arguments in the current debates. Some of these commentaries are at best confused. Indeed, problematic commentaries on science and on postmodernist figures and ideas are sometimes found in the same works. The discrimination between good and bad work, on all sides, may well be the greatest problem here, and the confusion (and bewilderment) on the part of scientists is understandable and, to a degree (but only to a degree), justified.

     

    It would be difficult for me, in part for the reasons just indicated, to comment here on the articles in the “Science Wars” issue of Social Text. These articles should, however, be evaluated with the factors just indicated in mind. Certainly specific problems found there, however severe (and some are), cannot be extrapolated so as to attack or dismiss any given areas of the humanities or the social sciences–whether cultural studies, deconstruction, gender studies, science studies, or whatever.

     

    That said, scientists (or other readers) are entitled to have a negative or indeed dismissive opinion about any work, however such work is regarded in its own field or elsewhere. It is a different matter, however, when a public criticism is at stake, especially in print. The ethics of public criticism demands that, if one wants to argue against lesser or even outright “junk” work, one has the obligation to read this work carefully and to support one’s argument accordingly. This is, unfortunately, not what we have seen in most recent commentaries by scientists in the wake of Gross and Levitt’s book (and in the book itself). The best work is often dismissed or attacked without a careful reading, or by egregious misreading, and without paying any attention to the context or the meaning of basic terms involved. The problem of discrimination, discussed above, cannot therefore serve as an excuse here.

     

    That is not to say that there are no exceptions in recent criticism of the humanities by scientists, nor, of course, that certain points concerning the lack of adequate knowledge and thinking on science in the humanities are not justified. It may be pointed out, however, that the humanists, while they should not be absolved of all responsibility, are not always entirely to blame. On the other hand, some popular, and sometimes even specialized, literature on science is not without some blame, or at least some responsibility. Quite a few misconceived or misleading statements on science in literary and cultural studies come directly from such literature. Unfortunately, too, the borderlines between radical views and bad thinking (and both occur in statements by scientists and humanists alike) are not always easy for nonspecialists to recognize.

     

    For ethical and conceptual reasons alike, then, much caution is required on all sides–and with respect to all sides. This caution is perhaps what has been most lacking thus far. This is one of the reasons for my conclusion in the article: “Scholars in the humanities should, of course, exercise due caution as to the claims they make about mathematics and science, and respect the areas of their specificity. Reciprocally, however, scientists and other non-humanist scholars should exercise due care and similar caution in their characterization of the humanities, especially when they are dealing with innovative and complex work, such as that of Derrida, and all the more so if they want to be critical about it.” By taking this approach, we may also develop a better sense of the meaning and quality of whatever we read, whether we do it for ourselves or, especially, when we want to communicate this sense to others.

     

  • Dry Leatherette: Cronenberg’s Crash

    Terry Harpold

    School of Literature, Communication, and Culture
    Georgia Institute of Technology

    terry.harpold@lcc.gatech.edu

     

    David Cronenberg, Crash. Dir. David Cronenberg. Perf. James Spader, Holly Hunter, Elias Koteas, Deborah Unger, Rosanna Arquette. Fine Line Features, 1996.

     


    The unfamiliar planes of her hips and legs steered me into unique culs-de-sac, strange declensions of skin and musculature.1


     

    Crash begins with a brilliant visual and aural segué. The title credits, dented chrome letterforms, pull out of a vanishing point into the glare of oncoming h eadlights. (Those of an automobile driven by the viewer? These first frames establish the film’s equivalence of cinema screen and windscreen, driver and audience; any reflective field in the visual landscapes of Crash–chrome, glass, vinyl, p ainted steel, and flesh–may be a projective screen.) Behind the credits, Howard Shore’s spare soundtrack repeats this tropology of approach, echo, reflection, abstraction. Cut to a floating POV shot that repeats the swerving movements of the credits: an airplane hangar, parked, partially disassembled private planes, gleaming surfaces of steel and glass. Catherine Ballard (Deborah Unger) is bent over a plane wing, caressing her bared breast (she holds an erect nipple against the wing’s rivets); her skirt is raised over her hips, presenting the curve of her buttocks to her lover’s face.

     

    The opening scene leads immediately to two further couplings. James Ballard (James Spader), a producer of television commercials, grapples vigorously in a darkened supply room with his camera assistant (his face and then thrusting groin buried in her buttocks), as his assistant director calls from outside for his approval of a tracking shot. Cut to James and Catherine, standing on their apartment balcony, describing to each other the day’s earlier infidelities. Her back is turned to him. She quietly raises her skirt to reveal the cleft of her buttocks, and he enters her from behind as they continue talking in low tones. Her white-knuckled hands grasp the balcony rails, as the camera roves over her shoulder to a panoramic shot of the urgent, perpetual traffic jams on the flyovers below.

     

    This opening triptych is noteworthy for its audacity–only a porn flick, says conventional wisdom, should begin with three uninterrupted sex scenes–and for its cool, detached anality. Since its controversial debut at Cannes in 1996 2 critics have complained of the film’s deadening, counter-erotic repetitions; the sex-scenes disconcert by both their frequency (nearly always occurring in sequences of two or three) and peculiar, inhuman grace: “Crash makes you nostalgic for the ersatz heartiness of porno performers,” writes Anthony Lane,

     

    at least they're pretending, for the viewer's sake, to have a good time, whereas the characters in Crash are so unsmiling--so driven, in every sense--that they make you ashamed of ever having enjoyed yourself. ("Off the Road" 107)

     

    This formalist sexual monotony is obviously intentional. Like much of Cronenberg’s work, Crash‘s narrative structure is determined more by the conventions of cinematic form than by its subject matter (this is one of its weaknesses, but for re asons other than monotony). Why not, Cronenberg proposes in a 1997 interview with Gavin Smith, construct a plot on the basis of a series of sex scenes? Why must film have a progressive narrative that gets anywhere? Why should the characters elicit sympath y, or evolve between the first and last scenes? (“Mind Over Matter” 20) Crash is obviously not unique in travelling a narrative route of uncertain shape or destination. It may be that the early repetition of sex scenes in the film makes it di fficult to resist comparing them to the enthusiasm and blatancy of porn. In that regard, the cerebrality, disconnectedness, and abstraction of the sex in Crashare likely to disappoint.

     

    The principle of disconnection and abstraction accounts for the film’s determined rear-endedness: nearly every act of intercourse shown in the movie is anal or rear-entry, Cronenberg’s trope for a disjunction at the center of his characters’ intimate embraces:

     

    It's been suggested that I'm obsessed with asses, but I like everything, you know. I don't think that I'm too overly obsessed with asses. It's more, "How do you have sex when you're not quite having sex with each other?" That kind of thing. (Cronenberg on Cronenberg 198)

     

    In the longest sex scene in the movie, Catherine and James make love after her first meeting with Vaughan (Elias Koteas), the “nightmare angel of the expressways,” toward whose cadre of accident victims James has gravitated, following his collision with Helen Remington (Holly Hunter), and through whom he has discovered the sexual possibilities of the automobile crash. James penetrates Catherine from behind, as she urges him on with questions about Vaughan’s body:

     

    Is he circumcised? Can you imagine what his anus is like? Describe it to me. Would you like to sodomize him? Would you like to put your penis right into his anus, thrust it up his anus?... Have you ever sucked a penis? Do you know what semen tastes like? Have you ever tasted semen? Some semen is saltier than others. Vaughan's semen must be very salty... (Cronenberg, Crash 37)

     

    Despite its verbal directness (never raunchy: sex-talk in the film and book is always clinical), this scene is among the coolest of the film–Catherine’s monologue aims at evokin g an image of an absent object of desire (Vaughan’s penis and anus), but the evocation is not sustained outside of the scene. Vaughan’s penis is never shown in Cronenberg’s Crash, though it is repeatedly remarked upon in the novel, in various stages of tumescence and detumescence, in and out of Vaughan’s jeans, pissing and crusted with dried semen, and so on. Although the film shows James and Vaughan’s eventual sex–James sodomizes Vaughan in the front seat of Vaughan’s ’63 Lincoln–Vaughan’s anus is obviously not depicted, not accorded Ballard’s exacting description (“…as I moved in and out of his rectum the lightborne vehicles soaring along the motorway drew the semen from my testicles…” [Ballard, Crash 202]).

     

    I say, “obviously” because it is precisely in this limit of the showable that Cronenberg’s movie differs most from Ballard’s novel. Crash was released in t he U.S. with an MPAA rating of NC-17, the hardest rating short of the “X” reserved for pornography. (The film was assigned a similar “18” BBFC certificate in the U.K.) The film’s U.S. release, originally slated for October, 1996, was delayed until March, 1997, reportedly following the personal intervention of Ted Turner, Vice Chairman of Time-Warner, Inc. (parent company of Fine Line Features), who described Crash as “appalling” and “depraved.” Release dates in the U.K. and Italy were similar ly delayed, following excoriating editorials in the conservative press. That a film of Crash should provoke censorial apprehension and retribution will surprise no one who has read the novel. But the surrogate strategies and directorial gambi ts required of a commercial film made of a novel like Crash determine the filmmakers’s product in ways that necessarily exceed his esthetic or technical aims. Whereas Ballard’s novel catalogs in frank and extended detail the shape, s mell, taste, and tactility of erectile and invaginated flesh, the varieties of matter within and expelled by the body, and elaborate grotesqueries of skin, steel and concrete, Cronenberg’s representational palette is more circumscribed, limited by the dic tates of the censor’s blade and the financial concerns of commercial theatrical release.

     

    The unshowable is filmable, of course, through indirection. That possibility accounts in large part for the stagy talkiness of much of Crash 3; the cinematic erection of the viewer’s gaze (reaffirmed, as I’ve noted, by the film’s many plays with reflective surfaces) is a substitute for the missing object of which cinematic convention prohibits direct exhibition. Bu t Cronenberg’s project since Shivers, “to show the unshowable, to speak the unspeakable” (Cronenberg on Cronenberg 43), runs up in Crash against a guiderail of sexual abjection that it never quite crosses.

     


    Each of her deformities became a potent metaphor for the excitements of a new violence.


     

    Missing from the film are the novel’s extended repertories of accident positions, real and imagined configurations of broken car parts, concrete, flesh, and viscera that can go on for paragraphs and whole pages. The film includes only a few players, and fewer accidents, restrictions dictated by a small budget, but perhaps also markers of a deeper incommensurability. Cronenberg’s screenplay for Naked Lunch suggests t he problem. The film of Burroughs’s novel is an extraordinary exercise in reduction and translation from a textual to a visual mode. The film avoids any attempt to linearize Burroughs’s expressly counter-narrative textuality, electing instead to follow a hallucinatory but mostly coherent storyline that sutures William Lee’s peregrinations in the Interzone to excerpts of more legible narratives from other Burroughs works. Burroughs’s 1951 accidental shooting of his wife Joan, an event central to Burroughs ‘s career as a writer but nearly indiscernable in the novel, becomes in Cronenberg’s version a defining frame, the openly biographical border of its counterfeit territories. The film repeats the counter-narrative provocations of the text in the resistant , stark unreality of its scenery and effects, the flatness of the characters’ performances, and the explicit awkwardness of its transitions. Naked Lunch is a film very conscious of its materiality; its obvious facticity repeats on a visual re gister the irreducible textuality of Burroughs’s writing.

     

    The visual landscapes of Crash recall the detached unreality of Cronenberg’s earlier films (Shivers, Rabid, The Dead Zone)–in this regard Crash cannily recasts the scopic dereliction of much of Ballard’s fiction. Whereas Ballard’s novel is a first-person narrative, most of the film is shot from a point of view that matches closely the objectifying eye framing the opening credits and the aureole of Catherine’s breast, pressed against the plane wing. This reinforces the viewer’s identification with that supervening voyeur, but it excludes from the film consciousness of the textual resistances of Ballard’s w riting, without substituting for them the explicit unreality that worked in Naked Lunch as the trace of Burroughs’s compositional methods. The novel is framed by a retrospective narrative (it begins and ends after Vaughan’s death); several chapters describe events that are out of sequence, or separated from one another by gaps of time that might be equal to hours or weeks. The elaborate multiple profiles of wounds, victims, and victim-positions are written in a bland prose modeled on the clinical voice of the hospital file or the coroner’s report, and staged in a sort of neo-Sadean grammar of excess: the characters imaginatively rehearse accident positions; they study and re-present the bodily postures of crises before they enact them.

     

    The film captures some of this temporal disjunction in implied delays, evidenced indirectly by healed bruises or scars. But the verbal excesses of Ballard’s novel translate less effectively to the screen. There, the literalness of the visual favors more denotative representations, or at best, perspectivalist re-presentations that are very different from the audacious similes of Ballard’s writing:

     

    The carapace of the instrument binnacle, the inclined planes of the dashboard panel, the metal sills of the radio and ashtrays gleamed around me like altarpieces, their geometries reaching towards my body like the stylized embraces of some hyper-cerebral machine. (Crash 200)

     

    Cronenberg’s decision to structure the film in essentially sequential episodes closes off the possibility of showing multiple, inconsistent points of view. Whereas Ballard’s novel is told in the first person, the film is shot from the same objectifying eye that frames the opening credits and the aureole of Catherine’s breast, pressed against the plane wing. This approach foregrounds the viewer’s identification with the presumed subjectivity of that supervening eye, but it excludes from the film any consciousness of the textual resistances of Ballard’s writing, without substituting in their place the explicit unreality that worked in Naked Lunchas the trace of Burroughs’s compositional methods.

     

    The clinical character of Ballard’s narrative voice is to some degree carried over into the spareness of the script (only 77 pages for 100 minutes of running time) and the subdued, at times affectless, performances of the actors. Lacking the baroque intensity of Ballard’s prose-style, their lines are divided by long silences that appear meditative at first, but over the course of the film come to signify nothing at all. (In this respect, Crash recalls The Dead Zone and Dead Ringers, in which a similar eccentric quietness frames much of the dialogue.) The rare exceptions to this principle are reserved chiefly for Vaughan, when he is called on to speak as thaumaturge or philosopher of the auto-erotic. Those moments are, as I’ve noted, the most Ballardian of the film, but they seem for that reason expressly prosaic, and out of place with the rest of the dialogue.

     

    The result is that the neo-Sadean theatricality of the novel–deeply rationalist, explicitly artificial–is traced in the film only in abiding and disconcerting absences. One has the uncanny feeling that something–some thing–is missing, and that this lack accounts, paradoxically, for both the film’s success in representing the perverseness of the collision, and for its failure to translate the novel’s audacious extremity and perpetual crisis.

     


    Her body, with its angular contours, its unexpected junctions of mucous membrane and hairline


     

    The first caresses of Crash set the tempo and esthetic of the film: a new geometry of the libido sprung from the intimate contact and resistance of flesh and steel. This geometry is figured in the opening scene by the explicit comparison of Catherine’s raised nipple to the hard roundness of the wing rivets. Her breast is doubly-valanced here: presented to the steel surface (and, indirectly, to the viewer) as both an erectile organ and an focal point of primary orality, an invitation to both anaclisis and perversion. This doubled valence is one of the film’s anchoring tropes. When Helen struggles to free herself from her seatbelt after her head-on collision with James, she tears open her blouse and exposes her breast to him, as they stare at each other over the crushed hoods of their cars and the mangled body of her husband, thrown into James’s windshield. When James and Helen drive to a carpark for their first sexual encounter, she directs his hand to the same breast, his first contact with her flesh. When Catherine submits to Vaughan’s depredations in the car wash (as James looks on in the rear view mirror), she first bares a single breast to Vaughan; he caresses the nipple intently with an oil-dirtied finger, as she looks down “with rapt eyes, as if seeing it for the first time, fascinated by its unique geometry” (Cronenberg, Crash 49; Ballard, Crash 160). Later, as James comforts a bruised Catherine in their bed, his hand is drawn to the abrasions on her breast left by Vaughan’s hand and mouth.

     

    The nipple is the only organ that may be openly shown in a state of erection in mainstream cinema, and this accounts for its tendency to often stand in for the erect penis. In Crash (the novel and the film), breasts may be the focal point of oral (as well as phallic) desire, but they are never maternal; there is never fluid expressed from these nipples, except as a result of mechanical injury. This may in part account for their effectiveness as substitutes for the penis, within the restrained erotic economy of Cronenberg’s film. The sexual organs shown in the film–and this includes the depraved orifices opened by the crash injury–are remarkably clean: debrided and drained, sutured and sterilized. Crash is almost entirely free of the organic mess that spills out of the cerebrality of Ballard’s prose.

     

    The novel is a catalog of crisis fluids: blood, vomit, urine, rectal and vaginal mucus, gasoline, oil, engine coolant. And most of all: semen; in dried, caked signatures on car seats, dashboards, stiffening the crotch of Vaughan’s fouled jeans; drooling across the gradients of seat covers, streaking instrument binnacles, hanging from steering columns and mirrors. Vaughan’s seminal glands seem infinitely capacious: their ebb and flow trace the tidal rhythms of the new sexuality awakened by the automobile: “As I looked at the evening sky,” James muses after observing one of many assignations between Vaughan and a prostitute in the back seat of the Lincoln, “it seemed as if Vaughan’s semen bathed the entire landscape, powering these thousands of engines, electric circuits and private destinies, irrigating the smallest gestures of our lives” (Ballard, Crash 191).

     

    In Powers of Horror Julia Kristeva excludes semen from her inventory of the abject substances expelled from the body and unrepresentable to the cultural psyche. (She classifies it with tears: “although they belong to the borders of the body, [neither has] any polluting value” [71]. 4) The ubiquity of that substance in Ballard’s novel, and its explicit, intimate connection to the violence and desubjectification of the auto-erotic, suggests, however, that seminal fluid belongs among the privileged forms of the abject, along with excrement and menstrual blood. Semen is, I would contend, the patently abject trace of phallic desire: a nugatory leftover of erotic satisfaction, obscene in its counter-utility, messy, smelly and sticky, unrecuperable in its organic extremity.

     

    Outside of the porn film, semen is the filmic epitome of the unshowable, the unwatchable.5 It is nearly always unseen, a secret substance deposited in rage or passion, demonstrated only by indirection: a sigh, a grimace, a woman’s hands held fast to the small of her lover’s back. Shown directly, it is the among the identifying marks of the contemporary pornographic film, where it appears chiefly in the “money shot:” in cascading pulses tracing the abdomen, rump, breast or face of the partner, proof of the “reality” of the male actor’s pleasure and the abjectness of his partner (who in her or his open-mouthed desire literally swallows up the abject, internalizing and identifying with it.) What counts in the money shot is the controlling effect of the emission, a gesture of mastery over the field (the body) against which it is cast. What is missing is the disorder of pleasure’s aftermath, the sticky mess it leaves behind. The wet spot has no place in a regime of phallic privilege, unless it is recuperated as a trait of the other over whom the phallus presides.

     

    The essential abjection of semen accounts, I think, for its omnipresence in Ballard’s novel. There, it marks a sly subversion of the novel’s insistent phallic construction of desire–the new organs of the automotive body are always invaginations; the renovated act of sexual congress is always one of penetration by a male organ, and usually of a vent in the female body; the novel seems deeply male and heterosexual in this regard–if only because there is too much of it. Its excess dribbles out, stains, the dispassion of the prose; it marks a material sign of male (Vaughan’s, James’s, perhaps Ballard’s) resignation to the essential deviance of desire and the impossibility of absolute, efficient satisfaction.

     

    There is no money shot in Cronenberg’s film–as there is none in Ballard’s novel–but there is one remarkable depiction of the seminal abject. James, Catherine, and Vaughan have left the scene of a multiple-car collision, in which Seagrave, a member of Vaughan’s troupe of crash enthusiasts (he is Vaughan’s chief stunt-driver) has killed himself in a remake of Jayne Mansfield’s fatal crash (complete with wig, false breasts, and pet Chihuahua.) The accident scene is the most classically, cruelly gorgeous of the film: steam and smoke rise from the overturned cars, merging with the dense fog; sparks arcing from the rescue workers’ chainsaws fragment the beams thrown by jammed traffic, flares, and flashing emergency lights; the accident victims (living and dead) stare numbly into space, as spectators gape, and police and fire fighters methodically reposition their crushed limbs, as though they were broken dolls or crash-test dummies. James sits off to the side of the accident, watching Vaughan and Catherine, who move through the scene in a state of increasing sexual arousal. Vaughan photographs her sitting in the front seat of one of the crashed cars, leaning against a crumpled panel–the fact that he is shooting her as a crash victim is emphasized by a long shot that places her profile (for our eyes) directly in line with that of a woman who slightly resembles her, except that her face is shattered on the side we can barely see by something horrific protruding from her cheek.

     

    Blood has spattered on the door and tires of Vaughan’s car, and the threesome drive to a nearby automatic car-wash. As the car is drawn into the brushes and spray, James, who has been driving, watches quietly in the rear-view mirror as Vaughan and Catherine have violent sex in the back seat. During their struggle, her hand is thrown across the top of the front seat, and James sees in it what he has been straining to locate in the mirror: her palm glistens, dripping with semen, casting back the light refracted through the trailing soap suds and streams of water running down the outside of the closed windows. The moment is remarkable–I can think of none other like it in recent mainstream films–but it is isolated, Cronenberg’s one tip of the hat, as it were, to the centrality of this abject substance in Ballard’s novel. What moisture there is elsewhere in the film comes largely from outside the body–fog, rain, soapy water, oil, gasoline, and engine coolant–but these fluids are seldom mixed with the organic fluids.

     

    By comparison, the sex scene with which this coupling is paired–James’s sex with Gabrielle (Rosanna Arquette)–is curiously dry. There is little trace of an organic disarray in the well-lit interior of her car, as they maneuver among the forest of machinery that she uses to steer and control it. (Gabrielle was the victim of a near-fatal crash before Crash begins. She hobbles through the film wearing an e xtensive body brace, her thighs and torso enclosed in a leather and steel apparatus that resembles the product of an Erector set from Fredericks of Hollywood.) Her flesh is barely exposed–one nipple is shown briefly, the scarred outline of the other brea st is hinted at. The object of James’s heated fumblings is the “neo-sex” organ (Cronenberg’s term, Crash 52) on the back of her thigh: a deep, invaginated scar that he tears open her fishnet stockings to reveal, and which he penetrates with h is penis. For all the breathless heat of the players, the new erogenous opening is revealed as something dry and cool, looking nothing like, for example, the ragged mess of Max Renn’s abdominal tape slot in Videodrome, or the dripping bodily openings/excrescences of Rabid and The Brood. The scene, one of the most arresting in the novel, seems awkward and hurried in the film–its potential subversiveness stems almost entirely from its near-comic clumsiness; the only e rections in the car are the among the mass of cables, knobs and controls protruding from under the dash, and these appear mostly to get in the way.

     


    detrusor muscle and erectile tissue, was a ripening anthology of perverse possibilities


     

    Cronenberg’s Crash aspires to a kind of fleshy, abject raggedness, but never quite makes it. It is perhaps undone in the end by the abstractness of the bodily vents that its collisions open. Near the conclusion of the film, Vaughan and James are tattooed with stylized imprints of automobile parts, Vaughan with the fluted lower edge of a steering wheel (on his abdomen), and James with the lines of the hood ornament of Vaughan’s car (on his inner thigh). Vaughan complains to the tattooist that the marks she is etching into his flesh are too clean.

     

    Tattooist: Medical tattoos are supposed to be clean.

    Vaughan: This isn't a medical tattoo. This is a prophetic tattoo. Prophesy is dirty and ragged. Make it dirty and ragged. (Crash 54-55)

     

    Afterwards, James and Vaughan drive to an abandoned auto-wrecker’s yard. In the shadows of piled, rusted automobile hulks, bumpers, and wheel covers, they complete the erotic series that has been building from their first meeting. Each exposes his tattoos and scars to the other, and guides the other’s flesh

     

    to the beckoning injury sites on the interior of the car, to the pointed sills of the chromium ashtrays, to the curtain of wheel covers hanging on a web of twisted wire just outside the car window. (Cronenberg, Crash 55-56)

     

    They embrace, kiss (the first open-mouthed kiss of the film) and Vaughan lies face down the car seat, presenting his rear to James, an obvious mirror of Catherine’s position at the start of the film.

     

    The tattoos are Cronenberg’s invention. In the novel, the sex between James and Vaughan is the culmination of an extended LSD trip, during which the two drive over an industrial landscape that transforms into towering concrete cliffs and racing waves of golden light. The cars on the highway swim the thick air, “delighted as dolphins” (Ballard: 196). James feels that he is fusing with the automobile:

     

    The bones of my forearms formed a solid coupling with the shift of the steering column, and I felt the smallest tremors of the roadwheels magnified a hundred times, so that we traversed each grain of gravel or cement like the surface of a small asteroid. The murmur of the transmission system reverberated through my legs and spine, echoing off the plates of my skull as if I myself were lying in the transmission tunnel of the car, my hands taking the torque of the crankshaft, my legs spinning to propel the vehicle forwards. (Ballard 196-97)

     

    The acid trip completes the novel’s neuronic odyssey, sanctioning the characters’ final embrace automotive desubjectification. Vaughan submits himself to James because the latter’s imaginary fusion with the automobile completes the deepest secret of Vaughan’s fantasies of the crash: through James, Vaughan is finally fucked by his car.

     

    In the book, the sodomy is described in detail, and culminates in the image of James’s semen leaking from Vaughan’s anus onto the vinyl upholstery of the seat. The film, of course, shows none of this (arguably, the camera pulls away from their embrace more quickly than it in fact needs to in order to stay within its rating.) The filmed scene captures some of the frankness, but little of the exhilaration and affection of Ballard version:

     

    In our wounds, we celebrated the re-birth of the traffic-slain dead, the deaths and injuries of those we had seen dying by the roadside and the imaginary wounds and postures of the millions yet to die. (Ballard 203)

     

    When James climbs out of the car and into a nearby junker to rest, he seems to leaving the site of a crime, not one of disorienting intimacy. Vaughan’s effort to crash the Lincoln into the junker seems in the film oddly like an act of revenge for sexual humiliation, rather than the gesture of reciprocation that it clearly represents in the book.

     

    At this point, the film rushes to its conclusion: Vaughan leaves his mark on Catherine’s car with his own, in the form of a vaginal tear in her door; James and Catherine go out driving, looking for him; he dies in a hurried attempt to crash into them; Helen and Gabrielle are shown embracing in the back seat of Vaughan’s junked car; James and Catherine retrieve the car from the pound, fix it up, and begin rehearsing their own crashing games, he in Vaughan’s Lincoln, she in her car. The film ends with their embrace beside her overturned car (he has driven her from the highway). He asks if she is hurt; she replies through tears that she thinks she is all right. He caresses her bruised and mud-streaked thighs, promising, “Maybe the next one, darling… Maybe the next one”–the same words that Catherine says to James in the third sex scene of the film, as he complained of being interrupted with his “camera girl” before she could come.

     

    Though James’s last thoughts in the novel are of “the elements of my own car-crash” (224), it is unclear in Ballard’s version that he will repeat Vaughan’s collisions in so exact a form as Cronenberg shows. The literalness of the film’s depiction of James and Catherine’s embarcation on the route to the perfect crash is, I think, another sign of Cronenberg’s compromises in moving Ballard’s text to the screen. On the last pages of the novel, James and Catherine visit the police junkyard and make brief, ritual love in the back seat of the wrecked Lincoln. (In the novel, Vaughan leaves his Lincoln at their apartment building and steals James’s car, eventually driving it off a flyover in an attempt to crash into a limo carrying Elizabeth Taylor.6) James gathers up his semen in one hand, and walks with Catherine among the cars, anointing their binnacles and instrument panels with his come. They stop at the wreck of James’s car, and James deposits the remaining fluid on the bloody imprint of Vaughan’s buttocks on the deformed seat, and on the “bloodied lance” of the broken steering column (224).

     

    This final gesture in the novel binds the two men to the violence and abjection of the perpetually-erect automotive phallus–to precisely the gory extremity of the phallus that Cronenberg cannot show on film. The cultural impossibility–and here, I mean an intersection of the “cultures” of the commercial film industry and of the filmgoing public–the impossibility of showing both the extent of the embrace of the film’s male characters and its nugatory residues, is the boundary against which the film finally stops. The tattoos, the wrecked Lincoln–these are Cronenberg’s recastings of the unrepresentable abject, across which James and Vaughan achieve a degree of transitivity; within the limited erotic economy of the film, they function perfectly well toward that end. Cronenberg’s Crash disappoints because its translation of Ballard’s inventories of the abject is necessarily imperfect, but that imperfection is itself the hallmark of the film’s specific abjection. Like much of Cronenberg’s work, the film is a mixed product, its successes paradoxically traced in its open intimations of its limits, its inability to figure Ballard’s perpetual crisis of the auto-erotic except by indirection. The unshowable and the unfilmable are not identical, and the unshowable may leave its stain at the edges of the filmable–a fact long ago observed by critics of cinematic subjections of the gaze. Cronenberg’s most audacious work labors at the margins of what can be made to appear on the screen. Crash exhausts, and collides against its own limits, depositing something unmentionable by the way.

     

    Notes

     

    1 Ballard, Crash175-76.

     

    2 The film was awarded a Special Jury Prize “For Originality, For Daring, and For Audacity” at a ceremony at which several of the prize judges were conspicuously absent, or departed prematurely.

     

    3 Vaughan describes the car crash to James as a “fertilizing rather than destructive event–a liberation of sexual energy that mediates the sexuality of those who have died with an intensity impossible in any other form” (Cronenberg, Crash 42). This strikes me as one of the most Ballardian moments of the film, as no one but a Ballard character would talk that way in an informal conversation.

     

    4 Calvin Thomas’s Male Matters includes a rare analysis of semen-as-abject. His focus is on the “shameful visibility” of spilled semen: “When the penis lapses and allows its productions to become visible, it does not assert but rather collapses the rigid distinction between the essential and the excremental, the beyond and the beneath. This collapse provides the very contradiction that phallologocentrism must efface or displace to go about its powerful business of generating, reproducing not only itself but the conditions of production that prevail and predominate at the historical moment” (54).

     

    5 And not, as is often proposed, an erect penis–or, to be more precise, the dry-and-erect penis. Movies of all stripes are run through with obvious hard-ons. It matters little that viewers rarely see “actual” penises in partial or full engorgement–they are always present, in the erectile structures of architecture, the phallic profiles of combat weaponry and all manner of machinery (especially in the projectile forms of speeding cars), in the body language and verbal inflection of nearly every character in the presence of an object of her or his desire. The erect phallus is marked out in the penetrative logic of the camera’s point of view, its prosthetic extension of our eye into the field of the screen.

     

    6 Vaughan dreams of dying in a head-on crash with Taylor that will join their torsos and crushed genitals with the collapsing bulkheads of their cars. He is first drawn to James because the producer is working on a film in which Taylor appears in a wrecked automobile. The abstracted torso and visage of the film actress is a perpetual presence in Ballard’s fiction of the 1960s and ’70s, especially in works like Crash and The Atrocity Exhibition. Cronenberg’s decision to excise the entire Elizabeth Taylor narrative from the novel was probably motivated by her decreasing role in 1990s popular culture as a figure of erotic mystery and satisfaction.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Ballard, J.G. Crash. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1994.
    • Cronenberg, David. Crash. London: Faber and Faber, 1996.
    • Kristeva, Julia. Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection. Trans. Leon S. Roudiez. New York: Columbia UP, 1982.
    • Lane, Anthony. “Off the Road.” The New Yorker, March 31 1997: 106-107. Rodley, Chris, ed. Cronenberg on Cronenberg. Rev. ed. Boston: Faber and Faber, 1997.
    • Smith, Gavin. “Cronenberg: Mind Over Matter.” Film Comment 33.2 (1997): 14-29.
    • Thomas, Calvin. Male Matters: Masculinity, Anxiety and the Male Body on the Line. Chicago: University of Illinois, 1996.

     

  • Play the Blues, Punk

    Bill Freind

    Department of English
    University of Washington

    williamf@u.washington.edu

     

    R.L. Burnside, A Ass Pocket Full of Whiskey, Matador, 1996.

    Jon Spenser Blues Explosion, Now I Got Worry, Matador/Capitol, 1997.

     

    Unlike almost every other form of contemporary music, blues thrives on tradition. While old school hip-hop, for example, refers to a style just over a decade old, in blues the I-IV-V chord progression remains as pertinent today as it was in Blind Lemon Jefferson’s day. Inextricably tied up in that is the question of who “owns” the tradition. Primarily developed by African-Americans, the blues provided inspiration to two generations of white rock musicians, and in some cases, offered them a convenient supply of riffs (and occasionally, entire songs) to steal.

     

    But most rock musicians were after more than riffs. They were searching for what for lack of a better word we might call authenticity. In the 1960s, when the power of rock and roll was its newness, its oppositional stance, most bands still had a few blues covers in their repertoire, which allowed them to augment that oppositional stance with a claim to a much longer tradition. Band names are far from incidental, and it’s interesting to note how many bands turned to the blues as a way of suggesting a connection with that origin. The Rolling Stones picked their name from Muddy Waters’ “Mannish Boy,” Pink Floyd was assembled from the first names of two bluesmen, and the Jefferson Airplane got their title from a fictitious blues singer, Blind Thomas Jefferson Airplane. Even the Lovin’ Spoonful, a band whose specialty was Top 40 pop, got their name from a line in Mississippi John Hurt’s “Coffee Blues.”

     

    So it’s not just critical fussing to note that for most of their career the Jon Spencer Blues Explosion avoided any connection with the blues, never covering a blues standard and shunning totally the staple riffs. That’s especially striking given the Blues Explosion’s approach to the rock, soul and R&B tradition: they’ve appropriated, alluded to, and parodied everyone from Elvis Presley and Jerry Lee Lewis to Led Zeppelin, Public Enemy, and George Clinton. None of that stopped Spencer from asserting his prominence as a blues howler. Toward the end of “Flavor,” from the Blues Explosion’s 1994 album, Orange, Spencer introduces the band members, and when it comes time to introduce himself, he says “And the number one blues singer in the country…” Apparently seeing no need to give his name, Spencer instead offers his trademark shout of “Blues Explosion!” But suddenly Spencer adds, “Yeah, that’s right, we’re number one… Number one in Philadelphia, Number one in DC, Number one in Chicago…” and continues to rattle off the names of most cities in the country.

     

    What’s interesting is that Spencer is playing on Public Enemy’s “Public Enemy No. 1” from their debut album Yo! Bum Rush the Show, in which Flavor Flav comes in with “That’s right, we’re public enemy number one in New York, public enemy number one in DC…” But Spencer’s saying something entirely different from Flavor Flav, not sampling PE, not responding to them, maybe not even making a serious claim, since he follows it with a high pitched “Sooooouuuullll,” a reference to the opening of the old “Soul Train” shows. At that point, the beat abruptly slows and neo-folkie turned alternative hip-hop star Beck comes in with a rap recorded during a phone conversation with Spencer. Whatever you might say about that pastiche of sources, one thing is clear: it’s not blues.

     

    If the Blues Explosion hold a less than reverent attitude toward “the tradition” and have essentially ignored the blues, why did they team up with R.L. Burnside? If you believe the press releases, Burnside is one of the last remaining bluesmen with any claim to “authenticity.” Son of a Mississippi sharecropper, himself a former sharecropper and juke joint proprietor, he learned guitar from Muddy Waters, who married Burnside’s first cousin. He also played with Mississippi Fred MacDowell in the country supper circuit, and was nominated last year for two W.C. Handy awards, including “Best Traditional Blues Singer.”

     

    After enlisting Burnside as an opening act on their last tour, the Blues Explosion backed up Burnside on his last album, A Ass Pocket Full of Whiskey (Matador). Burnside certainly wasn’t drawn to the Blues Explosion because of their feel for the blues: he notes, “when I first heard ’em, I thought they were into some other kind of country-western style.”[1] The idea was the Blues Explosion’s: Spencer has said that part of his intention in picking Burnside as an opener was to introduce Burnside, and the blues as a whole, to a new generation of listeners, and Ass Pocket clearly operates on the same principle. It’s nothing new for white, blues-influenced rock bands to search out older black blues musicians. Both Canned Heat and Bonnie Raitt sought out John Lee Hooker, Keith Richards has worked with Chuck Berry, and U2 (!) did an odd collaboration with B.B. King. Those meetings served a dual purpose, affording the bluesmen exposure to a much larger audience, while offering the younger musicians an opportunity to prove that they too “had the blues.” The bluesmen always had the advantage, since the younger musicians were trying to play the music of their idols.

     

    But Ass Pocket differs fundamentally from those collaborations. Because explicit blues influence is almost completely absent from contemporary rock, the Burnside-Blues Explosion meeting occurs on more neutral territory. At times it succeeds wonderfully. “Goin’ Down South” combines Burnside’s hypnotic groove with the Blues Explosion’s driving rhythms, and the cover of John Lee Hooker’s “Boogie Chillen” is a strong uptempo rocker in which Burnside takes the lead vocals and Spencer follows each verse with “You got to boogie.” Throughout the album Spencer and Burnside show an exceptional chemistry, developing call and response pairings in which neither overwhelms the other.

     

    But the album sometimes repeats the same problems previously seen with attempts to introduce the blues to a new audience. One problem is stylistic. Burnside favors a bassless trio of two guitars and drums with the emphasis on vocals and lead guitar; the drums and rhythm guitar are clearly there for support. While the Blues Explosion also are a trio without a bass guitar, the drums and second guitar are much more prominent, while the vocals are slightly lower in the mix. That difference is evident on “Shake ’em On Down,” which Burnside first released on his 1994 album Too Bad Jim (Fat Possum). The original version is spare, repeating musical phrases until the song acquires an almost trance-like quality. With the Blues Explosion, Burnside’s guitar fades behind Russell Simins’ drums. (Fans of psychoanalysis might be interested to note that Simins was replacing Burnside’s usual drummers: son Calvin and grandson Cedric.) The combination of the heavy percussion and harmonica–which Burnside usually avoids on his albums–introduces an unmistakable resemblance to Led Zeppelin’s cover of the blues standard “When the Levee Breaks.” While the Blues Explosion thrives on self-reflexive musical allusions, this resemblance seems unintentional. It’s a powerful version, but there’s a striking irony when a meeting between a Mississippi bluesman and one of the most original bands on the indie scene wind up sounding like a 25-year-old hard rock version of the blues.

     

    At times, a certain stageyness creeps in that seems to play on the worst stereotypes of the blues. The cover of the album features a drawing which depicts two blonde women wearing Daisy Duke cutoffs with bottles of whiskey secured in the pockets of their shorts. Burnside crouches between and in front of them, a leather belt looped in his hand. The cover was reportedly the idea of Matthew Johnson from Fat Possum Records (Burnside’s label), and Burnside, his guitarist Kenny Brown, and the Blues Explosion are said to hate it. But a similarly stagey moment comes up in “The Criminal Inside Me” when in the middle of the song Spencer asks Burnside for “forty nickels for a bag of potato chips.” Burnside replies “You don’t get outta my face quick, I’m gonna kick your ass you son of a bitch.” Spencer asks again and Burnside says “I’ll tell you what, you don’t get outta here and make it fast, I’m gonna put my foot right up your ass.” The exchange sounds like a canned version of “the dozens,” which is particularly disappointing since both Spencer and Burnside have both avoided that kind of theatrical mugging throughout their careers.

     

    * * *
     

    It’s no accident that the first song on each of the last three Blues Explosion albums opens with a false start. The band seems bent on questioning the boundaries of the song, interrupting riffs, incorporating unexpected stops and abrupt endings. When the unity of the song is called into question, other elements can enter. One of those elements is chance. Spencer says many Blues Explosion songs come out of accidents in the studio: “If something was fucking up, or something weird happened, or something suggested itself, Jim [Waters, producer of Now I Got Worry] and I usually just went with it. Accidents play a big role in the making of Blues Explosion records.”

     

    What also enters is a brief and selective history of rock, soul, and R&B. Their approach is not the same as hip-hop sampling, although it certainly comes out of it. More often than not, hip-hop samples are not easily identifiable, but Spencer’s vocal references are usually fairly obvious.[2] It’s worth emphasizing that most (though not all) of his borrowings come from the musicians he cites as influences. In “Water Main,” from their self-titled album (Caroline), Spencer takes advantage of a break in the song to say “Thank yuh.” It’s an unmistakable nod to Elvis (as is his black hair combed back into the beginnings of a pompadour and his low, slurred vocals). But why is he thanking us in the middle of a song recorded in a studio where there is no audience who could have applauded? It’s clearly satire, but the Blues Explosion aren’t a novelty band and, strangely, the Elvis reference seems appropriate, even coherent: it fits in the song. That’s why the Blues Explosion aren’t merely reducible to irony. Their music is simply too electrifying; somehow their driving guitars and relentless percussion keep the disparate elements from flying apart.

     

    What might be at work is the logical culmination of the punk attempt to deflate the overblown stature of the self-indulgent, egocentric Rock Star. The difficulty of that project can be seen in frontmen such as Smashing Pumpkins’ Billy Corgan, REM’s Michael Stipe, and Pearl Jam’s Eddie Vedder, all of whom claim to be (and perhaps are) uncomfortable with the trappings of stardom, and yet remain some of the most famous and well-paid singers in the world. Sonic Youth said kill yr. idols, but they never gave any hint of how that’s possible: Morrison, Hendrix, Presley, and Lennon have all been buried for years, but none shows any sign of dying in the near future.

     

    Spencer redirects the punk project, recognizing that there’s already something intrinsically absurd about the narcissistic preening of Elvis, James Brown, and Jerry Lee Lewis. After all, you have to laugh when JB sings “Sometimes I feel so good–Good God!–I wanna jump back, I wanna kiss myself.” But Spencer also understands that James Brown pulls it off, and that the willingness to risk absurdity is the mark of every godhead frontman. He revels in his self-consciously ersatz stardom; in one exemplary moment he says, “This is the part of the record when I want everyone to put their hands in the air and kiss my ass, ’cause your girlfriend still loves me.” Somehow the Blues Explosion manages to combine parody with imitation without sliding exclusively into either camp; they’re both riveting and hysterically funny. That ironic distance also gives them one of the most original sounds in contemporary music.

     

    On each new Blues Explosion release the band expands its list of musical references, and Now I Got Worry is no exception. If A Ass Pocket Full of Whiskey shows R.L. Burnside edging toward the Blues Explosion’s camp, Now I Got Worry (Matador/Capitol) proves that Burnside has also left his mark on the Blues Explosion. “Skunk,” the first song on the album, introduces an element previously absent from Blues Explosion albums: the slide guitar, which recurs on songs such as “Love All of Me” and “Rocketship,” (which with some modifications could be a Burnside song). From its title, “R.L. Got Soul” would seem to be an explicit tribute to Burnside, especially since the band claims it’s based on Burnside’s “Snake Drive.” But the song sounds a lot more like a quasi-hip-hop instrumental than a blues tribute. Maybe that’s because Spencer originally heard “Snake Drive” as covered by Tav Falco’s Panther Burns, an eighties band who had their own idiosyncratic approach to roots music. Maybe that’s just the Blues Explosion saluting Burnside on their own terms.

     

    “Chicken Dog” features the vocals of soul singer Rufus Thomas, a man who symbolizes two of the traditions which have most shaped the Blues Explosion. His song “Bear Cat” was the first hit for the now legendary Sun Records, the label which would later issue recordings by Elvis, Jerry Lee Lewis, Johnny Cash, and Carl Perkins. Later, Thomas recorded for Stax Records, which was arguably the most important soul label throughout the 1960s and ’70s. The Blues Explosion’s debt to Stax is unmistakable: when they signed with Matador Records, the contract stipulated that each member of the band would receive the complete boxed set edition of the Stax singles. The song’s title combines two of his hits: “Funky Chicken” and “Walking the Dog.” The chorus “It’s just as easy as falling off a log/ Everybody’s doing the Chicken Dog” seems like a retro take on the dance craze songs in which Thomas specialized (although, since Thomas, who is now 79, wrote the lyrics, they may be completely free of any intentionally retro qualities). One of the most interesting elements of the song is a break lifted from Lenny Kravitz’s “Are You Gonna Go My Way,” a borrowing which seems especially appropriate since Lenny was clearly parroting Jimi Hendrix when he wrote the song. Will the Blues Explosion succeed in introducing performers like Thomas and Burnside to an entirely new audience? That’s possible, especially since Now I Got Worry is the first album released by Matador since Capitol Records acquired 49 percent of the label, a deal which ensures that Blues Explosion releases will enjoy a much wider distribution. If another generation of suburban kids turns toward Mississippi and Chicago for inspiration, they might be doing it with a healthy dose of irony.

     

    Notes

     

    1 John Lewis, “Bastards of the Blues: Jon Spencer’s Illegitimate Spawn,” Option, September 1996, p. 70.

     

    2 The exception here is in some Top 40 rap, such as MC Hammer’s “U Can’t Touch This,” which borrowed Rick James’ “Super Freak,” and Vanilla Ice’s “Ice Ice Baby,” which sampled Queen’s “Under Pressure.”

     

  • Kerouac: Kicks Joy Darkness

     

    Robert Elliot Fox

    Department of English
    Southern Illinois University

    bfox@siu.edu

     

    Kerouac: Kicks Joy Darkness. Ryko RCD, 1997.

     

    The Beat Generation currently is enjoying what some might call a renaissance and others might think of as a resurrection–designations that could seem apt, given Jack Kerouac’s persistent and powerful sense of death always awaiting us at the end of our road. But, although Kerouac died in 1969 and Allen Ginsberg just passed away (April, 1997), several of the original figures (William Burroughs, Gregory Corso, Lawrence Ferlinghetti, Gary Snyder) are still with us, and the key Beat literary/philosophical principles also remain influential; thus the Beat Generation’s legacy is not dead–never died, in fact (although there certainly was a period of eclipse in which their presence was overshadowed)–so that resurgence might be the best term to describe the upswing of the Beats at this moment in history, so close to the cusp of the millennium. If I can be forgiven what I believe to be an appropriate pun, things are very upbeat now with regard to a wider acknowledgement of the contributions of the Beat Generation to American literature and American culture more generally. Consider, for example, the Whitney Museum of American Art’s exhibition, “Beat Culture and the New America: 1950-65,” or the extensive obituaries for Ginsberg which testify to his status as a trans-generational pop icon. Nostalgia may be a source of this renewed interest for those who remember firsthand the Beats’ original power and sway, while the desire to find a solution to the “X” that has been attached to the current generation of young people may explain the huge interest they appear to have in these “holdovers” from the forties and fifties. Commodity fetishism explains a lot, too–witness the images of Kerouac and Burroughs being used to promote jeans and sneakers. And indeed this marketability of the Beats poses a danger for the proper appreciation of their value. The “cool” image that is foregrounded today as a selling point may render them ultimately as shallow as the stereotyped “beatnik” image which was used by the media in the fifties to make fun of them. Lifestyle is the focus in both instances, and although the Beats certainly influenced the lifestyle of the succeeding counterculture of the sixties, it is their artistic contributions which get overlooked or underplayed in the celebration or condemnation of their lives and personalities.

     

    When I first was turned on to the Beats in my early teens by some college students who put the first issues of Evergreen Review in my hands, I was blown away by the apparent freedom of these writers, their sheer exuberance, their daring (a word that now may have lost its meaning when everything is, so to speak, out of the closet, but I’m referring here to a time when Lenny Bruce was busted for saying “fuck” in a nightclub act and great literary works still had to endure prosecution in order to reach the American public–not just Ginsberg’s Howl or Henry Miller’s Tropic of Cancer but D. H. Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover, to mention three celebrated examples). I was already in love with literature but it was mostly a rich ensemble of tradition, a “classical” art form; with the Beat writers, for the first time in my experience, literature was a living thing, an art in progress, informal and engaging. Yet–perhaps because of the formalism I had been reared on–at the same time that I was captivated and caught up in the rush of on-the-road energy and beatific inspiration and insight, I recognized a great unevenness in Beat writing and the collateral avant-garde–for example, abstract painting. (Jazz I didn’t understand at all then, although it intrigued me; and I guess in those days I thought you really weren’t supposed to understand it. I tried to “dig” it because the Beats did, but what really moved me in those days was rock-‘n’-roll.)

     

    My original adulation of the Beats has been tempered a bit over the years, but my respect for them has deepened as well; I’m confirmed in my sense of the weaknesses in their work and the kinks in their characters, and I’m even more convinced of the greatness they achieved, which, to a degree, included a refusal to shrink from those kinks and a furious drive to go on despite all the risks of failure. Kerouac, after all, wrote a dozen works in half as many years with no real expectation that they would be published. This was the period in which he made his breakthrough from the more conventional Romanticism of Thomas Wolfe which characterized his first published novel The Town and the City to the “spontaneous bop prosody” of the original version of On the Road, of Visions of Cody, of The Subterraneans. Kerouac revolutionized American prose, and the fact that he did it in part by incorporating lessons from the expressive culture of an oppressed minority–specifically, borrowing from the improvisational strategies of jazz, a quintessentially African American form–ought to resonate significantly in this “age of multiculturalism.”

     

    If what we might call the Beat Generation, Inc. doesn’t currently constitute big business, it certainly is doing good business. Kerouac’s works sell far better now than they did in his lifetime and there are more of them in print. It’s no surprise, therefore, that although Kerouac’s best-known novel, On the Road, is widely available, a fortieth anniversary edition is going to be released later this year. But if we are going to be in a position to appreciate the full range of Kerouac as a writer, what we really need is access to the work that hasn’t thus far appeared: his Buddhist book Some of the Dharma, for instance (which is supposed to be forthcoming), and more “selected” letters (also supposed to be in progress). In the meantime, a compact disc recently has been released which helps to fill in a few of the blanks. Kerouac: Kicks Joy Darkness (Ryko RCD 10329) is a compilation of lesser-known and previously unpublished material by Jack Kerouac performed by a wide variety of interpreters, including writers (JK himself, Ginsberg, Burroughs, Ferlinghetti), musicians (Michael Stipe, Patti Smith, John Cale), and actors (Johnny Depp, Matt Dillon), among others. There are twenty-five tracks in all, and all of them are interesting, although they inevitably vary in importance and effectiveness of presentation.

     

    At this point it is necessary to state that performance is one of the key elements of the art of the Beat Generation. I am not speaking here of the “drama” of the individual members of the Beat Generation on the roads and in the beat “pads” of America or of the authorial acts inscribed on the pages of their letters and books; rather, I want to emphasize oral performance, the function of voice in rendering palpable otherwise overlooked or misunderstood reaches and subtleties of Beat literary aesthetics. Much Beat writing, in short, demands a sensitive and attentive ear, not just an entranced eye.

     

    This is evident, not only on the disc under review, but going back to the series of recordings Kerouac made following the success of On the Road: Poetry For the Beat Generation (1959), with Steve Allen on piano; Blues and Haikus (1959), featuring Al Cohn and Zoot Sims on saxophones; and Readings by Jack Kerouac on the Beat Generation (1960). Rare and long out of print, these were reissued by Rhino Records in 1990 as The Jack Kerouac Collection, and it’s a set well worth having.

     

    The late fifties, by the way, seems to have been a good time for recordings combining words, voice, and music. Langston Hughes put out Weary Blues in 1958, which featured him reading his poems to the accompaniment of musicians like Charlie Mingus, Milt Hinton, and Horace Parlan. This, too, was reissued in 1990. Hughes, it is important to note, had pioneered poetry readings to jazz in the 1920s, along with Kenneth Rexroth.

     

    Another album that came out in 1958 and which to the best of my knowledge hasn’t been reissued (but should be) is entitled Jazz Canto. It was a compilation clearly intended to capitalize on the recently emergent Beat(nik) phenomenon, but interestingly, of the seven poets represented, only three were arguably Beat: Lawrence Ferlinghetti, Philip Whalen, and Lawrence Lipton (author of The Holy Barbarians [1959], one of the first books to document the Beat experience); the others were Langston Hughes, Dylan Thomas, William Carlos Williams (who influenced Ginsberg early on), and Walt Whitman (a kind of nineteenth century proto-Beat), whose long free verse line, radical inclusiveness, and public bardic stance were all appropriated in our time by Ginsberg. One of the standout tracks on this disc is black actor Roy Glenn’s marvelous reading of Philip Whalen’s “Big High Song for Somebody” (backed by the Gerry Mulligan Quartet), which brings vividly to life a poem that (for me, at least) lies rather inertly on the page. It’s connected with what I said earlier in this piece with regard to the importance of the ear–that a good deal of this material was intended to be heard. (This is equally the case with a good deal of contemporary poetry: see, for example, the anthology Aloud: Voices from the Nuyorican Poets Cafe [1994], ed. Miguel Algarin and Bob Holman. Holman is one of the people behind Mouth Almighty, a company dedicated to spoken word recordings, and the preservation and dissemination of a modern-day oral tradition.)

     

    Kicks Joy Darkness starts off with a piece by the Boston band Morphine that isn’t by Kerouac but about Kerouac. It’s a moody opener, but the title of the disc itself is moody, though it zeroes in on the multivalence of the Beat experience and the Beat ethos, which was far more than simple hedonism or frantic motion for its own sake. “What kicks!” Dean Moriarty, the raw hero of On the Road, exclaims, and getting your kicks was one thing, taking your kicks was another. The Beats felt both. (Remember that “beat” originally meant “beaten down,” “exhausted,” as well as referring to a generation that felt the beat, that sought beatitude, trying to beat a path to salvation through the midcentury American doldrums.) The second index, “joy,” is unalloyed–“a wild yea-saying overburst of American joy” is the way Sal Paradise, narrator of On the Road, puts it, and it’s one of the truest expressions of the driving force behind Kerouac’s own chronicle and of Beat ardor in general. And as far as the third term, “darkness,” is concerned, it, too, is ambiguous: “the nighttime is the right time” (a soul music quote, but applicably beat; in On the Road, it’s “boogie-woogie in the American night”), but it’s also the “sad night,” the dark night of the soul, “the unconditional night of Universal death” that Kerouac refers to in Vanity of Duluoz (1968), the last work he published before his untimely passing.

     

    The second track is an excerpt from “Bowery Blues” done by Lydia Lunch. It’s significant that the first of Kerouac’s own words to be performed on this disc are heard from a woman. If the relative position of the women of the Beat generation was prone or in the chorus, it’s clear that women in the post-Beat era are much more forward in every sense. Lunch’s reading is evocative, but check out performance artist Maggie Estep’s over-the-top presentation of “Skid Row Wine” (track 6). Estep has appeared on MTV, and she brings a hard rock raunchiness to her rendition of Kerouac’s poem. It’s one of the most gripping cuts on the album.

     

    Gerald Nicosia (author of the splendid Kerouac biography Memory Babe [1983]) argues that the “musicality of Kerouac’s art” is best exemplified by the Readings album, which he recorded without any accompaniment (“Kerouac as Musician,” in the companion booklet to The Kerouac Collection, p. 9). And while the associated music on Kicks Joy Darkness often does provide an interesting counterpoint to the spoken text, there are times when the music overwhelms the words or distracts us unnecessarily from the tonalities of voice as an instrument in itself. This is true, for example, on track 9, where Kerouac is reading from Macdougal Street Blues. The dubbed-in rock music by Joe Strummer of the British band The Clash doesn’t add anything to the performance and in fact makes it harder to hear what Kerouac is doing vocally; at the very least, the instrumental track should have been less prominent in the mix. For a much more successful amalgamation, compare the way Aerosmith singer Steve Tyler’s background vocal is handled on his reading of “Dream: ‘Us kids swim off a gray pier . . .’” (track 4), or how Kerouac quietly scats in the background while Grateful Dead lyricist Robert Hunter reads from Visions of Cody (track 16).

     

    Allen Ginsberg prefaces his typically Ginsbergian reading of choruses 1-9 of Kerouac’s “The Brooklyn Bridge Blues” (track 10) with the statement that, at the last minute, they couldn’t find the last chorus. This turns out to be fortuitous, because American troubador Eric Andersen’s reading of “Chorus 10,” which concludes Kicks Joy Darkness, is one of the best pieces on the disc. This piece was recorded on the Brooklyn Bridge, and there’s no music, unless you want to call the sounds of cars and people the natural music of the streets. One gets a powerful evocation of the ambience from which Kerouac’s poem sprang; it’s almost as if we’re transported back to the very site and moment of composition.

     

    Lee Ranaldo’s reading (track 17) of a section from a 1955 letter to John Clellon Holmes (author of Go [1952], the first Beat novel, which, in fact, was originally to have been entitled The Beat Generation) describing Kerouac’s wild ride with a girl in a convertible needs to be compared to the version of this incident to be found in chapter two of The Dharma Bums, which Kerouac later revisited at greater length in the story “Good Blonde,” originally published in Playboy. For my money, the version in the Holmes letter is by far the best–an excellent example of the way Kerouac was able to “blow,” using the American idiom as his instrument, a supercharged spontaneous breathless narrative. Compare this sort of writing, produced in the mid-fifties, with any other storytelling style you can think of from that time, and you’ll have a sense of the power of Kerouac’s contribution. And yet you’ll look for him in vain in the major anthologies. The canon wars involving issues of gender and ethnicity may have caused us to overlook the fact that, when it comes to the acknowledging the full range of achievement in American literature, there are still some important aesthetic scores to settle.

     

  • Enter Virtuosi: Erudition Makes Its Return

    Michael Witmore

    Department of Rhetoric
    University of California, Berkeley

    mwitmore@socrates.berkeley.edu

     

    The New Erudition Ed. Randolph Starn. Spec. issue of Representations56 (1996): 1-143.

     

    The title of the most recent special issue of Representations, “The New Erudition,” seems calculated to intrigue. Editor Randolph Starn recognizes the irony of the title in his introduction to this volume, making a broad case for the emergence of a new, more learned style of scholarship which harks back to the virtuoso learning of the Renaissance. Moving toward the future by way of the past, Starn finds several continuities between the genealogical, speculative mode of inquiry on display in this volume and an older, “erudite” strand of traditional humanities scholarship. Both approaches share an interest in intellectual controversy and specialized debates, a penchant for difficult or obscure details, and a willingness to follow out the ramifications of learned traditions. Of those writing in this volume, several are indeed fearless in their use of recondite sources and their reach across disciplines and historical periods. What seems noteworthy about the collection, however, is not so much the learning that is on display as the uses to which that learning is put.

     

    Motivating this kind of work seems to be a desire to re-engage a more speculative, searching mode of scholarship. Arriving at that speculative margin, however, requires that the familiar objects of study be estranged–made to function in ways that even the specialist can only comprehend indirectly. This process of estrangement is the subject of the first article. In “Making Things Strange: The Prehistory of a Literary Device,” Carlo Ginzburg argues that estrangement is not a generic feature of all art, but rather a literary device with its own peculiar history. Peculiar seems the right word, since the uncertain orbit of this device takes it from the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius to a sixteenth-century forger named Antonio de Guevara, through the Essays of Montaigne and popular riddles into the work of Proust, Tolstoy, and Dostoyevski. What this array of readings and citations produces is a heightened sense of the variable, contingent career of a literary convention over time. With erudition, it would seem, comes disorientation and reappraisal–precisely what Ginzburg argues is important in our engagement with the past.

     

    Two essays by Michel Zink and Robert Chibka locate the source of estrangement in a place: the library. Like Ginzburg, these writers have the genealogist’s eye for contingency in the development and transmission of an idea or text. Zink’s article on Gérard de Nerval’s Angelique, “Nerval in the Library, or The Archives of the Soul” traces the way in which a novelist loses track of the characters he is researching in the library when the historical sources he is using lead him back to his own memories and experience. While Zink focuses on the intersection of archival history and personal memory–moments when a source begins to reflect the altered image of its reader–Chibka is more interested in the recursive potential of such moments. In “The Library of Forking Paths,” Chibka tries to track down a citation from one of the sources referred to in Jorge Luis Borges’s “The Garden of the Forking Paths.” Having taken the bait, Chibka searches through several translations of the story to find that there are multiple versions of both the citation itself (translators varying the page number of the source cited) and of the source, a book about World War I by Captain Liddell Hart. The scholarly passion for detail is turned against itself in this essay so that, as Chibka notes, the professional reader of the story quickly becomes mired in paradox. Erudition is a liability here, one which Borges is credited with exploiting in his hyperbolic tales about the library.

     

    Another essay by Jan Assman, “The Mosaic Distinction: Israel, Egypt, and the Invention of Paganism” attempts to trace the distinction between true and false religion from the Egyptian King Akhenaten (Amenophis IV) to Sigmund Freud. Like Ginzburg, Assman traces the particular problem or device which interests him across a broad range of texts and periods. Treating such diverse figures as Moses, Moses Maimonides, Ralph Cudworth, and Karl Reinhold, Assman shows how Egyptian religious beliefs were variously repudiated and embraced by religious movements that defined themselves as the inversion (or double inversion) of earlier movements. Some of these reversals are quite striking–for example attempts in the late eighteenth century to define the God of the Bible as the Egyptian Supreme Being, Isis. While certain episodes in this history are designed to undermine what Assman refers to as “stereotypes,” the essay seems more valuable for the moving picture it provides, full of disorienting and often unprincipled turns which only a patient student could unravel.

     

    One of the most interesting essays, “Art, Ancestors, and the Origins of Writing in China,” comes from David Keightley. On the face of it, the piece seems an empirical answer to an equally empirical question: why does early Chinese writing remain logographic instead of syllabified or alphabetic? As the essay unfolds, however, it becomes clear that there is an irreducibly speculative margin to the inquiry. Searching the context for archaeological clues, Keightley concludes that early Chinese characters are a form of “aural commemoration,” a visual recording of spoken utterances with which the characters would have been connected in certain contexts. Having decided that early Chinese characters refer to spoken words and not directly to ideas, he reinterprets the logographic character of the language with reference to the ritual practices through which a “code” of correspondence would have evolved. While Keightley’s piece does not scan the Western canon as some of the other essays in the volume do, its speculative intensity and focus on detail link it to the rest of the work presented here.

     

    Two other pieces focus on the limits at which language ceases either to conserve or create meaning. The first, a thoughtful translation of Michel de Certeau’s “Vocal Utopias: Glossalalias” by Daniel Rosenberg, attempts to theorize the possibilities of speech without meaning. Like the other essays, this one tries to answer a difficult question not simply by reading an exemplary situation but by querying notable past attempts to understand it. Taking up Pfister’s and Saussure’s treatment of glossalalia, Certeau illuminates the ways in which these thinkers have tried to find hidden meaning in such utterances. Against this interpretive impulse, he emphasizes the resistance of glossalalic speech to determination; it is more the fact of enunciation in glossalalic speech, outside of whatever meaning it acquires, which Certeau would like to appreciate and build upon. One of the great subtleties of the essay is that instead of simply idealizing an absence of meaning in glossalalia, the author looks for an “other” kind of meaning residing in the enunciative space created by such utterances.

     

    Similar issues are treated in the final essay by Aleida Assman, entitled “Texts, Traces, Trash: The Changing Media of Cultural Memory.” Here Assman examines the metaphorical “life” of a written text, demonstrating how the almost supernatural power of letters to perpetuate the thoughts of the dead erodes after the Renaissance. In the eighteenth century, posterity comes to threaten the longevity of letters, so that later on the past becomes retrievable only through historical erudition or the imagination of the historical novelist. Like Ginzburg, Assman emphasizes the disruptive potential of historical inquiry whenever the past must be apprehended indirectly, through signs or traces that are as fragmentary as they are suggestive. This emphasis on incompleteness is warranted by a view of the past which arrives via Burckhardt and Carlyle: that some of the most important aspects of the past are those which are the least visible in the historical record or which elude the conscious grasp of those who want to preserve them. Both of these views make erudition, in its more searching guise, quite appealing–a means of oscillating between two kinds of constraints, those of empirical evidence and of the precedents of inquiry which govern inferences beyond that evidence.

     

    Many readers will ask, however, what the difference is between the constraints that “erudition” puts on speculation and those of “theory.” These are broad terms, perhaps too broad to support the desired comparison, but the relationship between erudition and theory becomes an issue as soon as names like Nietzsche, Foucault, de Man, and Barthes are mentioned in Starn’s introduction. The rigors of theory, at least in its post-Nietzschean guise, usually force critics to find and then interrogate their most abstract premises, often with other, equally abstract premises. Erudition, if we were to hazard a guess at its difference from theory, seems the means by which those initial premises are altered by an encounter with the particular. (One can ask how such an encounter is possible without a great deal of theoretical work, but for the most part, these essays assume that such work has already been done.) There are probably other hallmarks of erudition as it is presented in this issue–a penchant for obscure detail, interest in intellectual puzzles, a willingness to hear out the “authorities” on a given issue, the desire to follow a distinction over time–but they do not seem as new as this more self-conscious pursuit of particularity.

     

    If the new erudition is not yet fully formed, one might hope for a further innovation. As an antidote to metaphysical or empirical dogmatism, the encounter with the particular and incomplete recommended here seems quite apt. There is no reason, however, why this erudite passion might not also extend to philosophical texts. Although mention is made on these pages of Kant and Marcus Aurelius, on the whole these writers seem less optimistic about the uses of such texts in the project of estrangement. (Surprising, since one could argue that the effect of many philosophies has been to estrange us from our immediate experience by putting that experience into abstract terms.) This reluctance to use philosophical sources is all the more surprising when one sees how effectively someone like Ginzburg can take up a philosopher like Aurelius, absorbing the philosopher’s meditations on the things of this world into the larger history he is attempting to write.

     

    As a collection of essays, the “New Erudition” will no doubt please those who are ready to see the old apprehended as the new. Beyond the ironies of the title, however, readers will find searching, illuminating essays which do not back away from the real complexity of their subjects.

     

  • Penrose’s Triangles: The Large, The Small, and the Human Mind

    Arkady Plotnitsky

    Literature Program
    Duke University

    aplotnit@acpub.duke.edu

     

    Roger Penrose, The Large, the Small, and the Human Mind (with Abner Shimony, Nancy Cartwright, and Steven Hawking), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997; with a glance back at The Emperor’s New Mind, Shadows of the Mind, and The Nature of Space and Time.

     

    At 4 p.m. on May 11, 1997, “the truly impossible occurred,” as Newsweek reported (May 26, 1997, 84). The computer Deep Blue defeated the world chess champion and one of the greatest chess players of all time, Garry Kasparov. In the process, his confidence, bolstered by his impressive previous victories over computers, was shattered along with the confidence and hopes of much of the chess world. Indeed, the defeat was taken by some, including by Kasparov, as a humiliation. It appears to have been especially humiliating because it was inflicted on a great chess mind, capable of the most complex tactical and strategic thinking, by the raw power of computation. A great chess mind was defeated by crude number-crunching–a much inferior form of thinking or, in this case, not even thinking. Such minds have always been seen as able to circumvent and transcend protracted computational routines, and as entities whose own workings are themselves inaccessible to computational analysis.

     

    In the last installment of his ongoing argument against the possibility of artificial intelligence, The Large, the Small, and the Human Mind, Roger Penrose uses chess to illustrate the difference between the computational approach used by digital computers and non-computational thinking, which, according to him, fundamentally defines the human mind and gives it ultimate superiority over computers or computer-like computational intelligence (103-5). Penrose gives examples of two chess problems that are easily solved by even mediocre human players but have defeated a computer (in this case Deep Thought, the forerunner of Deep Blue). Penrose’s lectures (given in 1995 and published earlier this year) preceded the latest chapter of the story of computer chess just described, and he may even have been inspired in part by Kasparov’s previous decisive victories over computers and by the seemingly unquestionable ultimate superiority of chess players or, one might say, chess thinkers over chess computers.

     

    This latest episode of this, by now long, history does not prove the opposite. Nor does it prove the ultimate superiority of any one form of thinking over another, or of (human) thinking over (computer-like or other) non-thinking. That is, assuming that human thinking is indeed non-computational–a claim that, however appealing or likely, remains hypothetical, as Penrose admits. Everyone acknowledges that Deep Blue cannot think–leaving aside here the complexity, if not impossibility, of the latter concept itself. Nor does the episode prove that artificial intelligence is any more likely now than it was before. What it does prove is that computational thinking or (even more humiliatingly for its opponents) computation without thinking, number-crunching, can be taken to a level high enough to supersede non-computational thinking in certain specific cases. The fact that this is possible in some cases is in part (there are more general conceptual reasons) what drives the idea–which is more or less the idea of artificial intelligence–that it may be possible in any given case. Much else, it is further extrapolated, would be possible as well for computational devices. It may, for example, be possible for machines to perform any given task that human thinking can perform, or conceivably even to think or have consciousness or even to feel, just as humans do. Or–a rarely, if ever, discussed but interesting and radical possibility–it may be possible to perform even the most complex tasks better than humans without thinking and, thus, in a certain sense without intelligence. Or, as I said, it might also be possible to assume that at bottom the human mind is itself only a computational device, a number-crunching machine. These are the types of possibilities that are pursued in the field of artificial intelligence and related endeavors and that are argued against by, among others, Penrose.

     

    At a certain level, at stake here is still the power of creative thinking (seen as ultimately non-computational) against computational or calculating thinking (seen as ultimately uncreative) or against the nonthinking of machines. Along and interactively with other classical oppositions and hierarchies of that type, this opposition and this hierarchy has, from Plato (or even the pre-Socratics) to the present, defined the history of thinking about human thinking and its superiority over other animals, on the one hand, and machines, on the other.

     

    This theme is among several that link Penrose’s books to what have become known as “postmodern” problematics (using this term with caution here), within which the nature and structure, or deconstruction, of both of these oppositions–the human and the animal, and the human and the machine–and their interactions have been explored at great length. The general question of artificial intelligence is, of course, another such theme, although it is indissociable from the oppositions just described. This question is fundamentally connected by Penrose to a number of key questions raised by such revolutionary developments in twentieth century science and technology as Einsteinian relativity and quantum physics, post-Gödelian mathematical logic, modern biology, and computer technology; and these questions have in turn been central to postmodernist thinking. Such issues as the nature of causality and reality of the physical world, of truth and certainty in mathematics and mathematical logic, the nature of scientific explanations necessary for understanding the human brain (or indeed mind), all considered by Penrose, are part of the postmodernist intellectual scene and have been hotly debated recently, or, again, throughout modern (or earlier) intellectual history.

     

    Penrose’s ideas have themselves been the subject of considerable debate. The Large, the Small and the Human Mind is the last installment of his “trilogy” on “computers, minds, and the laws of physics,” initiated by The Emperor’s New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds and the Laws of Physics (1989), and continued, in part in reply to questions posed and debates provoked by the first volume, with Shadows of the Mind: A Search for the Missing Science of Consciousness (1994). There is, moreover, another companion (technical) volume, containing a debate with Stephen Hawking, The Nature of Space and Time (1996), which is more specialized and concerned more exclusively with physics, but with many echoes of and significant connections to Penrose’s books.

     

    Beyond and as part of an investigation into the question of the human mind and artificial intelligence, Penrose’s trilogy contains major semi-popular or, more accurately, semi-technical expositions of key revolutionary mathematical and scientific theories defining twentieth-century science–post-Gödelian mathematical logic, relativity, and quantum physics–and his controversial forays into the biology of the brain. Derived from a 1995 series of lectures, The Large, the Small, and the Human Mind is a summary presentation (with some updating) of the two previous volumes and a sample of the debate provoked by them. It includes contributions by Abner Shimony, Nancy Cartwright, and Stephen Hawking, and Penrose’s responses to their arguments. Both earlier volumes contain elegant extended expositions of the mathematical and scientific theories just mentioned. While, in principle, these expositions do not require a specialized knowledge of mathematics and science, it is doubtful that, in practice, they are sufficiently accessible to general readers to be read in depth by most of them. By contrast, the latest volume can be read as a more general introduction to Penrose’s main ideas and is more readable for general readers than the two previous volumes or, especially, The Nature of Space and Time. The latter work, however, contains arguably the most interesting discussions of general relativity and cosmology, parts of which can be read and productively assimilated by non-specialists, albeit with considerable (and, in my view, well-deserving) effort. Some of Penrose’s elegant mathematical thinking and presentation is found in the last volume as well, in particular in his discussions of relativity and non-Euclidean geometry in Chapter 1, and the reader will be especially rewarded here. Quantum mechanics, mathematical logic, and biology are, as will be seen, more complex cases in this respect.

     

    Penrose’s overall argument can be summarized as follows. He wants to argue definitively for the impossibility for artificial intelligence (at least that based on computation, such as that carried on by digital computers) to reach the level of human intelligence and, more generally, consciousness (both based, he believes, on non-computational processes and themselves effects of physical systems whose design is non-computable). This definitive argument is to be rigorously grounded in mathematically and scientifically ascertainable facts about (physical) nature and (mathematical) mind. Or, more accurately–and this nuance is crucial–Penrose contends that there is, at this point, enough scientific data to hope that one will be able to offer a definitive, rigorous argument of that type in the future (it is, Penrose acknowledges, speculative at present) from the new physics of the world and/as the new physics of the brain. Penrose also offers a specific argument for, or more accurately, a vision of what kind of physics it would and should be. Penrose’s argument, however, is fundamentally based on his interpretations of these theories and data, in particular quantum physics and post-Gödelian mathematical logic, two crucial ingredients of his overall argument. These interpretations are not uncontestable (and have been contested), as Penrose admits. This point is especially significant precisely because Penrose offers a vision of specific future theories of non-computational physical processes modifying existing theories in physics (and a program for developing such theories), and his case against artificial intelligence is fundamentally tied to the possibility and plausibility of such theories. Most especially at stake is a particular form of “quantum gravity” theory, a theory that joins quantum physics and general relativity, the Einsteinian theory of gravitation. Theories envisioned by Penrose will also account for a non-computable physics of the human brain and the non-computational mathematics of the human mind, and specifically for the phenomenon of consciousness. That is, these will be theories of physics that will lead to the physics of the brain that makes thinking and consciousness possible, along the way bridging the classical (macro) level–“the Large”–and the quantum (micro) level–“the Small”–so far resisting such a bridging in physical theory. In Penrose’s own words,

     

    We look for the non-computability in physics which bridges the quantum and the classical levels. This is quite a tall order. I am saying that not only do we need new physics, but we also need new physics which is relevant to the action of the brain. (103)

     

    One needs the non-computability in physics, which will, first, bridge the hitherto unbridged classical and quantum physics, and then will bridge two other hitherto unbridged territories–the physics and biology of the human brain. A tall order indeed, and Penrose acknowledges that his vision is speculative and that it reflects certain particular “prejudices” of a philosophical nature (97). There are, as will be seen, also “prejudices” that Penrose does not quite see, either by (overtly) seeing some of them as non-prejudicial arguments or by (unconsciously) missing, being blind to, the presence of others in his argument.

     

    Before commenting on the nature or, one might say, the structure of Penrose’s speculation, I would like to discuss Penrose’s presentation of key scientific theories involved. As I have indicated, Chapter 1, “Space-Time and Cosmology,” which deals with “the Large,” may well be the most rewarding chapter of the book. It also offers a discussion of the kind of theory (modelled on and extending Einstein’s general relativity) that conceptually grounds Penrose’s vision of what a physical theory should be, whether as a theory of the large, the small, or of the human brain/mind, or, as is Penrose’s ultimate desideratum, of all three together. One finds in this chapter a beautiful, highly informative, and reasonably accessible exposition of, among other things, special and general relativity, relativistic cosmology, and non-Euclidean geometry (the mathematical basis of general relativity). The overall exposition is itself mostly geometrical, which, as will be seen, also signals a significant philosophical point, as an example of something that is more likely to be non-computable. Penrose’s readers, especially non-scientists, will learn much about the conceptual richness of modern mathematics and science, and might be motivated to read or reread Penrose’s discussion of these subjects in his earlier books, or even in the more technical exposition of The Nature of Space and Time, his debate with Hawking.

     

    While the arguments of that debate may appear only tangential to the main ostensible concern (“the human mind”) of Penrose’s project, these arguments are in fact crucial, as is clear from the extension of this debate in The Large, The Small, and the Human Mind. The Nature of Space and Time provides a more comprehensive and more sustained picture of the experimental evidence (or at least testability) and theoretical argument as to what kind of theory “quantum gravity” could or should be. Penrose and Hawking disagree on that issue, as well as in their overall philosophical positions–the Platonism of Penrose versus the positivism of Hawking, or what they see as such.

     

    The specific shape of the evidence and arguments for (or against) a theory of quantum gravity is, as I said, crucial to Penrose’s argument concerning the human mind as something that, in contrast to computational digital computers, is based on non-computational thinking, mathematical or other. The debate with Hawking shows, however, how deeply speculative and at times problematic (at least at certain points and along certain lines) are Penrose’s ideas concerning quantum gravity even on scientific grounds. These complexities would remain, regardless of whether one agrees or disagrees with Hawking’s own vision of this theory, which is not without some speculation either; or regardless of how one can use currently available theories in approaching some of the problems at issue (Hawking’s primary concern).

     

    Obviously, such complexities in themselves offer no grounds for a criticism of Penrose’s ideas concerning modern physics, especially relativity, which have elicited much admiration, as have Hawking’s ideas. One might want to be more cautious in evaluating certain aspects of Penrose’s presentation of his argument as limiting the scope of the debate in modern physics concerning key scientific and philosophical questions at issue, on which I shall further comment below. My point at the moment is double. First, general readers of Penrose’s work should be aware of the complexities of the scientific (rather than only philosophical) nature of Penrose’s argument concerning relativity and cosmology, and even more so of other scientific theories and questions he considers. Second, The Nature of Space and Time is especially indicative of this situation and is especially significant in exposing such complexities, more than is The Large, the Small, and the Human Mind.

     

    For this and other reasons, of all the books mentioned here, The Nature of Space and Time may well be the most interesting and exciting one for scientists and, I would even argue, for general readers as well. The latter argument can, I think, be made in spite of the more technical and difficult, and at points prohibitive, nature of the book, but, to a degree, also because of that nature. A nonscientist may be unrecoverably frustrated even by such (by the book’s standards) benign elaborations as: “The No-Boundary Proposal (Hartle and Hawking): The path integral for quantum gravity should be taken over all compact Euclidean metrics. One can paraphrase this as ‘The Boundary Condition of the Universe Is That It Has No Boundary’” (The Nature of Space and Time, 79). The primary interest for general readers may be the very scene of the debate between two great scientific minds, rather than the scientific or even philosophical substance at stake, and the book is framed (not altogether justifiably) as a continuation of the Bohr-Einstein debate concerning quantum mechanics. An attempt to penetrate more deeply into the philosophical substance of the debate may, however, bring considerable rewards. Michael Atiyah (a great mathematician in his own right) describes the situation well in his foreword:

     

    Although some of the presentation requires a technical understanding of the mathematics and physics, much of the argument is conducted at a higher (or deeper) level that will interest a broader audience. The reader will at least get an indication of the scope and subtlety of the ideas being discussed and of the enormous challenge of producing a coherent picture of the universe that takes full account of both gravitation and quantum physics. (viii)

     

    First, then, by reading The Nature of Space and Timeone gets an indication of the scope and subtlety of the ideas being discussed, and, I would add, of their conceptual and metaphorical richness. This richness is one of the great philosophical or, one might even say, poetic achievements of modern mathematics and science. Penrose’s and Hawking’s ideas and their ways of thinking offer some superb examples here. I am thinking in particular of Hawking’s ideas concerning the “gluing” of spaces of different non-Euclidean geometries and curvatures in constructing his model or rather theory of the universe, or his ideas concerning more radical (than even in conventional quantum physics) non-causalities in quantum gravity (59-60, 103), or of Penrose’s own rich geometrical ideas, which inform and shape his books, and in many ways define his mathematical imagination.

     

    It is, one could argue, this richness that connects modern science and modern–and postmodern–discourses in the humanities in the most interesting and significant ways. It is easy to understand from this perspective why, for example, Gilles Deleuze appeals to Riemann’s mathematical ideas at key junctures of his work. We are, however, far from having really approached what Riemann’s work and subsequent mathematics and science have to offer us by way of new concepts, metaphors, ways of thinking, and so forth. Arguably the most interesting and important challenge for the interdisciplinary studies involving science is to convey or indeed present this richness, on the one hand, and meaningfully to absorb as much of this richness as possible, on the other. Obviously, this traffic can proceed in both directions, and Penrose’s philosophical arguments could benefit from absorbing certain key recent developments in the humanities. One also could and should, at least at certain points, expect in the theoretical discourses in the humanities a level of complexity and even a certain technical specificity, and hence also difficulty, comparable to those of mathematics and science. Philosophical (rather than mathematical and scientific) complexity is sometimes lacking in Penrose’s books. Their main value in this context is instead in the possibilities they offer for this traffic by their presentation of mathematical and scientific ideas.

     

    Equally important is Atiyah’s remark concerning “the enormous challenge of producing a coherent picture of the universe that takes full account of both gravitation and quantum physics.” First of all, this remark is, again, indicative of the speculative and tentative nature of Penrose’s ideas (and other ideas he considers) even as concerns relativity and, even more so, quantum physics, or, to a still greater degree, those concerning the biology of the brain, even in the scientific context. These scientific ideas, moreover, are the subject of much controversy and debate in these fields themselves. Secondly, equally significantly, not only key scientific but key philosophical ideas–such as those concerning physical reality and its mathematical nature, determinism, the question of truth in mathematics and mathematical logic, and so forth–are as much part of the debate within the scientific community itself as of the debate in the humanities (or the social sciences), or of the debate between both communities.

     

    As we progress with Penrose from the classical world, including relativity, the world of the large (although it is no longer quite clear how classical this world really is), to quantum physics, to Gödel’s theorem, to the biology of the brain, or (all the more so) as we travel between them, the level of complexity, ambiguity, speculation, debate, and so forth increases. This is all the more so because, as I indicated at the outset, Penrose’s arguments, including his ultimate argument for the non-computability of the human mind and against artificial intelligence, depend not only on complex aspects of mathematical and physical theories themselves but on his interpretations of these theories. These interpretations are far from being broadly accepted (which Penrose acknowledges) and some of their aspects are rather idiosyncratic, and sometimes problematic. Penrose’s non-computability argument, however, irreducibly depends on these interpretations. While, to his credit, Penrose acknowledges such complexities and complications and considers some of them in his books, these books, I would argue, do not fully reveal to their readers the extent of these complexities and complications, and of the debates concerning them. There are, that is, levels of complexity surrounding Penrose’s ideas that are hidden (I am not saying deliberately) from an unprepared reader, and the debates incorporated in The Large, the Small, and the Human Mind or even in The Nature of Space and Time help only partially in this regard. Science itself appears to provide no conclusive evidence for most, if any, of Penrose’s key ideas, and indeed certain of his claims concerning scientific theories are questionable. One can argue that modern mathematics and science, especially quantum physics or post-Gödelian mathematical logic, provide more evidence against classical or traditional thinking (based on the concepts of reality, determinism, truth, knowledge, and so forth) than for it. Nor is there indeed any measurable consensus of opinion on these issues among the scientific or philosophical communities themselves. Whether one speaks of mathematics, physics, or biology (or indeed of consciousness and the mind), classical ideas and ideals are put into question by science itself, including even by what is seen as classical science. Modern science questions some of the same ideas as does some of the most radical postmodernist work in the humanities, and questions them just as radically.

     

    To illustrate the argument just offered, I would like to consider one of Penrose’s key comments on quantum mechanics in The Large, the Small, and the Human Mind:

     

    One of the things which people say about quantum mechanics is that it is fuzzy and indeterministic, but this is not true. So long as we remain at this level [of the quantum, small-scale behavior], quantum theory is deterministic and precise. In its most familiar form, quantum mechanics involves use of the equation known as Schrödinger's Equation which governs the behavior of the physical state of a quantum system--called its quantum state--and this is a deterministic equation.... Indeterminacy in quantum mechanics only arises when you perform what is called "making a measurement" and that involves magnifying an event from the quantum level to the classical level. (8)

     

    One can indeed say that there is nothing fuzzy or imprecise about quantum mechanics in the sense that it is as precise and effective as any mathematical theory in the history of physics. The claim that it is deterministic is far more complicated, however, and may indeed be unacceptable, at least in this strong form–“this is not true.” There is certainly more disagreement with the view advocated by Penrose than this statement or Penrose’s overall treatment of the subject would suggest, even though he, again, indicates that his overall view of quantum physics is not widely accepted. One might argue that there is a degree of consensus that Schrödinger’s equation itself is mathematically deterministic. There is, however, hardly any consensus at all as to what, if anything, it is deterministic about. At best it may be deterministic about indeterminism–that is, in gauging the distribution of the randomness in quantum behavior, which behavior, it is true, is manifest only at the macro level of measurement. One cannot, however, infer from this fact, in the way Penrose appears to do, that the micro–quantum–behavior is physically deterministic on the basis of Schrödinger’s equation alone. This is a (metaphysical) assumption, not a logical inference on the basis of the available data of quantum physics. In Max Born’s elegant formulation: “The motion of particles follows the probability law but the probability itself propagates according to the law of causality” (cited in Pais, 258). Probabilities can be gauged in a reasonably deterministic manner, for example, by using Schrödinger’s equation. The process itself, however, is never fully predictable, and is constrained by Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations, which are inherent in Schrödinger’s equation as well. Indeed in any given case just about anything can happen. In this, quantum physics is very much like life, or chess. To cite Hawking’s comments in The Nature of Space and Time: “Einstein was wrong when he said, ‘God does not play dice.’ Consideration of black holes suggests, not only that God does play dice, but that he sometimes confuses us by throwing them where they can’t be seen” (26), and speaking of further indeterminacy that gravity may introduce: “It means the end of the hope of scientific determinism, that we could predict the future with certainty. It seems God still has a few tricks up his sleeve” (60).

     

    A number of other examples of the kind just considered can be given here, in particular (still in his discussion of the quantum world) certain aspects of his interpretation of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen argument and Bell’s theorem, or some aspects of his interpretation of Gödel’s and Turing’s findings in mathematical logic. As with Penrose’s claim concerning quantum determinism, these examples are not random. They occur at crucial junctures of his overall argument concerning the human mind and artificial intelligence. I mention these examples even though my space does not allow me to consider them in the detail necessary to offer a fully rigorous critical argument. My aim, however, is not so much to criticize Penrose, but to indicate the broader (than Penrose himself suggests) scope of the hypothetical and the “prejudicial” in the landscape surveyed by his books.

     

    I borrow the characterization “prejudicial” from Penrose himself, but give it a broader philosophical rather than negative meaning, as Penrose perhaps does as well. Penrose organizes his key philosophical “prejudices”–“that the entire physical world can in principle be described in terms of mathematics”; “that there are not mental objects floating around out there that are not based in physicality”; and “that, in our understanding of mathematics, in principle at least, any individual item in the Platonic world is accessible to our mentality, in some sense”–into a Penrose triangle of the Platonic, Physical, and Mental Worlds (96-97, 137-39). The Penrose triangle is arguably the most famous object which can be drawn so as to appear physically possible, but which cannot actually exist, and as such it was an inspiration for Escher’s famous drawings, which are often in turn used by Penrose. One finds a picture of the Penrose triangle in The Large, the Small, and The Human Mind (138). The title itself suggests (I think deliberately) a triangle and a Penrose triangle, similar to that of Platonic, Physical, and Mental Worlds. Both these triangles are in fact multiply connected into a kind of complex and perhaps ultimately impossible network. As I have pointed out, one of the main questions of the book (of all the books at issue here) is that of the possibility of bridging the hitherto unbridgeable; and the Penrose triangle is of course a very fitting figure in this context. While Penrose ultimately aims at, at least, some bridging, the metaphor itself inevitably suggests that at best one can only achieve an illusion of bridging, but can never actually implement it. Penrose is obviously aware of this, but I think that the broader space of the hypothetical and the prejudicial, as here considered, not only makes the figure of the Penrose triangle even more pertinent and poignant here, but also suggests a different implication of its use by Penrose. It suggests that each of the entities Penrose wants to bridge–whether large or small, human or inhuman–are themselves networks of real and Penrose triangles, or of much more complex figures or unfigures and networks of that type. This irreducible multiplicity might give us a better sense of the figures and of the unfigurability of the large, the small, and the human mind, and of the possible or impossible interconnections between them.

     

    By the same token, however, this richer and more complex conceptual geometry also suggests that we may connect things that Penrose (perhaps) wants to separate, for example, the computable and the noncomputable, or the human and the nonhuman. As I have pointed out earlier, the “prejudice” against computational thinking has a very long history which extends from the pre-Socratics to Heidegger and beyond. I can only consider here one early event in this history, in which it is, fittingly, geometry that (as against both arithmetic and logic) appears to have been especially associated with non-computational and/as creative thinking–the thinking of mathematical and perhaps (at least for Plato) all philosophical discovery. It appears that ultimately Penrose takes a similar view as well, although he does, of course, argue for the ultimate non-computability of arithmetic as well in view of Gödel’s findings. My example is all the more fitting here since it has to do with the diagonal of the square. Just as it was the square where numerical computation was defeated by the Greeks, it was the square–now that of the chess board–where the latest defeat of the non-computational, the mind of Garry Kasparov, took place.

     

    The diagonal of the square was both a great glory and a great problem, almost a scandal, in Greek mathematics and philosophy. For the diagonal and the side of a square were proved to be incommensurable, a discovery often attributed to Plato’s student Theaetetus. Their “ratio” is irrational, that is, it cannot be represented as a ratio of two whole numbers, and hence is not a rational number. This was the first example of such a number–what we now call the square root of, for example, two–a number that was proved to be unrepresentable as a ratio of two positive integers. It was an extraordinary and, at the time, shocking discovery, which was in part responsible for a crucial shift from arithmetics to geometry in mathematics and philosophy, since the diagonal is well within the limits of geometrical representation but outside those of arithmetical representation–as the Greeks conceived of it. To cite Maurice Blanchot:

     

    The Greek experience, as we reconstitute it, accords special value to the "limit" and reemphasizes the long-recognized scandalousness of the irrational: the indecency of that which, in measurement, is immeasurable. (He who first discovered the incommensurability of the diagonal of the square perished; he drowned in a shipwreck, for he had met with a strange and utterly foreign death, in the nonplace bounded by absent frontiers). (103)

     

    The Greeks, then, might have been more ambivalent about the relationships between geometrical and arithmetical, or logical, thinking (and their relation to computation and the non-computable) than is commonly thought, even though Plato or Socrates might have seen geometry as the greatest model of mathematical or even philosophical discovery. In closing his book Penrose relates (a bit too loosely) his philosophical triangle to the so-called cohomology theory, which is part of the field of algebraic topology:

     

    You may ask, "Where is the impossibility [of the Penrose triangle]?" Can you locate it?....You cannot say that the impossibility is at any specific place in the picture--the impossibility is a feature of the whole structure. Nevertheless, there are precise mathematical ways in which you can talk about such things. This can be done in terms of breaking it apart, glueing it together and extracting certain abstract mathematical ideas from the detailed total pattern of glueings. The notion of cohomology is the appropriate notion in this case. This notion provides us with a means of calculating the degree of impossibility of this figure. (137-39, emphasis added)

     

    The appeal to calculation in the end of a book that celebrates the incalculable and the non-computable could delight an early deconstructionist a couple of decades ago, and one finds the deconstruction of oppositions of that very type in the works of Derrida and de Man, among others. Penrose’s comment, however, can hardly be conceived as unselfconscious here. We must of course also be aware of the difference between calculation and computability. (Penrose, it should be noted, does not deny the significance of either). My point is that, by associating algebraic structures with topological ones, cohomology theory connects the often incalculable or even inconceivable geometry and topology (or indeed inconceivable algebra) to arithmetical and algebraic calculations and makes it possible to know something about the noncomputable and the (geometrically or otherwise) inconceivable. Mathematics may suggest to us a better model than we might be able to offer to mathematics. This model may be simultaneously both that of computation and that of noncomputability, or even of that which is neither one nor the other, and a sign of intelligence that is neither artificial (or otherwise inhuman) nor human, nor divine.

    Works Cited

     

    • Blanchot, Maurice. The Writing of the Disaster. Trans. Ann Smock. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P, 1983.
    • Hawking, Stephen. A Brief History of Time: From the Big Bang Black Holes. New York: Bantam, 1988.
    • Hawking, Stephen and Roger Penrose. The Nature of Space Time. Princeton, NJ.: Princeton UP, 1996.
    • Pais, Abraham. Inward Bound: Of Matter and Forces in Physical World. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1986.
    • Penrose, Roger. The Emperor’s New Mind: Concerning Minds and the Laws of Physics. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1989.
    • —. The Large, the Small and the Human Mind. Cambridge UP, 1997.
    • —. Shadows of the Mind: A Search for the Science of Consciousness of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1994.

     

  • Reactivating Deleuze: Critical Affects After Cultural Materialism

    Paul Trembath

    Department of English
    Colorado State University

    ptrembath@vines.colostate.edu

     

    Paul Patton, Deleuze: A Critical Reader. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996.

     

    A thing has as many senses as there are forces capable of taking possession of it.

    –Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy (4) [emphasis mine]

     

    New “theoretical” horizons are starting to open up on the scene of historicist criticism–or, rather, “old” ones, and it’s about time. If, as Adorno argued, philosophy lives on because the moment of its realization was missed, one can only hope that the same untimely life is not perpetually in store for the astonishing work of Gilles Deleuze. Then again, one might well hope otherwise, for Deleuze’s philosophy has untimely hopes as well as timely ones, even though academic criticism, given its present list of worldly concerns, is insensible to goals other than those that applied theorists can already sense and register, and by now perhaps too well.

     

    Deleuze has the power to change the goals and subjects of criticism as well as serve them–a power, a theoretical capacity, that most critics at present fail absolutely to demonstrate. Such failure of demonstration, in Deleuze’s still unexplored terms, signals an act of de/valuation–a living sign that a certain limit to what criticism can think and do has been “realized” (think Adorno again). Moreover, it is “signs” of this sort, in a way consistent with his larger philosophy of affects, that Deleuze teaches us to read. What is devalued by current criticism (and in no sense deliberately, but rather reactively, implicitly) is any way of reading the world that moves astray from the explicit subject areas and goals that encode current critical rhetoric and its affects (for Deleuze, the two are never distinct)–that is, astray from articles, conference papers, dissertations, and books that foreground gender, race, sexual orientation, etc. as their subjects, and which seek the enhanced cultural enablement of differences of this recognizable sort as their “practical” goals.

     

    These subjects and goals are of unquestionable importance to critical pedagogy and progressive politics. In the estimate of this reader, only an uncritical reactionary of the worst kind would be “against” these subjects and goals, or oppose the practical politics with which they aim to coincide. What Deleuze reminds us, however, is that theory can do other things than transform itself dutifully into common-sensical language and practical alterian politics. Theory can also, in addition to pursuing instrumental goals and perhaps at the same time, invent or pre-form new “sense” altogether, and move at speeds different from those compatible with the going quotidian or academic instrumentation. (All that theory needs to do this is a body capable of doing it, which always implies more than one body, if not the always-to-be-hoped-for critical mass). Theory would be the end and not just the means that untimely sense takes on in senselessly one-dimensional worlds, and not least when this one-dimensionality, even in the admirable and desirable spirit of social alterity, appears of necessity in academe itself. In Deleuze’s terms, theory would be a particular percept–the actual life of sense and values possibly to come, unrealizable within the exigent limits of current sensibility.

     

    If this sounds like Adorno again, it should. As Fredric Jameson suggests, in academic times saturated with orthodox critical moves and counters (to say nothing of the far worse orthodoxies outside academia), Adorno’s appeal to difficulty, rethought beyond order-words such as “avantgardism,” “hermeticism,” and “elitism,” might be good for nineties critics, or at least some of us, to reconsider. Certain critics are beginning to suggest that Deleuze, too (who could out-think the aforementioned list of metonymic accusations in his sleep), might offer different and even untimely things to academic criticism, yet they lack Jameson’s auto-critical agenda and edge. Deleuze, of course, has not had the same academic influence in North American literature and cultural studies departments that, among poststructuralists, Derrida and Foucault have had (and in roughly that order). Yet one can begin to sense that if our academic will-to-application has its simultaneously good and bad way with things, this might change.

     

    By any critical standards, Deleuze: A Critical Reader, edited by Paul Patton, is a major “minor” event and a marker of Deleuze’s incipient influence–in my opinion, the most significant critical compilation to appear in a decade. It alone among contemporary exegetical collections has the capacity to blow the whole field of critical studies wide open, which is not to say that it will, nor that it should. Perhaps for many reasons it shouldn’t; perhaps it would betray itself, or at least something in Deleuze, if it did. (We should recall that Deleuze likes traitors, but only when they’re not “tricksters” in disguise [Dialogues 44-5].) Yet along with Constantin V. Boundas’s and Dorothea Olkowski’s Gilles Deleuze and the Theater of Philosophy–as well as an increasing number of books published by somatic feminists, cultural critics, and other readers indirectedly “apprenticed” to Deleuze–there is much to indicate that the Deleuzian timebomb is about to explode, if it hasn’t already. For Deleuze is a timebomb, and can remain so in ways equal to the richness and multifariousness of his imperceptible but ubiquitous philosophy. No less rich and multiple than Derrida or Foucault, it is only a matter of times(s) before he, like them, explodes.

     

    Patton’s edition urges us on to several of these “times.” Some of them happen to be ours more than others, if only in degree and never kind. What all of the provocative essays make overwhelmingly clear, sometimes more explicitly than others, is that Deleuze can move contemporary critical studies, and cultural studies in particular, beyond the simple “materialism” that at present constrains our critical sense of things toward the “radical empiricism” we find everywhere in Deleuze’s writings. Indeed, Deleuze might best be classified, if only for the most tentative pedagogical purposes, as a poststructural empiricist, just as we might see Derrida as a poststructural textualist, and Foucault as a poststructural historicist. Having made these “useful” distinctions, allow me to emphasize their limits, since to all subtle readers any one of these conceptual emphases will inevitably fail to make critical sense without supplementation from the others. The danger of such distinctions, given the pedigree of critical one-upmanship that animates “successful” academe, is that Deleuze might be read as a mere cultural-critical “corrective” to Foucault (my empiricism’s better than your historicism!), just as Foucault was read, far too simply, as a historicist corrective to Derrida’s (nonexistent) hermeticism in the 1980s and into the 90s. Admirably there is none of this in Patton’s edition, all of the contributors being far too sensitive to the richness of Deleuze’s project and to the subtleties of critical inquiry taken as a whole.

     

    How, then, do the forces in this collection “take possession” of Deleuze? How do they make sense of him, and which ones are capable of making which senses? The thirteen essays in the Reader (including Patton’s erudite introduction) cover a wide variety of subject areas, and are supplemented by a bibliography of Deleuze’s works compiled by Timothy S. Murray. (Since I would like to consider the issue of Deleuze’s reception in general here, I will briefly summarize these marvelous essays, foregrounding four in particular.) Deleuze’s famous anti-Hegelianism is addressed in Catherine Malabou’s convincing piece “Who’s Afraid of Hegelian Wolves,” within which a monomaniacal version of Hegel is shown to animate Deleuze’s otherwise heterogeneous philosophy, and Jean-Luc Nancy’s essay demonstrates provocatively how a Hegelian can appreciate, and even identify with, Deleuze’s concept of the fold of thought. Pierre Macherey’s compelling reading of Deleuze’s reinvention of Spinoza speaks to the Althusserian investment in Spinoza that Deleuze evades; still, Macherey suggests unthought points of compatibility between Deleuze and structural Marxism, while questioning Deleuze’s notion that “passions” (think ideology here) are ever truly “joyful” in Spinoza. Jean-Clet Martin’s “Eye of the Outside” addresses Deleuze’s work on Melville in order to elucidate the philosopher’s seminal concepts of difference and exteriority, whereas Eugene A. Holland’s “Schizoanalysis and Baudelaire” develops Deleuze’s literary thinking beyond the minor literature register, or at least within a less current vocabulary. Constantin V. Boundas’s excellent contribution addresses Deleuze’s virtual ontology by way of Bergson, and suggests clearly how “ontology” and “poststructuralism” are not necessarily incompatible terms. Ronald Bogue’s impressive “Gilles Deleuze: The Aesthetics of Force” develops Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism in relation to his work on Bacon’s paintings in The Logic of Sensation. Finally, Jean-Michel Salankis’s singular “Idea and Destination” examines Deleuze’s distinction between differentiation and differenciation with reference to infinitesimal calculus and Kant.

     

    As outstanding as these essays are, Francois Zourabichvili’s “Six Notes on the Percept,” David W. Smith’s “Deleuze’s Theory of Sensation,” Moira Gatens’s “Through a Spinozist Lens,” and Brian Massumi’s “The Autonomy of Affect” have thus far most intrigued this reader. Zourabichvili, like Martin, looks at Deleuze’s Melville, but does so in order to investigate Deleuze’s concept of the percept, and would be for this reason alone unique in Deleuze’s reception. The “percept” is Deleuze’s attempt to characterize minor (or untimely) sense in active terms, whereas most critical rhetorics at present tend to equate untimely sense, reactively and metonymically, with quietism. Smith’s stunning piece demonstrates how Deleuze’s “aesthetic” treatment of Bacon’s painting undermines Kant’s notion that sensibility is found in the qualities of objects rather than signs, and explodes the Kantian division between objective elements of sensation (the first Critique) and subjective elements of sensation (the third Critique) (Patton 29). Gatens’s contribution advances a Deleuzo-Spinozist “social cartography” (168) to extend gender criticism, somaticism, and cultural critique generally beyond the rhetorical confines of “historicism,” and it discusses how “ethological” criticism can disalign the relation of order-words to the reactive affects they coordinate, particularly with reference to the juridical categories of sexual difference. Finally, Massumi’s astounding essay, like Gatens’s, develops Deleuze’s theory of affects in the area of cultural critique. As Massumi writes, “[a]ffect holds a key to rethinking postmodern power after ideology” (235). One can assume he means “after discourse” as well, insofar as Massumi makes it overwhelmingly clear how medial representations organize affect into standard emotion. As such, we can see in Gatens and Massumi the move toward a cultural criticism that will add Deleuze’s vocabulary and procedures to the (non)methodologies of Derrideans and Foucauldians, and continue to mount much needed criticism against the hegemonic stranglehold of contemporary “good sense.” Yet one is left wondering after such a rare show of critical fireworks what points might remain for other Deleuzians to pursue.

     

    My points are not that Deleuze’s currently untimely methods should be applied to the timely objectives of cultural criticism; that we combine Derrida, Deleuze, and Foucault in the pursuit of this end; or that we replace Foucault with a march toward a more “comprehensive” materialism. I think Derrida, Foucault, and Deleuze should be read together, but that we might also remember the forgotten radicalism of so-called “deconstruction” during its initial American reception in the 70s–a reception, a feeling, that threatened to take down the concepts of art and culture altogether, rather than simply replace an evaluative (idealist) approach to culture and its “works” with the by now orthodox, albeit pedagogically invaluable, analytic (materialist) approach, which is in effect what cultural criticism in all its modes has done. Although Patton’s edition certainly doesn’t settle for this latter, neither does it show any serious interest in the forgotten former. The untimely ends of that 70s deconstructive moment have been lost in the academic subjection of deconstruction–and poststructuralism generally–to the very categories of “culture” it once threatened to deconstruct (think of “literature,” “film” and so on). The concepts of culture and cultural works were saved and deformalized in one fell swoop. But something had to take the critical fall, and it was “aesthetics.”

     

    Certainly there is plenty in Deleuze that can supplement an improved materialist approach to “culture.” In fact, Deleuze spent a lot of time and unprecedented brilliance doing this himself. But what else can Deleuze do? Can his rhetoric be used to reverse the very terms of critical sense? Can his rhetoric create untimely goals as well as untimely methodological approaches to familiar ones? Can Deleuze be “used” as a percept to overcome, in Nietzsche’s anti-apocalyptic sense, the affects and concepts that cohere–both evaluatively and analytically, centripetally and centrifugally–with all interest in “cultural work”? As Godard suggests in his film Sympathy for the Devil (itself a “work” that does not escape the indictment that goes with the following statement, with the Foucauldian daimon or difficulty that animates it): “It is urgent to replace the word ‘culture’ by another one.” Urgent for whom? No such devil is in any attendance. But might this word to come, in some future of postformalist and overcultural sympathy, be “aesthetics”? Might the word return with a different sense (since only difference “returns”)–a sense that could read all cultural lifeworlds as unconscious coordinates of affective re/action, corresponding to different degrees of sensory capitalization? Does the range of Deleuze’s rhetoric make possible an aesthetic sense that, having overcome its apprenticeship to art, would operate as an affective Marxism and deconstruction? And might this minor sense of “aesthetics” begin to return today, or tomorrow, or whenever it can?

     

    Writing about the conditions that Deleuze articulates “for thinking of difference and repetition,” Foucault states that “(t)he most tenacious subjection of difference is that maintained by categories” (Foucault, 186). It isn’t that Foucault thinks we can escape categories in kind (although he argues, like all poststructuralists, that there is something acategorical about thought’s movement). Subjection to categories must always be understood in degree rather than kind, and a dominant value is always the affective trace of a dominant category, and vice versa. Each one is also the trace of a degree of lived instrumentation, or metonymic coordinate for particular capitalized sensoria. In our critical epoch–and I am speaking of the instrumental time of 20th-century art and criticism, from aestheticism to culturalism–there is no more dominant category (and value) than culture. “Culture” survived both the aestheticism and avantgardism of high Modernism quite comfortably, and has even managed to prosper as a concept during the poststructuralization of traditional humanism. Even the humanists welcomed variants of culturalism after the threat of deconstruction (better to have multicultural “works” than no works at all!). There is a definite redundancy in all this that has gotten by all but unexamined in the work of formalists, culturalists, and even poststructuralists.

     

    Aesthetics (as good taste, beauty, a specious sense of universality, and so on) once “took possession” of the concept of culture, and with it all the attendant affects that culminated in high Modernism. Culture then went on to take possession of art by deconstructing, ideology-critiquing, and genealogizing the artifacts of aestheticism (by equating them metonymically, and thus sensorially, with “patriarchy,” “sexism,” “imperialism,” “racism,” “homophobia,” “elitism,” and so on–all pretty convincing charges). However, culture then went on to confuse aestheticism metonymically with the far more diffuse concept of aesthetics taken as a whole. Can the overlooked side of 18th-century aesthetics (understood as sensation, feeling, affect, and not art) now “return” in revised nonidentic form to take possession of culture–that is, to subject all culturalism to a transvaluation, rather than logic, of sense: a perpetual devaluation of all rhetorics, feelings, and “works” that subordinate, in our metonymic and evaluative reflexes, the concept of “affects”–and thus of those reflexes themselves–to the concept of “culture”? With reference to my epigraph, which force is capable of reading, living, and judging “cultural” sense from the perspective of this “aesthetic” sense? Which one can do it, can want to do it instead of something else? Which one feels, and thus makes real, Godard’s percept, his urgency yet to come?

     

    For all its originality and excellence, there is no percept-ive struggle against the affects and concepts of art/culture in Deleuze: A Critical Reader. But there are no such percepts in the profession of criticism as it presently exists, so such a sensibility will hardly be missed. I anticipate that, essays such as Zourabichvili’s aside, a general disinterest in the theory of the percept will characterize Deleuze’s entry into the marketplace of post-Foucauldian ideas at the millennium: that (residually cultural) critics will be strong on affect (in order to supplement theories of “ideology” and “discourse”), less strong on concept (since the concept of “concept” remains exegetically aligned with an unpopular textualism), and virtually blind to the practical powers of the percept, since critical sense is today the indentured servant of generic culture and its counter-hegemonic critique, especially when such sense is in graduate school, when it tries to publish, and when it looks for employment. Contemporary critical affects are by inertial design incapable not only of understanding percepts as “active,” but of sensing their possible or actual existence at all, let alone where they might go.

     

    Perhaps theory has always manifested different degrees of “practical” power, depending on the speed(s) in question–those that are percept-ive and minor and those that are applied and major. If so, the percept-ive powers of theory today might be those that diverge from the willingness of appliers to operate beneath the explicit or implicit sign of culture, or worse, to embrace art (as does Deleuze himself) as some antifoundational line of flight away from molarities, striated spaces, black holes, etc. We should remember that it is not merely an old category or word (such as “culture” or “art”) that applied theory returns us to, but to the old sense of which the category and its object are a sign, a symptom, an evaluative accent or trace. And what sense is the experience, and even rhetoric, of culture a symptom of in these consumer-Modernist times? The reactively certain sense, or capital sense certainty, that value is always elsewhere (on screen, in books, or “in” other attention-invested media–the real reason We gotta get out of this place), whether the valuables in question are marginal or centrist, high or low, artistic or critical.

     

    Of course, “aesthetics” is an old word, too. Yet if it could return poststructuralism to the old sense (and value) of sense rather than to art, it could return eternally with an overcultural difference. It could mark how the living “currency” of culture (even in the sense of exchange value) is a mimetic devaluation of all sense that is not famous or spectacular. This holds true even of cooler-than-thou sense that despises the artifacts of “mainstream” culture, since the categories of culture still animate dutifully the sense that “rebels” uncritically against its own disciplinary sensibility (e.g., My favorite “band” is less popular than yours!). In a negating and far less interpellated way, this is true of cultural critique as well (which at least manages to turn culture into a conscious form of stupidity), and of more art-subservient theories of affective transgression, such as those we find in Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism and, quite differently, in other poststructuralisms. Smith’s Deleuzianism is this empiricist sort. If at moments Smith’s extraordinary essay on Kant and Deleuze promises to rethink aesthetics in overrelation to the concepts of art and culture (and thus bring culture to its senses), lo and behold, art turns out to be the categorical foreground for the percept-ual ungrounding of (es)sense once again, just as it was in Nietzsche’s evaluation a century ago, and everyone’s since. Certainly Deleuze can help us think something other than this, even if for him and his most “sympathetic” readers, art remains a way out of the prisonhouse of reactivity rather than a way in.

     

    We received Derrida in the 70s and got “literary” deconstruction, applied grammatology, and so on. We received Foucault in the eighties and got New Historicism, genealogical reception theory, somatic criticism, and–add some feminism, ethnography, and Birminghamized Raymond Williams–cultural studies in general.

     

    Now in the late 90s we’re receiving Deleuze, in some ways for the first “instrumentalizable” time, and we’re getting… well, what? A feminist post-Alice-Jardine Deleuze in the remarkable work of Elizabeth Grosz, Rosi Braidotti, and Moira Gatens? A gender-critical and queer-theoretical Deleuze in the affective (rather than “performative”) somatic theories of these same authors? A postcolonial Deleuze in the groundbreaking work of Reda Bensmaia, Robert Young, and in spots even Edward Said? A cinematicist Deleuze in the pan-postmodernism of Steven Shaviro, but also implicitly in the Benjaminian (and even Taussigian) reception theory of Miriam Hansen? An emerging OCTOBERfest Deleuze in the unprecedented art criticism of Daniel W. Smith and others soon to come? A Deleuzian cultural studies in the texts of Lawrence Grossberg but, most brilliantly, in the work of Brian Massumi? Even a Deleuzian auto-critique of “careerist” theory theorized, Symplokestyle, by Sande Cohen? We’re getting all of the above, and we can expect to get a lot more.

     

    What concerns me in all this is what might be left out once certain interpretations of Deleuze become official and more or less repeatable (Deleuze’s and Guattari’s theory of noology will itself prove “useful” here). I have no problem with timely, or even instrumental, applications of Deleuze to pre-established fields of inquiry (such as gender criticism). Without exception, I revere them for what they can do, just as long as their eventual currency and familiarity don’t make the whole of Deleuze–whatever that might be–“old-fashioned” in academic circles before a lot of it even happens, as was the unfortunate case in the U.S. with Foucault and, even more brutally “before” him, Derrida. Certainly this is not the fault of the applicants themselves, but of academia as a cutthroat marketplace of ideas and reputations. Theorists quickly become “out-dated,” but the redundant categories that critics and artists serve (such as painting) never do. It is always easier, and more immediately profitable, to apply new procedures to timely object(ive)s than to theorize new object(ive)s altogether. This latter implies reading against the affective tendencies and aims of critical studies taken as a whole–to say nothing of uncritical culture–and is as difficult critically (and even creatively as it is potentially suicidal professionally. But it is precisely the possibility of this latter (inventing new goals), as well as the actuality of the former (pursuing older ones), that Deleuze teaches us to sense and value. He reminds us that evaluation is itself active, and that theory is the form that practice takes when it has no immediate instrumental options–when sense becomes capable of thinking, feeling, and doing untimely things: material things that are not yet, and perhaps never will be, of “this” world.

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Deleuze, Gilles and Claire Parnet. Dialogues. New York: Columbia UP, 1987.
    • Deleuze, Gilles. Nietzsche and Philosophy. New York: Columbia UP, 1983.
    • Foucault, Michel. Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1977.

     

  • Impassable Passages: Derrida, Aporia, and the Question of Politics

    François Debrix

    Department of Political Science
    Purdue University

    debrix@polsci.purdue.edu

     

    Richard Beardsworth, Derrida & the Political. New York: Routledge, 1996, 174 pp.

     
    The impact of Jacques Derrida’s thought on contemporary politics has often been treated as an accidental, at best marginal, phenomenon. Unlike other French thinkers representative of what is generally understood as the postmodern moment (Foucault, Deleuze, or Baudrillard for instance), Derrida has arguably had more success with literature and philosophy scholars and students than with those whose recognized task is to think the political. Richard Beardsworth’s tour de force in Derrida & the Political is to highlight the political stakes present in Derrida’s works without, however, detracting from the spirit of Derridean thought.

     

    Beardsworth starts by offering a concise and accurate explanation of one of the most frequently used, yet often inaccurately presented, Derridean concepts, the notion of deconstruction. In Chapter One, Beardsworth turns to some of Derrida’s earlier works like Writing and Difference or Of Grammatology to explain that deconstruction is the product of, as he puts it, a “negotiation.” Deconstruction emerges as the result of an unsatisfied negotiation “between philosophy and what in France is called the Sciences Humaines, which is both characteristic of a certain style of philosophizing and carries with it and develops a clear set of intellectual, disciplinary and institutional stakes” (4). The difficulty of accessing philosophical notions “from outside philosophy” (the dilemma of the human sciences), or, conversely, the inability of “dominating the ’empiricity’ of the human sciences” by means of philosophical categories (the problem of philosophy confronted with domains traditionally thought through the disciplinarity of the human sciences), creates a “displacement” between these two discourses. Beardsworth thus places deconstruction in an epistemological and historic context, and argues that the displacement (an always already present décalage) between philosophy and the discursive practices of the human sciences is the point where the work of Derridean deconstruction takes place. The “method” of deconstruction is offered by Derrida as the result of an impossibility to reconcile, decide, or close. Yet, it does not seek to reconcile or close either. The impossibility (or impassability) of decision is a theme which recurs throughout Derrida & the Political. It later returns under the form of aporia, a figure which is at the core of Beardsworth’s reading of Derrida in this volume.

     

    Practically, deconstruction operates from within the text, in the discontinuities and ruptures of discourse which re-mark the original displacement (a displacement that the metaphysical opposition between the transcendental and the empirical seeks to normalize) between philosophy and the human sciences. Working through Derrida’s early deconstruction of Saussure’s analyses of language and writing, Beardsworth suggests that deconstruction is a mode of philosophical and/or literary discursive analysis which accounts for textual “contradictions and exclusions from within” an author’s scholarly or theoretical endeavor, “and not from the imposition of an external set of criteria” which seek to reappropriate the meanings of the text from outside (10-11). Otherwise, Beardsworth continues, “the violence inherent to metaphysics” would be repeated. Once again, such a metaphysical violence is one that maintains the two discourses of philosophy and the human sciences at an insuperable distance from one another. By imposing/affirming such a violence (the violence of separation), metaphysical discourse obliterates the very rules and principles contained within the text itself, including its own potential violence. Thus understood, deconstruction is an eminently liberal and democratic practice, one that approaches textuality from the very rules of formation that it contains, and not from an external model of thought.

     

    Building upon this preliminary exposition of the “method of deconstruction” (I put it between quotation marks because, as Beardsworth mentions, Derrida finds this appellation problematic. As Beardsworth notes, “Derrida is careful to avoid this term because it carries connotations of a procedural form of judgment” [4]), Beardsworth then embarks on a subtle analysis of the political within Derrida’s work (this actually starts in the last section of Chapter 1 on “Law, Judgment, and Singularity” but continues more clearly in Chapter 2). Unlike previous studies on Derrida and politics, Beardsworth’s reading avoids the temptation of simply applying Derridean theoretical insights to concrete political events, phenomena or discourses. Such an approach would perhaps be very fashionable and may give the impression that a postmodern mode of analysis, derived from Derrida, is used to make sense of current realities. Yet, such an appropriation of Derrida’s thought for concrete political purposes, although clearly feasible (liberal activist movements, from feminist groups to postcolonial formations have found in Derrida, as in many other postmodern writers, a source of political engagement), would nonetheless be an all-too facile way of employing Derrida’s notions without actively engaging the richness of his writing. Beardsworth seeks to remedy this theoretical lacuna by showing that, if Derrida can be of any practical political use, it is because his key theoretical reflections, and his practice of deconstruction in the first place, are in and of themselves political practices, and more precisely democratically involved endeavors.

     

    In an apparently irreconcilable fashion, Beardsworth suggests that Derrida is the most political when he is the least so, or, to put it another way, at the point where Derrida articulates the impossibility of politics. Derrida’s political “as” the impossibility of politics can be exposed only by bringing to the fore the figure of aporia, a figure central to Derrida’s thinking. Aporia, from the Greek aporos (without passage, without issue, not treadable, as Beardsworth reminds us on page 32), is a figure mobilized by Derrida to specify the fundamental irreducibility and undecidability of every concept or phenomenon that traditionally has been stabilized, fixed, subjected, represented and normalized by Western metaphysics (from Plato’s division of the empirical and the transcendental, to Levinasian ethics as Beardsworth later shows in Chapter 3). Aporia is for Beardsworth the democratic “core” (aporia also has the meaning of a “core,” an “undetachable and unsurpassable unit”) within Derrida’s philosophy, the originary yet impassable key to understanding the Derridean system of thinking the political.

     

    Derrida’s notion of the political is accessible only through the notion of what Beardsworth calls the “aporia of law.” Beardsworth is perhaps a victim of his democratic reductionism here, a tendency which leads him to assume and affirm that questions regarding the political are necessarily centered around the nature of law. Questions which examine the possibility or impossibility of formulating the law are at the core of the political (the aporia of law is the aporia of politics as well for Beardsworth). Beardsworth bases his understanding of the aporia of law on a micro-reading of Derrida’s analysis of Franz Kafka’s tale “Vor dem Gesetz” (“Before the Law”). In this tale, a man from the country seeks to gain access to the law and penetrate its space, which is represented in the story by a large door kept by a guardian. Beardsworth continues:

     

    On the man from the country's request to gain admittance into the Law [Beardsworth, following the German transcription, capitalizes the term], the doorkeeper tells the man to wait, adding that he is only the first of a long line of such keepers, each one more powerful and terrifying than the last. Whilst perplexed at this attitude towards the Law, having assumed that the Law is "accessible at all times and to everyone," the man from the country desists from attempting to enter, taking to heart the possibility of entrance in the near future. The rest of the man's life is made up of frequent attempts--each time more childish--to gain access, each attempt in turn vetoed by the doorkeeper and deferred to a later occasion. (27)

     

    For Derrida, Kafka’s story exemplifies the impossibility/impassibility of the law, its ambiguous status from which its aporia is derived. In order to maintain its authority of law (as law), the law must transcend the empirical domain. It must not be accessed or penetrated by history or experience (the man of the country in Kafka’s tale). For Derrida, this inaccessibility of the law is, first and foremost, an impossibility of narration. The law has no story; it cannot be told or re-told, represented. Rather, devoid of narration and experience, the law remains atemporal, universal, unattainable (as Beardsworth shows, Kantian understandings of the law are predicated on such attributes). But the law is paradoxical, and necessarily remains so. While it cannot be accessed, it must also be inscribed in history and empiricity in order for its authority to be meaningful. Decision and judgment require that the law bear its marks in history. This paradox is for Derrida the irreconcilable condition of the law, its fundamental disjointure. The aporia of the law emerges from its quasi-magical ability to hold together (in a sleight-of-hand trick perhaps) the two domains of philosophy (transcendence) and empiricity (experience) under its authority.

     

    This double plane on which the law operates must not, however, be recognized as such. Indeed, if the authority of the law were to be brought down to the level of experience, it would be made accessible to everyone (something that the man from the country erroneously assumed), and thus would become changeable, contextual, and uncertain. Conversely, if the applicability of the law, through judgment and decision, were to be tied to its universal and philosophical (and physically unverifiable) characteristics, its authority could easily be contested and challenged by another story or representation of the law (as many laws as there are potential narrations). This, for both Derrida and Beardsworth, explains the fact that the law requires a doorkeeper, as a stand-in for its material authority, its force of coercion. As Derrida notes:

     

    The law is prohibition: this does not mean that it prohibits, but that it is itself prohibited, a prohibited place...one cannot reach the law, and in order to have a rapport of respect with it, one must not have a rapport with the law, one must interrupt the relation. One must enter into relation only with the law's representatives, its examples, its guardians. These are interrupters as much as messengers. One must not know who or what or where the law is... This is what must be the case for the must of the law. (39)

     

    Metaphysical discourse which, as both Derrida and Beardsworth understand it, maintains a clear distinction between the empirical and the philosophical imposes the law (and politics, once again understood by Beardsworth as the practice of the law) as a form of violence. Indeed, each modality of the law (the physical or the abstract) requires that the other be negated. This violence is for Derrida nothing more than a way of denying the aporia of law, that is to say, the multipolar and undecidable plane on which the law operates.

     

    The aporia of law is thus a “neither/nor” structure which is “nowhere but in its inscriptions in history, yet unaccountable as well” (29). The origin of the law is “impossible to find” (31). It is completely indeterminate, unless one practices violence and arbitrarily fixes one origin (which is what happens in all modern conceptions of the law and the political). This aporia of law, this impassable “ordeal” (as Derrida puts it in his later works) through which the law nonetheless has to pass, is for Beardsworth the main lesson that Derrida has to offer about the political. Through Derrida, the political becomes an “impossibility of judgment,” a “neither/nor” spectrum of options and possibilities which the aporia of law offers, unless the mark of its undecidability (which, by the way, the work of deconstruction seeks to re-mark or retrieve; may we now re-read deconstruction as a nostalgic enterprise?) has been erased by metaphysics. Beardsworth thus interprets Derrida’s political as an impossibility of politics, that is to say, as the impossibility of choosing, discriminating, or passing judgment. Derrida’s political stakes, the aporia of politics, are thus blatantly democratic, even more purely democratic than classical or modern democratic theories perhaps, which based their legitimacy (and legitimacy as the basis for their authority) on the possibility of and necessity for judgment and discrimination (the will of the majority, contract theories, etc.). Ironically, Beardsworth’s Derrida may be the only true democratic purist.

     

    The latter part of Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 continue this exploration through Kant and Hegel and, more precisely, through Derrida’s elaboration of metaphysical logic as “a specific organization of time.” With time, the metaphysical limits are no longer the empirical and the philosophical, but rather the finite and the infinite. Metaphysical logic is predicated on the positioning of the human subject (logocentrism) in a world where the limit between the finite and the infinite (read by Beardsworth through Kant) (61-68) becomes the determining condition of human existence and, consequently, of thought. In such a dialectical construction, finite and infinite form polar opposites in between which Western thinking has had to define itself since the early days of the Enlightenment. Metaphysical time is, for both Derrida and Beardsworth, a disavowal of the “aporia of time.” Concerns with the articulation between the finite and the infinite impose themselves as a form of “historical” violence (whereby time is fixed and decided, either in the finitude of the present moment, or in the endless postponement of a future to come).

     

    The violence of time is shown by Derrida’s reading of the American Declaration of Independence. Beardsworth suggests that for Derrida “the independence of the United States is undecidably described and produced. The union of states is described as predating the signature of the declaration; at the same time, it is only produced through the signature” (99). Beardsworth reads Derrida’s analysis of the U.S. Declaration as an attempt at re-marking the impossible recognition of temporality. Only violence can compensate for such a “disjointure of time” (99). The violence of time is, once again, a product of the violence of the law. It is the violence of the law which fixes itself in history to, for instance, create the United States as a nation which will not be predicated on any prior law. It is through such an intervention, an intervention of the law, in the field of the law, that time begins, that temporality can be inscribed (once a particular event has thus been validated). The fixation of time, writes Beardsworth, is dependent on the writing of the law. What all this negates, however, is the aporia of time, the primordial undecidability of the temporality of the act (as act and as time), the possibility of the act outside time. For Derrida, temporality, and its ideology of the present moment or of the future to come affirmed through law, always arrive late, but never too late to discriminate between several modalities of action (which are selected to become one act of decision), and finally place an event in (its) time. As Beardsworth affirms, “in contrast to the metaphysical reduction of the passage of time to presence, reflection upon the political necessitates reflection upon the irreducibility of time” (101), that is to say, reflection upon the aporia of both time and law.

     

    For Beardsworth, democratic political practice requires a return to the aporia of time. Returning to the aporia of time, to the time when time does not take place, to the originary impossibility (since it does not allow time to take a unique predestined path) which is, at the same time, a cradle of possibilities, is, to use a terminology mobilized by Derrida in some of his recent work on Marx (Specters of Marx), a “promise of lesser violence.” This promise, democratic and (purely) ethical in its (almost ideal) character, casts a singular perspective on current political realities which, as Beardsworth believes, are increasingly violent and “depoliticized” (48). Towards the end of his study (end of Chapter 3 and conclusion), Beardsworth indeed returns to more obvious and direct concerns with contemporary politics (questions of violence, democracy, the proliferation of technology). By doing so, Beardsworth also reveals more overtly his democratic ambitions, his own political stakes.

     

    As noted before, Beardsworth may be lauded for demonstrating a unique understanding of Derrida’s writing. By weaving different philosophies together to the point where they self-deconstruct, Beardsworth is careful not to do violence to Derrida’s text. His style is that of supplementation, a mode of writing which offers itself as an enhancement of Derridean analyses and, as such, pays homage to the “method” of deconstruction without banalizing it. While it leaves the Derridean text intact, Beardsworth’s writing nevertheless reveals a lot about the author’s desire to build a democratic theory on Derridean precepts. The conclusion is particularly telling of such a tendency, even though “traces” of it can be found throughout the text (when, for example, the author slides from the term political to ethical, or from law to politics; the link between law and politics is taken for granted and rarely questioned). Beardsworth reveals his own “promise of democracy” by exposing his fear of technology, or, as he puts it, the lack of a Derridean articulation between the aporia of law and time and the growing phenomenon of technological globalization. Faced with the “spectralization” of the human experience of time, that is to say, the exponential configuration/acceleration of time caused by visual and virtual technologies (something that Derrida notes but does not theorize according to Beardsworth) as one of the most recent forms of the violence of late-modernity (it is violent because technology and speed force one to revise the meaning of the finite and the infinite, the relation of the individual subject with regard to the past, the present, and the future), Beardsworth hopes that the Derridean aporia can be of use as a way of maintaining the promise of democracy in a late-modern era (153). However, Beardsworth does not yet specify how this can be done without reading Derrida outside his text (which, in itself, would be reappropriation and violence). Furthermore, Beardsworth appears to be blind to the fact that even the most complex and “spectral” technologies can themselves be aporetic, providing against their wishes perhaps a fundamental instability and undecidability (the originary uncertainty which characterizes the Internet, for example, comes to mind). Faced with the fear of technics, Beardsworth falls back into a form of logocentrism, where the question becomes one of protecting the human subject at all costs from the potential alienation caused by technology (and the system of objects). Beardsworth does so because he cannot explicitly find in Derrida a politics of technology that suits his democratic objectives (155).

     

    Despite this awkward supplementation at the end, which to some extent undoes Beardsworth’s own project, Derrida & the Political is one of the best explorations of the political inside Derrida’s writing that has been produced of late. For political scholars and students in particular, and for cultural wanderers operating at the frontiers between philosophy and the human sciences in general, the presentation of the Derridean figure of aporia reveals the “promise” of discourses less concerned with forming durable regimes of truthful and certain knowledge, and more open to and careful about their own modalities of writing.

     

  • Intimate Bureaucracies & Infrastructuralism: A Networked Introduction to Assemblings

    Craig Saper

    Deparment of English
    University of Pennsylvania
    csaper@ccat.sas.upenn.edu

     

    In the second half of the twentieth century, artists, writers, and printers started many alternative distribution networks for their experimental art and literature. They supplemented or ignored the gallery system with direct mailings and other innovative ways to reach their audiences and collaborators. During the 1960s, these alternative networks became the driving force of a new artworld scene that encouraged works difficult to classify or hang on a wall. By the early 1970s, distribution networks depended on the periodic mailings of very small editions, 50-500 copies, collected in folios, bound volumes, and boxes of original artist’s print, texts, pages, books, and textual-objects. These assemblings require that each book maker, visual poet, media artist, or printer send the entire run of his or her contribution to an assembler or compiler who, in turn, distributes the collection to subscribers or sometimes simply to all participants.

     

    Often consisting of visual and concrete poems, rubber-stamp art, xerography, small three-dimensional found-art, fine-press printing, re-cycled or détourned cartoons and advertisements, mock examples of mass produced printed objects, hand-drawn scribbles and pictures, etc., the assemblings are extremely difficult to describe in terms of a single medium’s form or structure or as art or craft. Many of these collections consist of a single page from each participant. Significantly, iconoclastic and personal code systems as well as the common practice of parody and allusion make the network, rather than the internal workings of the texts, the key reference of these works.

     

    In the 1990s, many of the people involved in mail-art networks began producing multimedia magazines on the World Wide Web. “Home pages” and electronic “‘zines” depend on making links to other sites on the Internet. Each page, even corporate pages, link to and assemble other groups’ or individuals’ work. The pages link according to the logic of amateur discoverers. “Here’s what I found,” they say. As with earlier assemblings and networks, the sense of a potentially infinite web appears as a salient characteristic of these electronic forms. As with the artists’ networks, the participants in the World Wide Web also seem to cherish an intimacy between visitors and the assemblers of the page. The seemingly inevitable iconoclastic personality of each site makes it too difficult to imagine other ways to code and construct these pages. Much of the fetishism of artisan production appears in the electronic forms of assemblings. Although they depend on extremely limited and constrained design parameters, the designers try to add their own personal twists. The pages’ codes reflect the play within this huge impersonal system with bureaucratic routing instructions, the iconoclasm of the site, and the intimacy between visitors and “home” sites. While comparing the Web to a medium like film or video makes it difficult to examine this type of social-aesthetic interplay, comparing the Web to assemblings and mail-art networks helps to highlight this interplay. Because the alternative artists’ networks examine the same fears and hopes found in many descriptions of the information super-highway, we can learn about the electronic web’s potential from studying the assemblings’ codes.

     

    The attention to artists’ magazines and electronic on-line ‘zines has further encouraged the growth of these works and networks. Chuck Welch estimates the number of mail-art participants at around six thousand in 1993; that number does not include the many more who buy ‘zines at newsstands. Because these magazines inherently offer a forum for discussions about this type of work, much of the secondary literature resides within the community of these artists. For example, in an issue of Arte Postale! Vittore Baroni has written one of the most complete histories of mail-art, but only subscribers or collectors have access to this treatise. A flirtation with more ambitious summaries, analyses, and definitions has emerged among current participants. The special issue of the popular RE/Search magazine dedicated to “ZINES!” also includes a détourned photograph of the editor of one magazine, Mystery Date, with the cartoon-like voice balloon exclaiming, “SURRENDER TO THE INCREDIBLY STRANGE URGE…TO CREATE YOUR OWN ZINE!” This issue, and Mike Gunderloy’s earlier The World of Zines: A Guide to the Independent Magazine Revolution, mark the increasing interest in low-budget self-produced magazines, as well as a cross-over of these works from ‘zines, networks, and assemblings to a wider audience.

     

    From April 17 through June 27, 1997, the Van Pelt Library at the University of Pennsylvania will host an extensive exhibition of assemblings, “Networking Artists & Poets: Assemblings from the Ruth and Marvin Sacker Archive of Concrete & Visual Poetry.” In conjunction with the exhibit, a series of talks and demonstrations and a compilation of Web sites will help give visitors an opportunity to experience these works. In keeping with the “networked” characteristic of these works, this essay can function as the curator’s introduction to the exhibit.

     

    Except for one notable exception, which began in the first half of the twentieth century–Feuillets Inutiles (and perhaps Spawn, begun in 1917)–and issued compilations from the late 1920s through the middle of the 1930s, most of these assemblings began as part of the underground art scene in the second half of the twentieth century. Of course, Dada publications, like Marcel Duchamp’s The Blind Man, hinted at collaborative efforts with claims such as: “The second number of The Blind Man will appear as soon as You have sent sufficient material” (qtd. in Perkins 15). The editors did not turn the magazines into artworks in themselves, unlike assemblings.1 General histories of underground, experimental, and neo-avant-garde activities during the 1960s and 70s include only peripheral discussions about these crucial distribution systems. When future scholars examine the sensibility appearing during those years, and how it influenced later Web sites and e-zines, the work on texts somewhere between visual art, literary text, and performance will prove essential.

     

    In the late 1970s, punk ‘zines appeared in England as a fanzine variant of assemblings. Dick Hebdige writes that “the existence of an alternative punk press demonstrated that it was not only clothes or music that could be immediately and cheaply produced from the limited resources at hand.” These works allowed for a “critical space within the subculture itself to counteract the hostile or at least ideologically inflected coverage which punk was receiving in the media” (111). These punk ‘zines’ attitude grew from concerns shared by the Situationists with their forerunners the Lettrists. Greil Marcus traces the lineage from the Situationist aesthetic to the punk movement; later I will trace the historical development of these Lettrist and Situationist tendencies in assemblings.

     

    The two most significant factors of these punk ‘zines involved their production practices and their attitude toward readers. Punk ‘zines were published without editorial interference. “Typing errors and grammatical mistakes, misspellings and jumbled paginations were left uncorrected in the final proof. Those corrections and crossings out that were made before publication were left to be deciphered by the reader” (Hebdige 111). This slipshod aesthetic produced a sense of urgency and immediacy. These publications wanted to make readers into music makers, ‘zine publishers, and protesters rather than passive consumers. The most important sign of punk’s impact had as much to do with a diagram printed in the fanzine Sniffin Glue as it did with a particular concert. Sniffin Glue, with its irreverent title and attitude, achieved the highest circulation of the punk periodicals. The diagram showed “three finger positions on the neck of a guitar over the caption: ‘Here’s one chord, here’s two more, now form your own band’” (Hebdige 112). The most influential punk group, The Sex Pistols, played few concerts; the band members hated each other and much of their own music; yet their punk pose, flaunting raw, simple music challenged others to start bands. Much like the underground art scene’s assemblings, the punk ‘zines captured this “do it yourself” attitude and allowed for a positive spin on a cultural movement that mainstream media only described as a scourge, threat, or oddity. Considering punk music’s re-emergence in the form of grunge rock and more recently neo-punk, it is not surprising that the number of ‘zines has also rapidly increased since the late 1980s.

     

    This attitude that everyone is an artist also appears in the conceptual work of Fluxus, which helped motivate the emergence of mail art networks and assemblings with activities like their “flux-post” stamps and mailings. Many assemblings began because of the Fluxus influence. For example, the editor of ART/LIFE, Joe Cardella, worked with Alison Knowles and Yohima Wada at the Fluxus influenced performance space “The Kitchen” before he began his assembling. Not only did the “flux kits” serve as a model for boxed assemblings, but the Fluxus invention of fictitious organizations and official codes and stamps greatly influenced the attitude of some of these assemblings. In her discussion of conceptual artists’ books Johanna Drucker2 suggests a socio-political dimension of publication and distribution practices by coining the phrase “democratic multiples” (69). This type of work began with Fluxus, CoBrA, Lettrist, and Situationist work,3 and in assemblings we see this same spirit everywhere. In the first issue of Libro Internacional (1976, compiled by Edgardo-Antonio Vigo, Argentina), the influential mail artist Guglielmo Cavellini constructs a poem relevant to this democratic impulse. He prints his version of the ten commandments on a sticker of the Italian flag. The commandments instruct one to avoid being part of the history of art and modern art and not to glorify one’s art or art movement. The last commandment reads: “thou shalt not publish the story of thy past present and future history, nor shalt thou write it in diverse and sundry places such as thy personal clothing, other human bodies, bolts of cloth, columns, and so forth.” In the first issue of Arte Postale! (1979), Vittore Baroni’s introduction states that “the only way to get a copy of ‘arte-postale’ is contributing by sending a mail-art work or publication in exchange. Special contributors send 100 words size A4 and get a free subscription to 5 issues of the magazine.” One very influential assembling, Commonpress, is named after this effort at producing work by “common effort.” The coordinator of the assembling, Pawel Petasz, even invites readers to volunteer to edit special issues.4 In an interview, Baroni confesses that he started his assembling because he “needed something readily available to trade with other networkers,” so he followed the lead of other mail-artists and started his own periodical (Janssen 3). An advertising slogan for ART/LIFE captures the democratic spirit by offering the participant to “become a page in art history in your own time.” 5

     

    Drucker explains that a similar move toward democratization occurred at first in artists’ books because of the new inexpensive modes of reproduction available in post WWII Europe and America. Fluxus member George Brecht staged mail art events that resembled the famous Happenings. As the artists increasingly became engaged with conceptual art rather than traditional media or forms, they looked for alternative forms of expression. They soon found that the concept of “multiples,” as opposed to the unique art object, offered a fascinating way to criticize the aura or place of a work of art. By definition the printed book did not have an original in the same way that an oil painting does. Drucker notes that with a relatively wider audience, the conceptual artists had to confront the problem of an audience left “baffled by…esoteric and complex conceptual terms” (Drucker 80). In fact, she argues that the artistic vision of some of the artists’ books never quite came to terms with their ideal of liberating the body politic. The conceptual book artists needed to make and find an audience. To do so, they started several institutions, including Printed Matter, which sells mass produced multiples of books and periodicals with over 100 copies; Franklin Furnace, which recently sold its collection to the Museum of Modern Art; the Visual Studies Workshop, which the book-art critic Joan Lyons founded; NEXUS Press in Atlanta; and the Nova Scotia College of Art and Design, which has helped publish a number of important conceptual book works. Many of the printers and conceptual artists also looked to assemblings as a distribution and publicity system. For example, one editor of an assembling introduces a compilation by writing that “neither the editor nor the publisher feels this project will make any money, but it might well attract some press attention” (Bowles).

     

    The premiere issue of Running Dog One and Done (1976) is packaged in a portfolio with a silhouette reproduction of Muybridge’s running greyhound from 1879 on the cover. The contents include photocopy montages, concrete poems, and other texts on single sheets of loose pages. The letter from the editor, Michael Crane, notes that “the attempt of this publication is to present the documents of the experiments and explorations artists are undertaking today on an international level.” He explains that the unbound pages allow readers to “recycle the pages within their own information systems.” The introduction and the cover art point to a shared interest among participants in assemblings returning to a situation in which artists function more as experimenters, where information is produced to encourage and facilitate sharing. The work should feel as if it is taken from a journal of experimentation. The gallery system cannot compete with faster distribution systems that treat art as experiment rather than as masterpiece.

     

    The interest in manipulating distribution systems came by the end of the twentieth century to resemble a new form of art in itself–networked art. Nam June Paik, in his play on Karl Marx’s world-changing phrase, “seize the means of production,” emblematizes Fluxus’ concern to democratize networks. He says, “Marx: Seize the production-medium. Fluxus: Seize the distribution-medium!” This attitude led to great interest in mail-art systems. A fine example of mail art is Ben Vautier’s “postman’s choice,” which consists of a postcard with two identical sides. The sender fills in each side with two different names and addresses. The postman then has the choice of delivery. This work uses the open structural parameters of a system (mail) to run a humorous experiment.

     

    Assemblings allude to a socio-poetic practice and call for some type of network analysis. To describe these practices and analyses, alluding to the network artists’ penchant for playing on authoritative codes or terms, I use the term infrastructuralism. While structuralism is concerned with signs and sign systems, infrastructuralism is the study of system signs, socio-poetics, and conceptual-traffic patterns. The poets and artists involved in assemblings use many of the techniques of modernist poetics, but they especially cherish the dry wit involved in making fun of authoritative terms, official sounding institutional names, and the trappings of academic research. The Neoists, for example, invented a name that both spoofed and bettered any effort at riding the wave of the next new thing or neo-old thing. Infrastructuralism, with its connotations of bridges and roads as well as its apparent extension of structuralism, participates in this gentle caricature of the latest method even as it offers a serious and valuable methodology. A literal version of this motif or preoccupation with infrastructure, the assembling 8 X 10 includes a work by Robert Cummings analyzing sections of Los Angeles street maps. Cummings, once associated with mail art networks, withdrew in 1973 after writing a letter (which later appeared in FILE 2.3 [1979]) explaining that “The quick-copy mail art may pass in Vancouver or San Francisco as art, but wherever, it’s not worth the paper it’s on, nor the ink either; the utmost in idle activity” (qtd. in Banana, “Mail Art Canada” 252).6 A fascinating translation of concrete poetry into infrastructural poetry is “poemparades” by G.J. de Rook, which appears in AH (issue 8, 1967, compiled by Herman Damen). These “poemparades” consist of two photos of masses of people in a parade formation spelling out words and images in Chinese. This smirking seriousness is a defining characteristic of networked art. Conscious of readers, fascinated with bureaucratic collectivities, and aware of the serious value of a sense of humor, the networked artist often produces Janusian works.

     

    Impasses To Interpretation, or What An Assembling Can Teach Us About Reading On The Web

     

    The assemblings and mail art distribution systems examined here do not fit neatly into an art historical context in part because the individual works in any given assembling often, and often intentionally, lack aesthetic sophistication. Even an advocate of anti-aesthetic sensibilities might argue that many of the individual texts have little value to anyone besides the sender and possibly the receiver. These works appear in the context of hundreds and thousands of individual texts, images, objects, and textual-image objects all found in assemblings, collections of mail art, visual and conceptual poetries, and potentially mass produced multiples. My analyses follow many trails through the sometimes insignificant to suggest something monumentally important that exceeds the individual works. This strategy also assigns the prominent works a different significance in the context of this sea of insignificance. In this sense, the assemblings explicitly and implicitly advocate a postmodernist counter to modernist notions of genius and great works. Few of the individual works found in assemblings represent a great achievement. Some of the works flirt with a poetry of simple recognition. Marjorie Perloff notes that this sort of “license-plate joke” poetry merely demands one glancing look for appreciation. In the assemblings, recognition only starts the process of discovering invention and genius as inherently tied to the interconnectedness of these works.

     

    This resistance of assemblings to the leveling power of mechanical and electronic reproduction, even as they make use of these mechanisms, resembles the modernist poets’ struggle with the notion of genius while yielding to the initiative of (popular) languages. Network artists attempt more modestly to stave off homogenization, though they nonetheless wallow in the systems and mechanisms of mass distribution. Out of this and other peculiarities of networked art and poetry will spring an interpretive methodology unlike literary and art theories used to interpret individual texts and those texts’ individual contexts. Networked analysis and infrastructuralism refer both to the study of a particular type of networked art and literature and to a type of analysis which emerges from studying these networks. A number of interpretive impasses appear as soon as one begins examining these materials.

     

    1. Circumstantiality

     

    In describing one common paranoid schizophrenic symptom, clinicians use the term “circumstantiality.” That term describes the inability to edit out an overwhelming mass of trivial or irrelevant details which stymies the ability to stick to a topic or express a central idea. Read as an aesthetic strategy, circumstantiality appears in a comedy routine by Gilda Radner. Her character, Roseanne Roseannadana, begins her meandering stories with the pretext of giving a special news report on cultural events. She never quite gets to the point. Beginning a report about returning Christmas gifts, for example, she discusses her surprise at finding Bo Derek right in front of her in line. She notices that the movie star had a hair sticking out of her nose. She adds to this that she fantasized about pulling two more hairs out of her nose, making a braid, and putting a bead on them [in the style of Derek’s braided hair in the movie 10]. When the anchorman interrupts her absurdly irrelevant discussion, she quotes her uncle Dan Roseannadana who “always said, ‘if it’s not one thing, it’s another.’” Radner’s routine parodies the traditional news essay and also suggests a hilarious alternative. Circumstantiality as a joke allows for the realization that we usually edit out the morass of details when we want to “communicate” an idea, story, a point, or what have you.

     

    The mass of details in an assembling functions much like linguistic fetishes substituting for the loss of any central meaning. Readers cannot attend to everything; instead, they inevitably read and watch in the same way analysts listen: askew. Quickly they learn that to look for a central idea is not only frustrating, but also not particularly productive as an interpretive method. Using the analogy of circumstantiality to guide an interpretation allows readers of these often daunting works to appreciate the function of effects in terms of a social-aesthetic disruption or change. It will not help a reader to appreciate or cure an artist’s pathologies. The analogy highlights the significance of what appears explicitly and intentionally as a random compilation of many unrelated artists’ and poets’ works in assemblings.

     

    2. On-Sendings and Fanzines

     

    Another impasse for interpretation exists in the unique ways the network challenges authorship. Ray Johnson, the most influential mail artist, founded the New York Correspondance School (other artists invented variations–for instance, Glen Lewis’ Corres Sponge Dance School, started around 1970). Ed Plunkett, who actually coined the name, explains that “it was a reference to the ‘New York School,’ meaning the leading group of mostly abstract painters that flourished then” (qtd. in Filliou 7).7 This type of work always had a (parodic) connection to the vanguards of abstract painting. May Wilson, who also participated in Johnson’s School, explains that “Correspondence is spelled correspondance…the truth for Ray Johnson is not correspondence to actuality (verisimilitude), but is correspondence of part to part (pregnant similarities that dance)” (W. Wilson 54).8 His correspondence art has an implicit epistemology: a fan’s paranoid logic. This is the logic examined in the next section.

     

    Johnson initiated a practice called “on-sendings.” An on-sending involves an incomplete or unfinished artwork sent to someone, who, in turn, completes the work by sending it on with some additions to another participant in the network. The on-sending also creates the first (putatively) real network because the art depends on each link in the chain. These chains began when artists wanted to avoid the gallery system and art market. The gift exchanges evolved into more elaborate networks, but, in this case, remained relatively small circles of participants. This gift giving is reminiscent of the Lettrists’ interest in Potlatch (the name of their journal). The cultish gift exchanges soon led Johnson to explore the fan’s logic, and he increased his manipulation of the participants.

     

    Johnson would often involve famous artists, like Andy Warhol, as well as literary and art critics in his on-sendings. Another variant of this process asked the participant to send the work back to Johnson after adding to the image. Much of his mail art and on-sending consisted of trivial small objects not quite profound enough to be called “found-objects.” These on-sendings were part of the stuff previously excluded from art-galleries. He became famous for his repetition of a bunny-head character. These identical hand-drawn bunny-headed representations of famous people, each with its own caption, suggested that one could substitute any head as long as you included famous or personally significant names. The characteristic look of these bunny heads also suggested that portraiture represented an artist’s trademark as much if not more than the subject painted. His earlier collage works that included prints of James Dean and Elvis Presley found him a small place in the history of early Pop art, but the later work moved off the canvas and into conceptual work involving participants’ own desires. Clive Phillpot mentions that his later work is witty and demonstrates superb graphic skill.

     

    Because all his portraits are identical, his name-dropping stands out, as the reader inevitably associates the name under the picture with the identical image. The readers care about the big “names” even as they laugh at the absurdity of that interest considering the endless serial repetition. Johnson’s fascination with celebrity also manifests itself in his mail from fan clubs like the “Shelley Duval Fan Club.” Other clubs included: Marcel Duchamp Fan Club, the Jean Dubuffet Fan Club, and the Paloma Picasso Fan Club, as well as the Blue Eyes Club (and its Japanese division, Brue Eyes Club), and the Spam Radio Club. He even advertised meetings in newspapers, much to the surprise of the “genuine” fans. The kind of celebrity watching and stalking that Johnson is examining here pokes fun at artworld celebrity seeking. The lineage of assemblings from fanzines suggests another level of satire. Johnson’s work inevitably comments on fanzine-like networks and assemblings; his work takes these connections literally for figurative purposes. They put the reader in an uncomfortable position by highlighting the participants’ fan-like fascinations and identifications. For example, in his on-sendings, he challenges the participants not just to “participate,” but to resist sending the artwork on to a famous artist like Andy Warhol. The work points out just how difficult it is not to want to associate your scribbles with a work completed by a celebrity.

     

    The term “fan” re-emerges in common usage in the twentieth-century, but the word derives from the Latin fanum, a temple for prophets, and refers to the priests who flagellated themselves into a frenzy of inspiration. It appears in isolated instances during the 17th century, and becomes a more important term in the late 18th century as the threat to enlightenment. One study of fanaticism argues that the pejorative sense of the term appears only in the context of tolerance and tolerant societies. One is only a fanatic when certain intense behaviors are no longer considered appropriate (see Haynal, Molnar, and Puymège). Even though they share the same denotation, the usage “fan” has a different connotation from “fanatic.” The term “fan” conjures an isolated pathetic character idolizing stars, celebrities, or even genres of film, television, and literature like science fiction. We might think of the science fiction fans with their fanzines like Spockanalia. The fanzine began as a marketing ploy of Hollywood studios in the 1920s as part of their publicity machine. In the 1930s, fanzines produced by fans begin appearing. By the 1940s a new twist to these ‘zines appears. The Amateur Press Associations produce a type of science fiction collection of works by fans that will have an enormous impact on conceptual art especially during the late 1960s and early 1970s. An Amateur Press Association, usually referred to as an apa, consists of “a group of people who publish fanzines and send them to an official editor who mails a copy of each to each member in a regular bundle” (Sanders xi). The apas focus increasingly on the lives and interests of fans rather than on science fiction itself–they include “mailing comments” that do not react to sci-fi but to each other’s contributions. Soon these apa fanzines leave sci-fi behind and focus on small audiences of under a hundred. With the number of apas increasing through the 1950s, the participants in all such groups grew to include thousands (maybe even more than ten thousand). One commentator notes that these apas have a “curious blend of distance and intimacy.” That blend reappears in the conceptual art works found in mail-art and assemblings since the late sixties.

     

    The apas fanzines included written sounds, visual effects, puns (especially visual puns) irony, humor, nastiness, “fun with language,” running jokes and allusions, obscure lingo shared by the participants only, and a highly interactive feel to the works. One critic calls the atmosphere of an apa a “mail order cocktail party.” The especially “creative apas” contained poetry, drawing, and art. It was only a small step from these apas to the production of assemblings for artworld fans, those not-yet-famous artists looking for an outlet besides the absurdly restricted gallery system. In the science fiction apas, slogans like “Fandom Is A Way Of Life” and corresponding acronyms like FIAWOL or parodic comments on those acronyms like FIJAGH (“Fandom Is Just A Goddamned Hobby”) brings to mind the later use of pseudonyms and corporate names in assemblings and mail-art like The New York Correspondance School or the slogan “Mail-Art is Tourism.”

     

    A contemporary observer cannot help but notice the connection between fans and their particular type of fanaticism called stalking. The current political climate, with new national statutes defining and restricting stalking as well as increased concern on the state level, and the on-going representation of fans as stalkers in films like The Fan or King of Comedy, have highlighted the tendencies lurking in more benign forms in all fans–every one of us.9 The fan as stalker comments on the society of the spectacle in a disturbing performative criticism. While celebrities enter your home through the television, the fan returns the favor as a stalker. They challenge the one-way spectacle. If the star demands attention, then the stalking fan gives attention and demands a response. So, for example, Margaret Ray decided to pose as David Letterman’s wife. While he was away in California, she moved into his New Canaan, Connecticut house with her son, and began to live life as a celebrity’s wife. She ate meals there, drove the Porsche, and was only caught when she did not have the money for a turnpike toll. When Letterman dropped the charges, she moved back in within five days. When the police came to get her, she insisted that she tidy-up the house because Dave insists on a tidy home (“An Obsessed Fan Decides…”).

     

    Stars seek devoted and adoring fans. They send out photographs with personalized messages and their signature. Most fans understand the convention that this signature is not a personalized mark, but a signature in every other context functions as a sign of legitimation by connection to the actual person. Fans sometimes misrecognize these signs as signs of intimacy. They simply want their love requited, and when it goes unrequited, they write more letters. The typical stalker will write letters which in another context could pass for love letters. The crazed fan is perhaps the quintessential character in the late twentieth century. We see the dynamic in the films about obsessed fans mentioned above. In The Fan, the anti-hero confesses to his or her hero that “I lived my whole life for you, and you never answered me.” In fact, stalkers often begin by writing hundreds and thousands of letters to their idols. These letters often contain fetishized objects like locks of hair or pieces of skin much the same way that mail-artists send small fetishized objects to each other. Michael J. Fox and his bride received 6,000 letters with death threats from one of Fox’s fans because the fan was upset that Fox had not married her. Anne Murray received 263 phone calls in six months from a middle-aged farmer obsessed with Murray. The stars most likely to receive these letters have friendly approachable images on the screen; they are usually not the most glamorous or interesting stars.

     

    Michael Perry, who stalked Olivia-Newton John, had a fascination with her eyes and thought that her colored contact lens were a special signal to him. He eventually killed five people, including his parents, by shooting out their eyes. His fantasy also included Sandra Day O’Connor, and he was arrested in a Washington, D.C. hotel near the Supreme Court. In his hotel room, he had seven television sets–all turned on but tuned in to static and painted with eyes on the screens. The scene is reminiscent of Equus, the play in which a boy stabs out horses’ eyes. “Normal” fans do not recognize the embarrassment of the spectacle looking back at them–mocking them; the “normal” fan does not fantasize the possibility that she or he might play a role in the celebrity’s life. Normal fans give their love and attention without ever wanting anything in return: they recognize the celebrity as a god. The stalker wants his or her prayers answered.

     

    The mythic star quality of Ray Johnson himself (often referred to as “Sugar Dada”) grew as the networks increased in size. In 1970, Marcia Tucker staged the “New York Correspondance School Show” at the Whitney Museum. The show included work from 106 people–except Johnson’s own work–because he included only work sent to him. He put himself in the position of a structuring absence, and increased the desire to know more about him. Although he announced the death of the New York Correspondence School, in 1973, by sending a letter to the obituaries department of the New York Times, he soon invented Buddha University (reminiscent of Naim June Paik’s early mail-art series The University of Avant-Garde Hinduism). Playing on his tendency to drop people from his list of participants, his stamp read, “Ray Johnson has been dropped.” This sort of stamp, and the appearance of rubber stamps of Johnson’s head throughout the mail-art networks, further fueled the star frenzy. The mail-artist Honoria mentions a project in which she includes an image of herself with other images of mail-artists in a tub; the caption reads, “taking a bath with Ray Johnson.” (Honoria) In his efforts to become invisible from the art markets, he became a world-famous icon and name brand. He was so well-known as a “name” rather than as a personality, that in 1973 he was mistakenly included in a biographical dictionary of Afro-American artists. He had finally reached the status shared by Woody Allen’s Zelig. In fact, Johnson had done performances at the Fluxus AG gallery on “Nothing.” As one perverse twist on his highlighting of a fan’s logic, he would often include prints of potato mashers in his work as well, playing on that word’s other slang meaning: “a man who annoys women not acquainted with him, by attempting familiarities.” Fans were the ultimate mashers.

     

    In an article on Johnson, Clive Phillpot, the former director of New York’s Museum of Modern Art’s special collection of book and mail-art, mentions the last twist in Johnson’s effort to play through this perverse fan’s logic–the logic that fuels the art markets as well as the society of the spectacle–by calling or writing strangers. I think I received one of Johnson’s calls after publishing an article on the use of Fluxus strategies in University education. I do not know how he got my number, but one day my answering machine had a message on it (“Ray Johnson, Ray Johnson, Ray Johnson”); I did not recognize the voice, and at first was flattered. Then, when I could not figure out who called me, it began bothering me. Who actually called? How did they find me? Why did they call? What do they want? And, if it is actually Johnson, then what should I do with the tape-recording? Is this an artwork? Should I salvage the tape? What does this mean? Johnson (or some surrogate) had electronically mashed me. About two years later, Ray Johnson committed suicide–somehow not very surprising, considering his “suicide” of the New York Correspondence School and his book A Book About Death. With his typical flair he turned the sad occasion into a morbid joke and event. The New York Times ran a series of articles sifting through the details of his staging of the suicide, including a postcard sent to his home address that arrived the day after his suicide; it read: “If you are reading this, then Ray Johnson is dead.”10

     

    John Lennon often participated with Yoko Ono in Fluxus work and events. In issue number 7 of Aspen (1968, “The British Box”), Lennon includes a facsimile of his diary for 1968. Because of his status as a star, one rushes to read it carefully for any new information. This parodic use of “everyday life” appears in “The Lennon Diary” in which all the entries read: “Got up, went to work, came home, watched telly, went to bed.” The entries get increasingly scrawled, and the diary ends with one last “memorandum” that says, “Remember to buy Diary 1969.” In some ways, then, the repetition of the same everyday events plays a joke on the fan’s narcissistic identification with a star. One cannot avoid the urge, and the joke depends on that uncomfortable recognition and deflation of the pay-off. The other reading of the diary is that it parodies the boredom of everyday life in a Situationist send-up of the promise of change in the “society of the spectacle.” Like much of the work in assemblings, this is at first just a joke of recognition: you simply get the joke and move on. Its other meanings seep in more slowly.

     

    These works attack not just the art world’s production of celebrities as a marketing device, but also the way this marketing depends on the fantasies of other artists including those in alternative art groups. To break the narcissistic link between the participant and the celebrity may in fact be impossible; Johnson’s jokes depend on the link remaining strong. When you look at one of his serial images of basically identical bunny-like faces captioned by various famous names, or you are asked to function as the middle relay for a work involving Johnson and a celebrity, you laugh only if you recognize your own investment in this game. Otherwise, you simply discard the junk mail, fail to subscribe to the assemblings, and focus your narcissistic fascinations on other stars. You cannot simply disentangle personal desire from mass culture; there is no utopian outside for Johnson. His work challenges particular forms of celebrity and identity formation. On-sendings are not benign.

     

    Because the works depended on both reproducibility and on-sending, the notion of authorship was not merely disrupted by implicit problems with deciding about intention, but with the explicit disruption of that category. At the least, at the moment of the on-sending, everyone participated in authoring and reading. In assemblings the individual works often have signatures and sometimes even numbered prints or multi-media objects. Yet, when the works appear together in a compiled package, the works refer to each other and to other related assemblings and networks. It is not that authorship falls prey to a reader’s solipsism. It changes into a more fluid notion of production and consumption. The distinction between artists and spectators blurs not because of the open-ended-ness of interpretation, but because of the effort to build-in interactive game-like structures of discovery and play. Compilers, for example, function both as readers and as writers when they assemble work, package it, and send it back to the participants involved. Receiving this assembled package in the mail makes the participants join in the pleasures involved in discovery and relay. Once the participants begin joining in a number of assemblings, they often allude to other works in other assemblings. In fact, this article might function as a type of on-sending as it links to other sites and pages that then supplement and send-on the work in different contexts.

     

    3. Network Coverage

     

    The phrase “network coverage” probably conjures images of a nightly news broadcast rather than innovative artists’ and mail artists’ magazines. The irony of that situation is not completely coincidental. These assemblings explicitly respond to the distribution of words and images through gallery systems and in mass media. They respond to the lack of distribution systems for experimental work in the “media.” Some of this work responds to the art scene and some to the larger cultural scene’s or mass media’s exclusions and limits.

     

    The term “coverage” in museums, galleries, and academia usually refers to the research model of a scholar covering a field of study with a theory of explanation and corresponding descriptions of major works in that field. In the context of mail art and artists’ magazines, the term is somewhat ironic. The very form of these works challenges the coverage model with an information explosion that threatens the coverage paradigm, not only because of the elastic and ever-expanding number of these collaborative works, but also because authorship is often difficult to determine. In fact, Robert Filliou, associated with Fluxus, coined the term “eternal network,” often used to describe the mail-art networks, to describe the contemporary situation in which no one person can command all knowledge in any field; his article appeared in 1973 in the assembling FILE. The phrase describing the networks defines it as the chronicle of this failure of the coverage model.

     

    Assemblings propose another coverage model. Each assembling covers a mobile and changing network of artists and poets for a transitory moment even as it marks that moment for use by other readers at a later date. Each of these assemblings functions as a kind of relay system. Network coverage, in this sense, suggests a new way of understanding art and poetic practices which began flourishing in the last third of the twentieth century. From the perspective of the 21st century, may look like experiments in networked productions. They may, that is, have a similar impact and produce similar consequences as the rise of the novel in the 18th century.

     

    4. Unreadability (condensed version)

     

    The work found in assemblings tends to share one trait. It challenges any participant/receiver to figure out how to begin to read an assembling. In an historical context, the assemblings do seem to share a combination of lineages. From that history, a participant/receiver/reader can begin to find appropriate reading practices if not definitive meanings. To understand how “unreadability” becomes readable as an aesthetic opportunity requires a summary of the poetics involved. These poetic tendencies include concrete poetry as a break with “mainstream” expressive poetries, visual poetry as an effort to expand language systems, and conceptual art strategies as an intervention in everyday life. Through all of these tendencies, the problem of identifying the tone of these works makes the interpretation more complicated. Often these works’ meanings depend on the reader to recognize parodies, jokes, and a masquerade with the trappings of mass distribution systems like the post office and corporations. The tone of these works often presents many levels of meaning with important implications for interpretation. Besides these tendencies, the socio-poetics of networking also has important implications for ways of reading the unreadable assemblings.

     

    5. Craft as Conceptual Art

     

    Assemblings represent a special place in twentieth century art because they chart the emergence of craft in the age of mass production. The artists flaunt their fetishism of print and book-making alongside their fascination with huge bureaucratic systems of production and distribution. The artists cherish the production of carefully constructed individualized visual poems and constructions as well as the insistence that readers recuperate, re-cycle, plagiarize, and forever alter these codes and messages.

     

    In his study of modernist visual poetics, Jerome McGann argues that the “history of modernist writing could be written as a history of the modernist book” (McGann 77). In making and persuasively supporting this claim, McGann also opens the door to exploring other art and poetic practices as crafted and constructed objects. He explains how two small presses in particular, Kelmscott Press and Bodley Head, influenced modernist poetic practices by their emphasis on visual design over and above “legibility” (77). These practices also wanted to appeal to, as well as create, a particularly modern and aesthetically inclined audience. This interest in the printed page as an object found important practitioners not only in the later postmodern Concrete Poetry, but in Louis Zukofsky’s poetry. He initiated the interest in considering poetry as a “musical score” and an “aspiration…toward the condition of music” (83). Here again, the modernist precursors point toward the poetic compositions that resemble musical scores in concrete and visual poetry as well as the scores, instructions, and games found in assemblings. Ken Friedman explains how to perform a Fluxus event score:

     

    You can perform a Fluxus event in virtuoso or bravura style, and you can perform it jamming each piece into the minimal time possible as Ben Vautier does, or go for a slow, meditative rhythm as Alison Knowles does, or strike a balance as you'll see in the concerts organized by Dick Higgins or Larry Miller. Pieces can have a powerful torque, energized and dramatic, as in the work of Milan Knizak, the earthly folkloric touch seen in Bengt af Klintberg's pieces, or the atmospheric radiance, spiritual and dazzling, that is seen in Beuys's work. (Friedman, par. 4)

     

    McGann, focusing on American modernist poets, examines the usually overlooked work of Robert Carlton (“Bob”) Brown’s Readies for Bob Brown’s Machine. In that work Brown wanted to “immerse the reader in the print medium, much as the viewer is immersed in images at the cinema” (McGann 85). The modernist poetics of the page gain in intensity in postmodern poetry. McGann focuses on Language writing as the “key index of postmodern scene of writing” (88); that poetry uses a “textual process for revealing the conventions, and the conventionalities, of our common discursive formations” (107). This suggestion that the postmodern poetry emphasizes the social conventions of writing through the concrete visual construction also speaks to the further expansion and intensification of this process in assemblings. McGann summarizes these social concerns by discussing the implications of this writing’s “ironic self-representation,” that “situates poet and poem firmly in the social, institutional, and even the economic heart of things…an imagination of writing that knows it inhabits a world ruled by Mammon” (108). As Charles Bernstein writes, this poetry “flaunts its core idea as candy coating.” (Bernstein 380) McGann goes on to examine contemporary small presses, like Burning Deck, The Figures, Jargon, and Roof, in order to argue that in these presses’ publications (as well as throughout postmodern poetry) “writing is necessarily imagined as part of a social event of persons” (McGann 113).

     

    Charles Bernstein’s “Lift Off” demonstrates the way poetic practices capture this “social event.” To describe this process, McGann inserts a second narrative voice into his book. This disgruntled and humorous narrator describes Bernstein’s poem as a transcription of everything lifted off a page with a correction tape. The more earnest narrator remains unflappable and suggests that his (or her) reading also describes how Bernstein’s poem “foregrounds the machinery of writing” (McGann 109). For the suspicious narrator, it literally foregrounds the machinery, while for the more Apollonian narrator it figuratively foregrounds this process. In the work of assemblings individual pages or poems mean less than the distribution and compilation machinery. The assembling reader finds threads of the social connections as if receiving something “illegible,” but visual and poetically allusive and suggestive. Assemblings function as model and tool kits for both building and spoofing “a world ruled by Mammon” or at least Mammon’s corporate bureaucracy in webs and networks.

     

    Notes

     

    1. Held argues that “The first publication I know of to reflect the assembling sensibility was the cooperative periodical Spawn, initiated in East Orange, New Jersey, in 1917. In the March issue (1.3), the editorial stated that, “Spawn is the embodiment of an idea and is co-operative in the strictest sense of the word. Each man pays for his page and is absolutely responsible for what goes on it. Spawn is a magazine in name only…. It has no ax to grind or propaganda to propound.”

     

    2. Drucker is not only the premiere scholar in the study of book arts, having produced the first substantive book-length studies of these works, but is also an accomplished book artist.

     

    Editor’s Note: This issue of Postmodern Culture contains an extensive interview with Drucker. See “‘Through Light and the Alphabet’: An Interview with Johanna Drucker”.

     

    3. For an historical account of the development of CoBrA, Lettrism, and Situationism see Peter Wollen, Raiding the Ice Box: Reflections on Twentieth-Century Culture. Although Wollen focuses on the social history rather than aesthetic strategies, he does mention the importance of the “play of calligraphy” for the Lettrists (144). He also mentions the leader of the CoBrA artists’ strong criticism of Max Bill, who went on to influence the formation of Concrete Poetry.

     

    4. Pawel Patasz mentions that in Poland the censors would stamp each and every proof page of a publication on the back side of the proof. With these kinds of absurd controls, one can imagine how Commonpress began investigating these stamps of authentication.

     

    5. Joe Cardella, advertising slogan for prospective participants, ART/LIFE, 15, 11 (1995), back page.

     

    6. Also quoted in Banana’s “Corresponding Worlds: Debate and Dialogue,” Welch 189.

     

    7. The same quote appears in John Held, “Networking: the Origins of Terminology,” 17.

     

    8. The same quote appears in John Held, “Networking: the Origins of Terminology,” 19.

     

    9. The legal statute concerning stalkers in the state of Pennsylvania explains that “a person commits the crime of stalking when he engages in a course of conduct or repeatedly commits acts toward another person, including following the person without proper authority, under circumstances which demonstrate either of the following:

     

    1) an intent to place the person in reasonable fear of bodily injury;

     

    or

     

    2) an intent to cause substantial emotional distress to the person.”

     

    Pa.C.S. Ch. 27, 18 §2709 subsec. B.

     

    10. For comparison, see also D.A. Levy’s suicide while incarcerated. Levy was an important mail-artist collected by Fluxus list-maker Ken Friedman. Friedman had close ties to both of these artists. Perhaps they saw in suicide a socio-political act?

     

    Works Cited

     

    • Banana, Anna. “Mail Art Canada.” Crane and Stofflet.
    • —-. “Corresponding Worlds: Debate and Dialogue.” Welch 187-196.
    • Bernstein, Charles. “Living Tissue/Dead Ideas.” Content’s Dream, Essays 1975-1984. Los Angeles: Sun & Moon Press, 1986.
    • Bowles, Jerry G., ed. “letter from the editor.” Art Work, No Commercial Value. 1971.
    • Brown, Robert Carlton. Readies for Bob Brown’s Machine. Cagnes-sur-Mer: Roving Eye Press, 1931.
    • Crane, Michael and Mary Stofflet, eds. Correspondence Art. San Francisco: Contemporary Art Press, 1984.
    • Drucker, Johanna. The Century of Artists Books. New York: Granary Books, 1995.
    • Filliou, Robert. “Research on the Eternal Network.” FILE. 1973.
    • Friedman, Ken. “Getting Into Events,” The Fluxus Home Page : n. pag. Internet. 6 June 1996. Available URL: www.nutscape.com/fluxus/homepage/n2events.html.
    • Haynal, André, Miklos Molnar, and Gérard de Puymège. Fanaticism: A Historical and Psychoanalytical Study. Trans. Linda Butler Koseoglu. New York: Schoken Books, 1983. 20-33.
    • Hebdige, Dick. Subculture: The Meaning of Style. London & New York: Methuen, 1979.
    • Held, John. “Networking: the Origins of Terminology.” Welch 17-21.
    • Honoria. “Introducing Mail Art: A Karen Elliot Interview with Crackerjack Kid and Honoria.” Postmodern Culture. 3.2 (1993): n. pag. Online. Internet. 6 June 1996.
    • Janssen, Ruud. Interview. Assembling Magazines.
    • McGann, Jerome. Black Riders: The Visible Language of Modernism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.
    • “An Obsessed Fan Decides to Make David Letterman’s House Her Home.” People Weekly. 13 June 1988: 131.
    • Perkins, Stephen, ed. Assembling Magazines. Exhibit checklist and catalogue. Iowa City: Subspace Gallery, 1996.
    • Phillpot, Clive. “Artists’ magazines: News of the Art Strike, Monty Cantsin, and Karen Elliot.” Art Documentation (Fall 1992): 137-138.
    • Sanders, Joe, ed. Science Fiction Fandom. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1994.
    • Welch, Chuck, ed. Eternal Network: A Mail Art Anthology. Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1995.
    • Wilson, William. “NY Correspondence School.” Art and Artists. (April 1966). 54.
    • Wollen, Peter. Raiding the Ice Box: Reflections on Twentieth-Century Culture. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993.

     

  • Jumping to Occlusions

     
     
    Abstract: “Jumping to Occlusions” is perhaps the first thorough statement of a poetics of online space. In the present hypertextual trickster edition, a lively investigative language of the link is employed helping to develop this essay’s written argument through its own hypertextuality–its jumps, sidebars, graphics, embedded sound files, misleadings, and other features. This essay explores electronic technology’s opportunities for the production, archiving, distribution, and promotion of poetic texts but most importantly, argues that electronic space is a space of writing. For previous excursions into this a written terrain of links and jumps one need only look to the language experiments of certain poets writing in this century. Such poets include Gertrude Stein, Charles Olson, Robert Creeley, and Language-related experimentalists such as Charles Bernstein, Ron Silliman, and Susan Howe. Electronic writing, like previous instances of writing, engages the double “mission” of writing evident in some of this experimental poetry: to varying degrees, writing is about a subject, but also about the medium through which it is transmitted. If relevant previous poetic experiments involved the exploration of language as physical, what are the physical parameters of webbed online space? Texts move not only within themselves but into socially-charged externalities, “a webbed interference of junk mail, ‘frets’ of information, systemic failures, ephemera, disunion. There is no resting place–only the incessantly reconstituted links dissolving each time the reading is entered.” The physical features most up for grabs? These include online hypertext itself, a mass of fits and starts. Links are at the center of an electronic hypertextual writing and links introduce disjunction. This post-typographic and non-linear disunion is no news to poetics. It is through a poetics of experimental poetries that a framework is sketched and progress is made towards the building of an electronic poetics, one where experiments that changed poetic language may inform the electronic air we breathe.–lpg

     


    Proceed to Hypertext…

     

  • ‘Through Light and the Alphabet:’ An Interview with Johanna Drucker

     
     
    Abstract:Johanna Drucker’s cumulative work as a writer, printer, book artist, and scholar of visible language in all its forms has accumulated in a critical and creative corpus which is, as one observer has put it, nothing less than “a conceptual framework for the relationship between the visual arts and the written arts.” Nowhere is such a conceptual framework currently more needed than in the post-alphabetic writing spaces of electronic media–an area to which Drucker has, in fact, lately turned her attention.
     

    In this interview (conducted entirely via electronic mail) I have attempted to frame my questions so as to provide as complete an overview as possible of Drucker’s career, with particular emphasis on her recent interest in matters of the virtual. The text of the interview is accompanied by forty digital images of Drucker’s artistic work, as well as her brief catalogue essay entitled “The Corona Palimpsest: Present Tensions of the Book.”–mgk

     


    Proceed to Hypertext…

     

  • The Heimlich Home Page of Cyberspace

     
     
    Abstract: This collaborative document is a hypertextual reflection upon the politics of of sovereignty, self-hood, and community as they are embodied in three distinctive moments and formations of the social imaginary in Western capitalism: the emergence of linear perspective and the specular visual ordering of the social senses in Renaissance mercantile capitalism; the formation of imperial identity that was manifested in the rhetorical and cartographic construction and physical conquest of the “New World”; and the simulacra of virtual selves and communities of cyberspace. It explores the performative emplotment and emplacement of virtual “home pages” of identity in MOOspaces and the World Wide Web, and argues that a critical understanding of the “new frontier” of cyberspace must take into account the ways in which it uncannily restages the imperial drama of sovereignty which animated the conquest of the old frontier of America as “New World.”–ah

     


    Proceed to Hypertext…

     

  • Book Unbound*

    John Cayley

    © 1997
    PMC 7.3

     

    Book Unbound*

     

    Abstract: “Book Unbound” is a “collocational cybertext,” a self-assembling poetic collage that can be read in two ways: either automatically in the “bound” mode, or in an “unbound” mode that allows readers to extract and recycle words from its recombinant text stream. The present version is a HyperCard stack (Mac only, HyperCard program not required) available for downloading. –Editor

     


     
    Editor’s Note: “Book Unbound” is a HyperCard stack. The present version runs only on Apple Macintosh computers. Activate one of the links below to download a compressed, binary version of the stack (a self-extracting StuffIt archive). If you are using a correctly-configured graphical browser, the file should be converted and decompressed file automatically. If it does not, save the file, convert it with
    BinHex then double-click to launch the self-expanding archive. If you own a copy of HyperCard, download the stack only (120k). If you do not own HyperCard, download the stand-alone application (676k).
     


     

    Author’s Remarks

     

    “Book Unbound” is a literary object which, I believe, exemplifies certain potentialities of cybertext. 1

     

    The first version of “Book Unbound” was produced in 1995 using HyperCard for the Apple Macintosh, although I had made earlier collocational pieces in 1993. From one point of view–especially when read in its “bound” mode–“Book Unbound” is simply a text generator. As such, it employs a fairly simple algorithm, which I call “collocational” but which might also be recognized as a simple stochastic transformation. The transformation can proceed beginning with any word of the given (or source) text. Any other word–occurring at any point in the given text–which follows (collocates with) the word last chosen may then follow it and so become in turn the current word. Clearly, in this type of transformation, at the very least, each pair of successive words are two-word segments of natural English. However, the text will wander within itself, potentially branching at any point when a word that is repeated in the given text is picked, and this will most often occur when common, grammatical words are encountered.

     

    The given (or source) text of “Book Unbound” is a brief, closely-written piece concerned with the book, so-called new media, and varieties of textuality which they underwrite. In “Book Unbound” I have chosen to keep the source text hidden. Anyone who is interested to see it can either hack into the Hypercard stack or track down the catalogue of the exhibition for which it was written, “Mapping Knowledge” (curated and edited by Les Bicknell), an exhibition of book art held at The Minories Gallery, Colchester, UK, November 1994. Even when read in its “bound” mode, and starting from its initial state, I am more or less satisfied with the performance of the generative text. This performance is the “due form” of what “I” have (pre-)written or programmed, by composing the source text and applying these quasi-aleatory collocational procedures.

     

    However, “Book Unbound” has other, more interesting, potential which could be taken much further in the future work of this field. 2 Once read in its “unbound” mode and altered by a reader it becomes, in part, the work of that reader (or, if you prefer, that reading).

     

    When you open “Book Unbound” and read it in this “unbound” mode, you change it. New collocations of words and phases are generated from the given text according to the algorithm described briefly above. After each screen fills, the reader is invited to select a phrase from the generated text by clicking successively on the first and the last words from a continuous string of text. These selections are collected on the page of the book named “leaf,” where they are accessible to copying or editing. But they also become a part of the store of potential collocations from which the book goes on to generate new text. The selections feed back into the process and change it irreversibly. If the reader continues to read and select over many sessions, his or her preferred collocations may eventually come to dominate the process. The work may then reach a state of chaotic stability, strangely attracted to one particular modulated reading of its original seed text. Each reader’s copy of the work thus becomes unique: non-trivially different from every other copy.

     

    “Book Unbound” is (inevitably) an experiment with limitations. 3 For example, it is not possible to select discontinous text from one screen or from previous screens of generated language. Neither does the present work allow you to add your own new words to the total vocabulary of the piece (except to the freely editable “leaf” page). You can only select new or preferred collocations from those which are generated within its textual microverse. However, even within this defined and bounded space some interesting experiments can be performed, selecting, for example, only noun phrases, or only linguistic function words. Readers might make several copies of “Book Unbound” and train them in different ways, watching for divergences in the nature of the texts they generate, as for example, one version becomes a gallery for a small group of objects and another becomes a Steinian obsessive, possessed, let’s say, by pronouns.

     

    John Cayley
    May, 1997

     


     

    Addendum

     

    Remarks on “Book Unbound” from Espen Aarseth’s Cybertext: Perspectives on Ergodic Literature (PhD dissertation, University of Bergen, 1995; forthcoming from Johns Hopkins University Press):

     

    John Cayley's "Book Unbound" is a literary work not easily classified by traditional aesthetics... it takes over the screen and spits forth short suggestive sentences one word at a time ...

     

    The program is assembling these lines from its "hidden texts" according to certain algorithms. As the process goes on, the hidden text is changed by what is displayed, and the user can select passages for inclusion in the regenerative process. Thus the text output is influenced, and will be different for each copy of the text. Is it still the same text? Cayley calls the produced output "hologograms," fragments that contain holographic versions of the initial material....

     

    This text is an impurity, a site of struggle between medium, sign and operator. The fragments produced are clearly not authored by anyone, they are pulverized and reconnected echoes of meaning, and the meaning that can be made from them is not the meaning that once existed. "Book Unbound" is an extreme paragon of cyborg aesthetics, an illustration of the issue of communicative control. The pleasure of this text is far from accidental; it belongs not to the illusion of control, but to the suggestive reality of unique and unrepeatable signification. It would be a grave mistake to see this text as a metaphor of the "impossibility of perfect communication" or as the embodiment of the gap between sign and meaning in texts. Instead, it shows how meaning struggles to produce itself, through the cyborg activity of writing.

     

    Notes

     

    *. “Book Unbound” was also included in the CD-ROM issue, number 3, of the arts magazine, Engaged (London, 1995).

     

    1. Here, I distinguish cybertext from hypertext according to criteria first set out by Espen Aarseth in his essay, “Nonlinearity and Literary Theory” (in George Landow, ed. Hyper/Text/Theory, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1994) and refined in Cybertext: Perspectives on Ergodic Literature (forthcoming from John Hopkins University Press), and an article, “Text, Hypertext or Cybertext: a Typology of Textual Modes Using Corresponding Analysis,” forthcoming in Research in Humanities Computing, 6, ed. Susan Hockey, Nancy Ide and Giorgio Perissinotto, Oxford: Oxford University Press). Aarseth uses cybertext as a more inclusive term embracing, for example, generative or “ergodic” textuality (the latter explicitly demands work from the reader), while reserving “hypertext” for the (chiefly passive) link-node structures which are now familiar to over 50 million of (scare quotes) “us.”

     

    2. In its HyperCard version, my later work “Pressing the Code Key” employs a somewhat elaborated version of the “Book Unbound” form, although it does not address the limitations outlined below. As an essay, “Pressing the Code Key” was published in ejournal v.6, n. 1. See: http://www.hanover.edu/philos/ejournal/archive/ej-6-1.txt.

     

    3. There are also software limits to the HyperCard version, which cannot cope with text fields containing more than 32 kilobytes (about 32,000 characters or 5,000 words). Eventually, these software limitations would also be reached.

     

  • AlphaWeb

     

     

    Abstract: Alphaweb is a hypertext consisting of poetry and ruminations, graphics, and fragments of the Coriolis Codex, suggesting (but hardly conclusively) a special relationship between angels and dragons. The work has at least three interpenetrating structures, approximately 250 areas and three times that many doors and passageways. The structure that is always present for orientation is the alphabetical structure; both the poems and the angels progress from A to Z, a comfort for those who like to proceed in an orderly fashion from A to Z, or at least to B. The stability of this structure is seriously compromised by built-in folds in the alphabet; because you can link to any letter from any area, the structure can be used to demolish itself at the behest of the traveler. A prolonged wander will reveal interior structures, jointly created by author and traveler, which are the work itself. The author suggests a dark room for optimum viewing of the graphics. –drs


    Proceed to Hypertext…

     

  • Twelve Blue

     

     

    Abstract:A drowning, a murder, a friendship, three or four love affairs, a boy and a girl, two girls and their mothers, two mothers and their lovers, a daughter and her father, a father and his lover, seven women, three men, twelve months, twelve threads, eight hours, eight waves, one river, a quilt, a song, twelve interwoven stories, a thousand memories, Twelve Blue explores the way our lives–like the web itself or a year, a day, a memory, or a river–form patterns of interlocking, multiple, and recurrent surfaces.–mj

     

    Help with Reading: The story threads quite obviously along its edges, like frayed cloth, in the left window. You’ll find links there. There are passing links within the text on the right as well, but these, once followed, go away. You’ll want, I think, to open the space so all twelve threads show, diurnally (a not terribly obscure word for the weaving and unraveling of time). Their progress is measured in the stories and their occasional proximities are meaningful. The words work best with serifs and space enough (14 point is preferred). There are two hundred and sixty nine links here among ninety six spaces. Twelve blue isn’t anything. Think of lilacs when they’re gone.


    Proceed to Hypertext…

     

  • Editor’s Introduction

    Stuart Moulthrop

    School of Communications Design
    University of Baltimore
    samoulthrop@ubmail.ubalt.edu

     

    Decorating the Corpse: Hypertext After the Web

     

    Not long ago I learned that in 1997-98, two new literary prizes will be given for work in hypertext, one in the U.S. and one in Europe. When I reported this to a certain writer well versed in “new media,” I received an interesting answer. The givers of the prizes are very kind, the writer said, “but they are pinning medals on a corpse.” My correspondent thought that creative hypertext had a fine future behind it but little in the way of prospects. It was an idea whose time had been.Writers say these things. Sometimes, as in the case just mentioned, we speak from despair, fearing that the audience for serious work may be collapsing to a singularity. At other times the lament that X is lost may serve as prelude to hubris, for instance when the mourner believes that a bright and promising meta-X (of his own invention) is coming with the dawn. Writing is dead!–and not a moment too soon–long live my kind of writing! Because they can be disingenuous in this way, literary mass obituaries should never be taken at face value. The reader is warned.

     

    Yet if one has time and inclination to worry about such things, there are reasons to be concerned about hypertext. Until recently the United States had two major publishers of substantial work in new media: Eastgate Systems and the Voyager Company. After struggling to create a market for CD-ROMs with admirable production values and strong literary sensibilities, Voyager has left the field. Eastgate carries on, and other ventures, perhaps by university presses and non-U.S. firms, may compensate in some measure for Voyager’s absence. Still, the implications are troubling.

     

    No doubt the change at Voyager came for various reasons, many having little to do with the Internet, but Voyager’s withdrawal does seem to coincide neatly with the recent surge of interest in the World Wide Web. One has to wonder whether Voyager’s often exquisite products were eclipsed by offerings on the Web–from on-line ‘zines like Salon, Feed, and Suck to the more dubious prospects of “push” media and VRML. If this is the case, then we may be seeing a shift, as far as hypertext is concerned, from a commercial model of literary production:

     

    “EXPANDED BOOK” = CD-ROM =
    MARKETABLE COMMODITY

     

    to a public-service or indeed an amateur model:

     

    HYPERTEXT = WEB SITE =
    WORK OF PURE DEVOTION

     

    Postmodern Culture has an evident stake in these developments. Since our recent move to Johns Hopkins University Press and the Muse Project, back issues of the journal, formerly available to anyone with Web access, have been open only to institutional and individual Muse subscribers. (Each current issue continues in free circulation until the next issue appears.) As we explained when the change was announced, this seemed a reasonable way to cover operating costs and keep the journal alive. We knew, though, that we were swimming against the tide. As a number of our authors and readers pointed out, free availability has been a key feature of this publication. Imposing charges seems to some a betrayal. On the Web, as they would have it, information wants to be free.In response to these concerns, the Press and the editors have decided to make text-only versions of our back issues available to all. This is only a preliminary announcement; details of the new arrangement will appear in our next issue (September, 1997). It bears mentioning, though, that we are not abandoning the subscription model of on-line publishing. Subscriptions to Postmodern Culture will still be offered both individually and through Project Muse, and versions available to subscribers and non-subscribers will differ in important ways.

     

    The free archive will most likely contain full text of conventional articles minus hypertext links, search support, and other valuable features. Because they depend on more sophisticated forms of encoding, hypertext and hypermedia compositions like the contents of this special issue will almost certainly be excluded from the text-only archive. Where hypertext is concerned, some of us still prefer to go against the flow.

     

    It would be easy to mistake this perverseness for greed, common as that motive has become. The insistence on hypertext as a cash nexus (to say it bluntly) may seem in line with the rampaging commercialization of the Internet. Ever since the discovery of Web browsing as the fin de siècle“killer app,” the corporate world has been lusting after computer networks with priapistic urgency, and though pundits regularly predict a nasty end to this affair, the ardor shows no sign of cooling yet. Information wants to be free? On the dot-commons these days the buzz is rather different: info-makers want to see fees. This is a long way from pure devotion.

     

    Yet as any old cyberspace hand will tell you, it is hard to use the words hypertext and profit in the same sentence without arousing deep suspicion. In the most popular Internet business models, major revenues come not from subscriptions but from sale of advertising space. Advertising–as business has known it so far, anyway–depends on reliable, sustained audience attention, the sort of thing TV, movies, radio, and print provide quite handily. Hypertext systems foster rather different behavior. They emphasize transition and active selection of content, raising the primitive impulse of channel-surfing to something that might be called art. They challenge viewers to become interpreters, working out connections between fragments instead of relaxing into the paratactic flow. In short, hypertext does not go well with mass marketing.

     

    Mass marketing, however, remains our primary economic doctrine; so something needs to be done about hypertext (for starters) to make the Internet safe for oligopoly. This is where “push” programming and “Web channels” come in (who needs hypertext links?), where Microsoft’s absorption of WebTV starts to look like something other than amoebic reflex, and where Larry Ellison’s recent bid to turn Apple Computer into a manufacturer of dumb terminals makes a certain deeply sinister sense.

     

    In his interview with Johanna Drucker in this issue, Matthew Kirschenbaum adverts to Sven Birkerts’ attack on the “Faustian bargain” of emerging technologies. (See this and also Drucker’s response.) This argument also plays its part in the defense of the old order. Dire moralist that he is, Birkerts asks us to choose the stony but honest road to salvation. A more jaded reader, or one better informed about the current state of media, might draw a different conclusion: better the devil you know. How much more comfortable to live in a world where books are books, television is television, and so is the World Wide Web. Why learn to surf when it’s it’s so delicious to drown? As for hypertext, leave that to the hobbyists.

     

    Hypertext is a strange kind of hobby, though. Pursued for purposes of art or inquiry, hypertext is a vexation, a disorderly practice. As the projects collected in this issue demonstrate, this sort of writing calls us back to fundamental questions about language, meaning, structure, and authority that have long been part of the postmodern agenda; but we come to these questions in practice as well as theory, and in the marketplace and classroom as well as the library. To be sure, Messrs. Gates, Murdoch, Ellison and company will not lose much sleep over the contents of this issue, but that does not mean these texts are insignificant or futile, mere posthumous campaign ribbons for the celebrated corpse.

     

    Whatever its fortunes in the marketplace, hypertext is far from dead–and there may be hope, in the fulness of years, even for the marketplace, since late-stage capitalism doubtless does not mark the end of history. History is dynamic and therefore debatable–literary history in particular. The reader will have learned by now not to trust an author with a long face and a sad story about his favorite form. A hasty bill of mortality is often a transparent fraud. Consider the evidence.

     

    In This Issue

     

    This special issue on and of hypertext contains four explicitly hypertextual works and three scholarly articles in which electronic media figure as subject, mode of expression, or both.

     

    Michael Joyce’s “Twelve Blue” is a network of stories or a music in words composed of twelve parts in eight bars–all asking to be read at a certain blue depth.

     

    Two of the hypertexts are poems: Diana Slattery’s “Alphaweb” and John Cayley’s “Book Unbound.” Slattery’s work is a text-and-graphic exploration of the angelic, the demonic, and the electronic rendered onto the Web. Cayley’s work is a singular and significant representative of electronic writing outside the Web (it was created with HyperCard), and of generative, interactive “cybertext.”

     

    In the critical register there is “Through Light and the Alphabet,” Matthew Kirschenbaum’s interview with the writer, artist, and historian Johanna Drucker, the text supplemented with links to and reproductions of Drucker’s work. Loss Pequeño Glazier’s “Jumping to Occlusions” is a hypertextual essay considering the status, potential, and problems of interactive poetry. Craig Saper’s “Intimate Bureaucracies and Infrastructuralism” considers anti-institutional practices such as mail art and artists’ assemblings in relation to, among other things, the culture of the Internet.

     

    In addition this issue also includes “The Heimlich Home of Cyberspace,” a multi-authored, collaborative hypertext produced by undergraduates at Drake University. As a communal discourse, as a project from the classroom–and most important, as the work of writers about as young as the Internet itself–this text has a particular significance.

     

    Acknowledgements

     

    This issue could not have been produced without much wise and generous assistance. I am especially grateful to (and for) our Managing Editor, Sarah Parson Wells, who handled with capability and confidence the enormous technical work behind this issue. Thanks also to Mark Bernstein and Eastgate Systems for their kind cooperation in publishing “Twelve Blue.” My co-editors, Lisa Brawley, Eyal Amiran, and John Unsworth, along with Ellen Sauer at Johns Hopkins University Press, gave encouragement and counsel. Jane Yellowlees Douglas and Greg Ulmer graciously served beyond the call of their editorial board duties. Above all I wish to thank those who acted as consulting readers and advisers: Espen Aarseth, David Balcom, Carolyn Guyer, Jon Ippolito, Johndan Johnson-Eilola, Michael Joyce, Nancy Kaplan, Matthew Kirschenbaum, Catherine Marshall, Barbara Page, and Jim Rosenberg.

     

    Introductory Essay In this Issue

     

    Acknowledgements

     

    Meaning appears only at the intersection


    "Home pages" and electronic "'zines," much like assemblings, depend on making links to other sites on the Internet. Each page, even corporate pages, link to and assemble other groups' or individuals' work. The pages link according to the logic of amateur discoverers. "Here's what I found," they say. 


    He had been a coward. No one liked him. It was a life. Each morning he woke up surprised and a little disappointed that he'd made it to another goddamn day in this empty stinking valley. 

    The “forms” which will emerge won’t, I don’t think, replace print media for a long time–we’re too attached to the intimacy and convenience of portable books and magazines–but the electronic forms will and already are allowing the popular imagination to reinvent its relation to the received traditions of reading, writing, and imagining. Don’t you think?

     

    In my own experience, the Web is both useful and frustrating. A great source for information, research, and communication, it is very disorienting for me. I am attached to the spatial modes which print media offer as orientation. I despise the “scrolling screen” and the attempt to locate myself in a document by the position of the sidebar marker.

    …the point is not that everything is linked through these sequences. The constitution of any such whole could only be a misrepresentation of stability, the futile pursuit of yet another encyclopedia. The insistences of the internal orders of texts do not add stability to the text, rather they add a perplexing layer of instability; it is the “failure” of the links, whether they connect or not, that gives them their activity and it is through this activity that electronic writing departs irreversibly from the world of print.